FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 5D2023-0793 

LT Case No. 2021-DR-000407

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JAMIE HERSHBERGER, 

Appellant, 

v.

STASH HERSHBERGER, 

Appellee. 

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumter County. 

Michelle T. Morley, Judge. 

Eduardo J. Mejias, of AAA Family Law, LLC, Altamonte Springs, 

for Appellant. 

Freya L. Mclain, of Crawford, Modica & Holt, Chartered 

Attorneys at Law, Tavares, for Appellee. 

July 12, 2024

WALLIS, J. 

Jamie Hershberger (“Appellant”) appeals a Final Judgment 

of Dissolution of Marriage alleging that five errors were committed 

by the trial judge. We affirm the decisions by the trial court with 

regard to four of the alleged errors without comment. We reverse 

the trial court’s decision to delegate to Stash Hershberger 
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(“Appellee”), and others, the responsibility to determine additional 

timesharing for Appellant. 

Appellant argues that the trial court improperly delegated 

decision-making over the amount of present and future 

timesharing to others. She highlights the court’s orders that “[t]he 

Father has the discretion to facilitate additional time-sharing 

between the children and their Mother, anywhere up to 50/50 timesharing, at the children’s request,” and that Appellant participate 

in reunification therapy with the children “until the reunification 

counselor recommends overnight time-sharing.”1 

Florida law is clear that the delegation of judicial authority 

to decide timesharing to any person is error, whether that person 

is an arbitrator, another parent, a child, or an expert. See, e.g., 

Lovell v. Lovell, 14 So. 3d 1111, 1114 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) “([T]he 

trial court cannot delegate its authority to another person to rule 

on the visitation details.”); McCallister v. Shaver, 633 So. 2d 494, 

496 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (en banc) (reversing denial of modification 

request for visitation by non-custodial parent; although final 

judgment incorporated parties’ agreement that gave wife sole 

parental responsibility and was silent as to husband’s visitation, 

trial court was not bound by agreement and should have addressed 

husband’s right to visitation in modification proceeding). 

Additionally, section 61.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2022), states, 

“[[t]he court shall determine all matters relating to parenting and 

time-sharing of each minor child of the parties in accordance with 

the best interests of the child.” Delegating this responsibility to 

the Appellee violates the plain language of this statute. 

We are not persuaded by Appellee’s argument that the 

delegation in this case is not in error because the trial court 

established a baseline timesharing schedule. Caselaw applies the 

general rule to partial delegations as well. See Allyn v. Allyn, 351 

So. 3d 1228, 1229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (affirming modification order 

1 Appellant does not challenge one additional delegation, in 

which the court stated that “[f]or a period of 9 months following 

entry of this Final Judgment, Wife's parenting time may occur by 

phone at the children's discretion.” 
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that reduced mother’s overall amount of timesharing and 

eliminated overnight timesharing, except portion ordering parents 

to defer to therapist about expanding timesharing in summer); 

Subramanian v. Subramanian, 239 So. 3d 719, 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2018) (holding trial court did not abuse discretion by conditioning 

increased timesharing on successful completion of parenting 

courses and therapy, but erred by delegating authority to 

determine additional visitation to therapists and guardian ad 

litem); Witt-Bahls v. Bahls, 203 So. 3d 207, 209 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2016) (reversing order delegating decision to grant unsupervised 

visitation to child’s therapist); Clark v. Clark, 35 So. 3d 989, 990 

n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (holding trial court’s directive that if minor

child desired to spend more time (or less time) with former wife,

then child shall be allowed to do so “improperly places decisions

with regard to visitation in the hands of the child”); Lovell, 14 So.

3d at 1114 (reversing portion of order prohibiting former husband

from exposing children to his new wife “until such time as the

children’s therapist . . . deems it appropriate”); cf. Lewis v. Lewis,

665 So. 2d 322, 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (holding timesharing

schedule awarding husband visitation every other weekend,

telephone contact during the week, and half of every summer, was

reasonable, thus the “mere fact that the trial court, in addition to

the reasonable court-ordered visitation, made allowances for the

parties to agree to additional visitation times does not place

visitation under the wife's control”). But see cf. In re H.T., 204 So.

3d 120, 121 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (stating guardianship order that

awarded parent one hour per week of supervised visitation, with

additional supervised and unsupervised visitation at guardian’s

discretion, comported with section 39.6221(2)(c) because it did not

leave frequency and nature of parent’s visitation to guardian’s

“complete discretion”).

We reverse the Final Judgment and Timesharing Plan to the 

extent it delegates the decision regarding additional timesharing 

to others and remand with instructions for the court to make these 

decisions. 

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED with 

instructions. 
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BOATWRIGHT and MACIVER, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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