IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

Hosted by

The United States Army

Co-Sponsored by

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.

The International Security Studies Program of 

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment

General Editors

Christopher E. Hornbarger, Captain, U.S. Army

David W. Kearn, Jr., Research Associate, 

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

November 15-16, 2000

Crystal Gateway Marriott

1700 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, VA

Final Report

IFPA-Fletcher Conference 2000 
The material presented is based upon work supported by the US Army War College 

under contract no. DABT43-00-P-1111. Any opinions, fi ndings, and conclusions or 

recommendations expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily 

refl ect the views of the US Army War College. 

Photographs by Guy Noffsinger 

Design by Christian Hoffman
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

Introduction v

Areas of General Consensus vii

Introductory Remarks 1

The Honorable Louis A. Caldera, Secretary of the Army

Transforming National Defense 4

Prioritizing the Security Agenda 

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)

The National Interest 10

What is Driving our National Security Strategy and What Should?

Representative Ellen O. Tauscher (D-CA)

The Honorable Richard L. Armitage

Dr. Graham T. Allison

Globalization and National Security 18

Mr. Tom Friedman

Emerging Threats 23

Implications for Defense Strategy 

Dr. Michael E. O’Hanlon

Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III, USA

Mr. Michael Vatis

contents
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contents

Coalitions and Alliances 34

The Future of Military Engagement 

General Klaus Naumann (Ret.)

General Montgomery Meigs, USA

Lieutenant General Peter Cosgrove, AC, MC

Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall 

Service Contributions to 47

National Security Strategy and Capabilities 

General Eric K. Shinseki, USA

Admiral Vernon E. Clark, USN

General James L. Jones, USMC

General Michael E. Ryan, USAF

The National Military Strategy and Joint Vision 2020 58

General Henry H. Shelton, USA

Essential Military Capabilities for a Changing World 63

Admiral Hal Gehman, USN (Ret.)

General Charles T. Robertson, USAF

General Tommy R. Franks, USA

General Peter Pace, USMC

General Charles R. Holland, USAF

Setting Priorities for a New National Security Strategy 77

Dr. Condoleezza Rice

Developing Defense Strategy for a Changing World 82

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.)

Implementing Needed Change 87

Reforms to Structure and Process

Dr. John P. White

Admiral William A. Owens, USN (Ret.)

General Wesley K. Clark, USA (Ret.)

Concluding Remarks 97

The Honorable Rudy de Leon

Biographies 100
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

A high-level, two-day conference entitled National Strategies and 

Capabilities for a Changing World was held in Arlington, Virginia, 

on November 15-16, 2000. The purpose of the conference – hosted 

by the U.S. Army – was to examine critical security issues facing 

the new administration. The conference objectives were to understand more fully the challenges of the early twenty-fi rst century; to 

consider the implications of these challenges for national security 

strategy; and to address the national and military capabilities needed 

to execute that strategy.

The conference drew more than 450 participants from academia, industry, the think-tank community, the media, and the U.S. 

government – including the Departments of Defense and State, the 

military services, the National Security Council, and Congress. In 

an effort to stimulate the exchange of diverse views among attendees, an impressive gathering of distinguished speakers addressed the 

participants on various topics that included:

 The national interest

Globalization and national security 

 Emerging threats and implications for defense strategy 

 Coalitions and alliances and the future of military 

engagement

introduction
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

 Service contributions to national security strategy and 

capabilities

 Transforming the national defense

The conference was co-sponsored by the Institute for Foreign 

Policy Analysis (IFPA) and the International Security Studies 

Program of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, together with the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense for Net 

Assessment.

The report that follows provides a summary of key points from 

conference proceedings and an analysis of panel presentations and 

discussions. For more complete information, you may wish to refer 

to the transcript of each speaker’s presentation, which is posted on 

the IFPA web site (www.ifpa.org). 

introduction
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Despite a wide range of views articulated by participants during the 

two-day conference and summarized in this report, a number of 

common themes or areas of consensus were evident. Following are 

the key conclusions reached. 

1 A national discourse on America’s role in the world is necessary.

Much of the diffi culty associated with developing a national 

security strategy stems from the absence of a clear sense of 

where America sees itself in the world. A decade after the 

Cold War, we have yet to articulate clearly America’s role 

and obligations in a world of change. Without greater consensus on foreign affairs, it is diffi cult to determine appropriate 

uses of military force, levels of defense spending, or military 

capabilities. Further, coherent national security and military 

strategies depend on political leadership. Finally, without political support, it will be diffi cult to implement the needed but 

sometimes diffi cult reforms that are crucial to preparing the 

Department of Defense (DoD) and the uniformed services for 

the new century.

Although a majority of conference participants identifi ed a need for such a national discourse, some suggested that 

there is little divergence of views among foreign policy elites of 

areas of general 

consensus
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either party regarding the necessity for U.S. engagement and 

leadership. 

Isolationism is not an option. Fundamental to peace, 

maintaining prosperity and stability has been and will remain 

the active role of the United States. While it may be more 

diffi cult to make the case to the American people for active 

overseas U.S. engagement given no Cold War-type threat, there 

is a direct link between America’s strength and the stable global 

environment America requires to prosper. However, a global 

U.S. role can only be sustained within the context of a robust 

overall foreign policy in which the employment of the military 

is but one of a number of available options.

While no conference speaker advocated U.S. retrenchment, the speakers did not agree on the nature of America’s 

global role, particularly as it pertains to the use of military 

force. Some asserted the need for a more activist leadership 

role while others seemed inclined to allow allies to take a 

greater share of regional burdens. This tension among panelists 

mirrors that of the public at large and must be addressed.

2 The administration has the opportunity to address tough security 

issues. Rather than a comprehensive program review, the next 

QDR should be a truly strategic review that establishes a 

vision, sets priorities, and helps resolve the biggest strategy 

and program issues. The QDR must set forth the requirements 

and capabilities for all current and anticipated missions, not 

just preparedness for major theater wars (MTWs). DoD should 

broaden its planning scenarios beyond two MTWs to include 

a wider range of potential threats, objectives, conditions, and 

operational concepts. It is clear that the debate must continue 

on this crucial issue; its resolution will go a long way toward 

setting the framework for future personnel, procurement, and 

funding requirements. 

3 Strategists must identify and prepare for emerging threats and 

potential vulnerabilities. While the threat of major conventional 

land war appears to have greatly declined for now, continued 

U.S. global interests and responsibilities demand a military 

capable of a broad range of activities from engagement to warfareas of consensus
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ighting. The real challenge is identifying and understanding 

threats to our interests and developing comprehensive strategies and capabilities for deterring and, if necessary, responding 

to diverse threats when our interests demand it. Several threats 

were identifi ed as a basis for these national security priorities:

 3a Homeland security must be a national priority. The increased 

prospect of a conventional or weapons-of-mass-destruction 

(WMD) attack on the American homeland places an added 

burden on the national security apparatus. First and foremost, it requires the promulgation of clear directives that 

establish both the responsibilities and authority essential to 

any prevention efforts or effective response. It will also require 

robust contingency planning involving organizations not typically associated with national defense. Entities such as the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), along with state and local 

law enforcement, emergency, and health organizations, must 

be essential parts of any comprehensive approach to homeland 

security. Finally, while our ultimate goal is deterrence or prevention of attacks, we must earmark and disperse adequate 

funds for providing effective response capabilities. 

 3b Missile defense is a reasonable response to a real threat. In 

addition to the proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical 

weapons, the technology to deliver such weapons has greatly 

improved and increased the possibility of their use. While it 

is important that the United States make clear to those who 

might employ these weapons that our response will be decisive, unequivocal, and lethal, beyond a credible deterrence 

posture, policy makers must prepare for a deterrence failure. 

This preparation includes increasing resources for intelligence 

areas of consensus

left to right: General Eric 

Shinseki, USA; Admiral Vernon 

Clark, USN; Dr. Robert 

Pfaltzgraff; General James 

Jones, USMC; and General 

Michael Ryan
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

gathering and interdiction capabilities, and the development of 

technologies such as missile defense, including missile defense 

for friends and allies as well as for the United States itself.

In addition to the threat against the U.S. homeland and 

our friends and allies, the threat or actual use of missiles, particularly those carrying WMD, against forward bases could 

damage the U.S. ability to project power. Once power is projected, there is an even more critical need to protect those 

forces with land- and sea-based missile defense systems. As 

the United States becomes vulnerable to ballistic missile attack 

from states in regions of importance, the ability, and perhaps 

the willingness, of the United States to respond to crises may 

be diminished. These threats demand support for research and 

development on missile defense technology. 

 3c The cyber warfare threat requires immediate and close attention. There can be little question that the computers and 

networks that serve as the backbone of U.S. and global 

fi nancial markets present lucrative targets. Similarly, as the 

armed services continue to integrate information systems and 

capabilities to achieve battlespace dominance, the enabling 

technologies will become increasingly attractive targets. Public 

and private sector leaders must work together to safeguard the 

technologies integral to American prosperity and security. We 

must develop coordinated responses to potential attacks on 

existing systems, and work to minimize or eliminate potential 

vulnerabilities in new technologies. 

 3d The boldness of adversaries and their willingness to attack U.S. 

and coalition assets around the world make force protection 

a pressing concern. However, most commanders need additional resources to provide adequate protection to forward base 

positions. The bombing attacks against the U.S. facility at the 

Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and the USS Cole in Yemen, 

together with reports of plots by terrorists against other U.S. 

assets, make force protection a continuing near-term priority. 

Protection of forward bases remains crucial to the U.S. ability 

to move forces quickly to crisis settings. 

areas of consensus
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

4 It is critical that the United States maintain strong, fl exible, and 

full-spectrum military capabilities. Even in the absence of a 

single global rival, and with increased concern about asymmetric or nontraditional attacks on U.S. interests, the United 

States continues to face conventional threats around the world. 

American power must deter, and if deterrence fails, defeat 

challenges to U.S. security across the full range of military 

operations. A number of scenarios might require a U.S. military 

response. Currently, U.S. military power is globally preeminent, 

but the United States faces important military readiness and 

transformation needs if it is to maintain adequate military 

capabilities. 

5 There has been a strategy-capability mismatch, which has created 

a heavy and unsustainable burden on the armed services. To 

address this mismatch, there are four logical alternatives: (1) 

increase defense resources; (2) change our strategy to reduce 

the demands on the force; (3) adopt a very different way 

of meeting future challenges by transforming the military; 

and/or (4) adjust the level of acceptable risk in the near, 

medium, or long term.

Although the four alternatives are evident, conference 

participants did not reach a clear consensus about which 

of these alternatives is best. While a majority seemed predisposed to increase defense funding, a number of others 

stressed reduced demands, transformation, or a combination 

of approaches. An approach that merely reduces requirements 

is unlikely in itself to resolve the strategy-capabilities mismatch. 

6 Consequently, defense budgets will need to be increased over the near 

term. Even if essential reforms are made within the DoD and 

throughout the services, defense spending will need to increase 

in the years ahead. Given the spectrum of emerging threats and 

the day-to-day readiness requirements facing the services, a 

signifi cant infusion of funds will be required to address pressing 

needs. Developing robust means to respond to threats of terrorist or missile attack against the U.S. homeland, cyber warfare, 

and other changes in the operational environment will require 

areas of consensus
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

investment in research and development (R&D) of new capabilities. It is diffi cult to foresee how this R&D commitment 

will not place major pressure on existing and future procurement and modernization budgets for traditional service needs. 

Reconciling funding needs for a wide array of programs will be 

a daunting challenge for defense policy makers in the future.

Given a tight fi scal environment, additional efforts 

should be made to eliminate excess capacity and unnecessary 

redundancies. The secretary of defense should proceed with a 

new list of recommended base closures, while Congress should 

move forward with new legislation for a long-term, effective 

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) program. Current 

weapons systems deemed inadequate for the future operational 

environment and requirements across the full range of military 

missions should be halted. Congress must approach national 

security matters in a bipartisan manner to debate and resolve 

the diffi cult choices that lie ahead.

7 The debate over national military strategy is inevitably shaped by 

resource constraints. Nevertheless, it is important to consider 

the requirements for national security as a basis for determining the appropriate allocation of resources. Such an approach 

can help sensitize leaders to the effect of resource constraints 

on national military strategy and the risks that such constraints create. While threats should not be overplayed in 

order to attract resources for specifi c programs, neither should 

threats be downplayed because of a perception that adequate 

resources for addressing them may not materialize. The reality 

of budget limitations should drive civilian and military leaders 

to articulate as clearly as possible their needs and to work to 

build public support for various commitments that fl ow from 

an agreed national military strategy.

8 Alliances and coalitions should play an increasingly important 

role in responding to crises. While the United States currently 

possesses unparalleled military muscle, it should seldom act 

alone. Except perhaps in defense of fundamental national 

interests, most U.S. military operations in the future should 

be conducted as part of a multinational coalition or within an 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

alliance framework such as NATO. Coalition operations may 

lend greater legitimacy to a military operation. They have the 

practical benefi t of burden sharing, which is important particularly in cases where critical U.S. interests are not directly at 

stake. The increasingly transnational nature of threats (such as 

terrorism, weapons proliferation, or drug traffi cking) requires 

greater cooperation and coordination between countries to 

develop effective responses. Given potentially divergent interests even among allies, however, as well as limitations in their 

capabilities, the United States must retain the means to act 

alone where necessary in support of its most important interests. The United States must have a realistic estimate of the 

resources allies and coalition partners can provide, as well as 

their willingness to provide them. 

9 The services should continue to develop capabilities and concepts in 

accordance with Joint Vision 2020. Individual service transformations should be guided by their respective contributions to 

a transformed joint force. Moving beyond service traditions 

and cultures to build a more joint force requires political leadership and initiative within and among the services. While 

progress has been made, Kosovo revealed continuing defi ciencies in the jointness of U.S. forces. For example, critical support 

elements such as intelligence, communications, and logistics 

need to become more integrated. Most importantly, Joint Forces 

Command should be strengthened to become a true joint force 

integrator engaged in continuous exercises and experiments 

while mindful of each service’s core competencies.

10 A critical component of Joint Vision 2020, U.S. strategic mobility, 

may be in jeopardy. The United States needs to retain overseas 

bases in key regions in order to gain maximum mobility. At the 

same time, we will require the means to move both U.S.-based 

and forward-stationed assets quickly. This will require a strong 

transport fl eet. Procurement of transport platforms is often 

lost in the discussion over new weapons systems. Investment in 

transport capabilities is crucially important if the United States 

is to project joint capabilities in support of global interests and 

responsibilities. 

areas of consensus
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11 One of the greatest challenges facing the military is transforming 

the force, while remaining ready today to fi ght and win wars 

and execute other required missions. There are justifi able concerns about the added risks that transforming the military 

to address long-term threats may have on short-term readiness. The concern goes beyond just training and addresses risk 

associated with sustaining current equipment until new technologies pay off, if they eventually do. To the extent that a 

decision was made in the 1990s to skip over a generation of 

weapons systems, it is important that the risk in the interim 

period be adequately addressed and minimized as we search 

for high-payoff, leap-ahead technologies. 

12 Despite important changes in the strategic and operational 

environments, the essence of confl ict and war has not changed, 

making land forces an indispensable part of the joint force for 

the full range of twenty-fi rst century operations. Armed confl ict 

and war are ultimately contests of human will, and in the 

future, as in the past, will be waged in the competition for 

power and control over people, land, and natural resources. 

Adversaries will be adaptive and resolute. Land power, as 

part of a joint force, offers the greatest opportunity for 

addressing the human dimension of confl ict and bringing 

lasting resolution to complex problems. Land forces, by 

their very presence, communicate the strongest signal of 

strategic intent and are essential to cementing coalitions and 

enabling interagency actors. Adaptive land forces maximize 

the effectiveness of the other services, conduct missions under 

all conditions across the full range of military operations, 

and offer a response to problems for which there are no 

technological solutions. 

areas of consensus
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

 SUMMARY 

Among the instruments of national power, the next president must prioritize those that best contribute to our interests: tools that prevent wars 

as well as win them.

Our greatest strength lies not in military might, but in our 

principles and ideals. Applied in the international context, 

those principles and ideals include humanitarian, peacekeeping, other stability and support operations, and bilateral 

military ties.

 Thus, the tools that best enable us to prevent wars, in addition to those that ensure that we can fi ght and win wars, are 

essential to national security. This includes not only deterrence, but the proactive, people-to-people interventions that 

the Army regularly performs.

In the current era, these people-to-people interventions, coupled 

with economic and diplomatic efforts and backed by preeminent warfi ghting capabilities, are the key to our security.

To set effective priorities, the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

should be a comprehensive review, not a budget drill.

The QDR should examine four questions: (1) What short- and 

long-term threats confront the United States? (2) What preopening address

The Honorable Louis A. Caldera

Secretary of the Army
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

ventive measures or capabilities are needed to deter or respond 

to those threats? (3) What is the right force structure for those 

capabilities? (4) What resources are necessary to establish and 

sustain that force structure? 

 The QDR must capture the requirements and capabilities 

demanded by all of our current and anticipated missions, not 

just preparedness for major theater wars. Otherwise, it will perpetuate the present mismatch between strategy and resources, 

and balance the books on the backs of our troops.

 Resolving this strategy-resource mismatch will also require 

greater joint integration to eliminate ineffi ciencies and redundant capabilities.

The Army’s role is indispensable.

Army forces are critical to achieving quick, decisive, and lasting 

victory. The claim that a national aversion to casualties makes 

ground wars an anachronism is dangerous and false. Americans understand and support the risk of sacrifi ce if it is in our 

nation’s interest and properly and honestly explained.

 The Army is the most relevant force for shaping the 

international environment and preventing war through 

people-to-people interventions. It is the nation’s premier 

engagement force, and its principal operations-other-than-war 

force. 

 The Army is too small to do all that it is currently required to 

do. 

 The Army is just as capital intensive as the Navy and the Air 

Force, and needs comparable modernization resources (two to 

three times more than are currently allocated).

 ANALYSIS 

Secretary Caldera set the stage for the conference by raising several 

long-standing challenges to U.S. national security, particularly 

the perennially diffi cult problem of setting defense spending priorities among competing claims for resources. With an increasingly 

complex security environment and a change in administrations, 

opening address
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

Secretary Caldera stated that it is both an appropriate and opportune 

time to address these issues. 

Considering the upcoming QDR, the secretary asserted that the 

Army is not only strategically indispensable, but that it is too small 

for its current missions, and receives too small a share of the Defense 

Department’s modernization resources. While the Army’s leadership 

has been calling for additional modernization funding for years, only 

recently have they asserted that the Army’s current force structure 

of 480,000 active duty soldiers is insuffi cient. Leading into the next 

QDR, both of these issues will certainly be of central importance. 

While it is unsurprising that Secretary Caldera used his remarks 

to advocate for the service he leads, others in the conference echoed 

several of his main claims. Most notably, Admiral Owens, former 

vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreed that the Army 

is the “most relevant service and needs more money.” What is 

unclear going into the next administration is how this assertion 

will square with Secretary Caldera’s call to eliminate ineffi ciencies 

and redundancies among the military services. Critics of the Army’s 

transformation initiative, which seeks to convert the heavy, Cold 

War Army into a more mobile and responsive force, have questioned 

whether the Marines would be better suited to handle the missions 

this transformed force is intended to perform. 

opening address
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

 SUMMARY 

America’s interests have not changed, but the threats have.

 Our strategic objectives have remained constant: the survival 

of a free United States, its values and institutions intact, with 

a prospering economy and healthy alliance relationships, in a 

stable world made more secure by the growth of democratic 

institutions and free market economies linked by a fair and 

open international trading system. 

The threats to the United States have changed. Those for which 

we are best prepared are the least likely, including MTWs. 

Those for which we are least prepared are the most likely, 

including asymmetric attacks that potentially involve WMD, 

and terrorism. 

The United States should focus more on the most likely threats and less 

on the least likely, and therefore abandon the two-MTW construct.

 We should focus on preventing terrorist attacks using WMD, 

which may be more likely than a missile attack against the 

United States.

 We should expose extremist leaders who use religion as a tool 

of hate, perhaps convincing leaders of all religious faiths to join 

Transforming 

National Defense

Prioritizing the Security Agenda

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)

Ranking Minority Member, 

Senate Armed Services Committee

 keynote address
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

in the condemnation of terrorism. The United States should 

also make greater use of “red teams,” including foreign-born 

personnel, to help us better understand the thinking of other 

cultures.

• We should improve our intelligence-collection capabilities, particularly against terrorists.

• We should abandon the two-MTW construct and instead 

structure our forces for one MTW plus one or two small-scale 

contingencies (SSCs).

The United States should improve its ability, in concert with allies, to 

conduct peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations.

We should encourage our allies to take the lead in peace operations.

We should encourage the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO.

We should continue efforts such as the African Crisis Response 

Initiative (ACRI), and encourage African nations to develop a 

NATO-like regional defense capability.

keynote address

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

We should take steps to identify and minimize aspects of peace 

operations that have an adverse effect on our forces, such as 

initiatives to train civilian police volunteers.

Reverse the U.S. move away from multilateralism.

 Our allies have placed greater emphasis on multilateral organizations and international treaties. We have tended in the 

opposite direction by failing to ratify the Comprehensive Test 

Ban Treaty, refusing to pay UN dues, considering the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and unilaterally 

imposing economic sanctions.

 We should be more sensitive to the perceptions of friends and 

allies, which will require a great deal of thought and bipartisan 

support.

Improve Congress’s role in national security.

 Congress must approach national security issues on a 

bipartisan basis, overcoming the urge to score partisan points 

and to protect interests in members’ own states and districts 

at the expense of more important national security interests. 

The stalling of the BRAC process and the addition of unneeded 

items to the defense budget are examples of actions taken in 

Congress that thwart bipartisanship.

 Presidential leadership is central to achieving this bipartisan 

approach.

Congress should replace the unworkable War Powers Act. New 

legislation should provide, at the request of 20 percent of the 

members, a guaranteed vote on whether to fund U.S. forces 

already deployed into hostilities or whose deployment is imminent. If funding were cut off, a reasonable period of time would 

be allowed for U.S. forces to withdraw.

keynote address
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

 ANALYSIS 

Most signifi cant was Senator Levin’s fundamental assertion that our 

current security strategy is out of balance – weighted too heavily 

toward the least likely threats. Based on this assertion, Senator Levin 

made two proposals. First, abandon our “strategy” of being able to 

fi ght two MTWs nearly simultaneously and restructure our military 

forces for a single MTW and one or two SSCs. Second, improve our 

abilities to conduct peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations.

Perhaps most controversial was Senator Levin’s call to abandon 

the two-MTW construct. While other conference participants, 

such as General Wesley Clark (Ret.) and Michèle Flournoy, 

rejected this construct as an inadequate basis for national strategy, none actually said that we no longer need the capability to 

fi ght two MTWs, deferring that question to the QDR or another 

comprehensive strategic review. All of the conference’s uniformed 

participants supported a two-MTW capability, either because the 

threat warrants it, or perhaps as a justifi cation for preserving force 

structure.

Senator Levin’s unambiguous rejection of a two-MTW capability raises several important questions. First, by maintaining the 

force structure for two wars, we may have deterred those who might 

use a major U.S. military commitment as their strategic opportunity. Abandoning the capability to fi ght two wars may arguably 

increase the likelihood of having to do so, while the costs and consequences of a major war are much more signifi cant than one or 

two SSCs. Conversely, if we adopt a strategy that commits resources 

based more on the likelihood of a threat as opposed to its potential 

severity, we may risk playing into the hands of adversaries who use 

asymmetric threats principally as a means to dissipate our strength 

and focus.

It is impossible to know the answers to these questions with certainty, and Senator Levin’s appraisal of the proper balance between 

the likelihood and potential severity of the threats we face may 

indeed be the most prudent. It is important to note that, unlike 

many other critics of the two-MTW capability, Senator Levin’s 

stated goal is not to cut costs (a rebalanced strategy may in fact 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

cost more), but to ensure a more effective and relevant defense. In 

this regard, Senator Levin expressed strong support for the Army’s 

transformation effort, which he felt would produce a more strategically relevant force, even though it entails a signifi cant resource 

investment. 

According to Senator Levin, a symptom of our strategy’s overemphasis on MTWs is the frequent claim that peace operations erode 

our warfi ghting readiness. In his opinion, peace operations are not 

a distraction from our strategy – they are an integral part of it (or 

rather, they should be). Though Senator Levin proposed improving 

our ability to conduct peace operations, his specifi c recommendations were aimed at reducing their impact on our military forces. 

His view that the United States should encourage allies and partners 

to take on a larger share of these missions, including the lead role, 

echoed the recommendations made by Lieutenant General Peter 

Cosgrove and Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall later in the conference. However, Senator Levin stopped short of advocating specialized 

peacekeeping or constabulary forces, instead praising efforts by the 

Departments of State and Justice to train civilian police volunteers 

to perform these functions. 

Senator Levin’s third signifi cant proposal was to replace 

the ineffective War Powers Act with legislation that actually 

achieves what the act intended: to prevent the president from 

committing U.S. military forces to hostilities without the advice 

and consent of Congress. Senator Levin proposed a means to 

increase congressional accountability in the national security 

process, to make it more diffi cult for Congress to snipe at 

deployments without opposing them outright. By requiring a vote 

on whether to fund military deployments, the new legislation 

would force senators and representatives to take a clear position. 

It is important to note that this approach would also apparently 

strengthen Congress’s hand in challenging the president’s executive 

power to commit American military force when he sees fi t, 

a prerogative every modern president has exercised with little 

legislative constraint. Without an event to serve as a catalyst, the 

prospects for the success of such a reform are unclear.

On the subject of Congress’s role in national security, Senator 

Levin’s call for greater bipartisanship and a less parochial approach 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

to the defense budget signals at least the possibility that additional 

rounds of BRAC, widely recognized as necessary, may actually 

succeed in the 107th Congress.

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 MODERATOR 

General John Galvin, USA (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Dean Emeritus, The Fletcher School of Law and 

Diplomacy, Tufts University

 PANEL MEMBERS 

Representative Ellen O. Tauscher (D-CA), House Armed Services 

Committee 

Ambassador Richard Armitage, President, Armitage Associates 

L.C.; Former U.S. Envoy and Department of Defense Offi cial

Dr. Graham T. Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, 

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

 PANEL CHARTER 

It is a widely accepted principle that a well-defi ned conception of the 

national interest should serve as the foundation of American foreign 

policy and national security strategy. Such a foundation establishes 

priorities, clarifi es foreign policy and security choices, and ensures 

that decisions are made in the context of a coherent, long-term stratpanel one

The National Interest 

What is Driving Our National 

Security Strategy & What Should?
11

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

egy. However, there has long been disagreement about how to apply 

this principle in practice. In the current security environment, in 

which the United States enjoys an unprecedented level of prosperity 

and relative national power, the debate on this question has sharpened. 

What are the enduring national interests of the United States? 

Are “vital interests,” defi ned by some as the survival and well-being 

of America and her allies, the only appropriate yardstick for the 

commitment of national power? What other factors should inform 

decisions to commit such power: the management of national 

credibility and capability, humanitarian or ethical imperatives, the 

chances for success, the possibility of casualties or long-term involvement, the degree of popular support, the infl uence of the media, 

the roles of allies and partners? Which regions are most important 

to American national interests? Is it possible, or even useful, to 

develop a single doctrine that directs the use of diplomatic, military, 

economic, and other instruments of national power in given situations? How should the answers to these questions be captured in 

the QDR, and distilled into a national security strategy that provides 

clear guidance for the day-to-day and year-to-year management of 

America’s national security?

 DISCUSSION POINTS 

Prioritizing U.S national interests in a period of complexity 

and uncertainty – is long-term coherence even possible?

A future, clarifying concept: from containment to engagement 

to what?

Russia, China, India: future partners or strategic competitors?

The need for bipartisan consensus and popular support in 

foreign policy.

The information age: the instant visibility of crises and threats 

versus their relationship to interests.

Managing the risks of an assertive foreign policy: anti-U.S. 

backlash? Great-power rivalry?

panel one
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

Maintaining U.S. leadership and fl exibility: unilateral and multilateral action; burden sharing; the role of the United Nations, 

NATO, and other international institutions.

Force, or the credible threat of force, as a signal of national 

commitment.

Managing the use of force: missions, objectives, constraints, 

exit strategies.

Implications for defense strategy: alternatives to “shape, 

respond, prepare?” Alternatives to the two-MTW construct?

The need to maintain a superior military capability.

 SUMMARY 

Representative Ellen O. Tauscher

The United States must construct a foreign policy that refl ects the success 

of the last century and the environment of the next.

The United States should pursue “a foreign policy based on 

doing what is right, in addition to doing what is necessary.”

Thus, three distinct principles should guide U.S. foreign policy: 

(1) strong alliances and a commitment to economic security; 

(2) a credible reputation as a global force of benefi cence; and 

(3) a reliable, state-of-the-art military.

The United States should strengthen and expand its alliances and take 

action to ensure global economic security. 

Alliances facilitate acceptance of international standards, 

allow for burden sharing among members, and allow forwarddeployment of U.S. military force.

panel one

left to right: Dean Emeritus 

Dr. John Galvin with Dr. Robert 

Pfaltzgraff, Jr.; Congresswoman 

Ellen Tauscher; Ambassador 

Richard Armitage; and Dr. 

Graham Allison
13

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

The United States should seek to enlarge NATO, strengthen 

similar alliances in Asia, and work to reform international 

organizations to bring smaller nations into the fold.

A deep commitment to global economic security should govern 

U.S. strategic alliances. U.S. prestige rests on our willingness to 

help Asian governments overcome the effects of the 1997 Asian 

economic crisis, and to prevent a similar crisis from occurring 

in other developing regions.

The United States should maintain a credible reputation based on global 

benefi cence instead of self-preservation.

The United States loses credibility when it tolerates genocide or 

allows confl ict to go unanswered. This indicates the need for 

proactive involvement in areas traditionally regarded as outside 

of our national interests.

The United States should assist African nations in dealing 

with the AIDS epidemic by restructuring or erasing their debt, 

assisting with basic needs, and improving their civil and governmental institutions.

Bringing nations to a sustainable standard of living will 

increase their ability to participate in the world community 

and increase global access to natural resources.

The U.S. military should remain the best in the world, but it must restructure: less emphasis on major theater wars, more on peace operations and 

new threats.

The maintenance of a dominant military is critical to continued U.S. leadership.

The United States must re-calibrate its force to “do it all:” conventional warfi ghting, greater deployability for lower intensity 

confl icts, and countering new threats such as entrepreneurial 

terrorism and cyber warfare.

The Department of Defense must increase investment in 

research and development. 

The two-MTW concept is unrealistic. The next QDR should 

emphasize the capability to fi ght one MTW and simultaneously 

respond to a short-term crisis.

panel one
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

Ambassador Richard Armitage

U.S. strategy should rest on a clear statement of purpose: to preserve U.S. 

preeminence as a force for good – powerful but not arrogant.

National security strategy should be based on the realist principle that international politics is a struggle for power – for the 

United States, a struggle to remain the dominant power.

Four principles should guide our strategy: (1) there is an absolute need for U.S. leadership; (2) there is no dividing line 

between domestic and foreign policy; (3) the military is not 

the national instrument of fi rst recourse; (4) the United States 

must organize to conduct foreign and security policy in the 

twenty-fi rst century.

There is an absolute need for U.S. leadership in the world.

Not engaging in the international arena is every bit as irresponsible as indiscriminate intervention. The United States can 

use its national power wisely and well, or foolishly and badly.

The United States will be called upon in emergencies, but it 

has many tools other than military force – economic, political, 

international fi nancial institutions – with which to respond.

There is no dividing line between foreign and domestic policy.

The standards we exhibit domestically – in education, culture, 

and individual initiative and responsibility – send an important message to the world about U.S. values.

The military is not the national instrument of fi rst recourse.

Too often, military force is used to get out of crises created by 

weak-kneed diplomacy. Before committing force, we should recognize that half-measures won’t work in the absence of peace, 

and we should decide who will rule once peace is made.

The prerequisites for committing force are a clear national 

strategy and a coherent military mission.

The U.S. government must organize to conduct foreign and security policy 

in the twenty-fi rst century.

 The Departments of State and Defense are monumentally 

mismanaged. We must move away from “single-issue policy 

mavens” and towards a simpler way of developing strategy and 

policy. 

panel one
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

Dr. Graham T. Allison

The only foundation for sustainable American foreign policy is a clear 

sense of American national interests.

Dr. Allison’s remarks were drawn from his recent work as one 

of two lead authors of the report “America’s National Interests: 

A Report from The Commission on America’s National Interests,” published in July 2000. 

To make the crucial distinctions necessary to guide policy, 

interests should be ordered hierarchically: vital, extremely 

important, important, and secondary.

The United States has only fi ve vital national interests in the decade 

ahead:

To prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, 

and chemical (NBC) weapon attacks on the United States or 

its military forces abroad.

To ensure U.S. allies’ survival and their active cooperation with 

the United States in shaping an international system in which 

we can thrive.

To prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed 

states on U.S. borders.

Ensure the viability and stability of major global systems: trade, 

fi nancial markets, supplies energy, and the environment.

To establish productive relations, consistent with American 

national interests, with nations that could become strategic 

adversaries, specifi cally China and Russia.

How do national interests relate to national security strategy?

First, interests exist independently of threats to those interests. 

National security strategy should safeguard our most vital and 

important interests, looking beyond the immediate threats and 

allocating resources and assets accordingly. Such an approach 

aids not only in evaluating threats, but also in seizing opportunities.

Second, the clear delineation of interests aids in the complex 

task of evaluating national security in both the short and long 

term.

panel one
16

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

Third, a disciplined conceptual framework of interests informs 

the analysis of complex policy choices – threats and opportunities, options for action, costs and benefi ts of these actions, and 

capacities for implementation.

How do national interests relate to the debate on America’s role in the 

world?

An interest-based approach to foreign policy does not settle 

policy debates, but informs and disciplines the discussions. 

The United States is strong enough to use national power, 

including military force, for purposes that do not affect 

our vital interests in the short – or even intermediate-term. 

Whether to do so deserves to be a central part of the debate 

about American foreign policy going forward.

 ANALYSIS 

The prepared remarks of the speakers revealed the traditional and 

healthy tension in American foreign policy between idealism and 

realism: on one hand, Representative Tauscher espoused a foreign 

policy of global benefi cence; on the other, Ambassador Armitage 

asserted that the purpose of U.S. security and foreign policy should 

be to preserve American preeminence. However, while there was 

certainly a theoretical tension between these two positions, much of 

their follow-up commentary during the question and answer period 

actually seemed to articulate similar concerns. When asked by the 

audience for specifi cs, the panelists displayed a surprising degree of 

harmony. 

The idealist-realist tension between the fi rst two speakers was 

more refl ective of two different approaches to a shared goal: ensuring 

continued American international leadership as a force for good. All 

of the speakers stressed the need for continued and vigorous American engagement in the world. All agreed on the necessity of a strong 

military and a robust foreign policy apparatus capable of carrying 

out the day-to-day substance of that engagement. While none supported relegating the U.S. military to the role of global police force, 

each allowed that under some circumstances it may be appropriate 

to commit force even when vital or extremely important interests 

are not directly threatened.

panel one
17

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

The speakers did appear to differ on what those specifi c circumstances would be. Admittedly, those distinctions could yield starkly 

different records on the use of military force. For example, Representative Tauscher expressed her support for U.S. involvement in Sierra 

Leone, an intervention Ambassador Armitage would presumably not 

support. At the same time, while declaring Africa a region deserving 

far greater U.S. emphasis than a realist foreign policy would afford, 

Representative Tauscher stressed that the best approaches in Africa 

are those that rely on our allies, international organizations, and 

economic and diplomatic national tools. As a general proposition, 

each of the speakers agreed strongly that in most cases, creative and 

considered use of the other instruments of national power should 

precede the option of force. Ambassador Armitage was most explicit 

on this point, echoing much of what has come to be known as the 

Weinberger Doctrine.

Not covered in the panel was any discussion of how values 

or principles are translated into interests. Given Representative 

Tauscher’s emphasis on a foreign policy that “does what is right,”

such an articulation is crucial, providing coherence and strategic 

purpose to how those values are applied in the international arena. 

Only Dr. Allison offered a specifi c explication of what he sees as 

our vital interests, adopting those of the Commission on America’s 

National Interests.

Interestingly, all of the speakers agreed that the current foreign 

policy apparatus – the Departments of State and Defense – is in need 

of an overhaul, and that a revitalized and restructured Department 

of State (not Defense) should take the lead in “shaping” activities. 

Each also expressed strong support for appropriately funding an 

engagement strategy, advocating increased resources for both State 

and Defense (not at the expense of one or the other). And while Representative Tauscher called for replacing the Defense Department’s 

two-MTW capability with the capacity for one MTW and one shortterm crisis, she explicitly stated that defense spending increases were 

needed to develop and improve capabilities more suited to the emerging security environment. 

panel one
18

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

 SUMMARY 

Globalization is the international system that replaced the Cold War 

system.

Globalization is the integration of markets, fi nance, technology, and telecommunications, enabling people to reach around 

the world, and the world to reach people, farther, faster, more 

deeply, and cheaply than ever before.

Globalization’s features distinguish it from the Cold War 

system: integration (versus division), speed (versus strength or 

weight), and a decentralized internal logic in which no one is 

quite in charge (versus the bipolar Cold War system in which 

the United States and the USSR were in charge).

Globalization is built around three balances of power: states and states, 

states and “super-markets,” and states and “super-empowered people.”

The Cold War or traditional state-versus-state power structure 

remains the dominant mode of interaction in the international 

system. 

However, the interaction between states and “super-markets”

(the largest global stocks), and states and “super-empowered 

people” (Jodie Williams, Osama bin Laden, Ramzi Yousef) 

luncheon address

Globalization and 

National Security

Mr. Thomas Friedman

Columnist, New York Times
19

make globalization fundamentally different from previous 

systems.

It is the interaction of these three balances that makes the 

globalization system so complex, both to manage and to understand.

Globalization was born of three democratizations – the democratization 

of fi nance, of technology, and of information.

In the early 1990s, the democratization of fi nance, technology, and information transformed the global power structure 

from a static one of division and barriers to one of dynamic 

integration and interconnectedness. 

At the same time, the semblance of control that existed in the 

previous order is absent, allowing for a very different landscape 

and the emergence of new actors.

The democratization of information in particular is profoundly 

important for understanding international relations today.

Globalization has four key components:

First, the erosion of economic barriers greatly increases the 

speed of innovation and hence economic competition, with no 

one entity that is in charge and capable of setting or slowing 

the pace.

Second, to compete at this pace, states must adopt the “golden 

straitjacket,” embodying all the economic rules of the globalization system. Economies grow from greater privatization, 

deregulation, trade, and investment, but political choices 

narrow greatly.

Third, states that want to make their economies grow have 

to tap the energy of the “electronic herd,” the mass of investors who collectively command massive international capital 

fl ows. States’ political options are further narrowed to those 

that attract the capital of the herd.

Lastly, the rapid mobility of these 

international capital fl ows can 

have both hugely positive and devastatingly negative effects on states 

and their peoples. Institutional 

capacities within states (liberal 

luncheon address

Mr. Thomas Friedman
20

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

economic rules, courts, regulatory institutions, free press, and 

democracy) are often the difference between success and disaster 

in this system. 

Globalization has profound strategic and security implications.

The state matters more, not less, in the globalization system. 

Those who don’t have a state, or have a state without reasonably functioning civil and fi nancial institutions, pay a steep 

price. 

“Messy states” – those too big to fail or too messy to 

work (Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, China) – will very much 

shape the strategic environment. These states have to develop 

the institutional capacity to succeed in a greatly reduced 

timeframe. 

Our national security problem has been completely stood on 

its head. America’s biggest threats will be the weakness (not the 

strength) of Russia, China, and even Japan as they go through 

the wrenching adjustment to the globalization system.

Globalization doesn’t end geopolitics, but profoundly affects 

it. The electronic herd punishes states for going to war, causing 

leaders to think harder before doing so, and to pay a steeper 

price if they do.

America’s challenge is to keep this system as stable and sustainable as possible, because America is its biggest benefi ciary. 

Sustainable globalization is an overriding national interest. 

Cutting back foreign aid and reducing our assistance to international fi nancial institutions run contrary to that interest.

Globalization is happening in a power structure that is maintained and preserved by the U.S. armed forces – “the hidden 

fi st that keeps the hidden hand operating.”

 ANALYSIS 

The current strategic environment is very different from that of the 

Cold War world. Globalization is an attempt to defi ne the structure 

of that environment, and the forces that led to the fall of the Soviet 

Union have led to signifi cant changes, both positive and negative, in 

the international system that we see today. It is important for policy 

makers to understand the nature of the changes that have taken 

luncheon address
21

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

place in order to develop capabilities and contingencies to face the 

threats and exploit the opportunities of the globalization system. 

The removal of barriers forces states and leaders to reexamine 

their relationships with others and their position within the system. 

The increasing infl uence of supermarkets on state economic and 

political structures and the increasing abilities of super-empowered 

individuals to infl uence states, for better or worse, demands that 

policy makers possess a clear understanding of, and robust strategies 

for working within, the globalization system.

Globalization presents new opportunities and new challenges 

for policy makers. International relations during the Cold War were 

defi ned by the superpower confl ict. Interactions between states, to 

a great degree, were defi ned by their geopolitical positions within 

the East-West framework. This has already changed. The increasing integration of fi nancial markets and the effective end to Cold 

War client-state relationships has led to a reorientation of state goals 

toward setting the foundations, domestically and through interactions with other states, to benefi t from the ascendance of the 

super-markets. At the same time, unhindered fl ows of capital and 

information within and across borders have improved the capacities 

of individuals and groups to damage states. Transnational terrorism, 

crime, and traffi cking in arms, drugs, and other contraband have 

forced leaders to look for multilateral and cooperative approaches 

to responding to such threats. The ability of states to manage successfully their interactions with the globalization system, to develop 

the domestic capacities to withstand the stresses and exploit the 

opportunities presented by the system, make states more rather than 

less important.

The pressures of the system may often exacerbate problems 

within states. Intrastate confl ict has become an unfortunate hallmark in the fi rst decade of globalization. While the roots of the 

confl icts clearly predate the systemic shift, the stresses placed 

upon states by the system and the effects of demographic changes, 

resource scarcity, and economic turbulence add new fervor and 

impetus to ancient grievances, setting the stage for deadly confl ict. 

The rapid information fl ows that characterize globalization disseminate news of atrocities and humanitarian crises around the globe 

in real time. Leaders are well aware of the “CNN effect,” and there 

luncheon address
22

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

is no reason to expect that, as technology increases the speeds with 

which people are able to see current events in far off corners of the 

world, pressures to intervene or take meaningful action to save lives 

will decline. 

We have seen no evidence that state-level confl ict will disappear. 

The challenges presented by “messy states,” those states too large 

to fail, but inadequately equipped to navigate through the system, 

are likely to present problems in the future. States that have successfully sealed themselves off from the system, rogue states, can be 

contained, but are constant concerns. The United States has been 

the greatest benefi ciary of globalization, and therefore it is in the 

interest of the United States to keep the system moving forward. 

This requires that the United States remain engaged and actively 

involved in world affairs, willing to help countries make successful transitions into the system, thus increasing the likelihood of 

its sustainability. The role of U.S. military power is to provide the 

underlying power structure, upon which the system rests.

luncheon address
23

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

 MODERATOR 

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President, Institute for Foreign Policy 

Analysis, and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts 

University

 PANEL MEMBERS 

Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III, USA, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM)

Dr. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, the 

Brookings Institution

Mr. Michael A. Vatis, Chief, National Infrastructure Protection 

Center, National Security Division, FBI

 PANEL CHARTER 

The past decade may well give us a glimpse of the coming decades. 

The 1990s brought new challenges, complexities, and uncertainty. 

The future will likely be more challenging, complex, and uncertain. 

While the United States may not face a global rival for the next 

panel two

Emerging Threats –

Implications for Defense Strategy
24

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

fi fteen to twenty years, future challenges will come from an everwidening array of emerging threats. Some of these threats have been 

with us for some time but are new in scale, likelihood, or virulence. 

Some are truly new. Still others loom on the horizon, yet unseen and 

unnamed. 

Terrorism has been a concern for decades, but “grand terrorism” or “catastrophic terrorism” is a current and realistic threat to 

our citizens at home and abroad, to allies, and to the information, 

communications, transportation, energy, and fi nancial infrastructures critical to America’s prosperity and well-being. While the Cold 

War’s end diminished the threat of global nuclear war, the likelihood grows that nuclear weapons or materials will end up in the 

hands of adversaries who, wary of America’s conventional military 

might, seek WMD as a means of leveling the playing fi eld. These 

same adversaries have aggressively pursued ballistic missile technology as a means to challenge America “asymmetrically” – to confront 

us where we are less prepared and avoid confrontation where we are 

well prepared. The information technology revolution, while increasing the effi ciency and productivity of the American economy and 

enabling a revolution in military affairs, has created new vulnerabilities that a concerted adversary will undoubtedly seek to exploit. On 

the horizon, a determined opponent will surely attempt to harness 

the malicious potential of the incredible and rapid advances in the 

biotechnology fi eld. A clear lesson from these trends is that our 

opponents are watching and learning. Where they cannot match our 

strengths, they will target our weaknesses, real or perceived, with a 

wide range of constantly modifi ed conventional and unconventional 

means. 

panel two

right to left: Mr. Michael Vatis; Lt. 

General Edward Anderson, USA; 

Dr. Michael O’Hanlon; and Dr. 

Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
25

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

A common characteristic of many of these emerging threats is 

that they straddle the institutional divisions in America’s national 

security structure – between defense and law enforcement; between 

foreign and domestic affairs; and between federal, state, and local 

levels. Recent adaptations attempt to address this reality, namely a 

more robust National Security Council (NSC) capability to manage 

the interagency process, and the formation of new organizations 

such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Joint Task Force-Civil 

Support, the National Infrastructure Protection Center, and the 

National Domestic Preparedness Center. Have these adaptations 

been enough, or is further structural and procedural innovation 

required? 

On the high end of the threat spectrum, large-scale conventional 

warfare involving weapons of mass destruction has been discounted 

by some as a Cold War anachronism, but remains a possibility. While a 

peer competitor seems unlikely today, history shows that an emerging 

regional power, or regional alliance, can and will acquire the capability 

to challenge us. Are we too focused on the visible threats, ignoring 

those with the long-term potential to engage American vital interests 

more directly? Will a rising China confront us over the longer term? 

Will a retreat from democracy in Russia re-polarize European security 

affairs? Just how well do we see ten, fi fteen, twenty years down the 

road? And will we be ready for the challenges that await us?

 DISCUSSION POINTS 

National missile defense: its benefi t versus its cost, its effect 

on alliance relations and arms control, what to share with 

whom.

Are state and local agencies adequately equipped and trained 

to be effective fi rst responders to a terrorist nuclear, biological, 

or chemical attack? How do we build the capacity for effective 

domestic response? 

Ensuring the coherence of interagency programs: responsibility and accountability, resources, research and development, 

procurement, procedures, training. 

Emerging threats and conventional threats (MTWs): their 

relative importance, their likelihood versus their severity, balpanel two
26

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

ancing fi nite resources. Is the two-MTW construct focused on 

past wars (such as Desert Storm and Korea) that are not likely 

to happen again? 

The implications of globalization: staying ahead of adversaries who have access to America’s technological and industrial 

base.

Integrating foreign and domestic intelligence to counter terrorism while protecting civil liberties.

Additional organizational or structural reforms: are existing 

interagency solutions adequately responsive and fl exible?

The use of WMD to mitigate conventional power-projection 

capabilities.

The implications of emerging threats on military transformation, modernization, force structure, and force mix.

 SUMMARY 

Dr. Michael O’ Hanlon

If the United States is going to face anything close to a pure rival in the 

near future, China is most likely to play that role. 

The most realistic scenario for a conventional confl ict would be 

a Chinese attack on Taiwan. However, the form of this attack is 

likely to be a naval blockade, and not an invasion of Taiwan by 

the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This scenario is as probable 

as any MTW scenario we commonly assess. While it would 

certainly present the potential for escalation and greater confl ict, the United States currently has the capabilities to prevail 

in such a confl ict.

The ability of the PLA to conduct a successful amphibious operation 

against Taiwan is limited because of a lack of capabilities. 

The PLA presently lacks adequate assets in three key areas: air 

superiority; the ability to move troops ashore quickly; and the 

ability to reinforce a beachhead quickly and present forces at 

least as strong as the opposition’s counteroffensive.

Because of its lack of lift (air, naval, amphibious), the PLA does 

not have the ability to move the necessary forces across the 

Taiwan Strait to achieve the second two objectives. Though 

panel two
27

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

China’s air force may have numerical superiority, the technical 

superiority of Taiwan’s forces places the battle for air superiority squarely in doubt. 

A blockade scenario is more plausible.

If, during a successful surprise attack, Chinese air strikes were 

able to eliminate Taiwanese air and naval assets on the ground 

or in port, it would be possible for China to sustain a “leaky”

blockade of the island. Such a blockade would certainly damage 

the Taiwanese economy. 

The United States is in a strong position to respond to a blockade.

The United States would then have time to develop an effective 

response. Depending on how the confl ict began, whether it 

was the result of Chinese preemption or a perceived Taiwanese 

provocation, the confl ict and the response could play out over 

weeks and months. 

The response would likely entail three or four carrier battle 

groups, more than we currently have in the Pacifi c, depending on the responses of allies in the Pacifi c, most importantly 

Japan. If the United States is able to employ assets from 

Okinawa, a smaller carrier force may be warranted. 

Even without the support of allies in the East Asia/Pacifi c region, the 

United States is equipped to respond to the crisis. Not including assets on 

Okinawa, the operation would proceed along the following lines:

Dispatch carriers to the east of Taiwan, out of the range of 

Chinese diesel submarines and land-based PLA assets. From 

here, employment of air assets to achieve air superiority would 

effectively end the blockade. 

The United States should forward-deploy attack submarines to 

eliminate Chinese subs and engage in other anti-submarine 

warfare operations. 

The United States could escort Taiwanese ships in and out of 

Taiwan with impunity.

The entire operation would entail the use of approximately 

one MTW’s worth of air and naval assets. Depending on the 

situation, the U.S. forces would have the opportunity to move 

beyond these limited objectives, including striking Chinese 

panel two
28

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

ports and other assets on the mainland. However, it would be 

important to devise clear rules of engagement and operational 

safeguards to prevent escalation. 

Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III, USA

A real challenge for U.S. defense planners is identifying and understanding inchoate or emerging threats and potential U.S. vulnerabilities that 

must be adequately addressed.

While the United States may face no immediate conventional 

or strategic threats, and the probability is low that a global 

competitor will emerge, cross-border and internal confl icts, 

proliferation of weapons and technologies, and terrorism highlight existing and emerging threats to U.S. security. 

The negative aspect of possessing great power is that adversaries will 

search for nontraditional, unconventional ways to attack U.S. interests 

and assets.

Given U.S. power, it is unlikely that enemies are going to 

attack the United States with conventional or strategic nuclear 

weapons. Instead, adversaries will focus on areas of perceived 

weakness, choosing to attack asymmetrically. Three asymmetric threat areas are emerging: ballistic missiles, cyber warfare, 

and space control. SPACECOM has been charged with countering threats in these areas. 

The increasing threat of a ballistic missile attack on the United States 

has warranted the development of capabilities to deter or defend against 

the threat.

The ballistic missile threat has increased with the global proliferation of missile technology, as well as the secondary systems 

(guidance, targeting, surveillance, etc.) that make them more 

effective. SPACECOM is currently responsible for providing 

warnings for all fi fty states and for developing and deploying 

strategic missile defense capabilities for the nation. 

A national missile defense would be made up of three components: ground-based radars, interceptors, and space-based 

sensors. SPACECOM is working with other agencies and the 

services to make sure that an effective system is ready to go 

when the decision to deploy is made.

panel two
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

The integration of high-speed computers and information technology into 

critical U.S. infrastructures provides another target for adversaries.

The threat of cyber warfare has increased markedly as other 

nations have openly stated their intentions to develop computer network attack techniques and capabilities to target the 

U.S. military’s increasing dependence on computers and information technology. 

SPACECOM is developing and implementing safeguards 

against any information assurance vulnerability to defend 

information infrastructures against attack. Synchronized 

planning is necessary, across government agencies, across the 

Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) and the services, and between 

government and civilian entities to coordinate and implement 

the necessary responses to this threat. 

The space environment has changed and will continue to change, providing a new environment in which the United States must act to protect 

against potential threats.

Currently, space operations are employed, and are expected 

to improve in their effectiveness, as force enhancements: 

reconnaissance, surveillance, communications, and eventually space-based radar. It is important to examine and address 

threats to U.S. systems, and also potential adversarial space 

capabilities. 

Areas of concern include the problems of blending commercial 

and military space systems; the development of anti-satellite 

attack capabilities; asymmetric attacks on ground facilities; 

and ground-based laser systems. SPACECOM must focus not 

only on force enhancements, but also on maintaining space 

control and space superiority.

Space control and space superiority encompass four key elements:

Effective surveillance of the space-operating environment, on 

the ground and in the air

The protection of systems from deliberate attack or from environmental hazards

The prevention of unauthorized access to and exploitation of 

U.S. systems

Negation of systems that threaten U.S. or allied capabilities

panel two
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

In order to assure unfettered U.S. access to space, we must deny adversaries the use of it; if we fail to do so, we will degrade our future warfi ghting 

capabilities. SPACECOM is working to address these emerging threat 

areas, but there is much work to be done. 

Mr. Michael A. Vatis

Terrorism and the cyber threats against the United States share some 

common threads that distinguish them from conventional threats: 

Both can involve attacks against or within the homeland.

State and/or nonstate actors can be involved. 

Attribution of responsibility for a terrorist act or a cyber attack 

takes time. The identity of perpetrators is not immediately 

apparent. 

Responses to these types of threats (particularly if they originate or have consequences within the United States) are 

determined by legal regimes and provide constraints that are 

unfamiliar to DoD and the services.

Successful responses to terrorist or cyber threats require the 

development of close relationships between the services and 

law enforcement agencies, with clear rules of engagement 

(ROEs) and clear standard operating procedures. 

In a time of open conventional confl ict or war, enemies are identifi able. 

This is not necessarily the case with terrorism.

Attribution of responsibility is crucial, because the reliability 

of attribution affects the perceived legitimacy of a given 

response. 

Because of the FBI’s investigative mission, the bureau is clearly 

an important player in this realm, as are the intelligence services. 

Interagency coordination and cooperation are particularly 

important in a WMD attack scenario. The magnitude of 

such an attack and the damage done will overwhelm fi rst 

responders and civilian agencies, requiring DoD and service 

involvement. 

panel two
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

Clearly understood rules of engagement and standard operating procedures must be developed to craft an effective response and also to reconcile 

legal and technical issues. 

The perpetrators of cyber attacks are even more diffi cult to identify.

The universal nature of the Internet, the weakness of civilian 

communications and technology infrastructures (and lack of 

early warning systems), and the great number of viruses and 

hoaxes that are seen every day make the challenge daunting. 

Coordination across government agencies and between the 

government and civilian sectors is needed to develop the 

two-way communication necessary to respond to cyber 

threats. 

 ANALYSIS 

In examining emerging threats to U.S. interests, the panel provided a 

strong vision of the security landscape that confronts policy makers 

today. The China-Taiwan scenario, presented as one of the more 

likely examples of major conventional confl ict demanding a U.S. 

response, exemplifi es the current state of conventional threats to 

U.S. interests around the globe. A Chinese attack on Taiwan is a 

serious and formidable conventional threat. A blockade of the island 

and serious damage to Taiwan’s infrastructure would certainly have 

negative economic consequences for the region, and to some extent 

for the United States. However, neither the United States nor its citizens are directly threatened. Further, it seems clear that the United 

States possesses the capabilities to defeat such an attack in the short 

term. 

The underlying question for policy makers and planners is 

whether, over the medium and longer terms, the United States 

will remain capable of successfully responding to such a scenario. 

Given China’s increasing infl uence in the region, and its attempts 

to improve its capacities to project power, defense planners must 

countenance increasing Chinese capabilities with U.S. assets committed to the region. As Chinese forces modernize and evolve, the 

U.S. military will necessarily have to improve upon its capabilities 

to maintain its strategic advantage. Potential changes in the force 

levels and strategic positioning of existing forward deployments of 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

U.S. troops in the region also must be closely examined to determine 

the procurement and force structure strategies necessary to provide 

the capabilities needed to safeguard U.S. interests in Asia over the 

long term. 

While U.S. conventional military superiority may be unrivaled 

in the short term, asymmetric warfare presents frightening new 

threats to U.S. interests. Terrorism against U.S. citizens or U.S. assets 

at home or abroad is a real threat that must be addressed. The 

United States is not out of bounds for terrorists, as the Oklahoma 

City and World Trade Center bombings have clearly illustrated. The 

documented proliferation of weapons around the globe provides a 

sobering example of how relatively easy it is for state or nonstate 

actors to obtain weapons capable of great damage to persons or 

property. Clearly, the threat of the use of an NBC device on U.S. 

soil against a large population of U.S. citizens is one that must 

be seriously examined and understood as a realistic danger. While 

resources must continue to be devoted to apprehending potential 

terrorists and averting such disasters, policy makers must also come 

to the unfortunate realization that we must be prepared to respond 

to such a horrifi c scenario. This means working with local, state, 

and federal entities to develop comprehensive and clear guidelines 

for responding to large-scale crises and ensuring that the professionals that make up the various relevant agencies have the training, 

equipment, and resources they need to respond effectively to such 

contingencies. 

The proliferation of missile technology has also increased the 

likelihood that actors (state and nonstate) will develop the capability 

to launch missiles at the United States and its allies. While the detonation of a conventional warhead would certainly be disastrous, the 

truly frightening scenario would involve a missile carrying an NBCcapable payload, potentially causing catastrophic damage. Regardless 

of the political debate that has emerged over proposed missile defense 

programs, it is undeniable that the threat is real and over the nearto medium-term, it will increase dramatically. Policy makers and 

defense planners must examine developing the capabilities to address 

this clear vulnerability. Whether the fi nal decision is to deploy a 

national missile defense (NMD) system, a manner of theater-based 

system, or some combination of the two, it is important that all 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

potential solutions be examined and discussed in light of the clear 

existing threat. At the same time, it is important that the United 

States work closely with allies to stem the fl ow of weapons of mass 

destruction and technologies and improve intelligence and surveillance capabilities to prevent such an attack. 

Cyber or information warfare could have serious consequences 

for the United States. Aside from attempts to minimize U.S. military 

advantages by attacking the very technologies that provide it with 

communications, surveillance, and battlefi eld awareness capabilities, such attacks could hold grave consequences for civilians. Given 

the large roles that computers and information technologies play in 

the day-to-day lives of Americans, disruption or destruction of key 

information infrastructures could paralyze the country. Financial 

markets, large corporations, government agencies, hospitals, and 

many other crucial entities rely on technology, and a successful cyber 

attack could mean catastrophic loss of property and possibly lives as 

the system fails. It was made clear in the presentations that increased 

coordination between government and private entities is essential 

to devising effective safeguards and timely responses to these asymmetric threats. 

panel two
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

 MODERATOR 

Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis, President, National Security Planning Associates, and Executive Vice President, Institute for Foreign Policy 

Analysis

 PANEL MEMBERS 

Lieutenant General Peter Cosgrove, AC MC, Chief of Army, Australian Defence Force; Commander, International Force East Timor 

(INTERFET)

General Montgomery Meigs, USA, Commanding General, U.S. 

Army Europe

General Klaus Naumann (Ret.), Former Chairman, NATO Military 

Committee

Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Senior Advisor, Stanford-Harvard 

Preventive Defense Project, and Visiting Scholar, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University

panel three

Coalitions & Alliances 

The Future of Military Engagement
35

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

panel three

 PANEL CHARTER 

If there is a clear and unmistakable lesson from twentieth century 

history, it is that alliances and coalitions are a crucial and perhaps 

indispensable means for solving the most diffi cult diplomatic and 

security problems. While the United States has always reserved the 

right to act unilaterally, its greatest achievements have been accomplished in concert with others: allies, bilateral security partners, 

coalition members, even competitors when areas of common interest have served as the foundation for cooperation. Recent history has 

reinforced this lesson – from the end of the Cold War to the Gulf 

War, from the Balkans to East Timor. 

But the more fl uid and uncertain security environment of the 

last decade has also posed new questions and raised new challenges 

for the management of these relationships. Witness the strategic 

transformation of NATO, its test in Kosovo, and its relationship to 

the uncharted democratic transitions in Eastern Europe; witness 

confl ict and strife in places like the Middle East, Somalia, Rwanda, 

Indonesia, and Sierra Leone. In Asia, the emergence of nuclear competition on the Indian subcontinent and the pace of change on the 

Korean peninsula challenge the United States and its partners to 

stay in front of developments. Moreover, the rise in United Nations 

peacekeeping operations has spurred calls for greater American 

involvement. Does American power create a responsibility to act, or 

should the United States encourage the willingness and capability of 

others, including the UN, to do so? 

Add to these complex questions the less-discussed but perhaps 

equally important issues of alliance and coalition management. Even 

as NATO has succeeded in expanding both its strategic purpose 

and its membership, the technology and capability gap between the 

American and European militaries – a challenge in Kosovo – continues to widen, jeopardizing interoperability even with our closest 

allies. As our military services aggressively seek to transform for the 

future, do we risk leaving our allies and potential partners behind? 

Will the requirement for more strategically responsive forces, deployable in hours and days instead of weeks and months, reduce the 

window for conferring with allies, creating pressure for unilateral 

action? How do we ensure that we can operate effectively not only 

with other militaries, but with nongovernmental organizations, 
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

even other departments and agencies of our own government? How 

do we balance “shaping” activities such as military-to-military programs with the need to maintain warfi ghting readiness, especially 

given operational tempo and readiness challenges? For the unifi ed 

commanders in chief, responsible for much of the day-to-day substance of engagement, these are crucial questions. 

 DISCUSSION POINTS 

The future of NATO: conditions for the next round of enlargement; its effect on Russia and China.

European Security and Defense Identity and the Atlantic alliance: convergence or divergence?

The Pacifi c: the future of U.S. alliances with Australia, Japan, 

Korea, and the Philippines; the role of U.S. forces in the 

region.

Future alliances and relationships? Where is cultivation warranted? Feasible?

The U.S. role in multinational operations: Lead? Support? 

Enable? 

Improving U.N. capability and effectiveness while maintaining 

U.S. freedom of action.

The technological gap: encouraging allied investment; critical capabilities essential for interoperability; implications for 

Service transformation efforts. 

Managing commitment: setting priorities; ensuring readiness; 

maintaining popular support. 

panel three

left to right: General Klaus 

Naumann (Bundeswehr, Ret.); 

General Montgomery Meigs, 

USA; Lt. General Peter Cosgrove 

(Australia); and Dr. Elizabeth 

Sherwood-Randall
37

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

Intelligence sharing: achieving coalition unity of purpose and 

operations while maintaining the integrity of the U.S. intelligence apparatus.

 SUMMARY 

General Klaus Naumann (Ret.)

Interventions in the future will not be conducted by individual nations, 

but rather by alliances and coalitions. 

The United States is reluctant to act unilaterally and put soldiers at risk. There must be a clear and present danger to 

national interests at stake. This unwillingness to act on the 

part of the U.S weakens deterrence.

Regional and global intervention will be viewed as illegal unless 

legitimized by the UN or in an act of self-defense or where it 

is in response to a humanitarian tragedy as in Kosovo. Such 

interventions will be conducted by coalitions or allies. 

A coalition is a sub-element of an alliance. An alliance is based 

on common goals and beliefs focused toward a common gain. 

Coalitions will be used in an ad hoc manner to achieve a onetime goal or objective. 

The spectrum of military operations that we see today has intervention 

at the high end and engagement at the lower end. 

Intervention takes place without the consent of one or more 

of the warring parties. Engagement requires the consent of all 

parties. 

Intervention is the most likely scenario in the current environment, for 

a number of reasons. 

The occurrence of confl ict is increasing because there is no 

functioning world order within which to arbitrate disputes or 

adequately address grievances. 

The world today is made up of a small number of rich and powerful nations and a large number of poor and weak nations. 

The struggle for fi nite or scarce resources in developing regions 

will increase the likelihood of intrastate and, to a lesser 

degree, interstate confl icts. The struggles of nationalities and 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

ethnic groups to obtain independence and sovereignty will also 

increase in frequency and intensity and are exacerbated in situations of resource scarcities. 

The increasingly transnational nature of threats will require greater coalition cohesion and coordination to develop successful responses. 

The growing risk of proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction will increase the dangers. Nonstate actors acting 

independently or on behalf of states can themselves cause 

crises. State actors employing asymmetric means of attack will 

attempt to thwart coalition or alliance intervention. It may no 

longer be possible to ensure peace through deterrence because 

it will be more diffi cult to identify where threats originate.

The UN is not equipped to preserve stability. Therefore, the United States 

and Europe will increasingly need to act together. 

Such interventions will act to enforce peace and then set the 

stage for a transition to peace building. This model allows 

peacekeepers to exit in a certain timeframe as intervention 

shifts to engagement. NATO is more suitable for these lengthy 

operations than ad hoc coalitions.

In situations where coalitions or alliances act, the political leaders in 

the respective member nations must play an important role to hold the 

alliance or coalition together.

Political aims must be clearly defi ned and the military forces 

must be adequate for the mission required. 

The process must be seen through to the end. 

Operationally, for alliance or coalition military operations to be successful 

a unifi ed chain of command must be in place and national contingents 

must be capable of working together. 

The United States must be prepared to share technology 

with Europe to ensure interoperability, especially in regard to 

command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 

satellite and reconnaissance (C4ISR). 

Not only must the United States reconsider to what extent it 

will share technology but the Europeans must be willing to 

share the burden of developing new technologies. 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

Alliances have the necessary structures and underlying political commitment to achieve these goals and to participate in long-term operations. 

Since coalitions usually are ad hoc arrangements by nature, 

formed (typically) to achieve a single goal, future interventions 

will depend more heavily on alliances. 

General Montgomery Miegs, USA

The only way to conduct military operations in the future will be through 

a multinational coalition. 

The characteristics of successful coalitions include the existence of alliance 

cohesion, agreement on a single strategic purpose, and the commitment 

to withstand the pressures generated as a campaign progresses. 

Cohesion is dependent on three crucial factors:

The competence of the multinational commander. The commander must approach policy development and decision 

making with a coalition view, not his own national view. He 

must work to achieve strong relationships with all members 

of the multinational command to develop a functional unity, 

and to instill a feeling of unity and commitment in the multinational troops. 

Support of the political leadership. The commander often operates in gray areas and must know he has the support of his 

political masters. To a great degree, effectiveness depends on 

the support of the command by the coalition’s political leadership. Strong political support empowers the commander to 

assume risks that he is not otherwise able to accept. 

Singleness of strategic purpose. Aim and end-state are critical 

to the quality of the operational plan in terms of its intent, 

concept, validity, and clarity.

Coalitions must have the right commanders, who must be allowed operational initiative and be provided with political support when things get 

tough, and a clear end-state must be defi ned. Interoperability will fall 

into place if human factors are solved.

NATO worked through many problems in logistics, administration, and intelligence. The chain of command is a sound 

way of crossing barriers. The important sinews of coalitions 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

are human factors. Though there may be no real identifi able 

threat at the current time, it is impossible to know where the 

next crisis will arise. NATO contributes greatly to security with 

a ready means, including infrastructure, command structure, 

and training experience, to face these crises.

Lieutenant General Peter Cosgrove, AC MC

The model for coalitions based on the Australian experience in regional 

deployments includes the East Timor deployment. 

Several years ago, Australia began to prepare for unilateral 

non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) of Westerners 

and East Timorese. Options included, on the lower end of the 

spectrum, an air bridge, and on the upper end, deployment of 

ground forces to secure areas to be used for the evacuation and 

possibly a short-term stability operation. 

The actual operation lay somewhere in the middle. Australian forces evacuated over two thousand UN personnel and 

East Timorese. As the situation deteriorated further, it became 

apparent that Indonesia would agree to a multinational peacekeeping force. This force would come from an unknown 

coalition and structure. 

As the base force on the ground, the Australian Defence Force 

had the task of carrying out the initial phases of the coalition 

operation. They adapted the high-end intervention operation 

plan that they had previously developed for a unilateral operation to a strategy for the proposed multilateral coalition. As 

other nations signed on to the mission, Australia expanded 

operations on shore until the coalition forces could be phased 

in. 

The coalition operated under predetermined UN mandates 

that Indonesia and the East Timorese had agreed to. The existence of a UN mandate provided a legal basis and therefore 

legitimacy to the intervention. 

Several factors determine the effectiveness of coalition forces:

Differing levels of readiness, deployment timelines, and capabilities exist. Many nations may be willing to take part in 

coalition operations, but most are not capable of rapid deploypanel three
41

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

ment. For early-entry coalition forces, time is of the essence 

because of humanitarian and media pressure to act fast. 

Early-entry coalition forces must have an appropriate balance 

of operating systems and capabilities to stabilize rather than 

escalate the crisis. 

There must be a common end state and common objectives, 

and early-entry forces should exist when those are achieved. 

Governments (previously willing but incapable) should then 

be prepared to send follow-on forces for operations of longer 

duration. Build-up of follow-on forces is complex and highly 

specialized. 

The UN transition force can then be deployed when the threat 

environment is reduced.

Challenges remain for global and regional powers with rapid response 

force capabilities. 

They need to develop an international framework for earlyentry operations. 

They need to increase planning at the political/strategic level 

for such operations.

Military planners should take the fi rst steps to devise strategies 

at the operational level for such operations.

Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall

The United States has unparalleled military muscle, but it cannot act 

alone.

U.S. civilian and military leaders must know that future operations will include multinational forces, nonmilitary actors and 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The military must 

keep this in mind when planning for all operations across the 

spectrum. The management of the Pentagon’s international 

relations is about ensuring that the military can get the job 

done given the conditions it must operate in. 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

The international environment has changed, making the status quo posture 

of the DoD obsolete and requiring civilian and military leaders to be innovative in the management of the Pentagon’s international relations.

The Cold War is over, but the U.S. military is in greater demand 

to do more than ever.

Multinational operations are politically preferable, but often 

militarily ineffi cient.

The pace of technological change is creating an expanding gap 

between U.S. military capabilities and those of other nations.

Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations will consume too 

many military resources unless the United States works to build 

up the capacities of other nations to organize and carry out 

those missions.

DoD does not have existing mechanisms to interact with international and non-governmental organizations. 

Though offi cially mandated, the shaping function is neither 

institutionalized nor adequately funded. 

The United States must work to ensure interoperability with alliance and 

coalition forces. 

A technology gap with NATO allies became apparent during 

the Kosovo campaign, specifi cally in the areas of secure 

communications, intelligence cycle time, and compatible 

equipment. 

Fighting in coalitions should be a net benefi t to the U.S. military, not a drag on our system. The largest challenge is to close 

the growing technology gap. 

U.S. defense leaders must take steps to improve interoperability and close 

the technology gap.

A combined joint task force within NATO that develops a 

model for an enhanced alliance C4ISR capability should be 

established. 

DoD should require that the U.S. systems architecture now 

being built is capable of accommodating allied plug-ins. 

The United States should encourage the ESDI to enhance 

military capabilities, especially C4ISR compatibility among 

European nations. 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

The United States should encourage transnational defense 

industrial linkages with NATO countries and other major military allies to enhance interoperability.

The United States should build basic command, control, and 

communications compatibility with coalition partners, not 

just permanent allies, with whom we may need to deploy in 

the future.

Information security standards needed to enhance coalition 

warfi ghting capabilities should be set in advance. 

Recent multilateral deployments have highlighted the need for greater 

cooperation and coordination. 

The UN deployed twelve thousand multinational troops to 

Sierra Leone. They had no common training or experience; 

therefore their failures were no surprise. The United States 

and the United Kingdom had to train and equip the UN West 

African troops afterwards, at great expense. 

We learned that we need to strengthen others whom we may 

potentially depend on in future coalitions, so as to reduce the 

burdens that the United States faces when a crisis erupts. 

The United States needs to organize more effectively to facilitate cooperation with potential coalition members.

The United States should devote more political and fi nancial 

capital to enhance the UN and regional security organizations.

The United States should promote the establishment of an 

effective UN policing force to fi ll the gap between the completion of military intervention and the development of civilian 

institutions ready and able to keep the peace.

The United States should prepare for interaction with international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

One tool that has been underutilized is military-to-military cooperation.

Such programs contribute to the fulfi llment of the shaping 

mission. Military-to-military cooperation with potential partners should be used to prepare for future warfi ghting, 

peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. These programs 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

should be fully funded and fully institutionalized in the planning, programming, and budgeting systems. 

 ANALYSIS 

In the current global environment, the United States, as the only 

superpower, is uniquely capable of conducting unilateral operations 

on a strategic level. Regional powers may act along their borders, but 

not in prolonged operations. However, there is a growing perception 

that the United States is not willing to take on the risks and possible damage to its credibility for operations that do not present a 

clear and present danger to vital or major interests in a particular 

region. 

Whether the perception refl ects reality or not, it is clear that 

the United States cannot be everywhere at once, and that overseas 

commitments are already straining readiness and strategic fl exibility. 

Therefore, it is increasingly likely that future U.S. military operations 

will be almost exclusively carried out as part of an established alliance or within the framework of an ad hoc coalition. There are a 

number of reasons that this makes sense. Multinational operations 

typically provide a sense of legality to interventions, especially when 

the United Nations passes resolutions mandating a given action. 

Coalition operations also allow smaller nations to participate when 

their national interests are at stake, thus alleviating the burden typically faced by the United States, though it is clear that the United 

States can do more to make allies more able to assume greater shares 

of the burden. 

Leadership is clearly a crucial commodity in the development 

and ultimate success of a multilateral operation. In all coalitions it 

serves commanders and political leaders well to have a clear appreciation of the fundamental national interests driving each coalition 

partner. Even in a strong alliance, such as NATO, political disagreements can limit the ability to act. From political leaders down 

through staff offi cers to individual component forces, it is important 

that the people who make up multilateral forces have the answers 

to certain questions. Why are they there? What are they prepared 

to do, to the full extent of the UN resolution or restrictions? Once 

these issues are understood, it is easier to start tasking each compopanel three
45

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

nent of the coalition. Leaders can then devise operational decisions 

and tasks that are consistent with the national interests of various 

member countries.

Interoperability is obviously a problem. The technology gap 

between the United States and several of its allies or potential allies 

is signifi cant. The United States is more capable of managing critical intelligence and information in battlefi eld management. This is 

clearly an issue that must be addressed as we move forward. It is certainly a diffi cult question because of the infl uence of industrial and 

national political interests that are involved in the policy process, and 

existing opposition to sharing technologies and critical information. 

Through strong U.S. political leadership and cohesion of command 

it may be possible to overcome the interoperability problems, but at 

some point, if the technology gap persists and expands, the ability 

of commanders to lead multinational forces to decisive victory will 

erode. Further, the burden that is supposed to be shared by acting 

multilaterally will increase for the United States if allied capabilities 

are not improved. The United States should work with its partners 

to develop baseline standards and procedures for interoperability so 

that allied forces can be fully planned as part of any alliance strategy 

and can be counted on to contribute on the battlefi eld. Many of the 

differences in C4ISR may be solved by agreement on software and 

communication links between equipment. NATO must agree on how 

to move information around fi rst, and then advance to procuring the 

same equipment in such a fashion that industry in as many NATO 

countries as possible can participate. 

It is not necessarily only differing levels of technologies that 

affect interoperability. On the operational side, obstacles to units 

working together include differences in capabilities, differing 

interpretations of ROEs, and confl icting national instructions. The 

commander is the key to interoperability in this operational sense 

because he must understand these variables in order to tailor the 

missions of coalition member military components. 

To this end, military-to-military relationships and working with 

partner nations can pay large dividends and should be encouraged. 

The engagement arena provides the opportunity to develop leaders 

capable of working within multilateral frameworks. The United 

States should look closely at what is expected from senior leaders 

panel three
46

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

and develop training for junior leaders to attain those requirements. 

Increasing deployments to Bosnia and other coalition or alliance 

based assignments will assist junior offi cers when they advance to 

higher levels.

The incidence of intrastate confl ict has increased over the past 

decade. It is clear that the UN is incapable of stopping such violence, 

and many confl icts do not occur in areas of important U.S. national 

interest. There is certainly political opposition to the use of U.S. 

forces all over the globe, or on missions that fall under the mantle 

of “nation building.” At the same time, allies and other nations, 

humanitarian organizations, and media coverage have increased the 

pressure to intervene to save lives. Given the United States’ fi nite 

capabilities, concerted efforts to help build international peacekeeping or (in some cases) peace enforcement capacities for willing 

nations or regional organizations can dampen emotional calls for 

U.S. intervention, while making a meaningful difference in trouble 

spots around the world. 

panel three
47

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

 MODERATOR 

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President, Institute for Foreign Policy 

Analysis, and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts 

University

 PANEL MEMBERS 

General Eric K. Shinseki, USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Admiral Vernon E. Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations

General James L. Jones, USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

General Michael E. Ryan, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

 PANEL CHARTER 

The shape of America’s military services – the Army, Navy, Air Force, 

and Marines – has not changed nearly as dramatically as the international landscape. For the most part, this maintenance of the status 

quo has been deliberate and thoughtful – complex institutions can 

absorb only so much change without eroding the day-to-day readiness that our nation expects and our strategy demands. Nonetheless, 

panel four

Service Contributions to 

National Security 

Strategy & Capabilities
48

America’s military is in many ways simply a smaller version, by more 

than a third, of the force that won the Cold War. Today’s force –

still the best trained, best equipped in the world – has essentially the 

same capabilities and shortcomings as it did during Desert Storm, 

nearly a decade ago. 

There has been progress. Joint Vision 2010 and Joint Vision 2020 

have established a clear picture of the capabilities required by the 

future joint force. Each service has pursued its own strategy for 

achieving those capabilities and for applying the lessons learned 

from Desert Storm and other recent operations. And each service has 

set its priorities judiciously, making diffi cult choices to ensure that it 

can provide, now and in the future, the most critical capabilities. 

As each of the service chiefs has testifi ed, this has been and 

continues to be enormously diffi cult. The simultaneous challenges 

of downsizing the Cold War force, adapting to a rapidly changing 

security environment, and preparing for an uncertain future – all 

while maintaining the readiness demanded of an engagement strategy predicated on global interests and responsibilities – has not been 

easy. In order to maintain current readiness and support a greatly 

increased operational tempo, the services went through an extended 

period of successive declines in modernization accounts, deferring 

the investments in science and technology and the R&D necessary 

to build tomorrow’s capabilities. Even as the modernization investment remained at historically low levels, the increased maintenance 

costs of aging equipment and the burden of excess infrastructure 

stretched readiness resources even further. Meanwhile, the services 

have faced diffi culty in attracting and retaining enough quality personnel to fi ll their ranks and develop tomorrow’s leaders. 

These bills have compounded, adding to the challenge the 

services now face: building forces capable of ensuring America’s 

national security over future generations, just as they have over 

panel four

right to left: General Michael Ryan, USAF; General James Jones, USMC; Admiral Vernon 

Clark, USN; General Eric Shinseki, USA; and Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000
49

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

previous generations. There has been healthy debate, even heated 

controversy, over how best to achieve this. Should the services continue to spend money updating a “legacy force,” or should they take 

advantage of the strategic window of opportunity to skip the next 

generation of weapons systems? Should the services accept greater 

risk with current readiness in order to invest more heavily in the 

future? Are current and envisioned levels of investment enough? 

Should the services adjust existing structures, or adopt revolutionary 

new structures? Should future roles and missions change? What is 

the right pace of change? There are strong imperatives for fi nding 

the right answers to these questions. 

 DISCUSSION POINTS 

Change is more than technology: developing leaders and 

service members for tomorrow. 

Current readiness and operational tempo: A resource challenge? A strategy challenge? A force structure challenge?

The need for “legacy forces?” Will current or future technologies allow skipping a generation of weapons systems? 

Ensuring adequate science, technology, and research and development investment to achieve next-generation capabilities.

Innovative force structure proposals: are the services too reluctant to change existing structures? Too aggressive?

 SUMMARY 

General Eric K. Shinseki, USA

The role of the Army in the post-Cold War era.

The primary reason for an army is to fi ght and decisively win 

the nation’s wars. The purpose of fi elding a large peacetime 

standing army is to be able to fi ght and win the wars that 

cannot be anticipated. 

Depending on its fl exibility and versatility, such a force can 

do many other things besides fi ght wars, but it cannot fail to 

deliver on its warfi ghting responsibility, and its responsibility 

as part of a joint team, when called.

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

Developing a coherent and effective national military strategy.

A debate over national military strategy should begin without 

regard for resource constraints. The senior leadership must be 

aware of the requirements of U.S. national strategy. In this 

way, the leadership can fully appreciate the implications that 

resource constraints would have for that strategy and the risk 

such constraints create. 

The Army has begun a transformation that refl ects the needs and requirements for future missions.

The Army today, as it was ten years ago, is a Cold War legacy 

force designed to fi ght and win in Central Europe. Desert 

Storm showed that U.S. forces lacked strategic responsiveness 

and were not suited for full-spectrum operations. Today, the 

Army does not meet the requirements for Joint Vision 2020.

The Army has embarked on an ambitious transformation campaign that could take up to thirty years to complete. 

The challenge is to transform the force, while remaining ready to fi ght 

and win wars.

This will necessitate the selective recapitalization of the existing legacy force. At the same time, it is important to develop 

an interim force that bridges the gap between existing heavy 

and light forces. 

In the long term, through the aggressive use of new science 

and technology solutions, the goal is to build a force that is 

more agile, more lethal, more survivable, and more sustainable than the current force. In doing so, the force will provide 

dominant maneuver land capabilities and therefore contribute 

to the joint team full-spectrum dominance. Such a force will 

serve as a strong deterrent and provide policy makers with a 

wide range of strategic options. 

Policy makers must also address important personnel issues.

The Army is only as good as the soldiers who serve. Training 

and education are essential in developing the understanding 

and skill sets necessary to implement transformation fully and 

to overcome the challenges of tomorrow. 

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The U.S. Army will remain a vital component of the national military 

strategy.

Given the changing nature of the world, the National 

Command Authority (NCA) must possess the broadest range 

of options possible to deal with future threats. If the United 

States is to maintain its leadership, it must remain strong and 

possess the capabilities necessary to safeguard its interests. 

Admiral Vernon E. Clark, USN

The fl uid nature of the current security environment makes planning for 

specifi c contingencies diffi cult.

Before moving to discuss specifi c military issues, there is a real 

need to determine what kind of military America needs in the 

future and what it will be used for. Given the uncertainty in 

the world, the quote “The best strategy is to be strong,” seems 

appropriate.

The services have suffered in recent years without a clear direction, defi ned 

roles, or the resources necessary for the missions presented. 

During the past decade, the services’ capabilities have diminished signifi cantly. There is a need for a national commitment 

to address how to do all that the services are expected to do. 

The U.S. Navy plays a number of important roles within the national 

military strategy and will continue to do so in the future.

The services will be expected to take on important responsibilities in the decades ahead. Specifi cally, the Navy is expected 

to control and command the seas. With the other services, 

the Navy will work to provide the kind of stability that allows 

globalization to continue. The economic health of the United 

States is tied to the ability of the military to maintain stability 

and access. 

In the future, the Navy will continue to provide forward 

deployment and carry the infl uence and prestige of the United 

States to the four corners of the earth, and in doing so, to shape 

events. The capabilities of the services determine their ability 

to affect events around the world. 

As a component of a future joint force the Navy will sometimes 

serve as an enabler, sometimes in a lead role, sometimes in a 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

supporting role, but will always be capable of bringing a piece 

of the national capability to bear when and where the national 

command authority needs it. 

The future role of the Navy within the joint forces concept. 

For the Navy, transformation will not be about physical 

changes; two-thirds of the personnel who will make up the 

2020 force are active today. Rather, it is about building jointness by developing the tools, principles, and applications 

necessary to allow the Navy to integrate seamlessly into a joint 

strategy. To this end, the Navy will need to be forward, expeditionary, capable of applying speed and agility to the task, and 

where necessary, to provide access. 

General James J. Jones, USMC

There is a pressing need to have a national discourse on what portion of 

the U.S. GDP should be committed to national security.

It is important that people see national security in a greater 

context and not in a vacuum. The uniformed services and 

the entire national security apparatus provide the security 

and stability that allow our country to prosper. Failure to 

invest appropriately in national security will affect the longterm health of the U.S. economy, the successful exportation of 

American values, and ultimately U.S. technological leadership. 

In this context, it is appropriate to discuss whether the United 

States should be spending more on national security than 2.9 

percent of GDP.

The United States must come to terms with its place in the world and, in 

doing so, defi ne the roles and missions that the services will be expected 

to undertake. 

There is an inherent question of whether the United States will 

continue to accept the leadership role in the world that is its 

legacy. While the Marines spend a great deal of time focused 

on winning America’s battles, a great deal of time and effort 

is also spent on other contingencies. There is no doubt that a 

substantial portion of the investment that the United States 

receives for investing in national security goes toward engaging and shaping and setting the conditions under which it is 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

not necessary to fi ght. In doing so, the conditions are created 

within which nations of the world can come together and work 

to make the world, as a whole, a better place.

Transformation of the Marines is well underway.

The transformation and modernization of the Marine Corps 

are evolutionary in nature. The goal is to provide to the 

national command authority a force that possesses strategic 

agility, operational reach, and tactical fl exibility. Having committed itself to innovation and experimentation, the Corps 

seeks to be scalable, interoperable, and capable of combined 

arms utilization to contribute to joint, allied, or interagency 

operations. This will allow the Corps, as a strong joint component, to help shape the international environment as the Corps 

responds to an ill-defi ned spectrum of crises and confl icts. 

If the Marine Corps is able to obtain the exciting new programs 

and platforms that are currently on the books (such as the Joint 

Strike Fighter (JSF) and the V-22 Osprey), then it will continue 

to be a strong force for tomorrow’s offi cers and leaders. 

General Michael E. Ryan, USAF

The Air Force has undergone dramatic change. Moving forward, personnel issues will rival modernization as the primary concern for senior 

leaders.

During the past decade, the Air Force has undergone a huge 

change in size and shape. The ability to recruit and retain highquality personnel is essential for the Air Force, and the other 

services. Even with the best technology and machinery in the 

world, without the most competent and talented individuals 

to operate the equipment and solve the problems that will face 

the nation in the future, it will be diffi cult for America to enjoy 

the success that it has grown accustomed to. The lack of adequate compensation, combined with the burdens that enlisted 

men and women endure on today’s missions and deployments, 

makes it diffi cult for the services to compete with the booming 

private sector. Disparity in pay and benefi ts must be addressed 

in order to sustain an all-volunteer force. 

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The United States must decide, as a nation, about how it wants to engage 

the world in the future.

The debate will most likely land the United States somewhere 

between isolation and a role as the world’s policeman. This 

will present a variety of operational challenges to the services 

across the spectrum of confl ict. The United States should be 

prepared to address crises early on, with an engagement strategy, or later, when the crisis evolves or matures into a confl ict 

that the United States must win. 

Air Force transformation has been underway for ten years, and has taken 

the Air Force from a Cold War stature to one of an expeditionary aerospace force. 

The bomber force has been turned into a conventional rather 

than nuclear force. The intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance force has shifted from an information collection 

force to one that contributes to the targeting process. Overall, 

the Air Force can move from the strategic to the operational to 

the tactical very rapidly, and the strike force has evolved from 

an aluminum force to a stealthy, standoff force that operates 

with precision. 

Like the Navy, the Air Force will not change rapidly.

Recapitalization will be a huge issue in the upcoming QDR. 

While the average age of today’s force is twenty-two years, the 

current rate of purchase of new aircraft today is one-third of 

the rate necessary to arrest the continuing aging process. 

 ANALYSIS 

There seems to be consensus that the United States has not completely come to terms with its leadership position in the world. 

Given the removal of a monolithic threat and with it the likelihood 

of nuclear war, a majority of Americans have, to varying degrees, 

turned inward and become increasingly unconcerned about foreign 

affairs. This has serious implications for civilian and military defense 

planners. Clearly, the United States has benefi ted greatly from the 

past decade of relative peace. As Thomas Friedman pointed out in his 

presentation, the U.S. military has been crucial in providing stability 

and structure to a world very much in fl ux over that period. That 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

sentiment was echoed during this panel discussion when the service 

chiefs discussed engagement activities around the world. However, 

without a clearly defi ned adversary or a clear understanding of the 

threats that America faces today and in the future, it seems that 

many Americans are unsure about the importance of the military 

to the overall standing of the United States in the world. 

A populace that is generally disengaged from the discussion of 

world affairs and unclear on America’s role in the world is less likely 

to support the necessary commitment of resources that our military 

requires. However, without these resources, it may be diffi cult to fi eld 

the capabilities for missions needed to safeguard U.S. interests and 

therefore, to maintain the relative peace, prosperity, and security 

that most in the United States have come to expect. Therefore, it 

seems crucial that political leaders and policy makers do everything 

possible to work toward a national dialogue that will ultimately bring 

the nation to a consensus on the U.S. role in the world. From that, 

it will then be possible to develop a national security and national 

military strategy that refl ects the will of the nation.

In the meantime, it seems clear that the services are thinly 

stretched in terms of personnel. Overseas forward deployments have 

pushed the readiness envelope. All four of the service chiefs mentioned in their remarks that manpower, recruitment, and retention 

are major issues of concern. If the matter is not adequately addressed, 

there could be grave consequences for U.S. national security in the 

future. Increases in funding for increased pay and benefi ts for service 

men and women have been widely discussed and with congressional 

support can be acted on relatively quickly. The more diffi cult problem 

faced by the service chiefs and civilian and military policy makers is 

that of attrition in the junior offi cer corps. Increasingly, the bright 

talented young offi cers who will lead tomorrow’s military are opting 

to resign their commissions for opportunities in the private sector 

or elsewhere. Developing programs to retain junior offi cers will be 

critical to ensuring the high level of human capital that is essential 

in a professional military. 

Increasingly, Reserve and National Guard elements are critical 

to the overall force plans of the respective services and are considered active partners on a day-to-day basis. Given the stresses on 

manpower, these units are even more important in the current 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

environment, and the specialties possessed by some units make 

them essential to certain operations. These units have been active 

in Bosnia for most of the last fi ve years. Given the nature of participation in the National Guard and Reserves, continued use at 

current levels may discourage enlistment due to the heavy burdens 

on members, their families, and their employers. Monitoring the 

operations tempo of Guard and Reserve units to alleviate some of 

this burden will be important to sustaining the overall viability of 

those organizations. 

The service chiefs strongly believe that the two-MTW concept is 

important for the purpose of force structuring, but not for developing strategies. A shift away from the two-MTW framework would 

not be helpful now, even if the actual probability of two simultaneous confl icts may be low in the current and near-term environments. 

A shift to a one-MTW or similar framework would not improve readiness, given the strain on manpower that exists now. Instead, such a 

move would likely leave the National Command Authority without 

the level of forces capable of addressing the potential spectrum of 

confl ict that the United States could face in the future. Clearly, this 

position is at odds with some of the conference participants who 

favor a shift to a one-MTW, SSC, or two-SSC plan. However, given 

the acknowledgment by the chiefs that the two-MTW standard is a 

tool for force structure planning, and not a strategy, it seems that 

further discussion is warranted and a comprehensive, overall review 

of strategies and capabilities within the context of the upcoming 

QDR is of great importance. 

There is strong support for the increased jointness among the 

services. Specifi cally, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

(JROC) process, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and the CINCs 

are viewed collectively as positive developments that will improve 

the ability of the services to achieve joint transformation and in 

doing so, improve the ability of the respective forces to carry out their 

missions. Of course, at the same time, the service chiefs advocate 

continued support and necessary funding to modernize and recapitalize their respective services. Moving forward, as the Joint Vision 

is implemented it will be important to see how acquisition of new 

platforms and the defi nition of individual service roles and missions within a joint strategy progresses. The ability of the services 

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to carry on a joint fi ght has been characterized as still very much a 

work in progress. Aside from issues of technological integration and 

interoperability, the integration of four distinct cultures into a joint 

fi ghting force is a daunting task that military and civilian leaders 

will have to manage if truly joint forces are the ultimate goal. 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

 SUMMARY 

The current international security environment will be challenging 

because of its complexity and the variety of potential threats that may 

emerge. 

The services may not continue to act with the freedom that we 

are accustomed to because the operational challenges of this 

new environment may well exceed our capabilities. To address 

this challenge, experimentation to develop a new operational 

concept and associated service transformations is vital.

There is currently a strategy-force mismatch, which creates an unsustainable burden on the armed services. 

The global security environment dictates the needs of the 

services. Events give us a window through which to see the 

trends. 

U.S. global interests demand a broad range of military activities ranging 

from engagement to warfi ghting. 

In the future, the use of the military will not be restricted 

to vital interests. Rather, it is highly likely that forces will be 

deployed to achieve limited objectives. The two-MTW capabilThe National Military 

Strategy & 

Joint Vision 2020

General Henry H. Shelton, USA 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

day 2

 morning address
59

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

ity serves us well, because it enables us to go in two directions 

at one time. 

The two-MTW model deters opportunistic aggression if U.S. 

forces are engaged elsewhere, it strengthens relations with 

allies and coalition partners, and it provides a safeguard 

against surprises.

High technology brought about dramatic changes in the global environment, affecting decision making and creating new vulnerabilities.

It is understood that cable television, the Internet, and other 

information fl ows have greatly reduced the time available to 

the national leadership to respond to crises. Together with the 

increased complexity of current events, the tasks that the military is asked to accomplish will only become more diffi cult. 

Given our increased reliance on space-based capabilities and 

information operations, it is highly likely that information 

warfare will become a serious concern.

Given the recognition of U.S. power and the existence of anti-American 

sentiment around the world, adversaries will likely turn toward asymmetric approaches to attack our nation and its allies to thwart or sap 

our collective will. 

Opponents will make use of anti-access strategies, and extend 

the battlespace to U.S. territory. Although America has no peer 

competitor today, the fl uid environment holds the potential 

for a singular rival or some combination of rivals to emerge 

to oppose U.S. power and thus present competition to U.S. 

interests. 

Even in the absence of a single peer rival, it is critical that the United 

States maintain strong, fl exible, and versatile military capabilities. 

American power should deter, and if deterrence fails, decisively 

and overwhelmingly defeat challenges to U.S. security. U.S. 

global interests, responsibilities, and obligations are not going 

to disappear. It is likely that the range of types of confl ict that 

will face the U.S. military will expand. 

Therefore, it will be necessary to possess the capabilities to 

dominate across the full spectrum of military operations, and 

to do so simultaneously. This requires rapid, decisive operations 

and a seamless joint force. 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

The Joint Forces Command will oversee and focus on experimentation 

and transformation.

JFCOM is working to develop interoperability to provide a 

common operational picture of the battlefi eld where combat 

fusion is the ultimate goal and the key to success. 

The Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) concept is the primary 

vehicle for joint transformation. It provides the context for 

joint services and CINC warfi ghting experiments and necessary milestones for assessment, and serves to implement Joint 

Vision 2020.

At the same time, it is essential that the services continue their respective 

transformation programs to move toward the joint force concept.

Individual service transformation efforts have three fronts: 

investment in people through education and training, the 

development of new doctrine and organization to achieve joint 

goals, and experimentation and exercises. 

Three important issues will further the development of joint capabilities:

Transformation, innovation, and joint experimentation will 

be included in the upcoming QDR.

Interoperability will be the primary, non-negotiable parameter 

for all new systems acquisition. 

Joint organizations have been developed to address specifi c 

threats. In the fi eld of counterterrorism, a joint civil task 

force will support lead federal agencies. SPACECOM has been 

charged with developing approaches to information warfare. 

The joint force concept must pervade all aspects and decisions of the services and drive thinking as we move forward.

Integration of service capabilities into a joint force must also 

include areas such as intelligence, doctrine, organizations, and 

equipment. Joint force C4I must get down to lower levels. 

Joint force commanders must understand exactly what their 

own service brings to the fi ght and key areas where integration 

with other services and even coalition partners is opportune. 

These capabilities are needed to protect U.S. interests, deter, 

aggression, or fi ght across the spectrum of confl ict and assure 

victory.

morning address
61

 ANALYSIS 

While the dramatic changes of the past decade have seemingly left 

America as the only superpower, the world continues to be a dangerous place. Various actors will strive to challenge U.S. capabilities and 

leadership. While the evolution of asymmetric threats demands the 

development of appropriate preventive and responsive capacities, the 

United States must also remain vigilant to more traditional threats. 

It may seem that hegemonic rivalry is unlikely at this point, but given 

the complex environment, the potential exists for a nation or group 

of nations to challenge U.S. preeminence. Involvement in operations 

other than war can only be expected to continue, as well. In this 

environment, the U.S. military must be capable of operating and 

achieving decisive victory across a wide spectrum of challenges. 

Truly joint forces provide U.S. leaders with the best capabilities 

for addressing this new environment. By building upon existing 

strengths, developing combined strategies and doctrine that allow 

for synergies across the services, and integrating individual service 

activities such as intelligence, logistics, and procurement into a 

joint framework, the U.S. military will transform to meet future 

threats. Aside from the diffi culty in managing the cultural differences between the services in moving toward a joint force, the 

integration of these support activities may be the most diffi cult 

to achieve. General Shelton’s insistence that the Joint Vision must 

extend to all corners of the individual services illustrates his clear 

understanding of the diffi culty of developing a truly joint force. 

Budgetary constraints and demographic challenges also play a 

role in the need for change, as it becomes more diffi cult to count 

on funding for individual service programs and increasingly hard 

to recruit and retain soldiers. Interoperable, joint programs should 

lower costs and unlock the potential savings as unneeded redunmorning address

General Henry Shelton, USA, 

Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

dancies are eliminated, and remove the pressures on salaries and 

benefi ts for our fi ghting men and women. This should improve the 

readiness, fl exibility, and lethality of our current forces. However, 

the joint force concept, for all of its positive aspects, cannot be a 

cure-all for military and civilian leaders in terms of budget authority and funding. A joint force is not going to be a single, hollow, 

four-component version of what were four strong services. America’s 

presence in the world will require a signifi cant commitment of funds 

regardless of the exact nature, makeup, and structure of the military. 

In all likelihood, it will be necessary to increase defense 

budgets in the near future in order to recapitalize existing programs while modernizing the services with an eye on increased 

jointness. However, new programs that prove to exhibit high levels 

of interoperability and utility across services will improve our capabilities while also creating savings over individual, stand-alone 

programs. Joint acquisition will be a key component of the overall 

Joint Vision and should play a large role in the success of the effort 

toward joint transformation. 

morning address
63 MODERATOR 

Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis, President, National Security Planning Associates, and Executive Vice President, Institute for Foreign Policy 

Analysis 

 PANEL MEMBERS 

Admiral Hal Gehman, USN (Ret.) former Commander in Chief, 

U.S. Joint Forces Command

General Charles T. Robertson, USAF, Commander in Chief, U.S. 

Transportation Command

General Tommy R. Franks, USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. 

Central Command

General Peter Pace, USMC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern 

Command

General Charles R. Holland, USAF, Commander in Chief, U.S. 

Special Operations Command 

panel fi ve

Essential Military 

Capabilities for a 

Changing World
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

 PANEL CHARTER 

Earlier panels identifi ed the imperatives that should shape America’s 

military capabilities. What do our national interests demand of our 

security strategy and the military’s role as a crucial element of that 

strategy? How should we accommodate changing geopolitical realities, such as globalization and the increased uncertainty of the current 

and future security environment? What capabilities are required to 

meet the threats we face now and in the future? What capabilities will 

allow us to act effectively in concert with allies and partners? What 

capabilities, on what timeline, can and should the services provide? 

The customers who must help shape the answers to these questions are the warfi ghting and functional unifi ed commanders in 

chief. The CINCs are the senior commanders responsible for projecting and employing American military power – for carrying out 

the will of the president and the secretary of defense (SECDEF), for 

executing theater engagement strategies, and for integrating Army, 

Navy, Air Force, and Marine forces into effective joint teams. The 

services provide capabilities; the CINCs employ them. As the Department of Defense embarks on its second QDR, the CINCs’ perspectives 

are crucial. 

Are existing capabilities suffi cient for implementing a strategy 

of engagement? Are they suffi cient for executing the full spectrum 

of missions – from humanitarian operations to major theater wars? 

What gaps or shortcomings must be addressed? Are Service transformation and modernization efforts on track to provide the solutions? 

Which are most important and why? Has adequate jointness among 

the services been achieved? If not, what more should be done? Do the 

CINCs have the tools needed to ensure that military force is effectively integrated with interagency and multinational capabilities?

Perhaps just as important as defi ning the need for new or 

improved capabilities is the need to develop or refi ne the processes for 

achieving those capabilities. Given the challenges the services face 

in modernizing and transforming while maintaining current readiness, do current processes ensure that service modernization efforts 

complement instead of compete with one another? Are these processes 

aimed at providing the joint capabilities needed by the CINCs, making 

the best use of fi nite resources? What is the best way to integrate 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

individual service experiments – in equipment, leader development, 

doctrine, training, and force structure – into joint experiments that 

ensure the future synergy of American military power?

 DISCUSSION POINTS 

What military capabilities do the CINCs require for their areas 

of operation today? Are existing capabilities suffi cient: theater 

missile defense, strategic mobility, specialized capabilities, force 

structure?

What capabilities will be most needed in the future? Are 

service transformation and modernization plans on track to 

provide them?

Are changes warranted in the national military strategy? Is the 

two-MTW paradigm necessary given the emerging strategic 

environment? Is it suffi cient? What should the military strategy require?

The CINCs’ perspective: can we accept more risk in current 

readiness in order to invest in future capabilities? 

Ready for what? Are existing readiness standards a useful management tool for today’s strategy, or should they be changed? 

How?

Is recent success in achieving jointness enough? What should 

be improved? How? 

The future of joint experimentation: the role of Joint Forces 

Command? Of the other unifi ed commands?

Establishing joint requirements: ensuring coherence in Service 

modernization investments.

Integrating military and nonmilitary capabilities: interagency, 

multinational, nongovernmental.

panel 

fi ve

left to right: Admiral Harold 

Gehman, USN (Ret.); General 

Charles Robertson, USAF; Dr. 

Jacquelyn Davis; General Tommy 

Franks, USA; General Peter 

Pace, USMC; and General 

Charles Holland, USAF
66

IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

 SUMMARY 

Admiral Hal Gehman, USN (Ret.)

The Unifi ed Command Plan (UCP) serves the military well. 

The UCP, which is reviewed every two years, allows for a process 

by which evolutionary changes can be made, rather than disruptive large-scale reorganizations. 

The QDR and the UCP review will both take place in 2001, 

providing a special opportunity to examine military strategy 

and force structure. 

The existing structure of nine CINCs is suffi cient, and additional missions can be distributed accordingly without creating 

any additional CINCs. The CINCs’ role is signifi cant in the 

requirements-determination process. However, the process 

may need to be reinforced.

Military personnel, skills, and technical capabilities have to 

evolve with changes in the world. However, there is no need to 

develop a new set of military occupation specialties to accomplish the mission. Good soldiers make good peacekeepers, but 

not vice versa.

Recent discussion to leapfrog a generation of equipment in response to 

budgetary constraints should not be viewed as an either/or decision. It 

is more complicated than that. 

While there may be tradeoffs, we can modernize, transform, 

and adopt leap-ahead technology without necessarily sacrifi cing readiness. We cannot replace each item of equipment all at 

once with expensive new generations of equipment, but there 

are ways to bridge the gap. One method would be to improve 

situational awareness and solve the combat ID (fratricide) 

problem. This currently limits weapons systems to operate 

at only one-third of their effective range. We can also use 

interoperability and joint force core competency to fi x immediate problems, mitigate the risk to our forces, and modernize 

at the same time.

It is a challenge for military leaders, including the CINCs, to realize that 

this is a period of transition, and that new threats, new challengers, new 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

methods, and new technologies are going to present new challenges that 

cannot be anticipated. 

It is important that the review process strike the proper balance 

in ensuring that CINC priorities are understood and supported 

in the resourcing process. The current process only partially 

recognizes CINC requirements.

Missile defense is a legitimate concern and responses to that threat are 

being examined.

The current policy places priority on lower-tier missile defense, 

then upper tier, then national missile defense. This correctly 

corresponds to the threat. The weapons exist and it would be 

folly to ignore the danger they present.

Homeland defense has become an increasingly important issue for civilian 

and military defense planners.

In responding to a WMD attack against the homeland, the 

DoD is in a supporting role. The fi rst responders will be civil 

agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

Military training in core competencies such as engineering, 

security, and transportation will be required to prepare for an 

attack so serious as to overwhelm state and local offi cials. 

DoD cannot and should not replicate the core competencies of 

the national health system or civil police forces. There is plenty 

that the military can do in terms of training that is applicable 

to such a situation. 

Terrorism is a real threat and an unfortunate reality for the United States 

because of its position in the world.

It is important to understand that recent terrorist attacks 

are not aberrations. As long as the United States remains an 

open society, it presents targets to those who seek to do harm. 

There is an understanding that the United States needs to be 

engaged in different parts of the world where that presence is 

resented. There are vulnerabilities, and terrorist attacks should 

be expected. 

The task of the military and other government agencies is to 

minimize the risk and mitigate the damage of such attacks, 

using the lessons learned from past acts of terrorism. 

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The U.S. military is making progress in its abilities to participate in joint 

and combined operations with allies, but there are still key areas that 

need improvement.

Kosovo is illustrative of alliance operations. The alliance is 

basically interoperable. However, the top priority should be 

improvements in secure communications capabilities.

General Charles T. Robertson, USAF

The UCP provides a long-term strategic perspective on the roles of the 

CINCs in missions as opposed to a narrower tactical perspective. 

As the world evolves, and ways of approaching missions evolve 

because of changes in technology or modernization, so should 

planning. The biennial transformations of the UCP take into 

account a strategic, long-range view, so that it evolves as the 

environment evolves, without being infl uenced by short-term 

expediency. 

The nation must decide what its national interests are and then develop a 

strategy to protect those interests or achieve national objectives. 

It is particularly important to have adequate funding of 

the DoD and the services to implement that strategy. As a 

force provider, it is clear that Transportation Command possesses the resources for one MTW in the nearly simultaneous 

two-MTW scenario. 

It is important in the upcoming QDR that planners do not 

make unrealistic assumptions about what the force provider 

can provide and when, given existing missions and fi nite 

resources. 

TRANSCOM faces three specifi c challenges:

The health of the force is a concern. Recruitment and retention must be a top priority. Changes must be made to attract 

quality people and retain talent.

The health of the transport fl eet is a growing concern. As the 

services become increasingly expeditionary in nature, there 

will be greater emphasis on getting troops to where they 

need to be quickly. Aging fl eets and the necessary increased 

levels of maintenance to keep older platforms operating drain 

resources. 

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The boldness of adversaries and their willingness to attack U.S. 

and coalition assets around the world makes force protection 

a huge concern. However, most commanders do not have the 

resources to provide adequate force protection.

There is a pressing need to develop anti-missile technology as fast as possible.

There is great concern about the implications of missile threat 

for primary aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and SPODs. A 

missile attack or WMD attack could be devastating for TRANSCOM, seriously reducing capabilities to move and deploy 

troops. Aside from theater and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), it is also concerned about anti-ship and anti-air 

missiles. This threat will not go away. 

The decline in forward basing increases the diffi culty of TRANSCOM’s 

tasks.

In the two-MTW scenario, the ability to move cargo and personnel rapidly is the key objective. The United States is down 

to six bases in Europe and six bases in the Pacifi c since the 

height of the Cold War, making TRANSCOM’s job more diffi cult, placing greater strain on its fl eets. 

Within the areas of responsibility (AORs), healthy infrastructure is critical as it improves the effectiveness of TRANSCOM 

to perform its tasks. It is also important to realize that the 

access and support provided by allies is crucial and that relationships that the United States establishes in peacetime can 

pay huge dividends during a confl ict.

General Tommy R. Franks, USA

The UCP has remained dynamic so that it embraces the reality of the 

world. 

The UCP, the National Security Strategy, and the National 

Military Strategy should be reviewed and, where necessary, 

changes should be made to refl ect changes in the environment. 

As nations move along a continuum from confl ict to coexistence to coalition and back, U.S. policy should change. 

The most important relationships are the interagency ties 

among the services, DoD, the State Department, and the NSC, 

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among others. These entities must work together and stay 

abreast of developments in the world.

A change in the two-MTW framework should not simply be made because 

of budget constraints, but due to changes in assessments of threats and 

possible missions.

The two-MTW strategy was not developed capriciously and it 

did not have a great deal to do with capabilities. It was based on 

an assessment of the world at the time. If it is in the national 

interest to be able to conduct two major theater wars simultaneously, then the framework should remain unchanged. 

If the two-MTW strategy no longer applies, then an alternative 

strategy would be appropriate. There is a fl aw in addressing 

capabilities in accordance with what is affordable rather than 

what is necessary. 

Engagement and the building of strong relationships is a crucial part of 

the U.S. military’s mission overseas.

In a region where there is no NATO, it is important to engage 

in activities with friends and their militaries that build the best 

cooperating and collaborating capabilities possible. There will 

certainly be different levels of complexity and different levels 

of capability in dealing with each given nation. Tomorrow’s 

fi ght will certainly be a joint (combined) fi ght, likely within a 

coalition. It is important to work to build coalitions.

CENTCOM has a large, daunting, and complex mission given its 

AOR.

CENTCOM is made up of an area that includes twenty-fi ve 

countries on the nexus of three continents with 65 percent 

of the proven petroleum reserves on the planet. It is in the 

national interest for CENTCOM to be there. Threats include 

well-fi nanced terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. There 

are states in the region with confl icting interests, and states 

that oppose the U.S. presence. There are also great challenges 

and opportunities in the region. 

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Missile defense should be pursued as long as missiles continue to pose 

a threat. 

WMD and missiles present a threat to the United States and 

its allies and coalition partners for which missile defense is 

needed. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is de facto National 

Missile Defense to the states in the theater of deployment. 

CENTCOM is working with Gulf nations on a cooperative 

defensive initiative involving missile defense, building on the 

“plug and play” capabilities that exist to provide TMD in the 

coalition context.

Strategic responsiveness and the ability to deploy forces rapidly are crucial 

to CENTCOM’s mission.

CENTCOM has relatively few forces permanently stationed 

overseas. There are planning requirements for how long it 

would take to move assets into the fi eld to defend a given position, or how many people and assets must be forward deployed 

to facilitate a buildup.

We must consider many complex issues when developing a new 

strategy.

Going forward, it is important to remember that a strategy 

is defi ned in terms of ends, ways, and means. With an understanding of national interests, it will be most important to 

adapt to new realities. The military must adjust to the realities of asymmetries as an approach by enemies and potential 

enemies to achieve their goals. It is necessary to adjust structures, specialties, and processes to be as relevant tomorrow as 

yesterday.

General Peter Pace, USMC

The UCP serves the military well. 

The design of the UCP allows for evolutionary change, and 

encourages the CINCs to focus on strategy. Similarly, the interagency process provides the CINCs with an opportunity to 

prepare and properly infl uence planning.

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Force modernization is diffi cult and cannot be carried out at the expense 

of the safety of those currently in the services.

If the proposal to leapfrog a generation of technology to focus 

on acquisition of future platforms causes leaders to accept 

more risk today, then such a plan should absolutely not be 

implemented. Troops must be properly prepared and equipped, 

today and tomorrow.

The question becomes whether we need an incremental 

advance in capabilities or a greater advance for the next generation of technology. If it is correct that the United States does 

not have a peer competitor, then today’s equipment, properly 

maintained, should serve its purpose, and there can be greater 

risk taken to develop and utilize the leap-ahead technology.

Future operations will certainly be joint and, most likely, combined.

There must be interoperability within U.S. forces, and with 

our partners. U.S. partners do not necessarily have to possess 

the exact same equipment, as long as there are some technologies that are capable of bridging the gap. The United States 

should take advantage of increasing regional cooperation and 

attempts by nations to better partner with the United States. 

The number one challenge the United States faces today is homeland 

defense.

Within the Southern Command AOR, the greatest challenge 

is making the leadership of the United States understand the 

importance of the region to U.S. interests. Strong friendships and 

trade relations with nations of the region should not be taken for 

granted. The challenge is to encourage an allocation of resources 

to the region that refl ects its importance. 

NMD as a component of homeland defense is vitally important. The leadership owes it to the citizens of the country to be 

prepared for such an asymmetric threat.

General Charles R. Holland, USAF

The UCP and interagency review processes are important, because it is 

clear that there is no such thing as a status quo.

The world is changing. Special Operations Command trains to 

certainty but educates for uncertainty. SOCOM takes its leads 

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from the regional CINCs and attempts to provide them with 

the necessary assets. 

Most operations now are joint, combined, and interagency. 

It is important that each participating entity contribute the 

capabilities that can provide the most robust overall solution. 

Training and professional development are crucial in a changing 

environment.

It is important that service personnel today have the skills 

and requisite training to fully exploit available technology. The 

military should seek to update skills continually, and provide 

the requisite training necessary to meet new mission needs.

Force modernization decisions must be made with consideration of all 

potential risks.

There must be a bridge between today’s capabilities and tomorrow’s technology that accounts for the relevant threat that 

the United States is likely to face over that time period. If the 

decision is made to skip over a generation of technology, it is 

important that the risk be adequately addressed. 

SOCOM faces a number of challenges moving forward and views terrorism as the prevailing threat.

Challenges exist in three major areas: readiness, people, and 

modernization. The readiness piece and the ability to support 

the regional CINCs is coming up short in certain areas. The 

low-density, high-demand areas, such as civil affairs, are in 

need of greater resources and have been forced to turn to 

reserve components to help resolve the shortage. 

Terrorism, and the damage that committed individuals can do 

to U.S. assets, is a serious threat. Improvements in information operations and the continued development of coalitions 

are needed to maintain the edge that the United States has 

enjoyed. The threat of WMD and the importance of homeland 

defense are critical today.

Proactive use of SOCOM assets could protect U.S. interests from possible 

WMD attack.

WMD pose the greatest threat to the national fabric, and 

SOCOM will do everything possible to prevent a WMD attack. 

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There are a number of preemptive options available for Special 

Forces to counter the threat of WMD. It may be possible to 

stop the development of WMD at different points, by limiting 

the ability of adversaries to obtain technology or components. Coordination and increased resources will be critical to 

success. Most importantly, without the will to be preemptive, 

there is no next step.

Adapting to confront the next threat and remaining relevant threats is 

crucial.

Moving forward, it is important to adapt to change and to 

assess and understand new threats and realities. It is important to work with allies and coalitions to remain engaged. The 

United States must maintain its relevancy in the world of the 

twenty-fi rst century.

 ANALYSIS 

The panel members agreed that the UCP serves the operational needs 

of the CINCs well. The two-year review process allows for responsiveness to changes in priorities and requirements. As new threats 

and mission needs emerge, the regional CINCs are able to relay the 

changing needs for different equipment, specifi c skills, technical 

specialties, or other assets to force providers who can then develop 

and fi eld the necessary capabilities for each specifi c command. There 

was also general support for the progress made toward joint forces 

and JFCOM’s role in joint experimentation and the development 

of joint requirements. Panelists opposed the creation of any more 

unifi ed commands or CINCs and believed that new tasks could be 

effectively divided among existing commands. 

The regional CINCs have varying force needs and mission 

requirements, and while none complained about a lack of resources, 

General Robertson clearly illustrated a major problem facing military and civilian policy makers. His description of aging fl eets, 

crucial to the ability to project power and move troops into theater 

rapidly, provides a vivid picture of the diffi culties of procurement 

and developing military budgets. Transport platforms are often not 

discussed in policy debates and are lost in the arguments over the 

costs and benefi ts of high-tech weapons systems. However, their 

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importance to military operations is undeniable, particularly in 

the context of building more fl exible mobile forces and providing 

greater strategic reach to military leaders. TRANSCOM’s fl eets must 

be maintained and improved to achieve the strategic fl exibility and 

responsiveness desired by many policy makers. This will require a 

signifi cant commitment of resources to a fairly unglamorous purchase. This typifi es much of the debate over spending priorities, and 

illustrates how diffi cult it will be to make serious cuts in defense 

budgets without sacrifi cing needed capabilities. 

The panel members also discussed the issue of human capital 

in the context of the need to constantly improve the skill sets and 

technical abilities of our fi ghting men and women as the world 

changes. SOCOM’s ability to provide special skills to commanders 

in the fi eld is dependent upon recruiting, developing, and retaining 

highly-professional, highly-trained, highly-motivated individuals. 

Attrition degrades SOCOM’s ability to perform its mission, refl ecting the service-wide problems of retaining talented people. The issue 

of pay raises and increased benefi ts for service personnel has been 

raised and discussed, and this reinforces the idea that more funds 

will have to be made available.

The hesitation of the CINCs to endorse the notion of skipping 

a generation of technology is not surprising. It would be unusual 

for any offi cer to be willing to sacrifi ce capabilities and risk sending 

troops into combat without the best equipment, support, or protection available. It is diffi cult to envision this issue becoming a 

point of serious contention between civilian political leaders and 

the military. As Admiral Gehman intimated, there may be ways to 

take advantage of better technology to improve existing platforms 

without deploying the legacy system for each. There must be clear 

discussions about the ramifi cations and alternatives between civilian and military leaders to develop a comprehensive, effective, and 

viable approach to addressing this potentially divisive issue. 

Like the service chiefs, the CINCs were supportive of the 

two-MTW standard because of the fl exibility it provides with regard 

to force sizing. Again, this is not surprising, given that commanders in the fi eld would never want to be faced with the prospect of 

inadequate manpower when entering a confl ict. 

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The development of missile defense at the theater and national 

levels to address the growing threat of missile attacks is another 

area that received support from the CINCs during the discussion. 

However, this issue, together with others discussed in the session, 

seems to point to a looming battle over funding priorities that will be 

extremely diffi cult but nevertheless necessary to reconcile, given the 

many needs and emerging threats faced by defense policy makers. 

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 SUMMARY 

The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a position of singular power and infl uence.

This is not simply refl ective of U.S. military or economic power. 

The triumph of U.S. values – democracy, individual liberty, and 

market economics – over communism has created the situation 

where states now endeavor to join the international economic 

order of which the United States is the leading member. 

The overarching goal of this period is to extend peace, prosperity, and 

democracy around the globe. 

It is and will continue to be important to help states attempting 

to make the transition into the new system. At the same time, 

the United States must beware of overextending itself as the 

inevitable result of a lack of focus and purpose in its foreign 

policy. At the same time, the United States must take advantage 

of opportunities to help other states make the adjustment.

luncheon address

Setting Priorities for a 

New National Security 

Setting

Dr. Condoleezza Rice

Professor, Stanford University
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In order to achieve the overarching goal of developing a sustainable peace, 

there are three major security objectives that the United States must 

address:

The United States must address the challenges of major, 

potentially hegemonic competitors who could threaten global 

stability: Russia and China. 

The United States must address the challenge of regional 

powers that, while not directly threatening the survival of the 

United States, pose serious threats to the stability of important 

regions and U.S. allies. 

The United States must work to limit (if not eliminate) the 

potential for asymmetric attacks on its homeland or on U.S. 

assets and allies around the world. This includes terrorism of 

all types, the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, 

and the spread of WMD.

The gravity of these challenges necessitates a continued commitment to 

a strong national defense policy. 

A powerful military, capable of deterring aggression and safeguarding U.S. interests is fundamental to such a policy. The 

need to take steps to prevent and defend against asymmetrical 

attacks is also apparent, and a national missile defense should 

be the centerpiece of U.S. capacities to address such emerging, 

non-traditional threats.

In addition to strict security concerns, the United States must also address 

the problems of intrastate confl ict and humanitarian disasters around 

the world.

From a moral standpoint, extreme violence arising from ethnic 

and civil confl icts, crimes against humanity, and massive violations of human rights are in direct confl ict with American 

values and ideas. 

 From a pragmatic standpoint, such violence can spread and 

have seriously destabilizing effects on surrounding nations in 

a given region. 

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Use of military assets is not always the solution to such problems. A real, 

meaningful commitment to prevent and resolve intrastate confl icts should 

include various nonmilitary tools.

Provide structural and technical support to help nations build 

capacities to survive and improve within the international 

economic system. Supporting integration of less developed 

countries into free trade arrangements is one such method. 

Aid states in the development of civil institutions and civil 

society, by improving interactions between relevant U.S. government assets and private sector and NGOs on the ground. 

Support the development of civilian policing capabilities to 

maintain order and support peace-building initiatives.

In a complex global environment, U.S. foreign policy must be comprehensive and coherent.

Foreign policy should integrate security, economic, and diplomatic interests to develop a comprehensive approach to 

U.S interactions with other nations. Cohesive vision and 

greater coordination between and among U.S. government 

(and in some case non-government) actors is the most obvious 

approach for crafting robust foreign policy.

 ANALYSIS 

The active involvement of the United States around the world was 

the principal factor in the resolution of the Cold War. The removal of 

the principal adversary to U.S. global interests dramatically changes 

the international landscape, but the fl uidity and rapid change of the 

current system may demand even greater focus and closer attention 

from policy makers. It is a time of great opportunity to shape and 

infl uence the system and states within the system to solidify Ameriluncheon address

left to right: Dr. Jacquelyn Davis, 

Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr.; Dr. 

Condoleezza Rice; and General 

Eric Shinseki, USA
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can leadership and overall sustainability of global free trade and 

liberal economic principles. At the same time, the system presents 

threats to U.S. interests, particularly over the long term, if disengagement or disinterest precludes policy makers from taking important 

steps today that may have far-reaching effects. The progress of China 

and the transformation of Russia present the most obvious examples 

of relationships that demand ongoing U.S. engagement and attentiveness given the potential benefi ts of long-term cooperation and 

the potential costs of long-term rivalry. 

Comprehensive U.S. approaches to addressing such issues, 

taking into account security, economic, and diplomatic interests at 

play, are critical. Further, the strengthening of relationships with 

existing allies and the development of new strategic relations and 

coalitions are crucial to ensuring that the United States does not fi nd 

itself alone in responding to contingencies in the future. It is important for policy makers to defi ne areas where U.S. interests overlap 

with other nations and build upon areas of agreement. Similarly, it is 

useful to understand clearly where U.S. interests diverge from those 

of other states, and examine approaches to reconcile those differences, or if necessary, develop means to safeguard those interests. 

Clearly, coordination within and among relevant U.S. government 

agencies and with partners and allies is fundamentally important 

to developing robust policies that serve U.S. interests. 

There may also be situations where, though national interests 

may not be threatened, the United States may be compelled to act 

because of a fundamental challenge to American values. Genocide, 

humanitarian disasters, and intrastate confl ict are unfortunate realities. The United States may well have a strong moral inclination to 

alleviate suffering, stop violence, or help a state rebuild after confl ict. 

These are legitimate goals, though the U.S. military may not always 

be the correct instrument to best address the issues at hand. It is 

important that the U.S. government work with partners to develop 

capacities and structures that can effectively achieve the objectives 

of helping states in crisis without necessarily creating unmanageable burdens for the United States in general, or the U.S. military 

specifi cally. 

The United States must maintain a strong military that can 

not only win wars and meet necessary requirements to protect U.S. 

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global interests, but also deter potential enemies. It is important to 

have the “right” forces to meet tomorrow’s challenges and, given 

the dynamic international landscape, this would place a premium 

on fl exibility and adaptability. In addition, the development of solutions to asymmetrical threats – a national missile defense to deter or 

protect from ballistic missile attack, infrastructure and technological innovations to protect against cyber attacks, and improvements 

in domestic preparedness in the event of terrorism within the homeland – is central to a prudent national security strategy.

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 SUMMARY 

The United States has not developed a coherent foreign policy for the 

post-Cold War era.

We have yet to internalize the world we live in, one dramatically different from the Cold War world where we 

addressed clearly-defi ned threats with clearly-specifi ed capabilities. Developing a defense strategy was straightforward. The 

current environment is ambiguous, and developing defense 

strategy is more diffi cult because of the diverse nature of the 

threats. 

There seem to be two forces at work in the world today:

Globalization makes the world opaque by opening up national 

borders in order to trade and fosters economic interdependence. This is a world in which capitalism can prosper, and 

since the United States is the sole superpower, globalization 

and American power have become synonymous. 

Particularization is dialectically opposite and inimical to globalization as a unifying force within the global community. 

This is manifested in the ethnic and religious confl icts that 

have taken place around the globe. 

afternoon address

Developing Defense 

Strategy for a Changing 

World

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.)

Former National Security Advisor
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American leadership is essential.

The United States is the only nation that can galvanize the 

world to deal effectively with the myriad problems plaguing 

the global community. That makes us both a unifying force 

and a potential target of those who see us as arrogant, the 

“new Rome” trying to force American values and virtues on 

an increasingly diverse world.

The United States must develop a viable strategy for dealing with the 

post-Cold War world.

The United States cannot prosper in a world of turmoil. A 

strategy for dealing with the post-Cold War world should be 

based both upon protecting our vital national interests and on 

doing what is right and virtuous. This is not easy. It may be 

relatively easy to rank our national interests into a specifi ed 

order of importance, but it is much more diffi cult to measure 

humanitarian interests. 

The debate between values and interests is important because if 

we fail to have the debate we run the risk of strategic overextension. We have more crises than we have resources, and more 

crises than we have vital interests. America has not had this 

debate and consequently, no clearly defi ned policy exists on 

when and how we conduct humanitarian interventions.

There are some practical ground rules for the use of force within a national 

security strategy.

The United States should operate multilaterally rather than 

unilaterally whenever possible, incorporating allies and coalition partners and empowering the UN as a robust instrument 

of international peacekeeping. 

The United States should maintain substantial deployments in 

Europe and in Asia. In that regard, ground forces are a much 

more enduring symbol of American commitment than air or 

sea forces because they are visible and more relevant to dayto-day human activity. 

The United States should not embrace policies that are needlessly antagonistic toward China, a nation that could as easily 

become a partner as an antagonist. Additionally, future administrations ought to think about ways to thwart radicalization 

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in the Islamic world with more balanced policies and careful 

diplomacy.

Military modernization should move forward in the context of the emerging security environment. 

U.S. military capabilities should look ahead to the world of 

asymmetric threats and not backwards to the Cold War world. 

Army transformation is on the right track, but aversion to 

change exists in all the services. 

The United States needs hard-hitting forces that are fl exible, 

mobile, and able to strike quickly and precisely anywhere on 

the globe. We need both to enhance current capabilities and 

to foster new and different ones. 

Specifi cally, policy makers involved in modernization and transformation 

of the services should consider certain issues.

 The United States should leverage its technological advantages 

to develop asymmetric threats of its own. A long-range stealth 

bomber that attacks without warning with near-perfect precision is an asymmetric capability to most countries in the 

world. 

In defending the homeland we must be more proactive than 

reactive. Developing intelligence and surveillance capabilities 

that can identify threats such as ICBMs, together with the 

technology to deter such threats, is an example of a proactive 

policy.

There is a need for a dedicated peacekeeping force. Soldiers 

should be adept at warfi ghting. What is required in peacekeepafternoon address

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, 

USAF (Ret.)
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ing is a range of talents and capabilities not accessible to the 

military. The United States should encourage the UN to play a 

larger role in increasing capacities for peacekeeping.

 ANALYSIS 

The United States has the ability to shape the world to its benefi t 

without dominating through military power and economic coercion. 

Refl ecting the ideas of other speakers, General Scowcroft strongly 

articulated the need for U.S. leadership and the importance of developing clear policies to enhance and protect that leadership. However, 

there are ways in which the United States can sustain its power 

without creating enmity and jealousy or driving other nations to 

challenge American leadership. 

Most importantly, increased cooperation with allies within the 

structures of multilateral organizations, and with respect for other 

cultures and other agendas, is the key to furthering U.S. interests 

without creating confl ict or sowing jealousy and distaste. By working 

to build alliances and coalitions, and using resources to build UN 

capacities to deal effectively with some of the problems we have seen 

over the past decade, the United States can increase the international 

stability that is so crucial to continued prosperity. 

Empowerment of the UN has been a divisive political issue in 

recent years, with some political leaders advocating withholding 

U.S. funding for the organization and limiting any perceived UN 

encroachments on state sovereignty. General Scowcroft presents a 

strong case for supporting organizations like the UN for both altruistic and strategic reasons. Through multilateral organizations, it is 

possible to raise resources and develop capacities to aid nations in 

need, particularly in the developing world. At the same time, organizations like the UN lend legitimacy to sanctions, interventions, 

or other instruments of power to maintain a semblance of order in 

the world. The development of policing capabilities for peacekeeping 

operations and transitional administrations in states struggling to 

escape from civil confl ict or humanitarian crises is a major benefi t 

that organizations like the UN can provide to the United States 

and the global community. It may take greater U.S. involvement to 

improve and empower UN capacities to undertake such missions, 

afternoon address
86

but such an investment can pay real dividends, given the continuing 

incidence of intrastate confl ict around the world.

It is clearly important that the United States continue to work 

closely with traditional allies like the NATO countries and Japan to 

take advantage of forward basing of troops and assets, which allows 

the United States to respond quickly and forcefully to safeguard its 

interests. Given the rise of China and the continuing internal problems of Russia, it is important to maintain a forward presence in 

strategic regions to deter and, if necessary, defend against hostilities 

in a worst-case scenario. 

U.S. military capabilities should be matched to our strategy in 

such a way that traditional missions, like deterrence and warfi ghting, would be enhanced. Peacekeeping and activities that fall under 

the rubric of nation building would be shifted to dedicated forces 

and shared by other agencies or nations or multilateral organizations 

such as the UN. 

While political leaders should do everything possible to maintain a forward military presence in regions like Europe and Asia, 

General Scowcroft advocated increasing capabilities to strike anywhere in the world at any time. Given the discussions over 

procurement of certain platforms, such as the JSF and the F-22, the 

idea of reopening the B-2 production line to provide military planners with long-range strike capabilities (alleviating dependence on 

forward basing) is certainly worthy of serious discussion. Resources 

should also be devoted to proactively averting threats to the homeland and other U.S. interests. 

afternoon address

Dr. Andrew Marshall and 

Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
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 MODERATOR 

Ms. Michèle Flournoy, Distinguished Research Professor, Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University 

 PANEL MEMBERS 

The Honorable John P. White, Former Deputy Secretary of Defense; 

currently Lecturer in Public Policy, the John F. Kennedy School of 

Government, Harvard University

Admiral William A. Owens, USN (Ret.), Former Vice Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Wesley K. Clark, USA (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe

 PANEL CHARTER 

The purpose of this conference has been to look forward, engage 

a variety of perspectives, and identify what is required to ensure 

the security of our nation into the foreseeable future. Many ideas 

have been proposed and many solutions have been recommended. 

Acting on these proposals requires setting priorities. Only so much 

panel six

Implementing 

Needed Change

Reforms to Structure and Process
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can be done, only so fast. Of the major issues discussed, which are 

paramount? Conversely, where can the nation afford to accept some 

risk in order to address the most pressing concerns? Facing a future 

security environment that is uncertain and ever changing, how do 

we ensure the coherence of our efforts over time? We have great 

experience and success marshalling energy and resources to tackle 

the known threat; how do we do so when the threat is diverse, changing, or around the corner?

Some changes can be implemented immediately; most will 

require years, if not decades, of effort. Some changes require adjustment; many require a bold departure from the lessons of past 

experience and challenge the cultures of institutions with long 

and proud histories. On many fronts, there is bipartisan consensus 

on what should be done; in other cases, signifi cant differences of 

opinion must be bridged to move forward. Even where there is agreement on what must be done, there is a broad diversity of opinion on 

how to get it done. As formidable as these challenges are, we must 

work through them. History shows we have repeatedly failed to do 

so in the past, waiting for the fi rst battle of the next war to create 

the impetus for action.

The next administration’s national security team, in partnership with Congress, will undoubtedly work hard to prioritize the 

agenda. What priorities should they set, and why? What should they 

tackle fi rst; what second? What changes can be directed by executive 

action? What requires the often painstaking task of brokering compromise, winning consensus, and establishing momentum? What 

leadership and management strategies are needed to overcome the 

institutional and cultural inertia that stands in the path of meaningful and needed reform? In short, how do we translate discussion into 

action to ensure a future of peace, opportunity, and prosperity?

panel six

left to right: Admiral William 

Owens, USN (Ret.); Dr. John 

White; General Wesley Clark, 

USA (Ret.); and Ms. Michèle 

Flournoy
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 DISCUSSION POINTS 

Focusing effort: balancing priorities (what must be changed 

now) against realities (what can be changed given the constraints of resources, the political landscape, and time).

Who can do what? What requires presidential leadership? 

Congressional action? What can the secretary of defense and 

the senior civilian and military leadership accomplish?

Overcoming public indifference to security affairs: Why are 

these issues important? Are they worthy of time and resources? 

What level of investment are we willing to bear?

Adjusting national security structures: advantages and disadvantages of changing a system that has served us well? Are 

existing structures suffi ciently fl exible? Alternatives to the 

status quo?

Improving the interagency process.

Managing change: staying the course, synchronizing the 

effort, building momentum.

 SUMMARY 

Ms. Michèle Flournoy

The incoming administration must address the “iron triangle” of the next 

QDR.

The next administration must resolve a $30 billion to $50 

billion annual mismatch between what our defense program 

demands and the projected available resources. 

It must do so by taking action in one or more of three areas: (1) 

increase defense resources; (2) reduce costs while maintaining 

acceptable risk; (3) change our strategy to reduce the demands 

on the force. This is the iron triangle of the next Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR): spend more, reduce costs, or do less.

The next National Security Strategy and QDR must set explicit 

priorities. 

The next administration’s strategy must be more explicit in 

setting priorities. Greater prioritization requires a different 

approach to both the NSS and the QDR.

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National Security Strategy development should be a rigorous 

interagency exercise that involves the principals and deputies of 

the relevant agencies, sets prioritized objectives, and provides 

clear guidance for planning, resource allocation, and resource 

management within and among the various agencies.

Rather than a comprehensive program review, the next QDR 

should be a truly strategic review that establishes a vision, 

sets priorities, and decides the biggest strategy and program 

issues.

To ensure priorities drive resource allocation, the DoD’s incoming leadership must (1) take ownership of their strategy early; 

(2) issue the strategy as binding guidance; (3) be clear about 

the scenarios that should drive planning; (4) ensure that the 

strategy and priorities are consistently and rigorously enforced; 

and (5) create an environment in which there is an open and 

fair competition of ideas and approaches.

DoD should broaden its planning scenario set beyond two 

MTWs to include a wider range of potential threats, objectives, 

conditions, and concepts of operation.

Dr. John P. White

The next administration has an opportunity and an obligation to address 

a broad set of defense management problems.

Dr. White’s remarks were drawn from Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future, the book he recently co-edited with 

Dr. Ashton Carter.

While the United States has the fi nest military in the world, 

the support system behind the military – encompassing a broad 

range of management structures and processes – is antiquated 

and dysfunctional. 

If left unfi xed, these back-offi ce defi ciencies will erode the 

capabilities of our fi ghting forces.

We must develop an edge in new, or “homeless” missions.

The new administration should charge the NSC, in concert 

with the Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB), to develop 

an interagency program with strong central management 

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of multi-agency missions: information warfare, biological 

warfare, peacekeeping, and so on.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be required to 

develop an annual force development roadmap outlining joint 

requirements and architectures for functions such as information operations, intelligence, and precision strike.

The CINC JFCOM should join the JROC and the Defense 

Resources Board and should have previously served as a CINC, 

service chief, or vice chief.

JFCOM should be strengthened to become a true joint force 

integrator engaged in continuous exercises and experiments to 

upgrade our capabilities in command and control. 

We must maintain our edge in continuing missions.

To harness the forces of globalization and commercialization, 

DoD must adapt to remain the fastest integrator of commercial 

technology. This necessitates drastic changes to existing export 

controls.

DoD must encourage a strong core defense industry by rewarding business for sound performance, including shared savings 

and higher profi ts for better value.

DoD should encourage consolidation in the defense industry’s 

second and third tiers.

DoD should work toward more robust transatlantic linkages.

DoD should adopt specifi c policies that adjust the all-volunteer 

force to evolving demographic, economic, and cultural realities.

We must solve chronic problems.

The SECDEF should be given control over DoD’s civil service 

and implement a new system that allows fl exible pay and hiring 

rules, encourages career movement between the public and 

private sectors, compensates performance, ranks the person, 

and increases professional education.

The SECDEF should establish as policy that the private sector 

is the preferred supplier.

The SECDEF should obtain relief from OMB A76 constraints 

and congressional limitations and conduct a broadly based set 

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of functional competitions in areas such as communications, 

fi nancial management, depot maintenance, and common 

skills training. 

The SECDEF should proceed with a list of recommended base 

closures, while Congress should proceed with new legislation 

for a long-term, effective BRAC system.

Admiral William Owens, USN (Ret.)

DoD must embrace profound change. 

If left on its present course, DoD will not be able to perform 

even one Desert Storm. We must look at all kinds of possible 

changes, even at the possible expense of the things we have 

loved most about our defense institution.

These changes are matters of process and culture, not reorganization.

DoD needs a true joint requirements process.

DoD must adopt a joint requirements process that, while 

involving the services, focuses on producing the best defense, 

as opposed to service, capabilities. 

This could be an enhanced JROC, or a joint requirements 

management board consisting of high-level civilians, civilian 

defense leadership, four-star service representatives, and the 

chairman or vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

DoD must invest resources in an academically-based, sciencebased analysis of joint requirements. Both Admiral Owens and 

Dr. White proposed doubling current levels of investment as 

a starting point.

This improved joint requirements process should subsume a 

truly joint acquisition process, allowing elimination of layers 

of DoD and service acquisition structure.

DoD must greatly improve its ability to leverage commercial 

technology.

The future strength of DoD will lie in its ability to exploit 

opportunities created by commercial technology, using information technologies to improve battlefi eld sensors, integrate 

legacy weapons systems, and revitalize the effi ciency of infrastructure.

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This will generate $50 billion in savings that can capitalize 

needed requirements, such as a joint information umbrella 

that will allow us to see everything of relevance in future 

combat theaters. We don’t have it now; we need it.

Commercial technology is the key to solving the interoperability 

challenges inherent in joint and combined operations.

DoD should be willing to question traditional service roles and structures 

in order to spur needed innovation.

It is arguable whether, if conducting a zero-based review, the 

military would be organized into the Army, Navy, Air Force, 

and Marine Corps. 

A functionally-based analysis today would recommend a different structure – a battlefi eld awareness force, a precision strike 

force, a cooperative defense force, a mobile ground maneuver 

force, and a smart logistics force – essentially organized around 

the pillars of Joint Vision 2010.

The Army is the most relevant service today. It should receive 

greater funding even at the expense of other services. 

General Wesley Clark, USA (Ret.)

DoD must place more weight on the just-cause model of warfi ghting, and 

less on the Desert Storm model. 

Before we can pursue reform, we must understand the nature 

of the battlefi eld to which U.S. forces will be committed in the 

future. 

We have focused on the Desert Storm model (heavy forces, 

forty-four-day air campaign, precision strike) at the expense 

of the just-cause model (risk taking, bold maneuver, insertion 

of ground troops). We must reemphasize the latter.

Kosovo is an example. The United States expended one MTW 

worth of reconnaissance, and commanders couldn’t see what 

was on the ground. Service reconnaissance capabilities were 

not interoperable, and as a result were ineffective. 

The battlefi eld comprises more than targets. It includes people 

in buildings, in villages, and underground; therefore we must 

have the ability to go in on the ground, accepting higher risk. 

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The just-cause model requires investment in certain neglected joint capabilities.

Precision strike, while crucial, is overemphasized. We have 

underestimated the need for jointly synchronized reconnaissance to support just-cause operations more effectively.

Organizations need to be more “tailorable” and more joint. 

Despite Goldwater-Nichols, we must place far greater emphasis on jointness, in both combat and support areas, in service 

doctrine, and among military leaders at all levels. 

More must be done with joint experimentation, and the CINC 

JFCOM must have more authority to pull together early-in-war 

activities like joint reconnaissance and information fl ow.

The United States needs a true military strategy and should create the 

planning structure to develop it.

The two-MTW strategy was never a strategy for employment. 

It was only intended to retain the force structure we had.

To have a national military strategy, we must have a national 

security strategy. To have a national security strategy, the 

National Security Council needs the structure to focus beyond 

the current crisis: a planning section, a planned operations 

section, and an operations section. 

The armed forces must eliminate the zero-defect culture.

The armed forces must let go of the quest for control, simplicity, and perfection. Negatives happen, but junior leaders do not 

believe that senior leaders will underwrite their mistakes. 

We have gone too far in over-planning, over-prescribing, and 

over-controlling. We must focus on the objective and defi ne 

how we want to fi ght. 

 ANALYSIS 

The message from this panel discussion was the need for signifi cant, even radical, defense reform, and the obligation of the 

next administration to pursue it. The panel members not only 

called for reexamination of our strategic ends, characterizing the 

two-MTW construct as inadequate and wrongly applied, but importantly focused their remarks on the need to update, overhaul, or 

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create the crucial processes and systems that support those ends. Dr. 

White and Admiral Owens offered strikingly similar recommendations, perhaps not surprising given their former service as the senior 

civilian and uniformed systems managers of DoD. Truly notable, 

however, was the degree to which General Clark’s Kosovo observations complemented these recommendations. 

First and foremost, all stressed the need for the DoD to move 

beyond the Goldwater-Nichols reforms to achieve far greater jointness, including a truly joint requirements process, greater harmony 

in joint warfi ghting doctrine, and a more effective joint experimentation program under a strengthened CINC JFCOM. While General 

Clark stressed the importance of understanding the strategic landscape before pursuing reform, there was a shared tone of urgency on 

the issue of jointness – a clear call for immediate action.

Perhaps equally important, all of the panel members stressed 

the need for cultural change as a necessary precursor or accompaniment to reform. Admiral Owens put it most starkly, questioning 

the services’ long-standing roles and missions, but Dr. White and 

General Clark echoed the theme in different ways – White by proposing specifi c personnel management reforms, Clark by criticizing 

service dogmas and the zero-defect mentality. The lesson to the next 

defense management team seems clear: to transform the institution, 

you must change the culture as well.

You must also have an effective vehicle for initiating and managing change, and all of the speakers hit upon this point as well. Ms. 

Flournoy used this issue to build the foundation for the panel, asserting that the next administration’s defense leadership must fi rst apply 

a disciplined and rigorous approach to both the National Security 

Strategy and the QDR, only then implementing managerial initiatives within the priorities established by those reviews. There was 

general agreement that the QDR is suitable and the best available 

process for pursuing needed reforms in a coherent fashion. General 

Clark’s recommendation for a new NSC offi ce focused on strategic 

planning, and Dr. White’s proposal that the NSC, in concert with 

OMB, integrate multi-agency plans and programs both built on Ms. 

Flournoy’s assertion that national strategy formulation needs to 

become both more rigorous and interagency in character. 

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Lastly, each of the speakers either stated or implied that national 

security requires greater resources over current levels, even while 

acknowledging that dramatic increases are unrealistic. This reality 

demands greater prioritization with an eye toward greater jointness, 

and a willingness to pursue some long-standing management problems. In spite of nearly a decade of DoD effort, the well of effi ciency 

has not dried up. The change of administrations provides an opportunity to address some chronic ineffi ciencies, most notably excess 

infrastructure and non-core management functions, while putting 

in place management solutions that are not only more effi cient, but 

panel six

more effective in generating improved defense capability. 
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There has been a revolution in military affairs and the revolution is continuing.

The Clinton administration has indeed supported the military 

to the tune of $180 billion already with another $50 billion to 

$100 billion on the way. This infusion of funds should begin to 

address many of the issues discussed during the conference.

Four revolutions with signifi cant implications for defense policy have 

taken place in the last decade:

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the revolution in international relations with an accompanying reorientation of 

American defense thinking

The economic revolution which is still in motion

The information revolution whose dimensions we still do not 

fully comprehend

A demographic revolution as the baby boomer generation 

passes but is trailed by its progeny

closing address

The Honorable Rudy de Leon 

Deputy Secretary of Defense
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It will be a challenge for the president to govern in an evenly balanced 

political situation. Bipartisan activity will be fundamental to governing 

for the next four years at least.

The Goldwater-Nichols legislation fundamentally changed how DoD 

operates in establishing an acquisition czar, but more so in three other 

areas:

The expanded role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS)

The development of the acquisition chain of command

The creation of a Joint Requirements examination process –

the JROC

An unanticipated consequence of the changes from Goldwater-Nichols is 

the emergence of the regional CINCs as dominant forces in the development of foreign policy. 

In some cases, the CINCs have become the most signifi cant U.S. policy 

representatives to entire regions. 

The upcoming QDR is critically important to determine the direction of 

the U.S. military and U.S. defense capabilities. A number of issues must 

be examined:

The existing needs of the regional and functional CINCs are 

likely to dominate the discussions and will most likely clash 

with the views of the JCS, who are focused on platforms for 

modernization and future operations. 

Investments in people are critical – recruiting, training, and 

retaining, including keeping a close watch on Reserve Component operations tempo. 

We need the money and the will to refurbish essential infrastructure and divest ourselves of the excess (we must do 

another BRAC and do it thoroughly as we cannot afford the 

drain of excess infrastructure).

Business reform within DoD must continue. Currently DoD 

has no capacity to stay current with the information revolution: it takes DoD two years to replace computer systems and 

programs that change signifi cantly every six months.

closing address
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 ANALYSIS 

The deputy secretary’s closing remarks reaffi rmed an important 

theme that emerged from the conference. Political and institutional 

leadership within DoD is necessary to address the numerous problems confronting the department and the services today. 

Bipartisan support for tough decisions such as passage of BRAC 

legislation will play a large role in improving the effi ciency of 

resource allocation and obtaining new sources of revenue for needed 

programs. However, the closing of bases often becomes a highly 

charged political battle, as constituents in districts that house bases 

fear the loss of jobs and the disappearance of perhaps the largest 

single engine of economic power in the region. Representatives of 

districts slated to lose a base will face enormous pressure to fi ght 

the closing and thus it will take presidential leadership and a clear 

articulation of the pressing need to reduce unnecessary infrastructure burdens. 

Further institutional reforms allowing for better business practices and greater integration of new technology within DoD will 

also streamline operations and increase effi ciency, resulting in lower 

costs. However, even with the implementation of an aggressive BRAC 

campaign and a successful reform initiative at DoD, it is questionable whether the savings will be enough to cover the various 

spending needs that were made clear throughout the conference. It 

is diffi cult to envision a scenario where spending was curtailed in 

the absence of the implementation of serious, comprehensive reform 

efforts. However, it is diffi cult to see that such reforms would provide 

enough savings to address the needs that exist. 

This reinforces the importance of the upcoming QDR together 

with other ongoing efforts, including this conference, to examine 

emerging security threats and required strategies and force structures. 

closing address
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Dr. Graham T. Allison, Jr.

Dr. Graham Allison is director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. From 

1977-89, Dr. Allison served as dean of the School. Under his leadership, a 

small, undefi ned program grew twenty-fold to become a major professional 

school of public policy and government. In the fi rst term of the Clinton 

administration, Dr. Allison served as assistant secretary of defense for policy 

and plans where he coordinated DoD strategy and policy towards Russia, 

Ukraine, and the other states of the former Soviet Union. Dr. Allison has 

authored or co-authored more than a dozen books and one hundred articles, 

including, most recently, Realizing Human Rights: From Inspiration to Impact; 

Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear 

Weapons and Fissile Material; Cooperative Denuclearization: from Pledges to 

Deeds; and Beyond Cold War to Trilateral Cooperation in the Asia-Pacifi c 

Region. Dr. Allison has been a member of the secretary of defense’s Defense 

Policy Board for Secretaries Weinberger, Carlucci, Cheney, Aspin, Perry, and 

Cohen. He was a founding member of the Trilateral Commission, a director 

of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of many public committees and commissions. He has served on the boards of the Getty Oil 

Company, New England Securities, the Taubman Companies, and Belco Oil 

and Gas, as well as on the advisory boards of Chase Bank, Hydro-Quebec, 

and the International Energy Corporation.

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Lieutenant General Edward G. Anderson III, USA

Lieutenant General Anderson is deputy commander in chief and chief of 

staff, United States Space Command, and vice commander, U.S. Element, 

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). At United States 

Space Command, Lieutenant General Anderson helps lead the unifi ed 

command responsible for directing space control and support operations 

including missile defense, as well as Computer Network Defense and Computer Network Attack. Lieutenant General Anderson has also served as the 

director for strategic plans and policy, the Joint Staff. Lieutenant General 

Anderson’s awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished 

Service Medal, the Army Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit 

with Two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Bronze Star 

Medal with V Device. Lieutenant General Anderson is a graduate of the 

United States Military Academy. He holds a master of science degree in 

aeronautical engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology and a 

master of arts degree in national security and strategic studies from the 

Naval War College. He is also a graduate of the British Higher Command 

and Staff Course.

Ambassador Richard Lee Armitage

Mr. Richard L. Armitage, the president of Armitage Associates L.C., is 

engaged in a range of worldwide business and public policy endeavors as well 

as frequent public speaking and writing. From March 1992 to May 1993, 

with the personal rank of ambassador, Mr. Armitage directed U.S. assistance to the new independent states of the former Soviet Union. In January 

1992, Mr. Armitage was appointed coordinator for emergency humanitarian assistance. During his tenure in these positions, he completed extensive 

international coordination projects with the European Union, Japan, and 

other donor countries. From 1989 through 1992, Mr. Armitage fi lled key 

diplomatic positions as presidential special negotiator for the Philippines 

Military Bases Agreement and special mediator for water in the Middle 

East. President Bush sent him as a special emissary to Jordan’s King Hussein 

during the 1991 Gulf War. In the Pentagon from June 1983 to May 1989, 

he served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. 

From 1981 until June 1983, Mr. Armitage was deputy assistant secretary 

of defense for East Asia and Pacifi c Affairs in the Offi ce of the Secretary of 

Defense. In 1967, Mr. Armitage graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy. 

He has been awarded the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished 

Public Service four times, the Presidential Citizens Medal, and the Department of State Distinguished Honor Award.

biographies
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

The Honorable Louis Caldera

The Honorable Louis Caldera became the seventeenth secretary of the Army 

on July 2, 1998. As secretary of the Army, Secretary Caldera has statutory 

responsibility for all matters relating to Army man-power, personnel, reserve 

affairs, installations, environmental issues, weapons systems and equipment acquisition, communications, and fi nancial management. Secretary 

Caldera has overall responsibility for the Department of the Army’s annual 

budget of nearly $70 billion. He previously served as managing director 

and chief operating offi cer for the Corporation for National Service. Before 

coming to Washington, D.C., he served for fi ve years in the California 

state legislature, where he represented the nearly 400,000 residents of the 

46th Assembly District. He served as chair of the Assembly’s Banking and 

Finance Committee, Revenue and Taxation Committee, and Budget Committee. He also served as a member of the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory 

Committee to the U.S. trade representative. Secretary Caldera served as a 

commissioned offi cer in the U.S. Army from 1978 to 1983 and was awarded 

the Meritorious Service Medal. On active duty, he served as a military police 

platoon leader, battalion intelligence offi cer, and battalion executive offi cer. 

He later served in the U.S. Army Reserve. Secretary Caldera graduated from 

West Point and earned a law degree from Harvard Law School and an M.B.A. 

from Harvard Business School in 1987.

Admiral Vernon E. Clark, USN

Admiral Clark became the twenty-seventh chief of naval operations on July 

21, 2000. Admiral Clark directed the Joint Staff’s Crisis Action Team for 

Desert Shield and Desert Storm. While commanding the Carl Vinson Battle 

Group, he deployed to the Arabian Gulf and later served as the deputy commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia. Admiral Clark has also served as 

the deputy and chief of staff, United States Atlantic Fleet; the director of 

operations (J3) and subsequently director, the Joint Staff. He has received 

the Defense Distinguished Service Medal (three awards), the Distinguished 

Service Medal (two awards), the Legion of Merit (three awards), the Defense 

Meritorious Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal (four awards), 

and the Navy Commendation Medal.

General Wesley K. Clark, USA (Ret.)

General Clark was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) from 

July 1997 through May 2000. He was also the commander in chief of the 

United States European Command. As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 

General Clark was in overall command of NATO’s military forces in Europe. 

In his position as SACEUR, General Clark was also the overall commander 

of approximately 75,000 troops from thirty-seven nations participating in 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

ongoing operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In 1999, General 

Clark commanded Operation Allied Force, the Alliance’s successful military 

action in response to the Kosovo crisis. Simultaneously, as commander in 

chief of U.S. European Command, General Clark commanded United States 

military activities in eighty-nine countries and territories covering more 

than thirteen million square miles of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. 

General Clark’s previous assignments include commander in chief of the 

United States Southern Command, Panama, from June 1996 to July 1997, 

and director, strategic plans and policy, J5, the Joint Staff (April 1994-June 

1996). He also led the military negotiations for the Bosnian peace accords 

at Dayton. General Clark is a 1966 graduate of the United States Military 

Academy of West Point, New York, where he graduated fi rst in his class. He 

holds a master’s degree in philosophy, politics and economics from Oxford 

University where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar.

Lieutenant General P.J. Cosgrove, AC, MC

Lieutenant General Peter Cosgrove graduated from the Royal Military 

College of Australia in 1968 and was commissioned into the Royal Australian Infantry Corps. Shortly after graduation he was posted to the 9th 

Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, in South Vietnam where he commanded a rifl e platoon. He was subsequently awarded the Military Cross 

for his service in Vietnam. His command appointments include the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment in 1983-84, the 6th Brigade in 1992-93, 

and the Royal Military College in 1997. He is a graduate of the United 

States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the Joint Services Staff 

College, and the Indian National Defence College. He was appointed as 

commander 1st Division and Deployable Joint Force Headquarters in March 

1998, and commanded International Force East Timor (INTERFET) from 

September 1999 until February 2000. Lieutenant General Cosgrove assumed 

his current appointment as chief of army on July 16, 2000.

Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis

Dr. Jacquelyn Davis is executive vice president of the Institute for Foreign 

Policy Analysis and president of National Security Planning Associates. 

Dr. Davis is an authority on force planning and military technology 

trends; U.S.-allied security relations in NATO-Europe, the Persian Gulf, and 

the Asian-Pacifi c region; counterproliferation and deterrence issues; and 

regional security dynamics, especially as they affect U.S. policies regarding 

forward presence. Her other areas of expertise include defense problems 

related to the former Soviet Union and the CIS republics and the security 

policies and programs of key European countries, particularly the United 

Kingdom, France, and Germany. As a member of the chief of naval operabiographies
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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

tions’ Executive Committee, she has written and lectured extensively on 

issues of naval strategy and maritime power. Dr. Davis has written and 

collaborated on numerous books, articles and IFPA special reports. Her 

recent publications include: Strategic Paradigms 2025: U.S. Security Planning 

for a New Era (co-author) and CVX: A Smart Carrier for the New Era. Dr. 

Davis served a four-year tenure (1992-96) on the Board of Advisors at the 

Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. In addition, she was 

a member of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services 

(DACOWITS), serving as national chairperson from 1986-88. Dr. Davis is 

a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the CNO Executive Panel, 

the Hart-Rudman Study Group, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Dr. Davis received her M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of 

Pennsylvania.

Ms. Michèle A. Flournoy

Ms. Michèle A. Flournoy is a distinguished research professor and director 

of the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group at the National 

Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. Previously, she 

served as principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and 

threat reduction and as deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy. She 

was the principal author of the “Shape, Prepare, Respond” strategy and of 

Presidential Decision Directive 56. Before joining Department of Defense, 

she was a research fellow at Harvard’s Center for Science and International 

Affairs. Ms. Flournoy has published two books and more than fi fty articles 

on international security issues. She received a B.A. in social studies from 

Harvard University and an M.Litt. in international relations from Balliol 

College, Oxford University. She is a member of the Defense Policy Board, 

the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute of Strategic 

Studies, and the Executive Board of Women in International Security.

General Tommy R. Franks, USA

General Tommy R. Franks is the commander in chief, United States Central 

Command. He has commanded the Third (U.S.) Army/Army Forces Central 

Command and the Second Infantry (Warrior) Division, Korea and was 

assistant division commander (maneuver), First Cavalry Division during 

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. General Franks attended the Army 

War College where he completed graduate studies and received a master of 

science degree in public administration at Shippensburg University. General 

Franks’ awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal; Distinguished Service Medal (two awards); Legion of Merit (four awards); Bronze 

Star Medal with V (three awards); Purple Heart (three awards); Air Medal 

with V; Army Commendation Medal with V; and a number of U.S. and 

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IFPA-FLETCHER CONFERENCE 2000

foreign service awards. He wears the Army General Staff Identifi cation Badge 

and the Aircraft Crewmember’s Badge.

Mr. Thomas Friedman

Mr. Thomas Friedman joined the New York Times in 1981 as a fi nancial 

reporter specializing in OPEC and oil-related news and later served as the 

chief diplomatic, chief White House, and international economics correspondent. A two-time Pulitzer Prize winner for his coverage of the Middle 

East, Friedman is also the author of From Beirut to Jerusalem, which won both 

the National Book and the Overseas Press Club Awards in 1989 and was on 

the New York Times “Bestseller List” for nearly twelve months. Friedman 

also wrote The Lexus and the Olive Tree and the text accompanying Micha 

Bar-Am’s book, Israel: A Photobiography. Friedman graduated summa cum 

laude from Brandeis University, Waltham, Mass., with a degree in Mediterranean studies. He received a master’s degree in modern Middle East studies 

from Oxford. He has served as a visiting professor at Harvard University. He 

lives in Bethesda, Maryland, with his wife Ann and their two daughters.

General John R. Galvin, USA (Ret.)

General John Galvin was the sixth dean of The Fletcher School of Law and 

Diplomacy, Tufts University, and is currently dean emeritus. He served as 

NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe and commander in chief of U.S. 

Army, Navy, and Air Forces in Europe during the fi ve years that ended the 

Cold War. More recently, he was an envoy of the U. S. State Department with 

the rank of ambassador to assist with negotiations in Bosnia. Dean Galvin 

played a central role in many of recent history’s defi ning moments, including the Gulf War, the redesigning of NATO strategy, humanitarian support 

in Central and Eastern European nations, the rescue of 450,000 Kurdish 

refugees in northern Iraq, East-West negotiations on arms control, and U.S. 

military operations in Zaire, Liberia, and other African nations. He has 

published several books and articles on U.S. military strategy, transatlantic 

relations, and the future role of NATO. A graduate of West Point, Dean 

Galvin holds a master’s degree in English from Columbia University and 

continued his military education at the Army Command and General Staff 

College and the Army War College. He also did postgraduate study at the 

University of Pennsylvania and attended The Fletcher School of Law and 

Diplomacy on a fellowship in 1972-73.

Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., USN (Ret.)

Admiral Gehman served as commander in chief, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command, from September 1997 until his retirement September 5, 2000. 

He served briefl y as deputy commander in chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, 

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from 1994 until 1996. In 1996, he reported for duty as the twenty-ninth vice 

chief of naval operations. He served as executive assistant to commander in 

chief, U.S. Atlantic Command/Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, from 

1990 until 1991. Admiral Gehman served as the director for operations, 

U.S. Atlantic Command, from 1991 until 1993. Admiral Gehman served as 

assistant for surface warfare captain assignments at Naval Military Personnel Command; head, offi cer plans and management branch on the staff 

of the chief of naval operations and executive assistant to the vice chief of 

naval operations from 1989 until 1990. He attended the NROTC program 

at Pennsylvania State University and graduated with a bachelor of science 

degree in industrial engineering.

General Charles R. Holland, USAF

General Holland assumed command on Oct. 27, 2000, as commander 

in chief, U. S. Special Operations Command. Before his current position, 

General Holland was vice commander, Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces 

in Europe (USAFE), Ramstein Air Base, Germany. He acted for and in 

the absence of the USAFE commander. In support of the U.S. European 

Command, the general conducted and coordinated offensive and defensive 

aerospace operations. The general entered the Air Force in 1968 after graduating from the U.S. Air Force Academy. He has commanded a squadron, two 

Air Force wings, and the Special Operations Command Pacifi c, and served 

as deputy commanding general of the Joint Special Operations Command. 

Before his current assignment, he was commander of the Air Force Special 

Operations Command at Hurlburt Field, Florida. He is a command pilot 

with more than forty-six hundred fl ying hours, including seventy-nine 

combat missions in an AC-130 Gunship in Southeast Asia.

General James L. Jones, USMC

General James Jones assumed his current post as thirty-second commandant of the Marine Corps in July 1999. Immediately before this assignment, 

he served as the military assistant to the secretary of defense. Previously, 

General Jones served as deputy chief of staff for plans, policies, and operations at Headquarters Marine Corps; director, Expeditionary Warfare 

Division (N85) in the Offi ce of the Chief of Naval Operations; and commanding general, 2d Marine Division, Marine Forces Atlantic. General 

Jones also served as deputy director (J-3), U.S. European Command, before 

being reassigned as chief of staff, Joint Task Force Provide Promise, for operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Earlier, General Jones served 

as commanding offi cer, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and participated 

in Operation Provide Comfort. Earlier in his career, General Jones served as 

senior aide and then military secretary to the commandant of the Marine 

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Corps and as commander of the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, 1st Marine Division. General Jones’ decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service 

Medal, Silver Star Medal, Legion of Merit with three gold stars, Bronze Star 

Medal with Combat V, and the Combat Action Ribbon. General Jones holds 

a B.S. degree from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and 

has attended the National War College.

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)

Mr. Carl Levin was fi rst elected to the United States Senate in 1978, after 

serving as president of the Detroit City Council, and is now serving his 

fourth term. He is the senior Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, where he has earned a reputation as a strong advocate for the men 

and women of our armed forces and as an effective waste fi ghter. Levin is 

a member of the Small Business Committee. He also serves as the ranking 

member of the Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, as well as of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He 

graduated with honors from Swarthmore College, and from Harvard University Law School.

General Montgomery C. Meigs, USA

In October 1999, General Montgomery C. Meigs returned to the 

Headquarters of United States Army Europe and 7th Army in Heidelberg, 

Germany. He had been serving as the commander of the multinational 

Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina since October 1998. He assumed 

the duties of commanding general, U.S. Army, Europe, and 7th Army on 

November 1998. He graduated from the United States Military Academy 

in 1967. After study at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and a year 

at the Army’s Command and General Staff College, he taught in the 

History Department at West Point and spent the 1981-82 academic year 

at Massachusetts Institute of Technology as an international affairs fellow 

of the Council on Foreign Relations. He received his Ph.D. in history from 

Wisconsin in 1982 before reporting to 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment as its 

executive offi cer. He has worked as a strategic planner on the Joint Staff in 

Washington, D.C., and assumed command of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored 

Division, on September 26, 1990, and soldiered with it through Desert 

Storm. He subsequently commanded the 7th Army Training Command 

in Grafenwoehr and served as chief of staff of V Corps and deputy chief 

of staff for operations of the U.S. Army, Europe, and 7th Army. General 

Meigs commanded the 3rd Infantry Division from July 1995 until February 

of 1996. In October 1996, he deployed with the 1st Infantry Division to 

Bosnia, serving nine months as COMEAGLE in command of NATO’s MultiNational Division (North) in Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard. His awards 

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include the Distinguished Service Medal, the Bronze Star Medal with V 

Device, and the Purple Heart.

General Klaus Naumann (Ret.)

General Klaus Naumann was chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 1996 to 1999. Immediately before taking this position, he served 

as chief of staff, Federal Armed Forces of Germany, from 1991 to 1996. 

Previously, he served as commanding general of I Corps in Münster. Earlier 

assignments included deputy chief of staff (politico-military affairs and 

operations) and deputy chief of staff (planning) on the Armed Forces Staff 

at the German Ministry of Defense (MOD) in Bonn. In addition, he had 

two assistant branch chief tours in Bonn and an assignment as executive 

offi cer to the vice chief of staff, Federal Armed Forces at MOD. He also 

served on the staff of the German military representative to the NATO 

Military Committee in Brussels, where he was chief of the military policy, 

nuclear strategy, and arms control section. General Naumann has published 

widely, including the book Die Bundeswehr in einer Welt im Umbruch [The 

Bundeswehr in a World of Transition]. His military awards and decorations General Naumann include the Commander’s Cross of Merit of the 

Federal Republic of Germany and the Gold Cross of Honour of the Federal 

Armed Forces. General Naumann’s military education includes the 13th 

Army General Staff Offi cer Training Course at the Federal Armed Forces 

Command and Staff College in Hamburg, Germany, and courses at the 

Royal College of Defence Studies, London.

Dr. Michael O’Hanlon

Dr. Michael O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, 

specializing in U.S. defense strategy and budgets, military technology, 

Northeast Asian security, and humanitarian intervention. He has been a 

senior scholar at Brookings since 1994 and an adjunct professor at Columbia 

University’s School of International and Public Affairs since 1996. From 

1989-94 he worked in the national security division of the Congressional 

Budget Offi ce. His most recently published book at Brookings is entitled 

How to Be a Cheap Hawk: The 1999 and 2000 Defense Budgets. His latest 

effort, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare, is forthcoming. He 

and Ivo Daalder are now collaborating on a book on the war over Kosovo. 

Dr. O’Hanlon received a bachelor’s degree in physics and a Ph.D. in public 

policy from Princeton University.

Admiral William A. Owens, USN (Ret.)

Admiral Owens is co-chief executive offi cer and vice chairman of Teledesic 

LLC, which is building a global, broadband Internet-in-the-sky. Previbiographies
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ously, he was president, chief operating offi cer, and vice chairman of 

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), the nation’s largest 

employee-owned high technology company. Before joining SAIC, Owens was 

vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the nation’s second-ranking 

military offi cer. He had responsibility for the reorganization and restructuring of the armed forces in the post-Cold War era. Owens was the architect of 

the revolution in military affairs (RMA), an advanced systems technology 

approach to military operations that is the most signifi cant change in the 

system of requirements, budgets, and technology for the four armed forces 

since World War II. Owens has written more than fi fty articles on national 

security and authored the book High Seas. He is a 1962 graduate of the U.S. 

Naval Academy with a bachelor’s degree in mathematics. He has bachelor’s 

and master’s degrees in politics, philosophy, and economics from Oxford 

University and a master’s degree in management from George Washington 

University.

General Peter Pace

General Peter Pace was promoted to general and assumed duties as the commander in chief, United States Southern Command, in September 2000. 

General Pace previously served as commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, 

Atlantic/Europe/South. General Pace has served as president, Marine Corps 

University/Commanding General, Marine Corps Schools, Marine Corps 

Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia. While serving in this 

capacity, he also served as deputy commander, Marine Forces, Somalia and 

as deputy commander, Joint Task Force. General Pace was advanced to major 

general in June 1994 and was assigned as the deputy commander/chief 

of staff, U. S. Forces, Japan. He was promoted to lieutenant general and 

assigned as the director for operations (J-3), Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 

General Pace is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy. He also 

holds a master’s degree in business administration from George Washington 

University (1972).

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., is the president of the Institute for Foreign 

Policy Analysis and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. 

He has held a visiting appointment as George C. Marshall Professor at 

the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium, and as professor at the National 

Defense College, Tokyo, Japan. He has advised key administration offi cials 

on military strategy, modernization, the future of the Atlantic Alliance, 

nuclear proliferation, and arms control policy. Dr. Pfaltzgraff has published 

extensively and lectured widely at government and industry forums in the 

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United States and overseas, including the National Defense University and 

the NATO Defense College. Dr. Pfaltzgraff leads the Institute’s research projects on future security environments, technology diffusion, and curricular 

development on issues associated with weapons of mass destruction. His 

work encompasses alliance relations, crisis management, missile defense, 

the development and conduct of gaming exercises, arms control issues, and 

strategic planning in the emerging security environment. He holds an M.A. 

in international relations, a Ph.D. in political science, and an M.B.A. in 

international business from the University of Pennsylvania.

Dr. Condoleezza Rice

Dr. Condoleezza Rice is the Thomas and Barbara Stephenson Senior Fellow at 

the Hoover Institution. She previously served as a Hoover senior fellow from 

1991 until 1993, when she was appointed provost of Stanford University. She 

is a tenured professor in the university’s political science department and 

was a Hoover Institution national fellow from 1985 until 1986. Following 

her initial Hoover Institution affi liation, Rice went to Washington, D.C., 

to work on nuclear strategic planning at the Joint Chiefs of Staff as part of 

a Council on Foreign Relations fellowship. She came back to Stanford when 

the fellowship ended. Rice returned to Washington in 1989 as director of 

Soviet and East European affairs with the National Security Council. She 

also was appointed special assistant to the president for national security 

affairs and senior director for Soviet affairs at the National Security Council 

under President George Bush. She has written numerous articles and several 

books on international relations and foreign affairs, including Germany 

Unifi ed and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft, with Philip Zelikow 

(Harvard University Press, 1995). Rice enrolled at the University of Denver 

at the age of fi fteen, graduating at nineteen with a bachelor ’s degree in 

political science (cum laude). She earned a master’s degree at the University 

of Notre Dame and a doctorate from the University of Denver’s Graduate 

School of International Studies.

General Charles T. “Tony” Robertson, Jr., USAF

General Charles T. “Tony” Robertson, Jr., is commander in chief, United 

States Transportation Command, and commander, Air Mobility Command, 

Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. As a unifi ed command commander in chief, 

he is responsible to the secretary of defense for the nation’s defense transportation requirements. He exercises command over service transportation 

components from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. As commander of Air 

Mobility Command, he provides operationally trained, equipped, and mission-ready air mobility forces to support U.S. requirements. The general 

entered the Air Force in 1968 as a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. 

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His thirty-year career has included a wide variety of operational and staff 

positions, among them command at the squadron, wing, and numbered air 

force levels. His most recent assignments include duty as director, personnel 

plans, Headquarters U.S. Air Force; vice director, the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, Washington, D.C.; vice commander, Air Mobility Command; and 

commander, 15th Air Force, Travis Air Force Base, Calif. A command pilot, 

he has logged more than 4,000 hours in airlift, tanker, and bomber aircraft, 

including 150 combat missions as a gunship pilot in Vietnam.

General Michael E. Ryan, USAF

General Ryan is chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. As 

chief, he serves as the senior uniformed Air Force offi cer responsible for 

the organization, training, and equipage of 750,000 active-duty, Guard, 

Reserve, and civilian forces serving in the United States and overseas. As a 

member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he and the other service chiefs function 

as military advisers to the secretary of defense, National Security Council, 

and the president. The general entered the Air Force after graduating from 

the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1965. He has commanded at the squadron, 

wing, numbered air force, and major command levels. He fl ew combat in 

Southeast Asia, including one hundred missions over North Vietnam. He 

also served in staff assignments at the major command level, Headquarters, 

U.S. Air Force, and the Joint Staff. As commander of 16th Air Force and 

Allied Air Forces Southern Europe in Italy, he directed the NATO air combat 

operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina that directly contributed to the Dayton 

Peace Accords. Before assuming his current position, the general was commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe and commander, Allied Air Forces 

Central Europe, with headquarters at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.)

Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft is founder and president of the Forum 

for International Policy, a nonpartisan, nonprofi t organization that provides 

independent perspectives and opinions on major foreign policy issues. He 

also is president of the Scowcroft Group, Inc., an international business 

consulting fi rm. General Scowcroft served as assistant to the president for 

national security affairs to Presidents Ford and Bush, and he worked as 

military assistant to President Nixon and as deputy assistant to the president 

for national security affairs to Presidents Nixon and Ford. He has held positions in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the headquarters of 

the U.S. Air Force, and the Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs. He has also chaired or served on a number of 

policy advisory councils, including the President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control, the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, 

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and the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. 

General Scowcroft received his undergraduate degree and commission into 

the Army Air Forces from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He has 

an M.A. and Ph.D. from Columbia University.

General Henry H. Shelton, USA

Commissioned a second lieutenant in the infantry in 1963 through the 

Reserve Offi cer Training Corps, General Shelton spent the next twentyfour years in a variety of command and staff positions in the continental 

United States, Hawaii, and Vietnam. He completed two tours in Vietnam, 

the fi rst with the 5th Special Forces Group and the second with the 173d 

Airborne Brigade. Following his selection for brigadier general in 1987, 

General Shelton served two years in the Operations Directorate of the Joint 

Staff. In 1989, he began a two-year assignment as assistant division commander for operations of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), a tour 

that included the division’s seven-month deployment to Saudi Arabia for 

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Upon returning from the Gulf 

War, General Shelton was promoted to major general and assigned to Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina, where he assumed command of the 82d Airborne 

Division. In 1993, he was promoted to lieutenant general and assumed 

command of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps. In 1994, while serving as corps 

commander, General Shelton commanded the Joint Task Force that conducted Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. In March 1996, he was 

promoted to general and became commander in chief of the U.S. Special 

Operations Command. General Shelton became the fourteenth chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 1, 1997. In this capacity, he serves 

as the principal military advisor to the president, the secretary of defense, 

and the National Security Council.

Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall

Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall is a senior research scholar at Stanford 

University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a senior 

advisor to the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project. She is a coauthor of the project’s most recent publication, Keeping the Edge: Managing 

Defense for the Future, in which she writes about managing the Pentagon’s 

international relations. She served from 1994-96 as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, with responsibility for 

national security policy toward the newly independent states of the former 

Soviet Union. In this capacity, she was honored with the Department of 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal. She is a consultant to the Offi ce of 

the Secretary of Defense and a member of the Pentagon’s Regional Centers’

Board of Visitors. She also advises Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

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on its nonproliferation and arms control initiatives in the former Soviet 

Union. Dr. Sherwood-Randall served previously as associate director of the 

Harvard Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, as chief foreign 

affairs and defense policy advisor to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., and as 

a guest scholar in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution. She 

holds a bachelor’s degree from Harvard-Radcliffe Colleges and a doctorate 

in international relations from Oxford University, where she was a Rhodes 

Scholar.

General Eric K. Shinseki, USA

General Shinseki graduated from the United States Military Academy in 

1965. Since his commissioning, he has served in a variety of command and 

staff assignments, both in the continental United States and overseas. These 

assignments included two combat tours in Vietnam with the 9th and 25th 

Infantry Divisions, as an artillery forward observer and as commander 

of Troop A, 3rd Squadron, 5th Cavalry. He has served in Hawaii at Schofi eld Barracks with Headquarters, United States Army Hawaii, and Fort 

Shafter with Headquarters, United States Army Pacifi c, and taught in the 

United States Military Academy’s Department of English. General Shinseki’s 

ten-plus years of service in Europe included command and senior staff 

assignments in Schweinfurt, Kitzingen, Wårzburg, and Stuttgart. He served 

as the deputy chief of staff for support, Allied Land Forces Southern Europe, 

in Verona, Italy. General Shinseki commanded the 1st Cavalry Division at 

Fort Hood, Texas. In July 1996, he was promoted to lieutenant general and 

became the deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, United States 

Army. In June 1997, he was appointed to the rank of general before assuming 

duties as commanding general, United States Army Europe; commander, 

Allied Land Forces Central Europe; and commander, NATO Stabilization 

Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He assumed duties as the twenty-eighth vice 

chief of staff, United States Army, on November 24, 1998. General Shinseki 

assumed duties as the thirty-fourth chief of staff, United States Army, on 

June 22, 1999.

Representative Ellen O. Tauscher (D-CA)

Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher is currently one of only two women to 

hold a leadership post among House Democrats. She is a member of the 

House Armed Services Committee and is active on nuclear nonproliferation, 

particularly in Russia and the former Soviet Republics. Rep. Tauscher sits 

on the Procurement and Military Personnel subcommittees. Rep. Tauscher 

was the youngest woman to hold a seat on the New York Stock Exchange 

for Bache Securities.

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Mr. Michael A. Vatis

Mr. Michael Vatis is the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

National Infrastructure Protection Center. Previously, Mr. Vatis served as 

associate deputy attorney general and deputy director of the Executive Offi ce 

for National Security in the Department of Justice. In this capacity, he 

advised the attorney general and the deputy attorney general on national 

security matters and coordinated the Department of Justice’s national 

security activities. Mr. Vatis has also served as a special counsel in the 

Department of Defense and as a law clerk to the late Justice Thurgood 

Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court and then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg of 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. circuit. Mr. Vatis has also worked as 

a lawyer in private practice in Washington, D.C. Michael Vatis is a magna 

cum laude graduate of Princeton University and Harvard Law School.

Dr. John P. White

Dr. John P. White is a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John 

F. Kennedy School of Government. From 1995-97, he served as deputy secretary of defense. From 1993-95, he was director of the Center for Business 

and Government and a lecturer at the Kennedy School, following his active 

involvement in both the Perot and Clinton presidential campaigns in 1992. 

He chaired a Presidential Commission on Defense and has participated 

in previous IFPA-sponsored meetings. Dr. White also served in the federal 

government as the deputy director of the Offi ce of Management and Budget 

(1978-81), assistant secretary of defense, manpower, reserve affairs, and 

logistics (1977-78), and an offi cer in the U.S. Marine Corps, on active duty 

from 1959-61. He has held corporate management positions in the private 

sector at the RAND Corporation, Interactive Systems Corporation, and 

Eastman Kodak Company. Dr. White holds a B.S. in industrial and labor 

relations from Cornell University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in economics 

from Syracuse University. Dr. White’s recent work includes Keeping the Edge: 

Managing Defense for the Future, a publication of the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project. Dr. White co-edited the volume with Dr. Ashton 

Carter, and authored chapters on the revolution in business affairs and 

ensuring quality people in defense.

biographies