alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 13.2



ALESTRA, S. DE R.L. DE C.V.



SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER



I, Patricio E. de la Garza, the Chief Financial and Administrative Officer of Alestra, S. de R.L. de C.V. (the Company), hereby
certify pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that, to the best of my knowledge:



1. the Companys annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2004, to which this statement is filed as an exhibit (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. the information contained
in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



Date: March 30, 2005



/s/ Patricio E. de la GarzaPatricio E. de la Garza Chief Financial and Administrative Officer
No. 42959.

#### Protests 11110-K (B), etc., of Nelson Bead Co., Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Brown, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-6480

CLEVELAND SANDERS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.

(CA-03-1127-6-25AK)

Submitted: July 15, 2004 Decided: July 21, 2004

Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Cleveland Sanders, Appellant Pro Se. Susan Rawls Edwards, NEXSEN

PRUETT, Columbia, South Carolina; Roy F. Laney, RILEY, POPE &

LANEY, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Cleveland Sanders appeals the district court’s order

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge to deny his

motion to remand his action back to state court. We have reviewed

the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on

the reasoning of the district court. See Sanders v. South Carolina

Dep’t of Corr., No. CA-03-1127-6-25AK (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2004). We

deny Sanders’s motion to consolidate, and we dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### George S. Haines, Petitioner *v.*Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Respondent.

Sabmitted on briefs, Jane 5, 1981,

to Jadges Mencer, Craig and MacPhail, sitting as a panel of three.

*540*Richard L. Orwig,*witli him *William, W. Runyeon, Edelman, Malsnee <& Orwig,*for petitioner.

*Joel G. Cavicchia,*Associate Counsel, with him *Richard Wagner,*Chief Counsel, and *LeRoy S. Zimmerman,*Attorney General for respondent.

July 15, 1981:

Opinion by

Judge Craig,

The claimant questions the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review’s affirmance of a referee’s decision which denied compensation on the basis of the willful misconduct provision of the Unemployment Compensation Law.1

The referee found that on March 31, 1980, the employer2 discharged claimant from his security guard position because, on the previous day, he was intoxicated at work. Here the claimant contends that the record is devoid of substantial competent evidence to support the board’s finding.3 We cannot agree.

The testimony of the claimant’s supervisor found credible by the referee is alone sufficient to support the findings of the referee.4

*541The claimant admitted that lie had been warned about working while under the influence of alcohol. This court has consistently held that an employee who reports to work in an intoxicated condition or drinks intoxicating liquor while on the job is guilty of willful misconduct. *Robinson v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,*51 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 72, 414 A.2d 143 (1980).

Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the board.

Order

And Now, July 15, 1981, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. B-186853, is hereby affirmed.

1

 Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, *as amended,*43 P.S. §802(e).

2

 Reading Parking Authority.

3

 Where, as here, the party with the burden of proving willful misconduct prevails before the referee, our scope of review is limited to whether there is substantial competent evidence to support the findings of fact. *Brooks v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,*37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 6, 388 A.2d 799 (1978).

4

 The testimony was:

> AEW2: We found him intoxicated in the booth a couple different time. As a matter of fact, on that Sunday, he worked one hour on a Sunday.

> QR: What Sunday?

> *541AEW2: That would have been the 30th of March. I got a call from the Y.M.C.A. stating there’s a man laying in one of our booths. They didn’t know what he was or who he was. I knew who it was. I went in and it was George. He went home. Everything was thought it was gonna be alright. And . . .

> QR: Well, what was the cause . . . was he ill?

> AEW2: No, he was not ill. He was intoxicated.
#### Taub, Hummel & Schnall, Inc. *v.*United States

No. 7314.

Invoice dated Nottingham, England, April 9, 1946.

Certified April 18, 1946.

Entered at New York, N. Y., May 9, 1946.

Entry No. 759833.

(Decided June 26, 1947)

*Siegel, Mandell & Davidson*for the plaintiff.

*Paul P. Rao,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Lawrence, Judge:

It has been agreed between the parties hereto that the issues herein relating to the above-mentioned merchandise are the same in all material respects as those decided in *United States*v. *Wm. S. Pitcairn Corp.,*33 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 183, C. A. D. 334, and that the record therein may be incorporated herein.

Upon the agreed facts I find the export value, as defined in section 402 (d), Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for determining the values of said merchandise, and that such values are the appraised values, less additions made by importer on entry because of advances by the appraiser in similar cases.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
EFH-2014.12.31-Exhibit 10(bb)






Exhibit 10(bb)


Director Compensation Arrangements


Directors who are current or former officers of Energy Future Holdings Corp. or employed by the Sponsor Group do not receive any fees for their service as directors. Mmes. Acosta and Williamson and Messrs. Reilly and Youngblood receive $200,000 annually, and with respect to Ms. Williamson, $7,500 per day for days substantially spent on matters related to our restructuring.
November 19, 2013

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

RUSSELL EVANS AND TERRIE EVANS, Appellants

NO. 14-12-01053-CV V.

CASEY DAVIS AND HAPPY HIDE-A-WAY CIVIC CLUB, INC., Appellees

________________________________

This cause, an appeal from the judgment in favor of appellees, Casey Davis 

and Happy Hide-A-Way Civic Club, Inc., signed October 11, 2012, was heard on 

the transcript of the record. We have inspected the record and find the trial court 

erred by granting summary judgment and awarding statutory fines and damages in 

favor of appellee Happy Hide-A-Way Civic Club, Inc., and by dismissing 

appellants’ claims against Happy Hide-A-Way Civic Club, Inc. We therefore

order these portions of the judgment REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED 

for further proceedings in accordance with this court’s opinion.

We find no error in the portion of the trial court’s judgment dismissing 

appellants’ claims against appellee Casey Davis, and we order it AFFIRMED.

We order appellee Happy Hide-A-Way Civic Club, Inc. to pay all costs 

incurred in this appeal. 

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





I, Joseph B. Guerrero, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Sunergy, Inc., for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of Sunergy, Inc.



|                         |  |                                                                                       
|------------------------ |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date:  November 14, 2008 |  | By:
/s/ Joseph  B. Guerrero                                                           
|                         |  | Joseph B. Guerrero, President, Chief Executive Officer
and principal executive officer
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. 1350)

In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Wells Core Office Income REIT, Inc. (the Registrant) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), the
undersigned, Leo F. Wells, III, Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant, and Douglas P. Williams, Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350) that, to
the best of our knowledge and belief:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                           
|---------------------------
|/s/ LEO F. WELLS, III      
|Leo F. Wells, III          
|Principal Executive Officer
|August 11, 2010            



|                           
|---------------------------
|/s/ DOUGLAS P. WILLIAMS    
|Douglas P. Williams        
|Principal Financial Officer
|August 11, 2010
#### Stephen L. Bartlett, Resp’t, *v.*Edward Sutorious, App’lt.

*(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,*

*Filed January 10,*1890.)

Abbbst—When obdbb will be vacated.

An order of arrest on the ground that defendant has converted moneys-received by him in a fiduciary capacity will be vacated where the complaint does not allege, or set forth facts showing a fiduciary capacity on the part of defendant.

Appeal from order denying motion to vacate an order of arrest.

The order of arrest was granted November 8, 1888, the ground stated therein being conversion by defendant of money “received by him as agent of said plaintiff in a fiduciary capacity." The complaint alleged that plaintiff shipped certain goods to defendant, then his agent at New York, to sell for cash or on thirty days* credit; that defendant received and sold said goods, except a portion which was returned, and collected the proceeds of said sales; that he has neglected and refused,to render an account or pay over such proceeds, and has wrongfully converted the same to his own ■*se.

*61A motion was made, upon order to show cause returnable November 15, to vacate" said order of arrest on the ground that the complaint did not sufficiently allege the receipt of said moneys *in a fiduciary capacity.*The action having been tried November 16 and 17, and a verdict rendered against defendant, the motion was denied on the ground that it necessarily fell by reason of such trial and verdict.

*A. G.*Fox, for app’lt; *D. D.*Sherman, for resp’t.

Per Curiam.

The order appealed from should be reversed and the order of arrest vacated, without costs.

Van Brunt, P. J. and Bartlett, J., concur.
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**FastenTech, Inc. and Subsidiaries**

 

**CERTIFICATIONS**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

I, Ronald B Kalich, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of FastenTech, Inc.;

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b) evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

c) disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s othercertifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent functions): 

 

a) all significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and 

 

b) any fraud, whether or notmaterial, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: August 15, 2005
EX-31.1
         RULE 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) CERTIFICATION OF JOHN FLEMING

                RULE 13a-14(a)/15d-14(a) CERTIFICATION

I, John Fleming, certify that:

1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of GameZnFlix,
Inc.;

2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to
the period covered by this report;

3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and
cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;

4.  I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure
controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) [omitted pursuant to extended compliance period] for
the small business issuer and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused
such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)  [omitted pursuant to extended compliance period]

(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report
my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business
issuer's internal control over financial reporting that occurred
during the small business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter
(the small business issuer's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of
an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably
likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting; and

5.  I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation of internal
control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer's
independent registered public accounting firm and the audit committee
of the small business issuer's board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
design or operation of internal control over financial reporting
which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small
business issuer's ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other employees who have a significant role in the small
business issuer's internal control over financial reporting.

Dated: March 26, 2007                  /s/ John Fleming
                                       John Fleming,Chief Executive Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8255 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8255

 To establish a minimum public comment period with respect to proposed 
        rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 6, 2024

  Mr. Lucas introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Financial Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To establish a minimum public comment period with respect to proposed 
        rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MINIMUM PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD.

    Section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78d) is 
amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(l) Minimum Public Comment Period.--
            ``(1) In general.--With respect to a proposed rulemaking 
        for which a public comment period is required under section 553 
        of title 5, United State Code, the Commission shall provide a 
        public comment period of--
                    ``(A) at least 60 days; or
                    ``(B) if the Commission determines the proposed 
                rule addresses imminent investor harm, at least 30 
                days.
            ``(2) Calculation of periods.--For purposes of calculating 
        the number of days in a period under paragraph (1) with respect 
        to a proposed rulemaking--
                    ``(A) a Federal holiday shall not be counted; and
                    ``(B) the period shall begin on the date the 
                proposed rule is published in the Federal Register.''.
                                 <all>
```
Before the Second Division,

December 6, 1960

No. 64941.

#### Witkowski New York Agency, Inc., and J. J. Gavin & Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

protest 60/3605 (New York).

Opinion by

Lawrence, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of flashgun socket adapters the same in all material respects as those the subject of *Witkowski New York Agency, Inc., et al.*v. *United States (42*Cust. Ct. 84, C.D. 2069), the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Heiss, Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 828]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Clabby, J.), rendered October 26, 1994, convicting him of grand larceny in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered.

A branch of Fleet Bank mistakenly credited the account of one of the defendant’s businesses with $38,592. The defendant withdrew the money and refused to return it even after being informed of the error, contending that he was expecting pay*563ment of substantially the same amount in a business deal. The defendant was then charged with and convicted of grand larceny in the third degree.

The court erred in admitting into evidence four civil judgments entered against the defendant and allowing the People to use them, pursuant to *People v Molineux*(168 NY 264), to show intent, motive, or lack of mistake. The judgments were not related to the alleged larceny and the defendant made no effort to use the money the bank mistakenly credited to repay the judgments *(cf, Matter of Brandon,*55 NY2d 206; *People v Fenner,*155 AD2d 946). The court’s ruling allowing the People to use the judgments in its direct case, and the defendant’s resulting attempts to explain the different circumstances underlying the judgments, diverted the jury’s attention from determining whether the defendant was guilty of the charged offense based on relevant, material evidence. The error of allowing the People to use the judgments on their direct case was not ameliorated by the court’s belated and insufficient supplemental instructions.

The court also erred in allowing the civil judgments to be used on cross-examination pursuant to *People v Sandoval*(34 NY2d 371). The civil judgments cannot be characterized as bad or immoral acts or acts involving moral turpitude that would allow them to be used to question the defendant’s credibility *(see, People v Gray,*84 NY2d 709; *People v Buggs,*109 AD2d 1052; *People v Montlake,*184 App Div 578).

Accordingly, a new trial is warranted. In light of this determination, we do not reach the defendant’s remaining contentions. O’Brien, J. P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Krausman, JJ., concur.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. GEORGE RABATIN, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

*Mr. Sanford Soren*for the petitioner.

*Mr. Martin J. Queenan*for the respondent.

April 18, 1967.

Denied.
#### JESSE SPRECHER, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. LEONARD KALB, DEFENDANT-PETITIONER.

April 13, 1964. Denied.

*Messrs. Earth & Enright*for the petitioner.

*Mr. George B. McLaughlin*and *Mr. Nicholas Scalera*for the respondent.

On petition for certification to Superior Court, Appellate Division. ’
# SI 1. tissue PAHs

# SI 2. lipid-normalized PAHs

# SI 3. tissue c-PCBs

# SI 4. lipid-normalized c-PCBs

# SI 5. tissue OCPs

# SI 6. lipid-normalized OCPs

# SI 7. tissue PBDEs

# SI 8. lipid-normalized PBDEs
#### WILLIAM HENDRICKS AND ADRIAN HENDRICKS, PARTNERS t/a *ETC.,*PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v. FRED J. BROTHERTON, INC., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, v. CALDWELL COLLEGE FOR WOMEN, *ET AL.,*THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

*Messrs. Major & Major*for the petitioners.

*Mr. Milton T. Lasher, Messrs. Gassert & Murphy*and *Mr. Joseph A. darken, Jr.*for the respondents.

March 12, 1968.

Denied.