[Cite as State v. Beasley, 2011-Ohio-6650.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 96806

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs.

ANTHONY L. BEASLEY

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND VACATED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-521632 

BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Boyle, P.J., and E. Gallagher, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 22, 2011 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 

Robert Tobik 

Chief Public Defender 

BY: Cullen Sweeney 

Assistant Public Defender 

310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Daniel T. Van 

 James M. Price 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶ 1} Appellant Anthony Beasley appeals his convictions in Cuyahoga County 

Common Pleas Court Case No. CR-521632. The state indicted Beasley on one count for 

failure to verify his current address in violation of R.C. 2950.06(F). For the following 

reasons, we reverse Beasley’s conviction and vacate his sentence. 
{¶ 2} In 1997, Beasley was convicted of rape in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas 

Court Case No. CR-346960. He was sentenced to prison and classified as a sexually 

oriented offender. Under that classification, Beasley was required to register and verify 

his address annually for ten years from his date of release from prison. In July 2007, 

Ohio’s version of the Adam Walsh Act (“AWA”) was enacted. After the AWA’s 

enactment, Beasley was reclassified under the AWA tier system and required to verify his 

address every 90 days for life. 

{¶ 3} In August 2008, Beasley failed to verify his address. He had previously 

verified his address in June 2008 according to his yearly reporting requirement under 

Megan’s Law. Beasley pleaded guilty to the one count and was sentenced to three years 

in prison. On March 4, 2011, Beasley filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Beasley attached his own affidavit to the motion setting forth the basis of the motion, 

more specifically, stating he was reclassified under the AWA and subjected to the more 

stringent reporting requirements. The trial court denied Beasley’s motion on the basis 

that the indictment did not include, as an element of the offense, that his duty to register 

arose from the AWA reporting requirements. 

{¶ 4} It is from this order that Beasley now appeals, raising one assignment of 

error, which provides as follows: “The trial court erred when it denied Mr. Beasley’s 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Mr. Beasley’s conviction is predicated on an 

unlawful reclassification and he is actually innocent of the charge.” In light of State v. 

Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, and State v. Gingell, 128 
Ohio St.3d 444, 2011-Ohio-1481, 946 N.E.2d 192, we find that Beasley’s sole assignment 

of error has merit. 

{¶ 5} “A motion to withdraw a guilty plea of guilty or no contest may be made 

only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence 

may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her 

plea.” Crim.R. 32.1. “Manifest injustice is a fundamental flaw in the path of justice so 

extraordinary that the defendant could not have sought redress from the resulting 

prejudice through another form of application reasonably available to him or her. It has 

also been defined as ‘a clear or openly unjust act,’ which exists only in extraordinary 

cases.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State v. Cottrell, Cuyahoga App. 

No. 95053, 2010-Ohio-5254, ¶ 15. We review a trial court’s denial of a postsentence 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at ¶ 16. 

{¶ 6} The Ohio Supreme Court held that reclassification under the AWA was 

unlawful if offenders had a duty to report under Megan’s Law from a prior court order. 

Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, at ¶ 22. Further, failing to report based on an AWA 

registration requirement unlawfully imposed cannot serve as the basis of a reporting 

violation charge, and convictions for such violations are void. State v. Gingell, 128 

Ohio St.3d 444; see, also, State v. Page, Cuyahoga App. No. 94369, 2011-Ohio-83, ¶ 10; 

State v. Gilbert, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 95083 and 95084, 2011-Ohio-1928; State v. Smith, 

Cuyahoga App. No. 92550, 2010-Ohio-2880, ¶ 29; State v. Patterson, Cuyahoga App. 

No. 93096, 2010-Ohio-3715; State v. Jones, Cuyahoga App. No. 93822, 2010-Ohio-5004. 
{¶ 7} In this case, the trial court denied Beasley’s postconviction motion to vacate 

his plea on the basis that the indictment did not include the element that Beasley’s 

reporting violation was predicated on the AWA requirements. While a true statement, 

the indictment would never have information about the basis of an offender’s reporting 

requirement. The basis of the reporting requirement is not an element of the 

failure-to-verify offense, and therefore, it would not be included in the indictment. 

Beasley attached an affidavit to his motion in which he stated that he was indicted for 

failing to verify his address according to the 90-day reporting requirement, imposed based 

on the unlawful reclassification, and that his reporting requirement upon release was to be 

completed annually pursuant to Megan’s Law. 

{¶ 8} A trial court abuses its discretion in denying a defendant’s motion to vacate 

a plea without first conducting an evidentiary hearing when the motion includes evidence 

sufficient to demonstrate a manifest injustice. State v. Russ, Cuyahoga App. No. 81580, 

2003-Ohio-1001, ¶ 12. Beasley included evidence in support of his motion that 

established that his conviction was invalid as a matter of law, and therefore he 

demonstrated a manifest injustice. The trial court abused its discretion in summarily 

denying Beasley’s motion. 

{¶ 9} The state concedes that Beasley’s conviction for the reporting violation is 

invalid if his unlawful reclassification served as the predicate of the reporting violation. 

The state asks this court to remand the matter in order to determine whether the unlawful 

reclassification served as the basis for Beasley’s conviction. We decline such a request 
in light of the fact Beasley’s Megan’s Law reporting requirements could not have existed 

as a matter of law when he was charged with the reporting violation. 

{¶ 10} In August 2008 when Beasley was indicted, the only applicable law was the 

AWA and the reporting requirements thereunder. When the Ohio legislature enacted the 

AWA, it repealed Megan’s Law and required the Attorney General to reclassify all 

offenders under the AWA. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, at ¶ 20. Therefore, Beasley 

could only be charged with violating his duty to report pursuant to the more stringent 

AWA reporting requirements at the time he was indicted. See id. By legislative 

decree, Beasley’s Megan’s Law reporting requirements no longer existed. It was not 

until the Ohio Supreme Court issued the Bodyke decision in June 2010 that the Megan’s 

Law reporting requirements were “reinstated.” Id. at ¶ 66. 

{¶ 11} As a matter of law, Beasley was indicted for a reporting violation based on 

Beasley’s reclassification, which was deemed unconstitutional. It therefore cannot serve 

as the predicate for the violations charged in the indictment, and Beasley is permitted to 

withdraw his plea in order to correct a manifest injustice. See, e.g., Gingell, 128 Ohio 

St.3d 444. Beasley’s sole assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶ 12} We reverse the decision of the trial court, vacate Beasley’s conviction, and 

remand for the sole purpose of vacating Beasley’s conviction and ordering his immediate 

release from the prison time he is serving for the current case. 

It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR