alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.6

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C.§1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Currency Series, a Series of The Frontier Fund on Form 10-Q for the
period ended March 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned hereby certifies, to the best of his knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Currency Series.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                                                                                           
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Robert J. Enck                                                                                                                         
|Robert J. Enck                                                                                                                             
|President and Chief Executive Officer of Equinox Fund Management, LLC, the Managing Owner of Currency Series, a Series of The Frontier Fund
|



|                                                                                                                             
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Brent Bales                                                                                                              
|Brent Bales                                                                                                                  
|Chief Financial Officer of Equinox Fund Management, LLC, the Managing Owner of Currency Series, a Series of The Frontier Fund
|

Date: November 26, 2008
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, Guoshen Tu, the Chief Executive Officer of CHINA SECURITY & SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY, INC. (the Company), DOES HEREBY CERTIFY that:



1. The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A for the quarter ended June 30, 2008 (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the undersigned has executed this statement this
5th day of
December 2008.



/s/ Guoshen Tu



Guoshen Tu

Chief Executive Officer

(Principal Executive Officer)



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to China Security & Surveillance Technology, Inc. and will be retained by China Security & Surveillance Technology, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



The forgoing certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to § 18 U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.





---
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. RALPH J. VISCONTI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ANDREW F. BUTZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Argued January 24, 1967

Decided May 1, 1967.

*242
      *Mr. Henry M. Spritzer*argued the cause for appellants (Messrs. *Spritzer and*Spritzer, attorneys).

*Mr. Richard 8. Cohen,*Assistant County Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent *(Mr. Edward J. Dolan,*Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney).

The opinion of the court was delivered

Pee Cueiam.

Defendants were convicted of bookmaking in violation of *N. J. S. 2A*:112-3, and each was sentenced to serve two to four years in State’s prison and fined $1,000.

They raise a number of issues, only some of which need be mentioned.

Defendants moved to suppress evidence seized upon a search under a warrant. The supporting affidavits were *243ample. Defendants say the judge who issued the warrant should have required the production of the informer to which the affidavit refers. The objection is without merit. *McCray v.*Illinois, 386 *U. S.*300, 87 *S. Ct.*1056, 18 *L. Ed. 2d*62 (U. S. March 20, 1967); *State v.*Burnett, 42 *N. J.*377 (1964). Defendants’ suggestion that some five or six telephone calls taken by the raiding officers might have been made by the informer to create false evidence against defendants is without any factual basis, and the possibility of' it (extremely remote in the light of other overwhelming-evidence of bookmaking) did not make that evidence sen untrustworthy as to be inadmissible.

With respect to the sentence, defendants make the same attack we rejected in *State v.*DeStasio, 49 *N. J.*247 (1967), decided this day. The record reveals that counsel for defendant rested his objection upon an assumption that there was a directive requiring the sentencing judge to jail defendants unless they offered to testify against their superiors. The sentencing judge, who presided at the trial, said he had not seen the directive. There is some obscurity in the dialogue as to whether the sentencing judge assumed defense counsel was correct in his claim concerning the content of the directive, but we cannot find that the sentencing judge did anything other than exercise his own discretion. This seems evident from the fact that the sentencing judge imposed a jail term above the statutory mandatory minimum, a course he would not have followed if he thought that a jail term was not warranted. Further, since the presentence reports show that both defendants had criminal records, including as to each a lengthy prison term for traffic in heroin, we should not assume the trial judge did anything other than what he believed sound judgment demanded of him. Nonetheless, to obviate the chance that we misread the record, our action in affirming the judgment is without prejudice to a prompt application by defendants to the sentencing judge for resentenee, which of course should *244be denied, unless the judge sentenced under the misapprehension discussed above.

The judgments are affirmed.

*For*affirmance—Chief Justice Weintraub and Justices Jacobs, Erancis, Hall, Schettino and Haneman—6.

*For*reversal—None.
No. 58643.

protest 229216- K (New York).

#### H. A. Gogarty, Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

Since the protest was filed more than 60 days after liquidation, it was dismissed as untimely, by virtue of section 514, Tariff Act of 1930.
The following cases in wh ich the Court of Appeals issued published opinions have been appealed to the Supreme Court:

1. Dennis Holland v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Record No. 0965-12-3 Opinion rendered by Judge Humphreys on October 22, 2013

2. Traveyan Lee Chambliss v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Record No. 0983-12-2 Opinion rendere d by Judge Huff on October 22, 2013

3. Mark Farewell v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Record No. 1572-12-2 Opinion rendere d by Judge Huff on October 22, 2013

4. Darren D. Snowden v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Record No. 1570-12-1 Opinion rendered by Judge Alston on October 29, 2013

5. Levin Grimes v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Record No. 0293-13-1 Opinion rendered by Judge McCullough on October 29, 2013

6. Jared Benjamin Bailey v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Record No. 0465-12-2 Opinion rendered by Senior Judge Coleman on October 29, 20137. Kerry Lee Winslow v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Record No. 2113-12-1 Opinion rendered by Judge Kelsey on November 8, 2013
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8589 

To require the United States Postal Service to implement recommendations 

from the Inspector General of the United States Postal Service for 

decreasing instances of delayed mail, improving staffing, and training, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 31, 2024 

Mr. STAUBER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Oversight and Accountability 

A BILL 

To require the United States Postal Service to implement 

recommendations from the Inspector General of the 

United States Postal Service for decreasing instances 

of delayed mail, improving staffing, and training, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Rural Mail Improve5 ment Act’’. 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 8589 IH

1 SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT FOR THE POSTAL SERVICE TO IM2 PLEMENT CERTAIN RECOMMENDATIONS OF 

3 THE INSPECTOR GENERAL. 

4 Not later than one year after the date of the enact5 ment of this Act, the United States Postal Service shall 

6 review and, to the extent practicable, implement the rec7 ommendations of the Inspector General of the United 

8 States Postal Service with respect to delayed mail, staff9 ing, and training in the report by the Office of the Inspec10 tor General of the United States Postal Service entitled 

11 ‘‘Delivery in Northern Minnesota’’ (Report Number 24– 

12 048–R24) and dated May 6, 2024. 

Æ 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. QUY DINH NGUYEN, AKA The Boss, AKA The Godfather, AKA The Old Man, Defendant - Appellant. No. 12-30079 D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00062-RSM-1
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted April 9, 2013 Seattle, Washington Before: D.W. NELSON, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. Quy Dinh Nguyen appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We have jurisdiction unde r 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and dismiss the appeal pursuant to the appellate waiver include d in Nguyen’s plea agreement. In the 

# FILED
APR 26 2013 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 alternative, we affirm on the merits the district court’s denial of Nguyen’s motion to withdraw. 1. “A defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable if (1) the language of the waiver encompasses his ri ght to appeal on the grounds raised, and (2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.” United States v. Jeronimo , 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Jacobo Castillo , 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Nguyen argues only that his waiver is ambiguous as to whet her he retained the right to pursue the instant appeal, thus effectively concedi ng that his federal waiver was knowing and voluntary. Pursuant to his plea agreement, however, Nguyen unambiguously waived the right to appeal both the finding of his guilt (i.e., his conviction) and his sentence. See United States v. Rahman , 642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011). Nguyen’s appeal is thus dismissed. 2. Even if Nguyen had not waived his right to appeal, the district court properly denied his motion to withdraw hi s guilty plea. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B), “[a] defendant may withdraw a guilty plea . . . after the court accepts the plea, but beforeit imposes sentence if . . . the defendant can show a fair and just reason for reque sting the withdrawal.” The standard is applied liberally. See United States v. Nagra , 147 F.3d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1998).3 “Fair and just reasons for withdrawal in clude inadequate Rule 11 plea colloquies, newly discovered evidence, intervening circumstances, or any other reason for withdrawing the plea that did not exist when the defendant entered the plea.” United States v. Ortega-Ascanio , 376 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 2004). Nothing in the record indicates the district court applied an incorrect standard in rejecting Nguyen’s motion. Moreover, Nguyen points to no flaws in the federal proceedings. We thus concl ude that Nguyen did not show a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea. We do not reach his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which is better reserved for a habeas proceeding. United States v. Simas , 937 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). DISMISSED
.
## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
N O . A P - 76, 030

EX PA R TE FR A N C I SC O N O R I EG A - G A R C I A , A ppl i c ant
ON AP P LI CAT I ON F OR A W RI T OF HABE AS CORP US CAUS E N O. W 3 6 6 - 8 0 0 0 7 - 0 6 ( HC) I N T HE 3 6 6 TH DI S TR I CT COURT

FROM CO LLI N CO UNTY

P er cur i am . O P I N I O N Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Crim i n al P ro ce dure, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for writ of habe as cor

pus. Ex pa rte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of three counts of ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild and one count of indece ncy

with a child and sente nced to life imprisonment. The Fifth Court of Appea ls affirme d his conviction. Nor ie ga -Garc ia v . S

tate , No. 05-06-00262- CR (Tex. App. – Dallas, Marc h 7, 2007, no pet.) (not designated f or publication.) Applicant conte nds that his appellate counsel re ndere d ineff e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e b e c a u s e counsel failed to timely

notify Applicant that his conviction had been affirmed and failed to advise himof2

his right to petition for discretionar y revie w pro se. The trial c ourt has ente red fi n d i n g s of fa ct and c onclusions of law that Applica nt was deprive d of his right to file a petition for discre tionary revie w pro se. Ex parte Riley , 193 S.W .3d 90 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ). We f ind , th e re fo re , th at App lic ant is e nti tle d to the op po rt un ity to f ile
an o ut- of -t ime pe tit ion

fo r d isc re tio na

ry re vie w o f t

he jud g me nt o f t

he F if th Co urt of App e a ls i n Cause No. 05-06-00262- CR that aff irmed his conviction in Ca se No. 366-80007-06 from the 366th J udicial District Court of Colli nCounty . Applicant shall file his petition for discre tio nary revie w wi th t he F if th Court of Ap pe a ls w ith in 3 0 d ay s o f t he date on

wh ic h th is C ourt ’s mand ate iss ue s.

Deliver ed: Novembe r 5, 2008 Do no t pu bli sh
#### Rohner, Gehrig & Co., Inc., et al. *v.*United States

No. 7484.

Entry Nos. 25125; 714247; 705158.

Invoices dated London, England, December 1942, etc.

Certified December 1942, etc.

Entered at New York, N. Y., January 16, 1943, etc.

(Decided December 18, 1947)

*Siegel, Mandell & Davidson*for the plaintiffs.

*Paul P. Bao,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Mollison, Judge:

The appeals for reappraisement listed in schedule A, hereto attached and made a part hereof, have been submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of counsel for the parties hereto:

(Stipulation omitted.)

On the agreed facts I find the export value, as that value is defined in section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for the determination of the value of the merchandise here involved, and that such values are the appraised values, less the additions made by the importers on entry because of advances by the appraiser in similar cases.

Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 58 (Tuesday, March 27, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Page 14270]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-5513]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket No. CP05-92-003]


Liberty Gas Storage, LLC; Notice of Compliance Filing

March 21, 2007.
    Take notice that on March 16, 2007, Liberty Gas Storage, LLC, 
tendered for filing as part of its FERC Gas Tariff, Original Volume No. 
1, the revised tariff sheets attached to the filing, with an effective 
date of April 15, 2007.
    Any person desiring to protest this filing must file in accordance 
with Rule 211 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 
CFR 385.211). Protests to this filing will be considered by the 
Commission in determining the appropriate action to be taken but will 
not serve to make protestants parties to the proceeding. Such protests 
must be filed on or before the date as indicated below. Anyone filing a 
protest must serve a copy of that document on all the parties to the 
proceeding.
    The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests in lieu 
of paper using the ``eFiling'' link at http://www.ferc.gov. Persons 
unable to file electronically should submit an original and 14 copies 
of the protest to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First 
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426.
    This filing is accessible on-line at http://www.ferc.gov, using the 
``eLibrary'' link and is available for review in the Commission's 
Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. There is an ``eSubscription'' 
link on the Web site that enables subscribers to receive e-mail 
notification when a document is added to a subscribed docket(s). For 
assistance with any FERC Online service, please e-mail 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#20666572636f4e4c494e45735550504f525460464552430e474f56"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="0c4a495e4f4362606562695f797c7c637e784c6a697e6f226b637a">[email protected]</span></a>, or call (866) 208-3676 (toll free). For 
TTY, call (202) 502-8659.
    Comment Date: 5 p.m. Eastern Time on March 28, 2007.

Philis J. Posey,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. E7-5513 Filed 3-26-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P


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#### UNITED STATES, Appellant v ROBERT “R” ABBOTT, JR., Seaman Apprentice, U. S. Navy, Appellee

15 USCMA 406, 35 CMR 378

No. 18,587

May 21, 1965

*Major Daniel F. McConnell,*USMC, was on the brief for Appellant, United States. •

*Lieutenant Craig F. Swoboda;*USNR, was on the brief for Appellee, Accused.

Opinion of the Court

Per Curiam:

The issue presented in this case is identical to that decided by the Court in United States v Tuten, 15 USCMA 387, 35 CMR 359. Although the record of previous convictions admitted here omits the date on which the offenses involved occurred, the trial transcript otherwise demonstrates that they weré within accused’s current enlistment and within three years next preceding the date of the offense of which he was here found guilty. For the reasons set forth in United States v Tuten, supra, we find the board of review acted incorrectly in concluding that the admission of the prosecution exhibits in question was prejudicially erroneous.

The certified question is answered in the negative. The decision of the board of review is reversed, and the record of trial is returned to The Judge Advocate General of the Navy for further review by the board of review consistent with this opinion.
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v NORMAN L. MABRY, Staff Sergeant, U. S. Army, Appellant

17 USCMA 285, 38 CMR 83

*286No. 20,377

November 17, 1967

*Colonel Daniel T. Ghent, Captain Paul V. Melodía,*and *Captain Thomas D. Wise*were on the pleadings for Appellant, Accused.

*Lieutenant Colonel David Rarick*and *Captain William R. Steinmetz*were on the pleadings for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of ttle Court

Ferguson, Judge:

By his pleas of guilty, the accused was convicted of two specifications of willful disobedience of a lawful command, in violation of Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 90, 10 USC § 890. One of the orders was “to get your gear ready and go on a combat ambush patrol;” the other being “to go to the field with the Company.”

Evidence of accused’s eight years’ prior honorable service was introduced, and Sergeant Mabry expressed a desire to remain in the service. He stated circumstances “sort of built up in my mind and I couldn’t go out any more.” On cross-examination, he further declared that, if returned to duty in his unit, he would not accompany it on combat operations. Trial counsel in his argument admitted Mabry’s record was good and based his contention for a severe sentence on the seriousness of accused’s crimes. The law officer limited his instructions on the punishment to the maximum sentence which might be imposed — dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, confinement at hard labor for ten years, and reduction — and the mechanics of voting. In addition, however, he added that the maximum for each count was five years.

The law officer’s failure to instruct the court more fully regarding the matters it should consider was erroneous. United States v Wheeler, 17 USCMA 274, 38 CMR 72. Under the circumstances, however, the error was not prejudicial. The matter presented in mitigation was limited; accused offered no real explanation of his failure to comply with orders basic to the function of any military organization; and the court-martial adjudged a sentence which did not exceed half the maximum. In light of the simplicity of the matters presented and the punishment, we conclude there was no fair risk of harm from the erroneous lack of further instructions. Code, supra, Article 59(a), 10 USC § 859(a).

Judge Kilday concurs.

Quinn, Chief Judge

(concurring in the result):

I concur in the result. See my separate opinion in United States v Wheeler, 17 USCMA 274, 38 CMR 72.