No. 342 May 30, 2024 697

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 

STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of A. J. G., 

a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.

OREGON STATE HOSPITAL 

and Oregon Health Authority,

Appellants,

v.

A. J. G.,

Respondent,

and

LEGACY EMANUEL HOSPITAL & HEALTH CENTER,

dba Unity Center for Behavioral Health,

Intervenor-Respondent,

and

MARION COUNTY,

Other Interested Party.

Marion County Circuit Court

22CC00740; A179054

Audrey J. Broyles, Judge.

Argued and submitted March 4, 2024.

Jona J. Maukonen, Assistant Attorney General, argued 

the cause for appellants. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. 

Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, 

Solicitor General.

Liza Langford argued the cause and filed the brief for 

respondent A. J. G.

Eric J. Neiman argued the cause for respondent Legacy 

Emanuel Hospital & Health Center. Also on the brief were 

Emma P. Pelkey and Epstein Becker Green; and Alex Van 

Rysselberghe, Timothy W. Snider, Nathan R. Morales, and 

Stoel Rives, LLP.
698 Oregon State Hospital v. A. J. G.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and 

Hellman, Judge.

ORTEGA, P. J.

Motion to dismiss appeal denied; July 12, 2022, order 

vacated and remanded with instructions to grant Oregon 

State Hospital’s and Oregon Health Authority’s motion to 

dismiss the motion for immediate placement.
Cite as 332 Or App 697 (2024) 699

ORTEGA, P. J.

In this civil commitment case, the Oregon State 

Hospital and the Oregon Health Authority (collectively, 

OHA) appeal from a post-judgment order of the trial court 

that directed OHA to immediately place AG, a person civilly 

committed to the authority of OHA, into a secure residential 

treatment facility. In the order, the court granted a motion for 

immediate placement brought by Legacy Emanuel Hospital 

& Health Center d/b/a Unity Center for Behavioral Health 

(Unity), an acute-care psychiatric hospital, which was treating AG when she was civilly committed, and denied OHA’s 

motion to dismiss Unity’s motion for that immediate placement. In this appeal, we are asked to decide whether we 

have jurisdiction to review the placement order, whether the 

appeal is moot, and whether the trial court had authority to 

consider Unity’s motion and issue the placement order.

We conclude that we have jurisdiction and that the 

appeal is not moot. As for the final question, we conclude 

that the court did not have authority to consider Unity’s 

motion or issue the placement order given the scope of a 

civil commitment case as limited by statute. As a result, 

the trial court erred in denying OHA’s motion to dismiss. 

Accordingly, we vacate the court’s placement order and 

remand with instructions to grant OHA’s motion to dismiss 

Unity’s motion for immediate placement.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

The following facts are not in dispute. AG, a Marion 

County resident, first came to Unity, located in Multnomah 

County, on January 1, 2022. Unity is a free-standing psychiatric hospital with emergency services as well as several 

inpatient units. Its intended function is to admit individuals 

experiencing a psychiatric crisis, stabilize the person’s condition, and then transfer the person to a facility where they 

can receive the next level of care. The average length of stay 

for a patient at Unity is 14 days.

When AG arrived at Unity, her thinking was disorganized, she was experiencing command auditory hallucinations telling her to kill herself as well as hyperreligious delusions and suicidal and homicidal thoughts, 
700 Oregon State Hospital v. A. J. G.

and she was hypersexual. About four weeks after admitting her, Unity initiated proceedings to have AG committed 

to OHA. On February 11, AG stipulated to a civil commitment in Multnomah County to the custody of OHA for up 

to 180 days, but she remained at Unity. On March 31, AG 

was discharged from Unity for a trial visit in a community 

placement in Marion County, and the commitment case was 

transferred to Marion County. Shortly after beginning that 

trial visit, AG overdosed on fentanyl and later was arrested 

on a parole violation and jailed. On April 20, AG was transported from the jail back to Unity. At that time, she was 

again in a decompensated state.

A week after AG was readmitted to Unity, on April 

28, the exceptional needs care coordinator for Marion County, 

in cooperation with Unity, referred AG for admission to the 

Oregon State Hospital. On May 3, OHA approved the referral 

and AG was placed on the waitlist, but OHA denied Unity’s 

separate request for expedited admission for AG. While she 

was on the waitlist, OHA inquired about post-acute intensive 

treatment services for AG, which involves a short-term inpatient secure residential treatment facility that is available 

while a person is on the Oregon State Hospital waitlist. On 

June 16, however, AG was removed from the Oregon State 

Hospital waitlist because she no longer needed that level 

of care. At that point, the Marion County care coordinator 

made several other referrals to various forms of residential 

treatment, all of which were accepted but which resulted in 

AG being placed on waitlists. Thus, after AG was removed 

from the Oregon State Hospital waitlist, she remained at 

Unity.

While AG was still on the Oregon State Hospital 

waitlist, on June 1, Unity moved to intervene in the civilcommitment case for the purpose of “obtaining an order 

to immediately transfer [AG] to an appropriate long-term 

placement.” At that point, the court appointed counsel to 

represent AG. For its part, OHA also moved to intervene 

but did not oppose Unity’s intervention. On June 21, the 

court granted the motions to intervene. On June 24, Unity 

filed its motion for immediate placement of AG. In response, 

OHA moved to dismiss Unity’s motion or alternatively deny 
Cite as 332 Or App 697 (2024) 701

it, arguing that Unity could not obtain the relief requested 

through intervention in the case and that the court did not 

have authority to direct placement decisions. AG did not file 

a written response to either Unity’s or OHA’s motions, but 

her attorney participated in the hearing on the motions. 

At the hearing AG’s attorney stated that AG’s position was 

that she wanted to transfer to a less restrictive placement, 

acknowledging that that placement may be available soon 

but is not available now, and also stated that AG’s main 

desire was to not be placed at the Oregon State Hospital.

At the hearing on Unity’s motion, the court summarily denied OHA’s motion to dismiss, explaining that, in 

its view, “the Court has the inherent authority to address 

the issues that have been raised today.” After taking evidence, the court granted Unity’s motion, making extensive 

findings about AG’s history, including that the “people who 

are intimately familiar with AG and her needs believe that 

a secure residential treatment facility is most appropriate at 

this time.” The court found that Unity was not a “suitable” 

placement for AG, and that “there has been a dereliction of 

the obligation of OHA to find [AG an] appropriate long-term 

placement.” The court found that AG was unable to advocate 

for herself and that OHA’s failure to find a long-term placement violated her due process rights, which “require[] that 

mentally ill persons who are detained receive treatment calculated to lead to the end of their involuntary detention” and 

give a “realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve the 

mental condition.” The court stated:

“This is not an issue of the Court telling OHA where 

[AG] needs to go. That would be inappropriate. But this is 

a directive to figure out the appropriate [placement] rather 

than turning a blind eye to this issue. Lack of resources 

and capacity issues and whatever has been wreaking 

havoc apparently with OHA for the last several years is not 

a defense to violation of someone’s civil liberties and civil 

rights.”

The court then ordered that

“AG be transported to a secure residential treatment facility to include Oregon State Hospital if appropriate by next 

Friday, July 15th by noon.
702 Oregon State Hospital v. A. J. G.

“And if that does not happen, then I expect all parties to 

appear in front of me and show cause why that hasn’t happened and why * ** OHA would not be potentially found in 

contempt.”

On July 12, the court entered an order memorializing its oral pronouncement (the placement order), which 

provides:

“1. On February 11, 2022, respondent was involuntarily 

committed to [OHA] for 180 days of treatment.

“2. Aside from a brief trial visit, respondent has spent 

her entire commitment period at Unity, an acute care hospital that is not best able to treat her at this time. [OHA] 

has not made a placement decision or determined that 

Unity is best able to treat respondent.

“3. Respondent has a right to adequate and effective 

treatment. The State of Oregon must provide all civilly 

committed persons with access to mental health treatment 

that gives them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to 

improve the mental condition for which they were confined.

“4. Unity is not an appropriate facility at this time for 

respondent because it cannot provide adequate and effective long-term treatment that respondent is entitled to.

“Based on these findings,

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Unity’s motion for 

immediate placement is GRANTED; and

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [OHA] must transfer 

respondent from Unity to a secure residential treatment 

facility, to include the Oregon State Hospital if appropriate, 

by July 15, 2022 at 12:00 p.m. lf no such placement is made, 

[OHA] is to appear and show cause why it should not be 

held in contempt on July 15, 2022 at 1:30 p.m.”

OHA appeals from that order, and both Unity and 

AG appear on appeal to respond.1

1 In a prior opinion, Oregon Health Authority, 327 Or App 1, 533 P3d 827 

(2023), we set out what occurred following the entry of the placement order, which 

included the court holding OHA in summary contempt and fining it $100,000. 

We reversed the contempt judgment because the court did not have authority to 

punish OHA through summary contempt proceedings. Id. at 5.
Cite as 332 Or App 697 (2024) 703

II. UNITY’S JUSTICIABILITY ARGUMENTS

Before we can address the merits of OHA’s appeal, 

we must first address two issues of justiciability that Unity 

raises in its answering brief: appellate jurisdiction and 

mootness. As explained below, we conclude that we have 

jurisdiction to review this appeal under ORS 19.205(3) and 

that the controversy is not moot.

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, Unity asserts that we do not 

have jurisdiction to consider OHA’s appeal of the placement 

order. For jurisdiction, OHA relies on ORS 19.205(3), which 

provides that “[a]n order that is made in the action after a 

general judgment is entered and that affects a substantial 

right ** * may be appealed in the same manner as provided 

in this chapter for judgments.” Under that provision, “all 

orders entered after a general judgment [are] appealable so 

long as the order affects a substantial right.” Bhattacharyya 

v. City of Tigard, 212 Or App 529, 535, 159 P3d 320 (2007). 

It is undisputed that the placement order was made after 

general judgment was entered. The only issue is whether 

the placement order “affects a substantial right.”

OHA argues that the order affects a substantial 

right because it required OHA to make a specific type of 

placement for AG—to a secured residential treatment 

facility—and it continues to be in effect, exposing OHA to 

future litigation if AG’s placement changes. Unity counters 

that the placement order does not affect a substantial right 

because it merely effectuated the commitment judgment by 

requiring OHA to make a suitable placement for AG, which 

OHA was already statutorily required to do. Unity also 

asserts that the potential for future litigation does not confer jurisdiction.

We initially observe that Unity’s arguments about 

jurisdiction mirror its arguments on the merits of the 

order—that is, Unity asserts that the order merely effectuates the commitment judgment. Whether or not Unity is correct about what the order does is at the heart of the merits 

of OHA’s appeal. However, “[t]he issue for purposes of determining appealability * * * is not whether one party or the 
704 Oregon State Hospital v. A. J. G.

other is right on the merits of the appeal, but whether an 

order * * * is an order that ‘affects a substantial right’ under 

ORS 19.205(3).” Mendoza v. Xtreme Truck Sales, LLC, 314 

Or App 87, 92, 497 P3d 755 (2021).

We conclude that the placement order does affect a 

substantial right. On its face, the placement order directs 

OHA to take a particular action with respect to AG—an 

action that OHA contends the trial court did not have authority to require—and further provides that, should OHA fail 

to take the required action, OHA must appear and explain 

why it should not be held in contempt. See Bhattacharyya, 

212 Or App at 534 (concluding that an order setting aside 

judgments affected a substantial right because it “exposed 

petitioner to further litigation, additional costs, and attorney fees”). The placement order affects a substantial right of 

OHA and, thus, it is appealable under ORS 19.205(3).

B. Mootness

Unity also asserts that we should dismiss OHA’s 

appeal because it is moot.2 “A case becomes moot when a 

decision on the merits ‘would resolve merely an abstract 

question without practical effect.’” Garges v. Premo, 362 

Or 797, 801, 421 P3d 345 (2018) (quoting Warren v. Lane 

County, 297 Or 290, 293, 686 P2d 316 (1984)). “Whether a 

case has become moot will depend on a factual determination regarding the potential impact of the court’s decision on 

the parties.” Id. at 802. The burden is on the party seeking 

dismissal to establish that a case is moot. State v. K. J. B., 

362 Or 777, 785, 416 P3d 291 (2018).

Here, Unity asserts that the placement order can 

no longer have any practical effect on the parties because in 

November 2022 AG was accepted into a long-term care facility and, thus, the dispute no longer exists, and the placement order no longer applies. OHA responds that the mere 

fact that OHA is currently in compliance with the order does 

not render it moot. OHA argues that the terms of the order 

affect its ability to transfer AG to any placement other than 

a secured residential treatment facility or the Oregon State 

2 The Appellate Commissioner denied Unity’s motion to dismiss for mootness 

but, in denying reconsideration of that order, the Chief Judge expressly permitted 

Unity to raise the issue in briefing to the merits panel.
Cite as 332 Or App 697 (2024) 705

Hospital, even if her needs change. Unity argues that the 

placement order does not have any continuing effect because 

it was based on AG’s circumstances and needs at the time of 

the order and those circumstances are now changed.

We conclude that Unity has not carried its burden to 

demonstrate that the appeal is moot. Nothing in the placement order suggests that it ceases to be enforceable once AG 

is placed in a secured residential treatment facility. Indeed, 

AG was placed in such a facility in July 2022, according 

to the terms of the placement order, but when that placement promptly failed due to AG’s behavior in the placement, 

the trial court held OHA in contempt. See Oregon Health 

Authority, 327 Or App 1, 533 P3d 827 (2023). The placement 

order does not have an expiration date and, should AG’s current placement end while she is civilly committed and in 

need of long-term treatment, the placement order appears 

to have continuing effect. None of the parties on appeal 

have provided us with any information that would lead us to 

believe that the placement order has been vacated, replaced 

with a different order, or that AG is no longer committed to 

the custody of OHA such that the order could not have any 

continuing effect in this case.3 As a result, we deny Unity’s 

renewed motion to dismiss the appeal as moot.

III. OHA’S APPEAL

We proceed to address the merits of OHA’s appeal. 

Essentially, OHA asserts that the court reviewed and 

directed AG’s placement, which is a decision that is statutorily committed to the discretion of OHA and, thus, the court 

had no authority to enter that order.4 Taking a different 

3 At oral argument in March 2024, OHA represented that AG remains civilly 

committed. Our understanding from OHA is that AG’s civil commitment has continued well beyond the initial 180-day commitment period under the procedure 

that allows OHA to seek an order of the court every 180 days to continue a commitment. See ORS 426.301; ORS 426.303; ORS 426.307.

4 In its appeal, OHA raises two issues: the trial court’s authority to issue 

the placement order and Unity’s constitutional standing to obtain the order to 

the extent it was based on AG’s federal due process rights. Ordinarily, we would 

proceed first to address standing, because it raises an issue of justiciability. See 

Concienne v. Asante, 299 Or App 490, 498, 450 P3d 533 (2019), rev den, 366 Or 

135 (2020) (We “have an independent obligation to consider jurisdictional issues, 

including standing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). However, because we 

conclude that the court did not have authority to issue the order on any basis 
706 Oregon State Hospital v. A. J. G.

view, AG and Unity assert that the court’s order was an 

order enforcing the commitment judgment, which the court 

could enter pursuant to its inherent authority to enforce 

judgments. We conclude that the court did not have authority—statutory or inherent—in a civil commitment proceeding and at the request of the hospital currently treating AG, 

to review AG’s current placement and circumstances and 

issue an order directing OHA to transfer AG to a different facility, as the court undisputedly was asked to do and 

did. Thus, the court erred when it denied OHA’s motion to 

dismiss.

A. The court lacked statutory authority to consider Unity’s 

motion and issue the placement order.

AG was civilly committed to the custody of OHA as 

a “person with mental illness,” which is provided for in ORS 

426.005 to 426.390. Those statutes address the procedures 

to be followed both for the detention and care of a person 

who has not yet been committed and for the civil commitment of that person. See also generally State v. C. H., 195 

Or App 538, 542-44, 98 P3d 767 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 16 

(2005) (describing commitment statutes). Those statutes set 

out a limited scope for proceedings under ORS 426.095,5

with a limited number of potential outcomes. Under ORS 

426.130, if the court finds that the person is a “person with 

mental illness,” as defined in ORS 426.005(1)(f), there are 

three potential outcomes: (1) the court must release the person and dismiss the case if the person is willing and able to 

participate in voluntary treatment, (2) the court may order 

conditional release of the person, subject to the requirements of ORS 426.125, or (3) the court may order the person 

committed to OHA “for treatment” if either of the other two 

options is “not in the best interest of the person.”

raised by Unity, we do not separately address whether Unity had constitutional 

standing to base its request on AG’s constitutional due process claims. 

5 For the commitment hearing, only two parties are identified as having an 

interest, such that they have the right to request a postponement or cross-examine 

witnesses: the person alleged to have a mental illness (with their legal counsel) 

and the state. ORS 426.095 (setting out commitment hearing procedures); see 

also ORS 426.100 (setting out rights of a person alleged to have a mental illness 

and identifying who is responsible for representing the state’s interest). 
Cite as 332 Or App 697 (2024) 707

If the court commits a person to OHA, then OHA or 

its designee is required to take the person “into its custody, 

and ensure the safekeeping and proper care of the person 

until the person is delivered to an assigned treatment facility ** *.” ORS 426.150. Post-commitment, the commitment 

statutes do not contemplate further involvement of the court 

in the case except in two situations, both of which involve 

further restraint on the person’s liberty. The first involves 

the transfer of a committed person to a more restrictive class 

of facility, as set out in ORS 426.275. Under that statute, a 

court may, on its own motion, hold a hearing after receiving 

notice that the committed person has not adhered to the conditions of the less restrictive facility and determine whether 

the person should continue in the placement or be returned 

to OHA. ORS 426.275(2), (3); see ORS 426.060(2)(b)(C) 

(transfers to a facility in a more restrictive class must follow 

the procedure in ORS 426.275). The second involves recommitment orders. Under ORS 426.301, ORS 426.303, and ORS 

426.307, the court must issue a court order of commitment 

when OHA seeks to continue a period of commitment for a 

person past the initial 180 days. Notably, the statutes do not 

contemplate court involvement in either OHA’s decision for 

an initial placement of a committed person or the transfer of 

a committed person to a facility that is in an equally restrictive class, ORS 426.060(2)(b)(A), or in a less restrictive class, 

ORS 426.060(2)(b)(B), ORS 426.273.

The role of a trial court in civil commitment cases, 

as contrasted to OHA’s role, is reinforced by ORS 426.060. 

Under ORS 426.060(1), “[c]ommitments to the Oregon Health 

Authority shall be made only by the judge of a circuit court 

in a county of this state.” Then, ORS 426.060(2) sets out “a 

nonexclusive list of powers [OHA] may exercise concerning 

the placement of persons committed.” Three of those powers 

are relevant here. The first is the final, discretionary decisionmaking authority to place committed persons:

“In its discretion and for reasons which are satisfactory 

to [OHA], [OHA] may direct any court-committed person 

to the facility best able to treat the person. The decision of 

[OHA] on such matters shall be final.”
708 Oregon State Hospital v. A. J. G.

ORS 426.060(2)(a).6 The second is the discretionary authority to transfer a person to a different facility, subject to 

certain requirements. ORS 426.060(2)(b). And the third is 

that OHA may, pursuant to its rules, “delegate to a community mental health program director the responsibility 

for assignment of persons with mental illness to suitable 

facilities or transfer between such facilities under conditions 

which [OHA] may define.” ORS 426.060(2)(d).

We agree with OHA that, in the context of a civil 

commitment case, the legislature intended to grant to OHA 

the sole discretionary authority to direct the placement and 

transfer of persons civilly committed to the custody of OHA.

Having so concluded, however, we emphasize that, 

here, the hospital treating AG brought the motion to the 

court; AG herself did not seek the immediate placement 

order. Nothing in the civil commitment statutes evinces that 

the legislature intended for a treating facility to be able to 

intervene in a civil commitment proceeding and seek transfer of the person from the facility. We do note, however, that 

the statutes contemplate that the committed person can 

access the courts when needed. Under ORS 426.380, a committed person or “a friend” on behalf of the person is entitled to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. And, under ORS 

426.385, a committed person has enumerated rights, two of 

which are of note here. The first recognizes that a committed person is not legally incompetent based on the commitment alone. ORS 426.385(1)(p) (A committed person has the 

right to “[e]xercise all civil rights in the same manner and 

with the same effect as one not admitted to the facility, * ** 

unless the person has been adjudicated incompetent and has 

not been restored to legal capacity.”). The other right is that 

a committed person has the right to “[b]e represented by 

counsel whenever the substantial rights of the person may 

be affected[.]” ORS 426.385(1)(i). Those rights are required 

to be posted in facilities housing committed persons and 

must be given to the person upon admission. ORS 426.395.

6 “Facility” means “a state mental hospital, community hospital, residential 

facility, detoxification center, day treatment facility or such other facility as the 

authority determines suitable that provides diagnosis and evaluation, medical 

care, detoxification, social services or rehabilitation to persons *** who have been 

committed to the Oregon Health Authority under ORS 426.130.” ORS 426.005(1)(c).
Cite as 332 Or App 697 (2024) 709

Those statutes further inform our inquiry because 

those rights indicate that, whatever ability a committed person or “a friend” acting on their behalf may have to seek an 

order of the court directing their placement, a facility treating a committed person cannot just step into the shoes of 

the committed person, without first taking steps to legally 

act on their behalf. 7 We emphasize that the commitment 

proceeding itself is a limited proceeding governed by specific statutory procedures. Here, the statutes do not provide 

the court statutory authority to consider Unity’s motion and 

issue the placement order.

B. The court lacked inherent authority to consider Unity’s 

motion and issue the placement order.

Below and on appeal, Unity has maintained that 

the court could consider and grant its motion based on the 

court’s “inherent authority” to enforce the commitment judgment. Likewise, at the hearing on the motion, the trial court 

stated that it was acting pursuant to its “inherent authority” without further explanation. We conclude, however, that 

the court did not have inherent authority to consider Unity’s 

motion and issue the placement order.

On appeal, AG and Unity raise slightly different 

arguments about the court’s inherent authority. AG’s argument is specifically premised on the inherent authority of 

the court to use contempt to compel compliance with its 

orders and judgments and cites to the contempt statutes, 

ORS 33.015 to 33.155, and ORCP 78 B. We summarily reject 

that argument because the court was not purporting to act 

through its contempt power when it issued the placement 

order itself, see, e.g., ORS 33.055 (setting out procedure 

for imposition of remedial contempt sanctions), nor was it 

enforcing a judgment that “direct[ed] a party to perform a 

specific act,” ORCP 78 B. See also Air Rescue Systems Corp. 

v. Lewis, 292 Or App 294, 299, 423 P3d 775 (2018) (explaining that, to be enforceable through contempt, an order “must 

be an order that is certain and definite in its terms”).

7 Although it is not challenged in the appeal, we express our skepticism that 

ORCP 33 could provide a means for any person to intervene in this case after 

entry of the general judgment of commitment. See ORCP 33 (providing procedure 

for intervention “[a]t any time before trial”).
710 Oregon State Hospital v. A. J. G.

We turn to Unity’s argument, which is based on a 

broader idea than AG’s argument, because it includes the 

idea that a court can enforce a judgment through means 

other than just contempt. We agree with Unity that “[c]ourts 

have inherent power” to do things necessary to the “perform[ance of] their judicial functions,” even “when the legislature has not otherwise given them authority to do those 

things.” Cox v. M. A. L., 239 Or App 350, 353, 244 P3d 828 

(2010) (citing Ortwein v. Schwab, 262 Or 375, 385, 498 P2d 

757 (1972), aff’d, 410 US 656, 93 S Ct 1172, 35 L Ed 2d 572 

(1973)). That power includes “the power to compel obedience 

to a court’s own orders and judgments.” Law v. Zemp, 362 Or 

302, 327, 408 P3d 1045 (2018); see also ORS 1.010(4) (“Every 

court of justice has power ** * [t]o compel obedience to its 

judgments, orders and process ** *.”). Fundamental to that 

concept though, is that the court is enforcing the terms of 

an order or judgment. Here, neither Unity’s motion nor the 

court’s placement order was directed at enforcing compliance with the commitment judgment.

The relevant portion of the commitment judgment 

provided, in its entirety, “It is therefore ordered the abovenamed person be committed and promptly delivered to the 

Mental Health Division for a period not to exceed 180 days.” 

At most, the judgment could also be read to incorporate 

the ORS 426.130 provision that a person with mental illness is committed to OHA “for treatment.” However, nothing in the judgment implicates any decision OHA may or 

may not make with regard to a specific decision about where 

AG should obtain that treatment, nor did it reference any 

statutes or regulations relevant to AG’s placement or any 

other post-commitment actions. Nor do we believe the commitment judgment could have included such terms, based 

on the statutory scheme set out above.

However, Unity’s motion, which it titled “motion 

for immediate placement,” sought an immediate placement 

order for AG that was predicated on ORS 426.060(2) and 

OAR 309-033-0290, and on Unity’s assertion that OHA’s 

failure to place AG in a long-term placement pursuant to 

those authorities violated her statutory and constitutional 

due process rights. Simply put, Unity’s motion did not ask 
Cite as 332 Or App 697 (2024) 711

the trial court to enforce any of the terms of the commitment judgment in this case.8

Likewise, the court’s process and ultimate order did 

not purport to enforce the terms of the commitment judgment. Rather, the court held a hearing and, acting as a factfinder, determined what type of facility was most suitable 

for AG, and then directed OHA to place AG in that specific 

type of facility, or face contempt sanctions. Again, the placement order did not enforce any terms of the civil commitment judgment, nor did it merely direct OHA to comply with 

its statutory and regulatory duty to make a discretionary 

decision about AG’s treatment placement.

Whatever inherent authority a trial court may have 

to enforce its judgments does not encompass what occurred 

here—particularly in light of the explicit statutory scheme 

that places the decision on whether to commit a person 

solely with the trial court and, in turn, places the decision 

on where a committed person should be placed for treatment 

solely with OHA or its designee. Unity has not asserted, and 

we do not think we could conclude, that that scheme is “such 

a restriction upon the performance of the judicial function 

that the court can ignore the legislative command under the 

guise of exercising its inherent power.” Ortwein, 262 Or at 

385-86.

C. Conclusion

We in no way minimize the reasons for concern 

regarding the scenario this case presents. AG was left for 

months in an acute-care facility that, by all accounts, was 

not able to treat her mental illness beyond stabilizing her 

for the next level of care. However, this appeal presents a 

fairly narrow legal question: whether the trial court could, 

in a civil commitment proceeding and based on the motion 

of a treating hospital, review AG’s circumstances and direct 

OHA to transfer AG to a different facility. We conclude that 

8 We recognize that in reply to OHA’s motion to dismiss and response to its 

motion, Unity asserted that the court could grant its motion under the court’s 

inherent powers to compel obedience to the court’s judgment. That is the same 

argument that Unity asserts on appeal as a source of authority for the court. 

However, Unity did not point to any term in the judgment itself that it was asking 

the court to enforce.
712 Oregon State Hospital v. A. J. G.

it could not. Placement of civilly committed persons is statutorily within the discretion of OHA. A third-party challenge 

to that decision, or a failure to make a particular placement 

decision, on whatever basis, is not a claim that the legislature contemplated could occur within the limited statutory 

framework of a civil commitment case.9 Accordingly, the 

trial court erred in denying OHA’s motion to dismiss.

Motion to dismiss appeal denied; July 12, 2022, 

order vacated and remanded with instructions to grant 

Oregon State Hospital’s and Oregon Health Authority’s 

motion to dismiss the motion for immediate placement.

9 OHA has asserted that any person challenging OHA’s decision on placement or failure to make a decision on placement is required to proceed through 

the Administrative Procedures Act. We need not and do not decide that issue.