F PB99-917001

NTSB/SIR-99/01

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY

BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

HIGHWAY SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

REPORT

Selective Motorcoach Issues

7108A
Abstract: This report contains the findings of a special investigation conducted as a

result of two fatal motorcoach accidents. In the first accident, on October 14, 1995, two

passengers sustained fatal injuries, 13 sustained serious injuries, and 26 received minor

injuries when a 1989 Eagle motorcoach operated by Hammond Yellow Coach Line, Inc.,

overturned upon entering an Interstate 70 exit ramp in Indianapolis, Indiana. In the second

accident, on July 29, 1997, one passenger sustained fatal injuries, the driver and 3

passengers sustained serious injuries, and 28 passengers sustained minor injuries when a

1985 Transportation Manufacturing Corporation (TMC) motorcoach operated by RiteWay Transportation, Inc., drifted off the side of Interstate 95 near Stony Creek, Virginia,

and down an embankment into the Nottoway River, where it came to rest on its left side,

partially submerged in water.

From its investigation, the Safety Board identified safety issues in the following areas:

busdriver fatigue, Office of Motor Carriers safety rating methodology, emergency egress,

and passenger safety briefings.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to

promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety.

Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety

Board Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable cause

of accidents, issue safety recommendations, study transportation safety issues, and

evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The

Safety Board makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety

studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at http://www.ntsb.gov/.

Other information about available publications may be obtained by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries section, RE-51

490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.

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5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(703) 605-6000
HIGHWAY SPECIAL INVESTIGATION

REPORT

Selective Motorcoach Issues

NTSB/SIR-99/01

E P L U R IB U S UN UM

N AT I O

N A L T R A S PO R T A T IO N

B O A R D

S A F E T Y

N

PB99-917001 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7108A 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted: February 11, 1999 Washington, D.C. 20594

Table of Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1

The Accidents................................................................................................................................ 3

Indianapolis, Indiana ......................................................................................................... 3

Stony Creek, Virginia ........................................................................................................ 5

Injuries................................................................................................................................ 9

Busdriver Fatigue....................................................................................................................... 10

Hammond Busdriver ....................................................................................................... 10

Rite-Way Busdriver .......................................................................................................... 11

Office of Motor Carriers Safety Rating Methodology ............................................................ 16

Mechanical Condition of the Accident Vehicles .............................................................. 16

Motor Carrier Oversight of Hammond ............................................................................. 17

Motor Carrier Oversight of Rite-Way .............................................................................. 18

Regulatory Background .................................................................................................... 19

Preventing Operation of Unsafe Carriers ......................................................................... 22

Emergency Egress ...................................................................................................................... 27

Passenger Briefings .................................................................................................................... 34

Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 36

Recommendations ...................................................................................................................... 37

Appendix A - Pathways to Freedom Tour Schedule ............................................................... 39

Appendix B - Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations,

Part 385—Safety Fitness Procedures ............................................................................ 41

Appendix C - Available Consumer Guidance for Chartering a Motorcoach ....................... 51

Acronyms .................................................................................................................................... 58

1

Introduction

In an average year, more than 360 million bus passengers travel 28 billion

passenger miles in North America.1

 The motorcoach industry estimates that more than

30,000 commercial buses are presently in use for charters, tours, regular route service,

and special operations in North America. According to industry estimates, 4,000

motorcoach companies are operating in the United States.2 Bus accident statistics are

limited; however, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA’s)

Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) data for 1993 to 1997 indicates that 141

motorcoaches were involved in accidents that, in total, resulted in the deaths of 21

occupants and injuries to 442 occupants.

The National Transportation Safety Board investigated two accidents in 1995 and

1997 that are typical of the motorcoach accidents that it has investigated over the years.

On October 14, 1995, a 1989 Eagle motorcoach operated by Hammond Yellow Coach

Line, Inc., (Hammond) and occupied by a driver and 40 members of a high school booster

club overturned when it entered an Interstate (I)-70 exit ramp in Indianapolis, Indiana.

Two passengers sustained fatal injuries, 13 sustained serious injuries, and 26 received

minor injuries.

On July 29, 1997, a 1985 Transportation Manufacturing Corporation (TMC)

motorcoach operated by Rite-Way Transportation, Inc., (Rite-Way) and occupied by a

driver and 34 members of a tour group drifted off the side of I-95 near Stony Creek,

Virginia, and down an embankment into the Nottoway River, where it came to rest on its

left side. One passenger sustained fatal injuries, the driver and 3 passengers sustained

serious injuries, and 28 passengers sustained minor injuries.

These accidents involved factors that the Safety Board has repeatedly identified as

being issues in accidents and having the potential for catastrophic consequences, namely

driver fatigue and poorly maintained or out-of-adjustment brakes. In both cases, the

carriers involved had satisfactory safety ratings. The Safety Board therefore examined the

Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA’s) safety fitness criteria for motorcoaches.

The Safety Board is convinced that had a more restrictive compliance review process

been in place for motorcoaches, these and other accidents may not have occurred.

This special investigation report includes detailed descriptions of these two

motorcoach accidents and discussions of the following safety issues:

 

1

 National Safety Council. 1998. Accident Facts,TM 1998 Edition. p 122.

2

 Source: American Bus Association.
2

• busdriver fatigue,

• Office of Motor Carriers (OMC) safety rating methodology,

• emergency egress, and

• passenger safety briefings.

As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board makes recommendations to the

U.S. Department of Transportation, NHTSA, the American Bus Association, and the

United Motorcoach Association.
3

The Accidents

Indianapolis, Indiana

Bus Owner.

The owner of the Indianapolis accident bus, the Northwest Indiana Regional

Planning Commission (NIRPC), had purchased the vehicle with Federal Transit

Administration (FTA) funds and leased the bus to Hammond for the purpose of providing

transportation to commuters. When it determined that Hammond was using the bus for

charters, the NIRPC ordered the motorcoach operator to surrender the tax-free municipal

license plates. The bus still had the municipal plates at the time of the accident.

Operator Background.

Hammond, the motorcoach operator involved in the 1995 Indianapolis accident,

was headquartered in Hammond, Indiana. At the time of the accident, the company

operated 16 buses and employed 35 drivers. Hammond provided commuter service from

northwest Indiana to the greater Chicago, Illinois, area and for-hire charter service to

special events.

Preaccident Events.

The Hammond bus, carrying the North Central High School football booster fan

club, departed Indianapolis on Friday, October 13, 1995, between 5 and 5:30 p.m. The

busdriver later told Safety Board investigators that the speedometer light was out, the

speedometer was inoperative, and the air conditioner was not working. He said that the

passengers opened the emergency exit windows for ventilation because the bus was extremely hot. The bus traveled about 110 miles to Jeffersonville, Indiana, arriving at 7:15

p.m.

The busdriver stated that during the football game, he stayed on the bus and

attempted to nap, but could not fall asleep. After the football game, the bus departed

Jeffersonville, about 10:45 p.m., for the return trip to Indianapolis.

About 12:33 a.m., the bus was traveling east on I-70, approaching the Keystone

exit near milepost 85. Tire marks indicate that the bus entered the 150-foot radius rightcurve exit with its right tires on the right shoulder. The bus failed to negotiate the curve,

overturned onto its left side, and slid about 50 feet before coming to rest. (See figures 1

and 2.)
4

Figure 1. Schematic of Indianapolis accident scene

Figure 2. Indianapolis accident scene
5

Several passengers reported that the driver was attempting to take the exit at

highway speed, that is, 55 mph or “possibly a little faster,” when he lost control. The

busdriver also stated that he was driving at highway speed, took the exit ramp too fast,

and was unable to control the bus. He said that he did not remember applying the brakes,

although he was sure that he must have done so. Tire marks on the ramp indicate that the

brakes were applied.

The driver stated that he had not fallen asleep and that he was alert when the

accident occurred, although he was not familiar with the ramp. A bus passenger stated,

however, that the driver did not appear alert and that about 1.5 miles from the accident

site, where I-70 East and I-65 North diverge, she had had to remind him to move over

into the right lane. The busdriver recalled the passenger reminding him about the route,

but he stated that he was alert at the time.

Two passengers on the left side of the bus (a 9-year-old child in row 10 and a 30-

year-old woman in row 5) were partially ejected and died from massive head injuries.

Thirteen passengers received serious injures, and the driver and 25 passengers received

minor injuries. (See table 1.)

Stony Creek, Virginia

Operator Background.

Rite-Way, the motorcoach operator involved in the Stony Creek accident, is

headquartered in Detroit, Michigan. At the time of the accident, the company owned and

operated 6 motorcoaches and 72 school buses and employed 6 full-time charter busdrivers and 60 school busdrivers during the school terms. Rite-Way was an interstate, forhire common carrier of passengers that began business in 1991 as a taxi company. In

1992, Rite-Way expanded into the charter bus business and began contracting with the

Detroit School District to provide pupil transportation, which included regular school-bus

and special-activities services.

Preaccident Events.

The Pathways to Freedom tour program,3 sponsored by the Rosa and Raymond

Parks Institute for Self Development (Institute)4

 in Detroit, began with registration and

orientation at the Institute on Thursday, July 7, 1997. The tour group was scheduled to

 

3

 The tour was funded by a $50,000 grant from the FTA as part of its Garrett A. Morgan Technology

and Transportation Futures Initiative for students at the K-12 level. Children receive school credit for

participating in the tour. The tour was designed to educate students about the Underground Railway during

the pre-Civil War era, and tell them about the field of transportation, transit awareness, and job

opportunities in the transportation industry.

4

 The Institute is a private, non-profit organization engaged in mentoring and guiding young people.
6

travel to several States, including Ohio, Illinois, Nebraska, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Alabama, and South Carolina (figure 3). The tour began with one motorcoach bus

and one driver. Two days after the bus left Detroit, a second driver joined the tour in

Cincinnati, Ohio. Because of the amount of luggage that the tour participants had, the

second driver was assigned to a van for carrying excess baggage.

About midnight on Saturday, July 26, 1997, the tour departed Montgomery, Alabama, for Charleston, South Carolina. The busdriver’s duty status record indicates that

after the tour arrived in Charleston on Sunday morning, he was off duty until the bus

departed for Washington, D.C., on Monday evening. The busdriver said that on Monday,

July 28, he arose about 7 a.m. and spent the day sightseeing (not driving) with the tour

group. He did not sleep between the time he awoke and the time he began driving, about

8 p.m. that evening. In the 360 miles between Charleston and the accident site, the driver

stopped twice for fuel and twice for rest breaks. He indicated that he rested about 1 hour

at each of the two rest stops; the last one being at the Virginia border, about 28 miles

south of the accident site.

According to the driver of the luggage van, about 7:10 a.m. on July 29, he was

following the bus, traveling about 55 to 60 mph, when he observed the bus start to drift to

the right. He said that he honked the van’s horn, but the bus continued off the roadway.

The bus, which was traveling in the right lane, drifted off the pavement on the

right side of the roadway at an angle of 4 degrees. The bus continued drifting to the right,

passing behind the approach guardrail for the Nottoway River bridge. The bus proceeded

down an increasingly steep dirt and grass embankment about 350 feet where it struck a

mesh fence, continued over a 16-foot precipice, and vaulted into the river. (See figure 4.)

The front of the bus struck the water, and the vehicle rolled onto its left side,

coming to rest in about 5 feet of water. The front of the bus was severely damaged; the

two sections of windshield glass were displaced. The bus immediately began to fill up

with water through the displaced front windshield and the broken windows on the left

side. Many of the passengers who had been sleeping stated that the impact and water

entering the bus were their first indications of an emergency. Some passengers recalled

having to swim to the surface of the water to escape.

The roof emergency escape hatches were almost completely submerged, preventing their use for egress. Occupants stated that they escaped through the right-side

emergency escape windows, pulling themselves out and onto the side of the bus. Several

passengers reported that they had difficulty evacuating the bus because the emergency

window would not remain open. Some occupants stood on the edges of the seats and held

the windows open so that others could exit. Two passengers stated that they were not tall

or strong enough to open the emergency exit windows. After evacuating the bus, some of

the passengers formed a “human chain” to help others reach the riverbank.
7

Detroit

Cinc innati

Clarksville

Peoria

Omaha

Ka nsa s City

Tulsa Mem phis

Huntsville

C ha rle sto n

Neb ra ska City

$&&,'(17

Figure ?-Destination Map 

Stony Creek, VA

Figure 3. Route of the Pathways to Freedom Tour
8

The van driver stopped his vehicle on the Nottoway River bridge. He said that a

motorist stopped and called for help on a citizens band radio and that another motorist

stopped and called the police on a cellular telephone.

The 25-year-old passenger who had been seated in the first row on the right side

of the coach died in this accident. While the cause of his death was listed as drowning, he

also received multiple lacerations and contusions on the chest and upper and lower

extremities. The motorcoach driver and 3 teenagers sustained serious injuries, and 28

passengers received minor injuries of various types. Two occupants were not injured.

Figure 4. Stony Creek accident scene
9

Injuries

Table 1 is based on the injury criteria of the International Civil Aviation Organization, which the Safety Board uses in accident reports for all transportation modes.

Table 1. Injuries Sustained in the Accidents

Indianapolis Accident (Hammond)

Type Busdriver Passengers Total

Fatal 022

Serious 0 13 13

Minor 1 25 26

None 000

Total 1 40 41

Stony Creek Accident (Rite-Way)

Fatal 0 1 1

Serious 1 3 4

Minor 0 28 28

None 0 2 2

Total 1 34 35

Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.2 defines fatal injury as “Any injury which results in

death within 30 days of the accident.” It defines serious injury as an injury that: “(1) Requires

hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received;

(2) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) causes severe

hemorrhages, nerve, or tendon damage; (4) involves any internal organ; or (5) involves second or third

degree burns, or any burn affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.”
10

Busdriver Fatigue

The busdrivers in both of the accidents had exhibited signs of fatigue. The Safety

Board has been concerned about the impact of fatigue in transportation for some time.

Fatigue can degrade most aspects of human capability, although to what degree depends

on the individual. Fatigue can be associated with decrements in decision making,

vigilance, reaction time, memory, psychomotor coordination, and information processing.

Hammond Busdriver

The 49-year-old busdriver held a valid Illinois class B commercial driver’s license

(CDL) issued on May 16, 1995, with a passenger endorsement with no restrictions.

Illinois records indicate that he been convicted of speeding in a commercial vehicle in

1992 on a Michigan CDL.

The driver had attended Trainco Truck Driving school for 6 weeks in 1975. He

had driven motorcoaches for Indian Trails, Inc., (ITI) of Owosso, Michigan, from 1976 to

1994. The ITI Safety Director indicated that before the driver left the ITI, under favorable

terms, he had completed almost 1 million accident-free miles in a coach bus. The

busdriver had moved from Michigan to Illinois, where he had worked for Motorcoach

Industries in April and May 1995. He had been hired by Hammond in September 1995;

the accident trip was his first driving assignment for the company. He had a second job

with Fred Brown Transportation, for which he had driven one charter trip a few weeks

before the accident.

The busdriver supplied the following information regarding his sleep habits and

his activities during the 3 days before the accident. He said that he normally went to bed

between 11 p.m. and 1 a.m. and slept for 8 hours. On October 11, 1995, he spent the day

with his girlfriend, had dinner, and retired between midnight and 1 a.m. On October 12,

he awoke around 9 a.m. In the morning, the company notified him that he would be

driving to Indianapolis the following day. He then reported for his pre-employment

physical about noon. When his blood pressure reading was slightly higher than

acceptable,5

 the examining physician told him to come back the following morning. He

remained at home the rest of the day and went to sleep about 11 p.m.

On October 13, the busdriver awoke about 8 a.m. and went to the doctor at 10

a.m. to finish his physical examination. After picking up the bus at the Hammond terminal about 11 a.m., he returned to his home in Calumet, Illinois, for lunch. About noon,

 

5

 The busdriver advised Safety Board investigators that he was not using any medication for high blood

pressure.
11

he left on the 180-mile trip to Indianapolis, stopping twice en route at roadside rest areas

before arriving at North Central High School, about 4:15 p.m. After picking up the

booster club members, he left, between 5 and 5:30 p.m., on the 110-mile trip to Jeffersonville, arriving about 7:15 p.m. He said that he stayed on the bus during the game and

attempted to nap. He recalled that he could not fall asleep. However, a booster club

member who returned to the bus at half-time said that he observed the busdriver asleep.

About 10:45 p.m., the bus departed Jeffersonville for the return trip to Indianapolis.

According to one of the bus passengers, when the bus was about 1.5 miles from

the accident site, the driver did not appear to be alert, and she considered it necessary to

remind him to change lanes. Between that point and the exit ramp, I-70 had six signs

alerting him to the exit. The advisory sign indicating “Exit 25 MPH” and the geometry of

the ramp were visible from more than 220 feet. Despite these cues, the driver failed to

slow for the exit. The accident occurred about 12:33 a.m.

The Hammond motorcoach operator was an experienced driver, was physically

qualified, and was not impaired by alcohol or drugs, as evidenced by the results of his

postaccident toxicological test. The Safety Board therefore attempted to identify why an

experienced driver would fail to respond to a routine situation in which he was required

to reduce his speed. The Safety Board identified several factors that probably put the

busdriver at risk for fatigue, primarily the time of day and the length of time that he had

been awake, on uty, and driving. At the time of the crash, he was nearing the end of his

allowable duty cycle. He had been awake for 16.5 hours and on duty for about 11 hours,

during which he had driven for 7.5 hours. The accident occurred at a time of day when he

normally was asleep or preparing to go to sleep. Another factor potentially contributing to

fatigue included his operating a motorcoach that was not mechanically sound; the vehicle

had a broken speedometer and a broken air conditioner that was blowing hot air. (Additional information about the mechanical condition of the Hammond vehicle appears later

in this report.)

Fatigue is capable of degrading performance, which in turn can lead to an increased potential for operational errors. In this case, the possibly fatigued driver was also

driving a route with which he was unfamiliar. The Safety Board concludes that although

the exact cause of the Hammond driver’s failing to respond appropriately cannot be

determined, several factors, including fatiguing conditions and the driver’s unfamiliarity

with the route, may have contributed to his failing to slow down for the exit ramp.

Rite-Way Busdriver

The 54-year-old driver held a valid Michigan Class A CDL with endorsements for

hazardous materials, double-trailer vehicles, and passenger vehicles. His medical card

was valid until September 21, 1997. His driver’s license had no restrictions. Before going

to work for Rite-Way in 1992, he had been a busdriver, a cab driver, and a road supervisor for the Southeast Michigan Transit Authority.
12

His driving record showed no traffic accidents or traffic violations for the past 5

years. His postaccident toxicological test results were negative for alcohol and illicit

drugs.

The tour schedule (see table 2)6 for several days before the accident called for the

group to travel one night and then stay in a hotel the following night. Consequently, the

busdriver’s duty-sleep periods were constantly inverted as he alternately drove or slept on

successive nights. On July 26 and 27, the busdriver slept during the evening at a Charleston hotel. On July 28, he arose about 7 a.m. and took a local-area tour during the day. He

began driving Monday night about 8 p.m. He took two 1-hour rest breaks, the last one

ending about 1⁄2 hour before the accident. The accident occurred about 7 a.m. The

busdriver therefore had not had any bed rest and probably had obtained only 2 hours of

split sleep7

 during the 24 hours before the accident.

Split rest, such as that experienced by the driver in this accident, has been associated with driver fatigue and a resulting decrease in performance. Research has shown that

the sleep accumulated in short time blocks is less refreshing than the sleep accumulated in

one long time period.8

 Other research indicates that “the more sleep is disturbed or

reduced, for whatever reason, the more likely [that] an individual will inadvertently slip

into sleep.”9

The circumstances of this accident provide evidence that the busdriver’s performance was affected by fatigue. The van driver following the bus observed it drifting

toward the highway shoulder. The van driver stated that he sounded his horn to alert the

busdriver but saw no brake lights or other apparent response as the bus continued off the

road. A vehicle drifting off the road at a shallow angle without displaying turn signals or

brake lights is frequently an indicator that the operator has fallen asleep. In addition,

when the Virginia State Police asked him what happened, the busdriver replied, “I fell

asleep, I guess.” The Safety Board therefore concludes that the Rite-Way busdriver fell

asleep and ran off the road.

 

6

 Appendix A contains a graphic depiction of the tour schedule.

7

 Sleep that is accumulated in short blocks of time.

8

 Dinges, D.F. 1989. “The Nature of Sleepiness: Causes, Contexts, and Consequences.” In Stunkard,

A.J. and Baum, A. Perspectives in Behavioral Medicine: Eating, Sleeping, and Sex. Lawrence Erblaum

Associates. Hillsdale, NJ. p. 147.

9

 Mitler, M.; Carskadon, M.A.; Ceisler, C.A.; and others. 1988. “Catastrophes, Sleep and Public

Policy: Consensus Report.” In Sleep. p. 107; Rosekind, M.R.; Gander, P.H.; Connell, L.J.; Co, E.L. 1994.

“Crew Factors in Flight Operations X: Alertness Management in Fight Operations.” In NASA/FAA Technical Memorandum DOT/FAA/RD-93/1.
13

Extended bus tours such as the Pathways to Freedom tour impose unique fatigueinducing conditions on drivers. By their very nature, “extended” bus tours (longer than 2

or 3 days) are likely to entail inverted duty-sleep periods for the busdriver. For a variety

of reasons, tour organizers create schedules that alternate nights of travel with nights at a

hotel. Such schedules reduce the hotel expenses and the passengers’ monotony by having

Table 2. Rite-Way Tour Bus Schedule

Driver Night

Sleep/Drive*

July

Date

Day of

Week Time Tour Activity

7-9 Mon to

Wed

Registration, orientation, and workshops in Detroit

Night sleep 10 Thurs 8:30 a.m. - 1 p.m. Detroit to Cincinnati, Ohio

Night sleep 11 Fri 3 - 6 p.m. Cincinnati to Clarksville, Ohio

Night sleep 12 Sat All day Activities in Clarksville

Night drive 13 Sun 11 a.m. - 5 p.m.

9 p.m. - 4 a.m.

Clarksville to Peoria, Illinois

Peoria to Omaha, Nebraska

Night sleep 14 Mon 10:30 - 11:30 a.m.

3 - 4 p.m.

Omaha to Nebraska City, Nebraska

Nebraska City to Omaha

Night drive 15 Tues 3 - 4 p.m.

6 - 7:30 p.m.

7 p.m. - midnight

Omaha to Lincoln, Nebraska

Lincoln to Omaha

Lincoln to Kansas City, Missouri

Night sleep 16 Wed All Day Kansas City

Night drive 17 Thurs 5 p.m.- midnight Kansas City to Tulsa, Oklahoma

Night sleep 18 Fri Tour Tulsa

Night drive 19 Sat 5 p.m. - 1 a.m. Tulsa to Memphis, Tennessee

Night sleep 20 Sun All Day Tour Memphis

Night sleep 21 Mon All Day Tour Memphis

Night sleep 22 Tues 7:30 p.m. - 11 p.m. Memphis to Huntsville, Alabama

Night sleep 23 Wed All Day Tour Huntsville

Night drive 24 Thurs 7 p.m. - 2 a.m. Huntsville to Montgomery, Alabama

Night sleep 25 Fri

Night drive 26 Sat 11 p.m. - 9 a.m. Montgomery to Charleston, South

Carolina

Night Sleep 27 Sun Tour Charleston

Night drive 28 Mon 8 p.m. - Charleston to accident

*For the purposes of this report a “night drive” is one that includes driving all or part of the hours

between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.
14

them sleep on the bus while traveling at night and maximize the number of daylight hours

that passengers have available for sightseeing. But these efficiencies are gained at the

expense of the busdriver’s ability to acquire proper rest.

The contract specified two drivers; however, circumstances resulted in the second

driver operating a van to carry excess baggage. No additional well-rested drivers were

added throughout the tour.

The Safety Board concludes that the Rite-Way driver became fatigued because the

Pathways to Freedom tour schedule imposed inverted duty-sleep periods and because

additional well-rested drivers were not provided for relief. The Safety Board believes that

the American Bus Association (ABA) and the United Motorcoach Association (UMA)

should alert their members to the dangers of inverted duty-sleep periods. Further, the

Safety Board believes that the ABA and the UMA should encourage their members to

revise their scheduling practices to avoid inverted duty-sleep periods or to provide a wellrested relief driver if the schedule requires alternate day-night driving.

The Safety Board has addressed the issue of operator fatigue and the need to

provide employees with fatigue awareness training in all modes of transportation. In

1989, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation I-89-2, which asked the U.S.

Department of Transportation (DOT) to develop and disseminate educational material for

transportation industry personnel and management regarding shift work; work and rest

schedules; and proper regimes of health, diet, and rest. While the highway, aviation, and

railroad modes have made educational efforts in fatigue awareness, the marine and

pipeline modes have not. The recommendation was, therefore, classified “Open—

Acceptable Response” on July 19, 1996.

In its study of factors affecting fatigue in heavy truck accidents,10 the Safety Board

addressed the hazards of inverted duty-sleep periods. The study found that 17 of 107

drivers had inverted duty-sleep periods on their accident trips; of these 17 drivers, 16 had

fatigue-related accidents. As a result, the Safety Board issued the following recommendation to the FHWA and trucking organizations:

H-95-5

Develop and disseminate, in consultation with the DOT Human Factors

Coordinating Committee, a training module to inform truckdrivers of the

hazards of driving while fatigued. It should include information about the

need for an adequate amount of quality sleep, strategies for avoiding sleep

loss, such as strategic napping, consideration of the behavioral and

physiological consequences of sleepiness, and an awareness that sleep can

 

10 For more detailed information, read: Factors that Affect Fatigue in Heavy Truck Accidents, Volume

1: Analysis. Safety Study Report NTSB/SS-95/01. Washington, DC.
15

occur suddenly and without warning to all drivers regardless of their age or

experience.

The FHWA subsequently worked with several different organizations to educate

truckdrivers about the dangers of driving while drowsy, which resulted in the Safety

Board classifying Safety Recommendation H-95-5 “Closed—Acceptable Action” on July

7, 1998. The FHWA developed brochures and videotapes, such as “Awake at the Wheel,”

“Alert Driver,” and “Fatigue and the Truck Driver.” Although the FHWA developed its

fatigue-awareness brochures and videotapes with the trucking industry in mind, the

information provided in them applies to the motorcoach industry as well. The FHWA and

the American Trucking Associations (ATA) are promoting a toll-free telephone number,

1-800-ATA-LINE (1-800-282-5463), that commercial carriers can call to obtain

information on fatigue awareness and countermeasures.

According to FHWA officials, the agency has a stated goal of educating all 7

million CDL holders on recognizing fatigue and on the importance of adequate rest and

healthy work and lifestyle choices. The FHWA is planning a two-phase project to

specifically address busdriver fatigue. In the first phase, the FHWA intends to study the

differences between motorcoach operations and truck operations as they relate to operator

fatigue. The second phase is the development of a fatigue awareness and countermeasure

video for motorcoach drivers, which will be distributed through the National Technical

Information Service to industry. The Safety Board believes that the DOT should require

that the FHWA video being developed discuss the dangers of inverted duty-sleep periods.

The Safety Board is also aware that the ABA’s Safety Committee is in the process

of producing a driver training video on recognizing fatigue. The Safety Board realizes

that the FHWA project may affect the ABA’s development of a video, potentially

preempting it. However, if the ABA proceeds with its project, the Safety Board believes

the ABA busdriver fatigue training video currently under production should discuss the

dangers of inverted duty-sleep periods.

The Transportation Efficiency Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), enacted June 9,

1998, provides for the DOT to assess how the operations of shippers, brokers, freight forwarders, consignees, or others, such as tour or charter operators, encourage violations of

the hours-of-service rules. The Safety Board believes the DOT should include the inverted work schedules of motorcoach tours and charters in the TEA-21 assessment.
16

Office of Motor Carriers Safety Rating

Methodology

In postaccident mechanical examinations, discussed below, Safety Board investigators determined that the condition of the brakes on both accident vehicles met the

Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA)11 criteria to be placed out of service for

deficiencies requiring repair. As part of its investigation, the Safety Board reviewed the

history of oversight reviews for the two carriers and found that they both had OMC safety

ratings of satisfactory at the time of the accidents. The Safety Board then reviewed the

OMC method for rating the safety fitness of commercial passenger vehicles.

Mechanical Condition of the Accident Vehicles

Hammond Bus

The driver stated that the inoperative speedometer and the faulty air conditioner

were the only mechanical problems with the Hammond bus. The company’s maintenance

records indicate that in September and October 1994, the drive axle brakes and drums

were replaced. On March 31, 1995, the right drive axle brake chamber was replaced in

response to a reported leak. On July 21, 1995, the right drive axle brake chamber was

repaired rather than replaced in response to a reported leak. The industry-recommended

practice is to replace a leaking air chamber. Maintenance records also show that the

brakes were adjusted 2 weeks before the accident and that the air conditioner blower was

repaired in July 1995.

Although Hammond’s records showed that maintenance had been performed on the

accident vehicle several times during 1994 and 1995, Safety Board investigators identified a

number of defects not related to accident damage during their postaccident mechanical

inspection of the bus. An air leak was found in the engine’s air-operated high-idle system

and the diaphragm of the left rear air chamber. With the engine off, the air reservoir

pressure dropped from 108 to 70 pounds per square inch (psi) in 30 seconds during a service brake application. The air brake manufacturer recommends a drop of no more than 6

psi in 2 minutes. In addition, three of the six brakes on the bus were out of adjustment, and

three tires had less than the minimum required 2/32-inch tread depth; the condition of the

brakes met CVSA criteria for the bus to be placed out of service. The out-of-adjustment

 

11 The CVSA is an international organization consisting of State, provincial, and Federal officials

responsible for administering and enforcing Motor Carrier Safety Laws in the United States, Canada, and

Mexico. The CVSA standards are used by U.S., State, and local officials for commercial vehicle

inspections.
17

brakes resulted in the bus having only 50 percent braking efficiency. The Safety Board

therefore concludes that the condition of the brakes probably contributed to the

Hammond busdriver’s inability to slow his vehicle when he entered the ramp too fast.

Rite-Way Bus

Examination of the maintenance records for the accident bus revealed that the

records for 1996 were complete but that some service records for 1997 were missing.

Recent repairs included a rebuilt engine on March 15, 1997, and a brake adjustment after

receipt of two notices: one on May 29, 1997, of “the brakes pulling to the right,” and the

second on July 8, 1997, of “wheels shake 70 mph.”

Postaccident inspection of the accident bus found that both the left and right drive

axle brakes were out of adjustment. Although the Safety Board determined that the

condition of the brakes did not contribute to the bus drifting off the road, the condition of

the brakes did meet the CVSA criteria for the bus to be placed out of service.

Motor Carrier Oversight of Hammond.

Before the accident, the OMC had conducted reviews of Hammond nine times

between 1987 and 1995. After the accident, the OMC conducted a compliance review12

that resulted in an unsatisfactory rating and a subsequent out-of-service order. Table 3

summarizes the OMC’s ratings and notes on Hammond.

In response to numerous complaints from several sources, including many commuter passengers, the Hammond City Council, the NIRPC, and the Indiana Department

of Revenue, a terminal, or on-site, inspection was conducted of Hammond’s vehicles by

the Indiana State Police on June 22, 1994. The police found 104 defects, of which 39

were out-of-service defects, and placed 11 of 11 buses, or 100 percent of the vehicles reviewed, out of service. On September 14, 1994, the Indiana State Police performed

another terminal inspection of the carrier’s vehicles. During this review, the police found

154 defects, of which 22 were out-of-service defects, and placed 12 of 19 buses, or 63

percent of the vehicles reviewed, out of service.13

 

12 Title 49 CFR Part 385.3 defines “compliance review” as an on-site examination of motor carrier

operations, such as drivers’ hours of service, maintenance and inspection, driver qualification, CDL requirements, financial responsibility, accidents, hazardous materials, and other safety and transportation records,

to determine whether a motor carrier meets the safety fitness standard. A compliance review may be

conducted in response to a request to change a safety rating, to investigate potential violations of safety

regulations by motor carriers, or to investigate complaints or other evidence of safety violations. The

compliance review may result in the initiation of an enforcement action.

13 FHWA inspection records for 1997 indicate that the national out-of-service rate for motorcoaches

from roadside safety inspections is 9 percent for vehicles and 2 percent for drivers.
18

While the Indiana State Police were conducting the September 14, 1994, terminal

inspections, the OMC conducted a follow-up compliance review as a result of enforcement actions stemming from its September 30, 1993, review. The OMC used the Indiana

State Police’s inspection results in determining the rating for its compliance review. The

high number of vehicles meeting criteria to be placed out of service (63 percent) resulted

in Hammond receiving a conditional rating for the vehicle factor portion of the compliance review. The OMC rated all other factors satisfactory; therefore, Hammond’s overall rating for the compliance review was satisfactory.

Motor Carrier Oversight of Rite-Way.

The Michigan Department of Transportation performed three compliance reviews

of Rite-Way, in 1993, 1995, and 1996. After the accident, the OMC performed a compliance review. The ratings and deficiencies are summarized in table 4.

Table 3. Motor Carrier Compliance Reviews

of Hammond from 1987 to 1995

Date Rating Notes

09/22/87 Satisfactory Review at carrier’s request due to a prior enforcement action

10/25/88 No rating/violations

on vehicles operating

in commercial zone

Initiated because of congressional complaint

02/06/90 Conditional Initiated because of complaint regarding hours-of-service violations

07/31/91 No rating Initiated because of complaint/enforcement action underway

07/02/92 Conditional Follow-up review due to prior enforcement action

11/13/92 Conditional Initiated because of complaint regarding push-out windows

09/30/93 Unsatisfactory Due to accident rate and hours-of-service violations

12/17/93 Satisfactory 45-day follow-up review. Maintenance program moderately

deficient/mechanics have not promptly repaired safety-related

defects

June 22, 1994, Indiana police inspection places

100 percent of the 11 vehicles reviewed out of service.

09/14/94* Satisfactory High percentage of vehicles out-of-service [63 percent]

October 15, 1995, Indianapolis Accident Occurs

11/01/95 Unsatisfactory Postaccident compliance review. The OMC places 10 of 10

vehicles reviewed out of service.

11/20/95 Out-of-service order as a result of noncompliance within 45

days of the proposed unsatisfactory safety rating

*An Indiana State police inspection also occurred.
19

The ratings that both carriers received in the compliance reviews were in accordance with Federal guidelines. Concerned that carriers with significant regulatory violations received satisfactory ratings, the Safety Board looked at the Federal standards for

determining the safety fitness of carriers.

Regulatory Background

The Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 directed the U.S. Secretary of Transportation

to establish a procedure to determine the safety fitness of owners and operators of commercial motor vehicles operating in interstate or foreign commerce. Subsequently, the

FHWA promulgated a set of safety fitness standards and established a methodology for

determining whether a carrier has adequate safety management controls to ensure acceptable compliance with the safety requirements. The original methodology was modified as a

result of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1990 and a 1997 rulemaking.

Six factors (see table 5) form the basis for a carrier’s safety rating, that is, the degree

to which a carrier is in compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations

(FMCSR) and therefore meets the safety fitness standard. Appendix B lists the safety fitness procedures contained in Part 385 of 49 CFR.

Each factor is rated satisfactory, conditional, or unsatisfactory. A satisfactory factor

rating means the carrier has not violated any acute or critical regulations. A conditional factor rating means the carrier has violated one acute regulation or has a pattern of noncomTable 4. Motor Carrier Compliance Reviews

of Rite-Way from 1993 to 1997

Date Rating Comments/Deficiencies *

12/15/93 Conditional - failure to have some driver qualification records

- failure to have accurate duty status records

- failure to conduct preemployment and random drug tests

4/21/95 Conditional - failure to comply with driver “hours of service” rules (49 CFR 395)

- failure to have complete employment applications

- use of an unqualified driver

- failure to complete a pre-employment background check

- use of a motorcoach that had not received its annual inspection

- failure to have some driver qualification records

- failure to conduct random drug tests on 50 percent of drivers

4/26/96 Satisfactory - failure to fully comply with drug testing requirements

- use of a motorcoach that had not received its annual inspection

Postaccident

7/31/97

Satisfactory - failure to perform annual vehicle inspections

- failure to conduct random alcohol tests

- failure of driver to record hours of service while driving on local

 charter tours (minor violations)

* The company was fined for the violations noted during each review.
20

pliance with critical regulations. An unsatisfactory factor rating means the carrier has violated two or more acute regulations or has patterns of noncompliance with two or more critical regulations. The accident factor is based on the carrier’s size and number of accidents.

Acute violations are FMCSR or Hazardous Materials Regulation violations demanding immediate corrective action regardless of the overall safety posture of the motor

carrier. For example, requiring or permitting the operation of a vehicle declared out of

service before repairs are made (49 CFR 396.9[c][2]) is an acute violation.

Critical violations are regulatory violations that indicate breakdowns in a carrier’s

management controls. For instance, requiring or permitting a driver to drive after having

been on duty for 15 hours (49 CFR 395.3[a][2]) is a critical violation.

The ratings for the first five factors and the accident rate for the 12 months before

the review are then entered into a rating table, which is used to establish the motor carrier’s

safety rating (see table 6). Each of the six factors is given equal weight. The current rating

Table 5. Motor Carrier Safety Rating Factors

Factor* Applicable FMCSR

Factor 1 - General Parts 387 and 390

Factor 2 - Driver Parts 382, 383, and 391

Factor 3 - Operational Parts 392 and 395

Factor 4 - Vehicle Parts 393 and 396

Factor 5 - Hazardous Materials Parts 397, 171, 177, and 180

Factor 6 - Accident Factor Recordable Preventable Rate

*All factors are given equal weight.

Table 6. Motor Carrier Safety Rating Table

Factor Ratings Safety Rating

Number of

Unsatisfactory Ratings

Number of

Conditional Ratings

Resultant

Safety Rating

0 2 or fewer Satisfactory

0 more than 2 Conditional

1 2 or fewer Conditional

1 more than 2 Unsatisfactory

2 or more 0 Unsatisfactory
21

methodology resulted in the OMC giving Hammond a conditional rating for the vehicle

factor portion of the compliance review based on the high number of motorcoaches that

the Indiana State Police identified as meeting criteria to be placed out of service. However, because all other factors were rated as satisfactory, the OMC’s overall compliance

rating for Hammond was satisfactory.

As of September 30, 1998, the FHWA’s Motor Carrier Management Information

System (MCMIS) showed the following safety fitness statistics (see tables 7 and 8).

Table 7. MCMIS Safety Fitness Statistics

Description Number

Total number of interstate carriers, including trucks, hazardous

materials carriers, and passenger carriers, in the MCMIS census

467,539

FY’97 Federal-conducted compliance reviews (interstate carriers) 4,087

FY’97 State-conducted compliance reviews* (36 States reporting) 2,521

* Includes inter- and intrastate carriers

Table 8. MCMIS Safety Fitness Statistics for Passenger Carriers

Description Number

Total passenger carriers in the MCMIS census* 13,736

Cumulative number of passenger carriers rated since 1984 3,288 (24%)

Percentage rated “satisfactory” 82% (2,648)

Percentage rated “conditional” 17% (545)

Percentage rated “unsatisfactory” 1% (35)

*Includes all interstate carriers with the authority to carry passengers, including school buses, limousine

services, vans, private carriers and for-hire passenger carriers
22

Preventing Operation of Unsafe Carriers

Existing Regulatory Tools.

Federal regulations contain two tools for preventing unsafe motor carriers from

operating on the roadway. The first tool is part of the current safety rating methodology.

When any motor carrier receives an unsatisfactory rating in two of six rating factors, the

carrier receives a proposed unsatisfactory rating, which becomes effective after 45 days.

A passenger or hazardous-materials carrier then has an additional 45 days to correct the

noncompliance.14 Carriers of property have an additional 60 days to correct the noncompliance. If the carrier corrects the noncompliance to the satisfaction of the OMC, the

carrier receives a satisfactory or conditional rating. If the passenger carrier does not

correct the noncompliance within 45 days, the carrier receives an “out-of-service order”

and is prohibited from operation.15 In the case of Hammond, the postaccident compliance

review conducted on November 1, 1995, resulted in an unsatisfactory rating. On

November 20, 1995, the FHWA issued an out-of-service order.

The second tool for removing an unsafe carrier from the road is the imminent

hazard rule contained in 49 CFR 386.72 (b), which allows any driver, vehicle, or carrier

posing an imminent hazard to safety to be placed out of service. Imminent hazard means

any condition of vehicle, employee, or commercial motor vehicle operation that is likely

to result in serious injury or death if not discontinued immediately.

Despite the availability of these tools for removing unsafe carriers from the road,

OMC records for 1992 to 1996 indicate that they are used infrequently. (See table 9.)

Since 1968, the Safety Board has investigated many fatal motorcoach accidents

caused by fatigued drivers and loss of speed control due to poorly maintained brakes,

conditions that would put a driver or vehicle out of service. Table 10 lists the motorcoach

accidents investigated by the Safety Board that resulted from loss of speed control due to

deficient brakes.

In the Indianapolis accident, the inoperative speedometer on the Hammond bus

contributed to the driver’s lack of speed control, the condition of the brakes probably

contributed to the driver’s inability to slow down on the exit ramp, and the faulty air

conditioner may have contributed to the driver’s fatigue and resulted in the passengers

opening the windows, which may have contributed to the partial ejection and fatal injury

 

14 The November 6, 1997, final rule was amended to give all motor carriers a 45-day grace period

before a less-than-satisfactory rating takes effect.

15 This tool, regarding passenger and hazardous materials carriers, became available in 1991 as a result

of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1990, when the FHWA promulgated 49 CFR 385.13. The Transportation

Efficiency Act for the 21st Century, enacted June 9, 1998, provides for this tool to be extended to all motor

carriers within 60 days of receiving an unsatisfactory rating.
23

of two occupants. The Safety Board concludes that had the OMC given Hammond an

unsatisfactory rating based on the high percentage of vehicle defects, the brakes,

speedometer, and air conditioner on the accident vehicle might have been repaired.

Table 9. Number of Out-of-Service Orders from 1992 through 1996

Carriers Subject to

45-day Rule

Passenger and Hazardous Materials Carriers

Carriers Subject to

Imminent Hazard Rule

All Motor Carriers

Received Unsatisfactory

Safety Ratings

Received Operations

Out-of-Service Order Received Notices of Received Operations

FY Passenger Hazardous

Materials

Passenger Hazardous

Materials

Investigation Out-of-Service Order

92 5 43 0 19 101 4

93 20 152 2 15 106 15

94 23 235 3 25 26 8

95 23 141 4 16 58 29

96 40 217 6 53 27 17

Table 10. Past Safety Board Investigations in which the Motorcoach Accidents

Resulted from Loss of Speed Control due to Deficient Brakes

Location/Date Injured Fatalities

Jasper, Arkansas

June 5, 1980 13 20

Eureka Springs, Arkansas

September 13, 1985 37 5

Big Pine, California

May 18, 1990 43 2

Vernon, New Jersey

June 23, 1993 37 6
24

In its 1992 report, Heavy Vehicle Airbrake Performance,

16 the Safety Board

determined that available data do not allow the role of braking deficiencies in accidents to

be evaluated readily. The Safety Board stated that its investigations suggested that

deficient brakes on heavy vehicles are a factor in more accidents than statistics currently

reveal. The Board found that in 9 of 15 brake-related accidents that it had investigated,

State and local investigating agencies had failed to identify deficient brakes as a factor in

their final reports. The Safety Board also determined that the accidents in the study resulted from a variety of deficiencies, the most common being out-of-adjustment brakes.

Given its findings in both truck and motorcoach accident investigations, the

Safety Board has no doubt that the incidence of deficient brakes is probably far greater for

motorcoaches than statistics indicate. The Safety Board concludes that during a passenger

carrier compliance review, if a passenger carrier does not meet the vehicle factor rating

due to out-of-service vehicles, that determination should be serious enough to rate the

carrier unsatisfactory overall.

Table 11 lists motorcoach accidents investigated by the Safety Board in which the

driver was fatigued. The busdrivers in the Hammond and Rite-Way accidents were fatigued

or at risk for fatigue: one fell asleep and drove off the road, and the other’s alertness was diminished. At the time of the accidents, both drivers were within the hours-of-service rules.

Had both drivers completed their scheduled trips, they probably would have exceeded the

hours-of-service rules, resulting in the drivers meeting the criteria to be placed out of service. The Safety Board therefore concludes that during a passenger compliance review, if a

passenger carrier does not meet the driver factor rating due to out-of-service drivers, that

determination should be serious enough to rate the carrier unsatisfactory overall.

The FHWA has developed a ranking system to target for additional attention those

carriers presenting risks. According to the FHWA, the Motor Carrier Safety Status

Measuring System, or SAFESTAT, makes extensive use of performance data and assesses carrier performance over time. The results of a compliance review, accident rates,

roadside vehicle inspections, driver performance, and enforcement actions are included in

SAFESTAT. This ranking system is used to determine which carriers should be given

compliance reviews.

Satisfactory safety fitness ratings have become an important part of doing business. Cargo shippers routinely monitor the carriers they use, and some insurance companies will not insure cargo unless the carrier has a satisfactory rating. The Motor Carrier

Safety Act of 1990 requires that carriers have a satisfactory rating to be eligible to be

hired by a Federal agency to transport passengers or hazardous materials. As table 8

indicates, less than one third of the passenger carriers in the MCMIS census have been

 

16 Safety Study NTSB/SS-92/01. Washington, DC.
25

rated. Even with the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program and the States performing

compliance reviews, as Michigan did in the case of Rite-Way, the FHWA cannot keep up

with the need for compliance reviews.

On July 20, 1998, the FHWA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking17

asking for comments and suggestions regarding the “current safety fitness rating process

and methodology and the limitations on the availability of resources required to maintain

a safety fitness evaluation process at the level many in the public and even the Congress

expect.” The FHWA asked what issues should be considered in constructing a rating

system for the future.

 

17 Federal Register (FR) July 20, 1998. Vol 63. No. 138. pp 38788-38791.

Table 11. Past Safety Board Accident Investigations

in which the Motorcoach Driver was Fatigued

Location/Date Injured Fatalities

Richmond, Virginia

September 3, 1972 39 3

Jasper, Arkansas

June 5, 1980 13 20

Livingston, Texas

November 30, 1983 5 6

Cheyenne, Wyoming

July 18, 1984 10 1

Middleton, New Jersey

September 6, 1987 32 1

Phoenix, Arizona

September 10, 1993 33 0

Chestertown, New York

April 24, 1994 20 1

Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina

August 2, 1996 19 0

Albuquerque, New Mexico

June 6, 1997 35 1
26

Although the FHWA has established a performance-based system of selecting

carriers for safety fitness evaluation, it does not give sufficient priority to or place sufficient

weight on performance data in determining overall safety fitness.

The Safety Board is convinced that it is important to give more weight to the

performance data in the driver and vehicle factors in passenger carrier compliance reviews.

Deficiencies in these factors have been shown to be directly related to accidents. Considering the number of unrated carriers, Hammond and Rite-Way received above average

attention from the OMC and the States of Indiana and Michigan. Yet the OMC’s rating

methodology enabled those carriers that had repeatedly received conditional or unsatisfactory ratings in either the vehicle or driver factor of the compliance review to operate,

potentially placing school children and other passengers at risk. Hammond had received

conditional and unsatisfactory ratings for 3 years, yet still was allowed to operate. The

public rightfully expects motorcoaches to be safe. The Hammond, Rite-Way, and other

accidents demonstrate that greater Federal oversight of passenger carrier operations is

needed. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the DOT should change the safety fitness

rating methodology so that adverse vehicle or driver performance-based data alone are

sufficient to result in an overall unsatisfactory rating for the carrier.

Consumer Awareness.

OMC safety ratings are a matter of public record. An individual can call the OMC

or access the ratings through the internet. The OMC and the UMA offer consumers guidelines on the internet for chartering a motorcoach. Excerpts from their web pages appear in

appendix C.
27

Emergency Egress

Although quick and orderly

egress from a motorcoach is important during any emergency, it is critical when fire or water is involved.

In the Indianapolis accident, the survivors evacuated through the front

of the vehicle without incident. In

the Stony Creek case, the water and

the attitude, or position, of the bus

made evacuation difficult.

The Rite-Way bus interior

(see figure 5) had 11 rows of two

seats on each side of a center aisle.

A row of three seats and an enclosed

lavatory were at the rear of the

coach. The bus had two 23- by 16-

inch roof emergency escape hatches;

one near the front and the other near

the rear of the coach along the

center aisle.

Seven 56- by 36-inch windows on each side of the vehicle

were designated emergency exit

windows. Each window was hinged

at the top, allowing the window to

swing open when the emergency release bar was activated (see figure

6). Postaccident tests done by the

manufacturer indicated that an upward force of 85 pounds was needed

to fully open an emergency exit

window if the coach was lying on its

side.18

 

18 Title 49 CFR 571.217 regulates emergency exit windows. Testing requirements, which are based on

a vehicle being upright on a flat horizontal surface and not on its side, stipulate a low-force application,

rotary or straight, of not more than 20 pounds and a high-force application, straight and perpendicular to the

undisturbed exit surface, of not more than 60 pounds.

Figure 5. Rite-Way Bus Seating Chart

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abbreviated Injury Scale

00 = N o Injury

01 = Minor Injury

02 = M oderate

03 = Serious

04 = Severe

05 = C ritical

06 = M axim um Injury,

 Virtually Unsurvivable

09 = Unknown

M-54-03

M-16-01

M-46-01

F-17-01

F-16-02

M-16-01

M-12-0

M-25-09

F-28-01

M-12-01

F-12-01

F-13-01

F-11-01

F-17-01

F-17-01

F-13-01

M-14-01

F-14-01

F-16-01

F-15-01

M-14-02

M-14-01

M-13-01

M-13-02

M-18-01

M-17-01

F-15-01

M-15-01

M-15-01

F-16-0

F-12-01

F-12-01

F-14-01

F-56-01

M-13-01

Example: M -16-01 indicates a m ale,

16 years of age with minor injuries
28

The bus was equipped with three video monitors, two on the right side at rows

one and six, and one on the left side at row three. Eleven compartmentalized and enclosed

overhead storage racks were installed along the length of the motorcoach on each side of

the center aisle, above the passenger seats.

The only seatbelt on the bus was a lapbelt with an automatic retractor at the

driver’s seat. The police found that the belt was operational and unfastened.

The bus sustained major exterior damage to the entire front and the left side.

Inside, the floor immediately behind the driver’s seat had buckled downward. The

driver’s seat had tilted forward about 5 degrees, and the steering shaft was displaced from

the cup at the floor. Several passenger seatbacks were deformed or collapsed forward.

The overhead storage racks had broken in several places; the door locks on some storage

racks had opened, allowing the contents to spill out. The video monitor at the right front

had become dislodged and was not recovered.

Many passengers, some of whom were as young as 11, indicated that they had

difficulty evacuating the vehicle, which was overturned and partially submerged in 5 to 6

feet of water. To escape, they had to stand on the seats, push up on the emergency

windows, and climb out and onto the top of the bus. Their heavy water-soaked clothing

encumbered the passengers, and they had trouble lifting themselves up through the

windows. Other passengers said that they had trouble wading through the water or

keeping themselves above the water, which nearly filled the bus. One passenger experienced difficulty opening an emergency window when she could not see through the

Figure 6. Instructions on motorcoach’s emergency window release bar
29

murky water to read the instructions. She said that she began to panic when other passengers began shoving her.

Some passengers said that because of their height or the window weight, they

were unable to push the windows open after unlatching them. Because the bus was on its

side, several passengers had difficulty in keeping the windows open. The windows had to

be pushed open and back until they rested on the side of the vehicle, a rotation of 180

degrees, to prevent them from closing on the escaping passengers. Thus, the individual

opening the window not only had to have sufficient strength to push it open, but also

sufficient height and arm length to rotate the window to this degree.

Injured passengers particularly had problems evacuating through the emergency

windows. One passenger who had sustained bilateral ankle fractures could not stand to

evacuate. Another passenger with a broken finger could not pull himself up through the

window frame without great difficulty and pain. A passenger with an eye injury had

trouble opening the window and required assistance from another passenger.

For more than 30 years, the Safety Board has addressed the issue of passengers

having difficulty with emergency evacuations of motorcoaches.

On December 18, 1968, as a result of its investigation of the March 7, 1968,

coach-automobile collision on I-15 near Baker, California, in which 19 people died and

12 people were injured,19 the Safety Board issued the following safety recommendation to

the FHWA:

H-68-25

Change the basis of regulatory requirements intended to ensure escape

from buses so that they are based upon tests of performance of occupants

in escaping from buses standing or lying in all basic attitudes. In the

development of test criteria, it is suggested that consideration be given to

test procedures presently employed by the Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] for the regulation of the adequacy of escape techniques and

systems. Further, consideration should be given to adopting for buses, the

airline practice of placing emergency escape instructions at each passenger

location. It is further recommended that necessary regulations be expedited

to ensure that no new types of buses go into service which have not been

tested to ensure that all occupants can escape rapidly when the bus is in

any of its basic attitudes after a crash. This recommendation refers to

docket 2-10 of the National Highway Safety Bureau, as well as to Motor

Carrier Safety Regulations.

 

19 For more detailed information, read: Interstate Bus--Automobile Collision, Interstate Route 15,

Baker, California, March 7, 1968. Highway Accident Report NTSB/SS-H-3. Washington, DC.
30

In a letter dated January 17, 1969, the FHWA responded that the contemplated

regulations would require time to develop from performance-based emergency escape

tests because of the numerous bus configurations in existence. The agency indicated that

research was being planned “to correlate escape operations from on-side attitude with onwheels condition.” It also stated that it was using FAA airworthiness standards to develop

an escape demonstration technique for buses.

On March 19, 1970, as a result of its investigation of the December 26, 1968,

chartered motorcoach crash on Interstate Route I-80S near Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, in

which 3 people died and 36 people were injured,20 the Safety Board issued the following

safety recommendation to the FHWA:

H-70-9

Review our recommendation in the report of the interstate coach-auto

collision near Baker, California, to change the basis of its regulatory

requirements intended to ensure escape from buses standing or lying in all

basic attitudes. In the development of test criteria, it is suggested that

consideration be given to test procedures presently employed by the FAA

for the regulation of the adequacy of escape techniques and systems.

Further, consideration should be given to adopting for buses, the airline

practice of placing emergency escape instructions at each passenger

location. It is further recommended that necessary regulations be expedited

to ensure that no new types of buses go into service which have not been

tested to ensure that all occupants can escape rapidly when the bus is in

any of its basic attitudes after a crash. This recommendation refers to

docket 2-10 of the National Highway Safety Bureau, as well as to Motor

Carrier Safety Regulations.

On August 23, 1973, the FHWA advised the Safety Board that Federal Motor

Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 217, specifying requirements for window retention,

emergency release handles, and passenger escape, would be effective September 1, 1973.

Shortly thereafter, the Safety Board investigated the November 3, 1973, accident

near Sacramento, California, in which a 1953 GMC motorcoach operated by Greyhound

Lines, Inc., (Greyhound) ran off the left side of I-880, overrode a guardrail, and collided

 

20 For more detailed information, read: Chartered Interstate Bus Crash, Interstate Route I-80S Near

Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, December 26, 1968. Highway Accident Report NTSB/SS-H-5. Washington,

DC.
31

with a bridge column. The driver and 12 passengers sustained fatal injuries, 22 passengers

sustained serious injuries, and 11 passengers sustained minor injuries.21

Although the bus remained upright, passengers reported that they had difficulties

getting out because it was dark, they were confused and jammed between seats, and the

windowsill was 8 feet from the ground. In addition, some passengers stated that “the

windows were heavy and that there was no way to hold them open.”

As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board recommended that the FHWA:

H-74-37

Establish regulations to facilitate evacuation of buses in an emergency.

The incorporation of emergency lighting systems actuated through impact

and entry for rescuers should be included in the regulation. Attention is

called to the Board’s investigation of the interstate bus accident in Baker,

California, in 1968, in which it was recommended that “no new type buses

go into service which have not been tested to ensure that all occupants can

escape rapidly.”

The FHWA advised the Safety Board on February 2, 1975, that FMVSS 217 set

forth requirements for emergency exits on the sides, rear, and roof of buses to ensure

passenger escape. The FHWA further stated that the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety

(BMCS)22 had been monitoring the result of FMVSS 217 by reviewing accident reports,

and that in FY-76, the BMCS was scheduled to study the availability and cost benefits of

emergency lighting systems.

In a letter dated December 16, 1985, the Safety Board discussed the status of

several open safety recommendations, advising the FHWA:

The problem of escape from buses can be addressed satisfactorily through

the more general Safety Recommendation H-70-9; therefore, H-68-25 has

been classified as “Closed—Superceded,” and H-74-37 has been classified

as “Closed—Reconsidered.” The last response to these recommendations

was that the BMCS was planning a research and development effort to

address escape from buses. We would appreciate a further discussion of

FHWA action in this area. Safety Recommendation H-70-9 will be held in

an “Open—Acceptable Action” status, pending your response.

 

21 For more detailed information, read: Greyhound Bus Collision with Concrete Overpass Support

Column on I-880, San Juan Overpass, Sacramento, California, November 3, 1973. Highway Accident

Report NTSB-HAR-74-5). Washington, DC.

22 The forerunner of the OMC.
32

In a letter dated May 4, 1988, the FHWA stated,

We believe that the issues of Safety Recommendation H-70-9 are adequately covered in the NHTSA FMVSS 217 and no additional regulatory

requirements are necessary. The NHTSA has the responsibility for all

commercial vehicle manufacturers specifications such as those relating to

Safety Recommendation H-70-9.

As a result of this response, on June 28, 1988, the Safety Board classified Safety

Recommendation H-70-9 “Closed—Acceptable Alternate Action.”

Since the 1968 and 1973 accidents, the Safety Board has investigated several

other accidents in which a bus left the roadway and either rolled or vaulted into water and

the passengers had difficulty evacuating. On May 30, 1986, a motorcoach chartered for a

tour rolled over 360 degrees into the Walker River.23 Of the 41 occupants, mostly senior

citizens, 21 were fatally injured. Of the 21 passengers who were fatally injured, seven

drowned.

More recently, on August 2, 1996, a 1980 TMC motorcoach operated by Greyhound drove off the right side of I-95 and came to rest upright in Chockoyotte Creek near

Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina.24 The bus was submerged in water up to the bottom of

the push-out emergency windows. Some passengers exited through the push-out windows; others exited through the broken windshield. Several passengers indicated that

people were screaming and there was a state of panic. One passenger stated that “the bus

windows wouldn’t stay open, so we all had a hard time getting out.” Of the 50 occupants,

19 sustained minor to serious injuries.

As the Stony Creek accident illustrates, the emergency exit windows are very

difficult to operate in an evacuation when a motorcoach is not upright. In particular, some

children and those with minor injuries were not tall or strong enough to push the heavy

emergency windows open far enough to evacuate. The Safety Board therefore concludes

that the strength and height needed to open an emergency window when a motorcoach is

not upright poses a problem for some passengers, especially children, senior citizens, and

some injury victims.

Although the number of rollover accidents is relatively small, the increased

chance of injury is dramatic. Of 42 motorcoach accidents involving fatalities that the

Safety Board investigated between 1968 and 1998, more than 50 percent were rollover

accidents.

 

23 For more detailed information, read: Intercity Tour Bus Loss of Control and Rollover into the West

Walker River, Walker, California, May 30, 1986. Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-87/04. Washington, DC.

24 For more detailed information, read: Safety Board Docket Number SRH-96-FH-015.
33

The Safety Board is convinced that, to facilitate emergency evacuations, emergency exits and windows should be designed so that they do not open accidentally during

normal use and accidents, but do open easily when the vehicle comes to rest. The Safety

Board therefore believes that NHTSA should revise FMVSS 217, “Bus Window

Retention and Release,” to require that other than floor-level emergency exits can be

easily opened and that they remain open during emergency evacuation when a

motorcoach is upright or at unusual attitudes.

The Safety Board has made similar recommendations regarding floor-level door

openings on school buses. In September 1989, the Safety Board investigated an Alton,

Texas,25 accident in which a school bus involved in the crash went into a caliche pit and

was completely submerged in dark, murky water within 60 seconds. The 21 passengers

who drowned were unable to escape from the submerged vehicle because the emergency

exits would not remain open or were too small for egress.

On August 22, 1990, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation H-90-074

asking that NHTSA revise FMVSS 217, “Bus Window Retention and Release,” to require

that floor-level emergency exits be designed so that once opened, they remained open

during emergencies and school bus evacuations. On November 2, 1992, NHTSA

published the final rule revising FMVSS 571.217 S 5.4.2, “School Bus Emergency Exit

Opening.” The new regulation states, in part:

The positive door opening device shall perform the functions specified

in...this section without the need for additional action beyond opening the

door past the point at which the door is perpendicular to the side of the bus

body.

On February 19, 1993, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation

H-90-074 “Closed—Acceptable Action.”

 

25 For more detailed information, read: Collision Between Mission Consolidated Independent School

District School Bus and Valley Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc., Tractor Semitrailer, Intersection of

Bryan Road and Texas Farm-to-Market Road 676, Alton, Texas, September 21, 1989. Highway Accident

Report NTSB/HAR-90/02. Washington, DC.
34

Passenger Briefings

In many of the bus accidents investigated by the Safety Board, passengers have

described a general sense of panic because they did not know what to do or how to get out

of the bus. The Stony Creek accident occurred when the river was comparatively low.

Two days before the accident, the water in the river was 7 to 8 feet deeper.26 On the day

of the accident, had the water been deeper, it probably would have filled the vehicle. Had

this occurred, the passengers might not have been able to plan their escape or had the time

to read the window latch instructions, assist each other with opening the windows, and

aid the injured and incapacitated students, as they did in this case.

Before the Pathways to Freedom 97 trip began, Rite-Way did not provide passengers with instructions on the use of emergency exits on the bus. Many passengers stated

that they felt a briefing from the driver on the emergency exits would have been beneficial. The Safety Board determined that Rite-Way had not trained the driver to provide

passengers with a safety briefing before or during the trip; such training was not required.

The bus was equipped with a public address system, a videotape player, and

television monitors, which Rite-Way could have used to tell passengers what to do in the

event of an accident, vehicle fire, or submersion in water. Passenger briefings, such as

those provided on airplanes, could include instructions on emergency egress through the

emergency windows or roof hatches. The Safety Board concludes that emergency instructions can be crucial to a safe and expedient evacuation in the event of an accident or

emergency.

Carriers have a variety of opportunities to provide passengers with emergency

evacuation information. Depending on the size of the carrier or the scope of its operation,

safety materials could include all or any number of the following: videos, briefings,

pamphlets, or cards attached to seatbacks.

Safety Board investigators discussed the availability of safety briefing videos with

industry representatives for the two major trade associations, the ABA and the UMA, and

for a marketing and tour brokering organization, the National Motorcoach Network

(NMN). The NMN representatives said that many carriers, with the exception of Greyhound and some companies serving senior citizen groups, have motorcoaches that are

equipped with television monitors that can show videotapes. The ABA, UMA, and NMN

representatives said that passenger safety videos similar to those shown on aircraft are

available, but are not widely used throughout the motorcoach industry.

 

26 On July 28, 1997, at a gage 38.5 miles downstream of the accident site, an area of the river that is

normally 4 to 5 feet deep crested at 12.6 feet. U.S. Geological Survey officials estimated that the river

would have crested at the accident site on July 27, 1997.
35

The ABA’s safety committee has discussed the development of a safety briefing

video, but does not plan to produce one in the near future. The UMA has produced a

safety video similar to those shown on airplanes. The 4-minute video gives safety

messages, such as obeying the driver’s instructions, locating the fire extinguisher,

escaping during an emergency, and using the handholds while the motorcoach is moving.

While the video mentions the UMA, the film does not contain advertising.

The NMN representatives said that their company had produced customized video

and audio tapes, providing passengers with emergency and general safety information, as

part of a commercial project from 1994 through 1996. The NMN found that carriers did

not enforce the showing of the video because they reportedly “did not like to tell their

drivers what to do when on the road.” Some carriers did not wish to pay for the video. To

continue the program, the NMN solicited funding from outside sources, who frequently

were mentioned in the films. According to the NMN, carriers objected to the identification of the sponsors in the films because they “did not like to help promote the business

of the outside sources on their trips.” In October 1998, the NMN provided a total of 1,000

free video safety tapes to all of its motorcoach charter and tour operator affiliates having

video-equipped motorcoaches; however, the tape contains a 6-minute advertisement.

The Safety Board has stressed the importance of passenger safety education in all

modes of transportation. FAA regulations at 14 CFR Parts 121 and 135 provide minimum

requirements for conveying safety information to passengers. FAA advisory circulars and

air carrier operations bulletins provide general guidance to air carriers and to FAA

inspectors for developing flight attendant oral safety presentations and safety cards. The

guidance generally is in the form of what information should be presented, but not how it

should be presented.27 Although the Federal Railroad Administration does not specifically include information requirements in its passenger safety regulations, Amtrak uses

signs and placards, as well as briefings, to inform passengers about safety features on its

trains. U.S. Coast Guard regulations require safety drills on all cruise ships embarking

passengers from U.S. ports.

The Safety Board believes that the DOT should provide Federal guidance on the

minimum information to be included in safety briefing materials for motorcoach operations. In addition, the DOT should require motorcoach operators to provide passengers

with pretrip briefing information. In the interim, the ABA and the UMA should encourage their members to provide pretrip passenger safety briefings and to develop training

programs for their drivers on how to make pretrip passenger safety briefings.

 

27 For more detailed information, read: Airline Passenger Safety Education: A Review of Methods

Used to Present Safety Information. Safety Study NTSB/SS-85/09. Washington, DC.
36

Conclusions

1. The Rite-Way busdriver fell asleep and ran off the road.

2. The Rite-Way driver became fatigued because the Pathways to Freedom tour schedule

imposed inverted duty-sleep periods and because additional well-rested drivers were

not provided for relief.

3. Although the exact cause of the Hammond driver’s failing to respond appropriately

cannot be determined, several factors, including fatiguing conditions and the driver’s

unfamiliarity with the route, may have contributed to his failing to slow down for the

exit ramp.

4. The condition of the brakes probably contributed to the Hammond busdriver’s inability to slow his vehicle when he entered the ramp too fast.

5. Had the Office of Motor Carriers given Hammond an unsatisfactory rating based on

the high percentage of vehicle defects, the brakes, speedometer, and air conditioner on

the accident vehicle might have been repaired.

6. During a passenger carrier compliance review, if a carrier does not meet the vehicle

factor rating due to out-of-service vehicles, that determination should be serious

enough to rate the carrier unsatisfactory overall.

7. During a passenger carrier compliance review, if a carrier does not meet the driver

factor rating due to out-of-service drivers, that determination should be serious

enough to rate the carrier unsatisfactory overall.

8. The strength and height needed to open an emergency window when a motorcoach is

not upright poses a problem for some passengers, especially children, senior citizens,

and some injury victims.

9. Emergency instructions can be crucial to a safe and expedient evacuation in the event

of an accident or emergency.
37

Recommendations

As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes

the following Safety Recommendations:

to the Department of Transportation:

Require that the Federal Highway Administration’s fatigue video that is

being developed for motorcoaches discuss the dangers of inverted dutysleep periods. (H-99-4)

In the assessment that is mandated by the Transportation Efficiency Act

for the 21st Century, include the inverted work schedules of motorcoach

carriers in the study of how the operations of shippers, brokers, freight

forwarders, consignees, or others, such as tour or charter operators,

encourage the violations of the hours-of-service rules. (H-99-5)

Change the safety fitness rating methodology so that adverse vehicle or

driver performance-based data alone are sufficient to result in an overall

unsatisfactory rating for the carrier.(H-99-6)

Provide guidance on the minimum information to be included in safety

briefing materials for motorcoach operations. (H-99-7)

Require motorcoach operators to provide passengers with pretrip safety

information. (H-99-8)

to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration:

Revise the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 217, “Bus Window

Retention and Release,” to require that other than floor-level emergency

exits can be easily opened and that they remain open during an emergency

evacuation when a motorcoach is upright or at unusual attitudes. (H-99-9)

to the American Bus Association:

Alert your members to the dangers of inverted duty-sleep periods.

(H-99-10)

Encourage your members to revise their scheduling practices to avoid

inverted duty-sleep periods or to provide a well-rested relief driver if the

schedule requires alternate night driving. (H-99-11)
38

Include an explanation of the dangers of inverted duty-sleep periods in the

busdriver fatigue training video currently under production. (H-99-12)

Encourage your members to provide pretrip passenger safety briefings. (H99-13)

Encourage your members to develop training programs for their drivers on

how to make pretrip passenger safety briefings. (H-99-14)

to the United Motorcoach Association:

Alert your members to the dangers of inverted duty-sleep periods.

(H-99-15)

Encourage your members to revise their scheduling practices to avoid

inverted duty-sleep periods or to provide a well-rested relief driver if the

schedule requires alternate night driving. (H-99-16)

Encourage your members to provide pretrip passenger safety briefings. (H99-17)

Encourage your members to develop training programs for their drivers on

how to make pretrip passenger safety briefings. (H-99-18)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

JAMES E. HALL

Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member

ROBERT T. FRANCIS II

Vice Chairman

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

February 11, 1999
Appendix A

Pathways to Freedom Tour Schedule

12AM 3 6 9 12PM 3 6 9 12AM

Night Drive Night Sleep

DAY OF THE WEEK TIME SCHEDULE TOUR ACTIVITY 

Thursday, July 10 Detroit to Cincinnati, OH

Cincinnati to Clarksville, OH

Activities in Clarksville

Clarksville to Om aha, NE

Kansas City

Tour Tulsa

Tour M em phis

M em phis to Huntsville, AL

Huntsville to M ontgom ery, AL

Montgomery to Charleston, SC

Tour Charleston

Charleston to Washington, DC

Accident

Tour M em phis

Tulsa to Memphis, TN

Kansas City to Tulsa, OK

O maha to K ansas City, M O

Friday, July 11

Saturda y, July 12

Sun day, July 13

M ond ay, July 14

Tuesd ay, July 15

W ednesday, July 16

Thursday, July 17

Friday, July 18

Saturda y, July 19

Sun day, July 20

M ond ay, July 21

Tuesd ay, July 22

W ednesday, July 23

Thursday, July 24

Friday, July 25

Saturda y, July 26

Sun day, July 27

M ond ay, July 28

Tuesd ay, July 29
40
41

Appendix B

Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations

Part 385—Safety Fitness Procedures

Sec.

385.1 Purpose and scope.

385.3 Definitions.

385.5 Safety fitness standard.

385.7 Factors to be considered in determining a

safety rating.

385.9 Determination of a safety rating.

385.11 Notification of a safety rating.

385.13 Unsatisfactory safety rating--Prohibition on

transportation of hazardous materials and

passengers.

385.15 Request for a change in a safety rating; facts

and procedure.

385.17 Request for a change in a safety rating;

corrective action taken.

385.19 Safety fitness information.

385.21 Motor carrier identification report.

385.23 Failure to report.

APPENDIX A TO PART 385—FORM MCS-150,

MOTOR CARRIER IDENTIFICATION REPORT

APPENDIX B TO PART 385--SAFETY RATING

PROCESS

AUTHORITY: 49 U.S.C. 104, 504, 521(b)(5)(A),

5113, 31136, 31144, 31502; and 49 CFR 1.48.

SOURCE: 53 FR 50968, Dec. 19, 1988, unless

otherwise noted.

§ Sec. 385.1 Purpose and scope.

(a) This part establishes procedures to determine the

safety fitness of motor carriers, to assign safety

ratings, to take remedial action when required, and to

prohibit motor carriers receiving a safety rating of

“`unsatisfactory’’ from operating a commercial motor

vehicle:

(1) To provide transportation of hazardous materials

for which vehicle placarding is required in accordance

with part 172, subpart F, of this title; or

(2) To transport more than 15 passengers, including

the driver.

(b) The provisions of this part apply to all motor

carriers subject to the requirements of this subchapter.

[56 FR 40805, Aug. 16, 1991]

§Sec. 385.3 Definitions.

Applicable safety regulations or requirements

means 49 CFR subtitle B, chapter III, Subchapter B--

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations; and 49

CFR subtitle B, chapter I, Subchapter C--Hazardous

Materials Regulations.

Commercial motor vehicle shall have the same

meaning as described in § 390.5 of this subchapter.

Preventable accident on the part of a motor carrier

means an accident (1) that involved a commercial

motor vehicle and (2) that could have been averted but

for an act, or failure to act, by the motor carrier or the

driver.

Reviews. For the purposes of this part:

(1) Compliance review means an on-site examination of motor carrier operations, such as drivers’ hours

of service, maintenance and inspection, driver

qualification, commercial drivers license requirements, financial responsibility, accidents, hazardous

materials, and other safety and transportation records

to determine whether a motor carrier meets the safety

fitness standard. A compliance review may be

conducted in response to a request to change a safety

rating, to investigate potential violations of safety

regulations by motor carriers, or to investigate

complaints or other evidence of safety violations. The

compliance review may result in the initiation of an

enforcement action.

(2) Safety review means an on-site assessment to

determine if a motor carrier has adequate safety

management controls in place and functioning to meet

the safety fitness standard. The safety review includes

an inspection of selected motor carrier records and

operations. It is used to gather information for

assigning ratings to unrated carriers. The safety review

is not ordinarily employed to gather evidence in

support of enforcement actions, but will if certain

serious violations are discovered (e.g., absence of

proof of financial responsibility; document

falsification).

(3) Safety management controls means the systems,

policies programs, practices, and procedures used by a

motor carrier to ensure compliance with applicable

safety and hazardous materials regulations which

ensure the safe movement of products and passengers

through the transportation system, and to reduce the

risk of highway accidents and hazardous materials
42

incidents resulting in fatalities, injuries, and property

damage.

Safety ratings: (1) Satisfactory safety rating means

that a motor carrier has in place and functioning

adequate safety management controls to meet the

safety fitness standard prescribed in §385.5. Safety

management controls are adequate if they are

appropriate for the size and type of operation of the

particular motor carrier.

(2) Conditional safety rating means a motor carrier

does not have adequate safety management controls in

place to ensure compliance with the safety fitness

standard that could result in the occurrences listed in

§385.5 (a) through (h).

(3) Unsatisfactory safety rating means a motor

carrier does not have adequate safety management

controls in place to ensure compliance with the safety

fitness standard which has resulted in occurrences

listed in §385.5 (a) through (h). Motor carriers receiving an “unsatisfactory safety rating” may be

subject to the provisions of §385.13.

(4) Unrated carrier means that a safety rating has

not been assigned to the motor carrier by the FHWA.

[53 FR 50968, Dec. 19, 1988, as amended at 56 FR 40805,

Aug. 16, 1991]

§ Sec. 385.5 Safety fitness standard.

The satisfactory safety rating is based on the degree

of compliance with the safety fitness standard for

motor carriers. To meet the safety fitness standard, the

motor carrier shall demonstrate that it has adequate

safety management controls in place, which function

effectively to ensure acceptable compliance with

applicable safety requirements to reduce the risk

associated with:

(a) Commercial driver’s license standard violations

(part 383),

(b) Inadequate levels of financial responsibility (part

387),

(c) The use of unqualified drivers (part 391),

(d) Improper use and driving of motor vehicles (part

392),

(e) Unsafe vehicles operating on the highways (part

393),

(f) Failure to maintain accident registers and copies

of accident reports (part 390),

(g) The use of fatigued drivers (part 395),

(h) Inadequate inspection, repair, and maintenance

of vehicles (part 396),

(i) Transportation of hazardous materials, driving

and parking rule violations (part 397),

(j) Violation of hazardous materials regulations

(parts 170 through 177), and

(k) Motor vehicle accidents and hazardous materials

incidents.

[53 FR 50968, Dec. 19, 1988, as amended at 58 FR 33776,

June 21, 1993]

§ Sec. 385.7 Factors to be considered in determining a safety rating.

The factors to be considered in determining the

safety fitness and assigning a safety rating include

information from safety reviews, compliance reviews,

and any other data. The factors may include all or

some of the following:

(a) Adequacy of safety management controls. The

adequacy of controls may be questioned if their degree

of formalization, automation, etc., is found to be

substantially below the norm for similar carriers.

Violations, accidents, or incidents substantially above

the norm for similar carriers will be strong evidence

that management controls are either inadequate or not

functioning properly.

(b) Frequency and severity of regulatory violations.

(c) Frequency and severity of driver/vehicle

regulatory violations identified in roadside

inspections.

(d) Number and frequency of out-of-service

driver/vehicle violations.

(e) Increase or decrease in similar types of

regulatory violations discovered during safety or

compliance reviews.

(f) Frequency of accidents; hazardous materials

incidents; accident rate per million miles; preventable

accident rate per million miles; and other accident

indicators; and whether these accident and incident

indicators have improved or deteriorated over time.

(g) The number and severity of violations of State

safety rules, regulations, standards, and orders

applicable to commercial motor vehicles and motor

carrier safety that are compatible with Federal rules,

regulations, standards, and orders.

[53 FR 50968, Dec. 19, 1988, as amended at 58 FR 33776,

June 21, 1993]

§ Sec. 385.9 Determination of a safety rating.

(a) Following a safety or compliance review of a

motor carrier operation, the FHWA, using the factors

prescribed in § 385.7, shall determine whether the

present operations of the motor carrier are consistent

with the safety fitness standard set forth in § 385.5 and

assign a safety rating accordingly.

(b) Unless otherwise specifically provided in this

chapter, a safety rating will be issued to a motor

carrier within 30 days following the completion of a

compliance review.

[53 FR 50968, Dec. 19, 1988, as amended at 62 FR 28809,

May 28, 1997]

Effective Date Note: At 62 FR 28809, May 28,

1997, in § 385.9, the existing text was designated as

paragraph (a), and a new paragraph (b) was added,

effective May 28, 1997, until Nov. 28, 1997.
43

§ Sec. 385.11 Notification of a safety rating.

(a) The FHWA shall provide written notification to

the motor carrier of the assigned safety rating.

(b) Notification of a “conditional” or “unsatisfactory” rating will include a list of those items for

which immediate corrective action must be taken.

(c) A notification of an “unsatisfactory” safety rating

will also include a notice that the motor carrier will be

subject to the provisions of § 385.13, which prohibit

motor carriers rated “unsatisfactory” from

transporting:

(1) Hazardous materials requiring placarding under

part 172, subpart F, of this title; or

(2) 15 or more passengers, including the driver.

[56 FR 40806, Aug. 16, 1991]

§ Sec. 385.13 Unsatisfactory safety rating—Prohibition on transportation of hazardous materials and

passengers.

(a)(1) A motor carrier that receives a safety rating

from the Federal Highway Administration which is

“unsatisfactory” shall have 45 calendar days from the

effective date of that rating or from the date of notice

of that rating, whichever is later, to take such action as

may be necessary to improve such safety rating to

“conditional” or “satisfactory.”

(2) Prohibition on transportation. After the last day

of the 45-day period established pursuant to paragraph

(a)(1) of this section and until notification is issued

pursuant to this part of either a “conditional” or

“satisfactory” safety rating, a motor carrier rated

“unsatisfactory” shall be prohibited from operating a

commercial motor vehicle to transport--

(i) Hazardous materials for which vehicle placarding

is required pursuant to this title; or

(ii) More than 15 passengers, including the driver.

(3) Ineligibility for Federal Government

transportation. Any motor carrier that receives a

safety rating of “unsatisfactory” shall be ineligible to

contract or subcontract with any Federal agency for

the transportation of--

(i) Hazardous materials for which vehicle placarding

is required pursuant to this title; or

(ii) More than 15 passengers, including the driver.

(b) Penalties. Any motor carrier that operates

commercial motor vehicles in violation of this section

will be subject to the penalty provisions of 49 U.S.C.

App. 1809 and 49 U.S.C. 521.

[56 FR 40806, Aug. 16, 1991]

Sec. 385.15 Request for a change in a safety rating;

facts and procedure.

(a) A petition for review of a safety rating, where

there are factual or procedural disputes, must list all

issues in dispute and be accompanied by any information or documents the motor carrier is relying upon as

the basis for its petition.

(b)(1) The petition must be submitted to the

Director, Office of Motor Carrier Field Operations,

within 90 days of the date of notification of the

assignment or change of a safety rating.

(2) Motor carriers affected by the provisions of

§ 385.13 should submit their petitions and supporting

documentation to the Director, Office of Motor

Carrier Field Operations, within 15 days from the date

of notification of the assignment of a safety rating.

(c) As part of the consideration of a petition, the

Director, Office of Motor Carrier Field Operations,

may request the motor carrier to submit additional

data and attend a conference to discuss the safety

rating. Failure to provide such data or to attend the

conference may result in dismissal of the petition.

(d) The Director, Office of Motor Carrier Field

Operations, shall notify the motor carrier in writing of

a decision on a petition for review of a safety rating,

which will constitute the final agency action. The

decision may:

(1) Confirm the rating; or

(2) Revise the rating.

[56 FR 40806, Aug. 16, 1991]

§ Sec. 385.17 Request for a change in a safety

rating; corrective action taken.

(a) A request for a change in a safety rating may be

made when the basis for the change is evidence that

corrective actions have been taken and that operations

currently meet the safety fitness standard specified in

§ 385.5. The request shall be directed in writing, via

certified mail, to the Regional Director of Motor

Carriers for the FHWA Region in which the motor

carrier maintains its principal place of business for

safety. The Regional Office addresses are listed in

§ 390.27 of this subchapter. Such a request shall

include a written description of corrective actions

taken and other documentation that may be relied

upon as a basis for improving the assigned rating.

(b) The FHWA will make its determination based

upon documentation submitted or any additional

investigation deemed necessary.

(c) In cases where the FHWA is unable to make a

determination within the 45-day period established in

§ 385.13 and the motor carrier has submitted evidence

that corrective actions have been taken pursuant to

paragraph (a) of this section and has cooperated in any

investigation, the FHWA may conditionally suspend

the effective date of the “unsatisfactory” safety rating

for an additional period of up to 10 days.

[56 FR 40806, Aug. 16, 1991, as amended at 61 FR 1843,

Jan. 24, 1996]
44

§ Sec. 385.19 Safety fitness information.

(a) Safety rating information on motor carriers will

be made available to all Federal agencies telephonically or by remote computer terminals.

(b) The safety rating assigned to a motor carrier will

be made available to the public upon request. Any

person requesting the assigned rating of a motor

carrier should provide the FHWA with the motor

carrier name, principal office address, and the ICC

assigned docket number or the U.S. DOT identification number.

(c) Requests should be addressed to: OMC--Safety

Rating, P.O. Box 13028, Arlington, Virginia 22219.

(d) Oral requests by telephone will be accepted and

may be made by calling (703) 276-6876. Oral requests

made by telephone will be sent a written response if so

requested.

[56 FR 51344, Oct. 11, 1991]

§ Sec. 385.21 Motor carrier identification report.

(a) All motor carriers currently conducting

operations in interstate or foreign commerce shall file

a Motor Carrier Identification Report, Form MCS150, within 90 days after the effective date of this rule.

Exception: The provisions of this section do not apply

to a motor carrier that has received written notification

of a safety rating from the FHWA.

(b) All motor carriers beginning operation after the

effective date of this rule shall file the Motor Carrier

Identification Report, Form MCS-150, within 90 days

after beginning operations.

(c) The Motor Carrier Identification Report, Form

MCS-150, is available from all FHWA region and

division motor carrier safety offices nationwide and

from FHWA Office of Motor Carrier Information

Management and Analysis, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,

Washington, DC 20590.

(d) The completed Motor Carrier Identification

Report, Form MCS-150, shall be filed with the

FHWA, Office of Motor Carrier Information Management and Analysis, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,

Washington, DC 20590.

§ Sec. 385.23 Failure to report.

Failure by a motor carrier to file a Motor Carrier

Identification Report, Form MCS-150, pursuant to the

provisions of § 385.21 or furnishing misleading information or making false statements upon the MCS-150

shall subject the offender to the penalties prescribed in

title 49, United States Code, 522(b).

[53 FR 50968, Dec. 19, 1988, as amended at 60 FR 38743,

July 28, 1995]

APPENDIX A TO PART 385--FORM MCS-150, MOTOR

CARRIER IDENTIFICATION REPORT

(Approved by OMB under

control number 2125-0544)

[FORM NOT SHOWN]

NOTICE

The Form MCS-150, Motor Carrier Identification

Report, must be filed by all motor carriers operating in

interstate or foreign commerce. A new motor carrier

must file Form MCS-150 within 90 days after

beginning operations. Exception: A motor carrier that

has received written notification of a safety rating

from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)

need not file the report. To mail, fold the completed

report so that the self-addressed postage-paid panel is

on the outside. This report is required by 49 CFR Part

385 and authorized by 49 U.S.C. 504 (1982 & Supp.

III 1985).

The public reporting burden for this collection of

information on the Form MCS-150 is estimated by the

FHWA to average 20 minutes. If you wish to comment

on the accuracy of the estimate or make suggestions

for reducing this burden, please direct your comments

to Office of Management and Budget and the FHWA

at the following addresses:

Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork

Reduction Project, Washington, DC 20503

and

Federal Highway Administration, Office of Motor

Carrier Field Operations, HFO-10, 400 7th Street,

SW, Washington, DC 20590

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THE MOTOR CARRIER

IDENTIFICATION REPORT (MCS-150)

(Please Print or Type All Information)

1. Enter the name of the business entity (i.e.

corporation, partnership, or individual) that owns

and controls the motor carrier operation.

2. If the business entity is operating under a name

other than that in Block 1, i.e. “trade name,” enter

that name. Otherwise, leave blank.

3. Enter the principal place of business (where all

safety records are maintained) street address.

4. Enter the city where the principal place of business

is located.

5. Enter the name of the county in which the principal

place of business is located.

6. Enter the two-letter postal abbreviation for the

State, or the name of the Canadian Province or

Mexican State, in which the principal place of

business is located.

7. Enter the zip code number corresponding with the

street address.

8. Enter the telephone number, including area code, of

the principal place of business.
45

9. Enter the motor carrier “M” number under which

the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued

your operating authority, if appropriate. Otherwise,

enter “N/A.”’

10. Enter the identification number assigned to your

motor carrier operation by the U.S. Department of

Transportation, if known. Otherwise, enter

“unknown.”

11. Circle appropriate classification. Circle all that

apply. If F “other” is circled, enter the type of

operation in the space provided.

A. Authorized For Hire

B. Exempt For Hire

C. Private

D. Migrant

E. U.S. Mail

F. Other ____________________

Authorized For Hire--transportation for compensation

as a common or contract carrier of property owned

by others or passengers under the provisions of the

ICC.

Exempt For Hire--transportation for compensation of

property exempt from the economic regulation by

the ICC.

Private--transportation of property owned or leased by

the motor carrier in furtherance of a commercial

enterprise other than for-hire transportation.

Migrant--interstate transportation, including a contract

carrier, but not a common carrier of 3 or more

migrant workers to or from their employment by any

motor vehicle other than a passenger automobile or

station wagon.

U.S. Mail--transportation of U.S. mail under contract

with the U.S. Postal Service.

12. Circle the letter of the types of cargo you usually

transport. If Z “other,” is circled enter the name of

the commodity in the space provided.

13. Circle the appropriate type of operation.

A. Interstate

B. Intrastate, transporting hazardous materials (49

CFR 100-178)

C. Intrastate, NOT transporting hazardous materials.

Interstate--transportation of persons or property across

State lines, including international boundaries, or

wholly within one State as part of a through

movement that originates or terminates in another

State or country.

Intrastate--transportation of persons or property

wholly within one State.

14. Circle the letter of all of the types of hazardous

materials (HM) you transport. In the columns

following the HM types, either circle T if the HM is

transported in cargo tanks or P if the HM is transported in other packages.

15. Enter the total number of vehicles owned, term

leased and trip leased, that are, or can be, operational the day this form is completed.

16. Enter the number of drivers used on an average

work day. Part-time, casual, term leased, trip leased,

and company drivers are to be included.

100 mile radius driver--a driver that operates within a

100 air-mile radius of the normal work reporting

location.

17. Print or type the name, in the space provided, of

the individual authorized to sign documents on

behalf of the entity listed in Block 1. That individual

must sign, date, and show his or her title in the

spaces provided. (Certification Statement, see 49

CFR 385.21 and 385.23)

[56 FR 5365, Feb. 11, 1991]

APPENDIX B TO PART 385--SAFETY RATING PROCESS

Section 215 of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984

(49 U.S.C. 31144) directed the Secretary of Transportation to establish a procedure to determine the

safety fitness of owners and operators of commercial

motor vehicles operating in interstate or foreign

commerce. The Secretary, in turn, delegated this

responsibility to the Federal Highway Administration

(FHWA).

As directed, FHWA promulgated a safety fitness

regulation, Safety Fitness Procedures, which

established a procedure to determine the safety fitness

of motor carriers through the assignment of safety

ratings and established a safety fitness standard which

a motor carrier must meet to obtain a satisfactory

safety rating.

To meet the safety fitness standard, a motor carrier

must demonstrate to FHWA that it has adequate safety

management controls in place which function

effectively to ensure acceptable compliance with the

applicable safety requirements. A “safety fitness rating

methodology” (SFRM) was developed by FHWA,

which uses data from onsite reviews to rate motor

carriers.

The safety rating process developed by FHWA’s

Office of Motor Carriers is used to:

1. Evaluate safety fitness and assign one of three

safety ratings (satisfactory, conditional, or unsatisfactory) to motor carriers operating in interstate

commerce. This process conforms with 49 CFR 385.5-

-Safety fitness standard and § 385.7--Factors to be

considered in determining a safety rating.

2. Identify motor carriers needing improvement in

their compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier

Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) and applicable

Hazardous Material Regulations (HMRs). These are

carriers rated unsatisfactory or conditional.

SOURCE OF DATA FOR RATING METHODOLOGY

The FHWA’s rating process is built upon the operational tool known as the compliance review (CR). This

tool was developed to assist Federal and State safety

specialists in gathering pertinent motor carrier

compliance and accident information.
46

The CR is an in-depth examination of a motor

carrier’s operations and is used (1) to rate unrated

motor carriers, (2) to conduct a follow-up

investigation on motor carriers rated unsatisfactory or

conditional as a result of a previous review, (3) to

investigate complaints, or (4) in response to a request

by a motor carrier to reevaluate its safety rating.

Documents such as those contained in driver

qualification files, records of duty status, and vehicle

maintenance records are thoroughly examined for

compliance with the FMCSRs and HMRs. Violations

are cited on the CR document. Performance-based

information, when available, is utilized to evaluate the

carrier’s compliance with the vehicle regulations.

Recordable preventable accident information is also

collected.

CONVERTING CR INFORMATION INTO A SAFETY RATING

The FHWA gathers information through an in-depth

examination of the motor carrier’s compliance with

portions of the FMCSRs and HMRs which have been

identified as “acute” or “critical” regulations.

Acute regulations are those so essential that

noncompliance is obvious and requires immediate

corrective actions by a motor carrier regardless of its

overall safety posture. An example of an acute

regulation is § 383.37(b)--Allowing, requiring, permitting, or authorizing an employee with more than

one Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) to operate a

commercial motor vehicle. Noncompliance with

§ 383.37(b) is usually discovered when the motor

carrier’s driver qualification file reflects that the motor

carrier had knowledge of a driver with more than one

CDL and still permitted the driver to operate a

commercial motor vehicle. If the motor carrier did not

have knowledge or could not reasonably be expected

to have knowledge, then a violation would not be

cited.

Critical regulations are those which relate directly to

management and/or operational controls.

Noncompliance with those regulations is indicative of

a breakdown in a carrier’s management controls. An

example of a critical regulation is § 395.3(a)(1)--

Requiring or permitting a driver to drive more than 10

hours.

The list of the acute and critical regulations used in

determining safety ratings is provided at the end of

this document.

Noncompliance with acute regulations and patterns

of noncompliance with critical regulations are

quantitatively linked to inadequate safety management

controls and usually higher than average rates of

recordable preventable accidents. The FHWA has

used noncompliance with acute regulations and

patterns of noncompliance with critical regulations

since 1989 to determine motor carriers’ adherence to

the § 385.5--Safety fitness standard. Compliance with

the regulatory factors, (1) [Parts 387, & 390]; (2)

[Parts 382, 383 & 391]; (3) [Parts 392 & 395]; (4)

[Parts 393 & 396, when there are less than three

vehicle inspections in the last 12 months to evaluate];

and (5) [Parts 397, 171, 177 & 180], will be evaluated

as follows:

For each instance of noncompliance with an acute

regulation or each pattern of noncompliance with a

critical regulation documented during the CR, one

point will be assessed. A pattern is more than one

violation. When large numbers of documents are

reviewed the number of violations required to meet a

pattern is equal to at least 10 percent of those

examined.

However, each pattern of noncompliance with a

critical regulation relative to Part 395, Hours of

Service of Drivers, will be assessed two points.

VEHICLE FACTOR

When there are a combination of three or more

inspections recorded in the Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) during the

twelve months prior to the CR or performed at the

time of the review, the Vehicle Factor (Parts 393 &

396) will be evaluated on the basis of the Out-ofService (OOS) rate and noncompliance with acute

regulations and/or a pattern of noncompliance with

critical regulations. The results of the review of the

OOS rate will affect the Vehicle Factor rating as

follows:

1. If a motor carrier has three or more roadside

vehicle inspections in the twelve months prior to the

carrier review, or three vehicles inspected at the time

of the review, or a combination of the two totaling

three or more, and the vehicle OOS rate is 34% or

greater, the initial factor rating will be conditional.

The requirements of Part 396--Inspection, Repair, and

Maintenance--will be examined during each review.

The results of the examination could lower the factor

rating to unsatisfactory if noncompliance with an

acute regulation or a pattern of noncompliance with a

critical regulation is discovered. If the examination of

Part 396 requirements reveals no such problems with

the systems the motor carrier is required to maintain

for compliance, the Vehicle Factor remains

conditional.

2. If a carrier’s vehicle OOS rate is less than 34%,

the initial factor rating will be satisfactory. If noncompliance with an acute regulation or a pattern of

noncompliance with a critical regulation is discovered

during the examination of Part 396 requirements, the

factor rating will be lowered to conditional. If the

examination of Part 396 requirements reveals no such

problems with the systems the motor carrier is

required to maintain for compliance, the Vehicle

Factor remains satisfactory.

Nearly two million vehicle inspections occur on the

roadside each year. This vehicle inspection information is retained in the MCMIS and is integral to

evaluating motor carriers’ ability to successfully

maintain their vehicles. Since many of the roadside
47

inspections are targeted to visibly defective vehicles

and since there are a limited number of inspections for

many motor carriers, the use of that data is limited.

Each CR will continue to have the requirements of

Part 396--Inspection, Repair, and Maintenance reviewed as indicated by the above explanation.

ACCIDENT FACTOR

In addition to the five regulatory rating factors, a

sixth factor is included in the process to address the

accident history of the motor carrier. This factor is the

recordable preventable accident rate which the carrier

has experienced during the past 12 months. Recordable preventable accident means an accident that (1)

involves a commercial motor vehicle; (2) that meets

the definition of an accident in § 390.5; and (3) that

could have been averted but for an act, or failure to

act, by the motor carrier or driver. The sixth factor is

assigned a rating based on the carrier’s recordable

preventable accident rate compared to the national

accident rate distribution.

To determine this national distribution, recordable

preventable accidents per million miles were

computed for each CR performed in a year. Most of

these carriers (over 50%) had no recordable accidents.

The national average for all carriers reviewed in 1988

was 0.46 per million miles; in 1996, 0.50 per million

miles. From these data, the percent of all carriers

below or above any proposed accident per million

mile breakpoint could be established. The breakpoints

shown below were determined from consideration of

both the national average and the percentage of

carriers below and above alternative breakpoints, i.e.:

The Recordable Preventable Accident Rating Scale

(total recordable preventable accidents divided by

total mileage times 1 million) is:

Satisfactory = less than 0.3

Conditional = 0.3 to 1.0

Unsatisfactory = greater than 1.0

Exceptions to the Recordable Preventable

Accident Rating Scale

Single Accident Exception: The accident factor

excludes the accident rates for all motor carriers that

have only one recordable preventable accident. One

accident occurring in 12 months is too isolated an

occurrence to allow it to impact the accident factor.

Urban Carriers Exception: Experience has shown

that urban carriers, those motor carriers operating

entirely within a radius of less than a 100 air miles

(normally in urban areas) have a higher exposure to

accident situations because of their environment and

normally have higher accident rates. Therefore, the

rating does not become unsatisfactory for an urban

carrier until it exceeds the 2.0 recordable preventable

accident rate per million miles.

Small Carrier Exception: Accident rates for small

carriers (fewer than 20 drivers) vary to a great extent

from one year to the next. Therefore, the lowest

“accident factor” rating assigned to a small carrier is

conditional.

The Factor rating is determined by the following

table.

FACTOR #6.--RECORDABLE PREVENTABLE

ACCIDENT RATE TABLE

Calculated accident

rate

Rating Rating: urban

carriers only

Less than .3 ....... Satisfactory Satisfactory

0.3 to 1.0 Conditional Conditional

Greater than 1.0 to 2.0 Unsatisfactory Conditional

Greater than 2.0 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory

Factor Ratings

In the methodology, parts of the FMCSRs and the

HMRs having similar characteristics are combined

together into five regulatory areas called ``factors.’’

The following table shows the five regulatory factors,

parts of the FMCSRs and HMRs associated with each

factor, and the accident factor.

FACTORS

Factor 1--General=Parts 387 & 390

Factor 2--Driver=Parts 382, 383 & 391

Factor 3--Operational=Parts 392 & 395

Factor 4--Vehicle=Parts 393 & 396

Factor 5--Haz. Mat=Parts 397, 171, 177 & 180

Factor 6--Accident Factor=Recordable Preventable

Rate

Factor Ratings are determined as follows:

“Satisfactory”--if the acute and/or critical=0 points

“Conditional”--if the acute and/or critical=1 point

“Unsatisfactory”--if the acute and/or critical=2 or

more points

SAFETY RATING

The ratings for the five factors, along with the

recordable preventable accident rate for the 12 months

prior to the review, are then entered into a rating table

which establishes the motor carrier’s safety rating.

The FHWA has developed a computerized rating

formula for assessing the information obtained from

the CR document and is using that formula in

assigning a safety rating.

MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY RATING TABLE

Factor ratings Overall safety

Unsatisfactory Conditional rating

0 ..................... 2 or less ............ Satisfactory.

0 ..................... more than 2 ....... Conditional.

1 ..................... 2 or less ............ Conditional.

1 ..................... more than 2 ....... Unsatisfactory.

2 or more .......... 0 or more .......... Unsatisfactory.

ANTICIPATED SAFETY RATING

The anticipated (emphasis added) safety rating will

appear on the CR.
48

The following appropriate information will appear

after the last entry on the CR, MCS-151, Part B.

“It is anticipated the official safety rating from

Washington, D.C., will be SATISFACTORY.”

Or

“It is anticipated the official safety rating from

Washington, D.C., will be CONDITIONAL. The

safety rating will become effective thirty days from the

date of the CR.”

Or

“It is anticipated the official safety rating from

Washington, D.C., will be UNSATISFACTORY. The

safety rating will become effective thirty days from the

date of the CR.”

ASSIGNMENT OF RATING/MOTOR CARRIER

NOTIFICATION

When the official rating is determined in Washington, D.C., the FHWA notifies the motor carrier in

writing of its safety rating as prescribed in § 385.11.

An anticipated safety rating which is higher than the

existing rating becomes effective as soon as the

official safety rating from Washington, D.C. is issued.

Notification of a conditional or unsatisfactory rating

includes a list of those Parts of the regulations, or

recordable preventable accident rate, for which

corrective actions must be taken by the motor carrier

to improve its overall safety performance.

Motor Carrier Procedural Rights

Under §§ 385.15 and 385.17, motor carriers have

the right to petition for a review of their ratings if

there are factual or procedural disputes and to request

another review after corrective actions have been

taken. They are the procedural avenues a motor

carrier, which believes its safety rating to be in error,

may use and the means to request another review after

corrective action has been taken.

Conclusion

The FHWA believes this “safety rating methodology”’ is a reasonable approach for assigning a safety

rating which best describes the current safety fitness

posture of a motor carrier as required by the safety

fitness regulations (§ 385.9).

Improved compliance with the regulations leads to

an improved rating, which in turn increases safety.

This increased safety is our regulatory goal.

List of Acute and Critical Regulations

§ 382.115(c) Failing to implement an alcohol and/or

controlled substance testing program. (acute)

§ 382.201 Using a driver who has an alcohol

concentration of 0.04 or greater. (acute)

§ 382.211 Using a driver who has refused to submit to

an alcohol controlled substances test required

under Part 382. (acute)

§ 382.213(b) Using a driver who has used a controlled

substance. (acute)

§ 382.215 Using a driver who has tested positive for a

controlled substance. (acute)

§ 382.301(a) Failing to require driver to undergo preemployment controlled substance testing. (critical)

§ 382.303(a) Failing to conduct post-accident testing

on driver for alcohol and/or controlled substances.

(critical)

§ 382.305(a) Failing to implement a random

controlled substances and/or an alcohol testing

program. (acute)

§ 382.305(b)(1) Failing to conduct random alcohol

testing at an annual rate of not less than 25 percent

of the average number of driver positions.

(critical)

§ 382.305(b)(2) Failing to conduct random controlled

substances testing at an annual rate of not less

than 50 percent of the average number of driver

positions. (critical)

§ 382.309(a) Using a driver who has not undergone a

return-to-duty alcohol test with a result indicating

an alcohol concentration of less than 0.02. (acute)

§ 382.309(b) Using a driver who has not undergone a

return-to-duty controlled substances test with a

result indicating a verified negative result for

controlled substances. (acute)

§ 382.503 Driver performing safety sensitive function,

after engaging in conduct prohibited by Subpart B,

without being evaluated by substance abuse

professional, as required by § 382.605. (critical)

§ 382.505(a) Using a driver within 24 hours after

being found to have an alcohol concentration of

0.02 or greater but less than 0.04. (acute)

§ 382.605(c)(1) Using a driver who has not undergone

a return-to-duty alcohol test with a result

indicating an alcohol concentration of less than

0.02 or with verified negative test result, after

engaging in conduct prohibited by Part 382,

Subpart B. (acute)

§ 382.605(c)(2)(ii) Failing to subject a driver who has

been identified as needing assistance to at least six

unannounced follow-up alcohol and controlled

substance tests in the first 12 months following the

driver’s return to duty. (critical)

§ 383.23(a) Operating a commercial motor vehicle

without a valid commercial driver’s license.

(critical)

§ 383.37(a) Allowing, requiring, permitting, or

authorizing an employee with a Commercial

Driver’s License which is suspended, revoked, or

canceled by a State or who is disqualified to

operate a commercial motor vehicle. (acute)

§ 383.37(b) Allowing, requiring, permitting, or

authorizing an employee with more than one

Commercial Driver’s License to operate a

commercial motor vehicle. (acute)
49

§ 383.51(a) Allowing, requiring, permitting, or

authorizing a driver to drive who is disqualified to

drive a commercial motor vehicle. (acute)

§ 387.7(a) Operating a motor vehicle without having

in effect the required minimum levels of financial

responsibility coverage. (acute)

§ 387.7(d) Failing to maintain at principal place of

business required proof of financial responsibility.

(critical)

§ 387.31(a) Operating a passenger carrying vehicle

without having in effect the required minimum

levels of financial responsibility. (acute)

§ 387.31(d) Failing to maintain at principal place of

business required proof of financial responsibility

for passenger vehicles. (critical)

§ 390.15(b)(2) Failing to maintain copies of all

accident reports required by State or other governmental entities or insurers. (critical)

§ 390.35 Making, or causing to make fraudulent or

intentionally false statements or records and/or

reproducing fraudulent records. (acute)

§ 391.11(a)/391.95 Using an unqualified driver, a

driver who has tested positive for controlled

substances, or refused to be tested as required.

(acute)

§ 391.11(b)(6) Using a physically unqualified driver.

(acute)

§ 391.15(a) Using a disqualified driver. (acute)

§ 391.45(a) Using a driver not medically examined

and certified. (critical)

§ 391.45(b) Using a driver not medically examined

and certified each 24 months. (critical)

§ 391.51(a) Failing to maintain driver qualification

file on each driver employed. (critical)

§ 391.51(b)(1) Failing to maintain medical examiner’s

certificate in driver’s qualification file. (critical)

§ 391.51(c)(1) Failing to maintain medical examiner’s

certificate in driver’s qualification file. (critical)

§ 391.51(c)(3) Failing to maintain inquiries into

driver’s driving record in driver’s qualification

file. (critical)

§ 391.51(d)(1) Failing to maintain medical examiner’s

certificate in driver’s qualification file. (critical)

§ 391.87(f)(5) Failing to retain in the driver’s

qualification file test finding, either “`Negative”

and, if “Positive,” the controlled substances

identified. (critical)

§ 391.93(a) Failing to implement a controlled

substances testing program. (acute)

§ 391.99(a) Failing to require a driver to be tested for

the use of controlled substances, upon reasonable

cause. (acute)

§ 391.103(a) Failing to require a driver-applicant

whom the motor carrier intends to hire or use to be

tested for the use of controlled substances as a prequalification condition. (critical)

§ 391.109(a) Failing to conduct controlled substance

testing at a 50% annualized rate. (critical)

§ 391.115(c) Failing to ensure postaccident controlled

substances testing is conducted and conforms with

49 CFR Part 40. (critical)

§ 392.2 Operating a motor vehicle not in accordance

with the laws, ordinances, and regulations of the

jurisdiction in which it is being operated. (critical)

§ 392.4(b) Requiring or permitting a driver to drive

while under the influence of, or in possession of, a

narcotic drug, amphetamine, or any other substance capable of rendering the driver incapable of

safely operating a motor vehicle. (acute)

§ 392.5(b)(1) Requiring or permitting a driver to drive

a motor vehicle while under the influence of, or in

possession of, an intoxicating beverage. (acute)

§ 392.5(b)(2) Requiring or permitting a driver who

has consumed an intoxicating beverage within 4

hours to operate a motor vehicle. (acute)

§ 392.6 Scheduling a run which would necessitate the

vehicle being operated at speeds in excess of those

prescribed. (critical)

§ 392.9(a)(1) Requiring or permitting a driver to drive

without the vehicle’s cargo being properly

distributed and adequately secured. (critical)

§ 395.1(i)(1)(i) Requiring or permitting a driver to

drive more than 15 hours. (Driving in Alaska.)

(critical)

§ 395.1(i)(1)(ii) Requiring or permitting a driver to

drive after having been on duty 20 hours. (Driving

in Alaska.) (critical)

§ 395.1(i)(1)(iii) Requiring or permitting a driver to

drive after having been on duty more than 70

hours in 7 consecutive days. (Driving in Alaska.)

(critical)

§ 395.1(i)(1)(iv) Requiring or permitting a driver to

drive after having been on duty more than 80

hours in 8 consecutive days. (Driving in Alaska.)

(critical)

§ 395.3(a)(1) Requiring or permitting a driver to drive

more than 10 hours. (critical)

§ 395.3(a)(2) Requiring or permitting a driver to drive

after having been on duty 15 hours. (critical)

§ 395.3(b) Requiring or permitting a driver to drive

after having been on duty more than 60 hours in 7

consecutive days. (critical)

§ 395.3(b) Requiring or permitting a driver to drive

after having been on duty more than 70 hours in 8

consecutive days. (critical)

§ 395.8(a) Failing to require a driver to make a record

of duty status. (critical)

§ 395.8(e) False reports of records of duty status.

(critical)

§ 395.8(l) Failing to require a driver to forward,

within 13 days of completion, the original of the

record of duty status. (critical)

§ 395.8(k)(1) Failing to preserve a driver’s record of

duty status for 6 months. (critical)

§ 395.8(k)(1) Failing to preserve a driver’s records of

duty status supporting documents for 6 months.

(critical)
50

§ 396.3(b) Failing to keep minimum records of

inspection and vehicle maintenance. (critical)

§ 396.9(c)(2) Requiring or permitting the operation of

a motor vehicle declared “out-of-service” before

repairs are made. (acute)

§ 396.11(a) Failing to require a driver to prepare

driver vehicle inspection report. (critical)

§ 396.11(c) Failing to correct out-of-service defects

listed by driver in a driver vehicle inspection

report. (acute)

§ 396.17(a) Using a commercial motor vehicle not

periodically inspected. (critical)

§ 396.17(g) Failing to promptly repair parts and

accessories not meeting minimum periodic

inspection standards. (acute)

§ 397.5(a) Failing to ensure a motor vehicle

containing Class A or B explosives (Class 1.1, 1.2,

or 1.3) is attended at all times by its driver or a

qualified representative. (acute)

§ 397.7(a)(1) Parking a motor vehicle containing

Class A or B explosives (1.1, 1.2, 1.3) within 5

feet of traveled portion of highway. (critical)

§ 397.7(b) Parking a motor vehicle containing

hazardous material(s) within 5 feet of traveled

portion of highway or street. (critical)

§ 397.13(a) Permitting a person to smoke or carry a

lighted cigarette, cigar, or pipe within 25 feet of a

motor vehicle containing explosives, oxidizing

materials, or flammable materials. (critical)

§ 397.19(a) Failing to furnish driver of motor vehicle

transporting Class A or B explosives (Class 1.1,

1.2, 1.3) with a copy of the rules of Part 397

and/or emergency response instructions. (critical)

§ 397.67(d) Requiring or permitting the operation of a

motor vehicle containing Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3

(explosive) material that is not accompanied by a

written route plan. (critical)

§ 171.15 Carrier failing to give immediate telephone

notice of an incident involving hazardous materials. (critical)

§ 171.16 Carrier failing to make a written report of an

incident involving hazardous materials. (critical)

§ 177.800(a) Failing to instruct a category of

employees in hazardous materials regulations.

(critical)

§ 177.817(a)) Transporting a shipment of hazardous

materials not accompanied by a properly prepared

shipping paper. (critical)

§ 177.817(e) Failing to maintain proper accessibility

of shipping papers. (critical)

§ 177.823(a) Moving a transport vehicle containing

hazardous material that is not properly marked or

placarded. (critical)

§ 177.841(e) Transporting a package bearing a poison

label in the same transport vehicle with material

marked or known to be foodstuff, feed, or any

edible material intended for consumption by

humans or animals. (acute)

§ 180.407(a) Transporting a shipment of hazardous

material in cargo tank that has not been inspected

or retested in accordance with § 180.407. (critical)

§ 180.407(c) Failing to periodically test and inspect a

cargo tank. (critical)

§ 180.415 Failing to mark a cargo tank which passed

an inspection or test required by § 180.407. (critical)

§ 180.417(a)(1) Failing to retain cargo tank manufacturer’s data report certificate and related

papers, as required. (critical)

§ 180.417(a)(2) Failing to retain copies of cargo tank

manufacturer’s certificate and related papers (or

alternative report) as required. (critical)

[62 FR 28809, May 28, 1997]

Effective Date Note: At 62 FR 28809, May 28, 1997,

in part 385, the existing appendix was designated as

appendix A, and a new appendix B was added, effective May 28, 1997 until Nov. 28, 1997.
51

Appendix C

Available Consumer Guidance for Chartering a

Motorcoach

The following are safety concerns and instructions for chartering motorcoach services that were available from the OMC and the UMA websites at the time of this report.

OMC Guidance:

THE SAFE TRANSPORTATION OF PASSENGERS BY

MOTORCOACH -- AND WHAT IT MEANS TO YOU

A CONSUMERS GUIDE TO CHARTERING A MOTORCOACH

WHO ARE WE?

As part of the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Federal Highway Administration, Office of

Motor Carriers, is the truck and bus “safety agency.” Our vision is to create a CRASH-FREE

environment including the safe and efficient transportation of passengers by motorcoach.

WHAT DO WE DO?

The Office of Motor Carriers sets minimum safety standards that motorcoach companies must

follow for the buses they operate and the physical qualifications and operating rules for their

drivers. The following information will provide assistance in evaluating the safety practices of

interstate motorcoach companies before you charter a bus from them ! While it is always an

important consideration, price should not be the only deciding factor used when chartering a bus.

WHAT SHOULD I ASK?

When speaking to motorcoach companies, you should ask about the factors listed here.

Companies should always be willing to

answer any questions you have about their safety practices.

QUALIFICATION OF DRIVERS

Under DOT regulations, carriers are required to ensure their drivers are fully qualified. Ask the

carrier:

 Will the driver hold a current Commercial Driver's License with a "passenger" endorsement ?

 Will the driver hold a valid medical certificate ?
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 Does the company have a driver drug/alcohol testing program that complies with DOT

regulations ?

LIMITATIONS ON DRIVING

There are limits on how long a driver may drive, basically not more than 10 hours following 8

consecutive hours off duty. If planning a long trip, ask if it can be done within Federal hours-ofservice limitations.

VEHICLE STANDARDS

At a minimum, buses are subject to periodic safety inspections. Verify that the buses have been

inspected as required. Carriers must systematically inspect, repair, and maintain all buses subject

to their control. Additionally, many States have mandated motorcoach inspection programs. You

may wish to speak to your State's regulatory agency responsible for passenger carriers. You

should also consider asking the carrier what procedures are in place for roadside emergencies

requiring repair or replacement of their motorcoaches.

SUBCONTRACTING AGREEMENTS

Carrier's occasionally use other motor carriers' equipment and drivers to perform their trips.

Inquire as to whose bus will be used on your trip. All of the above conditions also apply to the

contracted carrier. You may wish to make similar inquiries of the subcontracting company.

INSURANCE

When a vehicle has a seating capacity of more than 15 passengers including the driver,

passenger carriers are required to have a minimum of $5 million public liability insurance. Ask for

proof of financial responsibility.

OPERATING AUTHORITY

Ask for the carrier's U.S. DOT identification number and its MC number. The MC number

represents interstate operating authority issued by the Federal Highway Administration. Using the

MC number, you may obtain insurance information about the carrier by calling (202) 358-7000.

Using the U.S. DOT identification number, you may obtain safety information about the carrier by

calling (703) 280-4001.

This information is also available on the Internet at http://www.safersys.org.

QUESTIONS???

If you have any questions, please contact the FHWA Office of Motor Carriers office within your

State.
53

UMA Guidance:

UMA's Consumer Guide to

Purchasing Professional

Motorcoach Services

Transportation by motorcoach is America's safest, most convenient and hassle-free mode

of ground transportation. A group trip or tour is made easy by using one of the

professional motorcoach company members of the United Motorcoach Association

(UMA).

While it's a simple matter to arrange for your group's transportation by motorcoach, most

consumers feel "under-educated" when they first step into the process. This quick

checklist is designed to help you find the right transportation company and ask the right

questions. It's intended to serve only as a guide. The list is divided into safety

considerations, a shopping checklist and a travel group transportation needs survey.

Use this guide when you plan your trip and make photocopies for your future travel use.

Once you've reviewed the list, we invite you to browse through our directory of more than

800 member companies to locate the UMA professional operators in your area. If you

have any other questions, we also invite you to drop us a note at info@uma.org.

THE CARDINAL RULE:

DON'T BUY ON PRICE ALONE.

All motorcoach companies are not alike. When you're deciding on which company to use,

remember that safety can be affected by many mechanical components which you can't

see. If the price you receive from one operator is significantly or surprisingly lower than

others in your community, it may be because that company is saving money by poor or

inadequate preventative maintenance procedures. Don't risk heartache to save a couple

of bucks! Follow these guidelines and remember that safety is a reputable company's first

priority.

As a final safety note, you may wish to check with your local law enforcement agency or

the closest state police installation to ask about their experiences with the company you'd

like to hire.
54

1. SAFETY & OPERATIONAL CHECKLIST:

Operating Authority

• Operator should provide proof of current operating authority from the *Interstate

Commerce Commission (ICC) if your trip will cross state lines. Some states also

require their own operating authority if your travel does not cross any state or

international boundaries.

* Note: The Interstate Commerce Commission was eliminated by Congress at the start of 1996. It's

safety and carrier certification responsibilities have now been transferred to the U.S. Department of

Transportation .

Insurance

• Operators should be willing to provide proof of valid, current insurance coverage

for any vehicle which might be used. The insurance must provide $5 million per

incident minimum liability if the carrier is authorized for interstate service by the

ICC (now the USDOT).

Vehicle Inspection

• Look for proof that the vehicle you will be using has passed a complete

mechanical inspection within the previous 12 months. Most states will issue

decals or reports to be placed on the coach indicating the date of a successful

inspection. If the carrier's state does not require a periodic inspection, look for a

decal issued by the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) or, at a minimum, a copy of the operator's own annual inspection form for that vehicle.

Company Inspection

• Operator should NOT have an UNsatisfactory USDOT Safety Rating. Some

operators, however, may have not been yet been rated by the USDOT. You may

call the USDOT to ask about a carrier's current safety rating. You may also check

the carrier's record online using the USDOT's new "SAFER" (Safety Fitness &

Electronic Records System) database for the carrier's safety profile. We caution,

however, that the SAFER system is new and is acknowledged by USDOT to

contain some errors.

Driver Licensing

• All drivers must possess valid, current "commercial driver's licenses" or "CDLs"

at the time of your trip. CDL's are issued only after drivers have demonstrated

their ability -- through skills and written tests -- to control the type of heavy

vehicle they will be using on the job.
55

Emergency & Breakdown policies

Ask about any affiliations with state or national professional associations or emergency

aid organizations which might be expected to assist in the case of a mechanical

breakdown or other complication during your trip.

Subcontracting Agreements

If the motorcoach company will not be providing all of the vehicles needed for your

journey, ask your prime operator about other companies which might be used to augment

his vehicles. Ensure that the subcontracted company also provides satisfactory answers to

each of your checklist questions.

2. MOTORCOACH SHOPPER'S CHECKLIST:

Inspection of Vehicles

• The consumer should be provided an opportunity to conduct an inspection of

available vehicles to determine vehicle and equipment preferences and review

vehicle cleanliness.

Vehicle Preferences

• Do you desire newer vehicles or (often) less expensive older vehicles?

• Do you desire a motorcoach equipped with video or audio playback capabilities?

• Do you need a vehicle with disabled passenger boarding assistance devices?

Price and Package Costs

• Determine how the trip price is determined? (Hourly costs, mileage, complete

package?)

• Ask if special rates or discounts are available for off-season, weekend or other

packages?

• Ask about driver accommodations and costs. Are they included in a package price

or are they the travel group's responsibility to arrange?

• Ask about driver gratuity policies? Are they included in the price of the coach?

• Ask if an additional driver will be needed for itineraries which extend daily

service beyond the legal USDOT hours of service rules.

• What is the contract deposit policy? How much is expected at the time of the

reservation.

• What is the refund/cancellation policy?

• When is final payment due?

• If your group wishes to view commercial video tapes or movies, ask the

motorcoach operator who is responsible for meeting copyright law requirements.
56

• Ask about smoking, alcoholic beverage and carry-on food policies of the

motorcoach company.

• Ask if the operator is aware of any costs normally incurred by consumers which

are NOT part of his package price (destination charges, city taxes, permits, etc.)

3. DETERMINE YOUR TRAVEL GROUP NEEDS

• Determine what size coach and what level of luxury or additional equipment you

will need or desire.

• Determine whether or not you will need a coach on which smoking, alcoholic

beverages or food are allowed.

• Determine if your group will include any disabled persons who may need

boarding/disembarking assistance.

• Determine the TOTAL number of persons who will be travelling in your group.

• Determine the total length of your trip, including preferred time-of-day starting

and ending times, departure and return points.

• Determine your itinerary, including time-of-day preferences for specific

attractions.

• Determine who will serve as the responsible liaison to the motorcoach company

for any en route changes or decisions.

For a UMA member motorcoach provider in your area, you may turn to the map locator

page or, if you already know the name of a motorcoach company you'd like to use, you

may turn to our alphabetized list of members to ensure that the professional coach you've

selected is a member of UMA.

If you’re considering a motorcoach company which is not a UMA member, you may also

wish to check the USDOT's Passenger Carrier Safety Ratings list to certify that the carrier

does NOT have an UNsatisfactory safety rating.

4. A FINAL NOTE

We’re pleased to help you better understand the professional motorcoach industry and we

invite your inquiries through info@uma.org. You will also find that each UMA member

may be reached through the Internet’s e-mail system.
57

We regret, however, that UMA is unable to make travel arrangements for callers or

provide specific carrier recommendations. Similarly, while UMA members are regarded

as professional motorcoach operators, UMA can not guarantee the service or performance

of any member.

You may write to UMA at 113 S. West Street, Alexandria, VA 22314 or phone us at 1-

(800) 424-8262 or (703) 838-2929. Thank you for using UMA member professional

motorcoach operators.
58

Acronyms

ABA American Bus Association

ATA American Trucking Associations

BMCS Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety

CDL commercial driver’s license

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CVSA Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance

DOT Department of Transportation

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FARS Fatality Analysis Reporting System

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

FMCSR Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations

FMVSS Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard

FR Federal Register

FTA Federal Transit Administration

ITI Indian Trails, Inc.

MCMIS Motor Carrier Management Information System

NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

NIRPC Northwest Indiana Regional Planning Commission

NMN National Motorcoach Network

OMC Office of Motor Carriers

psi pounds per square inch

SAFESTAT Safety Status Measuring System

TEA-21 Transportation Efficiency Act for the 21st Century

TMC Transportation Manufacturing Corporation

UMA United Motorcoach Association