An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in 

accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of 

A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e .

NO. COA13-727

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 21 January 2014

CASANDRA L. SPENCER,

Plaintiff,

v. Stokes County

No. 12 CVD 57

DALLAS THOMAS SPENCER, JR.,

Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from order entered 22 January 2013 by 

Judge Charles M. Neaves, Jr. in Stokes County District Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 December 2013.

Bennett & West, by Michael R. Bennett, for plaintiff–

appellee.

Randolph and Fischer, by J. Clark Fischer, for defendant—

appellant.

MARTIN, Chief Judge.

Defendant Dallas Thomas Spencer, Jr. (“husband”) appeals 

from an order that directs him to pay child support to plaintiff 

Casandra L. Spencer (“wife”) in the amount of $1,200.00 per 

month. For the reasons stated herein, we dismiss this appeal.

In January 2012, wife filed a complaint against husband in 
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which she sought child custody, child support, post-separation 

support, alimony, equitable distribution, and attorney’s fees. 

Husband answered and counterclaimed for equitable distribution, 

child custody, and attorney’s fees. In March 2012, the court 

entered a temporary order in which it determined only the issues 

of child custody and child support. Husband moved to set aside 

or modify the temporary order, which motion was heard in late 

2012. On 22 January 2013, the court entered an order in which 

it set forth the physical child custody schedule for husband and 

wife’s three minor children, and reduced husband’s monthly child 

support obligation from $1,461.00 to $1,200.00. Husband 

appeals.

_________________________

“Since the question [of] whether an appeal is interlocutory 

presents a jurisdictional issue, this Court has an obligation to 

address the issue sua sponte regardless [of] whether it is 

raised by the parties.” Akers v. City of Mt. Airy, 175 N.C.

App. 777, 778, 625 S.E.2d 145, 146 (2006). “As a general rule, 

interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable.” Turner v. 

Hammocks Beach Corp., 363 N.C. 555, 558, 681 S.E.2d 770, 773 

(2009), appeal after remand on other grounds, __ N.C. App. __, 

__ S.E.2d __ (No. COA11-1420) (filed Dec. 18, 2012) 

(unpublished). Nevertheless, a party “is permitted to appeal 
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from an interlocutory order when the trial court enters a final 

judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 

parties and the trial court certifies in the judgment that there 

is no just reason to delay the appeal,” Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks 

Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444 S.E.2d 252, 253 

(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted), or “when the order 

deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be 

jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on 

the merits.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The 

reason for these rules is to prevent fragmentary, premature and 

unnecessary appeals by permitting the trial divisions to have 

done with a case fully and finally before it is presented to the 

appellate division.” Waters v. Qualified Pers., Inc., 294 N.C. 

200, 207, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978).

In the present case, wife asserted claims regarding child 

custody, child support, post-separation support, alimony, 

equitable distribution, and attorney’s fees, and husband 

counterclaimed regarding issues of equitable distribution, child 

custody, and attorney’s fees. However, the record reflects that 

the court finally determined only the issues of child custody 

and child support. Because there is no indication in the record 

that the issues of post-separation support, alimony, or 

equitable distribution have been finally determined or 
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dismissed, we conclude that husband’s appeal is interlocutory. 

See, e.g., Evans v. Evans, 158 N.C. App. 533, 534, 581 S.E.2d 

464, 465 (2003) (“In the present case, the trial court’s order 

[from which defendant appeals determined issues regarding postseparation support, child custody, and child support, but] did 

not resolve the parties’ respective claims for equitable 

distribution and for attorney’s fees, and did not rule on 

defendant’s claim for alimony. We conclude that the order from 

which defendant appeals was interlocutory.”), appeal after 

remand on other grounds, 169 N.C. App. 358, 610 S.E.2d 264

(2005).

Nonetheless, we recognize that the General Assembly has 

recently “amend[ed] the laws pertaining to interlocutory appeals 

as related to family law,” 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 286, 286, 

ch. 411, including N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b), which now provides that 

an appeal “lies of right directly to” this Court from any 

interlocutory order or judgment of a superior or district court 

in a civil action which determines a claim prosecuted under 

N.C.G.S. § 50-19.1. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(3)(e)

(2013); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-19.1 (2013) 

(“Notwithstanding any other pending claims filed in the same 

action, a party may appeal from an order or judgment 

adjudicating a claim for absolute divorce, divorce from bed and
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board, child custody, child support, alimony, or equitable 

distribution if the order or judgment would otherwise be a final 

order or judgment within the meaning of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), 

but for the other pending claims in the same action.”). 

However, because the legislation that would permit husband to 

immediately appeal from the court’s 22 January 2013 

interlocutory order was not effective until eight months after

the trial court entered the order from which husband now seeks 

to appeal, see 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 286, 287, ch. 411, § 3, we 

dismiss husband’s appeal.

Dismissed.

Judges ERVIN and McCULLOUGH concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).