In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 16, 2023

S22Z0858. INQUIRY CONCERNING JUDGE GERALD 

JOHNSON.

 PER CURIAM.

This judicial discipline matter is before the Court on the Report 

and Recommendation of the Hearing Panel of the Judicial 

Qualifications Commission (“JQC”) and timely filed Notices of 

Exceptions filed by the Director of the JQC and respondent Gerald 

Johnson. The Hearing Panel recommended that Johnson be 

removed from office for violating Rules 1.1, 1.2 (A), and 1.2 (B) of the 

Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct (“CJC”). Johnson, however, 

submitted his resignation to Governor Kemp shortly after the 

Hearing Panel filed its Report and Recommendation. Removal from 

office is the only sanction the JQC seeks, and we cannot remove a 

former judge from an office he no longer holds. Accordingly, we 
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dismiss. 

According to the formal charges, which Johnson admits are 

true and correct, on the evening of October 18, 2021, the Habersham 

County Sheriff’s Office received a call regarding multiple gunshots 

fired in the residential area where Johnson lived. Travis Jarrell, the 

Habersham County Sheriff’s Office lieutenant who responded to the 

call, knew Johnson and knew that Johnson lived in the area, so he 

went to Johnson’s house to ask Johnson whether he had any 

information about the gunshots. After Jarrell rang Johnson’s 

doorbell, Johnson opened the door and pointed a loaded AR-15 rifle 

at Jarrell. Jarrell, who feared for his safety, fled to his patrol vehicle, 

and Johnson dropped the rifle. Johnson then spoke with Jarrell but 

told Jarrell he did not want their conversation to be recorded. As 

Johnson and Jarrell spoke, Johnson called Jarrell by his first name 

and several times asked Jarrell to turn off his recording device. Each 

time, Jarrell informed Johnson he could not turn off the recording 

device. Johnson, who was angry, visibly intoxicated, unstable on his 

feet, and spoke with slurred speech, admitted to Jarrell that he had 
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fired an AR-15 rifle from his porch that evening while intoxicated. 

Eight days after the incident, Johnson told the JQC Chief 

Investigator that the day of the incident was a “blur” because he had 

been drinking excessively, but he remembered sitting in his chair 

and hearing his wife’s “chatter,” which aggravated him and caused 

him to “snap.” Johnson admitted he then went to the porch and fired 

multiple rounds from the rifle into the ground, and when Jarrell 

came to his house in a marked patrol vehicle, he answered the door 

with the loaded rifle pointed at Jarrell’s head. 

On October 28, 2021, the Investigative Panel filed a consent 

motion suspending Johnson pending a final determination of the 

JQC’s investigation. Johnson was suspended with pay by order of 

this Court on October 29, 2021. On March 31, 2022, the Director 

filed a four-count formal complaint against Johnson. Count 1 alleged 

Johnson, in violation of Rule 1.2 (A), “failed to act in a manner that 

promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.” Count 

2 charged Johnson with a violation of Rule 1.2 (B) by failing “to 

establish, maintain, and enforce high standards of conduct and 
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personally observe such standards of conduct so the integrity of the 

judiciary might be preserved[.]” Count 4 charged Johnson with 

failing to respect and comply with the law in violation of Rule 1.11

A formal hearing on the charges against Johnson was held on 

November 16, 2022. On January 6, 2023, the Hearing Panel 

submitted to this Court its Report and Recommendation in which it 

concluded that the Director had proved Counts 1, 2, and 4 by clear 

and convincing evidence. Although the Hearing Panel acknowledged 

in its Report that all proven misconduct attributed to Johnson was 

personal in that it did not occur when Johnson was exercising his 

official responsibilities, it concluded that Johnson had “brought the 

judicial office into disrepute with his actions,” and “restoring 

Johnson to the bench would not ‘respect and honor the judicial office 

 

1 Count 3 of the Formal Complaint charged Johnson with violation of 

Rule 1.3 of the CJC by lending the prestige of his office to advance his own 

private interests by requesting that a law enforcement officer turn off his 

recording device. Rule 1.3 provides: “Judges shall not lend the prestige of their 

office to advance the private interests of the judge or others.” Count 3 was 

dismissed by the Director prior to the hearing and was not considered by the 

Hearing Panel.
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as a public trust,’ nor would it ‘enhance and maintain confidence in 

our legal system.’” The Hearing Panel thus issued its 

recommendation that Johnson be removed from his position as Chief 

Judge of the Magistrate Court of Habersham County. Five days 

later, Johnson submitted, and Governor Brian Kemp subsequently 

accepted, his letter of resignation. 

The matter is now before this Court, where Johnson asserts 

that the Hearing Panel made several errors in its findings and 

conclusions, and the Director argues that Johnson should be 

“removed” from office pursuant to this Court’s authority under 

Article VI, Section VII, Paragraph VII (a) of the Georgia 

Constitution of 1983 to discipline judges.

2 It is unnecessary to 

 

2 One argument raised by the Director is that although Article VI, 

Section VII, Paragraph VII (a) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, the 

provision that authorizes us to discipline judges, provides that a “judge may be 

removed, suspended, or otherwise disciplined for willful misconduct”

(emphasis supplied), we have authority to discipline Johnson, who is now a 

former judge, because JQC Rule 2 (B) (2) grants us “continuing jurisdiction 

over former judges.” We need not, and do not, address this argument here

because the Director’s request that Johnson be removed from office was 

rendered moot by Johnson’s resignation. See generally Inquiry Concerning 

Judge Coomer, 315 Ga. 841, 850 (885 SE2d 738) (2023) (“The [CJC] repeatedly 
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address the arguments of either party, however, because once

Johnson’s resignation was accepted by the Governor, the Director’s 

request that this Court remove Johnson from office3 became moot.

4

See OCGA § 5-6-48 (b) (3) (An appeal shall be dismissed “[w]here the 

 

makes clear that it governs the conduct of only judges and ‘judicial 

candidates[.]’”); Inquiry Concerning Judge Crawford, 310 Ga. 403, 405 (851 

SE2d 572) (2020) (concluding it was unnecessary to determine whether the 

evidence was sufficient to support the Hearing Panel’s conclusions because the 

judge resigned from office after the Hearing Panel issued its Report and 

Recommendation).

3 The Director’s request that Johnson be “removed,” even though he no 

longer holds a judicial position, appears to derive from the Director’s interest 

in preventing Johnson from seeking appointment or election to another judicial 

position for at least seven years, as well as the Director’s assertion that the 

timing of Johnson’s resignation allows Johnson to “circumvent the judicial 

disciplinary process.” See OCGA § 15-1-13 (a) (“[I]f a person has been removed 

from any judicial office upon order of the Supreme Court after review, that 

person shall not be eligible to be elected or appointed to any judicial office in 

this state until seven years have elapsed from the time of such removal.”). 

4 The attorney discipline process is notably different in this regard. In 

bar discipline matters, lawyers who are the subject of pending disciplinary 

proceedings generally cannot resign from membership in the bar without the 

approval of this Court. See Bar Rule 1-208 (d) (“No petition for leave to resign 

shall be accepted if there are disciplinary proceedings or criminal charges 

pending against the member, or if the member is not in good standing for 

failure to pay child support obligations[.]”). We are able to impose this rule in 

attorney discipline matters because we have exclusive authority to supervise 

and regulate the practice of law. By contrast, we have no control over the 

circumstances in which public officers, including judges, vacate their office. 

That process is controlled by the General Assembly through statute. See 

generally OCGA § 45-5-1 et seq., especially § 45-5-1 (a) (2) (“All offices in the 

state shall be vacated . . . [b]y resignation, when accepted”).
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questions presented have become moot.”); Scarbrough Group v. 

Worley, 290 Ga. 234, 236 (719 SE2d 430) (2011) (“A case is moot 

when its resolution would amount to the determination of an 

abstract question not arising upon existing facts or rights.”) 

(citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted). This matter is, 

therefore, dismissed.5

Dismissed. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J., not 

participating.

 

5 Our dismissal is without prejudice to the JQC reinstating charges 

against Johnson in the event he becomes a judge or judicial candidate in the 

future. This Court is not aware of any applicable statute of limitation or 

doctrine of estoppel that would prevent the JQC from revisiting any of the 

misconduct alleged in Counts 1, 2, or 4 of the Formal Complaint should 

Johnson again become a judge or judicial candidate because there has not been

a final disposition of those charges on the merits.