[Cite as State v. Clark, 2021-Ohio-2531.]

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 DARKE COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

WILLIAM H. CLARK 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 2021-CA-1 

Trial Court Case No. 2014-CR-288 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 23rd day of July, 2021. 

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R. KELLY ORMSBY, III, Atty. Reg. No. 0020615, Prosecuting Attorney, Darke County 

Prosecutor’s Office, 504 South Broadway, Greenville, Ohio 45331

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

WILLIAM H. CLARK, #A713-258, P.O. Box 5500 Chillicothe, Ohio 45601 

 Defendant-Appellant, Pro Se 

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EPLEY, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant William H. Clark appeals from a judgment of the Darke 

County Court of Common Pleas, which overruled his motion to withdraw his guilty plea 

without a hearing. For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} In November 2014, Clark was indicted on 11 counts of rape of a person less 

than 13 years of age in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). The charges stemmed from 

allegations that Clark had sexually abused his minor stepdaughter from July 2011 until 

August 2014 at various residences in and around Greenville. 

{¶ 3} In February 2015, Clark agreed to enter an Alford guilty plea, and in 

exchange, the State agreed to dismiss six rape counts and amend the other five to sexual 

battery, in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A). As part of the plea, the parties agreed to a jointlyrecommended sentence of 25 years in prison. It was also agreed that Clark would be 

designated as a Tier III sex offender. 

{¶ 4} At the plea hearing, the court conducted a full Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy and 

accepted Clark’s Alford plea to the five counts of sexual battery, finding that his plea was 

entered in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion. The trial court proceeded directly 

to disposition and imposed the agreed-upon mandatory 25-year sentence. 

{¶ 5} Clark did not file a direct appeal; instead, he filed a series of post-conviction 

motions. In August 2015, he filed a pro se motion for a new trial despite not having a trial. 

Clark claimed that he had discovered, through correspondence with his wife, that the 

victim had recanted her story. Further, he alleged that the State became aware of this 

information before trial, but neither he nor his counsel was made aware of it. In the 
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alternative, Clark requested that the court review his motion for a new trial as a postconviction relief petition under R.C. 2953.21(A). 

{¶ 6} The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, reasoning that a motion 

for a new trial was improper when there was, in fact, no trial. It did not address Clark’s 

post-conviction alternative. Clark appealed, and we remanded for the trial court to review 

the motion as a post-conviction relief petition under R.C. 2953.21 and to issue a ruling on 

the petition in accordance with Crim.R. 35. State v. Clark, 2017-Ohio-120, 80 N.E.3d 1251 

(2d Dist.). 

{¶ 7} Clark moved for the appointment of counsel to assist him in his postconviction pursuit. His request was granted, and new counsel filed several motions, 

including a request that the State provide copies of all discovery turned over to Clark’s 

original trial counsel. The State complied, and afterward, counsel filed a supplement to 

Clark’s original pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Ultimately, the trial court denied 

the petition, and Clark again appealed to this court. We affirmed the trial courts judgment 

and held that Clark was not prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel and that his 

claim was barred by res judicata. State v. Clark, 2d Dist. Darke No. 2017-CA-14, 2018-

Ohio-4042. 

{¶ 8} In June 2020, Clark filed a motion with the trial court to withdraw his guilty 

plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, alleging newly discovered evidence. Clark claims that he 

became aware of medical records in May 2020 that were “not included in the original 

discovery package.” These records, Clark averred, contradicted statements made by the 

victim, and had he known about them at the time, he would not have pled guilty. In fact, 

he declared that the documents proved his actual innocence. 
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{¶ 9} In response, the State asserted that all the documents were turned over to 

defense counsel in 2015 prior to Clark’s plea. Clark insisted, however, that his original 

trial counsel “withheld this valuable and vital information” from him. To settle the 

discrepancy, the trial court ordered that counsel provide “copies of any communications 

or other writings which describe or identify which documents and tangible evidence were 

provided to the Defendant. Copies of the documents and tangible evidence shall also be 

provided.” The items were disclosed under seal. 

{¶ 10} In December 2020, the trial court denied Clark’s motion to withdraw his plea. 

It found that the motion was “both untimely and an impermissible use of Criminal Rule 

32.1,” and therefore considered Clark’s motion “as one for post-conviction relief pursuant 

to R.C. 2953.21.” The court concluded that there was not any newly discovered evidence 

and that Clark had “failed to establish any manifest injustice in [his] conviction.” 

{¶ 11} Clark has filed a timely appeal. 

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion and counsel was not 

ineffective 

{¶ 12} Clark now argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

“recharacterized or converted” his motion to withdraw his plea into a post-conviction relief 

petition. He also alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly failing to inform 

him about favorable evidence, making his plea less than knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary. 

{¶ 13} Crim.R. 32.1 states that “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest 

may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct a manifest injustice the 

court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant 
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to withdraw his or her plea.” The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a pre-sentence 

motion to withdraw a plea “should be freely and liberally granted.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio 

St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). 

{¶ 14} Post-sentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea, on the other hand, may 

only be made to correct a manifest injustice. Crim.R. 32.1. “Manifest injustice relates to 

some fundamental flaw in the proceedings which result[s] in a miscarriage of justice or is 

inconsistent with the demands of due process.” State v. Williams, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

03AP-1214, 2004-Ohio-6123, ¶ 5. “Under the standard of manifest injustice, a 

postsentence withdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases.” State v. Day, 

2d Dist. Greene No. 2015-CA-15, 2016-Ohio-36, ¶ 18. The moving party has the burden 

of showing manifest injustice. State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), 

paragraph one of the syllabus. 

{¶ 15} Appellate courts review motions to withdraw guilty plea decisions for abuse 

of discretion. State v. Rozell, 2018-Ohio-1722, 111 N.E.3d 861, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.). Abuse of 

discretion has been defined as an attitude that is “unreasonable, arbitrary or 

unconscionable.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment 

Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). “It is to be expected that most 

instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, 

rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary.” Id. “A decision is 

unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.” Id.

{¶ 16} While Crim.R. 32.1 does not set out a time limitation to file a motion to 

withdraw, some courts have recognized one. The Third District, for example, has held 

that “a trial court has no authority to even consider a motion to withdraw a plea after a 
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conviction has been affirmed on appeal; or if there was no appeal, after the time for filing 

the original appeal has passed.” State v. Carter, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-36, 2011-Ohio6104, ¶ 11. See also State v. Caston, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-11-077, 2012-Ohio-5260. 

{¶ 17} Other courts of appeals, such as this one, have held that an “undue delay 

between the occurrence of the alleged cause for withdrawal of a guilty plea and the filing 

of a motion under Crim.R. 32.1 is a factor adversely affecting the credibility of the movant 

and militating against the granting of the motion.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Cardenas, 

2016-Ohio-5537, 61 N.E.3d 20, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 18} In this case, the trial court, using the logic from the Third and Sixth Districts, 

determined that because the time for filing the original appeal had passed, Clark’s motion 

to withdraw his plea was untimely, and it no longer had the ability to decide the motion as 

filed. Instead, the court recast the motion as one for post-conviction relief pursuant to R.C. 

2953.21. Converting the motion to withdraw the plea into a post-conviction relief petition, 

however, was an error. 

{¶ 19} Generally, courts have the ability to “recast irregular motions into whatever 

category [is] necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should 

be judged.” State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12. 

Some motions, however, may not be changed by the trial court, and this is one of those 

cases. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23 do not govern 

a Crim.R. 32.1 postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Postsentence motions to 

withdraw guilty or no contest pleas and postconviction relief petitions exist independently.” 

State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 235, 239, 2002-Ohio-3993, 773 N.E.2d 522. See also Schlee

at ¶ 13. 
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{¶ 20} While the trial court erred in recasting the motion, the analysis does not end 

there. We must determine, pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, if denying Clark’s motion to withdraw 

his plea after sentencing created a manifest injustice. As stated above, to rise to the level 

of manifest injustice, the denial must equate to a miscarriage of justice or be inconsistent 

with the demands of due process. Williams at ¶ 5. We do not find that here. 

{¶ 21} Clark first claims that he did not have access to some “favorable evidence” 

(in the form of medical records of both him and the victim) before his plea – going as far 

as to say that counsel “deliberately withheld evidence from [him] which was in [his] favor,” 

and accusing counsel and the State of conspiring against him to facilitate a guilty plea. 

{¶ 22} The trial court addressed this contention below, ordering Clark’s trial 

attorney to demonstrate that all the medical records were not just turned over by the 

prosecution prior to the plea hearing, but shared with Clark. After considering the 

evidence received from Clark’s counsel in response to the order, the trial court specifically 

found that there was no newly discovered evidence and that “[t]he Defendant’s attorney 

reviewed [the medical records] with the Defendant.” Judgment Entry at 3. 

{¶ 23} Taking the facts as relayed by the trial court as true, we cannot say that 

denying Clark’s request to withdraw his guilty plea resulted in a manifest injustice in this 

case. The court considered Clark’s claim, investigated the trial attorney’s conduct, 

received documents from the attorney, and then after reviewing them, made a reasonable 

decision to deny Clark’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. It appears that Clark had all 

the State’s evidence against him and chose to take the substantial benefit offered by 

pleading guilty – the dismissal of numerous charges and a dramatic reduction in possible 

prison time. 
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{¶ 24} We now turn to Clark’s next claim that he was a victim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel because, he alleges, trial counsel did not make him aware of the 

medical records before his plea. 

{¶ 25} It is well established that ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute the 

manifest injustice required to permit the post-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea. State 

v. Banks, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25188, 2013-Ohio-2116, ¶ 9. To establish 

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must satisfy the two-pronged test 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 

The defendant must demonstrate that (1) defense counsel’s performance was so poor 

that he or she was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, 

and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s errors. Id. To demonstrate prejudice, 

“the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for 

counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” State v. Bradley, 42 

Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1998), first paragraph of the syllabus. 

{¶ 26} A guilty plea, including an Alford plea, waives all appealable errors, 

including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the errors 

precluded the defendant from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering his or her 

guilty plea. State v. Riddle, 2017-Ohio-1199, 88 N.E.3d 475, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 27} Here, the record establishes that counsel did not act deficiently, and the 

analysis can stop at the first prong. Despite Clark’s contention to the contrary, the trial 

court found that his trial attorney shared the required medical records with him during the 

discovery process, prior to his pleading guilty. With that, Clark had the information he 

stated he needed to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. Any other potential 
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argument is negated by the Alford plea. 

{¶ 28} One final argument is weaved throughout Clark’s brief: that the State was 

in possession of his medical records and purposely concealed them from him. For its part, 

the State concedes that while it turned over other medical records, it did not provide Clark 

with a copy of his own records prior to the guilty plea. Providing Clark with his own 

records, however, was not the State’s responsibility. See Shank v. Mitchell, S.D. Ohio No. 

2:00-cv-17, 2009 WL 3210350, *9 (Sept. 30, 2009) (the State has no duty to disclose 

information that is readily available to the defense through exercise of its own diligence); 

LeCroy v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corr., 421 F.3d 1237, 1268 (11th Cir.2005) (“In this 

case, defense counsel obviously could have obtained the defendant’s own medical and 

school records by exercising reasonable diligence. Consequently, there is no Brady

violation.”); State v. Heisey, 2015-Ohio-4610, 48 N.E.3d 157, ¶ 32-33 (2d Dist.) (the State 

is not obligated to conduct the defendant’s investigation for him when the defendant could 

have obtained the requested information himself). 

{¶ 29} Like the cases just cited, the State was under no obligation to provide Clark 

with his own medical records. The purpose of discovery is to even the playing field, avoid 

surprise, and in a criminal case, to allow the accused to intelligently defend him or herself. 

Its purpose is not for the State to do the work of the defense attorney. Clark and/or his 

attorney was certainly capable of obtaining his own medical records. Clark’s argument 

that it was the State’s duty to provide him with his own records is without merit. 

{¶ 30} Finally, it should be noted that even though the trial court reclassified the 

motion as a post-conviction relief petition, it properly used the “manifest injustice” 

language associated with motions to withdraw guilty pleas. The ultimate result was 
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correct, and as we have previously held, “[a] decision that achieves the right result must 

be affirmed, even if the wrong reasoning is used to justify the decision, because an error 

in reasoning is not prejudicial.” John A. Baker Co., v. Jedson Eng., Inc., 2018-Ohio-3924, 

121 N.E.3d 788, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.). See City of Toledo v. Schmiedebusch, 192 Ohio App.3d 

402, 2011-Ohio-284, 949 N.E.2d 504 (6th Dist.) (an appeals court will not reverse a trial 

court’s decision that achieves the right result for the wrong reason because the error is 

not prejudicial). 

{¶ 31} The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Clark’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea, and his trial counsel was not deficient. The assignment of error 

is overruled. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 32} The trial court’s judgment denying Clark’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea 

will be affirmed. 

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DONOVAN, J. and HALL, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

R. Kelly Ormsby, III 

William H. Clark 

Hon. Jonathan P. Hein