alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(Reap. Dec. 9194)

#### Ira Furman Co. *v.*United States

Entry Nos. 59202; 69062.

(Decided July 16, 1958)

*Siegel, Mandell & Davidson*for the plaintiff.

*George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Donlon, Judge:

These appeals for reappraisement have been submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of counsel for the parties:

> IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the respective parties hereto that the merchandise covered by the Appeals to Reappraisement enumerated above consists of corned beef in cans imported from Paraguay.

> That on or about the exportation of said merchandise such or similar merchandise was not freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country of exportation in the usual wholesale quantities or in the ordinary course of trade for home consumption or for export to the United States; that such or similar imported merchandise was freely offered for sale in the United States for domestic consumption in the usual wholesale quantities in the ordinary course of trade as defined in Section 402 (e) of the Tariff Act of 1930; that the United States value, as defined in Section 402 (e) of the Tariff Act of 1930 is the proper basis of appraisement of said merchandise; and that said United States values for the merchandise covered by each of the appeals enumerated above are as follows:

> Reappraisement 278061-A, Entry 59202/51 embraces invoice

> dated on or about November 30, 1951_$12.6733 per ease of 48 tins, net packed.

> Reappraisement 278062-A, Entry 69062/52 embraces invoice

> dated on or about March 8, 1952_$13.1433 per case of 48 tins, net packed.

> IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED that the above-enumerated appeals to reappraisement be submitted on the foregoing stipulation.

The stipulation is not, of course, acceptable as the stipulation of an issue of law, namely, that United States value is the proper basis of appraisement of this merchandise. The facts stipulated are, however, sufficient to permit decision.

*497Accepting this stipulation as an agreed statement of facts, I find and hold that United States value, as defined in section 402 (e) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, is the proper basis for determination of value of the canned corned beef described in the invoices and entries covered by these appeals; and that, in reappraisement 278061-A, such value is $12.6733 per case of 48 tins, net packed, and, in reap-praisement 278062-A, such value is $13.1433 per case of 48 tins, net packed.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
No. 49745.

#### Protests 528992-G, etc., of Edward M. Poons Co. of Kobe, Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

The testimony showed that certain items consist of hats known as harvest hats, in chief value of paper, valued at less than $3 per dozen and that they are similar to those involved in *Caradine*v. *United States*(9 Cust. Ct. 69, C. D. 664). In accordance therewith those hats imported and withdrawn for consumption prior to the effective date of the Netherlands Trade Agreement (T. D. 48075) were held dutiable at 25 percent ad valorem under paragraph 1504 (b) (5), and those subsequent to that date, at 12)4 percent under paragraph 1504 (b) (5) and said trade agreement. The protests were sustained to this extent.
#### Albert Defreest and others, *Respondents, v.*The City of Troy, *Appellant.*

Judgment affirmed, with costs, on opinion of court below. Boardman, J., not acting.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C U IT M IC HAEL TATE,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lla

nt,
v. FAM ILY AUTO GR OUP, INC ., a C a l ifornia c orporat ion, De fe nda n t-Appe l le e . No. 15-56087 D.C . No. 2:14-c v-08738-SJO-M R

W
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the C e ntra l Distric t of C a lifornia S. Jam e s Ote ro, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d Fe brua

ry 6, 2017 ** Pa sa de n a , C a l ifornia B e fore : GR

AB E R , B YB EE, a

nd C HR ISTEN, C irc u it Judge s. W e va c ate the distric t

c ourt’ s dism issa l of this a c tion, a nd we re m and for
re c o nside ra tion in light of Ka rc z e wski v. DC H M ission Va l le y , LLC , No. 15-55633. V ACAT E D and RE M ANDE D . C o sts on a ppe a l awarde d to Pla intiff.



# F IL ED JUL 10 2017 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a

ppropria te for public ation a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.

* * T he pa ne l una nim ously c onc lude s tha

t this c a se is suita

ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).Tatev . Family Auto Grp., Inc
. , No. 15-56087 B YB EE, C irc uit Judge , a c quie sc ing dubitante : I a c quie s c e dubitante

for the re a sons a

rtic ulat e d in m

y se pa ra te opinion in K arc ze w sk i v . DC H Mission Valle

y , LLC , No. 15-55633. 

# F IL ED JUL 10 2017 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S. CO URT O F APPEALS
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COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00110-CV

STEVEN ADAMS APPELLANT

V.

SANDFORD OIL COMPANY, INC. APPELLEE

------------

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW OF WISE COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

------------

We have considered appellant's “Defendant's Motion For Withdrawal Of 

Appeal And Cancellation Of June 17, 2011 Hearing.” It is the court=s opinion that 

the motion should be granted; therefore, we dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 42.1(a)(1), 43.2(f).

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

Costs of the appeal shall be paid by appellant, for which let execution 

issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(d).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ. 

DELIVERED: June 23, 2011
#### Cramer v Metropolitan Savings & Loan Association.

(Docket No. 57215.)

Virginia Cramer, *in propria persona,*plaintiff-appellant. *McClintock, Donovan, Carson & Roach*for defendants-appellees.

Rehearing denied. Plaintiff-appellant’s motion to expand record to include exhibits pertaining to the application for rehearing is also considered and is hereby denied for the reason that no adequate cause has been shown for the granting of such relief.

Reported at 401 Mich 252.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

July 31, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

130501 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 130501 

 COA: 263492 

Macomb CC: 01-000959-FC 

ROBERT W. VANDERWIEL,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 23, 2006 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has 

failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). 

s0724 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

July 31, 2006 

 Clerk
Exhibit 10.50
 Non-Employee Director Compensation Policy of GTx, Inc.
Effective Date: 2/18/2011
 I. Purpose
  II. Scope
  III. Policy Statements
   A. Cash Compensation
 Annual Retainer
  Meeting Stipends
  Director Compensation Policy
    
    Page 1 of 3




---



##### 



Expense Reimbursement
  B. Directors Deferred Compensation
  C. Equity-Based Compensation
  Initial Award
  Annual Awards
  Provisions Applicable to All Non-Employee Director Awards
   Director Compensation Policy
    
    Page 2 of 3




---



##### 



IV. Related Documents / Information       Finance Policy, Business Travel and Expense
 V. Policy Owner
 VI. Revision History
 VII. Approval
  /s/ Henry P. Doggrell
    
    February 28, 2011Henry P. Doggrell
    
    DateVice President, General Counsel
Case No. 15,123.

#### UNITED STATES v. FLYNN.

[15 Blatchf. 302.] 1

Circuit Court, S. D. New York.

Oct. 14, 1878.

Internal Revenue—Distillery—Sign.

Section 3279 of the Revised Statutes of the United States makes it an offence to work in a distillery on which no sign is placed and kept, as provided in that section, and provides a punishment for such an act.

This was in indictment under section 3279 of the Revised Statutes, charging the defendant [John Flynn] with working in a distillery on which no sign was placed and kept, as provided by that section. A motion was made by the defendant to quash the indictment, upon the ground that no punishment was provided for the act charged. The contention was, that the construction and punctuation of section 3279, and the provision therein- for the forfeiture of all horses, &c., used in carrying such property aforesaid, compel the conclusion that there is an omission to provide any punishment for the act of working in a distillery on which no sign is placed and kept.

*1128Courtland P. L. Butler, Asst. U. S. Dist. Atty.

Louis P. Post, for defendant.

Before BENEDICT, District Judge.

1

 [Reported by H011. Samuel Blatchford, Cir.cuit Judge, and here reprinted by permission.]

THE COURT

held that section 3279 makes it an offence to work in a distillery on which no sign is placed and kept, as provided in that section, and provides for such an act the punishment of a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or imprisonment not less than one month nor more than six months.
ORDER

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

Nos. DA 21-0170

IN THE MATTER OF 

R.J.H. and K.H.,

Youths in Need of Care

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant Father, L.H.’s, motion to 

consolidate, and good cause appearing therefore, Appellant’s motion is 

GRANTED and Cause Nos. 21-0170 and 21-0171 are hereby consolidated 

under Cause No. DA 21-0170 and henceforth captioned In the Matter of 

R.J.H. and K.H, Youths in Need of Care.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

June 28 2021

06/28/2021
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 13, 2018

No. 04-18-00615-CR

Harry SCOTT,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016CR7403

Honorable Dick Alcala, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The trial court’s certification in this appeal states “this criminal case is a plea-bargain 

case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” The clerk’s record contains a written plea 

bargain, and the punishment assessed did not exceed the punishment recommended by the 

prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant; Rule 25.2(a)(2) applies. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

25.2(a)(2).

This court must dismiss this appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant has a right 

of appeal has not been made part of the record under these rules.” Id. R. 25.2(d); see Chavez v. 

State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 

We ORDER Appellant to cause an amended trial court certification to be filed in this 

court within THIRTY days of the date of this order showing Appellant has the right of appeal. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d), 37.1; see also Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005); Daniels v. State, 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). If no 

amended trial court certification is filed as ordered, this appeal will be dismissed. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 25.2(d).

All other appellate deadlines are SUSPENDED pending further order of this court.

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 13th day of September, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
1 The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, Chie f Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 05-1562

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. Jorge Magana-Suarez, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: March 20, 2006 Filed: March 20, 2006

___________ Before MELLOY, FAGG, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Jorge Magana-Suarez (Magana) appeal s the 30-month sentence the district court 1 imposed upon his guilty plea to illegal re-e ntry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Magana’s counsel has m oved to withdraw and filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning the reasonableness of the sentence (which was at the top of the advi sory Sentencing Guidelines range) in light of Magana’s cultural assimilation.-2- We conclude the sentence is not unreasonable. See United States v. Haack , 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. ) (standard of revi ew), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 276 (2005). The district court calculated the Guidelin es imprisonment range and took that range into account, along with other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and Magana’s culturalassimilation argument, in dete rmining the sentence. SeeUnited States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 260-62 (2005) (§ 3553(a) factors will guide reasonableness review). Having reviewed the reco rd under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.

______________________________
#### Mary Wakeman, *Appellant, v.*William Pettit, Respondent.

Judgment of County Court reversed and that of justice affirmed, with costs. Mem. by Learned, P. J.
#### Ralph DiClemente, as Administrator of the Estate of Beverly DiClemente, Deceased, Respondent-Appellant, v Southside Hospital et al., Respondents, and Michael Karp, Appellant-Respondent, et al., Defendants.

*[634*NYS2d 206]

—In a medical malpractice action to recover damages for wrongful death, the defendant Michael Karp appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Seidell, J.), entered July 11, 1994, as granted the branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was to amend the complaint to add a cause of action for punitive damages against him, and the plaintiff cross-appeals from so much of the same order as denied that branch of his motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants Southside Hospital, Medical Arts Radiology Group, P. C., and Michael Karp.

Ordered that the appeal is dismissed for failure to perfect the appeal in accordance with the rules of this Court *(see,*22 NYCRR 670.8 [a], [e]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as cross-appealed from; and it is further,

Ordered that the defendants Southside Hospital, Medical Arts Radiology Group, P. C., and Michael Karp, appearing separately and filing separate briefs, are awarded one bill of costs.

On July 20, 1984, Beverly DiClemente was treated by the defendant Michael Karp, M.D., at which time she complained of chest pains and difficulty in breathing. She again made the same complaints to Dr. Karp on August 9,1984, and September 10, 1984, and after the later visit had chest X rays taken at the defendant hospital by the defendant Radiology Group. The X rays were interpreted by a doctor of the Radiology Group. However, these findings and recommendations were not timely communicated to Dr. Karp, the hospital emergency room staff, the Hospital Employee Health Department, or to Ms. Di*585Clemente. On February 1, 1985, Ms. DiClemente was admitted to Southside Hospital with a diagnosis of Papilledema and Oat Cell Carcinoma. Another chest X ray was taken and it revealed that the size of the mass had increased from the time of the first X ray. As of result of her illnesses, Ms. DiClemente died on April 5, 1986. This medical malpractice suit was initiated by the administrator of the estate, the plaintiff Ralph DiClemente. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment as to the liability of the defendants for their alleged failure to timely diagnose and treat the illnesses of Ms. DiClemente. The motion was denied.

On appeal, the plaintiff contends that there were no issues of material fact precluding granting of the motion for summary judgment. We disagree. The denial of summary judgment was proper. The evidence in the record does not establish the plaintiff’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. There are issues of fact, *inter alia,*as to Dr. Karp’s duty, if any, to Ms. DiClemente under the circumstances presented. In addition, questions of fact exist as to what effect, if any, the alleged delay in the communication of the radiological report had on Ms. DiClemente *(see, Royal v Brooklyn Union Gas Co.,*122 AD2d 132). O’Brien, J. P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.
Exhibit



Exhibit 10.12



FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE
AMGEN INC. SUPPLEMENTAL RETIREMENT PLAN
AS AMENDED AND RESTATED EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 16, 2013


The Amgen Inc. Supplemental Retirement Plan, as Amended and Restated Effective October 16, 2013 (the “Plan”), is hereby amended, effective October 14, 2016, as follows:


		
	1.
	Section 6.3 is amended by deleting the third sentence thereof and replacing it with the following:




Any lump-sum payment made pursuant to this Section 6.2 or Section 6.5 shall be made, or installment payments shall commence, no later than December 31 of the year immediately following the year in which you die.


To record this First Amendment to the Plan as set forth herein, the Company has caused its authorized officer to execute this document this 14th day of October 2016.




AMGEN INC.




By:    /s/ Brian McNamee_______
Brian McNamee
Executive Vice President






1
Case No. 8,495.

#### LONSDALE v. BROWN.

[See Case No. 8.494.]
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 4, 2022

No. 04

- 21

- 00518

- CV

BULVERDE VILLAGE PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION

, Appellant

v.

BULVERDE VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. a/k/a The Point,

Appellee

From the 288th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020CI03243

Honorable Laura Salinas , Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Sitting : Ir ene Rios, Justice

Beth Wat kin s, Justice

Liza A

. Rodriguez, Justice

Appellee filed its Motion t o Dismiss f or Lack o f Jurisdiction Due t o Lack o f Authority o f

Appellant POA t o Appeal on December 1, 2021. The motion to dismiss is carried with the

appeal.

It is so ORDER ED on February 4, 2022.

PER CURIAM

ATTESTED TO:

_________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, CLERK OF COURT
#### In the Matter of Bernard J. Quinn, Appellant, v H. Carl McCall, as Comptroller of the State of New York, Respondent.

[633 NYS2d 93]

—Spain, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Cobb, J.), entered December 22, 1994 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a cause of action.

On August 14, 1990 petitioner filed an application for a service retirement with the State and Local Employees’ Retirement System and retired from State service effective September 30, 1990. By letter dated December 21, 1992, petitioner sought to convert his ordinary retirement into an accidental disability retirement on the basis of an injury he had suffered in 1989. Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 challenging respondent’s determination that he was ineligible for accidental disability retirement benefits because he had failed to file the appropriate application within the statutory time period. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition was granted by Supreme Court on the basis that petitioner’s request for accidental disability retirement benefits was untimely as a matter of law. Petitioner appeals.

*700We affirm. Retirement and Social Security Law § 63 (a), which governs applications for accidental disability retirement benefits, provides in relevant part that an "application may be made not later than two years after the member is first discontinued from service” *(Matter of O’Marah v Levitt,*35 NY2d 593). Petitioner’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits was made more than two years after he retired from State service.

Petitioner’s contention that his service retirement application should be retroactively deemed one for accidental disability retirement benefits is without merit. Accidental disability retirement benefits require a separate application *{see, Matter of Williams v Regan,*145 AD2d 884; *Matter of McKay v Levitt,*69 AD2d 921). Similarly without merit is petitioner’s contention that a 1977 leaflet issued by the then-State Employees’ Retirement System implies otherwise; eligibility cannot be provided by estoppel where a person does not statutorily qualify *{see, Matter of O’Neill v Regan,*114 AD2d 613, 614). Furthermore, the leaflet’s preface states that its contents are brief and very general, and it cautions the reader that it is not a substitution for the law.

Mikoll, J. P., Crew III, White and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies to such officers knowledge that:

(i) the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the annual period ended December 31, 2009 (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.



|                      |  |  |  |  |  |                       |  |                                          
|--------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | --------------------- |  | -----------------------------------------
|                      |  |  | 
|Dated: March 11, 2010 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ George G. Beasley
|                      |  |  |  |  |  |                       |  | George G. Beasley Chief
Executive Officer

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 1350, and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date
hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.