United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on National Security, International

Affairs, and Criminal Justice, Committee

on Government Reform and Oversight,

House of Representatives

September 1996 NASA

INFRASTRUCTURE

Challenges to

Achieving Reductions

and Efficiencies

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-187

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-272591 

September 9, 1996

The Honorable William H. Zeliff, Jr.

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, 

 International Affairs, and Criminal Justice

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is facing the

difficult task of fulfilling its mission with significantly fewer dollars. NASA’s

present strategy for absorbing its most recent funding reductions through

fiscal year 2000 focuses on cutting infrastructure.1

 If NASA fails to find and

implement sufficient infrastructure cost-reduction opportunities, meeting

its budget targets through fiscal year 2000 will require program

adjustments—stretching out, reducing the scope, or terminating existing

efforts and/or postponing new initiatives. At your request, we reviewed the

status of NASA’s efforts to achieve reductions and efficiencies in key areas

of its infrastructure, principally facilities,2

 and the challenges it faces.

Background In the early 1990s, NASA was planning an infrastructure to support a

projected annual budget of more than $20 billion and a civil service

workforce of about 25,000 by the turn of the century. However, over the

last several years, NASA has been directed by the Administration to reduce

its future years’ budget levels. In the fiscal year 1994 budget request, NASA’s

total funding for fiscal years 1994 through 2000 was reduced by 18 percent,

or $22 billion. In the fiscal year 1995 budget request, total funding was

reduced again by almost $13 billion, or an additional 13 percent. To absorb

these major reductions, NASA focused on adjusting programs. For example,

the Space Station program was restructured and given an annual budget

ceiling of $2.1 billion. Similarly, the scope of the Earth Observing System

program was reduced, and the program is being restructured once again.

Also, funding was terminated for the Space Exploration Initiative, the

National Launch System, and the National Aerospace Plane, and the

Comet Rendezvous and Asteroid Flyby project was canceled.

1

NASA’s infrastructure—the underlying foundation for agency operations—includes people, facilities,

equipment, business processes, and information systems.

2

NASA defines facilities as land, buildings, structures, permanently located trailers, and other real

property improvements, including utility systems and collateral equipment that is essentially

integrated into the facility.

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As part of the executive branch’s development of NASA’s $14.2-billion

budget request for fiscal year 1996, NASA was directed once again to lower

its projected budget through fiscal year 2000, this time by an additional 

5 percent, or $4.6 billion. Rather than terminating or delaying core science,

aeronautics, or exploration programs, NASA announced it would absorb

this funding decrease by reducing infrastructure, including closing and

consolidating facilities. NASA also said it would reduce its use of support

contractors and decrease the size of its workforce to about 17,500 by the

turn of the century—the lowest level since the early 1960s.

While NASA’s actual and planned budgets and staffing levels have

decreased sharply, the value of its facilities infrastructure has actually

increased. From fiscal years 1990 through 1995, the current replacement

value3

 of NASA’s facilities increased by about 14 percent, not including

inflation. At the end of fiscal year 1995, the agency’s facilities had an

estimated current replacement value of $17 billion. The agency owned or

leased about 3,000 buildings on nearly 130,000 acres of land at 71

locations. NASA’s facilities range in size from small buildings to large

industrial plants. Appendix I provides information about facilities at NASA’s

10 field centers.

As part of its infrastructure reduction efforts, NASA is also looking at ways

to cut the cost of its field center support activities. Each NASA field center

operates a wide range of such activities, with some support-unique

missions at particular centers. Common activities include building

maintenance, fire protection, security, printing, and medical services. NASA

provides these services primarily through a combination of civil service

employees, contractor labor, and arrangements with the Department of

Defense (DOD) where facilities are collocated.

Results in Brief NASA’s current facility closure and consolidation plans will not fully

achieve the agency’s goal of decreasing the current replacement value of

its facilities by about 25 percent (about $4 billion in 1994 dollars) by the

end of fiscal year 2000. More importantly, these plans will not result in

substantial cost reductions by that date. Also, although NASA is about half

way to its goal of lowering the number of its full-time equivalent4

3

The current replacement value is the acquisition cost of facilities, excluding land, plus the cost of

collateral equipment and incremental book value changes escalated to the current year using a 20-city

average cost index for buildings.

4

According to Office of Management and Budget guidance, full-time equivalent generally includes 

260 compensable days, or 2,080 hours, excluding overtime and holiday hours.

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employees to 17,500 by fiscal year 2000, it faces major uncertainties in

achieving additional workforce reductions. NASA has also had problems in

evaluating some cost-reduction opportunities; environmental cleanup

costs could affect future facility disposition efforts; and its efforts to share

facilities with DOD have progressed slowly.

NASA faces barriers to accomplishing additional consolidations and

closures that, to date, it has not been able to overcome on its own. Closing

facilities, relocating activities, and consolidating operations in fewer

locations with fewer employees have been slowed by parochial concerns

about the effects of such actions on missions, personnel, and local

communities. These concerns have been exacerbated by perceptions of

the lack of fairness and impartiality in the decision-making process. In the

face of these concerns, NASA must still reduce its infrastructure further.

Ultimately, if further progress in identifying and implementing

infrastructure reductions is limited, a process that uses an external

independent group similar to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment

Commission may be needed. To help determine the need for an

independent group to facilitate closures and consolidations of NASA

facilities, Congress may wish to consider requiring NASA to submit a plan

outlining how it intends to meet its reduction goals.

Planned Facilities

Reductions Will Not

Achieve Large Cost

Reductions

NASA’s current facility closure and consolidation plans will not fully

achieve the agency’s goal of decreasing the current replacement value of

its facilities by about 25 percent (about $4 billion in 1994 dollars) by the

end of fiscal year 2000. More importantly, these plans will not result in

substantial cost reductions by that date.

By the end of fiscal year 1997, NASA plans to have closed or converted

facilities to cost-reimbursable status that have a current replacement value

of $1.9 billion. Also, as of March 1996, planned reductions through fiscal

year 2000 were $2.8 billion, or about 30 percent below NASA’s goal of

reducing the current replacement value of its facilities by about $4 billion

in 1994 dollars.5

 Agency officials noted that the $4-billion reduction goal

was a “stretch,” or aggressive goal, which they were never certain could be

achieved.

5

Assuming all planned reductions occur, at the end of fiscal year 2000, NASA’s facilities will have a

current replacement value of $15.3 billion in fiscal year 2000 dollars.

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Additional reductions are unlikely in research and development facilities,

but there may be opportunities for further reductions in office space,

according to NASA officials. NASA classifies building space based on its

primary use, such as office space. NASA was providing general purpose

office space for about 53,000 civil service and contractor personnel at the

end of fiscal year 1995. Agencywide, the average square feet of office

space available per person, including substandard space, exceeded NASA’s

standard6

 by nearly 43 percent and the ceiling by over 25 percent. When

substandard space is not included, this average exceeded the standard by

over 27 percent and the ceiling by 12 percent.7

 Future reductions in the

number of on-site contractor personnel and NASA employees (almost

4,000) by fiscal year 2000 will make even more office space available.

NASA estimates that the planned $2.8-billion reduction in the current

replacement value of facilities will yield only about $250 million in cost

reductions through fiscal year 2000. Although some of these cost

reductions are from lowering facilities’ operations and maintenance costs,

most result from four centers8

 bringing contractor personnel from off-site

leased space onto the centers to fill space left vacant because of

reductions in NASA personnel and support contractors. Moreover, some

cost reductions may be offset by increased costs in future years. For

example, according to a NASA official, about three-quarters of NASA facilities

are 30 or more years old and keeping these facilities operational may lead

to higher operations and modernization costs.

Problems in

Evaluating

Cost-Reduction

Opportunities

NASA has had problems in identifying, assessing, or implementing some

cost-reduction opportunities. NASA personnel (1) did not thoroughly

evaluate potential larger cost-reduction options, (2) limited the scope of

consideration for consolidation, (3) performed questionable initial

cost-reduction studies, (4) made inappropriate closure recommendations,

and (5) substantially overstated cost-reduction estimates. Some of these

problems resulted when NASA acted quickly in an attempt to achieve

near-term cost reductions. NASA officials said that some cost-reduction

6

NASA’s allowance standard for office space is an average of 110 net square feet per person, and an

average of 125 net square feet per person is the ceiling, which NASA calls the “satisfactory liberal

limit.”

7

As of September 30, 1995, the agencywide average office density was about 157 net square feet per

person, including substandard space, or 140 net square feet per person, excluding substandard space.

A NASA official told us that these office space averages include space that was not intended to be used

as offices, such as industrial plants and test sites.

8

Goddard Space Flight Center, Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, and the Jet Propulsion

Laboratory.

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estimates were “interim” estimates because NASA was pressured into

prematurely providing what turned out to be imprecise savings estimates

to Congress. Also, some NASA staff lacked experience in developing

estimates, according to NASA officials.

Although there were problems with some evaluations, which are discussed

below, others appear to have been done better. For example, the Office of

Space Flight reviewed in detail a proposed consolidation of automated

data processing functions at a single location before developing a plan that

offered several options.

Concerns about closing facilities, relocating activities, and consolidating

operations have sometimes been exacerbated by perceptions of the lack of

fairness and impartiality in the decision-making process. In the past, we

have expressed concerns about NASA’s ability to accurately and

independently develop cost estimates to support its decisions on new and

ongoing programs and projects.9

 Just recently, the NASA Inspector General10

and NASA management have been discussing the structure required to meet

NASA’s continuing need for independent, impartial, and technically credible

systems analysis and program evaluation.

Cost-Reduction Options

for Telecommunications

Networks Not Thoroughly

Evaluated

NASA did not thoroughly evaluate potential larger cost-reduction options

for consolidating wide area telecommunications networks. NASA has five

such networks operating or being developed, and they provide a variety of

communications services among headquarters, field centers, major

contractors, affiliated academic institutions, and international partners.

Due to advances in technology, NASA no longer needs to operate multiple

telecommunications networks, and consolidating network operations at a

single site offers economies of scale, as well as reduced administrative

overhead.

Last year, NASA’s Zero Base Review11 team recommended that the field

centers compete to determine which one could consolidate the five wide

9

Space Programs: NASA’s Independent Cost Estimating Capability Needs Improvement

(GAO/NSIAD-93-73, Nov. 5, 1992).

10Assessment of the Relocation of NASA Independent Program Evaluation and Assessment Activities

to Langley Research Center, NASA Office of Inspector General, Inspections and Assessments (July 8,

1996).

11The Zero Base Review was an agencywide budgetary and management study. Its primary purpose

was to identify ways for NASA to reduce its infrastructure through fiscal year 2000 in order to meet the

budget target established in the agency’s fiscal year 1996 budget request. (See app. II for a brief

description of the Zero Base Review and other studies related to NASA facilities done since 1990.)

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area networks most cost-effectively. Goddard Space Flight Center, Ames

Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center prepared consolidation

proposals. NASA’s Office of Space Communications, which oversees the

two largest networks, decided against a competition and did not formally

consider the proposals offered by Goddard and Ames. Instead, with the

objective of obtaining some budget cost reductions in 1997, it endorsed

the Marshall proposal without determining which of the three proposals

was the most cost-effective. However, Marshall’s proposal did not project

cost reductions in the near term as aggressively as the others. For

example, Goddard’s proposal estimated potential cost reductions over the

next 6 years totaling $94.5 million more than the reductions in the Marshall

proposal.

Earlier this year, we recommended12 that NASA conduct an objective review

of network consolidation to determine whether its chosen approach

should be modified to achieve greater cost reductions. NASA agreed with

this recommendation and arranged for an independent group to conduct

the review. It indicated the agency’s telecommunications experts were not

participating in the review because they would have a “biased”

perspective. The independent review is scheduled to be completed this

month.

NASA’s initial network consolidation efforts were hampered by the lack of

clear direction within NASA to include all five wide area networks in the

consolidation effort. The Office of Space Communications, which directed

the consolidation effort at Marshall, does not have authority over three of

the five networks. The agencywide telecommunications network

consolidation or streamlining efforts did not have a strong central

advocate. NASA’s Chief Information Officer, who would be a logical choice

to fill this role, was not directly involved in this effort.13

Initial Limitations in Scope

of Consideration for

Supercomputer

Consolidation

NASA initially excluded almost 40 percent of its supercomputer systems,

which were used mostly for research and development, from the scope of

a supercomputer consolidation study. The agency uses supercomputers to

support some space mission operations and a variety of research projects,

including developing new supercomputer technologies.

12Telecommunications Network: NASA Could Better Manage Its Planned Consolidation

(GAO/AIMD-96-33, Apr. 9, 1996).

13We reported on the effectiveness of NASA’s initiatives to implement a chief information officer

position in NASA Chief Information Officer: Opportunities to Strengthen Information Resources

Management (GAO/AIMD-96-78, Aug. 15, 1996).

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In March 1995, NASA began studying ways to cut its supercomputer costs

by consolidating their management and operation. However, its initial

studies considered only some of the agency’s supercomputers and focused

on nonresearch and development supercomputing systems. Although

NASA’s consolidation study team had identified 29 supercomputers, NASA

management excluded 12 existing machines and some planned for future

procurement from consideration because (1) some are being managed

under existing contracts that could be affected by a consolidation decision

and (2) others were used in research programs primarily to develop new

supercomputer technologies.

We spoke with NASA program, field center, and supercomputer

consolidation study officials about the reasons for, and appropriateness of,

limiting the scope of NASA’s consolidation study. During a series of

discussions, NASA officials acknowledged our concerns about the study’s

limitations and expanded its scope to a phased approach that will

eventually consider all of the agency’s supercomputers. In commenting on

a draft of this report, NASA said the review will be based on a top-down

plan for agencywide management of supercomputing operations and will

design an optimal supercomputer architecture as a basis for determining

future directions in this area.

Questionable Initial

Studies of Aircraft

Consolidation Options

Questions about initial studies have delayed the decision-making process

in NASA’s attempts to consolidate aircraft. Last year, the transfer of

research and operational support aircraft from five NASA centers to the

Dryden Flight Research Center was proposed. NASA headquarters tasked

Dryden, the center that would gain from the consolidation, with planning

and performing an aircraft consolidation study. In a recent report,14 the

NASA Inspector General noted the Dryden study had estimated NASA could

save $12.6 million annually by consolidating aircraft at Dryden. However,

internal and external questions about the scope and quality of this study

have slowed the decision-making process. Subsequent reviews of the costs

and benefits of aircraft consolidation by both NASA management and the

NASA Inspector General staff have resulted in much lower annual savings

estimates.

In light of the controversy that potentially accompanies any significant

decision to consolidate, relocate, or close facilities, NASA would benefit

from ensuring an adequate balance of expertise and interests for study

teams, developing initial analyses that are objective and well-supported,

14Aircraft Consolidation at the Dryden Flight Research Center (HA-96-007, Aug. 12, 1996).

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and fairly and thoroughly considering reasonable alternatives before

making decisions. In this way, NASA can develop defensible decisions that

will withstand external scrutiny and can be implemented in a timely

manner.

Inappropriate

Recommendations to

Close Plum Brook Station

Plum Brook Station15 was inappropriately recommended for possible

closure twice. In February 1995, the NASA Federal Laboratory Review

recommended reviewing the station for possible closure because it was

being operated primarily for non-NASA users.16 At about the same time,

NASA’s White Paper, formally titled A Budget Reduction Strategy, suggested

that Plum Brook should be closed. NASA officials could not provide the

rationale for the proposed action. The Laboratory Review report did

acknowledge a problem concerning the existence of an inactive nuclear

reactor at the station, and the Zero Base Review subsequently

recommended retaining Plum Brook on a fully reimbursable basis because

of the reactor.

Plum Brook operates on a cost-reimbursable basis, with most of its

operating cost covered by revenue from users of four test facilities at the

station. Even if all four of the test facilities were closed, the operating cost

would still be about $2 million, primarily because the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission requires that the reactor be maintained in its current state.

The only way to close the location and dispose of the property would be to

dismantle the reactor. However, the cost for doing this would be

prohibitively expensive—about $100 million in 1997 dollars, according to a

1990 estimate. In addition, there are no disposal sites to accommodate the

radioactive waste that would be generated by the dismantling process.

Overstated Cost

Reductions for Some

Options

In some cases, NASA’s initial estimates of cost reductions were overstated.

For example, the Zero Base Review estimated that $500 million or more

could be saved through 2000 by commercializing the Tracking and Data

Relay Satellite System. However, NASA later determined this approach

could not be implemented and that none of the projected savings would

15Plum Brook is a field station of the Lewis Research Center, and it is located about 50 miles west of

Lewis, near Sandusky, Ohio. It encompasses 6,400 acres and employs 12 civil servants and 100

contractor personnel. Its primary mission is to provide risk reduction and system development testing

on space-bound hardware for a variety of customers.

16Between fiscal years 1988 and 1995, the station’s customers paid $32.9 million. NASA was the biggest

customer, with 34 percent of the business. Other users included the National Aerospace Plane,

18 percent; Department of Energy, 15 percent; Air Force, 13 percent; European Space Agency,

9 percent; Martin Marietta Aerospace, the Defense Nuclear Agency, ILC Dover Company, and NASA’s

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 3 percent each; and General Dynamics, Space Systems Division, 1 percent.

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materialize in the time frame targeted by the Zero Base Review. Also, the

Zero Base Review claimed that consolidation of telecommunications

networks would save between $350 million and $375 million.

Subsequently, NASA officials acknowledged these cost reductions would

not only be significantly lower, but the lower savings estimates had

already been considered in the preparation of the networks’ future budget

estimates.

The estimated savings noted above were part of the total savings estimate

that provided the basis for NASA’s claim that the fiscal year 1996 out-year

budget reductions could be covered by infrastructure decreases. To the

extent the estimates were overstated, additional pressure was placed on

NASA program and field center officials to find efficiencies to supplant the

overstated savings. For example, after NASA determined that

commercializing the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System would not

reduce costs, it began aggressively negotiating a fixed-price contract for

the purchase of three additional satellites needed for the system. However,

NASA estimates that the fixed-price contract produced considerably less

savings than the commercializing of the system.

Environmental

Cleanup Costs Could

Affect Facility

Disposition Efforts

NASA’s future facility disposition decisions could be affected by

environmental cleanup costs. Therefore, information about the extent and

type of contamination, the cost of its cleanup, and the party who is

financially responsible are relevant to such decisions. However, NASA

officials do not yet fully know what the cleanup requirements will be and

lack a policy for identifying other responsible parties and sharing cleanup

costs.

Currently, NASA officials are still working to identify all the challenges they

face as a result of environmental contamination. NASA’s 1996 site inventory

identified over 900 potentially contaminated sites, about half of which may

require cleanup. At this time, according to NASA records, only 72 sites are

classified as closed and, of these, only 15 required cleanup. Most sites are

still in the early stages of the cleanup process, with almost 400 still being

studied to determine the type and extent of contamination.17

NASA headquarters used selected portions of a DOD model to develop a

preliminary cost estimate of $1.5 billion for cleaning up potentially

contaminated sites over a 20-year period. Subsequently, NASA’s field

17NASA officials at some of the NASA field centers we reviewed said they may not finish assessing the

type and extent of contamination until 1998 or 1999.

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centers, in response to our request, developed cost estimates totaling

$636 million.18 This estimate excludes some sites that have not been

studied and is a projection of cleanup cost for only the next 8 years or less.

Although NASA field centers have not developed cleanup cost estimates for

disposing of property in the future, officials at several centers believed the

cost could be as much as two to five times higher than if NASA were to

retain the property. The higher cost would occur if NASA cleaned up

facilities to meet more stringent standards that might be required for

disposal.

Sharing cleanup costs with others could help NASA reduce its

environmental cleanup costs. Environmental law holds owners, operators,

and other responsible parties liable for correcting past environmental

contamination. However, NASA has no policy on pursuing other responsible

parties. It currently pays the cleanup costs for virtually all of its centers

and other field locations, regardless of who was responsible for causing or

contributing to the contamination. Although NASA has identified other

responsible federal agencies, it has not generally tried to identify

potentially responsible contractors or previous owners and pursue

cost-sharing agreements with them.

An ongoing facility reduction effort where cost sharing may be an issue

involves land at NASA’s Industrial Plant in Downey, California. The city

wants to acquire 166 acres of this property: 68 acres NASA has identified as

excess to its needs and 98 acres it has identified as potentially excess. The

city plans to use the land for economic development projects. An

assessment of environmental contamination determined that 16 of the

excess acres were free of contamination. Studies of the remaining excess

acreage are underway. The eventual disposition of the remaining 98 acres

of NASA-owned land is still unclear, and studies of their contamination

status are still in the early stages.

Before NASA took over the Downey facility, it was a DOD facility operated

by the predecessor organization of the contractor currently operating the

facility for NASA. NASA will have to decide which potentially responsible

parties it will pursue in supporting any corrective actions that may be

needed to meet applicable cleanup standards. However, NASA’s Johnson

Space Center, which manages the Downey facility, has not yet begun to

deal with the potential cost-sharing issue and, as noted above, there is no

NASA-wide policy providing guidance on this issue. In commenting on a

18These estimates excluded NASA’s potential share of the estimated $1-billion cleanup costs at

locations owned and operated by NASA contractors.

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draft of this report, NASA stated it intends to complete a policy statement

by the end of 1996 to address the issue of potential responsible parties at

NASA facilities requiring environmental remediation.

Efforts to Lower

Support Costs

Underway, but Little

Progress Made in

Sharing Facilities With

DOD

Among NASA’s initiatives to reduce its infrastructure are efforts to lower

the field centers’ operations support costs. NASA spends over $1 billion

annually to support maintenance and operations at field centers. Among

the actions NASA is taking to reduce this cost is consolidating its payroll

functions at one center to cut payroll-related civil service and contractor

staffing by about 50 percent. It is also implementing a variety of initiatives

to share resources and standardize processes at its principal aeronautics

centers—Ames, Langley, Lewis, and Dryden. NASA estimates that this

effort—known as Project Reliance—will reduce agency costs by about

$36 million by fiscal year 2000.19

In June 1995, NASA expanded the scope of its cost-reduction search outside

the agency; it teamed with DOD to study how the two agencies could

significantly reduce their operations costs and increase mission

effectiveness and efficiency through increased cooperation and sharing.

Study teams, referred to as integrated product teams,20 began work in

September 1995 in seven areas. We monitored three teams: major

facilities, space launch activities, and base/center support and services.

The objectives of the major facilities and space launch activities teams

included assessing facilities’ utilization and recommending potential

consolidations and closures. The major facilities team was responsible for

(1) developing recommendations on test and evaluation and research

facilities with unnecessary overlap or redundancy and (2) identifying and

providing the rationale for consolidations, realignments, and reductions

for specific facilities. The space launch activities team focused on

increasing cooperation in its area, including range and launch facilities and

infrastructure. Neither team recommended specific consolidations or

closures or identified cost reductions in their final briefings to the

Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board.21 Both teams did,

however, identify barriers to increased cooperation and coordination

19We did not review the payroll consolidation or the Project Reliance initiatives.

20Studies and activities related to NASA’s facilities infrastructure, including NASA-DOD integrated

product teams, are discussed in appendix II.

21The Board is a joint NASA-DOD organization for coordinating aeronautics and space activities of

mutual interest to the two agencies, including potential duplication of facilities.

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between NASA and DOD,

22 including differences in cost accounting systems,

practices, and standards.

More importantly, NASA and DOD officials noted a more general limitation:

the “old paradigm”—that is, each NASA and DOD program protects its ability

to maintain its own technical expertise and competence. The overcapacity situation in large rocket test facilities helps to illustrate this.

Several years ago, the National Facilities Study concluded that there was

excess large rocket test capacity and some facilities could be closed, but

DOD and NASA officials involved in the study said no direction or funding

was subsequently made available to pursue this recommendation. More

recently, the major facilities team found that NASA and DOD each have

excess large rocket test capacity based on both current and projected

workloads. However, the team made no recommendation to consolidate

facilities because comparable facilities’ cost data was not available. The

team did recommend that a facility agreement in the area of rocket

propulsion testing be established to identify areas where capability

reductions and greater reliance between NASA and DOD would be possible

in the future.

While the issue of large rocket test capacity remains unresolved, some

rocket test facilities are currently undergoing or being considered for

modification. A rocket test complex at Edwards Air Force Base is being

upgraded by DOD at an estimated cost of $15 million to $17 million. In

addition, NASA plans to upgrade one of its rocket engine test facilities at

Stennis Space Center for about $45 million. DOD and NASA officials believe

that their respective upgrades are cost-effective, although they agreed that

the agencies need to improve coordination to prevent further excess

capacity. NASA believes that the rocket test facilities at Stennis and

Edwards Air Force Base are not comparable. However, the National

Facilities Study and the major facilities integrated product team raised the

overall excess capacity issue, and it has not yet been resolved.

Independent actions by DOD and NASA to upgrade their individual facilities

potentially exacerbate the problem of overall excess capacity.

NASA and DOD officials acknowledged that recommending sharing and

increasing reliance on each other, including consolidating or closing

facilities, was difficult. These officials pointed out that, in many cases,

22Even within DOD, past efforts to share support services have produced limited results. We recently

reported that many studies identifying potential cost reductions and efficiencies through interservice

cooperation were ignored because of parochial resistance to implementing them. See Military Bases:

Opportunities for Savings in Installation Support Costs Are Being Missed (GAO/NSIAD-96-108, Apr. 23,

1996).

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such actions are “too politically sensitive” or could result in near-term

costs increases, rather than cost reductions. They noted that an external,

independent process, similar to the one used by the Defense Base Closure

and Realignment Commission, may be needed to overcome the sensitivity

and cost issues.

The base/center support and services team, which was responsible for

recommending ways to increase cooperation in base/center support and

services, examined existing and potential cooperative arrangements at

eight NASA centers and one test facility collocated with or geographically

near DOD installations. The team reported finding over 500 existing support

arrangements and identified additional cooperative opportunities. The

team identified changes to activities at several NASA locations, including

having NASA’s Dryden Flight Research Center and the Air Force Flight Test

Center jointly use space and combine certain operations; constructing one

fuel facility for joint use by NASA’s Langley Research Center and Langley

Air Force Base; and sharing use of contracts and services.

Although the team expects such changes to lower the agencies’ costs by

millions of dollars, it cited specific barriers to accomplishing more. For

example, different negotiated wage rates for support service contractors

could be a barrier, since consolidations would likely require paying the

higher rate, thereby substantially or totally offsetting consolidation cost

reductions. In other cases, merging certain activities could complicate

existing procurements in small and disadvantaged business set-aside

programs. However, the team said that many more sharing arrangements

are possible and should be included in follow-on studies. In developing the

follow-on process, this team recommended and then provided guidance on

designating lead offices, establishing and updating metrics and milestones,

and sharing information.

NASA and DOD officials indicated that the work started by the integrated

product teams would continue. A joint DOD-NASA report, which could be

released later this month, will recommend that six alliances be established

to continue the work initiated by the major facilities team,23 according to a

NASA official. Only two of the alliances have been organized. The official

also stated that four panels of the Aeronautics and Astronautics

Coordinating Board are to be established to oversee the follow-on

activities. However, three of the panels have been delayed due to

personnel reorganizations affecting both DOD and NASA, and it is uncertain

23The NASA-DOD alliance teams will have the authority to shape the integration and investment

strategies for six types of facilities: wind tunnels and air-breathing propulsion, rocket propulsion,

space environment, hypervelocity ballistic range/impact, and arc heated facilities.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
B-272591 

when they will be initiated, according to the NASA official. The only panel

to be established to date is the Aeronautics Panel, which met in July 1996.

The details of the follow-on processes for continuing the work of the

integrated product teams have not yet been fully developed. One measure

of the relevance and success of these processes will be how they handle

an issue such as overcapacity in large rocket test facilities. In commenting

on a draft of this report, NASA said that the NASA-DOD National Rocket

Propulsion Test Alliance will strive for joint management of facilities so

they can be brought on or offline and investments controlled for maximum

benefit. NASA also said this alliance “will examine indepth the current and

future projected workloads to achieve proper asset management and

utilization of rocket test facilities.”

NASA Faces

Uncertainty in

Achieving Further

Workforce Reductions

We recently reported24 that NASA does not yet have fully developed plans to

reduce its personnel level by about 4,000 full-time equivalent employees to

meet its overall goal of decreasing the size of its workforce to about 17,500

by fiscal year 2000. Also, it may not be able to do so without involuntarily

separating employees. NASA projections show that voluntary attrition

should meet the downsizing goal through fiscal year 1998, but will not

provide sufficient losses by fiscal year 1999. Thus, NASA intends to start

planning a reduction-in-force during fiscal year 1998, if enough NASA

employees do not retire or resign voluntarily.

NASA’s ability to reach its workforce reduction goal by the turn of the

century is subject to major uncertainties, including the shifting of program

management from headquarters to field centers and the award of a single

prime contract for managing the space shuttle at Kennedy Space Center.

We proposed that, in view of these uncertainties, Congress may wish to

consider requiring NASA to submit a workforce restructuring plan for

achieving its fiscal year 2000 personnel reduction goal. NASA estimates that

civil service personnel reductions will save about $880 million from fiscal

year 1996 through fiscal year 2000.

24NASA Personnel: Challenges to Achieving Workforce Reductions (GAO/NSIAD-96-176, Aug. 2, 1996).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
B-272591 

Conclusions and

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

NASA faces barriers to accomplishing additional consolidations and

closures that it may not be able to overcome on its own. Closing facilities,

relocating activities, and consolidating operations in fewer locations with

fewer employees is not easy because of concerns about the effects of such

actions on missions, personnel, and local communities. NASA and DOD

officials have suggested that a process similar to the one used by the

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission may ultimately be

needed to adequately deal with the political sensitivity and cost issues that

inevitably accompany consolidation and closure decisions. Given NASA’s

limited progress to date, further opportunities to reduce infrastructure,

and the agency’s lack of control over some barriers to further reductions,

Congress may wish to adopt the idea of having such a process if NASA’s

efforts fail to show significant progress in the near future in consolidating

and closing facilities.

To help determine the need for an independent process to facilitate

closures and consolidations of NASA facilities, Congress may wish to

consider requiring NASA to submit a plan outlining how it intends to meet

its goals for a reduced infrastructure through fiscal year 2000. Such a plan

should include estimated cost reductions resulting from specific facility

closures and consolidations.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, NASA stated that it is committed to

streamlining its workforce and supporting infrastructure and is continuing

to make fundamental changes in the way it operates. NASA specifically

noted that it intends to meet its fiscal and programmatic challenges

through efficiencies, restructuring, privatization, commercialization,

out-sourcing, and performance-based contracting. NASA commented on a

number of areas discussed in the report, and it provided us with some

additional or updated information and suggested changes to enhance the

clarity and technical accuracy of the draft. We have incorporated the

agency’s suggested changes in the final report where appropriate. NASA’s

comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III, along with our

final evaluation of them.

Our scope and methodology is discussed in appendix IV. Unless you

publicly announce this report’s contents, we plan no further distribution

until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to other

interested congressional committees, the Administrator of NASA, and the

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
B-272591 

Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will also provide

copies to others upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-4841, if you or your staff have any

questions concerning this report. Major contributors are listed in 

appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas J. Schulz

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Summary of the

National Aeronautics

and Space

Administration Field

Center Facilities

20

Appendix II 

Studies and Actions

Related to NASA

Facilities

Infrastructure

21

Appendix III 

Comments From the

National Aeronautics

and Space

Administration

24

Appendix IV 

Scope and

Methodology

31

Appendix V 

Major Contributors to

This Report

33

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix I 

Summary of the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration Field Center Facilities

Dollars in thousands

Center Acres

Number of

buildings

Net usable

square feet

(thousands)

Number of

trailers

Total current

replacement value

Kennedy Space Center 82,943 619 7,796 172 $3,585,612

Marshall Space Flight Center 1,242 246 6,186 55 2,197,076

Langley Research Center 788 233 2,748 131 2,113,208

Ames Research Center 3,411 355 2,169 88 2,065,116

Lewis Research Center 6,805 262 2,474 3 1,990,783

Johnson Space Center 3,570 332 5,320 3 1,559,158

Goddard Space Flight Center 10,105 402 3,112 24 1,316,201

Stennis Space Center 20,663 125 1,414 29 1,277,093

Jet Propulsion Laboratory 156 279 1,678 71 760,198

Dryden Flight Research Center a 80 654 44 168,049

Total 129,683 2,933 33,551 620 $17,032,494

Sources: GAO compilation of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) data as of

September 30, 1995. Excludes Yellow Creek Facility, Iuka, Mississippi, which was transferred to

the State of Mississippi in February 1996.

aDryden Flight Research Center is located on Edwards Air Force Base, California.

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix II 

Studies and Actions Related to NASA

Facilities Infrastructure

The Advisory Committee

on the Future of the U.S.

Space Program (Known as

the Augustine Committee)

The study’s purpose was to advise the NASA Administrator on the

approaches the agency’s management could use to implement the U.S.

space program in the coming decades. Of the 15 recommendations made, 2

related indirectly to facilities infrastructure. The study was completed in

December 1990.

Roles and Missions Study At the direction of the NASA Administrator, the agency’s Deputy

Administrator reviewed NASA’s roles and missions and suggested ways to

implement the Augustine Committee’s recommendations. The

recommendations focused on NASA field centers’ missions and project

management approaches. Of the 33 recommendations, 9 were related

indirectly to facilities infrastructure. The study was completed in

November 1991.

Response to Roles and

Missions Study

With some modification, the NASA Administrator approved all

recommendations from the Roles and Missions Study and called for

implementation plans from the center directors and headquarters program

offices. The recommendations were approved in December 1991.

National Performance

Review

This federal governmentwide review examined cabinet-level departments

and 10 agencies, including NASA. One of the 19 recommendations that

focused on NASA was directly related to facilities. The review was

completed in September 1993.

Implementation of Roles

and Missions

Recommendations

This document was issued in January 1994 by the Associate Administrator

for Space Flight in response to the Administrator’s December 1991 call for

implementation plans and the current Administrator’s renewed emphasis

on roles and missions. It identified a number of recommendations to

implement the roles and missions recommendations and assigned

follow-up responsibilities. Of 38 recommendations, 15 related to specific

facilities.

National Facilities Study The study was initiated in 1992 by the NASA Administrator to develop a

comprehensive long-range plan to ensure that research, development, and

operational facilities were world-class and to avoid duplication of

facilities. The study group was composed of representatives from NASA; the

Departments of Defense (DOD), Transportation, Energy, and Commerce;

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix II 

Studies and Actions Related to NASA

Facilities Infrastructure

and the National Science Foundation. Almost 200 recommendations were

made, including 68 specifically related to NASA facilities. The study was

completed in April 1994.

National Research Council

Review of the National

Facilities Study (Space

Facilities)

Contracted by NASA and DOD, the National Research Council reviewed the

findings in the National Facilities Study to evaluate the requirements

presented in the national facilities plan for space and research and

development operations. The Board made 11 recommendations, 4 of

which related to facilities in general. None of the recommendations related

to specific facilities. The review was completed in 1994.

National Research Council

Review of the National

Facilities Study

(Aeronautical Facilities)

The Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board conducted this review at

NASA’s request. The study’s purpose was to independently examine

projected requirements for, and approaches to, the provision of needed

aeronautical ground test facilities. The Board made 13 recommendations;

2 related to specific NASA facilities. The review was completed in 1994.

Federal Laboratory Review Conducted under the auspices of the NASA Advisory Council, this study

was tasked to evaluate and develop recommendations for improving the

efficiency and effectiveness of the federal research and development

investment in the NASA laboratory system. The review was also to consider

possibilities for restructuring, consolidating, closing, or reassigning

facilities. The Laboratory Review made 74 recommendations and 3

suggestions related to specific facilities. The review was completed in

February 1995.

NASA White Paper The White Paper, formally titled A Budget Reduction Strategy, was

intended as a starting point for discussions on a proposed realignment of

center roles and missions and reinvention in a constrained budget

environment. The paper made about 40 recommendations total; 15 were

related to facilities. The paper was issued February 1995.

Zero Base Review This review was a NASA-wide effort to allocate reductions in the fiscal year

1996 President’s budget, set center role assignments, provide suitable

guidance for the fiscal year 1997 budget, and change the way NASA

conducted business. About 50 recommendations were made, of which 2

applied to specific facilities. The review was completed in June 1995.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix II 

Studies and Actions Related to NASA

Facilities Infrastructure

NASA-DOD Integrated

Product Teams

NASA teamed with DOD to study how the two agencies could significantly

reduce their investment and operations costs and increase mission

effectiveness and efficiency through increased cooperation at all

organizational levels. Study teams, referred to as integrated product teams,

began work in September 1995 in seven areas. Each team addressed

facilities, as appropriate, in its assigned functional area. Teams reported

their recommendation to the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating

Board in April 1996. Additional information on this effort is presented in

the body of this report.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix III 

Comments From the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix III 

Comments From the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration

Now on p. 3.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 4.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 5.

See comment 2.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix III 

Comments From the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration

Now on p. 6.

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 9.

See comment 1.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix III 

Comments From the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration

Now on p. 10.

See comment 3.

Now on p. 11.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 12.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 11.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 12.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix III 

Comments From the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration

See comment 1.

See comment 4.

Now on p. 15.

See comment 5.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix III 

Comments From the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration

Now on p. 20.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 23.

See comment 1.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix III 

Comments From the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration

The following are GAO’s comments on NASA’s letter dated September 6,

1996.

GAO Comments 1. The language of the report was modified where appropriate.

2. NASA provided information on activities and initiatives that occurred

after the issuance of our report on Telecommunications Network: NASA

Could Better Manage Its Planned Consolidation (GAO/AIMD-96-33, Apr. 9,

1996).

3. Our description of the current situation at Downey is in the context of a

potential, not a known, cost-sharing issue.

4. NASA provided information on two rocket propulsion test facilities and

stated that they are not comparable. However, we made no comparison of

these facilities. We merely pointed out that, while the issue of potential

excess in large rocket engine test capacity remains unresolved, efforts are

underway or planned to upgrade such facilities. As noted in the report,

such independent actions potentially worsen the problem. The

overcapacity issue could benefit from a thorough, governmentwide

assessment.

5. The report discusses the possible future need for a process similar to

the one used by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

Such a process could be applied to individual facilities, groups of facilities,

or entire agencies. There is no reason to believe that the process would be

appropriate only for DOD or for numerous locations.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix IV 

Scope and Methodology

We reviewed the value of NASA’s facilities and its budgets and staffing;

facility reduction plans; real property reports; utilization data and reports;

studies, including the National Facilities Study and the NASA Federal

Laboratory Review; environmental law, policies, and procedures; and

reports by the NASA Inspector General.

We interviewed officials at NASA field centers and in the Offices of

Management Systems and Facilities, Headquarters Operations, Space

Flight, Space Communications, Human Resources and Education,

Environmental Management Division, and Inspector General at NASA

headquarters. To discuss NASA-DOD coordination efforts, we interviewed

NASA and DOD officials. We also spoke with officials from Rockwell

International, Space Systems Division, about plans for the NASA Industrial

Plant, Downey, California. We obtained information from all NASA field

centers, including information on the value and utilization of facilities,

plans for closing facilities and estimated savings through fiscal year 2000,

facilities project budgets, and cleanup and cost-sharing activities. We also

spoke with officials from other federal agencies, including the General

Services Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency.

We obtained electronic versions of NASA’s real property and major facility

inventory databases and NASA’s potentially contaminated site inventory

database, but did not independently verify the reliability of the data in the

databases. Because the National Facilities Study included aircraft in its

work, we included them in our review.

We conducted our audit work at

• NASA headquarters, Washington, D.C.;

• Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California;

• Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland;

• Wallops Flight Facility, Wallops Island, Virginia;

• Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California;

• Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas;

• NASA Industrial Plant, Downey, California;

• White Sands Test Facility, Las Cruces, New Mexico;

• John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida;

• Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia;

• Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio;

• Plum Brook Station, Sandusky, Ohio;

• George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama;

• Michoud Assembly Facility, New Orleans, Louisiana;

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix IV 

Scope and Methodology

• Santa Susana Field Laboratory, California;

• John C. Stennis Space Center, Mississippi;

• Phillips Laboratory, Edwards Air Force Base, California; and

• Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.

We conducted our work from June 1995 through August 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
Appendix V 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Uldis Adamsons

Frank Degnan

Raymond H. Denmark, Jr.

Sandra D. Gove

William E. Petrick, Jr.

Atlanta Field Office Lee Edwards

Dayna Foster

John T. Gilchrist

Reginia S. Grider

Los Angeles Field

Office

Jeffery N. Webster

Dale M. Yuge

Norfolk Field Office Johnnie Phillips

Edwin J. Soniat

Accounting and

Information

Management Division,

Washington, D.C.

John A. de Ferrari

Galen L. Goss

Elizabeth L. Johnston

Denver Field Office Jamelyn A. Smith

(709173), (709174), (709143) Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-96-187 NASA Infrastructure
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