THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

by

DAVID J. DEAN

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Airpower Research Institute

Air University

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532

October 1986
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Dean, David J.

The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict.

At head of title: Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and

Education.

"October 1986."

Includes bibliographies and index.

1 . Air warfare. 2. Low-intensity conflicts. 3. Aeronautics, MilitaryMorocco-History. 4. Morocco-History-20th century. 5. Military

assistance, American-Morocco. I . Air University (U .S .) . Center for

Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education. II . Title.

UG630.133 8 1986 358.4'14 86-17498

ISBN 1-58566-014-0

First Printing October 1986

Second Printing April 1992

Third Printing March 1999

Fourth Printing June 2001

DISCLAIMER

This study represents the views ofthe author and does not necessarily reflect the official

opinion of the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education

(CADRE) or the Department of the Air Force. This publication has been reviewed by

security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

US Government Printing Office

Washington DC 20402
Chapter

CONTENTS

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

1 LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: WHATIS IT AND WHY

SHOULD IT CONCERN THE USAF? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Low-Intensity Conflict Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Special Characteristics of Low-Intensity Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Operational Terms Relating to Low-Intensity Conflict . . . . . . . 8

Future Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Dealing with Future Conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

2 AIR POWER IN SMALL WARS : THE BRITISH AIR

CONTROL EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Air Control's Genesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Air Control : From Concept to Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

The Requirements of British Air Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Air Control and Today's US Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chapter Page

3 THE MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR: ACASE STUDY OF

AMODERN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Resources and Topography of Western Sahara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Moroccan Claims and Stakes in Western Sahara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

The Polisario Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Mauritania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

The United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Peripheral Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

The War's Importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Evolution of the War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

4 THE ROYAL MOROCCAN AIR FORCE AND UNITED

STATES' ASSISTANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

The Royal Moroccan Air Force in Moroccan Politics . . . . . . . . . 55

Building Up the Royal Moroccan Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

The Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Limitations of the RMAF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

United States Assistance to the Royal Moroccan Air Force . . 65

Meeting the SA-6 Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

5 MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR LOW-INTENSITY

CONFLICTS: LESSONS FROM MOROCCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Imprecise US Policies and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Basic Requirements for Assisting a Third World Air Force . . 76

Levels of Potential Air Force Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83
6 EARLY LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT EFFORTS BYTHE

USAF: THE SPECIAL AIR WARFARE CENTER . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Foundation of Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict . . . . . . 85

In Search of an Air Force Role in Small Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Creation of Jungle Jim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

The Special Air Warfare Center: Its Origin, Expansion,

and Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

A Time of Organizational Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Vietnam Devours Special Air Warfare Center Assets . . . . . . . . . 98

Lessons from the Special Air Warfare Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

7 A PLAN FOR USAF PARTICIPATION IN LOW-INTENSITY

CONFLICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Committing the Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Doctrine and Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

A Special Air Warfare Center for Today's World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Looking Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

1 Sarkesian's Conflict Spectrum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2 US Army Definition of Low-Intensity Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

3 Conflict Spectrum Defined in Terms of US Military

Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

4 North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

5 F-15-US Supplied Fighter of the Royal Moroccan Air Force . . 43

6 A Portion of the Ceinture Near Bu-Craa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

7 A Portion of the Ceinture Near Bu-Craa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

8 Close-ups of Defensive Positions Along Ceinture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

9 Close-ups of Defensive Positions Along Ceinture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

10 Reference Map: Saharan War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

11 Pilot Production in 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

12 Pilot Production in 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

13 Organizational Chart-Special Air Warfare Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

14 Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
15 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

16 A-37 Low-Level Attack Fighter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

17 C-7A Caribou Short Takeoff and Landing Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

18 C-128 Provider Attack Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

19 OV-10 Light-Armed Reconnaissance and Attack Aircraft . . . . . . 123

20 Hierarchy of War Fighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
FOREWORD

In the last few decades, the third world countries of Africa, Asia, the Middle

East, and the Pacific Basin have become increasingly important in world affairs .

Because the third world is a major source of many natural resources vital to the

industries of the United States and its allies and because many third world

countries occupy critical geostrategic points around the globe, it is the object of

intense competition for political, economic, and military influence between the

West and the Soviet bloc . This struggle for influence accompanies widespread

economic depression and seemingly perpetual political instability, conditions

which make the third world a ripe target for conflictinternal revolution, proxy

wars between East and West, or even direct intervention by or conflict between

the superpowers.

These conflicts have taken the form of guerrilla wars (national wars of

revolution or even counterrevolution), direct intervention (Grenada, the

Dominican Republic, Afganistan, Chad, and Vietnam), and military assistance

and advisory activities (El Salvador, Angola, Nicaragua, and Morocco). In

recent years military and political thinkers have seen these examples of

political-military conflict as presenting a new category of conflict that is not

adequately addressed in current US military doctrine, strategy, and planning.

Because of the high probability of involvement in third world conflicts in the

near future, the US military must devote a much larger share of its resources to

adapting its organization, doctrine, strategy, and planning to meet the flexibility

and innovation that low-intensity conflict missions will demand .

Colonel Dean's study makes a significant contribution to the growing body of

literature on low-intensity conflict. He offers many insights to the challenges that

low-intensity conflict presents to the Air Force. His proposal to reestablish the

Special Air Warfare Center deserves serious thought and study .

DONALD D . STEVENS

Colonel, USAF

Commander

Center for Aerospace Doctrine,

Research, and Education

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lt Col David J. Dean is an action officer in the Plans and Policy Directorate,

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A graduate of the Georgetown

University School of Foreign Service (BSFS) and Florida State University (MA),

Lieutenant Colonel Dean has served in maintenance, intelligence, and

international politico-military affairs assignments during his Air Force career.

PREFACE

This book grew from an opportunity to study a third world air force fighting an

externally supported insurgency. The players were the Royal Moroccan Air

Force and the Polisario, the latter trying to wrest control of the Western Sahara

from the Kingdom of Morocco . The United States has also been a player in the

Morocco-Polisario war as the source of much of Morocco's war material,

especially the weapons used by the Royal Moroccan Air Force. Help from the

United States was especially important when the Polisario deployed Soviet-built

SA-6 surface-to-air missiles to counter the growing effectiveness of the Royal

Moroccan Air Force. For many reasons, the United States and the US Air Force

were not able to assist the Moroccans effectively .

The Morocco-Polisario-US scenario that provides the basis for this study was a

tiny aspect of US foreign and military policy in the early 1980s. But it shows a

political-military problem that deserves a good deal of thought now . That

problem simply stated is : How is the United States going to exert politicalmilitary influence in the third world during the next twenty years? Clearly,

overall US influence in the third world will be a combination of political,

military, economic, and social activity . But the military, in many cases, will be

the most visible form of assistance, and one upon which the recipient nation will

depend for immediate results. Are the military components as instruments of

national policy able to act effectively in the third world? If not, what needs to be

done?

The US Air Force (and the other services) needs to consider the question of

effective assistance to third world countries as part of a basic shift in strategic

thinking . Our primary strategic planning effort has been to insert large numbers

of US ground and air forces into an area such as the Persian Gulf to accomplish

our policy objectives . That planning effort must continue, but with the

understanding that inserting a major US force in any third world region is

extremely unlikely, both for domestic political reasons and because potential

host nations are reluctant to support large US forces. Our primary strategic focus
for planning needs to shift to providing effective leverage for third world friends

and allies . That leverage can be in the form of arms sales, training, doctrine, or

even small specialized forces. But providing leverage depends on effective

planning that builds the data .base which allows us to pinpoint the host country's

needs and capabilities . Developing that kind of expertise in the USAF, and in the

other services, will be a difficult and frustrating long-term proposition. The Air

Force must recognize the need for a change and must act upon it . Planning to

exert effective political-military influence in the third world may not be a

glamorous task, but it will be the name of the game for the next twenty years and

beyond. This book offers some ideas in that regard.

DAVID J . DEAN

Lt Col, USAF
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Col Ken Alnwick, USAF, is the godfather of this book. It was he who led the

Air University expedition to Morocco to study the role of the Royal Moroccan

Air Force in the Morocco-Polisario conflict and who picked me to be the

"Morocco expert" for the trip . Colonel Alnwick also introduced me to the

mysteries of small wars and low-intensity conflict . Those who have helped me

understand the difficulties of military organizations coping with unfamiliar ways

of war are too numerous to mention. But the first to push me into questioning

conventional wisdom and traditional approaches to analyzing problems deserves

my special thanks-the late Professor Carroll Quigley of Georgetown

University . Finally, Mr Tom Lobenstein of the Air University Center for

_ Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, an editor par excellence,

deserves great credit for his manful struggle to make this book coherent .

CHAPTER I

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: WHAT IS IT AND

WHYSHOULD IT CONCERN THE USAF?

I believe that the low intensity conflict is the most important strategic issue facing the US . If

we don't learn to deal with it, we risk being isolated in an increasingly competitive

world. . . . t

What is low-intensity conflict? Why is General Nutting so concerned about it?

Is it counterinsurgent warfare, that form of conflict which the United States

failed to master and win in Southeast Asia? Is low-intensity conflict something

we should avoid lest the Vietnam-related social, political, and military

upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s be relived in the 1980s and 1990s? Or in the

years ahead, will the world be such that the United States must prepare for a form

of conflict that is not pristinely dualistic-good confronting evil, with clear-cut,

"vital" national interests or national survival at stake? To answer these

questions we must begin by attempting to understand the concept of lowintensity conflict and the kinds of military, paramilitary, political, and economic

activity it encompasses .

Low-Intensity Conflict Defined

General Wallace H. Nutting, USA

Professor Sam Sarkesian of the Loyola University of Chicago has done more

than anyone to try to establish a meaningful definition of low-intensity conflict.

Getting agreement on what exactly is meant by low-intensity conflict proved to

be the toughest issue faced by participants at a 1979 workshop at Loyola. The

best they could do was to adopt a working definition .
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Low-intensity conflict . . . refers to the range of activities and operations on the lower end of

the conflict spectrum involving the use of military or a variety of semi-military forces (both

combat and noncombat) on the part of the intervening power to influence and compel the

adversary to accept a political-military condition. 2

This definition presupposes an area within a conflict spectrum and an intervening

power seeking to impose its will in a given situation . Sarkesian depicts a

spectrum of conflict (fig . 1) ranging between noncombatant force employment

and today's ultimate form of conflict, strategic nuclear war.' Sarkesian is not

clear as to when a low-intensity conflict graduates to a mid- or high-intensity

one. Presumably a break point between wars of lower and higher intensity

would occur in a Vietnam-type conflict when the intervening power made the

decision to commit division-sized ground force units and wing-sized air force

units . At such a point, a conflict would no longer be defined as low-intensity

because major national resources are being committed to the conflict.

Sarkesian's conflict spectrum identifies three levels of US participation in

guerrilla warfare. During the first phase, Guerrilla I, US forces would be

involved in a purely advisory role; military advisory teams would work with a

host country to establish a useful level of proficiency in handling weapons

applicable to the type of conflict being experienced. At this level of conflict the

United States might also provide training in tactics and doctrine . When US

forces begin serving as cadre or "stiffeners" for local forces, then the level of

conflict would clearly move into the Guerrilla II level of involvement. At this

stage, special operations forces from any or all US services could work with

specific host country units as they developed and executed operations in the

field . The highest stage of US involvement in guerrilla war, Guerrilla III, would

see integration of complete US combat units with indigenous forces .

Presumably, this level of activity would be the highest in which the United States

could become involved without a declaration of war. Thus, Sarkesian defines

low-intensity conflict as a range along the conflict spectrum where a variety of

military and paramilitary activities take place to achieve limited political

goals-usually to assist a threatened friend.

In contrast, the US Army defines low-intensity conflict differently and in

terms that emphasize operational rather than theoretical uses of force . The Army

recognizes two levels of low-intensity conflict: Type A and Type B . Type A

requires assistance operations by US combat forces to "establish, regain, or

maintain control of specific land areas threatened by guerrilla warfare,

revolution, subversion, or other tactics aimed at internal seizure of power."

Type B conflicts require "US advice, combat support, and combat service

support fQr indigenous or allied forces facing the same kind of threat described in

Type A conflicts ." In the Army's definition of mid- and high-intensity conflicts,

a state of war between nations would exist . The difference between mid- and

high-intensity conflicts is the nature of the objectives involved, the level of force

that may be applied, and the size of the geographic area that might be involved.

2
Intensity

Low High

Guerrilla I : Weapons Assistance Teams - Police Training - Advisory.

Teams.

Guerrilla II : Special Forces Teams - Cadre for Indigenous Forces

(Continuation of Guerrilla I)

Guerrilla III : Integration of US Combat Units with Indigenous Forces

(Continuation of Guerrilla I and 10 .

All Guerrilla classifications include requisite economic assistance.

Figure 1 . Sarkesian's Conflict Spectrum.

Employment

of force Surgical Guerrilla Guerrilla Guerrilla

***

Vietnam Limited

Conventional

General

Conventional Nuclear

(non - Operations I * II ** III Type

War - War

War

combat)
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

The Army considers a worst case insurgency situation such as Vietnam as one

where a higher classification than low-intensity conflict may apply . 4 Figure 2

illustrates the Army's definition of the various levels of conflict.

Both Sarkesian's and the Army's definitions of low-intensity conflict are

useful . Sarkesian looks at the issue from the standpoint of a US decision maker

who needs to make policy decisions on what is to be done to help a threatened

friend . The Army's approach is a more prosaic one that makes a fundamental

distinction between two responses to low-intensity conflict: Will Army forces be

assigned to help a country by fighting or by advising? The Army thus limits

low-intensity conflict to involvement of the United States in a country requiring

assistance ; the Army's definition does not include the related ideas of US

participation in peacekeeping duties, shows of force, or unilateral US

intervention in a second country.

For the purposes of this paper, a fairly broad range of activity will be

considered as low-intensity conflict . Our definition will lean more to Sarkesian

than to the Army. Figure 3 shows the kinds of activities US forces may be asked

to accomplish in low-intensity conflict situations . As the chart suggests, the

Unites States should have forces designed to show resolve without engaging in

combat, to accomplish specialized operations such as the Son Tay raid, and to

assist friendly countries facing threats to their internal security by providing

advisory assistance, cadre, and, ultimately, US combat units that can be

integrated with those of the host nation. In addition, the United States should

have the ability to intervene unilaterally in other countries as the need arises .

Such intervention will be most likely in the third world. The primary purpose in

any such intervention would be to impose American will on a third world

situation . Although the notion of US intervention abroad, either unilaterally or in

concert with other forces, is not particularly popular in this country at this time,

and it is a capability our military needs to perfect, as proven in Grenada .

Counterterrorism is included in figure 3, although it is not included in the

definition of low-intensity conflict. Historically, terrorism has most often been

the approach taken by individuals or groups seeking to make a random political

statement or to commit an act of violence to support a vision of future

revolutionary change . Most often police forces rather than the military are in

charge of counterterrorist operations. However, terrorism could be part of an

insurgent group's repertoire of tactics and thus could be part of the problem faced

by US assistance forces-but not the primary problem for which the forces were

sent.

The more dangerous form of terrorism currently evolving in the Middle East is

state-sponsored terrorism, or terrorism that is an integral part of a strategy which

has both clear political objectives and the backing of sovereign states. Hence,

US forces that confront it will require special training and capabilities . As a

result of the bombing of the Marine barracks at the Beirut International Airport

on 23 October 1983, this country is devoting considerable attention to the
LOWEST

Figure 2. US Army Definition of Low-Intensity Conflict .

HIGHEST

LOW-INTENSITY B LOW-INTENSITY A SOUTHEAST ASIA TYPE MID-INTENSITY HIGH-INTENSITY

US advice, combat US combat forces Insurgency involving War between nations Unlimited war

support, combat supporting host nation several nations, out- with limited objectives, between nations.

service support d-matened by guerrilla side forces . limited force.

for host nations. warfare, revolution,

subversion
TERRORISM INTENSITY 

a

z

F

L

Figure 3 . Conflict Spectrum Defined in Terms of US Military Operations.

0

z

n

m

z

0

r

z

r

0

z

rM

z

0

z

Noncombat

Force

Employment

One-Time

Operations

Advisory

Assistance

Cadrefor

Host

Forces

ombat Uni

with Host

Forces

Unilateral

Intervention

Limited

Conventional

War

Unlimited

Conventional

War

Nuclear

War

-Joint -Son -Short -Longer -Battalion/ -Carrier f. LA

exercise Tay-type teen term squadron battle Rapid

-Show Show of raids military t

In geld

size

units

group Deployforce teams -Special

_

l

_

Z~i

ment

Joint

-Increased -No Operations Ord units Task

alert combat Force Force units

-Short employ- -Peace

keeping -Expedited term ment

foreign specific

-Combat military goal

art established sales

-Intelligence

-Logistics

foreign

military

sales
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

problems of counterterrorism . Nevertheless, this paper concentrates on a wider

concept-low-intensity conflict-and the special problems it presents, since that

form of conflict involves such a great range of challenges for the military, as

opposed to the very difficult but more focused challenges of counterterrorism .

Special Characteristics of Low-Intensity Conflict

Several characteristics of conflict make them "low-intensity" from the US

point of view . The issues that will be involved such a conflict will probably not

be "vital" US interests . Vital security interests can be defined in many ways .

The fundamental distinction between vital and other interests is that a nation will

go to war over the former but not the latter . In a low-intensity conflict, it is

conceivable that a vital interest could be at stake-perhaps access to oil or some

specific mineral . However, it would be much more likely that a low-intensity

conflict would not center on a vital interest, at least insofar as US involvement

was concerned . And although the US government might claim that a vital

interest is at stake, it would have difficulty convincing the American public and

its representatives in Congress that such a condition existed, thus making a

declaration of war by the United States impossible. For instance, recent activity

in El Salvador and the US involvement there clearly falls into the realm of lowintensity conflict. The United States government is trying to sell an increased

level of involvement to the nation on the basis that we are protecting a vital US

interest-keeping all of Latin America from succumbing to Soviet-inspired

revolutionary movements. US public opinion has a difficult time believing that

what is happening in El Salvador has any direct relevance to this country . It may

become necessary and even prudent to defend the notion that US military

involvement in small wars may be justified even if a vital US interest is not at

stake. The international perception that the United States can and will act

militarily in a whole range of ways, from assisting friends to actual intervention

to defend an important but not vital interest, is one this country may want to

foster in the years ahead.

Besides normally involving nonvital US interests, other characteristics of

low-intensity conflict distinguish it from the more familiar limited and strategic,

conflicts that consume so much of the military's attention and energy . A low-!

intensity conflict would likely be limited in geographic area, have few,

p

i

articipants, and be of limited duration; any US military operations'

contemplated would be accomplished by small, specialized units . The most

common type of low-intensity conflict would be a war of insurgency or a limited

;conventional conflict on a scale smaller than Vietnam. US forces would likely be

assisting friendly countries rather than managing the conflict unilaterally . Should;

a small war escalate to a level where larger US formations were involved (above`°

battalion or squadron size), the objectives and management of the conflict would
THE AIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

shift the level to the intervention level (fig . 3) and an expanded US effort to

control the war rather than merely assisting a friend would be expected .

By discussing low-intensity conflict in terms of operational responses and

limiting parameters (time, level of resources involved, geography, and related

variables), we have a foundation for a working definition of the term. That is,

low-intensity conflict is a wide range of political-military activity that aims to

accomplish limited political and military objectives without resorting to a

declaration of war or committing large-scale US forces (or nuclear weapons) to

the fray. The United States can participate in such conflicts in several ways :

using military forces in noncombat operations to show support, resolve, or

intent ; advising and assisting a host government; and intervening with

specialized combat forces . Thus in low-intensity conflicts US policymakers can

use military forces to accomplish political objectives without using massive

resources, and can do so at a controllable level of escalation . Most US military

responses to low-intensity conflict would be drawn from Department of Defense

special operations forces. Only when the stage of unilateral intervention had

been reached would general purpose forces be employed-and then the primary

forces (at this time) would be marine and naval air resources. The Strategic Air

Command's strategic projection force might come into play as well .

Operational Terms Relating to Low-Intensity Conflict

Two terms, special operations and special air warfare, are often used to

describe low-intensity warfare operations in the US Air Force . Both are

umbrella terms, as is low-intensity conflict itself . Special operations is defined in

the 1979 version of Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 (JCS Pub 1) simply as

"secondary or supporting operations which may be adjuncts to various other

operations and for which no one service is assigned primary responsibility . "5 A

recent draft of JCS Pub 20, volume 1, includes a new definition :

Special Operations (SO) is defined as operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and

organized Department of Defense forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of

national military, political, economic, or psychological objectives . These operations may be

conducted during periods of peace or hostilities . They may support conventional military

operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when the use of conventional forces is

either inappropriate or infeasible . Special operations may include unconventional warfare

(UW), counterterrorist operations, collective security (foreign internal defense [FID]),

psychological operations, direct action missions, and intelligent (strategic and tactical)

reporting. 6

Clearly, special operations are given a much wider area of operations under

the new definition . Especially noteworthy is the idea that special operations may

be independent of conventional operations and may include civil affairs
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

measures as well as collective security, a new term in the context of special

operations . Special operations apparently has replaced special air warfare, the

latter being an Air Force term referring to the air aspects of counterinsurgency,

unconventional warfare, and psychological operations . This change has two

effects : it gives all the US military services the same generic term for special

operations and it erodes the idea that air power can play an independent or

unique role in special operations. Moreover, this shift in terminology seems to

signify an Air Force realization that special air warfare was an outmoded

concept. (It was last defined in Air Force Manual [AFM] 2-5, Tactical Air

Operations/Special Air Warfare [1967], and does not appear in any more recent

manuals.)

Several specific types special operations of military have been subsumed

under the umbrella of special operations, and formerly under special air warfare .

For example, unconventional warfare is occasionally used interchangeably with

low-intensity conflict or special operations. It should not be. Unconventional

warfare traditionally concerns activities conducted within enemy-held

or -controlled territory . 7 Its major element is guerrilla warfare, which involves

military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held territory by

irregular, predominantly indigenous, forces . Escape and evasion, sabotage, and

other low-visibility operations comprise the other main aspects of

unconventional warfare .$

For another example, counterguerrilla activity in the past has been associated

with the term counterinsurgency, more familiarly known by the acronym COIN.

But because of negative connotations from Vietnam, counterinsurgency has

become a nonword in the lexicon of special operations forces. This development

represents a significant change, since in the the 1960s counterinsurgency was a

discipline separate from unconventional warfare and included all "military,

paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a

government to defeat subversive insurgency. "9 Today, by contrast,

counterinsurgency does not appear in the Army manual, Low-Intensity Conflict

(FM 100-20), or in the Air Force's Tactical Air Command Manual (TACM)

2-1, Tactical Air Operations, which presents the current doctrine for US Air

Force special operations forces. Moreover, the Army's new definitions of lowintensity conflict, cited earlier, cover counterinsurgency (without using the term)

by describing low-intensity conflict as operations to "establish, regain, or

maintain control of areas threatened by guerrilla warfare, revolution, subversion,

or other tactics aimed at internal seizure of power."'° Thus, an important

distinction between counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare is the area of

operations for each: in the former, forces are supporting the incumbent

government and are operating in territory they at least nominally hold, while in

the latter they operate to overthrow the incumbent government in enemy-held

territory .
THE AIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

An important aspect of counterinsurgency and other forms of low-intensity

conflict has been the ability of the United States to provide a threatened country

with appropriate arms, training, and advice . Then, in theory, the threatened

country could handle the threat without US combat forces . Collective security is

now being used to describe that kind of assistance effort .

The term collective security in the latest JCS definition of special operations

seems to be an acceptable substitute for the Vietnam-era term foreign internal

defense (FID) . The 1979 version of JCS Pub 1 defined foreign internal defense as

"participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the

action programs taken by another government to'free and protect its society from

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency ."" The Army continues to adhere to

this definition in its own statements of doctrine and strategy. 12 The Air Force,

however, defines foreign internal defense as "operations conducted on request

from a foreign government . . . to aid allied nations . . . attain an established

level of military self-reliance . FID is an extension of the Security Assistance

Program, which is often tied to foreign military sales or grant-in-aid

programs ."" The Army and JCS definitions encompass more than the Air Force

one and suggest nation-building programs by a wide variety of agencies. The Air

Force definition is more narrow and suggests an "air force building" mission in

a client country . It also tends to push this mission on to the security assistance

program, a Defense Department program that makes it difficult to pinpoint

foreign internal defense responsibility and expertise within the Air Force.

Assumed in both definitions, however, is the notion that US agencies and armed

services must be able to effectively transfer techniques, knowledge, and

concepts to the armed forces of other countries to improve their internal and

external capabilities .

The final term that invariably crops up when discussing special operations is

psychological operations. Most writing on low-intensity conflict includes

psychological operations as a discrete discipline, separate from

counterinsurgency or unconventional warfare or foreign internal defense .

Psychological operations are designed to influence friendly governments and

people to support US national objectives or to have a negative effect on the

enemy. Such actions can be passive or active and are designed to affect the

emotions, attitudes, and behavior of the target population . 14 Thus, psychological

operations should be considered part of every operation conducted along the

low-intensity conflict spectrum . Psychological warfare should not be considered

as a step along an escalatory process going from, for instance, a show of force to

military advisors to intervention . Rather, it is a capability and a resource that

must be exploited in any military operation. Therefore, it is not included as a

separate entity in figure 3, which shows the kinds of potential US operations

involved in low-intensity conflicts .
Future Conflicts

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Thus, as the above discussion shows,, low-intensity conflict remains a

somewhat nebulous concept. Since it may encompass a vast range of military

functions, we must ask: What are the most likely kinds of conflict the United

States will be involved in over the next 20 years or so?

It seems inescapable that conflict at the lower end of the conflict spectrum is

the most likely form of warfare over the next 20 years . Air Force 2000, one of

the many documents projecting the future of conflict, notes that low-level

conflict, which spans the political military spectrum from nonviolent political

unrest to intense civil war, will frequently threaten US interests . The potential

for low-level conflict will increase. ' 5 The reasons that make low-intensity

conflict, or small wars, the most likely form of conflict in the years ahead are

many.

The current and projected military balance between the United States and the

USSR and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact makes small wars more likely

than large ones . The strategic nuclear balance between the superpowers has

reached a balance-of-terror level . Both sides have enormous holdings of nuclear

warheads that can be delivered in many ways. Neither side truly comprehends

the effects of a large-scale nuclear strike in terms of achievable military goals.

Thus, the probability of successfully using nuclear arsenals to achieve policy

goals is uncertain enough to make their use unlikely . However, maintaining a

balance in comparative nuclear strength is necessary to ensure that neither side

could reduce this uncertainty to a level where initiating a nuclear attack could

become a realistic policy option .

To a lesser extent, the same sort of standoff exists in the Western European

and Korean theaters . These theaters could be flashpoints for a major nonnuclear

(or at least initially nonnuclear) war. Massive conventional forces, backed up by

the threat of nuclear escalation, face each other in the NATO-Warsaw Pact area.

This standoff has held for more than 30 years . The Soviets are facing powerful

centrifugal forces in their European empire that will occupy a good deal of their

resources and attention in the years ahead. Although these forces may encourage

increased Soviet repression in their empire that could increase tension between

Moscow and NATO, the balance of forces between the two alliances is such that

neither side could be assured of a quick or easy victory . Certainly the balance of

forces in Europe and the need to maintain credible deterrent forces to keep the

Warsaw Pact at bay in central Europe is a prime policy concern for the United

States. In recent years, the US military has expended vast resources in improving

NATO's war-fighting capability, and justifiably so since American and

European security, well-being, and cultural values are so closely interwined .
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

But, even though maintaining the standoff in Europe must be at the top of US

security concerns, the likelihood of a war erupting there is low . '6

The standoff in Korea, the other potential flashpoint where large US forces are

committed on site, is more fragile than the one in Europe but nonetheless quite

stable . South Korea's economy continues to grow rapidly while the North's

economy, strangled by defense commitments, continues to stagnate ." The

current military balance favors the North, but the South is making enormous

strides in weapon production capabilities and adopting advanced technologies

into its forces . These factors plus the continued presence of US ground, air, and

naval forces suggests that stability rather than war is the likely course of events

on that troubled peninsula for the next decade or two. The fly in the ointment of

that projection is the impossibility of forecasting the intentions of North Korea's

leader Kim 11-Sung .

Kim could well believe that because of his increasing age and the growing

relative strength of Seoul vis-a-vis Pyongyang he should make one last attempt to

unite the peninsula under his control . Possible political instability in Seoul,

brought on by the repressive tendencies of the current South Korean regime, may

provide an opportunity for Kim, although he was either unwilling or unable to

exploit such a situation when President Park Chung Hee was assassinated in

December 1979 . However, even assuming a strong North Korean desire to unite

the Koreans by force, the deterrence posed by the formidable South Korean

military, backed up by considerable US force, should make conflict in Korea

only slightly more likely than a NATO-Warsaw Pact war for the next 20 years.

The standoff situation that exists in Europe and Korea seems unlikely to

change significantly in the years ahead. US and allied forces have spent vast

resources on materials, strategic planning, and tactical readiness to ensure that

the standoff endures . The interests of both the United States and the USSR are

well served if conflicts that could threaten either country's vital national

interests, which theoretically could lead to a nuclear exchange, are avoided.

This being so, the area where the United States and USSR will likely be

competing in the future will be among the lesser-developed countries of the third

world, especially in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. The third world

will be an area of contention for the superpowers for many reasons . Economic

factors, however, tend to dominate any discussion as to why the third world is

and will be important to the United States . With the growing interdependence of

the world economies, greater volumes of raw materials and finished goods move

among nations than ever before." The stability of that flow strongly influences

US production programs, standards of living, and prices . Because disruptions

can have a direct impact on American and allied economies, the need to apply

force to maintain the flow may be required.

A related fact is that heavy industries are moving outside the industrialized

democracies . The United States and Western Europe may well be on their way

into a postindustrial revolution that will see increasing emphasis on high1 2
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

technology products and less on such traditional heavy industry as steel

production . In the last decade, more than 90 percent of new basic industrial

capacity such as steel and aluminum plants has been built outside the United

States ." Access to these new plants could eventually become as important to the

United States as was Japanese access to American scrap steel in 1940. The

United States may have to apply force to guarantee access to the materials

American industry needs and to ensure access to oil and strategic minerals as

well . Military force will certainly be part of any program designed to assure

access to resources abroad.

Economic issues and potential conflicts over access to resources and industrial

capacity must be considered in terms of the political realities in the third world.

The demands of population growth, rising expectations fueled by the explosion

in mass communications, and the difficulty of satisfying basic human needs is

already stretching the resources of many third world countries . Political

instability in many of these countries will be likely as governments fail to meet

the demands of their people; this instability could range between uncontrolled

migrations resulting from famines and violent internal attempts to change

governments. The Soviet Union and its proxies will likely be involved either as

instigators or supporters of revolutionary movements or, in the case of Soviet

proxies, as actual participants in such movements .

The weapons available to even small revolutionary groups, to third world

military organizations in general, and to Soviet proxy forces will make

participation by US forces or US client states especially difficult. Sophisticated

arms have been flowing to the third world from the United States, USSR, and

other arms producers for years. Even though most third world countries have not

developed the techniques and infrastructure to fully use the weapons they have

obtained, the mere presence in third world forces of quality aircraft, tanks,

artillery, and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) makes the potential destructive

capability very great. Highly capable SAMs are now available to even the

smallest insurgent organization and can be used to great effect in third world

conflicts .

Thus, it seems that a combination of factors will make low-intensity conflict a

very likely phenomenon in the years ahead . Preparing for a wide range of

conflict in the third world would be a prudent plan for the United States.

Dealing with Future Conflict

In a speech to the 1983 Air Force Long-Range Planning Conference,

Congressman Newt Gingrich, a distinguished scholar as well as a legislator,

spoke of four hierarchical layers of decision making and planning relating to

conflict." At the top of the hierarchy is vision, followed by strategy, operations,

and tactics . He suggested that military art is related to vision and strategy while

operations and tactics are oriented to military science. He further suggested that

1 3
THEAIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

achieving effective vision and strategy is more difficult and more important than

having good operations and tactics . Representative Gingrich used the example of

Vietnam to illustrate his concept. In his view, the North Vietnamese won at the

vision and strategy level; we won at the operational and tactical level . The

congressman suggested that we need to focus on small wars at all four levels of

this hierarchy if we are to survive in the years ahead .

Yet little is written about the "vision" and the "strategy" of the United States

for the future in any context, and especially so in the context of low-intensity

conflict or small wars . At the most prosaic level, a vision that makes some sense

for the United States in the context of low-intensity conflict is to assume that as a

nation we may need to be able to impose our will selectively in the third world

during the next 20 years and beyond. The volatility of the newly developing

countries will be such that disruptions to lines of supply coupled with the

vulnerability of key areas to Soviet or Soviet-proxy influence will require a US

response. The only hint we in the military have that such a vision for small wars

exists is the fact that high-level directives such as the Defense Guidance require

the military to prepare to fight all across the conflict spectrum .

Vision must come from the highest leadership level in the government. For

example, it was John F . Kennedy who stated so clearly that the United States

was going to fight communist insurgencies-wars of national liberationwhenever required . He pressured the US military to develop forces that the

counterinsurgency mission, both to assist beleaguered friends and to use in direct

action where required. That early counterinsurgency effort foundered in

Vietnam. Of the many difficulties with our participating in the Vietnam conflict,

however, the lack of a national vision on what we hoped to accomplish there

seems fundamental. Without a clear vision of what we hoped to accomplish, a

strategy-an overall plan for bringing all the elements of national power to bear

to achieve an objective-could not be developed .

The United States is in such a position today in regard to low-intensity

conflict. The scars of Vietnam are still severe. Because of the Vietnam

syndrome, most talk of assisting a third world country or intervening in the third

world will likely be met with the response that we can never allow a tragedy like

Vietnam to occur again. Yet, at the same time, Americans are beginning to

realize the importance of the third world to the economic well-being of the

United States and the need to maintain stability in such areas as Latin America,

Africa, and the Middle East. The years following Vietnam saw the US military

concentrate on building forces neglected during the Vietnam conflict . The

emphasis on spending and planning went almost exclusively to modernizing

strategic nuclear forces and rebuilding, reequipping, and training forces

designed for the anticipated high-intensity, incredibly crowded and complex

battlefield of Central Europe . That effort could be justified to the American

people in terms of "vital interests" without grating too harshly on their

noninterventionist sensibilities, which were still smarting from Vietnam.

1 4
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

If Frank Klingberg, a leading authority on alternating moods in US foreign

policy is correct, by the end of the 1980s the United States will have passed from

an "introvert" or noninterventionist phase back into an "extrovert" phase . The

extrovert phase will be marked by a general realization that the United States

must be able to exercise US military power abroad .22 Klingberg assumes that

over the intervening years, a "vision" will develop in the United States which

will include a demand that this country should be able to enforce its will in the

third world via diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military means. We in

the military cannot generate such a vision among the citizens of the United

States. But given our requirement to be able to fight all across the conflict

spectrum to achieve a wide range of policy goals, we must be prepared to support

such a vision now and in the future . We must build the capability now for

successfully conducting small wars .

Military ways, and specifically air power ways, of achieving policy goals in

the third world is the focus of this paper. Military activity is also the focus of our

working definition of low-intensity conflict, even though diplomatic, economic,

and social aspects of participating in low-intensity conflict may be as important

as military activity. Military procedures for designing, procuring, and

developing doctrine for new force structures are so time consuming that the Air

Force and Department of Defense must begin now to develop the strategies,

doctrines, and tactics to ensure effective US participation in the small wars

which will become a part of our lives for the foreseeable future .

This paper postulates a role for the Air Force in low-intensity conflict, and

suggests ways in which the Air Force can organize and develop resources to

support its current DOD responsibility to fight across the entire range of the

conflict spectrum, and to suggest ways the Air Force could contribute to

supporting future US needs in the area of low-intensity conflict. There are

worthwhile lessons to be learned from two historical cases. The first is the

British air control experienced in the 1920s and 1930s, which saw air power

specifically adapted to controlling what are now called third world countries . A

brief look at the history of the USAF Special Air Warfare Center of the 1960s

will show what we can learn about early United States Air Force attempts to

participate in low-intensity conflicts, especially in the area of

counterinsurgency. A case study of modern low-intensity conflict, one in which

air power has been playing a key role, will point out in real world terms the

difficulties the United States Air Force has in participating in today's small wars .

Finally, specific suggestions are made on the philosophic and organizational

changes the US Air Force should consider if it is to be a player in low-intensity

conflict now and in the future .

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

1 . Interview with Gen Wallace H. Nutting, Newsweek, 6 June 1983, 24.

2. Sam C. Sarkesian and William L. Scully, eds ., US Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict:

Potentials for MilitaryStruggles in the 1980s (New York: National Defense Information Center, Inc.,

1981),2 .

3. Sarkesian and Scully, US Policy, 6.

4. Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict, Department of the Army, 16 January 1981,

14-15 .

5. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Pub 1, Directory ofMilitary and Associated Terms, Joint Chiefs of

Staff, 1 June 1979, 319.

6. Draft JCS Pub 20, vol. 1, 1983, 2-1 . (Unclassified)

7. Air Force Manual (AFM) 2-5, Tactical Air Operations-,Special Air Warfare, Department of

the Air Force, 22 June 1965, 19.

8 . Tactical Air Command Manual (TACM) 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, Headquarters Tactical

Air Command, 22 June 1965, 19.

9. AFM 2-5, Tactical Air Operations--Special Air Warfare, Department of the Air Force, 10

March 1967, 30.

10. FM 100-20, 14 .

11 . JCS Pub 1, 1 June 1979, 143 .

12 . FM 100-20, 14.

13. TACM 2-1, 15 April 1978, 148 .

14. JCS Pub 1, 1 June 1979, 273 ; AFM 1-1, USAF Basic Doctrine, Department of the Air Force,

14 February 1979, 22-28; AFM 2-5, 10 March 1967, 20; TACM 2-1, 15 April 1978, 4-54, 4-55.

15 . Department of the Air Force, Air Force 2000 (Washington, D.C. : 11 June 1982), 9

(SECRET). See also W. J . Taylor and S. A. Maaranen, eds., The Future of Conflict in the 1980s

(Lexington, Mass. : Lexington Books, 1982).

16. Dozens ofdocuments support that conclusion. One of the most recent and carefully researched

is W. J. Taylor and R . H. Kupperman, Strategic Requirementsfor the Army to the Year 2000, six

volumes (Washington, D.C. : Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, November

1982). See especially volume 2, The WorldEnvironment to the Year 2000, 3.

17 . Richard H. Solomon, ed., Asian Security in the 1980s: Problems and Policies for a Time of

Transition (Santa Monica, Calif. : Rand Corp., November 1979), 12.
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

18 . Bruce F. Powers, "Is the United States Prepared for Its Most Likely Conflicts?" unpublished

Rand paper, February 1981, 5.

19 . David Stockman, "Let Chrysler Go Bankrupt," Washington Post, 9 December 1979.

20. Remarks by Congressman Newt Gingrich, Air Force Long-Range Planning Conference,

Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 12 April 1983 .

21 . David C. Martin, "The Vietnam Syndrome," Newsweek, 24 May 1982. Among other things,

the Vietnam syndrome makes thinking about, planning for, and participating in counterinsurgency

unacceptable to the US military .

22 . William J. Taylor, The Future of Conflict: US Interests, Washington Paper No. 94

(Washington, D.C. : Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1983), 36-38.
CHAPTER 2

AIR POWER IN SMALL WARS:

THE BRITISH AIR CONTROL EXPERIENCE

During the 1920s and 1930s the British were very effective in developing a

strategy and doctrine for dealing with one form of low-intensity conflict: lowlevel counterinsurgent warfare . The strategy they developed in the 1920s and

1930s flew in the face of two hundred years of colonial experience because it

rejected ground force operations in favor of a new, untried strategy based on air

power. The British experience with air control between World Wars I and II

demonstrates that air power was once effective in a constabulary and small-war

situation . That experience points out how air power, in the hands of creative

strategists, can be shaped and applied to support a government's most trying

political responsibilities.

Air Control's Genesis

The official British definition of air control circa 1933 noted that political

administration of undeveloped countries rests, in the last resort, upon military

force. The concept of air control implied that control is applied by aircraft as the

primary arm, usually supplemented by forces on the ground, according to

particular requirements .' How did the Royal Air Force (RAF) come to be the

dominant arm in colonial control? What doctrine did they develop to guide

operations in the wilds of the empire? What impact did air control have on the

development of the Royal Air Force?

British air control resulted from political and military necessity . Emerging

victorious but exhausted from the World War I, Britain had to deal with restive

populations and disorders of all sorts in its empire . Uprisings against British

rule, tribal warfare, and border problems seemed endemic in the Middle East, in

Africa, and along India's northwest frontier. The expense of large ground-force
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

expeditions to maintain order in the empire was becoming increasingly

burdensome . During the early 1920s the British began to search out alternatives

to these costly expeditions .

At that time the fledgling Royal Air Force, drastically reduced in size

following the armistice, was being eyed hungrily for absorption by the senior

services, which had never really approved the creation of a new service from

their air arms .z Thus, the RAF faced both a threat and an opportunity-the threat

was to its very existence and originated in the postwar struggle for resources

between the three services; the opportunity was to develop a better way to

control and administer the empire . The challenge, then, was to make itself

indispensable to the country as a separate unified service . Since the only

immediate requirement for military force was in the colonies, the Royal Air

Force needed to develop the methods and means whereby its aircraft could be

used as a cheap, effective force to control the empire .

The first indication that the British air force could deal effectively with a

colonial disturbance was the successful operation of Z unit in British Somaliland

in 1920 against Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan, the "Mad Mullah," who had

been pillaging the eastern tip of Africa since 1899 and had been evading punitive

operations by regular British army units and the Anglo-Egyptian-Sudanese army

for more than 15 years .' The inability of ground forces to stop the mullah and his

dervishes from overrunning the country led to a cabinet decision to use air power

against the brigand and his large following .

A self-contained RAF expedition, code-named Unit Z, was organized and

equipped for a six-month campaign . The unit had 12 de Havilland 9a aircraft, 10

Ford trucks, 2 Ford ambulances, 6 trailers, 2 motorcycles, 2 Crosley light trucks,

36 officers, and 183 men . 4

By New Year's Day 1920, Z force had built a temporary airdrome at Berbera

and was assembling its aircraft, which had been delivered by ship. By 19 January

all aircraft had been assembled and flight tested .' The RAF's plan was simple:

bomb the mullah's forts and pursue his bands wherever they could be founddriving them toward the resident ground forces stationed in the area.

The first raid, carried out by six aircraft, almost ended the war. A bomb blast

nearly killed the mullah, but he was saved by a fortuitously placed camel.

Further raids, resulting in heavy casualties, took place over the next 2 days

causing the dervishes to retreat . Somaliland field forces were positioned to

block the retreat while the Royal Air Force switched to a supporting role of

maintaining communications between the various ground force detachments,

providing air cover, and evacuating wounded. The aircraft proved eminently

successful in dislodging the mullah and his followers from their forts and driving

them toward the ground forces, which were able to neutralize the mullah and his

band of men . The campaign against the mullah lasted only 3 weeks and cost

about £ 77,000-a considerable savings over the campaign proposed by the

chief of the imperial general staff. He had estimated it would take 12 months and

20
AIR POWER IN SMALLWARS

two divisions to do the job, plus an additional expenditure running into millions

of pounds to build the railways, roads, and garrison bases necessary to maintain

the peace.

The experience in Somaliland showed that there was some justification for

Winston Churchill's declaration in December 1919, that "the first duty of the

RAF is to garrison the British Empire ."' As minister of war and air, he had been

behind Air Chief Marshal Hugh M. Trenchard's plan to use air power in

Somaliland . By 1920, Churchill had asked Trenchard to plan a much more

ambitious project-to control Mesopotamia (Iraq) by air .' The British were, at

the time, nurturing a new Arab government in Iraq, a government not popular

among the Arab tribes populating the country . These tribes seemed totally

unimpressed with British-sponsored progressive government, which included

rules about taxation and standards of acceptable behavior. In late 1920 a serious

rebellion against British rule was in progress ; the 80 British and Indian battalions

(120,000 troops) garrisoning the country were being hard pressed to maintain

order . An additional 15,414 men sent from India were quickly absorbed in trying

to control an insurrection of at least 131,000 armed men.' The British forces

were scattered all over the country, protecting population centers and vulnerable

lines of communication . With simultaneous outbreaks of violence in several

areas, the British force proved too weak in any single spot to deal effectively

with the problem. Even with 63 aircraft working with the army, putting down the

1920 insurrection in Iraq was a costly business: about f- 38 million . 10

In March 1921, with Iraq still restive and unrest simmering in much of the

Arab world, the British held a conference in Cairo to discuss the Middle East

situation. Winston Churchill, by then colonial secretary, chaired the meeting,

which was attended by all three service chiefs . They decided that Iraq, their

biggest trouble spot, was to be placed under the control of the Royal Air Force;

the progress made in using air power for colonial control in Somaliland would be

developed into an operational concept for the RAF. The army began to withdraw

from Iraq during the summer of 1922, leaving behind four battalions of British

and Indian troops and three armored car companies . Air Marshal Sir John

Salmond was made commander in chief of this force plus eight squadrons of

aircraft . He was the first air force officer to have complete military command of

a colonial territory ."

Salmond's command faced both an internal and external threat . The former

involved obstreperous tribes that rejected the central control of King Faisal, the

British-sponsored ruler of Iraq; the latter threat consisted of encroachments by

Turkish irregular (and some regular) forces concentrated in northeast Iraq that

were intent on claiming the Mosul Valley area of Iraq for Turkey. In the early

days of air control these problems were dealt with by the rather straightforward

method of delivering an ultimatum and then bombing the culprits . But, as the

Royal Air Force became more experienced in using aircraft to maintain order in

21
THEAIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

places such as Iran, Somaliland, Aden, the Sudan, India's northwest frontier,

Palestine, and Transjordan, the concept of air control became much more

sophisticated.

Air Control : From Concept to Doctrine

Before this period, Royal Air Force officers began to amass a substantial body

of knowledge on what worked and what did not when using air power to police

the empire. By the mid-1930s that knowledge had been codified and was being

taught at the RAF Staff College and the Imperial Defence College.

'z

Before air control came onto the scene, the British had been using ground

forces to control the empire for generations . Essentially, the British had

developed two types of operations: the punitive expedition followed by

withdrawing the troops to some centralized base-the so-called burn-and-scuttle

technique-and an expedition followed by military occupation. There were

many obvious difficulties with the army method of control. Paramount was the

expense of mounting and maintaining a large expeditionary force . Because of the

cost, expeditions could be sent out only rarely, and then only when the need for

action had been demonstrated repeatedly. The aim of those expeditions was to

administer a major defeat to discourage further undesirable behavior by forcing

guerrilla fighters or nomadic tribesmen to concentrate and face British

regiments . Usually the British entered and partially destroyed villages to

provoke a major battle with the insurgents . However, these campaigns in distant

and often harsh areas were hard on British troops. In addition to other casualties,

they often suffered numerous losses from disease. And the desired political

effect was often superficial and transitory . As soon as the punitive column

withdrew, the chastised offenders would begin planning new activity against

established authority .

There were other problems with the army method. The columns of the

punitive expeditions took an agonizingly long time to reach their targets . Thus

the effect of prompt reprisal for a specific act was lost. Further, if a punitive

column became a permanent occupying force, its mere presence often became a

cause for friction between the local inhabitants and the occupiers. Clearly, the

army approach had little subtlety about it . It involved moving masses of troops,

engaging the enemy, crushing him, and occupying his territory . Although

subtlety of action is not normally associated with air power, the air control

tactics developed by the Royal Air Force included some surprisingly subtle

techniques.

The doctrine supporting air control operations was exceedingly pragmatic and

provided guidance on both goals and techniques . In speaking to the RAF Staff

College in 1936, Wing Commander (later Air Chief Marshal) Saundby

repeatedly emphasized that the purpose of air control was "to support the

22
AIR POWER IN SMALL WARS

political authorities in their tasks of pacification or administration ." Because of

the political nature of the goal, political authority had to be supreme in these

operations . To be successful, the military commander had to cooperate closely

with the relevant political authority : "they must understand each other and

appreciate each other's point of view properly .

"'3

Since the objective of most air control operations was long-term political

stability, pacification, and administration, the techniques for achieving those

goals were contrary to the training and natural inclination of most military men,

namely, to militarily defeat the enemy. The guiding doctrine for air control

operations was that they would cause the enemy to submit with the minimum

loss of people and material on both sides . Thus, operations were aimed primarily

at the morale of those who were disturbing the peace-not by destroying the

people or terrifying them into submission, but by disrupting their normal routines

to such an extent that continued hostilities became undesirable . As it turned out,

the policy of minimal violence proved much more effective (and much cheaper)

than the bum-and-scuttle policy ofpunitive expeditions by ground forces .

For example, the future leader of the Royal Air Force in World War II,

Charles F. A. Portal, wrote about an experience he had in Aden in 1935 that

illustrated practical techniques supporting the doctrinal precept of minimal

violence. ' 4 His application of air control doctrine began when a caravan en route

to Aden from Yemen was raided by the Quteibis tribe in the mountains north of

the port of Aden . Portal drafted an ultimatum that was straightforward enough:

Pay a fine for damages incurred and hand over the raiders . It then stated the

consequences for not complying with the ultimatum:

If you do not produce the fine and the men, you must leave all your villages and fields, taking

all your property and animals with you, and keep right away until the Government gives you

permission to come back. The Government will do this as soon as you have complied with the

terms. Until you have complied with the terms, your villages and fields may be bombed or

rued on at any time by day or night, and you are particularly warned not to touch any bombs

that do not go off, as if you do so you will probably get killed . i s

The last section of the ultimatum outlined the concept of an "inverted

blockade," which became the standard method for dealing with similar

situations elsewhere in the empire.

The air blockade in this case went on for two months . The tribe went through

three phases of behavior during the blockade. At first, it was excited and

boastful, shooting freely at the airplanes ; next came a period of internal

squabbling; and, finally, the tribe's members showed signs of boredom as they

stayed away from their homes and fields and grew concerned about getting their

crops planted . The tribe's leaders then began to make peace overtures to the

government . Portal noted that the most remarkable aspect of this air control

operation was the way the tribe came back under government jurisdiction with

practically no ill-will, a phenomenon that had also had been observed in India

23
THE AIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

and Iraq. The reason for this, at least in part, was the relatively few casualties

that resulted from the operation . In Portal's words :

It would be the greatest mistake to believe that a victory which spares the lives and feelings of

the losers need be any less permament or salutary than one which inflicts heavy losses on the

fighting men and results in a peace dictated on a stricken field.

16

The Requirements of British Air Control

From experience, the British learned that, in applying air power to a specific

situation, their air forces had to satisfy certain operational requirements to attain

a satisfactory political solution by the minimum use of force. These

requirements, of necessity, became critical tenets in the British doctrine of air

control. Foremost among these was the need to have a detailed knowledge of the

culture, leaders, method of living, and state of mind of the target people. This

intelligence was necessary for early warnings of brewing trouble . When action

had to be taken, this intelligence made it a great deal simpler to determine the

decisive points at which to apply pressure .

Excellent intelligence also enabled the Royal Air Force to avoid attacking

people not directly involved-an important requirement in a constabulary-type

operation . The Royal Air Force had its own well-trained intelligence officers and

civilian political officers on hand to build the necessary intelligence networks . 17

The Royal Air Force required them to become expert in their area of

responsibility and to maintain the "closest possible touch with tribes and tribal

leaders and with their social and political activities .

"'g

To disseminate this intelligence effectively required a well-organized and

efficient communications system. During the air control era, the British made

good use of wireless telegraphy sets to keep intelligence and political officers in

the field in constant touch with the air staff headquarters and higher-level

political authorities . One drawback of wireless communication, even in the

1920s and 1930s, was the problem of shifting the responsibility for action from

the man in the field to higher level decision makers at home . One ofthe doctrinal

tenets of air control was that the authority to act must be delegated to the on-thescene commander. 19 The Royal Air Force had learned that procrastination in

acting had often been interpreted by recalcitrant tribes as weakness by the

government . Good intelligence, effective communications, and the authority to

act enabled RAF commanders to deal with trouble at its earliest stages and

greatly increased the likelihood of success in air control operations.

Writers of British air control doctrine also provided guidance on dealing with

the enemy throughout a campaign . A prime requirement, at the outset, was

establishing clearly understood terms . The British made sure that tribal leaders

and as many tribesmen as possible understood why the government was taking

action and knew exactly what they had to do before the government would end

24
AIR POWERIN SMALLWARS

the operation . The British took care to ensure that it was a simple matter for the

tribesmen to submit to the will of the government. Not only did the British

maintain constant contact with the enemy throughout a campaign, but they also

delivered propaganda by airborne loudspeaker. This propaganda emphasized the

peaceful intent of the British demands and stressed the futility of resistance

against the impersonal, invulnerable, and ubiquitous air force . Psychological

warfare was tailored to create a sense of helplessness among the target people

and was an integral part of air control operations. Coupled with the inverted

blockade, psychological warfare proved useful in air control operations .

A final aspect of British air control operations built upon the overriding

principle of minimal violence . After a successful air control campaign, it was

essential to use the aircraft as a means of positive contact with the former enemy,

doctors were flown to remote sites when needed, natives were evacuated to large

medical facilities if required, messages were delivered from one local chief to

another in the course of normal flying duties, and similar acts of good faith were

performed . This type of humanitarian work helped enormously in reintegrating

formerly rebellious tribes back into the fold of law-abiding citizens and showed

them some benefits that could result by accepting British control . 2°

Air Control and Today's US Air Force

Most who have looked at the British experience with air control have

concluded that the simple applications of that concept are gone forever. 2 '

Technology and the arms bazaar can provide even the smallest insurgent group

with sophisticated surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery . Clearly, the

nearly unchallenged operating environment enjoyed by the British in their preWorld War II empire no longer exists . And because US public opinion is deeply

concerned about another Vietnam disaster, any discussion on applying US power

in small wars is very unpopular . In spite of those obvious limiting technical and

political factors, the US Air Force can learn from Britain's air control

experience.

Perhaps the most important lesson we can extract from this episode in the

history of the Royal Air Force is that air power can be shaped in creative ways to

achieve political results . The methods used by the British to achieve simple

solutions were not all that simple, at least as the doctrine involved grew with

experience . A very sophisticated combination of superb intelligence,

communications, and psychological warfare coupled with ajudicious application

of firepower was necessary to achieve the desired results : pacification of a

troubled colonial area with minimum violence, lasting results, and minimum

cost. To design such a program required a flexibility of thinking that was most

impressive. Airmen emerging from World War I with their experience of fleets

of aircraft being used for bombing and air-to-air missions were able to modify

25
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

their concepts of air power to apply it to a totally new environment with a totally

new mission . While they were developing these new concepts, Britain's air

officers quickly learned the political nature of military power . They participated

in the political process of formulating plans of action that meshed political goals

and military capability-training that stood them in good stead during World

War II .

Technology of course played a key role in the success of Britain's air control

concept . There was a mystique about the aircraft in relation to the people being

controlled . The aircraft was seen as an impersonal, invulnerable projection of

British power that could overcome physical obstacles quickly and apply

firepower with extreme precision . These characteristics made air power in

underdeveloped areas an almost irresistible force .

Modern technology may make today's aircraft as effective a weapon for

supporting third world friends or pursuing limited military objective in small

wars as Britain's de Havilland 9a was for policing the empire in the 1920s and

1930s . Equipped with long-range, highly accurate standoff weapons, modern

aircraft could likewise project power quickly and with extreme precision . For

instance, it could be in the interests of the United States to assist a friendly

country facing a threat of an external foe's sophisticated surface-to-air missiles.

Long-range standoff US aircraft could jam or eliminate the SAM th?eat from

positions far from the battlefield . In another scenario, if an aggressive,

expansionistic third world nation were to mass troops and equipment on the

border of a country the United States wished to support, demonstration of US

ability to locate and destroy some of the massed equipment using weapons far

beyond the range of the aggressor's defensive systems might prove to be an

effective deterrent measure when diplomacy failed to keep the peace . If weapons

are ever placed in space, of course, the concept of using precise standoff

firepower assumes a much wider dimension. However, the United States needs

to have a concept of operations and a doctrine for their use before such space

weapons are produced and deployed. Many of the techniques developed by the

Royal Air Force for operating in the third world could serve the US Air Force

very well as it examines its role in the small wars of today, and in those of the

next decade and beyond.
NOTES

CHAPTER 2

AIR POWER IN SMALL WARS

1 . Great Britain, Royal Air Force Staff Memorandum No. 52, Air Ministry, June 1933, 3.

2. See Great Britain, Cabinet Paper 365(29), "The Fuller Employment of Air Power in Imperial

Defence," December 1929, for a brief outline of army-navy attempts to dismember the Royal Air

Force from 1919-29.

3 . C. G. Grey, AHistory ofthe AirMinistry (London: Unwin Brothers Ltd ., 1940), 173.

4. Flight Lieutenant F. A. Skoulding, "With Z Unit in Somaliland," The Royal Air Force

Quarterly (July 1931): 390 .

5 . Ibid ., 392.

6. Charles Sims, The Royal Air Force: The First Fifty Years (London: Adam and Charles Black,

1963), 38.

7. Ibid ., 37.

8. Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill: The Stricken World (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975),

216-18 .

9. Flight Lieutenant M. Thomas, "The Royal Air Force in Iraq Since 1918," lecture given at the

RAF Staff College, Andover, England, 1923.

10. N. N. Golovine, Air Strategy (London: Gae and Polden, Ltd ., 1936), 24.

11 . Sims, The Royal Air Force, 39-40.

12 . Air Vice Marshal E. R. Ludow-Hewitt, deputy chief of the air staff, Air Staff Memorandum

No. 52 "Air Control," lecture to the Imperial Defence College, London, April 1933 ; Wing

Commander R.H .M .S . Saundby, "Small Wars with Particular Reference to Air Control in

Undeveloped Countries," lecture to RAF Staff College, 14th Course, Andover, England, June 1936.

13 . Saundby, "Small Wars," 16 .

14. Air Commodore Charles F. A. Portal, "Air Force Cooperation in Policing the Empire,"

Royal United Service Institution Journal (May 1937): 341-58 .

15 . Ibid ., 352.

16 . Ibid ., 354.

17 . For an eminently readable example of how the Royal Air Force developed and used

intelligence in an air control operation, see Glubb, Warin the Desert: An R.A .F . Frontier Campaign

(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960) .

18 . Saundby, "Small Wars," 20.

19 . Ibid ., 6.

20. Portal, "Air Force Cooperation," 356-57 .

21 . See Lt Col Bryce Poe II, "The Role of Aerospace Attack Weapons in International Affairs,"

(Paper for the National War College, Washington, D.C ., 1965) .

27

CHAPTER 3

THE MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR:

A CASE STUDY OF A MODERN

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

The Kingdom of Morocco has been fighting a persistent guerrilla enemy, the

Polisario, for almost 10 years. Polisario is an acronym for the Popular Front for

the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro. This war brings together

several elements that may suggest the nature of future low-intensity conflicts :

nationalist ambitions (in this case where there is no nation), massive external

support, complicated political motivations on the part of both the combatants and

their sponsors, regional competition, sophisticated weapons in the hands of

small, irregular guerrilla formations, and the potential involvement of the

superpowers . It is a little-publicized war that is poorly understood in the United

States and involves one of America's oldest friends . King Hassan II, very much

the ruler of Morocco, has always been pro-Western in his political inclination

and in recent years has made a strong move toward increasing his ties with the

United States. The Reagan administration, in need of secure air base facilities to

support possible Mideast operations, has been courting Hassan and has sent an

ambassador to Rabat to assure the monarch that "he can count on us ."' How

Hassan interprets this commitment by the United States to support his regime

both economically and militarily in its effort against the Polisario is difficult to

assess. But there can be no doubt that in return for access to Moroccan air bases,

Hassan will expect a military and economic quid pro quo.

Resources and Topography of Western Sahara

The war between Morocco and the Polisario is over sovereignty of one of the

least hospitable areas in the world: Western Sahara. A former Spanish colony

known as the Spanish Sahara from 1884 to 1976, this region stretches some 430

miles from the southern border of Morocco to the northern border of Mauritania.
THE AIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Western Sahara is divided into two regions: the northern panhandle, Saguia el

Hamra, and the larger southern area called Rio de Oro. Together the two regions

form an area about the size of Colorado-an area of vast empty space, rough

terrain, few people, and quite modest resources.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Western Sahara's topography is that the

sand dunes one normally associates with the Sahara Desert are not the dominant

land form . There are sandy areas scattered throughout Western Sahara and sand

dunes are prevalent along the coast, but most of the area consists of rocky plains

with escarpments rising to several hundred feet .' This rocky desert floor makes

rapid motor vehicle transport possible, contrary to the image one normally has of

laborious movement over seemingly endless sand dunes . This terrain has been a

key factor in the success of Polisario operations over the past eight years.

The desert of Western Sahara has enough water sources to support seasonal

grazing by the camels and goats belonging to the handful of Bedouins who have

roamed the borderless stretches of desert included in southern Morocco, Algeria,

Mauritania, and Western Sahara for generations immemorial . All borders in this

vast area are the artificial creations of former colonial powers, borders that have

been meaningless to peoples unacquainted with Western concepts of nationalism

and frontiers .

Within these spaces there is little of economic value . Virtually all the writing

on the war in the Sahara describes the areas as the "mineral-rich former Spanish

colony ." It is true that there are considerable high-grade phosphate deposits in

Western Sahara. In the early 1960s the Spanish reported that about 1 .7 billion

tons of phosphate rock were located in the Bu-Crag region southeast of El

Ayoun, the largest city in the Sahara. However, Morocco proper has deposits of

16 .2 billion tons of phosphate rock-eight times the deposits of Western Sahara,

or about one-half the total world reserves of 34 .5 billion tons .' Currently,

Morocco is the third largest producer (after the United States and the USSR) but

the world's largest exporter of phosphates . Its phosphate reserves are more than

sufficient to continue to bring in nearly $700 million per year in foreign

exchange far into the future . That $700 million is an important but by no means

dominant portion of Morocco's $17 .5-billion gross national product . Unlike

other Arab countries whose economies rely on one natural resource such as gas

or oil, Morocco is diversified enough that phosphates are not the alpha and

omega of its economy. Phosphates, then, seem to be an exaggerated factor in

Morocco's decision to fight a long and expensive war in the Sahara. Similarly,

other mineral resources do not seem to enter the picture as causes of the war.

Although some iron deposits have been found in the Sahara, they do not qualify

as commercial quantities of iron ore, and other mineral and oil deposits have yet

to be found . The rich fishing grounds off the Atlantic coast of the Sahara are an

important potential resource that has not yet been fully exploited. If the mineral

wealth of Western Sahara is marginal, then why have the Moroccans and the

Polisario been so persistent in their conflict?

30
MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR

Moroccan Claims and Stakes in Western Sahara

Moroccans have emotional and political claims to the Spanish Sahara. They

also have historical arguments to justify their claim to the Sahara, but these are

less telling than the emotion that has been generated by the Moroccan populace

at all levels. Historically, Morocco traces its lineage from the Almoravid and

Almohad Berber empires, which, in the 11th century, began a process that led to

an empire stretching from southern Spain to Senegal. Thus, Morocco has

irredentist claims to a vast territory that includes, besides Western Sahara, all of

Mauritania and parts of Algeria and Mali-the so-called Greater Morocco. As

Lewis B . Ware has pointed out, however, Morocco's historical claims to the

Sahara are open to serious question, and by following Moroccan historical

analysis to its logical conclusion, Mauritania emerges as the country with the

best historic argument for owning Western Sahara . 4

The idea of Greater Morocco has a good deal of emotional appeal among

Moroccan nationalists, but pursuing it is unrealistic . On the one hand, except for

the Algerian-Moroccan boundary in the Tindouf region, the borders of

Mauritania, Western Sahara, Mali, and Algeria are well defined (fig . 4). On the

other hand, the nomadic nature of the herding tribes of North Africa makes

political boundaries irrelevant to the question of sovereignty in the context of the

Sahara .

A stronger, more relevant basis on which Morocco can and does justify its

claims to the region is the tribal allegiances and strong Islamic religious bonds

that have existed between the Moroccan sultan and the Sahrawi tribes that have

roamed Western Sahara . Traditionally, in Islamic cultures, tribes have conferred

sovereignty on their rulers by a pledge of allegiance-bai'a .s Most of the

Saharan tribes over the past two hundred years have sworn allegiance to the

sultan of Morocco, who, as Commander of the Faithful, combines both religious

and political authority in his being.' This allegiance, the Moroccans argue,

carries the same weight as territorial sovereignty in non-Islamic, Western

civilizations . Administrative control of these tribes was not always feasible .

There were no population centers to control and the sultan was not usually able to

project his power continuously into the far reaches of the desert areas . The

allegiance of these tribes allowed the sultan to establish a measure of sovereignty

over the region without compelling him to have absolute control over each tribe

and the land it inhabited . The pattern of historical and indirect political control

over the Sahrawi tribes provides Morocco with a reasonable basis for laying

claim to Western Sahara .

Modern Moroccans care little for the specific historical and legal claims their

country has over Western Sahara. Since independence in 1956, Moroccans from

all parts of the political spectrum have agreed that the Sahara is part of Morocco .

3 1
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Figure 4. North Africa.

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MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR

The conservative and nationalist Istiqlal party pushed Moroccan claims for the

Sahara at the time of independence . Two years later King Mohammed V, the

father of the current monarch, committed the regime to "recovering" Western

Sahara .

Morocco worked diligently in the diplomatic arena to establish its claim over

Western Sahara. During the 1960s this effort focused primarily on improving the

relationships between Rabat, Algiers, and Nouakchott. In 1970, after settling

other problems (Morocco and Algeria signed a 20-year Treaty of Solidarity and

Cooperation in 1969, and in 1970 Morocco signed a friendship treaty with

Mauritania that ended any Moroccan claim to Mauritanian territory), these three

countries began to discuss issues relating to the future of the Sahara. * In the early

1970s, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania applied coordinated pressure to

convince Spain to decolonize the Sahara. Previously Spanish movement toward

that end had been fitful and halting at best .

This joint movement lasted until 1974, when Morocco rejected the option of

an independent Saharan state and actively began to assert its own claim to the

Sahara . Morocco pressed its case in the United Nations, where the International

Court of Justice was asked to provide an advisory opinion on the legal status of

the Saharan territory prior to its colonization by Spain in 1884 . The court's task

was to determine if the Sahara belonged to any nation when it was colonized by

Spain and to evaluate any legal ties linking Western Sahara with Morocco.

The court rendered its advisory opinion in October 1975 . The judges decided

unanimously that when Spain colonized the Sahara the territory was not without

a master. The court concluded that Morocco did have legal ties of allegiance

with the Saharan tribes, but these legal ties did not constitute Moroccan

sovereignty over the area . The court stated the rights of the Sahrawi population

to self-determination . Morocco, however, chose to interpret the advisory

opinion as an endorsement of the kingdom's position, equating the court's

finding of legal ties to the Sahara with territorial sovereignty. The parts of the

opinion that did not support Morocco were ignored . 7

King Hassan used the decision of the International Court of Justice as support

for Morocco's claim to the Sahara. The court's opinion was followed in quick

order by the so-called Green March. Just after the decision, King Hassan

announced that 350,000 civilians, armed only with their Korans, would march

from Morocco into the Sahara to reclaim the territory . King Hassan's proposal

won the enthusiastic support of all Moroccans ; it was a nonviolent step to force

Spain into moving forward on negotiations to decolonize Spanish Sahara.

By this time (late 1975) Spain, concerned over the succession to

Generalissimo Franco and by a Morocco poised to peacefully invade the Sahara,

wanted only to get out of the territory without disgrace . As the Green March

began to develop a life and a force of its own, Moroccan-Spanish negotiations

forged ahead. On 6 November, the mass of Green Marchers crossed the frontier

of Western Sahara . By 9 November Spain had agreed to settle the Saharan

3 3
THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

question with Morocco and Mauritania, excluding the "interested" Algerians .

This development led to the November 1975 tripartite agreement between

Morocco, Mauritania, and Spain whereby Spain was to transfer administrative

authority (not sovereignty) to a joint Moroccan-Mauritanian administration .

Spain quickly withdrew its troops and administrators ; Morocco filled the

vacuum . Morocco and Mauritania then partitioned the Sahara. The struggle

began with Mauritania and Morocco on one side and the Polisario Front, backed

by Algeria, on the other.

The Polisario Front

The Polisario's origins, composition, and leadership are difficult to pinpoint.

The organization was formed in 1973 at Nouakchott, Mauritania, and first fought

Spanish troops that same year.' The Polisario claims to be the legitimate

representative of the Sahrawi people striving to establish an independent

nonaligned state from the territory colonized by Spain. It has established a

government in exile, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), in

Algiers, with its center of strength being the large base camp near Tindouf in

southwestern Algeria . The SADR defines itself as a democratic socialist republic

with Islam as its state religion within the recognized borders of Saguia el Hamra

and Rio de Oro.

The Polisario was initially based in Mauritania and for two years-1973 to

1975-fought the Spanish in a series of harassment operations. During that

period relations between Morocco, Mauritania, and the Polisario were friendly.

That situation changed as it became clear that Spain would partition its colony

between Morocco and Mauritania without really considering the desires of the

Sahrawi people. Following the division and occupation of Spanish Sahara by

Morocco and Mauritania, the Polisario organized an exodus of Sahrawis out of

the territory to the camps of Tindouf.

The number of "legitimate" Sahrawis, that is, those who could be considered

actual residents of Western Sahara versus the total number of refugees living in

the Tindouf area, is even more nebulous than the Polisario's origins . The

Spanish census of 1974 showed a total of 73,497 Sahrawis. 9 The 25,000 to

30,000 Sahrawis who left the territory for Morocco in the 1950s should also be

included in this total . Thus the "true" Sahrawi population is perhaps a bit over

100,000 people. At Tindouf the nationalities and the number of refugees are

subject to serious debate. Morocco claims that only 15,000 Sahrawis are in the

camps and that these are outnumbered by refugees from all over north and

central Africa. Relief agencies have estimated from 40,000 to 100,000 refugees

in the camps; the Polisario claims a camp population of 100,000 to 150,000.

John Damis, a leading analyst and writer on Western Sahara, made a count of

tents in the camps in 1979 and found a range of 17,000 to 35,000 refugees in the

camps . 10

34
Whatever the movement's size may be, the leadership of the Polisario-a

combination of Moroccan- and Spanish-educated Western Saharan nationalists,

Moroccans, and Mauritanians-has highly politicized the people in the camps .

A central goal of the Polisario's leaders is to develop a sense of loyalty to a

nation-the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic-among a people whose loyalty

has been to families and tribes. Reports from journalists suggest that the camps at

Tindouf are well organized and produce a high level of political awareness

among the residents ." The movement has been fighting the Moroccans for more

than nine years now and has suffered significant losses ; still its leaders have been

able to replace fighters and maintain cohesion among the Tindouf refugees with

little apparent difficulty. This fact suggests a considerable degree of success in

their organizational and administrative methods even though some Polisario

defectors have reported that recruitment is done by promises of money and food

and that discipline in the camps is maintained by intimidation .

'2

In spite of its strong leadership and its apparent cohesiveness, the Polisario

could not survive without the continuous support of Algeria and other countries .

Algeria provides territorial sanctuaries, food, military aid, and diplomatic

support ; Libya provides substantial arms supplies; and Cuba, North Vietnam,

East Germany, and North Korea give some training to the Polisario forces .

II The

Polisario would like the world to view the struggle as the Sahrawi' people's

struggle for self-determination against the Moroccan invaders and occupiers. But

the interest of such worldwide destabilizers as Cuba and Libya, the extensive

involvement of Algeria (which may even be described as control), and the

motley composition of the Polisario suggests a much more complex picture than

that of Moroccan aggressors trampling on home-grown Sahrawi nationalists .

Algeria

MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR

Even though not an active combatant in the Saharan conflict, Algeria is a key

player. In 1975, Algeria switched from supporting Morocco and Mauritania,

which had been pressing Spain to recognize Moroccan-Mauritanian claims to the

colony, to insisting on self-determination for Western Sahara. Algeria had come

to realize that its long-term geopolitical interests conflicted with a Moroccandominated Sahara . Ideologically, Algeria supports national liberation

movements and the principle of self-determination . These ideological

commitments fit very nicely with supporting the Polisario against a traditional,

conservative, pro-Western Moroccan monarchy .

In a sense Algeria may be using the Polisario to wage a surrogate war that is

very costly to the Moroccans. A Moroccan-controlled Sahara would contribute

to Morocco's challenge to Algerian preeminence in the Maghreb (Morocco,

Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) and, by extending Morocco's borders far to the

south, would tend to "encircle" Algeria . The Algerians clearly would like to

35
THEAIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

avoid such developments . The Polisario's activities effectively tie down the bulk

of Morocco's armed forces and are a serious financial drain on the weak

Moroccan economy. The level of financial support to keep the Polisario

operating and to maintain the base camps at Tindouf is a pittance for Algiers .

Algeria also has an economic interest in the Sahara . Large iron ore deposits

exist in southwest Algeria, but to exploit these deposits Algeria must be able to

transport the ore to processing plants . The best way to do this is to haul the ore by

rail to the Atlantic coast of Morocco or the Sahara. An independent (Algeriandominated) Saharan state would make exploitation of this iron feasible and

perhaps would lead to joint exploitation of the resource. However, Morocco and

Algeria-as regional competitors and, currently, implacable enemies-may find

it difficult, if not impossible, to work out arrangements for transporting the ore

across Morocco for export from the Atlantic coast.

Both Algeria and Morocco have been ambiguous and contradictory in their

statements regarding the Saharan problem . Algeria claims to have supported

self-determination in the Sahara since the mid-1960s . Yet, Algeria's President

Boumediene agreed, in both 1974 and 1975, to let Morocco and Mauritania take

over Western Sahara.

14 However, in late 1975 Algeria had become vehemently

opposed to Morocco and Mauritania's takeover of Spanish Sahara. Meanwhile,

Morocco had supported Sahrawi self-determination between 1966 and 1974 . But

in mid-1974 King Hassan opposed a referendum that could have led to Saharan

independence . Since then, and especially since 1979 when Mauritania withdrew

from the conflict, Hassan has considered the Sahara as Moroccan and has acted

accordingly . One major difference between the Moroccan and the Algerian

positions exists, however. In Morocco every level of the population and every

shade of political opinion fully supports Hassan's efforts to regain and keep the

Sahara . But, while a general feeling exists in Algeria that the Polisario's goals

are just, most Algerians would be unwilling to make the same kind of sacrifices

in men and treasure to support the Polisario that the Moroccans have made and

continue to make to support their government's goals in the Sahara.

Mauritania

Mauritania has had a difficult time with the Saharan conflict and has had wild

policy shifts over the past several years. Mauritania obtained the Tiris al

Gharbiyya area of Western Sahara in the tripartite agreement with Spain and

Morocco in 1975 . Because Mauritania began its occupation of the southern

Sahara with a weak military capability (12,000 troops in its army) and a vast,

empty northern border area to patrol, it relied on military assistance from

Morocco and financial aid from Saudi Arabia to fight the Polisario .

Additionally, there was almost no popular support to keep up the fight . In the

end the struggle was too expensive for the Mauritanians . In August 1979, they

36
signed a peace agreement with the Polisario, withdrew their forces, and

abandoned any claim to the Western Sahara.

Mauritania's withdrawal from the conflict, coupled with its inability to control

incursions from its northern border area into Western Sahara, has strained

relations with Morocco considerably in the past few years. Relations between the

two had never been especially good, indeed they had begun on an unfavorable

note . When Mauritania was granted independence by France in 1960, Morocco

refused to recognize Mauritania's sovereignty ; Morocco considered Mauritania

as part of Greater Morocco. In 1969 Morocco finally recognized Mauritania's

existence, but Mauritania remained suspicious of Moroccan ambitions and

considered the Western Sahara a useful buffer against Moroccan expansion .

To complicate matters further, Mauritania's Saharan policy has shifted often

over the years . From 1960 to 1974 Mauritania supported self-determination by

referendum for the Sahara, believing that the ethnic closeness of the Sahrawis

and the Mauritanians would result in a Sahrawi federation with Mauritania . Even

if the Western Sahara became an independent state, it would be a buffer to

Morocco. In 1974-75, when it became clear that Morocco was going to take the

Sahara either by peaceful or violent action, Mauritania considered dividing the

Sahara between the two countries as an acceptable outcome . This decision,

which seemed to be a good way of preventing Morocco from expanding to

Mauritania's northern border, forced Mauritania into a costly war with the

Polisario . It ended when the Ould Daddah government was overthrown by a

military coup in July 1978 .

Since making peace with the Polisario in 1979, Mauritania has tried not to

antagonize either Morocco or Algeria, but it has not been very successful in

avoiding conflict with Morocco . The two countries broke diplomatic relations in

March 1981 over alleged Moroccan complicity in a coup attempt in

Nouakchott. 15 Moreover, the Polisario, in 1981, was operating freely in the

undefended and unoccupied wastes of northern Mauritania. In response,

Moroccan air force fighters have on several occasions attacked Polisario base

camps in Mauritania . And even though diplomatic relations between Morocco

and Mauritania resumed in June 1981 after Saudi Arabia mediated the dispute,

the situation between the two countries has remained cool.

Libya

MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR

Libya, under the revolutionary guidance of Colonel Mu'ammar Qadhafi, has

been a strong supporter of the Polisario . Qadhafi's personal dislike of Hassan II

(who is, in Qadhafi's eyes, an anachronistic reactionary) is probably an

important factor in Libya's Western Saharan policy .

Libya was a financial backer and arms supplier to the Polisario from 1973 to

1985, when Libyan backing was stopped following the conclusion of the Oujda

3 7
THEAIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Accord. This arrangement has led to an uneasy relationship between Libya and

Algeria, the Polisario's other main backer. Algeria tends to exert a moderating

influence over the Polisario, preferring to drain Morocco's resources rather than

engage Morocco in open conflict, while Libya encourages a radical and violent

path for the Polisario even at the risk of direct hostilities with Morocco . 16 Algeria

is also leery of the level of Libyan influence over the Polisario . Some observers

have reported that Algerian and Libyan factions have formed within the

Polisario, which could result in a conflict over the strategy, tactics, and methods

that the Polisario will adopt as the struggle with Morocco continues .

France

France, a power in African events, has maintained a neutral stance on Western

Sahara, recognizing neither Moroccan sovereignty in the Sahara nor the

Polisario . France provides economic and military assistance to Morocco and is

Morocco's most important trading partner. Overall, France tilts toward Morocco

and against Algeria and Libya in the Sahara dispute .

France's heaviest involvement in the conflict occurred following two incidents

in 1977 . In the first incident in May, the Polisario kidnapped six French civilians

from the Mauritanian mining center at Zouirat and killed two others. The second

incident came in October, when the Polisario took two French railway

technicians as prisoners . In December, the French successfully used air power

stationed in Dakar, Senegal to obtain the release of these hostages ."

With the election of Mitterand as president in May 1981, France seems to have

become "more" neutral in its Saharan position. Former President Giscard

d'Estaing and King Hassan were close personal friends, a relationship the King

does not enjoy with Mitterand . Since US-Moroccan relations are warming

quickly, France's importance to Morocco as a source of military supplies and

assistance may be reduced.

The United States

For many years the United States has maintained a neutral stance on the

Saharan issue . We have recognized Moroccan administrative control over the

Sahara but not its sovereignty over the area. However, the election of the Reagan

administration, the assignment of Joseph Verner Reed as ambassador to

Morocco, and the need to obtain US air basing rights in Morocco to support

Mideast military contingencies have led to significant changes in the United

States position over the past five years.

The United States has long been an important source of military hardware for

Morocco. Most of the purchases made during the 1970s were designed to

modernize the Moroccan military and were not related to the Saharan conflict . In

38
1977, however, Rabat asked Washington for OV-10 and F-5E fixed-wing

aircraft and Cobra attack helicopters for use in Western Sahara. Previous USMoroccan agreements stipulated that US-supplied weapons could be used only

for internal security and self-defense ." Morocco had been using previously

obtained F-5A and B aircraft in the Sahara since 1976, a fact used by the Carter

administration to justify its rejection of the Hassan regime's request for

additional arms .

In 1979 the Carter administration began to shift its policy regarding Moroccan

arms purchases . The Polisario had made several attacks inside Morocco proper,

causing the administration to reconsider the nature of the war itself. A feeling in

the government that the United States had not done enough to support the Shah

of Iran also contributed to Washington's decision to be more supportive of

Hassan II . By October 1979 the Carter administration had approved the sale of 6

OV-10s, 20 F-5Es, and 24 Hughes Model 500 helicopters to Morocco.

Financing was provided by Saudi Arabia . Under President Carter the US

government linked these arms sales to Moroccan efforts to "progress in

negotiations .

"'9

The Reagan administration has dropped any conditions in supporting the

Moroccans.2° The need for aircraft basing rights, the recognition of Morocco's

strategic position, and the strong desire to demonstrate dependable US support of

our friends has formed the basis for new bonds of friendship between the United

States and Moroccan governments . Ambassador Reed has been fervent in his

public statements, telling King Hassan and the Moroccan people to "count on

us; we are with you . " His analysis that "it is obvious that the next pressure point

for the Soviets is going to be the Kingdom of Morocco, situated strategically as it

is on the Straits of Gibraltar" adds to the Moroccan perception that the United

States has security interests which involve Morocco very strongly ." Clearly, this

development puts a new emphasis on Morocco that has been missing from US

policy in years past .

Several players, although not directly involved with the war in the Sahara,

nevertheless have an interest in it . United States policy must consider these

peripheral players in the Saharan situation because of larger regional and

international issues that could be affected by US actions in the Western Sahara.

The USSR

Peripheral Players

MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR

Moscow has remained aloof from the Saharan conflict . The Soviets are of

course the ultimate source for the Polisario's arms, but financing and distributing

39
TIEAIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

those arms to the Polisario seem to be controlled by Libya and Algeria . The

political compatibility of Moscow and Algiers provides the Soviets with a

needed doorway through which to involve themselves in North Africa. Yet at the

same time, Moscow and Rabat have entered into a multibillion-dollar phosphate

deal as well as a major fishing agreement .22 Moscow may be positioning itself in

anticipation that a revolutionary regime someday will replace King Hassan. At

present the USSR wants good relations with both Morocco and Algeria and is

remarkably restrained in supporting or even having contact with the Polisario

Front.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia strongly supports King Hassan. Hassan, as a direct descendent of

Mohammed, has considerable prestige as Commander of the Faithful, and, thus,

is a central figure in modern Islam. The Saudis provide' massive financing

(perhaps $1 billion a year) to support Morocco's war in the desert and play a key

role in mediating disputes among the Arab nations of North Africa . The

importance of Saudi Arabia to the United States also lends clout to its effort to

influence events in North Africa.

Spain

Spain is strictly neutral in the Saharan conflict and has not recognized the

Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. Spain has important economic links to

Morocco and is willing to help find a solution to the situation . At present,

however, Spanish influence in the situation is negligible . Moreover, the two

Spanish enclaves in Morocco-Ceuta and Melilla-provide a basis for

occasional friction between the two countries .

The War's Importance

The international implications of the war in the Sahara are readily apparent

from the foregoing and are well documented in the literature dealing with that

conflict . However, the war itself and the tactics both sides are developing as the

fighting continues are not particularly well known . The relative unconcern of

most governments with this remote and comparatively small war, the dearth of

reliable reporting from the war zone, and the seemingly interminable length of

the Saharan war all contribute to its relegation far down on the list of problems

facing the world's nations . Yet, this war offers some very important lessons on

the use of air power, the role of defensive thinking in strategy, and the impact of

superpower assistance on third world armed forces . The United States must learn

40
MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR

these lessons if it expects to be able to participate effectively in the small wars

that might occur during the remainder of this century, especially in Africa, Asia,

and Central and South America.

This analysis examines the pattern of the Saharan war through the prism of the

Royal Moroccan Air Force (RMAF) experience .23 This approach may seem

incongruous since the RMAF is so much smaller and less influential within

Morocco than the ground forces of the Forces Armees Royales (FAR). Today's

Moroccan air force has about 13,000 people compared to about 130,000 in the

ground forces, yet it plays a key role in every phase of this desert war. The Royal

Moroccan Air Force has set the pace for the conflict. Its actions have at times

denied the Polisario fighters the freedom of movement so critical to their success

and have led the Polisario to obtain high-technology weapons to drive the

Moroccan air force from the battlefield .

Evolution of the War

Many political and military benchmarks mark the ebb and flow of this long

and at times spasmodic war. Looking at it from the Moroccan perspective, the

war can be seen as developing in four phases: static defense (November 1975 to

June 1979), incipient offense (July 1979 to September 1981), SA-6-induced

paralysis (October to December 1981), and aftermath of Guelta Zemmour

(January 1982 to present) .

Static Defense (November 1975 to June 1979)

The Morocco-Polisario conflict can be said to have begun with the Green

March on 6 November 1975 when 350,000 unarmed Moroccan civilians entered

the Spanish Sahara and reclaimed it for Morocco. The Moroccan army

organized, supported, and controlled the Green March and remained in Saharan

cities and outposts after the Green Marchers withdrew . Meanwhile the Polisario

moved many Sahrawis out of the Western Sahara and into the base camp in

Tindouf, Algeria . Polisario strength increased rapidly from about 800 to 3,000.

Perhaps 2,000 to 2,500 of the new Polisario fighters carne from the Spanish

Sahara territorial police, "nomadic troops," and former members of the regular

Spanish army in the Sahara, mostly local Saharans . These men brought to the

Front their training, knowledge of the terrain, and weapons. 24

From late 1975 through mid-1976, the Polisario tried to prevent Morocco and

Mauritania from establishing military and political control over the Sahara. At

first the Polisario attempted to hold towns and engage Moroccan units in fixed

battles. Moroccan superiority in numbers and firepower soon forced the Polisario

to adopt more productive, conventional guerrilla hit-and-run tactics . The value
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

of firepower, however, was a lesson the Polisario learned thoroughly, and using

firepower with devastating effect has become an important factor in their

operations.

In 1976 and 1977 Morocco was clearly on the defensive, the Polisario on the

offensive . Moroccan strategy concentrated on maintaining control of the few

principal population centers and oases . The guerrillas, well supported by

Algeria, struck at will in the Sahara and northern Mauritania . Polisario tactics at

this time emphasized small unit actions (five to eight land rovers loaded with

men), mobility, and surprise. Essentially these rebel units harassed Moroccan

and Mauritanian forces, interdicted supplies, and occasionally ambushed

government patrols .

By 1977 the Polisario had improved its ability to coordinate military

operations and could bring motorized columns of up to 150 vehicles to bear on an

objective . In the spring of 1977, for example, the Front was able to attack the

Mauritanian mining down of Zouirat from two directions and to mass firepower

equal to a Moroccan regiment. 25 The Polisario was clearly concentrating its

efforts on Mauritania, a country tottering on the brink of economic collapse, to

force Mauritania to withdraw from its partnership with Morocco in the Sahara.

The war was a key factor in the July 1978 coup in Nouakchott, which saw

Mokhtar .Ould Daddah replaced by a military junta . Militarily, Mauritania was

no longer a factor in the war after July 1978, and in 1979 the junta withdrew all

Mauritanian claims to Western Sahara and made peace with the Polisario .

During this phase of the war, the Moroccan air force was basically ineffective

infighting the Polisario . The only area in which it was effective was aerial

resupply . The Polisario's ability to harass and interdict ground transport at will

made resupply by air vital in the early part of the war. The Royal Moroccan Air

Force accomplished this important, and often overlooked, mission of supplying

Moroccan ground forces in the cities and remote garrisons with its fleet of C-130

cargo planes .

The Moroccan fighter force, in comparison, had little experience in ground-air

coordination, no routine tactical air intelligence, and limited experience in

locating and attacking mobile targets. Although it would react to army requests

for support, the Moroccan air force had almost no success in denying the

Polisario freedom of movement in the desert . On the one hand, the mainstays of

the RMAF's fighter force, Fouga Magisters and T-34s, had limited capabilities .

On the other hand, the Moroccans utilized their more advanced aircraft to only a

limited extent . Together, all the F-5s flown in the south during 1977 and 1978

averaged only about 100 hours a month (fig . 5) . Nonetheless, the RMAF was

enough of a threat to the Polisario that SA-7 surface-to-air missiles began to

appear in the rebels' inventory of weapons by 1976 . 26

The most interesting use of air power during this period occurred in 1977 .

Over a period of several months the Polisario struck several targets in Mauritania

and in the process killed a French doctor and his wife and captured eight other

42
MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR

Figure 5 . F-5-US Supplied Fighter of the Royal Moroccan Air Force.

French citizens. The French decided they needed to discourage the Polisario

from capturing French citizens . In December, Paris sent nine Jaguar aircraft, two

KC-135 tankers, and a few support transports to Dakar, Senegal . The French

also employed aerial reconnaissance to detect Polisario movements and base

camps. Based on the combination of good intelligence and capable fighter

aircraft, the French were soon able to make devastating attacks on Polisario

columns. Within two weeks the Polisario returned its hostages to French

authority . Even though the French quit attacking the Polisario, they kept their

Jaguars in Dakar for several more weeks to assist the Moroccan air force in

locating the Polisario but did not actually participate in any further attacks . 2' The

success of the French attacks made the Polisario reluctant to operate in

Mauritania . For a while the Front shifted its operations further north to the

southern part of Morocco .

The French emphasis on using good intelligence and air power to achieve a

specific political-military goal paralleled British air control policy. And, as in

British air control, the psychological impact of an effective air control effort had

an immediate and lasting impact on the enemy-the Polisario have not tried to

pressure the French in any way since the 1977 incident. The effectiveness of

French air power was a precursor of things to come as the Moroccan air force

improved its capability in the period from mid-1979 through late 1981 .
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Incipient Offense (July 1979 to September 1981)

Between the summer of 1979 and the fall of 1981 the level of violence in this

desert war increased, while Morocco stood alone against the Polisario and its

Algerian and Libyan sponsors . During this period the capabilities of the

Moroccan air force grew rapidly and Moroccan tactics improved quickly . It was

also a time of important operational reforms in Morocco's conduct of the war in

the south, reforms induced by Polisario successes in 1980 .

The Polisario began to step up its attacks in January 1979 with its so-called

Houari Boumediene offensive in honor of the Algerian president (who had died

in December 1978) .21 The Polisario, freed from operations in Mauritania, had

more resources to pit against the Moroccans and began to launch large-scale

attacks against Moroccan positions in Western Sahara. Morocco's diplomatic

efforts against the Polisario had fared badly in 1978-79, leaving Rabat no

alternative but to increase its military offensiveness .

One of the first steps Morocco took to increase pressure in the south was to

form Task Force Ohoud in August 1979 . In three weeks this 6,000-man task

force, under the command of Colonel-Major Ahmad Dlimi, swept from

Benguerir in central Morocco to Dakhla, the capital city of what had been

Mauritania's section of the Sahara. 29 The Polisario chose not to face off against

the enormous firepower of this Moroccan column and the task force reached

Dakhla with few incidents in November 1979. Task Force Ohoud discovered

several Polisario supply caches and base camps but made little contact with the

guerrillas . Although only modestly successful, the task force was a move,

however tentative, away from the "hold the towns" mentality that had

characterized previous Moroccan military efforts in the south.

During the fall of 1979, the Polisario mounted a major attack on Semara, a

religious center of Western Sahara . The Polisario attacked with 2,000 to 5,000

men. The Moroccan garrison of 5,400 men held its own until a new factor could

be brought to bear on the battle: Morocco's new Mirage F-1 fighters, which

could operate day or night. Operating at night, the Mirages inflicted heavy

damage on the Polisario, both on the units operating at Semara and on

reinforcements coming across the desert .

Morocco's increased effort in the south, as reflected by Task Force Ohoud and

the qualitative increase in air power resources exemplified in the presence of the

Mirages, caused the Polisario to change its tactics in at least two ways. First, the

Polisario reverted to small unit guerrilla tactics rather than large-scale attacks

such as the one at Semara . Second, early in 1980 the Polisario began to increase

its activities in Morocco proper. This effort may have backfired. The Moroccans

were pushed into making significant military reforms as a result of the attacks

within their boundaries, and the increased Polisario activity inside Morocco was
MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR

an important argument used by the Carter administration to justify additional

military support for Rabat.30

The Polisario's attack on Zag in southern Morocco was a major turning point

in the war. The Moroccans formed a second task force, Zallaca, early in 1980 to

clear the Polisario from the Ouarkziz mountains where the rebels had succeeded

in isolating the town of Zag. Task Force Zallaca failed to dislodge the guerrillas

and had to be reinforced by another task force, Al Arak. In May 1980 Morocco

began a counteroffensive to relieve Zag . Although this relief effort eventually

succeeded, Morocco's forces were, during the next several months, unable to

dislodge the Polisario from Moroccan home territory . King Hassan and the

senior Moroccan leadership viewed this situation as a humiliation to Morocco

and its military forces . Hence, in the spring of 1980, Morocco's armed forces

initiated significant reforms ."

Dlimi, now a brigadier general, was put in charge of all forces south of

Agadir. Hassan, because of two previous military-led coup attempts, had been

loath to put significant power beyond his personal grasp . However, the situation

in the south was desperate enough to force this concession . New equipment and

additional personnel were sent south . Additionally, the command and control of

the air force was improved by relaxing control from Rabat . Since a 1972 coup

attempt that had involved the F-5 squadron, the air force had been under direct

control from Rabat. Therefore, launching aircraft in the south against guerrilla

attacks had been unnecessarily time consuming. Communication between the

army and air force also became more effective as staffs of the two services began

to work together under the new, on-the-scene leadership of General Dlimi .

These reforms led to more effective Moroccan initiatives . By late 1980 the

Moroccan military had reversed the perception that it was losing the war to the

Polisario . The air force, now getting intelligence from the Army and using a

C-130 for command and control and for surveillance, began a series of strikes

that had a serious impact on the Polisario . These attacks not only led to a high

attrition of the rebel forces but also denied them the ability to operate freely in

the desert . The air force undertook extremely successful operations at Akka,

Guelta Zemmour, Hausa, Messeid, and elsewhere between the summer of 1980

and the summer of 1981 .

In these operations the Moroccan pilots operated at altitudes and at speeds that

made the SA-7s and SA-9s, which had appeared in the Polisario's arsenal,

ineffective . They flew a few high-speed, low-altitude missions to deliver French

cluster bomb units and established good cooperation between the army and air

force by using C-130s as communication platforms . Meanwhile, the Polisario

had improved its antiaircraft capability not only with the SA-7 and SA-9, but it

also with ZPU-23 antiaircraft artillery . And the Front had seemingly

inexhaustible supplies of 122-mm rockets and ammunition for assaulting

Moroccan fixed positions . Nevertheless, the Royal Moroccan Air Force had hurt
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

the Polisario's ability to strike at will . This development limited the Polisario's

heretofore unchallenged initiative .

By late 1980 Morocco was in the best position militarily that it had been in for

a long time . The Moroccans realized, though, that they would never have the

resources to control all of Western Sahara . So they decided on a strategically

defensive move that fit in nicely with the defensive posture they had been in for

most of the war. This step was destined to be one of immense importance ; it sent

important political and military messages to everyone concerned with this war.

Morocco's leaders in Rabat decided to build a barrier to protect the population

and economic centers of Western Sahara . The barrier, called a ceinture or belt,

would be primarily an earthen wall and would include fortified positions at

various points, mine fields, and intermittent radar surveillance posts scattered

along its perimeter (fig . 6 to 9). Anything of any value in the Sahara would be

protected behind this wall : the major cities, virtually all of the population, the

Bu-Crag mines, and a large force of the Moroccan army. The army would hold

strong points, have mobile reaction units, and have quick access to air power

based at El Ayoun. Tactically the barrier presented a formidable problem for the

Polisario . Once the ceinture was in place, the rebels would have to penetrate this

defensive wall to be effective ; if they penetrated at one point, they would be

"walled in" and vulnerable to devastating counterattack . Politically the wall

sent another message: the Moroccans are staying in Western Sahara regardless of

the diplomatic and military pressures anyone may impose . Construction on the

barrier began in the summer of 1980 and was completed in the summer of 1982 .

Eventually it followed a path nearly 750 kilometers long and enclosed all the

"useful" area of the Sahara (fig . 10) . The Polisario made dozens of raids during

its construction but failed to stop the belt from being erected .

From the summer of 1980 to the fall of 1981, specifically to 13 October, the

Polisario was on the defensive primarily because of the increased effectiveness

of the Royal Moroccan Air Force. The Moroccans were using one C-130 for

reconnaissance and command and control even though the aircraft had none of

the sophisticated sensors one normally expects from today's tactical air

reconnaissance platforms. In June 1980 the Moroccan air force made successful

attacks on Polisario forces at Hausa, flying 10 Mirage F-1 sorties a day, a fairly

impressive effort. In July the Mirages attacked Polisario "Stalin Organs," 40-

tube banks of 122-mm rockets mounted on truck beds, at Messeid. Between late

March and early April 1981 the air force experienced perhaps its most intense

level of activity in conflicts around the Guelta Zemmour area. The Polisario

attacked Guelta Zemmour in strength and drove out the Moroccan garrison. The

air force covered the army's retreat, flew air cover for advancing reinforcements,

and intercepted two Polisario battalions joining the fight in late March . The

Moroccan air force inflicted considerable damage on the Polisario .

After Guelta Zemmour the Polisario clearly was on the defensive. The RMAF

had effectively found and hit the Polisario, had developed tactics that negated the

46
MOROCCO-POLISARIOWAR

Polisario SAMs, had improved air-ground coordination, and was beginning to

integrate a nascent tactical air intelligence capability with its fighter forces. The

Polisario had been so bloodied that the top leader of the Moroccan air force

believed that it had effectively eliminated the Polisario as a military threat. 32 The

Polisario did indeed reduce operations during the summer of 1981, but by the fall

its forces were back, and with a vengeance .

SA-6 Induced Paralysis (October to December 1981)

A second major attack on Guelta Zemmour began on 13 October 1981 and

lasted for 10 days. This attack was yet another turning point in the evolution of

this long and indecisive war. The Polisario attacked the 2,600-man Moroccan

garrison with about 3,000 troops . Besides the usual "Stalin Organs" the

Polisario brought with them two new types of weapons: T-54 and T-55 tanks and

SA-6 surface-to-air missiles .33

The SA-6 was the biggest surprise. It is an exceptionally capable and mobile

surface-to-air missile, the same one the Israeli air force worked so hard to

eliminate from Lebanon . This weapon system requires a high degree of training

and maintenance skill to keep it operational . No one in Morocco dreamed that

the Polisario had access to the SA-6, although the far less capable SA-7 and SA-9

had been on the battlefield for several years . Obviously the improved

effectiveness of the Moroccan air force had driven the Polisario to obtain a

weapon capable of countering the RMAF's F-5s and Mirage F-Is .

In this second battle of Guelta Zemmour, the Moroccan garrison was again

driven out. The Moroccan air force lost two Mirage F-Is, its only C-130

command and control platform, and one F-5 ; in addition one Puma helicopter

was damaged. The loss of two Mirage and one F-5 pilot was especially

devastating to the Moroccan air force-it had lost only four Mirage pilots over

the entire previous course of the war. The Moroccans retook Guelta Zemmour,

but later abandoned it as they retrenched behind the belt.

The presence of the SA-6 in the Sahara had a paralyzing effect on the

Moroccan air force . Although this paralysis eventually dissipated, as of July

1982 its effects had not entirely disappeared . The Moroccan pilots had no

experience against a SAM as capable as the SA-6, and had no readily available

information on how to cope with it . The air force's first reaction was to sharply

reduce its flying beyond the belt. From October to mid-December 1981

practically no air force missions were flown against the Polisario . The failure of

the air force to operate in the south provoked the ire of the army, which felt

naked without air cover. The disaster at Guelta Zemmour also encouraged

"finger pointing" between the army and air force on who was responsible for the

defeat. The fragile working relationship slowly built up by the army and air force

units in the south was shaken by the reluctance of the RMAF to operate against

the SA-6 .

47
THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Figures 6 and 7. A Portion of the Ceinture Near Bu-CraA.

48
MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR

Figures 8 and 9 . Close-ups of Defensive Positions Along Ceinture.

49
Atlantic Ocean

MAURITANIA

FES'

MEKNES ,^^ \P

nn.v `DD

n^

BENGUERIR MOROCCO

CANARY ISLANDS Q GOULIMINE

TAN TAN ZAG

~ J" TINDOUF

DEFENSE \xx

FOnTIFICATION REFUGEE CAMPS I

CRAA 1 POLISARIO

------- HEADQUARTERS

ALGERIA

MOUNTAINS

Figure 10. Reference Map: Saharan War.
MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR

The small number of T-54 and T-55 tanks (reports differ, but the number was

certainly fewer than 10) that the Polisario used in the attack on Guelta Zemmour

reinforces a notion suggested by the presence of the SA-6s. The Polisario, a

ragtag group of perhaps 5,000-8,000 North Africans with no economic means of

support except that provided by Algeria and Libya, has access to very

sophisticated and quite heavy weapons. The picture of guerrilla warfare as a

rebel force armed with automatic weapons is no longer a valid one. In the case of

the Sahara war, the guerrillas can match or even surpass the firepower of their

opponent . The impact of these heavy weapons on guerrilla tactics, and the

possible vulnerability of massed heavy weapons to air power, remains to be

seen .

Aftermath of Guelta Zemmour (January 1982 to Present)

The disaster at Guelta Zemmour drove the Moroccans in several directions

simultaneously . First, the air force experimented with its Mirages, which have

very basic electronic countermeasure equipment (such as radar warning receivers

and chaff and flare dispensers), to "test" the SA-6 . They very carefully tried to

determine "safe" altitudes in which to operate with SA-6s present. This action

was a limited one, fraught with danger; it did not yield conclusive results. 34

Second, during January 1982, the air force again went on the offensive, but in a

very limited manner. Third, the Moroccans withdrew behind their defensive

barrier and prepared themselves again for a long, defensive war. Finally, the

Moroccans went to the United States for help.

In the Moroccan view, Washington recently had moved dramatically closer to

Rabat. Ambassador Reed had long been saying that the United States was "with

Morocco," and King Hassan was well aware of the US desire for basing options

in Morocco in case of a Mideast contingency . Further, the Moroccans see their

war with the Polisario as a fight against Soviet-supplied Communists intent on

overthrowing the pro-West regime of King Hassan . The opinion was likely

shared at the highest levels of the State Department in October 1981 . With that

sort of background, Hassan felt he could count on US assistance to solve the

highly technical threat posed by the SA-6 .

NOTES

CHAPTER 3

1 . Martha Wenger, "Reagan Stakes Morocco in Sahara Struggle," Merip Reports, May 1982,

22.

2. John Mercer, Spanish Sahara (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976) . Chapter I has the best

description of the Spanish Sahara's topography available .

3 . John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute (Stanford, Calif:

Hoover Institution Press, 1983), 25-29.

4. Lewis B. Ware, Decolonization and the Global Alliance in the Arab Maghrib: The Case of

Spanish Sahara (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Institute for Professional Development, 1975),

28.

5 . John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful (New York: Columbia University Press,

1970),74.

6. Jerome B. Weiner, "The Green March in Historical Perspective," the Middle East Journal 33,

no. 1 (Winter 1979): 22.

7 . V. Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Western Saharans (Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes and

Noble Books, 1980), 172 .

8 . David L. Price, "Morocco and the Sahara: Conflict and Development," Conflict Studies, no.

88 (October 1977): 5-6.

9. Le Monde, 19 February 1976, 5.

10. Damis, Conflict, 40-41 .

11 . Ibid., 42.

12. Interview by author with senior Moroccan military officials in Rabat, 22 March 1982 .

13. Ibid.

14. The Manchester Guardian Weekley, 5 March 1978, 12, and 17 March 1978, 12.

15. Africa : An International Business Economic and Political Monthly (London, April 1981): 44.

16. Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily 11, no. 24 (15 December 1982): 1-2 .

17. Barbara Harrel-Bond, "The Struggle for the Western Sahara, Part II : Contemporary Politics,"

American Universities FieldStaff Reports, no. 38, 1981, 6.

18. 1960 US-Moroccan Security Assistance Agreement .

19. Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S . Drops Sahara Issue in Arms Sales to Morocco," the New York

Times, 26 March 1981, 27.

20. Ibid.

21 . Pranay B. Gupte, "US Aide in Rabat Has Mixed Reviews," the New York Times, 18 April

1982, 23.

22. Damis, Conflict, 129 .

MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR
THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITYCONFLICT

23 . Much of what follows, especially insofar as RMAF activity is concerned, is based on my trip

to Morocco from 7-28 March 1982. I visited all major RMAF installations and had extensive

interviews with senior, middle-level, and junior officers of the RMAF .

24. Damis, Conflict, 70-71 .

25 . Ibid ., 84.

26. This information was provided by the RMAF .

27 . Tony Hodges, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara (Metuchen, N.J . : The Scarecrow

Press, Inc ., 1982), 151-52 .

28 . Ibid ., xxxvi.

29 . Ibid ., 258 .

30. Based on the prepared statement of Honorable Harold H. Saunders, assistant secretary of state

for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, to House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing before

the Subcommittee on Africa, 96th Cong., 1st sess ., 4 December 1980, 8.

31 . Hodges, Historical Dictionary, 363-64 .

32. Statement made by Colonel-Major Mohammed Kabbej to General Lew Allen, 22 September

1981, Washington, D.C.

33 . "Desert Victory--0r Was It A Mirage?", The Economist 281, no. 7208 (24-30 October

1981): 43; "International News,"; Reuters Ltd., 6November 1981 ; Smith Hempstone, "High Stakes

in Morocco's `Forgotten War'," Reader's Digest, June 1982, 26.

34. Based on discussions with Mirage pilots at Sidi Slimane AB, Morocco, 23 March 1982.
CHAPTER 4

THE ROYAL MOROCCAN AIR FORCE AND

UNITED STATES' ASSISTANCE

After the second battle for Guelta Zemmour, King Hassan asked the United

States to help solve the problems of the SA-6. It was a request the United States

could not refuse. As noted earlier, Ambassador Reed, from his first day there,

had been very clear about our intent to assist the Moroccans . In addition, the

Reagan administration had decided that the failure of the United States to support

the Shah of Iran had soured the trust many third world friends had in the United

States . Moreover, Morocco's location at the mouth of the Mediterranean was

being recognized as an important geostrategic chokepoint . Also, King Hassan's

ability as a moderate Arab leader to communicate with Arab leaders representing

every shade along the moderate to radical political spectrum was becoming

increasingly important to US diplomatic initiatives in the Mideast. Finally, the

need for staging bases in North Africa for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task

Force made access to Morocco's airfields important. The administration realized

that Morocco had serious economic problems, and that Hassan's regime might

not survive an economic crisis and a major defeat in the Sahara. Thus, the United

States decided to assist the Moroccans in general and the Royal Moroccan Air

Force (RMAF) in particular . However, providing this assistance in an effective

way proved much more difficult than expected . One of the basic problems was

that nobody in Washington truly understood the capabilities, limitations,

problems, potential, and nature of the Royal Moroccan Air Force-the

organization that faced the SA-6 threat most directly .

The Royal Moroccan Air Force in Moroccan Politics

The Royal Moroccan Air Force finds itself in a difficult position . It is

continuously involved in fighting a nasty war (often with unreasonable, at least
THE AIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

by our standards, controls from Rabat), but at the same time must transform

itself into a first-class, modern air force that can support Moroccan interests

throughout Africa in the years ahead . The mission of the RMAF is made difficult

by the fact that it has evolved to its present level of preparedness and

effectiveness under very trying conditions .

When Morocco attained independence from France in 1956, a small air arm

was one of the early requirements of the armed forces. However, the Royal

Moroccan Air Force was not created as a separate service until 1964. Since that

time it has gradually grown in size and capability with help primarily from

France and the United States . Although Morocco obtained some Soviet aircraft

during the 1960s (for example, MiG-17s, MiG-15s, MiG-21s, and AN-12s),

none of those aircraft are operational today. Moreover, that Soviet assistance did

not extend to organizational and tactical experiences of a lasting nature .'

The key event affecting the growth of the Moroccan air force occurred on 16

August 1972 when the F-5 squadron apparently fell under the influence of

General Mohammed Oufkir, the minister of defense and chief of staff of

Morocco's military forces (Forces Armees Royales) . 2 Oufkir was thought to be

totally loyal to the King; he enjoyed the monarch's full confidence and was

clearly second in power only to the King.

The August 1972 coup attempt saw six pilots from the F-5 squadron intercept

the King's Boeing 727 and try to shoot it down . The pilot of the King's aircraft,

Mohammed Kabbej, radioed to the attacking aircraft that the King was dead and

that Kabbej was taking the damaged airliner down. The King had not been hit

and Kabbej's quick thinking and superb airmanship in landing the badly

damaged 727 were credited with saving the monarch's life . The pilots of the F-5

squadron were arrested; many of them "disappeared ." When Oukfir's

masterminding of the plot became apparent, he and his close associates were

purged. As it turned out, Oukfir had engineered not only the August 1972

attempt, but also one in July of the previous year when a group of

noncommissioned officer trainees attacked the royal seaside palace at Skhirat

where a birthday party for Hassan was in progress . This attack was part of a

wider coup d'6tat attempt that fizzled out rather quickly .

Following the 1972 coup attempt, King Hassan took strong steps that stripped

the military, especially the air force, of much of its power. Hassan took over as

his own minister of defense and chief of staff. Hassan showed his apparently

well-founded distrust of the military by virtually disarming the ground forces and

tightly controlling ammunition and all military operations. Kabbej, the King's

pilot, became inspector of the air force, equivalent to the chief of staff of the US

Air Force .

Even though the loss of many experienced F-5 pilots during this episode has

had a negative impact on the Moroccan air force to this day, the appointment of

Kabbej as its commander has had a positive impact. In fact, the RMAF was

really reborn in 1972 under Kabbej's dynamic leadership . 3 At the time of the

56
coup attempt, Kabbej was chief pilot of Royal Air Maroc, Morocco's national

airline . He was more than a pilot who happened to gain the trust of the King,

however. Kabbej had spent most of his working life in the air force . His long

association with the air force gives Kabbej a great deal of legitimacy to serve as

its commander. He joined the Royal Moroccan Air Arm in 1957 and served as its

chief from 1960 until 1963 when he left active duty to fly with Royal Air Maroc.

But he kept a reserve commission in the air force. Thus, because of his active

duty and reserve service, Kabbej is not regarded in the air force as an upstart

whose only claim to fame is service as the King's personal pilot . He is a superb

pilot who has flown a wide range of aircraft (from MiGs to Mirages), is a

supremely confident and intelligent man, and has a great deal of personal

charisma. Finally, Kabbej is the single point of authority for everything dealing

with the air force-an especially important fact when one realizes that no such

person exists in the Moroccan army. All of these facts combine to make Kabbej

a most powerful individual in the Moroccan military.

In addition, Kabbej is more than a loyal royal retainer and a bureaucrat with a

great deal of power. He is a man with considerable vision on how the Royal

Moroccan Air Force should be built and he is in a position to build it according to

his vision . The RMAF, as it exists today, shows Kabbej's foresight at work .

ROYAL MOROCCAN AIR FORCE

Building Up the Royal Moroccan Air Force

Morocco hopes to achieve two basic goals in the buildup of its air force: to

fight a successful war against the Polisario in Western Sahara and to build a

national force that can defend Morocco against air attack and can project its

power throughout North Africa in pursuit of possible future Moroccan national

objectives . Some of the current and projected programs of the RMAF clearly

reflect the dual purpose ofMorocco's approach to strengthening its air force.

Facilities

A look at the RMAF's operating bases and support facilities immediately

draws attention to the existence both of room for expansion and of several highly

advanced capabilities that are, at this time, only marginally used. These two

facts suggest that the Moroccans are planning a force which can be greatly

expanded in the future. For example the RMAF's command center at Sald, built

by Westinghouse Corporation at a cost of about $240 million, is the hub of a very

modern air defense system that blankets all of Morocco. Radar stations

throughout the country feed into the Sal6 center where operators track air

movements throughout the nation. All the equipment at the center is operated by

Moroccans (but some Westinghouse technicians remain as advisors and

troubleshooters) . Interestingly, the RAMF has many women technicians in its

57
THE AIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

ranks; many of the computer and scope operators are women, quite a rarity in

Islamic countries . Although the women are limited in the level to which they

can progress (there are only 10 female officers in the RMAF), they are getting

advanced technical training and are working alongside men, important indicators

ofthe progressive outlook of the RMAF.

The air defense center at Sale is a facility designed with the future in mind, not

just to meeting today's operational needs . Presently, Morocco has no aircraft

sitting strip alert, armed and prepared for an air defense mission . Thus, the

center is a paradox . It is a very expensive and modern facility that is being used

at much less than its full capability . Its dividends will only be paid in the future

when the center becomes the operational keystone in an effective air defense

system. Should international tensions increase in the meantime, however,

aircraft would have to be assigned to that mission .

Moreover, Morocco's command and control network functions under definite

limitations . For instance, the only time the command center could really operate

as a command center would be if Kabbej or King Hassan were on the scene ready

to conduct operations . Independent action by the officers routinely running the

Sale facility is unlikely . Furthermore, the controllers at the center are prohibited

from communicating directly with fighter bases-they speak only to airborne

aircraft . This restriction undoubtedly reflects King Hassan's lingering fear of

what an effective air defense system could accomplish if guided by a potential

usurper. In the meantime, the Sale air defense center serves primarily as a

training ground for young Moroccan computer operators and air defense

specialists .

The concern of the RMAF for Morocco's technological future is also reflected

at the Precision Measurement and Evaluation Laboratory (PMEL) at Kenitra .

This facility consists of four laboratories, concentrating on direct current,

alternating current, microwave, and physical dimension. They are modern and

well organized and are used by civilian organizations as well as the RMAF . The

air force allots eight years to train a PMEL technician . The laboratory is

essentially a national technical asset-again one that is being underutilized at

present, but it will become more important as the Royal Moroccan Air Force

develops. Kenitra also houses a central, computerized inventory system for the

air force . This system locates all the spare parts at all the bases of the RMAF. By

today's standards, it is a modest, even primitive, system, but it is the first of its

type in the Moroccan military. This system is a stepping-stone toward future

development and shows the RMAF's commitment to technological growth .

The main operating bases for fighters at Meknes (F-5 unit) and Sidi Slimane

(Mirage F-1 unit) also suggest commitment to the future. Both bases are well

maintained ; both have unused flightline and maintenance capacities . And Sidi

Slimane has 24 hardened aircraft shelters that rival those of any air force in the

world . The present threat and Morocco's current, limited air-to-air intercept

capability hardly justify expending resources for hardened shelters . However,

5 8
future requirements (which may include a need to project power on a regional

level) will be well served by the ability to expand that is built into current RMAF

facilities .

Training

These facilities would mean little without the qualified aircrews and support

personnnel to make the air force an effective unit . The Moroccans are expending

a great deal of their meager resources on building a first-rate training

establishment . The heart of their officer training system is the air academy at

Marrakech . The school opened eight years ago with only 14 students . In 1982

there were 120 students ; the goal for 1983 is for 150 students. In 1982, there

were 5,000 applicants for the 120 openings in the academy . Of those 120

students about one-half are expected to become pilots .

However, pilot production, especially for fighter pilots, is quite slow. Figures

11 and 12 show the time it takes to train a Mirage F-1 or an F-5 pilot and the

small number who successfully qualify . The two and one-half years needed to

become basically qualified in the Mirage and the three years for the F-5 are much

too long by US standards. The shortage of fighter pilots is perhaps Morocco's

greatest deficiency in its air war against the Polisario . But, because the time lag

in training fighter pilots is so long, there is no quick fix for this problem.

The Force

ROYALMOROCCAN AIR FORCE

In contrast, Morocco's air force does not seem to be short of aircraft . The

Royal Moroccan Air Force has an interesting variety of aircraft in its inventory.

Perhaps the area in which it is strongest is in support aircraft . The main

contribution of the RMAF in the early phases of the war was aerial resupply done

primarily by C-130H aircraft . Currently (as of 1983), the Moroccans have 15

C- 136s with 35 pilots and copilots available-an adequate pilot to aircraft ratio .

The RMAF maintains its C-130s at a 60-70 percent operationally ready rate, not

bad considering that Morocco has horrendous problems getting spare parts for its

aircraft . One of the C- 130s is equipped with side-looking airborne radar (SLAR),

which gives it an important surveillance capability as long as it does not get too

close to surface-to-air missiles . Two additional SLAR kits are on order. In

addition, Morocco has purchased two KC-130 airborne refueling aircraft and has

recently obtained a Boeing 707 with a refueling pod . The air force inventory also

includes several other transport aircraft . The Moroccans have two Mystere

Falcon 20s and a Mystere Falcon 50; all three aircraft have some electronic

countermeasures (jamming) and perhaps intelligence collection capability.

Morocco's training fleet consists largely of aircraft that were once strike

aircraft . The most advanced trainer is the Alpha Jet. During 1982, the RMAF

59
AIR FORCE ACADEMY

120 BEGINNING

CLASS

Figure 11 . Pilot Production in 1982 .

FLIGHT TRAINING BEGINS 20 HRS/5 WEEKS

3D YEAR

F-5 PILOT TAKES 3 YRS F-1 PILOT HAS ABOUT 2 1/2

TO ACHIEVE INITIAL YR6 TRAINING BEFORE

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY BECOMING OPERATIONAL

60 FLIGHT (POST -

CANDIDATES GRADUATION)

20% WASHOUT

INITIAL TRAINING

BRAVO

50 HRS/ 15

WEEKS

HELICOPTER ' FIGHTER INTERMEDIATE TRAINING 130 HRS/36

. TRANSPORT BEECHCRAFT78N WEEKS

FOUGA 52H

6 16 16

`r 20% 1 10% 1 13% (WASHOUT)

13 14 11

F-5 10% F-1 ADVANCED TRAINING 120 HRS/

MEKNES & KENETRA 6 MONTHS

ALPHA JET

5

6 MONTHS IF F-1 THEN 140 HRS/6-8

ENGLISH MONTHS

- LANGUAGE

TRAINING 40 HRS POLISH OFF

AT SQUADRON
40

7 20% (WASHOUT)

HELICOPTER TRANSPORT FIGHTER

t I I

11 11 11

20% 10% 1

30%

9 10 8

110%

Figure 12. Pilot Production in 1982 .

used 24 of these aircraft for training; however, only 7 students and 4 French and

3 Moroccan instructor pilots took part in this flight training program. One

squadron of Alpha Jet trainers, 12 aircraft will eventually go back to a groundattack role . For initial training role, the Moroccan air force uses 9 AS-15 Bravo

aircraft ; for intermediate training, it utilizes 12 T-34 Mentors and 26 CM-170

Fouga Magister aircraft . Only between 40 to 50 pilots are being trained in the

Mentor, Fouga, and Bravo programs.

The Moroccan air force has a sizeable fleet of helicopters, including 37

Agusta Bell 37s, 4 Agusta Bell 206s, 4 Agusta Bell 212s, 6 CH-47s, 21 SA-330

Pumas, and 6 SA-202 Gazelles . Eighteen more Gazelles are to be delivered

under current contracts . The Gazelles will be equipped with antitank missiles .

Morocco has enough helicopter pilots ; they had done some creditable work in the

war zone flying flank reconnaissance for moving ground forces .

Morocco also has six OV-10 aircraft. These planes were part of an arms deal

with the United States that also brought over F-5Es . The Moroccan air force has

only two pilots trained to fly the OV-10. However, these aircraft have never

been used for combat missions . They are too slow and too vulnerable to SA-7

attacks to use in the war zone and are currently of little value to the RMAF. One

possible role might be in sea patrol along the Moroccan-Saharan coast to protect

Morocco's rich fishing grounds from encroachment.

61

ROYALMOROCCAN AIRFORCE

F I

F-1 F-5

4 4
THE AIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

The Moroccan fighter force has the potential to become an effective source of

strength. It has been carrying the battle to the Polisario in recent years with its

Mirages and F-5 Freedom Fighters. The RMAF has a sizeable number of French

Mirage fighters; it has 24 F-1CHs and 15 of the more advanced F-lEHs . The

F-1CH, which is equipped to carry manually released weapons, is used primarily

in a ground-attack role; the newer F-lEH has more advanced radar and

electronics and can carry automatically released ordnance. Morocco has 8 F-5A

and B Freedom Fighters and 13 F-5E and F-5 Tiger Us. Although there are 12

qualified F-5A and B pilots, these older model F-5s are all rarely used. In

contrast, the RMAF has only 6 pilots qualified to fly the more advanced E and F

models . Since the F-5s do not have radar warning receiver (RWR) gear, they are

used only minimally in the war zone. Six more F-5Es with radar warning

receivers are on order. These additional aircraft will place further demands on

the already too few pilots qualified to fly this model of the F-5 . Moreover, the

F-5 unit is still suffering the aftereffects of the 1972 purge that followed the

assassination attempt against Hassan II . Finally, the best F-5 pilots have been

skimmed off to fly the more capable Mirages . The lack of qualified pilots rather

than insufficient airframes is the main factor limiting an expanded Moroccan air

war against the Polisario .

But when considering the current capability and potential of a third world air

force such as the RMAF, one needs to differentiate clearly between the notions

of qualified pilots and the quality of the pilots . Although Morocco suffers from a

shortage of qualified pilots, they do not show a lack of quality . Becoming

qualified is a function of effective training; we can judge the quality of pilots in

terms of their loyalty, dedication to service, and capacity and willingness to

learn . Based on these measures Morocco's pilots are quality officers . They are

loyal to the King, anxious to help Morocco advance whenever possible,

intelligent, and able . Senior RMAF officers are dedicated, professional, and

loyal to the King. The line pilots and support officers respect their seniors and

are a cohesive, capable group of men . Both the senior and junior officers

interact well and debate problems openly and without rancor. It is a personal air

force and one that fully understands its vital role in the Saharan war and its

importance to Morocco's future . Judged on their performance, the RMAF pilots

are clearly an elite group. With improved training programs, the personnel of the

RMAF have the capability to make important strides to raise their skill levels .

This point is an important factor to keep in mind while evaluating the air force's

role and potential in the Saharan war.

Limitations of the RMAF

Good facilities and aircraft, quality people, and decent equipment and

facilities provide a basis for developing a quality air force in the years ahead.

The limitations on the RMAF today, however, far outweigh these positive

62
Inadequate Training

ROYALMOROCCAN AIR FORCE

attributes, a situation that is to be expected in an air force that is developing

while simultaneously fighting a war.

The number one problem, fighter pilot production, has already been raised.

The slow rate of training results in a gross imbalance in fighter asset-to-pilots

ratio : 3 to 1 in the case of Mirages, slightly less for the F-5s. Basic F-5 pilot

training is done in the United States, basic Mirage training in France . But these

courses teach little more than rudimentary skills in handling the aircraft .

Morocco also does not have a strong, effective program of advanced pilot

training. Formation flying, air-to-air combat, ground attack tactics, and SAM

tactics are done in the Moroccan units . Yet, because pilots and aircraft are so

incredibly expensive for third world countries, these nations are loath to put

either at risk . Hence, training is done as safely as possible, causing it to lack

realism and intensity . The pilots rarely gain the confidence to take the aircraft to

the limits of its performance capability . Thus, the expensive weapon systems

that Morocco and other developing countries are buying in impressive quantities

are rarely used to their potential .

Poor Army-Air Force Relationship

A second limitation on the effectiveness of the RMAF is the lack of adequate

training with the ground forces and the failure to develop effective coordination

of air-ground tactics . This situation, in part, stems from the competition between

Colonel-Major Kabbej, the head of the air force, and senior army officers who

compete for the King's attention and favor. That competition hampers effective

staff work between the two organizations . Besides, King Hassan has purposely

fragmented the army to limit its potential political power. Thus, the army does

not have a chief of staff who can coordinate activity between the various

branches of the ground forces . Rather, each branch operates autonomouslythere is virtually as much difficulty in coordinating between army branches as

between the army and the air force . This fragmentation of the army makes joint

army-air force training quite difficult .

Further, the Moroccan air force and army differ in a fundamental way, a

difference that is not uncommon in any nation's military. Morocco's air force is

technologically much more advanced than its army . This is a fact brought on by

necessity . The aircraft, simulators, communication equipment, weapons, and

similar equipment that comprise an air force create a need for technological

expertise . The Sal6 air defense center and the air force's computerized spare

parts management system have no parallels in the army . In attitude and training,

the air force is technologically a different animal than the army, and that makes

communication between the two difficult.

63
THEAIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

In spite of these difficulties, some progress is being made in joint army-air

force coordination and planning. The air force has trained 20 army men to act as

ground controllers for air strikes . These troops are much like US ground-based

forward air controllers and have been trained in air force communication

techniques and weapon systems capabilities . For example, the RMAF has

adapted from the French a manual on ground-air coordination . But, although the

manual is available in the field, the extent of its use is not known.

The current practices at El Ayoun, the command air base in the war zone,

provide the best evidence of this progress . The air commander at El Ayoun has a

direct link to the ground-force communications net and is in constant contact

with officers operating along the belt. They exchange information, analyze

Polisario activity, and work together in planning and evaluating the effectiveness

of air strikes . The working relationship between the army and the air force in the

war zone is very good and stands in stark contrast to the situation in Rabat.

Inadequate Air Intelligence

A third serious weakness of the Royal Moroccan Air Force is the lack of

adequate air intelligence . In 1981 the RMAF took the initial step in an effort to

correct this deficiency when it created an intelligence section at the headquarters

level . But this unit was allocated just one officer and no staff. With no formal

training in air intelligence, this officer will be unable to make a noticeable

contribution toward building an effective intelligence capability for quite some

time. Meanwhile, the Moroccan air force is faced with several shortcomings in

intelligence skills and intelligence equipment. It has only rudimentary film

processing and readout equipment. And, although the SLAR-equipped C-130s

provide the Moroccans with a good intelligence collection platform, the RMAF

must recruit and train able people for intelligence work. It must also learn and

adopt modern intelligence concepts and methods to use its equipment

effectively . Additionally, the Moroccans must buy the right kind of equipment

in the future, a step that will require developing considerable intelligence

expertise within the service . Likewise, the Moroccans have not developed a

systematic program for collecting, analyzing, and using intelligence . Nor have

they learned the related concepts of targeting, selecting the best ordnance for

destroying a given target, and assessing strikes . These support activities are

essential if the air force is to use its assets fully .

Ineffective Planning

A fourth problem facing the Royal Moroccan Air Force is the lack of an

effective planning staff. The Moroccans have established a planning section at

64
ROYAL MOROCCAN AIR FORCE

their Rabat headquarters but have no one assigned to it . The planning is done by

its top three leaders : Colonel-Major Kabbej, his deputy, and the director of

operations . These men carry in their heads the needs and vision for developing

this air force . Even though they are extraordinarily capable men, they do not

have the time and energy to meet their demanding schedules and, at the same

time, do an effective planning job.

In short, the major weakness of the Moroccan air force is its lack of midlevel

staff officers to develop and conduct intelligence operations and joint training

exercises, to do the planning necessary to ensure that the RMAF can perform its

mission successfully, and to design the doctrinal basis for the air force. The

demands of the war and the need "to put rubber on the ramp," when compared

to the relative unimportance of support structures, make this situation

understandable . But, if the RMAF is to develop fully over the next 20 years or

so, it must begin now to develop the infrastructure that will enable it to become a

potent force .

United States Assistance to the Royal Moroccan Air Force

The United States has long been involved with supporting Morocco's armed

forces. In the past, this involvement has been quite limited; Washington was

always a distant second to Paris in providing assistance to Rabat. However, over

the last several years, the political and military importance of Morocco has

grown considerably in the eyes of the United States . The result has been a

significant increase in US defense assistance to Morocco .

The United States began supplying Morocco with arms in 1960 . From 1960

through the late 1970s, this arms program concentrated on modernizing

Morocco's overall military posture and did not relate specifically to the war in

the south. For instance, after a 1974 visit to assess Rabat's defense needs, Brig

Gen Edward Partrin (US Army) recommended equipping two Moroccan armored

brigades stationed along the Algerian frontier. This equipment was to be

provided through military sales (not aid) at a cost of about $500 million with

delivery to be completed by 1980 . 5 US military credits to Morocco from 1975 to

1980 ranged between $14 million and $45 million a year-far too small to

finance major arms purchases . Morocco had been receiving help from wealthier

Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, to buy aims for quite some time .

The situation changed in the late seventies . In 1977 Morocco asked for

military assistance to cope specifically with the Polisario . The Moroccans

requested OV-10 aircraft and attack helicopters . However, a 1960 security

assistance agreement between the United States and Morocco stipulated that

US-supplied weapons could be used only for internal security and self-defense .

This particular agreement was designed to prevent American arms from being

used against Israel. The Arms Export Control Act, which applies to all US

65
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

foreign arms sales, similarly limits the use of US-supplied weapons. During

congressional hearings in March 1978, the State Department said that the

Moroccans had been using US-supplied F-5 aircraft in the Sahara but that their

action was not a "substantial violation" of US law .' At the same time,

Morocco's request for OV-10s and helicopters was shelved . The Carter

administration was limiting arms sales to Morocco apparently because the

Moroccans were using US arms in offensive actions in the Sahara . President

Carter did allow Morocco to buy six CH-47C Chinook transport helicopters

because these could be considered "defensive" weapons. The Carter

administration's refusal to support Morocco was bitterly resented by the

Moroccans who, to this day, have unpleasant memories of US policy in the

Carter era.

In the summer of 1979, the Carter administration began to revise its position

on support for Morocco. It used the successful Polisario attacks in Morocco

proper to justify providing what had been considered as offensive arms, namely

parts for F-5s being used in the south .' By the fall the Carter administration had

completely reversed its position and approved a $235-million arms sale to

Morocco, including 6 OV-10 armed reconnaissance aircraft, 20 F-5E fighters,

and 24 Hughes helicopters-half of which were to be armed with antitank

missiles, the other half with guns . 9 The administration was apparently reacting to

a number of pressures besides the Polisario attack in southern Morocco . A need

to show that the United States is reliable in support of its third world friends and

a good deal of pressure from Saudi Arabia, which financed the deal, were major

factors that affected the decision to allow Morocco to buy weapons that would be

brought to bear against the Polisario in the Sahara.

Hearings in January 1980 by both the House Subcommittee on Internal

Security and Scientific Affairs and the Subcommittee on Africa concerning the

proposed aircraft sales to Morocco were heated. 10 On one side stood

Congressman Stephan Solarz (D-NY). He believed the arms sales were not in US

interests, would hurt US relations with Nigeria and Algeria, and would, in

effect, suppress a genuine national liberation movement. In contrast, the Carter

administration reiterated the need to support America's friends-a need made all

the more poignant with the fall of the Shah of Iran, the need to offset Soviet arms

available to the Polisario, and the need to bolster the Moroccans' confidence to

encourage them to move toward a negotiated settlement. In the end, these two

congressional committees tied the arms deal to progress in negotiations by

Morocco. This proviso, obviously, was difficult to measure and implement.

Early in 1980, the United States had made an important shift in its attitude

toward the Morocco-Polisario war. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern

and South Asian Affairs Harold H . Saunders testified that the administration had

decided that "an outright military victory . . . by Morocco's adversaries would

constitute a serious setback to major US interests in this area ."" The Saharan

66
ROYALMOROCCAN AIR FORCE

war now had become a major US interest, whereas in the past the United States

had been unwilling to support the Moroccans in their fight with the Polisario in

Western Sahara .

The trend toward support of the Moroccans was vigorously pursued when the

Reagan administration took office in January 1981 . One of Secretary of State

Alexander M. Haig's earliest initiatives was to support Morocco's request for

108 M-60A3 tanks with a price tag of $89 million, a request which had been

shelved by the Carter administration. At the same time Haig rescinded the

Carter administration's requirement that shipment of arms to Morocco would be

tied to progress toward a negotiated settlement. This arms request ran into little

congressional opposition. 12 Since then the Reagan team has continued a high

level of support for Morocco. The Reagan budget for fiscal year 1983 raised

foreign military sales credits to Morocco from $34 million to $100 million ."

And Ambassador Reed, who maintained a high profile, started parading highlevel Americans-Secretary Haig, Secretary Weinberger, Deputy Director of

Central Intelligence Admiral Bobby Inman, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director Lt Gen James Williams, and Senator Charles Percy, to name fewthrough Rabat .

The United States had been taking a very supportive stance toward Morocco

for well over . a year when the Guelta Zemmour disaster occurred in October of

1981 . In light of these changes in the position of the United States, King Hassan

probably felt that his request for help against the new, sophisticated SA-6 would

not go unheeded. The appearance of the SA-6 in Morocco was a dramatic

improvement in the forces of the Polisario and had a devastating impact on the

ability of Morocco to continue achieving success on the battlefield . The

Moroccans turned to the United States in the hope of immediate assistance . ' 4

Meeting the SA-6 Threat

To meet the SA-6 threat the Moroccans needed help in several areas. First, to

increase the proficiency of its aircrews, the RMAF needed specific training on

how to operate in an SA-6 environment and how to attack that system. A critical

factor for the RMAF was that its aircrews needed to know what the performance

characteristics of the SA-6 were; whether it could be defeated by speed,

maneuvering, or altitude ; or whether a combination of flying tactics and

appropriate electronic countermeasures (ECM) could defeat the SA-6 . Yet,

Moroccan pilots were not being instructed on how to fly in an SA-6 environment

during the basic F-5 training they were getting in the United States . Thus, the

first priority was to send US pilots to Morocco to provide this additional training.

Second, the Moroccans also needed various kinds of ECM gear for their fighter

aircraft . Their F-5s had neither radar warning receivers (RWR) to report when

their aircraft had been acquired by radar nor chaff and flare dispensers . Although

67
THE AIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

the Moroccan Mirage fighters had RWR gear, these aircraft did not have chaff

and flare dispensers appropriate for dealing with SA-6s; they were set up for

SA-7 and SA-8 missiles not the SA-6s. Finally, the Moroccans needed

information: Where were the SA-6s? How many were there? What was the

Polisario's refire capability?

The need to help the Moroccan air force meet the SA-6 threat pointed up some

serious deficiencies in the ability of the United States and the US Air Force to

help friends in the third world face difficult military challenges. The US Air

Force had to overcome three problems in this effort . First, no one knew how

proficient the Moroccan pilots were in basic flying skills . Second, the US Air

Force had not developed a clear set of tactics for operating against the SA-6 other

than the highly sophisticated Wild Weasel tactics-which were far beyond the

capability of any third world air force. Third, the United States could provide

training on only one of Morocco's two primary fighters, namely the F-5 ; yet the

Mirage, the more capable of the two aircraft, was doing most of the fighting in

the war zone.

The United States Air Force's response was to send a three-man training team

to the F-5 unit at Meknes . Although the trainers did not know French, this

language barrier was not as great an impediment as it could have been because

the Moroccan pilots had learned a good deal of English as part of+their F-5

training . The US pilots quickly found that the Moroccans had little capability in

high-speed, low-altitude work-the very tactics the US team wanted to develop.

The US team stayed in Morocco 60 days. Although the F-5 pilots improved their

basic flying proficiency, primarily in formation and low-altitude flying, the US

team concluded that Morocco's F-5 pilots would need much more training before

they could go after SAMs-even if they did have improved electronic

countermeasure equipment . Several Mirage pilots visited the F-5 unit to learn

what they could from the Americans; however, the US pilots, who were

unfamiliar with the Mirage, were of little help to Morocco's Mirage pilots.

The Americans favorably impressed the Moroccans with their skill in the

aircraft, the intensity of their training program, and their ability and willingness

to push the aircraft to its operational limit . Previously the Moroccans had been

exposed primarily to the comparatively conservative and tame training programs

of the French. The intense training philosophy of the Americans considerably

impressed Morocco's pilots. For their part, the US pilots thought the Moroccans

were excellent students, were willing to take risks, and had the potential to

improve their flying skills greatly . Nevertheless, the US effort to train pilots to

cope with SAMs did not accomplish its goal.

Our attempt to provide appropriate ECM equipment for the F-5s and Mirages

also fell short. The United States thought it could provide immediate assistance

by furnishing Morocco with 10 ALQ-119 ECM pods and 10 ALE-38 chaff and

flare dispensers for the F-5s . (The best pod we have for the SA-6 threat, the

ALQ-131, is not compatible with either the Mirage or the F-5.) The US offer was

68
ROYALMOROCCAN AIR FORCE

for a nonrenewable 180-day lease of the 10 ALQ-119s and ALE-38s with an

installation and maintenance cost of $20 million to $40 million, payable in cash.

The Moroccans-already strapped by a tough economic year, a drought, and the

enormous cost of the war-did not have the cash to pay for the installation.

Furthermore, a nonrenewable 180-day loan of equipment did not seem like a

reasonable bargain. Instead Morocco shopped around and bought some ECM

pods from the Italians and installed them on the Mirages . As a result, US

credibility for supplying the right equipment at the right time suffered greatly .

Additionally, the United States had the capability to provide important

intelligence to the Moroccans about the SA-6 .~ Because of very high-level

interest in helping the Moroccans, the United States made a concerted effort to

locate the position of SA-6s operated by the Polisario . At considerable expense,

US forces obtained specific intelligence data that could have been put to

operational use by the RMAF. But, the United States did not develop clear

procedures to transfer the intelligence that its personnel had gathered and

analyzed to the people who could use the intelligence-the RMAF strike pilots at

El Ayoun. On the one hand, the US intelligence community insisted on keeping

the intelligence under tight control at a high level . On the other, Morocco did not

use efficient procedures to disseminate the information properly from Rabat .

Frequently the timely intelligence obtained by the United States did not reach the

south in time to do any good.

The United States offered help to the Moroccans in yet another area . In

November 1981, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security

Affairs Francis J. West led a US delegation to review Morocco's security needs .

He urged the Moroccans to engage in more aggressive, mobile

counterinsurgency tactics . To that end he offered a team of 20 US ground force

experts to train the Moroccans in commando-style tactics . One aim was to

develop a special unit that could make commando-type attacks on SA-6 units in

the desert, perhaps using helicopters. The US Army team sent to work with the

Moroccans had no tested plan for coping with the SA-6 in a desert, so they

invented tactics along the way . The Army team was working with an elite

Moroccan battalion assigned to protect the King; it was, perhaps, the best

equipped and trained unit in the Moroccan army . The effects of the US Army's

training are yet to be seen . One hopeful sign is that a senior RMAF officer is now

working with the Moroccan army to develop this special unit . The use of tactics

involving ground forces, air cavalry, and fighter aircraft working together

against the SA-6 might prove very interesting and successful . However, the US

Air Force does not have any practical experience in developing those kinds of

tactics for the use in the third world by third world air forces, so we can offer our

friends little help in that area.

The one positive step that resulted from this short-term effort was that the

United States finally decided to supply the RMAF with the cluster bomb units

(CBU) it had been requesting for several years . These weapons are particularly

69
THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

effective against personnel, unarmored vehicles, and radar. The United States

had refrained from allowing the Moroccans to buy cluster bombs because of their

lethality . (The same policy applied to napalm.) But, we were now ready to sell

the cluster bomb to the Moroccans to meet the SA-6 threat .

However, given its deficiencies as described throughout this chapter, the

Royal Moroccan Air Force has used these expensive cluster bombs in a most

profligate way . For example, in March 1982, five months after the Guelta

Zemmour debacle, a flight of three Mirages and two F-5s operating from El

Ayoun used these bombs to attack an area of suspected Polisario activity near the

Bu-Crag area. The planning for the operation was simple: reports from the army

on Polisario activity were plotted on a map and an area perhaps 2 kilometers by 1

kilometer was sketched around the map points . The aircraft flew to

predetermined coordinates, about a mile from the strike area, and "tossed" their

bombs from the predetermined coordinates using the inertial navigation system

of the Mirages . There was no pre- or poststrike reconnaissance of the target area,

hence the results of the attack were not known. At best, it could have harrassed

the Polisario ; most likely it had no impact at all . This attack was a waste of the

equipment at the disposal of the Moroccan air force . It shows too clearly the allconsuming caution the RMAF feels it must exercise where there is even the

possibility of an SA-6 attack .

In spite of these US attempts to help the Moroccans neutralize the SA-6s, the

missiles remained in the desert unharmed . Clearly problems existed on both the

American and Moroccan sides . The United States had problems understanding

the capability of the RMAF, imposed impossible limitations on providing ECM

equipment, and failed to understand the workings of Moroccan politics . This

situation yielded marginal returns . The Moroccan air force lacked basic

capabilities in flying skills, had inadequate means to use intelligence, and had

poor equipment-a combination that made a link up between what the United

States could provide and what the Moroccans would use impossible . This

experience raises several important issues : Should US Air Force improve its

capabilities to assist a friendly third world air force? If small scale intervention is

required, can the United States act effectively? Should there be organizational

changes in the US Air Force to make an improved assistance and intervention

role feasible?
NOTES

CHAPTER 4

1 . Harold D . Nelson, ed., Morocco-A Country Study, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C. : The

American University, 1978), 289-92.

2. The details of this coup attempt have never been made public. Harold Nelson's Morocco-A

Country Study, referenced above, has the basic facts of the event on pages 78-79. The information

contained in my paragraphs on the subject was gleaned from conversations with several mid- and

high-level Moroccan officers in March 1982.

3. The information on Kabbej's background and on the organization, capabilities, limitations, and

potential of the Royal Moroccan Air Force that follows is based on data gathered by the author while

touring all operational RMAF bases during March 1982.

4 . The Moroccan army, ten times the size of the RMAF, is potentially far too potent for the King

to allow it to become too efficient . Thus, the army is kept decentralized and essentially leaderless .

5. John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa : The Western Sahara Dispute (Stanford, Calif . :

Hoover Institution Press, 1983), 25 .

6. Ibid ., 26 .

7. House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Hearings, Foreign

Assistance Legislationfor Fiscal Year 1979 (Part 3), 96th Cong ., 2d sess ., 159 .

8 . House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa and International

Organizations, Hearings, US Policy and the Conflict in the Sahara, 97th Cong.,lst sess ., 23-24 July

1979,14-15.

9. David H. Price, "Conflict in the Maghreb: The Western Sahara," Conflict Studies, no. 127

(February 1981): 10 .

10. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific

Affairs and on Africa, Hearings, Proposed Arms Sale to Morocco, 96th Cong., 2d sess ., 24-29 June

1980.

11 . Ibid ., 3 .

12. Bernard Gwertzman, "US Drops Sahara Issue in Arms Sales to Morocco," New York Times,

26 March 1981, 24.

13. Martha Wenger, "Reagan Stakes Morocco in Sahara Struggle," Merip Reports, May 1982,

24.

14. The analysis of US attempts to help the Moroccans with the SA-6 problem is based on

discussions held with Moroccan and American military and diplomatic personnel in Rabat and

Washington, March-April 1982. Few public sources on this episode have emerged . The most

complete such article is Tony Hodges, "The Endless War," in Africa Report, July-August 1982.

Hodges' article, however, contains several significant errors of fact . Its bias toward the Polisario is

also evident.

7 1

ROYAL MOROCCAN AIR FORCE

CHAPTER 5

MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICTS:

LESSONS FROM MOROCCO

The Moroccan experience in fighting a protracted guerrilla war and in seeking

assistance from a professed, superpower friend has lessons at many political,

diplomatic, and military levels . The attempt by the United States government to

assist Morocco at a critical point in its war against the Polisario suggests several

points about modern low-intensity conflicts, the role of the US military in

general and the US Air Force specifically in such conflicts, and the requirements

that would be generated by such involvements.

The overarching point is that low-intensity conflicts will not go away . There

will be times when the United States must act to protect its interests and those of

its friends, and when exercising specialized military capabilities will likely

become a necessary and useful option to have as policymakers design a plan of

action. The Morocco-Polisario war has been dragging on in spite of major

diplomatic efforts by the King of Morocco, the United States, the Organization

of African Unity, the United Nations, Saudi Arabia, and others. Most

commentators believe that the conflict has no military solution, yet continuously

escalating military activity seems to be a constant in the war. Until recently the

United States was relatively uninvolved and unconcerned . During the first years

of the Carter administration, US aid to Morocco was very limited. Only when

Morocco's geostrategic position became a factor in US planning for Middle East

contingencies did US aid to Morocco increase. After the Reagan administration

assumed power, US policy closely embraced Morocco, promising strong

support, even if that support was not clearly defined. Morocco's call for help

came quickly. The United States government wanted to help, but failed to

achieve the desired results .
THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Imprecise US Policies and Objectives

This failure occurred for many reasons . At the policy level, deciding to act on

Morocco's behalf was hampered both by the complex international interests

intertwined in this seemingly remote and inconsequential war and by the

considerable internal squabbling within policy-making circles in the United

States. On the one hand, the United States interest in maintaining Hassan in

power as a pro-Western, moderate Arab leader in a country whose location is

important to US strategies in the Mideast and on the southern flank of NATO . On

the other hand, a less obvious but equally significant factor for US decision

makers was the need, especially in late 1981 when the SA-6 crisis occurred, to

deal fairly with Algeria, Morocco's real protagonist in the war. A strong faction

in the US State Department believes that Algeria, not Morocco, will be the

future leader of the Maghreb and that US interests would be better served by

strengthening its ties with Algeria rather than Morocco . Moreover, many US

policymakers would like to maintain access to Algeria's oil should other supplies

be endangered . Finally, a desire to repay Algeria for its assistance in securing

the release of US hostages in Iran also affected US planning to support Morocco

in late 1981 .

Another factor, which helps complicate the picture, is the high level of

support provided to Morocco by Saudi Arabia . Saudi Arabia is now central to

United States policy in the Middle East. Riyadh has played an important role as

financial backer to many US allies and friends and is, in large part, financing

Morocco's war against the Polisario . Saudi Arabia has a great deal of influence

in Washington and its strong support of King Hassan must be considered as the

United States formulates its Moroccan policy. Thus, many argue that we must

back Morocco, even at the risk of antagonizing Algeria .

Arms control philosophy also had an important impact at the policy level . As

discussed earlier, the US Congress had bitterly debated providing arms to

Morocco for use against the Polisario . The legitimacy of Moroccan claims to

Western Sahara had been deeply questioned in Congress and no clear consensus

had been established defining US interests and responsibilities in the conflict .

The crisis precipitated by the Polisario's SA-6 attack on Moroccan aircraft could

only exacerbate concern about escalating US support to the Moroccans because

dealing with the SA-6 would have to include considering such options as direct

US attacks on the SA-6s or, much more likely, providing the Moroccans with the

intelligence, electronic countermeasures, munitions, and training that would

enable them to meet the threat on their own . The idea of direct action against the

SA-6s was probably never considered as a serious option for US assistance. Our

efforts concentrated on helping the Moroccans deal with the SA-6 themselves .

This effort revealed some institutional weaknesses in the Air Force and US

security assistance programs. The three-man Air Force team sent to Morocco on
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FORLIC

60-day temporary duty was able to work only with Morocco's F-5 pilots . These

pilots were the least experienced pilots in the RMAF and flew an aircraft that is

clearly a second stringer behind the Mirage F-1 . The US pilots chosen to help the

Moroccans had many handicaps going into the problem . They were professional

flight instructors from the Air Training Command and had no special training in

dealing with a third world air force, no training in understanding the MoroccoPolisario war, no ability to speak or understand French or Arabic, and no

understanding of the flying proficiency of the Moroccan F-5 squadron.

Before the United States could aid Morocco effectively, those people in the

Air Force and elsewhere who were responsible for developing viable assistance

options had to understand fully the capabilities and limitations of the Royal

Moroccan Air Force, the nature of the war the Moroccans were pursuing in the

Sahara, and the impact of Moroccan politics on any military activity undertaken

by the Moroccan armed forces . However, in proposing to help a third world air

force meet a threat such as the SA-6, US military personnel often tend to analyze

the situation in terms of their own experiences . In Morocco this tendency was

evident . The plan developed to help the Moroccans applied the typical US Air

Force solution of combining specialized tactical flying training with appropriate

electronic countermeasure equipment; the Moroccans then would be able to

attack the SA-6 themselves . If we added assistance in locating the target, it

would make the Moroccans' task that much easier. But because our information

on the Royal Moroccan Air Force was so limited and because we had only a

marginal understanding of political-military relations in Morocco, our attempts

at helping were ineffectual .

Moreover, the United States has great difficulty supplying sophisticated

electronics equipment to a friendly third world country for political and practical

reasons . Politically, many officials are reluctant to provide sophisticated

equipment because of the fear of compromising US technological secrets .

Additionally, many political decision makers resist any attempt to provide

military assistance to a threatened friend because such assistance suggests an

escalation in terms of the quality and sophistication of the arms involved in the

conflict. From a practical standpoint, getting equipment that could be adapted to

Morocco's first-line Mirage fighters proved infeasible ; adapting the equipment

to the F-5 was possible but impractical, primarily because of the terms we

imposed on providing the equipment. A nonrenewable 180-day lease for

equipment that cost many millions of dollars to install is not a very palatable

offer for a country short of money and concerned with permanent improvements

to its forces . In addition, this equipment, even if it could be provided

permanently to Morocco, could be used only on the F-5, clearly Morocco's

second-string fighter . If the US could have provided electronic countermeasure

equipment for the Mirage that would have met the SA-6 threat, then perhaps our

assistance could have been more productive . Certainly the flying skills of the

Mirage pilots were much more advanced than those of the F-5 pilots . Our

75
THE AIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

training assistance would have been much more be neficial had we been able to

work with the Mirage unit.

Basic Requirements for Assisting a Third World Air Force

Effective assistance by the US Air Force to third world air forces in the future

will require a major effort in at least three areas . First, the Air Force must

acquire a much deeper knowledge of third world countries in general and third

world military forces in particular . This effort .-equires that we give higher

priorities to collecting and analyzing intelligence on most third world countries.

Intelligence analysts and security assistance progr,,im managers normally tend to

concentrate their efforts on the high-visibility, high-priority programs such as

those in Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, and similar hot spots . Analysts covering less

important areas normally have several countries to cover simultaneously . This

division of responsibility precludes those analysts from building a really

thorough knowledge about these smaller countries . Thus, when a crisis occurs,

US policy formulators have inadequate information and are ill prepared to offer

meaningful and effective options to assist a threatened friend . As seen in

Morocco, a poor understanding of the capabilities of the Royal Moroccan Air

Force resulted in ineffectual attempts to assist-the training and the electronic

countermeasures the United States tried to supply failed to deal effectively with

the problem at hand.

Second, the Moroccan experience points up the need for the United States and

the Air Force to be able to transfer knowledge and techniques if they are to aid a

third world country effectively and its air force . But our ability to transfer

knowledge and techniques presupposes that we will have appropriate knowledge

about third world countries and their military services, and will know what

techniques and knowledge would be valuable for their air forces to acquire . It

may not be appropriate, for example, to train a third world air force in the

sophisticated aircraft and tactics used at the US Air Force's Red Flag facility at

Nellis Air Force Base . Moreover, in terms of both flying skills and

infrastructure, the US Air Force must identify those areas in which it is most

qualified to provide assistance. Infrastructure includes the support elements that

enable combat aircraft units to be viable components of an armed force-the

planning, intelligence, logistics, and doctrinal organizations that make air power

a powerful force. The Air Force must create training and infrastructure packages

appropriate to developing air power in third world countries, not just to building

smaller mirror images of the US Air Force . In short, we in the Air Force will

have to exert the effort to identify a friendly country's weaknesses and be

flexible enough to adapt our equipment and capability to respond to the host

country's needs.

Once these kinds of training packages are built, techniques for transferring

that knowledge effectively must also be developed . That means having the

76
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR LIC

organization and the people to support work in third world countries. At present,

the Air Force tends to attempt to transfer knowledge to third world militaries

only in an ad hoc manner. (Transferring equipment is institutionalized within

the Department of Defense military assistance programs .) The normal procedure

is to wait for a foreign nation to request specialized training, usually in response

to an immediate need, such as the SA-6 crisis in Morocco . The Air Force

searches out those personnel who seem able to fill the requirement, pulls them

from their current assignment, and sends them on temporary duty (TDY) to the

problem area . Sometimes the TDY personnel get briefed on the political-military

situation they will encounter, sometimes not. Language training usually cannot

be provided to meet a short-term contingency . Thus, if knowledge of the

language is mandatory, the selection of personnel is limited ; and of course, the

effectiveness of personnel who have no language capability will be limited since

they must work through interpreters .

A related issue is the cross-cultural awareness of each member of the training

team . Working with foreign nationals, especially the extremely proud elites of

the developing world, is greatly eased if the US personnel are trained in the

cultural mores of the country to which they are assigned . Yet, there are very few

ways for an Air Force officer to become attuned to the subtleties of the cultures

in which he may be required to work. The handful of officers trained as-foreign

area specialists is mostly concentrated in the intelligence, international

political-military affairs, and office of special investigations career fieldscareer specialties that are not normally involved in transferring knowledge to

allied or friendly countries . Some personnel sent abroad have the opportunity to

participate in a USAF Special Operations School course on cross-cultural

relations . However, it is very broad brush, and, thus, useful but by no means

comprehensive preparation for entering a foreign culture as a teacher of complex

ideas and equipment .

Third, the United States and the Air Force must develop the capability to react

speedily to assist threatened third world friends . Being able to put the right

combination of people and equipment on the scene fast would greatly impress

third world friends and allies . The ability to act quickly depends on our first

acquiring a knowledge of potential host countries and their militaries, and then

building effective means to develop and transfer military knowledge and

techniques to host countries. For a few countries such as Israel and Egypt, the

United States has the knowledge and the capability needed to act with speed if

the need arises; for most other countries, the US government has not applied the

resources necessary to establish the base that makes quick and effective action

possible .
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Levels of Potential Air Force Participation

To be effective in low-intensity conflict, the Air Force and the United States

must be flexible enough to act at three levels : assistance, integration of forces,

and intervention . The Air Force can make an important contribution at each of

these levels, both as an independent entity working directly with a third world air

force and as a member of a joint service or joint agency effort.

Participation by the Air Force at the assistance level means working with third

world air forces on both a short- and long-term basis. The Air Force can make its

most important contribution to supporting US interests in the third world at this

level of activity. This mission, called foreign internal defense, includes nationbuilding in conjunction with other US and host government agencies, assisting in

training and equipping host country air units, and providing continuous guidance

to indigenous air force units on employing equipment and techniques in military

operations .'

The potential benefits of developing close training and working relationships

on an air force to air force basis between the US Air Force and friendly third

world air forces are many . Working with foreign air forces enables the US Air

Force to gain tremendous insight into the capabilities, limitations, and potential

of those air forces. This arrangement provides the essential knowledge needed to

establish meaningful assistance programs that result in the appropriate growth of

the host nation's air arm . Additionally, by working in an environment that could

become a low-intensity battlefield at some point, the Air Force personnel

involved in the training would gain knowledge invaluable should the United

States need to intervene . Developing true interrelationships between the US Air

Force and other air forces has the potential of increasing the political stability of

a region and increasing US access to the region, and could even result in gaining

a US proxy there . Those kinds of results, however, require long-term US Air

Force to host nation air force programs, well-trained US Air Force people

dedicated to developing close working relationships with other nations,

conscious planning by the US Air Force that determines which countries of the

world will be strategically important to United States foreign policy, and active

seeking of air force to air force relationships in those countries . These kinds of

foreign internal defense efforts are handled under two broad programs-military

assistance and advisory groups (MAAGs) and mobile training teams (MTTs)-

neither of which is currently effective .

Shortcomings of Assistance Programs

Our military assistance and advisory groups operate worldwide. (MAAGs, for

our purposes, include all activities designated as military advisory groups,

78
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FORLIC

security assistance offices, offices of military or defense cooperation, and like

agencies or activities ; defense attaches are not part of the MAAG system.)

However, in the aftermath of Vietnam, many US policymakers felt that the

MAAGs were to blame for much of the failure of US policy in Vietnam and had

no further role to play in US foreign policy. 2 Thus, the level of assistance offered

through these programs was severely reduced . The Arms Export Control Act of

1976 was a major result of the debate on the US military presence abroad. This

act set the tone for US policy in the middle to late 1970s regarding MAAGs; the

number of MAAGs and the number of people involved in security assistance

overseas were reduced significantly . The cutback in people led to reduced

contact with host military offices, which generally eroded the ability of the

United States to advise a host nation on the suitability of specific systems .'

This trend continued with the International Security Assistance Act of 1977

(Public Law 95-92) . That law circumscribed MAAG operations and established

a ceiling on MAAG manpower . Equally important, it established four areas that

were to be the focus of MAAG activities : logistics management, transportation,

fiscal management, and contract administration of country programs . Thus, the

MAAGs were not responsible for providing host nations with help on long-range

planning objectives, force development, strategy and doctrine development, or

building the support infrastructure that makes military forces-especially air

forces-useful parts of a defense establishment . The role of the MAAGs was

changed from providing advice and assistance, as the name of the organization

implied, to administering equipment contracts, collecting payments, and moving

paper. MAAGs, therefore, have tended, for the past decade, to operate in capital

cities and have had minimal contact with forces in the field . This condition exists

for all the services represented in a MAAG, including the Air Force .

Contact with the field forces of nations the United States wishes to help has

been primarily through mobile training teams (MTTs) . These teams consist of

military personnel with the specific skills needed by the host country. They make

short-term visits (usually 30-90 days) to the host country . The teams are manned

by representatives from each service, or more likely, from a single service . As

noted in the Moroccan SA-6 crisis, the United States sent two teams: an Air

Force team to teach flying skills and an Army team to teach ground tactics . The

Department of Defense runs the mobile training teams through various foreign

military assistance programs, but each service has its own way of selecting,

supporting, and training the team members . The team sent to Morocco to solve

the SA-6 problem is typical of the Air Force approach: an ad hoc team is selected

and sent to do a complex job with little or no specialized training in the country

or situation into which it is being thrust.

Despite of the lack of training for Air Force mobile training team members,

the teams normally do a very creditable job, primarily because of the quality of

Air Force people sent, the understanding by foreign nationals of our deficiencies

in foreign language skills, and the eagerness of foreigners to learn from US

79
THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

personnel . The system could, however, be much improved . The specific

organizational and personnel requirements to improve the effectiveness of US

Air Force mobile training teams are discussed in chapter 7, but, as a minimum,

the teams need a corps of expertise on regional areas that can provide in-country

language and cultural assistance to MTTs . 4

Problems of Integrating Forces

Assisting third world air force through the mechanisms of military training

teams and in-country advisory groups may be inadequate in some instances . A

friendly country may face an active internal or external threat requiring

assistance beyond what assistance groups and mobile training teams, can

provide, since they are not eligible to participate in combat . United States forces

may need to integrate with indigenous forces to provide training in combat. The

special problems of integrating US forces with host forces in a combat situation

need special consideration by Air Force planners.

Integrating small contingents with host nation forces operating in the field

would generate significant equipment and personnel requirements for the US Air

Force . The Air Force has had no extensive experience with integrating special

forces with host nations since the 1960s, when Air Force units operated with the

Vietnamese and Laotians . The purpose of integrating small, specialized Air

Force units today with host nation forces would be to provide training under

combat conditions, to stiffen inexperienced local forces, to gain knowledge of

local conditions for future Air Force planning, to test equipment and tactics in

the field, and to provide a low-cost, low-visibility US presence in an area where

such a presence is desired for policy reasons . Such a presence would require

specially trained and equipped air forces--ones that could operate independently

in cooperation with local forces, that are self-contained in communications, and

that have minimal logistic and administrative overhead . The personnel operating

in these kinds of situations would also need language and cultural training

appropriate to the area as well as knowledge of local political and military

institutions . Ideally, they would have equipment that could be supported by the

host country . The most of the third world, where the need for US forces to train

and stiffen host country forces is most likely, the Air Force capability to do so is

nonexistent . Deploying primary Air Force general purpose forces-F-15, F-16,

or A-10 units-in such situations is unrealistic . Those forces are trained almost

exclusively to operate in European and Korean conflict scenarios . And they

require very extensive and intensive logistic support and are not easily

supportable in small elements . The equipment and techniques needed to support

the front-line aircraft of the US Air Force cannot be readily adapted to provide

the equipment and techniques needed to support the main fighter aircraft of the

third world-F5s, various types of Mirages, and many other aircraft smaller and

simpler than the front-line fighters of the United States .

80
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR LIC

In addition, the US Air Force special operations force-the one we would

expect to work most closely with third world air forces-has become very

narrow in its area of potential operations . It has no strike aircraft other than the

AC-130 Spectre gunship, which must fly in a totally permissive operating

environment. Other than the Spectre, the Air Force special operations force

currently operates only the MC-130 Combat Talon, HH-53 Pave Low, and UH1N helicopter . These aircraft are designed for a very narrow mission within the

low-intensity conflict spectrum. In conjunction with other service forces, they

can be used for direct action raids against specific targets, especially to insert and

extract special action teams into and out of their area of operations. But these

crews and aircraft are not appropriate for integrating with and augmenting a host

nation's air force . Thus, a potentially significant option for a US decision maker

wishing to assist a third world country is lost .

Limits to US Ability to Intervene

The Air Force also needs to assess its ability to act at another, higher level of

low-intensity conflict: intervening unilaterally or in concert with allies in third

world conflicts . The airlift capability of the US Air Force leaps to mind as one

way in which it can act in intervention scenarios ; so too does the capacity of the

Strategic Air Command's strategic projection force (SPF) to deliver

conventional bombs. The value of airlift to support the intervention forces of

either the United States or others cannot be overstated. It is one area where air

power is a visible and useful instrument of US power . The strategic projection

force is both a visible and an important psychological element of US military

force. The 35 B-52Hs assigned to the SPF have tremendous range and payload

capabilities . The SPF also includes reconnaissance, intelligence, air refueling,

and force management assets-KC-135A and Q, SR-71, U-2, RC-135, E-3A,

and EC-135 aircraft . The heart of this force, though, is the B-52Hs, which have a

range of about 8,800 miles and have been modified to carry 500-pound general

purpose bombs, the same types of bombs dropped by B- 17s in World War II .

However, despite the military power embodied in the SPF, its value as an

employable element of US military force is severely limited . The destructive

power of its bombs is poor, and their use suggests "carpet bombing" techniques

rather than the precise application of firepower-yet precision, as shown in the

British air control case, is a key to intervening successfully in small wars .

Further, because they are gravity bombs (as opposed to long-range standoff

missiles), they require overflight of the target . The availability of sophisticated

SAMs to virtually any potential adversary makes overflight by B-52s using

conventional tactics unattractive .' In addition, conventional bombing by B-52s

would be a highly visible form of intervention in a low-intensity conflict, which

8 1
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

given the currently available weapons, would be an imprecise application of

firepower that could have negative psychological results . Nevertheless,

inadequate as it may be in many respects, the strategic projection force is the

only effective means the US Air Force has of applying firepower in the third

world areas .

Under current operating concepts, Air Force tactical fighters have little or no

role to play in low-intensity conflicts . The current fighters (F-15, F-16, and

F-111) all are limited by range and would require a large aerial tanker fleet to get

them to the scene of a conflict . Extended on-station time would require more

tankers for force effectiveness . And basing would be a problem. Even with

access to bases, supporting a US fighter squadron is an expensive and demanding

proposition. Deploying Air Force squadrons to a third world country would not

be like deploying to a European base where identical fighters are serviced and

maintained (which is what US Air Force fighter units train to do) .

At present, the US Air Force does not have techniques and doctrine

appropriate for using its tactical fighter force to intervene in low-intensity

conflicts . Exploring and evaluating ways to improve the ability of the Air Force

to participate in low-intensity conflicts or to fight across the lower end of the

conflict spectrum as the Defense Guidance dictates (and thus ameliorate some of

the problems outlined in this chapter) is a subject worthy of serious debate by the

service. This shortcoming did not always exist in the Air Force . In the early

1960s, when small wars were threatening US interests in many places, the US

Air Force had a special unit that was designed to assist and integrate with third

world air forces and, if necessary, intervene . It was called the Special Air

Warfare Center.
NOTES

CHAPTER 5

MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR LIC

1 . AFM 2-5, Tactical Operations Special Air Warfare, Department of the Air Force, 22 June

1965,14-15.

2. House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies

Appropriations for 1976, 231-36 .

3. Paul Y. Hammond, "Growing Dilemmas for the Management of Arms Sales," Armed Forces

and Society, Fall 1979 .

4. This summary of Air Force procedures for supporting mobile training teams is based on

interviews with many US Air Force MTT members and with members of the Policy and Management

Division, Directorate of International Programs, Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs and Resources (HQ

USAF/PRIM), the tasking authority in the Air Force for obtaining US Air Force members for MTTs.

5. See Colonel Clyde E. Bodenheimer's paper, Impact of New Technology Weapons on SAC

Conventional Air Operations (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. : Airpower Research Institute, 1983) for

more details on the limitations of the SPF.

CHAPTER 6

EARLY LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

EFFORTS BY THE USAF: THE SPECIAL

AIR WARFARE CENTER

In contrast to the Royal Air Force experience with small wars that saw it

develop a well-established and creative doctrine over a period of two decades,

the US Air Force has had little cause to build a strong and enduring interest in

low-intensity conflict. The history of Air Force participation in small wars is

linked strongly to a very limited segment of low-intensity conflict-a role in

unconventional warfare . However, the central concern in unconventional

warfare is not a strategy for winning a small war, but rather a strategy for

supporting regular conventional forces in a large, "hot" war. Unconventional

war includes guerrilla warfare (surreptitiously introducing special warfare

personnel into enemy-dominated areas), air strikes, reconnaissance, and aerial

resupply and extraction of special warfare forces operating in enemy-controlled

areas . It is very much more a direct-action mission that supports larger military

objectives than a strategic use of specialized forces to attain specific political

goals. The evolution of the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) illustrates the

emphasis of the US Air Force on unconventional warfare and its relative lack of

interest in developing long-term strategies and capabilities for low-level

conflicts .

Foundation of Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict

The beginning of what, in 1962, became the Special Air Warfare Center can

be traced to unconventional warfare activities by early air commandos operating

in China, Burma, Southeast Asia, Korea, and Europe during World War II . The

ability to escape, evade, and survive in enemy-held territory was central to the

mission of these early air commandos.'

85
THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

The concept of a US air commando unit sprang from Gen H . H . Arnold's

fertile imagination. He wanted to see what air power could do to support ground

forces operating behind enemy lines . Thus, the mission of the 1st Air

Commando Group was to support the 12,000 British troops of Brigadier Orde C .

Wingate operating behind Japanese lines in Burma . Wingate's troops were

placed behind the Japanese lines by air and were supplied entirely by air. The 1st

Air Commando Group quickly became adept at air drops, short-field landings,

evacuations, resupply, and strike missions . The group also became proficient at

independent action and getting things done under the molt trying of conditions .

Perhaps most importantly the airmen and the men on the ground learned how to

work together effectively and to develop workable joint operational plans.

In Europe effective use was made of the air commando corps, especially in

resupply operations behind German lines . Operation Carpetbagger, a code name

for clandestine delivery of supplies, was conceived in September 1943 with the

first missions being flown in January 1944. From January to mid-September

1944, C-47s and modified B-24s of Operation Carpetbagger delivered 20,000

containers, 11,000 packages of supplies, and more than 1,000 agents behind

enemy lines . The Allies began using other American transport and bomber

aircraft in the spring of 1944 to deliver 160 tons of goods per month to the French

forces of the interior. Thousands of guerrillas throughout Western Europe, the

Mediterranean, and the Balkans were also supplied by air .

And even though the Air Force approved a program after World War II that

called for the creation of seven air resupply and communications wings which

would be used in unconventional warfare roles, only scant attention was paid to

small wars as a separate form of conflict. Using specially configured B-29s,

C-119s, SA-16s, and H- 19s, these new wings were to conduct unconventional

warfare, covert operations, and psychological warfare, and were to carry out

clandestine intelligence collection activities . However, the Air Force

commitment to these missions was not very strong . Only three of these

unconventional warfare wings were able to survive budgetary cuts that were

made in the early 1950s . These three remaining wings were deployed to Libya,

the Philippines, and England . Only the wing assigned to the Philippines saw any

combat, that coming in Korea.

In its early thinking on special operations, the Air Force focused on those

tactical aspects of special air warfare that were most closely linked to

unconventional operations supporting larger, conventional efforts . This

tendency in Air Force thought reflected the traditional, predominant perspective

subscribed to by the top officers of the Air Force . From the 1920s, US strategists

thought "big ." The major idea to emerge from the Air Corps Tactical School in

the 1920s and 1930s was the unstoppable power of the well-planned, wellexecuted bomber offensive, which as a war-winning device had the potential to

crush the enemy's ability and will to wage war.z The experience of World War II

reinforced the idea that air power's role was to destroy the enemy's capacity and

desire for continued conflict, and that objective was to be accomplished by

86
EARLY LOW-INTENSITYCONFLICT EFFORTS

massive bombing campaigns. Thus, in the minds of the Air Force leadership,

there was no need to develop a small-war strategy as there had been for the

British during the post-World War I era .

In Search of an Air Force Role in Small Wars

Occasionally a voice in the Air Force could be heard questioning the

tremendous concentration of equipment, people, planning, and thinking that was

being devoted to create a strategic force which would primarily support a

massive war of annihilation beyond the scope even of World War II . One such

worried voice was the Air Force vice chief of staff who, in March 1954, sent a

message to the commanders of Air University, the Tactical Air Command, and

the Far East Air Forces asking for comments on an issue being raised in the New

Look debates then rocking the defense establishment . The vice chief felt that the

New Look debates were raising doubts as to whether "air forces can do anything

other than offer massive retaliatory action in the event of major war. Most of the

doubts expressed and many of the outright charges made concerning limitations

of the `New Look' contain a common fundamental implication that surface

forces are more capable of dealing with localized aggressions than are the air

forces ." The vice chief was leading up to the question he was really concerned

about: What can air forces do to resolve the military problem in Indochina,

where the French were doing very badly against Ho Chi Minh . The vice chief felt

the Air Force did not project an ability to combat local aggression and, as a

result, did not appear capable ofjustifying an increased emphasis upon air power

to meet the military threats posed by anything short of major war.'

Such questions did little more than raise a flurry of activity among a few staff

agencies . Serious thinking about Air Force participation in unattractive small

wars did not develop-it was far too easy to concentrate on the threat of largescale war and how the Air Force could win it in short order. It took direct

prodding by the dynamic, young Kennedy administration to push the US Air

Force into thinking about how air power could be applied to small wars,

especially to the Communist wars of national liberation that so deeply concerned

President Kennedy .

When John F. Kennedy was elected president, he expressed his dissatisfaction

with Eisenhower's massive retaliation policy . He saw this policy as limiting the

US reaction to Communist activity to either "indignant platitudes or an atomic

bomb.

"4 Kennedy believed that because of the nuclear standoff, future wars

would have to be limited in nature, such as the "wars of national liberation" that

Khrushchev espoused . 5 Hence a capacity for flexible response capacity was

needed to counter Communist action at any level on the spectrum of conflict.

The early sixties were marked by confrontation between the superpowersover Berlin and Cuba and in many wars of national liberation . Soviet Premier
THEAIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Khrushchev pledged to support the revolutionaries in these liberation wars in a 6

April 1961 speech . He cited conflicts in Algeria, Laos, Vietnam, and Cuba as

examples of increasing guerrilla activities against oppressive regimes. 6 Kennedy

believed it was necessary and correct for the United States to resist aggression

and Communist-inspired revolts .' In 1961 the National Security Council outlined

policies that spelled out the US decision to counter the threat of insurgency in

underdeveloped countries .' National Security Action Memorandum 56, May

1961, tasked the military services to develop counterinsurgency forces for

special operations in their functional areas .'

Creation of Jungle Jim

In response, the Air Force established the 4400th Combat Crew Training

Squadron (CCTS), nicknamed Jungle Jim, on 14 April 1961 at Eglin Air Force

Base, Florida . Jungle Jim had a two-fold mission: training and combat . A 50-

hour flying training course was given to pilots of friendly foreign air forces, and

ground crews were trained to maintain aircraft under very austere conditions .

Jungle Jim also provided "USAF personnel with optimum type training for

supervising the development of unit combat capability in similar type aircraft of

friendly foreign nations . . . . . . '° The combat mission of this new unit was divided

into strike, reconnaissance, and airlift operations.

In typical fashion, the Air Force wanted this unit to be in full operation very

quickly . Jungle Jim which put the Air Force into the counterinsurgency business

for the first time, was to be totally operational by 8 September 1961 . Everybody

assigned to the unit was to to be trained on the job. They would invent the

techniques and tactics of counterinsurgency in developing countries from Latin

America to Africa to Southeast Asia on an ad hoc basis . There was no basic Air

Force doctrine to guide them . All that the people of Jungle Jim knew was that

someone on high had decreed that the Air Force would have a counterinsurgency

capability, and they were it . The idea of visualizing how a small war might be

planned and carried out using air power, by itself or in conjunction with other

capabilities, had never been studied in the Air Force . The World War II

experience of using commandos to support larger scale combat objectives did not

apply to this new kind of warfare . The main thrust of the Jungle Jim mission was

to impart knowledge on the capabilities of aircraft to friendly foreign forces.

The Jungle Jim units used World War II vintage aircraft such as the C-47,

T-28, and B-26. These aircraft had proven their ability to operate from remote,

primitive bases and had capabilities in firepower, ranges, and cargo capacities

useful for counterinsurgency operations . Only four months after activation,

Jungle Jim personnel made their first overseas deployment as Detachment 1 of

the 4400th CCTS . Code named Sandy Beach l, this operation involved training

Mali paratroopers to operate from C-47 aircraft. It was interesting for the Jungle

88
EARLY LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT EFFORTS

Jim people to note that just across the airfield at Bamako, there stood Soviet and

Czechoslovak aircraft, a stark reminder that superpower rivalry was beginning to

occur in some very obscure places." Detachment 1 completed its training

mission in November and returned to Eglin AFB . They had established such

good working relationships that air commandos returned to Mali in 1963 to give

more training .

Jungle Jim's second assignment was a precursor of the conflict that would

shape the role of the Air Force in small wars for years to come. In November

1961 elements from the Jungle Jim squadron (officially designated Detachment

2) went to Bien Hoa, Republic of Vietnam. Detachment 2 was nicknamed Farm

Gate and the requirements of supporting it soon became central to Air Force

thinking on small wars . The equipment the commandos had was not significantly

different from that used by their predecessors in World War 11 . And, because the

Air Force had not used air commandos since 1948, tactics for using the

equipment came from the ingenuity and imagination of the men on the scene.

Sent to Vietnam primarily to train the Vietnamese air force in counterinsurgency

tactics, the men of Farm Gate from the beginning wanted to conduct an air

offensive against the Vietcong. The conflict between training and combat roles

for Farm Gate reflected the imprecise and often conflicting directions given to

the men in the field . 'z The Kennedy administration, however, was becoming

increasingly aware of the need to clarify missions and roles for the military

forces involved in counterinsurgency .

The Special Air Warfare Center:

Its Origin, Expansion, and Growth

In an open letter to the armed services in the spring of 1962, President

Kennedy said:

The military challenge to freedom includes the threat of war in various forms, and actual

combat in many cases. We and our allies can meet the thermonuclear threat . We are building a

greater "conventional deterrent capability ." It remains for us to add still another military

dimension: the ability to combat the threat known as guerrilla warfare.

13

He directed the secretary of defense to "expand rapidly and substantially the

orientation of existing forces for sublimited or unconventional wars .

1114 In

response to this political pressure, the Air Force established the Special Air

Warfare Center (SAWC) at Eglin AFB on 19 April 1962 . Air Force Chief of

Staff Gen Curtis E. LeMay announced the creation of the new unit, which

absorbed the men and assets of Jungle Jim and continued to operate Farm Gate .

The new unit was composed of the 1 st Air Commando Group (1 st ACG), the

1st Combat Applications Group (1st CAG), and a headquarters section (fig . 13) .

89
Airlift/Air Assult

Division

*: As of 19 April 1962

Special Air Warfare Center

7n

O

W

m

O

1st Combat 1st

Operations Air Commando

Groom - Group

r

0

Directorate Directorate 44 10th

of 919thTroop _Carrier I I of I ( Squadron ( I I Training

Combat Crew I I

Requirements Operations ng Squadron

Devel- Analysis 6th 1st

opment Division Fighter Air Material

Division II I I Squadron I I Squadron I

Civic Action

Training Division

Strike

and

Reconnaissance

Division

Figure 13 . Organizational Chart-Special Air Warfare Center.
EARLY LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT EFFORTS

The primary mission of SAWC was to train the air forces of friendly foreign

nations in all aspects of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency air

operations and techniques . SAWC was equipped with C-47, C-46, T-28, B-26,

and U-10 aircraft . The training included low-level parachute resupply, close air

support, use of flares for night operations, and other counterguerrilla

techniques."

The 1st Combat Applications Group was a unique organization . Its task was to

develop the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and hardware that the crews of the 1st

Air Commando Group would use in its operations and training. The 1st CAG

was responsible for all short-term development, testing, analysis, and evaluation

of special operations related materiels . It could design and construct new

hardware, purchase goods locally, or use and modify off-the-shelf products . If

the project was too big or required more than six months to complete, it could

contract out to the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) or to civilian firms.

The period April 1962 to July 1963 was a boom time for the Special Air

Warfare Center. In the first few months of its existence, the center was occupied

with acquiring aircraft and equipment, becoming established at Eglin AFB and

Hurlburt Field, hiring personnel, and maintaining support of its various overseas

detachments. Aircrews trained in and practiced the techniques they would soon

be teaching . These included assault takeoffs and landings, day and night

navigation and landings, jet-assisted takeoffs in the C-47, psychological

missions with leaflets and loudspeakers, flare drops, and close air support with

rockets, guns, and bombs . The air commandos also received instructions in areas

not normally part of air warfare: self-defense, extensive small arms training,

daily physical training, and basic language training in French or Spanish . Those

two languages were chosen for their wide usage in Latin America, North Africa,

and Asia. Much of the vocabulary dealt with aircraft terms and words related to

guerrilla warfare . Language capability was a key to success as the commandos

began to operate with the air forces of the developing world .

Among the first detachments to be established after Farm Gate was

Detachment 3 at Howard AFB, Canal Zone. Beginning on 10 May 1962,

Detachment 3 offered counterinsurgency training to any Latin American country

that requested it . Detachment 3 sent mobile training teams (MTT) throughout

Latin America to survey the needs of countries that requested training . These

teams determined the type of operations that it needed to conduct and gave

instructions in counterinsurgency air operations and civic action techniques .

One of the key elements in the success of Detachment 3 was its civic action

and training programs . Commandos from Detachment 3 provided medical

assistance and evacuation in Panama and other Latin American countries . In

mid-1963, the 1st Combat Applications Group developed a mobile medical

dispensary . This 212-pound, three-piece unit fit easily in a U-10 light utility

aircraft, and contained almost all the necessary medicines and equipment needed

9 1
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

for ailments encountered in a tropical environment . '6 On many occasions, the air

commandos of Detachment 3 flew into villages to give medical and dental care .

From appendectomies to inoculations, the air commandos provided much

needed treatment that had never before been available . They also conducted

classes in basic hygiene for villagers . This type of civic action created much

public support for the air commandos and the local government. When the air

commandos conducted training for the air forces of friendly foreign countries,

they pointed out to indigenous government officials that popular support could

be gained from conducting such civic action operations .

Another key civic action effort was to establish regular communications with

totally isolated villages. With their typical elan, the air commandos solved this

difficult problem. First, a message was dropped from an airplane asking for the

villagers' help in building an airstrip . Later, a U-10 equipped with loudspeakers

flew over the village and instructed the villagers on how to clear the area needed

for an airstrip . Once the rough strip was readied, a U-10 landed and the air

commandos helped complete the strip . Later, these operations became more

sophisticated, to include parachuting a tractor down to the villagers to make their

task of clearing the landing site easier .

A doctrine governing the roles and mission of the commandos slowly evolved

during the early period of the center's existence. SAWC's first regulation,

Tactical Air Regulation 23-12, which came out on 13 July 1962, defined

SAWC's mission thusly:

[The] USAF Special Air Warfare Center will command, organize, equip, train, and

administer assigned or attached forces to participate in and conduct combat improvement

projects for air actions in counterinsurgency warfare and other special warfare operations .

17

SAWC's major responsibilities included testing and evaluating projects for

short-range periods, modifying existing equipment or inventing special items for

special warfare, and providing forces for "supporting, instructing, and advising

friendly foreign forces in counterinsurgency warfare ."' s Significantly, no

mention was made of creating a capability to conduct air strikes . At this stage

SAWC was merely supposed to train and develop foreign armed forces through

short-term assignments overseas .

'9

By the summer of 1962 SAWC units had begun applying this emerging

doctrine of assistance on a widespread scale . In August 1962 a team of air

commandos from Detachment 3 went to Honduras to survey that country's needs

for counterinsurgency and to train its pilots . 2° Members of Detachment 3 on

another occasion installed wing racks for rockets on Guatemalan air force F-51 s,

resulting in a 600-percent increase in firepower.zt Later, commandos installed

radio equipment at the airfield of David, Panama, which gave the airfield

necessary air traffic control capability . Ayear later the air commandos recovered

and refinished an old ambulance and gave it to the city .zz The air commandos

flew teachers into remote areas to instruct villagers in public sanitation . They

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EARLY LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT EFFORTS

flew a US Army team into villages to drill wells and improve local agriculture .

In December they airlifted Christmas gifts to cities in Panama. 23 Maj William W.

McDannel, Detachment 3 commander, said:

Civic actions are now an integral part of commando operations in Latin America. We are

using the "grass roots" or people-to-people approach . In training indigenous forces, we have

created many lasting friendships . These friendships inspire confidence and trust. We believe

the mutual trust to be the "key" to hemispheric solidarity and the greatest deterrent to

international Communism.

24

The work of Detachment 3 clearly demonstrated that special warfare missions

could be successful and showed what SAWC could accomplish with ingenuity

and flexibility . Although Detachment 3's accomplishments in the remote jungles

of Central America were largely overshadowed by events in Vietnam,

nonetheless they had a positive impact in Central America . Looking at events

today, that impact seems to have been ephemeral. One can only speculate what

today's situation in Latin America would be had the kind of work being done by

the commandos in 1962 been continued over the past 20 years.

In the technical arena, the 1st Combat Applications Group was busy

innovating equipment to fit the mission of SAWC. From April to December

1962, the 1st CAG was involved in approximately 80 counterinsurgency, civic

action, and psychological operations projects . The primary project was to

modernize SAWC's air fleet . B-26s and T-28s received new engines and

additional armament.25 By 13 June 1963, the personnel of the Ist CAG had

designed and installed a public address system in the C-47, C-46, and U-10

aircraft to handle psychological operations broadcasts and civic action

messages. 26 The group also worked on improved methods of air resupply such as

an arresting-hook delivery system-a precursor to the low-altitude parachute

extraction system (LAPES). 2 '

The Special Air Warfare Center continued to expand, largely because of

increased commitments in Vietnam . On 1 May 1963 the center activated the

602d Fighter Squadron, which was equipped with B-26s . In July the 603d and

604th Fighter Squadrons were activated . These additions raised the 1st Air

Commando Group to wing size . During this period of expansion and growth, the

first indication that SAWC was not adequately performing its training mission

became apparent. Farm Gate in Vietnam was supposed to be operating under

Kennedy's five rules of engagement. The first of these rules, which stipulated

that Vietnamese air force personnel must be aboard the aircraft on all combat

support sorties, was supposed to ensure that US Air Force personnel were

conducting training and were not unilaterally involved in combat. Col Joseph

W. Kittenger, Jr, a B-26 pilot for Farm Gate in 1963, told, in his Corona Harvest

report, how the air commandos got around this requirement . Although

Vietnamese airmen were aboard these flights, they were not pilot trainees . Most

of them were low-ranking enlisted men and were so unmotivated to fly that the

93
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

air commandos had to take away their boots at night so they could not run away.

"None of them knew anything about flying or wanted anything to do with it . . . .

There was not any intention whatsoever to teach them to fly ever. They could not

touch the controls if they wanted to. "z8 So from the very beginning a major part

of the air commando mission, training, was not being fulfilled .

Nevertheless, the air commandos did train enough pilots for two fighter

squadrons. And even though an increase in the strike proficiency of the

Vietnamese air force in late 1963 demonstrated that at least some training was

being done, the trend for the future was set. Our training cadres were absorbed

by the expanding operational effort, leaving the air commandos unable and

perhaps unwilling to provide effective training. On 1 July 1963, Farm Gate was

reassigned to the 2d Air Division of the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) . The

Special Air Warfare Center still trained the aircrews going to Vietnam, but for

operational and administrative purposes Farm Gate was run by PACAF. This

move removed a vital element of its forces from the control of the Special Air

Warfare Center. 29

The experience of Farm Gate nonetheless provided the basis for planning

future assistance missions in the third world . Brig Gen Gilbert L. Pritchard,

commander of the Special Air Warfare Center, wrote, in his 1963 commander's

appraisal, that the use of mobile training teams to assist newly emerging and

independent nations in their fight against emerging and independent nations in

their fight against "subversive insurgency" would continue to grow in

importance . He noted that "today, as a result of our evaluation of the potential of

this program, this command is now prepared and has in being specially trained

and equipped military training teams to meet the future demands of the unified

commands for such assistance .' 3o Thinking about using commando resources in

situations after Vietnam was clearly alive at Hurlburt Field, Florida, in spite of

the immediate requirements of that conflict .

A Time of Organizational Change

With the transfer of Detachment 2 (Farm Gate) to PACAF, the Special

Warfare Center entered a period of organizational change. New units were

established and old ones expanded. The Vietnam conflict had its greatest impact

on the organization during this time .

On 25 July 1963 the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated that they wanted a special

air warfare squadron in Europe . In response Detachment 4 was established at

Sembach Air Base, Germany, in January 1964 . Detachment 4 could conduct

day or night resupply and air drops, psychological operations, and photodocumentation missions and could provide mobile training teams . 31

On 1 August 1963, the Tactical Air Command published a new regulation that

redefined the center's mission to meet the needs of the expanding organization .

Now SAWC would

94
EARLY LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT EFFORTS

command, organize, equip, train, administer, and, in special instances, operate assigned or

attached forces for the purpose of conducting air actions in counterinsurgency, counterguerilla warfare, unconventional, and psychological warfare . In addition, the Special Air

Warfare Center will conduct combat improvement projects designed to increase the

effectiveness of all air operations associated with special warfare . 32 [Emphasis added.]

The center was given two major responsibilities . The first was training,

deploying, and, in special instances, employing special air warfare (SAW)

forces in counterinsurgency. The second covered the 1st Combat Applications

Group's duties, which included testing and evaluating items or systems in shortrange periods, devising or modifying equipment, and developing doctrine,

tactics, and techniques for SAWC operations. The center also had

responsibilities to establish liaison with Army, Navy, and Air National Guard

special warfare units .

A significant difference between this and the previous regulation was that

SAWC was now authorized

through application of airpower and associated resources [to] optimize air-ground operations

with indigenous military and/or irregular forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations

either unilaterally or in conjunction with other US military or government agencies . 33

The new regulation now authorized the Special Air Warfare Center to conduct

strike combat operations, which, early in 1962, Washington had admitted Farm

Gate was doing anyway .3a

In the same time frame, the center developed an interesting new concept as

reflected in SAWC Op-plan 5-63 . Under this plan, the center was to develop a

special air warfare force that could deploy within 24 hours to any selected area of

the world. Once there, this force would be able to operate in conjunction with

and in support of US or friendly forces in counterinsurgency, unconventional

warfare, and psychological warfare operations. It was also to provide training to

a friendly nation's air forces in those areas .35 Clearly, the center had a

considerable material and intellectual investment in providing an air force

capability in a wide range of small wars .

But this capability never came to full fruition due to the increasing demands of

Vietnam . Because of the quantum increases in strike and airlift requirements for

special air warfare assets in Southeast Asia, the role of SAWC more and more

shifted to training US Air Force crews and away from its mission of providing

combat- and advisory-ready forces . General Pritchard noted that

utilization of nearly all of the strike resources of the center by the conduct of an accelerated

training program completely divested the center of a capability to provide combat ready strike

forces for support of US Strike Command and other unified command contingency

requirements.

36

95
THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

The Special Air Warfare Center was quickly becoming a very busy training

center with the "special" part of its title being replaced by the routine demands

of an expanding conventional war in Vietnam.

Late 1963 and early 1964 was an extremely busy time for SAWC . The center

had grown from a small unit with limited resources to almost 3,000 personnel

spread throughout the world, a growing inventory of aircraft, and funding

priority for its test projects . New detachments were established, mobile training

teams were sent out, and major organizational changes took place .

The chief of staff, Air Force, wanted to start a special air warfare unit for the

Middle East, Africa, and South Asia; it was to be assigned to Strike Command .

In response SAWC established Detachment 5 on 11 February 1964, but it was

not operationally ready for some time . 37 Detachment 5 (Provisional), known as

Tiger Rag, was to be capable of reacting quickly and deploying with Strike

Command forces. The unit was stationed at Hurlburt Field, Florida .

Another unit, Detachment 6 (Water Pump) was sent to Udorn, Thailand, in

January 1964, to train the Laotian air force in counterinsurgency to provide a

nucleus of US counterinsurgency forces near Laos for combat operations, and to

stimulate the Royal Thai Air Force to step up its counterinsurgency program."

At first the detachment was equipped with a small number of T-28s; later it

received C-47s as well.

During mid-July 1964 the Special Air Warfare Center continued its pattern of

organizational change . Events in Vietnam directly affected the organization . On

1 July 1964, Detachment 3 in Panama, which had been renamed the 605th Air

Commando Squadron (Composite), passed to Southern Command's contro1 . 39

Detachment 3's operations were the benchmark of how effective a good SAWC

program could be. This unit had provided many highly successful civic action

programs and counterinsurgency training to various Latin American countries .

The removal of this unit from SAWC's control severely curtailed the center's

role in training foreign forces . Now the only active training detachment of

SAWC was Detachment 6 (Water Pump) in Thailand . In contrast, the major

contribution of Detachment 5 (Tiger Rag), a CONUS-based unit, was to Strike

Command exercises, while Detachment 4 in Germany provided unconventional

warfare support to United States Air Forces, Europe. Toward the end of 1964,

activities of the center's mobility training teams had all but ceased.

At this juncture, SAWC proposed a reorganization to the Tactical Air

Command . The center wanted one large consolidated unit to conduct training.

The proposal also included the radical combination of strike and airlift units into

composite squadrons . This reorganization would make it easier to accommodate

the increased load of training aircrews at Hurlburt . On 27 July 1964, the TAC

commander, Gen Walter C . Sweeney, Jr, approved part of this reorganization .

He accepted the formation of a composite training squadron but not the

reorganization of the operational training squadrons into three composite strike

96
EARLYLOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT EFFORTS

or airlift squadrons . In October, the 4410th Combat Crew Training Squadron

was activated .

At the end of December 1964 General Pritchard, the commander of SAWC,

described four areas of responsibility in the center's mission . First, the center

was to develop doctrine and tactics for air aspects of counterinsurgency,

unconventional warfare, and psychological operations . Second, SAWC was to

train and equip US forces in the strike, reconnaissance, and airlift roles of special

air warfare . Third, the center was to provide advice and assistance in training

indigenous forces . Last, SAWC was to provide air support to the Army's Special

Forces . This step in the evolution of SAWC's mission placed its training of

foreign air forces as third priority .

In January 1965, the mission statement of the 1 st Combat Applications

Group's for the first time, failed to mention the development of doctrine .

Although this group did provide data to aircrews in Vietnam on how to best dive

bomb with World War 11 vintage aircraft and how to avoid flak, most of its

efforts went to developing hardware for air commando units rather than to

doctrine or tactics . This situation resulted because the 1st CAG was

undermanned and staffed mostly with technical people . Almost no attempt had

been made to establish any doctrine or correct tactics for counterinsurgency

warfare ; operational units were sent into the field to develop their own methods

for counterinsurgency . For the most part, these units used conventional air power

tactics, especially in Vietnam, and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere .

The center tried to keep alive the idea of specialized people to work foreign

assistance . In January 1965 it had the opportunity to comment on a draft

document called the "Air Force Plan." The plan apparently was a philosophical

analysis of the future direction of the Air Force. The center pointed out two basic

concerns, which were prophetic-it conceded that preventing war on a grand

scale was clearly the Air Force's primary concern, but it also warned that the Air

Force should not ignore subversion in the free countries of the developing world.

Specifically the center noted that "the nation-building capability of the Air

Force and its ability to train friendly air forces through the use of military

training teams has not been clearly stated as a capability or clearly established as

a requirement ." Further, the plan apparently lumped all nonnuclear,

nonstrategic forces into a conventional capability. However, the center believed

that in the normal course of duty, pilots (fighter or transport) lacked the "talent"

and experience required for military assistance, civic action, and nationbuilding . As early as 1965, the erosion of the idea of a specialized force to

accomplish US Air Force to foreign air force training was well established.

Even though the war in Vietnam had expanded far beyond a counterinsurgency

operation, SAWC people still held to the idea that sending specially trained

detachments to indoctrinate the air forces of friendly foreign countries on how to

employ air power was a valid concept particularly where conditions were

different from Vietnam-that is, where the conflict had not graduated to a full97
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

scale conventional war. The growing emphasis on training combat crews in the

mid-sixties, however, forced the center to devote more and more of its resources

into the business of training people for the larger war in Vietnam . By 1966

SAWC had become primarily

,a combat training unit, preparing people for Air Force commands and a number of friendly

foreign powers . . . rather than training and maintaining combat ready forces in being for

counterinsurgency or civic action missions in all parts of the world . 43

Vietnam Devours Special Air Warfare Center Assets

As 1965 drew to an end, the Vietnam War had its most telling impact on the

Special Air Warfare Center . Trained aircrews were needed to resupply the

expanding effort in Vietnam, and SAWC was the unit to provide these crews. In

a major organizational change, the 1st Air Commando Wing (1st ACW) was

moved to England AFB, Louisiana, and the 4410th Combat Crew Training

Squadron was expanded to a wing at Hurlburt. 44 The departure of 1st ACW

relieved some of the congestion at Hurlburt caused by the expansion of existing

units and provided more room for aircrew training. Now the number one mission

of the Special Air Warfare Center was to train and equip aircrews and ground

crews for operations in Vietnam. Officially the Tactical Air Command (TAC)

still required the center to provide mobile training teams to unified commands to

train friendly foreign air forces in counterinsurgency, but this requirement was

ignored both by TAC and the center as training US aircrews became SAWC's

big mission ." By late 1966 the war had clearly escalated to a conventional level .

The air commandos were not involved in counterguerrilla operations, but mostly

conducted close air support operations in support of the conventional war.

On 8 July 1968 SAWC was redesignated the US Air Force special operations

force (SOF), and became the equivalent of a numbered air force . Yet, as

operations in Vietnam became more conventional, the need for the Special

Operations Force lessened and the command billet was reduced from a major

general to a brigadier general . The reduction in rank was incongruous with an

apparent increase in organizational statute from the unique designation of a

center to the organizational equivalent of a numbered air force .

As the Vietnam effort wound down, beginning in late 1969, the SOF was

gradually squeezed by budgetary and manpower cutbacks . By 1970 SOF unit

manning was at 30 percent . The decline in assets continued space through the

early seventies ; on 30 June 1974 the special operations force was deactivated,

officially closing out this important chapter on special operations within the Air

Force . The final unit history notes the passing of the organization :

This is the final installment of the history of the USAF Special Operations Force, an elite

element of the Tactical Air Command. Changing priorities, the ever-trimming budget scalpel,

98
EARLY LOW-INTENSITYCONFLICT EFFORTS

and shrinking manpower resources were the key factors in the decision to deactivate the

USAF Special Operations Force .

47

Lessons from the Special Air Warfare Center

Even a cursory look at the history and activities of the Special Air Warfare

Center suggests some points about early Air Force participation in low-intensity

conflict. First, it is clear that the center was created in response to political

pressure from the top . Without President Kennedy's call to create forces to fight

Communist-sponsored wars of national liberation, it seems very unlikely that the

Air Force would have generated a counterinsurgent capability on its own.

Second, the center was created in rapid order. Aircraft and men were thrown

together hurriedly and with there was no time to develop thinking on strategies

and doctrines that could guide the plans of those earliest Air Force

counterinsurgent forces . As noted by Col Robert Gleason, who was with the

commandos from Jungle Jim days, "The immediate missions of the original

USAF COIN unit (Jungle Jim) . . . were not immediately obvious even to the

original cadre .

"4s The organization, equipment, planning, and developing

concepts of operation for the early air commandos was very much an ad hoc

affair.

The importance of doctrine in this case must be stressed . A lack of doctrine

and the short time between SAWC's inception and its first operations are the

keys to the problem that resulted in the misuse of this special organization. The

Special Air Warfare Center was entering a brand new field beyond any

experience of the Air Force and most of the military. Entering the

counterinsurgency arena without guidance encouraged the use of conventional

air power tactics . The British air control methods of the 1920s and 1930s,

psychological operations, and civic actions, such as using loudspeaker

operations to guide the construction of airstrips, are examples of unconventional

uses of air power that could have been applied in Vietnam. However, as early as

1963, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command, Adm Harry D. Felt,

noted that Farm Gate fliers were conducting conventional missions and did not

need counterinsurgency training.49

In spite of the lack of conceptual thinking that went into establishing Air Force

counterinsurgency forces in the early sixties the people assigned to that task did a

most impressive job in establishing a credible force . The basic idea of

developing a force to impart techniques and training to friendly foreign air forces

took root quickly . Aircraft were obtained that were simple and rugged enough to

operate under primitive conditions . A separate organization was created to

obtain and develop equipment for use in developing countries . People were

trained in languages, cross-cultural relations, hand-to-hand combat, and a host

of other skills not normally part of an Air Force career. Operating outside the

bounds of usual Air Force operations became normal for the air commandos : - A

99
THEAIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

sense of "eliteness" came naturally to the air commandos because of their

special training, special missions, and special way of operating .

The success of the lst Combat Applications Group in providing

counterinsurgency and civic action equipment for the 1 st Air Commando Wing

gave the center a unique resource. The group also gave the center flexibility to

handle the unusual missions that came its way. The lst Combat Applications

Group completed literally thousands of projects from 1962 to 1972, ranging

between testing the prototype VC-123 transport under field conditions and

designing an efficient way to dispense sterile screwworm flies . The group

developed low-light-level television equipment for night strikes and

reconnaissance and cargo extraction systems. It also designed and tested the

AC-47, -119, and -130 gunship platforms. The technical requirements of

operating in a counterinsurgent and small war environment taxed the ingenuity

and resources of this organization . But its ability to function quickly to find ways

to get the job done by going beyond routine Air Force supply and research and

development channels was legendary .

The Special Air Warfare Center also scored many successes with its mobile

training teams and civic action programs. Our air commandos contributed to the

capacity of third world militaries to function effectively, and showed them how

to improve both the conditions in their countries and the relations with their

citizens . By operating with and magnifying the role of the host nation's military

in civic action programs, the commando teams increased the prestige of the local

military in the eyes of its own population . Also, the US assistance in conducting

beneficial programs provided a boost to the prestige of the United States in

remote areas throughout the world. Often teams served as a bridge between army

and air force hierarchies in third world countries . In many of these countries, the

army and air force were (and remain today) distinct competitors . This

competition resulted in complete breakdown in communication . By conducting

joint training operations, the air commandos were able to bridge the

communications gap and establish a good working relationship between these

indigenous forces . Our air commandos contributed to the capability of third

world militaries to function effectively, and showed them how to improve both

the conditions in their countries and the relations with their citizens. The

benefits of these low-risk, low-cost operations were continued friendship and

respect as well as possible direct military benefits, such as basing agreements .

Due to the increased commitments to Vietnam, these efforts declined

dramatically .

As the Vietnam War grew, the center's mission eventually underwent a

dramatic change. In its original inception, the Special Air Warfare Center had

conducted operations worldwide and had had considerable control over its own

operations. But as US involvement in Southeast Asia intensified, special

operations in Vietnam soon ceased to be "special." As Colonel Gleason noted,

the Vietnam War quickly erased the distinction between special air warfare and

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EARLY LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT EFFORTS

conventional air force assets, the only difference being the "age of the aircraft

assigned to each.

"5° Conventional tactics such as interdiction, close air support,

and reconnaissance became the mainstay of Farm Gate's operations . The special

capabilities of SAWC's personnel were becoming more and more limited by

their assignment to the increasingly narrow role of combat training. By 1973, the

mission of the Special Air Warfare Center had officially narrowed the role of

training and operating forces in Air Force special operations, and to training

other US Air Force and allied personnel as directed by Headquarters Tactical Air

Command or Headquarters USAF. The center's previously wide-ranging

responsibilities had fallen completely by the wayside.

Thus, because of the demands of Vietnam, the Special Air Warfare Center

never had the time to develop and prove an air doctrine that operated outside the

bounds of normal, conventional air tactics . Moreover, as the Vietnam War

wound down, the Air Force quickly pulled back from any commitment to a

special operations force . After the war the Special Operations Force was

disbanded with most of its assets being sent to various elements of the Tactical

Air Command . What few assets remained were quickly committed to the

narrow, unconventional warfare mission of supporting conventional operations

by operating behind enemy lines and by carrying out specific one-time missions.

For the past 12 years, the Air Force special operations capability has been only a

faint shadow of its mid-1960s force of over 5,000 men and women and 550

aircraft . The force has dwindled to one wing based in the United States (the 1st

Special Operations Wing), which operates four types of aircraftthe AC-130

Spectre gunship, the MC-130 Combat Talon, the HH-53 Pave Low, and the

UH-1N helicopter . Two other operational Combat Talon squadrons operate

overseas . Altogether there are only 37 aircraft in the active Air Force special

operations inventory. The shortage of equipment is, however, only the tip of the

iceberg when one considers the organizational, doctrinal, and philosophical

issues that are as yet unresolved in the Air Force concerning the mission of the

Air Force in small wars in general and in low-intensity conflict specifically .

EARLY LOW-INTENSITYCONFLICT EFFORTS

NOTES

CHAPTER 6

1 . The sketch that follows is based on a historical review of Air Force unconventional warfare

activities sent by General Walter C. Sweeney, Jr, commander, Tactical Air Command, to General

John K. Waters, commanding general, United States Continental Army Command, 19 July 1963 .

2 . See R. F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine : A History of Basic Thinking in the United States

AirForce, 1907-1964, AU-19 (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University, 1974), 31-47.

3. HQ USAF, Chief of Staffmessage DTG 302128Z, March 1954.

4. R. Montgomery, Military Civic Action and Counterinsurgency: The Birth of a Policy (Ann

Arbor, Mich. : University Microfilms, 1971), 24.

5 . Ibid ., 28.

6. Ibid ., 20.

7 . Richard J. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy ofJohn F. Kennedy

(New York: Viking Press, 1972).

8 . R. L. Gleason, "Quo Vadis?-The Nixon Doctrine and Air Power," Air University Review 23,

no . 5 (July-August 1972): 49.

9. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution, 169.

10 . USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, vol . 2 (27 April-31 December 1962),

"Jungle Jim Final Operational Concept," supporting document 7. In USAF Historical Collection,

USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

11 . Brig Gen Jamie Gough, "Airpower and Counter-insurgency," Airman 6, no . 8 (August

1962):2-7.

12 . Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965

(Washington, D.C. : Office of Air Force History, 1981), 83-84.

13. USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 April-31 December 1962, 1 :14. In

USAF Historical Collection, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

14. John Hawkins Napier III, "The Air Commandos in Vietnam, Nov 5 1961-Feb 7 1965"

(unpublished thesis, Aubum University, 16 March 1967).

15 . Air Force Times, 5 May 1962, 1 .

16 . Ibid ., 31 July 1963, 21 .

17 . USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 April-31 December 1962, vol . 2,

supporting document 8, 1 . In USAF Historical Collection, USAF Historical Research Center,

Maxwell AFB, Ala.

18. Ibid ., 2 .
THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

19. USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 April-31 December 1962,1 :212 .

20. Ibid ., 220.

21 . Ibid ., 229.

22. USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 January-30 June 1963, 1 :148. In USAF

Historical Collection, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

23. Ibid ., 234.

24. USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 April-31 December 1962, 1 :245.

25 . Ibid ., 303.

26. Ibid ., 306.

27 . USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 January-30 June 1964, vol. 2, appendix

K, A2-7. In USAF Historical Collection, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

28 . USAF Oral History Program, Col Joseph W. Kittenger, Jr, interview, 5 September 1974,

24-25 (U) . In USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

29. Ibid ., 12.

30. Ibid ., 21 .

31 . USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 January-30 June 1965, supporting

document 3. In USAF Historical Collection, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

32. USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 January-30 June 1966, "Foreword ." In

USAF Historical Collection, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala .

33. USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 January-30 June 1965, 9.

34. USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 July-31 December 1965, 14 . In USAF

Historical Collection, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

35. Ibid ., 1 .

36. Air Force Times, 2 November 1966, 26.

37. USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 July 1973-30 June 1974, "Foreword ."

In USAF Historical Collection, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala .

38. Gleason, "Quo Vadis?", 23 and 49.

39. Futrell, The USAF in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965, 170 .

40. Gleason, "Quo Vadis?", 23 and 49.

41 . USAF Special Air Warfare (TAC), History, 1 January-30 June 1965, supporting document 3.

In USAF Historical Collection, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

42. USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 January-30 June 1966, "Foreword . " In

USAF Historical Collection, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

43. USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History 1 January-30 June 1965, 9 .

44. USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 July-31 December 1965, 14. In USAF

Historical Collection, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

45. Ibid ., 1 .

46. Air Force Times, 2 November 1966, 26.

47. USAF Special Air Warfare Center (TAC), History, 1 July 1973-30 June 1974, "Foreword."

In USAF Historical Collection, USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala .

48. Gleason, "Quo Vadis?", 23 and 49.

49. Futrell, The USAF in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965, 170 .

50. Gleason, "Quo Vadis?", 23 and 49.
CHAPTER 7

A PLAN FOR USAF PARTICIPATION IN

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

If the Air Force is to be an effective instrument of national power in lowintensity conflict, it must recognize the peculiar difficulties of war at the lower

reaches of the conflict spectrum and commit a modest portion of its intellectual

and material resources to building a low-intensity capability . Some of the

fundamental problems that make participating in low-intensity conflicts difficult

include the seemingly nebulous interests of the Unites States in becoming

involved in such conflicts, the difficulty of obtaining public support for

assistance or intervention in the third world, the difficulty of clearly defining

precise US objectives, and the reluctance of military leaders to develop special

capabilities for unfamiliar kinds of conflict .' That is, reallocating funds and

shifting priorities away from the mainstream efforts of the military (strategic

nuclear deterrence, fighting a major conventional war in Europe, and protecting

the oil fields of the Middle East) are difficult for the military. Hence, the US

military tends to depend on conventional force structures, conventional

command structures, and conventionally trained and equipped forces to cope

with small wars . As the Morocco case study points out, important political and

military constraints impinge on any US effort to assist a friendly third world

country . Intervening in any form in the third world results in similar difficulties .

The US Air Force, to be effective in such situations, must have very detailed

knowledge about the recipient of US assistance and the capabilities and

limitations of that nation's military forces . Only after the Air Force recognizes

that participating in low-intensity conflicts requires special knowledge and

special capabilities can the debate begin on how best to organize and develop

that capability .
THE AIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Committing the Organization

The Air Force seemingly puts a good deal of emphasis on its low-intensity

capability by highlighting the importance of the USAF special operations

forces-forces theoretically tailored for low-intensity conflict . The basic

doctrine of the Air Force (Air Force Manual [AFM] 1-1, Basic Aerospace

Doctrine ofthe United States Air Force, 16 March 1984), lists special operations

as one of the nine basic operational missions of the United States Air Force.

Because it is one of the basic operational missions, commanders are required to

prepare their forces for that mission . Yet, the special operations mission in AFM

1-1 is defined vaguely as "operations which are undertaken in enemy controlled

or politically sensitive territory, cover a broad spectrum of action and are

conducted at every level of conflict.

"2 The Air Force recognizes unconventional

warfare, foreign internal defense (FID), and psychological warfare as the three

main facets of special operations, but in spelling them out it suggests that these

roles are limited in scope to short-term or one-shot efforts. For example, AFM

1-1 states that the evasion and escape, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, direct action

missions, and other covert or clandestine operations associated with

unconventional warfare missions are to be directed "by the joint unconventional

warfare task force of a unified command for military, political, economic, and

ideological purposes." Thus, the unconventional warfare mission refers almost

exclusively to activity behind enemy lines, implying that it is a mission adjunct

only to those undertaken in a conventional conflict. Likewise, US forces

assigned to the role of foreign internal defense will have only an ad hoc mission

of assisting "allied or friendly nations in maintaining their internal defense

operations ." Forces assigned to this mission "are often sent into unstable areas

to help the host country to prevent low-level conflict from expanding into open

hostility" through such programs "as education, training, and military

construction. " Finally, those forces that are to conduct or support psychological

warfare are expected to operate only behind enemy lines and against hostile

forces by developing "comprehensive programs to influence favorably the

attitudes and behavior of hostile forces and people in areas under enemy

control .

"3 The idea of creating forces that can operate on a long-term basis to do

things such as help a third world air force grow effectively, to integrate with an

air force already involved in a conflict, or to intervene directly in a conflict in

support of US policy goals is not accommodated by that part of the Air Force's

basic doctrine which comes closest to considering the issue of low-intensity

conflict, namely, special operations .

Another way to judge the commitment of the Air Force to its various missions

is the emphasis given to efforts to procure, maintain, and improve the equipment

106
PLAN FOR USAF PARTICIPATION IN LIC

dedicated to each mission . The intense effort to get substantial numbers of the

B-l, MX, F-15, and F-16 shows rather clearly the importance the Air Force

attaches to its strategic attack and air superiority missions. Special operations has

been given little attention in recent years . In fact, it has been called by many of

those in special operations the "forgotten force. "4 In contrast, during its heyday

in the early 1960s, the Special Air Warfare Center had 550 aircraft capable of

performing several special operations missions, including reconnaissance, aerial

resupply, forward air control, close air support, and interdiction . The aircraft

were designed to operate from unimproved airfields, could be supported by host

country air forces, and were operated by men specifically trained in assisting

third world air forces .

Today, however, this large, capable force has dwindled to a mere 37 active

duty aircraft thinly spread between the 1st Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt

Field, Florida, and two overseas squadrons at Rhein-Main AB, Germany, and

Clark AB, Philippines; these two units operate the MC-130 Combat Talon. The

wing at Hurlburt also operates the AC-130 Spectre gunship, the HH-53 Pave

Low helicopter, and the UH-1N helicopter . These aircraft are uniquely capable

in many ways, yet are able to perform only a narrow range of missions .

The MC-130 Combat Talon is specifically designed and equipped to support

long-range infiltration, extraction, and aerial resupply and to do so in spite of

any type of enemy air defenses . This aircraft also has a limited photo

reconnaissance capability . The AC-130 Spectre is the only aircraft in special

operations capable of delivering firepower . And since it is equipped with

infrared, television, and radar sensors to acquire targets and pinpoint friendly

forces, the AC-130 can operate as effectively at night as it can in daylight.

Armed with 20-mm, 40-mm, and 105-mm guns, it is ideal for missions that

require very accurate fire, such as supporting troops in contact with the enemy,

perimeter defense, and search and destroy missions . Special operations

helicopters allow support of missions where prepared airfields are not available .'

But this handful of aircraft assigned to special operations gives the Air Force

the ability to participate in low-intensity conflict only in a very limited way. The

missions for which the US Air Force special operations force is presently

configured are direct-action, one-time raids such as the aborted Iran rescue

attempt. Capabilities for the broader missions of low-intensity conflictassisting third world air forces, integrating with them, or directly intervening in a

situation that requires activity beyond a single mission-are not currently within

the means of the Air Force special operations force. Furthermore, limiting Air

Force special operations to direct-action missions may soon become part of Air

Force doctrine and policy. A January 1983 draft of AFM 1-1 defines special

operations as a combat mission conducted to exploit counteroffensive actions

through low-visibility covert or clandestine actions across the spectrum of

conflict. The draft further states that the Air Force special operations force can

conduct and support direct-action counterterrorist operations, collective

107
THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

security, psychological operations, and humanitarian operations .' The

implication of this definition is that special operations are basically reactive in

nature since they primarily exploit counteroffensive actions . However, the thrust

of participating in low-intensity conflict is that forces must be able to act in

several ways ; to be effective they must not be committed only for one-time

missions.

While direct-action missions have remained a recognizable part of Air Force

special operations, the two other aspects of its mission-foreign internal defense

and psychological operations-have been grossly neglected . Although the

proposed draft of AFM 1-1 does not mention foreign internal defense as an Air

Force mission, it does mention "collective security" as falling under special

operations' area of responsibility . ("Collective security" is not defined in the

draft AFM 1-1, so it could have the same meaning as foreign internal defense.)

Foreign internal defense, however, remains on the books as a mission for the

special operations force. For example, Tactical Air Command Manual (TACM)

2-1, Tactical Air Operations, says foreign internal defense (FID)

operations are conducted on request from a foreign government and are to aid allied nations to

attain an established label of military self-reliance . . . . The role of USAF SOFs in FID is to

encourage, advise, and train indigenous personnel in nation building and internal security

activities .

Moreover, participating in foreign internal defense operations is the heart of the

assistance level of activity postulated earlier . Such activity would dominate

operations in the areas of noncombat force employment, advisory assistance,

and providing cadre for host forces (fig . 3, chap . 1) . Assisting the air forces of

friendly countries can take a wide variety of forms but, in any form, it is a

complex undertaking . Some of the goals of an assistance mission could include

providing security for US-owned assets against threatened insurgent activity,

maintaining a friendly government in power, gaining strategic access to a region

to obtain basing or port rights, securing access to resources in a region, or related

aims.

However, the intended recipient often will have problems with accepting US

military assistance . Some countries may be reluctant to request US military

assistance for fear that the presence of US personnel could cast doubt on the

patriotism and independence of the regime . Such an attitude could make

establishing a long-term air force to air force relationship difficult . Hence, we

must be able to anticipate problem areas; acting early will be equally crucial . On

the other hand, when a third world nation is facing pressing internal or external

threats, its government is much more likely to seek assistance. A request for

help in what has become a crisis situation means that the United States must be

able to make a quickly planned, organized, and coordinated response. Thus, our

resources must be committed to a situation that not only may involve active

combat but also brings with it the risk of casualties, propaganda attacks on the

108
PLAN FORUSAF PARTICIPATION IN LIC

US government, and media coverage that might result in a negative public

reaction in the United States, which in turn would make the assistance attempt

even more difficult to pursue successfully .

Effective psychological warfare in low-intensity conflict is perhaps even more

difficult than foreign internal defense operations . As mentioned earlier,

psychological warfare operations should be part of any military operation,

regardless of the level of intensity . They should condition populations in a target

area to support specific US assistance efforts, subvert, enemy forces, and, on a

long-term basis, generate favorable perceptions toward US policies and interests

on a regional basis .

But developing a capacity for psychological operations is very difficult . The

military forces involved must receive detailed training in psychology, massmedia techniques, communications, and cross-cultural relations, plus an

interdisciplinary understanding of the target population's history and cultural,

religious, economic, political, and military values . The Air Force has never

developed the intellectual resources to design true psychological warfare

operations of any scale . Moreover, even though TAC Manual 2-1 includes

psychological operations (PSYOPS) as a mission for the Air Force special

operations force, the Air Force's role in psychological operations has been

primarily in the area of disseminating information . As Air Force 2000 states,

"PSYOP responsibilities are primarily an Army rather than an Air Force

function. The proper Air Force role should be covert dissemination of PSYOP

broadcasts and programs .

"8 Yet there are important potential roles for the Air

Force in psychological warfare, as will be discussed shortly .

The Air Force is currently at a low point in its ability to accomplish its special

operations mission in the areas of unconventional warfare, foreign internal

defense, and psychological warfare . In addition to the drawdown of its aircraft

assets, the special operations mission has suffered from weak interest within the

Air Force as suggested by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Affairs Noel Koch at an Air War College symposium in

1985 . 9

In 1982 with capabilities for participating in low-intensity conflict at such a

low point, the Air Force saw the need to realign completely the command

structure for the special operations force. The Tactical Air Command had

controlled special operations assets since the days of Jungle Jim and the Special

Air Warfare Center . Under TAC, special operations in the Air Force saw both its

days of greatest activity and expansion and its long recent history of neglect and

contraction. Moreover, because of the unique and specialized kind of warfare to

which they were dedicated, special operations people in TAC were always

outside the mainstream of Tactical Air Command thinking . And being equipped

with a strange mixture of aircraft, none of which resemble fast-moving F- 15s and

F- 16s, the special operations units in TAC were distinctly out of place . These

factors may have contributed to the precipitous decline in the capability of the

109
THE AIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

special operations force since the Vietnam War. The reorganization of the

special operations force that was approved in December 1982 and took effect on

1 March 1983 places all special operations forces under the Military Airlift

Command. The special operations force was elevated from a wing to an air

division . The Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS), long a MAC

organization, also became an air division and was joined with the special

operations force to form a new numbered air force, the Twenty-Third Air Force .

This reorganization means nothing in terms of additional manpower and

equipment for the special operations force. It could be, however, the first step in

a renaissance of special operations in the Air Force. MAC is a global command

with global responsibilities, while TAC is a continental command that has

training and readiness as its primary missions . MAC has also been very

supportive of the special mission of the ARRS . Indeed, as the most decorated

unit to come out of the Vietnam War, ARRS has long been a source of pride for

the Military Airlift Command . Perhaps, under the Military Airlift Command the

deficiencies of the current special operations force will be corrected. The time

seems auspicious for a rebirth of special air warfare .

Doctrine and Philosophy

The first step in such a renaissance is to establish a new philosophy for special

operations in the Air Force and to develop the doctrine that will be the basis for

establishing a force structure that meets the need of the philosophy. The

philosophy for participating in low-intensity conflict is very simple . It should

recognize that applying power in low-intensity conflicts is a complex

undertaking that includes a wide range of activity in small conflicts . The service

must recognize that participating in low-intensity conflicts may be a long-term

affair, could have very limited political goals, and may require operating with

minimal fanfare . There likely will be little ".`glory" for low-intensity warriors

and no great air campaigns . Rather, air power in low-intensity conflicts must be

used as required to achieve a clearly defined political goal, whether it be to build

an air capability in a friendly nation's armed forces, to stabilize and support a

regime threatened by external aggression, or to apply military pressure directly

in support of US political objectives .

The philosophy, then, should not be based on discrete kinds of missions

epitomized by the unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and

psychological warfare missions that currently make up special operations .

Rather the philosophy should be to apply the right level of assistance, integration

of forces, or intervention appropriate to the situation (unconventional warfare,

foreign internal defense, or psychological warfare) to achieve the objective .

Thus, Air Force participation in low-intensity conflict needs to be considered in

terms of assistance, integration of forces, and intervention . And the Air Force
PLAN FOR USAF PARTICIPATION IN LIC

must develop, from a philosophic base that postulates the limited goals and

specialized means applicable to low-intensity conflict, the doctrine and

organization to support an assisting, integrating, and intervening capability .

Moreover, the two doctrinal works that most directly affect the theory and

practice of low-intensity conflict (Air Force Manual 2-5, Tactical Air

Operations-Special Air Warfare, and Air Force Manual 3-5, Special Air

Warfare Tactics) have not been revised recently. (The most recent version of

AFM 2-5 was published on 10 March 1967 and has not been revised or amended

since that date; AFM 3-5 was published on 18 March 1966, amended in 1968,

and has been dormant since.) These two manuals should be the bible on what the

Air Force should be doing if it is to participate in low-intensity conflicts . Yet,

both manuals refer to organizational structures and air power capabilities that

have not existed for many years. Some important weapon systems capabilities,

such as the inflight refueling capability of the AC-130, MC-130, and HH-53, are

not mentioned in these obsolete manuals. Further, AFM 2-5 describes the

Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) as the Air Force focal point for training,

advice, guidance, and recommendations on special operations matters . Within

the SAWC, it tasks the 1st Combat Applications Group to develop tactics,

techniques, and equipment for the various air command wings. But as shown in

the preceding chapter, the Special Air Warfare Center and its highly capable

specialized units have long since faded from the Air Force .

from the Air Force.

AFM 2-5 lists a wide range of responsibilities for the special operations force,

including search and rescue, military civic action, country team surveys and

planning, mobile training teams, close air support, interdiction, and tactical air

reconnaissance . Those tasks, reflecting a capability that existed in the 1960s

could be easily adapted to our proposed philosophy of assisting, integrating, and

intervening; but the capability is gone . Furthermore, AFM 3-5 provides detailed

tactical guidance for aircraft no longer available for the special operations

missions.

The point is that rethinking special operations doctrine in new terms must

begin now . But before the doctrine can be written, the Air Force must decide at

what level it wishes to participate in low-intensity conflicts . At present the Air

Force special operations force can participate only in a very narrow part of the

low-intensity conflict spectrum . It can effectively insert and extract small-sized

forces covertly, and it can carry out one-time raids, but the ability of Air Force

special operations forces to participate for longer time periods has waned

considerably. If the Air Force wishes only to provide airlift for special operations

and a highly specialized infiltration or "exfiltration" capability, current

organizational structures are adequate. However, if we as an institution accept

the notion that low-intensity conflict involves a broad scope of activity requiring

a wide range of military options, then thought must be given to a special

operations force of greatly expanded capability.
THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

The Special Air Warfare Center, as originally conceived, provides a model for

us to work toward . The center worked to build US Air Force capability to assist,

integrate with local forces, and intervene in small wars . I propose reestablishing

and reinvigorating the Special Air Warfare Center. The chart at figure 14 shows

the major functional entities that would be essential to a new special air warfare

center or any other such Air Force organization that was designed to participate

at all levels of activity in the low-intensity conflict spectrum . The mission of

such an organization would be, as suggested previously, to provide military

options for United States decision makers considering involvement in lowintensity conflicts . These options would include programs to assist or integrate

with third world air forces or to intervene directly in a conflict if necessary . This

organization would maximize Air Force participation in small wars . Although a

highly idealized vision, this model provides the basis for discussion within the

Air Force about what the proper role for a revitalized center in low-intensity

conflicts should be.

This infrastructure is what will make the operational units-the aircraft and

the people-effective in the missions they are to achieve . In a low-intensity

warfare unit, the rapport between the operators and the support organizations

will have to be extraordinarily good . Thus, the infrastructure elements of the

center should be collocated with the operational units if the special warfare

wings are to be effective .

Liaison

A Special Air Warfare Center for Today's World

Although a separate directorate to handle liaison functions (fig . 13, chap . 6)

might seem incongruous in an air division, interagency, interservice, and

intraservice liaison will be a key factor in the effectiveness of an Air Force unit

dedicated to low-intensity conflict. Any kind of military activity in the third

world will require extensive cooperation between many agencies . At a minimum

an Air Force unit designed for low-intensity conflict would need to maintain a

close working relationship with the US Army Special Operations Command at

Fort Bragg, the Navy's sea-air-land (SEAL) teams, the Defense Department

international security affairs office, the State Department, numerous Air Staff

agencies including the Directorate of International Programs (HQ USAF/PRI)

and the Plans Directorate (HQ USAF/XOX), the Defense Security Assistance

Agency, the Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and major Air Force commands .

Whether the mission is making a one-time raid as in Son Tay or Iran, providing

technical assistance on a short- or long-term basis to a friendly country, or
w

Twenty-Third Air Force

Low Intensity Warfare enter (Air Division Level)

Warfare

Operations

(Low-Intensity

Wing)

Plans Liaison Intelligence Combat

Applications I I

Low-Intensity

Warfare School

Current Training

Operations F-1

Asia

Africa Middle Research Tactics Concepts

AmeAmerica E

sDIA

and

Development Exercise

and

Doctrine Current

Intel -

Regional and

Evaluation r

CIA ligence Estimates a

z

State 0

C

a

Mo ile

Imagery Operational

b

a

Facility Intelligence

b

Logistics' a

Figure 14 . Infrastructure .

0

z

r

n
THEAIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

preparing to intervene with advisors or combat forces, the US Air Force unit will

need to work with the policy-making elements of the US government and other

US military services . A continuously operating liaison unit will be able to

organize joint operations more easily, and can make an Air Force role in any

interdisciplinary approach to resolving a low-intensity conflict more effective .

Operations and Training

The operations directorate would provide normal operations and training

support for the center. The composition of this directorate, which would control

the aircraft and aircrews of the center, will be discussed in detail under the topic

of force structure .

Plans

The plans directorate would be the heart of any assistance provided by the Air

Force in low-intensity conflict. It would be divided into regional branches (Asia,

Latin America, Africa, and Middle East at a minimum) and would provide

support for all Air Force assistance programs abroad. Thus, the plans directorate

would provide a core of expertise to assist any Air Force mobile training teams

sent on specific assistance missions, and could provide advice to decision makers

in Washington on proposed aid packages for friends and allies .

The center's plans staff would maintain close contact with Air Staff regional

planners and DOD international security affairs project officers . The center's

plans directorate would gather and maintain information on conditions in all

regions . The staff would be composed of trained area specialists with thorough

language training; their knowledge of the political-military situations in the

countries of each region would be unsurpassed . Because of their expertise, the

people in this directorate would be an invaluable advisory resource to the hardpressed action officers of the Air Staff, who often have to make decisions on

military aid proposals with minimal background information . In addition, the

center's plans people would be responsible for evaluating likely future problem

spots in the areas for which they were responsible . That is, they would

continuously evaluate US interests in each region and develop priorities for each .

Then they would develop potential assistance, integration, or intervention

scenarios against which the center would test its people, equipment, doctrine,

and tactics .

Intelligence

While the plans directorate would build knowledge oriented to operations and

scenarios, the intelligence directorate would build data bases on each region,
PLAN FOR USAF PARTICIPATION IN LIC

keep track of current intelligence developments, and have the prime

responsibility for developing political-military estimates on key countries . As

suggested throughout this paper, knowledge about target areas is the key to

participating successfully in low-intensity conflicts . Superb intelligence was the

key factor that made British air control work . Knowing the people and the

country where they were operating enabled the British forces to develop the

doctrine and tactics that made their air control concept so successful . By

comparison, US ignorance of the capabilities of the Royal Moroccan Air Force

and the political-military realities in Morocco (and in the United States) caused

our efforts to assist Morocco during the SA-6 crisis to fall short of the mark.

Clearly the intelligence and planning functions would complement each other

and would have to work together closely to achieve the greatest productivity .

The intelligence directorate would also have a strong capability to support

immediate operational requirements, separate from its current estimative and

basic intelligence functions . It would have to meet the intelligence requirements

for one-time special operations missions; this effort would require extreme

protective measures to ensure security of the operation . The intelligence staff

would also have to develop the procedures to provide intelligence assistance to

host countries in assistance, integration, and intervention scenarios . Permanently

assigned liaison officers from DIA, CIA, and the State Department would be

invaluable in developing, and eventually standardizing, procedures for

transferring intelligence to friendly third world countries .

Another important intelligence function would be to tailor specific

intelligence techniques and equipment to support the operational assets of the

low-intensity conflict center. Should a conflict expand beyond the pure

assistance stage to a level where Air Force units are tasked to assist a friendly air

force or to intervene directly, our units would need this tailored intelligence . The

intelligence directorate should include a fully mobile, miniature imageryprocessing facility . This unit should be able to process photographic and radar

imagery from aircraft and to receive finished intelligence from national sources.

This facility would also serve as the core for a most important teaching asset . As

exemplified in the Morocco-Polisario case study, many third world air forces

need help in developing viable air intelligence collection, processing,

interpretation, and dissemination capabilities . A mobile intelligence processing

center could deploy to any third world country and could train third world air

forces in intelligence techniques.

Combat Applications

The combat applications directorate would be a direct descendant of the 1st

Combat Applications Group of the original Special Air Warfare Center.

Working closely with the operational wing, the combat applications directorate
THEAIR FORCEROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

would develop and test equipment for use in low-intensity conflict arenas . Its

primary functions would be to provide training in individual combat skills, to

train units to operate with host forces, and to train units to operate in conjunction

with other US services . It would also maintain contact with the research and

development community to keep abreast of technological developments that

could be adapted to low-intensity conflicts .

In addition, the combat applications directorate would develop and evaluate

exercises and document new tactics for use by the center's forces as well as by

third world countries . A realistic and creative program of exercises is a useful

way of expanding one's knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of

sister services, the services of potential allies and friends, and one's own unit .

During the course of an exercise, new or innovative tactics can be developed .

Regardless of the exercise, special attention must be given to developing realistic

scenarios . The combat applications directorate could draw on expertise from the

plans and intelligence directorates in developing these training scenarios .

Exercises must be held often and with as many "real" players as possible.

Operating with the forces of the US Army and Navy would contribute to

effective joint operations when those are necessary; operating with the air forces

of friendly or allied nations would yield valuable insight into the real and

potential capabilities of those forces . It could also provide invaluable experience

in operating in future potential battlefields .

Logistics

The logistics directorate, as in any Air Force organization, would have the

essential task of making sure proper supplies are available for the mission. A

normal Air Force logistics unit would be acceptable for this new organization,

with a few exceptions . It needs to have a priority, no-wait procurement

capability for specialized items that may be required for the low-intensity

conflict mission . One-time raids, an important part of that mission, may require

a few pieces of specialized' equipment that need to be procured under conditions

of strict secrecy for security purposes. Such extraordinary requirements generate

unusual demands on any logistics system that need to be anticipated and allowed

for. The logistics directorate needs to be able to fabricate and modify equipment

to meet the special needs of the organization.

Low-Intensity Warfare School

The proposed low-intensity warfare school would operate much as the Special

Operations School has over the past several years . However, it would put greater

emphasis on teaching US personnel techniques to prepare them to train friendly
third world air forces better . Intensive courses in cross-cultural relations,

language training in coordination with the Defense Language Institute, and

instruction in the courses currently being taught would become part of the

school's mission. In addition, the school should have a separate concepts and

doctrine section . As the center becomes involved in various levels of lowintensity conflict, a tremendous influx of knowledge and experience will begin

to accumulate at the center. The school should have the additional responsibility

of gleaning what is important from that experience, preserving it, and, where

appropriate, including it in the constantly evolving doctrinal process . The school

would quickly become the Air Force focal point for new thinking regarding lowintensity conflict .

Force Structure

PLAN FORUSAF PARTICIPATION IN LIC

Structuring forces to be assigned to the suggested low-intensity conflict center

will be critical to any potential for success by the Air Force in future small wars .

Deciding on the quantity and types of aircraft to be operated by this center will

be a difficult matter. At this point quantitative issues are less important than the

qualitative requirements for such a unit. Figure 15 shows the basic aircraft of a

low-intensity conflict wing .

The capabilities provided by the C- 130s and helicopters currently assigned to

the Air Force special operations force have been discussed previously. As noted,

they provide a superb infiltration and extraction capability, a modest firepower

delivery and reconnaissance capability, and a minimal psychological warfare

capability . These aircraft are best suited for one-time raids . However, if the

philosophy of assisting, integrating, or intervening that is espoused here is

adopted, the low-intensity conflict center will need additional types of assets .

The major assets currently assigned to special operations-C-130s and heavy

helicopters-are extraordinarily complex and, therefore, difficult to maintain:

they are ill-suited for the assistance mission. Moreover, few third world

countries can maintain the complex electronics of these systems, much less

afford to buy them; they also have little need for these aircraft . Their needs are

more traditional than unconventional . They need reconnaissance, transport, and

strike aircraft adapted to their specialized environments .

Two of the needs of a typical third world air force correspond to weak spots in

the current US Air Force special operations force-reconnaissance and strike .

Our Air Force special operations force has a limited reconnaissance capability in

its C-130s, and a very specialized strike capability in its AC-130s . The lowintensity conflict center should have a squadron of Northrup F-20 Tigersharks

since this aircraft is being pushed as the future fighter for many third world

countries . Developing the tactics and techniques for using this aircraft in a

variety of roles will determine if it will be a useful addition to third world air
THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Headquarters Military Airlift Command

Twenty-Third Air Force

Low Intensity Warfare Center (Air Division Level)

t-ow-kitensity Warfare Wing

C-130 Helicopter F-20 A-10 Short Experimental

Qiaison) Takeoff Aircraft

Figure -15. Operations .

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forces. Theoretically the F-20 could be adapted to reconnaissance, strike (deep

and close), and air defense roles. Because of this flexibility and the designed-in

simplicity of the aircraft, it should be a welcome addition to most third world air

forces. But third world countries often are reluctant to buy what they consider to

be second-string fighters of the superpowers . Normally, a third world country

will want a top-of-the-line fighter such as the F-15 or F-16, regardless of the

reality of the threat faced and the exorbitant initial and follow-on costs of the

super-sophisticated front-line fighters . It is very hard to convince commanders of

a third world air force that they should buy an F-5 and F-20 when they see that

the US Air Force has neither aircraft in its combat inventory . An F-20 unit as part

of the US Air Force low-intensity conflict center would perhaps make selling the

F-20 abroad a good deal easier.

More important than the commercial aspects of an Air Force F-20 unit is the

potential value of such as unit to developing a low-intensity conflict strategy for

the US Air Force. With such a unit, the US Air Force could devise and test

tactics for using a moderately sophisticated aircraft in small wars . It would also

be the ideal aircraft around which to build the assistance, integration, and

intervention concept . As the Air Force developed tactics for using the F-20,

those tactics could be passed on to friendly third world air forces . Training

exercises between the US Air Force and host country air forces would refine

those techniques and provide the groundwork should the Air Force need a unit to
integrate with a host nation air force. This unit would be ideal for serving as a

third world Red Flag team; it could fly with and teach specialized tactics to host

nations' units-a capability sorely lacking in the US Air Force, as we saw in the

Morocco SA-6 crisis . And, an Air Force F-20 unit could be supported more

easily than F-15 or F-16 units in a beleaguered third world country . Using the

specifically trained and experienced people of a low-intensity conflict center, the

US Air Force could respond as effectively in many parts of the world as do the

French in Africa (assuming we develop the political will and finesse to operate

like the French) . A modest amount of easily supported US air power could play

an important role in many third world conflicts .

The low-intensity conflict center should have access to other strike resources

as well. Perhaps a general purpose A-10 unit could be designated to train with

the center to develop tactics appropriate to low-intensity conflicts . The A-37

(fig . 16), a workhorse in Vietnam, might also be resurrected by the center. That

aircraft is currently being operated by several third world countries and could

have a role similar to that proposed for the F-20 within the center.

Airlift within the current special operations force is being handled by the

modest C-130 and helicopter assets assigned to the command . The short takeoff

and landing (STOL) aircraft that were so much a part of the special operations

force of the 1960s have been largely purged from the Air Force . The C-7A

Caribous (fig . 17) and C-123 Providers (fig . 18) are no longer in the active

inventory ; the former are about to be phased out from the reserves and only a few

of the latter are operated by the Air National Guard . Reactivated C-7s and

C-123s could provide a valuable and cheap intratheater capability . When

combined with helicopters, a modest STOL fixed-wing force could be a valuable

asset in low-intensity conflict scenarios . OV-10s (fig . 19) might be used for a

reconnaissance role .

Of course, developing appropriate follow-on aircraft specifically designed for

those kinds of conflicts would be a primary goal of both the operational flying

units and the combat applications directorate. The US aircraft industry has never

had reason to exert its energies toward developing an aircraft for low-intensity

conflict. The Air Force has never generated the doctrine or the operational

requirement to develop such an aircraft . The proposed low-intensity conflict

center would be the ideal organization to develop the expertise leading to a

viable proposal for a new aircraft specifically designed for low-intensity conflict .

The options are enormous : vertical-takeoff aircraft, superlight aircraft,

multipurpose fighters, tilt-rotor aircraftall are possibilities .

Looking Ahead

PLAN FOR USAF PARTICIPATION IN LIC

This paper has suggested that small wars will be with us for the foreseeable

future and that our ability to cope with large-scale conventional conflict does not
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THEAIR FORCE ROLE IN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

necessarily mean that we can cope with small wars . The least likely kinds of

conflict-strategic nuclear exchange, large-scale conventional war in Europe,

and a major Rapid Deployment Force movement to the Persian Gulf-currently

drive resource allocation as well as strategic and doctrinal thinking. While this is

true of all the services to some degree, the Air Force seems especially negligent

in defining its role and developing a doctrine applicable to small wars, or as we

have called it here, low-intensity conflict .

The chart at figure 20 summarizes how a newly revitalized and renamed

USAF Special Air Warfare Center would provide the basis for effective US Air

Force participation in current and future small wars . Running vertically along

the left-hand margin of the chart is a hierarchy for looking at any war. Vision,

strategy, operations, and tactics are the vital elements that make up a war. Vision

is the policy-level concept of what a nation or institution hopes to achieve in a

conflict situation . In the case of low-intensity conflicts, the US vision can be

stated bluntly : to exert control or influence in support of US policy in the third

world. Boldly stated, this sounds chauvinistic and unrealistic . Perhaps so . For

the United States to develop an overall small-war capability, US political resolve

must become firm and the American people must support our need to act abroad.

The problems associated with attaining a vision for active US involvement in the

third world are vast . Here I am dealing only with establishing one small

capability in the overall resources-political, military, and economic-that must

be dedicated to the problem of low-intensity conflict.

Below national vision, national strategies or plans are developed to implement

that vision . Operations are programs within the overall plan, and tactics are

specific activities within operations . The experience that would flow from the

proposed low-intensity conflict center would be the basis for developing air

tactics for use in various low-intensity warfare situations . The conceptual

framework expressed by the ideas of assisting, integrating, and intervening in

small wars provides the philosophic basis for developing an Air Force capability

to participate in small wars. Finally, figure 15 shows that the proposed US Air

Force low-intensity warfare center would be in close coordination with the rather

diverse collection of agencies that are now concerned with low-intensity

conflicts .

An organization based on the USAF Special Air Warfare Center of the 1960s

should be the focal point for concentrating the Air Force people and equipment

concerned with low-intensity conflict . Before such a unit could be established,

however, the Air Force must make an organizational commitment to developing

ways of participating in low-intensity conflicts . From this commitment should

come theoretical doctrine on applying air power in low-intensity conflict. As the

new low-intensity conflict center takes shape, this theoretical doctrine would be

tested and refined, eventually to become "true" doctrine . This process will be

long, difficult, and unpopular but necessary if the Air Force is to have a

meaningful role in the most likely kinds of future conflicts . As a result of the

recent transfer of special operations assets from the Tactical Air Command to the
VISION---o-EXERT CONTROL AND INFLUENCE IN SUPPORT OF U .S. POLICY IN THIRD WORLD

AIR FORCE-TO-AIR FORCE

STRATEGY ASSIST INTERDISCIPLINARY OPERATIONS

COOPERATIVE FUNCTIONS USAFE LOW-INTENSITY WAR

. JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS

WITH FRIENDLY FOREIGN LOW-INTENSITY COMMUNITY

AIR FORCE-TO-AIR FORCE FORCES, ESP TRANSITIONAL WARFARE CENTER

INTEGRATE <--INTERDISCIPLINARY OPERATIONS

NATIONS. ARMY

NAVY

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS MARINE

INTERVENE-*- AIR POWER/JOINT SERVICE

Figure 20. Hierarchy of War Fighting .

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NOTES

CHAPTER 7

1 . See Sam C. Sarkesian and William L. Scully, eds ., US Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict (New

York: National Defense Information Center, 1981), 11, and Robert B . Asprey, War In the Shadows

(New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1975), 159 .

2 . AFM 1-1, Basic Aeospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Department of the Air

Force, 16 March 1984, 3-4.

3 . Ibid .

4 . Robert L. Brenchi, "USAF Special Operations: The Forgotten Force," Air War College

Research Report No. AV-AWC-93-026 (Maxwell AFB, Ala., February 1983).

5 . TACM 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, 15 April 1978,

4-57 to 4-58 .

6 . Draft AFM 1-1, dated 9 January 1983 .

7 . TACM 2-1, 5-54 .

8 . Department of the Air Force, Air Force 2000 (11 June 1982), 93. (SECRET)

9 . "USAF Beefing Up Low-Level Warfare Capabilities," Tech Trends, 3 March 1986, 3.

7rU.S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 2001-636-471/40017

PLAN FOR USAF PARTICIPATION IN LIC