F-35 JOINT STRIKE 

FIGHTER

Program Has Improved in 

Some Areas, but 

Affordability Challenges 

and Other Risks Remain 

Statement of Michael J. Sullivan, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air 

and Land Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT 

Wednesday, April 17, 2013

GAO-13-500T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-500T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and 

Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives

April 17, 2013

F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

Program Performance Has Improved in Some Areas,

but Affordability Challenges and Other Risks 

Remain 

Why GAO Did This Study

The F-35 Lightning II, the Joint Strike 

Fighter, is DOD’s most costly and 

ambitious aircraft acquisition. The 

program is developing and fielding

three aircraft variants for the Air Force, 

Navy, Marine Corps, and eight 

international partners. The F-35 is 

critical to long-term recapitalization 

plans as it is intended to replace 

hundreds of existing aircraft. This will 

require a long-term sustained funding 

commitment. Total U.S. investment is 

nearing $400 billion to develop and 

procure 2,457 aircraft through 2037. 

Fifty-two aircraft have been delivered 

through 2012. The F-35 program has 

been extensively restructured over the 

last 3 years to address prior cost,

schedule, and performance problems. 

DOD approved a new acquisition 

program baseline in March 2012. 

GAO’s prior reviews of the F-35 made 

numerous recommendations to 

improve outcomes, such as increasing 

test resources and reducing annual 

procurement quantities. 

This testimony is largely based on 

GAO’s recently released report, GAO13-309. This testimony discusses (1) 

progress the F-35 program made in 

2012, and (2) major risks that program 

faces going forward. GAO’s work 

included analyses of a wide range of 

program documents and interviews 

with defense and contractor officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made prior recommendations 

to help reduce risk and improve 

outcomes, which DOD has

implemented to varying degrees.

What GAO Found

The new F-35 acquisition baseline reflects positive restructuring actions taken by

the Department of Defense (DOD) since 2010, including more time and funding 

for development and deferred procurement of more than 400 aircraft to future 

years. Overall, the program progressed on several fronts during 2012 to further 

improve the current outlook. The program achieved 7 of 10 key management 

objectives and made substantial progress on one other. Two objectives on 

aircraft deliveries and a corrective management plan were not met. The F-35 

development test program substantially met expectations with some revisions to 

flight test plans and made considerable progress addressing key technical risks.

Software management practices and some output measures improved, although

deliveries to test continued to lag behind plans. Manufacturing and supply 

processes also improved—indicators such as factory throughput, labor efficiency, 

and quality measures were positive. While initial F-35 production overran target 

costs and delivered aircraft late, the latest data shows labor hours decreasing 

and deliveries accelerating.

The F-35 program still faces considerable challenges and risks. Ensuring that the 

F-35 is affordable and can be bought in the quantities and time required by the 

warfighter will be a paramount concern to the Congress, DOD, and international 

partners. With more austere budgets looming, F-35 acquisition funding 

requirements average $12.6 billion annually through 2037 (see below). Once 

fielded, the projected costs of sustaining the F-35 fleet have been deemed 

unaffordable by DOD officials; efforts to reduce these costs are underway. 

Software integration and test will be challenging as many complex tasks remain 

to enable full warfighting capability. The program is also incurring substantial 

costs for rework–currently projected at $1.7 billion over 10 years of production–to 

fix problems discovered during testing. With two-thirds of development testing 

still to go, additional changes to design and manufacturing are likely. The 

program continues to incur financial risk from its plan to procure 289 aircraft for 

$57.8 billion before completing development flight testing. 

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition Funding Requirements 

View GAO-13-500T. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 

or sullivanm@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-13-500T 

Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the F-35 Lightning II, 

also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). At a cost approaching $400 

billion, the F-35 is the Department of Defense’s (DOD) most costly and 

ambitious acquisition program. The program is developing and fielding 

three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and eight 

international partners. The F-35 is the linchpin of U.S. and partner plans 

to replace existing fighters and support future combat operations. In a 

time of austere federal budgets, DOD continues to project significant 

long-term sustained funding requirements for the F-35 while, at the same 

time, pursuing several other expensive systems. Over the past 3 years, 

DOD has extensively restructured the F-35 program to address poor cost, 

schedule, and performance outcomes. Most recently, in March 2012, 

DOD established a new, more realistic, F-35 acquisition program baseline 

that reflects increased costs, longer schedule times, and deferred

procurement of 410 aircraft to the future. Appendix I tracks program 

baseline changes since the start of system development in 2001.

We have reported annually on F-35 issues since 2005.

1 My testimony

today is largely based on the results of our latest review,

2

 

1

See related GAO products at the end of this statement.

and addresses 

(1) the progress the F-35 program made in 2012 and (2) the major risks

that the program faces going forward. To conduct our work, we reviewed 

program status reports and briefings, management objectives, test plans 

and results, and internal DOD analyses with a focus on accomplishments 

in calendar year 2012 compared to original plans for that year. We 

obtained manufacturing data and cumulative outputs from the start of 

production in 2007 through the end of 2012, and discussed development 

and production issues and results to date, future expansion plans, and 

improvement efforts with DOD, F-35 program, and contractor officials. We 

toured the aircraft manufacturing plant, obtained production and supply 

performance indicators, identified cumulative and projected engineering 

changes, and discussed factory improvements and management controls 

with members of the contractor’s work force and DOD plant 

representatives. We evaluated DOD’s restructuring actions and impacts 

2

GAO, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term Affordability 

Is a Major Concern, GAO-13-309 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2013).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-500T 

on the program, tracked cost and schedule changes from program start to 

the March 2012 baseline, and determined factors driving the changes.

We obtained current projections of acquisition funding needs through 

2037 and estimated life cycle sustainment funding requirements. We 

conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

The F-35 program made progress in 2012 on several fronts. The program 

met or substantially met most of its key management and development 

testing objectives for the year. We also found that the program made 

progress in addressing key technical risks, as well as improving software 

management, manufacturing, and supply processes. 

The F-35 program met or substantially met most of its key management 

objectives established for calendar year 2012. The program office 

annually establishes major management objectives that it wants to 

achieve in the upcoming year. The F-35 program achieved 7 of its 10 

primary objectives in 2012. Those included, among other things, the 

completion of development testing on early increments of software, the 

beginning of lab testing for both variations of the helmet mounted display, 

the beginning of pilot training for two aircraft variants, and the completion 

of negotiations on the restructured development contract. Although the 

program did not complete its software block 33 critical design review as 

planned in 2012, it did successfully complete its block 3 preliminary 

design review in November 2012 and the critical design review in late 

January 2013. The program did not meet its objectives to (1) deliver 40

production aircraft in 2012 and (2) receive approval from the Defense 

Contract Management Agency of the contractor’s plan for correcting 

deficiencies in its system for tracking and reporting cost and schedule 

progress.

4

 

3 Software capabilities are developed, tested, and delivered in three major blocks. Block 3 

is to provide the F-35 its full warfighting capability.

 

4

This specifically refers to the contractor’s Earned Value Management System, which has 

been found to be deficient. Earned value management is a disciplined process for 

tracking, controlling, and reporting contract costs and schedule. DOD requires its use by 

major defense suppliers to facilitate good insight and oversight of the expenditure of 

government dollars. 

F-35 Program

Performance 

Improved in 2012

Most Management and 

Development Testing

Objectives Were Achieved
 

Page 3 GAO-13-500T 

The F-35 development flight test program also substantially met 2012 

expectations with some revisions to original plans. The program 

exceeded its planned number of flights by 18 percent, although it fell short 

of its plan in terms of test points5

• Conventional takeoff and landing variant (F-35A)—accomplished high 

angle of attack testing, initial weapons separation, engine air start, 

expansion of the airspeed and altitude envelopes, and evaluated 

flying qualities with internal and external weapons.

flown by about 3 percent, suggesting 

that the flights flown were not as productive as expected. Test officials 

had to make several adjustments to plans during the year due to 

operating and performance limitations with aircraft and late releases of 

software to test. As a result, none of the three variants completed all of 

their planned 2012 baseline points, but the test team was able to add and 

complete some test points that had been planned for future years. Testing 

accomplished on each of the aircraft variants in 2012 included: 

6

• Short takeoff and vertical landing variant (F-35B)—accomplished the 

first weapons release, engine air start tests, fuel dump operations, 

flight envelope expansion with weapons loaded, radar signature 

testing, and tested re-design air inlet doors for vertical lift operations.

 

• Carrier suitable variant (F-35C)—conducted speed and altitude range 

verification and flights with external weapons, prepared for simulated 

carrier landings, and conducted shore-based tests of a redesigned 

arresting hook.

In 2012, the F-35 program also made considerable progress in 

addressing four areas of technical risk that could substantially degrade 

the F-35’s capabilities and mission effectiveness. However, additional 

work remains to fully address those risks. These risk areas and the 

actions taken in 2012 are discussed below: 

1. Helmet mounted display (HMD)—DOD continued to address technical 

issues with the HMD system. The original helmet mounted display, 

integral to mission systems, encountered significant technical 

 

5

Flight test points are specific, quantifiable objectives in flight plans that are needed to 

verify aircraft design and performance.

6

Due primarily to operating restrictions and deficiencies in the air refueling system, the F35A did not accomplish as many flights as planned and fell short of planned test points by 

about 15 percent.

Progress Made in 

Addressing Key Technical 

Risks 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-500T 

deficiencies and did not meet warfighter requirements. The program is 

pursuing a dual path by developing a second, less capable helmet 

while working to fix the first helmet design. In 2012, DOD began 

dedicated ground and flight testing to address these issues. Both

variations of the helmet mounted display are being evaluated and 

program and contractor officials told us that they have increased 

confidence that the helmet deficiencies will be fixed. DOD may make 

a decision in 2013 as to which helmet to procure. 

2. Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS)—ALIS is an important 

tool to predict and diagnose aircraft maintenance and supply issues.

ALIS systems with limited capability are in use at training and testing 

locations. More capable versions of ALIS are being developed and 

program and contractor officials believe that the program is on track to 

fix identified shortcomings and field the fully capable system in 2015. 

Limited progress was made in 2012 on developing a smaller, 

transportable version needed to support unit level deployments to 

operating locations.

3. Arresting hook system—The carrier variant arresting hook system

was redesigned after the original hook was found to be deficient, 

which prevented active carrier trials. The program accomplished risk 

reduction testing of a redesigned hook point to inform this new design. 

The preliminary design review was conducted in August 2012 and the 

critical design review in February 2013. Flight testing of the 

redesigned system is slated for late 2013.

4. Structural durability—Over time, testing has discovered bulkhead and 

rib cracks on the aircraft. Structural and durability testing to verify that 

all three variants can achieve expected life and identify life-limited 

parts was completed in 2012. The program is testing some 

redesigned structures and planning other modifications. Officials plan 

to retrofit and test a production aircraft already built and make 

changes to the production line for subsequent aircraft. Current 

projections show the aircraft and modifications remain within weight 

targets.

In 2012, the F-35 aircraft contractor and program office took steps to 

improve the program’s software management and output. The program 

began the process of establishing a second system integration laboratory, 

adding substantial testing and development capacity. The program also 

began prioritizing and focusing its resources on incremental software

development as opposed to the much riskier concurrent development

approach. In addition, the program began implementing improvement 

initiatives recommended by an independent software review, and

Software Management and 

Output Improved
 

Page 5 GAO-13-500T 

evaluated the possible deferral of some of the aircraft’s capabilities to 

later blocks or moving them outside of the current F-35 program

altogether. At the same time, program data regarding software output 

showed improvement. For example, program officials reported that the 

time it took to fix software defects decreased from180 days to 55 days, 

and the time it took to build and release software for testing decreased 

from 187 hours to 30 hours. 

Key manufacturing metrics and discussions with defense and contracting 

officials indicate that F-35 manufacturing and supply processes improved

during 2012. While initial F-35 production overran target costs and 

delivered aircraft late, the latest data through the end of 2012 shows labor 

hours decreasing and deliveries accelerating. The aircraft contractor’s

work force is gaining important experience and processes are maturing 

as more aircraft are built. The labor hours needed to complete aircraft at 

the prime contractor’s plant decreased, labor efficiency since the first 

production aircraft improved, time to manufacture aircraft in the final 

assembly area declined, factory throughput increased, and the amount of 

traveled work declined. In addition, program data show that the reliability 

and predictability of the manufacturing processes increased while at the 

same time aircraft delivery rates improved considerably. Figure 1 

illustrates the improvement in production aircraft delivery time frames by 

comparing actual delivery dates against the dates specified in the 

contracts. 

Manufacturing Process

Metrics Improved
 

Page 6 GAO-13-500T 

Figure 1: F-35 Production Aircraft Deliveries Compared to Contract Dates

Note: The numbered aircraft are in order of delivery. AF= U.S. Air Force F-35A, BF = U.S. Marine 

Corps F-35B, CF = U.S. Department of the Navy F-35C; and BK = United Kingdom F-35B.

Ensuring that the F-35 is affordable and can be bought in the quantities 

and time frames required by the warfighter will be of paramount concern 

to the Congress, U.S. military and international partners. The acquisition 

funding requirements for the United States alone are currently expected 

to average $12.6 billion per year through 2037, and the projected costs of 

operating and sustaining the F-35 fleet, once fielded, have been deemed

unaffordable by DOD officials. In addition, the program faces challenges

with software development and continues to incur substantial costs for 

rework to fix deficiencies discovered during testing. As testing continues 

additional changes to design and manufacturing processes will likely be 

required, while production rates continue to increase.

F-35 Program Still 

Faces Risks 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-500T 

The March 2012 acquisition program baseline places the F-35 program 

on firmer footing, but aircraft are expected to cost more and deliveries to 

warfighters will take longer than previously projected. The new baseline 

projects the need for a total of $316 billion in development and 

procurement funding from 2013 through 2037, or an average of $12.6 

billion annually over that period (see figure 2). Maintaining this level of 

sustained funding will be difficult in a period of declining or flat defense 

budgets and competition with other “big ticket items” such as the KC-46 

tanker and a new bomber program. In addition, the funding projections 

assume the financial benefits of the international partners purchasing at 

least 697 aircraft. If fewer aircraft are procured in total or in smaller 

annual quantities—by the international partners or the United States—unit 

costs will likely rise according to analysis done by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

(CAPE) office.

Figure 2: F-35 Program Budgeted Development and Procurement Funding Requirements, Fiscal Years 2013-2037

Note: Development and procurement of the Marine Corps variant is included in the Department of the 

Navy budget accounts.

Long-Term Affordability 

Remains a Concern
 

Page 8 GAO-13-500T 

In addition to the costs for acquiring aircraft, significant concerns and 

questions persist regarding the cost to operate and sustain the F-35 fleet 

over the coming decades. The current sustainment cost projection by 

CAPE for all U.S. aircraft, based on an estimated 30-year service life, 

exceeds $1 trillion. Using current program assumptions of aircraft 

inventory and flight hours, CAPE recently estimated annual operating and 

support costs of $18.2 billion for all F-35 variants compared to $11.1 

billion spent on legacy aircraft in 2010. DOD officials have declared that 

operating and support costs of this magnitude are unaffordable and the 

department is actively engaged in evaluating opportunities to reduce 

those costs, such as basing and infrastructure reductions, competitive 

sourcing, and reliability improvements. 

Because of F-35 delays and uncertainties, the military services have 

made investments to extend the service lives of legacy F-16 and F-18 

aircraft at a cost of $5 billion (in 2013 dollars). The Navy is also buying 

new F/A-18E/F Super Hornets at a cost of $3.1 billion (in then-year 

dollars) to bridge the gap in F-35 deliveries and mitigate projected 

shortfalls in fighter aircraft force requirements. As a result, the services 

will incur additional future sustainment costs to support these new and 

extended-life aircraft, and will have a difficult time establishing and 

implementing retirement schedules for existing fleets.

Over time, F-35 software requirements have grown in size and complexity 

and the contractor has taken more time and effort than expected to write 

computer code, integrate it on aircraft and subsystems, conduct lab and 

flight tests to verify it works, and to correct defects found in testing.

Although recent management actions to refocus software development 

activities and implement improvement initiatives appear to be yielding 

benefits, software continues to be a very challenging and high-risk 

undertaking, especially for mission systems.7

 

7

Mission systems are critical enablers of F-35’s combat effectiveness, employing next 

generation sensors with fused information from on-board and off-board systems (i.e., 

electronic warfare, communication navigation identification, electro-optical target system, 

electro-optical distributed aperture system, radar, and data links).

While most of the aircraft’s 

software code has been developed, a substantial amount of integration 

and test work remain before the program can demonstrate full warfighting 

capability. About 12 percent of mission systems capabilities have now 

been validated, up from 4 percent about a year ago. However, progress 

Software Development 

Challenges Remain 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-500T 

on mission systems was limited in 2012 by contractor delays in software 

delivery, limited capability in the software when delivered, and the need to 

fix problems and retest multiple software versions. Further development 

and integration of the most complex elements—sensor fusion and helmet 

mounted display—lie ahead. 

F-35 software capabilities are being developed, tested and delivered in 

three major blocks and two increments—initial and final—within each 

block. The testing and delivery status of the three blocks is described 

below:

• Block 1.0, providing initial training capability, was largely completed in 

2012, although some final development and testing will continue. 

Also, the capability delivered did not fully meet expected requirements 

relating to the helmet, ALIS, and instrument landing capabilities.

• Block 2.0, providing initial warfighting capabilities and limited 

weapons, fell behind due to integration challenges and the 

reallocation of resources to fix block 1.0 defects. The initial increment, 

block 2A, delivered late and was incomplete. Full release of the final 

increment, block 2B, has been delayed until November 2013 and will 

not be complete until late 2015. 

• Block 3.0 providing full warfighting capability, to include sensor fusion 

and additional weapons, is the capability required by the Navy and Air 

Force for declaring their respective initial operational capability dates. 

Thus far, the program has made little progress on block 3.0 software. 

The program intends initial block 3.0 to enter flight test in 2013. This is 

rated as one of the program’s highest risks because of its complexity.

Although F-35 manufacturing, cost, and schedule metrics have shown 

improvement, the aircraft contractor continues to make major design and 

tooling changes and alter manufacturing processes while development 

testing continues. Engineering design changes from discoveries in 

manufacturing and testing are declining in number, but are still substantial 

and higher than expected from a program this far along in production. 

Further, the critical work to test and verify aircraft design and operational 

performance is far from complete. Cumulatively, since the start of 

developmental flight testing, the program has accomplished 34 percent of 

its planned flights and test points. For development testing as a whole, 

the program verified 11.3 percent of the development contract 

specifications through November 2012. As indicated in table 1, DOD 

continues to incur financial risk from its plan to procure 289 aircraft for 

$57.8 billion before completing development flight testing. 

Design Changes and 

Rework Continue to Add 

Cost and Risk 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-500T 

Table 1: F-35 Procurement Investments and Flight Test Progress

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Cumulative procurement (thenyear dollars in billions)$0.8 $3.5 $7.1 $14.3 $21.3 $27.6 $33.8 $40.1 $47.9 $57.8 $69.0 

Cumulative aircraft procured 2 14 28 58 90 121 150 179 223 289 365

Percent total flight test points 

completed 

- <1% <1% 2% 9% 22% 34% 54% 74% 91% 100%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Notes: Years listed denote fiscal years. Flight test data reflects the percentage of total flight test 

points completed in time to inform the next year’s procurement decision. For example above, the F-35 

program accomplished about 22 percent of total planned flight test points through the end of calendar 

year 2011 that could help inform the fiscal year 2012 procurement decision. The program intends to 

complete developmental flight test points in 2016 and would be in a position to fully support the 2017 

procurement buy.

This highly concurrent approach to procurement and testing increases the 

risk that the government will incur substantial costs to retrofit (rework) 

already produced aircraft to fix deficiencies discovered in testing. In fact, 

the F-35 program office projects rework costs of about $900 million to fix 

the aircraft procured on the first four annual procurement contracts. 

Substantial rework costs are also forecasted to continue through the 10th 

annual contract (fiscal year 2016 procurement), but at decreasing 

amounts annually and on each aircraft. The program office projects about 

$827 million more to rework aircraft procured under the next 6 annual 

contracts. 

Restructuring actions place the F-35 program on firmer footing, although 

aircraft are expected to cost more and deliveries to warfighters will take 

longer. Going forward, ensuring affordability is of paramount concern as 

more austere budgets are looming. The program continues to incur 

financial risk from its plan to procure 289 aircraft for $57.8 billion before 

completing development flight testing. Meanwhile, the services are 

making significant investments to extend the life of existing aircraft and to 

buy new ones to mitigate shortfalls due to F-35 delays. Overall, the F-35 

Joint Strike Fighter program is now moving in the right direction after a 

long, expensive, and arduous learning process. It still has tremendous 

challenges ahead. The program must fully validate design and 

operational performance against warfighter requirements, while, at the 

same time, making the system affordable so that the United States and 

partners can acquire new capabilities in the quantity needed and can then 

sustain the force over its life cycle. DOD and the contractor now need to 

demonstrate that the F-35 program can effectively perform against cost 

Concluding Remarks 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-500T 

and schedule targets in the new baseline and deliver on promises. Until 

then, it will continue to be difficult for the United States and international 

partners to confidently plan, prioritize, and budget for the future; retire 

aging aircraft; and establish basing plans with a support infrastructure. 

Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, and members of the House 

Armed Services Committee, this completes my prepared statement. I 

would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have. 

For further information on this statement, please contact Michael Sullivan 

at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement 

are Bruce Fairbairn, Travis Masters, Marvin Bonner, W. Kendal Roberts, 

Megan Porter, and Erin Stockdale.

GAO Contact and 

Acknowledgments 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-500T 

October 2001 

(system 

development start)

December 2003 

(approved 

baseline) 

March 2007

(approved 

baseline)

June 2010 

(NunnMcCurdy)

March 2012

(approved 

baseline)

Expected quantities

Development quantities 14 14 15 14 14

Procurement quantities (U.S. only) 2,852 2,443 2,443 2,443 2,443

Total quantities 2,866 2,457 2,458 2,457 2,457

Cost estimates (then-year dollars in 

billions)

Development $34.4 $44.8 $44.8 $51.8 $55.2

Procurement 196.6 199.8 231.7 325.1 335.7

Military construction 2.0 0.2 2.0 5.6 4.8

Total program acquisition $233.0 $244.8 $278.5 $382.5 $395.7

Unit cost estimates (then-year dollars 

in millions)

Program acquisition $81 $100 $113 $156 $161

Average procurement 69 82 95 133 137

Estimated delivery and production 

dates

First production aircraft delivery 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011

Initial operational capability 2010-2012 2012-2013 2012-2015 TBD TBD

Full-rate production 2012 2013 2013 2016 2019

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: TBD means to be determined.

.

Appendix I: Changes in Reported F-35 

Program Quantity, Cost, and Deliveries, 2001-

2012 
Related GAO Products

Page 13 GAO-13-500T 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-13-294SP. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2013.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Current Outlook Is Improved, but Long-Term 

Affordability Is a Major Concern. GAO-13-309. Washington, D.C.: March 

11, 2013.

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Actions Needed to Further Enhance 

Restructuring and Address Affordability Risks. GAO-12-437. 

Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2012.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Added Resources and Reduced Risk, 

but Concurrency Is Still a Major Concern. GAO-12-525T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 20, 2012.

Joint Strike Fighter: Implications of Program Restructuring and Other 

Recent Developments on Key Aspects of DOD’s Prior Alternate Engine 

Analyses. GAO-11-903R. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2011.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Places Program on Firmer Footing, but 

Progress Still Lags. GAO-11-325. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2011.

Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting 

Warfighter Requirements on Time. GAO-10-382. Washington, D.C.: 

March 19, 2010.

Joint Strike Fighter: Accelerating Procurement before Completing 

Development Increases the Government’s Financial Risk. GAO-09-303. 

Washington D.C.: March 12, 2009.

Joint Strike Fighter: Recent Decisions by DOD Add to Program Risks.

GAO-08-388. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.

Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. 

GAO-07-360. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing 

Demonstrates Acceptable Performance. GAO-06-356. Washington, D.C.:

March 15, 2006.

Tactical Aircraft: Opportunity to Reduce Risks in the Joint Strike Fighter 

Program with Different Acquisition Strategy. GAO-05-271. Washington, 

D.C.: March 15, 2005.

Related GAO Products

(121139)
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