United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

JOHN B. SCOTT,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT WILKIE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________

2018-1535

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 16-734, Chief Judge Robert N. Davis, Judge Michael P. Allen, Judge Joseph L. Toth.

______________________

Decided: April 15, 2019

______________________

CORA RENAE HOLT, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, 

Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for 

claimant-appellant. Also represented by PAUL WILLIAM 

BROWNING, RONALD LEE SMITH, GUANG-YU ZHU. 

 JANA MOSES, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented by 

MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

JOSEPH H. HUNT; BRIAN D. GRIFFIN, JONATHAN KRISCH, 
2 SCOTT v. WILKIE

Office of General Counsel, United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

 ______________________

Before NEWMAN, O’MALLEY, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

United States Navy veteran John Scott appeals a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans 

Claims (“the Veterans Court”) affirming the determination 

of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“the Board”). The Board 

determined that Scott was only entitled to a disability rating under diagnostic code (“DC”) 5276 on the VA’s disability rating schedule and that DC 5284 was inapplicable. 

Because the Veterans Court improperly affirmed the Board 

based on rationales the Board never provided and because

the Board legally erred by failing to consider DC 5284 for 

Scott’s unlisted foot disability, we vacate and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Disability Rating Schedule

The Department of Veterans Affairs regulations establish a disability rating schedule that provides specific DCs 

for certain disabilities. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a. Relevant to 

this appeal, DCs 5276–5284 relate to foot conditions. DCs 

5276 through 5283 identify specific foot conditions a veteran might suffer (“listed conditions”). Listed conditions 

include, for example, flatfoot, which is covered by DC 5276. 

DC 5284, on the other hand, broadly covers “Foot injuries, 

other,” without identifying any specific condition. 

In this appeal, we consider whether foot conditions not 

specifically listed in the rating schedule (“unlisted conditions”) may be rated by analogy under DC 5284. We hold 

that they may and, indeed, such a rating by analogy must 

be considered by the Board for its determination to be complete.
SCOTT v. WILKIE 3

B. Procedural History

In the early 1970s, during his time serving in the Navy, 

Scott developed a bilateral foot disability caused by prolonged standing. J.A. 370, 2042. In August 1973, the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office awarded

Scott service connection for bilateral pes planus (i.e., flatfoot) and granted him a 0% disability rating under 

DC 5276. J.A. 2038. In January 1990, the Regional Office 

amended Scott’s service connection to include a hallux valgus deformity (i.e., angulation of the big toe toward the 

other toes) as part of his pes planus without altering his 

0% disability rating under DC 5276. J.A. 1470–71. Scott’s 

foot disability continued to progress, and, in April 2007, a 

Department of Veterans Affairs medical examiner diagnosed Scott with plantar fibromas (i.e., masses of fibrous 

tissue in the arch of the foot) in addition to his prior diagnosis of pes planus with hallux valgus deformity. 

J.A. 1033.

Despite his new diagnosis, the Regional Office continued Scott’s 0% disability rating for “bilateral pes planus 

with slight hallux valgus deformity” under DC 5276 without discussing service connection for his plantar fibromas. 

J.A. 2554–56. Scott filed a notice of disagreement and, in 

October 2014, after a seven-year delay, the Regional Office

issued a new rating decision increasing Scott’s disability 

rating under DC 5276 from 0% to 30%. J.A. 2131–32. The 

October decision did not mention Scott’s plantar fibromas. 

Scott appealed to the Board.

On January 13, 2016, the Board issued its decision increasing Scott’s disability rating from 30% to 50%. J.A. 15. 

The Board recognized that Scott’s medical record revealed 

“palpable fibromas in both plantar arches” and that Scott 

experienced “significant pain on palpation of his plantar 

arches in the areas of the fibromas.” J.A. 24. The Board 

also acknowledged that Scott’s medical diagnoses included 

“bilateral pes planus, moderate hallux valgus deformity 
4 SCOTT v. WILKIE

bilaterally, and plantar fibromas.” J.A. 24. (emphasis 

added). Nonetheless, the Board did not directly address 

the effect of Scott’s plantar fibromas on his disability rating. Rather, the Board concluded that Scott was entitled 

to a 50% rating “under DC 5276 . . . for [his] bilateral pes 

planus” under the benefit of the doubt rule because, while 

he did not present all symptoms necessary for a 50% rating, 

the medical record showed Scott’s disability as having a 

“chronic, progressive nature and symptomology.” J.A. 26; 

see 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). 

In reaching its conclusion, the Board noted that 

DC 5284 was “not applicable” because “the Veteran’s service-connected condition, pes planus, is one of the foot condition[s] specifically listed in [the diagnostic code]” and “to 

rate his pes planus under DC 5284 would constitute an impermissible rating by analogy.” J.A. 26–27 (emphasis 

added). The Board stated, moreover, that all of Scott’s 

symptomatology was “being compensated for in the increased evaluation provided under DC 5276.” J.A. 27. Finally, the Board acknowledged that, while it is required to 

consider a veteran’s entitlement to a higher evaluation under other DCs, here, “analogous ratings for impairment of 

the foot either are not applicable to the Veteran’s case or do 

not offer a higher disability rating.” J.A. 27 (emphasis 

added). 

Scott appealed to the Veterans Court, arguing that the 

Board erred in failing to consider DC 5284 for his plantar 

fibromas or adequately explain why DC 5284 did not apply. 

On July 19, 2017, the Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s 

decision in a single-judge memorandum decision. Scott v. 

Shulkin, No. 16-0734, 2017 WL 3045899, at *1 (Vet. App. 

July 19, 2017). The Veterans Court found that the Board’s 

“selection” of DC 5276 over DC 5284 was not arbitrary and 

capricious because (1) the Board had considered the evidence of record and concluded that “DC 5276 most nearly 

approximated his symptoms,” and (2) evaluating Scott’s 

plantar fibromas under multiple DCs would have 
SCOTT v. WILKIE 5

constituted impermissible pyramiding under 38 C.F.R. 

§ 4.14. Id. at *1–2. 

Scott sought reconsideration or, in the alternative, a 

panel decision. J.A. 5. The Veterans Court denied Scott’s 

motion for reconsideration and a panel affirmed the singlejudge memorandum decision on November 16, 2017. 

J.A. 5–6. The Veterans Court entered final judgment on 

December 8, 2017. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction over decisions of the Veterans Court is 

limited by statute. Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), we 

may review the validity of a Veterans Court’s decision on 

“a rule of law or of any statute or regulation . . . or any 

interpretation thereof” that the Veterans Court relied on in 

making its decision. Unless the case presents a constitutional issue, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual 

determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as 

applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2). Where, as here, the material facts are undisputed “and the adoption of a particular legal standard 

would dictate the outcome of a veteran’s claim, we treat the 

application of law to undisputed fact as a question of law.” 

Conley v. Peake, 543 F.3d 1301, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Because Scott’s appeal concerns the Veterans Court’s 

interpretation of a rule of law—namely, the applicability of 

DC 5284 in the context of disabilities both listed and not 

listed in the VA’s schedule of ratings—and because it is undisputed that Scott suffers from an unlisted service-connected foot condition, we have jurisdiction. See, e.g., Harris 

v. Shinseki, 704 F.3d 946, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[W]e may 
6 SCOTT v. WILKIE

consider whether the Veterans Court failed to consider a 

controlling rule of law in reaching its decision.”).1

Scott raises two arguments on appeal: (1) the Board 

and the Veterans Court legally erred by failing to consider 

DC 5284 for Scott’s unlisted foot disability, plantar fibromas; and (2) the Veterans Court legally erred by substituting new rationales for the Board’s decision. We agree with 

Scott on both points.

A. The Board Is Required to Consider

DC 5284 When Evaluating Unlisted Conditions

It is undisputed that Scott suffers from three serviceconnected conditions, among others: pes planus, hallux valgus (as part of his pes planus), and plantar fibromas. See 

Appellant Br. 4; Appellee Br. 3–4, 7. Pes planus is a listed 

condition; plantar fibromas is not. Because pes planus is a 

listed condition, the Board found DC 5284 inapplicable to 

Scott’s disability rating determination. That was legal error.

The Veterans Court first addressed the applicability of 

DC 5284 to listed conditions for foot-related disabilities in 

Copeland v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 333 (2015). There, 

veteran Ulysses Copeland suffered from two listed conditions: bilateral pes planus and hallux valgus. Id. at 335. 

While the Board granted Copeland a disability rating under DCs 5276 and 5280 (covering pes planus and hallux 

valgus, respectively), Copeland argued that he was entitled 

to a higher rating under DC 5284, which he contended was 

a “catch-all” for all foot conditions. Id. at 336. The 

 

1 While some factual questions remain open—including, for example, which diagnostic code will ultimately 

apply and the final disability rating to which Scott is entitled—Scott does not ask us to make those findings on appeal or apply the law to those facts, see Reply Br. 2, nor 

could we under § 7292(d)(2).
SCOTT v. WILKIE 7

Veterans Court disagreed, holding that, “as a matter of 

law, DC 5284 does not apply to the eight foot conditions 

specifically listed” in the rating schedule. Id. at 338. The 

court explained that a listed condition must be rated “under the DC that specifically pertains to it.” Id. at 337. Unlisted conditions, on the other hand, “may be rated by 

analogy under the DC for ‘a closely related disease or injury.’” Id. at 336 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.20 (2014)). Because 

Copeland’s foot conditions were both listed in the rating 

schedule under specific diagnostic codes, rating them under DC 5284 would have constituted an impermissible rating by analogy. Id. at 338.

Less than a year after Copeland, the Veterans Court 

addressed the applicability of DC 5284 to unlisted conditions in Yancy v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 484 (2016). Veteran Nathan Yancy was diagnosed with both listed and 

unlisted conditions, but the Board based its disability rating solely on Yancy’s listed condition, pes planus. Id. at 

493. On appeal, the Veterans Court vacated and remanded 

the Board’s decision. Id. at 497. The court explained that,

in Copeland, it held that “listed conditions could not be 

rated by analogy” under DC 5284 but that it had not addressed “whether unlisted conditions may be rated by analogy under that DC.” Id. at 491 (emphases added). Looking 

to the language of the rating schedule and its underlying 

statutory and regulatory framework, the Veterans Court 

concluded that “the plain meaning of the word ‘injury’ limits the application of DC 5284 to disabilities resulting from 

actual injuries to the foot, as opposed to disabilities caused 

by, for example, degenerative conditions,” but that “nothing prevents the Board from rating closely related conditions by analogy under that DC.” Id. at 493. Accordingly, 

the court held that unlisted conditions may be rated by 
8 SCOTT v. WILKIE

analogy under DC 5284. Id. The Veterans Court has since 

followed that procedure in several other cases.2 

We adopt the Veterans Court’s approach as set forth in 

these cases. Under Copeland and Yancy, the Board is obligated to consider analogous DCs, including DC 5284, when 

rating unlisted conditions, despite the presence of listed 

conditions. The Board here failed to follow this rule. While 

the Board discussed Scott’s plantar fibromas in its recitation of the medical record (see J.A. 23–24), it failed to consider whether Scott was entitled to a disability rating for 

that unlisted condition. At most, the Board treated Scott’s 

unlisted condition (plantar fibromas) as a symptom of his 

 

2 See, e.g., Rolen v. Wilkie, No. 17-3176, 2018 WL 

4616298, at *2 (Vet. App. Sept. 25, 2018) (finding remand 

warranted because Board failed to address evidence of veteran’s unlisted symptoms “or explain whether these symptoms are analogous to the symptoms of pes planus” such 

that they were appropriately rated under DC 5276); Tyner 

v. McDonald, No. 15-1113, 2016 WL 6885866, at *2–3 (Vet. 

App. Nov. 23, 2016) (finding the Board’s reasoning “for the 

selection of DC 5276, considered in isolation, . . . does not 

provide an adequate explanation for the exclusion of 

DC 5284 as an alternative possibility” and the Board’s failure to consider whether the veteran’s unlisted condition 

might be rated by analogy to DC 5284 “render[ed] its statement of reasons or bases inadequate, requiring remand”); 

Stacy v. McDonald, No. 14-4396, 2016 WL 1719132, at *1 

(Vet. App. Apr. 29, 2016) (remanding to Board for consideration in the first instance whether veteran’s unlisted condition deserves to be rated separately under DC 5284 

because a finding that the veteran’s pain was associated 

with a listed disability “does not explain why the [unlisted] 

disability itself does not warrant a separate rating under 

its own DC”).
SCOTT v. WILKIE 9

pes planus, rather than a separate condition, without making any factual finding to support that analysis.

While the Secretary is correct that “there can be no 

doubt that the [B]oard considered the prospect of an additional rating under DC 5284,” Appellee Br. 16, the Board’s 

analysis focused on the wrong condition. That is, the Board 

was correct that rating Scott’s pes planus or hallux valgus 

under DC 5284 would be improper under Copeland, but the 

Board failed to consider Scott’s unlisted condition—plantar 

fibromas—under DC 5284 and, instead, found DC 5284 negated by Scott’s pes planus. This is directly contrary to 

Yancy. Rather, the Board was required to consider 

“whether [the veteran’s] unlisted conditions could be rated 

by analogy pursuant to DC 5284.” Yancy, 27 Vet. App. at 

493. Because the Board failed to consider the applicability 

of DC 5284 to Scott’s unlisted condition, its analysis solely 

under DC 5276—without any factual finding that the two 

conditions constituted one disability properly rated under 

that DC—is not in accordance with law.

The Board’s broad statement, moreover, that “all of 

[Scott’s] symptomatology is being compensated for in the 

increased evaluation provided under DC 5276” does not 

mitigate the Board’s error. J.A. 27. The Board made no 

factual findings to support this conclusion. For example, 

the Board never considered whether Scott was entitled to 

a disability rating for his unlisted condition under DC 5284 

or whether a higher rating would be available to cover “all 

of his symptomatology.” Nor did the Board determine 

whether Scott’s unlisted condition was more properly considered an additional symptom of his pes planus, rather 

than a separate diagnosis, such that a rating only under 

DC 5276 was appropriate. Without these factual findings, 

the Board’s decision cannot stand. See Allday v. Brown, 7 

Vet. App. 517, 527 (1995). 
10 SCOTT v. WILKIE

B. The Veterans Court Wrongly Substituted

New Rationale for the Board’s Decision

The Veterans Court compounded the Board’s error by 

both failing to correct it and by substituting new rationales 

of its own. First, despite Scott specifically citing Yancy and 

raising this argument in his brief to the court (see 

J.A. 2571–74), the Veterans Court never addressed the applicability of DC 5284 to Scott’s unlisted conditions nor corrected the Board’s failure to do so. The Veterans Court, 

instead, proceeded as though the Board made factual findings to determine that Scott’s plantar fibromas and pes 

planus presented the same symptomatology and were 

properly compensated under DC 5276. Scott, 2017 WL 

3045899, at *1–2. But, as addressed above, the Board 

made no such findings.3 

Second, the Veterans Court found that rating Scott’s 

plantar fibromas under DC 5284 would have been 

 

3 The Veterans Court, moreover, conflated the findings the Board did make. Rather than “select[]” DC 5276 

over DC 5284, the Board found that Scott’s symptoms 

“more nearly approximate the criteria for a 50 percent disability rating under DC 5276,” despite Scott not yet satisfying the full criteria for a 50% rating. J.A. 26. That is, the 

Board evaluated whether Scott was entitled to a 30% or a 

50% rating under DC 5276 and concluded that 50% “best 

reflects the disability picture shown.” J.A. 26. The Board 

did not, as the Veterans Court finds, evaluate whether DC 

5276 or DC 5284 “most nearly approximate[d] his symptoms.” In fact, the Board could not have made that finding 

given its failure to address whether Scott’s conditions were 

properly treated as one disability or whether Scott’s plantar fibromas was entitled to a separate rating and, if so, 

which diagnostic code would grant Scott a higher disability 

rating. The Veterans Court cannot make those findings in 

the first instance on appeal.
SCOTT v. WILKIE 11

impermissible pyramiding. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.14. But, beyond broadly listing plantar fibromas among Scott’s medical history, the Board made no findings to support treating 

Scott’s two conditions as one disability such that the rule 

against pyramiding would even apply. See Fanning v. 

Brown, 4 Vet. App. 225, 231 (1993) (“When the Board finds 

appellant is not entitled to a separate rating for a disability 

due to pyramiding, the decision must include an explanation of the [Board’s] reasons for so concluding according to 

the applicable law and regulations.”). The Veterans Court 

cannot simply “chisel that which must be precise from what 

the agency has left vague and indecisive.” SEC v. Chenery 

Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 197 (1947).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Veterans 

Court’s decision upholding the Board’s determination and 

remand for proper consideration of Scott’s foot disabilities 

under DC 5284.

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to Appellant.