[Cite as State v. Slaughter, 2018-Ohio-105.] 

Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Municipal Court 

 

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed in C-170110 and C-170112; Appeal 

 Dismissed in C-170111 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 12, 2018 

Paula Boggs Muething, City Solicitor, Natalia Harris, City Prosecutor, and 

Christopher Liu, Appellate Director, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Carrie Wood, Assistant 

Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

TYRONE SLAUGHTER, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

APPEAL NOS. C-170110 

 C-170111 

 C-170112 

TRIAL NOS. 16TRC-37026A 

 16TRC-37026B 

 16TRC-37026C 

 

 O P I N I O N.

 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2

DETERS, Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Tyrone Slaughter appeals his convictions, 

following his no-contest pleas, for operating a vehicle with a prohibited breathalcohol content and a marked-lanes violation. In this appeal, he argues that the trial 

court erred by overruling his motion to suppress evidence on the basis that an Ohio 

State Highway Patrol trooper lacked probable cause or a reasonable and articulable 

suspicion to stop his vehicle for a marked-lanes violation. 

{¶2} The trial court based its decision to overrule the motion on a second 

marked-lanes violation that it noted after viewing a video recording taken from the 

trooper’s cruiser camera. But the trooper testified he had not seen that violation. 

Since the trooper’s unrebutted testimony was that he had witnessed a prior markedlanes violation, and that testimony was not inconsistent with the video recording of 

the traffic stop, the trooper had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop 

Slaughter’s vehicle. We, thus, affirm the trial court’s judgments albeit for reasons 

other than those stated by the trial court. 

Trial Court Proceedings 

{¶3} Slaughter was charged with operating a vehicle while under the 

influence of alcohol (“OVI”) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), having a prohibited 

breath-alcohol content under R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d), and crossing marked lanes in 

violation of R.C. 4511.33. Slaughter filed a motion to suppress all the evidence 

against him on the basis that the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion or 

probable cause to stop his vehicle. 

{¶4} At the suppression hearing, Slaughter stipulated that he had been 

arrested without a warrant. Trooper Alex Burnett testified that he was in a uniform 

and in a marked cruiser on patrol on North Bend Road when he observed a Nissan 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

3 

Altima ahead of him traveling out of its lane. He testified the vehicle was in the left 

lane and it traveled to the right approximately one to two feet. He sped up to catch 

the vehicle and signaled to the driver to pull over. He then came into contact with 

Slaughter, who was driving the vehicle. After administering field-sobriety tests, he 

arrested Slaughter for OVI. 

{¶5} The video from Trooper Burnett’s cruiser camera was admitted into 

evidence and played during the suppression hearing. As the video was playing, 

defense counsel questioned Trooper Burnett about the basis for the traffic stop. The 

video showed a vehicle ahead of Trooper Burnett that turned right onto one of the 

north-south streets. Trooper Burnett testified that while it was difficult to see on the 

video, he had then followed a red Nissan Altima. He saw the marked-lanes violation 

and sped up to stop the vehicle. The video showed that Slaughter had committed a 

second marked-lanes violation near the intersection of North Bend Road and 

Hamilton Avenue when he had driven his vehicle partly into the left-turn lane and 

then back into the adjoining lane, before proceeding straight through the traffic light. 

Trooper Burnett testified, however, that he had not seen that marked-lanes violation. 

{¶6} On cross-examination, Trooper Burnett testified that even though he 

was 100-110 meters behind Slaughter’s vehicle, he had a clear and unobstructed view 

of the marked-lanes violation. He acknowledged it was difficult to see this violation 

on the video because “the blur from the traffic lights and the headlights of the other 

vehicles had blurred out some of the violation.” 

{¶7} The trial court overruled the motion to suppress. It found that 

Trooper Burnett had probable cause to stop Slaughter based on the second markedlanes violation depicted on the video. Shortly thereafter, Slaughter pled no contest to 

OVI with a prohibited concentration of alcohol and the marked-lanes violation. The 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

4

trial court accepted the pleas and found Slaughter guilty. It dismissed the remaining 

OVI charge. 

{¶8} In a single assignment of error, Slaughter argues the trial court erred 

in overruling his motion to suppress. 

{¶9} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of 

fact and law. See State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 

71, ¶ 8. The trial court, acting as the trier of fact, is in the best position to resolve 

factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. Id. Therefore, an appellate court 

must accept a trial court’s findings of historical fact if they are supported by 

competent, credible evidence, but it reviews de novo the trial court’s application of 

the law to the facts. See id.; see also State v. Sweeten, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C150583, 2016-Ohio-5828, ¶ 8. 

{¶10} A traffic stop initiated by a police officer constitutes a seizure within 

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, any seizure must comply with the 

Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 

806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). A police officer’s decision to 

stop an automobile is reasonable where the officer has probable cause to believe that 

a traffic violation has occurred. Id. Accord Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-

12, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996). Probable cause is a complete justification for a traffic 

stop. State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23; 

Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St.3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563, 850 N.E.2d 698, ¶ 

11. 

{¶11} Probable cause, however, is not required to justify a traffic stop. 

Mays at ¶ 23. A traffic stop may be based on less than probable cause when an 

officer possesses reasonable suspicion that a driver has committed, or is committing 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

5

a crime, including a minor traffic violation. Id. at ¶ 7-8. To justify a traffic stop 

based on reasonable articulable suspicion, the officer must be able to articulate 

specific facts that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the 

driver has committed, or is committing, a crime, including a minor traffic violation. 

Id. at ¶ 8 and 12. Probable cause is a stricter standard than reasonable and 

articulable suspicion and subsumes reasonable and articulable suspicion. Id. at ¶ 23, 

citing State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 411, 618 N.E.2d 162 (1993). Accordingly, an 

officer who witnesses a traffic violation possesses probable cause, and a reasonable 

articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. Mays at ¶ 23-24. 

{¶12} In determining whether an officer possesses probable cause or a 

reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle, the court must examine the totality 

of the circumstances. Id. at ¶ 7. “[T]he existence of probable cause [or reasonable 

and articulable suspicion] depends on whether an objectively reasonable police 

officer would believe that [the driver’s] conduct * * * constituted a traffic violation, 

based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the 

stop.” Bowling Green, 110 Ohio St.3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563, 850 N.E.2d 698, at ¶ 16. 

{¶13} Here, the record reflects that Trooper Burnett testified that he had 

stopped Slaughter’s vehicle because he had observed Slaughter’s vehicle, which was 

ahead of him in the left lane, travel out of that lane and into the right lane 

approximately one to two feet. Trooper Burnett testified that he then sped up to 

catch Slaughter’s vehicle. He testified that it was difficult to see this marked-lanes 

violation on the video because the traffic lights and the headlights of the other 

vehicles had blurred out some of the violation. 

{¶14} The video showed Slaughter had committed a second marked-lanes 

violation when his vehicle traveled out of the left-turn lane into the adjoining lane 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

6

and then drove straight through a traffic light. Trooper Burnett testified, however, 

that this was not the marked-lanes violation that he had seen. Rather, he had 

stopped Slaughter’s vehicle based solely on his observation of the first marked-lanes 

violation. 

{¶15} The trial court’s legal conclusion that the second marked-lanes 

violation provided the trooper with probable cause to stop Slaughter’s vehicle is 

erroneous given that the trooper expressly denied observing this second markedlanes violation. However, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in overruling the 

motion to suppress, because the trooper’s unrebutted testimony that he had 

personally observed a prior marked-lanes violation was sufficient to provide him 

with reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Slaughter’s vehicle. See State v. Lopez, 

166 Ohio App.3d 337, 2006-Ohio-2091, 850 N.E.2d 781, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.); State v. 

Shisler, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-050860, C-050861, C-050878 and C-050879, 

2006-Ohio-5265, ¶ 7; State v. Burwell, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-09-06, 2010-Ohio1087, ¶ 14. 

{¶16} Slaughter argues that this court cannot rely on the trooper’s 

testimony because the trial court chose not to rely on the trooper’s testimony when 

overruling the motion to suppress. Thus, he contends, the trial court must have 

found the trooper’s testimony lacking in credibility. We disagree. The trial court did 

not expressly address the credibility of the trooper’s testimony. Our review of the 

record reveals that the trooper’s testimony conforms to the video of the traffic stop, 

which reflects that the trooper’s vehicle was 100-110 meters behind another vehicle 

and that the glare of oncoming headlights blurred out the violation. The trooper’s 

vehicle accelerated and he initiated the traffic stop. Because the trooper’s testimony 

that he had observed Slaughter’s vehicle, which was in the left lane, travel out of that 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

7

lane and into the right lane is not inconsistent with the video, it was sufficient to 

establish a reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that Slaughter’s vehicle 

had been operated in violation of the law. See Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-

Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, at ¶ 24; State v. Hodge, 147 Ohio App.3d 550, 2002-

Ohio-3053, 771 N.E.2d 331, ¶ 50 (7th Dist.). Under these circumstances, the trial court 

did not err in overruling Slaughter’s motion to suppress. 

{¶17} We, therefore, overrule Slaughter’s sole assignment of error and affirm 

the judgments of the trial court in the appeals numbered C-170110 and C-170112. We 

dismiss the appeal numbered C-170111, which was taken from the trial court’s judgment 

dismissing the R.C. 4511.191(A)(1)(a) charge. 

Judgment accordingly. 

CUNNINGHAM, P.J., and ZAYAS, J., concur.

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry this date.