### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Ja nua ry 10, 200 6 S es sio n

WI LLI E V. MELVI N, II I, M.D. v. ANI TA LOUI SE J OHNS ON-MEL VIN, M.D.

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Sumner County No. 2000D-138 TomE. Gr ay, Judge

No. M2004- 02106-COA-R 3-CV - F iled April 27, 2006

Dr. Johnson (“ the wife” ) and Dr. Melvin (“the husba nd”) w ere marrie d in October 1988 while the wife w as pre g nant wit h the parties’ first child. That child born i n 1989 and the second child born in 1991 are the only minor children of this mar riag e. Husband filed a complaint for divorce, claiming inappropria te marital conduct. The wife counterclaimed in that action. The actions of the trial court f

rom which the wife appea ls, a nd with w hich both pa rties raise issues on appea l, include the De c re e of

Di vo rc e iss ue d A ug us t 6, 20 04 ; the int e rl oc uto ry or de r a ndme mor a nd um e nte re d July 28
, 2 0 0 4 ; a n d th r e e p o s t- tria l o r d e r s a n d o n e me mo r a n d u m. I s s u e s r a is e d o n ap peal c oncer n distribution of marital pr operty , awa rd of alimony

and child support, and r efusa l to awar d the wife attorney fee s and costs. We aff

irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt in all respe cts.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of t he court, in which P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., joined. W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P. J., M

. S

. , fi led a se parate conc urring opinion, in which P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J . joined.

Audre y L . Ander son, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Anita Johnson-Melvin, M.D.

Gre g ory D. S mith and Aminah M. Colli ck, Na shville, Tennessee , for the a ppellee, Willie V. Melvin, I I I , M.D.

OP IN ION

P roce edings an d Sal ient F acts
The pa rties to th i s d i v o rc e case married in October 1988. The two c hildren born to that marria g e ar e still mi nors. The husba nd filed for divorce in March 2000, a nd the wife

c o u n t e r c l a i m e d

. T h u s b e g a n a c o n t e n t i o u s b a t t l e o v e r v i s i t a t i o n , c u s t o d y , p r o p e r t y a n d s u p p o r t

. In-2-

t h e mi d s t o f t h i s b at t l e, i n M ay 2 0 0 2
, t h e t ri al co u rt en t er ed an o rd ers et t i n g pe nd e nte lit e support at $9 51 pe r mon th, or 21 % of the hu sb a nd ’s inc ome

. Th e wi fe fi le d an a me nd e d co mpl a int in A pr il 2004 seeking perma nent and pe riodic alimony due to a lupus diag nosis. I n ad d i t i o n, prior to the final hearing, she filed two motions see king r elief f rom the pe nd

e nte lit e order . These motions wer e take n u nd e r a dv ise me nt pe nd ing the fi na l he ari ng , wh ic h too k fo ur da y s sp re a d o ve r thr e e mon ths

.

The c ourt enter ed its Or d er a nd Memorandum on July28, 2004 reg arding reha bilitative alimony . The De cre e of D ivorce was entered Aug ust 6, 2004. The wife fil ed a notice of a ppeal on Aug ust 25, 2004, after

which both parties filed motions to alter or ame nd. T h es e m o t ions were

re so lve d by tw o ord e rs a nd on e me mor a nd um. F ro m the a c tio ns of the tr ia l c ou rt

the wi fe app e a ls,

a sse rt ing a s e rr or th e tr ial cou rt ’s va luatio n o f the mari ta l e state , it s r e fu sa l to a wa rdpe ri od ic alimony
, its alleg ed inadequate modification of t he pendente lite child support, as we ll as its refusal
to a wa rda tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Th e hu sb a nd c ha lle ng e s the mod if ic a tio n o f c hil d s up po rt

a s c on tr ary

to statut e

. I n ad dit ion , Hus ba nd arg ue s tha t th e mod if ic a tio n in app ro pr ia te ly

re qu ir e d h im t o p a y

ha lf

o f t h e p ri v at e s ch o o l t u i t i o n f o r t h e c h i l d re n an d i m p ro p er l y gav e c re d i tt o t h e w i fe fo r m o rt gage pay ments made by

her during the divorce . Husband a lso challeng es the a mount of reha bilitative alimony as insufficie ntly

supported by

the re cord.

Marit al P ropert y

When the husband filed his divorce complaint, t h e t rial court entere d a Te mporary Restraining Orde r whic h enjoined the wif e fr om “dissipating, withdra wing , transfe rring , or liquidating any

assets, except in the normal course of business with a full acc ounting, pe nding or ders of the Court.” I n the Dec ree of Divorc e which w as ente red A ug ust 6, 2004, the court identified the fo llo wi ng mari ta l a sse ts:

Th e Cou rt

.. . fi nd s that the mari ta l e state c on sis ts of the fo llo wi ng : the mari ta l ho me located at 102 Par

k Court G oodlettsvill e, Tenne ssee, which has a fair ma rket va lue of $242,000.00 and a

debt as of Ma

rch 2, 2004 of

$147,586.00 with eq u i t y of $94,404.00. ... The Court finds that the B ank of A merica chec king a ccount in the Wife’s name ha s a value to the marital estate of $562.85. The Court f inds that the Ba nk of America Mone y

Marke t Savings a ccount in the W ife’s na me had a value of $17,355.61 on Marc h 17, 2000 and as of Fe bruary 18, 2004 has a value of

$8,270.63. Th e Cou rt

fi nd s that th e mari ta l e state va luein the sa id M on e y Ma rk e t A c c ou nt i s $8,270.63. The Court finds that the differe nce therein should be allowed to the wife

as e x p en d i t u re s for he rself a nd the parties’ two (2) minor daug hters. The Court fu rthe r f ind s th a t th e B a nk

of Am e rica S EP I RA in the na me of the Wif e fo rm e rl y had a va lue of $6,861.59 on Mar ch 31, 2000 and a s of Dec ember 31, 2003 had a

va lue of $2 ,6 87 .0 7 a ndthat f

or the pu rpose of

the ma ri ta l e state , th e va lue is $2

, 6 8 7

. 0 7

. T h e Co u r t f

in d s th a t th e F id e li ty I n v e s tm e n ts a c c o u n t in th e n ame of Anita L . J ohnson had a va lue of $203,052.32 on April17, 2000 and as of January 15, 2 0 0 4 had a va lue of $25,737.35. Th e Co u r t d o e s n o t re d u c e th a t a m o u n t to the-3-

current amount and finds that for pur p oses of the marital estate, the value of the Fidelity Inve stments Acc ount is $203,052.32. The Court finds that the Va ng uard Group I nvestmen t s Ac count i n the name of the wife has a ma

rital estate va lue of $55,372.69. The Court finds t hat t he J anus Oversea s funds i n the name of the Wife had a va lue of $14,741.88 on Mar ch 31, 2000 and w as closed in Ma y , 2002. The
court finds that for marital estat e purposes that asset has a value of $14,741.88 . The Court further finds that the J anus Mercury Funds a ccount in the na me of the Wife ha d a value of $9,117.02 on Mar ch 31, 2 0 0 0 and wa s closed in May , 2002. The Cou rt f i nds that that

account has a v alue of $9,117.02 for marital estat e purposed. The Court finds that the Tenne ssee Te ache rs Credit uni on acc ount in the name of the Wife had a value of $4,125.44 on Marc h 31, 2000 and now ha s a value of $417.01

as of Dec ember 31,2003. The Court a llows the reduc tion therein as e x penditures f or the wife and two (2) daug hters and values this a ccount for marital estate purposes a t $417.01. The Court finds that the TI AA C REF ac counts in the name of the Wife had a value of $142,887.97 on Mar ch 31, 2000 and a s of Dec ember 31, 2003 has a value of $117,594.94. The Court f inds that there wa s a dec l i n e i n v al ue but not by

e xpe nd itu re s ma de by

the Wif e a nd thu s the Cou rt va lue s this a sse t f or mari ta l e state purposes a t $ 1 1 7 ,594.94. The Court finds that the John Hancock L ife I nsuranc e Policy on the life of the Wife has a net cash surre nder value of $6,903.54. The Court finds that the J ackson N ational L ife I nsuranc e Policy on the life of the Wife has no cash va lue for ma

rital estate purposes. The Court f inds that the Paul Revere Di sa bil ity po lic y on the Wi fe pa y ing $4 ,0 00 .0 0 p e r m on th m a ximum dis abil ity benef it has no cash va lue for marital estate purposes. The Court further finds that the Amsouth Added Adva ntag e checking acc ount in the name of the Husband ha s a value of $4,889.53 for marital estate purposes. The Court f inds tha t the NB A bank a ccount in t h e name of the Husba nd had a va lue of $2,188.21 on Mar ch 15, 2000 and w as closed in May
, 2002. I t has no value for m arital estate purposes, the acc ount being used for t h e Hu sband’s re asonable expenses. The Court finds that the F irstar I nvestment Service s chec king a ccount in the na me of the H usband h ad a v al ue of $64,497.07 o n M ar ch 3 1
, 2000 and wa s closed on May 31, 2001. The Court fi nds that for marit al estate purposes this account has a value of $64,497.07. The Court fi nd s th a t th e Am Sou th Pr ima ry Sa vin g s Ac c ou nt i n th e na me of the Hu sb a ndha s a value of $1,001 .01 for ma ri tal estate pur poses. The Court finds that the Thrift Savings Plan (V A Retirement Plan) in the na me of the H usband has a value of $1 77 .6 2 f or mari ta l e state pu rp os e s. Th e Cou rt f ind s th a t th e F ide lit y

I nv e stm e nts Vande rbilt Retirement plan in the name of the Husband has a value of $43, 156.23 for m arital e state purpose s. The Court finds that the John Hancock F unds in the name of the Husband has a value of $942.33 f or marital e state purpose s. The Court finds that the J ohn Hancock I RA in the name of the Husband ha s a value of $11,108.37 for marital estate purposes. The Court finds that the J ohn Hanc ock Life I nsuranc e o n th e L if

e o f th e H u s b a n d h a s a c a s h s u rr e n d e r v a lu e o f $ 1 5
, 5 8 4

. 7 0 for marital estate purposes. The Court f i n d s that the J ohn Hanc ock Life I nsuranc e Flexible Varia

ble Policy

on his life has a c ash surre nder va lue of $12,1 90.54 for-4-

marital estate purposes. The Court finds that the UNUM Provident Life a nd Acc ident DisabilityI nsuranc e on the Husba nd has no suc h ca sh value for marital estate pur poses.
(Emphasis adde d.)

The wife challeng es the valuation of sever al of the a ccounts in her name a s of Marc h 2000, rathe r than a s of a da te as ne ar a s possible to the final hearing pur suant to the s t at u t e . See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4- 121 (b)( 1)(2001) . For his part, the hus b an d arg ues that since the wife ha d dis sip a te d th e se a sse ts w ith ou t pr ov idi ng a pr op e r a c c ou nt ing , th e tr ia l c ou rt a c te d w e ll w ith in i ts discretion in valuing certain property as of the date the di vorce complaint was filed. T he valua tion and distribution of the marital estate rest within the sound discre tion of the trial court. See I ngram v. Ingram, 721 S.W .2d 262, 264 (Tenn.Ct.Ap p

. 1 9 8 6 ). The c ourt’s dec isions in t his reg ard,

e sp e c ia lly in ma tte rs inv olv ing the c re dib ili ty of wi tne sse s, sh ou ld n ot b e ov e rtur ne d a bs e nt a n a bu se of that discre tion.

Courts dividi ng a mar ital estate a re not re quired to apply the statutory

fac tors mecha nically

. Batson v. Batson, 769 S.W .2d at 859. The pa rties ar e entitled to an equitable division of their marital property
, n ot an equa l one, Thompson v. Thompson, 79 7 S. W.2 d 5 99 , 6 04 (T e nn .Ct .A pp .1 99 0) , o r on e that is m a the ma tic a lly prec ise. All that Tenn.Code Ann. § 36- 4-121 require s is essential fair ness in light of the fa cts of the c ase.

Essential fairne ss is promoted byusing va luation and distribution procedure s that are straig htforwa

rd and e asily

applied.

Kendrick v . Kendrick, 902 S.W .2d 918, 930 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994).

A full rea ding of the order i n conjunction wit h the entire rec ord bef ore us sug g ests dissipation of a sse ts o n b othsid e s of the mari ta l e state ’s le dg e r. Th e on ly inf ir mit y in the De c re e ma y

re st w ith the method employ ed by the t rial court to addre ss that dissipation. I n the four instanc es cited by the wi fe on app e a l, a s w e ll a s o ne ins ta nc e on the pa rt of the hu sb a nd ’s sh are , th e tr ia l c ou rt c ho se to

va lue mari ta l a c c ou nts a s o f a da te a s c los e a s p os sib le to the da te the div or c e c omp la int wa s f ir st filed. The me chanic ally

prec ise way

of valua tion and distribution would be to value all property as of a date as close as possible to the date of the hearing a nd then to divide that property in acc ordanc e with the ratio found by the trial court to r epre sent the parties’ re spective ma rital share s of debt and assets. Separ ate a nd apart from that “c urre nt” valuation should be the determination of the amount of any assets dissipated by

the parties in the interim betwee n the filing o f d i v o rce and the f inal hearing. At the discretion of the trial court, the amounts could be applied to ‘ balanc e the ledg er’ by decr easi n g the offe nding spouse ’s cur rent shar e or inc rea sing the non-off ending spouse’s shar e. Although the decr ee e ntere d by the trial court is innovative, it i s nevertheless a stra ightf orwa rd

a tte mpt to a dd re ss the dis sip a tio n in the simple st m a nn e r g ive n the pa rt ic ula r fa c ts i nv olv e d in thi s controve rsy

. Se e ge ne ra lly Fl an na ry v Fl an na ry , 121 S.W .3d 647 (Tenn.2003) . The de cre e of the-5-

trial court f

ully addre sses the appa

rent dissipation of t he marital assets. The recor d substantiates the trial court’ s actions, and we cannot find an abuse of the trial court’s discretion which w ould warr ant

re ve rs a l.

Al im ony

As with the valuation of t h e es tate, the tria l court has br oad discre tion to determine the appropriate ty

pe of a limonyto awar d. See Crabtr ee v . Crabtree, 16 SW .3d 356, 359 (Tenn. 2000) ;

see also Hanover v . Hanove r, 77 5 S.W.2 d 612 , 615 (T e nn . Ct. App . 198 9)

. Pe rm a ne nt a lim on y is disfavore d under the statute absent a specific finding that reha bilitation i s not feasible.

The trial c ourt is a ssigne d the re sponsibili ty and the discr etion to fashion an a war d that is appropria te under

the circ umstances of

eac h case

. T

. C

. A. § 36-5-101. T he circ umstances of the parties as found by the t rial court, particular ly the potential for reha bilitation of one who i s economica lly disadvantag ed, rather than the particula rs of the a war d, deter mine if the aw ard is subjec t to modification.

The statute reflec ts an obvious leg islative policy that, if possible, the depe ndency of

one e x- s p o u s e o n th e o th e r b e e li mi n a te d a n d b o th p ar ti e s b e r e li e v e d of the impediments incident to the dissolved marria g e, and that an ex-spouse be a djudge d perma nently

depende nt upon the ot her only when the c ourt g ranting the divorce finds
t h a te c o n o m i c r e h a

b i l i t a t i o n i s n o tf

e a s i b l e a n d l o n g

- t e r ms u p p o r ti s n e c e s s ar y.

Se lf v . S e lf, 861 S.W .2d 360, 361 (Tenn. 1993)

.

I n J une 2000, the wif

e wa s diagn o s ed wi t h sy stemic lupus erythemetosus. At that time,

a c c or din g to the me dic a l r e c or ds a ndthe wi fe ’s ow n tes tim on y , the dis e a se didno t a ff e c t he r a bil ity
to w or k in a ny way oth e r tha n the inc re a se d str e ss n or ma lly e ng e nd e re d b y

a dia g no sis of

thi s c hr on ic

a ndso me tim e s f

a ta l di so rd e r. Th e wi fe ev ent ual ly too k a le a ve of abs e nc e fr om M e tr o N a sh vil le Gene ral Hospital and Me harry Medica l Coll eg e, whe re she had been working prior to the divorce

. She did not cite the lupus diag nosis as a re ason for the re quest, despite having notified Mehar ry of the diag nosis. The rec ord reve als that her employ er had rec eived c erta in complaints about the wife from students and f

aculty at the colleg e. Thoug h the nature and merit of these complaints ar e not at issue in the instant case, the reque sts f or leave ref

ere nce these complaints (and the stress caused by them) as r easons f

or the lea ve. A lea ve of a bsence was g rante d i n Au gust of 2000. The wife
returne d to w ork in D ece mber of 2000, and continued there until her contra ct term e nded June 30, 2001. Her employ er chose not to rene w the contra ct. The wife has rema ined unemploy ed since that date.

The wife asserts tha t he r lupus dia g nosis render s her una ble to be re habilitated. She ar g ues t h at i n creased f

lare s, or episodes of

sy mptomatic pleuritic pain, numbness in the extremities and fatig ue , s o in te rf

e re wi th h e r a

bil ity to w or k tha t she c a n no long e r p ur su e he r c ho se n p os iti on a s a-6-

board c ertified a nesthesiolog ist. I n d et er m i n ing the amount and ty pe of a war d, the statute make s clea r that a c hronic disea se is but one of many fac tors to consider.

(I ) I n determining whe ther the g ranting of an or der f or payment of support and

ma int e na nc e to a

pa rt y is a pp ro pr ia te , a ndin d e te rm ini ng the na tur e , a mou nt, le ng th of ter m, a ndma nn e r o f p a y me nt, the c ou rt sh a ll c on sid e r a ll r e le va nt f a c tor s, i n cl u d i n g:
(1) The rela tive earning c apac ity , obligations, needs, and f inancial

re so ur c e s o f e a c h p art y , in c lud ing inc ome fro m pe ns ion , p ro fi t sh ari ng or re tir e me nt p la ns a nda ll o the r s ou rc e s;
(2) The rela tive education and training of ea ch party , the ability and opportunity

of ea ch party

to secure such education and tra ining, a nd the ne c e ssi ty

of a pa rt y to s e c ur e fu rthe r e du c a tio n a ndtr a ini ng to imp ro ve su c h p art y ' s e arn ing s c apa c ity to a re a so na ble le ve l;

(3) The duration of the ma rriag e;
( 4 ) T h e a g e a n d m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n o f e a c h p ar t y;
(5) The phy sical conditi on of each party
, including, but not limit ed to, phy sical disability

or inca pacity due to a chronic debilitating disea se;
(6) The extent to which it would be unde s i ra b l e for a party to seek employ ment outside the home, beca use such party

will be custodian of a minor c hild of the marriag e;
(7 ) Th e se pa

rate a sse ts of e a c h pa

rt y , bo th re a l a ndpe rs on a l, t a ng ibl e and intang ible;

(8) The provisions made with reg ard to t h e m ar i tal property , as define d in § 36-4-121;

(9) T h e s ta n d ar d o f li v in g o f th e p ar ti e s e s ta b li s h e d d u r ing the marria g e;
(10) The extent to whi ch ea ch party has made such tang ible and intang ible contributions to the marria g e as monetary and homemake r
c on tr ibu tio ns , a ndta ng ibl e a ndint a ng ibl e c on tr ibu tio ns by a pa rt y to t h e e d u c a t i o n , t r a i n i n g o r

i n c r e a s e d e ar n i n g p o w e r

o f t h e o t h e r p ar t y;-7- (1 1) Th e r e l a t i v e f

a u l to f t h e p ar t i e s , i n c a s e s w h e r e t h e c o u r t , i n i ts discretion, dee ms it appropriate to do so; and

( 1 2 ) S u c h o t h e r f

a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g t h e t a x c o n s e q u e n c e s t o e a c h p ar t y,
a s a re ne c e ssa

ry to c on sid e r the e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-121 (2005)

.

Th e re c or d r e ve a ls no expe rt te sti mon y c on c e rn ing a ny c on sta nt ep iso de s so extre me a s to interfe re w ith work. We have only the testimony

of Dr. A nita L ouise J ohnson-Melvin herse lf– testimonywhich the tria l court repeatedly found to lack c redibility . The testimony of the wife ’s expert, Dr. J ohn J ohnson, the rheuma tologist to w hom the wife was ref err ed for eval u at i o n and
trea tment prior to J uly

2003, shows that the cour se and f reque ncy of lupus f

lare s was unpre dictable. Neve rtheless, he char acte rized her disease manag ement as excellent despite her complaints relate d to Ray naud’s sy ndrome, a numbing a n d b l u i n g of the e x tremities due to under ox y g enate d blood flow. He wrote le tters on th e wife ’s beha lf to her e mploy er stating that she wa s capa ble of continuing he r prof

ession at the time.

Dr. J ohn J ohnson provided testimony of the severity of lupus symptoms in th i s p ar t icular patient. His testimony

shows that the di s ea s e h as n o t as y et re ndere d the wife incapa ble of reha bilitation. Of paramount conc ern in the a war d of spous al support is the remova l of an economica lly

disadvantag ed spouse f

rom depe ndence upon the obligor spouse. The le g islature has made that c oncern clea

r:
(d )( 1 ) ( A ) S p o u s e s h a v e t r a d i t i o n a l l y s tr e n g t h e n e d t h e f

a m i l y u n i tt h r o u g h p r iva te

arr ang ements whereby one (1) spouse focuses on nurturing the per sonal side of the

marria g e , in c lud ing the c are a ndnu rtur ing of the c hil dr e n, wh ile the ot her spou se fo c us e s pri mar ily

on bu ild ing the e c on omi c str e ng th o f the fa mil y un it. Th is

arr ang ement often results in e conomic detriment to the spouse wh o s u b o rdinated

su c h s po us e ' s o wn pe rs on a l c are e r f or the be ne fi t of

the marriage. I t is the pu bli c polic y of thi s st a te to e nc ou ra g e a ndsu pp ort ma rria g e , a ndto e nc ou ra g e fa mil y
arr a ng e me nts that pr ov ide fo r the re ari ng of he a lth y a nd pr od uc tiv e c hil dr e n w ho wi ll become healthy

and produc tive citizens of our state.

* * *

(C) I t is the int e nt o f the g e ne ra l a sse mbl y that a sp ou se wh o is e c on omi c a lly disadvantag ed re lative to the other spouse
, be re habilitated whene ver possible by the g ranting of an or der f or payment of re habilitative, temporary suppo rt and maintenanc e. To be reha bilitate d means to ac hieve, with re asonable eff ort, an

earning c apac ity

that will permit the economica lly disadvantag ed spouse's standa rd of living a fter the divorce t o b e re asonably compar able to the standa rd of living

e njo y e d d ur ing the marria g e , or to the po st- div or c e sta nd ardof liv ing e xpe c te d to-8-

be available to the other

spouse, considering the rele vant statutory fac tors and the equities betwe en the pa

rties. Where the re is re lative ec onomic disadvantag e and

re ha bil itatio n is no t fe a sib le in c on sid e ratio n of a ll r e le va nt f

a c tor s, inc lud ing tho se set out in this subsection (d), the court may g rant an order for pay ment of support and maintena nce o n a l o ng -term ba sis or until t he death or rema rriag e of the

re c ipi e nt e xce pt a s o the rw ise pr ov ide d in su bd ivi sio n (a )( 3)

. An a wa rdof pe ri od ic

a lim on y ma y be ma de e ith e r in ad dit ion to a re ha bil itatio n aw ard , whe re a

sp ou se may be partially reha

bilitated as defined i n this subdivision (d)( 1)(C), or instead of

a re habilitation awar d, wher e rehabilitation is not fea sible. When appropria te, the court may also awa rd transitional alimony

as provided in subdivision (d)(1) (D).

Rehabilitative support and maintena nce is a separ ate c lass of spousal support as d i s t i n g u i s h e d f

r o ma l i m o n y in solido
, p e r i o d i c a l i m o n y, a n d t r a n s i t i o n a l a l i m o n y. An awa rd of reha bilitative, tempor ary support and maintenanc e shall re main in the court' s control for the duration of suc h aw ard, and may be incr ease d, decr ease d, terminated, ex tended, or otherwise modified, upon a showing of a substantial and

ma ter ial cha ng e in c ir c ums ta nc e s. Re ha bil itativ e su pp ort a ndma int e na nc e sh a ll
te rm inate up on the de a th o f the re c ipi e nt. Suc h s up po rt a ndma int e na nc e sh a ll a lso terminate upon the death of the pay or unless otherw ise specif ically stated. The

re c ipi e nt o f the su pp ort a ndma int e na nc e sh a ll ha ve the bu rd e n of pr ov ing that a ll

re a so na ble e ff orts at r e ha

bil itatio n h a ve be e n ma de a ndha ve be e n u ns uc c e ssf ul.

Tenn. Code Ann. §36- 5-101(d) (1)( A);(C)( Supp. 2004).

No s u ch d ep en d en ce ap p ea rs i n t h i s ca s e. W h i l e ad i s cr ep an cy ex i s t ed d u ri n g t h e m ar ri age
a s to the pa

rt ie s’ e arn ing c apa c ity , th a t di sc re pa nc y fa vo re d th e wi fe . Sh e wa s b oa rd cert if ied in anesthe siology

prior to the divorc e and r ema i n s s o n o w. The stre ss eng ender ed by this and other conflicts notwithstanding, the wife has not sought a ny disabilitystatus. The statutory fac tors wer e pr op e rl y c on sid e re d b y

the tr ia l c ou rt , an d we fi ndno abu se of dis c re tio n in the app lic a tio n o f tho se fac tors.

M o di fi c a t io n o f Pendente Lite Child Sup port
Both pa rties raise issues on appea l conce rning the trial court’s post judgment orde r re g arding child support. The wife challeng es the trial court’s refusal to adjust the pe nd e nte lit e awa

rd upwa rd
to a ccount for an incr ease in the husband’s income immediately afte r the e ntry

of the pe nd

e nte lit e
awa rd. On April 19, 2002, the trial court hea rd proof co n cerning the support of the c hildren
pe nd e nte lit e , a ft e r w hic h th e c ou rt e nte re d it s o rd e r f

ind ing in p e rt ine nt p art ,

that the Father is not willfully undere mploy ed, and that he is try ing to be come B oard Certified as a surg eon. The Court f urther f inds that based upon his curr ent income, he should pay

child support in acc ordanc e with the Te nnessee Child S u pport Guidelines i n the amount of Nine Hundred F ifty -One ($951.00) Dollar s per month.-9-

Th e Cou rt

fu rthe r f ind s th a t th e re sh ou ld be a n upw ard de viatio n in chi ld s up po rt to the extent of one-ha lf (1⁄2) the cos t of tuition and fees at Goodpasture Christian School for the r emainder of t he current contrac t y ear , in the amount of F our Hundre d ($ 40 0. 00 ) D oll ars pe r mon th, so that he sh ou ld pa y tot a l c hil d su pp ort pe r m on th t o the Wife in the amount of One Thousand Thre e Hundr ed F ifty -One ($1,351 .00) Dollars, commenc ing on May 2, 2 0 0 2 and pay able on the se cond (2 ) day of the nd

mon th the re a ft e r. Th e Cou rt fu rthe r f ind s th a t in the e ve nt the pa rt ie s do no t mu tua lly ag ree to re-e n rol l their two (2) minor c hildren at Goodpa sture Christian School or some other private school for the ac ademic y ear

2002-2003, then the c hild support sh a ll b e in the a mou nt of Ni ne Hu nd re d Fi ft y -O ne ($ 95 1. 00 ) Do lla rs pe r m on th. So long a s the children attend private school and the Husband pay s one-ha lf (1⁄2) ther eof in acc ordanc e with this Order , the Wife shall pay the re mainder a nd shall make pa y me nts dir e c tly

to the pr ivate sc ho ol.

Sub se qu e nt t o th e e ntry

of that or de r, the hu sb a ndob ta ine d b oa rdc e rt if ic a tio n. I mme diate ly afte r the orde r wa s entere d, the hus band’s income substantially incre ased. Howeve r, t he first motion to i nc re a se c hil d sup po rt

to r e fl e c t th a t in c re a se wa s f ile d in Janu ary

of 20 04 . T his mot ion re pr e se nts the first of two motions seeking an in cr ease from $951 to $3,200 per month, and arg uing tha t the husband misled the wife a nd the trial court during the pendente lite hearing a s to his annual income. The trial court enter ed an order on Marc h 10, 2004, rese rving the consider ation of the motion “upon submissi on, within f

ourtee n (14) day s of the Husband’s sworn I ncome and Expense Statement and any arg ument in writing w hich the Husba nd wishes t he C ourt to consider in this reg ard.” Acc ording to the wife’ s Brief, the tria l court also ente red a n order incre asing t h e s u p p o rt awa rd to $3,200. Although the technica l rec ord conta ins no such order
, the wife ’s later -filed Motion for Pe nd e nte Lite Relief ref ere nces an additional order enter ed on Marc h 10, 2004, which contained the requested incre ase, but made that incre ase e ffe ctive as of the date of t he later order rathe r than May 2002, the da te of the or ig ina l a wa

rd . A ft e r the De c re e of Di vo rc e wa s e nte re d, wi fe re ne we d h e r c ha lle ng e to the pe nd e nte lit e order , raising ag ain the spec ter of ma lfea sance on th e husband’s pa rt. The wif

e
arg ue d b e fo re the tr ia l c ou rt , a s sh e arg ue s be fo re thi s Cou rt , that the Hu sb a nd ’s re fu sa l to c omp ly with disc overy reque sts misled the trial court a nd the wife as to the true a mount of his 2002 annual income. The rec ord re veals, a nd the husband doe s not deny
, that within a month after the April 19, 20 02 hear ing , th e hu sb a nd ’s inc ome inc re a se d s ig nif ic a ntl y . T he tr a ns c ri pt i s in str uc tiv e a s w e ll. Refer ring to the leng thy

pre- trial proce eding s in testimonybefor e the c o u rt , the husband g ave the f o l l o w i n g t e s t i m o n y:
Q. And wit h that divorce complaint, we f iled what ar e ca lled interrog atories a nd

re qu e st[s ] fo r pr od uc tio n o f d oc ume nts ; y ou ha ve be c ome fa mil iar w ith tho se over the last sever al y ear s, haven’ t y ou? A. Quite, thank y ou. Q. And it took three-a nd-a- half y ear s to ge t y our wife’ s answer s to that; is t hat

c or re c t? A. Th a t is c or

re c t.-10-

Up onc ro ss- e xaminat io n, th e hu sb and tes ti fi ed t hat res po ns es t o t he w if e’s di sco veryre qu e sts

wer e conve y ed “r ou gh l y ” ar o und September 2003. The first motion presented to the c ourt in an attempt to fac ilitate the wife’ s discovery of financ ial rec ords was in March of 2004. T he alleg ed malfea sance is not subst antiated by the re cord.

The re cord shows tha t the delay in discovering the husband’s income was due to bo th pa rt ie s’ uncooper ative behavior i n discovery over the three and one- half y ear s this case wa s pending prior to trial. Whi le the tra nscript and e x hibits show an incre ase in the husband’s inc ome af ter the e ntry of the orde r, the re cord revea ls no attempt by the husband to conc eal this incre ase. In addition, the
tr ia l c ou rt a dd re sse d thi s inc re a se a t its fi rs t op po rtun ity

-- the Ma rc h 1 0, 20 04 , o rd e r i nc re a sin g c hil d support to $3,200 per month. Wife arg ues, and there is no dispute, that the pendente lite order was
no t f ina l prior to the e ntry

of the de c re e , and th ere fo re c ou ld b e mod if ie d, a s th e tr ia l c ou rt

didin ordering the incre ased support from May of 2002 throug h Marc h of 2004. S ee Fo x v. Fox , 657 S.W .2d 747, 749 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1983) ( a pendente lite order is not final abs en t d et ermination of f i n a l i ty b y tr ia l c ou rt c on sis te nt w ith Te nn .R. Civ .P. 54 .0 2) ; compare T en n

. Code Ann. 36-5- 101(a) (5) (judg ment as to child support is final judg ment and not r etroa ctively modifiable prior to the date such support is sought and notice is convey ed to the oblig or).

The fla shpoint of the instant controver sy is the decision of the trial court to ame nd the May 2002 order

from the support pe rce ntag e for a sing le child to r efle ct the 32% flat rate for the support of two childre n. T h e wi fe a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in fa iling to apply that 32% rate to the income as r evea led in the 2004 proc eeding s. For his pa rt, the husband a

rg ues that the trial c ourt lacke d jurisdiction to enter t h e amending order afte r the wife had filed he r notice of appea l. The Dec ree of Divorc e wa s entere d Aug ust 6, 2004. The wife fil ed her notice of appea l 19 day s later on Aug ust 25. The husband filed his Motion to Alter or Ame nd on Aug ust 31,and the wi fe f iled a motion to alt er o r amend on September 2. The proce dural posture of this appea l presents the question of whethe r the trial c ourt has jurisdictio n t o consi der the timely post-trial motions, or whether , as this Court stated in Spann v. Abraham , 36 S.W .3d 452 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), the notice of appea l dive sted the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the motions. I n Spann we he ld that once the notice of

appea l had been filed, a trial court did not err in de ny ing a post judg ment motion filed afte r the timely

notice of a

ppeal due to lack of jurisdiction. I n Spann , howeve r, we held that the trial

c ou rt c ou ld, c on sis te nt wi th Te nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e du re 60 .0 1, c or re c t c le ri c a l e rr or s in its jud g me nt su a s

po nte

. Whil e ou r c ur

re nt Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ap pe llate Pr oc e du re 4( e ), e ff e c tiv e July 1, 20 0 5
, clea

rly allows a trial c ourt to retain jurisdiction while motions to alter or a mend the judgme nt, filed within 30 day s of said judg ment, are pending ; the rule a s amende d in 2005 does not

a dd re ss the c ur

re nt c on tr ov e rs y

wh os e e xiste nc e pr e da te s it. Th e ov e ra rc hin g pr inc ipl e in the ru le is that a ca se should not be pending in two courts at once

. Yet both parties filed motions to alter or

a me nda ft e r the no tic e of

app e a l. T e nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e du re 59 .0 4 a llo ws the tr ia l c ou rt to

a m e n d i t s o w n o rd e rs s u a sponte wi thi n th e sa me 30 -d a y pe ri odin w hic h th e pa

rt ie s c ou ld f

ile motions pursuant to Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedur e Rule 59.04. By corr ecting the pe nd e nte lit e award to acc ount for the 32% support rate for two children, the trial court mer ely corr ecte d a cle rica l

err or. The tr ial court wa s well within its di scre tion in amending the pe nd e nte lit e or de r, a ndwe wi ll

no t di stu rb that po rt ion of the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on on app e a l.-11-

Attor neys F ees and Discre tionary Costs

Th e c us tod ia l sp ou se in a divor c e c a se “ ma y re c ov e r f

ro m th e oth e r s po us e re a so na ble attorney ’s fe es incurr ed” in a ny proce eding involvi n g t h e esta blishment or enforc ement of tha t obligation. See Tenn. Code Ann. §36- 5-103. As with the wife ’s other issues on appea l, the decision
to awar d attorney s fee s and the a mount of t h ose fe es aw arde d is a matter r esting within the sound dis c re tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

I n a d i v o r c e c a s e , a n a w ar d o f a t t o r n e y' s f

e e s i s t r e a t e d a s a n a w ar d o f a l i m o n y in solid o

. K i nard v. Kinard, 98 6 S. W.2 d 2 20 , 2 35 (T e nn .Ct .A pp .1 99 8) ; Herrera v

. Herrera, 944 S.W .2d 379, 390 (Tenn.Ct.Ap p

. 1 9 96). Thus, whe n determining wh e the r t o a wa

rda tto rney 's fees , th e tr ia l c ou rt is r e qu ir e d to c on sid e r the sa me fac tors u s ed wh en considering a re quest for a limony

. Kincaid v. Kincaid, 912 S.W .2d 140, 144 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). A s with alimony
, need is the c ritical fa ctor to b e c on sid eredby

the c ou rt

wh e n d e c idi ng wh e the r t o a wa rda tto rn e y ' s f

e e s. Herrera, 94 4 S.W.2 d at 390 . A n a wa rdof a tto rn e y ' s f

e e s is pr op e r w he n o ne sp ou se i s d i s ad v an t age d an d d o es n o t h av e su ff i ci en t re s o u rc es wi t h wh i ch t o p ayat t o rn ey 's fee s. Id. The question of whether to a war d attorney ' s fee s, and the a mount thereof,

are larg ely

left with in the discretion of the trial court a nd will not be disturbed on appea l unless the trial court c lear ly abused tha t discretion. Aa r on v. Aaron, 909 S.W .2d 408, 411 (Tenn.1995)

. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 137 S.W .3d 1, 24-25 (Te nn.Ct.App. 2002).

Wif e ba se s h e r c la im t o a tto rn e y fe e s o n th e un c e rt a int y

of e mpl oy me nt in the fu tur e . A s w ith many of the issues ra ised in this appeal, the tria l court’s de termination hing es on the wife ’s

cre dibilit y . The c o urt specif ically found that the wife was not cr edible. I n response to the wife’ s motion to alter or amend which reque sted “spec ific finding s of fa ct as to why the court stated that [t he wife ] l acke d cre dibilit y ,” the c ourt cit ed s pecif ic instance s where the court found the wife ’s

cr ed i b i l i t y

l ac k i n g.

Wit h no citation of additional authority , the wife challeng es the trial court’s determination of he r c re dib ili ty

a s to he r abil ity

to w or k, a ndthe ult imate de c isi on that e a c h p art y be re sp on sib le for that pa

rty ’s costs incurr ed in this divorce whic h fails only in duration to match the strife of the marria g e. We find no abuse of discre tion in either determination.

The husband’ s challeng es to the court’s exercise of d i s cr et i o n are likewise subjec t to the same discr etionary

standard. H e takes issue with the post-trial order allowing a cr edit for $38,375 in mortg ag e pay ments which the husba nd was re quired to make pursuant to the May 2002 pe nd

e nte lit e su pp ort or de r. He ur g e s th a t th e c re dit c on sti tut e s a

re tr oa c tiv e mod if

ic a tio n. Sin c e we ha ve he ld that the pendente lite or de r w a s in te rl oc uto ry in n a tur e a ndsu bje c t to mod if ic a tio n w e fi nd no e rr

in the su bs e qu e nt o rd e r. Whil e we re c og nize that a c c or din g to the hu sb a nd ’s pr e se ntatio n of the fa c ts,-12-

child support and alimony obliga tion may exceed his a bilityto pay , the trial court properly exercised its role as fa ct finder , and we find no abuse of discretion in the aw ard. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

So much of this c ase is a swea ring contest betwee n Plaintiff a nd Def endant. The trial c ourt

re pe a te dly

qu e sti on e d th e cred ib ili ty of An ita L ou ise John so n- Me lvi n. Suc h c re dib ili ty de te rm inatio ns by

the tr ia l c ou rt , w he n th e me ri ts of the c a se re sts so fi rm ly on c re dib ili ty , a re ne arl y insurmountable on appe al. Mi tc he ll v . A rc hib ald , 971 S.W .2d 25, 29 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998).

Th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt is a ff ir me d. Cos ts o f the app e a l are ta xedto A pp e lla nt.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM B. CAIN, J UDGE