Taggants in Explosives

April 1980

NTIS order #PB80-192719
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 80-600070

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402 Stock No. 052-003-00747-9
Foreword

This assessment was made in response to a request from the Senate Committee

on Governmental Affairs that OTA examine the issues surrounding a proposal to require that commercial explosives and gunpowders be manufactured with “taggants” as an aid to law enforcement. Two types of taggants are contemplated:

● “identification taggants” would be designed to survive an explosion, and would

carry a code which would enable those who recovered such taggants from the

debris of a criminal bombing to assemble a list of the last legal purchasers of

the batch of explosives used to make the bomb;

● “detection taggants” would be designed to emit a vapor which would escape

from a suitcase, package, etc., so that a taggant-sensing machine at an airport

or public building could detect the presence of concealed explosives.

The proposal to require taggants is generally viewed as helpful by the law enforcement community, and opposed by the manufacturers of explosives (and some

others) on the grounds that taggants would be ineffective, unsafe, and too costly.

The report addresses four major questions. First, it reviews the program to develop such taggants, and addresses the question of whether taggants would in fact

work. Second, it assesses the question of whether adding such taggants to explosives

and gunpowders might create a safety hazard. Third, the cost of a taggant program

(on the assumption taggants work and are safe) is calculated, and the major parameters which would affect its costs are identified. Finally, the study assesses the likely

value of such a program (assuming that taggants work, are safe, and are available at

a reasonable cost) to law enforcement.

The project was directed by Dr. Peter Sharfman, Program Manager for Interna

tional Security and Commerce within OTA’S Energy, Materials, and International

Security Division, headed by Assistant Director Lionel S. Johns. The principal inves

tigator was David Garfinkle of Science Applications, Inc.

OTA is grateful for the assistance of its Taggants in Explosives Advisory Panel,

as well as for the assistance provided by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Institute of Makers of Explosives,

the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute, the 3M Company, and

the Federal Aviation Administration.

JOHN H. GIBBONS

Director

. . . Ill
Taggants in Explosives Project Advisory Panel

Sanford Kadish, Chairman

Dean, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley

Tom Ashwood Robert E. Hodgdon

Air Line Pilots Association president, Hodgdon powder Co., Inc., and

Pyrodex Corp.

Jerome S. Brower

president, /. S. Brower & Associates, Inc. Neal Knox

H. J. Burchell

president, At/a

Charles E. Cal fee

Special Agent

Executive Director, Institute for

Legislative Action

Powder Co. National Rifle Association

Lynn Limmer

Director, Department of Public Safety

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Robert R. Dimock, Jr.

Utah Copper Division

Kennecott Copper

Ernest H. Evans

Brookings Institution

Henry Eyring

Department of Chemistry

University of Utah

Eugene H. Eyster

Los Alarnos Scientific Lab.

Rona M. Fields

Consultant in Psychology

Gary L. Hendrickson

Dane Count y Sheriff’s Department

Madison, Wise.

Dallas-Fort Worth Airport

Alexander v. d. Luft

Director, Internationa/ Operations

Explosives products Division

E. 1. du Pent de Nemours & Co.

Hugh M. McGowan

New York City Police Department

William T. Poe

Louisiana State Police

Theodore J. Sullivan

Naval Surface Weapons Center

Robert W. Van Dolah

Pittsburgh, Pa.

Charles O. Williams

Olin Corp.

NOTE: The advisory panel provided advice and critique throughout the assessment, but does not necessarily

approve, disapprove, or endorse the report, for which OTA assumes fulI responsibility.
Taggants in Explosives Project Staff

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA

Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Peter Sharf man, Program Manager

International Security and Commerce Program

David R. Garfinkle, Principal /investigator

(under contract with Science Applications, Inc.)

Administrative Staff

Dorothy Richroath Jacqueline Robinson

GIoria Proctor Helena Hassell

Contractors

Edward James, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

Steve Kornish

Roland R. Franzen, Physics Internationa/ Co.

James A. Henderson, Jr.

OTA Publishing Staff

John C

Kathie S. Boss

Marvin Liebstone, Science Applications, Inc.

Rowland B. Shriver, J r., Science Applications, Inc.

Susan Katznelson

Mark Starinsky

Holmes, Publishing Officer

Debra M. Datcher Joanne Heming

v
Contents

Chapter

1.

Il.

Ill .

Iv.

v.

V1.

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . .

Detailed Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Taggant Research Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . .

Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Taggant Cost Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Taggant Utility Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendixes

A. Letterof Request. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Detection and identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings–

Summary and Questionnaire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. OTA Recovery Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

D. Products Liability implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusionof

Taggants in Explosives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

E. Suitability of ANFO as aFiller for Criminal Bombs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

F. Derivation of Bombing Statist Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

G. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

3

19

51

75

97

137

175

177

194

202

227

233

262
Chapter I

SUMMARY
. .

Chapter L-SUMMARY

Page

Introduction ***. *.. **. **.   ** . **** *.. .*. **e**************** 3

ResearchApproach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Some Project Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

SummaryofFindings .**.*..* . . . . . . . . . .***..*.. .**.**.*. ● **..*.. 9

Taggant Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

TaggantCost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......11

Technical Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......12

Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......12

ContinuingControversies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...0..0. ..0..0.. 13

Significance of Compatibility Testing to Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......13

Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......14

Blasting Agents(ANFO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......14

Survivability and Recovery of Taggants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......15

Development Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....16

Congressional Options . . . . . . . . ● ..*..*.. ....***** ● ..0..... ● **O. * 16

TABLES

Page

l. MajorSourcesof information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2. Current Status of Taggant Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

3. Summary of Current Status of Taggants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

4, Minimum Bombing Incidents Statistics Summary . . . . . . . . . . .......10

5. Praportions of Bombings Attributed to Groups of Perpetrators. .. ....10
Chapter I

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

At the request of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the Office of

Technology Assessment has undertaken an analysis of the proposal to mandate the

use of taggants in explosive materials manufactured for commercial use. A “taggant” is a material that might be added to explosives and gunpowders* at the time

of manufacture, as an eventual aid to law enforcement. This study assesses the existing taggant technology in order to assist Congress in its decision whether to adopt

legislation which would require taggants in explosives and gunpowders.

Two different kinds of taggants are being developed for possible incorporation

in chemical explosives, and it has been proposed that both be required. Identification

taggants are designed to survive the detonation of an explosive, and to be retrieved

from the debris. They would contain a code identifying the batch of explosives or

gunpowder used in a particular bombing. The intent of those advocating the development of such taggants is that law enforcement officers investigating a criminal

bombing would retrieve identification taggants and decode them, could then begin

their investigation knowing what kind of explosive material had been used, and

would be able to obtain a list of the last legal purchasers of these explosives and

gunpowders. At the present time the leading contender for an identification taggant

is a color-coded microscopic plastic chip which has been developed by the 3M Co.

Detection taggants are designed to be sensed by a suitable detection machine

even when contained in a package. The intent of those developing detection taggants is that detection machines at airports, public building entrances, and other appropriate sites would signal any effort to introduce explosive materials into the

area. In facilities not normally protected by such devices, portable detection sensors could be used to search the facility in response to a threat. The leading contender for a detection taggant is a microcapsule which would emit small quantities

of a vapor whose molecules are so distinctive that a suitable sensing instrument

(which is under parallel development) could detect a parts-per-trillion concentration.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) of the Department of the Treasury, which is the executive agency that has

jurisdiction over most crimes involving high explosives, has sponsored a program to develop

taggants, Most of the effort has been carried

out or supervised by the Aerospace Corp., under contract to BATF. Neither identification

taggants nor detection taggants have been ful-

● The term gunpowder includes black and smokeless powders

and pyrodex (a registered trademark of thePyrodex Corp) a

black powder substitute

Iy developed and tested; the detection taggant

effort is less advanced than the identification

taggant effort.

Legislation proposed in the U.S. Senate

would make it unlawfuI (in the words of S. 333)

//

. . . for any person or persons to manufacture

any explosive material which does not contain . .“ both detection taggants and identification taggants, and would require tha t

manufacturers and distributors keep records

showing the distribution chain for each batch

of explosive material that carried a separate

3
4 ● Taggants in Explosives

identification taggant code. (Similar legislation has been proposed in the House of Representatives. ) The Secretary of the Treasury

wouId issue regulations implementing this requirement, and such regulations would be

phased in as testing was completed and taggants became avaiIable in sufficient quantity.

At hearings on this proposal, representatives

of the explosives and gunpowder industries

and others expressed opposition to this proposal on the grounds that:

●

●

●

●

it is premature to consider explosives tagging legislation while development and testing of taggants have not been completed;

taggants may be unsafe, since they would

require adding a foreign substance to the explosive materials;

a taggant program would be extremely costly; and

a taggant program would not, in fact, have

much utility for law enforcement.

Proponents of a taggant program have countered that:

●

●

●

taggants are inert materials, no more unsafe

than current additives to explosives and gunpowder;

a taggant program need not be unduly costly; and

bombings are extremely difficult crimes to

prevent or solve using existing methods, and

taggants would provide an extremely useful

tool to law enforcement agenices.

The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs has requested that OTA review the available data on explosive taggant technology,

and conduct an assessment which would address;

1.

2.

3.

4.

the safety of adding taggants to explosives;

the postdetonation survivability and recoverability of identification taggants;

the cost impact of a taggant program on

the explosives industry and users;

the utility of a taggant program to law enforcement;

5.

6

7

The

the effects on cost and utility of excluding

certain explosive materials from the taggant program;

the removal of taggants from tagged explosives; and

alternatives to a taggant program.

text of the request letter is included as appendix A.

The proposal to require that taggants be

added to commercial explosives at the time of

manufacture has aroused intense controversy.

While OTA believes that this report will serve

to narrow many of the areas of controversy,

there are a number of issues on which the

available data do not permit a scientifically

conclusive finding. OTA has therefore made a

number of judgments based on the available

evidence where conclusive proof was lack ing.

In some cases these judgments, and the reasoning underlying them, have proved unpersuasive to one side or another in the controversy.

Therefore, the final section of this chapter

calls attention to the major areas in which one

or more affected parties may disagree with the

OTA findings.

Research Approach

In order to assess the impacts of a taggant

program, a two-stage approach has been necessary. As the first stage, an analysis has been

made of the safety and technical efficacy of

the taggants at the current state of development, since cost and utility are moot points if

the taggants are not safe and do not work. As

the second stage, an assumption has been

made that the taggants work and are safe and

a parametric analysis of costs and utility made

as a function of the specific implementation

plan.

Due to severe time constraints, OTA did little original research; instead, an intensive review of existing research was supplemented by

discussions with manufacturers, distributors,

and users of explosives and gunpowders, and

with law enforcement personnel and experts
Ch. l—Summary ● 5

on terrorism. Table 1 summarizes the major

sources consuIted.

I n addition, OTA sent a questionnaire to approximately 950 members of the International

Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) asking

them to assess the utility of taggants. (The

IACP membership list was chosen because it

constituted a broad cross section of the law enforcement community. ) The questionnaire was

sent to a random sample of the IACP members,

and the low response rate (about 15 percent)

probably created a bias towards those with interest in, and knowledge of, the subject. (A

possible misconception may have been introduced by the explanatory material introducing

the questionnaire, which inadvertently indicated that identification taggants could identify the last legal purchaser of explosives used

in a bombing, rather than identifying a list of

last legal purchasers. ) The results of the questionnaire, interpreted with considerable caution, are integrated into the

VI, and reported in detail in

analysis in chapter

appendix B.

OTA also directed a series of tests on the recoverability of the 3M identification taggant.

The Aerospace Corp. had conducted a large

number of laboratory tests on the survivability

of the 3M identification taggants, but the only

information on the recovery of taggants under

field conditions came from poorly documented demonstrations and training tests, conducted by BATF, the Federal Bureau of investigation, and other organizations. These tests,

and others conducted by the Institute of Makers of Explosives, had produced conflicting

and contradictory results. OTA planned and

supervised a limited series of tests of the postdetonation recovery process of taggants from

automobiIes. The resuIts of these tests are integrated into the findings, and described in detail in appendix C.

Table.–Major Sources of Information

Manufacturers

Explosives manufacturers (Du Pent, Atlas, Independent, Goex, Hercules)

Gunpowder manufacturers (Hercules, Goex, Olin, Pyrodex )

Manufacturer of identification taggants (3M Co. )

Trade organizations

Institute of Makers of Explosives(I ME)

Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute (SAAMI)

Consumer organizations

National Rifle Association (NRA)

National Muzzle Loaders Association (NM LA)

Organizations developing a taggant program

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms of the U S. Treasury

Department (BATF)

Aerospace Corp. (BATF contractor)

Organizations involved in taggant research

Management Sciences Associates

Institute for Defense Analyses

Lawrence Livermore Laboratories

Explosives and gunpowder distributors

B, F Hodgdon

Tri-State Explosives

Gunpowder retailer

The Bullet Hole

Explosives users

Copper mines (Bingham Canyon open pit mine. Crow Fork

underground mine)

Explosives users–continued

Coal Mine (Webster Coal Co. )

(Quarries (Tri-State, Rockville Crushed Stone)

Construction firm (Guy Atkinson)

Blasting contractor (Tri-State Explosives)

Law enforcement personnel

New York, N.Y,

San Mateo County, Calif,

Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, Tex,

Summit County, Ohio

Washington, DC.

Experts on terrorists and terrorism

Experts from foreign and domestic law enforcement agencies

Writers on the subject (Dr. Ernest Evans, Dr. Rona Fields,

Dr. Robert Kupperman)

Foreign law enforcement sources

West Germany

England

Ireland

Interpol

U.S. Federal agencies

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Federal Avation Administration

Bureau of Mines

Department of Transportation

U.s. Army (Corps of Engineers, Criminal Investigation Division,

Development and Research Command)

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
6 ● Taggants in Explosives

Photo credit Kennecott Copper Co.

[explosives are utilized extensively at the Bingham Canyon open pit copper mine

Some Project Limitation s

There are three general limitations to the

completeness of this analysis of the proposal

to legislate the use of taggants in explosive materials. The primary limitation is caused by the

preliminary nature of the taggant research–

much data are simply not available. Additional

information is req Jired on all aspects of the

analysis—technical efficacy, safety, cost, and

utility. Table 2 summarizes the research conducted to date.

Preliminary safety testing has been conducted on only a portion of the materials to

which identification taggants would be added,

and compatibility testing has barely begun

with detection taggants. Evidence has been

found of reactivity (using high taggant concentrations at elevated temperatures) between the

3M identification taggants and one type of

smokeless powder, as well as one booster material. This reactivity creates a presumption of

incompatibility. Until this presumed incompatibility is resolved, taggants cannot be safely

added to these explosive materials. Resolution

of the problem may result in significant

changes in the taggants, requiring a new set of

compatibility tests and perhaps changing the

basis of the cost analysis. If the problem is resolved, more data still need to be generated.

The lack of data on long-term effects, in terms

of safety, stability, and performance, especially on products such as gels and slurries, is par-
Ch. l—Summary ● 7

Photo credit U S Department of fhe Treasury

Photograph of automobiles utilized in the OTA taggant recovery test

Table 2.–Current State of Taggant Researcha

ID taggants Detection taggants

Compatibility Survival recovery Compatibility

Cap sensitive . Preliminary finished Preliminary finished Preliminary underway

Booster s Preliminary underway–compatibility problem identified Preliminary underway Testing initiated

Detonators . ., Prelimmary underway Preliminary underway Testing initiated

Blastlng agents ., ., . , None None None

Detonating cord ., . . None Testing initiated Testing initiated

Black powder ., . . . . Preliminary finished Preliminary underway Preliminary underway

Smokeless powder ... . . Preliminary underway–compatibility problem identified Preliminary underway Testing initiated

Military explosives ., ., None None None

a

As of mid-January 1980

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
8 . Taggants in Explosives

ticularly important. As a result of this uncertainty, not even preliminary indications of

safety are possible at this time, much less the

demonstrations recessary before a taggant

proposal could safely be implemented.

While preliminary research has been conducted on the survivability and recoverability

of the 3M identification taggants, only a portion of the explosive materials which might be

tagged was tested, and that research is poorly

documented. Hundreds of possible detection

taggants have been screened to yield five candidate materials, but detailed testing of the

properties of those materials is barely underway. Similarly, three candidate detection sensors have been identified, and Iimited Laboratory testing of preliminary or “breadboard”

models completed. Methods of air sampling

are also at a preliminary stage. Thus, estimates

of technical efficacy can only be made on the

basis of preliminary data.

As a result of the pilot test program, reasonable data are available for the analysis of the

cost impact of adding taggants during the

manufacture of cap-sensitive high explosives,

at least for those companies which participated in the program. The data, however, on

the cost impact of adding taggants during the

manufacture of the other types of explosive

materials (for exalmple, gunpowder) are less

adequate. While firm estimates of the cost of

unencapsulated identification taggants are

available from 3M under a variety of implementation conditions, little data are available

for the cost of encapsulated identification taggants (a more likely baseline case) or for the

cost of detection taggants. Only the grossest

estimates have been made of recordkeeping

costs, and the estimates by both the proponents and opponents are open to some questions of objectivity. Rule-of-thumb engineering

estimates have been made for the candidate

sensor systems costs, but the accuracy of those

estimates cannot be very precise as neither

production rate, tc)tal production, nor specifications have been established.

So far, identification tagging of explosives

has played a part in only one criminal case that

has reached a courtroom. (Those investigating

and prosecuting the case considered evidence

from taggants very helpful.) Quantification of

the utility of taggants (identification as well as

detection) is therefore simply not possible, particularly given the inadequacy of bombing statistics. Experience with the date-shift code

(which facilitates tracing of undetonated explosives) provides useful data, as does the experience of foreign countries, but the available

information on the utility of taggants is preponderantly qualitative in nature.

A second general limitation to the completeness of the analysis, imposed by Iimits on available time and resources, is that only a limited

sample of the population concerned with the

study could be contacted. As a result, cost data

derived from a detailed analysis of one or two

companies have been assumed to be representative of an entire segment of an industry, such

as underground coal mining or retail sale of

gunpowders. Similarly, processes for adding

taggants, reworking of waste material, quality

control, compatibility testing, and storage,

which are applicable to a segment of the manufacturers of explosive materials, have been

assumed to be universal for the purpose of

generating cost estimates. A more serious manifestation of the limited sample size is that indepth discussions of the utility of identification and detection taggants to law enforcement and security personnel could only be

held with a small number of organizations. As

the bomber threat varies considerably from

one part of the country to another, it is difficult to generalize the results of those discussions.

The third limitation on the analysis is caused by

the language of the draft legislation, S. 333. The

bill calls for tagging of all “explosive materials, ” which does not appear practicable if the

phrase is strictly interpreted to include the tagging of blasting agents that are mixed the same

day they are detonated, and otherwise offers

no guidance for the implementation regulations which the Secretary of the Treasury

would promulgate.
Ch. l—Summary ● 9

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This assessment distinguishes between an

evaluation of the present state of development

of taggants and a projection of the cost and

utility of a taggant program if and when the

necessary development and testing are successfully completed. A detailed evaluation of

the development status of the identification

and detection taggants is contained in chapter

I I 1. A crucial factor in the development status

evaluation concerns the safety of adding taggants to explosives; the safety and general

compatibility analysis is contained in chapter

IV. OTA then separately evaluated the cost

and utility of a program to add taggants to

commercial explosive materials. For this analysis, it was assumed that the baseline identification and detection taggants had successful Iy

completed the development process, including

a resolution of the safety issues. These analyses are contained, respectively, in chapters V

and VI. Details of these and other findings are

given in chapter 11. The principal findings are

shown in table 3 and briefly summarized below.

Taggant Utilit y

Assuming, for purposes of analysis, that stability questions are successfully resolved and that

technical development is successfully completed,

both identification taggants and detection tagTable 3.–Stimmary of Current Status of Taggants

Idenhf!cation taggants Detection taggants

safety

Dynamites, gels. slurries, No change in sensitivity, stability No reported data; testing initiated

Black powder. No change in sensitivity, stabddy No reported data; testing initiated

Smokeless powde r Reactivity with Herco’ powder observed, No reported data, testing initiated

incompatibility presumed

Booster material s Reactivity with Composition B observed, No reported data; testing initaited

incompatibility presumed

Blasting agents ., No data No data

Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . Limited testing No data

Survivability

Favorable conditions. Yes N/A

Fire ., ., Probable N/A

Confinement : Insufficient data N/A

Recoverability

Field recovery . , Probable if survive N/A

Field readin g Unlikely N/A

Laboratory reading Almost all conditions NIA

Sensor development. . . . . . . N/A Early stages

utility

Low-value targets Little Virtually none

High-value targets, no

countermeasures High High

High-value, Including

countermeasure s High, due to Increased risks High for all but most sophisticated

bombers

Cost, $ millions/year Identification Detecioon Both

Low-level program (ID tag code for each product changed

each year. ANFO excluded )

a

. $15 $22 $30

Baseline program (ID tag code for each product changed

for each date/shift, ANFO excluded) . 25 25 45

High-level program (ID tag changed for each 10,000-lb

batch, ANFO Included) . . 215 65 268

N/A not applicable

aThese programs are defined in detail in ch v

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
10 ● Taggants in Explosives

gants would be useful law enforcement tools

against most terrorist and other criminal bombers. Their utility against certain types of bombers

would probably be quite high; their utility against

the most sophisticated of terrorists and professional criminals is open to question.

●

●

Data on the number and kinds of bombings

committed are dispersed and inconsistent.

Table 4 gives an idea of the magnitude of

the problem; its significance is discussed in

chapter II and the derivation of the figures

in appendix F. OTA diligently sought to find

or reliably derive data from which one could

calculate the number of bombings that a

taggant program would solve or deter, and

found this an impossible task.

Criminal bombings are committed by a wide

range of perpetrators, including both “individuals and groups. It is helpful to group criminal

bombers into four categories, which differ

Table 4,–Minimum Bombing Incidents Statistics Summary a

BATF FBI

●

Item 1977 1978 1977 1978

Explosive bombings, number. ., ... l,037b 896b 867 768

Undetonated explosive bombs, number. 319 287 118 105

Incendiary bombings, number . ., 339 446 248 349

Unignited incendiary bombs, number ., 81 71 85 79

Criminal accidents, number ., ., ., ., 21 67 – –

Property damage from bombings,

millions of dollars c d . ., . . . . . . $ 10 $ 17 $ 9 $ 9

Injuries c ., ., . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 185 162 135

People killed by bombingsc ., , ., , 38 23 22 18

a BATF reported 3.177 total Incidents in 1977 and 3,256 in 1978 Total incidents include accidents, threats deized and recovered explosives, and hoaxes as well as axtual explosives and incendiary bombings The OTA stud/ was concerned only with explosive bombings

b of these 953 in 1977 and 787 m 1978 were against substantial targets

c lncludes both explosive and incendiary bombings OTA was unable to obtain Separate figures for

the number of criminal accidents, injuries, deaths, and property damage caused by Incendiary

bombs Incendiary bombs and bombings would not be affected by taggant program

d Actual value probably considerably higher due 10 lack Of data file updates

SOURCE SOURCE: BATF 1978 Explosives Incidents Report. FBI Uniform Crome Report. Bomb Report.

1978 See app F for a dicussion of the derivation of these figures

●

greatly in their motivation, skill, training, resources, and ability to respond to a changing

enforcement environment. They are defined

and their proportions estimated in table 5.

Note that despite the tendency for some

groups to claim “credit” for a bombing, a

motive was established for only 23 percent

of the bombings reported to BATF in 1977

and only 38 percent in 1978; table 5 is based

on the assumption that the distribution of

motives was the same for the numerous incidents in which law enforcement officials

were unable to assign a motive.

Identification taggants would facilitate the investigation of almost all significant criminal

bombings in which commercial explosives

were used. Due to the need for laboratory involvement in the taggant recovery process,

the taggants would probably not enter into

investigations of bombings that produce no

casualties and I ittle property damage.

Detection taggants would be very effective in

protecting those high-value targets where protection by detection taggant sensors is feasible.

The improvement in protection of such potential targets would be quite substantial.

However, most current bombings take place

against targets that are unlikely to be protected by detection taggant sensors.

Adding taggants to blasting agents would have

some utility, but the incremental utility would

be small compared to the utility of tagging capsensitive high explosives, gunpowders, and

detonators (and the incremental cost would be

high). A taggant program that did not include gunpowders would be of relatively

limited utility as pipe bombs filled with gunpowder are used in a substantial number of

Table 5.–Proportions of Bombings Attributed to Groups of Perpetrators (average for years 1974-78)

Percentage Estimated number

Bomber type Characteristics of bombings in 1978a

Terrorists. . . ., ., ., ... Highly motivated, varied skill levels, act in groups, continuing involvement 12 107

Criminals . . . ., . . . . . . Varied motivations, varied skill levels, act alone or in small groups, 11 98

repeated activities, specific targets

Mentally disturbed ., ., ., . . . . Highly motivated, poorly trained, act alone, seldom repeat crimes 38 340

Vandals and experimenters , Limited motivation, poor training, limited resources, do little damage 39 348

asee app F for dervations of these estimates

SOURCE FBI data
Ch. l—Summary ● 1 1

bombings; it only high explosives were

tagged, criminals could shift to pipe bombs

rather easily.

● The utility of both identification and detection

taggants would be decreased because some

bombers would take countermeasures. Explosives experts have suggested a number of

possible countermeasures to the proposed

taggant technology which would be available to those bombers with the requisite

knowledge and resources. Most available

countermeasures would increase the risk to

the bomber of personal injury or arrest, or

decrease the reliability of the bomb. Law enforcement officials and experts on terrorism

agree that most bombers would not utilize

the available countermeasures. A taggant

program would retain substantial utility

even though some criminal bombers would

attempt countermeasures, and these countermeasures would be effective whenever

they were carried out with sufficient knowledge and skil1.

● The utility of taggants to law enforcement personnel is not adequately quantifiable, due to

the paucity of data on taggants or similar

control mechanisms, the difficulty of analyzing the currently collected statistics on

bombings, and the fact that it is difficult to

quantify how much any single clue adds to

an investigation or prosecution. Generally

speaking, law enforcement techniques are

seldom subjected to cost-benefit analysis,

and the data which exist do not lend themselves to such effort. Similarly, OTA was unable to quantify the deterrent effect taggants may have, although the apparent effectiveness of airport screening procedures

in reducing the number of hijacking attempts suggests that detection taggants may

have a considerable deterrent value.

Taggant Cost

The cost of a taggant program would vary

enormously depending on the nature of the pro=

gram. Costs are likely to be reasonable if and

only if any taggant legislation requires regulations to be written in a way that weighs costs

against considerations of law enforcement

ut i I it y.

A low-level taggant program, in which a

unique taggant species would be used to

identify each year’s production of a specific

product, and 800 detection sensors would be

deployed, would cost $3o million per year.

A “baseline” program identified by OTA (described in detail in ch. V) would cost approximately $45 million per year,adding approximately 12 percent to the cost of cap-sensitive explosives and slightly under 8 percent

to the cost of gunpowder, Cap-sensitive

high explosives, boosters, detonators, detonating cord, and gunpowder would be

tagged. A unique taggant species would be

used for a shift’s production of each product

and size. Fifteen hundred detection sensors

would be deployed. The bulk of this cost

would eventually falI on users of explosives

and on users of products produced with the

aid of explosives; the costs of detection taggant sensors would presumably be borne by

the owners or users of protected facilities. It

is not expected that costs of this magnitude

would lead to any major shifts in the patterns of production and use of explosives.

Separate baseline identification and detection

taggant programs would cost approximately

$25 million per year each, including public

overhead costs.

A high-level program, in which a unique taggant would be used for each 10,000-lb batch

of explosives or 2,000-lb batch of gunpowder, in which blasting agents would be

tagged, and in which 5,000 detection sensors

would be deployed, would have an estimated

cost of $268 million per year.

The cost estimates assume that the taggant

material costs do not differ appreciably from

current estimates for mass-produced taggants.

Chapter V discusses the causes and the extent of the uncertainties surrounding these

cost estimates.
02 ● Taggants in Explosives

Technical Development

The development of taggants is not yet complete. Further developmental effort, particularly resolution of the questions regarding the

stability of smokeless powder and cast boosters to which taggants have been added, and

successful completion of a variety of tests,

would be required before it would be appropriate to begin adding taggants to commercial explosives.

●

●

The identification taggants developed by 3M

appear to survive the detonation of commercial explosives under ideal conditions. Confinement and fire may adversely affect survival, although test data is very limited. Recovery of the taggants appears to be a function of the specific incident conditions

(weather, type of target, firefighting activities) as well as the training and care of the

field and laboratory investigators. A trained

team can probably recover debris from

which a laboratory can separate taggants

under most incident conditions.

There is little basis for judging whether the detection taggant system, based on machine

sensing of microencapsuiated vapors, which

appears to show promise under laboratory

conditions, would function reliably under conditions of mass production and field use, or

how soon sucn a system would be available.

Safet y

The tests so far conducted create a presumption that there are no incompatibilities between

the 3M identification taggant and dynamites, slurries, gels, emulsions, or black powder. Nevertheless, a full-scale qualification program is necessary before taggants can be added to all such materials.

●

●

●

The addition of 3M identification taggants to

one brand of smokeless powder (Herco” *)

and one variety of booster material (Composition B) produces a chemical reaction at elevated temperatures and high taggant concentrations. The taggants must be considered incompatible with such explosives unless or

until: 1 ) the composition of the taggant is

changed in a way that eliminates this chemical reaction, or 2) a determination is made

that the reaction takes place only under circumstances that can be prevented from arising in commercial production, distribution,

and use. If the incompatibility remains, then

Congress could, if it chose, require that

these particular explosives either be themselves modified, withdrawn from the market, or granted an exemption from tagging.

(OTA believes that exemption of smokeless

powders could significantly diminish the

utility of a tagging program; exemption of

cast boosters would diminish this utility to a

somewhat lesser extent. ) If compatibility is

established, completion of a qualification

program would still be necessary.

There is little evidence regarding the safety of

detection taggants, or of the combination of

identification and detection taggants, as testing

has only recently been initiated and no results

have yet been reported.

Analysis, and the limited testing so far conducted, indicate that the performance of explosive material would not be degraded by the

addition of taggants. However, preliminary

tests suggest that abnormally high concentrations of taggants might decrease the ballistic performance of smokeless powder.

Testing, including long-term effects, would

be necessary, however, before the question

could be fully resolved.

*A registered trademark ot Hercules, Inc
Ch. l—Summary ● 1 3

CONTINUING CONTROVERSIES

Some of OTA’S findings have been challenged by one or more of the participants in

the controversy that surrounds the proposal to

require that commercial explosives be tagged,

The nature of these challenges is outlined here

Significance of Compatibility

Testing to Date

A large number of tests have been carried

out to determine whether the 3M identification taggant is compatible with commercial explosives. More tests are required, and the Aerospace Corp. (under contract to BATF) is sponsoring a continuing testing program. The tests

completed to date are described in chapter IV.

OTA found that the testing done to date creates a reasonable presumption that the 3M identification taggant is compatible with dynamites,

gels, slurries, emulsions, and black powder. On

the other hand, there is evidence of increased reactivity, and thus a presumption of incompatibility, with at least one form of smokeless powder,

and at least one cast booster composition. It is

not yet possible to arrive at presumptions

about the compatibility of the 3M taggant with

blasting caps or detonating cord, or about the

compatibility of detection taggants with any

commercial explosive. OTA further found that,

even for products such as dynamites where no

evidence of incompatibility exists, further testing is required before it can be definitely concluded that taggants are compatible with, and

can safely be added to, al I such explosives.

The Aerospace Corp. takes the view that the

compatibility tests with dynamites, gels, slurries,

emulsions, and black powder generally are sufficient to permit implementation of a program to

tag these substances. Aerospace recognizes

that there is a need for Mine Safety and Health

Administration approval of tagged permissible

dynamites, that final qualification of production-line 3M taggants must be made to ensure

that they match those used in the pilot test,

and that the black powder ballistics testing

should be reviewed and possibly augmented.

However, Aerospace points out that while not

every test has been conducted with every

brand of every explosive, the program successfully carried out was designed by industry

and was considered sufficiently thorough so

that several major firms were willing to distribute pilot quantities of tagged explosives

through their normal commercial distribution

channels. With regard to smokeless powders

and cast boosters, Aerospace takes the view

that no safety hazard has been demonstrated,

but that the failure of the tagged explosive to

pass certain extreme tests means that compatibility has yet to be demonstrated, and the possibility that some changes will be required to

ensure safety cannot be ruled out.

Representatives of the explosives industry take

the view that taggants cannot be considered

compatible with explosives until all the testing

that ought to be carried out has been successfully

completed. They maintain that untiI safety has

been conclusively demonstrated, it would be

premature to consider whether to legislate a

requirement that commercial explosives be

tagged. Explosives industry representatives

also make a distinction between the pilot program so far carried out and normal commercial production. They maintain that the tagged

explosives manufactured under the pilot program received unusual care and attention during the manufacturing process, and were

distributed to a limited number of selected

distributors. The manufacturers also believe

that the terms of the pilot program relieved

them of liability for accidental explosions due

to taggants, a point which the Aerospace Corp.

contests. Some explosives industry representatives take the view that the failure of the mixture of taggants with one brand of smokeless

powder and one cast booster composition to

pass one safety test means that the 3M taggant

should be viewed as unsafe unless or until it is

redesigned, and point out that any such redesign would require repeating all other tests

previously carried out.
14 . Taggants in Explosives

Countermeasure s

It is clear that it would be possible for terrorists

or other criminals to take measures to defeat the

impact of a tagging program, by making or acquiring untagged explosives. OTA found that

such countermeasures would require a considerable degree of technical knowledge and

skil1, and that in most cases countermeasures

would either require the commission of an additional crime (with some added risk of apprehension), or else manufacturing or modifying explosives in a way that would risk either a

premature explosion or a misfire of the bomb.

The law enforcement experts whom OTA consulted predict that many terrorists and other

criminals would probably not avail themselves of

countermeasures that were theoretically available to them.

Representatives of the explosives industry take

the view that one should assume that an available countermeasure will in fact be employed.

They point out that the most sophisticated

bombers, who are most likely to be willing and

able to employ countermeasures, are those

which may pose the greatest threat. They fear

that a taggant program would fail to be effective because of widespread use of countermeasures, and that law enforcement officials

would then wish to counter the countermeasures by extending the range (and hence the

cost) of the taggant program.

OTA has noted a consistent pattern of disagreement on this point. Experts in the explosives industry and Government explosives experts almost unanimously believe that countermeasures exist which would enable bombers to evade the effects of a taggant program,

whether the countermeasures take the form of

removal of taggants from tagged explosives,

use of untagged blasting agents, theft of explosives, fabrication of “homemade” explosives,

or use of incendiary devices. Law enforcement

experts, and experts on terrorists and terrorism,

almost unanimously believe that most bombers, including terrorists, would fail to take the

steps necessary to evade a taggant program,

even though the necessary equipment and

knowledge is not too difficult to obtain. A possible analogy is the effectiveness of the program to counter aircraft hijacking; since that

program began, thousands of weapons have

been detected each year, while there have

been no cases of aircraft hijacked with weapons smuggled onboard, despite the fact that

mechanisms can be postulated for smuggling

weapons past the screening apparatus. OTA

believes that while countermeasures to a taggant program would be available and would be

effective if correctly used, most bombers

would not make effective use of such countermeasures. OTA believes that taggants, if successfully developed, could have significant law enforcement utility even if some terrorists or other

criminals successfully employed countermeasures.

Blasting Agents (ANFO)

Blasting agents are the most widely used

type of commercial explosive; the most common type of blasting agent consists of mixtures

of prilled ammonium nitrate and fuel oil; these

explosives are collectively known as ANFO.

ANFO can be mixed in a factory, or mixed directly at the site where blasting is to take

place. Ammonium nitrate fertilizer can be

mixed with ordinary fuel oil to create a rather

insensitive ANFO.

Because of the very large volume of ANFO

that is used commercially, a tagging program

which included ANFO would be substantially

more costly than one from which ANFO was

excluded. Chapters I I and V present detailed

information on this point. One of the reasons

for the wide gap between BATF and the explosives industry cost estimates for a tagging program is that the industry read the draft legislation (S. 333) as requiring that ANFO and other

blasting agents be tagged, while BATF was

planning for a taggant program that would not

include ANFO.

Representatives of the explosives industry

have taken the position that exclusion of

ANFO would greatly diminish the law enforcement utility of a taggant program, because

bombers could and would use untagged ANFO

in place of tagged, cap-sensitive explosives or

tagged gunpowders. OTA believes that it is in-
Ch. l—Summary ● 1 5

deed the case that an effective bomb, suitable

for almost all criminal or terrorist purposes,

can be manufactured from ANFO if the criminal has adequate time, skill, knowledge, and

motivation. The critical area about which judgments differ is the extent to which terrorists and

other criminals would in fact make use of ANFO

bombs if other commercially available explosive

materials were tagged.

OTA does not consider it appropriate to describe here how one would go about manufacturing an AN FO-filled bomb. The process involves more steps, a greater number of materials and components, and more opportunities

for error than a bomb made from a cap-sensitive explosive; however, it would be easier and

safer than fabrication of a bomb from “raw

chemical s.” The ANFO commercially available in the United States would not be reliably

detonated by an ordinary detonator (#8), even

in a pipe bomb. ANFO can be readily detonated by using a smalI high-explosive booster,

but such boosters would be tagged, and a large

booster or several small ones would make an

efficient bomb without the use of ANFO.

ANFO can also be detonated using materials

that wouId not be tagged (if the bomber knows

how to wire them), but an ANFO pipe bomb is

substantialIy harder to detonate than a smokeless-powder pipe bomb or a stick of dynamite.

Photo credit U.S Department of the Treasury

A typical pipe bomb. Such bombs are normally filled with

black and smokeless powder, but a bomber with sufficient

knowledge and skill could use ANFO

At the present time, ANFO is seldom used in

pipe bombs despite the fact that it is cheaper

and, if properly detonated, considerably more

energetic than smokeless powder. Whether the

tagging of cap-sensitive high explosives and

powders would in fact lead many criminals to

switch to the use of ANFO is a question that

cannot be answered with certainty. However,

as in the case of other countermeasures, OTA

has found that explosives experts tend to expect

that criminals would switch to ANFO, while law

enforcement experts and experts on terrorism

tend to doubt that this would happen in many

cases.

Survivability and Recovery of Taggants

The testing done to date on the conditions

under which identification taggants would in

fact survive an explosion, and surviving taggants could in fact be recovered, is not adequate to sustain firm conclusions. Much of the

available data is anecdotal rather than systematic. Part of the problem is that it is difficult

to arrange for testing under realistic but controlled conditions. Faced with inadequate and

somewhat contradictory data, particularly

with respect to the recovery question, OTA arranged for a very Iimited test program to supplement the previous tests; appendix C reports

on this effort.

OTA feels that prior testing supports the

presumption that taggants would probably survive most bomb detonations under most conditions. However, survivability decreases with

the size of the explosive charge and its power.

The survivability of individual taggants in

large explosive charges or in extremely powerful explosives (such as booster material and

military explosives) has not been demonstrated. Pressed pellets, fabricated from the individual taggants, do survive the detonation,

but recovery has not been adequately demonstrated, and compatibiIity tests on pellets remain to be accomplished. OTA found that the

taggants surviving most bombs could probably

be recovered under most conditions. However,

field investigators might well find it impossible to

separate the taggants from the debris, identify in-
15 ● Taggants in Explosives

dividual taggants, and read the codes in the field;

instead the field team would have to gather debris likely to contain taggants, and a laboratory

could thereafter separate and read the taggants.

Such a laboratory need not be elaborate, and

could be installed in a truck if onsite taggant

reading was considered desirable.

BATF maintains that, on the contrary, the 3M

identification taggant can be recovered and read

in the field by investigators who have received a

reasonable amount of training.

Some industry representatives maintain that

there is considerable doubt as to whether taggants would actually survive and be recovered

from a bomb. Such doubts should, they hold,

be cleared up before attempting to reach any

judgment about the utility of an explosives

tagging program.

Development Time

OTA believes that the further development

and testing that would be required before an

identification taggant program couId be implemented are likely to take until 1983. If an identification taggant program were legislated

early in 1980, it would be at least late 1984 before all commercial explosives could be manufactured with taggants. Even if the sensor development and detection taggant programs are

successful, OTA feels it would be at least 1985

before full implementation could occur. BATF

maintains that these times are too pessimistic.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

Given the present state of development of

taggants, OTA’S data and analysis appear to be

consistent with any of three possible courses ●

of action. (No significance is intended in order

of listing. )

● Pass legislation requiring taggants, and set up

a procedure to determine if and when the

technical development and testing have pro- ●

gressed to a point where implementation

can begin. Given the active involvement of

BATF in the development of taggants, it may

be inappropriate for the implementation decision process to reside in the Treasury Department.

Defer legislative action on taggants, but encourage BATF to continue taggant development, with a view to consideration of legislation when development and testing are complete.

Take no legislative action on taggants, and encourage the executive branch to search for

other ways of improving the effectiveness of

law enforcement against terrorist and other

criminal bombers.
Chapter II

DETAILED FINDINGS
Chapter II- DETAILED FINDINGS

Page

Overview of the Problem . *.*..**.*...***...******************** 19

The Bombing Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......19

Manufacturer to User Chain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......21

Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......21

Gunpowders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......22

TechnicalEfficacy ● *****.* ● *****9** ● ***.  ● ** *****O .******** ● 24

Compatibility ofTaggant wtih Explosive Materials. . . . . . . . . .. . . .......28

Cost of aTaggant Program ● ******** ● ******** ● ****...* .* * 32

Utility of Taggants....... ...... .***.  ● ** ****** ● **.**.** ● 36

Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......36

Common Criminals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......37

Mentally Disturbed.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......37

Vandals and Experimenters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....38

program implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....46

TABLES

Page

6. Minimum Bombing Incidents Statistics Summary . . . . . . . . . .......20

7. Identified Explosive Fillers Used in Bombs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......20

8. BombingCasualtiesand Damage in 1978 byTypeof Bomb . . .......21

9, BATF Recovery Demonstrations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......25

10. Recovery Tests Participated in by Summit County Sheriff’s Office ...25

11. OTA Recovery Test Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..26

12. Elements of a Suggested Compatibility Qualification Program ......29

13. Cost of a Taggant Program as a Function of implementation Plan. ...32

14. Attributes of Criminal Bomber Croups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......37

15. Taggant Utility Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....38

FIGURES

Page

I. Explosive Distribution Chain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....22

2. Gunpowder Distribution Chain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

3. Photo micrographs of Recovered Taggants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......26

4. Size Comparison of the 3M Identification Taggantand

Some Smokeless Powders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....41

S. Marginal Cost-Utility Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....47
Chapter II

DETAILED FINDINGS

This chapter presents the findings of the study in some detail, along with a

sketch of the data and analytical methods used to arrive at them. The full analyses

on which these findings are based are found in the subsequent chapters and the appendixes.

The analysis proceeded in two stages, which were conducted simultaneously.

The first stage assessed the technical efficacy of the taggants, and their compatibility with explosive materials. Definitive judgments on these points must await the results of further technical development and testing. The second stage estimated the

cost and law enforcement utility of taggants, assuming that taggants can be made

which work and are safe. It should be clearly understood that a taggant program is

only appropriate if all the conditions are met: it must be technically sound, it must

be safe, it must have value for law enforcement, and the costs must be reasonable in

the light of this law enforcement value.

The analysis and discussion of technical efficacy and safety were conducted as

if it had been established that taggants are useful in relation to their cost. The analysis and discussion of cost and utility were conducted as if it had been established

that taggants work and are safe.

Because a variety of implementation plans are possible, costs and utility are evaluated parametrically in order to show how the choices made in writing regulations

would lead to variations in cost and law enforcement value.

OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

In order to appreciate the potential benefits

and shortfalls of a tagging program it is necessary to understand the magnitude of the current and projected future bombing threat, as

well as the processes involved in the manufacture, distribution, and sale of the various explosive materials.

The Bombing Threat

Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms (BATF) maintain national bombing

data information centers which collect statistics on bombings and other explosive incidents. The data are not consistent between the

two centers, however, and many bombings are

not reported to either center. The formatting

of the data, and the lack of updating procedures, make accurate analysis difficult. Appendix F explains in some detail which data

sources were used, and why. While BATF and

FBI data differ in the absolute values (e. g.,

number of bombings in a year), both sets of

data support the OTA findings. Most tables in

this report make use of BATF data because its

format appeared more amenable to analysis.

The BATF 1978 Explosives Incidents Report

includes over 3,000 incidents for both 1977 and

1978. The incidents include accidents, threats,

seized and recovered explosives, and hoaxes,

as well as actual explosive and incendiary

bombings. Of these incidents, 1,377 represented actual explosive detonations, accidental detonations by criminals, or recovered

bombs that failed to detonate in 1977, with

19
20 ● Taggants in Explosives

1,250 the corresponding number for 1978. At

least 953 of these in 1977 and 787 in 1978 represent actual detonation of explosive bombs

against substantial targets (mailbox and openarea bombings are not included).

During 1977, BATF estimates that 38 people

were killed and 180 wounded by explosive and

incendiary bombs, while the numbers in 1978

were 23 and 185, respectively. Due to the way

initial estimates of property damage are made,

and the lack of updating, only the crudest

property damage estimates can be made.

There was at least $10 million in direct property damage due to explosive and incendiary

bombs in 1977, and at least$17 million in 1978.

In 1977, 35 of the 38 reported deaths and 20

of 23 reported in 1978 were from bombings

against vehicles, residences, and commercial

establishments. Similarly, about 80 percent of

the injuries from bombing of known targets in

1977 and about 70 percent in 1978 were caused

by bombings of those three types of targets.

The 1977 and 1978 statistics are summarized in

table 6, and discussed in more detail in appendix F.

The available data do not sustain any conclusions about trends in the bombing threat;

both the number of incidents and the extent of

deaths, injuries, and property damage vary

from year to year, and from data base to data

Table 6.–Minimum Bombing Incidents Statistics Summary a

BATF FBI

Hem 1977 1978 1977 1978

Explosive bombings, number. . . . . . . . . 1,037b 896b 867 768

Undetonated explosive bombs, number. 319 287 118 105

Incendiary bombings, number . . 339 446 248 349

Unignited incendiary bombs, number 81 71 85 79

Criminal accidents, numberc . . . . . 21 67 – –

Property damage from bombings, millions

of dollarsc d . . . . . . . . . . . ... $ 10 $ 17 $ 9 $ 9

Injuries c 

., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 185 162 135

People killed by bombingsc . . . . . 38 23 22 18

aBATF reported 3,177 total incidents in 1977 and 3,256 in 1978 Total incidents include accidents threats, seized and recovered explosives and hoaxes as well as actual explosive and incendiary bombings The OTA study was concerned only with explosive bombings

b of these 953 in 1977 and 787 m 1978 were against substantial targets

includes both explosive and incendiary bombings OTA was unable obtain separate figures for

number of criminal accidents, injuries deaths, and property damage caused by explosive and incendiary bombings Incendiary bombs and bombings would not be affected by a taggant program value probaly Considerably higher due to lack Of data file updates

SOURCE : BATF 1978 Explosive Incidents Report, FBI Uniform Crime Report: Bomb Report

1978 See app F for a discussion of the derivation of these figures

base. Management Sciences Associates (MSA)

conducted a detailed study of the data in the 5

years from 1972 through 1976 without discovering any significant trends. Many experts on

terrorism believe that the United States may

experience an increase in bombings, particularly catastrophic bombings, in the years

ahead. However, this belief is based on an assessment of U.S. vulnerability to bombings and

the observation that the United States has

recently had less of a terrorist problem than

other developed countries; there is no evidence that this increased threat has materialized. In looking at bombing statistics, one

should bear in mind that a single incident involving an aircraft exploding in flight could

produce more deaths than have occurred in

any year to date.

Data on the types of fillers used in bombs

are also not consistent between the FBI and

the BATF data banks. It is instructive to look at

two BATF data sources, however, as shown in

table 7. The second column represents 1978

data for the fillers identified in the field for all

explosive bombs that were detonated, bombs

recovered undetonated, and criminal accidents. The first column represents 1978 data

for only those fillers that were identified in the

laboratory from postdetonation analysis. The

third column averages the first two. In both

cases, black and smokeless powders and capsensitive high explosives all occur with high

frequency. Table 8 shows a breakout of the

minimum number of significant bombing incidents, deaths, and injuries occurring during

1978 by explosive material fillers. The average

column in table 7 was multiplied by data on

Table 7.–ldentified Explosive Fillers Used in Bombs

Lab identified All Identified

fillers 1978 fillers 1978 Average

Black powder ., . 13% 21% 17!40

Smokeless powder . 16 19 17.5

Military ., ., ., ... 2 7 4.5

Cap sensitive ., ., 32 30 31

Blasting agents, – 1 .5

Chemicals . . – 1 .5

Others, ... ., 36 21 2 8 5

See app F for derivation of these numbers

SOURCE BATF data
Ch. n-Detailed Findings ● 2 1

Table 8.–Bombing Casualties and Damage in 1978 by Typo of Bomb

Number of

bombings against Property damage

Filler material substantial targets Deaths Injuries $ millions’

All fillers. ., 1,298 23 185 $17.2

Incendiary ... . , 428 3 13 3.7

Black powde r 148 4 19 .2

Smokeless powder : : : : : : : 152 3 23 .2

Military explosives . 39 0 7 —

Cap sensitive. . . . . . . . . . . . 270 7 26 3.3

Other . . . . . 3 40 2.4

Unknown ., ., 3 57 7.4

Total for those fillers which

would be directly taggedb

. 570 14 68 3,7

a

Value probably higher due to lack 01 data update

b cap-sensitive explosives black powder and smokeless Powder would be tagged

SOURCE BATF data See app F for a derivation of these figures

total bombing to generate the table 8 estimates. See appendix F for details.

Manufacturer to User Chain

Explosives

Approximately 4 billion lb of explosives are

manufacturered and used annually in the

United States. Of this amount, approximately

600 million lb are standard explosives and 3.4

billion lb are blasting agents, primarily ammonium nitrate-fuel oil mixtures. Of the 600

million lb of standard explosives, about half

are cap-sensitive (will reliably be detonated by

a #8 detonator) dynamites, emulsions, gels,

and slurries, and about half are non-cap-sensitive gels, slurries, and emulsions. Most of the

standard explosives are manufactured in a

plant, packaged in cartridges, and shipped,

either directly to a large user such as a coal

mine or to a distributor, although some are

processed essentially onsite. Some of the blasting agent products are prepared by a manufacturer and sold in packages, some are prepared

by a manufacturer and sold in bulk [tanker

truck), while some are mixed onsite and used

the same day they are prepared.

Standard explosives are made by mixing together the fuel and oxidizer ingredient and

feeding the mixed product into the final cartridges by a batch, semicontinuous, or continuous process. I n a batch process, the ingredients

for a particular batch are first mixed and then

packaged before another batch is started on

that production line. In a semicontinuous process, the mixed batch is fed into an intermediate

hopper from which packaging takes place,

while another batch is mixed in parallel to the

packaging of the first batch. In a continuous

process, the material is continuously added to

the mixer, processed, and packed in a continuous flow.

If taggants were added to standard explosives, they would be added at the mixing stage.

Taggants could also be added to packaged or

bulk form manufactured blasting agents at the

mixing stage. If the ammonium nitrate used to

make onsite-fabricated blasting agents were to

be tagged, identification taggants could be

added during the “prilling” process, while detection taggants, which are not batch specific,

could be added with the fuel oil.

Boosters are generally fabricated by pouring

a molten, high-energy, cap-sensitive explosive,

such as TNT, into containers. Taggants could

be added during the cooling process of the explosive.

Detonators and detonating cord are manufactured products in which the product is built

up around an explosive core in an assemblyIine process. In both cases, the taggants would

be added during the assembly process, rather

than directly to the explosives.

All of the products have a similar flow from

manufacturer to ultimate user, as shown in fig-
.

12 ● Taggants in Explosives

ure 1. Some of the products are sold directly

by the manufacturers to large users, such as a

Figure 1.— Explosive Distribution Chain

I Manufacturer

I

I 1

I Distributor I

1 I

1 .

Retailer

b

- User User m

4

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment

mine or large construction company. Such

sales may represent an entire day’s production.

The rest is sold to distributors, who may buy

portions of several production batches, entire

batches, or even several batches. The distributors in turn sell to retail stores, supply explosives directly to some users (such as a quarry or

construction site), and may also do explosive

contracting themselves. A particular uniquely

tagged batch of explosives may, therefore, go

directly to one user, may go to one distributor,

or may be sold to a number of users and distributors. From the distributor it may again go

to one of several users, sometimes with a further distribution level (retailer) involved. A list

of the ultimate purchasers of one specific

batch of explosives could, therefore, contain

one name, or up to a hundred names for a

worst case example, although generally the

number would be at the low end of that range.

Gun powders

The manufacture and distribution processes

for gun powders are significantly different from

those of explosives. Approximately 2 1/2 million

lb of black powder and 20 million lb of smokeless powder are produced for commercial use

each year. Most of the smokeless powder is

used in fixed ammunition for rifles, pistols, and

shotguns, would not be sold to users as an end

product, and would not be tagged under S.

333. Approximately 5 million lb per year would

be sold to the end user, primarily for handloading of ammunition. Of the black powder production, approximately 2 million lb are used as

an intermediate product in the manufacture of

fuzes and other finished products and would

not be tagged; approximately 400,000 lb per

year are sold for use in muzzle-loading guns

and would be tagged if a taggant program

were legislated.

The basic process for the manufacture of

gunpowders involves the following steps:

mixture of ingredients, which may include

the raw ingredients as well as surplus and

reworked powders;

granulation, where the “dough” is extruded, chopped, or otherwise granulated

to form the various grains;

screening of grains into designated sizes;

and

blending of various batches to get the desired ballistic characteristics.

In the smokeless powder manufacturing

process, nitroglycerine, nitrocellulose, and

other additives are combined to make various

grades before the blending process. Smokeless

powder grades therefore differ due to size differences and composition differences (various

amounts of nitroglycerine), while black powder and black powder substitutes such as Pyrodex

@ * vary only by grain size. In a given grade

of powder, variations in density and other fluctuations during the manufacturing process can

cause considerable variations in the ballistic

properties of the final powder. As the handIoader generally has no means of controlling

his ballistics other than the weight or volume

of powder added, the ballistic properties of a

particular grade of powder must be carefully

controlled by blending. A given brand name

*A registered trademark of Pyrodex Co
Ch. n-Detailed Findings “ 23

product may therefore contain parts of several

batches, blended like brandy to give the desired ballistic properties. Several sequential

blending operations may be necessary before

the product meets the required specifications.

If the ballistic properties of a particular batch

or blended lot are too far off, the material

must be reprocessed or used for something

other than hand loading.

If taggants are added to gunpowders, they

may have to be added at different stages in the

manufacturing process for different manufacturers, due to the differences in blending and

reworking processes. As an example, at one

smokeless powder factory that makes powder

for both handloading and fixed ammunition,

taggants could be added during the blending

stage; blended batches that were still not

satisfactory could be used for fixed ammunition. At another factory, due to their large

rework factor, an additional taggant-mixing

stage might be necessary. For some products, it

may be possible to add taggants to the dough,

although this may affect the granulation process and present blending problems.

The distribution network from gunpowder

manufacturers to users differs markedly from

that of explosives, since there is a very large

number of ultimate users, each of whom consumes a smalI amount of powder. The network

is shown schematicalIy in figure 2. The manufacturer has several master distributors, each

of whom supplies a number of distributors.

Each distributor supplies a number of retailers,

who sell the product, often in lots as small as 1

lb. A 2,000-lb uniquely tagged batch of product “A” may therefore ultimately be sold to

over a thousand customers. Not only does this

produce a much larger list of last legal purchasers, but considerably more record keeping

would be involved at the retail level.

Figure 2.—Gunpowder Distribution Chain

Manufacturer

u

Master

distributor u

Master

distributor

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
24 ● Taggants in Explosives

TECHNICAL EFFICACY

The issues to be addressed here include the

survivability of the identification taggants and

the status of the detection taggant materials

and sensors. A detailed discussion of the research program related to technical efficacy is

in chapter I I 1; chapter IV discusses in detail the

research related to safety.

The identification taggants developed by 3M

appear to survive the detonation of commercial

explosives under ideal conditions. Confinement

and fire may adversely affect survival, although

the test data are very limited. Recovery of the

taggants appears to be a function of the specific

conditions in which the explosion and taggant recovery take place, as well as the training of the

field and laboratory investigators.

A large number of laboratory survival tests

have been conducted to establish the postdetonation survivability of the 3M identification

taggants. In many of these tests, the chamber

used to recover the taggants was not ideal, resulting in low recovery rates. For example,

when relatively small steel-walled chambers

were used, the impacting taggants either broke

up upon impact, or flowed plastically due to

the impact pressure pulse. When the explosive

charges were detonated in large chambers, or

on a large open pad, however, several hundred

tags were recovered from a single, one-half-lb

stick of the cap-sensitive explosives, including

Atlas Power Primer, the most energetic of the

standard commercial explosives. Similarly, the

taggants should survive the detonation of

black and smokeless powders, which have

much lower energy than the more energetic explosives, under idea I conditions. The individual taggants are not expected to survive the

detonation of high-energy explosives, such as

the TNT used in boosters or military explos ives; Aerospace Corp. calculations have

shown that the taggant material would be

raised above the taggant decomposition temperature in these explosives. Survival in these

energetic explosives has been demonstrated

when the taggants are pressed into large pellets (one-fourth inch), but no definitive recovery testing has been conducted.

When conditions are less than ideal, survival

decreases. The number of surviving taggants

decreases sharply as the size of the charge increases, although sufficient taggants have

been recovered even from a 25-Ib Power

Primer charge to establish a definite identification. The number of taggants also decreases if

the explosive is confined, for example, in a

pipe bomb. Hundreds of taggants survive a

black powder pipe bomb; tens of taggants

have been recovered, under nonideal recovery

conditions, from smokeless powder pipe

bombs. Only one test seems to have been conducted with cap-sensitive high explosive in a

pipe bomb; scores of taggants were recovered

from a pipe bomb filled with 60-percent Extra,

a low-energy explosive.

The recoverability of the taggants under

real-world conditions is less well-established.

The vast majority of the tests of recovery have

been demonstrations and training exercises,

with IittIe attempt at scientific controls, procedures, or documentation. Table 9 shows the

results of 10 demonstrations using explosives

tagged during the manufacturing process with

encapsulated taggants at a 0.05 percent by

weight tagging level. The number of taggants

recovered is shown in each case; in some cases

heroic recovery efforts were required. Statistical analysis by the Aerospace Corp. indicates

that it is highly desirable to recover 20 taggants; that many were not recovered in each

case. In some tests, particularly the last one,

recovery was halted after the reported number

was found. Table 10 shows the results of 14

similar tests, conducted without the assistance

of the Aerospace Corp. and the BATF laboratory team. These tests were significantly less

successful.

Due to the apparent inconsistency of the

test results and the lack of documentation,

OTA had a limited series of five recovery tests

conducted. The purpose was twofold: to get a

feel for the recovery process and its difficulties, and to generate a limited number of data

points for which the testing, recovery, and

anaIysis were well controlled and docu-
Ch. n-Detailed Findings 25

Table 9.–BATF Recovery Demonstrations

Place Time Target Explosive Test conditions Taggant recovery

Birmingaham, Ala. February 1977 Car

House

House

Donaldson, Pa March 1977 Borehole in

coal mine

Seneca, Md. June 1977 House

Car

Fort McArthur, Calif, November 1977 House

Los Angeles, Calif. August 1978 Open

Otis AFB, Mass. October 1978 Open

Fort Belvoir, Va March 1979 Car

1 1/2 -lb Power Primer Against engine, fire, firefighting

11/2 -lb Coalite-8S Table, near front hall

j/4-lb, 60% Extra in pipe Outside house, near wall

101/2 -lb Coalite-8S 7 each, 1 I/2-lb packages in

separate boreholes

2-lb Coalite-8S Exterior room

2-lb Coalite-8S Passenger compartment

1/2 -lb Powerdyne —

1-lb Powerdyne In suitcase

1-lb. Tovex 220a Three shots, 1 lb each

2-lb. Coalite Z Trunk

35 from soil sample in laboratory

Hundreds, at scene

Scores, at scene

20 from coal in laboratory

Dozens at scene

Few at scene

Many at scene

20 at scene

Less than 10

3 in field

a Undetonted stick had only 10 percent of expected taggants Data Indicates that this explosive was from end of a batch

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

Table 10.–Recovery Tests Participated in by Summit County (Ohio) Sheriff’s Office

Date Explosives Target Conditions Recovery results

May 2, 1978 Total of 41/z-lb permissibles

May 11, 1978 2-lb permissibles

May 17, 1978 3-lb permissibles, 1 black

powder pipe bomb

(untagged)

Oct 12, 1978 2-lb permissibles

May 16, 1979 1/2 permission

May 17, 1979 2-lb permissibles

Aug 14, 1979 2-lb water gel

1 3/4-lb gelatine dynamite

2-lb permissible

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

Two cars, —

ground

Car —

3 cars, pipe 1 car fire

bomb in open

Car —

Car —

Car —

Car Under driver seat

Car Under driver seat

Car Under driver seat

2-hour field search (night), 10 men, 4 taggants in one car,

no tags from other targets.

2-hour field search (night) by 2 men. No taggants

1-hour field search (daylight with blankets). No taggants.

2-hour field search (night). by 2 men. No taggants.

1 I/2 -hour field search (daylight with blankets), 20 men.

No taggants

2-hour field search (night) by 2 men. No taggants

3-hour field search (dark), 6 men Found 3 taggants from water

gel. Laboratory analysis of 60-lb debris from each car Found

5 more taggants from water gel.

mented. The results of the tests are summarized in table 11 and described in detail in appendix C. Sample photomicrographs of recovered taggants are shown in figure 3. Although

these tests were extremely limited in scope,

and covered only one type of target (automobile), they provided a great deal of insight into

the recovery process and suggest a reconciliation of the prior test results. However, a fullscale test program must be completed before a

definitive assessment of taggant recovery is

possible. With that caveat, the foIlowing tentative observations may be made:

1. The recovery process does not appear to

be a field-readable process under the

tested conditions. No taggants were spotted, and identified as such, in any of the

five tests, under daylight or night conditions, without the use of a laboratory separation procedure. However, the recovery

conditions were not ideal. Field recovery

and identification of the taggants may be

more Iikely on paved surfaces.

2. Under ideal conditions (no fire, subsequent firefighting activities, or adverse

weather), sufficient debris can be gathered in a short time (less than 1 hour) by

an untrained team to produce a positive

taggant identification (more than 20 taggants) in the laboratory. Only a moderate

(1 to 2 hour) laboratory effort is necessary

by a highly trained laboratory team to isolate and identify the taggants. This probably holds for all classes of unconfined

commercial explosives (excluding very

high-energy explosives such as boosters or

military explosives). The laboratory need

not be elaborate and could well be transportable to the bombing site.

3. Under conditions of confinement (bomb

placed between the engine block and the
26 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table 11 .–OTA Recovery Test Resutts

Target Placement Dynamite Test condition Taggant recovery

Auto Under driver seat 2-lb Collier C 5-gal gas in tank; no fire 28 taggants in 1 M-hour lab time

Auto Under driver seat 2-lb Unigel 5-gal gas in tank; no fire 23 taggants, 1 contaminant in %-hour lab time

Auto Under driver seat 2-lb Power Primer 5-gal gas in tank; no fire 21 taggants in 1 1/2-hour lab time:

12 of type A

oftype ~ dual tagge d

Auto Under driver seat 2-lb Collier C 1-gal gas adjacent to bomb, 23 taggants in3-hour lab time

fire, firefighting

Pickup Between engine 2-lb Power Primer Dry tank, no fire 26 taggants, plus one contaminant in 4 hours lab time, 5-hour

and firewall induction time preceded the search time due to confusion caused

by equipment contamination,

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Figure 3.—Photomicrographs of Recovered Taggants

\

\

.

\ \

.

a) Scale— 1 division = 1 mm b) Collier C under driver, 8 taggants

on slide

e) Collier C under driver, 17 taggants

on slide

Photo credits’ U.S Department of the Treasury

firewall), sufficient taggants can still be 4. Taggants can be recovered from an autorecovered for a confirmed identification, mobile bombing with a low-power exploalthough somewhat more effort is prob- sive, even after a gasoline fire and subseably necessary, both in the field and in the quent firefighting efforts. Tests would be

laboratory. This tentative conclusion necessary to determine if taggants would

would hold for all cap-sensitive commer- survive a postdetonation fire in conjunccial explosives (excluding boosters and tion with a more energetic explosive. It

miIitary explosives). should be noted that no fire occurred in
Ch. n-Detailed Findings 27

5.

6.

the three tests in which gasoline was

placed in the gas tank. Fire had to be specifically induced (a gallon of gasoline was

placed adjacent to the bomb) for the burn

test.

The results of the automobile tests may

well be generalizable to other test conditions (buildings, open areas), but testing

would be required before that claim could

be made.

No substantive recovery data are avail able for large charges, explosives in pipe

bombs, tagged boosters, detonators or

detonating cord, or charges consisting of

an untagged blasting agent with a tagged

booster and detonator. Taggants were reported recovered from a large bomb consisting of an untagged blasting agent and

a tagged booster, conducted in December

1979, but the test specifics have not yet

been examined by OTA.

The technology for detection sensors has been

demonstrated in the laboratory, but at least

several years of development would be necessary before field models would be available.

Three types of sensors are being considered for

use with the microencapsulated vapor detection taggants. Each type is capable of sensing,

under properly controlled conditions, in the

parts-per-trillion regime envisioned for the system. The mass spectrometer sensor is a simplified version of a standard laboratory instrument. The spectrometer, however, must be calibrated regularly, requires ski lied scientists to

operate and maintain it, is large, and is quite

expensive. The ion mobility spectrometer has

been commercially available for approximately 5 years, with approximately 50 machines being used in laboratory analyses. It shares the

laboratory instrument characteristics of the

mass spectrometer. The continuous electron

capture detector has been produced as a laboratory instrument, but in limited numbers. Laboratory and controlled-environment testing

with the three types of instruments has shown

promising results. For example, a less sensitive

mass spectrometer is currently operating in an

online process mode at Libby-Owens-Ford,

maintained by regular maintenance personnel.

Testing of the ion mobility spectrometer in an

airport environment has indicated that the

spectrometer can differentiate molecules of

mass similar to the vapor taggants from the

ambient environment. Similarly, laboratory

testing of the continuous electron capture detector has indicated its ability to discriminate

taggant-like molecules.

These limited tests, however, are a long way

from demonstrating that the sensors can distinguish the specified vapor taggant species from

other molecules, particularly those in the same

mass range. The ion mobiIity spectrometer and

mass spectrometer have an active separation

mechanism to preclude interference with molecules that differ significantly in mass; the

continuous electron capture spectrometer

must rely on a far less reliable passive breakup

mechanism.

No estimates have been made of the time required to produce fielded units, once a feasibility demonstration has been made (none of

the three candidates has yet progressed that

far). The only time estimate so far made is an

estimate by the Aerospace Corp. that it would

take 14 months from demonstration of feasibility to the completion of the prototype stage

for the ion mobility spectrometer. This estimate is quite optimistic for an instrument that

would be produced in large numbers by a

small company. OTA feels it would be at least

3 years, and probably more like 5, before a taggant sensor could be fielded. The estimate is

based on generalizing from other commercial

and military instrument development experience.

The candidate detection taggant vapors appear promising, but more research is necessary.

Several hundred candidate chemicals have

been screened in a search for a vapor that exhibits the desired properties of scarcity in

nature, long-term stability, chemical inertness,

vapor pressure, penetration, and nonadhesion

to surfaces likely to be present in containers

used to conceal bombs. The five candidate

perfluorinated cycloalphones appear promising on the basis of early tests. (No long-term

stability data are available, however, nor are

there data on the long-term stability of the diffusion rate through the encapsulating materi-
28 . Taggants in Explosives

al). Additional problems, such as ease of manufacture, specificity with respect to the detector, and compatibility, have not yet been

addressed. Ease of manufacture is a doubleedged problem — if manufacture is too difficult, then costs will be high; if it is too easy,

then illegally manufactured material can be

used as a countermeasure to the detection sensors. The most promising candidates are dif -

ficult to manufacture, require highly specialized equipment, and would be hard for

bombers to make or acquire for use as countermeasures. Once the equipment is operational,

unit costs should not be unreasonable. A problem which probably applies to all varieties of

vapor taggants is that seals can be made that

are taggant proof — although apparently common seals are insufficient.

COMPATIBILITY OF TAGGANTS WITH EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS

The compatibility of explosive materials

with the specific identification and detection

taggant materials is addressed here. Compatibility has two connotations: the first concerns

the safety during manufacture, transportation,

storage, and use of explosive material due to

the addition of taggants; the second concerns

changes in the performance of the explosive

materials to which taggants have been added.

Such compatibility must be demonstrated by

specific tests. Generalization of the results to

other hypothetical taggants is hazardous at

best.

Safety tests conducted to date with the encapsulated 3M identification taggants have shown no

incompatibilities with dynamites, gels, slurries,

emulsions, or black powder, allowing a presumption that comprehensive testing would show that

these taggants are compatible with these explosives. High concentrations of taggants do react

with one kind of smokeless powder and one type

of cast booster material at elevated temperatures, and consequently incompatibility must be

presumed pending further research. A large

number of paired safety tests have been conducted comparing the sensitivity and stability

of commercial explosives and gunpowders

with and without identification taggants

added. Safety tests included mechanical impact, thermal stability, thermal impact, friction, electrical properties, and chemical reactivity, although no single explosive has been

subjected to al I of the above tests. I n no case

did the addition of encapsulated taggants significantly increase the sensitivity of the explosive materials to the test conditions. No evidence of any decreased stability, or other significant changes, was found in any of the tests

with dynamites, gels, slurries, or black powder.

The tests with tagged cast booster materials

showed some indications of instability at elevated temperatures. A mixture of RDX and

TNT (Composition B) showed evidence of reaction and probable decomposition at temperatures of 120° C when taggants were added to

the booster mix; significantly less reaction occurred without taggants. Tests with Octol

showed little reaction whether taggants were

present or not. Pentolite showed little evidence of reaction with taggants in one test at

1 20

0 C; the gas evolution from untagged pentolite was too high for comparative testing on

a second series.

Similarly, the stability of one type of Hercules smokeless powder has been shown to be

significantly decreased by the addition of the

3M identification taggants at elevated temperatures and taggant concentrations. (Although

Hercules tested only Herco * powder, Hercules believes that their other brands of powder designed for the reloading market are so

similar to Herco@ that similar test results could

be expected.) Tests were conducted at temperatures ranging from 80° to 120° C and at taggant concentrations of 50 percent. Tests at the

Lawrence Livermore Laboratories appear to indicate that the incompatibility is between

some element of the powder and the basic

melamine/alkyd material of the taggants,

rather than with the encapsulant or a pigment.

*A registered trademark of Hercules Inc.
Ch. n-Detailed Findings 29

Both the smokeless powder and booster material tests took place at high temperatures,

and, in most of the tests, at high taggant concentrations. The temperature used for the

smokeless powder test was higher than would

be expected in actual manufacture, storage, or

use; the temperature used for the cast booster

is sometimes reached in manufacturing processes. In each test, a taggant concentration of

50 percent was used rather than the 0.05-percent tagging concentration suggested for routine use. The tests, nonetheless, indicate that

the stability of the materials has decreased,

due to the addition of taggants, and that a reaction is taking place between elements of the

taggant and elements of the explosive material. Standard qualification test procedures require that such evidence be considered a sign

of an existing incompatibility between the materials. Carefully controlled testing and extensive analysis must be completed before it can

be determined if the observed evidence of incompatibility does, in fact, indicate a potential

safety problem during the manufacture, storage, transportation, and use of the tested materials. Unless demonstrated otherwise, it must

be assumed that it is unsafe to add the taggants to that smokeless powder or to the

booster material. Until the elements of the incompatibility have been identified, a question

remains as to the safety of adding the taggants

to similar smokeless powders and booster materials, although tests with other smokeless

powders and boosters have shown no evidence

of incompatibility.

The tests so far conducted are only a small

fraction of the total number of tests that must

be performed before it can conclusively be determined whether taggants are compatible

with commercial explosives and gun powders.

Even if the current question of the stability

of smokeless powder and boosters is resolved,

it is not possible to generalize from the results of

the limited test program so far completed and

conclude that the testing has demonstrated that

taggants can be safely added to explosives.

Thousands of people come into contact with

explosives every day during the manufacture,

storage, transportation, and use of explosives.

Accidents involving explosives can have extremely severe consequences to these thousands of people; therefore, safety must be

demonstrated. A carefully administered qualification program of analysis, safety testing,

manufacturing procedures control, and experience is necessary before a new explosive, or an

explosive with a significant change in composition, can be considered safe. I n addition,

each type of explosive product requires individual evaluation and testing, The type of

qualification program considered necessary

before safety can be demonstrated is shown in

table 12 and discussed in detail in chapter IV.

A particularly important aspect of that qualification testing is the effect of long-term storage.

While the qualification program outlined in

table 12 must be performed before taggants

Table 12.–Elemertts of a Suggested Compatibility

(qualification Program

● unique with each manufacturer

● analysis to define the new explosive or Ingredient

● laboratory testimg

—impact, friction, thermal, chemical composition

–electrical, aging, chemical interactions, performance

● pilot production

 committee and management review

● early production and review

 special tests

● experience

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

can be safely added to explosive materials, the

apparent incompatibility with the Herco”smokeIess powder must be resolved before it makes

sense for the taggant compatibility qualification

program to proceed. Resolution of this problem

is pertinent for the entire identification taggant program, not simply for smokeless powders or for Herco @

. As discussed in detail in

chapter Vl, smokeless powders are used in a

significant number of criminal bombing incidents and account for a significant fraction of

bombing casualties. If smokeless powders are

not controlled, then more bombers may well

switch to their use, resulting in an even greater

smokeless powder born bing problem. The resolution could take any of several forms, includi ng:
—.

30 ● Taggants in Explosive s

Reformulation of the 3M taggant — this

could require starting essentially from

scratch in the taggant testing program, as

the reformulated taggant would undoubtedly exhibit different compatibility, as

well as survivability, properties.

. Reformulation of the particular reactant

smokeless powder— this may or may not

be easily accomplished, once the element

or elements that react with the taggant

are isolated. This option would be viable

only if no other smokeless powders were

found to show incompatibilities.

● Exe/us ion of the reacting smokeless powwaler from the taggant program– the economic effects on competition could need

to be carefully considered, as would alternate control mechanisms.

● Exclusion of smokeless powders from the

identification taggant program — such an

exclusion would rely on the fact that

smokeless powders would be less effective than cap-sensitive high explosives and

that the detonators would be tagged. OTA

believes that this last approach may not

be viable–too many people are currently

killed or injured by bombs using smokeless powders and the numbers would almost certainly increase if this approach

were adopted. Alternate control mechanisms for smokeless powders could also

be adopted.

● Development of a different type of taggant for use with Herco

@

, or with all

smokeless powders, while retaining the existing taggant for high explosives. This

would somewhat complicate field investigation of bombings.

● Demonstration that the observed stability

problem does not constitute a safety hazard. The observed decreased stability occurs at elevated temperatures and taggant

concentrations 1,000 times greater than

“normal. ” As the decomposition rate is

both temperature and concentration sensitive, it may be that no safety hazard exists under realistic conditions. If it could

be positively demonstrated that the decomposition rate was within the normally

accepted range for temperature regimes

and concentrations which reflect worst

case actual use conditions, then it may be

possible to add taggants to the smokeless

powder, particularly if no further incompatibilities surface. Demonstration of

safety would have to be quite convincing,

however, to overcome the currently perceived incompatibility.

Similarly, the apparent incompatibility with

one cast booster material should be resolved before the taggant compatibility qualification program should proceed. Booster material is rarely

used as a bomb filler, but it is used to initiate

blasting agents. The current BATF plan would

be to not directly tag blasting agents, but to

tag the booster and detonators used to initiate

the blasting agent. Exclusion of boosters from

the taggant program may well require an alternate control mechanism for blasting agents.

Given the extremely large quantity of blasting

agents produced (3.4 billion lb annually), any

other control mechanism may have serious

cost consequences.

The limited number of tests conducted, the

conditions under which some of the tests were

conducted, and the preliminary manner in

which the tests have been reported, make it

difficult to definitely assess the extent of the

potential compatibility problem. If definitive

test results do show an increased decomposition rate, at least for RDX/TNT explosive materials, the incompatibility will have to be resolved before those booster materials can be

tagged. Most of the mechanisms for resolution

of the smokeless powder incompatibility are

applicable to booster materials, with the same

consequences and caveats.

While the testing program conducted to

date gives an indication that the identification

taggants may well be compatible with most

commercial explosives and gunpowders, little

data are available as to the potential compatibility of detection taggants with explosive materials.

Compatibility testing with gunpowders and

cap-sensitive high explosives has recently been

initiated under contract to the Aerospace

Corp.; however, no compatibility testing has as
Ch. n-Detailed Findings . 31

yet been reported. As indicated above, each

change to an explosive composition must be

evaluated separately. Successful completion

of the preliminary detection compatibiIity program would indicate the need for a full qualification program. As some compounding of sensitivity may occur with both types of taggants

present, the full qualification testing program

should address that issue.

Compatibility testing includes performance

testing, as well as the safety testing discussed

above. In most cases, the performance of explosive materials is unlikely to be significantly affected by the addition of small amounts of taggant materials. Performance proof-testing must

be completed, however, before a definitive statement could be made. The energy density and

rate of energy release are the two most important performance attributes of commercial explosives. Energy density is a fundamental

chemical property of the explosive formulation. The rate of energy release is a function of

the materials involved and the physical proximity of the fuel and oxidizer components. The

presence of taggants, in the few hundreths-ofa-percent by weight basis being considered, is

unlikely to directly affect either of those performance characteristics. Similarly, the presence of taggants in the suggested concentration is unlikely to affect the ballistic properties

of gunpowders. The few tests conducted s o

far, including tests of the basic properties of

explosive materials, such as detonation velocity, cap sensitivity, chamber pressure, and projectiIe velocity, support that conclusion.

Physical segregation of the taggants is one

mechanism which could affect performance. If

the gunpowder grains segregate from the taggant, then it is statistically possible that a

clump of taggants could cause uneven burning, prevent ignition, or result in a hazardous

hangfire condition. Similarly, in some specialty

explosive products, such as shaped charges

used for oiI welI perforators, migration of the

taggants to the explosive-metal interface could

cause poor jet formation. Testing with gunpowder has shown that migration apparently

does occur, at least u,nder vibration conditions

consistent with truck transportation. I n tests

with gunpowders that differ in both size and

density from the taggants, the taggants and

powder fines tend to separate from the larger

powder grains. Tests with smokeless powder

matched in size with the taggants, but different in density, were inconclusive. Testing is required to determine both the extent of segregation which could be expected if tagged gunpowders went through extreme but plausible

conditions of transportation and storage, and

also the statistical probability that segregation

to this degree would adversely affect ballistic

performance or in-gun safety.

The Winchester Western Division of the

Olin Corp. recently conducted a series of tests

to evaluate the effects of segregation and high

taggant concentration on the ignition properties of smokeless powder. Significantly reduced ballistic performance was noted on one

round, fired at – 30

0 C with four times the suggested taggant concentration. The other

rounds fired in this test series showed acceptable performance (velocity, chamber pressure,

and ignition time).

Olin-Winchester conducted additional tests

using 100-percent segregation of taggants from

powder grains, a condition so extreme that no

conclusions can be drawn (see ch. IV).

OTA believes that although testing is indeed

required to establish the ballistic effects, if

any, of adding taggants to smokeless powder,

it is necessary first to establish (by testing and

by statistical analysis) the extent to which

variation in taggant concentrations and segregation of taggants in normal conditions of

transportation and use could be expected.

Taggant clumping (10 to 15 taggants) sometimes occurs when the taggants are added to

explosive materials. It is unlikely that the

clumping would affect performance or safety,

but that type of anomalous behavior should be

investigated, particularly as the physical chemistry of some of the explosive products, particularly the gels and slurries, is so poorly understood.

As for the possible performance degradations in shaped charges due to taggants, OTA
32 ● Taggants in Explosives

estimates, based on tests conducted by the could cause some degradation to occur, but it

U.S. Army Ballistics Research Laboratory, in- is difficult to envision a mechanism which

dicate that a clump as large as 0.02 inch would would allow that large a clump to accumulate,

not affect performance, even for precision- as that would represent all of the taggants in

shaped charges, unless the clump contained a approximately one-half lb of explosives.

large hollow center. Clumps as large as 0.1 inch

COST OF A TAGGANT PROGRAM

Estimates can be made of the total cost of a

taggant program, the cost impact on manufacturers and users of explosives, the effects of a

legislated monopoly, and the possibility of

added liability of manufacturers due to the inclusion of taggants in explosives. In the above

safety and efficacy discussion, the status of

the current identification and detection taggant systems was evaluated. In the following

cost section, an assumption is made that the

taggants work and are safe, and cost estimates

are generated parametrically as a function of

the implementation plan. It is specifically assumed that the resolution of the smokeless

powder and booster material incompatibility

questions, and any subsequent questions

which may arise, do not have significant cost

impacts. I n the case of the smokeless powder

and booster materials, this assumption is probably justified, as the cost of the taggant materials represents only a small fraction of the total

cost added by a taggant program.

The primary finding of the cost analysis is

that the cost of a taggant program can vary by

almost an order of magnitude, depending on the

implementation plan. A baseline program is identified that would increase the cost of explosives

and gunpowders to the ultimate user by approximately 10 percent. The primary variables affecting the total program costs are the class of

explosive materials to be tagged, the uniquely

tagged batch size, and the number of locations

at which the detection sensors would be deployed. Cost estimates for total program cost,

added cost per pound of explosive or gunpowder, and public overhead costs are shown in

table 13 for three implementation levels. The

cost estimates include the costs for both identification and detection taggant programs. The

Table 13.–Cost of a Taggant Program as a Function

of lmplemmtation Plan

Program level

Cost parameter Low Baseline High

Added cost per pound to cap-sensitive explosives 3.5$ 6.0$ 9.6c

Added cost per pound to gunpowders . . 3,5c 65.8c $1.04

Public overhead cost, millions of dollars per year $5,3 $8.5 $24.5

Total program costs, millions of dollars per year $30.5 $45 $268

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

total program cost for separate implementation of identification and detection taggant

programs is included in the discussion of each

case. The low, baseline, and high cost estimates do not correspond to different estimates

of the same program; rather they refer to different tagging levels, different explosives tagged, and different numbers of sensors. Chapter

V contains a detailed discussion of the cost

estimates and a discussion of the sensitivity of

the costs to the accuracy of the cost element

estimates. To compare the program costs for a

constant number of detection taggant sensor

locations, it is only necessary to adjust the

high- and low-program cost figure by $4,370 for

each sensor deployed.

1. The low-level program would use a unique

identification taggant for each manufacturer, type of product, and year of manufacture. A total of 800 detection sensors

would be deployed, one for passengers

and one for baggage at each airport location currently deploying magnetometers

and hand baggage X-ray units. Cap-sensitive high explosives, detonators, boosters,

detonating cord, and smokeless and black

powders would be tagged with both identification and detection taggants. Blasting

agents would not be directly tagged. The
Ch. n-Detailed Findings 3 3

cost of separate low-level identification

and detection taggant programs would be

approximately $15 million and $22 million, respectively.

2. The baseline program would tag the same

materials as the low-level program, but

would use a unique identification taggant

for each shift of each product –analogous to the current date-shift code marking on the exterior of explosives. Traceability to the list of last legal purchasers

would be maintained, as the taggants

would contain all the information needed

for a BATF trace (date, shift, product, and

size). Approximately 2,500 detection taggant sensors would be deployed at airports and major controlled-access facilities such as powerplants, refineries, and

Government buildings. Major police

bomb squads would operate portable

units,

This baseline program differs from the

program proposed by the BATF/Aerospace Corp. team in only two respects.

The most important is that a full shift of

the same product (a different cartridge

size would be treated as a different product) would be tagged with the same taggant, rather than an arbitrary 10,000 to

20,000 lb. The practical utility result is

that a potentially longer list of last purchasers would be produced by a trace, at

least for those lines that make more than

10,000 to 20,000 lb of a product in a single

shift. The second difference concerns rework. It has been assumed that a special

taggant will be added to material with

more than 10-percent cross-containination; such a taggant would indicate that

the material used was a composite and

that taggant codes other than the specific

composite code should be ignored.

The cost of separate baseline identification and detection taggant programs

would be approximately $25 million for

each.

3. The high-level program would uniquely

tag each 10,000-lb batch of explosive and

each 2,000- I b batch of gunpowder. AlI explosive materials, including blasting

agents, would be directly tagged. Ammonium nitrate fabricated for use in blasting agents would be tagged, but not fertilizer-grade ammonium nitrate. Approximately 5,000 detection taggant sensors

would be deployed at every major transportation facility, controlled-access utility, Government facility, and other potential high-value targets such as campus

computer locations. Portable units would

be routinely available to police bomb

squads. The taggant level and types of explosives to be tagged in the high-level program correspond to a strict interpretation

of S. 333, as propounded by the Institute

of Makers of Explosives (IME). The cost of

separate high-level identification and detection taggant programs would be approximately $214 million and $65 million,

respectively.

The identification taggant cost figures used

in alI three levels of the analysis are based on

price estimates furnished by 3M, for specific

implementation guidelines. 3M furnished management-approved cost estimates for unencapsulated taggants for three different quantities

of explosives to be tagged, assureing a firm

order for 2 years (costs would remain the same

for a 5-year contract). These cost estimates represent the firmest figures possible short of an

actual contract. Assuming linear interpolation

between data points furnished, the unencapsuIated taggants would cost between $93 and

$114/lb for the amount of taggants necessary

for the baseline level case (41 9 million lb of explosive equivalent). The first figure represents

a cost goal and the second a worst case estimate. 3M technical people also furnished an

estimate of encapsulating cost, but were unable to estimate the cost of the opaque encapsulation assumed by OTA as the baseline product. Based on the above data, OTA estimated

that it would cost approximately $55/lb for

opaque encapsulated taggants; as the baseline

tagging level is 0.05 percent by weight of encapsulated taggants, and the encapsulating

material weighs the same as the unencapsuIated taggants, this corresponds to 2.75 cents/-

lb of cap-sensitive explosives for the identifica-
34 . Taggants in Explosives

tion tagging material ($93 for 1 lb of unencapsulated taggants plus $17 for 1 lb of encapsulating material plus the process equals $110 for

2 lb of encapsulated taggants, or $55/l b.) OTA

estimated the same cost for taggants at the

other two implementation levels. Chapter V includes an analysis of how changes in the cost

and/or concentration of the taggants themselves wouId affect the cost of the program.

All other cost figures are estimates based on

specific inputs submitted to OTA by manufacturers, distributors, and end users. Detailed

treatment of the cost elements is contained in

chapter V.

The cost impact to end users of explosives

can be considerable. Implementation plans

that do not take into account the impact on

manufacturers and users of explosives could

drive a number of manufacturers and users out

of the market; could make some classes of

finished products, like copper, uncompetitive

in the world market; and could force entire

segments of industries to radically change

operating procedures, such as shifting underground coal mining from explosive mining to

mining machines. Detailed discussions and

analysis, however, indicate that it is quite unlikely that a taggant program similar to the

“baseline” would eliminate any current uses of

explosive materials, although marginal companies and product lines might be eliminated. As

indicated above, the baseline program differs

from the BATF-proposed implementation only

in that batch size takes into account the normal production processes and quantities of the

explosives and gunpowder manufacturers. This

finding is based on detailed discussions with a

limited number of users and manufacturers

about current costs and the possible impact of

cost increases.

Some examples are illustrative. Increasing

the cost of cap-sensitive high explosives the 12

percent projected would increase the cost of

extracting coal in a particular modern underground mine by only 0.1 percent. Such a small

increase would not be significant to this intensive user of cap-sensitive explosives, and

would be quite unlikely to cause a shift to

mechanical mining machines or render a particular mining operation uneconomic. Similarly, that type of increase in the cost of capsensitive explosives, boosters, detonators, and

detonating cord in a large, open pit copper

mine would increase the cost of producing

copper only 0.03 percent. As blasting agents

are currently used whenever possible in that

mine (cap-sensitive explosives are used only

for secondary breakup), no shift in explosive

products used would take place. The cost of a

recent explosive-intensive dam construction

project would increase 1 percent under the

baseline program, a larger percentage, but not

enough to be significant or force alternate

uses. A price differential of approximately

five-to-one currently exists in favor of blasting

agents over cap-sensitive high explosives,

which has caused most users of explosive materials to consider blasting agents, and shift

where feasible; an increase in that differential

to six-to-one is unlikely to significantly change

the current status.

As a final example, consider the cost impact

on handloaders. Handloaders load their own

ammunition for two reasons —economy and

the hobby aspect. A less-than-l O-percent cost

increase in expendable material is unlikely to

affect a hobby for which hundreds of dollars in

costs have already been incurred (hand loading

equipment and guns). As powder is only one of

several materials on which a handloader saves

costs (cartridge cases, projectiles, wadding),

and additional cost-savings are realized from

labor and by eliminating the excise tax on purchased ammunition, an 8-percent increase in

powder cost would translate into an even

smaller increase in total reloading costs. It is

possible, however, that manufacturers would

shrink the range of available product lines in

order to minimize the startup costs of tagging.

A smaller choice of products would bean additional “cost” to the handloader.

The identification taggants currently proposed to be used are manufactured only by 3M

and are a proprietary product manufactured

by a proprietary process. In addition, a significant public overhead cost would have been incurred before the compatibility of explosive

materials with the taggants could have been
Ch. n-Detailed Findings ● 3 5

demonstrated. Mandating the addition of identification taggants to explosive materials

would, therefore, ensure a monopoly of the

Government-mandated market for 3M, at least

for a period of several years. Under such circumstances, development of a mechanism to

regulate the virtual monopoly of the identification taggant market which 3M would enjoy is

highly desirable.

A number of mechanisms are available to

regulate the price of taggants, including:

1. a price level set by Congress in the enabling legislation,

2. regulation as a public utility,

3. licensing by 3M of competitors,

4. a multiyear, fixed-price contract, and

5. a free-market price, regulated only by the

possibility of competition or sanctions if

prices get too high.

The free-market mechanism may be unacceptable to manufacturers of explosives and

gunpowders, given the long time needed to

either develop and qualify an alternative taggant or enact sanction legislation. Legislation

of a price or use of a regulation mechanism

similar to that used for public utilities would

be an awkward, time-consuming process for a

product whose total annual value would be on

the order of $10 milIion.

Licensing is not only disagreeable to 3M, but

it is probably not cost-effective. The cost of

the taggant material includes a component for

amortization of the taggant production facility, as a new facility must be built and the

primary market for identification taggants

would Iikely be the mandated explosives market. The process which 3M plans to implement

is capital intensive. Licensing of other manufacturers would therefore require the construction of facilities for the licensee, in addition to

a new 3M facility, resulting in a substantially

higher total cost.

A long-term contract is a potentially attractive mechanism, In fact, the 3M cost estimates

are conditional on firm orders for a 2-year

period, although 3M is willing to consider contracting periods of up to 5 years. The details of

the regulating mechanism have not been addressed by this study; if a multiyear contract is

an acceptable mechanism, there may be some

advantage to a single contracting agency (presumably within the Government), rather than

separate contracts with each manufacturer of

explosives and gunpowders. I n addition to saving the cost of multiple contracting, the single

contract concept would Iimit the amount of information on numbers of product lines and

production quantities of explosives available

to 3M, a matter of some sensitivity to the explosive manufacturers.

A final cost-related issue merits attention.

The legislation of a taggant program might

change the extent to which manufacturers are

held liable for accidental explosions. In the event

that an accidental explosion takes place, those

injured may attempt to hold the manufacturer

of the explosives, the seller of the explosives,

or the manufacturer of the taggants liable. The

addition of taggants to explosives could

change the existing situation in several possible ways:

●

●

●

●

The use of taggants would make it easier

to identify undetonated explosives from

the same batch as those involved in the

accident, thus facilitating proof or disproof of allegations that the explosive, the

taggant, or both were incorrectly manufactured.

Evidence that incorrectly manufactured

taggants had been involved in an accident

would probably subject the taggant manufacturer to liability, regardless of any

disclaimers made at the time of sale.

Evidence that taggants had been incorrectly added to explosives (e. g., an excessive concentration) might expose the

explosives manufacturer to Iiability, if

evidence could be presented that such a

high concentration posed a danger.

There should be no cases in which the

evidence shows that taggants were unsafe

if made and used correctly, due to the extensive qualification program required to

demonstrate taggant safety. In any event,

the fact that Federal law required the use

of taggants would be a defense.
36 . Taggants in Explosives

● If, however, taggants actualIy create a

hazard but there is no evidence that they

do so, the manufacturers of explosives

might be exposed to liability based on an

(incorrect) assumption that the manufacturing process was somehow at fault.

Furthermore, Congress could include in the

legislation mandating a taggant program provisions directing who should bear the costs of accidents. For example, Congress could shift the

cost to the Government by allowing suits

against the Government for accident losses alUTILITY OF

Before the utility of identification and detection taggants to law enforcement, security,

and other regulatory agencies can be assessed,

it is first necessary to examine the bomber

threat in some detail. The utility against each

segment of the bomber population can then be

assessed, together with the possible responses

of the criminal bombers, and be compared to

the utility of other control methods. identification taggants may also have utility for purposes other than tracing of criminal bombers.

The bomber population of the United States is

extremely heterogeneous, with varying motives,

resources, skills, and ability to adapt to a changing control environment. For ease of discussion,

bombers are divided into four categories

which differ from each other in most characteristics. These categories include terrorists,

common criminals, the mentally disturbed,

and vandals and experimenters. The characteristics of the various types of bombers are summarized in table 14 and briefly described

below.

Terrorists

The terrorist groups active in the United

States vary widely in ability, resources, training, and adaptability. They share the common

characteristics, however, of high motivation,

action as a part of a group, and a continuing

Iegedly due to taggants. Alternatively, by legislating a presumption that taggants are safe or

simply by granting immunity to manufacturers, Congress could shift the cost of any taggant-caused accidents to explosives users. A

third possibility would be to legislate in a way

that would make taggant and/or explosives

manufacturers liable for accidents caused by

taggants despite legislative coercion to use

them. A final option would be to divide the

costs of accidents by legislative limits on the

dollar amount of claims arising from accidents

allegedly caused by taggants. The issue of

liability is treated in detail in appendix D.

TAGGANTS

involvement in catastrophic, illegal

against society. These characteristics

activities

make the

terrorist particularly dangerous to society and

a particularly appropriate target for anti bombing controls. Terrorists can be roughly divided

into political, reactionary, and separatist

groups. Political groups are primarily interested in attracting attention to, and sympathy

with, their cause. For that reason they engage

in spectacular events, such as bombings, but

generally attempt to avoid or limit injury and

death resulting from their bombings. Political

terrorists often have considerable resources

available to them, due to the significant number of people who support their aim, if not necessarily their means. The leadership of most of

these groups are of above-average inteliigence,

and have either had specialized training or

have studied extensively in terrorist activities.

They are thus able to adapt to a changing environment, although the range of responses

available to them may be Iimited by their political aims. Such political groups have been relatively inactive in the United States in recent

years.

Separatist groups, such as FALN (a Puerto

Rican terrorist group), generally hope to gain

their aims by generating a reaction to their activities, rather than a sympathy to their aims.

They are therefore generally less concerned

with public revulsion to bombings that cause
Ch. n-Detailed Findings ● 3 7

Table 14.–Attributes of Criminal Bomber Groups

Experience Individual

Perpetrator and training Resources Motivation or group Reaction capability Frequency

Criminal

Unsophisticate d

Sophisticated .

L

H

M

H

M

H

Mu It!

Multi

L

M

I

I

Terrorist

Political .,

Separatis t

Reactionar y

M-H

M-H

L

M-H

M

L

M-H

H

H

G

G

G

M-H

H

L-M

Multl

Multi

Multi

Mentally disturbed

Disenchante d

Vengefu l

Pathologica l . ,

L

L

L-M

L

L

L

L-M

M-H

H

I

I

I

L

L-M

L-M

Single

Single

Varies

Other

Vandal s

Experimetto r

L

M

L-M

L-M

Single

Single

L

L

I

I

L

L-M

L Low M-Moderate H-High I Individual G. Group

SOURCE Oftice of Technology Assessment

substantial injury and deaths. Separatist

groups have been credited with more than 25

percent of catastrophic bombings—those resulting in major property damage, injuries, and

deaths. The resources of domestic separatists

vary from group to group, but are generally

less than for comparable groups of political

terrorists.

Reactionary groups, such as the Ku Klux

Klan and the American Nazi Party, share some

of the characteristics of the political terrorists,

but generally do not possess the same levels of

training, motivation, and resources, and are

not as capable of reacting effectively to a

changing control environment. They also differ

in that their bombings are usualIy directly targeted at the individual or group they intend to

influence, rather than simply at a spectacular

target.

Terrorists have been responsible for approximately 12 percent of those bombing incidents

in the past 5 years to which law enforcement

agencies assigned a motive.

readiIy adapt to a changing enforcement environment. The only major characteristic he

shares with the professional bomber is that his

targets are generally individuals or small commercial establishments, unlikely to be protected by a detection taggant sensor. The professional bomber is highly trained and motivated and generalIy has considerable resources available to him, either directly or

through his “employer.” Criminals share with

terrorists the characteristics of engaging in repeated bombings, but differ in that the professional criminal bomber usualIy works alone,

rather than as part of a group. Criminals as a

group are responsible for approximately 6 percent of bombing incidents. Most incidents are

limited to specific targets and do not generally

cause substantial injury or death to innocent

bystanders.

Mentally Disturbed

The mentally disturbed bomber differs from

terrorists and criminals in that he generally

does not engage in multiple bombings, although exceptions such as the Los Angeles “Alphabet Bomber” certainly exist. He generally

is poorly trained, has Iimited resources, and

acts alone. He is often highly motivated, but

perhaps only for short periods of time, in direct

response to some stimulus. He is extremely

limited in his ability to respond to changing

Common Criminals

Criminals range from the petty operator who

utilizes a bomb for extortion to the professional bombers of organized crime. The petty

operator is generally poorly trained, is not very

motivated, has limited resources, and cannot
38 ● Taggants in Explosives

control situations, either through lack of care

of consequences or belief in his invincibility.

As his motives are hard to identify, it is dif -

ficult to predict his targets.

Vandals and Experimenters

vandals and experimenters share the characteristics of poor training, limited motivation,

and limited resources. They generally work

alone or in small groups, and do not generally

intend to harm people or cause extensive damage. Their targets are often of little value, like

mailboxes or outhouses, but some acts of vandalism can cause extensive damage to buildings such as schools. While accounting for

over 40 percent of the reported bombing incidents, they are responsible for little damage

and few casualties.

Given the diversity of the criminal bomber

population, the range of targets involved in

bombings, and the choice of explosives available to the bombers, it is difficult to assess the

utility of taggants to law enforcement agencies. The assessment is made particularly difficult by the lack of experience with taggants,

although the McFillan case (recently tried in

Baltimore) provides one example where identification taggants were an extremely important

piece of evidence linking a suspected perpetrator to the crime. Inferences can also be made

from experience with the date-shift code and

with the X-ray machines and magnetometers

used at airports to prevent hijackings. A useful

construct for viewing the findings is shown in

table 15, the discussion of which follows.

Both identification and detection taggants

would have limited utility in combating bombings

of low-value targets. Due to limitations on law

enforcement time and resources, minor bombings, such as a vandalism bombing of a mailbox, do not warrant as thorough an investigation as bombings involving casualties or significant property damage. In New York, for example, such cases are generally handled at the individual precinct level, without the use of the

trained bomb squad, bombing investigators,

and forensic laboratories. As evidenced by the

results of the recovery demonstrations, a visTable 15.–Taggant Utility Summary

Specific bombing

conditions Identification taggants Detection taggants

Low-value targets Limited utility Limited utility

High-value targets,

no bomber High utility Extremely high utility

countermeasures

High-value targets, Countermeasures Countermeasures

bomber costly due to require technical

countermeasures increased risk knowledge,

planning

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

ual search of the area by untrained law enforcement personnel is unlikely to turn up

identification taggants. Similarly, detection

taggant sensors are unlikely to be present before the detonation. The lack of utility in these

cases, however, does not greatly diminish the

overall utility of a taggant program, as the intent of the program is not to prevent this type

of bombing, but to help prevent significant

bombings and to help in the arrest and conviction of the perpetrators of such bombings.

Identification and detection taggants would

provide a quantum increase in utility in combating bombings of high-value targets, assuming the

absence of effective bomber responses.

The current procedure for the apprehension

and control of criminal bombers consists of

three phases:

1.

2.

3.

the postdetonation search of the area for

physical evidence;

the investigation, based on the results of

the analysis of the physical evidence; and

intelligence gathering on, and surveillance of, suspected perpetrators or expected targets.

The search for evidence phase includes a detailed analysis to try and determine the type of

explosive used (successful approximately 5 0

percent of the time) and examination of whatever parts of the bomb, such as elements of the

timing device, may have survived the detonation. This evidence, together with any evidence

of the presence of the perpetrator (such as hair

or footprints) serves as the starting point for

the investigative phase.
Ch. I/—Detailed Findings ● 3 9

The investigative phase consists primarily of

trying to generate some type of lead to the perpetrators from the physical evidence gathered,

as well as tracking leads provided by informants or witnesses and attempts to correlate the

characteristics of the bombing with similar instances. A great deal

pended, for instance,

sources of a common c

mechanism.

The addition of ident

of effort may be exin investigating the

ock used as the timing

fication taggants to explosives would aid the investigatory efforts of

law enforcement personnel in a number of

ways, provided that tagged explosives are

used, the taggants survive the detonation, and

the taggants are recovered from the explosive

debris. The taggants provide a good starting

point for an investigation as they directly indicate the type of explosive used, manufacturer, time of manufacture, and provide a list

of the last legal purchasers. This information

may lead directly to a bomber who purchased

the explosives legally. In some cases, the

bomber would not otherwise be identified with

the bombing; in others, as was the case with

the McFillan incident in Baltimore, the taggants add a strong link in a chain of evidence,

which may help to obtain a conviction. Taggants may provide intelligence information,

such as linking a series of bombings, or linking

a suspect to a theft of explosives by establishing that one of the legal purchasers reported a

theft at the time the suspect was in the city in

which the theft occurred. Finally, bombers

may be deterred from committing bombings

by the knowledge that the chances of their being apprehended are increased by a taggant

program.

In order for the taggant information to be

useful, however, the bombing must be of sufficient importance (in terms of property damage, notoriety generated, or casualties produced) to warrant a thorough investigation. In

such cases, identification taggants will provide

much more information, and more reliable information, than present methods, and this information will require much less effort by the

investigating team.

The value of the list of last legal purchasers

will depend somewhat on the length of the Iist.

A trace which indicates that the full taggant

batch of explosives was sold directly to a mine

by the explosives manufacturer obviously provides a more useful lead than a trace which

shows a large number of purchasers of a lot of

smokeless powder. Even for the smokeless

powder case, the list of names would probably

not be excessively long. The types of bombings

likely to warrant a detailed investigation are

unlikely to be caused by 1 or 2 lb of gunpowder, eliminating most purchasers from the list

or providing multiple traces of the multiple 1-

Ib lots used to make up the filler.

The utility of detection taggants in protecting high-value targets is obvious. The current

procedures for protection of potential highvalue targets vary with the type of the facility

and the time since the last perceived threat.

Airports are protected by requiring all carry-on

luggage to go through inspection (usually Xray) and all passengers to walk through a magnetometer. Search of checked baggage is not

routinely required, although spot checks,

sometimes with trained dogs, do occur, particularly when the perceived threat is high.

Many Government buildings and other controlled-access facilities require a package or

briefcase check as well as personnel identification to gain entry. The airport instruments are

operated and inspection checks conducted primarily by personnel who are poorly trained,

poorly paid, and subject to the problems of

maintaining alertness over long periods while

performing a dull job. The magnetometers are

useful solely to detect metal, and information

from the X-ray machines must be interpreted

by the attendant. The use of a self-calibrating

sensor, which would reliably give an alarm at

the presence of explosives in hand baggage,

checked baggage, or on a person would offer

an enormous increase in utility over current

methods.

Many of the criminal bombers who would be

likely to attack a high-value target would be

deterred by the knowledge that the target was

protected by a sensor that would detect the explosives in their bombs (assuming no effective
40 . Taggants in Explosives

countermeasures by the bomber). The deterrence might work to redirect the bomb against

another target, to cause a less vulnerable part

of a target to be attacked, or (perhaps infrequently) to deter the attack altogether. Those

who were not deterred would have their bombs

intercepted, protecting that target and providing security personnel with additional clues

to the perpetrator.

Detection taggants would only provide utility to those targets that were protected by a

detection taggant sensor. Portable detection

taggants sensors would also be quite valuable

in locating a bomb whose approximate location was known and in determining if a suspected package contained explosives.

In summary, identification taggants would

provide a quantum increase in utility for those

bombings significant enough to warrant a thorough investigation, while detection taggants

would provide that increased utility in protecting those potential targets sufficiently important to warrant a detection taggant sensor.

The above discussion assumes that the criminal bombers do not respond to the introduction of a taggant program. However, countermeasures exist which would enable bombers to

evade the effects of a tagging program. The available countermeasures require varying degrees of

specialized knowledge, and some of them involve significant risks. Because most bombers

would probably not avail themselves of the possible countermeasures, a taggant program would

probably retain substantial law enforcement utility.

Bombers seeking to respond to a taggant

program by using countermeasures can use

any

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

ot several approaches:

removal of the taggants,

fabrication of homemade explosives,

use of incendiary bombs,

theft of explosives,

black-market purchase of explosives,

use of explosives manufactured before

the taggant program commenced,

use of blasting agents,

sealing of detection taggants,

● “spookng” of taggant sensors, or

● resorting to another unlawful activity,

such as assassination or kidnapping.

The baseline 3M identification taggants contain both a magnetic layer and a fluorescent

layer to aid in recovery after a detonation. The

taggants could therefore be removed from

powdery explosives by using a magnet; the

process would be both easy and safe, and

would require less than an hour for a typical

bomb. In order to hinder this countermeasure,

taggants have been manufactured without a

magnetic layer. If a powdery explosive were

tagged with a mixture of magnetic and nonmagnetic taggants, then the use of a magnet

would enable a criminal to remove only a portion of the taggants; the remainder would be

present after an explosion, although they

would be somewhat more difficult to recover

than the baseline taggant. If the criminal were

deterred from attempting magnetic removal

by the knowledge that about half the taggants

were nonmagnetic, then postdetonation recovery would be only marginally more difficult

than the baseline case.

Another possible technique for removing

taggants from an explosive is to use a black

light to identify the taggants by their fluorescence, and then remove them with a tweezer.

This process is safe, but more difficult than

magnetic separation, and would probably require many hours of painstaking effort for a

typical bomb. Unlike magnetic separation, it

could be used to remove taggants from explosives that are tacky rather than powdery. It has

been proposed that the encapsulation of the

taggants be made opaque, and matched to the

color of the explosive, in order to render such

removal impossible. Since the encapsulant

would be melted by the heat of a detonation,

postdetonation recovery would not be affected. Although it should not be difficult to

develop an opaque encapsulant, this has not

yet been done. Opaque encapsulation would

make quality control, both of manufacturing

taggants and mixing them with explosives,

more difficult, and its cost impact has not

been evaluated.
Ch. /l—Detailed Findings . 41

In order to remove a nonmagnetic taggant

with an opaque encapsulant from an explosive, the explosives could be acetone dissolved, the taggants and other SoIid material

removed by filtering, and the explosives reconstituted. This complex operation wouId require

specialized knowledge, be roughly equivalent

in danger and difficulty to fabrication of explosives from raw materials, and would result

in less reliable (less likely to detonate) explosives.

Taggant removal from some gunpowders

could be significantly easier than from explosives, as some gunpowder grains are considerably larger than the identification taggants, as

shown in figure 4. Separation from these powders may therefore be accomplished simply by

screening, even if the taggants are nonmagnetic. Tests with several Du Pont IMR powders

have shown that it would be difficult to separate the taggants from the chips and fines contained in the gunpowder package, but all small

particles could easily be separated from the intact grains by screening. It has been proposed

to alleviate this problem by agglomerating the

taggants into clumps whose size roughly

matches the specific powder grain size. The

cost impact of such a solution was not addressed during this study.

Removal of the detection taggants would

not be feasible.

Fabrication of explosives may be accomplished by a variety of means, but a considerable degree of expertise is required to avoid

the risk of premature detonations, and to ensure high reliability. It should be noted that

fabrication of detonators is significantly more

difficult than fabrication of the explosive

charge.

A substantial number of bombing incidents

involve the use of incendiary bombs; it is quite

impractical to tag the wide range of materials

from which incendiary bombs could be fabricated. It may be more difficult, however, to

fabricate a reliable delay fuze for an incendiary bomb. In addition, while incendiary bombs

may be effective in destroying structures and

jeopardizing groups of people, explosive bomb

Figure 4.—Size Comparison of the 3M Identification

Taggant and Some Smokeless Powders

3M identification

taggants

Hercules Bullseye

Du Pont IMR 4350

W-W 452AA

Hercules Red Dot

F 1-4 1’) “1 - - 93 - L
42 . Taggants in Explosives

fillers offer a better chance of killing, injuring,

or intimidating a particular individual.

A significant fraction of the explosive currently used for fabricating bombs is stolen. A

taggant program may well increase the theft of

explosives; however, additional explosive security could reduce the incidence of theft. Taggants from stolen explosives would not provide

a direct clue to the purchaser, but would help

law enforcement officials to establish patterns

and I inks between crimes, improving the

chances of apprehending the criminals. The

bomber who steals explosives further increases

the risk of apprehension by committing an additional crime. Finally, taggants could pinpoint

locations from which explosives were stolen,

providing a guide to tightening security in

those places most vulnerable to theft.

Explosives could be purchased on the black

market or illegally imported from abroad. Both

courses of action subject the bomber to increased risk of capture, from informants or undercover agents in the former case and as a result of smuggling, in the latter. Both courses of

action would require substantial resources and

the ability to plan in advance.

Explosives manufactured before the implementation of a taggant program could be used

to fabricate bombs. There is some evidence

that a considerable stockpile of explosives currently exists in the hands of criminal bombers,

and this stockpile could be expanded in the

time between legislation and implementation

of a taggant program. Acquisition and storage

of the explosives for a period of time require

considerable advance planning and resources,

however, and increase the risk to the bomber

of discovery of the explosives. While the use of

explosives manufactured prior to a taggant

program may be an effective countermeasure

initial I y, most explosive materials have a

limited shelf-life. Gels, slurries, and emulsions

are generally reliable for less than 1 year; the

sensitivity of dynamites tends to increase with

age; gunpowders and booster materials have a

long shelf-life.

Blasting agents, such as ANFO, are not

among the explosive materials BATF plans to

directly tag. (OTA finds that tagging blasting

agents, if it were judged desirable, would

greatly increase the cost of a taggant program.)

Effective bombs can be fabricated from

ANFO; to do so requires a certain level of skill

to ensure reliable detonation and the assembly

of a number of components, some of which

may not be readily available. The risk of premature detonation is small for a bomber with

adequate knowledge and patience, but may be

significant for bombers without those characteristics. Blasting agents are infrequently used

at present in criminal bombings.

The effectiveness of detection taggants can

be severely limited by creating a seal between

the explosives and the detection taggant sensor as the vapor could not escape the package

to trigger the sensor. Such a seal can be constructed with the appropriate industrial materials and equipment, but a reliable seal would

be very cliff i cult to fabricate with the resources

normally available to individuals. Hence specialized knowledge, advance planning, and the

resources to buy the required material, would

be needed to defeat the detection taggants.

Detection taggant sensors could be purposely triggered or “spooked” by placing detection

taggants, or other materials so similar chemically to the detection taggant that the sensor

could not make the distinction, in nonexplosive materials. If several suitcases or packages

within a short period of time triggered the detection taggant sensor for no apparent reason,

those operating the sensor might well conclude that it was malfunctioning, and disconnect it. It would then be possible to introduce

tagged explosives into the protected area. This

countermeasure would require that the

bomber obtain a supply of the detection taggant material; access to detection taggants

could and should be made difficult.

Finally, bombers can turn to other crimes,

such as murder, assassination, or kidnapping.

These crimes, however, are often not as spectacular as bombings and all involve greatly

higher risk to the perpetrators than do bombings. I n addition, a direct action against a visible target requires more motivation and a different temperament than does an indirect

crime such as a bombing.
Ch. n-Detailed Findings ● 4 3

Dynamite bomb with nails

Pipe bomb

. ..

. .-

Molotov cocktail, dynamite, and grenade

Photo credits US. Department of the Treasury

Various types of explosives used by terrorists

OTA consulted numerous explosives experts, all of whom agreed that countermeasures such as these are possible. However, the

experts on law enforcement and terrorism

which OTA consulted agreed that criminal

bombers would fail to make use of countermeasures, even when the necessary knowledge and

equipment could be obtained without enormous

efforts. However, some terrorists and professional criminals would make use of countermeasures. This judgment appears to be based on an

assessment of the type of personality that is

generally involved in this kind of criminal activity. Bombings are currently a low-risk, relatively simple type of criminal activity. Each

added element of risk, or additional stage

necessary to fabricate a bomb, will decrease

the likelihood of the prospective bomber actually committing the bombing. An instructive

analogy is aircraft hijacking. It is possible to

smuggle a weapon on to an airplane by a number of means, but, in fact, since the antihijacking program started there have been thousands

of weapons found annually by the screening

process, hundreds of weapons found abandoned near the controlled boarding gates, and

few or no cases of aircraft hijacked with the

use of smuggled weapons.

Consequently, OTA believes that countermeasures are not likely to greatly diminish the

law enforcement utility of a taggant program,

despite their potential to do so.

The above discussion has been essentially

qualitative, as little quantitative data is available. However, an attempt was made to draw inferences from similar programs. The data available from the date-shift program suggests that

identification taggants may prove effective in increasing the arrests and convictions of criminal

bombers. However, the data base is too small to

be more than suggestive. Similarly, data on the

reduction of hijackings after the introduction of

an antihijacking program suggests that detection

taggants would prove an effective deterrent. The

program most directly analogous to the proposed identification taggant program is the requirement that the date and shift of cap-sensitive high explosives be clearly printed on each

stick. For undetonated bombs the date-shift
44 ● Taggants in Explosives

code provides the same information as identification taggants would provide for the postdetonation case. No total review of the cases

involving explosives recovered from malfunctioning bombs has been conducted. A limited

set of 55 cases was examined, however, by

BATF. In that sample, six cases were forwarded

for prosecution (10.9 percent). That is twice the

percent forwarded in cases that did not include date-shift code data. Similar results were

obtained by MSA during a review of the BATF

data. Of the 10 bombing attempts MSA reviewed, the date-shift code proved useful in 40

percent of the cases, was not useful in 50 percent of the cases, and was of questionable utility in 10 percent. While the results were positive in both cases, the extremely small sample

size makes it impossible to draw significant

conclusions. I ME reported to OTA that manufacturers are seldom requested to appear in

court to testify regarding a date-shift trace; in

recent years less than 1 percent of the traces

requested led to a court appearance.

The most direct analog of the detection taggant program is the antihijacking program initiated in 1971. There was an average of 27 hijackings from domestic origins in the 4 years

preceding full implementation of the program.

In the next year (1973), hijackings decreased to

a single incident, and have averaged only four

per year since. It should be noted that a number of countermeasures are possible that

would evade the currently used magnetometers and X-ray machines. However, essentially

no incidence of the use of these countermeasures have occurred since the inception of the

anti hijacking program.

Numerical estimates of the numbers of

bombers who would be arrested and the number who would be deterred by a taggant program were made by MSA in order to generate

input to their cost-effectiveness analysis of the

taggant program. The numbers they used in the

analysis were a 50-percent increase in the arrest rate (from 8 to 12 percent) and a 5-percent

detergency rate. These numbers are simply

guesses and OTA has no data that would allow

it to make guesses or assess the accuracy of

the MSA guesses.

The above discussion dealt with the utility

of taggants for the control of criminal bombers. There exist other approaches to the problem

of control of criminal bombers which could be

used in conjunction with, or instead of, a tagging

program. Some of the methods, however, may

be unpalatable or not cost-effective. Other approaches, some of which have been implemented in areas facing a more severe bomber

threat, particularly from separatist terrorist

groups, include:

● alternate detection approaches,

● control of explosive materials,

● better security,

. more coordinated police response, and

● harsher judicial response.

The Aerospace Corp., the Federal Aviation

Administration, and the military are currently

investigating, or have investigated, a large

number of techniques for detection of untagged explosives. Methods investigated have included X-ray fluorescence, gamma ray excitation, nuclear magnetic resonance, both fast

and thermal neutron activation, dual energy

tomography, detection of the characteristic

vapors of explosives, and deactivation of blasting caps. Some of the approaches are prom ising, although all but the last two would be

limited to checked baggage. However, none of

the approaches, with the exception of nontagged vapor detection, has progressed as far

as the detection taggant research and most appear to be significantly more expensive, both

for the instrument and for personnel to man

the instrument. Commercial vapor detectors

are currently marketed for explosive detection,

but their sensitivities and flexibility fall far

short of the goals of the taggant vapor detection devices. Research on the promising approaches should continue; it may be most effective to deploy a detection taggant system in

conjunction with one of the other systems.

Control of explosive materials could range

from uniform procedures for the purchase of

explosives to the total control by the military

or police of all explosives, from manufacture

to the legal detonation. In some States, explosives are tightly controlled. For instance, in

Louisiana all users or transporters of explosives
Ch. /l—Detailed Findings ● 4 5

must be licensed by the State police. I n some

other States, however, explosives may be purchased over-the-counter simply by providing

identification and presenting a Federal permit

or filling out a form. Uniform tight control

would make it more difficult to purchase explosives for illegal use and would be particularly effective in combating the less sophisticated bombers. Complete control of explosives, to the point of requiring police or military personnel to physically be at the site of a

legal use of explosives and be responsible for

each detonator, as is the case in Ireland, would

essentially eliminate the use of domestically

produced commercial explosives in bombings.

Sophisticated bombers would be forced to fabricate their own explosives (or purchase

“homemade” explosives on a black market),

while the unsophisticated bomber would be

eliminated. Such a program would entail extremely high costs however, both in monetary

terms and in terms of the disruption to industries that currently use explosives.

Better security is possible, both to protect

potential targets and to protect explosive materials from theft. It would be possible, as an

example, to hand-search all checked luggage

being loaded on an airplane; in fact, EL AL (national airline of Israel) does conduct such

searches. Similarly, it would be possible, although extremely time-consuming, to search

every person entering the Rose Bowl for the

Rose Bowl game. However, detection taggants

appear a more reasonable alternative.

Protection of explosives from theft could be

improved, however, and may well have to be

to prevent a wholesale shift to theft as a

source of explosive material if a taggant program is instituted. All of these controls have

cost impacts which have not been calculated

in this study; a match must be made between

their cost and their marginal utility in the face

of the current bomber threat. As an example, if

the use of military explosives in criminal

bombings increases markedly it may become

necessary to counter that threat. Tagging of

military explosives would be extremely costly,

due both to the large amount produced and to

the requalification cost of all current munition

systems which would be necessary. A reasonable alternative may be to increase the security of military explosives.

A more coordinated law enforcement response to the bomber threat would be effective, whether a taggant program were instituted or not. At present, “major” bombings

must be reported to either the FBI or BATF.

However, no uniform definition of “major” exists. Other agencies, including some State

agencies, also collect bombing statistics. Examination of the statistics shows a significant

lack of uniformity in what is reported to each,

the information available on each incident reported, the retrievability of information from

the data bank, and the methods for updating

the files. One responsible center, to which all

bombing information would be required to be

reported in a uniform, easily updated, easily

accessed format, would be an obvious aid to

law enforcement efforts against criminal

bombers.

Better coordination and communications

between the forensic laboratories and the field

investigators would also be helpful. Agents in

the field are sometimes not sensitive to what

information or what physical evidence would

be useful to the laboratory. This coordination

will be particularly important if an identification taggant program is introduced, as the recovery of the taggants appears to be a laboratory-intensive procedure.

Finally, control of the physical site of the

bombing by a single responsible individual

would be extremely useful. A major incident

may involve several levels of law enforcement

agencies, several levels of elected representatives, and other activities such as first aid and

fire control. Uncoordinated activity by all

these people could well destroy valuable physical evidence. Excessive use of water by firefighters is a potentially serious problem if identification taggants are used, as they might be

washed totalIy away from the bombsite.

The utility of a harsher judicial response to

criminal bombers is a particularly sensitive issue, with little technological insight available,

and is mentioned only for completeness.
46 ● Taggants in Explosives

Program Implementation

Given the current development state of the

identification and detection taggants, a number of options are available regarding the

method of implementation of a taggant program. Among the issues are what, if any, taggant program should be legislated; if a taggant

program is legislated, what materials should be

tagged, what level of tagging should apply,

and what is the procedure for making decisions not specifically resolved by the legislation.

One of the first issues needing resolution is

what explosives should be tagged. The analysis

conducted showed that criminal bombers tend

to use the most readily available source of explosives. Therefore the tagging program with the

highest utility would include provisions for tagging of commercial explosives and gunpowders.

Table 7 showed the frequency-of-use distribution of explosives for bombings, including

explosives identified both in the field and in

the BATF laboratory. While the completeness

of these statistics may be open to interpretation, it is clear that a wide variety of materials

are used as bomb fillers. Discussion with both

domestic and foreign law enforcement officials has stressed the fact that all types of

bombers will use the most readily available

source of explosives, although sophisticated

bombers would be more likely to limit their

use to materials that are efficient for the intended purpose. As an example, a relatively

small amount of a powerful explosive was appropriate for the La Guardia Airport bombing,

as it would cause extensive damage and be

concealable in a relatively small package. The

amount of gunpowder needed to do as much

damage would occupy a much larger volume,

and might be noticed; it would therefore not

be an appropriate choice for a sophisticated

bomber.

If one type of explosive material is not as

highly controlled, then bombers will tend to

shift toward that material. For that reason, it

may be desirable to tag or otherwise control

military explosives. Although current statistics

show a relatively infrequent use of military explosives in criminal bombings, tagging of commercial explosives may shift the expected future frequency. Similarly, tagging of black and

smokeless powders is of critical importance to

an overall taggant program.

Some mechanisms to tag blasting agents

may also be desirable. However, the cost of

directly tagging the agents would be extremely

high. The BATF plan to tag the detonators,

boosters, and detonating cord normally used

with blasting agents may be a reasonable compromise, particularly as blasting agents are

now rarely used in criminal bombings and approximately half of the blasting agents are

mixed and used onsite in the same day.

As indicated above, various levels of implementation of a taggant program are possible, each with an associated cost of implementation. The most reasonable way to determine

the optimum program to implement may be to

consider the marginal additional cost of each additional element of utility. This approach is illustrated in figure 5, where the identification

taggant utility function is varied. Qualitative

estimates of marginal utility are shown to approximate scale, along with quantitative estimates of the cost of implementing a program

that would yield that level of utility.

The lowest implementation option would

tag cap-sensitive explosives, boosters, detonators, detonating cord, and gunpowders, but not

blasting agents. A unique identification taggant would be used for each manufacturer,

type of product, and year of manufacture. This

program corresponds to the low-level program

previously discussed. That level of implementation would directly provide most of the physical evidence information that current methods attempt to provide. However, it would not

directly provide a list of last legal purchasers.

The relatively modest cost for that program

would be approximately $15 million per year, *

probably less than is currently

attempt to provide the same

current means, although the

shifted to manufacturers and

sives.

*The cost estimate In this sectton IS for

gant program only

expended in an

information by

cost would be

users of exploan Identification tag-
Ch. n-Detailed Findings ● 4 7

Figure 5.— Marginal Cost-Utility Function

Marginal utility Marginal cost

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

The next option would be to provide a

unique taggant code for each shift of each

product manufactured and to keep a record of

the movement of explosives from the manufacturer to the last purchasers, in a manner

analogous to the date-shift code currently

marked on the casings of explosives. This option corresponds to the OTA-identified baseline program, and would provide a list of last

legal purchasers and additional intelligence information, at a program cost increase of approximately $10 million per year.

A further implementation option would be

to uniquely tag each 10,000-lb batch of explosives and each 2,000-Ib batch of gunpowder.

This would lead to a somewhat smaller Iist of

last legal purchasers, which would mean fewer

places that must be investigated, as well as a

somewhat finer grain of intelligence information. However, the cost increase of $20 million

per year would be fairly substantial.

Additional marginal utility could be gained

by tagging blasting agents. This would be of

value in two cases —the case in which the identification taggants from the detonator and

booster used to ignite the blasting agent did

not survive (or were not recoverable) from the

debris of an explosion, or the case in which a

bomb was fabricated that used some other (untagged) means of detonating the blasting

agent. There is no body of test data to indicate

the likely frequency of the first condition;

while the second condition is certainly possible, almost all bombers capable of detonating

a blasting agent without commercial detonators and boosters would also be capable of obtaining or fabricating untagged explosives in

the first place. At present blasting agents are

infrequently used for bombings — averaging

two BATF sources suggests that blasting agents

are used in about 0.5 percent of bombings, and

account for a small percentage of the property

damage and casualties. Since the cost of tagging blasting agents would be approximately

$170 million per year, several times that of all

the other elements of a tagging program combined, the marginal utility of doing so appears

relatively low.

In short, the implementation of a taggant

program would require unambiguous decisions

about which materials required taggants, and

what the applicable regulations would be. It

would be desirable if any legislation on the

subject either made these determinations or

unambiguously delegated authority to do so.

Given the present state of development of taggants, OTA’S data and analyses appear to be consistent with any of three possible courses of congressional action:

1

2.

Pass legislation requiring taggants, and set

up a procedure to determine if and when

the technical development and testing

have progressed to the point where implementation can begin.

Defer legislative action on taggants, but

encourage (inter alia by appropriating
48 . Taggants in Explosives

adequate funds) BATF to continue taggant development, with a view to consideration of legislation when development

and testing are complete.

3. Take no legislative action on taggants,

and encourage the executive branch to

search for other ways of improving the effectiveness of law enforcement against

terrorists and other criminal bombers.

If Congress chooses the first of these options, it should recognize that even though the

legislation can define precisely what materials

would require taggants and provide guidance

on the stringency of regulations, there will remain some determinations which it is not yet

possible to make:

● When and if an adequate number of successful compatibility tests have been conducted. Particularly pertinent in this regard would be a determination of what

constitutes a resolution of the current incompatibility between the 3M identification taggants and one type of smokeless

powder or the RDX-based booster material. The 3M identification taggants cannot safely be added to these materials un-

●

●

●

til such a resolution is accomplished, and

neither smokeless powders nor boosters

should be excluded from a tagging program.

When and if a sufficient probability of

survival and postdetonation recovery of a

given identification taggant has been

demonstrated to justify adding that taggant to a given type of explosive.

When and if a detection sensor has demonstrated adequate sensitivity, low falsealarm rate, ease of operation, ease of

maintenance, and acceptable unit cost

under field conditions to be considered

sufficiently “available” to justify requiring the addition of detection taggants to

explosives.

When and if a detection taggant has demonstrated adequate shelf-life, nontoxicity,

and penetrativity to be considered “available. ”

In view of the fact that BATF has become the

major proponent of the use of taggants in explosives, there is much to be said for entrusting

such determinations to an official or procedure outside the Treasury Department.
—. —

Chapter Ill

TAGGANT RESEARCH REVIEW
Chapter 111.–TAGGANT

—. . — —

RESEARCH REVIEW

**** **** *.*0 **** 9***   ** ** ***0 *0**   ** 0 ***** 9 51

Taggant Development History●   ** ** **** 900* **4* *a **a********** 51

Identification Taggants.

Predetonation Only. .

Radiological Tracers.

Chemical Assay. . . . .

Physical Taggants . . .

Summary. . . . . . . . . .

Detection Taggants. . . .

Vapor Taggants. . . . .

Summary. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Detection Taggant Sensor Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......59

untagged Detectoin ●   a** * ****   e.**  a*** **** *e* be********* 62

Vapor Detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..62

Differential Contrast Radiography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .....63

Excitation lnduced Emissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......64

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......65

Current BAFT/Aerospace Tagget ●   65

Program Status ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Projected Schedule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............68

Implementation Philosophy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . .......69

Identification Taggant Surviaval Teasting ● ** 0* **** **m* **09 *b** **em **0** 70

Boosters, Military Explosives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . .......71

Black and Smokeless Powders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......72

Detonators and Detonating Cord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......72

Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......72
Chapter Ill

TAGGANT RESEARCH REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

TAGGANT DEVELOPMENT HISTORY

The idea of adding material to explosives to

enhance the predetonation detection and the

postdetonation identification of explosives has

been considered by various military and civilian agencies for at least 15 years. Some of the

suggested material, such as radioactive isotopes, would perform both functions, some

could only perform one. A number of the concepts which have been proposed during that

time are briefly described in the following subsect ions.

Identification Taggants

Ideas for tagging materials to be used for

identification of the source of explosives used

in criminal bombings and bombing attempts

can be generally grouped into the following

four classes:

1. addition of materials that would not survive the detonation, but which would provide information if a bomb were recovered undetonated;

51
52 ● Taggants in Explosives

2. addition of materials that would physically survive the detonation and be recovered intact;

3. addition of materials to the explosives

that would be detected in an assay of the

debris; and

4. addition of radioactive isotopes.

Predetonation Only

Since 1970, the date, shift, manufacturer,

and product have been printed on the cartridge of cap-sensitive high explosives. The

manufacturer keeps records, by that date-shift

code, and can tell to whom each batch of material was sold; distributors also are required to

keep records of sale. It is possible, from the

date-shift code, to compile a list of last legal

purchasers of explosives from a lot with the

same date-shift code. I n fact, BATF maintains

a National Explosives Tracing Center, whose

function is to coordinate that activity. A typical trace would start with the recovery of an

undetonated bomb by a BATF special agent.

He would call into the tracing center with the

information, and the data would be forwarded

to the manufacturer who would provide the

list of consumers or distributors; if explosives

from that lot were sold to a distributor or distributors, they would be contacted for a list of

retail purchasers.

The date-shift code information has proven

useful in investigations of criminal bombings,

although its utility is Iimited to instances

where the explosive is recovered before detonation, or in some cases, where a low-order

detonation does not destroy the cartridge. In

addition, the information is only on cap-sensitive high explosives, and on the packages of

detonators, black powder, and detonating

cord. No trace data is available for other explosive material, such as smokeless powder, individual detonators, or even cap-sensitive high

explosives that have been removed from the

cartridge.

Smaller amounts of information are given by

other systems that do not survive the detonation. For instance, all dynamite legally coming

into New York must be red. I f dynamite is recovered that is not red, it indicates a purchase

not legally usable in New York. This data is not

helpful to police in tracking bombers but does

assist in control of legal uses of dynamite

within New York.

The English apparently use a method somewhat better than the date-shift code in that the

identifying code consists of colored threads

within the explosives. The threads do not survive the detonation, but the information content is not lost by discarding the cartridge, as is

the case with the date-shift code; it may not be

possible, however, to encode sufficient information for U.S. needs by that method.

Radiological Tracers

Addition of small amounts of radioactive

isotopes to explosives during the manufacturing process is particularly attractive as it provides a mechanism for both identification of

the explosive materials from the postdetonation debris and a simple detection mechanism.

There are a large number of radioisotopes, so

an identification scheme could certainly be developed that would provide sufficient unique

code species.

The two primary objections to this oftenproposed solution are public reaction and

safety. Given the present widespread antipathy

to anything involving radioactivity, it is doubtful if the public would accept such a solution,

even if there were no safety hazards.

Two potential safety hazards exist, one having to do with sensitization of the explosive

materials, and the other with the effects of

low-level radiation. Addition of foreign materials to explosives poses a potential sensitivity

hazard. However, the amount of radioisotopes

required would be far smalIer than the material necessary for other tagging mechanisms,

so explosive sensitization would probably be

no more of a problem than with other types of

taggants.

The hazards of low-level exposure to radiation are not well-defined; the current trend is

toward severe limitation of exposure. Thousands of people come into direct contact with

explosives every day at the manufacturers, distributors, and users level, so a large number of
Ch. 111—Taggant Research Review . 53

people would have some exposure. Primary

concern would be at the manufacturing level,

where workers would have more continuous

exposure than, for instance, a user. Aside from

the adverse psychological effect the use of

tracers might have on such workers, and the

possible long-term effects of low-level exposure, there would be a large cost impact due to

the need for specially trained personnel, as

welI as storage, handling, and decontaminating equipment. If it were necessary for the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission to control the

shipment of the explosives and to license and

otherwise supervise all explosive users, additional major costs and inconvenience would

occur.

A final drawback is that reading of the information encoded in the postdetonation debris would be a fairly complicated laboratory

procedure involving sample preparation, radiation counting, and radioisotope identification.

Only a limited number of laboratories in the

country have the trained personnel and facilities; police forensic laboratories are not

among them.

Chemical Assay

A number of approaches have been proposed that have in common the addition of

chemicals to the explosives that would be recovered from the postdetonation debris and be

identified by a laboratory assay of the debris.

While the number of chemical materials is almost limitless, a successful chemical taggant

must have the following properties:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

inertness,

nonsensitization of the explosives,

not present in background material,

able to survive the detonation,

long-term stability,

not a health hazard, and

sufficient variation must be possible to

form a large number of unique codes.

The chemical taggant with which the greatest amount of research has been conducted

was developed by the Ames Laboratories in the

early 1970’s, I n this method, rare earths were

added to explosives as oxides or as nitrates in

ethanol solutions. By using several rare earths

and by varying concentrations, a sufficient

number of unique codes could be constructed.

The taggants were recovered from the debris

with ethanol-dampened cotton swabs. The

swabs were then assayed in the laboratory by

ion-exchange methods; analysis was accomplished by X-ray excited optical luminescence

techniques.

Drawbacks to the Ames taggants included

sensitization of the explosives by the ethanol

carrier, a high background level, particularly

for detonations taking place near or on the

ground, and a rather specialized laboratory

procedure necessary for the taggant assay and

identification.

Physical Taggants

This class of taggants is designed to survive

the detonation in its original physical form, to

be separated from the debris, and to be decoded, either in the field or in the laboratory.

Several types of materials have been suggested. Physical taggants must meet the same

requirements as the chemical taggants, however, in addition to physical survival, so the

number of serious candidates is somewhat limited. Three taggants remain promising candidates.

3M COLOR-CODED TAGGANT

More research has been conducted with the

3M identification taggant than with any other.

It is the baseline taggant proposed by BATF for

implementation if a taggant program is legislated, and is the taggant used for the OTA cost,

safety, and utility analyses.

The taggant consists of an irregular chip of

thermosetting melamine alkyd, approximately

0.12 mm thick and about 0.40 mm in its greatest dimension. Figure 6 shows the eight-layer

construction; variation of the sequence colors

provides the necessary library of codes. A total

of approximately 6 million unique codes is

available, when al Iowances are made for certain forbidden adjacencies (colors too difficult

to distinguish) and other restrictions. One face

of the taggant visably fluoresces when illumi-
54 . Taggants in Explosives

Figure 6.—3M Color-Coded Identification Taggants

I

. . .

4 ---

. “ : . 3 - . I m

r

- .

., -. -

- 4
Ch. 111—Taggant Research Review ● 5 5

nated with black Iight (366 nanometers) as an

aid in recovery, either in the field or laboratory. The other face contains iron powder, allowing the taggant to be picked up by a

magnet, another recovery aid.

I n theory, the taggant can be recovered from

the debris by use of a magnet and a black light,

read in the field by a low-power microscope,

and traced through the BATF tracing center. I n

fact, laboratory separation may be needed in

most bombings; the recovery and laboratory

procedures are quite simple, however, and can

be performed in the field with little equipment

and train i ng.

Several variations of the basic concept have

been tried, some including a polyethylene encapsulant and some including SIightly different

chemical and physical properties of the individual layers. The safety, survivability, utility,

and cost aspects are discussed in great detail

elsewhere in this report.

WESTINGHOUSE CERAMIC TAGGANT

The Westinghouse taggant consists of a mixture of rare-earth compounds, bound together

into a ceramic-1ike particle, whose appearance

is similar to a grain of sand, and whose largest

dimension is approximately 0.2 mm. Each of

the rare-earth compounds fluoresces at a characteristic wavelength when illuminated by ultraviolet radiation (325 nanometers). A scanning monochronometer is used to read the

wavelength of the various rare-earth compounds, and thus to identify the taggant code.

The 10 rare earths that have been evaluated,

and their characteristic emission wavelengths,

are:

Nanometers

Strontium chlorophosphate. europium 447

Yttrium vanadate thulium. 476

Yttrium phosphate cerium, terbium 546

Yttrium vanadate erblum 555

Yttrium vanadate: dysprosium 575

Yttrium vanadate: samarium 608-648

Yttrium vanadate: europlum 618

Yttrium oxy sulfide europlum 62 6

Strontium fluoroborate. europlum,

samarium 687

Strontium fluoroborate europlu m 375

As in the 3M taggant, the Westinghouse taggant incorporates a spotting phosphor which

fluoresces in the visible range when illuminated by shortwave ultraviolet radiation (254

nanometers) and magnetic particles, both of

which assist in the recovery process.

Due to the limited number of rare-earth

compounds available, and the fact that the individual components are not ordered like the

3M taggant layers, the Iibrary of possible codes

is only approximately 3,000, even with three

distinct spotting phosphors. Use of different

concentrations or pairing of two different taggants to form a unique species can significantly increase the library, with approximately

600,000 codes available for the paired taggant

variation.

A significant number of compatibility tests

have been conducted with the taggant, as have

a small number of survivability-recoverability

tests. Due to the ceramic nature of the taggant,

it is extremely survivable and does not thermally degrade in high-energy explosives (such

as boosters), as does the 3M taggant. In addition, since the rare-earth doping is homogeneous throughout the material, the full code

can be read from even a small recovered taggant chip. The Westinghouse taggant is extremely gritty, and has been shown to sensitize

explosives if not encapsulated in a polyethylene coating.

No additional effort is currently underway

with the Westinghouse taggant, due to a Westinghouse concern over liability should some

taggant not be fully encapsulated and thus

cause sensitization of an explosive material.

From the limited data available, it would appear that the Westinghouse taggant shows interesting potential, particularly due to its high

survival rate, although solutions must be

sought to ensure 100-percent encapsulation. I n

addition, some further limitations are imposed

by the relatively small code library available

and by the rather complex laboratory identification procedure required.

CURIE POINT TAGGANT

The Curie point taggant consists of a collection of five distinct ferrites, packaged with an

ultraviolet sensitive spotting phosphor in a

binder of potassium silicate. Ferrites exhibit
56 ● Taggants in Explosives

the property that their ferromagnetism disappears when the temperature of the ferrite is

raised above a specific temperature, designated the Curie point temperature. identification of a particular taggant is thus accomplished by placing the recovered taggant in a

temperature-controlled chamber and recording the magnetism as a function of temperature.

Approximately 50 ferrites have been identified whose Curie point falls in a laboratory

practical temperature range. The 50 ferrites,

used in combinations of s at a time, yield a library of approximately 2 million unique species.

As the taggants are ceramics, their survivability in high-energy explosives, such as boosters, should be good. Very preliminary tests

have demonstrated the survivability of the taggant in boosters and high-power commercial

explosives such as Power Primer.

The Curie point taggants share the potential

sensitization problem of the Westinghouse

taggants, and must therefore be encapsulated

with 100-percent certainty. The Curie point

taggants have another serious drawback: magnetic separation from powdery materials such

as gunpowders and powdery dynamite would

be an obvious simple countermeasure.

Summary

The 3M taggant, which has been the most

thoroughly researched identification taggant,

appears to be the most viable candidate, although the Westinghouse taggant exhibits a

good deal of promise at this early stage of development. The other candidates exhibit technical, cost, countermeasure, or public acceptance problems, or require elaborate laboratory

separation and analysis to yield the identification code. However, as other sections of this

report make clear, the 3M taggant is not yet

fully developed or tested, and could not be

generally used unless and until several remaining problems are resolved.

Detect ion Taggants

Four general types of detection tagging approaches are described in the literature, inCI uding:

1. radioisotopes,

2. vapors,

3. electromagnetic (E/M) taggants, and

4. activation of nonradioactive isotopes

Radioisotopes for use as detection taggants

possess the same drawbacks as they do for use

as identification taggants; the above discussion need not be repeated here.

Electromagnetic taggants incorporated into

a detonator, such as the passive harmonic radar taggant investigated by the Aerospace

Corp., offer the possibility of detection at a

distance with a relatively low rate of false

alarms. All of the concepts so far proposed,

however, can be easily defeated by wrapping

explosives in metal foi1. I n addition, inclusion

of such devices would probably have a significant effect on the procedures used to manufacture detonators, on detonator cost, and significant false alarms could be caused by common diodes from radios, calculators, and other

electronic instruments.

A variation of the idea of electromagnetic

taggants has been proposed, called detonator

deactivation. In this concept, a reed switch is

connected in series with a detonator bridge

wire. illumination of the detonator by a switchable electromagnetic source would cause the

reed to open. A number of methods are possible to ensure that the reed could not be subsequently closed. The advantages of the concept

are twofold:

●

●

the necessary illuminator could probably

be made quite inexpensively, allowing it

to be used to protect far more targets than

would be possible with other detector

concepts; and

the deactivator process is passive — no operator is necessary.

Disadvantages include the fact that deactivation rather than detection of bombs would

offer no help in finding the would-be criminal
Ch. 111—Taggant Research Review . 57

bombers; significant (and possibly costly) impacts on current processes of manufacturing

detonators; and the risk of accidentally deactivating detonators, resulting in their failure for

normal use. No research beyond initial conceptualization has been conducted for this concept.

An interesting taggant concept has been suggested by the Franklin Institute, based on the

idea of using Moss bauer active isotopes as taggants. The technique involves the addition of

nonradioactive trace taggants to explosives,

followed by the gamma ray excitation of the

Mossbauer isotopes and the measurement of

the characteristic absorption spectrum of

those taggant isotopes. The Mossbauer effect

has been measured in numerous common elements, including iron, tin, and nickel. In a

Mossbauer isotope, gamma rays, whose energy

corresponds to the transition energy between

nuclear levels, may be resonantly absorbed

upon excitation, producing a sharp absorption

spectrum characteristic not simply of the

Mossbauer element, but of the chemical compound of the element. This effect is due to the

small perturbations of the nuclear levels by the

surrounding electrons. For use as a taggant, a

chemical compound not found in nature or

used in industry would be manufactured. Due

to the low excitation level required, little

shielding of the source wouId be necessary.

Mossbauer taggants are simply a concept at

this stage, however, so little judgment can be

made of its practicality, cost, or safety in explosives An Aerospace Corp, analysis questions the practicality of the technique. A significant I imitation to the use of the Moss bauer

and other activation techniques is that they

cannot be used to search people, due to the activation radiation

A number of other activation taggant techniques have been suggested, including the doping of explosives with material that would enhance the effectiveness of X-ray or similar devices These concepts al I lack specificity, however, and could cause the X-ray to be triggered

by many common items, resulting in an unacceptable faIse a I arm rate

Vapor Taggants

vapor taggants have received the bulk of

the research on detection taggants. vapor taggants share the common taggant requirements

of stabiIity, inertness, compatibility with explosives, and absence from normal materials.

In addition, they must have a vapor pressure

sufficient to produce enough molecules to be

sensed, but not so high that a large initial mass

would be required to ensure continued operation when placed in explosives that have a

shelf-life of several years. They must have a

relatively steady molecuIe emission rate over a

5- to 10-year shelf-life, must not produce an environmental hazard, and must not readily adhere to surfaces with which they are likely to

come into contact.

Several hundred different vapor sources

have been considered, with almost 200 having

been investigated in the laboratory. Avenues

of approach have included the use of disproportionating salts, the direct adsorption of

vapor taggants into the elastomeric plug material of detonators, and the microencapsulation

of taggant materials.

DISPROPORTIONATING SALTS

A number of the salts of weak acids and

bases, such as boron trifluoride adduct compounds, disproportionate or separate into two

or more constituent parts, some of which sublimate at room temperatures, theoretically

providing a possible stable vapor emission

source. Tests conducted by the Aerospace

Corp. indicated that no compounds investigated had the proper balance of vapor pressure, emission rate, desired Iifetime, and projected detection limit by a sensor to allow the

use of a sufficiently small amount of taggant

material. It is possible to control the emission

rate of a high vapor pressure salt by the use of

a microencapsulation membrane; use of such

a membrane allows the consideration

large number of more easily handled

taggants, however, as described below.

ELASTOMERIC ADSORPTION OF

VAPOR TAGGANTS

The adsorption of the vapor detection

rial directly into the elastomer used to

of a

liquid

mat efabri61-401 0 - 80 - 5
58 ● Taggants in Explosives

cate the end plug of detonators offers a number of advantages, including removal of the

necessity for additional steps or changes in the

detonator fabrication process. Research has

therefore been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of various elastomer/taggant pairs.

Taggants evaluated include sulfur hexafluoride, and hologenated alkanes, amines, aerobatics, esters, and ketones. A number of combinations appear feasible, although useful lifetimes may be shorter than the 5-year minimum

desirable. A more severe limitation, however,

is that the elastomerically adsorbed taggants

would be useful only on detonators, and possibly with detonating cord. None of these taggants appears to be as successful as other candidates when microencapsulated for use with

other explosive materials. Use of separate taggants for detonators for other explosives

would lead to the development of two sensors

or to the requirement for dual-mode sensing in

a single sensor, an unnecessary sensor development constraint.

MICROENCAPSULATED VAPOR TAGGANTS

Approximately 180 vapor materials have

been screened in the laboratory as candidate

microencapsulated vapor taggants. In addition, several hundred other materials were rejected after a thorough analytical review. Five

candidate perfluorinated cycloalkane compounds have been extensively tested, and have

successfulIy completed barrier penetration,

mutagen, toxicity, and atmospheric impact

testing. The five candidate vapor taggants and

their chemical properties are shown in table

16.

A parallel research effort has been underway to find an appropriate microcapsuIe material. The optimum material would be inexpensive, easy to use with the candidate taggant

materials, compatible with the explosive materials, and form membranes that account for

only 10 to 20 percent of the microencapsuIated taggant weight. Figure 7 shows a photograph of a canadidate microencapsulated vapor

detection taggant, with a needle to indicate

relative size.

Emission rate studies are currently underway with a number of membrane materials.

Early tests were very encouraging; a number of

more recent test results show variations in

emission rate from lot to lot and as a function

of ambient relative humidity and temperature.

Tests have not yet started on long-term emission behavior, especially in the presence of explosives. Tests have only recently started on

the compatibility of explosive materials with

either the taggant vapors or the membrane materials.

Summary

Although a wide range of detection taggant

materials have been proposed, the need for

long life, stability, specificity, and absence of

easy countermeasures has caused the bulk of

these to be rejected, at least given the current

state-of-the-art. The most promising concept is

the microencapsulation of perfluorinated cycloalkane compounds, although the direct adsorption of taggants into the detonator plug

elastomer appears promising for that application. A number of preliminary tests have been

conducted with five candidate taggants; compatibility testing has just been initiated. Detonator deactivation is a possible alternate approach, although little research has been accompl i shed.

Table 16.–Candidate Vapor Taggant Properties

Empirical Molecular Boiling point Melting point Specific Vapor pressure

Chemical name Abbreviation formula weight “ c “ c gravity (300° K = 27° C)

Perfluoro-1 1-2-dlmethyl-cyclobutane PDCB C, F,, 300 45 - 3 2 1.67 390

Perfluoromethylcy clohexane ., PMCH C, F,, 350 76 - 3 7 1.79 106

Perfluoro-1,3 3-dimethylcyclohexane PDCH C, F,, 400 101-2 - 7 0 185 35

Perfluorodecall n PFD C 0F ,

8

462 141-2 0 193 6.6

Perfluorohexylsulf sulfur-pentafluonde L-4412 CSFI,SF, 446 118 - 3 1 1.89 195

SOURCE The Aerospace Corp
Detect ion Taggant Sensor Systems

The development of a system to detect the

emitted vapors is proceeding in parallel with

the development of vapor-emitting detection

taggants. A schematic block diagram for the

operation of such a system is shown in figure 8.

Air, from the vicinity of the item being inspected, is collected and delivered to a sensor,

after first being conditioned. The sample collector can simply consist of a gust of air for inspection of boarding passengers, or can include a small pressure pulse to a piece of

checked baggage to introduce more of the air

from the interior of the baggage into the air

sample stream. For some of the concepts the

free oxygen and water vapor must be removed

Photo credtt Aerospace Corp

prior to insertion of the air into the sensor. If

the vapor taggant is present, an alarm indication is registered; if none is present, then the

item passes through with no delay. A detailed

procedure has not been developed to deal with

alarms, but the procedure would probably include a recycle through the sensor to eliminate

the chance of an equipment transient being responsible, followed by a suspected bomb disposal procedure if the alarm persists.

Work is progressing on three candidate detection sensors. Very little effort has been expended by the Aerospace Corp. on the other

elements of the system, although some preliminary design identification work has taken

place on the air sampling process and on methods of enhancing the original sample. A U.S.
60 ● Taggants in Explosives

Figure 8.— Detection Taggant Sensor System

Block Diagram

Sample

collector

Air

sampler

Sampler

conditioner

sensor

Alarm

Calibrator Inspection

No Alarm

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

Customs Service device has been tested, for instance, which exerts a gentle force on baggage,

causing an exhalation of the baggage interior

air into the sampling network.

The three candidate detection sensors are, in

order of increasing complexity and cost, the

continuous electron capture detector (CECD),

the ion mobility spectrometer (lMS), and the

mass spectrometer (MS). Figure 9 shows a schematic diagram of the operation of IMS. Gas is

introduced from the sampling device into the

conditioner. After the free oxygen and water

vapor are removed, the sampled gas molecules

are drawn into the ionization region where

many molecular species, including the taggant

molecules if present, form negatively charged

ions. The negative ions are then gathered and

injected into a drift tube where an electric

field causes them to flow against a counterflowing drift gas stream. By virtue of the ion

molecule reactions between the negative ions

and the neutral drift gas molecules, the ions

are separated into spatial clumps of like species. Each species, depending on the strength

of the ion-molecule interaction, traverses the

length of the drift tube in a different length of

time so that one can turn-on, or gate, the detector to respond only to a specific molecular

species or group of species such as the taggant

vapors.

The taggant molecules being considered all

have long drift times and are easily separated

from common gasses in the IMS. Additional

specificity is gained by the toughness of the

taggants; most other large molecules fragment

in processing through the detector.

IMS devices have been commercially available for approximatelys years, with about sO

currently in use for various applications. Tests

have been run with a commercial IMS unit at

airports to examine ambient air for the presence of molecules in the critical drift time region; no molecules which would have triggered

a false alarm were detected.

While the laboratory tests are promising, it is

not possible to extrapolate to estimates of IMS

performance in the field, in a real-life environment, when maintained by normal airport

maintenance people, and when using an internal calibration source.

CECD can be conceptually viewed as an IMS

device without a drift tube. It simply consists

of the conditioner and reaction chamber; the

decrease in current in the reaction chamber is

a sign that the taggant molecules are present

and have been ionized. As described, CECD

would have less specificity than IMS, and

would probably be triggered by a wider range

of interference sources. The key to the device

is in the conditioning chamber; the chamber is

a catalytic reactor that contains hydrogen gas

and palladium metal plated onto a number 5A

molecular sieve and operating at 1400 C. The

reactor removes oxygen and water vapor, fractures some other potential interference

sources, while still others are removed by

reduction or combustion. The number of molecules that will survive the conditioning chamber is limited, but the taggants may well not be

the only survivors of the passive screening

process.

CECD devices have been used as a laboratory instrument by the Brookhaven National

Laboratory for the past several years. A bread-
Ch. 111—Taggant Research Review . 61

Figure 9.— Cutaway View of the Phemto”Chem 100 Sensor Cell in the Ion Mobility Spectrometer

ALL GAS

SAMPLE AND GAS FLOWS DRIFT GAS 80% ●

CARRIER 200/0

SAMPLE ●

;

d

:

7 ml ol

SAMPLE INLET

.—=’) :

7=-7 !

- L . — . —————— -—

<

~-MoL=E :

NIr2x. AZ—= + - — ‘

— REKJON R EG IOy :

DRIFT REGION

FAST

IONIZER ELEcTROMEl

Ni-63 AMPLIFIER

100 ml Vol

IMS HOUSING AND HEATER

DRIFT GAS

100-3000 ml/min

‘ER

SOURCE David Williams BATF

board device was recently shown to be quite

successful in detecting vapor-tagged dummy

blasting caps in baggage on a conveyer belt.

The MS is a standard laboratory instrument,

easily capable of resolving the taggant molecuIes from other species. Current MSS, however, are usualIy expensive, relatively sensitive

laboratory instruments. The challenge is to design and develop a low-cost, field-usable instrument that will detect taggant molecules in

a parts-per-tril I ion concentration level.

The limited laboratory testing of detection

sensors that has taken place has demonstrated

that the technology exists for sensors which

could detect the taggant vapors. These tests

have not yet demonstrated, however, the ability of the instruments to distinguish between

the taggant materials and similar materials

which may exist in the environment or may be

deliberately introduced into the environment

as a countermeasure. It has also not been demonstrated that any of the instruments can successfully detect the taggants in the required

parts-per-tri I I ion concentration level under

field-use conditions.

The time required to develop instruments of

this type is a pertinent subject for discussion,

even assuming that the technical problems can

be solved. The milestones in a development

process include:

● demonstration of technical feasibility,

● generation of specifications for a prototype,

● prototype development,

● generation of specifications for the instrument,

● pilot production of the instrument, and

● ful l-scale production.

None of the detection sensor concepts has

yet passed the technical feasibility demonstration milestone. The only time estimate which

has been made is an extremely optimistic estimate of 14 months from demonstration of

technical feasibility to completion of a prototype. The estimate assumed no technical, contractual, or other problems, and may well be

off by a factor of two. Given the fact that these

instruments would be produced in quantity (up

to several thousand), must be self-calibrating,

maintained by routine maintenance people,
62 ● Taggants in Explosives

and detect at the state-of-the-art parts-pertrillion level, it is unlikely that production

could be underway in less than 5 years.

If the instruments can be developed to perform as desired, however, they should be quite

effective; the operating costs and false alarm

rates would be negligible while the detection

rate would ensure essentially no successful

penetration of the sensor system.

UNTAGGED DETECTION

Three general methods have been explored

for detecting explosives that do not have detection taggants added. These include vapor

detection of the characteristic vapors present

in the explosives, the use of differential contrast radiography, and the use of excitation induced emissions. Some of the specific techniques investigated are briefly discussed

below.

Vapor Detection

A great deal of research effort has been expended in the field of detection of the characteristic vapors emitted by explosives. Table 17

shows the physical properties of the vapor

phase of a number of explosive materials,

while table 18 shows some of the methods

used to detect the explosive vapors. ’ Much of

the effort has been concerned with characterizing the vapors that are present in explosives,

looking for vapors common to a number of explosive materials, and quantifying the problems of vapor detection. While the equilibrium

concentrations of the vapors shown in table 17

are within the detection capabilities of much

of the instrumentation depicted in table 18,

several problems limit the utility of vapor detection.

One of the primary problems is the lack of a

common vapor in the various explosive materials. Either nitroglycerine or EGDN is often

present in dynamites, and in smokeless powders, but neither are present in the other explosive materials used in criminal bombings,

such as gels, slurries, black powder, detonat-

‘From “Explosive Vapor Detection Instrumentation, ” by j R

Hobbs, prtnted In the Proceedings of the 1979 Electro Professional Program, New York, April 1979

ors, and boosters. A detection device would

thus have to be able to detect a significant variety of vapors (and thus either be quite slow or

expensive) or it would be subject to a high rate

of false alarms if it could be triggered by the

spectrum of materials that would be spanned

by the vapors from the common explosive materials.

A second significant problem is the amount

of vapor actually available for detection.

While the equilibrium concentrations of the

vapors are high enough to ensure detection,

the actual amount of vapor present will be significantly degraded by the container that contains the explosive, particularly if an effort is

made to create a vapor barrier. The explosive

vapors do not have the properties of penetration and nonadsorption of the vapor taggant

materials discussed in the previous section.

Concentration of the vapors could help alleviate this problem, but that might cause sufficient concentration of ambient interference

molecules to generate a high false alarm rate.

These defects must be balanced against the

major advantage that detection of the characteristic vapors of explosives has over the detection of taggant vapors —only those explosives

that have been tagged can be detected if the

sensors are designed to look for the vapor taggant.

As shown in table 18, a large number of

physical principles have been used to detect

the vapors. The most successful, however, are

the ionization mechanisms exploited for detection of taggant vapors. Continued research is

primarily devoted to these sensors.

Animal detection deserves a specific comment. Although less sensitive than the other
Ch. 111—Taggant Research Review . 63

Table 17.–Vapor Pressures of Selected Explosives

Vapor pressure Composition

Compound Molecular weight Temperature 0 C mm Hg gm/cm3

EGDN–ethylene glycol dmltrat e 152 25 2,8 X 10-2 23 x 1 0 7

NG–nitroglycerine . 227 25 2,4 X 1O-s 29 x 10-10

PETN–pentaerythrltol tetranltraie’ ., . . 316 25 54 x 10”6 9.2 X 10 II

AN–ammonium nitrate 80 25 5.0 x 10”6 2.2 x 1011

DNT–dinitrotluene , . 182 25 1 4 x 10”4 1,4 x 109

TNT–2, 4, 6,-trinitrotoluene. ~ 227 25 30 x 10”6 37 x 10”11

R D X 222 25 1.4 x 109 1.7 x 1014

Mole fraction

(V. P./76O)

37 ppm

32 ppb

7 ppb

7 ppb

184 ppb

4 ppb

2 ppt

SOURCE J R Hobbs Explosive Vapor Dection Instrumentations`

Table 18.–Explosive Vapor Detection Techniques

Optical Ionization Animals Other

Infrared Electron capture Bioluminescence Plezoelectnc

Ultraviolet Gas chromatography Dogs Thermoionic

Microwave Mass spectrometry Gerbils Condensation nuclei

Fluorescence Gas chromatography/ Enzymes

Laser- raman mass spectrometry

Two-photon absorption Plasma chromatography

Chemiluminescence

Laser optoacoustical

SOURCE J R Hobbs Explosive Vapor Detection Instrumentations

sensors (by orders of magnitude), animals have

some potential advantages. If small animals

such as rats and gerbils can successfulIy detect

explosive vapors, then the cost of an animal

backup system would be quite small. Dogs are

more expensive to train and work with, but

have the advantage of being used for other law

enforcement work such as patrols.

Differential Contrast Radiography

Differential contrast radiography takes advantage of the fact that different materials attenuate the strength of a source to a different

degree, depending primarily on density and

atomic number. Common clinical X-rays and

the imaging X-ray detectors used to screen

hand baggage at airports work on this principle. Similar devices have been fabricated using

gamma radiation and neutrons as the beam

source. This method is quite effective for detecting materials whose density is significantly

greater than other materials in the environment, such as a steel gun (specific gravity of

7.8) in a briefcase containing books or clothes

(specific gravity less than 1,0), but is much less

effective in detecting smaller differences in

density. Most dynamites have a specific gravity of approximately 1.6; booster materials and

military explosives are SIightly higher (up to

1,8); gunpowders have a bulk density of less

than 1.0.

The current imaging systems at airports are

operator-monitored and therefore dependent

on the ability of the poorly trained operator to

discriminate small density differences. Most

recent research has been concerned with automating the radiographic scannin g systems.

Due to the wide span in density of explosive

materials, and the large density overlap between explosives and other materials, it is

necessary to include other means of discrimination in the detection algorithm. Shape is the

other discriminant currently used. The pattern

recognition algorithm in a computer reacts

when the proper density and shape pattern are

detected. Such a system is sensitive to orientation, arrangement, and shape of the high explosive as well as to the mass of the high explosive. The breadboard laboratory models so far

developed can incorporate only a limited

number of shape-density combinations and are

able to detect only certain shapes of C-4 explo-
64 “ Taggants in Explosives

sive and certain shapes of dynamite bombs.

While they could detect a 2-lb C-4 charge

shaped like a package of butter, they would

not detect the same charge shaped as a sphere,

cylinder, pancake, or sausage, or even another

explosive of slightly different density shaped

in the butter package shape. As the devices

scan from only one axis, a 2-inch-thick slab

with a specific gravity of 0.5 looks much Iike a

l-inch-thick slab of density 1.0. Such a lack of

specificity not only generates high false

alarms, but explosives arranged in an unusual

shape would not be detected.

Two avenues of approach are being pursued

to try and alleviate the discrimination specificity problem. The first is to use more than one

energy level for the radiation source. Each

type of material has a different opacity to different radiation energies. If more than one energy source is used to illuminate the object,

then additional information about the material

is gained. Some recent work indicates substantial gains in information are possible using two

carefully chosen energy levels.

The second approach is to illuminate the

package along more than one scanning direction. The information gained can help generate

a better idea of both the package shape and its

density. In a technique called tomography, the

images formed by scanning from several directions are computer processed and used to generate a three-dimensional image of the package in the computer. Any two-dimensional projection can then be generated as well as an accurate density value. This image can be compared to all possible conformations of common explosive materials by the computer,

yielding a much higher probability of detection as well as a lower false alarm rate. Aerospace Corp. is currently sponsoring research on

dual-energy tomography, which would combine the additional information available from

both multiple directional scans and multiple

energy scans.

Excitation-Induced Emissions

Many materials absorb radiation of a specific wavelength and subsequently emit an induced radiation whose energy may be a function of the element itself or of the specific

compound, due to the interaction of the orbital electrons with the nuclear material. The

Mossbauer isotope taggants described in the

previous section were an example. Several

methods of utilizing induced emissions have

been investigated for detection of explosives,

including the use of thermal neutrons, X-ray

fIuorescence, and nuclear magnetic resonance.

The thermal neutron detection concept utilizes the capture of thermal neutrons by nitrogen with the subsequent prompt emission of a

10.8 MeV gamma ray. Explosives are rich in nitrogen and should be easily detected in an unshielded suitcase, but so are a large number of

other materials, such as wool, orlon, nylon,

and leather. Coupling the system to a pattern

recognition computer might be sufficient to

discriminate between a solid block of explosives and a couple of orlon sweaters (although

test results were marginal), but discrimination

between these sweaters and a bomb in which

single dynamite sticks are connected by detonating cord, for instance, would be extremely

difficult. Processing times for this concept are

also rather long for efficient transport of baggage.

Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) is a

technique with considerably greater specificity. In NMR detection, an applied radio frequency magnetic field, with the correct frequency, induces energy level transitions in hydrogen, with the subseq~ent prompt reradiation of energy in a manner specific to the

chemical compound containing the hydrogen.

A sensor, tuned to receive the signals that

would be emitted by the hydrogen in various

explosive materials, could theoretically detect

any type of explosive, even when present in

small quantities. A major problem with the

utilization of this technique for explosive

detection would be the fact that metal interferes with the NMR performance, thus shielding the explosive. The unit would also have to

be quite large (and thus expensive); the magnet

for an NMR unit large enough to scan a suit-
Ch, 111—Taggant Research Review . 65

case would weigh several tons. Another problem is the rather slow response cycle time.

Summary

A number of techniques have been described for the detection of untagged explosives. Preliminary testing has been accomplished on most of the techniques discussed;

few concepts have progressed as far as the

studies on detecting vapor taggants, with the

exception of the use of animals to detect the

characteristic vapors of explosive materials.

Some explosive detection devices are currently

on the market, although their performance is

not satisfactory. Other techniques have been

suggested, and extremely Iimited testing has

been conducted on some of them. All of the

untagged detector concepts contain significant problems in terms of adaptation to field

use. Instrumentation for many of the concepts

would be large and expensive; many are easily

countermeasure and none, with the except ion

of the vapor detection devices, could be used

to screen passengers.

Granting the many problems in nontagged

detection, there may still be a significant potential payoff. If an explosive detection instrument or technique could be fielded, it could

detect all explosives, not just those to which

taggants had been added.

CURRENT BATF/AEROSPACE TAGGANT PROGRAM

I n 1976, the Aerospace Corp. was designated

by BATF as the system technical manager of

the taggant program. Prior milestones leading

to the current taggant program development

effort were:

1973.–Joint establishment by BATF and

FAA of an ad hoc committee on explosives seeding.

1973.–Formation of the Advisory Committee on Explosives Tagging chaired by

BATF for coordination of Federal agencies involved with tagging and the control

of the illegal use of explosives.

1973.–Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

study to determine feasibility of identification tagging with Aerospace Corp. acting as the program technical manager and

LEAA as sponsor.

1976.–National Implementation Model

and Pilot Test Plan for Identification Tagging developed by the Aerospace Corp.

u rider contract to the Bureau of Mines,

1977.–Aerospace Corp. designated the

system technical manager for the tagging

program by BATF.

Since 1977, Aerospace has been engaged in

an ongoing program of analysis and testing to

develop identification and detection taggants

and to demonstrate their use in explosive materials. Details of the taggant and sensor development programs were given above; the status

of the compatibiIity testing program is detailed in chapter IV; the status of survivability

and recovery testing is reviewed in the following section and in appendix C; some details of

the analysis and pilot testing status are reviewed in chapter V. This information is briefly

summarized below, as is a description of the

BATF implementation philosophy.

Program Status

The status of the taggant development effort is summarized in table 19 for identification taggants and in table 20 for detection taggants. In the tables, “Technical feasibility”

refers to a demonstration or analysis which indicates the concept is feasible, “Technical

read i ness ” refers to a demonstration or analysis that the concept will work in the manner

suggested, and “Practical readiness” indicates

that the full spectrum of analyses and tests has

been completed which shows that the concept

is ready for full-scale implementation.

The ability of the 3M Co, to produce the

color-coded taggants has been demonstrated,
66 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table 19.–ldentification Taggant Program Status

Accomplished I Planned or required

Technical feasibility Technical readiness Practical readiness 1 Technical feasibility Technical readiness Practical readiness

Color-coded taggant development

● Initial survivability ● Pilot production ● Leadyime study

compatibility compatibility

testing

● Environmental impact assessment

● Health impact

assessment

Cap-sensitive packaged explosives (dynamite, water gels, slurries,

I

I

I

I

1 0

● Tooling-up period/

testing

 Optimize hues

and emulsions)

● Initial compatibihty

testing

● Initial survivability

testing

● Manufacturing

process reviewed

and practicality

assessed

Black powders

● Initial compatibility

testing

● Hand-mix survwability testing

● Manufacturing

process reviewed

and practicality

assessed

Cast boosters

● Initial compatibility

testing

● Initial survivability

testing

● Manufacturing

process reviewed

and practicahty

assessed

Online tagging

demonstrated

Tagging methods

selected/evaluated

● Pilot test production-level tagging

● Record/tracing

methods demonstrated

● Some ballistics

testing

Comprehensive

compatibility testing

Comprehensive survivability testing

● Analysis/optimization of approach

 Long-term compatibility

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Online tagging

Additional compatibility (electrostatic) testing

Transport/vibration

segregation testing

Comprehensive compatibility testingComprehenswe survivability testing● Ballistics testing

● Online tagged survivability testing

 Long-term segregation

● Long-term compatibility

Online tagging

Tagging methods

selected/evaluated

Solution of problem

posed by reactivity

(and presumed incompatibility) with

Composition B

Comprehensive compatibility testing

Recovery testing

Comprehensive survivability testing

● Pilot testing, production-level tagging

● Long-term compatt-

●

●

bility

Comprehensive survivability testing

Record/tracing

methods

demonstrated

Analysis/optimization of approach

Comprehensive survivability/compati -

bility testing

Pilot testing

●

Detonating cord

● Taggants added by

hand, initial

surwvability demonstrated

● Manufacturing

process studied and

tagging practicability assessed

Smokeless powders

● Hand-mix survivability testing

Recovery testing Tagging station

development

● Online tagging

●

Solution of problem ● Evaluation testing

of sequential lots

● Production hazard

and acceptance

testing

● Comprehensive survivability testing

● Online tagging

Ballistics testing

I posed by reactivity Pilot testing

 (and presumed in-

 compatibility) with

I Herco” powder

● Compatibility and

hazards analysis

 . Compatibility and

acceptance testing

Detonators

— I

I Full range 01 tests and process evaluation required

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
Ch. 111—Taggant Research Review ● 6 7

Table 20.–Detection Taggant Program Status

Accomplished I Planned or required

Technical Practical I

Technical feasibility readiness readiness 1 Technical feasibility Technical readiness Practical readiness

Microcapsule development

 Production and evaluation of test batches

● Health and atmospheric

Impact assessment

Dynamite, slurries, and water gels

● Compatibility testing —

initiated

Black powder

● Compatibility testing —

initated

Cast Boosters

● Compatlblllty testing —

I

10

10

I

1 0

I

I —

Intial compatibility studies ● Pilot production of capsules ●

Complete health and atmospheric Impact assessment ●

Taggant selection

●

Competitive award /leadtime

studies

Development and testing

of production

Full-scale production capability

initiated The full range of analyses and tests detailed for identification taggants must be accomplished

Smokeless powder for the detection taggants, with the exception of postdetonation surivability

● Compatibility testing— — and recovery testing

initiated

Detonating cord

— —

Detonators

● Compatibility testing

Initiated

Continuous electron capture detector

● Successful bread- —

board demonstration

● Instrument characterization (initiated)

● Callbration system

(initiated)

I

I — I

I

I

I

I —

I

10

IMS detector I

● Initial feasibility

studies

I

/

I

I

I

I10

I

I

I

I

I

I

MS detector

● High-cost laboratory

system testing

● Development and

breadboard demonstration—in process

Instrument characterization (in process)

Calibration (in process)

Demonstration

(Imminent)

Development and breadboard demonstration

to be completed

● Design prototype

● Fab and lab test

evaluation

● Aerospace lab test

● Design prototype

● Fab and lab test

prototype

● Aerospace lab test

 Prototype field test

 Prototype design,

fabrication, and test

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Prototype field test

Prototype design changes

Final production drawings

Production pilot release

Production pilot complete

Field support function setup

Training and field test

Prototype design changes

Production drawings

Manufacture and checkout

engineering

Production pilot release

Production pilot complete

Support functions setup

Training and field test

Prototype design changes

Production drawings

Manufacture and checkout

engineering

Production pilot release

Production pilot complete

Support functions setup

Training and field test

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

although some hue and color code optimiza- in detail, this initial testing has revealed aption remains, as well as construction of a facili- parent incompatibilities between the 3M tagty to produce the taggants. Initial compatibili- gant and one type of smokeless powder and

ty and survival testing has been completed for also between the 3M taggant and one cast

the cap-sensitive high explosives, as has pilot booster material. If and when these presumpproduction of tagged explosives and activation tions of incompatibility are removed, compreof the tracing network. As chapter IV describes hensive compatibility and survivability testing
68 . Taggants in Explosives

must then be completed and decisions made

on implementation levels before readiness is

demonstrated. A similar level of testing and

analysis has been accomplished for black powder, while significantly less has been accomplished for smokeless powder and cast boosters. One of the key remaining booster issues is

the recoverability of the taggants when

pressed into large pellets (survivability has

been demonstrated). Methods of approach

have been explored for tagging detonators and

detonating cord, but little testing has occurred.

The significant accomplishments in identification taggant compatibility testing which

have so far occurred have been made possible

by cooperation between the Aerospace Corp.

and the explosives and gunpowder industries.

Unfortunately, this working arrangement has

broken down in the past few months, and the

industry has, for a number of reasons, withdrawn its cooperation. The result of this

change in the prior working relationship has

been a significant delay in the program, particularly with regard to compatibility testing of

the detection taggants. The results of these delays, together with an originally planned lag of

approximately 1‘A years between the identification and detection taggant development efforts, are evident in the current status of the

detection taggant development program,

shown in table 20.

Development of candidate detection taggants is continuing. Taggants have only recently been added to explosive materials for compatibility testing and process evaluation. As

described previously, development of three

candidate sensors is also continuing, with laboratory-type tests showing prom i sing resuIts.

Projected Schedule

As a result of withdrawal of industry cooperation, technical problems which have occurred, and the uncertainty of funding for outyear efforts, a firm schedule for the remaining

development effort is not available. An estimate was made by Aerospace of the revised

schedule for the remaining development ef -

fort; the estimate is shown in table 21. This

schedule does not take into account, however,

the need for additional compatibility and survivability recovery tests, particularly the resolution of the current smokeless powder and

booster material reactivity issues, and the need

for the evaluation of long-term effects of taggants on explosive material safety and performance. These efforts would probably add

at least 1 year, and possibly more, to the development time. It is unlikely that the effort to

demonstrate the use of identification taggants

in cap-sensitive high explosives, the type of explosives with which the research effort has progressed farthest, could be completed prior to

early 1981. The research on identification taggants in detonators, including pilot-plant toolup and testing, would not likely be finished

before late 1983; the research on other explosive materials would probably fall between

these dates. These estimates assume a successful completion of each development stage.

Technical problems may occur that add substantially to the estimate delays; continued

lack of industry participation could make pilot

testing impossible; even resolution of contractual problems could add months of delay.

Table 21 ,–Revised Schedule Estimates for the

Identification Tagging Program

Aerospace preliminary

Program element estimated completion date a

Identification taggants

Color-coded taggan t Early 1983

Cap-sensitive packaged explosives ., Early 1980

Black powders. ., .,

Cast boosters ., ., ., Mid-1981

Detonating cord ... ., ., ., ., Mid-1980

Smokeless powders . , Mid-1983

Detonator ., . ., ., ., Late 1983

Detection taggants

Mlcrocapsule development . , Mid-1981

Cap-sensitive packaged explosives. ., Mid-1981

Black powde r Not critical

Cast boosters ., . 7

Smokeless powder, ... Late 1981

Detonating cord ., ., Not critical

Blastlng caps-micocapsules. . , ?

CECD ., ., Mid-1982

IMS detector. ., ., Late 1981

MS detector ., ., . ., Mid-1982

a Estimated by Aerospace October 1979

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
Ch. 111—Taggant Research Review ● 6 9

3M has indicated that it would need a leadtime of at Ieast 22 months after receipt of a

firm order before substantial quantities of taggants could be delivered. It is unlikely that a

firm order would be given before resolution of

all technical problems, including uncertainties

regarding long-term effects. If a mid-1 983 date

is assumed for resolution of al I identification

taggant efficacy and compatibility questions,

then explosives tagged with the 3M identification taggant could be in full-scale production

by late 1985.

A decision could be made to implement tagging as soon as all technical uncertainties are

resolved for some portion of the explosive materials, such as cap-sensitive explosives. Under

those circumstances, 3M could receive firm

orders by early 1981 and tagged explosives

could therefore be in full-scale production as

early as 1983,

The detection taggant development has

lagged that of identification taggants; the

development cycle may be shorter, however,

due both to the learning experience of the

identification taggant tests and to the fact that

no survivability demonstration is necessary.

The Aerospace Corp. estimates are probably

quite optimistic, however, for development

and test times of both the detection taggant

and the detection sensors, Few compatibility

tests have yet been conducted. These tests,

particularly the effects of long-term storage,

will take at least 2 years. No specific taggant or

encapsulation method has been chosen. Pilotplant production of the taggant is likely to

take a considerable time, as the manufacturing

processes are complex and the reagents used

quite reactive. It is unlikely that solving the

technical problems and constructing proper faciIities for the large-scale production of detection taggants can be accomplished in a significantly shorter period than that required for the

identification taggants. Assuming completion

of the compatibility tests, pilot-plant testing of

detection taggants in the explosive materials

could be accomplished by early 1983, and

assuming 22 months from that time to the

availability of production quantities of detection taggants, full-scale production of explosives containing detection taggants could

probably not be underway until mid-1 982, with

sometime in 1984 a more reasonable estimate.

As indicated previously, the estimated development schedule for the detection taggant

sensors is extremely optimistic; a more realistic

estimate would be that production of the sensors couId be underway by late 1984.

In summary, by early 1985 it is possible that

all explosives manufactured could be tagged

with both identification and detection taggants, and that detection taggant sensors

could be in fulI production. This schedule is

realizable only if no major development problems occur and a taggant program is mandated

by legislation,

Implementation Philosophy

BATF has publicly stated’ that it feels taggants should be included only in those explosive materials that constitute a present or expected threat of use by criminal bombers.

They feel that explosive materials that do not

constitute a threat could be excluded. Among

the materials which BATF considers appropriate for exclusion are:

1.

2.

3,

4.

explosives manufactured for U.S. Government agencies other than the military

(e.g., National Aeronautics and Space Administrate ion); military explosives are specificalIy excluded in S.333;

special fireworks such as used for 4th of

July displays;

industrial tools such as explosive bolts,

switches, and air bag in flaters;

blasting agents. It is the BATF intention to

tag the boosters and detonators normally

used to initiate the blasting agents. The

explosives industry maintains that if capsensitive explosives are tagged but blasting agents are not, the use of ANFO by

bombers will increase, and BATF will then

 Proposed Guidelines for Exemptions to the Requirements for

Tagging Explosive Materials Bureau of AIcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms, June 7, 1978
70 ● Taggants in Explosive s

5.

In

wish to tag ANFO. See chapters 1, 11, and

VI for a discussion of this issue; and

explosives which are raw materials used in

a fabrication process, such as the black

powder used infuzes.

addition to the categories eligible for exemption, certain types of explosive materials

are currently exempted from regulation, and

are viewed by BATF as inappropriate for tagging, including:

1. explosives used in medicine;

2. fireworks soId to the public;

3. propellant-activated industrial devices,

such as nail guns; and

4. fixed small arms ammunition.

Given that philosophy, the BAT F/Aerospace

team has concentrated on taggant research for

cap-sensitive high explosives (dynamites, gels,

emulsions, slurries), boosters, detonating cord,

black and smokeless powders directly consumed by the public (primarily for handloading), and detonators. Blasting agents would not

be directly tagged; rather the detonators and

boosters normally used to initiate the blasting

agents would be tagged.

A strict interpretation of S. 333, at least in

the opinion of the Institute of Makers of Explosives, would not allow the Secretary of the

Treasury to exempt explosives simply because

they do not constitute a significant threat.

Resolution of this issue may be facilitated by

more specific wording in the final proposed

legislation.

IDENTIFICATION TAGGANT SURVIVAL TESTING

The 3M identification taggant would have to

survive the detonation of the explosive and be

recoverable from the postdetonation debris to

be useful in identifying the source of the explosive. It is useful to separate the survival and

recovery discussions. Recovery of taggants under real-life conditions is discussed in detail in

chapter I I and in appendix C. Survival of the

taggant is briefly reviewed here.

To assess the survivability of taggants in explosives, the tests should be carried out so that

recovery is maximized. ideally, tests would

take place on a large concrete pad or in a very

large bunker with steel or concrete walls and

floor. Unfortunately, few of the survivability

tests carried out by the Aerospace Corp. were

done under conditions that enhanced recovery. A majority of the tests were carried out in

a 4-ft-diameter steel-walled chamber. For all

but the lowest power explosives, the taggants

either shattered upon impact or flowed plastically due to the large impact pressure pulse

(estimated by Aerospace to be between 10 and

40 kilobars (kb)). Many of the other tests were

carried out in a chamber with a cracked rock

floor, or in the open on a dirt and cinder floor.

I n several cases rain made the open area quite

muddy or covered the taggants with a layer of

water, severely decreasing the efficiency of the

magnetic pickup.

The survival test results for cap-sensitive

high explosives, under the varying conditions,

are gathered in table 22. That table includes all

the survival tests conducted by Aerospace with

uniformly tagged explosives. Earlier tests, in

which the explosive stick was split down the

center and salted, are not realistic and are not

discussed here. Some of the tests used unencapsulated taggants (so indicated on the

table); as no difference was observed, they are

lumped together in the discussion.

Aging time was another variable tested, with

the material being aged up to 6 months before

testing; again, no effect was observed and all

the tests are lumped together.

Given the diversity of test sites and conditions, it is difficult to assess each test. However, several trends appear clear:

1, Under optimum recovery conditions,

using small explosive charges, many hundreds of taggants survive, even for Power

Primer, the most powerful cap-sensitive
Ch. 111—Taggant Research Review . 71

Table 22.–3M Identification Taggant Survival Testing

Detonation

pressure Number of Tags recovered

Explosive K bars Explosive weight, lb Test site tests (averaqe)

Independent K -10-4 0

Coalite 8 S 30-40

Gel coa l -25-4 0

Gel power A-2 - 4 0

600/o Extra 50

Tovex 800 70

400/o giant gelatin 75

Specially sensitized

emulsion 100

Power Primer 135

1/2

1/2

10 (part of composite 25-lb charge)

3/4

10

1

10

‘/2

5 (Part of composite 25-lb charge)

‘/2

‘/2

‘/2

‘/2

1/2

1/2

1

1

10 (part of composite 25-lb charge)

25

25

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

commercial explosive (excluding boosters).

2. As the size of the charge increases, the

percent of surviving taggants decreases

sharply, particuIarly for the most powerful explosives, Under optimum conditions, however, dozens of taggants still

survive; even under rainy conditions 26

taggants were recovered from the 25-lb

Power Primer tests.

3. Confinement sharply decreases survival,

even under optimum recovery conditions.

Only one test has been conducted with explosives confined in a pipe bomb (see

chapter I I discussion); in that test scores

of taggants were recovered from 60 Percent Extra Dynamite. When that result is

compared to the chamber survival tests

(in which over 1,000 taggants were recovered from 60 Percent Extra) it appears IikeIy that considerably fewer taggants would

survive in pipe born b detonations using

one of the more powerful explosives.

4-ft diameter steel chamber

4-ft diameter steel chamber

Open air, dirt, cinder floor

4-ft diameter steel chamber

10-ft cube concrete chamber, rock floor

4-ft diameter steel chamber

10-ft cube concrete chamber, rock floor

12x 20x 8 ft concrete bunker

4-ft diameter steel chamber

Open air, dirt, cinder floor

12x 20x 8 ft concrete bunker

4-ft diameter steel chamber

12x 20x 8 ft concrete bunker

4-ft diameter steel chamber

4-ft diameter steel chamber

12x 20x 8 ft concrete bunker

4-ft diameter steel chamber

500 x 100 ft concrete pad

Open air, dirt, cinder floor

Open air, muddy, cinder floor

500 x 100 ft concrete pad, rainy day

2

10

1

7

1

8

1

3

9

1

6

5

6

12

11

13

6

6

1

1

1

1,000

1,000

180

75

4

115

10

1,450

(unencapsulated)

1,160

58

1,390

(unencapsulated)

16

(some tests with

encapsulated, some

unencapsulated)

545

620

16

510

(unencapsulated)

3

530

4

0

26

Boosters, Military Exp osives

Commercial boosters are normally made

from cast TNT or TNT-based explosives. These

explosives have higher detonation pressures

than even the most powerful cap-sensitive

commercial explosives (180-200 kb v. 135 kb).

Calculations by the Aerospace Corp. show that

taggants will be raised above 4000 C, their decomposition temperature, by booster explosives. Testing showed fewer than two taggants

recovered per pound of booster, even for tests

conducted under ideal conditions on a large

concrete pad. The Aerospace solution to the

problem is to press the individual taggants and

polyethylene into a large pellet (one-fourth

inch). Tests show that approximately 65 taggants survive in a pound booster when pelletized into a one quarter-inch-diameter pellet.

Initial recovery tests indicate that the taggants

from boosters can be recovered, but far too

few tests have been completed to allow a definitive judgment.
72 ● Taggants in Explosives

Military explosives are generally at least as

energetic as boosters, presenting even more severe survival problems for the taggants. Due to

the survival issue

military explos

use in criminal

to include military

program.

, the excessive cost of tagging

ives and their low frequency of

bombings, BATF does not pIan

tary explosives in the taggant

Black and Smokeless Powders

Black and smokeless powders are much less

energetic than the least energetic dynamite.

Gunpowders are normally used as fillers for

pipe bombs, however, so the effect of confinement is expected to be considerable, Tests with

both black and smokeless powders were conducted in a 20-ft semicircular chamber having

steel walls but a sand floor. Due to the poor

recovery conditions, only 2 to 3 dozen taggants were recovered for the black powder

bombs, and from O to 3 for the smokeless powder. When black powder bombs were detonated under near ideal recovery conditions,

using the 8 ‘ x 12 ‘ x 20 ‘ bunker, an average

of 1,100 taggants survived 1 lb of the FFFg

powder. No ideal recovery tests have been

conducted with smokeless powders, but the

one pipe bomb test with explosives gives an indication that scores to hundreds of taggants

should survive.

Detonators and Detonating Cord

Only the most rudimentary tests have been

conducted of the survival of identification taggants when placed on a detonator and none

conducted with detonating cord. As the taggants are placed outside of the explosive in

both cases, sufficient taggants should survive

to enable a positive trace to be made. How

likely the taggants are to be recovered in realworld s ituat ions, however, cannot be ascertained without testing.

Summary

In summary, the 3M identification taggants

survive the detonation of cap-sensitive high explosives in large numbers for small charges

which are unconfined. Survival decreases as

the charge size increases, but sufficient taggants should survive even a large charge of the

most energetic commercial explosive. The effect of confinement significantly reduces taggant survival, but taggants can probably survive pipe bombs filled with low-energy explosives and gunpowder; their survival in pipe

bombs filled with higher energy explosives is

uncertain. Individual taggants do not survive

booster detonation but pellets made from the

taggants do. Taggants wou Id probably survive

the explosion of detonators and detonating

cord, but there is little or no test data.
. .

Chapter IV

TAGGANT SAFETY AND

COMPAT BILITY REVIEW
* .

9 *.**. *
Chapter IV

TAGGANT SAFETY AND COMPATIBILITY REVIEW

The addition of identification and detection taggants to explosive materials

would constitute a significant change to the material qualification program is

therefore necessary to investigate the compatibility of the explosive materials with

the taggants. This chapter briefly discusses the involved in compatibility, describes qualification procedures in industry and for defense applications, suggests the form. that a qulification program should take to demonstrate the

compatibility of taggants with explosives and gunpowders , and describes the compatibilitytesting that has been reported to date.

EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS COMPATIBILITY PARAMETERS

Explosive materials are chemical systems

that I iberate a large amount of energy in an extremely short time. The detailed physical and

chemical behavior of these reactants is not

well-understood, due to the complexity of

some of the reactants and the very short reaction time scale. However, the principal measurable parameters of the materials and their

reactions are well-known. To demonstrate

compatibility of the explosive materials with

the taggants, it is necessary to show that there

is no significant change in these parameters as

a result of the addition of taggants. The principal parameters include:

● energy density and rate of release,

● sensitivity,

● chemical stability,

75
76 ● Taggants in Explosives

● electrical properties,

● generalized mechanical properties, and

● toxicity.

Energy Density and Rate of Release

The energy density and rate of energy release are the two most important performance

attributes of commercial explosives and gunpowder. Energy density is a fundamental

chemical property of the explosive material

formulation. The available energy of a given

explosive material is well-understood, and it

can be measured with a high degree of accuracy and reliability. It can also be calculated

quite accurately from the basic chemical

knowledge of a particular formulation. The

presence of the small amounts of taggants that

are currently recommended should have only

a minute effect. Limited testing has borne out

this conclusion. 1 2

Generally speaking, the higher energy density explosives tend to be easier to initiate and

tend to progress to a fast energy release or

detonation more quickly. Primary explosives

used in caps are an exception. They are easy to

initiate, and build to detonation very rapidly,

but do not always have a high energy density.

The rate of energy release is a function of

the materials involved and the physical proximity of the fuel and oxidizer components.

When the fuel and oxidizer are in the same

molecule, as in nitroglycerine, the explosive

can release its energy on a millionth of a second time scale. Ammonium nitrate/fuel oil

mixtures, on the other hand, contain rather

large, separated fuel and oxidizer components

and thus release their energy on a much slower

time scale. The physical proximity of the components also tends to affect sensitivity; the intimately connected materials are generally

more sensitive than the gross mixtures. The

balance of fuel to oxidizer directly affects the

1

1 etter, R E Lunn (Du Pent) to C [30yars (Aerospace), “Tagging — Du Pent Pilot Te~t S~tety and stabil Ity Tests, ” Mar 6,

1978, pp 5-17, 5-41, 5-42

‘C Hovar$, CornpatIbI/Ity of /derrf/f/cat/on Taggant\ W ItfI Exp/o~Ive\, Aerospac e report No AT E!-78( 1860-02}1 ND, August

1978

energy density and sensitivity of the explosive

material. The balance that yields idealized

combustion products generally yields the

highest energy and most sensitive explosives.

The rate of energy release cannot be predicted quantitatively from basic physical and

chemical considerations but it can be estimated in a qualitative way. Energy release rate

can be measured accurately but the test methods can be quite expensive and difficult. A

few hundredths of a percent by weight of taggants should not affect the energy release rate.

Sensitivity

Sensitivity is an ill-defined term which has

meaning in a safety sense, but is not definable

with simple direct physical constants. One relative sensitivity scale can be developed from

impact and friction tests, another scale from

electrochemical reactions, and still another

from thermal considerations. All aspects of

reactions to external stimuli must be considered and judged with respect to practical experience. Then with a variety of “sensitivity “

numbers and functions a systems safety estimate is made — not always totally scientificalIy

but with an additional input from experience

and common sense.

Sensitivity tests are referenced and discussed in other sections of this report, but the

individual numbers are not in themselves the

final criteria. It is their sum total plus experience which determines sensitivity.

Chemical Stability

Chemical stability is a critical safety parameter, of paramount importance in the handling,

transportation, and storage of the raw materials that go into making explosives and gunpowder and in the manufacture, handling, transportation, storage, and use of the final explosive product. The stability of the explosive

products cannot be adequately predicted ana-

‘.Sa/ety and Performance Tests for Qual/t/cat/on oi Exp/o\/ves,

I Kablk, (NSWC, WO), R Strefau (Stre$du Ldboratorles, I nc ),

K R Hamilton (NWC), J Jones, (NWC), N~vord 0[1 44811, VOI 1,

January 197.2
Ch. /V— Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review 77

Iytically, but must be confirmed by tests that

demonstrate the stability behavior of the products, such as long-term rates of decomposition,

interact ions between the explosive components, and reaction with materials into which

they are likely to come into contact during

manufacture, packaging, and end use. As an

example, picric acid and ammonium picrate,

rather powerful high explosives, which are insensitive and generally quite safe, were once

used extensively. When these explosives come

into contact with copper or copper salts, however, they become quite sensitive; their use is,

therefore, now quite limited.

Electric Properties

The sensitivity of initiation of explosives by

static electricity and/or induced currents has

always been a major concern. There are several modes of initiation due to electrical energy.

One, inductive coupling, is serious enough to

preclude the use of electric blasting caps in

some operations. Direct initiation by static

spark discharges is another mode, The energy

of an electric field can be coupled to an explosive device in other ways, for example, by thermal heating of a wire or capacitance effects,

The primaries, lead styphnate and lead azide,

are extremely sensitive to electric effects. Dry

nitrocellulose and black powder are also very

sensitive. Most cap-sensitive high explosives

and generalIy used blasting agents are not particularly sensitive to electric forces. Addition

of taggants to the explosive materials could

cause a change in their electrical properties;

buildup of a static charge during the addition

of the taggant to the mix could be one mode.

As analytical methods are not adequate to

handle the problem, tests are normally conducted.

Generalized Mechanical Properties

The relationship of mechanical properties to

explosive safety has only recently been understood to be of paramount importance, Experience and intuition led the industry into explosive formulations that were not ideal chemically, but have proven safe and economical.

Most, but not all, commercial explosives are

rather soft granuIes, rubbery or gelatinous substances, or sometimes Iiquid-like.

When soft substances are subjected to impact the mechanical forces are not concentrated in a smalI volume and they dissipate as

low-level thermal waves. Stiff, brittle materials

experience strong fast compression or shock

waves under impact conditions that locally

produce high-energy concentrations. Local

high-energy concentrations create hot spots.

This means that a hot spot can be a center of

intense chemical reaction and therefore, in an

explosive composition, a region of fast energy

release. Thus, an initiation center is created

when the rate of energy release exceeds its

dissipation. Grit or hard substances can create

local hot spots under handling conditions present in the mixing and packaging processes, and

especially in operations such as explosive

tamping in the bore hole. As an example, a

small number of hard particles has been demonstrated to critically sensitize certain military

explosives in United Kingdom la boratories. 4

The danger of hot-spot creation may be even

greater for more, brittle explosives, such as

those used in cast boosters.

The effects of adding taggants to explosives

could be simulated using complex hydro-elastic-plastic computer codes, but the calculations would be quite expensive. In addition,

lack of sufficient data on the detailed physical

properties of the various materials would tend

to limit the reliability of such calculations. Experimental testing must therefore be undertaken.

Toxicity

The decomposition products of explosive reactions are generalIy toxic; standard precautionary measures must be taken to avoid excessive exposure. The materials used in the

taggants are generally not mutagenic or carcinogenic. Tests must be conducted to evaluate the toxicity of any taggant materials
78 ● Taggants in Explosives

whose properties are not well-known, and to

determine if the end-product gases show addiQUALIFICATION

A new explosive compound or formulation

must be subjected to an extensive series of

tests before it can be qualified for use an d

manufacture. The number and nature of the

tests differ between various manufacturers of

commercial explosives and between commercial manufacturers and Government developers such as the Department of Defense (DOD)

and the Department of Energy (DOE). Tests are

specifically designed for the explosive product, the environment it will be subjected to,

and its end use. It follows that an extensive

battery of tests are required for each explosive.

Interpretation of the tests, including the validity of some prescribed ones, is not straightforward and a single number derived from a test

or tests cannot alone define its safety. The

closest that one can come to a measure of explosive safety is the long-term accident record.

[t is important to realize that experience plays

a role equal to good scientific understanding

and execution of prudent, conservative practices. The decisionmaking process as to

whether or not the new explosive and process

of manufacture are safe is therefore unique to

each organization.

In general, the qualification procedures described in this section are those followed by

agencies or companies that routinely develop

new explosives or significant modifications of

existing explosives, including Government

agencies such as DOD and DOE and some

manufacturers of commercial explosives.

Companies that rarely develop new products

do not generally need a comprehensive qualification program. Within those organizations

that do have a comprehensive program, the

complexity, qualification time, and cost vary

considerably, due to differing manufacturing

procedures and end uses. As an example, complete qualification of a new military explosive

can take several years with a total cost of

many m i I I ions of dolIars.

tional toxicity as a result of the addition of taggants to explosive products.

OF EXPLOSIVES

NAVORD Report OD 44811 specifies safety

and performance tests for qualification of explosives for the Navy. There is also a Joint

Service Safety and Performance Manual used

by all three services. The DOE procedures are

similar to the DOD ones but are not documented in a single manual. Each plant and laboratory has its own rules and specifications approved by the director. There are certain procedures and test methods that are common to

all, however, which are briefly discussed in this

sect ion.

The initial testing is done on small quantities

on a laboratory scale, usually less than a gram.

Drop weight impact tests are always done, followed by friction and thermal test such as

DTA, DSC, Taliani, or others. The results of a

statistically significant number of tests are

then compared with known standard explosives. If the tests give satisfactory results, then

a laboratory or plant level management decision, usually backed up by a safety committee

review, will give a go ahead to make limited

quantities sufficient to do the preliminary performance tests such as detonation velocity,

detonation pressure, and shock sensitivity.

These tests usually require several pounds of

the new explosive to complete. At this stage

more elaborate chemical compatibility and

thermal stability tests are also run along with

some accelerated aging tests. The small-scale

laboratory tests are repeated at this stage and

compared with the original results. Unless all

test results are satisfactory, further work on

the new explosive will be stopped.

If results are satisfactory and if the performance is as desired then a management decision beyond the laboratory level will generally be made to proceed with Iimited pilot production. As much as several hundred pounds

may be involved. It is at this stage that manufacturing hazards are assessed. Special tests

will usually evolve at this stage that will relate
Ch. IV—Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review ● 7 9

to the actual manufacturing equipment such

as pipe diameter in which a liquid explosive or

slurry will or wilI not propogate a detonation.

Exact details of equipment and controls are

then reviewed. In the case of addition of taggants there is the possibility of buildup of the

material in some part of the mixing or cartridge-loading machinery. Consideration is

given to fail-safe controls in the event of power

failures or other equipment failures. Transportation of raw materials and finished product

within the plant is planned. Barricades and remote control are planned where required. For

example, the pressing of booster pellets of

Tetryl or PETN is a hazardous operation and

must be done by remote control and the press

itself barricaded so that no personnel are exposed in case of an accidental explosion. Storage in magazines must also be planned.

If the new product has passed its performance and safety requirements in the pilot

study, a parallel effort of evaluating the new

explosive in its use environment is made. Here

DOD and DOE differ significantly from industry. Military weapons are subjected to many

extreme environments and the finished weapon with the new or modified explosive must

undergo special safety testing to qualify it.

Commercial explosives generally are used in

somewhat more benign environments and the

end-use safety testing is more limited and less

expensive. End-use testing is required for permissible explosives (i. e., explosives that have

been approved by the Bureau of Mines for use

in underground coal mining operations). Their

cap sensitivity, toxic fume production, and

failure diameter must be established. For example, the minimum size bore hole required

for a particular permissible explosive to function properly must be determined, as well as

the safety of use in the underground coal environment (incendivity testing).

Samples from pilot production must, at this

stage, be submitted to the Department of

Transportation (DOT) for determination of

shipping category. DOT has stated that addition of taggants does not change the shipping

category of the explosives used in the program. 5

The aspects of quality control are addressed

during the pilot phase of development. Chemical and physical test specifications are established to control all component raw materials.

Incoming taggants must be examined for foreign material and their code verified. If the

taggants are gritty, such as the Westinghouse

ceramic particles, there must be assurance

that each taggant is properly coated with the

desensitizing polyethylene or wax. Similarly,

sampling and test schemes for product quality

assurance are set up at this stage.

In some cases a company’s management

may decide that the change involved in the

new explosive is smalI and complete requalif ication is not required. The extensive experience the management has developed in the

history of its plant and products makes this, in

many cases, an acceptable procedure. Although taggants would be added in only a

smal I amount by weight, their use in explosives

is sufficiently different from other constituents

that it is the general consensus of manufacturers and other parties that addition of taggants will require complete requalification of

al I tagged explosives.

Description of Qualification Tests

Normally Performed

Testing of explosives involves a wide variety

of tests which must ascertain chemical composition, performance, sensitivity, and stability.

Chemical composition analysis is a dominating

factor since it is obvious that the manufacturer

and user must know what he is using and what

he has made. Chemical analysis methods are

not the direct concern here, as taggants

change the composition little, but it is to be

emphasized that knowledge of the chemical

composition must be a part of qualification

assessment.

‘Letter, P J Student (As$oc of Amer Railroads) to R B Moler

(Aerospace), June 27,1977
80 ● Taggants in Explosives

There is a large number of tests that are specific to evaluation of an explosive product.

The details of these tests are given in several

sources. 6 10 The most commonly used tests are

briefly described below.

Performance

Performance is determined by measuring

detonation velocity, detonation pressure, pressure rise rate, shock sensitivity, and failure diameter in explosives and ballistic properties

such as burn rate, muzzle velocity, and chamber pressure in gunpowder. The addition of

smalI amounts of inert material to an explosive

probably will not effect its performance sign if i cant I y; however, performance must be

demonstrated. Detonation velocity measurements consist of placing electric probes in

precisely measured positions, detonating the

explosive, and measuring the time that it takes

the detonation front to pass between the

probes with high-speed electronic equipment. 11 12 Initiation or shock sensitivity tests

are done by separating a donor explosive from

the test acceptor explosive by a measured gap.

The gap is varied until a 50-percent probability

of explosion of the acceptor explosive is estab

Iished.

Detonation pressure and pressure rise rate

are measured by inserting transducers into the

explosive material and recording the resultant

pressures on fast response rate electronic

equipment. Critical diameter testing, to establish the failure diameter of an explosive material, is accomplished by attempting to detonate varying diameters of the explosive. The

6“Safety and Performance Te\t\, op c it

‘)o/nt Service .Sa/et y anci Performance Manual tor Qua//i/cat/on

of ~ xp/o JILw\ for M///tar y U\P (Ch ln,~ Lake, Ca I If Nava I Wea pens

Center, September 1971 )

‘G R Walker, CARDE, Canada, E G Whltbread, ERDE, United

K Ingdom, D C Horning, NSWC/WO, U S A , The Technica/ Cooperation Program Manual of Sensitiveness Tests, TTCP Panel

0-2, February 1966

“K R tlecker, C M Ma\on, ~nd R W Wat\on, Bureau o f

M)nef /n~trurnentec/ /mpact Tester (Bureau ot Mines) RI 7670 ,

1972

‘“R W Wdtson, (arci(;ap and Pro/ecti/e /mpact Senslflvity

Measurements, a compilation, 1 C 8605, 1971

‘ ‘Safety and Performance Tes(~, op clt

‘‘~ M Mason and t G Alken, Methods for [ valuatlng Explo

~lve$ and Ha/ardou\ Mater/a/$ (Pltt\burg Mlnlng and Safety Research Center, Bureau of Mine\), report No 1 (“ 8541, 1971

diameter at which 50 percent of the tests propagate to a high-order detonation is the critical

or failure diameter.

The chamber pressure of gunpowder is

measured by the use of spherical copper crush

gauges or by transducers placed in the chamber. Burn rate is measured by a variety of

methods, often by placing the powder in aVgroove, igniting one end, and measurin g t h e

velocity by high-speed camera, thermocouple,

or pressure transducers. The muzzle velocity

of the propelled projectiles can be measured

by a variety of methods, including photography and make or break switches.

Impact

Impact tests, although variable in nature

and sometimes difficult to interpret, are critically important; their relationship to safety is

obvious. They quickly provide information

that categorizes the level of hazard of an explosive composition. They normally are used

to tell if significant differences exist between

explosive samples. Impact tests are not infallible and the results must be considered in relation to other type testing.

Impact tests range from laboratory-scale

tests involving less than 35 mg to large-scale

drop tests amounting to as much as 50 kg. As

indicated previously, the initial tests would be

laboratory-scale tests.

All laboratory impact machines are similar

in principle. The energy source is a free-falling

weight which impacts the explosive sample

through a mechanical linkage. Criteria are established for distinguishing between positive

and negative responses. The criteria differ for

various laboratories so comparisons are only

valid when made in a single laboratory. The

tests consist of dropping the weight from varying heights onto samples of test explosives

placed between them — sample weights are

usualIy about 50 to 100 mg. The results are recorded as a go or no-go. A statistical analysis

of the data determines the relative stimulus

level corresponding to a chosen level of probabiIity that the explosive will react to give a

positive result accordin g to the arbitrary cri-
Ch. /V—Taggant Safety and Compafibility Review . 81

teria, 13 14 15 Some manufacturers report a 50-

percent probability height, but most report a

threshold height.

Bullet tests are done by firing buIlets or projectiles, usually .22, .30, or 50 caliber, into the

test explosive. Powder loads are varied to obtain a range of projectile velocities. The test

explosive may either be essentialIy unconfined

in an ice cream carton, or highly confined in a

heavy steel pipe, The minimum velocity required to obtain a reaction is reported, 6

Friction

I n the manufacture, handling, and use of explosives there are many situations where frictional forces either are or could be present.

Several test methods have been devised over

the years and two of them have been used extensively in evaluating the taggants. In the

Bureau of Mines tester a sample is placed on

an anviI and subjected to the glancing, rubbing

motion of a weighted shoe attached to the end

of a pendulum that swings freely over the anvil. The shoe is either mild steel or a specified

phenolic resin-bonded composite. The other

test, developed by commercial industries, utilizes a 2-kg torpedo which is released to slide

down a V track and obliquely impact the test

sample. Both the height and angle of impact

are independent variables, 17

A new precision instrument developed in

West Germany and known as the BAM (after

the Bundesanstalt fur Material prufung which

developed it) seems to demonstrate improved

discrimination. Some of the permissible will

be tested on this new machine at the Bureau of

Mines. 18 The friction surfaces in this device are

ceramic. The load on the moving friction surface is varied until a response level is established.

Stability

Stability testing may be divided into two

general categories. One is simply long-term

storage in which samples are removed periodicalIy and retested to see if a significant

change has occurred. The second category involves accelerated aging, which generally

means subjecting the test sample to extreme

temperature environments and then measuring

the effects of the environment. Stability tests

normalIy conducted include the above-described friction and performance tests, plus

tests which are basically thermal in nature.

These thermal tests provide a measure of some

physical chemistry parameters of the explosive

as well as being measurements of stabiIity.

Among the stability tests widely used are:

Differential thermal analysis [DTA) in which

identical containers, one containing the sample and the other a standard reference material, are set up in identical thermal geometries

with temperature sensors arranged so as to

give both the temperature in each container

and the difference in temperature between the

containers. The data are displayed as a DTA

thermogram in which this temperature difference is plotted against the temperature of the

sample. Such a plot is almost a straight line if

the sample has no rapidly changing thermal

behavior. Excursions below or above the baseline are due to endothermic, that is heat absorbing, or exothermic, that is heat releasing,

reactions. The DTA analysis permits the interpretation of phase changes, decomposition,

and melting points; from these, some kinetic

information on thermal stability can be obtained. Sample sizes are in the order of 20 mg.

Since the temperature of the thermal event is

dependent, to some extent, on the heating

rate, various heating rates are normally used.

The standard rates are 100 C/rein and 20 C/rein.

Differential/ scanning calorimetry is very

similar to DTA except the energy difference

(calories) between the standard reference material and the explosive is recorded during the

time-temperature program.

Vacuum stability is measured by placing a 5-

mg sample in a gas burette and then evacuat-
82 ● Taggants in Explosives

ing the burette. The flask containing the sample holder is then heated to an appropriate

temperature for 20 to 48 hours. The gas

evolved is measured by the manometer connected to the sample flask and then normalized to standard temperature and pressure.

Test temperatures specified for military explosives are 1000 C and 1200 C. Dynamites and

slurries are less temperature-resistant and usually contain volatile compounds; therefore,

the test is really only useful for candidate

booster materials, gunpowders, and explosive

components of detonating cord.

The Taliani test is almost exactly the same as

the vacuum stability test except that the test is

usually run in a nitrogen atmosphere at 750 C

at some laboratories and 93.30 C at others; taggant tests in one laboratory were run at 1200 C.

At the end of 1 or 2 hours, the apparatus is

vented to 1 atmosphere to eliminate the effect

of the vapor pressure of water and the expansion of the original gas. The pressure change

between 2 and 5 hours is measured.

In the chemical reactivity test (CRT) a sample

of the explosive, approximately 0.25 g, is usually heated under a helium blanket at 1200 C for

22 hours. Tests have been conducted at other

temperatures and times; tests with the Westinghouse taggants in dynamites were run at

1000 C for 4 hours. A cryogenic gas chromatography unit is then used to measure the individual volumes of the product gases, including

such species as nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide and dioxide, water, and other gases as may

be determined necessary. This test is used principally to determine the reactivity of explosives with other materials, i.e., a compatibility

test.

In the hot bar test a bar is heated to 2500 C

and test samples of explosive are dropped on

it. In the hot tip test, a 7\8-inch square by 1\8

inch-thick piece of steel is heated to white heat

by means of a Presto-Lite torch and dropped

on a test sample.

The stability bath test measures an exotherm

and, therefore, decomposition at elevate d

temperatures. It is similar to the DTA, but uses

larger samples. The sample is generally heated

to a predetermined temperature and retained

there for a number of hours. Visual evidence of

decomposition is sought as well as the measurement of endothermic and exothermic reactions.

The abel heat test consists of heating

samples in contact with methyl violet paper,

usually at 71 0 C. The elapsed time before the

paper changes color is recorded. The test is applicable only to explosives containing nitrate

ester. A similar test, the German test is done at

1200 C and a minimum time of 40 minutes

allowed before a color change.

When the stability of an explosive is being

compared to the stability of that explosive

after an additive (such as the taggant) has been

incorporated, the tests are normally conducted

with significantly increased concentration of

-that additive. Thus, while only 0.05 percent by

weight of taggants is proposed to be added to

explosives, stability tests are conducted with

taggant concentration as high as so percent.

Incendivity Testing (The Gallery Test)

Incendivity testing is done to certify explosives and blasting assessories for use in

underground mines. Permissible explosives are

those that pass the proscribed incendivity test.

An explosive charge, which is loaded into a

steel cannon (mortar), is fired directly into the

gallery chamber containing a flammable mixture of natural gas and air or natural gas, air,

and coal dust. There are two large gallery tests

for explosives. on one test the incendivity is

measured in mixtures of coal dust and natural

gas in which the gas concentration (4 percent)

is below the explosive limit of the mixture. In

the other, the incendivity of explosives is measured in the presence of an 8-percent natural

gas-air mixture.

The gallery represents a coal mine face, and

is a 6-ft, 4-inch diameter steel tube, 80 ft long.

The first 20 ft are charged with the flammable

air/gas mixture and isolated by a thin membrane from the remaining 60 ft of tube which is

filled with air and acts as an expansion volume. I n the 4-percent concentration test, 1‘A -

lb charges of the explosive are fired in the cannon under specified conditions. Ten trials are
Ch. IV—Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review ● 8 3

made; if any explosion occurs the explosive

has failed the test. In the 8-percent concentration version, the amount of explosive that is

being treated is varied from shot to shot to establish the weight required to cause a 50-percent probability of ignition. 19

Cap Sensitivity

This test provides a simple means for differentiating an explosive from a blasting agent. A

No. 8 detonator is inserted into a sample of

given size and fired. If the sample is initiated

to detonation, the material is classified as an

explosive. A material that is not initiated to

detonation is classed as a blasting agent. The

test is used by the Bureau of Explosives to

establish its shipping classification. The sample is put into a container at its approximate

packaged density and a No. 8 detonator is inserted through the cover. The assembly is

placed on soft ground in an isolated, safeguarded area, and the detonator is fired. If a

crater is formed, the sample is considered to

be cap-sensitive. The sample container is a 1-

qt, spiralwound, paperboard cylinder with

cover, of the type used commercially for food

packaging. Any commercial No. 8 blasting cap

may be used as the detonator.

Spark Sensitivity

The method of determinin g sensitivity to

spark initiation is to subject the material to

single discharges from a capacitor charged to

a high voltage. The maximum energy of the

spark discharge to which the material can be

subjected without being ignited is a criterion

of its sensitivity. Results are expressed as the

maximum energy, in jouIes at 5,000 v, at which

the probability of an ignition is zero. 20

Charge Generation

Taggants are electrically nonconductive. A

charge can be generated on them by pouring

the taggant into the mixer; a charge generation

test was therefore devised by one manufacturer. The test apparatus consists of an angled

lker, et dl 01) c It

‘“K w Wdtw)ll, ()[) ( It

chute (grounded stainless steel, 2 ft long), and

an ungrounded stainless steel catch container

with a known capacitance connected to an

electrostatic volt meter. The taggants were

poured from a polyethylene container, down

the chute into the catch container. The charge

developed is calculated from the voltage. The

relaxation time is determined by the time required for the charge to dissipate. The charge

generated, and relaxation time, can then be

compared to materials commonly added to explosive materials, such as aluminum powder.

Elements of a Taggant Compatibility

Qualification Program

Taggants are a sufficient departure from the

materials normally used in explosives and gunpowder to require full qualification of the

new taggant-explosive material composition.

While the taggants are fabricated from quite

inert materials and are to be added i n amounts

of only a few hundredths of a percent by

weight, the conservative safety philosophy of

the explosives industry makes requalification

necessary. As the detailed physical chemistry

of the explosive reactions is not completely

understood, it is not possible to safely conduct

a few spot tests and generalize to alI explosive

materials from these tests. Table 23 outlines

the elements of the type of qualification test

program considered adequate by the OTA

study team.

In principle, the manufacture of explosive

materials consists simply of adding together

the fuel, oxidizer, sensitizers, and stabilizers,

mixing the components and packaging them in

Table 23.–Elements of a Suggested Compatibility

Qualification Program

● Unique with each manufacturer.

● Analysis to define the new explosive or ingredient

● Laboratory testing+impact, friction, thermal, chemical composition,

electrical aging, chemical Interaction, performance

● Pilot production

● Commitee and management review

● Early production and review

 Special tests.

● Experience

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
84 ● Taggants in Explosives

a casing (most explosives) or granulating the

mixture (gunpowder). I n practice, however,

each explosive mixture of ingredient is combined and processed in ways that differ significantly for each manufacturer. The number

of ingredients used can vary from 2 (for ANFO)

to 10 or more for some explosives and smokeless powders. The mixing process used can vary

from the simple mixing of ammonium nitrate

and fuel oil to form ANFO to a complex process involving preparation of the basic ingredients (one manufacturer grinds all ingredients

to a 300 mesh powder for instance) and several

mixing and processing stages. The equipment

used also varies widely, from the wooden mixing equipment used by one manufacturer of

nitroglycerine-based dynamites to the complex

continuous process equipment used by one

manufacturer of emulsions. End uses also vary;

soft dynamites are often dropped or otherwise

subjected to impact forces which would be unsafe if used with more brittle explosives such

as TNT boosters. For these reasons, the qualification program must be unique to each manufacturer, and must reflect the exposure expected during the manufacture, storage, transportation, handling, and use of that particular

product.

While it is true that the state of the art and

laboratory instrumentation of physical chemistry are not sufficiently advanced to provide a

detailed understanding of the process involved

in all explosive reactions, it is certainly true

that a careful and thorough analysis of the

probable effect of adding taggants to explosive materials can provide a great deal of information. This information can be used as a

preliminary screen to eliminate obviously dangerous explosive-taggant combinations, such

as taggants placed directly in primary explosives or the use of gritty taggants. In addition

the analysis can suggest critical tests and provide insight into the expected result and their

interpretation. Proper analysis must therefore

be considered the first element of any compatibiIity qualification program.

Laboratory testing must obviously play the

central role in a qualification program. The exact tests to be performed are a function of the

manufacturing process and end use, the results

of the analysis, and the standard procedure of

the manufacturers. At a minimum, tests must

be conducted to demonstrate that the addition

of taggants to explosive materials does not increase their impact and friction sensitivity;

does not detrimentally alter the thermal,

chemical, electrical, or storage properties of

the materials; does not decrease stability; does

not alter the chemical interactions involved

(by eliminating interactions originally present

or by introducing new interactions); and does

not adversely affect the performance of the explosive material,

After the small-quantity laboratory tests and

the analysis are successfully completed, pilotplant scale production should be initiated to

investigate potential problems involved in the

manufacturing, packaging, and storage of the

tagged explosives and gunpowder. This testing should simulate, as nearly as possible, the

actual manufacturing processes to be used if

tagged explosives were to be produced.

Reviews, both technical and managerial, are

an integral part of the qualification process.

Substantive special reviews would probably be

held at the end of the small-scale laboratory

testing phase and at the end of the pilot production.

Through their qualification process the manufacturer would gain a great deal of experience in handling and working with the tagged

explosives. This experience, and the general experience gained by working with the untagged

explosives, and with other explosives, represent an important, although qualitative, part

of the qualification evaluation process. For

this reason, it is desirable for the manufacturers to conduct at least a large part of the

qualification process. Some manufacturers do

not have the requisite facilities and personnel

to conduct the initial analyses and laboratory

testing. This testing can be accomplished by

outside agencies. It is obviously necessary for

the manufacturer to participate in the pilotscale testing phase.

In the taggant compatibility testing which

has taken place (presented below), the manu-
Ch. IV—Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review ● 8 5

facturers were asked to suggest critical tests minimum program, such as described above,

that were required before the pilot test manu- must be conducted; additional tests, suggested

facturing and distribution program could take by the manufacturer, may be made a part of

place. That process is not sufficient for a for- the program.

mal compatibility qualification program. A

TAGGANT COMPATIBILITY TESTING ACCOMPLISHED TO DATE

Several hundred individual tests have been

conducted in an effort to define the compatibility of identification taggants with explosive

materials. These tests have generally been

paired tests in which the reaction of a specific

explosive material to a specific test is compared to the reaction of that material when

identification taggant have been added. Materials tested include dynamite and other capsensitive high explosives, cast boosters, black

powder, and smokeless powder.

Several varieties of identification taggants

have been tested, including the current 3M

baseline taggant in both encapsulated (type C)

and unencapsulated (type A) form; a harder,

more highly cross-1 inked variety of the taggant

(type B); a higher melting point variety (type

D); the Westinghouse ceramic taggant; and the

Curie-point taggant.

No tests have shown increased explosive

sensitivity due to the addition of the baseline

3M taggant (either encapsulated or unencapsuIated). Similarly, no changes in electrical,

general mechanical, or toxicity characteristics

have been noted, Decreased chemical stability

was noted, however, for one type of smokeless

powder (Herco@ );21 22 decreased stability was

also noted in one type of booster material

(Composition B). The tests conducted to date

clearly show that some chemical reaction

takes place when Herco@ powder or Composition B is mixed with a high concentration of

3M taggants and then heated to a high temperature; further research is required to determine the nature and cause of the reaction, the

extent of the safety hazard created, and what

remedial steps may be feasible. Extremely Iimited testing has indicated no significant change

in balIistic velocity or chamber pressure when

the 3M taggants are added to smokeless powders, even at extremely high taggant concentrations.

The hard 3M taggants (types B and D) did

cause significantly increased sensitivity in capsensitive explosives, as did the Curie-point taggant and the unencapsulated Westinghouse

taggant.

Compatibility testing for the detection taggant materials has been recently initiated with

black powder and cap-sensitive high explosives. No data has been formally reported; toxicity and mutogenacity tests of the materials

themselves have been negative.

The following paragraphs briefly summarize

the tests so far conducted. The extent of testing described in the tables includes those

whose results had been formally reported by

March 1, 1980. However, OTA has reviewed all

testing about which information was received,

whether or not formal reports have been

issued. Tests are continuing.

Dynamites

The paired compatibility tests conducted

with dynamite and with EDCN are summarized

in table 24, In this table and those which follow in this section, an asterisk by the taggant

type indicates a sensitization or other indication of noncompatibility The other symbols

are defined in the legend. As can be seen from

the table, no significant differences in response to the various tests evaluated were ob-
86 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table 24,–Summary of Compatibility Tests Conducted With Dynamite and Dynamite Ingredients

Test typ e

Electro -

Dro p Slidin g 5-k g stati c Chemica l

Type of dynamit e weigh t Frictio n r o d impact discharge Heat (abol D T A ) reactivity pH

Vibroge l

Red H A

Tamptite gelatin extra 60% .

Unige l

Gelobel A A

EGDN

Nitroglycerin .

90/10 EGDN/NG : :

60% ammonia gelati n

60% semigelati n

40% specia l

85% hydrive .

850/o gelatin

Gelatinous permissibl e

60/40 NG/EGDN

Power Prime r

A , C

A , C

A , C

A , C

A,B *

C,W, X*

c

w

w

w

w

A , C

A , C

A , C

A , C

x *

A, B*, C,

W, X,D, E

c A ’

C,Y,Z *

w w

w w

c

A , C

A , C

A , C

A,B* ,W *

C,W *

x

c

D *

w

w

w

w

w

w

w w

A’ ,C’ Y*, E,A*, C A*, C,D*

Y*, Z*

c

c

c

c

A’

C, W, X,D, E

A ’

c

w

W.x ”

A ’

w w

w

w

A’

A– unencapsulaled 3M laggant X–unencapsulaled Westinghouse ceramic taggant

B–unencapsulated hard cross.linked 3M taggant Y–encapsulated Curie-point Iaggant

C–encapsulated 3M Iaggant Z–unencapsulah?d Cunepolnt faggant

D–encapsulated higher meltlng point 3M taggant ‘ indicating Irradiated taggant

E –unencapsulated higher melting point 3M taggant “–md[caled noncompatibility

W–encapsulated Westinghouse ceramic taggant

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

served for any of the dynamites into which

either the encapsulated or unencapsulated

baseline 3M taggants were added. UnencapsuIated hard or gritty taggants of various sorts

caused sensitization under impact testing.

In addition to those tests shown in the table,

a small number of drop weight tests were conducted in which the 3M taggants (both baseline and the cross-linked varieties) were encapsulated in several high melting point resins.

Sensitization of both Power Primer and 90/10

EGDN/NG were noted for most combinations

tested.

A final series of tests examined the stability

of tagged Power Primer, Coalite-8S, and EC DN

under both accelerated aging (higher temperature) and ambient aging conditions. The Power

Primer showed a significant decrease in stability as measured in the Abel test after 2 months

aging at 400 C. Unfortunately, no control test

was conducted with untagged Power Primer,

so no compatibility judgment can be made. No

other signs of decreased stability appeared in

the other tests.

Gels and Slurries

A smaller number of tests was conducted to

compare the response of tagged and untagged

gels, slurries, and emulsions. These tests are

summarized in table 25. I n no case tested was

there an indication of changes in sensitivity or

stability due to the presence of taggants. Tests

were also conducted to determine if the addition of taggants to the gels and slurries would

affect performance as the explosive materials

aged. Tests included initiation sensitivity and

detonation velocity as well as visual observation of gel quality. Both ambient and accelerated aging tests were conducted. No changes

in these properties were observed. Cap-sensitivity tests at low temperature were also conducted with special sensitized emulsions containing a combination of the baseline 3M and

the Westinghouse taggants. The performance
Ch. IV—Tagganf Safety and Compatibility Review ● 8 7

Table 25.–Summary of Compatibility Tests Conducted With Gels and Slurries

Test type

Weight ElectroDrop Sliding Projectile Chemical Thermal loss under Hot Hot static

Type gel or slurry weight rod impact Friction stability stability Taliani heat tip bar disch

Gel-power A- 2 A,C A,C c

● H20, MMAN, SN, AN A c

Mixture of tovex 700, tovex 800, tovex 320 C c c c c

Gel-coa l c c

Gel-powder

c c c

c c c c c

Permissible (unspecified) W W w

A–unencapsulaled 3M taggant Y–encapsulated curie-poml taggant

B–unencapsulated hard cross linked 3M taggant Z–unencapsulated curie point taggant

C–encapsulated 3M taggant ‘ indicating iradiated taggan

D–encapsulated higher melting point 3M taggant “MMAN –monomethylamme nitrate

E–unencapsulated higher melting point 3M taggant SN –sodium nitrate

W–encapsulated Westing ceramic taggant AN–ammonium nitrate

X –unencapsulated Westinghouse ceramic taggant

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

of the tagged explosives was superior to the

untagged control samples. It should be noted

that the reason for any change in performance

should be carefully investigated.

Cast Boosters

The tests comparing the sensitivity and stability of tagged and untagged cast boosters are

summarized in table 26. The 3M taggant did

not affect the sensitivity of any of the cast

boosters explosives in any of the paired testing. Evidence of decreased stability was observed in tests conducted of molten booster

material to which 3M taggant had been added.

I n a series of tests, Goex heated booster explosives to temperatures between 1200 and 1650

C for a period of 16 hours. ” Evidence of decomposition of the explosives occurred, including bubbling, dislocation, and the appearance of voids. Pentolite (50/50 PET N/TNT), Octol (25/75 TNT/HMX), and an explosive mixture

similar to Composition B were tested. The only

paired test was with the Composition B-like

material. Composition B normally contains

just under 30 percent TNT and just under 60

percent RDX, with the rest being wax. The

Goex mixture used A-3 instead of pure RDX. As

A-3 contains approximately 9 percent wax, the

composition of the Goex Composition B differs from standard Composition B. Ignoring

I I L~tt~r j w H~rOn (GO~X, I nc ) to S []erda (Aemspdc ~),

“StdtlJs ot Tdgg, !ng Program, ” Aerospace purchase order W-025,

lab rept DTL) 10479

this nomenclature difference, the tagged composition B showed significantly more severe

degradation at the 120° C test temperature

than did the untagged composition B at a 1300

C test temperature. As no control tests were

conducted with an untagged batch of explosives for the Octol and Pentolite tests, it is impossible to ascertain if the taggants were responsible for the observed reactions. While

testing is often conducted at temperatures

above those encountered in normal use, it is

extremely dangerous to heat common booster

materials to temperatures above 1200 C. The

test serves as an indication of a potential compatibility problem. More carefully controlled

tests are currently underway at the Naval Surface Weapons Center, White Oak, Md. Preliminary indications are that a 50-50 mixture of unencapsulated taggants and TNT undergoes a

chemical reaction at 1200 C; research is continuing to determine the nature, cause, and

safety significance of this apparent incompatibi I it y.

On July 15, 1979, an explosion and fire occurred at the Goex factory in Camden, Ark.,

causing damage which Goex has estimated at

$2 million. The explosion took place in a meltpour operation in which scrap high explosives

were being melted. Goex, Inc., asserts that the

scrap materials avaiIable for melting down included some materials containing 3M identification taggants. Goex further asserts that the

explosion began in a way that resembled the
88 . Taggants in Explosives

Table 26.–Summary of Compatibility Tests Conducted With Cast Boosters

Test type

Vacuum BAM Pendulum Thermal

Type of booster Drop weight stability friction friction Sliding rod stability

PETN , A, B. C,X*,W A,B, X w C,W

Pentolit e A, B,X* A, C,Y,Z A.B, X w

50/50 pentolite w w w

Composition B . w w w c*

T N T w w w

R D X w w w

A–unencapsulated 3M taggant X– unencapsulaled Westinghouse ceramic taggant

B–unencapsulaled hard cross linked 3M taggant Y–encapsulated Cune-point Iaggant

C –encapsulated 3M taggant Z–unencapsulated Curie-poml taggant

D–encapsulated higher melting point 3M Liggant ‘ –idicating Irradiated taggant

E - unencapsulaled higher melting point 3M taggant ‘ –Indicated noncompatibility

w–encapsulated Westinghouse ceramic taggant

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

reaction of tagged booster material in the

above tests. Goex claims that the explosion

must have been caused by the taggants. The

Aerospace Corp. asserts that no tagged booster

material was located at the Camden factory at

this time, and that furthermore the low concentrations which Goex asserts were present

could not have initiated an explosion; the tests

to which Goex refers involved extremely high

taggant concentrations, OTA is not familiar

with the facts regarding the possible presence

of taggants, and is not aware as the report goes

to press of any experimental data on the possible destabilizing effects of low concentrations

of taggants mixed with TN T/RDX mixtures.

As would be expected, the more gritty taggants clearly showed evidence of sensitizin g

the booster explosives. In the case of the Curiepoint taggant, sensitization occurred even for

encapsuIated taggants; these are the onIy tests

showing sensitization with encapsuIated taggants.

Black Powder

The black powder compatibility test results

are summarized in table 27. Neither the black

powder nor the black powder tailings are sensitive to either the friction or impact tests conducted, even for the gritty taggants, However,

no stabiIity tests were conducted.

. .

Table 27.–Summary of Compatibility Tests

Conducted With Black Powder

Test type

Drop BAM

Type of powder weight frlctlon

FFFg A,B, X A,B, X

Tailngs A.B, X A,B, X

A - unencapsulated 3M tagant

B–unencapsulated hard cross-linked 3M taggant

X –unencapsulated Westinghouse ceramic taggant

SOURCE Off Ice 01 Technology Assessmem

Smokeless Powders

The compatibility tests conducted with

smokeless powders are summarized in table

28. Only the encapsulated 3M taggant (type C)

was tested. Tests were originally conducted by

Hercules, Olin, and Du Pent on their own

smokeless powders.24 25 No evidence of sensitization or change in electrostatic properties

was observed. I n the case of the Herco@ powder, however, the Taliani and German heat

tests both indicated a significant decrease in

stability due to the addition of the taggants (in

a 50-percent concentration) to the smokeless

powder. (Although Hercules tested only

Herco

@ powder, Hercules believes that their
Ch. IV—Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review “ 89

Table 28.–Summary of Compatibility Tests Conducted With Smokeless Powders

— — -. — ————

Test type

Electro- Crltlcal

static Impmge- height to German Balllstlc Balllstlc

Type of powder Impact Frlctlon discharge ment explosion DSC Tallanl heat veloclty pressure — — —

Hercules HPC c

Hercules bullseye c

Hercules Herco’m’ C c c c c c c* c,

Du Pent H1-skor c c c c c c

Du Pent PB c c c c c c

Du Pent IMR 3031 c c c c c c

Du Pent IMR 4064 c c c c

Olln 23 1 c

Olln 296 c

Olln 45 2 c

Olln 540 c

Olln 473 c

Olin 571 c

Olln 680 c

Olln 748 c

Olln 760 . c

Olln 785 c

Olln WC 57 1 c c

— —

C–encapsulated 3M taggant

“–lndlcaled noncom pall bllrly

SOURCE Off/cc of Technology Assessment

other brands of powder designed for the reloading market are so similar to Herco” that

similar test results could be expected. OTA

believes that this is highly likely for the four

other Hercules brands that are chemically

identical to Herco”; it may not be the case for

the three Hercules brands with different compositions.) As no changes were noted for the

Du Pent or Olin Abel tests, the Herco @ tests

were repeated at the Naval Ordnance Station,

Indian Head, Md. The decreased stability was

confirmed. A more carefully controlled series

of tests was then conducted by the Lawrence

Livermore Laboratory (LLL) for the Aerospace

Corp. in an attempt to isolate the element or

elements of the taggant materials which are

responsible for the incompatibility. zb Briefly,

the tests indicated that there exists an incompatibility between something in the

Herco” and the melamine/alkyd which forms

the basic matrix of the 3M taggants. It may be

a basic reaction with the melamine/alkyd or

with the catalyst used to speed up the cure

time. There may also be reactions occuring between the taggant pigments and the Herco @

powder. The LLL tests are continuing in an attempt to resolve the issue.

‘“[l 5f’,]ton A I’,]vne Iettt’r, OIJ c It

At the present time, there appears to be an

incompatibility between the 3M taggants and

the Herco” smokeless powder. Hercules has

indicated that it does not consider the combination safe and has stopped all work on it.

OTA feels that, on the basis of the tests just

described, the conclusion must be drawn that

the 3M taggants cannot be safely added to the

Herco

@ powder unless the present incompatibility is resolved. Some justification exists for

questioning the validity of tests using severely

increased concentrations of the taggant materials (5o percent in the tests v. 0.05 percent of

encapsulated material in the proposed taggant

program), but it has not been demonstrated

that there is a threshold concentration below

which the problem disappears, and that such a

threshold would never be exceeded in practice.

Preliminary ballistic tests have been conducted on tagged WC 571 shotgun powder

manufactured by Olin. Ballistic velocity,

chamber pressure, and time to initiate burning

were measured. Tests were conducted at three

temperatures ( –30° C, 20° C, and 50° C) and

four taggant concentrations (2, 4, 10, and 20

times the recommended concentrations), both

with the taggants mixed in the powder and

61-401 9 - 80 - 7
90 ● Taggants in Explosives

with the taggants separated and placed directly over the primer flash hole.

The Olin rationale for such extreme tests

condition (up to 20 times the nominal concentrations, 100-percent segregation) was an attempt to evaluate the worst-worst case conditions that might appear due to segregation of

the taggants from the powder during manufacture, transportation, and storage.

No deviation from acceptable ballistic performance was noted for the ambient- and hightemperature tests. A steady decrease in velocity and pressure was noted with increasing taggant concentration. The practical signifance of

this depends on the extent to which taggant

concentration would vary in actual use by

handloaders, which can and should be established by careful testing and statistical analysis. At the low-temperature condition two

anomalous test results occurred. Evidence of

improper ignition occurred in 1 of the 20 firings at the 20 times normal concentration, 100-

percent segregation condition. Improper ignition would constitute a safety hazard as the

round might not clear the barrel, Significantly

reduced bal I istic performance occurred on 1

of the 20 tests at 4 times nominal taggant concent rat ion, with the taggants and powder

mixed. No other performance degradation was

noted, even under conditions of higher taggant

concentrate ion.

DISCUSSION OF COMPATIBILITY TEST RESULTS

Several hundred tests have been conducted

to investigate the compatibility of explosive

materials with identification taggants. Most of

the tests have been conducted with the baseline 3M taggants and variations of these taggants; a large number of tests, however, have

also been conducted with several other candidate taggant materials. Compatibility tests

have included those designed to indicate increased sensitivity, decreased stab i I it y,

changed electrical properties, and changed

performance, Explosive materials have included dynamites, gels, emulsions and slurries,

cast boosters, bldck powder, and smokeless

powders. A full set of qualification tests has

not been completed on any single explosive

product and only a small fraction of the hundreds of products has had any testing. Given

these limitations, it is still possible to draw

some tentative conclusions on the compat ibi I ity of taggants with explosive materials (which

may change as more data becomes available)

and to discuss the implications of these results

for the taggant program,

First, it is important to realize the purpose of

~ cornpatibiIity qua I if i cat ion testing program.

In brief, a set of tests is established on the

basis of analysis, the projected manufacturing,

storage, transportation, and end-use processing of the material, and the normal procedures

and experience of the organization conducting

the tests. If the candidate explosive product

fails to pass any of the critical tests in the

series, it is judged to have failed the qual ification test program. If a flaw can be corrected,

then the tests can continue, but the material

must pass al I of the critical tests, not just a majority or a certain fraction.

There is no indication that the 3M taggants

are incompatible with dynamites, gels and SIurries, or black powder.

Composition B booster material and

Herco” smokeless powder do show significantly reduced stability in the presence of the 3M

identification taggants. Furthermore, careful

testing appears to indicate that the incompatibility is with the basic melamine/alkyd material of the taggants, rather than with a particular

pigment or the polyethylene encapsulate.

Tests, similar to those conducted with Herco”,

were conducted with other smokeless powders; no loss in stability was noted for other

Hercules powders, or for the Olin or Du Pent

smokeless powders. The reaction, therefore,

probably is between the melamine/alkyd and

one of the sensitizers or stabilizers of the

Herco

@ . As the formulations of both Herco @

and the 3M identification taggants currently

stand, the two are not compatible. Further in-
Ch. IV— Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review ● 9 1

vestigation may isolate the element of incompatibility, and it may be possible to replace

elements in either the Herco@ or the taggants

to remove the incompatibility. It is not yet

possible to tell whether the booster material

incompatibility is with the basic melamine/alkyd or with one of the components of the taggants.

Both the smokeless powder and booster material tests took place at high temperatures,

and, in most of the tests, at high-taggant concentrations. The temperature used for the

smokeless powder test was higher than would

be expected in actual manufacture, storage, or

use; the temperature used for the cast booster

is sometimes reached in manufacturing processes. In each test, a taggant concentration of

so percent was used rather than the 0.05-percent tagging concentration suggested for routine use. The tests, nonetheless, indicate that

the stability of the materials has decreased,

due to the addition of taggants, and that a reaction is taking place between elements of the

taggants and elements of the explosive material. Standard qualification test procedure requires that such evidence be considered a sign

of an existing incompatibility between the

materials. Careful Iy controlled testing, and extensive analysis must be completed before it

can be determined if the observed evidence of

incompatibiIity does, in fact, indicate a potential safety problem during the manufacture,

storage, transportation, and use of the tested

materials. Unless demonstrated otherwise, it

must be assumed that it is unsafe to add the

taggants to that smokeless powder or the

booster material. Until the elements of the incompatible Iity have been identified, a question

remains as to the safety of adding the taggants

to similar smokeless powders and booster materials, although tests with other smokeless

powders and boosters have shown no evidence

of incompatibility.

The significance of the 01 in ballistic property tests cannot be fully assessed at this time.

The Olin tests indicated that increasing taggant concentrations lead to a reduction in velocity and pressure, and this could create a

problem if and only if it proves impossible to

mix taggants with smokeless powder in such a

way as to avoid extreme variations in taggant

concentration from one round to the next.

Testing is required to establish how great a

variation in concentration could be expected

using reasonable manufacturing methods, and

normal transportation, storage, and loading

procedures. The Olin tests did show one case

of poor performance (at four times the suggested taggant concentration), but performance anomalies sometimes occur without taggants, and a single anomaly is not enough to

justify a prediction as to whether taggants

would increase the frequency of such occurrences. The segregation tests were conducted

with 100-percent segregation, which appears

quite unreal istic. Testing is needed to establish

the extent of segregation which might occur

before a realistic worst case can be defined.

Unlike the Herco@ and Composition B cases,

the Olin ballistic property tests do not appear

to OTA to constitute sufficient evidence to require presumption of an incompatibility. It remains true, however, that no presumption of

compatibility can be made until adequate ballistics tests have been conducted.

This raises the question of the value of a taggant program from which smokeless powders

and cast boosters were excluded. As noted in

chapter Vl, smokeless powders are used in a

significant percentage of criminal bombings

(approximately 20 percent) and cause 10 to 20

percent of deaths and injuries. As also noted in

chapter Vl, criminal bombers are Iikely to react to a taggant program, If smokeless powders are not tagged, then a logical reaction

would be for a large number of bombers to

switch to the use of smokeless powders. Although bombs using smokeless powder are

considerably less efficient (lower specific

energy) than those using cap-sensitive high explosives, smokeless powder bombs are responsible for a considerable number of injuries and

deaths. Effective controls over smokeless powder by means other than taggants may be possible but appear unlikely. Booster material is

rarely used as a bomb filIer. It is used, however, to initiate blasting agents. The current

BATF plan would be to not directly tag blast-
92 ● Taggants in Explosives

ing agents, but to tag the booster and detonators used to initiate the blasting agent. Exclusion of boosters from the taggant program may

well require an alternate control mechanism

for blasting agents. Given the extremely large

quantity of blasting agent produced (3.4 billion

lb annually), any other control mechanism may

have serious cost consequences.

The above discussion concerned the results

of the tests to investigate the compatibility of

the baseline 3M taggants with explosive materials. Tests were also conducted using hard or

gritty taggants, In all cases, the unencapsuIated hard taggants caused increased sensitivity to the drop weights, and, in most cases, to

the sliding rod tests. The ceramic Curie-point

taggants caused increased sensitivity in some

cases even when encapsulated, although no incompatibility was noted for the Westinghouse

or hard-core 3M taggants when encapsulated

with polyethylene. When a hard resin was used

as an encapsulant, the 3M taggants showed a

clear sensitization of PETN. The implications

of these tests are obvious. l-lard or gritty taggants must be encapsulated. The encapsulated

material should not only be soft but it should

also be a heat sink. The use of a soft additive is

a common desensitizer in military explosives.

Composition B and other RDX-based explosives include approximately 1 percent wax

with a softening point in the 800 F range.

The tests show that encapsulated gritty taggants, such as the Westinghouse ceramic taggant, may be alternatives to the baseline 3M

taggant. As even a small amount of the unencapsulated material (0.01 percent) causes increased sensitivity, however, great care must

be exercised to ensure essentially 100-percent”

encapsulation; this may seem to create an impossible quality control problem. However,

the problem may not be as difficult as it first

appears. If 99 percent of the taggants are encapsulated, then unencapsulated taggants

would constitute only .00025 percent by

weight of the explosive, almost two orders of

magnitude less than the amount demonstrated

to cause increased sensitivity. Tests of those

extremely low levels might welI show no increased sensitivity.

As noted above, much compatibility testing

remains to be accomplished. Identification

taggants have undergone comprehensive testing with a representative sample of dynamites,

gels, slurries, cast booster materials/smokeless

powders, and black powder; even after the resolution of the compatibility questions which

testing so far has revealed, it would eventually

be necessary to test taggants with all such materials before instituting a comprehensive tagging program. In the case of detonators and

detonating cord, compatibility testing has no t

been completed even with a representative

sample. Compatibility testing of detection taggants started only recently, and with the exception of testing with detonators it is less far advanced than compatibility testing of identification taggants.

It is necessary to resolve the incompatibility

observed between the 3M identification taggants and the Composition B booster material

as well as the Herco@ powder however, before

it makes any sense to finish the rest of the tests

with other materials. The resolution of the

smokeless powder incompatibility could take

any of several forms, including:

●

●

●

●

Reformulation of the 3M taggant– this

could require starting essentially from

scratch in the taggant-testing program, as

the reformulated taggant would undoubtedly exhibit different compatibility,

as well as survivability properties.

It might be possible to develop a different

taggant that proved compatible with

smokeless powders, and to use the existing 3M taggant for explosive materials

with which it is compatible.

Reformulation of the Herco” powder—

this may or may not be easily accomplished, once the element or elements

that react with the taggant are isolated.

This option would only be viable if no

other smokeless powder were found to be

incompatible.

Exclusion of Herco” from the taggant

program —the economic effects on competition would need to be carefully considered, as would alternate control mechan isms.
Ch. IV—Taggant Safety and Compatibility Review . 93

● Exclusion of smokeless powders from the

identification taggant program — such an

exclusion wouId rely on the fact that

smokeless powders would be less effective than cap-sensitive high explosives and

that the detonators would be tagged. OTA

believes that this last approach may not

be viable– too many people are currently

killed or injured using smokeless powders

and the numbers wouId almost certainly

increase if that approach were adopted.

Alternate control mechanisms for smokeless powders would be required,

● Demonstrate ion that the observed stabiIity

problem does not constitute a safety hazard. The observed decreased stabiIity occurs at elevated tern peratures and at more

than two orders of magnitude higher taggant concentration, As the decomposition

rate is both temperatu r-e and concentration sensitive, it may be that no safet y

hazard exists under realistic conditions If

it could be positively demonstrated that

the decomposition rate was within the

normal I I y accepted range for temperature

regimes and concentrations which reflect

worst case actuaI use conditions, then it

may be possible to add taggants to the

smokeless powder, particuIarly if no further incompatibiIities surface. However,

demonstrate ion of safety wouId have to be

quite convincing to overcome the currently perceived incompatibility.

A resolution of the booster incom pat

problem could be accomplished by a s

set of methods, once the elements of t

compatibiIity have been identitied.

bility

milar

lein -
Chapter V

TAGGANT COST REVIEW

Page

Overview ● *.*.*..,.*,.*.****..*,...,.** , 97

T-t Material Costs........., . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Identification Taggants, . ................101

Detection Taggant Materials Costs . .......102

Cost and Supply Guarantees , . ...........103

Sensor-Related Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104

Numbers of Sensors Needed . . . . . . . .. ....105

Sensor System Related Costs . ............105

Mix of Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..106

False Alarm Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107

ExpMvesandGunpowder Manufacturing Costs . 1(I7

Page

Recordkeeping Costs . ..................111

Markup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........112

Summary of Manufacturing Costs Added .. .112

Distributor Costs . . . . . . . . . ................113

Recordkeeping at 13istribution Levels .. ....113

Storage . . . . . . . . ......................115

Summary Cost IncludingMarkup. . ........116

UserCostImpacts. . ......................117

Increased Material Costs . ...............117

Commercial IJsesof Explosives and

Cunpowcfers-Genera\. . ............118

Revised Processes, Tooling, and Facility Underground Mines. . ................118

costs. . . .....’... . ................10 8 Quarries . . . . . . . . . ..................118

Cap-Sensitive PackagedExpkMVes .. ....108 Open PitMines. . ....................11 9

Cast Boosters, Smokeless Powcfersg and Construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119

Black Powder., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....108 Handloading. . . . . ...................120

DetonatingCord. . ...................10 9 othercostlmpacts. ... .o .. .0.............121

BlastingCaps ..+. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .:.109 Government investigation Costsand Program

Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ...’. .109 Administration. . ..................12 1

Cap-Sensitive Packaged Explosives .. ....109 InvestigativeCosts. . ...................121

Cast Boosters.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ,..?09 EffectsofCompetition-Substitution . . . . ...I22

Black Powder... . ..................,10 9 Effects on Fixe&PriceCommodities. . ......122

Smokeless Powder . ...............,..110 Possibie RemovaiofSome Gunpowders From

DetonatingCord and Blasting .. 11 0 the Market . ......................12 3

Productivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110-bw*$ -

. . . . . . . ● . . . . . . 123

Cap-SensitivePackagedExplosiv~ .. ....110 “ Identification Taggant Material

Other Explosive Categories . ...........111 Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........123

InventoryCosts . ......................11 1 Detection TaggantProgram Material Costs. .123

QualityControl . . . . ...................111 Manufacturing Level Program Costs . . . . . . 124

Safety . . . . . . . . . . . ....................111 Distribution Network Program Costs. ., ....124
Public Overhead Program Cost . ..........124

Taggant Program Baseline Cost Estimate. .. .125

Program Cost Versus Implementation Level .125

Program Cost of Separate Identification and

Detection Taggant Programs . ........126

Comparison of OTA Cost Estimates With I ME

and Aerospace Corp. Estimates . . . . . .. 127

Who Bears the Cost of a Taggant Program? .. 128

Cost Analysis Precision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Cost Sensitivity Analysis . ...............129

Taggant Materials . ..................129

Adequacy of Current Data. . ................133

Suggested Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

TABLES

Page

Qualification of the Estimating Basis for

Taggants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

List of Taggant Program Cost Elements .. ..100

Baseline Taggant Program Configuration. .. 100

Annual Taggant Requirements. . .........101

Qualification of Estimating Basis for

Sensors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......105

Vapor Taggant Detector System Cost .. ...106

Current Manufacturing Cost/Price

Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............108

36. Summary of Explosives and Gunpowder

Manufacturing Costs Included. . .........112

37. Cost Summary of Cap-Sensitive Packaged

High Explosives Manufacturing Cost

Variations With Assumptions. . ..........113

38. Estimated Cost for Powders at

Distribution Network . .................116

39. Distribution System –Summary of Cost

Added and Markup. . ..................116

40. Current High Explosives Cost Impact for

Various User Classes . .................121

41. Identification Taggant Material Annual

Costs, Baseline Program. . ..............12 4

42. Detection Taggant Material Annual

Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........124

43. Manufacturing Cost Added . ............12 5

44. Distribution System Cost Added . ........125

45. Taggant Program Summary Annual CostBaseline Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125

46. Taggant Program Summary Annual Cost

Versus Implementation Level. . ..........12 5

47. Identification Taggant and Detection

Taggant Program Cost Comparisons -

Basline Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .126

48. Summary Program Costs Versus Level of

Implementation ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

49. Comparison of the Estimates for ID

Tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........127

50. Comparison of OTA and Aerospace Program

Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......128

51. Taggant Program Cost Impact by Who

Will Bear the Cost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

52. Elements of Cost Uncertainty. . ..........130

53. Annual Cost per Sensor for Various

Mixes ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............132

FIGURES

Page

10. Schematic Illustration of General Cost

11.

12.

13.

14,

15.

16.

17.

16.

19.

20$

21.

Element Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

BM Identification Taggant Cost

Estimates: 5Ib Tag Lots, Unencapsulated,

2-Year Minimum Required . . . . . . . . .. ....102

General Functional Network for Vapor

Taggant Detector, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..106

Estimated Annual Vapor Taggant

Detector Cost v. Quantity Deployed .. ...,106

Estimated Cost of False Alarms v. FalseAlarm Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... , .107

Schematic of Cap-Sensitive High Explosive

Distribution Network . .................114

Schematic Distribution Network of

Gunpowder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... , 114

Recordkeeping Activity v. Tagging

Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........115

Summary of Added Costs to Explosive Users

Cost Per Unit of Explosives in Dollars .. ...117

Bingham Canyon open Pit Copper

Mine. . . . . . ., ., . . . . . . . . .............120

Baseline Program Cost Sensitivity Impact

With Changes in Identification Taggant,

Material Cost, and Concentration Level, .. .131

Baseline Program Cost Sensitivity Impact

With Changes in Detection Taggant,

Material Cost, and Concentration Level. .. .131
Chapter IV

TAGGANT COST REVIEW

OVERVIEW

A detailed review of the potential cost and economic impacts of the proposed

taggant program was conducted in parallel with the safety and utility segments of

the study. In this analysis, the assumption was made that the taggants work and are

safe to put in explosive materials. it was furthermore assumed that the current incompatibilities observed between the 3M identification taggant and one type of

smokeless powder, as well as one type of cast booster material, would be resolved in

a way which has no additional cost impact. The various cost elements were estimated by: ‘

● drawing on existing studies and testimony; and

● interviewing the identification taggant manufacturer, explosive and gunpowder manufacturers and distributors, users of explosive materials, law enforce

ment personnel, and sensor instrumentation engineers.

Other important economic issues were addressed in parallel with the development of the

program cost. The addition of taggants to explosives has a potential cost impact to an industry in which explosive-type decisions are

frequently made on an economic, rather than

performance or brand loyalty, basis. An additional taggant material cost issue is that raised

by the probable monopoly of supply by one

company, particularly by 3M for the identification taggants. The question of assuring price

and taggant availability also required attention. Introduction of taggants into the explosive fabrication process will cause changes in

the manufacturing process, due both to possible tooling costs and to the labor costs associated with purchasing, controlling, and using

the taggants. Other, one-time costs are associated with product requalification tests for

safety, potential costs for waste disposal

equipment, and added plant capacity to make

up for lost productivity.

Identification taggants require additional

recordkeeping by the manufacturer, by wholesalers and distributors, and by the retail sellers.

There are law enforcement costs associated

with the recovery and tracing of identification

taggants from explosions and with the subsequent followup process. These costs must,

however, be compared with the cost of current

law enforcement practices.

Detection taggants require a sensor and a

system to sample and convey the air from the

sample item to the sensor. The sensor and sampling system requires operation and maintenance, although it is possible that current

security personnel could operate the additional equipment at an airport, for instance. There

is an additional potential cost associated with

possible delays raised by false alarms in the detection system. Significant false alarms could

cause enough ill-will (in addition to high costs)

to lead to the abandonment or curtailed usage

of detectors in situations such as airports.

A final cost aspect which must be considered is the economic effect of a taggant program in which only selected explosives are required to be tagged. In the cost-conscious

commercial explosive industry, that could

eliminate certain products or companies from

the marketplace, perhaps resulting in significant local unemployment.

Due to the fact that the identification taggants have progressed further down the development path, the relative precision of the cost

97
98 ● Taggants in Explosives

estimates associated with their introduction

into explosives is expected to be greater than

the estimates of detection taggant and related

sensor costs. The precision of each estimate is

indicated during the course of the cost analysis

discussion.

This cost analysis by OTA has been an intensive, short-duration study. Of necessity, the

study was accomplished by drawing on existing studies from a wide variety of sources and

by a limited number of onsite interviews with

industry and Government. Discussion with industry included various explosives manufacturers and BM, the taggant manufacturer. Various user types such as mining companies (underground and surface), construction firms,

and quarry operators were also visited. Extensive discussions were also held with the Aerospace Corp. (the taggant program development

contractor), with the Institute for Defense

Analysis, with Management Science Associates, and with consumer groups such as the

National Rifle Association and the National

Muzzle Loaders Association. Government

agencies with whom detailed discussions were

held include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

and Firearms (BAT F), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of Commerce (DOC), the Bureau of Mines (BOM), and

various Department of Defense agencies.

Various degrees of uncertainty exist in costing out the taggant program, as little test data

exists and some potential manufacturing process applications are undefined. Table 29 illustrates the qualifications of the estimating basis

for the taggant program, indicating the status

of pilot testing and the OTA understanding of

the manufacturing processes required to implement taggants. On the right side of table 29

is set forth, in general terms, the method for

estimating utilized, such as direct estimating,

Aerospace Corp. analysis and assumptions, the

Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) member estimated inputs, Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute (SAAMI)

estimated inputs, etc. The particular methods

and data sources utilized are documented

throughout this study where appropriate.

Table 29.–(lualification of the Estimating Basis for Taggants

Etimating, basis

Taggant mfgr

Type explosive Pilot tested process Process labor

understood

Cap-sensitive Yes Yes Direct/ estimate

packaged explosives Proprietary detail estimate

available.

I ME member inputs.

Cast booster s Yes Yes Aerospace analysis/

assumptions

Smokeless powder Underway Yes Aerospace analysis

SAAMI estimate.

Black powde r Yes Yes Goex Study

 storing

● security

● administrative & records

● mfgr, process cleanup

Detonating cor d Planned No Aerospace assumptions,

Blasting cap s Planned No Aerospace assumptions

Process tooling

Direct estimate

Equipment required:

storage bins, hoppers,

equipment for weighing,

packaging, transferring

tag samples,

Tooling. ●

Design required (no effective

equipment currently available

Significant cost ● expected–

Other capital expenses

Direct estimate

Nonrecurring

Requalification of products.

Waste disposal if

additional waste due to

‘‘unacceptable contaminated

tag batches

Investment offset losses

in productivity.

Cost of taggant Inventory

Including the cost of money

new machine must be designed.

‘Aerospace estimates utilized and OTA survey inputs

—

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
Ch.--Yaggant Cost Review . 99

The primary methodology utilized in this

cost analysis was to translate all program

costs, both nonrecurring one-time costs and recurring costs, to annualized values. Capital investment costs were annualized over a 10-year

period at an interest rate of 10 percent. This

method was utilized for all initial expenditures

(requalification, waste facilities, etc.) with the

exception of tooling costs estimated for detonators and blasting caps, which were written

off in a 5-year period at 10-percent interest.

The taggant program costs vary substantially as a function of the level of implementation

of the program. In this study, an OTA identified baseline program was assumed for baseline cost estimates, and the parametric variation of the costs examined as a function of

higher and lower level implementation plans.

Cost estimates were also generated for the implementation program proposed by BATF.

All cost data and program estimates in this

report are stated in fiscal year 1979 dollars to

assure consistent treatment. A list of taggant

program cost elements was developed to permit a comprehensive framework for treating

all potential costs and resources impacted by

the taggants program. Figure 10 illustrates the

general sources of costs potentialIy involved in

the program, while a detailed list of potential

cost elements is shown in table 30.

For purposes of exposition throughout this

cost impact assessment, a baseline set of conditions or assumptions is utilized in the determination of a total program estimate. These

are shown in table 31. This baseline program

Figure IO.—Schematic Illustration of General Cost

Element Sources

Direct Costs Direct costs

added by added by

mabyfactyrer distributor

Taggant Direct costs

materials Incurred by

IdentificationTaggant s

user

Program Cost

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment.
100 . Taggants in Explosives

Table 30.–List of Taggant Program Cost Elements

Taggant materials

Idenhflcahon taggants

Detection taggants

Detection sensor-related costs

Sensors

Sensor sampling and transport instrumentation

Operations and maintenance

Cost of false alarms

Explosive and gunpowder manufacturing costs

Nonrecurring cost

● Tooling

● Storage

● Product requalification- safety testing

● Waste disposal facilities

● New Investment to offset production losses

Recurring costs

● Manufacturing process labor

● Record keeping

● Quality control

● Production losses

● Waste product line

● Inventory costs

● Administration expense

Markup

Distributor costs

Record keeping

Storage

Markup

User costs

Other costs

Government administration

Taggant program development

Investigative costs

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Table 31 .–Baseline Taggant Program Configuration

. Encapsulated identification taggants

● Explosive weight or units to be tagged and tagging concentration

Category Units/yr Concentration

Cap-sensitive packaged

explosives 325,000,000 lb .05%

Booster s 6,000,000 lb .1 %

Black powde r 400,000 lb .05%

Smokeless powde r 5,000,000 lb .05%

Detonating cor d 500,000,000 ft 5 tags/in.

Blasting cap 84,000,000 units 50 mg

. Identification and detection taggants

. 1,500 sensors to be deployed

● Sensor mix. M S 10°/0, I MS 90°/0

. 10% taggant contamination permitted

● “Composite tag” permits rework of previously tagged material

● Days production of each type/size explosive (date-shift basis)

● New taggant code for each

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

includes several provisions which, OTA believes, would do much to hold down costs

without a significant reduction in the utility of

the program: blasting agents are not tagged;

the identification taggant code is changed

only when the date, shift, or product changes

(resulting in some code numbers corresponding to a large batch size and others to a small

batch size); and a special “composite code” is

used for taggants added to already tagged material (permitting rework without removal of

previous tags). The special composite code

taggant would be added to material with more

than 10-percent cross-contain ination; such a

taggant would indicate that the material used

was a composite and that taggant codes other

than the specific composite code should be ignored.

Although confidence levels are relatively

high for certain elements of costs, particularly

for the identification taggant program, other

program elements are subject to considerable

uncertainty (particularly the number and types

of sensors to be employed in the detection taggant program). Attention is called to the baseline assumptions associated with each cost element throughout the discussion of cost.

In the following section the costs for the taggant materials are developed. This is followed

by detection taggant sensor-related program

cost estimates. The potential cost increases occurring during the explosive manufacturing

process and at the distribution level are then

addressed. The potential cost impact(s) to the

users of explosives are subsequently discussed.

Other cost impacts, including the cost contribution by Government for administration, investigation, and taggant program development, are set forth in the next section. A gener1 synthesis and summary of the taggant program cost estimates follows, with the relative

precision or accuracy of the estimates discussed after that, including aspects of cost uncertainty and program cost sensitivity. The

adequacy of the current cost data and suggested further research are briefly discussed in

the last two sections, respectively,
Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 1 0 1

TAGGANT MATERIAL COSTS

The cost of both the identification and detection taggant material is heavily influenced

by the amount of explosive material to be

tagged, the form of the tagging material, and

the concentration levels. Material cost estimates are developed for the baseline program

described above.

Identification Taggants

The annual quantity of explosives produced

in the United States, shown in table 32, was

estimated based on data obtained from IME,

BATF, Aerospace Corp., BOM, and DOC. An

unresolved problem exists with respect to the

production of cap-sensitive packaged high explosives. The basic difficulty stems from the

method of reporting data in the surveys collected by both BOM and DOC, Some “unknown” quantity (both permissible and other

high explosives) of cap-sensitive explosives is

reported as included in unprocessed ammonia

nitrate and “al I other purpose” categories in

order to avoid disclosing individual company

data. Since the data are masked to protect the

marketing positions of explosive manufacturers, the uncertainty in annual quantity will persist, For purposes of this study, the quantity of

325 million lb/year (as adopted by Aerospace)

wil I be used as the baseline condition.

A second variation concerns the level of

black powder produced. Approximately 2.5

m i I I ion lb of black powder are produced per

year in the United States, but the majority is

used as a raw material in other fabrication

processes, such as fuzes. Approximate y

400,000 lb are sold directly to the consumer;

this amount is included in the explosive materials to be tagged. Table 32 shows the production quantity, the concentration of unencapsuIated taggant material suggested by the BATF/

Aerospace team, and the resultant quantity of

unencapsulated taggants required annualIy,

Price estimates, obtained from 3M as a function of annual taggant production, are shown

in figure 11 The estimates quoted are for unTable 32.–Annual Taggant Requirements

— .

Annual taggant

Concentration requirement

Quantity to be level pounds

Explosive category lagged (unencapsulated) (unencapsulated)

Cap-sensitive packaged high explosives 325.000.000 lb 0.025% 81,250

Cast boosters 6.000,000 lb 005 % 3,000

Smokeless powder 5,000.000 lb O 025% 1,250

Black powde r 400,000 lb 0.025% 100

Detonating cord 500,000,000 ft 5 tags/in, 160

Blasting caps 84,000.000 caps 50 mg each 4,620

90,380

SOURCE Of ficeof Technology Assessment

encapsulated taggants produced in 5-lb lot s

and assume a firm order for a minimum of 2

years. The 150,000-lb level is a result of a detailed Ieadtime study conducted under contract to the Aerospace Corp. The target price

and worst case estimates for the 75,000- and

100,000-lb levels were provided by 3M in response to an OTA request. The range of prices

reflects the fact that less time was available

for the 3M estimates than the original 150,000-

Ib level, resulting in some uncertainties. These

target prices have all been through a rigorous

price review within the 3M corporate structure

and represent the firmest commitment possible short of a production contract.

Assuming linear extrapolation between the

data points, the price for unencapsulated identification taggant material was estimated by

OTA (from figure 11) to be approximately $93/

lb for the estimated 90,000 lb of taggants to be

required annualIy. This cost figure assume s

production in 10,000-lb lots. In cases where

most lots are substantialIy smaller, taggant

costs per pound of explosives might rise.

This figure is for unencapsuiated taggants,

while the baseline OTA program assumes the

taggants are encapsulate? in an opaque polyethylene wax. The 3M technical people furn i shed an estimate of the cost of encapsuIating

the taggants in polyethylene wax, but were unable to estimate the cost impact of using an

opaque polyethylene wax. Based on the above

data, OTA estimated that it would cost $55/lb
102~Tggants in Explosives

Figure 11 .—3M Identification Taggant

Cost Estimates

● 5-lb tag lots ● Unencapsulated

● 2-year minimum required

Cost per pound

of taggant

in 1979 dollars

140

130

120

110

100

90

80

70

75,000 100,000 150,000

Annual identification taggant production in pounds

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

for opaque encapsulated taggants, as the baseline tagging level is 0.05 percent by weight of

encapsulated taggants, and the encapsulating

material weighs the same as the unencapsuIated taggants. ($93 for 1 lb of encapsulated

taggants, plus $17 for 1 lb of encapsulating material, plus the process, equal $110 for 2 lb of

encapsulated taggants, or $55/l b.) This corresponds to 2.75 cents/lb of cap-sensitive explosives for the identification tagging material.

IME and a number of other individuals and

organizations have based their cost estimates

on a price of $200/lb of encapsulated taggants

and an additional library maintenance fee of

$100/year per unique taggant species. This

identification taggant cost has been clearly

identified by 3M as the cost of taggants produced in their current pilot plant, which is

labor intensive, if there is no program legislated to tag commercial explosives. It does not

represent a potential cost figure if a taggant

program is legislated, Details of the cost of

taggants, as a function of total quantity

needed, were given above. No additional fee

would be required for Iibrary maintenance.

Detection Taggants Materials Costs

The Aerospace Corp., as part of its taggant

contract effort for BATF, has put considerable

effort into the development of molecules for

detection taggant purposes. As a result of investigation of the properties of several hundred potential molecules, five chemicals are

currently considered excellent candidates for

the program. These perfluorinated cycloalphones are:

● PDCB — perfluorodimethyl cyclobutane,

● PMCH — perfluoromethyl cyclohexane,

● PDCH — perfluorodimethyl cyclohexane,

● PFD — perfluorodecal in, and

● PS P — perfIuorohexyl-suIfur-pentafIuoride.

The final selection of a particular detector

taggant will depend on the results of compatibility testing, efficacy in conjunction with the

detection taggant sensor, price, and availability.

The microencapsulated detection taggant

would be directly incorporated as a free-flowing powder in commercial explosives and gunpowder. Since part of the chemical selection

criteria includes a low or negligible utilization

of these materials in standard manufacturing

(to minimize false alarms due to ambient air

background), standard cost/price data currently available was supplemented by requests by

the Aerospace Corp. to a number of companies

for budgetary pricing-type estimates at quantity levels of 200,000 lb/year. A range of estimates was received for both the cost of the de-
Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 1 0 3

tection taggants and for the encapsulation

process. Taking these values into account, as

well as adjustments for process yield, the following range of estimates was made by OTA.

Lower end of range $22 20/lb

Mediu m 40.00\I b

Higher end of range 58.15/lb

For purposes of the baseline study OTA has

utilized the medium cost of $40/lb of encapsulated detection taggant. The Aerospace Corp.,

in their inflationary impact study, estimated

conservatively a value of $65/lb, based on

early data. With the more recent quotes it is

reasonable to estimate a lower value for detection taggant material. Uncertainty as to the

value chosen remains due to the following factors:

 final taggant selection,

● final contract price,

● cost of encapsuIation,

● the weight effect of the encapsu I at ion

process, and

 the final yield ratio of the encapsulant ion

process,

Since the detection taggant program remains in the early stages of development, uncertainty will persist in this value. Variations

from this value will be examined in the cost

sensitivity analysis. The relative significance of

the variations of the detection taggants cost is

not expected to greatly perturb the overalI taggant program cost estimates.

Cost and Supply Guarantees

The identification taggants currently proposed to be used are manufactured only by 3M

and are a proprietary product manufactured

by a proprietary process. In addition, a significant public overhead cost would have been incurred before the compatibility of explosive

materials with the taggants could have been

demonstrated, Mandating the addition of identification taggants to explosive materials

would, therefore, ensure a monopoly of the

Government-mandated market for 3M, at least

for a period of several years. Under such circumstances, development of a mechanism to

regulate the virtual monopoly of the identificat ion taggant market that 3M would enjoy is

highly desirable. While several suppliers a re

capable of supplying the vapor detection taggant, production in the necessary quantity wilI

probably require significant capital investment, much of which wouId be amortized by

the taggant program. It is therefore desirable

to have a mechanism that will ensure the price

of the vapor taggant material as welI

A number of mechanisms are available to

reguIate the price of taggants, incIuding:

. a price level set by Congress in the enabling legislation,

● regulation as a public utility,

● licensing by 3M of competitors,

● a multi year, fixed-price contract, and

● a free-market price, regulated only by the

possibility of competition or sanctions if

prices get too high.

The free-market mechanism is probably unacceptable, given the long time needed to

either develop and qualify an alternative taggant or enact sanction legislation, Legislation

of a price or use of a regulation mechanism

similar to that used for public utilities would

be an awkward, time-consuming process for a

product whose total annual value would be on

the order of $11 million.

Licensing is not only disagreeable to 3M, but

it is probably not cost-effective. The cost of

the taggant material includes a component for

amortization of the taggant production facility, as a new facility must be built and the

primary market for identification taggants

would Iikely be the mandated explosives market, The process that 3M plans to implement is

capital-intensive. Licensing of other manufacturers would therefore require the construction of facilities for the licensee, in addition to

a new 3M facility, resulting in a substantially

higher total cost.

A long-term contract may be the most effective mechanism. I n tact, the 3M cost estimates

are conditional on firm orders for a 2-year period, although 3M is willing to consider contracting periods of up to 5 years, The details of the
104 ● Taggants in Explosives

contracting mechanism have not been addressed by this study, although there may be

some advantage to a single contracting agency

(presumably within the Government), rather

than separate contracts with each manufacturer of explosives and gunpowder. In addition to saving the cost of multiple contracting,

the single-contract concept would limit the

amount of information available to 3M on

numbers of product lines and production

quantities of explosives, a matter of some sensitivity to the explosives manufacturers.

Assurance of availability of a taggant supply

is a related issue. A number of approaches are

possible, including:

1. manufacture and maintain a large inventory of taggant materials, either by the

manufacturers directIy or by the Government acting as purchasing agent; a 6-

month supply should certainly be adequate;

2. develop redundancy by constructing a

backup manufacturing site for taggants;

and

3. utilize the discretionary power of BATF to

provide relief from the legislation in cases

of emergency induced interruption of supply.

A detailed tradeoff would be necessary to

decide the relative merits of options 1 and 2.

Option 2 shares the cost impact of additional

capital-intensive construction identified for

the licensing option considered above. The acceptability of option 1 to the explosives and

gunpowder manufacturers may be heavily

weighted by who bears the cost burden of

maintaining the 6-month inventory. Option 3

carries with it a possibility of weakening the

utility of the taggant program, and would

probably be implemented only if necessary;

for instance, if a manufacturer ran out of taggants and would otherwise be forced to stop

product ion.

In the OTA baseline costing estimate, the 6-

month inventory option was assumed, and

manufacturing cost estimates include the cost

of the taggant inventory, as well as the cost of

money to carry the inventory.

SENSOR-RELATED

The detect ion taggant sensor program is in

the very early stages of development. To date,

most of the effort in the detection area has

been devoted to the vapor taggant selection

process. Because detection taggants are still in

an early development phase, a relatively high

degree of uncertainty exists in several of the

principal cost-driving factors. The sensor(s) development and product ion unit cost estimates

are one area, and the quantity of sensors to be

deployed is another. Table 33 sets forth the

major qua I if i cat ions which underlie cost estimates of the sensor program. Three systems

are current I y undergoing development by the

Aerospace Corp.: the continuous electron capture device (CECD), the ion mobiIity spectrometer (IMS), and the mass spectrometer (MS).

Performance specifications are severe for each

of these canal i date opt ions incIuding sensitivity at

COSTS

the parts-per-tril ion level and low (0.01

percent) false alarm rates. Parts lists for each

of these systems have been identified and

priced by Aerospace Corp. instrumental ion

engineers and scientists, Commercial engineering “rules-of-thumb” have been utilized in estimating production price levels. Development

cost budgets and outyear forecasts totaling on

the order of $2.5 million have been estimated

for advanced engineering development. The

estimates, by the very nature of a development

program, assume that development proceeds

smoothly and without major redirect ion of design activity. In addition to the total number of

sensors Iikely to be deplovecl, uncertainty exists in:

 the development cost,

● the production unit cost,
Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 1 0 5

Table 33.–Qualification of Estimating Basis for Sensors

Continuos electron capture device Ion mobility spectrometer Mass spectrometer

General availabilty of technology Currently utilized in lab situation– Commercially available 5 years– High-cost laboratory model in use–no

Brookhaven Breadboard 50 currently in use commercially available that meets

cost and performance requirements

Taggant program status Design of field Instrument in progress Off-the-shelf PC-1OO Instrument IS Preliminary design underway for

being characterized for candidate low-cost field unit

taggants

Parts (materials) identified and

estimated by Aerospace Yes Yes Yes

Taggant sensor production cost

estimated with engineering ruleof-thumb factor applied to material

costs Yes Yes Yes

Quantities to be Implemented in a

national program Quantities depend on scenario selection–also decision to purchase Instruments rests with a large

and varied user community–airports, courthouses, nuclear reactors, nuclear weapon centers,

military communication centers, national shrines, Government office buildings, etc –quantities are

uncertain and open-ended

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

the system or systems actually employed,

and

the relative mix of systems to be deployed

if severaI successfuI canal i dates emerge.

Numbers of Sensors Needed

Estimates of the total quantity of sensors

Iikely to be deployed in the field are further

subject to a wide range of uncertainty, as the

decisions must be made individualIy by a large

number of organizations, aIthough reguIatory

a u t horities s u c h as FAA and the NucIear ReguIatory Commission couId potentiaIIy represent customers for Iarge numbers of sensors,

The target to be protected must be high-valued

and subject to control ted-access. With the exception of checked baggage, it is unlikely that

any Iocation that does not now have a guard

wouId employ a detection taggant sensor.

Likely targets for bombers, and Iikely Iocations

for sensors, include airports, nuclear reactors,

nuclear weapons centers, military communications centers, Government buiId i rigs, and computer centers. There are approximately 620 air

ports in the United States, using approximately

400 X-ray machines to scan carry-on luggage

There are 70 nuclear power station~, and thousands of Government buildings of one type or

another. POIice bomb squads may also use

portable sensors for investigation of bomb for all

threats.

In the baseline program identified by OTA, a

total of 1,500 sensors was assumed deployed.

That number would include one sensor each

for passenger screening, carry-on baggage, and

checked Iuggage for each current X-ray machine stat ion, as welI as 300 for protection of

other high-value targets. l-he low-level program assumed 800 sensors, 2 each for each current X-ray station. The high-level program assumed 5,000 sensors, enough for aII centrolledaccess transportation faciIIties nucIear powerplants, important Government buildings, and

portable police use

Sensor System Related Costs

The annual unit system cost for the sensors,

including installation, maintenance, and false

alarms, is shown in table 34. Since each point

of controlled access where detection sensors

are contemplated is already manned by personnel (who check entering personnel or

search baggage), direct operator costs are not

included for the baseline case. Excess false

alarm rates would possibly be a cause for adding personnel, Training would be accomplished by the detector instrumentation company and occur either at the company as part

of an operator training seminar or at the time

of equipment instaIIation. Maintenance costs

for al I of the canidate systems are estimated

at 10 percent of the hardware investment cost.

61-401 - 80 - 8
106 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table 34.–Vapor Taggant Dotoctor System Cost (annual cost per unit)

Continuous

electron capture Ion mobility

Hardware investment device spectrometer Mass spectrometer

Cost per unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $12,355

Installation and checkout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500

Hardware subtotal a ., ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,855

Annual cost of investment per unitb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,082

Annual maintenance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,236

Cost of false alarm@ .01% rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0

$15,160

500

15,660

2,537

1,516

0

Total annual cost per detector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $3,31 8 $4,053

$35,270

500

35,770

5,795

3,433

0

$9,228

a lncludes cost of training operating Personnel

b Estimated 10-year life and 10 percent interest rate

SOURCE Office of Technology Asessment

Figure 12.– General Functional Network for

Vapor Taggant Detector

Vapo r Sample

Sampler

D

gas source

Total Cost A+ B+C+ D

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

Mix of Sensors

Development of the CECD, IMS, and M S

sensors is expected to continue in a parallel

fashion. A system type would be eliminated if

demonstrated to be infeasible. A mix of possible sensors in the field is likely (given feasibility demonstration) since each instrument type

would be found to offer advantages in given

scenarios for performance (specificity, threshold, etc. ) and costs (acquisition and operation

and maintenance). The baseline program asFigure 13.—Estimatecl Annual Vapor Taggant

Detector Cost v. Quantity Deployed

● Hardware cost only

● Annual cost = P - S

[

i 1

+ i + SI

Annual cost (1 + i)n - 1

where: P = first cost

in millions of S = salvage value (assumed O)

FY 79$ n = equipment life (estimated 10 years)

i = interest rate (estimated 10 percent)

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

5001,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000

Quantity of detectors deployed

sumes a total of 1,500 sensors is deployed, 90-

percent IMS and 10-percent MS.

The annual cost per sensor for this mix is approximately $4,580. In the cost synthesis section program costs have been estimated for

various levels of implementation of sensor system to fit various utility levels examined in this

study.
Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 1 0 7

False Alarm Costs

False alarm response costs have been examined by FAA as a function of the false alarm

rate for various technical approaches including explosive vapor detector schemes. The FAA

study examined two airline operations at Logan Airport, Boston, as a basis for the operational scenario. As false alarm rates increase,

so do the number of hand-searchers required

and, therefore, the cost of operation. The results of that analysis, adjusted for the taggant

vapor sensor, are shown in figure 14, where

estimated annual cost impact for each of the

airlines is shown as a function of the vapor

detector false alarm rate. Incremental costs

are incurred in a stepwise fashion at alarm

Figure 14. —Estimated Cost of False Alarms

v. False”Alarm Rate

Annual

system

costs

($00,000)

4

3

2

1

Based on analysis of selected

airline activity @ Logan Airport

processing 6.5 bags/rein in

explosives vapor-detection scheme

Detection taggant sensor ●

.2 .4 .6

Probability of false alarm

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment

rates greater than 0.05 percent (1 in 2,000).

Since the performance design specification for

the taggant sensor false alarm rate has been established at 0.01 percent (1 in 10,000), no false

alarm costs are expected if this performance

goal is realized. Cost level impacts reflect the

particular operational activity characteristics

of Logan Airport and would not necessarily

reflect nationwide characteristics. Discussions

with FAA personnel indicate that nationwide

cost effects due to false alarms would be less

than that reflected for the Logan scenario;

costs of false alarms, on a national average,

would probably not be significant at rates as

high as a few percent, the current false alarm

rate for airport magnetometers.

The cost of false alarms can also be calculated as a function of the cost per bag

checked. At a rate between 0.05 and 0.175, the

estimated cost of increased inspections due to

false alarms is approximately 2.8 cents/bag at

Logan Airport. At an annual level of 300 million checked bags per year in the United

States, the estimated cost of false alarms due

to checked baggage alone would be approximately $8.4 million. As noted, the cost estimate for Logan is considered high for purposes

of estimating national levels; nonetheless, the

potential cost due to false alarms would be a

significant cost impact when considered in absolute terms. Since the cost of security checks

at airports are ultimately passed on to the

airline customer, the direct per capita costs

would be minimal. At an average of 1.5 bags

checked per passenger the per capita annual

cost for the above conditions would be on the

order of 5 cents. A high false alarm rate could

lead to delays in the departure of aircraft, with

significant losses to both airlines and the

delayed passengers.

EXPLOSIVES AND GUNPOWDER MANUFACTURING COSTS

The value-added costs of the taggant pro- understood for cap-sensitive packaged high exgram that occur at the explosive manufactur- plosives where pilot-plant tests have been acing level are addressed here. As has been al- compl ished. The tagging implications for detoIuded to earlier, the manufacturing process im- nating cord and detonators, conversely, are

placations for tagging implementation are best only addressable in a general way. As no feasi-
—

108 ● Taggants in Explosives

ble designs have been set forth for the required

tooling, and engineering design and analysis

have not been accomplished, the implications

for blasting cap design remain uncertain. Because the OTA study effort was time-constrained, the major survey emphasis was

placed in the area of cap-sensitive packaged

high explosives. The estimates for cap-sensitive

manufacturing costs are based on discussions

with the major manufacturers. Some of these

estimates are applied to other explosive types

where appropriate. Preliminary estimates and

analysis by the Aerospace Corp. are also utilized as a cost basis for certain explosive types

and associated cost elements where deemed

appropriate. These cases will be cited and

commented on as to their reasonableness and

depth of treatment.

The following subsections address each of

the manufacturing cost elements considered in

this study. The last subsection summarizes the

estimates of the various elements of manufacturing cost.

Estimates of the current cost for each of the

explosive product categories considered are

shown in table .35, along with the raw material

costs. The difference between price and raw

material costs is made up primarily of labor,

overhead, and markup (profit). Specific data

for these important elements of cost were not

available to this study, since this kind of data

is considered extremely proprietary. The uncertainty in the specific division of the other

costs and markups makes it difficult to assess

the degree to which the explosives manufacturer will either absorb, or pass on through

Table 35.–Current Manufacturing Cost/Price Data

Current cost of

explosive raw Average current

Explosive product category materials a

price per unnit

Cap-sensitive explosives. 15c/lb 50@/lb

Cast booster s 60cflb $1.5011b

Black powder . . 11 c/lb $6- $9/lbd

Smokeless powder. NAc $6 - $9/lbd

Detonating cor d 2c/ft 5/f t

Blasting cap s 20c - 30c/cap 50c/cap

—

‘Source I ME

bAerospace Corp

c The ME reference did not contain thiss data It IS known that the military Pays on the order of

88 cents/lb

d A leading manufacturer has recently quoted$9 of powder

SOURCE Officeof Technology Assessment

higher markups, the added cost of taggants in

the manufacturing process. This issue will be

amplified later.

Revised Processes, Tooling, and

Facility Costs

Cap-Sensitive Packaged Explosives

Requirements for additional tooling and

equipment to accommodate the tagging process in dynamites, emulsions, slurries, and gels

consist of equipment for weighing, hoppers,

means of transferring taggant samples, and

storage bins for secured storage areas. The

cost for equipment to add the taggants into the

explosive mixing process is small, as most

manufacturers use a handmixing operation.

Based on data provided by one explosives

manufacturer, OTA estimated the added cost

for these investments as a function of the

unique batch size and other considerations regarding waste and productivity. OTA assumed

a 10-year Iife, 10-percent interest rate in order

to annualize this initial investment. Detailed

requirements for other manufacturers of capsensitive packaged explosives were not made

available for this study. OTA believes that

these marginal cost requirements are representative of the cap-sensitive explosives industry.

The Aerospace Corp. indicated that some

manufacturers might wish to install automatic

taggant-dispensin g equipment, and concluded

that this cost should be similar to the cost of

the labor it replaces and hence would be covered under the Iabor cost element. OTA’S

study survey and site visits did not uncover any

particular requirement for automatic dispensing equipment at either gel or dynamite manufacturing facilities.

Cast Boosters, Smokeless Powder, and

Black Powder

Specific tooling and equipment requirements for these product categories were not

available. For estimating purposes the assumption was made that the estimate for cap-sensitive explosives should be a representative value until detailed requirements are established.
Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 1 0 9

Detonating Cord

Tooling designs must be developed in order

to provide tagging capability at each detonating cord production line. Aerospace Corp. indicates that several pieces of hardware have

been tested but no effective equipment is currently available. They further feel that a station configuration would apply both the identification and detection taggants together with

an adhesive before the final assembly polyethylene sheath is applied, and that a reasonable

cost for a station having a 5-year Iife is $50,000.

Five such stations would be required by the industry for an annual production of 500 mill ion

ft. The estimated cost for detonating cord tooling is $250,000. Amortizing this cost over 5

years at 10-percent interest yields an annua l

cost of $66,000 or $0.00013/ft.

Blasting Caps

The process by which taggants would be

added to blasting caps has not yet been determined; it may well vary from one manufacturer to another. Alternate possible approaches are to place the taggants between

two end plugs, embed the taggants within a

single end plug, or add taggants to an existing

interior polyethylene strip. Cost will vary considerably depending on the process chosen

and the current cap assembly process. For purposes of the study, a conservative value of $2

milIion per manufacturer was assumed. Amortizing the $8 million cost (four manufacturers)

over 5 years yields an annual cost of

$2,112,000 or $0.025/cap. This figure would be

high if one of the simpler methods of tagging

detonators were adopted. However, the effect

on the total cost of a tagging program is small.

Labor

Cap-Sensitive Packaged Explosives

Manpower estimates by the manufacturers

indicated a range of requirements varying

from two to six additional men at a site, The

variation results from differences among particular site layouts, processes, and procedures

in use, For instance, in one company effort

would be required in various locations such as

the dope house, works control, laboratory (including works laboratory), and in the magazine

area. Additional activities involved include

ordering, stocking, weighing, and supplying

taggants to operators; collecting data, taggant

samples, keeping records of codes; handIing increased record keeping in magazine areas; and

examining the codes before use in the manufacturing process. One contractor also indicated increased manpower costs due to code

confusions and returned shipments. It should

be noted that incremental labor costs for the

actual mixing operation of taggants and related packaging are essentially zero. All additional estimated labor costs are associated

with peripheral activities in coordinating, handling, and recordkeeping activities.

The estimate for labor, as indicated by the

manufacturers, is SIightly greater than 1 cent/lb

of explosives, which reflects approximately

five to six additional men at the plantsite.

Cast Boosters

For the purposes of developing a baseline estimate, the Aerospace Corp. analysis is utilized

here. Assuming that this will be a manual process, two additional personnel were estimated

per assembly line, Given the four manufacturers (eight Iines) the estimated annual cost is

$400,000 or $0.067/lb of explosives.

Black Powder

Labor costs associated with tagging black

powder were studied by the Goex Co. and referenced in the Aerospace Corp. Inflationary y

Cost Impact Study. The estimated cost per

pound of black powder for manufacturing labor of 1.5 cents is based on replacing the present date-shift code with a tagging material system. EIements include:

storing tagging materiaIs,

security for storage and handling of tagging materials,

administrative and recordkeeping, and

impact on the manufacturing process (assuming a cleanup would be required in
110 ● Taggants in Explosives

the glaze and packhouse operation each

shift).

This cost is exclusive of taggant material costs.

Based on the study by Goex, OTA estimated

the cost of labor for black powder to be 1.5

cents/lb.

Smokeless Powder

The Aerospace Corp. estimated labor effort

added costs per pound of smokeless powder to

be on the order of 6.6 cents (including the

distribution system costs) and assumed that

much of this cost could be absorbed within the

current manufacturing and distribution organization. The estimate is based on the following

assumptions:

● 2,000 Ib/lot,

 2,500 different tag lots produced, and

● 100,000 cases/year (50-lb cases).

Manufacturing costs were estimated to be

0.4 cents (of the total 6.6 cents). Since adequate data are unavailable to validate the estimate, OTA estimated the cost of manufacturing labor for smokeless powders at the same

level as black powder, using the Goex estimate

of 1.5 cents/lb.

Detonating Cord and Blasting Caps

The Aerospace Corp. estimate for detonating cord assumes that each assembly Iine

would require one additional person to maintain a tagging station and to operate it during

production. At $25,000 per man, the five stations would add an annual cost of $125,000 or

$0.00025/f t of cord,

Similarly, the Aerospace Corp. estimates are

used for blasting caps. Several additional

workers may be necessary to operate and

maintain the new equipment required. A reasonable estimate is four per manufacturer

(there are four manufacturers) for an annual increase of $400,000. The resulting cost per blasting cap is $0.0048/cap.

Productivity y

Cap-Sensitive Packaged Explosives

Potential productivity losses have been estimated by the industry to be as high as 15 percent. The primary cause of such losses would

be halting production to change taggant codes

and avoid contamination. Consequently, the

extent of such losses depends on the degree of

taggant cross-contamination that would be

permissible and the taggant batch size. Various kinds of cost can impact the situation.

They are:

● loss associated with scraping of hoppers,

● new investment to offset production

losses,

● loss of the market for mixed scrap, currently sold as an inexpensive explosive,

and

● new investment for expanding waste disposal facilities.

As currently perceived by one major manufacturer of cap-sensitive packaged high explosives, productivity losses wilI have a direct cost

impact in each of the areas noted above. Productivity losses are estimated at 15 percent in

the condition where cross-contamination is not

permitted and on the order of 8 percent where

batch cross-contamination of 10 percent is

permitted. Waste losses associated with scraping of hoppers every fourth mix were also estimated. A significant amount of the mixed

scrap material is currently marketed as a lowquality explosive. If this material could no

longer be marketed due to extensive taggant

cross-contamination, there would be a further

loss in profits. Current environmental regulations require that waste be disposed of by

means other than burning in the open, in effect

requiring additional waste disposal facilities.

In order to maintain the current production

and sales base, and thus maintain an adequate

profit level for the company, additional production facility augmentation would be required to offset the expected losses in productivity.
Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 1 1 1

The total cost due to losses in productivity

could thus add up to several cents per pound

of explosives for the worst case condition. If a

10-percent taggant cross-contamination level

were permitted (BATF assumes this level) the

cost impact would drop dramatically. If a special “composite code” were created, then tags

containing this code could be added to scrap

material and any other material containing

cross-contamination in excess of 10 percent;

investigators finding tags with the composite

code would know that any other tags should

be ignored, This would essentially eliminate

costs for decreased productivity, The OTA

baseline program assumes that such a composite code taggant is used, so that productivity

losses are negligible.

Other Explosive Categories

Since pilot testing of adding taggant material to boosters, gunpowder, detonating cord,

and caps has not taken place, the effects on

productivity are not apparent. For purposes of

costing the baseline system, OTA assumed

there would be no productivity losses.

Inventory Costs

Inventory costs, including the associated

cost of money, are a function of supply held in

inventory. There is no reason to assume the

tagged finished product would be held longer

than is currently the case. It may be necessary,

however, to stockpile a significant inventory of

the taggant material to ensure an uninterrupted supply, particularly for identification

taggants, where there is likely to be only one

supplier. For the baseline case, the quite conservative assumtion was made that a 6-month

inventory of both types of taggant materials

would be stockpiled. The added costs for the

various types of explosives wouId be:

(’alp Cap sensitive $0 0021‘1 b

Boosters $0 0066/lb

Smokeless powder $0 0021/1 b

Black powder $0. 0021 lb

Space and added labor have been included in

the facility and labor costs detailed above. For

the baseline case, no additional storage or labor would be required for cap-sensitive explosives, as the batch size would be the same as

the current date-shift batch size. For the highIevel program, with 10,000-lb maximum batch

size, each batch would need to be separated

by an access aisle from other batches, requiring additional space and labor. Access aisles

would need to be maintained for inventory

control and inspection.

Quality Control

Quality control cost estimates are included

in the labor costs element. Some level of effort

is required to ensure the taggant code and taggant quality prior to mixing. This effort would

take place in the plant lab or “works” lab, to

examine each code before use in the product.

This appears to be a reasonable precaution

since the integrity of all substances entering

the “mix” must be assured to maintain prior

safety levels. In addition, occasional specimens would be examined to assure that the

taggant-mixing specification (uniformity, shelfIife, etc. ) was being achieved.

Safety

Requalifying all product lines with taggant

materials would be a necessary safety testing

requirement for the various explosives manufacturers This one-time capital cost would involve analysis and testing of each type of product. To an extent uncertain at this time, the

pilot testing programs have and will contribute

to this requalification effort. Due to the uncertainty involved, OTA included the cost of safety requalification in the cost element estimates. It should be pointed out that the absolute cost levels of nonrecurring costs are not

insignificant. However, after amortizing these

costs over the significant production weights

of explosive produced annuaIIy, the relative

contribution of incremental costs to a pound

of explosives is quite smalI.

Record keeping Costs

I n order to maintain the integrity of the identification taggant tracing network, a certain
112 ● Taggants in Explosives

amount of additional or new recordkeeping

must take place within the explosives distribution network. Current Federal requirements are

that each explosive package and shipping case

be marked with an identification code citing

the:

● plant of manufacture,

● the date and shift manufactured, and

● the type and grade of explosives.

 explosives covered under this regulation are

the:

●

●

●

●

●

cap-sensitive packaged explosives (dynamites, slurries, water gels, and emu Is ions),

cast boosters,

blasting caps,

black powder, and

detonating cord.

Records of the identification code must be

maintained at the manufacturer level as well

as each subsequent distributor. Smokeless

powders are currently exempt from this requirement, although powders used to handIoad pistol ammunition must be recorded at

the retail sales level.

The cost of recordkeeping has been incIuded as part of the labor manufacturing cost

elements.

Markup

To the extent that incremental taggant costs

are passed on to distributors and users, markup

costs must be included as part of the final

product price. No specific data were available

to treat markup for most of the explosive product categories. For purposes of establishing a

baseline cost estimate, OTA assumed a IO-percent markup at the manufacturing level. This

value may seem low, but all handling costs

have been specifically covered in other cost

elements, including an overhead allowance.

Markup in that sense is essentially profit on the

additional costs. Normal markups must cover

al I of the handling costs.

In addition to manufacturing level markups,

OTA considered the pyramid of markups that

occurs throughout the various echelons of distributor and retailer levels. This is addressed in

the next sect ion.

Summary of Manufacturing

Costs Added

Manufacturing costs elements and total cost

added as a result of the inclusion of identification and detection taggant materials in explosives are summarized in table 36. The added

Table 36.–Summary of Explosives and Gunpowder Manufacturing Costs included

—.——.— .

Costs included

Baseline case Black Smokeless Detonating

Cost element cap sensitive Boosters powder powder cord Blasting caps

Nonrecurring costs

Toolin g Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Storag e No No No No No No

Product requalificatio n Yes Yes Yes Yes NAa NAa

Waste disposal facilities No No No No No No

New investment to offset product losses No No No No No No

Recurring costs

Manufacturing process labor. . . . . . . . . .

Recordkeeping . . . . . .

}

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Quality control. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Product losses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No No No No No No

Waste product line , . No No No No No No

Inventory cost s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Administrative expens e

b

.

Bottom line cost per unit of explosives 1.03/l b 7 7c/lb 2c./lb 7,2./lb .04c/lb 3.lc/cap

— .

a

Data unavailable

b

lncluded in labor

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review 113

costs include the estimated costs to the manufacturer and associated markup as well as the

markup placed on the cost of the taggant raw

materials.

Manufacturing costs for cap-sensitive packaged high explosives are based on detailed inputs received from a major manufacturer. The

raw data are proprietary informat ion and are

not shown here. The detailed cost data were

anaIyzed and alternative ground rules were

established to gain insight into cost effects

where taggant batch size was varied; related

effects were taken into account regarding the

productivity and waste issues. The cost elements incIuded in various assumptions, along

with the bottom Iine cost per- pound of explosives, are shown in table 37.

Table 37.–Cost Summary of Cap-Sensitive Packaged High Explosives Manufacturing Cost Variations With Assumptions

Costs Included

Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 —

10000-12000 lb tag

Cost elements batch size —

Site manpowe r Yes

Production losses Yes

Wast e Yes

Requalification Yes

Waste disposal facilities Yes

Equipment and storag e Yes

Investment to offset production losses Yes

Taggant Inventory costs Yes

Administrativ e Yes

Bottom line cost per pound of

explosives excluding markup 4.Oc/lb

20,000-lb tag batch size

plus allow cross- Tag batch size equals

20,000-lb tag batch size contamination day s production

Yes (less than case 1 ) Yes (less than case 1 ) ‘-No

Yes Yes No

Yes (less than case 1 ) No No

Yes Yes Yes

Yes (less than case 1 ) No No

Yes (less than case 1 ) Yes (less than case 1 ) Yes (less than case 3) Yes

Yes (less than case 1 ) Yes (less than case 2) No

Yes Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes

2 3c/lb 1 4c/lb O 6c/lb

Plan! /year

No

No

No

Yes

No

less than case 3)

No

Yes

No

O 3c/lb

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

DISTRIBUTOR COSTS

A general schematic illustration of the distribution network for explosives is shown in

figure 15 while the network for gunpowder is

shown i n figure 16 Detailed quantitative networks are not available; however, these illuss

trations serve to depict the manner in which

transactions take place within the industry.

Within the networks, potential cost impacts

occur in the areas of recordkeeping, processing and handling, storage, and further potential pyramiding of markup costs throughout

the distribution network.

Recordkeeping at Distribution Levels

Record keeping and control of packaged

high explosives are required by the present

date-shift code regulation. AdditionaI part Itioning of explosive products may be required

beyond that required by the date-shift code

reguIations, which may or may not have an incremental cost effect at the distribution level.

NO detailed studies of additional recordkeeping elements which wouId be required, or the

time necessary, have been conducted to date.

I IME assessment of new activity requirements

by the distributor includes.

● comparing the taggant lot numbers with

the bilI of lading with greater- frequency,

● classifying each explosiveproduct by typeby produ ct by t ype

and taggant lot number to faciIitate locating records,

● expanding storage space for the increaseci

number- of books and records, and

● increasing the time to Iocate the proper

product and taggdnt lot number at sale
114 . Taggants in Explosives

Figure 16.—Schematic Distribution Network

of Gun powders

Large

customer

Primary

distribution

points

Customer

User

(due to the greater number of records that

must be searched).

The Aerospace Corp. further considered:

● segregating material on trucks and in

magazines to a smaller quantity; and

 recording additional information in orders, invoices, and inventory lists.

An analysis by the Aerospace Corp. of available BATF tracing records revealed that recordkeeping entries on bills of lading would involve:

 1.26 codes per order (20,000-lb tagging level) (based on 282 BATF traces of seven

manufacturers in 1976 and 1979),

■

Distributor

m

Retailer

User

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

● 1.46 codes per order (12,000-lb tagging level) (based on Du Pont data), and

. 1.66 codes per order (7,900-Ib tagging Ievel) (based on dynamite traces).

In effect these data indicate that the additional recordkeeping, processing, and handling efforts for the finished explosives may be increased by up to 66 percent, depending on the

tagging level. A plot of activity increases versus tagging level is plotted in figure 17. This

plot underscores the dramatic inverse relationship of recordkeeping activity with the unique

tagging batch level.

The Aerospace Corp. further reviewed th e

additional data entry requirements whic h
Ch. V—Tagganf Cost Review ● 1 7 5

Figure 17.— Recordkeeping Activity v.

Tagging Level

● Cap.sensitive packaged explosives

● Impact on distributor/retailer

● Based on Aerospace analysis of

BATF tracing record

Distributor/retailer

percent increase

in recordkeeping,

processing and

handling effort

70

60

50

40

30

20

5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000

Tagging level in pounds

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

would be required on bills of sale. Tagged explosive materials would require approximately

25 percent more entries than the untagged explosives for transactions at the distributor

level. This analysis was specifically for tagging

at the 20,000-lb level. At the retailer/explosive

user level an 8.7-percent increase in data entries were computed using Federal form 4710

and the biII of sale or delivery ticket.

Aerospace did not quantify the absolute

cost impact as a result of this tracing analysis,

but did conclude, however, that the costs

would be insignificant for cap-sensitive packaged high explosives. The OTA analysis assumed that negligible added costs exist at the

distributor retailer level for:

● cap-sensitive explosives,

● boosters,

● detonating cord, and

● blasting caps.

This conclusion is particularly appropriate for

the baseline case, in

corresponds to the

batch size.

The impact on the

smokeless powders

which the taggant batch

current date-shift code

distributors of black and

is somewhat different.

Black powder and pistol-grade smokeless powder currently have significant recordkeeping

requirements, while the other smokeless powder grades have no current recordkeeping requirements. (Pyrodex”, a black powder substitute, would be marketed and regulated like

smokeless powder, so incremental recordkeeping costs would approximate those of smokeless powder.) An estimate was therefore made

of the additional cost of entering the currently

unregistered smokeless powder in, and detailing it out of, the records at each distributor

level by taggant code. It was assumed that a

record for an “item” would take 2 minutes.

The further conservative assumption was

made that the average size of an “item” at the

master distributor level was 25 lb (primarily

case lots handled), was 10 lb at the distributor

level, and was 2 lb at the retail level. Since considerable recordkeeping requirements currently exist for pistol-grade smokeless powder, the

costs were assumed to be half those of the

other powders. A small additional cost for recordkeeping was assumed at the retail level for

black powder. The cents per pound added by

those costs are shown in table 38.

Storage

Explosives are now generally separated b y

date-shift code batches for magazine storag e

at all levels in the distribution chain, as records

must be kept, and physical control maintained

by date-shift batch. For the baseline taggant

case, no changes would be necessary. If the

taggant batch were smaller, then additional

storage space would be required for access. An

estimate was made of the cost of magazine

space, based on two data points. The added
116 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table 38.–Estimated Cost Impact for Powders

at Distribution Network (cents per pound)a

Smokeless powder

Pistol loading Rifle and

Distribution level Black powder grade shotgun grade

Master distributors

Recordkeeping . . . ., 0 1 .2b 2.4C

Storage . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.2

Distributor/wholesale level

Recordkeeping . 0 3d 6C

Storage . . . . . . . . . 0.2 0.2 0.2

Retail level

Recordkeeping. . . . . 1 I5e 30C

Storage ., . ., . . 0 0 0

1,4 19,6 38.8

Total cost through the distribution chain

Black, . ., . . ., . . ., ., ... .. 1,4$

Pistol . . . . . ... . . . . ., .19,6$

Other. . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . .. 38.8$

If pistol powder is assumed to be 25 percent of total smokeless powder,

the average cost impact for smokeless powder is 33c/lb.

aEstimate by Integrated master distributor wholesaler, retailer

bBased on I minute Average lot size 25 lb

c

Assume 2 minutes/lot

‘Assumed lot size IS 10 lb

‘Assumed lot size IS 2 lb

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

cost per pound of explosives was less than 0.1

cents, even for the case in which 10,000-lb

maximum lots were tagged. For black and

smokeless powders, the assumption was made

that separation by taggant lot would require

additional storage space at both the master

distributor and distributor levels, but probably

not at the retailer level. Using the same data

base as above, the cost was estimated to be approximately 0.2 cent/lb at each level, as shown

in table 38.

Summary Cost Including Markup

Distribution level costs are summarized in

table 39. Markup on total costs incurred

through the distribution system for explosives

was assessed at 25 percent; for black and

smokeless powders a total markup of 80 percent was assumed. This estimate is based on

analysis of costs and price at each level, supplied by an integrated powder distributor.

Table 39 sets forth the net cost added by the

distribution network and further summarizes

the net cost to explosive users from both

manufacture and distribution for the various

explosive categories. To illustrate the effect

that the method of program implementation

can have (taggant batch size and treatment of

waste), costs for the five cases previously

defined for the cap-sensitive high explosives

are shown. Case 4 is, as noted, the OTA baseline case.

Table 39.–Distribution System-Summary of Cost Added and Markup (cents per pound)

Total cost Ieaving Distribution Distribution Total cost added by Total added price

Explosive category manufacturing facility system cost added system markup distribution system to user

Cap-sensitive packaged high explosivesv

Case . ., 8.5 0.2 2.2 2,4 10,9

Case 2 . 66 0 1 1.7 1.8 8.4

Case 3 ., ... ., 5.6 0.1 1.4 1.5 7.1

Case 4 (baseline). . . . . . . ., . . ., 4.8 — 1,2 1,2 6.0

Case 5 ..., . . . ., . . 29 — 0.7 0.7 3.6

Boosters . . . . . . ., ., . . . 20.9 0.2 5.3 5.5 26,4

Black powder , 6 3 1,4 6.20 7.6 13.9

Smokeless powder 6.3 33.0 31.4 64.4 70,7

Detonating cord ., ., 0.6 — 0.2 0,2 0.8

Blasting caps ., 5 0 — 1.2 1,2 6 2

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 117

USER COST IMPACTS

The cost increases estimated to occur as a

result of the baseline taggant program are summarized and their impact on users analyzed.

Increased Material Costs

The net cost increase due to tagging explo -

sives is summarized here. Summary cost impacts include:

● the cost of identification taggant materials,

● the cost of detection taggant materials,

● manufacturing costs added including

markup, and

$/lb

.56

.55

.54

.53

.52

.51

.50

● distribution network cost added inc

markup.

The following increases are noted for the

line case:

Explosive category Percent cost increase

Cap-sensitive packaged high explosives. ., .. ..11.9

Boosters 

Black powder. 2.3

Smokeless powder . . .. 11.8

Detonating cord .23.5

Blasting caps . . . . 15

The individual contributing cost elements to

the overall cost impact are illustrated in figure

18 for the respective explosive categories.

$/lb

1.80

1.70

1.60

1.50

uding

baseFigure 18.—Summary of Added Costs to Explosive Users Cost

Per Unit of Explosives in Dollars $/cap

$/lb

9.15

9.10

9.05

9.

.58

$/lb

9.70

r

9.60

9.50

9.40

9.30 1

$/ft

.062 ~

.57

.56

.55

.54

.52

.52

.51

.5(

.

.

.

.

Dist.

cost

added

Mfgr.

cost

added

Detec.

tag

matl.

ID tag

matl.

-Current

 ‘ric e

Cap-sensitive Boosters

packaged

explosives

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

Black Smokeless Detonating Blasting

powder powder cord caps
118 ● Taggants in Explosive s

For the baseline case, the overall average increase in costs due to tagging is on the order of

12.8 percent, the weighted average for each of

the above percentage contributions. The estimate of absolute annual cost increase in explosives is approximately $37 million.

Commercial Uses of Explosives and

Gunpowders—General

Who uses commercial explosives and gunpowders? Over 55 percent of the total weight

of explosives and blasting agents is utilized in

the mining of coal, both in underground and

surface mining operations. Quarrying and nonmetal mining are next in rank (1 5.4 percent) followed closely by metal mining (14.6 percent).

Construction work at 10.6 percent and “other

uses” at 4.2 percent complete the spectrum of

user classes as adopted by BOM’S annual

“Mineral Industrial Survey s.” Onsite investigations were conducted for each of the major

user classes in order to determine the order of

magnitude cost and economic impact to the

users of tagged high explosives. The selection

of users investigated included both underground mining and surface mining as each

type differs in the relative utilization of high

explosives. Onsite investigations were conducted with the following users during the

course of the study:

Underground mining

Metal mining (copper) –Anaconda, The

Crow Fork Mine, Utah

Coal mine– Webster Coal Co., Kentucky.

Quarry

Tri State, Maryland

Rockville Crushed Stone, Maryland

Surface mining (open pit]

Metal mining (copper)– Kennecott

“Bingham Canyon Mine, ” Utah

Construction work

Guy F. Atkinson, California

The following sections describe the findings

of the limited number of intensive investigations of the above explosive users,

Underground Mines

The Crow Fork (Anaconda) Mine near Toole,

Utah, is a large, deep underground operation

in hard-rock, mining for essentially high-grade

ore. The mine will primarily produce copper,

although significant amounts of silver, gold,

and molybdenum are expected as byproducts.

This mine is still under development and has

had no production of ore as yet. Mine reserves

are estimated at 20 years with an estimated

production output capacity of 10,000 tons of

ore per day. The total use of explosives is projected to be approximately 0.6 percent of total

operating costs. Approximately 80 percent of

the explosives used are non-cap-sensitive gels

and blasting agents such as ANFO. The remaining 20 percent of explosives, including dynamites, slurries, boosters, detonators, and detonating cord would be subject to a tagging requirement if taggant legislation were enacted,

A 12.8-percent boost in the cost of tagged explosives would translate into a 0.02-percent increase in the cost of mining, certainly an insignificant cost increase. The use of ANFO is

currently related to clearing and aboveground

excavation. Steady-state underground mining

in the future can be expected to change the explosive mix and potentially increase the cost

increase noted above. If all explosives used in

the future were the cap-sensitive types, a taggant program would increase mining costs less

than 0.1 percent.

The cost impact on underground coal mining is somewhat higher. At present, the cost of

the cap-sensitive slurry and detonators (the explosives used to mine the coal) represents approximately 1.4 percent of the total cost of

bringing the coal out of the ground. The increase in the cost of the explosives, due to tagging, would increase operating costs less than

0.2 percent. Other economic factors far outweigh increases of this sort.

Quarries

Discussion with the Rockville Crushed Stone

Quarry revealed that explosives contribute to
Ch. V—Tagganf Cost Review ● 119

slightly over 8 percent of the gross total costs

of operation. Between 1.5 million and 1.75 million lb of cap-sensitive (80 percent) and noncap-sensitive (20 percent) explosives are utilized annually at their location. Since the environment is wet, no ANFO is currently utilized.

The blasting activity is all contracted with a

local blasting jobber, who provides the drilling,

explosives, and blasting operation. The cost

impact of an increase due to a tagging program is thus significantly higher in this explosive-intensive operation, However, the increase would still be less than 1 percent of operating costs. If the costs of explosives, caused

by legislation of a tagging program, are much

higher than estimated for the baseline program, then the quarry might investigate the

cost potential of using inexpensive blasting

agents, coupled with a water pumping operat ion.

A quite dissimilar situation is provided by

the quarry operated by Tri State Explosives.

The Tri State Quarry produces “facing stone”

in various grades. The use of explosives in the

operation is relatively insignificant, averaging

from 10 to 15 blastings per year. Between 15 to

105 lb of explosives are used in each blasting,

characterized as a “very precise operation. ”

The incremental cost of tagged explosives is

therefore trivial.

Open Pit Mines

The OTA study team visited the Kennecott

“Bingham Canyon Mine” near Salt Lake City,

Utah. This open pit mine has many distinctions, including:

●

●

●

●

the world’s largest manmade excavation,

the first open pit mine in the copper industry (started in 1904),

the largest single mining operation ever

undertaken, and

the holder of the largest copper production record of any individual mine in history.

Figure 19 shows a photograph of the Bingham pit. Each vertical terrace is approximately

50 ft high. The mine is an extremely large user

of explosives, with approximately 105,000 lb of

explosives used per day or over 36 million

lb/year. For every pound of explosives used, 4.2

tons of material are mined. Cap-insensitive explosives predominate the utilization, consisting of almost 80-percent ANFO and almost 20-

percent cap-insensitive slurry. Explosive costs

run from 3 to 5 percent of total operating

costs. High explosives, although a smalI percentage of the total weight of explosives used,

account for 7 to 10 percent of costs for all explosives used in the mine. Large amounts of

primacord are used, together with boosters,

detonators, and some dynamite for secondary

blasting (e. g., breaking up boulders). High explosives therefore contribute on the order of

0.3 percent of the total cost of operation. The

cost increase for a baseline taggant program

would be on the order of 0.03 percent of operating costs.

Construction

The study team discussed the impact of

tagged explosives with the Guy F. Atkinson Co.

in South San Francisco, Cal if., a large contracting firm that utilizes large quantities of

explosives in both underground (tunnels, etc. )

and aboveground construction operations. In

recent years this firm has utilized on the order

of 20 million lb of explosives annually. In underground applications, operating costs are

considered to be very sensitive to the cost of

powder. Values placed on underground operations were:

Pounds Of

powder to

remove yd 3 Cost per yd’

Genera l 1/4 to- 1 3\4 lb 13 - 8 8

Coa l ‘/~ I b 17~

Hard-rock 1 lb 50~

In a recent tunnel application, Guy F. Atkinson used approximately 900,000 caps in the

construction of a 22-mile tunnel. At an estimated 50 cents/cap, the value of caps alone

amounted to approximate y $500,000.

In aboveground work, Guy F. Atkinson recently utilized over 40 milIion lb of explosives

in the construction of the Maloney Dam in California. This fixed-price contract was very
120 ● Taggants in Explosives

Figure 19.— Bingham Canyon Open Pit Copper Mine

“powder intensive. ” The value put on explosives was approximately 9 percent of operating

costs, consisting of 70-percent cap-sensitive explosives and 30-percent ANFO.

A baseline taggant program would increase

operating costs approximately 1 percent, a significant cost, but probably not sufficient to

cause a shift to alternative excavation methods. One additional potential impact should

be noted. Such construction projects are normally long-term, fixed-price contracts. A sharp

jump in the cost of explosives during the

course of the contract could significantly affect profits.

A summary of the findings on current explosive cost contributions to the various user

Photo credit: Kennecott Copper Co

classes is shown in table 40. Explosives percentage contributions to operating costs vary

(dependent on user type) from less than 1 percent (underground metal mining) to as high as

9 percent (dam construction example). As a result, the cost impact of an increase in the price

of cap-sensitive high explosives also varies,

particularly as these explosives represent varying portions of the total explosive mix used.

Hand loading

The above cost impact calculations were for

industries that are generally able to pass on increases in the cost of operations to their customers. Handloaders, however, are the ultimate users of the product, and must absorb
Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 121

Table 40.–Current High Explosives Cost Impact

for Various User Classes’

Percent Increase in

operating costs

Percent of due to baseline

operating costs taggant program

Underground metal minin g 0.2b 0.02

Underground coal mining 1 .4C 02

Open pit metal mining 0.2 to 0.5d 003

Quarrie s

8 0e

1 0

Construction

Aboveground dam construction 9.0e 

1 0

Excavation–general 2 to 3

Tunneling 5 —

dTheSe are single poml samples

bTo[al Operating COSIS mcludlng ref[mng were nol available For dlrecl mlnmg cost OPeratlOnS e~

ploslves accounted Ior less than 1 percent of costs

C

NOTE This data point reflects a htghly efflclent operalton

‘Excludes blasllng agents

‘Includes blastlng agents

SOURCE Otflce of Technology Assessment

any increased cost due to a taggant program.

Handloaders load their own ammunition for

two reasons —economy and the hobby aspect.

A less than 10-percent cost increase in expendable material is unlikely to affect a hobby for

which hundreds of dollars in costs have already been incurred (hand loading equipment

and guns). As powder is only one of several

materials on which a hand loader saves costs

(cartridge cases, projectiles, wadding) and additional cost-savings are realized from labor

and avoiding paying the excise tax on purchased

powder

percent

—

ammunition, an 8-percent increase in

cost would translate into a very few

increase in total reloading costs.

OTHER COST IMPACTS

Government Investigation Costs

and Program Administration

BATF has estimated* a requirement of 11

man-years of effort annually to enforce the

provisions of S.333, primarily to establish

standards and monitor implementation of the

taggants program. Estimated program costs in

fiscal year 1979 dollars for this level of effort

are approximately $500,000. This would include several explosive specialists, chemists,

inspectors, and clerical help. Estimated costs

for actually investigating taggant-tracing services are expected to be marginal beyond current BATF personnel levels and are contained

in the above estimate. Their current tracing

service personnel would require one additional

slot at a cost of approximately $30,000. The total annual costs estimated for BATF are, therefore, just over $500,000.

Completing the spectrum of Government

level costs are those expenditures that are

budgeted and projected to complete the technical development of the taggants program by

the Aerospace Corp. Total program costs (including sunk costs of $5.4 million prior to fiscal year 1980) are $10.0 million budgeted; projected outyear costs are estimated at $4.6 million.

Investigative Costs

Investigators of bombing incidents currently

devote considerable time to examining explosive debris for clues regarding the type and

source of the explosive material. Further effort

is devoted to forensic analysis at the laboratory level. If an identification taggant program

is implemented, collection of debris for a laboratory search for taggants wiI I become part of

the standard bombing-scene investigatory procedures. There should be little or no impact on

the time required for a bombing-scene investigation. Taggant recovery from the debris will

be an additional laboratory exercise but it

could we I I replace the more time-consuming

procedures now carried out to obtain less information than would be furnished by taggants. Similarly, it will take time to follow up

on the leads furnished to investigators by having a list of last legal purchasers of the bomb

filler material,

than would be

rect leads. For

sumption was

but that time is probably less

expended following up less dipurposes of this study, the asmade that a taggant program

61-401 0 - 80 - 9
122 . Taggants in Explosive s

would have no net cost effect on investigation

time .

Effects of Competition-Substitution

Depending on the ultimate rise in the price

of explosives to the user community due to the

addition of taggants, a variety of economic impacts could occur. As has been pointed out

earlier, the choices of the type of explosive

purchased by users are frequently made on a

basis of the lowest price rather than brand loyalty. Since this is so, various kinds of potential

substitution threaten the explosives industry if

the user perceives more economical choices

available to him. For instance, in the underground mining of coal, the cost of explosives

can play a predominant role in the overall cost

of operations, particularly so in marginal types

of mining operations. Substitution of mechanical coal mining equipment could essentially

eliminate the use of explosives in those mines.

The cost impact of the baseline taggant program is unlikely to significantly affect that

type of choice, particularly given the capital

investment in machinery that is currently used

to support explosive mining. A full economic

cost tradeoff analysis between mechanical

tools and the increased cost of explosives

would need to take place for a meaningful

sample size of users to determine the net effect on the explosives industry.

Discussions with a dynamite and packaged

slurry manufacturer revealed that in one case

a recent 5.4-percent increase in the price of a

slurry product resulted in several buyers shifting to other products —a loss in sales of 6 million lb of product for that manufacturer. Other

estimated potential losses by substitution were

suggested by the manufacturer. For instance,

given a price increase of $1 0/1 00-weight in

their nitroglycerine-based products, that manufacturer estimated that as much as 25 percent

of their business would shift to other booster/slurry combinations. The manufacturer further estimated that if a 10-cent increase in the

price of packaged slurries occurred, they could

lose 50 percent of their slurry business t o

ANFO, as mining operations would substitute

borehole dewatering (by pumping the hole out

and utilizing a borehole liner) coupled with

ANFO. This kind of substitution, for cap-sensitive packaged high explosives to ANFO, was

also noted by an explosives jobber (operating

in a quarry environment) as a highly likely

prospect should the cost of tagged explosives

increase inordinately. l-he accuracy and objectivity of this type of unsubstantiated estimate

are open to question, particularly as other

operators expressed opposite views. Safety, reliability, and ease of handling were cited as

reasons why a cost increase, such as would occur for the baseline tagging program, would

not cause a product substitution. The examples do, however, highlight a very real potential problem, particularly if the taggant program were to substantially increase the cost of

cap-sensitive explosives, or if a program were

adopted that included tagging some portion of

a cost-competitive segment of the industry

(such as tagging dynamite, but not gels and

slurries).

It is noted that the current annual utilization

of ANFO in this country is on the order of 3.4

billion lb. It is estimated that the trend toward

utilization of ANFO has gone about as far as it

can go, given the excel lent economies for

ANFO in a wide variety of circumstances. increasing inordinately the cost of explosives

due to tagging could, however, further shift

current utilization from cap-sensitive packaged explosives to ANFO.

Effects on Fixed-Price Commodities

There is a potentially important economic

spillover on the marketplace for fixed-price

commodities, due to taggants. Copper prices

are established in a competitive worldwide

market setting. The Kennicott copper mine, for

instance, competes in this environment, and as

a result is limited in its. ability to pass on additional costs of operations. Tagged explosives

could affect this situation, depending on the

degree of tagging implemented and the cost of

tagging. The OTA analysis revealed that only

insignificant influences on cost of operation

would take place due to cost increases from a
Ch. V— Tagganf Cosf Review ● 123

mandated taggant program. If ANFO and unpackaged slurries were also tagged, however,

the impact could be quite different. The price

of ANFO could approximately double, raising

the cost of operations as much as percent.

Such an increase may well require a higher

grade cutoff point for ore, resulting in a significant decrease in the effective reserves of economically recoverable copper at that site.

Possible Removal of Some

Gun powders From the Market

The initiation of a tagging program involves

startup costs to the manufacturer, which this

analysis has assumed would be amortized over

10 years and passed along to the consumer in

the form of somewhat higher prices. It is possible, however, that some manufacturers o f

black or smokeless powder might prefer t o

take some product lines off the market, so as

to incur these startup costs for only a portion

of their existing product line. It is also possible,

though perhaps less Iikely, that a manufacturer

might choose to halt all production for the

handloader market rather than be involved i n

tagging such powders. If this should occur,

handloaders would find their existing choice

among powders reduced; this reduction in

choice would be a “cost” to handloaders,

though not one which can be expressed in dollars.

TAGGANT PROGRAM COST SYNTHESIS

In this section of the report, cost estimates

are established for implementing a baseline

taggant program. This development of cost is

an accumulation of total program cost elements developed in prior sections of the report. The program cost elements include:

. identification taggant material costs;

● detection taggant material costs;

 manufacturing level costs;

● distribution system costs; and

● public overhead costs:

— sensor-related production,

— sensor development,

— other taggant program development

costs, and

— BATF annual administration and tracing activity,

Subsequent to the buildup of the total baseline taggant program costs, a series of alternative implementation levels are examined for

their cost impact. Costs are estimated for a

total taggant program and for separate identification and detection taggant programs. Following that are set forth the various aspects of

cost uncertainty in the study and a cost-sensitivity analysis of key uncertainty cost drivers

or parameters intrinsic to the taggant program.

Identification Taggant Program

Material Costs

Table 41 shows the buildup of identification

taggant material costs. The calculations, which

are self-explanatory, are based on the program

units (weight, feet, caps) set forth in the earlier

section on “Taggant Material Costs, ” A price

for polyethylene encapsulated tags of $55/lb is

utilized with the concentration noted. The total annual cost for this baseline condition is

$11,200,000.

Detection Taggant Program

Material Costs

Table 42 sets forth the buildup of detection

taggant program material costs. The calcu la-
124 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table 41 .–Identification Taggant Material Annual Costs, Baseline Program

Annual cost

for taggant

Estimated Explosive Encapsulated/ Taggant Increased cost materials

annual average Taggant unencapsulated cost per per unit of Increase in (dollars in

production unit cost concentration (total pounds) pound explosives explosive cost thousands)

Cap-sensitive packaged

high explosives.

Cast boosters, .,

Smokeless powders

Black powder ,

Detonating cord .,

Blasting cap s

Total program

325 million lb $0.5011b o 05%

, . 6 million lb $1 50/lb 0.1% 

5 million lb $6 00/lb 0,05%

400,000 lb $9.00/ lb 0.05%

500 million ft 5$/ft 5 taggants

per inch

. 84 million units 50c each 50 mg

Encapsulated

(162,500)

Encapsulated

pellets (6,000)

Encapsulated

(2,500)

Encapsulated

(200)

Encapsulated

(160)

Encapsulated

(9,240)

$ 5 5 2.75u 5.5% $8,900

122 12.2C 8.1 % 732

55 2.75$ 0 46% 137

55 2.75c o 30% 11

25/batch 0.05$ 1 %0 250

120 1.32$ ea. 2 64% 1,100

( +46) a

. . . , . ., .,, . ., . . .,, ,,, ,, . . . ,., $11,200

‘Allowance for cap materials

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

Table 42.–Detection Taggant Material Annual Costs

Taggant cost per unit Expected

Estimated annual Detection taggant level Detection taggant explosives total annual costs

Explosive category production concentration required, pounds (@$40 /lb taggant) (dollars in thousands)

Cap-sensitive packaged high

explosive s 325 million lb 0.025% by weight 87,500 1$ $3,250

Cast booster s 6 million lb 0.025% by weight 1,500 lc 60

Smokeless powders. 5 million lb 0.025% by weight 1,250 I 50

Black powde r 400,000 lb 0.025% by weight 100 1$ 4

Detonating cor d 500 million ft 100 mg/ft 110,000 0.9C 4,500

Blastlng cap s 84 million units 200 mg per cap 36,960 1.76c 1,478

worst case set

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $9,340

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

tions, which are self-explanatory, are established at the noted concentration levels and

weights, feet, and unit quantities common to

the identification taggant program. At the estimated cost of $40/lb of detection taggant material, the total annual program estimate is

$9,340,000.

Manufacturing Level Program Costs

Explosive manufacturing level program

costs are delineated in table 43. The annual

cost estimate for the baseline program is

$7,068,500. The costs are based on explosive

quantities and manufacturing incremental

costs developed in previous sections.

Distribution Network Program Costs

The annual program cost attributable to the

distribution network is $9,231,000. The calculation, shown in table 44, is based on the quantities of explosives and distribution system incremental costs established in previous sect ions.

Public Overhead Program Cost

Public overhead program costs are defined

to include the folIowing cost elements:

● sensor-related deployment costs,

● taggant program development, and
Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 1 2 5

Table 43.–Manufacturing Cost Added

Total program

manufacturing

cost added

Estimated annual Manufacturing (dollars m

Explosive category producilon cost added/unit thousands)

Cap-senstive packaged

high explosives ., 325 million lb 1.0 3

a

$3,347

Boosters . . 6 million lb 7.72 463

Black powde r 400,000 lb 2.57c 10

Smokeless powder 5 million lb 2.57c 128

Detonating cord ., 500 million ft 0.094C 470

Blasting caps .84 million units 3.15C 2,650

Total ., ., ., $7,068

a

Baseline condition

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Table 44.–Distribution System Cost Added

Total program

distribution

system

Distribution cost added

Estimated annual system cost (dollars in

Explosive category production added/unit thousands)

Cap-sensitive packaged

high explosives ., 325 million lb 1. 19$a $3,869

Boosters . ., 6 milllon lb 5.4 8 328

Black powder ., 400,000 lb 7.55$ 30

Smokeless powde r 5 milllon lb 6443$ 3,222

Detonating cord ., 500 million f t 015$ 750

Blasting caps .84 million units 1.23c 1.033

Total ., ., ., $9,232

a

Baseline conditions

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

● BATF administrative costs, including tracing activity.

The annual sensor program cost is $6.83 million for the baseline case in which 1,500 units

are deployed in an assumed mix of 90-percent

IMS and 10-percent MS sensor types. As indicated earlier, the annual BATF administration cost is approximately $0.53 million, while

the taggant program development annual cost

is estimated at $1.15 million, for a total of

$8.51 million.

Taggant Program Baseline

Cost Estimate

The total estimated cost for the baseline taggant program is $45.37 million per year. The

calculation of this estimate is shown in table

45. It includes the estimated cost impact of

Table 45.–Taggant Program Summary Annual

Cost-Baseline Program (millions of FY 1979 dollars)

Annual cost

Taggant material s $2056

Identification taggants(11 22)

Detector taggants (9,34)

Sensor-related costs a 6 8 3

Explosives manufacturers’ added costs 7.07

Distributors’ costs 9 2 3

Government costs. ., 1,68

Administration and tracing

Taggant program development

Increased Investigative costs . 0

Total baseline program annual cos t $4537

a Assumed 500 units 90.percent IMS and 10 percent MS

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

taggant materials (identification and detection), manufacturer-added cost, distributoradded costs, and public overhead (sensors, taggant development, and BATF administration).

Program Cost Versus

Implementation Level

Table 46 shows the major cost elements of

the taggant program as a function of implementation level. The low-level program would

use a unique identification taggant for each

manufacturer, type of product, and year of

Table 46. --Taggant Program Summary Annual Cost Versus

Implementation Level (millions of FY 1979 dollars per year)

Low case Baseline High case

Summary cost elements program program program

Taggant materials

Identification taggants $ 5.61a $11.22 $1122

Detection taggant s 9 3 4 9 3 4 9 3 4

Explosive manufacturers’ added cost 5.26b

7. 07C 19.41d

Distribution system added cost 5.02e

9.23 16.55f

Public overhea d 5329 8. 51h

24.5 ‘

Total program annual cost $3055 $4537 $810

(less ANFO)

ANFO $187.0 

$268.0

aOTA estimate of slmpllf!ed code based on halwng the baseline es~lmafe

bPlant/year tagging level

cDate-shlff Iagglng level

dlo 00010 f 2 Or30.lb lagglng level for cap-sens(tlve 2000 lb for powders

‘Inc’ludes markup costs only

flncludes Increase for adlustecj markups 75 mllllon lb of powders powder record keeping @

$Illb

gBased on 800 sensors

‘Based on 1 500 sensors

IBased on 5 000 sensors

IBased on 34 bllllon lb of ANFO lagged annually ID lag @I 2C/lb of ANFO detection lag C @

O 5c/lb of ANFO manufacturing @ 2c/lb of ANFO and recordkeepmg @I lc/lb of ANFO

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
126 ● Taggants in Explosives

manufacture. A total of 800 detection sensor s

would be deployed, one for passengers and

one for baggage at each airport location currently deploying magnetometers and hand

baggage X-ray units. Cap-sensitive high explosives, detonators, boosters, detonating cord,

and smokeless and black powders would be

tagged with both identification and detection

taggants. Blasting agents would not be directly

tagged.

The baseline program would tag the same

materials as the low-level program, but would

use a unique identification taggant for each

shift of each product — analogous to the current date-shift code marking on the exterior of

explosives. Traceability to the lists of last legal

purchasers would be maintained, as the taggant would contain all the information needed

for a BATF trace (date, shift, product, and

size). Approximately 1,500 detection taggant

sensors would be deployed at airports and major controlled-access facilities such as powerplants, refineries, and Government buildings.

Major police bomb squads would operate portable units.

This baseline program differs from the program proposed by the BATF/Aerospace Corp.

team in two respects. The most important is

that a full shift of the same product (a different size would be treated as a different product) would be tagged with the same taggant,

rather than an arbitrary 10,000 to 20,000 lb.

The practical utility result of that change is

that a longer I ist of last legal purchasers would

be produced by a trace, at least for those lines

that make more than 10,000 to 20,000 lb of a

product in a single shift. The second difference

concerns rework. It has been assumed that a

special taggant containing a “composite

code” will be added to material containing

more than 10-percent cross-contain inat ion;

such a taggant would indicate that other codes

in the explosive were contaminants and could

be ignored.

The high-level program would uniquely tag

each 1(),()0()-lb batch of explosive and each

2,000-Ib batch of gunpowder. All explosive

materials, including blasting agents, would be

directly tagged. Ammonium nitrate fabricated

for use in ANFO would be tagged, but not fertilizer-grade ammonium nitrate. Approximately 5,000 detection taggant sensors would be

deployed at every major transportation facility, controlled-access utility, Government facility, and other potential high-value targets

such as campus computer locations. Portable

units would be routinely available to police

bomb squads. The taggant level and types of

explosives to be tagged in the high-level program correspond to a strict interpretation of

S.333, as propounded by IME.

Program Cost of Separate Identification

and Detection Taggant Programs

The above discussion has been for a program that includes both identification and detection taggants. Interest has been expressed

in the cost of each program separately; the

total cost and breakouts by cost elements are

discussed for each of the three implementation levels. For the baseline set of conditions,

the cost breakout is set forth in table 47. These

costs are, in summary:

I dentification taggant program $248 mllllon

Detection taggant program $254 milllon

Total combined program $4537 mllllon

Table 47.–identification Taggant and Detection Taggant

Program Cost Comparisons–Baseline Case

(millions of dollars per year)

Identification Detection Baseline

taggant taggant combined

Program cost elements program program program

Taggant materials ., ,$1122 $9.3 4 $20.56

Sensor-related costs – 6.83’ 6.83’

Manufacturers’ cost ., 6.0b 94 7 0 7

Markup

4.82

Labor and

tooling

Distribution system cost, 6.66b 2.57 9.23

Markup

-oLabor and

tooling

Government cost

Administration and tracing 53 13C 53

Taggant program development ,34 81 1.15

Total ., ., ., ., .$24.76 $25.44 $4537

a

For 1,500 sensors

b LesS markup on delecllon Iaggafll

CASSUMed 25 percent of combined Program

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
Ch. V— Taggant Cost Review ● 127

As one can note, the sum of individual programs is greater than the total combined program. This follows from the fact that each of

the programs share certain labor and capital

resources in the combined program and each

opt ion bears the tota I cost for these resources

if only one of the programs would be implemented. Shared resources in the combined

baseline program are approximately $5 million/year, The detection taggant program is

directly sensitive to the number of deployed

sensors; variation in this would affect the cost

differentials significantly.

Similar cost breakdowns were calculated for

the separate identification and detector taggant programs at the low and high implementation levels; these separate costs for the three

implementation levels are summarized in table

48.

Table 48.–Summary Program Costs Versus

Level of Implementation

Total combined

Identification Detection program a

L o w $ 1493 $2192 $305 5

Baseline 2476 2544 4537

Hig h 21454 6526 2688

ac~~tJ(”~d ~rOgram CoSIS are less—than the sum of the Indlwdual Programs because of shared

labor tooling admlnlsfrallon etc

SOURCE Otftceof Technology Assessment

Comparison of OTA Cost Estimates

With I ME and Aerospace Corp.

Estimates

In testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, IME has estimated that

the cost of the identification taggant program

would be on the order of $700 miIIion/year.

That estimates includes the cost for the taggant materials, library maintenance fees, and

record keeping costs. The estimate did not include public overhead cost, manufacturing

added costs, costs through the distribute

chain, and markup. In addition, the I ME estimates for the quantity of cap-sensitive explosives produced is lower than the OTA estimate

by 50 million lb, IME does not include the effects of tagging 5 million lb of smokeless powder and assumes that the total production of

2.5 million lb of black powder would be

tagged. All but 400,000 lb of the black powder

is used as a raw material input to other manufactured items, such as fuzes, however, and so

would not be tagged.

For a taggant program with the scope assumed by IME, OTA estimates the cost would

be $214 million, not $700 million. The major

reasons for this difference are: I ME assumed

material cost for the identification taggants of

$200/lb (versus the OTA estimate of $55/lb), the

inclusion of a Iibrary maintenance fee of $100/-

year per unique taggant (this fee would not be

charged), and a concentration level of 0.05 percent for unencapsulated taggants versus the

BAT F/Aerospace suggested level of 0.025 percent (equivalent to a 0.05-percent concentration level for encapsulated taggants). As indicated previously, the IME figures for the

material and library maintenance costs reflect

a 3M quoted cost for taggants produced in a

pilot program.

Table 49 depicts the various cost elements

for an identification taggant program that includes blasting agents. The three columns

show, respectively, the element cost estimates

made by I ME, the corresponding costs under

the same assumptions made by OTA, and the

actual cost elements, as estimated by OTA. It

must be clearly understood that these cost estiTable 49.–Comparison of the Estimates for ID Tags

(millions of dollars per year)

OTA estimates OTA estimates

I ME cost using I ME using OTA

Cost elements estimate assumptions a assumtions

ID tag materials–non-ANFO $ 525

ID tag materials–ANFO 3400

Manufacturers’ costs–

non-ANF O —

Manufacturing cost–ANFO

and recordkeeping –

Distribution system cost –

Public overhead –

Record keeping costs 195

Code reservation 291 1

Tota l $703,1

$ 1038

68.0

172

1020

8 0

87

in mfgr &

distribution

—

$206.45

$ 112

680

18.47

102,0

13,98

87

in mfgr &

distribution

—

$21454

dAssumpllons 275 mllllon lb of cap senslhve packaged explosives 25 mllllon lb of black

powder smokeless powder not Included

SOURCE Ott[ceol Technology Assessment
128 ● Taggants in Explosives

mates are for the identification tagging pro -

gram for the high implementation level.

The Aerospace Corp. cost estimate of approximately $48 million/year was for a different program —one in which ANFO and other

blasting agents are not directly tagged. As

noted above, the program for which the Aerospace Corp. cost estimate was given is quite

similar to the OTA identified baseline program, differing only in the size of the unique

taggant batch and in some assumptions on rework material.

A summary of major differences between

the Aerospace Corp. assumptions and the OTA

baseline case assumptions is as follows:

Aerospace

assumptions

Detonating cord. ... 12,000,000

Number of sensors

deployed ., 5,000

Increased investigating

costs. .$5.4 million

Markup . , No

ID tag material cost,

encapsulated . $50/lb ta g

Detection tag material

cost . . . . . . $65/lb tag

OTA

assumptions

500,000,000 f t

1,50 0

None

Yes

$55/lb tag

$40/lb tag

Table 50 depicts the various cost elements

for an identification and detection taggant

program that does not include blasting agents.

The columns represent, respectively, the cost

estimates made by the Aerospace Corp. and

the cost elements as estimated by OTA.

Table 50.–Comparison of OTA and

Aerospace Program (Option 2) Estimate

Aerospace

Cost elements estimates OTA estimate

ID tag materials ., ., .,

Detection tag material s

Labo r

Retooling. ., ., ., .,

Total instrumentation cos t

Increased investigative costs . . . .

Explosives manufacturing cost .,

Distribution system cost ., . ,

Government costs, .,

Total ., ... . . . .,

$8.5 8

7.86

2.05

1.65

22.50

5.40

(c)

(c)

—

$48.04

$11.22

9.34

— b

— b

6.83

-o7.07

9.23

1.68

$4537

aFr~m Explosives Tag9m9 Inflaflon Impact Analysls Aerospace Corp April 1979

blncluded In exploswes manulaclunng cost

Clncluded In labor cost

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

In summary, the question as to which cos t

estimate is “correct, ” that by Aerospace o r

that by IME, cannot be simply answered, a s

they are giving estimates for different levels of

implemental ion. Both estimates contain values for cost elements that are not currently

relevant, and these are clearly indicated in

tables 49 and 50.

Who Bears the Cost of

a Taggant Program?

For the baseline program set of conditions,

an analysis was made to determine which of

the various segments affected would bear the

costs of the taggant program. Table 51 shows

the cost breakout. Sensor-related costs would

reflect the perceived utilization of sensors at

airports for screening of personnel, hand-carried baggage, and checked baggage. For the

baseline case of 1,500 sensors, 1,200 or 80 percent are assumed to be employed at airports,

with 300 or 20 percent in Government buildings, courthouses, transportation centers, and

police bomb squads.

The users of explosives absorb the primary

impact of the program, assuming that all costs

associated with the taggants (material, manufacturing, and distribution), are passed on to

the various classes of users examined. The extent to which these costs will ultimately impact consumers of goods produced by the explosive users is uncertain.

Public overhead costs of administration and

taggant program development are borne directly by the taxpayer who would also bear

some portion of the detection taggant sensor

deployment in the baseline case.

Table 51 .–Taggant Program Cost Impact by Who Will Bear the

Cost (millions of dollars by impact segments)

Users of Airline

Baseline program costs explosives Taxpayers users Total

Taggant materials . . $20.56 $20.56

Sensor-related costs ., – $1–3 $5-

53 6.83

Explosive manufacturers’

cost s 7,07 – – 7.07

Ditribution system costs. 9.23 – – 9.23

Public overhead – — 1,68 – 1.68

Total ., $36.86 $2.98 $5.53 $45.37

Percent, . 81 ,2% 6,6% 12 2%40

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 1 2 9

COST ANALYSIS PRECISION

I n the preceding narrative description of the

taggant program cost analysis, OTA has set

forth the basis for estimating the various factors in the total program cost equation. The

relative certainty (or precision) of the estimates has been addressed to varying degrees.

In this section, OTA specifically summarizes

concerns regarding the precision of the estimates and the related implications for: 1 ) the

reasonableness of the estimates and 2) the

prospects for cost-estimate growth or stability.

A precise evaluation of the costs of a taggant program is not possible due to the current

state of development of the taggants and sensors and the uncertainties in how a taggant

program would be implemented. Pilot testing

has been conducted between the identification taggants and several of the types of explosive materials proposed to be tagged (capsensitive packaged explosives, boosters, and

black powder), testing is underway on smokeless powder, and no pilot tests have been conducted for detonating cord or blasting caps.

Three candidate sensors are being evaluated,

but no system has progressed past the laboratory stage. Various implementation levels are

possible, each of which directly affects costs.

Examples of critical implementation decisions

include: which explosives will be tagged, what

would constitute a unique “batch” with a

unique identification species, and how many

of which type of detection sensors would be

deployed.

Several forms of cost uncertainty analysis

are possible. Given a baseline case, one can examine the cost effects of changes in individual

cost factors and note the perturbation on total

program cost in a deterministic manner. This

method is employed in the following section in

order to highlight the primary cost drivers in

the taggant program. Another method treats

costs in a probabilistic manner. Additional

data would be required to implement this procedure.

Cost Sensitivity Analysis

The method used here essentially sets forth

the cost impact changes that occur due to variations in cost-driving variables of interest. The

cost-impact variations from an established or

hypothesized baseline case is the traditional

method taken. Cost element changes in absolute or percentage terms are set forth and the

impact on total program cost is noted. Since

the taggant program is in the early stages of

development, the factors in the total cost

equation need to be examined to determine

the potential ranges of variance from an established baseline. Table 52 includes a relatively

comprehensive Iist of elements that have an influence on the program cost estimate. These

include the various factors (both cost and related requirements) for:

taggant materials;

the manufacturing and distribution system;

public overhead (sensors, administration,

taggant program development); and

programmatic considerations.

Taggant Materials

IDENTIFICATION TAGGANTS

Various factors can further influence the

cost of identification taggant material. The

best estimate from 3M is based on their recent

Ieadtime study, $75/lb of unencapsulated taggants in 2.5- to 5-lb lots. This value is based on

tagging 600 million lb of explosives per year,

requiring a guarantee of manufacturing of

150,000 lb of taggants per year for a minimum

of 2 years. Values utilized in the OTA study are

based on lower quantities of encapsulated taggants. 3M has made their best estimate of this

effect on cost; however, more detailed study

would be required by them to provide an

equivalent confidence to the current $75/lb

quotation. Encapsulated taggants estimates

provided for this study are targeted at $55/lb of

polyethylene-coated taggants for 90,000 lb of

taggants per year. Additional study of opaque-
130 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table 52.–Elements of Cost Uncertainty

/dentiiication taggant material

● Taggant cost dollars per pound

–Encapsulation cost-opaque capsule

–Yield from encapsulation process

–Cost IS an estimate, not a contracted value

–Monopoly issue

● Taggant concentration level

● Quantity of explosives to be tagged

–Cap-sensitive packaged explosive

–ANFO and other blasting agents

● Taggant waste

Detection taggant material

● Molecule prices

● Encapsulation cost

● Concentration levels

● Quantity of explosives to be tagged

Sensor cost

● Quantity of sensors to be deployed

● What type sensors WiII be successfully developed?

● What will be the mix of deployed sensors?

● Development cost uncertainty

● False alarm rate

● Production price uncertainty

Explosive manufacturers added cost

● Record keeping costs (particularly smokeless powders)

● Tooling and labor, etc . for explosive categories not pilot tested

(powders, detonating cord, blasting caps)

● Batch size

–Productivity

–Waste

● Taggant inventory costs

● Markup and degree to which costs are passed on

Distribution costs

 Recordkeeping

● Storage

● Markup levels

Cost of investigation

● Cost penalty v. cost savings

Government regulation and administration

Implementation and programatic

● Level of Implementation

● Stand alone program costs

–Identification taggant program

–Detection taggant program

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

type encapsulation is req u red in order to refine the $55/lb estimate. 3M assessment of the

worst case is $70/lb, to account for the uncertainty i n :

● encapsulation and encapsulant ion process

yield (further research is required to definitize these parameters), and

● ultimate contractual conditions specified

(the only basis for “precise” quotations).

3M believes that the worst case estimate is

highly unlikely and was provided to the study

group to permit the cost uncertainty analysi s

of the taggant program. The ultimate effect of

the worst case condition would be to increase

identification taggant direct costs of materials

by 27 percent.

If one were to implement unencapsulated

taggants, as was studied in some detail in the

Ieadtime study, the ultimate effect would be a

reduction in the baseline program estimate

from $11.2 million to $9.6 million, a reduction

of approximately 14 percent.

Other areas of cost uncertainty are:

●

●

●

●

●

Monopoly issue–this is discussed in the

second section of this chapter.

Taggant concentration levels –the survivability and recovery tests so far conducted have been at one concentration

level, as have the safety tests. The tests

have identified areas where the taggants

survive and areas where individual taggants do not survive (with a substantial

grey area). Nonsurvival seems to be primarily a function of the thermal or physical decomposition of the taggant materials, which would be essentially unaffected

by concentration level. If concentration

levels were changed, the cost of material

would increase almost linearly (see

below).

Quantity of explosives to be tagged–

greater quantities (over 325 million lb of

cap-sensitive) of tagged explosive would

decrease cost per pound of taggant material; however, total program increases

would not increase I i nearly.

ANFO tagging—see the section on “Taggant Program Cost Synthesis” for estimated effects. It is probable that if ANFO

were to be tagged, a taggant with additional layers would require development,

to permit the larger number of codes required by the large quantities of ANFO

and other blasting agents.

Taggant waste— the degree of taggant

waste (if any) in a production environment

is unknown; this factor, which is not considered significant, would tend to increase

taggant material cost estimates.
Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review . 131

Summary baseline program cost sensitivit y

to variations in identification taggant material

costs or concentration levels is depicted i n

figure 20. Cost-impact changes include the effect of markup at the manufacturing level and

throughout the distribution network.

Figure 20.—Baseline Program Cost Sensitivity

Impact With Changes in Identification Taggant,

Material Cost, and Concentration Level

Total program

cost in millions of dollars

55 “

50 -

program Percent

change in

1 45 1 ID taggant

2 500\o 100 ”/0 material

cost or

concentration

 Increase ● Decreas e

SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment

DETECTION TAGGANT MATERIALS

Detection taggant materials are still in the

exploratory stage of development, with five

candidate molecules currently under consideration. As shown in our discussion in the second section, estimates based on recent budgetary and pricing quotations vary depending on

the molecule and the spread in the submitted

cost estimates. The average value utilized in

this study is $40/lb. The range of estimates is

from $22 to $58/Ib. The uncertainty in program

dollar terms is as follows:

Baseline program $9.34 million

Optimistic estimate ., $5.14 million

Worst case estimate . . . $13.54 million

Concentration levels are another issue. Current

expectations are that 0.025-percent concentrations are adequate. Further development testing is required in order to definitive this parameter. Baseline program cost sensitivity due to a

range of variation in detection taggant material costs or concentration levels is set forth in

figure 21. Cost variations include the succession of markups that are estimated at the manufacturing level and throughout the distribution network. It should be noted that the concentration levels for identification and detection tagging of detonating cord are inconsistent, with a very small concentration of identification taggants assumed and a very high concentration of detection taggants.

THE MANUFACTURING AND

DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

Taggant program cost estimates at the manufacturing and distribution levels vary in their

degree of precision and are highly influenced

by various assumptions that are required due

to the lack of substantive empirical data. Confidence is relatively higher in the estimates

Figure 21 .—Baseline Program Cost Sensitivity

Impact With Changes in Detection Taggant,

Material Cost, and Concentration Level

Total program

cost in millions of dollars

60

55

50;

45

Percent

change in

_ detection

50% 1000% taggant

material

cost or

concentration

❑ increase ■ Decrease

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
132 . Taggants in Explosives

where pilot testing has been accomplished

(e.g., cap-sensitive packaged explosives). The

degree to which costs will be passed on, with

associated markups through the distribution

network, to the user of explosives is another

area of uncertainty.

As a result of the pilot test program, reasonable data is available for the analysis of the

cost impact of adding taggants to the manufacture of cap-sensitive high explosives, at

least for those companies that participated in

the program. No similar data is available,

however, on the manufacturing impact of the

other types of explosive materials that might

be tagged. Only gross estimates have been

made for recordkeeping and storage costs.

Federal requirements for date-shift code recordkeeping currently pertain to cap-sensitive

packaged explosives, boosters, black powder,

detonating cord, and blasting caps. Smokeless

powders, currently exempt from the requirement, represent the largest uncertainty in recordkeeping costs. OTA has treated this cost

element parametricalIy with the level of implementation analysis. For the three cases studied, the following cost estimates were utilized:

Low program no cost increase

Baselin e 60.4/lb powder

High estimate ., ., 100$/lb powder

These estimates are based on preliminary assessments; further refinements in the smokeless powder recordkeeping estimate require a

data base reflecting pilot-testing experience

and a detailed description of the distribution

network.

An analysis of manufacturing cost impact

for cap-sensitive packaged explosives revealed

the following cost sensitivity to program implementation levels:

Manufacturers’ cost per

Tag batch size pound of explosives

10,000 to 12,000 lb ., ., ., 4.O

20,000 lb . ., 2.3

Shift production .. 0.6$

Plant year . 0.3

Uncertainty in other particular explosive typ e

cost elements will persist until a particular program level is recommended for implementation.

Taggant inventory costs, which were assessed as part of the manufacturers’ costs,

were estimated at 10-percent interest for a taggant inventory supply of one-half year. Variations from this assumption would have relatively minor influence over total program cost

effects. Markup costs were estimated at 10

percent at the manufacturing level and 25 percent for the distribution network for explosives, while 80-percent markup was utiIized for

the black and smokeless powders for the distribution network, based on estimated inputs

from a manufacturer. Uncertainty exists in the

degree to which taggant program costs will be

passed on to explosive users, since ultimately

these markups would be determined in the

marketplace.

PUBLIC OVERHEAD

Sensor-related costs.— Considerable uncertainty exists in estimates of the sensor program

cost. These relate to:

●

●

●

●

●

●

what type of sensors will be successfully

developed?

what will be the mix of deployed sensors?

how many will be deployed?

development cost uncertainty,

production price uncertainty, and

false-alarm rates.

Table 53 delineates a set of cost possibilities

where sensor mix and quantity are varied. One

can note the wide spread of resulting estimates

given these variations in assumptions. OTA estimated the sensor development costs of twice

the level of the Aerospace estimates to acTable 53.–Annual Cost per Sensor for Various Mixes

Total annual cost

(millions of dollars)

Annual cost

per sensor 1,500 sensors 5,000 sensors

FY79 dollars

All CEC D $3,318 $5.0 $16.6

All IMS . 4,053 6.1 20.3

All M S 9,228 13.8 46.1

CECD 90% MS l0%. 3,909 5 8 6 19.5

CECD 75%; MS 25%. 4,796 7 2 24.0

IMS 90%, MS 10%

(baseline) . 4,570 6.8 22.8

IMS 75%; MS 25%. 5,347 8 0 26.74

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
Ch. V—Taggant Cost Review ● 1 3 3

count for development program contingencies. Production cost estimates confidence has

been stated by Aerospace as about * 25 percent. This production effect on the baseline

case estimate would be as follows:

BaselIne (1, 500 sensors). $683 million

Low estimat e $512 million

Worst cas e $854 million

The effects of quantity and sensor mix are

more profound. Sensor costs could vary from

$5 million to $13.8 million (see table 53) for the

baseline quantity of 1,500 sensors depending

on the ultimate mix of system deployed. Quantity variations would also proportionately impact program costs. High false-alarm rates

(greater than 0.05 percent) in fielded sensors

would have tangible cost impacts in the cost of

operations and in creating ill will.

Programmatic considerations.— The overriding uncertainty in the cost of the taggants program stems from the nature of the present early phase of program development. Program

cost uncertainty is a profound problem during

ADEQUACY

The taggant program cost estimates

the development phase of most major hardware system programs. This is so even for programs where precedent-type data are available

(e.g., aircraft, missile, electronics). The taggant

program has no direct precedent as such and

analogous situations are limited. Historical

data are therefore severely limited and slowly

evolved as pilot testing progresses. Traditionally, as a program proceeds during development,

new elements of costs are recognized that

were poorly perceived at the onset of development” in addition, program directions change

as ergineering and scientific problems are uncovered, resulting in scope changes and potential for cost growth. Questions of scope, for instance, include program implementation levels

which have been addressed in the cost synthesis section. As noted, costs estimates can vary

by significant degrees depending on the program specification. Related to the scope issue

are the individual identification and detection

taggant programs as separate entities. Pursuing

either one of these objectives rather than proceeding jointly would have a significant impact on cost.

OF CURRENT DATA

are scope changes; cost-es

based on a limited empirical data base and utes to a lesser degree.

various analyses and assumptions. This situai mating error contribution is caused by the relatively early stage of Further pilot testing and sensor deveiopthe development program, the limited number

of pilot tests conducted to date, and the limited sample of organizations surveyed (manufacturers, distributors, and users of explosives).

The limitations in the data base and resultant

assumptions have been underscored within the

cost analysis section. Where assumptions were

made, OTA has taken a conservative position

in order to provide a reasonable cost estimate

for the program options. This is important because cost growth normally ensues in typical

developmental efforts. Cost growth is predominately affected by redesign and program

ment efforts are requi~ed in order to provide

refined designs and requirements data for both

manufacturing processes (e. g., detonating cord

and blasting caps) and sensors, which are necessary for redefining the cost estimates. Until

this progress is made, further refinements in

cost-estimate precision are not possible.

Additional survey samples of manufacturers, distributors, and explosive users would

provide higher confidence in certain of the

cost-element estimates and other cost impact

areas.
134 ● Taggants in Explosives

SUGGESTED FURTHER RESEARCH

Additional cost analysis research would improve the ability to determine more accurately

and at a finer level of resolution the cost impact of the taggant program. This research effort could take a number of avenues including:

● development of a cost model,

● development of an economic model,

● application of design-to-cost principles

for the sensor development, and

● special studies and analysis.

The OTA study effort on the costs of the taggant program was limited in time and resources. Various insights gained during this research indicate that further research in the

above areas would contribute significantly to

a better understanding of the multitude of cost

and economic tradeoffs and effects which

could guide the development of a taggant system. The model developments (cost and economic) would further this goal. AppIications of

formal design-to-cost principles to the development of sensors will further permit the production and implementation of cost-effective

systems.

Other special stud

provide further value

taggant program cos

are:

es and analyses would

to the understanding of

impact. Among these

Q cost/uncertainty probabiIity analysis; !!

i

● price elasticity for black powder, smoke- [

i

less powders, and cap-sensitive high ex- ,

plosives, etc.;

● assessment of manufacturers’ “front end”

costs and the related burden; and

● amplified cost and economic impact surveys of manufacturers, distributors, and

users of explosives.

It must be clearly understood, however, that

resolution of the basic program issues, such as

level of implementation, as well as resolution

of technical efficacy, safety, and utility is necessary before it makes sense to attempt a more

detailed cost analysis. The work reported in

this chapter clearly indicates the order of magnitude of the cost impact that decisions concerning taggant legislation would have on the

manufacturers, distributors, and users of explosives and gun powders.
Chapter VI

TAGGANT UTILITY REVIEW
Chapter VL-TAGGANT UTILITY REVIEW

Page

introduction . ....0.........,...,.....,. . 137

Problem Characterization . .................138

The Bombing Threat. . ..................139

Explosives Used in Bombs . ..............141

Types of Targets Bombed. . ..............142

Characteristics of Criminal Bombers . ......142

Terrorists ... , ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , .143

Common Criminals. . .................145

Mentally Disturbed . .................145

Vandals and Experimenters . ...........145

Sources of Explosives. . .................146

Current Security Measures. . .............148

Sources of Explosives. . ...............148

Potential Targets . ................,..149

Current Antibomber Procedures . .........154

Discussion of TaggantlJtiiity. .. ..............155

Deterrence. . . . . ......................155

Bomb Detection–Target Protection . . . . . . .157

Bomber Apprehension . ...........,.....159

Intelligence Concerning Criminal Bomber

Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....161

Prosecution of Criminal Bombers . ........162

Taggant Utility by Typeof Perpetrator .., ..163

Utility of Taggants to Update the Taggant

Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., ,, , .163

Nonbomber Control Utility of Taggants, ...,164

PossIble BomberCountermeasures in Response

to a TaggantProgram . ...............,..164

Fabrication of Homemade Explosives. .. ...167

Use of lncendiary Bombs. . ..............167

Use of Blasting Agents. . ................168

Theft of Explosives. . ...................168

Illegal Sources. . .....................,16 9

Use of Explosives Manufactured Before a

Taggant Requirement. . ........,....169

Detection Taggant Seal . ................169

“Spooking’’of DetectionTaggant Sensors. ..l7O

Shift to Other Unlawful Activity . .........170

Summary . ...........................17 0

Foreign Experience Controlof80mbers .. ....171

TABLES

Page

54. Minimum Bombing Incidents Statistics

Summary . ..........................13 9

Page

55. Explosive Bombing Incident Trends,

1972-78. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...140

56. identified Explosive Fillers Used in

57

58

59

60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

67

68

69

70.

22.

23.

24

25

26

Bombs . . . .; . . . . . . . . . . . .............141

Bombing Casualties and Damage in 1978

by Type of Bomb . ...............,..,.142

Bombings by Specific Targets for

1977-78 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...143

Percent of Bomber Targets That WouldBe

Protected by a Dectection Sensor . .......143

Attributes of Criminal Bomber Groups. ....144

Estimated Number of Significant

Bombings by Group of Perpetrators. .., ...146

Stolen and Recovered Explosive

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., .,147

Explosives Thefts by Method of Entry–

Number of lncident sand Percentages

for 1977-78 . . . . . . . ...................148

Explosions Aboard U.S. Aircraft . .........150

Location of Explosions Aboard Aircraft,

1949-76. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ...150

Explosions and Devices Found at U.S.

Airports,1972-75 . ...................,15 1

Results of Civil Aviation Security Program

Passenger Screening. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Premature Detonation Statistics . . . . . . .

Commercial Airliner Hijacking Statistics

by Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Possible Perpetrator Response

Countermeasures to Taggant Program. . .

FIGURES

Annual Bombing Statistics, 1972-77 . . . . .

Schematic Airport Security System . . . . .

Passenger/Hand-Baggage Screening

Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Schematic lllustration of Identification

Taggant Utility in Criminal Investigation.

Size Comparison of the 3M Identification

Taggant and Some Smokeless Powders. ,

.. 153

. . 155

. . 157

. . 165

Page

. . 141

. . 152

. . 153

. . 160

. . 166
Chapter VI

TAGGANT UTILITY REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Bombings are a particularly heinous crime as they are normally indiscriminate

in their choice of victims, often involve innocent people, and have the potential for

producing large numbers of casualties and high property damage. Bombings are attractive to the perpetrator as bombs can be placed at the bomber’s convenience and

set to detonate at a time when the bomber is elsewhere. Bombings are a quite spectacular crime, easily drawing public attention when that is the perpetrator’s purpose.

Bombings are particularly difficult crimes for law enforcement agencies to

handIe as the bomber is not usually near the scene of the crime, the physical evidence is destroyed or damaged by the detonation, and the materials necessary to

fabricate even a quite catastrophic bomb are easily obtainable.

It is the purpose of this chapter to review the utility of both identification and

detection taggants to law enforcement and security personnel. In order to assess the

utility of taggants, it is first necessary to understand the magnitude of the bomber

problem, including the types of bombers, the types of targets, the sources of explosives, and current measures to control and combat bombers. This information is reviewed in the next section. The utility of taggants is then discussed, together with

possible responses by criminal bombers to a taggant program. The chapter concludes with a short discussion of the experience of selected foreign countries in the

control of bombers.

In the analysis it is assumed that the tag -

gants have been demonstrated as safe to add

to explosive materials; that the identification

taggants survive the detonation of tagged explosives and can be recovered at the scene of

the crime, either directly or by laboratory

separation of collected debris; and that sensors exist which detect the detection taggant

vapor at a parts-per-tril I ion concentration in

air, with extremely few false alarms and with

no requirement for special maintenance or

skilled operators. These assumptions would

have to be verified before a taggant program

could be implemented.

The analysis is primarily qualitative. Data

exist on the numbers and types of criminal

bombings which take place, but it is difficult

to analyze the data as it is not consistent from

one data bank to another and information retrieval in any other than summary form is difficult. Characterization of types of perpetrator,

or of motives, is available in only a limited

number of bombings; even identification of

the explosive fiIler is not available for a sign if icant fraction of bombings.

No data exist that would allow a quantitative assessment of the numbers of bombers

137

61-401 0 - 80 - 10
138 ● Taggants in Explosives

who would be deterred, arrested, or convicted

as a result of a taggant program, or of the

amount of property damage or casualties

which would be averted by such a program. An

analogy can be drawn between the utility of

the current date-shift information contained

on explosive cartridge cases and the utility of

identification taggants in apprehending and

convicting bombers, but the date-shift information utility data base is quite small. Similarly, an analogy can be made between the

drop in hijackings that occurred after the introduction of antihijacking procedures and the

potential reduction to be expected in the

bombings of high-valued, controlled-access

buildings protected by detection sensors. Such

analogies are discussed in the text. The primary source of data on the current bombings

threat, current means of combating that

threat, and the utility of taggants to law enforcement personnel, however, comes from

the opinion of law enforcement personnel in

the field.

In-depth discussions were held with a broad

cross section of law enforcement and security

personnel, including personnel from the following agencies:

●

●

●

domestic law enforcement and security

personnel. (New York City; San Mateo

County, Calif.; Dallas-Fort Worth Airport;

Summit County, Ohio; Washington, D.C.);

foreign law enforcement personnel (West

Germany, England, Republic of Ireland,

INTER PC) L);

Federal agencies (Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI), Federal Aviation Admin -

istration (FAA), Bureau of Mines, Department of Transportation, Corps of Engineers, U.S, Army Criminal Investigation

●

Division, U.S. Army Development and Research Command); and

contractors (Management Sciences Associates (MSA) and Institute for Defens e

Analysis).

A number of discussions were also held, on

various subjects, with the Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), the agency

charged with explosives control.

Unfortunately, it was not possible, given the

time and money constraints of the OTA analysis, to meet with as many law enforcement personnel as would be desirable, particularly

given the large variations in types of bombers,

types of targets, and local laws and procedures

in the various parts of the country. To obtain a

larger sample of expert opinion, a questionnaire was sent to approximately 950 members

of the International Association of Chiefs of

police (l AC P), chosen at random from their

directory. The IACP was chosen because of the

OTA desire to obtain input from a broad cross

section of the law enforcement community—

geographically, functionally, and by size of

community. The results of the in-depth interviews and questionnaire responses are integrated in the discussion in this chapter. A

detailed discussion of the questionnaire is

given as appendix B. Due to the small response

rate (approximately 15 percent) the sample

may be biased. However, the bias is probably

toward those with knowledge of, and interest

in, the subject. An additional possible bias was

introduced by an error in the explanatory

material accompanyin g the survey, which indicated that the identification taggant trace

would identify the last legal purchaser of the

explosives, rather than indicating that the

trace would produce a Iist of last legal purchasers.

PROBLEM CHARACTERIZATION

Approximately 3,000 incidents are reported we I I as actual explosive and incendiary bombannually in the BATF Explosives Incident s ings. The BATF report contains a breakout by

Report. The incidents include accidents, target type and explosive filler used, but Iittle

threats, recovered explosives, and hoaxes, as information on the various types of perpetra-
Ch. V1—Taggant Utility Review ● 139

tors. The FBI compiles similar bombing statistics at its National Bomb Data Center, which

are published quarterly and summarized annually. The bombings are committed by a wide

range of perpetrators, who differ in their skills,

resources, motivations, and types of targets attacked. Current security measures at most explosive manufacturers, distributors, and users

are sufficient to dissuade casual outside theft,

but cannot readily protect against thefts that

are committed by or assisted by employees, or

against a determined outside attempt to steal

explosives. Protection of some high-value potential targets against bomber threats is currently adequate but some targets are essentially unprotected against a serious bombing attempt. Finally, current law enforcement efforts

to control criminal bombings are not very effective. These topics are discussed briefly

below.

The Bombing Threat

Both the FBI and BATF maintain national

bombing data information centers which collect statistics on bombings and other explosive

incidents. The data are not consistent between

the two centers, however, and many bombings

are not reported to either center. The formatting of the data, and the lack of updating procedures, make accurate analyses difficult.

The BATF 1978 Explosives Incidents Report

incIudes over 3,000 incidents for both 1977 and

1978. The incidents include accidents, threats,

seized and recovered explosives, and hoaxes as

welI as actual explosive and incendiary bombi rigs. Of these incidents, 1,377 represented explosive detonations, accidental detonations by

criminals, or recovered bombs which failed to

detonate in 1977, with 1,250 the corresponding

number for 1978. At least 953 of these in 1977

and 787 in 1978 represent actual detonations

of explosive bornbs against substantiaI targets

(mailbox and open-area bombings are not inclided).

During 1977, at least 38 people were killed

and 180 wounded by explosive and incendiary

bombs, while the numbers in 1978 were 23 and

185, respectively Due to the way initial estimates of property damage are made in the

BATF data and the lack of updating, only the

crudest property damage estimates can be

made. There was at least $10 million in direct

property damage due to explosive and incendiary bombs in 1977, and at least $17 million in

1978. Thirty-five of the thirty-eight reported

deaths in 1977 and twenty of the twenty-three

reported in 1978 were from bombings against

vehicles, residences, and commercial establishments. Similarly, about 80 percent of the

injuries from bombing of known targets in

1977 and 70 percent in 1978 were caused by

bombings of those three types of targets.

The FBI data, as indicated above, are somewhat different, both in number of incidents reported and in the breakout of categories. In

1977, for instance, FBI data show 867 actual

explosive bombings and 118 attempted bombings. Similarly, the number of people reported

killed that year from both explosive and incendiary bombings was 22, while 162 were reported injured. In 1978 there were 768 explosive bombings and 105 attempted explosive

bombings. The pertinent 1977 and 1978 BATF

and FBI statistics are summarized in table 54.

Table 54.–Minimum Bombing lncidents Statistics Summary’

BATF FBI

Item 1977 1978 1977 1978

Explosive bombings, numbe r 1,03 7

b 8 9 6b 8 6 7 768

Undetonated explosive bombs, number 319 287 118 105

Incendiary bombings, numbe r 339 446 248 349

Unignited incendiary bombs, number 81 71 85 79

Criminal accidents, number c

21 67 – –

Property damage from bombings.

millions of dollar s

c d

$ 10 $ 17 $ 9 $ 9

Injuries c 

. . . 180 185 162 135

People killed by bombings c 38 23 22 18

.

dEATF repel’fed 3 177 total Incidents [n 1977 and 3 256 In 1978 Total Incidents include ac

cldents threats seized and recovered explosives and hoaxes as well as actual explosive and (n

cendlary bombings The OTA study was concerned only wllh explosive bombings

bof these 953 In 1977 and 787 In 1978 were agalnsl subslarm!drgek

clncludes both exp[oslve and Incendiary Domblngs OTA was unable to oblam separate f19ures tor

number of cnm!nal accidents lnjurles deaths and property damage caused by exploswe and In

cendlary bombs Incendiary bombs and bombings would not be affected by Ihe proposed laggant

d~~l~~~~alue probably considerably higher due 10 lac~ of data file uPdates

SOURCE EM TF 1978 Exp/os/ves /nc{derrfs Report Ft3/ Um/rmrJ Cnrne Repor/ Bomb /7epor/

1978 See app F for a discussion ot me derivation 01 these hgures

An effort was made to resolve the differences in statistics compiled by FBI and BATF;

according to the Explosives Enforcement Division of BATF:
140 ● Taggants in Explosives

●

●

●

s

●

—

There is no Federal statute or law on the

books requiring local police officials to report bombing incidents to either BATF or the

FBI.

Cooperation at the local level has led to an

informal procedure on the part of local police to report a bombing incident to either

BATF or FBI, who in turn will normally notify each other. (There are obviously some

breakdowns in this procedure).

There is a statute giving BATF the “right of

inspect ion” at the site of any explosion;

therefore, whether BATF receives word of a

bombing from the local police, or whether a

local special agent reads of it in the local

paper, BATF can by law check it out.

BATF requires each agent to report a l l

bombing incidents to its explosives data center in Washington, irrespective of the theoretical importance, damage, casualties, or

jurisdiction since, among other uses, these

data are used by the Secret Service in arranging security for the President when he is

travel ing.

There is a question of jurisdiction with reference to investigations. A memo of understanding exists between BATF and the FBI.

Generally the FBI covers terrorist acts, attacks on airlines, attacks involving unions,

college campus buildings, and Federal buildings other than Treasury and Postal buildings. BATF has primary jurisdiction over

criminal bombings related to interstate commerce, firearms violations, and Treasury

buildings. Either the FBI or BATF may respond to requests for aid from other jurisdictions. Conflicts are settled by mutual agreement.

● The normally higher number of incidents annually in BATF reports is a direct result of

the above.

It is of considerable interest to know

whether the statistics for 1977 and 1978 are

characteristic of the recent past, or if trends in

criminal bombings are apparent. Table 55

shows the bombing trend since 1972, from the

FBI data. While the BATF numbers differ, the

rough trends are similar. Figure 22 shows the

trends graphically, with the total number of incidents depicted in figure 22a, property damage in 22b, injuries in 22c, and deaths in 22d.

The total incident numbers in figure 22a in -

clude both successful bombings and attempts;

the property damage and casualty figures may

include incendiary bombings as well as explosive bombings. No long-term trend is detec -

table from the data, although an unusuall y

high number of incidents and casualties oc -

curred in 1975. This increase was primarily due

to three incidents.

1. On January 24 a bombing at the Fraunces

2

3

Tavern in New York .City killed 4 people,

injured 53 others, and did extensive property damage. Responsibility for the bombing has been claimed by FALN, the Puerto

Rican separatist terrorists.

A bomb detonated in the baggage claim

area at La Guardia Airport, on December

29, killing 11 people with 70 additional

serious injuries. No positive identification

of the exact type of explosives used has

been made for this incident and no attribution has been made.

A bomb detonated at a sponge factory in

Shelton, Corm., in March 1975, killing

Table 55.–Explosiv e 8 Bombing Incident Trends, 1972-78

Total actual and Total actual and

attempted ex- attempted incen- Property damage Personal

Year plosive bombings Actual Attempted diary bombings Actual Attempted (dollar value) injury Death

1972 ., 951 714 237 1,011 793 218 $ 7,992,000 176 25

1973 . . . . . . . 995 742 253 960 787 173 7,262,000

1974. , . . . . .

187 22

1,129 893 236 915 758 157 9,887,000 207 24

1975, . . . 1,326 1,088 238 748 613 135 27,004,000a 326’ 69a

1976 ..., . . . 1,040 852 188 530 405 125 11,265,000 212 50

1977, ... , 985 867 118 333 248 85 8,943,000 162 22

1978. , . . . . 873 768 105 428 349 79 9,161,000 135 18

alncludes three rnalor born~lrlg mcldents resulting In unusually high personal mjunes and dealhs and substanhal damage to ProPedY

SOURCE FBI UrJ//orrrJ Crmre Repwk t?wnb .%rnmary /978
Ch. V1—Taggant Utility Review . 141

Figure 22.—Annual Bombing Statistics, 1972-77

t 1 1 I I I I I

3,000 ~

Including incendiary

2,00 0 -

z 1,00 0 (1,301)

873)

I 1 1 I Explosive only~ I

. r

1

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

a. Number of incidents (includes attempts)

3 0 L

I I I I I I

-1

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

b. Property damage (includes incendiary bombings)

350f I I I d 1 I I

)

) 300

.- 25 0 -

Z

200

150 -

(135)

100 “

I 1 1 I 1 I

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

c. Persona/ injury (includes incendiary bombings)

‘“~’ ‘

1978

d. Deaths (includes incendiary bombings)

SOURCE: Drawn by OTA from FBI data

three people and injuring several others .

No attribution has been made for this incident.

Using FBI and BATF data, the trend of both

total bombing incidents and catastrophic incidents was analyzed by MSA for the 5-year period from 1972 through 1976. The data show no

significant change in incidents over that period, although 1975 and 1976 had significantl y

higher injuries and deaths. In contrast to inferences based on past statistics, many experts

believe a significant increase in bombings, particularly catastrophic bombings, can be ex -

pected over the next few years. It should b e

noted that a single incident involving an aircraft exploding in flight could produce mor e

deaths than have occurred in the United States

from bombings during this decade. Such incidents have occurred in foreign countries and a

near miss occurred recently in New York. On

March 25, 1979, a TWA plane bound from New

York to Los Angeles was delayed. A bomb

planted in the checked baggage exploded

while being transported to the aircraft on the

luggage truck. If the aircraft had taken off on

time the bomb might have caused the deaths

of most or all of the 166 people aboard.

Explosives Used in Bombs

Data on the types of fillers used in bombs

are also not consistent between FBI and BATF

data banks. It is instructive to look at two

BATF data sources, however, as shown in table

56. The second column represents 1978 data

for the fillers identified in the field for all explosive bombs that were detonated, bombs recovered undetonated, and criminal accidents.

The first column represents 1978 data for only

those fillers that were identified in the laboratory from postdetonation analysis. In both

cases, black and smokeless powders and capsensitive high explosives all occur with high

frequency. Table 57 shows a breakout of the

estimated number of significant bombing incidents, deaths, injuries, and property damage

occurring during 1978 by explosive material filIer. The average of the two frequencies columns shown in table 56 was used for the table

57 estimates. (See app. F for the derivation of

Table 56.–ldentified Explosive Fillers Used in Bombs

Lab identified All identified

fillers 1978 fillers 1978 Average

Black powder . . . . . . 13% 21% 17Y0

Smokeless powder ., ., 16 19 17.5

Military ., ., . . . . . . . . 2 7 4.5

Cap sensitive . . . . ., 32 30 31

Blasting agents. ., . . . . . – 1 .5

Chemicals . . . . . . –

Others, ., . . . . ., 36 2: 28:;

See app F for derivation of these numbers

SOURCE BATF data
142 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table 57.–Bombing Casulties and Damage in 1978 by Type of Bomb

Number of

bombings against Property damage

Filler material substantial targets Deaths Injuries $ millionsa

All fillers. ... . . . . . .

Incendiary . . . . . .,

Black powder ., ., . . . .

Smokeless powder, . ,

Military explosives. . . . . . . . . . .

Cap sensitive. . . . . . .

Other . . . . . . . . . .

Unknown . .

1,298 23

428 3

148 4

152 3

39 0

270 7

3

3

185

13

19

23

7

26

40

57

$17.2

3.7

.2

.2 —

3.3

2.4

7,4

Total for those fillers which

would be directly tagged b

, 570 14 68 3 7

avalue probably higher due to lack Of data uPdale

bcap-sensltlve explosives black Powder, and smokeless powder would be ta99ed

SOURCE BATF data See app F for a dertvatlon of these rlgures

these numbers. ) The table shows that a large

percentage of the total bombings deaths and

casualties is caused by black powder, by

smokeless powder, and by cap-sensitive high

explosives.

Types of Targets Bombed

The types of targets that attract criminal

bombers range from attacks on mailboxes and

outhouses by vandals and pranksters to attacks on aircraft by terrorists. The targets most

frequently attacked on a year-in, year-out basis

are private residences, commercial facilities

(usually small operations), and vehicles. Table

58 is taken from the BATF 1978 Explosives incidents Report. It shows the total number of actual bombings (both explosives and incendiary)

for the years 1977 and 1978, the bombin g

breakout by target type, the number killed and

injured, and the estimated property damage ,

all by target type. The FBI data are somewhat

different, but show the same trends in that the

majority of bombings, property damage, and

casualties occurs at residences, at commercial

facilities, and in vehicles. In table 59, these

data are rearranged to explicitly show that

most of the bombings and casualties would occur at targets that are not likely to be protected by detection sensors. It is extremely unlikely that such sensors would be placed in private residences or in vehicles; most commercial establishments would also not have sensors. If the assumption is made that all of the

incidents that happened at commercial facilities occurred at facilities unlikely to be protected by sensors, then 79 percent of the incidents, 89 percent of the injuries, and 94 percent of the deaths from actual explosive and

incendiary bombings which happened in 1977

and 1978 occurred at places unlikely to be protected by detection taggant sensors.

Data are not available that would allow separation of the explosive and incendiary bombings statistics. It is Iikely that a larger percentage of the targets of explosive bombings would

be of the type protected by a detection sensor,

but probably not a large percentage.

Characteristics of Criminal Bombers

Criminal bombings are committed by a wide

range of perpetrators, including both individuals and groups. While it is always difficult to

place a heterogeneous population into well-defined categories with well-defined characteristics, it is helpful to group criminal bombers

into four categories: terrorists, common criminals, mentally disturbed, and vandals and experimenters. These groups vary greatly in motivation, skill, training, resources, and ability to

respond to a changing enforcement environment. It is also difficult to determine which

group is responsible for a bombing, although

“credit” is sometimes claimed, particularly by

certain terrorist groups. Of the bombings reported in the BATF 7978 Explosives Incidents
Ch. V1Taggant Utility Review ● 143

Table 58. –Bombings by Specific Targets for 1977-78 (actual detonations or ignitions)

Total incidents No. killed No. injured Property damagea

Type target 1977 1978 1977 1978 1977 1978 1977 1978

Residential . . 352 294 17 7 66 57 $ 1,022.3 $2,982.2

Commercia l 367 375 7 6 48 46 6,640.1 8,777.7

Airports/aircraft: . 7 l – 1 — ,2

Police facllltles/vehicle . . . . . 14 2 : — — — — 5 : ; 70.4

Educational ., . . . . 106 97 — — 13 5 43.1 532.3

Government (local ) 24 9 — 1 1 4 145.6 70.1

Government (Federal ) 26 22 — — 4 1 2.4 6.6

Military installation s 4 3 — — — 1 — 0.0

Utdilities. . 51 57 l – 1 2 628.0 1,727.7

Banks . 22 18 — — — — 225.2 49.3

Vehicle s 216 252 11 7 24 25 363.3 2,119.4

Open area s 36 40 1 2 8 13 .5 4.2

Mailboxes . 48 69 — — 1 2 25.8 2,1

Othe r 90 137 — — 8 27 1,206.8 869.9

Unknow n

b

34 2 — — 5 2 22.6 0.0

Total ., ., 1,397 1,409 38 23 180 185 $10,331.7 $17,212.1

ap(opefiy danlage figures are In thousands and are esmated

~Thls category includes those Incldenls where the type [argel was either unknown or not repofled

SOURCE BATF T978 Exphswes Inc(derm Reporf

Table 59.–Percent of Bomber Targets That Would Be Protected by a Detection Sensor

Total bombings aInjuries Deaths

Average number of bombings of known, substantial targets b . . . 1,175 150 29

Bombings of residences, vehicles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557 (47%) 86 (58%) 21 (72%)

Bombings of commercial establishments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 (32%) 47 (31%) (22%)

Total unlikely to have sensors . . . . . . 928 (79%) 133 (89%) 2 (940/0)

alncludes both Incendiary and exploswe bombings for 1977 and 1978

bopen f(elds and mailboxes are excluded from these data

SOURCE BATF data

Report, a motive was established for only 2 3

percent of the bombings in 1977 and only 38

percent in 1978. Keeping in mind the above caveats, it is nonetheless useful to examine the

characteristics of the various groups, which

are summarized in table 60 and briefly described below.

Terrorists

The terrorist groups active in the United

States vary widely in ability, resources, training, and adaptability. They share the common

characteristics, however, of high motivation,

action as a part of a group, and a continuing

involvement in catastrophic, illegal activities

against society. These characteristics make the

terrorist particularly dangerous to society and

a particularly appropriate target for anti bombing controls. Terrorists can be roughly divided

into political, reactionary, and separatist

groups. Political groups, such as the Weather

Underground, are primarily interested in attracting attention to and sympathy with their

cause. For that reason they engage in spectacular events, such as bombings, but generally attempt to avoid or Iimit injury and death resulting from their bombings. Political terrorists

often have considerable resources available to

them, due to a significant number of people

who support their aim, if not necessarily their

means. The leadership of most of these groups

are of above-average intelligence, and have

either had specialized training or have studied

extensively in terrorist activities. They are thus

able to adapt to a changing environment, although the range of responses available to

them may be limited by their political aims.

They may lack mechanical skilIs, however, and

be more likely to be involved in accidental ex-
144 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table 60.–Attributes of Criminal Bomber Groups

Experience

Perpetrator and training Resources Motivation Individual or group Reaction capability Frequency

Criminal

Unsophisticated . . . . . . . .

Sophisticated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Terrorist

Political ., ., ., . . . . . . .

Separatist . . . ., ... . . . . .

Reactionary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

M

H

M

H

Multi

Multi

L

H

L

M

I

I

M-H

M

L

M-H

H

H

G

G

G

M-H

H

L-M

Multi

Multi

Multi

M-H

M-H

L

Mentally disturbed

Disenchanted ... . . . .

Vengeful ., . . . . . . . . . . .

Pathological . . . . . . . . . . .

L

L

L-M

L

L

L

L-M

M-H

H

I

I

I

L

L-M

L-M

Single

Single

Varies

Other

Vandals ., ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Experimenter . . . . . . . . . . . .

L-M

L-M

L

L-M

Single

Single

L

M

L

L

I

I

L-Low, M-Moderate, H-High, I-lndwldual, G. Group

SOURCE Ofllce ol Technology Assessment

plosions, either while fabricating bombs or

while placing them. Political terrorists have become less visible in the United States in recent

years.

Separatist groups, such as FALN, generally

hope to gain their aim by generating a reaction

to their activities, rather than sympathy for

their aims. They are therefore generally less

concerned with public revulsion to bombings

that cause substantial injury and deaths. Separatist groups have been credited with more

than 25 percent of catastrophic bombings—

those resulting in major property damage, injuries, and deaths. The resources of domestic

separatists vary from group to group, but are

generally less than for comparable groups of

political terrorists, as only a fraction of the

population represents even potential supporters. As an example, few people outside of the

Yugoslavian exile community care whether or

not the Croatians achieve separation from the

Yugoslavian federation; on the other hand, a

group like the Weather Underground, that

seeks to exploit discontent with the U.S. Government, could seek support from a larger population. Separatist groups are often critically

dependent on a small cadre of leaders; loss or

incapacitation of those leaders may shatter the

group or considerably reduce their effectiveness. As an example, FALN in New York

lost their bombmaker over a year ago and have

not committed any bombings in New York

since that time. Their ability to react to a

changing control environment is less than the

political terrorist groups, due to more limited

resources. If the goal of the separatist group is

viewed with sympathy by a large part of the

population, as is the case in Northern Ireland,

then the group can attract resources, attract

recruits, and perfect skills. If, on the other

hand, the population is either not in sympathy

with the separatists or is not directly affected

by the cause of the separatists (as is the case of

the Croatians in the United States or the South

Moluccans in the Netherlands), then the group

will not be able to attract resources or otherwise grow.

Reactionary groups, such as the Ku Klux

Klan and the American Nazi Party, would appear to share some of the characteristics of the

political terrorists, but generally do not possess the same levels of training, motivation,

and resources, and are not as capable of reacting effectively to a changing control environment. They also differ in that their bombings

are usually directly targeted at the individual

or group they intend to influence, rather than

simply at a spectacular target. Generally, their

purpose is intimidation; thus, fairly small, contained bombs are used. Even when murder or

injury is desired, the results are usually confined to the directly targeted individual. While
Ch. V/— Taggant Utility Review ● 145

the political terrorists are generally younger

and well-educated, the reactionary terrorists

tend to be less well-educated and somewhat

older.

Terrorists, as a group, have been responsible

for approximately 12 percent of those bombing incidents in the past 5 years for which the

FBI attributed a motive,

Common Criminals

Criminals range from the petty operator who

utilizes a bomb for extortion to the professional bombers of organized crime, The petty operator is generalIy poorly trained, not very motivated, has limited resources, and cannot readily adapt to a changing enforcement environment. The only major characteristics he shares

with the professional bomber are that his targets are generalIy individuals or smalI commercial establishments, unlikely to be protected

by a detection taggant sensor, and that he

generally works alone or as part of a small

group. The petty operator normally engages in

repeated bombings over a number of years.

The professional bomber is highly trained

and motivated and generally has considerable

resources available to him, either directly or

through his “employer.” While the professional generally works alone, he may be affiliated

with a larger criminal structure, such as the organized crime network in the United States.

His target may range from bombs planted as a

result of labor problems to murder-for-hire

“hits.” The professional bomber and the more

sophisticated terrorists share many characteristics and are the most difficult to control or

contain.

Criminals as a group are responsible for approximately 11 percent of bombing incidents.

Most incidents are limited to specific targets

and do not generally cause substantial injury

or death to innocent bystanders.

Mentally Disturbed

The category of mentally disturbed includes

psychopaths, those seeking revenge for a real

or imagined wrong, and those who may be temporarily disenchanted with a particular situation. Many of the individuals who become terrorists or criminals could fall into this broad

category; the term is Iimited here to the disturbed persons who act alone and do not act

for profit.

The mentally disturbed bomber also differs

from terrorists and criminals in that he generally does not engage in multiple bombings, although exceptions such as the Los Angeles “alphabet bomber” certainly exist. He generally is

poorly trained, has limited resources, and acts

alone. He is often highly motivated, but perhaps only for short periods of time, in direct response to some stimulus. He is extremely Iimited in his ability to respond to changing control situations, either through lack of care of

consequences or belief in his invincibility. As

his motives are hard to identify, it is difficult to

predict his target.

The mentally disturbed account for approximately 38 percent of al I bombing incidents

that can be attributed to a specific type of perpetrator.

Vandals and Experimenters

Vandals and experimenters share the characteristics of poor training, limited motivation,

and limited resources. They generally work

alone or in small groups, and do not generally

intend to harm people or cause extensive damage. Their targets are often of little value, such

as mailboxes or outhouses, but some acts of

vandalism can cause extensive damage to

buildings such as schools. While accounting

for 39 percent of the reported bombing incidents, they are responsible for little damage

and few casualties.

The primary danger from this group is that a

harmless prank may accidently turn into a major bombing with subsequent significant property loss and casualties. There is also the danger that experimenters will learn their craft and

“graduate” to a more dangerous category of

criminal bomber.

In summary, table 61 shows the approximate

number of significant explosive bombings (excluding mailboxes and detonations in the

open) that would be attributable to each type
146 Taggants in Explosives

Table 61 .–Estimated Number of Significant Bombings by

Group of Porpotrators (average of years 1974-78)

Estimated number

Perpetrator group of bombings

Terrorists, ., ., ., ., 107

Criminals . . . . . . . 98

Mentally disturbed ., ., . . . . ., ., ., 340

Vandals and experimenters. ., . . . . 348

SOURCE FBI data See app F for a deribation of these figures

of perpetrator, if the same relative distribution

by perpetrator held for unattributed bombings

as for attributed ones. To obtain these estimates, OTA averaged F B I data from the 5

years 1974-78 (no 1979 data is yet available).

Year-to-year numbers vary due to changes in

the FBI categories and method for allocating

bombings by motive. (See app, F for more detail. )

No detailed data is available concerning the

number of deaths and injuries caused by the

various bomber groups. However, almost 40

percent of catastrophic bombings (those with

casualties or serious property damage) are attributed to separatist terrorists and the more

professional criminals.

Sources of Explosives

The explosives used in criminal bombings

can come from a variety of sources, including:

●

●

●

●

●

●

legal purchase,

illegal purchase,

theft,

importation from abroad,

homemade, and

theft of some components, fabrication of

others.

At present, a determination of the source of explosives can rarely be made except in the case

of bombs that have been recovered undetonated. The date-shift code information on the

cartridge label allows the source of the recovered explosives to be traced. Such traces can,

theoretically, locate the source of essentially

all cap-sensitive high explosives recovered in

their original cartridges; however, investigative

effort is necessary to determine which of the

last legal purchasers on the list is the source of

the explosives. Such an effort would be expended if the recovered bomb had the potential to cause catastrophic damage, if the target

was an important one, or if the pattern of the

attempted bombing indicates that useful intelligence information would be gathered by the

trace. Devices recovered undetonated, which

were small in size or which were to be used

against relatively unimportant targets, may

welI never be reported to the BATF network,

While it is impossible to determine precisely

the source of explosives used in most criminal

bombings, analysis of the existing data does indicate some trends. Examining table 56, it appears that homemade explosives are used very

infrequently in criminal bombings in the

United States, although they account for up to

85 to 90 percent of the explosives used in countries such as West Germany and England,

where commercial explosives are rigorously

controlled. There also appears to be little use

of explosives imported from abroad, a judgment supported by discussion with various law

enforcement agencies. Both of these sources

could become more important, however, if a

taggant program were legislated.

I I legal purchases are primarily of stolen explosives, discussed below. That leaves legal

purchases and theft as the primary current

sources of explosives.

Explosive materials can be purchased legally

in each State; the requirements vary from State

to State, and they vary for different explosive

materials. In every State, gunpowder can be

purchased legally; identification may or may

not be required for smokeless powders and is

required for black powder. In some States,

cap-sensitive high explosives can be purchased

simply by showing identification and filling

out a form. In others, the explosives can only

be legally sold to people with State or Federal

Iicenses.

A general rule-of-thumb expressed by most

law enforcement personnel was that criminal

bombers will use the most easily available

source. If explosives can be purchased legally,

the bombers will do so; the Weather Underground apparently purchased much of their ex-
Ch. V/— Taggant Utility Review ● 147

plosives legally in New Hampshire. If explosives are easy to steal, then stolen explosives

will be used. Explosives are more prevalent

and easier to steal in the western States; a

large theft from Colorado, for instance, furnished the explosives for a large number of

bombings in the Eastern States.

BATF keeps track of stolen explosives, as

well as explosives seized, recovered, or found.

The data for 1977 and 1978 are summarized in

table 62. While no firm conclusions as to outstanding amounts of explosives can be made

on the basis of the data, several trends are apparent.

Little gunpowder is stolen. As gunpowder

are easily purchased, there is little need

for theft

Large amounts of blasting agents are

stolen, and recovered, each year. According to table 56, however, little of it is used

in criminal bombings.

More military explosives seem to be recovered than stolen. This may be due to

the inclusion of “souvenirs” as recovered

explosives, or to the reluctance of the military to report thefts. At any rate, the

amounts stolen are small. Much of the

miIitary explosives used by criminal

bombers is material acquired some years

ago. For instance, the Cuban exile terrorist

groups, such as omega 7, still primarily

use C-4 given to them by the Central Intelligence Agency at the time of the Bay

of Pigs invasion.

●

●

The amount of cap-sensitive explosives

stolen and recovered appears in rough

balance. Some of the recovered explosives, however, include abandoned explosives found in old mines and other places.

A significant net amount is probably available, and used, for criminal bombings.

A large net number of blasting caps appears to be stolen each year, and to be

available for use in criminal bombings.

This is not surprising as caps are generally

not as well secured as main charge explosives. If a taggant program is initiated, security of detonators will require upgrading, as detonators are generally needed to

initiate explosives and the fabrication of

detonators is a much more difficult and

dangerous job than fabrication of the

main explosive charge.

An additional analysis can be made of the

frequency with which explosives are stolen on

a State-by-State basis and compared to the frequency of criminal bombings. A high correlation appears between the number of thefts and

number of bombings. An even higher correlation appears when the thefts from nearby

States are included in the analysis. As an example, both California and New York have more

stringent regulations controlling the use and

storage of explosives than nearby States such

as New Jersey and Washington. Law enforcement officials feel that many of the incidents

in New york and California use explosives

stolen in New Jersey and Washington.

Table 62.–Stolen and Recovered Explosive Summary

Amount stolen Amount recovered

Tvpe 1977 1978 1977 1978

Blasting agents, pounds . . 20,834 42,172 21,260 23,623

Black powder, pounds. . . . . 145 379 277 723

Smokeless powder, pounds . . . 0 163 16 1,361

Boosters, pounds . 2,177 9,528 2,804 362

Military explosives, pounds . , 49 140 640 701

Cap-sensitive high explosive, pound s 36,498 44,316 43,738 41,097

Primer, units ., ., ., : : . 1,300 4,333 2,733 344

Blasting caps, unit s 61,531 66,614 40,719 44,456

Det. cord/safety fuse/lgnltor cord feet . 183,224 113,510 84,554 101,117

Total, explosives, pound s 61,003 101,217 71,470 74,966

Blasting caps, unit s 61,531 66,614 40,719 44,456

Det cord/safety fuse/igniter cord, feet . . 183,224 113,510 84,554 101.117

SOURCE BATF 1978 Explosivea incidents Report
148 ● Taggants in Explosives

Current Security Measures

Sources of Explosives

Current methods of securing explosives vary

somewhat from State to State; different types

of explosives are also secured in differen t

ways. In general, all cap-sensitive high explosives, including boosters and detonating

cord, must be stored in BAT F-approved magazines. The magazines require hardened locks

and lock-covers to protect the lock from direct

access by hacksaws or from attempts to shoot

off the lock. Detonators must be stored separately, in magazines that are not as well protected from theft as the high-explosive magazines. Blasting agents are not as well-reguIated; bulk ANFO is often stored in large hoppers for direct loading into trucks. Gunpowder are stored in BATF-approved magazines,

at least at the manufacturer and distributor

levels. At the retail sales level however, gunpowders are just stacked on the shelves.

The above provisions are for permanent

storage; some States allow overnight storage

of explosives in temporary magazines; at least

one manufacturer keeps less than full-lot

amounts of detonators in the detonator assembly area overnight.

The purpose of BATF and other regulations

on the storage of explosives is primarily to protect against surreptitious or casual theft by

outsiders, in much the same way that locking

your car door protects the car from theft. The

magazines, however, are fairly flimsy, often

simply a correlated frame building with additional plywood or plank walls. Entry can still

be gained by cutting or prying off the locks,

forcing entry through the door, a window, the

roof, or a vent, or by help from an employee.

Table 63, from the BATF 1978 Explosives Incidents Report, tabulates the methods used to

gain entry to explosives. An average of 48 percent of known entries were by removing the

lock, another 16 percent were by forcing entry

through the door, wall or vent, while almost 9

percent involved the use of a key or other inside help.

Some magazines are well-protected by their

placement in a facility or by guards. At the

Table 63.–Explosivos Thefts by Method of Entry–

Number of Incidents and Percentages for 1977-78

Number Percentage

Entry method 1977 1978 1977 1978

Locks cut. . . . . . . . . . . .

Locks pried ... . . .,

Door pried . . . . . . . . . . .

Key. ... . . . . . . . . . . .

Window entry. . . . . . . .

Inside help. ., . . . . . . . .

Wall entry ... . . . . . . .

Burning. . . . . . . . . . .

Roof entry . . . . . . . . . .

Door blown. . . . . . . . . . .

Floor entry . . . . . . . . . .

Vent entry . . . . . . . . . . .

Other b

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unknown. . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

36

10

14

7

3

10

2

7

1

0

1

40

137

327

71 31.1 26.9

50 18.9 19.0

10 5.3 3.9

23 7.4 8.8

3 3.7 1.1

0 1.6 –

16 5.3 6.1

1 1.0 .4

3 3.7 1.1

2 .5 .8

.4

3 .5 1.1

80 21.0 30.4

99 – –

362 100 100

a These percentages do not Include 137 unknown method incidents for 1977 and the 99 Incident

for 1978

b This figure reflects those incidents where the entry method could not be Placed in the above

categories

SOURCE BATF 1978 Explosives incidents Report

Bingham Copper Mine, for instance, the magazine is placed within the interior of the property of the large open pit mine. The mine has a

limited number of access points, controlled by

guards. As the mine is operated three shifts a

day, 7 days a week, it would be difficult for

anyone to gain illegal access to the magazine

area. A similar situation prevails for at least

one manufacturer. The entire property is

fenced with cyclone fencing, topped by

barbed wire. Inside the perimeter, and placed

strategically throughout the complex, is a

microwave break-circuit alarm system. These

facilities are in sharp contrast to others, in

which the magazines are located in areas remote from other operations, and accessible by

nearby roads.

Security of explosives on military reservations is stricter, with magazines within a

fenced area. Security lighting is provided, the

magazines are either directly guarded or protected by an alarm which would bring a response within 15 minutes, security patrol inspections are held at frequent intervals, and

access is only through secured access roads.

At present neither commercial nor military

installations can guard against theft by insiders. While the theft of case lots would be
Ch. V—Taggant Utility Review ● 149

quickly discovered by inventory procedures, it

would be difficult to detect the theft of small

amounts of explosives, whether by military

troops or by a miner daily placing a couple of

sticks of dynamite in his lunch pail.

Transportation of explosives is another potential point of theft. The primary purpose of

regulations concerning the transportation of

explosives is to protect those people who Iive

along the route being traversed. For that reason trucks are clearly marked when they carry

explosives. Commercial explosives are often

transported by a single driver; military explosives normally have two drivers. In neither

case is the driver normalIy armed.

Potential Targets

A previous section discussed the wide variety of targets attacked by criminal bombers.

The security measures vary widely for each

type, in response to the perceived probability

of attack and the perceived consequence of

such a bombing. Table 59 indicates that almost

half of the bombing incidents (and 60 percent

of bombing casualties) result from attacks on

private residences and vehicles. Security at

these targets is almost nonexistent, unless the

individual believes he is likely to be attacked;

except in certain cases, such as Government

officials or witnesses, it is unlikely that law enforcement officials play much of a security

role with regard to those targets.

Another 32 percent of the incidents, and 30

percent of the casualties, occur in commercial

establishments. Most of these establishments

have no security means at present and it is

unlikely that the development of detection

taggants and sensors would significantly

change that situation. Some large office buildings, with control led access, have provisions

for checking people as they enter and leave

the building and, in fact, institute checks in

off work hours. G iven a sufficiently severe

bombing threat, it would be possible to protect

the larger facilities by a detection sensor, but

the difficulties involved, the large number of

facilities, and the cost of operators and equipment probably preclude such deployment.

Government buildings, banks, police stations, and military establishments account for

less than 10 percent of bombing incidents and

just over 3 percent of casualties. Most of these

targets have controlled access and maintain

some sort of guards. In times of increased

bombing threats, as happened in the late

1960’s and early 1970’s, many of these facilities instituted checks of incoming people and

packages. A similar situation exists with respect to high-value manufacturing facilities,

utilities, and high-value complexes within educational facilities, such as computer centers.

Many of these facilities now require inspection

of any parcels (including briefcases and purses)

brought into the facility, as well as identification of people entering. Detection sensors

could be easily installed in each of these facilities, given sufficient threat.

Airports and aircraft represent another major class of potential targets. While attacks on

airports and aircraft represent well under 1

percent of incidents, the catastrophic consequences of an aircraft bombing make it an attractive potential target for criminal bombers

and the subject of much current security effort.

Current large aircraft cost in the neighborhood of $2o million to $50 million each, and

carry several hundred passengers. A single aircraft bombing could, therefore, cause more

property damage and more deaths than the

sum of all domestic bombings this decade.

Table 64 lists the explosions that have occurred aboard U.S. aircraft from 1949 through

1976. Table 65 lists the location of the explosive devices for the 19 U.S. aircraft listed in

table 64 and compares the location with the 63

aircraft bombings worldwide in that time period. Table 66 Iists the 26 incidents between

1972 and 1976 in which explosive or incendiary

devices were found at U.S. airports. All of the

tables are from FAA report FAA-R D-77-28. The

tables show that no bomb has caused casualties on a domestic flight since 1962; in fact,

since 1962, all but one of the casualties, and all

deaths at U.S. airports or on U.S. domestic

flights, were caused by bombs placed in

lockers.
150 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table 64.–Explosions Aboard U.S. Aircraft

Date Carrier Aircraft Aircraft location Bomb location Outcome Device

1 1/1/55

7/25/57

1/6/60

5/22/62

11/12/67

11/ 19/68

8/29/69

9/7/7 0

9/12/70

12/29/71

3/8/7 2

9/21 /73

12/17/73

8/26/74

9/8/7 4

2/3/75

12/19/75

7/2/7 6

7/5/76

. . . . -- -- . . . ,. -- Baggage

Lavatory

Airplane disintegrated–44 killed

Passenger thrown out of lavatory–

hole in aircraft side; plane landed

successfully

34 killed, airplane disintegrated

Tail blown off–45 killed

3 bags destroyed; aircraft saved

Fire and explosion in lavatory;

extinguished by crew; plane landed

safely

No casualties from explosion

Demolished after evacuation

Demolished after evacuation

Aircraft destroyed, hangar damaged;

no casualties

No casualties (plane empty)

Not known

Fire damage; 30 killed,

many injured

Fire, confined to local area;

no casualties

High-order explosion; 88 killed,

aircraft lost

Extinguished by crew; minimum

damage

$10,000 damage to aircraft

Explosion and fire destroyed main

fuselage

Extensive damage

Dynamite

Dynamite

Dynamite, dry cells

Dynamite

Black powder (?)

—

Grenades &

canister explosive

—

—

—

c-4

—

White phosphorous

grenades

c-4

—

Petrol and butane

Blasting caps

Dynamite (8-10

sticks)

Dynamite

UAL

WA

NA

co

AA

co

TW

PA

TW

—

TW

—

PA

TW

TW

PA

—

EA

—

UL-6B

CY-240

DC-6B

707

727

707

707

747

707

Turbo Cmdr

707

Navion

707

707

707

747

Alouette

Helicopter

Electra

Helicopter

11 minutes after 10

47 minutes after TO

184 minutes after TO

39,000 ft

102 minutes after TO

24,000 ft

Ground after hijack

(Damascus, Syria)

Ground after hijack

(Cairo, Egypt)

Ground after hijack

(Dawson Field, Jordan)

In hangar

Parked on ground

Parked on ground

On ground, Rome

On ground, Rome

Over Ionian Sea

In air, Burma

On ground

Parked next to fence

On ground

Under seat passenger

compartment

Towel container in rear

lavatory

Rear baggage

compartment

Lavatory

Explosives thrown in

cockpit after evacuation

—

—

Seat in cabin

Cockpit

Engine manifold

Attack while loading

Aft baggage compartment

Aft baggage compartment

Lavatory (suicidal

passenger set fire)

Near fuel tank

External, near right

landing gear

External, under tail

SOURCE FAA Civil Avaton Security Service

Table 65.–Location of Explosions Aboard Aircraft, 1949-76

Worldwide U.S. aircraft

from FAA report FAA-RD-77-28, shows a detailed schematic of the flow of people and material into the airport area.

It is possible that bombs could be introduced through the mail, freight, air courier

services, or food services, as well as from

checked baggage; or could be carried on by

aircraft flight or service personnel or by passengers. Current security procedures assume

that personnel screening procedures will be

sufficient to eliminate a serious threat from

airport or aircraft personnel and that air

freight and mail service would not allow a

criminal bomber to be sure his bomb would be

aboard a particular aircraft. Current aircraft

security procedures, therefore, concentrate on

passengers, carry-on baggage, and checked

baggage. Air courier services, in which a small

Location of explosion Number Percent Number Percent

Stowed . . ... , ., . .

Baggage. . . . . . . .

Cargo or freight ., ...

Ground attack. . . .,

External attachment. . .

Passenger or crew

compartment. . . . .

Lavatory. ... . . . . .

Passenger compartment

Cockpit. . . . . .

Unknown, . . . . . . . . .

13

(8)

(5)

5

7

21

—

4

3

21

—

8

11

21

16

(19)

(4)

5

63

52

—

—

—

8

(2)

19

42

—

o

Total . . . . . . . . 100 100

SOURCE Data supplied by FAA Civil Avation Security Service

Current airport security is based on an attempt to separate the areas of public access

from the secure air operations areas. Figure 23,
Ch. V—Taggant Utility Review ● 151

Table 66.–Explosions and Device Found at U.S. Airports, 1972-75

Date Airport Location Effects Comment Device

,

3/7/ 2

3/8/72

11 /19/72

3/24/72

12/1 /72

12/31 /72

3/20/73

3/29/73

8/9/7 3

11/30/73

3/1 /74

7/21 /74

8/1 /74

8/6/7 4

8/9/7 4

8/26/74

9/ 16/74

3/15/75

3/22/75

3/27/75

7/22/75

Kenneay

Seattle

Denver

San Carlos, Calif

Grand RapIds,

Mich.

Austin

Los Angeles

Milwaukee

Los Angeles

Nashville

Kennedy

New Orleans

Kennedy

Los Angeles

JohnstownCamoria, Pa.

O’Hare

Boston

San Francisco

Honolulu

Kingsford, Mich

Tampa

10/17/75 Miami

10/20/75 Miami

11/6/75 Buffalo

11 /27/75 Miami

12/29/75 La Guardia

Cockpit of TWA B-707

Baggage compartment (UAL

flight)

Attache case carried by

Individual

Hanging from belly of

helicopter

Paper towel container in

terminal

Concession area

On runway during approach

of Continental Airlines plane

Locker

Locker

Locker

Locker

(unknown)

Cargo building

Locker

Hangar

Men’s room

Airline baggage room

Near ticket counter

Lost & found baggage area

Storage area

Baggage cart

Locker

Dominican Airlines Office

Baggage claim area (2 bags)

Bahamasair aircraft. Behind

wall panel in lavatory

Locker

No explosion

No explosion

No explosion

Hole in ground at remote

location

No exploslion

Moderate damage

None

1 Injury–moderate damage

Did not detonate

Did not detonate

3 injured–moderate damage

No explosion

No explosion

3 killed, 34 injured

Hangar and aircraft destroyed

Commode damaged

Substantial damage

Minor damage

Did not detonate

No explosion

1 injured

Lockers and ceiling destroyed

No explosion

No exploslon

No explosion

11 killed, 70 injured;

substantial damage

Detected by dog

Extortion attempt; timer

stopped

Indvidual stated intent to

blow up plane

Removed by police

Device extinguished after

emithng smoke

—

Thrown by individual on field

Extortion attempt

Extortion attempt/located

by dogs

Extortion attempt

—

Removed by bomb squad

Removed

—

—

—

Bomb was in an unclaimed

c-4

Gelatin dynamite in aerosol

cans, blasting caps

8 sticks of dynamite

3 sticks of dynamite, timer and

detonators

—

Incendiary (gasoline)

Molotov cocktail

—

—

Smokeless powder, timer,

initator

—

3-m long bamboo with powder

and fuse

Cardboard container with

explosive powder, fireworks

fuse

—

Probable incendiary (in 55-gal

drum)

Probably firecrackers

Incendiary (?)

suitcase destined for Tel Aviv

— Probably firecracker

— Crude pipe bomb

Removed —

— Firecrackers

— —

Discovered by janitor; Time bomb

disarmed by bomb squad

Checked bags unclaimed after Black powder and gasoline

flight, timers turned off

(inadvertently)

Removed —

— Dynamite and RDXa

a FAA estimate Other agencies diagree with this assessment

SOURCE FAA CIVII Aviation Security Service

parcel can be placed aboard a specific aircraft

for subsequent pickup, are treated in the same

way as freight or maiI by most airlines.

As a result of the hijacking threat in the mid1970’s, a set of procedures were developed to

deal with passengers, checked baggage, and

carry-on baggage. Figure 24 (from FAA report

FAA-R D-78-66) shows a schematic of the passenger and carry-on luggage-screening systems.

Passengers must pass through a magnetometer, which will trigger an alarm upon detection of a significant metal mass, such as a gun

or knife. If the alarm is triggered, the passenger

is instructed to remove any metal objects, suc h

as keys, and repass through the magnetometer,

If an alarm still rings, he is searched by a handheld magnetometer and subject to a patdown

search if the alarm persists. FAA estimates that

the probability of detection of guns or knives

by the magnetometer, hand magnetomer, and

patdown, are 0.90, 0.95, and 0.95, respectively,

adding up to an overall detection probability
152 ● Taggants in Explosives

v

13 NNOSU3d

u =\ I

~? ,

d d

L =------------ ~ -

D k IGri l

------ ~lE~,,,,,,,,--f:

i

I

I

i

i

------------------1 6

— — 3Nl13dld

b = 4

13 iNNOSti3d
Ch. V—Taggant Utility Review ● 153

Figure 24.—Passenger/Hand-Baggage

Screening Station

o

o

o= Screening contractor personnel

o= Law enforcement officer

SOURCE: FAA report No. FAA-RD-78-88

of 0.81. * The system is not designed to detect

bombs, but FAA estimates that the probability

of detecting a bomb is 0.17.

Carry-on baggage is screened, either by an Xray examination or by visual hand search (only

at small airports or when the X-ray machines

● The total probability of detection must be less than the probability of detection by the magnetometer, as no subsequent

searches are conducted on those passengers who do not trigger

the magnetometer Total detection probability is thus

PDT = ( PD 1

) (PD,) (PDN)

are nonoperable). FAA estimates that the probabiIity of detecting guns and bombs in carry-on

baggage is 0.81 and 0.19, respectively.

FAA estimates are probably high, especially

for the X-ray detection of illegal materials in

hand baggage. Magnetometers are set to a

wide range of sensitivities; one may trigger on

a small keyring while another may fail to trigger on a sizable metal mass. X-ray attendants

are generally paid at, or near, the minimum

wage, have little training, and must deal with

the problem of maintaining alertness for long

hours while performing an extremely dull job.

While an attendant may well recognize a gun,

particularly at the start of a shift, it is doubtful

that a carefully constructed explosive device

would be detected.

Notwithstanding the above limitations, the

use of magnetometers and X-ray machines,

coupled with a search profile of likely hijackers, has resulted in the recovery of an impressive amount of hardware, and the arrest of

substantial numbers of people, as shown in

table 67 (from FAA report FAA-R D-77-28), as

well as the virtual halt of hijackings of U.S.

domestic airlines.

The current procedure for screening

checked baggage consists simply of ensuring

that baggage can only be checked by a passenger with a valid ticket. When checking baggage at curbside or at the check-in counter, the

Table 67.–Results of Civil Aviation Security Program Passenger Screening

1972 1973 1974 1975

Passengers (millions) ., . . ., . . ., 192 203 201 202

Passengers denied boarding. ., . , 8,265 3,459 2,663 (a)

Referrals to law enforcement . . . ., ... (a) (a) (a) 12,270

Persons arrested. ... ... ., ., . . .,

Aviation offenses detected

3,658 3,156 3,501 2,464

Carrying weapons or explosives aboard aircraft 774 736 1,147 1,364

Giving false information ., ., ., ., . . . . 244 658 1,465 227

Weapons detected

Firearms. . . 1,313 2,162 2,450 4,783

Explosive devices . . ., ... ... ., 13 3,459 14,928 b

158

Ammunition, fireworks, ... ., ., ., . . (a) (a) (a) 17,047

Knives . . . . . . . . . 10,316 23,290 21,468 46,318

Other ., ... , ., ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,203 28,740 28,864 55,830

aData 1101 collected In this form

bThls figure IS a piece count which Includes hreworks and ammuntmn

SOURCE Fws[ Second, and Ttwd Sem/-Anrwa/ Reports 10 Corrgress on (he E((ecfweness of Passenger Screemng procedures, FAA CIVII Awat!on Security

Serwce

f “ -[4 n 1 r) _ g o - 11
154 ● Taggants in Explosives

passenger must show his ticket. The system

can be totally defeated by anyone willing to

buy a ticket he does not use, by convincing

someone to check a piece of luggage for him,

or by a suicidal passenger.

EL AL does hand search each piece of

checked baggage before it is boarded, as do

the British and French for Concorde flights.

Spot checks are made at most airports, particularly if the passenger is identified as matching

the hijacker profile, or in times of high perceived bombing threat.

In recognition of the fact that all but one

casualty in recent years in domestic airlines or

at domestic airports have been due to bombs

placed in lockers, most airports have either

removed the lockers entirely or placed them

behind the security inspection gate.

In summary, most bombings take place at

targets that have no means of detecting

bombs. Some high-value targets check incoming parcels and require identification. Airport

procedures are quite effective in finding guns

in carry-on luggage or on the person of a passenger, but much less effective in finding

bombs. The probability of finding a bomb in

checked baggage is low and essentially nil for

courier service, mail, or freight.

Current Anti bomber Procedures

The predetonation anti bomber procedures

followed by security personnel at airports are

typical of the entire security industry. Effort is

primarily directed at prevention — the best procedure is to not allow bombs to reach the secured areas of the airport or the aircraft.

The anti bomber procedures of most law enforcement personnel are primarily aimed at

the apprehension and conviction of criminal

bombers normally starting after a criminal

bombing has occurred. The actual range and

intensity of the effort will vary with the severity of the bombing and will be somewhat different for different parts of the country.

The first step in the postdetonation investigation is to secure the area of the bombing, both to ensure that no further danger exists from unexploded material and to preserve

whatever clues remain in the area.

After the area is secured, a search is made

for physical evidence. This search has two

objectives —evidence of the presence of the

perpetrator and evidence of the bomb. Traces

of the perpetrator include small pieces of

clothing, hair, fingerprints, footprints, and possible tire tracks. Fingerprints, in the rare cases

they are found, provide a clue to the identity

of the perpetrator; the other evidence would

be primarily used to tie the suspect to the

crime after he has been apprehended by other

means. Evidence from the bomb includes undetonated explosives and parts of the container, the detonator, and the timing system.

Debris from the explosive is also collected for

laboratory analysis.

If the bomb does not fully detonate, the

date-shift code information may be recoverable, providing a clue to the source of explosives and a list of the last legal purchasers. If

the device fully detonates, the parts of the

timer and container can provide some information to start an investigation, but the leads so

generated are quite indirect. The debris is

more likely to furnish intelligence information,

such as connecting a particular bombing with

simiIar bombings.

The next step in the investigation is a laboratory analysis of the debris, and a followup investigation to attempt to trace the perpetrator

from whatever clues are available. The laboratory attempts to characterize the physical evidence obtained, including an attempt to determine the type of explosive used. The laboratory evidence could provide clues in the search

for the perpetrator, but more likely provides

confirmatory evidence and inteliigence.

Armed with the data provided by the search of

the bomb scene and laboratory analysis, the investigator attempts to trace and apprehend the

perpetrator.

In addition to physical evidence, law enforcement agencies question witnesses, attempt to get information from informers, and

exercise the resources brought to bear to solve

any major crime.
Ch. V—Taggant Utility Review ● 155

The amount of time spent by law enforcement investigators at the bomb scene, in the

laboratory, and working in the investigation

depends on the seriousness of the bombing,

the workload, and to some extent, the location. A bombing homicide would command

considerably more resources than a vandal

blowing up a mailbox.

In addition to the postdetonation investigations described above, law enforcement agencies engage in undercover infiltration of

bomber groups, undercover contracting for the

services of bombers, surveillance of expected

targets, and gathering of intelligence concerning expected perpetrators or groups of perpetrators. Sometimes an informant volunteers

valuable information. Clues from collateral

crimes, such as theft of explosives or buying

timers with a bad check, sometimes provide

additional clues. Perpetrators are even occasionally apprehended in the act of placing a

bomb by routine law enforcement patrol of

the area.

A further mechanism which tends to facilitate law enforcement efforts is the occurrence

of accidental detonations whiIe bombs are being fabricated or placed, Table 68, taken from

FBI data, shows the number of premature detoTable 68.- Premature Detonation Statistics

Year Incidents Injuries Deaths

1974, ., ., ., ... ., 29 31 11

1975, . ., . . . . 37 53 2

1976. , ., ., ., 42 42 11

1977. , ., ., . ., ., 29 34 2

1978. , ., . . . . ... ., ., 33 43 5

SOURCE FBI data

nations and the casualties caused by those detonations for the period 1974 through 1977.

During that period, approximately 23 percent

of al I deaths by bombings and 14 percent of al I

injuries were to perpetrators as a result of premature detonations. A premature detonation

often provides considerably more evidence

than a bombing, as the explosion often takes

place in the residence or vehicle of the perpetrator and with the perpetrator present. This information can lead to the arrest of other members of the perpetrator group.

Given the paucity of clues to work with, law

enforcement personnel are not able to effectively combat criminal bombers. Perpetrators

of fewer than 10 percent of all bombings are

brought to trial. Considerably fewer than half

of those tried are convicted, resulting in a rate

of only a few percent for the successful solving

of criminal bombings.

DISCUSSION OF TAGGANT UTILITY

Given that identification taggants are able

to survive the detonation and be recovered,

that detection sensors can be developed which

will detect taggant vapors in the parts-per-trillion concentration regime, and that taggants

can be safely added to explosives, what would

be the utility to law enforcement and security

personnel of the taggant program? Possible

utility attributes would include increased intelligence information, methods to decrease the

theft of explosives, increased rates of apprehension and conviction of criminal bombers,

deterrence of potential bombers, and an increased rate of detection of bombs at potential target sites. These issues are discussed in

this section; the discussion is primarily qualitative, as little quantitative data is available.

In the initial discussion, the assumption i s

made that perpetrators make no response to a

taggant program. The range of responses available to perpetrators, their likelihood of use,

and their effects on a taggant program are discussed in the following section.

Deterrence

Supporters of a taggant program believe

that both identification and detection taggants

can cause some portion of the criminal

bomber population to reconsider a planned incident and decide to either abandon the plan

or modify it in a way beneficial to society. The

deterrent effect of the identification and detection taggants is quite different, and should
156 ● Taggants in Explosives

be considered separately. The deterrent effect

that an identification taggant may have on a

criminal bomber would be to lead him to perceive an increased likelihood of his postdetonation arrest and conviction. This differs significantly from the deterrent effect of the detection taggants , in which the bomber perceives a decreased likelihood of a successful

completion of the criminal bombing as well as

an increased arrest probability.

A good deal of study has been conducted on

the general subject of the efficacy of punishment on behavior modification, and on the deterrent value of prison sentences (or death) on

criminals. The results are not clearcut, however, and it is not possible to make a quantitative estimate of the percentage of bombers

who would be deterred by knowledge that

commercial explosives contain identification

taggants. It seems reasonable to expect some

deterrence, however, a point made by most of

the law enforcement personnel contacted, either personally or by questionnaire. Most law

enforcement personnel felt the effect would

be small or moderate, although approximately

30 percent predicted a substantial deterrent effect (over 25 percent of bombers would be deterred). The deterrence effect was felt to be

most effective in preventing revenge bombings

(almost 50 percent of the law enforcement personnel estimated a substantial effect) and

crime-of-passion bombings (40 percent) and

least effective in preventing bombings by terrorists, criminals, and psychopaths (approximately 25 percent of the respondents felt a

substantial deterrent effect would be present

for these bombers from identification taggants). These results are shown in more detail

in appendix B.

A dedicated terrorist is primarily interested

in attracting attention to his cause (and less so

in self-protection); a professional criminal recognizes the risk of arrest as a cost of doing business; a psychopath may either feel invincible

or doesn’t care about the personal aftermath

of his crime. These criminal bombers may not

be greatly deterred by the increased probability of arrest that identification taggants would

provide; however, they may well modify their

bombing plans if detection taggants significantly decrease the probability that they will

succeed in their bombing mission. Whether the

bombers would be deterred from committing a

crime, or would modify the type of crime, is

uncertain, and would depend, to some extent,

on the type of bomber, as well as the target

type.

Many targets, such as residences, vehicles,

and commercial establishments, would not be

protected by detection taggant sensors (about

80 percent of bombings in 1977 and 1978 were

of this type); the deterrence effect of detection

taggants for bombers who plan to attack that

class of target would therefore be small. For

bombings which currently are planned against

the remaining targets, the presence of detection taggants in commercial explosives and deployed sensors could modify the plan in several ways. Fear of detection taggants could lead

bombers to shift to unprotected targets, or a

less vulnerable, more accessible portion of the

target complex (a bomb could be planted

against an outside wall, rather than within a

Government building, for instance). Alternatively, fear of detection taggants could lead to

one of the countermeasure responses described in the next section.

Some guidance on the deterrent effect that

a program of detection taggants and sensors

could provide to high-valued targets can be

gained by analogy to the effectiveness of the

current anti hijacking procedures at airports.

Hijacking statistics are summarized in table

69. Between 20 and 30 commercial airliners

originating from domestic airports were hijacked each year between 1969 and 1972. In

1973, a series of antihijacking measures became fully implemented in the United States,

which included 100-percent passenger screening by magnetometers, X-ray examination of

carry-on luggage, and development of a hijacker personality profile. The number of hijackings dropped dramaticalIy — to a single incident in 1973 and an average of 4.5 per year

s i rice.

Some foreign countries have instituted antihijacking procedures as well, although not as
Ch. V1—Taggant Utility Review ● 157

Table 69.–Comm8rcial Airliner Hijacking Statistics by Year

Hijackings U.S. Hijackings foreign

Year origin origin

1949 -67, . . . . . . . . . . .

1968 . . .

1969 ,.. .,, .,,..,.

1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1971 . . . . . .

1972... . . . . .

1973a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1974 .,,. . . . . .

1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1976, . . . . . . . . .

1977, ,, .,,.... . . . .

1978 .,,. . .

9

15

36

20

24

27

1

3

6

4

5

b

8

b

45

14

48

50

29

29

17

17

11

15

NAC

NA

a U.S antijacking measures became fully effective

b U.S airlines irrespective of point of origin

c

Not avadable

SOURCE FAA report No FAA.RD-77-66

uniformly as has the United States. As a result,

the foreign hijackings declined approximately

60 percent when the 1969-72 period is compared with the 1972-77 period, while hijackings

from domestic airports declined almost90 percent in that same period.

While part of this drop may have been due

to additional measures such as the use of

armed sky marshals for a period on the most

vulnerable routes and the gradual erosion of a

friendly welcome for hijackers at some foreign

countries, a good deal of it is probably due to

the deterrent effect of a visible screening system In fact, large numbers of weapons have

been reported recovered from trash containers, potted plants, and other hiding places, as a

result of the weapon carrier being confronted

with an operating screening system. That the

deterrent is not 100-percent effective is clearly

shown by the number of weapons currently

confiscated by the screening process, as shown

in table 67.

I n summary, it is not possible to quantify the

number or percentage of bombers who would

be deterred by a taggant program. identification and detection taggants will probably deter

some bombers, particularly revenge bombers

and those committing crimes of passion. Detection taggants will deter bombers from attacking protected targets, perhaps at the expense of more frequent attacks on unprotected targets. Law enforcement personnel indicated that, overall, about the same magnitude of deterrence would be expected for each

type of taggant, perhaps reflecting the larger

value of detection taggants for those targets

protected by detection sensors, and the total

lack of deterrent for those not visibly protected.

Bomb Detection—Target Protection

Detection taggants should greatly increase

the probability of detecting explosives containing the taggants and thus increase the protection of the targets at which detection sensors would be deployed, either permanently or

in response to a heightened perceived threat.

Again, no data exists that would allow quantitative estimates of the detection effectiveness.

As indicated in the previous section, FAA esti-

. .

Photo credit U.S. Department of Transportation

Typical airline passenger screening point
158 ● Taggants in Explosives

mates that the current passenger and carry-on

baggage scanning systems at airports have an

overall probability of detecting guns or knives

of over 80 percent, while they estimate less

than a 20-percent detection probability for explosives. If the assumption is made that a detection sensor would have the same effectiveness in detecting bombs that the current systems have for detecting guns, a fourfold increase in effectiveness would be expected. If

the Aerospace Corp. prototype specification

of 0.9999 probability of detection is met by the

fielded system, then essentially full protection

would be available to those targets protected

by a detection taggant sensor, The term full

protection must be qualified– it refers to

bombs that are fabricated from tagged commercial explosives and do not have a sufficient

seal to prevent escape of the taggant molecule. No protection is offered for bombs fabricated from untagged explosives (homemade,

taggant removed, foreign supply, explosives

fabricated prior to the taggant program) or

from explosives with a sufficient seal.

It is unlikely that a detection taggant program would result in a significant increase in

the number of bombs detected, as few of the

current bombings are directed at the type of

high-value, limited-access targets at which detection sensors would be located. The utility of

the detection taggant system would be in eliminating, or greatly decreasing, the low number

of bombings which occur at these targets, each

of which can cause catastrophic damage and

casualties.

The above discussion addressed the utility

of fixed detection taggant sensors. Portable

sensors have an additional function — locating

a bomb whose approximate location is known

or suspected. Law enforcement and security

personnel are often notified of a bomb threat,

through tips, calls claiming credit for planting

a bomb, and extortion. Current procedure is to

evacuate the premises and then conduct a

time-consuming search, using personnel and

perhaps trained dogs, in an attempt to locate

the bomb. The disruption caused by a bomb

threat can be quite costly; a recent evacuation

of the World Trade Center in New York is estimated to have cost several million dollars in

lost time. The use of a portable sensor could

significantly cut down on the time for a search

and increase the probability of finding a bomb.

It is possible that the existence and deployment of portable detection sensors would deter some bombers from planting bombs, particularly as an extortion device, as well as act to

deter bomb hoaxes. BATF reported 105 hoax

device incidents in 1977 and 47 in 1978, so reducing the number, or reducing the time lost

from each, could have a significant economic

impact.

The additional utility of portable detection

sensors was noted by law enforcement personnel returning the questionnaire. Approximately

65 percent felt that a portable sensor, needing

no skilled operator, would have a high utility

(deter over 25 percent of bombers), while less

than 50 percent felt that a stationary sensor

would have high utility. Similarly the respondents felt that portable units were superior to

nonportable units for each type of target suggested. The differences were small for targets

such as airports, large Government buildings,

and nuclear power stations, but ranged up to

more than 5 to 1 for targets such as schools

and bus and train depots.

An important limitation to the detection of

explosives by any means should be noted. It is

possible to defeat any type of detector. Therefore, failure to detect a bomb cannot be taken

as proof that no bomb exists. The easier it is to

defeat the sensor, the greater the limitations to

the utility of the system. A system that detected 50 percent of the bombs would therefore be useful only as a screen. A system that

detected 99.9 percent of the bombs would not

only screen out twice as many bombs, but

could be used to give a high probability that

no bombs were present, significantly decreasing search time for bombs, more easily detecting hoaxes, and giving more useful decision

data for dealing with threats or extortion attempts.
Ch. V1—Taggant Utility Review . 159

Bomber Apprehension

The current procedure for the apprehension

of criminal bombers consists of three phases:

1. the postdetonation search of the area for

physical evidence and subsequent laboratory analysis;

2. the investigation, based on the results of

the analysis of the physical evidence; and

3. intelligence gathering, used as an input to

the investigation or to direct surveillance

of suspected perpetrators or expected targets.

A great deal of effort is currently spent on

the postdetonation search and analysis of

physical evidence from a criminal bombing.

The purpose of this search is to attempt to generate leads to help in the apprehension and

conviction of criminal bombers, either directly

from clues found in the debris or as a result of

intelligence information gathered from a number of bombings.

The search for evidence phase includes a detailed analysis to try and determine the type of

explosive used and to find and examine any

parts of the bomb, such as elements of the timing device, which may have survived the detonation. This evidence, together with any evidence of the presence of the perpetrator (such

as hair or footprints) serves as the starting

point for the investigative phase. Laboratory

analysis is currently successful in determining

the type of explosive used approximately 50

percent of the time, but experts indicate that

the manufacturer can be identified in less than

10 percent of current cases undergoing intensive analysis. Parts of the detonator and timing

device usually survive the detonation, and in

many cases, currently provide the best initial

leads from which to launch an investigation.

The investigative phase consists primarily of

trying to generate some type of lead to the perpetrators from the physical evidence gathered,

as well as tracking leads provided by informants or witnesses and attempts to correlate the

characteristics of the bombing with similar instances. A great deal of effort may be expended, for instance, in investigating the

sources of a common clock used as the timing

mechanism.

The addition of identification taggants to explosives would aid the investigatory efforts of

law enforcement personnel in a number of

ways, provided that the taggants survive the

detonation and are recoverable from the explosive debris. In order for the taggant information to be useful, however, the bombing

must be of sufficient importance (in terms of

property damage, notoriety generated, or casualties produced) to warrant a thorough investigation. In such cases, identification taggants

will provide much more definitive information

at much less effort by the investigating team.

Equally important, the information can be

made available quickly— in a matter of hours,

if necessary, rather than the days or weeks it

may take to generate whatever data can be

generated by conventional means. The taggants provide a good starting point for an investigation as they directly indicate the type of

explosive used, manufacturer, and time of

manufacture, and provide a list of the last

legal purchasers. This information may lead

directly to a bomber who purchased the explosives legally, provide a limited number of

suspects for intensive investigation, tie reported thefts of explosives to bombings, provide leads to an unreported theft of explosives,

or provide indirect information to limit the

scope of an investigation, such as to a specific

geographical region of the country. Some of

the ways in which identification taggants can

contribute to an investigation are shown schematically in figure 25.

There will be some cases in which the perpetrator legally buys the explosive, and subsequently uses it to commit a criminal bombing.

In some of these cases, the bomber would not

otherwise be identified with the bombing; in
160 . Taggants in Explosives

Figure 25. —Schematic Illustration of Identification

Taggant Utility in Criminal Investigation

[

Direct

1 “ ’

r 1

L

‘1

I

Indirect I

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

others, the taggants add a strong I ink in a chain

of evidence, which may help to obtain a conviction. A chain-of-evidence example recently

occurred at Sparrow’s Point, Md., where a

bomb, planted in a pickup truck, killed the

driver. A search was made of the bomb scene

and the physical evidence subsequently examined in the BATF national laboratory. The

laboratory analysis indicated that the explosive used in the incident had been tagged as

part of the pilot-plant taggant program. The

list of legal purchasers of that lot of explosives

included James McFillin, one of the prime suspects in the bombing. McFillin was found

guilty on December 19, 1979.

Even in those cases where the list of last

legal purchasers does not contain an obvious

suspect, it provides a means of identifying a

limited number of people for a subsequent

thorough investigation.

In some cases, explosives will be legally purchased, but with phony identification or by a

third party not directly involved in the commission of the bombing. When phony identification is used, an intensive investigation could

still provide a viable lead to the purchaser. Although the purchaser’s real name and address

would not be directly provided by the list of

purchasers, a location, a time of purchase, and

a witness to the purchase would have been

provided. Similarly, for the cases involving a

third-party purchase, that intermediary might

be identifiable, providing a good lead to the

perpetrator. It may also be helpful to know the

time frame when explosives used in a crime

were obtained.

Some of the explosives used in criminal

bombings are currently stolen, and it may be

that a taggant program would increase the

incidence of explosive theft, as discussed in

the next section. Identification taggants would

provide information of considerable utility to

an investigation of a criminal bombing, even

for explosives that turn out to have been

stolen. The list of last legal purchasers should

provide information as to the source from

which the explosives were stolen. In some

cases the theft of explosives will have been reported. Identification of the source of the explosives provides intelligence information on

the sources and disposition of explosives for

criminal bombings. It may also provide a lead

directly to the perpetrators of a bombing, by

establishing a connection between specific

thefts and specific bombings. It may be difficult to establish a motive or any other useful

lead for an isolated theft, but tying it in with

specific bombings may provide that lead, particularly if the explosives are stolen with the

help of an employee.

In some cases, the explosive theft may not

be reported, perhaps due to the surreptitious

theft by an employee of small amounts of explosives over a period of time. Identifying a

source by the use of taggants could result in

leads to the explosives thief, and through him,

perhaps to the criminal bomber.

While not directly related to an investigation of a criminal bombing, identification of a
Ch. V—Taggant Utility Review ● 161

particular facility as the source of stolen explosives would help pinpoint those facilities,

or types of facilities, that are in need of increased security for their explosives.

The value of the list of last legal purchasers

wilI depend somewhat on the length of the Iist.

A trace which indicates that the full taggantbatch of explosives was sold directly to a mine

by the explosives manufacturer obviously provides a more immediately useful lead than a

trace which shows thousands of purchasers of

a lot of smokeless powder. Even the list with

thousands of legal purchasers would provide a

better starting place for an investigation than

the types of information generally available

with present methods. For example, investigators attempt to trace timing mechanisms

even though thousands of people may have

purchased the model of clock that was used,

and there are no records available that would

turn up their names.

It is rather unlikely that the trace would turn

up a Iist of thousands of names as likely perpetrators of a significant or catastrophic bombing, even if black or smokeless powder was

used as the filler. The types of bombings likely

to warrant a detailed investigation are unlikely

to be caused by 1 lb of gunpowder, which

would eliminate most of the people on the list

either by narrowing the Iist to those purchasing

more than 1 lb of the same lot, or by providing

multiple traces of the multiple lots used in the

filler. When effects such as the geographical

distribution of the tagged gunpowder lot are

also taken into consideration, the list of viable

names is likely to be much smaller than would

appear to be the case on the surface.

BATF traced the number of entities that

were involved in the manufacture, distribution, and ultimate end use of the unique taggant lots produced during the pilot test program; the number ranged between 2 and 68.

The size of the uniquely tagged batch varied

from 12,000 to 26,000 lb, with the number of

entities directly, but weakly, related to the taggant batch size. The batch involving the most

entities (68) included the manufacturer, 3 primary distributors, and 21 secondary and 43 tertiary distribution points.

The above discussion is pertinent when the

taggant trace produces information directly indicating a suspect, a group of suspects, or a

source of explosive theft. I n some instances it

may not be possible to directly narrow the list

of possible suspects. Examples would include

unobserved theft with no inside help, purchases from which no obvious leads turned up,

or traces in which the list of last legal purchasers was too large to provide a reasonable starting point for investigations of all of the individuals involved. I n these cases, the identification taggant traces, including the manufacturer, time of manufacture, specific product, and Iist of distributors and ultimate purchasers would stilI provide indirect information of use to the investigation. Examples of indirect information might be data that limit the

investigation to a small geographic region of

the country, identification of the type and

manufacturer of the explosives, and an indication of when the explosives were acquired by

the bomber. Even the indirect information provides more data to the law enforcement investigators than currently available, after extensive laboratory and field investigation of postdetonation debris.

I n addition to providing both direct and indi

rect leads to the investigation of crimina

bombings, taggants can contribute consider

able intelIigence information.

Intelligence Concerning Criminal

Bomber Activities

The gathering and integrating of intelligence

concerning the activity of criminal bombers

and groups of bombers is a time-consuming

process which is a necessary activity of control

by law enforcement agencies. Identification

taggants would greatly facilitate law enforcement intelIigence activities, particularly in

monitoring the range of activities of bomber

groups, the theft and disposition of explosives,

cooperation between various bomber groups

and between domestic bomber groups and foreign organizations, and keeping track of current sources of explosives for criminal bombers. Intelligence information is particularly
162 . Taggants in Explosives

useful in combating the repeat bomber, and

may provide the only effective method to generate leads to the most sophisticated bombers — professional criminals and terrorists.

Strategic data banks, receiving information

from a variety of domestic and foreign

sources, have successfully identified patterns

and trends that have led to a better understanding, and arrests and convictions, of members of international narcotics rings, high-finance swindlers, and terrorists. Taggants could

enhance the utility of such data banks to faciIitate identification of terrorist objectives, leading toward arrests and convictions of terrorist

bombers. Taggants, by identifying known

sources of terrorist bombs, and bombs used by

other criminal organizations as well, would

help intelligence analysts differentiate among

several groups which may claim, or which may

seem to be responsible for a particular bombing incident, separating out the group directly

responsible. The British taggant system, which

apparently consists of identifier threads dispersed in the explosives, is used primarily as an

apparatus for gathering intelligence about

criminal bombers. A few specific examples of

how intelligence information could be used for

bomber control are instructive.

Some criminal bombers operate in a single

location, with no activities beyond that area.

Others range over a fairly wide geographic

area. If taggants recovered from a bombing indicate that the explosives were purchased in

the area of the bombing, then a local group or

individual is probably responsible. On the

other hand, if the explosives were stolen or

purchased in one part of the country, and used

in another, that would indicate that either a

group with a considerable geographic span of

activity was involved, or that there was cooperation between various groups of criminal

bombers.

BATF currently keeps a record of the

amount of explosives stolen, recovered, and

expended in bombings. While it is possible to

trace and allocate cap-sensitive high explosives that are recovered in their original cartridges (by the date-shift code stamped on the

cartridge), it is extremely difficult to identify

the source of explosives that have been detonated. Recovery of taggants would allow a

much more accurate record to be kept of the

use to which stolen explosives are put.

At present there appears to be little cooperation among domestic groups responsible for

criminal bombings (terrorists and professional

criminals, in particular) or between these

groups and foreign organizations. That is not

the case, however, for foreign groups that engage in bombings or other terrorist activities

abroad. Some terrorist activities abroad have

involved groups from two or even three different countries, separated widely in geography.

Intelligence analysts predict that coordinated

activity of that sort may soon be seen in the

United States. Taggants could help to identify

cases of intergroup activity. As an example, explosives may be stolen, and the modus operandi of the theft or a claim of credit for theft indicates that one group was responsible. If the

taggants recovered from the debris of a criminal bombing (identified as having been caused

by a different perpetrator) indicate the use of

those explosives, then a link may be postulated

to exist.

A final example illustrates the predictive

value of bombing intelligence that would be

available from a taggant program. Analysis of

the explosives used in a series of bombings

could indicate they were all from the same taggant lot. Analysis of the pattern of the bombing could be useful in predicting a geographic

area for a subsequent bombing, or in predicting a time for a bombing by the group involved, allowing increased surveillance of individuals in the group (if identified) or of potential targets.

Prosecution of Criminal Bombers

There is rarely a single piece of evidence

that so clearly ties a perpetrator to a criminal

bombing that additional evidence would not

enhance the case for the prosecution. A limited amount of data on the use of the dateshift code indicates that taggants may forge an

important I ink in the chain of evidence against

a criminal bomber, resulting in a higher rate of
Ch. V/— Tagganf Utility Review ● 163

convictions than would be possible without

that link. For undetonated bombs the dateshift code provides the same information as

identification taggants would provide for the

postdetonation case. No total review of the

cases involving explosives recovered from malfunctioning bombs has been conducted. However, a limited set of 55 cases was examined by

BATF. In that sample, six cases were forwarded

for prosecution (10.9 percent). That is twice the

percent forwarded in cases that did not include date-shift code data. SimiIar results were

obtained by MSA during a review of BATF

data. Of the 10 bombing attempts they reviewed, the date-shift code proved useful in 4 0

percent of the cases, was not useful in 50 percent of the cases, and was of questionable

utiIity in 10 percent. WhiIe the results were

positive in both cases, the extremely small

sample size makes it impossible to draw significant conclusions. The Institute of Makers of

Explosives (I ME) has informed OTA that testimony from manufacturers to establish the

source of explosives with a given date-shift

code is occasionally requested in criminal

prosecutions, but that such requests are very

infrequent. I ME estimates that less than 1 percent of al I traces lead to a prosecution.

As one specific example, the prosecution in

the McFill in case believes that taggants were a

key piece of evidence in that case, and that the

taggant evidence was valuable in court.

Taggant Utility by Type of Perpetrator

Taggants may well be more effective in contributing to the direct arrest and conviction of

certain types of criminal bombers than of

others, due to the varying ability of different

types of perpetrators to develop effective

countermeasure responses to taggant programs, as well as to the nature of the bombings

and targets. These countermeasures and their

effects in limiting taggant utility are discussed

in detail in the next section.

Vandals are not likely to be greatly affected,

as their bombings generally cause little damage, and would not normally initiate the field,

laboratory, and investigative procedures necessary to utilize the information available

from identification taggants. On the other

hand, bombings by professional criminals

often involve homicide and bombings by terrorists generate considerable public attention,

both of which are Iikely to initiate extensive investigations. To the extent that the more sophisticated of these groups make use of countermeasures, an operational taggant program

may not add much to the Iikelihood of their arrest and conviction. Psychopaths are likely to

engage in bombings that initiate a thorough investigation, may well attack targets protected

by detection sensors, and are unlikely to have

the resources to generate effective countermeasures. Taggants should be particularly effective in their control.

The law enforcement respondents to the

questionnaire indicated a differing utility for

taggants against the various bomber categories. As an example, almost 60 percent estimated that identification taggants would result in a significantly higher arrest rate for revenge bombings, and over 40 percent estimated significantly higher arrests for crime-ofpassion bombings by psychopaths, while less

than 25 percent estimated a significantly

higher arrest rate for bombings by terrorists

and organized crime. A significantly higher

rate means an increase in the arrest rate by

more than 25 percent. Similar estimates were

made for the use of detection taggants.

Utility of Taggants to Update

the Taggant Program

BATF plans to implement the taggant program only for those explosive materials that

have been identified as being used extensively

by criminal bombers. If analysis of bombing

debris shows that tagged explosives are not

used in a large number of cases, then the BATF

plan would need modification. Similarly, if

some explosives that are tagged are not identified as being used in bombings, then those explosive materials should be considered as candidates for exclusion from the program.
164 ● Taggants in Explosives

Nonbomber Control Utility of Taggants

The Bureau of Mines is very interested in the

use of identification taggants to determine the

types of explosives used when an accident occurs in a mine. Some mine operators are suspected of using nonpermissible explosives in

underground coal mines. Permissible explosives have been specifically tested for low

flame emission and certified for use in underground coal mines— other explosives may not

be used. If nonpermissibles are identified as

POSSIBLE BOMBER

IN RESPONSE TO A

The above discussion assumes that criminal

bombers do not respond to the introduction of

a taggant program. There are a number of

countermeasures the bomber can take, however, which may decrease the utility of a taggant program. Only a limited subset of bombers would respond to the taggant program, and

those criminal bombers who seek to evade the

effects of a taggant program are likely to encounter additional risks or require substantial

training and technical knowledge.

Among the possible responses of a criminal

bomber to an identification taggant program

are:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

removal of the taggant,

fabrication of homemade explosives,

switch to incendiary devices,

use of blasting agents, if they are not

tagged,

theft of explosives,

black-market purchase of explosives,

use of explosives manufactured before

the taggant program is implemented, and

resorting to another type of unlawful activity, such as assassination or kidnapping.

In addition to the above responses, the effectiveness of detection taggants can be defeated by providing a seal between the explosives and the detection taggant sensors. It is

also possible that the detection taggant senbeing used illegally, the appropriate action can

be taken.

Similarly, taggants could be used to identify

the cause of an explosion. If an explosion were

to occur at a natural gas plant, for instance,

then it might be difficult to determine if the explosion were an accident or caused by a bomb.

The resolution of cause is important both to

law enforcement personnel and to the insurance industry. A similar resolution of cause

could be of interest in investigating possible insurance fraud cases.

COUNTERMEASURES

TAGGANT PROGRAM

sors could be purposel y triggered, or

“spooked,” by placing detection taggant materials, or chemicals which the detection taggant

sensor could not distinguish from detection

taggants, in or on nonexplosive material.

The appropriateness and effectiveness of

the various responses, in terms of possible

limitation to the utility of a taggant program,

are a function of the resources, motivation,

and aim of the various types of criminal bombers. Table 70 briefly summarizes the likely

response countermeasures of each type of

bombers, and how effective those responses

are Iikely to be. Effectiveness in this sense includes both the likelihood of successfully accomplishing the response and the appropriateness of the action in fulfilling the primary aim

of the criminal bomber. It is interesting to note

that approximately half of the law enforcement respondents to the questionnaire estimated that the less sophisticated bombers

would initiate no response to an identification

taggant program, while almost 40 percent felt

that even the most sophisticated bombers

would not initiate response countermeasures.

Each of the response countermeasures is briefly discussed below.

The baseline 3M identification taggants contain both a magnetic layer and a fluorescent

layer to aid in recovery after a detonation. The

taggants could therefore be removed from
Ch. V—Taggant Utility Review “ 165

Table 70.–Possible Perpetrator Response Counter mesuresasuros to Taggant Program

Criminal Terrorist Mentally disturbed Other

Unsophis- Sophis- Disen -

Countermeasures ticated ticated Political Separatist Reactionary chanted Vengeful Pathological Vandals Experimenters

Taggant remova l

Fabrication of explosives.

Incendiary devices .

Use of blasting agents if

untagged. . . .

Theft, commercia l

Theft, military . . . . . .

Illegal sources. . . .

Use of exploswes

manufactured before

implementation of tagging

Vapor seals. . . . .

Other tactics ., . . . .

— a M b

H

—

M

H

L

H

M

L

L-M

M

M

—

L

M

—

L

M

L

L-M

—

—

—

—

L-M

—

L

M

L-M

L-M

L-M

L

M-H

L

H

L M

M

H

H

—

H

H

M-H

L

H

M

M-H

L

H

M

L-M

L

—

L

L-M

L

L-M

L

—

L

M

L

L

— —

— —

H

L-M

L-M

M

L-M

H

L

—

H

L — —

L

H

— —

L

M

— — —

— — —

a

Unlikely to be attempted

b Letters indicate possibility of succes in the attempted countermeasure L = lOW, Medium medium, H = high

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

powdery explosives by using a magnet; the

process would be both easy and safe, and

would require less than an hour for a typical

bomb. In order to hinder this countermeasure,

taggants have been manufactured without a

magnetic layer. If a powdery explosive were

tagged with a mixture of magnetic and non -

magnetic taggants, then the use of a magnet

would enable a criminal to remove only a portion of the taggants; the remainder would be

present after an explosion, although they

would be somewhat more cliff icult to recover

than the baseline taggant. If the criminal were

deterred from attempting magnetic removal

by the knowledge that about half the taggants

were nonmagnetic, then postdetonatio n

recovery would be only marginally more dif -

ficult than the baseline case.

Another possible technique for removing

taggants from an explosive is to use a black

light to identify the taggants by their fluorescence, and then remove them with a tweezer.

This process is safe, but more difficult than

magnetic separation, and would probably require many hours of painstaking effort for a

typical bomb. Unlike magnetic separation, it

could be used to remove taggants from explosives that are tacky rather than powdery. It has

been proposed that the encapsulation of the

taggants be made opaque, and matched to the

color of the explosive, in order to render such

removal impossible. Since the encapsulant

would be melted by the heat of a detonation,

postdetonation recovery would not be affected. Although it should not be difficult to

develop an opaque encapsulant, this has not

yet been done. Opaque encapsulation would

make quality control, both of manufacturing

taggants and of mixing them with explosives,

more difficult, and its cost impact has not

been evaluated.

The explosives could be acetone dissolved,

the taggants and other solid materials removed

by filtering, and the explosive reconstituted,

but that complex operation would be within

the capabilities of only the professional terrorists and criminals and would be roughly equivalent in danger and difficulty to fabrication of

explosives from raw materials. It was the near

unanimous opinion of law enforcement personnel that criminal bombers would not attempt this complex removal/reconstitution

process. Reconstituted explosives would also

be less reliable (less likely to detonate) than

the original explosives. If detonators were

tagged, some taggants would still be present

after the detonation of bombs using reconstituted or homemade explosives, unless the even

more difficult task of fabricating detonators

was attempted.

Removing taggants from some gunpowders

is considerably simpler than removal from explosives. Many gunpowder grains are consider-
166 . Taggants in Explosives

ably larger than the identification taggants, as

shown in figure 26. Separation may therefore

be accomplished simply by screening, al -

though the manufacturing process may pre -

clude that approach in some cases. Alternatively, it may be possible to agglomerate the

taggants into clumps whose size roughly

matches the specific grain size. However, the

cost impact of such a solution was not addressed during this study.

The detection taggant vapors are microencapsulated into extremely small spheres,

which form powder with fineness approaching

that of talcum powder. Removal of these taggants from tacky or powdery explosives is

clearly impractical and most likely impossible.

There is some evidence that the taggant grains

tend to adhere to gunpowder grains. The tenacity of adhesion (response to attempts to

dislodge the taggants) has not been tested. It is

probable, however, that the extremely small

taggant powder cannot be simply separated by

physical means; similar materials, such as

graphite, do not respond. Attempts to “wash”

the grains off with a solvent are likely to affect

the properties of the smokeless powder.

The only viable removal technique, therefore, appears to be removal of individual identification taggants from gunpowders. As was

shown in table 70, the more sophisticated criminals and terrorists could accomplish the removal with moderate to high success, while

the less sophisticated terrorists and experimenters would have a somewhat lower success

rate. One result of the greater practicability of

removing taggants from gun powders may be to

produce a shift in explosive materials used in

criminal bombs by sophisticated bombers

from high explosives to gunpowders. As gunpowder are significantly less energetic than

cap-sensitive high explosives, such a shift

could result in a significant loss of efficiency

for the bombers.

In summary, taggant removal would tend to

somewhat decrease the effectiveness of a taggant program in the control of the most sophisticated bombers, attacking targets not protected by a detection sensor, but at some loss

in efficiency by the criminal bomber. It is

Figure 26.—Size Comparison of

the 3M identification Taggant and

Some Smokeiess Powders

*

i’mtinuto .
Ch. V/— Taggant U Review ● 1 6 7

possible to make identification taggant clumps

which simulate the grain size of the larger

powder grains, thus making taggant removal

an ineffective countermeasure, but the cost of

doing so has not been calculated. AternativeIy, taggants could be incorporated in the grain

of some, but not all powders.

Fabrication of Homemade Explosives

As noted in table 70, only the most sophisticated bombers would have a significant success in fabricating explosives. Even to these

criminal bombers, the fabrication of homemade explosives would involve a somewhat

higher danger of premature detonation than

with commercial explosives. It is true that a

number of “cookbooks” are available that describe methods of making explosives from uncontrolled materials, but many of these texts

list the ingredients without describing a safe

and effective fabrication process, or contain

errors that could result in a high accident rate

or unreliable detonation. The present incidence of premature detonations with commercial explosives, while fabricating and placing

bombs, is high, accounting for almost 25 percent of all deaths and 15 percent of injuries

from bombings. If homemade explosives are

used, the number of deaths and injuries to perpetrators of bombings may climb substantially—acting as an effective bomber control

mechanism.

Fabrication of detonators is a much more

complex and dangerous activity than fabrication of explosive materials, and could probably be accomplished only in a well-equipped

central facility. The widespread use of homemade detonators would, therefore, require the

development of a central illegal manufacturing and distribution network, implying a degree of cooperation among perpetrator groups

that does not currently exist.

It was the opinion of law enforcement officials contacted that the establishment of a taggant program would tend to drive the more sophisticated criminal bombers toward the use

of homemade explosives. The example provided by criminal bombers in Europe, particularly Britain and West Germany, is illustrative.

Approximately 85 percent of criminal bombings in West Germany and a majority of the

bombings in Britain and Ireland use homemade fillers. As the bombing statistics include

both explosive and incendiary devices, the percentage of explosive bombs using homemade

explosives may be somewhat less, but may still

constitute a majority in all three countries. It is

interesting to note that most bombs, including

those with homemade explosives, use commercial detonators.

I n summary, the more sophisticated criminal

bombers would tend to use homemade explosives more frequently in response to the introduction of a tagging program. Such use would

tend to have some detrimental effect on the

utility of a taggant program although the effect would be limited by the increased risk of

premature detonation, and the reduced reliability and effectiveness of bombs fabricated

from homemade explosives. Commercial detonators would still be needed, further limiting

the effectiveness of this response countermeasure, as would the elimination of some

types of targets. The main threat is that over a

period of time, the criminal bombers might

become increasingly sophisticated in the fabrication of explosives and even of detonators,

and that a degree of cooperation and coordination could develop between the various

terrorist and professional criminal groups. The

British indicated that they face just that problem —the coordinated IRA improves its tactics

and ability to fabricate explosives almost in

step with the development of law enforcement

control mechanisms.

Use of Incendiary Bombs

A substantial number of current bombing incidents use incendiary materials for bomb

filler. Tagging of incendiary materials is not

practicable, so legislation of a taggant program may cause a shift toward the greater use

of incendiaries in place of explosives. However, incendiary bombs cannot be relied on to

cause catastrophic damage or casualties, and

are therefore an appropriate filler only for
168 ● Taggants in Explosives

some types of perpetrators and against some

types of targets. It may also be harder to fabricate a reliable delay fuze for incendiary

bombs.

Use of Blasting Agents

BATF has indicated that it does not

directly tag blasting agents such as

pIan to

ANFO .

There are several reasons for their position, In

the first place, very few criminal bombings are

currently committed using blasting agents as

the explosive filler. In addition, tagging the

blasting caps, boosters, and detonating cord

generally used to initiate the blasting agents

would stilI ensure that taggants were present at

blasting-agent bombings, unless homemade

detonators and boosters were used. Finally, as

blasting agents represent over 80 percent of

the commercial explosives currently used in

the United States, directly tagging the biasting

agents would have a very large cost impact.

Some shift to the use of blasting agents might

therefore occur if a taggant program were implemented. However, there are a few drawbacks to the use of blasting agents. As detailed

in appendix E, the blasting agents are not normalIy cap sensitive and wou Id therefore require a booster of some sort. Commercial

boosters, very large detonators, at least one

type of rocket motor used by hobbyists, or

several large cherry bombs used together

would be sufficient boosters. The fabrication

of a bomb using a blasting agent would therefore require the acquisition and assembly of

more components than would a bomb using

cap-sensitive explosives or gunpowders. The

assembly process would not prove a large obstacle to the more sophisticated bombers, but

might well prove one to the other types of

bombers. Similarly, the increased risk associated with blasting-agent bombs would depend on the knowledge and patience of the

bomber.

Blasting-agent bombs would be useful

against targets where the blast was the primary

damage mechanism, but somewhat less useful

than cap-sensitive explosives against targets in

which fragment damage was the primary

threat. More blast and better fragmentation

would be expected from blasting-agent pipe

bombs than from gunpowder pipe bombs, but

the assembly process would be more complex.

Blasting agents have a density of approximately one-half that of cap-sensitive explosives; approximately twice the volume would

therefore be needed, a possible limitation in

some circumstances.

Theft of Explosives

Explosives can be stolen, either from the

military or from sources of commercial explosives. Some of the explosives used in criminal

bombings are currently stolen and more may

well be stolen if a taggant program is initiated.

Theft of explosives would mean that the perpetrator would be required to commit a collateral crime, increasing the chance for error, the

number of leads generated, and the ultimate

chance of capture. As detailed previously, the

use of taggants should contribute significantly

to the rate of solution of explosive thefts, increasing the chance of capture above the current rate.

In addition, protection of explosives from

theft could be improved, and may well have to

be, to prevent a wholesale shift to theft as a

source of explosive material if a taggant program is instituted. Security procedures for explosives storage, transportation, and use are

primarily geared to prevent casual or surreptitious theft. Storage magazines have double

locks and other features which would require

some limited amounts of time and skill to defeat. Inventory controls currently would uncover thefts of large amounts of explosives

(case lots). Transportation regulations are primarily to protect the people Iiving along the

travel route from accidental detonation. All of

these could be altered to decrease the probability of explosive theft. Magazines could be

made quite difficult to enter, all explosive

material could be required to be stored overnight in a secure magazine (some construction

sites use quite flimsy magazines, some manufacturers store sublet amounts of detonators in

the assembly building overnight), and transportation of explosives could require armed
Ch. Taggant Utility Review ● 1 6 9

guards. Tighter inventory controls, including

accountability for each stick of explosive at

the blaster level, could also be required. All of

these controls, however, have cost impact; it

would require investigation to determine

whether their cost would be justified by their

marginal utility in the face of the current, and

predicted, bomber threat. Possible costs for increased security of explosives were not included in the OTA study. As noted above, a

benefit of identification taggants is that they

would help to pinpoint the places from which

explosives used in crimes are stolen, and thus

serve as a guide to where security most needs

to be tightened.

As noted earlier, military explosives are

more securely guarded than commercial explosives, so criminal bombers may be expected to

more frequently attempt to steal commercial

explosives. As noted in table 70, the more sophisticated bombers are likely to have moderate to high success in stealing commercial explosives (although at increased risk) while the

less sophisticated bombers can expect low to

moderate success. No group would be expected to have significant success in stealing

military explosives, an indication of the success Iikely for theft of commercial explosives if

increased explosive security measures are implemented.

Illegal Sources

Explosives could be purchased on the black

market or illegally imported from abroad. Both

courses of action subject the bomber to increased risk of capture, from informants or undercover agents in the former case and as a result of smuggling, in the latter. Only terrorists

or professional criminals with substantial resources and the ability to plan in advance are

likely to be able to import explosives from

abroad, or likely to make the proper blackmarket connections.

The term black market, in this context, does

not refer to a sophisticated nationwide network but to a local array of entrepreneurs who

deal in an illicit product for profit. This

criminal element exists in nearly every major

American city, and when asked could provide

stolen commercial explosives or explosive materials as quickly as they could provide stolen

drugs, jewelry, or television sets. A taggant program, it is believed by analysts and law enforcement experts, would increase the demand

for stolen explosives, thus increasing the local

market. However, experts of the two major

metropolitan police agencies and two Federal

law enforcement organizations with whom detailed discussions on this subject were held

agree that initial increases in the black-market

demand would be low, as the sophisticated

bombers are more likely to turn to one of the

other countermeasures as a source of explosives. Moreover, taggants could help in tracing

any black marketeer who dealt in stolen, but

tagged, explosives.

Use of Explosives

Before a Taggant

Manufactured

Requirement

One further countermeasure is possible, at

least initially— the use of explosives manufactured prior to implementation of a taggant program. This response requires planning well

ahead and storage of the explosives for a period of time. Storage would increase the risk of

accidental detonation (particularly if the explosives had to be moved several times) and of

the explosives being found. In addition, most

commercial explosives have a limited useful

lifetime. Gels, slurries, and emulsions have a

limited useful life on the order of 6 months,

while dynamites have a Iifetime of a few years

[more for the lower power dynamites). Gunpowder, boosters, detonators, and detonating

cord have a useful life of tens of years.

Detection Taggant Seal

Detection taggants emit a vapor; their efficacy depends on its being able to permeate the

container in which they are placed and be detected in the free air stream. It is possible to

create a seal around the explosives, thus defeating the detection taggant system, but the

construction of such a seal is difficult, cannot

be accomplished without specific technical

knowledge and equipment, and cannot be ac-
170 ● Taggants in Explosives

complished without the time and resources to

construct such a seal. Ordinary sealing mechanisms, such as placing the explosive in a paint

can, using baggies, home sealing units, or using

activated charcoal apparently will not work,

even if several are used in conjunction, as the

taggants were specifically chosen for their

ability to penetrate the microencapsulated

membrane and the sensors are able to detect

taggants at a parts-per-trillion concentration

level. It should be noted, however, that tests

under field conditions to confirm these laboratory results have not yet been conducted.

Only the more sophisticated of the criminal

bombers are even likely to attempt to achieve

vapor seals, and they stand only a low to moderate chance of succeeding. One of the problems faced in trying to construct a seal is the

lack of feedback – without a taggant vapor detector, or other sophisticated laboratory instrument, the bomber will not be able to tell if his

seal is sufficient.

“Spooking” of Detection

Taggant Sensors

Detection taggant sensors could be purposely triggered or “spooked” by placing detection

taggants, or other materials so similar chemically to the detection taggant that the sensor

could not make the distinction, in nonexplosive materials. If several suitcases or packages

within a short period of time triggered the detection taggant sensor for no apparent reason,

those operating the sensor might well conclude that it was malfunctioning, and disconnect it. Large amounts of taggant material

might also be used to “saturate,” and at Ieast

temporarily disable, the sensor. It would then

be possible to introduce tagged explosives into

the protected area. This countermeasure

would require that the bomber obtain a supply

of the detection taggant material; access to

detection taggants can and should be made

cliff icult.

Shift to Other Unlawful Activity

Finally, bombers can turn to other crimes,

such as murder, assassination, or kidnapping.

These crimes, however, are often not as spectacular as bombings and all involve a higher

risk to the perpetrators than do bombings. In

addition, a direct action against a visible target

requires more motivation and a different temperment than does an indirect crime such as a

bombing. The switch to other tactics is an appropriate response only for a subset of criminal bombers; only some of the types of bombers who would attempt to switch tactics in response to a taggant program wouId be successful. The small-scale criminal, the experimenter,

and the disenchanted would be unlikely to

turn to the other crimes. Some of the mentally

disturbed would, with low to moderate success. The professional criminal can be considered a craftsman at his trade; he may not be

able, either physically or emotionally, to adjust to other methods of attaining his ends. Terrorists are the most Iikely to switch tactics,

based on foreign experience, and would probably be moderately to highly

though at greatly increased risk.

Summary

successful, alThere are a variety of response countermeasures which the criminal bomber can attempt in an attempt to decrease the utility of

the identification and detection taggants programs, The amount of success expected for

each response varies with the skill, resources,

and aim of the different types of criminal

bombers. Most of the countermeasure responses carry with them an increased risk of

capture, increased probability of an unreliable

or premature detonation, or decreased effectiveness of the explosive. The effect of the

added risk should not be underestimated —

bombing is an attractive crime because of the

low risks currently associated with it. if those

risks escalate, then the attractiveness decreases, probably resulting in significantly reduced numbers of bombings and significantly

reduced severity of the bombings. Domestic

and foreign law enforcement officials were

emphatic in their opinions that increasing

bomber risk was a realistic and important control mechanism.
Ch. V—Taggant Utility Review “ 171

In a similar vein, the importance of reducing

the effectiveness of bombs should not be overlooked. Taggants have their optimum effectiveness in the protection of high-value targets

and the investigation of significant bombings.

It is in just those types of situations that reducing the effectiveness of bombs will have the

most payoff.

Nevertheless effective countermeasures are

possible. Bombers with sufficient skill and

training can completely overcome the effects

of a taggant program if they have adequate

time and resources. The greater the sophistication of the bomber, the smaller the risks and

the smaller the loss of effectiveness resulting

from countermeasures.

However, it should be recognized that while

the countermeasure responses are entirely possible, it is by no means certain that significant

numbers of bombers wilI actualIy use them.

OTA consulted numerous explosives experts, all of whom agreed that countermeasures such as those described were possible, at

least for some of the types of criminal bombers. However, the law enforcement experts and

experts on terrorism which OTA consulted also

unanimously agreed that most criminal bombers, including terrorists, would fail to make use

of the countermeasures. This assessment appears to be based on an assessment of the type

of personality that is generally involved in

bombings, as well as the general level of skill

of the bombers. An instructive analogy is aircraft hijacking. It is possible to smuggle a

weapon on an aircraft by a number of means,

but, in fact, since the antihijacking program

started there have been thousands of weapons

found annually by the screening process, hundreds of weapons found abandoned near the

controlled boarding gates, but essentially no

cases of aircraft hijacked with the use of smuggled weapons.

FOREIGN EXPERIENCE IN CONTROL OF BOMBERS

Discussions were held with British, West

German, and Irish law enforcement officials in

an attempt to gain insight into the methods

used to combat and control criminal bombings

in those countries. The bombing problem i n

those countries, and most of the rest of Europe, is considerably different than the domestic problem; it is appropriate that the control

methods also differ.

Essentially all bombings committed in the

three countries are carried out by terrorists; in

Britain and Ireland the bombings are almost

entirely by one group of separatist terrorists —

the IRA.

Commercial explosives are rigidly controlled

in all three countries. In West Germany this

control is primarily administrative— permits

are needed for the transportation, storage, and

use of explosives. I n addition, a much more intensive surveillance of suspected criminals is

practiced, together with a very intensive intelligence operation and a relatively strict

border inspection procedure. As a result,

almost all explosives used in bombings are

homemade (85 percent), although some military and commercial explosives are used. The

military explosives are stolen from military

bases or recovered from maneuver areas, while

the commercial explosives and detonators appear to come primarily from Eastern Europe.

In Ireland and Britain the controls are more

direct. Commercial explosives are stored,

transported, and maintained by the army or

police, who personally supervise the detonators and check to ensure that no undetonated

explosive remains in the area. The army or police accountability for the explosives extends

to the individual detonators and sticks of explosive. As a result, almost all criminal bombings use homemade explosives.

The number of bombing incidents per year

in West Germany is about one-fourth of the

number of domestic bombings reported to the

FBI or BATF data banks, which results in about

the same bombing rate on a population basis,

but a far higher rate per unit area, since West
172 ● Taggants in Explosives

Germany is about the size of Oregon. This geographic concentration, the single class of

bombers, the almost universal use of homemade explosives and an effective centralized

criminal control authority have allowed the

West Germans to develop field and laboratory

investigative techniques that apparently result

in higher arrest and conviction rates than is the

case in the United States.

The number of bombings in the Republic of

Ireland is quite low; no data was available concerning numbers of bombings in Britain or arrest and conviction rates in either country.

The British use a tagging system that apparently consists of different colored threads interspersed in the explosive The threads do not

survive the detonation, but the system cannot

be defeated by simply discarding the cartridge,

as can the current U.S. date-shift code. The

West Germans use a system similar to the dateshift code, while the Irish dye their explosives

(from the single plant) to indicate a destination.

The experience of these three countries offers some insight into the problem of control

of domestic bombers and to potential bomber

countermeasures.

As a result of law enforcement efforts to

control the source of commercial explosives

and to institute other efforts to combat bombers, there are essentially no bombers other

than terrorists in any of the three countries.

Given the different conditions in the United

States, it is improbable that all other bombers

would be eliminated, but their relative numbers could be expected to decline dramatically, if a taggant progam were implemented.

As a result of the control of commercial explosives, bombers in the three countries rely

largely on homemade explosives. As noted earlier, this countermeasure is likely to be seen in

the United States, as well, if a taggant program

is initiated. The result of this shift in explosives

will eliminate some bombers, make some targets difficult to attack, due to decreased effectiveness of the explosives, and significantly increase the risk of an accident to the perpetrator.

Finally, a possible long-term effect of the

taggant program, as is the case in Europe due

to explosive controls, may be the development

of a highly skilled group of bombers, as well as

more coordination and cooperation between

bomber groups.
APPENDIXES

A—Letter of Request

B—Detection and Identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings—

Summary and Questionnaire

C—OTA Recovery Tests

D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of

Taggants in Explosives

E—Suitability of ANFO as a Filler for Criminal Bombs

F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables

G—Glossary
APPENDIX A–LETTER OF REQUEST

ABAHAM RIBICOFF, CONN., CHAIRMAN

JOHN GLEN, OHIO

JIM SASSER, TENN.

DAVID H. PRYOR, ARK.

CARL LEVIN MlCH.

CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.

JOHN C . 

WILLIAM S. COHEN MAINE

DANFoRTH, MO. UNITED STATES SENATE

DAVID DURENBERGER, MlNN. COMMITTEE ON

RICHARD A. WEGMAN GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 7, 1979

The Honorable Morris K. Udall

Chairman

Technology Assessment Board

Office of Technology Assessment

U. S. Congress

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear MO :

As YOU KNOW , the Committee on Governmental Affairs is

presently considering S. 333, the Omnibus Antiterrorism Act

of 1979. Section 303 of the legislation would mandate the

use of identification and detecTion taggants in explosive

materials.

During the course of our consideration of the bill,

several issues have been raised pertaining to the viability

and cost of the tagging program.- While there has been a

great amount of technical reserach in this field, we believe

it would be useful to have an independent review and evaluation of the available data concerning the use of explosive

taggants.

Specifically, we request that the Office of Technology

Assessment review this data, and address the following issues:

● the safety of the use of taggants in production,

storage, and handling of explosive materials;

● the effectiveness of the tagging program in deterring crime and aiding in criminal investigation

and prosecution;

175
— —

176 ● Taggants in Explosives

The Honorable Morris K. Udall May 7, 1979

Page Two

●

8

●

the regulatory impact of requiring the use of explosives taggants (including record-keeping, cost

to the explosives industry, and cost to the consumer) ;

the potential effects of a partial application

of tagging requirements (such as excluding black

and smokeless powders and including all other explosive materials, excluding military, and materials for homemade bombs and common nitrate) ;

the issues relating to the survivability of

taggants, including effects of detonation,

retrieval, and possible removal before detonation; and

possible alternatives to tagging explosives

and initiators.

Because of the Committee’s tight schedule and the desire

to enact comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation promptly,

we would appreciate receiving a report from OTA not later than

August 6, 1979.

Many thanks for your

—

cooperation

Abe Ribicoff

Sincerely,

b ’

Jacob Javits

and assistance.
APPENDIX B—DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION

TAGGANTS AND CRIMINAL BOMBINGS—

SUMMARY AND QUESTIONNAIRE

This paper is a short statistical summary of an

empirical survey conducted by OTA for the evaluation of taggant effectiveness,

Using a listing of the International Association of

Chiefs of Police, a systematic sample of 980 names

was selected (from a total of 10,800 names on the

list). Each of the subjects sampled–assumed to be

both knowledgeable and interested in the problem

of bombings — received a mail questionnaire covering five related areas of inquiry (see attachment).

The questions probed issues such as the profile of

the criminal bomber, the estimated effects of the

taggants program on deterrence, detection, and

conviction, and preferred location and types of

detection taggants sensors.

Of the 980 questionnaires mailed out, only 1 1 4

have been returned in time for this analysis, a return rate of less than 12 percent. No assumption

can be made that these 12 percent of the respondents are a random and unbiased subsample of the

980 subjects in the original sample, and most likely

they represent the people most highly involved in,

and motivated to deal with, criminal bombings. In

that sense, the findings of this analysis must be

viewed as tentative. However, these 114 questionnaires serve as a valuable instrument to bring to

light some of the experiences, attitudes, and assessments of people who deal, often on a rather frequent basis, with criminal bombings. A further

source of error may have been introduced by an

error in the explanatory material accompanying the

questionnaire. That material indicated that the taggant trace would identify the last legal purchaser,

rather than indicating that the trace would provide

a list of the last legal purchasers. Following is an

overview of their responses.

Background of Subjects

Over half (51 percent) of the subjects worked in

an urban area, with an additional 37 percent in suburban areas. The majority (41 percent) came from

relatively small cities (population up to 25,000),

with only 20 percent from metropolitan areas with

a population of 500,000 and more. Due to a lack of

significant differences between the subjects by

place of work; and due to the relatively small

number of respondents, the data will not be analyzed by the type of area and its population size.

Bomber Profiles

As estimated by the sample, a wide variety of

criminal bomber types, rather than one specific

type, is responsible for the total number of bombings in their jurisdictions (table B-1). Eighty-four

percent of the sample thought that each type of

bomber is encountered infrequently (accounting

for only up to 25 percent of the bombings). Domestic terrorists, organized crime figures, and people

motivated by revenge were mentioned as somewhat more frequent types (between 25 to 75 percent of the cases) and, most noticeably, revenge

was seen more than any other motive as a very frequent (over 75 percent) motivation for bombings.

Similarly, the consensus of the sample was that

there is a fairly evenly distributed use of the various types of explosives (table B-2). While ANFO,

plastic explosives, and cast or pressed military explosives were thought to be infrequent, there was

less agreement about the other types. Commercial

explosives, smokeless and black powders, and to a

lesser degree, homemade explosives were mentioned by the subjects as frequently, and even very

frequently, used in bombings in their areas.

A potentially important question refers to the

various bomber types and their preferences for

types of explosives (table B-3).

While again, in general, the various bombers will

use all the available explosives, when looking only

at the “frequent” and “very frequent” use of

those explosives, an interesting preference-profile

emerges: al I offenders show a preference for commercial explosives, and black and smokeless powder, but their highest use is by offenders acting out

of revenge. Terrorists and organized crime use

commercial explosives more often, while people

committing crimes of passion or revenge opt more

frequently for the powders.

An issue of some importance is the target of the

bombing. As indicated by the sample (table B-4),

bombers attack a variety of targets; however, there

are some patterns in the attacks. Government and

law enforcement facilities, transportation facilities,

and residences are mostly infrequent targets, while

commercial and industrial facilities, people and

vehicles, and schools are very frequent targets.

Some patterns emerge when looking at the target-preference of the various bomber types (table

B-5). Combining the “frequent” and “very fre177
178 ● Taggants in Explosives

Tablo B-1 .–Typo of Criminal Bomber’ (percent)

Bomber type

Revenge,

disgruntled

employee,

International Domestic Organized Crimes of malicious

terrorists terrorists crime Psychopaths passion mischief Others Total

Infrequent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98. % 83. 86. 93. 96. 58. 90. (321) 84.

Frequent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . O 7. 11. 5. 2. 10. 5. (23) 6.

Very frequent . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. 10. 3. 2. 2. 32. 5. (37) 10.

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . (56) (58) (56) (59) (54) (78) (20) 381

14,7 15,2 14.7 15.5 14.2 20.5 5,2

a

Based on pt 11, Q 1

Infrequent = betweenO1025 percent Frequent = 25 to 75 percent Very frequent = 75 to 100 percent

Table B-2,–Typo of Explosive Used’ (percent)

Explosive type

ANFO and Cast

other non-cap- or pressed

sensitive Plastic military Smokeless Black Homemade

Commercial explosives explosives explosives powder powder materials Other Total

Infrequent . . . 59. % 96. 97. 93. 68. 62. 83. 95. (446) 799

Frequent . . . . 21. 4. 3. 6. 21. 19. 12. 0. (65) 11.7

Very frequent. 20. 0. 0. 1. 11. 19. 5. 5. (47) 8.4

Total. . . . (81) (68) (68) (71 ) (73) (81) (75) (41) 558

14.5 12.2 12.2 12.7 13.1 14.5 13.4 7.4

a

Based on pt 11, Q 2

Infrequent = between O to 25 percent Frequent = 25 to 75 percent Very frequent = 75 to 100 percent

Table B-3.–Most Frequently Used Typos of Explosives by Type of Bomber~ (percent)

Bomber type

Terrorists Organized crime Psychopaths Crimes of passion Revenge, etc. Total

Commercial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15. % 32. 18. 24. 33. (281) 33.

ANFO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. (257) O.

Plastics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. 2. 4. 2. 2. (260) 2.

Military explosives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9. 8. 4. 2. 4. (262) 6.

Black and smokeless powder . . . . . . 13. 11. 17. 29. 48. (278) 37.

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263. 265 260. 258. 292. 1,338

a

Based on pt 11, 0 2Ib

The percentages Indicate for each cell the propoportion of responses estimating a frequent use (over 25 Percent) of the Particular explosive, by the particular type of bomber The numbers m parentheses

refer to the frequency of all responses within the cell

Table B-4.–Typo of Bombing Targets” (percent)

Type of target

Commercial/ Gov’t, law

Vehicles, Transportation industrial enforcement

people Schools Residences facilities facilities facilities Other Total

Infrequent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73. % 77. 83. 96. 68. 91. 93. (401) 82.

Frequent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12. 8. 12. 3. 12. 6. 5. (42) 9.

Very frequent. . . . . . . . . . . 15. 15. 5. 1. 20. 3. 2. (47) 9.

Total. . (78) (83) (75) (69) (75) (68) (42) 490

15.9 16.9 15.3 14. 15.3 13.9 8.6

a

Based on pt 11, II 3

Infrequent = between O to 25 percent Frequent = 25 to 75 percent Very frequent = 75 to 100 percent
Appendix B—Detection and Identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings —Summary and Questionnaire . 179

Table B-5.–Most Frequent Targets, by Typo of Bomber (percent)

Bomber type

Terrorists Organized crime Psychopaths Crimes of passion Revenge, etc. Total

Vehicles, people ... . . . . . . . . . 10, % (51) 22. (51) 4. (47) 27. (56) 28. (58) 20.5 (263)

Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0. (56) o. (53) o. (49) o. (49) 20. (59) 4.5 (266)

Residences, ., . . . . ... . ., 6. (50) 14. (49) 14. (50) 17. (52) 26. (61) 16, (262)

Transportation facilities . . . . . . . . . . 8. (51) 0. (49) 2. (51) o. (50) 6. (51) 2.8 (252)

Commercial/industrial facilities. . . . 22. (51 ) 17. (52) 10. (50) 6. (51) 30. (64) 17.5 (268)

Government, law enforcement

facilities ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15. (47 ) 4. (49) 4. (47) 4. (49) 13. (55) 8. (247)

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0. (33) 0. (32) 0. (33) 0. (31) 15. (41) 3.5 (170)

Total ... . . . . . . . . . . . 339 335 327 338 389 1,728

a

Based on PI II O 3/b

The Percentaaes Indicate for each cell the proportion of responses estimating a frequent use (over 25 percent) of the particular explosive, by the particular type of bomber The numbers in parentheses

refer 10 the frequency of all responses within the cell

quent” categories, the most common targets for

terrorism are commercial and industrial establishments, followed by Government; organized crime

focuses on people and vehicles, and industry and

commerce; psychopaths, as expected, act more

randomly, mainly victimizing residences; crimes of

passion are directed against people and residences;

and revenge bombings are directed against commercial and industrial facilities, and people and

vehicles. It appears that the preferences for targets

follow an underlying assumption about the motivations of the various bomber types.

Thefts of commercial explosives, legal purchase,

and homemade supply seem to be the most frequent sources of explosives; while import and military theft are the least frequent forms (table B-6).

The most frequent source of explosives for terrorists and organized crime is theft. People acting

out of revenge, and psychopaths prefer homemade

explosives; for crimes of passion the offender purchases explosives legally or prepares them at home

(table B-7).

Finally, a question about the tagging program

brought some inconsistent responses; in estimating

the expected frequency of various sources by

bomber after tagging went into effect, the sample

predicted .a large shift toward increased use of

military (untagged) explosives through theft; and of

homemade and imported explosives. However,

they did not predict an appreciable decline in the

theft of commercial (tagged) explosives, or their

legal purchase (table B-8). Comparing tables B-7

and B-8, the sample predicted a clear shift for terrorists toward homemade explosives, and for organized crime and terrorists toward military theft, but

few other discoverable patterns emerged.

To summarize, there seems to be a consensus

about a wide range of motives for criminal bombings, as well as their targets, the explosives used,

and their sources. The profile of the bomber, and

some characteristic patterns of his modus operandi

that emerge are consistent with general predictions

as to the behavior rationality and psychological

motivation of such offenders.

Present Law Enforcement Effectiveness

As estimated by the sample, both the arrest and

the conviction rates for criminal bombings are

lower than those for all other crimes (table B-9).

Estimated Utility of Identification Taggants

When asked about the utility of the program, all

respondents viewed taggants as a useful additional

Table B-6.–Source of Explosives Used (percent)

Theft of Theft of

Legal commercial Blackmarket military

purchase explosives purchase explosives Homemade Importation Total

Infrequent. . . 72. % 57. 83. 89. 68. 98. (309) 76.9

Frequent, . . . . 11. 23. 12. 8. 18. 2. (51) 12.7

Very frequent. . . 17. 20. 5. 3. 14. 0. (42) 10.4

Total .. . (76) (70) (65) (66) (72) (53) (402)

18.9 17,4 16.2 16.4 17,9 13.2

a

Based on PI II O 4

Infrequent = between O to 25 percent Frequent = 25 to 75 percent Very frequent = 7510100 percent
180 . Taggants in Explosives

Table B-7.–Most Frequent Sources of Explosives, by Type of Bomber’ (percemt)

Bomber type

Source of explosives Terrorists Organized crime Psychopaths Crimes of passion Revenge, etc. Total

Theft of commercial explosive. , . . . . 30. % (44) 29. (45) 9. (45) 5. (44) 20. (49) 18.5 (227)

Theft of military explosive. . . . . . . . . 20. (45 ) 9. (44) 5. (44) 2. (43) 6. (49) 8.4 (226)

Legal purchase. . . . . . . . . . . . 7. (45) 18. (45) 11. (44) 16. (45) 32. (56) 17.4 (235)

Black-market purchase . . . . . 9. (43) 19. (47) 2. (43) 5. (40) 11. (47) 9.5 (220)

Homemade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14. (44) 11. (44) 17. (46) 14. (43) 35. (55) 19. (232)

Importation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. (44) 6. (46) o. (44) o. (43) 2. (47) 2.2 (224)

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 272 266 258 303 1,364

a

Basedon pl 11, Q 4/b

The percentages indicate for each cc// the proportion of responses estimating a frequent use (over 25 percent) of the particular explosive, by the particular type of bomber The numbers m parentheses

refer to the frequency of all responses within cell

Table B-8.–Estimated Most Frequent Sources of Explosive by Bomber Type, Following the Institution of Tagging Programs’ (percent)

Bomber type

Sources of explosives Terrorists Organized crime Psychopaths Crimes of passion Revenge, etc. Total

Theft of commercial explosive. . . . . 39. % (41) 41. (54) 22. (51) 17. (48) 30. (54) 29.4 (248)

Theft of military explosive. . . . . . . . 32. (40 ) 37. (38) 20. (49) 14. (50) 19. (52) 23.6 (229)

Legal purchase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14. (42) 10. (50) 25. (55) 25. (53) 20. (60) 19.2 (260)

Black-market purchase . . . . . . . . 27. (41 ) 22. (49) 18. (50) 14. (50) 19. (53) 19.7 (243)

Homemade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39. (41 ) 24. (49) 25. (51) 25. (53) 36. (61) 29.8 (255)

Importation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29. (42 ) 24. (51 ) 8. (48) 2. (50) 6. (51) 13.2 (242)

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 291 304 304 331 1,477

a

Basedon Pt 11, Q 5

The percentages indicate for each cell the proportion of responses estimatiog a frequent use (over 25 percent) of the particular explosive, by the particular type of bomber The numbers m parentheses

refer to the frequency of all responses within the cell

Table B-9.–Estimated Rates of Arrest and Conviction’

Estimated rates of arrest

For criminal bombings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....24.08

For other crimes. ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....38.85

Estimated rates of conviction

For criminal bombings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....39.35

For other crimes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....46.82

a

Based on pt Ill O 1

NOTE BATF considers these estimates unduly optimistic At present some 8 percent of criminal

bombings are forwarded for prosecution

clue in investigation and conviction, though they

estimated it to increase arrest rates most noticeably for offenders acting out of revenge or passion

and having very Iittle effect on the arrest of terrorists (table B-10).

As for the deterrent value of taggants, it was

viewed to be most effective for those acting out of

revenge and least effective, as expected, for psychopaths (table B-1 1).

In response to a tagging program, some countermeasures by the bombers are expected. For example, the sample estimated that if packaged explosives would be tagged, but black and smokeles s

powders would not, an average of 55 percent of the

bombers would shift to using powders.

Table B-l O.–The Estimated Increase in the Arrest Rate for

Criminal Bombers, Due to the Use of Identification Taggants’

Increase in arrest rate

Type of bomber UP to 25% UP 25-75% UP over 75% Total

Terrorists. ., . . . . . . . . . 79. % 15. 6. 53

Organized crime . . . . . . 74. 13. 13. 54

Psychopaths, . . . . . . . . . 60. 19. 21. 53

Crimes of passion . . . . . . 53. 23. 24. 55

Revenge, etc.. ... . . . . 44. 30. 26. 61

Total, ., ... . . . (170) (56) (50) 276

61.6 20.3 18,1

a

Based on pt IV, II 2

Table B-n ,–The Estimated Deterrent Effect of Identification

Taggants on Criminal Bombers’

Magnitude of deterrent effect

Type of bomber Up to 25% Up 25-75% Up over 75Y0 Total

Terrorists. . . . . . . . . . . . 80. % 11. 9. 55

Organized crime . . . . . . . 75. “ 15, 10. 60

Psychopaths. . . . . 79. 16, 5. 58

Crimes of passion . . . . . 70. 19, 11. 56

Revenge, etc. . . . . . . . 54. 27. 19. 63

Total. ., . . (208) (52) (32) 292

71,2 17,8 11.

a

Based on pt IV, (1 4
Appendix B—Detection and identification Taggants and criminal Bombings—summary and Questionnaire . 181

The main consensus of the sample was that professional bombers (terrorists and organized crime)

would be more likely to work on some countermeasure than wou Id the nonprofessional offenders.

The first two types would most Iikely shift to other

kinds of explosives (not tagged) or remove the taggant if it required a reasonable amount of work.

However, psychopaths and people motivated by

passion or revenge were predicted most likely to do

nothing in response to the taggants (table B-1 2). The

most frequent countermeasure overall was shifting

to another type of explosive, and the least frequent

one was the removal of the taggant if it involves 10

hours/lb of explosives.

Estimated Utility of Detection Taggants

Tagging explosives would have, as estimated by

the respondents, a varying deterrent effect, depending on the type of bomber. It would be most

effective for those acting out of revenge or passion,

least effective for psychopaths and terrorists (table

B-1 3).

Taggants were also viewed as being instrumental

in the direct or indirect apprehension of the

bomber. It was estimated to lead most frequently

to apprehension of the nonprofessional offenders,

(i.e., psychopath, crimes of passion, and revenge) as

expected (table B-1 4).

Table B-12.–The Most Frequent Indicated Change in Tactics by Type of Bombers, Due to the Use of Identification Taggants’ (percent)

Bomber type

Change in tactics Terrorists Organized crime Psychopaths Crimes of passion Revenge, etc. Total

Taggant removal (1 hr/tb ) 40. % (47) 35. (43) 18. (44) 11. (44) 17. (46) 245 (224)

Do nothing ... . ., 36, (45 ) 37. (46) 49 (45) 52 (48) 47. (55) 44.3 (239)

Taggant removal (10 hr/lb) ., 23. (43 ) 22 (41) 10. (42) 10, (41 ) 9 (44) 14.7 (21 1)

Shift to other explosive, ., 59. (42 ) 62. (45) 39. (44) 32. (41) 40 (47) 46,6 (219)

Shift to other unlawful activity 19. (42) 22, (40) 15, (40) 20. (39) 34 (47) 22,6 (208)

Total ., ., ... 219 215 215 213 239 1,101

a

Based on pt II O 6

The percentages Indicate for each cc//the proportion Of responses estimating a frequent use (over 25 percent) of the particular explosive, by the particular type of bomber The numbers in parentheses

refer to the frequency of all responses within the cell

Table B-13.–The Estimated Deterrent Effect of Detection

Taggants on Criminal Bombers’

Magnitude of deterrent effect

Type of bomber UP to 25% Up 25-75% Up over 75% Total

Terrorists, . . ... , . . . 85. % 9. 6. 69

Organized crime . . . . . . 72. 18. 10. 58

Psychopaths, ., ., . . . . . 90. 8. 2. 59

Crimes of passion . . . . . . 75. 10. 15. 67

Revenge, etc. . . . . . . . . . 54. 31. 15. 67

Total. ., ., ., ., (240) (49) (31) 320

75. 15.3 9.7

a

Based on pt V, O 1

Table B-14.-The Estimated Increase in the Arrest Rate for

Criminal Bombers, Due to the Use of Detection Taggants~

Increase m arrest rate

Type of bomber UP tO 25% UP 25-75% UP over 75% Total

Terrorists. . . . . . . . . . . . 72. % 21. 7. 60

Organized crime . . . . . 74. 19. 7. 58

Psychopaths. . . . . . . . 60. 16.

Crimes of passion . . . . . 49. ; ; : 24. : ;

Revenge, etc. . . . . . . . . . 41. 32. 27. 75

Total. . . . . ., . (183) (79) (52) 313

58.2 25.2 16.6

a

Based on pt V, O 2

The most effective sensor to deter and apprehend bombers was judged to be the portable one,

requiring no special operator (table B-1 5). The other

three types were viewed as considerably less effective, especially the stationary, special-operated

sensor.

Detection taggants are also expected to prompt

a variety of countermeasures by the potential

bombers (table B-16). The more frequently used

measures, as estimated by the sample, would be

shifting to other explosives (untagged), removing

the taggant or sealing the package, if it is relatively

easily accomplished. Terrorists and people acting

out of revenge showed a clear preference for the

first form; organized crime offenders for the secTable B-15.–The Estimated Deterrent Effect of Detection

Taggants, by Type of Sensors Used

Magnitude of deterrent effect

Type of sensor Up to 25% Up 25-75% Up over 75% Total

Stationary, with skilled

technician. . . . . . . . . . 58.% 22. 20. 59

Portable, with skilled

technician. . . . . . . . . 41. 35. 24, 59

Stationary, no need for

skilled technician. . . . . 50. 28. 22. 60

Portable, no need for

skilled technician, ... 35. 25. 40. 65

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . (Iii) (69) (63) 243

45.7 28.4 25.9

a

Based on pt V O 3
182 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table B-16.–The Most Frequent Indicated Change in Tactics by Type of Bomber, Due to the Use of Detection Taggants~ (percent)

Bomber type

Change in tactics Terrorists Organized crime Psychopaths Crimes of passion Revenge, etc. Total

Taggant removal, special knowledge,

equipment required . . . . . . . . . . . 33. % (45) 33. (42) 17. (35) 18. (34) 17. (43) 24.6 (199)

Taggant removal, with relative ease. . 51. (41 ) 51. (43) 26. (35) 23. (39) 27. (44) 35.9 (206)

Shift to other explosive. . . . . . . . . . . 63. (41 ) 45. (53) 24. (42) 19. (36) 33. (45) 37.8 (217)

Shift to targets less likely to have

sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43. (44 ) 24. (38) 31. (39) 18. (34) 27. (44) 29.1 (199)

Shift to other unlawful activity. . . . . . 20. (40 ) 26. (39) 9. (35) 8. (36) 23. (43) 17.6 (193)

Do nothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27. (37 ) 30. (37) 34. (35) 27. (33) 29. (38) 29.4 (180)

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248 252 225 212 257 1,194

aBasect on @ V, Q 4

The percentages Indicate for each cc// the proportion of responses estimating a frequent use (over 25 percent) of the particular exploswe, by the parlcular type of bomlw The numbers In parentheses

refer to the frequency of all responses wlthln the cell

end. Psychopaths and crimes of passion were

judged to be unaffected.

Finally, the sample was asked to recommend the

four sensor types (based on cost) for the various

target locations (table B-1 7). OveraIl, the most frequently recommended type was the portable and

less expensive sensor (33 percent); and the most frequently mentioned locations to be protected were

nuclear power stations and airports (both 14.8 percent). The only location for which the portable, expensive sensor was more often (31.4 percent) recommended was nuclear power stations. The expensive, nonportable sensor was suggested to any appreciable degree for use only for airports, large

Government buildings, and nuclear powerplants,

while the less expensive portable set was the overwhelming preference for small Government buildings, schools, public stadiums, buses, and police

stations. Apparently, the respondents based their

recommendations on cost factors, coupled with the

frequency and likelihood of attacks and damage in

the various locations.

Summary

Even though the response rate to the mail questionnaire was low, resulting in a small and statistically nonrepresentative sample, some valuable

findings emerged from the study.

In the assessment of the respondents, criminal

bombings are characterized by a heterogeneity of

all the elements involved: a variety of bombers, different kinds of targets, a choice of explosives, and a

wide offering of sources to obtain them. No one

kind of bomber is overwhelmingly responsible for a

majority of the bombings; bombers do not concentrate on one type of target or use one type of explosive. However, within this complex picture,

some patterns are discernible. Certain types of

bombers show a preference for certain targets, explosives, and sources. Depending on their motivations, the various bomber types are also expected

to respond differently to the proposed taggant program. While the sample in general estimated taggants to reduce bombings (by deterrence, appreTable B-17.–Type of Sensor Recommended by Location*

Sensor type

Portable cost Portable cost Non portable Nonportable

Location $15,000 $50,000 cost $15,000 cost $50,000 Total

Airports . . . . . . . . . . . ., ., . . . 29.7% 24.8 25.6 19.8 (121) 14,8

Large Government buildings, 29.5 27.5 18.4 24.5 (98 12.

Small Government buildings 53.8 14.1 24.4 7.7 (78) 9.5

Nuclear power station ... ., ., 25.6 31.4 16.5 26.4 (121) 14,8

Schools , ., ., ., ., ., ., 63.6 12.1

Public stadiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13.6 10.6 (66) 8.

58.2 21.5 16.5 3.8 (79) 9.7

Bus, train depots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.9 11.1 27.8 4.2 (72) 8.8

Large commercial buildings , . . . . . . 42.2 18.3 28.2 11.3 (71) 8.7

Police bomb investigation. . . . . . . . . 57.4 31.5 6.5 4.6 (108) 13.2

None, no ability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25. 0. 75. 0. (4) .5

Total ... . . . . . . . . . . . (360) (186) (160) (112) 818

44. 22.7 19.6 13.7

a

Based on pt V, O 5
Appendix B—Detection and Identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings—Summary and Questionnaire “ 183

hension, conviction, difficulty in obtaining untagged explosives, etc.), there is evidence in their

views that the taggants will be more effective with

certain bomber types than with others. In addition,

the taggants were also predicted to initiate a chain

of countermeasures, with varying degrees of probable success.

In summary, the study points to some new directions in appraising the present scene of criminal

bombings, and evaluating taggant effectiveness.

The majority of the findings, which point to the

hypothesized direction, should increase their validity, and the confidence in their suggestive value,

though the methodological/sampling problems prevent the study from serving as a definitive, verifying answer to the issues researched.

QUESTIONNAIRE

T ECHNOLOGY A SSESSMENT B OAR D Congress of the United States

MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZ.. CHAIRMAN

TED STEVENS. ALASKA. VICE CHAIRMAN O FFICE OF T ECHNOLOGY A SSESSMEN T

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS. GEoRGE E. BROWN, JR., CALIF.

ERNEsT F. HOLLINGS, S.C. JoHN O. DINGELL. M ICH. W ASHINGTON , D.C. 20510

ADIAI E. STEVENSON, ILL. LARRY WINN, JR., KANS.

ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH CLARENCE E. MILLER, OHIO

CHARLES McC. MATHIAS. Jr., MO. JOHN W. WYDLER, N.Y.

JOHN H. GIBSONS

JOHN H. GIBBONS

Dlrector

DANIEL Desimone

DEDEPUTY DIRECTOR

The Congress has before it draft legislation which would

require the addition of detection and identification taggants to

commercial explosives. Detection taggants are material which

would be detected by a suitable sensor to indicate the presence

of explosives. Identification taggants are material which would

survive the explosive detonation and provide informat ion which

would identify the last legal purchaser of the explosives used.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and FireArms Control (BATF) has

been supporting the development of taggants for the past several

years. Testimony before the Congress has displayed a considerable

diversity of opinion as to the utility, cost and safety of a tagg~t

requirement t.

At the present time considerable progress has been made in

identification taggants research. Small plastic chips, consisting

of several pigmented layers, have been developed by 3M which

survive the detonation of most commercial explosives. The sequence

of the pigmented layers provides the code to trace the explosives

type, the manufacturer and time of manufacture. A record keeping

network, by which the manufacturers, distributers, and retail

sellers keep track of the code species would then allow law

enforcement officials to trace the last legal purchaser of the

explosives used in a bomb.
184 ● Taggants in Explosives

Research is less advanced on detection taggants. A number

of approaches are being pursued. The best system so far developed

consists of microencapsulated organic liquids which emit a distinctive

vapor, coupled with a sensor tuned to detect those specific taggant

molecules at a parts per trillion concentration level.

The Office of Technology Assessment has been asked by the

Congress to analyze the proposed legislation and resolve the

differences surfaced in the congressional testimony. Your response

to the enclosed questionnaire is being sought as a part of the analysis

of the utility of taggants. The questions bear on the issues of the

profiles of the criminal bomber and the impact the proposed program

would have on the efforts of law enforcement personnel to deter,

apprehend, and convict criminal bombers.

The results of the study must be available to the Congress

when it returns from the August recess. Would you therefore

please fill out the enclosed material and return it as soon as

possible. The information about where you work is necessary for

demographic analysis; all individual replies will be treated as

confidential information.

In answering the questions below, your estimates would be

appreciated where data is not available. Please feel free to comment

on any point of the questionaire.

Indicate the approximate range of your answers by the following

code:

A - almost none, O-5%

B - infrequently, 5-25 %

c - frequent or usual, 25-75%

D - very frequent, 75-95%

E - Almost always, 95%-100%
Appendix B—Detection and Identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings—Summary and Questionnaire ● 185

DATA BASE (Where you Work)

I. Population of city or county

stat e

Check one: urban area suburb rural

II. Bomber Profiles

1. Type of Criminal Bombers. The term criminal bomber”

can cover a large spectrum of types of bombers. What type

would you estimate is responsible for the bombings in

your area, over the last 4-5 years.

International terrorists

Domestic terrorists

Organized crime

Psychopaths

Crimes of passion

Revenge, disgruntled employess,

malicious mischief

Others ( )

2 . Types of explosives used in bombs. A variety of

materials can be used as explosives. How often are the

following explosives used in your area.

Commercial explosives such as dynamites ,

water gels

A.NFO or other non-cap sensative explosives

Plastic explosives such as C-4

Cast or pressed military explosives such

as Composition B, TNT, RDX

Smokeless powder

Black powder

Homemade materials

Others

61-401 0 - 80 - 13
186 ● Taggants in Explosives

Please estimate how often each type of bomber in your area uses

each type of explosive

Terrorists

Organized Crime

Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion

Revenge, Disgruntled

employees, malicious

mischief

*

c!)

m

-+-+--t -

I

I

I

--t

I

3. Targets

Please indicate the frequency with which each type of target

is attacked by criminal bombers in your area.

Vehicles or people

Schools

Residences

Transportation

facilities

Commercial, Industrial

facilities
Appendix B—Detection and Identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings—Summary and Questionnaire ● 187

Government, law enforcement

facilities

Other

Please indicate approximately how frequently each type of

bomber in your area attacks each type of

I

Terrorists

Organized Crime

, Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion

Revenge, Disgruntled I I

Employees, malicious

mischief

targe t

l=!

o

I

i

I

I

4. Sources of Explosives

Please indicate the relative frequency of each of the

following as a source of supply of explosives for the

criminal bombers in your area:

Legal Purchase

Theft of commercial explosives

Blackmarket Purchase

Theft of military explosives

— . .

—
188 ● Taggants in Explosives

Home-made

Importation

Please estimate the relative frequency of the various

for each group of bombers in your area:

Terrorists I I I

Organized crime

1 I 1

Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion

1 1 1

Revenge, Disgruntled

Employees, malicious I I I

mischief I I I

— —

—

sources

al ‘d

$!!

5 . If explosives were tagged, would you expect bombers to

alter their pattern of acquiring explosives? Please estimate

the expected relative frequency of the various sources for

each type of bomber in your area if a tagging program were

instituted (military explosives would not be tagged).

--------- - 1

Organized Crime I

Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion

Revenge, Disgruntled

Employees, malicious

mischief

— —
Appendix B—Detection and Identification Taggants and Crinmal Bombings—Summary and Questionnaire ● 189

III Law Enforcement Ef festiveness at Present

1. In answering the following questions, please

estimate to the nearest 10%

a. What is the rate of arrests for criminal bombingp

b. What percent of arrested bombers are convicted

c. What is a typical arrest rate for other crimes

d. What is a typical conviction rate for other crimes

IV: Estimated Utility of Identification Taggants

1 . Would the use of identification taggants provide a useful

additional clue in an investigation of criminal bombings?

Comment:

2 . In your estimation, would the use of identification taggants lead to

an increase in the arrest rate for criminal bonbers?

Please estimate for each type of bomber in your area.

Terrorists

Organized Crime

Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion

Revenge, Disgruntled

Employees, Malicious

Mischief

Comment:

3 . Would the use of identification taggants lead to increased

conviction rates for criminal bombers?

Comment:
190 . Taggants in Explosives

4 . Would knowledge of the fact that identification taggants are

used in explosives deter criminal bombers? Please estimate for

each type of bomber in your area.

Terrorist

Organized Crime

Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion

Revenge, Disgruntled

Employees, Malicious

Mischief

Comment:

5. Some people have proposed tagging packaged explosives, but

not tagging black or smokeless powder. If this were done,

approximately what proportion of the bombers who now use packaged

explosives would shift to using powder to make bombs?

6. Countermeasures

The use of identification taggants in exploves could alter

the current method of operation of criminal bombers. Please

estimate how likely each of the indicated change in tactics

would be for each of the types of bombers encountered in your area.

Taggant removal, if removal takes

1 hour per pound of explosives

1

Do nothing

Taggant removal if removal takes

10 hours per pound of explosives

Shift to another type of explosives

(foreign, stolen, home-made)

Shift to another type of

unlawful activity
Appendix B—Detectjon and Identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings—Summary and Questionnaire . 191

v. Utility of Detection Taggants

1. Would knowledge of the fact that detection taggants are

used in explosives deter criminal bombers? Please estimate for each

type of bomber in your area

Terrorists

Organized Crime

Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion

Revenge, Disgruntled

Employees, malicious

mischief

2 . How frequently would the use of detection taggants in explosives

lead to the arrests of criminal bombers either through direct

apprehension of a bomber with explosives in his possession, or

through an indirect means such as a clue being provided by a bomb

discovered unexploded? Please estimate for each type of bomber

in your area.

Terrorists

Organized Crime

Psychopaths

Crimes of Passion

Revenge, Disgruntled

Employees, malicious

mischief

3 . A number of types of sensors are being investigated for use in

conjunction with the detection taggant source. Please indicate the

frequency with which criminal bombers are likely to be detered or

apprehended due to the use of detection taggants coupled with

sensors possessing the following characteristics:

Stationary installation only; must be .—— —

operated by a skilled technician
192 ● Taggants in Explosives

Sensor is easily portable, (can be used also

in a fixed installation); must be operated

by a skilled technician

Stationary installation only; requires

no special operator, only someone in

the area to react to an alarm or other

simple indicator

Sensor is easily portable; requires no

special operator

4 Counter measures

The use of detection taggants in exploslves Could alter tie

current method of operation of criminal bombers. Please

estimate how likely each of the changes in tactics would be for

each type of bomber in your area.

4J 5

a)

: N

LI . ! +

I I

Package seal or taggant removal

if specialized knowledge and I I

equipment is required ! r

Package seal or taggant removal

if relatively easily accomplished

Shift to another type of explosive I I

(Foreign, stolen, home made)

I 1

Shift bombings to targets less

likely to have sensors

Shift to another type of I I

unlawful activity

Do Nothing
Appendix B—Detection and Identification Taggants and Criminal Bombings—Summary and Questionnaire ● 193

5 . Sensor Location

Please indicate the location where you believe detection

sensors should be placed. For this question, simply

check all locations appropriate for each cos t

portability category.

I

o

0

0

Airports I

m u

Large Government Bldgs. I

Small Government Bldgs.

Nuclear Power Stations

Schools

Public Stadiums, arenas

Bus, train depots

Large Commercial Bldgs.

Police Bomb Investigators

None, No-Utility

I

m

M l

o

m u

o

0

0

o“

2

I

JJ

U2

8

* Sensors to be used by investigators in searching for bombs
APPENDIX C–OTA RECOVERY TESTS

Introduction

As indicated in chapters I I and Ill, a number of

tests, demonstrations, and training exercises have

been conducted by BATF, the Aerospace Corp.,

FBI, 3M, BOM, IME, local police departments and

others in which attempts were made to recover the

3M identification taggants from the postdetonation

debris. These tests usually had limited objectives,

such as demonstrating that taggants could be

found by trained law enforcement personnel; as a

result, Iittle or no control was placed on the tests

and Iittle or no documentation was attempted. As

an example, BATF conducts 2-week training

courses at its academy at Glenco, Ga. Over 50 test

bombings of automobiles have been conducted

with tagged explosives as part of that training exercise, but no data has been collected on recovery.

Due to the different aims, purposes and procedures used, similar tests conducted by different

groups resulted in widely varying recovery rates. As

an example, table 11 of chapter II shows that BATF

and Aerospace were able to recover taggants from

automobile bombing demonstrations under both

relatively benign and very adverse conditions. I n

similar I ME tests, shown in table 13 of chapter 11,

difficulty was encountered in recovering taggants

from automobile detonations, even under benign

conditions.

As none of the tests were well-controlled or

documented, it was extremely difficult to analyze

the reasons for the differences, or even quantify

the recovery expectations under any conditions.

OTA therefore accepted an offer by BATF to conduct a controlled series of tests under OTA control.

Test Objective

The objective of the test series was to obtain

quantified data on the postdetonation recovery of

the 3M identification taggants under carefully controlled test and recovery conditions. Such data

would provide an indication of the recoverability

of the taggants under those conditions (although

probably not a statistically valid demonstration). It

might also provide insight into recovery under simiIar conditions, and help to resolve the dichotomy

of prior test results. It was originally hoped that

tests could be run against a variety of targets, including buildings and automobiles; due to time and

fiscal constraints, however, it was necessary to

limit the target to automobiles. Test facility restrictions limited the placement of the automobiles to

unpaved surfaces; the surfaces used were hardpacked, gravel-laden earth. Within the constraints

it was hoped that the tests would resolve the following four specific questions:*

1.

2.

3.

Is it reasonable to presume that sufficient taggants can be recovered from automobile

bombings under real-life conditions to enable

a determination to be made as to the origin of

the tagged explosives? Even if taggants are recovered from each test condition, no more

than a presumption of recoverability may be

made. A more extensive testing program

would be necessary to determine the conditions under which the taggants are recoverable. Parameters of a definitive test series

would include weather, fire, fireman response,

and between-test replication variability. Failure to recover taggants under each of the test

conditions would lead to a presumption that

the taggants could not be expected to provide

information on the origin of explosives in car

bombings. Success in some of the tests would

indicate that information would presumably

be available from a subset of automobile

bombings; definitive testing would be required

to precisely define that subset.

Are there conditions that are more likely than

others under which automobile bombings will

yield taggants sufficient to establish the explosives’ source? The specific condition to be

tested is the relative strength of the explosive.

Test conditions may also permit a limited assessment of the effects on recovery of the skill

or dedication of the investigator, the weather,

and the effects of fire and subsequent firefighting efforts.

What is the magnitude of the effort necessary

to recover sufficient postdetonation taggants

for explosive source determination? If, in fact,

heroic efforts are required (as was reportedly

the case in one of the Aerospace/BATF tests)

then the utility of taggants in automobile

bombings would be limited to the bombings of

high-value targets and would not be of value

to routine investigations normally carried out

by bomb squads, These limitations would apply only to those conditions under which

heroic efforts were necessary. This question

only has meaning if the taggants are, in fact,

recovered, even after heroic efforts.

● These questions are repeated verbatim from a pretest plannining document and have been modified only to reflect the unavaliability of paved

surfaces

194
Appendix C—OTA Recovery Tests “ 195

4. Are the taggants field readable? One of the advantages of the 3M taggants is their ability to

be easily and quickly read by agents in the

field. If, in fact, large amounts of debris must

be collected and laboratory processed, then

the taggants are not field readable, at least for

those automobile bombings which are similar

to the test conditions. If the 3M taggants are

not field readable, then perhaps some of the

other tagging methods, rejected for that reason, should be reconsidered.

Similarly, OTA believed that if taggants were not

recovered in usable quantities in the tests, this

would not necessarily indicate that taggants could

not be recovered under more favorable conditions;

for example, a bombing that damages but does not

destroy a building. However, the presumption that

taggants could not be recovered under some realworld conditions would affect OTA’s analysis of

the utility of taggants, and the greater the range of

conditions in which taggants could not be recovered —or could be recovered only after heroic efforts –the greater the negative impact on estimates

of taggant utility.

Test Conditions

Bombs, each consisting of approximately 2 lb of

dynamite, were placed in five automobiles and

remotely detonated. The automobiles were located

on hard-packed, relatively level earth. Three were

on dirt roads and two were on bare patches of hardpacked ground. No brush or debris was in the immediate vicinity of the automobiles. Specific test

conditions are summarized in table C-1. By comparing the results of tests 1 through 3 it is possible to

relate recovery to the power of the dynamite; by

comparing the results of tests 1 and 4, it is possible

to assess the effects of a fire and subsequent firefighting activities, by comparing tests 3 and 5, it is

possible to assess the effects of the added confinement provided by the engine block.

The explosives for the tests were chosen by OTA

from a larger inventory of factory-tagged explosives provided by the Aerospace Corp. A 0.05 -per-

,

cent concentration of encapsulated taggants was

used in each case, except that in test 4 the explosive contained 0.05 percent of each of two separate

unencapsulated taggants. The explosives were assembled into a bomb and covered with a brown

bag by Dr. Edward James of the OTA analysis team

and placed in the target by Dr. James, with the assistance of a different FBI agent for each test; the

FBI agents could not see the explosive cartridges.

The choice of explosives and placement decisions

were made by David Garfinkle and Dr. James, the

OTA test coordinators, and were unknown to anyone else. Samples were removed from each bomb

for analysis to ensure that taggants were, in fact,

present in each type of dynamite and to validate

the identity of the postdetonation recovered taggants.

Recovery Procedures

An attempt was made in the recovery process to

see if differences in training and experience resulted in differences in the probability of recovering taggants. To test the question of field recovery

skill, two sweeps were made of each target. The

first sweep was made by an “amateur” team, to

roughly simulate the procedure and skill that might

be expected from a typical bomb squad. The second sweep was made by a trained BATF team. The

amateur team, in each case, consisted of a member

of the OTA study group, another non-BATF volunteer, and one BATF agent. The non-BATF volunteers, one to a team, included Randall Bowman of

NRA, Robert Hodgdon of the Hodgdon Powder Co.,

Officer Larry Linville of the Washington Metropolitan Police Bomb Squad, and Dennis Kline, an FBI

agent. The team was given approximately 5 minutes of instruction and 1 hour for the search. The

searches of all but the firebombing site (test 4) were

conducted between approximately 3 and 4 p.m.,

with the use of blankets, black Iights, and magnetic

brooms contained in the Aerospace Corp. developed kits, shown in figure C-1. The amateur teams

searched for taggants with the black light, did a

magnetic sweep, and collected debris for laboratory analysis.

Table C-1 .–Specific Test Conditions, OTA Recovery Tests

Test Placement Dynamite Test condition

1 Under driver’s seat Collier C, low power 5-gal gas in tank, no fire

2 ... Under driver’s seat Unigel, medium power 5-gal gas in tank, no fire

3. . . . . . . Under driver’s seat Power Primer, high power 5-gal gas in tank; no fire

4., ., Under driver’s seat Collier C, low power 1-gal gas adjacent to bomb, fire, firefighting

5 ., ., Between engine and firewall Power Primer, high power Dry tank, no fire

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
196 . Taggants in Explosives

Figure C-l .–Portable Kits, Developed by

the Aerospace Corp., Were Utilized in the

OTA Taggant Recovery Tests

Photo credit: U.S. Department of the Treasury

The six-man BATF professional teams then conducted a thorough second sweep of each target, including further collection of debris, magnetic

sweeping, and taggant black-light search. For this

search, the area was divided into grids, and the collected material was carefully identified by the grid

number. Figure C-2 shows the grid used in test 3.

Each BATF search took approximately 3 hours.

Laboratory Analysis

A preliminary analysis was conducted at the test

site by a team from the BATF national laboratory.

A few taggants were identified from the first three

tests conducted (actually tests 5, 1, and 2) to demonstrate field laboratory identification. The material was then taken to the BATF national laboratory

and quantitatively analyzed. The time necessary to

recover more than 20 taggants for each test was recorded, as was the location of the debris from

which the taggants were collected. The taggants

were then mounted on slides and the codes read.

Identification of the explosives was then made

from the taggant code. Most of the laboratory analysis was conducted by Mr. Richard Strobel of the

BATF national laboratory, although a volunteer

team from NRA separated four of the taggants

from the test 3 debris.

Test Results

The results of the tests are summarized in table

C-2. Over 20 taggants were recovered in the laboratory from the debris of each automobile bombing.

Laboratory time ranged from less than Vi hour to

approximately 4 hours (plus 5 hours preliminary

time to refine procedures). Taggants were recovered from the amateur sweep in three of the five

tests. In one test, the amateur and professional

sweep material became mixed up during transportation to the BATF national laboratory as a result of

a deep chuckhole. In the final case, the amateur

search material was inadvertently stored separately from the other recovered debris and not examined. Photo micrographs of the recovered taggants

are shown in figures C-3 through C-7, one for each

test. Some of the mounted taggants from test 5

Figure C-2.- BATF Search Grid

‘ b .Fii b

A s

a. General recovery grid b. Recovery within automobile
Appendix C—OTA Recovery Tests ● 197

Table C-2.–OTA Recovery Test Results

Number of

Test Condition taggants recovered Source of taggants Laboratory time (hours)

1, . Collier C, low power, under driver’s seat 28

2. ..., Unigel, medium power, under driver’s seat 23 + 1 contaminant

3. . . . . . . Power Primer, high power, under driver’s seat 21 total

12 type A, 9 type B

4, ., Collier C, low power, under driver’s seat, fire, 23

firefighting

5. . . . . . . Power Primer, high power, between engine 26 + contaminants

and firewall (training tags from

collection equipment)

Amateur search 1 1/2

Amateur search 1/2

Unknown 1 1/2

BATF team, primarily from 3

automobile interior and

under automobile

Amateur search 4 hours + 5 hours preliminary time

to define procedures, This was

first material processed in laboratory.

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

Figure C-3.—Recovered Taggants From Test 1

(low power)

Figure C.4.—Recovered Taggants From Test 2

(medium power)

were accidently brushed off the mounting SIide;

other recovered taggants are shown.

No taggants were individually recovered in the

field, recognized as such, and field read.

All the explosives were correctly identified by

BATF as a result of the color code on the taggants.

The letter from BATF to OTA, which gives the identification information, is shown as an attachment.

The test nomenclature in the letter differs from

that used in test. The letter refers to the scenes in

chronological order; in the text the tests have been

grouped for ease of comparison. The following conversion of the letter “scene” designation to the text

“test number” designation is necessary:

Scene 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Test 5

Scene 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Test 1

Scene 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Test 2

Figure C.5.—Recovereci Taggants From Test 3

(high power)

Scene 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Test 3

Scene 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . Test 4
198 ● Taggants in Explosives

bombs, and placed the bombs in the target. (FBI

agents inserted the detonators and initiated the explosives.) No one else knew which explosives were

used on each automobile, or even which explosives

from a larger selection were chosen. OTA, with assistance from NRA, observed the laboratory procedures and participated in the separation process.

BATF supplied the automobile targets, the test

site, and the agents for field recovery and laboratory analysis of the taggants. The explosives were

supplied by the Aerospace Corp.

IME was invited by OTA to participate in the test

series. Due to the short time available for the test

planning, IME was not able to fully participate.

They did provide some valuable guidance, however, in a working session attended by OTA, BATF,

SAAMI, NRA, and I ME representatives.

Discussion of Results

Too few recovery tests of the 3M identification

taggants were conducted under real-world conditions to allow a definitive judgment to be made of

recovery. In addition, only one type of target,

automobiles, was used in the tests. However, the

ease with which taggants were recovered, under

the rather severe test conditions, indicates that taggants could be expected to be recovered under a

wide range of bombing conditions, given the proper

training and effort by field and laboratory investigators. A number of points should be made as a

result of the test series.

In the first place, the taggants do not appear to

be field recoverable and readable, at least under

the test conditions. Approximately 25 people

looked for taggants, for a total of approximately 35

man-hours, in both daylight and nighttime conditions, without visually recovering a single taggant.

This was the case even though taggants were easily

recoverable from the debris in the laboratory.

BATF operating procedure, which calls for visual

search, is not only ineffective, it is counterproductive. Investigators are likely to become disenchanted when they can’t visually find a taggant,

and not collect samples for laboratory analysis.

BATF procedures should stress the importance of

the collection of debris for analysis. It has been

claimed that the earth at the test site is unusually

rich in magnetic materials and materials which

fluoresce naturally, and that the tests were particularly severe from the visual recovery standpoint. Visual recovery may, in fact, be possible in

situations such as an automobile bombing on a

large paved area, or a small bomb in a large building. It appears likely, however, that taggants will be
Appendix C—OTA Recovery Tests ● 199

missed quite often if visual recovery means are emphasized.

The second point is that taggants appear to be recoverable from bombings, with a modest, but coordinated, effort on the part of field and laboratory

personnel. Even under conditions of partial confinement, taggants from a high-energy dynamite

were easily recovered. Similarly, taggants from a

low-power dynamite were recovered even after a

severe fire and firefighting activity. Additional tests

would be required before the effects of full confinement, such as in a pipe bomb, or before the effect of fire after a high-energy detonation, could be

known. Similarly, no tests have been conducted

with large charges, or with tagged boosters and detonators used to detonate an untagged blasting

agent.

It appears that the power of the explosive does

not significantly affect recovery probability or the

laboratory time necessary to separate taggants

from the debris. Confinement and the occurrence

of fire, however, do significantly affect laboratory

recovery time, as the size of the taggants decreases.

Some difficulty was encountered in reading the

colors of the taggant layers, even by experts from

3M. The pigments currently available, however,

have been substantially improved, hopefully leading to fewer errors in interpreting the code.

The tests were conducted and field recovery

completed on three of the five tests under near

ideal weather conditions. A light rain fell before

debris was collected from two tests, however, including the unconfined Power Primer and the case

in which a fire followed the detonation. The light

rain did not appear to hamper recovery, even for

those severe test conditions; a heavy rain might,

however, have more effect.

It should be noted that the automobile tests conducted represent rather severe tests of recovery (at

least neglecting confinement). It is reasonable to

infer, therefore, that taggants couId probably be recovered from building bombings, bombings in the

open, and most other nonconfined bombings.

It is interesting to note that no fires occurred as a

result of the bombings, when fuel was in the fuel

tanks, even for the most powerful commercial explosive (excluding boosters). While a sample of

three is hardly significant, the tests do indicate that

fires do not occur as a matter of course in automobile bombings.

Finally, it should be noted that these tests provide a possible explanation of the wide divergence

of prior test data. Most of the tests in which BATF/

Aerospace recovered taggants involved a laboratory recovery procedure; this was particularly true

for the severe automobile bombings. Most of the

unsuccessful tests by IME and others have either

not included laboratory analysis, or have had the

laboratory separation process conducted by people with no training in separating the taggants.
200 . Taggants in Explosives

D EPARTMENT OF THE T REASUR Y

B UREAU OF A LCOHO L, T0BACC0 ANO F IREARM S

W ASHINGTO N , D.C. 2022 6

September 28, 1979

Refer TO

DS : RD : WDW

Mr. David Garfinkle 7555

Office of Technology Assessment

600 Pennsylvania Avenue

Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Garfinkle:

The following test results were obtained from the

taggant survival studies conducted for you at

Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on September 13, 19790

Scene 1 was a 1949 Ford pickup truck. A 3- to 4-hour

laboratory analysis of the bomb debris collected by

Dr. Ed James (OTA), Mr. Randall Bowman (NRA), and

Special Agent Marcus Davis (ATF) resulted in the

isolation of 26 taggants bearing code F5959592M8.

This identifies the explosives used in this case as

Atlas Power Primer, size l-1/4~t x 8’?, Date/Shift

Code 01-12-77-R2. Many contaminate training taggants

were also in portions of the bombing debris. These

probably came from a single contaminated recovery

kit. The red layer in this early pre-pilot test

version of the 3M taggant contains an organic pigment,

and noticeable variation in hue was observed. This

problem has subsequently been corrected in later

versions of the 3M taggants.

Scene 2 was a late model Ford Galaxy. A l-hour,

20-minute laboratory analysis of the bomb debris

collected by you, Mr. Robert Hodgdon (Hodgon Powder

Company), and Special Agent Eugene Reagan (ATF)

resulted in the isolation of 28 taggants bearing

code F3913142M0. This identifies the explosives

used in this case as a Hercules permissible dynamite,

either Red HA, size l-1/4 x 8“, Date/Shift Code

Jul 12 78 Jl, or Collier C, size 1-1/4” x 8“,

Date/Shift Code Nov 21 78 J1. Both explosives

were tagged with the same taggant code.

Scene 3 was an Oldsmobile station wagon. A 25-minute

laboratory analysis of the bomb debris collected by

Mr. Steve Kornish (OTA), Officer Larry Linville

(Washington, DC Metropolitan Police Department), and
Appendix C—OTA Recovery Tests . 201

Special Agent Ivan Kalister (ATF) resulted in the

isolation of 23 taggants bearing code F5989142M0.

This identifies the explosives used in this case as

Hercules Unigel Tube Shell, size 2“ x 16”, Date/Shift

Code Jun 27 78 J1. One contaminate training taggant

was also found in this debris.

Scene 4 was a Chevrolet Malibu sedan. Twenty–one

taggants were recovered--l7 by our laboratory’s

chemist in 45 minutes, and 4 by the NRA’s observers,

Ms. Susan Rogers and Mr. James Flechenstein, in an

unspecified time. Twelve of these taggants bear code

F9986726M0, and 9 bear code F5984642M0. These taggants

identify the explosives used in this case as Atlas

Power Primer, size 1-1/4” x 8“, Date/Shift Code

1O-24-78-R2. This material was specially produced

for The Aerospace Corporation by Atlas Powder Company

with an unencapsulated taggant species of one code

and a taggant of a different code from which the

encapsulating material had been stripped by solvent

action.

Scene 5 was the Chrysler-product station wagon which

was “fire-bombed” and permitted to burn until you

directed the Fort Belvoir Fire Department to respond.

A 3-hour laboratory analysis of bomb scene debris

collected during an 8-man, 2-hour ATF search under

the direction of Special Agent Eugene Reagan, resulted

in the isolation of 23 taggants bearing code F3913142M0.

This identifies the explosives used in this case as

either Hercules Red HA, size 1-1/4” x 8“, Date/Shift

Code Jul 12 78 Jl, or Collier C, size 1-1/4” x 8“,

Date/Shift Code Nov 21 78 Jl, both with the same taggant.

These taggants and those mounted by Mr. Bowman of the

NRA from field and first-day laboratory recoveries

were given to you on September 24, 1979, for your

use and examination. If we can be of any further

service to you in documenting the results of these

tests, please contact me.

W. David Williams

Explosives Scientist

61-401 0 - 80 - 14
APPENDIX D–PRODUCTS LIABILITY IMPLICATIONS

OF LEGALLY REQUIRING THE INCLUSION OF

TAGGANTS IN EXPLOSIVES

by James A. Henderson, Jr., Boston University School of Law;

William L. Groner, Research Assistant,

3rd Year Law Student, Boston University School of Law

October 9,1979

ANALYSIS OF EXPLOSIVES INDUSTRY’S EXPOSURE TO

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Limits and Purposes

of the Present Analysis

The analysis in this section covers the exposure~

to civil liability for damages under existing law of

1) manufacturers and other commercial suppliers

of explosives; 2) manufacturers and other commercial suppliers of components that go into the production of explosives; 3) manufacturers and other

commercial suppliers of accessories ordinarily

used with explosives, such as blasting caps and

fuses; and 4) commercial transporters and users of

explosives. The analysis does not cover the commercial suppliers of a range of products sometimes

referred to by legal commentators as “explosives,”

including firearms and ammunition, volatile and

caustic flu ids, fireworks, and bottled beverages.

The term “products liability” includes all civil

liability for damages arising out of injury to person

or property caused by unsafe, defective products,

including liability based on theories of negligence,

warranty, misrepresentation, and strict liability.

“Products liability” does not include criminal liability, or civil liability based on express contractual

obligations other than express warranty. The phrase

“exposure to Iiability” refers to the conceptual

bases and limits of liability; the author does not

have access to factual data relating to frequency of

claims, payouts to claimants, availability of liability insurance, and the like, in the explosives industry. The Final Report of the Interagency Task Force

on Products Liability (Dept. of Commerce, Oct. 31,

1977) indicates that the industrial chemicals industry, the closest industry to explosives in that study,

is more often than not a leader in terms of the average number of new claims per firm per year. (See

Final Report, table I I l-l 3.)

The main objective of this appendix is to examine the products Iiability implications of legalIy reUNDER EXISTING LAW

quiring the inclusion of taggants in explosives. Such

examination can meaningfully be undertaken only

in the context of an adequate understanding of the

existing legal environment into which such a taggants requirement would be inserted. The analysis

in this section should render such an understanding

possible for those, including some members of Congress and their staffs, who may not be intimately familiar with the subject of products liability. A summary of the elements bf this analysis is provided at

the end of the section to facilitate review and quick

reference.

The Major Doctrinal Bases of Liability

Negligence

Negligent conduct is conduct that is riskier than

a reasonably prudent person would engage in. The

mere fact that conduct creates risk does not make

it negligent conduct. All human activities involve

some risks of injury, and certain levels of risk are

socially acceptable. Driving a car, for example, is a

risky activity; but everyone who drives a car is not

for that reason necessarily negligent, because a certain type and amount of driving is not only acceptable but necessary. It is only when a driver drives

too fast, or while intoxicated, that his or her particular mode of driving behavior becomes negligent.

(See generally United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,

159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).)

Translating these basic notions over to the explosives industry, obviously the activities of manufacturing, supplying, and using explosives are risky activities. But they become negligent activities only if

those engaging in them do not take sufficient precautions to reduce (but not necessarily to eliminate) the risks. Thus, the plaintiff who seeks to hold

202
Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives ● 203

the dynamite manufacturer liable in negligence for

harm caused by an allegedly defective stick of dynamite will not be allowed to reach the jury unless

he proves that the manufacturer failed to take reasonable steps to avoid product defects, and that as

a consequence of such failure the defendant produced a defective stick of dynamite which ultimately and proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. (See, e.g., Soso v. Atlas Powdet Co., 238 F.2d

388 (8th Cir. 1956).) If the plaintiff succeeds in proving these elements, then in the absence of any legal

defenses (which are considered in the next section)

he will be entitled to recover from the defendant

manufacturer, (See, e.g., Morris v. E.I. du font de

Nemours & Co., 109 S.W.2d 1222 (Mo, 1937).)

Given the difficulties and complexities of proof

in the plaintiff’s attempting to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the defend ant-m anufacturer’s

production methods, it is not surprising that some

courts have permitted an inference of negligent

manufacture to be drawn from the fact that the defendant produced and distributed a defective explosive. (See, e.g., Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960), applying the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. ) However, some courts

have refused to recognize this special rule. (See,

e.g., Matievitch v. Hercules Powder Co., 3 Utah 2d

283, 282 P.2d 1044 (1 955), refusing to apply res ipsa

loquitur doctrine.) Presumably, in States recognizing it, this special rule would also be available to

plaintiffs in actions brought against explosives handlers. (See, e.g., Tassin v. Louisiana Power & Light

Co., 250 La, 1016,201 So.2d 275 (1967 ).)

These same negligence principles apply to other

activities engaged in by explosives manufacturers,

including marketing their products. Thus, a dynamite manufacturer will be liable in negligence for

unreasonably failing to warn of hidden dangers associated with use of its products. (See, e.g., Eck v. E.

1. du Pent de Nemours & Co., 393 F.2d 197 (7th Cir,

1968).) And these principles apply to all other nonmanufacturer suppliers of explosives with respect

to their own commercial activities. Thus, a retailer

who sells explosives to persons obviously incompetent to handle such risky products is negligent

toward those eventually injured by an accidental

explosion. (See, e.g., Flint Explosives Co. v. Edwards,

84 Ga. App. 376, 66 S.E.2d 368 (1 951 ).) And explosives handlers are Iiable for harm caused by their

negligent conduct. (See, e.g., Tassin v. Louisiana

Power & Light Co., supra. See also separate section,

infra, on explosives users. )

Warrant y

Warranties are legal obligations incurred by

commercial sellers as an incident to the sale of

goods, or products. They are by and large creatures

of statute— in most States today, versions of the

Uniform Commercial Code, article 2. Three basic

types of warranties are relevant here: 1) express

warranties, in which the seller actualIy promises

that the product will perform in a prescribed manner (see Uniform Commercial Code, 2-31 3); 2) implied warranties of merchantability, in which the

seller promises nothing but is held by the law

“impliedly” to have warranted that its products are

free from defects (see Uniform Commercial Code $

2-31 4); and 3) implied warranties of fitness for particular purpose, in which the seller knows of special

requirements of the buyer, and of the buyer’s reliance, and supplies a product that fails to meet

those requirements (see Uniform Commercial Code

 2-315). All three types of warranties have been

held to accompany the sale of explosives. (See, e.g.,

Hercules Powder Co, v. Rich, 3 F.2d 12 (8th Cir.

1924), cert. often. 268 U.S. 692 (1924) (express warranty that fuse would burn at rate of 1 ft per m inute); Arfons v, E. 1. du Pent de Nemours & Co., 261

F.2d 434 (2nd Cir. 1958) (implied warranty that fuse

and dynamite were nondefective); and Unite d

States Casualty Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 4 N.J,

Super. 444, 67 A.2d 880, rev’d on other grounds 4

N.J. 157, 72 A.2d 190 (1 950) (fuse unfit for purchaser’s particular purposes),)

Comparing these warranty theories with the negligence theory considered earlier, two important

differences should be observed. On the one hand, it

is not necessary for the plaintiff in a warranty case

to prove, as the plaintiff must prove under negligence, that the defendant explosives seller acted

unreasonably. It is sufficient that the product

failed, for whatever reason, to meet the standards

imposed by law at the time of sale: promised performance (express warranty); freedom from defects

(implied warranty of merchantability); and suitability to purchaser’s special needs (implied warranty of

fitness for particular purpose). On the other hand,

however, the plaintiff must prove other elements

not required in a negligence case. In some jurisdictions, for example, the plaintiff must prove privity

of contract— i.e., that he purchased the explosives

directly from the defendant. (See, e.g., Green v.

Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 95 F. Supp. 127 (W. D,

Ark. 1951 ) (negligence action allowed against ex-
204 ● Taggants in Explosives

plosives manufacturer; warranty action barred because of lack of privity). Many courts today do not

require privity to be established in products liability actions based upon warranty theories. (See, e.g.,

Henningsen v. Bloom field Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,

161 A.2d 69 (1960).)

Misrepresentation

Misrepresentation is a tort theory of recovery

that overlaps somewhat with express warranty. A

main difference between them is that the tort doctrine is not dependent upon the existence of contractual privity between the plaintiff and defendant. As set forth in Restatement of Torts, Second, $

402 B, the essence of the tort is a misrepresentation

(whether or not innocently made) to the public by a

commercial seller of a product that harms someone who justifiably relies thereon. Commercial sellers of explosives who misrepresent their products

are Iiable for harm proximately resulting. (See, e.g.,

Marsh v. Usk Hardware Co., 73 Wash. 543, 132 Pac.

241 (191 3).)

Strict Liability in Tort

Strict liability in tort is liability for harm caused

by defective products and ultrahazardous conduct

irrespective of fault on the seller’s or actor’s part

and irrespective of the requirements, such as privity of contract, that sometimes accompany warranty theories. Members of the explosives industry are

exposed to two major forms of strict liability in

tort: 1) strict liability imposed primarily on commercial transporters and users of explosives based

upon the fact that those activities are considered

“abnormally dangerous” (see Restatement of Torts,

Second, $8519 and 520); and 2) strict liability imposed on the sellers of explosives based upon the

fact of their having sold defective products (see Restatement of Torts, Second 402 A). Consideration

of the first of these types of strict liability will be

deferred to a later section dealing specifically with

the liabilities of commercial transporters and users.

The focus in this section will be on the strict liability of commercial selIers of defective explosives.

According to section 402A of the Restatement of

Torts, Second, in order to recover in strict liability

an injured plaintiff must establish that the product

was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the defendant seller’s control

and that such defective condition proximately

caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The rule applies to

all commercial sellers in the chain of distribution,

including retailers and wholesalers. The essential

element of proof is that the product was defective

at the time of sale by defendant. Full consideration

of the different ways a product can be said to be

“defective” will be deferred to later sections dealing with recurring fact patterns in cases involving

allegedly defective explosives. The important point

here is to understand that the focus in a strict liability case is on the product, rather than on the defendant’s conduct. Even if an explosives manufacturer exercises due care to avoid flaws in its explosives, it will be held liable if flaws occur and cause

harm. (See Restatement of Torts, Second 402

A(2)(a).) A clear majority of American jurisdictions

recognize strict Iiability for sellers of defective

products. (See CCH Prod. Liab. Rep. 4060), and a

number of courts have applied that doctrine in

cases involving allegedly defective explosives. (See,

e.g., Hall v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345

F. Supp. 353 (E. D.N. Y. 1972); Clay v. Ensign-Bickford

Co., 307 F. Supp. 288 (D.C. Colo. 1969); Canifax v.

Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App.2d 44, 46 Cal.

Rptr. 552 (1965); Cooley v. Quick Supp/y Co,, 2 2 1

N.W.2d 763 (Iowa, 1974).)

The Major Defenses

The major defenses available to members of the

explosives industry in products liability actions fall

into three basic categories: 1) disclaimers, 2) contributory fault, and 3) intervening cause. The third

is not technically a defense, inasmuch as the plaintiff must prove that his injuries were proximately

caused by the defendant’s conduct. As a practical

matter, however, the defendant raises the issue of

intervening cause, arguing that the negligent conduct of explosives users constitutes a break in the

chain of proximate causation. Thus, intervening

cause may be treated as a “defense” for present

purposes.

Disclaimers

A disclaimer is a term in a contract purporting to

exempt the disclaiming party from liability for future events to which liability would otherwise and

ordinarily attach. Although no authority has been

found addressing the question of the effectiveness

of disclaimers in cases involving defective explosives, it is very likely that the rules which apply

generally in products liability apply here as well, A s

a general rule, in products liability cases in which

the plaintiffs are individuals physically injured by

allegedly defective products, disclaimers are set

aside by courts as being against public policy,

whether the plaintiff seeks to recover on the basis
Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives . 205

of negligence (see, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code

$ 1-102(3); R. Hursh & H. Bailey, American Law of

Products Liability $ 2:7 (2d ed. 1974)); express warranty (see, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code $ 2-

316(1 )); implied warranty (see, e.g., Heriningsen v.

Bloom field Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69

(1960)); misrepresentation (see Clements Auto co. v.

Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971));

or strict liability (see, e.g., Restatement of Torts,

Second, $402 A, comment m; Vandermark v. Ford

Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d

168 (1964)). On the reasonable assumption that

these same rules apply in cases involving allegedly

defective explosives, plaintiffs physically injured in

accidental explosions should not be barred simply

because of the inclusion of disclaimer language in

the contracts of sale and distribution.

On the other hand, there is more reason to expect that disclaimers will be given effect as between business entities in cases where the harm suffered is economic rather than physical. Two business entities, dealing at arms length from roughly

equal bargaining positions, arguably should be allowed to allocate responsibilities between them by

contract, Some courts have given effect to disclaimers in indemnity and contribution actions between business entities. (See, e.g., Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W.Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1 964); but

see Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark, 883, 430 S.W.2d

778 (1 968).) Thus, were a large explosives distributor to seek indemnity from the manufacturer after

being held liable in a products liability action

brought by an injured victim of an accidental explosion, the court might give effect to a disclaimer

in the contract of sale between the explosives manufacturer and the distribute.

Contributory Fault

Certainly when the basis of the plaintiff’s action

against the explosives seller is negligence, contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff will reduce (or

eliminate, if comparative fault is not applicable)

the plaintiff’s recovery, (See, e.g., Da/by v. Hercu-

/es, Inc., 458 S.W.2d 274 (Mo. 1970).) When the

plaintiff seeks recovery on the basis of warranty,

courts today are likely to speak in terms of the

plaintiff’s conduct breaking the chain of proximate

causation, especially when the plaintiff is shown to

have been aware of the defective condition of the

defendant’s product. (See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code 2-316 (3)(b), comment 8, & 2-715, comment 5.) The majority rule in products liability

cases involving strict liability in tort is that only the

form of contributory fault commonly referred to as

“assumption of the risk, ” in which the plaintiff

knows or has reason to know of the defective condition of the product, will reduce or bar the plaintiff’s recovery. (See, e.g., Restatement of Torts, Second, $402 A, comment n; but see Codling v. Paglia,

32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N. Y.S.2d 461

(1973 ).) This general rule reflects a policy favoring

liability of commercial sellers of defective products in all cases except those involving fairly gross

behavior on the part of plaintiffs.

Examining recent products liability cases involving allegedIy defective explosives sold to commercial users, it appears that courts have been sympathetic to defendants’ arguments that the users of

their products, rather than the products themselves, are to be blamed for the accidents. These judicial sympathies manifest themselves in several

ways. Courts have been willing to weigh user mis -

conduct fairly heavily as an independent bar to recovery. (See, e.g., Hercules Powder Co. v. Hicks, 453

S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1970).) And they have been willing

to give such misconduct weight in deciding that the

plaintiff’s circumstantial proof of product defect

was insufficient. (See, e.g., Hopkins v. E. l. du Pent

de Nemours & Co., 212 F.2d 623 (3rd Cir, 1954), cert.

den. 348 U.S. 872 (1954 ).) The main reason for this

willingness to weigh user misconduct more heavily

in explosives cases than in cases involving other

types of products appears to be the fact that explosives are not, as a general rule, “consumer products” in the same sense as household appliances.

(But see p. 217, intra. ) Commercial users of explosives are generally assumed to be expert, and can

be relied upon to reduce the incidence of accidental explosions. Of course, when explosive products

are sold to obviously incompetent users, such as

young children, contributory fault plays much less

of an important role in reducing or barring the

seller’s liability. (See, e.g., Wendt v. Balletto, 26

Corm. Super. 367,224 A.2d [561 (1966).)

Intervening Cause

The main difference between this “defense” (see

earlier comment) and the defense of contributory

fault just considered is the fact that in cases involving intervening cause, the plaintiffs are not the

same persons who misused or mishandled the explosives. Although the victims in these cases are innocent of personal wrongdoing, they will be denied

recovery against the sellers of allegedly defective

explosives if the conduct of those using the explosives was so negligent as to constitute an intervening, or superseding, cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries.

(See, e.g., Hercules Powder Co. v. Hicks, 453 S.W,2d
206 ● Taggants in Explosives

583 (Ky. 1970).) In contrast, where an innocent third

party brought a strict liability action against those

in charge of storing explosives, the Supreme Court

of Alaska rejected the defendant’s intervening

cause argument as a matter of law, even in the face

of proof that vandals had broken into the storage

area and deliberately set off the explosion. (See

Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co

585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1978).)

Actions Against Manufacturers and

Other Commercial Sellers of Explosives

The objective in this and the following sections

will be to examine the significant fact patterns that

tend to recur in this area. The focus will not be on

legal doctrine, but on the basic fact patterns and

the reactions of courts to them.

Product Flaws

As developed earlier, an injured plaintiff stands a

good chance of recovering against the manufacturer and other commercial sellers of explosives if

he can prove the existence of a product defect in

existence at the time of sale by the defendant. A

flaw is a type of defect which consists of the inadvertent failure of a product unit, or batch of units,

to conform to the intended product design. Flaws

are what Iaypersons most often think of as “defects.” The flaws most frequently encountered in

explosives cases are “bad batches’ ’– for example,

sticks of dynamite some of which contain too

much, and some too little, explosive ingredients

due to improper mixing during manufacture.

The greatest source of difficulty confronting

plaintiffs in flaw cases is not so much conceptual

as practical. Because explosives always “self-destruct” in use, it is uniquely difficult for plaintiffs to

obtain direct evidence of product flaws, When

other types of products break unexpectedly, experts can sometimes reconstruct the products and

determine the existence of flaws. But with explosives, such reconstruction is almost never possible.

Consequently, plaintiffs in cases in which accidental explosions are caused by alleged flawed explosives are almost always forced to rely upon circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence of the existence of product flaws.

A classic example of how a plaintiff can successfully build a case based on circumstantial proof is

presented in Morris v. E. /. du Pent de /Vemours &

Co., 109 S.W.2d 1222 (Me. 1937). The plaintiff in

that case claimed that the defendant explosives

manufacturer, through its employees, had negligently mixed a batch of dynamite so as to cause the

stick used by the plaintiff to explode prematurely.

The plaintiff’s proof, which the court held to be sufficient to reach the jury, consisted of the following:

1) purchase of the dynamite from the defendant by

the plaintiff’s employer; 2) careful handling and

storage of the dynamite up to the time it came into

the plaintiff’s hands on the day of the accident, 3)

careful handling of the dynamite by the plaintiff up

to the time of the premature explosion; 5) difficulties experienced by other employees with dynamite from the same batch; and 6) expert testimony

to the effect that the dynamite that injured the

plaintiff was unevenly mixed. Of course, because

the plaintiff proceeded on a negligence theory, the

record also included testimony on both sides relating to the issue of due care in manufacture. Today,

under a strict Iiability in tort theory, this last described evidence would not be necessary. But the

plaintiff must still prove the existence of a defect,

even under strict Iiability theories. And on the issue

of circumstantial proof of defect, the Morris case is

still good law.

Where the plaintiff is unable to build a solid circumstantial case, courts are apt to rule in favor of

the defendant manufacturer as a matter of law. Especially where there is evidence of mishandling of

the explosives at the time of the accident, the plaintiff may meet with judicial disapproval regarding

the sufficiency of his proof of defect. (See, e.g.,

Soso v. At/as Powder Co., 238 F.2d 388 (8th Cir.

1956); Hopkins v. E. /. du Pent de Nemours & Co.,

212 F.2d 623 (3rd Cir. 1954), cert. den. 348 U.S. 872

(1954).) Another source of difficulty often encountered by plaintiffs in these flaw cases is the necessity of accounting for the conditions of storage and

handling between the time of sale by the defendant

and use by the plaintiff. That this may even defeat

claims based upon strict liability in tort is suggested by Clay v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 307 F. Supp.

288 (D. C. Colo. 1969), in which the trial court concluded that the fuse was defective at the time of

the explosion but held that the plaintiff failed to

prove that the defect originated with the defendant

manufacturer.

Product Designs

Although products liability actions based on allegedly defective designs are escalating in frequency in many other product areas, they are relatively

insignificant in actions against explosives manufacturers. Obviously, explosives are supposed to explode. When they explode prematurely, the tenden-
Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives “ 207

cy is to explore the possibility of a product flaw, or

mishandling. The only type of case that could be

said to involve the defective design of an explosive

would be one in which the explosive was deliberately made too strong, or too weak. But even there,

the tendency would be to treat such a case as involving the failure of the defendant adequately to

warn users of the explosive characteristics of its

products.

Marketing

The cases involving claims by injured plaintiffs

based on the manner in which explosives are marketed may be grouped into three basic categories:

1) cases in which the defendant’s product fails to

perform as promised by the defendant; 2) cases in

which the defendant fails to warn users of hidden

risks associated with its product; and 3) cases in

which the defendant selIs or distributes the explosives to persons who are obviously incompetent to

handle them, Cases in the first of these categories

may involve express warranties. (See earlier discussion, pp. 203-204, supra. ) They may also involve

negligence, as in Raatikka v. O/in-Mathiesort Chemical Corp., 8 Mich. App. 638, 155 N.W.2d 205 (1967),

where the seller of dynamite advised the plaintiff

to use too much explosive in the primer.

By far the most significant category of marketing

cases involves alleged failures to warn explosives

users of risks that are not obvious. Although often

based upon allegedly negligent omissions by defendants (see Restatement of Torts, Second, $ 388),

failure to warn is also generally recognized as a

basis for imposing strict liability. (See genera//y

Restatement of Torts, Second, 402 A, comments h

and j.) As a general rule, manufacturers and other

commercial product sellers owe a duty to warn of

risks that are not Iikely to be obvious to persons

who will foreseeably use their products, and that,

with such warnings, the users are in a position to

avoid. Because users of explosives are presumably

knowledgeable regarding many of the risks associated with those products, the manufacturer’s duty

to warn tends to be drawn somewhat more narrowly than in other product areas. (See, e.g., Croteau v.

Borden Co., 277 F. Supp. 945 (E. D. Pa. 1968), aff’d

395 F.2d 771 (3rd Cir. 1968); Hercules Powder Co. v.

HiCkS/ 453 S.W. 2d 583 (Ky. 1970).)

One source of controversy concerning the explosives manufacturer’s duty to warn is the question of

the proper addressees of the warnings. Some courts

have held that it is sufficient if the supervisory personnel in charge of directing blasting operations receive warnings, negating any requirement that the

manufacturer attempt to warn those actually using

the explosives. (See, e.g., Bryant v. Hercules, Inc.,

325 F. Supp. 241 (W. D. Ky. 1970). ) Other courts have

held that the manufacturer of explosive products

must attempt to warn those actually using those

products of risks that may be hidden to them, notwithstanding the fact that information is supplied

to the manufacturer’s immediate vendee. (See, e.g.,

Eck v. E. l. du Pent de Nemours & Co., 393 F.2d 197

(7th Cir. 1968); Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz.

426, 581 P, 2d 271 (1978 ).) In other product areas,

with the exception of prescription drugs, courts

generalIy require warnings to be gotten to the actual users. (See, e.g., Hubbard-Ha// Chemical Co. v. -

Silverman, 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965) (industrial

poison); McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co.,

11 N.Y.2d 62, 226 N. Y.S.2d 407, 181 N.E.2d 430

(1962) (heat blocks for use in rescue operations).)

Regarding the third category of cases focusing

on the explosives seller’s manner of marketing its

products —cases in which explosives are sold to

persons obviously incompetent to handle them–

retailers are occasionally exposed to liability on

that basis. (See, e.g., Wendt v. Balletto, 26 Corm .

Supp. 367, 224 A.2d 561 (1966) (sale to minor); Flint

Explosives Co. v. Edwards, 84 Ga. App. 376, 66

S.E.2d 368 (1951) (sale by unlicensed retailer to inexperienced users). ) However, courts have been reluctant to hold explosives manufacturers responsible for failing to follow up on the ultimate distribution and manner of use of their products. (See, e.g.,

Doss v. Apache Powder Co., 430 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir.

1970); Flint Explosives Co. v. Edwards, 86 Ga. App.

404,71 S.E.2d 747 (1952 ).)

Actions Against Manufacturers and

Other Commercial Sellers of

Explosives Components

“Component” is a term of art in products liability

law; in the present context it is synonymous with

“ingredients. ” Commercial sellers of explosives

components are entities that manufacture and sell

the chemical ingredients of explosives. Most often,

the ingredients are sold to explosives manufacturers.

Product Flaws

No cases have been found in which an action has

been brought against a commercial seller of explosives components on the grounds that the component was flawed at the time of sale. This paucity of

reported decisions undoubtedly reflects the earl ier
208 ● Taggants in Explosives

described circumstance that most product flaws in

connection with explosives occur as a result of the

improper mixing of ingredients by the explosives

manufacturer. (See p. 206, supra. ) And those few instances of flawed explosives that might be theoretically traceable to flawed components would pose

insurmountable problems of proof as a practical

matter. However, as a matter of legal theory there

is little doubt that the selIer of a product component proven to have been flawed at the time of sale

would be liable to persons injured because of such

product flaw. (See, e.g., Clark v. Bendix Corp., 345

N. Y.S.2d 662, 42 A.D.2d 727 (1973); Barnhart v.

Freeman Equipment Co., 441 P.2d 993 (Okla. 1968).)

Whether courts would give effect to a disclaimer in

the contract of sale of the component, as between

the component seller and the explosives manufacturer, is not clear. (See pp. 204-205, supra. )

Product Designs

Here, too, it is unlikely that a plaintiff injured in

an accidental explosion would bring an action

against the selIer of a component based on a theory

of defective design. TypicalIy, the explosives manufacturer decides what it needs in the way of ingredients, and orders them specifically by description.

The components supplied to explosives manufacturers are basic chemical compounds; it is difficult

to envision a design-based theory of recovery

against the component selIer in the typical case.

In other product areas, suppliers of product components have been held liable for the designs of the

finished product, even where the component was

not dangerous by itself. A recent decision by the

Supreme Court of Mississippi (Dunson v. S.A. Allen,

Inc., 355 So. 2d 77 (Miss. 1978)) held that the supplier of a component could be held liable when

such component is intended to be used only in conjunction with a second component and when so

combined, the combination of the two is unreasonably dangerous. The finished product in that case

was a pulpwood cutter, and the component was a

thinning shear attachment. Even though the dangers posed by the combination could be eliminated

only by a modification in design of the larger machine, the seller of the component was held liable

based on its knowledge of the dangers and its involvement in manufacturing a component designed specificalIy for use in the finished product.

In contrast, the manufacturer-seller of bulk sulfuric acid was held not to owe a duty to the general

public to make sure that commercial purchasers of

its product did not combine the acid with other

ingredients to produce unreasonably dangerous

chemical combinations. (See Walker v. Stauffer

Chemical Corp., 19 Cal.App. 3d 669, 96 Cal. Rptr.

803 (1971 ).) The plaintiff in that case was injured

when a drain-cleaning product containing the defendant’s sulfuric acid exploded during use. On balance, the bulk sulfuric acid manufacturer seems

closer to the seller of explosives components than

does the manufacturer of the machinery component. Assuming that the explosives manufacturer is

knowledgeable regarding what it wants in the way

of components, and assuming that the component

manufacturer delivers exactly what is ordered, it is

unlikely that liability would extend to the seller of

basic chemical constituents of explosives. When

the seller of basic components has reason to know

that the buyer is relying on the seller’s judgment in

recommending what type of component to use, liability may extend to the component seller. (See,

e.g., Kramrner v. Edward l-lines Construction Co., 16

I Il. App. 3d 763, 306 N.E. 2d 686 (1974) (seller supplied wrong grade of lumber for scaffolding).) But

assuming the absence of such reliance in most

sales of basic components to explosives manufacturers, liability probably would

component selIers.

Marketing

Given the presumed expertise

ufacturers, it is difficult to see

not extend to the

of explosives manhow sellers of explosives components in the typical instance could

be held to a duty to warn of the risks associated

with their products. Even when the purchaser of explosives components is an individual, liability on

the basis of failure to warn will be denied if the user

is an explosives expert. (See, e.g., Croteau v. Borden

Co., 277 F. Supp. 945 (D. C.E. D. Pa. 1968), Aff’d 395

F.2d 771 (3rd Cir. 1968) (plaintiff was a lab technician conducting an experiment on a solid rocket

fuel component).) However, when the manufacturer of a component knows or has reason to know

of the purchaser’s ignorance of the risks, or knows

that the purchaser is combining the component

into a dangerous combination without adequate

warnings to users ignorant of the risks, liability may

be imposed on the component seller for failing to

warn. (See, e.g., E. l. du Pent de Nemours & Co. v.

McCain, 414 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969) (liability imposed even where component sold by defendant

was inert–defendant’s name was on the label of

the finished product).)

On balance, it is unlikely that sellers of explosives components would be Iiable for failure to

warn in the normal situation in which the components are sold to explosives manufacturers. This
Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives ● 209

conclusion is somewhat strengthened by the earlier

described reluctance of courts to impose duties

upon explosives manufacturers to follow up sales

of their products with efforts to reduce carelessness in their handling and use. (See p. 207, supra. )

Actions Against Manufacturers

and Other Commercial Sellers

of Explosives Accessories

“Accessories” refers to products normally used

in connection with explosives, including blasting

caps and fuses.

Product Flaws

I n contrast to the situation with regard to explosives components, a number of cases have been reported in which injured plaintiffs have sought to recover from manufacturers and other sellers of explosives accessories on the basis of product flaws.

(See, e.g., Huffstutler v. Hercules Powder Co., 305

F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962) (blasting caps); Demerit v.

Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th

Cir. 1960) (blasting caps); United States Casualty Co.

v, Hercules Powder Co., 4 N.J. Super. 444, 67 A.2d

880 (1949); rev’d on other grounds, 4 N.J. 157, 72

A.2d (190) (1950) (fuse),) To no less extent than other

product manufacturers and sellers, commercial

suppliers of explosives accessories are exposed to

liability (in many jurisdictions, strict liability) for

harm caused by flawed products. As in the case of

explosives manufacturers, the difficulties encountered by injured plaintiffs are in proving that a defect was present at the time of sale. (See p. 206,

supra. ) Indeed, the difficulties are Iikely to be comparatively greater in cases involving blasting caps,

due to their smaller size and relatively greater mobility, and the correspondingly greater likelihood

that injured plaintiffs will be unable to prove that

the product was handled normally between the

time of original purchase and the time of the accident, (See, e.g., E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.

Duboise, 236 Fed. 690 (5th Cir. 1916); Hicks v. E. 1.

du Pont de Nemours & Co., 246 F. Supp. 589 (D.C.

Okla. 1965).)

Interestingly enough, plaintiffs who hav e

brought similar actions against fuse manufacturers

appear to have fared somewhat better in reaching

the jury with circumstantial proof of product defects. (See, e.g., Hercules Powder Co. v. Rich, 3 F.2d

12 (8th Cir. 1924); United States Casua/ty Co. v. liercules Powder Co., 4 N.J. super. 444, 67 A.2d 880

(1949) rev’d on other grounds, 4 NJ. 157, 72 A.2d

190 (1950). But see Clay v, Ensign-Bickford Co., 307

F. Supp. 288 (D.C. Colo. 1969) (plaintiffs proved

defect at time of accident but not at time of sale).)

One practical difference between blasting caps

and fuses that may help to explain this difference

in treatment is the fact that fuse ordinarily is sold in

reels, from which the users take whatever lengths

are required under the varying circumstances of

use. Thus, more often than in the case of blasting

caps, the unused portion of the fuse may be examined for defects after the accident, and if defects

are discovered the plaintiff can argue that the fuse

that caused the accident had the same defects.

Another reason plaintiffs may fare better in fuse

cases is the fact that eyewitnesses are able to testify regarding the behavior of the fuse at the time

of the accident, in ways that directly point to the

existence of a defect, (See, e.g., Hercules Powder

Co. v. Rich, supra, (fuse burned too quickly); Cooley

v. Quick Supply Co., 221 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa, 1974)

(user could not tell if fuse was burning).)

Product Designs

Design cases would appear more likely to arise

here than in the case of explosives and components, given the somewhat more mechanical nature

of some accessories. For example, one can envision

an action being brought on the ground that a particular type of blasting cap was designed so as to

allow accidental detonation too easily. However,

no reported cases have been found in which the

plaintiff proceeded against the manufacturer or

other commercial seller of an explosives accessory

on the basis of an al Iegedly defective design.

Marketing

injured plaintiffs have brought actions against

accessory manufacturers and selIers on the ground

that adequate warnings did not accompany the

products into the hands of the ultimate users. With

respect to fuses, plaintiffs typically argue that they

were not adequately warned of the burning characteristics of the products. Especially where the fuse

is sold as “safety fuse, ” such arguments have been

successful. (See, e.g., Canifax v. Hercules Powder

Co., 237 Cal. App.2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965);

Cooley v. Quick Supply Co., 221 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa

1974).) The plaintiffs in the blasting cap cases have

more frequently been persons outside the class of

professional users originally intended by the manufacturer to use the products, who have argued that

the defendant failed adequately to warn against

the possibility of the caps exploding accidentally.
210 ● Taggants in Explosives

RefIecting the tendencies for courts to refuse to extend the responsibilities owed by explosives manufacturers (see p. 205, supra) and components manufacturers (see p. 208, supra) to untrained, incompetent persons into whose hands these dangerous

products sometimes come, some courts have refused to hold blasting cap manufacturers for failing

to label their products as explosives. (See, e.g., Ball

v. E. /. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 519 F.2d 715 (6th

Cir. 1975); Littlehale v. E. l. du Pent de Nemours &

Co., 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).) However, at least

one court has not only recognized the duty of blasting cap manufacturers to warn children of the explosive nature of their products, but has suggested

that injured plaintiffs may join in a single tort action against all major members of the blasting cap

industry, together with their trade association. (See

Hall v. E. /. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F.

Supp. 353 (E. D.N.Y. 1972) .)

Actions Against Commercial

Transporters and Users of Explosives

Commercial transporters and users of explosives

are subject to strict liability for harm to persons

and property caused by their activities to an extent

that in some ways can be said to exceed the strict liability of sellers of defective products. Although

this rule is not strictly speaking a rule of “products

liability, “ it deserves brief mention in this analysis.

The general rule is set forth in sections 519 and 520

of the Restatement of Torts, Second. In essence,

persons engaged in activities considered to be “abnormally dangerous” are strictly Iiable without regard to the degree of care exercised. The rule applies whether or not the abnormally dangerous activity is commercial; but a clear majority of its applications involve commercial activities. A number

of courts in recent years have imposed strict liability in tort for harm to the persons and property of

others caused by transporters and users of explosives. (See, e.g., Ward v. H. B. Zachry Const. Co., 570

F.2d 892 (lOth Cir. 1978); Yukon Equipment, Inc. v.

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska,

1978) (storers of explosives strictly liable even when

explosion caused by vandals); Iannone v. Cayuga

Const. Corp., 411 N. Y.S.2d 59966 A.D.2d 745 (1978)

(blasters strictly liable). Cf. O’Connor v. E.). DiCarlo

& Sons, Inc., 378 N.E.2d 695 (Mass. 1978) (consequential damage from blasting is actionable only

on proof of negligence). )

HOW WOULD THESE EXPOSURES TO LIABILITY

CHANGE IF CONGRESS REQUIRED THE INCLUSION

OF TAGGANTS IN EXPLOSIVES?

Factual Assumptions

A number of factual assumptions will be carried

through the following analysis of the potential

changes in the products Iiability exposure of the explosives industry. At the end of the analysis, each

assumption will be hypothetically altered to permit

consideration of alternative outcomes. These assumptions are included here to render manageable

what follows. They are not meant to reflect any

judgment by the author regarding the merits of the

issues to which they relate.

Congress will require the inclusion of both identification and detection taggants. Identification taggants are small pieces of coded material, capable

of surviving an explosion in sufficient numbers to

be retrieved mechanically. They are mixed with the

other ingredients of explosives at the time of manufacture. When retrieved foIlowing an explosion,

they allow the manufacturing source and date of

manufacture of the explosive to be determined.

Detection taggants are small pieces of material

that emit traces of a gas capable of being detected

by sensors. Explosives containing detection taggants presumably could be discovered prior to detonation by the use of gas-sensitive monitoring devices. Although the author understands that detection taggants are still in the relatively early

stages of development, the present analysis will assume their required inclusion in the interest of

completeness.

The designs of the taggants required to be included

will be specifically described by regulation. Two basic

regulatory approaches are available by which to

describe the taggants which would be required to

be included in explosives: 1) design standards, in

which the design specifications of the taggants are

described with relative specificity; and 2) performance standards, in which the taggants are described

in terms of expected performance — e.g., their capability of being retrieved after an explosion, or detected before one. With respect to most consumer
Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives ● 211

products, performance standards are preferred

over design standards because they leave the producers relatively free to provide consumers with

choices among designs. In the present context,

however, it may be assumed initially that uniformity in the design of taggants is more desirable than

variation, and therefore that design standards will

be adopted by regulation after adequate testing.

Congress will exclude black and smokeless powders from the list of explosives required to contain taggants. The following analysis will focus on solid explosives, such as dynamite. Because the inclusion

of taggants in explosive powders could present

somewhat different products liability issues, that

possibility will be deferred until later.

Government-supervised testing indicates explosives

containing taggants are “safe” for normal handling.

The assumption here is that Congress will not require the inclusion of taggants in explosives if testing reveals accompanying safety hazards. However, the word “safe” must be put in quotations because of the inherent Iimits of any testing pro -

gram — all possible conditions of use cannot be anticipated and tested against. Thus, notwithstanding

this assumption, experts are likely to be available

to plaintiffs who will testify in good conscience

that on the facts of a particular case the taggants

played a role in causing an explosion involved in a

particular case.

Taggant manufacturers will sell the taggants directly

to explosives manufacturers. The author is aware of a

proposal to have the Federal Government purchase

taggants and then sell them to explosives manufacturers. That alternative will be addressed in a subsequent section.

Congress will provide no special immunities or

other legislative adjustment of liabilities. Again, the

author is aware of suggestions that Congress adjust

the exposures to liability of members of the explosives industry, and wilI return to consider those possibilities in a later section.

Changes in Explosives Manufacturers’

and Sellers’ Exposures to Liability

In the following analysis, the question of whether these manufacturers and sellers of explosives

can successfully raise as a defense the fact that

they are required by law to include taggants in their

products will be deferred until the underlying questions of whether injured plaintiffs could succeed in

proving defects have been addressed.

Claims That the Taggants Caused

Accidental Explosions—Proof of Defect

At the outset, it must be recognized that in cases

in which injured plaintiffs claim that taggants

caused accidental explosions, technically they will

be asserting alleged defects in design rather than in

production. It will be recalled from an earlier discussion that a flaw consists of an inadvertent failure of a product unit to conform to the intended

product design. (See p. 206, supra. ) Because taggants are to be included in explosives intentionally,

technically they are not flaws, but part of the product designs. Will, or should this circumstance make

a difference in the way courts react to the plaintiff’s proof and arguments in cases involving accidental explosions? Functionally, taggants that are

proven to cause accidental explosions are quite

flaw-like. (The question of whether plaintiffs will

actually succeed in proving that the taggants

caused the explosions will be addressed shortly. )

That is, from the point of view of the injured user of

the explosives, the taggants would act very much

like flaws – i.e., they would constitute bits of “foreign” material that would not enhance, but rather

would detract from, the intended performance of

the explosives. Presumably, any instability produced by their inclusion would be a feature against

which normally careful handling would constitute

inadequate protection. On the assumption that

their inclusion causes accidents, they would be the

functional equivalent of “designed-in flaws, ”

The interesting question is whether, putting to

one side the functional equivalency of these taggants to product flaws, defendant manufacturers

would be permitted to argue, as a matter of public

policy, that the benefits to society at large sufficiently outweigh the risks presented to explosives

users as a justification for the inclusion of taggants.

(Again, the narrower question of whether it should

matter that the Government forces this decision on

explosives manufacturers will be deferred until

later.) What makes this question particularly intriguing is the fact that influential legal commentators have recognized that a “cost-benefit” analysis

is appropriate in determining whether product designs are unreasonably dangerous. (See, e.g., Wade,

On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,

44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973 ).)

On balance, the circumstances surrounding the

inclusion of taggants in explosives appears to be

sufficiently different from most cases involving allegedly defective product designs to cause this
212 . Taggants in Explosives

writer to doubt that courts would give much weight

to such policy arguments on behalf of defendants.

In most product design cases, the risks and benefits

to be balanced off against each other accrue to the

same more or less limited group of persons atypically, the product users. With respect to taggants,

the group put to risk —the users— are a much smaller group than the group benefited —society at

large. In product design cases in which one distinct

group is benefited and another put at risk, courts

have tended to impose liability on product designers, in part on grounds of basic fairness. (See, e.g.,

Passwaters v. Genera/ Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270

(8th Cir. 1972).) Admittedly, in most cases of this

sort the nonusers are the ones who are put to risk

and the users the ones who benefit. But it would

not be surprising if courts were to react similarly in

these taggant cases, where the situation is the reverse.

Taking these considerations together—the functional similarity of taggants to production flaws

(presumably, they cause the product suddenly and

without warning to self-destruct) and the general

tendency for courts in products liability cases to be

suspicious of allowing one group of persons to be

put at risk so that a different group can benefit– it

is likely that courts would treat these cases as they

would treat flaw cases. That is, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving that the taggants caused an accidental explosion, the plaintiff will have proved the

product to be defective and unreasonably dangerous notwithstanding efforts of manufacturers to

argue “the greater good for the greater number. ”

This conclusion draws support from the increasing

reliance by courts and commentators on the test of

“reasonable consumer expectations” to determine

the defectiveness issue. (See generally Restatement

of Torts, Second, 402 A, comment i; Hubbard,

Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative

Model for Imposing Strict Liability for Defective

Products, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 465 (1978).) Certainly

from the point of view of the user of explosives, a

stick of dynamite that explodes unexpectedly and

without fault on the user’s part could be said to fail

to meet that user’s “reasonable expectations.” (For

a consideration of the efficacy of warning users

that the explosives may accidentally explode, see

pp. 216-217, infra. )

Assuming that a plaintiff will succeed in establishing a prima facie case if he can prove that the

taggants caused the accidental explosion, it remains to be considered whether it is likely that he

will succeed in his proof. It will be recalled from an

earlier treatment of the liability of explosives manufacturers and sellers that the major problem confronting injured plaintiffs in cases involving product defects is establishing the existence of a defect

by means of circumstantial evidence. (See p. 206,

supra. ) Would the required inclusion of taggants in

explosives reduce those difficulties or proof? That

is, putting aside for a moment the question of

whether defendants would be allowed to raise as a

defense the fact that they are required by law to include taggants in their products, (see pp. 215-216,

infra. ) would plaintiffs be more I ikely to reach triers

of fact with arguments that the explosives themselves, rather than mishandling, caused the accidental explosions?

Although the magnitude of the reduction in

plaintiffs’ problems of proof brought about by the

inclusion of taggants cannot be predicted with any

degree of certainty, the answer to this question is

almost certainly, “Yes, plaintiffs’ problems of proof

would be reduced. ” In accidental explosion cases

up to now, plaintiffs almost invariably have been

unable to offer direct evidence of the presence of

foreign material due to the fact that the explosives

in question “self-destruct” in use. Once taggants

are required to be included, direct proof of their

presence will almost always be available– indeed,

their presence based on the Federal requirement

would probably be presumed.

Of course, the mere fact of the inclusion of the

taggants in the explosives would not make a case

for an injured plaintiff unless there were proof that

the taggants caused the explosion. Would such

proof be available to plaintiffs in the face of extensive, Government-supervised product testing showing taggants to be “safe”? I n part, the answer here

depends on a factor difficult for this writer to predict at this time– i.e., the degree of unanimity

among scientific professionals on the question of

whether taggants may pose risks of accidental explosions. On the reasonable assumption that in this

instance, as with most relatively novel technical

questions relating to probable risks, some division

of opinion is likely to be present among experts,

then the proof needed by plaintiffs will likely be

available in the form of expert testimony. In general, this expert testimony could be expected to

take two basic forms: 1) testimony that the presence of even a “normal” concentration of taggants

caused the accidental explosion; and 2) testimony

that in a given case an “abnormal” concentration

of taggants was present and caused the explosion.

Regarding the first form of expert testimony, on

the assumption that some members of the scientific community believe that taggants may at least

contribute to instability under certain conditions, a

qualified expert will probably be available who is
Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives . 213

willing to testify in good conscience that based on

the surrounding circumstances, including proof of

careful handling, the presence of normal concentration of taggants caused the accidental explosion. Without the taggants, the plaintiff’s expert

would be forced to rely more heavily on speculation regarding the presence of explosion-inducing

foreign material, making it easier for the judge to

intervene on behalf of the defendant as a matter of

law. With the inclusion of the taggants, the expert

could more easily anchor his opinion to a specific

hypothesis. Courts would continue to direct verdicts for defendants in cases where the plaintiff’s

other circumstantial proof was weak. But the presence of the taggants could be expected to cause

this to happen somewhat less frequently. However,

if in a case there is nothing, or almost nothing, in

the way of circumstantial evidence of what caused

the explosion, opinion of an expert that the explosion “may have been caused” by the taggants is unlikely to be sufficient, standing by itself, to support

a conclusion of causation. (See genera//y 2 F.

Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 1117-1118

(1956).)

With regard to the second form of expert testimony, to the effect that an abnormally high concentration of taggants caused the accidental explosion, the possibility exists that high concentration

could be established by evidence other than the

fact of the explosion itself: either the expert could

testify to an abnormally high number of taggants

recovered at the explosion site; or the expert could

testify to an abnormally high concentration of taggants in other undetonated explosives from the

same lot, which should be more easily traceable

given the taggant requirement. (It should be observed that proof of an abnormalIy high concentration would be proof of a “flaw” in the classic

sense —see p. 206, supra. ) If either type of independent proof of an abnormalIy high concentration

were available, the plaintiff would very probably

reach the trier of fact on a defect theory. In addition, the plaintiff should reach the trier of fact if

the taggants recovered were shown to be too large,

or otherwise misshapen in ways that could contribute to accidental explosions, If no such independent evidence were available, as a practice matter it

is difficult to see how the plaintiff’s case would be

strengthened simply by an assertion that a high

concentration of taggants, or odd-shaped taggants,

existed. With no direct evidence of the existence of

flaws, the mere fact of explosion ought not to suffice to permit the trier of fact to conclude that the

explosive was defective. Admittedly, the fact that

taggants are present in the explosives in the first

place adds “one more thing that can go wrong.”

But in the absence of independent proof of high

concentration, (which, perhaps significantly, the

special recoverability of taggants would help make

possible), as a practical matter the plaintiff’s case

would only be as strong as his circumstantial evidence.

In connection with the foregoing analysis of the

effects of the presence of taggants on the plaintiff’s

proof of defect, it should be noted that the utility

to the plaintiff of the first type of expert testimony—testimony that a normal concentration of

taggants caused an accidental explosion — depends

on the assumption made at the outset that explosives manufacturers would not succeed in raising

“Government coercion” as a defense. If manufacturers were to succeed with that defense, then it

would be to their advantage, and not the advantage of plaintiffs, to blame accidental explosions

on normal concentrations of taggants,

Claims That Detection Taggants

Failed to Function Properly

The basic fact pattern envisioned here is one in

which the plaintiff claims to have been injured by

an illegal use of explosives because detection taggants failed to operate to prevent the explosives

from being used illegally. This sort of case raises a

host of issues that are probably not worth pursuing

in-depth at this point given the fact that detection

taggants are very much more in the development

stage than are identification taggants. It will be

useful, however, to sketch the basic framework of

analysis.

It will be recalled from an earlier discussion that

normally explosives manufacturers are not liable

for harm caused by abnormal uses of their products. (See p. 207, supra. ) Thus, if dynamite were

used by a terrorist in such a way as to harm others,

the manufacturer of the dynamite would not be Iiable even if the dynamite could be traced to its

source, However, the situation might be different in

connection with detection taggants. That is, if an

injured plaintiff were to prove that a detection taggant failed to function as intended, allowing the

plaintiff to be harmed under circumstances where

an adequate performance by the taggant would

have prevented the harm, the manufacturer of the

explosives in question might be exposed to liability

for having sold a flawed product. In a somewhat

analogous situation, courts have imposed liability

for explosion damages on commercial sellers of

bottled gas containing insufficient odiferous containinant to permit detection of the gas in the air by
214 . Taggants in Explosives

sense of smell. (See genera//y Annotation, Duty and

Liability in Connection With Odorization of Natural Gas, 70 A. L. R.3d 1060 (1 976). ) To be sure, the defendants in a detection taggant failure case would

have an argument of intervening cause, based upon

the criminal conduct of the users of the explosives.

(See, e.g., Watson v. Kentucky & Ind. Bridge & Ry.

Co., 137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146 (1910); see genera//y

P P. 205-206, Supra. ) However, the Supreme Court of

Alaska recently imposed strict liability on a storer

of explosives, notwithstanding the fact that the explosion was deliberately set off by thieving vandals. (See Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund

Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1978). See a/s o

K/ages v. Genera/ Ordnance Equipment Corp., 367

A.2d 304 (Pa. Super. 1976) (plaintiff watchman was

criminally assaulted after mace gun failed to subdue an attacking felon).)

A major difficulty facing plaintiffs in such cases

wouId be proving the existence of a product defect.

Rival hypotheses as to the cause of the breakdown

in detection would include: 1 ) explosives aged beyond the useful life of the detection taggants; 2) explosives somehow “cleansed” of detection taggants; 3) explosives that never contained detection

taggants in the first place (not included in taggant

requirement, homemade, illegally imported, or pretaggants); 4) enclosure of explosives in container

that “defeated” taggants (might expose manufacturer to design or failure to warn liabilities); 5)

breakdown in detection devices (court might hold

explosives manufacturer and device manufacturer

jointly liable); and 6) breakdown in personnel in

charge of detection operation. Although the list appears formidable, some of these hypotheses might

be eliminated by independent evidence. If such evidence were available, an injured plaintiff might

reach the trier of fact in an action against the explosives manufacturer.

Significance of the Fact That

Manufacturers Are Required by Law to

Include Taggants

The question to be considered here is whether

defendant manufacturers and sellers of explosives

could argue effectively in defense of liability for

accidental explosions that the taggants were required by law to be included in their products. In

addressing this issue, the discussion will first center

on the basic analytical principles involved, apart

from considerations of the extent to which a Federal taggants requirement should be given deference over the products liability law of the States.

Thereafter, attention will focus upon the question

of possible preemption of State law.

A possible source of confusion may be eliminated at the outset. The fact that these taggant

cases are technically design cases, discounted in

importance in the earlier discussion of whether

manufacturers would be allowed to escape Iiability

on the basis of their actions promoting “the greater

good, “ is here highly relevant. By hypothesis, when

the Government orders products made to Government design specifications, the defense here being

considered is limited to those aspects of the manufacturer’s product that conform to those design

specifications. Whether the manufacturer will be

liable for product units that do not conform to the

Government design specifications –e.g., individual

sticks of dynamite that contain too high concentrations of taggants —may be relatively less affected

by the fact that the Government has requested, or

dictated, the relevant design. Thus. in Foster v. Day

& Zimmerman, 502 F. 2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974) an army

reservist recovered from the manufacturer of a

flawed hand grenade notwithstanding the fact that

the hand grenade had been made according to

army design specifications.

One area in which courts have frequently addressed the possibility of a defense to tort liability

based on conformance to Government-imposed design requirements involves products made to Government contract specifications. It can be argued

that the defendants in these contract specification

cases were not “required” by law to produce the

products later alleged to be defective, in the same

sense that the explosives manufacturers would be

“required” to include taggants in explosives. To

some extent, however, that distinction gives way

under analysis. It is a fact of economic life that the

companies who produce the sorts of products typically purchased in large quantities by Government

cannot survive without getting their share of

Government business. Moreover, as a technical

matter even the explosives manufacturers are not

being required to produce explosives containing

taggants —they are “free” to.decide not to sell explosives at all. Thus, the products liability cases involving the availability to producers of the “made

to Government specification” defense are relevant

to the present analysis. Indeed, to the extent that

the degree of coercion is marginally less in the contract cases, judicial recognition of such a defense

in that context provides that much stronger support

for a defense in the context of a statutory taggants

requirement.

A decision frequently cited for the proposition

that a manufacturer will not be Iiable for the design
Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives 215

characteristics of a product made to Government

specifications is Littlehale v. E. I. du Pent d e

Nemours & Co., 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967), aff’ing

268 F. Supp. 791 (S. D.N. Y. 1967). The plaintiff in that

case was a civilian employee injured by a special

type of blasting cap made 13 years earlier by the

defendant to Government design specifications.

The district court entered summary judgment in

favor of the defendant, stressing the fact that the

product design was dictated by the Government.

The court of appeals affirmed, emphasizing the

lack of any duty to warn such an unforeseeable

user. (It appears the plaintiff had begun by combining flaw, design, and warning theories, but abandoned the first two during trial.) Subsequent decisions have tended to question whether the Littlehale decision actually supports the principle that

a product cannot be defective by reason of those

of its design characteristics that conform to design

specifications dictated by the Government. In S uchromajcz v. Hummel Chemical Co., 524 F.2d 19 (3rd

Cir. 1975), for example, the court read Littleha/e a s

standing for the principle that a manufacturer’s

duty to warn is Iimited to foreseeable users.

A recent decision that cites Littleha/e for the

“Government specifications is a defense” principle

is Sanrter v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364

A.2d 43 (Law Div. 1976), aff’d per curiam 154 N.J.

Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (1977), pet. certif. denied

75 N.J, 616, 384 A.2d 846(1978). The plaintiff in that

case was a civilian driver of a Government surplus

Jeep, injured in a rollover accident, who claimed

that the design was defective because it lacked

seat belts. The trial court denied recovery as a matter of law, chiefly on the ground that the design

conformed to Government specifications, met the

special purposes for which the military originally

had ordered and purchased it, and therefore was

not defective. And in Hunt v. Blasius, 55 111.App.3d

14, 12 Ill. Dec. 813, 370 N.E.2d 617 (1977), aff’d 74

111.2d 203, 23 Ill. Dec. 574, 384 N.E. 368 (1978), the

court ruled as a matter of law for the defendant

manufacturer and installer of a roadside signpost

whose allegedly defective design conformed to

specific design specifications imposed as a condition of purchase by the State.

Several possible limitations on the availability of

these precedents to explosives manufacturers in

the present context must be noted. First, an exception to the general rule of nonliability would almost certainly be recognized in cases where the

manufacturer knew or had reason to know that the

Government specifications were dangerously deficient. (See Ryan v. Feney & Sheehan Building Co.,

145 N.E. 321 (NY. 1924).) Admittedly, cases recognizing this exception have tended to be ones in

which the defendant could be said to have “volunteered” its services; and in the cases envisioned by

courts to fall into the exceptional category, the

Government agencies are probably ignorant of the

deficiencies of the designs. Neither of these circumstances appear to be present in connection

with the inclusion of taggants, and thus the exception to the nonliability rule probably does not apply.

A second caveat is based on the fact that both

the Sanner and Hunt decisions, supra, are distinguishable on their facts from the taggants case

on another ground besides the fact that the design

requirements were not imposed by statute. In those

cases, and in most of the others that have recognized the non liability rule, the Government agencies purchased the products exclusively for their

own use. To impose I iability on the product suppliers would be, in effect, to impose liability on the

governmental agencies by way of an increase in

prices paid for products designed specifically and

exclusively for Government use. The initial assumption here is that the Federal Government will not

limit the application of the taggants requirement to

products for its own use. Thus, were explosives

manufacturers held liable for harm caused by the

inclusion of taggants, the accident costs would be

shared by all users of explosives; Government operations would be “singled out” to bear the costs of

taggant-related accidents.

It remains to consider the significance of the fact

that the taggants requirement is imposed by statute

rather than by contract. In this connection, one

possible source of confusion must be eliminated. A

long-recognized rule in tort law is that compliance

with Government safety regulations is no bar to Iiability for one’s negligent conduct. (See Restatement

of Torts, Second, S 288(c). ) That proposition, however, is very different from the one here being considered. The rule in 288(c) relates to the situation

in which the Government mandates a certain level

of safety precautions, and a reasonable person

would take additional precautions. The rule of nonviability being considered here relates to the very

different situation in which the Government mandates action which a court would, in the absence of

the mandate, find to be negligent. It is one thing to

hold an actor liable for not being safer than the

Government minimally requires him to be; it is

quite another to hold an actor liable for a dangerous course of conduct which his Government requires him to take. In the first case, the governmentally imposed requirement leaves the actor free to

decide whether to act more safely than the Govern-
216 ● Taggants in Explosives

ment requires; in the second, the requirement does

not leave him free to make that decision.

The main difference theoretically between the

Government imposing design specifications by

contract and by statute lies in the legislature’s

power to change the common law by the latter, but

not the former, method. Thus, when taggants are required by statute to be included in explosives, in

addition to considering whether it is fair to hold the

defendant liable for complying with the requirements of his Government, courts must consider

whether the legislature has, by implication,

changed the common law rules that determine liability. Viewed properly, the question is whether the

taggants requirement reflects a legislative judgment on the same issue that the courts are being

asked to resolve in the liability action. If it does,

then courts are required (putting constitutional aspects to one side for the moment –see pp. 222-223,

irtfra) to give deference to the legislative judgment.

In many instances of Government-imposed design

changes, a legislative judgment that the design

changes will increase the safety of those affected

by the product could be inferred from the fact of

the mandated change. To hold a defendant liable

in tort for doing something the legislature has decided is safer than not doing it would be contradictory.

IS the taggant requirement similar to these other

safety requirements? That is, does that requirement

reflect a legislative judgment that their inclusion

reduces — or at least does not increase — the risks of

accidental explosions? Given the legislative history

of the measure, it could be argued that it does not

reflect such a judgment. Indeed, it can be argued

that the taggant requirement reflects a legislative

decision actually to increase slightly the risks of accidental explosions in the interests of increasing

public safety against intentionally criminal explosions. (See discussion, pp. 211-212, supra. ) If the

courts were to view the taggant requirement in this

way, presumably they would be free to address for

themselves the question of liability for those increases in risks.

Assuming that some courts, at least, do not feel

themselves bound by an implicit judgment by the

legislature regarding the reasonableness of taggant

inclusion from the standpoint of user safety,

whether the “Government requirement” defense

will be available in taggant cases brought against

explosives manufacturers will probably depend on

whether those courts view products liability primarily as a means of deterring unreasonable conduct, or as a means of compensating innocent accident victims. If the focus is on deterring unreasonable conduct, the defense will probably be

available; after all, holding manufacturers liable

will not cause them to violate Federal law. On the

other hand, if the focus is on compensation, it is

more cliff i cult to see the direct relevance of the taggants requirement. If manufacturers are forced to

pay for harm caused to innocent victims by instable products, in the end society will bear the

costs through higher prices paid for the goods and

services whose production requires the use of explosives. To the extent that members of this larger

segment of society are general Iy the ones who also

benefit from the anticriminal aspects of taggants

inclusion, the results of imposing liability may

seem fairer to some courts than the results of denying liability. To some extent, even a denial of liability would cause accidental explosion costs to be reflected in the prices of goods and services, the production of which is dependent on the use of explosives, Commercial users of explosives, for example,

presumably insure themselves against portions of

the costs of accidental explosions, and pass the insurance costs on to their customers. And commercial users are liable to others injured by their activities. (See p. 210, supra. ) However, the imposition

of liability on explosives manufacturers would

seem to accomplish the cost-spreading objective

more fully.

One further issue must be addressed in connection with the possibility of a “Government specifications” defense, Because the inclusion of taggants would be required by Federal law, courts applying State law rules of products liability would be

required to determine whether the Federal law had

“preempted” — superseded –State law. The substance of such an analysis would be essentially similar to the analysis just described when a State

statute is involved. The major difference would be

that the Federal courts would become involved in

reviewing the State court decisions interpreting the

intent of Congress.

The Efficacy of Warnings and Disclaimers

It is most unlikely that explosives manufacturers

would be allowed to exempt themselves from liability by disclaimers included in their sales contracts. (See pp. 204-205, supra. ) Would warnings

fare any better in court? That is, would manufacturers be allowed to escape liability by warning users

that their explosives contain explosion-inducing

taggants? Again, the answer here is likely to be in

the negative. It will be recalled from an earlier discussion that warnings serve to apprise persons of

risks which they are in a position to avoid. (See p.
Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives ● 217

207, supra. ) Presumably, users of explosives containing taggants would not be in a position to avoid

taggant-related risks by modifying their use of explosives, In effect, manufacturers would be warning users that flaws exist which may, more or less

on random basis, cause harm, Viewed in this light,

such “warnings” appear to be more Iike “disclaimers in warning cloth ing, ” and presumably would

not be given legal effect by many courts. However,

it is to be expected that sales of explosives would

be accompanied by such “warnings,” and it cannot

be said with certainty that some courts would not

bar recovery on that basis, (Or perhaps on the basis,

equally dubious on these facts, that the users

“assumed the risks” of accidental explosions. See

p. 205, supra. )

Changes in Explosives Handlers

Exposures to Liability

It will be recalled from an earlier discussion that

professional users and handlers of explosives are

held to particularly high standards of care, approaching strict liability in some jurisdictions, (See

p. 210, supra. ) The addition of identification taggants could have four types of effects on their exposures to liability. First, to the extent that they are

already held strictly Iiable, an increased incidence

of accidental explosions would as a practical matter increase their strict liability. Second, to the extent that the inclusion of taggants were to require

special care in handling, explosives users would

presumably be exposed to great negligence-based

liability. Third, the inclusion of taggants would facilitate tracing explosives detonated by terrorists

(or by children, into whose hands the explosives

came) to their sources, opening up the possibility of

an argument of inadequate care taken to prevent

the escape of such dangerous instrumentalities.

And finally, the presence of taggants might provide

the basis for users of explosives to escape negligence-based liability by blaming accidental explosions on the taggants, and might allow explosives

users to succeed in indemnity actions against explosives manufacturers.

Exposure to Liability of

Taggant Manufacturers

Claims That the Taggants Caused

Accidental Explosions—Proof of Defect

The question of whether plaintiffs will succeed

in proving that taggants caused accidental explosions was addressed in the preceding section and

the analysis will not be repeated here. Assuming

that some plaintiffs succeed in Iinking taggants to

accidental explosions, what will be the taggant

manufacturers’ exposure to Iiability? Presumably, if

a plaintiff proves that a particular batch of taggants was abnormal in some way— perhaps the

pieces were too big, or varied too greatly in size—

he would have a good chance of reaching the trier

of fact with a claim based on a flawed component.

(See pp. 207-208, supra. )

If no such proof of abnormal taggant configuration were available, the plaintiff would be left to

proceed on the basis that the taggant manufacturer

supplied a defectively designed component part.

The defendant would argue that it is in the same

position as the supplier of any basic ingredient supplied in bulk to a product manufacturer– if the

combination of ingredients turns out to be dangerously defective, it is the product manufacturer’s,

and not the component part manufacturer’s, responsibility. It will be recalled from an earlier discussion that suppliers of traditional ingredients of

explosives would probably succeed with such an

argument. (See p. 208, supra. ) However, courts may

view the taggant manufacturer as being closer to

the manufacturer of the machine component in the

Dunson decision discussed earlier (p. 208, supra. )

The defendant in that case was held liable for a

“dangerous combination of components” on the

basis of its knowledge of the dangers and its involvement in manufacturing a component designed specificalIy for use in the final product.

In response to plaintiffs’ attempts to draw them

into the orbit of responsibility for the (presumably)

dangerous and defective explosives containing taggants, taggant manufacturers could be expected to

argue that they did not design their product specifically for use in explosives, but rather as a product

of many and varied industrial applications. Viewed

in this manner, they would appear closer to the sellers of basic, general-purpose ingredients of explosives. They could also be expected to rely on the

disclaimers included in their contracts of sale

which, when reviewed in Iight of this analysis, appear consciously designed to “build a record” to

support their assertions of a general-purpose product. However, it might be shown that taggant manufacturers would never have gotten into the manufacture of taggants in the first place without the

prospect of their being required to be included in

explosives, notwithstanding their protestations to

the contrary. (This writer lacks information on this

issue– he advances these considerations merely as

possibilities.)
218 ● Taggants in Explosives

Claims That Detection Taggants

Failed to Function Properly

On the assumption that it could be proved that

detection taggants failed to function properly (see

pp. 213-214, supra), plaintiffs injured because of

such failures might have causes of action against

the manufacturers of those taggants. (For a discussion of the liability of component manufacturers

generally see pp. 207-208, supra. ) Some of the difficulties facing plaintiffs in such actions have already been described. (See pp. 213-214, supra. )

Significance of the Fact That

Explosives Manufacturers Are Required

by Law to Include Taggants

Much of the legal material relevant to this issue

is contained in the earlier treatment of explosives

manufacturers’ liabilities, and will not be repeated.

(See pp. 214-216, supra. ) At least two factual differences in the positions occupied by taggant manufacturers in contrast to explosives manufacturers

deserve attention: 1 ) taggant manufacturers, unlike

explosives manufacturers, are not required by law

to be involved with taggants; and 2) taggants manufacturers, unlike explosives manufacturers, exercise control over the design of the taggants. D o

these differences suffice to take taggant manufacturers out of the rule of nonviability that may apply

to explosives manufacturers based on the fact of

Government regulation?

In attempting to persuade a court that the nonviability rule based on Government specifications

ought not to extend to taggant manufacturers,

(even if the court decides to extend it to explosives

makers) a plaintiff might argue as follows: “No one,

including the Government, urged (much less required) taggant manufacturers to begin to develop

such a product. Sensing a substantial profit to be

made, those manufacturers on their own developed

the taggant designs in question, patented them, and

then worked diligently to persuade Congress to require them in explosives. In the cases relied upon

by the defendants (see pp. 214-215, supra), the Government went to the producers and requested bids

on specifically described projects. The Government did not exactly require the manufacturers to

produce the products; but it is an economic fact of

life that producers of most products rely for their

survival on getting their share of Government contracts. (Indeed, as a technical matter explosives

manufacturers are not required to include taggants — they are “free” to choose to go out of business. ) Moreover, in the cases relied on by the defendants, the Government made all the significant

design choices. If taggant manufacturers are allowed to invoke the nonviability rule, the court will

have extended the excuse of “we had no control

over the design” to companies that in fact dreamed

up the idea of explosives taggants in the first place,

controlled completely their development and ultimate design, and then with substantial effort convinced Congress to require other manufacturers to

include them in their products under penalty of

law.”

The writer wishes to make clear that in advancing this argument hypothetically, he takes no position regarding its intrinsic merit. Whether courts

would listen to such an argument is a different

question. On balance, this writer is inclined to believe some of them, at least, would accept it, and

not allow the taggant manufacturers to argue that

they should not be liable because they made the

taggants to Government specifications.

The Efficacy of Disclaimers

It is likely that the taggant manufacturers’ disclaimers would not be given effect as disclaimers in

actions brought by injured plaintiffs. (See pp.

204-205, supra. ) Whether they would be given effect in the context of contribution or indemnity actions between themselves and explosives manufacturers is less clear. It will be recalled from an earlier

discussion that business entities dealing from equal

bargaining positions are often left by courts to allocate Iiabilities between them. (See p. 205, supra. )

However, it is not clear that the bargaining positions in this instance are equal, given the fact that

the explosives manufacturers cannot go without

taggants. In a sense, the taggant manufacturers

would have the explosives manufacturers “over the

barrel,” and courts might refuse to give effect to

disclaimers for that reason.

Returning to the Initial

Factual Assumptions

The objective here is to return briefly to some of

the factual assumptions made at the beginning of

this second section, to consider the implications of

alternative assumptions. The first assumption, that

Congress will require the inclusion of both identification and detection taggants is omitted. If detection taggants are not required to be included, it

may reasonably be assumed they will not present

products liability problems, The last assumption

made earlier, that Congress will not provide immu-
Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives ● 219

nities or other legislative adjustments of Iiabilities

will be treated separately in the next section.

What If the Designs of the Taggants Are

Not Specifically Described by Regulation?

It will be recalled from an earlier discussion that

two types of standards are available with which to

describe the taggants that would be required to be

included in explosives — design standards and performance standards. (See pp. 210-211, supra. ) If performance standards were used in the relevant regulations, their major impact would be in connection

with the issue of whether the manufacturers of explosives and taggants could argue against liability

on the ground that the Government required taggants to be included in explosives. (See pp. 214-216,

supra. ) Performance standards wouId give the manufacturers greater control over the designs of the

taggants to be included, and would weaken the

nonliability argument. Of course, from the explosives manufacturers’ viewpoint, control in this context may be illusory if only one taggant manufacturer’s product meets the Government performances standards and it is not feasible for the individual explosives manufacturers to develop their

own. At least from the taggant manufacturer’s

viewpoint, however, performance standards would

give them even more control — and continuing control — compared to the situation that would be presented by design standards.

What If Congress Includes Black and

Smokeless Powders in the List of

Explosives Required to Contain Taggants?

The major source of added difficulty in this circumstance is the fact that these powders, unlike

most of the other explosives considered to this

point, are “consumer products” in the normal sense

of that term — i.e., consumers purchase and use

these powders in small quantities in connection

with a fairly broad range of sporting and recreational purposes. Generally speaking, courts have

traditionally been more willing to impose liability

on the makers and selIers of consumer products

than on the makers of other types of products.

Moreover, it may reasonably be assumed, at least

for purposes of this analysis, that including taggants in loose-packed powders presents greater

technical problems —e. g., physical separation of

the taggants from the powders– than would be the

case with sol id-packed explosives such as dynamite. The combination of these two factors — a consumer product that poses greater technical problems – might very well increase the exposure to liability of both explosives and taggant manufacturers as a practical matter.

One major battleground, not particularly significant in connection with the sale of solid-packed,

taggant-treated explosives to professional users

(see pp. 216-217, supra) would be failure to warn.

Persons (including nonuser bystanders) injured during the course of consumer use of taggant-treated

powders would argue that they were not sufficiently warned of the risks accompanying such use, and

a percentage of such cases could be expected to

reach the jury. (On the subject of failure to warn

see genera//y p. 207, supra. ) Moreover, consumers

would include in such actions claims based on

product flaws (powder contained abnormally high ,

or low, concentration of taggants, or wrong size

taggants —see genera//y pp. 206, 213, supra), a n d

defective product designs (taggants are defectively

designed component parts) (see genera//y pp. 206-

207 and 211-213, supra), and a percentage of those

claims could be expected to succeed.

What If Congress Decides That Explosives

Containing Taggants Pose “Socially

Acceptable” Levels of Risk?

The change in the assumption here is that instead

of determining that taggants pose no practical risks

of accidental explosions — i.e., are “safe” for normal handling –Congress determines that the levels

of risk presented by including taggants are not insignificant but are nevertheless socially acceptable–i.e., that some explosives will accidentally

detonate, but that the antiterrorism benefits to society derived from including the taggants outweigh

the costs of accidental explosions. With this hypothetical change in the assumption, the exposures to

liability of explosives and taggants manufacturers

(absent judicial recognition of the defense of governmental coercion and absent a special immunity

provided by Congress–see the next section, infra)

would almost certainly increase over what it would

have been based on the former assumption. It will

be recalled from an earlier discussion that even a

finding by Congress that taggants are “safe” is unlikely to insulate manufacturers from liability as a

practical matter. (See p. 216, supra. ) By hypothesis,

plaintiffs would be helped more if Congress were to

concede in its findings the existence of a measurable, but acceptable, risk of accidental explosions.

The question of whether courts would allow manufacturers to rely upon the social acceptability of

the risks in arguing against liability was considered

earlier, (see pp. 211-212, supra), and that analysis
220 Taggants in Explosives

will not be repeated. On the strength of the earlier

analysis, it is unlikely that an explicit declaration

by Congress that the benefits to society outweigh

the risks of accidental explosions would change the

courts’ reactions to this aspect of the problem.

What If Taggant Manufacturers Sell

Their Products to the Federal

Government, Which in Turn Sells

Them to Explosives Manufacturers?

In an earlier discussion of the significance of the

fact that explosives manufacturers are required to

include taggants, it was recognized that in most of

the cases in which manufacturers appear to have

been exempted from liability on that basis, the

Government actually purchased the products later

alleged to be defective. (See p. 215, supra. ) Superficially, at least, it would appear that both explosives

and taggant manufacturers would be able to

equate themselves more easily with the sellers in

those cases were the Government to purchase the

taggants and then resell them to explosives manufacturers.

One basis for questioning whether it would be

that simple, however, is the other half of the earlier

distinction between the precedents and the instant

situation — i.e., the Government agencies in those

cases originally purchased the products for their

own use. It could plausibly be argued that there is a

significant difference between the Government

purchasing specially designed products for its own

use and later allowing the public to gain access to

those products, on the one hand, and the Government acting merely as a conduit between private

interests, on the other. To impose liability in the

first situation arguably would burden unduly the

ability of the Government to obtain at reasonable

costs products specially suited to its operational —

e.g., military— needs. To impose liability in the second situation would not have those consequences,

assuming that the Government passed on its costs

to the explosives manufacturers. Indeed, it can be

argued that to refuse to impose Iiability merely because the Government acted as a sales conduit

wouId be to exalt form over substance.

If the Government were to act as a sales conduit

for the taggants, would the Government be exposed to products liability? The answer here would

almost certainly be in the negative, given the availability of sovereign immunity. It has been held that

strict products liability actions do not fall within

the consent to suit provisions of the Federal Tort

Claims Act. (See In Re Bomb Disaster At Roseville,

Cal., on April 28, 1973, 438 F. Supp. 769 (E. D. Cal.

1977).) And were a plaintiff to pursue a claim in

negligence on the basis of inadequate testing or

mistake in judgment in deciding to include taggants, the claim would almost certainly come within the preclusion of IiabiIity for the “exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty” in 28 U. S.C. A.S

2680(a).

ASSUMING THAT THE TAGGANTS REQUIREMENT WILL INCREASE

THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY EXPOSURES OF THE EXPLOSIVES

INDUSTRY, WHAT ADJUSTMENTS OF THOSE EXPOSURES

MIGHT CONGRESS

The purpose here is not to make recommendations regarding whether, or how, legislatively to adjust the exposures to liability of the parties affected by the proposed taggants requirement, but

rather to explore the major alternatives available

to Congress in this regard and to explore briefly the

significant implications of each. In developing

these alternatives in the sections that follow, the

underlying assumption will be that Congress is

chiefly concerned with the possible allocations of

accidental explosions costs generated by the inclusion of normal concentrations of properly manufactured taggants in explosives, and is ready in any

event to allocate the accident costs of abnorma l

CONSIDER MAKING?

concentrations and improperly manufactured taggants —the costs of product “flaws” in the traditional sense of that term—to the manufacturers

and sellers of taggants and explosives responsible

for such abnormalities.

Congress Could Decide to Shift the

Accident Costs of “Normal Taggant

Inclusion” to the Federal Government

The main policy argument in support of this alternative is that the costs of accidental explosions

caused by the inclusion of normal concentrations
Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives ● 221

of properly manufactured taggants are costs directIy attributable to the decision of Congress to require such inclusion in the interests of public safety, and therefore they should be borne by the Federal Government and spread generally to the public through the tax system, At least three basic variations of this alternative are available:

The Existing Tort System Remains

Unchanged; When Manufacturers’ Liability

Is Based on “Normal Taggant Inclusion, ”

They May Obtain Indemnity From the

Government

Under this approach, manufacturers (and other

commercial sellers) would be the defendants

against whom the actions would initially be

brought. In cases in which they are held liable in

tort based upon the inclusion of normal concentrations of properly manufactured taggants, they

would be indemnified, thus shifting the liability

losses to the Federal Government. A number of

questions may be raised concerning the efficacy of

this approach, among which are the following: 1)

manufacturers would still be open to the expense

of defending these actions —would such expenses

be reimbursed? 2) How would the basis of the defendant’s liability be determined? Might Congress

require a special verdict mechanism in all such

cases — i.e., a specific finding by the trier of fact as

to the role played by taggants in the explosion? 3)

Would every case have to go to trial? What if settlements were reached? 4) Would such an approach

create sufficient financial incentives favoring a

finding of taggant involvement that manufacturers

would manipulate the trial process to help assure

such a result? 5) Would triers of fact, some of

whom can be assumed to know of the indemnity

plan, be tacitly encouraged to “blame the taggants” in cases involving accidental explosions?

One further issue that is inherent in indemnity

actions which would have to be addressed is that of

collateral estoppel. A decision in the action against

the manufacturer that normal concentrations of

properly manufactured taggants did not cause the

explosion would preclude relitigation of that factual issue in an indemnity action against the Government. (See Park lane Hosiery Co., Inc. V. Shore

439 U.S. 322, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552, 99 S. Ct. 645, (1979 ).)

But a finding that a normal concentration of properly manufactured taggants caused the explosion

would not necessarily bind the Government in a n

indemnity action. A sensible statutory procedure

involving indemnity actions against the Government would almost certainly include consent by

the Government to be bound by the factual determinations in the actions against the manufacturers.

Immunity From Liability Is Granted to

Members of the Explosives Industry for All

Accidental Explosions; Plaintiffs Bring

Actions Against Government; Government

May Obtain Indemnity From Manufacturer

If “Normal Taggant Inclusion” Is Not

the Basis of Liability

This is the reverse of the variation considered in

the preceding section, and resembles somewhat

the approach to the liability question adopted recently in the National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976 (42 U. S.C.A. 8 247b(j) - (1) (1976 ).) In

theory it reaches the same allocations of Iiability as

the preceding variation, but the actions are brought

in the first instance against the Government, not

the explosives industry.

One significant difference between the circumstances surrounding the Swine Flu Program and the

circumstances surrounding the inclusion of taggants in explosives relates to the relative significance of causal factors other than the Governmentinstigated activity. In connection with the Swine

Flu Program, it could be assumed that a majority of

the cases brought successfully by injured plaintiffs

would not involve indemnity — i.e., that a majority

of those persons injured were injured as a result of

the inherent risks of the Program rather than the

negligence of the manufacturers. With the taggants

program, the situation may be quite the reverse.

Here, it might be assumed that a relatively small

percentage of accidental explosions are actually

attributable to the normal inclusion of taggants. If

that is the case, then the approach here being considered would, in contrast to the Swine Flu Program, in most cases send plaintiffs initially to the

“wrong place” from which to seek relief.

Two results of this misdirection of focus, neither

particularly desirable, might result: either taggants

would typically be exonerated in the actions

brought against the Government, in which case indemnity actions would become routine and the associated transaction costs a source of waste; or the

triers of fact in the actions against the Government,

sensing something of a “giveaway,” would tend to

blame the taggants in many more cases than could

be supported on the data. In theory, of course, the

latter circumstances would not arise. In practice, it

could well be a real possibility.

The problem of whether findings in actions

against the Government would be binding in indemnity claims against manufacturers would have
222 ● Taggants in Explosives

to be resolved differently from the way it could be

resolved when suits are brought initially against

manufacturers. Under the variation discussed here,

the Government could not consent on behalf of the

manufacturers that they be bound. But a statutory

provision calling for making the appropriate members of the explosives industry parties to the actions could be worked out.

Limited Immunity From Liability Is

Granted to Members of the Explosives

Industry for Accidental Explosions

Caused by Normal Taggants Inclusion;

Government Is Liable for Explosions

Caused by Normal Taggant Inclusion

This variation is a combination of the two preceding, and could be accomplished by either of

two procedures. One method would be for plaintiffs to bring “normal” taggant cases against the

Government and all others against the appropriate

members of the explosives industry. One drawback

to this is the inefficiency connected with bringing

two separate actions, if it turns out that the plaintiff sued the wrong defendant first. A further problem is that once the indemnity idea is abandoned, a

theory which would make the findings in the first

trial binding on the defendant in the second would

be more difficult to work out.

The second method would be for the plaintiff to

sue both the Government and the appropriate industry members in a single suit. This would have

the advantages of bringing all the parties together

in a single proceeding. But if the action were

brought in Federal court, accommodations would

have to be made with the existing rules of diversity

jurisdiction and jurisdictional amount. For the action to be brought in State court, Congress would

have to consent to such suits.

Congress Could Decide to Shift the

Accident Costs of “Normal Taggant

Inclusion” to Explosives Users

The main policy argument in support of this

alternative is that the actual risks posed by normal

inclusions of taggants in explosives may be significantly smaller than the practical increases in manufacturers’ exposures to liability resulting therefrom,

causing an unfair shifting to manufacturers of accident costs that have been traditionally, and arguably should continue to be, borne by the users of

explosives. Under this alternative, when commercial users or their employees are injured because of

normal taggant inclusion, the losses would remain

where they fall due to the accident. When innocent

bystanders are thus injured, the users would presumably be strictly Iiable in tort. (See p. 210, supra. )

Admittedly, explosives users are not to blame for

the very few accidental explosions that are in fact

caused by normal taggant inclusion; but there is no

practically feasible way to allow them to seek recovery for those accidents without unfairly shifting

much greater accident costs, unrelated to taggant

inclusion, to explosives manufacturers. (Obviously,

the greater Congress’s confidence in the safety of

normal taggant inclusion, the more attractive this

alternative becomes.)

The following variations on this theme deserve

mention here.

The Existing Tort System Remains

Unchanged Except That Congress

Establishes a Presumption That Taggants

Do Not Cause Accidental Explosions,

Subject to Being Rebutted by Proof of

Abnormal Taggant Concentrations or

Improper Taggant Manufacture

Under this variation, plaintiffs would succeed in

al I of the cases in which they have traditionally succeeded under existing law, and would succeed in

cases in which they can prove a “taggant flaw” in

the literal sense of that term — i.e., cases in which

they can prove that the concentration of taggants

was too high (or low, if that were to cause the explosion), or that the taggants themselves were abnormal in some way. The major legal difficulty with

this approach would be presented in the form of attacks by injured plaintiffs against such a provision

on the ground that it constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of rights in violation of due process

of law. The recent Supreme Court decision in Usery

v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. I (1976), however, would seem to support the validity of such a

presumption. The plaintiffs in that case were coal

mine operators challenging on due process grounds

the constitutionality of the Coal Mine Health and

Safety Act. The Supreme Court upheld the Act’s

validity, including the establishment of an irrebuttable presumption that certain coal miners’ lung

diseases were work-related, concluding that due

process requirements are satisfied in connection

with Iiability-related presumptions if there is “a rational connection between the fact proved and the

ultimate fact presumed.” (428 U.S. at 4.)
Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives ● 223

Admittedly, the “rational connection” to which

the court refers would become strained in the present context if Congress were not factually to conclude that normal taggant inclusion was “safe” for

normal handling of explosives. But assuming that

Congress views as remote the chances of normal

concentrations of taggants causing explosions, a

presumption of no causal connection should withstand judicial scrutiny. “When it comes to evidentiary rules in matters ‘not within specialized judicial competence or completely common place,’ “

the Court concluded in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn

Mining Co., [supra], “ ‘it is primarily for Congress to

amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it. ’ “ (428 U.S. at 33-34, quoting

United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63,67 (1965 ).)

Congress Could Grant to Manufacturers

Immunity From Tort Liability for Accidental

Explosions Caused by Normal Taggant

Inclusion

If the “rebuttable presumption” approach were

believed to present constitutional problems of the

sort considered in the preceding section, this variation might provide an alternative approach to accomplishing the same objective without reliance

on presumptions. Thus, if Congress were ready to

accept the policy argument advanced at the outset

of this section, it might be more straightforward to

speak in terms of an immunity granted on the basis

of a policy judgment rather than a presumption

based on a factual judgment. Of course, plaintiffs

could be expected to attack this alternative on the

ground that it denies to them the constitutionally

guaranteed right to equal protection of the laws.

An attack of this sort was recently brought in Federal court against a somewhat similar provision in

the Federal law limiting the liability of nuclear

plant operators.

In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental

Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978), the Federal nofault compensation scheme created for the benefit

of victims of nuclear accidents resulting from the

operation of federally licensed nuclear power generation facilities was challenged on due process

and equal protection grounds. The district court

held the statutory ceiling of $560 million on liability from one accident to be, inter alia, violative of

the equal protection requirement because the

statute “place(d) the cost (of the encouragement of

nuclear power) on an arbitrarily chosen segment of

society, those injured by nuclear catastrophe. ” 431

F. Supp. 203 (W. D.N.C. 1977). The U.S. Supreme

Court reversed, holding the ceiling on liability to be

“classic example of an economic regulation. ”

fi38 U.S. at 83.) The Act was rational, according to

the Court, in view of Congress’s purpose of encouraging private development of nuclear energy,

and this was “ample justification for the difference

in treatment between those injured in nuclear accidents and those whose injuries are derived from

other causes. ” (438 U.S. at 93-94.) Although the

facts are somewhat different, (a limited remedy

was available to injured plaintiffs under applicable

legislation), it can be argued that the Duke Power

decision supports extending the immunity described herein.

Congress Could Decide to Shift the

Accident Costs of “Normal Taggant

Inclusion” to Manufacturers of

Taggants and Explosives

Congress could reach at least two conclusions

that would support this alternative. First, Congress

could assume that the costs of these taggantrelated accidental explosions will be passed on by

the manufacturers to their customers in the form of

increases in prices and conclude that such a distribution of those costs is appropriate; and second,

Congress could assume that the manufacturers are

in positions of control over the techniques of

design and manufacture affecting the levels of

risks presented by normal taggant inclusions, and

conclude that imposing liability wilI pressure

manufacturers to exercise their control in ways to

accomplish reductions in those risks.

A starting place for accomplishing these objectives would be for Congress to grant no immunities,

nor extend any rights of indemnity, to manufacturers of taggants and explosives. In addition, some

or al I of the following changes in existing law might

be considered:

Nonviability Based on the Fact of the

Government’s Involvement Could Be

Eliminated Legislatively

It will be recalled that in cases involving taggants, manufacturers may have available to them

arguments that they should not be liable due to the

fact that taggants are required by law to be included in explosives. (See pp. 214-216, supra. ) If

Congress concludes that these accident costs

should be borne by the manufacturers, the possibility of such a defense could be eliminated legislatively.
224 ● Taggants in Explosives

Manufacturers’ Liability for Accidental

Explosions Caused by Taggants Could

Be Established Legislatively

It will be recalled from an earlier discussion that

some courts, at least, could be expected to hold the

manufacturers liable in cases where the plaintiff

succeeds in proving that the taggants caused an accidental explosion. (See pp. 211-213, supra. ) However, to clear up any doubt on the question, Congress might consider making it clear in the statute.

A Presumption That Accidental Explosions

Are Caused by Taggants Could Be

Established, Subject to Being Rebutted

by Proof of User Mishandling

This would be a drastic change in existing law

which, in combination with the preceding two,

wouId practicalIy assure that every plaintiff injured

in an accidental explosion would reach the trier of

fact regardless of the actual cause of the explosion.

The practical effect of this change in existing law

wouId be to make manufacturers almost insurers of

the safety of those using and affected by explosives. (For a brief description of the basis for constitutional challenge of this change by the manufacturers, see pp. 222-223, supra. )

consider the possibility of establishing specific

rules governing questions of indemnity and contribution between these manufacturing groups. (Cf.

pp. 211-213 and 217, supra. ) On the basis of “who

profits?” and “who controls?” the activity in question, taggant manufacturers might be required to

indemnify explosives manufacturers.

Congress Could Decide to Divide

the Costs Among the Interested

Parties, Apportioning Such Costs in

a Variet y of Ways

The possible variations under this alternative are

numerous, and will not be explored in their variety.

One possibility, however, deserves mention if for

no other reason than the fact that it has become

something of a favorite with State legislatures in

addressing areas of tort liability, such as medical

malpractice, perceived to be in various stages of

“crisis.” Congress could decide to place a dollar

limit on claims arising out of accidental explosions

found to have been caused by normal inclusions of

taggants. Were this approach adopted it would, in

effect, divide the costs of such accidents between

manufacturers and users/victims.

The Question of Indemnity and

Contribution Between Taggant

Manufacturers and Explosives

Manufacturers Could Be Addressed

Legislatively

Especially if the alternative of shifting the costs

of manufacturers were adopted, Congress should

SUMMARY

Exposure of the Explosives Industry to

Products Liability Under Existing Law

Liability of manufacturers and other sellers of explosives. Basically the same rules of Iiability that apply

to manufacturers and commercial sellers of other

products apply to manufacturers and commercial

sellers of explosives. Defendants are liable on the

basis of negligence, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, and strict liability in tort. Two fact patterns predominate in actions against explosives

manufacturers: those involving product flaws, and

those involving failures to warn, In product flaw

cases, plaintiffs may rely on strict liability in most

jurisdictions; in failure to warn cases, a basic negligence analysis is most often employed. Two factual characteristics unique to explosives cases account for the somewhat different judicial treatment afforded these cases compared with products

liability cases generally. First, explosives invariably

“self destruct” during use, forcing plaintiffs to rely

to an unusual extent upon circumstantial evidence

of product flaws. And second, explosives are not

“consumer products” in the usual sense of that

term —the typical purchasers and users of explosives are presumably experienced professionals.

This second characteristic tends to affect negative-
Appendix D—Products Liability Implications of Legally Requiring the Inclusion of Taggants in Explosives . 225

Iy not only the plaintiff’s opportunity circumstan -

tially to prove the existence of a product flaw, but

also the likelihood of his succeeding with an argument that the defendant failed adequately to warn

of hidden dangers.

Liability of manufacturers and other sellers of explosives components. “Components” in the present

context is synonymous with “ingredients. ” Manufacturers and other commercial sellers of explo -

sives components are theoretically liable (and in

most States, strictly liable) for flaws in their products, but practical problems of proof tend to preclude such liability in most cases. Although sellers

of components in other product areas have been

held liable both for defective designs and failure to

warn, the factual bases of such liability— reliance

by others on the component seller’s unique knowledge and judgment regarding the risks associated

with uses of its product — are not typically present

in situations in which basic, general-purpose chemical compounds are sold in bulk to explosives manufacturers.

Liability of manufacturers and other commercial

sellers of explosives accessories. “Accessories” refers

to products normally used in connection with explosives, including blasting caps and fuses. When

the injured plaintiff can prove that he was injured

in an accidental explosion due to a flawed accessory, most jurisdictions will hold the commercial

selIers of that accessory strictly Iiable. However, as

a practical matter, proof of physical defect is difficult, especially with respect to blasting caps. A

number of actions have been brought on the basis

of the defendant’s failure to warn. When fuse

manufacturers fail adequately to warn of the burning characteristics of their products, they are held

liable to users injured by that failure. Judicial reactions to arguments that blasting cap manufacturers

should warn children and other incompetent users

that their products are explosive have been mixed.

One court not only recognized such a duty, but

suggested that the entire blasting cap industry,

together with their trade association, could be

joined as defendants in a single action.

Liability of commercial transporters and handlers of

explosives. Commercial transporters, handlers, and

users of explosives are subject to strict liability for

harm to persons or property caused by accidental

explosions.

How Would These Exposures to

Liability Change If Congress Required

the Inclusion of Taggants in

Explosives?

Changes in explosives manufacturers’ and sellers’

exposures to liability. TechnicalIy, normal concentrations of taggants pose questions of product

design rather than product flaws. However, taggants that cause accidental explosions are functionally quite flawlike, and some courts can be expected to treat them like flaws. Thus, unless the

defendants are permitted to rely on arguments of

governmental coercion (a question to be addressed

shortly), their exposure to liability will be increased

to the extent that plaintiffs can prove that taggants

caused accidental explosions. Expert testimony

supporting such a causal relationship could take

two basic forms: 1) testimony that a normal concentration of taggants caused the explosion, and 2)

testimony that an abnormal concentration of taggants caused the explosion. It is likely that plaintiffs will, in appropriate cases, find experts willing

to offer both types of testimony.

It is difficult to predict the legal significance

courts will attach to the fact that defendant

manufacturers are required to include taggants in

explosives. A strong argument can be made, supported by precedent, that this element of governmental coercion should constitute a defense. However, the situation surrounding the inclusion of taggants may be sufficiently different from the situations in prior cases to allow courts to impose liability. In any event, because the taggants requirement

is imposed by Federal law, courts will be faced with

the question of whether State laws governing tort

liability have been preempted.

The exposure to liability of taggant manufacturers.

If the plaintiff can prove that a particular batch of

taggants was flawed, causing an accidental explosion, the taggant manufacturer wiII probably be Iiable. Whether taggarits manufacturers will be Iiabie

for explosions caused by “normal” taggants depends on whether courts view taggants as components specially designed for inclusion in explosives

exclusively, or whether courts view taggants as

general-purpose products suitable for a range of

different applications not all of which are neces-
226 ● Taggants in Explosives

sarily dangerous. On balance, the former approach

seems more plausible, and therefore taggants

manufacturers may be exposed to liability to injured victims of taggant-caused accidental explosions. Although courts are unlikely to give effect to

disclaimers vis-a-vis injured plaintiffs, the question

of whether they wilI give effect to disclaimers vis-avis explosives manufacturers is more in doubt.

Whether courts will allow taggants manufacturers to depend on the basis that taggants are required by Federal law to be included in explosives

is not clear. It can be argued persuasively that taggants manufacturers should not be allowed such a

defense even if courts were to make that defense

available to explosives manufacturers.

What Adjustments to These Exposures

to Liability Might Congress

Consider Making?

Congress could decide to shift the accident costs of

“normal taggant inclusion” to the Federal Government. Three approaches to this end might be considered: 1) allow defendant companies held liable

in tort actions because of the inclusion of normal

concentrations of taggants to seek indemnity from

the Government; 2) grant to the companies immunity from tort liability for all allegedly defective explosives, allow all actions based on allegedl y

defective explosives to be brought against th e

Government, and then allow the Government t o

seek indemnity from the companies when “norma l

taggant inclusion” is not the basis of the Government’s liability; or 3) grant immunity to the companies limited to liability for accidents caused by

“normal taggant inclusion, ” and allow those cases

to be brought against the Government.

Congress could decide to shift the accident costs of

“normal taggant inclusion” to explosives users. Two

approaches to accomplish this end might be considered: 1 ) Congress could create a presumption

that taggants do not cause accidental explosives,

subject to being rebutted by proof of abnormal taggants concentrations or improper taggants manufacture; or 2) Congress could grant to manufacturers and sellers immunity for accidental explosions caused by normal taggant inclusion.

Congress could decide to shift the accident costs of

“normal taggant inclusion” to manufacturers of taggants and explosives. A range of alternatives are

available to accomplish this end, among them: 1)

nonliability based on the fact of Government coercion could be eliminated legislatively; 2) manufacturers’ liability for accidental explosions caused by

taggants could be established legislatively; 3) a presumption that accidental explosions are caused by

taggants could be established legislatively, subject

to being rebutted by proof of user mishandling; and

4) the question of indemnity and contribution between taggant manufacturers and explosives manufacturers could be addressed legislatively.

Congress could divide the costs among the interested parties. This objective could be accomplished

by placing a dollar limit on claims arising out of accidental explosions found to have been caused by

normal taggants inclusion, effecting a division of

accident costs between manufacturers and users/

victims.
APPENDIX E–SUITABILITY OF ANFO AS

A FILLER FOR CRIMINAL BOMBS

2700 Merced Street . San Leandro, Ca. 94577

16 January 1980

24-1393/0 084

Congress of the United States

Office of Technology Assessment

Washington D. C. 20510

Attention: Mr. Peter Sharfman

Reference: Your Letter of 11 January 1980

Dear Sir:

Referring to questions put to me by Mr. David Garfinkle of

Science Applications, Inc. about the initiation and the damage

potential of explosive devices loaded with ANFO, I would like

to answer you with the following statements.

ANFO generally consists only of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil at

a weight ratio of about 95 to 5, but may be used to designate

other types of ammonium nitrate based explosives. The density is

approximately 0.78 gicms, the energy density E. = 2.9 X 103 J\cm3,

and the ratio of specific heats of the gaseous products is I’ “= 2.554.

Under ideal conditions (i.e. quantities of several hundred kg and a

strong initiation source) ANFO detonates at a rate of 5 km\s ‘with

a Chapman-Jouguet pressure (at the shock front) of 55 kbar. In

small samples (e.g. 10 to 20 kg) . even if confined, the detonation

velocity is considerably lower, depending on confinement conditions

and initiation, and typically between 1.9 and 2.8 km/s. The

shock front pressure in these cases is also considerably lower

than 55 kbar. Samples with small dimensions and negligible

confinement will not detonate at all, (e.g. cylindrical samples

in thin plastic confinement 5 cm or less in diameter, or

unconfined layers of 5 cm or less in thickness) .

2700MERCEDSTREET ● SAN LEANDRO,CALIFORNIA 94577 ● (415) 357-461OTWX 910-366-7033

227
228 ● Taggants in Explosives

24-139 3/0 084

Page 2

The ANFO commercially sold and used in the U.S.A. can generally

not be initiated by a detonator only. A “booster” made of

about 50 to 500 g of high explosives such as Composition C 4,

which can be initiated by a detonator only, is generally used

to start the detonation. A criminal use of this type ANFO

in quantities of 1 or 2 kg does not seem reasonable since the

efficiency of a destructive explosive device under these

circumstances would generally not be significantly improved

beyond that resulting from the booster alone.

It is possible, however, to produce high explosives similar

to ANFO which can be detonated by a detonator only. Some

ANFO sold and used in the Federal Republic of Germany for

mining and quarrying purposes has this property called “cap

sensitivity”. It is also possible to modify the composition

of the blasting agent such that it becomes cap sensitive,

e.g. by replacing the fuel oil by hydrazine hydrate. The

sensitivity of ANFO can be increased by certain additives,

e“9” aluminum powder or potassium perchlorate. In some

cases, the sensitivity of the ANFO-like blasting agent can be

increased by crushing the ammonium nitrate prills. Most of

the premixed ANFO commercially sold in the U.S.A., however,

does not become cap sensitive by crushing the prills. ANFO

obtained by first crushing prilled ammonium nitrate commercially

bought in the U.S.A. and then mixing it with fuel oil will also,

in general, not be cap sensitive. If either the ANFO or the

ammonium nitrate used to mix it were obtained from certain

areas outside the U.S.A. , crushing of the prills may render

it cap sensitive. In all these cases of “cap sensitivity”,

however, a high powered detonator (e.g. one containing 1 g base

charge) is still needed, and also a certain amount of special

information is required, whereas modern propellants as well as all

types of black powder can be initiated by a heat source only,

like match heads, squibs, or even only an electrically heated

wire or a spark.
Appendix E—Suitability of ANFO as a Filler for Criminal Bombs ● 229

Page 3 24-1393-0 1

/008 4

The initiation requirements for various configurations are

summarized in Table 1 below. It should be noted that this

table is intended to give a general overview and that it

cannot present all limitations, exemptions, or special

circunwtances.

Table 1

REQUIRED FOR INITIATION

MATERIAL CONFINED UNCONFINED

Small amounts of Booster charge of (NO Reaction)

commercial ANFO 50-500 g high

(-- 2 kg.) explosive

Large amounts of Booster charge of Booster charge of

commercial ANFO 50-500 g hig h 50-500 g high

(> 50 ka), explosive explosive

Sensitized ANFO or Detonator with Detonator with

special mix at least lg at least 1 g

blasting agent base charge or base charge or

6“ prima cord 6“ prima cord

(50 grainift.) + (50 grain\ft.) +

small detonator small detonator

like below like below

Military explosive Small detonator Small detonator

like Comp. B or with about .25 g with about . 25 g

Comp. C - 4 base charge base charge

Modern propellant Heat source like (No explosion; only

or black powder matchhead, squib, violent burning

hot wire, or spark possible)
230 . Taggants in Explosives

24-139 3/0 084

Page 4

To compare the damage producing capability of destructive

explosive devices, one has to consider air blast, fragmentation,

and potential incendiary effects. Assuming the initiation

problems can be resolved for an explosive device containing

only a few kg of a blasting agent similar to ANFO, then the

air blast caused by this device could do approximately as

much air blast damage as a device with the same weight of

TNT (see Figure 1). The density difference between ANFO

and TNT (approximately 0.8 vs. 1.6) would require a larger

confinement volume for a device containing ANFO.

Comparing fragmentation of a device loaded with TNT versus

one loaded with a blasting agent similar to ANFO, the latter

would produce a smaller number of fragments larger in size

and with a somewhat lower velocity than the TNT device. The

total damage producing capability of the fragments of the

ANFO device would probably come fairly close to that of the

TNT device. Neither one of the two device types would produce

any significant incendiary effect.

The damage producing capability of propellant or black powder

loaded devices will generally be significantly smaller than

that of devices loaded with an ANFO-like blasting agent due

to the following reasons:

(a) The rate Of energy release is much higher in

high explosives, including blasting agents

like ANFO, than in propellants including

black powder. Expressed, e.g. in Megawatts,

a 5 cm diameter device loaded with ANFO delivers

energy at a rate of about 10,000 MW; a gun

cartridge of the same diameter delivers energy

at a rate of about 500 MW.

(b) The rate of detonation of high explosives,

including blasting agents like ANFO, is only

weakly depending on ambient conditions whereas

the propellant burn rate strongly depends on

the ambient pressure. Propellants including

black powder which are initiated in a metallic

shell will frequently violently rupture the

shell at a time when only a fraction of the

propellant energy has been released, producing
Appendix E—Suitability of ANFO as a Filler for Criminal Bombs . 231

24-139 3/00 8 4

Page 5

only very few medium velocity fragments and

only a moderate pressure wave . The burn rate

of the still remaining mass of propellant will

at the time of the shell rupture drop to a very

low rate imposing no other danger than a fire

hazard. A high explosive or blasting agent

detonated in a metallic confinement like a

bomb shell will always produce a number of

high velocity fragments and a strong air blast.

To summarize, it can generally be

producing capability of an explosi

expected that the damage

ve device loaded with an

ANFO-like blasting agent, if it is properly initiated, is

somewhat smaller than that of a device of equal weight loaded

with TNT, but significantly larger than that of a device of

equal weight loaded with black powder or modern propellants.

Very truly yours,

fl?&4F -

Roland R. Franzen

Senior Staff Engineer

Attachment: Figure 1
232 ● Taggants in Explosives

Figure 1 .—Airblast Pressures From TNT and

60

40

20

10

~ 8. 0

& 6.0 al

~ 4.0

@

~

a

5

= 2.0

0

~

z

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.1

Field Mixed AN/FO Fired on Ground

This figure was copied from: L. D. Sadwin,

J. F. Pittman, Airblast Characteristics of ANFO.

U.S. Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, MD

April 1969.

 -pound TNT hemispheres

 260- field mixe d

 500-Pound field mixed AN/FO

 l,000=pw@fla+d mixed AN/F@

Ambient atmospheric

pressure = 11.88 PSI

\

1 2 14 6 8 10 20 40 60

Scaled ground range, feet/( pounds) ’/3
APPENDIX F—DERIVATION OF

BOMBING STATISTICS TABLES

Chapters 1, 11, and VI contain a number of tables

summarizing the current and projected bombing

threat. These tables were compiled from data originating from a number of sources, including BATF,

the FBI, FAA, and a number of other law enforcement agencies.

BATF and the FBI compile overall bombing statistics. The data, however, are available only in the

form of periodic summary documents (semiannually from BATF and quarterly from the FBI) in compiled, tabular form, or in the form of individual

case files. Both data banks are computerized, but

the formating does not make it possible to retrieve

and analyze the data in a meaningfuI way. Management Sciences Associates had previously attempted an analysis of the BATF and FBI data

bases as reported in reference F-1, and had been

unsuccessful in retrieving the data in a manner

which allowed meaningful analysis. OTA reviewed

the BATF case file data, and concluded that

analysis of the raw data files was not feasible, for

the following reasons:

●

●

●

the files did not contain all the data needed

for the OTA analysis;

files concerning cases currently before the

courts could not be made available to OTA;

the amount of effort necessary to analyze the

individual data files was not commensurate

with the time and funds available for the OTA

anal ysis.

OTA conducted a similar, although less intensive, review of the FBI data files and concluded

that detailed analysis of the FBI files would have

the same limitations as cited above for the BATF

files; in addition, fewer bombing incidents are contained in the FBI file.

The OTA analysis was therefore based primarily

on the compiled summary reports. OTA had no reason to suppose that the data from any of these Government sources were more or less reliable than the

others, and so made use in each case of the data

source whose formating was most appropriate for

the analysis in question.

In this appendix, the original tabular data from

the FBI, BATF, and FAA are shown, and the way in

which the tables in chapter VI were compiled from

these sources is explained. The tables in chapters I

and 11 were derived in turn from the chapter VI

tables.

Table 54

The BATF data in table 54 are taken directly

from tables 1 and 9 of the BATF 1978 Explosives incidents Report, (ref. F-2) reproduced below. The

first five rows come from table 1, the last three

from table 9. The FBI data comes from table 1 of

the 1978 FBI Bomb Summary, (ref. F-3) also reproduced below.

Table 9 of the BA TF 1978 Explosives Incidents

Report shows 435 injuries in 1978. This includes 250

fireworks accidents (listed as “unknown targets”),

and OTA therefore reduced the figure to 185 injuries from bombings.

Table 55

The explosive trend data in table 55 are also

from the same FBI table 1. The only differences are

that a column of total explosive bombings and attempts has been added and the property damage

values have been rounded off to the nearest thousand dolIars.

Similarly, figure 22 shows the same data in a

graphical format,

Table 56

Table 56, on the determination of the explosive

filler used in criminal bombs, comes from two

BATF sources. The 1978 “all identified fillers” data

are based on table 13 of the 1978 BATF report (ref.

2). A total of 1,767 cases is shown for 1978 in that

table. This represents al I of the explosive and incendiary bombings, criminal accidents, and unignited

and undetonated actual bombs recovered during

1978, as shown by the first five rows of table 1 of

the 1978 BATF report (ref. F-2). If those fillers which

were not identified and the flammable liquids categories are removed, the number of cases involving

identified, explosive filIers from actual explosive

bombings, recovered explosive bombs, and criminal accidents are 824. If the 1978 numbers for each

type filler is divided by 824, then the percentages

shown are found (rounded off to the nearest percent). The BATF category called “dynamite” includes dynamites, gels, slurries, and emulsions. The

1978 laboratory identified filler data are taken

from page 43 of the BATF Annual Report for FY 78

233
234 ● Taggants Explosives

(ref. F-4). The “average” column is just arithmetic

average of the other two columns. OTA believes

these data give as accurate a feeling for the percentage of bombings for each filler type as can be derived, short of a case-by-case examination.

Table 57

The data shown in table 57 are derived from two

BATF sources. The total number of bombings

against substantial targets was derived from table 9

of the 1978 BATF report (ref. F-2). The table shows

1,409 incidents, which corresponds to the number

of actual explosive and incendiary bombings during 1978 plus the number of criminal accidents, due

to premature initiation, from table 1 of that report.

From that was subtracted the number of bombings

against unknown targets, mailboxes, and open

areas, from BATF table 9, to yield 1,298 bombings

against substantial targets. The breakout between

incendiary and explosive bombings was also obtained from data in BATF tables 1 and 9. Table 1

shows 896 explosive bombings (67 percent) and 446

incendiary bombings (33 percent). If the criminal

accidents from the use of explosive and incendiary

bombs are assumed to have occurred with the

same relative frequency, then the total number of

incendiary bombings and criminal accident s

against substantial targets is equal to 33 percent of

the 1,298 figure, or 428, while the number for explosive bombings is equal to 870.

The breakout of number of explosive bombings

by type of filler was arrived at by using the percentage filIer data from column 3 of table 56 and multiplying the percentage for each category by the

total number of explosive bombings of substantial

target figures given above.

Neither the FBI nor the BATF data summaries

break down deaths and injuries by the type of

bomb filler used. However, A. Atley Peterson, Special Assistant (Research and Development) to the

Director of BATF, gave a breakdown of deaths, injuries, and property damage by type of bomb filler

before the 4th International Conference on Terrorist Devices and Methods in England during M a y

1979 (ref. F-5). These data are shown in table 57.

Peterson’s figure for total injuries, like OTA’s table

54, excludes 250 injuries from fireworks accidents,

which are included in table 9 of reference F-2.

The row entitled “total for those fillers which

would be directly tagged” aggregates figures for

black powder, smokeless powder, and cap-sensitive

dynamite, gels, slurries, and emulsions, corresponding to BATF planning documents and also to the

OTA baseline case.

Table 58

Table 58 is BATF table 9 (ref. F-2) slightly modified. The words “property damage” were added to

footnote a. Also, the number injured in 1978 from

bombings of “unknown” targets was reduced to exCIude 250 injuries from fireworks accidents.

Table 59

Table 59 is an OTA compilation based on BATF

table 9 (ref. F-27). The percentage data are based on

the average of the 1977 and 1978 bombings. The

statistics for residences and vehicles and for commercial establishment come directly from that

table. To get the percentage of identified substantial targets unlikely to be protected by a detection

sensor, the unknown, other, mailbox, and open area

bombings were removed from the data. That left

1,189 bombings of substantial targets (i.e., eliminating open area and mailbox bombings) in 1977 and

1,161 in 1978 in which the target was identified. It

was then assumed that residences, vehicles, and

commercial establishments would be unlikely to be

protected by a detection sensor, while the other

target categories might well be.

Table 60

Table 60 is an OTA-generated categorization of

criminal bomber attributes.

Table 61

Table 61 was generated by the following process.

First, a calculation was made of the proportion of

bombings attributable to various types of bombers.

This calculation was made by taking FBI data on

apparent motives for the year 1974 (p. 9 of the FBI

Bomb Summary 1974, ref. F-6), 1975 (p. 16 of the FBI

Bomb Summary 1975, ref. F-7), 1976 (table 9 of the

FBI Bomb Summary 1976, ref. F-8), 1977 (table 9 of

the FBI Bomb Summary 1977, ref. F-9), and 1978

(table 8 of the FBI Bomb Summary 1978, ref. F-3)

and averaging them. The FBI used different categories in each year, and they were combined into the

four OTA categories as shown in the tabulation

below:
Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables 235

Terrorist category

Antiestablishment

Extremist

Foreign political

Political

AntlreligIous

Civil rights

Protest

Publicity

Sabotage

Subversion

Criminal category

Labor

Racketeering

Monetary gain

Extortion

Fraud

Intimidation

Diversion

Mentally distrubed

Animosity

Suicide

Reprisals

Revenge

Vandals and experimenters

Malicious destruction

Mischief

Vandalism

1975 1976 1977 1978

From the average for these 5 years, a calculation

was made of the proportion of al I bombings committed by each type of perpetrator: terrorists 12

percent; criminals 11 percent; mentally disturbed

38 percent; and vandals and experimenters 39 percent. The assumption was made that these proportions, calculated from bombings in which a motive

had been attributed, apply also to those bombings

where no motive is assigned by a law enforcement

agency. The average number of actual explosive

bombings for that 5-year period, taken from table 1

of the FBI Bomb Summary 1978, was then multiplied by these proportions to yield the data in table

61.

OTA feels that the 5-year average is more appropriate than presenting year-by-year trends as the

FBI categories have changed over that period, with

a substantial revision apparent between 1976 and

1977. In addition, the percentage of bombings to

which the FBI assigns a motivation has changed

drastically over that period. In 1974, 96 percent of

the bombings were attributed, while only 33 percent were attributed in 1978.

Table 62

Table 62 is taken directly from BATF tables 17

and 23 (ref. F-2), except that the BATF categories of

TNT and dynamite were combined in the category

“cap-sensitive high explosives, ” and RDX is included in the military explosives category.

Table 63

Table 63, on methods of entry for explosive theft,

is simply BATF table 18 (ref. F-2). The first footnote

has been slightly modified.

Tables 64,65,66,67

Tables 64, 65, 66, and 67 are taken directly from

an FAA document FAA-RD-77-28 (ref. F-10). Table

64 is table 4 of the FAA report; table 65 is table 5 of

that report; table 66 is table 7 of that report; and

table 67 is table 15 of the FAA report. The only

change in the tables occurs in table 66. Footnote a

indicates that the identification of the explosive

used in the LaGuardia bombing as dynamite and

RDX is an FAA estimate; other agencies have offered different opinions.

Table 68

The premature detonation statistics in table 68

are from the 1974 through 1978 FBI bomb summaries, references F-6 (p. 3), F-7 (p. 6), F-8 (p. 12), F-9 (p.

4), and F-3 (p. 9).

Table 69

The commercial airliner hijacking statistics in

table 69 are from reference F-11, FAA report, FAARD-78-66, table 5, for the years 1949-76. The 1977

data are taken from the FAA semiannual report to

Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation

Security Program for the period July through December 1978. The 1978 data were obtained directly

from FAA officials.

Table 70

Table 70, concerning possible perpetrator countermeasures, was generated by OTA.

REFERENCES

F-1 – J Roth, Evaluation of the Needs and Benefits of

the Explosive Tagging Program, MSA report 317-1, March

1978.

F-2 – BATF, Explosives Incidents, 1978 Annual Report,

F-3 – FBI, Uniform Crime Reports: Bomb Summar y

1978.

F-5–A A Peterson, 4th Annua/ /nternatiOna/ Conference on Terrorist Devices and Methods, England, ,May

1979.
236 ● Taggants in Explosives

F-6— FBI, Uniform Crime Reports: Bomb Summary

1974.

F-7 – FBI, Uniform Crime Reports: Bomb Summary

1975.

F-8 – FBI, Uniform Crime Reports: Bomb Summar y

1976,

F-9— FBI, Uniform crime Reports: Bomb Summar y

1977.

Table 54.–Minimum Bombing Incidents Statistics Summary’

BATF FBI

item 1977 1978 1977 1978

Explosive bombings, number . . . . . . . . . 1,037b 896b 867 768

Undetonated explosive bombs, number 319 287 118 105

Incendiary bombings, number . . . . . . . .

Unignited incendiary bombs, number .,

Criminal accidents, numberc . . .,

Property damage from bombings,

millions of dollars c d ., . . . . . . ., $

Injuries ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

People killed by bombings ` . . . . .

339 446 248 349

81 71 85 79

21 67 – –

10 $ 17 $ 9 $ 9

80 185 162 135

38 23 22 18

a BATF reported 3, 177 told incidents m 1977 and 3 256 in 1978 Total incidents include ac”

cldents threats seized and recovered exploswes, and hoaxes as well as actual explosive and m.

cendlary bombings The OTA study was concerned only with exploswe bombings

bof these 953 In 1977 and 787 m 1978 were against substanual far9ets

clncl”des both exploslve and Incendiary bombmgs OTA was unable to oblam SeParate f19Wes for

number of cnmmal accidents Injuries, deaths and property damage caused by exploswe and mcendlary bombs incendiary bombs and bombings would not be affected by the proposed lagganl

d~~~~~~~alue probably considerably higher due 10 lack of dala !lle Updates

SOURCE LMTF 1978 E@oswes Mcldem Report, FBI UrrIlorrn Cwrre Reporl 80~LJ Re@T,

1978

Accident-Criminal 21 .70 67 2.1%

Bombing (Detonation) 1037 32 .6% 896 27. 5%

Bombing (Nondetonation) 319 10. 08 287 8.80

Incendiary (Ignited) 339 10. 7% 446 13 .7%

Incendiary (Nonignited) 81 2.5% 71 2.2%

Stolen Explosives 327 10. 3% 362 11. 1%

Recovered ExpIosives 751 23.7% 870 26. 7%

Seized Explosives 102 3.28 117 3 .6%

Threats (Treasury facilities 33 1. 0 22 .78

Hoax Devices 105 3.3% 47 1 .4%

F-10— J. Bengston, P. Cutchis, and J Henry, Protection

of Airports Against Explosives, report No, FAA-R D-77-28,

January 1977

F-11 — N. Asher, P. Frazier, C Kennedy, and J. Kiernan,

Analysis of Past Airline Hijacking and Bombing Incidents

and the Present Defense Against Such Attacks, report No

FAA-R D-78-66, December 1977,

TABLE 9

BOMBINGS BY SPECIFIC TARGETS

FUR 1977 - 1978

(Actual Detonations or Ignitions

TOTAL

INCIDENTS

TYPE TARGET —L. —. ..— 137-7 1978

Residential 352 294

Comercial 367 375

Airports/Aircraft 7 5

Police Faci1ities/ 14 29

Vehicles

Educational 106 97

Government (Local) 24 9

Government (Federal ) 26 22

Militat y 4 3

Installation s

Utilltie s 51 57

Banks 22 18

Vehicles 216 252

Open Areas 36 40

Mai1 boxes 48 69

Other 90 137

Unknown 2

34 2

Total 1,397 1, 409

NO. KILLED

1977 1978 - —

17 7

7 6

l —

. —

— —

— 1

. —

— —

l —

— —

11 7

1 2

— —

— —

—

.

38 23

— —

Propert y

NO. INJURE D Damage

1977 l978 1977.-–

66 57 1,022.3 2,982.2

48 46 6,640.1 8,717.7

l — . 2

— — 5 . 8 70.4

13 5 43.1 532.3

1 4 145.6 70.1

4 1 2 . 4 6 . 6

— 1 — 0 . 0

1 2 628.0 1,727.7

— — 225.2 49.3

24 25 363.3 2,119.4

8 13 . 5 4 . 2

1 2 25.8

8 27 1,206.8 869.9

5 252 22.6 E.0

—

180 435 10,331.7 17,212.1

1 . Figures are in thousands and are estimated.

2. This category includes those incidents where the type target was

either unknown or not reported.

Table 1. Bombing

Year

1972

1973

1974

1975

1916

1977

1978

— —

INCIDENTS

TotaI

Actual and

Attempted

EmmblnSs1,962

1,955

2,044

2,074

1,570

1,318

1,301

-–. K!

Explo.

714

742

893

1,006

852

867

768

Actual—

Incend

793

787

758

613

405

240

349

.- ——— — Properly

Damage

(Dollar Personal

—-v&. ~—. — 1nJug7, 991,815 176

7,261,832 181

9, 886,563 207

27,003,981. 326.

11, 265,426 213

8,943,102 163

0, 161,485 133

Includes three major bombing incidents resulting in unusually high personal injuries

and deaths and substantial damage 1. property.

Death —

25

22

24

69*

50

23

18

Accident-!Joncr Nocriminal 62 2. 68 71 2.28

— —

TOTAL 3,177 100% 3,256 10C%

TOTAL KILLED ‘TOTAL INJURED TOTAL DAMAGE AJMOUNT

1977 127 374 $61,300,000

1978 69 707 $27,500,000

—
—

Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables . 237

Table 55.–Explosive Bombing Incident Trends, 1972-78

Total actual and Total actual and

attempted ex- attempted incen - Property damage Personal

—

Year plosive bombings Actual Attempted diary bombings Actual Attempted (dollar value) injury Death .

1972 . . . . . .-: 951 714 237 1,011 793 218 $7,992,000 176 25

1973 . . . . . . . 995 742 253 960 787 173 7,262,000 187 22

1974 . . . . . . . 1,129 893 236 915 758 157 9,887,000 207 24

1975 . . . . . . . 1,326 1,088 238 748 613 135 27,004,000a 3 2P 6 9

1976 . . . . . . . 1,040 852 188 530 405 125 11,265,000 212 50

1977 . . . . . . . 985 867 118 333 248 85 8,943,000 162 22

1978 ......, 873 768 105 428 349 79 9,161,000 135 18

a includes three major bombing incidents resulting in unusually high personal injuries and deaths and substantial damage to property

SOURCE FBI Uniform Crime Reports Bomb Summary 1978

Figure 22.—Annual Bombing Statistics, 1972-77

I

I 1 I 1 i I I

3,000 “

Including incendiary

 2,000 -

z 1,00 0

(1 ,301)

873)

1 I I

I Explosive only~ I

. ,

1

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

a. Number of incidents (includes attempts)

Table 1 BOMBING

— Year

1972

1913

1974

1975

1976

1971

1978

INCIDENTS

Total

ACTUAL Attempted

Bombings

1,962

1, 955

2, 044

2, 074

1,570

1,318

1,301

, 1972 through

Actual

Explo

114

742

093

1, 088

852

861

768

Incend

793

781

758

613

405

248

349

Attempt

Explo

237

253

236

238

188

119

105

A

~ce~d

218

113

1s7

13s

125

85

19

Propefly

Khmage

(collar

—~zlhg~

7,991,815

7, 261,832

9,996,563

7, 003, 981,

1,265,426

8,943, 300

9, 161,485

%rsonal

~n~r~ -

176

181

207

326.

212

162

135

.I, eludes lhree ma]or twnbint Incidents resull!w In unusually h@ personal lnluries

and deaths and .ubshtial damage to propc~.

Death

25

22

24

69.

so

22

18

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

b. Property damage (includes incendiary bombings)

(/3

az . - 300

3. -

C. - 250

% 200

$

e 150

; 1

(135)

4 nn

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

c. Personal injury (includes incendiary bombings)

k r m r , 4

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978

d. Deaths (inciudes incendiary bombings)
238 ● Taggants in fx~losives

Table 56. -ldontified Explosive Fillers Used in Bombs TABLE 13

Types of Explosivcs Filler Used

Lab Identified All Identified With in the Destructive Device

fillers 1978 fillers 1978 Average —— —

Black powder, . . 13% 21% 17?40

Smokeless powder 16 19 17.5

Military , ., . . ., . . 2 7 4.5

Cap sensitive ... . . . 32 30 31

Blasting agents. . . – t 5

Chemicals – 1 .5

Others. . . . . . . . 36 21 28.5

Type of Fille r

Flammable Liquid

Black Powder

NUMBER

1977 1978

279 468

PERCENTAGE 

2

1977 1978 --

36. 4% 36. 2%

222 171 29.00 13. 2%

SMOKELESS Powder

Military Explosives

Dymmite 3

Blasting Agent

Chemical

Other 4

133 157

19 54

17. 4% 12. 2%

2 .4% 4 .2%

30 251 4 .0% 19. 4%

SOURCE. BATF data. 23 8 3 .0% .6%

10 7 1 .3% .5%

TABLE 1

Types of Explosive Incident s

By Number and Percentage

50 176 6.58 13.7%

1.

2.

3.

4.

This category includes f i hers that were placed in some Specific

type of container such as a pipe, metal box, or attache case.

These percentages do not include 1,031 incidents in 1977 and 475

incidents in 1978 in which the type of fi1ler was not made available,

or the laboratory result-s for recent incidents were not completed .

The method in which the filler was determined has been revised for

1978. Dynamite with in the sticks are counted as a f i her.

This category includes those fillers which could not be placed in

the categories provided.

TYPE OF INCIDENT‘

Accident- Criminal 21 . 7t

32 .6%

10 .0%

10 .7%

2 .5%

10. 3%

23.7%

3 . 2

1. o%

3.3%

2.08%

100%

67

896

287

446

71

362

870

117

22

47

71

3,256

2.1%

27. 5%

8 .8%

13. 7%

2.2 $

11 .1%

26.7R

3.6%

. 7

1 .4%

2.2%

Bombing(Detonation) 1037

BOmbing (Nondetonation) 319

Incendiary (Ignited) 339

Incendiary (Nonignited) 81

Stolen Explosives 327

Recovered Exclusives 751

Seized Explosives 102

Threats (Treasury Facilities) 33

Hoax Devices 105

1%> MILITARY

97% ,lMKmwu [

31% DYNAMITES ( J

. . ,. . . . . . . . . . . .. 1

\

Accident-Noncrimina l 62

—

TOTAL 3,177

TOTAL KILLED TOTAL INJURED —

1977 127 374

1978 69 707

12% SMOKELESS POWDER \

7%BlACK POWDER \

100%

TOTAL DAMAGE AMOUNT

$61,300,000

$27,500 ,000 1978

279 SAMPLES

2% MILITARY

16% DYNAMITES

26% UNKNOWN /

14% SMOKELESS

13% BLACK POWDER

27% OTHER

27% DYNMITES

17% UNKNOWN

SD% OTHER

2% MILITARY

11% BLACK POWDER Field lab
Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables ● 239

Table 57. -Bombing Casualties and Damage in 1978 by Type of Bomb

Number of

bombings against Property damage

Filler material substantial targets Deaths Injuries $ millions

Air fillers. ., 1,298 23 185 $172

lncendiary ., 428 3 13 3.7

Black powde r 148 4 19 2

SmoKeless powde r 152 3 23 2

Milltary explosive 39 0 7

Cap sensitive . 270 7 26 2.3

Othe r 3 40 2.4

Unknown ~ 3 57 7 4

Total for those fillers which

would be directly tagged 570 14 68 3.7

TABLE 9

127

1976 69

21

1037

31!4

339

81

327

751

102

33

105

62

3,117

—

374

707

.70 67 2. 1%

32 .6% 9 6 27.58

10. % 287 8 .8%

10.7% 446 13. 7%

2. 5% 71 2.2%

10. 3% 362 11. 1%

?3.7b 870 26. 7%

3.2% 117 3 .6%

1. L!% 22 .7%

3.3% 47 1.4$

Res Ident 1.31 352 294

cOm-*rcla l 367 375

Ai r~rts/Ai rcraft 7 5

Po) Ice Faci 11 ties/ 14 29

Vehicles

Eriucat ional 1D6 97

Government (Local) 2 4 9

Govern..ent (Federal) 26 2 2

Mi 1 I tary 4 3

Instal lat ions

uti 1 i t ies 51 57

Banks 22 18

Vehicles 216 252

O P Are = 36 40

Mai 1 Boxes 48 69

Other 90 137

? . u% 71 2. 2s

1.

2. IGo% 3, ?56 1008

Unknohm 2 34 2

Total 1,397 1,409

PROPE:R7Y 1

NO. KI LL!D W. INJURED D,W.WE

1977 ““- ‘- ‘- “‘- ‘ --- ‘-”-

—

17

7

1

1—

11

1 —

—

38

19 /5 IY / / IY /5 IY / / -lY /: –

7 66 57 1,022.3 2,982.2

6 48 46 6,640.1 8,777.7

— l — .2 .2

— — 5.8 70.4

— 13 5 43.1 532.3

1 1 4 145.6 70.1

— 4 1 2.4 6 . 6

— — 1 — 0.0

— 1 2 628.0 1,727.7

— — — 225.2 49.3

7 24 25 363.3 2,119.4

2 8 13 .5 4 . 2

— 1 2 25.8 2.1

— 8 27 1,206.8 869.9

— 5 252 22.6 0 . 0

23 180 435 10,331.7 17,212.1

— —

Figures are in tho~sands and are estimated.

This catego~ includes those incidents where the type target was

either unknom or mt reported.
240 “ Taggants in Explosives

Kil

Property

INCENDIARY

BLACK POWDER

SMOKELESS POWDER

MILITARY

DYNAMITE

OTHER

UNKNOWN

TOTALS

led, Injured, and

Damage by Explosives

CY1978

—

K—

3

4

3

—

7

3

3 —

BOMBINGS

I

13

19

23

7

26

40

57

PROPERTY

DAMAGE.$

3,659,760

174,739

150,000

21,0511

3,359,433

2,442,s63

7,404,765

ACCId

EXPLo

I —

K—

8

—

3

6

1

16

12

—

156

—

2

17

4

321

20

TAL

ONS

PROPERTY

DAMAGE-$

300,000

—

7,000

5,545,100

4,396,000

23 185 17,212/330 46 522 10,246,103

—

K—

11

4

6

6

8

19

15 —

69

—

Slide used to illustrate a presentation on explosives tagging by A. Peterson,

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire arms U.S. Treasuray Department, at the forth

International Conference on Terrorist Devices, and Methods England. May 7. 1979.

TOTALS

1

171

19

25

24

: 30

361

77

707

PROPERTY

DAMAGE$

3,959,760

174,739

150,200

28,050

3,359,433

7,967,963

11,800,765

27,460,931
Appendix F—Derivation ot Bombing Statistics Tables ● 241

Table 58.–Bombings by Specific Targets for 1977-78 (actual detonations or ignitions)

—.

Total incidents No killed No injured Property damage a

Type taret 1977 1978 1977 1978 1977 1978 1977 1978

Residential . . . . . . . . . . . 352

Commercial . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367

Airports/aircraft 7

Police facilities/vehicle: : : : : 14

Educational . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Government (local) . . . . . . . 24

Government (Federal ) 26

Millitary Installation s 4

Utilities . . . . ., 51

Banks . . . . . . . . 22

Vehicles . . . . . ., 216

Open areas ., ... ., ... 36

Mailboxes . . . . ., 48

Other ., . . . . . . . . . . 90

Unknown b

. . . . . . . . 34

294 17 7 66 57 $ 1,022.3 $2,982.2

375 7 6 48 46 6,640.1 8,777.7

l – 1 —

2; — — — — 5:: 70”:

97 — — 13 5 43,1 532.3

9 — 1 1 4 145.6 70.1

22 — — 4 1 2.4 6 6

3 — — — 1 — 0.0

57 l – 1 2 6280 1,727.7

18 — — — — 225.2 493

252 11 7 24 25 3633 2,1194

40 1 2 8 13 5 4.2

69 — — 1 2 25.8 2.1

137 — — 8 27 1,206.8 869.9

2 — — 5 2 22.6 0.0

Total. . . . 1,397 1,409 38 23 180 185 $10,331.7 $17,212.1

ap~Opefly ~amage flgufes are In thousands and arekmatefd

hh!s category includes those ,nc(dents where the type target was e,ther unknown or no! reporled

SOURCE BATF 1978 Exp/os,ves /rrcrJenfs Reporl

TSLE 9

BOMBINGS BY SPECIFIC TARGETS

FOR 1977 – 1978

(Actual Detonations or Ignitions)

——- ——-

TOTAL PROPERTY 1

INCIDENTS NO. KILLED NO. INJURED DAMAGE

TYPE TARGET — ——.. —-1977—

Residentia l 352

Commercial 367

Airports/aircraft 7

Police Facilities/ 1 4

Vehicle s

Educational 106

Government (Local) 24

Government (Federal) 26

Militar y 4

Installations

Uti1ities 51

Banks 22

Vehicle s 216

Open Areas 36

Mail Boxes 48

Other 90

Unknown 234

1978——.._—.————— 

1977 1978 1977 1978 — —.—— - ——.————— 1977 1978

294

375

5

29

97

9

22

3

57

18

252

40

69

137

2

17 7

7 6

l —

— —

— —

— 1 — —

— —

l —

— —

11 7

1 2

— —

— —

— —

66 57

48 46

l —

— —

13 5

1 4

4 1 — 1

1 2 — —

24 25

8 13

1 2

8 27

5 252

1,022. 3

6,640. 1

. 2

5 . 8

43.1

145.6

2.4

—

628.0

225.2

363.3

. 5

25.8

1,206.8

22.6

2,982.2

8,777.7

. 2

70.4

532.3

70.1

6.6

0.0

1,727.7

49.3

2,119.4

4 . 2

2 . 1

869.9

0 . 0

Tota l 1,397 1,40 9 38 23 180 435 10,331.7 17,212.1

.

1 . Figures are in thousands and are estimated.

2 . This category includes those incidents where the type target w a s

either unknown or not reported .
242 . Taggants in Explosives

Table 59. -Percent of Bomber Targets That Would Be Protected by a Detection Sensor

Total bombings Injuries Deaths

Average number of bombings of known, substantial target b . . . . . . . . . 1,175 150 29

Bombings of residences, vehicles . 557 (47%) 86 (58%) 21 (72%)

Bombings of commercial establishments. 371 (32%) 47 (31 %) (22%)

Total unlikely to have sensors . . . . . . . . . . 928 (79%) 133 (89%) 28 (94%)

alnclu~~{h mcendia~ and exploswe tmmbmgs tor 1977 and 1978.

br)~ fIWS and malit)oxas are excluded fmm ttrese aala.

SOURCE. BATF /978 tioloswes Incluems #leom.

TABLE 9

BOMBINGS BY SPECIFIC TARGETS

FOR 1977 - 1978

(Actual Detonations or Ignitions)

TOTAL

INCIDENTS NO. KILLED

TYPE TARGET 1977 1978 1977 1978 —

Residential 352 294 17 7

Commercial 367 375 7 6

Airports/Aircraft 7 5 l —

PO lice Facilities/ 14 29 — —

Vehicles

Educational 106 97 — —

Government (Local) 24 9 —1

Government (Federal ) 26 22 — —

Militar y 4 3 ——

Installations

U t i 1 i t i es 51 57 l —

Banks 22 18 — —

Vehicles 216 252 11 7

Open Areas 36 40 1 2

Mail Boxes 48 69 — —

Other 90 137 — —

Unknown 2 34 2 ——

——— ———— —

Total 1,397 1,409 38 23

PROPERTY 1

NO. INJURED DAMAGE

1977 1978 1977 1978

66 57 1,022.3 2,982.2

48 46 6,640.1 8,777.7

l — .2 .2

— — 5.8 70.4

13 5 43.1 532.3

1 4 145.6 70.1

4 1 2.4 6.6

— 1 — 0.0

1 2 628.0 1,727.7

— — 225.2 49.3

24 25 363.3 2,119.4

8 13 .5 4.2

1 2 25.8 2.1

8 27 1,206.8 869.9

5 252 22.6 0.0

180 435 10,331.7 17,212.1

.

1. Figures are in thousands and are estimated.

2. This category includes those incidents where the type target was

either unknown or not reported.
Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables “ 243

Table 60.- Attributes of Criminal Bomber Groups

Exprience

Perpetrator and traning Resources Motivation Individual or group Reaction capability Freaquency

Criminal

Unsophisticated . . . L L M I M Multi

Sophisticated . . . . . . . . . . . . H M H I H Multi

Terrorist

Polittcal . . . . . . . M-H M-H M-H G M-4 Multi

Separatist . . . . . . M-H M H G H Multi

Reactional . . . L L H G L-M Multi

Mentally disturbed

Disenchanted . . . . L L L-IW I L Single

Vengeful . L L M-H I i--M Single

Pathologica l , . L-M L H I L -M Varies

other

Vandal s . L L L-M I L Single

Experimenter : ~ M L L-M I L.M Single

L.Low. M. Mooerate High” Individual G-Group

SOURCE. Office of Technology Assessment

Table 61,-Estimated Number of Significant Bombings by

Group of Perpetrators (average of years 1974-78)

Estimated number

Perpetrator group of bombings

Terrorists. ., ., ., 107

Criminals. . . . . . 98

Mentally disturbed ... ., ... 340

‘Vandals and experimenters. . 348

SOURCE. FBI data.
244 ● Taggants in Explosives

Target

TOTAL

Residences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Private Residence

Apartment House

other Private Property”

Commercial Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Commercial Building

Office Building

Industrial Building

Theater

Motel and Hotel

Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Auto

Other Vehicle

Aircraft

School Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Law Enforcement

Fire Department

Public Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recreation Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . .

Government Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Federal

state

Constructiom Sites and Equipment. . . . . . . .

Telephone Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities . . . . . . . .

Millitary Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Churches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Postal Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . .

International Establishments . . . . . . . . . .

Court Houses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Open Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unknown (Premature Deter.ationi . . . . . . . .

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

/

Total

2.044

560

420

61

79

458

356

38

30

22

12

257

182

73

2

187

72

69

3

63

44

38

37

36

10

8

18

30

20

3

19

15

15

7

5

1 1 7

29

21

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

1 . . .

2 . . .

1 . . .

1 . . .

..- . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

...J 6

1 . . .

It. . .

1

. . . . .

. . ., . . .

I

I

.- 1...

. . . . .

~

. . . . . .

I

. . . . . .

.

25—

1

4

2

9

;

. .

. .

. .

2

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

.,

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

—

—

30 —

1

. . .

1

13

3

. . .

3

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

1

. . .

1

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

1

1

. . .

. . .

. . .

2

3

—

11

1

. .

. . .

1

1

. .

2

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

!..

,..

—

. .

,..

,..

,..

,..

,..

,..

l..

,..

,..

,..

, . .

4

, . .

,..

. . .

. . .

. . .

1 —

/

.

#

/

‘ +

—

24—

13

;

13

5

10

3

1

8

16

. .

2

. .

. .

34

. .

1

5

1

1

. .

5

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

3

. .

. .

—

$ -

/~<

70 I —

33

13

52

92

7

4’

6

3

35

8

. .

52

13

1

10

6

30

25

2

2

10

11

11

. .

11

4

11

. .

1

4

. .

96

6

9

—

—

—53

2

1

2

20

. .

. .

. .

1

2

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

12

2

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

4

5

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

2

—

69

41

38

16

56

8

8

7

3

24

37

. .

27

29

2

2

29

2

2

3

3

3

5

2

3

2

4

2

. .

4

1

. .

3

. .

3

51

s

. .

. .

17

7

. .

. .

1

;

. .

. .

1

. .

2

. .

2

. .

. .

. .

2

2

. .

. .

3

. .

. .

4

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

1

—

13—

2

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

1

3

1

. .

. .

2

. .

. .

2

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

—

—

—2

. .

,..

,..

,..

!..

,..

!..

!..

,..

,..

,..

,..

,..

. . .

,..

2

. . .

!..

. . .

. . .

. . .

,..

,..

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

—

—

90—

13

2

3

18

2

4

1

. .

5

4

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

1

1

2

1

. .

1

3

1

. .

2

. .

1

. .

1

. .

1

9

13

. .

—

:2

7

1

. .

3

1

. .

. .

x

2

1

. .

4

2

. .

1

2

2

. .

1

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

5

6

1
Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables . 245

BOMBING INCIDENTS BY TARGET AND APPARENT MOTIVE /’

Target

TOTAL

Residences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Private Residence

Apartment House

other Private Property

Commercial Operations . . . . . . . . .

Commercial Building

Office Building

Industrial Building

Theater

Motel and Hotel

Vechicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Automobile

Other Vehicle

Aircraft

School Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . .

Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . .

Building

Vehicle

Other

Government Property . . , . . . . . . .

Federal

state

Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recreation Facilitates . . . . . . . . . .

Telephone Facilities . . . . . . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities . . . . .

Tranportation Facilitates . . . . . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment . . . .

Postal Facilities and Equipment . . . . .

Churches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military Facilities. . , . . . . . . . . .

International Establishments . . . . . . .

Medical Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . .

Courthouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities . . . . . . . . . .

Open Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,

Unknown (Premature Detonation). . . . . .

other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2,074

582

364

77

121

485

387

39

37

12

10

273

201

69

3

165

76

22

33

21

62

24

43

41

33

26

6

25

20

17

16

14

11

10

4

1

101

37

26

1T

F

3

1

4

9

3

, . .

, . .

, . .

2

1

, . .

4

3

5

, . .

1

1

. . .

. . .

s

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

1

2

. . .

. . .

..<

. . .

1

. . .

. . .

—

L

.++

/1

F

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

2

. .

. .

. .

. .

l..

..!

. .

. .

/

4,.%

/

>

$.. 4c —

C7—

12

. . .

. . .

10

:

. . .

. . .

1

2

. . .

10

. . .

2

1

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

I

. . .

. . .

2

. . .

. . .

1

..4

. . .

2

. .

. .

.&

/

p

*<

>

/ 4 —

a

1

,..

,..

u

s

3

, . .

,..

2

2

1

1

2

3

:

9

1

1

. . .

u

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

2

. . .

. . .

1

. . .

2

. .

. .

—

!5—

1

,..

. .

2

1

,..

,..

. . .

,..

3

,..

,..

2

,..

,..

2

1

1

,..

. . .

. . .

,..

1

1

,..

2

,..

. . .

6

. . .

2

. . .

. .

. .

. .

—

F

11

. . .

. . .

19

2

13

2

. . .

4

8

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

..!

..!

. . .

2

. . .

2

. . .

2

10

..<

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. .

. . .

. .

. .

. .

4s! 57

I

I

4 1

3 2

s . . .

s . . .

36 2

9 3

. . . . .

25 . . .

4 1

; . i.

4 . . .

6

18 :::

3 . . .

10 . . .

29 . . .

16 7

. . . . .

14 2

6 1

11 . . .

6 1

4 . . .

. . . . .

3 . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

80 1

12 ..<

15 . .

G

07

38

19

u

8

11

.4

3

.37

32

1

16

6

13

16

2

. .

3

30

. .

3

1

4

I

2

1

2

3

. .

6

. .

1

:

J

!

~

f

;

1

. .

. .

9

8

. .

. .

. .

. .

2

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

4

. .

.<

.,

.

.

c

1

. .

. .

9

. .

. .

. .

. .

2

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

.,

. .

. .

. .

2

.,

.,

. .

.!

.,

.,

.4

.!

.1

.,

.!

.!

.{

1

,.

,.

-1-

9236

24 4

14 1

7 1

34 4

s 1

3 , . .

. . 1

2 . . .

14 1

5 1

1 . . .

8 1

3 1

5 1

. . . . .

s . . .

2 . . .

4 . . .

3 s

10 . . .

1 . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

4 . . .

1 . . .

3 . . .

2 . . .

1 2

1 . . .

. . . . .

1 . . .

. . . . .

8 3

1 3 9

8 . .
246 . Taggants in Explosives

Table 9

BOMBINGS INCIDENTS BY TARGET AND APPARENT MOTIVE

1976.

Target

TOTALS

Residences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Private Residence

Apartment House

Other Private Property

Commercial Operatitons . . . . . . . . . . . .

Commetcial Building

Office Building

Industrial Building

Theater

Motel sad Hotel

Vehicles . . . . . . .

Automobile

Other Vehicle

Aircraft

School Facilities. . .

Law Enforcement . .

Building

Vehicle

Other

Government Property

Federal

State

Local

Persons, ● . . ● . .

Public Utilities. . . .

Recreation Facilities

Telephone Facilities.

Other Communication

. * * * .**.**.*.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .* ..*.**.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

● ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

Facilities. . . . . . .

Transportation Facilities ● . . . ● . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment_ .* ...* .

Postal Facilities and Equipment. . . . . . .

churches. ● ● ● ● . ● . . . ● ● . ● . . . . ● .

Military Facilities. . . . . . ● ● . . . ● . ● .

International Establishment ● . ● . . ● . ● ●

Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Courthouses . . ● ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Open Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unknown (Premature Detonation) . . . . . . .

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. 570

433

262

40

112

335

279

21

23

7

5

192

142

48

2

124

47

10

17

20

38

13

19

62

28

22

25

2

14

28

26

10

s

10

4

s

2

77

42

20

19 I 5 I 9 I 7a

3 . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

3 . .

. . - , .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

1 1

.0. 1

.*. .*

2 .*

. . . . .

2 . .

2 . .

● . . . .

1 . .

1 . .

. . . . .

1 . .

. . . . .

1 . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

● ** .*

. . . w.

. . . J

1 . .

. . . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

-

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

2

. .

. .

. .

.*

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

s

1

● *

26

4

2

. .

2

1

1

1

● ✎

2

. .

2

1

1

. .

12

5

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

1

. .

1

3

. .

1

1

● ✎

. .

3

1 1 !

. . . 11 5 4 9

. . 1 .0. 1 {

● . . . . . 6 . . . 1

1 10 3 10 6

. . 0 1 1

. . s 2 1

,2! 67I37J39I31417 I 16 I S3J78

1 1 10 3

. . . . . . 1 1

1 1 2 7

4 5 1 13

2 . *. . *.

, . . . . . 2

1 I 2 i d ...1 ...1 ...1...1 d ...1

1 ! Ii! ..* ● . . ..* ● . . . . . 1 ● . .

● . . 2 4 3 2 5 5

1 1: : : : . . . 1 1 2

.
Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables . 247

Table 9: BOMBING TARGETS AND

APPARENT MOTIVES. 1977

TOTAL

Residences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

private Residence

Apartment Howe

other Private Property

Commercial operations . . . . . . . . . . . .

Commercial Building

Office Building

Industrial Building

Bank

Theater

Motel and Hotel

Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Automobile

Other Vehicle

Aircraft

School Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Law Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Building

Vechicle

Ocher

Government Property . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Federal

State

Local

Persons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recreation Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Telephone Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities. . . . . . . .

Transportation Facilities . . . . , . . . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment . . . . . . .

Postal Facilities and Equipment. . . . . . . .

Churches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International Establishments. . . . . . . . . .

Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Courthouses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

open Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unknown (Premature Detonation . . . . . . .

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.31 8

292

193

21

78

282

186

28

25

26

11

6

175

119

47

9

100

36

13

5

18

66

15

11

40

78

28

17

13

1

23

32

15

6

9

3

. . .

4

2

78

29

29

I

41 . . .

4 . . .

3 ..*

15 1

: :::

1 1

2 . . .

I

. . . . . .

91’ . . .

6 . . .

, . . . . .

3 . . .

1 1

1’. . .

, . . . . .

!.. . . .

. . . . .

s . . .

19 . . .

1 . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

1 . . .

I . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . .

. . ;. . .

i ● . ,. . .

!

2! . .

. . . .

. . . .

1 I 2

“ij ::

. . . .

J

J:.1” i I

/

. . . .

. . . . . . 1

I

. . . . .

. . . . .

I

I . . . . . . . . . ..!

I

. . . ..%

I :::! :::

. . . . . . I

1 1

...1 , .,

,.. . . .

,.. . . .

,.. . . .

I

,.. . . .

! . . . * .

! . . . . .

,.. . . . I

,.. . . .

,.. . . .

I

,.. . . .

. . !

. .

. .

..<

. . .

. . (

. . .

. . .

1

. . .

. . .

. . .

..<

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

1

. .

. .

,.

,.,

1

!.,

.,

. .

1

l..

.,

. .

,.,

,.(

!.4

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

3

. .

. . !

. . 1

. . 4

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

—

~~ ! 6QZ

I

. : . : :

13 49

5 113

. . . 11

. . .

1 1 :

. . . 6

. . . . . .

: : :

. . . 1

27 41

. . . 6

1

. . . :

1 9

: ~ 2:

. . . I

31

1 I 14

2

I

12

I

2 9

. . . l.. .

J 16

2 18

1 13

. . . I

6

1

1

5

,.. I 1

. . . . . . . I

,.. 1 3

. . . 2

2 44

2 11

1 11

I

u.

4

1

2

7

2

:

1

,.,

3

2

,..

!..

1

!..

1

. .

4

. .

3

z

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

6

7

I

.

● Unlessafeasiblemotivecanbedeterminedforeachbombingincident,the motive is listed ❉■ the

Unknown Catergory.
248 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table 9: BOMBING TARGETS AND

APPARENT MOTIVES, 1978

Target

TOTAL

Residences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Private Residences

Apartment House

Other Private Property

Commercial Operations . . . . . . . . . . . .

Commercial Building

Office Building

Industrial Building

Theater

Motel or Hotel

Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Automobile

Other Vehicle

Aircraft

School Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Law Enforcement

Building

Vehicle

Other

Fire Department and Equipment

Government Property . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Federal

State

Local

Persons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Utilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recreation Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Telephone Facitlties . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities. . . . . . . .

Transportation Facilities . . . . . . . . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment . . . . . . .

Postal Facilities and Equipment. . . . . . . .

Churches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International Establishments . . . . . ..* .

Medical Facilities 9 * * * . * .*..*... .

Courthouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Open Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unknown (Premature Destination) . . . . . . .

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.301

341

216

53

72

270

180

: :

18

10

11

178

142

36

. . . . . .

101

41

38

11

23

4

3

31

11

2

18

61

31

19

21

2

37

10

14

9

7

7

3

3

5

46

33

31

/ 7 —

—2

4

3

1

13

. .

1

. .

7

5

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

0

. .

1

. .

● .

2

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

● *

. .

. .

2

. .

● ✎

—

~

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

1

. .

● .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

2

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

● .

P.

. .

. .

. .

. .

.*

c

$

C

{4

—

~

● .

. .

. .

1

. .

1

. .

. .

s

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

. ,

. .

,.

1

,.

,.

,9

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

—

1q

I

. .

. .

. .

2

. .

. .

● .

. .

. .

2

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

● .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

● .

● .

. .

● *

● O

. .

. .

. .

. .

—

{

p

~

14 -

U

;1

5

. .

1

. .

.0

. .

9

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

—

~

#*

/

?

4 —

Q_

2

. .

s

4

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

!2

. .

1

. .

1

2

. .

3

. .

1

2

3

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

● .

. .

. .

. .

8

9

. .

—

—

—8

● .

. .

. .

4

. .

3

2

1

. .

. .

, . .

. .

3

. .

1

. .

. .

2

. .

. .

1

1

. .

. .

. .

2

. .

. .

1

1

3

1

. .

1

. .

. .

1

—

$

/

?

4

—

~

. .

. .

. .

3

3

. .

.0

1

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .

. .

, .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

. .,

. .

.*

. .

. .

—

.-+

/

G●

(

—

~

5

2

1

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

2

2

. .

1

. .

1

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

2

. .

. .

. .

. .

● .

1

. .

. .

, .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

#

/

t

4

—

~

8

4

1

s

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

7

1

. .

. .

1

1

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

5

. ,

1

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

#

/

}

q —

~

,..

,..

,..

,..

,..

) . .

) . .

, . .

) . *

, . .

, . .

, . .

, . .

, . .

, . .

, . ,

, . .

, . .

, . .

, . .

0 . .

2

..4

. . .

. .

2

. .

. .

. .

2

● .

. .

. .

. .

. .

.*

. .

—

—

~

5

;

1

. .

. .

. .

1

. .

3

1

. .

10

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

2

. .

. .

. .

. .

. .

1

.*

2

,.

2

,0

, .

,.

. .

, .

. .

2

—

~

34

40

43

35

17

18

14

5

5

97

23

.0

63

10

19

. .

2

6

2

12

35

19

15

18

1

24

8

12

7

2

3

2

3

4

33

16

22

—

—

s

8

. . .

3

6

. . .

3

1

1

1

:

..4

1

..(

. . .

..!

. . .

1

. . .

1

6

6

. .

..!

1

5

1

. .

. .

. .

..!

. .

. .

. .

1

8

s

—

● Unlew a feasible motive can be determined for each bombing incident, the motive is listed ❉■ the Unknown category.
Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables . 249

Table 1: BOMBING

Yea r

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

 INCIDEN

Total

Actual and

Attempted

Bombings

1,962

1,955

2,044

2,074

1,570

1,318

1,301

 1972 through 1

Actual

Explo.

714

742

893

1,088

852

867

768

Incend.

793

787

758

613

405

248

349

78

Attemp t

EXplo.

237

253

236

238

188

118

105

Attempt

Incend

218

173

157

135

125

85

79

Property

Damage

(Dollar

Value)

‘t, 991,815

7,261,832

9,886,563

27,003, 981*

11,265,426

8,943,300

9,161,485

Personal

Injury

176

18?

207

326*

212

162

135

Dea l

25

22

24

6 9

5 0

2 2

1 8

•Includes three major bombing incidents resulting in unusually high personal injuries

and deaths and substantial damage to property.

61-401 0 - 80 - 17
250 . Taggants in Explosives

Table 62.-Stolen and Recovered Explosive Summary

Amount stolen Amount recovered

Type 1977 1978 1977 1978

Blasting agents, Pounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,834 42,172 21,260 23,623

Black powder, pounds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 379 277 723

Smokeless powder, pounds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 163 16 1,361

Boosters, pounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,177 9,528 2,804 362

Military explosives, pounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 640 701

Cap-sensitive highexplosives, pounds . . . . . . . . . . 36,498 44,316 43,738 41,097

Primer, units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,300 4,333 2,733 344

Blasting caps, units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61,531 66,614 40,719 44,456

Det. cord/safety fuse/igniter cord, feet . . . . . . . . . . 183,224 113,510 84,554 101,117

Total, explosives, pounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61,003 101,217 71,470 74,966

Blasting caps, units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61,531 66,614 40,719 44,456

Oct. cord/safety fuse/ignitor cord, feet. . . . . . . . . . 183,224 113,510 84,554 101,117

SOURCE. BATF 1978 Explosives incidentsReport

TABLE 23

The Amount of Explosives Recovered and

Seized by General and Specific types for

1977 - 1978

—.— .—. . . . . . . . . . .—.

AMOUNT RECOVERED

———.————. . . . . . . .

TYPE< GENERAL 1977 1978

High Explosives 49,915 42,501

L OW Explosives 295 8,842

Blasting Agents 21,260 23,623

Blasting Caps 40 ,719 44,456

---- Det. Cord/Safety Fuse/ Ig.Cord - .- 84,554 101, 117 ..—

AMOUNT RECOVERED

TYPE-SPECIFIC .- 1978

Blasting Agents 21,260 23,623

Black Powder 277 723

Smokeless Powder 16 1,361

Photo lash Cartridges Powder 2 150

Potassium Chlorate — 6,300

Boosters 2,804 362

Military Explosives 156 697 .

RLIX 484 4

TNT 699 86

Dynamite 43,039 41,008

Primer 2,733 344

Blasting Caps 40,719 44,456

Det. cord/Safety Fuse/Ig. cord 84,554 . 101,117

197 8

TOTAL EXPLOSIVES RECOVERED: 71,470 lbs. 74,966 lbs.

DET. CORD/SAFETY FUSE/IGNITOR CORD: 84,554 ft. 101,117 ft.

BLASTING CAPS: 40,719 ea. 44,456 ea.

TABLE 17

The AMOUNT of Explosives Stolen By

General and Specific Types

for 1977 - 1978

— — —

AMOUNT STOLEN

TYPE - GENERAL 1977 197 8

High Explosives 40,024 58,327

Low Explosives 145 718

Blasting Agents 20,834 42,172

Blasting Caps 61,531 66,614

Det. Cord/Safety Fuse/Ig. Cord 183,224 113,510 ——— —-——— AMOUNT STOLEN

TYPE - SPECIFIC 1977 1978 ——.—— —

Blasting Agents 20,834 42,172

Black Powder 145 379

Smokeless Powder 0 163

Boosters 2,177 9,528

Military Explosives 44 123

TNT 5 17

Dynamite 36,498 44,316

P r imer 1,300 4,333

Blasting CapS 61,531 66,614

Det. Cord/Safety Fuse/Ig. Cord 183,224 113,510

—— —. .

1977 1978 ———— ————— —

‘TOTAL EXPLOSIVES STOLEN:

— — —

61,003 its. 101,217 lbs.—

DET’. COIU)/SAFE’IY ~SE/IGNI~co~: 183,224 ft. 113,510 ft.

BLASTIW CAPS: 61,531 ea. 66,614 ea.
—

Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables 251

Table 63.-Expiosives Thefts by Method of EntryNumber of Incidents and Percentages for 1977-78

Number Percentage

Entry method 1977 1978 1977 ‘1978

Locks cut. . . . . . . . . . 59 71 31.1 26.9

Locks pried . . . . . . . . 36 50 18.9 19.0

Door pried . . . . . . . 10 10 5.3 3.9

Key, . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 23 7.4 8.8

Window entry. . . . . . . . . 7 3 3.7 1.1

Inside help. . . . . . . . . . 3 0 1.6 -

Wall entry . . . . . . . . . . . 10 16 5.3 6.1

Burning. . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.0 ,4

Roof entry . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ; 3.7 1.1

Ooor blown. . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 .5 .8

Floor entry . . . . . . . . . . . 0 .4

Vent entry . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ; .5 1.1

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 80 21.0 30.4

Unknown. . . . . . . . . ., 137 99 - - — — —

Total . . . . . . . . . . . 327 362 100 100

a~h~ ~~@W @ ~~ l~t~ 137 unknOWO fTI@M!d IIICIOOIMS k)f 1977 and fho w incl*fl~

for 1978.

~Ishgure reflects those mcteonts whars the enw method could not bc Placad m the above

cal~fles.

SOURCE. 8ATF 1978 Gr@/ves/llC/d6WS R@@rT

TABLE 18

Explosives Thefts by Method of Entry - Number

of Incidents and Percentages for 1977–1978

—

ENTRY METHOD

.——— - .—.——— -—— NUMBER PERCENTAGE 1 ‘—

1977 1978 —. 1977 1978

Locks Cut 59 71 31 .1%

Locks Pried 36 50 18. 9%

Door Pried 10 10 5.3%

Key 14 23 7 .4%

Window Entry 7 3 3.7%

Inside Help 3 0 1.6%

Wall Entry 10 16 5.3%

Burnin g 2 1 1 .0%

Rooff Entry 7 3 3.7%

Door Blown 1 2 .5%

Floor Entry 0 1 —

Vent Entry 1 3 .5%

Other 2

40 80 21 .0%

Unknown 137 99 — —

——.— . —.

Total ----- 327-— _ 362 100%

1. These percentages do not include 137 incidents for 1977 and

99 incidents for 1978.

2. This figure reflects those incidents where the entry Method

could not be placed in the above categories provided.

(from reference 2)

26. 9%

19. 0%

3 .9%

8 .8%

1 .1%

- —

6 .1%

.4%

1 .1%

.8%

.4%

1 .1%

30. 4%

-—-

100%
252 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table 64.–Explosions Aboard U.S. Aircraft

Date Carrier Aircraft Aircraft location Bomb location Outcome Device —- -— 1 1/1/55

7/25/57

1/6/60

5/22/62

11/12/67

11/19/68

8/29/69

9/7/70

9/12/70

12/29/71

3/8/72

9/21/73

12/17/73

8/26/74

9/8/74

2/3/75

12/19/75

7/2/76

7/5/76

UAL

WA

NA

co

AA

co

TW

PA

TW

—

TW—

PA

TW

TW

PA

—

EA

—

DC-6B

CY-240

DC-6B

707

727

707

707

747

707

Turbo Cmdr

707

Navion

707

707

707

747

Alouette

Helicopter

Electra

Helicopter

11 minutesafterTO Baggage

47 minutesafterT0 Lavatory

184 minutes afterT0 Underseat passenger

compartment

39,000ft Towel container in rear

lavatory

102 minutes after TO Rear baggage

compartment

24,000 ft Lavatory

Ground after hijack

(Damascus, Syria)

Ground after hijack

(Cairo, Egypt)

Ground after hijack

(Dawson Field, Jordan)

In hangar

Parked on ground

Parked on ground

On ground, Rome

On ground, Rome

Over Ionian Sea

Explosives thrown in

cockpit after evacuation

—

—

Seat in cabin

Cockpit

Engine manifold

Attack while loading

Aft baggage compartment

Aft baggage compartment

In air, Burma Lavatory (suicidal

passenger set fire)

On ground Near fuel tank

Parked next to fence External, near right

landing gear

On ground External, under tail

Airplane disintegrated–44 killed

Passenger thrown out of lavatory–

hole in aircraft side; plane landed

successfully

34 killed, airplane disintegrated

Tail blown off-45 killed

3 bags destroyed; aircraft saved

Fire and explosion in lavatory;

extinguished by crew; plane landed

safely

No casualties from explosion

Demolished after evacuation

Demolished after evacuation

Aircraft destroyed, hangar damaged;

no casualties

No casualties (plane empty)

Not known

Fire damage; 30 killed,

many injured

Fire, confined to local area;

no casualties

High-order explosion; 88 killed,

aircraft lost

Extinguished by crew; minimum

damage

$10,000 damage to aircraft

Explosion and fire destroyed main

fuselage

Extensive damage

Dynamite

Dynamite

Dynamite, dry cells

Dynamite

Black powder (?)

—

Grenades &

canister explosive

—

—

—

c-4

—

White phosphorous

grenades

c-4

—

Petrol and butane

Blasting caps

Dynamite (8-10

sticks)

Dynamite

SOURCE: FAA Civil Aviation Security Service

Table 65.-location of Explosions Aboard Aircraft, 1949-76

Worldwide U.S. aircraft

Location of explosion Number Percent Number Percent

stowed . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 21 21

Baggage. . . . . . . . . . . (8) - (4) -

Cargo or freight. . . . (5) - – –

Ground attack. . . . . . . . . 5 8 4 21

External attachment. . . . . 7 11 3 16

Passenger or crew

compartment. . . . . . . 33 52 42

Lavatory. . . . . . . . . . . (lo) - (4) -

Passenger compartment (19) - (2) –

Cockpit. . . . . . . . . . . . (4) - (2) –

Unknown. . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8 0 0 — — .

Total ... , ... , . . . . 63 100 19 100

SOURCE. Data supplied by FM Civil Aviation Security Service.
Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables . 253

Table 66.-Explosions and Devices Found at U.S. Airports, 1972-75

(late Airport Location Effects Comment Device

- .— --- . . 3/7/ 72

3/8/7 2

11/19/72

3/24/7 2

12/1/72

12/31/72

3/20/7 3

3/29/7 3

8/9/7 3

1 1/30/73

3/1/7 4

7/21/74

8/1/7 4

8/6/7 4

8/9/7 4

8/26/7 4

9/16/7 4

3/15/75

3/22/75

3/27/7 5

7/22/75

10/17/75

10/20/75

11/6/75

11/27/75

12/29/75

Kennedy

Seattle

Denver

San Carlos, Calif.

Grand Rapids,

Mich.

Austin

Los Angeles

Milwaukee

Los Angeles

Nashville

Kennedy

New Orleans

Kennedy

Los Angeles

JohnstownCamoria, Pa.

O’Hare

Boston

San Francisco

Honolulu

Kingsford, Mich

Tampa

Miami

Miami

Buffalo

Miami

La Guardia

Cockpit of TWA 8-707

Baggage compartment (UAL

flight)

Attache case carried by

individual

Hanging from belly of

helicopter

Paper towel container in

terminal

Concession area

On runway during approach

of Continental Airlines plane

Locker

Locker

Locker

Locker

(unknown)

Cargo building

Locker

Hangar

Men’s room

Airline baggage room

Near ticket counter

Lost & found baggage area

Storage area

Baggage cart

Locker

Dominican Airlines office

Baggage claim area (2 bags)

Bahamasair aircraft. Behind

wall panel in lavatory

Locker

No explosion

No explosion

No explosion

Hole in ground at remote

location

No explosion

Moderate damage

None

1 injury-moderate damage

Did not detonate

Did not detonate

3 injured–moderate damage

No explosion

No explosion

3 killed, 34 injured

Hangar and aircraft destroyed

Commode damaged

Substantial damage

Minor damage

Oid not detonate

No explosion

1 injured

Lockers and ceiling destroyed

No explosion

No explosion

No explosion

11 killed, 70 injured;

substantial damage

Detected by dog c-4

Extortion attempt; timer Gelatin dynamite in aerosol

stopped cans, blasting caps

Individual stated intent to 8 sticks of dynamite

blow up plane

Removed by police 3 sticks of dynamite, timer and

detonators

Device extinguished after –

emitting smoke

— Incendiary (gasoline)

Thrown by individual on field Molotov cocktail

Extortion attempt —

Extortion attempt/located –

by dogs

Extortion attempt Smokeless powder, timer,

initiator

— —

Removed by bomb squad 3-in long bamboo with powder

and fuse

Removed Cardboard container with

explosive powder, fireworks

fuse

— —

— Probable incendiary (in 55-gal

drum)

— Probably firecrackers

Bomb was in an unclaimed Incendiary (?)

suitcase destined for Tel Aviv

— Probably firecracker

— Crude pipe bomb

Removed —

— Firecrackers

— —

Discovered by janitor; Time bomb

disarmed by bomb squad

Checked bags unclaimed after Black powder and gasoline

flight; timers turned off

(inadvertently)

Removed —

— Dynamite and RDXa

aFM .$@mla[e mher agermes disagree wllh IINS aW.eSSMen[

SOURCE FM CIVII Aviahon Security Service
254 ● Taggants in Explosives

Table 67.-Results of Clvil Aviation Security Program Passenger Screening

1972 1973 1974 1975

Passengers (millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 203 201 202

Passengers denied boarding. . . . . . . . . . ... 8,265 3,459 2,663 (a)

Referrals to law enforcement . . ., ., ., . . (a) (a) (a) 12,270

Persons arrested. . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . 3,658 3,156 3,501 2,464

Aviation offenses detected

Carrying weapons or explosives aboard aircraft . . . 774 736 1,147 1,364

Giving false information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 658 1,465 227

Weapons detected

firearms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,313 2,162 2,450 4,783

Explosive devices , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3,459 14,9280 158

Ammunition, fireworks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (a) (a) (a) 17,047

Knives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., 10,316 23,290 21,468 46,318

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,203 28,740 28,864 55,830

%ata notcolbuOa m tfus farm.

~hls figure M a pIOCa COIMI WIM Inctua$ firawoms and ammunfian.

SOURCE. first. SownQ, and Tiwd Sonn-Awu# RIWWS IO Congmson the Effa#veness olFa,ssangw ScnwnIng tYOcodLUtss, FM CM Awafkm Sacunfy

s61vlca.

Table-68.-Pramatura Detonation Statistics

Year Incidents Injuries Deaths

1974 ......., . . . . . . 29 31 11

1975 ...., ., . . . . . . . . . : : 37 53 2

1976 .., ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 42 11

1977, ., . . ., . . . . . . . . . 29 34 2

1978, . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 43 5

SOURCE. FBI data.
Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables ● 255

BOMBING INCIDENTS BY TARGET

TOTAL

ResIDENCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Private Residence

Apartment House

Other Private Property

Commercial Operations. . . . . . . . .

Commercial Building8uild!ng

Office Building

Insustrial Building

Theater

Motel and Hotel

Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Auto

Other Vehicle

Aircraft

School Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Safety. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Law Enforcement

Fire Department

Public Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recreation Facilities . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation Facilities . . . . . . . .

Government Property . . . . . . . . . .

Federal

State

Local

Construction Sites and Equipment. . . .

Telephone Facilities. . . . . . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities . . . .

Military Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . ,

Churches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Postal Facilities and Equipment . . . .

International Establishments. . . . . .

Court Houses . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities . . . . . . . . . .

open Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unknown (Premature Detonation) . . . . ,

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total

Actual 

Attempted

Bombings

2,04 4

61

79

45a

356

38

30

22

12

257

182

73

2

187

’72

69

3

63

44

38

37

36

10

8

18

30

20

3

19

15

15

10

7

5

1

117

29

21

Actual

Explo.

893

110

11

55

143

16

17

9

7

84

31

1

91

18

. . . .

54

21

24

13

6

3

11

22

17

. . . .

8

5

8

6

2

1

1

54

29

15

11

kend.

758

232

41

20

143

13

7

:

56

29

. . . .

69

38

..-.

1

3

s

14

2

3

3

s

2

2

2

8

1

1

4

1

. . . .

39

. . . .

3

AU

Explo.

236

25

2

4

43

4

4

4

. . . .

29

11

. . . .

16

8

. . . .

8

17

8

7

2

1

4

2

1

. . . .

s

1

3

2

I

3

. . . .

18

. . . .

.

4

n o t

Incend.

157

53

7

. . . .

27

5

2

1

2

13

2

1

11

5

3

. . . .

3

1

3

. . . .

1

. . . .

1

. . . .

1

4

1

3

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

6

. . . .

. . . .

38,950

25,980

223,278

65,900

44.150

13,320

490,450

69,323

9,000

49,842

97,200

623

113.750

47 750

100

2,500

595

3,325

216,300

Personal

Injury

207

17

12

2

18

. . . .

1

7

1

6

4

. . . .

24

4

. . . .

3

34

. . . .

28

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

2

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

11

31

. . . .

Death

24

. . . .

1

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . . —

6

. . . .

3

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

11

. . . .
256 ● Taggants in Explosives

Target

TOTAL

Residences. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Private Residence

Apartment House

Other Private Property

Commercial Operations. . . . . . . . .

Commercial Building

Office Building

Industrial Building

Theater

Motel and Hotel

Vehicles . . , . . . . . . , . . . . .

Automobille

Other Vehicle

Aircraft

School Facilities . . . . . . . . . . .

law Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . .

Building

Vehicle

Other

Government Property. . . . . . . . . .

Federal

State

Local

Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Public Utilities. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recreation Facilities. . . . . . . . . .

Telephone Facilities . . . , . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities. . . . .

Transportation Facilities. . . . . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment, . . .

Postal Facilities and Equipment . . . .

Churches . , , . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military Facilities. . . . . . . . . . .

International Establishments . . . . . .

Medical Facilities. . , . . . . . . . .

Courthouses . . . . . . . , . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities . . . . , . . . .

open Area. . . . . . . . . . . . , . .

Unknow (Premature Detonation). . . . ,

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● . .

Total

Actual and

Attempted

Bombings

2,074

582

384

77

121

485

387

39

37

12

10

273

201

69

3

165

76

22

33

21

62

24

11

27

43

41—

33

26

6

25

20

17

16

14

11

10

4

1

101

37

26

Act

Explo.

L & L

115

27

92

214

25

22

9

s

96

37

1

87

12

11

8

14

7

16

28

33

21

26

5

15

11

13

2

4

10

8

3

1

55

36

21

1

Incend

x

199

36

20

108

7

:

4

54

16

. . . .

40

7

12

8

4

2

7

4

1

4

. . . .

1

7

3

2

12

s

1

i

. . . .

. . . .

27

1

4

Attempt

Expla

24

10

8

42

1

6

. . . .

1

32

13

2

18

1

7

4

s

:

12

6

4

. . . .

. . . .

3

4

1

2

4

. . . .

1

1

. . . .

15

,.. .

1

Attempt

lncend

135

46

4

1

23

. . . .

3

1

. . . .

19

3

. . . .

12

2

3

1

1

1

1

1

1

4

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

2

1

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

.., .

. . . .

4

. . . .

. . . .

Property

Damage

(Dollar

Value)

27.003.961

398,586

284,470

37,365

4,465,308

679,380

14, 528, 588

62,300

20,160

191, 059

1,049, 145

10, 000

833, 

313, 225

30, 8

9, 860

334,300

101, 100

84,284

59,625

252.37 5

35, 390

13,333

11,060

886,800

713, 000

5, 840

5,730

154, 209

87,846

39, 300

6, 515

100

580

35, 573

24,270

326

28

19

. . . .

90

6

7

. . . .

. . . .

9

1

. . . .

8

1

4

s

. . . .

2

. . . .

29

. . . .

4

. . . .

. . . .

53

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

4

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

4

u

2

Death

99

18

2

. . . .

20

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

2

1

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

10

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

11

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .
Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables . 257

1976

Residence . , . . . . . . . . . .

Private Residence

Apartment House

Other Private Property

Commercial Opetation. . . . .

Commercial Building

office_ Building

Industrial Building

Theater

Motel and Hotel

Vehicles. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Automobile

Other Vehicle

Aircraft

School Facilities . . . . . . . . .

Law Enforcement. . , . . . . . ,

Building

Vehicle

Other

Government Property. . . . . . .

Federal

State

Local

Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

public Utilities . . . . . . . , . .

Recreation Facilities , . . . . . .

Telephone Facilities . . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilities .

Transpotation Facilities. . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment

Postal Facilities and Equipment .

● ✎☛✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎

Churches . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . .

Milltary Facillties. . . . . . . . . . . . . ,

International Establishments~ . . . . . . . .

Medical Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Courthouses . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . .

Newspaper Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . .

Open Area . . . . . . . . . . ... , ., , .

Unknown (Premature Detonation). , . . , .

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Actual and

Attempted

Bombings

1.57 0

433

281

40

112

335

279

21

23

7

s

192

142

48

2

126

47

10

17

20

38

13

6

19

82

28

21

25

2

14

26

26

10

5

10

4

5

2

77

42

20

Actual I Attempt

Exple.

952

82

15

92

136

9

13

7

3

75

25

2

75

6

5

5

7

4

12

37

20

15

24

1

9

21

23

7

3

5

2

s

2

48

42

15

405

135

20

7

90

9

4

. . . .

2

35

12

. . . .

31

2

8

6

1

. . . .

s

4

5

4

. . . .

1

. . . .

2

1

1

2

. . . .

1

● . . .

. . . .

16

. . . .

1

1 2 1 8 8 s

I

26 I 38

2 3

12

31

1

4

. . . .

. . . .

18

8

. . . .

14

1

1

s

4

1

1

32

3

2

1

. . . .

3

2

2

1

. . . .

4

... *

. . . .

... *

8

... *

1

1

22

2

2

. . . .

. . . .

14

3

. . . .

6

1

3

4

1

1

1

9

. . . .

,,. .

. . . .

. . . .

2

1

. . . .

1

. . . .

1

1

. . . .

. . . .

5

. . . .

3

Property

Damag e

(Dollar

Value}

11,265,.468

3or, 501

622, 360

58,976

3, 350, 711

254, 925

612,550

13, 300

319,500

161,071

126, 368

1, 075, 000

361,683

4, 975

34,310

75,443

5, 939

360,005

265,445

623, 450

177..973

6, 070

17,722

350

29, 388

566.150

17.504

46, 250

15, 350

150, 350

625

1,122,030

. . . . . . . . . .

1, 362

3,950

443, 335

Personal

lnjury

212

13

6

2

t 23

. . . .

2

2

. . . .

4

L :

7

. . . .

. . . .

7

. . . .

. . . .

1

59

1

1

. . . .

. . . .

I

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

4

. . . .

21

1

9

42

3

8

. . . .

.,. .

1

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

2

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

22

1

... ,

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

11

t
258 ● Taggants in Explosives

:**:*

:C7AL.

+CSIC=K- . . . : . . . . . . ● . ● . . , . “ “

private Res;dence

~MtruwK House

Cl$.er Prlrate Property

C:mmerclat Qwattom . . . . . . . . . . . s

C~mmerclal !3wlding

Otflce 9uLldINC

{wtrta! Butldkag

9Mk

~.eater

>1OCO1 and Hotel

:??lc!es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ . .

Aucomobllo

L%her Vehicle

Awcraft

3rh~wl Facahtles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

b- CnforcemeftC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

%Ulding

t“ehtcle

oth4r

Cowcrnmonl Proporty. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fe4eral

Ztate

bcal

?Wsoru. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Psllc L“tllil]es . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . .

R:crcatmn Facliltles. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

re!ephone FaclIities . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

~ser Commumcallon Facilities. . . . . . . .

Trsportatton FactlKles . . . . . . . . . . .

C,ms(ruction Sites and Equipment . . . . . . .

?cstal Factlutes and Equipment . . . . , . . .

Churckes . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . .

Mil,[art. F~llt~les . . , . . . . . . . . , . . -

!P,er~~lona~ Establishments. . . . . . . . 0 0

‘*lesJcaA Facll; ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . , .

c!nKmNs@ . . . , . . . . . # . . . . . . . , .

Sewspapec ~acll;tle~+ , . . . . , . . . . . . .

-n Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

c~~ (premamre Detonation) . . . . . . .

~~er . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , # ,

T(xti

{Ctud aJw

Utamptsd

3ombin$s

1,318

292

193

21

78

282

186

28

2s

26

11

6

17s

119

47

9

100

36

13

s

18

66

13

11

!0

78

2a

17

13

1

23

32

15

6

9

3

. . . .

4

2

78

29

29

Ac?lal

E*% I

m

66

9

99

111

16

Ii?

1s

t

5

87

23

2

70

7

2

9

12

H

49

20 I

1’+

13

. . . .

18

27

11

4

4

2

kcexl.

-m-

:6

9

4

44

a

2

3

1

. . . .

17

16

s

1s

2

2

3

. . . .

. . . .

s

7

1

2

. . . .

1

2

5

1

1

1

. . . .

. . . . . . . .

4 . . . .

1 1

58 13

29 . . . .

21 3

.-m{

qllo.

118

13

:

23

6

4

2

2

1

9

5

. . . .

12

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

:

13

6

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

2

. . . .

3

. . . .

4

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

s

,.. .

. . . .

!nc erd.

8s

18

2

2

8

. . . .

I

5

1

. . . .

6

3

2

3

4

1

6

2

. . . .

. . . .

9

1

1

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

2

. . . .

s

[DOUG

“/alfJe)

3.943, 300

4e6, ?.9

:, 655

16,130

1. %0, 145

247,775

572,648

408,429

209,810

651,200

221, S64

191,887

IW

546,368

8, 38S

12,200

9,500

59, 42s

18.250

179,140

270,996

I :94 ● --

14, :2s

12,200

300

342,300

356,475

3, a37

~, 560

400

2s, 300

. . . . . . . . .

1 !0, 450

3, mo

1, 3s0

7, ?s0

la9, 102

>~r~o@

tn]ury

192

9

;

“ 20

6

. 1

. . . .

. . . .

.

. . . .

3

. . . .

. . . .

5

2

. . . .

2

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

62

J

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

. . . .

7

34

2

Death

22

1

. . . .

. . . .

2

t

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

14

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

1

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

2

. . . .
Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables ● 259

~~blc 3: BOMBNG NCIDENTS TARGETS, 1978

rawx

TOTAL

fteei&ncaa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . privat. Weldence

Apatiment House

Oth.r Pmvate Pxtp.rry

Commercial OParatlcms . . . . . . . . . . . , ,

Cammemiai Building

(mea Rlllding

Irldustrlal adding

Tti.ater

Motel or Hotel

VdtIcles . . . . . . . . .

Automobile

Other VeMcle

Alrcdt

8chool FaciUtle9. . . . .

public Safety . . . . . .

Law Enforcemmt

Building

Vehicle

Other

Fire Department and

Government Property . .

Federal

State

bca.1

Persona . . . . . . . . .

public Utilities . . . . .

Recreation Facffltles . .

Telepimne Facilities . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

Equipment

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

Other Communication Facilltleg , . . . . . , .

Tnnapotiion Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . .

Construction Sites and Equipment. . . . . . . .

Postal Faciiitles and Equipment . . . . . . . .

Churchea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , .

Military Facilit;ea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Luhmatiooal EwabIlshmeote . . . . . . . . . .

Medal Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

cOurumSO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Newap~r F~ueq . . . . . . . , , . . . . .

-n Ar= . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . .

u~(Premamre C8tooaticm) . . . . . . . .

Othr. . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Toti

Actual u

Attempte

&mbinq

1, 301

341

216

53

R

270

180

2X

30

18

10

11

178

142

36

. . . . . .

101

41

38

11

23

4

3

31

11

2

18

61

31

19

21

2

37

10

14

9

7

7

3

3

5

46

33

31

A

Explo.

—768 .

84

::

lot

14

17

Is

7

2

7s

17

. . . .

7s

5

11

3

3

7

2

12

29

21

14

1s

1

29

7

13

6

5

3

1

1

s

31

32

26

Id

bced

349-

92

25

7

61

5

7

2

:

46

13

. . . .

18

s

6

. . . .

. . . .

I

. . . .

5

8

5

3

3

1

5

3

. . . .

3

2

1

2

. . . .

. . . .

8

1

2

Attemot

Sxp’b

lc5

11

;

8

2

4

1

;

7

4

. . . .

4

:

. . . .

. . . .

2

. . . .

. . . .

19

5

2

3

. . . .

2

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

3

. . . .

2

. . . .

s

. . . .

3

-

Incenc

79

23

7

1

10

. . .

2

. . .

1

. . .

14

2

. . .

4

. . .

4

1

. . .

1

. . .

1

5

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

1

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

a

. . .

. . .

?roperty

Damage

(Kklllar

Va!ue)

.3, 161. 4a5

547, ‘rrS

57,330

36,813

1,870,420

1,854,731

220, 27s

114,902

24,000

75,200

142,366

631,300

. . . . . . . . .

877,862

33,350

24, 310

2, Soo

5,670

17, 07s

200

51,340

121,295

372,800

S9, 785

9,220

17s, 000

261, 9S0

1, 28S, 450

5,589

7,480

26,900

12, 0s0

2,06 0

. . . . . . . . .

13,960

101,035

7,150

112, 240

-s

4

15

. . . .

1

0 . . .

3

. . . .

s

. . . .

. . . .

8

2

. . . .

1

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

21

1

. . . .

1

. . . .

2

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

3

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

3

43

3

2

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

1

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

9

. . .

1

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

s

. . .
260 “ Taggants in Explosives

Table 69.–Commercial Airliner Hijacking Statistics by Year

Hijackings U.S. Hijackings foreign

Year origin origin

1949-67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1973a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

15

36

20

24

27

1

3

3

4

5

8

45

14

48

50

29

29

17

17

11

15

NAc

NA

au S antlhlpcklng~easureska~ fu~ysrffectrw

bus ~~lnes,~resm~veotwlntofmgln,

cNotavailable

SOURCE. FAArermlN o.FM-RG77-66.

Table 5.-Hijacking and Associated Bombing Costs for U.S. and Foreign Airlines by Flight Origination

(hijacker and bomber fatafftiasat$300,000 each)

U.S. originationss Foreign originations

Total costs, Enplanements, Costperenplane- Total costs, Enplanements. Cost per enplaneYear No. $millions millions ment(dollars) No. $millions millions merit (dollars)

1949 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 $0.0 0 18.0 $0.000 3 $ 0.2 3 10.0 $0.023

1950 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 20.7 0.000 3 0.01 12.0 0.001

1951 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 26.8 0.000 0.01 17.0 0.000

1952. . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 29.7 0.000 ; 0.61 18.0 0.034

1953 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 29.7 0.000 0.00 20.0 0.000

1954 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 38.2 0.000 ; 0.00 23.0 0.000

1955. . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 45.0 0.000 0 0.00 26.0 0.000

1956 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 49.6 0.000 0 0.00 31.0 0.000

1957. . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 53.3 0.000 0 0.00 37.0 0.000

1958 . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7,41 53.1 0.140 6 7.07 38.0 0.186

1959 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 60.3 0.000 6 0.33 42.0 0.008

1960 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 62.3 0.000 7 0.93 48.0 0.019

1961 ........,.. 4 0.19 63.0 0.003 6 1.47 53.0 0.028

1962 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 67.8 0.000 2 0.07 58.0 0.001

1963 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 77.4 0.000 1 0.00 64.0 0.000

1964 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 88.5 0.000 0 0.00 73.0 0.000

1965 . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0.00 102.9 0.000 0 0.00 77.0 0.000

1966 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 118.1 0.000 3 0.63 91.0 0.007

1967 . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0.00 142.5 0.000 4 0.01 101.0 0.000

1968. . . . . . . . . . . 15 0.13 162.2 0.001 14 0.45 115.0 0.004

1969. . . . . . . . . . . 36 0.54 171.9 0.003 48 6.59 134.0 0.049

1970. . . . . . . . . . . 20 0.77 169.9 0.005 50 60.95 141.0 0.432

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . 24 1.01 173.7 0.006 29 6.43 159.0 0.040

1972. . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.40 191.4 0.013 29 11.01 176.0 0.063

1973 . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0.00 202.2 0.000 17 52.06 201.0 0.259

1974 . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0.93 207.5 0.004 17 29.12 216.0 0.135

1975 . . . . . . . . . . . 6 0.38 205.1 0.002 11 0.81 228.0 0.004

1976 . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0.68 223.3 0.003 15 18.15 247.0 0.073

Total . ........14 5 S14.44 2,858.3 SO.005 275 S196.95 2.456.0 S0.080

SOURCE BATF
Appendix F—Derivation of Bombing Statistics Tables ● 261

Table 70.–Possible Perpetrator Response Countermeasures to Taggant Program

Criminal Terrorist Mentally disturbed Other

Unsophis- Sophis- DisenCountermeasures ticated ticated Political Separatist Reactionary chanted Vengeful Pathological Vandals Experimenters

Taggant removal . . . . . . . . –a M M H L-M – – – – L-M

Fabrication of explosives. . . L H H M M L L L L L-M

Incendiary devices. . . . . . . H — L L M M M M M-H L-M

Use of blasting agents if

untagged. . . . . . . . . . . . L H H M M L L L L M

Theft, commercial . . . . . . . M H M-H M-H L-M L-M L-M L-M – M

Theft, military . . . . . . . . . . L L L L – – L – –

Illegal sources. . . . . . . . . . L H H H–– – — — —

Use of explosives

manufactured before

implementation of tagging L H M L––––– –

Vapor seals. . . . . . . . . . . . – L-M L-M – L – – L – –

Other tactics . . . . . . . . . . . – L-M H H H – L-M M – –

aUnllkely to be attempted

bLener5 Indlcafe Wsslbdlly of success m the attempted countermeasure L = IOW, M = medium: H = high.

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
APPENDIX G—GLOSSARY

This glossary defines, for easy reference, some of

the terms used in this study in ways that may differ

either from normal English usage or from the technical vocabulary of the explosives industry.

ANFO. A mixture of prilled (or pelletized) ammonium nitrate and fuel oil, which is the most commonly used “blasting agent” (q. v.). About half

the ANFO used commercially is mixed in a factory, and half is mixed at the site where the explosion is to take place. Sometimes other similar blasting agents are called ANFO.

Black powder. See “gun powder.”

Blasting agent. An explosive material that is too insensitive to be detonated with a #8 detonator.

Because blasting agents are generally cheaper

to buy, safer to store, and (because of regulations) easier to ship than cap-sensitive explosives (q. v.), their annual commercial use far exceeds that of any other explosive materials. The

most common blasting agent is ANFO (q.v.), but

many gels, slurries, and emulsions are also

blasting agents.

Bomb. In this study, a “bomb” refers to a device designed to cause death, injury, and/or property

damage by means of an explosion. In the usage

of many law enforcement agencies, incendiary

devices (designed to cause death, injury, or

property damage by means of fire) are also considered bombs. The context makes it clear

whenever this report refers to incendiary as well

as explosive bombs.

Bombing. In this study, a “bombing” refers to an incident in which an explosive device actually

detonates and causes death, injury, or damage.

Cap-sensitive. An explosive material is said to be

cap-sensitive if it can be detonated by a #8 detonator. Dynamites are cap-sensitive; blasting

agents are not cap-sensitive; confined gunpowder (q.v.) are cap-sensitive. In normal commercial practice, a cap-sensitive booster is used to

detonate a non-cap-sensitive explosive material.

Catastrophic bombing. A bombing which causes

death, injury, and/or substantial property damage.

Compatibility. A foreign substance (such as a taggant) is said to be compatible with an explosive

material if the presence of the foreign material

does not have any deleterious effect on the performance or safety of the explosive material under any conditions whose occurrence can reasonably be foreseen.

Criminal. Used in two senses in this study. In OTA’s

characterization of different kinds of bombers,

“criminals” are those who have an economic

motivation for committing crimes. Elsewhere, a

“criminal bombing” is any bombing in violation

of the law.

Detection taggant. See taggant.

Device. A bomb. The distinction sometimes made

between a device and a bomb is not meaningful

in the context of this study.

Encapsulation. In the context of this study, the coating of a taggant at the time of its manufacture

with an inert material.

Explosive. In this study, an explosive material that is

cap-sensitive and more energetic than a gunpowder (q.v.). Typical explosives include dynamites, some gels, some slurries, and high explosives such as TNT.

Explosive material. A material that is manufactured

for the purpose of being exploded, generally in

a blasting or shooting application. Explosive

materials include blasting agents, explosives,

gun powders. (q.v.)

Explosives incident. In the data collection procedures of some law enforcement agencies, explosives incidents include stolen explosives, recovered explosives, accidents, hoaxes, and undetonated bombs, as well as bombings (q.v.).

Gunpowder. In this study, the term is used to refer

to any of the propellants commonly used by

those who engage in shooting for sport. These

comprise black powder (which, strictly speaking, is what the term gunpowder means), smokeless powder, and Pyrodex @ (a black powder

substitute).

High explosive. An explosive material that is both

cap-sensitive and highly energetic.

Identification taggant. See taggant.

Incendiary. See bomb.

Permissible explosive. An explosive with a low flame

output specifically approved by the Bureau o f

Mines for use in underground mining.

Powder fines. Grains of gunpowder or fragments of

such grains that are smaller than the grains of

which the gunpowder is primarily composed.

Pyrodex@. See gunpowder.

Reactivity. Two materials are said to be reactive if

mixing them under a specified set of conditions

causes a chemical reaction. If the reactivity of a

foreign substance and an explosive material exceeds a specified standard, they may or may

not be incompatible, but must be presumed to

be incompatible in the absence of information

about the nature and conditions of the chemical reaction.

Smokeless powder. See gunpowder.

262
Appendix G—Glossary . 263

Substantial target. A person or structure as the target

of a bomb. This study uses the term because a

number of bombings are directed against mailboxes, open fields, or other targets suggesting

that the purpose of the bomber is to create an

explosion without causing very much actual

damage.

Taggant. A microscopic particle added to a commercial explosive in order to facilitate law enforcement. Identification taggants carry a code

making it possible to trace the batch of explosives, and the chain of legal distribution; they

are intended to survive a bombing, be recovered from the debris, and assist in tracing the

source of the explosives used. Detection taggants permit a suitable sensor to detect the

presence of the taggants (and hence the explosives) through suitcases, packages, etc. Taggants of various kinds have been used for identification and detection purposes not related to

commercial explosives (and additional such

uses have been proposed), but in this study all

references to taggants or tagging refer to the application of this technology to commercial explosives.

U.s . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1980 0 - 61-401