FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BILAL HUSSAIN,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFREY A. ROSEN, Acting Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 18-70780

Agency No.

A209-171-424

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted August 12, 2020

Pasadena, California

Filed January 11, 2021

Before: Consuelo M. Callahan, Patrick J. Bumatay, and

Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge VanDyke
2 HUSSAIN V. ROSEN

SUMMARY*

Immigration

Denying Pakistani national Bilal Hussain’s petition for 

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 

the panel held that substantial evidence supported the denial 

of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture, and that the immigration judge 

did not deprive Hussain of due process.

The panel held that the IJ provided Hussain, who was pro 

se, due process by providing details about the structure of the 

hearing and the availability of counsel, and asking numerous 

questions through which Hussain had ample opportunity to 

develop his testimony. The panel rejected Hussain’s 

assertion that the IJ repeatedly misled him about what he 

needed to show to meet his burdens by asking open-ended 

questions and failing to adequately probe the record. Rather, 

the panel explained that the IJ developed the record in its role 

as an independent fact-finder, and it was Hussain’s 

responses that determined the scope of the testimony 

elicited. The panel also rejected Hussain’s reliance on 

Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2000), for the 

proposition that IJs must go beyond their impartial role and 

instead essentially act as advocates for pro se asylum 

applicants. The panel explained that it could not read 

Jacinto’s imprecise “fully-develop-the-record-for-pro-sepetitioners” dicta as expansively as Hussain seeks without 

doing serious harm to the adversarial process established by 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
HUSSAIN V. ROSEN 3

Congress for petitioners like Hussain. The panel also 

concluded that, even if Hussain could demonstrate error, he 

did not show prejudice, where he failed to point to any 

additional evidence concerning past persecution or the other 

grounds upon which the Board denied relief.

The panel held that the evidence did not compel the 

finding of past persecution, where Hussain did not testify to 

any individualized physical attacks or threats, and he failed 

to show sufficient economic or psychological harm. 

The panel also held that Hussain failed to establish that 

the Pakistani government was unable to control the Taliban, 

noting that Hussain failed to report his two attacks to 

authorities, and that record evidence demonstrated that the 

government’s significant efforts to combat terrorism and 

sectarian violence had resulted in a substantial reduction in 

terror-related fatalities. Although Hussain argued that he did 

not report the attacks because police provide no protection, 

the panel noted that even if the government’s response to 

Hussain’s two attacks was lacking, the standard is not that 

the government can prevent all risk of harm. 

The panel held that Hussain failed to establish that he 

could not reasonably relocate within Pakistan to avoid future 

persecution. The panel rejected Hussain’s arguments that it 

would be unreasonable for him to relocate to an unfamiliar 

town without family, or because he would need to live in a 

rented space or with a host family. The panel also noted that 

Hussain failed to show there were restrictions on movement 

in areas outside the areas of high unrest that Hussain would 

assumedly seek to avoid. The panel also explained Hussain 

could not successfully argue that relocation was 

unreasonable because the country at large is subject to 
4 HUSSAIN V. ROSEN

generalized violence, because he did not show he is at risk 

of country-wide targeted persecution.

The panel also held that substantial evidence supported 

the denial of CAT protection because Hussain failed to 

establish that he faces a particularized risk of torture, and 

never alleged, in the record or in his testimony, that he ever 

suffered any harm—“severe pain or suffering”—that rose to 

the level of torture.

COUNSEL

Salmah Y. Rizvi (argued) and Douglas H. HallwardDriemeier, Ropes & Gray LLP, Washington, D.C., for 

Petitioner.

Kristen A. Giuffreda (argued), Trial Attorney; Shelley R. 

Goad, Assistant Director; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 

Attorney General; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C.; for Respondent.

OPINION

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge:

Pakistani national Bilal Hussain (Hussain) attempted to 

enter the United States near Otay Mesa, California without 

valid documentation, stating he feared persecution from the 

Taliban in his native Pakistan. The Department of 

Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and 

Hussain petitioned for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
HUSSAIN V. ROSEN 5

At his removal hearing, Hussain testified before the 

Immigration Judge (IJ) that the Taliban burned down his 

jewelry store in an attack on his hometown in 2007, but 

never hurt or personally threatened him or his family during 

that attack or at any other time, including up to when Hussain 

left Pakistan in September 2015. Hussain also submitted 

documents describing a subsequent 2012 Taliban attack on 

a convoy of cars that he was traveling with. The attack did 

not injure Hussain, but in fleeing he lost the business 

inventory in his car. The IJ asked Hussain open-ended 

questions about his experiences with the Taliban and never 

received any information suggesting Hussain was 

specifically targeted, and ultimately determined that Hussain 

failed to meet his burden of proof for asylum, withholding 

of removal, or CAT.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, 

noting that Hussain never testified or submitted evidence 

claiming any actual injury caused by the Taliban, or that the 

Taliban individually targeted or attacked him for any reason. 

The BIA also concluded that the IJ provided Hussain due 

process because there was no indication in the transcript or 

the appeal that Hussain did not understand the proceedings 

or that there were facts he was “unable to present.”

Hussain seeks review of the BIA’s decision, and we have 

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We dismiss Hussain’s 

due process claims and deny review of his petition because 

the IJ provided Hussain with a full opportunity to present 

testimony, and the record does not compel the conclusion 

that the agency erred in determining that Hussain’s 

description of generalized violence did not meet his burden 

of proof to show targeted persecution or torture.
6 HUSSAIN V. ROSEN

I. BACKGROUND

At the start of Hussain’s first hearing before the 

Immigration Court, the IJ explained his statutory rights as a 

petitioner, detailed the court’s procedures, told him he had 

the right to an attorney, and continued the hearing to allow 

Hussain to find an attorney. The IJ also described the role 

of the facility’s “legal orientation provider (LOP),” and 

placed Hussain on the LOP list. Hussain chose to receive 

LOP assistance instead of retaining counsel.

During Hussain’s hearing, the IJ asked “why [he was] 

afraid to return to Pakistan.” When asked to describe his first 

Taliban encounter, Hussain described an incident in 2007 

where “the Talibans [sic] were passing through our town, 

and we did not give them the way,” causing the Taliban “to 

fire on the people and in the market.” Neither Hussain nor 

his family were injured or targeted in the attack.1 He 

testified his jewelry shop was among others that the Taliban 

burned, and that the Taliban later killed people and blocked 

the roads. Hussain testified that no police or military 

responded to this particular attack, but described that the end 

of the encounter occurred when people from his village 

“attacked back.” Hussain’s hometown is located within the 

FATA region, where “[i]n lieu of police, . . . [t]ribal leaders 

convene . . . tribal militias . . . not . . . formal law 

enforcement entities.” Hussain remained in his hometown 

of Parachinar until 2015, and testified he had no further 

interaction with the Taliban there.

1 Hussain initially testified he was fired at by the Taliban, but did 

not elaborate when later asked if he “had any other adverse incidents 

with the Taliban.”
HUSSAIN V. ROSEN 7

Hussain responded “no” when the IJ asked if he was 

“ever harmed,” if “anybody threaten[ed]” him, or if at “any 

time at all . . . anybody harmed or threatened [him] in 

Pakistan.” Hussain also denied any problems with the police 

or any threats to his wife, children, mother, brothers, or 

sisters.2

The IJ considered this evidence and concluded Hussain 

“was not a victim of past persecution.” The IJ ultimately 

found Hussain credible, but not “100 percent accurate as to 

country conditions in Pakistan.” The IJ acknowledged that 

the 2015 and 2016 country reports for Pakistan described “a 

culture of lawlessness” in Hussain’s region, but also showed 

“that the government is making great efforts to try to control 

the violence that is committed by . . . the Taliban.” The IJ 

thus found Hussain “has not established a well-founded fear 

of future persecution on account of a protected ground,” nor 

does he “have a nexus to a protected ground if he fears 

general violence in his home country.” (emphasis added). 

The IJ denied Hussain’s applications because he was never 

“harmed in the past, let alone tortured,” and “could live in 

other locations in Pakistan without fearing or suffering any 

harm at the hands [of] the Taliban.” And given that “the 

government has taken great strides to crack down on the 

Taliban,” Pakistan was not “unable or unwilling to control 

the Taliban.”

The BIA affirmed, noting that there was no indication in 

the transcript or the appeal that Hussain did not understand 

the proceedings or was “unable to present” any facts. The 

2 Hussain testified that “[o]nce, in Peshawar, a couple of boys had 

followed me,” but Hussain went into a hotel and the boys did not harm 

him. He also testified that his father was threatened once in 2015 “by 

the Sunnis from [his] village,” but that his father was never harmed.
8 HUSSAIN V. ROSEN

BIA agreed with the IJ that Hussain “was never physically 

harmed or personally threatened in Pakistan” and concluded 

that the IJ did not err in failing to probe a 2012 convoy attack 

described only in Hussain’s written application because 

Hussain did not allege the attack targeted or injured him 

specifically.3 The BIA determined that “any future harm 

3 Hussain’s application included two letters from the Anjuman-eHussania, a committee in Hussain’s hometown. The first detailed how 

after the 2007 incident Hussain did not immediately re-establish his 

jewelry store, but because he was a “Tailor Master” he continued his 

other tailoring job despite the “huge financial los[s].” The letter 

described a second Taliban attack in 2012 on a convoy of vehicles, one 

of which Hussain was riding in. Hussain’s vehicle was “in the last row” 

and drove away to escape the attack, but in doing so “fell down in the 

pitch and all the jewellers [sic] [were] lost.” Hussain was not injured.

The parties dispute whether a second letter from the Anjuman-eHussania describing Hussain’s community activities in Parachinar was 

included in the record. We assume without deciding that it was, but it 

does not affect the analysis. According to the second letter, as an “active 

member of Passdaran,” Hussain “helped the homeless peoples and taken 

injuries [sic] to the hospital for treatment during crises in the area. Due 

to which Taliban terrorists threatened him and his family members to 

kill or kidnap.” (emphasis added). The IJ asked multiple questions that 

would have allowed Hussain to elaborate on the Taliban’s “threat[]” 

nonspecifically referenced by this one sentence in the second letter. 

Hussain provided no additional detail. “Our court generally treats 

unfulfilled threats, without more, as within that category of conduct 

indicative of a danger of future persecution, rather than as past 

persecution itself.” Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Moreover, “vague and conclusory allegations . . . are clearly 

insufficient” to support a petitioner’s claim of persecution; “[o]ur case 

law has consistently required more.” Mendez-Gutierrez v. Gonzales, 

444 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006); see also id. at 1170 (“We cannot 

conclude that the unspecified threats against Mendez-Gutierrez were 

sufficiently menacing to constitute past persecution, as we do not even 

know what the threats entailed.” (citation omitted)). In contrast to this 

one anomalous, bare assertion in the letter, Hussain’s testimony—which 

we take as true (as the IJ did)—provides substantial evidence that neither 
HUSSAIN V. ROSEN 9

[Hussain] may suffer in Pakistan would not constitute 

‘persecution’ under the Act because” of the Pakistani 

government’s “significant efforts to combat terrorist 

organizations.” And the fact that “terrorist attacks continue 

in Pakistan . . . is insufficient” on its own to conclude the 

government was unable to control the Taliban. Although 

Hussain testified that the police did not intervene after the 

2007 attack on his village, the BIA concluded the single 

incident did not in itself demonstrate the government’s 

inability or unwillingness “to protect him from the Taliban.” 

The BIA therefore found no clear error in the IJ’s conclusion 

that Hussain failed to meet his burden of proof for asylum, 

withholding of removal, or CAT protection.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the BIA’s factual findings underlying its 

determination that a petitioner failed to establish eligibility 

for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under 

CAT for substantial evidence. Hanna v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 

933, 937, 940 (9th Cir. 2007) (asylum and withholding of 

removal); Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 

2003) (CAT). We reverse the BIA only where “any 

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to 

the contrary.” Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 

2011) (citation omitted). “The possibility of drawing two 

inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent 

an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by 

substantial evidence.” Go v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1047, 1054 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Accordingly, review of 

the Board’s eligibility determinations in this regard is 

he nor his family were ever the specific targets of the Taliban’s 

generalized violence.
10 HUSSAIN V. ROSEN

“extremely deferential.” Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 

(9th Cir. 1995).

III. DUE PROCESS

As an initial matter, Hussain claims the IJ did not 

sufficiently explain the proceedings and did not ask him 

adequately probing questions, resulting in a denial of due 

process.4

 A petitioner facing removal “is entitled to a full 

and fair hearing of his claims and a reasonable opportunity 

to present evidence on his behalf.” Colmenar v. INS, 

210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000). We “will reverse the 

BIA’s decision on due process grounds if the proceeding was 

‘so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from 

reasonably presenting his case.’” Id. (citation omitted). To 

prevail on such a claim, a petitioner must also demonstrate 

“substantial prejudice.” Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 

(9th Cir. 2000).

A. The Fairness of the Proceedings

1. The IJ Explained the Legal Procedures.

“[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of 

law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 

292, 306 (1993). But because “an alien in civil removal 

proceedings is not entitled to the same bundle of 

constitutional rights afforded defendants in criminal 

4 Hussain also argues that the IJ did not provide due process because 

the IJ declined to enter certain photographs and a memory card into the 

record during his hearing. As this claim was not raised before the BIA, 

we cannot address it here. Brezilien v. Holder, 569 F.3d 403, 412 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (“Because Brezilien failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies as to this alleged procedural error, we lack jurisdiction to 

review it.”).
HUSSAIN V. ROSEN 11

proceedings . . . ‘various protections that apply in the context 

of a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing.’” 

Valencia v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(quoting Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 

1984)). As an adversarial process, immigration proceedings 

are impartial proceedings where petitioners may make their 

case, but are not entitled to the IJ’s legal assistance in doing 

so. Crucially, a pro se “alien has no blanket right to be 

advised of the possibility of asylum” in a hearing before an 

Immigration Judge. Valencia, 548 F.3d at 1263. As required 

by statute, an IJ must ensure “the alien shall have a 

reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against the 

alien, to present evidence on the alien’s own behalf, and to 

cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). In considering whether Hussain 

received due process, “[t]he critical question is ‘[w]hether 

the IJ’s actions prevented the introduction of significant 

testimony.’” Oshodi v. Holder, 729 F.3d 883, 890 (9th Cir. 

2013) (citation omitted).

Here, the IJ ensured that Hussain understood and had the 

opportunity to access all manner of procedural assistance to 

“introduc[e] [] significant testimony.” Id. The IJ explained 

Hussain’s statutory rights, detailed the court procedures, and 

ensured Hussain had the opportunity to procure a lawyer if 

he wanted one. Instead, Hussain ultimately chose to receive 

LOP assistance in preparing his asylum application.

2. The IJ Developed the Record.

During the hearing, the IJ asked Hussain multiple broad 

questions to elicit testimony explaining why Hussain was 

“afraid to return to Pakistan.” Hussain faults the IJ’s openended questions, arguing that the IJ needed to explicitly 

detail the elements of a claim for asylum and failed to 

“adequately probe the record” for nuggets that might lend 
12 HUSSAIN V. ROSEN

support to Hussain’s claims. Consequently, Hussain argues 

that he was “repeatedly misled” by the IJ as to what he 

needed to show to meet his burdens.

The IJ developed the record in its role as an independent 

fact-finder, and it was Hussain’s responses that determined 

the scope of the testimony elicited. By starting the 

questioning at a general level, the IJ let Hussain control the 

testimony presented, while being prepared to drill down 

based on whatever Hussain provided, rather than curtailing 

or improperly influencing the testimony ex ante. This was 

not a violation of due process. See Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 

871, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The IJ must be responsive to the 

particular circumstances of the case . . . .” (emphasis 

added)). Notwithstanding the adversarial character of the 

proceedings, the IJ repeatedly sought clarification of 

Hussain’s answers and gave him multiple opportunities to 

expand his testimony. Hussain framed the landscape of his 

testimony in this case through his answers to these questions.

Hussain’s argument that he was nonetheless misled 

demands too much of the IJ, and if accepted would 

fundamentally alter the well-recognized adversarial nature 

of immigration proceedings. The IJ was not required to ask 

Hussain leading questions and feed him the types of 

scenarios sufficient to achieve asylum. That could change 

the IJ’s role from that of an impartial adjudicator to 

effectively being an advocate for the petitioner—a role that 

our court has repeatedly rejected. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(8) 

(delineating that IJs have a neutral role and “shall act 

impartially and not give preferential treatment to any . . .

individual”); C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923 F.3d 622, 636 (9th Cir. 

2019) (Paez, J., concurring) (emphasizing that, despite the 

IJ’s duty to enable the petitioner to present testimony, “the 

IJ cannot be a[n] . . . advocate”); United States v. Moriel-
HUSSAIN V. ROSEN 13

Luna, 585 F.3d 1191, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We do not 

require IJs to speculate about the possibility of anticipated 

changes of circumstances and advise aliens of facts not 

suggested in the record,” nor does “our precedent . . . require 

that an IJ act creatively to advise an immigrant of ways in 

which his legal prospects at forestalling deportation might 

improve with fundamental changes in his status.”); Bui v. 

INS, 76 F.3d 268, 271 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The regulations do 

not require the IJ to scour the entire record or to interrogate 

an alien regarding all possible avenues of relief . . . .”).

Despite the IJ’s broad queries in this case, Hussain 

argues that Ninth Circuit precedent demands that IJs go 

beyond their impartial role and instead essentially act as 

advocates for pro se asylum applicants. That is wrong. 

Hussain emphasizes Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 732–33 

(9th Cir. 2000), where he claims this court “remanded where 

the IJ did not ask the applicant questions about her 

persecutor’s motive.” But Hussain miscomprehends the 

holding and import of Jacinto, relying on hypothetical 

questions from that case that this court in dicta said the IJ 

might have asked. Id. at 732. The actual reason this court in 

Jacinto found a violation of due process was because the IJ 

there “did not clearly explain either that she had the right to 

testify even if she was represented by a lawyer . . . and 

perhaps most important, the [IJ] never gave her the 

opportunity to present her own additional narrated 

statement.” Jacinto, 208 F.3d at 734 (emphases added). 

That was the due process violation in Jacinto. Here, in 

contrast, the IJ gave Hussain multiple opportunities to 

expound upon the documents he provided and explicit 

instructions and options regarding counsel.

Hussain’s attempt to leverage the panel’s dicta in Jacinto

into a far more sweeping requirement for IJs doesn’t work, 
14 HUSSAIN V. ROSEN

in large part because our court’s remand in Jacinto

represents the high-water mark of what due process can 

require in Immigration Court hearings—at least as long as 

they remain adversarial hearings. In contrast to the specific 

reason it gave for remanding in Jacinto, the majority in that 

case—relying on a handbook from the United Nations, a 

Ninth Circuit dissent, and the very different, non-adversarial

fora of Social Security hearings—also attempted to 

transplant the statement, oft-repeated by Hussain, that a

Social Security ALJ “must ‘scrupulously and 

conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all the 

relevant facts.’” Jacinto, 208 F.3d at 733 (citation omitted). 

Pointing to language describing the ALJ’s role in that 

statutorily distinct, non-adversarial context, the Jacinto 

majority—in language as sweeping as it is ambiguous—

stated that, like Social Security ALJs, IJs are similarly 

“obligated to fully develop the record in those circumstances 

where applicants appear without counsel.” Jacinto, 208 F.3d 

at 734 (emphasis added). Overreading this inherently 

indeterminate standard, as Hussain asks us to do, would 

supplant the adversarial process required by Congress in 

these proceedings with a non-adversarial process improperly

borrowed from the very different Social Security context.

However we may properly interpret Jacinto’s imprecise 

“fully-develop-the-record-for-pro-se-petitioners” dicta, we 

cannot read it as expansively as Hussain seeks without doing 

serious harm to the adversarial process established by 

Congress for petitioners like Hussain. The core of the due 

process right afforded petitioners in immigration 

proceedings is the opportunity to testify. IJs need not—

indeed, cannot—essentially act as Sherpas for pro se 

petitioners, guiding them in making their case. Extending 

Jacinto as Hussain urges would put that case in unnecessary 

conflict with our court’s other, later, precedent, which holds 
HUSSAIN V. ROSEN 15

that due process has been provided whenever “an alien [is] 

given a full and fair opportunity to be represented by 

counsel, to prepare an application for [immigration] relief, 

and to present testimony and other evidence in support of the 

application.” Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 

926–27 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Lopez-Umanzor v. 

Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We will 

grant a petition for review from a BIA decision on due 

process grounds if the proceeding was so fundamentally 

unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably 

presenting [his or her] case.”) (emphasis added) (citation 

omitted)).5

Here, the IJ provided Hussain due process by providing 

details about the structure of the hearing, the availability of 

counsel, and asking numerous questions through which 

Hussain had ample opportunity to develop his testimony. 

See Ramirez v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 764, 772 (8th Cir. 2018) 

(finding the IJ provided due process by asking “relevant fact 

questions” and then “three open-ended questions allowing 

[the petitioner] an opportunity to elaborate”).

B. Prejudice

“To prevail on a due process challenge to deportation 

proceedings, [the petitioner] must show [both] error and 

5 The other cases Hussain cites where we have found due process 

violations have no resemblance to this case. See, e.g., Pangilinan v. 

Holder, 568 F.3d 708, 709–10 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding due process 

violated where the IJ delegated all questioning of the pro se petitioner to 

the government’s attorney); Agyeman, 296 F.3d at 877 (finding due 

process violated where the IJ required testimony from an inaccessible 

witness for the petitioner to present his application); Colmenar, 210 F.3d 

at 971–72 (finding due process violated where the IJ affirmatively 

prevented petitioner’s testimony).
16 HUSSAIN V. ROSEN

substantial prejudice.” Grigoryan v. Barr, 959 F.3d 1233, 

1240 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Even if Hussain 

could demonstrate error (he hasn’t), he cannot show 

prejudice.6 Although Hussain claims he would have 

provided many more details about his political and religious 

background if asked, he doesn’t point to any additional 

evidence of persecution or the grounds upon which the BIA 

denied him asylum. See, infra, §§ IV.B, IV.C. And some of 

the testimony Hussain now claims he would have proffered 

is belied by the actual testimony he gave.

To reiterate: the IJ asked broad questions to give Hussain 

the opportunity to testify to whatever he wished. Hussain’s 

allegations that he would have provided different answers to 

more pointed questions are unpersuasive and do not establish 

prejudice. Hussain claims he would have told the IJ about 

direct threats the Taliban made to him before burning down 

his shop in 2007. But when the IJ broadly asked “[what 

happened] the first time you had a problem with the 

Taliban?,” Hussain only said the “Talibans [sic] were 

passing through our town, and we did not give them the 

way.” Hussain claims he would have testified about Taliban 

threats against himself specifically from 2007 to 2015 for his 

anti-Taliban politics, but to the IJ he denied receiving any 

threats because “[t]hey don’t threaten you . . . they just kills 

[sic] you.” Hussain says he would have described injuries 

from the 2012 convoy attack, but when asked “were there 

any times—was there any time at all that anybody harmed or 

6 Hussain argues prejudice is presumed by relying on two cases, one 

where the petitioner was prevented from testifying altogether and 

another where the petitioner received an incomprehensible translation 

during proceedings. See Colmenar, 210 F.3d at 971–72; Perez-Lastor v. 

INS, 208 F.3d 773, 778–80 (9th Cir. 2000). While Hussain may overread 

those cases to say we presumed prejudice, neither is like this case.
HUSSAIN V. ROSEN 17

threatened you in Pakistan?” Hussain answered, “No. I was 

not beaten up or anything like that, no.” Hussain cannot now 

claim he was prejudiced when the IJ’s exact questions could 

have elicited the very responses Hussain claims he was 

unable to provide.

IV. ASYLUM & WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL

To meet the burden for asylum because of past 

persecution, the petitioner “has the burden of establishing 

that (1) his treatment rises to the level of persecution; (2) the 

persecution was on account of one or more protected 

grounds; and (3) the persecution was committed by the 

government, or by forces that the government was unable or

unwilling to control.” Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 

1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010). A petitioner who cannot show 

past persecution might nevertheless be eligible for relief if 

he instead shows a “well-founded fear of future persecution” 

along with the other elements. See id.; Wakkary v. Holder, 

558 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009). Even if the standard is 

met, an applicant is still ineligible for asylum if it would be 

reasonable under the circumstances to relocate within the 

country to avoid future persecution. Kaiser v. Ashcroft, 

390 F.3d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 2004). Because the asylum 

standard is more lenient than withholding of removal’s 

“clear probability” standard, failing to establish eligibility 

for asylum forecloses eligibility for withholding of removal. 

Alvarez-Santos v. INS, 332 F.3d 1245, 1255 (9th Cir. 2003).

A. Hussain Did Not Demonstrate Past Persecution.

Hussain testified to incidents of generalized violence that 

do not rise to the level of persecution. Hussain argues the 

physical attacks, death threats, economic harm, and 

psychological harm he suffered “both independently and 

cumulatively rose to the level of persecution.” The BIA 
18 HUSSAIN V. ROSEN

disagreed, and the record in this case does not compel the 

conclusion that the BIA erred.

1. The physical attacks were not past 

persecution.

To establish past persecution, an applicant must show he 

was individually targeted on account of a protected ground 

rather than simply the victim of generalized violence. Ndom 

v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 743, 753 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Where we 

have found no persecution despite civil strife or random 

violence, the reason has been the applicant’s failure to 

establish that his or her persecutor was motivated by one of 

the five statutory grounds.”), superseded by statute on other 

grounds as recognized in Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 

734, 739 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Rostomian v. INS, 

210 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000) (determining petitioners 

did not show past persecution where they “did not establish 

that the [knife] attack was anything more than an act of 

random violence during a period of significant strife”); 

Prasad v. INS, 101 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining 

that in order to demonstrate past persecution “[i]t is not 

sufficient to show [petitioner] was merely subject to the 

general dangers attending a civil war or domestic unrest”).

Hussain based his past persecution claim on two events: 

in 2007 the Taliban burned his jewelry shop along with other 

shops in his hometown, and in 2012 the Taliban attacked a 

convoy of cars that included Hussain. Because “[a]sylum 

generally is not available to victims of civil strife, unless 

they are singled out on account of a protected ground,” 

Hussain needed to show he was “singled out” in his region 

of Pakistan that is often subject to Taliban incursions. 

Ochave v. INS, 254 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 2001). But 

Hussain testified the burning of his shop was the result of a 

general attack on the town that resulted in other shops being 
HUSSAIN V. ROSEN 19

burned as well. And though others died in the attack, 

Hussain did not testify to any individualized physical attacks 

or threats. Likewise, Hussain provided no testimony that he 

was a specific target of the Taliban’s attack on his convoy 

rather than a general victim of a random raid. Cf. Gormley 

v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining 

that such attacks “do not rise to the level of [past] 

persecution; robberies of this sort are an all too common 

byproduct of civil unrest and economic turmoil”). 

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that this 

is not persecution. See Ochave, 254 F.3d at 865.

2. The other harms alleged do not qualify as 

persecution.

Hussain also argues he was subjected to death threats,

economic harm, and psychological harm.7 Hussain during 

his testimony denied either he, his wife, or children were 

ever threatened by the Taliban. Unfulfilled threats are very 

rarely sufficient to rise to the level of persecution, and 

Hussain has not made that showing here. Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 

319 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 

unfulfilled threats in that case constituted “harassment rather 

than persecution”). While his father was once threatened by 

a group of Sunni Muslims (not the Taliban), no harm ever 

came to his father, mother, or siblings. Hussain’s testimony 

7 Hussain fainted during his bond hearing, which he argues was a 

result of the psychological harm he experienced in Pakistan. While 

psychological harm may constitute persecution, see Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 

383 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), there is no evidence in the record, 

other than Hussain’s attorney’s assertions, that his fainting during his 

hearing was due to past psychological harm rather than for some other 

reason.
20 HUSSAIN V. ROSEN

and documentation do not support his assertion on appeal 

that he received death threats.

“We have defined economic persecution as ‘substantial 

economic disadvantage’ that interferes with the applicant’s 

livelihood . . . .” He v. Holder, 749 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citation omitted). While the record reflects that 

Hussain’s jewelry shop—along with other shops in the 

town—was burned in 2007 and he lost jewelry stock in the 

2012 convoy attack, Hussain did not detail the actual impact 

of these losses and was afterward able to “continue[] his 

Tailoring job.” “[M]ere economic disadvantage alone does 

not rise to the level of persecution.” Gormley, 364 F.3d at 

1178. Though Hussain undoubtedly experienced hardship 

from his shop burning, this harm also lacks the individual 

targeting necessary to show persecution because other shop 

owners in his village experienced the same losses. And 

while the burning of the store occurred in 2007 and the 

convoy attack in 2012, Hussain did not leave the country 

until 2015. As he was “able to continue working during that 

period . . . substantial evidence supports the BIA’s 

determination that [the petitioner] did not suffer 

persecution” based on economic harm. He, 749 F.3d at 796.

3. Considered cumulatively, Hussain did not 

demonstrate past persecution.

Even considered cumulatively, Mashiri, 383 F.3d at 

1120–21, Hussain’s claims of generalized physical attacks, 

contradictory testimony of death threats, unspecified 

economic harm, and unsubstantiated psychological harm do 

not rise to the level of targeted persecution. Where a country 

is embroiled in “indiscriminate violence,” citizens of that 

country are only eligible for asylum if they can demonstrate 

that “they are singled out on account of a protected ground.” 

Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 
HUSSAIN V. ROSEN 21

2010). Hussain did not carry his burden to show past 

persecution and this court is not compelled to reverse the 

BIA’s determination that the IJ correctly found “the violence 

created by the Taliban . . . basically targets everybody.”

B. The Pakistani Government Is Not Unwilling or 

Unable to Prevent Harm.

Hussain also failed to demonstrate the third prong of his 

persecution claim—that his persecution was “committed by 

the government, or by forces that the government was unable 

or unwilling to control.” Baghdasaryan, 592 F.3d at 1023. 

Hussain does not dispute the Pakistani government’s 

willingness to control the Taliban, but contends he was 

persecuted and will be again due to the government’s 

inability to eradicate the Taliban.

Hussain argued that “the police do[] not provide any 

protection to the Shias, and the Pakistan government is also 

not helping or protecting Shias.” But Hussain never claimed 

that he reported the 2007 or 2012 attacks to law enforcement 

authorities or ever sought police assistance, which we 

balance in our analysis of the BIA’s determination. See 

Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th 

Cir. 2017). Hussain maintained he did not report the attacks 

because the police provide no protection. But even if the 

government’s response to these two particular events was 

lacking, the standard is not that the government can prevent 

all risk of harm. This is effectively the standard pressed by 

Hussain. Such a requirement could not even be met by the 

United States or the European Union, where terrorist attacks 

unfortunately harm innocents too frequently. Instead, we 

have reasonably determined that a country’s government is 

not “unable or unwilling” to control violent nonstate actors 

when it demonstrates efforts to subdue said groups. See

Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 2004) 
22 HUSSAIN V. ROSEN

(finding the Egyptian government was not unable or 

unwilling to control terrorists because “the relevant State 

Department Profile reflected the fact that Egyptian 

authorities have prosecuted those who have committed ‘acts 

of terrorism’ against Christians”); Rahimzadeh, 613 F.3d at 

922–23 (finding the Danish government was not unable or 

unwilling to control extremists based on “active efforts to 

address and control violence by radical religious groups”).

The BIA reviewed the country reports and recognized 

that “the Pakistani government has made significant efforts 

to combat terrorist organizations and sectarian violence,”

and the record reflected “multiple counterinsurgency and 

counterterrorism operations in [Hussain’s home region] to 

eradicate militant safe havens.” These operations produced 

a substantial reduction in terror-related fatalities in Pakistan 

from 11,704 in 2009 to 1,720 in 2016. Although the record 

also reflects that the Taliban continues to operate in regions 

of Pakistan, “[t]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent 

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an 

administrative agency’s finding from being supported by 

substantial evidence.” Go, 640 F.3d at 1054 (citation 

omitted). Considering the government’s efforts we are not

compelled to conclude that the Pakistani government is 

entirely unable to control the Taliban—even assuming the 

government did not prevent or effectively punish the two 

specific attacks Hussain experienced. See Doe v. Holder, 

736 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[U]nwillingness or 

inability to control persecutors is not demonstrated simply 

because the police ultimately were unable to solve a crime 

or arrest the perpetrators . . . .”).
HUSSAIN V. ROSEN 23

C. It Would Not Be Unreasonable for Hussain to 

Relocate Within Pakistan.

Hussain contends that he would be at risk of future 

persecution if he were deported. Importantly, Hussain’s 

claims of future persecution were focused on the risks that 

would arise if he returned to his hometown in Parachinar. 

But “[a]n applicant does not have a well-founded fear of 

[future] persecution if the applicant could avoid persecution 

by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country,” 

unless doing so would be unreasonable under the applicant’s 

circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii); see also Kaiser 

v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 2004).

Relocation is generally not unreasonable solely because 

the country at large is subject to generalized violence. 

8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3). The BIA noted that the country 

reports suggest Taliban attacks are “more prevalent” in some 

parts of Pakistan than others. Thus “the applicant shall bear 

the burden of establishing that it would not be reasonable for 

[them] to relocate, unless the persecution is by a government 

or is government-sponsored.” Id. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i). 

Because Hussain never claimed to fear the government or a 

government-sponsored group, that burden is properly placed 

on him to demonstrate why relocation is unreasonable. Id.

Hussain first argues it would be unreasonable for him to 

relocate within Pakistan because “his parents, wife, four 

children, and nine of his siblings all live in Parachinar . . . .

It would be a hardship” to require him to relocate to “an 

unfamiliar town of Pakistan without his family.” This is a 

strange argument. Surely relocating to an unfamiliar town 

in Pakistan—while no doubt some inconvenient distance 

from his family—would pose less of a hardship for his 

family than relocating halfway across the globe to the United 

States?
24 HUSSAIN V. ROSEN

Hussain also argues that relocating would be difficult 

because he may have to live in a rented space or with a host 

family, and there are government restrictions and special 

permission needed to travel through certain areas. See 

8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3). But anyone who moves out of 

their home and is unable to outright buy a new house would 

need to live with others or in a rented space. That relocation 

might be inconvenient or undesirable does not make it 

unreasonable. And the referenced travel restrictions and 

special permission requirements only apply to areas in the 

FATA region with high instances of unrest due to security 

concerns—but those are the very areas Hussain would 

assumedly seek to avoid. Hussain did not show that there is 

restricted freedom of movement in other regions.

Hussain also cannot successfully argue that relocation is 

unreasonable because the country at large is subject to 

generalized violence, because he did not show he is at risk 

of country-wide targeted persecution. As the BIA noted, 

violent attacks were less prevalent in other areas outside of 

Hussain’s hometown. No country is immune from 

generalized violence. Every country, even our own, has 

been subjected to some instances of “generalized” violence. 

For example, we have seen our own violent terrorist attacks, 

robberies and muggings targeting unfortunate passersby, and 

riots resulting in destroyed properties, looting, and physical 

injuries. Acknowledging that a particular country is 

currently plagued by generalized crime and violence cannot 

be a basis for granting asylum to any citizen of that country 

in the United States.

By failing to show either past personal persecution or 

that it would be unreasonable to expect him to relocate to 

avoid future persecution, Hussain failed to provide evidence 

to compel reversal of the BIA’s decisions to deny asylum 
HUSSAIN V. ROSEN 25

and withholding of removal. See Gonzalez-Hernandez v. 

Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 1001 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003).

V. CAT PROTECTION

To succeed on a claim under CAT, Hussain must show 

it is “more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if 

removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.16(c)(2). Hussain was required to show that he faces 

a “particularized threat” of torture, Dhital v. Mukasey, 

532 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted), and 

as discussed above, he failed to make that showing. More 

crucially, Hussain never alleged, in the record or in his 

testimony, that he ever suffered any harm—“severe pain or 

suffering”—that rose to the level of torture. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.18(a)(1). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s 

determination that Hussain cannot meet his burden to obtain 

CAT protection.8

VI. CONCLUSION

The IJ ensured Hussain received due process by 

providing multiple opportunities to testify regarding his 

experiences with the Taliban in Pakistan. Hussain never 

alleged he was personally targeted by the Taliban and his 

testimony was consistent with an environment of 

8 Hussain argues the country conditions report should fulfill his 

burden under CAT. A report describing general persecution “is 

insufficient to compel the conclusion that Petitioner would be tortured if 

returned.” Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2013). Nor do 

Hussain’s allegations that the government did not respond to the 2007 

Taliban attack suffice, as the Pakistan government “does not ‘acquiesce’ 

to torture where the government actively, albeit not entirely successfully, 

combats the illegal activities.” Del Cid Marroquin v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 

933, 937 (9th Cir. 2016).
26 HUSSAIN V. ROSEN

generalized violence. The BIA’s conclusion that he failed to 

meet the burden for either asylum or withholding of removal 

was supported by substantial evidence. So too was its 

determination that Hussain did not show that safe relocation 

within Pakistan was unreasonable and that he failed to meet 

his burden under CAT.

PETITION DENIED.