[Cite as State v. Harrison, 2011-Ohio-3258.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 95666 

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

LORENZO HARRISON

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-513945 

BEFORE: E. Gallagher, J., Sweeney, P.J., and Keough, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 30, 2011 
2

 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

David L. Doughten 

The Brownhoist Building 

4403 St. Clair Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44103 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Mary McGrath 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

The Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶ 1} Lorenzo Harrison appeals from the decision of the trial court, 

denying his pro se request for new counsel. Harrison argues the trial court 

failed to follow the mandates issued by this court in State v. Harrison, 

Cuyahoga App. No. 93132, 2010-Ohio-2778. In particular, Harrison argues 

the trial court erred in failing to hold a full and fair hearing and in failing to 
3

appoint new counsel for the hearing on remand. For the following reasons, 

we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

{¶ 2} On June 17, 2010, this Court announced its opinion in Harrison. 

 The facts in Harrison are as follows: 

“I. Procedural History 

In August 2008, Harrison was indicted on ten counts of rape, each with 

a furthermore clause that he purposely compelled the victim to submit 

by force or threat of force, a furthermore clause that the victim was 

under ten years of age, a notice of prior conviction, and a repeat violent 

offender specification. Harrison was also indicted on ten counts of 

kidnapping, each with a sexual motivation specification, notice of prior 

conviction, and repeat violent offender specification. 

Two of the rapes (Counts 1 and 2) and kidnappings (Counts 3 and 4) 

were alleged to have occurred between August 1, 2005 and January 15, 

2006. Four of the rapes (Counts 5-8) and kidnappings (Counts 9-12) 

were alleged to have occurred between February 1, 2006 and August 1, 

2006. The remaining rapes (Counts 13-16) and kidnappings (Counts 

17-20) were alleged to have occurred between August 2, 2006 and June 

1, 2007. The sole alleged victim was R.A. 

A bill of particulars delineated that the charges set forth in Counts 1-4 

occurred at a Columbia Avenue, Cleveland home; the charges set forth 

in Counts 5-12 occurred at an East 106th Street, Cleveland apartment; 

and the remaining charges set forth in Counts 13-20 occurred at a 

Woodside Avenue, Cleveland apartment. 

After a psychiatric evaluation was performed on Harrison, the case 

was placed on the common pleas court’s mental health court docket. 

The repeat violent offender specifications and notices of prior 

conviction were bifurcated from the underlying charges and tried to 

the court. On the day of trial, Harrison made an oral motion to excuse 

his assistant public defender, but the court summarily denied his 

request. Counts 13-20 were dismissed at the close of the state’s case 
4

pursuant to the defense’s Crim.R. 29 motion. The defense did not 

present any evidence. 

The jury found Harrison guilty of the following: Count 1, rape, and 

Count 3, kidnapping (at the Columbia Avenue address); Count 5, rape, 

Count 8, rape, Count 9, kidnapping, and Count 12, kidnapping (at the 

East 106th address). Harrison was also found guilty of the notices 

and specifications attendant to Counts 1, 3, 5, 8, 9, and 12. He was 

acquitted of the remaining charges. 

The trial court sentenced him to a life term for the rape counts, to be 

served concurrently to ten-year sentences for the kidnapping 

convictions. 

II. Trial Testimony 

The victim, R.A., testified that she and her mother lived in Cleveland 

with Harrison at three different residences; she had previously lived 

with her Aunt Evelyn in Detroit. She stated that Harrison anally 

raped her on seven different occasions during the time she lived with 

him. R.A. testified that the incidents occurred while her mother was 

at work and R.A. was at home with Harrison. After the last time that 

Harrison raped R.A., he told her that what he had done was wrong and 

he was going to stop. 

R.A. testified that she once told her mother about the rapes, but her 

mother did not do anything. Her mother admitted that R.A. had told 

her about Harrison’s conduct and that she did not do anything because 

she loved Harrison, did not want to see him get in trouble, and did not 

believe R.A. She continued to leave R.A. alone with Harrison after 

R.A.’s disclosure. 

The trial testimony also revealed that R.A.’s mother and Harrison had 

a tumultuous relationship that involved drinking and physical 

violence. R.A.’s mother eventually tired of the relationship, and she 

and R.A. moved to their hometown of Detroit. Shortly after the move, 

R.A. told her Aunt Evelyn of the rapes; Evelyn immediately contacted 

the Cleveland police. 

A medical exam was conducted on R.A. two months after the last rape; 

no evidence of sexual conduct was noted.” 
5

Id. 

{¶ 3} In its opinion, this court overruled Harrison’s objections to the 

jury panel, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, his challenge to the 

weight of evidence supporting his convictions, and Harrison’s argument that 

his waiver of the right to testify was not knowingly, intelligently, or 

voluntarily given. Id. However, this court found merit to Harrison’s fourth 

assignment of error, in which he argued that the trial court erred in denying 

his request to dismiss his counsel without investigation into the grounds for 

the request. 

“Just prior to voir dire, Harrison asked for replacement counsel, to 

which the court responded, ‘[t]hat request is denied.’ Trial then 

commenced. 

At sentencing, Harrison raised the issue of his request for replacement 

counsel and stated that he felt as if he had been ‘railroaded’ by the 

court and counsel. Defense counsel stated, ‘I don’t want to get into a 

discussion with Mr. Harrison about the issues he raised. We do have 

a – I just don’t want to do that on the record.’ The assistant 

prosecutor responded, ‘Your Honor, if I may for the record just point 

out that at no point during the four days of trial did the defendant 

state he was not being properly represented, he never brought 

anything forward to the court, so I would just like to state that for the 

record.’” 

Id. 

{¶ 4} In Harrison, this court found error with the trial court’s 

summary dismissal of Harrison’s request for replacement counsel without 

permitting him to explain his reasons for the request. Based on the 
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authority from Ohio case law, this Court remanded the case to the trial court 

“for the limited purpose of inquiring into Harrison’s allegations, with 

instructions to re-enter the judgment of conviction if the allegations are 

unfounded.” Id. 

{¶ 5} On August 20, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing 

pursuant to this court’s order of remand. The trial court provided Harrison 

with the opportunity to explain why he wanted another lawyer. Harrison 

stated that counsel told his family that he thought Harrison was guilty and 

that it was only his job to get the best plea bargain for him, and that counsel 

would not call or speak to any of Harrison’s witnesses. Harrison further 

stated that counsel refused to acquire police reports that would show that he 

was evicting R.A. and her mother from his residence and that they did not 

leave on their own. 

{¶ 6} In response, defense counsel explained that Harrison did claim 

that a lot of people lived in the house when these alleged incidents occurred 

and that any number of those individuals could have been an alibi witness. 

Defense counsel stated that he did attempt to locate an alibi witness, 

however, because the allegations happened over multiple years and at least 

three separate locations, counsel was unable to pinpoint the days when other 

people were present. Counsel also stated that he did not recall anything 
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about the police reports Harrison mentioned. 

{¶ 7} In response to the court’s questions, trial counsel stated that he 

did speak with Harrison’s family and that he always leaves the decision to go 

to trial to the client. Counsel stated that he believed the plea bargain offer 

was a good offer, but he never said Harrison had to take the deal. In fact, 

Harrison elected to proceed to a jury trial. 

{¶ 8} Harrison next complained that the trial court never asked him or 

let him proceed with his own counsel; rather the court subjected him to the 

public defender. Harrison admitted that the first time he told the court he 

was bringing in paid counsel was on the date of trial, with a jury waiting to 

proceed. Additionally, Harrison admitted to filing numerous pro se motions 

with the court, but that he never told the court of his new counsel because he 

did not have the opportunity. The trial court fund Harrison’s claim 

unbelievable given all of the motions Harrison filed during the course of his 

case. 

{¶ 9} Harrison next told the court that he hired Attorney David 

Doughten. Harrison stated that he had not paid Mr. Doughten but that he 

was in the process of getting his retainer fee. Harrison reported that Mr. 

Doughten would make an appearance as soon as he got the money and all 

court papers. Although Mr. Doughten never made an appearance during 
8

Harrison’s trial, he did represent Harrison on appeal because, according to 

Harrison, “that was the stage that [they were] at.” Tr. 11. Further, 

Harrison stated that Mr. Doughten did not make an appearance at trial 

because he was not yet on the team. Harrison then stated that there was no 

way he wanted to go to trial with the public defender because he used to be a 

prosecutor, and still had friends in the prosecutor’s office. 

{¶ 10} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that 

the reasons Harrison asserted for replacing counsel were insufficient. The 

trial court found that had Harrison hired an attorney, the attorney could 

have made an appearance. The trial court then denied Harrison’s request 

for new counsel. 

{¶ 11} Harrison appeals, raising the two assignments of error contained 

in the appendix to this opinion. 

{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, Harrison argues the trial court 

failed to provide a full and fair hearing on the remand from this court. This 

assignment of error lacks merit. 

{¶ 13} In State v. Deal (1969), 17 Ohio St.2d 17, 244 N.E.2d 742, the 

Ohio Supreme Court stated the following at its syllabus: “Where, during the 

course of his trial for a serious crime, an indigent accused questions the 

effectiveness and adequacy of assigned counsel, by stating that such counsel 
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failed to file seasonably a notice of alibi or to subpoena witnesses in support 

thereof even though requested to do so by accused, it is the duty of the trial 

judge to inquire into the complaint and make such inquiry a part of the 

record. The trial judge may then require the trial to proceed with assigned 

counsel participating if the complaint is not substantiated or is 

unreasonable.” 

{¶ 14} In State v. Prater (1990), 71 Ohio App.3d 78, 83, 593 N.E.2d 44, 

the Tenth Appellate District found a judge’s concerns about the timeliness of 

a motion for new counsel unpersuasive in ruling that the judge should have 

inquired about the defendant’s complaint. The Ohio Supreme Court cited 

Prater with approval in State v. Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 524, 684 

N.E.2d 47. In State v. Beranek (Dec. 14, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76260, 

this court noted that, “[i]n both Deal and Prater, the case was remanded to 

the judge for the limited purpose of inquiring into the defendant’s 

allegations, with instructions to re-enter the judgment of conviction if the 

allegations were unfounded. Deal, 17 Ohio St.2d at 20, 244 N.E.2d at 

743-44; Prater, 71 Ohio App.3d at 85-86, 593 N.E.2d at 48.” 

{¶ 15} This court explained the purpose of the limited remand: “[t]he 

purpose of the inquiry and investigation are to allow a defendant the 

opportunity to place his allegations on the record, and to show sufficient 
10

investigation into their merit to allow appellate review. Thus the 

complaining defendant is allowed the opportunity to place allegations and 

evidence of at least some issues of ineffective assistance of counsel on the 

record for review on direct appeal, rather than having those issues postponed 

for postconviction relief petitions, because they rely on evidence outside the 

record.” Beranek. This court noted that if the defendant’s allegations are 

specific enough to justify further investigation, the court must investigate, 

but no further investigation is required for vague or general reasons for 

wanting to discharge counsel. Beranek. This court also stated, quoting 

Prater, that the investigation may be “‘brief and minimal.’” Beranek. 

{¶ 16} This court held that the judge on remand should attempt to 

determine those issues for which the defendant sought to discharge his 

attorney initially, and acknowledged that “in the aftermath of trial,” a 

defendant “might assert numerous errors of his trial counsel,” but cautioned 

that “it is unlikely that he would foresee each error prior to trial.” Beranek. 

{¶ 17} It was on the above authority that this court in Harrison

remanded this case for a hearing. On remand, the trial court properly 

conducted a hearing and allowed Harrison to place on the record, his reasons 

for the request for new counsel. After reviewing the record and all evidence 

adduced at the hearing, we find that the trial court made sufficient inquiry 
11

into the allegation to provide this court with meaningful review. We also 

agree with the trial court that Harrison’s reasons supporting his request for 

new counsel were insufficient. 

{¶ 18} Primarily, during the hearing, Harrison made general, broad 

statements about his dislike for the manner in which trial counsel conducted 

the investigation into his case. Harrison claimed that he had alibi 

witnesses and police reports that would provide a motive for R.A. and her 

mother to falsely accuse him. However, Harrison never provided the name 

of any alleged alibi witness or any police report showing that he evicted R.A. 

or her mother. Moreover, defense counsel provided a reasonable 

explanation for the lack of an alibi witness: given the length of time over 

which these allegations occurred and the number of residences at which they 

were to have occurred, defense counsel found it impossible to pinpoint any 

alibi witnesses. Lastly, this court rejected Harrison’s suggestion that the 

victim made up the crimes. Harrison, supra. 

{¶ 19} Next, Harrison claims the trial court erred when it failed to 

inquire into the attorney-client relationship during the hearing. Initially, 

we note that Harrison never alleged that a breakdown between himself and 

trial counsel ever occurred. Nonetheless, we find that the trial court was 

not required to do so. The purpose of the hearing was to allow Harrison to 
12

state the reason why he wanted replacement counsel. If the reasons were 

vague and general, as the trial court found in this case, no further 

investigation was required. Prater, Beranek. Accordingly, the trial court 

did not have to determine whether a breakdown in the attorney-client 

relationship occurred. 

{¶ 20} Harrison also claims that the trial court erred by allowing his 

trial counsel to represent him on the remand hearing and further erred when 

it failed to place himself and his trial counsel under oath. Again, however, 

Harrison misses the point of the limited remand in his case. A court is 

required to conduct an investigation only if it determines that a defendant’s 

allegations are specific enough. Prater, Beranek. The remand hearing was 

an informal procedure designed to flush out meritorious claims for new 

counsel. Had Harrison presented such a claim, the trial court would have 

been bound to conduct a further investigation, which would have presumably 

involved the swearing in of witnesses and assigning of counsel. 

{¶ 21} Based on the foregoing, we agree with the court’s conclusion that 

Harrison’s allegations for replacement counsel were insufficient. 

{¶ 22} Harrison’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 23} In his second assignment of error, Harrison argues that the trial 

court erred when it failed to appoint new counsel for the remand hearing. 
13

We disagree. 

{¶ 24} Primarily, we note that in making this argument, Harrison fails 

to cite to any authority requiring a trial court to appoint counsel on a remand 

hearing on a motion for replacement counsel. Moreover, similar case law 

and this court’s decision in Harrison do not require new counsel to be 

appointed on remand. 

{¶ 25} Nonetheless, Harrison argues that had new counsel been 

appointed, counsel would have argued that Harrison did not know he had an 

absolute right to testify and that trial counsel’s failure to acquire a medical 

expert was an error. Additionally, Harrison claims that appointment of 

counsel would have permitted cross-examination of witnesses and the 

procurement of records that would have allowed the court to determine 

whether Harrison’s charges were justified. 

{¶ 26} Again, as stated above, on remand, the trial court was merely 

required to allow Harrison to state his reasons for wanting to discharge 

counsel. Prater, Beranek, Harrison. If Harrison’s allegations were found to 

be vague and general, as in the instant case, no further investigation was 

warranted. Moreover, this Court specifically rejected Harrison’s arguments 

concerning his right to testify and the lack of a medical expert. See, 

Harrison. 
14

{¶ 27} Accordingly, Harrison’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 28} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas 

court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been 

affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for 

execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J., and 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR 

Appendix 

Assignments of Error: 

“I. The trial court failed to provide the appellant a full and 

fair hearing on the remand from this court.” 
15

“II. The trial court deprived the appellant his right to 

assistance of counsel by failing to appoint counsel for the 

remand procedure.”