IN THE

AFTERMATH OF WAR

US Support

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Nation-Building

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Richard H. Shultz, Jr.


ISBN 1-58566-058-2

First Printing August 1993

5

Second Printing May 1996

Third Printing June 1998

Fourth Printing December 2000

Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interes

academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views 

pressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or positio

the Department of Defense or the UnitedStates government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared 

public release .
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vii

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv

1 THE USE OF FORCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF

THE COLD WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2 PANAMA 1989: THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES

OF PRAETORIAN RULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Origins ofPraetorianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The 1968 Coup and the Emergence of Omar Torrijos . . . . . . . 6

Noriega andthe Panamanian Defense Force . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

3 CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR RESTORATION . . . . . . . 15

Genesis ofIntervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Planning Challenges and Obstructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Blind Logic: AReappraisal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

4 JUST CAUSE AND THE BREAKDOWN OF

BLIND LOGIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

5 THE MILITARY SUPPORT GROUP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Origins of the Military Support Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Personnel and Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Military Support Group Tasking andthe

Panama Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

i~
Chapter Page

6 ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Creating a Panamanian Security Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Infrastructure Reconstruction andNation-Building . . . . : . . 55

Psychological Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Military Support Group Liaison with the

Panamanian Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Interagency Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

7 LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE RELEVANCE . . . . . . 67

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.

. . 73

iv
Foreword

In a more benign post-cold war international system, where no threat approaches

that of the former Soviet Union, the rationale for the use of US military power cannot

be based solely on the national interest. It ill have to reflect concern with and

support for such issues as self-determination, democratization, human rights, and

economic development. The United States must have a postconflict reconstruction

assistance policy that contributes to a positive consolidation of the situation and that

promotes developments seen as contributing to stability and positive change. The

use of force without a policy for the postconflict situation will be politically

precarious.

Additionally, in this new international security environment the employment of

armed forces in missions outside of or short of war has become increasingly important and frequent. Several indicators suggest that these operations will continue to

grow in prominence on the US national security agenda. What do these nontraditional operations encompass? The two that have received the most attention to date

are peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. Very recently, a third, peace

enforcement, has been added to the list.

However, peacekeeping and peace enforcement only focus on the violence or combat that is taking place. Neither addresses the complex issue of what takes place

after the termination ofhostilities. Following peacekeeping and peace enforcement is

another nontraditional use of the military: postconflict/postcrisis reconstruction assistance missions. In the future, the US is likely to find itself involved in the aftermath of crisis and conflict situations where it may or may not have been one of the

initial belligerents but is part of a bilateral or multilateral effort to resolve the

problem and assist in the reconstruction .

Professor Shultz addresses the need for a postconflict policy that takes into account all of these considerations . This study is an important contribution to policy

analysis and planning. It should be read by civilian and military planners alike.

About the

Author

Dr Richard H. Shultz, Jr., is director of the International Security Studies Program and associate professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law

and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Dr Shultz frequently lectures at US military

academies and war colleges. He has been a research associate at the Consortium for

the Study of Intelligence and a consultant to various US government agencies concerned with national security affairs . He has been a nonresident fellow ofthe Hoover

Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, and a recipient of an Earhart Foundation

Research Fellowship and a United States Institute of Peace Research Fellowship.

During 1988-89 he was a secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow and a

member of the Strategy Department of the Naval War College. Dr Shultz is the

author of The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices and

Regional Comparisons (1988), and has coauthored or edited 12 other books, including

Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (1984); The Future ofAir Power

in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (1991); The United States Army: Challenges and

Missions for the 1990s (1991); U.S. Defense Policy in an Era of Constrained Resources

(1990); Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (1984); and Lessons from an Unconventional War: Reassessing U.S. Strategies for Future Conflicts (1981). His articles have

appeared in numerous professional journals, including The Annals of the American

`Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Survival, Conflict, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, World Affairs, Strategic

Review, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of International Affairs, Polity, Western

Political Quarterly, and The Journal ofPolitics .

vit

Preface

Post-conflict policy has only recently been considered by the defense community.

However, in Panama in 1989-90, the United States was programmatically and structurally ill-equipped for the situation that followed the fighting. Missing was an

integrated and interagency strategy to support short-term conflict resolution and

long-term reconstruction.

This study represents an attempt to preclude such a shortfall in the future. It

presents a detailed assessment of contingency planning for and execution of the

postconflict reconstruction policy implemented by the Department of Defense in

Panama following Operation Just Cause. Hopefully, it will provide a framework for

analysis and planning that will be of value to those who prepare for the use of

military capabilities in post-conflict reconstruction operations, whether this follows

interventions, as in Panama, or is a part of the aftermath of US involvement in

peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. Each of these situations will require

close attention to the situation following conflict.

I would like to thank several individuals for their assistance in this study. First,

from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and

Low-Intensity Conflict, Dr Alberto Coll, Dr Chris Lamb, and Col Dennis Barlow

provided invaluable assistance and encouragement . Many doors were opened due to

their backing. Throughout the study, I quote numerous officials who were involved

in various aspects of the Panama policy following Just Cause. I would like to thank

each for taking time from busy professional schedules to sit for long interviews with

me. While the number is too large to note each of these officials, a special debt of

gratitude is owed to Col Jack Pryor. These interviews were transcribed by Mrs

Freda Kilgallen and edited by Mr Harald Breitenstein. Their professionalism in

addressing each of these tasks was truly outstanding. The same is true of Mrs

Roberta Breen, who prepared the manuscript for publication . Finally, I want to

thank Col Ed Mann, chief, Doctrine Research Division, Airpower Research Institute,

who encouraged me to publish the study with the Air University Press and Mr

=,,Preston Bryant, who provided outstanding editorial assistance.

Introduction

What factors led to the decision to use force in Panama? President George Bush

listed four reasons: to protect American citizens abroad, to defend democracy in

Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama

Canal treaties. 1 For Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Colin Powell, six criteria

had to be satisfied:

Was there sufficient provocation? Powell thought yes . Has the PDF [Panamanian Defense

Force] changed and gone out of control? Again yes. Would Blue Spoon [the military plan for

intervention] resolve the problem? Yes. Would the plan minimize damage and casualties?

Yes. Would it bring democracy? Yes. And public and press reaction? Probably positive .2

These statements coincide with four guidelines for using force in the aftermath of

the cold war detailed in chapter 1. First, there was an identifiable threat to US

interests on three counts. The killing of a US Marine officer on 16 December 1989

and the physical abuse of a Navy lieutenant and his wife had put Americans at risk.

Noriega and the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) appeared to be going out of

control. By extension, this situation was seen as threatening the Panama Canal.

PDF violence might put the canal at risk. Finally, there was Noriega's involvement

in international drug trade, an increasingly important US national security issue.

However, the decision to intervene entailed more than the defense of US interests .

It included the normative objective of supporting democratization in Panama.

Noriega's nullification of the presidential election results of May 1989, and his use of

"dignity battalions" to assault the winners, was a major setback for US policy in

Panama and in the region. At a time when democracy was spreading throughout

Latin America, an important policy objective of the Bush administration, Noriega

remained a symbol of right-wing dictatorship. His removal was seen as contributing

to the wave of democratization taking place on a global scale.

The decision to use force in Panama likewise satisfies our second criterion, which

specifies that the political entity against which military power is directed must have

lost credibility and be seen as acting outside the bounds of acceptable behavior.

° . Noriega had little or no credibility, either in Panama or in the region. He was seen

r

as acting outside the bounds of acceptable behavior in the "new world order." To put

it bluntly, he was a heavy-handed thug, who trampled on democratic elections, beat

up the successful candidates, and lavishly profited from his involvement in the drug

trade. Clearly, he was out of step.

Operation Just Cause also appears to have met our third criterion-the use of

force conformed to the principles of proportionality and discrimination. While the

operation was, based on General Powell's "doctrine of overwhelming force," which

seeks to mass and employ superior firepower to guarantee victory, civilian damage

and casualties were of great concern in the planning process . 3 This concern was

reflected in the rules of engagement.
It is with respect to our fourth criterion-a follow-on policy that contributes to a

positive consolidation of the situation and promotes stable, orderly change and

development-that the Panama intervention encountered problems. This study will

assess those aspects of US policy concerned with support for reconstruction and

democratization (also called restoration) in the aftermath of Operation Just Cause.

The research approach taken to examine these issues included a review of the

literature on contemporary Panamanian politics, with particular focus on praetorian

rule. Declassified and other relevant US government documents were collected and

reviewed. In-depth interviews were conducted with military and civilian personnel

involved in planning and implementing the postconflict policy. (These included three

commanders in chief of Southern Command and the US ambassador and charge

d'affaires, among other key officials .) Research trips to Panama were made.,in April

1990, March 1991, and September 1992 . The research included extensive use of the

Panamanian press and discussions with Panamanian officials . Finally, the secondary

literature on Operation Just Cause was reviewed.

As noted above, this study assesses those aspects of US policy that addressed

reconstruction, nation-building, and democratization in Panama following Operation

Just Cause. Specifically, seven questions are examined:

1. In the late 1980s, what was the nature and degree of praetorian rule in

Panama?

2 . How thorough was the contingency planning for reconstruction and

democratization in Panama?

3. What were the limitations in the contingency plans?

4. What were the unanticipated civil-military problems that unfolded at the time

of Just Cause?

5. Why, and under what circumstances, was the Military Support Group (MSG),

Southern Command's organization for assisting in nation-building and democratization, established?

6. How well did the MSG perform?

7. What lessons can we derive (from the Panama experience) that have future

relevance?

Panama provides an example of what can occur when planning requirements are

neglected. Destabilizing developments appeared, not foreseen in the contingency

plan (Operation Blind Logic), that considerably weakened restoration efforts . Massive looting, a new Government of Panama (GOP) that was "hollow" and not ready to

govern, an empty treasury, and a decaying societal infrastructure proved to be major

obstacles. The Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF), which executed

Operation Blind Logic, was unprepared for each. It likewise was not ready to address

the security force issue. The CMOTF stood conceptually deficient, lacked a coherent

organizational structure, and was short of personnel .

To address these postconflict obstacles, an ad hoc organization-the Military Support Group-was conceived. While it did not completely snatch victory out of thejaws

of defeat, the MSG did save face for the United States. Conceptually, as this study

xii
details, it had the right organizational elements-and it has future applications if

postconflict situations are added to the national security agenda ofthe United States.

The MSG should serve as a conceptual model for the development of doctrine, an

area in need of serious attention within the Department of Defense (DOD).

However, the MSG was only part of what was needed. Postconflict assistance

requires a civilian-military interagency response. As this study demonstrates, the

civilian agencies of the US government were much less prepared, both conceptually

and organizationally, and this undermined interagency organization . An important

lesson of Panama is the need for an interagency mechanism that can plan for and

respond to postconflict crises in an effective way. No such country team was in place

in Panama; it should have been. This approach would, in turn, generate a working

interagency group to prepare for future contingencies.

There are also crucial lessons to be derived from specific reconstruction activities

of the MSG. Perhaps most important is how to assist in restructuring security

forces. Any state that hopes to transition from an authoritarian or dictatorial regime

to democracy will require assistance in reforming its military and security institutions. The reason is straightforward . These institutions are the instruments of

coercive control. In Panama, this led to the complicated decision to establish a police

force and eschew a military.

In the future, it is more likely that states seeking to transition from dictatorship

will retain military institutions . The Panamanian approach is probably more the

exception than the rule. If the US is to assist in such postconflict transitions, DOD

must create advisory teams and programs to facilitate the institutionalization of our

civil-military ethos into the host country's military organization. This approach goes

well beyond the traditional programs that DOD currently maintains. Fundamental

transformation requires a more direct and sustained effort of institution-building.

With respect to the infrastructure reconstruction process, the MSG demonstrated

US commitment to Panama while US civilian agencies struggled to establish themselves. At a time when the GOP needed to give to the Panamanian people a sign that

it was responding to their problems, the MSG helped to accomplish this. There are

important lessons not only in the reconstruction programs but also in how the MSG

carried them out under the auspices of the GOP. It encouraged the development of a

decision-making and implementation process that involved the Panamanian government-local, province, and national levels-in the reconstruction process . What the

MSG established is instructive in terms of US-host country relations . In fact, more

broadly, this is true of the overall MSG-GOP liaison process. While unorthodox for

the US government, it was in tune with the political and societal context of Panama.

Finally, with respect to psychological operations (PSYOPS), the MSG encountered

not uncommon civilian agency biases. Conceptually, PSYOPS has an important contribution to make to postconflict reconstruction programs. This can be seen in the

limited Psychological Support Element programs developed during its short tenure

with the MSG. However, the larger lesson to be drawn is that postconflict

reconstruction and nation-building necessitates the ability to communicate and in-
form. To constrain PSYOPS use, as in Panama, does not make sense. These a

other lessons are described in this study. All have important implications for fut

US postconflict missions.

Notes

1. "Fighting in Panama: Statements in Washington," New York Times (20 December 1989), Al.

2. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 171.

3. For a discussion ofthe planning process, see Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Bak

Operation Just Cause: The Storming ofPanama (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991

Xiv
Chapter 1

The Use of Force in the Aftermath

of the Cold War

A decision by an American president to use military force is invariably

difficult and complicated. The process is characterized by an intensive debate

that generally goes beyond the hardheaded realist's requirement of defending

the national interest. Rather, questions concerning ethics, morality, justice,

and related democratic principles are frequently taken into consideration.

The debate over how to respond to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is a case in point.

The same is true of the decision to intervene in Panama.

During the postwar period, it has been very difficult for US policymakers to

adopt the Clausewitzian imperative that war "is simply a continuation of

political intercourse, with the addition of other means."' Likewise, few have

been willing to embrace Machiavelli's exhortation that a ruler "should therefore have no other aim or thought, nor take up any other thing for his study,

but war and its organization and discipline, for that is the only art that is

necessary to one who commands."2 While not all would agree, the evidence

suggests that, in several instances during the cold war, the justification for an

American use of military force was influenced by normative factors outside

the guidelines proposed by Clausewitz and Machiavelli. 3

If this was the case during the cold war, a conflict that many saw as a dire

threat to the survival of the United States, the decision to use military force

will be determined even more by normative factors in a more benign post-cold

war international environment. Indeed, the counsel of Aristotle may become

a prerequisite: "the full performance of [the statesman] depends on a combination of prudence and moral virtue: virtue ensures the correctness of the

end at which we aim, and prudence that of the means toward it."4 We believe

that such normative considerations will be important policy determinants in

the "new world order." As this study will demonstrate, these considerations

were part of the decision to use force and, more importantly, to support

reconstruction and democratization in Panama in 1989-90.

Why should such normative prescriptions as supporting self-determination,

democratization, human rights, and economic development influence a

decision to use force? At least four post-cold war themes are contributing

factors. First, there no longer exists a threat to the United States of such

proportion that it could place our survival at risk. Consequently, the adage

that we must "fight fire with fire" no longer holds. 5 While the defense of

interests will remain central, it will not stand alone. Second, many believe

1
that the employment of military force has become rationally unthinkable in

the developed world and, at some point in the near future, will cease to be a

conceivable option in the third world as well. While evidence exists to raise

doubts about this proposition, it will be a constraining argument against any

future US decision to use force. Third, and closely related, is the opinion of

many that the ability to translate military potential into active influence has

lessened considerably with the emergence of a pluralistic and economically

interdependent international system.$ While economic interdependence is a

fact, whether one of its consequences will be an end to the active influence of

military power is questionable . 9 A fourth argument that will militate against

the use of force in the future is that the US is in decline and should look

inward to solve grave domestic problems rather than become involved in

international conflicts that do not directly affect its well-being. 1 °

If even some of the above propositions prove to be incorrect and, as others

suggest, the emerging post-cold war international system is more complicated, more volatile, and less predictable-and is characterized by a host of

security challenges^a US decision to use military force still will have to take

these constraining forces into account. The use of force will need to be explained in terms of both meaningful self-interest and larger normative principles and values. The following general guidelines, briefly noted in the

introduction, are proposed for this purpose:

1 . In addition to countering a threat to an identifiable interest of the

United States, the use of force will also have to foster some larger normative

purpose. One example might be to promote the growth of free and democratic

political institutions that enhance regional stability. A related situation could

entail assistance in combating aggression and coercion directed against new

and/or existing democratic institutions .

2. The state or political entity against which military force is directed must

have both lost credibility and be seen as acting outside the bounds of acceptable international behavior. Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait is an

obvious but extreme example.

3. The use of force should conform with the principles of proportionality

and discrimination. The former are based on existing standards set by the

international law of war and on judgments of acceptable military practice.

The latter refers to prohibitions against attacks on noncombatants and targets that have no military value.

4. Following the military action, the US should have a follow-on policy that

contributes to a positive consolidation of the situation and that promotes

stable and orderly change and development, as seen by both domestic and

international audiences . Using force without attending to the postconflict

situation will be politically precarious.

The US intervention in Panama was the first major use of force by the

United States in the aftermath of the cold war. It provides an interesting case

study against which to test the requirements proposed above for the use of

2
military power. Our attention will focus on the fourth guideline as we assess

the effectiveness of American postconflict policy following Operation Just

Cause.

The issues of postconflict policy and strategy have only recently begun to be

`" addressed by the US foreign policy and defense communities. Looking back

on the experience in Panama, it is evident that the US government was

programmatically and structurally ill-equipped for the situations that followed the fighting. It lacked integrated and interagency political, economic,

social, informational, and military policies and strategies to support shortterm conflict resolution and longer-term stability and development. According to one recent report:

Few leaders look forward to the third day ofwar, the day after the fighting stops. It.

i s just as important to win the peace as it is to militarily defeat the enemy. . . .

Conflict termination is an essential link between national security strategy, national military strategy, and post-conflict aims-the political effects desired . This

holds for both war and measures shortof war."

The current initiative by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (DASD[SOILIC]) to outline a

"policy for the environment short of war" likewise calls attention to these

post---cold war requirements . Such a policy would emphasize "the selective

pursuit of opportunities to enhance regional stability, defuse nascent crises,

and support the growth of representative governments and market economies

where possible." Successful implementation of this policy requires that

civilian and military agencies of the US government be adept in four security

mission areas, including postconflict activities . As this study will

demonstrate, such proficiency was missing in Panama in the days following

the use of force.

Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton,

N.J . : Princeton University Press, 1976), 605.

2. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, in Great Political Thinkers: From Plato to the Present,

William Ebenstein, ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969), 291.

3 . Cold war historian John Gaddis believes that consideration of such principles did not

take place. Rather, a doctrine of what he terms moral relativism held sway. Gaddis asserts

that American policymakers "in the end . . . came to the view . . . that in periods ofmortal peril

these standards [democratic principles] could not be allowed to stand in the way of whatever

seemed required to defend the national interest." John Gaddis, "Morality and the Cold War,"

inEthics and International Relations, Kenneth Thompson, ed. (New Brunswick, N.J . : Transaction Books, 1985), 118. For other perspectives on the issue, see Bernard Brodie, War and

Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1974); Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of

Force: Military Power and International Politics, 3d ed. (New York: University Press of

America, 1988); Richard Shultz, "Can Democratic Governments Use Military Force in the War

Against Terrorism," WorldAffairs 148, no. 4 (1986).

4. Aristotle, Ethics, trans. J. A. K. Thomson (New York: Penguin Books, 1955), 222.

5. This argument was first made by Lt d-- ., Jam-s H. Doolittle in a July 1954 report to

President Eisenhower. His recommendations were tough minded and action oriented : "It is

3
now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination. . . . Ifthe United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of fair play must

be reconsidered. We must . . . learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more

clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us." Contained

in The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, William M. Leary, ed. (Tuscaloosa,

Ala. : University ofAlabama Press, 19,84), 143-45.

6. John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence ofMajor War (New York: Basic

Books, 1989). He bases his argument on the fact that modern warfare is no longer either

romantic or an effective method for achieving the goals of statecraft. Simply put, it is not a

rational choice. Rather, state power is shifting toward economic prowess and away from

military robustness . While Mueller concentrates on the developed states, he perceives similar

trends, in embryonic form, taking root in the third world.

7. For example, Eliot Cohen takes issue with the core arguments of those who believe that

military power has lost its utility. He raises serious doubt about the assertion that modern

weaponry, even nuclear ones, will have the same inhibiting effect on regional conflicts that they

have had on the superpowers . New weapons, in his opinion, signify only that war will take new

forms, not that it will cease to exist . Eliot Cohen, "The Future of Force and American

Strategy," The National Interest, Fall 1990, 4-5.

8. See David P. Calleo, Beyond American Hegemony: Future of the Western Alliance (New

York: Basic Books, 1989); and David P. Calleo et al., "The Dollar and the Defense ofthe West,"

ForeignAffairs, Spring 1988.

9. During the early 1970s, a growing number of international relations specialists postulated that the international system was experiencing a major change in the essence and structure of power. This change was brought about by the disintegration of superpower hegemony

and the emergence of a multipolar, pluralistic, international regime. In this new structure, it

was argued, the relations among nations were changing from one marked by conflicting national interests and independence to one characterized by economic interdependence, common

interests, and transnational cooperation . With changes in the modes ofconflict and the sources

of friction, nonsecurity issues were growing in importance. The low politics of economics,

resources, energy, and the environment were replacing the high politics ofsecurity and military

power. This optimism, which predicted an accelerated advance in international political

development toward a more peaceful and just world order, proved illusive . Military power and

the use of force remained fundamental instruments ofstatecraft through the remainder of the

1970s and 1980s.

10. The decline of the US is open to challenge ; nevertheless, a continuation of superpower

activism will not be automatically accepted by the American electorate. The case for activism

can be found in Samuel Huntington, "The United States-Decline or Renewal," Foreign Affairs,

Spring 1988.

11. "Results of the Roundtable Discussion on Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities" (Carlisle Barracks, Pa. : Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 21-22 July

1992),1 .

12. "Policy for the Environment Short of War," working draft (Washington, D.C.-.'

DASD[SO/LICI), 20 February 1992),4.71 .

4
Chapter 2

Panama 1989

The Nature and Consequences

of Praetorian Rule

A reasonable starting point from which to plan for reconstruction and

iemocratization in Panama is a clear understanding of what is to be replaced.

k review of the Panamanian political setting before 1989 reveals that restora-

-ion of democracy was an inaccurate description of what was to take place

:ollowing the dismantling of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) and the

*emoval of Manuel Noriega. While the Panamanian government had been

)ased on a constitutional framework and an electoral process, it would be

-rroneous to refer to a democratic legacy that could be restored.' Erroneous,

;hat is, if one adopts Samuel Huntington's "minimal definition" of democracy

3,s a political system where the "most powerful collective decision makers are

Selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which virtually all the

i.dult population is eligible to vote." 2 This was not the case in Panama.

Origins of Praetorianism

From 1903 through World War II, political power was concentrated in the

hands of a few traditional upper-class families known as the rabiblancos .

they had built an oligarchy composed primarily of old families of Spanish

3escent. They had developed and maintained strong ties of association and

kinship aIn the aftermath of the war, things began to change as new forces

Sought to challenge the oligarchy's domination of Panamanian politics.

The most important ofthese challengers was the National Police Force and

its commissioner, Jose Antonio Remon. Formed in 1904, the National Police

Force was Panama's only official armed force for the next half century. Under

Remon, the institution emerged as a political protagonist .

Remon, who came from the middle class, received a scholarship to attend

the Mexican Military Academy following his graduation from Panama's elite

[National Institute . He graduated from the academy in 1931 and returned to

Panama. According to Steve Ropp, "because few Panamanian police officers

at that time had academy training of any sort, he entered the National Police

as a captain. By 1947, he had become commandant of police."4 From this

5
position, Remon converted the National Police into the National Guard,

professionalized it, and employed the new institution as an instrument for

wielding political power.

" As National Police head, Remon frequently manipulated the political

process . As Jan Knippers Black" and Edmundo Flores note, "between 1948

and 1952 . . . [he] installed and removed presidents with unencumbered

ease."5 Remon also organized his own political base-the National Patriotic

Coalition-and was elected president in 1952. It was at this point that the

National Guard was established. The result was a paramilitary force that

began to receive modernized training and equipment.

In 1955, President Remon, who both enriched himself and promoted

economic and social reform as the head of state, was assassinated . However,

his creation of the National Guard had laid the foundation for praetorian sm

in Panama. s Between 1955 and the 1968 military coup, the professionalization and growth of the National Guard continued . So did its involvement in

politics.

As the professionalization and militarization of the National Guard was

taking place, the oligarchy returned to power. While it is beyond the scope of

this study to review the 1955-68 period, suffice it to say that it was marked

by several destabilizing currents. Those currents included manipulation of

the electoral process, political maneuvering, competition among various political parties that were extensions of leading families, and rising nationalist

opposition to US involvement in Panama. 8

The 1968 Coup and the Emergence of Omar Torrijos

The political crisis of 1968, which was marked by complex political

maneuvers and machinations, resulted in the election of Arnulfo Arias, a

legendary and controversial political figure. 9 Upon assuming office, Arias

immediately announced changes in the leadership of the National Guard (to

curtail its independence). This involved removing two of the most senior

officers and appointing a new commander. The Guard, however, removed

Arias from the presidency, established a provisional junta, and disbanded the

National Assembly as well as all political parties. During 1969, different

members of the junta maneuvered to take control . Omar Torrijos, commander

of the National Guard, consolidated his power after defeating a coup attempt

that sought to remove him. With this event began 20 years of praetorian rule

in Panama.

To help the reader understand the extent of military control in Panama,

Eric Nordlinger's typology of praetorianism will be utilized. i° He identifies

three types of military intervention in politics : moderators, guardians, and

rulers. Each is then defined in terms of two variables: the extent of political

power exercised and the political and economic objectives pursued.

6
According to this conceptual design, praetorian moderators "exercise a veto

power over a varied range of governmental decisions and political disputes,

without taking control of the government themselves."" While civilians hold

formal power, any action is subject to military rejection . In terms of political

and economic goals, moderators seek to maintain the status quo and prevent

"any kind of important change in the distribution of economic rewards, ensuring political order and government stability.

"12

Praetorian guardians differ in that they exercise governmental power

themselves. Nordlinger attributes this, in part, to increasing politicization of

the armed forces. "When moderator-type actions are unsuccessful in bringing

about desired outcomes-when the veto-type actions have to be repeated

again and again-the officers conclude that the only remedy is to control the

government themselves." 13 Once in command, guardians seek either to

preserve the political and economic status quo or to make necessary adjustments. They are dictatorial in that political rights and liberties are curtailed

or eliminated. Once the situation is in hand, guardians return to the barracks

and reinstate formal political control to civilian government.

Finally, praetorian rulers "not only control the government but dominate

-the regime, sometimes attempting to control large slices of political, economic,

and social life.

"14 With respect to political and economic goals, these attempts

are generally far-reaching and are seen as taking "considerable time to become securely rooted." This "necessitates regime dominance and an indefinite

period of military rule." 15 Rulers will eliminate all power centers that might

challenge their control and are much more dictatorial than their moderator

and guardian counterparts . Some will seek to create a base of support in the

population through mobilization and control from above.

What kind of praetorian system did Torrijos establish and Noriega perpetuate in Panama? To answer this question, the following issues will be

briefly addressed: What was the nature of their rule? How did they advance

the interests of the military? What impact did praetorianism have on other

Panamanian political elements? How did it affect the larger economic and

social context?

Once in control, Torrijos consolidated political power in his hands through a

mix of repression and populism. He referred to his form of rule as a "dictatorship with a heart." In fact, for the 1968-78 period, all political parties were

illegal-and the legislature was replaced in 1972 by a National Assembly of

Community Representatives, the members of which were selected by the

government. Torrijos justified these measures by citing pressing economic,

political, and social needs that required extraordinary measures.

While civilian political parties and institutions were held in check, the

National Guard continued to grow and increase its power and influence. Ropp

notes:

From 1968 until Torrijos's death in 1981, the National Guard continued the expansion, militarization, and professionalization that had begun under Remon in the

late 1940s. Furthermore, dramatic changes took place in officer recruitment and

training . During the 1950s and 1960s, most academy-trained officers entering the

7
National Guard were members of the lower-middle class who had received their

military training in Mexico and other countries in Central America; Torrijos himself

was schooled in El Salvador. During the 1970s, more junior officers attended South

American academies, such as those in Brazil, Peru, Chile, Venezuela, and Argentina.l s

Thus, the National Guard not only continued to develop as a praetorian institution but its officer corps was educated by some of Latin America's leading

praetorians . l7 Indeed, the National Guard came to define one of its two major

missions as internal security. Operationally, this came to mean any challenges by domestic political forces to the political power of the National

Guard. Under this system, there was no civilian control, and the National

Guard's command structure was highly centralized with the commander in

chief (CINC) having very broad authority.

As was noted above, the impact of praetorian rule on other Panamanian

political elements was considerable. All political parties were banned until

1978, as was the national legislature. Furthermore, the new constitution that

was promulgated in 1972 gave "legal" standing to the political domination of

Panama by General Torrijos and the National Guard. 18 During the mid1970s, due to outside pressures, Torrijos began the process of "democratization."

In 1978, under the guise of reforming the 1972 constitution, political parties

were legalized and Torrijos gave up his position as head of the government.

The National Assembly elected Aristides Royo as president of Panama. In

reality, this "democratization" was necessary to gain US support for the

proposed canal treaties. 19 Political power remained in the hands of Torrijos

and the National Guard. Presidential elections were set for 1984, and Torrijos created his own political party-the Democratic Revolutionary Party

(PRD)-to prepare for them.

The PRD was seen by Torrijos as the culmination of building a popular base

for his rule by forming alliances with those parts of Panamanian society that

had been ignored by the oligarchy. To his credit, Torrijos did carry out some

far-reaching social reforms. On the debit side, however, these reforms were

accompanied by increasing government and National Guard corruption and

personal enrichment.

To summarize, General Torrijos established praetorian rule in Panama between 1968 and 1978. His title of Maximum Leader of the Panamanian

Revolution exemplifies this fact. So does the way in which he ruled Panama

and built up the National Guard to ensure that this rule would continue.

Although he moved from praetorian ruler to guardian status in 1978, the

National Guard continued to dominate Panamanian politics.

Noriega and the Panamanian Defense Force

The sudden death of General Torrijos (in an airplane crash on 31 July 1981)

threw Panama into a succession crisis. The struggle was not between the

8
National Guard and civilian political parties but within the military itself.

Out of this struggle for power, Manuel Antonio Noriega, a longtime protege of

Torrijos, emerged as dictator of Panama.

20

Torrijos was succeeded at first by the chief of staff of the National Guard,

Col Florencio Florez Aguilar, who quickly became a target of intrigue because

of his willingness to allow President Royo to exercise more authority. According to one observer, he was seen as "too passive . . . too amenable to the

civilian politicians who saw the transition to democracy as a contest for power

with the National Guard." His passivity was seen as a threat to praetorian

rule and the corporate interests of the military. "Floret declined to project

himself as a national leader but seemed to epitomize the subordinate military

officer .

"21

For three other powerful members of the National Guard-Executive

Secretary of the General Staff Roberto Diaz Herrera, Chief of Staff Ruben

Dario Paredes, and Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Noriega-this was

not acceptable. Florez had to go, as did Royo. Along with Assistant Chief of

Staff for Operations Armando Contreras, they sent Florez to retirement in a

bloodless coup.

22 Likewise, Royo was quickly dispatched as president. He

was replaced by Vice President Ricardo de la Espriella, who immediately

referred to the National Guard as a "partner in power."23

The remaining struggle to succeed Torrijos was between Paredes and

Noriega, but it really was no contest . Noriega easily outmaneuvered Paredes

and became a brigadier general in August 1983 and commander in chief of the

National Guard. Unlike Torrijos, whose power was rooted in a combination

of populism, nationalism, corruption, and praetorianism, Noriega relied on

control of the military, corruption, and repression.

25 To this end, he greatly

expanded the military's power and control over all aspects ofgovernment.

The first step in this progression was to create the Panamanian Defense

Force, an amalgamation of the national guard, the air force, the naval force,

the canal defense force, the police force, the traffic department, the department of investigation, and the immigration department. He accomplished

this by pressing the legislative assembly to approve a bill that mandated

consolidation. Next, the officers and troops in military units were increased,

equipment and training were upgraded, and missions were expanded. 26 Between 1978 and 1987, the PDF expanded from 8,700 to nearly 15,000. Beyond

this, Noriega widened its influence and power through manipulation of the

law and corruption. He also took steps to ensure control over the PDF

through a network of his most trusted and well-placed followers .

Law 20, which created the PDF, assigned to the military a great deal of

autonomy in determining internal procedures, requirements, and missions.

The duties of the PDF commander in chief were broadened to include "preservation of the public order and social peace." 27 Law 20 built on the existing

constitutional stipulation that "power emanates from the people, and is exercised by the government through a distribution of functions among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in harmonic collaboration with the

National Guard.

"28 In effect, as Ricardo Arias Calderon noted, the PDF be9
came "the final arbiter in political life and government."29 This was true in

both law and practice.

Noriega also continued to expand the corporate interests of the military, a_

process that had begun under Torrijos. Senior PDF officers were engaged in a

wide variety of legal and illegal business activities, of which the most lucrative was narcotics trafficking.

30 While the extent to which Noriega enriched

himself is well known, the aftermath of Just Cause revealed that an extremely high percentage of the PDF's senior leaders had large bank accounts,

property, and business interests worth many millions of dollars that could not

be accounted for.

31

By 1984, there was little doubt that Noriega and the PDF were in control .

The presidential election of that year was to bear this out. The candidate the

PDF selected and supported-Nicolas Ardito Barletta-defeated Arnulfo

Arias, three-time president of Panama. There is little doubt that the election

results were fixed. The irregularities were massive and blatant .32 Then, less

than a year later, Barletta stepped out of line and Noriega forced his resignation. 33 He was replaced by Vice President Eric Arturo Delvalle. Thus, because of military intervention, Panama had five presidents in less than four

years.

In addition to using the stick against civilian opposition, Noriega used the

carrot. This was the case when he was dealing with civilian government

agencies. While certainly not new, Noriega-fostered corruption became extensive and endemic in public administration. Through this process, he brought

civilian government agencies under his control . Corruption became a means

of suborning civilian officials to Noriega and the PDF. The economic and

social infrastructure was in disarray. As we shall see, this disarray had an

unforeseen effect on the restoration process .

Finally, the Noriega regime was considerably more repressive than its

predecessor . Within the PDF, special elements-most notably the First

Public Order Company (Doberman)-were used to quell public opposition.

Noriega also created local militias, known as "dignity battalions," to frighten

and assault the political opposition. They carried out violent attacks on the

victorious opposition in the May 1989 presidential election.

34

To summarize, Noriega continued and refined the praetorian control of the

political process that had begun under Torrijos. This control ensured that the

PDF was "the final arbiter in political life and government." Noriega also

bore responsibility for the deterioration of the social and economic structure.

Corruption and repression flourished. In 1989, when popular opposition

coalesced against him, he used force to crush it. It seemed clear that political

opposition parties, on their own, could not bring about change through the

electoral process. As praetorian guardians, Noriega and the PDF did not

allow this to happen.

This was the political legacy with which those planning for democratic

restoration and nation-building had to contend. Missing in Panama was a

democratic tradition, a professional civil administration, a nonpoliticized

military, and a civic culture. For two decades, Panama's experience was

10
marked by extralegal, corrupt, and increasingly repressive praetorian rule by

the National Guard andthe PDF.

Notes

1. Panama had four constitutions between 1903 and 1989: 1904, 1941, 1946, and 1972. The

1972 constitution was amended by the Reform Acts of 1978 and the Constitutional Act of 1983.

For a discussion, see Richard Millett, "Government and Politics," in Panama: A Country Study,

ed. Sandra W. Meditz and Dennis M. Hanratty (Washington, D.C . : Government Printing

Office, 1989),174-83 .

2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century

(Norman, Okla. : University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 7.

3. John Biesanz and Mavis Biesanz, The People of Panama (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955).

4. Steve Ropp, "National Security," in Panama: A Country Study, 221. Also see Steve C.

Ropp, Panamanian Politics : From Guarded Nation to National Guard (Stanford, Calif. :

Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 25-29.

5. Jan Knippers Black and Edmundo Mores, "Historical Setting," in Panama: A Country

Study, 34.

6. Here we adopt Eric Nordlinger's definition of praetorianism as "a situation in which

military officers are major or dominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened

use offorce. . . . Thus praetorianism (or military intervention) occurs when officers more or less

overtly,threaten to carry out a coup d'etat unless certain demands are met, when they stage an

unsuccessful coup, when a coup brings about or prevents the replacement of the government by

another group of civilians, and, most importantly, when the officers themselves take control of

the government ." Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government

(Englewood Cliffs, N.J . : Prentice-Hall, 1977), 2-3.

7. Ropp attributes this to the following factors. One, the legacy of Remon was continued by

his successors, as the "total force strength reached 5,000 with an officer corps of 465; an

increasing number of officers received academy training ." Two, the National Guard benefited

from US aid through the Mutual Security Act. "More Panamanian officers and enlisted personnel were trained at United States facilities in the Canal Zone, and military assistance increased dramatically in the 1960x." This was due, in part, to Castro's victory in Cuba. Ropp,

"National Security," 221.

8. For a discussion ofthese developments see Ropp, Panamanian Politics ; William Jordan,

Panama Odyssey (Austin, Tex. : University of Texas Press, 1984); and Walter LaFeber, The

Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press,

1978).

9. For background on his fascinating political career, see J. Conte Porras, Arnulfo Arias

Madrid (Panama: Litho-Impresora, S. A., 1980); Ropp, Panamanian Politics ; and Milled .

10. Nordlinger. While there is a rich literature of praetorianism, Nordhnger presents one of

the more conceptual treatments of the subject and attempts to establish general propositions

that can be tested in specific case studies. Among the more standard general works are Claude

E. Welch, Jr ., and Arthur K Smith, Military Role and Rule (North Scituate, Mass. : Duxbury

Press, 1974); William R. Thompson, The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers (Beverly Hills,

Calif. : Sage Publications, 1973); S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role ofthe Military

in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962); Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development ofNew Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); and Amos Perlmutter, The

Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1977). In

addition, there are numerous studies of praetorianism in specific countries and regions, including Latin America. Afew interesting recent articles on the latter include: David Pion-Berlin,

"Retreat to the Barracks: Recent Studies on Military Withdrawal from Power," in Journal of

Inter-American Studies and WorldAfJ`airs, Spring 1990, 137-45; Gabriella Marcella, "The Latin

American Military, Low Intensity Conflict, and Democracy," in Journal of Inter-American

11
Studies and World Affairs, Spring 1990, 45-82; and Fernando Bustamante, "The Military in

Latin America: Is the Retreat for Good?" Bulletin of Peace Proposals, no. 4 (Fall 1990): 371-

84.

11. Nordlinger, 22.

12. Ibid.

.,_.

13. Ibid., 23.

14. Ibid., 26.

15. Ibid.

16. Ropp, "National Security," 223-24.

17. For an interesting comparative analysis of praertorian institutions in Latin America,

see Robert Wesson, ed., The Latin American Military Institution (New York: Praeger, 1986).

18. For an informed discussion of these events see Ropp, Panamanian Politics; and George

Priestley, Military Government and Popular Participation in Panama: The Torrijos Regime,

1968-75 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1976).

19. LaFeber.

20. As the head of intelligence for Torrijos, Noriega did the dirty work. Those unwilling to

cooperate with Torrijos were harassed, arrested, or forced into exile. Noriega handled these

matters. While it is fashionable to consider Torrijos a populist, and to a degree he was, there

was also a repressive underside to his rule . To handle these matters he turned to Noriega, a

loyal associate whom Torrijos is said to have referred to as "my gangster." R. M. Koster and

Guillermo Sanchez, In the Time of Tyrants: Panama: 1968-1990 (New York: W. W. Norton,

1990).

21. John Dinges, Our Man in Panama: How General Noriega Used the United States and

Made Millions in Drugs and Arms (New York: Random House, 1990), 139.

22. Ibid ., 139-40 .

23. Black and Flores, 60.

24. For an account of how Noriega did this see Dinges, chap. 7.

25. For interesting insights and comparison of Torrijos and Noriega, see Ricardo Arias

Calder6n, "Panama: Disaster ofDemocracy," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1987/1988, 328-47. Also

see Koster and Sanchez.

26. It should be noted that for other reasons this restructuring had been urged by the US

Department of Defense. It was seen as necessary if Panama was to be able to defend the canal

under the 1978 treaty agreements .

27. Ropp, "National Security," 225.

28. Ibid ., 247.

29. Calder6n, 335. He also notes that Noriega sought to reaffirm this status within the

PDF itself "Through meetings and seminars he barrages officers and troops with indoctrinating messages ." This is not surprising, given Noriega's interest in psychological warfare. For

insights into how he viewed this instrument of power, see Manuel Antonio Noriega,

OperacionesPsicologicas (Panama: Panamanian Defense Force, G2, 1975).

30. It is unclear when Noriega first became involved with narcotics trafficking. The US

may have had evidence as early as 1971. By the early 1980s, it was well known that he directly

facilitated the flow of drugs through Panama for the Medellfn Cartel . Noriega likewise arranged for the laundering of drug profits in Panamanian banks and provided narco-fugitives

sanctuary. He also was heavily involved in the covert transfer of arms to other governments

and guerrilla movements. This became front-page news in June 1986 when an article by

Seymour Hersh was published entitled "Panama Strongman Said to Trade in Drugs, Arms, and

Illicit Money," New York Times, 12 June 1986.

31. According to Military Support Group (MSG) documents, 100 percent of all colonels and

83 percent of all lieutenant colonels were excluded from positions in the new Panamanian

police force. Many were under arrest. According to the chiefof staff of the MSG, this had to do

with fmancial corruption. For example, he noted that in addition to regular pay, "every colonel

received [$]10,000 a week in cash." This was only one way that "Noriega was corrupting the

12
society in a very purposeful, methodical way." Interview with the chief of staff of the Milita

Support Group, 20 January 1992.

32. Millett, 188-89.

33. The reasons behind this are complicated, but the key one seems to center on Barletta

attempt to conduct an open investigation of the brutal murder of the outspoken critic 

Koriega, Dr Hugo Spadafora.

34. For an account, see Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story (New York: Simon an

Schuster, 1991), chaps. 10 and 11.

1 A

Chapter 3

Contingency Planning for Restoration

The events resulting in the use of force in Panama have been recounted 

numerous publications.' They need not be revisited here. Suffice it to no

that the following incidents, beginning in the summer of 1987, escalated t

domestic political crisis in Panama and sharpened the confrontation betwe

Noriega and the United States.

First came the revelations of Col Roberto Diaz Herrera. Having been for

into retirement, the former PDF chief of staff publicly charged that Norie

was heavily involved in narcotics trafficking and money laundering for t

drug cartels ; had rigged the 1984 election; had ordered the brutal murder 

his outspoken critic, Dr Hugo Spadafora; and had even been behind the dea

of Torrijos. 2 This energized the recently established Civic Crusade for Just

and Democracy, a broad citizens' coalition of 26 organizations . The coalit

called for a campaign of demonstrations and civil disobedience until Norie

resigned. He responded with violence.

This upheaval did not go unnoticed, and the international media gave 

substantial attention. The impact on foreign governments, particularly t

of the United States, was not negligible . Noriega's image suffered anoth

major blow in February 1988 when two US grand juries indicted him on dr

trafficking. These indictments fueled the demonstrations and drew bat

lines between the Panamanian dictator and the Reagan administration.

For its part, the administration pressured President Eric Arturo Delvalle 

fire Noriega as commander of the PDF. He did so on 25 February-and w

subsequently removed from the presidency. The US responded with financ

pressure that, by 15 March, resulted in Noriega's failure to pay governme

employees. A general strike and a bungled coup ensued. Formal sancti

were invoked by the US administration on 8 April, while it secretly offered 

drop the drug indictments if Noriega would resign and depart from Panam

He rejected the inducement and further escalated PDF harassment of 

military installations, personnel, and their dependents.

This situation gestated for the remainder of 1988. The next major confr

tation resulted from the election that Noriega decided to allow on 7 May 19

For reasons that are not completely clear, he failed to fix the results . T

Civil Democratic Opposition Alliance of Guillermo Endara, Ricardo Ar

Calder6n, and Guillermo ("Billy") Ford was well in front when Noriega int

vened and annulled the election. Demonstrations followed and the P

crushed them, disregarding international media coverage. According to G

Frederick F. Woerner, Jr., commander of US Southern Command (U
CINCSO) at the time, "the elections were the last desperate hope. Nobo

expected the opposition to win . . . but there was still hope that it mig

happen. It was a measure ofthe lack of viable policy options ."'

Genesis of Intervention

While General Woerner's statement reflects the crisis atmosphere of t

time, US contingency planning for military intervention in Panama beg

well before this turning point. It commenced in November 1987, whe

General Woerner directed Maj Gen Bernard Loeffke, the commander of U

Army South (USARSO), to begin a discussion of options for intervention 

Panama.' The process was officially launched by a JCS planning order issu

on 28 February 1988. 5

Over the next 22 months came a series of plans, first code-named Operati

Elaborate Maze and then renamed Operation Prayer Book. While each ca

to include a range of options, the plans subsumed under Prayer Book we

divided into two separate and largely uncoordinated categories. One focus

on the use of military force, the other on postconflict, restoration. The forme

termed Operation Blue Spoon and later Just Cause, was first planned 

Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) Directorate of Operations (SCJ-3) a

later revised and implemented by the Joint Task Force-Panama (JTF-PM

with the XVIII Airborne Corps as the standing task force headquarters f

contingency operations . The latter, which had three successive code name

(operations Krystal Ball, Blind Logic, and Promote Liberty), was under t

auspices of SOUTHCOM's Directorate of Policy, Plans, and Strategy (SCJ-5

As we shall see, this bifurcation of the planning process had serious, if uni

tended, consequences during implementation.

Krystal Ball was completed in August 1988, but Panama went to the ba

burner due to the US presidential campaign. In January and again in Ma

1989, Krystal Ball, under the new code name of Blind Logic, was tak

through major reviews. s As was observed earlier, the events surrounding t

May elections in Panama had a significant impact on American policymaker

This was reflected in the contingency planning process, which continued 

follow the bifurcated approach noted above.

By the end of the summer a new USCINCSO, Gen Maxwell R. Thurman

had been designated . The crisis in Panama continued to escalate, and Thu

man focused his attention on Blue Spoonnot on Blind Logic. He notes th

"I did not even spend five minutes on Blind Logic during my briefing as t

incoming CINC in August." Once in Panama (on 29 September 1989), "t

least of my problems at the time was Blind Logic. . . . We put together t

campaign plan for Just Cause and probably did not spend enough time on t

restoration .

"8

In fact, restoration was generally of secondary importance throughout mo

of the 22 months leading up to 20 December 1989. The effects of this can 

16
seen through a number of key problems that plagued restoration plann

from start to finish. We will identify and discuss six specific obstacles. The

the final restoration plan-Blind Logic-will be assessed.

Planning Challenges and Obstructions

The first obstacle to effective planning was a lack of clarity over wh

restoration should encompass and could realistically hope to accomplish. T

right issues were either not addressed at the SCJ-51evel or, if they were, we

not incorporated into the plans. These issues included: What kind 

democracy was possible in Panama? How long would it take to establish a

secure? What were the major obstacles that had to be overcome? Would 

operative civil government exist once the PDF was destroyed? What wou

replace the PDF? What was the state of the economic and social infrastr

ture? These and related questions apparently were not adequately address

in Krystal Ball or Blind Logic.

In fact, they were not raised in a systematic manner until May 1990, wh

the Military Support Group completed its "Panama Strategy." That stu

began by assessing the difficulties the US faced in supporting democratizati

and nation-building in Panama following Just Cause. Nowhere in the doc

ment is there the assumption of a legacy of democracy. The problem was n

identified as one of restoration. Rather, it noted that "there is no history 

democracy in Panama, nor is there a point in Panamanian history when t

functions of government were sustained on the basis of Panamani

revenues.' Furthermore, it cautioned that three contextual factors cou

cripple the process of democratization and nation-building: (1) limits on t

extent to which Panama can be democratic and self-sufficient ; (2) doub

about the degree of legitimacy the Endara government could achieve; (3) t

chances of creating a police force out of elements of the PDF. With this 

prologue, a strategy was proposed for US support of the transition 

democracy.

There is little evidence to suggest that those planning for restoration eith

realistically understood or adequately addressed these historical and conte

tual issues. But how was that possible? One explanation was proposed by t

former chief of the Policy and Strategy Division of SOUTHCOM's J-5: "T

planning that began in 1988 was strictly contingency planning, it was oper

tions planning, what the Army and Joint Staff call OPLANS. It was not do

at the campaign level, it was not done at the strategy level."io

That comment is an important insight into what went wrong with conti

gency planning for restoration. Civil-military operations (CMO), the focus 

SCJ-5 planners, were seen as a short-term proposition and not as part of 

broader political-military strategy. It was assumed that, following a bri

period (30 days), responsibility for supporting restoration would be tran

17
ferred to the embassy. Moreover, planners also anticipated that there wou

be a functioning civilian government in place.

A broader approach would have evinced an understanding of t

Panamanian context and of the political, cultural, economic, and soci

ramifications of Just Cause. Further, it would have established those pos

intervention activities that SOUTHCOM could conduct as a part of an i

tegrated political-military policy to support democratization an

nation-building in Panama. In retrospect, General Thurman notes th

"Blind Logic was not suitable for the reconstruction of Panama because it d

not accurately assess the dimensions of the task. . . . [I]t was a plan based 

the hope that life would quickly return to normal, people would go back 

work, and schools would reopen. Unfortunately, this was a faulty premise

In fact, the opposite transpired. According to Thurman, "we ended up havi

to rebuild an entire government.""

If a broader political-military effort was required, should it have been t

sole responsibility of the SCJ-5 to formulate the plan for it? The fact that 

was seen so is a second obstacle that prevented the development of an effe

tive postconflict design. The process was highly compartmented, and it e

cluded interagency drafting and coordination. The plan was restricted to t

Department of Defense; in fact, several of the reserve civil affairs'personn

who were brought into the planning cell to develop Krystal Ball and Bli

Logic were not cleared to work at such a high level of secrecy. While th

problem was being addressed, restoration planning remained the respo

sibility of the military.

The exclusion of civilian agencies was a major mistake. Earlier, we list

the kinds of issues and contextual knowledge required to develop an i

tegrated political-military program of assistance. Such a program wou

necessarily involve the Department of State (DOS), the Agency for Intern

tional Development, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and other civili

agencies. Assisting in democratization and nation-building is not the e

clusive responsibility of the Department of Defense (DOD). In fact, DOD wa

treading heavily in civilian territory-where it had little expertise-to unde

take what was essentially an interagency planning and implementation task

Why was the process compartmented? The stock answer was the need 

maintain security. According to General Woerner, "Everybody was concern

with the security dimension of this particular plan, because (a) it involved t

invasion of friendly country; and (b) the very existence of the plan may hav

become a self-fulfilling prophesy. . . . Thus, the planning was quite limited 

necessity and dealt only with those issues that the military could addre

unilaterally, without the coordination of the government departments." 12 

member of the joint staff at the time, who reviewed the plans and wa

knowledgeable about the process, stated it somewhat differently. Accordi

to him, the explanation from SOUTHCOM and the joint staff was "we do n

share information with other US government entities because we cannot tru

them to maintain operational security.

"13

to
While security is obviously a legitimate issue, the fact remains that exc

sive compartmentation prevented the kind of interagency planning that mig

have resulted in a postconflict design that addressed the critical politic

military issues raised earlier. While interagency planning does not guaran

success, confining planning to DOD, as is born out by this study, is no

desirable alternative. As General Thurman observed, "It is a deficiency o

very tightly held plan that it does not get discussed in the governmen

apparatus. This is where the post-conflict problem for Panama originated.

A third obstacle was the aforementioned bifurcation of the planning proc

into war fighting and postconflict restoration. This bifurcation ensured t

the former would receive much closer attention than the latter and that 

tegration would suffer. The above comments of General Thurman undersc

this truth. General Woerner, in part, concurred when he stated that integ

tion "was the key. We recognized it at SOUTHCOM but we did not emphas

it enough.

"15

The fact is that, above the SCJ-5 level, bifurcation turned postconflict r

toration planning into an afterthought. According to a former member of 

J-5, there was some attempt at coordination under Woerner. However, w

the change of command, "the XVIII Corps planners generally treated 

SOUTHCOM staff [J-5] as irrelevant. Under the ° circumstances, there w

little reason to be surprised about the extensive disconnects between SOUT

COM and the Corps with respect to Blind Logic." 1s

What accounts for this development? In large part, it has to do with h

the military perceives its raison d'etre. The military defines itself, alm

exclusively, as either deterring wars or fighting and winning them. Civ

military operations and those elements of the force structure that engage 

them are not judged as being very important-and this has been an endur

aspect of US military culture . One case in point is Army opposition 

counterinsurgency missions in Vietnam and elsewhere during the 1960s; 1

second is the Army's aversion to the creation of the Special Operations Co

mand (SOCOM) and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operati

and Low-Intensity Conflict in the 1980s. 18 General Thurman alluded to 

military attitude when he described how the XVIII Corps, under his guida

as CINCSOUTHCOM, approached contingency planning for Just Cause:

The warfighting elements are mainly interested in conflict termination as opposed

to post-conflict restoration, which is admittedly a problem for us in the military

establishment. If I had been the XVIII Corps commander, I might have very well

said Blind Logic is going to be residual . . . . My task is to conduct the strike force

operation and get out. I think the proclivity was to leave the fighting to the warfighter and the restoration to the people who were in country. SOUTHCOM should

have been more attentive to the transition from one phase to the other, but I readily

admit it was the last priority on my agenda at the time.

19

Gen Carl W. Stiner also described the situation that way, observing that th

was a great war-fighting plan but insufficient attention to postconfl

strategy.

20

19
One specialist in CMO, who served on the joint staff during the Panama

crisis, put it more directly: "It was widely known that key elements of the

Army hierarchy did not have a high opinion of its civil affairs component." He

points out that members of the Army staff regularly "denigrated the Army's,

civil affairs (CA) capability" and questioned whether it could "perform well

enough."21 A lack of interest in CA, largely accounted for by the lack of

initiative from the Army, appeared at the joint staff level during Just Cause.

'' On three different occasions when, it was recommended to senior leadership

that we form a joint civil affairs committee, the response was "no" every time.

"Allegedly, we had too many other, more important, things to do. The implication was the civil affairs just were not important.

"22 As we shall see

later, this was precisely at the time when several critical CMO problems were

unfolding in Panama.

The fact that restoration was accorded a lower status can likewise be seen

in the way personnel were selected to develop the plan and in the conditions

under which they functioned. This was the fourth obstacle that inhibited

effective planning. We proposed earlier that Panamanian history, political

culture, and legacy of praetorian rule implied that the postconflict environment would be complicated and challenging . Therefore, an important prerequisite for effective planning was having personnel who grasped the setting.

The SCJ-5 had no such competence. According to General Woerner, "While

we were engaged in planning for an invasion of Panama, we still had other

continuing responsibilities throughout the hemisphere. Thus, we were not

only lacking expertise but also manpower."23 The civil affairs branch of the

SCJ-5 had only four full-time Army Reserve officers,24 and they were not

specialists on Panama. Further, as Woerner noted, they had CA responsibilities throughout the region.

In light of this shortfall, the J-5 turned mainly to SOUTHCOM's Capstone

reserve unit, the 361st CA Brigade. In terms of civil affairs experience in

Panama, it seemed to be the appropriate choice. Since 1983, the 361st, a

137-man unit, had "manned a two-man cell fifty-two weeks out of the year

rotating people in and overlapping on the weekend." They had been apportioned to SOUTHCOM to train for CA support in the region, and they conducted civic action exercises and seminars in theater.

25 Still, two questions

remained: Was the mission beyond the competence of the 361st? Was the

unit utilized in the most effective way?

The answer to the latter is "no." Personnel from five different CA units

were invited to Panama in small teams and on a volunteer basis for tours of

31 days. The result was an incremental and disjointed approach to planning

that was bereft of continuity. Here, compartmentation again reared its head;

each member of the planning team was sworn to secrecy and thus unable to

use the ,full expertise of the units they were representing. Also, each of the

team leaders, generally a colonel, sought to put his own "spin" on Krystal Ball

or Blind Logic. In other words, there were "too many cooks" in the planning

process. This also raises questions about how seriously DOD and SOUTHCOM leaders took restoration .

20
Even if these obstacles had been overcome, did the CA reservists have t

ability to design and implement a blueprint for democratization and natio

building? It does not appear so. Recall that this ability entailed a knowled

of the history, politics, and cultural context of Panama, as well as an unde

standing of the dynamics of democratization and nation-building. This co

bination was beyond the capabilities of small groups of reservists or, for th

matter, any other part of the military . While CA units had skills to co

tribute, much of the required expertise had to come from elsewhere in bo

military and civilian parts of government. Whether it can be found today 

the US government is a question we will return to later.

The lack of adequate contextual knowledge is reflected in, t

misunderstanding that planners displayed on such critical issues as the i

stitutional and societal impact of 20 years of praetorian rule in Panama. Th

lack of contextual knowledge was a fifth obstacle to effective planning becau

praetorianism had seriously weakened the Panamanian political, social, a

economic structure. Its removal would cause short- and long-term proble

that should have been anticipated but were not, as generals Woerner a

Thurman acknowledge.

In the case ofWoerner, it appears that he understood the problem:

In my mind it was imperative to destroy the PDF completely and to reestablish . . .

a credible professional internal security force. This security, not defense, establishment had to be clearly subordinated to civilian rule. I felt the recruiting and

training to build such an internal security force would take at least six months. I

did not work this out, but it probably could have lasted up to a year. . . . I

considered the PDF, and have not changed my opinion, the most corrupt military

institution in the hemisphere . I saw no chance of reeducation. . . . The PDF had

the skills and was extraordinarily effective in its public security missions, in its

small unit operations and in its institutionalized corruption .Z6

Furthermore, Woerner assigned to the commander of US MILGROUP t

task of designing the future security force. The goal was "to have a complet

concept on the shelf detailing what the new security force would look lik

Woerner "wanted this done before we invade. . . . I felt deeply about th

dimension, but I did not pressure the MILGROUP commander enough.

Consequently, no such concept was available on 20 December 1939. Whe

asked whether the 361st had the same understanding, General Woern

answered "No, I don't think so."28

According to General Thurman, the planning process under his comma

focused on destroying the PDF, "not on putting up a new government. I thi

one of the lessons is that we have not been good at implementing the pos

conflict termination phase." He identifies this lack of attention as an instit

tional shortcoming. "We do not teach it in our school system, or include it 

our doctrinal work.

"29 Thus, for example, the extent to which PDF corrupti

permeated civilian organizations, governmental and nongovernmental, w

not recognized: "The depth to which that penetration had occurred was n
well understood by us and it complicated the restoration of the government

and hampered the formation of a cogent interagency postconflict resolution

approach."3o

`" Finally, the issue of what would replace the PDF was never resolved. Two'

questions were not answered: To what extent could members of the PDF be

incorporated into the new security force? And would the replacement take the

form of a military institution or a police institution? If the decision was to

follow the Costa Rica model, who in the US government had the legal

authority to advise and train a police force?

A sixth obstacle was encountered in determining who would execute restoration and under what command authority. Through most ofthe 22 months

of planning, the assumption was that the SCJ-5 would serve as commander,

civil-military operations task force (COMCMOTF). Evenwhen the Joint Task

Force-Panama was established, with the XVIII Airborne Corps as the standing task force headquarters for contingency operations, the SCJ-5 was

retained as COMCMOTF in Blind Logic. It has been reported that, in May

1989, General Woerner decided to keep this in the plan because "the very

sensitivity of the relationships and their political-military nature demanded

that the COMCMOTF be a general officer on his staff and that the J-5 was

most appropriate."31

This is an unusual command arrangement. Generally, planners are not

given responsibility for execution. The J-5 is supposed to draw up the plans

and issue the necessary instructions to the implementing agency. According

to General _Thurman, "The J-5 is a staff agency, headed by a staff officer . It

simply does not have the communication or transportation services, nor does

it have the necessary organizational fabric. Thus, it is a bad plan when the

J-5 ends up commanding anything." 32 Be that as it may, both Krystal Ball

and Blind Logic assumed that the J-5 would be COMCMOTF for execution

This assumption appears to be attributable to the low priority of postconflict

planning. As we shall see, Thurman's counsel on this proved correct-the

CMO plan broke down.

If the command structure was muddled, so was the question of which forces

to use for restoration. A reserve unit call-up was proposed.

The assumption that units would be used was predicated on the further assumption

that in the event of execution the Presidential authority to call up individual members and units of the Selected Reserve involuntarily for up to 90 days would be

exercised. Assuming that a Reserve call-up would be exercised made the planning

for CMO significantly easier since units which trained in Panama would lead the

effort .

33

However, realizing that a call-up might not occur, the SCJ-5 planning cell also

devised an alternative based on preselected volunteers who would come to

Panama on a temporary tour of active duty. This was the way members of the

planning cell had been deployed. Whether via a call-up or volunteers, the

forces would come mainly from the 361st, with backup from other reserve

units and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion.

22
As we shall see, the reserve call-up never took place and the volun

alternative ran into deployment and command problems. Planners hoped 

the call-up but did not provide an effective alternative. Because of the un

tainty over what forces would be available for execution, as well as the 

priority of postconflict planning, there was no attempt to rehearse B

Logic-not even on a simulation basis. This was at the same time 

General Thurman had ordered the XVIII Airborne Corps to freque

rehearse Blue Spoon.

Blind Logic: A Reappraisal

An examination of the final version of Blind Logic reveals that severa

the planning challenges and obstacles identified above were not overc

For example, because planners lacked contextual knowledge, t

misunderstood critical issues and failed to anticipate the kinds of disrupt

that occurred following the defeat ofthe PDF.

The estimate of the situation that would likely follow military interven

was framed in such a broad way that it appeared to cover all possible con

gencies :

The execution of this operation will be conducted under one of three possible levels

of social, economic, and governmental disruption . Although the three levels of

disruption : serious, moderate, and minimal, are presented separately for clarity,

they could occur simultaneously in different geographical areas, population centers,

and by specific service or agency within the Republic ofPanama.

34

Unfortunately, the estimate failed to include the contingency that would 

tually cause the greatest disruption.

What were the characteristics of these potential forms of disruption? T

ranged from the "non-functioning of essential social, economic 

governmental services [caused by] violent military confrontation and op

tions . . . [and] substantial and widespread acts of sabotage and subversion

"having basic social, economic and governmental services available, but 

decreased, limited level."35 And who would be responsible for the disrupti

The following sources were identified: pro-Noriega/anti-US members of 

PDF; paramilitary groupings composed mainly of the leftist faction of 

Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD); criminal elements (e.g., the narco

cartels); and international terrorist organizations .

The problem with this kind of estimate is that it is too general to be use

By predicting all possible scenarios, one places a difficult burden on con

gency planners, since they have to design responses for each. However, 

larger problem in this case is that it did not estimate the en masse collaps

the 'civilian agencies of government or the disruption that would result f

looting. This postconflict situation was not estimated in Blind Logic. 

situation, as we shall see, required a response the US was unprepare

perform.

23
Indeed, the civil-military operations planned for were short-term in scope

and based on incorrect assumptions about the resiliency of the Government of

Panama (GOP). According to the CMO mission statement in Blind Logic,

"When directed by the NCA [National Command Authority], through CJCS,

USCINCSO conducts civil-military operations in the Republic of Panama to

protect U.S. lives and property, secure U.S. interests, restore law and order,

and stabilize the situation until a government duly recognized by the U.S.

"government is installed .

"36 As one reads further, it becomes evident that the

planners assumed this process would occur in relatively short order and that

democratic government would ensue.

COMCMOTF establishes a Civil-Military administration (CMA) at the national

level to the extent required to ensure basic services to the Panamanian people.

Contacts are made with designated Panamanian leaders to ensure law and order is

restored and maintained and that a democratic GOPis established.37

Furthermore, planners not only assumed that a democratic GOP would be

up and running quickly, but that "long range efforts . . . to ensure a stable,

democratic Panama" could be transferred to the US country team. 38 As was

noted in the previous section, the restoration and creation of democratic

government in Panama was not going to be an easy or : a short-term process.

Likewise, to expect the embassy to quickly pick up responsibility for supporting it, given that it was kept out of the planning process, was unrealistic at

best.

With respect to what would replace the PDF, the options were left open.

The COMCMOTF could "conduct reconstruction and training of military/

police forces of the Republic of Panama.

"39 According to the commander's

intent, as stated in Blind Logic: "My intention is to be prepared to change, on

order, the PDF as a military institution. For this to occur it must be reformed

and retrained so as to remove its political role and permeation of the institutions of the Republic of Panama."4o This could be undertaken as long as the

replacement for the PDF took the form of a military institution. If it was to be

transformed into a police force, then the following question had to be addressed. Did the US military have either the expertise or the legal authority

to advise and train police? This issue was not addressed in Blind Logic.

Finally, in terms of command relationships, the SCJ-5 was still designated

as COMCMOTF. His deputy was to be the commander of the 361st CA

Brigade. Personnel for the CMOTF were to be drawn mainly from the functional teams of the 361st. No mention was made of the reserve call-up or

alternatives to it.

Notes

1. Perhaps the most detailed account ofboth contingency planning and the operation itself

is Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of

Panama (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991). For broader treatments that

focus on the political crisis, see Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story (New York: Simon

24
and Schuster, 1991); John Dinges, Our Man in Panama: How General Noriega Used the Un

States and Made Millions in Drugs and Arms (New York: Random House, 1990); and R

Koster and Guillermo Sanchez, In the Time ofTyrants: Panama 1968-1990 (New York: W

Norton, 1990).

2. For an account of the murder of Dr Hugo Spadafora and the charges ofCol Roberto D

Herrera, see Buckley.

3. Gen Frederick F. Woerner, Jr., Boston University, interview with author, 15 June 199

4. Donnelly, Roth, and Baker, 17.

5. John T. Fishel, The Fog ofPeace: Planning and Executing Restoration ofPanama (

lisle Barracks, Pa. : Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 15 April 1992), 7. Col

Fishel was deputy chiefofthe Public Force Liaison Division ofthe Military Support Group. 

study provides an interesting and thoughtful insider's perspective. He was interviewed by 

author as part ofthe field research for this study.

6. Ibid., 17-19.

7. While not of concern in this study, Thurman's decision to radically change Blue Sp

from an intervention based on a deliberate buildup of forces in Panama to a rapidly.,

surprise strike from outside, employing overwhelming combat power, is an interes

one from which important lessons can be drawn. See Donnelly, Roth, and Baker.

8. Gen Maxwell R. Thurman, Arlington, Va., interview with author, 29 May 1992.

9. Military Support Group, "Panama Strategy" (Working paper, Headquarters South

Command, Republic of Panama, May 1990),3 .

10. Lt Col John T. Fishel, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washingt

D.C., interview with author, 12 May 1992.

11. Thurman interview .

12. Woerner interview.

13. Lt Col Dennis Barlow, The Pentagon, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for S

cial Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, interview with author, 18 June 1992.

14. Thurman interview.

15. Woerner interview .

16. Fishel, 21.

17. There is a rich literature on how the US Army first rejected counterinsurgency doct

during the Vietnam War, and in the aftermath of the war supported the downsizing of spe

operations forces for low-intensity conflict (LIC). See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Ar

and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); Richard Hunt and Rich

Shultz, Lessons from an Unconventional War (New York: Pergamon, 1981); and Douglas K

nard, The War Managers (Hanover, N.H. : University Press of New England, 1977). W

respect to Army planning in the 1980s, see Richard H. Shultz and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, e

The United States Army: Challenges and Missions for the 1990s (Lexington, Mass. : Lexing

Books, 1992).

18. See Richard Shultz, "Low Intensity Conflict: Future Challenges and Lessons from 

ReaganYears," Survival, July/August 1989, 359-76.

19. Thurman interview .

20. Gen Carl W. Stiner, Tufts University, Bedford, Mass., interview with author

February 1992.

21. Barlow interview.

22. Ibid.

23. Woerner interview.

24. Fishel, 8.

25. Fishel interview.

26. Woerner interview.

27. Ibid.

28., Ibid.

29. Thurman interview.

30. Ibid.

31. Fishel,18.

32. Thurman interview.

25
33. Fishel, 14.

34. USCINCSO OpOrd (Operations Order) 6-88, to execute Blind Logic, 2. (Declassified)

35. Ibid ., 1-2.

36. Ibid ., 4.

37. Ibid .

38. Ibid ., 5.

39. Ibid .

40. Ibid ., 6-7.
Chapter 4

Just Cause and the Breakdown

of Blind Logic

On 20 December 1989, Operation Just Cause was executed. Overall, t

war-fighting plan went extremely well and the PDF was quickly neutraliz

as a military force. For such a complex operation, described by JCS Oper

tions Director Lt Gen Thomas Kelly as having "a lot of moving parts," the

were few significant complications.1 The same cannot be said for Blind Logi

In addition to the conceptual problems in Blind Logic, the followi

developments contributed to an ad hoc and inadequate restoration policy 

the part of the United States. As a result of these limitations, the Milita

Support Group was conceived .

In the days immediately preceding 20 December, the command respo

sibility was disrupted . On 12 December, General Thurman assigned t

Blind Logic mission to USARSO. His rationale for doing so was straightfo

ward: "The J-5 is supposed to draw up plans and issue instructions to t

implementing agency. In this case USARSO was to implement the pla

because it is the residual American force on the spot."2

While this made sense, the chief of staff ofUSARSO had reservations abo

Blind Logic. Apparently, he advocated a coordinated interagency respon

and believed the military could not do it alone . 3 Discussions ensued betwe

the SCJ-5 staff and the USARSO staff over how to work out a transfer. Whe

the final version of Blind Logic went to the JCS for approval on 20 Decembe

the SCJ-5 no longer had the mission. On the same day, General Thurm

ordered the J-5 to execute Blind Logic. The reasoning was that the J-5 w

all that was available to him and that several serious, largely unanticipate

civil-military problems had emerged. Thurman provides the following e

planation :

How did the J-5 get wrapped up in all of this? . . . On December 20, 1989, the day

Just Cause took place . . . we needed to assist the big three [Endara, Arias

Calderon, and Ford] in setting up the government. We really did not do our

homework very well . One of the difficulties resulted from the looting. . . . There

was chaos in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the Ministry of Education, and

other Panamanian government agencies . In the late afternoon of December 20, 1

ordered the J-5, BG Ben Gann, and his staff to go to Bushnell, the Deputy Chief of

Mission (DCM). I made the decision because the embassy staffhad been reduced to

forty three people . . . . I was fighting the war and gave SOUTHCOM's J-5 intact to

Bushnell in order to give him the manpower to work with various ministries . . . . I

also made the reservists, who reported to us after Christmas, available to the

embassy in order to expedite the process ofsetting up the government. That is how

27
the J-5 evolved from a planning agency to an operations agency. . . . It is a bad plan

when the J-5 ends up commanding anything. . . . If you ask me why I did not catch

all of this. . . . -I can only say that my primary focus was Just Cause.4

Thurman's explanation singles out part of the problem. While he is right in

arguing that a planning agency should not have an operational mission, this

problem went unnoticed in Blind Logic until the last minute. Restoration was

an afterthought that only became important when several unanticipated but

serious civil-military problems emerged. And by then it was late in the day.

Recall that JCS did not sign off on Blind Logic until the day the US intervened, which partially explains why CMO went poorly.

It also points to other reasons for the breakdown. Not only did senior

commanders in SOUTHCOM and JCS not consider Blind Logic important,

but three destabilizing developments that followed the dismantling of the

PDF were not foreseen. Each considerably weakened restoration efforts.

The first development was massive looting, which, as noted earlier, was not

anticipated and which had serious economic consequences. According to one

account, "these looters did more damage to the economy than all the economic

sanctions . They emptied department stores, supermarkets, pharmacies,

boutiques, fast-food shops, and whatever could be entered easily. The looting,

which U.S. troops watched, cost $1 billion, according to the Panama City

Chamber of Commerce."5 When other metropolitan centers are included, the

amount "of losses ranged from $1 billion to $2 billion.

"6 These losses could

have been avoided.

The second development was that the new Panamanian government was a

"hollow force ." Although the US installed the "big three," they inherited a

civilian government that was corrupt and dysfunctional . A plan stipulated

that a democratic GOP would be up and running quickly ; just the opposite

was the case, as the CMOTF found out when it was assigned to the GOP

ministries. In the first place, many members of civilian government agencies

were themselves busy looting.

During the course ofthe looting, people not only looted storefronts, they also looted

government offices. This was a surprising turn. We expected that most of the

people in the civil service would report to their offices and take charge of all government property, provided they had been anti-Noriega. Unfortunately, many of the

people in the various cabinet offices were Noriega cronies. Subsequently, those

offices were looted in retribution, just like the stores .7

The depth of civil government corruption "was not well understood by us,"

in Thurman's retrospective view, and "it complicated the restoration of the

government and hampered the formation of a cogent post-conflict resolution

approach.

"8 Could it have been otherwise? It was no secret that corruption

had reached a new height under Noriega. He orchestrated a pattern of clientelism that extended deep into the civilian government agencies, the banks,

and the business community. This corruption was going to complicate restoration, and it should have been understood and addressed . Instead, General

Gann and his CMOTF "behaved as if they expected the new government to be

functional, or nearly so, with cabinet ministers reporting in on a daily basis.

"9

28
The third development was that the new Panamanian government 

herited a treasury that was nearly empty and a decaying societal infrastr

ture that had suffered from years of neglect. When the Deputy Chief 

Mission (DCM), John Bushnell, began to work with the various Panamani

ministries, he found that "they had exhausted inventories ." He attribu

this, in large part, to the corruption of the Noriega government.10 Again, t

depth of this problem should not have been a surprise. During Noriega's ru

Panama's economic debt reached $6.2 billion, one of the highest (per capita) 

the world. Unemployment was above 35 percent. 11 Further, the societal 

frastructure of roads, schools, hospitals and clinics, social services, and so 

was in a serious state of neglect and disrepair.

To solve these and other difficulties, Operation Blind Logic required t

early activation of five civil affairs reserve units (approximately 600 perso

nel). Army doctrine, as well as the plans themselves, called for the sen

theater apportioned reserve unit, the 361st CA Brigade, to command t

other CA units; a hierarchy and control arrangement would have obvia

much ofthe ad hoc organization which was to dog the CMOTF throughout t

operation. The Joint Staff Current Operations Division was well aware of t

requirement for these reserve units and, throughout the autumn of 19

considered their activation a key provision of Blind Logic.

General Thurman officially requested these units as his preferred opti

but also included a "last-resort option" of CA volunteers. It was this opt

that the joint staff accepted on the morning of the invasion; any thought 

requesting a presidential call-up was quickly dismissed . Instead, the Ar

was directed to provide up to 200 CA volunteer reservists . Within hours, t

Army had created a selection, processing, and deployment system at F

Bragg, North Carolina. This group of volunteers became known as the Civ

Military Operations Task Force.

Beyond these stated difficulties, the CMOTF proved to be unprepared 

reshape the security forces, lacked a coherent organizational structure, a

found itself short of personnel as the crisis unfolded. Each of these devel

ments contributed to the breakdown of the postconflict policy of the Unit

States.

When the new Panamanian government decided to establish a police fo

out of the remnants of the PDF, the CMOTF was not staffed to address t

mission. Maj Gen Marc Cisneros, the head of USARSO, had to set up an 

hoc organizationthe US Force Liaison Group (USFLG)--to advise, tra

and equip the police . The USFLG could do this within the context of Ju

Cause to help the Panamanian police respond to the collapse of law and ord

Once this was over, however, US law would prohibit the military from tra

ing foreign police .

The Civil-Military Operations Task Force that was created out of the bo

of reservists was formed under the auspices of the J-5 but was given v

little guidance. Since the group was not defined as a military unit, inordin

administrative problems beset its members. Receiving mail, procuring logis

cal support, and recommending awards became major challenges . The Ar

29
also decided against sending a reserve general officer to take command of t

CMOTF, thus compounding the "Who's in charge?" syndrome. The-result-wa

that while nominally the 361st commander was in charge of the CMOTF, h

and five other US Army Reserve (USAR) colonels divvied up the pie. At one,

point the junior members of the CMOTF referred to the various comman

structures within the organization as "Dueling Headquarters." CMOT

morale was low and the organization was dysfunctional . However, the i

dividuals selected for duty proved to be top-rate. Highly skilled professiona

of the CMOTF were assigned to support counterparts in 12 of the 16 gover

ment ministries. As advisors to the government of Panama, these reservis

helped restore basic sanitation and health services, reestablished correction

facilities, reestablished customs and immigration procedures; jump-starte

the economy with funds confiscated from casinos, conducted site surveys f

all schools in Panama City, produced a national agriculture plan, supervise

the reopening of a sugarcane plant, conducted health clinics in Colon an

David, planned the reconstruction of water and sewer systems, and produce

scores of assessments for follow-on projects. In spite of the heroic efforts 

CMOTF teams, however, it became evident that the mission required eve

more capabilities and a firmer sense of direction.

The CMOTF has been described as a hodgepodge organization that lacke

unity. The head of the Military Support Group, which was established 

bring organizational coherence to the restoration efforts, found when he a

rived in Panama that the CMOTF structure "had not been thought throug

all the way." 12 This was apparent to General Cisneros, who not only esta

lished the USFLG but provided other USARSO resources to help the CMOT

in its efforts to revive the Panamanian government. While the CMOTF wa

doing some good things, like providing assistance to the GOP ministries, 

needed a more formal and expanded structure. The MSG was shaped 

address these deficiencies .

The CMOTF seems to have been doomed from the initial decision of th

JCS to reject the reserve call-up and opt for the use of reserve volunteer

Why did this happen? One reason given by General Thurman is that t

reserve call-up process has "deficiencies rooted in the laws for getting rese

vists on active duty," which make it very difficult to employ reserves in 

flexible manner.

13

At least one other reason for why there was no reserve call-up has bee

advanced. According to one member of the joint staff, both the chief of staff 

the Army and the director of operations for the JCS opposed the call-up .

Inthe caseof the latter, the reason given was 

affairs was not capable or important.

14

Whatever the reason, the reserve issue was sidestepped until the problem

appeared. Then, General Thurman's "last-resort" request for reserve volu

teers was approved. While there was no shortage of reservists who cam

forward, their transportation to Panama did not go smoothly. According 

one officer involved in this process, "even though the reserve headquarter

had validated their mission, no effort was made to deploy them immediatel

30
We had to find room for small groups on MAC flights which meant that the

trickled into Panama one by one."" This deployment procedure only added t

the problems facing the CMOTF.

Notes

1. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Stor

ing ofPanama (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991), 79.

2. Gen Maxwell R. Thurman, Arlington, Va., interview with author, 29 May 1992.

3. John T. Fishel, The Fog ofPeace: Planning and Executing Restoration of Panama (Ca

lisle Barracks, Pa. : Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 15 April 1992), 7, 2

Colonel Fishel was deputy chief of the Public Force Liaison Division of the Military Suppo

Group. His study provides an interesting and thoughtful insider's perspective. He was inte

viewed by the author as part of the field research for this study.

4. Thurman interview.

5. For an account, see Kevin Buckley, Panama: The Whole Story (New York: Simon a

Schuster,1991), chaps. 10 and 11.

6. Eusebio Mujal-Leon and Christopher Bruneau, "Foreign Assistance and Reconstructi

Efforts," in Conflict Resolution and Democratization in Panama, ed. Eva Loser (Washingto

D.C . : The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), 61.

7. Thurman interview.

8: Ibid.

9. Fishel, 33.

10. John Bushnell, NewYork, interview with author, 22 June 1992.

11. Irving Louis Horowitz, "Panama: National Shadow without Political Substance," 

Conflict Resolution and Democratization in Panama, 76.

12. Col James Steele, Dominican Republic, telephone interview with author, 29 June 1992

13. Thurman interview.

14. For further discussion on this issue, see Grant Willis, "Panama: Did Politics Railro

Reserve Call-up?" Army Times, 11 June 1990, 3, 20-21.

15. Lt Col Dennis Barlow, The Pentagon, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sp

cial Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, interview with author, 18 June 1992.

Chapter 5

g

The Military Support Group

Designed to overcome this plethora of conceptual and execution o

the Military Support Group (MSG) was activated on 17 January 1990

an ad hoc creation, conceived out of crisis to "conduct nation buildi

tions to ensure that democracy, internationally recognized standard

tice, and professional public services are established and institution

Panama."' We will examine the MSG's origins, personnel, organi

structure, and strategy and evaluate its performance.

Origins of the Military Support Group

Interestingly, the idea for a new organization to assist in restoratio

come from US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), JTF-PM, 

CMOTF. The initiative was that of the US Special Operations C

(USSOCOM). Its PSYOPS and CA Directorate (J-9) had been taske

James Lindsay, the commander in chief (CINC) USSOCOM, to be pre

support the regional unified commands, including USSOUTHCOM. 

Panama operation unfolded, Lindsay and members of the J-9 conclu

the restoration plan being executed "was not built around what was n

be done in order to transition from war to peace . . . [T]he transition 

planned as well as it should have been."2

Lindsay contacted General Thurman five days into Just Cause, re

permission to conduct an in-country assessment of CMO activi

propose possible organizational alternatives . This made sense, given 

gressional mandate of the then recently created USSOCOM. Accord

member of his staff, Lindsay felt that "if there was no adequate prepar

plan for transition it may come back on him.

"3 Thurman agreed t

quest, and on 25 December, Lindsay sent one of his senior CA special

Harold Youmans, to Panama.

Based on discussions with members of the SCJ-5, USARSO, CMO

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Group, 96th Civil Affairs Battal

SOCSO, Youmans produced the memorandum for commander in c

Southern Command (CINCSOUTH) that provided the foundation 

Military Support Group. 4 It was based on the assumption that "re

Panama will be a difficult task." In fact, the memorandum stated th

MSG was given the full range of potential nation-building tasks, it 

33
hard pressed to meet [these] many demands."' Moreover, it con

illusions about the ability of the Panamanian government to be up 

ning in a short period oftime.

The memorandum called for a flexible organizational structure t

expand or contract, depending on the degree of involvement of th

ment of State (DOS) and other US civilian agencies, and on the tim

take for the GOP infrastructure to emerge and take over these 

Given the state of the embassy and the fact that the DOS had been 

the planing process, it became apparent that the USMSG could en

responsibility for "the establishment of stable democratic and eco

stitutions in Panama. The mission of the USMSG is to facilitate t

[US government] ability to assist the growth ofthese institutions ."s

The memorandum placed the hodgepodge of organizations in

various aspects of restoration under one organization . These orga

included CA and PSYOPS elements from the JTF-PM-, the 

SOCSO-, and USARSO-directed combat/combat service support unit

ing medical, transportation, military police, and engineer elements

would be subsumed under the MSG, which consisted of the follo

units: special operations, civil affairs, psychological operations, 

bat/combat service support.

The report went to SOUTHCOM's J-3, Brig Gen William Hartzog, 

taken part in the review and agreed with the concept. Apparently, h

on the name Military Support Group.' The memorandum served as 

for the MSG. One interesting question is, why did the MSG emerge 

hoc creation conceived out of crisis? Why not include SOCOM in the 

of Blind Logic? After all, SOCOM is a supporting command that w

lished, in part, for these kinds of situations . It could provide not 

forces but planning expertise. When asked why SOCOM was not 

General Thurman responded:

That would be nice, but it is not the waythe U.S. military does business. The 

is responsible for the planning of the operation in his AOft [area of responsib

The CINC can call Lindsay for suggestions, but it is structurally impossi

integrate another command in a planning/advisory role. Theoretically, you 

but it is not practiced because the planning staffs of CINCSOUTHCOM sho

able to handle the planning and support forces that are only brought in 

operational sides

Unfortunately, as this study demonstrates, General Thurman's 

staffs were not "able to handle the planning," and the end resul

previously discussed ad hoc and inadequate restoration policy.

Personnel and Structure

Once the concept was accepted, a commander for the MSG 

selected. The SOCOM memorandum recommended a brigadier gen

34
CMO and Latin American experience. Thurman selected Col Jam

He had been selected for promotion to brigadier general, served in E

as the commander of the US MILGROUP, and was a Latin 

specialist. Fluent in Spanish, Steele had a reputation for getting th

His tasking from Thurman was straightforward: "He wanted me 

[MSG] a reality. At this stage$the organization already existed, whi

most part, I deemed to be good."9

Steele selected Col Jack Pryor as his chief of staff. Pryor had bee

to the president and the two vice presidents of Panama since Just 

executed.

The same day Operation Just Cause took place, General Thurman called m

his office and told me that I was to work for the government of Panama. I 

report to the president and the two vice presidents whowere in a safe house 

Clayton. General Thurman ordered me to take off my uniform and to 

civilian attire . He told me that I was to be . . . the liaison between the Panam

government and our embassy. It was my mission to become an insider, a t

insider.lo

While Pryor's involvement became controversial, as we will disc

he also knew how to get things done, and he quickly developed a c

ing relationship with the big three. According to Steele:

When we established the MSG, we assumed responsibility for (the CMOTF'

tivities and personnel. The most useful of its people was Pryor. He had wor

the presidential palace before my arrival. In fact, when I found out the role 

played, I asked him to become my deputy. . . . The importance of personal re

ships is characteristic of Latin America, and for most third world countri

transcends the national interest in many cases. The role that Jack Pryor . . . 

during Just Cause, particularly in January, proved to be invaluable for th

later on.li

While Steele was able to recruit some other talented officers to 

ments of the MSG, personnel remained a continuing problem. Thi

to the fact that he wanted the organization to be a joint activity . A

notes, "that was a mistake, because only the Army had committed i

staffing of the MSG. By reducing the Army portion to 50 or 60 pe

MSG ended up as an understaffed organization." 12

Furthermore, the MSG had to deal with the constant turnover of 

on short tours. While it had its share of active duty personnel, the 

quite dependent on the reserves. Because there had been no call-u

duty were 31 days for these volunteers. Additionally, as Fishel p

this "did not permit the composite unit to build any kind of int

establish sufficient continuity of support." 13 Steele concurs and 

MSG's civil affairs people had a real turnover problem. They were 

at some things, but you have to evaluate just how competent su

ganization can be." 14

Structurally, the MSG followed the recommendations in the 

memorandum. It contained a J-1 (Manpower and Personnel Di

through J-5 staff of approximately 40 members. According to Colo

"I had problems with all these staff elements." 15 In fact, each elem

35
be developed over time. For example, at first there was no J-1. On

lished, the J-1 had to maintain an effective administrative compet

continuity because of the large turnover of personnel due to th

reliance on reserves. However, the J-1 itself was staffed by reservis

restricted the effectiveness of the personnel section. "This was one of 

difficult areas, because the MSG had a tremendous turnover of peo

ticularly when we brought in reservists . . . . This required a 

ministrator . . . and trying to staff this section with civilians [reserv

difficult."ls

The J-2 (Intelligence Directorate) also had early problems. The 

personnel scattered across Panama, which provided the ability to 

significant amount of intelligence. However, initially the J-2 was 

personnel and lacked a conceptual framework for collection . Once t

became aware of the kind of intelligence that could be provided, th

expanded and refocused. According to Colonel Pryor, "The J-2 h

people, plus the analysts, and the Special Forces who worked in their 

had C-Teams and A-Teams. We had quite a number of collectors 

analysis capability. We found our analysis was more accurate tha

We knew what Panama looked like." 17 Still, the intelligence collecte

always utilized as effectively as it might have been.

The J-3 (Operations Directorate) was a critical element becaus

oversight of the planning and execution of the MSG's day-to-day op

This included, most importantly, joint patrols with the Panamani

force. These joint patrols were an important part of the effort to co

PDF into a civilian police . Eventually, the head of the J-3 was 

foreign area officer (FAO) who had served in El Salvador as the MILG

operations officer.

The J-4 was in charge of logistics, including all the foreign milit

(FMS) cases. This included such things as procuring equipmen

Panamanian police and moving supplies and equipment where t

needed. According to Steele, this could be complicated, given the 

quirements.

Initially, we had problems with the J-4, because some of its personnel was [si

competent enough. The J-4 was involved in a lot of projects and we needed p

who were not only competent but also very attentive to detail, because there w

number of restrictions on these activities . We did not encounter these restri

at the outset, during Just Cause, but rather when we entered the Promote Li

phase. At this point the MSG had to observe the stipulations of the Foreign 

tance Act. Thus, we were not able to supply and train the Panamanian 

without a legislative mandate. Under emergency legislation, however, we 

allowed to use existing military assistance funds, which had been suspend

1988, to purchase police equipment. It was a challenging effort to buy police 

radios, uniforms, etc. We worked closely with the controller general an

Panamanian government."'

This is but one example of the complicated nature of the MSG's 

military activities .

36
This complexity also had an impact on the J-5. Staffed by civ

specialists, it had responsibility for the nation-building programs 

dinating these activities with the Panamanian government. Pryor 

the J-5, which was headed by an Army FAO who had been raised i

as "the real workhorses of the MSG. . . . They formulated the 

coordinated the input of all the players supporting nation-buildi

effort included the Army Corps of Engineers. Furthermore, the J-

the sites with the Panamanian ministers and coordinated the nati

with local governiients." is

Beyond these staff elements, the MSG was composed of the 

divisions : public force liaison, civil affairs, military police (MP), PSY

special forces . Functionally, they were involved in three tasks: e

Panamanian security force; reconstruct the infrastructure; and pro

mation programs to marshal support for the GOP and influence the 

of the police.

The Public Force Liaison Division (PFLD) was the US Force Liai

(USFLG), which had been established because the CMOTF was not 

to create a security force out of PDF elements . Recall that the US

sion was to advise, train, and equip this new security entity. To t

deployed teams throughout Panama and also developed a transitio

course. The latter consisted of a 20-hour program for police trai

would use what they learned as the basis for the rudimentary trai

former members of the PDF accepted into the security force. US 

servists, who in civilian life were career police officers, helped de

course.

While transferring the mission to the MSG was uncomplicated, 

proved to be just the opposite, because US law prohibits the arme

from training foreign police (specified in section 660 of the Foreign A

Act). As we shall see, US training ofthe Panamanian police was pla

the auspices ofthe administration of the Justice Program . However

the MSG could continue to support this effort at the operational le

be determined. The result was a complicated arrangement wher

civilian element-the International Criminal Investigative Train

tance Program (ICITAP)---was assigned responsibility for training, 

MSGIPFLD would monitor the operational activities of the polic

joint patrols. In other words, a policy was adopted that separate

from operations and assigned responsibilities to different agen

civilian and the other military. This generated problems, as we 

later.

The MPs were a part of the teams deployed by the PFLD t

Panama. Initially, the MP brigade was under the command o

during Just Cause. Its primary duties were protecting US facilities 

taining law and order following Just Cause. When the USFLG w

lished to assist the GOP in creating a police force, the MPs were d

the urban and rural areas of Panama. In addition to conducting jo

with the police, according to one member of the USFLG, they "as

37
PNP [Popular Nationalist Party] in developing a number of polici

niques and procedures including training."2o Once section 660 of the 

Assistance Act was invoked, all training had to end; but patrolling w

police continued throughout MSG's existence.

The number of MPs involved fluctuated, with a high of approximat

, in the spring of 1990. The number progressively declined as the M

proached its termination date. In addition to MPs, reservists were ass

the joint patrols. At any given time, between 30 and 50 were em

generally on 31-day active duty tours. According to Colonel Pryor, th

"each of the MSG field teams a built-in police expertise," because in 

life these reservists were police officers .

21

The other US element of the joint patrols was drawn from the 

Forces (SF). They were assigned to all the urban and rural prec

Panama during Just Cause, "with responsibility for almost anything t

done in the name of the new government.

"22 In addition to their wo

the police, the Special Forces were assigned "an intelligence collect

civil-military mission." The former provided a significant part of the r

processed and analyzed by the J-2, while the latter "helped the J5 to 

the meetings with local Panamanian government officials to mak

everybody knew what was going on [in terms of rural infrastructure r

According to Pryor, "the MSG's Special Forces component did all t

affairs work that could be expected in our nation-building programs."23

In sum, the MSG deployed a combination of MPs, Special Forces, 

servists (civilian policemen or reserve components [RC]) on joint patro

the Panamanian police throughout the country. According to MSG 

ments, their mission was "to conduct joint patrols as well as to o

record, and monitor the Panamanian law enforcement agencies and 

both successes and failures."24 As we will document below, DOD 

concluded that this arrangement did not violate section 660. To condu

patrols, the MSG established a Metropolitan Area Police Liaison E

(MAPLE) for Panama City and Colon, and a Rural Area Police Liais

ment (RAPLE) to oversee the countryside of Panama. At its height, 

sonnel for joint patrols reached the 600 level. By the early summer, 

reduced to 145 SF personnel, 200 MPs, and 30 reservists.

25

The MSG also had a civil affairs division that employed enginee

medical personnel to support infrastructure reconstruction and 

building projects. Initially, under the CMOTF, civil affairs personne

assigned to each of the GOP ministries. They assisted ministries to 

schools and health clinics and to restore the public transportation 

Under the MSG, their mission was expanded to include deploying engi

and medical units into the rural areas of Panama to begin rebuil

infrastructure that was in a serious state of disrepair. This was classi

civic action.

The immediate problem was one of showing that the GOP was working. It had 

be demonstrated that something was happening right away. Part of that 

starting to build an infrastructure so that the Panamanians could take over as s

38
as possible . We made sure that the Panamanians made an investment in eve

thing we did, even if it was just sweat. We started o$' repairing health clini

schools, and eating farm-to-market roads. We were not building anything n

What we did was maintainence of e>dsting infrastructure . . . . We coordina

everything we did with the ministries . . . . We worked at the national, provin

and local level as

Engineering units were criticalgto this mission, and the MSG was 

employ the 356th Corps of Engineers for infrastructure repair project

356th is a heavy organization that has both vertical and hori

capabilities. The MSG also brought in reserve engineering units, mainl

the National Guard, to augment the 356th. 27

Finally, the MSG had a PSYOPS division during the first half o

Originally part of Just Cause, elements of the 4th Psychological Oper

Group were assigned to the MSG to conduct positive PSYOPS missio

hance the prestige of the GOP among the Panamanian people; assist i

ing the police into a motivated, effective, professional force, respec

human rights, dedicated to law and order, and subordinated to 

democratic control; and boost popular support for the police.

The embassy, and in particular the ambassador, viewed these activ

controversial . Indeed, this was a sensitive area, as the MSG chief 

observed, "PSYOPS are a very risky game. . . . We knew the risk

reviewed everything very carefully and coordinated it with the emba

Not, however, to the satisfaction of Ambassador Deane Hinton. In f

PSYOPS campaign conducted by the MSG came close to the line in t

whether it was within the bounds of military responsibility.

Military Support Group Tasking

and the Panama Strategy

There was no integrated strategy for supporting nation-buildi

democratization in Panama following Just Cause. In fact, contingenc

ning, due to compartmentation, excluded the possibility . Further, dur

period between 20 December 1989 and activation of the MSG on 17 J

1990, no such strategy was conceptualized. There were a few inte

meetings, but nothing transpired. According to one official that attend

I recall attending at least two interagency meetings involving 18 USG agencies 

January. I was very frustrated at that time, not because they seemed unwillin

participate, but because very little happened. Thinking back on it, they may h

felt that they had been left out of the game until it was too late. From th

perspective, they were justifiably irritated, and may not have wanted to get 

volved after the military had already created its own little mess. I could und

stand that attitude . . . . Unfortunately, nothing came of these meetings .

29

The same was true in Panama, as the CMOTF was overwhelmed 

civil-military problems described earlier, and the embassy was in d

39
When he took command of the MSG, Colonel Steele found little inte

involvement in restoration, let alone an integrated strategy. 3o

The absence of an integrated country team strategy was due, as th

d'affaires explained, to the fact that "we did not have a staff at the emb

'do much of that. . . . It took a very long time to get a staff, because un

military, the State Department has to go through a process of req

volunteers, advertising, and so forth.

"31 This inability to respond to th

as Ambassador Hinton notes, left little choice but to rely on the mil

take the lead in restoration. However, it was Hinton's goal to br

military lead to an end as soon as possible. He believed that it wa

tradiction to have the US military in the forefront of supporting democ

tion, the creation of civil government, and nation-building.

32

As a result of these structural problems in the US government, t

was tasked in its mission statement to "conduct nation-building opera

ensure that democracy, international standards of justice and prof

public services are established in Panama." This was a broad manda

military organization. Indeed, in the view of the MSG commander, 

more applicable to an integrated country team, ofwhich the military w

one element. However, because "the embassy was not functional," t

"played the role of the country team."33 In February 1990, General T

also assigned it the task of devising a Panama strategy or, more accur

country team plan.

The guidance called for the clear statement of objectives and supporting objecti

how they were to be achieved, by what organization, and how much it would co

achieve each objective. Moreover, the MSG specifically was not limited to deve

ing only the military portion ofthe plan but also the role other government agen

were to play. Finally, the MSG was to derive the strategic objectives for Pan

from the ambassador's message stating his goals and objectives . 34

Like its mission statement, this tasking took the MSG into uncharted 

The Panama strategy was defined as "an integrated U.S. gov

strategy . . . [that] addresses the Ambassador's goals, USSOUTHCOM

porting objectives, the capabilities required to achieve those goals an

tives, and the funding necessary to affect them."35 As an interagency 

was to be coordinated with the appropriate US agencies and the Pana

government. Thus, although a military creation, the planners soug

agency unity in the effort.

In devising the strategy, the MSG placed it within the context of t

administration's policy of encouraging democratic development in t

American region. Further, the MSG sought to make it consistent wit

the original reasons for intervention-the defense of democracy in P

Two overriding goals were proposed: "a stable and democratic gover

Panama supportive of US interest" and "lasting reform and subordin

the Panamanian police force to legitimate civil authority.

"36

40
Those who were developing the strategy understood that there we

straints on achieving these goals because there was no legacy of dem

"there is no history of democracy in Panama, nor is there a p

Panamanian history when the functions of government were sustaine

basis of Panamanian revenues.""

Consequently, planners believed 

tensive government reform would take some time to transpire, thus 

the pace of democratization. Questions were raised about "ho

legitimacy the Endara government [could] hope to achieve," and the e

which the US should commit to it . They recommended treating 

"caretaker during . . . democratic transition.

"38 Finally, concern 

pressed about the extent to which the police would shed the PDF legac

These questions were realistic, and they reflected a contextual 

standing not found in the contingency planning for restoration. Othe

of the document were less realistic . For example, MSG planners so

target US support to encourage a particular form of democracy in Pana

The objective is to ensure a consolidation of political powers that supports a mu

party system and provides free elections. . . . The strategy is to support a consol

tion of power in the middle class across several parties and prevent brokering 

the economic elites and the disenfranchised elements like the' PRD."

The extent to which this was realistic in Panama, given its h

demographics, and political culture, was not addressed. Rather, a 

phase program of support, extending to 1999, was proposed. For each 

US nation-building assistance was focused on security, political and e

development, and counternarcotics .

While it is beyond our scope to assess these phases in detail, a s

review will provide insight into the constraints on them. The focus wi

the security, political, and economic development aspects of the s

Phase one--consolidation of democracy-covered 1990 and was tantam

the one-year charter of the MSG. In terms of security, the objective 

establish a security force (out of the old PDF) that was professionally 

and subordinated to civilian democratic governance. To achieve t

strategy simply reaffirmed what had been set in motion. ICITAP, wit

support, would assist the Panamanian Ministry ofJustice in this endea

Support for political development in phase one was to consist of help

Panamanians to learn democratic practices "at the grass roots level" 

as "from the top down."

The first step in attaining this objective would be to establish the U.S. Peace Co

in Panama emphasizing community development. In conjunction, the USAID 

Agency for International Development] program of small grants for commun

development needs to be activated and publicized . US military exercises . . . m

be conducted in coordination with local appointed authorities and the popul

through town meetings (a Latin American tradition known as cabildos abiertos). 

the interior, RC and SF personnel must work to foster communication between lo

and civil authorities and the PNP.41

41
How feasible were these proposals? Were they realistic for Panama

USAID and the Peace Corps equipped and ready to undertake such ef

a countrywide scale? Such questions were not addressed. Moreover, 

1990 there was no evidence that such programs were initiated.

Basic infrastructure repair for,1990 was to focus on "high priority 

including health facilities, schools, roads, railroads, ports, utilities, 

agricultural base." Economic aid would be employed to "jumpst

economy with a massive infusion." While USAID was assigned the 

supporting infrastructure repair, it was barely present in Panama 

1990. Most of what did take place, as we will detail below, was carrie

the MSG. There was no massive infusion of aid in 1990, althoug

promised.

Phases two and three of the strategy consisted of some sketchy ide

how to help Panama stabilize and sustain democracy by the end of 

tury. The proposals appear to be prefaced on the assumption that 

would stay engaged and committed. How realistic was this? The plan

not address the question, but merely proposed some rather grandi

hastily drawn suggestions-particularly in the third phase, which ex

1999. In the areas of security and political development the US will c

to sustain police force professionalism, monitor civil liberties and 

rights, monitor and support public confidence in democratic institutio

grass roots, and maintain the US partnership with GOP agencies. 42

In terms of economic aid, MSG planners assumed the US would m

support to strengthen the Panamanian economy. "USAID will take 

with programs to sustain and expand GOP capabilities and servic

military activity will support this [through continued] maintena

repair of roads and facilities."43

What can be concluded about this effort to develop an integrated 

team plan for Panamanian democratization and nation-building? Firs

necessary if the US hoped to reap the potential benefits of eli

Noriega and the PDF. As we proposed in the introduction, the use of f

to be accompanied by concern with what takes place after the shooti

Second, the document gave focus to what had to take place in 1990 to 

the security force and basic infrastructure repair.

Problems with the Panama strategy occur when the time frame is e

to 1999 and the goals include designing the appropriate model of de

for Panama. In terms of long-range planning, the proposals are ske

underdeveloped and based on uncertain political and bureaucratic 

tions. Moreover, if the US is to develop a policy to support a particul

of democracy in another country, an interagency process has to be dev

expertise will be required. At present, neither of these exists in any o

way in the bureaucracy.

Put simply, undertaking these broader political and developmenta

tives was beyond the expertise of those who designed the Panama 

42
To be sure, FAOs and civil affairs specialists from the military have a 

play-but neither in the lead nor to the exclusion of civilian agencies

the documents assert, the Panama strategy was coordinated with 

propriate US government agencies, that fact only supports our con

that the USGwas unprepared for such exercises.

Notes

1 . The missions and organizational structure of the MSG are outlined in a docu

titled, "US Military Support Group Panama: Envision the Future . . . Then Make It 

Headquarters Southern Command(April 1990).

2. Col Harold Youmans, Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, Fla., telepho

view with author, 26 August 1992.

3. Ibid .

4. Memorandum for commander in chief, US Southern Command, Col Harold Y

subject: Need for aTraining and Support Organization, 8January 1990.

5. Ibid .

6. Ibid .

7. John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of

(Carlisle Barracks, Pa. : Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 7. 

Fishel was deputy chief of the Public Force Liaison Division of the Military Support Gr

study provides an interesting and thoughtful insidefs perspective. He was interview

author as part of the field research for this study.

8. GenMaxwell R. Thurman, Arlington, Va., interview with author, 29 May 1992.

9. Col James Steele, Dominican Republic, telephone interview with author, 29 June 

10. Col Jack Pryor, US Army Management Engineering College, Rock Island Arse

interview with author, 20-21 January 1992.

11. Steele interview.

12. Ibid .

13 . Fishel, 61.

14. Steele interview.

15 . Ibid .

16. Ibid .

17. Pryor interview. Pryor asserts that they produced a report predicting the D

1990 coup attempt, but that it was ignored. Additionally, the J-2 could have provid

ligence on the operational patterns of the drug traffickers, along with their network

ever, this capability was not utilized.

18. Steele interview.

19. Pryor interview.

20. Fishel, 47.

21. Pryor interview.

22. Fishel, 47.

23 . Pryor interview.

24. Memorandum, Headquarters Southern Command, USMSG, for Rick Lang, 

subject: Joint Patrols, 5 July 1990.

25. Ibid .

26. Pryor interview.

27. Ibid .

28. Ibid .

29. Lt Col Dennis Barlow, The Pentagon, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense 

cial Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, interview with author, 18 June 1992.

30. Steele interview.

31. John Bushnell, NewYork, interview with author, 22 June 1992.

43
32. Ambassador Deane Hinton, Panama, interview with author, 24 September 19

33. Steele interview.

34. Fishel, 51.

35. US Military Support Group, "Panama Strategy," working document (He

Southern Command, May 1990),12.

36. Ibid ., 1-2.

37. Ibid ., 3.

38. Ibid ., 4-5.

39. Ibid ., 7.

40. Ibid ., 24-27.

41. Ibid ., 27.

42. Ibid., 35.

43. Ibid ., 36.

44
Chapter 6

,

Assessment and Evaluation

How effective was the Military Support Group? What were its st

and weaknesses? Were its shortcomings due to MSG limitations, or we

the result of larger problems with US policy? To answer these and 

questions, our assessment and evaluation is divided into 5 parts: (1) c

a Panamanian security force, (2) infrastructure reconstruction and 

building, (3) psychological operations, (4) liaison with the Governm

Panama, and (5) interagency coordination.

Creating a Panamanian Security Force

In the contingency plan for restoration in Panama (Blind Logic), 

never determined what kind of security force would replace the Panam

Defense Force. Rather, several -options were--identified, including t

eventually selected by the GOP. In the days immediately following the 

ning of Just Cause, this issue became critical due to the breakdown of l

order. With the elimination ofthe PDF, SOUTHCOM found itself resp

for law enforcement functions. The situation also presented the ne

augurated Endara government with an immediate crisis. Once t

military operation was completed, the government would have to take 

sibility for maintaining law and order.

In consultation with US authorities, Endara, Arias Calderon, an

opted for the creation of a police force . They saw the Panamanian situa

analogous to that of Costa Rica. A standing army was not necessary 

thermore, in order to build democracy, it was essential to expunge all v

of praetorian rule. The PDF had to go. However, they sought to acco

this exorcism in an unconventional way. The new security force wou

out of the remnants of the defunct PDF. The decision to adopt this ap

was not an easy one.

There was a great debate over what should be done. What do you do with the o

PDF members? Do you put them all in jail? How do you start a new police force 

establish law and order? Endara, Arias Calderon, and Ford struggled with the

questions . . . . The decision was made that the country had to heal . The bad on

were to be put in jail. The rest of the old PDF was to be converted into a pol

force. The weeding out process would continue over time but [they] were opposed 

revolutionary change and chose the evolutionary path.'

45
In addition to 

healing,there was a more practical reason for the 

The GOP believed that "it could not afford to disenfranchise 1

thousand ex-PDF members, whose only skills consisted of beating u

and pulling triggers, because this group would have presented a direc

to them.

"a

What were the chances of converting those skilled in "beating u

and pulling triggers" into policemen subordinated to democratic gov

and respectful of international standards ofjustice and human rights

not going to be easy. According to General Thurman:

Changing attitudes was an enormously difficult task, and a lot of attitudes n

got changed. Those people who could not adjust were released as time went 

They [GOP] did this as opposed to trying to build a completely new force duri

period of chaos. I do not think we did a particularly good job of anticipating 

outcome. 3

Whether it was the right alternative is still debated. The GOP argue

was the prudent choice . Others believed it was Byzantine logic "to 

thugs into your security force in order to solve potential security 

employment problems."4 Among Panamanians, doubts remain over 

dom ofthe decision .

Once the choice was made, for the US the issue became how to as

GOP in carrying it out. Was this a mission for the American military

have both the expertise and legal authority to train a civilian securi

With respect to the former, the creation of the US Force Liasion Gro

gests that SOUTHCOM felt it could accomplish the mission. Recall 

USFLG was tasked to advise, train, and equip the new police force

questioned whether this was beyond the capacity of the US armed 

General Thurman answered:

I think you underrate the nature of the Military Police . The MP knows ho

operate a police force. We had the 16th MP Group in Panama. An installation 

Fort Bragg has one hundred thousand people located on the post . So understan

police functions is something well known to the MPs. . . . MPs are policemen, 

are trained to be policemen. MPs know how to arrest you, pull you over if you 

DWI, stop rioting, stop looting, etc. 5

Still, there are differences between MPs and civilian police. An e

domestic law enforcement offered the following basic distinction: "

military does not understand police-community relations in terms of 

on the beat, who develops a network of contacts, so they can work to

A civilian police force has to be "fully integrated into society," a circu

that is not within DOD's purviews The head of the MSG concur

sounds logical . . . I agree with this argument." However, it "pits the p

against the theoretical. . . . Either the military would do it [in Panam

would not get done." 7 In January 1990, there were few alternatives .

There also was a legal issue. Under section 660 of the Foreign Ass

Act, the US military is prohibited from training foreign police. Howev

restriction can be waived if a formal request is made to the Congress 

Congress votes to allow it. During Just Cause, section 660 did no

dR
sion was given to the USFLG. When the MSG was activated on 17 Jan

1990, police training was assigned to it. Since the military operation ha

been officially terminated, the transfer was legal. However, it could on

temporary unless a waiver of section 660 was forthcoming . It was not.

As was noted earlier, the military became fully engaged in the proce

this time. It created the 20-hour course to provide basic instruction in "

ethics, community relations, criminal law, the role of force, reporting, pa

ling, arrest procedures, traffic enforcement, crowd control, wea

familiarization, and first aid." The course was given to "selected pers

from each major police unit in Panama City and the provinces, who 

returned and acted as instructors for the rest of the police force."8

US military personnel were likewise involved in the vetting of the f

members of the PDF, a process that eventually eliminated all colonel

percent of the lieutenant colonels, 38 percent of the majors, 31 percent o

captains, and 19 percent of the lieutenants . 9 Finally, the USFLG and 

the MSG conducted joint patrols with members of the police . The obje

was to establish "an effective means of reinforcing newly established p

dures of conduct by the Panamanian Police Force."i oThis was a neces

given the PDF legacy of doing whatever it wished vis-a-vis the population

With the official termination of Just Cause at the end- of January 1990

legal question could no longer be put off. Congress forced the issue by pa

the Urgent Assistance to Democracy in Panama Act on 7 February 199

renewed the section 660 prohibition on military training of the Panama

police. However, even before the legislation was passed, the State De

ment in Washington and Ambassador Hinton in Panama sought to 

military involvement with the police .

Hinton's reasoning was straightforward and logical . He did not believe 

the US military was the right institution to build a civilian security fo

an emerging democracy." While this position is perfectly reasonable, w

was the expertise to be found? The training of foreign police had beco

very contentious subject for the Congress back in the mid-1970s. Ear

during the Kennedy administration, an Office of Public Safety was e

lished within the Agency for International Development (AID) to improv

administration, organization, and methods of foreign police forces. An 

national Police Academy was also established in Washington to provid

vanced instruction for senior police officials . Both programs were pa

Kennedy's counterinsurgency policies .

In 1974, Congress closed down the Public Safety program and the Int

tional Police Academy due to allegations that they had become closel

sociated with and supportive of some of the most repressive p

organizations in Latin America and elsewhere. The allegations inc

either participating in or condoning the use of torture against political 

dents. According to Charles Maechling, "While these charges were 

substantiated, there is no doubt that in modernizing foreign police f

while failing to insist on rigorous standards of criminal justice and civil 

47
ties, the United States was guilty of creating efficient instruments o

sion where none had existed before." 12 Apparently, given the politica

of the mid-1970s, unproven allegations were sufficient-US involvem

foreign police was terminated.

In 1985, the Department of State requested that Congress provide 

waiver of section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Congress amen

tion 534(b)(3) to authorize the president to support "programs to 

investigative capabilities, conducted under judicial or prosecutor 

This resulted in the Department of State requesting that the Depar

Justice assist in establishing and managing such programs. In Janua

the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 

(ICITAP) was established by the US Deputy Attorney General.

13

Because of the legacy of the Office of Public Safety, strict limitati

placed on ICITAP. It could not provide lethal equipment. Nor coul

vide assistance that related to such police techniques as arrests, use 

or other general policing skills. What it could do was assist in the 

ment of investigative and forensic functions, academic curricula and 

tion for law enforcement, and administrative and management capabi

they relate to career advancement, personnel evaluation, and inte

cipline.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 

guidance to ICITAP and, in conjunction with the Department of 

develops the annual program and budget. It was through this offi

State Department that ICITAP received the mission of train

Panamanian police force. Michael Kozak, the principal deputy a

secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, appears to have been the 

force behind the decision, according to David Kriskovich, head of ICIT

I visited Panama in the first week of January 1990. Mike Kozak, who was es

tially my boss at the Department of State . . . asked me to come to Panama whil

was there. He had dealt with Panama for the past five or six years. He had a 

time convincing Bushnell that ICITAP was the right organization for the job. B

nell knew nothing about us. ICITAP had never been in Panama. The DOD did 

know who we were, at least SOUTHCOM did not. . . . Thus, I had to convince 

of people, with Mike Kozak's assistance, that ICITAP was the right institutio

the job.

14

This convincing included the Congress, which amended the Foreig

tance Act to give ICITAP authority to provide training for the security 

civilian law enforcement techniques. According to Kriskovich, "t

Department presented the proposal to Congress." 15 More accuratel

Department officials lobbied Congress. The result was a significant 

ing of ICITAP's authority.

In -Panama, according to Colonel Steele, "Ambassador Hinton 

thusiastic about ICITAP." And why not? After all, ICITAP "was est

to train police forces ." It would eliminate the need for military invo

"So, why shouldn't ICITAP do it?"1s

The fact that ICITAP had neve

48
taken a mission even close to what was involved in Panama appears 

been downplayed. Its personnel could learn while doing.

Were they ready, in terms of programs and personnel, to train a pol

of approximately 12,000, most of which were former members of t

The answer is "no." Prior to Panama, ICITAP's efforts were small

generally consisted of conducting short-term courses and worksh

functioning police departments, mainly in investigative training, 

judicial cooperation, police ethics, forensic skills, child abuse, manag

and nonlethal equipment.

17 Because its staff was small, ICITAP r

consultants-mainly retired FBI agents-to implement these sho

programs in Latin America. It had never attempted to establish and 

entirely new security force department.

An interesting compromise was worked out between SOUTHCOM 

embassy over the Panamanian police issue. General Thurman, who w

cerned with maintaining law and order in Panama, had doubts about 

The way I understood it, ICITAP had been established to provide training 

assistance to already operating police departments, which is quite different f

what had to be done in Panama, where a police department and attitudes had t

built from scratch. ICITAP did not have the manpower, resources, or lesson pl

ICITAP was ill-prepared to set up a new police structure. 18 ^,

Likewise, the embassy, and in particular Bushnell, became somew

than sanguine about how quickly ICITAP could take over the mission

was of the essence . But the key factor was ICITAP's ability to mobil

ICITAP was not really geared up and surely did not have the person

the MSG did."is

Ambassador Hinton, who initially had wanted to make the transit

the MSG to ICITAP as quickly as possible, had to backtrack. There w

choice in the matter. A compromise was reached whereby ICITAP w

responsible for training the security force and assisting them to "deve

policies, methods and procedures that will transition them from a 

mode to a civilian police mode." The MSG would continue with t

patrols to "monitor and report on the practical implementation of the 

program.'° In this arrangement, ICITAP had the lead and the MSG 

supporting role. Further, as the ICITAP program expanded, the M

was to recede. The Military Support Group was scheduled to stand 

17 January 1991.

How well did this arrangement work in 1990? ICITAP's challeng

create a programmatic and personnel infrastructure for a mission it ha

before performed. This took much longer, both in terms of organizat

innovation, than was anticipated. ICITAP was a small and new ins

with a congressionally limited mandate; Panama, with a praetoria

extending back two decades, was a big problem.

During 1990, the ICITAP staff in Panama took time to set up the 

and remained relatively small. Only two full-time professional positi

assigned to Panama, but these professionals could draw on a large nu

49
year Panama Program Description and Budget, to "consist of a Project 

tor, a Training Manager, a Technical Assistance Manager, a Procu

Manager, a Training Coordinator, a Technical Assistance Coordinator

Secretary . With the exception of the Procurement Manager, all full-ti

will be based in Panama City."" While it has become somewhat large

1990, ICITAP's professional staff in Panama remained small in 1991-9

To supplement the professional staff in Panama, ICITAP used 

consulting firm, Miranda Associates, to "station personnel in Panam

full-time basis to manage office and classroom facilities in support of 

activities and to provide supplies and equipment." They also had admi

tive authority for the consultants who directed many of ICITAP's work

courses, and seminars. According to Kriskovich, "approximately 50 

FBI agents [were retained] to do training and technical assistance." 23

The size of the ICITAP effort generated criticism from the CINCS

COM. Members of the MSG likewise had doubts : "ICITAP might have 

many as seven people in country when I departed [in 1991]. How 

transform the old PDF with that amount of people?"24 They also raise

tions about ICITAP's cultural understanding of Panama and its staf

ingness to develop close relationships with their Panamanian counterp

Several members of the MSG, including its commanding officer, wer

American foreign area officers (FAO) with experience in the region

believed that knowledge of and affinity for the countries of the regi

essential for operating effectively. The MSG took such an approach. 

ing to Colonel Steele:

MSG personnel spent a lot of time with the government. . . . The MSG and 

Panamanian government weathered demonstrations and crises together. Perso

relationships were forged in this environment. . . . I spent a lot of time in the of

of the chief of police . We brought in police cars, police-type equipment, and trie

remove the legacy of the PDF. . . . In other words, the MSG was very act

whereas ICITAP was not. I gave ICITAP an office in the police headquarters . 

fact, I offered to share my office with the head of ICITAP. It would have bee

logical place for ICITAP to set up an office, but ICITAP chose not to . Inst

ICITAP worked out of the Marriott Hotel. The policemen never went to this 

fice . 25

While some members of ICITAP had regional experience and 

Spanish, ICITAP was not comparable to the MSG. Why should it be

all, ICITAP's previous programs were of a short-term and technical 

They never represented themselves as the civilian counterparts of U

FAOs. Forming the kinds of bonds that the MSG did was outside I

standard operating procedures. However, given the mission involv

kind of background and expertise that MSG personnel had would ha

helpful . When working with foreign nationals, it is essential that o

proach be based on a cultural and political understanding of co

dynamics.

Professional organizations, whether civilian or military, develop a

dardize functional operating procedures. When given a task, they 

50
these existing methods. This is the way bureaucracy works, even sma

relatively new ones . Initially, ICITAP approached the training 

Panamanian security force by drawing on its past experience, which co

of workshops, courses, and seminars in the various police-related s

identified earlier . Most of the instructors were retired FBI agents, but 

sionals from state and local police agencies as well as other federal a

participated when their special expertise was required.

ICITAP's early efforts in Panama followed standard operating proc

According to Kriskovich, "We did not have a new concept on the shelf

ever, we had a lot of experience in smaller projects, such as building a

of professional responsibility, and working with police academies to i

curricula. Putting all these pieces together, we knew we could have 

pact. "27 To what extent did they have an effect, relying on existing pro

Were they reaching a police force of more than 10,000, many of who

former members of the PDF, "whose only skills consisted of beating up 

and pulling triggers"?

Critics of ICITAP believe the answer is that its initial impact was mi

the reason being that ICITAP's approach did not get at the crux of th

lem. In previous programs in the region, ICITAP did not have to 

attitudes on a mass scale or convince the client to adopt a professional 

model. In other words, ICITAP was used to providing instruct

policemen who thought ofthemselves as policemen.

In 1990, this was not how the Panamanian police perceived itself. C

Steele described the situation:

Given the decision to incorporate the remnants of the PDF into the new natio

police, it was necessary to recognize that certain mind sets came with them. Th

had been officers and soldiers, and within the new police force they would beco

policemen. . . . ICITAP needed to find ways to infuse civilian values . . . so as 

break down the military mind set. . . . Otherwise the police force would turn into 

institution which was merely waiting for the gringos to leave, so it can go back 

being an army, back to the old way."

During its first year in Panama, ICITAP was reaching only a small part 

police force with a curriculum that, while important, did not addre

larger problem." It did not get at the legacy of praetorianism that h

fused the PDF. How could ICITAP do that, questioned its critics, when 

not deploy personnel to the urban and rural precincts to work with the 

on a daily basis? "We tried to push ICITAP in the direction of deploy

people throughout the country to work in every precinct and province." 

ever, they "could not comprehend operating on this scale."s° Was it 

expect ICITAP to be able to do so, on a countrywide basis, during 

ICITAP had never conducted a program of this size or focus before, 

showed.

On the other hand, and to its credit, ICITAP began during 1990, to d

programs that could, over the long term, address these initial shortco

Three initiatives stand out. First was the transition course for all 

members of the PDF. The goal was to provide 120 hours of instructi

51
p, 

police professionalism, service to the public, conflict resolution, interv

report writing, preventive patrolling procedures, crime scene protectio

niques and mechanics of arrest, human rights and the appropriate 

'force, and firearms safety."" This course, as well as other ICITAP t

programs, stressed incorporating concern with human rights and ethi

duct.

ICITAP hoped to have 5,000 policemen complete the course in 19

cording to a recent report, virtually all of the former PDF had gone 

the transition course by September 1992. 32 The extent to which this t

has resulted in4;cosmetic or real attitudinal change is difficult to m

ICITAP officials in Panama believe it has, and point to the low rate o

misbehavior that could be characterized as analogous to the PDF. 33 

will see, others have serious doubts. The subject is still hotly deb

Panama.

The second initiative was the creation of a police academy. Its goal 

"long-term institutionalization of basic and continuing educational d

ment . . . and maintenance of professional standards throughout the N

Police."34 Through the academy, Panama would eventually develop a 

officers not tainted by the past. It would take time, but even I

strongest critics believe this initiative is the key to a future that is 

praetorianism.

Finally, ICITAP sought to address the problems of corruption, 

abuse of power, violation of human rights, and related criminal acts

were the raison d'etre of the PDF. The solution was to institutionalize 

the national police, as well as in the Ministry of Government and Just

Office of the Attorney General, and the Judicial Technical Police, an O

Professional Responsibility. This likewise was a good idea. If properl

mented, these organs could "curb human rights abuses and other mis

and improve performance." 35

In sum, through such initiatives, ICITAP began to develop long-te

tions to praetorianism. While it is fair to criticize some of its initial ef

off the mark, it was, in the American tradition, learning while doing

ever, in 1990 there was the immediate problem of a new police force, 

percent of which was made up of former PDF members. It was this 

ment that necessitated the continuing involvement of the MSG with th

through the joint patrols.

While the embassy would have preferred otherwise, there was littl

in the matter. In retrospect, the ambassador believes the joint patro

successful. 36 In fact, the embassy in Panama requested that DOD con

provide this support after ICITAP received training authority. 37 W

continuation of this MSG activity within the parameters of section 66

issue was addressed at an "OASD/ISA hosted meeting of DOS, DOJ, a

representatives on 8 March 1990." They concluded that MSG personn

stay involved "if their mission is operational and not primarily to 

52
at each police precinct were construed as liaison and operational activ

not training.

The distinction between operational and training duties appears to be 

one of semantics than of actuality, however. Indeed, this was candid

mitted in the directive sent to Panama:

It is important that reservists with law enforcement backgrounds, and our Specia

Forces personnel, do not insert themselves into this process on an ad hoc basis. . 

[T]hey may monitor and report on the practical implementation of the ICITA

program, but not train.

It is recognized that a certain amount ofDOD operational activity may result in t

inevitable "training" of the Panamanian police as the practical result of joi

patrols, precinct house administration, and other law enforcement functions. . 

Such "on the job training" by "osmosis" as the result of U.S . personnel exhibiti

model police practices and behavior in the course ofcarrying out their official duti

is not, repeat, not precluded . . . so long as it is incidental to the DOD mission. 39

While the distinction may be ambiguous, the practical results wer

The MSG actions addressed a serious limitation in ICITAP's 1990 pro

On the one hand, as Colonel Pryor notes, the joint patrols provide

Panamanian population "with a sense of security because presumab

U.S. would not allow the police force to violate the law." 4° The populati

no illusions about the new police . They were still the PDF, just dres

new uniforms and without the boots. Having a US presence was mean

to the Panamanians.

Beyond security, the joint patrols could set examples of correct be

and provide to the "new Panamanian police somebody to talk to when 

was needed.

"41 This was important, as Bushnell pointed out: a soldie

also is a cop "is a tremendous resource." They could "go out in the pre

and make the precincts work.

"4' Kriskovich concurred : the joint patrols 

the peace and an eye on the former PDF members. They provided a 

information and we learned from them."43 Still, this was only a temp

solution and no substitute for a systematic program ofinstitution-buildi

While the 1990 compromise seemed like an exemplary, if temporary, 

fix to a policy issue that the US was neither bureaucratically nor pro

matically prepared to address, there were problems with it due to IC

MSG friction. Each organization considered itself best suited for the mi

and the resulting tension placed constraints on the overall performance

To summarize, during 1990 the MSG made an important, if limited

tribution to establishing a new security force institution in Panama. 

constrained by both the law and the requirements of the mission. Fol

the end of military operations, the MSG could only play a supporting r

is generally agreed that it did so in a very effective way. However, on

decision was made to create a civilian police force, the US military cou

be the lead agency.

53
This created a conundrum for US policy in Panama. None of it

agencies maintained the programmatic and personnel infrastructu

sary to create a civilian security force . While ICITAP was selected to 

lead, it had never before attempted something of this magnitude 

plexity . It was understaffed and programmatically unprepared. Ri

the ICITAP project director in Panama since June 1990, observed th

end of 1990, ICITAP's involvement was "still at a very rudimentary 

To its credit, ICITAP sought to develop in 1990, and began to i

during 1991-92, the kinds of initiatives that could assist the GOP to 

a professional police institution consistent with democracy.

With respect to 1990, the year ended with the police issue still very 

doubt, as the 4-5 December 1990 police mutiny or attempt

demonstrated . The former director general of the police, Col Eduardo 

Hassan, broke out of jail and, aided by former PDF officers, took c

police headquarters. The GOP had to request US military involv

restore order. The Panamanian police force was either unwilling or 

do so. In the opinion of Gen George Joulwan, CINCSOUTHCOM at 

MSG presence and involvement "helped prevent the insurrection 

calating into something greater."4s

While beyond the scope of this study, we would note that the po

remains a question mark today. According to former head of police 

Asvat, ICITAP "was not prepared . . . I think the Panamanian pro

much more complex than what they as an organization were able to 

just do not understand the US ambassador's decision to use ICITAP 

ing the Panamanian police force ." 41 Originally scheduled to finish 

ICITAP now estimates that it will take until 1995 to complete the 

establishing a professional police institution in Panama. The police 

had six chiefs during its brief existence, and this is only one of sev

tinuing problems facing the institution. ICITAP's 1992 annual proje

identified a number of others, including "a lack of credibility with 

munity, low salaries . . . which affect morale and the ability to at

retain quality personnel, and limited resources which impact on all 

police performance." 48

As a result, the police have been the target of sharp criticism in 

Some charge that the institution is rife with incompetence. This rep

amplified following the police debacle during President Bush's visi

1992. Others believed the police continue to harbor old PDF attitud

as connections to secret associations of former PDF officers, and that 

still possible . Recent public opinion polls reveal that 64 perce

Panamanians distrust the police, while only 26 percent express con

them." Thus, it appears that the goal of ensuring public security i

through a civilian police force that is competently led, professional

and organized, and adequately equipped remains to be realized.

- 54
Infrastructure Reconstruction and Nation

Buildi

According to its mission statement, the MSG was to "conduct nation

ing operations" in Panama. In reality, it would be more appropr

describe what took place under its auspices in 1990 as infrast

reconstruction . According to the MSG chief of staff, the focus was on "

ing health clinics, schools, and existing farm-to-market roads. . . . W

did was maintain existing infrastructure."5o This was no nominal tas

ever; recall that, under Noriega, the countryside had been almost com

neglected.

As we noted earlier, MSG reconstruction projects were not part of 

tegrated US program. The civilian agencies were not prepared for 

1990. Moreover, resources for such an effort were not forthcoming fr

US government when the MSG began reconstruction activities. The 

that would have provided financial assistance languished in Congress: 

dent Bush had pledged to request $1 billion in foreign aid for Panama; 

1990, Congress allocated $420 million; by the beginning of 1991, onl

million had actually been provided. 51

In lieu of an integrated US plan, and the resources to support nation

ing, the MSG initiated a modest program of infrastructure reconstr

This effort could not hope to fill the void created by US unpreparedn

course. Rather, as one member of the MSG put it, the reconstruction p

were more like a "dike to keep the floodgates of chaos from overr

Panama. . . . The hope was to keep the country from collapsing."52

In spite of their modest dimensions, these MSG projects were import

at least three reasons. First, they began to address a serious problem; 

the countryside was in bad condition. Second, the 1990 program led to 

engineer training exercises in Panama that bring units to the cou

conduct infrastructure reconstruction. Third, there was an importan

bolic aspect to these efforts. As we will describe below, the MSG establ

decision-making process whereby the selection and implementat

reconstruction projects was under the direction of the GOP. This 

signaled to the Panamanian people that the new government was fu

ing-and it "demonstrated that something important was happening, 

GOP auspices, right away."53

To begin infrastructure reconstruction, the MSG had to gain access 

gineering and related assets and establish an effective decision-maki

implementing process between itself and the GOP. With respect 

former, active and reserve engineering units were essential . Becau

MSG was an ad hoc organization, it had to acquire personnel and equ

from other units. This caused obvious problems and resentment. Ho

the place of the MSG in the chain of command was unusual. Officially

to report to the JTF-PM, which was under the command of Gen C

Stiner. Once Just Cause officially ended, it reported to US Army Sou

General Cisneros. However, because of its mission, the MSG also r

55
existence, the senior leadership of the MSG briefed General Thurm

daily basis. 54

Because of the CINC's interest in the MSG and its access to him, t

was able to acquire the assets needed for its reconstruction project

included the 536th EngineerBattalion.

55 Additionally, the MSG got 

from National Guard engineering units. Apparently, the Nationa

Bureau took the initiative in offering assistance; in any event, these e

ing units were integrated directly with the 536th.

56 This was also 

medical and dental units. In sum, the MSG was able to gain acces

resources necessary for beginning a limited program of rural reconstru

The next step was to involve the Panamanian government in the 

and implementation of the projects. According to the MSG command

goal was "to set up a model to coordinate these projects . . . [and] ma

that the Panamanian government gets credit at the local, province, 

tional level.

"17 Unfortunately, coordination among local, province, 

tional level officials had been absent in Panama for years. It ha

reinvigorated.

The MSG encouraged coordination by requiring that every recons

project be coordinated between the MSG and the appropriate GOP m

For example, if the Ministry of Education presented .a list of schools 

like the MSG to repair, the MSG identified the resources requir

ministry representatives took the proposal to the appropriate provi

cials and then to the local level for their input. When consensus was 

the project would be initiated.

The MSG purpose was to encourage active and visible GOP 

reconstruction at all levels of government. The government also ha

resources into the projects, even if it was only labor. While it took t

process did evolve. According to the MSG J-5: "There developed 

communication between representatives of the government of Panam

project sites in the hinterland and their respective ministries. Thro

ministries this feedback went into the cabinet stimulating decision ma

a daily basis." 58 Of course, the new government could take the c

reconstruction and demonstrate to the population that it was active 

volved.

The MSG served as the catalyst to stimulate this process. It 

through the GOP to "nurture a decision-making process, policy impl

tion, communication, and coordination within the Pana

bureaucracy. . . . In this way the MSG stimulated basic, lateral and 

decision making." 59 Furthermore, the Panamanian government was 

give to its people a visible sign that it was trying to respond to their ne

What was the extent of these reconstruction projects? Two major e

ing exercises were conducted in 1990, as were a number of smaller 

The first, Fuertes Caminos 90, took place from April through Augus

western six provinces. The mission included repairing 50 schools, 1

70 kilometers (km) of roads, 17 bridges, and 10 other projects. 

56
September

December, a second exercise, Cosecha Amistad 90, was 

taken in the provinces of Darien and San Blas. This smaller p

repaired another 19 schools, clinics, and 22 kms of roads.

60

These projects were limited in scope, particularly given the extent 

deterioration. Nevertheless, they were important in two respects. Fi

exercises began the process of reconstruction and the Panamanian 

ment was integrated into it. The MSG charted how these projec

reported in the Panamanian media: "We essentially had three cat

favorable, neutral, and negative . . . [A]ll of the press was favorab

received tremendous publicity . . . . Every night there was a televis

about it."61 This was important to the embryonic Panamanian govern

Second, the 1990 exercises established an annual program that br

gineering units to Panama to train by implementing rural recons

projects. For example, in the 1991 exercises, Army and National Gu

',en-gineers repaired 91 schools, 42 clinics, 7 bridges, and 151 kms of ro

participated in 20 other projects. In 1992, 61 schools, 29 clinics, 12 roa

16 bridges were repaired. In addition, 169 well pumps were installed 

of the goals of these annual programs is to promote infrastructure 

ment within Panama.

In sum, while the MSG was not precisely involved in nation-buil

helped the Panamanian government to begin the recovery process . Wh

embassy and civilian agencies of the government were just retur

Panama, the MSG was demonstrating US commitment to the country

nurtured the GOP decision-making process . Finally, the 1990 engine

cises have become routine; they now take place on an annual basis.

Psychological Operations

During the first five months of its one-year mandate, the MSG inc

Psychological Operations Support Element. That element's mission 

"plan, coordinate, and execute PSYOPS and PSYOPS-related actions d

to support nation-building, with a high priority on the National Polic

March 1990, this part of the MSG was composed of 48 specialists from 

Battalion of the 4th PSYOPS Group. In April, it was reduced to 18

June 1991, it was ordered to depart from Panama.

Why was the PSYOPS Support Element (PSE) the first part of the 

stand down, and why so early? The specific reasons are difficult to as

What is clear is that the ambassador wanted it out of the country as 

as possible. Based on previous experiences he had a negative 

psychological operations in general, and saw no place for them in P

According to the ambassador the MSG "had this PSYOPS operation . 

told Steele very early on that I do not like PSYOPS. As you plan to ph

[the MSG], you phase out PSYOPS as a high priority.

"14 According 

senior embassy officials, most notably John Bushnell, the reason ha

57
more with specific aspects of the PSYOPS campaign, particularly 

tivities aimed at enhancing the internal prestige of the GOP a

Panamanian people . Bushnell believed that this was beyond the ma

military psychological operations.

Whether the reason for the decision to order the PSE out of 

resulted from explicit objections to specific actions or from the amba

general distrust of PSYOPS remains unclear. There appears to have 

discussion surrounding the decision at the time. The embassy simply 

exercise its authority and that was the end of it .

Did PSYOPS have a place in the Military Support Group? What 

specific campaign objectives? Were they beyond the purview of 

PSYOPS? Did the PSYOPS Support Element exceed its mandate? 

lowing were specified as campaign objectives:

1. Make the PNP a motivated, effective, professional police force, 

to law and order, respectful of human rights, and subordinated to de

government control.

2. Enhance popular support and respect for the PNP.

3. Enhance the internal respect ofthe GOP.

4. Neutralize disinformation and hostile propaganda directed ag

GOP, PNP, the population of Panama, and the United States .

5. Enhance the image of the US in Panama and in the region.

6. On order, support counternarcotics efforts by the US and GOP.6

Ofthese, according to the commander of the PSE, the emphasis was 

the first three. There was negligible hostile propaganda or disinfor

counter, and little time for the last two objectives.

67 How were t

three objectives approached, and were the products and activities 

permissible?

The first objective appears to be within the boundaries ofmilitary 

It likewise was consistent with one of the main tasks of the MSG-to 

the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Progr

efforts to establish a civilian security force under the authority o

officials. How did PSYOPS fit into this endeavor? Recall that o

major challenges facing ICITAP was to convert former members of 

into civilian policemen subordinated to democratic government con

cording to Lt Col Jeffery Jones, head of the PSYOPS Support Eleme

problem was the transition . . . you had to change the attitu

policemen themselves, you have to teach them a set of rules by wh

should live and work.

"68 Here is where PSYOPS had an important 

tion to make. After all, the easy part was dressing the former PDF 

in police uniforms. On the other hand, training them to think and ac

respectful of human rights and democratic government was exceedi

lenging.

The goal was to reinforce the training by ICITAP, most important

transition course for former PDF members. The PSYOPS product

focus on encouraging the policemen to act in accordance with those 

58
responsibilities taught in ICITAP courses . In effect, this entailed dir

range of positive PSYOPS programs toward the police to induce attit

performance change.

These products could take several forms, including face-to-face com

tion, printed messages, and radio and television spots. For examp

printed item given to every policemen was the "Ten Commandments.

consisted of a basic set of rules that all were to abide by. There were 

and certificates to recognize proper behavior and achievement. Sloga

as "Take No Bribes" and "True Courage," were adapted to posters fo

precinct buildings. Finally, there was a plan for a police newspaper.

To have a meaningful effect, these PSYOPS products had to be coo

with, and had to directly support, ICITAP's various training programs

attempts at coordination did take place, according to Jones, "it did not 

well as it should have. We interfaced with ICITAP periodically but p

not routinely.

"69 While the PSE was prepared to develop specific prod

ICITAP's training programs, ICITAP's efforts were only in an em

stage.

In light of the above, how effective could these PSYOPS support p

really be? It took 20 years for the PDF to develop a praetorian outlo

doubtful that, in the few short months during which the PSYOPS 

Element was in existence, any meaningful inroads were made into 

that outlook. While the concepts and actual projects developed appe

appropriate and innovative, the implementation must be long-term 

was no opportunity for this in Panama. .

The second campaign objective focused on gaining popular support 

police among the Panamanian people. To this end, "The full spec

PSYOPS products [were to be utilized] to establish trust and confide

to encourage active cooperation and collaboration."7o This woul

publicizing police improvements and successes, commitment to reform

tance of new rules of behavior, and discipline. In sum, what the PSE 

to develop was a "public relations program" based on evidence that su

the messages to be propagated. 71

PSYOPS products designed to support the public relations progr

either completed or in the development stage during the spring 

These included television spots that stressed police acceptance of a n

sion to serve the Panamanian people. One interesting example of th

video entitled "La Nueva Policia National," in which the police were 

as committed to the mission of serving the interests of the population

TV videos focused on police-initiated community interaction progr

steps being taken to earn respect. 72

To be sure, many government agencies in democracies, and certain

in the United States, maintain public relations or public affairs offic

is true for police departments at the federal, state, and local levels. T

Panamanian police .would establish one is of no surprise, especially g

image it inherited from the PDF. That it would seek to present itse

Panamanian people as the antithesis ofthe old PDF was a necessity.

59
The question here is whether or not the PSE could assist the Pana

government in doing so . At first sight, this seems to be a gray area 

clear answer. Probably, a legal interpretation was necessary . Sec

makes it clear that the MSG could not train the police. Presumed

included instruction in PSYOPS and in public relations methods a

niques aimed at building a positive image for the police. Howeve

restrictions on training were waived for ICITAP. Since the MSG wa

to support ICITAP, it is plausible to conclude that this waiver could 

pass assistance in developing a PSYOPS program to "establish t

confidence" in the police among the Panamanian people. Of cours

should be "positive" PSYOPS products (and not deception or disinfor

and they should be based on evidence that supports the message of t

paign. Moreover, ICITAP would have lead responsibility.

Finally, in terms of prohibition, the third PSYOPS campaign obje

enhance the internal respect of the GOP-seems to be clearly out

scope of military PSYOPS. However, an examination of what this en

Panama raises some interesting questions.

For example, some of the products were narrowly focused and l

rectly to the MSG's rural reconstruction activities. Recall that t

sought to integrate the GOP into this process so that it could take c

reconstruction and demonstrate to the population that it was active 

volved. The PSE saw as one of its missions assisting those GOP mi

involved in reconstruction. For example, it developed posters, pamphle

leaflets to assist the Ministry of Health in its campaign to prevent th

of dengue fever, a dangerous tropical disease .

73 When the Ministry o

tion distributed desks, books, and related supplies to schools in rura

the PSE would produce a video for a news spot to be used by the GOP

broadly, the PSE covered US/GOP reconstruction efforts, particularly 

Caminos, in print and in video, throughout the country. Did these a

exceed the bounds of military PSYOPS, or were they within the missi

ment ofthe MSG?

While these examples may raise questions about whether or not t

PSYOPS campaign objective lies outside the scope of the PSE, othe

less problematic. For instance, the PSE produced videos that aimed 

at building legitimacy for the Endara, Arias Calderon, and Ford gove

While this was obviously necessary and a normal function for any de

cally elected government, it carried the PSE directly into the arena 

tisan politics-an arena that is beyond the bounds of military PSYO

course, it is plausible to argue that the same is true of the print a

materials developed to propagate the achievements of GOP minis

US/GOP reconstruction efforts .

In sum, the issue was one of boundaries. In peacetime activities, 

the reconstruction efforts in Operation Promote Liberty, communicati

information are important support activities. Military PSYOPS u

perform these tasks. Of course, limits and boundaries must be est

Unfortunately, no discussion of these boundaries seems to have tak
the embassy simply chose to exercise its authority and that was the en

PSE.

This was unfortunate because the PSE provided crucial communicat

information support. Some of the examples cited above are illustrativ

ever, no attempt was made to establish what was and what was not 

the boundaries of military PSYOPS, or to follow up after the groundw

laid.

Military Support Group Liaison

with the Panamanian Government

Throughout this study, reference has been made to the relation

tween the MSG leadership and the Panamanian government of Endar

Calderon, and Ford. This relationship involved a liaison arrangeme

can only be characterized as both special and, for the two Army colon

headed the MSG, highly unusual. According to the MSG commande

were "involved in activities in which the military does not normally 

He cites the following example as illustrative :

We were in the presidential palace on a daily basis for meetings with the presid

I spent approximately three hours every day with the first vice president, A

Calderbn . We discussed all sorts ofissues relating to his roles as vice president 

minister of justice, which put him in charge of dealing with the police issues 

certainly was not anormal relationship.76

This was an unusual situation . How did it come about? At lea

reasons appear to account for it. First, the relationship was forged du

crisis that followed Just Cause. The new Panamanian leadership fou

installed as a government that was both under siege and without pe

and resources. In January, physical threats were still very high for th

dent and the two vice presidents. Colonel Pryor gives the following e

"I can remember when we were under attack at the National Polic

quarters for two-and-a-half hours. I was physically protecting Arias C

from flying glass and ricocheting bullets. [By] providing them with p

protection, you build trust and commitment.

"77 It is not surprising th

Pryor became MSG chief of staff, he would have access to the Pana

leadership. As Steele notes, "A lot of confidence was built up early on

was not easily replaced by the normal embassy-host government r

ship.

"78

A second reason for the MSG-GOP special relationship has to 

resources. The Panamanian government, as noted previously, inher

infrastructure that was in serious disrepair and a treasury that was 

The GOP needed assistance and the MSG had access to resources. Th

could initiate the reconstruction program and do so relatively quickly. 

quently, the new government came to rely on the MSG for resources.

61
Finally, and related to this second reason, was the "can do" attitude 

military. General Thurman explained it this way:

The MSG had an unusual arrangement with the Panamanian government becau

the government was not a government, it was trying to be a government. The on

people who could get something done were the people in the MSG. The governme

did not know-how to move something, how to take care of refugees, how to resto

electricity. 79

The fact that the MSG approached its mission aggressively was attrac

the Panamanian leadership. $°

As a result of these three factors, the MSG-GOP relationship develo

ways that were unorthodox. US Army colonels are not supposed to b

advisors to foreign heads of state and when it happened in Panama 

turbed the US Embassy-the MSG had crossed over into its territory

occurred because of the extensive and close interaction between the MS

the GOP. Colonel Pryor notes that they worked together "to solve ve

problems within the country twenty hours a day, seven days a week. . 

had midnight meetings with Endara, Arias Calder6n, and Ford. . . . On 

occasions we sat down and mapped out how to put the government to

based on the constitution and what was needed to make it function."

extent of the relationship is best captured in the following account by Pr

Jim Steele and I used to have breakfast with President Endara every Wednesda

Usually Rubin Carlos [comptroller] and we discussed strategies for what we we

doing in the countryside. We consulted the president and got his approval 

various MSG projects. This was bothering the embassy. . . . Jim and I suggested 

Endara to invite the ambassador. So he invited the ambassador and deputy chief 

mission . . . . Everytime we needed to see the president . . . we cleared it with t

embassy to see if anyone had a problem with what we were doing. . . . As time we

by, it became harder for us to get embassy clearance, even though the Panamani

leadership did not like that the embassy was putting up roadblocks for t

MSG. . . . It was clear that he did not want us involved anymore. We were at t

end of our one year life cycle. . . . I stopped going to the breakfasts with t

president. . . . Nevertheless, from that point on until we went out ofbusiness, t

president continued to set my place at breakfast . 82

When the MSG stood down in January 1991, colonels Steele and Pryo

personally decorated by the senior leadership of the GOP for their ser

Panama.

There were obvious benefits to this arrangement in terms of advanc

reconstruction effort following Just Cause, even though it was not do

the book." But was it appropriate, or did it go too far off course? Ambas

Hinton stated that "they were too closely involved . . . [it] was j

much."" Nevertheless, he also felt that the MSG had made a contribu

the situation. Was the MSG too intimately involved with the Panam

government, as the ambassador asserts? It is a difficult question to ans

From a practical point of view, the MSG-GOP arrangement hel

stimulate the reconstruction process. It filled the gap that resulted fr

contingency planning and the lack of an integrated country team st

Although its accomplishments were limited, they gave the GOP re

62
have confidence in the US commitment to Panama. This confidence b

was necessary, especially given the doubts caused by the fact th

promised foreign aid was stalled in Congress.

Even in light of these advantages, however, this special relationship 

drawbacks. Perhaps the most serious one was the perception crea

having the military of the United States in the forefront of nation-b

and democratization in a Latin American country. In spite of all the p

and important things the MSG accomplished, through Latin American 

the military is a peculiar instrument to be in the lead in building 

democracy. Of course, the one-year mandate of the MSG did curta

perception.

Interagency Coordination

Interagency planning and coordination were missing in the pos

Cause restoration policy of the United States. Two reasons account 

failure to coordinate. First, the Department of Defense compartment

planning process and excluded those civilian agencies that should hav

involved in the planning for restoration. There is no justification f

exclusion. The security argument is simply unacceptable. Postconflict 

tions are political-military in scope; to exclude the civilian agencies ju

not make any sense. We agree with Ambassador Hinton:

The excuse here was security, you could not trust those guys, and those ot

departments and up to the last minute there was just a handful of people in st

who had the vaguest idea of what was coming. That is the excuse. I think it w

inexcusable, government has to be able to trust people. Somebody should ha

informed the other parts of the government that there was X probability o

military action, put aside some people, and done some planning for what to do a

be ready to follow up if it happens. I had no clue at all, arrived here wit

disorganized embassy staff, no AID at all, a few local employees. . . . No resour

and a mandate to fix things. . . . I think their [DOD] planning and the way they 

things was mistaken in some respects . 84

The fact that the contingency planning process is not defendable, ho

does not excuse a second reason for inadequate interagency coordi

Once involved, the civilian agencies revealed that they were neither 

tually nor organizationally prepared for the kind of situation that f

Just Cause. Perhaps the most glaring example of this was the inabilit

embassy to establish a reasonable timetable for the initiation of a c

team structure and program for supporting restoration.

When asked in the fall of 1992 to reflect back on why it took so 

establish a country team structure, Ambassador Hinton replied tha

something I'm wondering if we have now." He went on to observe tha

kinds of situations are the ones that "we do not do very often." Consequ

he found it difficult to build a staff in Panama that understood and 

tune with the mission. "We had a very high turnover in the embass

63
16. Steele interview.

17. US Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Criminal Justice and Dem

the WesternHemisphere .

18. Thurman interview.

19. John Bushnell, New York, interview with author, 22 June 1992.

20. Joint Staff Action Processing Form, "Status of the USAR Police Support to 

March 1990 (in author's possession). 'The purpose of this document and the acc

message to SOUTHCOM and the embassy was to answer a question by the J-3 of SO

pertaining to the legal status ofUSAR support to police operations in Panama.

21. Offices of ICITAP, Panama Program Description and Budget, annual report, 1

22. Rick Lang, Panama, interview with author, 23 September 1992. Since the s

1990, Rick Lang has served as ICITAP project director in Panama. According to him

of the ICITAP staff in Panama since 1990 has remained about the same as that 

inherited when he arrived.

23. Kriskovich interview.

24. Pryor interview.

25. Steele interview. Initially, ICITAP did use the Marriott Hotel as its base and 

of its courses and seminars there. However, during 1990, it moved to offices at th

bassy.

26. US Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Criminal Justice and Dem

the Western Hemisphere .

27. Kriskovich interview.

28. Steele interview.

29. ICITAP, Panama Program Description and Budget, 8-12.

30. Ibid ., 10.

31. ICITAP, Panama Program Description and Budget, 8-9.

32. Shirley Christian, "Panama's New Police Force under Fire," New York Times, 

ber 1992, A10.

33. Lang interview.

34. ICITAP, Panama Program Description and Budget, 18 .

35. Ibid ., 16-17.

36. Hinton interview.

37. Joint StaffAction Processing Form, "Status ofthe USAR Police Support to Pan

38. Ibid .

39. Ibid .

40. Pryor interview.

41. Ibid .

42. Bushnell interview.

43. Kriskovich interview.

44. Several sources of tension were identified by members of both organizations. 

Colonel Steele notes, "the MSG's reserve policemen and special forces, who lived 

quarters and worked at night, resented that ICITAP operated in an academic environ

did not really understand the streets" (Steele interview) . ICITAP was seen as unwill

up its sleeves and get involved at the working level. For ICITAP, the strong persona

ships the MSG formed with the senior GOP leadership, according to Kriskovich, ma

difficult for his organization. "Colonel Pryor carried a radio . . . which linked him excl

Vice President Arias Calder6n. . . . Howdo I convince Arias Calder6n . . . that I am su

save the law enforcement infrastructure in his country. . . . I never had that kind ofa

I resented it" (Kriskovich interview). The fact that the MSG had access to significa

resources likewise led to friction . According to Steele, "MSG became the equipment 

whereas ICITAP made it clear that it was not about to do that . . . . [Bly providing e

you gaina tremendous amount of influence." The consequence was "when somethi

[to be] done, the government turned to the MSG" (Steele interview). This created r

not only at ICITAP but also with its backers in the embassy. General Thurman stat

were long and heated debates" between the MSG, ICITAP, and the embassy. "I had 

65
pp

the 

(Thurman interview).

45. Lang interview.

46. Gen George Joulwan, Panama, interview with author, 23 September 1992.

47. Ebrahim Asvat, interview with author, 21 November 1992.

48. Offices of ICITAP, ICITAPPanama Project: FY 1992 Program Description an

annual report, 7. %

49. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily ReportLatinAmerica, 14 May 1

50. Pryor interview.

51. Agency for International Development, US Economic Assistance to 

(Washington, D.C . : Government Printing Office, 8January 1991), 1.

52. William Coy, Tysons Corner, Va., interview with author, 14 April 1992.

53. Pryor interview.

54. Ibid .

55. Col Ed Bush, Panama, interview with author, 24 September 1992, 1.

56. Ibid .

57. Steele interview.

58. Coy interview.

59. Ibid .

60. US Army Corps of Engineers, "Overview of Engineer Exercises in Panama for 

Gordon R. Sullivan," 16 February 1992 (in author's possession).

61. Steele interview.

62. US Army Corps of Engineers, "Overview of Engineer Exercises in Panama for 

Gordon R. Sullivan ."

63. Headquarters Southern Command, Military Support Group, PSYOPSupport to 

Liberty: Stability Operations, 2. This MSG document outlines the PSYOP assets, to

paign objectives, and projects initiated during the first part of 1991.

64. Hinton interview.

65. Bushnell interview.

66. Military Support Group, PSYOPSupport to Promote Liberty: Stability Operatio

67. Lt Col Jeffery Jones, National Security Council Staff Office, Washington, D.

view with author, 14 April 1992.

68. Ibid .

69. Ibid .

70. MilitarySupport Group, PSYOPSupport to Promote Liberty: Stability Operatio

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., 10.

73. Lt Col Jeffery Jones, "Psychological Operations and Nation-Building in 

Operation Promote Liberty" (no date), 3 (in author's possession).

74. Jones interview.

75. Steele interview.

76. Ibid .

77. Pryor interview.

78. Steele interview.

79. Thurman interview.

80. The author was able to observe this interaction firsthand during his first 

Panama in April 1990. This involved sitting in on meetings between the leadership of 

and senior Panamanian government officials, including President Endara.

81. Pryor interview.

82. Ibid .

83. Hinton interview.

84. lllid.

85. Ibid.

86. Thurmaninterview.

87. Joulwan interview.

66
Chapter 7

Lessons Learned and Future Relevance

Is it necessary for the United States to develop policy and strategies for

postconflict situations? At least two recent developments suggest that it is.

The first was identified in the introduction . It was proposed that in the more

benign post-cold war international environment, a US decision to use military

force will have to be explained and justified in terms of both defending a

particular national interest and promoting larger normative principles or

values. Specifically, we asserted that the US will require a follow-on policy

that contributes to a positive consolidation of the situation and that promotes

developments seen by domestic and international audiences as contributing to

stability, positive change, and development. The use of force without attention to the postconflict situation will be politically problematic.

A second reason has to do with the fact that the United States will face a

number of new issues and challenges in the aftermath of the cold war. For

the Department of Defense, this is likely to encompass missions that are not

traditional war-fighting ones as well as ones that result from the use of force.

With respect to the former, the US may find itself involved in peacekeeping,

peace enforcement, and postconflict situations where it was not one of the

belligerents but is part of a multilateral effort to resolve a conflict. Indeed,

these missions are likely to receive increased consideration as regional

security and stability ascend in importance on the national security agenda of

the United States.

In light of these post-cold war developments, several lessons drawn from

the Panama case study have relevance to the future. At the most general

level, the first is the need to recognize postconflict situations as important and

complex missions for the Department of Defense. This was clearly not discerned in Panama. The US did not have, at the time of Operation Just Cause,

a policy for the period following the use of force. While consideration is now

being given to this issue in DOD, the Gulf War suggests that more must be

done.

Recognition of this deficiency is reflected in the attention paid to forward

presence missions in the 1992 National Military Strategy ofthe United States .

It states that "in addition to traditional activities . . . in the new security

environment, our military forces may be called upon to execute less traditional operations."' Unfortunately, it defines these new missions narrowly as

counternarcotics and humanitarian assistance. This suggests that, while

moving in the right direction, DOD has yet to develop a comprehensive "Policy

for the Environment Short of War," as outlined in the OASD(SO/LIC) initia67
Lave.` Indeed, OASD(SOALIC) and USSOCOM have important roles to play in

the development of policy and strategy for these kinds of situations.

Beyond this generic lesson, there are several more specific ones to be

derived from the Panama experience in terms of planning and executing

postconflict support for reconstruction and democratization. In terms of contingency planning, one must begin with a clear understanding of both the

immediate situation and the historical and cultural context of the territory

involved. This will drive the focus of the postconflict reconstruction effort.

Such an understanding was missing in the case of Panama.

Postconflict planning called for the restoration of democracy in Panama. A

review of the Panamanian political setting prior to 20 December 1989 reveals

that the concept of restoration was an erroneous basis for what was to _take

place following the destruction of the Panamanian Defense Force and the

removal of Noriega. There was no legacy of democracy to be restored. In fact,

just the opposite was the case. From 1903 to 1968, political power was concentrated in the hands of a few upper-class families. They formed an oligarchy that ruled Panama.

Following World War II, new forces began to emerge and challenge the

oligarchy. The most important new force was the National Police Force,

which became the National Guard and then the PDF. In 1968, the PDF

established a provisional junta. This was the beginning of 20 years of

praetorian rule in Panama. Under Noriega, the PDF dominated all power

centers that might challenge its control of political, economic, and social life in

Panama. The authority and autonomy of the military was confirmed in the

Panamanian constitution and in "Law 20." The latter assigned to the PDF

responsibility for "preservation of the public order and social peace," which

amounted to a legal blank check. The PDF became the "final arbiter in the

political life and government" of Panama.

Noriega also continued to expand the corporate interest of the military,

providing officers the opportunity to enrich themselves through both legal and

illegal business activities. Additionally, he fostered corruption within the

civilian government agencies and the business community. Corruption became a means of suborning civilian institutions to the PDF. The threat and

use of brute force was its counterpart. Beyond refining praetorian control, a

process begun by Torrijos, PDF rule resulted in the neglect and deterioration

of Panama's economic and social infrastructure.

An accurate assessment of the historical and cultural context as well as the

immediate situation in Panama would have reflected these facts. An understanding of the facts would have served as the basis for a realistic postconflict

reconstruction effort. Such understanding was missing in the planning

process that resulted in Blind Logic.

However, this defect was only one of several in the contingency planning

process . A second was the fact that the senior SOUTHCOM leadership paid

little attention to postconflict planning. Recall General Thurman's comments:

"I did not spend five minutes on Blind Logic during my briefing as incoming

CINC in August [1989]." Once in Panama, "the least of my problems at the

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time was Blind Logic." This view was not confined to the CINC-it permeated

the military institution. It set the tone and created obstacles that undermined the entire process in several ways.

Because Blind Logic was of secondary importance, there is no evidence that

,senior officials raised any doubts about several aspects of the final product.'

In retrospect, General Thurman observed that "Blind Logic was not suitable

for the reconstruction of Panama because it did not accurately assess the

dimensions of the task." He was correct; Blind Logic did not evidence an

understanding of the Panamanian context and the political, cultural,

economic, and social ramifications of 20 years of praetorian rule. It lacked a

realistic assessment ofwhat reconstruction should encompass and could hope

to accomplish. Obviously, in the future, senior officials have to be more interested.

A third problem with the planning process was compartmentation. From

the very beginning, for "security" reasons, the plan was restricted to DOD.

The exclusion of civilian agencies was a big mistake. Their involvement was

essential, given the issues involved and the contextual knowledge required to

develop an integrated political-military reconstruction program. Assisting in

democratization and nation-building is hardly the exclusive responsibility of

the military. The services do not have the expertise for all that is involved.

An interagency approach is critical to effective contingency planning and is a

prerequisite for future situations.

A fourth difficulty was that Panama contingency planning in DOD was

bifurcated. War fighting and postconflict restoration were separated, thus

ensuring that the former would receive more attention than the latter and

that the integration of the two would suffer. - This separation allowed the

Pentagon to play to its strength and interest--deterring wars or fighting and

winning wars. In fact, bifurcation turned postconflict planning above the

SCJ-51evel into an afterthought. This should not happen in the future. How

military force is used has a direct impact on the kind of situation that follows

the shooting.

Fifth, compartmentation and bifurcation had a direct effect on determining

who was selected to do the planning for restoration. It also affected the

conditions under which they functioned. The kind of expertise that was

necessary did not exist within the SCJ-5, the unit assigned the task. In light

of this, SCJ-5 turned to SOUTHCOM's Capstone Reserve unit, the 361st Civil

Affairs Brigade. While the SCJ-5 had civil affairs experience in Panama, the

task of designing a blueprint for reconstruction support was beyond their

expertise. On top of this, the conditions under which they worked were hardly conducive to effective contingency planning. The use of volunteers on short

tours of duty resulted in an incremental and disjointed approach.

Sixth, the process not only resulted in a plan that both misunderstood

critical issues and proposed an insufficient course of action, but that also was

flawed in terms of how it was to be executed. Through 22 months of contingency planning, the assumption was that SCJ-5 would serve as commander of

the civil-military operations task force. Not only is this an unconventional

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arrangement-planners are not commanders-but the fact that it was overlooked serves as a testament to the low priority of postconflict planning in

DOD.

To summarize, there are several lessons to be drawn from the Panama

experience that should guide future contingency planning for postconflict

situations. Unfortunately, most of them fall into the category of things to be

avoided: One, do not allow senior DOD officials to ignore planning for

postconflict situations; such planning will be critical in the new international

environment. Two, do not allow the planning process to be compartmented

within DOD ; postconflict situations have to be planned in a civilian-military

interagency setting. Three, do not bifurcate the process within DOD into war

fighting and postconflict compartments; bifurcation is a prescription for ignoring the latter. Four, do not assign the task within DOD to those who lack an

understanding of the situation and the historical and cultural context ; make

use of the expertise that exists. Five, do not limit resources, particularly

personnel, that are necessary for effective planning. Six, do not fail to review,

review, and review the product.

Panama is an example of what can occur when these requirements are

neglected. The execution of Blind Logic went poorly.; At the last minute, the

senior leadership discovered that execution was assigned to a planning staff.

An attempt to correct that situation failed, and the SCJ-5 executed the plan.

SCJ-5 was not prepared for what transpired. In addition to command

problems, other flaws appeared. Destabilizing developments that were not

foreseen weakened the restoration efforts . Massive looting, a new GOP that

was "hollow" and not ready to govern, an empty treasury, and a societal

infrastructure in a state of serious disrepair, all proved to be major obstacles

to reconstruction and democratization. The CMOTF was unprepared for

each. It likewise was not ready to address the security force issue. In the face

of these major but unanticipated problems, the CMOTF stood conceptually

deficient, lacked a coherent organizational structure, and was short of personnel. Postconflict restoration was not considered very important before 20

December 1989; these were the consequences .

To address these postconflict obstacles, an ad hoc organization-the

Military Support Group-was conceived. While it did not completely snatch

victory out of the jaws of defeat, the MSG did save face for the United States.

Conceptually, it had the right elements. Based on the SOCOM memorandum,

it consisted of a J-1 through J-5 staff and the following divisions : Public Force

Liaison, Military Police, PSYOPS, Civil Affairs, and Special Forces.

The MSG is a case study of how to devise the military component of a

postconflict response on an ad hoc basis. However, it has future applications

as an organizational concept if, as we have argued, postconflict situations will

be a part of the national security agenda of the United States. The MSG

concept can be expanded or contracted, depending on what is required. It can

and should serve as a conceptual model for planning and developing

doctrine-an area in need of serious attention. While the MSG was success

ful, a preplanned and structured organization makes much more sense. Such

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an organization requires closer consideration within both the Office of the

Secretary of Defense (OSD) and JCS. There are conceptual and structural

lessons to be learned from the MSG that can help the military better prepare

for future situations.

However, the MSG was only part of what was needed in Panama.

Postconflict assistance requires a civilian-military interagency response. As

this study demonstrates, the civilian agencies of the US government were

much less prepared, conceptually and organizationally, than the military.

Once in Panama, they were very slow to address the reconstruction issues.

This was especially true of the State Department, AID, and Department of

Justice . It took entirely too long to establish an integrated country team.

According to Ambassador Hinton, it may not exist even today. This is unacceptable. Concern with postconflict planning and interagency organization

should be incorporated into US national strategy. An important lesson of

Panama is the need for an interagency mechanism that can plan for and

respond to postconflict crises in an effective way. Including this issue in the

national strategy will make the importance of these kinds of situations more

visible . This greater visibility should, in turn, generate a working interagency

group tasked with preparing for future contingencies through the use of

simulations and other management tools. OASD(SO/LIC) should take the

lead in promoting this initiative.

This interagency group could drive the development of an integrated

strategy for postconflict scenarios. The MSG's attempt to devise an integrated

strategy for supporting reconstruction and democratization in Panama was in

the right direction but was insufficient. While the strategy gave focus to what

occurred in 1990, problems arose with its projections to 1999 in terms of

political development, security force, and basic infrastructure repair. These

proposals were sketchy and underdeveloped, and were based on a US government political commitment that was uncertain as well as a bureaucratic expertise that was nonexistent.

Developing such a strategy requires an interagency process for planning

and implementation . Expertise is also necessary in the various aspects of

reconstruction. At the time of Blind Logic, neither existed in any organized

manner in the US government. It remains yet to be established .

There are other crucial lessons to be derived from specific reconstruction

activities of the MSG. Perhaps the most important is how to assist in restructuring security forces. Any state that hopes to make the transition from an

authoritarian or dictatorial structure to one based on democracy must reform

the military and security institutions . The reason is that these instruments of

authoritarian control operate above the rule oflaw.

To build democracy in Panama, it was necessary to expunge all vestiges of

praetorian rule and replace the PDF with a security force subordinated to a

democratically elected government and respectful of the law. It was not difficult to destroy the PDF; Operation Just Cause made short work of it. However, when it came to providing the expertise and - programs required for

establishing a national police force, the US was not prepared. While the

71
military could lend support to such an effort, it was beyond DOD's expertise to

direct it .

However, the organization selected for the mission-International Criminal

Investigative Training Assistance Program-likewise was unprepared. 1t did

not have the programs and personnel necessary to establish a police force of

approximately_ 12,000, most of whom were former members of the PDF. If

ICITAP is given such a mission in the future, it will know a great deal more

and will have experience and programs that it did not have when it began the

Panama project.

It is more likely, however, that states seeking to transition from dictatorship in the aftermath of internal conflict will plan to maintain military

institutions . Threats from outside their borders will remain important

problems to contend with. The selection of the Costa Rican option, which nay

have been appropriate for Panama, will be more the exception than the rule.

If the US is to be involved in such postconflict transitions, it will require DOD

advisory teams and programs whose concept of operations includes assisting

in the institutionalization of the civil-military ethos of democracy in host

countries' military organizations.

This concept goes well beyond the traditional DOD programs that are

designed to indirectly nurture such change. For example, military-to-military

contracts, joint exercises, security assistance, and internal defense and

development programs are all useful and can support the concept proposed

here, but they are not sufficient to the task. Fundamental change requires a

more direct and sustained effort of institution-building. If the US is to be

involved in postconflict situations, this kind of DOD capability is essential.

The skills, expertise, and programs required to support such efforts do not

currently exist, although at least one interesting initiative has been proposed

by the US National Guard. Within DOD, the OASD(SO/LIC) should take the

lead in promoting this initiative.

The MSG was able to assist the Panamanian government as it began the

reconstruction process . While the US civilian agencies struggled to establish

themselves in Panama, the MSG demonstrated,, US commitment to the

country. At a time when the GOP needed to give to the Panamanian people a

sign that it was responding to their needs, the MSG helped accomplish this.

Furthermore, the 1990 engineering programs were routinized and continue

today.

There are important lessons not only in these reconstruction programs but

in how the MSG carried them out under the auspices of the GOP. The MSG

sought to stay in the background and encouraged the development of a

decision-making and implementation process that involved the Panamanian

government--local, province, and national levels. Such an approach had been

missing in Panama for years. What the MSG established is instructive in

terms ofUS-host country relations .

In fact, more broadly, this is true of the overall MSG-GOP liaison process.

While there were drawbacks to what we have called a special relationship, it

did reflect an understanding ofthe Panamanian culture. While perhaps unor72
thodox for the US government, it was in tune with the political and societal

context in which the MSG had to operate. In many parts of the developing

world, not just in Central America, this is the most effective way.-, to

accomplish US objectives. However, many parts of the foreign policy and

national security bureaucracy do not see such close relations as their cup of

tea.

Finally, psychological operations have a place within an MSG construct.

Unfortunately, in Panama PSYOPS encountered not uncommon civilian

agency attitudes and biases. An objective examination of what took place

demonstrates that PSYOPS has a contribution to make to postconflict

reconstruction programs. Communications and information are important

assets, and military PSYOPS units have the skills and expertise to perform

these tasks. This can be seen in the limited PSYOPS products developed

during its short tenure with the MSG. However, the larger lesson is that such

postconflict activities require the ability to communicate and inform. To

exclude PSYOPS does not make sense.

Notes

1. Gen Colin S. Powell, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the

United States (Washington, D.C. : Department ofDefense, January 1992), 14.

2. "Policy for the Environment Short ofWar," worlang draft (Washington, D.C. : 20 January

1992), 4.7 .

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