alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1Judge Thornberry concurred in the above opinion before his

death on December 11, 1995.

 

2 Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that

have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."

Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 95-30319

Summary Calendar

CHARLES C. WHITE, SR., Individually,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

EXXON CORPORATION, doing business as Exxon Co. USA Inc.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(93-CV-1745)

December 13, 1995

Before THORNBERRY1, JOLLY and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:2
2

Charles C. White, Sr., filed suit against Exxon under the

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356, to

recover damages for injuries he sustained while working on an

offshore platform owned and operated by Exxon. Exxon moved for

summary judgment, alleging that because White was a borrowed

employee, Exxon was entitled to tort immunity under the Longshore

and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a). The

district court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor of

Exxon.

In granting summary judgment, the district court determined

White was a borrowed employee in light of Ruiz v. Shell Oil, 413

F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1993). The court reviewed the summary judgment

evidence in light of the nine Ruiz factors, Id. at 312-14, and

determined there was no genuine issue as to any material fact

regarding White's status as a borrowed employee.

After conducting a de novo review of the record, and viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to White, we conclude that

the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in

favor of Exxon. See Billizon v. Conoco, Inc., 993 F.2d 104 (5th

Cir. 1993); Melancon v. Amoco Production Co., 834 F.2d 1238 (5th

Cir. 1993). The judgment of the district court is therefore

AFFIRMED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lubomir Blaho, Appellant.

[634 NYS2d 193]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Posner, J.), rendered October 21, 1993, convicting him of criminally negligent homicide and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50 (5).

The defendant’s contention that the accomplice testimony was not sufficiently corroborated to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt *(see,*CPL 60.22), was not preserved for appellate review *(see, People v James,*75 NY2d 874; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245). In any event, we reject the defendant’s contention. The testimony of the defendant and the other witnesses placed the defendant at the scene of the crime during and immediately after the shooting. The defendant’s presence, furtive behavior, and false statement to the police were sufficient independent evidence tending to connect the defendant to the crimes *(see, People v Moses,*63 NY2d 299; *People v Austin,*216 AD2d 310).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

*651The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). O’Brien, J. P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Donald Jackson, Appellant.

[634 NYS2d 327]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: There is no merit to the contention of defendant that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to suppress property seized from him during his detention by police officers. The record reveals that the actions of the police in stopping defendant and conducting a pat-down frisk were supported by a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was at hand *(see, People v Martinez,*80 NY2d 444, *965448). Because the police were justified in requesting that defendant set down the hammer and case he was carrying, the court properly concluded that defendant intentionally abandoned that property when he fled from the lawful police detention *(see, People v Marrero,*173 AD2d 244, 245, *lv dismissed*78 NY2d 969).

The court erred in failing to determine the suppression motion prior to the commencement of trial *(see,*CPL 710.40 [3]). However, because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no prejudice to defendant’s substantial rights, reversal is not required *(see, People v Gaddy,*42 AD2d 735, 736; *see also, People v Brannaka,*46 AD2d 929). Additionally, defendant expressly consented to the deviation from CPL 710.40 (3) *(see, People v Melendez,*141 AD2d 860, 861, *Iv denied*73 NY2d 788; *cf., People v Blowe,*130 AD2d 668).

Finally, there is no merit to the contention that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. The evidence, the law and the circumstances of this case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that defense counsel provided meaningful representation *(see, People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137). (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Mark, J.—Criminal Possession Stolen Property, 4th Degree.) Present—Pine, J. P., Fallon, Callahan, Doerr and Davis, JJ.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-20872 

USDC No. H-95-CV-4012

(H-90-CR-25-1)

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

FRANK EUGENE MURRY,

 Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

- - - - - - - - - -

February 2, 1996

Before JOLLY, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This case is here on a motion to proceed in forma pauperis

(IFP) on appeal. Murry filed this motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

seeking to set aside his conviction for being a felon in

possession of a firearm, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is

unconstitutional because Congress exceeded its authority under

the Commerce Clause. We have reviewed the record and the

district court's opinion and find no issue of arguable merit. 
No. 95-20872

-2-

Accordingly, we deny IFP and dismiss the appeal as frivolous. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a); Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir.

1983); 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

We caution Murry that any additional frivolous appeals filed

by him will invite the imposition of sanctions. To avoid

sanctions, Murry is further cautioned to review any pending

appeals to ensure that they do not raise arguments that are

frivolous because they have been previously decided by this

court.

IFP DENIED, APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS.
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In  connection  with the  Annual  Report  of  Calypso  Financial  Services,
Inc.(the  "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ending  December 31, 2004, as
filed with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on the date  hereof  (the
"Report"), I, Edward F. Cowle, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,  certify,
pursuant  to 18  U.S.C.  Sec.  1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to Sec.  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

     (1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
     material respects,  the financial condition and result of operations of the
     Company.


/s/ Edward F. Cowle
----------------------------
Edward F. Cowle
Chief Executive Officer
April 14, 2005

     A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906, or
     other document  authenticating,  acknowledging,  or otherwise  adopting the
     signature that appears in typed form within the electronic  version of this
     written  statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by
     the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange  Commission or its
     staff upon  request.  The foregoing  certifications  are  accompanying  the
     Company's Form 10-KSB solely pursuant to section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
     Act of 2002  (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350,  chapter 63 of title
     18,  United  States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-KSB
     or as a separate disclosure document.
June 12, 2015 

Mr. Ted Juszczyk 

JTM Solutions LLC 

5103 Falling Leaves Lane 

McFarland, WI 53558 

Dear Mr. Juszczyk : 

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption. It 

explains why we can not process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days. 

Why We Can Not Process Your Request 

We entered your June 1, 2015 exemption request into the public docket (No. FAA-2015-

2016), but we are unable to process your request any further. The information you sent does 

not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request 

any further, you must send us all of the following: 

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the 

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief. 

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole. 

 The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption 

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you 

seek an exemption. 

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request. 
2 

What You Should Do 

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described 

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your 

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 

If We Do Not Hear From You 

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you 

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Brenda Robeson 

Program Analyst, Airmen and 

 Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
"Jane Staveley" < j staveley@exponent.com> 02/16/2012 10:26 AM To EHPV-Program-Submissions@EPA

cc "Franz, Christina" <Christina

_ Franz@americanchemistry.com>, "Ralph Parod" <ralph.parod@basf.com>, "David A Cortes" bcc Subject Revised test plan and robust summaries for C4 (CAS No. 170373-17-8)

On behalf of BASF Corporation, the attached submission is made under the EHPV Program. A revised test plan and revised robust summaries are hereby being submitted for C4, or 3-thiophenamine, N -[(1S)-2-methoxy-1-methylethyl]-2,4-dimethyl-, CAS No. 170373-17-8. Please note that the original submission in September 2008 was for the racemic C4, which has a different CAS Number (87676-07-1). This submission uses the correct CAS Number, for the chiral molecule.

As explained in the cover letter, the robust summaries have been entered into HPVIS but a pdf file is attached for your convenience.

Please contact me if you have any questions.

Thank you.

Jane Staveley Senior Managing Scientist

E x ponent ® 1000 Centre Green Way, Suite 200 Cary, N C 27513 Phone: 919-228-6480 Mobile: 919-961-0987
Fax: 919-228-6501Email: j staveley@exponent.com

www.exponent.com

- C4 submission Letter.pdf - C4 Revised final test plan 2-16-12.pdf - C4 revised final RS.pdf
**REGULATORY EVALUATION**

**Directorate Identifier:** 20 12

- NM

- 052

- AD

**Executive Order 12866:** Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”? YES ( ) explain NO (X) **DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:** Is the AD significant? YES ( ) explain NO (X) **Regulatory Flexibility Act:** Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? YES ( ) explain NO (X) **Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:** This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. I s it appropriate t o include specific requirements for aircraft operated in Alaska, where aviation might be the only mode of transportation? YES ( ) explain NO (X)
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0544-08

HECTOR RENE GALVEZ, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

FROM THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

McLENNAN COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

A jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual assault and the trial

court assessed punishment at life imprisonment. The Court of Appeals reversed the

conviction, finding that extraneous offense evidence was inadmissible because Appellant

raised a defense of fabrication, but not a claim of "frame-up" or retaliation. Galvez v. State,

No. 10-03-00083-CR (Tex. App. — Waco 2008). In doing so, the Court of Appeals relied

on Newton v. State, No. 10-06-00160-CR (Tex. App. -- Waco 2007) (unpub.), which in turn,
GALVEZ - 2

relied on Bass v. State, 222 S.W.3d 571, 576-77 (Houston--14th 2007). 

The State has filed a petition for discretionary review contending the Court of Appeals

erred in finding evidence of Appellant's extraneous offenses inadmissible to rebut the

defensive theory of fabrication, arguing that the focus should not be on the title of the theory

but on the facts justifying admission.

This Court granted discretionary review in Bass, in order to address this issue. We

concluded that extraneous offense evidence is admissible to rebut a fabrication defense, and

that no categorical distinctions exist between such defenses and "frame-up" or "retaliation"

defenses. Bass v. State, S.W.3d (Tex. Crim. App. Nos. PD-0494-07, 0495-07, delivered

September 10, 2008), slip op. at 16-17. The Appellant's motion for rehearing was denied on

November 26, 2008. The Court of Appeals in the instant case did not have the benefit of our

opinion in Bass. Accordingly, we grant the State’s petition for discretionary review, vacate

the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for

consideration in light of our opinion in Bass.

Delivered: December 17, 2008

Do Not Publish
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of Chief Executive Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as created by
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies to such officers knowledge that:

(i) the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the annual period ended December 31, 2007 (the Report)
fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                      |  |  |  |                       |  |                                           |  | 
|--------------------- |  |  |  | --------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------- |  | 
|Dated: March 12, 2008 |  |  |  | /s/ George G. Beasley
|                      |  |  |  |                       |  | George G. Beasley Chief Executive Officer

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof,
regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
---

Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002

In connection with the Annual Report of IntelGenx Technologies
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-K/A for the period ending December 31,
2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Paul A. Simmons, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section
906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the
signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this
written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the
Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request. The foregoing certifications are accompanying the Company's Form
10-K/A solely pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States
Code) and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-K/A or as a separate
disclosure document.

|September 20, 2011 | By: | /s/Paul A. Simmons                           | 
|------------------ | --- | -------------------------------------------- | 
|                   |     | Paul A. Simmons                              | 
|                   |     | Chief Financial Officer                      | 
|                   |     | (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) | 

---
No. 45053.

#### Protests 36518-K, etc., of Dan Brechner & Co. (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, P. J.

It was stipulated that the spring daggers in question are similar to those the subject of Abstract 37637. The claim at 45 percent under paragraph 397 was therefore sustained.
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EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Bryan Miller, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Sunergy, Inc. for the period
          ended March 31, 2011 (the "Report") fully complies with the
          requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
          of 1934; and

     (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of Sunergy, Inc.

Date: February 10, 2012


By: /s/ Bryan Miller
    ------------------------------------
Name:  Bryan Miller
Title: President and Director (Principal
       Executive Officer, Principal
       Financial and Principal
       Accounting Officer)

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to Sunergy, Inc. and will be retained
by Sunergy, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-12170

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

WILLIAM L. APGAR, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant- Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket Nos. 5:21-mc-00017-JA-PRL,

5:21-mj-01088-PRL-1

USCA11 Case: 23-12170 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 08/16/2023 Page: 1 of 2
2 Opinion of the Court 23-12170

____________________

Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal is DISMISSED, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction. William Apgar filed a notice of appeal to the district court 

from the magistrate judge’s June 28, 2023 amended criminal judgment, and the district court transmitted the notice to us. However, 

we lack jurisdiction to directly review a magistrate judge’s judgment entered pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3401, as an appeal from such 

a judgment must be taken to and heard by the district court first. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3402; United States v. Pilati, 627 F.3d 1360, 1363-64 

(11th Cir. 2010); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Kruckenberg, 720 F.2d 653, 654 

(11th Cir. 1983).

No petition for rehearing may be filed unless it complies 

with the timing and other requirements of 11th Cir. R. 40-3 and all 

other applicable rules.

USCA11 Case: 23-12170 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 08/16/2023 Page: 2 of 2