United States General Accounting Office

GAO Briefing Report to Congressional

Requesters

June 1996 CONTINGENCY

OPERATIONS

Update on DOD’s

Fiscal Year 1995 Cost

and Funding

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-272270 

June 27, 1996

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Floyd D. Spence

Chairman, Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Department of Defense (DOD) participated in contingency operations

in several places, including Haiti, Southwest Asia, and the former

Yugoslavia during fiscal year 1995. To help cover the incremental costs1

 of

these operations, the Congress provided DOD with a supplemental

appropriation. We previously reported to you that while DOD ended fiscal

year 1995 with supplemental funding of $12 million above its reported

incremental costs, some of the services and defensewide agencies as a

whole had reported costs in excess of their supplemental appropriations

while other services reported costs below their supplemental

appropriations.2

 We also reported that costs surged in September 1995.

Based on continued interest in these issues, we agreed with your offices to

provide information on (1) how the services that reported costs in excess

of supplemental funding covered their shortfalls and (2) why the surge

occurred. We recently briefed your staff on these issues.

Background The Congress appropriated $253 billion for DOD for fiscal year 1995, of

which $92 billion was for operation and maintenance (O&M). Through fiscal

year 1996, DOD’s annual appropriations have not included funds for

possible contingency operations. DOD has not budgeted for the incremental

costs of military operations or contingencies. It has budgeted to be ready

to conduct such operations. When the services have had to conduct these

operations, the planned budget execution cycle was disrupted. DOD then

had to absorb the incremental costs of these operations, which were

mostly O&M items, within its appropriations or seek supplemental

appropriations.

1

As used in this report, “incremental costs” means those costs that would not have been incurred if it

were not for the operation. This is the same definition that is contained in 10 U.S.C. 127a, as amended

by the fiscal year 1996 Department of Defense Authorization Act.

2

Contingency Operations: Defense Cost and Funding Issues (GAO/NSIAD-96-121BR, Mar. 15, 1996).

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
B-272270 

In the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the

Department of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of

1995 (P.L. 104-6), the Congress, in April 1995, provided DOD $2,235 million

for incremental costs associated with ongoing operations in a variety of

locations, including Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Cuba,

Southwest Asia, and Korea. The vast majority—91 percent—of the

appropriation was for O&M. DOD reported fiscal year 1995 contingency

operations-related incremental costs of $2,223 million, $12 million less

than its supplemental funding.

In our March 1996 report, we stated that some of the services received

fiscal year 1995 supplemental funding in excess of their reported costs.

This excess funding was used for a variety of otherwise unfunded

operational needs. Other services and defensewide agencies as a whole,

on the other hand, reported costs that exceeded their supplemental

appropriations.

Through August 1995, DOD had reported costs of $1.9 billion. Projecting

August costs to September, we estimated that had September costs been

the same as August costs, DOD’s full fiscal year 1995 reported costs would

have been $266 million below appropriated funding. However, reported

September costs were about 4 times more than the costs of the previous

month and over $120 million more than the sum of the prior 

3 months—June through August.

Results in Brief The Army and the Navy reported incremental costs in excess of their O&M

supplemental appropriations. While they covered their shortfall

differently, both Army and Navy officials believe that unit readiness was

not affected significantly. The reported shortfalls, however, may not be as

great as reported costs suggest. We previously reported that some Army

and Navy O&M costs were overstated. For example, in fiscal year 1995, we

identified instances totaling $33 million where the Army did not reduce its

reported incremental costs for such things as normal operating costs not

incurred and training not conducted due to participation in contingency

operations.

The surge in September costs primarily related to (1) accounting

adjustments; (2) end-of-fiscal year payments; and (3) other spending,

including spending associated with higher operating tempo in Bosnia and

Southwest Asia. We identified $92 million in accounting adjustments and

$82 million in end-of-fiscal year payments, which together represented 

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
B-272270 

60 percent of the September costs we examined. For example, we

identified $62 million in accounting adjustments made by the Army and the

Air Force to reflect costs that should have been reported earlier in the

fiscal year. Regarding year-end payments, the Air Force reported about

$47 million in payments for items such as communication requirements,

support and base maintenance contracts, consumables, and landing fees.

Over half of the $47 million involved payments to other DOD components,

such as the Army Corps of Engineers, and to contractors for expenses

incurred in the last quarter of the fiscal year, although funds were not

obligated until the end of the fiscal year to pay for them. The balance of

these payments was for expenses incurred in September.

Scope and

Methodology

To obtain information on how the Army and the Navy covered their

differences between funding and reported costs, we reviewed service

documents and met with officials in the military services, including those

in selected major commands. We also discussed these matters with

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Because we found in

our March 1996 review that the vast majority of the differences between

funding and reported costs was in O&M accounts, we focused our efforts on

these accounts.

To obtain information on the surge in reported costs for September 1995,

we reviewed the O&M appropriation accounts because they constituted the

vast majority of that surge. We also analyzed DOD’s monthly contingency

operation incremental cost reports to identify the sources of the surge by

service and operation, and we selected those operations that accounted

for 88 percent of the reported September 1995 costs. We then reviewed

service documentation supporting those operations and discussed the

reasons for the surge with officials from the affected major commands and

with service headquarters officials.

We previously reported that when considering the cost of operations, it

should be recognized that DOD’s financial systems cannot reliably

determine costs. DOD’s systems are classified as high risk, are not

integrated, and cannot easily capture actual incremental costs. Only the

total obligations are captured by the accounting systems. The services use

various management information systems to identify incremental

obligations and to estimate costs.

We performed our work between March and May 1996 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards. We reviewed the

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
B-272270 

information in this briefing report with DOD officials and made changes

where appropriate. DOD officials generally agreed with our findings.

We are providing copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking

Minority Members of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations

and to the Ranking Minority Members of the Senate Committee on Armed

Services and the House Committee on National Security. We are also

sending copies to the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Air Force, and

the Navy and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will

be made available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me

at (202) 512-3504. The major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix I.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security 

 Analysis

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Contents

Letter 1

Briefing Section I 

Background

8

Reported Incremental Costs for Fiscal Year 1995 Operations 8

Services’ Fiscal Year 1995 O&M Incremental Costs and Funding 10

Briefing Section II 

How Services

Absorbed Funding

Shortfalls

12

Army’s Reported O&M Costs Exceeded Supplemental Funding 12

Navy’s Reported O&M Costs Exceeded Supplemental Funding 14

Briefing Section III 

Reasons for

September O&M Cost

Surge

16

Reported Incremental Costs Surged in Late Fiscal Year 1995 16

Principal Reasons Why Reported O&M Costs Surged in

September

18

Accounting Adjustments 20

Year-end Payments 22

Appendix Appendix I: Major Contributors to This Report 24

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

O&M operation and maintenance

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

GAO Reported Incremental Costs for Fiscal 

Year 1995 Operations

Cuba

$266M

Haiti

$569M

Former Yugoslavia

$347M

Rwanda

$36M

Somalia

$49M

Iraq--

Provide Comfort $138M

Southern Watch $468M

Vigilant Warrior $258M

Korea

$91M

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

The Secretary of Defense’s 1995 Annual Report to the President and the

Congress describes contingency operations as military operations that go

beyond the routine deployment or stationing of U.S. forces abroad but fall

short of large-scale theater warfare. U.S. military forces participated in

several contingency operations during fiscal year 1995. These operations

included (1) activities in support of United Nations peace operations in

Haiti, Southwest Asia, and the former Yugoslavia; (2) the increased

deployment of military capability to South Korea in response to

heightened tensions; (3) the deployment of additional military forces to

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in response to the threat of renewed Iraqi

aggression against Kuwait; and (4) the enforcement of a revised U.S. policy

designed to prevent Cuban migrants from reaching the United States. The

map shows where these operations occurred and the Department of

Defense’s (DOD) reported incremental costs for each operation.

Most of DOD’s reported incremental costs are for operations in four

areas—Southwest Asia, Haiti, Cuba, and the former Yugoslavia. These

costs total about $2 billion, or 92 percent of DOD’s total reported

incremental costs. Within Southwest Asia, DOD participated in operations

to (1) enforce United Nations sanctions against Iraq, (2) enforce the no-fly

zone over both northern and southern Iraq, and (3) provide humanitarian

relief to the population of northern Iraq.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

GAO

Dollars in millions

Services' Fiscal Year 1995 O&M 

Incremental Costs and Funding 

Air Force Army Navy Marine Corps

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

735

775

420

19

853

694

389

34

Cost Funding

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section I 

Background

In April 1995, the Congress provided DOD with an emergency supplemental

appropriation of $2,235 million to fund contingency operations occurring

in fiscal year 1995. The vast majority—91 percent—of the appropriation

was for operation and maintenance (O&M), which funds the operating costs

of a deployment, such as transportation and contractor support. The

balance of the appropriation was for military personnel accounts, which

fund the cost of incremental pay, such as imminent danger pay. Through

the end of fiscal year 1995, DOD reported about $2,223 million for

contingency operations-related incremental costs. Therefore, DOD ended

the fiscal year with supplemental funding of $12 million above its reported

incremental costs. However, some of the services and defensewide

agencies as a whole reported costs that were in excess of their

supplemental appropriations, while other services reported costs below

their supplemental appropriations.

The Army and the Navy reported O&M incremental costs of $81 million and

$31 million, respectively, in excess of their supplemental funding.

Defensewide agencies collectively reported O&M incremental costs of

$3 million in excess of their supplemental funding. The Air Force and the

Marine Corps reported incremental O&M costs that were less than their

supplemental O&M funding. The Air Force received $118 million more in

O&M supplemental funding than its reported costs; the Marine Corps

$15 million more. Both services used their excess O&M funding for a variety

of otherwise unfunded operational needs.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section II 

How Services Absorbed Funding Shortfalls

GAO Army's Reported O&M Costs Exceeded 

Supplemental Funding

Reported O&M contingency costs $775

Supplemental O&M funding 694

 Difference 81

How the Army covered difference

 Special reserve fund $41

 Nonreadiness accounts 40

Dollars in millions

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section II 

How Services Absorbed Funding Shortfalls

The Army reported $81 million more in O&M incremental costs than its O&M

supplemental appropriation. The Army absorbed this shortfall within its

fiscal year 1995 appropriation. Army officials told us that $41 million was

funded through a special reserve fund, which is created at the beginning of

each fiscal year for senior leadership to (1) take advantage of

opportunities that arise throughout the year and/or (2) cover unbudgeted

expenditures in the year of execution. In fiscal year 1995, this fund was

created by requiring the commands to provide a total of $50 million, less

than one-half of 1 percent of the active Army’s $18 billion O&M

appropriation.1 The remaining $40 million was absorbed within

nonreadiness accounts, resulting in some unfunded nonreadiness

requirements, such as environmental and construction requirements to

initiate base closures. According to Army officials, unit readiness was not

affected by the $81-million shortfall.

The Army’s reported shortfall may not be as great as its reported costs

suggest. We previously reported that some Army O&M costs were

overstated.2

 The Army has not offset its reported incremental costs to

reflect costs that are not incurred when soldiers are deployed for

contingency operations. For example, in fiscal year 1995, we identified

instances totaling $33 million where the Army did not reduce its reported

incremental costs for such things as (1) normal operating costs not

incurred and training not conducted due to participation in contingency

operations and (2) items purchased but not used and either retained by the

unit or returned to the DOD supply system for credit that was not deducted

from reported incremental costs. We did not identify any instances of

underreporting of O&M costs.

1

The remaining $9 million of the special reserve fund was spent on such activities as funding the

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces and reviewing information systems and

consolidations in the Army.

2

Contingency Operations: DOD’s Reported Costs Contain Significant Inaccuracies (GAO/NSIAD-96-115,

May 17, 1996).

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section II 

How Services Absorbed Funding Shortfalls

GAO Navy's Reported O&M Costs Exceeded 

Supplemental Funding

Reported O&M contingency costs $420

Supplemental O&M funding 389

 Difference 31

How the Navy covered difference

 Emergency supplemental for 

 flying hours $11

 Command absorption 20

Dollars in millions

The Navy reported $31 million more in O&M incremental costs than its

supplemental appropriation. The Navy’s Pacific Fleet had the bulk of the

shortfall, almost two-thirds, or $20 million. To help cover the shortfall,

Navy headquarters provided the Pacific Fleet with $11 million in additional

funds. These funds were drawn from $41 million the Navy was allotted for

flying hours in emergency supplemental funds beyond those funds the

Congress provided for the cost of contingency operations. The Pacific

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section II 

How Services Absorbed Funding Shortfalls

Fleet absorbed the balance of its shortfall—$9 million—by deferring

funding for base support programs.

The Navy Comptroller office provided us documentation indicating that

the other Navy commands with significant shortfalls either deferred or

reduced spending to absorb their shortfalls. The Naval Reserve Force

covered its $4.4-million shortfall by deferring funding for helicopter and

aircraft maintenance. The Naval Air Systems Command covered its

$3-million shortfall by deferring or reducing funding for tactical systems

software programs, transportation requirements, and other programs. The

Navy Computers and Telecommunications Command funded its $2-million

shortfall by deferring funding for the maintenance of real property at

facilities in both the Atlantic and Pacific regions. The Chief of Naval

Personnel covered its $1.1-million shortfall by reducing purchases of

subsistence items. According to the Navy Comptroller office, the deferrals

and reductions in program funding were made in programs where the least

negative readiness impact would occur.

As was the case with the Army, we recently reported that the shortfall may

not be as great as the reported costs suggest. We found an instance where

the Navy may have overstated its costs in fiscal year 1995 because it did

not adjust incremental flying hour costs to reflect over $1 million worth of

free fuel received.3

 While the Navy has advised us that it does account for

free fuel in its flying hour cost factors, it did not provide any documents to

support this position. While we identified instances of underreporting

Navy procurement costs in fiscal year 1995 in our report on the accuracy

of contingency cost reporting, we did not identify any instances of

underreporting of O&M costs.

3

In some cases, the United States is provided fuel by other nations at no cost for U.S. ground, air, and

naval forces during contingency operations.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section III 

Reasons for September O&M Cost Surge

GAO Reported Incremental Costs Surged in 

Late Fiscal Year 1995

June

July

August

September

October

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

O&M monthly totals

Monthly totals 58 63

57 73

74

75 86

330 334

58

86

Dollars in millions

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section III 

Reasons for September O&M Cost Surge

We previously reported that through August 1995, DOD had reported costs

of $1.9 billion. Projecting August costs to September, we estimated that

had September costs approximated August costs, DOD’s full fiscal year

1995 reported costs would have been $266 million below appropriated

funding. However, reported costs surged in September to bring reported

costs within $12 million of the funding provided through the supplemental

appropriation. The reported September costs were about 4 times more

than the costs of the previous month and over $120 million more than the

sum of the prior 3 months—June through August.

The surge in costs was due to a sharp increase in reported September 1995

O&M costs. Between August and September 1995, reported O&M costs

increased from $75 million to $330 million. O&M costs then declined to

$74 million in October 1995, the first month of fiscal year 1996, suggesting

that September costs were atypical.

Except for the Marine Corps, each of the military services and other DOD

agencies, such as the Defense Health Program and the Defense Mapping

Agency, reported a collective increase of $256 million in September over

August O&M costs. The Army and the Air Force reported the largest

increases, $112 million and $106 million, respectively. The Navy reported a

smaller increase, $35 million, and other DOD agencies collectively reported

the smallest increase, $3 million. The Marine Corps reported September

costs that were about $1 million below August costs.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section III 

Reasons for September O&M Cost Surge

GAO Principal Reasons Why Reported O&M 

Costs Surged in September 

 Dollars in millions

 

Accounting adjustments $92 

Year-end payments 82

Other 118

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section III 

Reasons for September O&M Cost Surge

The surge in September O&M costs primarily related to (1) accounting

adjustments and (2) end-of-fiscal year payments. As previously noted, we

examined 88 percent of reported September costs, or $292 million of the

$330 million. We identified $92 million in accounting adjustments and

$82 million in end-of-fiscal year payments, which together represented

60 percent of the amount we examined and more than half of all reported

September costs.

The balance of the O&M costs reviewed was $118 million. Some of these

costs related to higher operating tempo costs, including flying and

steaming hours for operations involving the former Yugoslavia and Iraq. In

the case of the former Yugoslavia, the pace of operations increased during

the bombing campaign in Bosnia that began in late August and ended

September 22, 1995. In September 1995, the Air Force and the Navy

reported O&M costs of $49 million and $17 million, respectively, involving

the former Yugoslavia, an increase of $25 million and $10 million,

respectively, above reported August 1995 costs.

In the case of Iraq, operations increased as the United States provided

support for Jordan while that country provided asylum for two high-level

Iraqi defectors. These costs related to Operation Southern Watch. The

Navy reported $29 million in Southern Watch O&M costs in September 1995,

or more than 3 times reported August O&M costs of $8 million. Of the

September 1995 reported costs, the Navy’s Pacific Fleet reported costs of

about $25 million, including $17 million for air and ship operations

attributed to both the aircraft carriers USS Lincoln and USS Independence

being deployed in the Persian Gulf area, and an additional carrier, USS

Nimitz, preparing for deployment. During September 1995, the USS

Lincoln and the USS Independence conducted 24-hour, “around the clock,”

operations in which one carrier supported 12 hours of operations as

normal when operating alone in the Gulf, and the other carrier conducted

operations for the other 12 hours. This effectively doubled the Pacific

Fleet’s costs for air and ship operations for the month of September in that

region.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section III 

Reasons for September O&M Cost Surge

GAO Accounting Adjustments

 Dollars in millions

 

Omissions $62

Reimbursements 31 

Total 93

a

aTotal in this chart does not match the accompanying text and the preceding chart due to

rounding.

The services, in finalizing their financial data at the end of the fiscal year,

made accounting adjustments for a variety of reasons. These reasons

included correcting errors and omissions. Both the Army and the Air

Force adjusted their reported costs to reflect omissions. For example, the

Air Force included in its September report $24 million in Korea costs that

we were told should have been reported throughout the year. This amount

reflected the cost of operating and maintaining more aircraft than

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section III 

Reasons for September O&M Cost Surge

anticipated because of heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula.

According to an Air Force official, while costs for these aircraft were being

incurred throughout the fiscal year, through an administrative oversight

prior to September 1995, the Air Force had not been including them in its

contingency cost reporting. Upon recognizing this and the need to

properly report these costs as contingency related, Air Force officials told

us that they took action to do so in late fiscal year 1995 and included all

these costs incurred throughout the fiscal year in the September 1995 cost

report.

The Air Force also adjusted reported costs to include (1) about $17 million

in costs associated with aircraft maintenance in Southern Watch that were

incurred before September but were not reported earlier due to an

administrative error and (2) $1 million in costs associated with operations

in the former Yugoslavia that had not been included in its contingency cost

reporting. The Army erroneously deleted $20 million in cumulative Haiti

costs from its August cost report, which it corrected by including the cost

in its September report.

The Army also adjusted its cost reporting to include (1) $25 million in

Operation Southern Watch costs to correct overbilling of Kuwait and

(2) $6 million in reimbursement it received from the Department of State.

In the case of Kuwait, the government of Kuwait reimburses the Army for

some costs associated with exercises conducted in that country. Exercises

are not considered contingencies and so are normally not included in

contingency cost reporting. The Army does not include the reimbursed

exercise costs in its contingency cost reporting. However, the Army billed

Kuwait, and Kuwait paid $25 million for exercise costs that were really

contingency costs. Subsequently, the Army reimbursed Kuwait and revised

its September contingency cost report to reflect this adjustment.

The Army does not include costs incurred on behalf of other U.S.

government agencies in its contingency cost reporting if it is reimbursed

by those agencies. Until it is reimbursed, the Army pays and reports these

costs. The Army had been incurring and reporting costs involving the

Department of State. When it was reimbursed by the Department of State,

it reduced its August costs by $6 million to reflect the reimbursement. The

reduction had the effect of making the change between August and

September costs appear to be $6 million higher than it actually was.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section III 

Reasons for September O&M Cost Surge

GAO Year-end Payments

Air Force $65

Army 8

Navy 9

Total 82

Dollars in millions

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Briefing Section III 

Reasons for September O&M Cost Surge

Part of the surge in reported costs related to end-of-fiscal year payments.

Among the services, the Air Force had the largest amount of such

payments, totaling $65 million. Of this amount, the Air Force reported

about $47 million for items such as communication requirements, support

and base maintenance contracts, consumables, and landing fees. Over half

of the $47 million involved payments to other DOD components, such as the

Army Corps of Engineers, and to contractors for expenses incurred in the

last quarter of the fiscal year, although funds were not obligated until the

end of the fiscal year to pay for them. Consequently, these costs were

reported in the September cost report when the funds were obligated. The

balance of these payments was for expenses incurred in September. The

remaining Air Force year-end payments related to $18 million in estimated

transportation costs for September in anticipation of billings. The Army

also reported $8 million in payments to pay transportation bills both

received earlier in the fiscal year and in anticipation of further billings. The

Navy reported almost $9 million in payments for a September airfield

rental billing and to support Navy P-3 operations in Oman.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Appendix I 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Steven H. Sternlieb, Assistant Director

Lisa M. Quinn, Evaluator

Norfolk Field Office Joseph A. Rutecki, Evaluator-in-Charge

Carleen C. Bennett, Evaluator

(701085) Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-184BR Contingency Operations
Ordering Information

The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.

Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the

following address, accompanied by a check or money order

made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when

necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address

are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 6015

Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015

or visit:

Room 1100

700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

U.S. General Accounting Office

Washington, DC

Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 

or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006.

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and

testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any

list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a

touchtone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on

how to obtain these lists.

For information on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET,

send an e-mail message with "info" in the body to:

info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web Home Page at:

http://www.gao.gov

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested

Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid

GAO

Permit No. G100