alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Wilder Winslow and others v. Lyman Herrick.

A party can not, in a suit upon a joint and several demand, treat the demand^ as a *joint*obligation of less than all tlie debtors. It must be joint as to all or several as to all.

Where, therefore, action was brought on a replevin bond against all the obligors, two of whom were defaulted, and the plaintiff instead of proceeding to trial as. to the others, discontinued as to them, and took judgment against the two, who were defaulted, Held erroneous.

*Submitted on*briefs, *November 12th.*

*Decided November 20th.*

Error to Oakland Circuit.

*Baldwin & Draper,*for plaintiffs in error.

*M. M. Crofoot,*for defendant in error.

Campbell J.:

The suit below was brought on a replevin bond exe-cuted by Garret S. Swazie, as principal, and James R, Vleit, Jonathan H. Bescherer and Wilder Winslow, as, sureties. All of the sureties were served. The bond was joint and several.

Vliet appeared and pleaded, and a default was entered against the other defendants served. When the case came, on for trial, plaintiff discontinued as against Swazie and "Vleit, and took judgment against Bescherer and Winslow, This is assigned as error.

*381We think the objection well taken. A party can not, upon a joint and several demand, treat the demand as a *Joint*obligation of less than all the debtors. It must be joint as to all, or several as to all: — 1 *Pars. on Cont.*12, 13. This is a well settled and very familiar doctrine.

The rule authorizing a plaintiff to discontinue against me or more defendants was not designed to change any legal rights, hut merely to enable a plaintiff who had sued more parties than he could recover against to amend his case by declaring against his real debtors. Whether a default obtained under the original declaration could stand so as to bind defendants under a new declaration, setting itp a contract with fewer parties, is a serious question which we aro not now called upon to decide. It is very clear that the declaration before ns does not set out a contract under which the plaintiffs in error were jointly ‘liable without Swazie and Vleit, and had they been sued jointly without their oo-obligors, they might have pleaded in abatement. Plaintiff could not, by the indirect process which he adopted, place them in any different position, or charge them in any way not justified by bis declaration.

Some other questions were presented, hut the view we have taken renders it unnecessary to decide them. The judgment must be reversed, with costs.

The other Justices concurred.
Exhibit 32



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)







In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Southern Star Central Corp. (the Company), a Delaware corporation, for the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned, Christopher H. Lee, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Michael J. Walsh, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of his knowledge, that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods presented in the Report.



The foregoing certification is provided solely for purposes of complying with the provisions of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is not intended to be used or relied upon for any other purpose.



|    | Signature              | Title                   | Date          
|--- | ---------------------- | ----------------------- | --------------
|By: | /s/ Christopher H. Lee | Chief Executive Officer | August 8, 2005
|    | Christopher H. Lee     |                         |               
|By: | /s/ Michael J. Walsh   | Chief Financial Officer | August 8, 2005
|    | Michael J. Walsh       |                         |               



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Southern Star Central Corp. and will be retained by Southern Star Central Corp. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or staff upon request.
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002



I, Garrett Hale, hereby certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Sunergy, Inc. for the quarter ended September 30, 2013 (the
"Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of Sunergy, Inc..
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|Dated: November 14, 2013 |  |                                                                                             
|------------------------ |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                         |  |                                                                                             
|                         |  |                                                                                             
|                         |  | /s/ Garrett Hale                                                                            
|                         |  | Garrett Hale                                                                                
|                         |  | President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Director                    
|                         |  | (Principal Executive Officer, Principal Financial Officer, and Principal Accounting officer)
|                         |  | Sunergy, Inc.                                                                               





A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in
typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided Sunergy, Inc. and
will be retained by Sunergy, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

In re:

WHATABURGER RESTAURANTS,

L.L.C.,

Relator. §

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 1 9

- 00180

- CV

AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

IN MANDAMUS

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus against

the Honorable Ruben Morales, Judge of the County Court at Law No. 7 of El Paso County, Texas,

and concludes that Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus should be denied. We there fore deny

the petition for writ of mandamus, in accordance with the opinion of this Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 6TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2021.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Chief Justice

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.

Alley, J., Dissenting
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1

19–011 2003

108th Congress, 1st Session – – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 108–54

A REPORT CONSISTENT WITH THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REGARDING THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 

AGAINST IRAQ

COMMUNICATION

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

A REPORT CONSISTENT WITH THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 

THAT HE DIRECTED U.S. ARMED FORCES, OPERATING WITH 

OTHER COALITION FORCES, TO COMMENCE COMBAT OPERATIONS ON MARCH 19, 2003, AGAINST IRAQ

MARCH 24, 2003.—Referred to the Committee on International Relations 

and ordered to be printed 


E:\Seals\Congress.#13
(1)

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

Washington, March 21, 2003. 

Hon. J. DENNIS HASTERT, 

Speaker of the House of Representatives, 

Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: On March 18, 2003, I made available to you, 

consistent with section 3(b) of the Authorization for Use of Military 

Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–243), my 

determination that further diplomatic and other peaceful means 

alone will neither adequately protect the national security of the 

United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq, nor lead 

to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. 

I have reluctantly concluded, along with other coalition leaders, 

that only the use of armed force will accomplish these objectives 

and restore international peace and security in the area. I have 

also determined that the use of armed force against Iraq is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to 

take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001. United States objectives also support a transition to democracy in Iraq, as contemplated by the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–338). 

Consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93–148), 

I now inform you that pursuant to my authority as Commander in 

Chief and consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military 

Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102–1) and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 

(Public Law 107–243), I directed U.S. Armed Forces, operating with 

other coalition forces, to commence combat operations on March 19, 

2003, against Iraq. 

These military operations have been carefully planned to accomplish our goals with the minimum loss of life among coalition military forces and to innocent civilians. It is not possible to know at 

this time either the duration of active combat operations or the 

scope of duration of the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces necessary to accomplish our goals fully. 

As we continue our united efforts to disarm Iraq in pursuit of 

peace, stability, and security both in the Gulf region and in the 

United States, I look forward to our continued consultation and cooperation. 

Sincerely, 

GEORGE W. BUSH.

Æ
#### In the Matter of 2400 East 3 Owners Corp. et al., Appellants, v State of New York Division of Housing and Community Renewal, Office of Rent Administration, Respondent.

[635 NYS2d 497]

—In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Commissioner of the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, Office of Rent Administration, dated January 27, 1992, which, without a hearing, *inter alia,*reduced the rents of 91 rent-stabilized apartments upon a finding that the petitioners had decreased services required under the Rent Stabilization Law, the petitioners appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of a judgment of. the Supreme Court, Kings County (Feinberg, J.), entered April 15, 1994, as confirmed the determination.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the petitioners’ contentions on appeal, the determination of the respondent that the petitioners had decreased services required under the Rent Stabilization Law in a building owned and managed by them was neither arbitrary nor capricious nor an abuse of discretion *(see, Matter of Ansonia Residents Assn, v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal,*75 NY2d 206; *see also, Matter of Pell v Board of Educ.,*34 NY2d 222).

*645We have considered the petitioners’ remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Balletta, J. P., Ritter, Copertino and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.
(Reap. Dec. 10502)

#### Nozaki Associates, Inc. Hoyt, Shepston & Sciaroni et al. *v.*United States

Entry No. 8409, etc.

(Decided May 7, 1963)

*Lane, Young <£ Dow*for the plaintiffs.

*John W. Douglas,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Oliver, Chief Judge:

The appeals for reappraisement enumerated in schedule “A,” hereto attached and made a part hereof, have been submitted for decision on a written stipulation, reading as follows:

> IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between counsel for the parties hereto, subject to the approval of the Court, that the merchandise *460covered by tbe above appeals for reappraisement consists of baby clams, packed in cans weighing with tbeir contents 10 ounces (5 oz. drained weight), exported from Japan during the period October, 1953 through March, 1956.

> That the said canned baby clams and the issues involved in the said appeals for reappraisement are the same in all material respects as the canned baby clams and the issues involved in *GEO. S. BÜSE & 00., ING. v. UNITED States,*ARD 140, wherein it was held that the imported canned baby clams were properly dutiable on the basis of the American selling price of certain hard-shell little neck clams, canned in Bellingham, Wash., in 10 ounce tins, packed 24 such tins to a carton.

> That during the period October, 1953 through March, 1956, the American selling price, as defined in Section 402(g), Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, of said clams, canned in 10 ounce tins in Bellingham, Wash., was $7.50 per two dozen 10 ounce tins, less 1%% cash discount, less *Vio*of *1%*swell allowance, net packed.

> That the record in said ARD 140 may be incorporated into the records of the above for reappraisement, and that said appeals may be deemed to be submitted for decision upon this stipulation.

On the agreed facts and consistent with the cited authority on the law, we hold that the proper basis for appraisement of the merchandise in question, as hereinabove identified, is statutory American selling price and that such value therefor is $7.50 per 2 dozen 10-ounce tins, less *iy2*per centum cash discount, less one-tenth of 1 per centum swell allowance, net, packed.

Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DONALD MORRIS LEE, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 16-35472 

D.C. No. 2:16-cv-00311-RSL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 8, 2017**

Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Washington state prisoner Donald Morris Lee appeals pro se from the 

district court’s judgment dismissing his “RICO Complaint by a Civilian.” We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s

dismissal for failure to state a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 11 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-35472

Organizations Act (“RICO”), see Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 746 

(9th Cir. 2000), and we affirm. 

Although Lee’s action was docketed as a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition, 

Lee is not seeking habeas relief, as the district court noted. Instead, he alleges a 

RICO violation premised upon someone allegedly forging a judge’s signature on 

orders in his state court proceedings. The district court properly dismissed Lee’s

action because he failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible RICO claim. 

See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (elements of 

RICO claim); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro 

se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual 

allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief). 

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.
#### ANNA V. HIGGINS ET AL., RESPONDENTS, v. GOERKE KIRCH COMPANY, APPELLANT.

Submitted July 8, 1918

Decided March 3, 1919.

1. In an action of negligence, where there is a trial before the court without jury, the judge takes the place of the jury as to all matters of fact that should properly be submitted to the jury; and when he undertakes to deal with a jury question as a court question, it is legal error as to the party injured by such action.

2. In a trial before the judge sitting without jury, a determination of the case on all the evidence, which determination is tantamount to a direction of a verdict for the defendant, is erroneous when the evidence, and the inferences reasonably arising therefrom, are legally sufficient to substantiate the plaintiff’s claim, in this case, of negligence.

On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion, reversing a judgment of the District Court of Elizabeth, is reported in 91 *N. J. L.*464.

For the appellant, *William E. Holmwood.*

For the respondent, *John J. Stamler.*

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Parker, J.

The facts, or the inferences deducible therefrom, are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court, and we concur in the result reached by that court in reversing the judgment and remanding the cause for a new trial.

The trial judge held specifically that he could “find no negligence in law on the part of the defendant upon which liability in this case can be based.” This, taken in connection with other language in his written decision,, we understand as meaning that upon no legitimate finding of facts as based on the evidence could negligence be predicated as a ground of recovery. This amounts to saying that if there had been a jury the case was one for a nonsuit or a direction of a verdict for defendant.

*425If the judge, sitting as a jury, liad said lie did not think plaintiff had shown negligence, his finding would be impregnable on an appeal raising only matters of law; but in dealing with the question as one for the court rather than for the jury, lie fell into an error similar to that which necessitated a reversal in *Weston Company*v. *Benecke,*82 *N. J. L.*445, where the judge, sitting as judge and jury, nonsuited, instead of dealing with the evidence as a jury was entitled to deal with it.

There was evidence in this case to go to a jury on the questions both of negligence and contributory negligence; and it should have been dealt with in that aspect.

We agree with the Supreme Court that the evidence of the remark by the salesman should have been excluded. We do not agree, however, that on the evidence the liability of defendant was “manifest.” When the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur*is invoked, the question of negligence is still one for the jury. *Hughes*v. *Atlantic City Railroad,*85 *N. J. L.*212; *Niebel*v. *Winslow,*88 *Id.*191; *Fanshawe*v. *Rawlins,*89 *Id.*344.

Let the judgment of the Supreme Court be affirmed.

*For affirmance*— The Chief Justice, Parker, Bergen, Kalisch, Black, Taylor, JJ. 6.

*For reversal*— The Chancellor, White, Heppenheimer, Williams, Gardner, JJ. 5.
EXHIBIT 32.1

       CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 1350 OF CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18 OF
                             THE UNITED STATES CODE

     In connection with the Annual Report of MediaNet Group Technologies, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2008, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Martin Berns Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

     (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

March 27, 2009                                        /s/ MARTIN BERNS
                                            ------------------------------------
                                                        MARTIN BERNS
                                            DIRECTOR AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATIONOF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Anthony Piscitelli, certify that:

 

     1. I havereviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of American Defense Systems, Inc.;

 

     2. Based onmy knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

     3. Based onmy knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

 

     4. Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

          (a) designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

          (b) evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

          (c) disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

     5. Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (orpersons performing the equivalent functions):

 

          (a) allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

          (b) anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

 

Date:  May 15,2009

 
|   | /s/ Anthony Piscitelli                          |
|--------|-------------------------------------------------|
|   | Anthony Piscitelli                              |
|   | Chief Executive Officer, President and Chairman |

 

----