Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cardwell, Thomas A.

Airland combat : an organization for joint warfare/by Thomas A.

Cardwell,111 .

p. cm.

"December 1992."

Includes index

1 . Unified operations (Military science) 2. Military doctrine-United

States . 1 . Title.

U260.C37 1993

355.4'2-dc20 92-21120

CIP

DISCLAIMER

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school

environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of

national defense-related concepts . The views expressed in this publication

are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review

authorities and is cleared for public release.

For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents

US Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C . 20402

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Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

1 HISTORICAL REVIEW OF AIRLAND COMBAT

ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Prologue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Up to World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The War Years, 1942-46 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Post-World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Korean and Vietnamese Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

1973 to the Gulf War to the Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

The Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

2 AIRLAND DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

US Army AirLand Battle Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

US Air Force Doctrine for Tactical Air Operations . . 51

Naval Doctrine in Support of Land Warfare . . . . . . . 52

Joint Doctrine for Unified Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Analysis of Service and Joint Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Working of Joint Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

v
Chapter Page

3 ORGANIZATION FOR AIRLAND COMBAT . . . . . . 89

Airland Combat Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Command Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Conduct of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

4 SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

PHOTO SECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

NUMERICAL INDEX OF SELECTED JOINT

PUBLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

Illustrations

Figure

1 Airland Combat Organization Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

2 Perception of Functions, Roles, and Missions

(as abasis for issues between services-strategy,

tactics, and organization) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

3 Perception of Strategy Issues between the Services . . . . 77

4 Perception of Tactics Issues between the Services . . . . 78

Vi
Figure Page

5 Perceptions of Organizational Issues between

the Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

6 Basis for Issues between the Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

7 Ten Commandments of Airland Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

8 Ten Principles of War in Support of the

Airland Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

9 Five Principles for Establishing Commands . . . . . . . . . 93

10 Command Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

11 Component Command Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

12 Theater Command Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

13 Notional Component Command Structure . . . . . . . . . . . 108

14 Notional Land Component Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

15 Notional Naval Component Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

16 Notional Air Component Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

17 Command Structure for Airland Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

18 Command, Control, Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

19 Tactical Air Control Systems and Army

Air Ground System Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

20 Tactical Air Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

21 Relationship of Air Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

22 Army Battle Planning Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

23 Air Missions in Support of AirLand Battle . . . . . . . . . . 127

24 Spectrum of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Vii

Foreword

It takes all our services together plus the industrial efforts ofour Nation

to win any major war.

-Gen Omar N. Bradley

Our unified or joint system of command is at the heart of our ability

to plan and conduct the operations required to implement the national

military strategy . The joint system is disciplined by the principle that

allows decisions to be made at the lowest possible level so that flexibility is given, along with the necessary authority, initiative, and

responsibility, to those who can use it to the best advantage-the joint

commanders on the scene.

Our commanders exist to be ready to fight and fight successfully .

Should deterrence fail, they are the ones who will carry out our war

plans. We must make sure that commanders get the forces they need

and that the forces of the four services are integrated properly. We must

realize the full potential of those forces by ensuring that they can work

together through sensible equipment, effective joint doctrine, and

exercises . Interoperability and effectively coordinated joint and

combined operations will give us a payoff that is greater than the sum

of the individual parts .

This book addresses one important aspect of our joint doctrine for

unified operations within a theaterjoint warfare for airland combat.

Without clearly defined and well-practiced joint tactics, techniques,

procedures, and an organization for airland combat, the effective

employment of all arms toward a single objective is made difficult, even

wasteful and dangerous .

The author is well qualified to write this book. He served on the Air

Staff during the important years in which the airland battle interface was

developed and participated in the Air Staff contributions to the US

Army's Extended Battlefield and AirLand Battle Concepts . While

assigned to the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colonel

Cardwell participated in the development of NATO's and SHAPE'S

ix
Conceptual Military Frameworks, SHAPE's Follow-On Forces Attack

Concept, the Joint Staff's Interdiction and Follow-On Forces Attack

Studies, andthe Joint Doctrine Development Program.

Colonel Cardwell has traced forus the development of airland combat

strategy since World War I, outlined current thinking on the subject,

and offered prescriptions for strengthening our capabilities for joint

operations . In so doing, he has built a valuable source document on

airland combat and contributed to the dialogue on joint doctrine in a

meaningful and useful way.

x
About the

Author

Col Thomas A. Cardwell III

Col Thomas A. Cardwell III has served in numerous operational and

staff assignments since his accession to active duty in 1965 . He was

assigned in 1967 to the 390th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Da Nang Air

Base (AB), Republic of Vietnam, where he flew 100 missions over

North Vietnam in the F-4C. After a combat tour there, he transferred to

the Aerospace Defense Command, flying the F-106 from 1968 to 1972.

He was selected in 1969 as the outstanding junior officer in North

American Air Defense Command (NORAD) . In 1973 he served one

year on the Air Staff under the Air Staff Training (ASTRA) Program in

the Foreign Military Training Division.

In 1974 he was assigned to the USAF Interceptor Weapons School

as director of academic training and publications . In 1977 Colonel

Cardwell returned to the Air Staff to serve as an air operations staff

officer in the Directorate of Concepts, then as a planning and

programming officer in the Directorate of Plans, in the office of deputy

chief of staff for plans and operations, Headquarters USAF. During this

tour he served as the US principal member to the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization's (NATO) Tri-Service Group on Air Defense and to the

Inter-Service Tactical Air Working Party.

In 1982 Colonel Cardwell was assigned to the 323d Flying Training

Wing, Mather Air Force Base (AFB), California, as the deputy

commander for operations. In 1984 he was assigned to the Joint Chiefs

of Staff (JCS) as the chief of the Strategic Concepts Branch, then as

chief of the Strategy Division, Deputy Directorate for Force

Development and Strategic Plans, Directorate of Plans and Policy (J-5) .
In 1985 Colonel Cardwell assumed command of the 601 st Tactical

Control Wing, Sembach AB, Germany . In August 1987 he was

reassigned to Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe as the

assistant deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, Ramstein AB,

Germany. In September 1988 he was assigned as the deputy assistant

chief of staff for studies and analyses and vice-commander of the Air

Force Center for Studies and Analyses at Headquarters USAF. In April

1991 he assumed his current position as commander of the Air Force

Studies and Analyses Agency, Headquarters USAF, Washington, D.C .

Colonel Cardwell has a BBA degree from Texas A&M University,

an MS from the University of Southern California, and a PhD from

Pacific Western University . He is a graduate of the Tuck Executive

Program of the Amos Tuck School of Business Administration,

Dartmouth College.

Xii
Preface

It is true that there are deep-rooted interservice differences that break out

occasionally in seemingly bitter exchanges. But they are the product of honest

convictions by honorable men ofbroad experiences and . . . manifestations ofa

deeply justifiedpride in all that their respective services have contributed to the

growth and security of the country.

-Gen Matthew B. Ridgway

Even prior to World War II, there were leanings toward uniting the

military efforts . Lt Gen John S . Pustay, USAF, Retired, former

president of the National Defense University, once stated that: "Long

before the end of the war, there was a growing conviction . . . to establish

a system to coordinate and unify the activities ofthe US Armed Forces ."

He went on to say that "although today's circumstances are vastly

changed, the Nation [still] remains concerned about issues such as

defense organizations . . . and the relationship of the Services to one

another."'

One area of defense organization that has received considerable

attention has been airland combat. The US Army in the last 15 years

has devoted much energy to the discussion of how to organize its forces

to prosecute airland combat. The current Army doctrine on airland

combat states that

there is no simple formula for winning wars . Defeating enemy forces in battle

will not always insure victory. . . . Wars cannot be won, however, without a

national will and military forces equal to the task. Although successful military

operations do not guarantee victory, they are an indispensable part of winning. 2

To win requires an organization that supports the forces assigned to the

commander. It also requires a coordinated effort among all the services

in pursuit of common objectives . 3 "Joint planning in the combined

alliance [and the joint] arena, at the component commander level, is the

key to . . . success in these missions ." 4 This planning must take into

account our capabilities, the campaign objectives for the theaters, and

of course the threat. The challenges we face today are not that much

xiii
different than those faced by ancient warfighters. Current Air Force

thinking on airland combat states that

the tempo of warfighting has increased over the last several decades; and the range,

accuracy, and kinds of weaponry have greatly improved. But some challenges will

never change. Commanders at all levels need to understand the enemy, to know

their own forces, to establish warfighting goals and objectives, and to lead men and

manage battles while suffering the fog and friction of war. . . . 5

Air, land, and naval component commanders translate theater objectives into

joint campaigns aimed at theater goals. . . . Air forces conduct campaigns of

their own as well as support and jointly prosecute surface campaigns. . . . Air

campaigns are theater-level campaigns, all parts of air power's operational art. 6

This book proposes an organization, a command structure, joint

doctrine, and procedures to accomplish airland combat. The underlying

theme is this: our airland combat organization must be based upon the

principle of unity of effort, which requires an integrated team of land,

naval, and air assets operating for a common objective . There is a void

in the literature on integrating land and air assets at echelons above the

corps and coordination of these assets between the services.

There is little uniformity in air/land field organizations, as they now exist at

echelons above (or even below corps) . Norcan there be [uniformity], given the

variety of conditions where U.S . air/land forces are, or may be, deployed. Any

search for principles or for the best available thought, must take that lack of

uniformity into account, and also the practical reality that U.S . Army forces [and

the other services' forces for that matter] will always be employed in a multiservice or multinational* framework in which the multiservice/multinational

commander's needs and perspectives should govern. 7

This book proposes an organization to fill that void and attempts to

provide the uniformity needed to ensure that we have the proper

organization to win wars . The theater or joint force commanders have

the authority to organize along the functional lines described in this

book.

Recent events in Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America have

caused us to rethink some of our organizational tenets. This review has,

I believe, strengthened our view that sound organizational principles

are needed as much today as they were some 70 years ago. The

command structure proposed in this book will accommodate the

*Multiservice refers to joint and multinational refers to combined operations .

xiv
changes in the international environment we have seen over the past

years .

This book is one person's view of how we should organize our forces

based on the author's experience in working doctrinal issues on

command relations. My views have been shaped by staff and command

assignments, a review of history, and the views of present and former

military officers. My objective was to set down in writing, for staff

officers and commanders involved in airland combat, useful thoughts

on the subject of the organization and employment of forces engaged

in airland combat. I have not ignored the joint doctrine found in JCS

publications but rather have sought to amplify that doctrine and try to

put it into the context of current thinking.

In putting this book together, one ofmy aims was to present historical

perspectives and doctrinal statements to provide a sound foundation for

the understanding of how the services employ forces in airland combat.

History has shown that misapplication of sound organizational

principles can cause needless loss of life and equipment. Wars in the

future will not allow time to experiment with command structures; we

must organize today to ensure success on the modern battlefield

tomorrow. $ When we violate sound principles of organizing our forces

for the most efficient and effective command structure, we court defeat. 9

Defective organizations lose wars.

It should be noted that wax-fighting organizations are, by their very

nature, the subject of varying views. Intellectual debate on how to

employ our forces should be the cornerstone of our military education

svstem . It is in that spirit this book was written.
Notes

1 . Gordon W. Keiser, The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-47:

The Politics ofSurvival (Washington, D.C. : National Defense University Press, 1982),

vii .

2. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 20 August 1982, 1-1 .

3 . Ibid . Chapter 1 details the US Army's view on how to identify the challenges

for winning the battle on the modern battlefield. "Soldiers and units must prepare for

such battles and the Army's operational concept must enable it to win. AirLand Battle

is the doctrine that deals with the worldwide challenges."

4. Gen Charles L. Donnelly, Jr ., "A Theater-Level View of Air Power," Airpower

Journal, Summer 1987, 5 .

5. Ibid ., 7.

6. Ibid., 4.

7. Lt Gen John H. Cushman, USA, Retired, "Organization and Operational

Employment of Air/Land Forces" (Carlisle Barracks, Pa. : US Army War College,

1983-84), v.

8. See Col Thomas A. Cardwell 111, Command Structure for Theater Warfare:

The Questfor Unity ofCommand(Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Press, 1984),

xiii and 73, for examples of this .

9 . Ibid ., 2 .

xvi
Acknowledgments

Without the generous help of many people this manuscript would

never have been produced. I am deeply indebted to all for giving so

freely of their time. To list all would be impossible, so to each of you

who participated in the development of this book my simple, but most

sincere, thanks .

I do, however, owe a special debt of thanks to Col Dennis M. Drew,

USAF, Retired, who while the director of the Airpower Research

Institute, Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and

Education (AUCADRE), provided encouragement and critical

comments . I would also like to express my appreciation to Dr David

Maclsaac of AUCADRE; Col Ralph L. Allen, USA, Retired; Col John

F. Shiner, USAF, Retired; and Lt Col Derwin W. ("Brad") Bradley,

USAF, for providing valuable background material.

I would be remiss if I did not mention the special contribution to this

book by Gen Gerry O'Malley, whose untimely death in 1985 cut short

a brilliant career. General O'Malley taught me much about the

employment of air power in airland combat. Much of his wisdom is

contained in this book. Also special thanks to Maj Gen Carl D. ("Pete")

Peterson, USAF, Retired, and Maj Gen William J . ("Bud") Breckner,

USAF, Retired, who gave me the opportunity to apply, in an operational

setting, the ideas contained in this book.

I also want to mention the contribution that Lt Col Donald R.

Baucom, USAF, Retired, and Maj Jeffery W. Coyle, USAF, Retired,

made to this effort.

To Mrs Roseann Shrader, Ms Denise Ching, Mrs Connie Walker,

Mrs Ruth Siebert, Mrs Leona Lane, Ms Deb Barnhart, and the

AUCADRE Document Processing Center-Mrs Marcia Williams, Ms

Lula Barnes, Ms Carolyn Ward, Mrs Sue Carr, Mrs Katie Ladd, and

Mrs Debbie Beal, who really made this manuscript possible, thank you

for all your hard work. Also, my special thanks to Ms Joan E. Bromiley

for the initial editing and to Ms Emily Adams of AUCADRE for the

final editing of my book. Also at AUCADRE, my appreciation to

Xvic
members of the Editorial Branch for their efforts in turning the

manuscript into a printed book.

A special word of thanks to my wife, T. J., for her encouragement

and understanding in the long process of putting this book together. I

shall always cherish her love, understanding, faith, trust, and kindness.

("Gratitude is the conscience of memory." Unknown)

Last but not least, I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of my

parents and brothers-Michael and Timothy. Without their faith in me,

their unfailing confidence, and their love through many trying times, I

would not have started, nor much less completed this book. ("Absence

sharpens love, presence strengthens it ." Unknown) It is then to T. J.,

Mother, Dad, Mike, and Tim that I lovingly dedicate this effort.

xvtii


Chapter 1

Historical Review of

Airland Combat Organizations

History offers the best training for those who take part in public office .

-Polybius

In modern times-the air power age-no one service has ever won a

war by itself. Winning wars has been a joint effort by two or more

services . Small skirmishes may have been won by a single service, but

the employment of forces on the modern battlefield to achieve military

objectives takes the coordinated effort of two or more services . In every

war ofthis century involving the United States, the efforts ofthe separate

services contributed to the accomplishment of the overall theater

strategy and the campaign objectives that support this strategy .' Witness

the results of the Gulf war. Although air power played a significant-if

not crucial-role, it took naval, army, and marine forces to obtain the

objective.

To achieve military objectives, our forces must be capable of

producing three fundamental effects in varying degrees: neutralization,

destruction, and capture. Our military forces possess certain intrinsic

capabilities to produce these effects . "By integrating and coordinating

their actions, each force makes a unique contribution to achieving the

primary objective." 3

This book examines two aspects-the contributions of land forces

and air forces-to achieve the primary objective. It examines the use of

land forces-US Army and US Marine forces employed in sustained

operations ashore-and air forces-US Army, Air Force, Navy, and

Marine air assets employed in support of the land campaign.
AIRLAND COMBAT

This study is organized into four chapters. Chapter I briefly reviews

the history of joint combat organizations to lay the foundation for our

current doctrines, principles, and organization for airland combat in

theater warfare. Chapter 2 describes the underlying principles and

doctrine that support airland combat. Chapter 3 provides the command

structure and organization, the joint doctrine, and the operational

procedures to integrate land and air assets to fight a war. Chapter four

provides a summary of the airland combat organization.

To appreciate how services view the employment of forces on the

battlefield, and hence the development of doctrine, one must consider

the historical development of airland combat organizations . It is this

historical perspective that lays the foundation for our current doctrine .

This chapter briefly reviews how we organized and employed our forces

in the past for airland combat based upon our doctrinal views . It is a

historical review of command structures .

Prologue

Since recorded history began, man has experimented with methods

to increase his fighting ability . One of these methods has been

development of combat weapons. Combat weapons have, in varying

degrees, contributed to the success or failure of the battle. "Since time

immemorial, weapons have played a significant role in tipping the scales

of victory from one side to another." 4 As weapons are developed,

military people devise plans to use them. These plans are turned into

concepts and then into doctrine to support the use of these weapons on

the battlefield. This doctrine then drives the method we use to organize

our fighting forces .

"Victory smiles upon those who anticipate changes in the

character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after

the changes occur ." 5 All too often we take a weapon that has great

potential for combat and fail to use it properly, or do not recognize

its full potential . When we do this, we lose the opportunity for

success. A good example was the development of the longbow .

2
HISTORICAL REVIEW

The longbow was used by the English in 1346 against the French at

the Battle of Crecy. The English longbow, used against the armored

French knights, turned the tide of the battle in favor of King Edward III.

The bow had been in existence since 1066-over 250 years before the

battle in the forest of Crecy-yet its potential was not fully recognized

even after the decisive Battle of Crecy. Sir Charles Oman, 1860-1946,

found it "rather surprising that Edward III was so slow in heeding the

obvious lesson of the preponderant influence of the longbow and

increasing the proportion of bowmen in his forces ." 7 Although Edward

I, in 1298, perfected the use of the longbow at the Battle of Falkirk,

"English chroniclers . . . forgot that the archers had prepared the way,"

and they reported that it was "the victorious charge of the knights at the

end of the day that ensured victory against the Scots ." 8 Forty years after

this battle Edward III led an army, skilled in the use of the longbow, to

victory; and 300 years passed after the introduction of the bow before

it was realized that this "new" weapon gave one side an advantage. Not

only was the potential of the longbow not fully recognized for a long

time, but no one thought to develop a counter to it . "Sometimes the

advantage of a superior weapon is decisive before countermeasures can

be evolved." 9

Dr I . B . Holley, Jr., points to numerous examples in his book Ideas

andWeapons. He concludes that it "follows then that the methods used

to select and develop new weapons and the doctrines concerning their

use will have an important bearing upon the success or failure of

armies-and of nations." I° He goes on to state that

the prior acceptance and application of the thesis that superior arms favor

victory, while essential, are insufficient unless the superior arms are

accompanied by a military doctrine . . . which provides for full exploitation of

the innovation . But even doctrine is inadequate without an organization to

administer the tasks involved in selecting, testing, and evaluating inventions .

The history of weapons in the United States is filled with evidence on this

point.

3
AIRLAND COMBAT

All too often we take a weapon, test it, develop a doctrine to support

it, but still fail to recognize that weapon's full potential. Alater chapter

discusses this chain of events and shows the relationship between ideas,

weapons development, concepts, doctrines, organizations, and

assessment and evaluation .

More recent history points toward failure to fully realize the

importance of weapons to concepts, doctrine, and organizations . Also,

we tend to ignore* lessons learned from the past when we set up current

organizational structures for theater warfare!2

Up to World War II

Early history of airland combat records a fascination with linking air

powerto ground forces to enhance the combat capability of our fighting

forces. The potential was unlimited it seemed-only man's imagination

and the pace of technology could slow the rapid integration of air and

land power.

Whether technology will be decisive in modern wars may be open to

question. Technology, but also national will, is crucial to winning.

Without the resolve to use modern weapons in a manner that will have

the greatest impact on the enemy and to do so until the enemy's will

and capability to continue the war are undercut, modern technology

cannot be decisive . For example, in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war the

Israelis had the necessary resolve and made wise use of technology.

In the early 1890s Count von Zeppelin foresaw a combat role for the

airplane and airship. Zeppelin told the German army chief of staff that

the airship he was building had the capability to attack troop

concentrations and fortifications . Then in 1899, at the first Hague Peace

Conference, the United States successfully opposed a ban on the use of

aerial weapons. It was argued that the airship could bring a quick and

decisive end to the land battle, while others asserted that such an

`Or perhaps we become so locked onto what "worked" in past wars (e .g ., WWII) that we insist on

retaining past doctrines and organizational arrangements in noncomparable situations (e .g., Vietnam) .

4
HISTORICAL REVIEW

invention could not be utilized under critical battlefield conditions and

that it would not decide the Victory .' 3

Prior to 1914 military leaders were chiefly interested in air power

because of the enhanced possibilities it offered in observation and

reconnaissance over the battlefield.

14 In 1908 Benjamin D . Foulois

wrote about a struggle for control ofthe air over the battlefield .* Foulois

speculated that the victor in that struggle would enjoy an advantage in

aerial observation and that this would be an important factor in a battle

to bring the campaign to a short and decisive end.

15

The years up to World War I saw the development of the aircraft

primarily as the eyes of the army-an extension of the land battle .

France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and to some extent the United

States were experimenting with the use of aerial bombs and were

adapting the machine gun for use on aircraft. The offensive potential of

aircraft was tested in small wars prior to World War I . For example, in

Libya aerial bombing was introduced during the Italy-Turkish War of

1911-13 .

As World War I began, the value of aircraft became more apparent.

A few weeks into the war, the offensive use of aircraft began to find

acceptance. Air power, in support of the land battle, reached its greatest

peak over the Western Front with the use of specialized aircraft with

specialized tasks . During the German Western Front offensive, fighter

aircraft were used to protect the reconnaissance and artillery spotting

aircraft. During the Western Front, bomber aircraft served as an

extension of artillery and the fighter was used primarily to keep enemy

aircraft away from the battlefield . Both the bomber and the fighter

aircraft had an indirect influence on the outcome of the battle in that the

bomber made its effect felt well behind the enemy's front, and the fighter

shielded the land forces from the enemy's air reconnaissance. However,

during the first few months of the war, the bombers did not have much

of an impact for there were few bombers in existence at that time . Since

the activity in the air was for the most part neither directly nor intimately

tied to the ground fighting, the command relationship and the

Foulois wrote this as a school thesis at the US Army Signal School.

5
AIRLAND COMBAT

communication systems were very simple. The command structure used

was at the army group level. At that level there was an air service

commander; and below that, at the corps and division levels, were air

liaison officers or teams. Land communications were via telephone,

while air-to-ground communications were by air-dropped messages .

16

Late in 1915 the armies began to acquire newer reconnaissance-type

aircraft for use by the infantry. This close contact with the infantry

opened the door for close-air-support (CAS) operations . Additionally,

the air services began to experiment with improved air-to-ground

communications. Early experiments with primitive communicationsflares, lights, Klaxons-brought about improvements to the overall

communications system. In 1916 the French issued the first instructions

on communications techniques for air-infantry cooperation. The

British, and eventually the Americans, adopted the French system. The

time frame 1916-17 saw vast strides in airland combat-in tactics,

doctrine, and communications .

Low-level attack* gained prominence in 1916, gaining official

sanction at the Battle of the Somme. The battles of 1917 saw expanded

use of low-flying aircraft. The year 1918 brought further refinement to

the techniques of airland combat. The British added formation flying to

ground attack operations which greatly increased the firepower of the

attacks . By the end of the war, there was much talk about the usefulness

and need for special units for close air support. This discussion led to

improvements in airland communications. The lessons learned opened

up a number of opportunities for the conduct of airland combat.

First of all, the intervention of the airplane in the land battle had significant

effects on the morale of the troops engaged in that battle (both the troops being

supported and those being attacked). Aerial tacticians were much struck by this

phenomenon, and gave it a large place-probably too large a place-in their

conceptions.

During the interwar period, the idea that ground attack aircraft, like

the bomber, could make their best contribution behind the battlefield

" Low-level attack had little impact as this was the "age of trench warfare" and artillery could do so

much more damage than attack aircraft .

6
HISTORICAL REVIEW

took root mainly among the air staffs. The army staffs, on the other hand,

wanted to use the aircraft as they used any other arm of the army-that

is, commit it directly to the battle. Most aviators, and some army ground

officers, agreed that to be effective, the air arm should be controlled and

directed centrally, for this would enable massed employment against

the most critical targets .' 8 However, general agreement could not be

reached on who should exercise centralized control of air power.

During World War I, German army Gen Erich F. W. Ludendorff laid

down the principle of centralized control by stating, "Central control

must insure that, when the battle flights are put in, dispersion of force

is avoided and that the great effect of a number of machines cooperating

at points of decisive importance in the battle is fully developed." i9

Experiments in centralized control of air power during the interwar

years, quite understandably, encountered opposition by ground forces.

This was true particularly among corps and army commanders who

wanted their own aviation as a part of the corps .

20

The years between the two world wars were characterized by

antimilitary sentiment. Many aviation units were disbanded. Most

notable were the air force of the Russian armed forces, which was

disorganized by the Russian Revolution and Civil War, and the German

air force, which was abolished by the Versailles Treaty. Compounding

the problem of developing military aviation concepts and doctrine

was the fact that there was no real chance to test them. Therefore,

the combat application of aircraft was very limited between 1919 and

1935. The chief application of aircraft during this period was to suppress

lawlessness and rebellions . However, in 1935 a new cycle of wars

emerged and with it a renewed interest in tactical air power. The

Italo-Ethiopian War, Sino-Japanese conflict, and the Spanish Civil

War started this new cycle .

21

By 1938 articles on close air support began to appear in European

military journals. The relationship between the armies and air forces

influenced the development of airland doctrine. For example, in

countries where air forces had independence from army forces, tactics,

doctrine, and concepts were not subordinate to the army view. Also,

where armies tended to be innovative, as was the case in Germany,

7
AIRLAND COMBAT

planners became interested in an enhanced role for the airplane in

airland combat. This was not always true for air forces that were

subordinate to the army. For example, the air arm of the Japanese army

worked at tactical air, while our Army Air Corps largely ignored tactics

because it believed that strategic bombardment was more important and

would justify independence from the US Army. Tactical concepts for

support of the airland battle that were developed during the period

between the wars-as well as the organizational structure to support

these concepts-were largely logical assumptions and theoretical

calculations and were not based on combat experience .

22

The history of airland combat for the United States during the period

1919 to the American entry into World War 11 could be characterized

as an episodic one. This episodic period

can be conveniently divided into three parts: first, a brief period of intense

interest, stimulated by the First World Warand continuing into the early 1920s;

then a period lasting from the midtwenties to the outbreak of World War 11,

characterized by a certain doctrinal confusion over the role and function of

ground attack aviation and wavering interest in the concept of close-air support;

and finally, a period ofrenewed interest and intense developmental activity from

1940 to 1942. 23

Gen William ("Billy") Mitchell's and Lt Col William C. Sherman's

books on employment of the Air Service and operations of air

units-both written immediately after World War 1-became the basis

for ideas that were held in the postwar Air Service.* The topics treated

were essentially these : the value of air superiority, strategic bombing,

attack on ground troops, and low-level bombing raids. Mitchell argued

for the idea that the air forces might have to be totally committed to the

land battle, but under more usual circumstances the bulk of air power

would be used more profitably in strategic bombardment. Both texts

have overtures of a shift of emphasis away from targets on the

immediate battlefield to more non-close-air-support roles. To support

* In the early postwar years Mitchell favored acombat force composed of 60 percent pursuit, 20 percent

bombers, and 20 percent attack. He definitely saw the need for air superiority . In the early 1920s, Mitchell

began to place emphasis on strategic bombing to win future wars, but he never lost sight of the need for

pursuit aircraft . See Alfred F. Hurley, Billy Mitchell : Crusader-forAir Power (Bloomington, Ind . : Indiana

University Press, 1975) .

8
HISTORICAL REVIEW

the role of air power, it was argued that attack squadrons should be

placed under the command and control of the chief of air service of an

army or army group.

24

"It was not so much the outbreak of war in September 1939 that

galvanized the Army and Air Corps to action, but rather the

catastrophic events of the summer of 1940 (for example, the rapid

fall of France) ." 2s The Air Corps began developing new aircraft

requirements for bombers and tactical aircraft during the period 1939

to 1941 . Also, the War Department began issuing preliminary

instructions on airland combat. Training circulars set up the position of

air task force commander and an advanced air support command post

to make decisions regarding air support. From 1940 to the United

States' entrance into World War II in 1941, airland activity could be

characterized as one of a crash effort to establish a comprehensive

system of air support, training, and development of tactics and doctrine

to support airland combat.

The War Years, 1942-46

Army doctrine for land combat was well entrenched when the United

States entered the war in Europe.

27 Not so entrenched, however, was air

doctrine in support of airland combat. Before discussing how air and

land assets were used in World War II, it will be useful to review the

development of the command structure for airland combat for the

European and Pacific theaters.

Prior to World War II, command structure discussions in the United

States were between the US Army and the US Navy. All debates

centered around command doctrines espoused by these two services .

By early 1941 it became apparent to many military leaders that the

United States would be involved in a war in Europe. The debate began

on what type of structure should be adopted in the event US forces were

employed.

Within the Army there was a drive initiated by the Army Air Corps

to reorganize. The US Air Force had its beginnings in the Army Air

9
AIRLAND COMBAT

Corps in the late thirties and early forties . Airmen believed their views

on a command structure should be heard in any Army reorganization

and also in Army-Navy discussions over a command structure.

The Army Air Corps wanted a separate role in any command

structure. The War Department was opposed to any reorganizing of

the existing Army command structure. However, most senior Army

generals recognized a need to provide a more realistic staff

organization to manage the war effort .* The Army Air Corps saw an

opportunity to open the issue of employing air power in a wider role

in a theater of operations . Gen Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold, chief of

the Army Air Corps, wrote to Gen George C. Marshall, the Army chief

of staff, asking for a complete reorganization that would allow the air

forces to play their proper roles . 28 General Marshall was not ready

to discuss the issue. He based this decision upon his desire to keep

the Air Corps "in the existing command structure in order to promote

the collaboration between ground and air operation[s] ." 29

General Arnold was not satisfied with this response. He again

approached General Marshall to request that a group study the

current command structure . General Marshall agreed and directed

that Brig Gen Joseph T. McNarney chair such a study . Based on

General Arnold's proposal, the McNarney Committee recommended

three separate commanders-one for ground, one for air, and one for a

service command.

The War Department agreed in principle with this plan for three

separate commands. "By General Arnold's persistence, the Air Force

was the champion of the War Department reorganization . "'o The

reorganization was accomplished by an executive order and became

effective on 9 March 1942. 31 This order created the Army Ground

Forces Command, the Army Service Forces Command, and the

Army AirForces Command. The commanding general of the new Army

Air Forces would train and equip air units for independent air strikes

and for joint and combined combat operations with ground forces.

32

* Since 1935 there had been a General Headquarters Air Force whose commander controlled all Army

combat air. During peacetime, he was directly subordinate to the Army chief of staff, and during war he

reported to the theater commander.

10
HISTORICAL REVIEW

Additionally, the "Air Forces would also be responsible for research,

design, development, and procurement of all items peculiar to air

operations ." 33 With the Army reorganized, the War Department turned

its attention to discussions with the Navy Department on a joint

command organization for theater warfare.

Prior to Pearl Harbor, the agreed upon structure was based on the

doctrine of mutual cooperation. This doctrine stated that no single

commander would be in charge of the Army and Navy forces and that

the services were expected to cooperate in any joint effort. However, if

mutual cooperation appeared inadequate, a single command could

be organized under the doctrine of unity of command. This

doctrine could be placed in effect by agreement between the

secretaries of War and Navy, by an agreement between commanders

of the Army and Navy theater forces, or by the president. The doctrine

of unity of command stated :

The [single] commander has the authority to direct the operations of the Army

and Navy elements of his commandby assigning them missions and giving them

objectives. During operations, he could exercise commandand control as would

insure success of the common mission. He could also organize task forces . He

could not issue instructions to the other services on tactics, nor could he control

its administration or discipline, nor issue any instructions beyond those

necessary for effective coordination .

35

The American doctrine of mutual cooperation for command

proved inadequate for combined operations in Europe and the

Pacific. On 27 November 1941 unity of command was vested in the

commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. Six months later, in the

European theater, the British Chiefs of Staff recommended

command arrangements along the lines of the American unity of

command doctrine, and the principle of unified command was

adopted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in 1942 . Gen Dwight D.

Eisenhower served as the supreme commander of all Allied armed

forces in Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, in

November of 1942 . Unity of command was the basis for

command of Allied operations for the remainder of World War

11. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) did not approve the

doctrine of unified command until April 1943 . 36

1 1
AIRLAND COMBAT

Within this unified framework, the command structure used

during World War II was as follows : the combined armies and navies

engaged in theater operations, and the Royal Air Force and US Army

Air Forces units were under a single commander. Within the

combined armies structure in North Africa, and later in Europe.

General Eisenhower had two components-one for land forces and

one for air forces.* This structure changed as new forces were added.

For example, in 1944 with the establishment of the US 12th Army

Group, General Eisenhower attempted to create a single land

component command to control the US 12th Army Group and British

21st Army Group.

37 However, political considerations prevented the

creation of this command. When General Eisenhower decided not

to create the land component command, American air force leaders

saw no reason to retain the air component command-the Allied

Expeditionary Air Forces .

American air force leaders argued that there was no need to

coordinate tactical bombers and fighters since the US Ninth Air

Force was already working closely with the 12th US Army Group.39

Also, since the deputy to General Eisenhower had the responsibility

for coordinating the US Ninth Air Force and the British Second

Tactical Air Force with the US Strategic Air Forces Europe and

British Bomber Command, the air component command was

unnecessary . General Eisenhower agreed and dissolved the Allied

Expeditionary Air Forces in October 1944 . 4° "Thus, Eisenhower's

decision to sidestep the problem of choosing either an American or

British ground force component commander resulted indirectly in

the unfortunate lack of a single air component command ." 4l

This brief review of command structures shows that World War

II provided the foundation for two important developments in the

US command structure . It provided the doctrine for a unified

command structure, and it laid the groundwork for a separate air

force .

"Naval aviation came under the command of the Navy fleet commander .
HISTORICAL REVIEW

The existence of airland combat, and specifically the role of tactical

air in support of land operations, really came about during World War

1, which gave rise to tactical air roles and missions and employment

concepts of today. World War 11 refined these employment concepts

and showed the need for effective tactical air in airland combat.

At the onset of World War 11, air doctrine was not very well

entrenched, and employment concepts were in a state of confusion. This

was caused primarily by neglect of tactical air during the 1930s. Had it

not been for Gen Claire Chennault, "the lone voice crying in the

wilderness," things could have been much worse. Chennault tried to

awaken the Air Corps to the importance of pursuit aircraft and

adamantly maintained that the first mission of an air force was to gain

air superiority.* He further argued that pursuit would be essential to both

offensive and defensive air superiority . That position was proven in

World War 11 and again in more recent conflicts. In the midthirties, the

Air Corps turned its attention to long-range bombers-strategic

bombardment. The Air Staff was convinced that bombers could

produce a quick victory in a war by destroying the enemy's will and

capability to make war even before ground forces became heavily

involved in the conflict.

Although tactical air was de-emphasized in the 1930s, airmen did

get Army acceptance of an air organization that would enable the

effective employment of strategic and tactical air power. In 1935 the

Army agreed to put all offensive air resources under a single air

commander. The organization was called the General Headquarters

Air Force, or GHQAF. The GHQAF commander exercised centralized control over all Air Corps bomber, pursuit, and attack planes .

As the United States entered the war in Europe in 1942, Allied

tactical air employment concepts were in a confused state . Aviators

believed in the importance of air superiority and that interdiction would

be helpful to ground operations ; however, no one was particularly eager

to pursue close air support for ground troops . This was due in part to

Chennault believed in the importance ofboth offensive and defensive air superiority . His thinking was

not in terms of point air defense, and in the early mid-1930s he didn't really do much thinking about air

support for ground operations other than in providing air superiority .

1 3
AIRLAND COMBAT

the importance placed on strategic bombardment by airmen. Very little

thought had been given to airland combat until the US-British combined

invasion of North Africa in November of 1942.

The Twelfth Air Force was created to support Operation Torch .

Unfortunately, air power in support of airland combat was employed

in an uncoordinated manner . Air power was split into three

portions-Bombardment Command (tactical and strategic strikes

behind enemy lines), Air Defense Command (rear area protection),

and Air Support Command (direct support of land troops) . The Army

carried this dispersion one step further by dividing the Air Support

Command into corps air forces ., Air Support Command units were

parceled out to army divisions on a semipermanent basis . The

division commanders then held onto "their" pursuit and tactical

bombers, much the same way as they held onto their artillery assets .

This prevented concentrated employment, left no capability for

powerful offensive punches, and gave the initiative to the Germans

so they could mass and strike whenever they chose .

Gen Carl ("Tooey") Spaatz, commander of the Twelfth Air Force,

and General Arnold argued for doctrinal and organizational changes

to this arrangement. Spaatz was impressed with the way British

Army Gen Bernard L . Montgomery and Royal Air Force's (RAF)

Sir Arthur Coningham employed air power during the Egyptian

campaign of 1942 through early 1943 . The British system put all

Royal Air Force aircraft under a single air commander whose

headquarters was collocated with the ground commander . This

allowed close coordination between the air and land forces and

allowed concentrated employment of all tactical air.

Through efforts of the Generals Spaatz and Arnold, the Army

approved a new air doctrine and organization in mid-1943 . General

Marshall, chief of staff, approved the creation of tactical air forces

separate from strategic forces. In July 1943 the War Department

approved Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command and Employment of

Air Power. The new doctrine stated that land power and air power

were equal and interdependent forces. It went on to state that the

14
HISTORICAL REVIEW

inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest asset [and this] flexibility makes

it possible to employ the whole weight of available air power against selected

areas in turn. Control of available air powermust be centralized and command

must be exercised through the air force commander.

42

Additionally, the doctrine stated that "the gaining of air superiority

is the first requirement for the success of major land operations (and)

air forces must be employed primarily against the enemy's air force

until air superiority is obtained.

"43 The second mission of tactical air

forces was interdiction ; close air support of land forces had third

priority. This doctrine was in force during the remainder of World

War II and was a reflection of the doctrine developed at Maxwell

Field in Alabama by the early 1930s . Using this doctrine to set up

the organization, the Army Air Forces refined its system for

providing air support to land forces by collocating the land and air

headquarters, setting up a system for immediate support of ground

troops through the Army radio net, using ground and air forward air

controllers to direct this support, gaining air superiority, and

isolating the battlefield through interdiction operations .

44

World War II, like World War I, taught military planners a great deal

about the effective use of air power in airland combat. Also, like the

post-World War I era, the period after World War II saw us forget many

of the lessons learned and, again, ignore tactical air.

The period following World War II provided the United States with

the opportunity to reflect upon achievements and failures of the World

War II command structure for airland combat. This was a significant

input which led to a total reorganization of US military forces.

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff was established early in World War I

as a counterpart to the British Chiefs of Staff committee . The two.

together became the supreme military body responsible for strategic

direction and were known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 45 Also, the

concept of a unified command in a theater of operations was established

during World War II. However, neither the JCS nor the unified

command structure was officially recognized or authorized by US law.:

In his 1945 message to Congress, President Harry S Truman stated that,

'"had we not early in the war adopted this principle ofa unified command

15
AIRLAND COMBAT

for operations, our efforts, no matter how heroic, might have failed." 46

The president and the senior leadership of the military recognized the

need for centralized direction of American armed forces.

Post-World War II

The year 1947 was a milestone in restructuring our military forces.

The JCS proposed the reorganization of the military, and with strong

support by President Truman,* Congress passed the National Security

Act of 1947-which became effective on 17 September 1947.

In Section 2, Declaration ofPolicy, the National Security Act of 1947

states : "It is the intent of Congress to provide . . . for authoritative

coordination and unified direction [of the armed forces] but not to merge

them, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and

air forces." This act created a National Military Establishment with three

departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force); authorized a secretary of

defense; created the Joint Chiefs of Staff; reorganized the unified and

specified command structure ; and authorized the JCS to establish such

commands.

This act accomplished three things. First, it formally established the

unified command structure and, thus, the doctrine ofunity ofcommand.

Second, it established the framework for a three-component command

organization-land, sea, and air-under the unified command structure.

Third, it established the Department of the Air Force, established the

Air Force as a separate service, and retained the Marine Corps under

the Navy as part of the Department of the Navy . This act was the start

of a movement toward centralized authority over the armed forces that

culminated in the Reorganization Acts of 1958 and 1986. 4

The separation of the Air Force from the Army in September 1947

left the Army in a "position of client dependency on the Air Force for

aviation support." 48 As the newly created Air Force struggled for

independence, the other services tried to carve out roles and missions

* Truman was the driving force behind the reorganization . He convinced the services to agree on the

bill, thus assuring its passage .

16
HISTORICAL REVIEW

for themselves. This led to continued discussions on employment of air

power during the late 1940s . The Air Force and the Navy discussions

were over the strategic offensive mission, and the Air Force discussion

with the Army revolved around close air support of the land battle. The

consistent emphasis by the Air Force on strategic bombardment was,

some critics charged, at the expense of tactical air and other missions.

49

This discussion over roles and missions led Secretary of Defense

James Forrestal in 1948 to seek agreement among the services on their

respective roles and missions . "In a series of meetings with Forrestal at

Key West, Florida, in March 1948, the JCS agreed on principles and

functions that were approved by President Truman and issued on April

21 [1948] ." 5° The agreement was contained in the Office of the

Secretary of Defense's directive entitled "Functions of the Armed

Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." However, even with this

agreement, further clarification was needed. Forrestal assembled the

Joint Chiefs of Staff at Newport, Rhode Island, in August 1948 to once

again discuss the issue . The Newport Agreement resulted in another

Office of the Secretary of Defense publication which set forth the

exclusive responsibilities for each of the services.

Between September 1947 and July 1949, some 40 transfer orders

were accomplished relating to aviation and associated personnel,

functions, and facilities . On 20 May 1949 an agreement on the

employment of aircraft for airland combat, the Bradley-Vandenberg

Agreement, was published . Sl It was named after Gen Omar N. Bradley,

Army chief of staff, and Gen Hoyt S . Vandenberg, Air Force chief of

staff . This document defined Army organic aviation (i .e ., rotary-wing

and fixed-wing aircraft) as not to exceed 4,000 pounds.

52 For all

practical purposes, the Air Force would develop all other aircraft.

This period in history for the Air Force was one of continual struggle

for airmen to insure that limited air assets were applied in an effective

manner. The Air Force viewed the most effective means of control to

be from a theater perspective where all air forces were under the air

component commander-the single manager for air. However, even

within the Air Force, there were differing views. Some believed that

strategic bombers should be employed separately from tactical air; thus,

17
AIRLAND COMBAT

there would be two subordinate air components-one for tactical air in

support of land operations, and one for strategic bombing. The debate

continues today . Air Force doctrine supported then, as it does today, the

single unified command with three functional components as the most

effective means to employ theater-assigned assets .

The newly created Air Force and the other newly reorganized military

departments were trying to agree upon a workable command

arrangement for war fighting . Against this backdrop, the United States

entered the Korean conflict.

Korean and Vietnamese Conflicts

In Korea in 1950 the command structure again became a major

problem. Since the United Nations did not have a staff structure

capable of directing military operations, on 8 July 1950 President

Truman appointed Gen Douglas MacArthur commander of all military

forces assisting the Republic of Korea.

53 These forces were placed

under the unified command of the United States by members of the

United Nations . 54 As the United Nations commander, General

MacArthur controlled all Allied forces. As commander of US forces,

his title was commander in chief, Far East (CINCFE). The Far East

Command was a unified command which reported directly to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. 55

On 24 July 1950 General MacArthur established the United Nations

Command (UNC), and he became commander in chief, United

Nations Command (CINCUNC). The line of authority for the United

States ran from General MacArthur to the president through the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. Allied troops were assigned to the appropriate US

military organization for operational control. 56

The Korean hostilities provided a combat test of the armed forces'

unification which the United States had adopted in 1947. 5 In

essence, the National Security Act of 1947 provided for a theater

commander, separate from his service, who would provide

command authority over theater land, naval, and air forces . 58

1 8
HISTORICAL REVIEW

When the United States entered the war, the Far East Command

was comprised of the Far East Air Forces, the Naval Forces Far East,

and the Army Forces Far East . Instead of having an Army Forces

Far East Headquarters, which would have been the land component

headquarters, General MacArthur personally commanded the Army

elements of the Army Forces Far East Command with his General

Headquarters, Far East Command, doubling as the joint headquarters

staff and the land component headquarters . The General

Headquarters was almost wholly manned by Army personnel and

concerned itself primarily with ground operations . 59 The air

component of the unified command, the Far East Air Forces, usually

operated in an independent manner.

60

When General MacArthur recognized that the command arrangements he had established were not operating as he had planned, he

established the land component command, US Army Forces in

Korea. MacArthur directed the commander of the US Army Forces

in Korea to communicate directly with the other two component

commanders-Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces Far East-to

secure the required air and naval support.

61

Two events occurred in July 1950 that highlighted the problem of

unified actions of land, naval, and air forces . The first was the

introduction of bomber aircraft into the Pacific theater . The US Air

Force chief of staff placed two medium bombardment groups-the 22d

and 92d-on temporary duty with the Far East Air Forces. These two

bombardment groups-organized as the Far East Air Forces Bomber

Command-would, in conjunction with the tactical aircraft of the Fifth

Air Force, provide strategic bombardment and tactical air support for

the Far East Command. On 11 July the air component commander

directed the Bomber Command to handle deep interdiction and strategic

targets, and the Fifth Air Force to carry out tactical air operations in

support of the airland battle.

The second event was the massive effort to coordinate land-based and

carrier-based air operations over Korea. The first two weeks in July

1950 presented a new challenge to the joint effort of coordinating air in

support of theater objectives. The commander of Naval Forces Far East

19
AIRLAND COMBAT

had secured an exclusive use of airspace in northern Korea for naval air

operations from 2-4 July 1950. Due to limited communications and the

Navy's practice ofradio silence while at sea, US Air Force air operations

were severely hampered .

These two events led the commander of the Far East Air Forces,

Lt Gen George E. Stratemeyer, to conclude that to be effective, some

form of centralized control was required to coordinate the mass of Air

Force and Navy air. He requested that the air component commander

be given operational control over all naval land-based and

carrier-based aviation operating over Korea-except for aviation used

in amphibious or naval tasks of mining and antisubmarine warfare.

General Stratemeyer did not want to control naval aircraft when they

were engaged in Navy air tasks at sea. He stated that operational

control meantonly control over the targets to strike within capabilities

of the forces involved .

64

Not surprisingly, the Navy did not agree with General Stratemeyer.

The Navy did not want the Air Force to have operational control of

naval air forces in any circumstances. A compromise was worked out

on 11 July when the air component commander was given coordination

authority . "When both Navy Forces, Far East, and Far East Air Forces

are assigned missions in Korea, coordination control, a Commander in

Chief, Far East, prerogative, is delegated to Commanding General,

Far East Air Forces," read the directive drafted by the Joint Strategic

Plans and Operations Group, General Headquarters, Far East

Command. As there was no definition for coordination authority, in

effect there was no real change in the way the airland campaign was

conducted.

Historian Robert F. Futrell summed up the command relationship

during the Korean conflict as follows :

Belatedly, at the end of July, improved procedures brought some order to the

fantastically confused command situation in the Far East. . . . Certainly, at the

outset of the Korean War, the defective theater command system prevented the

fullest employment of airpower, delayed the beginning of a comprehensive

air-interdiction program for more than a month [and] caused confusion and loss

of effectiveness at the very time that every single aircraft sortie was vital to the

survival of the Eighth Army in Korea. Had he possessed a joint headquarters

20
HISTORICAL REVIEW

staff, General MacArthur might never have encountered these mischievous

problems.

6

Gen Otto P. Weyland reached a similar conclusion when he wrote on 10

October 1950, "Whenever combinations of Air Force, Army, and Navy are

in a joint command, it is essential that the Commander-in-Chief have

a joint staff with proportionate representation of the services

involved .",67

The first full-scale experiment with a unified command structure

with three components was tried in Korea. There were some false

starts and heated discussions, but on the whole the system proved to

be an effective means to control theater-assigned assets. One can

argue that it was not always the most efficient, but it was effective.

The Korean War provided the foundation for service cooperation

in a theater of operations which would be the basis for the command

structure used in Vietnam-that is, there would be one commander

with three components. However, not totally solved was the question

of what to do with air power in support of the airland battle . Vietnam

provided an arena to test a new method. Before looking at the

command arrangements in Vietnam, let us review the events from

1953 to 1962.

In 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff lost its authority to appoint one of

its members as the executive agent for a unified command. 68 This

authority would now rest with the secretary of defense who, with the

advice of the JCS, would appoint a military department as the executive

agent. The chain of command ran from the president through the

secretary of defense, to the service secretary, then to the unified

commander. This chain of command proved to be unworkable.

"President Eisenhower called that arrangement `cumbersome and

unreliable in time of peace and not usable in time of war' .",69

That arrangement did not change until 1958 . The Defense

Reorganization Act of 1958 took the military departments and

services out of the command chain. The chain of command, as it stands

today, runs from the president, to the secretary of defense, through the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the unified (joint) commander. It is important

to note that none of the service chiefs-for example, the chief of staff

21
AIRLAND COMBAT

of the Army-has command authority over US combatant forces . That

authority is vested in the unified or specified commander, who is the

joint force commander.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Pub) 0-2, Unified Action ArmedForces

(UNAAF),x outlined the changes brought about by the National

Security Act of 1947, as amended in 1949, and the Defense

Reorganization Act of 1958 . Briefly, these acts established the

three separate services-with the US Marine Corps coming under

the Department of the Navy-and the unified command structure .

The experiences of World War II and Korea formed the basis for

the US command structure for the Vietnam conflict.0

Between 1950 and 1965 the Army and Air Force engaged in

discussions over the use oftactical air in support of the airland battle.

The operational requirements and experiences of the Korean War

intensified Army concern about the tactical air mission, and

especially the close-air-support mission. "This controversy was

prevalent in World War II from the early days of North Africa to the

invasion of Europe, and it persisted throughout the Korean War." 71

This concern drove the Army to acquire helicopters which exceeded

the weight limits established by the Bradley-Vandenberg Agreement

of 1949. Also, the Army expressed concern over the responsiveness

of tactical air to the needs of the ground troops in Korea. Some

elements within the Army never accepted the idea of centralized

control of air power under a single commander and argued for air

assets to be divided among the corpS .72 "There can be little doubt

that the majority [of Army Senior officers] would have preferred

to see close air support resources assigned to and under the control

of division and corps commander.",73

After extensive discussion between the two services, a special

memorandum of understanding was signed by Secretary of the Army

Frank Pace and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter on 2

October 1951 . 4 This became known as the Pace-Finletter

Agreement and sought to "draw a line between the two services

" Joint Pub 0-2 replaced JCS Pub 2 in 1986.

' 22
HISTORICAL REVIEW

based upon functions rather than aircraft weight." 75 This agreement

stipulated that the Army would use its aircraft, to include helicopters,

as an integral part of its components for "the purpose of expediting

and improving ground combat and logistical procedures within the

combat zone," but would not duplicate the functions of Air Force

aircraft . 76 The Pace-Finletter Agreement further defined Army

organic aviation as fixed-wing utility aircraft and rotary-type aircraft

with the functions of aerial observation; control of Army forces ;

command, liaison, and courier missions ; aerial wire laying; and

transport of Army supplies within the combat zone.

77

The Army became more aware of the potential of the helicopter,

and this drove yet another round of discussions between the Army

and Air Force and consideration of the issue by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. Under pressure by the secretary of defense, the two service

secretaries drew up another letter of agreement dated 4 November

1952. The second Pace-Finletter Agreement expanded the list of

functions of Army organic aviation assets to include aeromedical

evacuation and artillery and topographic survey . It also returned to

a weight-restriction formula which imposed a 5,000-pound

limitation on Army fixed-wing aircraft, but with a caveat that the

weight restriction would be subject to review by the secretary of

defense-in light of technical development and assigned missions .

The agreement also contained an expanded definition of the combat

zone.

78

The Air Force, still placing emphasis on strategic bombardment,

ignored Army advances in its organic aviation. In fact, the Air Force

issued a policy statement shortly after the Pace-Finletter Agreement

of 1951 that the Air Force would not actively oppose the Army

if it "can procure sufficient funds to perform supporting missions

(in reference to missions the Army and Air Force were given in the

Functions Paper) ." 79 It appears this policy statement actually

encouraged the Army to build up its organic aviation .

During 1951 to 1956 the Army increased its inventory of assault

helicopters and fixed- and rotary-wing assets . At the end of the

Korean War, the Army had almost 3,500 air vehicles. $° In 1960 the

23
AIRLAND COMBAT

Air Force became concerned about the potential duplication of effort

and competition with its own tactical air assets. This was caused in part

by the Army increasing its aircraft authorization per division from 26

to 39, and subsequently to 50 for the Pentomic Division and to 103 in

the Reorganization Objectives, Army Division (ROAD) divisions .

Once again, after neglect, the Air Force turned its attention to tactical

aviation in support of airland combat.

The years 1957 to 1961 were characterized by numerous

discussions among the services over roles and missions. Charles E.

Wilson, secretary of defense, became concerned over the numerous

issues concerning roles and missions. In late 1956 he issued a

comprehensive memorandum covering five problem areas-which

included use of aircraft by the Army . 8 ' Department of Defense

(DOD) Directive 5160 .22, Clarification ofRoles andMissions ofthe

Department of the Army and Air Force Regarding Use of Aircraft,

issued 18 March 1957, rescinded the 1952 Pace-Finletter

Agreement. This directive now defined the combat zone as "not

more than 100 miles forward of the general line of combat . . . and

its extension to the rear of the general line of combat . . . normally

. . . about 100 miles ." 82 Thus, the combat zone in which Army

aircraft were authorized to operate was roughly 200 miles in

length-100 miles either side of the forward edge of the battle area.

The directive also established a weight limitation of 5,000 pounds

for fixed-wing and 20,000 pounds for rotary-wing Army aircraft.

Finally, the directive stated that the Army Aviation Program

would not provide aircraft to perform strategic and tactical airlift,

tactical reconnaissance, interdiction of the battlefield, or close

air support.

83 It is interesting to note that the directive prohibited

the Army aircraft from providing close air support, but the directive

did allow the Army to enlarge the overall function of its organic

aviation, thereby providing an opportunity for the Army eventually

to move into close air support.

84 A review of the original Army

aviation functions, prescribed by directives of World War II and as

modified by the Pace-Finletter Agreement and DOD Directive

24
HISTORICAL REVIEW

5160.22, indicates an increase in Army aviation capabilities over those

originally envisioned.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 ; DOD Directive

5100 .1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major

Components, 31 December 1958 (sometimes called the

"Functions Paper") ; and Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 (JCS

Pub 2), issued in November 1959, all contain the phrase "the

Army includes such aviation as may be organic to its needs ."

Developments on the political side also influenced doctrine,

organization, and concepts for airland combat . For example, the

American people agreed with President Eisenhower that never again

would we be involved in a long, inconclusive war like Korea . To

prevent this from recurring, the US developed a policy of massive

retaliation which was in effect from 1953 to 1961 . Since the

emphasis was upon nuclear weapons, the shift in doctrine was

toward strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and the systems to

carry them. This very much encouraged the Air Force to ignore

tactical air in support of airland combat in favor of strategic and

tactical nuclear systems.

In 1961 President John F. Kennedy made a complete change in

our policy. Kennedy did not like the nuclear-only option and so

developed the policy of flexible response . Flexible response

authorized appropriate forces to deter, fight, and win at any level of

conflict. As a result of this policy, tactical air-and the

Army-received new life . With the ensuing buildup of tactical air,

the Air Force was, for the first time in 50 years, ready for a war

during peacetime-conventional or nuclear-an advantage that

could have made a difference in Vietnam .

The Vietnam experience provided another opportunity to

organize US military forces for the most efficient application of

firepower. 85 Yet, we were to experiment again and again with

different methods . With a clear set of instructions-Joint Pub

0-2-the United States should not have had difficulty ; but, once

again we had to face some tough organizational questions .

25
AIRLAND COMBAT

The initial command structure used in Vietnam evolved from the

Military Advisory Group that was established on 17 September

1950 . In the beginning the role of the US Military Advisory Group

was very limited . After the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, however,

that role dramatically changed. On 1 November 1955 the Military

Advisory Group was redesignated the Military Assistance Advisory

Group, Vietnam. From 1955 to the early 1960s the US military was

involved only in organizing and training Vietnamese units; it had no

combat role .

On 8 February 1962 the Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam-known as MACV-was formed replacing the Military

Assistance Advisory Group.

86 MACV was an operational

headquarters and had the staff elements needed if direct military

operations were required. In discussions over command arrangements, the Army and Air Force argued that MACV should be a

theater unified command with land, naval, and air components. The

Navy opposed such an arrangement and recommended Pacific

Command function as the unified command structure for Vietnam

where the commander in chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC)-a

naval officer-would control all forces assigned to Vietnam.

CINCPAC won, and military operations in Vietnam came under the

Pacific Command with MACV as a subunified command under

Pacific Command. However, the debate continued about the

structure of such a subunified command.

The command structure used in Vietnam in 1962 was as follows.

Pacific Command, the unified command-under the JCS-had three

components : the air component, Pacific Air Forces; the naval

component, Pacific Fleet; and the land component, US Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam, which was also the subunified

command, MACV. Under the air component-commander in

chief Pacific Air Force (CINCPACAF)-there was the Thirteenth

Air Force, with the 2d Air Division advanced echelon at Tan Son

Nhut. Under the naval component-commander in chief Pacific Fleet

(CINCPACFLT)-there were the Seventh Fleet, Fleet Marine Force,

and Task Force 77 . Under the land component and subunified

26
HISTORICAL REVIEW

command-MACV-were the III Marine Amphibious Force, US

Army Support Group, Vietnam, and the assigned Army combat

units .

As the war expanded into Laos, new questions arose over

command relations . On 12 May 1964 President Lyndon B . Johnson

sent a joint task force-Joint Task Force 116-composed of Army,

Air Force, and Marine units to Thailand . $$ Joint Task Force 116 was

deployed to show US resolve about Laos .

This new arrangement presented a problem for the Air Force and

Army. Air Force assets were fragmented among three commands:

Joint Task Force 116, air units from the USAF's Tactical Air

Command; South Vietnamese air units under the 2d Air Division

advanced echelon ; and air units in Thailand under the Thirteenth

Air Force . The question of command relationships between Joint

Task Force 116 and MACV was particularly difficult for the

Army .

89

The Army recommended that all forces in Vietnam and Thailand

be placed under MACV. 9° The Navy disagreed with the idea of a

single command under the Army in Vietnam. The Navy preferred

separate headquarters in Vietnam and Thailand . 9l CINCPAC

recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that MACV have two

deputies-one for Vietnam and one for Thailand-with the

commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

(COMUSMACV), commanding both MACV and Military

Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI). 92 The JCS agreed,

and Joint Task Force 116 was deactivated and replaced by

MACTHAI.

The debate was not yet over. In 1963 and 1964 the services

continued discussing the complicated command structure in the

Pacific, and in particular Southeast Asia. The Air Force chief of

staff proposed that an airman should be the deputy commander

of MACV. COMUSMACV disagreed with the proposal as he was

satisfied with his deputy being an Army officer . The Air Force also

proposed that MACV be organized along the lines of a theater of

27
AIRLAND COMBAT

operations with MACV being a unified command having a land and air

component.

93

The JCS continued to discuss the issue in 1964 . The debate

centered around making MACV a unified command. The JCS were

divided on the issue, and to break the deadlock, COMUSMACV

proposed that MACV be a specified command reporting directly to

the JCS . There is a fundamental difference between a unified and

specified command . "A specified command recognizes the

dominance of one service in military operations [while] a unified

command represents a multiservice activity." 94 COMUSMACV's

proposal would make the US Army the executive agency for the

specified command . CINCPAC opposed this idea, and the JCS

agreed. The issue of MACV becoming a specified command never

came up again, but the issue of a unified command for MACV

continued .

95 Thus, by the end of 1964 the command organization

was still not settled .

In 1964 CINCPAC opposed command arrangement changes in the

Pacific . He believed that the war against North Vietnam should

be fought by two components, Pacific Air Forces and Pacific Fleet,

while the war in South Vietnam and Laos should be fought by forces

assigned to MACV and supported by Pacific Fleet and Pacific Air

Forces . In 1965 the Air Force again raised the issue of having an

airman as the deputy commander of MACV. These two issues were

discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on 25 June 1965 the

position of air deputy for MACV was approved. However, the

command structure did not change . MACV was still a subunified

command under Pacific Command, and the deputy commander for

MACV was a soldier, but a new position-deputy commander for

air operations-was created . Prior to this change, there was no single

air component commander. The naval component was handled by

CINCPAC . The air deputy position was then, in effect, the air

component under the subunified command, MACV. The air

deputy exercised operational control over Air Force assets, but his

authority was specifically excluded from control over Army

helicopters and Marine aviation.

97

28
HISTORICAL REVIEW

Although the Air Force raised the issue of a single manager for

air with MACV numerous times, the command arrangement issue

lay essentially dormant from 1965 through the end of 1967 . In

January 1968 the problem of the fragmentation of the air effort

became very clear with the battle for Khe Sanh. 98 The issue of a

single manager for air thus came to the forefront .

MACV Directive 95-4, 6 May 1965, had excluded Marine

aviation from control of the MACV air deputy ; Marine forces were

employed in I Corps (the northernmost corps area in South Vietnam)

under the III Marine Amphibious Force command . "Under this

directive [and arrangement], air power was further fragmented by

the establishment of all elements of two separate tactical air forces

in the theater, one controlled by the theater air component

commander and the other by the equivalent of a corps commander

(III MAF) ." 99

The Army and Air Force supported a single manager for air for

all tactical air in Vietnam .

IOO The Navy and Marine Corps

objected. The issue was debated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

early 1968 . On 15 May 1968 the deputy secretary of defense

decided in favor of the Army and the Air Force. US Air Force and

US Marine Corps air assets in South Vietnam came under the direct

control of the air deputy, MACV. IO1 The debate was not ended, but

the creation of a single manager for the air war in South Vietnam

did function as proposed until the end of the Vietnam War.

102

American involvement in the Vietnam conflict officially ended in

1973, drawing to a close a war that challenged our military in many

ways-not the least of which was deciding the command arrangement for airland combat . Gen William C . Westmoreland,

commander of MACV from 1964 to 1968, summed up the command

arrangements when he stated:

In view of this [Vietnam] command arrangement, seeds of friction not unlike

those that had plagued MacArthur . . . during World War II were present. As I

took command of MACV, the CINCPAC . . . was succeeded by one who was

as determined as I to make the command arrangement work . . . what many failed

to realize was that not I but Sharp (CINCPAC) was the theater commander . . .

my responsibilities and prerogatives were basically confined within the

29
AIRLAND COMBAT

borders of South Vietnam. Admiral Sharp commanded the Navy's Seventh

Fleet, over which I had no control (and) when the bombing of North Vietnam

began i n . . . 1965, Admiral Sharp controlled that too. . . . My task would have

been easy had I headed a "Southeast Asia Command" (unified command).

Creating a unified command for all of Southeast Asia would have gone a

long way toward mitigating the unprecedented centralization of authority in

Washington . . . . Instead of five "commanders "-CINCPAC,

COMUSMACV, and the American ambassadors to Thailand, Laos, and

South Vietnam-there would have been one man directly answerable to the

President on everything . . . . Such an arrangement would have eliminated

the problem of coordination between the air and ground wars that was

inevitable with CINCPAC managing one, MACV the other.

103

The Vietnam conflict, like the Korean conflict, was primarily an

airland campaign, and for the Air Force it was a tactical air

campaign . It did, however, include tactical employment of strategic

bombers as well as use of tactical fighter-bombers hitting strategic

targets in North Vietnam.

Tactical air power was much more useful in the conventional war

inside South Vietnam and in the interdiction campaign in Laos and

North Vietnam. The airland battle employment gave the United

States a great advantage in that the Air Force enjoyed air superiority

over the battle area and could concentrate upon close air support and

interdiction missions in support of the airland battle . The Air Force

used a system first initiated in World War II to conduct airland

combat. This system called for preplanned sorties backed up by

"on-call" (alert) aircraft, all in close coordination with the Army.

After the conclusion of the Vietnam conflict, unlike our previous

three wars, the United States did not forget the importance of air and

land assets for the conduct of future airland combat. The current US

policy of flexible response calls for abalance between conventional and

nuclear weapons. With an apparent nuclear parity between the US and

Russia, it appears that a conventional war, requiring ground forces and

tactical air, is the most likely kind of conflict we face today.

The period after the Vietnam War provided the military services

another opportunity to profit by past experience when designing

command structures to fight wars . Two recent examples are the Rapid

30
HISTORICAL REVIEW

Deployment Joint Task Force (which is now called the US Central

Command) and Space Command discussions . On 24 April 1981 the

secretary of defense announced that "over a period of three to five years,

the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) should evolve into a

separate unified command-with its own geographic responsibilities,

service components, forces, intelligence, communications, logistics

facilities, and other support elements ." 104 In setting up new unified

commands, the military has an opportunity to establish a command

structure with clear and direct lines of authority and responsibility .

105

1973 to the Gulf War to the Present

The past years have provided military planners with an opportunity

to apply lessons learned from past wars to set up a command and control

system to accomplish airland combat. The two major issue areas have

been the US Army's AirLand Battle concept and the US Air Force-US

Marine Corps discussion over tactical air assets during sustained

operations ashore.

The current discussion of command and control of tactical air for

sustained operations ashore began during the Vietnam conflict. The

Air Force raised the question of centralized control of air power many

times. Although this question has been raised, and answered numerous

times in the past, it never has really been resolved-each time it was

"resolved" someone brought it up again, and again it was discussed and

once again resolved . During World Wars I and II and during the

postwar eras of 1947-50 and 1953-65, the issue was discussed by

the Army and Air Force, and they agreed that air power would be

centrally controlled by the air component commander. Then came

Vietnam and the introduction of US Marine Corps (USMC) forces

in a sustained-operations-ashore role. This was a relatively new role

for Marine forces because in past conflicts the Marines participated

primarily in amphibious operations and had little or no play in

sustained operations ashore, although they did have forces in Korea

to carry out sustained operations ashore. When the issue was raised

31
AIRLAND COMBAT

in Vietnam, the Army and Air Force chiefs decided to place all aviation

assets under the air component commander. The Marine Corps and

Navy did not agree, but in time reluctantly consented to this

arrangement .*

After Vietnam the question of USMC forces being committed to

sustained operations ashore came up again during the review of

operations plans in NATO.

106 The Marine Corps wanted to employ

its forces as an integrated team of land and air assets under its

doctrine of the Marine Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTF) . The US

Air Force and Army and allied forces disagreed and argued for

employment of Marine forces in accordance with combined doctrine

and in line with Army and Air Force interpretation of Joint Pub 0-2

on integrating armed forces as a team of land, air, and naval forces.

The issue was debated in 1979, and in December 1980 the Marine

Corps and Air Force presented their views to the joint chiefs . After

discussion the joint chiefs reached an omnibus agreement whereby

they agreed that as far as possible the integrity of the Marine

Air/Ground Task Force would be maintained, but the joint force

commander would be the final authority on any command

arrangement. This agreement is still the operative one and is used

when developing command structures today .

The agreement really did not resolve the issue, because it left

the decision of who controls the Marine Air/Ground Task Force up

to the unified and specified commanders . Since the services

provide forces to the commanders of unified and specified

commands, the decision is really left to the individual services .

As a result, recent command structures (e .g ., the Central

Command discussion) have included four components-Army,

Navy, Air Force, and Marine-as opposed to the "functional

three" (air, land, and naval) which we find in the current unified

command structure .

In airland combat, the command structure to accomplish

theater warfare becomes very complicated. The commander-

" It took three years to get their grudging agreement.

32
HISTORICAL REVIEW

joint task force, unified or specified, subunified-now has an additional

component commander. Instead of dealing with ground and air forces,

the commander deals with these two plus a Marine component

commander when US Marine forces are operating in a

sustained-operation-ashore role. The Army and Air Force do not agree

with this method. They have expressed a strong desire to have all land

forces come under the land component commander and all air forces

come under the air component commander. On the other hand, the US

Marine Corps and Navy argue for the additional Marine component.

Now add to this the issue of naval air assets operating in the airland

campaign in an in-support-of role and you can see how complicated the command structure becomes .

The other issue discussed was the US Army's AirLand

Battle concept. Aside from the question of centralized control

of air power, this issue has generated considerable discussion

and has the potential for becoming the catalyst for future joint

doctrine on airland combat .

The issue first appeared in the midseventies when Army

officers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, began looking at the

integrated battlefield . The Army invited officers from the Air

Staff and Headquarters Army Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC) and from Tactical Air Command (TAC) to participate

in discussions on how to integrate chemical, nuclear, and

conventional weapons on the modern battlefield . Discussions

ensued over how to use tactical air on the battlefield . At about

the same time TRADOC was looking at the extended battlefield, and discussions were ongoing in NATO over battlefield

air interdiction . The period 1976 to 1980 was marked by

intense discussions over integrating air and land assets on the

modern battlefield .

107

In 1978 the Army circulated its concept to the Army Staff and

Air Staff. Gen Donn A. Starry, then commanding general of the

US Army's Training and Doctrine Command, began an extensive

campaign to gain acceptance of this "new" concept. After much

discussion the headquarters staffs of the Army and Air Force

33
AIRLAND COMBAT

coordinated the agreement. It was signed in 1981 by Lt Gen Jerome F.

O'Malley, the Air Force's deputy chief of stafffor plans and operations,

and by Lt Gen Glen K. Otis, the Army's deputy chief of staff for

operations and plans . The O'Malley-Otis Agreement defined apportionment and allocation* of offensive air support. This was an

important first step in the development process of joint war fighting

for airland combat. The emerging Army doctrine got its name in

March 1981 when General Starry used AirLand Battle to describe

the Army concept. From 1981 to 1983 more discussion ensued on

how to fight the AirLand Battle ; and in 1983 the two service

chiefs-Gen Charles A. Gabriel and Gen John A. Wickham-signed

a memorandum of agreement on 22 May 1984 . The GabrielWickham Agreement addressed broad, across-the-board,

war-fighting issues, and identified 31 specific initiatives which have

the potential to enhance our war-fighting capability and have an

impact upon the way future airland combat is conducted. The period

from 1984 to 1989 saw a refinement of the AirLand Battle concept

envisioned by General Starry in 1980 . In early 1990 the doctrine

underwent a reexamination . It should be noted that AirLand Battle

doctrine is US Army doctrine and has not been formally accepted

by the US Air Force as Air Force doctrine.

The Army is currently rewriting its AirLand Battle doctrine in

light of the current changes in East-West relations . The fast-paced

geopolitical changes have forced the Army to rethink its

war-fighting strategy . The Army is developing a new strategy

entitled "AirLand Battle-Future." This strategy is based upon a

smaller but versatile, deployable ground force. All indications are

that this strategy will still have the corps as the centerpiece of its

AirLand Battle doctrine. The Army will use smaller, lightweight

units to fight the battle.' °s The US Army's Training and Doctrine

Command updated the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine in 1991 in a

working draft publication entitled "Trends and Implications for

" See Terms and Definitions . Apportionment is basically the determination and assignment of the

TOTAL expected effort expressed in a percentage or priority ; allocation is the translation of the

apportionment into total number of sorties .

34
HISTORICAL REVIEW

the US Army's Future Airland Battle ." This publication states

that AirLand Battle-Future is an evolutionary concept that will

project the airland battle into the next century . The Army is in

transition from a forward defense focus to a force focused upon

projection and deployability. The paper goes on to describe the why

and how of the Army's disciplined evolution as a strategic force for

the 1990s and beyond with a focus at the operational level . However,

the central issue of joint operation remains the same and will not

change in the future-the requirement for cooperation of land and

air forces will always be there.

In 1986 the National Security Act of 1947 and the Department of

Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 were amended by the

Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 . This act

strengthened the role of the joint chiefs and reaffirmed the unified

command structure. The Goldwater-Nichols Act, as it relates to

airland combat, places clear responsibility on the commanders (the

joint commanders) of unified and specified combatant commands

for mission accomplishment-in essence reaffirming the authority

of the unified commander to organize his forces as needed to

accomplish the assigned mission . This in effect creates the

environment for the joint commander to establish component

commanders to carry out the unified mission unencumbered by the

services' staffs (i .e ., without having the chief of Naval Operations

Staff or the Air Staff or the Army Staff "approve" the organization) .

However, the joint chiefs would be the final approval authority

of any command arrangement for a unified command ; so the

services do contribute to the "discussion" through their respective

chiefs when the issue is discussed in the tank.

Also in 1986, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces

(UNAAF), was published (Joint Pub 0-2 replaced JCS Pub 2) . This

joint publication establishes the principles and doctrine that govern

the activities of the armed forces when two or more of the services

are acting together. This publication also sets forth "principles and

doctrines to govern the joint activities and performance of the armed

forces of the United States" ("Purpose," p. 1) . It provides guidance

35
AIRLAND COMBAT

governing the exercise of command by unified, specified, and

joint force commanders. Joint Pub 0-2 provides military guidance

for use by the military departments and armed forces in the

preparation of their detailed plans . The integration of forces,

provided by the services for assignment to combatant commands, is

known as the unified command structure . The underlying principle

of unified operation is, of course, the principle of unity of effort.

Unity of effort is defined as an efficient team of land, naval, and air

forces which is based on the principle that "effective use of the

military power of the nation require[s] that the efforts of the separate

Military Services be closely integrated" (p . 1-1) . This is done to

prevent unnecessary duplication or overlapping of functions among

the services . This integration should enable the armed forces to

achieve a high degree of cooperation by coordinating the operations

of the team to promote efficiency and economy and to prevent gaps

in responsibility-that is, to fight more effectively .

It should be noted that the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act

and Joint Pubs 0-2 and 1-01 assign responsibility to the joint staff

for the development of joint doctrine. The services participate in the

development of joint doctrine . For example, the Air Force

developed, in coordination with the other services, joint doctrine for

air defense of land areas, including the United States .

In the summer/fall of 1990, after Saddam Hussein invaded

Kuwait, the US military was faced with a serious problem : How. to

respond to a crisis and defend our ally, Saudi Arabia, from Iraq .

For the Air Force, it had to develop a strategic air campaign and a

plan to support our land forces .

To support the joint force commander, US commander in chief,

Central Command (CINCCENT), the US Air Force provided the

joint force air component commander (JFACC)-as specified in

Joint Pub 3-01 .2 (formerly JCS Pub 26) . The JFACC, who was

commander of US Central Command Tactical Air Force

(COMUSCENTAF), was charged to ensure that unity of effort was

achieved, to serve as the Area Air Defense Commander and as the

36
HISTORICAL REVIEW

Airspace Control Authority, and finally, to ensure proper application of

air power in support of Central Command (CENTCOM) objectives .

Because the US was prepared for use of its forces in such a

situation-that is, the USCENTCOM-and used that plan, the

outcome of the Gulf war was predictable. For the first time, the US

did not experiment with a command structure, but used the one

specified in joint publications . Specifically, the use of a JFACC

allowed the joint force commander, CINCCENT, to effectively

conduct the war. The agreed upon definition of JFACC conforms to

the spirit and intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of

1986 . Also, the JFACC enhances unity of command and, hence,

unity of effort.

The Air Force had three major problems to solve from the onset.

The first was the defense of Saudi Arabia, the second was the

beddown of US air, and third, the development of the air campaign.

The success of the air campaign may be directly linked to the

success of the JFACC concept . With a single commanderUSCINCCENT-who reported directly to the president, through the

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretary of defense,

who had a single person-the JFACC-responsible for the

preparation and execution of the air campaign and backed by true

experts in air warfare, truly, then did we as a nation use unity of

command to its fullest .

The Future

The change in the international political environment that started

in late 1989 could tempt one to doubt that any aspect of our future

situation could be predicted with real validity, but that is not the

case. 109 We can expect a relative decline in superpower influence in

the world and may have to cope with a superpower succession

because one nuclear-armed power, the USSR, has lost its standing

in favor of a new European concentration of influence. While arms

control will continue to be a fertile field for the development of

37
AIRLAND COMBAT

mutual confidence, it will become increasingly evident that arms control

treaties serve essentially to place milestones marking the passage of

evolving security relationships but not their ultimate destination. As the

changes in central and eastern Europe engender greater economic

productivity, international competition can be expected to increase,

both for markets and for resources. International interdependence will

never be higher. In this environment we must assume that the United

States will endeavor to continue the global reach of its influence and

will tailor its military capabilities appropriately to exercise balanced,

stabilizing, global power.

The size and pace of modernization of Soviet nuclear and

conventional force structure has not yet begun to show signs of

significant change to reflect reforms in Soviet intentions . Crucially

important, through this transitional period, is the resolute maintenance

of ample deterrent forces. In the earlier years of the bipolar standoff, the

United States did not feel confident that it could assure deterrence

without a rather massive nuclear weaponry advantage. With years of

experience in a relatively stable relationship, deterrence was maintained

with decreasing numbers and size of nuclear weapons. The current

turbulence in the East may undercut assumptions about the Soviets'

motivations and place limitations on national decision-making

operatives used in the stable past.

US involvement in major conventional conflict is changing so

significantly that an entirely new concept needs to take shape

before we can see major future conventional missions with any

clarity . Rather than standing with the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization to defend European countries against the old Soviet

Union (now Russia), we will be standing with all the EuropeansEast and West-to help preserve stability in the midst of a period of

dynamic and potentially dangerous change. Outside of Europe we

can expect to find a world where major regional powers try to profit

from the relative decline in superpower influence . The fact that this

comes at a time of increased worldwide competition for markets and

resources and even greater interdependence means that our ability

to project power globally will become increasingly important for the

38
HISTORICAL REVIEW

protection of the full range of US interests around the world. The most

spectacular expansion of military roles is taking place at lower levels of

conflict. Events in Central America highlight the rapidity with which

US political and economic interests, interfacing with third-world

problems, can escalate to the point that US military intervention is

justified. A whole new area of antidrug operations is opening up.

Security and humanitarian assistance programs require military

involvement. Sovereignty protection and the environmental and

resource policing of the global commons all imply military capabilities

exercised in support of the active role we can expect the United States

to continue to play in the world.

Land, naval, and air forces all make their contribution to this

strategy . Ground forces seize and hold strategically dominant

locations, naval forces control important ocean and coastal areas,

and air forces extend potentially decisive power. This view of joint

operations is important if we are to avoid a conceptual trap caused

by structuring our capabilities around one strategy-naval, ground,

or air.

In the era of shrinking defense budgets, hard decisions need to be

made to insure that the strategy we follow is a winning one-one

that accords with a realistic view of the world, and one that enables

us to play from our strongest suit.

We do not know what kind of war the US military will fight in the

future. The only thing we can say with any degree of certainty is that

military forces will be required, to some degree, to protect our national

interests . Since we must be prepared to defend the US against a wide

range of threats, it is important that we recognize the fundamental

soundness of joint actions whereby the services provide, train, and

equip forces to fight under a unified command structure .

Summary

George Santayana once remarked that those who cannot

remember the past are condemned to repeat it . I I° If the United States

39
AIRLAND COMBAT

is to arrive at a logical command structure to accomplish airland combat,

we must avoid past mistakes when setting up command arrangements .

Very little has changed over the past 70 years . The same issues

that existed during World War I are still with us today . At times we

"solve" a problem only to "forget" what the solution was when faced

with the same problem years later. A good example is the question

of centralized control of air power. Policy has shifted toward

jointness over these years. Prior to 1942 we had the doctrine of

mutual cooperation . After 1942 we developed the unity of effort

doctrine . In summary, the lesson we should learn from our

experiences with command structures during wars over the past 70

years is this : When developing a command structure, we should

place all theater-assigned assets under a single unified commander.

The forces should be subdivided, under this commander, into three

components-generically called land, naval, and air components.

All forces should operate as a coherent team under this unified

command structure, which must have clear and direct lines of

authority and responsibility. The review of the command structures

used over the past seven decades tends to show that we have moved

toward unity of command but have never fully achieved it .

III

The next chapter discusses these issues-sustained operations

ashore and airland combat-in greater detail and provides the

framework for our current organization for airland combat.

Notes

1 . 1 am deeply indebted to Col John F. Shiner, USAF, Retired (Formerly of the

Office of Air Force History) for his help in developing this chapter of the book.

2. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine ofthe United States

Air Force, 16 March 1984, 1-3 . Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 20 August

1982, discusses these same thoughts in chapters 2 and 7 . For example, FM 100-5 uses

the expression "achieve a position of advantage from which to destroy or threaten the

destruction of the enemy," 2-4.

3. AFM 1-1, 1-3.

4. 1. B. Holley, Jr ., Ideas and Weapons (Washington, D.C. : Office of Air Force

History, 1983), v .

5. Giulio Douhet as quoted in Holley, 15.

40
HIST( zZICAL REVIEW

6. Holley, 3-5 . See also Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the

Middle , I hes (London: Methuen, 1898), 597-615.

7. l-'+.)lley, 5, as quoted from Oman, 57-124 .

8. Ibid . Oman, as quoted in Holley .

9. Ibid .

10. Ibid ., 5-6 .

11 . Ibid ., 19.

12. See Col Thomas A. Cardwell III, USAF, Command Structure for Theater

Warfare : The Questfor Unity ofCommand(Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Press,

1984), 7-24, for additional background information.

13 . Lee Kennett, "The First World War, 1914-1918," Office ofAir Force History

working paper (Washington, D.C. : Office of Air Force History, n.d .), 7.

14. John Frederick Shiner, "The Army Air Arms in Transition, General Benjamin

D. Foulois and the Air Corps, 1931-1935" (PhD diss ., Ohio State University, 1975),

in Kennett, 1.

15. Kennett, 7.

16. Ibid ., 1-54.

17. Ibid ., 12.

18. Ibid ., 19-21 .

19. Extracted from German Manual, "The Attack in Position Warfare," 1 January

1918, in Kennett, 20.

20. Ibid ., 21 .

21 . Ibid ., 22-33.

22. Ibid ., 24-39.

23 . Ibid ., 40.

24. Ibid ., 41-50.

25 . Ibid ., 51.

26. Ibid., 53-54.

27. Portions of this section were adapted from Cardwell, 7-10; and from Alfred

Goldberg and Lt Col Donald Smith, USAF, Army-Air Force Relations: The Close Air

Support Issue, Rand Report R-906-PR (Santa Monica, Calif. : Rand Corporation,

October 1971), 2-8. (Previously classified . Declassified in 1982.)

28. Cardwell, 8.

29. John D. Millett, The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

(Washington, D.C. : Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,

1954), 26 .

30. Ibid ., 25 .

31 . Executive Order 9082, Reorganization of the Army of the United States and

Transfer of Functions within the War Department, 28 February 1942.

32 . Ibid ., and Millett, 37.

33 . Millett, 37 .

4 1
AIRLAND COMBAT

34. "Command and Employment of Military Forces," USAF Extension Course

Institute, vol. 2, pt. C (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air War College, 1952), 5.

35. Ibid .

36. Ibid .

37. Gen W. W. Momyer, USAF, Retired, Air Power in Three Wars (Washington,

D.C . : Government Printing Office, 1978), 50.

38. General Eisenhower was under considerable pressure to have all American

ground forces placed under General Montgomery's commandand to have a single air

component commanded by the British. The American forces opposed this . To appease

both the British and the Americans, Eisenhower elected to retain ground forces under

his authority, and to keep tactical air and RAF bombers under the British and US

strategic bombardment under the Americans . Thus, bowing to political pressures, he

compromised the command structure. Momyer, 46-52.

39. Ibid ., 51 .

40. Ibid ., 50-51, for a detailed discussion .

41 . Ibid ., 51 .

42. FM 100-20, Commandand Employment ofAir Power, July 1943, 16.

43 . Ibid .

44. Ibid .

45 . John L. Frisbee, "Command Lines for Combat Force," Defense 81, August

1981,10. See also Frisbee, "New Life forJCSat Forty,"AirForceMagazine, February

1982, 86. The Joint Chiefs of Staff first met on 9 February 1942 having been

established by President Franklin D. Roosevelt following the Arcadia Conference of

December 1941-January 1942. President Roosevelt and United Kingdom (UK) Prime

Minister Sir Winston Churchill agreed to form the US-UK Combined Chiefs of Staff

as the military organization to provide strategic direction for American and British

forces . The US Joint Chiefs of Staff was the counterpart of the British Chiefs of Staff

committee which was organized in 1923.

46. Frisbee, "Command Lines," 10.

47. Ibid .

48. Goldberg and Smith, 6.

49. Ibid .

50. Ibid ., 7-8 .

51 . Ibid ., 8 . For a detailed discussion on unification, see Warren A. Trest,

"The Legacy of Halfway Unification," Air University Review 37, no. 6 (SeptemberOctober 1986) : 63-73 .

52. Goldberg and Smith, 9 .

53 . Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (New

York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1961), 38. Futrell gives an excellent review of the

events leading up to the Korean War. See pages 38 through 55.

54 . Message, JCS-85743, Joint Chiefs of Staff to commander in chief, Far East,

12 July 1950.

42
HISTORICAL REVIEW

55. Momyer, 52.

56. Roy E. Appleman, United States Army in the Korean War, South to the

Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C. : Office of the ChiefofMilitary History,

Department of the Army, 1961), vii.

57. Ibid ., and Futrell, 43.

58. Futrell, 44. As early as 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had issued a directive

(JCS 1259/27, 11 December 1946) to all theater commanders requiring unified

commanders to establish ajoint staff to provide the specialized knowledge and advice

needed to employ land, naval, and air forces . MacArthur took three years to

acknowledge this directive. He established a Joint Strategic Plans and Operations

Group of the General Headquarters, FarEast Command, on 20 August 1949. However,

in reality, the unification principle never reached the highest level of his command.

Even in June 1950, the General Headquarters, Far East Command, demonstrated an

absence of any vestige of unification principles .

59 . Ibid . Conclusion taken from Far East Air Forces Report I, 24-25, and

reported in Futrell.

60. Ibid .

61 . Ibid .

62. Lt Gen George E. Stratemeyer to commanding general, Far East Air Forces

(CGFEAF) Bomber Command, Mission Directive, 1 l July 1950, in Futrell, 45.

63 . Ibid ., 48.

64. Ibid .

65 . Gen Edward M. Almond to commander, US Naval Forces Far East and

CGFEAF, Mission Directive, Coordination of Air Effort of Far East Air Forces and

United States Naval Forces Far East, 15 July 1950, in Futrell, 50.

66. Futrell, 55.

67. Ibid .

68. The JCS may designate one of its members to act as their executive agent to

execute functions or activities for which they are responsible and for which they have

been assigned a specific responsibility . Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces

(UNAAF), December 1986, par. 30291 .

69. Frisbee, "Command Lines," 11 .

70. See Cardwell, 89-98, for a review of the provisions of Joint Pub 0-2.

71 . Ibid ., and Momyer, 39.

72. Goldberg and Smith, 9.

73. Ibid ., 10.

74. Ibid .

75. Ibid .

76. Ibid .

77. Ibid .

78. Ibid ., 11 . The combat zone was defined as an area "normally understood to

be 50 to 100 miles in depth," and the Pace-Finletter Agreement included a statement

43
AIRLAND COMBAT

that "nothing contained herein is intended to or shall be construed as modifying,

altering, or rescinding any of the assigned functions of the Armed Forces [the Key

West Agreement, dated April 21, 1948] ."

79. Ibid ., 11-12.

80. Ibid ., 12.

81 . Ibid .

82. Ibid ., 13 .

83 . Ibid ., 14.

84. DOD Directive 5160.22, Clarification of Roles and Missions of the

Departments ofthe Army and Air Force Regarding Use ofAircraft, 18 March 1957.

Now cancelled, served its purpose.

85. Ibid., and Goldberg and Smith, 15.

86. Col Harry G. Summers, Jr ., USA, On Strategy : The Vietnam War in Context

(Carlisle Barracks, Pa. : Strategic Studies Institute, US Army WarCollege, April 1981)

provides an insight into military theory and strategy used in Vietnam. He places

Clausewitzian theory and principles ofwar in context of domestic problems and helps

explain the Vietnam Warin hopes ofpreparing the US Army to serve more effectively

in future conflicts. Additionally, this book takes a critical look at how the principle of

unity of commandwas used by the United States and North Vietnam. See pages 87-93

and 101-11 .

87 . Ibid ., and Momyer, 66-68.

88. Momyer, 71.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91 . Gen Paul D. Harkins, USA, COMUSMACV, argued the point.

92. AdmHarry D. Felt, USN, CINCPAC, expressed this view. Momyer, 68-78 .

93 . Ibid ., 73.

94. Ibid ., 74.

95 . Ibid ., 76.

96. Adm U. S . Grant Sharp replaced Admiral Felt on 1 July 1964 as CINCPAC.

97 . Momyer, 77.

98. MACV Directive 95-4, 6 May 1965 . MACV acted at the time of Khe Sanh

to put Marine air in Vietnam under the air component commander. On 22 January

1968, the air component commander was given authority to coordinate the Khe Sanh

support effort . The Marine commander (General Cushman) resisted Marine air being

placed under the control of the air component commander. On 8 March General

Westmoreland formally designated his air component commander, General Momyer,

the single manager for tactical combat aviation in all South Vietnam. Marine air thus

came under the air component commander's direction. It was the battle of Khe Sanh

that created the climate for the discussion that ensued in Washington as the Marine

Corps brought the issue to the JCS. See Barnard C. Nalty, Air Power and the Fight

for Khe Sanh (Washington, D.C. : Office of Air Force History, 1973), 72-81 .

44
HISTORICAL REVIEW

99. "The Single Manager Problem : The Creation of an Operational Control

System for US Tactical Air in I Corps of South Vietnam During 1968" (Washington,

D.C. : JCS Historical Division, July 1976), 1-25. (Previously classified . Declassified

by SM-197-81, 20 March 1981 .)

100 . Ibid ., and Momyer, 82. Maj Gen Norman J. Anderson, USMC, Retired,

provides a different view in his review essay of General Momyer's book. The review

essay titled "Short Shrift for Marine Air" appeared in the May 1981 issue of Marine

Corps Gazette, pages 86-88. General Anderson states : "It was my contention then as

Commanding General, 1st Marine Air Wing, and it remains my conviction today that

the root reason for `single management' was years of Air Force neglect of Army

requirements, neglect which could only be overcome by putting Marine Corps

resources to work for the Army as a stop gap," page 87. Commenting upon the single

manager for air concept in MACV and air component commander (i .e ., the

Commander of the Seventh Air Force), he states :

Others looked at the Seventh Air Force performance quite differently. To them, it simply revived

and reaffirmed the conviction that when, in 1947, the United States set up an independent Air Force,

it went a step too far by including tactical aviation in the newly established department . By thus

separating tactical aviation in doctrine and objectives from the ground forces it is charged with

supporting, ourcountry committed aghastly mistake. Asevidencedin Korea and Vietnam, the Army

relinquished capabilities which were to be regained only after long and bitter machinations in the

war theater, whereas in both instances, the Marine Corps functioned as a team from the outset (page

88).

101 . Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, COMUSMACV, raised the

issue-supported by Gen William W. Momyer, USAF, Air Deputy MACV-with

the JCS in 1968.

102. "The Single Manager Problem." See also Gen William C. Westmoreland, A

Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday &Co., Inc., 1967), chap. 18, "The Battle for

Khe Sanh," 335. The US Marine Corps does not agree with the conclusion reached

by the JCS historical paper. They believe that the single manager for air used in

Vietnam did not work. Momyer, Westmoreland, the US Air Force, and the JCS

Historical Division paper conclude that the single manager for air used in Vietnam

after 1967 did, in fact, work.

103 . Westmoreland, 76, 261-62, and 411 .

104. Air Force Policy Letterfor Commanders: Supplement (Washington, D.C. :

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Government Printing Office, August 1981),

7. The US unified command-Central Command-evolved out of the Rapid

Deployment Joint Task Force.

105 . Gen David C. Jones, USAF, Retired, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, expressed these same thoughts during an address to the class of 1982, Air

War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 29 January 1982. In brief, his remarks were:

45
AIRLAND COMBAT

History has shown that span of control becomes a limiting factor in designing an effective command

structure. For example, when General Marshall was Chief of the Army Staff, he reorganized his

staff because too many people-some 61-reported directly to him. His span of control was too

great . Today, we seem to have slipped back to Marshall's days, our span of control is too great . As

applied to the recent discussions of unified commands, we tend to overly complicate our command

structures with an excessive span of control . We need to ensure his command structure is a true joint

command, with representation from each service, with clear and direct lines of communications .

(Used with permission of General Jones.) See also Joint Pub 0-2, 3-4. General Jones,

in an interview at the Pentagon on 17 February 1982, and reported in The Montgomery

Advertiser, 18 February 1982, 49, in an article titled "General Seeks Changes in Joint

Chiefs System," stated that "changes need to be made in the joint system ." The aim

of his proposed changes was to "improve planning . . . in military readiness matters.

The current system . . . puts emphasis on budget matters and on . . . peacetime

management of the services . Changes in strategy tend to threaten traditional service

roles or a redistribution of money."

106. Interview with Maj Gen Carl D. Peterson, USAF, Retired, former air deputy,

Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), NATO, held on 6 February 1982, in

Panama City, Florida. The commander in chief, United States Air Forces in

Europe/commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, told the USMC that when they

arrived in Central Europe, commandand control of USMC aviation forces would be

in consonance with current NATO doctrine and procedures . Disagreeing with this

philosophy and NATO's doctrine for employing air power, the Marines looked to

AFNORTHas the most fruitful ground to perform their NATO mission in consonance

with their own doctrine . The AFNORTH air forces-commanded by Norwegians,

Danes, and Germans-were opposed to the USMC doctrine . The fact that a force was

to be dedicated to the area and pre-position equipment in central Norway to back up

General Peterson's commitment, is perhaps a major factor in which these political

decisions overrode military concepts, doctrine, and command and control procedures .

107. John L. Romjue, "AirLand Battle : The Historical Background," Military

Review 60, no. 3 (March 1986) : 52-55.

108 . "Army Rewrites Airland Battle Doctrine To Reflect Geopolitical Changes,"

Inside the Army, 19 February 1990, 7. See also "Trends and Implications for the US

Army's Future Airland Battle," Training and Doctrine Command, working draft,

Airland Battle for a Strategic Force, 18 January 1991 (CMD-GP-27-1).

109. Col John J. Kohout III, USAF, Retired, contributed to this section of the

book. I appreciate his insights into the "future."

110. Phillip A. Crowl, The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions without

Answers, The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, no. 20 (Colorado

Springs, Colo. : US Air Force Academy, 1978), 1, stated this same thought when he

said: "History is simply recorded memory. People without memory are mentally sick.

So, too, are nations or societies or institutions that reject or deny the relevance of the

collective past ."

46
HISTORICAL REVIEW

111 . See Cardwell for discussion . See also Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, "Two

Decades in the Air Power Wilderness : Do We Know Where We Are?" Air University

Review 37, no. 6 (September-October 1986) : 2-13, for discussion on the history of

air power.

47

Chapter 2

Airland Doctrine

A moment's insight is sometimes worth a life's experience .

-Holmes

"Sound military doctrine is essential to the successful implementation

of US strategic concepts. Joint doctrine ties together the capabilities of

the different military services, guiding both the employment and

development of forces."' Joint doctrine is influenced by service

perspectives and doctrine. Service doctrine forms the basis for joint

doctrine because joint doctrine requires the concurrence of the services.

Since war fighting will be done jointly, the services should subordinate

service doctrine to joint doctrine for airland combat-or at least make

service doctrine agree with joint doctrine.

The services are moving toward a more joint flavor to war-fighting

doctrine. Joint Pub 0-2 and the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act

of 1986 assigned responsibility for the development ofjoint doctrine to

the Joint Staff.

Before reviewing joint doctrine for airland combat, I will briefly

overview service doctrines to lay the foundation for the discussion on

joint doctrine.

US Army AirLand Battle Doctrine

The US Army articulates its doctrine for airland combat in Field

Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations . The current edition details the US

Army's perspective on airland doctrine. It stresses mobility, flexibility,

49
AIRLAND COMBAT

and staying power so that the Army will be prepared to win the first

battle of any war. 2

From the US Army's point of view, warfare is ajoint effort combining

the forces of the US military establishment to accomplish the objective.

"In the contemporary world, it is also necessary that Army, Navy,

Marine Corps, and Air Force requirements be coordinated so as to

exploit unique characteristics of each service, and so as to avoid

unnecessary duplication among the Services ."3 This captures the

Army's capstone doctrinal statement on force employment. The key

element of Army doctrine is a land force prepared to fight worldwide

against a varied threat while integrated, under a single commander, into

an effective team of land, naval, and air forces .

The Army seldom fights alone since the military operations of US

forces normally will involve the employment of more than one service.

The Army subscribes to the provisions ofjoint doctrine publications as

they relate to force deployment, while stating that tactical employment

is written by each service, and is found in service doctrine. 4

To support the objectives of theater commanders and to prosecute the

land battle, the Army employs the AirLand Battle doctrine of which

deep battle is a part . From the Army's perspective, the corps

commander plays the vital role of force executor. It is from this corps

perspective that the US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine was created

some 10 years ago. According to the Historical Research Department

of the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command, the "story of how

the US Army came to formulate the doctrine of AirLand Battle [and

thus the doctrine found today in FM 100-5] is a significant chapter in

Army history ."5

The AirLand Battle doctrine replaced the active defense doctrine

with its emphasis upon firepower and force ratios. The current Army

doctrine is an initiative-oriented land doctrine that restored, in the US

Army's view, the maneuver-firepower balance and signaled a return to

the fundamental principles of attaining victory .

According to current doctrine, the Army views the battlefield as one

battle having three distinct areas-rear, close-in, and deep. However,

the three areas of the battlefield are inextricably linked. As there is only

50
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

one battle, the corps commander must have the means to control and

influence the rear, close-in, and deep areas of the battle. Service forces

must be synchronized (integration of tactical assets) into the land

commander's maneuver scheme.

The Army is currently reviewing the AirLand Battle doctrine with a

view toward a force focused upon projection and deployability . The

strategy is based upon a smaller but more versatile ground force. This

new strategy is entitled "AirLand Battle-Future," and like previous

updates is grounded in the corps concept of battle management.

US Air Force Doctrine for Tactical Air Operations

The US Air Force articulates its doctrine for air combat in Air Force

Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air

Force, and the supporting operational or tactical doctrine in the Air

Force and major air commands' 2-series tactical manuals .6

AFM 1-1 states that doctrine for joint operations describes service

responsibilities for force employment by two or more services and

stresses that air forces must be effective in supporting the other services

in their roles and missions. Air Force doctrine further states that air

power, to be effective, must be coordinated with other forces because

Air Force missions during theater air operations are not isolated from

land operations. 8

Basic AirForce doctrine does not specifically address airland combat,

but indirectly discusses the Air Force missions which contribute to

theater warfare and hence land operations .

Air Force missions describe broad military objectives attained by employing

aerospace forces . . . . The fundamental role of the Air Force is to prepare

aerospace forces to accomplish these missions : strategic aerospace offense;

defense; counter air; air interdiction ; close air support; special operations ;

airlift ; aerospace surveillance and reconnaissance; and aerospace maritime

operations .

Additionally, the Air Force performs specialized tasks which enhance

the execution ofAir Force missions and "support(s) the accomplishment

51
AIRLAND COMBAT

of other Services' missions as well ." 1° These include aerial refueling,

electronic combat, intelligence, aerospace rescue and recovery,

psychological operations, and weather services.

11

According to Air Force doctrine, mutual support of the other services

is an important function of aerospace forces. To support the land

campaign, the Air Force provides the theater commander close air

support for land forces, tactical air reconnaissance and surveillance,

air defense, offensive counterair, air interdiction (to include battlefield

air interdiction), and special air operations .

Naval Doctrine in Support of Land Warfare

Although the naval services do not have, like the US Army and US

Air Force, basic or capstone doctrine, they do have doctrinal

pronouncements that illuminate naval views for joint warfare . The US

Navy and US Marine Corps doctrines for employment of naval forces

in support of airland combat are articulated in Naval Warfare

publications and Commandant of the Marine Corps white letters. These

are contained in such publications as Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)

8, Amphibious Warfare Doctrine, Naval Warfare publications, and

Marine Corps manuals .

US Navy aviation assets, if required to support airland combat, are

flown "in support of" these operations . Operational control is not

passed to the land or air component commander; the naval component

commander retains operational control . This use of naval aviation in

support of the Army in AirLand Battle, according to naval doctrine, is

temporary in nature. The rationale given by our naval forces is that

naval aviation is for fleet defense and is required primarily to support

naval and amphibious operations.

12

The US Marine Corps states that if Marine forces are employed in

airland combat, they will be employed as an integrated unit called the

Marine Air/Ground Task Force . Marine Corps doctrine emphasizes

the close integration of Marine air and ground assets that function as a

separate component of a naval task force, joint task force, or combined

52
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

force. 13 Marine Corps doctrine provides that the employment of the

MAGTF in nonamphibious-airland-combat will be as an integrated

entity and that the MAGTF is prepared to operate alone in any battlefield

scenario . 14

Joint Doctrine for Unified Operations*

Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), establishes

the principles and doctrine that govern the activities of the armed

forces when two or more of the services are acting together." This

publication also sets forth "principles and doctrines to govern the

joint activities and performance of the armed forces of the United

States ." 16 It provides guidance governing the exercise of command

by unified, specified, and joint force commanders. Joint Pub 0-2

provides military guidance for use by the military departments and

armed forces in the preparation of their detailed plans . The

integration of forces, provided by the services for assignment to

combatant commands, is known as the unified command structure .

The underlying principle of unified operation is, of course, the

principle of unity of effort .' 7 Unity of effort is defined as an efficient

team of land, naval, and air forces which is based on the principle

that "effective use of the military power of the nation requires that

the efforts of the separate Military Services be closely integrated ." 18

This prevents unnecessary duplication or overlapping of functions

among the services . This integration enables the armed forces to

achieve a high degree of cooperation by coordinating the operations

of the team to promote efficiency and economy, and to prevent gaps in

Portions of the material contained in this section were originally published as Doctrine Information

Publication 1, So You Want to KnowAboutJCSPub 2, prepared by Lt Col Thomas A. Cardwell III, USAF,

and distributed by the Assistant Deputy Directorate for Strategy, Doctrine, and Long-Range Planning,

Headquarters USAF, Washington, D.C ., 25 August 1978 . The more important parts of the Doctrine

Information Publication have been presented here to underscore the salient points on how to organize for

joint and combined warfare. This section was updated in 1987 to track to the December 1986 version of

JCS Pub 2. Pub 2 was renumbered to Joint Pub 0-2 by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1988 .

Additionally, it was again updated in 1992 to account for changes in joint doctrine and revisions to Joint

Pub 0-2.

53
AIRLAND COMBAT

responsibility-that is, to fight more effectively . 19 Joint Pub 0-2 assigns

responsibility to the services for the development of joint doctrine .

For example, the US Air Force is charged with the responsibility

for developing, in coordination with the other services, joint

doctrine for air defense of land areas, including the United States.

20

Joint Pub 0-2 is based upon the provisions of law as outlined in the

National Security Act of 1947, as amended; Titles 10 and 32 of the US

Code, as amended; DOD Directive 5100.1, sometimes called the

"Functions Paper"; DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 ; and the

Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986. In enacting these laws,

Congress intended

to provide a comprehensive program for the future security ofthe United States ;

to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the

departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national

security ; to provide a Department of Defense including the three Military

Departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United

States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and

control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department

shall be separatelyorganized under its own Secretary and shall function under

the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for

their unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary ofDefense but not

to merge these departments or services ; to provide for the establishment of

unified or specified combatant commands, and a clear and direct line of

command to such commands; to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the

Department ofDefense, and particularly in the field ofresearch and engineering,

by vesting its overall direction and control in the Secretary of Defense; to

provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration in the

Department of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic direction of the

combatant forces ; for their operation under unified command, and for their

integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces, but not to

establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an overall armed

forces general staff. 21

Additionally, the National Security Act of 1947 was amended in 1986

by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This act strengthens the role of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff by reorganizing the Department of Defense. The

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of

1986 makes the following statement of policy :

54
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

In enacting this Act, it is the intent of Congress, consistent with the congressional

declaration ofpolicy in section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S .C.

401)

1. to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority

in the Department;

2. to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National

Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;

3. to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and

specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned

to those commands;

4. to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified

combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those

commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;

5. to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency

planning;

6. to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;

7. to improve joint officer management policies ; and

8. otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and

improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

22

The military departments and services provide forces for assignment

to unified and specified commands (service line of authority) .

Commanders of unified and specified commands exercise operational

command over these assigned forces . The service component

commanders are responsible to the unified or specified commander, in

the operational chain of command, for the composition of subordinate

forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and the

authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.

23

The authority to establish unified and specified commands is found

in chapter 3 of Joint Pub 0-2. Unified and specified combatant

commands are established and designated by the president through the

secretary of defense with the advice and assistance of the chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Commanders of unified and specified commands are responsible to

the president and secretary of defense for the accomplishment of the

military mission assigned to them. The chain of command runs from

the president to the secretary of defense through the JCS to the

commander. This is operational direction or operational command and

not service line of authority. For purposes other than operational

55
AIRLAND COMBAT

direction, the chain of command runs from the president to the secretary

of defense to the secretaries of the military departments (Army, Navy,

and Air Force), and thence to the service chiefs . The services have

responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces

to fulfill certain specific combatant functions . 24

The JCS is subject to the authority and direction of the president and

secretary of defense, serves as the adviser and military staff in the chain

of operational command (with respect to unified and specified

commands), and coordinates all communications in matters of joint

interest addressed to the commanders of the unified and specified

commands . Of interest is the fact that the joint staff "shall not operate

or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall

have no executive authority." 26 The JCS is composed of the chairman

of the JCS, the chiefs of staff of the Army and the Air Force, the chief

of naval operations, and the commandant of the Marine Corps.

Common Functions of the Military Departments

Chapter 2 of Joint Pub 0-2 outlines the primary and collateral

functions of the services and responsibilities by law of each service .

Common functions of the military departments and services include the

requirement to

1 . prepare forces and establish reserves of supplies and equipment

to meet the needs of war;

2. maintain mobile reserve forces for emergencies;

3 . provide departmental intelligence for DOD use;

4. prepare and submit budgets and justify before Congress

DOD-approved programs . Administer funds provided for maintaining,

equipping, and training forces;

5 . conduct research and development, develop tactics and

techniques, and develop and procure weapons and equipment essential

to the fulfillment of assigned functions ;

6. garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases;

7 . assist in the training and equipping of military forces of foreign

nations;

56
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

8 . provide such administrative and logistic support to headquarters

of unified and specified commands;

9 . assist the other services in their assigned functions ; and

10. organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to unified and

specified commands.

Each of the services has primary and collateral functions . The forces

developed and trained to perform the primary functions described in

Joint Pub 0-2 are employed to support and supplement the other

services' forces in carrying out their primary functions . This assistance

occurs whenever it results in increased combat effectiveness and

contributes to the accomplishment of the overall military objectives .

While the assignment of collateral functions may establish further

justification for stated force requirements, collateral functions are not

used as the sole basis for establishing additional force requirements .

29

Army

Listed below are the primary and collateral functions of the Army,

Navy, and Air Force as they relate to joint operations. The Department

of the Army is responsible for preparing land forces to meet the needs

of war. The Army includes land combat and service forces and such

aviation and water transport as may be organic to the Army. Selected

functions of the Army are to

l . organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and

sustained combat operations on land-specifically, forces to defeat

enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas;

2. organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and

missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of

forces as required for the strategic defense of the United States, in

accordance with joint doctrines ;

3 . organize, equip, and provide Army forces, in coordination with

the other military services, for joint amphibious, airborne, and space

operations and to provide for the training of such forces, in accordance

with joint doctrines . Specifically, the Army:

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AIRLAND COMBAT

a. develops, in coordination with the other military services,

doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Army for

amphibious operations and not provided for elsewhere in Joint Pub 0-2 ;

b. develops, in coordination with the other military services, the

doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army and Marine

Corps forces in airborne operations. The Army will have primary

responsibility for developing those airborne doctrines, procedures, and

equipment that are of common interest to the Army and the Marine

Corps ;

c. develops, in coordination with the other military services,

doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army forces in the

conduct of space operations;

4. provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine necessary

for the effective prosecution of electronic warfare operations and, as

directed, support of other forces;

5. develop doctrines and procedures, in coordination with the other

military services, for organizing, equipping, training, and employing

forces operating on land, except that the development of doctrines and

procedures for organizing, equipping, training, and employing Marine

Corps units for amphibious operations will be a function of the Marine

Corps, coordinating as required with the other military services;

6. organize, train, equip, and provide forces, as directed, to operate

land lines of communications.

30

The collateral functions of the Army are to train forces to interdict

enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on or

from land.31 The Army is given other responsibilities, which include

space operations and close air support of ground forces . With respect

to space operations, the Army has specific responsibility for the

following:

1 . organizing, training, equipping, and providing Army forces to

support space operations ;

2. developing, in coordination with the other military services,

tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by Army forces for use in

space operations;

5 8
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

3 . participating with other services in joint space operations,

training, and exercises as mutually agreed to by the services concerned

or as directed by competent authority; and

4. providing forces for space support operations for the Department

of Defense when directed.

With respect to close air support of ground forces, the Army has specific

responsibility for providing, in accordance with interservice

agreements, communications, personnel, and equipment employed by

Army forces.

33

The Army functions (primary and collateral) are oriented to

terrain-to conduct operations on land and to seize and occupy land

areas, among others. Key points on Army responsibilities for the

conduct of land operations are determining Army force requirements;

planning, procuring, organizing, equipping, and training forces;

developing doctrines, procedures, tactics, and techniques ; providing

logistic support; and administering forces for the Army.

Navy and Marine Corps

The Department of the Navy is responsible for preparing Navy and

Marine Corps forces to meet the needs of war. The Navy contains naval

combat and service forces including organic land and aviation units .

Selected functions of the Navy and Marine Corps are to

1 . organize, train, equip, and provide Navy and Marine Corps

forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to

operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and

land-based naval air components. Specifically, the Navy and Marine

Corps provide forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to

suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval

supremacy, to control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of

communication, to establish and maintain local superiority (including

air) in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval

bases, and to conduct such land, air, and space operations as may be

essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

59
AIRLAND COMBAT

2. maintain a Marine Corps organized, trained, and equipped tc

provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with

supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or

defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land

operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign .

In addition, the Marine Corps will provide detachments and

organizations for service on armed vessels ofthe Navy, provide security

detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and

bases, and perform such other duties as the president may direct.

However, these additional duties must not detract from or interfere with

the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized . These

functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army .

Further, the Marine Corps will

a. develop, in coordination with the other military services, the

doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by landing

forces in amphibious operations . The Marine Corps will have primary

responsibility for the development of landing force doctrines, tactics,

techniques, and equipment which are of common interest to the Army

and the Marine Corps;

b. train and equip, as required, forces for airborne operations, in

coordination with the other military services, and in accordance with

joint doctrines;

c . develop, in coordination with the other military services,

doctrines, procedures, and equipment of interest to the Marine Corps

for airborne operations and not provided for by the Army, which has

primary responsibility for the development of airborne doctrines,

procedures, and techniques, which are of common interest to the Army

and Marine Corps;

3 . organize and equip, in coordination with the other military

services, to provide naval forces, including naval close air support and

space forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious operations, and to be

responsible for the amphibious training of all forces assigned to joint

amphibious operations in accordance with joint doctrines ;

60
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

4 . develop, in coordination with the other services, the doctrines,

procedures, and equipment of naval forces for amphibious operations

and the doctrines and procedures for joint amphibious operations;

5 . organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic nuclear

warfare to support strategic deterrence ;

6 . furnish adequate, timely, reliable intelligence for the Coast

Guard;

7. organize, train, equip, and provide forces for reconnaissance,

antisubmarine warfare, protection of shipping, aerial refueling and

mine laying, including the air and space aspects thereof, and controlled

minefield operations;

8 . provide the afloat forces for strategic airlift;

9 . organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and

missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of

forces as required for the strategic defense of the United States, in

accordance with joint doctrines;

10. provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine necessary

for the effective prosecution of electronic warfare operations and, as

directed, support of other forces;

11 . develop, in accordance with the other services, doctrines,

procedures, and equipment employed by Navy and Marine Corps forces

in the conduct of space operations;

12. provide sea-based launch and space support for the Department

of Defense when directed;

13 . coordinate with the Department of Transportation for the

peacetime maintenance of the Coast Guard. During war, the Coast

Guard will function as a military service . The specific wartime functions

of the Coast Guard are as follows:

a. to provide an integrated port security and coastal defense

force, in coordination with the other military services, for the United

States;

b . to provide specialized Coast Guard units, including

designated ships and aircraft, for overseas deployment required by

naval component commanders ; and .

6 1
AIRLAND COMBAT

c. to organize and equip, in coordination with the other military

services, and provide forces for maritime search and rescue, ice

breaking, and servicing of maritime aids to navigation ."

The collateral functions of the Navy and Marine Corps are to train

forces to interdict enemy land and air power through operations at sea,

conduct close air and naval support for land operations, furnish aerial

cartographic photography, and prepare to participate in the overall air

and space effort .

35 Additionally, the Navy and Marine Corps are given

other responsibilities . With respect to space operations, the Navy and

Marine Corps have specific responsibility for the following:

1 . organizing, training, equipping, and providing Navy and Marine

Corps forces to support space operations ;

2 . developing, in coordination with the other military services,

tactics, techniques, and equipment employed by Navy and Marine

Corps forces for use in space operations; and

3 . participating with the other services in joint space operations,

training, and exercises as mutually agreed to by the services concerned

or as directed by competent authority.

36

Other responsibilities of the Navy and Marine Corps include

1 . providing and operating sea transport for the armed forces other

than that which is organic to the individual services; and

2. developing in coordination with the other services, doctrine and

procedures for close air support for naval forces and for joint forces in

amphibious operations .

37

Naval responsibilities for the support of naval operations include:

determining Navy and Marine Corps force requirements; planning,

procuring, organizing, and equipping ; developing doctrine, procedures,

tactics, and techniques ; providing logistic support; and administering

forces for the Navy and Marine Corps. Naval functions, including naval

air, are oriented toward the sea.

62
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

Air Force

The Department of the Air Force is responsible for preparing air

forces necessary to meet the needs of war. The Air Force includes

aviation forces, both combat and service . The primary functions of the

Air Force are to

l . organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of

prompt and sustained combat operations in the air-specifically, forces

to defend the United States against air attack in accordance with

doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff-gain and maintain

general air supremacy, defeat enemy air forces, conduct space

operations, control vital air areas, and establish local air superiority

except as otherwise assigned;

2. organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and

missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of

forces as required for the strategic defense of the United States, in

accordance with joint doctrines ;

3 . organize, equip, and provide forces for joint amphibious, space,

and airborne operations, in coordination with the other military services,

and to provide for their training in accordance with joint doctrines ;

4. organize, train, equip, and provide forces for close air support

and air logistic support to the Army and other forces, as directed,

including airlift, air support, resupply of airborne operations, aerial

photography, tactical air reconnaissance, and air interdiction of enemy

land forces and communications;

5. organize, train, equip, and provide forces for air transport for the

armed forces, except as otherwise assigned;

6. develop, in coordination with the other services, doctrines,

procedures, and equipment for air defense from land areas, including

the United States;

7. organize, train, equip, and provide forces to furnish aerial

imagery for use by the Army and other agencies as directed, including

aerial imagery for cartographic purposes;

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AIRLAND COMBAT

8 . develop, in coordination with the other services, tactics,

techniques, and equipment of interest to the Air Force for amphibious

operations and not provided for elsewhere;

9 . develop, in coordination with the other services, doctrines,

procedures, and equipment employed by Air Force forces in airborne

operations;

10. provide launch and space support for the Department of Defense,

except as otherwise assigned;

11 . develop, in coordination with the other services, doctrines,

procedures, and equipment employed by Air Force forces in the conduct

of space operations;

12. organize, train, equip, and provide land-based tanker forces for

the in-flight refueling support of strategic operations and deployments

of aircraft of the armed forces and Air Force tactical operations, except

as otherwise assigned;

13 . organize, train, equip, and provide forces, as directed, to operate

air lines of communications; and

14 . provide equipment, forces, procedures, and doctrine necessary

for the effective prosecution of electronic warfare operations and, as

directed, support of other forces.

38

The collateral functions ofthe Air Force are to train forces to interdict

enemy sea power through air operations, conduct antisubmarine warfare

and protect shipping, and conduct aerial mine-laying operations. 39 Key

points on Air Force responsibilities for the conduct of air operations

include: determining force requirements ; planning, procuring,

organizing, and equipping ; developing doctrine, procedures, tactics,

and techniques ; providing logistic support; and administering forces

for the Air Force .

The Air Force is given additional responsibilities . With respect to

space operations, the AirForce has specific responsibility for the following :

1 . organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces to support

space operations ;

64
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

2. developing, in coordination with the other military services,

tactics, techniques, and equipment employed for use in space

operations; and

3 . participating with the other services in joint space operations,

training, and exercises as mutually agreed to by the services concerned,

or as directed by competent authority.

40

Other responsibilities of the Air Force include

1 . with respect to amphibious operations, the Air Force will

develop, in coordination with the other services, tactics, techniques, and

equipment of interest to the Air Force and not provided for by the Navy

and Marine Corps;

2. with respect to airborne operations, the Air Force has specific

responsibility to provide forces for the air movement of troops, supplies,

and equipment in joint airborne operations, including parachute and

aircraft landings; and

3 . with respect to close air support of ground forces, the Air Force

has specific responsibility for developing, in coordination with the other

services, doctrines and procedures, except as provided for in Navy

responsibilities for amphibious operations and in responsibilities for the

Marine Corps .

Unified Command Structure*

Perhaps the most important part of Joint Pub 0-2 is chapter 3, which

outlines and describes the unified command structure . This chapter

provides guidance for commanders who employ the forces that are

organized, equipped, trained, and provided by the military departments .

Chapter 3 discusses command, organization, operations, intelligence,

logistics, and administration of service-provided forces in a unified

and specified command structure. Command is defined in these

terms-direction, coordination, and control ; an order; a unit under the

command of one individual . Command given an individual in the

unified structure is called operational command. Specific guidance is

See appendix, "Unified Command Plan," for more detailed information .

65
AIRLAND COMBAT

provided on the exercise of operational command, where the

commander of the unified command is authorized to

1 . plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the action of

assigned forces;

2. conduct joint exercises;

3 . exercise direct authority for logistics within the command; (Note :

The military departments and services continue to have responsibility

under the secretary of defense for logistic and administrative support

of component commands.)

4 . exercise direct authority over all elements of the command;

5. establish plans, policy, and overall intelligence activities of the

command;

6. participate in the development and acquisition of the command

and control system and direct its operation ; and

7 . review respective military department budgets bearing on the

command to verify they are in agreement with plans and programs.

Operational command is exercised through the service component

commanders-land, naval, and air components .

43

A unified command is a command established by the president with

a broad continuing mission under a single commander. It is composed

of assigned components of two or more services (e .g., United States

European Command is a US unified command with United States Air

Force Europe as the air component).* A commander of a unified

command may direct the attachment of elements of any service

components to a subordinate unified command, joint task force, or

uniservice force . A specified command is a command established

by the president which has a broad continuing mission and is composed

normally of forces from one service .

There is only one specified command: US Army Forces Command

(FORSCOM). A joint task force is a force composed of assigned or

attached elements ofthe USA, USAF, USMC, and USN, or two or more

There are currently nine unified commands : USEuropean Command, US Space Command, US Central

Command, US Atlantic Command, US Transportation Command, US Southern Command, US Pacific

Command, US Special Operations Command, and US Strategic Command.

6 6
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

of these services, which is constituted by the secretary of defense or by

a unified or specified commander. A joint task force, unlike a

subordinate unified command, is not a permanent command

arrangement.

Joint Pub 0-2, paragraph 3-15, defines the methods of exercising

command by a unified commander. One method is the use of functional

component commanders. Others are: through a service component

commander establishing a single service (uniservice) force that reports

directly to the commander of the unified command (may be established

only under exceptional circumstances and normally will be assigned to

the service component commander), establishing a joint task force, and

attaching elements ofone force to another through a subordinate unified

command (when authorized by the JCS) and directly to a specific

operational force. At times the unified command issues orders directly

to specific operational forces. Due to the mission and urgency of the

situation, this special force must remain immediately responsive to the

commander. The commander must identify these specific forces, and

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must approve them.

In December of 1988 the Joint Chiefs of Staff published an initial

draft of Joint Pub 3-0, entitled "Doctrine for Joint Operations." 44* The

purpose of this draft regulation is to set forth "doctrine principles and

fundamentals to govern the unified and joint activities of the armed

forces of the United States." 45 This publication states that the doctrine

is authoritative but not directive, and that commanders shall exercise

their best judgment in applying it . Joint Pub 3-0 was developed to

provide a basis for employment of joint forces and provides the

guidelines for the planning and execution of theater strategy,

campaigns, and joint operations. Additionally, this publication states

that "single service, joint, combined, and other U.S . Government or

allied agency operations are integrated by the CINC, [commander in

chief-the theater commander/joint force commander], resulting in

unity of effort within the theater." 47

`Joint Pub 3-0 is now entitled "Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations" and is atest publication dated

1 January 1990.

67
AIRLAND COMBAT

According to Joint Pub 3-0, the theater commander "organizes his

theater, in peace, to posture forces and resources for war." 48 In

organizing the theater command for peace and war, the commander

must consider mission, task and objectives, the nature and scope of US

military operations, the capabilities of and the doctrinal commonality among allied and US forces, and logistical considerations .

Additionally, the theater commander exercises operational command

through subordinate commanders. The commander may, according to

Joint Pub 3-0, organize command of forces in one of seven ways . These

are : service component commanders ; functional component

commanders; subordinate unified commanders ; joint task force

commanders; single-service force commanders ; a specific operational

force commander; or by attachment (i .e ., by attaching elements of one

force to another force)49 This publication also states that when

conducting unified operations, the theater commander conducts joint

operations (when forces of two or more services are involved), service

operations (operations conducted by service forces involved under the

same service), or supporting operations (operations conducted by forces

assigned to one CINC but placed in support of another CINC) . So

In a nutshell, this publication says that the theater commander shall

organize forces to accomplish this assigned mission as he prepares for

and executes his deterrent and war-fighting responsibilities . Although

JCS publications do not specifically address airland combat, they do

provide broad guidance for the development of joint doctrine,

procedures, and tactics when two or more services are operating

together such as in airland combat for theater warfare.

Analysis of Service and Joint Doctrine

To fully understand the services' views on theater warfare and a

command structure for airland combat, one must compare not only the

written doctrine but also how the services use that doctrine in arriving

at a structure for joint doctrine for airland combat. This section

compares and analyzes doctrinal statements to provide an insight into

68
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

the services' actual employment of their forces in a theater of operation .

By analyzing the services' doctrine, the following general statements

can be made concerning airland and sea combat.

The Navy and Air Force view war fighting from a theater perspective .

The Army sees the battle from the corps' perspective where the corps

is the highest tactical fighting unit, although the Army fully supports

the concept of an echelon above the corps (i .e ., an element higher than

the corps-for example, a field army) . The Marines view war fighting

from a single-mission, uniservice perspective ; that is, from the

perspective of an integrated, combined arms force-the Marine Air/

Ground Task Force-which is task organized to perform a specific

mission. These views drive the services to differing opinions on how

to organize forces for airland combat. The services' written doctrines

support these views .

Naval forces are structured to conduct sea control and power

projection. Air Force forces are structured to support surface (land or

sea/water environment) operations and to carry out the air campaign.

Army forces are structured to support the concept of the corps as the

highest tactical combat command in theater warfare. Marine Corps

forces are structured to support the concept of an integrated Marine

air-ground team in support of theater objectives.

Each of the services formally acknowledges the principle of unity of

effort but not always unity of command. However, each service applies

this principle of unity of effort in varying ways. The Army, Navy, and

Air Force agree that one single commander-the theater or joint force

commander-should exercise operational control of theater-assigned

assets through the land, naval, and air component commanders . The

Marine Corps believes that Marine combat forces should come directly

under the joint or theater commander and be employed by a Marine

component commander. The Army and Air Force believe in the

functional component-air, land, and naval; the Navy and Marine

Corps believe in the service component-US Navy component, US

Marine Corps component, US Air Force component, and US Army

component.

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AIRLAND COMBAT

All four services believe that the theater or joint task force

commander should organize forces the best way he sees fit . In general,

the Army and Air Force believe there are three generic components

composed of land forces, naval forces, and air forces . The Navy and

Marines believe that for sustained operations ashore by US Marine

forces, a fourth component should be added. If the theater or joint force

commander organizes forces with only three components, then the Navy

and Marine Corps would support this arrangement as long as Marine

aviation remained integral to the MAGTF. They do not support placing

Marine Corps ground combat forces under the land component and

aviation forces under the air component-that is, splitting the MAGTF.

The US Army has employed its forces under the unified command

structure since the beginning of the concept in the early 1940s . Army

forces are normally divided into an army group or field army and then

further divided into corps. Past decisions by the Army Staff and

doctrinal statements by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command

have tended to imply a drift from this principle of unified command.

For example, the US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine portrays the battle

from a corps-and-below perspective. 51 Additionally, the 1973 Abrams

agreement changed Army doctrine by placing emphasis on the corps,

thus in effect eliminating the echelon above corps (that is the field or

group army) . The Army recognized that an echelon above corps was

needed and is working to provide the interface for joint coordination of

organic Army assets and Air Force tactical air assets . Ongoing

discussions by the Army Staff and Air Staff, and the dialogue between

the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and the Air Force's

Tactical Air Command (TAC), have centered on working out

procedures to effect the needed coordination between Army and Air

Force units in a theater of operations.

In 1977 discussions began over how to integrate USAF and USA

tactical assets . The central theme was integration of chemical,

conventional, and nuclear weapons. Several meetings were held at the

Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to focus

on this area. These meetings led to discussions on how to fully utilize

tactical air on the battlefield . At about the same time, discussions were

70
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

ongoing in NATO at the Land Forces Tactical Doctrine Working Party

and the Tactical Air Working Party on employment of air and land assets

on the modern battlefield . By 1978, a concept had been developed by

TRADOC and was circulated in NATO and to the Air and Army staffs .

This concept generated considerable discussion . The concept was

perceived by NATO air forces, to include the USAF, as a move by

armies to control tactical air assets . The heart of the problem was a

feeling that the concept was really an attempt to splinter air power and

to go back to the days of "corps air forces" much like those found in

North Africa in 1942 and in France in 1944.

After much discussion the staffs at TRADOC and TAC reached an

agreement on control of the airland battle . The headquarters staffs of

the Army and Air Force coordinated the agreement which was signed

by the services' deputy chiefs of staff for operations in 1981 . This

agreement defined the apportionment and allocation of offensive air

support and was an important step in the development process of true

joint-or at least US Army and US Air Force joint-war fighting . This

was an important step because for the first time the Army and the Air

Force had a common definition for the employment (apportionment and

allocation) of offensive air support. Additional discussions ensued from

1981 to 1983, and these discussions led to a memorandum of

understanding (MOU) on Joint USAJUSAF Efforts for Enhancement of

Joint Employment of the AirLand Battle doctrine signed on 21 April

1983 . On 22 May 1984 the two service chiefs signed a memorandum

ofagreement (MOA) on US Army-US Air Force development process.

The MOA addressed broad war-fighting issues and identified 31

initiatives which have the potential to enhance our war-fighting posture

and have an impact on the way future combat operations are conducted.

Gen Charles A . Gabriel, USAF, Retired, former Air Force chief of

staff, stated that

last May [1984], Army Chief of Staff Gen John A. Wickham, Jr ., and I

emphasized our commitment to increased cooperation by requiring a

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on Joint Force Development. The MOA

identified thirty-one initiatives aimed at improving joint cooperation and

providing the most effective joint airland capability . . . . There has been

significant improvements in many areas. . . . Aside from hardware decisions,

71
AIRLAND COMBAT

the most important aspect of the process has been a significant improvement in

our joint approach to major force-structure issues, and that bodes very well for

the future . General Wickham and I are committed to the fullest implementation

of all the initiatives, and progress has been excellent . We're also working more

closely with the Navy. . . . Interservice cooperation increases our warfighting

capability, meets the needs of our commanders, and produces the most cost

effective force possible.

54

Like the Army, the US Navy employs its forces under the unified

command principle . The Navy believes in the unified command

structure to fight a theater war; however, if naval forces are assigned to

unified commands not associated with naval operations (e.g., support

of the land campaign), then these naval forces operate "in support of

the airland operation, where operational control remains with the fleet

commander. This means that naval forces supporting the theater or

joint task force commander may not be diverted, withdrawn, or used in

other tasks without the express approval of the fleet commander. Under

the unified component command system, this presents no problem for

the theater command organization as the fleet commander and the naval

component commander are one and the same.

In the case of naval aviation supporting a land campaign, a problem

exists . In effect, there would be two air component commanders

operating in the same area. The argument presented by the Navy is that

naval air assets are limited, must be available as required to maintain

sea control, and must be responsive to the needs ofthe fleet, for defense

of the fleet, and in maintaining the sea lines of communication." The

Navy points out that naval air assets supporting the land commander

will be provided to the theater or joint task force commander as

determined by the fleet commander.

57 Discussions between the Navy

and Air Force over this issue resulted in an agreement that naval air

assets provided for support of land operations will be in an "in support

of" role .

58 Senior officers of the Air Force and Army argued for naval

air assets to be placed under the air component commander. The

rationale is that having two air component commanders operating in the

same area creates coordination problems, inhibits effective command

and control of peacetime exercises, and could maximize the difficulty

of transitioning from peace to war.

72
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

Historically, the Marine Corps has operated under the operational

control of the naval component commander of a unified command when

conducting amphibious operations. In recent history Marine forces

have been employed more in a sustained-operations-ashore method of

employment than in amphibious operations . When employed in

sustained operations ashore, the question of command and control is

raised . The Marine Corps argues that when operating in support of the

land campaign-sustained operations ashore-these forces should be

placed under the theater or joint force commander and operate as a

uniservice command.

Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance on employment of USMC tactical air

during sustained operations ashore is as follows : (1) under most

circumstances, the theater or joint commander will organize his

command to retain the unique capabilities of Marine forces to pose to

an enemy the threat of amphibious operations ; (2) under sustained

combat operations ashore, the theater commander should place the

MAGTF forces under the land component commander-this also

applies to placing Army forces subordinate to a land component

commanded by a Marine ; (3) normally, Marine air assets would remain

organic to the MAGTF; however, under certain circumstances these air

assets could be placed under an air component commander as directed

by the theater commander; and (4) field commanders should organize

their forces for wartime operations and peacetime exercises in ways that

minimize the difficulty of transitioning from peace to war.

60

The Marine Corps argued for the integrity of the MAGTF. Past

discussions by the JCS on these issues led to the services' agreement

that the MAGTF normally would not be split-that is, Marine aviation

would remain integral to Marine land combat forces, but the final

command organization would rest with the theater or joint force

commander.

61 With that guidance the Omnibus Agreement was a

compromise between the USMC and USAF position. The first part of

the agreement is essentially the Marine Corps position, and the second

part is essentially the Air Force position, less the Air Force position of

all air assets coming under control of the air component commander.

62

To clarify the Omnibus Agreement, guidance was issued by the JCS

71
AIRLAND COMBAT

and the services in 1981 . It is interesting to note that the Army and Air

Force interpret this agreement and the guidance along the lines of tacit

approval for the placing of all tactical air (TACAIR) under the air

component commander-not the Air Force, but the air component . The

Marine Corps interprets it as tacit approval to function either as a

uniservice force, fourth component, or as a MAGTF with no splitting

of land and aviation assets . The guidance seems quite clear; it is up to

the theater commander to organize his forces as he sees fit, and it is

important for field commanders to organize their forces in peace as they

will fight in war. The USMC, USA, USAF, and USN have agreed to

the provisions of both the agreement and the guidance. The still

unresolved question is "how should we organize our peacetime forces

for war fighting?" This we have not totally come to grips with. Until

we do, the debate will continue .

Since its inception in 1947, the US Air Force has supported the

unified command principle . The Air Force also supports the

three-component command structure. For theater operations, most air

assets should come under the operational control of the air component

commander.* With the exception of strategic airlift, all bomber, tactical

fighter-bomber, fighter, and support aircraft, including theater airlift,

come under the operational control of the theater air component

commander. For national security reasons, however, the US has

separated strategic airlift from tactical air power in a theater of

operations . This does not create two air components in the same sense

as in the case of naval aviation operating in an "in support of" role or

Marine air operating as part of a MAGTF. The Air Force recognized

that all air power should come under the air component commander,

and in 1992 combined "tactical" and "strategic" air in one command.

Before 1992 when "strategic" assets were assigned to a theater of

operations, SAC advanced echelon was assigned to handle the

strategic assets . Operational control was maintained by SAC. In the

past the US Air Force provided the theater air component commander

with a Strategic Air Command Advanced Operational Nucleus

The Air Force does not state that the air component commander must be a USAF officer . The service

providing the preponderance of the air assets would furnish the air component commander .

74
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

(SACADVON) to support theater strategic bombardment operations .*

Currently all air assets are placed under the air component commander.

The four services have formally agreed with the principles of war

fighting and theater organization as specified in JCS publications, but

have applied the principles in different ways.

63 Looking at the service

doctrine and service perspectives, and then comparing these with joint

doctrine, the following general statements can be made .

Services provide forces to the unified and specified commanders.

They are responsible for training and equipping these forces. The

unified or specified commanders are responsible for organizing and

employing service assigned forces . The organization is specified in

Joint Pub 0-2. The principles found in this publication provide broad

guidance for setting up the command structure. What appears to be

clear guidance gets cloudy when the services interpret this guidance

because each service views the guidance according to its perspectives

of war fighting. All four services formally support the broad guidance

contained in Joint Pub 0-2; however, in applying these principles there

is not always general agreement. This is caused partially by force

orientation . That is, Army and Air Force are oriented toward airland

operations, while Navy and Marine Corps are oriented toward naval

or amphibious operations . Each service carefully guards its functions

as specified in DOD Directive 5100.1 and Joint Pub 0-2. It is from

this functional basis that issues can arise.

Working of Joint Issues

The following section provides one view ofhow issues arise and how

they are resolved. This concept of working joint issues will provide an

insight into the types of problems we face when attempting to develop

an organization for airland combat (fig . 1).

When an issue is discussed in the joint arena, the four services take

sides according to the type of issue discussed. The types of issues

'" Strategic Air Command (SAC) was a specified command and was not part ofa unified command. On

I June 1992 SAC was disestablished and combined with the Tactical Air Command to form the new Air

Combat Command (ACC).

75
normally concern strategy, tactics, or organization-with organizational issues usually generating the most discussion. Figure 2 shows

the perception of functions, roles, and missions as a basis for working

joint issues. Figures 3 through 6 graphically depict how service issues

arise.

64

When the issue is one of strategy, the Air Force and the Army are

usually in agreement and in opposition to the Navy and Marines. It is

simply a matter of medium orientation . That is, the Air Force and the

Army focus upon a continental strategy-the land and the air over the

land and oceans-while the Navy and Marines focus upon maritime

activities such as sea control and power projection . A good example is

the past discussion over maritime strategy . Much discussion ensued

76

AIRLAND COMBAT

over whether the United States is oriented toward a naval (maritime)

strategy or a land (continental) strategy . Figure 3 depicts this

orientation .

When employment or tactics are discussed, the Air Force and Navy

are allied and the Army and Marine Corps join sides . The Air Force and

Navy focus on delivery of firepower while the Army and the Marines

are orientated to physical objectives-land . Figure 4 depicts this

orientation .

Perhaps of greater importance are the debates that occur when

organizational issues arise between the services . We generally find

that the Army and Navy oppose the Air Force and Marines. We find

that the "owners" of the primary medium-land and sea-are in

opposition to the "tenants" who do not own a primary medium, unless

you argue for the qualities of air or the substance of an amphibious

objective area . There are exceptions to this organizational alliance .

Most notable is the issue over tactical control of air assets. In this case

the Army and Air Force are in opposition to the Navy and Marines.

This is due in part to an issue that cuts across two areas-organization

and strategy-and which includes the question of roles and mission

and weapon system employment. Figure 5 depicts this organizational
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

orientation . Taken together, this is one way issues arise in the joint arena

between the services-the basis for service issues (fig . 6) .

Since command structures must be approved by the JCS,

discussions in the joint arena normally occur along these lines: the

Army and Air Force, being oriented toward airland operations, are in

opposition to the Navy and the Marine Corps, which are oriented

toward maritime or amphibious operations . Since strategy plays an

important function also, the discussions tend to focus on medium

orientation, that is, continental versus naval. Therefore, discussions in

the joint arena are primarily focused on command structures whereby

the services argue from a functional approach based upon force

orientation .

Any command structure proposal, or modification to an existing

command structure, must be specifically addressed by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. A good example of this requirement was the establishment of

the new unified command, US Central Command (USCENTCOM).

It should be noted that once agreement has been reached and a

structure is set, the procedures to implement the structure are determined

by the commander in chief of the unified or specified command-the

joint commander. Normally, the commander leaves the detailed

integration of procedures and tactics up to the services to work out. As

in the case of airland combat, the US Army and US Air Force normally

develop procedures to accomplish airland combat; however, all four

services must formally approve them. As services normally develop the

organization and procedures, issues will arise and must be resolved.

Doctrinal differences drive the discussions . These differences have

caused issues not to be resolved or to be resolved not necessarily in the

"spirit and intent" of Joint Chiefs of Staff publications . Additionally,

failure to resolve has caused delays in approving operations plans

(OPLAN) and created the environment to modify exercises where

modification might not be required. As will be shown later, this debate

and failure to make a decision has caused numerous problems.

79

AIRLAND DOCTRINE

Notes

1 . Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Posture FY 1985 (Washington, D.C. :

Government Printing Office, 1985), 9.

2. 1 am deeply indebted to Col Ralph L. Allen, USA, for his help in preparing

this section of the book. Those interested in the development of the US Army's

AirLand Battle concept should see John L. Romjue, "The AirLand Battle : The

Historical Background," Military Review 66, no. 3 (March 1986): 52-55.

3 . FM 100-5, Operations, 20 August 1982, 1 .

4. Ibid ., chaps. 15 and 17.

5 . Romjue, 52.

6. I am deeply indebted to Lt Col Brad Bradley, USAF, and Lt Col Bill

Hopewell, USAF, for their help in preparing this section of the book.

7 . AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine ofthe United States Air Force, 16 March

1984, vi-vii .

8. Ibid ., 4-1 to 4-5.

9 . Ibid ., 3-2.

10. Ibid ., 3-6.

11 . Ibid ., 3-6 to 3-8.

12. Interview with Adm Robert E. Kirksey, US Navy director of Strategy, Plans

and Policy Division, Office ofthe Chief of Naval Operations . See complete interview

in Thomas A. Cardwell, Command Structurefor Theater Warfare: The Questfor Unity

ofCommand (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Press, 1984), 34-35 and 107-9.

13. Fleet Marine Manual (FMM) 0-1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine,

31 August 1979,1-8. See also White Letter no. 7-81, Commandand Control ofUSMC

TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore (Washington, D.C. : CMC, Headquarters

USMC, 29 June 1981). This white letter was superseded by White Letter no. 4-86, 18

March 1986, which reaffirms the doctrine and policy contained in the previous white

letter.

14. FMM 0-1, 1-8; White Letter no. 7-81, 1, and no. 4-86.

15 . Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), December 1986. For

a detailed discussion on joint doctrine see Cardwell, Command Structure, 56-63,

89-98, and 167-68 .

16 . Joint Pub 0-2, 1 .

17. Ibid ., 1-1 ; Cardwell, Command Structure, 56-63, 89-98.

18. Joint Pub 0-2,1-1 . Lt Col Edward M. Postlethwait, USA, "Unified Command

in Theaters of Operations," Military Review 29, no. 8 (November 1949) : 26, describes

service doctrinal views on unified operations .

19. Joint Pub 0-2, 1-3.

20. Ibid ., 2-12.

21 . Ibid ., 1 .

22. Ibid ., 2.

8 1
AIRLAND COMBAT

23 . Ibid., 2-1, 3-2, 3-4, and 3-19.

24. Ibid., 3-2, 3-4, 3-12, 3-19, 3-20, and 3-23.

25 . Ibid ., 1-17 .

26 . Ibid ., 1-20g.

27. Ibid ., 1-17a.

28. Ibid ., 2-1 .

29. Ibid ., 2-3 .

30. Ibid ., 2-5 .

31 . Ibid ., 2-6.

32. Ibid ., 2-7 .

33 . Ibid., 2-8.

34. Ibid., 2-10.

35. Ibid ., 2-11 .

36. Ibid ., 2-12.

37. Ibid ., 2-13 .

38. Ibid ., 2-15.

39. Ibid ., 2-16.

40. Ibid ., 2-17.

41 . Ibid ., 2-18.

42. Ibid., sec. 2.

43. Ibid ., 3-13 .

44. Joint Pub 3-0, initial draft, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," December 1988.

45. Ibid ., 1-1 .

46. Ibid ., 1-2 and 1-3 .

47. Ibid ., 2-17.

48. Ibid ., 3-1 .

49. Ibid ., 3-16 to 3-22.

50. Ibid ., 3-22 to 3-23.

51. Ibid . ; Cardwell, CommandStructure, 137-43 .

52. In 1973 Gen Creighton Abrams, US Army chief of staff, approved a change

in Army doctrine which deleted the army group and merged functions of the field army

and corps into a single echelon called the corps. Cardwell, Command Structure,

99-105 .

53 . Lt Gen William R. Richardson, USA, interview with author, 15 October 1981,

at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. General Richardson was at the time the Army

deputy chief of staff for operations and plans. He stated that the Army was forced to

change its emphasis from the echelon above corps to a corps orientation. However,

the Army recognizes the need to provide a joint interface above corps to work out the

coordination problems between the corps and the Air Force.

54. Gen Charles A. Gabriel, "The Force and the Future," Air Force Magazine,

May 1985, 73.

55 . Interview with General Richardson and FMM 0-1 .

82
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

56 . FMM 0-l .

57 . Ibid.

58 . While assigned to the Air Staff during 1977-81,1 participated along with Lt

Col Willard E. ("Bill") Naslund, USAF, Retired, and Col Robert C. Clark, USAF, in

headquarters staff level discussion with the Navy over the issue of "in support of,"

versus operational control of, naval assets passing to the air component or land

component commander. At the staff level, a consensus could not be reached and the

issue was not passed to the service chiefs for resolution . Therefore, the agreement

stands that naval assets operating in support of land operations and Air Force assets

operating in support of naval operations will be used in an "in support of' role .

59. Lt Gen John H. Miller, USMC (now retired), interview with author, 15

October 1981, at Washington, D.C. General Miller, then the USMC deputy chief of

staff for plans, policy, and operations, stressed the point that the unique nature of the

Marine forces dictates that they must be employed as an integrated team of land, air,

and support forces under the MAGTF commander whoreports directly to the theater

orjoint force commander. However, if the theater orjoint force commander splits the

MAGTF, the USMC would honor that decision . FMM 3-1, Command and Staff

Action, 21 May 1979, states that Marine forces will be employed under a unified,

specified, naval component, or joint task force commander when operating in its

primary function of amphibious operations ; and when operating in combined

operations, Marine forces will be employed as directed by agreed combined doctrine .

No mention is made of how Marine forces will be employed in sustained operations

in current Marine Corps doctrine publications . The commandant's white letters

supply guidance on this aspect of force employment.

60. Doctrine Information Publication (DIP) no. 11, "Command Relationships, the

Marine Air/Ground Task Force, and What They Mean to an Airman!" draft

(Washington, D.C. : Headquarters USAF, Doctrine and Concept Division, 1982), 31 .

61. While assigned to the Air Staff, 1977-81, 1 participated in discussions on

commandand control ofUS MC tactical air assets during sustained operations ashore.

I had the honor to present the Air Force's position to the joint chiefs on 12 December

1980. The Marine Corps' position was presented by Lt Col James W. ("Jay") Bierman,

USMC (now retired) . After deliberations by the joint chiefs, a decision was reached

whereby the MAGTF's integrity would be maintained, but the theater or joint force

commander would make the final determination of how forces assigned to his

command would be organized.

It should be noted that the issue of command and control of Marine aviation assets

first came up in 1968 during the Vietnam conflict. The issue continued through the

1970s and 1980s. In 1977 Col Robert C. Clark, USAF (now retired then a lieutenant

colonel) ; Col Merlin D. ("Huck") Smith, USAF (now deceased); Lt Col Willard E.

Naslund, USAF (now retired) ; Col Donald J. Alberts, USAF (now retired then a

lieutenant colonel) ; and 1, of the Doctrine and Concepts Division, Headquarters

USAF, began developing the USAF position on the single manager for air concept.

83
AIRLAND COMBAT

In 1978 Col David R. McNabb, USAF (now retired), and in 1979 Col Bruce L. Brown,

USAF (now retired), joined the Air Force team when Colonels Smith, Clark, and

Naslund left the division . The years 1978 and 1979 saw many discussions between

the USAF and USMC over the issue of who should have control of USMC aviation

assets-the USAF arguing for the single-manager approach and the USMC arguing

for retention of operational control by the MAGTF commander. In 1980 the issue

came to a head when USMC forces were introduced into NATO. (See chapter 1, note

106.) The issue was debated in the joint arena by Gen Jerome F. O'Malley, USAF

(now deceased), then DCS/Plans and Operations; Brig Gen Robert A. Norman, USAF

(now retired), then director ofJoint and NSC Matters, Headquarters USAF, and author

for the USAF; and by Lt Gen John H. Miller, USMC (now retired), then DCS/Plans,

Policies, and Operations; and Col D. E. ("Dep") Miller, USMC (now retired), and Lt

Col Jay Bierman, USMC (now retired), for the USMC . The joint staff decided to

elevate the issue to the chiefs of the services in December 1980. Colonels Cardwell

and Bierman presented the service views to the JCS on 12 December 1980. After much

discussion a compromise was reached by the chiefs of the services whereby the

integrity of the MAGTF was maintained, but the CINC (theater) or joint force

commander would decide how to organize his forces . This is the current guidance on

employment of USMC forces during sustained operations ashore. Source: Personal

Diary. See also Robert C. Toth, "Joint Chiefs to Resolve Dispute on Air Strategy,"

Los Angeles Times, 12 December 1980, 1 . Having been directly involved in the JCS

discussions over the employment of USMC tactical air during sustained operations

ashore since 1977, I believe that the agreement reached (the so-called Omnibus

Agreement) by the Joint Chiefs of Command and Control of USMC TACAIR during

sustained operations ashore was the best agreement the JCS could make given the

requirement for a unanimous decision by the service chiefs . The chairman of the JCS

stated that he wanted full agreement-no split decisions . The "vote" after both services

presented their views was two to two. The chairman did not vote to break the tie .

More discussion ensued and at the end, the chairman stated he wanted to reach_a

unanimous agreement.

62. Reprinted below is the result of that decision reached on 12 December 1980.

OMNIBUS AGREEMENT ON COMMAND AND CONTROL OF

USMC TACAIR DURING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS ASHORE

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control

of his organic air assets . The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the

support ofthe MAGTF ground element . During joint operations the MAGTF air assets will

normally be in support of the MAGTF mission . The MAGTF commander will make

sorties available to the joint force commander, for tasking through his air component

commander, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance .

Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the joint force

commander for tasking through the air component commander for the support of other

components of the Joint Task Force (JTF) or of the JTF as a whole. Nothing herein shall

infringe on the authority of the theater or joint force commander, in the exercise of

84
AIRLAND DOCTRINE

operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among his

subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort prescribed in JCS Publication 2, "Unified

Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)." USMC White Letter No 7-81, Command and Control

of USMC TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore (Washington, D.C . : Headquarters

USMC, 29 June 1981), and reconfirmed in White Letter No. 4-86, 18 March 1986.

63. The matrix presented below summarizes the services' positions on war

fighting and organization for airland combat. It is based upon the services' written

doctrine on the subject of a war-fighting organization. Cardwell, CommandStructure,

45 .

64. Col Thomas A. Cardwell III, USAF, "How Interservice Issues Arise," Air

University Review 37, no. 4 (May-June 1986): 76-81 . The figures were adapted from

this article.

85

THEATER OR SINGLE MANAGER

PRINCIPLE OF NUMBER OF COMMANDER JTF OPERATIONAL FOR AIR, LAND, AND

UNITY OF THEATER ORGANIZESHIS CONTROL NAVAL

ORIENTATION EFFORT COMPONENTS FORCES EXERCISED BY FORCES

USA Corps, land Agree 3 (naval, land, Agree Theater or JTF' Believes in single

(highest and air) commanderthrough manager for air, land,

tactical - land component and naval forces

command) commander

(normally)

USN Theater (sea Agree (as long 3 (naval, land Agree Theater or JTF Believes in single

and land) as naval forces and air) commander through managerfor air-but

are commanded naval component navalforces are under

by a naval commander navalcomponent

officer) (always)

USAF Theater (air Agree 3 (naval, land, Agree Theater or JTF com- Believes in single

and support and air) mander through air manager for air, land,

of surface component com- and navalforces

operations$ mander (always)

USMC Mission Agree (marine 4 (add the Agree (however, Theater or JTF Do notbelieve in single

directed (am- aviation Marinesas the prefer not to split commander, or by manager forair, land,

phibious and remains under fourth) theMAGTF) Marine component and naval forces ;

other OPCON" of commander Marine air and land fordirected MAGTF)"' (uniservice or service ces are underone

operations) component) manager, the MAGTF

commander

'Joint task force

control

"' Marine

"Operational

Air/Ground Task Force



Chapter 3

Organization for Airland Combat

Alas! Hegel was right when he said that we learn

from history that men never learnfrom history.

-George Bernard Shaw

Perhaps this quote is an oversimplification, but there is a ring of truth

in what he said . Too often we ignore the past when we set up command

arrangements for our military fighting forces . As the preceding chapters

show, the issue ofhow to employ our military forces has been addressed

numerous times. It appears that we address the issue on how to

accomplish airland combat without due regard to how it was done in

the past. This is not to say we should not be innovative or look for better

ways to organize our forces, but at least we should not fall into the traps

of "not invented here" or "let's reinvent the wheel."

Considering service and joint doctrine and the history of airland

combat, the following generalized statements can be made . They are

divided into commandments (fig . 7) and principles (figs . 8 and 9, see

notes 1 and 2) for airland combat.

With these principles in mind, we can look at the issues which affect

airland combat and influence the development ofthe command structure

and organization for the conduct of theater operations .

89
AIRLAND COMBAT

Commandments

1 . The outcome of any war, which is a clash of national wills and

interests, will not always be determined by the defeat of enemies on the

battlefield . Other national instruments of power and influence often

determine the results of war. However, successful military operations

are an indispensable element of winning wars; therefore, military forces

must be prepared-trained, equipped, and organized-to fight and

win .

2. Once the political decision is made to use military forces as part of

our national instruments of power, they must be committed to win . The

purpose of military operations is to gain victory-not avert defeat .

3. To win we must fight the airland campaign with the coordinated

actions of military forces in pursuit of common objectives .

4. The battlefield of the future will not allow the luxury of continually

experimenting with command structures . Therefore, we must organize

in peace as we will fight in war. That is, we must learn from history so

that we can put aside, in peacetime, our service interests to allow us to

organize better for a future war.

5. Airland combat should have as its objective retaining the initiative

and aggressively defeating the enemy. This is accomplished by either

attacking the enemy on a wide front, or using a narrow concentration of

attack for selected in-depth penetration with firepower necessary to

obtain the joint commander's objectives . It requires close coordination

of air, naval, and land forces .

6. The organization to accomplish the airland campaign is composed

of a single commander with three components-land, naval, and air.

The organization is based upon the principles of unity of effort and unity

ofcommand.

7. The application of air power in the airland battle should be centrally

controlled . This allows air power to be massed when and where it is

most needed . The air component commander provides the central point

In low-intensity conflicts or insurgency-type operations, the issue gets cloudy, but the

objective should be to win or gain victory.

-Continued on nextpage90
ORGANIZATION

of contact for the theater commander and coordinates the use of air

power with the land and naval component commanders.

8. The application of ground power in the airland battle should be

centrally controlled . The land component commander provides the

central point of contact for the theater commander and coordinates the

use of land power with the air and naval component commanders .

9. Naval forces, to include Marine assets supporting the airland

campaign, will be controlled by the naval component commander as

part of the three functional components of the theater command.

(Aviation assets will be employed through the air component

commander and ground forces through the land component

commander, when used to support the land campaign.) The naval

component commander provides the central point of contact of the

theater commander and coordinates the use of naval power with the air

and land component commanders.

10 . Coordinated airland combat power allows potentially unlimited

movement for military forces . This inherent power provides a capability

to maneuver freely in all dimensions and fully exploit the characteristics

of speed, range, and flexibility . To realize this potential requires a

pattern of employment whereby forces survey, assess, command,

control, generate assets, then engage and attack-where the single

aim of this employment is victory.

Figure 7 . Ten Commandments of Airland Combat

91
AIRLAND COMBAT

Principles of War

1 . Unity of Command. Give appropriate authority and responsibility to

a single commander to effect unity of effort .

2 . Unity of Effort . This is the coordinated actions by military forces to

accomplish a common goal through a single commander who exercises

unity of command over the components of his command.

3. Objective. Any military activity must have a clear and concise

statement of a realistic objective. (It must be remembered that war is a

means to achieve a political objective and must never be considered

apart from the political end.)

4. Surprise. A force must attack the enemy at a time, in a place, and

in a manner for which the enemy is neither prepared nor expects.

5. Offensive. Unless offensive action is initiated, military victory may

not be possible .

6. Security. Continuous, positive measures must be taken to prevent

surprise and allow freedom of action .

7. Mass and Economy of Effort . Success on the battlefield requires a

proper balance between mass and economy of effort . (Economy of

effort-i .e ., force-is a means to attain mass .) Concentrated firepower

can overwhelm enemy defenses and secure an objective at the right

time and place .

8. Maneuver. Combat requires interaction of moves and

countermoves . Commanders seek to maneuver their strengths

selectively against enemy weakness while avoiding engagements with

forces of superior strength .

9 . Simplicity . To achieve unity of effort toward a common goal,

guidance must be quick, concise, and clear-in short, it must have

simplicity.

10. Cohesion . To win, it is necessary to establish and maintain the warfighting spirit and capability of a force .

Figure 8 . Ten Principles of War in Support

of the Airland Campaign

92
ORGANIZATION

Principles of Command

1 . Unified Command. The integration of combat forces is known as

unified operations and is based on effective use of the military power

which requires that the efforts of the separate services be closely

integrated into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces . These

forces are organized under the principles of unity of effort and unity of

command.

2. Maximum Integration. The integration of policies and procedures

to produce an effective, economical, and harmonious organization is

called maximum integration. Force should be integrated so as to be

able to effect the outcome of any combat situation and have some

degree of survivability .

3. Full Utilization of Forces. Each service's unique capabilities must

be exploited to their full potential to achieve the effective attainment of

overall unified objectives.

4. Command. This principle provides the authority vested in an

individual for direction, coordination, and control of military forces .

Command consists of two elements-operational command and

operational control (which includes tactical control) . Operational

Command: The command authority vested in a commander to

exercise command over his assigned forces . Operational Control:

The overall commander exercises operational control through the

subordinate commands of component-land, naval, and aircommands. Tactical Control : The detailed and, usually, local direction

and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish

assigned missions or tasks.

5. Selection of Commanders . The overall commander will set up his

command and control structure and will not act as commander of any of

his subordinate commands . Component commanders will be

commanded by the senior officer of the service assigned to the overall

command from the service with the largest share of the forces . The

staff to support the commander should have knowledge of their service

so as to properly advise the commander.

Figure 9. Five Principles for Establishing Commands

93
AIRLAND COMBAT

Airland Combat Issues

Many ofthe doctrinal problems identified during World War 11 are still with us

today. A look back, therefore, can be a useful reminder- ofhow such problems

developed andhow they might be solved .

-Gen John T. Chain

There are four issues that directly relate to joint airland combat. These

are: functional versus service components; centralized control of air

power; attack in-depth, follow-on forces attack (FOFA), or joint

interdiction ; and low-intensity conflicts .

Functional versus Service Component

"Command arrangements provide the structure through which

commanders employ their forces . An effective command structure,

combined with common doctrine, is essential to winning wars." 3 Any

command arrangement consists of an overall commander* with

components which exercise operational control of assigned forces . The

services provide forces to the combatant commands . This command

arrangement provides for a service chain of command and an

operational chain of command. Figure 10 depicts the relationship

between these two distinct chains of command.

This issue is one over interpretation of the term component. There is

discussion within the services over the term component as used in Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Joint Pub 0-2. There exists some confusion on

interpreting and applying this concept to the command arrangements in

our unified command structure. The confusion focuses on the ambiguity

of the terms component and service component. Discussions of

command relationships in the joint arena have centered around whether

Joint Pub 0-2 is to be interpreted to mean that a component is either a

"service term"-that is, US Navy or US Air Force component- or a

"Theterm commander refers to the theater or joint force commander which is the commander ofa unified

or specified command or joint task force-the joint force commander . The terms theater and joint force

commander are used interchangeably in this book.

94

AIRLAND COMBAT

"functional term"-such as air, land, or naval component 4

The Marine

Corps and Navy favor the service descriptive tag-Marine component

or Navy component-while the Army and Air Force favor the generic

tag-air component or land component.

Use of the term service component, such as US Air Force component,

does not consider those military situations when a member of other than

US Air Force has operational control of air assets. The issue is more

than one of terminology . It is one of doctrine. Use of parallel

terminology and doctrine facilitates a smooth transition from US

unified to allied combined operations . Our allies manifest this

philosophy clearly in agreed-on doctrine. For example, Allied Tactical

Publication (ATP) 33(A), NATO Tactical Air Doctrine, states that

military forces are "functionally arranged into naval, land, and air

components, each with a component commander." 5 Our combined

doctrine in the Pacific region, Air Standard 45/3, Tactical Air

Doctrine, expresses the same thought.

Endorsement of the term service component, vice just component,

implies an endorsement of the term US Navy component, for example .

Use of this descriptive tag implies the acceptance of a multicommander

concept-that is, two or more commanders responsible for the same

general mission-which has two or more forces that are usually

organized, trained, and equipped to handle the same basic mission, all

operating in the same theater . The use of two US ground forces (e.g.,

one composed of Marine troops and the other composed of Army

troops) is a good example.

Endorsement of the term component, vice service component,

implies an endorsement of the term air, land, or naval component

which supports the doctrinal concept of having a single commander

for all generic theater-assigned assets regardless of service affiliation.

As an example, the importance of having a single air commander was

affirmed in JCS Memorandum 2502/645-1 which states :

To realize their full potential and effectiveness, air forces must be employed as

an entity under command arrangements that preclude dissipation or

fragmentation of effort and permit the integrated, responsive, and decisive

application of available air assets to tasks in the overall air effort that best

96
ORGANIZATION

achieves designated objectives . Unity of effort is best achieved when planning

and control of the air effort are centralized at the highest level practicable under

the unified authority of a single air commander.'

Additionally, the JCS approved new doctrine to improve command

and control and unity of effort of our operations in a theater. This

doctrine clarifies the authority of the joint force commander to appoint

ajoint force air component commander and outlines his responsibilities .

The text of this discussion, which follows, appeared in JCS Publication

26, Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operation (From Overseas

Land Areas):

The Joint Force AirComponent Commander derives his authority from the Joint

Force Commanderwho has the authority to exercise operational control, assign

missions, direct coordination among his subordinate commanders, redirect and

organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall

mission. The Joint Force Commander will normally designate aJoint Force Air

Component Commander. The Joint Force Air Component Commander's

responsibilities will be assigned by the Joint Force Commander (normally these

would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation and

tasking based on the Joint Force Commander's apportionment decision). Using

the Joint Force Commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with

the other service component commanders and other assigned or supporting

commanders, the Joint Force Air Component Commander will recommend to

the Joint Force Commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or

geographic areas.

The current system of using the service component method of

command, in my view, does not serve the stated purpose of Joint Pub

0-2 which is to organize our combat commands as an integrated team

of land, naval, and air forces . The functional approach, as opposed to

the service component approach, is the proper organization for the

reasons stated above . $ The discussions in the sections titled "Command

Structure" and "Conduct of Operations" use this functional approach as

opposed to the service component approach.

Now numbered Joint Publication 3-01 .2 .

97
AIRLAND COMBAT

Centralized Control of Air Power

The issue of centralized control of air power has been around since

aircraft were first thought of in a military context. 9 It is closely related

to one of the components discussed above in that if you have a service

component, you can have more than one air component operating in the

same area. The rationale for centralized control is below.

The air component should comprise all of those elements engaged in

sustained air operations on a daily basis . Thus, marine and naval air,

when directed to support operations in a theater, and Air Force strategic

and tactical airlift such as bomber and fighter air assets assigned to a

theater of operation, should be under the operational control of the air

component commander.* Army, Navy, and Marine fixed-wing liaison

aircraft and liaison helicopters are not included. (These assets are

organic to service needs and are more effectively employed by that

service.) Having all air assets under one commander is the only sure

means of using these forces in a coordinated manner to achieve the

objectives set forth in the theater strategy. Decisions that have to be

made on a daily basis demand detailed planning and careful

coordination of all assets in order to get the most from the assigned air

elements . There should not be any cross-purposes or different

interpretations ofwhat the jobs of these elements are. The air component

should contain forces that have a variety of capabilities to handle all of

the air missions that may evolve in the course of airland operations . The

pace of the air war is such that there isn't time to go through a long and

tedious process of coordination and arguments about what should be

done and when . The decisions must be made, and the forces must

execute in accordance with a coordinated plan of action . This principle

of operation is applicable not only to the air elements of a given country

but also to the air elements ofa number ofcountries assigned to a theater

of operations .

At lower levels of command, ground commanders are concerned

about control of air operations because of their tremendous impact upon

. Of course naval air-US Marine and US Navy-together and separately have their own legitimate

theater of operation. Only when supporting the operations ofthe other components (e .g ., landand air) would

this apply .

98
ORGANIZATION

the capabilities of ground forces and the rapid response time of these

air force systems . Since the air weapon system is the only system that

can be directed to such a wide variety of targets, there is a desire on the

part of some ground commanders to have it under their direct control.

By being under such control, air firepower can be employed exclusively

to the area of responsibility assigned that ground commander. If the air

weapon system is assigned to the air component, then the ground

commander has to compete with the air commander for its use. The

United States started World War II with tactical air units under the

control of divisions and corps in North Africa. The result of that early

experience demonstrated the folly of parceling out air power. The initial

employment of air power in the Second World War was in support of

the various ground forces when the enemy air force dominated the sky.

The priority employment of air power should have been to gain air

superiority so that it could then provide effective concentrated air

support to the divisions and corps engaged in combat operations. The

absence of a theater structure during these early days encouraged this

division of air power and the resulting near disaster.*

Centralized control of air power enables the corps commander to get

more support than if air power were under his control . The support will

be in the form of air superiority to protect friendly forces and reduce

enemy fighting strength because the centralized control of air power

permits concentration of effort against decisive elements of enemy

strength. There is no way to achieve this application of strength and

results if each corps commander is given control of a portion of the

tactical air power.

Generally, air power today-with the exception of marine and naval

air assets and strategic air power-is centrally controlled by the air

component commander. It is my view that all air power should come

under the air component commander.

.Gen William W. Momyer, USAF, Retired, helped in the preparation of this rationale for a single

manager for air . This information was collected from correspondence, interviews, and personal and

telephone conversations with General Momyer from 1978 to 1991 .

99
AIRLAND COMBAT

Attack In-depth, Attack on Follow-on Forces, or joint

Interdiction

One of the overriding considerations in determining the use of air

power is one of attacking targets located deep in enemy territory . Many

names-extended battlefield, interdiction, deep attack, attack of the

second echelon, follow-on forces attack, integrated battlefield, and so

forth-have been applied to the mission of striking targets beyond the

forward line of our own troops . This issue still exists and is embodied

in the current tenets of follow-on forces attack, Army AirLand Battle

doctrine, joint interdiction, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe's

(SACEUR) long-term planning guidelines.

Follow-on forces attack-or FOFA-is a Supreme Headquarters

Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) subconcept* for employing

conventional forces . 10 FOFA is designed to attack, with conventional

weapons, Warsaw Pact forces from "just behind the troops in contact to

as far into the enemy's rear as our target acquisition and conventional

weapons systems will allow."" This concept addresses the traditional

echeloning in depth of Soviet-Warsaw Pact offensive forces, as well as

the emerging Soviet operational maneuver group (OMG) concept.

FOFA is designed to permit the attacking of targets that will have an

effect, in the near term, upon the central battle by preventing, hindering,

or delaying the use of an area or route by the Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces.

The objectives of FOFA are to delay, disrupt, divert, or destroy an

enemy's military potential before it can be used effectively against

NATO forces. FOFA views the battle from the theater commander

perspective while AirLand Battle doctrine sees it from the corps

commander perspective .

Even the events in the 1990's struggle for balance of power between

NATO and the Warsaw Pact will not mitigate the need, in the view of

the Army, to continue to plan for deep attack. Therefore, it is unlikely

that the issue of FOFA will disappear in the near future .

*FOFA is a part of the larger SACEUR concept for employing conventional forces . Since FOFA was

conceived by former SACEUR Gen Bernard Rogers in the early 1980s as a version of AirLand Battle deep

operations tailored to Europe (and palatable to NATO), the issue has steadily gained momentum. The Air

Force has begun to reassert that the air commander must orchestrate FOFA operations beyond the fire

support coordination line (FSCL) as part of the theater interdiction campaign .

100
ORGANIZATION

AirLand Battle doctrine encompasses deep operations . It is an

extension of the battlefield, in space and time, of the corps and division

commanders' planning horizon. The Army view of the battlefield is that

it consists of three inextricably linked areas-rear, close-in, and deep.

According to Army doctrine the corps commander must influence these

areas out to some 150 kilometers beyond the forward edge of the battle

area.

12 This is accomplished in the deep battle area by destroying,

disrupting, or delaying enemy follow-on formations before they reach

the main battle, or close-in, area.

The Army updates its AirLand Battle doctrine as needed to reflect

the current world situation. The Army is developing a war-fighting

strategy called "AirLand Battle-Future" to account for the dramatic

geopolitical changes that occurred in late 1989 and early 1990 . The

current refinement to the AirLand Battle doctrine envisions a smaller

but more versatile ground force that allows deployment of light,

heavy, and special operations forces . The latest edition of AirLand

Battle doctrine still has the corps at its center with improvements in

intelligence of the battle area so that it can avoid long-duration/attrition

battles .

Interdiction is attack to delay, disrupt, divert, or destroy an enemy's

potential before the enemy can harm friendly forces .' 3

Air interdiction

has the same objective, and the air component commander provides

interdiction for the joint force commander.

Additionally, as part of air interdiction, battlefield air interdiction air

forces provide in direct support of the airland campaign. Joint

interdiction is the combination of the capabilities possessed by air

forces-the ability to conduct air interdiction missions-with the

capabilities possessed by land forces-the ability to strike targets in the

zone just beyond the close-in battle area. (Interdiction becomesjoint when

two or more services provide systems to accomplish this task.)

There are several terms-deep attack, extended battlefield, follow-on

forces attack, joint interdiction-that describe a similar function that

has as its aim to delay, disrupt, or destroy the enemy's potential before

it can be used against friendly forces. This function is to perform combat

operations at such distances from friendly surface forces that detailed

101
AIRLAND COMBAT

integration of specific actions with the fire and movement of friendly

forces normally is not required. This form of attack is usually executed

against enemy surface forces ; command, control, and communication

networks ; force buildups ; supply points ; airfields, and so on. The

interdiction campaign should limit the enemy's mobility to maneuver

forces, while forcing them into a high consumption rate and creating

opportunities for friendly forces to exploit the disabilities produced by

these interdiction missions . The phasing, timing, and weight of effort

of interdiction attacks can provide friendly forces the time and

opportunity to seize the initiative and deny that same opportunity to

enemy forces. ' 4

Much of the discussion in the joint arena has been misdirected as we

have used too many terms for the same function. Had the focus been

upon interdiction vice FOFA, or extended battlefield, or deep attack,

much of the controversial discussion could have been avoided.

Low-Intensity Conflict

Gen W. H . Nutting, former commander of Readiness Command,

stated: "Low-intensity conflict is the most important strategic issue

facing the US . If we don't learn to deal with it, we risk being isolated

in an increasingly competitive world." Is Given the current world

situation and the projected threat in the foreseeable future, conflict at

the lower end of the spectrum appears to be the most likely.

US military forces must have the ability to distribute and apply

military means to fulfill our national policy at all levels of conflict.

Success depends upon a sound calculation of objectives and requires

that the means employed should be proportioned to the objective being

sought.

There are many different views on how to accomplish military actions

in low-intensity conflict . Numerous discussions are being held in the

joint arena on this subject. Military planners must decide how to employ

military forces in such actions based on the strategy espoused in joint

documents . This strategy relies on an organization which must be

capable of handling low-intensity conflicts . The command structure

102
ORGANIZATION

proposed in the next section accounts for all levels of conflict, including

low-intensity conflict.

Command Structure

Experiences . . . have indicated that in many operations, if not in the majority,

the task was of necessity accomplished by contributions from two or three

services acting under the principle ofunified command. . . . The welding of the

forces resulted in the greatest possible concentration of combat power at the

decisive point while at the same time permitting the greatest economy offorce .

-Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower

Command structures, theater strategy, and operational plans are

developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in concert with the unified and

specified commanders and the military services, and in response to

Department of Defense guidance as contained in our national security

objectives . Based upon our strategy, the unifiedjoint forcecommanders are then charged with preparing operational plans to carry

out the broad guidance provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Our objective is to be prepared to meet all challenges . This requires

that US military forces be able to conduct military operations at all levels

of the spectrum of conflict.' 6

To accomplish this objective, we must have an effective

organization . The organization is called the unified command

structure . This structure must be organized to accomplish assigned

military missions . The theater or joint commander is responsible to

the national command structure, through the JCS, for accomplishing

assigned military missions . 17 The theater commander has full

operational command over the service-assigned forces. The operational

chain of command starts with the national command authorities (NCA),

goes through the JCS, to the single theater commander (see fig. 10) . 18

To support the theater commander, a joint staff is required." The

elements of this staff are as follows : personal staff (e .g ., executive

officer, aides, and a public relations team), personnel division,

intelligence division, operations division, plans division, logistics

103
AIRLAND COMBAT

division, and communications-electronics division . The composition of

the staff should include representation from the services assigned to the

theater command. The staff officers must be able to advise the

commander on service doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures,

capabilities, needs, and limitations . "Positions on the staff should be

divided so that service representation and influence generally reflect the

service composition of the force."2° The success of any joint system is

the staff which is composed of people with current field experience. Gen

P. X. Kelley, former commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task

Force, stated: "People who have demonstrated their ability to provide

expert advice to the theater commander is what is required for the joint

staff to be effective . What is needed is demonstrated leadership, not

professional staffers ."2I

The composition of the senior staff should be based on the assigned

mission with each of the services represented on the staff. If the theater

commander is a soldier, then the deputy should be either an airman or

a sailor-depending on the theater . If it is primarily a land theater, then

the deputy should be an airman, and the chief of staff should be a naval

officer. The other senior staff positions should be balanced between the

services . This encourages harmonious relations between the services

and provides the needed expertise for the joint staff.

Below the theater commander and the staff are three componentsland, naval, and air. It is important to note that the division is not based

upon the service but upon the missions they are to perform. The services

provide forces to the unified command, and these forces are under the

operational command of the theater commander. To employ these forces

effectively, the commander exercises operational control through the

component commander. Figure 11 shows this command relationship.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force generally agree on the threecomponent system for force employment. However, the Navy agrees with

the Marine Corps that for sustained operations ashore, a fourth

component-a Marine componentshould be added. However, given the

theater-assigned missions of a unified, combined, or joint command

structure where two or more services, or two or more nations, are

assigned to the command, a fourth component is not needed. The Marine

104
forces should be assigned to either the land, naval, or air component

command depending on their assigned mission . The assignment of

Marine land combat forces directly under the theater commander and

not under the land component commander would create, in effect, a

second land army and a second air component command. It makes

little sense to have two land or two air commanders doing the same job.

This is not to state that a US Marine Corps senior officer should not be

a component commander within a theater command. The key is that

105
AIRLAND COMBAT

the service with the predominance of component forces should head that

component. If the Marine Corps has the predominance of land forces,

then the land component commander should be a Marine officer. If the

predominance of air forces were Marine aviation assets, then the air

component commander should be a Marine officer .

24

The commander of the component command should be the senior

officer of the service with the majority of theater-assigned component

forces.

25 The theater commander and the component commander should

never be the same person. The component commander should have a

staff to support the assigned mission . Composition of this staff is

dependent on the mission ; but, in general, it should contain liaison

elements, plans and operations divisions, intelligence, and other staff

elements deemed appropriate by the component command, to include

members of the various services who are included in that component.

26

If Army and Marine Corps forces are assigned to the land component

and the Army has the predominance of forces, the senior Army officer

would be the land component commander and the senior Marine Corps

officer would be the deputy commander. Figure 12 shows the overall

theater command structure, and figure 13 depicts a notional component

command structure. Note that the staff structure does not have a specific

fixed organization but is staffed based on the varied theater-assigned

missions, the theater of operations, the forces assigned, and the desires

of the component commander. Looking at each of the components,

certain statements can be made concerning the organization of the

component command structure.

Land Component Command

The land component command comprises the land forces assigned to

a theater of operation . Its mission is to employ combat forces to support

the unified command structure .

28 The commander exercises operational

control of assigned forces and is responsible for plans and forces to

support the unified command plans and operations.

Generally speaking, these functions include land combat,

intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, unconventional

warfare, combat service support, cover, deception, and electronic

106
ORGANIZATION

NATIONAL

COMMAND

AUTHORITIES

JOINT CHIEFS

OF STAFF

THEATER

COMMANDER

PERSONAL (JOINT STAFF)

CHIEFS OF STAFF AND

STAFF DEPUTIES

J-1 J-4

J-2 J-5

J-3 J-6

LAND NAVAL AIR

COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT

Land Combat Naval/Amphibious Air Force Combat

Units (e .g ., Units (e.g ., carrier Units (e .g .,

corps) task force) numbered air force)

Figure 12. Theater Command Structure

107

ORGANIZATION

warfare operations . 29 The combat unit is normally the Army corps and

Marine land combat units. (See figure 14 for a notional land component

structure .)
AIRLAND COMBAT

Naval Component Command

The naval component command comprises the naval forces assigned

to a theater of operation . Its mission is to employ combat forces to

support the unified command structure. The commander exercises

operational control of assigned forces to support the unified command

plans and operations.

In general, the function of the command includes gaining control of

sea lines of communication and the sea approaches to the landmass, as

well as amphibious operations and support of the land battle. This last

function, support of the land battle, implies support in the areas of

resupply and reinforcement of ground and air elements . During

sustained operations ashore, this includes naval air assets in support of

the airland battle . When naval aviation units are assigned to support the

land battle, these aviation units should be assigned to the air component

commander. The combat elements depend on the assigned mission.*

Figure 15 contains a notional naval component structure.

Air Component Command

The air component command comprises the air forces assigned to a

theater of operation . Its mission is to employ combat forces to support

the unified command structure. The commander exercises operational

control of assigned forces to support the unified command plans and

operations .

In general, these functions include counterair, air interdiction, close

air support, tactical airlift, air reconnaissance, and special air operations.

All theater-assigned air assets, excluding Army organic aviation, and

specialized naval aviation (such as P-3C and C-2A aircraft) should be

assigned to the air component commander. This includes the strategic,

tactical, and airlift systems employed in a theater of operation.

30 The

combat element depends upon the assigned mission. (See figure 16 for

a notional air component structure .) 31

'This of course does not mean the carrier should be assigned to the air component commander but rather

the tasking for the sorties provided by the carrier wing should be given to the air component commander.

110
Command Structure Summary

Accomplishing the military objectives assigned by political

authorities to a theater command requires a coherent approach to war

fighting. This approach demands a detailed knowledge of warfare,

history, service doctrine, tactics, and one's own forces and their

capabilities and an understanding of enemy forces and their capabilities .

Service and joint doctrine to support the military objectives and the

command structure fortheater warfare must be oriented toward a unified

approach for warfare.

History has shown that the most efficient method to organize combat

forces is through a unified command structure wherein one single

commander has command of all assigned theater assets .

32 To control

111

ORGANIZATION

these forces effectively, an integrated team-land, naval, and air-is

employed to carry out the combat function of the theater-assigned

mission . Forces are assigned to the theater command to accomplish

combat missions based upon their ability to contribute to the overall

effort.

When discussing organizational structures for airland combat, we

tend to focus on systems to fight a war and on service orientation instead

of on the structure itself and the delegation of responsibility by

functional area. But if we focused on the command structurejoint and

combined-and used a theater perspective, many of the roles and

mission issues would never surface. A theater perspective is simply a

joint and combined view of war fighting. It drives us toward a unified

command structure where all land combat forces are employed under a

single land component commander, and all air combat forces are

employed under a single air component commander.

Joint and combined doctrines have evolved to state that combat forces

are employed most effectively and efficiently by centralized control

through decentralized execution . Centralized control permits

concentrated combat power to be directed toward the primary objective

and redirected in response to contingency requirements . This approach

affords a more flexible use of the principles of war in directing combat

forces . Decentralized execution permits the higher command echelons

to establish objective priorities and to implement strategy while placing

the responsibility for tactical and operational execution at the lower

level . This allows the commander at the lower level to exploit

opportunities that arise in support of the strategic plan. Planning is at

the higher level. Centralized control and decentralized execution are the

most economical utilization of limited resources .

To employ combat power effectively and efficiently, a single

component commander for land, naval, and air forces must be given the

authority and responsibility for employing theater-assigned assets .

33

The command structure must be simple and have clear and direct lines

of authority . The structure for theater warfare is the unified command

with three components-land, naval, and air. Future conflicts will not

allow time to experiment with command arrangements .

34

113
AIRLAND COMBAT

Figure 17 shows the three elements of the command structure for

airland combat-land, naval, and air forces. This figure depicts how the

components would work together under the unity of command

principle. This structure is designed to work in a large theater war or in

a low-intensity conflict. With this command structure in mind, we can

now discuss the methods and organizational arrangements for

conducting airland combat.
ORGANIZATION

Conduct of Operations

We see clearly that the activities characteristic of war may be split into two

main categories : those that are merely preparationfor war, and warproper.

The same distinction must be made in theory as well . . . . The knowledge and

skills involved in the preparation will be concerned with the creation, training,

and maintenance of the fighting forces. . . . The theory of warproper on the

other hand, is concerned with the use of these means, once they have been

developed, for the purpose ofwar.

-Carl von Clausewitz

Airland combat operations must be approached from a joint

perspective which requires us to look at war fighting from a unity of

effort point of view .

35 Simply stated, we should employ our forces as

an efficient team that is closely integrated . Unity of effort also requires

that we hold aside service biases so that when we employ our forces the

overall objectives of the theater commander are achieved.

For the Air Force this means placing all air forces under the air

component commander. For the Marines and Navy this means placing

all aviation assets under the air component commander when these

assets are operating in sustained operations ashore in support of airland

combat missions; and for the Marines it means that land combat units

would come under the land component commander for sustained

operations ashore. For the Army it means that air support is under the

centralized control of the air component commander.

To make airland combat a reality requires a system that will integrate

the tactical assets through a tactical control network. This network is

called the Air Ground Operations System (AGOS).*

The AGOS is composed of the Army's Air Ground System (AAGS)

and the Air Force's Tactical Air Control System (TACS) . This system

(the AGOS) provides the means to initiate, receive, process, and execute

* AGOS can also refer to the Air Ground Operations School In this book AGOS refers to the tactical control system.

11 5
AIRLAND COMBAT

requests for air support and to disseminate information and intelligence

produced by air means .

36

In the joint and combined arena the command structure to fight wars

is called the unified command system.

37 Within the unified structure

there are components based upon the forces provided-for example, air

forces within the air component, land forces comprising the land

component, and naval forces making up the naval component. The air

component commander is responsible for the execution of the air

portion of the theater battle . The land and air component commanders

together are responsible for the execution of the airland battle.

Under the US Army's AirLand Battle doctrine, targets are identified

by the air and land side of the AGOS and then are programmed and/or

planned to be destroyed, delayed, or disrupted by tactical air or land

force organic assets . Since there will be more targets than assets to put

against the targets, some adjudication must occur.

38

The AAGS "is used for coordinating and integrating tactical air

support with US Army ground operations." 39 The Air Force tactical

air forces "are used in support of the Land Component Command

(LCC) ." 4° The TAGS "begins at the air component level and extends

through all operating (ground) echelons." 41 The TACS provides the

organization and equipment necessary to coordinate air operations with

the land forces and is used to conduct tactical air operations.

The method used to translate requests for tactical air support into

operations is called the apportionment system . The component

commanders make recommendations to the unified commander. 42 The

unified commander takes these recommendations into account, makes

his estimates, and then apportions the available assets among the air

tasks-counterair, close air support (CAS), and air interdiction. The

apportionment is expressed as percentages (e.g., 40 percent for CAS)

or as priorities (e.g ., priority one is counterair). According to Joint Pub

1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms, "Air apportionment is based upon priorities established by the

[commander] during consultation with the subordinate commanders

and is designed to assure optimum distribution of limited assets which

must perform a wide range of missions.",44

11 6
ORGANIZATION

The next step is the allocation of the assets .

45 The air component

commander allocates the number of sorties of each kind of mission

based upon the apportionment decision, availability of airframes, and

sortie generation rate. Once the allocation has been made, the land

component commander distributes his allocated close-air-support

sorties to the subordinate land commanders .

46 The land component

commander knows what sorties are available for each of the air tasks,

including air reconnaissance, by reviewing the air tasking order which

is published by the air component commander.

That is the way the system is supposed to work. The system described

above had a single unified (or joint force) commander, at least two of

the three components (air and land), and a method to execute the

tasks-the air ground operations system which is composed of the

Army's Air Ground Control System and the Tactical Air Control

System. As long as the organization is designed with these elements,

there are no major problems. The AirLand Battle doctrine, as envisioned

by the Army, will function if there are equal levels of coordination

between the Army and the Air Force . The Air Force employs its forces

through the single manager for air-the air component commanderand all actions are coordinated at this level. As long as the Army has

a field army or army group-the land component commander-there

are no coordination problems .

48

So the system-the AGOS-must account for requirements of the

land forces and the capability of the air forces. For the system to work,

close coordination between the land and air components is required.*

Many people are involved in the target nomination and allocation

process . It starts at the bottom-the battalion-and works up through

the division and corps level. Once the corps has made its target list, in

priority order, the corps commander can look at the scheme of maneuver

and make a recommendation on targets that need to be attacked by

tactical air.

`Thetwo components need to have over them comparable levels for coordination of tactical assets . This

must be accomplished at the component level ; for example, in NATO this would be the Allied Tactical Air

Forces-Army Group Level . Without this level, the adjudication of competing needs wouldnot be possible .

9

Once this coordination level has been established then the process of allocating tactical assets can begin .

117
AIRLAND COMBAT

The land component commander then takes the corps' priority target

lists and makes a recommendation for targets to be struck; and, in

consultation with the air component commander, comes up with a list

of targets to be attacked by tactical air for each area of operation . The

land and air component commanders provide their scheme of attack to

the unified, combined, or joint task force commander, who in turn

develops the apportionment plan. Based on this apportionment, the air

component commander allocates tactical air to the air tasks to be

performed. The inherent flexibility of tactical air allows the two

component commanders to change targets as the battle develops, in

response to the tactical situation.

Simple as it sounds, if the above is followed we will have the most

effective and efficient method to employ tactical air assets on the

modern battlefield . This method was combat tested in World War II,

Korea, and Vietnam . 5° The system used by NATO and used in the

Pacific is basically the same one described above, but modified to

account for national systems.

Equally as important as coordination levels is synchronization.

Synchronization is the integration of tactical assets into the land

component commander's maneuver scheme. It is, however, directly

related to levels of coordination . A subset of synchronization is the joint

employment of air and land tactical assets on the battlefield (e.g., TR-1 ;

Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense [JSEAD] ; and the Joint

Tactical Missile System).

If we account for the coequal levels of coordination so that there is

an avenue to adjudicate competing corps needs on the battlefield for

scarce assets, the problem of synchronization will be solved. This is

accomplished by having the system to ensure that close air support, air

interdiction-to include battlefield air interdiction-and related tactical

air missions, and organic Army assets are integrated to accomplish the

theater objectives .

52

On the land side we have the Army's Air Ground Operations

System.

53

11 8
ORGANIZATION

This system includes the personnel, equipment, procedures, and techniques

comprising the US Army's air-ground system to initiate, to receive, to process,

and to execute requests for air support, and to disseminate information and

intelligence produced by air means . . . (and it) functions as a single entity in

planning, coordinating, and integrating air support operations with ground

operations.

The system begins at the highest field echelon-the field army-and

extends down through all echelons.

Within the AAGS are Air Force liaison officers. The Air Support

Operations Center (ASOC) is a mobile, air-transportable facility

designed to operate with a tactical operations center-corps or

division-and functions as the forward element of the Air Force's

tactical air control center in the operational command channel of the

TACS . The primary function of the ASOC is to "assist in executing

the air operations order to provide [US Army] forces the tactical air

support required [and] is collocated with the supporting [Army] unit

tactical operations center." ss

Also within the AAGS are naval liaison officers. Naval aviation,

which includes both Navy and Marine air assets, can contribute to the

airland campaign. When employed in sustained operations ashore, naval

aviation is controlled through the US Navy-US Marine Corps command

and control system.* The US Marine Corps' tactical air control party is

organic to the Marine Corps and is attached to each infantry element.

The Army maintains a battlefield coordination element (BCE) at the

air component commander's tactical air control center. This element

monitors and interprets the land battle situation for the tactical air

control center. The BCE also provides the necessary interface for the

exchange of current intelligence and operational information . In order

for the US Army to synchronize land operations effectively, tactical air

support must be planned and employed in concert with the land

component commander's scheme of maneuver. The land component

commander uses the BCE to represent his interests at the tactical air

control center. The BCE is a part of the land component commander's

staff and processes the land force's requests for tactical air support,

"I should point out that this USMC proposal is counter to what I propose in this book.

119
AIRLAND COMBAT

monitors and interprets the land battle situation for the tactical air

control center, and provides the necessary interface for the exchange of

current intelligence and operational data.

56

Figure 18 depicts the relationship between the land and air component

command and control and coordination with tactical air and the theater

army. Figure 19 shows the relationship between the tactical air control

systems and the Army's Air Ground Operations System.

On the air side we have the tactical air control system.It is composed

of the operational elements required to plan, control, and direct air

operations and is normally collocated with the air component

commander. The tactical air control center issues the tasking order,

monitors mission execution, adjusts and readjusts mission priorities,

AIRLAND COMBAT

and issues threat warnings. Within the tactical air control center is an

airlift control center that provides centralized direction for all airlift

forces . Additionally, a control and reporting center is used for the

decentralized execution of air defense and airspace control .

To extend the coverage provided by the control and reporting

posts-which provide radar surveillance and control within assigned

areas of responsibility and report to the control and reporting

center-forward air control posts are deployed into forward areas. Also,

airborne warning and control systems (e.g ., the E-3A aircraft) are the

airborne extensions of the ground-based sensors .

Stationed with Army units are tactical air control parties . They are

normally located with corps, division, brigade, and battalion units . The

tactical air control party provides the interface between the land units

and the air unit providing tactical air support for airland combat. Figure

20 depicts the elements of the tactical air control system .

Now combining the two systems-tactical air support system and the

Army's air ground system-we see how the interface between the two

is accomplished (fig. 20). With a system to accomplish airland combat,

let us turn our attention to the concept of operation for the airland battle.

To meet and counter enemy attacks, land and air forces are employed

to achieve the theater commander's objectives. "Effective reconnaissance, surveillance, and warning systems are essential to

decipher enemy attack preparation indicators to allow air and land

commanders to direct the right weapons against the right targets at the

right time. " 60

The air forces' contribution to the airland campaign is in the mission

areas of counterair, close air support, reconnaissance, and interdiction .

Counterair protects friendly forces from hostile air attacks and increases

freedom of action for friendly ground and air forces . Close air support

provides firepower against enemy forces which are engaged with or

preparing to engage friendly ground forces . Interdiction against

follow-on echelons is "inseparable in purpose from close air support.

"61

Interdiction against deeper targets indirectly supports the airland battle .

Figure 21 shows this relationship .

122


ORGANIZATION

The Army's contribution in the AirLand Battle is in the area of

combined arms,* and includes infantry, mechanized infantry, armor,

armored cavalry, field artillery, air defense artillery, aviation units

(attack helicopters), and combat support units. The effects of the

combined arms may be thought of as complementary and reinforcing.

Weapons or arms complement each other by achieving jointly an effect

none can obtain separately.

62 Figure 22 shows the planning lines used

by the Army in the AirLand Battle and shows how the combined arms

come together on the battlefield.
AIRLAND COMBAT

The naval contribution to the airland battle is essentially aviation

assets-Navy and Marine tactical air-and Marine ground combat

units . Their missions are the same as those of the Air Force and Army

in airland combat.

To accomplish airland combat requires the coordinated effort of all

service-assigned forces. Figure 23 depicts how air missions are used in

support of the AirLand Battle.

Each service-assigned force contributes directly and indirectly to the

overall mission of the theater command . To win we must fight

campaigns and battles which coordinate the actions of all available

military forces in pursuit of common objectives . Exploiting the full

potential of military forces requires integrating the combat potential of

these forces in a way whereby the enemy is attacked, in depth, to the

full extent of his formations . In all types of operations, our forces must

be prepared to fight to preserve and exploit the initiative, to attack in

depth, and to synchronize all effects to obtain the common theater

objective .

Our concept of operations for airland combat must account for the

unique contributions of each ofthe services . We must avoid duplication

and integrate our forces into a coherent fighting team. At the top, the

commander must have a clear understanding of the developing battle to

direct forces toward the theater objective . The component commanders

must translate this guidance into action by directing the assigned forces

to accomplish the objective. The command structure must be

uncomplicated to allow effective and rapid execution of missions. To

assist the component commanders there is a control system-the

component's tactical control network described above.

Above this must be an organization that allows the military forces,

when directed by the national command authorities, to be employed at

any level of conflict. Figure 24 graphically shows this spectrum of

conflict.

The organization this book describes works at any level on the

spectrum ofconflict-from low-intensity to high-intensity. The unified

command structure does not necessarily mean large forces. The forces

must be tailored to meet the threat. Potential danger in Europe and the

126


ORGANIZATION

Pacific requires large forces . However, to fight a low-intensity conflict,

small forces or even uniservice forces might be more appropriate than

having all four services participate in the command structure. Unity of

command does not mean that a military operation must have Army,

Navy, Air Force, and Marine forces assigned to that operation . That is,

each service does not have to have a "piece of the action." Limited

conflict or small scale operations may not require Army and Marine

land combat forces backed up by the Air Force. A Marine air/ground

task force could be more appropriate than say half of the 82d Airborne

Division plus a Marine amphibious brigade and a US Air Force fighter

wing. The point is that forces assigned to the unified (joint force)

commander must be appropriate to the task and not based on

jointness-all services participating .

Notes

1 . Adapted from AFM 1-l, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air

Force, 16 March 1984; FM 100-5, Operations, 20 August 1982; and Joint Publication

0-2, Unified Action ArmedForces (UNAAF), December 1986. The principles of war

are interrelated and interacting elements which help provide a better understanding of

warfare. The US Air Force lists the principles of war as objective, offensive, mass and

economy of force, surprise, security, unity of effort, maneuver, simplicity, timing and

tempo, logistics, and cohesion. The US Army lists the principles of war as unity of

command, objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, surprise, security, maneuver,

and simplicity .

2 . Joint Pub 0-2, discusses how to establish command structures based on these

principles.

3. Doctrine Information Publication No . 12, Command Relationship

(Washington, D.C . : Headquarters USAF/XOXID, June 1984), 1 .

4. Joint Pub 0-2, 3-7, 3-8, 3-14, and 3-15.

5. ATP 33(A), NATO Tactical Air Doctrine (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic

Treaty Organization [NATO], May 1979), 2-3 .

6. JCS Memorandum 2502/645-1 "NATO Tactical Air Doctrine," 20 February

1975,2 .

7. Joint Pub 3-01.2, formerly JCS Pub 26,JointDoctrinefor Theater Counterair

Operations (From Overseas LandAreas), 1 April 1986, B-5.

8 . See Col Thomas A. Cardwell, CommandStructurefor Theater Walfare: The

Questfor Unity ofCommand (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Press, September

1984), 173.

129
AIRLAND COMBAT

9. Much of the material contained in this section came from a discussion with

Gen William W. Momyer, USAF, Retired . Additionally, discussions with Gen Donn

A. Starry, USA, Retired ; Gen Jerome F. O'Malley, USAF (now deceased); and Lt Gen

William R . Richardson, USA, Retired ; support this data. Interview with General

Momyer during the period 1977 to 1991 ; with General O'Malley during the period

1979 to 1983; with General Starry held at MacDill AFB, Fla., on 3 December 1981 ;

and with General Richardson, USA, held at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., on 15

October 1981 . Complete interviews contained in Cardwell, Command Structure,

99-105, 137-43, and 169-70 .

10. Gen Bernard W. Rogers, USA, "Follow-On Force Attack (FOFA): Myths and

Realities," NATO Review 32, no. 6 (December 1984): 1-9.

11 . Ibid., 2.

12. Gen Donn A. Starry, interview with author, held at MacDill AFB, Fla., 3

December 1981 . See also his article "Extending the Battlefield," Military Review,

March 1981, 31-50.

13 . Adapted from the definition of air interdiction taken from AFM 1-1, 3-3 .

14 . FOFA, a phrase coined by (then SACEUR) General Rogers in 1982, entails

the delay, disruption, and destruction of enemy follow-on forces prior to their contact

with friendlies in order to keep the enemy's force manageable at the forward line of

own troops (FLOT). Gen John Galvin's proponency for FOFA is as strong as his

predecessors' . Numerous FOFA-related initiatives are under way in Office of the

Secretary of Defense (OSD), the services, United States European Command

(USEUCOM), and NATO. FOFA is a subconcept of SACEUR's Conceptual Military

Framework. FOFA, as defined by SHAPE, is equivalent to interdiction and so is not

a new mission. It expands upon current interdiction capabilities and focuses on

time-sensitive, mobile, hard targets. However, the new aspects of FOFA are its

emphasis on enhanced technology and the intrusion of the Army into the Air Force's

domain. The Air Force owns most of the assets (sensors, C31, weapons) which can

interdict follow-on forces . It also has a viable, in-place, apportionment/allocation/

execution mechanism (commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe (NATO)

[COMAAFCE], Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO) [ATAF], Allied Tactical

Operations Center (NATO) [ATOC], Wing Operations Center [WOC]). Until

recently, US Air Force involvement in FOFA was negligible. There has been a major

effort by "blue-suiters" to get FOFA back on track. Significant events include : (1)

circulation of a JCS (USEUCOM) FOFA doctrine document to services and the

CINCs; (2) the Tactical Air Force (TAF), now called Combat Air Forces (CAF), and

Air Staff inputs to the USEUCOM document were consolidated at Langley AFB in

late October 1987 (TAF position : FOFA is interdiction . The fire support coordination

line should be the single delineating boundary between the ground and air component

areas of responsibility, and interdiction of follow-on forces must be integrated/

orchestrated by the air commander), and (3) creation ofa USEUCOM FOFA working

130
ORGANIZATION

group and establishment of a six-month initiative to implement FOFA in theater. The

group first met on 27 October 1987.

15. Lt Gen W. H. Nutting, USA, "Nutting: Stand Fast," Newsweek, 6 June 1983,

23 .

16. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture FY

85 (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1984), 8.

17. National command authorities (NCA) are the president and the secretary of

defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors . See Joint Pub 0-2, 1-2.

18 . Joint Pub 0-2, 1-2.

19. Ibid ., 1-18, and 3-36 through 3-42.

20. Ibid ., 3-36.

21 . All of the services agreed upon the composition of thejoint staff. See Cardwell,

Command Structure, 65, 78, 99-144 .

22. Joint Pub 0-2 and DOD Directive 5100.1 in the discussion of the functions of

the United States Marine Corps, state that "these functions do not contemplate the

creation of a second land army" (Joint Pub 0-2, 2-28 and DOD Directive 5100 .1,

Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, 25 September

1987),9.

23. This would depend on the mission assigned to the Marine forces . There are

scenarios where a Marine component could be required . If the Marine Corps is the

only service assigned to the theater of operations, or the Marine combined forces are

the initial combat unit in a theater of operations, a Marine component would be

required. However, upon arrival of other service forces, the Marine component would

be integrated into the land, naval, and air component as appropriate.

24. Maj Gen Norman J. Anderson, USMC, Retired, former commanding general

of the 1st Marine Air Wing and deputy commander for Air III Marine Amphibious

Force (MAF) in Vietnam in 1967, does not believe in placing Marine air under a single

air component commander. He states, in reference to the Marine Corps maintaining

air assets in I Corps and the contention that the 1st Military Airlift Wing divided its

air assets between the two Marine divisions regardless of the ground situation:

"Nothing could be further from the truth than this spurious charge of inflexibility.

Marine Corps sorties were applied when needed most and frequently to other than

Marine Corps units." He further states : "It was of such poppycock, however, that the

infamous `single management' was born and adopted." Maj GenNorman J. Anderson,

"Short Shrift for Marine Air," Marine Corps Gazette, May 1981, 87. General

Anderson believes that history has shown that the best wayto apply tactical air power

is from the corps (or MAGTF, in the case of the Marines) level, not from the air

component level (see page 88 of his article) .

25. Ibid . ; Joint Pub 0-2, 3-25 .

26. Ibid ., 3-36.

27. Ibid ., 3-24 through 3-28 . Joint Pub 0-2 provides specific guidance on

command responsibilities for components .

13 1
AIRLAND COMBAT

28. Unified as used here, and in the other component commands, refers to

combined command structure also .

29. Field Manual (FM) 100-15 (Test), Larger Unit Operations, March 1974, 3-1

through 3-3.

30. Correspondence with Gen William W. Momyer, USAF, Retired, during the

period September 1981 to January 1991 . The essence of the correspondence, and

subsequent telephone conversations with General Momyer, on the subject of rationale

for placing all air under the aircomponent commander, is as follows: within the theater,

there should be an air, a ground, and a sea component. These are generic commands

which control all combat operations in the media of the air, ground, and sea. There

must be an overall component command structure to assure that those forces are

directed in a coherent, coordinated, and positive manner. There is no place for two

similar forces operating outside a single authority for that type of mission.

31 . Tactical Air Command Manual (TACM) 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, 15

April 1978, 11-1 through 11-7, and 2-19.

32. Ibid . See also Gen William C. Westmoreland, A SoldierReports (New York :

Doubleday, 1967); Gen William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (Washington,

D.C . : US GovernmentPrinting Office, 1979); Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War

(Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday & Co., 1967); and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade

in Europe (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday &Co., 1948) for discussion. JCS Pub 0-2

and allied doctrine publications also recommend this command structure.

33. Gen David C. Jones, USAF, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Maxwell

AFB, Ala., interview with author, 29 January 1982 . When asked his view on the

unified component command structure in light of the ongoing JCS discussion over

commandand control of US Marine Corps forces during sustained operations ashore,

General Jones said :

JCS Pub 0-2 provides clear guidance on establishing these command relationships. It is a unified

structure with land, sea, and air components to carry out the assigned mission. As to the discussions

over Marine forces used during sustainedoperations ashore, it would depend upon where these forces

are employed . I could see where they might be employed separately and where they might be

employed under one of the other components. You must remember that the components are not

service oriented but are generic terms to describe a function to be performed-land operations, sea

operations, or air operations . The Marine forces could be the land component if they have the

majority of the forces . As you are well aware, having worked this issue while on the Air Staff, the

discussions boil down to doctrinal issues . The separate services guard their roles and missions very

closely. This is what causes the discussions. Anyway, we must take a morejoint view when debating

these type issues to arrive at a command structure for the theater war.

Quote from General Jones's personal diary. See also Joint Pub 0-2, par. 3-24 to 3-28.

34. In developing the proposed command structure, the author studied some 20

different models before arriving at the single unified command structure. Command

structure variations are possible depending upon the scenario. For example, a case

could be made for placing all close combat air assets-both fixed and rotary

wing-under a theatercommanderwith no land or air component; that is, asubordinate

132
ORGANIZATION

command. This would be used only in a limited-both in time and effort-war

scenario. See Joint Pub 0-2's discussion on joint task forces . Another case could be

made for placing close-air-support air assets directly under the land component or

ground commander-as the Marine Corps does with its Marine Air/Ground Task

Force (MAGTF) arrangement. However, given the constraints in purchasing assets to

accomplish not only the close combat functions but other air missions of the Air Force,

Navy, Army, and Marine Corps, the services cannot afford to place unlimited assets

in this single role . For example, multirole aircraft have been developed for the Air

Force, Navy, and Marine Corps-the F-4 being the best example-not only to

accomplish close air support but also to provide fleet defense, battlefield air

interdiction, air defense, and air interdiction . Specialized aircraft, such as the AV-8 or

A-10, although limited in number, have been developed to accomplish the

close-air-support role for ground combat forces. However, there are not enough

specialized close-combat air assets to dedicate some to each individual corps.

Therefore, we cannot afford this option. One could argue that the Marine Corps force

package is structured in this manner and, therefore, provides a model for a theater

command structure. True, but the close-air-support aviation assets are dedicated to the

Marine Corps to make up for its light firepower. Since the primary mission of the US

Marine Corps is amphibious operations where a highly mobile, light firepower force

is required, the Marine Corps needs aircraft assigned to the MAGTF to perform this

function.

35 . Joint Pub 1-02 defines unity of effort as the concept of our military

establishment as an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces based on the principle

that effective utilization of the nation's military power requires that the efforts of the

separate military services be closely integrated . Unity of effort among the services at

the national level is obtained by the authority of the president and secretary of defense.

It is exercised through the secretaries of the military departments and by the strategic

planning and direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by common, joint, and

cross-servicing forces by the military departments . Unity of effort among service

forces assigned to unified or specified commands is achieved by exercise of

operational command, by adherence to common strategic plans and directives, and by

sound operational and administrative command organizations. Unity of effort also

provides for the relationship between the JCS and the military departments and

services charged with preparing and providing forces for the unified and specified

commands. Unity of effort is founded upon the principle of unity of command. Joint

Pub 0-2, 1-1 .

Gen John W. Vessey, USA, Retired, while chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

expressed the view that the concept of unity of command is a fundamental principle

of the armed forces and is central to the structure of our operational forces . Unity of

command is a principle which is a guideline for effective action, and it was an

important motivation for President Eisenhower when he proposed the legislation

which led to the last major reorganization of the Department of Defense. The Joint

133
AIRLAND COMBAT

Chiefs ofStaff are the secretary of defense's military staff to advise both the secretary

and the president on commandstructure and arrangements which provide for the most

effective defense of the nation . Joint Pub 0-2 specifically sets forth principles,

doctrines, and functions governing the activities of US forces in joint operations.

Source : Response to Senators Sam Nunn and Barry Goldwater on the question of

unity of command, 19 April 1985, and reported in "DOD Leaders Defend Command

Structure, but Joint Commanders Ask for More Say," Armed Forces Journal

International, June 1985, 26.

36. Field Circular (FC) 100-26, Air-Ground Operations, 31 July 1984, 2-1.

37 . Joint forces are forces of two or more services, while combined forces are

forces of two or more nations-JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military andAssociated Terms, 1 April 1984, 76 and 200. Joint Pub 0-2 specifies how

we will fight and provides the command structure to support our combat forces .

38. The AirLand Battle is a joint battle-targets will appear that are of interest

only to the air or land side, and targets will appear that are ofjoint interest .

39. FC 100-26, 2-3. This field circular further states that the Army's Air-Ground

System "begins at the highest field echelon (normally field army or corps) and extends

through all echelons down to maneuver battalion."

40. Ibid ., 2-2.

41 . Ibid ., 2-6.

42. The joint forces commander could also make recommendations. The term

unified commander, for purposes of this book, is used to also mean the joint force

commander.

43. JCS Pub 1, 32.

44. Ibid.

45. Allocation is the translation of the apportionment into total numbers of sorties

by aircraft type available for each operation/task . JCS Pub 1, 24 .

46. Ibid . ; FC 100-26, 3-4.

47. Col Thomas A. Cardwell III, USAF,"Managing Theater Air Assets," Military

Review, May 1983, 40115, describes the single manager for air concept.

48. A problem arose when the Army developed the BCE to function as the

coordination level with the air component commander. The head of the BCE is a

colonel, while the air component commander is a general officer.

49. The problem is the same as with a BCE headed by a colonel and the air

component headed by a general officer.

50. The Single ManagerProblem: The Creation ofan Operational ControlSystem

for US Tactical Air in 1 Corps ofSouth Vietnam during 1968 (Washington, D.C . : JCS

Historical Division, July 1976), previously classified, declassified by SM-197-81, 20

March 1981 . For a discussion on how the system worked in Vietnam, see Momyer,

Air Power, 82, and Westmoreland, 335-40 .

51 . Much work has been done in this area by TAC and TRADOC and by the Army

and Air Staffs . Examples include the study on Joint Attack of the Second Echelon

134
ORGANIZATION

(J-SAK) and the ongoing work on the battlefield air interdiction initiatives . Also, the

31 joint war-fighting initiatives on such subjects as night combat, close air support,

theater interdiction system, intratheater airlift, and so on, are helping to solve this

synchronization issue.

52. Having been on both sides-operational and staff-I make this point only to

show that we can delay decisions or force action depending upon the objective. At

times it is useful to employ these tactics to accomplish the particular

objective-especially when the issue is "too hard to do." However, now is the time to

get the system right, and by jointly working the issue and taking field inputs into

account we will solve the issue . As a personal footnote, I had the opportunity to work

this concept from its inception in 1977-some 15 years now. I have noticed a very

real effort being exerted by staff officers to make the system work. It is refreshing to

see a spirit of cooperation and a sense ofjointness in our officers today struggling to

balance individual service needs and joint war-fighting requirements . Also, the

Persian Gulf war points out how successful we can be when we organize our forces

along the lines of naval, air, and land components .

53. FC 100-26, chapter 2, "Organization of the Air-Ground Operations System,"

details how the Army system works, 2-2 through 2-30.

54. Ibid ., 2-1 .

55. Ibid ., 2-11 .

56. FM 100-16-1, Theater Army, Army Group, and Field Army Operations, 18

December 1984, 5-28. See also Capt Thomas A. Owen, USA, "The Battlefield

Coordination Element: The Key to AirLand Synchronization," AirLand Bulletin, no.

85-4,31 December 1985, TAC-TRADOC ALFA, 20-23 .

57 . TACM 2-1, details the tactical air control system .

58. Ibid ., 3-9.

59. Ibid ., 3-11 and 3-12.

60. Ibid ., 4-1 .

61 . Ibid .

62. FM 100-5, 7-3, 7-4.

135

Chapter 4

Summary

We are always looking for ways to improve our

capability to respond to any contingency.

-Gen Jerome F. O'Malley

The organizational structure for airland combat proposed in this

book is based on lessons learned from past conflicts and on the broad

guidance contained in service and joint publications . The focus is on

the air contribution to the airland battle as this area is the most discussed

aspect of recent warfare.

The structure, organization, doctrine, and procedures to accomplish

airland combat must be based on the principle of unity of effort. That

is, the principle of integrating the capabilities of the service-provided

forces into a team operating for a common objective. The command

structure and organization proposed in this book to accomplish airland

combat is based on this principle of unity of effort.

The organization for airland combat must be kept simple so as not to

complicate the coordination process of applying land and air combat

assets. This command structure has one overall commander who

employs assigned assets through three component commanders-one

for naval, one for air, and one for land assets. The proposed airland

combat organization accounts for the unique characteristics of the

services. These capabilities are blended together to form a coherent

war-fighting organization .

Lt Gen John H. Cushman has observed that "the way the US military

establishment is organized makes difficult the writing of useful

authoritative operational guidance for . . . US forces engaged in joint

137
AIRLAND COMBAT

operations ."' This is because each service writes its own doctrine and

the services are responsible for the preparation of forces, but they are

not responsible for their wartime operations . These operations are the

responsibility of the joint force commander and are shared by a joint,

and in some cases combined, staff composed of two or more services

or nations. The chain of command does not include the service chiefs

of staff who are charged with providing forces for the combatant

command. However, recent initiatives in the US armed forces have

attempted to reverse this trend . The Joint Chiefs of Staff started a pilot

program to develop joint doctrine. This program was called the Joint

Doctrine Development Program.*

Also NATO, through its Allied Tactical Publications (e.g., ATP 27B,

Offensive Air Support Operations), has published doctrine and

procedures for combined operations, and in the Pacific the Air

Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC) has published

doctrine for combined operations (e.g., Air Standard 45/3, "Tactical Air

Doctrine") .

I have chosen JCS Pub 26, which has been renumbered to Joint Pub

3-01 .2, to illustrate the problems we face in developing joint doctrine.

(These same problems are also found in developing combined doctrine.)

Before discussing these problems, let us briefly review the contents of

Joint Pub 3-01 .2.

In 1986 the services agreed to joint doctrine for the employment of

air assets in counterair operations from overseas land areas (published

in Joint Pub 3-01 .2) . 2 The aim of this publication is to issue doctrine for

the planning and employment of joint forces in theater counterair

operations . This directive applies to US military forces that can be used

by the joint force commander in conducting air operations to attain and

maintain a desired degree of air superiority by the destruction or

neutralization of enemy forces in overseas land areas. 3

The objective of counterair operations is to gain control of the air

environment and protect the force. It is up to the joint force commander

"The JCS established this pilot program to allow various unified commanders to develop doctrine in

specific areas . Forexample, commander in chief European Command has the responsibility for developing

joint doctrine for the attack of follow-on forces .

138
SUMMARY

to see that the forces are capable of achieving sufficient air superiority

to ensure freedom of action for critical operations and protection of key

assets . 4 Joint Pub 3-01 .2 says that "Counterair operations should

consider, as a minimum," the fundamental principles of concentration

of force, economy of effort, unity of effort, use of all appropriate forces,

and responsive force readiness posture. 5

Command arrangements for counterair operations according to Joint

Pub 3-01 .2 will be in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action

ArmedForces (UNAAF). Specifically, the "joint force commander will

normally designate a joint force air component commander . . . to

employ combat air forces in support of counterair operations."

However, the "tactical and strategic forces that may be committed to

counterair operations, as well as other contributing forces such as

[special operations forces], elements of Army, Navy, Air Force, and

Marine aviation, surface air defense, and [electronic warfare], remain

under the command of their respective components ." 6 During sustained

operations ashore, US Marine Corps tactical air will be employed in

accordance with JCS Pub 12 (vol. 4, subpar. 1A.4.3) [which has been

changed to Joint Pub 3-56, Tactical Command and Control Planning

Guidance andProcedures forJoint Operations (Information Exchange

Planning Guidance)] which follows :

The Marine Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander will retain

operational control ofhis organic air assets . The primary mission of the MAGTF

air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint

operations, the MAGTF air assets unit normally will be in support of the

MAGTF mission. The MAGTF Commander will make sorties available to the

Joint Force Commander, for tasking through his air component commander for

air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance . Sorties in

excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the Joint

Force Commander for tasking through the air component commander for

the support of other components of the joint force or the joint force as a whole.

Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the Theater or Joint Force

Commander in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions, redirect

efforts (e .g ., the reapportionment and/or reallocation of any MAGTF TACAIR

sorties when it has been determined by the joint force commander that they are

required for higher priority missions), and direct coordination among his

subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort in accomplishment of his

139
AIRLAND COMBAT

overall mission, or to maintain integrity of the force, as prescribed in JCS Pub

2 [now Joint Publication 0-2] . 7

In summary then, Joint Pub 3-01 .2 states that operational control of

the assigned forces is exercised by the joint force commander to ensure

unity of effort . Normally, this authority will be exercised through the

service component commanders of assigned forces . $

Doctrine is so integral to service roles and missions that "to date it

has not been possible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who operate

essentially as a committee, to write meaningful 'how-to-fight' guidance

for multiservice forces*-or even to set up a mechanism for the

development of such doctrine as the best available thought-that can

be defended by reason ." 9 Additionally, joint publications are restricted

due to their being written by "committee." That is, the Organization of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff is composed of officers from each of the four

services . Therefore, the ways of thinking are "codified by service

proponents meeting in committee and [they are] then promulgated by

the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a series of definitive publications ." to

Frequently joint doctrine is a series of compromises. Often the

action officers and joint planners compromise the issues before they

get to the flag-officer level . For example, in Joint Pub 3-01 .2 the

terms component command and service component command were

both used . Since both terms have definite meanings, using both

terms could create confusion in exactly what is meant . The confusion

focuses on the ambiguity of the terms as defined in Joint Pub 0-2.

A component is defined as "a component command is also a

`component' or a `service component' ."' Therefore, one could

conclude that the joint force commander has an Army, Navy, Marine,

and Air Force component command, plus a fifth component-the air

component commander. The use of both terms in this document was a

compromise of the Army/Air Force and Navy/Marine positions .

12

Another example is the exercise of command over assigned forces .

In one instance Joint Pub 3-01 .2 states that counterair should consider

The term multi was selected by the author of the quote to mean more than one rather than many.

140
SUMMARY

the principle of unity of effort.* Yet the same document states that the

strategic and tactical forces committed to counterair operations, as well

as other contributing forces (e .g ., special operations forces [SOF],

electronic warfare [EW] forces, etc .), remain under the command of

their respective components . In fact, the Omnibus Agreement is quoted

verbatim in Joint Pub 3-01 .2 (and Joint Pub 3-56, vol . 4) . This

agreement is a compromise between the Air Force and Marine Corps

positions on sustained operations ashore.

Joint Pub 3-01 .2 is still a useful document because it outlines how to

plan for the use of forces in counterair operations. What the doctrine

does not do is prescribe how to organize the assigned forces ; rather, it

leaves that up to the joint force commander. This may be the best we

can expect given the way we develop doctrine. I would argue that we

can do better-that we can develop an organization based upon the

concepts and principles found in Joint Pub 0-2, on historical data, and

on projections of future conflicts . With these thoughts in mind, the

organization for airland combat proposed in this book, as outlined in

chapter 3, was developed.

In summary, the proposed organization has a single commanderjoint force or theater commander-and three components : one for naval

assets, one for land assets, and one for air assets. The interface to

accomplish airland combat occurs at the component level where a

tactical control system is used to effect coordination and control assets .

Within the air component command structure, there are liaison elements

for Navy, Army, and Marine assigned assets.

13 These elements allow

close coordination effectively employing the assigned assets to

accomplish the theater or joint force commander's objectives .

After reviewing past conflicts and analyzing service doctrine, I have

concluded that the following statements can be made concerning joint

doctrine for airland warfare.

1 . Military forces are best employed under the principle of unity of

effort.

"Unity ofeffort is accomplished through the exercise ofcommand by a single joint force commander

having full operational command over all assigned forces (Joint Pub 3-01 .2, 111-3) .

141
AIRLAND COMBAT

2. Organizational structures to accomplish airland combat are more

efficient when they are organized under the principle of unity of

command.

3 . The command structure must account for the unique

characteristics of the three components of the service forces-air, land,

and naval-to accomplish airland combat.

4 . Air power, in support of the airland battle, must be centralized

under a single air component commander.

5 . Jointness in command organization does not mean all four

services must share in the organization .

6. Command lines and communications must be kept as simple as

possible . Defective organizations lose wars.

I hope that this book has increased your awareness of the problems

we can create if we do not employ our forces under the principles of

unity of effort and organize our combatant commands into a coherent

structure that allows for the integration of the service assigned assets

into a team of naval, land, and air forces. This book proposes one way

to organize our forces for airland combat based on joint principles for

war fighting-the unified command structure.

14

Notes

l . Lt Gen John H. Cushman, USA, Retired, "Organization and Operational

Employment of Air/Land Forces," US Army War College Reference Text (Carlisle

Barracks, Pa. : US Army WarCollege, 1983-1984), viii-x . General Cushman provides

an interesting view on the difficulty in getting the services to agree on joint doctrine .

2 . Joint Pub 3-01 .2, Joint Doctrinefor Theater Counterair Operations (From

Overseas LandAreas), 1 April 1986.

142
SUMMARY

3. Joint Pub 3-01 .2, pages B-1 to B-2, defines counterair operations as

air operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority by the

destruction or neutralization of enemy forces . Counterair operations include such measures

as the use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface-to-air missiles, electronic

countermeasures, and destruction of the air or missile threat both before and after it is

launched. Other measures that are taken to minimize the effects to hostile air actions are

cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic), and mobility . Both

offensive and defensive actions are involved . The former range throughout enemy territory

and are generally conducted at the initiative of the enemy air forces . The latter are normally

conducted near or over friendly forces and aregenerally reactive to the initiative of the enemy

air forces .

See also antiair warfare, which is defined as "a US Navy/US Marine Corps term to

indicate an action required to destroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemy air

and missile threat . It includes such measures as the use of interceptors, bombers,

antiaircraft ."

4. Ibid., III-1 to 111-2.

5 . Ibid., 111-2.

6. Ibid., 111-4.

7 . Ibid., 111-4 to III-5.

8 . Ibid., 111-5.

9. Ibid. ; Cushman, ix .

10. Cushman, ix .

11 . Joint Pub 0-2, 4.

12. There is discussion within the services over the term component as used in

Joint Pub 0-2. There exists some confusion on interpreting and applying this concept

to the command arrangements in our unified command structure. The confusion

focuses on the ambiguity of the terms component and service component.

Use of the term service component, such as US Air Force component, does not

consider those military situations when a member of a service other than the US Air

Force has operational control of air assets . Endorsement of the term service

component, vice component, implies an endorsementof the term US Navy component,

for example. Use of this descriptive tag implies the acceptance of a multicommander

concept in which two ormore generic theater-assigned assets are operating in the same

theater. The use of two land armies is a good example.

Endorsement of the term component, vice service component, implies an

endorsement of the term air, land, or naval component which supports the doctrinal

concept of having a single manager for all generic theater-assigned assets, regardless

of service affiliation. As an example, the importance ofhaving a single air commander

was affirmed in JCS Memorandum 2502/645-1, "NATO Tactical Air Doctrine," 20

February 1975, which states :

143
AIRLAND COMBAT

To realize their full potential and effectiveness, air forces must be employed as an entity

under command arrangements that preclude dissipation and fragmentation of effort and

permit the integrated, responsive, and decisive application of available air assets to tasks in

the overall air effort that best achieve designated objectives . Unity of effort is best achieved

when planning and control ofthe air effort is centralized at the highest level practicable under

the unified authority of a single air command.

13. The air component structure is based upon the single-manager-for-air

concept. Gen William W. Momyer, USAF, Retired, provided the following rationale

for the single-manager-for-air concept. This information was collected from

conversations with General Momyer during the period 1977 to 1984.

The air component should comprise all of those elements that are engaged in

sustained operations on a daily basis. The decisions that have to be made on a daily

basis demand detailed planning in order to get the most out of the assigned air

elements . The air effort must be articulated carefully so that all of the elements work

together . The pace of the air war is such that there isn't time to go through a long and

tedious process of coordination and arguments about what should be done and when.

Decisions must be made, and forces must execute operations in accordance with a

plan of action . The air weapon system is the only system that can be directed to such

a wide variety of targets. The priority employment of air power should be to gain air

superiority so that it can provide air support to the divisions and corps.

14. Unified Command Structure. Perhaps the most important part of Joint Pub

0-2 is chapter 3, which outlines and describes the unified command structure. This

chapter provides guidance for commanders whoemploy the forces that are organized,

equipped, trained, and provided by the military departments. Chapter 3 discusses

command, organization, operations, intelligence, logistics, and administration of

service-provided forces in a unified and specified command structure. Command is

defined in these terms : direction, coordination, and control; an order; a unit under the

command of one individual . Command given an individual in the unified structure is

called operational command. Specific guidance is provided on the exercise of

operational command. According to Joint Pub 0-2, the commander of the unified

command is authorized to

a. plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the action of assigned

forces ;

b. conduct joint exercises;

c . exercise direct authority for logistics within his command (the military

departments and services continue to have responsibility under the secretary of

defense for logistic and administrative support of component commands);

d. exercise direct authority over all elements of the command;

e. establish plans, policy, and overall intelligence activities of the command;

f. participate in the development and acquisition ofthe command and control

system and direct its operation; and

144
SUMMARY

g. review respective military department budgets relevant to the command to

verify that they are in agreement with the command'splans and programs . Operational

command is exercised through the service component commanders-Army, Navy,

and Air Force components .

Chapter 3 discusses unified and specified commands ; joint task forces; and

support, coordinating authority, and executive agent for the JCS. A unified command

is a command established by the president with a broad continuing mission under a

single commander. It is composed of assigned components of two or more services

(e .g ., United States Eurqpean Command is a US unified commandwith United States

Air Force Europe as the air component) . A commander of a unified command may

direct the attachment of elements of any of his service components to a subordinate

unified command, joint task force, or uniservice force.

PHOTO SECTION

The majority of the photographs in this section have not previously

been published. The assistance of Mr David Chenoweth of the Office

of Air Force History, Ms Carol H. Parks of Headquarters United States

Air Forces Europe (USAFE) History Office, the 601 st Tactical Control

Wing History Office, Det 2 of the 1367th Visual Information Squadron,

the 602d Air Support Operations Group, and the Public Affairs Office

of the 66th Electronic Combat Wing for providing these photographs is

greatly appreciated.





















Appendix

Unified Command Plan

Command of unified and specified combatant commands is exercised

as provided for in the unified command plan and as directed by the

Secretary of Defense. The National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10

of the United States Code provide the basis for the establishment of

unified and specified combatant commands .

A unified combatant command has broad, continuing missions and

is composed of forces from two or more Military Departments . A

specified command has broad, continuing missions and is normally

composed of forces from a single Military Department. The Unified

Command Plan (UCP) establishes the missions, responsibilities and

force structure for commanders of unified and specified combatant

commands and establishes their general geographic areas of

responsibility and functions . Communications between the National

Command Authorities (NCA), that is the President or the Secretary of

Defense, and the commanders of the combatant commands shall be

transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unless

otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense .

Forces assigned to unified or specified combatant commands will be

under combatant command of commanders of the unified or specified

combatant commands. Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of

Defense, forces assigned to the unified or specified combatant

commands do not include forces assigned to carry out functions of the

Secretary of a Military Department as defined in Title 10 or forces

assigned to multinational peacekeeping organizations .

Unified and specified combatant command forces will be assigned to

such commands by the Secretary of Defense's memorandum entitled

"Forces for Unified and Specified Commands." Except as otherwise

directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, all forces

* Adapted from the Unified Command Plan (UCP).

17 1
operating within the geographic area assigned to a unified combatant

command shall be assigned or attached to and under the command of

the commander of that command. A force assigned or attached to a

combatant command under Section 162 of Title 10 may be transferred

from that command only as directed by the Secretary of Defense and

under procedures prescribed by the Secretary of Defense and approved

by the President .

The authority of combatant commanders is established in Chapter 6

of Title 10. The commander of a unified or specified combatant

command shall exercise command authority, as defined in Section

164(c) of Title 10, over all forces assigned to that command. In addition,

the commander of a unified or specified combatant command will,

unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, exercise those

functions of command involving the control of assigned resources .

In the temporary absence of the commander of a unified or specified

command, interim command will pass to the deputy commander. If a

deputy commander has not been designated, interim command will pass

to the next senior officer present for duty who is eligible to exercise

command, regardless of service affiliation .

The commander of a unified or specified combatant command is

responsible for:

a. Maintaining the security of the command, including its assigned

or attached forces and assets, and protecting the United States, its

possessions, and bases against attack or hostile incursion .

b . Carrying out assigned missions and tasks.

c . Assigning tasks to, and directing coordination among, the

command's subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort in the

accomplishment of the commander's assigned missions.

d. Planning for and executing operations in contingencies, limited

war, and general war.

The commander of a unified command that includes a general

geographic area of responsibility is additionally responsible for:

172
a . Planning and implementing the evacuation of US noncombatant

and certain non-US persons abroad and reviewing emergency action

plans within the commander's general geographic area of responsibility .

b. Providing for US military representation, within the

commander's general geographic area of responsibility, to international

and US national agencies unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of

Defense. The US military representatives will provide advice and

assistance to Chiefs ofUS Diplomatic Missions in negotiation of rights,

authorizations, and facility arrangements required in support of US

military missions in the region.

c. Providing the single point of contact within his area of

responsibility . Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense,

whenever a commander undertakes exercises, operations, or other

activities with the military forces of nations in another commander's

area of responsibility, those exercises, operations, and activities, and

their attendant command relations, will be as mutually agreed between

the commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall prepare

for the approval of the Secretary of Defense directions as appropriate.

d. Providing military assessments of the security assistance

programs within their assigned security assistance area.

e. Ensuring the coordination of regional security assistance matters

under command responsibility with affected Chiefs of US Diplomatic

Missions.

f. Commanding, supervising, and supporting the security

assistance organizations in matters that are not functions or

responsibilities of the Chiefs of US Diplomatic Missions.

g. Carrying out advisory, planning, and implementing responsibilities relating to security assistance within their assigned security

assistance areas.

Those geographic areas not assigned to a combatant commander will

be assigned as necessary by the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unless

otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

173
General Geographic Areas of Responsibility

In establishing commands, it is not intended to delineate restrictive

geographic areas of responsibility for accomplishment of missions

assigned . Commanders may operate forces wherever required to

accomplish their missions . Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary

of Defense, when significant operations overlap boundaries, a task

force will be formed. Command of the task force will be determined by

the President or the Secretary of Defense and transferred to the

appropriate commander. Forces directed by the President or the

Secretary of Defense may also conduct operations from or within any

geographic area as required for accomplishing assigned tasks, as

mutually agreed by the commanders concerned or as directed by the

President or the Secretary of Defense. To provide a basis for

coordination by commanders, general geographic areas of

responsibility are delineated in subsequent paragraphs concerning

unified and specified combatant commands. These areas also provide

the basis for coordinating intelligence and logistic planning.

Unified and Specified Combatant Commands

US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM). The Commander in

Chief, US Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT), headquartered at

Norfolk, Virginia, is the commander of a unified combatant command

comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the

commander's missions. USCINCLANT's general geographic area of

responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Atlantic Ocean

west of 17 degrees E, the Caribbean Sea, the Pacific Ocean east of 92

degree W, the Arctic Ocean east of 95 degrees W and west of 100

degrees E, and Greenland andother islands (except the United Kingdom

and Ireland) in all assigned water areas .

US Central Command (USCENTCOM). The Commander in

Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), with headquarters at

174
MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, is the commander of a unified

combatant command comprising all forces assigned for the

accomplishment of the commander's missions . USCINCCENT's

general geographic area of responsibility for the conduct of normal

operations includes Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,

Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates,

Republic of Yemen, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, plus

the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea.

US European Command (USEUCOM). The US Commander in

Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), with headquarters at Patch Barracks,

Stuttgart, Germany, is the commander of a unified combatant command

comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the

commander's missions. USCINCEUR's general area of responsibility

for the conduct of normal operations in Europe, including eastern

European countries (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria,

Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania), the United Kingdom, and Ireland; the

Mediterranean Sea and its islands ; the Mediterranean littoral (excluding

Egypt) ; and the continent ofAfrica (less Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia,

Somalia, and Djibouti) .

US Pacific Command (USPACOM). The Commander in Chief, US

Pacific Command (USCINCPAC), with headquarters at Camp H . M.

Smith, Oahu, Hawaii, is the commander ofunified combatant command

comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the

commander's missions. USCINCPAC's general geographic area of

responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Pacific Ocean

west of 92 degrees W, the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean west of 95

degrees Wand east of 100 degrees E, the Indian Ocean east of 17 degrees

E (excluding the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Oman), Japan, the

Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the

People's Republic of China, Mongolia, the countries of Southeast Asia

and the southern Asian landmass to the western border of India, and

Madagascar and the other islands in all assigned water areas. In addition,

USCINCPAC's general geographic area of responsibility for the

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conduct of normal operations other than air defense will include Alaska

and the Aleutian Islands .

US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). The Commander in

Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO), with headquarters at

Quarry Heights, Panama, is the commander of a unified combatant

command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the

commander's missions . USCINCSO's general geographic area of

responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is Central and South

America. USCINCSO is also responsible for the defense of the Panama

Canal and the Panama Canal area.

Forces Command (FORSCOM). The Commander in Chief, Forces

Command (CINCFOR), with headquarters at Fort McPherson, Atlanta,

Georgia, is the commander of a specified combatant command

comprising assigned major combatant conventional general purpose

forces . CINCFOR has no general geographic area of responsibility for

normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command

associated with area responsibility . However, CINCFOR's

responsibilities include:

a. Planning for land defense of CONUS and execution on order.

CINCFOR is also responsible for planning for combined

Canada-United States land defense of Canada and military support to

civil defense.

b. Provision of a general reserve of deployable Army forces to

reinforce other unified or specified commands when and as directed.

c. Readiness and related deployment planning for assigned or

apportioned forces to reinforce the other unified and specified

commands.

US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The Commander

in Chief, US Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC), with

headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, is the

commander of a unified combatant command comprising assigned

forces . USCINCSOC has no general geographic area of responsibility

for normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command

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associated with area responsibility . In addition to functions specified in

Sections 164(c) and 167 of Title 10, USCINCSOC's responsibilities

include:

a. Providing combat-ready special operations forces to other

unified or specified commands when and as directed.

b. Training, including joint training exercises, of assigned forces

and developing appropriate recommendations to the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, regarding strategy, doctrine, tactics, techniques,

and procedures for the joint employment of special operation forces.

c. Exercising command of a selected special operations mission if

directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

US Space Command (USSPACECOM)

a. The Commander in Chief, US Space Command

(USCINCSPACE), with headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base,

Colorado Springs, Colorado, is the commander of a unified combatant

command. USCINCSPACE has no general geographic area of

responsibility for normal operations and will not exercise those

functions of command associated with area responsibility . However,

USCINCSPACE's responsibilities include :

(1) Supporting the North American Aerospace Defense

Command (NORAD) by providing the missile warning and space

surveillance necessary to fulfill the US commitment to the NORAD

Agreement.

(2) Exercising combatant command over those assigned US

forces that provide warning and assessment of strategic space and

missile attack of CONUS and Alaska.

(3) Conducting space operations to include launch and on-orbit

operations and advocating space and missile warning requirements of

other CINCs, and advocating their needed space support capabilities in

coordination with each concerned operational commander.

(4) Conducting space operations by exercising combatant

command over assigned space control, space support, and force

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enhancement forces, as well as forces that provide strategic ballistic

missile defense for the US .

(5) Planning for and developing requirements for strategic

ballistic missile defense and space-based tactical ballistic missile

defense .

(6) Providing integrated tactical warning and attack

assessment of space, missile, and air attacks on CONUS and Alaska

should NORAD be unable to accomplish the assessment mission.

b. USCINCSPACE is also Commander, US Element, NORAD

(CDRUSELMNORAD), and is normally designated CINCNORAD,

commander in chief of the binational command of the United States and

Canada. When, in accordance with United States-Canada agreement,

CINCNORAD is a Canadian, USCINCSPACE is designated Deputy

CINCNORAD (DCINCNORAD) . CINCNORAD is responsible for the

employment of assigned forces, with the support of USCINCSPACE

and commanders of other unified and specified combatant commands,

to carry out the NORAD mission. Relationships with regard to air

defense of Alaska will be identified in a memorandum of agreement

between USCINCPAC and CINCNORAD unless otherwise directed by

the Secretary of Defense.

US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The Commander in

Chief, US Strategic Command (USCINCSTRAT), with headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska, is the commander

of a unified combatant command comprising all forces assigned for the

accomplishment of the commander's missions . USCINCSTRAT has

no geographic area of responsibility for normal operations and will not

exercise those functions of command associated with area

responsibility . When USSTRATCOM's forces are deployed in a

geographic CINC's AOR, they will remain assigned to USSTRATCOM

unless reassignment is directed by the Secretary of Defense.

USCINCSTRAT will have primary responsibility for strategic nuclear

forces to support the national objective of strategic deterrence. In

addition, USCINCSTRAT's responsibilities include :

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a. Employing assigned forces, as directed.

b. Providing support to other combatant commanders, as directed.

c. Conducting appropriate worldwide strategic reconnaissance.

d. Ensuring command, control, communications, and intelligence

(C3 I) for strategic force employment.

US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The

Commander in Chief, US Transportation Command

(USCINCTRANS), with headquarters at Scott Air Force Base,

Belleville, Illinois, is the commander of a unified combatant command

comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the

commander's mission. USTRANSCOM will not exercise those

functions of command associated with area of responsibility . When

USTRANSCOM's forces are deployed in geographic CINC's AOR,

they will remain assigned to USTRANSCOM unless reassignment

is directed by the Secretary of Defense . USCINCTRANS's

responsibilities include:

a. Providing air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of

Defense, both in time of peace and time of war.

b. Providing airlift, sea lift, surface transport, and terminal services,

and commercial air, land, and sea transportation, including as needed

to support the deployment, employment, and sustainment of US forces

on a global basis, as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

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Terms and Definitions

The following terms and definitions were extracted from AFM 1-1,

Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force; FM 100-5,

Operations; FC 100-26, Air-Ground Operations; TACM 2-1, Tactical

Air Operations; Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms; Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed

Forces (UNAAF) . Additionally, selected terms are explained in greater

detail to show their relationship to other terms, and how these terms are

applied in the airland battle.

A

active air defense. Direct defensive action taken to destroy or reduce

the effectiveness of an enemy air attack. It includes such measures as

the use of aircraft, antiaircraft guns, electronic countermeasures, and

surface-to-air guided missiles. See also air defense and passive air

defense.

aerial mine laying. On 22 May 1974 the US Air Force and the US

Navy signed a joint agreement, specifying mine-laying responsibilities and procedures for each service. While the primary US Air

Force support for mine-laying operations comes from SAC which

provides drogue-retarded cylindrical mines dropped from B-52s,

several other tactical aircraft are capable of conducting mine-laying

operations . Joint procedures for mine laying are detailed in current

plans which are exercised during annual tests .

aerial surveillance . A systematic observation of airspace or surface

areas by visual, aerial, electronic, photographic, or other means . See

also surveillance .

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aerospace. Of, or pertaining to, the earth's envelope of atmosphere and

the space above it . These are two separate entities considered as a

single realm.

aerospace control (air space control) . The role that encompasses all

actions taken to secure and control the aerospace environment and to

deny the use of that environment to the enemy.

aerospace control operations. The employment of air forces,

supported by ground and naval forces, as appropriate, to achieve

military objectives in vital aerospace areas . Such operations include

destruction ofenemy aerospace and surface-to-air forces, interdiction

of enemy aerospace operations, protection of vital air lines of

communication, and the establishment of local military superiority

in areas of air operations .

aerospace defense. A mission that includes strategic air defense and

space defense operations.

air base operability . The integrated capability of an installation to

defend against, survive the effects of, and recover from hostile

action; thus supporting effective wartime employment of air power.

Air base operability provides the sustained operational capability to

wage war.

airborne battlefield command and control center . A US Air Force

aircraft equipped with communications, data link, and display

equipment; it may be employed as an airborne command post or a

communications and intelligence relay facility. It is an airborne

aircraft equipped with necessary staff, communications equipment,

and operations facilities to function as an airborne air support

operations center.

airborne warning and control system. An aircraft suitably equipped

to provide an airborne control, surveillance, and communications

capability for strategic defense and/or tactical air operations.

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air campaign . A connected series of operations conducted by air forces

to achieve joint force objectives within a given time and area of

operations .

air command. A major subdivision of the Air Force; for operational

purposes it normally consists of two or more air forces.

air component. The air portion of the combined/unified/joint force.

air component commander. The commander of the air portion of the

combined/unified/joint force .

air defense. All measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft

or missiles in the earth's envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or

reduce the effectiveness of such attack .

air defense area. Overseas-a specifically defined airspace for which

air defense must be planned and provided. United States-airspace

of defined dimensions designated by the appropriate agency within

which the ready control of airborne vehicles is required in the interest

of national security during an air defense emergency.

Air Defense Command. The authority responsible for the air defense

of a designated area.

air defense commander. A duly appointed commander responsible

for the air defense of a designated area.

air defense identification zone. Airspace of defined dimensions

within which the ready identification, location, and control of

airborne vehicles are required.

air interdiction . Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or

delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear

effectively against friendly forces and at such distances from friendly

forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and

movement of friendly forces is not required. See also interdict .

air interdiction operations . Air interdiction of enemy ground force

second-echelon movements, sometimes referred to as battlefield air

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interdiction, requires extensive reconnaissance and surveillance

support to determine the location and movement of these forces. Air

interdiction operations can include attacks on industrial, supply, and

transportation complexes to reduce the availability or movement of

personnel and materiel. The air component commander requires

prestrike reconnaissance as well as poststrike damage assessment to

determine the status and vulnerability of the enemy logistics system.

Reconnaissance and surveillance ofthe enemy's capability to reroute,

transship, or employ new means of transportation is essential as is

reconnaissance of concentration areas along lines of communications. These include transshipment facilities, supply depots,

repair centers, geographical choke points, troop staging areas, and

industrial installations. Since air interdiction operations do not

normally inhibit all enemy activity, commanders should repeatedly

employ reconnaissance forces to monitor movement and resupply

efforts .

Some interdiction operations are supported by strike control and

reconnaissance (SCAR) aircraft. Information provided by these

aircraft with real-time sensors or through visual means is passed

directly to attack aircraft for immediate strike. These missions are

normally flown into areas where activity is known to be taking place

but cannot be accurately located by other means . See also target

nomination (interdiction).

air liaison officer . A tactical air force or naval aviation officer attached

to a ground or naval unit or formation as the adviser on tactical air

operation matters . See also ground liaison officer.

airlift control center. An operations center where detailed planning,

coordinating, and tasking for tactical airlift operations are

accomplished . This is the focal point for communications and the

source of control and direction for the tactical airlift forces .

airlift control element . A subelement ofthe airlift control center which

can be displaced to a staging area to coordinate or assist in controlling

airlift mission requirements .

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airmobile operations. Operations in which combat forces and their

equipment move about the battlefield in air vehicles under the control

of a ground force commander to engage in ground combat.

air reconnaissance. The acquisition of intelligence information

employing visual observation and/or sensors in air vehicles . See also

tactical reconnaissance and coordination of reconnaissance

operations .

air reconnaissance liaison officer. An Army officer especially trained

in air reconnaissance and imagery interpretation matters who is

attached to a tactical air reconnaissance unit. This officer assists and

advises the air commander and staff on matters concerning ground

operations and informs the supported ground commander on the

status of air reconnaissance requests .

air refueling (aerospace refueling). The capability to refuel combat

and combat support aircraft in flight, which extends presence,

increases range, and allows air forces to bypass areas of potential

trouble.

airspace control element. A functional component of appropriate

service control elements involved with coordination, integration, and

regulation of the use of airspace .

airspace management. The coordination, integration, and regulation

of the use of airspace of defined dimensions .

air strike. An attack on specific objectives by fighter, bomber, or attack

aircraft on an offensive mission . May consist of several air

organizations under a single command in the air.

air superiority. That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force

over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former

and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place

without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.

air support. Air forces of different services function as equal partners

in airland combat. Air support assists the land battle with counterair

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and interdiction operations, offensive air support, and tactical airlift

operations which are conducted to achieve necessary air superiority

and ensure that enemy forces cannot interfere with the operations of

friendly air or ground forces. Air interdiction operations are

conducted to destroy, isolate, neutralize, or delay the enemy's

military potential before it can influence friendly operations .

Offensive air support is that part of air operations which is conducted

in direct support of land operations-it consists of tactical air

reconnaissance, battlefield air interdiction, and close air support.

See also air interdiction, and close air support.

air support operations center (ASOC) . The air agency subordinate

to the air command operations center, and collocated at the field

army/corps or the highest national army formation deployed. Where

different command or tasking structures at tactical levels exist, the

functions of the ASOC may be carried out by another air tasking

agency subordinate to the air command operations center. The ASOC

may be responsible for tasking (depending on regional regulations)

the air effort allocated to offensive air support of the appropriate land

forces. The ASOC is a US Air Force agency that can include US

Army and, if appropriate, US Navy representation .

air supremacy. The degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air

force is incapable of effective interference.

air-to-ground operation system. An Army-Air Force system

providing the ground commander with the means for receiving,

processing, and forwarding the requests of subordinate ground

commanders for air-support missions and for the rapid dissemination

of information and intelligence .

air weapons controller . An individual especially trained for and

assigned to the duty of employing and controlling air weapon systems

against airborne and surface objects .

allocation. The translation of the apportionment into total numbers of

sorties by aircraft type available for each operation/task. See also

force allotment .

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amphibious operation. An attack launched from the sea by naval and

landing forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a

hostile shore.

amphibious task force . The task organization formed for the purpose

of conducting an amphibious operation . The amphibious task force

always includes Navy forces and a landing force, with their organic

aviation, and may include Military Sealift Command (MSC)

provided ships and Air Force support when appropriate .

antiair warfare. A US Navy/US Marine Corps term to indicate that

action required to destroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemy

air and missile threat. It includes such measures as the use of

interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface-to-air and air-to-air

missiles, electronic countermeasures, and destruction of the air or

missile threat both before and after it is launched. Other measures

which are taken to minimize the effects of hostile air action are:

cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic),

and mobility .

antisubmarine warfare (ASW) . ASW includes-by implication more

than mission statement-the protection of friendly shipping against

its greatest threat. Enemy submarines can operate submerged for

extended periods of time which makes them less vulnerable to visual

detection and tracking. Consequently, the major contribution of

tactical aircraft in an ASW role will be against submarine supporting

forces, port facilities, and surfaced submarines .

apportionment . The determination and assignment of the total

expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be

devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a

given period of time. See also force allotment .

area of influence . A geographical area wherein an army commander

is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire

support systems which are normally under his control or command.

(US Army term .)

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area of interest . That area of concern to the commander, including the

area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy

territory to the objectives of current or planned operations . This area

also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize

the accomplishment of the mission. (US Army term.)

area of operations (theater of operations) . That portion of an area of

war (theater) necessary for military operations .

area of responsibility. A defined area of land in which responsibility

is specifically assigned to the commander of the area for the

development and maintenance of installations, control of movement,

and the conduct of tactical operations involving troops under the

commander's control, along with parallel authority to exercise these

functions .

armed reconnaissance . A mission with the primary purpose of

locating and attacking targets of opportunity (i .e ., enemy materiel,

personnel, and facilities) in assigned general areas or along assigned

ground communications routes and not for the purpose of attacking

specific briefed targets .

Army air-ground system . The Army system which provides for

interface between Army and tactical air support agencies of other

services in the planning, evaluating, processing, and coordinating of

air support requirements and operations . It is composed of

appropriate staff members, including G-2 and G-3 air personnel, and

necessary communications equipment.

Army corps. A tactical unit larger than a division and smaller than a

field army . A corps usually consists oftwo or more divisions together

with supporting arms and services .

Army group. A formation of land forces normally comprising two or

more field armies or army corps under a designated commander.

assign. To place units or personnel in an organization where such

placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization

18 8
controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary

function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel .

attach . To place units or personnel in an organization where such

placement is relatively temporary. Subject to limitations imposed in

the attachment order. The commander of the formation, unit, or

organization receiving the attachment exercises the same degree of

command and control thereover as over units and persons organic to

the command. However, the responsibility for transfer and promotion

of personnel normally is retained by the parent formation, unit, or

organization . See also in support of.

attrition. The reduction of effectiveness of a force caused by loss of

personnel and materiel.

attrition rate. A factor, normally expressed as percentage, reflecting

the degree of losses of personnel or materiel due to various causes

within a specified period of time.

B

battle coordination element. This element formalizes Army liaison at

the tactical air control center. It integrates the theater ground situation

into the tactical air support management process. The element also

replaces and expands Army liaison element functions . The element

assures that the tactical air control center and the air component

commander are aware of the theater ground situation. For this reason,

it serves as an expediter and interpreter of information-both from

the Army to the Air Force and vice versa. As part of the planning

process, the joint force commander provides an integrated battlefield

air interdiction target list and reconnaissance requirements to the air

component commander. The element, however, acts in those

situations where time or lack of communications prevents

consultation with the joint commander. In such cases the element

distributes close-air-support sorties among the corps . It also

consolidates and provides the corps' prioritized battlefield air

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interdiction target lists and reconnaissance requirements to the air

component commander for execution .

battlefield air interdiction. Air action against hostile surface targets

which are in a position to directly affect friendly forces and which

requires joint planning and coordination . While battlefield air

interdiction missions require coordination in joint planning, they may

not require continuous coordination during the execution stage. See

also air interdiction .

C

campaign. A series of joint actions designed to attain a strategic

objective in a theater of war.

campaign plan. Aplan for a series of related military operations aimed

to accomplish acommon objective, normally within a given time and

space.

center ofgravity . The characteristic, capability, or locality from which

a force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to

fight. It exists at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of

war. Army publications define it as: the sources of strength and

balance from which a military force derives its freedom of action,

physical strength, or will to fight. It may be the mass of the enemy

force, the seam between two of its major force elements, a vital

command and control center, its logistical base, its lines of

communications, or something more abstract, such as military

cohesion, morale, or the national will .

centralized control . In air defense, the control mode whereby ahigher

echelon makes direct target assignments to fire units .

chain of command. The succession of commanding officers from a

superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised.

change of operational control . The date and time (Greenwich mean

time/Greenwich civil time) at which the responsibility for operational

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control of a force or unit passes from one operational control authority

to another. See also transfer of authority.

close air support. Air action against hostile targets which are in close

proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of

each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. See also

air interdiction.

Close-air-support operations, because of the fluidity of most battle

situations, require responsive near-real-time reconnaissance of

hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly ground forces .

These operations must be integrated with other tactical air operations

such as fighter/attack and airlift and with movements of ground

forces. Typical targets include enemy troop concentrations and

mechanized/airmobile elements in the immediate battle area. Related

tasks include battlefield surveillance contiguous to the main battle

area, topographic update, and limited strike control.

What is close air support? Since the introduction of aircraft into

modern warfare, principally World War II, the outcome of wars has

depended on air and land forces working together effectively. Close

air support (CAS) is air action requested by the ground commander

against hostile ground targets requiring detailed integration of each

mission with the fire and movement of the supported ground officers .

The mobility of aircraft and their ability to concentrate firepower

complements the fire support of the ground forces. Air power can

strike targets that are inaccessible or invulnerable to ground forces .

CAS can blunt an enemy attack and help friendly ground forces

obtain and maintain the offensive .

To be effective, CAS must be timely and responsive. It must be of

sufficient magnitude (including strategic systems such as the B-52),

with accurate weapons delivery at the critical point. CAS is flown at

the request of ground forces against a variety of targets which pose a

threat or obstacle to planned and ongoing operations.

Relationship of CAS to other air operations . Air superiority must

be achieved so that CAS aircraft can reach the battle area to make

19 1
direct attacks on enemy forces. The degree of superiority may vary

from total supremacy to momentary, localized air superiority

provided by fighter escort to the battle area. The greater the degree

of air superiority, the greater the range of options that are available

to support ground forces .

Interdiction is closely related to close air support. The effectiveness

of interdiction operations in disrupting enemy supply routes, limiting

reinforcement of enemy ground forces, and destroying/neutralizing

follow-on echelons influences the size and intensity of CAS

requirements . Battlefield air interdiction against echeloned forces on

the attack must be closely integrated and may be inseparable from

the CAS effort. Tactical reconnaissance is used to locate the enemys'

positions, defenses, and in some cases, estimate their intentions .

Other joint operations which increase effectiveness of CAS are:

l . Suppression of Enemy Defenses . Suppression is enhanced by

joint operations that include electronic countermeasures (ECM),

electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), chaff, strike, drone

support, and ground fire support. As enemy air defenses are

countered, CAS can be employed more effectively against first

echelon enemy forces. Both air and ground commanders must

contribute the necessary firepower and electronic warfare to this end.

2. Joint Airspace Management. Procedures have been established

to assure that friendly aircraft may enter, depart, or move within the

area of operations without undue restrictions on their movements and

without interfering with the effectiveness of the offensive and

defensive capabilities of the joint force.

combat air patrol (CAP) . CAP may be used to provide temporary air

superiority over a given area to protect friendly air or ground forces

from attack by air during the conduct of their operations . CAP can

patrol a general area, defend a localized area, or could be positioned

between the expected threat and the friendly forces to act as a fighter

screen or barrier. Regardless of the positioning, the objective of the

CAP remains the same: intercept and destroy enemy aircraft before

they can pose a threat to friendly forces. See also air defense.

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cohesion . The principle of establishing and maintaining the warfighting spirit and capability of a force to win; the cement that holds

a unit together through the trials of combat and is critical to the

fighting effectiveness of a force .

combatant command. One of the unified or specified commands

established by the president. Not to be confused with the command

authority titled "combatant command" exercised by commanders of

unified and specified commands.

combat area . A restricted area (air, land, or sea) which is established

to prevent or minimize mutual interference between friendly forces

engaged in combat operations .

combat forces. Those forces whoseprimary missions are to participate

in combat.

combat-maneuver forces. Those forces which use fire and movement

to engage the enemy with direct-fire weapons systems, as

distinguished from those forces which engage with indirect fire or

otherwise provide combat support andcombat service support. These

elements are primarily infantry, armor, cavalry (air and armored), and

attack helicopter units.

combat power. The outcome of battle is decided by the application of

combat power at the decisive place and time . Combat power is a

complex combination of tangible and intangible factors. Force ratios

and the effects of firepower and maneuver are significant elements

of combat power, but its actual development depends on the manner

in which that potential is applied and is largely a function of other

intangible factors which have historically differentiated military

forces. See also firepower, maneuver, and protection .

combat readiness. Synonymous with "operational readiness," with

respect to missions or functions performed in combat.

combat service support. The assistance provided operating forces

primarily in the fields of administrative services, chaplain services,

civil affairs, finance, legal services, health services, military police,

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supply, maintenance, transportation, construction, acquisition and

disposal of real property, facilities engineering, topographic and

geodetic engineering functions, food service, graves registration,

laundry, dry cleaning, bath, property disposal, and other logistic

services .

combat support elements. Those elements whose primary missions

are to provide support to the combat forces and which are a part, or

are prepared to become a part, of a theater, command, or task force

formed for combat operations .

combat zone. 1 . That area required by combat forces for the conduct

of operations . 2. The territory forward of the Army rear area

boundary.

combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more

allies . (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating

nations and services shall be identified, i .e ., combined navies .)

combined force. A military force composed of elements of two or more

allied nations.

combined operation . An operation conducted by forces of two or more

allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single

mission.

combined staff. A staff composed of personnel of two or more allied

nations.

combined theater. A theater in which US and allied forces, by

agreement, are engaged in combat operations against a common

enemy .

command. l . The authority that a commander in the military service

lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.

Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively

using available resources and for planning the employment of,

organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces

for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes

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responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned

personnel . 2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the

commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular

action . 3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the

command of one individual . (In NATO: 1 . The authority vested in an

individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and

control of military forces. 2. An order given by a commander; that

is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing

about a particular action . 3 . A unit or units, an organization, or an

area under the command of one individual.)

command and control (C) . The exercise of authority and direction

by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the

accomplishment of the mission. CZ functions are performed through

an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities,

and procedures which are employed by a commander in planning,

directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the

accomplishment of the mission.

command and control system. The facilities, equipment,

communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a

commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of

assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned.

command, control, and communications (C) . The process of and

the means for the exercise of authority and direction by a properly

designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment

of the commander's mission. C functions are performed through an

arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities,

and procedures that are employed by a commander in planning,

directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the

accomplishment of the commander's mission .

command, control, and communications countermeasures (CCM).

The integrated use of operations security, military deception,

jamming, and physical destruction, supported by intelligence, to deny

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information to, influence, degrade, or destroy enemy C capabilities

and to protect friendly C against such actions.

commander in chief. 1 . The supreme commander of all the armed

forces of a nation . 2 . The officer commanding a major armed force .

communications zone. Rear part of a theater of operations (behind

but contiguous to the combat zone) that contains the lines of

communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and

other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance

of the field forces.

component commander. The senior service commander of either air,

naval, or land forces (e .g ., land forces component commander).

concept. Anotion or statement of an idea, expressing how something

might be accomplished, that may lead to an accepted procedure.

concept ofoperations. Averbal or graphic statement, in broad outline,

of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or

series of operations . The concept of operations frequently is

embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case,

particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to

be carried out simultaneously or in succession . The concept is

designed to give an overall picture of the operation . It is included

primarily for additional clarity of purpose.

control. Authority which may be less than full command exercised by

a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other

organizations.

control and reporting center. An element of the US Air Force tactical

air control system, subordinate to the tactical air control center, from

which radar control and warning operations are conducted within its

area of responsibility.

coordinating authority . A commander or individual assigned

responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities

involving forces of two or more services, or two or more forces of

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the same service . The commander or individual has the authority to

require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have

the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential

agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the

appointing authority.

coordination of reconnaissance operations. Air Force component

commanders centrally manage and coordinate aerospace

reconnaissance and surveillance missions to achieve economy of

force while providing necessary intelligence laterally to other

component commanders and rearward to the joint force commander.

This coordination process is accomplished within and among the air

forces and other component staffs and provides the intelligence upon

which thejoint force commander bases his strategy . The effectiveness

of reconnaissance operations contributes to the success of all tactical

combat operations .

counterair. Air operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired

degree ofair superiority by the destruction or neutralization of enemy

forces. Both air offensive and air defensive actions are involved. The

former range throughout enemy territory and are generally conducted

at the initiative of the friendly forces. The latter are conducted near

to or over friendly territory and are generally reactive to the initiative

of the enemy air forces . Air operations conducted to attain and

maintain a desired degree of air superiority are called counterair

operations-see below.

The degree of air superiority achievable or needed may range from

full control over the entire area by the friendly forces to local control

in a specific battle area. It may also vary by time, from temporary

control in an area, to prolonged periods depending on the type and

amount of force that is applied. In the absence of an enemy offensive

air capability either by aircraft or surface-to-air defensive systems,

security offriendly forces from air attack is gained by default . In most

instances, however, friendly tactical air operations will be challenged

by hostile air attack, surface-to-air missiles, and/or air defense

artillery . These enemy weapons will normally be part of an elaborate

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and well-integrated air defense system designed to deny us air

superiority . The types and degree ofenemy air defenses will influence

what actions are necessary to achieve air superiority .

counterair operations . Employment of reconnaissance resources in

support of our counterair objectives will be related to offensive

actions . These actions will be conducted to seek out and destroy

enemy air power where return is likely to be highest. Typical targets

will include aircraft, airfields, tactical missile complexes, command

and control facilities, support and storage facilities, and surface-to-air

defensive systems . Counterair strikes normally will be initiated at the

onset of hostilities to gain an immediate advantage in the air battle .

Therefore, much of the targeting for these actions can be preplanned

based on data obtained during peacetime. However, reconnaissance

forces are required to penetrate enemy territory during all weather

conditions to acquire the latest information concerning the status of

fixed targets and to search for and acquire mobile targets that pose a

threat to friendly forces. Transient and fleeting targets such as mobile

surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA)

facilities present the most difficult challenge since data must be

relayed in near real time to permit immediate destruction of these

targets by strike forces.

Types of counterair operations. Counterair operations include

operations conducted over enemy and friendly territory . Operations

over enemy territory may be the most effective contributor to air

superiority because they destroy the enemys' air power in their

territory before they can threaten friendly forces . Counterair

operations over friendly territory tend to be reactive in nature .

Nonetheless, these operations can be highly effective in eliminating

or neutralizing the enemys' offensive air actions .

The ratio of forces assigned to counter an enemy attack on friendly

territory and those committed against enemy forces in their own

territory will depend largely on the level of the enemy air threat and

the vulnerability of friendly forces to air attack. Offensive pressure

forces enemies to withhold a portion of their air power for defense of

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their own territory, thus reducing their offensive numerical strength

where actions over friendly territory are reactive to the level ofenemy

activity over or near friendly skies.

D

decentralized control . In air defense, the normal mode whereby a

higher echelon monitors unit actions, making direct target

assignments to units only when necessary to ensure proper fire

distribution or to prevent engagement of friendly aircraft.

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by

manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him

to react in a manner prejudical to his interests .

deep battle. The deep battle is designed to support the commander's

basic scheme of maneuver by disrupting enemy forces in depth. (US

Army term.)

defensive counterair. Those operations mounted to nullify or reduce

the effectiveness of an attack by enemy air power.

defensive counterair operations. Air defense operations are

conducted to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of an attack by enemy

air forces. The enemy's air potential is the primary factor to be

considered in establishing air defense requirements . An effective air

defense system consists of active measures and passive measures.

delaying operation. An operation in which a force under pressure

trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and

inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without becoming

decisively engaged.

destroyed. A condition of a target so damaged that it cannot function

as intended nor be restored to a usable condition .

destruction. A type of adjustment for destroying a given target.

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destructive means. Military action employed to physically damage or

destroy surface-to-air systems or personnel .

deterrence. The prevention from action by fear of the consequences.

Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a

credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.

direct support. The support provided by a unit or formation, not

attached or under command of the supported unit or formation, but

required to give priority to the support required by that unit or

formation. See also assign and in support of for related terms.

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements

thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives . It is

authoritative but requires judgment in application.

E

echelon. A separate level of command.

echelons above corps (EAC). Army headquarters and organizations

that provide the interface between the theater commander (joint or

combined) and the corps for operational matters ; and between the

continental United States, host nation, and deployed corps for combat

service support (CSS). Operational EAC may be US only or allied

headquarters where EAC for CSS will normally be a US national

organization. (US Army term.)

electronic combat (EC. Electronic combat (EC) is action taken in

support of military operations against the enemy's electromagnetic

capabilities . EC includes electronic warfare (EW) ; command,

control, and communications countermeasures (CCM) ; and

suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD).

electronic warfare. Military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use

of the electromagnetic spectrum and action which retains friendly use

of the electromagnetic spectrum. There are three divisions within

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electronic warfare: electronic warfare support measures, electronic

countermeasures, and electronic counter- countermeasures .

electronic warfare elements . All radiated electronics can be

countered. The procedure is to detect quickly the frequencies and

modulation techniques of the enemy equipment and by combinations

of jamming, deception, tactics, and weapons degrade the effectiveness of that equipment. The three elements of electronic warfare are

defined as:

Electronic support measures (ESM) . The interception, location,

and analysis of enemy electromagnetic emitters to plan or aid our

military operations. The emitter data can be used for aircrew warning,

avoidance tactics, homing, countermeasures or countercountermeasures .

Electronic countermeasures (ECM). The jamming or deceiving of

hostile electromagnetic emitters . Such targets can be enemy

command and control, intelligence, or weapons systems dependent

on electronic control of emissions.

Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). This is action against

enemy ECM to ensure effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

It encompasses the tactics and special equipment used to allow our

electronic dependent weapon systems or emitters to work effectively

when the enemy is employing ECM.

element. The smallest subdivision of a military unit that can be

tactically maneuvered independently .

elements of national power. All the means that are available for

employment in the pursuit of national objectives .

F

field army. Administrative and tactical organization composed of a

headquarters, certain organic Army troops, service support troops, a

variable number of corps, and a variable number of divisions.

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field echelons. Separate levels of command operating within the

combat zone (e .g ., army group, field army) .

firepower. Firepower must be massed against the enemy at the right

time and place . It involves positioning weapons systems in the hands

of well-trained people in locations where these systems can be

employed effectively . Firepower is essential to a successful

maneuver. See also combat power.

fire support. Assistance to those elements of the ground forces which

close with the enemy, such as infantry and armor units, rendered by

delivering artillery and mortar fire, naval gunfire, and CAS . Tanks,

air defense artillery, and Army aviation may also provide fire support.

fire support coordination. The planning and executing of fire so that

targets are covered adequately by a suitable weapon or group of

weapons.

fire support coordination line. A line established by the appropriate

ground commander to ensure coordination of fire not under his

control but which may affect current tactical operations. The fire

support coordination line is used to coordinate the firing of air,

ground, or sea weapons systems, using any type of ammunition,

against surface targets . The fire support coordination line should

follow well-defined terrain features . The establishment of the fire

support coordination line must be coordinated with the appropriate

tactical air commander and other supporting elements . Supporting

elements may attack target elements forward of the fire support

coordination line, without prior coordination with the ground force

commander, provided the attack will not produce adverse surface

effects on or to the rear of the line. Attacks against surface targets

behind this line must be coordinated with the appropriate ground

force commander.

fire support element. A functional portion of a force tactical

operations center that provides centralized targeting, coordination,

and integration of fire on surface targets. This element is staffed by

personnel from the field artillery headquarters or field artillery staff

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section of the force and representatives of other fire support means.

(US Army term .)

fire support plan. This plan provides for the employment of mortars,

field artillery, naval gunfire, and air-delivered weapons in support of

the operations plan.

Fleet Marine Force. A balanced force of combined arms comprising

land, air, and service elements of the US Marine Corps. A Fleet

Marine Force is an integral part of a US fleet and has the status of a

type command .

force allotment . The mobility, flexibility, and responsiveness of

tactical air forces enable them to perform multiple, diverse combat

tasks. Since there will rarely be sufficient resources to meet all

demands, the problem becomes one of dividing resources so they can

do the most good.

The joint force commander apportions air resources to meet overall

objectives. In dividing or apportioning total air resources among the

various tactical functions, decisions must be made at the highest

practical level, normally the joint force commander. This ensures

unity of effort across the broad spectrum of the entire operation .

The air component commander allocates sorties to fulfill tasks. When

priorities have been determined, the actual allocation of sorties to

perform specific tasks is made by the air component commander.

Once air resources have been allocated for CAS, the ground force

commander determines which targets will be attacked. Requests for

CAS strikes may originate at any level of command within the

supported land forces. After evaluating these requests, the Army

commander then decides which targets to strike and their relative

priorities. Some of the allocated sorties can be used for preplanned

strikes against known targets, and some portion of CAS assets may

be held in reserve and placed on alert to fill immediate CAS requests

for which specific target makeup and location cannot be determined

in advance. Air sorties on immediate alert may be used to quickly

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reinforce sagging defenses or to gain the maximum from friendly

force advancement .

The organization and equipment required for the Air Force to plan,

direct, and control tactical air operations and coordinate CAS with

surface forces is the tactical air control system (TACS). At the heart

of this system is the tactical air control center (TACO), which assists

in developing target lists, processing CAS requests, determining

force requirements, and publishing the detailed air tasking orders

necessary for mission execution.

forward air controller. An officer (aviator/pilot) member of the

tactical air control party who, from a forward ground or airborne

position, controls aircraft in close air support of ground troops .

forward air control post. A highly mobile US Air Force tactical air

control system radar facility subordinate to the control and reporting

center and/or post used to extend radar coverage and control in the

forward combat area.

forward edge of the battle area. 1 . The foremost limits of a series of

areas in which ground combat units are deployed, excluding the areas

in which the covering or screening forces are operating, designated

to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver

of units . 2. The forward limit of the main battle area.

forward line of own troops . A line which indicates the most forward

positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a

specific time .

forward operating base. An airfield used to support tactical operations

without establishing full support facilities . The base may be used for

an extended time period. Support by a main operating base is required

to provide backup support for a forward operating base.

fragmentary order (frag) . An abbreviated form of an operation order,

usually issued on a day-to-day basis which eliminates the need for

restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be

issued in sections .

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G

G-2 air. An assistant on the staff of each corps, army group, and theater

headquarters who is especially trained in the capabilities and

limitations of tactical air reconnaissance and photographic

reconnaissance in airland operations .

G-3 air. An assistant G-3 (officer in the operations and training section)

on the staff of each division, corps, army, army group, and theater

headquarters who is especially trained in the methods of employment

of air effort .

general support. That support which is given the supported force as a

whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.

general war. Armed conflict between major powers in which the total

resources of the belligerents are employed and the national survival

of a major belligerent is in jeopardy.

Greenwich mean time. Mean solar time at the meridian of Greenwich,

England, used as a basis for standard time throughout the world.

Normally expressed in four numerals 0001 through 2400. It is

expressed as GMT or Zulu (Z) time .

ground liaison officer. An officer especially trained in air

reconnaissance and/or offensive air support activities . These officers

are normally organized into teams under the control ofthe appropriate

ground force commander to provide liaison to air force and naval

units engaged in training and combat operations .

guidance. Policy, direction, decision, or instruction having the effect

of an order when promulgated by a higher echelon .

I

in support of. Assisting or protecting another formation, unit, or

organization while remaining under original control .

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intelligence. The product resulting from the collection, processing,

integration, analysis evaluation, and interpretation of available

information concerning foreign countries or areas.

interdict. To isolate, or seal off an area by any means . To deny the use

of a route of approach. See also air interdiction.

interdiction . An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's

surface military potential before it can be used effectively against

friendly forces .

interoperability . The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide

services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces

and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate

effectively together.

intertheater airlift. The air movement of personnel and materiel

between the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas areas,

normally over long distances. (Airlift between theaters exclusive of

that airlift between CONUS theaters .)

intratheater airlift . The air movement of personnel and materiel

within an area, command, or theater of operations.

J

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which

elements of more than one service of the same nation participate.

joint force. A general term applied to a force which is composed of

significant elements of the Army, the Navy or Marine Corps, and the

Air Force, or two or more of these services operating under a single

commander authorized to exercise unified command or operational

command over joint forces .

joint maritime operations (air) . The employment of joint force air

efforts to achieve military objectives in the maritime environment.

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joint operations . An operation carried on by two or more of the

services of the United States.

joint operations center . A jointly manned facility of a joint force

commander's headquarters established for planning, monitoring, and

guiding the execution of the commander's decisions .

joint staff. 1 . The staff of a commander of a unified or specified

command, or of a joint task force, which includes members from the

services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in

such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the

tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the

component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided

so that service representation and influence generally reflect the

service composition of the force. 2 . The staff of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff as provided for under the National Security Act of 1947, as

amended.

joint suppression of enemy air defenses (JSEAD) . BEAD is

conducted to increase the overall effectiveness of friendly airland

operations . Theaterwide BEAD is planned by the air component

commander against specific surface-to-air defenses . Local BEAD

operations are conducted as part of the attack of specific ground

targets. See also electronic warfare.

joint task force. A force composed of assigned or attached elements

of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two

or more of these services, which is constituted and so designated by

the secretary of defense or by the commander of a unified command,

a specified commander, or an existing joint task force.

joint/unified commander. Commander of the combined/unified/joint

force.

L

land campaign plan. A long-range plan developed by the land

component command to support the theater campaign plan. The plan

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contains amplifying information on the employment of Army forces

in sustained land combat operations in accordance with the theater

commander's concept.

land component. The land portion of the combined/unified/joint

force.

land component commander. The commander of the land portion of

the combined/unified/joint force.

limited war. Armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of

incidents, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of

two or more nations.

lines of communications. All the routes-land, water, and air-which

connect an operating military force with a base of operations and

along which supplies and military forces move.

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and

maintenance of forces . In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects

of military operations which deal with (1) design and development,

acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance,

evacuation, and disposition of materiel; (2) movement, evacuation,

and hospitalization of personnel; (3) acquisition or construction,

maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and (4)

acquisition or furnishing of services .

M

main attack . The principal attack or effort into which the commander

throws the full weight of the offensive power at his disposal. An

attack directed against the chief objective of the campaign or battle.

main battle area (MBA). That portion of the battlefield in which the

decisive defensive battle is fought to defeat the enemy attack.

Designation of the MBA may include the use of lateral and rear

boundaries. Referred to in combined usage as the defense area. For

any particular command, this area extends from the forward edge of

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the battle area (FEBA) to the rear boundaries of those units

comprising its main defensive forces .

maneuver. Maneuver is the concentration of or dispersion of troops to

achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy to produce

results that would otherwise be more costly in men and materials . See

also combat power.

maritime interdiction . Sea control operations . The employment of

naval forces, supported by land and air forces, as appropriate, to

achieve military objectives in vital sea areas . Such operations include

destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea

commerce, protection of vital sea lanes, and establishment of local

military superiority in areas of naval operations.

maritime operations. Actions performed by forces on, under, or over

the sea to gain or exploit control of the sea or to deny its use to the

enemy.

mass. 1 . The concentration of combat power. 2. To concentrate or

bring together, as to mass the fire of multiple weapons or units .

military strategy . The art and science of employing the armed forces

of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the

application of force or the threat of force. See also strategy and

national strategy.

mission. 1 . The task, together with the purpose, which clearly indicates

the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2 . In common usage,

especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an

individual or unit; a task. 3 . The dispatching of one or more aircraft

to accomplish one particular task.

mobility. A quality or capability of military forces which permits them

to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their

primary mission.

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movement control . The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of

personnel and supply movements over lines of communications ; also

an organization responsible for these functions .

N

national command. A command that is organized by, and functions

under the authority of, a specific nation.

national command authorities. The president and secretary of

defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors .

national strategy. The art and science of developing and using the

political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together

with its armed forces, during peace and war to secure national

objectives . See also strategy.

naval component. The naval portion of the combined/unified/joint

force.

naval component commander . The commander of the naval portion

of the combined/unified/joint force .

nuclear warfare. Warfare involving the employment of nuclear

weapons.

O

offensive air support (OAS). OAS is a NATO term for that part of

tactical air support, conducted in direct support of land operations,

that consists of tactical air reconnaissance (TAR), battlefield air

interdiction, and close air support which are conducted in direct

support of land operations .

offensive counterair. Those operations mounted to destroy, disrupt,

or limit enemy air power as close to its source as possible . See also

counterair .

21 0
operation. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical,

service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of

carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense,

and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or

campaign .

operational art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic

goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design,

organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations .

Operational art translates strategy into operational, and ultimately,

tactical action. No specific level of command is concerned with the

operational art.

operational command. Those functions of command involving the

composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the

designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary

to accomplish the mission . It does not include such matters as

administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training

except when a subordinate commander requests assistance . The Term

is synonymous with operational control and is uniquely applied to

the operational control exercised by the commanders of unified and

specified commands over assigned forces . (In NATO: The authority

granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate

commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or

delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed

necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics . It may also be used to denote the forces assigned

to a commander.)

operational control. The authority delegated to a commander to direct

assigned forces so that the commander may accomplish specific

missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or

location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical

control of those units . It does not include authority to assign separate

employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it,

of itself, include administrative or logistic control .

21 1
operational level of war . The level of war at which campaigns and

major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations.

Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing

operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives,

sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating

actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these

events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space

than do tactics ; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of

tactical forces and provide the means by which tactical successes are

exploited to achieve strategic objectives.

operation order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate

commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution

of an operation .

operation plan . A plan for a single or series of connected operations

to be carried out simultaneously or in succession . It is usually based

upon stated assumptions and is in the form of a directive employed

by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare

supporting plans and orders. It implements operations derived from

the campaign plan. When the time and/or conditions under which the

plan is to be placed in effect occur, the plan becomes an operation

order.

order of battle. The identification, strength, command structure, and

disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military

force .

organization for the strategic and operational direction of

combatant forces. With the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

president, through the secretary of defense establishes unified or

specified combatant commands for the performance of military

missions and determines the force structure of such combatant

commands . Commanders of unified and specified commands are

responsible to the president and the secretary of defense for the

accomplishment of the military missions assigned to them . The chain

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of command runs from the president to the secretary of defense,

through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the commanders of unified,

specified, and joint commands. Orders to such commanders will be

issued by the president or the secretary of defense, or by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff by authority and direction of the secretary of defense.

These commanders shall have full operational command over the

forces assigned to them and shall perform such functions as are

assigned by competent authority.

P

passive air defense. All measures, other than active defense, taken to

minimize the effects of hostile air action. Passive air defense consists

of those measures that do not involve the use of weapons systems . It

includes radar coverage, warning systems, cover, concealment,

deception, camouflage, dispersion, protective construction such as

hardened sites, frequent movement, and personnel training. It is

seldom possible to stop an attack completely, so passive measures

might very well determine the success or failure of an enemy attack.

See also air defense and active air defense.

preplanned mission request. A request for an air strike on a target

which can be anticipated sufficiently in advance to permit detailed

mission coordination and planning .

principle of full utilization of forces. It is essential that there be full

utilization and exploitation of the weapons, techniques, and intrinsic

capabilities of each of the military departments and services in any

military situation where this will contribute effectively to the

attainment of overall objectives . To effect this, the Functions Paper

(DOD Directive 5100 .1) assigns to the services both primary

functions and collateral functions .

principle ofsupport. The forces developed and trained to perform the

primary functions assigned to one service by DOD Directive 5100.1

shall be employed to support and supplement the other services in

carrying out their primary functions wherever and whenever such

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participation will result in increased effectiveness and will contribute

to the accomplishment of the overall military objectives .

protection. This refers to action a force takes to continue the fight over

an extended period and to prevail in the end. Protection has two

components-all actions taken to counter the enemy's firepower and

maneuver and actions that keep forces healthy, maintain their fighting

morale, and protect equipment and supplies. See also combat power.

psychological operations. A planned psychological activity in peace

and war directed toward enemy, friendly, and neutral audiences in

order to create attitudes and behavior favorable to the achievement

of political and military objectives .

R

rear area . The area in the rear of combat and forward areas . Combat

echelons from the brigade through the field army normally designate

a rear area. For any particular command, that area extending rearward

from the rear boundary of their next subordinate formations or units

deployed in main battle or defense area to their own rear boundary .

It is here that reserve forces of the echelon are normally located. In

addition, combat support and combat service support units are

activities located in this area.

rear battle. Those actions, including area damage control, taken by all

units (combat, combat support, combat service support, and host

nation) singly or in a combined effort, to secure the force, neutralize

or defeat enemy operations in the rear area, and ensure freedom of

action in the deep and close-in battles .

rear combat zone. In combined usage, the rear part of the combat zone

required by field echelons to conduct combat operations . The

territory between the corps rear boundary and the rear boundary of

the highest combat land operational echelon (e.g., army group) .

rear echelon. Generic term used to describe all elements normally

located in the rear area.

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reconnaissance . Amission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation

or other detection methods, information about the activities and

resources of an enemy or potential enemy ; or to secure data

concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic

characteristics of a particular area.

roles . The broad and enduring purposes for which a service was

established by the Congress .

rules of engagement. 1 . Directives issued by competent military

authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under

which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with

other forces encountered. 2 . In air defense, directives that delineate

the circumstances under which weapons can fire at an aircraft. The

right of self-defense is always preserved.

S

S-3 air. See G-3 air.

scheme of maneuver . That part of a plan to be executed by a maneuver

force to achieve its assigned objective or to hold its assigned area.

sea power interdiction . The capability to conduct maritime

interdiction has been consistently maintained since the days of Gen

William ("Billy") Mitchell. Tactical air force crews and aircraft stand

ready to perform this function anywhere, anytime, and at the level

necessary. New reconnaissance and weapons delivery systems will

further enhance existing capabilities . See also maritime interdiction .

search and rescue. The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines,

specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue

personnel in distress on land or at sea.

sea surveillance . Visual detection of shipping is generally limited to 25

nautical miles either side of the observer's track in good visibility

conditions. Several tactical aircraft have sensors with night and

all-weather capabilities . Some have electro-optical systems like the

215
target identification system electro-optical (TISEO) to aid in visual

acquisition and identification.

Once potential targets have been located, the appropriate collateral

function can be performed by employing the proper force/weapon

mix. Guided munitions with a standoff capability significantly reduce

the number of sorties required to achieve a specified level of damage.

situation map . A map showing the tactical or administrative situation

at a particular time.

sortie. An operational flight by one aircraft.

special operations. Operations conducted by specially trained,

equipped, and organized DOD forces against strategic or tactical

targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic, or

psychological objectives . These operations may be conducted during

periods of peace or hostilities . They may support conventional

operations or they may be prosecuted independently when the use of

conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible.

special operations forces (SOF) . Forces which include special forces

(SF), range, psychological operations (PSYOPS), civil affairs, and

special operations aviations units. SOF perform missions requiring

specialized capabilities across the full spectrum ofconflict in a variety

of operational environments .

specified command. A command which has a broad continuing

mission and that is established and so designated by the president

through the secretary of defense with the advice and assistance of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from one

service .

spectrum of war. A term which encompasses the full range of

conflict-cold, limited, and general war.

strategic airlift . The continuous or sustained movement of units,

personnel, and materiel in support ofDepartment of Defense agencies

between area commands, between CONUS and overseas areas, or

216
within an area command. Strategic airlift resources possess a

capability to airland or air-drop troops, supplies, and equipment for

augmentation of tactical forces when required.

strategic air defense operation. One that uses air defense forces

independently or with other air, ground, or naval forces to detect,

identify, intercept, and, if necessary, destroy enemy air vehicles

attempting to penetrate the defined air space of North America.

strategic air warfare. Air combat and supporting operations designed

to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected

series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration

of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where the enemy no

longer retains the ability or the will to wage war.

strategic concept. The course of action accepted as the result of the

estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of what is to be

done expressed in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its use

in framing the basic undertakings that stem from it .

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation or group of

nations determines national or alliance security objectives and

develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives .

Activities at this level establish national and alliance military

objectives and sequence initiative, define limits and assess risks for

the use ofmilitary and other instruments of power, develop global or

theater war plans to achieve those objectives and provide armed

forces and other support in accordance with the strategic plan.

strategic mission. A mission directed against one or more of a selected

series of enemy targets with the purpose of progressive destruction

and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity and the will

to make war. As opposed to tactical operations, strategic operations

are designed to have a long-range, rather than immediate, effect on

the enemy and their military forces.

217
strategic offense. The mission that consists of operations directed at

vital targets of an enemy nation . The purpose of strategic offense is

to destroy the enemy's war-making capacity or will to fight.

strategic plan. A plan for the overall conduct of a war.

strategy. The art and science of developing and using political,

economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during

peace and war to afford the maximum support to policies in order to

increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and

to lessen the chances of defeat. See also military strategy and national

strategy .

subordinate unified command. A subordinate command established

by an existing unified command with a broad continuing mission and

with significant assigned components of two or more services. The

subordinate unified commander has functions, authorities, and

responsibilities within the area of responsibility which are similar to

a unified commander. See also unified command.

suppression of enemy air defenses. That action which neutralizes,

destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy air defenses in a specific

area by physical attack and/or electronic warfare.

surveillance . The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or

subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural,

electronic, photographic, or other means .

The most current tactical air force (TAF) systems-for example,

tactical electronic reconnaissance system (TEREC, and UPD-4

side-looking airborne radar (SLAR)-are used to maintain and

update a data base on areas along political borders. These are

all-weather systems . The TEREC has a near-real-time capability.

Routine surveillance of specific areas can be performed using visual

or optical means from the RF-4C.

National systems, such as the SR-71, U-2, and RC-135, collect

surveillance information that can be made available to theater

commanders in peacetime as well as during a conflict. The

218
information ranges from optical photography to radar and SIGINT

data.

synchronization . The arrangement of battlefield activities in time,

space, and purpose to maximize combat power at the decisive point.

It requires understanding the complementary and reinforcing effects

of combining all available combat means, the ways in which friendly

and enemy capabilities interact, mastery of space-time relationships,

and unambiguous unity of purpose. The goal of synchronization is to

use every asset where, when, and in the manner in which it will

contribute most to superiority at the point of decision. Putting all the

available forces together at the correct place and time to achieve

victory . See also combat power. (US Army term .)

T

tactical air control center. The principal air operations installation

(land- or ship-based) from which all aircraft and air warning

functions of tactical air operations are controlled .

tactical air control party. A subordinate operational component of a

tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison to land

forces and for the control of aircraft.

tactical air force. An air force charged with carrying out tactical air

operations in coordination with ground or naval forces .

tactical airlift . The airlift that provides the immediate and responsive

air movement and delivery of combat troops and supplies directly

into objective areas through air landing, extraction, airdrop, or other

delivery techniques ; and the air logistic support of all theater forces,

including those engaged in combat operations, to meet specific

theater objectives and requirements (intertheater airlift) .

tactical air reconnaissance. The use of air vehicles to obtain

information concerning terrain, weather, and the disposition,

composition, movement, installation, lines of communication,

electronic, and communication emissions of enemy forces . Also

219
included are artillery and naval gunfire adjustment and systematic

and random observation of ground battle area, targets, and/or sectors

of airspace .

Tactical aerospace reconnaissance forces are employed to provide

all-weather battlefield reconnaissance or surveillance for ground

combat forces and naval forces. Enemy movements and concentrations are located and maintained under surveillance . Targets which

require immediate command attention are reported by near-real-time

transmission through the appropriate TACS element or other

agencies for necessary action by air, ground, and naval commanders.

The FEBA and contiguous border areas are covered by tactical air

reconnaissance and surveillance forces to provide detailed

information concerning location of enemy field weapons, force

composition, logistics, and intentions to ground commanders . This

task requires full-time operation regardless of weather conditions,

and requires coverage of large areas of the theater in near real time.

Information concerning friendly forces and weather reconnaissance

are provided on a continuing basis. Map updating of the conflict area

is accomplished as required using manned or unmanned vehicles.

Sea reconnaissance and surveillance are integral parts of sea-lane

interdiction, antisubmarine warfare, protection of shipping and aerial

mine-laying operations . Tactical air reconnaissance and surveillance

operations can provide information on enemy maritime forces in

support of air force offensive maritime operations or in conjunction

with friendly naval operations.

tactical air support. Air operations carried out in coordination with

surface forces and which directly assist land or maritime operations.

tactical air support of land operations (TASLO). Those activities

that are conducted to influence a land battle. The activities include

the following basic air operations : counterair, air interdiction,

offensive air support, and tactical air support.

tactical air support of maritime operations (TASMO) . All tactical

air operations performed in the maritime environment by nonorganic

220
land-based/shipborne aircraft to assist the naval commander in

completing the mission .

tactical level ofwar. The level of war at which battles and engagements

are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned

to tactical units or task forces . Activities at this level focus on the

ordered arrangements and maneuver of combat elements in relation

to each other and the enemy to achieve combat objectives .

tactical operations center. A physical grouping of those elements of

an Army general and special staffs concerned with the current tactical

operations and the tactical support thereof.

tactical reconnaissance (air) . Tactical reconnaissance sensors are

carried by the manned RF-4C and the AQM-34 series remotely

piloted vehicles (RPV). The primary sensors are optical and infrared

(IR), and are employed from low through medium altitudes. RPVs

can fly either a preprogrammed route or flight headings commanded

from an airborne control station. They are employed to augment

manned systems and can be used when political situations or the

threat environment dictate.

Manned systems use a variety of sensors and visual techniques to

search specific areas for tactical targets . They are used against both

fixed and mobile targets . Information is disseminated to the decision

maker to assist in determining target priorities and in making the

decision to launch attack sorties or to divert airborne aircraft. When

target types are known and an accurate position is needed, a

commander may pass strike authority to attack to SCAR aircraft. In

this case the reconnaissance aircraft passes target identification and

location directly to attack aircraft or marks/designates the target for

the attack aircraft.

Strategic assets have the capability to provide reconnaissance

information based on IR, optical, or radar imagery. A capability also

exists to provide SIGINT to the TACS in near real time.

tactical reconnaissance (ground) . The US Army contributes a

surveillance capability with near-real-time data dissemination . For

22 1
example, Guardrail provides a corps commander with the capability

of intercepting transmissions of enemy regimental, division, and

Army command post logistical centers .

"Quick Look" is an airborne noncommunications ESM system

capable of locating the radars of ZSU-23-4, SA-4, SA-6, and SA-8

air defense systems. Additional information is available from SLAR,

IR, and photographic systems carried on the OV-1 D Mohawk. SLAR

uses a moving target indicator to detect moving targets beyond the

FEBA. Both the SLAR and IR systems have a data-link capability.

Although the SLAR can detect targets beyond the effective range of

artillery, the information is used to determine what the enemy has in

the second echelon and where the main thrust of follow-on attacks

may be located.

tactics. The employment of units in combat; the ordered arrangement

and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy

in order to utilize their full potentialities .

target nomination (interdiction) . The joint force commander initiates

the interdiction program and outlines the broad plan of operations .

This plan describes the general interdiction area, the degree of

neutralization required, what effects are desired, and the relative

priority of the tasks.

Based on this guidance the air component commander executes the

air interdiction campaign . An interdiction campaign is directed

against the enemy's transportation systems, concentration points,

communication facilities, stockpiled supplies, and industrial facilities

producing these supplies. The geography of the area, together with

the enemy capabilities and the friendly objective, will determine the

interdiction pattern. The detailed integration of each air interdiction

mission with the fire and movement of friendly ground forces is not

normally required because these strikes are normally not conducted

near friendly forces. However, the Soviet concept of employment of

armored forces calls for deeply echeloned forces directed at a narrow

section of friendly defenses to force a breakthrough and exploit the

penetration. This concept tends to reduce the distinction between

222
close air support and interdiction. To stop the advance of these

echeloned attacks, air support is needed from the point of contact to

the depth of the enemy thrust directed at friendly positions. These

operations, sometimes referred to as battlefield air interdiction, must

be closely coordinated with the ground commander. When air

interdiction is conducted by both US Air Force and other air forces,

the separate operations must be integrated to ensure a common plan

of action and to preclude strike interference and/or effort duplication .

Timely and accurate intelligence is a prerequisite to successful

interdiction . Careful analysis can identify vulnerable elements in the

enemy's forces . Tactical air reconnaissance and intelligence are used

by the air commander when selecting air interdiction targets and by

the ground commander for long-range artillery target selection. The

air commander must know the length of the enemy's supply lines,

the time it takes for supplies to reach the battle area, and the points

where personnel and materiel will most likely concentrate. These

concentration points, whether supply depot/storage areas, troop

staging areas, or transportation centers where rerouting and reloading

are done, will provide the most lucrative targets . Based on this

intelligence, interdiction targets are nominated for attack and are

prioritized in accordance with priorities established by the joint and

air component commanders. See also air interdiction and air

interdiction operations .

theater. The geographical area outside CONUS for which a

commander of a unified, specified, or joint command has been

assigned military responsibility .

theater airlift (tactical airlift) . The mission consisting of airlift

operations that provide immediate and responsive air movement and

delivery of combat troops and supplies directly into objective areas

by air landing, airdrop, extraction, or other delivery techniques. Also

air logistic support of all theater forces, including those engaged in

combat operations, to meet specific theater objectives and

requirements.

223
theater of operations (area of operations). That portion of an area of

war necessary for military operations and for the administration of

those operations .

transfer of authority. The date and time (Greenwich mean time) at

which the responsibility for operational control of a force or unit

passes from one operational control authority to another. See also

change of operational control.

U

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or

politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but

is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion

and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a

low-visibility, covert, or clandestine nature.

unified command. Acommand with a broad continuing mission under

a single commander and composed of significant assigned

components of two or more services, and which is established and so

designated by the president, through the secretary of defense with the

advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, when so

authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the commander of an

existing unified command established by the president.

unified operations . It is essential to have a clear understanding of the

term unified operations, its relationship to joint and uniservice

operations, and the distinction between the terms . The term unified

operation is a broad generic term descriptive of the wide scope of

actions taking place within unified combatant commands under the

overall direction of the commander of those commands . Within this

general category of operation, subordinate commanders of forces

conduct either uniservice or joint operations in furtherance of the

overall unified operation. The types of forces to which doctrines,

principles, and guidance established in Joint Pub 0-2 are applicable

are unified commands, specified commands, subordinate unified

224
commands, and joint task forces. It is also applicable in the general

sense where significant forces of one service are attached to forces

of another service, or where significant forces of one service support

forces of another service, under criteria set forth in Joint Pub 0-2.

unity of command. Also known as unity of effort as defined by Joint

Pub 0-2 . The concept of our military establishment as an efficient

team of land, naval, and air forces is based on the principle that

effective utilization of the military power of the nation requires that

the efforts of the separate military services be closely integrated .

Unity of effort among the services at the national level is obtained by

the authority of the president and the secretary of defense exercised

through the secretaries of the military departments and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, by the strategic planning and direction of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and by common, joint, and cross-servicing by the

military departments . Unity of effort among service forces assigned

to unified or specified commands is achieved by exercise of

operational command, adherence to common strategic plans and

directives, and sound operational and administrative command

organization . This concept is the basis for a sound working

relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders

of unified and specified commands in the overall strategic direction

of the armed forces on the one hand and, on the other, the military

departments and services charged with preparing and providing

forces for the unified and specified commands and administering and

supporting the forces so provided.

W

war. Essentially war is fighting, the only effective principle in the

manifold activities generally designated as war. The process by which

a nation endeavors to impose its will on its opponent. As generally

understood, armed conflicts on a fairly large scale, usually excluding

conflict in which fewer than 50,000 combatants are involved

(Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th Edition, 1988) .

225
wing operations center (WOC). The facility from which the unit

commander controls resources . Major functions are to receive and

implement plans and order/air tasking orders (ATO) received from

the Tactical Air Force commander/TACC. The reconnaissance WOC

includes a photo processing and interpretation facility which

processes, interprets, and disseminates information derived from

tactical air reconnaissance missions.

Z

zone. A tactical subdivision of a larger area, the responsibility for which

is assigned to a tactical unit; generally applied to offensive action .

Also referred to as a zone of action.

226
Numerical Index of Selected Joint Publications

Number Date Title Remarks

0-1 Basic National

Defense Doctrine

0-2 1 Dec 86 Unified Action Replaces JCS Pub 2.

Armed Forces Change 1, 21 Apr 89

(UNAAF)

1-01 15 Apr 88 Joint Publication Change 2, 1 Jun 90

System (Joint

Doctrine and JTTP

Development

Program)

1-02 1 Dec 89 DOD Dictionary of Replaces JCS Pub 1

Military and

Associated Terms

3-0 Doctrine for Test Pub, 1 Jan 90

Unified and Joint

Operations

3-00.1 Joint Doctrine To be developed

for Contingency

Operations

3-01 .1 1 Feb 82 Joint Doctrine Replaces JCS Pub 9

for the Defense

of the United

States Against

Air Attack

227
Number Date Title Remarks

3-01 .2 1 Apr 86 Joint Doctrine Replaces JCS Pub

for Theater 26. To be

Counterair consolidated with

Operations JCS Pub 3-01 .3

3-01 .3 23 May 64 Joint Doctrine Replaces JCS Pub 8 .

for Air Defense To be consolidated

from Overseas with JCS Pub

Land Areas 3-01 .2. Change 1,

9 Jan 84

3-01 .4 JTTP for Joint In development

Suppression of

Enemy Air Defense

3-01 .5 Doctrine for In development

Joint Tactical

Missile Defense

3-02.1 Joint Doctrine Test Pub, 1 Nov 89.

for Land Force Replaces LFM02,

Operations FM 100-43,

AFM 2-54

3-02.2 30 Jun 87 Joint Doctrine Test Pub, 1 May 90.

Amphibious Replaces LFM03,

Embarkation FM 20-12, NWP22-6

AFR 75-6

3-03 Doctrine for In development

Joint Interdiction

Operations

228
Numbe7° Date Title Remarks

3-03.1 Doctrine for Test Pub, 16 Jun 88

Joint Interdiction

of Follow-on

Forces

3-04 Doctrine for Test Pub, 1 May 88

Joint Maritime

Operations (Air)

3-05 Doctrine for In development.

Joint Special Replaces JCS Pub

Operations 20, Vol II

3-05 .3 30 May 83 Joint Special Replaces JCS Pub

Operations, 20, Vol II

Operational

Procedures

3-56 1 Apr 74 Tactical Command Replaces JCS Pub

and Control 12, Vol I. Change 1,

Planning Guidance 16 May 79

and Procedures

for Joint

Operations

(Information

Exchange Planning

Guidance)

229

Glossary

A

AAA antiaircraft artillery

AADCOM Army Air Defense Command

AAFCE Allied Air Forces Central Europe

AAGS Army air ground system

AAP Allied Administrative Publication (NATO)

AAW antiair warfare

AB air base

ABCCC airborne battlefield command and control

center

ABNCP airborne command post

ACA Airspace Control Authority

airspace coordination area

ACC Air Combat Command (established

1 July 1992)

ACCHAN Allied Command Channel

ACCIS Automated Command and Control Information

System

ACCMPS Automated Command and Control Message

Processing System

ACCS Air Command and Control System

ACE airspace control element

Allied Command Europe (NATO)

ACLANT Allied Command Atlantic (NATO)

ADCC air defense control center

ADCOM Aerospace Defense Command

ADGE air defense ground environment

ADIZ air defense identification zone

ADOA Air Defense Operation Area (NATO)

ADP automatic data processing

231
ADVON advanced echelon

advanced operational nucleus

AEF Allied Expeditionary Forces

AEGIS Airborne Early Warning Ground Environment

Integration Segment

AEW airborne early warning

AFAC airborne forward air controller

AFAMPE Air Force Automated Message Processing

Exchange

AFB air force base

AFCC/ACC Air Force component commander/

air component commander

AFCENT Allied Forces Central Europe (NATO)

AFFOR Air Force forces, Air Force component

command/commander

AFM Air Force manual

AFMC Air Force Materiel Command (established

1 July 1992)

AFNORTH Allied Forces Northern Europe (NATO)

AFR Air Force regulation

AFSINCGARS Air Force single channel ground and airborne

radio subsystem

AGOS Air Ground Operations School

air ground operations system

AI air interdiction

Air Alloc air allocation message

AIRBALTAP Allied Air Forces Baltic Approaches

AIRSONOR Allied Air Forces South Norway (NATO)

ALB AirLand Battle

ALCC airlift control center

ALCE airlift control element

ALFI air land force interface

ALO air liaison officer

232
AMC Air Mobility Command (established

1 July 1992)

Airspace Management Center

AME airspace management element

AO/AOA area of operations

AOB air order of battle

AOC air operations center

AOR area of responsibility

ARFOR Army forces, Army force component/

commander

ARLO air reconnaissance liaison officer

ARN air reporting network

ARVN Army, Republic of Vietnam

AS air standard

ASCC Air Standardization Coordinating Committee

ASCS Air Support Control Section

ASIC All Source Intelligence Center

ASIT adaptable surface interface terminal

ASOC air support operations center

ASTRA air staff training

ATAF Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO)

ATM air tasking message

ATO air tasking order (frag)

ATOC allied tactical operations center (NATO)

ATP allied tactical publication (NATO)

AUTODIN automatic digital network

AUTOSEVOCOM automatic secure voice communications

AWACS airborne warning and control system

AWC air weapons controller

B

BAI battlefield air interdiction

BALTAP Baltic Approaches

233
BCE battlefield coordination element

BENELUX Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg

C

C command and control

C command, control, and communications

CCM command, control, and communications

countermeasures

C3 I command, control, communications, and

intelligence

C

1

I

2

command, control, communications

intelligence and interoperability

03 coordinated command, control,

communications, and computing for

integrated information and intelligence

CA civil actions

CAA Combined Arms Army

CAME Corps Air Space Management Element

CAP combat air patrol

CAS close air support

CENTAG Central Army Group, Central Europe (NATO)

CG commanding general

CH cargo helicopter

CHOP change of operational control (TOA)

CI counterintelligence

CIC combat intelligence center

CINC commander in chief

CINCENT commander in chief, Central Europe (NATO)

CINCEUR commander in chief, European Command

CINCFE commander in chief, Far East

CINCHAN commander in chief, Channel

CINCLANT commander in chief, Atlantic Command

CINCMAC commander in chief, Military Airlift Command

CINCNORTH commander in chief, Northern Europe (NATO)

234
CINCPAC commander in chief, Pacific Command

CINCPACAF commander in chief, Pacific Air Force

CINCPACFLT commander in chief, Pacific Fleet

CINCSAC commander in chief, Strategic Air Command

CINCSOUTH commander in chief, Southern Europe (NATO)

CINCUSAFE commander in chief, United States Air Force

Europe

COB collocated operating base

COC combat operations center

COIC combat operations intelligence center

COMAAFCE commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe

(NATO)

COMALF commander, Allied Land Forces

COMBALTAP commander, Baltic Approaches

COMJAM communications jamming

COMLANDJUT commander, Land Forces Jutland

Comm communication(s)

COMMZ communications zone

COMTAF commander, Tactical Air Force

COMUSMACTHAI commander, United States Military Assistance

Command, Thailand

COMUSMACV commander, United States Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam

CONUS continental United States

COSCOM Corps Support Command

CR central region

CRAF civil reserve air fleet

CRC control and reporting center

CRP control and reporting post

CS combat support

CSS combat service support

CTF carrier task force

CTOC corps tactical operations center

235
D

DCA defensive counterair

Defense Communications Agency

DCS deputy chief of staff

DEFCON defense readiness condition

DGZ designated ground zero

DISUM daily intelligence summary

DIVAD division air defense

DOB dispersed operating base

DOD Department of Defense

DOO daily operations order

DS defense suppression

direct support

DSU direct support unit

DTOC division tactical operations center

DZ drop zone

E

EAC echelons above corps

EC electronic combat

ECCM electronic counter-countermeasures

ECM electronic countermeasures

Eifel Elektronisches Informations-und

Fuhrungssystem fur die

Einsatzbereitschaft der Luftwaffe

(electronic information C2 system

for the German Air Force [Luftwaffe])

ELINT electronic intelligence

EOB electronic order of battle

enemy order of battle

ETA equivalent target area

estimated time of arrival

ETD estimated time of departure

EUCOM European Command

236
EW early warning

electronic warfare

EWO electronic warfare officer

emergency war order

F

FAC forward air controller

FAC-A forward attack coordinator-airborne

FACP forward air control post

FEAF Far East Air Forces

FEBA forward edge of the battle area

FECOM Far East Command

FIST fire support team (Army)

FLO fighter liaison officer

FLOT forward line of own troops

FM field manual

FMFLANT Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic

FOB forward operating base

FOL forward operating location

FRAG fragmentary order (ATO)

FSCL fire support coordination line

FSCOORD fire support coordinator

FY fiscal year

G

G-1 personnel officer at division and corps

G-2 intelligence officer at division and corps

G-3 operations officer (Army) at division and

corps levels

G-3 air operations officer (air) at division and

corps levels

G-4 logistics officer at division and corps

GCI ground controlled intercept

237
GDP general defense plan

GEADGE German air defense ground environment

GFAC ground forward air controller

GHQAF General Headquarters Air Force

GLCM ground launched cruise missile

GLO ground liaison officer

GMT Greenwich mean time (Zulu time)

GOB ground order of battle

H

Hawk homing all the way killer-missile system

(low-altitude SAM)

HFAC helicopter forward air controller

HHQ higher headquarters

HIDACZ high density airspace control zone

HIGHMEZ high altitude missile engagement zone

HIMAD high-to-medium altitude air defense

HOJ home on jamming

HQ headquarters

HUMINT human intelligence

I

IFF/SIF identification, friend or foe/selective

identification feature

IFR in-flight report

instrument flight rules

I-Hawk Improved Hawk (homing all the way killer)

IMINT imagery intelligence

INTREP intelligence reports

IntSum intelligence summary

IP initial point

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield

238
J

J-l, G-1, S-1 Personnel/Administration Section

J-2, G-2, S-2 Intelligence Section

J-3, G-3, S-3 Operations & Training Section

J-4, G-4, S-4 Logistics Section

J-5 Plans Section

J-6 Communications/Electronics Section

JAAT joint air attack team

JCAAD joint counter air/air defense

JCOC Joint Combat Operations Center

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JINTACCS Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command

and Control Systems

JMEM Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual

JOC joint operations center

Joint Pub joint publication

J-SAK joint attack of the second echelon

BEAD joint suppression of enemy air defenses

JSOC joint special operations command

J-STARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

JTF joint task force

JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System

K

KM (Km) kilometer

Kts knots

L

LANDJUT Land Forces Allied Land Forces SchleswigHolstein & Jutland

LC line of contact

LOC lines of communications

239
LOWMEX low altitude missile engagement zone

LZ landing zone

M

MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAB Marine Amphibious Brigade (USMC)

MACTHAI Military Assistance Command, Thailand

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MAF Marine Amphibious Force (USMC)

MAG Military Advisory Group

MAGTF Marine Air/Ground Task Force (USMC)

MAJCOM major command

MARFOR Marine forces, Marine Corps component/

commander

MAS Military Agency for Standardization (NATO)

MBA main battle area

MEZ missile engagement zone

MIDI meaconing, interference, jamming and intrusion

MISREP mission report

MOA memorandum of agreement

MOB main operating base

MOD Ministry of Defense

MOP memorandum of policy

MOU memorandum of understanding

MPC message processing center (TAGS)

N

NADGE NATO air defense ground environment

NAEGIS NATO Airborne Early Warning and Ground

Control Integration Segment

NAEW NATO airborne early warning

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVFE Naval Forces Far East

240
NAVFOR naval forces, naval force component/

commander

NAVLO Navy liaison officer

NC National Command

NCA national command authorities

NEC Northern European Command

NFA no-fire area

NLT not later than

NOE nap of the earth

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

NORTHAG Northern Army Group, Central Europe (NATO)

NOSC NATO operations support cell/center

O

OAS offensive air support

OCA offensive counterair

OPCOM operational command

OPCON operational control

OpFor opposing forces

OPlan operations plan

OpOrd operation order

OPSEC operational security

OSC Operations Support Center

P

PACAF Pacific Air Forces

PACFLT Pacific Fleet

PACOM Pacific Command

PLSS precision location strike system

PSYOPS psychological operations

PTZ predesignated target zone

241
Q

QRA quick reaction alert

QRC quick reaction capability

R

RACO rear area combat operations

RADAR radio detection and ranging

RADINT radar intelligence

RAF Royal Air Force

RDF rapid deployment force

RDJTF rapid deployment joint task force

RECON/RECCE reconnaissance

REDCOM readiness command

RIPL reconnaissance and interdiction planning line

RLO reconnaissance liaison officer

ROE rules of engagement

RVN Republic of Vietnam

S

SAC Strategic Air Command (now part of ACC)

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO)

SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (NATO,

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses

SF special forces

SHAPF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary

Forces

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

(NATO)

SHORAD short range air defense

SIGINT signals intelligence

SINCGARS single channel ground and air radio system

Slop single integrated operational plan

SITREP situation report

242
SLAR side-looking airborne radar

SLOC sea line of communication

so special operations

SOC sector operations center (NATO)

SOF special operations forces

SOP standing operating procedure

STANAG standardization agreement

STRATCOM Strategic Command

STRICOM strike command

STRIKEFLEET Strike Fleet, Atlantic Command

SURGE maximum sortie generation

T

TAC Tactical Air Command (now part of ACC)

TACAIR tactical air (fixed wing air assets)

TACO tactical air control center

TALON tactical control

TACP tactical air control party

TACREP tactical report

TACS tactical air control system

TACSATCOM tactical satellite communications

TADIL tactical digital information links

TAF tactical air force

TALO tactical airlift liaison officer

TAO tactical air operation

TAOR tactical area of responsibility

TAR tactical air reconnaissance

TARN Tactical Air Request Net

TASS tactical air support squadron

TCW tactical control wing

TEREC tactical electronic reconnaissance system

(USAF)

TF task force

TFS tactical fighter squadron

243
TFW tactical fighter wing

tgt target

TIPI tactical information processing and

interpretation

TIS tactical intelligence squadron

TM technical manual

TOA transfer of authority (CHOP)

TOC tactical operations center

TOT time over target

TPFDL time-phased force and deployment list

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command (US Army

TRANSCOM Transportation Command

TRI-TAC tri-service tactical communications

tropo tropospheric

TRS tactical reconnaissance squadron

U

UE unit equipment

UK United Kingdom

UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces

UNC United Nations Command

US United States

USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USAFE United States Air Force Europe

USAREUR United States Army in Europe

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

USEUCOM United States European Command

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

USNAVEUR United States Naval Forces Europe

UTM Universal Transverse Mercator (Map Grid

System)

UW unconventional warfare

244
W

weapons allocator

weapons assignment officer

wing operations center

war reserve materiel

war readiness spares kit

Z

standard time (Greenwich mean time)

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AAP 6, NATO Glossary ofTerms andDefinitions for Military Use.

AAP 15(B), Glossary ofAbbreviations Used in NATO Documents.

AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine ofthe United States Air Force.

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ATP 27, Offensive Air Support Operations .

ATP 33 (A), NATO Tactical Air Doctrine .

261
ATP 35, Land Force Tactical Doctrine.

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ATP 41, Airmobile Operations.

ATP 42, Counter Air Operations.

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FM 1-100, ArmyAviation Utilization .

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FM 27-10, The Law ofLand Warfare .

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FM 32-30, Electronic Warfare Tactics ofDefense.

FM 57-35, Airmobile Operations.

FM 61-100, The Division .

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FM 100-27, US ArmylUS Air Force Doctrinefor Joint Airborne and Tactical Airlift

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262
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263

Index

Air component command/commander: 12, 17, 19-20, 32-33, 72, 74, 97-101, 110,

113,115-17,120

Air Defense Command: 14

Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air

Force: 51

Air Forces (numbered)

Fifth : 19

Ninth: 12

Thirteenth: 26-27

Twelfth: 14

Air Ground Operations System (AGOS): 115, 118, 120

AirLand Battle doctrine (US Army): 31, 33-34, 49-52, 70-71, 100-101, 117, 125

AirLand Battle-Future: 34, 51, 101, 116

Air Service : 8

Air Staff: 13

Air Support Command: 14

Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) : 119

Allied Expeditionary Air Forces : 12

Allied Tactical Publications (ATP)

8, Amphibious Waifare Doctrine: 52

27B, Offensive Air Support Operation: 138

33(A), NATO Tactical Air Doctrine: 96

Arab-Israeli war, 1967 : 4

Army Air Corps: 8-10, 13

Army Air Forces : 10, 12, 15

Army Air Forces Command: 10

Army Air Ground System (AAGS) : 115-16,119

Army Forces Far East : 19

Army Ground Forces Command: 10

Army Service Forces Command: 10

Arnold, Henry H. ("Hap") : 10, 14

Battlefield coordination element (BCE): 119

Bombardment Command: 14

Bradley, Omar N. : 17

Bradley-Vandenberg Agreement : 17, 22

265
Centralized control : 7, 13, 20, 22, 30, 33, 98-99, 115

Chennault, Claire : 13

Chiefs of Staff

Air Force (US): 17

Army (US): 10, 17, 21

British: 11, 15

Combined: 11, 15

Joint (US) : 11, 15-18, 35, 56, 67, 73, 140

Close air support (CAS): 6-8, 17, 24, 30, 59, 122

Coningham, Arthur: 14

Cushman, John H. : 137

Defense Reorganization Act of 1958: 16, 21-22, 25, 35, 54

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: 16

Department of Defense (DOD) Directives

5100.1, Functions of the Department ofDefense andIts Major Components:

25,75

5160.22, Clarification of Roles and Missions of the Department of the Army

andAir- Force Regarding Use ofAircraft: 24-25,54

"Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff' (OSD): 17

Doctrine of mutual cooperation/unity of command: 11, 16, 129

Egyptian campaign: 14

Eisenhower, Dwight D. : 11-12,25,99

Far East Air Forces : 19-20

Far East Command: 18-19

Field Manuals (FM)

100-5, Operations : 49

100-20, CommandandEmployment ofAir Power: 14

Finletter, Thomas K. : 22

Flexible response : 25

Follow-on forces attack (FOFA) : 100

Forrestal, James: 17

Foulois, Benjamin D. : 5

Futrell, Robert F. : 20

Gabriel, Charles A. : 34, 71

Gabriel-Wickham Agreement: 34

General Headquarters Air Force (GHQAF): 13

Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 : 35-37, 49, 54

Gulf war: 1, 31, 37

266
Hague Peace Conference : 4

Holley, l. B., Jr . : 3

Hussein, Saddam: 36

Integrated team: 32, 97, 113

Interservice communication: 96

Iraq : 36

Italo-Ethiopian War: 7

Italo-Turkish War, 1911-13: 5

Johnson, Lyndon B. : 26

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): 11, 15, 21, 23, 27-29, 32, 79, 103, 138

Memorandum 2502/645-1 : 96-97

Joint force commander. See Unified command

Joint Publications

0-2, UnifiedAction ArmedForces (UNAAF): 22-25,35-36,49,53-57,65,75,

94,96,139-41

1-02, Department ofDefense Dictionary ofMilitary andAssociated Terms: 116

3-0 (draft), "Doctrine for Joint Operations": 67-68

3-01 .2 (formerly Joint Pub 26), Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair

Operations (From Overseas Land Areas): 97, 138-41

3-56, Tactical Command and Control Planning Guidance and Procedures for

Joint Operations (Information Exchange Planning Guidance): 139

Joint staff: 36, 56, 103-4

Joint Task Force 116: 27

Kelley, P. X. : 104

Kennedy, John F. : 25

Korea, Republic of: 18, 20

Korean War: 18, 20, 22-23, 30

Kuwait : 36

Land component command: 12, 19, 33, 106, 115-19

Laos: 26-27, 30

Lessons learned: 6, 15, 30-31, 40

Low-intensity conflict : 38, 102-3, 129

Ludendorff, Erich F. W. : 7

MacArthur, Douglas: 18-19

Marine Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTF): 32,52-53,69-70,73-74,139

Marshall, George C. : 10

Massive retaliation : 25

McNarney, Joseph T. : 10

Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam: 26

267
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV): 26-29

Mitchell, William ("Billy") : 8

Montgomery, Bernard L. : 14

National Security Act of 1947: 16, 18, 22, 35, 54-55

Naval component command: 73, 110

Naval Forces Far East : 19

Newport/Omnibus Agreement: 17,32,73-74,141

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) : 38, 71, 99

Nutting, W. H. : 102

O'Malley, Jerome F. : 34

O'Malley-Otis Agreement: 34

Oman, Charles: 3

Operational control : 20, 68, 94, 98, 103, 110

Operation Torch : 94, 97, 110

Otis, Glen K. : 34

Pace-Finletter Agreement: 22-24

Pace, Frank: 22

Pacific Command : 11, 19, 26, 28

Royal Air Force (RAF): 12, 14

Saudi Arabia: 36-37

Sherman, William C. : 8

Single manager for air: 12-14, 17, 22, 28-29, 50, 69, 96-97, 113

Sino-Japanese conflict : 7

Spaatz, Carl ("Tooey"): 14

Specified command: 28, 32, 55, 79

Starry, Donn A. : 33-34

Strategic Air Command (SAC): 74

Stratemeyer, George E. : 20

Synchronization : 51, 118-19, 126, 129

Tactical Air Command (TAC): 27, 70

Tactical air control system (TACS): 115-16,119

Theater commander: 68, 74, 100, 103-4, 122

Truman, Harry S: 15-18

268
Unified command: 11-12, 15-16, 18-19, 22, 26, 28, 30, 32, 35, 53, 55, 65-71, 74,

79, 97, 103, 113, 116, 126, 129

Uniservice : 1, 67, 69

United Nations Command: 18

Unity of effort : 36, 53, 97, 115, 137, 140

US Air Force

Department of: 9, 16, 23, 63-65, 73, 78, 104-6, 129, 140

functions of: 63-65

US Army

Department of: 8-10, 16-17, 23, 57-59, 74, 104-6, 129, 140

functions of: 57-58

US Central Command/Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force: 30-31, 37, 79

US Marine Corps : 16,22,29,31,52,59-62,73,78,104-5,129,140

functions of: 59-62

US Navy: 9-11, 52, 78, 104-6, 129, 140

Department of: 16, 59-62

functions of (including USMC): 59-62

Vandenberg, Hoyt S. : 17

Vietnam War: 2, 25, 28-31

War Department: 9-11, 14

Westmoreland, William C. : 29

Weyland, Otto P. : 21

Wickham, John A. : 34,71

Wilson, Charles: 24

World War 1: 5, 8, 13, 15, 31

World War 11 : 8, 11-13, 15, 24, 31, 99

North African theater: 11-12, 14, 22, 71, 99

Zeppelin, von: 4

269 *U.S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1993-735-396