J-S15045-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

H.H.

v.

F.M.

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1794 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered November 6, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at

No(s): FD 18-07155-002

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 21, 2020

Appellant, F.M. (“Father”), files this appeal from the Final Protection

From Abuse (“PFA”) Order dated and entered November 6, 2019, in the

Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, granting H.H. (“Mother”) and their

child, L.H. (“Child”), protection from Father for a period of two years, and

including a temporary custody provision, pending conciliation. After review,

we affirm the trial court’s order.

A PFA Petition and Temporary Order on behalf of Mother and Child, and

against Father, dated October 15, 2019, was filed on October 16, 2019.

Subsequently, the court held a hearing with respect to a Final PFA Order on

November 6, 2019. Both Mother and Father were present and represented by

counsel. Each testified on their own behalf.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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The trial court recounted,

The parties began a relationship in October of 2016. The

[p]arties both testified to a strained relationship. The parties first

separated while [Mother] was pregnant with their only minor child

together, L.H. L.H. was born in [August of 2017]. However, after

L.H. was born, and after a DNA test that confirmed [Father] is

L.H.’s father, the parties, albeit unsuccessfully, attempted to

reconcile. The first testimonial evidence about an instance of

abuse, chronologically, occurred when [Mother] stated on direct

examination that in December of 2016, [Father] told [Mother] that

he wanted to punch her in the face and “got in [her] face” at a

bar. [Mother] further testified about [Father]’s anger issues, that

he is destructive and threatens to hit [Mother]. [Mother] also

testified that [Father] drinks alcohol every day and this has been

an issue in the parties’ relationship. The parties ceased their

intimate relationship sometime in July of 2019.

Multiple exhibits containing text messages between the

parties were entered, without objection, into evidence throughout

the hearing. Therein, on July 29, 2019, [Father] made the

following threat, which is but one of multiple threats

communicated to [Mother]: “You’re a f’ing piece of bad f’ing shit

and you will pay motherf’er. I mean f’ing pay.” Earlier that

month, on July 18, 2019, [Father] also texted [Mother]: “Stop

me from seeing my son and his grandparents. You f’ers will pay.”

[Father] backed his threatening texts and statements

with a course of cowardly conduct which placed [Mother] in

reasonable fear of bodily injury and in some instances, the

conduct extended directly to L.H. On July 18, 2019, [Father]

broke into [Mother]’s house while she was at work and her place

was “just destroyed.” [Mother] adamantly and credibly testified

that she never gave [Father] a key and that he did not have

permission to be there. [Father] claimed that [Mother] told him

in a text message that he could come to her home to get his stuff

but did not produce the text message. [Mother] also testified that

[Father] admitted to stealing a part out of her air-conditioner at
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her home, and then apologized for doing it and came back to fix

it.[1]

On Friday, October 11, 2019, [Mother] was scheduled to

transfer L.H. to [Father] at the South Fayette Township Police

Station. Because of an odd and incomplete text message sent on

“Our Family Wizard” earlier in that day, [Mother] was concerned

that [Father] was already intoxicated and as such inquired as to

same. [Father] did not respond. [Mother] then credibly testified

that she was worried about giving her son to [Father] when he is

intoxicated, as she was fearful that he would drive intoxicated with

her son in the car. [Mother] testified that [Father] had a history

of drinking on Friday nights after work. [Mother] ultimately did

not exchange the minor child on Friday, October 11 because she

was fearful for his safety.

The very next day, on October 12, 2019, [Mother]

discovered that one of her tires was slashed and that another tire

and the surrounding wheel-well on her vehicle was doused in

gasoline. [Mother] testified that after changing the flat tire, she

attempted to drive the vehicle. [Mother]’s testimony was clear

that gasoline “was all doused in there so when you turned the heat

on, like the vent, it filled the entire vehicle with fumes.” L.H., who

was also in the car, became ill from the gas fumes leaked into the

vehicle.

[Father] was evasive and incredible when responding to

questions about his awareness of [Mother] transporting L.H. in

[Mother]’s car. [Father] testified that he went to “Seven Springs”

from 8:00 P.M. Friday October 11, 2019 and stayed through

Saturday October 12. [Father] was not able to produce any

documentation or receipts to support this assertion. Nor did

[Father] produce any witnesses to corroborate his alibi. The

[c]ourt found [Father]’s testimony regarding his whereabouts

during this time period to be especially incredible.

[Mother] agreed when prompted on cross-examination

that [Father]’s responsibility for the events surrounding the tire

was “speculative.” However, the [c]ourt concluded that [Mother]

lacked an appreciation for the word “speculative” in a legal sense. ____________________________________________

1 Mother additionally testified to discovering in early August 2019 that

someone cut the propane line to the gas grill on her patio, near where Child

plays. See Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 11/6/19, at 14-17, 21, 38-41; see

also Plaintiff’s Exhibits D and E.
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The [c]ourt found [Mother]’s testimony regarding [Father]’s

threats, rage, timing of events, access of her home and vehicle to

be compelling. Her belief and conclusion that [Father] was acting

on his threats were sincere and credible.

In reaching a decision, the [c]ourt had ample opportunity

to observe the demeanor of the parties, review written exhibits,

and measure the credibility and veracity of both parties. The

[c]ourt determined that [Father]’s actions and threatening

statements placed [Mother] and minor child in reasonable fear of

bodily injury. During the hearing on this matter, [Father]’s rage

was palpable and concerning to the [c]ourt.

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 1/17/20, at 1-6 (citation to record omitted). At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered a Final PFA Order

against Father on behalf of Mother and Child for a period of two years, stating,

The [c]ourt has heard considerable testimony today

regarding [Mother]’s [p]etition for a final protection from abuse

order. The [c[ourt concludes that the evidence establishes that

abuse has occurred primarily with respect to placing [Mother] in

reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury in the text

messages that were submitted to the [c]ourt, namely[,] that you

will pay[,] and messages of the like. The [c]ourt notes that this

was in the context of a dispute[,] however[,] the nature of the

communications stemming from [Father], in particular, leads the

[c]ourt to conclude that [Mother] was in reasonable fear of

imminent serious bodily injury.

In addition, the [c]ourt concludes that [Father] did enter

[Mother]’s home without proper permission and that also

contributed to placing her in reasonable fear of bodily injury

pursuant to 23 [Pa.C.S.] Section 6102.5.

With respect to the minor child, there was circumstantial

evidence, and the [c]ourt notes that this is not a beyond a

reasonable doubt standard that we are dealing with, the [c]ourt is

not convinced that the incident on the grill was performed by

[Father,] but[,] given the exchanges between [Mother] and

[Father], and the [c]ourt did not find the alibi of [Father]

convincing with respect to where he was on October 11th through

the 12th, the [c]ourt concludes that [Father] did, indeed, puncture
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the tire despite the lack of -- despite the reliance on circumstantial

evidence and that the gasoline was also placed there.

Given that this placed the child in potential danger, the

[c]ourt will extend the two-year PFA also to the child[,] but the

[c]ourt would like [Father] to work towards a different custodial

schedule over time. We’ll start with supervised visits. I’m going

to refer [Father] to anger management. I also note that nothing

in my decision is based on past history of anger management

history with respect to [Father]. This is recent conduct on behalf

of [Father].

So[,] the [c]ourt has entered an order granting a two-year

PFA. We’re going to go off the record and see how we can facilitate

the supervised custody. I’ve also already scheduled a judicial

conciliation for the end of January[,] so we will be back here at

the end of January.

N.T., 11/6/19, at 112-114. The court entered a written order on the same

date memorializing a Final PFA Order against Father on behalf of Mother and

Child, and including a temporary custody provision of supervised custody for

Father, pending conciliation. Thereafter, Father, through counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal on

December 6, 2019, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred by awarding a Protection From

Abuse order protecting Mother and the parties’ child under

circumstances in which she failed to meet her burden[?]

II. Whether the trial court erred by making determinations of

material fact in a capricious manner and/or that were either

unsupported, insufficiently-supported or contradicted by the

record[?]

III. Whether the trial court erred by adopting at trial an

improper presumption in favor of Mother and against Father,
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thereby improperly shifting all or a material portion of the

burden of proof from Mother to Father[?]

IV. Whether the trial court erred by including the parties’ child

as a protected person in its order[?]

V. Whether the trial court erred by superseding its own prior

child custody order, entered by the agreement of the

parties, without sufficient basis for doing so[?]

Father’s Brief at 10 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Initially, we note our standard of review. “In the context of a PFA order, we review the trial court’s

legal conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion.”

Boykai v. Young, 83 A.3d 1043, 1045 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of the PFA

Act is to protect victims of domestic violence from those who

perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance

prevention of physical and sexual abuse.” Buchhalter v.

Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1262 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations

omitted).

K.B. v. Tinsley, 208 A.3d 123, 127 (Pa.Super. 2019); see also C.H.L. v.

W.D.L., 214 A.3d 1272, 1276 (Pa.Super. 2019); Custer v. Cochran, 933

A.2d 1050, 1053-1054 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc).

We turn, first, to Father’s issues one through three, which we view

together as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and burden of proof. Our standard and scope of review regarding claims as to sufficiency of the

evidence is well-settled.

When a claim is presented on appeal that the evidence is not

sufficient to support an order of protection from abuse, we review

the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner and

granting her the benefit of all reasonable inference, determine

whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court’s
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conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence. This Court defers

to the credibility determinations of the trial court as to witnesses

who appeared before it. A preponderance of the evidence is

defined as “the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale

slightly is the criteria or requirement for preponderance of the

evidence.”

Thompson v. Thompson, 963 A.2d 474, 477 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations

omitted); see also D.H. v. B.O., 734 A.2d 409, 410 (Pa.Super. 1999); see

also Fonner v. Fonner, 731 A.2d 160, 161 (Pa.Super. 1999). The Act does

not seek to determine criminal culpability, and therefore, the petitioner is not

required to establish abuse occurred beyond a reasonable doubt; but rather,

as indicated supra, the abuse must be established by a preponderance of the

evidence. See Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977, 981 (Pa.Super. 1993).

Furthermore, we must defer to credibility determinations of the

trial court. Finally, we note that a PFA petitioner is not required

to file a police report, nor is it necessary for her to introduce

medical evidence of an injury. The petitioner’s testimony is

sufficient if it is believed by the trial court.

Custer, 933 A.2d at 1058 (citations omitted).

Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a), “abuse” is defined as:

The occurrence of one or more of the following acts between

family or household members, sexual or intimate partners or

persons who share biological parenthood:

(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly

causing bodily injury, serious bodily injury, rape, involuntary

deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, statutory sexual

assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault or incest

with or without a deadly weapon.

(2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily

injury.
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(3) The infliction of false imprisonment pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 2903 (relating to false imprisonment).

(4) Physically or sexually abusing minor children, including such

terms as defined in Chapter 63 (relating to child protective

services).

(5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly

committing acts toward another person, including following the

person, without proper authority, under circumstances which

place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury. The definition

of this paragraph applies only to proceedings commenced under

this title and is inapplicable to any criminal prosecutions

commenced under Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses).

23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a).

In finding the evidence supported a finding of abuse under the Protection

from Abuse Act and that the court used the appropriate burden of proof, the

trial court reasoned,

In the instant case, the credible testimony of [Mother]

about [Father]’s statements and actions, as well as the text

messages and documentary evidence of the condition of her home

and her vehicle[,] sufficiently evidence a finding of abuse under

23 Pa.C.S. § 6102.

Moreover, [Mother]’s fear for her physical safety and the

safety of the minor child was reasonable under the circumstances.

The evidence presented at this hearing evidenced the [c]ourt by

a preponderance of the evidence that [Father] berated and

threatened [Mother], broke into her home, and sabotaged the

vehicle that she uses to transport their minor child. [Mother]

credibly testified that these activities make her “fear for my safety

and my son.” The [c]ourt believes that her fear is reasonable.

The tone of [Father]’s testimony grew increasingly hostile

throughout the hearing and his rage and struggle with anger were

obvious to this [c]ourt. Although [Father] did not make an explicit

communication that he was going to injure her, his statements

like “you will pay motherf’er. I mean f’ing pay[,]” coupled with

his actions[,] most certainly conveyed a threat sufficient to call

[Mother]’s fear of bodily injury reasonable.
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With specific regard to [Father]’s third assignment of

error, the [c]ourt applied the appropriate standard and burden of

proof as outlined above, and the record is clear that [Mother] met

that burden.

T.C.O. at 7-8 (citations to record omitted).

Father, however, argues that, as suggested by Mother’s testimony, as

well as her statements and actions of record, his text messages did not

represent threats of physical harm or cause reasonable fear of imminent bodily

harm. Father’s Brief at 27-35. Father states that Mother

offered no testimony as to the nature of the threat she perceived,

nor testimony or evidence that any or all of these messages placed

her in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, reasonable or

otherwise. To the contrary, Mother agreed on the record that

Father’s texts did not place her in fear of imminent bodily injury.

. . .”

Id. at 28-29 (emphasis in original). Rather, Father posits, Mother agreed that

the exchange captured by the text messages was an argument between

Father and her, where both were forceful and she did not express fear. Id.

at 29-30. He continues, “Given that the record contains no testimony or other

evidence that Father ever committed a single act of violence against Mother,

whatever understanding Mother may have had of Father’s statements that

she would ‘pay,’ it is plain that she did not interpret them as a threat of

physical violence.” Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).

Moreover, highlighting that Mother did not raise his text messages,

despite opportunity, until two and one-half months later, upon filing the

instant protection from abuse filings, Father maintains that Mother’s own
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actions and statements of record suggest that his texts did not constitute

threats of harm or place her in reasonable fear of harm. Id. at 31-35.

Father further asserts that the evidence does not support that his entry

into Mother’s home to retrieve his belongings, in conjunction with his text

messages, placed Mother in reasonable fear of bodily injury. Id. at 35-39.

He argues that Mother agreed that she and Father discussed that he needed

to remove his belongings from her home, and that he only removed his

belongings. Id. at 37. He continues, “When Father informs Mother that he

has a key, she does not dispute him but instead demands its return. She does

not display any fear; to the contrary, she angrily threatens Father that she

will leave any of his remaining property at the curb for garbage collection.

She says nothing about the condition of her home following his departure.”

Id. at 38. Father, therefore, states,

Father’s entry into the home in which he had been living, made

when [Mother] was not home and for the express and mutually- desired purpose of recovering his personal property, and to which

Mother responded with anger and threat but no evident fear, does

not contribute [a] basis for the [t]rial [c]ourt’s finding that

Father’s texts may now be considered part of ‘a course of conduct

or repeatedly committing act[s]’ that place Mother in reasonable

fear of bodily injury for purposes of finding abuse under 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 6102(a)(5).

Id. at 39.

Additionally, as to burden of proof, Father argues that the trial court’s

determination that he vandalized Mother’s car, despite Mother’s lack of direct

knowledge and proof, was error in that it shifted the burden from Mother to

Father and created a presumption against Father. Id. at 41-44. He maintains,
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In making this determination, the [t]rial [c]ourt effectively

conjured a baseless presumption against Father which shifted the

burden of proof from Mother’s shoulders to Father’s, and

thereafter found against him for his failure to rebut that novel

presumption with sufficient evidence. This is clearly demonstrated

in the [t]rial [c]ourt’s expression of disfavor toward Father’s

failure to produce documentation of a witness to corroborate his

“alibi,” without any corresponding disfavor (or even mention) of

Mother’s own failure either to supply documentation, or to call a

corroborating witness, in support of her allegations against Father.

The [t]rial [c]ourt thereby has misapplied Pennsylvania law, which

requires that PFA plaintiffs “must prove the allegation of abuse by

a preponderance of the evidence.”

Id. at 43-44.

Moreover, Father asserts that the trial court’s use of “collateral

evidence” and/or “circumstantial evidence” rejects the statements and actions

of Mother and reflects an animus against Father and a desired outcome. Id.

at 46-47. Father states, “Particularly in light of the [t]rial [c]ourt’s

impermissible shift of the burden of proof from Mother to Father. . ., it is clear

that the ‘circumstantial evidence’ cited by the [t]rial [c]ourt is less the product

of reasonable extrapolation, than it arises from a desire to achieve a particular

outcome irrespective of the record.” Id. at 47. He similarly claims that the

trial court’s credibility determinations were entered “in blatant disregard of

the evidence.” Id. at 49.

For the reasons stated by the trial court, Father’s challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence and burden of proof is without merit. The record

supports the court’s finding of abuse and entry of a final PFA order. We discern

no abuse of discretion and do not disturb the trial court’s determination.
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Next, as to Father’s fourth and fifth issues as to the inclusion of Child

and the custody provision, the trial court stated,

The Protection From Abuse Act (23 Pa.C.S. § 6101 [et

seq.]) (the “Act”) is clear and unambiguous in its delineation of

whom may petition the court for a Protection From Abuse Order

on behalf of a minor child. That is, the Act states that “any parent,

adult household member or guardian ad litem[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. §

6106(a).

In the instant case, [Mother] is the mother of the minor

child, L.H. As such, [Mother] acted in accordance with Section

6106(a) when she brought forth her petition on behalf of herself

and on behalf of L.H. Moreover, and for the reasons outlined more

thoroughly above, this [c]ourt was convinced that both [Mother]

and minor child were at risk of further abuse from [Father]. The Act further provides that this [c]ourt “may grant any

protection order or approve any consent agreement to bring about

a cessation of abuse of the plaintiff or minor children.” 23

[Pa.C.S.] § 6108(a). Section 6108(a)(4) specifies that this order

may include “Awarding temporary custody of or establishing

temporary visitation rights with regard to minor children.”

In the Final Protection from Abuse Order that is the

subject of this appeal, the [c]ourt expressly stated that the

custody provisions contained therein are temporary, and that

either party may initiate custody proceedings pursuant to the

custody [s]tatute at 23 [Pa.C.S. § 5321 et seq.]. In the Order,

the [c]ourt also referred [Father] to anger management therapy

and scheduled a judicial conciliation regarding custody for January

30, 2019. The Order expressly states that “Father/Defendant’s

progress will be reviewed at that time.” Accordingly, [Father] has

ample opportunity for restoration of his partial physical custody

time should he address his threatening and aggressive conduct.

The Superior Court has concluded that a “PFA court need

not conduct a best interests custody analysis to award temporary

custody as [a] form of relief under section 6108 of the Protection

from Abuse Act.” [C.H.L., 214 A.3d at 1281]. In [C.H.L. v.

W.D.L.], this Court went on to clarify that “the PFA Act does not

require a child to be physically struck before a court can award

temporary sole custody to a plaintiff. The court may do so even

though the defendant has inflicted serious abuse upon the plaintiff
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alone.” [Id.] at 1282. [See also] 6108(a)(4)(iii)(8). In the

present case, the [c]ourt concluded that [Father] directed his

abuse to both [Mother] and minor child, L.H., requiring protection.

Based on [Mother]’s credible testimony regarding

[Father]’s actions towards [Mother], as well as the evidence

entered at this hearing, this [c]ourt found [Mother]’s fear of bodily

injury to both herself and minor child to be reasonable.

Accordingly, this [c]ourt’s November 6, 2019 Order,

granting [Mother]’s request for a Final Protection from Abuse

Order behalf of herself and minor child, L.H., for a period of two

(2) years against [Father] should be affirmed.

T.C.O. at 8-10. Based upon circumstantial evidence, as discussed above, Father argues

that the trial court’s inclusion of Child as a protected party was without

evidentiary basis and contrary to law. Father’s Brief at 50-51. Father also

asserts that the trial court impermissibly superseded the existing custody

order without notice and an opportunity to be heard after full preparation,

without any apparent emergency or change in circumstances, without any

explanation as to why it was in Child’s best interest. Id. at 51-52.

23 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a) provides:

General rule.--An adult or an emancipated minor may seek relief

under this chapter for that person or any parent, adult household

member or guardian ad litem may seek relief under this chapter

on behalf of minor children. . .by filing a petition with the court

alleging abuse by the defendant.

23 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a).

Further, as to relief, 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108(a) states:

General rule.--Subject to subsection (a.1), the court may grant

any protection order or approve any consent agreement to bring

about a cessation of abuse of the plaintiff or minor children. The

order may include:
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. . . (4) Awarding temporary custody of or establishing

temporary visitation rights with regard to minor

children. In determining whether to award temporary

custody or establish temporary visitation rights

pursuant to this paragraph, the court shall consider

any risk posed by the defendant to the children as well

as risk to the plaintiff. The following shall apply:

(i) A defendant shall not be granted

custody, partial custody or unsupervised

visitation where it is alleged in the

petition, and the court finds after a

hearing under this chapter, that the

defendant:

(A) abused the minor children

of the parties or poses a risk

of abuse toward the minor

children of the parties;

. . . (ii) Where the court finds after a hearing

under this chapter that the defendant has

inflicted abuse upon the plaintiff or a child,

the court may require supervised

custodial access by a third party. The

third party must agree to be accountable

to the court for supervision and execute

ab affidavit of accountability.

(iii) Where the court finds after a hearing

under this chapter that the defendant has

inflicted serious abuse upon the plaintiff

or a child or poses a risk of abuse toward

the plaintiff or a child, the court may:

(A) award supervised

visitation in a secure visitation

facility; or

(B) deny the defendant

custodial access to a child.
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. . . 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108(a).

Moreover, as we stated in C.H.L.,

. . .[W]e conclude that a PFA court need not conduct a best

interests custody analysis to award temporary custody as a form

of relief under section 6108 of the Protection From Abuse Act.

The purpose of the Protection From Abuse Act is to protect victims

of domestic violence from the perpetrators of that type of abuse

and to prevent domestic violence from occurring. It is well settled

that trial courts have the authority to enter protection from abuse

orders that conflict with custody orders. The PFA Act allows the

court to award temporary custody or establish temporary

visitation rights with regard to minor children. Where the court

finds after a hearing that the defendant has inflicted serious

abuse, the court may deny the defendant custodial access to a

child. In order to prevent further abuse during periods of access

to the plaintiff and child during the exercise of custodial rights, the

court shall consider, and may impose on a pre-existing custody

award, conditions necessary to assure the safety of the plaintiff

and minor children from abuse.

Custody[-]wise a PFA order is not designed to impose anything

but emergency relief. . . .But while the domestic violence

emergency is still pending a PFA order may alter a pre-existing

custody order and remand for clarification to avoid conflict. “To

hold otherwise would have the effect of emasculating the central

and extraordinary feature of the PFA which is to prospectively

control and prevent domestic violence.” C.H.L., 214 A.3d at 1281-82 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in

original).

Instantly, again, Father’s claims are without merit. As Child’s mother,

Mother was entitled to seek relief on his behalf. Further, the trial court had

the authority to supersede the existing custody order and impose a temporary

custody provision in order to protect Mother and Child from abuse.
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2020