PRESIDENTIAL 

HELICOPTER 

ACQUISITION

Program Makes 

Progress in Balancing 

Requirements, Costs, 

and Schedule

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2013

GAO-13-257

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-257, a report to 

congressional requesters

April 2013

PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER ACQUISITION

Program Makes Progress in Balancing Requirements, 

Costs, and Schedule

Why GAO Did This Study

The VXX is a Navy program to develop 

a replacement for the current fleet of 

presidential helicopters. The Ike 

Skelton National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2011 directed GAO 

to review and report annually to the 

congressional defense committees on 

the program. GAO has reported on the 

program twice previously. The first 

report identified major lessons learned 

from a prior terminated program that 

should be applied in the follow-on 

program. The second covered the 

program’s progress, upgrades to the 

existing helicopters, and plans for 

moving the program forward. This is 

the last of the required reports. It 

discusses (1) the program’s progress 

over the past year, particularly 

regarding evaluation of alternatives, 

and (2) DOD’s efforts to develop key 

technologies for the VXX aircraft. GAO 

examined program documents; 

interviewed officials; and compared the 

AOA with elements GAO previously 

reported are needed for a robust AOA, 

and cost estimating and analysis 

standards. GAO also assessed the 

Navy’s approach to developing key 

technologies and progress made. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making recommendations 

in this report. DOD stated that it would 

ensure that mitigations are in place to 

address potential risk areas. It believes 

its efforts are aligned with GAO’s best 

practices and the recommendations in 

GAO’s 2011 report on the program and 

plans to continue to monitor program 

progress in view of these standards. 

What GAO Found

The Navy made progress in the past year in establishing a sound VXX business 

case that reflects a rational balance between requirements, costs and schedule. 

In 2012, the Navy completed an updated Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) based 

on refined requirements and an acquisition approach that would leverage mature 

technologies from outside the program onto an in-production commercial or 

military airframe—allowing the program to begin in the engineering and 

manufacturing development phase of the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

acquisition process. The 2012 AOA reflected additional trade-offs made among

cost, schedule, risk, and performance. The table below illustrates how some key 

performance requirements changed from the terminated VH-71 program to the 

VXX.

Comparison of Minimum VXX to VH-71 Requirements for Certain Performance Areas 

Performance area VXX requirements compared to VH-71

Passenger capacity Reduced

Range Reduced

Landing zone suitability Unchanged

Transportability Reduced

Operational availability Reduced

Airspeed Reduced

Hover performance Reduced

Source: GAO analysis of VXX and VH-71 program information. 

Per the AOA, using this approach would reduce investment cost by 

approximately $1.5 billion (19.7 percent) and shorten the schedule by about 18 

percent from the approach anticipated in 2010, which included more time and 

cost to develop technology within the program. 

DOD’s Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation deemed the AOA 

sufficient to inform future acquisition decisions and the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics approved the program to 

move forward toward a decision to begin engineering and manufacturing 

development. GAO’s review of the AOA found it to be sufficient for this phase of 

the acquisition. 

DOD’s efforts to ensure key technologies are ready for integration into VXX 

aircraft are also making progress. The Navy’s acquisition approach relies on the 

government providing mature technologies for integration into an in-production 

aircraft selected for the VXX program. These technologies either exist or are in 

development. Their use will be an important factor in achieving the reduced cost 

and schedule the Navy seeks. While the program reports that these efforts are 

on track and assesses the risks of integration as low, it is possible that key 

technologies may not be realized as planned or be as easy to integrate as 

anticipated. To mitigate integration risk, the Navy is making use of an integration 

laboratory and plans to demonstrate key technologies in a test aircraft. 

Building on these decisions, the program will have to manage challenges in a 

number of areas, including holding the line on VXX requirements, controlling

helicopter weight growth, and ensuring that efforts to mitigate integration risks 

are adequately planned, resourced, and executed.

View GAO-13-257. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841

or sullivanm@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

Letter 1 

Background 2

Program Makes Progress Toward Establishing a Sound Business 

Case 5

Efforts Intended to Leverage Technologies into VXX Aircraft 

Progress 12

Concluding Observations 15

Agency Comments 15

Appendix I Cost Estimating Best Practices 18

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 19

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 20

Tables

Table 1: Comparison of Minimum VXX to VH-71 Requirements for 

Certain Performance Areas 11

Table 2: Technologies to Be Provided by the Government for 

Integration in VXX Aircraft 14

Figure

Figure 1: Program’s Entry into DOD Acquisition Process as 

Currently Anticipated 4

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

Abbreviations

AOA Analysis of Alternatives

CAPE Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

CDD Capability Development Document

DOD Department of Defense 

EMD engineering and manufacturing development

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OUSD (AT&L) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

 Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

April 9, 2013

Congressional Committees

In June 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) terminated the Navy’s 

VH-71 presidential helicopter program because of cost growth, schedule 

delays, and a projected shortfall in system performance. The Navy 

subsequently began work to define a follow-on program, now known as 

VXX, to acquire aircraft to replace the current presidential helicopters. 

The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 

directed that we review and report annually to the congressional defense 

committees on the program beginning in 2011 and ending in 2013.1 We 

have previously issued two reports in response to this requirement. In the 

first, we identified major lessons learned from the terminated program that 

should be applied in the follow-on program.2 In the second, we provided 

information on the program’s delays and on DOD’s planned upgrades to 

the in-service fleet of presidential helicopters and plans for moving the 

program forward.3 This is the last of the required GAO reports. It 

discusses (1) the program’s progress over the past year, particularly 

regarding the evaluation of alternatives, and (2) DOD’s efforts to develop 

key technologies and capabilities for integration into VXX aircraft.

To determine the progress of the VXX program since our last report, we 

examined program documents and interviewed program officials. We 

assessed the program’s Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) report and 

supporting materials against GAO identified factors that have affected the 

scope and quality of AOAs in the past.4 We also reviewed and assessed 

the AOA report and supporting materials against cost estimating and 

 

1

Pub. L. No. 111-383 § 233.

2 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Application of Lessons Learned and Best Practices in the 

Presidential Helicopter Program, GAO-11-380R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2011).

3

GAO, Presidential Helicopter Acquisition: Effort Delayed as DOD Adopts New Approach 

to Balance Requirements, Costs, and Schedule, GAO-12-381R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 

27, 2012).

4

An AOA is an evaluation of the effectiveness, suitability, risks, and estimated costs of 

alternative systems to meet a capability. The AOA is normally conducted during the 

Materiel Solution Analysis phase of the Defense Acquisition Management System to 

support a Milestone A decision to begin technology development for a preferred solution. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

analysis best practice standards. In addition, we discussed the AOA 

report with the study team director and other study team staff. We also 

compared the requirements for VXX to the requirements for the 

terminated VH-71 program. However, because the VXX requirements 

were not finalized until January 2013, we were unable to complete our 

analysis of them during this review. To determine the status of DOD’s 

efforts to develop key technologies and capabilities for integration in VXX 

aircraft, we obtained a list of ongoing and planned upgrades to the current 

presidential helicopters and had the program office identify those 

intended for use in the VXX platform. We reviewed documents related to 

each upgrade, discussed those efforts with program officials, including 

those responsible for the cockpit mission system and the aircraft’s 

avionics system, and analyzed those documents and the results of those 

discussions to identify issues. We discussed the benefits and status of 

each upgrade effort. We also discussed the risks associated with 

maturing key technologies in time for insertion into the platform. We 

toured the systems integration laboratory at the Naval Air Station 

(Patuxent River, Maryland) and observed some of the upgraded 

equipment installed on demonstration test assets.

We conducted this performance audit from July 2012 to April 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Marine Corps’ HMX-1 squadron uses a fleet of 19 VH-3D and VH60N helicopters to transport the President in the national capital region, 

as well as when the President is traveling in the continental U.S. and 

overseas locations. These aircraft have been in service for decades. The 

events following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United 

States highlighted the need for improved transportation, communication, 

and security capabilities for the presidential helicopter fleet. As a result, a 

program (subsequently designated the VH-71 program) was initiated in 

April 2002 to develop aircraft to replace the helicopters currently in 

service. Initial plans to field the VH-71 by 2011 were accelerated in 

response to a November 2002 White House memorandum directing that 

a replacement helicopter be fielded by the end of 2008. By 2009 

significant cost growth, plus schedule delays and performance issues 

resulted in the decision to terminate the VH-71 program. At the time of 

Background 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

termination, in June 2009, the estimated VH-71 program cost had 

doubled from about $6.5 billion at development start in 2005 to $13 

billion. Because there remained a need to replace the current in-service 

presidential helicopters, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition Technology and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) directed the Navy 

by late June 2009 to present a plan to develop options for a new program 

to acquire replacement aircraft, now designated VXX.

The Navy’s VXX efforts began immediately with the initiation of an AOA to 

assess options on how to proceed toward developing and fielding the 

replacement presidential helicopter. It was focused, at least in part, on 

one of the primary lessons learned from the VH-71 program experience—

the need to establish and maintain a sound business case. A sound 

business case is one in which a balance is established between 

requirements, costs, and schedule that reflects an executable program 

with acceptable risk.5 According to program officials, the program would 

be aligned to pursue a best practices knowledge-based acquisition 

approach with the intent of establishing and maintaining an affordable 

business case.6

Last year, we reported that VXX program’s entry into development had 

been delayed as the program worked to provide a sound initial business 

case for development, which is a best practice that was not followed by 

the terminated VH-71 program.7 The Navy had produced an initial AOA 

report under June 2010 study guidance from DOD’s Office of Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). This initial work presumed 

an acquisition strategy under which the program would start in the 

technology development phase of DOD’s acquisition process. The Navy 

released this initial AOA report to DOD. While CAPE found this initial 

work sufficient, OUSD(AT&L) did not accept its results. Rather, it 

identified the need for a 2012 update to address using a streamlined 

acquisition strategy focused on mitigating cost drivers identified in the 

2010 AOA study. Additional guidance was provided by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) in December 2011. That guidance reflected 

insights on requirements gained in the 2010 study and expectations of 

 

5

GAO-11-380R. 

6

GAO-11-380R. 

7

GAO-12-381R. 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

using a streamlined acquisition approach proposed by the Navy. The 

proposed approach would leverage mature technologies being developed 

outside of the program before including them on aircraft selected for the 

program with their adoption being facilitated by open systems 

architectures. This would allow the program to start with Milestone B 

approval for engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) and then 

selecting an existing in-production commercial or military platform and 

working to integrate communications and mission systems provided by 

the government, which are expected to be mature by that time. Figure 1 

depicts the program’s entry into DOD’s acquisition process as currently 

anticipated.

Figure 1: Program’s Entry into DOD Acquisition Process as Currently Anticipated

DOD is investing in the current fleet of presidential helicopters to increase 

their service life and address capability gaps while working to field VXX 

aircraft. The current inventory of 19 aircraft are sometimes stressed to 

meet operational demands—demands that have been growing—making it 

difficult to take them out of service for lengthy upgrades. A larger VXX 

inventory of 21 aircraft is expected to help address this.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

The Navy has made progress in the past year toward establishing a 

sound business case for development that reflects a rational balance 

between requirements, costs and schedule. The Navy completed the 

AOA, which was deemed sufficient by CAPE to inform future acquisition 

decisions, and OSD has approved the program to proceed to a Milestone 

B decision. The CAPE did note, however, some areas of caution, for 

example, that some air vehicles would require aggressive efforts to 

manage the weight of the VXX while other air vehicles would be more 

challenged in other respects. We reviewed that AOA and found that it 

included elements of a sound AOA.

The Navy, building on its initial 2010 study, completed its AOA on April 4, 

2012, and concluded that the currently proposed acquisition approach of 

using mature technologies from outside the program on an in-production 

commercial or military helicopter was acceptable. The initial 2010 study, 

which considered nine alternative aircraft, revealed that technology 

development and recertification of aircraft for airworthiness were primary 

cost drivers of the total projected program cost under the approach it 

presumed. The 2012 updated study (focused on the most promising 

aircraft) assessed that mature, certified, and capable in-production 

commercial and military aircraft exist that can be modified for presidential 

requirements and be procured under the proposed strategy using a 

“Customized” rather than a “Min Mod” approach.8 It determined that there 

are candidate aircraft with performance characteristics that can meet to 

varying degrees the February 2012 draft Capability Development 

Document (CDD) requirements used to conduct the study and found that 

 

8

The 2012 updated AOA study defined the "Customized" approach as utilizing an existing 

in-production commercial or military helicopter modified by the prime contractor to satisfy 

VXX requirements without requiring recertification of the aircraft's airworthiness by the 

original airworthiness certification authority (Federal Aviation Administration, Army, or 

European Aviation Safety Agency). As defined, any modification that would void those 

certifications would be prohibited and certifications needed would be limited to the unique 

VXX mission modifications as opposed to the entire air vehicle. According to the definition, 

this approach would principally involve an integration effort—incorporating government 

supplied items such as communications and mission systems which would hypothetically 

reduce development time and cost. The "Min Mod" approach was considered in the 2010 

AOA analysis work and was thought at the time to represent the lowest cost approach 

allowing the prime contractor to make the minimum necessary modifications to an 

aircraft's structure, drive-train, or other fundamental systems to meet minimum VXX 

requirements. As defined, this approach would have required a Navy or other 

airworthiness recertification of the aircraft.

Program Makes 

Progress Toward 

Establishing a Sound 

Business Case

Navy Completes AOA
 

Page 6 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

the Navy’s proposed streamlined acquisition strategy is feasible and 

would reduce the program’s expected schedule, cost, and risk.9

Specifically, the 2012 study estimates suggest that using the proposed 

approach of having the program enter the acquisition process in the 

engineering and manufacturing development phase rather than the 

technology development phase, as was anticipated in the 2010 study, 

would reduce investment cost by approximately $1.5 billion (19.7 percent) 

and shorten the development schedule by about 18 percent. The 2012 

study also revealed, however, that the alternatives offered varying 

degrees of individual system performance with no single alternative 

meeting all of the VXX requirements. For example, while one alternative 

met most of the requirements, it would require strict weight and 

requirements management throughout its life to avoid a more costly Min 

Mod approach. While other alternatives provided differing capacities for 

weight growth, they would be challenged in meeting other requirements, 

such as range, transportability, landing zone suitability, or material 

supportability requirements. Further, for all of the alternatives in the 2012 

study, it was found that if they were required to meet the military’s 

airworthiness standards (as opposed to the certifying authority standard 

they currently meet), the weight growth associated with meeting some of 

these standards would likely trigger a more costly Min Mod approach.10

The 2012 VXX AOA study team made a number of recommendations 

including:

• To mitigate aircraft certification risk, the airworthiness certifying 

authority actively participate in all government development activities 

for the cockpit, communications, and mission systems and be 

involved in the source selection process for the aircraft;11

 

9

The CDD is a document that captures the information necessary to develop a proposed 

program(s). It outlines an affordable increment of militarily useful, logistically supportable, 

and technically mature capability.

10The Navy currently plans to rely on the airworthiness certification already existing on 

whatever aircraft is selected for VXX (e.g., Federal Aviation Administration certification).

11At the time the 2012 AOA study was conducted, the program intended to provide a 

cockpit as government furnished equipment for integration into VXX aircraft; however, the 

program subsequently determined that doing so would increase risk and cost and decided 

to utilize the existing cockpit in the to-be-selected aircraft. 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

• To reduce the risk of having to resort to a Min Mod approach, an 

active and aggressive life cycle weight management effort should be 

put in place if the selected platform does not provide a large enough 

margin to accommodate future weight growth; and

• The release of a request for proposals be contingent upon achieving 

acceptable technical maturity of critical government developments, 

such as communications and mission systems.

The Director of CAPE in a May 30, 2012, memorandum concluded that 

the 2012 study achieves a logical outcome and was sufficient to inform 

future acquisition decisions. The CAPE found that the AOA demonstrates 

that each of the alternatives examined can be provided in a manner 

consistent with the streamlined acquisition approach, though with 

assessed limitations as described in the report. It concluded that the 

study also shows that an approach that avoids recertification was feasible 

for some of the options considered, and, if adopted, offers potential for 

reduced cost and schedule.

There are some areas of caution, however, in the CAPE’s assessment.

• The alternatives examined in the 2012 study identified similar mission 

limitations as those seen in the 2010 study. In particular, it was noted 

that some air vehicles studied exhibited weight sensitivities that would 

require aggressive weight management for the program’s lifecycle. 

Other air vehicles exhibited better performance in some aspects 

including allowing for weight growth, but were more challenged in 

others, for example, landing zone suitability and transportability.

• The AOA did not examine the integration risk of the governmentdeveloped communications package and mission systems—key 

system components that under the Navy’s acquisition strategy are 

being developed outside of the program but must then be successfully 

integrated into the selected aircraft.

The CAPE’s assessment also stated that the validity of the study results 

was contingent on the reduced requirements in the draft CDD—reduced 

from the requirements for the VH-71 acquisition—becoming finalized as 

documented and that a return to the previous requirements would require 

AOA Accepted and VXX 

Program Approved to 

Proceed
 

Page 8 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

additional analysis. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) 12

subsequently approved the CDD on January 3, 2013. While program 

officials informed us that there were changes to requirements reflected in 

the approved CDD, they stated that none would affect the validity of the 

AOA or require the additional analysis mentioned in CAPE’s memo. A 

CAPE official subsequently informed us that they had reviewed the CDD 

and do not believe that any of the changes affect the AOA’s validity. In 

addition, the official stated that they reviewed the requirements changes 

and were satisfied that they made sense.

In an August 28, 2012 Acquisition Decision Memorandum, the USD 

(AT&L) approved the VXX to proceed to Milestone B—approval to enter 

engineering and manufacturing development—as the program’s initial 

acquisition milestone. The Under Secretary decided that:

• Milestone B, scheduled for 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2014, will be the 

first formal acquisition system milestone for VXX; however, a PreEMD Review will occur prior to release of the Request for Proposals 

for development, integration, and production;13

• Prior to the pre-EMD review, the Navy and the JROC are to approve 

the CDD and the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

is to develop an Independent Cost Estimate based on the approved 

CDD; and

• The Under Secretary will establish affordability targets for the VXX 

program concurrent with CDD approval by the JROC.

The Under Secretary concluded that based on utilization of mature 

technologies and a proven, mature, existing aircraft, this approach would 

not require a technology development phase. In addition, the Under 

Secretary expects to waive a requirement in the Weapon Systems 

Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, as amended, for competitive prototyping 

 

12The JROC is an advisory council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the 

responsibility to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in: (1) identifying, 

assessing, and approving joint military requirements; and (2) assigning priority for joint 

military requirements. JROC also has responsibility to assist acquisition officials in 

identifying alternatives to acquisition programs that meet joint military requirements.

13The Navy released a draft Request for Proposals in November 2012 and anticipates 

releasing a final request in March 2013.
 

Page 9 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

because its anticipated cost outweighs the expected risk reduction and 

life cycle benefit it would provide.14

In our prior two reports on this acquisition, we stated that when the AOA 

was issued we would assess it for its robustness—the range of 

alternatives it considered, its depth of analysis, and its consideration of 

trade-offs.15 Based on our review of the AOA report, supporting material, 

and interviews of program and other defense officials, we found the AOA 

to be sufficient for this stage of the acquisition. It included elements that 

GAO has reported should be part of a robust AOA.16 We also found it 

used a cost estimating process that was substantially compliant with GAO 

identified best practices.17

An AOA compares the operational effectiveness, suitability, and life-cycle 

cost estimates of alternatives that appear to satisfy established capability 

needs. Cost estimating and analysis are significant components of an 

AOA.18 We have previously reported on the importance of a robust AOA 

as a key element in ensuring a program has a sound, executable 

 

14Pub. L. No. 111-23, § 203(a); Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 813. Specifically, the Weapon 

Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 required DOD to modify its guidance relating to 

the operation of its acquisition system to provide that the acquisition strategy for each 

major defense acquisition program provides for competitive prototypes before Milestone B 

approval to enter system development unless the Milestone Decision Authority waives the 

requirement. DOD did so through Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027, 

“Implementation of Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009” (Dec. 4, 2009, 

incorporating Change 3, Dec. 9, 2011). Major defense acquisition programs are those 

estimated by DOD to require an eventual total expenditure for research, development, 

test, and evaluation of more than $365 million, or for procurement, including all planned 

increments or spirals, of more than $2.19 billion in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars. The 

Milestone Decision Authority for major defense acquisition programs is the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the head of a DOD 

component, or if delegated the component acquisition executive. 

15GAO-11-380R and GAO-12-381R. 

16GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Many Analyses of Alternatives Have Not Provided a Robust 

Assessment of Weapon System Options, GAO-09-665 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 

2009). 

17GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 2009). 

18GAO-09-3SP. 

Our Assessment of the 

AOA
 

Page 10 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

business case prior to program initiation.19 Our work has found that 

programs that conduct a limited AOA (failing to consider a broad range of 

alternatives or assess technical and other risks associated with each 

alternative) tended to experience poorer outcomes—including cost 

growth.

We found that the AOA study team considered a broad range of 

alternatives. The initial 2010 study effort evaluated 9 platforms and 19 

possible alternatives to satisfy the mission and the 2012 update studied

the most promising platforms in the 2010 study to document the impact of 

the Navy’s proposed streamlined acquisition strategy would have on the 

merits of each of those alternatives. The study team assessed 

effectiveness, suitability, technical, schedule, and operational risks 

associated with the alternatives, though, according to CAPE, it did not 

assess the risks of integrating government-furnished communications and 

mission control systems into those alternatives. The study director noted 

that this integration risk could not be assessed by the study team, given 

the maturity of these subsystems at the time. Rather, the AOA identified 

the need to consider this issue at a future engineering review when 

sufficient maturity existed and an accurate assessment could be made.

The AOA process reflected and influenced performance trade-offs. The 

initial 2010 analysis was based on performance requirements that were 

lower in a number of areas than for the VH-71 program. The 2012 AOA 

study reflected additional trade-offs made with regard to cost, schedule, 

risk and performance. The performance trade-offs enabled the Navy’s 

revised strategy, and is expected to result in reduced costs and schedule. 

Following the 2012 study the performance requirements were further 

refined as reflected in the final CDD. Table 1 illustrates some of the 

performance trade-offs made by comparing the minimum requirements 

for VXX aircraft as captured in the final CDD to the minimum VH-71 

requirements captured in the equivalent Operational Requirements 

Document for that program.

 

19GAO-09-665. 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

Table 1: Comparison of Minimum VXX to VH-71 Requirements for Certain 

Performance Areas

Performance area VXX requirements compared to VH-71

Passenger capacity Reduced

Range Reduced

Landing zone suitability Unchanged

Transportability Reduced

Operational availability Reduced

Airspeed Reduced

Hover performance Reduced

Source: GAO analysis of VXX and VH-71 program information. 

We also assessed the cost estimating procedure for the AOA using 

GAO’s criteria for cost estimating and assessment and found that it was 

substantially compliant with those criteria. For the purposes of this review, 

we collapsed the best practices identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and 

Assessment Guide into four general characteristics: well documented, 

comprehensive, accurate, and credible. 20 The cost estimating best 

practices associated with each of those characteristics used in judging 

the AOA are provided in appendix I.

We found the AOA cost estimate to be comprehensive and well 

documented. We also found that it was substantially accurate and 

partially met our criteria for being credible. The AOA cost estimate was 

properly adjusted for inflation, relied on historical analogous aircraft data, 

contained no significant calculation errors, and had been recently updated 

from the estimate contained in the 2010 study. While the documentation 

stated that the estimate reflected most likely costs, it did not specifically 

identify potential contingency costs and no cost risk analysis was 

performed to determine a level of confidence for the cost estimate. As 

result, we were unable to determine if the costs were indeed most likely.21

In addition, the AOA cost estimate was deemed as having partially met 

the best practices criteria for being credible as there was evidence that a 

 

20GAO-09-3SP. 

21In comments provided after we had completed our audit work, program officials stated 

that subsequent to the 2012 AOA confidence levels were developed that depict a 

reasonable probability of program success.
 

Page 12 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

robust sensitivity analysis had been performed but not an independent 

cost estimate or cost risk analysis.

Although there was not a cost risk analysis, a detailed technical risk 

assessment process was followed for identifying technical risks, their 

likelihood of occurring, and the consequences if they occurred. The 

technical risks were mitigated by incorporating costs into the cost 

estimate through derivation of realistic and reasonable staffing levels and 

sufficient schedule for design, development and testing of each 

alternative. In addition, while an independent cost estimate had not been 

conducted, the USD(AT&L)’s August 28, 2012, acquisition decision 

memorandum directs CAPE’s completion of one prior to the Pre-EMD 

Review. This is to occur in the second quarter of fiscal year 2013. As a 

result, the program could have confirmation of the AOA cost estimating 

results at that point. The program will then continue to work on its cost 

estimate to result in a more refined estimate supporting the Milestone B 

decision in the third quarter of fiscal year 2014.

The Navy’s currently proposed acquisition approach relies on the 

government’s providing, as government furnished equipment, mature 

technologies for integration into aircraft. Those technologies either 

already exist or are in development, some as legacy fleet aircraft 

upgrades. Their provision will be an important factor in the Navy’s 

achieving the reduced cost and schedule it seeks through its proposed 

acquisition approach. The program assesses their risks for integration 

into VXX aircraft as low—supporting the Navy’s goal of providing initial 

operational capability in fiscal year 2020.

While the program reports the key technologies to be provided by the 

government for integration are on track, there are risks that they will not 

work out as planned. For example, the Navy had originally anticipated 

that the cockpit technologies leveraged into the VXX acquisition would 

include a “glass cockpit” display system installed as an upgrade on VH60N aircraft. It dropped its planned use of this system. Adopting its use 

would likely necessitate an airworthiness recertification of the platform 

selected to be the VXX aircraft, a costly and time-consuming endeavor. 

As a result, the Navy now plans on the prime contractor using the display 

systems already in use in its certified aircraft—systems that the program 

manager noted are as capable if not more capable than the VH-60N’s. 

Efforts Intended to 

Leverage 

Technologies into 

VXX Aircraft Progress 
 

Page 13 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

Even if individual technologies work out as anticipated, they will still have 

to be successfully integrated in the aircraft. The program depends on a 

number of government-defined sub-systems and technologies being 

hosted in a new airframe. Environmental issues such as size, weight, 

thermal profile, and stability will have to be ascertained, not separately 

but in totality as a dynamic system. Only then will it be known whether 

key performance parameters are met, how closely, and what, if any, 

refinements need to be applied. In the past, we found integration issues 

can be significant. For example, in fiscal year 2004 DOD rebaselined the 

Joint Strike Fighter program extending its development by 18 months and 

adding resources to address problems discovered during systems 

integration and the preliminary design review.22 To mitigate integration 

risk, though, the VXX program is making use of a systems integration 

laboratory and also plans to install the communications and mission 

systems into a test aircraft and do demonstration testing before 

integration efforts begin on the VXX platform. Table 2 provides more 

information on the technologies to be provided by the government for 

integration in VXX aircraft.

 

22GAO, Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain, GAO-07-360

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2007).
 

Page 14 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

Table 2: Technologies to Be Provided by the Government for Integration in VXX Aircraft

Existing technologies Description/status

Central Data Unit Description: The program intends to use the existing cockpit that is provided with the basic 

aircraft. Integration and consolidation of the control of the Mission Communications System is 

being developed by the government and validated in a Systems Integration Laboratory, using the 

legacy central data units (CDU-7000) to host communication functionality.

Status: The computer is an existing fielded system currently in use on cockpit upgraded VH-60N 

helicopters. It is also planned for incorporation into the current VH-3D helicopters in a cockpit 

upgrade. The Navy is working toward integration of the CDU-7000 into the Mission 

Communications System and will test and verify it using a Systems Integration Laboratory. As 

such, the program assesses the risk for transition to VXX as low.

Navigation System Description: The navigation technology referenced here is the Embedded GPS Inertial system, a 

radar altimeter, remote air data system and a stability augmentation capability.

Status: These components exist in fielded systems flying on the current fleet of helicopters. As 

such, the program assesses the risk for transition to VXX as low.

Surveillance System Description: This component includes the transponder which meets all U.S./North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization requirements for the air traffic control system that is used to identify and track 

military aircraft. The system measures the distance and heading of the aircraft, and the 

transponder encodes identification and position information into the response.

Status: This system is an existing fielded system that is flying on the current fleet of helicopters. 

As such, the program assesses the risk for transition to VXX as low.

Existing technologies

currently being upgraded Description/Status 

Command Communication 

System

Description: This system consists of various radios and components that provide for off-board 

communications. Current communications capability includes: UHF/VHF Line of Sight (via ARC210 Gen 5 radios); Satellite Communications (via ARC-210 Gen 5 radios); VHF FM LOS (via 

ARC-244 radios); and HF (via HF 9067) radios. With the exception of the HF radio, all of these 

radios are planned for incorporation into the VXX platform. The HF-9067 radio will be replaced by 

an existing ARC-220 HF radio. To satisfy a new National Security Agency Cryptography mandate 

for encryption, the VXX team is working closely with another Navy organization to develop new 

software for the ARC-210 Gen 5 radios which meets the new encryption requirements. This 

software upgrade is on schedule for release in early fiscal year 2015.

Status: All of these radios are existing fielded radios, so the program assesses the risk for 

transition to VXX as low. The ARC-210 Gen 5 software update for Crypto mandate is on track and 

is expected to be fielded on the in-service helicopters in fiscal year 2015. As such, the program 

also assesses its risk for transition to VXX as low.

New technologies Description/Status 

Mission Communications System Description: The Presidential Helicopters Program Office is currently partnering with another 

Navy organization to assemble an executive communications suite, referred to as the Mission 

Communications System, using existing off-the-shelf components that will meet the 

communications subsystem requirements of the VXX program. The Mission Communications 

System is a communications architecture consisting of currently available hardware components 

integrated together to create a network designed to provide passengers and crew with access to 

on-board and off-board communications services. Off-board communications are to be provided 

through the use of existing radios (described above) integrated into this architecture.

Status: A preliminary design review of the Mission Communications System was completed on 

December 17, 2012 and the effort is on track for prototyping and testing in a Systems Integration 

Laboratory. As such, the program assesses the risk for transition to VXX as low.

Source: U.S. Navy, Presidential Helicopters Program Office.
 

Page 15 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

The program has made progress toward establishing a sound business 

case for development, one that rationally balances requirements, costs, 

and schedule. The program still faces challenges that will need to be 

actively managed to provide greater assurance that a sound business 

case is maintained throughout development as the program moves 

forward. These challenges include:

• Maintaining the VXX requirements without significant deviation 

throughout the acquisition process. Subsequent requirement changes 

will need to be considered carefully in the context of their implications 

for cost, schedule, risk, and performance and the program will need to 

effectively manage technology maturation and integration to achieve 

success. 

• Managing weight growth of the platform during development so as to 

not trigger the need for modifications that could then require a flight 

recertification of the VXX platform. Also, having a weight margin once 

fielded will place the program in a better position in the future to more 

readily enhance the platform over its anticipated 40-year service life.

• Ensuring the technologies being developed for integration into the 

selected VXX platform develop as needed and integration mitigation 

efforts are adequately planned, resourced, and executed.

Failing to address these challenges could impact the program’s ability to 

stay on track and delay replacement of the in-service helicopter fleet, 

which is currently stressed at times to meet demand. Additionally, in our 

prior reports we described both VH-71 lessons learned and acquisition 

best practices that, if heeded, should help the program remain on track.

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. The comments 

are reprinted in appendix II. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it would ensure 

that mitigations are in place to address potential risk areas. It believes its 

efforts are aligned with GAO’s best practices and the recommendations in 

GAO’s 2011 report on the program and plans to continue to monitor 

program progress in view of these standards.

Concluding 

Observations 

Agency Comments
 

Page 16 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and the Secretary of the Navy. 

This report also is available at no charge on GAO’s website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

Should you or your staff have any questions on the matters covered in 

this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to 

this report are listed in appendix III.

Michael J. Sullivan, Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management
 

Page 17 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Dick Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 18 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

Characteristic Best practices

Comprehensive • The cost estimate includes all life cycle costs.

• The cost estimate completely defines the program, reflects the current schedule, and is technically 

reasonable.

• The cost estimate work breakdown structure (WBS) is product-oriented, traceable to the statement of 

work/objective, and at an appropriate level of detail to ensure that cost elements are neither omitted 

nor double-counted.

• The estimate documents all cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions. 

Well documented • The documentation should capture the source data used, the reliability of the data, and how the data 

were normalized.

• The documentation describes in sufficient detail the calculations performed and the estimating 

methodology used to derive each element’s cost.

• The documentation describes step by step how the estimate was developed so that a cost analyst 

unfamiliar with the program could understand what was done and replicate it.

• The documentation discusses the technical baseline description and the data in the baseline is 

consistent with the estimate.

• The documentation provides evidence that the cost estimate was reviewed and accepted by 

management.

Accurate • The cost estimate results are unbiased, not overly conservative or optimistic and based on an 

assessment of most likely costs.

• The estimate has been adjusted properly for inflation.

• The estimate contains few, if any, minor mistakes.

• The cost estimate is regularly updated to reflect significant changes in the program so that it is always 

reflecting current status. Variances between planned and actual costs are documented, explained, 

and reviewed.

• The estimate is based on a historical record of cost estimating and actual experiences from other 

comparable programs. 

Credible • The cost estimate includes a sensitivity analysis that identifies a range of possible costs based on 

varying major assumptions, parameters, and data inputs.

• A risk and uncertainty analysis was conducted that quantified the imperfectly understood risks and 

identified the effects of changing key cost driver assumptions and factors.

• Major cost elements were cross-checked to see whether results were similar.

• An independent cost estimate was conducted by a group outside the acquiring organization to 

determine whether other estimating methods produce similar results.

Source: GAO.

Appendix I: Cost Estimating Best Practices
Page 19 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Page 20 GAO-13-257 Presidential Helicopter Program

Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov

Key contributors to this report were Bruce H. Thomas, Assistant Director; 

Jerry W. Clark, Analyst-in-Charge; Bonita J.P. Oden; Karen A. Richey; 

Jennifer K. Echard; Tisha D. Derricotte; Marie P. Ahearn; Hai V. Tran; 

and Robert S. Swierczek.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(121084)
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