2024 WI 16

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN

CASE NO.: 2022AP35-D

COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Roger G. Merry, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant,

 v.

Roger G. Merry,

 Respondent.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MERRY

OPINION FILED: April 24, 2024 

SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 

ORAL ARGUMENT: 

SOURCE OF APPEAL:

COURT: 

COUNTY: 

JUDGE: 

JUSTICES:

Per curiam. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 

REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, HAGEDORN, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, 

JJ., joined.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:
2024 WI 16

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further 

editing and modification. The final 

version will appear in the bound 

volume of the official reports. 

No. 2022AP35-D

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Roger G. Merry, Attorney at Law:

Office of Lawyer Regulation,

 Complainant,

 v.

Roger G. Merry,

 Respondent.

FILED

APR 24, 2024

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Supreme Court

ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license 

revoked. 

¶1 PER CURIAM. We review the report of Referee Edward 

E. Leineweber, issued after an evidentiary hearing, in which he 

concludes that Attorney Roger G. Merry committed two counts of 

professional misconduct as alleged by the Office of Lawyer 

Regulation (OLR). Referee Leineweber recommends that the court 

suspend Attorney Merry's license for a period of one year and 
No. 2022AP35-D 

2

that we order Attorney Merry to pay the full costs of this 

disciplinary proceeding.

¶2 Neither party has appealed from the referee's report 

so we review this matter pursuant to Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 

22.17(2).1 After completing our review, we approve the referee's 

findings and conclusions. With respect to the discipline to be 

imposed, we consider the recommended one-year suspension to be 

too light a sanction. Revocation is in order for Attorney 

Merry's egregious misconduct. We order Attorney Merry to pay 

the full costs of this proceeding. We accede to the OLR's 

conclusion that restitution is not warranted.

¶3 Attorney Merry was admitted to practice law in 

Wisconsin in 1981. He has a lengthy disciplinary history. In 

1990, Attorney Merry was privately reprimanded for engaging in a 

conflict of interest. Private Reprimand, No. 1990–26.2 In 1993, 

Attorney Merry was publicly reprimanded for client fund and 

trust account violations, as well as making at least six 

intentional misrepresentations to the former Board of Attorneys 

Professional Responsibility, the OLR's predecessor. Public 

 

1 SCR 22.17(2) provides: "If no appeal is filed timely, the 

supreme court shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject 

or modify the referee's findings and conclusions or remand the 

matter to the referee for additional findings; and determine and 

impose appropriate discipline. The court, on its own motion, 

may order the parties to file briefs in the matter."

2 Electronic version not available.
No. 2022AP35-D 

3

Reprimand of Roger G. Merry, No. 1993–3.3 In 1994, Attorney 

Merry was privately reprimanded for failing to keep a client 

reasonably informed about the status of a matter. Private 

Reprimand, No. 1994–8.4 In 1999, Attorney Merry was publicly 

reprimanded for engaging in a conflict of interest. Public 

Reprimand of Roger G. Merry, No. 1999–1.5 In 2008, Attorney 

Merry was publicly reprimanded for making a false statement to a 

tribunal; offering false evidence; and engaging in conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 

Public Reprimand of Roger G. Merry, No. 2008–9.6 Attorney 

Merry's law license is also subject to administrative 

suspensions for failure to pay Wisconsin State Bar dues and 

failure to file a trust account certification.

¶4 This disciplinary matter concerns Attorney Merry's 

publication of a book regarding his former client, M.S. This 

matter began with three counts, one of which the referee 

dismissed before the evidentiary hearing at the OLR's request. 

 

3 Electronic version available at 

https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/51417a2b8d566b1c706f83303424

783b34565c38.continue. 

4 Electronic version not available.

5 Electronic version available at 

https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/12575b0f2a8b1a496c420a41151a

8e486b127922.continue. 

6 Electronic version available at 

https://compendium.wicourts.gov/app/334e1203175d7659478d85166513

148f3883286a.continue. 
No. 2022AP35-D 

4

The referee's report and the exhibits received at the 

evidentiary hearing may be summarized as follows.

¶5 Attorney Merry served as M.S.'s defense attorney in 

her 2006 trial on charges including first-degree intentional 

homicide. M.S. was convicted and sentenced and remains in 

prison to this day.

¶6 In November 2013, Attorney Merry sent M.S. a letter, 

received into evidence at the evidentiary hearing, stating the 

following:

There remains a debt for my representation of you 

of approximately $19,000.00. I am willing to call it 

even if you would sign a release so the public 

defender could give me their copy of the transcript, 

and also sign a waiver of attorney/client privilege. 

The reason I am willing to write off the bill in 

exchange for the above, is I am planning on publishing 

a book about the case.

If you are unwilling to sign these two documents, 

I will have no choice but to sue your grandparents for 

the balance of the fee. Accordingly, if this meets 

with your approval, please sign both originals before 

a witness, have the witness sign it, and return it to 

me in the enclosed, self-addressed stamped envelope. 

The extra copies are for your file.

¶7 Attorney Merry enclosed with this letter an 

"Authorization for Release of Transcripts" from the State Public 

Defender's Office (SPD) to him, as well as a "Waiver of 

Attorney-Client Privilege," which called for M.S. to "waive all 

attorney-client privilege" and to "authorize my former attorney, 

Roger Merry, to publish any and all information he has regarding 

me, including, but not limited to, everything I have said to him 
No. 2022AP35-D 

5

which might have been privileged by the attorney-client 

relationship." M.S. did not sign either document.

¶8 In March 2015, Attorney Merry sent the SPD's Office a 

letter, received into evidence at the evidentiary hearing, 

stating that he knew the SPD's Office considered transcripts to 

be the property of its clients; that he wanted a copy of M.S.'s 

trial transcripts; that she "did not consent to give me a copy 

since I obtained a judgment against her in [circuit court] for 

$18,000"; and that he was "hoping to execute the judgment and 

obtain a copy or the original of the transcripts." He asked 

where the transcripts might be, and whether the SPD's Office 

"had a preferred method of delivery to me pursuant to an 

execution." Attorney Merry copied M.S. on this letter. 

¶9 The SPD's Office responded with a letter, received 

into evidence at the evidentiary hearing, informing Attorney 

Merry that it could not send documents from M.S.'s file without 

her permission. 

¶10 Ultimately, in August 2020, Attorney Merry selfpublished a book about his representation of M.S. The book was 

available at public libraries and for purchase at a local book 

store and an online book retailer. Attorney Merry used 

information relating to his representation of M.S. to write the 

book. To provide details about the case in the book, Attorney 

Merry drew from his own review of court records located at the 

circuit courthouse, as well as from his own recollection of 

events, chambers discussions or sidebars, and discussions with 

the prosecutor, other attorneys, experts, or private 
No. 2022AP35-D 

6

individuals——some of which might have occurred in the presence 

of others, but were not made in open court or in media coverage 

of the case at the time of the prosecution or its immediate 

aftermath.7

¶11 While the crime and the subsequent criminal 

prosecution had generated much publicity and discussion within 

the local community, it had generally subsided in the 14 years 

between those events and the publication of the book. 

Publication of the book revived public discussion of the events 

surrounding the crime and M.S.'s criminal prosecution.

¶12 M.S. suffered psychological harm from Attorney Merry's 

unsuccessful attempt to obtain her consent to his use of 

information concerning her case, as well as from his publication 

of the book about her case without her consent. The effects of 

the publication of the book included:

 damage to her relationships with her children, mother, 

siblings, and other family members who, previous to the 

publication of the book, were supportive of her;

 fear that the book would be available in the prison 

library and be read and discussed by prison staff and 

 

7 We note that excerpts of Attorney Merry's book were 

received into evidence at the evidentiary hearing. In the 

"Acknowledgements" section of his book, Attorney Merry wrote 

that "[a]ll matters in this book not derived from my own 

observation were taken from over five thousand pages of police 

reports and over two thousand five hundred pages of court 

reporter transcripts. All statements made by myself and others 

were made in anticipation of litigation."
No. 2022AP35-D 

7

fellow inmates, disrupting her relationships in the 

institution and undermining her well-being there;

 revelation of intimate private details of her personal 

and family history;

 reviving the stress of events from the commission of the 

crime through her trial, conviction, and sentencing;

 concern that the book would circulate in her home 

community and subject her children and family to social 

ostracism or abuse; and

 concern that the publication of the book would adversely 

affect her chances of eventually obtaining some form of 

relief through further court proceedings.

¶13 M.S. sought and received psychological treatment to 

address the emotional trauma caused by the contacts from 

Attorney Merry prior to publication and from circulation of the 

book in the community following the publication.

¶14 As pertinent here, the OLR's complaint alleges that:

 by using information to write and publish a book relating 

to his representation of M.S. that was not generally 

known, Attorney Merry violated SCR 20:1.9(c)(1) (Count 

1); and 

 by revealing in the book information relating to his 

representation of M.S. without her permission, Attorney 

Merry violated SCR 20:1.9(c)(2) (Count 2). 

¶15 After holding an evidentiary hearing, the referee 

determined that the OLR had proven the misconduct alleged in 

both counts. The applicable Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule is SCR 
No. 2022AP35-D 

8

20:1.9, "Duties to former clients." That rule reads, in 

pertinent part:

(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a 

client in a matter or whose present or former firm has 

formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 

thereafter:

(1) use information relating to the 

representation to the disadvantage of the former 

client except as these rules would permit or require 

with respect to a client, or when the information has 

become generally known; or

(2) reveal information relating to the 

representation except as these rules would permit or 

require with respect to a client.

¶16 In disputing the claimed SCR 20:1.9(c)(1) violation 

alleged in Count 1 before the referee, Attorney Merry argued 

that the information relating to the representation of M.S. that 

he relied upon in writing his book had become "generally known," 

and therefore fell outside the scope of the rule. The referee 

disagreed, noting that in Wisconsin Formal Ethics Opinion EF-20-

02,8 the State Bar Professional Ethics Committee explained that 

information is "generally known" for purposes of the rule only 

if widely recognized by members of the public in the relevant 

geographic area or within the former client's industry, 

profession, or trade. Id. at 6 (citing American Bar Association 

Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 

Formal Opinion 479). The referee wrote that "[a]t best the 

 

8 Full text of the Wisconsin Formal Ethics Opinion EF-20-02 

is found here: 

https://www.wisbar.org/formembers/ethics/Ethics%20Opinions/EF20-02%20Former%20Client%20Cross%20Examination%20-%20FINAL.pdf. 
No. 2022AP35-D 

9

record in this matter might demonstrate that some of the 

personal information and detail [used by Attorney Merry in the 

book] was previously known by some others, but it does not 

support a finding that it was 'generally known.'"

¶17 The referee additionally rejected Attorney Merry's 

argument that his use of information relating to the 

representation of M.S. in his book did not "disadvantage" M.S., 

as is required for an SCR 20:1.9(c)(1) violation, because the 

book asserted her innocence of the underlying crimes, and 

because she allegedly suffered from mental health issues prior 

to publication of the book. The referee reasoned that, 

regardless of the particulars of Attorney Merry's account of the 

crimes in the book or the status of M.S.'s mental health prior 

to publication of the book, M.S. was disadvantaged by the 

psychological harm she suffered from his use of information 

relating to his representation of her. 

¶18 The referee also rejected Attorney Merry's claim that 

he neither used nor revealed former-client confidences under SCR 

20:1.9(c) in that the information related to his representation 

of M.S. in his book fell outside the scope of the attorneyclient privilege. The referee disagreed, reasoning that an 

attorney's ethical duty to keep client confidences is broader 

than the evidentiary concern of attorney-client privilege.

¶19 Ultimately, the referee recommended that a one-year 

suspension of Attorney Merry's law license is merited based on 

his disciplinary history, the "egregious facts of this case," 
No. 2022AP35-D 

10

the precedent cited by OLR in its briefing to the referee, and 

the court's policy of progressive discipline.

¶20 Attorney Merry has not appealed the referee's report 

and recommendation. Accordingly, this court reviews the matter 

pursuant to SCR 22.17(2), which provides that if no appeal is 

timely filed, the court shall review the referee's report; 

adopt, reject, or modify the referee's findings and conclusions 

or remand the matter to the referee for additional findings; and 

determine and impose appropriate discipline. 

¶21 When we review a referee's report, we will affirm a 

referee's findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly 

erroneous, but we review the referee's conclusions of law on a 

de novo basis. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 

2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125. We determine 

the appropriate level of discipline to impose given the 

particular facts of each case, independent of the referee's 

recommendation, but benefiting from it. In re Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 

N.W.2d 686.

¶22 Upon careful review of the matter, we adopt the 

referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Attorney 

Merry has not contested the facts found by the referee, and 

after reviewing the record ourselves, we find no basis in the 

record to conclude that the referee's findings are clearly 

erroneous. And for the reasons set forth below, we agree with 

the conclusions of law that flow from the referee's findings of 
No. 2022AP35-D 

11

fact; namely, that the OLR established by clear and convincing 

evidence that Attorney Merry violated SCR 20:1.9(c)(1) and (2). 

¶23 Our ethical rules make clear that attorneys owe a duty 

of confidentiality to both current and former clients. Supreme 

Court Rule 20:1.6, titled "Confidentiality," prohibits a lawyer 

from revealing information relating to the representation of a 

client unless the client gives informed consent, or the 

disclosures are impliedly authorized to carry out the 

representation, or the disclosures are authorized by SCR 

20:1.6(b)9 or (c).10 Supreme Court Rule 20:1.9, quoted above, 

 

9 SCR 20:1.6(b) provides: "A lawyer shall reveal 

information relating to the representation of a client to the 

extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the 

client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the 

lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or 

substantial bodily harm or in substantial injury to the 

financial interest or property of another."

10 SCR 20:1.6(c) provides: 

(c) A lawyer may reveal information relating to 

the representation of a client to the extent the 

lawyer reasonably believes necessary:

(1) to prevent reasonably likely death or 

substantial bodily harm; 

(2) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial 

injury to the financial interests or property of 

another that is reasonably certain to result or has 

resulted from the client's commission of a crime or 

fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the 

lawyer's services; 

(3) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's 

conduct under these rules;

(4) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of 

the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the 
No. 2022AP35-D 

12

extends this duty of confidentiality to former-clients' 

confidential information.

¶24 Supreme Court Rule 20:1.9(c)(1) governs an attorney's 

use of former clients' confidential information. It prohibits 

an attorney from using information relating to the 

representation of a former client "to the disadvantage of the 

former client except as these rules would permit or require with 

respect to a client, or when the information has become 

generally known." 

¶25 Supreme Court Rule 20:1.9(c)(2) governs an attorney's 

revelation of a former client's confidential information. It 

prohibits an attorney from revealing information relating to the 

representation of a former client "except as these rules would 

permit or require with respect to a client." 

¶26 Applying these provisions to the referee's wellsupported factual findings, it is clear that Attorney Merry both 

revealed M.S.'s confidential information and used it to her 

disadvantage. He did the latter when he drafted a book 

containing M.S.'s confidences after she refused to assist him in 

 

client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or 

civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in 

which the client was involved, or to respond to 

allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's 

representation of the client; 

(5) to comply with other law or a court order; or 

(6) to detect and resolve conflicts of interest, 

but only if the revealed information would not 

compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise 

prejudice the client.
No. 2022AP35-D 

13

the endeavor, causing her psychological harm. As for the 

former, he revealed the confidential information when he made 

the book available for public distribution and purchase.

¶27 It is further clear, based on the referee's wellsupported factual findings, that none of the exceptions to the 

duty of former-client confidentiality apply. M.S. never 

provided informed consent to Attorney Merry's use or revelation 

of her confidential information. The "generally known" 

exception allowing use of confidential information does not 

apply given that, as found by the referee, the information used 

by Attorney Merry was not widely recognized by members of the 

public in the relevant geographical area. See State Bar of 

Wisconsin Professional Ethics Committee, Formal Opinion EF-20-02 

(June 25, 2020). There has been no claim that any of the 

exceptions contained within SCR 20:1.6(b) and (c) apply. See

n.9-10. And the referee correctly observed that the scope of 

information protected by the ethical duty of confidentiality is 

broader than that protected by the evidentiary doctrine of 

attorney-client privilege.11 Thus, Attorney Merry's insistence 

 

11 See SCR 20:1.6, cmt. 3, which explains, in pertinent 

part: 

The attorney-client privilege and work-product 

doctrine apply in judicial and other proceedings in 

which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise 

required to produce evidence concerning a client. The 

rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in 

situations other than those where evidence is sought 

from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The 

confidentiality rule, for example, applies not only to 

matters communicated in confidence by the client but 
No. 2022AP35-D 

14

to the referee that he never violated the attorney-client 

privilege, even if true, does not prove that he satisfied his 

more robust ethical duty of confidentiality.

¶28 We therefore conclude that this record clearly 

establishes that Attorney Merry committed the charged 

misconduct. Our rules prohibited him from revealing M.S.'s 

confidential information or using it to her disadvantage (he did 

both) unless special circumstances apply (none do). 

¶29 We turn now to the appropriate level of discipline to 

impose. Sources of guidance in determining appropriate 

sanctions include prior case law, the American Bar Association 

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and aggravating and 

mitigating factors. See Matter of Disciplinary Proc. Against 

DeLadurantey, 2023 WI 17, ¶52, 406 Wis. 2d 62, 985 N.W.2d 788. 

¶30 Turning first to our own prior case law, we discover 

that the misconduct here is in a league of its own. In In re 

Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 2001 WI 71, 244 Wis. 2d 

438, 628 N.W.2d 351, we imposed a six-month suspension on an 

attorney for eight counts of misconduct that included revealing 

his client's medical records to a prosecutor who was prosecuting 

the client's cohabitant; we found a violation of the duty of 

client confidentiality even though the records had been publicly 

filed in a prior lawsuit. The attorney had been reprimanded 

three times previously. In In re Disciplinary Proceedings 

 

also to all information relating to the 

representation, whatever its source.
No. 2022AP35-D 

15

Against Marick, 204 Wis. 2d 280, 554 N.W.2d 204 (1996), we 

imposed a nine-month suspension, as reciprocal discipline 

identical to that imposed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, for an 

attorney's use of confidential information concerning a client's 

proposed business acquisition to profit in the stock market. 

The attorney had no prior discipline. Finally, in In re Peshek, 

2011 WI 47, 334 Wis.2d 373, 798 N.W.2d 879, 881, we imposed a 

60-day suspension, as reciprocal discipline identical to that 

imposed by the Illinois Supreme Court, for an attorney's 

misconduct that included writing blog posts about her job that 

contained confidential information about her clients, whose 

identities she made inadequate efforts to conceal. The attorney 

had no prior discipline.

¶31 Here, Attorney Merry's conduct is considerably more 

serious, and his disciplinary history considerably more 

troubling, than that involved in Harman, Marick, and Peshek. It 

is bad indeed for an attorney to share a client's confidential 

medical information with another attorney (Harman), or to use a 

client's confidential business information to profit from a 

stock transaction (Marick), or to expose client confidences in 

personal blog posts (Peshek). But it is hard to imagine a more 

flagrant violation of 20:1.9(c)(1) and (2) than an attorney 

attempting to both publicize and profit from his client's 

confidences against the client's express wishes, as Attorney 

Merry did here. Such actions destroy the trust that is vital to 

the client-lawyer relationship and erode public confidence in 

the integrity of the legal profession. And Attorney Merry's 
No. 2022AP35-D 

16

disciplinary history——which at five previous reprimands is more 

extensive than any of those involved in the above cases——clearly 

shows that his misbehavior was not a one-off incident. 

Considerably more discipline is therefore merited than what we 

imposed in Harman, Marick, and Peshek. 

¶32 We turn next to the American Bar Association Standards 

for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("ABA Standards"). Although these 

standards are in no way binding on this court, they provide 

helpful direction in assigning an appropriate sanction. 

Standard 4.21 applies here. It reads:

4.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a 

lawyer, with the intent to benefit the lawyer or 

another, knowingly reveals information relating to 

representation of a client not otherwise lawfully 

permitted to be disclosed, and this disclosure causes 

injury or potential injury to a client.

Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Standard 4.21 

(Ellyn S. Rosen ed., 2nd ed. 2019). The Annotation to ABA 

Standard 4.21 explains that disbarment is warranted when a 

lawyer "knowingly abuses" the client's trust and "knowingly 

reveals confidential client information improperly with the 

intent of achieving personal benefit and causing injury or 

potential injury to the client."

¶33 That is precisely what happened here. Attorney Merry 

improperly revealed M.S.'s confidential information and used it 

to her disadvantage, causing her extensive psychological harm——

all so that he could self-publish and sell a book devoted to his 

musings about the case in which he represented her. This was an 

intentional, self-benefitting violation of client confidences 
No. 2022AP35-D 

17

within the meaning of the standard. We therefore make an 

initial determination that revocation12 is the appropriate 

sanction in this case, subject to modification as a result of 

aggravating or mitigating factors.

¶34 Several aggravating factors are present. As noted 

above, Attorney Merry has a considerable disciplinary history. 

See ABA Standard 9.22(a). His motivation was selfish; he 

prioritized his interest in self-publishing a book above M.S.'s 

confidentiality interest and his ethical duty to protect it. 

See ABA Standard 9.22(b). He has not acknowledged the wrongful 

nature of his conduct, see ABA Standard 9.22(g); to the 

contrary, he portrayed himself to the referee as a past and 

present victim of an unfair disciplinary system and insisted 

that "I don't care what the likes of OLR or judges or lawyers 

say about me and my ethics because they're wrong. It's 

motivated for improper purposes, and it doesn't add to the 

discussion. And it, in fact, disgraces the practice of law." 

M.S., as an inmate, was a vulnerable victim. See ABA Standard 

9.22(h). Finally, Attorney Merry had decades of experience in 

the practice of law, and thus should have known better than to 

act as he did. See ABA Standard 9.22(i). 

¶35 There is little on the mitigating side of the scale. 

Attorney Merry appears to have generally cooperated with the OLR 

during this disciplinary process. See ABA Standard 9.32(e). 

 

12 The ABA Standards use the term "disbarment"; Wisconsin 

uses the term "revocation." See SCR 21.16(1m)(a). 
No. 2022AP35-D 

18

And his disciplinary history is relatively remote in time. See

ABA Standard 9.32(m).

¶36 Although there is no mathematical formula for weighing 

these factors, we conclude that the many aggravating factors 

outweigh the few mitigating factors present in this case. We 

therefore conclude that revocation is appropriate under the 

facts of this case. 

¶37 We note that this result is consistent with that 

reached in an out-of-state case with reasonably analogous facts. 

In In re Smith, 991 N.E.2d 106 (Ind. 2013), the Indiana Supreme 

Court disbarred an attorney who wrote a book that purported to 

be a true account of his personal and professional relationship 

with a former client, who was active in politics and at one 

point held a high-level job in the federal government. See id.

at 107. The attorney's professed motivation for writing the 

book was at least in part to recoup legal fees the former client 

owed him and money the former client had obtained from him over 

the years. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court determined that the 

attorney committed multiple ethical violations in writing the 

book, including the improper disclosure of details of his 

representation of the former client. The court wrote:

In the book, Respondent revealed personal and 

sensitive information about [the former client] that 

was obtained in confidence as her attorney, and its 

revelation had the potential of causing her public 

embarrassment and other injury, such as impairment of 

her employment opportunities. Respondent's selfish 

motivation in deliberately attempting to reveal this 

confidential information to a wide audience for 

monetary gain, his false statements in the book and in 
No. 2022AP35-D 

19

this disciplinary matter, and his lack of any remorse 

lead us to conclude that that disbarment is 

appropriate for Respondent's misconduct.

The court cited ABA Standard 4.21, discussed above, as support 

for this result. Id. at 110.

¶38 We acknowledge that all of Attorney Merry's previous 

disciplinary matters resulted in reprimands, not license 

suspensions. Under different facts, a suspension, rather than 

revocation, might be considered a reasonable next step in the 

progressive discipline process. But when the circumstances have 

called for it, we have revoked an attorney's law license for 

misconduct even where (quite unlike here) the attorney had no 

prior disciplinary history. In In re Disciplinary Proceedings 

Against Wright, 180 Wis. 2d 492, 509 N.W.2d 290 (1994), for 

example, we concluded that an attorney's conversion of client 

funds warranted license revocation, even though the attorney had 

never been disciplined before. Here, Attorney Merry's 

misconduct was arguably far more serious than that involved in 

Wright: client funds can be replaced, but the harm caused by 

Attorney Merry's improper use and very public revelation of 

M.S.'s confidences cannot be undone; that bell cannot be 

unrung. We therefore impose revocation as the next disciplinary 

step for Attorney Merry.

¶39 We turn now to the issue of costs, which total 

$16,853.92 as of December 20, 2023. Attorney Merry does not 

dispute them. As is our normal practice, we deem it appropriate 

to impose the full costs of this proceeding on him. See SCR 

22.24(1m).
No. 2022AP35-D 

20

¶40 We note that the OLR does not seek restitution. None 

is ordered.

¶41 Finally, we note that, on August 3, 2022, several 

months after the OLR filed its disciplinary complaint against 

him, Attorney Merry filed a petition to voluntarily surrender 

his law license. The court has not yet taken action on this 

petition. We hereby deny it. See In re Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Snyder, 127 Wis. 2d 446, 380 N.W.2d 367 

(1986) (voluntary resignation is an inappropriate disposition of 

a disciplinary proceeding).

¶42 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Roger G. Merry is 

revoked, effective the date of this order. 

¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Roger G. Merry's August 3, 

2022 petition to voluntarily surrender his law license is 

denied. 

¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 60 days of the date 

of this order, Roger G. Merry must pay to the Office of Lawyer 

Regulation the costs of this proceeding totaling $16,853.92.

¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Roger G. Merry shall comply 

with the requirements of SCR 22.26 pertaining to the duties of a 

person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 

revoked.

¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the administrative 

suspensions of Roger G. Merry to practice law in Wisconsin for 

failure to pay Wisconsin State Bar dues and failure to file a 

trust account certification will remain in effect until each 
No. 2022AP35-D 

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reason for the administrative suspension has been rectified, 

pursuant to SCR 22.28(1).
No. 2022AP35-D.akz

1

¶47 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J. (concurring). I 

concur in the court's order revoking Attorney Merry's license to 

practice law in Wisconsin. I write separately to point out that 

in Wisconsin the "revocation" of an attorney's law license is 

not truly revocation because the attorney may petition for 

reinstatement after a period of five years. See SCR 22.29(2). 

I believe that when it comes to lawyer discipline, courts should 

say what they mean and mean what they say. We should not be 

creating false perceptions to both the public and to the lawyer 

seeking to practice law again. See In re Disciplinary 

Proceedings Against Moodie, 2020 WI 39, 391 Wis. 2d 196, 942 

N.W.2d 302 (Ziegler, J., dissenting). And, as I stated in my 

dissent to this court's order denying Rule Petition 19-10, In 

the Matter of Amending Supreme Court Rules Pertaining to 

Permanent Revocation of a License to Practice Law in Attorney 

Disciplinary Proceedings, I believe there may be rare and 

unusual cases that would warrant the permanent revocation of an 

attorney's license to practice law. See S. Ct. Order 19-10 

(issued Dec. 18, 2019) (Ziegler, J., dissenting).

¶48 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL 

BRADLEY, BRIAN HAGEDORN, JILL J. KAROFSKY, and JANET C. 

PROTASIEWICZ join this concurrence.
No. 2022AP35-D.akz

1