U.S. STRATEGY AT THE CROSSROAD

Gabriel Marcella

Donald Schulz

March 5, 1999
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ii
Colombia is the most troubled country in the W

Hemisphere. Drug criminals, guerrillas, and paramilitary 

are feeding a spiral of violence that makes “colombianiza

metaphor for a failing state. This monograph, by Dr. G

Marcella and Dr. Donald Schulz, addresses the strategic dim

of the crisis. It argues that Colombia’s future deeply affects r

security and U.S. interests. The country’s afflictions are spilli

its borders, threatening Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Brazi

Mexico, and the Caribbean. At the same time, Colombia is the 

of most of the cocaine and heroin entering the United Stat

fear is that, if the situation continues to worsen, the count

become balkanized, with large areas under the de facto co

guerrilla and paramilitary regimes based, in large part, on 

economies.

U.S. policy is now at a critical juncture. A decision has bee

to become more engaged in the war against narcotrafficking. Y

question remains: Can counternarcotics be separated 

counterinsurgency? The authors believe that it canno

everything is related to everything else—and that unle

Colombian and U.S. governments address the problem throu

creation of a coherent, holistic strategy, the situation will 

much worse. In the latter half of their report, they discuss b

military and nonmilitary components of such a strategy. 

other things, they contend that restrictions on U.S. police t

and counterinsurgency assistance should be removed or rev

order to enable the Colombian security forces to halt the mom

of the insurgents and paramilitaries and give them incent

negotiate seriously. They also argue that a respect for human 

is of strategic importance.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publis

monograph as a contribution to the growing national security 

on this important issue.

LARRY M. WORTZEL

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute

iii
OF THE AUTHORS

GABRIEL MARCELLA is Professor of Third World S

with the Department of National Security and Str

U.S. Army War College. He served as International A

Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Sou

Command, Panama, 1987-89. Dr. Marcella has w

extensively on strategy, low-intensity conflict, and 

American policy. His writings have appeared in num

journals and in various edited volumes. His most 

works include Warriors in Peacetime: The Militar

Democracy in Latin America; War and Peace in the Am

Strategic Implications for the United States and 

America of the 1995 Ecuador-Peru War ; and 

Presidential Advisory System and the Making of 

American Policy. He is coauthor/coeditor of the forthc

book, Security Cooperation in the Western Hemis

Resolving the Ecuador-Peru Conflict. 

DONALD SCHULZ is the Strategic Studies Inst

expert on Latin American affairs. He has lived and tr

extensively in the region. Prior to joining SSI in 19

taught at several colleges, most recently Northea

Illinois University in Chicago. He has coauthored or 

several books including Mexico Faces the 21st Centur

United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central Am

Cuba and the Future; Revolution and Counterrevolu

Central America and the Caribbean; and Po

Participation in Communist Systems. He has also pub

many journal and newspaper articles on Latin Am

politics, and testified before the Senate on U.S. po

Haiti. Dr. Schulz’s current research focuses on M

Colombia, and Haiti. He holds a B.A. in Political S

from Wake Forest College and a Ph.D. in Political S

from Ohio State University.

iv
v
vi

Map of Colombia.
U.S. STRATEGY AT THE CROSSROAD

The biblical holocaust that has been consuming Colombia 

more than twenty years.

Gabriel García Márquez

Colombian novelist

Introduction.

Gabriel García Márquez’s version of the b

holocaust, Colombia’s bloody internal strife, deeply 

the United States and the regional community of na

Colombia is the most troubled country in the Hemis

Law and order have broken down. Drug crim

guerrillas, and paramilitary “self-defense” organiz

are feeding a spiral of violence and corruption that 

“colombianization” a metaphor for a failing state. 

day, about 10 Colombians are killed in politically r

strife, while 85 percent of the 30,000 annual homicid

caused by pervasive criminal violence.

1

 More tha

million people have been displaced by war. To som

country appears beyond redemption. Mindful o

challenge, the U.S. Army War College, on December 

1998, conducted the international conference “Land

and Ambiguous Warfare: The Challenge of Colombia 

21st Century” to better define the problems and p

constructive measures to assist this democracy in di

Some of this monograph is based on the confe

proceedings. 

Colombia’s problems are analyzed within the fram

of U.S. national interests and policy. The authors b

that current policy, dominated by counternarcotics, 

decisive juncture. The complexity and interrelatedn

Colombia’s three wars and the priority ne

reestablishing governmental authority and contro

1
and insurgent influence argue for a more compreh

and visionary response. But a combination of pruden

timidity, the product of ghosts from the past (co

insurgency and police training in Latin Ameri

programmatic approach driven by scarce resources, a

fact that Colombia’s three wars are intimidatingly com

inhibits American policy.

Colombia also presents to the United State

strategic dilemma posed by ambiguous warfare: h

adapt its political, economic, and military instrume

assist a nation confronted by three interrelated fo

internal violence that have deep international implic

and whose elimination will take a long time. In

strategic adaptation of the kind that Colombia deman

be a challenge for the United States in the 21st ce

Accordingly, greater clarity of purpose is in order 

United States and Colombia deepen a relationship 

future is uncertain. The purpose of this essay is to clar

issues and generate a responsible dialogue on the str

alternatives. 

Colombia’s Three Wars.

Colombia is a large country, three times the s

Montana and slightly less than France, Germany, an

combined. It fronts both the Pacific Ocean an

Caribbean. Seventy-five percent of its 37 million peop

in urban areas. Population growth in 1997 was 1.9 pe

Its $89 billion gross domestic product places it in the m

of the major economies in Latin America, though lik

countries in the region, income distribution is 

skewed. About 50 percent of its people live in poverty

20 percent in absolute poverty. Gross domestic p

growth for the economy averaged 4.1 percent from 1

1997. In a nation of abundant resources and lan

percent of the owners possess 90 percent of the cult

land.

2
one-third of the country framed by the Andean vert

Its large eastern region, where guerrillas and 

traffickers operate with impunity, is lightly populate

poorly controlled by the central government. In

integration of Colombia’s many regions into a co

nation-state has been the principal challenge 

independence. It is even more so now. Preston Jame

eminent geographer, has written: “It would be diffi

conceive of a geographic pattern of internal arrang

that would appear to make the achievement of po

unity and coherence more difficult than in Colombia.”

of government control makes large parts of the co

particularly conducive to narcotrafficking and gu

insurgency.

Today Colombia is being torn apart by 

simultaneous wars: the violence and corruption gen

by drug traffickers, insurgents, and parami

organizations (which in 1998 accounted for more th

percent of all political killings). Over 35,000 people 

been killed in these conflicts during the last decad

rate of killing in Colombia far exceeds the amount of 

cleansing that went on after the breakup of Yugo

Both the paramilitaries and the guerrillas take over 

and displace thousands of people. The nation’s capa

deal with this turmoil has been sharply declining, due 

weakening of most state institutions and the fragmen

of the social fabric. One scholar, Nazih Richani, re

Colombia as a self-perpetuating “war system” t

practically unbreakable.

3

 Similarly, Eduardo Pizarro 

National Autonomous University of Colombia, refers 

“partial collapse of the state.” 

Yet, there is hope. In October 1997, 10 m

Colombians went to the polls for mayoral elections 

national referendum to reject violence and criminal

August 1998 the Andrés Pastrana administration cam

office, with renewed domestic and international legit

and support from the United States and the demo

3
Washington had been reluctant to give to the pr

Ernesto Samper government because the presiden

received campaign money from drug traffic

Washington’s distancing, which included denying 

visitor’s visa to enter the United States and decer

Colombia twice for not meeting Clinton administ

criteria in the fight against drugs, was counterprod

because it weakened the country’s institutional capa

the face of the three wars. The upshot was that the en

of democracy were emboldened, and Colombia fell f

into the abyss.

President Pastrana quickly opted to open a 

process with the guerrillas, which commenced in Ja

1999. His top priority is to end the 34-year guerrill

Proclaiming that “For peace I risk everything,” he agr

the demand of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucio

Colombianas (FARC) to withdraw all government 

from an area of 16,000 square miles (the size of Switz

and containing 96,000 people) controlled by the insur

The other insurgent group, the Ejército de Libe

Nacional (ELN), would make a similar demand in Feb

1999. This recalls a previous peace process between 

and 1994, when some 5,300 guerrillas surrendered 

arms and were reintegrated into society. Past

controversial measure was seen as a bold stro

strengthen the government’s credibility and legitima

the peace negotiations ahead. Some observers, how

were worried that it would enhance the FARC’s posit

legitimating their de facto control of territory.

In November 1998, the U.S. Congress voted $165 m

in supplemental counternarcotics assistance which, 

to $124 million appropriated earlier, makes Colomb

third largest recipient of annual U.S. aid in the worl

following month, Secretary of Defense William Cohe

his counterpart Minister of Defense Rodrigo Lloreda 

an agreement in Cartagena for closer cooperation an

military assistance to help the police and special army 

4
traffickers. In a significant development, Colombi

form an air mobile army battalion to assist i

counternarcotics effort.

The Strategic Imperative: Why Colombia Matte

Defining U.S. national interests in the We

Hemisphere in the post-Cold War era is doubly challe

Gone are preoccupations about the threat to U.S. m

security from the other superpower or its reg

accomplices. The strategic environment is far more co

and variegated, and the threats are more systemic an

term. The East-West framework has given way to a 

differentiated and mutually satisfying global agenda, 

stresses the common goals of democratic govern

judicial reform, free trade, economic modernizatio

fight against terrorism and transnational crime

protection of the environment. The Miami Summit o

and the Santiago Summit of 1998 advanced a co

agenda, targeting the year 2005 for the establishme

Free Trade Area of the Americas. Similarly, the Pres

1998 National Security Strategy stresses the commu

interests and convergence of values between the U

States and the countries of the Western Hemisphere (

for Cuba).

Some might argue that defining U.S. national int

too broadly and inclusively in the post-Cold W

unsustainable. Such a definition, they argue, would 

credible to the American people. By so doing, any diffic

that arise may be seen as threats to U.S. security. 

narrow definition would obscure the obvious long

linkages that exist between the core interests: na

defense, economic well-being, international orde

promotion of democratic and humanitarian principle

protection of the environment. Colombia’s travails 

affect the military defense of the United States. Bu

powerfully influence the balance of values that mak

5
indispensable power in a global environment fraugh

new threats to international order and human de

They also deeply affect the security and well-be

countries in the region, many of which are far 

vulnerable than the United States. With these cave

mind, the authors believe that unless national intere

broadly defined, the U.S. policy response, ho

intelligent and well thought out, will be at best insuffi

The very weakness of Colombia as a nation

threatens international order in the region an

well-being of any number of countries. Its turmoil spil

into Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru

Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico. The threat 

different forms in different countries: extra-ju

killings, paramilitary activity, displaced people f

violence, drug trafficking, money laundering, kidna

illegal arms trafficking; corruption of government of

policemen, military, the news media, judges, and 

officers of the court; illegal immigration, ecological d

(from precursor chemicals and defoliants, oil spills 

sabotaged pipelines, and the cutting of the tropical f

and economic distortions caused by quick and unacco

movements of capital. This melancholy brew weake

societal will to resist the breakdown of order and se

Indeed, one of the cardinal objectives of the U.S. Na

Security Strategy, the strengthening of democracy, is 

assault because of the corrosive influence of drug mo

The Stakes for the United States:

Trade, Investment, and People.

In 1997 Colombia accounted for $11.6 billion in tw

trade with the United States. The latter provided 47 p

of the country’s imports and is the top investor, accou

for 44 percent of foreign direct investment. Colombia 

fifth largest market for U.S. goods in Latin America

400 of the Fortune 500 companies doing business the

is already the fifth largest supplier of foreign oil, and h

6
from the guerrilla violence that is inhibitin

development of the industry. Over a million Colombia

in the ethnic tapestry of the United States, as are 

35,000 Americans who reside and work in Colombia

The Impact of Drug Trafficking on American

Society.

Seventy percent of the cocaine entering the U

States originates from Colombia, amounting to 300 

tons with a street value of $30 billion. In additi

percent of the heroin seized by U.S. authorities on th

Coast is Colombian. The magnitude of the problem i

that drug consumption caused 100,000 deaths in th

decade. There are 13.9 million drug users and 3.6 m

addicts in the United States. The total societal c

estimated at $300 billion annually from lost produc

crime, policing, incarceration, rehabilitation, insuran

hospital care.

5

 A large portion of the U.S. prison popu

is accounted for by drug-related crimes. According 

Department of Justice, seven out of ten people in jai

been drug users.

Colombia produces 80 percent of the world’s cocain

now grows more coca than any other country, h

overtaken Peru and Bolivia. Coca production appear

consolidating in Colombia, since production in Peru is 

56 percent since 1995 and in Bolivia 17 percent since 

According to Thomas J. Umberg and Allison Major fro

Office of National Drug Control Policy, most of the in

in cultivation in 1998 occurred in areas control

guerrillas. Such evidence confirms the existence 

narco-guerrilla as well as the narco-paramilitary nex

will be seen later, narcotics now provides a major sou

income for guerrilla military operations. (Inciden

Colombia now grows the high-yield Peruvian coca va

The narcos create another distortion also. Accord

Gustavo Gallón, Director of the Colombian Commiss

Jurists, an estimated 40 percent of the land with

7
traffickers converted into landowners.7

Democracy and Human Rights.

Colombia is one of the oldest democracies i

Hemisphere. But it is not a strong participatory dem

with institutions that effectively mediate conflic

channel citizen demands to the national government

Liberal and Conservative parties alternated i

monopoly of power from 1958 until 1974, each runni

national government for 4 years. This prag

accommodation (the National Front) helped en

post-1948 La Violencia, but it also closed “po

participation to groups and sectors who did not fee

were represented” by the two parties.

9

 From 1985 to 

states former Foreign Minister and presidential can

Noemí Sanín, Colombia “experienced 5 years of syste

elimination of leaders, members and movements of 

trends.” 10 In the 1990 presidential campaign, 

candidates not representing the bipartisan system 

assassinated.

Defective democracy has many manifestations

judicial system is weak, despite the fact that Col

allocates the second highest percentage (4.62) 

national budget to the judicial system in Latin Ameri

probably employs the highest number of judges o

democracy, 17.1 per 100,000 people (in compariso

United States has 2; Spain, 3).

11

 Corruption permeat

political culture.

12

 In this environment, public of

including judges, prosecutors, investigators, and la

are widely subjected to the temptations of dishonesty

members of Congress have been so corrupted or intim

by the narcotraffickers that they attempt to weak

defeat legislation aimed at strengthening the govern

ability to deal with drug trafficking. 

In addition, Colombia is one of the most violent cou

in the world. It is the leader in kidnappings, regis

8
rescued 451 victims in 1998, preventing total ra

payments of $52.2 million. Among those target

murder are human rights activists, leftists, f

guerrillas who were “reinserted” into society (some 

were murdered from the period 1989 to 1994), and f

public figures. Between 1987 and 1992 there we

homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, by far the highes

in the world. Prominent victims killed in the last d

have included:

• Presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán

• Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla

• Diane Turbay, daughter of former President 

César Turbay and director of a major Colo

televison news show

• Carlos Pizarro, leader of the M-19 former gu

movement

• Guillermo Cano, editor of El Espectador newsp

• Colonel Jaime Ramírez, first Director o

Colombian Anti-Narcotics Police

• Bernardo Jaramillo, of the Patriotic Un

movement close to the Communist Party

• Dozens of judges and prosecutors

• At least 2,000 labor union members since 1991

In short, the human rights situation is appallin

annual U.S. Department of State Human Rights Re

which are mostly based on reporting by Colom

organizations, paint a pessimistic picture.

14 For the 

1993-98, the Colombian Commission of Jurists and h

rights groups indicated that security forces, param

groups, and the guerrillas were involved in political k

9
against drug addicts, prostitutes, beggars, transve

and street children) according to the following percent

Security Forces Paramilitary Guer

1993 54 18 28 

1995 16 46 38 

1996 18 46 36

1997* 7.5 69 23.

1998* 2.7 (21) 76 (573) 21

* First nine months. Figures not available for 1994. These s

may contain serious imprecisions because it is difficult to s

political from non-political killing.

In May 1998, the Army’s 20th Military Intelligence B

was disbanded because personnel had been involv

human rights violations. The State Department also r

that the paramilitaries engage in active depopu

measures that force people to move to safer area

Colombian Commission of Jurists estimates that the 

impunity for violations by the military, guerrillas

paramilitaries is virtually 100 percent.15

The Guerrillas.

The guerrillas number about 20,000 and compri

FARC, the ELN (reputed to have 5,000 fighters), a

much smaller EPL (Popular Liberation Army). 

operate in more than 100 separate “fronts” (upwards 

for the FARC, and 35 or so for the ELN) and ex

significant influence over 50 percent of the nation’s 

municipalities. On the eve of the 1997 election

targeted political office holders, candidates, and el

workers as valid military targets.16 Their purpose w

discourage participatory democracy, destabiliz

country, and delegitimate the government. In the pr

they killed more than 200 candidates and elected o

and forced more than 2,000 candidates to withdraw. D

the first nine months of 1997, guerrillas committe

10
50 percent of reported kidnappings.

Founded in the mid-1960s, the Marxist-Leninist 

and ELN expanded significantly in the 1980s. The 

important reason for the FARC’s growth wa

development of a stable and lucrative source of financ

activities—the drug trade—by extracting protection 

from coca growers and the operators of clandestine la

fields and laboratories, along with kidnapping. The 

received new life by extorting money from oil com

operating the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline conn

Arauca province to the Caribbean. From 1986 to 1997 

were nearly 79 million barrels of crude oil spilled in pi

attacks. Damage and lost revenue were estimated a

billion, while the oil spills seriously damaged the ec

Between 55 to 70 percent of the guerrilla war chest 

from extortion and protection of drug activities, accord

former Defense Minister Rafael Pardo.

17

 He argues f

that extortion has changed the nature of the guer

making them more like large criminal enterp

Moreover, 

While their leaders and declared political platforms contin

to be superficially revolutionary, their purposes are changi

From their declared objective in the 1960s, which was 

seizure of national political power by arms, they have evolv

toward less lofty goals: local power for the ELN, coalit

government for the FARC.18

In early 1999, however, the FARC vowed to return 

battlefield if the peace talks do not bring them to pow

a socialist state.

While their political support has been declining 

last decade, the insurgents constitute a formidable m

threat. Though they cannot now take power, they 

operational momentum. They can feed the “war sy

and maintain a costly stalemate indefinitely. In 1998

displayed their growing military capability. For exam

early March the FARC decisively defeated troops 

11
of El Billar. David Spencer, a respected analyst 

Colombian Army, called this the most humiliating de

date because, for the first time, the guerrillas had defe

large unit in maneuver warfare. The FARC m

strategy appears to be to attack troops and police in r

and vulnerable positions, a pattern repeated at the 

October 1998 attack on the police garrison at Mitú (a 

that had no strategic significance to the FARC other th

psychological impact), deep in the Amazon Basin ne

Brazilian border. These were serious defeats fo

government, which does not have the forces, intelli

and quick reaction mobility to respond across th

distances of Colombia.

What cannot yet be determined is whether the gue

are serious about the peace process that began in Ja

1999. Some observers believe they are not. They argu

the insurgents have a vested interest in the continua

the “war system”: after all, it provides them wi

enormous source of revenue through the protection 

growers and drug traffickers, something they 

presumably have to surrender in the event of a 

settlement. Skeptics also contend that the insurgen

winning the war, and consequently have no rea

compromise. If these arguments are correct, negoti

will be little more than a convenient tactical ploy. Th

provide the rebels with a cloak of legitimacy and 

them to garner international support while consoli

control over territories and preparing for the opt

intensifying the fighting in the future.

Current estimates are that neither side can 

military victory, and there are substantial costs and 

involved in a prolongation and escalation of the co

Such a scenario could well draw the United States 

more direct security assistance role for counterinsu

(such as equipment and training), much as it was pulle

the Central American conflicts in the 1980s. I

happens, the likely result would be a strengthening 

12
where neither side could beat the other. Thus it migh

the guerrillas’ interest to negotiate now, while they a

relatively strong bargaining position, rather than 

when the balance of military power has been redress

the same token, one should not dismiss the factor of fa

The war has been going on for decades. The insurgen

paying an increasingly heavy price, especially fro

attacks launched by the growing parami

organizations. Finally, it is not really known how mu

FARC and ELN would be hurt from a loss of drug rev

Some observers believe their intake is much less th

Colombian military contends. If they are correct, the 

might be willing to come to a peace agreement, partic

if the government were willing to address some of 

political, social, and economic demands, such as ag

reform and rural development.

The Paramilitaries.

Many paramilitaries originated as self-defense 

izations because of the need to provide security again

guerrillas in the absence of law and order. Paramilitar

which the largest group is the Autodefensas Campes

Córdoba and Urabá, the Peasant Self-Defense of Có

and Urabá) now constitute a serious threat to both th

of law and the guerrillas, often engaging in tit-

reprisal strikes, with increasingly brutal consequen

noncombatants.

19

 In fact, in this war without quarte

the paramilitaries and guerrillas share a disqu

tendency to consider “legitimate military targets” 

normally defined by the international laws of armed c

as hors de combat, noncombatants. The paramil

operate locally, regionally, and nationally under v

commands. In 1997-98, they inflicted serious losses 

guerrillas and sympathizers, especially in the Magd

Medio region. Some organizations also derive incom

the drug trade in order to fund operations. The ext

such involvement is not certain, but it points ou

13
political-ideological motivation and the need to 

substantial military operations on the part of bo

guerrillas and the paramilitaries.

During the first 9 months of 1998, the paramil

committed an estimated 76 percent of all polit

motivated extrajudicial killings, according to Colo

sources cited earlier. Some Colombian authorities, s

General Fernando Tapias, Commanding General 

Armed Forces, and General Rosso José Serrano, Dire

the National Police, profess to see no difference betwe

paramilitaries and the guerrillas, regarding each 

threat to state authority. Others, such as some m

commanders, take a live and let live attitude. Some 

the paramilitaries as allies in the war agains

insurgents. Daniel García-Peña, the chief negotiator 

Peace Commission under the Samper administr

states that though it would be “barbaric” to grant po

recognition to them, they must be included in the 

process via separate negotiations.

20 A minority of an

such as David Spencer, go further, regarding them 

potentially constructive element.

21

 While criticizing 

human rights violations, they argue that these group

reality that cannot be ignored. They have become a po

force that the government must bring into the 

process. 

The Narco Nexus.

 No discussion of Colombia’s accelerating na

disintegration would be complete without an apprecia

the role of narcotrafficking. Violence and corruption 

always been a problem in Colombia, of course, as h

weakness of the state—its inability to command an eff

presence—in rural areas. But the narcorevolution 

1980s served as a catalyst for worsening these afflicti

channeling new resources (both financial and milita

old foes and creating new social sectors, which transf

14
which multiple groups and sectors are armed.

22

 Thus, one of the root causes of paramilitary violen

a decade-and-a-half investment boom in agricultural 

by nouveau riche drug traffickers seeking to launder p

accumulate wealth, and acquire social stan

Throughout the 1980s, these traffickers made 

investments in traditional areas of the Colom

countryside, largely in cattle ranches in the nort

Atlantic coast regions and the central Magdalena 

valley. There rural elites were abandoning their holdi

large numbers both because of the extortionary ta

and violence of the guerrillas and the willingness 

traffickers to pay in cash for choice but overvalued lan

upshot was that in the 1980s and early 1990s an esti

5-6 million hectares fell into the hands of the drug lo

 This was, in effect, an agrarian counterreform, 

aggravated all of the traditional problems of 

inequality, land concentration and land poverty, an

class conflicts that accompany them. To consolidate 

holdings in the face of the threats posed by disgr

peasants and revolutionary guerrillas, the narcotraff

allied themselves with local political bosses, other 

landowners, and the armed forces. Most important

sought to augment security by organizing their own p

paramilitary units, which they used to cleanse their a

the insurgents and their supporters. In this, they fo

willing ally in the Colombian Armed Forces which

little civilian government oversight, supported and t

these groups or acquiesced in their formation und

assumption that the paramilitaries were their n

allies in the war against the guerrillas. By the t

became clear that the paramilitaries could pose as g

threat to the state as the guerrillas, it was too lat

genie was out of the bottle.

24

But the narcorevolution not only fueled param

violence; it also fueled the insurgencies. Out i

15
working closely with the small and medium-sized fa

who provided the raw coca for processing into cocai

with other businesses in areas under their contro

imposed revolutionary taxes on the growers, while ch

traffickers fees for the protection of landing strips, 

and processing facilities. When the heroin boom of the 

1990s hit, the insurgents benefitted from that 

Similarly, with the recent shift of coca farming from 

and Bolivia to Colombia, the potential for revenue inc

once again. Estimates of the guerrilla revenues fro

drug business go as high as $500-600 million ann

Table 1 depicts the nature of the guerrilla-

relationship via the taxes imposed by the guerrillas.

Nevertheless, the precise nature of the r

relationship with the traffickers remains the subj

heated debate. The Colombian military has patent

term “narcoguerrilla” to suggest that the insurgent

become an international drug mafia. The claim is th

guerrillas now receive the bulk of their financing fro

drug business. Other observers, however, believe 

charges are exaggerated. Some argue that the milita

a vested interest in magnifying the rebel involvem

order to lure the United States into expanding its m

involvement. They point out that the guerrillas

revenues come largely from taxation on the least pro

sector of the business—farming; that apparently few 

units are engaged in the actual cultivation of illegal 

and that there is little, if any, involvement in the s

these narcotics abroad (which is where most of the 

come from). Indeed, even some U.S. and Colo

government estimates suggest that only about 20 per

the guerrillas are providing protection for drug proc

facilities and farms. (Then again, illicit crops a

cultivated everywhere. But wherever the insurgen

present in drug-producing areas, they take advantage 

opportunity.) Recent reports that the FARC is still l

using old and improvised weapons and is increa

16
with drug money as is often claimed.

25

Beyond this, it seems clear that the relationship be

the FARC and the drug traffickers varies widely in dif

parts of the country. At the risk of oversimplificat

appears that where the guerrillas are strong, the 

tend to acquiesce to their demands for taxes and prot

money, rather than try to confront them. In contrast, 

17

Concept Quantity

Coca crops production Col $100,000 monthly 

hectare, U.S. $100

Coca leaf production Col $1,000 per kilo, U.

Coca leaf harvesting Col $500 per kilo, U.S. 

Lab security Col $50,000 per kilo of 

 base, U.S. $50

Col $100,000 per kilo, 

 cocaine, U.S. $100

Clandestine airstrip Col $18,000,000 per fli

control U.S. $18,000

Aircraft security Col $5,000,000, U.S. $5

Chemical riverine 20 percent of shipment 

transport

Poppy crop protection 40 percent of productio

Morphine production Col $4,000,000 per pro

kilo, U.S. $4,000

Poppy harvesting Col $8,000,000 per pro

kilo, U.S. $8,000

*Source: U.S. Department of State, “Narcotrafficking and G

Alliance, Colombia 1997,” www.usia.gov/abtusia/post

wwwgng97.gif

Table 1.

Narcotrafficking And Guerrilla Income, 1997
resist, supporting paramilitary forces to attac

insurgents.

26

Finally, it must be noted that the paramilitaries a

guerrillas are not the only groups with ties to the traff

The latter have penetrated all branches of govern

from the national level to the local. The case of E

Samper (in which the former president accepted 

money for his presidential campaign) may be the 

notorious instance, but it should not obscure the fac

dozens of congressmen have also accepted drug mo

return for providing political protection for the m

Similarly, countless judges have released traff

because of bribery or intimidation. Nor have m

officers been exempt from such temptations. And as 

traffickers’ economic connections, suffice it to say tha

money goes everywhere. The Colombian economy 

more dependent on narcotrafficking than, for ins

Mexico’s is.

27

None of this suggests that the traffickers contr

political system, any more than they can contr

guerrillas or the paramilitaries (which are h

monolithic in their origins or agendas). The wa

Colombian government waged and won agains

Medellín and Cali cartels suggest the conti

ambivalent relationship that the traffickers have w

these political actors. They also suggest the difficu

defeating the traffickers. Following the destruction 

giant cartels, the industry decentralized. Today, mor

is grown in Colombia than ever before, and at least as 

cocaine, and increasingly heroin, is flowing to the U

States. Which suggests that while mafias and 

henchmen may come and go, the basic problem re

unresolved.

18
Colombia’s agony deeply affects other societies

notably Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, M

and the Caribbean. The microstates of the Caribbea

especially vulnerable. In the words of the West 

Commission:

Nothing poses greater threats to the civil society . . . than t

drug problem, and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness 

regional governments more. That is the magnitude of t

damage that drug abuse and trafficking hold for o

community. It is a many-layered danger. At base is the hum

destruction implicit in drug addiction; but implicit also is t

corruption of individuals and systems by the sheer enormity 

the inducements of the illegal drug trade in relatively p

societies. On top of all of this lie the implications 

governance itself—at the hands of both external agenc

engaged in international interdiction, and the drug baro

themselves—the “dons” of the modern Caribbean—w

threaten government from within.

28

Neighboring Venezuela has a population of 3 m

Colombians, the vast majority of whom came for jobs

others are agents of corruption and violence. Accord

retired Venezuelan Air Force General Boris Saavedr

FARC operates in an area along 2,100 kilometers 

border and engages in drug trafficking, kidna

extortion, bribery, contraband, money laundering, 

rustling, and auto theft. In addition, guerrillas attac

harass Venezuelan police and military units.

29

 Venez

police and military officials have developed ext

coordination with their Colombian counterparts t

with these threats. The binational security agenda inc

fighting off the insurgents, denying them control 

border areas, checking continuing actions of drug m

associated with them, dealing with the large num

undocumented immigrants, and mitigating ra

progressive environmental degradation.

19
350,000 illegal Colombians. Some contribute to crime

as kidnapping members of the business commun

ransom. In 1995, the FARC attacked military and 

units. Ecuadoran officials are concerned th

intensification of Colombia’s internal wars, coupled 

the failure of the peace process, could create a more s

threat because the Colombian Army might be for

withdraw troops from border control missions.

3

Putumayo region, which is adjacent to Ecuador, is a 

stronghold. Ecuadorean authorities, therefore, also co

extensive coordination with their Colombian counterp

Brazil shares a long and unpopulated border 

Colombia. On November 1, 1998, 800 FARC gue

attacked the Colombian police garrison of Mitú (popu

15,000), the capital of Vaupés state, located some 20 

from the Brazilian border. Using homemade m

constructed from modified gas cylinders, they killed 

60 policemen and seized the town and airp

Government airborne reinforcements were forced t

inside Brazil, doing so without diplomatic clearanc

the government of Brazil, in order to relieve the ga

and retake the city. Though there is informal 

coordination between Colombian and Brazilian auth

on security matters, Brazil recalled its ambassado

Bogotá for consultations, a relatively timid measur

did little to secure the vast open spaces of the A

Basin. 

This is merely one aspect of the impact on B

Colombian traffickers are also developing ties 

Brazilian criminal gangs. The brutal and indiscrim

attack on Mitú, which had stunning psychological i

nationally and internationally, was preceded by s

assaults in remote areas where the guerrillas ha

operational advantage. Moreover, the vast unpop

Amazon Basin, which is shared with five coun

facilitates the movement of drugs, contraband

guerrillas. These countries have yet to work out a sys

20
security problems.

On February 7, President Alberto Fujimori of 

announced that Peru would shift military forces for

deployed along the Ecuadorian Border and build th

fields along the 1600 kilometers-long border with Col

in order to stop the FARC and the drug trafficker

using the vast open Peruvian territory. Colom

authorities welcomed this assistance from their neigh

an important step that would help remove sanctuar

the guerrillas and traffickers. Days earlier in Washi

Fujimori had publicly criticized the Colombian gover

for giving legitimacy to the FARC via concession 

demilitarized zone and the negotiation process.

Panama’s remote and jungle-covered Darién prov

a case where the government exercises laissez

authority, according to Bertha Ramona Thayer.

32

 

guerrillas and paramilitaries regularly cross over fro

Chocó-Urabá region, conduct kidnappings, de

contraband, and acquire arms and provisions to ret

Colombia. It is doubtful that Panama can restore c

over its eastern province. Drug money from Col

deeply affects Panamanian life, from money launder

prostitution, large purchases of goods in the Colón 

Zone, illicit contributions to political campaigns

small-time drug trafficking and associated crime.

Finally, Mexico is experiencing the complex proc

“colombianization.” This is defined by Raúl Be

Manaut, of the National Autonomous University of M

as:

The decisive influence on the economy of the profits made fr

cocaine sales, the penetration of the drug cartels in t

political and judicial systems, the creation of a social base 

support for the narcotrafficking, the permanent presence 

armed groups of the left in control of rural areas, and fina

the establishment of alliances between the guerrillas of 

left and the traffickers. In sum, “colombianization” is the l

21
economy, the social base of support, and the presence of arm

autonomous from the state and with great firepower.

33

Mexico is a transit area for Colombian drugs, and the

tacit alliance between trafficker organizations o

countries.

The Reconstruction of Colombia:

A Strategy for Generating Legitimate Power. 

Colombia faces an imposing set of challenge

paraphrase U.S. Ambassador Myles R. Frechette, s

these only Colombia can deal with. For others, the U

States and other countries can provide advice, spec

training, some of the material means, and interna

political support. But only Colombians can achiev

political will to make the necessary commitm

sacrifices, and reforms. The will to win is simp

exportable. A coherent national strategy is essentia

that establishes continuity and has broad political su

Strategy is the calculated relationship between end

means. The ends are political objectives which are ac

by the intelligent application of programs and reso

Ends must be prioritized, synchronized, and articula

the nation. The objectives of a national strate

Colombia are formidable: reassert control over na

territory, end the violence and corruption, and bu

effective democracy.

Any strategy must establish legitimate and respo

governmental authority over territory and popu

Legitimacy is defined as belief by the governed th

government has the right to govern. It is achieved th

participatory elections and then sustained by eff

governance. It is defended, when necessary, throug

state’s monopoly of force, but always ethically a

constrained manner. Colombia’s very divisions are 

root of the failure to achieve a national consens

strategy. What Colombia must do is daunting: it is n

22
generate sufficient legitimate power and apply it effe

to establish public security, deter the criminality, and 

the guerrillas to the peace table for serious negotiat

end the fighting and rebuild the nation.

When societies reach rock bottom during interna

there often emerges a general realization that commit

and sacrifices must be made. In recent years, Nica

Argentina, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Peru have 

through this process. At some point, the decisional 

develop the will to mobilize the ministries of gover

and generate the popular support to take on the chall

At times, the armed forces have taken the leadership i

though this is not the best way to proceed.

Caesar Sereseres, a leading authority on the l

gleaned from internal wars, suggests that the experie

other countries contain important lessons for Colom

Basing his argument on the experiences of Central Am

Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines, he note

successful cases possess similar strategic and opera

characteristics:

• Civil authority took control and, in every cas

government went to war by mobilizing itself, n

the military;

• Counterinsurgency was not cheap; vast resour

people, money, equipment, and time were requ

• The military was reformed and restructured; in 

case the army was reorganized; institutional re

were critical, and in each case special oper

forces were the cutting edge of the military eff

• A national campaign plan was developed, w

strategy to separate the guerrillas from 

population, defend the infrastructure, and att

insurgents;

23
ote ed gae, at appes ote batt

matters. If the army is not successful o

battlefield, it will affect the final result. In ever

the guerrillas had an end game. In most cases 

the government defined that game in purely m

terms, the government lost.

But Colombia is no ordinary country. There a

analogies to its three simultaneous wars, the le

corruption, institutional weaknesses, and to its form

geography. Its insurgents, paramilitaries, and 

traffickers generate their own resources; there ar

external supporters; geographic enclaves withi

country afford the guerrillas and paramilitaries pr

autonomy; and the United States exercises less lever

the strategic balance and the government than it did i

Central America. Clearly, these problems must be re

through the integrated application of all the instrum

national power. While military power is essential, it 

sufficient. Indeed, militarizing the effort may be a 

indicator of continued failure.

Most of the policy relevant academic resear

comparative lessons that might apply to Colombia 

more to do with discrete parts, such as how to w

counterinsurgency, how to conduct peace negotiation

internal power contenders, and the reform of the m

and the judicial system. There is little academic writ

how nations can be reconstructed after they begin 

apart (such as Colombia) or have failed altogethe

exception is the work of I. William Zartman. He mai

that the keys to reconstituting legitimate governmen

authority are: power, participation, resources, ex

assistance, and leadership.35

Colombia is nowhere near the failed state syndrom

the five variables shed light on the task ahead. With r

to power, the 200,000 plus armed forces and police ar

constituted. Their task is to restore public securit

governmental presence and control in the na

24
broad sectors of society, including constructive engag

by civil society, in order to legitimize the political s

being restored. Resources need to be made availab

reconstruction, to pay for the implementation of reform

the expanding personnel costs, for the expe

counterinsurgency, and the gamut of nation-bu

activities that reach the citizenry in order to r

confidence in the legitimacy of the government.

But power, participation, resources, and ex

assistance are irrelevant without the catalyst of leade

It takes leadership to mobilize the finite resources, p

ministries, and organizations to sustain the effort f

long term. Zartman sums up the challenge:

Power, participation, resources are the ingredients beh

this leadership process; unfortunately, there is no order 

priority among them to prescribe. Elementary security m

be restored, most basically through ceasefire; the natio

reconciliation must be begun, through informal negotiatio

and institutionalizing fora; resources must be secured a

mobilized. . . . All of this must be done at once and at the sa

time, and the steps kept apace of each other as the proc

moves along. It must also be done with an end in view, a

process that combines order, legitimacy, and authority w

policy, production, and extraction, rather than a series 

discrete steps taken one . . . at a time. In addition, it must 

done looking backward as well as forward, preparing t

introduction of mechanisms that will prevent the new effo

from falling back. . . . It must be done with a keen sense 

indigenous . . . ways of doing things, which can be the strong

allies of reconstruction efforts. . . . state restoration is an uph

challenge, not an automatic process. . . . It takes time. . . .

3

The United States and Colombia:

Ambiguous Warfare and Strategic Dilemmas.

Uncertain of domestic support and skeptical abo

Colombian government’s capabilities and inten

American officials are clearly anxious to draw limits o

support and involvement. The country’s ambiguous w

25
there seems to be more consensus in Washington 

threat, there are differences on the solutions, and w

the priority focus should be the counternarcotics effo

counterinsurgency, or both simultaneously. Thus, it 

surprising that Phil Chicola, the State Departm

Director of Andean Affairs, recently affirmed: “W

committed to maintaining a line between counterna

and counterinsurgency.”

37

 Similarly, Defense Sec

Cohen told his Colombian counterpart Rodrigo Llored

U.S. policy is driven by “self interest.” In the same 

Assistant Secretary of State for International Na

Matters and Legal Affairs R. Rand Beers stated th

“current consensus is to support a counternarcotics 

first.”

38 Defense Minister Lloreda concurred that Col

needs no help with the counterinsurgency.

According to Beers, the goals of U.S. counterna

policy are:

• Enhancement of the Government of Colom

intelligence capability;

• Eradication of coca, amapola, and heroin

development of alternative crops;

• Interdiction;

• Strengthening Colombian law enforcement ag

and the administration of justice.

Beers added that the policy represented a consensus w

the U.S. Government that would be placed at risk 

United States were to attempt a counterinsurgenc

Chicola stated that the policy is one of enh

engagement, with counternarcotics as the center

supplemented by support for the peace process wi

insurgents, human rights, humanitarian relie

assistance, support for economic reforms, investment

environmental concerns. 

26
depends on how it balances the effort to reduce supply 

countries of origin with the reduction of demand at 

Because it is the major consumer of illegal drugs, the U

States accepts co-responsibility for the pro

Accordingly, the 1999 National Drug Control Strateg

its annual predecessors) provides a comprehe

approach to stem domestic use, such as: greater 

education, reducing the number of addicts, drug te

treatment of prisoners, and securing the borders 

United States against drugs. Of course, demand red

is a long-term generational effort.

There is agreement between Bogotá and o

Washington that the primary threat is drugs, though 

analysts believe that the guerrillas are the greater d

Yet, the guerrillas challenge, if not supplant, governm

legitimacy, authority, and presence in large sections 

countryside. In short, the guerrillas feed o

government’s military and institutional debilities to s

war for the long term. Unless Colombia bring

insurgents to a negotiated end of the war, it may sin

the abyss of civil war. President Pastrana appa

believes that the guerrillas are a potential ally in th

against the narcos. On January 5, 1999, he stated th

“first enemy of peace is narcotrafficking. If the FARC 

the decision to eradicate drug crops, they’ll do it. Be

they definitely have the influence to carry it out.

added, however: “First they must denarcotize thems

This is part of the rationale for the peace negotiation

were scheduled to begin January 7, 1999. The U

States, it should be reiterated, is encouraging the 

process. At the same time, one must question wheth

FARC is truly the champion of the people’s cause 

continue to contribute to the downfall of Colomb

toleration and protection of the drug traffickers and 

infrastructure of corruption and violence.

The trouble is that American reticence to get 

deeply involved is well-founded. It is based on 

27
beset with internal war, fueled in part by high lev

corruption. El Salvador, a relative success story fo

policy and with no combat assistance from U.S. m

forces, fought the insurgents to a negotiated peace. 

had a steep strategic learning curve. With Am

prodding and cajoling and the prudent applicat

significant leverage, El Salvador mobilized some po

will and augmented its institutional capac

Importantly, it made necessary fundamental po

economic, and social reforms, restructured its armed 

and changed its military strategy to deal wit

insurgents. Ultimately it went to the negotiating ta

the very twilight of the Cold War, when the S

Cuban-Sandinista support system came to an end.

But the learning process was messy and never 

often involving considerable backsliding on the part 

ally in the field, notably in the area of human rights a

constrained use of force. Twelve years of strateg

operational learning were required before El Salv

military and police forces could sway the tide again

guerrilla Farabundo Martí National Liberation Fr

period which led to a huge human and material toll 

Salvadoran people but which, in the end, force

guerrillas to agree to peace talks which ultim

succeeded. But El Salvador did not face the aw

menace of drug money feeding corruption, violence, a

guerrillas.

Thus, American caution on Colombia is understa

and prudent. The Colombian government has stated 

does not want U.S. counterinsurgency support. 

Colombia needs, just like El Salvador did, is eff

pressure to restructure and retrain its armed f

Nonetheless, counternarcotics aid is a signi

commitment that comes close to crossin

counterinsurgency line. The United States may h

cross the line, not with troops in active combat, bu

training and equipment support for the military and 

28
allow the Colombian government to be success

combating the guerrillas and drug traffickers, 

control of its national territory, and thus end human 

abuses, including those committed by the armed forc

guerrillas, and the paramilitaries.

 Under these circumstances, the United State

Congress will expect Colombians to make the sac

required to succeed, and they will not support an unj

unwinnable war. But how are we to determine justn

this kind of ambiguous warfare? Americans do so 

basis of the legitimacy granted to the government th

democratic elections, and the rejection of illegal me

the use of force, whether on the part of the insurgen

paramilitaries, or rogues in the military. Support w

be premised on the expectation that the governm

Colombia will engage in a serious effort at winning a

national reconstruction. Accordingly, it must app

legitimate authority and power effectively to r

territorial control and literally win “the hearts and m

the people.” While many Colombian leaders recogniz

need, the institutional and societal commitment has 

be made. It may be that society will have to reach a 

threshold of pain before decisive action is taken.

Recovering the Legitimate Use of Force:

Clausewitz and Colombia.

The Commanding General of the Colombian A

Forces, Fernando Tapias, asserted: “Unless the 

recovers the legitimate use of force the country coul

sink into civil war.”

40 The legitimate authority to 

recourse to force should reside in the state. The insu

and paramilitaries advance the principle that might 

right. Moreover, they conduct violence that negat

principles of just war by targeting noncombatants a

using means proscribed by international humanitaria

The legitimate authority of the state to use the mono

29
morally.

Three of Clausewitz’s principles are especially use

Colombia’s strategic purposes: the center of gr

knowing what kind of war you are engaged in, an

“remarkable trinity” of the people, armed forces

government. The center of gravity for the governmen

legitimacy: regaining the support of the people

Colombian Army probably has been involved in 

counterinsurgency warfare than any army in the wor

the fact remains that it has not been able to defeat the 

and ELN and is currently performing badly. It will r

extraordinary effort to wear down the guerrillas be

counterinsurgency is indeed expensive in terms of 

resources, political endurance, and individua

institutional sacrifices.

At 146,300 troops, the armed forces may not be 

enough, given the size and terrain of the na

territory.

41

 Conventional wisdom holds that a succ

counter- insurgency requires a ratio of 10 soldier

guerrilla, though this is seldom achieved in the real 

Currently, only about 30,000 of Colombia’s troops are 

used for active military operations against the guer

Even if the army were to achieve the 10 to 1 force r

might still not be enough to “saturate” the country, 

the words of former Defense Minister Rafael Pardo. U

effectively trained, organized, and deployed, it might 

create more lucrative targets for the guerrillas.

42 T

ratio can be somewhat compensated for by the use o

multipliers, such as greater mobility and b

intelligence. However, in the fall of 1998 the m

utilized only 20 helicopters, though it had access to ov

more. In contrast, El Salvador had 60 helicopter

60,000 troops in a territory 1/50 the size of Colombi

military needs major improvements in intelli

collection, evaluation, and dissemination; close qu

combat, small unit operations, logistics administratio

30
humanitarian operations, and human rights.

However tentatively, Colombia and the United 

are deepening their relationship. Yet, it is uncertain h

this can go. The United States must communicate forc

to the Colombians that they must make fundam

changes based on proven principles for this k

ambiguous warfare. This includes: respect for human 

and justice; adapting the army to aggressive sma

operations by enhancing intelligence, mobility and 

reaction capabilities; and improved relations wit

civilian population. Such professional training is ava

from U.S. Army Special Forces, as well as those of the 

and Air Force.

43

 The difficulties of getting such tr

through the U.S. political process would diminish 

Colombian government and the public security 

demonstrated that they can win the wars while resp

human rights.

 These institutional improvements must be accomp

by careful cultivation of Clausewitz’s “remarkable tr

To be successful in war, the government, military

people must have a trinitarian relationship of m

support and cooperation. This relationship is the esse

the American military tradition. It originates 

principles of democratic civil-military relations and c

control of the military that were written int

Constitution by the founding fathers. Trinitarian st

dominates the American approach to planning for w

The absence of such a relationship is another indic

Colombia’s debility. Commenting on the weakn

civil-military relations, the respected former presid

candidate and Central Bank board member, 

Mercedes Cuellar, commented that Colombia’s instit

operate as isolated “castes” hermetically sealed from 

other in defending their unique institutional inter

Regarding military service, for example, high 

graduates (some 35,000 bachilleres serving in the mi

31
college deferments during America’s debacle with a 

war” in Vietnam.) Moreover, one can buy freedom 

military service. Thus, peasant soldiers fight a

peasant guerrillas, while the middle and upper class

spared the nastiness of war. Clearly, the sacrifices for 

the armed power of the state to fight the traff

paramilitaries, and insurgents need to be borne 

equitably. Until all sectors of society share the bur

war, they are likely to undervalue their stake in th

game. It will take time—perhaps even a generati

inculcate such changes. But unless these commitmen

fundamental reforms are made, the three war

continue indefinitely.

Difficult as it sounds, the war must be humanized

does not mean putting down weapons, however. Rathe

the creation of a more professional military 

restructured and retrained, which would be able to ta

offensive against guerrillas on the battlefield, thus 

them an incentive to negotiate seriously at the barg

table. But turning the military institution around 

time, an asset that is diminishing for the govern

Nonetheless, the outcome could be more humane in th

of limiting casualties, respecting the human rights o

combatants and noncombatants, and bringing the c

to an earlier (rather than later) conclusion.

45

 The U

States has a lot of experience in teaching its military 

and those of other nations how to fight according 

humane considerations of the laws of armed conflict. I

help train Colombian forces in order to inculcate 

values in their operations. This would be a powerful l

justifying to the American public and Congress appro

levels of security assistance, which might be forthc

only if Colombia wages war through just means (

bello). Along these same lines, the United States also 

to jettison its outmoded prohibition of police tr

assistance to Latin America.

46

Imparting the b

32
powerful force multiplier for democracy.

Returning to General Tapias’s formulation, Col

has the choice of generating legitimate power in or

pursue peace and reconciliation or attempting to i

order through the use of illegitimate power. The 

course may bring about civil war, while the former enh

the chances for peace. The broad alternative

summarized below:

GENERATING STATE POWER

Legitimate Illegitimate

Inclusive democratic governance Exclusive or “facade”

democracy

Respect for human rights Human rights violatio

Accountability and impartial justice Injustice and impunit

Civilian control of the military Lack of control

Rules of engagement controlled by Autonomous and illeg

president as commander-in-chief operations

Constrained use of force Arbitrary and

disproportionate use

Respect for humanitarian considera- Massacres, extrajudic

tions in military operation abuse and killings

Discrimination between combatants Indiscriminate attack

and noncombatants

Effective public information program Secretiveness and

at home and abroad incompetence

Agrarian reform and rural Abandonment of peas

development and rural areas

Colombian national effort Dependence on extern

Burdensharing by all sectors of Sacrifices made only b

society poor

The fact that the Army will establish an air m

counternarcotics battalion is a critical step forward f

reasons. First, it shows greater commitment b

government to pursue drug trafficking. Second, by l

the unit’s establishment with U.S. counternar

33
professionalism that will have to adhere to U.S. h

rights law in order to receive U.S. support. (The 

Amendment to the 1996 international affairs b

proscribes assistance to: “Any unit . . . if the Secret

State has credible evidence to believe such un

committed gross violations of human rights unle

Secretary determines and reports to the Commit

Appropriations that the Government of such coun

taking steps to bring the responsible members 

security forces unit to justice.”) It remains to be see

this new battalion will operate with the police, wh

mission will be, how it will be subordinated to comman

control, and what its rules of engagement will be

ultimately, if it will make a difference. Nonetheles

training and experience of an operationally eff

counternarcotics battalion may have a positive p

sionalizing impact on the military while strengtheni

support to the police if Colombia is to avoid becom

“failed state,” at war with itself and the region.

 Colombia must also reconstruct its battered ju

system, where a mere 3 percent of those indicte

currently convicted. The issue of land distribution, a 

source of peasant discontent and fertile ground for gu

recruiting, must also be addressed. Here a promising 

would be redistributing land now in the han

narcotraffickers to peasants. This can also be a sou

bargaining leverage in the peace negotiations wit

insurgents, in addition to alternative crops, 

infrastructure projects, and marketing schemes. In 

Colombia must maintain the moral high grou

legitimacy in order to win the support of its own peo

well as of the United States and other nations (esp

the Europeans). But it should not continue to ma

mistake of putting its armed forces and police out 

without an effective national strategy that engag

efforts of all the ministries of government and all clas

society. The Pastrana administration is committed to 

34
improved institutional capabilities, combined with su

professional performance on the battlefield, it can cr

more promising environment for peace negotiations.

The Peace Negotiations Process.

On January 7, 1999, President Pastrana made g

his promise to begin peace negotiations with the FAR

that day he met with guerrilla leaders (excep

68-year-old Manuel Marulanda, “Tirofijo") in San V

del Caguán, in the demilitarized zone (despeje). 

negotiations are fundamental for national reconci

and further legitimize the reconstruction of state p

The first round of meetings was intended to test wheth

political climate was conducive for putting subst

issues on the agenda. The process may take years be

yields positive results.

For the peace process to be successful, it needs 

accomplished by Colombians, who can take advantage 

advice, experiences, and support of other nations. It 

include insurgents as well as the paramilitaries. (Wh

the latter can be brought in as a formally reco

political force or will have to remain as uno

participants will have to be worked out durin

negotiations.) The armed forces must also be giv

important role. To fortify the legitimacy of the ju

system, the issue of impunity must be faced head on. 

can be no impunity for the drug traffickers. The is

legal impunity for the insurgents and paramilitaries

of whom have much blood on their hands, is a more co

question. Complete justice in a deeply torn soci

impossible to achieve, and is potentially too divisive f

future of democracy. Numerous recent experiences a

the globe, from Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, El Sal

Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti, and South Africa 

reunification of West and East Germany, point to v

forms of compromise for the greater good of a pe

35
determination of how far to go in punishing the guilt

experience of other nations indicates that the h

process takes time. Thus, it will be imperativ

Colombians to strike a balance between what cons

sufficient punishment for the guilty and the need to m

to reconstruct the nation.

The FARC, as well as the ELN, claim to have an a

for social justice at the negotiating table, including ag

reform, income redistribution (in Colombia, the 

percent earn more than 30 times that earned by the b

5 percent), an end to fumigation intended to eradicat

plants, and economic development aid for neglected a

the country.47 They also want security for their peopl

they put down their arms, fearing that unarmed they 

killed, as happened to former members of the M-19

may also want political power, but would have to co

for it within the bounded uncertainty of democra

exchange, they would help get rid of drug traffickin

United States supports the peace negotiations and 

that if they develop a momentum of their own, the

eventually persuade enough fighters now outsid

political process to reinsert themselves as prod

members of society. The United States also insists th

FARC cut the umbilical cord to the drug bus

something that would appear hard to do given the luc

income the guerrillas receive from it. Indeed, the insu

may be so corrupted by their involvement in the 

system” as to be unwilling to pursue the best agenda 

Colombian people: peace, democracy, and just

democracy and justice were truly to come abou

guerrillas would cease to exist. Military power rathe

ideology appears to be the basis of their influenc

continued existence.

48

36
Colombia and the United States are at a str

crossroads. The directions they take will help dete

whether the principles of democracy and human d

survive in Colombia, and whether this major thr

regional security thrives and infects other societies 

corruption and violence. This essay has set 

frameworks and strategic directions that should info

debate on what is to be done. The responsibility lies w

people of Colombia to reconstruct their nation. The U

States, the crucial outside actor, has indispen

experience, resources and political clout. The jud

application of principles that have worked in the p

other settings, including legitimate power, demo

participation, the commitment and resources o

populace, focused and restrained external assistanc

creative and sustained leadership, are the keys. The

be no turning back if Colombia is to avoid becoming a 

state,” at war with itself and the region.

ENDNOTES

1. Michael Shifter, “Policy Brief: Colombia’s Security Predi

and Opportunities for Peace,” Washington: Inter-American D

1998, p. 3.

2. James, Latin America, 4th edition, New York: Odyssey, 

426.

3. Richani, “The Political Economy of Violence: The War Sy

Colombia,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 

No. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 37-82; and “The Political Economy of 

War: Extraction and the Crisis of the War System in Colombia

presented at the conference “Landpower and Ambiguous Warfa

Challenge of Colombia in the 21st Century,” U.S. Army War C

Carlisle, PA, December 10-11, 1998; hereafter cited as U

Colombia conference.

4. Statistics derived from Ambassador Myles R. Frechett

Challenge to Democracy, Regional Security and the United Stat

Ambassador David Passage, “Untying the Gordian Knot: 

37
at the USAWC Colombia conference.

5. Frechette, “The Challenge to Democracy,” pp. 6-7.

6. Thomas J. Umberg and Allison Major, “The Challe

Colombia and Our National Drug Control Strategy,” paper prese

the USAWC Colombia conference.

7. Gallón, “The Threat to Human Rights in Colombia,

presented at the USAWC Colombia conference, p. 12.

8. Noemí Sanín, “A Democracy Without People,” paper prep

the USAWC Colombia conference, p. 4.

9. Sanín, p. 4.

10. Ibid., pp, 4-5.

11. Edmundo Jarquín and Fernando Carrillo, Justice D

Judicial Reform in the Americas, Washington: Inter-Am

Development Bank, 1998, p. 11.

12. For an excellent analysis of corruption and its relation

drugs, see Francisco Thoumi, “Corruption and Drug-Traf

General Considerations and References to Colombia,” paper pr

at the USAWC Colombia conference.

13. “Colombia Leads in Kidnapings With 1,678 This Year,” 

Herald, December 25, 1998; www.herald.com/americas/d

067395.htm.

14. See also the comprehensive and balanced reporting by 

Rights Watch, War Without Quarter: Colombia and Intern

Humanitarian Law, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998.

15. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human 

Practices for 1996 and 1997, Submitted to Committee on 

Relations, U.S. Senate, and the Committee on International R

of the U.S. House of Representatives, February 1997, pp. 389-3

February 1998, pp. 451-465, and February 1999, www.state.go

global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/colombia.html.

16. Frechette, “The Challenge to Democracy,” p. 3.

17. Others estimate less. See Richani, “The Political Econ

Civil War.”

38
y Esperanzas, Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 1996, p. 497.

19. Human Rights Watch, War Without Quarter.

20. García-Peña, “Negotiating With Multiple, Possibly 

patible Armed Organizations: Is Peace Possible?,” presentation m

the USAWC Colombia conference.

21. Spencer, “Colombia’s Paramilitaries: Criminals or P

Force?,” paper presented at the USAWC Colombia conference.

22. Marc Chernick, “Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple F

Violence: The Protracted Search for Settlement to the Armed C

in Colombia,” in Cynthia Arnson, ed., Comparative Peace Proc

Latin America, Stanford University Press, forthcoming.

23. Alejandro Reyes, “Compra de tierras por narcotrafican

Francisco Thoumi, et. al., Drogas ilícitas en Colombia, Bogotá

Naciones Unidas-PNUD, Ministerio de Justicia, Dirección Naci

Estupefacientes, 1997, pp. 270-346.

24. Chernick, “Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple Forms.”

25. Diana Jean Schemo, “Congress Steps Up Aid for Colom

Combat Drugs,” New York Times, December 1, 1998; Todd Rob

“Experts Question Strength of Colombian Rebel Group,” 

Morning News, January 11, 1999.

26. George Vickers, Washington Office on Latin America, 

correspondence with authors, January 6, 1999.

27. Francisco E. Thoumi, “Some Implications of the Growt

Underground Economy in Colombia,” Journal of Interamerican 

and World Affairs, Vol. 29, Summer 1986, p. 42; Maria Celia To

Political Repercussions of Drug Trafficking in Mexico,” in El

Joyce and Carlos Malamud, eds., Latin America and the Multin

Drug Trade, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. 137.

28. Cited in Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Drugs in the Car

Sovereignty Under Siege, State College: Pennsylvania State Un

Press, 1997, p. 1.

29. Saavedra, “Venezuelan Perspective of the Colombian 

paper presented at the USAWC Colombia conference.

39
Security: An Ecuadorian Perspective,” paper presented at the U

Colombia conference.

31. Associated Press, “Colombia Rebels Attack Remote 

Garrison,” Miami Herald, November 2, 1998.

32. Thayer, “Colombia and Regional Security: A Pana

Perspective,” paper presented at the USAWC conference. S

“Afirma Monseñor: Peligra Entrega del Canal a Panamenos,” La 

(Panama), January 29, 1999; www.sinfo.net/prensa/hoy/nacion

33. Benítez, “Mexico-Colombia: Problemas Estratégico

Relación Bilateral a Fin del Siglo,” paper presented at the U

Colombia conference.

34. Sereseres, “Applying the Lessons of the Past to Col

presentation made at the USAWC Colombia conference.

35. Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Res

of Legitimate Authority, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995.

36. Zartman, p. 273.

37. Chicola, “United States Policy Towards Colombia,” prese

made at the USAWC Colombia conference.

38. Beers and Thomas Umberg, “U.S. Counterdrug Stra

Colombia,” joint presentation made at the USAWC Co

conference.

39. Pastrana, cited in Diana Jean Schemo, “Bogotá Sees Dr

as Path to Peace,” New York Times, January 6, 1999; nytim

library/wor10699colombia-pastrana-rebels.html.

40. Tapias, “Colombia’s Military Strategy,” presentation m

the USAWC Colombia conference.

41. For this perspective, see David Spencer, “Bogotá Conti

Bleed as FARC Find Their Feet,” Janes Intelligence Review, No

1998, Vol. 10, No. 11, p. 39. See also, Douglas Farah, “Colombia

Fighting Legacy of Abuses,” Washington Post, February 18, 1

A15. Farah cites unnamed U.S. officials: “It will take at 

generation to turn the armed forces around.”

42. Passage, “Untying the Gordian Knot,” p. 3.

40
44. Cuellar, comments made at the “Houston Project Confer

Civil-Military Relations,” Cartagena, Colombia, August 25-28, 

45. This is not a view shared by some analysts, who arg

expanding military capabilities would simply create more blo

See, for example, Gallón, “The Threat to Human Rights in Colo

46. Passage, “Untying the Gordian Knot,” p. 2.

47. Tim Johnson, “Rebels Might Be Willing to Switch Side

Drug War,” Heraldlink, Miami Herald, January 8, 1999; S

“Bogotá Sees Drug War as Path to Peace.”

48. On the seeming contradiction between power and i

within the FARC, see Serge F. Kovaleski, “Rebel Movement on t

Colombian Guerrillas Use Military Force, Not Ideology to Hold 

Washington Post, February 5, 1999, p. A27.

41
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

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