1 Filed 7/29/14 In re E.A. CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re E.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. E.A., Defendant and Appellant. A138988 (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. C-182345)

I NTRODUCTION Defendant E.A., a minor, appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional orders terminating his dependency st atus and declaring him a ward of the court. Defendant contends that the juvenile court erred by de claring him a ward of the court and violated his constitutional and statutory rights to du e process by holding a jurisdictional hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 600 before ordering an assessment pursuant to section 241.1. As explained below, we reject these contentions of error. However, defendant also contends his maximu m custody exposure sh ould be reduced by six months, and the Attorney General concurs, as do we. Accordingly, we direct the

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further unspe cified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.2 juvenile court to amend the dispositional orde r to reflect a maximum time of confinement of three years, and otherwise affirm.
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND A. Dependency Proceedings By the time defendant was adjudged a ward of the court at 14 years old in May 2013, defendant and his family had expe rienced a long history of contact and
involvement with child welfare services. Defendant’s mother (mother) is the single parent of six children and ha s developmental disabilities and limitations. All the children have varying degrees of l earning disabilities, developmen tal disabilities and serious
behavioral issues. Defendant and his sib lings were raised in a very chaotic home environment, witnessing numerous episodes of domestic violence, as well as other acts of violence within the neighbor hood. Mother has been involved with Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) since 2001 , with 31 referrals and a case history for issues related to physical abuse and genera l neglect of all six of her children. Defendant has been the subject of th ree dependency procee dings, the first of which was instigated in May 20 01 when he was two years ol d. In August 2009, when defendant was 10 years old, the Agency filed the third section 300 de pendency petition relating to defendant’s family, alleging as to defendant and his older brother C.H. (age 12) that mother was “unable and unwilling to provide the necessary care, support and supervision, . . . due to [their] extensive be havioral and mental health issues/needs” and had signed a voluntarily re linquishment of custody for both minors. The Agency’s detention report dated August 18, 2009, st ates “the minors have been exhibiting dangerous behaviors. They had been picked up by the Oakland Police Department twice during the previous week for being out past curfew and causing trouble in the family home and within the surrounding neighborhood. . . . The ch ildren reportedly have been stealing; hustling in the neighborhood, and now the mother is faci ng eviction due to the
children’s behaviors and harassment of other people living in the complex. [Mother]3 stated that Child Protective Services ‘needed to come out and pick up her kids immediately.’ It appeared that [mother] was at the end of her rope and was not able to
control the children.”
In an interview with the social worker, mother stated the minors (defendant and C.H.) have always had behavi oral problems, but they had worsened in the past six months. Recently, they do not listen to her at all and had been intimidating towards her
and the other children. Mother stated the minors are destru ctive in the home and in the community; they have broken windows, destroyed property, stolen from family and neighbors and the police confiscated a pelle t gun from them. The minors “hang out until
well after dark . . . with older teens and adu lts in the area,” and mother fears they are involved in gang and/or illegal activities. Mother is aware the minors “are scamming people for money,” for example by collectin g “donations” for a nonexistent basketball team, and then spending the money on clothe s and electronics. Mother is concerned about “the dangerous people th e boys associate with and she fears they could be harmed intentionally or unintentionally.”
The social worker also ta lked to defendant and C.H. in the course of transporting
them from home to the assessme nt center. The minors were so agitated the social worker thought they were unde r the influence of a stimulant. They presented as chaotic and impulsive, used profanity to complain about the situation and “brag about their street credibility. They showed absolutely no fear or respec t for authority and it seems clear that they are used to doing whatever they want.” The minors bragged to the social worker that they have numerous “uncles” an d “brothers” who are not blood related, and claimed they had possessed firearms before. The social worker opin ed the minors “have a lot of knowledge of what goes on in the streets and it seems they are already involved in dangerous and probably illega l activities.” For example, they “admitted to ‘scamming’ people for money by soliciting donations for a fake basketball team.”4 At the detention hearing held on A ugust 18, 2009, the court designated defendant’s appointed counsel as his guardian ad litem and ordered him detained for placement in a suitable family home or private institution. On August 20, 2009, the court authorized the administration of psychotrop ic medications to defendant on the treating physician’s preliminary diagnosis of intermitte nt explosive disorder and bipolar disorder, manic type. The jurisdiction/disposition report related that defendant had been transferred from a psychiatric unit where he ha d been held pursuant to section 5150 at
Lincoln Child Center in Oakl and (the Center), where he wa s “doing relatively well” and appeared to be “moving in a positive direc tion in terms of . . . behavior.” At an uncontested disposition hearin g held on September 1, 20 09, the court established dependency and ordered ou t-of-home placement. The Agency’s status review report of Febr uary 2010 related defendant was still at
the Center. Mother had mainta ined regular telephone contact with defendant and visited him at the Center on a weekly basis. De fendant had “shown some improvement and is learning to work out his dile mmas.” He has been diagnos ed with mood disorder and disruptive behavior disorder. Defendant’s assigned psychiat rist placed defendant on a drug regime of Risperdone, Cogentin and Se roquel in prescribed dosages. Defendant reports he wants to return hom e as soon as possible, but know s he needs to continue to work on his behavior. According to the Center staff, defendant is engaged with staff and peers, but “takes offense when he is challenged by author ity.” Following the status review hearing held on February 19, 2010, th e court continued defendant in placement. The Agency filed a 12-month status review report on July 26, 2010, recommending defendant continue in placement. The report notes defendant is enrolled in sixth grade at Lincoln Child Center School, but has a difficult time managing his behavior in class. According to his ther apist at the Center, defendant manages his
behavior at times and at other times he is co mpletely out of control. At times, defendant appears unable to control his temper, making hi m aggressive, volatile and disrespectful.5 He has received numerous incident reports on account of his behavior. Mother has
maintained contact with defe ndant and his older brother, a nd they have had overnight visits and occasional day vis its. Defendant woul d like to return ho me, but needs to engage in ongoing therapy and medication mana gement in order to manage his behavior appropriately. Following the status review hearing on August 19, 2010, the court continued defendant as a dependent with the permanent plan of placement at the Center and the specific goal of returning home. In January 2011, th e Agency submitted an ex parte ap plication for defendant to go
home on a two-week exte nded visit with his mo ther on a trial placement. Defendant had expressed frustration over never returning hom e and his behavior was regressing. The Center staff, defendant’s therapist and soci al worker agreed an extended home visit would give defendant hope of returning home and help stabilize his behavior. On February 4, 2011, the court continued the mi nor as a dependent, and placed him at home with his mother with family maintenance services. On June 21, 2011, the Agency filed a supplemental petition pursuant to section 387, alleging mother is unable to mana ge defendant’s “acting out” behaviors, due to his severe emotional instability and her ow n developmental delays. Specifically, the section 387 petition alleged mother was unwilli ng or unable to ensure defendant takes his medications; and defendant is becoming incr easingly aggressive, which places his own safety and the safety of others at risk. Th e detention report states defendant was removed
from his mother’s home and taken to the asse ssment center on June 9, 2011. He was placed at Refuge Group Home (Refuge) on J une 11 and shortly ther eafter went absent without leave (AWOL). The Refuge case ma nager reports defendant comes and goes during the day, sometimes attends school, and us ually sleeps at a friend’s home or at his mother’s home. The social worker expr essed concern defendant was not taking his
medications while AWOL.6 The Agency requested a c ontinuance of the jurisdic tion/disposition hearing in order to assess defendant’s stability and the option of placement with mother. In an addendum report dated August 16, 2011, the so cial worker stated defendant continually goes AWOL from his placement at Refuge; on July 29, 2011, defendant was taken for a psychiatric evaluation after thr eatening another minor at Refu ge, was later discharged and continued on his medication, Seroquel, w ith a diagnosis of in termittent explosive disorder. In a second addendum report f iled on October 14, 2011, the Agency changed its recommendation to a planned permanent living arrangement for the minor. The Agency reported defendant ha s been AWOL on overnights fro m his placement at Refuge, and had been staying at his mother’s home or elsewhere in the community; he attended
school at Seneca Center in San Leandr o, where he attended group therapy and participates, albeit “in negative ways.” Th e staff at Refuge recommended stabilizing defendant in his placement “to avoi d a higher level of care.” In a third addendum report filed on No vember 23, 2011, th e Agency reported
defendant was admitted to the emergency room at Children’s Hospital in Oakland with two gunshot wounds to the abdomen on November 6, 2011 and discharged on November 16, 2011 after recovering from emer gency surgery. Regarding placement, the Agency’s goal was to place defendant with a nonrelativ e extended family member (NREFM), a former foster parent who had as ked for the placement. Defendant was not attending school on a regular basis, was at second or third grade level for language arts, and was often only in class for a short time before leaving for the crisis room. On November 28, 2011, the court sustained the a llegations of the section 387 supplemental petition, continued defenda nt as a dependent, set aside the order placing him in mother’s home, and ordered de fendant to be placed with th e NREFM and the Agency to investigate a possible level 14 placement. In an interim review report filed on Dece mber 23, 2011, the so cial worker stated defendant has been in placemen t with the NREFM since November 23, is recovering well7 from his gunshot wounds, and has not spoken about running away. The caregiver reports defendant is doing well in the home, and she is currently trying to en roll him in school in Tracy. However, in a subsequent status review report filed on April 30, 2012, the social worker reported the NREFM re linquished care of defendant due to his behaviors and refusal to attend school on a regular basis. Thereafter, defendant spent 72 hours at
Willow Rock on a secti on 5150 hold, before he was pla ced at Hawk’s Place Group Home (Hawk’s Place), in Contra Costa County on February 6, 2012. Defendant stated he liked living at Hawk’s Place, but wa s concerned he was too far away from Oakland, where his mother and siblings lives. Hawk’s Place di rector reported defendant “is a pleasure to have around,” had adjusted we ll to the group home, and bene fited from the positive role modeling provided by the young men at the home who were attending school and going to college. On May 9, 2012, the court co ntinued defendant as a dependent with the permanent plan of placement at Hawk’s Plac e and a specific goal of independent living with the aid of a caring adult. In the status review report filed on Oc tober 26, 2012, the so cial worker reported Hawk’s Place closed abruptly due to a licensing infraction an d defendant was placed at Creative Alternatives Group Home (CAGH) in Merced on October 13, 2012. However,
defendant went AWOL while retu rning to CAGH after a visit w ith his family in Oakland; he exhibited signs of a panic attack in the car and after CAGH staff pulled over to the side of the freeway, defendant jumped out of the car and ran off. A protective custody warrant was filed on October 22, 2012. Also , defendant stopped taking Seroquel because he did not like the way it made him feel; he rejected a medication evaluation and asserted
he does not need medication. The social wo rker stated defendant has not exhibited any behavior requiring medication and a medication evaluation is not necessa ry at this time. Defendant appeared for the status review hearing held on November 7, 2012, and the court recalled the protective custody warrant. The court ordered defendant placed in the8 Westwind Foster Family Agency home of Bria n and Pearlina Gaither with a specific goal of legal guardianship. That plan soon fell apart. In a status review report filed on April 19, 2013, the social worker reported defendant was curren tly AWOL again. Defendant was placed with the Gaithers on November 1, 2012. On December 6, 2012, the social worker received a call from Mrs. Gaither requesti ng a meeting because defendant was being defiant, disrespectful to her and refused to do his chores. He also re fused to comply with his curfew and stayed out overnight without permission. Defendant went AWOL from the Gaithers’ home on December 14, 2012. On January 18, 2014, his mother reported he had returned to her home; and he was no w staying with moth er without Agency recommendation or approval. The social worker opined defenda nt had “been on a downward spiral” since Hawk’s Place closed in October 2012. The social worker reported that defendant had become defiant to most adults in his life, refused to attend school, and was hanging out in the streets. Mother allowed him to stay in her home because she did not want him on the streets, however, she did not set firm limits on his
behavior and conduct. The social worker ex pressed she is “at a lo ss on what to do with [defendant] so he will remain safe, attend school , and follow the rules of his placement.” On April 23, 2013, defenda nt’s court-appointed special advocate (CASA) filed an addendum report stating a team decision meeting (TDM) had taken place regarding defendant’s placement. Everyon e at the TDM agreed the best placement for defendant is at Cedar’s Place in Hercules, a facility ope rated by the director of the now defunct Hawk’s Place group home, a prior placement where defendant had made progress. B. Wardship Proceedings On April 24, 2013, the District Attorney of Alameda County (DA) filed a delinquency petition pursuant to section 602, subdivision (a). 2 The petition alleged

2 This was not defendant’s first section 60 2 petition. On March 10, 2010, just after the six-month review point in the section 300 proceeding described above, the DA’s9 defendant (age 14) committed residential burg lary, in violation of Penal Code sections 459 and 460, subdivision (a) (count one), an d possessed a projectile firearm, a replica BB gun resembling a .45-caliber semiautomatic handgun, a misdemeanor in violation of Oakland Municipal Code section 9.36. 130, subdivision (A) (count two). Regarding the burglary charge, the Oakl and police report related that on April 23, 2013, at approximately 11:20 a.m., an afte r school coordinator received a phone call reporting someone was breaking into a reside nce on 7th Street. Security officers responded to the scene. A security officer saw defendant jumping over the back fence of

office filed a wardship petition pursuant to section 602 allegi ng two counts of felony assault (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) a nd one count of felony battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)), arising from defendant’s assa ult on two of the Center staff members. The probation officer’s intake /jurisdiction report states st aff member Yen Luv tried to stop defendant from climbing onto the roof of a shed to join his 11 -year-old and 12-yearold friends and defendant punched her in the chest and ki cked her in the legs. After defendant joined his friends on the roof, anot her staff member, Valerie Labanca, came to assist Luv. One of the boys threw a three and one-half foot stick, which hit Labanca in her right eye and caused bleeding. Police officers subsequently arrived, ordered defendant and his friends off the roof and took them into custody. The report also notes that since being placed at the Center, defe ndant had incurred 53 do cumented incident reports for inappropriate behavior. At a hearing held on May 12, 2010, th e DA dismissed the felony charges with restitution open and defendant admitted one count of misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code § 242) pursuant to an amended petition. The court ordered pr obation to prepare a section 241.1 report. In their section 241.1 report, the Agency and the probation department recommended that the court con tinue defendant as a section 300 dependent because he “does not have a le ngthy history with prob ation, he is in a stable environment [at the Center] where the program is willing to co ntinue to work with him on his issues.” At a hearing held on July 14, 2010, the court continue d defendant’s dependency and placed him on probation without wardship pursuant to secti on 725, subdivision (a). In a December 2010 progress report, the probation officer noted defendant had not complied with conditions of probation requiring that he pay $25 in restitution and complete an apology letter to the victim. However, the probation officer recommended that if defendant appeared at the hearing with a copy of th e apology letter, the restitution fine should be set aside a nd the entire matter dismissed. At a hearing held on December 8, 2010, defendant ap peared by counsel and submitted a letter of apology. The court set aside the restitution fine and dismissed the matter.10 the residence in question, and detained him. An Oakland police officer examined the
victim’s residence. The rear door had substantial pry mark s around the door knobs and the inside of the door frame was severely da maged. The perpetrator(s) had conducted “a messy search” of upstairs bedrooms, and tw o screwdrivers found on one of the beds appeared to have been used to pry open the rear door. In regard to the misdemeanor weapons ch arge, the BART police report related that at 9:23 p.m., on March 28, 2 013, BART police officers we re in the area around the MacArthur BART station on the report of two African-American juveniles, one of whom appeared to be carrying a concealed weapon . The officers contacted defendant and
another minor at the scene. The officers f ound a BB gun (a replica of a Colt .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol) in defendant’s front wais tband after one of the officers approached
defendant with his service weapon unholstered and pointed at the ground. Defendant appeared in detention at a h earing held April 25, 2013, represented by the public defender; dependency counsel was al so present. The court recalled the warrant and defense counsel requested that the matter be “put over to May 1st for a pretrial and May 14th for a jurisdictional hearing.” The court granted counsel’s request and ordered
defendant detained under the care of the probation departme nt. At the May 1 hearing,
defense counsel advised the cour t defendant wished to admit to second degree burglary, with restitution open. The court stated de fendant’s maximum exposure was three years six months and, thereafter, advised defendant of his co nstitutional rights. Defense counsel stipulated the police re port provided a factual basis fo r the guilty plea. The court found defendant knowingl y and voluntarily waived his rights and pleaded guilty. The court accepted the plea and dismissed count two. The court set a disposition hearing for May 22 and ordered a section 241.1 report. The Agency and the probation department filed a section 241.1 report on May 20, 2013. The report related defendant “has absconded from every Social Services placement . . . . He will not attend school. He smokes weed with his friends, hangs out11 past his 8:45 p.m. curfew, and often stays out overnight without his mother’s permission with people his mother does no t know. [Defendant] is also very defiant towards most of the adults in his life. . . . [¶] . . . [Defendant ] stated to his child we lfare worker . . . his plan is to . . . go AWOL, not to go to school, and get in trouble so no one will deal with him and he can be sent home.” The Agen cy and the probation department agreed
defendant should be ad judged a ward of the court for hi s safety and the safety of the community. At the disposition hearing held on May 22, 2013, defendant’s public defender (trial counsel) and dependency counsel both appeared on hi s behalf. However, county counsel was not present and trial counsel ha d another matter at wh ich she had to be present. Trial counsel agreed to put her comments on the record regarding the section 241.1 report’s recommendation of wardship. Tr ial counsel stated sh e disagreed with the recommendation, stating defendant committed the burglary on his 14th birthday and should remain in dependency proceedings on account of his young age. Dependency counsel agreed with trial counsel, arguing that the placements that worked for defendant, such as the Center and Hawk’s Place, had cl osed down. Dependenc y counsel also argued dependency was preferable because defenda nt is a “special-needs child” who had “bounced around” placements and requires a stab le placement and therapeutic services. Counsel for the Agency noted that in addition to th e current matter, defendant was recently arrested in San Francisco for po ssession of a stolen iPhone, and was facing charges for that offense.
The court stated it was concerned with defendant’s escalating delinquent behavior, beginning with assault and moving to burgla ry and possession of a BB gun resembling a .45-caliber semiautomatic handgun. Thereaft er, the court declared defendant a ward of
the court and set the maximum term of confin ement at three years six months. The court dismissed dependency and ordered out-of-h ome placement. Defendant’s dependency counsel filed a timely notice of appeal on June 18, 2013.12 D ISCUSSION A. Legal Standard The law with respect to a minor with cas es in both the dependency system and the delinquency system is as follows: “Under section 300, a child who is neglected or abused falls within the juvenile court’s protective jurisdiction as a ‘ “dependent child of the court.” ’ [Citation.] As a dependent, the juvenile court may remove the minor from the home, or place the minor in alternative care that meets his or her needs for custody, care and guidance. [Citation.] Alternatively, the juvenile court may take jurisdiction over a
minor as a ‘ “ward of the court” when the child is habitually disobedient or truant’ under section 601, or commits a crime under section 602. [Citation.] When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court, the minor is subject to more-restrictive placements because
of his or her criminal conduct and the cour t may commit the minor to a juvenile home, ranch, camp, forestry camp, or juvenile hall. [Citation.] The Legislature has declared that a minor cannot simultaneously be both a de pendent and a ward of the juvenile court. [Citation] [¶] Section 241.1 sets forth th e procedure for handling cases with dual jurisdiction in which a minor is both a de pendent under section 300 and a ward under
sections 601 or 602. It re quires the probation department and the welfare department to jointly develop a written protocol to determine which stat us will best serve the interests of the minor and the protection of society. Once completed, the report is presented to the juvenile court for a determination of the appr opriate status for the minor. [Citation.] The joint assessment report must contain th e joint recommendation of the probation department and child welfare departments and al so include (1) a descri ption of the nature of the referral, (2) the age of the child, (3) the history of a ny physical, sexual or emotional abuse of the child, (4) the prior record of the child’s parents fo r abuse of this or any other child, (5) the prior record of the child for out-of-c ontrol or delinquent behavior, (6) the parents’ cooperation with the child’s school, (7 ) the child’s functioning at school, (8) the nature of the child’s home environment, (9) th e history of involvement of any agencies or13 professionals with the child and his or he r family, (10) any services or community agencies that are available to assist the child and his or her family, (11) a statement by any counsel currently represen ting the child, and (12) a statement by any court-appointed special advocate (CASA) volunteer currently appointe d for the child.” 3 ( In re Joey G. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 343, 347 ( Joey G. ).) “We review the juvenile court’s determ ination under section 241.1 for abuse of discretion. [Citation]. ‘To s how abuse of discretion, the a ppellant must demonstrate the juvenile court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
manner that resulted in a misca rriage of justice.’ [Citation.] Throughout our analysis, we will not lightly substitute our decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. Rather, we must indulge all reasonable inferences to s upport the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings where there is substantial evidence to support them.” ( In re
M.V. (2014) 225 Cal.App. 4th 1495, 1506–1507 ( M.V. ).) 4
B. The Juvenile Court’s Se ction 241.1 Determination The juvenile court adopted the recommenda tion of both proba tion department and the Agency and determined defe ndant should be ad judged a juvenile court ward and his dependency proceedings dismissed. As noted ab ove, when a minor is both a dependent
under section 300 and a ward un der section 602, the juvenile court is required by section 241.1 to “determine which status is appropri ate for the minor.” (§ 241.1, subd. (a).) When doing so, the juvenile court cons iders the recommendations of the county

3 The list of items required in a section 241.1 report is derived from section 241.1 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.512(d).

4 In arguing for sufficiency of the evidence review rather than abuse of discretion, defendant cites In re Marcus G. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1008 , 1014, in which the court found that there was insuffici ent evidence to support the order dismissing the minor’s dependency petitio n because the joint assessment requi red by section 2 41.1 had not been performed or presented to the court. In this case, howeve r, a section 241.1 report was prepared and considered by the court, so we find Marcus G. inapposite.14 probation department and the child welfare serv ices department as to “which status will
serve the best interests of the minor and the protection of society.” ( Ibid. ) Thus, as our colleagues in Division Four st ated recently, “within the cont ext of the juvenile court law generally,” section 241.1 grants “broad discretion to the juve nile court when determining
which status will best meet a particular minor’s needs. (See § 202, subd. (b) [both delinquent and dependent minors shall receive ‘care, treatment, and guidance’ that is ‘consistent with their best interest’]; Joey G., supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 346 [juvenile court determination under § 2 41.1 reviewable only for abus e of discretion]; see also In re
Abdirahman S. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 963, 969 [ 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 402] [juvenile delinquency court has broad discretion to set conditions of probation for purpose of rehabilitation]; In re Jose M. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1103–1104, [254 Cal. Rptr. 364] [juvenile dependency court ‘has broa d discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance with this discretion’].)” ( M.V., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1513.) Notwithstanding the juvenile courts “significant latitude in this area” ( M.V., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 534), defendant conten ds the juvenile court erred in choosing wardship over dependency. Reviewing th e factors specified under section 241.1, defendant concludes they “clearly show[] that the minor should have remained a dependent.” Defendant downplays the seri ousness of the crime and his role in it, asserting “nothing was taken from the home,” he was merely the “lookout,” and the crime was committed impulsively because his family overlooked his birthday, and emphasizes his relative youth (age 14), his long histor y of dependency, and his dysfunctional home
environment. We are not unsympathetic to the fact defendant experienced a traumatic early childhood, a chaotic home e nvironment, and continues to wrestle with the resulting mental and behavioral problems in his te enage years; nevertheless, on this record defendant fails to demonstrate the juvenile court abused its discretion in selecting15 wardship over dependency as the system that would best serve his interests at this juncture. The juvenile court judge was understandably concerne d with defendant’s escalating criminal conduct an d out-of-control behavior, wh ich posed great dangers to himself and others. (See § 202, subd. (a) [t he purpose of the juvenile court law is “to provide for the protection and safety of . . . each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court”].) As related in the sec tion 241.1 report, defendant “has absconded from every Social Services placement . . . . He w ill not attend school. He smokes weed with his friends, hangs out past his 8:45 p.m. curfe w, and often stays out overnight without his mother’s permission with peop le his mother does not know. [Defendant] is also very
defiant towards most of the adu lts in his life. . . . [¶] . . . [Defendant] stated to his child welfare worker . . . his plan is to . . . go AW OL, not to go to school, and get in trouble so
no one will deal with him and he can be se nt home.” Even moth er told the court defendant thinks “he grown [ sic ], he can go rob people, . . . go in people [ sic ] houses” and that he “don’t want to go to school, don’t want to follow th e rules.” The judge opined defendant’s behavi or had escalated to the point wh ere wardship is appropriate and
that defendant would benefit from a structur ed placement where “he can get the school . . . [and] the services he needs.” In sum, we see no abuse of discretion in the juvenile
court’s conclusion that defendant’s intere sts would best be served through the delinquency system. Defendant also asserts the juvenile c ourt’s 241.1 determin ation was defective because the delinqu ency court judge failed to review his dependency file prior to determining his status as a ward. The Peop le argue the delinquenc y court judge was not required to examine defendant’s voluminous dependency file and, moreover, that defendant has forfeited this point by failing to raise it below. The People are correct on the first point because “neither section 241.1 nor [California Rules of Court,] rule 5.512 requires judicial examination of the full depe ndency file. In fact, while section 241.1 requires that relevant ‘records of other ag encies’ be considered by Probation and the16 Agency in the development of their recommendation rega rding a dual status minor [citation], the 241.1 report pr escribed by rule 5.512 requ ires only ‘the history of involvement’ of those agencies. This makes sense as a well-drafted 241.1 report should successfully summarize the minor’s social hist ory, including the impact of any previous abuse or neglect on current wrongdoing, th at would otherwise be contained in the underlying records. [Citations.] Of course, where the best interests of a child are at stake, it may well be prudent for the juvenile court to consider as much information as possible. However, review of the entire depende ncy file was not mandatory .” ( M.V.,

supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1514 –1515, italics added.) Accord ingly, even if the court did not review the entire dependency file prio r to making its section 241.1 determination,
reversal is not warranted on that basis. C. Timing of the Section 241.1 Assessment Defendant contends the j uvenile court violated his constitutional and statutory rights to due process by holding the section 602 jurisdictional hear ing before a section 241.1 assessment had been completed. In this regard, defendant asserts section 241.1 requires the assessment to be filed early in the proceedings and notes that California Rules of Court, rule 5.512 (rule 5.512), ad dressing the joint assessment procedure under section 241.1, specifically requires the jo int assessment be prepared before the jurisdictional hearing. (See rule 5.512(e) [“If the child is detain ed, the hearing on the joint assessment report must occur as soon as possible after or concurrent with the detention hearing, but no later than 15 co urt days after the order of detention and before the jurisdictional hearing .”], italics added.) Here, defendant was ordered detained on the section 602 petition on April 25, 2013; on May 1, 2013, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction on the 602 petition after defendant knowingly and volu ntary pleaded guilty to seco nd degree burglary with dismissal of the misdemeanor weapons charge ; and, on May 22, 2013, the juvenile court held the section 241.1 hearing. Clearly, th e timing of the section 241.1 hearing in this17 case did not comport with rule 5.512(e) because it occurred after the jurisdictional hearing. 5 However, defendant failed to object in tr ial court to the section 602 hearing going
forward before a section 241.1 assessment had been conducted pursuant to rule 5.512. Indeed, defendant affirmatively acquiesced in the section 602 proceeding: After full
advisement and waiver of his constitutional ri ghts, defendant entered into a plea bargain allowing him to admit to the reduced charge of second degree burglary with dismissal of the misdemeanor weapons charge . Accordingly, defendant has forfeited this issue on appeal for failure to object below. (See, e.g., In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 502 [citing cases in which a ppellate courts have applie d the forfeiture doctrine “in dependency proceedings in a wide variety of contexts, including cases involving failures to obtain various reports requi red by statute”]; see also M.V., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1508 [“Contrary to appellant’s asserti on, the fact that section 241.1 imposes a ‘mandatory’ statutory duty does not preclude the application of the forfeiture rule.”].) Even if the issue was not forfeited, the failu re to comply with ru le 5.512 is not of constitutional magnitude. “A procedural due pr ocess claim . . . requires a deprivation of a constitutionally protected inte rest and a denial of adequa te procedural protections. [Citations.] Although what procedural process is due in a given circumstance may vary,

5 Interestingly, in M.V., Division Four noted “that at least one commentator has indicated that the timeframes set forth in rule 5.512(e) may be contrary to the best interests of the minor and the protection of so ciety and therefore void as inconsistent with the intent of section 241.1. (See Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2013) § 3.27[2], p. 3-52 [citing California Court Reporte rs Assn. v. Judicial Council of California (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 15, 24–26, 46 Cal.Rpt r.2d 44].) This is because a decision to terminate one status s hould not be made until after a determination that the jurisdictional allegations supporting the alternate status are true. [Citation.] As is pertinent to the present matte r, ‘[s]ince the full nature of the delinquency allegations may not become clear until after th ey have been litigated and the juvenile court may or may not find those allegations true,’ there may be ‘substantial merit’ to deferring the section 241.1 determination until after the jurisdicti on hearing in the appropriate case.” ( M.V., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1507, fn. 4.)18 it ‘always requires a relatively level playing fi eld, the “constitutional floor” of a “fair trial in a fair tribunal,” in other words, a fair hearing before a neutra l or unbiased decisionmaker.’ ” ( Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4t h 229, 265–266.) In particular, “In the dependency context, due process may be implicated where a required investigative report is completely omitted. [Citation.] However, where ‘the assessment report is prepared, is available to the partie s in advance of the no ticed hearing, and does
address the principal questions at issue in the pa rticular proceeding, errors or omissions in the report cannot be characterized in terms of denial of due process.’ [Citation.] Here, a section 241.1 report was prepared and avai lable prior to the court’s noticed section 241.1 hearing and did address the principal question at issue. Further, the report was considered by the juvenile court—along wi th argument by the parties regarding the report’s recommendation—before the court anno unced its section 241.1 decision. Under such circumstances, we do not perceive any lateness in the report’s preparation to be a defect that fundamentally un dermined the statutory scheme such that the minor was unable to avail herself of its protections.” ( M.V, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1510.) The
same holds true in this case. In sum, defendant forfeited any issue c oncerning the tardiness of the section 241.1 assessment by failing to object below and, even if the issue is not forfeited, any tardiness in the preparation of the section 241.1 assessment did not violate defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights to due process. D. Maximum Confinement Time Defendant contends the juve nile court erred in determining that his maximum time of confinement under section 726, subdivisi on (d), is three years six months, instead of three years. The Attorney General agrees, as do we. At the dispositional hearing on May 22, 2013, the court determined defendant’s maximum time of confinement was three years six months. The maximum time of
confinement for the offense to which defendant pleaded gu ilty—second degree19 burglary—is three years. (See Pen. Code, §§ 461, subd. (b), 1170, subd. (h).) The trial court apparently added six months to the maximum time of confinement for second degree burglary based on defendant’s first ad judication for misdemeanor battery in 2010 (see ante, fn. 2), as well as a secti on 602 petition filed in Contra Costa County in March 2012, alleging misdemeanor battery on a school employee. However, defendant was not declared a ward of the court in th e 2010 matter, so no custody time remains from that adjudication (see § 726, subd. (d)), and the record
indicates the 2012 matter was dismissed in C ontra Costa County and no finding was ever made on that petition. More importantly , as the Attorney General correctly acknowledges, no aggregation of any prior adjudications was permissible because the prosecutor did not give th e required notice. (See In re Donnell L. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 185, 192 [“a petition under section 602 must contain notice of the intent to rely upon previously sustained petitions under section 602, in orde r to aggregate the maximum period of confinement on the basis of those petitions”].) In sum, we agree that the maximum time of confinement is three years.20 D ISPOSITION The juvenile court is directed to am end the dispositional order to reflect a maximum time of confinement of three years. As modified, the dispositional order is
affirmed.

_ _____________________ Becton, J.*

We concur:

__________ ____________ Margulies, Acting P.J.

__________ ____________ Banke, J.

* Judge of the Contra Costa County Superi or Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.