Opinion issued February 5, 2015.

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-13-00546-CR

———————————

STEVEN GOLDEN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No. 4

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1833897

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Following the denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress, Steven Golden pled 

nolo contendere to the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated and the

trial court assessed punishment at thirty days in county jail. On appeal, Golden

argues that the denial of his motion to suppress was an abuse of discretion because 
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the detaining officer did not personally observe anything that would give rise to 

reasonable suspicion that a crime was afoot and the citizen informant’s information 

was conclusory and lacked sufficient articulable facts of criminal activity. We 

affirm.

Background

Kevin Polasek was leaving a home improvement store in Houston, Texas, 

one afternoon when he saw a truck driving erratically in the store’s parking lot. 

According to Polasek, the truck’s driver, who was later identified as Golden, 

appeared to be confused and was having trouble finding the lot’s exit. Polasek

followed Golden’s truck as it exited the parking lot and turned onto the northbound 

highway. Golden immediately made two u-turns which, combined with his 

difficulty navigating the parking lot, made Polasek suspect that Golden was driving 

while intoxicated. At that point, Polasek called 911, identified himself to the 

dispatcher, and reported his observations along with a description of Golden’s 

truck and its license plate number.

Polasek stayed on the phone with the dispatcher and continued to follow 

Golden’s truck in his own vehicle. At one point, Golden stopped his truck in the 

middle of the road at a green light, and when Polasek pulled up next to him, he saw 

that Golden appeared to be asleep behind the wheel. After Golden drove off, 

Polasek followed him and watched as Golden drove to a gas station, hitting the 
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curb as he pulled into the parking lot. Polasek parked nearby and watched Golden, 

who appeared to be having difficulty getting the gas pump to work. Polasek also 

notified the 911 dispatcher of Golden’s location, and several police units arrived at 

the gas station within five to ten minutes. 

Harris County Sheriff Deputies M. Nguyen and W. Trejo responded to 

Polasek’s call and observed Golden at the gas station just as Polasek had told the 

dispatcher he would be. The information that Polasek had given to the dispatcher, 

along with Polasek’s name, was relayed to the deputies via their call slips. 

Deputies Nguyen and Trejo noted that Golden’s vehicle matched Polasek’s 

description, a white truck with a stripe, and the exact license plate number. 

Polasek remained in the parking lot and watched as the deputies arrived, 

assessed the situation, and watched Golden get into his truck and start the engine. 

At that point, Deputy Nguyen initiated a traffic stop before Golden could exit the 

parking lot. After the deputies investigated and arrested Golden, Polasek spoke 

with Deputy Trejo and gave a statement confirming what he had seen.

Reasonable Suspicion

Golden argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his 

motion to suppress because the information that Polasek gave to the dispatcher was 

conclusory and lacked sufficient articulable facts of criminal activity, and Deputy 
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Nguyen did not personally observe anything that would give rise to reasonable 

suspicion that a crime was afoot.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated 

standard of review. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2010). Under this standard, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Id. When a 

trial court makes written findings of fact, as it did in the instant case, a reviewing 

court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the ruling and uphold 

those fact findings so long as they are supported by the record. See id. We defer to 

the trial court’s determination of historical facts if the record supports them. See id.

We review a trial court’s application of the law of search and seizure to the facts de 

novo. Id. A trial court’s ruling will be sustained if it is “reasonably supported by 

the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.” Id. at 447–48 

(quoting State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

B. Applicable Law

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.1 Brief investigative

 1 When, as here, an appellant does not separately brief state and federal 

constitutional claims, we assume that he claims no greater protection under the 

state constitution than that provided by the federal constitution. See Reed v. State, 
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stops, however, such as the traffic stop in this case, are permitted if the law 

enforcement officer has a reasonable suspicion that some crime was, or is about to 

be, committed. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014). 

Reasonable suspicion exists when a peace officer has “a particularized and 

objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” 

Id.; see Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 

Courts determine if reasonable suspicion exists by objectively viewing the totality 

of the circumstances. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687; Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 

914. 

Whether reasonable suspicion exists to justify a stop depends “upon both the 

content of the information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” 

Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1685 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 

S. Ct. 2412, 2416 (1990)). The content of the information possessed by the police 

includes the totality of the information known collectively to the cooperating peace 

officers, including 911 dispatchers. Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 915 (explaining 

that 911 dispatcher is regarded as “cooperating officer” for purposes of 

determining reasonable suspicion); see also Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 

 

308 S.W.3d 417, 419 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.); Varnes v. State, 

63 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Therefore, 

we will analyze Golden’s claims under the Fourth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution, following guidelines set by the United States Supreme Court 

in interpreting the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
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924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (stating that “any information known to the police 

dispatcher is imputed to the detaining officer”).

It is well established that a detaining officer need not personally observe the 

factual basis giving rise to reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop; rather, a stop 

may be justified if the facts underlying the traffic stop are observed by another 

person, including a civilian informant. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687–88; see 

also Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“The factual 

basis for stopping [an individual] need not arise from the officer’s personal 

observation, but may be supplied by information acquired from another person.”). 

The amount and detail of corroboration of the information contained within a 

citizen informant’s tip can support a less reliable report. Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at

923; Taflinger v. State, 414 S.W.3d 881, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2013, no pet.). The less reliable the tip, the more corroborating information the 

police need to justify the stop. Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923 (citing White, 496 U.S. 

at 330); Taflinger, 414 S.W.3d at 885; see Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1688 

(discussing effect of corroboration on reliability of anonymous tip).

Courts have recognized several indicia of reliability with respect to tips from

a citizen informant. For example, a tip from a citizen informant who identifies

himself and holds himself accountable for the veracity and accuracy of his 

information may be regarded as reliable. Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914–15; 
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Hawes v. State, 125 S.W.3d 535, 538 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no 

pet.). An anonymous tip, on the other hand, rarely rises to the level of suspicion 

required to justify a detention without sufficient police corroboration. White, 496 

U.S. at 329, 110 S. Ct. at 2416.

The citizen informant’s firsthand account and detailed description of 

wrongdoing increases the reliability of his information. Hawes, 125 S.W.3d at 539; 

see also Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689 (stating that contemporaneous eyewitness 

reports of suspected criminal activity have “long been treated as especially 

reliable”). Courts consider an informant who is not connected with the police 

inherently trustworthy when advising the police of suspected criminal activity. 

Taflinger, 414 S.W.3d at 885. The Supreme Court has recognized that use of the

911 emergency system, which “has some features that allow for identifying and 

tracing callers, and thus provide some safeguards against making false reports with 

immunity,” is another indicia of reliability. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1691–92.

C. Analysis

Golden argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his 

motion to suppress because Polasek’s tip failed to establish reasonable suspicion 

because Polasek merely claimed that he thought that Golden was driving while 

intoxicated and he did not give specific articulable facts of Golden’s criminal 

activity. Golden further contends that Deputy Nguyen could not rely on Polasek’s 
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tip, and therefore, he could only have lawfully detained Golden if the officer 

personally observed something that would give rise to reasonable suspicion that a 

crime was afoot, which the officer admits he did not. 

Here, Polasek testified that he became concerned that Golden was driving 

while intoxicated because he watched Golden driving erratically in the store’s 

parking lot only to immediately make two successive u-turns on the highway once

he got onto the road. He then followed Golden in his own vehicle and immediately 

called 911 to report his suspicions and Golden’s driving to law enforcement. 

Polasek, who was on the phone with the 911 dispatcher from the time he followed

Golden’s vehicle out of the store parking lot until Golden was stopped by Deputy 

Nguyen, testified that he contemporaneously relayed his observations of Golden’s 

erratic driving to the 911 dispatcher. Specifically, Polasek told the dispatcher that 

Golden could not drive in a straight line, stopped at green lights, fell asleep behind 

the wheel, and drove his vehicle up on the curb when he pulled into the gas station 

parking lot. Polasek also gave the dispatcher his name and a description of his 

vehicle, along with a description of Golden’s vehicle (white truck with a stripe) 

and its complete license plate number. Deputy Nguyen testified that the 

information that Polasek provided to the dispatcher was relayed to him and the 

other officers via their call slips.
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This case is similar in many ways to the recent Supreme Court decision in 

Navarette. In that case, a 911 caller reported that a driver in a silver Ford 150 

pickup ran her vehicle off the roadway near a specific mile marker five minutes 

earlier while driving southbound on Highway 1, and she provided the truck’s 

license plate information. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686–87. Law enforcement 

detained the pickup truck driver less than twenty minutes later on southbound 

Highway 1, as reported by the 911 caller. Id. The Supreme Court held that the 

caller’s tip contained adequate indicia of reliability to support reasonable suspicion 

because the content of the tip indicated that it was based on eyewitness knowledge, 

was contemporaneously made, and was made to the 911 emergency system. Id.

The Supreme Court also found persuasive the fact that the 911 caller in Navarette

reported 

more than a minor traffic infraction and more than a conclusory 

allegation of drunk or reckless driving. Instead, she alleged a specific 

and dangerous result of the driver’s conduct: running another car off 

the highway. That conduct bears too great a resemblance to 

paradigmatic manifestations of drunk driving to be dismissed as an 

isolated example of recklessness. Running another vehicle off the 

road suggests lane-positioning problems, decreased vigilance, 

impaired judgment, or some combination of those recognized drunk 

driving cues.

Id. at 1691. The Court reasoned that “[r]easonable suspicion depends on ‘the 

factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 

prudent men, not legal technicians, act[]’ [and u]nder that commonsense approach, 
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we can appropriately recognize certain driving behaviors as sound indicia of drunk 

driving.” Id. at 1690.

Polasek provided the 911 dispatcher with specific information of Golden’s 

dangerous driving that exceeded in detail and volume the information provided to

the police in Navarette (e.g., inability to drive in a straight line, stopping at a green 

light, sleeping behind the wheel, and hitting a curb while pulling into a parking 

lot), all of which amount to more than mere traffic violations and, when considered 

together, are “sound indicia of drunk driving.” See id.

Furthermore, also like in Navarette, Polasek reported Golden’s driving to 

law enforcement via the 911 system, Polasek’s description of Golden’s erratic 

driving to the 911 dispatcher indicated that the tip was based on his eyewitness 

knowledge, and Polasek told the dispatcher that he was following Golden and he 

made a contemporaneous report of his observations. Unlike the twenty minute gap 

in Navarette, law enforcement found Golden parked at the gas station within 

minutes of Polasek reporting the vehicle’s location to the dispatcher, all the while 

the vehicle remained under the citizen informant’s constant observation. All the

factors recognized as indicia of reliability in Navarette are present in this case. See 

id. at 1691–92. Furthermore, unlike in Navarette, in which the 911 caller was 

considered “anonymous” for purposes of the Court’s analysis, this case contains 

additional indicia of reliability because Polasek made himself accountable for his 
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tip by identifying himself and his vehicle, and staying at the gas station in order to 

give his statement to the deputies. See Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923 (noting that 

when citizen informant provides self-identifying information, his degree of 

reliability “significantly improves”); see also Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914–

15 (noting that “information provided to police from a citizen informant who 

identifies himself and may be held to account for the accuracy and veracity of his 

report may be regarded as reliable.”).

Golden takes issue with the fact that Polasek did not have contact with 

Officer Nguyen prior to the stop. A citizen informant does not have to have contact 

with the officer who performs the stop in order for the stop to be lawful. See 

Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1688–89 (holding officer, who had no interaction with 911 

caller and did not observe defendant commit any traffic violations, had reasonable 

suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle based on information caller provided to 911 

system). Furthermore, the record establishes that Polasek was in constant contact 

with the 911 dispatcher for over twenty minutes preceding the stop. See 

Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914–15 (explaining that 911 dispatcher is regarded 

as “cooperating officer” for purposes of determining reasonable suspicion); 

Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 924 (stating that “any information known to the police 

dispatcher is imputed to the detaining officer”).
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We hold that Deputy Nguyen had reasonable suspicion to stop Golden’s 

vehicle in the gas station parking lot based on the information Polasek provided to 

the 911 dispatcher, pursuant to Navarette. It was not necessary for Deputy Nguyen 

to wait until he personally observed something that would give rise to reasonable 

suspicion that a crime was afoot. See Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 259 (“To require 

officers who are apprised of detailed facts from citizen-eyewitnesses to observe 

suspects and wait until additional suspicious acts are committed, would be foolish 

and contrary to the balance of interests struck in Terry and its progeny.”).

Accordingly, we overrule Golden’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of his 

motion to suppress.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Russell Lloyd

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Massengale, and Lloyd.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).