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KOSOVO AND SERBIA: A PATHWAY TO PEACE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 24, 2013

Serial No. 113–23

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

LUKE MESSER, Indiana 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Jonathan Moore, Director, Office of South Central European Affairs, 

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ........... 9

Daniel Serwer, Ph.D., professor, School of Advanced International Studies, 

Johns Hopkins University ................................................................................... 30

Ms. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi, Balkan Affairs adviser, Albanian American 

Civic League ......................................................................................................... 36

Mr. Obrad Kesic, senior partner, TSM Global Consultants, LLC ....................... 53

Mr. Roland Gjoni, JD, LLM (former senior legal and policy advisor to Effective Municipalities Initiative in Kosovo) ............................................................ 61

Mr. Robert A. Churcher (former director, International Crisis Group in 

Prishtina) .............................................................................................................. 70

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and 

Emerging Threats: Prepared statement ............................................................. 3

Mr. Jonathan Moore: Prepared statement ............................................................ 11

Daniel Serwer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 32

Ms. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi: Prepared statement ............................................. 39

Mr. Obrad Kesic: Prepared statement ................................................................... 55

Mr. Roland Gjoni: Prepared statement .................................................................. 63

Mr. Robert A. Churcher: Prepared statement ....................................................... 72

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 100

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 101

Ms. Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi: Material submitted for the record ...................... 102

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher: Material submitted for the record .............. 104

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KOSOVO AND SERBIA: A PATHWAY TO PEACE 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 2013

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I call to order this hearing of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats. 

Today’s topic is Kosovo, or Kosovo—I keep changing the way I 

pronounce it just so I won’t offend anybody, or offend everybody—

and Serbia: A Pathway to Peace. 

After the ranking member and I each take 5 minutes to make 

opening remarks, each member present will have 1 minute to make 

an opening statement, and alternating between majority and minority members. And without objection, all members may have 5 

days to submit statements, questions, or extraneous materials for 

the record. And hearing no objection, so ordered. 

This hearing was postponed from an earlier date, but the delay 

has proven most fortunate. Because it was just last Friday that 

after 6 months, the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia initialed 

an agreement mediated by Lady Ashton of the European Union. 

However, the document that emerged last week was entitled, ‘‘First 

Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations.’’ 

So it is not the end of the process, and as it implies there is much 

more to come. 

So today’s hearing, we will look at what has been accomplished 

and what still needs to be done. Just this week, Kosovo’s Prime 

Minister summed up the sentiment on both sides, and that is, and 

I quote, ‘‘Don’t expect us to start loving each other.’’ So the divisions are still there and they run very deep. A huge issue has been 

the status of the four overwhelmingly Serbian majority municipalities in northern Kosovo, which borders on Serbia. 

The Kosovars fought a war, a brave war and a courageous war 

for independence, because they did not want to be ruled by the 

Serbs. In the same token, the Serbs do not want to be ruled by the 

Kosovars. The principle of self-determination, I believe, should 

apply to everyone. And this wasn’t a case over the years where 

American policy, or at least my involvement in it as a person who 

is deeply involved in these issues, was never based on because I 

like Kosovars more than I like Serbs or vice versa, but always that 

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the principle of self-determination is something that is written 

down in the American Declaration of Independence and should be 

part of the heart and soul of what Americans are all about. 

The United States and NATO supported Kosovo’s independence 

with the use of military force, and it has also sided with Kosovo 

over who should control the northern Serb communities. Of course, 

they have decided Kosovo. The Serbs have wanted autonomy for 

municipalities, and Serbia has been supporting ‘‘parallel institutions’’ to provide local services. While this first agreement favored 

Kosovo on the principle of ‘‘authority’’ over the northern disputed 

territory, the Serb communities will control their own areas of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning. 

Thus, Kosovar authority, here, you could read that ‘‘sovereignty,’’ 

in those areas is a facade. It is an illusion which will come back 

to hurt both parties if an illusion just is allowed to sit in order to 

take one step more in a certain direction. 

The core of sovereignty is the control of security forces. The 

agreement places all police and security personnel under central 

Kosovo command. However, the northern regional police commander will be a local Serb appointed by the Kosovo Government 

from a list provided by Serb mayors. The composition of the police 

force will reflect the ethnic composition of the population of the 

four municipalities. So it will be a Serb force, under a Serb leader, 

supposedly enforcing Kosovo law. There will be a division of the 

National Appellate Court established in the north with a majority 

of Serbian judges to hear cases from the Serbian municipalities. 

Serbia has not recognized Kosovo’s independence, and still 

stands in the way of Kosovo joining the United Nations or other 

international bodies as a sovereign state. Both did agree not to 

block each other’s path into joining the EU. I don’t know what that 

says about people who want to join the EU at this point, sort of 

wishing each other good luck. The New York Times called this a 

‘‘power-sharing agreement.’’ What it doesn’t do is satisfy the people 

most affected, and that is the people of northern Kosovo. As long 

as there is a clash of identities and a deep distrust borne of centuries of conflict, there is a likelihood of more trouble. Negotiations 

between governments can lead to compromise, but they can also 

heighten tensions when core values are at stake. 

Perhaps it is time to consult the people living in the disputed 

areas and see what they want to do. The people living in predominantly Serb areas of northern Kosovo should be allowed to vote in 

a referendum for which country they would like to be integrated 

into. The parallel referendum should be held in predominantly Albanian areas in southern Serbia and surrounding areas giving 

them the same choice. And that is an American concept that the 

people of certain areas have rights to self-determination through 

the ballot box. But I don’t think anyone would be surprised by the 

outcome of there was such a vote. 

The borders of both Serbia and Kosovo could be adjusted in accordance with the desires of the people who are living within those 

borders. Territory of about equal size could be exchanged to establish a new equilibrium in the region. The result would be two much 

more unified countries without the constraint and irritation of tryVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:57 Jun 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\042413\80547 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ing to rule over unhappy minorities who are looking across the border for help and sparking disputes. 

So I would be interested to hear from our panelists why such a 

democratic process would not be welcome, and what is truly the 

way to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo. With that 

said, I turn to the ranking member, Mr. Keating. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]


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Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this timely hearing. We are also pleased to be joined by Ranking Member Engel who has extensive firsthand knowledge and experience in the region. 

In the last week, we witnessed both Kosovo and Serbia take immense strides toward greater stability and prosperity for their people. Through agreeing to the EU-brokered April 19th agreement, 

both nations did something rather unprecedented in the region. 

They set aside their deep-rooted past to focus on the future. If they 

continue on this path, this week may signify a turning point for the 

Balkans as a whole. Of course, there have been many notable successes in the region, but some of that progress has been stalled by 

obstructive policies that have prevented budding nations from joining Western multilateral institutions like NATO or the EU. 

If implemented correctly and thoughtfully this agreement can 

place both Kosovo and Serbia on a path toward EU accession, 

which is certainly a positive move for both nations and a vision 

that our own troops helped to protect. Yet, peace is fragile, and in 

the Balkans this fragile nature can at times take a life of its own. 

For this reason, I encourage this committee to look forward just as 

these nations have decided to do, especially since there is much left 

to be done. Aside from the practical matter of implementing this 

agreement, the two sides need to address respective corruption and 

rule of law issues. Further, the region has much to gain from attracting increased investment which has the potential to encourage 

cooperation over division. 

Finally, and perhaps most important, both countries must to 

their best to support tolerance and leadership amongst the youth 

in Serbia and throughout Kosovo. There are already a number of 

NGOs in this region, like the National Democratic Institute and 

the institute Crisis Group and others that foster this type of collaboration, and their work should be encouraged. There is absolutely no need for your younger generations to get wrapped up in 

battles of their grandparents and, ultimately, I don’t believe that 

anyone within Kosovo and Serbia truly wants their children to repeat the regional cycle of violence that either has experienced. 

Director Moore, it is good to see you again, and I look forward 

to your testimony as well as the testimony of our second panel of 

witnesses. With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will now have 1-minute statements by 

the rest of our panel. Judge Poe? 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The world is seeing the results when out-of-towners, as I call them, go into an area of the 

world and start drawing a new map and forcing people to live in 

their specific areas. Outsiders have forced people to live together 

who really don’t want to live together. We have drawn the boundaries and they do not really reflect the historical situation on the 

ground. I believe Serbia, though, has been hard at work to make 

this work. When it comes to identifying the missing from wars, 

Serbia has done an excellent job. It has shared locations of graves, 

identified bodies exhumed, and more countries, I think, in the area 

need to follow Serbia’s lead in identifying the missing. 

We also need to recognize that human rights violations occur on 

all sides. Too little attention has been paid to ethnic violence 

6

against non-Albanians, including Serbs, in Kosovo. We have seen 

the destruction of 100 Serbian gravesites and 150 churches destroyed. In February, nine Serbians were arrested in Kosovo by 

Kosovo police outside of a Serb monastery, allegedly tortured, released without being charged. The accusations of torture were so 

serious that the EULEX and the EU Mission in Kosovo launched 

an official investigation and the 11 accused Kosovo police officers 

have been suspended. 

I use this as an example to show that human rights violations 

still occur in the region. The good news is in spite of all the problems, now Serbia and Kosovo are trying to work together, I believe, 

both in good faith to resolve certain issues. As explained by the 

chairman, last Friday’s agreement is a good first start. It is important that the rest of the world keep these two areas of the world 

in constant conversation and communication and discussion about 

resolving issues that they both are concerned about. When people 

are not talking, bad things occur. So this is a good first step. 

I urge the EU national leaders to formally agree to start talks 

with Serbia at their summit in June. My personal opinion is, it is 

in the best interest of Serbia and the United States that Serbia 

look to the West and not look to the former Soviet Union for political dialogue. Just because some deal has been worked out since 

last Friday doesn’t mean problems have been resolved. There are 

numerous unresolved human rights cases throughout the area. 

There is a problem with ethnic tension and violence, and we must 

take a stand for all victims of violence regardless of who they are 

and where they are from. Ethnic violence is always wrong no matter who does it. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Your Honor. Next, we 

have a statement from the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Affairs Committee, Eliot Engel, who has been deeply involved in this 

issue for at least 20 years. And we were both very young and handsome at that time. But Eliot is someone who has kept very active 

in this issue. He understands the area, and we are very happy that 

you have joined us today, and you may use whatever time that you 

choose to consume. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Ranking Member. Thank you for the opportunity to join your subcommittee today. As the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs 

Committee, let me say, Mr. Chairman, that we both share a longstanding interest in the Balkans, and while I may disagree with 

some of your proposals regarding moving borders, you have been a 

serious and important player in all of these issues for so many 

years. 

We obviously are classmates together. We came to Congress together in 1988, and there has been no one who has been more serious than you as far as I am concerned in terms of knowing these 

issues, working hard on these issues, and trying to resolve these 

issues. So I look forward to continuing our discussions on efforts to 

bring peace and prosperity to the region. 

This hearing is obviously, as the ranking member pointed out, 

very timely as it comes on the heels of an agreement reached between the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia. I congratulate 

7

Kosovo and Serbia for reaching this landmark agreement, and in 

particular I would like to recognize Prime Minister Thaci for his 

courage and his willingness to make hard decisions, and Prime 

Minister Dacic for his pragmatism and forward-leaning vision. The 

personal involvement and leadership of EU foreign policy chief 

Lady Ashton has been critical to this historic agreement. It sends 

a clear signal of hope to a region which longs for an end to conflict 

and to peoples who want to live their lives in peace and prosperity 

in the European Union. 

I was very happy to have a chance to speak with Lady Ashton 

about this region when she was last in Washington a few months 

ago. And yet again, which is another very positive point, this is yet 

another affirmation of the fact that the Republic of Kosovo is independent, sovereign, free and permanent. I was a leading supporter 

of independence for Kosovo and am proud of how far they have 

come. It has been 9 years since the EU declared a Thessaloniki 

Summit at ‘‘The future of the Balkans is within the European 

Union.’’

Croatia’s July entry into the EU validates the strategic vision of 

last week’s agreement. The EU is moving to buttress the confidence 

of the other Balkan States including Kosovo that their day is near, 

and we learn once again that it is the shared aspiration of EU 

membership that binds the Balkan States together. The KosovoSerbia agreement underscored the understanding that the region 

will only prosper when all of the states of the Balkans have joined 

the European family, and I welcome all of them into the EU. The 

EU as it now offers Serbia a date for EU accession negotiations, 

must also offer Pristina what other Balkan countries have already 

been granted, a clear and transparent pathway to future membership. 

I would like to take a minute or so to discuss Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Brussels is working with Pristina on moving 

Kosovo toward a Stabilization and Association Agreement and toward visa liberalization where Kosovars would be able to travel 

freely to Europe as citizens of their fellow Balkan countries can already do. Unfortunately, the progress is halting and slow, and unlike its neighbors, every little step in Kosovo’s progress with Brussels could face a veto by one of the five EU non-recognizers of 

Kosovo independence. While this makes the climb even steeper, it 

makes Kosovo’s accomplishments even more significant. In the end 

we must ensure that Kosovo be included in Europe along with its 

neighbors, because otherwise we would create a new black hole in 

the Balkans where our worst fears of crime, corruption, and worse 

could come true. 

Kosovo’s pathway toward NATO is equally very important. Along 

with other countries in the region, Kosovo’s membership in NATO 

will cement its Western outlook while adding another strongly proAmerican country to the alliance. In fact, Kosovo is the most proAmerican country in Europe according to a recent Gallup survey. 

Of course, membership in NATO requires Kosovo to develop a military, and I am glad that we may see the early steps in that direction through the planning of a professional defensive army later 

this year. As a sovereign and independent republic, Kosovo has 

every right to build its armed forces, and it speaks highly of the 

8

new country that it plans to work closely with the United States 

and our European allies on the timing and organization of its defense forces. We must not buy into the irrational fears of some who 

express unfounded misgivings about a potential Kosovo military 

considering the assurances that it will be small and defense-oriented. Regardless, I look forward to the day when Kosovo’s troops 

will stand side by side with American soldiers in the fight against 

international terrorism and other global ills. 

And finally, I think it is long past time for the five EU holdouts 

to recognize Kosovo. Twenty-two EU nations do, five do not. Not 

only has the International Court of Justice accepted Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence as valid and legal, but with the KosovoSerbia normalization agreement there is no reason left for the continued intransigence. I hope the State Department along with European foreign ministries will now renew their efforts to bring 

about more recognitions. 

There is certainly additional challenges which the new country 

must still address. Unemployment is high. Corruption continues to 

place a drag on the economy. And interethnic relations must continually be strengthened. At the same time, however, agreements 

between Serbia and Kosovo must be fully implemented, and as laid 

out in the latest accord, parallel structures in the north must either be eliminated completely or made a transparent part of the 

unified Kosovar state so that minorities can be treated fairly wherever they are. Again, I would like to congratulate Kosovo and Serbia for signing the agreement on normalization, and offer my help 

to both countries in their efforts to join a Europe whole and free. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to offer my 

thoughts on the matter, and the time, and again look forward to 

working with you and the ranking member. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Holding? 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing 

as the subcommittee examines the recent agreement between 

Kosovo and Serbia and what this means in terms of providing a 

starting point for achieving regional stability as both countries look 

to the international community. 

While I served as the United States Attorney for eastern North 

Carolina, I was privileged to travel to Kosovo and work with their 

government and Department of Justice to train law enforcement 

authorities, which focused on establishing their rule of law by ensuring the proper enforcement of criminal laws. And indeed, while 

U.S. Attorney, I sent about a dozen different missions to Kosovo 

from my office comprised of Federal prosecutors and various members of law enforcement to engage, and then in return we welcomed 

several missions from Kosovo to North Carolina to cross-train. 

So I am encouraged by recent developments made within the last 

week that recognize that challenges still exist, and look forward to 

hearing from our witnesses as how we can best support their efforts. So Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And Mr. Stockman? 

Mr. STOCKMAN. I want to thank the chairman for taking on 

issues which aren’t always popular but are nonetheless very important. I was fortunate to visit Belgrade a few years ago, and I think 

it is important that we listen to all sides and to work out a solution 

9

that we can all benefit from. And I appreciate these hearings being 

open and honest and balanced, and I look forward to working out 

a solution that we can all join on. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Our first panel, which 

is composed of our representative of the administration, and then 

we follow by a second panel of experts. So our first panel is Jonathan Moore, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and 

Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State and has led policies responsible, these for Albania, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, 

Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia. That is quite a portfolio. 

He is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and with 

extensive experience in this region. He was assigned to the U.S. 

Embassy in Belgrade in 1991, and was Desk Officer for the former 

Yugoslavia in the State Department from 1993 to 1995. He was 

Deputy Director of the State Department’s Office of Russian Affairs 

from 2000 until 2002, and prior to his current assignment was 

Deputy Chief of Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2009 to 

2012. 

And Mr. Moore, if you would perhaps could keep your statement 

down to about 5 minutes and the rest will put into the record, you 

may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JONATHAN MOORE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE 

OF SOUTH CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Mr. MOORE. Chairman Rohrabacher, members of the subcommittee, good afternoon. I am honored to appear before you to 

discuss Kosovo and Serbia. On behalf of the State Department, 

please allow me to thank you and the subcommittee for your timely 

and deep interest in these countries, as well as in the broader Balkan region, where the United States continues to make investments of personnel and resources to ensure that the conflicts of the 

1990s are not repeated. 

The Governments of Kosovo and Serbia concluded a significant 

agreement last Friday through the European Union facilitated Dialogue. This development has come after years of sustained engagement by the United States and our European partners. In order to 

speak of a Europe that is whole, free, democratic, and at peace, the 

Balkans must be in the European and Euro-Atlantic family. This 

has been a goal of administrations, both Democratic and Republican, for over 20 years. As we have seen elsewhere in Europe, integration has been and remains the best means of fostering longterm stability, investment, and prosperity. The unprecedented joint 

visit of Secretary of State Clinton and European Union High Representative Ashton to Pristina, Belgrade, and Sarajevo last year is 

proof that we and the EU stand united in this goal. 

The parties’ April 19th agreement on the normalization of relations includes a durable solution for northern Kosovo within 

Kosovo’s legal and institutional framework with substantial local 

self-governance under Kosovo law. The agreement covers the creation of an ‘‘Association’’ or ‘‘Community’’ of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo that may exercise municipal competencies collecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:57 Jun 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\042413\80547 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tively, and will also have a role in representing the Serb community to the central authorities. 

On April 22nd, High Representative Ashton and EU Enlargement Commissioner Fuele recommended to EU member states that 

negotiations be opened with Serbia on EU accession, and with 

Kosovo on an EU Stabilization and Association Agreement, as well 

as allowing Kosovo to participate in EU programs. We welcome 

these recommendations which the European Council will consider 

at its June session. While the Dialogue is an EU-led process, it has 

had our full and active support. Our Deputy Assistant Secretary, 

Ambassador Philip Reeker, has actively engaged the parties and 

the EU. We have been in constant contact with both countries’ 

leaders, including meetings of Vice President Biden with President 

Nikolic and Prime Minister Thaci in Rome in March. We are encouraging Kosovo and Serbia to implement expeditiously and fully 

all Dialogue agreements. 

We know, Mr. Chairman, this will not be easy. Hardliners and 

criminal elements in northern Kosovo will resist. They have long 

benefitted from the conditions that disadvantage and intimidate 

the population in northern Kosovo, keeping the situation there on 

edge and perpetuating weak rule of law. Dismantling the parallel 

political and security structures in northern Kosovo will be a major 

challenge. Municipal elections in the north this year with OSCE facilitation should usher in a new era of accountable, decentralized, 

and effective governance. Serbia must demonstrate the willingness 

and ability to use its influence to isolate those who block implementation. 

For its part, Kosovo must demonstrate the commitment and ability to protect and preserve the lives and livelihoods of the KosovoSerb population in the north and throughout the country, and to 

guarantee the rights afforded to them by Kosovo and international 

law, including the far-reaching self-governance to which they are 

entitled under Kosovo’s Constitution. Of course, the full cooperation 

of both Kosovo and Serbia with the international community and 

its missions, NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the EU Rule of 

Law Mission (EULEX) remains essential for success. The United 

States will support both parties and its partners on the ground in 

their implementation efforts. 

Despite the difficulties, this agreement is the best way forward. 

Reconciliation is the goal of Serbia and Kosovo, not partition or 

land swaps. This administration, like the Bush administration that 

recognized Kosovo’s independence in 2008, has made clear its commitment to a democratic, sovereign and multi-ethnic Kosovo within 

its existing borders. Assistant Secretary of State Gordon stated our 

policy before this subcommittee in November 2011, ‘‘There is no 

way for borders in this region to be redrawn along ethnically clean 

lines. . . . Questioning the ability of people of different ethnicities 

to live together is harmful to regional reconciliation and contrary 

to the international community’s decade-long effort to move the region beyond the brutal conflicts of the 1990s.’’ The April 19th 

agreement should be the focus. It is a key signal that both governments are capable of making compromise and are committed to 

putting the past behind them, moving forward with their European 

aspirations, and building a peaceful and prosperous future. 

11

Mr. Chairman, we remain committed to helping them realize 

these goals, and hope for your support and that of the subcommittee. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moore follows:]


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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. Now Mr. Secretary, I will ask you a few questions. We will pass this on to other 

members as well. First is, the agreement sets out in detail the establishment of a Serb-led police force in the northern areas, in that 

northern area of Kosovo. The commentators claim also that there 

was some sort of sidebar agreement not to deploy Kosovo’s Security 

Forces or special police units into that northern Serbian area except in an emergency. Is that true? 

Mr. MOORE. Thank you for your question, Mr. Chairman. The 

Kosovo Security Forces work very closely with NATO and KFOR. 

The authorities in Kosovo fully respect the role of KFOR to provide 

safe and secure conditions in northern Kosovo. As you have seen 

from the informal text of the agreement that has circulated, there 

is no role for KSF in implementing the agreement, so we are quite 

confident that KFOR has the lead, not the KSF, in the north and 

in the context of implementation. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the answer is yes. 

Mr. MOORE. The answer is yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. Both Serbia and Kosovo want to 

join the EU, and Kosovo has expressed interest in joining NATO. 

Do we have a position on whether or not they should be part of 

NATO, both of these countries? 

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, as you know NATO operates by consensus. Serbia has not sought membership in NATO. Kosovo is not 

yet in a position to have applied for membership in NATO. The 

Kosovo Security Force needs to evolve. It will do so with the help 

of NATO. This is something being discussed in Brussels now with 

our NATO partners and allies. We certainly see the potential for 

their future in Euro-Atlantic institutions, that means NATO and 

the EU. If Serbia chooses to apply that would be taken very seriously. We have excellent bilateral military-to-military relations 

with Serbia as well as with Kosovo. That will depend upon the desires of those countries, and of course the decisions of all NATO 

member states including ours. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. So the bottom line is that we have 

no position on it right now, but maybe in the future. 

Mr. MOORE. We support them having that aspiration and we will 

have to see. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. Okay, though this agreement gives 

central government in Kosovo authority, on paper at least, over the 

entire claimed territory or what you said, within existing borders, 

I think, was the phraseology you used, does the local power that 

has been granted to the Serbians in the northern part of the country, doesn’t that mean, and especially what you have just acknowledged was that there wouldn’t be Kosovar forces going up there, 

doesn’t that mean autonomy? And wouldn’t an autonomy up there 

in the northern part of Kosovo harden the feelings on both sides? 

And if Kosovo can’t control the north, which is composed of 90 percent of the people there don’t want to be part of Kosovo, why do 

you think it wants to hang on to it, and why are we encouraging 

them to keep authority but not actually having authority, but the 

facade of authority, over an area in which has autonomy from their 

rule? 

21

Mr. MOORE. Well, Mr. Chairman, we do not use the term ‘‘autonomy’’ in the context of the agreement and what is being granted 

to those municipalities. By the way, it is important to note that the 

opportunities, the rights of those municipalities, which they can exercise collectively, extend to other municipalities in the south of 

Kosovo that have a majority Serb population. 

In terms of the eventual development of the Kosovo Security 

Force and its role in the north, that is a subject for a later point. 

In terms of immediate implementation of the Dialogue, all of these 

matters need to be worked out. 

But Mr. Chairman, I think part of the fundamental perspective 

we have—and granted, as diplomats we are looking for the middle 

path, the compromises, to succeed—is that we honestly don’t believe that ethnic rights and freedoms are protected by anything 

other than the rule of law. You make the point, Mr. Chairman, the 

population may be 90 percent Serb but it is not 100 percent Serb. 

We don’t believe that ethnic rights and freedoms, human rights, 

are protected by making countries ethnically pure. We think the 

key thing is the rule of law, so that is what we hope to see in the 

north——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am sure that our great thinkers at the 

State Department have charted out philosophically how people 

must be taught to respect the rule of law and that is the nirvana. 

That is the solution that is going to happen. Them people have 

been fighting each other for centuries, and we are just going to 

have a rule of law concept that is going to let some of them then 

say, well, we will just submit to these people who we have been 

fighting for centuries, rather than trying to find a way in which 

people in Kosovo are happy to be in Kosovo, and people in Serbia 

are happy to be Serbians, thus they don’t have to believe in anything except what they really desire, which is a national identity, 

of being ruled with a national identity. 

Let me ask you this. Why is it that when we, we always focus 

on the Serb communities in Kosovo when we are talking about autonomy and things such as that but we never mention the Kosovar 

communities in Serbia. There are several areas right near the border in this valley there that are just as heavy a concentration of 

Kosovars as you have a concentration of Serbs north of the river. 

So how come we never talk about Kosovars and their community 

across the river and their desire for autonomy? 

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that point as well. 

Talking about the ethnic Albanian population in that part of southern Serbia, Presheva Bujanovac, we have every confidence that the 

Government of Serbia will look after the human rights of its citizens there regardless of their ethnicity, and we have the same confidence in the ability of the Government of Kosovo to look after all 

of its citizens in the north or the south regardless of their ethnicity. 

So that is why we are focused on the rule of law aspect with that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And Mr. Keating, and 

then we will let Mr. Engel again. Well, maybe we will go with the 

judge and let Mr. Engel have what time he would like to consume. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The April 19th agreement includes the establishment of an implementation committee 

by the two sides with the facilitation of the EU in place as well. 

22

How strong do you feel the EU’s role has to be in order to actually 

ensure that implementation, and are there clear penalties laid out 

by the EU or the U.S. if Serbia or Kosovo do not implement the 

accord? For instance, could the EU freeze Serbia’s accession talks 

or Kosovo’s Stabilization and Association Agreement? What are 

your feelings on that, Mr. Moore? 

Mr. MOORE. Congressman Keating, thank you for the question. 

Yes, of course, as an EU-facilitated process the continued role of 

the EU is critical to the success of the process. The next implementation meetings are taking place in Brussels even today, tomorrow, 

the rest of the week, to see about the best way to move things forward. Both sides fully recognize that it was not just by initialing 

this agreement last Friday that they move forward on their EU 

paths. They have to show commitment and they have to work to 

implement the agreement. So while it is up to the EU to decide 

what penalties or steps they might take, it is certainly necessary 

for both Serbia and for Kosovo to act to implement this agreement 

in order to benefit from positive decisions by the European Union. 

Mr. KEATING. Right. I just wanted to quickly say, do you think 

any kind of penalties are in order as part of that enforcement process? Can you envision that? 

Mr. MOORE. I can tell you, Congressman Keating, from what I 

know and what we have heard, the EU is definitely going to hold 

both sides’ feet to the fire. Exactly what the menu of options is for 

them, it may be among those that you suggested, that will have to 

be determined by the willingness of one side or both sides to implement. The important thing is that both Kosovo and Serbia have 

passed toward the European Union and that neither can hold up 

the other. 

Mr. KEATING. And you think that one of those possibiities could 

be not allowing accession? 

Mr. MOORE. Certainly that again becomes a matter for the member states. Accession to the EU is years away even for Serbia. We 

just saw for Croatia the process took well over 10 years. So there 

are many steps along the process where the EU can stall or suspend or make other demands if they have concerns, and we expect 

that they would do that if implementation is not complete. 

Mr. KEATING. All right, thank you. As you mentioned, Kosovo 

lags behind the other countries in the Balkans in its efforts to join 

the EU, but while Serbia is moving ahead with accession talks, 

Kosovo is still working to achieve visa liberalization and a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. 

Mr. MOORE. Yes. 

Mr. KEATING. And every small step in Kosovo’s progress with 

Brussels could, indeed, as mentioned before by the ranking member, could face a veto by one of the five EU non-recognizers making 

their path even harder. Can you discuss Kosovo’s pathway toward 

the EU? Are they making steady progress at this point even if it 

is a ways off, or are there more roadblocks, literally and figuratively, ahead? Is there a way that the U.S. assistance to Kosovo 

can be used to help Pristina with some of the technical requirements involving moving forward in the EU? What could be the 

U.S.’s role in that regard? 

23

Mr. MOORE. Thank you for the question, Congressman Keating. 

In terms of the support and assistance of the United States on specific issues, for example, visa liberalization, that comes down to 

many aspects of the rule of law and the functioning of Kosovo’s institutions and many technical requirements. The assistance we 

have in the rule of law sector along the lines of where Congressman Holding did his work years ago was very important to that effort. 

On a grander scale, of course, this agreement opens many doors 

to the EU for Kosovo as well as for Serbia. On the specific issue 

of non-recognizers it is of course true, Congressman, that 

recognizers at one point or another can raise objections or concerns 

to the process moving forward. That is the nature of how the EU 

works. We would certainly like to see a situation where those five 

non-recognizers are able to recognize Kosovo. We have an ongoing 

diplomatic effort to encourage greater recognition of Kosovo not 

just in Europe but all around the world. Those countries like other 

EU members will have to choose their own level, what decisions 

they want to make and how supportive they are of Kosovo’s 

progress toward the EU. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes, you mentioned briefly that the U.S. could be 

helpful in giving technical advice toward moving toward the rule 

of law. What other things could the U.S. be doing besides that? 

Mr. MOORE. Well, there are many aspects of course of EU legislation. I forget how many tens of thousands of pages of laws, rules, 

have to be harmonized, have to be implemented as a country moves 

toward the EU. Rule of law is an obvious sector because legislation 

has to be harmonized and implemented throughout Kosovo. There 

are other areas in which we work to provide assistance for the 

growth of the economy, for example in the energy sector which are 

not as directly tied to their EU prospects, but are necessary for 

their long-term prosperity and economic success. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. Judge Poe? 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned in my opening statement, Mr. Moore, human rights violations are a big concern. And part of the reason is when the people involved, the countries involved, believe that there are human rights violations in another country that causes tension in trying to work out some longterm relationship of trust. 

I want to ask you about the status of the special task force investigating an organ trafficking ring operation out of the so-called Yellow House in Kosovo. This operation supposedly took place from 

1999 to 2000, maybe after that. When I went to Serbia and Kosovo 

this was talked about and brought up quite a bit. It is not talked 

about, I don’t think, over here in the United States much, and I 

don’t know about the United Nations. But it is talked about as a 

situation that is not resolved. 

And do the findings made by the Council of Europe Special 

Rapporteur Dick Marty, in his findings, deserve some kind of closer 

look? And has anybody been brought to, so to speak, justice for 

these accusations? Has it been resolved one way or another? I 

mean it has been awhile. Where are we on this, Mr. Moore? 

24

And let me just finish this. You said that we expect that the 

Kosovos will make sure that there are no human rights violations 

in their country and we expect the Serbs to do the same. This may 

be an example of where that isn’t working out so well when we 

have these accusations of human rights violations. So help me out 

with this. Where are we on the Yellow House situation? 

Mr. MOORE. Thank you, Your Honor. First, let me say that unfortunately as is documented in our annual human rights reports to 

Congress, there are human rights violations in countries all around 

the world, including very well established and——

Mr. POE. I am not talking about around the world. Let us talk 

about the area that we are talking about today, Mr. Moore. 

Mr. MOORE. I am very pleased to do that, Your Honor. In specific 

reference to those accusations, we take them and all accusations of 

war crimes very seriously. Clint Williamson, the former Ambassador-at-Large of the United States for war crimes, is leading the 

Special Investigative Task Force. He is doing that under the auspices of the European Union EULEX Mission. That work continues. 

The hope is that——

Mr. POE. What does that mean that the work continues? What 

does that mean? What is being looked at? Are people being questioned? I mean how long is this investigation going to take? Is it 

going to be another investigation like the Warren Commission that 

just takes forever, or what? Is there going to be some resolution to 

it? So kind of cut to the chase, Mr. Moore. Where are we on this 

investigation? 

Mr. MOORE. Well, thank you, Your Honor. You would be more familiar with the amount of time needed for prosecution than I am. 

The hope is that a prosecution will be possible in the next year. 

Ambassador Williamson and his team are still collecting evidence. 

They are doing that through EULEX. The latest information I 

have, Your Honor, is that they are not ready to go directly to prosecution. There is also a question about where the prosecution is 

going to take place. I will take that question, if you will allow me, 

Your Honor, and get you any more specific up-to-date information 

on that. Ambassador Williamson is working very actively and certainly the intention is to have a prosecution if there is sufficient 

evidence to warrant that within the next year. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Thank you, I would appreciate some follow-up in 

writing. NATO, what is the current position of the Serbian Government and its desire or lack of desire to be in NATO? When I am 

over there I hear different things. What is it today regarding Serbia being a part of NATO? 

Mr. MOORE. The latest information we have with regard to the 

current opinion of the standing government in Serbia, is that they 

have not in any way applied for NATO membership. The previous 

governments have not done that. We do have a very active military-to-military relationship at the highest ranks, but at this point 

I am unaware of any desire by this or previous Governments of 

Serbia to apply for NATO membership. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. I will yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Your Honor. And now 

I yield to Mr. Engel for what time you may choose to consume. 

25

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 

just want to say that there have been trials by some people, 

Ramush Haradinaj and others, in The Hague, and Mr. Haradinaj 

was found innocent of all charges twice. So we in the United States 

are not used to a situation where if you are found innocent at a 

trial you can be recharged on the same issues. He was recharged 

and found innocent twice. I think it is important to state that. 

Let me ask you that Kosovo hopes not only to join the EU in the 

future but to join NATO as well. To do that it has to first establish 

a military and join the Partnership for Peace. Could you let the 

subcommittee know the U.S. position on when the independent, 

sovereign Republic of Kosovo will be able to create a military and 

join the Partnership for Peace? Will the United States support 

Kosovo’s efforts to establish a military and join the Partnership for 

Peace? 

Mr. MOORE. Thank you, Congressman Engel, for your question. 

Now let me say that as I mentioned before we are working very 

closely with our NATO allies on exactly these issues now. The 

Kosovo Security Force, of course, has essentially a civil emergency 

mission now. The evolution of that into a different sort of military 

is something which involves KFOR and NATO very closely. It is 

also a matter of consensus within NATO exactly the sort of relationship that NATO is able to support, the sort of forces that 

NATO is able to support. This is an ongoing topic. At the same 

time we are working with the Kosovo Security Force directly. We 

are working with the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force on 

these sorts of questions. It is a likely step for that to evolve at some 

point in the near future, but this is a matter of discussion both 

with Pristina and within NATO. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I just think that the U.S. needs to let our European allies know, particularly the five EU countries out of the 27 

that still do not currently recognize Kosovo, that they ought to do 

it. I know that has been our position and I know we have been 

somewhat vocal about it. But I think that in light of the April 19th 

accord, I think that should change the equation. Do you think that 

the April 19th accord will cause those five EU countries that do not 

currently recognize Kosovo to do so? 

Mr. MOORE. We would certainly like to think that the April 19th 

accord would provide greater impetus and justification for recognition by those five and countries outside Europe. That is part of our 

diplomatic efforts as you say, Congressman Engel. We will have to 

see what successes we have with that effort. But certainly they 

should have more reasons to engage, if not recognize, Kosovo. 

Mr. ENGEL. How about us? Will we make a renewed effort to do 

this? 

Mr. MOORE. The pursuance of recognition of Kosovo is an active 

effort. We have a full-time action officer in my office at the State 

Department focused on this. Whether it is for Europe, Asia, Africa, 

or the rest of the world, we have a comprehensive effort to seek 

recognitions. I even traveled to Africa in an effort to secure more 

recognitions from African countries as part of a delegation with 

Kosovo. This is a very comprehensive effort and I can assure you 

that we continue to engage on that. 

26

Mr. ENGEL. I am for Kosovo joining the EU and I am for Serbia 

joining the EU. Should Serbia and Kosovo join the EU at the same 

time in order to prevent the potential of Serbia blocking Kosovo’s 

membership? What are we doing to make sure that if Kosovo is 

moving at a slower pace with the EU accession that Serbia cannot 

or would not block it, and what can we do expecting Kosovo’s aspirations to join the United Nations that is currently blocked by both 

Serbia and Russia? 

Mr. MOORE. On the first question in terms of their path toward 

the EU, they are on different tracks. They of course had different 

starting points. Serbia is already a candidate member and Kosovo 

is just looking at securing a Stabilization and Association Agreement. Exactly what tempo, of course, they pursue toward EU membership will depend very much upon their performance in the process of introducing and implementing legislation, meeting other 

steps, meeting other criteria set by the EU. They are on separate 

tracks. As was pointed out in the agreement, of course, neither can 

hold back the other. That is a principle to which they should continue to be held. So regardless of which country reaches membership first, they would not be able to disadvantage the other. That 

has been an issue of evolving policy in the European Union, and 

we will have to see at what stage the European Union is when that 

question arises, if it is a question of one trying to block the other. 

We certainly would hope that is not the case. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, is it ironclad that it cannot happen? It seems 

to me to be a bit unfair if there is even the remote possibility that 

it could happen. It would seem to me that we should make it clear, 

or that you should make it clear that that could not happen. That 

one country could not block the other. 

Mr. MOORE. Congressman, that is an excellent question. I can 

only tell you that in the recent case of Croatia and Slovenia, Slovenia raised objections quite late in the process to Croatia moving 

forward. They were able to address that issue bilaterally. The EU 

has changed the circumstances under which a single member state 

can block the progress of a new member. I think that process will 

need to evolve, but I apologize, I am not in the position to speculate 

about exactly how thing will be. Even for Serbia we are talking 

about a process that will last, to judge by other averages, at least 

a decade. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. Let me ask you a final question. I have been 

deeply concerned that to date no individuals have been convicted 

for the brutal killing of three United States citizens, the Bytyqi 

brothers, Agron, Ylli and Mehmet. As you know, they were helping 

to save the lives of a Roma family from Kosovo where they were 

unlawfully detained by Serbian authorities and suffered an execution-style murder. It was a long time ago. We want to move on. But 

11 years after the discovery of their bodies no one has been held 

accountable for their killing, and the chief suspects in the chain of 

command, including the camp commander, have never been 

charged. 

So what is the status of their case, and can you describe the 

State Department’s efforts to press Serbia to bring the killers to 

justice? Is there anything more that Congress can do to help press 

Serbia to achieve justice for the Bytyqi family? I just met with the 

27

fourth Bytyqi brother who is in New York. Just a few weeks ago 

I sat down with him. 

Mr. MOORE. Thank you, Congressman. This is a case which disturbs us greatly, the arrest and then murder of three American 

citizens. We also have met with Fatose Bytyqi, the surviving brother, who lives in the United States. We have engaged at this level 

and at the most senior bilateral levels including by Secretary Clinton when she was in Belgrade last fall. Our Deputy Secretary of 

State raised it directly with Prime Minister Dacic, and he is also 

Interior Minister of Serbia. 

We continue to call upon these authorities in Belgrade to investigate this case and to prosecute it. We are not aware of direct 

progress. There have been no convictions in this case. Serbia is certainly very well aware that it is extremely high on our bilateral 

agenda. We want to see justice in this case as in all cases of war 

crimes. This happens to involve, as you say, three American citizens so it figures prominently in our bilateral agenda from that 

perspective as well. But unfortunately, to this point we have not 

received any information from the government or authorities in 

Serbia that that case is moving forward other than some investigations. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, let me conclude by saying that I think that this 

should be continued to be pressed and is a real priority, and I know 

the chairman would agree with me because we have discussed 

these issues a lot. These are three American citizens and we really 

demand answers for American citizens. 

Mr. MOORE. Yes. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I guess when you have a case like that pending that it undermines this belief that everyone can just trust the 

rule of law, even though you set up a situation where you have 

people who hate each other are within the same governmental 

structure. 

Mr. Holding? 

Mr. HOLDING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Speaking of the rule of 

law, I would like to take my time and allow you to give us, or give 

me, somewhat of an update on the state of the rule of law in 

Kosovo. I believe I was there in 2010. It is plagued by high unemployment and high crime and public corruption. So I would be interested in having your thoughts as to where they stand now. Have 

they had some improvement over the course of the last 3 or 4 

years? 

Mr. MOORE. Congressman Holding, thank you for the question. 

We do believe there has been improvement. Part of that has come 

about because of our assistance programs and our cooperation. As 

you mentioned, we offered training exchanges. We brought people 

from law enforcement organizations and authorities here. We 

worked through different programs of the U.S. Department of Justice with judges, with prosecutors. We worked directly through 

ICITAP with the police in Kosovo as well. 

It is a comprehensive effort. It takes a lot of time. Corruption is 

rampant throughout the region, throughout the former Yugoslavia. 

These are all countries, even the most established like Serbia, that 

suffer under a history of years of Communist and undemocratic 

28

leadership and institutions. So it is a tough road. I think there has 

been progress. We believe there has been improvement. But indeed 

the Kosovo police is better able, for example, to protect Serbian historical and cultural sites than they did in the past. Of nine key 

sites, they are able to provide security at seven. There are excesses. 

The situation is not perfect. 

Taking Judge Poe’s advice and comments into mind, I don’t wish 

to comment on comparisons to other countries, but suffice it to say 

we are not done with the work. We are working closely with Ministers of Interior and other such leaders to fix things, but we do see 

some improvement over the past few years. I apologize. I don’t 

have a direct means to quantify that now. If this is of interest to 

you I would be happy to follow up with more specific information 

on that. 

Mr. HOLDING. That would be great if you could get back on that. 

The level of cooperation that we have now, has it been increasing 

over the number of years as far as Department of Justice cooperation, U.S. lawyer cooperation? Is that still on the rise or has that 

started to diminish? 

Mr. MOORE. Congressman, you are correct, it has started to diminish. Based on needs and priorities around the world for U.S. assistance dollars, the number has gone down a bit. Both Kosovo and 

Bosnia and Herzegovina are still focal points for U.S. assistance in 

the region. Those numbers have gone down for all countries in the 

region, but we still have a robust effort coordinating with our colleagues at the U.S. Department of Justice on rule of law cooperation in Kosovo. 

Mr. HOLDING. Well, Kosovo always has struck me as a great opportunity for the United States to partner with because it is a nation that likes the United States and it has a predominantly Muslim population of some 90 percent, and it is a Muslim nation that 

likes the United States. And I think there is great opportunity 

there being the youngest nation on our planet. And hopefully it will 

be welcomed into the fold by all nations as it comes to fruition in 

the course of years. So thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. MOORE. Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. I have one last clarification for you. 

Mr. MOORE. Please. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Was it your testimony earlier that part of 

this understanding, if not part of the agreement, was that Kosovo 

would not deploy security forces in those northern provinces that 

are Serbian-dominated, and that how ever that was going to be 

compensated for, in some way balanced out because the fact that 

KFOR and U.S. forces would then be deployable. Is that correct? 

Mr. MOORE. In the context of what you correctly pointed out, 

Chairman Rohrabacher, as the first agreement, there is no role for 

KSF, and freedom of movement in a safe and secure environment 

will be handled by EULEX and KFOR without needing to turn to 

KSF. So in this immediate situation—as this is again just the first 

step—there is no role for KSF or a successor military. However, in 

the future that could change. And if I have stated in a way that 

there is no role at any point in the future that would not be correct. 

29

In the context of this agreement and the effort to implement this 

agreement, there is no role for KSF. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So the agreement then actually depends upon KFOR and the United States to continue indefinitely, 

because there is no mention as to any length of time that this status quo will exist either. That is quite disturbing. 

Mr. MOORE. May I clarify further, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, you may. 

Mr. MOORE. It is certainly not our intention that KFOR should 

remain there indefinitely. There are still 5,000 troops in KFOR of 

which nearly 800 belong to the United States. Recognizing needs 

and priorities around the world, we want to see that change. The 

hope is that with this effort to implement this agreement, over 

time the security situation in Kosovo will evolve, and we hope, by 

the way, on a shorter timeline rather than a longer timeline so that 

KFOR’s role does not need to be what it is today and that both the 

United States and other troop contributors can appropriately reduce their presence on the ground in Kosovo. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. I would suggest that 

again that things will evolve a lot quicker if people would draw 

maps that are consistent with the will of the local population rather than expecting the local population to ignore the attitudes and 

the values that they have developed and reactions to each other 

that have been developing for centuries. Thank you very much, and 

we appreciate your testimony. 

Mr. MOORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And next we have another panel and they 

may proceed to sit down. And we will have five panelists, and each 

one will be expected to testify around 5 minutes, but have a more 

in-depth testimony will be made part of the record as part of their 

testimony. 

I want to thank this panel of witnesses for joining us today. We 

will start with Daniel Serwer who is a senior research professor of 

Conflict Management as well as a senior fellow at the Center for 

Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 

International Studies. He is also a scholar at the Middle East Institute, and while working for the U.S. Institute of Peace he led missions to the Balkans. He was a minister-counselor at the Department of State, serving from 1994 to ’96 as a special U.S. envoy and 

coordinator for the Bosnian Federation, mediating between the 

Croats and the Muslims, and negotiating the first agreement that 

they reached at the Dayton peace talks. 

We then have with us Shirley DioGuardi, and she is a Balkan 

affairs adviser to the Albanian American Civic League, a position 

she has held since 1995, together with her husband who is a 

former Member of Congress, I might add, a very well respected 

Member of Congress. She has worked to bring lasting peace and 

stability to the Balkans. Shirley is a former publisher of the Lawrence Hill Books specializing in domestic and international politics. 

And then in 1995, she published ‘‘Yugoslavia’s Ethnic Nightmare,’’ 

the first book on the causes and consequences of the Balkan conflict. She has worked closely with the Albanian communities and 

holds a Bachelors degree in Sociology from Oberlin College and a 

30

Masters in Divinity from the Union Theological Seminary in New 

York. 

And after that we have Mr. Kesic, a senior partner with TSM 

Global Consultants. Over the last two decades, Mr. Kesic has 

served as consultant on Balkan affairs for various U.S. agencies, 

international corporations and organizations. Mr. Kesic is a member of the board of directors of the Institute on Religion and Public 

Policy. He is a co-founder and represents the Serbian American 

community in the National Democratic Ethnic Coordinating Committee, and is a consultant and advisor to the Serbian American 

Institute. 

We then have Mr. Gjoni who, since 2005, has been an advisor 

and a component leader for USAID projects in Kosovo. Before that 

he worked for the United Nations in Kosovo. He was also an expert 

working on drafting the Kosovo Constitution in 2008. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the School of Politics and International 

Relations of the University College Dublin, and a Fulbright Scholar. He holds a Masters of Law degree from Columbia Law School, 

and a law degree from Faculty of Law at the University of Tirana 

in Albania. 

And then we have Bob Churcher, a freelance consultant specializing in political analysis and post conflict issues with considerable 

experience in the Balkans. Following a successful career in the 

British Army, he went to work for the British Foreign Office and 

the European community as an observer in the Bosnian war, and 

stayed in the Balkans, most often in Albania and Kosovo, with various international organizations. This included serving as director 

for the International Crisis Group on Kosovo. 

Now with that we may start with Mr. Serwer, and as I say, if 

you could try to keep it to 5 minutes then we will have time for 

a dialogue or questions and answers. But anything you would like 

to put into the record will be made part of the record, at the time, 

along with your testimony. So thank you very much. You may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL SERWER, PH.D., PROFESSOR, SCHOOL 

OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS 

UNIVERSITY 

Mr. SERWER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this 

opportunity to testify on the pathway to peace for Kosovo and Serbia, which has been a long and difficult one. With your permission, 

I will summarize and submit my full testimony for the record. 

I would like to make five points. First, this is a good agreement. 

If fully implemented, it will go a long way to establishing democratically validated institutions as well as clear legal and police authority on the whole territory of Kosovo while allowing ample selfgovernance for Serbs in northern Kosovo on many other issues, in 

fact, ample self-governance for Serbs throughout Kosovo. 

Second, implementation will be a challenge, one that requires 

Pristina to make integration attractive, and Belgrade to end the financing that makes resistance in northern Kosovo possible. Belgrade and Pristina will need to cooperate to end the smuggling of 

tax-free goods that has enriched organized crime and spoilers, both 

Serb and Albanian. 

31

Third, the agreement should end any discussion of exchange of 

territory between Kosovo and Serbia which, in my view, is a bad 

idea that risks destabilizing Bosnia, Macedonia, and even Serbia 

proper. We should work to make northern Kosovo a model of winwin reintegration for the rest of the Balkans. 

Fourth, Belgrade and Pristina have taken an important step toward normalizing relations, but they will need to do more, including eventual recognition and exchange of Ambassadors. If that does 

not happen neither will be able to get into the EU and both may 

try to arm themselves for a possible new confrontation. In accordance with this agreement, I would note, each will apply for EU 

membership as a separate, independent and sovereign state. 

Fifth, we owe props to the EU, and in particular Catherine Ashton not only for the mediation work she did but also for the vital 

incentives the EU provided. The U.S. Government shares supporting actor credit with leading Lady Ashton, which is as it should 

be. 

Mr. Chairman, I am relieved that an agreement has been 

reached, but still concerned about the future. The BelgradePristina Dialogue is a classic case of elite pact-making without a 

broader peacebuilding process. The underlying drivers of conflict 

have not been addressed. Many Serbs and Kosovo Albanians still 

think badly of each other and rank themselves as victims. I agree 

with you about that. 

There has been little mutual acknowledgement of harm. Few Albanians and Serbs have renewed personal ties and it is becoming 

increasingly difficult to do so as many younger people lack a common language other than English. It is almost 14 years since the 

end of the NATO-Yugoslavia war. To be self-sustaining this peace 

process is going to need to go deeper and involve many more citizens on both sides. 

The road is long, Mr. Chairman, but we are near its end and we 

need to keep going in the right direction. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Serwer follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much for your very optimistic testimony. 

Shirley, are you as optimistic as that gentleman? 

STATEMENT OF MS. SHIRLEY CLOYES DIOGUARDI, BALKAN 

AFFAIRS ADVISER, ALBANIAN AMERICAN CIVIC LEAGUE 

Ms. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. I regret to say I am not. Mr. Chairman, 

first of all, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify. I will 

be submitting my testimony for the record and summarizing it 

here. I would also like to take this opportunity to append to my testimony a recent article in the Eurasia Review by Faton Bislimi, entitled, ‘‘The Politics of Compromise is Compromising Kosovo’s Future.’’

Mr. ROHRABACHER. With no objections that will be attached to 

your testimony. 

Ms. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. Thank you. I want to note that it is primarily in this hearing room among all the governmental bodies in 

the West that the hard questions about the Balkan conflict have 

been asked over the past two decades. Under former chairmen Gilman, Hyde, Lantos, the serious effort was made to reveal and explore the realities on the ground in South Central Europe during 

Serbian dictator Slobadan Milosevic’s brutal 10-year occupation of 

Kosova and genocidal march across the Balkans that ultimately 

claimed 200,000 lives and left 4 million displaced. It was here that 

the vote was cast to support NATO airstrikes against Serbia which 

finally brought the Kosova war to an end in 1999, and ended the 

Balkan wars of the 1990s. 

Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, it cannot be more timely to have 

this particular hearing now in your subcommittee raising questions 

about the resolution of the Balkan conflict just days after Catherine Ashton, the European Union’s High Representative, has proclaimed a successful outcome to 10 rounds of talks between Belgrade and Pristina. If the outcome were genuinely successful this 

hearing would not be necessary. 

But unfortunately, in my opinion, the agreement between Serbian Prime Minister Dacic and Prime Minister Thaci is a quick fix. 

It does not amount to a comprehensive and effective agreement 

that will bring lasting peace and stability to the region. In my opinion, this will only happen when Serbia recognizes Kosova’s sovereignty and its admission to international institutions, grants 

equal civil and human rights to the Albanian majority in the 

Presheva Valley-on a par, I might add, with the rights that are currently enjoyed by Serbs in Kosova-relinquishes its parallel structures in northern Kosova, and focuses on the economic and political 

development of Serbia. Once that happens, Kosova’s Government 

will need to focus on the establishment of a genuine democracy and 

rule of law, something it has failed to do because of its lack of sovereignty and the corruption of many of its government officials. 

The 15-point agreement on April 19 does not, in my opinion, as 

Catherine Ashton has declared, amount to ‘‘a step closer to Europe 

for both Serbia and Kosovo.’’ On the contrary, it will allow Serbia 

to interfere in the internal affairs of Kosova. With this agreement, 

Serbia will be allowed to enter into the membership negotiations 

with the EU through a false demonstration of neighborly relations 

37

with Kosova and ultimately to achieve what has always been its 

primary goal, the denial of Kosova’s sovereignty and the acquisition 

of northern Kosova. 

Now how have we arrived at this point? It is the result, in my 

opinion, of three interconnected patterns in the postwar period that 

still continue 13 years after the war. One, delaying the resolution 

of Kosova’s final status, its declaration of independence notwithstanding, due to a misguided Western foreign policy approach that 

has appeasing Serbia as its centerpiece. Two, successive U.S. administrations taking a backseat to Europe when it comes to policy 

in the Balkans. And three, Belgrade’s efforts to destabilize Kosova 

with the goal of making the de facto partition of northern Kosova 

a legal, de jure reality. 

We had a different chance at war’s end. The Clinton administration and the EU could have recognized Kosova’s inevitable independence, informed Belgrade that it had forfeited its legitimacy to 

govern Kosova, and set Serbia on a path to democratization. But 

as we know this isn’t what happened. Kosova became a protectorate of the U.N., and even today because of a large number of 

member states in the U.N. General Assembly have not recognized 

Kosova’s sovereignty, and especially because five member states in 

the EU—Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Romania, and Slovakia—still 

refuse to do so, Kosova’s political, economic and social progress, 

like Bosnia, has been stymied. 

For the past 13 years, almost 14, we have witnessed a foreign 

policy in the U.S. State Department that instead of being prevention-oriented and making human rights the centerpiece, that it instead has constructed policy frameworks to delay the resolution of 

Kosova’s final status and admission to the EU, NATO, U.N. and 

other international institutions. I don’t believe that it serves the 

United States to continue to distance itself from the resolution of 

the Balkan conflict by deeming it Europe’s problem. Contrary to 

what our State Department has said today, whenever the United 

States has taken a backseat to Europe, and I still believe it has, 

the situation in the region has deteriorated because the EU’s diverse, 27 member states have not been able to coalesce around a 

common foreign policy apart from America’s political and military 

leadership. That has been true for over a decade. 

The Obama administration has been publicly holding the line 

that the de facto partition of northern Kosova should not become 

legal, but they actually haven’t taken any action to back up the position. For more than two decades, Belgrade has been able to move 

into that vacuum created by the lack of unity and lack of resolve 

among the EU member nations, between the EU and the U.S., and 

all the more so because the guiding principle of the EU and our 

Government has been appeasement. Belgrade’s goal has always 

been to achieve its expansionist aims in Kosova diplomatically by 

legalizing the partition of northern Kosova, just as it achieved its 

expansionist aims in Bosnia by force when at the end of the Bosnian war in 1995 it was awarded with the artificially created 

Republika Srpska. 

Ever since the war ended in June ’99, there has been an effort 

to destabilize the north. Now, and I will conclude, in a final push 

to resolve the conflict between Belgrade and Pristina in order to 

38

achieve the principle of exiting the region, the EU, with the support of the U.S. Government, has proclaimed an agreement that 

unfortunately papers over the roots of the conflict and the realities 

on the ground. The Balkans are again at risk because the current 

agreement does not grapple with the roots of the Balkan conflict 

and doesn’t carve out a real solution. 

I think the time has come to ask all parties, the U.S. Government, the EU, Serbia, what do they really want? Will Belgrade 

struggle to retain Kosova at all costs, and will Serbia become part 

of Europe? The current accord enables Belgrade to enter into membership talks with the EU but without dismantling the structures 

of northern Kosova, without recognizing Kosova’s sovereignty, without acknowledging Kosova’s right to enter bodies. Will the U.S. and 

the EU decide what they really want—a whole, undivided, peaceful, democratic, and prosperous EU, or a periphery of failed, aiddependent societies that saddle it with economic and law enforcement responsibilities? 

To prevent a costly and potentially deadly conflict going forward, 

the West will have to rethink its diplomatic strategy. We need a 

new paradigm for how we handle foreign policy in the Balkans and 

elsewhere, again one that emphasizes conflict prevention and 

human rights not stability at all costs. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cloyes DioGuardi follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me add one phrase and then we will go 

onto the questions afterwards from your presentation. And does 

Kosovo, how long will they insist on hanging on to an area where 

the vast majority, 90 percent of the people, don’t want to be part 

of Kosovo in the same way they didn’t want to be part of Serbia? 

Mr. Kesic, you may proceed with your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MR. OBRAD KESIC, SENIOR PARTNER, TSM 

GLOBAL CONSULTANTS, LLC 

Mr. KESIC. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that my complete 

statement be entered into the record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It certainly will be, thank you. 

Mr. KESIC. Thank you. One quick question for you. Can I depart 

from my prepared statement for 1 minute? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You may depart from your prepared statement for the whole testimony, and your testimony will be put into 

the record, but you have got 5 minutes. 

Mr. KESIC. Okay. That is fine. That is all I will need. I want to 

respond to something that you actually initiated in the discussion 

with Jonathan Moore. And that is the question about the issue of 

partition or allowing self-determination. And I will come back to 

this from my full statement. But the one question that has really 

perplexed not only Serbs but also some experts in this town is why 

the U.S. Government insists on taking every option off the table 

and claiming that partition is destructive when they partitioned 

Serbia? There seemed to be no qualms about changing the borders 

of Serbia, but yet they all of sudden have found the religion, true 

religion, when it comes to changing any other borders. 

And I think your position is legitimate. That is not to say that 

I agree with it, but I believe it is a question that needs to be asked, 

and this is a timely hearing to pose questions like that as well as 

the questions that Congressman Poe posed about the discrepancy 

between justice and how justice and the rule of law are interpreted 

when it comes to trying to push forward the independence of 

Kosovo. 

Now having said that let me go back and try to explain to you 

why Serbs are very skeptical about this agreement as a whole. 

Even those who have signed this agreement have expressed skepticism and have claimed that they signed on the basis that if they 

didn’t they would be forced to accept the worst reality. So it wasn’t 

out of free will as they would portray it, it was coerced signature. 

And of course that leaves questions of implementation, and there 

we agree in terms of the skepticism that we share about the pitfalls of continuing dialogue and trying to implement something 

that from the start is difficult to implement. 

Now many Serbs view that the U.S. and the EU have shown a 

consistent pattern of lying about their commitment to protect Serbs 

in Kosovo. During the ’99 NATO intervention, Serbs were told that 

NATO, following the withdrawal of Serbian police and army, would 

protect them. Since the entry of NATO into Kosovo in June 1999, 

over 250,000 non-Albanians were driven from their homes through 

violence, intimidation and harassment. According to the OSCE 

Kosovo Mission in a report of October 2012, 235,000 non-Albanians 

remain displaced. 

54

Also the U.S. constantly, and the EU constantly move the goalpost. The Serbs were promised that status would be dealt with 

after standards were implemented, then once that proved to be impossible they told the Serbs that it would be standards and status 

simultaneously. Then when Kosovo proclaimed independence they 

were told that standards would come after status. We are still 

waiting to this day to deal with the standards. Serbs do not have 

confidence in the word of the U.S. and the EU. 

Secondly, many Serbs also question the selective application of 

international law by the U.S. and the EU. When the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was disintegrating in violence and conflict, the Badinter Committee ruled that territorial sovereignty and 

integrity of the republics prevailed over the rights of national 

groups to self-determination, thus holding that Slovenia, Croatia 

and the four republics have the right to partition Yugoslavia, while 

at the same time being entitled to their own territorial integrity regardless of the demands of the Krajina Serbs and the Bosnian 

Serbs to self-determination. It should be noted that the Commission held that this was also was the case with Serbia itself. Most 

Serbs wonder why it seems that everybody but Serbs have a right 

to self-determination. 

The third point is that Serbs are also upset with what seems to 

be constant moving of goalposts by the EU and the U.S. when it 

comes to conditionality regarding Serbia’s entry into the EU. I just 

want to move to my recommendations and I will end there. 

The first recommendation is the U.S. and the EU should firmly 

oppose any use of violence especially directed or threatened against 

the Serbs in the rth of Kosovo no matter from whom that threat 

comes from. Secondly, the EU should engage the Serbian leaders 

in the north of Kosovo and begin a series of discussions that would 

lead to their active involvement in all negotiations that concern 

their future. Third, the EU and the U.S. should reconsider all potential options for the northern Serb communities including enhanced autonomy, parallel shared sovereignty, the federalizationregionalization of Kosovo and even allowing them the right to selfdetermination. 

Fourth, the EU should be encouraged to formally and publicly 

announce all of the remaining conditions being put before Serbia 

and Kosovo. That the U.S. should insist that this list be considered 

final and that no additional conditions be added without the consensus of all EU members. 

Fifth, the EU and the U.S. must demand that the Albanian 

dominated Kosovo Government increase its efforts to protect the 

rights of Serbs and other non-Albanians throughout the remaining 

territory under its control. Sixth, the U.S. Congress should organize additional hearings focusing attention and building support for 

action in improving human, minority and civil rights of Serbs and 

other non-Albanians in Kosovo. 

And finally, the EU-sponsored talks between Belgrade and 

Pristina should be continued but refocused on technical issues such 

as property rights, et cetera, so that there could be a gradual building of goodwill, so that then we can address this other issue of status. And once the issue of status is addressed then the U.N. should 

55

be present since it will take a Security Council resolution to resolve 

the issue of status and formalize it. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kesic follows:]


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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for your very poignant 

presentation. 

And Mr. Gjoni? 

STATEMENT OF MR. ROLAND GJONI, JD, LLM (FORMER SENIOR LEGAL AND POLICY ADVISOR TO EFFECTIVE MUNICIPALITIES INITIATIVE IN KOSOVO) 

Mr. GJONI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and dear members of committee. I would like to say that I have made a full written statement which I wish, with your permission, to be included as a part 

of the record, and I hereby summarize the main elements of it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And no objection, so ordered. 

Mr. GJONI. So my presentation today is mainly based from a policymaking perspective. I come here after working with Pristina institutions and many extensive experience in Serb communities in 

Kosovo with the establishment of post independence municipalities. 

So I will explain the positions of the parties when this EU-brokered 

agreement started, where did it end, and what does it mean for the 

future or the sustainable peace in the Balkans. 

First, I must say that in October 2012, EU High Representative 

Ashton managed to bring together for the first time after independence the two prime ministers, and the central issue revolved 

around the status of the northern predominately Serb municipalities. Pristina started from the prospective that the Ahtisaari Plan 

was sufficient to address all potential concerns of Serb community 

in Kosovo in terms of cultural preservation, leaving Serbs within 

Kosovo. And Serbia started with a new political platform for discussions with Pristina institutions which provided extensive powers 

for a Serb community in the north Kosovo extending as well in the 

south enclaves. 

After several rounds, with several workouts from both representative delegations, we have now seen one rejection on 4th of April 

by the Prime Minister of Serbia arguing that what has been offered 

by EU does not address the concerns of the Serb community in the 

north. And on 19th of April we have a 15-point agreement. This is 

now important to see what the position of the parties came to be 

after the renewed talks. 

Now Kosovo has gone beyond the Ahtisaari Plan in accepting, 

partially, the Serbian requests. For one, elevating the status of the 

Serb community to almost an autonomous monoethnic entity allowing the four municipalities to coalesce and have the police commander for the region and four police stations, a separate panel of 

judges, and I hope it is not true but it has been reported that under 

guarantees from NATO it has been agreed that no Kosovo Security 

intelligence or police forces will ever access or operate or in the 

area. Now this as you may better know from MCulloch v. Maryland 

in the United States, it is very consequentials for the territorial integrity of Kosovo, because even in Federal states, the Federal Government can and should in the limited areas where it is sovereign, 

intervene for different reasons. In this particular case, it appears 

that no Kosovo institution can ever reach there even if it is about 

scenarios of rebellious attitudes from a local population. 

So the second thing that I would like to point out is that it has 

been during the Ahtisaari talks the policy of international EU and 

62

U.S. negotiators that a human rights based approach and not a territorial based approach is the solution to Kosovo’s future. And we 

have looked carefully to Ohrid Agreement and Bosnia, and without 

any doubt people thought back then that the best institutional mix 

for ensuring all communities in Kosovo was a human rights minority based approach modeled around Ohrid. What we see now, we 

see a further territorialization of politics, which is a departure from 

the concept of a multi-ethnic society, which is the lynchpin of 

Ahtisaari incorporated in Kosovo institution. 

The second problem that I see in this agreement is that it is uneven. While we can see the move of Kosovo into approaching or accommodating the Serb community, it has not been the persistence 

of EU to ensure that at least Kosovo is not blocked in the membership in the U.N. system. Of course there is some thrown-away provision about not blocking each other on U.N. integration, but what 

does that mean when five nations don’t recognize Kosovo anyway, 

so what can Serbia help there, I don’t understand. 

And the third is, where do we go from now? I think if there is 

any good thing that this has shown, is that EU regardless of economic downturn and crisis has a significant appeal in the western 

Balkans and it may be the only thing that Albanians and Serbs 

agree on is the EU integration. Therefore, I think, first, there is no 

room for complacency here. Second, there should be a point where 

EU and U.S. redirect the parties toward a comprehensive deal 

which deals with missing persons, which deals with war reparations, which deals with border demarcations and reciprocity in 

terms of how we treat minorities no matter where they are straddled. 

And this is why I think the U.S. has a significant role to back 

this agreement and ensure this is only a first step, very pragmatic 

though. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gjoni follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for your testimony, 

and we will be anxious to read your written testimony as well. So 

you are still waiting for this comprehensive agreement to be 

brought on by the Europeans and the Americans. After 12 years of 

waiting, hope springs eternal. 

Mr. Churcher, you are next. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT A. CHURCHER (FORMER 

DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP IN PRISHTINA) 

Mr. CHURCHER. Mr. Chairman, firstly, I want to thank you and 

the members for the honor of being able to testify here. I would 

then say that I would like to submit my testimony for the record. 

I should start with an interjection to say that you have, really, 

very much taken the words out of my mouth. My views very much 

reflect yours. Despite the difficulties, I think that a better settlement would be self-determination in some way. I do appreciate the 

difficulties with it. Now let me summarize my views about this new 

EU-brokered agreement. 

In contrast to many, certainly outside of this room, I do not believe that it is a good or workable agreement. International commentators have already made the agreement out to be wonderful, 

but as people say, the devil is in the detail. In reality, without any 

recognition of Kosovo by Serbia, it leaves Pristina in limbo. There 

will be a roadblocked Kosovo, and the agreement will enable the 

creation of a new Republika Srpska in the north of Kosovo. 

Without recognition there is no way forward for Kosovo. Kosovo 

will remain dysfunctional in the absence of any real legal sovereign 

status, and Serbs will continue to want to claim it or claim it back. 

Unfortunately, to be frank, this agreement has been much more 

about making the new EU Foreign Service, and in particular its 

leader Catherine Ashton, look good rather than producing any 

long-term sustainable solution to the Balkans. In my view, this was 

any agreement at any cost, whatever it took to agree it. 

Without including the recognition of Kosovo by Serbia, the agreement simply ratifies what already exists—a Serb-run statelet in 

the north of Kosovo. All that will be changed is that it will now 

be a legal Serb-run statelet within the north of Kosovo. Serbia’s 

failure to recognize the loss of Kosovo is a failure to recognize the 

defeat of the Serbian project to drive the Kosovos out of Kosovo in 

the 1990s. I regard it as admirable that the United States intervened decisively in the Bosnian-Kosovo wars, but find it puzzling 

and disappointing that the resulting peace agreements have been 

designed to appease Serbia rather than to create stability and lasting solutions in the Balkans. 

A much better solution than the present agreement might have 

been an agreement for territorial exchange, swapping the new, now 

Serb-populated north with the still Albanian speaking Presheva 

and Bujanovac Valleys. In contrast to the State Department speaker’s view, I can assure you that the local people in Presheva do not 

share the feeling that Serbia is looking after their human rights. 

Unfortunately, this idea is probably not yet practical in international terms, but there has to be a way forward. The situation 

ratified by the new agreement will be disastrous in enabling the establishment of a second Republika Srpska. 

71

The only answer, in my view, is that the United States should 

use its international influence to press for Serbia to recognize 

Kosovo, and thus finally end the conflict and enable the Kosovo 

Government to move forward from what will be otherwise an endless uncertainty. Without recognition I believe we are doomed to 

perpetuating instability in the Balkans which is not in the United 

States’ interest or that of anyone else. 

And then let me conclude by pointing out, there is absolutely no 

use to rely on Europe, unfortunately, to sort this out. Europe remains completely disunited and dysfunctional in its dealings with 

Kosovo, as it was and is in Bosnia. As in 1999, only the United 

States has sufficient weight and influence to bring the Serbs to recognize reality that Kosovo is lost and that in order for both countries to move forward they need to recognize it. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Churcher follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I want to thank all of our witnesses, 

and I certainly appreciate your last comments there, of course. Let 

me just note and then we will have a dialogue, a little back and 

forth. 

This religious conviction that you cannot change borders or it 

will create all sorts of problems is, I think, the major obstacle to 

having a significant peace agreement between these two entities, 

between the Kosovars and the Serbs. And it is our own Government that is pushing this nonsense. It is nonsense. I mean the 

Czechs and the Slovaks knew that they couldn’t get along so they 

divided, and they have changed the border. The border what now 

became Czechs and Slovaks in two separate countries. You had the 

north and south Sudan. They believe that we should forcibly keep 

the north and south Sudan together? What would that bring? It 

would bring a lot of bloodshed, that is what it would bring. 

What about Ireland? Wouldn’t it be how horrible to think that 

we are going to change the borders of Great Britain itself by letting 

these—so what if the Irish want to have independence, the vast 

majority? They are still part of the British Empire, and here it is. 

We can’t change the border of the British Empire to just include 

the areas in the northern part of Ireland that happen to be a majority of Protestant. That was a good decision. That was a good decision. Let us end the conflict and agree that those people in the 

northern part of Ireland have the right to make their decision with 

a ballot box. But we are being told here, no, no, oh, can’t do that. 

Then of course we do have to, as Mr. Kesic said, if we accept the 

fact that the United States and the allies had any moral foundation 

to coming in to help Kosovo—I want you to know of course that I 

was a huge supporter of Kosovo—and coming in to help them win 

their freedom and independence, because I believe in their right to 

make that determination, national self-determination. Well, if the 

people in the north don’t have, how come Kosovo had that right to 

break away from Serbia? That changed borders. 

And I believe Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, I seem to remember the 

Soviet Union as it was breaking up say, no, no, this is a part of 

Russia. It doesn’t make any difference what those people want. 

They are part of Russia. And there are, of course do we think that 

it was really, we should have encouraged the people of Bangladesh 

to knuckle under and stay part of Pakistan? Because that is going 

to change the borders of Pakistan. 

And by the way Pakistan, what borders do they have? Who created Pakistan? Pakistan and most of the things we are talking 

about were created by the colonial imperialists of 150 years ago 

and 200 years ago. And we are saying we have to stick with the 

decision of some drunken royalty in one of these countries who decided this is where the borders are going to be now? It is ridiculous. 

And what we have done by this fantasy that that is off the table, 

we have left us in a situation where our friends the Kosovars have 

now, it looks like from this agreement, they have now been put into 

a position of getting nothing, because this word that you can call 

autonomy authority all you want, but what we have here is an official recognition of the autonomy of those four northern provinces. 

And our friends in Kosovo, who I happen to be on their side, 

have got nothing to show for it. At least if we could have an honest 

87

agreement on the right of self-determination, which is what the 

people of Kosovo believe in, that is why they declared their independence, at least we could have some sort of a readjustment of a 

border that includes people who want to be in the country that now 

has emerged because of the changes that have taken place historically. 

So I am very disturbed by this settlement. This settlement will 

not lead to peace. This settlement will encourage those Serbs in the 

northern part, these four provinces, to work with Belgrade and Belgrade to work with them in order to keep this sort of combative relationship going, and it will not create less, it will create more tensions. And that is just my personal observations. And it seems to 

be that the Presheva Valley and the fact that you have so many 

Kosovars living there, it is almost the same sizes as the four northern provinces, almost same territory, almost same population, that 

it is a natural way for Kosovo and Serbia to do something real. Not 

just play with words about autonomy versus authority, but something real that could then serve as the basis for them starting to 

get along and try to open up their borders, try to have free trade 

between them, try to have respect for each other’s citizens. Because 

we now aren’t forcing people into a recognition of something that 

they don’t want and they don’t culturally feel right and historically 

feel right about it. 

So all of these countries what I just mentioned, especially the 

Irish, can you imagine if Britain would have said that and wanted 

to keep the Irish in? That would have been a disaster for Great 

Britain as well as, I might add, for Pakistan and Bangladesh and 

the rest of the ones. If any of you have a comment on what I just 

said, please feel free. Yes, sir? 

Mr. SERWER. Mr. Chairman, with due respect——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Absolutely. Feel free to disagree with everything that I have said. 

Mr. SERWER. I do disagree. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SERWER. I disagree because I think you are failing to make 

some important distinctions between moving the border to accommodate ethnic differences and changing the status of an existing 

boundary or border, which is what we have done in the Balkans. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So moving the border and changing the border are two different things? 

Mr. SERWER. Moving the border and changing its status are two 

completely different things. Moving the border to accommodate ethnic differences leads to an infinity of movement of borders. It can 

never be——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, isn’t that what we did with Kosovo? 

Isn’t that what——

Mr. SERWER. No, we did not do that with Kosovo. We kept the 

boundary between the province of Kosovo, the one time Serbian 

province of Kosovo, and Serbia proper. We kept that exactly where 

it is. That is why we have the problem that we have. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. By the way, who drew those borders? 

Mr. SERWER. Those borders were drawn under Tito, they were 

changed various times. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Tito, was he a democratically elected——

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Mr. SERWER. No, but look——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How about Stalin changing the borders of 

Ossetia and Abkhazia for Georgia? 

Mr. SERWER. If you set off an infinite series of border changes 

you also precipitate ethnic cleansing, and that would be a disaster 

for the Balkans. I can guarantee you that if the north of Kosovo 

is lost to Kosovo, you will have radical Albanians who will seek to 

expel Serbs from south of the Ibar and who will seek union with 

Albania and with Macedonia. You would say, let them. I say that 

is a scenario for an extreme outburst of violence. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Actually, I would never say, let them. I believe that keeping large hunks of people who are contiguous to another border can’t be in the middle of a country obviously, but 

keeping them artificially in that other country is what creates violence, which creates people wanting to commit some sort of attack 

on those people, and their retalitation against those. It has happened over and over again. 

And what doesn’t create, I mean this idea that we are going to 

instill in the rule of law and that that is what is going to make 

the Irish give up their notion that they want to be independent or 

the Bangladeshis or the people, the Serbs north of that river going 

to give up their consciousness as being Serbs, it doesn’t work that 

way. 

Mr. SERWER. Nobody is asking them to give up the consciousness 

of being Serbs. In fact, there are all sorts of provisions in the 

Ahtisaari Plan for maintaining the links to Serbia. They get dual 

citizenship. But to open Pandora’s box and allow an infinite series 

of border changes to accommodate ethnic differences would be a 

mistake. There are Bosniaks in Serbia who would want to be part 

of Bosnia. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And so you believe that the boundaries set 

up by brutal tyrants and kings and royalty have to be maintained 

because it is going to open Pandora’s box, even though there are 

significant groups of people who have a cultural and historical 

identification with each other who want to become a nation, but if 

violates what King Charles or some monarch someplace did back 

2 or 3 years ago——

Mr. SERWER. I believe that everybody’s rights should be protected 

within the borders in which they happen to find themselves, yes, 

because anything else——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you oppose the Kosovars’ independence? 

Mr. SERWER [continuing]. Leads to death and destruction. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, but you then oppose Kosovars’, when 

they rose up and said no, we want to be independent, you were opposed to that, right, because that would change the borders of Serbia? 

Mr. SERWER. I was not the first one to endorse independence for 

Kosovo, I will say that. But the behavior of Serbia in response to 

that uprising unquestionably made independence the only solution. 

It was achieved not by moving the border to accommodate ethnic 

difference, but by changing the status of a preexisting border. And 

I believe that that decision saved lives, yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me suggest to you that, and then I will 

go to the panel, suggest to you that had, when Yugoslavia just 

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broke up, had the West been very clear that different people have 

a right to vote on their self-determination and included the 

Kosovars in that, that would have been a whole, the bloodshed that 

happened wouldn’t have happened. Instead we had Jim Baker 

down there misstating our case to, was it Milosevic, and let him 

think that well, whatever force he needs to use to keep things together that is, we are looking for you to be the force down here of 

stability. And of course that just was a go-get-them type of thing. 

Shirley, and then Mr. Kesic, and then Mr. Engel will have a 

chance or whoever else wants to jump in. Yes? 

Ms. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. To my colleague I want to ask a question because I want to ask many. Why are we always talking about 

potential Albanian violence in Macedonia, in the north? Why is 

that happening? I think one of our problems is the constant discussion of a kind of false parity and characterization of a war that was 

supposedly based on ethnic and religious differences. This was not 

the case. 

This was a land grab. And we sat back as you know, our State 

Department, the EU, while Milosevic made his genocidal march 

across Europe over 10 years. What I would like to see right now 

is for this agreement to be ground to a halt, because I understand 

very much what you are trying to say about the issue of Presheva 

and the north. But the problem is we are in trouble now. Presheva, 

the Albanian majority of Presheva, were never brought to the discussion to begin with. 

And Mr. Churcher, was I correct in saying the State Department 

was wrong when it said that Mr. Moore said that the Albanians in 

the Presheva Valley had civil rights and human rights protections? 

That is absolutely not the case. They have second, if not third-class 

citizenship. So how do we do something now to turn this around 

so that everyone is forced to look at the true conditions of what is 

happening in the Albanian scene? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What we could do is we can make believe 

that the word authority and autonomy just have different meanings and we could make pretend what those words mean. 

Ms. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. Well, we already have because the Association of Serbian Municipalities is, in effect, an autonomous region 

already. To a great extent we have lost the north. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Especially when you suggest that the forces 

of the country can’t go into the area, and that is not an autonomy. 

Mr. Kesic, do you have a comment? 

Mr. KESIC. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It is, for me, the most frustrating 

thing is this relative moralism that comes out in the official position of the U.S. Government, but also in terms of some analysts 

here in Washington, DC, and also in Europe. You have this argument, for example, that you can change the borders of Yugoslavia. 

And by the way, the U.S. Government was against that at that 

time as you know, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is right. 

Mr. KESIC. We opposed it, but it happened. Imperial powers have 

come to the Balkans throughout history believing that they were 

setting borders that were going to last for all ages. Every single 

time the borders changed. We are just the latest of the great powers who have come into the region, and our hubris tells us that 

90

what we are going to do is going to last for all time. History will 

prove us wrong, unfortunately, I just hope it is not through more 

bloodshed. 

Now to go back and to say as was said here, for example, that 

Serbia somehow lost its right to Kosovo because of the use of violence, then I would lay before the question, what is that magic 

point where a country loses the right to part of its country because 

of ethnic persecution and violation? Is it 60,000 Kurds in Turkey 

that are killed? Is it 230,000 Serbs and non-Albanians driven out 

of Kosovo? What is that magic point where a people become entitled to self-determination? It would be very useful as a guideline 

for all of these oppressed peoples throughout the world to understand, what is the position of the U.S. Government on this? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I appreciate that comment, and if you do believe in self-determination by a vote of the people you don’t have 

to worry about that, do you, because you have got that one standard. And yes, why don’t we go right on down and then we will let 

Mr. Engel have his chance to question. Yes, sir? 

Mr. GJONI. Mr. Chairman, with your permission I will come back 

to a point that you, in passing, mentioned about relying more on 

internationals even after 13 years. And I would respectfully disagree with you. What I am saying in my presentation, and it is 

clear in the full, written statement, is that I don’t believe in hypocrisy. If in 2008, Russia, EU and U.S. did a lot of arm twisting to 

say to Kosovo that the way forward is a melting pot. Now you either stick to it or you say let us go to border changes, open all the 

cards, let us talk about Albania and nationalism effects in Bosnia 

and Croatia, but openly so, just put the cards on the table. 

So my perspective is that I think that the idea of EU is to 

Europeanize the Balkans, not to further Balkanize the north, and 

wait for the moment when Serbia or Kosovo can out-trick, outsmart, or out-maneuver each other through the help of great powers. Mine is for a no-borders Balkans where minorities just leave 

the Serbs or Albanians where they are, and there are 127 laws 

adopted for that matter in Kosovo. Thanks. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Again, I don’t know why that you have a vast 

majority of people in a certain area that that is not to be taken into 

consideration. That their views are, again, we have got Serbians 

who are north of that river who do not want to be part of this country, and there is a natural border, and it is the same number of 

Kosovars just in a valley not too far from there in about the same 

area, but nobody wants to talk about adjusting a border because 

of this—and I will have to say it from my point of view, and I know 

you are very educated people who can disagree honestly on it—but 

this absolutely hysterical idea that borders can’t change. 

It is people, we as the United States started with what, we, the 

people of the United States, I mean we are here because we are 

declaring our independence. We declared our independence from 

Great Britain. That is what the Declaration of Independence was, 

that the people have a right by a majority to determine their future. 

And last question, and then Mr. Engel. Yes, sir? Or a comment, 

go right ahead. 

Mr. CHURCHER. To reenforce your remarks about borders——

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, then you can have twice as much time. 

Mr. CHURCHER [continuing]. And to comment on Mr. Serwer’s 

point. He referred all the time to opening the possibility of an infinity of changes, and he skated over slightly the fact that there have, 

in fact, been an infinity of changes in this particular area, in 1912, 

in the 1920s and ’30s, again in the ’50s. At times in Yugoslavia, 

different ministries used different borders in this area. There was 

nothing fixed or immutable about these borders. And as you said 

before, my view remains that if people wish to change them voluntarily, that is entirely different from imposed border changes. The 

key is, if people want to vote to be somewhere else then they 

should be able to. 

And just then very quickly to answer two points which came up 

earlier. The Yellow House was remarked to be by rumor in Kosovo. 

It is not. It was rumored to be in Burrel, which is in Albania, just 

as a point. My end view is that those stories are fantasy, but you 

wouldn’t want to catch a cold in Burrel, let alone have a transplant. 

And finally, to answer your question about the KSF in the north, 

my understanding is that there is a further sort of sidebar within 

this agreement that, in fact, the present Serbian Civil Defense 

Force in the north will in some way attempt to be incorporated 

within the Kosovo Security Forces as a Serb part in the north, 

again a separate thing under the same sort of arrangements that 

have been made for the police and justice sectors. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. It would seem to 

be that—and then Mr. Engel can, or Mr. Keating, would you mind 

if Mr. Engel——

Mr. KEATING. I was just going to say, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. Why don’t we yield, with your permission, to Mr. Engel? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, and let me just, one point and that is, 

it seems to me if we have had armed forces there, and I have visited our troops there many times, if we have armed forces there 

and not just from our country but from all these countries, it would 

be better to have them there to strongly and emphatically enforce 

a pre-election, run the election for people to determine how they 

want to run, what sovereignty they are willing to give, rather than 

have a force there for 13 years just to deter any type of ethnic violence that might happen, and hope that in another 20 years from 

now they will forget the historic differences between them. 

Mr. Engel? 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and you and 

I have had many, many, many discussions on this through the 

years. And while we may disagree on this point, you have certainly, 

as I said in my opening statement, been a champion for freedom 

in the region. And since I was among the first, if not the first person, Member of Congress, to endorse the independence of Kosovo, 

and we looked for people who would take principled position on this 

issue, you were right there all the time as well. So I want to say 

that publicly because I have lived with this issue for many years 

and you were always right there fighting for peace and justice. 

92

I essentially disagree with moving the borders. If you could 

somehow just do it with Kosovo and Serbia and kind of move the 

borders and it would have no ramifications on any other place in 

the Balkans I would say, well, okay, if both sides agree let us just 

do it and do it quickly, and that would be it. But I do agree with 

Mr. Serwer that this would just, in the Balkans anyway what 

would you do with western Macedonia which is a vast majority Albanian? What would you do in Bosnia when Republika Srpska 

wants to join Serbia? And you would just keep going, keep going. 

There would almost be no end. But I do know how sincere you are 

and how thoughtful you have been with all these issues. 

I really wanted to talk about the agreement, because I was told 

that most of you, if not all of you, didn’t like this agreement between the Kosovars and the Serbs. I like the agreement. I like it 

not because I think every part of it is just, I like it because I think 

it offers the potential of hope and peace to the Balkans. I would 

hope that ultimately both Kosovo and Serbia would be members of 

the EU, and I think when the people are all in the EU, borders are 

not going to be that important because people will have access to 

all places. 

I mean I was, I think, the first Member of Congress to advocate 

for an independent and free Kosovo, but I also set up a time that 

Serbs had a lot of interest there that needed to be respected, for 

instance, monasteries and things like that. I think it is possible to 

do that. 

I have met with Slobodan Petrovic. He is the deputy Prime Minister in Kosovo. I have met with him in Kosovo. I have met with 

him in Washington. I have met with him in New York. He plays 

a very important role. I know perhaps many Serbs don’t like it, but 

I have watched him and I have seen him be very constructive. He 

is a Serb and he is part of the majority in the Kosovo Parliament 

and a deputy Prime Minister. I met him in the municipality of 

Gracanica. That is a Serb municipality in Kosovo. I sat and met 

with him and bunch of other Serbs who are participating in the 

system, in the election. We had lunch. We sat for hours and hours, 

and had very, very frank talks. 

I would remind everybody here that most of the Serbs, the majority of the Serbs living in Kosovo are in southern Kosovo not in 

northern Kosovo. When Serbs south of the Ibar first voted in 

Kosovo they said they would only vote in local elections, but then 

they voted in Kosovo’s national elections. So these things can work 

if people really put their minds to it. In negotiations you don’t get 

everything you want. I mean that is the point of negotiations. You 

get what you need to get and the other side gets what they need 

to get, and if you have an agreement you move on from there. 

I think that Prime Minister Thaci had pressure on him, and I 

think he passed the test and was very courageous in moving forward with this agreement. And I think the same for Prime Minister Dacic, also had pressure. Sometimes, I think you have got to 

look beyond the rhetoric. You have got to look beyond the passion. 

In the Balkans, especially, there are all kinds of grievances. Grievances, slights that have been going on for centuries. I would hope 

that this agreement would be a small step in moving the Balkans 

into the 21st century. And again, I hope that Kosovo and Serbia 

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become part of the EU and that borders would not be that important any more. 

So I just wanted to say that. I think it is easy to take a position 

in opposition to agreements where not everybody gets everything 

that they want, but I think it is a courageous step forward and I 

think it will be good for the region. And I have in my 24, now 25 

years in Congress, I have not worked harder on any issue than I 

have worked on this issue. I know it backwards and forwards. I respect everybody’s opinion up here. You are all good witnesses and 

intelligent people and have your vantage points. But I think that 

when you boil it all down, this agreement has some promise for the 

future, and I hope it will be implemented and I hope we will take 

little steps that will be moving forward. 

And I think the role of the United States in this is very, very important because we are trusted in the region. I certainly know the 

Albanian community in the Balkans better than I know any community in the Balkans, and I know that the Albanians like and 

trust the United States and are very pro-West. The day that 

Kosovo issued its independence, there were more American flags in 

the streets of Pristina than there were Albanian or any other kind 

of flags. So there is a very strong tie in the Albanian communities 

of Kosovo, and Albania, frankly, of trusting the United States, of 

a belief in the United States, and wanting to work with the United 

States. 

So I hope the administration will be there every step of the way. 

And it doesn’t mean it is going to be easy, and it doesn’t mean that 

there still aren’t perceived slights and threats and everything on 

both sides. But I hope it means we are moving forward, and I hope 

the United States is there every step of the way. Because I don’t 

believe that there can be as much progress without the United 

States right there as there is with the United States right there. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me express these sentiments. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Might I suggest to my colleague that if they 

have some comments, you might want to have a little dialogue with 

our panel? 

Mr. ENGEL. Sure. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Whoever, go. 

But you are in charge of pointing out who you want here. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. Shirley, yes. 

Ms. CLOYES DIOGUARDI. Congressman Engel, thank you. I very 

much agree with your long-term perspective. I think there is no 

one at this panel who would not want, obviously, just and lasting 

peace and stability in the region, and certainly, ultimately, the integration of the EU. But I think we have to look at the specifics 

of this issue. For example, you have said something, I think, that 

is very important. The majority of Kosova Serbs live in the central 

and southern part, two-thirds do. Sixty-six percent of the Kosova 

Serbs voted in the last election. Those Serbs are well integrated 

into Kosova. Why is it that the north is a different story? 

And I am concerned that we tend to forget about how the north 

became to be. I mean after the war ended, the French took over 

the area. It became the part of Kosova that Albanians were thrust 

out of. Yes, there are a majority of Serbs in the north, but what 

94

has transpired since the war is Belgrade extremists, Serb extremists in the north backed by Belgrade, and we have had lawlessness, 

corruption, smuggling, a complete breakdown. 

So when we go now, and by the way we should add one other 

thing. When independence was declared, what happened? Our own 

NATO troops even stood on the sidelines while Serb extremists 

blew up customs, courthouses, destroyed many things in reaction. 

So now when we look at the current agreement that has come forward, I think we have to be realistic. Does it solve the root causes 

of the crisis? Does it change the conditions in the north? And the 

devil is always in the details? 

And when you look at the ability of what will be, and Chairman 

Rohrabacher talked about it, a police force and an executive that 

very much has a lot of autonomy, we will now see, I think, a different relationship—and this is sad—between the northern municipalities where four mayors will basically decide who the Kosova 

chief of police will be. There will be a different relationship, potentially, between the north and the Serb communities in the central 

and south areas of Kosova because there isn’t any kind of real willingness on the part of the Belgrade Government for Kosova to succeed in the future in what you are talking about, long-term development and integration into Europe. 

So this is why I said, before you came back into the room, to 

Chairman Rohrabacher, I would like to see this whole agreement 

ground to a halt. I know that may be the ultimate illusion, but if 

we had more U.S. interaction and less of a backseat on the part 

of the administration and an ability to reconnect at least in a very 

full engagement during this process where we are supposedly now 

going up until April 26th, look how soon that is, to talk about the 

implementation, and that is when we bring Presheva back on the 

table. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I would say this. The incentive for the Serbs 

to try to make this happen is that they know that they cannot become an EU member unless they normalize, to an extent, their relations with Kosovo. That is the incentive. And likewise, the 

Kosovar Albanians understand that if they want to be integrated 

into Europe they have got to have some kind of agreement with the 

Serbs. So I think that that is the glue that binds them, and we 

have to again, America, United States, be there every step of the 

way. 

Many things similar to what you just said, Shirley—and I respect 

the work you have done through the years—was said about the 

Serbs in the south. That they would never participate. That they 

would never accept it, until people started participating. And then 

they saw benefits in their lives of being part of the Kosovar state. 

I believe a similar thing can happen in the north. I think we have 

to try, and I think that again while there’s no magic wand and obviously people are born and raised in their families talking about 

previous wars 100 and 200 years ago, 500 years ago, and whatever, 

that is ingrained in people. 

But I think we need to understand that once Belgrade feels that 

they may not like everything in the agreement but if it gets them 

into the EU that is the price they have to pay. And conversely, the 

same thing with the Kosovar Albanians. So I think that that is the 

95

glue that holds them together, the incentive to get into the European Union. And that is why I think this is a good agreement. I 

don’t think it is a great agreement for either side, but I think it 

is a good agreement for either side. And I think, again, Thaci and 

Dacic deserve a lot of credit for their courage. 

Mr. KESIC. Thank you, Mr. Engel. Just a few quick comments 

and ideas for you to think about. First, I agree with you. It would 

be wonderful when the time comes when borders are unimportant. 

But the Serbs in the north have a hard time understanding, if borders are to become unimportant why are the borders of Kosovo so 

important to be established? If the goal is to make borders irrelevant, why force the Serbs in the north to accept borders and have 

to impose it on them, which leads me to my second statement, 

which is that the only way this agreement can be forced on the 

Serbs in the north is through the use of force. And I don’t think 

any one of us in this room would like to see the use of force against 

anybody in the region. There has been already too much use of 

force. 

So if we say that this is not an enforceable agreement, doesn’t 

mean that we don’t support the process of negotiations and the 

general idea that agreements need to be reached between conflicting parties, it is just the skepticism that this particular agreement, for all the reasons that were laid out from different perspectives, are going to create more problems on the ground and lead us 

to this decision of whether or not to use force. And I hope that this 

committee as well as the U.S. Congress comes firmly down against 

the use of any force against anybody in the region in any future 

scenario. 

And finally, the EU process I wish could be sped up, but we have 

to be realistic. What the remaining countries of the western Balkans are looking are, first, the very uncertain end of the line. Nobody knows, first and foremost, what is going to happen with the 

EU. Secondly, nobody knows how long the process will take. We 

heard the representative of the administration say it took Croatia 

10 years, so that we can then start the clock rolling perhaps for 

Serbia for the next 10 years, but we are not sure. My own opinion 

is that realistically, in the best case scenario it will take 15 to 20 

years, and in the meantime we have a security vacuum that needs 

to be filled. 

And I think we need to have everything on the table to consider 

including the ideas of the chairman in order to better approach 

dealing with these issues in a durable way, in a long-term way. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, let me say this. I have long felt that Belgrade 

was lacking in leadership of people with vision who would take 

their people into the future. It is very easy to be as radical as you 

want to be. We do it here in this country. It is human nature. You 

throw red meat at the crowd. Republicans do it. Democrats do it. 

And you can all do that. But I think if you are really trying to foster a change that it takes concessions and at least an attempt to 

understand what the other side is thinking and needs. 

So we can all pick apart this agreement all we want. There are 

things anyone could pick apart. I could pick it apart. But I instead 

would like to accentuate the positive. I think there are a lot of 

96

positives in this agreement that we can hopefully see the people of 

the Balkans building on for the future so that they could live side 

by side and have a better future for their people. 

I remember the northern Ireland situation. I thought that was 

a situation that would never be solved. And look at it. It was solved 

because people decided that it was time to put aside these fights 

forever and look toward a better future for their children. I hope 

that is done here in the Balkans. I hope it is done in the Middle 

East regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I think it was done 

in Ireland. I think that there are always things that we think 

should be changed a little bit, but in negotiations, you don’t get everything that you want. 

And the incentive, I think, for the people of Kosovo is that they 

deserved their independence and that they can be a country and 

are a country that will be recognized as an independent country. 

It is one thing—when I used to go around and talk about independence for Kosovo, and again I was the first Congressman to say that 

I supported independence and have worked very hard for it, I used 

to say, and this is where Mr. Rohrabacher, because he and I have 

discussed this many times, feel strongly about self-determination 

and the right to exist. I used to say, it is one thing to say that the 

former Yugoslavia should not have broken up and that everybody 

should stay together, but once it did break up and once you had 

Croatia and all these different countries deciding that they, Macedonia, et cetera, would be independent, I felt very strongly that 

the people of Kosovo had that same right to self-determination. I 

hope again that with the EU borders will not be that important. 

And you are right, Mr. Kesic, it might take 10 or 15 years. I hope 

not. I hope not. Can I guarantee that it won’t? I can’t. But I think 

if people want to put the past, the bad elements of the past behind 

them, I think that extreme nationalism is just a path to destruction. And maybe trying to forge an agreement with a gentle push 

of the United States, maybe that is a better path to a better future 

for all the peoples in the Balkans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Engel, for all 

you have done. And his whole career has been trying to be a positive force in that part of the world. I guess I have been out trying 

to stir things up and he has been trying to make things better. But 

we both are trying to make things better. 

Mr. ENGEL. You have been trying to make things better too, and 

I applaud you for it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And we have time for just a few 

more questions from Mr. Keating, and then we are going to have 

to close up. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And there is one thing 

I think the people here can get a sense of, we have the ranking 

member of the full committee and we have the chairman here, and 

their interesting concerns of the Balkans is intense and it is real 

and that is a good thing that there is that much feeling for our 

country and the representatives to get involved. 

I am newer to the scene. I have a different approach. I really was 

going to use the same analogy that Mr. Engel used with northern 

Ireland and Ireland in terms of the emotions and the feelings, and 

the feeling by most that they would never succeed. It is interesting, 

97

even though it is centuries difference, some of those same arguments that I have heard you can say about our country, when we 

were starting our own country that there is not a strong enough 

authority, there is not a strong enough administration to pull 

things together. We are not in a position yet to do those things. 

And we had some tough times and we had a civil war along the 

way, but we have succeeded in that process here in the United 

States as well. 

So my view that I just want to address the one question on is 

just the belief that this cannot be done just with two countries. 

That it is really a regional issue, has regional impact. And I believe, personally, that progress and stability and prosperity will 

come through economic means. I think we have seen it so many 

times. We have seen it in Europe. We have seen it throughout the 

globe. So with the region as a whole as the context, what we do, 

I guess if I had to ask one question given the time, Mr. Serwer, 

I would just like to say, what do you think the April 19th agreement would have on the region on other areas if this is to progress 

and we make progress, what would it do with the Presheva Valley 

area and Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia, what could it be? Because I 

think as hard as the road is ahead with this agreement there could 

be great regional progress. It can be a great example to go forward 

for other areas too. Could you address that please? 

Mr. SERWER. I agree entirely, Mr. Keating, and it is suggested 

in my testimony that northern Kosovo could be a model of reintegration. I must say, in the initial stages though, I think there 

may be some protests in southern Serbia among Albanians asking 

for some of the same things that people in the north are getting 

in this agreement. 

But ultimately I think the point is this. If partition were to take 

place you would have real trouble in Macedonia and real trouble 

in Bosnia and southern Serbia. With this agreement, as imperfect 

as it may be from the point of view of some of my colleagues, I 

think you have the potential, if fully implemented, for a decent sort 

of reintegration that could really help with the rest of the Balkans. 

And it is very much my hope that the authorities in Pristina and 

Belgrade will take the implementation seriously. 

And I see no reason why it is unworkable, frankly. It leaves a 

large amount of room for self-governance, but it incorporates the 

north into the legal constitutional structures of Kosovo, and if they 

are sincere about initialing this agreement, and I think the EU will 

ensure that they remain sincere by not giving out any goodies until 

they continue with implementation, I think it is workable. I think 

it could be a real step forward for the region. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. The 

hour is late. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would like to thank our panelists, and 

thank you, each and every one. You added, each, a lot of spice to 

our meal of ideas, and I want to thank Eliot and our ranking member for adding to this hearing. I think we have had a very good discussion and aired a lot of ideas and concepts, and I appreciate each 

and every one of you. 

The one little thing I left out on my list, I left out of the list that 

Montenegro was permitted to have a vote by the Serbs, MonteVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:57 Jun 11, 2013 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\042413\80547 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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negro. And the Serbs could have just said, no, no, no. Montenegro, 

that is part of our country. And that is like a state. It is not really 

like a separate country. And by doing that they let those people 

have their freedom. And I am just sorry that that didn’t happen 

with Kosovo a long time ago. But I think the Serbs demonstrated 

with Montenegro that this type of thing can work, and I would 

hope eventually all of these people understand that these borders 

are artificial and they should have free trade and work together. 

And once you get something like that going where there are all 

those countries, people will be crossing the borders and making 

money and building things, and positive things such as that. And 

that is a vision we all have is a Balkans at peace and not a Balkans where people are at war with one another. 

So thank you all very much, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MS. SHIRLEY CLOYES DIOGUARDI, BALKAN

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE DANA ROHRABACHER, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

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