The Effects of Nuclear War

May 1979

NTIS order #PB-296946
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D C, 20402
—

Foreword

This assessment was made in response to a request from the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations to examine the effects of nuclear war on the

populations and economies of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is

intended, in the terms of the Committee’s request, to “put what have been

abstract measures of strategic power into more comprehensible terms. ”

The study examines the full range of effects that nuclear war would

have on civilians: direct effects from blast and radiation; and indirect effects

from economic , social, and politicai disruption. Particular attention is

devoted to the ways in which the impact of a nuclear war would extend over

time. Two of the study’s principal findings are that conditions would continue to get worse for some time after a nuclear war ended, and that the effects of nuclear war that cannot be calculated in advance are at least as important as those which analysts attempt to quantify.

This report provides essential background for a range of issues relating

to strategic weapons and foreign policy. It translates what is generally known

about the effects of nuclear weapons into the best available estimates about

the impact on society if such weapons were used. It calls attention to the

very wide range of impacts that nuclear weapons would have on a complex

industrial society, and to the extent of uncertainty regarding these impacts.

Several years ago, OTA convened a panel of distinguished scientists to

examine the effects of a limited nuclear war. The report and testimony of

that panel, which were published by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, remain valid. That panel recommended that a more thorough and comprehensive study of the effects of nuclear war be undertaken. This study is

such an effort.

The Director of this assessment was Dr. Peter Sharfman, Group Manager

for National Security Studies. OTA is grateful for the assistance of its

Nuclear War Effects Advisory Panel, chaired by Dr. David S. Saxon, President

of the University of California, and for the assistance of the Congressional

Research Service, the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Central Intel Intelligence Agency. 1 t shouId be understood, however, that OTA assumes full responsibility for this report and that

it does not necessarily represent the views of any of these agencies or of the

individual members of the Advisory Panel.

DANIEL DE SIMONE

Acting Director
Nuclear War Effects Project Staff

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director

Energy, Materials, and Global Security Division

Peter Sharfman, National Security Group Manager and Project Director

Jonathan Medalia (on detail from Congressional/ Research Service)

Robert W. Vining (under contract with Systems Science and Software)

Kevin Lewis

Gloria Proctor

Supplemental OTA Staff

Henry Kelly Marvin Ott

Consultants

Advanced Research and Applications Corporation

Analytical Assessments Corporation

General Research Corporation

Santa Fe Corporation

Systems Science and Software

Stuart Goldman

Nan Randall

George R. Rodericks

Ronald Stivers

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

Kathie S. Boss Joanne Heming

iv
—

Nuclear War Effects Project Advisory Panel

David S. Saxon, Chairman

President, University of California

Donald G. Brennan

Director of National Securit y Studies

Hudson Institute Inc.

Charles Cooper

Department of Biology

San Diego State University

Russell E. Dougherty

General, USAF(retired)

Sidney Drell

Deputy Director, Stanford linear

Accelerator Center

Stanford University

Richard Garwin

IBM Fellow

IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center

Gene R. La Rocque

Rear Admiral, USN [retired)

Director, Center for Defense /formation

Cecil Leith

Director, Atmospheric Analysis

and Prediction Division

National Center for Atmospheric

Research

J, David Linebaugh

Washington, D.C.

J. Carson Mark

Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

James V. Neel

Chairman, Department of Human

Genetics

University of Michigan Medical School

University of Michigan

Jack Ruina

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Harriet Scott

McLean, Va.

Huston Smith

Syracuse University

John Steinbruner

Director of Foreign Policy Studies

Brookings Institution

Jeremy Stone

Director, Federation of American

Scientists

Hilary Whitaker

Director, Emergency Preparedness Project

National Governors Association

The Advisory Panel provided advice and constructive criticism throughout this project. The panel

does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility y for the report and the accuracy of its contents.
Contents

Chapter Page

1. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Il. A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on

the Effects of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Ill. Civil Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

IV. Three Attack Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

V. Other Long-Term Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Appendixes:

A. Letter From Senate Foreign Relations Committee Requesting the Study... 119

B. Strategic Forces Assumed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

C. Charlottesville: A Fictional Account by Nan Randall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

D. Summary of Contractor Report on Executive Branch Studies . . . . . . . . . . . 139

E. Suggestions for Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

F, Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Volume ll—Working Papers:

1. Examination of the Direct Effects of Nuciear War (CRC Carp).*

2. Small Attacks on U.S. and Soviet Energy Production and Distribution Systems

(Santa Fe Corp).

3. Long-Term Health Effects From Nuclear Attack Radiation Exposures (Aracor)

4. The Effects of Nuclear War Economic Damage (Analytical Assessment Corp.)*

NOTE: A Iimited number of copies of the working papers will be available for congressiorral use

from OTA by the end of June 1979 Others can obtain the working papers from the National Technical

Information Service about the beginning of August 1979

* Indicat e

s that a classified version is also available to qualified requesters

vii
Chapter

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Chapter I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Page

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Uncertainties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..,... . . 10

TABLES

Page

l. Summary of Cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2. Summary of Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Chapter I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Office of Technology Assessment has undertaken to describe the effects of a nuclear war on the civilian populations, economies, and societies of the United States and the Soviet

Union.

Nuclear war is not a comfortable subject. Throughout all the variations, possibilities, and uncertainties that this study describes, one theme is constant—a nuclear

war would be a catastrophe. A militarily plausible nuclear attack, even “limited, ”

could be expected to kill people and to inflict economic damage on a scale unprecetiented in American experience; a large-scale nuclear exchange would be a calamity

unprecedented in human history. The mind recoils from the effort to foresee the

details of such a calamity, and from the careful explanation of the unavoidable uncertainties as to whether people would die from blast damage, from fallout radiation, or

from starvation during the following winter. But the fact remains that nuclear war is

possible, and the possibility of nuclear war has formed part of the foundation of international politics, and of U.S. policy, ever since nuclear weapons were used in 1945.

The premise of this study is that those who deal with the large issues of world

politics should understand what is known, and perhaps more importantly what is not

known, about the likely consequences if efforts to deter and avoid nuclear war should

fail. Those who deal with policy issues regarding nuclear weapons should know what

such weapons can do, and the extent of the uncertainties about what such weapons

might do.

FINDINGS

1 The effects of a nuclear war that cannot be

calculated are at least as important as those for

which calculations are attempted. Moreover,

even these Iimited calculations are subject to

very large uncertainties

Conservative military planners tend to base

their calculations on factors that can be either

control led or predicted, and to make pessimistic assumptions where control or prediction

are impossible. For example, planning for strategic nuclear warfare looks at the extent to

which civilian targets will be destroyed by

blast, and discounts the additional damage

which may be caused by fires that the blast

could ignite. This is not because fires are

unlikely to cause damage, but because the extent of fire damage depends on factors such as

weather and details is of building construction

that make it much more difficult to predict

than blast damage. While it is proper for a military plan to provide for the destruction of key

targets by the surest means even in unfavorable circumstances, the nonmiIitary observer

should remember that actual damage is likely

to be greater than that reflected in the military

calculations. This is particularly true for indirect effects such as deaths resulting from injuries and the unavailability of medical care,

or for economic damage resuIting from disruption and disorganization rather than from

direct destruction.

For more than a decade, the declared policy

of the United States has given prominence to a

concept of “assured destruction:” the capabilities of U.S. nuclear weapons have been described in terms of the level of damage they

3
4 ● The Effects of /Vuc/ear War

can surely inflict even in the most unfavorable

circumstances. It should be understood that in

the event of an actual nuclear war, the destruction resulting from an all-out nuclear attack

would probably be far greater. In addition to

the tens of millions of deaths during the days

and weeks after the attack, there would probably be further millions (perhaps further tens

of millions) of deaths in the ensuing months or

years. In addition to the enormous economic

destruction caused by the actual nuclear explosions, there would be some years during

which the residual economy wouId decline further, as stocks were consumed and machines

wore out faster than recovered production

could replace them. Nobody knows how to

estimate the likelihood that industrial civilization might collapse in the areas attacked; additionally, the possibility of significant long-term

ecological damage cannot be excluded.

2. The impact of even a “small” or “limited” nuclear attack would be enormous. Although predictions of the effects of such an attack are

subject to the same uncertainties as predictions of the effects of an all-out attack, the

possibilities can be bounded. OTA examined

the impact of a small attack on economic targets (an attack on oil refineries limited to 10

missiles), and found that while economic recovery would be possible, the economic damage and social dislocation could be immense.

A review of calculations of the effects on civilian populations and economies of major counterforce attacks found that while the conse

quences might be endurable (since they would

be on a scale with wars and epidemics that nations have endured in the past), the number of

deaths might be as high as 20 million. Moreover, the uncertainties are such that no government could predict with any confidence what

the results of a Iimited attack or counterattack

would be even if there was no further escalation.

3. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that

the extreme uncertainties about the effects of a

nuclear attack, as well as the certainty that the

minimum consequences would be enormous,

both play a role in the deterrent effect of nuclear

weapons.

4. There are major differences between the

United States and the Soviet Union that affect the

nature of their vulnerability to nuclear attacks,

despite the fact that both are large and diversified

industrial countries. Differences between the

two countries in terms of population distribution, closeness of population to other targets,

vulnerability of agricultural systems, vulnerability of cities to fire, socioeconomic system,

and political system create significant asymmetries in the potential effects of nuclear attacks. Differences in civil defense preparations

and in the structure of the strategic arsenals

compound these asymmetries. By and large,

the Soviet Union is favored by geography and

by a political/economic structure geared to

emergencies; the United States is favored by

having a bigger and better economy and (perhaps) a greater capacity for effective decentralization. The larger size of Soviet weapons

also means that they are likely to kill more

people while aiming at something else.

5. Although it is true that effective sheltering

and/or evacuation could save lives, it is not clear

that a civil defense program based on providing

shelters or planning evacuation would necessarily be effective. To save Iives, it is not only

necessary to provide shelter in, or evacuation

to, the right place (and only extreme measures

of dispersion would overcome the problem

that the location of safe places cannot be reliably predicted), it is also necessary to provide

food, water, medical supplies, sanitation, security against other people, possibly filtered air,

etc. After fallout diminishes, there must be

enough supplies and enough organization to

keep people alive while production is being restored. The effectiveness of civil defense

measures depends, among other things, on the

events leading up to the attack, the enemy’s

targeting policy, and sheer luck.

6. The situation in which the survivors of a

nuclear attack find themselves will be quite unprecedented. The surviving nation would be far

weaker—economically, socially, and politically— than one would calculate by adding up

the surviving economic assets and the numbers

and skills of the surviving people. Natural resources would be destroyed; surviving equip-
Ch. 1—ExecutNe Summary ● 5

ment would be designed to use materials and

skills that might no longer exist; and indeed

some regions might be almost uninhabitable.

Furthermore, prewar patterns of behavior

would surely change, though in unpredictable

ways. Finally, the entire society would suffer

from the enormous psychological shock of

having discovered the extent of its vulnerability.

7. From an economic point of view, and

possibly from a political and social viewpoint as

well, conditions after an attack would get worse

before they started to get better. For a period of

time, people could live off supplies (and, in a

sense, off habits) left over from before the war.

But shortages and uncertainties would get

worse. The survivors wouId find themselves in

a race to achieve viability (i. e., production at

least equaling consumption plus depreciation)

before stocks ran out completely. A failure to

achieve viability, or even a slow recovery,

would result in many additional deaths, and

much additional economic, political, and

social deterioration. This postwar damage

could be as devastating as the damage from

the actual nuclear explosions.

APPROACH

The scope of this study is both broader and

narrower than that of most other studies on

this subject. It is broader in three respects:

1. it examines a full range of possible nucle

ar attacks, with attacking forces ranging

in extent from a single weapon to the bulk

of a superpower’s arsenal;

2. it deals explicitly with both Soviet attacks

on the United States and U.S. attacks on

the Soviet Union; and

3. it addresses the multiple effects of nuclear war, indirect as well as direct, long term

as well as short term, and social and economic as well as physical.

Those effects that cannot be satisfactorily calculated or estimated are described qualitatively. But this report’s scope is narrower than

most defense analyses because it avoids any

consideration of military effects; although it

hypothesizes (among other things) missile attacks against military targets, only the “collateral” damage such attacks would inflict on

the civilian society are examined.

The approach used was to look at a series of

attack “cases,” (table 1) and to describe the

various effects and overall impact each of

them might produce. By analyzing the impact

of the same attack case for both a U.S. attack

on the Soviet Union and a Soviet attack on the

United States, the report examines the significance of the different kinds of vulnerabilities

of the two countries, and offers some insights

about the consequences of the differences between the two countries’ nuclear weapon

arsenals. The cases were chosen primarily to

investigate the effects of variations in attack

size and in the kinds of targets attacked. It is

believed that the analysis is “realistic,” in the

sense that the hypothetical attacks are possible ones. Patterns of nuclear explosions were

examined that are not very different from

those that, OTA believes, the existing nuclear

forces would produce if the military were

ordered to make attacks of the specified size

on the specified targets.

Case 1: In order to provide a kind of tutorial

on what happens when nuclear weapons are

Table 1. –Summary of Cases

Case Description

1 Attack on single city: Detroit and Leningrad; 1 weapon.

(pp. 27-44) or 10 small weapons.

2 Attack on oil refineries, limited to 10 missiles.

(pp. 64-80)

3 Counterforce attack; includes attack only on ICBM silos

(pp. 81-94) as a variant.

4 Attack on range of military and economic targets using

(pp. 94-106) large fraction of existing arsenal.

For each case the first section describes a soviet attack on the United States and the following

section a U S attack on the Soviet Union
(3 . The Effects of Nuc/ear war

detonated, the study describes the effects of

the explosion of a single weapon. Then it examines the effects of such an explosion over a

single U.S. city (Detroit) and single Soviet city

(Leningrad) of comparable size. The base case

was the detonation of a l-megaton weapon (1

M t = energy released by one million tons of

TNT), since both the United States and the

Soviet Union have weapons of roughly this size

in their arsenals. Then, in order to look at the

ways in which the specific effects and overall

impact wouId vary if other weapons that might

be available were used, the effects of a 25-Mt

weapon over Detroit, the effects of a 9-Mt

weapon over Leningrad, and the effects of 10

weapons of 40 kilotons (kt) each over Leningrad are described. An attempt was made to

describe as well the effects of a small weapon

in a large city (such as a terrorist group might

set off) but was unsuccessful because the effects of such a weapon in a metropolitan setting cannot be inferred from the existing body

of knowledge regarding military weapons. This

is explained in the body of the report.

The casualties from such attacks could

range from 220,000 dead and 420,000 injured

to 2,500,000 dead and 1,100,000 injured (many

of the injured would wind up as fatalities),

depending on the details of the attack and the

assumptions made regarding conditions. The

discussion in chapter I I shows how the time of

day, time of year, weather conditions, size of

weapon, height of burst, and preparation of

the population could all make a great difference in the number of casualties resulting from

such an attack. The extent of fire damage is a

further uncertainty, Even if only one city is attacked, and the remaining resources of a nation are available to help, medical facilities

would be inadequate to care for the injured. A

further imponderable is fallout (if the attack

uses a surface burst), whose effects depend on

the winds.

Case 2: In order to examine the effects of a

small attack on urban/industrial targets, the

study examines a hypothetical attack limited

to 10 SNDVs (strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the term used in SALT to designate one

missile or one bomber) on the other superpower’s oil refineries. In “planning” this attack,

which is not analogous to any described in recent U.S. literature, it was hypothesized that

the political leadership instructed the military

to inflict maximum damage on energy production using only 10 SNDVs without regard to the

extent of civilian casualties or other damage, It

was assumed that the Soviets would attack

such targets with SS-18 missiles (each carrying

10 multiple independently targetable reentry

vehicles, or MlRVs), and that the United States

would use 7 MlRVed Poseidon missiles and 3

MlRVed Minuteman III missiles.

The calculations showed that the Soviet attack would destroy 64 percent of U.S. oil refining capacity, while the U.S. attack would destroy 73 percent of Soviet refining capacity.

Calculations were also made of “prompt fatalities, ” including those killed by blast and fallout, assuming no special civil defense measures: they showed about 5 million U.S. deaths

and about 1 million Soviet deaths. The results

were different for the two countries for several

reasons. Soviet oil refining capacity is more

concentrated than U.S. oiI refining capacity, so

that a small attack can reach more of it. At the

same time, Soviet refineries tend to be located

away from residential areas (the available data

on population location deals with where people live rather than with where they work) to a

greater extent than U.S. refineries. A further

difference is that a limitation on the number of

delivery vehicles would lead each side to use

weapons with many MlRVs, so the United

States would attack most of the targets with

Poseidon missiles which have small warheads,

while the Soviets would use SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which carry

much larger warheads, and large warheads

cause more damage to things not directly

targeted (in this case, people) than do small

warheads.

One can only speculate about the consequences of such extensive destruction. There

would have to be drastic changes in both the

U.S. and Soviet economies to cope with the

sudden disappearance of the bulk of oil refining capacity. Productivity in virtualIy every industrial sector would decline, and some sectors would be largely wiped out. There would
Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 7

have to be strict allocation of the remaining

available refined petroleum products. Some

Soviet factory workers might end up working

in the fields to replace tractors for which fuel

was unavailable. The United States might have

to ban commuting by automobile, forcing suburban residents to choose between moving and

long walks to a bus stop. The aftermath of the

war might lead to either an increase or a decrease i n the amount of petroleum products required by the military. Changes in people’s attitudes are impossible to predict. Calm determination might produce effective responses

that would limit the damage; panic or a breakdown in civic spirit could compound the effects of the attack itself.

It is instructive to observe the asymmetries

between the problems which the United States

and the Soviets would face. Soviet agricultural

production, which is barely adequate in peacetime, wouId probably decline sharply, and production rates would slow even in essential industries However, the Soviet system is well

adapted for allocating scarce resources to

high-priority areas, and for keeping everybody

employed even if efficient employment is unavailable. The relative wealth and freedom of

the United States brings both advantages and

disadvantages: while agriculture and essential

industry wouId probably continue, there wouId

be a staggering organizational problem in

making use of resources that now depend on

petroleum — one must ask what the employees

of an automobile factory or a retail establishment on a highway wouId do if there were virtualIy no gasoline for cars,

A major question relating to these results is

how much they could vary with changed assumptions, The figures for fatalities were

based on air bursts, which would maximize destruction of the refineries. (As an excursion,

U.S. fatalities were recalculated on the assumption of surface bursts, and use of the best

fallout shelters within 2 miles of where each

person lives. This reduced fatalities by onethird, ) There was no data available on the

types of Soviet residential construction in the

vicinity of oiI refineries: treating it parametrically gave casualty figures of about

1,5OO,OOO if the construction is all houses, and

about 800,000 if it is al I apartment buildings.

Perfect accuracy was assumed for missiles that

are in fact somewhat inaccurate — some inaccuracy might reduce the extent of damage to

the refineries, but it might well increase the

number of deaths.

Case 3. I n order to examine the effects on civiIian popuIations and economies of counterforce attacks, the study examined attacks on

ICBM silos and attacks on silos, bomber bases,

and missile submarine bases. Such attacks

have received fairly extensive study in the executive branch in recent years, so OTA surveyed a number of these studies in order to determine the range of possible answers, and the

variations in assumptions that produce such a

range, An unclassified summary of this survey

appears as appendix D of this volume. (The

complete survey, classified secret, is available

separately. )

A counterforce attack would produce relatively Iittle direct blast damage to civiIians

and to economic assets; the main damage

would come from radioactive fallout, The uncertainties in the effects of fallout are enormous, depending primarily on the weather and

on the extent of fallout sheltering which the

population makes use of. The calculations

made by various agencies of the executive

branch showed a range in “prompt fatalities”

(almost entirely deaths from fallout within the

first 30 days) from less than 1 to 11 percent of

the U.S. population and from less than 1 to 5

percent of the Soviet population. This shows

just how great a variation can be introduced

by modifying assumptions regarding population distribution and shelter

What can be concluded from this? First, if

the attack involves surface bursts of many very

large weapons, if weather conditions are unfavorable, and if no fallout shelters are created

beyond those that presently exist, U.S. deaths

couId reach 20 m i I I ion and Soviet deaths more

than 10 million. (The difference is a result of

geography; many Soviet strategic forces are so

located that fallout from attacking them

wouId drift mainly into sparsely popuIated

areas or into China. ) Second, effective fallout
—

8 ● The Effects of Nuc/ear war

sheltering (which is not necessarily the same

thing as a program —this assumes people are

actually sheltered and actually remain there)

could save many Iives under favorable conditions, but even in the best imaginable case

more than a million would die in either the

United States or the U.S.S.R. from a counterforce attack. Third, the “limited nature” of

counterforce attacks may not be as significant

as the enormous uncertainty regarding their

resuIts.

There would be considerable economic

damage and disruption as a result of such attacks. Almost all areas could, in principle, be

decontaminated within a few months, but the

loss of so many people and the interruption of

economic life would be staggering blows. An

imponderable, in thinking about the process of

recovery, is the extent of any lasting psychological impacts.

Case 4: In order to examine the kind of destruction that is generally thought of as the

culmination of an escalator process, the

study looked at the consequences of a very

large attack against a range of military and

economic targets. Here too calculations that

the executive branch has carried out in recent

years were used. These calculations tend to

assume that Soviet attacks on the United

States would be a first strike, and hence use

most of the Soviet arsenal, while U.S. attacks

on the Soviet Union would be retaliatory

strikes, and hence use only those weapons that

might survive a Soviet counterforce attack.

However, the difference in damage to civilian

populations and economies between a “first

strike” and a “second strike” seems to lie

within the range of uncertainty created by

other factors.

The resulting deaths would be far beyond

any precedent. Executive branch calculations

show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i. e., from 70 million to 160 million dead),

and Soviet deaths from 20 to 40 percent of the

population. Here again the range reflects the

difference made by varying assumptions about

population distribution and sheltering, and to

a lesser extent differences in assumptions

about the targeting policy of the attacker.

Soviet casualties are smaller than U.S. casualties because a greater proportion of the Soviet

population lives in rural areas, and because

U.S. weapons (which have lower average

yields) produce less fallout than Soviet

weapons.

Some excursions have been run to test the

effect of deliberately targeting population

rather than killing people as a side effect of attacking economic and military targets. They

show that such a change in targeting could kill

somewhere between 20 million and 30 million

additional people on each side, holding other

assumptions constant.

These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would

be injured, and many would eventually die

from lack of adequate medical care. In addition, millions of people might starve or freeze

during the following winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. Chapter V attempts

to calculate the further millions who might

eventually die of latent radiation effects.

What is clear is that from the day the survivors emerged from their fallout shelters, a

kind of race for survival would begin. One side

of the race would be the restoration of production: production of food, of energy, of

clothing, of the means to repair damaged machinery, of goods that might be used for trade

with countries that had not fought in the war,

and even of military weapons and supplies.

The other side of the race would be consumption of goods that had survived the attack, and

the wearing-out of surviving machines. If production rises to the rate of consumption

before stocks are exhausted, then viability has

been achieved and economic recovery has

begun. If not, then each postwar year would

see a lower level of economic activity than the

year before, and the future of civilization itself

in the nations attacked would be in doubt. This

report cannot predict whether this race for

economic viability would be won. The answer

would lie in the effectiveness of postwar social

and economic organization as much as in the

amount of actual physical damage. There is a
Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 9

controversy in the literature on the subject as

to whether a postttack economy would be

based on centralized planning (in which case

how would the necessary data and planning

time be obtained?), or to individual initiative

and decentralized decision making (in which

case who would feed the refugees, and what

would serve for money and credit?).

An obviously critical question is the impact

that a nuclear attack would have on the lives

of those who survive it. The case descriptions

discuss the possibilities of economic, political,

social, and psychological disruption or collapse. However, the recital of possibilities and

uncertainties may fail to convey the overall

situation of the survivors, especialIy the survivors of a large attack that included urban-industrial targets. In an effort to provide a more

concrete understanding of what a world after a

nuclear war would be Iike, OTA commissioned

a work of fiction. It appears as appendix C and

presents some informed speculation about

what life would be like in Charlottesville, Va.,

assuming that this city escaped direct damage

from the attack. The kind of detail that such an

imaginative account presents—detail that

proved to be unavailable for a comparable

Soviet city–adds a dimension to the more

abstract analysis in the body of the report.

Civil Defense: Chapter 11 I provides some

basic information about civil defense measures, discusses the way in which they might

mitigate the effects of nuclear attack, and

discusses the uncertainties regarding their effectiveness. There is a lively controversy

among experts as to the effectiveness of existing Soviet civil defense programs, and another

controversy as to whether existing U.S. programs ought to be changed. The major points

in dispute were identified, but no attempt was

made to assess the merits of the arguments.

For the purposes of this study, it was assumed

that the existing civil defense programs, as

described in this report, would be in effect,

and that a full-scale preattack evacuation of

cities (sometimes called “crisis relocation”)

would not take place. This assumption was

made because it appeared to be the only way

to describe existing vulnerabilities while

avoiding predictions about the course of

events leading up to a nuclear war. While both

the U.S. and the Soviet Governments profess to

believe that urban evacuation prior to an attack on cities would save lives, ordering such

an evacuation would be a crisis management

move as welI as a civil defense precaution.

Long-Term Effects: While the immediate damage from the blasts would be long term in the

sense that the damage couId not be quickly repaired, there would be other effects which

might not manifest themselves for some years

after the attack. It is well established that

levels of radiation too low (or too slowly absorbed) to cause immediate death or even illness will nevertheless have adverse effects on

some fraction of a popuIation receiving them.

A nuclear attack would certainly produce both

somatic effects (largely cancer) and genetic effects, although there is uncertainty about the

numbers of victims. OTA calcuIated the ranges

of such effects that might be produced by

each of the attack cases analyzed. Cancer

deaths and those suffering some form of

genetic damage would run into the millions

over the 40 years following the attack. For the

comprehensive attack (Case 4), it appears that

cancer deaths and genetic effects in a country

attacked would be smalI relative to the numbers of immediate deaths, but that radiation

effects elsewhere in the world would appear

more significant. For counterforce attacks, the

effects would be significant both locally and

worldwide.

A 1975 study by the National Academy of

Sciences (NAS)l addressed the question of the

possibility of serious ecological damage, and

concluded that while one cannot say just how

such damage would occur, it cannot be ruled

out. This conclusion still stands, although the

NAS report may have been more alarmist

about the possibility of damage to the ozone

layer than recent research would support.

Table 2 summarizes the results of the case

studies.

1f.ong-Terrn Wor/dwide Effects of Mu/tip/e Nuc/earVVeapons Detonations (Washington, DC.: National Academy of Sciences, 1 975).
—

10 . The Effects of A/uc/ear War

Table 2. –Summary of Effects

Main causes of

Case Description civilian damage —

1

(pp. 27-44)

2

(pp. 64-80)

3

(pp. 81-94)

4

(pp. 94-106)

Attack on single city:

Detroit and Leningrad;

1 weapon or 10 small

weapons,

Attack on oil refineries,

Iimited to 10 missiles,

Counterforce attack:

Includes attack only on

ICBM silos as a variant

Attack on range of military and economic targets using large fraction

of existing arsenal

Blast, fire, & loss of infrastructure, fallout IS elsewhere,

Blast, fire, secondary

fires, fallout, Extensive

economic problems from

loss of refined

petroleum,

Some blast damage if

bomber and missile sub

marine bases attacked

Blast and fallout, subsequent economic disruption; possible lack of resources to support surviv -

ing population or economic

recovery, Possible breakdown of social order. Possible Incapacitating psychological trauma.

Immediate deaths Middle-term effects Long-term effects

2oo,oo2,000,000

1,000,000-

5,0001000

1,000>000-

20,000,000

20,000,000-

160,000,000

Many deaths from injuries;

center of city difficult to

rebuild,

Many deaths from injuries;

great economic hardship for

some years; particular problems for Soviet agriculture

and for U.S. socioeconomic

organization

Economic impact of deaths,

possible large psychological

impact

Enormous economic destruction and disruption,

If Immediate deaths are in

low range, more tens of milIions may die subsequently

because economy iS unable

to support them Major

question about whether economic viability can be restored–key variables may

be those of political and economic organization Unpredictable psychological

effects,

Relatively minor

Cancer deaths in millions

only if attack involves

surface bursts

Cancer deaths and genetic

effects in millions, further

millions of effects outside

attacked countries

Cancer deaths and genetic

damage in the millions; relatively Insignificant in

attacked areas, but quite

significant elsewhere in the

world. Possibility of ecological damage.

UNCERTAINTIES

There are enormous uncertainties and imponderable involved in any effort to assess

the effects of a nuclear war, and an effort to

look at the entire range of effects compounds

them. Many of these uncertainties are obvious

ones: if the course of a snowstorm cannot be

predicted 1 day ahead in peacetime, one must ●

certainly be cautious about predictions of the

pattern of radioactive fallout on some unknown future day. Similar complexities exist

for human institutions: there is great difficulty

in predicting the peacetime course of the U.S.

economy, and predicting its course after a nuclear war is a good deal more difficult. This

study highlights the importance of three categories of uncertainties:

●

● Uncertainties in calcuIations of deaths

and of direct economic damage resulting

from the need to make assumptions about

matters such as time of day, time of year,

wind, weather, size of bombs, exact location of the detonations, location of people, availability and quality of sheltering,

etc.

Effects that would surely take place, but

whose magnitude cannot be calculated.

These include the effects of fires, the

shortfalIs in medical care and housing, the

extent to which economic and social disruption would magnify the effects of

direct economic damage, the extent of

bottlenecks and synergistic effects, the extent of disease, etc.

Effects that are possible, but whose likelihood is as incalculable as their magnitude. These include the possibility of a
Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 11

long downward economic spiral before

viability is attained, the possibIity of political disintegration (anarchy or regionalization), the possibility of major epidemics, and the possibility of i reversible ecological changes.

One major problem in making calculations

is to know where the people wilI be at the moment when the bombs explode. Calculations

for the United States are generally based on

the 1970 census, but it should be borne in mind

that the census data describes where people’s

homes are, and there is never a moment when

everybody in the United States is at home at

the same time If an attack took place during a

working day, casualties might well be higher

since people would be concentrated in factories and offices (which are more likely to be

targets) rather than dispersed in suburbs. For

the case of the Soviet population, the same

assumption is made that people are at home,

but the inaccuracies are compounded by the

unavailability of detailed information about

just where the Soviet rural population lives.

The various calculations that were used made

varying, though not unreasonable assumptions

about population location.

A second uncertainty in calculations has to

do with the degree of protection available.

There is no good answer to the question:

“Would people use the best available shelter

against blast and fallout?” It seems unreasonable to suppose that shelters would not be

used, and equally unreasonable to assume that

at a moment of crisis all available resources

would be put to rational use, (It has beep

pointed out that if plans worked, people

behaved rationally, and machinery were adequately maintained, there would be no peacetime deaths from traffic accidents. ) The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency has concluded from public opinion surveys that in a

period of severe international crisis about 10

percent of all Americans would leave their

homes and move to a “safer” place (spontaneous evacuation); more reliable estimates are

probably impossible, but it could make a substantial difference to the casualty figures

A third uncertainty is the weather at the time

of the attack at the various places where

bombs explode. The local wind conditions, and

especialIy the amount of moisture in the air,

may make an enormous difference in the number and spread of fires. Wind conditions over a

wider area determine the extent and location

of fallout contamination. The time of year has

a decisive effect on the damage that fallout

does to agriculture–while an attack in January might be expected to do only indirect

damage (destroying farm machinery or the fuel

to run it), fallout when plants are young can

kill them, and fallout just before harvesttime

would probably make it unsafe to get the harvest in. The time of year also has direct effects

on population death — the attack in the dead

of winter, which might not directly damage

agricuIture, may lead to greater deaths from

fallout radiation (because of the difficulty of

improvising fallout protection by moving

frozen dirt) and from cold and exposure.

The question of how rapid and efficient economic receovery would be— or indeed whether

a genuine recovery would be possible at all —

raises questions that seem to be beyond calcuIation. I t is possible to calculate direct economic damage by making assumptions about

the size and exact location of bomb explosions, and the hardness of economic assets;

however, such calculations cannot address the

issues of bottlenecks and of synergy. Bottlenecks would occur if a key product that was

essential for many other manufacturing processes could no longer be produced, or (for the

case of a large attack) if an entire industrial

sector were wiped out. I n either case, the economic loss wouId greatly exceed the peacetime value of the factories that were actually

destroyed. There does not appear to be any reliable way of calculating the likelihood or extent of bottlenecks because economic input/

output models do not address the possibiIity or

cost of substitutions across sectors. Apart from

the creation of bottlenecks, there couId be synergistic effects: for example, the fire that cannot be controlled because the blast destroyed

fire stations, as actually happened at Hiroshima. Here, too, there is no reliable way to
.

12 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

estimate the likelihood of such effects: would

radiation deaths of birds and the destruction

of insecticide factories have a synergistic effect? Another uncertainty is the possibility of

organizational bottlenecks. In the most obvious instance, it would make an enormous difference whether the President of the United

States survived. Housing, defined as a place

where a productive worker lives as distinct

from shelter for refugees, is another area of

uncertainty. Minimal housing is essential if

production is to be restored, and it takes time

to rebuild it if the existing housing stock is destroyed or is beyond commuting range of the

surviving (or repaired) workplaces. It should be

noted that the United States has a much larger

and more dispersed housing stock than does

the Soviet Union, but that American workers

have higher minimum standards.

There is a final area of uncertainty that this

study does not even address, but which could

be of very great importance. Actual nuclear attacks, unlike those in this study, would not

take place in a vacuum. There would be a

series of events that would lead up to the attack, and these events could markedly change

both the physical and the psychological vulnerability of a population to a nuclear attack.

Even more critical would be the events after

the attack. Assuming that the war ends

promptly, the terms on which it ends could

greatly affect both the economic condition

and the state of mind of the population. The

way in which other countries are affected

could determine whether the outside world is a

source of help or of further danger. The postattack military situation (and nothing in this

study addresses the effects of nuclear attacks

on military power) could not only determine

the attitude of other countries, but also

whether limited surviving resources are put to

military or to civilian use.

Moreover, the analyses in this study all

assume that the war would end after the hypothetical attack. This assumption simplifies

analysis, but it might not prove to be the case.

How much worse would the situation of the

survivors be if, just as they were attempting to

restore some kind of economy following a

massive attack, a few additional weapons destroyed the new centers of population and of

government?
Chapter II

A NUCLEAR WEAPON OVER DETROIT

OR LENINGRAD: A TUTORIAL ON THE

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Chapter ll.–A NUCLEAR WEAPON OVER DETROIT

OR LENINGRAD: A TUTORIAL ON THE

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Pdge

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 15

General Description of Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Blast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Direct Nuclear Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Thermal Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Electromagnetic Pulse. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Fallout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Combined Injuries (Synergism). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Detroit and Leningrad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

1Mt on the Surface in Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Physical Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Infrastructure Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Radioactive Fallout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

1-Mt Air Burst on Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

25-Mt Air Burst on Detroit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Leningrad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

l-Mtand 9-Mt Air Bursts on Leningrad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Ten 40-kt Air Bursts on Leningrad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

1-kt Terrorist Weapon at Ground Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

TABLES

Page

3. Blast Effects of a 1-Mt Explosion 8,000 ft Above the Earth’s

Surface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

4. Casualty Estimates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

S. Burn Casualty Estimates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

FIGURES

Page

l. Vulnerability of Population in Various Overpressure Zones . . 19

2. Main Fallout Pattern— Uniform 15 mph Southwest Wind . . . . 24

3. Main Fallout Pattern— Uniform 15 mph Northwest Wind . . . . 25

4. Detroit 1-Mt Surface Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

5. Detroit 1-Mt Air Burst. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

6. Casualties. ......., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

7. Detroit 25-Mt Air Burst. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

8. Leningrad –Commercial and Residential Sections . . . . . . . . . 40

9. Leningrad –Populated Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

IO. Leningrad l-Mt Air Burst. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

11. Leningrad 9-Mt Air Burst. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

12. Leningrad Ten 40-kt Air Burst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Chapter II

A NUCLEAR WEAPON OVER DETROIT

OR LENINGRAD: A TUTORIAL ON THE

EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a brief description of the major effects of nuclear explosions on the people and structures in urban areas. The details of such effects would

vary according to weapons design, the exact geographical layout of the target area,

the materials and methods used for construction in the target area, and the weather

(especially the amount of moisture in the atmosphere). Thus, the reader should bear

in mind that the statements below are essentially generalizations, which are subject

to a substantial range of variation and uncertainty.

To convey some sense of the actual effects of large nuclear explosions on urban

areas, the potential impact of explosions is described in two real cities—Detroit and

Leningrad. To show how these effects vary with the size of the weapon, the effects

have been calculated in each city for a variety of weapon sizes.

The descriptions and analysis assume that there is no damage elsewhere in the

country. This may appear unlikely, and in the case of a surface burst it is certainly

wrong, since a surface burst would generate fallout that would cause casualties

elsewhere. However, isolating the effects on a single city allows the setting forth in

clear terms of the direct and immediate effects of nuclear explosions. The result is a

kind of tutorial in nuclear effects. Subsequent sections of this report, which deal with

the effects of larger attacks, discuss the indirect effects of fallout and of economic

and social disruption.

Although it is outside the scope of a discussion of “nuclear war, ” there has been

considerable public interest in the effects of a nuclear explosion that a terrorist

group might succeed in setting off in an urban area. Accordingly, a discussion of this

possibility y is added at the end of this chapter.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EFFECTS

The energy of a nuclear explosion is released ●

in a

●

●

●

number of different ways:

an explosive blast, which is qualitatively ●

similar to the blast from ordinary chemical explosions, but which has somewhat

different effects because it is typically so

much larger;

direct nuclear radiation;

pulses of electrical and magnetic energy,

called electromagnetic pulse (EM P); and

the creation of a variety of radioactive

particles, which are thrown up into the air

by the force of the blast, and are called

radioactive fallout when they return to

Earth.

direct thermal radiation, most of which The distribution of the bomb’s energy

takes the form of visible Iight; among these effects depends on its size and on

15
16 . The Effects of Nuclear War

the details of its design, but a general descrip- Blast and shock Thermal radiation

tion is possible. and EMP

Blast

Most damage to cities from large weapons

(called static overpressure) that can crush ob- \ /

jects, and high winds (called dynamic pressure) \ /

that can move them suddenly or knock them

down. In general, large buildings are destroyed

by the overpressure, while people and objects

such as trees and utility poles are destoyed by

the wind. Initial Residual nuclear

nuclear radiation

For example, consider the effects of a 1-

radiation (fallout)

megaton (Mt) air burst on things 4 miles [6 km] Effects of a nuclear explosion

Thermonuclear ground burst Photo credit: U S Department of Energy
Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons ● 17

away. The overpressure will be in excess of 5

pounds per square inch (psi), which will exert a

force of more than 180 tons on the wall of a

typical two-story house. At the same place,

there would be a wind of 160 mph [255 km];

while 5 psi is not enough to crush a man, a

wind of 180 mph would create fatal collisions is ions

between people and nearby objects.

The magnitude of the blast effect (generally

measured in pounds per square inch) diminishes with distance from the center of the explosion. It is related in a more complicated

way to the height of the burst above ground

level. For any given distance from the center of

the explosion, there is an optimum burst height

that will produce the greatest overpressure,

and the greater the distance the greater the optimum burst height. As a result, a burst on the

surface produces the greatest overpressure at

very close ranges (which is why surface bursts

are used to attack very hard, very small targets

such as missile silos), but less overpressure

than an air burst at somewhat longer ranges.

Raising the height of the burst reduces the

overpressure directly under the bomb, but

widens the area at which a given smaller overpressure is produced. Thus, an attack on factories with a l-Mt weapon might use an air

burst at an altitude of 8,000 feet [2,400 m],

which would maximize the area (about 28 mi2

[7,200 hectares]) that would receive 10 psi or

more of overpressure.

Photo credit: U S Air Force Fireball from an air burst in the megaton energy range
18 . The Effects of Nuc/ear War

Photo credit U S Uepartmenf of Defense

The faintly luminous shock front seen just ahead of the fireball soon after breakaway

Table 3 shows the ranges of overpressures returns to Earth as fallout. An explosion that is

and effects from such a blast. farther above the Earth’s surface than the

When a nuclear weapon is detonated on or radius of the fireball does not dig a crater and

near the surface of the Earth, the blast digs out produces negligible immediate fallout.

a large crater. Some of the material that used For the most part, blast kills people by into be in the crater is deposited on the rim of direct means rather than by direct pressure.

the crater; the rest is carried up into the air and While a human body can withstand up to 30

Table 3.–Blast Effects of a 1-Mt Explosion 8,000 ft Above the Earth’s Surface

Distance from ground zero

—

Peak Peak wind

(stat. miles) (kilometers) overpressure velocity (mph) Typical blast effects

.8 1,3 20 psi 470 Reinforced concrete structures are leveled.

3 0 4 8 10 psi 290 Most factories and commercial buildings are

collapsed. Small wood-frame and brick

residences destroyed and distributed as

debris,

4.4 7.0 5 psi 160 Lightly constructed commercial buildings and

typical residences are destroyed, heavier

construction IS severely damaged

5.9 9 5 3 psi 95 Walls of typical steel-frame buildings are

blown away: severe damage to residences.

Winds sufficient to kill people in the open.

11 6 18.6 1 psi 35 Damage to structures, people endangered by

flying glass and debris
Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons ● 19

psi of simple overpressure, the winds associated with as little as 2 to 3 psi could be expected to blow people out of typical modern

office buildings. Most blast deaths result from

the collapse of occupied buildings, from people being blown into objects, or from buildings

or smaller objects being blown onto or into

people. Clearly, then, it is impossible to

calculate with any precision how many people

would be killed by a given blast—the effects

would vary from buiIding to buiIding.

In order to estimate the number of casualties from any given explosion, it is necessary to

make assumptions about the proportion of

people who will be killed or injured at any

given overpressure. The assumptions used in

this chapter are shown in figure 1. They are

relatively conservative. For example, weapons

tests suggest that a typical residence will be

collapsed by an overpressure of about 5 psi.

People standing in such a residence have a 50-

percent chance of being killed by an overpressure of 3.5 psi, but people who are lying

down at the moment the blast wave hits have a

50-percent chance of surviving a 7-psi overpressure. The calculations used here assume a

mean lethal overpressure of 5 to 6 psi for people in residences, meaning that more than half

of those whose houses are blown down on top

of them will nevertheless survive. Some studies

use a simpler technique: they assume that the

number of people who survive in areas receivple killed in areas receiving less than 5 psi, and

hence that fatalities are equal to the number

of people inside a 5-psi ring.

Direct Nuclear Radiation

Nuclear weapons inflict ionizing radiation

on people, animals, and plants in two different

ways. Direct radiation occurs at the time of the

explosion; it can be very intense, but its range

is Iimited. Fallout radiation is received from

particles that are made radioactive by the effects of the explosion, and subsequently distributed at varying distances from the site of

the blast. Fallout is discussed in a subsequent

sect ion.

For large nuclear weapons, the range of intense direct radiation is less than the range of

lethal blast and thermal radiation effects.

However, in the case of smaller weapons, direct radiation may be the lethal effect with the

greatest range. Direct radiation did substantial

damage to the residents of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki.

Human response to ionizing radiation is subject to great scientific uncertainty and intense

controversy. It seems likely that even small

doses of radiation do some harm, To understand the effects of nuclear weapons, one

must distinguish between short- and long-term

effects:

ing more than 5 psi equal the number of peo-

●

Figure 1 .—Vulnerability of Population in Various

Overpres-sure Zones

50 I

Over 12 psi 5-12 psi 2-5 psi 1-2 psi

75

25

Short-Term Effects.-A dose of 600 rem

within a short period of time (6 to 7 days)

has a 90-percent chance of creating a fatal

ilIness, with death occurring within a few

weeks. (A rem or “ roentgen-equivalentman” is a measure of biological damage:

a “rad” is a measure of radiation energy

absorbed; a roentgen is a measure of radiation energy; for our purposes it may be

assumed that 100 roentgens produce 100

rads and 100 rem. ) The precise shape of

the curve showing the death rate as a

function of radiation dose is not known in

the region between 300 and 600 rem, but a

dose of 450 rem within a short time is estimated to create a fatal illness in half the

people exposed to it; the other half would
20 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

●

get very sick, but would recover. A dose of

300 rem might kill about 10 percent of

those exposed. A dose of 200 to 450 rem

will cause a severe illness from which

most people would recover; however, this

illness wouId render people highly susceptible to other diseases or infections. A

dose of so to 200 rem will cause nausea

and lower resistance to other diseases, but

medical treatment is not required. A dose

below so rem will not cause any shortterm effects that the victim will notice,

but will nevertheless do long-term damage.

Long-Term Effects.-The effects of smaller

doses of radiation are long term, and

measured in a statistical way. A dose of 50

rem generally produces no short-term effects; however, if a large population were

exposed to so reins, somewhere between

0.4 and 2.5 percent of them would be expected to contract fatal cancer (after

some years) as a result. There would also

be serious genetic effects for some fraction of those exposed. Lower doses produce lower effects. There is a scientific

controversy about whether any dose of

radiation, however small, is really safe.

Chapter V discusses the extent of the longterm effects that a nuclear attack might

produce. It should be clearly understood,

however, that a large nuclear war would

expose the survivors, however well sheltered, to levels of radiation far greater

than the U.S. Government considers safe

in peacetime.

Thermal Radiation

Approximately 35 percent of the energy

from a nuclear explosion is an intense burst of

thermal radiation, i.e., heat. The effects are

roughly analogous to the effect of a 2-second

flash from an enormous sunlamp. Since the

thermal radiation travels at the speed of light

(actually a bit slower, since it is deflected by

particles in the atmosphere), the flash of light

and heat precedes the blast wave by several

seconds, just as lightning is seen before the

thunder is heard.

Photo credit U S Air force

Burn injuries from nuclear blasts

Photo credit’ U S Department of Defense

The patient’s skin is burned in a pattern corresponding

to the dark portions of a kimono worn at the time of

the explosion
Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons ● 21

The visible light will produce “flashblindness” in people who are looking in the direction of the explosion. Flashblindness can last

for several minutes, after which recovery is

total. A l-Mt explosion could cause flashblindness at distances as great as 13 miles [21 km] on

a clear day, or 53 miles [85 km] on a clear night.

If the flash is focused through the lens of the

eye, a permanent retinal burn will result. At

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there were many

cases of flashblindness, but only one case of

retinal burn, among the survivors. On the other

hand, anyone flashblinded while driving a car

could easiIy cause permanent injury to himself

and to others.

Skin burns result from higher intensities of

light, and therefore take place closer to the

point of explosion. A 1-Mt explosion can cause

first-degree burns (equivalent to a bad sunburn) at distances of about 7 miles [11 km],

second-degree burns (producing blisters that

lead to infection if untreated, and permanent

scars) at distances of about 6 miles [10 km],

and third-degree burns (which destroy skin

tissue) at distances of up to 5 miles [8 km].

Third-degree burns over 24 percent of the

body, or second-degree burns over 30 percent

of the body, will result in serious shock, and

will probably prove fatal unless prompt, specialized medical care is available. The entire

United States has facilities to treat 1,000 or

2,000 severe burn cases; a single nuclear

weapon could produce more than 10,000.

The distance at which burns are dangerous

depends heavily on weather conditions. Extensive moisture or a high concentration of particles in the air (smog) absorbs thermal radiation. Thermal radiation behaves like sunlight,

so objects create shadows behind which the

thermal radiation is indirect (reflected) and

less intense. Some conditions, such as ice on

the ground or low white clouds over clean air,

can increase the range of dangerous thermal

radiation.

Fires

The thermal radiation from a nuclear explosion can directly ignite kindling materials. In

general, ignitible materials outside the house,

such as leaves or newspapers, are not surrounded by enough combustible material to

generate a self-sustaining fire. Fires more likely

to spread are those caused by thermal radiation passing through windows to ignite beds

and overstuffed furniture inside houses. A

rather substantial amount of combustible

material must burn vigorously for 10 to 20

minutes before the room, or whole house,

becomes inflamed. The blast wave, which arrives after most thermal energy has been expended, will have some extinguishing effect on

the fires. However, studies and tests of this effect have been very contradictory, so the extent to which blast can be counted on to extinguish fire starts remains quite uncertain.

Another possible source of fires, which

might be more damaging in urban areas, is indirect. Blast damage to stores, water heaters,

furnaces, electrical circuits, or gas lines would

ignite fires where fuel is plentiful.

The best estimates are that at the 5-psi level

about 10 percent of al I buildings would sustain

a serious fire, while at 2 psi about 2 percent

would have serious fires, usualIy arising from

secondary sources such as blast-damaged utilities rather than direct thermal radiation.

It is possible that individual fires, whether

caused by thermal radiation or by blast damage to utilities, furnaces, etc., would coalesce

into a mass fire that would consume alI structures over a large area. This possibility has

been intensely studied, but there remains no

basis for estimating its probability. Mass fires

could be of two kinds: a “firestorm, ” in which

violent inrushing winds create extremely high

temperatures but prevent the fire from spreading radially outwards, and a “conflagration, ”

in which a fire spreads along a front. Hamburg,

Tokyo, and Hiroshima experienced firestorms

in World War 11; the Great Chicago Fire and

the San Francisco Earthquake Fire were conflagrations. A firestorm is likely to kill a high proportion of the people in the area of the fire,

through heat and through asphyxiation of

those in shelters. A confIagration spreads slowly enough so that people in its path can
22 ● The Etffects of Nuclear War

escape, though a conflagration caused by a nuclear attack might take a heavy toll of those

too injured to walk. Some believe that firestorms in U.S. or Soviet cities are unlikely

because the density of flammable materials

(“fuel loading”) is too low–the ignition of a

firestorm is thought to require a fuel loading of

at least 8 lbs/ft2 (Hamburg had 32), compared

to fuel loading of 2 lbs/ft2 in a typical U.S.

suburb and 5 lbs/ft2 in a neighborhood of twostory brick rowhouses. The Iikelihood of a conflagration depends on the geography of the

area, the speed and direction of the wind, and

details of building construction. Another variable is whether people and equipment are

available to fight fires before they can

coalesce and spread.

Electromagnetic Pulse

Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is an electromagnetic wave similar to radio waves, which

results from secondary reactions occurring

when the nuclear gamma radiation is absorbed

in the air or ground. It differs from the usual

radio waves in two important ways. First, it

creates much higher electric field strengths.

Whereas a radio signal might produce a thousandth of a volt or less in a receiving antenna,

an EMP pulse might produce thousands of

volts. Secondly, it is a single pulse of energy

that disappears completely in a small fraction

of a second. In this sense, it is rather similar to

the electrical signal from lightning, but the rise

in voltage is typically a hundred times faster.

This means that most equipment designed to

protect electrical facilities from lightning

works too slowly to be effective against EMP.

The strength of an EMP pulse is measured in

volts per meter (v/m), and is an indication of

the voltage that would be produced in an exposed antenna. A nuclear weapon burst on the

surface will typically produce an EMP of tens

of thousands of v/m at short distances (the 10-

psi range) and thousands of v/m at longer distances (l-psi range). Air bursts produce less

EMP, but high-altitude bursts (above 19 miles

[21 km]) produce very strong EMP, with ranges

of hundreds or thousands of miles. An attacker

might detonate a few weapons at such altitudes in an effort to destroy or damage the

communications and electric power systems of

the victim.

There is no evidence that EMP is a physical

threat to humans. However, electrical or electronic systems, particularly those connected to

long wires such as powerlines or antennas, can

undergo either of two kinds of damage. First,

there can be actual physical damage to an

electrical component such as shorting of a

capacitor or burnout of a transistor, which

would require replacement or repair before the

equipment can again be used. Second, at a

lesser level, there can be a temporary operational upset, frequently requiring some effort

to restore operation. For example, instabilities

induced in power grids can cause the entire

system to shut itself down, upsetting computers that must be started again. Base radio

stations are vulnerable not only from the loss

of commercial power but from direct damage

to electronic components connected to the

antenna. In general, portable radio transmitter/receivers with relatively short antennas are

not susceptible to EMP. The vulnerability of

the telephone system to EMP could not be

determined.

Fallout

While any nuclear explosion in the atmosphere produces some fallout, the fallout is far

greater if the burst is on the surface, or at least

low enough for the firebalI to touch the

ground. As chapter V shows in some detail, the

fallout from air bursts alone poses long-term

health hazards, but they are trivial compared

to the other consequences of a nuclear attack.

The significant hazards come from particles

scooped up from the ground and irradiated by

the nuclear explosion.

The radioactive particles that rise only a

short distance (those in the “stem” of the

familiar mushroom cloud) will fall back to

earth within a matter of minutes, landing close

to the center of the explosion. Such particles
.-

Ch, II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons Ž 23

are unlikely to cause many deaths, because

they will fall in areas where most people have

already been killed. However, the radioactivity

will complicate efforts at rescue or eventual

reconstruct ion.

The radioactive particles that rise higher will

be carried some distance by the wind before

returning to Earth, and hence the area and intensity of the fallout is strongly influenced by

local weather conditions. Much of the material

is simply blown downwind in a long plume,

The map shown in figure 2 illustrates the

plume expected from a 1-Mt surface burst in

Detroit if winds were blowing toward Canada.

The illustrated plume assumed that the winds

were blowing at a uniform speed of 15 mph

[24 km] over the entire region, The plume

wouId be longer and thinner if the winds were

more intense and shorter and somewhat more

broad if the winds were slower. If the winds

were from a different direction, the plume

would cover a different area. For example, a

wind from the northwest would deposit

enough fallout on Cleveland to inflict acute

radiation sickness on those who did not

evacuate or use effective fallout shelters

(figure 3). Thus wind direction can make an

enormous difference. Rainfal I can also have a

significant influence on the ways in which

radiation from smalIer weapons is deposited,

since rain will carry contaminated particles to

the ground. The areas receiving such contaminated rainfall would become “hot spots, ” with

greater radiation intensity than their surroundings, When the radiation intensity from fallout

is great enough to pose an immediate threat to

health, fallout will generally be visible as a thin

layer of dust.

The amount of radiation produced by fallout materials will decrease with time as the

radioactive materials “decay. ” Each material

decays at a different rate, Materials that decay

rapidly give off intense radiation for a short

period of time while long-lived materials radiate less intensely but for longer periods, Immediately after the fallout is deposited in

regions surrounding the blast site, radiation intensities will be very high as the short-lived

materials decay. These intense radiations will

decrease relatively quickly. The intensity will

have fallen by a factor of 10 after 7 hours, a

factor of 100 after 49 hours and a factor of

1,000 after 2 weeks. The areas in the plume illustrated in figures 2 and 3 would become

“safe” (by peacetime standards) in 2 to 3 years

for the outer ellipse, and in 10 years or so for

the inner ellipse.

Some radioactive particles will be thrust

into the stratosphere, and may not return to

Earth for some years. In this case only the particularly long-lived particles pose a threat, and

they are dispersed around the world over a

range of latitudes, Some fallout from U.S. and

Soviet weapons tests in the 1950’s and early

1960’s can still be detected. There are also

some particles in the immediate fallout (notably Strontium 90 and Cesium 137) that remain

radioactive for years. Chapter V discusses the

likely hazards from these long-lived particles.

The biological effects of fallout radiation

are substantially the same as those from direct

radiation, discussed above, People exposed to

enough fallout radiation wiII die, and those exposed to lesser amounts may become ill. Chapter 11 I discusses the theory of fallout sheltering, and chapter IV some of the practical difficulties of escaping fallout from a large counterforce attack.

There is some public interest in the question

of the consequences if a nuclear weapon destroyed a nuclear powerplant. The core of a

power reactor contains large quantities of

radioactive material, which tends to decay

more slowly (and hence less intensely) than the

fallout particles from a nuclear weapon explosion, Consequently, fallout from a destroyed

nuclear reactor (whose destruction would, incidently, require a high-accuracy surface burst)

would not be much more intense (during the

first day) or widespread than “ordinary” fallout, but would stay radioactive for a considerably longer time. Areas receiving such fallout wouId have to be evacuated or decontaminated; otherwise survivors would have to stay

in shelters for months,
Figure 2.— Main Fallout Pattern —Uniform 15 mph Southwest Wind (1-Mt Surface Burst in Detroit).

(Contours for 7-Day Accumulated Dose (Without Shielding) of 3,000,900,300, and 90 Rem.)
Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons ● 25

Figure 3.—Main Fallout Pattern —lJniforrn 15 mph Northwest Wind (1-Mt Surface Burst in Detroit).

(Contours for 7-Day Accumulated Dose (Without Shielding) of 3,000,900,300, and 90 Rem.)
26 . The Effects of Nuclear War

Combined Injuries (Synergism)

So far the discussion of each major effect

(blast, nuclear radiation, and thermal radiation) has explained how this effect in isolation

causes deaths and injuries to humans. It is customary to calculate the casualties accompanying hypothetical nuclear explosion as follows:

for any given range, the effect most likely to

kill people is selected and its consequences

calculated, while the other effects are ignored.

it is obvious that combined injuries are possible, but there are no generally accepted ways

of calculating their probability. What data do

exist seem to suggest that calculations of

single effects are not too inaccurate for immediate deaths, but that deaths occurring

some time after the explosion may well be due

to combined causes, and hence are omitted

from most calculations. Some of the obvious

possibilities are:

●

●

Nuclear Radiation Combined With Thermal

Radiation.– Severe burns place considerable stress on the blood system, and often

cause anemia. It is clear from experiments

with laboratory animals that exposure of a

burn victim to more than 100 reins of radiation will impair the blood’s ability to support recovery from the thermal burns.

Hence a sublethal radiation dose could

make it impossible to recover from a burn

that, without the radiation, would not

cause death.

Nuclear Radiation Combined With Mechanical Injuries. –Mechanical injuries, the indirect results of blast, take many forms.

Flying glass and wood will cause puncture

wounds. Winds may blow people into obstructions, causing broken bones, concussions, and internal injuries. Persons caught

in a collapsing building can suffer many

similar mechanical injuries. There is evidence that all of these types of injuries are

more serious if the person has been ex-

●

posed to 300 reins, particularly if treatment is delayed. Blood damage will clearly make a victim more susceptible to

blood loss and infection. This has been

confirmed in laboratory animals in which

a borderline lethal radiation dose was

followed a week later by a blast overpressure that alone would have produced

a low level of prompt lethality. The number of prompt and delayed (from radiation) deaths both increased over what

would be expected from the single effect

alone.

Thermal Radiation and Mechanical lniuries. — There is no information available

about the effects of this combination,

beyond the common sense observation

that since each can place a great stress on

a healthy body, the combination of injuries that are individually tolerable may

subject the body to a total stress that it

cannot tolerate. Mechanical injuries

should be prevalent at about the distance

from a nuclear explosion that produces

sublethal burns, so this synergism could

be an important one.

In general, synergistic effects are most likely

to produce death when each of the injuries

alone is quite severe. Because the uncertainties of nuclear effects are compounded when

one tries to estimate the likelihood of two or

more serious but (individually) nonfatal injuries, there really is no way to estimate the number of victims.

A further dimension of the problem is the

possible synergy between injuries and environmental damage. To take one obvious example,

poor sanitation (due to the loss of electrical

power and water pressure) can clearly compound the effects of any kind of serious injury.

Another possibility is that an injury would so

immobilize the victim that he would be unable

to escape from a fire.
Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons ● 27

DETROIT AND LENINGRAD

Detroit and Leningrad are representative industrial cities large enough to warrant the use

of very large weapons. Both have metropolitan

populations of about 4.3 million, and both are

major transportation and industrial centers.

In assessing and describing the damage, several assumptions were made that may not be

realistic, but which assisted in making a clear

presentation of the range of possible effects:

. There is no warning. The popuIations have

not evacuated or sought shelter, both of

which measures could reduce casualties.

● The detonations take place at night when

most people are at their residences. This

corresponds to the available census data

about where people are, and indeed people are near their residences more than

half the time.

● There is clear weather, with visibility of 10

miles [16 km].

● The air bursts are at an altitude that maximizes the area of 30 psi or more overpressure. A higher height of burst would

have increased the range of 5-psi overpressure (i.e. destruction of all residences) by

up to 10 percent, at the cost of less

damage to very hard structures near the

center of the explosion.

● No other cities are attacked, an assumption that allows for analyzing the extent

of outside help that would be required, if

it were avaiIable.

1 Mt on the Surface in Detroit

Physical Damage

Figure 4 shows the metropolitan area of

Detroit, with Windsor, Canada, across the river

to the southeast and Lake St. Clair directly

east. The detonation point selected is the intersection of 1-75 and 1-94, approximately at

the civic center and about 3 miles [5 km] from

the Detroit-Windsor tunnel entrance. Circles

are drawn at the 12-, 5-, 2-, and 1-psi Iimits.

The l-Mt explosion on the surface leaves a

crater about 1,000 feet [300 m] in diameter and

200 feet [61 m] deep, surrounded by a rim of

highly radioactive soil about twice this diameter thrown out of the crater. Out to a distance

of 0.6 miles [1 km] from the center there will be

nothing recognizable remaining, with the exception of some massive concrete bridge abutments and building foundations. At 0.6 miles

some heavily damaged highway bridge sections will remain, but little else until 1.3 miles

[2. I km], where a few very strongly constructed

buildings with poured reinforced concrete

walls will survive, but with the interiors totally

destroyed by blast entering the window openings. A distance of 1.7 miles [2.7 km] (1 2-psi

ring) is the closest range where any significant

structure wilI remain standing.

Of the 70,000 people in this area during nonworking hours, there will be virtually no survivors. (See table 4.) Fatalities during working

hours in this business district would undoubtedly be much higher. The estimated daytime population of the “downtown” area is

something over 200,000 in contrast to the census data of about 15,000. If the attack occurred during this time, the fatalities would be

increased by 130,000 and injuries by 45,000

over the estimates in table 4. Obviously there

would be some reduction in casualties in outlying residential areas where the daytime population would be lower.

In the band between the 1.7- and the 2.7-mile

(5 psi) circles, typical commercial and residential multistory buildings will have the walls

completely blown out, but increasingly at the

greater distances the skeletal structure will remain standing.

Individual residences in this region will be

totally destroyed, with only foundations and

basements remaining, and the debris quite uniformly distributed over the area. Heavy industrial plants will be destroyed in the inner part

of the ring, but some industry will remain functional towards the outer edge. The debris

depth that will clutter the streets will naturally
28 ● The Effects of Nuclear War
Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons . 29

:1 , <-- ‘ ; ““+-’-~--k

Miles

Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons ● 31

o-1 7 9 1 70

1 7-27 13.8 250

27-4 7 4 6 5 400

47-7 4 1026 600

—

depend on both the building heights and how

close together they are spaced. Typical depths

might range from tens of feet in the downtown

area where buildings are 10 to 20 stories high,

down to several inches where buildings are

lower and streets broader in the sector to the

west and north, In this band, blast damage

alone will destroy all automobiles, while some

heavier commercial vehicles (firetrucks and

repair vehicles) will survive near the outer

edges. However, few vehicles will have been

sufficiently protected from debris to remain

useful. The parking lots of both Cobb Field and

Tiger Stadium will contain nothing driveable.

I n this same ring, which contains a nighttime

population of about 250,000, about half will be

fatalities, with most of the remainder being injured. Most deaths will occur from collapsing

buildings. Although many fires will be started,

only a small percentage of the buildings are

Iikely to continue to burn after the blast wave

passes. The mechanics of fire spread in a

heavily damaged and debris strewn area are

not well understood. However, it is probable

that fire spread would be slow and there would

be no firestorm. For unprotected people, the

initial nuclear radiation would be lethal out to

1.7 miles [2.7 km], but be insignificant in its

prompt effects (50 reins) at 2.0 miles [3.2 km].

Since few people inside a 2-mile ring will survive the blast, and they are very Iikely to be in

strong buildings that typically have a 2- to 5-

protection factor, the additional fatalities and

injuries from initial radiation should be small

compared to other uncertainties.

The number of casualties from thermal

burns depends on the time of day, season, and

atmospheric visibility. Modest variations in

these factors produce huge changes in vulnerability to burns. For example, on a winter night

70 0 0

130 100 20

20 180 200

0 150 450

less than 1 percent of the population might be

exposed to direct thermal radiation, while on a

clear summer weekend afternoon more than

25 percent might be exposed (that is, have no

structure between the fireball and the person).

When visibility is 10 miles [16 km], a l-Mt explosion produces second-degree burns at a distance of 6 miles [10 km], while under circumstances when visibility is 2 miles [3 km], the

range of second-degree burns is only 2.7 miles

[4.3 km]. Table 5 shows how this variation

could cause deaths from thermal radiation to

vary between 1,000 and 190,000, and injuries to

vary between 500 and 75,000.

In the band from 2.7 to 4.7 miles [4.4 to 7.6

km] (2 psi), large buildings will have lost windows and frames, interior partitions, and, for

those with light-walled construction, most of

the contents of upper floors will have been

blown out into the streets. Load-bearing wall

buildings at the University of Detroit will be

severely cracked. Low residential buildings will

be totally destroyed or severely damaged.

Casualties are estimated to be about 50 percent in this region, with the majority of these

injured. There wilI stiIl be substantial debris in

the streets, but a very significant number of

cars and trucks will remain operable. In this

zone, damage to heavy industrial plants, such

as the Cadillac plant, will be severe, and most

planes and hangars at the Detroit City Airport

wilI be destroyed.

In this ring only 5 percent of the population

of about 400,000 will be killed, but nearly half

will be injured (table 4). This is the region of

the most severe fire hazard, since fire ignition

and spread is more likely in partly damaged

buildings than in completely flattened areas.

Perhaps 5 percent of the buildings would be

initially ignited, with fire spread to adjoining
32 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

buildings highly likely if their separation is less

than 50 feet [15 m]. Fires will continue to

spread for 24 hours at least, ultimately destroying about half the buildings. However, these

estimates are extremely uncertain, as they are

based on poor data and unknown weather conditions. They are also made on the assumption

that no effective effort is made by the uninjured half of the population in this region to

prevent the ignition or spread of fires.

As table 5 shows, there would be between

4,000 and 95,000 additional deaths from thermal radiation in this band, assuming a visibility

of 10 miles [16 km]. A 2-mile [3 km] visibility

would produce instead between 1,000 and

11,000 severe injuries, and many of these

would subsequently die because adequate

medical treatment would not be available.

In the outermost band (4.7 to 7.4 miles [7.6

to 11.9 km]) there will be only light damage to

commercial structures and moderate damage

to residences. Casualties are estimated at 25

percent injured and only an insignificant number killed (table 4). Under the range of conditions displayed in table 5, there will be an additional 3,000 to 75,000 burn injuries requiring

specialized medical care. Fire ignitions should

be comparatively rare (limited to such kindling

material as newspaper and dry leaves) and

easily control led by the survivors.

Whether fallout comes from the stem or the

cap of the mushroom is a major concern in the

general vicinity of the detonation because of

the time element and its effect on general

emergency operations. Fallout from the stem

starts building after about 10 minutes, so during the first hour after detonation it represents

the prime radiation threat to emergency crews.

The affected area would have a radius of

about 6.5 miles [10.5 km] (as indicated by the

dashed circle on figure 4) with a hot-spot a

distance downwind that depends on the wind

velocity. If a 15-mph wind from the southwest

is assumed, an area of about 1 mi2 [260 hectares]—the solid ellipse shown —would cause

an average exposure of 300 reins in the first

hour to people with no fallout protection at

all. The larger toned ellipse shows the area of

150 reins in the first hour. But the important

feature of short-term (up to 1 hour) fallout is

the relatively small area covered by lifethreatening radiation levels compared to the

area covered by blast damage.

Starting in about an hour, the main fallout

from the cloud itself will start to arrive, with

some of it adding to the already-deposited

local stem fallout, but the bulk being distributed in an elongated downwind ellipse.

Figures 2 and 3 show two fallout patterns, differing only in the direction of the wind. The

Table 5.–Burn Casualty Estimates

(1 Mt on Detroit)

Distance from Survivors of Fatalities (eventual) Injuries

blast (mi) blast effects 2-mile visibility 10-mile visibility 2-mile visibility 10-mile visibility

(1 percent of population exposed to line of sight from fireball)

0-1. 7 0 0 0 0 0

1 7-2 7

27-4.7 .

47-74 .

Total (rounded

0-1 7 .

120,000 1,200 1, 200” o 0

380,000 0 3,800 500 0

600,000 — 0 2,600 ————.— 0 3,000

1,000 8,000 500 3,000

(25 percent of population exposed to line of sight from fireball)

o 0 0 0 0

1 7-27 , 120,000 30,000 30,000 0 0

2.7-4 7 380.000 0 95,000 11,000 0

4,7-74 . 600,000 0 66,000 0 751000

Total (rounded) 30,000 190.000 11.000 75,000
Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons • 33

contours marked are the number of reins received in the week following the arrival of the

cloud fat lout, again assuming no fallout protection whatever. Realistic patterns, which will

reflect wind shear, 2 wider crosswind distribution, and other atmospheric vari

be much more complex than this i

Infrastructure Status

As a complement to the prece

~bilities, will

lustration.

~ing description of physical destruction, the status of the

various infrastructure elements of the Detroit

metropolitan area, and the potential for their

recovery, can be addressed. The reader should

understand that this tutorial considers Detroit

to be the only damaged area in the United

States, that there is no other threat that would

prevent survivors and those in surrounding

areas from giving all possible aid, and that

Federal and State governments will actively

organize outside assistance.

The near half-million injured present a medical task of incredible magnitude. Those parts

of Wayne, Macomb, and Oakland counties

shown on the map have 63 hospitals containing about 18,000 beds. However, 55 percent of

these beds are inside the 5-psi ring and thus

totally destroyed. Another 15 percent in the 2-

to 5-psi band will be severely damaged, leaving

5,000 beds remaining outside the region of significant damage. Since this is only 1 percent of

the number of injured, these beds are incapable of providing significant medical assistance. In the first few days, transport of injured

out of the damaged area will be severely hampered by debris clogging the streets. In general,

only the nonprofessional assistance of nearby

survivors can hope to hold down the large

number of subsequent deaths that would

otherwise occur. Even as transportation for the

injured out of the area becomes available in

subsequent days, the total medical facilities of

the United States will be severely overburdened, since in 1977 there were only 1,407,000

hospital beds in the whole United States. Burn

victims will number in the tens of thousands;

yet in 1977 there were only 85 specialized burn

centers, with probably 1,000 to 2,000 beds, in

the entire United States.

The total loss of all utilities in areas where

there has been significant physical damage to

the basic structure of buildings is inevitable.

The electric power grid will show both the inherent strength and weakness of its complex

network. The CO I lapse of buiIdings and the toppling of trees and utility poles, along with the

injection of tens of thousands of volts of EMP

into wires, will cause the immediate loss of

power in a major sector of the total U.S. power

grid. Main electrical powerplants (near Grosse

Point Park to the east, and Zug Island to the

south) are both in the l-psi ring and should suffer only superficial damage. Within a day the

major area grid should be restored, bringing

power back to facilities located as close to the

blast as the l-psi ring. Large numbers of powerIine workers and their equipment brought in

from the surrounding States will be able to

gradually restore service to surviving structures in the 1- to 2-psi ring over a period of

days.

The water distribution system will remain

mostly intact since, with the exception of one

booster pumping station at 2 psi (which will

suffer only minor damage), its facilities are

outside the damaged area. However, the loss

of electric power to the pumps and the breaking of many service connections to destroyed

buildings will immediately cause the loss of all

water pressure. Service to the whole area will

be restored only when the regional power grid

is restored, and to the areas of Iight and intermediate damage only as valves to broken

pipes can be located and shut off over a period

of days. There will be only sporadic damage to

buried mains in the 2- to 5-psi region, but with

increasing frequency in the 5- to 12-psi region.

Damaged sections near the explosion center

wiII have to be closed off.

The gas distribution system will receive similar damage: loss of pressure from numerous

broken service connections, some broken

mains, particularly in the 5- to 12-psi ring, and
34 ● The Effects of Nuc/ear War

numerous resulting fires. Service will be slowly

restored only as utility repairmen and service

equipment are brought in from surrounding

areas.

Rescue and recovery operations will depend

heavily on the reestablishment of transportation, which in Detroit relies on private cars,

buses, and commercial trucks, using a radial

interstate system and a conventional urban

grid. Since bridges and overpasses are surprisingly immune to blast effects, those interstate

highways and broad urban streets without significant structures nearby will survive as far in

as the 12-psi ring and can be quickly restored

to use on clearing away minor amounts of

debris. However, the majority of urban streets

will be cluttered with varying quantities of

debris, starting with tree limbs and other minor

obstacles at 1 psi, and increasing in density up

to the 12-psi ring, where all buildings, trees,

and cars will be smashed and quite uniformly

redistributed over the area. It could take

weeks or months to remove the debris and

restore road transportation in the area.

The Detroit city airport, located in the middle of the 2- to 5-psi ring, will have essentially

all of its aircraft and facilities destroyed.

Usually runways can be quickly restored to use

following minor debris removal but, in this particular example with the southwest wind, the

airport is the center of the fallout hot spot

from the dust column as well as of the intensive fallout from the cloud. Thus, cleanup efforts to restore flight operations could not

commence for 2 weeks at the earliest, with the

workers involved in the cleanup receiving 100

reins accumulated during the third week. The

Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport

and the Willow Run Airport are far outside the

blast effects area and would be available as

soon as the regional power grid electric service

was restored.

The main train station, near the DetroitWindsor highway tunnel, would have suffered

major damage (5 psi), but since few people

commute to the downtown area by train, its

loss would not be a major factor in the overall

paralysis of transportation. The surrounding industry depends heavily on rail transportation,

but rail equipment and lines will usually survive wherever the facilities they support survive.

Most gasoline fuel oil tanks are located out

beyond Dearborn and Lincoln Park and, at 16

miles from the detonation, will have suffered

no damage. Arrival of fuel should not be impeded, but its distribution will be totally

dependent on cleanup of streets and highways.

The civil defense control center, located just

beyond the Highland Park area in the 1- to 2-

psi ring, should be able to function without impairment. Commercial communications systems (television and base radio transmitters)

will be inoperable both from the loss of commercial power in the area and, for those facilities in the blast area, from EMP. Those not

blast damaged should be restored in several

days. In the meantime, mobile radio systems

will provide the primary means of communicating into the heavily damaged areas. The

telephone system will probably remain largely

functional in those areas where the lines have

survived structural damage in collapsing buildings, or street damage in areas where they are

not buried.

Radioactive Fallout

The extent and location of radioactive fallout will depend on weather conditions, especially the speed and direction of the wind.

Figures 2 and 3 show how a uniform wind

velocity of 15 mph could distribute fallout

either over sparsely popuIated farming areas in

Canada if the wind is from the southwest, or

over Cleveland and Youngstown, Ohio, and

Pittsburgh, Pa., if the wind is from the northwest. It should not be forgotten that these fallout patterns are idealized—such neat elipses

would occur in reality only with an absolutely

constant wind and no rain.

No effort was made to calculate the deaths,

injuries, or economic losses that might result

from such fallout patterns. However, the possibilities are instructive:

. The onset of fallout would depend on

wind velocity and distance from the ex-
Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons ● 35

plosion and it would be most dangerous

during the first few days. In the case of an

attack on a single city (using a surface

burst, as our example does), people living

downwind would probably evacuate.

Those who neither evacuated nor found

adequate fallout shelters would be subjected to dangerous levels of radiation:

people in the inner contour would receive

a fatal dose within the first week; people

in the next contour out would contract

very severe radiation sickness if they

stayed indoors and would probably receive a fatal dose if they spent much time

outdoors; people in the next contour out

would contract generally nonfatal radiation sickness, with increased hazards of

deaths from other diseases. People in the

outer contour (9o roentgens in the first

week) would suffer few visible effects, but

their life expectancy would drop as a

result of an increased risk of eventual

cancer.

● As time passes, the continuing decay of

fallout radiation could be accelerated by

decontamination. Some decontamination

takes place naturally, as rain washes

radioactive particles away, and as they

are leached into the soil which attenuates

the radiation. It is also possible to take

specific measures to speed decontamination. Presumably evacuees would not

move back into a contaminated area until

the effects of time and decontamination

had made it safe.

● A Iimiting case is one in which no significant decontamination takes place, and

areas receiving fallout become safe only

when the radioactive particles have decayed to safe levels. Decay to a level of

500 millirems per year would require 8 to

10 years for the inner contour (3,000 roentgens in the first week); 6 years or so for the

next contour (900 roentgens in the first

week); 3 to 4 years for the next contour

(300 roentgens in the first week); and

about 3 years for the outer contour (90

roentgens in the first week).

● Natural processes could concentrate

some radioactive particles, and those that

entered the food chain could pose an additional hazard.

Summary

It should be emphasized that there are many

uncertainties in the assumptions underlying

the description of the results of a l-Mt surface

burst in Detroit. Nevertheless, several salient

features stand out:

●

●

●

●

●

seventy square miles of property destruction (2 psi),

a quarter-of -a-roil I ion fatalities, plus half a

million injuries,

additional damage from widespread fires,

casualties could have been greatly re

duced by an alert and informed population, and

rescue and recovery operations must be

organized and heavily supported from

outside the area (food, medical, utility restoration, and cleanup).

l-Mt Air Burst on Detroit

For comparison, the same l-Mt nuclear

weapon was assumed to have been air burst at

an altitude of 6,000 feet [1.8 km] over the same

interstate intersection as used in the preceding

ground burst discussion. This altitude will maximize the size of the 30-psi circle, but the

radius of the 5-psi circle that results will be

only 10 percent smaller than what would have

resulted from a height of burst raised to the 5-

psi optimized value. There will be several

significant differences in this case.

●

●

●

●

●

The sizes of the rings of pressure damage

wilI be larger.

The range of thermal burns and fire starts

will also increase.

There will be no significant fallout.

There will be no crater.

The strongest structures may partly survive even directly under the blast.

Figure 5 shows the corresponding pressure

circles and figure 6 (second column) illustrates

that the number of fatalities nearly doubled,

and the number of injured have greatly increased. At the same time, damage to major in-
36 ● The Effects of Nuc/ear War

Figure 5.— Detroit l-Mt Air Burst

I 1 1 1 1 J

0 2 4 6 8 10

Miles
Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons ● 3 7

Figure 6.—Casualties (thousands)

Population

(1 ,000’s)

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

.

420

s

220

dustrial facilities is becoming significant, with

the Chrysler plant in the middle of the 2- to 5-

psi band, and the Ford River Rouge plant in the

1- to 2-psi band.

25-Mt Air Burst on Detroit

For 25 Mt, we assumed a burst altitude of

17,500 feet [5.3 km], over the same detonation

point. Figure 7 shows the 12-, 5-, and 2-psi rings,

but the 1-psi ring at 30.4 miles [48.9 km] is completely off the map. It is obvious that damage

and casualties wouId be increased even further

had the detonation point been moved about 5

1,360

1,840

1,260

390

1,100

2,460

miles [8 km] to the northwest. But even without

this shift, it is clear that the whole metropolitan area has been heavily damaged by the explosive power of this huge weapon. The casualties are again shown on figure 6 (column 3).

The contrasts to the l-Mt surface burst are

stark:

● There will be very few survivors (1.1 million available to assist the much more numerous casualtie

1-Mt surface burst in which

3.7 million survivors were potentially

avai I able to assist the 640,000 casualties.
38 . The Effects of Nuclear War

Figure 7.— Detroit 25-Mt Air Burst

I 1 1 1 1 J

O 2 4 6 8 10

Miles
Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons . 39

● There wilI be virtually no habitable housing in the area.

● Essentially all heavy industry will be totally destroyed.

As a result, rescue operations will have to be

totally supported from outside the area, with

evacuation of the 1.2 mi II ion survivors the only

feasible course. Recovery and rebuilding will

be a very long-term, problematical issue.

Leningrad

Leningrad is a major industrial and transportation center built on the low-lying delta where

the Neva River enters the Gulf of Finland. The

older part of the city is built on the delta itself,

with the newer residential sections leapfrogging industrial sections, primarily to the south

and southwest (figure 8). The residential and

commercial (but not industrial) areas are

shown on the map.

The major difference between housing in

Leningrad and that in Detroit is that Leningrad

suburbs contain very few single-family residences. In the older part of Leningrad, the

buildings have masonry load-bearing walls and

wooden interior construction and are typically

six to eight stories, reflecting the early code

that only church spires could be higher than

the Tsar’s Winter Palace. The post-World War

I I housing construction is 10- to 12-story apartments having steel frames and precast concrete walls, with the buildings comfortably

spaced on wide thoroughfares in open parklike

settings.

Since actual population density data for

Leningrad was unavailable, simplifying demographic assumptions are used. The assumed

populated areas are shown in figure 9, broken

down into l-km [0.6 mile] squares. The stated

area of Leningrad is 500 km2 [193 mi2

]. Since

the shaded squares cover 427 km2 [165 mi2

], it

is assumed that the remaining areas are relatively uninhabited at night. It has also been

assumed that in these inhabited areas the

population density is uniform at 10,000 per

km’, because although the building density is

lower in the newer apartment areas, the buildings themselves are generalIy higher. Thus, the

population density does not drop off as it does

in the U.S. suburbs of predominately singlefamily houses.

l-Mt and 9-Mt Air Bursts on Leningrad

The Leningrad apartments described are

likely to have their walls blown out, and the

people swept out, at about 5 psi, even though

the remaining steel skeleton will withstand

much higher pressures. Thus, although the type

of construction is totally different from Detroit, the damage levels are so similar that the

same relationship between overpressure and

casualties is assumed (figure 1, p. 19).

The l-Mt and 9-Mt air burst pressure rings

are shown in figures 10 and 11. Note that for

the 9-Mt case the l-psi ring falls completely off

the map, as was the case for 25 Mt on Detroit.

The calculated casualties are illustrated on

figure 6 (columns 4 and 5), and are about double those for Detroit for the comparable l-Mt

case. This resuIts directly from the higher average population density. Other contrasts between the cities can be noted; in Leningrad:

●

●

●

●

●

●

People live close to where they work. In

general, there is no daily cross-city movement.

Buildings (except in the old part of the

city) are unlikely to burn.

Apartment building spacing is so great as

to make fire spread unlikely, even though

a few buiIdings wouId burn down.

There will be much less debris preventing

access to damaged areas.

Transportation is by rail to the outlying

areas, and by an excellent metro system

within the city.

There is only one television station— in

the middle of the city— so mass communications would be interrupted until other

broadcasting equipment was brought in

and set up.

Ten 40-kt Air Bursts on Leningrad

Figure 12 shows one possible selection of

burst points, set to have the 5-psi circles
40 Ž The Effects of Nuclear War

lm.

13

12

In

,

z

3

4

,

Figure 8.— Leningrad—Commercial and Residential Sections

“ , ,

I I

I
—

Ch, II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons . 41

Figure 9.—Leningrad—Populated Area

,

I

, I

,

,.4 I .I I I

TIT

I

I

,

1

\
42 . The Effects of Nuclear War

Figure 10.— Leningrad 1“Mt Air Burst
Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons ● 43

Figure 11 .—Leningrad 9-Mt Air Burst

LENINGRAD

,, ,

/
44 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

1 1

- . .

t

.<

! ,

+
Ch. II—A Nuclear Weapon Over Detroit or Leningrad: A Tutorial on the Effects of Nuclear Weapons ● 45

touching, and with only the envelope of the 2-

and l-psi rings shown, Since this is an effects

discussion only, it is assumed that this precise

pattern can be achieved. The errors arising

from neglecting the overlap of the 2- to 5-psi

bands will be negligible compared to uncertainties in population distribution and structural design. Casualty estimates are shown in

the right hand column of figure 6 (p. 37). Note

that fatalities are only slightly greater than for

the l-Mt case, which corresponds well to the

equivalent megatonage (1.17 Mt) of the ten 40-

kiloton (kt) weapons. However, the number of

injured are considerably smaller because they

primarily occur in the 2- to 5-psi band, which is

much smalIer for the 40-kt pattern than for the

single 1-Mt case.

1-KT TERRORIST WEAPON AT GROUND LEVEL

To this point this chapter has addressed

nuclear effects from current strategic weapon

systems. Another nuclear weapon of concern is

one constructed by terrorists and detonated in

a major city, * A terrorist group using stolen or

diverted fission material, having general technical competence but lacking direct weapon

design experience, could probably build a

weapon up to several kilotons. This weapon

would be large and heavy, certainly not the

often-discussed “suitcase bomb, ” so is Iikely to

be transported in a van or small truck, with

threatened detonation either in the street or

the parking garage of a building.

Because of the locations and yield of this

weapon, its effects will be much less devasting

than those of high-yield, strategic weapons.

The range and magnitude of all the nuclear effects will be greatly reduced by the low yields;

in addition, the relative range of lethal effects

will be changed. At high yields, blast and thermal burn reach out to greater distances than

does the initial nuclear radiation. At 1 kt the

reverse is true; for example, 5-psi overpressure

occurs at 1,450 feet [442 m], while 600 reins of

initial radiation reaches out to 2,650 feet [808

m], For the 1-Mt surface burst, 5 psi occurred at

2.7 miles and 600 reins at 1.7 miles.

In addition to these changes in range, the

highly built-up urban structure in which the

weapon is placed wilI significantly modify the

resulting nuclear environment. This occurs

*OTA report o n ‘‘ NucIear Proliferation andi Safeguards, ” U S Government Printing Office, June 1977, pp

111-12.2

when the lethal range of effects shrink to such

an extent that they are comparable to the size

of urban structures. It is indeed reasonable to

expect that the blast effects of a smalI weapon

(5 psi at a range of only 1,450 feet) will be

severely infIuenced by nearby structures having comparable dimensions. Preliminary calculations have confirmed this. For example, suppose a device is detonated in a van parked

alongside a 1,000-foot high building in the middle of the block of an urban complex of rather

closely spaced streets in one direction and

more broadly spaced avenues in the other direction. Whereas the 2.5-psi ring would have a

radius of 2,100 feet [640 m] detonated on a

smooth surface, it is found that this blast wave

extends to 2,800 feet [850 m] directly down the

street, but to only 1,500 feet [460 m] in a random direction angling through the built-up

blocks. These calculations have been made by

many approximating factors which, if more accurately represented, would probably lead to

an even greater reduction in range.

Other weapons effects will be similarly modified from those predicted on the basis of a

relatively open target area. I n the case of initial nuclear radiation, a lethal 600 rem would

be expected to extend to 2,650 feet [808 m ]

from 1 kt. Because of the great absorption of

this radiation as it passes through the multiple

walIs of the several buildings in a block, it is

expected that 600 reins will reach out no further than 800 feet [245 m], thus covering an

area onIy one-tenth as great. The thermal radiation wilI affect only those directly exposed up
46 Ž TheEffects of Nuclear War

and down the street, while the majority of people will be protected by buildings. For the

same reason directly initiated fires will be insignificant, but the problem of secondary fires

starting from building damage wilI remain. The

local fallout pattern also will be highly

distorted by the presence of the buildings. The

fireball, confined between the buildings, will

be blown up to a higher altitude than otherwise expected, leading to reduced local fallout

but causing broadly distributed long-term

fallout.

In summary, the ranges of nuclear effects

from a low-yield explosion in the confined

space of an urban environment will differ significantly from large yield effects, but in ways

that are very difficult to estimate. Thus the

numbers of people and areas of buildings affected are very uncertain. However, it appears

that, with the exception of streets directly exposed to the weapon, lethal ranges to people

will be smaller than anticipated and dominated by the blast-induced CO I lapse of nearby

buiIdings.
Chapter III

CIVIL DEFENSE
Chapter llI.–CIVIL DEFENSE

m.— .

rage

49

49

49

49

50

51

53

54

54

54

56

59
Chapter Ill

CIVIL DEFENSE

INTRODUCTION

Effective civil defense measures have the potential to reduce drastically

casualties and economic damage in the short term, and to speed a nation’s economic

recovery in the long term. Civil defense seeks to preserve lives, economic capacity,

postattack viability, and preattack institutions, authority, and values. The extent to

which specific civil defense measures would succeed in doing so is controversial.

Some observers argue that U.S. civil defense promotes deterrence by increasing

the credibility of U.S. retaliation and by reducing any Soviet “destructive advantage”

in a nuclear war. Others, however, argue that a vigorous civil defense program would

induce people to believe that a nuclear war was “survivable” rather than “unthinkable,” and that such a change in attitude would increase the risk of war.

CIVIL DEFENSE MEASURES

Civil defense seeks to protect the population, protect industry, and improve the quality

of postattack life, institutions, and values. This

section considers several measures that support these goals.

Population Protection

People near potential targets must either

seek protective shelter or evacuate from

threatened areas to safer surroundings; if not

at risk from immediate effects, they must still

protect themselves from fallout. Both forms of

protection depend on warning, shelter, supplies, life-support equipment (e. g., air filtration, toilets, communication devices), instruction, public health measures, and provision for

rescue operations. I n addition, evacuation involves transportation, This section examines

each form of protection.

Blast Shelters

Some structures, particularly those designed

for the purpose, offer substantial protection

against direct nuclear effects (blast, thermal

radiation, ionizing radiation, and related effects such as induced fires). Since blast is

usually the most difficult effect to protect

against, such shelters are generally evaluated

on blast resistance, and protection against

other direct effects is assumed. Since most urban targets can be destroyed by an overpressure of 5 to 10 psi, a shelter providing protection against an overpressure of about 10 psi is

called a blast shelter, although many blast

shelters offer greater protection. Other shelters provide good protection against fallout,

but little resistance to blast–such “fallout

shelters” are disccused in the next section.

Blast shelters generally protect against fallout,

but best meet this purpose when they contain

adequate Iife-support systems. (For example, a

subway station without special provisions for

water and ventiIation wouId make a good blast

shelter but a poor fallout shelter. )

Nuclear explosions produce “rings” of various overpressures. If the overpressure at a

given spot is very low, a blast shelter is unnecessary; if the overpressure is very high (e. g.,

a direct hit with a surface burst), even the best

blast shelters will fail. The “harder” the blast

shelter (that is, the greater the overpressure it

49
—

50 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

can resist), the greater the area in which it

could save its occupants’ lives. Moreover, if

the weapon height of burst (HOB) is chosen to

maximize the area receiving 5 to 10 psi, only a

very smalI area (or no area at all) receives more

than 40 to 50 psi. Hence, to attack blast shelters of 40 to 50 psi (which is a reasonably attainable hardness), weapons must be detonated at a lower altitude, reducing the area

over which buildings, factories, etc., are destroyed.

The costs of blast shelters depend on the

degree of protection afforded and on whether

the shelter is detached or is in a building constructed for other purposes. However, a large

variation in costs occurs between shelters

added to existing buildings and those built as

part of new construction. The installation of

shelters in new construction, or “slanting,” is

preferable, but it could take as long as 20 years

for a national policy of slanting to provide adequate protection in cities.

An inexpensive way to protect population

from blast is to use existing underground facilities such as subways, where people can be

located for short periods for protection. If people must remain in shelters to escape fallout,

then life-support measures requiring special

preparation are needed.

Other lethal nuclear effects cannot be overlooked. Although, as noted above, blast shelters usually protect against prompt radiation,

the shelters must be designed to ensure that

this is the case.

Another problem is protection against fallout. If a sheltered population is to survive fallout, two things must be done. First, fallout

must be prevented from infiltrating shelters

through doors, ventilation, and other conduits.

Other measures to prevent fallout from being

tracked or carried into a shelter must also be

taken. More important, the shelter must enable

its occupants to stay inside as long as outside

radiation remains dangerous; radiation doses

are cumulative and a few brief exposures to

outside fallout may be far more hazardous

than constant exposure to a low level of radiation that might penetrate into a shelter.

Since radiation may remain dangerous for

periods from a few days to several weeks, each

shelter must be equipped to support its occupants for at least this time. Requirements include adequate stocks of food, water, and necessary medical supplies, sanitary facilities, and

other appliances. Equipment for controlling

tern perature, humidity, and “air quality”

standards is also critical. With many people

enclosed in an airtight shelter, temperatures,

humidity, and carbon dioxide content increase, oxygen availability decreases, and fetid

materials accumulate. Surface fires, naturally

hot or humid weather, or crowded conditions

may make things worse. If unregulated, slight

increases in heat and humidity quickly lead to

discomfort; substantial rises in temperature,

humidity, and carbon dioxide over time could

even cause death. Fires are also a threat to

shelterers because of extreme tern peratures

(possibly exceeding 2,000” F) and carbon

monoxide and other noxious gases. A large fire

might draw oxygen out of a shelter, suffocating shelterers. World War I I experience indicates that rubble heated by a firestorm may remain intolerably hot for several days after the

fire is put out.

Fallout Shelters

In the United States, fallout shelters have

been identified predominantly in urban areas

(by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency

(DCPA) shelter survey), to protect against fallout from distant explosions, e.g., a Soviet attack on U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles

(ICBMs). On the other hand, Soviet fallout

shelters are primarily intended for the rural

population and an evacuated urban population.

Fallout protection is relatively easy to

achieve. Any shielding material reduces the

radiation intensity. Different materials reduce

the intensity by differing amounts. For example, the thickness (in inches) of various substances needed to reduce gamma radiation by

a factor of 10 is: steel, 3.7; concrete, 12; earth,

18; water, 26; wood, 50. Consider an average

home basement that provides a protection factor (PF) of 10 (reduces the inside level of radia-
Ch. ///—Civi/ Defense . 51

tion to one-tenth of that outside). Without additional protection, a family sheltered here

could still be exposed to dangerous levels of

radiation over time. For example, after 7 days

an accumulated dose of almost 400 reins inside the basement would occur if the radiation

outside totaled 4,000 roentgens. This could be

attenuated to a relatively safe accumulation

of 40 reins, if about 18 inches of dirt could be

piled against windows and exposed walls before the fallout begins. Thirty-six inches of dirt

would reduce the dose to a negligible level of 4

reins (400 - 100). Thus, as DCPA notes,

“fallout protection is as cheap as dirt. ” Moving

dry, unfrozen earth to increase the protection

in a fallout shelter requires considerable time

and effort, if done by hand. A cubic foot of

earth weighs about 100 lbs; a cubic yard about

2,700 Ibs. Given time, adequate instructions,

and the required materials, unskilled people

can convert home basements into effective

fallout shelters.

The overall effectiveness of fallout shelters,

therefore, depends on: (a) having an adequate

shelter—or enough time, information, and

materials to build or improve an expedient

shelter; (b) having sufficient food, water, and

other supplies to enable shelterers to stay sheltered until the outside fallout decays to a safe

level (they may need to remain in shelters for

periods ranging from a few days to over 1

month, depending on fallout intensity); and (c)

entering the shelter promptly before absorbing

much radiation. (An individual caught by fallout before reaching shelter could have difficulty entering a shelter without contaminating

it. )

Over the years, home fallout shelters have

received considerable attention, with the Government distributing plans that could be used

to make home basements better shelters. Such

plans typically involve piling dirt against windows and (if possible) on fIoors above the shelter area, stocking provisions, obtaining radios

and batteries, building makeshift toilets, and

so forth. Such simple actions can substantially

increase protection against radiation and may

slightly improve protection against blast. How5

ever, few homes in the South and West have

basements.

With adequate time, instructions, and materials, an “expedient” shelter offering reasonable radiation protection can be constructed. This is a buried or semi buried structure, shielded from radiation by dirt and other

common materials. Expedient shelter construction figures prominently in Soviet civil defense

planning.

Evacuation

Evacuation is conceptually simple: people

move from high-risk to low-risk areas. I n effect,

evacuation (or crisis relocation) uses safe

distances for protection from immediate nuclear effects. The effectiveness of crisis relocation is highly scenario-dependent. If relocated

people have time to find or build shelters, if

the areas into which people evacuate do not

become new targets, and if evacuated targets

are attacked, evacuation will save many Iives.

Although evacuating is far less costly per

capita than constructing blast shelters, planning and implementing an evacuation is difficult. First, people must be organized and transported to relocation areas. This is a staggering
52 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

logistics problem. Unless people are assigned

to specific relocation areas, many areas could

be overwhelmed with evacuees, causing severe

health and safety problems. Unless private

transportation is strictly controlled, monumental traffic jams could result. Unless adequate

public transportation is provided, some people

would be stranded in blast areas. Unless necessary supplies are at relocation areas, people

might rebel against authority. Unless medical

care is distributed among relocation areas,

health problems would multiply.

Once evacuated, people must be sheltered.

They might be assigned to existing public shelters or to private homes with basements suitable for shelter. If materials are available and

time permits, new public shelters could be

built. Evacuees require many of the same lifesupport functions described previously under

fallout shelters; providing these in sufficient

quantity would be difficult.

Evacuation entails many unknowns. The

time available for evacuation is unknown, but

extremely critical. People should be evacuated

to areas that will receive little fallout, yet

fallout deposition areas cannot be accurately

predicted in advance. Crisis relocation could

increase the perceived threat of nuclear war

and this might destablize a crisis.

Whether people would obey an evacuation

order depends on many factors, especially

public perception of a deteriorating international crisis. If an evacuation were ordered and

people were willing to comply with it, would

time allow compliance? If the attack came

while the evacuation is underway, more people might die than if evacuation had not been

attempted. Sufficiency of warning depends on

circumstances; a U.S. President might order an

evacuation only if the Soviets had started one.

In this case, the United States might have less

evacuation time than the Soviets. The abundance of transportation in the United States

could in theory permit faster evacuation, but

panic, traffic jams, and inadequate planning

could nullify this advantage. Disorder and

panic, should they occur, would impede evacuation.

The success of evacuation in the United

States would likely vary from region to region.

Generally, evacuation requires little planning

in sparsely populated areas. In some areas,

especially the Midwest and South, evacuation

is feasible but requires special planning because fallout from attacks on ICBMs might

mean longer evacuation distances. Evacuation

from the densely populated Boston-to-Washington and Sacramento-to-San Diego corridors,

with their tens of millions of people and limited relocation areas, may prove impossible.

The Soviet Union reportedly has plans for

large-scale evacuation of cities, and recent debate on its effectiveness has stimulated discussion of a similar plan, known as “crisis relocation’” for the United States. Some key considerations are:

●

●

●

Tactical warning of a missile attack does

not give enough time for an evacuation.

Evacuation plans thus assume that an intense crisis will provide several days’ strategic warning of an attack, and that the

leadership would make use of this warni ng.

Unlike in-place blast sheltering, peacetime expenditures on evacuation are relatively small, since most expenditures

occur only when a decision has been

reached to implement plans.

Evacuation involves considerably more

preattack planning than a shelter-based

civil defense plan, as logistical and other

organizational requirements for moving

mill ions of people in a few days are much

more complex. Plans must be made to

care for the relocated people. People

must know where to go. Transportation or

evacuation routes must be provided. A recent survey of the U.S. population revealed that many would spontaneously

evacuate in a severe crisis, which could interfere with a planned evacuation.

Some U.S. analysts argue that detailed

Soviet evacuation plans, together with evidence of practical evacuation preparations, indicate a reasonable evacuation capability,

Others claim that actual Soviet capabilities
Ch. Ill—Civil Defense ● 5 3

are far less than those suggested in official

plans and that, in particular, an actual evacuation under crisis conditions would result in a

mixture of evacuation according to plan for

some, delay for others, and utter chaos in some

places. In any case, a large evacuation has

never been attempted by the United States.

The extent of Soviet evacuation exercises is a

matter of controversy.

Crisis relocation of large populations would

have major economic impacts. These are the

subject of a current DCPA study in which the

Treasury, Federal Reserve Board, and Federal

Preparedness Agency are participating. Results

to date indicate that economic impacts of relocation, followed by crisis resolution and return

of evacuees, could continue for 1 to 3 years,

but that appropriate Government policies

could significantly reduce such impacts. If

blast shelters for key workers are built in risk

areas, and if workers are willing to accept the

risks, essential industries couId be kept functioning while most people were in relocation

areas. Such a program would substantially reduce the economic impacts of an extended

crisis relocation.

Protection of Industry and

Other Economic Resources

Efforts to preserve critical economic assets,

and thereby accelerate postattack recovery,

could take several forms. For example, if there

is warning, railroad rolling stock might be

moved from urban classification yards into

rural locations, perhaps saving many cars and

their cargo. Some industrial equipment and

tooling might be protected by burial and sandbagging. Other industrial facilities, such as

petroleum refineries and chemical plants, may

be impossible to protect. Industrial defense

measures include measures to make buildings

or machinery more resistant to blast pressure

(hardening), dispersal of individual sites and of

mobile assets (e. g., transport, tools, equipment, fuel), proliferation of “redundant” and

complementary capabilities, and plans to minimize disruption to an economy and its components in wartime by coordinated shutdown of

industrial processes, speedy damage control,

and plant repair.

There is no practicable way to protect an industrial facility that is targeted by a nuclear

weapon with 1980’s accuracy. Protective measures might, however, be helpful at industrial

facilities that are not directly targeted, but

that are near other targets.

Some equipment within structures can be

protected against blast, fire, and debris with

suitable measures. Other equipment, especially costly and critical equipment, and finished

products, can be sheltered in semiburied structures and other protective facilities. A recent

study’ demonstrated that special hardening

measures could save some machinery at blast

overpressures higher than necessary to destroy

the building in which the machinery is housed.

However, it is unknown whether the amount of

equipment that could actually be protected

would make much difference in recovery.

Another method of protecting industrial

capabilities is the maintenance of stock piIes of

critical equipment or of finished goods. Stockpiling will not provide a continuing output of

the stockpiled goods, but could ensure the

availability of critical items until their production could be restarted. Stockpiles can obviously be targeted if their locations are

known, or might suffer damage if near other

potential targets.

Finally, dispersal of industry, both within a

given facility consisting of a number of buildings and between facilities, can decrease damage to buildings from weapons aimed at other

buildings. A Soviet text on civil defense notes

that:

Measures may be taken nationally to limit

the concentration of industry in certain regions. A rational and dispersed location of industries in the territories of our country is of

great national economic importance, primarily from the standpoint of an accelerated economic development, but also from the stand-

‘T. K, Jones, “lndustrlal Survival and Recovery After

Nuclear Attack A Report to the Joint Committee on Defense Production, U S Congress” (Seattle, Wash The

Boeing Aerospace Co , November 1976)
54 Ž The Elfects of Nuclear War

point of organizing protection from weapons

of mass destruction. 2

However, there is little evidence that the

U.S.S.R. has adopted industrial dispersion as

national policy. Despite reports of Soviet industrial decentralization over the last decade

or so, Soviet industry appears more concentrated than ever. An excellent example is the

Kama River truck and auto facility, a giant

complex the size of Manhattan Island where

about one-fifth of al I Soviet motor vehicles is

produced. Clearly, Soviet planners have

chosen industrial efficiency and economies of

scale over civil defense considerations. Sim2P. T, E gorov, 1 A S hl yakov, and N. 1. A Iabi n, Civi/ Defense. Translated by the Scientific Translation Service

(Springfield, Va : Department of Commerce, National

Technical Information Service, December 1973), p 101.

ilarly, the United States has no directed policy

of decentralization, and other facts suggest

that nuclear war is not a significant civil planning determinant. There are those who reason

that this “disregard” for many of the consequences of nuclear war indicates that policymakers betieve nuclear war is a very low possibility.

Planning for Postattack Activities

The economic and social problems following a nuclear attack cannot be foreseen clearly

enough to permit drafting of detailed recovery

plans. In contrast, plans can be made to preserve the continuity of government, and both

the United States and the Soviet Union surely

have such plans.

U.S. AND SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

U.S. Civil Defense

U.S. attitudes have been ambivalent toward

civil defense ever since the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 responded to the first Soviet

test of atomic bombs in 1949. Indeed, much of

the U.S. civil defense was a reaction to external factors rather than part of a carefullythought-through program. The “duck and cover” program and the evacuation route program, both of the early 1950’s, responded to

the threat of Soviet atomic bombs carried by

manned bombers. Lack of suitable protection

against fire and blast led to plans for rapid

evacuation of cities during the several hours

separating radar warning and the arrival of

Soviet bombers.

The first Soviet test of thermonuclear weapons in 1953 necessitated changes in these

plans. The much higher yield of these weapons

meant that short-distance evacuations and

modestly hard blast shelters in cities were ineffective for protecting people, and that simply

“ducking” in school corridors, while perhaps

better than nothing, was not part of a serious

civil defense plan. H-bombs also raised the

specter of radioactive fallout blanketing large

areas of the country. Previously, civil defense

could be conceptualized as moving people a

short distance out of cities, while the rest of

the country would be unscathed and able to

help the target cities. Fallout meant that large

areas of the country—the location of which

was unpredictable— would become contaminated, people would be forced to take shelter

in those areas, and their inhabitants, thus

pinned down, would be unable to offer much

help to attacked cities for several weeks.

The advent of ICBMs necessitated further

changes. Their drastically reduced warning

times precluded evacuations on radar warning

of attack.

With previous plans made useless by advances in weapons technology, the United

States cast around for alternative plans. One

approach was to identify and stock fallout

shelters, while recognizing the impracticability

of protecting people from blast. After the

Berlin crisis of 1961, the President initiated a

program to provide fallout shelters for the entire population. The National Shelter Survey
Ch. Ill—Civil Defense ● 5 5

Program was commenced on a crash basis. The

President proposed:

1. the survey, identification, and stocking of

existing shelters;

2. the subsidization of fallout shelter instalIation in new construction; and

3. the construction of single-purpose fallout

shelters where these were needed.

Only the first step in this program was authorized. The Government also urged people to

build home fallout shelters.

The civil defense program was broadened in

the early 1970’s to include preparedness for

peacetime as well as wartime disasters. The

1970’s also saw a new emphasis on operational

capabilities of al I available assets, including

warning systems, shelters, radiological detection instruments and trained personnel, police

and fire-fighting forces, doctors and hospitals,

and experienced management. This development program was called On-Site Assistance.

I n the mid-1970’s, contingency planning to

evacuate city and other high-risk populations

during a period of severe crisis was initiated.

At present, U.S. civil defense has the following plans and capabilities:

Organization. – The Federal civil defense

function has been repeatedly reorganized

since the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.

The most recent organization gave prime responsibility for civil defense to the Defense

Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), housed in

the Defense Department. The Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA) in the General Services Administration conducts some planning

for peacetime nuclear emergencies, economic

crises, continuity of Government following a

nuclear attack, and other emergencies. The

Federal Disaster Assistance Administration

(FDAA), in the Department of Housing and Urban Development, is concerned with peacetime disaster response. In 1978, Congress

assented to a Presidential proposal to reorganize civil defense and peacetime disaster functions into a single agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which will incorporate DC PA, FPA, FDAA, and other agencies.

Civil Protection. -The United States is looking increasingly at crisis relocation (CR), under

which city-dwellers would move to rural

“host” areas when an attack appeared likely.

CR would require several days of warning, so it

would be carried out during a crisis rather than

on radar warning of missile launch. The United

States has conducted surveys to identify

potential fallout shelters in host areas, and

blast and fallout shelters in risk areas. Through

FY 1971, about 118,000 buildings had been

marked as shelters; about 95,000 other buildings have been identified as potential shelters

but have not been marked. Marking would be

done in crises. In the early 1960’s, the Federal

Government purchased austere survival supplies for shelters. The shelf life of these supplies has expired; shelter stocking is now to be

accomplished during a crisis.

Direction and Control.–The Federal Government has several teletype, voice, and radio

systems for communicating in crises between

DCPA, FDAA, and FPA headquarters, regional

offices, States, and Canada. State and local

governments are planning to integrate communication systems into this net. DCPA has eight

regions, each with emergency operating centers (EOCs). Six of these centers are hardened

against nuclear blast. Forty-three States have

EOCs, and EOCs with fallout protection are

operational or under development in locales

including about half the population.

Attack Warning.–Warning can be passed

over the National Warning System to over

1,200 Federal, State, and local warning points,

which operate 24 hours a day. Once warning

has reached local levels, it is passed to the

public by sirens or other means. Almost half of

the U.S. population is in areas that could

receive outdoor warning within 15 minutes of

the issue of a national warning. Dissemination

of warning to the public, however, is inadequate in many places.

Emergency Public Information.–Fallout protection, emergency power generators, and remote units have been provided for radio stations in the Emergency Broadcast System, to
56 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

permit broadcast of emergency information

under fallout conditions. About a third of the

stations are in high-risk areas and could be

destroyed by blast. A program has been initiated to protect 180 stations from electromagnetic pulse (EM P). About one-third of the more

than 5,000 localities participating in the civil

defense program have reported development

of plans to provide the public with information

in emergencies.

Radiological Defense. — This function encompasses radiological detection instruments,

communication, plans and procedures, and

personnel trained to detect and evaluate radiological hazards. Between FY 1955-74, the Federal Government had procured about 1.4 million rate meters, 3.4 million dose meters, and

related equipment. Effective radiological defense would require an estimated 2.4 million

people to be trained as radiological monitors

in a crisis.

Citizen Training.–The civil defense program

once provided substantial training for the public via news medi . a

must now be relied on to educate citizens on

hazards and survival actions. DCPA offers

classroom and home study training for civil defense personnel.

Several points emerge from this discussion:

1.

2.,

On paper, civil defense looks effective.

The United States has more than enough

identified fallout shelter spaces for the entire population, which include underground parking, subways, tunnels, and

deep basement potential blast shelters.

The United States has a vast network of

highways and vehicles; every holiday

weekend sees a substantial urban evacuation. CB and other radios can aid communication after an attack. The United

States has enormous resources (food,

medical supplies, electrical-generating

capability, etc. ) beyond the minimum

needed for survival.

However, no one at all thinks that the

United States has an effective civil defense.

3,

4.

U.S. civil defense capability is weakened

because some elements are in place while

others are not or have not been maintained. Shelters will not support life if

their occupants have no water. Evacuation plans will save fewer people if host

areas have inadequate shelter spaces and

supplies, or if people are poorly distributed among towns.

Faced with drastic technological change,

moral and philosophical questions about

the desirability of civil defense, and budgetary constraints, Federal plans have been

marked by vacillation, shifts in direction,

and endless reorganization.

Soviet Civil Defense

Soviet civil defense has faced the same technical chalIenges as the United States — atomic

bombs, hydrogen bombs fallout, ICBMs, limited warning, and so on. The Soviet Union has

consistently devoted more resources to civil

defense than has the United States, and has

been more willing to make and follow longterm plans. However, it is not known how

Soviet leaders evaluate the effectiveness of

their civil defense.

The Soviet civil defense organization is a

part of the Ministry of Defense and is headed

by Deputy Minister Colonel-General A. Altunin. Permanent full-time staff of the organ izaiion is believed to number over 100,000.

Some civil defense training is compulsory for

all Soviet citizens, and many also study first

aid. There has also been a large shelter-building program.

The Soviets reportedly have an extensive urban evacuation plan. Each urban resident is

assigned to a specific evacuation area, located

on COIIective farms; each farmer has instructions and a list of the people he is to receive. If

fallout protection is not available, it is planned

that simple expedient shelters would be constructed quickly. Soviet plans recommend that

shelters be located at least 40 km [25 miles]

from the city district to provide sufficient protection against the effects of a l-Mt weapon
Ch. Ill—Civil Defense . 57

exploding at a distance of 10 to 20 km [6 to 12

miles].

In July 1978, the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) released its unclassified study, “Soviet

Civil Defense. ”3 In brief, the report finds that

Soviet civil defense is “an ongoing nationwide

program under military control. ” It notes several motivations for the Soviet program: the

traditional Soviet emphasis on homeland defense, to convince potential adversaries they

cannot defeat the Soviet Union, to increase

Soviet strength should war occur, to help maintain the logistics base for continuing a war effort following nuclear attack, to save people

and resources, and to promote postattack recovery. It observes that Sov’iet civil defense “is

not a crash effort, but its pace increased beginning in the late 1960’ s.” It points to several difficulties with the Soviet program: bureaucratic

problems, apathy, little protection of economic installations, and little dispersal of industry.

According to the report, the specific goals of

Soviet civil defense are to protect the leadership, essential workers, and others, in that priority order; to protect productivity; and to sustain people and prepare for economic recovery following an attack. In assessing Soviet efforts to meet these goals, the CIA found:

The Soviets probably have sufficient blastshelter space in hardened command posts for

virtually all the leadership elements at al I

levels (about 110,000 people) Shelters at

key economic installations could accommodate about 12 to 24 percent of the total work

forc e

A minimum of 10 to 20 percent of the total

population in urban areas (including essential

workers) could be accommodated at present

in blast-resistant shelters

The critical decision to be made by the

Soviet leaders in terms of sparing the population would be whether or not to evacuate

cities. Only by evacuating the buIk of the urban population could they hope to achieve a

marked reduction in the number of urban

casualties. An evacuation of urban areas could

probably be accomplished in two or three

‘Sov/et Civil Defense (Washington, D C Director o f

Central Intelligence, July 1978), the text quotation below

IS from pp 2-3

days, with as much as a week required for full

evacuation of the largest cities

Soviet measures to protect the economy

could not prevent massive industrial dama g e

(Regarding postattack recovery), the coordination of requirements with available supplies and transportation is a complex problem

for Soviet planners even in peacetime, let

alone following a large-scale nuclear attack

Assessing the effectiveness of Soviet civil

defense, the CIA study found that a worst case

attack could kilI or injure welI over 100 milI ion

people, but many leaders would survive; with a

few days for evacuation and shelter, casualties

could be reduced by more than 50 percent;

and with a week for preattack planning, “Soviet civil defenses could reduce casualties to

the low tens of milIions. ”

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency (AC DA) released “An Analysis of Civil

Defense in Nuclear War” in December 1978.4

This study concluded that Soviet civil defense

could do Iittle to mitigate the effects of a major attack. Blast shelters might reduce fatalities to 80 percent of those in an unsheltered

case, but this could be offset by targeting additional weapons (e. g., those on bombers and

submarines that would be alerted during a

crisis) against cities. Evacuation might reduce

fatalities to a range of 25 million to 35 million,

but if the United States were to target the

evacuated population, some 50 million might

be killed. Furthermore, civil defense could do

little to protect the Soviet economy, so many

evacuees and millions of injured could not be

supported after the attack ended.

The sharp disagreement about Soviet civil

defense capability revolves around several key

issues:

Can the Soviets follow their stated civil defense

plans? Some believe that the Soviets would fill

their urban blast shelters to maximum occupancy rather than leave unevaluated people

without protection and would evacuate all

persons for whom no urban shelter spaces

‘“An Analysls of CIVII Defense In Nuclear War” (Washington, D C U S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, December 1978)

1 -! ‘ -
58 ● The Effects of Nuclear war

were available. Others believe that administrative confusion and other difficulties might render the Soviets far more vulnerable in practice.

How widely would evacuees be dispersed? It

is obvious that the more widely dispersed an

urban population is, the fewer casualties an attack on cities will produce. It is equally obvious that the more time there is for an evacuation, the more widely people can disperse.

Nevertheless, there is great uncertainty over

how well an evacuation would perform in

practice. A Boeing study estimates that if urban dwellers walked for a day away from the

cities, the population of cities would be more

or less distributed over a circle of radius 30

miles [48.3 km]. 5 If they did not dig shelters, a

U.S. attack would kill about 27 percent of the

Soviet population; if they dug expedient shelters, the attack would kill about 4 percent. If

the Soviets fulIy implemented their evacuation

plans but the evacuees were not protected

from fallout, then 8 percent of the total population would die; if they constructed hasty

shelters, 2 percent would die. AC DA, however,

argues that even if the Soviet Union is totally

successful in implementing its evacuation, the

United States could, if the objective is to kill

people, use its reserve weapons against the

evacuated population and ground burst its

weapons, thus inflicting from 70 million to 85

milIion fatalities.

How well would evacuees be protected from

fallout? Some believe that Soviet evacuees

could be fully protected against very high

radiation levels if they are allowed a 1- to 2-

week preattack “surge” period. (Tests conducted by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory

have shown, for example, that American families can construct adequate fallout shelters in

24 to 36 hours, if they are issued the necessary

tools and instructions.)b The ACDA study as5T K. Jones, “Effect of Evacuation and Sheltering on

Potential Fatalities From a Nuclear Exchange” (Seattler

Wash.: The Boeing Aerospace Co,, 1977),

6 S J Condie, et al , “Feasibility of Citizen Construction

of Expedient Fallout Shelters” (Oak Ridge, Term,: Oak

Ridge National Laboratory, August 1978), See also R. W,

Kindig, “Field Testing and Evaluation of Expedient Shelters” (Denver, Colo,: University of Colorado, February

1978)

sumes that from one-third to two-thirds of the

evacuees would have little protection against

fallout. The two cases are not necessarily exclusive, since the ability to dig in depends on

assumptions, especially time available for

preparations before an attack. Some assume a

lengthy and deepening crisis would precede

nuclear strikes. Others believe that error or

miscalculation would lead to nuclear war,

leaving the United States or the Soviet Union

unprepared and not having ordered evacuation. I n addition, should an attack occur

when the earth is frozen or muddy, construction of expedient shelters would be difficult.

How effective is Soviet industrial hardening?

Soviet civil defense manuals provide instructions for the last-minute hardening of key industrial equipment in order to protect it from

blast, falling debris, and fires. A considerable

controversy has developed in the United States

as to how effective such a program would be.

The Boeing Company and the Defense Nuclear

Agency carried out a number of tests that led

them to conclude that “techniques similar to

those described in Soviet Civil Defense manuals for protecting industrial equipment appear

to hold great promise for permitting early

repair of industrial machinery and its restoration to production.’” Others have challenged

this conclusion: for example, the ACDA civil

defense study concluded that “attempts to

harden above-ground facilities are a futile exercise, and that even buried facilities which

are targeted cannot survive. ”

To understand this issue, one must recognize that it is virtually impossible to harden an

economic asset so that it would survive if it

were directly targeted. By lowering the height

of burst, the maximum overpressure can be increased (at a small sacrifice to the area covered by moderate overpressures), and even

missile silos can be destroyed by sufficiently

accurate weapons. However, many economic

targets are relatively close together (for example, separate buildings in a single factory), and

it iS possible and efficient to aim a single

‘E”dwin N, York, Industrial Survival/Recovery (Seattle,

Wash.: The Boeing Aerospace Co., undated).
—

Ch. Ill—Civil Defense ● 5 9

weapon so that it destroys a number of targets

at once. If each target is adequately hardened,

then the attacker must either increase the

number or yield of weapons used, or else accept less damage to the lower priority targets,

However, the practicability of hardening entire

installations to this extent is questionable, and

the more likely measure would be to harden

key pieces of machinery, The uncertainties

about the Soviet program include the following:

● How much hardening could be done in

the days before an attack?

. Would the United States target additional

or larger weapons to overcome the effects

of hardening?

● To what extent would the survival of the

most important pieces of machinery in the

less important Soviet factories contribute

to economic recovery?

CONCLUDING NOTE

These pages have provided a brief descrip- ●

tion of civil defense as it might affect the impact of nuclear war. However, no effort has

been made to answer the following key ques- ●

tions:

• WouId a civiI defense program on a large

scaIe make a big difference, or onIy a mar- ●

ginal difference, in the impact of a nuclear war on civil society?

What impact would various kinds of civil

defense measures have on peacetime diplomacy or crisis stability?

What civil defense measures would be appropriate if nuclear war were considered

likely in the next few years?

What kind and size of civil defense program might be worth the money it would

cost ?
Chapter IV

THREE ATTACK CASES
—

overview ● **************************

Case 2: A Soviet Attack on U.S. Oil Refineries

The First Hour: Immediate Effects . . . . .

Fatalities and Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Petroleum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Electric Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Casualty Handling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Reaction: The First Week . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Long-Term Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Case 2: A U.S. Attack on Soviet Oil Refineries

Immediate Effects: The First Hour . . . . .

Reaction: The First Week . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Long-Term Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Case 3: A Counterforce Attack Against the

United States ●   e ** o*************

Prompt Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Period Before Fallout Deposition.

Casualty Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Contamination Period . . . . . . . . . . .

Economic Disruption . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recuperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Long-Term Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Case 3: A Comterforce Attack Against the

Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The First Day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Shelter Period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recuperation . . . . . . . . . . .“. . . . . . . . . .

Long Term Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Case 4: A large soviet Attack On U.S. Military

and Economic● Targets ● 8************ *

The First Few Hours. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

63

64

65

69

69

77

71

71

72

72

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

80

81

81

81

83

86

88

88

90

90

90

91

93

94

94

95

Page

The First Few Days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

The Shelter Period (Up to a Month). . . . . 97

The Recuperation Period . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Case4: A large U.S. Attack on Soviet Military

and Economic Targets

The First Few Hours. .

The First Few Days . .

The Shelter period. . .

Recuperation . . . . . .

● *********** * 100

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

. ’ . ., . . . . . . . . . . 105

TABLES

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

13.

14.

15.

16.

Page

Energy Production and Distribution

Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

U.S. Refinery Locations and Refining

Capacity by Rank Order. . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Summary of U.S.S.R. Attack on the

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Electric Powerplants in Philadelphia. . . 71

Summary of U. S. Attack on U.S.S.R. . . . 76

Approximate Distance of Various Effects

From Selected Nuclear Air Bursts . . . . . 77

FIGURES

Page

Approximate Footprint Coverage–U.S.

and Soviet attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Philadelphia and Surrounding Counties 70

Counterforce Targets in the United

States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Expected Casualties as a Function of

Typical Monthly Winds Resulting From an

Attack on Selected Military Targets in

the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Chapter IV

THREE ATTACK CASES

.

OVERVIEW

The following pages present descriptions of three ‘*cases” of nuclear attacks.

(The tutorial on nuclear effects–chapter H-was the first of our four cases.) As mentioned in the Executive Summary, these cases do not necessarily represent “probable” kinds of nuclear attacks; they were chosen rather to shed light on the way in

which different types of attacks could have differing effects on the civilian population, economy, and society. Moreover, each case is considered in isolation—events

that could lead up to such an attack are deliberately ignored (because their prediction

is impossible), and it is assumed (although that assumption is questionable at best)

that the attack described is not followed by further nuclear attacks.

Each case considers first a Soviet attack on the United States, and then a U.S. attack on the Soviet Union. These attacks are similar in that they attack similar target

sets, but different in detail because both the weapons available to the attacker and

the geography of the victim are different. It should be emphasized that this discussion is not suggesting that in the real world an attack would be followed by a mirrorimage retaliation; rather, it is looking at similar attacks so as to highlight the asymmetries in the ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union are vulnerable.

To save space, it is assumed that the reader will read the Soviet attack on the United

States in each case before turning to the U.S. attack on the Soviet Union, and repetition has been minimized.

The analyses that follow are much more like sketches than detailed portraits.

Precise prediction of the future of the United States or the Soviet Union is impossible

even without taking into account something as unprecedented as a nuclear attack. A

detailed study would say more about the assumptions used than about the impact of

nuclear war. What is possible, and what this report tries to do, is to indicate the kinds

of effects that would probably be most significant, and to comment on the major

uncertainties.

The following pages discuss the impact on

civil i an societies of:

● A Iimited attack on industrial targets. For

this case the hypothesis was an attack

that would be limited to 10 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (S NDVs) (i. e., 10 ●

missiles or bombers, in this case Soviet

SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles

(I CBMs), and U.S. Poseidon submarineIaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and

Minuteman Ill ICBMs), and that would be

directed at the oil refining industry. Oil

refining was chosen as the hypothetical

target because it is vital, vulnerable, and

concentrated in both countries. It is assumed that the attack would be planned

without any effort either to minimize or to

maximize civiIian casualties.

A large counterforce attack. The possibilities considered included both an attack

on ICBM silos only (a case that has gained

some notoriety as a result of assertions by

some that the United States may become

vulnerable to such an attack) and an attack on silos, missile submarine bases, and

bomber bases (which some characterize

63
64 • The Effects of Nuclear War

●

as the least irrational way to wage a strategic nuclear war). The analysis draws on

several previous studies that made ‘varying assumptions about attack design,

weapon size, targets attacked, and vulnerability of the population; the ways i n

which variations in these assumptions affect the calculations of estimated fatalities are discussed.

A large attack against a range of military

and economic targets. This attack is intended to approximate “the ultimate deterrent’’—the climax of an escalation

process. The description of the results of

this attack draws upon several previous

studies that made differing assumptions

about the number of weapons used and

the precise choice of targets, but such

variations are useful in indicating the

range of possibilities. However, deliberate

efforts to kill as many people as possible

are not assumed, which would lead to

more immediate deaths (perhaps 10 million to 20 million more) than targeting

economic and military facilities.

CASE 2: A SOVIET ATTACK ON U.S. OIL REFINERIES

This case is representative of a kind of nuclear attack that, as far as we know, has not

been studied elsewhere in recent years–a

“limited” attack on economic targets. This section investigates what might happen if the

Soviet Union attempted to infIict as much economic damage as possible with an attack

limited to 10 SNDVs, in this case 10 SS-18

ICBMs carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MlRVs). An OTA contractor designed such an attack, operating on

instructions to limit the attack to 10 missiles,

to create hypothetical economic damage that

would take a very long time to repair, and to

design the attack without any effort either to

maximize or to minimize human casualties.

(The contractor’s report is available separately.) The Department of Defense then calculated the immediate results of this hypothetical attack, using the same data base, methodology, and assumptions as they use for their

own studies. *

Given the limitation of 10 ICBMs, the most

vulnerable element of the U.S. economy was

judged to be the energy supply system. As

table 6 indicates, the number of components

*The Office of Technology Assessment wishes to

thank the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency for their

timely and responsive help in calculations related to this

case, the Command and Control Technical Center performed similar calculations regarding a similar U S attack on the Soviet Union

in the U.S. energy system forces the selection

of a system subset that is critical, vulnerable to

a small attack, and would require a long time

to repair or replace.

OTA and the contractor jointly determined

that petroleum refining facilities most nearly

met these criteria. The United States has about

300 major refineries. Moreover, refineries are

relatively vulnerable to damage from nuclear

blasts. The key production components are the

distillation units, cracking units, cooling

towers, power house, and boiler plant. Fractionating towers, the most vulnerable components of the distillation and cracking units, collapse and overturn at relatively low winds and

overpressures. Storage tanks can be I if ted from

their foundations by similar effects, suffering

severe damage and loss of contents and raising

the probabilities of secondary fires and explosions.

MlRVed missiles are used to maximize damage per missile. The attack uses eight l-megaton (Mt) warheads on each of 10 SS-18 ICBMs,

which is believed to be a reasonable choice

given the hypothetical objective of the attack.

Like all MIRVed missiles, the SS-18 has limitations of “footprint” –the area within which

the warheads from a single missile can be

aimed. Thus, the Soviets could strike not any

80 refineries but only 8 targets in each of 10

footprints of roughly 125,000 mi2 [32,375,000
Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases ● 65

hectares], The SS-18’s footprint size, and the

tendency of U.S. refineries to be located in

clusters near major cities, however, make the

SS-18 appropriate. The footprints are shown in

figure 13. Table 7 lists U.S. refineries by capacity; and table 8 lists the percentage of U.S. refining capacity destroyed for each footprint.

The attack uses eighty l-Mt weapons; it

strikes the 77 refineries having the largest

capacity, and uses the 3 remaining warheads

as second weapons on the largest refineries in

the appropriate missile footprints, In performing these calculations, each weapon that detonates over a refinery is assumed to destroy its

target. This assumption is reasonable in view

of the vulnerability of refineries and the fact

that a l-Mt weapon produces 5-psi overpressure out to about 4.3 miIes [6.9 km]. Thus, damage to refineries is mainly a function of numbers of weapons, not their yield or accuracy;

collateral damage, however, is affected by all

three factors. it is also assumed that every

warhead detonates over its target. In the real

world, some weapons would not explode or

wouId be off course. The Soviets could, however, compensate for failures of launch vehicles by readying more than 10 ICBMs for the

attack and programming missiles to replace

any failures in the initial 10. FinalIy, all weapFebruary 1976

ons are assumed detonated at an altitude that

wouId maximize the area receiving an overpressure of at least 5 psi. This overpressure was

selected as reasonable to destroy refineries.

Consequences of using ground bursts are

noted where relevant.

The First Hour: Immediate Effects

The attack succeeds. The 80 weapons destroy 64 percent of U.S. petroleum refining

capacity.

The attack causes much collateral (i. e., unintended) damage. Its only goal was to maximize

economic recovery time. While it does not

seek to kill people, it does not seek to avoid

doing so. Because of the high-yield weapons

and the proximity of the refineries to large

cities, the attack kills over 5 million people if

all weapons are air burst. Because no fireball

wouId touch the ground, this attack wouId produce little fallout. If all weapons were ground

burst, 2,883,000 fatalities and 312,000 fallout

fatalities are calculated for a total of

3,195,000. Table 8 lists fatalities by footprint.

The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency

(DC PA) provided fatality estimates for this attack. DCPA used the following assumptions re-
66 • The Effects of Nuclear War

Figure 13

8

Kalingrad

● ‘Moscow

Approximate footprint coverage of U.S. attack

Approximate footprint coverage of Soviet attack
Ch. IV— Three Attack Cases ● 67

Table 7.–U.S. Refinery Locations and Refining Capacity by Rank Order

Rank Percent Cumulative Rank Percent Cumulative

order Location capacity percent capacity order Location capacity percent capacity

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

3.6

2.9

2.3

2,1

2.1

2,0

2,0

1,9

1 9

1.8

1.6

1.6

1,5

1.6

1.3

1,2

1.1

1.1

1.1

1.0

1 0

1 0

1 0

0.9

0.9

0 9

0 9

0.9

0 8

0.8

0 8

0.8

0 7

3,6

6.4

8.7

10.8

12,9

14,9

16,9

18,8

20.7

22.5

24,1

25.7

27,3

28,9

30.1

31.3

32.4

33.5

34.6

3 5 7

36.7

37.7

38.7

39.6

40,6

41,5

4 2 4

4 3 3

44,1

4 4 9

4 5 7

46,5

47.2

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

0 7

0 7

0 7

0 7

0.7

0 7

0.6

0 6

0 6

0.6

0 6

0 6

0 5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0 5

0 5

0 5

0 5

0 5

0 5

0.5

0.5

0 4

0 4

0.4

4 1

1,6

0 5

0 3

3 1 3

47,9

48,6

49.3

50.0

5 0 6

51.3

51.9

52,5

531

5 3 7

5 4 3

5 4 9

5 5 4

5 5 9

56,5

57.0

57.5

58.0

5 8 5

59,0

5 9 5

6 0 0

60.4

6 0 9

6 1 3

61 7

6 2 2

66.3

6 7 9

68.4

68.7

1000

asum of all refineries m the mdlcated geographic area

bForelgn Irade zone only

c[n~lude~ summary data from ali rehnerles with capacity less than 75000 bblfday 224 refineries Included

SOURCE National Petroleum Refiners Assoclahon

Table 8. –Summary of U.S.S.R. Attack on the United States

Totals ., ., ., 80 63.7 NA 5,031

aEMT = Equlvalenl megatons

bNA = Not applicable
68 • The Effects o/ Nuclear War

——. —.—— —
Ch. IV— Three Attack Cases Ž 69

garding the protective postures of the population in its calculations:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Ten percent of the population in large

cities (above 50,000) spontaneously evacuated beforehand due to rising tensions

and crisis development;

Home basements are used as fallout shelters as are such public shelters as subways;

People are distributed among fallout shelters of varying protection in proportion to

the number of shelter spaces at each level

of protection rather than occupying the

best spaces first;

The remaining people are in buildings that

offer the same blast protection as a singlestory home (2 to 3 psi); radiation protection factors were commensurate with the

type of structures occupied.

These assumptions affect the results for reasons noted in chapter III. Other uncertainties

affect the casualties and damage. These include fires, panic, inaccurate reentry vehicles

(RVs) detonating away from intended targets,

time of day, season, local weather, etc. Such

uncertainties were not incorporated into the

calculations, but have consequences noted in

chapters I I and I I 1.

The attack also causes much collateral economic damage. Because many U.S. refineries

are located near cities and because the Soviets

are assumed to use relatively large weapons,

the attack would destroy many buildings and

other structures typical of any large city. The

attack would also destroy many economic facilities associated with refineries, such as railroads, pipelines, and petroleum storage tanks.

While the attack would leave many U.S. ports

unscathed, it wouId damage many that are

equipped to handle oil, greatly reducing U.S.

petroleum importing capability. Similarly,

many petrochemical plants use feedstocks

from refineries, so most plants producing complex petrochemicals are located near refineries; indeed, 60 percent of petrochemicals

produced in the United States are made in

Texas gulf coast plants.l Many of these plants

‘ Bill Curry, “Gulf PIants Combed for Carcinogens, ”

W’ash/ngton Post, Feb 19, 1979, page A3

would be destroyed by the attack, and many of

therest would be for lack of feed stocks.

III the attack aimed only at refineries

would cause much damage to the entire petroleum industry, and to other assets as well.

All economic damage was not calculated

from this attack, because no existing data base

would support reasonably accurate calculations. Instead, the issue is approached by using

Philadelphia to illustrate the effects of the

attack on large cities. Philadelphia contains

two major refineries that supply much of the

Northeast corridor’s refined petroleum. In the

attack, each was struck with a l-Mt weapon.

For reference, figure 14 is a map of Philadelphia. Since other major U.S. cities are near targeted refineries, similar damage could be expected for Houston, Los Angeles, and Chicago.

Fatalities and Injuries

The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency

(DCPA) provided not only the number of people killed within each of the 2-minute grid cells

in the Philadelphia region but also the original

number of people within each cell. These results are summarized in the following table for

distances of 2 and 5 miles [3 and 8 km] from

the detonations:

Deaths From Philadelphia Attack

Distance from Original Number Percent

detonation population killed killed

2 ml 155,000 135,000 87

5 ml 5,785,000 410,000 52

Detailed examination of the large-scale map

also indicates the magnitude of the problems

and the resources available to cope with them.

These are briefly discussed by category.

Petroleum

Local production, storage, and distribution

of petroleum are destroyed. 1 n addition to the

two refineries, nearly all of the oil storage

tanks are in the immediate target area. Presumably, reserve supplies can be brought to Philadelphia from other areas unless– as is likely–

they are also attacked. While early overland

shipment by rail or tank truck into north and

northeast Philadelphia should be possible,

water transport up the Delaware River may not
70 Ž The Effects of Nuclear War

Figure 14.— Philadelphia and Surrounding Counties

The two large dots represent the ground zeros of the two l-Mt Soviet weapons. Within 2 miles of these around

zeros, there are approximately 155,000 people of which 135,000 were calculated to have been killed. Within 5

miIes, there are 785,000 people of which 410,000 would have died.
Ch. IV— Three Attack Cases ● 71

be. This busy, narrow channel passes within

about 1.3 miles [2.1 km] of one of the targets

and could become blocked at least temporarily by a grounded heavily laden iron ore ship

(bound upriver for the Fairless Works) or by

sunken ships or barges.

Electric Power

There are four major electric powerplants in

or near Philadelphia. Table 9 summarizes capacity, average usage (1976), and expected

damage to these four installations.

While the usage figures in table 9 are average and do not reflect peak demand, it should

be noted that a large percentage of this demand will disappear with destruction of the industrial areas along the Schuylkill River and of

a large portion of the downtown business district. Thus, the plant in the Richmond section

of Philadelphia, Pa., may be able to handle the

emergency load. Assuming early recovery of

the Delaware plant,

quate emergency e

ing portion of the d

Transportation

Air.– The major

phia International

1.5 nautical miles

there probably will be adeectric power for the survivstribution system.

facilities of the PhiIadelAirport are located about

[2.8 km] from the nearest

burst. These can be assumed to be severely

damaged. The runways are 1.5 to 2.5 nautical

miIes [2.8 to 4.6 km] from the nearest burst and

should experience Iittle or no long-term damage. Alternate airfields in the northeast and

near Camden, N. J., should be unaffected.

Rail.– The main Conrail lines from Washington to New York and New England pass about

a mile from the nearest burst. I t can be expected that these will be sufficiently damaged

to cause at Ieast short-term interruption. Local

rail connections to the port area pass within a

few hundred yards of one of the refineries. This

service suffers long-term disruption. An important consequence is the loss of rail connections to the massive food distribution center

and the produce terminal in the southeast corner of the city.

Road.– Several major northeast-southwest

highways are severed at the refineries and at

bridge crossings over the Schuylkill River.

While this poses serious problems for the immediate area, there are alternate routes

through New Jersey and via the western

suburbs of the city.

Ship.– Barring the possible blockage of the

channel by grounded or sunken ships in the

narrow reach near the naval shipyard, ship traf -

fic to and from the port should experience only

short-term interruption.

Casualty Handling

Perhaps the most serious immediate and

continuing problem is the destruction of many

of Philadelphia’s hospitals. Hospitals, assuming a typical construction of muItistory steel or
72 . The Effects of Nuclear War

reinforced concrete, would have a SO-percent

probability of destruction at about 2.13 miles

(1 .85 nautical miles [3.4 km]). A detailed 1967

map indicates eight major hospitals within this

area; all are destroyed or severely damaged.

Another nine hospitals are located from 2 to 3

miles [3 to 4 km] from the refineries. While

most of the injured would be in this area, their

access to these hospitals would be curtailed by

rubble, fire, and so on. Thus, most of the seriously injured would have to be taken to more

distant hospitals in north and northeast Philadelphia, which would quickly become overtaxed.

Military

Two important military facilities are located

near the intended targets. The Defense Supply

Agency complex is located within 0.5 miles [0.8

km] of one of the refineries and is completely

destroyed. The U.S. Naval Shipyard is 1.0 to 1.8

miles [1.6 to 2.9 km] from the nearest target

and can be expected to suffer severe damage.

The large drydocks in this shipyard are within a

mile of the refinery.

Other

Several educational, cultural, and historical

facilities are in or near the area of heavy destruction. These include Independence Hall,

the University of Pennsylvania, Drexel institute of Technology, Philadelphia Museum of

Art, City Hall, the Convention Hall and Civic

Center, Veterans Stadium, Kennedy Stadium,

and the Spectrum.

Reaction: The First Week

During this period people would be in a

state of shock, with their lives disrupted and

further drastic changes inevitable. Many

would have loved ones killed and homes destroyed. Factories and offices in the target

areas would be destroyed, throwing people out

of work. People would face many immediate

tasks: care of the injured, burial of the dead,

search and rescue, and fire fighting.

Fires at petroleum refineries, storage tanks,

and petrochemical factories would rage for

hours or days, adding to the damage caused by

blast. Some oil tanks would rupture and the oil

would leak onto rivers or harbors, where it

would ignite and spread fire. Fires at refineries

could not be extinguished because of intense

heat, local fallout, an inadequate supply of

chemicals to use on petroleum fires, and roads

blocked by rubble and evacuees. Petrochemical plants, already damaged by blast, would

be further damaged by fire and would leak toxic chemicals. As discussed in chapter 11, firestorms or conflagrations might begin, in this

case supported by thousands of tons of gas01 inc. Anyway, the plants would likely be damaged beyond repair. Finally, with fires threatening to burn, poison, or asphyxiate people in

shelters, rescue crews would attach top priority to rescuing survivors.

Once it was clear that further attacks were

unlikely, the undamaged areas of the country

would supply aid. However, the available medical aid would be totally inadequate to treat

burns this attack would cause. The radius of

third-degree burns (5.2 nautical miles [9.6 km]

for a l-Mt weapon air burst) is far greater than

for any other life-threatening injury, and huge

fires would cause more burns. But, even in

peacetime, the entire United States has facilities to treat only a few thousand burn cases

adequately at any one time.

If the attack used ground bursts exclusively,

it would cause fewer prompt fatalities (2.9 million instead of 5.0 million for the air burst

case), but much fallout. Given the extensive

fallout sheltering described above, 312,000

people would die of fallout. Fallout casualties,

however, would depend strongly on wind directions: would gulf coast fallout blow toward

Atlanta, Miami, Cuba, or Venezuela? Would

New Jersey fallout land on New York City on

its way out to sea? The problems of shelterers

are discussed under “Case 3: A Counterforce

Attack Against the United States, ” in this

chapter.

Beyond the physical damage, people would

realize that a central assumption of their

lives–that nuclear war could not occur—was

wrong. Even people beyond target areas would

know immediately that secondary effects
Ch. IV— Three Attack Cases w 73

—.——..———.——— — —.—

would irrevocably change their way of Iife; survivors traveling to undamaged areas would

drive this point home. Most would fear further

attacks, and would seek protection by evacuating or seeking shelter. While recovery plans

could be made and damage assessed, little reconstruction could be done with many people

away or in shelters. Thus, the reaction period

would not end until most people acted as if

they believed the war was over.

Recovery

Once people believed that the war was over,

the Nation would face the task of restoring the

economy. The human consequences would be

severe, but most deaths would have occurred

within 30 days of the attack. Economic disruption and the economic recovery process would

last much longer.

Restoring an adequate supply of refined

petroleum would take years. It is unlikely that

any of the attacked refineries could be repaired, although enough infrastructure might

survive to make it cost effective to clear and

decontaminate the rubble and rebuild on the

old sites, The attack would kill many people

skilled in building or operating refineries. The

attack wouId also destroy many ports with special facilities for handling large quantities of

crude oil and refined petroleum, While intensive use of pIant and equipment can substantially increase output for many industries, it

can increase a typical refinery’s output by only

4 percent. Thus, the attack would leave the

United States with about a third of its prewar

refining capacity and with Iittle of its prewar

oil importing capacity; this situation would

persist until new refineries and ports could be

built.

The survival of a third of the Nation’s refining capacity does not mean that everyone

would get a third of the petroleum they did

before the war. The Government would surely

impose rationing. Critical industries and services would have top priority— military forces,

agriculture, railroads, police, firefighting, and

so on. Heating oil could be supplied, but at

austere levels. Uses of petroleum for which

P

there were substitutes would receive little or

no petroleum. For example, railroads could

substitute for airlines, trucks, and buses on intercity routes; mass transit would probably

substitute for private automobiles and taxis in

local transportation.

The demise of the petroleum industry would

shatter the American economy, as the attack

intended. A huge number of jobs depend on refined petroleum: manufacture, sales, repair,

and insurance of cars, trucks, buses, aircraft,

and ships; industries that make materials used

in vehicle manufacture, such as steel, glass,

rubber, aluminum, and plastics; highway construct ion; much of the vacation industry;

petrochemicals; heating oil; some electric

power generation; airlines and some railroads;

agriculture; and so on. Thus, many workers

would be thrown out of work, and many industries would be forced to close.

The limited direct economic damage, already muItiplied by thousands of secondary effects just enumerated, would be multiplied

again by tertiary effects. Economic patterns

that rest on the petroleum economy would be

disrupted. Much of the American way of life is

dependent on automobiles, from fast-food restaurants and shopping malls to suburban housing construction and industries located on major highways whose workers commute by car.

The many people thrown out of work would

have less money to consume things made by

others. Service industries of all kinds would be

especialIy hard hit.

These economic changes would lead to

social changes that would have further

economic consequences. Gasoline rationing

would at best severely curtail use of private

cars; mass transit would be used to its capacity, which would appear inadequate. Demand

for real estate would plummet in some areas,

especially suburbs, and skyrocket in others,

notably cities, as people moved nearer to work

and stores. Such mass movement, even within

cities but especially between them, would

upset the demographics underlying taxes ,

schools, and city services. With many people

out of work, demand for unemployment com-
74 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

pensation would rise at the same time taxes

were falling. Vacation patterns would shift;

cuts in air and car travel would force people to

travel by train, which would lead people to

vacation closer to home. The situation following the attack could lead the dollar to tumble,

but whether or not that occurred, the curtailment of commercial air travel would prevent

most people from traveling abroad. The economic system on which production depends

would be radicalIy different. To be sure, most

workers and equipment would survive unscathed, and economic recovery would eventually take place.

Production depends, however, not only on

the use of physical resources, but also on a

wide range of understandings between producers and consumers. These underpinnings would

be destroyed by the attack just as surely as if

they were targeted. Prices would be uncertain,

and various kinds of barter (trading favors as

well as goods) would supplement the use of

money. Credit and finance could not function

normally in the absence of information about

the markets for continuing production. Contracts would have uncertain meaning. Many

businesses would go bankrupt as patterns of

supply and demand changed overnight. Courts

would be seriously overburdened with the task

of trying to arbitrate among all of these competing claims. Corporations and individuals

wouId be reluctant to make commitments or

investments.

Given this disruption, the effort to resume

production would require grappling with some

basic organizational questions. To which tasks

would surviving resources be applied? How

would people be put back to work? What mix

of goods would they produce? Which industries should be expanded, and which curtailed?

Which decisions would Government make,

and which wouId be left to the market?

This organizational task is unprecedented,

but in principle it could be performed, Presumably the United States would follow the

precedent of the mobilization for World Wars

I and 11, in which extensive Government planning supplemented private enterprise, and key

assets and key people from the private sector

were borrowed by the Government for the duration of the emergency. Certain tasks, such as

caring for the injured, decontamination, highpriority reconstruction, and serving as an employer of last resort (to say nothing of meeting

military requirements), would obviously be

handled by the Government. The difficulty

wouId be in planning and facilitating the transformation of the private sector. The combination of unusable factories and service faciIities

with unemployed workers could easily create a

situation analogous to that experienced in the

United States between 1929-33.

Long-Term Effects

Postattack society would be permanently

and irrevocably changed. People would live in

different places, work at different jobs, and

travel in different ways. They would buy different things and take different kinds of vacations. The Nation would tend to apply the

lessons of the past to future policy by seeking

to reduce its vulnerabilities to the last attack.

Energy conservation, where not required by

regulations, would be encouraged by prices,

taxes, and subsidies. Railroads and mass transit

would supplant travel by cars and planes; rail

and ships would substitute for planes and

trucks in hauling freight. Automobile production would drop sharply and would emphasize

energy-efficient models; bicycles and motorcycles would be popular. While housing construction would not necessarily end in the

suburbs, new homes there would probably be

built closer together so that mass transit could

serve them. Construction in cities would boom.

All houses would be better insulated; more

would use solar energy as fuel costs soared.

Farms would be able to obtain adequate

supplies of petroleum and its derivatives. Agriculture uses only 4 or 5 percent of the Nation’s

petroleum, and its products are necessary.

While gasoline and petrochemical-based fertilizers and pesticides wouId be much more expensive, they comprise only a small fraction of

farm expenses and would be essential for

large-scale efficient agriculture. Moreover
Ch, IV—Three Attack Cases Ž 75

much fertilizer is made from natural gas rather

than petroleum, so its price would not rise as

dramatically as that of gasoline, Petroleumrelated cost increases would be passed on to

the consumer. The character of agriculture

couId change, however. I n particular, the Iivestock industry might be sharply curtailed. At

every stage, Iivestock raising, slaughter, and

distribution require much more energy than do

crops. For example, rapid transportation and

extensive refrigeration are required. Meat

wouId become very much more costly in relation to other foods than it is now, and so would

become a luxury. If livestock production

dropped, a major source of demand for corn,

soybeans, and other fodder would decline,

possibly slowing price increases for other farm

products.

Although refineries and oil importing facilities would be rebuilt, U.S. refining capacity

after recovery wouId probably be less than preattack capacity. Increased prices for gasoline

and heating oil would shift demand to other

sources of energy, raising their prices and encouraging an acceleration of their development.

Patterns of industrial production would shift

dramatically because of these changes, forcing

massive shifts in demand for ski I Is and resources. Many people and factories would be

oriented to the production of things no longer

in demand; it would take many years for the

economy to adjust to the sudden, massive

changes imposed by the attack.

The attack would affect public health.

Chapter V discusses the long-term effects of

sublethal levels of radiation. Petrochemical

plants damaged by the attack would leak carcinogenous petrochemicals, but numbers of

cancer cases from this source, the time of their

appearance, and the duration of the threat

cannot be predicted. To the extent that contamination or destruction of housing, or economic collapse, force people to live in substandard housing, illness would increase. Not

all changes, however, would be for the worse.

Some new patterns of living would promote

public health. There would be fewer auto, aircraft, and boating accidents. More people

would walk or bicycle, increasing exercise. Reduced consumption of meat would reduce dietary fats, heart attacks, and strokes. At some

point, Government-imposed controls necessitated by the attack could be lifted because

societal changes and market forces (price increases, alternative energy sources, residential

patterns, and numbers and efficiency of cars)

would achieve the goals of controls without

coercion. For example, gasoline rationing

would certainly be imposed immediately after

the attack, and might be lifted in stages as refining capacity was restored, or subsidies to expand and support mass transit could level off

or decline as revenues made it self-supporting.

The Nation’s adjustment to all these

changes would be painful. The problems

would be especially severe because of the

speed of their onset. Many people say that the

United States would be better off if it was less

dependent on cars and petroleum. While

changing to new patterns of Iiving via nuclear

attack would minimize political problems of

deciding to change, it would maximize the difficulties of transition. Problems would appear

all at once, while any advantages of new patterns of Iiving would come slowly.

CASE 2: A U.S. ATTACK ON SOVIET OIL REFINERIES

This case investigates what might happen if ber and long construction time, and because

the United States tried to inflict as much eco- of the severe economic consequences of doing

nomic damage as possible on the Soviet Union without refined petroleum,

with 10 SNDVs without seeking to maximize or

minimize casualties. Petroleum refineries were The Soviet refining industry is at least as

selected as targets because of their small num- vulnerable as its U.S. counterpart, though the
76 . The Effects of Nuclear War

vulnerabilities differ slightly. The United

States refines more petroleum than does the

U. S. S. R., about 17.9 million barrels per day of

crude (1978 figures) versus 11.0 million (1980

projection). 2

According to a 1977 source, the

U.S.S.R. had 59 refineries, including at least 12

under construction, some of which are very

large; the U.S. and its territories have at least

288.

3 All individual refineries in both nations

are highly vulnerable to attacks with nuclear

weapons. The U.S. attack destroys most of

Soviet refining capacity because the U.S.S.R.

has few refineries; the Soviet attack destroys

most of U.S. refining capacity because U.S. refineries are clustered.

The hypothetical attack targets 24 refineries

and 34 petroleum storage sites. Some major refineries are beyond range of Poseidon missiles,

so the United States uses 7 Poseidons with a

total of sixty-four 40-kiloton (kt) RVs and 3

Minuteman IIIs with a total of nine 170-kt RVs.

Because of the dispersal of Soviet refineries

and limits of footprint size, each footprint had

2“U S. Refining Capacity” (Washington, D.C National

Petroleum Refiners Association, July 28, 1978), p 1 (U. S

figures), and International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1976

(Tulsa, Okla.: Petroleum Publishing Co , 1977), p, 323 (Soviet figures).

‘International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1976, op. cit.,

p, 393 (Soviet figures); and “U.S. Refining Capacity,” op

cit.; passim, (U.S. figures).

fewer refineries than available RVs. The additional RVs were first allocated 2 on 1 against

large refineries; remaining RVs were targeted

against petroleum storage complexes. As in the

U.S. case, every weapon is assumed to detonate over and destroy its target. It is assumed

that all weapons are air burst, and the consequences of using ground bursts are noted

where appropriate.

Immediate Effects: The First Hour

The attack destroys 73 percent of Soviet refining capacity and 16 percent of Soviet storage capacity, as table 10 shows. Collateral economic damage could not be calculated or collateral damage to a large Soviet city assessed

because sufficient unclassified data could not

be found.

If all weapons are air burst, the attack kills

1,458,000 people assuming everyone to be in

single-story buildings, and 836,000 assuming

everyone in multistory buildings; the latter

assumption comes closer to reality. If all

weapons were ground burst, the attack would

kill 1,019,000 people, 722,000 promptly and

297,000 by fallout, assuming the worst case,

everyone Iiving in single-story buildings.

The estimated injuries from the attack are

substantial under all conditions. Under the

single-story assumption on housing, the air-
— -- — -- — - -- - - - —— —-

burst attack would produce 3.6 million injuries

and a surface-burst attack about a m i I I ion less.

If in multistory buildings, the population

would suffer 3.8 miIIion injured from an airburst attack and 2.5 million for the surface

burst. (A protection factor of 5 was assumed

against fallout from the surface bursts. )

The attack kills fewer Russians than Americans. The differences in fatalities do not mean

that the United States is necessarily more vulnerable than the Soviet Union to nuclear attack; rather, the asymmetries occur from the

design of the attack. Soviet refineries are farther from cities than are U.S. refineries: a nd

U.S. weapons are smaller, so fewer Russians

are within the lethal radii of U.S. weapons. Sensitivity of fatalities and injuries to distance

from ground zero is shown in table 11, Had

either nation sought to kill people, it would

have used different weapons and targeted

them differently.

Reaction: The First Week

As in the United States, life for the surviving

majority would be totally disrupted. Many

would be directly affected by the attack: the

injured, those with injured relatives, the homeCh. IV—Three Attack Cases ● 77 — —-- — .-—-—

less, people affected by shortages. Accommodation to a future with a sharply reduced

petroleum supply would begin: gasoline and

other products might be hoarded, by enterprises if not by individuals. Some less-important industries would probably be closed to

save fuel or to allow their workers to shift to

the military, agriculture, and essential industry. Until it became clear that the war was

over, millions of reservists would be mobilized

for military service, placing a heavy demand

on the domestic economy to replace them. Because of the mobilization, hours worked and

the mix of production would change dramatically and overnight; workers in essential industries might be on 12-hour shifts; other workers not drafted wouId be pressed into service in

essential industries, and quite possibly moved

to factories in distant areas. The speed and

magnitude of disruption would cause much

psychological shock.

How would the Soviet Union cope with the

damage? Although a greater percentage of its

refining capacity would be destroyed, it would

suffer fewer fatalities than would the United

States (1.0 million to 1.5 million versus 3.2 million to 5.0 million) and fewer injuries (2.5 million to 3.8 million versus 3.9 million to 4.9 milTable 11 .–Approximate Distance (Nautical Miles) of Various Effects From Selected Nuclear Air Bursts

(personnel casualties)
78 • The Effects of Nuclear War

lion) because of the lower yield of U.S. weapons and the location of Soviet refineries away

from cities. If all weapons were air burst at optimum height of burst, there would be negligible fallout in both countries; if all weapons

were ground burst, the Soviet Union would receive far less fallout because of the lower yield

of the weapons. Because the Soviets have built

many widely dispersed small dispensaries and

first aid centers, rather than smaller numbers

of modern full-service hospitals concentrated

in cities, more of these facilities would survive

than in the United States. In addition, many

Russians have received first aid training, and

people with injuries that could be treated by

paramedics, dispensaries, and first aid would

probably be better off than their American

counterparts; others would be at least as bad

off. Those who required treatment at major

hospitals would suffer because of the small

number of beds in nearby modern hospitals

and the inability of the Soviet transportation

system to move them elsewhere. Like the

United States, the U.S.S.R. could not cope with

large numbers (say, over 100) of severe burn

cases. There would be many victims of severe

burns in both nations who would die for lack

of adequate treatment.

The damage, the emergency conditions, and

the risk of further attacks would remind everyone of the special horror that the Soviets faced

in World War II. The psychological trauma

would be exacerbated in the first week by anticipation of crisis economic conditions. The

Soviet Government in past crises has proved to

be ruthless and efficient in moving people to

parts of the country where labor was needed.

Such action would be likely in this crisis as

well, along with cutbacks in food, consumer

goods, housing construction and maintenance,

and transportation. Only regimentation would

be likely to increase. Life would be grim, and

wouId remain so for years.

Recovery

What course would Soviet recovery take?

Economic viability would not be at issue

following this attack, and the Government

could be expected to remain firmly in control

because of the limited scale of this attack.

Assuming that there are no further attacks,

most of the deaths would occur within 30 days

of the attack. While the course of economic

recovery cannot be predicted in detail, it is

clear that:

●

●

●

The attack would hurt. The recovery period would be marked by shortage and sacrifice, with particular problems stemming

from agricultural shortfalls.

Nevertheless, the Soviet economy and political system would survive, and would

do so with less drastic changes than the

United States would probably experience.

The asymmetries between the two nations

in effects for a given attack are greater for

this case than for a very large attack.

The political and economic structure of the

U.S.S.R. appears designed to cope with drastic

emergencies like this attack. While almost all

economic assets would be unscathed, resources would need to be shifted rapidly to

produce a different mix of outputs. The attack

would totally disrupt existing economic plans.

The economic planning apparatus and Government control methods in place in the U.S.S.R.

would permit the Government to shift plans

and resources, but the speed with which such

changes could be made is uncertain. To the extent that revisions in the economic plan were

not made or were delayed, people and equipment would sit idle or would be producing according to less-efficient priorities, draining

scarce resources from higher priority tasks and

hindering recovery. Workers would be shifted

to different industries as pIants closed; some

would be forced to move, share apartments

with strangers, or work at new jobs (including

manual labor in farms or factories).

Some insight into the economic consequences can be obtained by looking at four

sectors of the economy— military, agriculture,

transportation, and industry. Each of these sectors would have a strong claim on available

petroleum, but their total demand would exceed the supply.
Ch. IV— Three Attack Cases ● 79

The military would have first call on fuel,

especially if the war continued. It has adequate stocks to prosecute a war for several

weeks. However, unless this attack led to a

decisive Soviet victory or to a major relaxation

of tensions, the military would need refined

petroleum to rebuild its stocks and to carry out

normal training.

Soviet agriculture is precarious even in

peacetime because of its inefficiency. Agriculture engages about a third of the work force

and consumes a third of Soviet gasoline and

diesel fuel. (U.S. agriculture, in contrast, uses

2.7 percent of the work force (in 1978) and a

small fraction of U.S. refined petroleum .)4 The

Soviet Union imports grain in most years. Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. has maintained a large

cattle industry at considerable expense to provide a consumer good much in demand. Farms

use petroleum for tractors and trucks; petroleum and natural gas are feedstocks for fertilizer and pesticides. Agricultural use of petroleum is increasing. One small example is the

Soviet use of light aircraft to spread fertilizer;

while this task could be done by tractors or by

hand, it is much more efficiently done by aircraft.

Cutbacks in petroleum would magnify agricultural inefficiency. Even if the Soviet Union

allocated all the petroleum it produced to agriculture, it would not produce enough to sus4Statistica/ Abstract of the United States, 1978 (Washington, D C U S Department of Commerce, Bureau of

the Census, 1978), I ists 91,846,000 employed persons age

16 and over in the United States, of whom 2,469,000 were

listed as farmworkers, for January-April 1978 (p. 418). The

Statistical Abstract does not present the amount of petroleum consumed by American agriculture. Several statistics, however, indicate this number to be a small fraction

of total U S petroleum consumption Preliminary 197 7

data showed all U S prime movers (automotive and nonautomotive) had 26,469,000,000 horsepower, whi Ie farms

accounted for 328,000,000 horsepower, or 1 2 percent (p.

604) In 1976, industrial consumption of petroleum accounted for 18 percent of total U S petroleum consumption (p 764) And a National Academy of Sciences study

found that agriculture accounted for 3.5 percent of total

national energy consumption In 1968 Agricu/?ura/ Production Efficiency (Washington, D C National Academy

of Sciences, National Research Council Committee on

Agricultural Production Efficiency, 1975), p 119)

tain agriculture’s prewar consumption, and

other critical sectors would compete for petroleum. Drawing on inventory would sacrifice

later agricultural production for earlier production. Following the attack, the main concern of agriculture would be planting, growing,

or harvesting the year’s crop; sacrifices and

substitutions would be required in other agricultural subsectors to meet this goal with

available petroleum. The U.S.S.R. would be

likely to divert people from schools, factories,

and (depending on the international situation)

the military to work the fields, as it does in

peacetime, but to a greater extent. The substitution of human labor for mechanical energy

would be a poor but perhaps unavoidable

trade. The most obvious cutback would be

livestock; meat is a luxury, livestock consume

much food that could otherwise be used for

human consumption, and cattle raising,

slaughter, and distribution require much

energy. The Soviet Union might slaughter

much of its Iivestock after the attack to free

farmers, fields, trucks, and petroleum to produce crops. Russians might have a 3-month

orgy of meat followed by two decades without.

Soviet transportation would be pinched. A

few top leaders would still have cars; other

cars would sit idle for years, monuments to the

prewar standard of living. Air transportation

would be sharply curtailed, and Soviet supersonic transports would be grounded. Truck

transportation would be curtailed, with trucks

used almost exclusively for intracity transportation and hauling goods between railroads

and loading docks. By elimination, the transportation burden would fall to railroads because of their energy efficiency. Key trunklines

are electrified, and might obtain electricity

from sources other than petroleum. The Soviets have stored a number of steam locomotives, which would be hauled out, refurbished,

and put to use.

The tempo of industrial production would

slow. Even as it stands now, the Soviets have

barely enough energy and occasional shortages. Electric power would continue, but

would probably be cut back 10 to 15 percent,
80 Ž The Effects of Nuclear War

forcing some industries to close and reducing

heat and light at other industries and apartments. With transportation cut back, factories

would have to wait longer for inputs, lowering

productivity.

Some less-essential industries, especially energy- or petroleum-intensive ones, might shut

down. Plastics use petroleum derivatives as

feedstocks. Aluminum production uses great

amounts of energy, though some Soviet aluminum pIants, such as at Bratsk in Siberia, use

hydroelectric power. Truck production would

stop for lack of fuel for existing vehicles, idling

the huge Kama River truck plant.

Construction consumes much petroleum, so

it would be curtailed except for essential industries, hydroelectric powerplant construction, refining construction, and minimal housing for workers in those occupations.

These changes would disrupt workers’ lives.

Closing of some plants would idle many workers, forcing them to work in other industries;

many could be moved long distances to other

plants. Workers would not necessarily be

forced to work long hours. While some plants

would operate around the clock, others would

be closed or cut back to enable the energy

they consume to be diverted. At the same time,

however, and within limits of substitutability,

workers could Iikewise be diverted from closed

to open plants, providing extra labor for factories that remained open extra time.

In sum, the reduction in the standard of living and the amount of disruption would probably be less than in the United States but there

might well be more hardship and misery. Russians would have less food, especially protein,

than they did before the attack, while American agriculture consumes so Iittle petroleum

that its output could probably be maintained,

though some variety might be sacrificed. There

would be less heat in both nations, but winters

are shorter and milder in the United States,

and U.S. indoor temperatures in winter could

be reduced 50 or 10° F without ill effect.

Therefore, heating could probably not be cut

as much in the U.S.S.R. as in the United States

without jeopardizing health. Cars would be

sacrificed at least temporarily in both nations.

Soviet industries producing consumer goods

would be cut back more sharply than their U, S.

counterparts after the attack, and would regain productivity more slowly.

Long-Term Effects

Destroying 73 percent of refining capacity

would force the economy onto a crisis footing,

curtailing choices and consumer goods, dropping the standard of living from austere to

grim, and setting back Soviet economic progress by many years. Recovery might follow the

post-World War II pattern, with a slow but

steady improvement in the quality of life. But

recovery wouId be slow, The desire to reduce

vulnerability to future attacks would undoubtedly divert resources from recovery to

such tasks as building some underground refineries. While the United States could possibly recover in a way that would use less petroleum than it did prewar, this course would be

difficult for the U.S.S.R. because much of

Soviet petroleum goes to necessities. Longterm health and genetic effects would be less

than for the United States because of the

smaller size of U.S. weapons and the location

of Soviet refineries away from people. But the

Soviet Government might accept greater radiation exposure for people in order to speed production, increasing such effects.
Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases ● 81

CASE 3: A COUNTERFORCE ATTACK

AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

The case of a Soviet attack on U.S. strategic

forces has received extensive public attention

in recent years, since some observers believe it

is the least irrational way of waging strategic

war. For the purposes of this study, the military

success of such an attack (i. e., how many U.S.

forces would be destroyed) and the resulting

U.S. responses are not important. It is sufficient to assume that such an attack is

launched, and to examine the consequences

for the civilian population, economy, and

society. For this purpose, small variations in

the attack design (e. g., whether control centers

as well as silos are targeted) are immaterial.

While there are many possible variations in the

design of a counterforce attack, a question of

particular interest is whether the attack would

be delivered only against ICBM silos, or

whether bomber bases and missile submarine

bases would also be attacked. Some of the

public discussion of such an attack suggests

that an attack on ICBM silos alone could cause

much less civilian damage than a full-scale

counterforce attack because the silos are more

isolated from population centers than are

bomber bases. It is certainly true that, holding

al I the other possible variables constant, an attack that included bomber bases and missile

submarine bases would cause more civilian

damage than one that did not. Nevertheless,

the difference between the ICBM-only attack

and a comprehensive counterforce attack was

found to be no greater than the difference

made by other variables, such as the size of

weapons used, the proportion of surface bursts

used, and the weather. Both cases are considered in this section; the countersilo attack is a

subset of the counterforce attack, and available data is too coarse to support a believable

differentiation between the civilian effects of

each attack.

Prompt Effects

The blast damage from a counterforce attack is concentrated on military installations.

Attacks on submarine bases and bomber bases

would cause considerable blast damage to

nearby populations and urban structures; attacks on silos would cause relatively little

civilian blast damage. Unlike ICBM silos, many

bomber bases and fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) support facilities are near cities.

(See figure 15.) For example, an attack on Griffiss Air Force Base, near Utica and Rome, N. Y.,

would place nearly 200,000 people at risk from

prompt effects; attacking the SSBN support facility near Charleston, S. C., would place more

than 200,000 people at risk; attacking Mather

Air Force Base, near Sacramento, Cal if., would

place more than 600,000 people at risk. The additional attacks would simultaneously reduce

the number of people able to provide aid and

increase the number of injured or evacuees re

quiring aid. The attacks would make it harder

for people able to provide aid to sustain those

needing it.

Countersilo attacks would probably detonate some weapons at or near the Earth’s surface to maximize the likelihood of destroying

ICBM silos. Surface bursts produce intense

fallout, causing most of the damage to the civilian population, economy, and society. The

principal civilian impact of adding attacks on

bomber and SSBN bases is the large increase in

urban destruction.

The Period Before Fallout Deposition

Fallout would begin to reach closer populated areas in a few hours; it would reach many

others in a few days. As fallout arrives, radiation levels rise sharply and rapidly. People

would therefore have to take any protective

act ions —shelter or evacuation — before the

fallout arrives. This prearrival period would

thus be one of intense activity and intense confusion. How would people react? Training

could help, but people trained in how to behave under fallout conditions would fare poorly if they could not get to shelters or if shelters

were unstocked. To what extent would people
82 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

Figure 15.—Counterforce Targets in the United States

State capital

NOTE: No targets in 15 States; one target each in 11 States

panic, seek other family members, or evacuate

spontaneously, and what would be the consequences of such actions?

Evacuation would probably be a poor

choice, since it would be difficult or impossible to predict which would be the safe areas

and which the hot spots, and since a car in a

traffic jam would offer poor shelter indeed.

The decision on whether or not to evacuate,

however, is complicated because evacuation is

a reasonable response for people who would

be at risk from blast from further attacks even

though evacuation is a poor strategy for people at risk from fallout alone.

Shelter would in theory be available to a majority of people, although the best available

shelter might not be good enough in areas

where the fallout proved to be very intense.

However, the practical difficulties of fallout

sheltering could be very great. The time to

seek shelter could be very limited (and people

would not know how long they had), and people would want to get their families together

first. A shelter must have a sufficient protection factor. Fallout particles must be kept out

of the shelter, which requires a ventilation

system more complicated than an open window or door, and if anybody enters a shelter

after fallout has fallen there must be some

means of decontaminating the new arrival.

Water is necessary; heat may be necessary depending on the time of year; sanitation is a

problem. Finally, people could not tell how

long it was necessary to stay in the shelter

without radiation rate meters.

It is obvious that the time of day, the time of

the year, and the degree of emergency preparations during the hours or days before the attack would all affect the level of deaths. Whatever the circumstances, the few hours after the

attack would see a frantic effort to seek shelter on the part of most of the American popu-
Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases Ž 83

Iation. Then, in densities and locations determined by the attack parameters and the

weather, the fallout would descend. Many

Americans would be lucky enough to be in

areas where the fallout level was low. Many

others (between an estimated 2 million and 20

million), would be caught without shelter, or

with inadequate shelter, and would die. Still

others would suffer from a degree of radiation

that would make them sick, or at least lower

their life expectancy, but would not kill them.

The trials of living in fallout shelters would be

intensified by the fact that many people would

not know which category they and their families were in.

A comprehensive counterforce attack would

impose a greater burden than a countersi 10 attack. Many more people would be injured by

prompt effects, and people near bomber and

SSBN bases would have only a few minutes

warning in which to seek shelter.

Cities in the blast area –those near SSBN or

bomber bases–would be heavily damaged. A

few cities, such as Charleston, SC., and Little

Rock, Ark., could suffer consequences similar

to Detroit in Case 1 (chapter 11) or Philadelphia

in Case 2 (above in this chapter); most would

not. People in blast areas would face hazards

as noted in Case 1 — injuries from blast, initial

nuclear radiation, and thermal radiation, and

from such secondary effects as falling buildings and fires. As in other cases, rescue would

be difficult, with streets blocked by rubble,

water pressure gone, and emergency vehicles

destroyed.

People in areas damaged by blast and in the

path of fallout would be in greatest peril. injuries, damage to prospective shelters, damage

to transportation, and damage to power and

water could make them highly vuInerable. Little Rock, Ark., for example, the site of an ICBM

base and a bomber base, would receive both

blast damage from a pattern attack (designed

to destroy bombers in flight) and intense

fallout radiation from the attack on ICBMs.

People in areas neither damaged by blast

nor threatened by fallout would believe themselves to be at risk from blast or, at a minimum, from fallout until it was clear that attacks had ended. To these people would fall

the burdens of producing necessities and caring for the injured and evacuees. Yet people in

these areas, believing themselves to be at risk,

would feel compelled to seek shelter or, especially in unattached cities, to evacuate spontaneously. These actions would reduce the

flow of aid to damaged areas. Indeed, the

economy would probably shut down until people were certain that the war had ended and

until most people could get back to work,

probably until the end of the shelter period.

Even if some people reported to work, production would be difficult with many absentees.

There would be large credit, monetary, contractual, and legal problems. If production

stopped even for a week, the loss wouId be tremendous. This attack would disrupt the economy less than Case 2, however, because most

productive resources would remain intact.

Casualty Estimates

In seeking to estimate prompt damage from

the attacks, fatalities are the most important

component of damage and the most calculable. To estimate fatalities, the critical questions are which areas would be damaged by

blast, and to what extent? How much fallout

would there be, and where wouId it be deposited? These questions cannot be answered with

great confidence because estimates of deaths

from these attacks are highly sensitive to attack parameters and civilian shelter assumptions. However, reference can be made to several recent executive branch studies of counterforce attacks.

OTA drew on several executive branch

studies, conducted between 1974 and 1978, of

counterforce attacks. These studies differed

widely in their results, primarily because of differences in the assumptions they made. OTA

felt that it would be more useful to look at the

ways in which these assumptions affect the results than to attempt to determine the “correct” assumption for each uncertainty. Consequently, a range of results is presented; it is

believed that if OTA had done a new study of
84 ● The Effects of Nuclear war

this case the results would have fallen somewhere within this range. 5

The executive branch countersilo studies

that OTA drew on indicated that between 2

million and 20 million Americans would die

within the first 30 days after an attack on U.S.

ICBM silos. This range of results is so wide because of the extent of the uncertainties surrounding fallout. The key uncertainties are:

●

●

●

Height of Burst.– If the fireball touches

the ground, it vaporizes some dirt, irradiates it, and draws it up into the mushroom

cloud. This material condenses to become

fallout. The lower the height of burst, the

more of the fireball touches the ground,

and the more fallout that is produced. An

air burst in which none of the fireball

touches the ground creates negligible

fallout. Because ICBM silos are very hard,

a surface burst offers the greatest probability of destroying the silo with one explosion; it also maximizes fallout. The

probability of destroying an ICBM silo is

increased if two warheads are targeted

against it; opinions differ as to whether

the most effective tactic is to use two surface bursts, which doubles the amount of

fallout, or one air burst and one surface

burst.

Weapon Design.— Some weapons derive a

greater portion of their energy from fission (as opposed to fusion) than others;

the more fission, the more fallout. The

weapon yield affects the amount of fallout; the higher the yield of a given explosion, the greater the fallout.

Wind.– The speed and direction of the

wind at various altitudes determines the

directions and distance from the explosion at which fallout is deposited, and infIuences fallout concentration. Winds typically vary with the season; indeed, this

variance is so great that it can affect

casualties by about a factor of three, as

‘For exdmple, after the OTA analysis, was completed,

a new study was completed showing fatalities from a

counterforce attack with the current U S civil defense

posture to be 8 to 12 million without warning, and 5 to 8

million with warning. See Roger Sullivan et al , “Civil

Defense Needs of High-Risk Areas of the United States”

(Arlington, Va System Planning Corporation, 1979), p.

22

●

●

●

figure 16 shows. The hourly and daily variation of winds also affects casualties. It is

important to bear in mind, when considering possible civil defense measures, that

winds could not be accurately predicted

even after an attack had taken place,

much less in advance.

Rain. – Raindrops collect fallout particles

from the radioactive cloud, thereby creating areas of intense fallout where it is raining, and reducing fallout elsewhere.

Terrain. — Hills, buildings, and ground temperature gradients (such as are caused by

highways and small lakes) affect the exact

pattern of fallout, creating hot spots in

some places and relatively uncontaminated spots nearby.

Distance.—Other things remaining constant, fallout decreases with distance

from the explosion beyond roughly 50

miles [80 km].

As chapter 11 explained, radiation from fallout in large doses causes death, in smaller

doses causes illness, and in still smaller doses

creates a probability of eventual illness or

death (hence, .Iowers life expectancy). As

chapter I I I explained, protection can be obtained when matter is placed between the fallout and people— in general, the more matter

(the greater the mass) between a source of

radiation and a person, the greater the protection. The degree of protection offered by various materials is described as a protection factor (PF). The adequacy of a given PF depends

on the intensity of the fallout. For example, a

PF of 20 (typical of a home basement with

earth piled over windows and against the

walls) would reduce an outdoor radiation level

of 60 rem per hour to an indoor level of 3 rem

per hour. In this case, a person outdoors for 10

hours would almost certainly be killed by radiation, and a person in the basement shelter

would have a good chance of survival. But if

the outdoor level is not 60 reins per hour but

600 reins per hour, a PF of 20 is inadequate to

save I ives.

Calculations of deaths from fallout are

made by combining:

● an assumed distribution of fallout, with

various intensities at various locations;
Ch. /V—Three Attack Cases ● 85

Figure 16.—Expected Casualties as a Function of Typical Monthly Winds Resulting From an Attack

on Selected Military Targets in the United States

1 I 1 I I I I I I I

I I I I I I 1 I I I

J F M A M J J A s 0 N D

Typical monthly wind

● an assumed distribution of population

within the areas where fallout is assumed

to be deposited; and

● an assumed distribution of PFs for the

population.

Some computer models use a grid (perhaps

4,000 yards on a side for a fine-grained model,

but much larger in other cases) and assume

that within each square of the grid the fallout

intensity and population density are constant,

with PFs mixed. Other calculations use regional or nationwide averages. In general, the

calculations show lower numbers of deaths

when they assume that the population is widely dispersed, and higher numbers when they

take into account concentrations of population. The calculations also show lower numbers of deaths when they assume high PFs; in

general, increasing PFs above 40 does not

reduce casualties much in the calculations,

but that does not mean that raising a PF above

40 might not save an individual’s Iife in reality.

The calculations also show lower numbers of

deaths when the winds do not blow fallout into

densely populated areas.

The studies mentioned previously made

separate calculations for attacks including

bomber and missile submarine bases, as well

as silos. Assuming that there is no preattack

evacuation, calculated deaths range from a

low of 2 million to a high of 22 million. The differences result primarily from variations in

assumptions regarding fallout protection: the

high figure assumes approximately to degree

of protection which people receive in their

daily peacetime lives (PF of 3), and the IO W

figure assumes that the entire population

moves after the attack to fallout shelters with

a PF of at least 25. A more reasonable assumption, that the fallout shelters which now exist
86 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

-.

are utilized by people Iiving near them, produces a calculation of 14 million dead. The

same studies also assessed the effects of extensive preattack evacuation (crisis relocation),

and found that it reduced the range of predicted deaths. However, the assumptions regarding fallout protection, both for those who

are assumed to evacuate and for those who are

assumed to remain near home dominate the

results. Further detail is in appendix D.

Given the threat U.S. bombers pose to the

Soviet Union, a Soviet preemptive counterforce attack on bomber bases would probably

seek to destroy the aircraft and supporting

facilities rather than cratering the runways. To

destroy airborne bombers launched on warning of attack, an attacker might detonate

weapons in a spaced pattern over the base. Airbursting weapons rather than ground-bursting

them could reduce the threat of fallout but increase casualties from blast and thermal effects; if the weapons were detonated much

above the optimum height of burst for maximizing overpressure on the ground, faIlout

would be negligible and blast damage would

be reduced. The attacks against missile submarine bases are much less complex. Ususally

a single high-yield weapon with medium-togood accuracy will destroy docks, piers,

cranes, and other facilities — and nearby cities,

factories, and people as well.

Accordingly, it is certain that if the only difference between two attacks is that one attacks only ICBM silos and the other attacks

bomber and missile submarine bases as well,

the latter attack would kill more people. However, the variations in assumptions made

about attack design, weather, and fallout protection obscure this. Since these variations

reflect genuine uncertainties, it is not possible

to determine which set of assumptions and

which fatality calculation is most probable.

However, some of the extreme assumptions do

appear implausible. One Defense Department

study notes that its highest fatality figure

assumed the use of Soviet weapons larger than

those which U.S. intelligence estimates the

Soviets possess. Very low fatality estimates

assume abnormally low winds, an absence of

surface bursts, and /or virtually perfect fallout

protection. On balance, it does not appear

possible to sustain greater precision than to

say that “studies of hypothetical counterforce

attacks show deaths ranging from 1 million to

20 million, depending on the assumptions

used. ” However, the low end of this range

(deaths below the 8 to 10 million level) requires

quite optimistic assumptions, while the high

end of the range is plausible only on the

assumption that the attack is not preceded by

a crisis period during which civilians are

educated about fallout protection.

The data on injuries contained in the executive branch studies are quite limited; for the

counterforce attacks, however, the results suggest that injuries would about equal fatalities.

The Contamination Period

For several days or weeks, radioactive contamination would be so intense that people in

fallout areas would have to stay in shelters or

evacuate. What might be called the “shelter

period” begins at each location when fallout

starts arriving and ends when people can leave

their shelters long enough to do a day’s work.

The length varies from place to place; many

places will receive no fallout, and some hot

spots will be hazardous long after surrounding

areas are safe. Note, however, that people

could go outside for brief periods before an 8-

hour day outside a shelter became safe, and

could not live in houses with a low protection

factor for weeks afterwards. After 2 or 3

months people would ignore the residual radiation, though it would be far higher than is

considered “safe” in peacetime.

For the first 10 to 30 days, shelterers would

have to remain in shelters almost all the time.

Brief excursions outside, for example, to obtain water or food, would substantialIy reduce

the effective protection factor. Life in a shelter

would be difficult at best. People would not

know if the shelter offered a sufficient PF, or

whether further attacks were imminent. The

shelter might be dark, as power could be out,

and windows would be covered with dirt. Unless the shelter had a good air filtration system,

the air would become clammy and smelly, and

carbon dioxide concentration would increase.

Supplies of food and water might or might not
Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases Ž 87

be adequate, depending on what people

brought and how many people were in a shelter. Unless the shelter were specially stocked,

medical supplies would probably be inadequate. This would be a severe problem in light

of unhealthy conditions in shelters. People

who required special medicines would be

threatened unless they could obtain an adequate supply. While most people would have

radios to receive broadcasts, few would have

two-way radios to transmit. While phones

might or might not work, it would be difficult

to obtain help, as anyone in a contaminated

area who left shelter would be in jeopardy

from radiation. In particular, medical care

would probably be unavailable because of the

radiation risk of going to a hospital and the

tremendous number of patients seeking help at

the few hospitals that remained open.

Radiation sickness would present special

problems. Exposures too low to cause acute

radiation sickness nevertheless weaken bodily

resistance to infection. Resistance would also

be weakened by a deterioration in sanitation,

prolonged exposure to heat or cold, lack of

medical care, psychological shock, and inadequate food, water, and medicine. Hence shelterers would be especially vulnerable to contagious diseases, ranging from colds and influenza to typhoid fever. There is a trend in the

United States away from immunization; as a

result, many would contract diseases they

otherwise wouId not.

While many people would contract radiation sickness and Iive, it is very difficult for the

layman to determine whether an individual

showing pronounced symptoms of radiation

sickness has received a moderate, severe, or

lethal dose of radiation. Moreover, acute psychological shock induces symptoms similar to

radiation sickness, and vomiting— a symptom

of both— is contagious in small spaces. Thus,

someone who vomited would not know if he

had received a moderate, severe, or lethal dose

of radiation; if he had severe psychological

shock; if he had vomited because of contagion; or if he had some other illness. This

uncertainty about one’s own condition and

that of one’s loved ones, and nausea itself,

would increase the tension in a shelter. Moreover, nausea weakens people.

Some people will be better off than others:

people in adequately equipped shelters of

good PF; people who are neither very young,

very old, or ill; people who have received little

or no radiation before entering the shelter;

people in less-crowded shelters. Moderate ambient temperature would be better than hot,

and hot would be better than cold. People in

snow zones in the winter, however, would be

more Iikely than others to have adequate provisions as a precaution against being stranded

at home by snow. I n addition, much would depend on how shelterers used their time before

fallout arrived to prepare the shelter.

Even if the winds were perverse, there would

be substantial areas of the country that would

receive little or no fallout. I n some cases (e. g.,

Oregon), it would be evident that no fallout

could be expected unless the war continued

after the counterforce attack; in other cases it

would be several days before people in an uncontaminated area were certain that they had

been among the lucky ones. Once it became

clear that a given area had been spared, the

people living there could be expected to step

up their normal pace of activity. To the extent

possible, help would be offered to the contaminated areas. Depending on circumstances,

there might be large numbers of evacuees to

care for. The major task, however, would be to

keep the country going until the other survivors could emerge from shelters. Intense but

rather disorganized activity would be likely,

and essential production would probably take

place.

Most productive resources would survive

unscathed, but would shut down until the

threat of attack had ended; those in fallout

areas would remain closed until radiation

levels had diminished, with the possible exception of such critical services as radio stations,

water pumping facilities, and sewage disposal

units. Some plants, and some sectors of the

economy, would use productive resources as

intensively as possible to meet the demands of

the damaged areas and the injured, and to

compensate for loss of production elsewhere.

The burden imposed on the economy by the
88 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

Armed Forces would depend on the international situation.

Economic Disruption

Most economic damage would occur from

lost production, but there would be other

losses as well: fires would burn unchallenged,

and machinery would suffer damage from

being shut down in haste or not at all, or from

being left outside unprotected. The major

damage to the economy, however, would result from deaths and long-lasting injuries (to

consumers and producers), and persona I tragedies and other traumas making people less

able to work. The magnitude of economic loss

could be expected to vary with the number of

deaths.

The attack would cause considerable economic disruption in the uncontaminated area.

Facilities there would need to produce a vastly

different mix of goods and cope with the absence of goods that normally come from contaminated areas. Until people acted as if they

believed the war was over, it could prove difficult to organize production in the uncontaminated areas. Uncertainties about the legal

and financial arrangements that support production (money, contracts, credit, etc.) following a nuclear attack might impede production

in the uncontaminated areas. Some workers,

fearing further attacks, would spontaneously

evacuate. Public disorder could also impede

production. The changes and uncertainties

would cause some economic disruption; however, the greater effort put forth would probably more than compensate for it.

Recuperation

Economic viability would not be at issue

following a counterforce attack. Because the

attack seeks no economic damage, it would be

far less likely than a deliberate strike on

economic targets to create any bottlenecks

that would greatly hinder recovery. The Nation

would be able to restore production and maintain self-sufficiency. The attack would cause

enormous economic loss, but the Nation’s capacity for growth would be at worst only slightly impaired. The major task would be ending

disruption and disorganization rather than

rebuilding the economy — putting the pieces

back together. Most likely these tasks would

be accomplished by a mixture of individual,

local, State, and Federal initiatives, with

Federal intervention used as a last resort.

The main problem areas would be:

1. Agriculture. The attack could be expected

to destroy a tiny fraction of farmland with

blast and fire; of much greater significance,

fallout would contaminate a substantial fraction of cropland because many ICBMs are in or

near the Great Plains. Other cropland would

escape with little or no fallout. It is unlikely

that more than a fraction of the livestock in

nearby fallout areas would be adequately protected. Fallout would affect agriculture in two

ways: by killing livestock and crops, and by

preventing farmers from working in the fields.

Damage from fallout contamination of

crops would depend on the time of year. Most

crops take up relatively Iittle fallout and external irradiation does not contaminate them.

Moreover, it is easy enough to remove fallout

particles from food. However, the vulnerability of crops to fallout varies significantly with

the type of crop and the stage of its growth.

For example, yield of various crops can be

reduced 50 percent by the following doses, in

roentgens (R): peas, less than 1,000 R; rye, 1,000

to 2,000 R; wheat, corn, cucumber, 2,000 to

4,000 R; cotton, melons, 6,000 to 8,000 R; soybeans, beets, 800 to 12,000 R; rice, strawberries, 12,000 to 16,000 R; and squash, 16,000

to 24,000 R. At the same time, young plants are

most vulnerable to radiation, whiIe those near

maturity are least vulnerable.

Knowledge about radiation effects on crops

is, however, limited because much more is

known about how gamma radiation affects

crops than about beta radiation effects. Since

fallout emits both types, and since beta doses

to plants could be from 1 to 20 times the gamma dose, this is a major uncertainty.

Fallout would prevent farmers from working

in fields for a time. Fallout does decay, and
Ch. IV— Three Attack Cases . 89

weathering would further reduce its effects on

people. By a year after the attack, fallout

would no longer be of consequence to farmworkers in most areas. How soon after the attack they could begin work would depend on

the amount of fallout deposited on a field.

The effects would thus depend significantly

on time of year. An attack between October

and January would have little effect, as fallout

would have decayed enough by planting time

to permit farmers to work the fields and to

avoid serious damage to crops. Radiation on

fields could be substantially reduced by plowing the fallout under or by scraping off the top

layer of dirt. An attack in February or March

wouId delay planting, reducing crop yields or

making it necessary to shift to crops that

mature more quickly. An attack between April

and June could kill the entire crop. An attack

in July or August could conceivably have little

effect, if the plants were undamaged by radiation. But the resulting crop should be safe for

human consumption in an emergency. An attack during or just before the harvest could

result in the loss of the whole crop, not by

damaging the plants, but by preventing

farmers from harvesting.

Fallout would be more damaging to livestock than to plants. Animals are only slightly

more resistant to radiation than are people; for

sheep, cattle, and pigs in barns, where they are

protected from direct contact with the ingestion of fallout, a dose of 400, 500, and 600 R,

respectively, will kill half these animals. The

median lethal dose is considerably lower for

animals in pastures, where they can eat fallout

along with grass. Poultry are considered more

resistant; a dose of 850 R will halve the poultry

in a barn. Many animals in heavy fallout areas

would probably be killed, as farmers generally

have no fallout shelters for animals. Moreover,

depending on the damage the attack wreaks

on human food crops, it might be necessary to

use animal feed as human food. The consequence could be that it would take many years

to rebuild the national livestock supply, and

until then meat would become a scarce luxury.

2. Decontamination. Cities, farms, and factories in contaminated areas would require

decontamination in order to reopen for human

use. Decontamination involves moving fallout

to areas where it can do less harm in order to

reduce the dose rate to people in certain

places. It can be done with bulldozers, street

sweepers, firehoses, brooms, etc. It does,

however, require people to place themselves

at risk. Would enough people be willing to run

these risks? Training is required for people to

know that certain doses are tolerable and

other doses are not; this training would make

people less unwilling to face these risks, but

wiII enough people have received this training?

3. Public health standards would have to be

lowered following the attack. in peacetime,

standards are often set cautiously; when acceptable exposure risk is unknown, it is preferable to err on the side of safety. Following

the attack, that luxury would not be possible.

Fields would be farmed while low-level radioactivity persisted; the risks, quite unacceptable in peacetime, wouId be preferable to starvation. The cost-benefit ratio would change:

the benefits of individual safety would need to

be weighed against the costs of foregoing

critical production. Moreover, how applicable

would our knowledge be for setting standards

for the entire population after an attack?

Could enough instruments be made available

to enable everyone to know what dose they

were receiving? And what role wouId politics

play in setting standards when “acceptable

risk” rather than “negligible risk” was at issue?

Society would be running greater risks without

knowing just how great the risks were; so doing

wouId increase low-level radiation sickness,

cancers, genetic damage, and so on.

4. Burdens on society would increase, removing people from production while increasing

demand on production. Many people would

suffer long-lasting, permanent, or debilitating

injuries. Demands for more military force

could well increase. Inefficiencies stemming

from economic dislocation would reduce the

outputs from any given set of inputs. Decontamination and civil defense would draw

resources.
90 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

5. Economic disorganization would be a problem, possibly a severe one. Once people were

confident that the war had ended, money

would retain its value, and so would property

in uncontaminated areas. But the marketplace

that organizes the American economy would

be severely disrupted by abrupt shifts in demand, abrupt changes in supply, questions

about the validity of contracts involving people or things in contaminated areas, etc. In addition, a major question would develop over

how to share the losses from the attack in an

equitable way.

Long-Term Effects

The main long-term damage would be

caused by countersilo strikes, which release

the great bulk of radiation even if bomber and

missile submarine bases are also attacked.

Radiation has long-term health consequences,

such as cancers, other illnesses, deaths, and

genetic damage, that blast does not.

Similarly, ecological damage would be

caused mainly by countersilo attacks; this

topic is dealt with in chapter V.

In the long run, the economy would recover,

although it would be some decades before the

people killed would be “replaced” in either a

demographic or an economic sense. There

would undoubtedly be permanent shifts in demand (e. g., there might be little market for

houses without basements or fallout shelters),

and supply of some goods (notably meat)

might be scarce for some time.

An imponderable is the psychological impact. The United States has never suffered the

loss of millions of people, and it is unlikely

that the survivors would simply take it in

stride. The suffering experienced by the South

in the decade after 1860 provides the nearest

analogy, and a case can be made that these effects took a century to wear off.

CASE 3: A COUNTERFORCE ATTACK

AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

As in the case of the Soviet counterforce attack on the United States (described in the previous section), the main threat to the civiIian

population, economy, and society is derived

from fallout, while the damage done to the

strategic forces is outside the scope of this

study. Here too OTA drew on the executive

branch for calculations, and here too the uncertainties are very great.

The First Day

Each of the parameters mentioned in the

previous section as affecting the damage to

the United States would also affect the damage to the Soviet Union. An additional source

of variation is pertinent: the U.S. missiles mostly carry smaller warheads than their Soviet

counterparts, but U.S. bombers carry weapons

with quite high yields. Ground bursts of bomber-carried weapons (which are especialIy Iikely

in an attack on Soviet bomber bases) would

create very large amounts of fallout.

As in the case of a counterforce attack on

the United States, sheltering is preferable to

evacuation for protection provided there are

no subsequent attacks. Depending on the time

of year, the Soviets might have more difficulty

than the United States in improvising fallout

protection (both frozen earth and mud would

create problems); on the other hand, Soviet

preparations for such sheltering in peacetime

are more extensive than their U.S. counterparts.

The executive branch has performed several

calculations of fatalities resulting from counterforce attacks, and variations in the assumptions produce a range of estimates. All these

studies except one assume a Soviet first strike

and a U.S. retaliatory strike. As a result, estimates of Soviet fatalities are lower than they

would be for a U.S. counterforce first strike,
Ch. IV— Three Attack Cases ● 91

partly because the United States would have

fewer ICBMS available for a second strike, and

partly because the Soviets are more likely to

take precautionary civil defense measures

before a Soviet first strike than before a U.S.

first strike. All of these studies consider only

fatalities in the so days following the attack;

they exclude later deaths resulting from relatively less intense radiation or the effects of

economic disruption.

For both counterforce and countersilo attacks, with an in-place Soviet population, the

fatality estimates are very similar: for the

former, from less than 1 to 5 percent of the

population; for the latter, from less than 1 to 4

percent. The low end results from using

smaller weapons air burst, while the high end

results from using larger weapons ground

burst. A comprehensive counterforce attack

can logically be expected to kill more people

than the countersilo attack because the latter

is a subset of the former. However, other factors have a greater influnce on numbers of fatalities: A full counterforce attack in which the

United States deliberately tried to minimize

Soviet fatalities by using small weapons air

burst, in which winds were favorable, and in

which the Soviets had tactical or strategic

warning, would kill far fewer people than a

counters ilo-only attack in which the United

States used one large weapon ground burst

against each ICBM silo.

An unpublished Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (AC DA) analysis highlights the

importance of sheltering and attack characteristics for fatal ities from a U.S. countersilo attack. One estimate is that, with the urban

population 90-percent sheltered and the rural

population given a PF of 6, Soviet fatalities

would range from 3.7 million to 13.5 million,

depending on attack parameters. With a degraded shelter posture (urban population 10-

percent sheltered and rural population given a

PF of 6), fatality estimates for the same set of

attacks range from 6.0 m i I I ion to 27.7 miIIion.

The Shelter Period

If bomber bases (or airfields with long runways that were attacked even though r-to

bombers were present) are attacked, tactical

warning could be of great importance to people living nearby. There would be an area near

each base (roughly, the area more than 1 mile

[2 km] but less than 10 miles [16 km] from a surface burst) in which people who were sheltered

at the moment of the blast would have a much

greater chance of survival than those who were

unsheltered. Soviet civiI defense plans envisage that civilians in such high-threat areas

would receive some warning, but it cannot be

said to what extent this would actually be the

case.

Many millions of Soviet citizens Iive in areas

that would receive substantial amounts of fallout from such an attack. Those far enough

away from the explosions to be safe from blast

darnage would have some time (a range from

30 minutes to more than a day) to shelter themselves from fallout, but evacuation from highfaliout areas after the attack would probably

not be feasible. The Soviet civil defense program gives attention to blast shelters rather

than fallout shelters in urban areas (see

chapter I I l), and while such blast shelters

would offer good protection against fallout,

some of them may not be habitable for the

necessary number of days or weeks for which

protection would be required.

The sheltering process would be much more

tightly organized than in the United States.

The Soviet Government has extensive civil

defense plans, and while Americans would expect to try to save themselves under general

guidance (informational in character) from the

Federal authorities, Soviet citizens would expect the Government to tell them what to do.

This introduces a further uncertainty: efficient

and timely action by the authorities would be

very effective, but it is also possible that

Soviet citizens would receive fatal radiation

doses while waiting for instructions or following mixed-up instructions. I n any event, some

hours after the attack would see a situation in

which a large number of people in contaminated areas were in fallout shelters, others

were receiving dangerous doses of radiation,

and those outside the fallout areas were congratulating themselves on their good luck
92 • The Effects of Nuclear War — .— —— . . ——.——. —— .— ———. - .———...— .——.—-.—

while hoping that no further attacks would

take place.

Would Soviet shelterers be better off than

their American counterparts? They have several advantages. They are more accustomed to

crowding and austerity than are Americans, so

would probably suffer less “shelter shock. ”

They would be more accustomed to following

Government orders, so to the extent that

orders proved correct and were correctly implemented, they would be more evenly distributed among shelters. Training in first aid and

civil defense is widespread, which would improve people’s ability to survive in shelters. If

the U.S. attack used low-yield warheads, fallout would be less widespread and less intense.

Soviet shelterers face some problems that

Americans would not. They would be more vulnerable than Americans to an attack in winter.

The Soviet economy has less “fat,” so other

things being equal, Soviet citizens could bring

less food and supplies into shelters than could

Americans.

Public health is a major uncertainty. To the

extent that shelters are well stocked, provided

with adequate medications and safe ventilation, have necessary sanitary facilities, are

warm and uncrowded, and have some people

with first aid knowledge, health would be less

of a problem. If Soviet citizens receive less

fallout than Americans, they would be less

weakened by radiation sickness and more resistant to disease. If conditions were austere

but reasonably healthy, public health in shelters would be mainly a matter of isolating ill

people and practicing preventive medicine for

the others. Doctors would be unnecessary for

most such tasks; people trained in first aid, especially if they have some access (by phone or

radio) to doctors, could perform most tasks. To

be sure, some people would die from being untreated, but the number would be relatively

small if preventive care worked. However, isolating the ill would not be easy. It is likely that

many people would be moderately ill (from

flu, etc.) when they entered their shelter, and

radiation would make the others more susceptible to contamination. The Soviet Government might send medical teams to contaminated areas, especially to shelters containing

workers with key skills. The Soviet Army has

built tanks and some other military vehicles

with protection against fallout, and has trained

its soldiers for operations in areas contaminated with fallout. In addition, as in the United

States, military helicopters could ferry people

and supplies into contaminated areas with

limited exposure to crews. Using such resources would obviously improve health of

shelterers, but priority military tasks might

make these miIitary resources unavailable.

People in hasty shelters, if they could be

built, would face worse health problems,

despite the legendary ability of Russians to endure hardships. Presumably these shelters

would have inadequate supplies, heat, air filtration, sanitary facilities, waterproofing, and

so on. Placing people in a cold, damp hole in

the ground for 2 weeks with little food and

makeshift toilets would make many people

sick even in peacetime; how well would such

problems be overcome in war?

Soviet civil defense presents a large question mark. Some believe that the Soviets have

massive food stockpiles, meticulous plans

detailing where each person should go, ample

shelter spaces, subways and buildings convertible to shelters, and so on that would be valuable in the shelter period. Others contend that

these claims are vastly overstated and confuse

speculation about a plan with its existence and

the existence of a plan with its operational effectiveness. (See chapter III on civil defense.)

If Soviet civil defense works well, it would save

many lives; if it doesn’t, Soviet shelterers

would face conditions at least as hazardous as

their American counterparts.

Agricultural losses would, as in the United

States, depend on the time of the year when

the attack came and on the precise patterns of

fallout. In general, Soviet agriculture appears

more vulnerable because it borders on inadequacy even in peacetime–even relatively

minor damage would hurt, and major crop

losses could be catastrophic. On the other

hand, for this very reason the Soviets would
Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases ● 93

know how to handle agricultural shortages:

surviving production and stockpiles (the extent

of Soviet food stockpiles is a matter of controversy, apart from the fact that they are

lowest just before each harvest) would probably be used efficiently.

The economy outside the contaminated

area would continue to function. There would

be more than enough industrial facilities in uncontaminated areas to keep necessary production going. The key task facing Government

planners, however, would be using available

workers and resources to best advantage. How

fast could planners generate new economic

plans that were detailed enough for that task?

Because the Soviet economy operates closer

to the margin than does that of the United

States, the Soviets could tolerate less loss of

production than could the United States. This

would make superproduction the norm, with

key factories working all the time. It would

lead to suspending production of many consumer goods. It would probably lead the Covernment to begin decontamination earlier and

to take more risks with radiation exposure than

would the United States. These actions to increase production would be aided in general

by the Government’s control of the economy,

and in particular by keeping work groups

together in shelters and host areas.

Recuperation

As in the United States, economic viability

would not be threatened. The key question,

which would begin to be answered in the shelter period, is how appropriate Soviet emergency plans are and how rapidly planning mistakes could be corrected. Major shifts, and the

inefficiencies that accompany them, would be

inevitable. To what extent could planning

minimize them? Could a command economy

do better under the circumstances than a

mixed economy? The Soviet Union’s long experience with central planning would mean

that the changes would involve details within

the existing system rather than changing from

one economic system to another.

In the U. S. S. R., as in the United States, the

crop loss caused by the attack would depend

on season, fallout deposition, which crops

were hit by fallout, and so on. Similarly, the

amount of food reserves would vary with the

season. The immediate goal for agriculture

would be to send adequate food supplies to

cities. Presumably, the Government would try

to meet this goal by tightening controls rather

than by giving farmers more capitalistic incentives. For a moderate attack like this one, with

little physical damage, controls would probably work.

It is questionable whether adequate labor

would be available for agriculture. Depending

on the situation, millions of men might be

mobilized into the Army. On the other hand

the Soviets have well-established procedures

for getting military personnel, factory workers,

and others to help with harvests; moreover,

following a nuclear attack, some workers in

nonessential industries would be out of work,

and could be sent to farms. The large number

of farmers (perhaps 35 to 40 percent of the

Soviet work force is in agriculture, compared

to 2 or 3 percent in the United States), the

fallout contaminating some farmland, and accepting more exposure to radiation would increase the Soviet population’s exposure to

radiation.

If a year’s crop were lost, would there be

austerity, short rations, or starvation? How

much surplus food is there? In particular,

would there be enough to maintain a livestock

industry, or would meat be seen as a nonessential consumer good and feed grains diverted

for human use?

As in the United States, the attack would

create many burdens for the Soviet economy.

Military expenditures would probably increase; people injured by the attack would

need care, and fewer people would be alive

and well to care for them; major changes in the

economy would cause inefficiencies; lowered

public health standards would increase early

production at the expense of later health

burdens.
94 Ž The Effects of Nuclear War

The Soviet Union would not face certain

problems that a market economy faces. The

legal and financial devices supporting production – money, credit, contracts, and ownership

of productive resources — would be far less important than in the United States. Instead,

Soviet production would be guided by a central plan. There are reports that contingency

planning has been done for postwar recuperation; such contingency plans (or the peacetime

plan if there are no applicable contingency

plans) would have to be adjusted to take account of the actual availability of surviving

workers and economic assets. Without doubt

such adjustments would be made, though

there would be some waste and inefficiency.

CASE 4: A LARGE

U.S. MILITARY AND

This case discusses a massive attack that

one normally associates with all-out nuclear

war. The attack uses thousands of warheads to

attack urban-industrial targets, strategic targets, and other military targets. The number of

deaths and the damage and destruction inflicted on the U.S. society and economy by the

sheer magnitude of such an attack would

place in question whether the United States

would ever recover its position as an organized, industrial, and powerful country.

OTA favored examining purely retaliatory

strikes for both sides, but all of the available

executive branch studies involved Soviet pre

emption and U.S. retaliation. However, the differences between a Soviet first strike and a

retaliation do not appear to be appreciably

large in terms of damage to the civilian structure. Like the United States, the Soviets have a

secure second-strike force in their SLBMs and

are assumed to target them generally against

the softer urban-industrial targets. Moreover, a

U.S. first strike would be unlikely to destroy

the bulk of Soviet ICBMs before they could be

launched in retaliation.

The effects of a large Soviet attack against

the United States would be devastating. The

Long-Term Effects

Chapter V discusses the likely long-term

health hazards from such an attack.

All things considered, an attack of this

nature could be somewhat less damaging than

World War II was to the Soviet Union, and

Soviet recovery from that conflict was complete. However, it helped that in 1945 the

Soviets were victorious and able to draw on

resources from Eastern Europe. Much would

depend on whether the aftermath of this attack found the Soviet people pleased or appalled at the results of the war and on the

relative power and attitudes of the Soviets’

neighbors.

SOVIET ATTACK ON

ECONOMIC TARGETS

most immediate effects would be the loss of

millions of human lives, accompanied by similar incomprehensible levels of injuries, and the

physical destruction of a high percentage of

U.S. economic and industrial capacity. The full

range of effects resulting from several thousand warheads — most having yields of a megaton or greater— impacting on or near U.S.

cities can only be discussed in terms of uncertainty and speculation. The executive branch

studies that addressed this level of attack

report a wide range of fatality levels reflecting

various assumptions about the size of the attack, the protective posture of the population,

and the proportion of air bursts to ground

burst weapons.

The DOD 1977 study estimated that 155 million to 165 million Americans would be killed

by this attack if no civil defense measures were

taken and all weapons were ground burst.

DCPA looked at a similar attack in 1978 where

only half the weapons were ground burst; it

reduced the fatality estimate to 122 million.

ACDA’s analysis of a similar case estimated

that 105 million to 131 million would die.

If people made use of existing shelters near

their homes, the 155 million to 165 million
Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases ● 95

fatality estimate would be reduced to 110 million to 14s million, and the 122 million fatalities to 100 million. The comparable ACDA

fatality estimate drops to 76 million to 85

million. Again ACDA gets a lower figure

through assuming air bursts for about 60 percent of the incoming weapons. Finally, if urban

populations were evacuated from risk areas,

the estimated prompt fatality levels would be

substantially reduced. The DOD study showed

fatalities of 40 million to 55 million, with

DCPA showing a very large drop to 20 million

from the 100 mill ion level. The primary reason

for the 2-to-1 differential is the degree of protection from fallout assumed for the evacuated population.

In summary, U.S. fatality estimates range

from a high of 155 million to 165 million to a

low of 20 million to 55 million. Fatalities of this

magnitude beg the question of injuries to the

survivors. None of the analyses attempted to

estimate injuries with the same precision used

in estimated fatalities. However, DCPA did

provide injury estimates ranging from 33 million to 12 million, depending on circumstances. An additional point worth noting is

that al I of the fatality figures just discussed are

for the first 30 days following the attack; they

do not account for subsequent deaths among

the injured or from economic disruption and

deprivation.

The First Few Hours

The devastation caused by a single l-Mt

weapon over Detroit (chapter I l), and of two

similar weapons denoted near Philadelphia,

have been described. In this attack the same

destruction would take place in 30 or so other

major cities (with populations of a million or

greater). Many cities with smaller populations

would also be destroyed. The effects on U.S.

society would be catastrophic.

The majority of urban deaths will be blast induced, e.g., victims of collapsing buildings, flying debris, being blown into objects, etc. Except for administering to the injured, the next

most pressing thing (probably ahead of handling the dead) for most survivors would be to

get reliable information about what has occurred, what is taking place, and what is expected. Experience has shown that in a disaster

Situation, timely and relevant information is

critical to avoiding panic, helpful in organizing

and directing productive recovery efforts, and

therapeutic to the overall psychological and

physical well being of those involved. Presumably, the civil preparedness functions would

be operating well enough to meet some of this

need.

Rescuing and treating the injured will have

to be done against near insurmountable odds.

Fire and rescue vehicles and equipment not destroyed wil I find it impossible to move about in

any direction. Fires wilI be raging, water mains

will be flooding, powerlines will be down,

bridges will be gone, freeway overpasses will

be collapsed, and debris will be everywhere.

People will be buried under heavy debris and

structures, and without proper equipment

capable of lifting such loads, the injured cannot be reached and will not survive. The fortunate ones that rescuers can reach will then

be faced with the unavailability of treatment

facilities. Hospitals and clinics in downtown

areas would likely have been destroyed along

with most of their stocks of medical supplies.

Doctors, nurses, and technicians needed to

man makeshift treatment centers are likely to

have been among the casualties. The entire

area of holocaust will be further numbed by

either the real or imagined danger of fallout.

People will not know whether they should try

to evacuate their damaged city, or attempt to

seek shelter from fallout in local areas and

hope there will be no new attacks. No doubt

some of both wouId be done.

If this situation were an isolated incident or

even part of a smalI number of destroyed cities

in an otherwise healthy United States, outside

help would certainly be available. But if 250

U.S. cities are struck and damaged to similar

levels, then one must ask, “Who is able to

help?” Smaller towns are limited in the amount

of assistance they can provide their metropolitan neighbors. It is doubtful that there would

be a strong urge to buck the tide of evacuation
in order to reach a place where most of the

natives are trying to leave. Additionally, the

smaller cities and towns would have their own

preparedness problems of coping with the anticipated arrival of fallout plus the influx of

refugees. In light of these and other considerations, it appears that in an attack of this

magnitude, there is Iikely not to be substantial

outside assistance for the targeted areas until

prospective helpers are convinced of two

things: the attack is over, and fallout intensity

has reached safe levels. Neither of these conditions is likely to be met in the first few hours.

The First Few Days

Survivors will continue to be faced with the

decision whether to evacuate or seek shelter in

place during this interval. The competence and

credibility of authority will be under continuous question. Will survivors be told the

facts, or what is best for them to know, and

who decides? Deaths will have climbed due to

untreated injuries, sickness, shock, and poor

judgement. Many people will decide to attempt evacuation simply to escape the reality

of the environment. For those staying, it likely

means the beginning of an extended period of

shelter survival. Ideally, shelters must protect

from radiation while meeting the minimums of

comfort, subsistence, and personal hygiene.

Convincing people to remain in shelters until

radiation levels are safely low will be difficult,

but probably no more so than convincing them

that it is safe to leave on the basis of a radiation-rate meter reading. There will be

unanswerable questions on long-term effects.

Sheltering the survivors in the populous

Boston to Norfolk corridor will present unprecedented problems. Almost one-fifth of the

U.S. population lives in this small, 150- by 550-

mile [250 by 900 km] area. Aside from the

threat of destruction from direct attack, these

populations are in the path of fallout from attacks on missile silos and many industrial targets in the Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Duluth triangle. Depending on the winds at altitude, the

fallout from the Midwest will begin arriving 12

to 30 hours after the attack.

At the time when fallout radiation first becomes intense, only a fraction of the surviving

urban population will be in adequate fallout

shelters. Those that are sheltered will face a

variety of problems: making do with existing

stocks of food, water, and other necessities or

else minimizing exposure while leaving the

shelter for supplies; dealing with problems of

sanitation, which will not only create health

hazards but also exacerbate the social tensions

of crowds of frightened people in a small

space; dealing with additional people wanting

to enter the shelter, who would not only want

to share scarce supplies but might bring contamination in with them; dealing with disease,

which would be exacerbated not only by the

effects of radiation but by psychosomatic factors; and finally judging when it is safe to venture out. Boredom will gradually replace

panic, but will be no easier to cope with. Those

with inadequate shelters or no shelters at all

will die in large numbers, either from lethal

doses of radiation or from the combination of

other hazards with weakness induced by radiation sickness.

The conditions cited above are generally

more applicable to urbanites who are trying to

survive. The problems of rural survivors are

somewhat different, some being simpler—

others more complex. With warning, people

living in rural areas could readily fabricate

adequate fallout shelters. However, it might be

more diifficult for a rural shelteree to have current and accurate information regarding fallout intensity and location. The farm family is

likely not to have suffered the traumatic exposure to death and destruction, and consequently is probably better prepared psychologically to spend the required time in a shelter. (Possible consequences to livestock and

crops are addressed later in this section. )

Outdoor activity in or near major cities that

were struck would likely be limited to emergency crews attempting to control fires or continuing to rescue the injured. Crews would

wear protective clothing but it would be necessary to severely limit the total work hours of

any one crew member, so as not to risk dangerous accumulations of radiation. Areas not
Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases ● 97

threatened by fallout could begin more deliberate fire control and rescue operations.

Whether a national facility would survive to

identify weapons impact points and predict

fallout patterns is doubtful.

The extent of death and destruction to the

Nation would still be unknown. For the most

part, the agencies responsible for assembling

such information would not be functioning.

This task would have to wait until the numbing

effect of the attack had worn off, and the

Government could once again begin to function, however precariously.

The Shelter Period (Up to a Month)

As noted earlier, after the initial shock

period, including locating and getting settled

in shelters, the problem of sheltering large

masses of people will be compounded as the

shelter time extends. Survival will remain the

key concern. People will experience or witness

radiation death and sickness for the first time.

Many previously untreated injuries will require

medical attention, if permanent damage or

death to the individual is to be avoided. Stockpiles of medical, food, and water supplies are

sure to become items of utmost concern.

Whether some people can safely venture outside the shelter for short periods to forage for

uncontaminated supplies will depend on fallout intensity, and the availability of reliable

means of measuring it.

This period will continue to be marked by

more inactivity than activity. Many areas will

have been freed from the fallout threat either

by rain, shifting winds, or distance from the

detonations. But economic activity will not

resume immediately. Workers wilI remain concerned about their immediate families and

may not want to risk leaving them. Information and instruction may not be forthcoming,

and if it is, it may be confusing and misleading,

and of little use. Uncertainty and frustration

will plague the survivors, and even the most

minor tasks wilI require efforts far out of proportion to their difficulty. Many will interpret

this as symptomatic of radiation effects and

become further confused and depressed. The

overall psychological effects will likely worsen

until they become a major national concern,

perhaps on the same level with other incapacitating injuries.

Deaths occurring within the first 30 days of

an attack are categorized as prompt fatalities.

This duration is a computation standard more

than it is related to specific death-producing

effects, and is the basis for most fatality

estimates. However, deaths from burns, injuries, and radiation sickness can be expected

to continue far beyond this particular interval.

The Recuperation Period

Whether economic recovery would take

place, and if so what form it would take, would

depend both on the physical survival of

enough people and resources to sustain recovery, and on the question of whether these survivors couId adequately organize themselves.

Physical survival of some people is quite

probable, and even a population of a few million can sustain a reasonably modern economy

under favorable circumstances. The survivors

would not be a cross-section of prewar America, since people who had Iived in rural areas

would be more likely to survive than the inhabitants of cities and suburbs. The surviving

population would lack some key industrial and

technical skills; on the other hand, rural people

and those urban people who wouId survive are

generally hardier than the American average.

While the absolute level of surviving stocks

of materials and products would seem low by

prewar standards, there would be a much

smaller population to use these stocks. Apart

from medicines (which tend to have a short

shelf life and which are manufactured exclusively in urban areas), there would probably

not be any essential commodity of which supplies were desperately short at first. A lack of

medicines wouId accentuate the smallness and

hardiness of the surviving population.

Restoring production would be a much more

difficult task than finding interim stockpiles.

Production in the United States is extremely

complex, involving many intermediate stages.
98 . The Effects of Nuclear War

Photo credit: U.S. Air Force

A part of Hiroshima after atomic blast

New patterns of production, which did not rely

on facilities that have been destroyed, would

have to be established.

It cannot be said whether the productive

facilities that physically survived (undamaged

or repairable with available supplies and skills)

would be adequate to sustain recovery. It

seems probable that there would be enough

equipment and that scavenging among the

ruins could provide adequate “raw materials”

where natural resources were no longer accessible with surviving technology.

The most serious problems would be organizational. Industrial society depends on the

division of labor, and the division of labor

depends on certain governmental functions,

Physical security comes first—a person is reluctant to leave home to go to work without

some assurance that the home will not be

looted. While some degree of law and order

could probably be maintained in localities

where a fairly dense population survived, the

remaining highways might become quite unsafe, which would reduce trade over substantial distances. The second requirement is some

form of payment for work. Barter is notoriously inefficient. Payment by fiat (for example,

those who work get Government ration cards)

is inefficient as well, and requires a Government stronger than a postwar United States

would be Iikely to inherit. A strong Government might grow up, but most surviving citizens would be reluctant to support a dictator-
Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases • 99

ship by whatever name. The best solution is a

viable monetary system, but it would not be

easy to establish. Regions or localities might

develop their own monies, with “foreign”

trade among regions.

The surviving resources might not be used

very efficiently. Ideally one would want to

conduct a national survey of surviving assets,

but the surviving Government would probably

not be capable of doing so, especially since

people would fear that to acknowledge a surviving stock was to invite its confiscation. To

make use of surviving factories, workers would

have to live nearby, and they might be unwilling to do so in the absence of minimally adequate housing for their families. Ownership of

some assets would be hopelessly confused,

which wouId diminish the incentives for investment or even temporary repairs.

There is a possibility that the country might

break up into several regional entities. If these

came into conflict with each other there would

be further waste and destruction.

In effect, the country would enter a race,

with economic viability as the prize. The country would try to restore production to the point

where consumption of stocks and the wearing

out of surviving goods and tools was matched

by new production. If this was achieved before

stocks ran out, then viability would be attained. Otherwise, consumption would necessarily sink to the level of new production and

in so doing would probably depress production

further, creating a downward spiral. At some

point this spiral would stop, but by the time it

did so the United States might have returned

to the economic equivalent of the Middle

Ages.

The effect of an all-out attack would be

equally devastating to the U.S. social structure. Heavy fatalities in the major urban areas

would deprive the country of a high percentage of its top business executives, Government

officiaIs, medicaI speciaIists, scientists,

educators, and performers. There is no measure for estimating the impact of such lasting

losses on our society. In addition to the irreplaceable loss of genius and talents, the

destruction of their associated institutions is

still another compounding of effects that is

overlooked by some recovery estimates. Who

could calculate how long to get over the loss

of Wall Street, an MIT, a Mayo Clinic, and the

Smithsonian?

The American way of life is characterized by

material possessions, with private ownership

of items representing substantial long-term investments (such as homes, businesses, and

automobiles) being the rule rather than exception. Widespread loss of individual assets such

as these could have a strong, lasting effect on

our social structure. Similarly, the question of

whether individual right to ownership of surviving assets would remain unchanged in a

postattack environment would arise. For example, the Government might find it necessary to

force persons having homes to house families

who had lost their homes.

The family group would be particularly hard

hit by the effects of general nuclear war.

Deaths, severe injuries, forced separation, and

loss of contact could place inordinate strains

on the family structure.

Finally, major changes should be anticipated in the societal structure, as survivors attempt to adapt to a severe and desponding environment never before experienced. The loss

of a hundred million people, mostly in the

larger cities, could raise a question on the advisability of rebuilding the cities. (Why reconstruct obvious targets for a nuclear Armageddon of the future?) The surviving population

could seek to alter the social and geopolitical

structure of the rebuilding nation in hopes of

minimizing the effects of any future confIicts.

How well the U.S. political structure might

recover from a large-scale nuclear attack depends on a number of uncertainties. First, with

warning, national level officials are presumed

to evacuate to outlying shelter areas; State and

local authorities will take similar precautions,

but probably with less success, especially at

the lower levels. The confidence and credibility of the system will come under severe strains

as relief and recovery programs are imple

mented. Changes in an already weakened
100 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

structure are sure to result as many normal

practices and routines are set aside to facilitate recovery. Survivors may demand more immediate expressions of their likes, dislikes, and

needs. Widespread dissatisfaction could result

in a weakening of the Federal process, leading

to a new emphasis on local government. An

CASE 4: A LARGE

SOVIET MILITARY AND

A U.S. retaliatory attack against the Soviet

Union would destroy 70 to 80 percent of its

economic worth. The attacking force would

consist primarily of U.S. strategic bombers and

Poseidon/Polaris SLBMs, since most U.S. landbased ICBMs are assumed lost to a Soviet first

strike. Bombers carry gravity bombs and shortrange attack missiles having yields of about 1

Mt and 200 kt respectively. Poseidon SLBMs

nominally carry up to 10 RVs of 40 kt each.

The attack would strike the full set of Soviet

targets —strategic offensive forces, other military targets, economic targets, and cities.

Population would in fact be struck, although

killing people would not be an attack objective in itself. The objectives would be to cause

as much industrial damage as possible and to

make economic recovery as difficult as possible. The attacks might not be limited in time.

Concentrations of evacuees would probably

not be struck, but industries that recovered

very quickly after the attack could be.

The immediate effects of the attack would

be death and injury to millions of Soviet citizens, plus the destruction of a large percentage of Soviet economic and industrial capacity. As with the all-out Soviet attack, the executive branch studies provided a wide range of

casualty estimates. Since the thrust of those

analyses was to look at the potential effectiveness of Soviet civil defense, casualties

were estimated under various assumptions re

Iated to the posture of the population.

If the Soviet population remained in-place,

fatality estimates range from a high of 64 million to 100 million (26 to 40 percent of the

alternative possibility is martial law, which

might be controlled in theory but decentralized in practice.

All of this assumes that there would be no

significant ecological damage, a possibility

discussed in chapter V. Chapter V also discusses long-term health hazards.

U.S. ATTACK ON

ECONOMIC TARGETS

Soviet population) to a low of 50 million to 80

million (20 to 32 percent). The high-value range

is due to the different data bases used by DOD

and ACDA and the higher protection levels

assumed by AC DA. The low-value range results

from the use of day-to-day alert status by the

interagency intelligence study as compared to

ACDA’s use of generated forces, and the types

of weapons used against the economic target

base in the two studies. With evacuation, the

ACDA study estimated that fatalities would be

reduced to 23 million to 34 million. It is difficult to judge whether these figures represent

a high or low estimate. They could be considered as representing the low side because of

the coarseness of Soviet data as used by

ACDA. On the other hand, some would say

that the evacuation scheme assumed by ACDA

was unrealistic, and the results should be considered a high estimate. Nevertheless, Soviet

fatalities are lower than the United States for

both in-place and evacuated population postures. The lower Soviet fatalities are again primarily due to major differences in the yields of

the weapons detonating in each country, and

to the greater proportion of Soviet population

that lives in rural areas.

As to the cause of fatalities (blast, thermal

radiation, and direct nuclear radiation versus

fallout radiation), DCPA data suggests that, in

large attacks, that is, attacks that include

economic or economic and population targets,

fatalities are primarily due to prompt effects

as opposed to fallout. Prompt effects account

for at least 80 percent of the fatalities for all

population postures when economic targets or

population are included in the attack. ACDA
Ch. /V—Three Attack Cases ● 101

notes a similar result in its study for attacks

that include counterforce and other military

targets. The reason for this is that in attacks on

targets near urban areas, that is, attacks involving economic targets or popuIation, those protected enough to survive the blast effects also

have enough protection to survive the fallout.

Conversely, those who do not have enough

protection against fallout in urban areas near

targets will not have enough protection against

prompt effects and will already be dead before

fallout has an effect.

Estimates of Soviet injuries were generally

not included in the analyses. However, one

study suggested that injuries might be roughly

equal to fatalities under certain attack and exposure assumptions.

The First Few Hours

As chapter 11 I notes, Soviet civil defense can

have substantial impact on the full range of effects. Fallout shelters, blast shelters, and industrial hardening can reduce the overall damage from nuclear attack. First aid and civil

defense training can ameliorate health problems. Storing supplies in shelters lengthens

shelter stay time. Thus, the issue is how well

Soviet civil defense would in fact work. Many

unknowns— numbers of shelters, amount of

food and medicine stock piIes, small er

amounts of surplus resources than the United

States–prevent a judgment in detail. It seems

safe to assume, however, that Soviet civiI defense measures would be at least as effective

as U.S. measures and probably better.

Preattack preparations would have a decided influence on damage caused. Since a

U.S. retaliatory attack is by definition preceded by a Soviet first strike, it would seem

logical that some evacuation would have occurred. However, there are reasons why evacuation might not have taken place. These include the following Soviet concerns: an evacuation could increase the risk of a U.S. attack;

the U.S. attack might be so close at hand that

an evacuation couId increase casualties; a prolonged evacuation might be such an economic

disruption that it would be better to wait until

war appeared certain; or war through miscalculation. I n any event, a Soviet decision to

strike first would allow the Soviets to make

preparations—distribute supplies, improve

and stock shelters, increase production of

essential goods, harvest grain, protect Iivestock, conduct civil defense training, harden

industrial facilities, and so on. These actions

would also make Soviet citizens more responsive to civil defense instructions, especially to

a warning that an attack was underway. While

these actions would be observed by the United

States, they would be more ambiguous than an

evacuation, so the United States could see

them as safeguarding against an attack rather

than preparing for one.

The effects of evacuation in reducing casualties could be diluted to some extent by varying U.S. attack strategy. Spreading the attack

over a period of time could extend shelter periods, enhance economic disruption, and delay

rescue and emergency operations.

The Soviet Union, despite its vast geographical size, is vulnerable to an urban/industrial

attack in many of the same ways as the United

States. Although there has been extensive publicity on their reported dispersal of industry, indications are that population and industry are

becoming more and more concentrated. While

some industries may have been moved away

from cities, many others have been built near

cities. Indeed, some of the industries recently

built away from cities are themselves so concentrated that they form new targets of their

own. Hedrick Smith describes

the Kama River Truck Plant as an archetype of the gigantomania of Soviet planners,

as a symbol of the Soviet faith that bigger

means better and the Soviet determination to

have the biggest at any cost.

Kama is the kind of massive crash project

that appeals to Russians. It emanates brute

strength. In 1971, Soviet construction brigades

started from scratch to build the world’s

largest truck plant in the open, rolling, windswept plains about 600 miles east of Mos -

cow Kama was not just one factory but six,

all huge The production complex, costing

in the bilIions, occupies 23 square miles, an

area larger than the entire island of Manhat-
102 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

tan. At full capacity, Kama is slated to produce 150,000 heavy trucks and 250,000 diesel

engines a year, dwarfing anything in Detroit or

the German Ruhr.6

The attack could cause “derussification. ”

The U.S.S.R. is a nation of nationalities, of

which Great Russians — who dominate politics,

industry, and much else— comprise about 48.5

percent of the population. Most Great Russians live in cities, so an attack would reduce

their numbers and influence. Derussification

could weaken Great Russians’ control of the

U. S. S. R., with unforeseeable consequences.

Timing makes a critical difference in destruction. An attack at night would have people with their families and more dispersed;

they would seek shelter in apartment buildings. An attack during the day would strike

people at factories and offices; to the extent

they left to find family members, chaos would

result as in the United States, but to the extent

they sought shelter at work, they would be organized by economic task. Such organization

would be useful for postattack recovery.

An attack in winter would expose more people to bitter cold and impede evacuation; an

attack in spring or fall, when many roads are

made impassable by mud, would hinder evacuation by motor vehicle. An attack near harvest time could result in the loss of an entire

year’s crop, thus leaving food reserves at a low

point. This effect could be magnified if the

United States attacked agricultural targets,

such as storage silos, dams, and drainage facilities.

Even time of month makes a difference because of the Soviet practice of “storming.” The

Soviet factory month in practice divides into

three periods: “sleeping,” the first 10 days;

“hot” work, the second 10; and “feverish”

work, the third. This division occurs because

the economic plan calls for a specified output

from each plant by the end of the month, but

the inputs needed often arrive only after the

15th or 20th of the month. Thus, perhaps 80

‘Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Ballantine

Books, 1977), p. 241.

percent of a factory’s output is produced in

the last 10 or 15 days of the month. (This 80

percent is typically of such reduced quality

that Soviet consumers often refuse to buy merchandise made after the 20th of a month. ) Hypothetically, an attack around the 15th or 20th

of a month would cause the loss of most of a

month’s production, and would destroy the

large inventory in factories of partially completed goods and of inputs that cannot be used

until other inputs arrive.

On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. has several

strengths. Cities are in general less flammable

than U.S. cities, as there are more large apartment buildings and fewer wood frame houses.

These buildings would also provide better

shelter, especially those that have shelters

built in. People would expect to follow instructions and would be less likely to evacuate

spontaneously. The Party apparatus would

probably survive with a far lower casualty rate

than the population at large because it is well

distributed and because blast shelters have

been constructed for party members. Russians

are likely to be less traumatized by shelter conditions, as they are more accustomed to austerity and crowding. The nation is larger, which

in theory provides more land area over which

people could relocate, but much of the area is

mountain, desert, or arctic.

The First Few Days

Actions in this period would greatly affect

the number of casualties and the amount of

economic damage. Obviously, much damage

would have been caused in the first hour.

Many people trapped in the rubble could be

rescued, would be seriously injured but could

survive with medical care or first aid, would be

able to seek shelter or evacuate, could prepare

hasty fallout shelters, could improve existing

shelters, and so on. Some industries would be

damaged but not destroyed; if small fires were

extinguished, undamaged equipment hardened against blast, exposed equipment protected from rust, and so on, more resources

would be available for recovery. Likewise,

farms could harvest crops, shelter livestock,
Ch. IV—Three Attack Cases • 103

and protect harvested crops in the few days

before fallout deposition.

The issue is not what could be done but

what would be done. Proper use of time— organization and prioritization to get the most

important tasks done with the least wasted effort and resources —would be critical. The

Soviet system offers a major advantage in this

period. As we noted in the case of a counterforce attack, the Government’s role in this

crisis would be more clearly defined, and its

control over individual action and the economy would be much stronger than that of the

U.S. Government in a comparable situation. Its

experience with central planning and a command economy would be good preparation for

the actions needed —decisions involving large

shifts in behavior and resources, obeyed

without argument. Its decisions would save

some people and industries and condemn

others, but delay in order to make better decisions could easily condemn more. Evacuation

would have to be ordered in this period, or else

would-be evacuees would have to wait until

radiation had reached safe levels. For cities

damaged only slightly, evacuation would

prove difficult but not impossible. With many

rail yards and some key bridges out, it would

be difficult to get trains to smaller cities.

Destruction of petroleum refineries, some

petroleum storage capacity (especially that

located in rail marshaling yards that were attacked), and some electric power generators,

would further impede evacuation by train.

Fallout contours would be difficult to predict,

so it would be hard to select the best evacuation routes and relocation centers. An attack in

winter wouId add other problems.

Survivors in Soviet cities would face the

same severe problems as those in U.S. cities.

Many would be injured, trapped in rubble, irradiated with initial nuclear radiation, etc.

Many shelters would be destroyed or damaged. Power would be out, so water pressure

would be too low for fighting fires. Rubble

would impede rescue.

Undamaged areas, especially those not

threatened by heavy fallout, wouId face severe

burdens. They would receive many evacuees in

the first few days, would send rescue teams

and resources to devastated areas, and would

strive to produce as much as possible. Evacuees in undamaged areas would be pressed

into work in fields and factories, and would be

sheltered in public buildings or private homes.

The performance of undamaged areas would

thus largely determine the nation’s ability to

prosecute the war and to achieve economic

viability. The Government would, however,

face a dilemma in how to use resources surviving in undamaged areas: it could maximize

current production, leaving workers and resources vulnerable to further attacks, or it

could seek to protect workers and resources,

thus reducing current production. The specific

choices wouId depend on the likelihood of further attacks, criticality of various products,

and so forth, but the dilemma would stand.

An all-out attack would exacerbate the inefficiencies that Soviet industry has in peacetime. The Government would have to decide

what it needed to have produced, and whether

the factories existed to have them produced.

The Government would have far more difficulty correlating inputs and outputs and arranging for their transportation. It would have to

assign people to jobs, and arrange to transport,

shelter, and care for workers. Many workers

would be sick, in shelters, killed, traumatized,

or debilitated by radiation sickness. However,

the Government would probably be able to

control what movement of people did take

place. Even in peacetime, the Government has

very high control over mobility. People are not

in the habit of going anywhere without permission, and everyone’s actions must be justified

and accounted for. There is little independent

travel. The internal passport system strengthens these controls. I n wartime, the Government would presumably strengthen its control

of transportation. People would have nowhere

to go where they could be sure of shelter from

fallout unless the Government arranged their

transportation and shelter. This control would
104 “ The Effects of Nuclear War

help the Government maintain economic organization following attack.

The Shelter Period

By all reports, the Soviets are better prepared than Americans to spend extended periods of time in shelters. In their literature wellconceived protective structures are seen that

should afford good survivability. Life in

shelters and evacuation areas would in some

ways be similar to that described in earlier

cases. Actions taken before fallout deposition

would affect casualties. Public health, number

and quality of shelters, and amount of food

and medicine stockpiled are uncertainties.

Civil defense and first aid training would

mitigate deaths, but to an unpredictable extent. People in uncontaminated areas would

be best off, followed by those in fallout shelters in contaminated areas, those in secure

fallout shelters in blast areas, and those in

hasty shelters in contaminated areas.

One public health problem would be especially acute in this case. Antibiotics, which are

invaluable in fighting many diseases, are in

short supply in the U.S.S.R. even in peacetime.

Antibiotics have a short sheIf life and cannot

be frozen. Large doses of radiation destroy

most of the body’s antibodies, which fight diseases. Antibiotics are typically used to compensate for the drastic decrease in antibodies

in radiation victims, as it takes the body a long

time to rebuild its antibodies after large radiation doses. Because of the U.S.S.R. ’S limited

supply of antibiotics, many people could be

expected to die from diseases.

In areas contaminated by fallout but undamaged by blast, shelter life would be less intolerable. Utilities might be working, buildings

would be undamaged so would offer better

shelter, people would be uninjured, there

would be time to prepare and provision shelters, there would be less inclination to

evacuate, and there would be less pressure to

leave shelters prematurely.

Fallout deposition patterns would become

clear in this period, and would largely determine the damage to agriculture and which industries would need to remain closed. Harvesting crops uncontaminated by fallout would be

impeded by fuel shortages, but evacuees

would be plentiful and could harvest crops by

hand. Similarly, evacuees could work in surviving industries in uncontaminated areas.

The key issue that the Government would

face would be successful organization. Production would be far below prewar levels. It

would take some time before the Government

could take inventory, set priorities, arrange for

inputs of workers, resources, and power, and

transport the outputs. Most needs in this

period would be met from inventory. The Covernment would thus need to establish strict

controls over inventory; it could be necessary

to implement severe rationing of food, as was

done in Leningrad in World War 11.

Problems of organization would be especially critical in light of the intense struggle for

resources and the need to use resources as

widely as possible. The competition for petroleum, discussed previously in Case 2, would be

minimal compared to the competition here.

The military, agriculture, industry, transportation, and life support systems would all have

urgent claims on resources. Everything would

be in short supply; there would be hundreds of

bottlenecks instead of one. How would the

Government mediate among these claims?

There would be far less margin for error than in

peacetime, and a decision to use resources for

one purpose would almost automatically pre

elude other courses of action. Viability would

be at issue, and deaths would increase because

of delays in achieving it.

What sacrifices would the Government demand? Obviously, each critical sector would

be called on to make some, and consumer

goods would probably be sacrificed completeIy. Public health would be sacrificed to some

extent by starting production in contaminated

areas early and by giving people contaminated

food rather than nothing.

The Government would probably be able to

maintain control. Food rationing, control of

transportation and shelters, and internal
Ch. /V—Three Attack Cases ● 105

passports would help the Government restart

the economy. Its economic plans would be the

only alternative to chaos, and people would

expect to obey them and their demands even

without controls. Many party members would

survive. Contenders for resources wouId struggle inside the Government, but external

threats, the specter of chaos, the urgency of

decisions, and the recognized impossibility of

getting everything needed would dampen the

debate. All sectors would make sacrifices. The

military, for example, might be forced to

forego fuel-intensive training. In agriculture

and industry, manual labor—which would be

plentiful – would substitute for machinery.

People would use wood for fuel where possible; many would go cold. Coal-burning locomotives woud Iikely be taken from storage.

Decisions would be taken quickly and set rigidly, Productivity would decrease before it increased. The standard of living would be far

lower, and some would die in this period and

the next as a result. The question is— how

many?

Recuperation

Production– and with it, standard of living

and the number of people production could

support —would go down before it went up. Industries would use inventories of supplies for

production, then would have to close until supply could be reestablished. Transportation

wouId wind down as petroleum refining was

cut off, and petroleum supplies became exhausted or requisitioned by the military. People would be diverted from production by being sick or injured, caring for the sick or injured, or being drafted for military service.

What production took place would be far less

efficient. Many workers would be debilitated

by minor cases of radiation sickness, other illness, malnutrition, psychological shock, and so

on. Many would be called on to do tasks for

which they lacked the training or the physical

strength. Factories would be damaged or could

not obtain necessary parts, so industrial processes would have to substitute labor for capital

or use shortcuts that would reduce the quality

of the product or the efficiency of the process.

If things went well, production would stabilize at a level that made good use of surviving resources, and would recover from there.

The Government would increase its control

over people and the economy, production of

consumer goods wouId be delayed, many resources would flow to the military, public

health would be lower, but sacrifices would

pay off. Soviet engineers and plant managers

reputedly are skiIIful at improvising solutions

to mechanical problems. Such skills, Government organization and control, and brute

force could overcome bottlenecks, use production to expand capacity, and give people

austere but adequate food, housing, medical

care, and other necessities.

The recovery could go poorly, however. A

great many people could require medical care

that could not be provided, and would die. The

harvest could be lost, and more would die.

Starving people would find and eat grain to be

planted next year, reducing that crop and causing others to starve. Transportation could collapse, preventing factories from obtaining inputs and making it impossible for their products to be distributed, forcing them to close.

Hardening might save key machine tools, but

these tools might be buried under tons of rubble or be in intensely radioactive areas, pre

eluding their use. The Government might be

unable to conduct a detailed resource inventory that could integrate these tools into the

economy, or there might be no way of transporting them to a factory that could use them.

A war or threat of war, from NATO, China, or

both, might divert surviving industry and materials into producing for the war effort and

away from the economy. Which way the economy would go is unpredictable, for there are

far too many unknowns. But should economic

productivity fall precipitously, for whatever

reason, the economy couId support fewer people, and more would die. Indeed a failure to

achieve viability could cause as many Soviet

deaths as the attack itself.

I n summary, the effects of a large-scale nuclear attack against Soviet military and urbanindustrial targets wouId remove that nation

from a position of power and influence for the
106 Ž The Effects of Nuclear War

remainder of this century. Soviet fatalities, due ing industry would be less severely damaged

to asymmetries in weapons yields and popula- than their U.S. counterparts. Nor is there any

tion densities, would be lower than those for evidence that the Soviets face a lower risk of

the United States. However, there is no evi- finding themselves unable to rebuild an indusdence that the Soviet economy and its support- trial society at all.
Chapter V

OTHER LONG-TERM EFFECTS

.
Chapter V.—OTHER LONG-TERM EFFECTS

TABLES

Page

12. Assumed Effects of Radiation Exposures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

13. Assumed Sources of Cancer Deaths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

14, Long-Term Radiation Effects From Nuclear Attacks . . . . . . . 113
Chapter V

OTHER LONG-TERM EFFECTS

The preceding chapter has made it clear that even the immediate effects of a

nuclear attack would have a long-term impact. Structures and resources that would

be destroyed in seconds (by blast) or hours (by fire) might not be rebuilt or replaced

for years, or even decades. People who would die in seconds or in weeks (from fallout

radiation) might not be repiaced in a demographic sense for several generations. PoIitical social, and economic changes arising from the immediate postattack disruption would probably prove in some significant respects to be irreversible.

There is another category of effects of nuclear war, however, which are “long

term” in the sense that they would probably not be noticeable for some months, or

even years, after the attack took place. Such effects include long-term somatic and

genetic damage from radiation, possible changes in the physical environment (including the possibility of damage to the ozone layer of the upper atmosphere), and

possible changes in the ecological system of which humans area part. These are effects that conventional weapons cannot produce. They are discussed under three

rubrics:

●

●

A

Effects from low-level ionizing radiation,

which are reasonably certain to take

place, whose magnitude would depend on

the scope of the attack, and which can to

some extent be calculated on the basis of

existing data and theory.

Damage to the ozone layer in the at- ●

mosphere. Such damage could injure

human and animal health, and possibly

lead to changes in the Earth’s climate. At

the present time it is not known how to

calculate the Iikelihood of its occurrence,

but ongoing research into the chemistry of

the upper atmosphere offers promise of

greater understanding in the future.

Other effects whose magnitude and likelihood are incalculable, but whose possibility should not be ignored.

CALCULABLE EFFECTS: IONIZING RADIATION

large body of scientific literature addresses itself to the issue of long-term effects

from low levels of ionizing radiation, There has

been an intensive study over the years of the

health of the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and of some of those who were subjected

to radioactive fallout as a result of nuclear

weapons testing. There has been considerable

research into the question of how large a quantity of radioactive particles of various kinds

are produced by nuclear weapon explosions.

There is a body of theory regarding the effects

of ionizing radiation on the human body. But

there are also formidable uncertainties. New

information is coming to Iight regarding some

of the effects of past weapons testing, and

there are unresolved scientific controversies

over matters as basic as whether a small dose

of radiation does more damage to the human

body (or, from a statistical point of view, is

more likely to do a given amount of damage to

a human body) if it is absorbed during a brief

period of time than if it is absorbed over a

longer period. There are pertinent questions

whose answers are only known to within a factor of 10.

Previous chapters have discussed the effects

of very intensive ionizing radiation: 1,000 reins

will almost certainly be lethal if absorbed

109
110 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

within a matter of days; 450 reins will kill 50

percent of a healthy adult population, and a

slightly higher percentage of the young, the

old, and those without adequate medical care;

250 reins will cause acute radiation sickness,

from which “recovery” is probable; and even

lower doses may lower the body’s resistance to

infectious diseases of various kinds. It is

generally assumed that because of the rate at

which fallout radiation decays, doses of this

magnitude are likely to be received during the

first so days after an attack if they are received

at all. The preceding chapter, and appendix D,

include calculations on the numbers of people

who might die from radiation effects during

the first 30 days after various kinds of nuclear

attack.

However, doses of ionizing radiation that

are too small or too slowly accumulated to

produce prompt death or radiation sickness

nevertheless have harmful effects in the long

run. These effects can only be discussed statistically, for it appears that if a large population

is exposed to a given (small) dose of radiation,

some will suffer harmful effects while others

will not. The larger the dose, the greater the

percentage of the population that is harmed,

and the greater the risk to any one individual.

There are a number of ways in which a nuclear attack would lead to radiation exposures

which, although too low to cause death within

the first 30 days, nevertheless pose an appreciable long-term hazard:

● Prompt radiation from the nuclear explosions could inflict sublethal doses on

some survivors, especially if the weapons

are small ones. Most of the radiation absorbed by survivors of the Hiroshima and

Nagasaki attack was direct radiation. A

substantial number of U.S. weapons have

yields in the tens of kilotons, and might inflict radiation on people far enough away

from the explosion to survive the blast effects. Few Soviet weapons are of such low

yields and high-yield weapons are expected to kill those within radiation range

by blast. A terrorist weapon would almost

certainly inflict direct radiation on sur-

●

●

●

●

—

vivors. There is a particular area of uncertainty regarding the effects on humans of

low levels of neutron radiation.

Local fallout will inflict small doses of

radiation on people who are on the fringe

of “fallout zones, ” or on people who are

in fallout shelters in zones of heavier fallout. It is important to realize that even the

best fallout shelters attenuate fallout

rather than block it completely, and the

whole theory of fallout shelters is to see to

it that people who would, if unsheltered,

receive a lethal dose would instead receive a sublethal dose. However, this sublethal dose will produce harmful longterm effects for some percentage of those

exposed.

After a period of time, local fallout radiation levels decay to the point where the

area would be considered “safe,” and survivors in fallout shelters would emerge.

Nevertheless, low levels of radiation

would persist for some time— indeed, low

levels of radiation have persisted for years

at some sites of nuclear weapons tests.

The question of safety here is a relative

one. By the standards of peacetime, many

such areas would be considered unsafe,

because living in them would expose a

population to a significant risk of longterm hazards— cancer, genetic damage,

etc. However, in the aftermath of a nucle

ar attack, there may be few habitable

areas that do not have a measurable

(though low) level of additional radiation,

and the survivors wouId simply have to accept the hazards.

Some fallout is deposited in the troposphere, and then is brought down to Earth

(largely by rain) over a period of weeks.

Such fallout reaches areas quite far from

the blast. While the doses inflicted would

be relatively small, they would add to the

risk.

Some fallout is deposited in the stratosphere. It returns to Earth over a period of

years (through the effects of gravity), and

consequently only very long-lived radioactive isotopes pose a significant hazard.

If the attacks are confined to the territory
Ch. V—Other Long-Term Effects Ž711

of the United States and the Soviet Union

(and, for that matter, to Europe and China

as well), then stratospheric fallout will be

confined mostly to the Northern Hemisphere, and the region between 300 and

600 north latitude will receive the bulk of

it.

In quantifying the radiation dose received

by individuals, radiation from external and internal (ingested) sources must be distinguished.

External radiation passes through the skin. lngested radioactivity derives its effects from

particular radioactive isotopes becoming concentrated in specific organs. For example,

radioactive iodine (l-1 31), which may enter the

body through breathing, eating, and drinking,

is concentrated in the thyroid, and radioactive

strontium (Sr 89 and Sr 90) is concentrated in

bone.

An OTA contractor performed a series of

calculations to estimate the magnitude of the

long-term health hazards that would be created by the long-term, low-level radiation that

each of the OTA cases might produce. The

basic method was to calculate the total

amount of radiation that all the survivors of

each hypothetical nuclear attack might absorb

during the 40 years following the attack, and

then calculate the numbers of adverse health

effects that this much radiation could be expected to produce. (Tables 12 and 13 present

the risk factors used for these calculations.)

The difficulties in such a procedure are formidable, and precise results are manifestly impossible to obtain.

The major uncertainties, which result in a

wide range of answers, are the following:

●

●

●

All of the uncertainties discussed in previous chapters about the size and nature

of the attack, and the distribution of the

population.

How much of the population benefits

from what degree of fallout sheltering? It

has been noted that there is no necessary

relation between civil defense plans and

actual shelter received.

How many people die in the immediate

aftermath of the attack?

●

●

Does radiation that is part of a low exposure or a very slow exposure do as

much damage per rem absorbed as radiation received as part of a high and rapid

exposure? One theory holds that, given

time, the body can repair the damage

done by radiation, and that hence the

same dose spread over years does less

damage than it would if received within a

few days. Another theory is that radiation

damages the body in ways that are essentially irreparable. The contractor calculated the effects both ways (DEF = 1

and DEF = 0.2), which accounts for some

of the range in the answers.

IS there a threshold dose below which

radiation exposure does no harm at all? If

there is, then the methodology used produces somewhat exaggerated results,
112 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

●

●

since it attributes damage to radiation absorbed by people whose total dose is below the threshold.

How to deal with the distribution of ages

of the population at the time of the attack, since susceptibility to cancer, etc.,

from causes other than radiation varies

with age.

How great are the genetic effects from a

given level of radiation? Extensive experimental results permit an approximate calculation of the number of mutations that

would be produced, although one source

notes that the doubling dose for genetic

disorders might be anywhere from 20 to

200 reins. However, it is far more difficult

to predict exactly how these mutations

would manifest themselves in future generations.

The results of these calculations are summarized in table 14. [The full report of the contractor is available separately. ) The ranges result from the uncertainties noted above, and it

is expected that the “actual” results if a war

took place would be some distance from either

extreme. It is observed that:

● Cancer deaths in the m i I I ions couId be expected during the 40 years following a

large nuclear attack, even if that attack

avoided targets in population centers.

These millions of deaths would, however,

be far less than the immediate deaths

●

●

caused by a large attack on a full range of

targets.

A large nuclear war could cause deaths in

the low millions outside the combatant

countries, although this would represent

only a modest increase in the peacetime

cancer death rate.

These results might not apply if an attacker set out deliberately to create very

high radiation levels.

Just as this study was going to press, the

results of the new report of the Committee on

the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations

(“BEIR II”) of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) became available. (The full report,

entitled “The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiations,” will

be published by NAS during the second half of

1979. ) In general, the new report suggests a

slightly narrower range of uncertainty than the

OTA calculations, but generally confirms their

assumptions. OTA used assumptions of cancer

deaths per million person-reins which appear

to be about 10 percent higher at the high end

of the range and about 40 percent lower at the

low end of the range than the findings of the

new BEIR report. OTA calculated genetic effects on the basis of a doubling dose of 20 to

200 reins, compared with a range of 50 to 250

reins suggested by the new BE I R report, which

may mean that the OTA estimates are too high

at the high end of the range. The new BEIR

report also notes that the incidence of radiation-induced cancer would be higher for

women than for men.

EFFECTS ON THE OZONE LAYER

Large nuclear explosions would, among

other things, inject a variety of particles into

the upper atmosphere. In recent years, considerable attention has focused on the possibility

that the injection of a substantial quantity of

nitrogen oxide (NOX

) into the stratosphere by a

large number of high-yield nuclear weapons

might cause a depletion or thinning of the

ozone layer. Such a depletion might produce

changes in the Earth’s climate, and would

allow more ultraviolet radiation from the Sun

through the atmosphere to the surface of the

Earth, where it could produce dangerous burns

and a variety of potentially dangerous ecological effects.

As of 1975, a report by the National Academy of Sciences (discussed more fully below)
Ch. V—Other Long-Term Effects •113

Table 14.–Long-Term Radiation Effects From Nuclear Attacksa

fallout sheltering treated parametrically

Somatic effects PF* = 5 PF* = 10

Cancer

deaths 2,000.000-5.500,000 1,000,000-3,000>000

Thyroid

cancers about 2,000,000 about 1,000,000

Thryold

nodules about 2,500,000 about 1,500,000

Genetic effects

AbortIons due to chromosomal

damage 250,000-2,500,000 150,000-1,500,000

Other genetic

effects 900,000-9,000,000 500,000-5,000,000

Estimated effects outside he United States from this attack

Somatic effects

Cancer deaths

Thyroid cancers

Thyroid nodules

Genetic effects

AbortIons due to chromosomal damage

Other genetic ffects

PF* =40

300,000-1 ,000! 000

about 300,000

about 500,000

50,000-500,000

150,000-1,500,000

8,000-80,000

about 30,000

about 50,000

4,000- 40,000

13,000-130,000

of air bursts and surface bursts was assumed, and the ranges include variations

fallout protection

Somatic effects

Cancer deaths 1,200,000-9,300,000

Thyroid cancer s about 5,500,000

Thyroid nodules 7,700,000-8,400,000

Genetic effects

Abortins due to chromosomal damage 320,000-8,000,000

Other genetic effects 1,000,000-12,500,000
774 ● The Effects of Nuc/ear War

called attention to this danger as a serious one,

estimating that a 30- to 70-percent reduction in

the ozone column was a possibility.

Since that time, however, there have been

two changes which bear on the question of the

degree of risk of ozone depletion:

1. Further research into the chemistry of the

upper atmosphere has modified the model calculations used in 1975. The results of

past nuclear tests do not, however, provide data adequate for the complete validation of any chemistry model. There are

also indications that the chemistry concerned is much more complex than was

formerly believed. The state of knowledge

in early 1979 is roughly this: injections of

NO. could deplete the ozone layer if they

occur at very high altitudes (80,000 ft [24

km] and upwards), which would result

from very high-yield explosions (i.e., sub2

stantially more than 1 Mt) in large numbers (1 ,000 or more), or possibly from highaltitude explosions. Otherwise, ozone depletion is not believed to be likely. However, further changes in the theory of what

would happen are Iikely in the future.

The development of MIRVs has reduced

the number-of very high-yield warheads in

the arsenals of the superpowers, as they

are replaced by multiple weapons of

lower yield.

These changes cast doubt on the likelihood

of serious ozone depletion as a consequence

of nuclear war. However, they by no means

demonstrate that ozone depletion is impossible, and even slight depletion could cause an

increase in the incidence of skin cancer.

This is an area where research continues,

and further changes should not be surprising.

INCALCULABLE EFFECTS

In 1975, the National Academy of Sciences

published a report, Long-Term Worldwide Effects of Mu/tip/e Nuclear-Weapons Detonations, which addressed the question of whether

a large-scale nuclear war would be Iikely to

produce significant, irreversible effects on the

world environment.

This document may be summarized as follows:

●

●

●

It is possible that a large nuclear war

would produce irreversible adverse effects on the environment and the ecological system.

In particular, it would not require very

large changes to greatly diminish the production of food. The report notes that it

would be difficult to adapt to such

changes in view of the likelihood that

much of the world’s expertise in agricultural technology might perish in the war.

The physical and biological processes involved are not understood well enough to

say just how such irreversible damage, if it

occurred, would take place.
—-.——.-—. — .-

. Therefore, it is not possible to estimate

the probability or the probable magnitude

of such damage.

With the exception of the discussion of

possible damage to the ozone layer, where

there has been some advance in knowledge

since 1975, these conclusions still hold in 1979.

Moreover, there are at least two other respects in which there are hazards whose magnitude cannot be calculated. It is certain that

the radiation derived from a nuclear war

would cause mutations in surviving plants and

animals; it is possible that some of these mutaFINDINGS

The calculations for long-term radiation

hazards, with all their uncertainties, permit an

order-of-magnitude conclusion: ●

There would be a substantial number of

deaths and illness due to radiation among

those who were lucky enough to escape a

much greater than what is considered tolerable today.

The number of deaths would be rather

small compared to the number of deaths

resulting from the immediate effects of

the attack — millions compared to tens or

hundreds of millions.

lethal dose during the first weeks after the I n contrast, the incalculable effects of damattack. age to the Earth’s ecological system might be

on the same order of magnitude as the immediThe number of deaths would be very large ate effects, but it is not known how to calcuby peacetime standards, and the hazards late or even estimate their likelihood.
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A–LETTER OF REQUEST

COMMllTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

W ASHINGTON , D.C. 20510

September 8, 1978

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy

Chairman, Technology Assessment Board

Office of Technology Assessment

United States Congress

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Several years ago, a study conducted under the auspices

of the Office of Technology Assessment at the requestof t

Committee on Foreign Relations provided guidance which led

to substantially improved analyses by the Department of

Defense of the effects of limited nuclear war.

The resulting study was released by the Committee and

has become an invaluable aid in the study of nuclear conflict. However, the OTA panel, under the chairmanship of

Dr. Jerome M. Wiesner, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which was convened to oversee the study,

went on to point out the need for a more thorough and comprehensive study of the effects of nuclear warfare and

recommended that such a study be undertaken.

On behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, we are

writing to request that the Office of Technology Assessment

organize and conduct such a study on the effects of nuclear

warfare, which would put what have been abstract measures of

strategic power into more comprehensible terms. The study

should concentrate on the impact which various levels of

attack would have on the populations and economies of the

United States and the Soviet Union. In the case of larger

levels of attack, the study should address impact upon other

nations. The earlier Department of Defense analyses concentrated upon short-term effects. In this more comprehensive

study, intermediate and long-term, direct and indirect effects

should be addressed as well. In the original study, the panel

cited in its appendix a list of effects which should be detailed in a comprehensive and systematic way. The list is

attached.

119
120 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

- 2 -

We believe that this study would be valuable to the

Commit tee, and to the Congress and the general public.

It would become a basic reference work in this area of

inquiry. We hope that the Office of Technology Assessment will be able to embark upon this project promptly,

so that a finished product can be provided the Committee at the outset of the new Congress to assist the

Committee in its oversight of strategic arms limitation

issues. The earlier effort was conducted with the full

support of the executive branch. We stand ready again

to seek the assistance of appropriate government agencies

in carrying out the necessary supporting work.

Ranking Member

Sincerely,

Chairman

Attachment
Appendix A—Letter of Request ● 121

1975 OTA Panel’s List of Damage Effects Requiring Examination

1. Damage effects should be detailed in a comprehensive and systematic

way. At a minimum, each case examined should include the following

information:

a. Fatalities and injuries resulting from:

-Direct and indirect blast effects;

-Indirect effects resulting from fires, disruption of transportation, communications, medical facilities, etc.;

-Acute radiation deaths from fallout;

-Cancers, genetic defects, life shortening and other direct

effects of radiation exposure resulting from: external exposure~

inhalation of radioactive particles, ingestion of material from

the food chain or the water supplies;

-Infections and diseases aggravated by the loss of resistance

resulting from exposure to radiation.

Analysis of exposure should include both people exposed initially and people who have been sent to the area to assist in

recovery. There should also be a discussion of world-wide effects

with particular attention paid to Canada because of that nation’s

proximity to many U.S. targets which may be of strategic interest.

b. The average integrated REM per survivor from all sources

(prompt and fallout) should be indicated along with the geographic

distribution of these dosages and a discussion of the disabilities

resulting from each exposure level.

co A detailed analysis should be made” of the impact of the attacks

on the local areas most heavily affected. The discussion should include a discussion of the feasibility of restoring the area to a

viable economy, the land lost to agriculture, manufacturing assets

lost, skilled manpower lost, and the impact on local ecologies

(permanent altering of watersheds, pollution of streams and rivers

with radioactivity, bursting of dams, etc.) . The effect of these

local losses and problems on the national economy and environment

should also be indicated.

d. An attempt should be made to indicate the magnitude of the

effort which would be required to clean up the contaminated area

and restore it to its pre-attack condition. It should be possible

to draw on the experience which we have had in attempting to

restore the Bikini and Eniwetok atolls.

2. An attempt should be made to determine the amount of radioactive

material which would be released by U.S. sites damaged by the

effects of the enemy attack. Such material might be found in power

or research reactors, nuclear material reprocessing facilities,

waste disposal areas for radioactive materials, military installations where some nuclear weapons are not in hardened storage areas,

weapons carried by aircraft which are on the bases attacked, and

possibly on the ICBM’s which may be destroyed in their silos. The

added fallout from these sources should be included in the assessment of overall radiation exposure.
APPENDIX B—STRATEGIC FORCES ASSUMED

The strategic forces assumed to be available

for an early to mid-1980’s conflict between the

United States and the Soviet Union are derived

from open-source estimates of weapons characteristics and force levels. Generally, the

forces are assumed to be within SALT I I established limits and assume the completion of

ongoing intercontinental ballistic missile

(ICBM) modernization programs of both superpowers. For the United States this means that

yield and accuracy improvements for the

MM I I I force are carried out. On the Soviet

side, it means completing the deployment of

their fourth-generation ICBMS, the SS-17,

SS-18, and SS-19.

A recent study conducted by the Congressional Budget Office, entitled, “Counterforce

Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, ”

provided table B-1, which shows Soviet forces

and their capabilities for the early to mid1980’s.

Western estimates differ as to the exact attributes and capabilities of Soviet strategic

systems, As a result some of the assumptions

used in the studies drawn on for this report are

mutually inconsistent. This wouId be an important factor in an analysis of relative U.S. and

Soviet military effectiveness, where the outcomes of a study would be very sensitive to the

exact technical data used. In a study of the impacts of nuclear war on civilian population,

however, a slight difference in the estimated

yield or accuracy of a Soviet weapon will have

no corresponding effect on the computation of

the consequences of a given attack, relative to

the degree of uncertainty that already exists in

the prediction of those consequences.

U.S. estimates, on the other hand, are not

subject to such great uncertainties. The Congressional Budget Office summary of U.S.

forces is shown in table B-2.

It is useful to bear in mind that Soviet ICBM

warheads are much higher in yield than their

U.S. counterparts. While this has only a marginal impact on relative capabilities to destroy

civil ian targets on purpose, it means that

Soviet attacks on U.S. targets will produce

much more collateral damage (i.e. population

casualties from attacks on economic targets,

or economic and population damage from attacks on military targets) than will U.S. attacks

on Soviet targets.

Table B-1 .–Estimated Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1985

Warheads per Equivalent

Total SLBMs .

Bear. ., ., .,

Bison ...

(Backfire). ., .,

Total bombers ., .

Grand tota l

600

300

900

100

(250)

140

(390)

2,438

(2,688)

1 600

3 900

1,500

1 100

(2) (500)

. —

140

(640)

8,294

(8,794)

1.0 600

0.2 180

780

20 2,000

200

(0.2) (loo)

2,200

(2,300)

10,111

(10,211)

600

306

906

740

116

(170)

856

(1,026)

8,622

(8,792)

1 2 2
Appendix B—Strategic Forces Assumed ● 123

Table B-2.–Estimated U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1985

(Mid-1980’s force)

Warheads per Equivalent

Launcher Number launcher Total warheads Yield in megatons Total megatons megatons

Total ICBMs . 1,054

Poseidon ., 336

Poseidon C- 4 160

Trident I ., 240

Total SLBMs ., 736

B-52 G/H . , 165

B-52CM ., 165

FB-111, ., ., 60

Total bomber s 390

1 450 1,0 450,0

3 1,650 0.17 280.5

3) (1 ,650) (0.35) (572.5)

1 54 9.0 486,0

2,154 1,216.5

(1 ,508,5)

o 3,360 0.04 134

8 1,280 0.10

8 1,920 0.10

128

192

454

198

660

660

24

120

450

512

(825)

232

1,194

1 ,507)

403

282

422

1,107

337

660

1,122

41

120

1,662 2,280
APPENDIX C—CHARLOTTESVILLE:

A FICTIONAL ACCOUNT BY NAN RANDALL

/n an effort to provide a more concrete understanding of the situation

which survivors of a nuclear war would face, OTA commissioned the following

work of fiction. It presents one among many possibilities, and in particular it

does not consider the situation if martial law were imposed or if the social fabric

disintegrated into anarchy. It does provide detail which adds a dimension to the

more abstract ana/ysis presented in the body of the report.

At first, it seemed Iike a miracle. No fireball

had seared the city, no blast wave had crumbled buildings and buried the inhabitants, no

dark mushroom cloud had spread over the sky.

Much of the country had been devastated by

massive nuclear attack, but the small, gracious

city of Charlottesville, Va., had escaped

unharmed.

* * *

The nuclear attack on the Nation did not

come as a complete surprise. For some weeks,

there had been a mounting anxiety as the

media reported deteriorating relations between the superpowers. The threat of possible

nuclear war hung heavy in the world’s consciousness. As evidence reached the U.S. President’s desk that a sizable number of Americans were deserting the major cities for what

they perceived to be safety in the rural areas,

he considered ordering a general evacuation.

But, with the concurrence of his advisors, he

decided that an evacuation call from the

Federal Government would be premature, and

possibly provocative. There was no hard

evidence that the Soviets were evacuating and

there was a good chance that the crisis would

pass.

Spontaneous evacuation, without official

sanction or direction, grew and spread. A week

before the attack, Charlottesville had no free

hotel or motel rooms. A few evacuees found

lodgings with private families, at great expense, but most were forced to camp by their

cars in their traiIers next to the fast-food chains

124

on Route 29. The governing bodies of Charlottesville and surrounding Albemarle County

were rumored to be concerned about the drain

on the area resources, without really having

any way of turning back newcomers. “If this

keeps up, ” remarked a member of the Al bemarle Board of Supervisors, “we’re going to be

overrun without any war. ”

A few of the students at the University of

Virginia left Charlottesville to join their

families. But the majority of the students

stayed, believing that they could go home easily if it were necessary.

Refugees came from Washington, 130 miles

to the north, and they came from Richmond,

70 miles to the east. A few of the hardier types

continued on into the mountains and caverns

near Skyline Drive; the majority sought the

reassurances of civilization that the small city

could provide.

The population of Charlottesville normally

stood a little above 40,000, while Albemarle

County which surrounds the city like a donut

boasted an additional 40,000 to 50,000. With

the arrival of the city evacuees, the combined

population was well over 120,000.

In the week before the nuclear attack, much

of the population familiarized itself with the

location of fallout shelters. Little hoarding

took place as retailers limited sales of food

and other necessities. Transistor radios accompanied both adults and children when they

were away from home. However, most of the

residents of CharlottesviIIe continued to Iive as
Appendix C—Charlottesville: A Fictional Account by Nan Randall ● 125

they always had, although they were particularly alert for sirens or bulletin broadcasts on

the radio. Many children stayed out of school.

* * *

At the sound of the sirens and the emergency radio alerts, most of Charlottesville and Albemarle County hurried to shelter. Fortunate

Iy, Charlottesville had a surplus of shelter

space for its own population, though the refugees easily took up the slack. Many headed for

the University grounds and the basements of

the old neoclassical buildings designed by

Thomas Jefferson; others headed downtown

for the office building parking garages. Carrying a few personal effects, blankets, cans and

bottles of food, and transistor radios, they converged in a quiet if unordered mass, For most

people, the obvious emotional crises —grief at

leaving behind a pet, anxiety at being unable

to locate a family member or relative—were

suppressed by the overwhelming fear of the

impending attack.

Some residents chose not to join the group

shelters. Many suburbanites had ample, sturdy

basements and food stocks. They preferred not

to crowd themselves. In the event, those who

had taken the precaution of piling dirt against

the windows and doors of their basements

found that they provided adequate shelter.

Among the rural poor, there was a reluctance

to desert the small farms that represented the

sum of their Iife’s work. They wondered whether, if they left, they would return to find their

means of livelihood gone. Further, many lived

far from an adequate public shelter. So they

stayed.

* * *

Most did not see the attacks on Richmond

and on Washington as they huddled in their

shelters. But the sky to the east and north of

Charlottesville glowed brilliant in the noonday

sun. At first no one knew how extensive the

damage was.

Communication nationwide was interrupted

as the Earth’s atmosphere shivered with the

assault of the explosions. Each town, city,

village, or farm was an island, forced to suffer

its selected fate of death or salvation alone.

(Some time later it was learned that more than

4,000 megatons (Mt) had destroyed military

and industrial targets, killing close to 100

million people in the United States. The U.S.

counterattack on the Soviet Union had had a

similar, devastating effect. Destruction ranged

from the large industrial centers on the coasts

and Great Lakes to small farming communities

that had the misfortune to be close to the great

missile silos and military bases. )

Areas of the country such as the northeast

corridor were reduced to a swath of burning

rubble from north of Boston to south of Norfolk. Still, there were some sections of the Nation that were spared the direct effects of blast

and fire. Inland in Virginia, only the town of

Radford, west of Roanoke, received a direct

hit. The farming and orchard land of the rural

counties were not targets.

Charlottesville, the small but elegant center

of learning, culture, and trade in central Virginia, was not hit either. This monument to the

mind and manner of Jefferson retained its

status as a kind of genteel sanctuary, momentarily immune to the disaster that had leveled

the cities of the Nation.

* * *

An hour after nothing fell on Charlottesville,

rescue squads and police were dispatched to

scour the countryside for stragglers to get

them to shelters. Because, even if the population was safe from the direct effects of the

nuclear warheads, another danger was imminent. Fallout, the deadly cloud of radioactive

particles sucked up by the nuclear fireballs,

could easily blanket the town of Charlottesville in a matter of hours. And no one could

predict how much, and where it would go. Fallout could poison many of those idyllic rural

towns and villages that seemed light-years

away from the problems of international

power and politics. While a few places, such as

Roseberg, Ore., would receive no fallout at all,

the rest of the Nation would have to constantly

monitor to know the level of radiation and

where it was located. Fortunately for Charlottesville, the University and the hospitals had
126 Ž The Effects of Nuclear War

sophisticated radiological monitoring equipment, and the training to use it. Many other

towns were not so lucky.

Two and one-half hours after the warnings

had sounded, the nuclear engineering staff

from the University picked up the first fallout.

Starting at a moderate level of about 40 reins

an hour — a cumulative dose of 450 reins received in a l-week period would be fatal to

one-half of those exposed —the intensity rose

to 50 reins before starting the decline to a level

of about four-tenths of a rem an hour after 2

weeks. (The total dose in the first 4 days was

2,000 reins, which killed those who refused to

believe shelter was necessary, and increased

the risk of eventually dying of cancer for those

who were properly sheltered. ) For the immediate period, it was essential to stay as protected

as possible.

For several days, Charlottesville remained

immobile, suspended in time. It was unclear

just what had happened or would happen. The

President had been able to deliver a message

of encouragement, which was carried by those

emergency radio stations that could broadcast. As the atmosphere had cleared, radio station WCHV was able to transmit sporadically

on its backup transmitter and emergency generator in the basement. However, the message

from the President posed more questions than

it answered — the damage assessment was incomplete. Nevertheless, he said that there was

a tentative cease-fire.

In the first days of sheltering, only those

with some particular expertise had much to do.

Nuclear engineers and technicians from the

University were able to monitor radiation in

the shelters they occupied, and CB radios

broadcast results to other shelters. The doctors

were busy attempting to treat physical and

psychological ailments — the symptoms of

radiation sickness, flu, and acute anxiety being

unnervingly similar — while the police and government officials attempted to keep order. The

rest waited.

For the time being, the food stocks brought

to the shelter were adequate if not appetizing.

The only problem was the water supply which,

though it kept running because of its gravity

system, was contaminated with lodine 131. Potassium iodide pills, which were available in

some shelters, provided protection; elsewhere

people drank bottled water, or as little water

as possible.

Not all of the shelters had enough food and

other necessities. Most shelters had no toilets.

The use of trash cans for human waste was an

imperfect system, and several days into the

shelter period, the atmosphere was often oppressive. As many suffered from diarrhea –the

result either of anxiety, flu, or radiation sickness — the lack of toilet facilities was especially cliff i cult.

Shelter life was bearable in the beginning.

Communications by CB radio allowed some

shelters to communicate with one another, to

locate missing family members and friends. A

genuine altruism or community spirit of cooperation was present in almost all the shelters —

though some of them were fairly primitive.

Even those refugees who were crowded into

halls and basements with the local residents

were welcomed. Parents watched out for one

another’s children or shared scarce baby food.

Most people willingly accepted direction from

whomever took charge. Among the majority of

the shelter residents, the out-of-town refugees

being an exception, there was a sense of relief,

a sense that they had been among the lucky

ones of this world. They had survived.

Within a few days, the emergency radio was

able to broadcast quite regularly. (As the

ionosphere does not clear all at once, occasional interruptions were expected. ) The station had had no protection from the electromagnetic pulse that can travel down the antenna and shatter the inner workings of electronic

equipment during a nuclear explosion. However, by detaching the back-up transmitter at

the sound of the warning, the station engineer

had protected equipment. Intermittent communications from Emergency Operations Centers got through to Charlottesville officials,

though the main communications center at

Olney, Md., was silent. Telephone switching facilities were almost entirely out, although the
Appendix C—Charlottesville: A Fictional Account by Nan Randall ● 127

small, independent phone company could expect to be operational fairly quickly. The complex, coast-to-coast trunk lines of Ma Bell

might take a year or more to reconnect.

Lifeline of the sheltered community was the

CB radio. Rural Virginians had been CB fans

long before it became a national craze, and

they put their equipment to imaginative use.

Prodded by anxious refugees, as well as by

local residents who had relatives and friends in

other parts of the world, CBers tried to set up a

relay system on the lines of an electronic pony

express. Though less than perfect, the CB relay

was able to bring Iimited news from outside,

most of that news being acutely distressing.

From the limited reports, it was clear that there

was Iittle left in the coastal cities; those who

had abandoned family or friends to come to

Charlottesville understood that probably they

wouId never see them again.

The first surge of grief swept over the refugees and those Charlottesville residents who

were affected. In time, the sorrow of loss

would affect almost everyone. Although they

had survived themselves, still they had lost.

* * *

Three days after the attacks, the next large

influx of refugees poured into Charlottesville,

many of them suffering with the early symptoms of radiation sickness. They had been

caught poorly sheltered or too close to the

nuclear targets themselves. A few showed the

effects of blast and fire, bringing home to

Charlottesville the tangible evidence of the

war’s destruction. Some refugees had driven,

while others had hitchhiked or even walked to

reach what they hoped was safety and medical

help. On the way, many were forced to abandon those who were too weak to continue.

The hospitals were completely overwhelmed. Up to now, the hospitals had managed to treat the ill with some modicum of

order. The hospitals themselves were fallout

shelters of a kind; patients’ beds had been

moved to interior corridors for fallout protection; emergency surgery was feasible with the

emergency generators, hospital staff slept in

the most protected areas. Some borderline

cases in intensive care were released to

nature’s devices while any elective medical

procedures were eliminated, Still, hospitals

were able to cope, even with the increasing

number of common ailments caused by the

shelter crowding.

Suddenly, this changed. Fallout levels were

too high for anyone to be out in the open for

any length of time, but the people came anyway. The carefully laid plans of the University

of Virginia Emergency Room, devised for the

possibility of peacetime accidents, were hurriedly modified. No longer was the careful

showering and decontaminating of victims

possible with the single shower and uncertain

water pressure. Instead, patients were stripped

of their clothes and issued hospital gowns.

With no time for studied decision, doctors segregated the very sick from the moderately

sick — the latter to be treated, the former given

medication and allowed to die.

Nevertheless, the day came when the hospitals were full. The University Hospital, Martha

Jefferson Hospital, the Blue Ridge Sanatorium,

and the others were forced to lock their doors

to protect those patients they had already accepted.

After being turned away, the sick had no

specific destination. Many still clustered

around the middle of town near the two major

hospitals, taking up residence in the houses

abandoned by local residents several days

before. With minimal protection from fallout

and no medical treatment for other trauma,

many died, their bodies left unburied for several weeks.

The combined populations of Charlottesville and Albemarle County rose to 150,000 in

the 7 days after the nuclear attack. Slowly,

hostility and resentment wedged a gap between residents and refugees who attempted

to join the group shelters, The refugees, still in

a daze from their experience, believed that

they had priority rights after all they had suffered. The local residents viewed the outsiders

as a threat to their own survival, particuIarly as

the extent of the war damage was becoming

evident.
128 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

In fact, the supply of food was not a problem in the short run. Like most other towns and

cities, Charlottesville and Albemarle had some

3 weeks worth of food on hand, on home

shelves, in supermarkets and wholesale outlets. The Morton Frozen Food plant could be

expected to supply a rich diet of convenience

foods for a short time, even after the refrigeration was off. The problem was, after the local

supplies were exhausted, where could they get

more?

Nerves, already frayed by the stresses of the

past days, threatened to snap. Older people

were irritated by the noise and commotion of

children; children resented the lack of free

dom. The friction between differing groups

became increasingly evident, and vocal. An experiment in communal living was clearly not to

the taste of many, and the discomforts, both

physical and psychological, had the effect of

pushing local residents out of the shelters.

(There was some effort to stop them as the

radiation levels still posed some hazards; they

were urged at least to stay inside most of the

time.) Left in the shelters, now, were mostly

those out-of-town refugees who had no homes

to go to.

Not all the residents of Charlottesville and

Albemarle found their homes intact. In some

cases they returned to find the house looted or

occupied by refugees who were unwilling to

give up squatters’ rights. Sometimes claims

were backed with guns; in a few cases, squatter

and owner worked out a modus vivendi of

sharing the property.

Some animals had survived, in varying states

of health. Unprotected farm animals were

dead, while those which had been confined to

fairly solid barns with uncontaminated feed

had a fair chance of surviving. Many of these

farm animals, however, were missing, apparently eaten by hungry refugees and residents. Some pets had remained indoors in

good de facto shelters so that, if they had

found water, they needed only to be fed to

regain health. Worried about the amount of

food pets could consume, many families simply put them out to fend for themselves.

For the first week or so after the nuclear attacks, authorities had few options. Simple survival was the priority, the elements of which included food and water distribution, fallout

protection, and retention of some civil order.

Government was ad hoc, with the leadership of

the city and county naturally cooperating,

along with the different police forces. As the

population left the shelters, however, officials

felt that some more formalized system was desirable. After several long meetings — in the

basement of the courthouse where the government officials had stayed to avoid fallout— an

emergency government, led by the city manager of Charlottesville, was agreed on. The

combined city council and the Albemarle

County Board of Supervisors also elected the

chairman of the board of supervisors as deputy, and the sheriff of the county as chief of

public safety to oversee the combined police

forces and provide liaison with those military

units which were still in the area.

The powers given to the city manager were

sweeping in scope, certainly far beyond any

powers he had held before, and ran “for the

duration of the emergency. ” While some considered the new form of local government

close to martial law, great care was exercised

to be sure that the offensive term was not

used. In effect, however, Charlottesville and

Albemarle were under a highly centralized,

almost totalitarian rule.

Whatever it might be called, under the new

system, the city manager was able to take over

all resources and their allocation. Following to

some extent the paper plan that the area had

developed, the new government attempted to

set out priorities. It was greatly aided by the experts from the University, who volunteered

time and expertise to analyzing the needs of

the area. (In this respect, Charlottesville was

particularly fortunate in having an extensive

pool of talent on which to draw.)

However, if Charlottesville was lucky to

have reasonably functioning government and

a number of experienced planners and managers, and to have suffered comparatively

modest disruption from refugees and fallout,
Appendix C—Charlottesville: A Fictional Account by Nan Randall Ž 129

the city and county authorities were becoming

painfully aware that they were not set up to ‘go

it alone’ without any outside help. Even were

the weather suitable for planting, Charlottesville was no longer an agricultural center.

There wasn’t enough energy to process any

food that might be grown. Where would people get clothes and building materials and

medicines and spare parts for the cars and

buses? The very complexity of American society— its technological marvels and high standard of Iiving — could well prove to be a barrier

to the reconstruction of any one part.

* * *

During the third week after the attacks, the

new rationing system come into force. individual identification cards were issued to

every man, woman and child. Food was distributed at centralized points. Those without I.D.

cards were unable to get their ration of flour,

powdered milk, and lard–and the processing

of cards could take 3 or more days. Some desperate refugees resorted to stealing I.D. cards

in order to get food, while an enterprising

printer started turning out forgeries within 2

days after the government had first issued

cards. Rumors of hoarding and black marketeering abounded. Some of the missing

supermarket food turned up in black market

centers, accompanied by exorbitant prices.

Fuel supplies were dropping more rapidly

than the government had hoped. Most families

were heating their homes with wood, either in

fireplaces or in recycled oil drums for stoves.

As the winter was waning, the most desperate

need was for fuel for driving motors and generators. Even the drinking water was dependent on the emergency generator that ran a

single purifying system for the Rivanna Water

and Sewer Authority. (Water for other uses

could simply be drawn from the gravity-powered reservoir system, bypassing the filtration

system entirely. ) The hospital and radio stations all ran on small generators. The University could luxuriate in its coal-powered steam

heat, but there was no way, save generators or

candles and lanterns, to get lights.

No one was exactly certain how much fuel

there was in the area. Both jurisdictions had

once surveyed, for emergency planning purposes, the fuel storage capacity, and they

hoped they could count on having about half

of that on hand. Armed guards were assigned

to those larger facilities that had not already

been raided by the desperate. All private use

of cars or tractors was outlawed, and the

government threatened to confiscate any moving vehicles.

Electricity was restored, partially, some two

weeks after the attack. Workers from the smalI

Bremo Bluff generating plant, about 15 miles

away from Charlottesville, succeeded in starting the p I ant with the coaI reserves that were

on hand. From then on, limited electricity use

was permitted for a few hours hours a day. This

was particularly pleasant for those families

whose water came from electrically powered

well pumps. Well water was issued to children

for drinking, as it had escaped the Iodine 131

contamination which was still elevated in the

reservoirs.

The radioactivity level continued to drop

(after two weeks it was 0.4 rem per hour) and it

was “safe” to go outdoors. However, the re

suiting doses, though too low to cause immediate illness or deaths, posed a long-term health

hazard. The authorities, while recognizing that

everybody would receive many times the prewar “safe dose, ” tried to reduce the hazards by

urging people to stay inside as much as possible when not picking up food rations at the

distribution centers. Life for the residents of

Charlottesville revolved around those trips and

figuring out ways to make do without the normal supplies and services. Some chanced

outings to forage for a greater variety of food,

but most were resigned to waiting. There

wasn’t much else they could do.

* * *

Three weeks after the nuclear attack, almost

all the Charlottesville and Albemarle County

residents had returned to their homes. Those

few whose homes had either been occupied by

squatters, or been destroyed by fire, easily
130 Ž The Effects of Nuclear War

— . — ——. . — — .-—.- ——— ——— .— . ——. — .—. —

found some alternate housing with the government’s help.

This left the refugees. Though the drop in

fallout intensity allowed the refugees to move

out of basements and interior halls, they still

were forced to I ive a version of camp Iife. They

spent their endless, empty hours waiting in

lines for food, for a chance to use the bathrooms — which at least functioned now — for a

chance to talk to authorities. Information from

the outside was still sketchy, and for the

refugees, this uncertainty added to their

already high level of anxiety.

The city manager and the emergency

government attempted to solve the refugee

housing problem by billeting refugees in

private homes. At first they asked for

volunteers, but got few, The authorities then

announced that any house with fewer than two

people per room would be assigned a refugee

family. Resistance to this order was strong,

and, particularly in the outlying areas where it

was hard to check, outright defiance was common. Families would pretend to comply and

then simply force the refugees out as soon as

the authorities had left. The refugees would

struggle back to town, or take up residence in

barns or garages.

And still the refugees came to CharlottesvilIe, bringing with them stories of the horrors

they had experienced. They camped in

schools, in banks, in warehouses. By night the

neoclassical architecture of the University was

packed with the residents of Arlington and

Alexandria. By day, the new downtown mall

was awash with a floating mass of men,

women, and children, who, with nothing to do,

milled around the unopened stores. A retired

ambassador was overheard comparing the

scene to that of downtown Calcutta.

By now, the emergency government recognized that the need for food was going to be

acute. Without power for refrigeration, much

food had spoiled; stocks of nonperishable

foods were mostly exhausted. As the shortages

became clear, the price of food skyrocketed.

Many people refused money for food, preferring to barter. Food and fuel were the most

valuable commodities, with shoes and coats

high on the list as well.

Since shortly after the attack, the city

manager had been in contact both with the

Federal Government and with the relocated

State government in Roanoke. He had repeatedly asked for emergency rations, only to be

met with vague promises and explanations

about the problems of transportation. He was

generally urged to cut rations further and hang

on. Help would arrive when it could.

For some time, the relatively few surviving

farm animals had been gradually and mysteriously disappearing. The farmers concluded

that “those damned city folks” were stealing

them for food, although some of the local

residents were also making midnight forays on

the livestock. Farmers themselves slaughtered

animals they had planned to fatten-up for the

future. They couldn’t spare the feed grain, and

they needed food now.

Finally the emergency authorities announced that they would take a percentage of every

farmer’s livestock to help feed residents and

refugees, Farmers were outraged, considering

the action simple theft. There were rumors that

angry farmers had shot several agents who had

tried to confiscate the animals. Though they

were offered promissory notes from the city

authorities, the farmers thought such payment

worthless.

(The radiological experts at the University

had been questioned on the advisability of

eating the meat of animals with radiation

sickness. Many of those beasts which had remained outside during the high fallout period

were showing clear signs of illness. The experts

decided that the meat would be edible if

cooked sufficiently to kill any bacterial

invasion — the result of the deterioration of the

animal’s digestive tract. Strontium 90 wouId be

concentrated in the bones or the milk, not the

muscle tissue. )

Although the city government had relatively

frequent contact, mostly by radio, with the

Federal and State governments, the citizens
Appendix C—Charlottesville: A Fictional Account by Nan Randall ● 131

had to rely on the occasional Presidential

message that was broadcast on WCHV. Three

weeks after the attacks, the President made a

major address to reassure the people. He announced that the cease-fire was still holding

and he saw no reason why that would change.

He described the damage that the U.S. retaliatory strike had done to the Soviet Union. He

also noted that the United States still retained

enough nuclear weapons, most of them at sea

on submarines, to inflict considerable damage

on any nation that attempted to take advantage of the recent past. He did not mention

that he suspected that the Soviets also held

reserve weapons.

Describing the damage that the country had

suffered, the President noted that, even with

the loss of over 100 million lives, “We stilI have

reserves, both material and spiritual, unlike

any nation on earth. ” He asked for patience

and for prayers.

There had been broadcasts earlier by the

Lieutenant Governor of Virginia —the Governor was killed in Richmond — from his shelter

in Roanoke. However, as fallout in the

Roanoke area was quite high (Radford just to

the west had been struck), he was effectively

immobiIized for some time. The State government appeared less organized than the Federal.

CharlottesvilIe was still on its own. Residents

hunted game as the last of the food stocks disappeared, but the fallout had killed most animals that were in the open. Refugees were reduced to stealing. A number of people managed to fill their gas tanks with contraband

gasoline and set out to forage in the mountains

to the west.

Three and one-half weeks after the attack,

an old propeller-driven cargo plane landed at

the Charlottesville Airport with a supply of

flour, powdered milk, and vegetable oil. The

pilot assured the few policemen who guarded

the airstrip that more would be on the way by

truck as soon as temporary bridges could be

built over the major rivers.

The emergency airlift was supposed to supply CharlottesviIle with food for a week or two.

However, the officials who had calculated the

allotment had overlooked the refugees. Charlottesville’s population was some three times

the normal. (No one was absolutely sure because the refugees moved around a good deal,

from camp to camp )

The first of the deaths from radiation had

occured 10 days after the attacks, and the

number grew steadily. By now, it was not uncommon to see mass funerals several times a

day. The terminally ill were not cared for by

the hospitals — there were too many, and there

was nothing that could be done for them anyway— so it was up to their families to do what

they could. Fortunately there were still ample

supplies of morphia, and it was rumored that

college students had donated marijuana. The

city set aside several locations on the outskirts

of town for mass graves.

In addition to those with terminal radiation

sickness, there were those with nonfatal cases

and those who showed some symptoms. Often

it was impossible for doctors to quickly identify those with flu or psychosomatic radiation

symptoms. The number of patients crowding

the emergency rooms did not slacken off. The

refugees, crowded together, passed a variety

of common disorders, from colds to diarrhea,

back and forth, Several public health experts

worried that an outbreak of measles or even

polio could come in the late spring. “So far, we

have been lucky not to have a major epidemic

of typhus or cholera, ” a doctor observed to his

cotleagues.

The supply of drugs on hand at the hospitals

was dwindling fast. Although penicillin could

be manufactured fairly easily in the laboratories at the university, many other drugs were

not so simple, even with talent and ingenuity.

(The penicillin had to be administered with

large veterinary hypodermics as the homemade mix was too coarse for the small disposable hypes that most doctors stocked. There

was a considerable shortage of needles.) Other

medications were in such short supply that

many patients with chronic illnesses such as

heart disease, kidney failure, respiratory prob-
132 Ž The Effects of Nuclear War

Iems, hypertension, and diabetes died within a

few weeks.

* * *

Food riots broke out 41⁄2 weeks after the

attacks — precipitated by the first large shipment of grain. Three large tractor-trailers had

pulled into the parking lot of the Citizens Commonwealth Building quite unexpectedly, the

word of their arrival somehow misplaced between the Agriculture Department dispatchers

and the local authorities. The trucks were

greeted with cheers until the residents of

Charlottesville discovered that they had been

shipped raw grain rather than flour. The drivers

were taken unawares when empty cans and

bottles showered them and one driver jumped

in his cab and departed. (The official explanation, delivered some time later, was that processed food was going to those areas where the

bulk of the population was sick or injured. It

was also assumed that Charlottesville had

some livestock reserves. )

With only a fraction of the population knowing what to do with raw grain, a number of

angry citizens broke open the sacks and scattered wheat through the parking lot. They in

turn were set upon by those who wanted to

conserve as much as possible. The local public

safety forces waded into the melee with night

sticks and tear gas.

Everyone blamed everyone else for the incident, but the fragile glue that had held public

order together began to unstick.

From this time on, it was almost impossible

for the local authorities, not to mention the

State and Federal governments, to convince

everyone they were getting a fair share. People

in one section of town would watch suspiciously as delivery trucks passed them by and

headed somewhere else. Blacks distrusted

whites, the poor distrusted the rich and everyone distrusted the refugees as “outsiders. ”

The refugees were convinced that the local

authorities were favoring the residents and

tried repeatedly to get State intervention, with

little success. Still billeted in dormitories,

schools, and motels, the refugee camps were a

breeding ground for discontent and even rebellion.

* * *

The presence of the Federal Government

was not entirely confined to the occasional

delivery of food or radio broadcast. Some time

before, the National Guard and the Reserve

Unit were moved to North Carolina, partly to

give the impression of military readiness, and

perhaps to be assigned to dig out cities and

start reconstruction. The Government had put

out calls for volunteers to help in the reconstruction, but found that most workers, young

and old, wanted to stay with their families. A

system of national conscription for young men

and women with no children was in the planning stage.

The Federal Government attempted to urge

refugees back to where they had come from,

first to assist in the rebuilding of the damaged

cities which were rich in resources, and ultimately to redistribute the population to a

more normal pattern. Some refugees were happy to attempt to return, particularly those

whose houses were more or less intact. However, those who found their homes destroyed

preferred to return to the refugee camps inland. There was nothing to hold them to their

former lives. Fearful memories of the past

made any time spent in the cities painful.

One day, quite without warning, the city

manager was informed that one-half of his fuel

stores were to be confiscated by the Federal

Government, for the military and for the reconstruction effort. (Earth-moving equipment

was gathering on the outskirts of the devastated cities and needed fuel. ) After it was clear

that there was no way to stop the Government

from taking the fuel, the city manager suggested that unmarked tank trucks, well

guarded, pick up the stocks at night. He was

aware of the effect this action would have on

the morale of the population.

Already transportation was difficult for the

elderly and those who lived in the rural areas.

A sporadic bus service ran from one end of

town to the other once a day and an occasional school bus made a sortie out into the

suburbs. Bicycles were prized, and sometimes
Appendix C—Charlottesville: A Fictional Account by Nan Randall ● 133

fought over. Those gentlemen farmers whose

thoroughbred horses had been protected from

fallout could use these animals for transportation, but it was risky to let the animals stand

unprotected. Horse thievery had made an

anachronistic reappearance.

With even less fuel, the bus service would be

cut in half.

* * *

By now, barter was clearly established as the

preferred means of trade. For a time, the government had paid for commandeered foodstuff and resources with checks and prom issory notes, but no one wanted them any more.

The local banks had opened for a few days,

only to find all their savers lined up to withdraw everything. They closed down. Stores

either never opened, or shut down quickly

when they were overrun. (Many stores had

been looted in the second week after the attack, when the fallout intensity had dropped.)

A few people hoarded money, but most

thought money worthless.

Workers in the small industries in the Charlottesville area saw no point in turning up for

work if all they could get was paper money.

They preferred to spend the time hunting for

food and fuel. If barter was a highly inefficient

way to do business — it’s hard to make change

for a side of beef–still, it was preferable to

using worthless currency.

Psychologically, the population seemed to

be in a quiet holding pattern. The refugees,

many of them, had survived experiences that

would mark them for years. The memories of

fire, collapsing buildings, and screaming,

trapped people were still vivid, and some

would tremble at loud noises. However, the

profound grief over what they had lost–family members, possessions, or friends — underlay

emotions and made many apathetic and passive Victims of the nuclear attacks, they appeared willing to be victims afterwards too.

Still shunned as outsiders by the resident population, most refugees appeared to accept the

exclusion just as the surviving population of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki had 30 odd years

before.

The effect on the Charlottesville and Albemarle residents was less pronounced. They

were disoriented. For each lucky one who had

a specific job to do, there were many more

who were in effect unemployed. They turned

inward to their families or else friends and relatives. Their worries about the future–would

there be another attack, would they go back to

their old jobs, etc. — made most days rather

anxious, unproductive ones. Children particularly reflected a continuous nervousness,

picked up from their elders, and had difficulty

sleeping at night. Though many parents hoped

for a return to normalcy once the schools reopened, others quietly decided not to send

their children for fear of a second outbreak of

war.

* * *

Spring changed a lot of things. A new optimism surfaced as everyone looked forward to

planting, to good weather and warmth. The

residents of Charlottesville had survived the

first hurdle; they felt confident they could survive the next.

At the University, agronomists studied the

best crops to plant in the Charlottesville area.

No one was certain what effect the nuclear explosions had had on the ozone layer. If indeed

the ozone was severely damaged, more ultraviolet rays could reach the crops and perhaps

burn them. This effect would be more pronounced on delicate crops such as peas and

beans. Instead it was suggested that potatoes

and soybeans be encouraged and whatever

limited fertilizer became available go to farmers who followed the government guidelines.

The emergency government announced that

two-thirds of the former pasture land was to be

cultivated. Feed grains were to be used for

humans, not Iivestock. Dairy cattle and

chickens were the only exceptions.

The next few months in Charlottesville and

Albemarle County had a slow, almost dreamlike quality. Fears of new attacks had abated.

It was a time of settling into a new lifestyle, a

severely simplified way of being, of making do.

Children ate meat, cheese, or eggs rarely,
134 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

adults practically never. A good pair of shoes

was guarded — and worn only on special occasions. (With warmer weather, most children

and adults went barefoot, bringing concern to

doctors that there would be an increase in

parasitic diseases such as hookworm. )

Many people were unable to return to their

former jobs. In some cases, their employers

never reopened for business, their goods and

services being irrelevant in the postattack

society. College teachers, for example, had no

students to teach; computer programmers had

no computers to program.

For some, it was relatively easy to adapt.

Electronics experts set up CB and short wave

radio repair shops. Cottage industries — sandal

and clothing manufacturing from recycled

materials, soap and candle making — sprang up

in many homes. Some workers were able to acquire new, relevant skills quickly.

Others had to make do with menial jobs–

burying the dead, cleaning the streets, assisting

carpenters and bricklayers — that took little

skill.

And then there were those who could not fit

in anywhere. Many found it difficult to adapt

to the idleness. Disruption of the 9 to 5 work

ethic was a disruption of basic psychological

props, of a sense of identity. In the immediate

period after the attacks, parents concentrated

on protection of their families. Once their

families were no longer directly affected,

adults were robbed of their traditional roles.

By now, a few of the refugees had melted

into the general popuIation. But the vast majority were no further along than in the late

winter. The drag on the area resources was significant, and many in the leadership wanted to

force them out.

Charlottesville was fortunate in many respects, however. Being located on two easily

repairable rail Iines — with a major storage

yard for cars only two counties away—there

was some access to the outside world. Travel

was only permitted with a special pass,

naturally, and so the younger members of the

community resorted to the hallowed art of riding the rods.

Government officials, many of whom had

visited CharlottesvilIe and the University frequently in the past, kept in closer contact with

the city than with many other locales. Doubtless the area residents benefited with more

Federal assistance, As a result, Charlottesville

became the unofficial “capital” of the area,

economicalIy and politicalIy.

But as autumn approached, a universal depression settled on the residents and refugees.

Starvation had been heId at bay by the planting — but crop yields were smalIer than expected. No one was cold, but the weather was

still fine. There seemed to be no appreciable

progress towards preattack conditions. Those

young men and women who had been conscripted to build housing for the Nation’s

refugees returned with gloomy reports of the

devastation to the Nation’s commerce. The

east coast was effectively leveled. Where factories were rebuildable, the shortage of materials precluded their operation.

Recognizing that many families would have

to make do without heating oil or gas, the

AgricuIture Extension Service issued pamphlets on how to make your own wood-burning

stove. Fortunately for Charlottesville and the

surrounding area, trees were plentiful. However, the momentum that had started with the

spring planting slowed,

* * *

Winter was harder than anyone had expected. There were few additional deaths that

could be directly attributed to the nuclear

blast effects or the radiation; however, a large

percentage of the surviving population was

weakened. Lack of medicines, lack of adequate food and reasonable shelter, plus the

lingering physical and psychological effects,

meant that many were unable to work effectively, even if there were work available. An

epidemic of flu raged through the cities of the

east where refugees were huddled in camps.

Many died, especially children and old people.

Although vaccine for this particular, common
Appendix C—Charlottesville: A Fictional Account by Nan Randall ● 135

strain of fIu had been developed, the stocks

had been destroyed in the attacks

I n the northern sections of the country, food

supplies were inadequate and poorly distributed. The average diet — day in, day out — consisted of unleavened bread and potatoes,

where there was enough of those. As animal

herds, both domestic and wild, had been decimated by faIlout and indiscriminate hunting,

the only available meat came from dogs, cats,

and rats — those animaIs whose Iiving habits

protected them from fallout. Dietary deficiency diseases appeared.

Growing children were the first to notice the

lack of replacement clothes–particularl y

leather shoes. Coats and blankets were highly

prized in the cold climates.

Next to food, the most severe shortage was

housing. Even with the temporary barracks

that had been erected in a cluster around the

damaged cities, refugees were crowded two or

three to a room, Kitchens were shared by four

and five families; bathrooms by as many as 12

people.

Although there was relatively little work to

occupy time, and schooling was strictly curtailed, if indeed it existed, there was also very

little available recreation. The entertainment

industry located in California and New York

had been particularly hard hit. Local TV stations could broadcast and rebroadcast those

old films and cartoons they had in stock, but

little was fed nationwide, In the small towns,

public libraries were overwhelmed. In the large

cities, the Iibraries had been destroyed. There

were no movie houses to speak of; there were

no professional sports. The lack of recreation,

perhaps a minor problem, still served to underscore the bleakness of the winter.

In Charlottesville alone, several thousand

people died in the first winter after the nuclear

attack.

* * *

A year almost to the day after the nuclear

war between the United States and the Soviet

Union, Charlottesville was host to a blue ribbon panel of experts on reconstruction planning. The University had not returned to normal — there were no undergraduate classes as

the students had been conscripted for reconstruction work in the cities — but it was a natural meeting place since so many centers of

learning had been destroyed.

The questions before the group centered on

setting priorities: what were the goals and how

couId the country reach them?

The U.S. Government still existed, if in a

SIightly reordered form. The President, now

permanently located in the Midwest along

with the surviving Members of Congress and

the Cabinet, retained the emergency powers he

had taken just after the attacks. (Congress had

had no choice but to ratify his assumption of

these extraordinary powers at the time. However, there was growing resentment that he

showed few signs of relinquishing them. Congress was reduced to a kind of advisory body,

its Members spending most of their time on

helping constituents relocate or obtain a id.)

The State governments had, by and large, reestablished themselves, often in new locations.

Virginia’s government was located in Roanoke,

for example, under the Lieutenant Governor.

State governments were not as well respected

as before; citizens tended to blame them for

the mixups in aid distribution. Only the refugees looked to the States for assistance against

the local governments, which they distrusted.

The residents of an area such as Charlottesville

were most loyal to their local government, particularly when that government had a reputation of basic evenhandedness.

Everyone, however, was growing hostile to

the imposition of strict governmental controls

over their lives —what they could or could not

buy, or eat, where they could travel, etc. I n certain rural sections, such as Nelson County,

south of Charlottesville, farmers had barricaded themselves off, ignored government

orders, and occasionally, it was rumored, took

potshots at the government agents.

Attempts to conscript the able-bodied to rebuild the damaged areas often failed miserably. Many simply walked off the job and returned to their families. Since there were no
136 ● The Effects of Nuclear war

adequate records remaining of the prewar

population, and no records at all of war

deaths, the Government found it an impossible

task to track down offenders. (Criminals in

medium- and light-security detention facilities

had simply evaporated into the population.)

Charlottesville, like the rest of the undamaged parts of the country, still had a huge

refugee population that was unwilling or

unable to return to former homes. The majority were in camps such as the large facility in

the old Lane School, and children were in day

care or orphanages, depending on the status of

their surviving families. If anything, the

refugees were both more apathetic and more

rebellious when faced with simple assignments. Lawless bands of teenaged refugees

roamed the countryside, hijacking supply

trucks and raiding farms and villages. Partly it

was simple bravado, partly a way to feed

themselves. Most refugees simply sat and

waited for the next meal.

Yet even now, the flow of refugees continued. The winter had driven out those who

could not find enough to eat or enough shelter.

Stories of Vermont families subsisting on

maple syrup and wild rabbits might have

proven entertaining in the retelling, but those

who had survived did not want to repeat the

performance.

The medical problems were still acute. Drug

supplies were almost exhausted, but the weakened population remained more susceptible to

disease. The birth rate had fallen drastically 9

months after the attacks, partly because of the

radiation, which produced temporary sterilization – but there had also been a rise in miscarriages, stillbirths, and abnormalities. Infant

mortality soared. Experts worried that an unprecedented increase in cancer, particularly in

children, could be expected in several years.

And there was still the possibility of some

devastating epidemic as cholera running unchecked through the population. The Blue

Ridge Sanatorium in Charlottesville, which had

seen few tuberculosis patients in the last years

before the attacks, was making plans to convert back to specializing in the disease. TB was

making a comeback.

The Nation’s economy was in shambles. The

bulk of the oil refining capacity had been

knocked out, and only a few facilities were

functioning again. The small oil wells around

the country that were situated away from

target areas produced more oil than the

refineries could handle— and it was only a

fraction of the need. Coal mining, mostly by

the time-honored pick and shovel method as

strip mining took heavy equipment, was the

only industry that could be called booming.

(There was a major migration to the mining

areas by the unemployed. ) Agriculture, of

course, was a major undertaking for much of

the population. However, yields from the

farms were considerably below what had been

hoped for. The lack of pesticides and fertilizer

cut heavily into the crops and there was concern about a major insect invasion next summer. Food processing —wheat and corn milling

particularly– showed encouraging signs of

recovery.

Most major industries, however, were in disarray as a result of lack of energy, lack of raw

materials, and lack of managerial expertise.

The world economy was staggering from the

effect of losing both the United States and the

Soviet Union as suppliers and markets. (If the

Latin Americans were able to make small fortunes on selling the U.S. refined petroleum,

political pressures were building in those countries to raise the prices to double the current

rates. )

An efficient system of money still had not

been reestablished. The Federal Government

paid the military and other Federal employees

with dollars and tried to preserve purchasing

power through a series of price controls. However, most people were reluctant to accept

dollars in exchange for essentials such as food

or clothing. As a result, a barter system continued to flourish and the black market, with

its highly inflated prices, continued to encourage defiance of the law.

Most experts believed that the experience of

post-World War II in Europe and Japan could

provide the model for currency reform, including replacement of the dolIar, that was necessary to restore an economy based on the divi-
Appendix C—Charlottesville: A Fictional Account by Nan Randall Ž 137

sion of labor. However, the resolution of two

policy issues stood in the way. First, should the

market, on one hand, or Government control,

on the other, determine the distribution of

scarce resources? Second, should the new

money go to those with legitimate claims, pensions, promissory notes for goods confiscated

during the postattack period etc., or to those

who held productive jobs, or even to the entire

population even if many were more drag than

help to the recovery? Politically, the Government was unable to deny any one of the

groups; practically, it was obvious the Government couId not satisfy al I three.

It was clear that if the economy did not get

moving again soon, it might never. Already

there were indications that manufacturing was

not reestablishing itself with anywhere near

the speed the planners had hoped. The amount

of shipping, by rail and by truck, was actually

down from the mid-summmer high.

“We are in the classic race, ” remarked one

of the participants who had written a major

study of postattack recovery some years

before. “We have to be able to produce new

goods and materials before we exhaust our

stored supplies. We can continue to eat the

wheat that is in the grain elevators of the

Midwest for another year, perhaps. But after

that, we have to have the capacity to grow new

wheat, When our winter coats wear through,

we have to have the capacity to weave the

cloth for new ones. When our railroad cars

break down, we have to be able to make new

ones, or replacement parts. Right now we are a

long way from that capacity. ” Privately, he

and a group of conferees agreed that heavy

controls on the economy, and ultimately on

the population, would be the only way to get

things going. Resources, both material and

human, were severely limited,

One of the major problems, it was obvious

to everyone, was the drag the huge refugee

population had on the recovery effort. While

numbers of workers were actively engaged in

the rebuilding of the cities as well as the factories and services that powered the economy,

there were as many more who were unemployed and unemployable for the time being.

Their skills were not suited to the priority

tasks. Several participants had prepared a

statement on what should be done with these

nonproductive members of society. “We cannot let this mass of people drain our resources

while they do nothing to contribute, ” it was

rumored to say. “If we cannot let them starve

outright, we suggest that they be issued only

that amount of food which is minimally

necessary to sustain life. They should be

moved to camps away from the center of activity for reason of public morale. ” The report

was suppressed but several copies were leaked

to the press anyway.

The most basic disagreement among the participants in the conference was over the level

of reconstruction that might actually be feasible. Optimists cited the phenomenal recovery

of Japan and West Germany after World War

I I and insisted that these be the models for the

United States in the next 5 to 10 years

Pessimists, noting the major differences between the post-World War 11 era and the situation of Japan and Germany, felt these examples were irrelevant, or worse, misleading.

“Everyone forgets the amount of aid that came

in from outside in the late ‘4o’s and early ‘50’s.

We don’t have the United States, wealth to

turn to. Such a goal is unrealistic and unreachable, even with absolute controls on the

economy. ”

The pessimists were divided. Some saw the

Nation building itself along the line of some of

the Asian nations, which boasted a small technologically advanced segment in the midst of

a large agrarian or unskilled worker population, on the model of India or Indonesia. Some

thought technology itself would eventually

disappear from American society. “If you

don’t have computers to run, you don’t train

computer programmers, ” one expert was overheard to say. “After a while, in a few generations, no one remembers how the machines

worked at all. They remember the important

things: how to plant crops, how to train draft

horses and oxen, how to make a simple pump.

We will have survived biologically, but our
138 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

way of Iife is going to be unrecognizable. In get there, the conference report straddled all

several generations, the United States is going fences and concluded nothing. Follow-up task

to resemble a late medieval society.” forces were appointed and the conferees

agreed to meet again in the summer. Perhaps

Because the conferees could not agree on by then they would have a better idea of

what was a reasonable goal, much less how to whether or not they were winning the race.
APPENDIX D–SUMMARY OF REPORT ON

[Note: The full

EXECUTIVE BRANCH CALCULATIONS

 report, classified SECRET, is available separately to qualified requesters.]

PURPOSE

This appendix summarizes and analyzes Iy viewed by the sponsoring agency as being

studies of the direct effects of nuclear attacks valid and applicable to the current through

that have been performed by and for various mid-1980's time period, with the U.S. and

agencies of the executive branch of the U.S. Scviet forces projected under a SALT I I agreeGovernment in recent years. This review in- ment.

eludes those studies whose results are currentSCOPE

The estimates of the direct effects of nuclear attacks presented in this paper represent

analyses performed by or for the Department

of the Defense (DOD), the Arms control and

Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and the intelligence community. Although these analyses

describe the direct effects of nuclear attacks in

terms of popuIation fatalities and attack damage objectives against military, Ieadership, and

economic target systems, it is recognized that

a more meaningfuI basis for assessing the

direct effects of nuclear attacks would be to

analyze the effects of such attacks in terms of

postwar national survival and recovery To

date, however, analytical capabilities have not

permitted such analyses, I n fact, the complex

issues concerning nationaI recovery shouId

nucIear war occur, or the postwar power and

recovery capabilities of the belIigerents, have

as yet not even been properly formulated for

analysis. Until that is accomplished, analyses

of the direct effects of nuclear attacks will

continue to focus, as have the studies used for

this analysis, on one-dimensional first-order

direct effects

Furthermore, all analyses examined in this

study assume a “two-shot” nuclear war — the

Soviets strike first against all targets included

under a particuIar scenario and the U S. retaliates against a similar set of Soviet targets.

More protracted (and more likely) attack scenarios are not examined. Hence, such factors

as the feasibility of sustaining popuIation in a

“ protected or evacuated” posture over a protracted duration, either i n a continuing crisis

with no nuclear attacks or one with attacks repeated every few days or so, are not refIected

i n the damage estimates avaiIable from these

studies and included in this report

Five questions provided the focus for the

anaIyticaI results exam in this study:

1. How many people would be killed by:

– Prompt effects of nuclear explosions?

– Fallout radiation?

2. What number of nonfataI but disubIing injuries C OuId be expected?

3. What areas would possibly receive damaging levels of overpressure and ho w

many peopIe Iive o r work i n those areas?

4. What areas would receive what levels of

fallout contamination ?

5. What wouId be the possible extent of fire

damage, and what mechanisms would create it?

Answers to these questions, as provided in the

various studies used in this anaIysis, are given

i n the following section.

139
140 • The Effects of Nuclear War

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

In viewing the estimated direct effects of nuclear attacks, particularly population casualties, it is important to focus on the relative

numbers for the various nuclear attack scenarios examined, as opposed to the absolute. The

analyses on which these estimates are based

do not take into account the many imponderable associated with such a cataclysmic

event, the majority of which would cause

higher levels of human devastation than are indicated by the analyses of hypothetical attacks. A significant imponderable is the uncertainty of human behavior. Would people really

react as planned and as assumed in the computer models? Also, our ability to simulate

even the immediate direct effects from thousands of nuclear detonations based on data extrapolateions from single bursts is suspect

because of its inherent uncertainties. And,

finally, the inability to assess the longer term

prospects for the immediate survivors, which

would depend not only on the availability of

subsistence levels of food, medical supplies,

etc., but also on how quickly they could adapt

to a radically unfamiliar environment and social structure, further limits the validity of

these estimates as a net assessment of the

damage to be expected as a result of nuclear

war.

Population Damage

Table D-1 summarizes in terms of total national population high- and low-range fatality

estimates derived from the various analyses

used for this report. I n view of the many uncertain factors involved in such estimates, it is not

possible to synthesize a “best estimate” range

from the results of the studies used for this

analyses.

Differences within and between the low and

high ranges listed in the table are due primarily

to differences in force alert status, weapons

laydown, population protection level, population data base, and/or evacuation scheme

assumed.

Table 0-1 .–OTA Attack Cases–Executive Branch Fatality Estimates

Population Percent of national fatalities

Case OTA attack cases posture Low range High range

(not available)

(not available)

1-3

< 1

< 1- 5

35-50

10-26

20-32

9-14

14-23

28-40

8-10

1-4

7-11

5-7

1-5

59-77

32-43

26-40

26-27

18-25

22-24

60-88

47-51

40-50
Appendix D—Summary of Report on Executive Branch Calculations ● 141

For Soviet First-Strike Attacks

on the United States, Against:

ICBM Targets Only (Case 3). – The 1- to 3-percent spread in the low range results from

assureing two 550-kiIoton (kt) optimum heightof-burst (OPT HOB) weapons per silo (1-percent national fatalities) versus assureing one

550-kt OPT HOB and one surface burst 550-kt

weapon per silo (3-percent national fatalities).

The 8- to 10-percent spread in the high range

results from assuming one 3-megaton (Mt) OPT

HOB and one surface-burst 3-Mt weapon per

silo (8 percent) versus assureing two 3-Mt surface bursts per silo (1 O percent). The difference

between the ranges is due to the difference in

the yield of the assumed weapons.

All Counterforce Targets (Case 3).–The less

than 1-to 3-percent low range for in-p/ace U.S.

population fatalities results from the difference in fallout protection levels assumed by

DOD and AC DA. The less than l-percent value

assumes an enhanced U.S. in-place fallout protection program that would provide a fallout

protection factor (PF) of at least 25 for the entire population. The 3-percent value assumes

in-place fallout shelters providing PFs of 10 to

1,000 and that 90 percent of the population

would use the shelters. The unprotected portion of the population is assumed to be equally

divided between a PF of 3 and 6. The 7- to 11-

percent high range also results from differences in fallout protection levels assumed by

DOD and AC DA. In this case, the 7-percent

value assumes the current U.S. in-place fallout

protection program. PFs as low as 5 are assumed for about one-half of the U.S. rural

population, and PFs as low as 15 for one-quarter of U.S. urban population. The 1 l-percent

value assumes essentially no U.S. civil defense

program and a PF of 3 for the entire U.S. population. The difference between the ranges

refIects the differences in the assumed fallout

protection levels.

All Counterforce Targets (Case 3).– The 5- to

7-percent high range for evacuated U.S. population fatalities reflects ACDA’s assumptions

concerning the amount of fallout protection

available for the combined rural and evacuated urban population. The 5-percent value

assumes 66 percent of the total exurban population would be able to obtain fallout protection of 10 to 40 PF. Those persons not protected were assumed to be equalIy divided between between a PF of 3 and of 6. The 7-percent value assumes only 33 percent of the total

exurban population would be able to obtain

fallout protection of 10 to 40 PF. The rest were

assumed to be equally divided between a PF of

3 and 6. This range of values is listed as “high”

because it results from assuming that no expedient fallout protection upgrading could be

achieved by the evacuated popuIation.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, and Economic Targets (Case 4). — The 35- to 50-percent

low range for in-p/ace U.S. population fatalities results from assuming day-to-day alert (35-

percent fatalities) versus generated forces (50-

percent fatalities), and that 90 percent of the

U.S. population are sheltered in available civil

defense shelters. The 59- to 77-percent high

range reflects differences in weapons Iaydown

and popuIation protection level. The 59-percent vaIue assumes a generated forces Soviet

attack with about 60 percent of the weapons

air burst and that only 66 percent of the U.S.

population are sheltered in available civil

defense shelters. The 77-percent value also

assumed a generated forces attack, but with

all weapons ground burst and no civil defense

sheltering of the popuIation. The reasons for

the differences between the ranges are the differences in assumed population protection

levels and weapons Iaydown.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, and Economic Targets (Case 4). — The 10- to 26-percent

low range for evacuated U.S. population fatalities results from differences in assumed weapons Iaydown. The 10-percent value assumes

about half the attacking weapons are air burst.

The 26-percent value assumes all weapons are

ground burst. Both values in the low range

assume expedient upgrading of fallout protection couId be achieved by the evacuated population, that is, a fallout PF of at least 25 for the

entire U.S. population. The 32- to 43-percent

high range reflects ACDA’s assumptions as to

the fallout protection that could be achieved

by the evacuated population. The 32-percent
142 ● The Effects of Nuclear War ———-——.—-————

retIects the effect of ground bursting all

weapons versus air bursting about half the

weapens The difference between the ranges is

due to differences in assumed population protection levels,

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, Economic, and Population (Case 4 excursion).— In this

case the 60- to 80-percent fatality range for

U.S. population in-place reflects the impact of

the protection levels assumed. The 60-percent

value corresponds to the high protection levels

used by DC PA. The 88-percent value corresponds to the more modest levels assumed

by OSD analysts. This range is listed as “high”

because of the severity (all ground bursts and

all but 10- to 15-percent of Soviet weapons) of

the attack used.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, Economic, and Population (Case 4 excursion). — The 28-

to 40- percent low range for U.S. population

evacuated refIects the d inferences between

DOD’s and ACDA’s assumptions concerning

levels of fallout protection, evacuation

scheme, and weapons Iaydown. The 28-percent

value assumes expedient upgraded protection

levels as specified by DCPA and evacuation of

80 percent of all risk area population. The 40-

percent value reflects ACDA’s less extensive

evacuation scheme (only cities with population greater than 25,000 are evacuated) and no

expedient upgrading of protection levels. In

addition, the 28-percent value results from an

attack with all weapons ground burst and the

40- percent value assumes about half the values are air burst. The 47- to 51-percent high

range also results from differences in fallout

protection, evacuation scheme, and weapons

Iaydown. In this case the 47-percent value

assumes degraded protection levels based on

DOD’s sensitivity analysis, and evacuation of

80 percent of all risk area population. The 51-

percent value also reflects degraded protection levels, only 33 percent of the total exurban population are able to obtain protection

in rural shelters, and AC DA’s Iess-extensive

relocation scheme. Once again, the range also

reflects the effect of ground bursting al l

weapons versus air bursting about half the

weapons. The difference between the ranges is
Appendix D—Summary of Report on Executive Branch Calculations ● 1 4 3

clue to differences in assumed population protection levels.

For U.S. Retaliatory Attacks on

the U. S. S. R., Against:

ICBM Targets Only (Case 3).– The low, less

than l-percent, value assumes one OPT HOB

weapon per silo In this case fatalities are less

than 1 percent for attacks using only 40-kt,

only 200-kt, or only 1-Mt weapons The high

range of 1 to 4 percent results from assuming

one ground-burst weapon per silo. I n this case

the 1-percent value assumes only 200-kt weapons and the 4-percent value assumes only 1-Mt

weapons are used. The differences between

the range reflects the effect of OPT HOB

weapons versus ground bursting al I weapons.

All Counterforce Targets (Case 3).– The less

than 1-percent low value for in-p/ace Soviet

population assumes relatively good fallout

protection for the entire Soviet population

and, in the case of ACDA’s analysis, a U.S. attack based on a preplanned laydown using in

part U.S. ICBMs that do not survive the Soviet

first strike. The high range reflects differences

in weapons laydown, population protection

levels, and data bases used by ACDA and

DOD. The less than l-percent value reflects

ACDA’s preplanned attack laydown, relatively

good fat lout protection assumptions, and use

of a coarser Soviet population data base. The

5-percent value refIects DOD’s attack lay

down, which does not attrite U.S. weapons due

to a Soviet first strike, lower fallout protection

assumptions, and use of a finer Soviet population data base The difference between the

ranges results from all these differences i n

dassumptions.

All Counterforce Targets (Case 3).– The less

than 1- to 2-percent variation results from differences in popuIation protection levels assumed by ACDA for evacuated Soviet popuIation. The less than 1 -percent value assumes

66 percent of the exurban popuIation use

avaiIable sheltering. Those not using such sheltering are assigned protection levels of 3 and 6

in equal shares. It is difficuIt to judge whether

this represents a low or high range On one

hand the range could be considered on the low

side because of the coarseness of the Soviet

data base used by ACDA. Conversely, the evacuation scheme assumed by ACDA would suggest that it be considered a high range.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, and Economic Targets (Case 4). — l-he 20- to 32-percent

low range for in-place Soviet population fatalit results from d inferences i n force aIert

status and weapons Iaydown assumed T he 20-

percent value reflects day-to-day alert forces

and an attack using only 40-kt air-burst weapons against economic targets. The 32-percent

vaIue reflects generated forces and an attack

using d mixture of weapens against economic

targets. The 26- to 40-percent high range

refIects differences between ACDA and DOD

assumptions. The 26-percent vaIue from ACDA

analysis assumes relatively good popuIation

protection levels and a lower amount of EMT

used against economic tar-gets than assumed i n

the DOD analysis. The W-percent vaIue from

DOD analysis reflect lower popuIation protection levels, a finer popuIation data base,

and a Iarger attack against economic targets

than used i n the ACDA anaIysis. The difference

i n assumptions made by DOD, AC DA, and the

interagency intelIigence group.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, and Economic Targets (Case 4). — The 9- to 14-percent

range reflects the difference in poplation protection levels used by ACDA for evacuated

Soviet population . The 9-percent value

assumes 66 percent use available sheIters The

14 percent assumes only 33 percent use available shelters It is difficult to judge whether

this refIects a low or high range. The coarseness of the Soviet data base used by AC DA

wouId suggest it be treated as a low range

Conversely, the ACDA evacuation scheme

would suggest it be considered a high range.

Counter-force and Other Military Targets (Case

3 excursion) .—The differences within both

ranges for Soviet population in-p/ace refIects

the variation in protection levels assumed by

AC DA. The difference between the ranges is

due to the alert status of U.S. forces used.

Counterforce and Other Military Targets (Case

3 excursion).–The 6- to 9-percent range
744 ● The Effects of Nuc/ear War

reflects the variation in protection levels

assumed by ACDA for evacuated Soviet population, 66 percent use available shelters versus

33 percent. As in the previous cases, with

Soviet population evacuated, it is difficult to

judge if this is a low or high range of fatalities.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, Economic, and Population (Case 4 excursion). — Fatality

estimates range from 40 to 50 percent for Soviet population in-p/ace based on DOD analysis.

The variation is primarily due to differences in

assumed population protection levels. Given

the rather low protection levels assumed by

DOD, the range probably represents the high

level of Soviet fatalities.

Counterforce, Other Military Targets, Economic, and Population (Case 4 excursion). — Fatality

estimates range from 22 to 26 percent for Soviet population evacuated based on ACDA analysis. The variation reflects differences in

assumed popuIation protection levels; 66 percent use available shelters versus 33 percent.

Once again it is difficult to judge whether this

is a high or low range. The coarse data base

used by ACDA suggests their estimates are low,

but the evacuation scheme suggests they

might be high.

In examining the fatality ranges listed in

table D-1 it should be noted that the differences between U.S. and Soviet fatality levels

for comparable attacks and population postures can be primarily attributed to:

The nature of the nuclear attacks assumed in the various studies; that is, the

assumption that the Soviets attack first

and the United States retaliates in the

various attack scenarios examined,

The higher yields of Soviet weapons,

which resuIt in significantly higher Ievels

of nuclear yield detonating in the United

States than the U.S.S.R. for comparable

attack cases.

Although the data on nonfatal injuries available from the studies used in this analysis are

quite Iimited, the results suggest that:

●

●

●

For attacks against ICBMs or counterforce

target sets, nonfatal injuries would about

equal fatalities.

For attacks that include economic targets,

but not population per se, nonfatal injuries would vary from about 20 to 40 percent of total casualties.

For attacks including population, nonfatal injuries vary from about 8 to 25 percent of total casualties.

Military and Economic Damage

Unlike population damage levels, which (except for excursions to Case 4) result only collaterally from attacks on other target sets,

damage levels against military and economic

target sets are input objectives used in structuring the attack laydowns examined in the

various analyses on which this report is based.

Damage levels attained against these target

systems in the studies examined in this analysis

were:

For Soviet First-Strike Attacks Against

the United States:

Counterforce Targets (Percent Total Damaged).— ICBMs (42 to 90 percent), SAC bomber

bases (90 to 99 percent), and submarine support facilities (90 to 99 percent).

Other Military Targets (Percent Installations

Damaged). –Major military leadership facilities (90 to 95 percent), State capitals (95 percent), DCPA and FPA emergency operating

centers (95 percent), and other military instalIations (77 to 90 percent).

Economic Targets. – 70- to 90-percent damage

of the national manufacturing value of the

economic targets attacked.

For U.S. Retaliatory Attacks Against

the U. S. S. R.:

Counterforce Targets (Percent Total Damaged).— Bomber bases (70 to 90 percent).

Other Military Targets (Percent Installations

Damaged).– Major military leadership facil-
ities (70 to 90 percent), major political

Appendix D—Summary of Report on Executive Branch Calculations ● 145

leader- As in the case of population fatalities, the

ship facilities (7o to 90 percent), and other differences between U.S. and Soviet damage

miliitary instalI at ions (20 to 50 percent). levels against strategic forces, other military

Economic Targets. – 70- to 90-percent damage targets, and economic targets can be attribof the national manufacturing value added uted to the assumption that the Soviets strike

first and to the larger yields of Soviet weapons. plus capital replacement cost of the economic

targets attacked.
APPENDIX E–SUGGESTIONS FOR

FURTHER READING

Physical Effects of Nuclear Warfare

Ayers, R. N., “ Environmental Effects of Nuclear Wea pens” (3 VOLS, ), Hudson Inst., H 1-518,

December 1965.

Batten, E. S., “The Effects of Nuclear War on

the Weather and Climate, ” RAND Corp. ,

RM-4989, November 1966,

Bennett, B., “Fatality Uncertainties in Limited

Nuclear War, ” RAN D, R-2218-AF, November 1977.

Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, “DCPA Attack Environment Manual,” Publication CPG 2-1A, 9

Vols, June 1973 (vol. 4 revised June 1977).

Drell, S. and von Hippel, “Limited Nuclear

War, ” Scientific American, November 1976.

Glasstone and Dolen, eds: Effects of Nuclear

Weapons, 3rd ed., U.S. Department of Defense and Department of Energy, Washington, DC., 1977,

Green, J., “Response to DCPA Questions on

Fallout, ” Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Washington, D. C., November 1973.

Mark, J, C., “Global Consequences of Nuclear

Weaponry, ” Annual Review of Nuclear Science, 1976, 26:51-87.

National Academy of Sciences, “Effects of

Multiple Nuclear Explosions Worldwide, ”

Washington, D. C., 1975.

U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency,

“The Effects of Nuclear War,” Washington,

D. C., April 1979.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign

Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control,

International Organizations, and Security

Agreements, Hearings: Effects of Limited

Nuclear Warfare, 94th Cong., 1st sess.

(1975). 61 p.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign

Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control,

International Organizations, and Security

Agreements, Comm. Print: “Analyses of Effects of Limited Nuclear Warfare,” 94th

Cong , 1st sess (1975). Contains, among

other things, the Sept. 11, 1974, Briefing on

Counterforce Attacks by Secretary of

Defense, James R Schlesinger, and the

report of the Office of Technology Assessment Ad Hoc Panel on NucIear Effects.

Economic Impact of Nuclear War

(General) and Economic Recovery

From Nuclear War

Goen, R., et al., “Analysis of National Entity

Survival,” Stanford Research Institute, November 1967,

Goen, R., et al , “Critical Factors Affecting National Survival,” Stanford Research institute, 1965,

Goen, R., et al., “Potential Vulnerabilities Affecting National Survival,” Stanford Research Institute, 1970,

Hanunian, N , “Dimensions of Survival: Postattack Survival Disparities and National Viability,” RAND Corp., KM-51 40, November

1966.

Hirshleiter, j., , “Economic Recovery, ” RAND,

P-11 60, August 1965,

Katz, A., “Economic and Social Consequences

of Nuclear Attacks on the United States, ”

U S Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st sess.

(March 1979),

Laurius, R., and F. Dresch, “National Entity

Survival: Measure and Countermeasure, ”

Stanford Research Institute, 1971.

Lee, H., et al., “ Industrial Production and Damage Repair Following Nuclear Attack, ”

Stanford Research Institute, March 1968.

Pettis, Dzirbals, Krahenbuhl, “Economic Recovery Following Nuclear Disaster: A

Selected, Annotated Bibliography,” RAND

Corp., R-2143, December 1977.

146
Appendix E—Suggestions for Further Reading Ž 147

Sobin, B., “Post Attack Recovery, ” Research

AnaIys is Corp., RAC-P-51, june 1970.

Winter, S.G., Jr., “Economic Recovery From

the Effects of Thermonuclear War, ” RAND,

p-2416, August 1961.

Winter, S.G., Jr, “Economic Viability After

Nuclear War: The Limits of Feasible Prod u c t ion, RAND, RM-3436, Septembe r

1963

Economic Impacts of Nuclear War

(Specific), Including Agricultural

Impacts

Brown, S., “Agricultural Vulnerability to Nuclear War,” Stanford Research Institute,

February 1973.

Jones, T.K., “Industrial Survival and Recovery

After Nuclear Attack: A Report to the Joint

Commit tee on Defence Production, U.S.

Congress, ”The Boeing Co., Seattle, Walsh.,

1976

Killion, et al., "Effects of Fallout Radiation on

Crop. Production,” Comparative Animal Research Laboratory, July 1975

Leavitt, J., “Analysis and Identification of NatIonaIIy EssentiaI Industries, Vol. I: Theo

reticaI Approach, ” Institute for Defense

Analyses, P-972, March 1974

Stanford Research Institute, “U S. Agriculture:

P’otentiaI VuInerabiIities,” January 1969.

Stantford Research Institute, “Agricultural Vulnerability in the National Entity Survival

Context, ” July 1970

Stephens, M M , “VuInerabiIIty of Total Petroleum Sytems,” Office of Oil and Gas, Department of the Interior, May 1973.

Administrative, Social, Psychological,

etc., Factors Relating to Postattack

Issues

Allmitt, B., ‘‘A Study of Consensus on social

and PsychologicaI Factors ReIated to Recovery From NucIear Attack, ” Human Sciences Research, Inc., May 1971

Brown, W. M., “Emergency Mobilization for

Postattack Reorganization, ” Hudson Institute, H1-874/2, May 1968.

Brown, W., M , ‘‘On Reorganizing After Nuclear

Attack, ” RAND, P-3764, January 1968.

Dresch, F., "Information Needs for Post-Attack

Recovery Management,” Stanford Re -

search Institute, ApriI 196 8

EIlis, Dresche, “ Industrial Factors in Total VulnerabiIity,” Stanford Research Institute,

April 1968.

Hirshleiter, J , “Disaster and Recovery: A Historical Survey, ” RAND, RM-3079, April

1963.

Ikle, F.,C., The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction, Norman, Okla., University of OkIahoma Press, 1958.

Janis, l., Air War and Emotional Stress, New

york: McGraw Hill, 1951.

Vestermark, S., (cd.), “Vulnerabilities of Social

Structure, ” Human Sciences Research, Inc.,

December 1966.

Winter, S. G., Jr., “The Federal Role in Post Attack Economic Organization, ” P-3737,

RAND, November 1967.

Civil Defense

Aspin, Les, “The Mineshaft Gap Revisited,”

Congressional Record, Jan. 15, 1979, pp.

E26-35.

Egorov, P. T., et al., Civil Defense, Springfield,

Va.: National Technical Information Service, 1973. A translation of Crazhdanskaya

Oborna, 2nd cd., Moscow, 1970.

Goure, L., War Survival in Soviet Strategy,

Washington, D. C.: Advanced International

Studies Institute, 1976.

Goure, L., Soviet Civil Defense in the Seventies,

Washington, D.C.: Advanced International

Studies Instititute, 1975.

Kaplan, F. M., “The Soviet Civil Defense Myth

Parts I & Il,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March and April 1978.
148 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

Kincaid, W., “Repeating History: the Civil Defense Debate Renewed,” International Security, winter 1978.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Civil Defense

(Grazhdanskaya Oborna) (translation), December 1973.

Sullivan, R., et al., “Candidate U.S. Civil Defense Programs,” System Planning Corp.,

March 1978.

Sullivan, R., et al., “Civil Defense Needs of

High-Risk Areas of the United States,” System Planning Corporation, SPC 409,1979.

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,

“An Analysis of Civil Defense in Nuclear

War,” Washington, D. C., December 1978.

U.S. C. I. A., “Soviet Civil Defense,” Director of

Central Intelligence, N178-10003, July 1978.

U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking,

Housing, and Urban Affairs, (Hearings on

Civil Defense), Jan. 8, 1979.
APPENDIX F–GLOSSARY

[This glossary is excerpted from the larger one in The Effects of Nuc/ear Weapons, 3rd cd., compiled

and edited by Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. DoIan, prepared and published by the U.S. Department

of Defense and the U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D. C., 1977.]

Alpha Particle: A particle emitted spontaneously from the nuclei of some radioactive elements. It is identical with a helium nucleus,

having a mass of four units and an electric

charge of two positive units.

Cloud Column: The visible column of weapon

debris (and possibly dust and water droplets)

extending upward from the point of burst of

a nuclear (or atomic) weapon.

Crater: The pit, depression, or cavity formed in

the surface of the Earth by a surface or underground explosion. Crater formation can

occur by vaporization of the surface material, by the scouring effect of air blast, by

throwout of disturbed material, or by subsidence. In general, the major mechanism

changes from one to the next with increasing

depth of burst. The apparent crater is the depression which is seen after the burst; it is

smaller than the true crater (i. e., the cavity

actually formed by the explosion), because

it is covered with a layer of loose earth, rock,

etc.

Dynamic Pressure: The air pressure that results

from the mass air flow (or wind) behind the

shock front of a blast wave. It is equal to the

product of half the density of the air through

which the blast wave passes and the square

of the particle (or wind) velocity behind the

shock front as it impinges on the object or

structure.

Electromagnetic Pulse: A sharp pulse of radio

frequency (long wavelength) electromagnetic radiation produced when an explosion

occurs in an unsymmetrical environment, especially at or near the Earth’s surface or at

high altitudes. The intense electric and magnetic fields can damage unprotected electrical and electronic equipment over a large

area.

Fallout: The process or phenomenon of the descent to the Earth’s surface of particles contaminated with radioactive material from

the radioactive cloud. The term is also applied in a collective sense to the contaminated particulate matter itself. The early (or

local) fallout is defined, somewhat arbitrarily, as those particles which reach the Earth

within 24 hours after a nuclear explosion.

The delayed (or worldwide) fallout consists

of the smaller particles that ascend into the

upper troposphere and into the stratosphere

and are carried by winds to all parts of the

Earth. The delayed fallout is brought to

Earth, mainly by rain and snow, over extended periods ranging from months to

years.

Fire Storm: Stationary mass fire, generally in

built-up urban areas, causing strong, inrushing winds from all sides; the winds keep the

fires from spreading while adding fresh oxygen to increase their intensity.

Fission Products: A general term for the complex mixture of substances produced as a result of nuclear fission. A distinction should

be made between these and the direct fission products or fission fragments that are

formed by the actual splitting of the heavyelement nuclei. Something Iike 80 different

fission fragments result from roughly 40 different modes of fission of a given nuclear

species (e. g., uranium-235 or plutonium-239).

The fission fragments, being radioactive, immediately begin to decay, forming additional (daughter) products, with the result that

the complex mixture of fission products so

formed contains over 300 different isotopes

of 36 elements.

Gamma Rays (or Radiations): Electromagnetic

radiations of high photon energy originating

i n atomic nuclei and accon:panying many

nuclear reactions (e. g., fission, radioactivity,

and neutron capture). Physically, gamma

rays are identical with X-rays of high energy,

the only essential difference being that Xrays do not originate from atomic nuclei but

are produced in other ways (e. g., by slowing

down (fast) electrons of high energy).

149
750 ● The Effects of Nuclear War

Height of Burst (HOB): The height above the

Earth’s surface at which a bomb is detonated in the air. The optimum height of

burst for a particular target (or area) is that

at which it is estimated a weapon of a specified energy yield will produce a certain desired effect over the maximum possible

area.

Kiloton Energy: Defined strictly as 1 0

12 calories

(or 4.2 x 1019 ergs). This is approximately the

amount of energy that wouId be released by

the explosion of 1 kiloton (kt) (1 ,000 tons) of

TNT.

Megaton Energy: Defined strictly as 1015 calories (or 4.2 x 1022 ergs). This is approximately the amount of energy that would be released by the explosion of 1,000 kt (1 million

tons) of TNT.

Neutron: A neutral particle (i. e., with no electrical charge) of approximately unit mass, present in all atomic nuclei, except those of ordinary (light) hydrogen. Neutrons are required

to initiate the fission process, and large numbers of neutrons are produced by both fission and fusion reactions in nuclear (or

atomic) explosions.

Nuclear Radiation: Particulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei

in various nuclear processes. The important

nucIear radiations, from the weapons standpoint, are alpha and beta particles, gamma

rays, and neutrons. AlI nucIear radiations are

ionizing radiations, but the reverse is not

true. X-rays, for example, are include d

among ionizing radiations, but they are not

nuclear radiations since they do not originate from atom i c nucIei,

Nuclear Weapon (or Bomb): A general name

given to any weapon in which the explosion

results from the energy released by reactions

involving atomic nuclei, either fission or fusion or both. Thus, the A- (or atomic) bomb

and the H- (or hydrogen) bomb are both nuclear weapons. It would be equally true to

call them atomic weapons, since it is the

energy of atomic nuclei that is involved in

each case However, it has become more-orIess customary, although it is not strictly accurate, to refer to weapons in which all the

energy results from fission as A-bombs or

atomic bombs. In order to make a distinction, those weapons in which part, at least,

of the energy results from thermonuclear

(fusion) reactions of the isotopes of hydrogen have been called H-bombs or hydrogen

bombs.

Overpressure: The transient pressure, usually

expressed in pounds per square inch, exceeding the ambient pressure, manifested in

the shock (or blast) wave from an explosion.

The variation of the overpressure with time

depends on the energy yield of the explosion, the distance from the point of burst,

and the medium in which the weapon is detonated. The peak overpressure is the maximum value of the overpressure at a given

location and is generally experienced at the

instant the shock (or blast) wave reaches

that location.

Rad: A unit of absorbed dose of radiation; it

represents the absorption of 100 ergs of nuclear (or ionizing) radiation per gram of absorbing material, such as body tissue.

Rem: A unit of biological dose of radiation; the

name is derived from the initial letters of the

term “roentgen equivalent man (or mamreal). ” The number of reins of radiation is

equal to the number of rads absorbed multiplied by the relative biological effectiveness

of the given radiation (for a specified effect).

The rem is also the unit of dose equivalent,

which is equal to the product of the number

of rads absorbed and the “quality factor” of

the radiation.

Roentgen: A unit of exposure to gamma (or X)

radiation. It is defined precisely as the quantity of gamma (or X) rays that will produce

electrons (in ion pairs) with a total charge of

2.58 X 10- 4 coulomb in 1 kilogram of dry air.

An exposure of 1 roentgen results in the deposition of about 94 ergs of energy in 1 gram

of soft body tissue. Hence, an exposure of 1

roentgen is approximately equivalent to an

absorbed dose of 1 rad in soft tissue. See

Rad.

Thermal Radiation: Electromagnetic radiation

emitted (in two pulses from an air burst)

from the fireball as a consequence of its
Appendix F—Glossary ● 1 5 1

very high temperature; it consists essentialIy radiation Iies in the visible and infrared

of ultraviolet, visible, and infrared radia- regions of the spectrum, For high-aItitude

tions. I n the early stages (first pulse of an air bursts (above 100,000 feet [30,480 meters]),

burst), burst), when the temperature of the fireball the thermal radiation is emitted as a single

is extremely high, the uItraviolet radiation pulse, which is of short durartion below

predominates; i n the second puIse, the tem- about 270,000 feet [82,296 meters] but inperatures are lower and most of the thermal creases at greater burst heights