COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

Paradigm Lost

Rethinking Theater Airlift to

Support the Army After Next

DAVID W. ALLVIN

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

CADRE Paper No. 9

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

September 2000

AIR UNI V ERSITY
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Allvin, David W.

Paradigm lost : rethinking theater airlift to support the Army after next / David

W. Allvin.

p. cm. –– (CADRE paper ; no. 9)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-58566-084-1

1. Airlift, Military––United States. 2. United States. Army––Reorganization. I.

Title. II. CADRE paper ; 9.

UC333.A63 2000

358.4′17′0973––dc21 00-060594

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of

the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air

Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public

release: distribution unlimited.

ii

This CADRE Paper, and others in the series, is available electronically at the

Air University Research web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil under

“Research Papers” then “Special Collections.”
CADRE Papers

CADRE Papers are occasional publications sponsored by

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Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE).

Dedicated to promoting understanding of air and space power

theory and application, these studies are published by the Air

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Manuscripts should deal with air and/or space power history,

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Fax: (334) 953-6739

Internet: james.titus@cadre.maxwell.af.mil

iii
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Assumptions and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2 THE ARMY AFTER NEXT CONCEPT . . . . . . . . . . 5

Genesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Force Structure––The Hybrid Force . . . . . . . . . 11

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3 THE ARMY AFTER NEXT IMPLICATIONS

FOR THEATER AIRLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Austere Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Cargo-Handling Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Situational Awareness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Defensive Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

4 CURRENT THEATER AIRLIFT

CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

C-130E/H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

C-130J (and J-30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

C-17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

CH-47D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

V-22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Coming Up Short . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

5 BRIDGING THE GAP—FUTURE THEATER

AIRLIFT CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Austere Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Cargo-Handling Capability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Situational Awareness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Defensive Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

v
Chapter Page

It All Sounds Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

6 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Austere Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Cargo-Handling Capability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Situational Awareness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Defensive Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Other Key Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Illustrations

Figure

1 Decisive Operations across the Battlespace . . . . . 15

2 Robotic Transport System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

3 Loading with Double-Hinged Cargo Ramp . . . . . . 57

4 Automated Manipulator Arm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

5 Load-by-Wire Articulated Ramp . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

6 Layered Survivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Table

1 Current Theater Airlift Platform Capabilities . . . . 36

vi
Photographs

Page

Unloading the “Prime Mover” from a C-47 . . . . . . . . . 31

Boeing Tilt-Wing Advanced Theater

Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Lockheed Advanced Theater Transport . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Mobile Offshore Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

vii
Foreword

Lt Col David W. Allvin’s Paradigm Lost: Rethinking Theater

Airlift to Support the Army After Next analyzes the theater airlift implications of the United States (US) Army’s vision for

land warfare in the twenty-first century.

Those planning the “Army After Next” (AAN)—now called the

“Army Vision: The Transformation of the Army,” which is a

continuum of the AAN—envision a lighter, leaner, and more

lethal force that will rely heavily on information dominance to

maximize combat effectiveness throughout the projected nonlinear battlespace. Of chief concern in Colonel Allvin’s study

are changes in the role of theater airlift that the AAN may portend.

Colonel Allvin identifies theater airlift capabilities critical to

the AAN concept and examines emerging systems that seem

likely to furnish those capabilities. He argues that improvements in cargo handling, situational awareness, and defensive

systems—as well as the ability to operate in austere conditions—constitute the most crucial future requirements for theater airlift. Based on his analysis of currently available data,

Allvin concludes the most promising emerging systems for

achieving required theater airlift capabilities include the tiltwing concept, autonomous cargo-handling systems, and a

standoff capability for examining the suitability of opportune

landing sites.

Paradigm Lost originally was written as a master’s thesis for

Air University’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies. The

College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education

(CADRE) is pleased to publish Colonel Allvin’s study as a

CADRE Paper, thereby making it available to a wider audience

of US Air Force and sister-service thinkers and planners.

ix

JAMES R. W. TITUS

Dean of Research

Air University
About the Author

Lt Col David W. Allvin is currently serving at Headquarters

Air Mobility Command as the assistant chief, Commander’s

Action Group. He was commissioned through the United

States Air Force Academy (USAFA) in 1986. Graduating from

undergraduate pilot training in 1987, he went to fly C-12s at

Ramstein Air Base, Germany, departing in 1990 as a flight

examiner. He was then stationed at McChord Air Force Base

(AFB), Washington, as a C-141 aircraft commander, instructor

pilot, and flight examiner. In 1993 he was selected for the US

Air Force Test Pilot School at Edwards AFB, California, graduating in 1994. Among his primary test programs were the C17A and C-130J platforms. Colonel Allvin has accumulated

more than 4,000 hours in over 30 aircraft types. He has a

bachelor’s degree in astronautical engineering from the USAFA

and a master’s degree in business management from Troy

State University. Colonel Allvin is a 1999 graduate of the

School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell AFB,

Alabama.

xi
Chapter 1

Introduction

Si vis pacem, para bellum. (If you want peace, prepare

for war.)

—Roman Proverb

Since the end of the cold war, rapid and sweeping changes

in the strategic environment have forced the United States

Army (USA) to evaluate new ways to support the national military strategy. The single greatest threat against which the

force has organized, trained, and equipped no longer exists.

Amorphous, unpredictable threats have emerged in its place.

Cold war catchphrases such as the Red Bear, nuclear winter,

and the evil empire have been replaced by asymmetric operations, transnational threats, soft security issues, and cyberwar.

These terms represent threats that are not easy to visualize

and are therefore also difficult to demonize. The military has

been fighting an uphill battle to justify funding a defense force

to deal with such threats. The fiscal year (FY) defense budget

for 1998 was 3.2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP),

the lowest point since before World War II.1

In an effort to support the US engagement policy for the

twenty-first century under austere budgets, the USA embraced the Army After Next (AAN) concept—now called the

Army Vision: The Transformation of the Army, which is a continuum of the AAN. This concept is the follow-on to the Force

XXI notion, which is a transformation of the current pareddown cold war structure to a lighter, leaner force. The cornerstone of the AAN is the ability to exploit technological advances to accomplish the mission with fewer forces across the

spectrum of conflict. Accompanying this change in force structure will be an emergence of supporting concepts to include logistics and sustainment requirements. As forward basing

dwindles and the force is increasingly based in the continental United States (CONUS), the role of the US Air Force (USAF)

mobility forces will become more critical.

Currently, all USAF mobility assets are designed around the

cold war concept of operations (CONOPS). Though the C-17 is

still relatively “bright and shiny” (as of 1 January 1999 less

1
than 30 percent of the initial approved fleet had been fielded),

Congress approved it for initial developmental test and evaluation in 1981 when the cold war was still in full swing. 2 The

C-130J is the newest airlifter, but it represents a technological

facelift on an airframe design that is more than 40 years old.

In large part, the operational concepts of Air Force airlift

must evolve in concert with those of the Army. These new operational concepts will drive weapons systems procurements.

Although the AAN vision is for a force that will not be fielded

for another 25 years, procurement planning must be considered now. In the past two decades, the average lifetime of a

weapon procurement program from initial testing to fielding

has been 15 years.3 Investigating air mobility concepts to complement the AAN now will enable the Air Force to integrate

them smoothly with existing systems. As these legacy systems

end their service life, the theater airlift concept will have matured and will ease the transition from Force XXI to the Army

After Next.

This paper explores the AAN vision with specific focus on

those elements that will require a shift in the emphasis of logistics considerations. It also analyzes those new requirements to determine their airlift mobility and sustainment implications across the spectrum of future Army operations.

These requirements will dictate new capabilities the next generation of theater airlift platforms or systems must possess to

support the new Army. An evaluation of current capabilities

and USAF airlift vision will illuminate gaps between capability

and requirements. Finally, this paper introduces new theater

airlift platform and system concepts and analyzes them

against the new capability requirements derived from AAN operational concepts. In short, this paper addresses the question: What theater airlift capabilities will be critical to support

the Army After Next, and which emerging systems provide the

best path to achieve such capabilities?

Assumptions and Limitations

To frame the argument appropriately, this paper makes several assumptions. The first is that the Army will not significantly stray from its AAN vision. This statement entails subordinate assumptions. One of the contributing factors behind

the new Army vision central to the AAN and this paper is the

2

CADRE PAPER
changing strategic environment and the assumption that such

an environment will continue to exist.

Another element contributing to the formulation of the AAN

is the reduction in defense budgets. This paper assumes that

there will be no radical change in the defense spending posture of the United States. This assumption allows for fluctuations due to shifts in the balance of power in Congress and

presidential administrations. These changes may shift spending trends, but a new monolithic threat such as the Soviet

Union will not emerge to galvanize the nation and stimulate a

defense buildup similar to that of the cold war.

Another major assumption is that the current technological

trends will continue, and any shortfalls as they relate to the

AAN concept will not significantly alter the strategic path. One

challenge accompanying long-range planning is to reduce the

impact of interim environmental perturbations on the accomplishment of the ultimate aims. This challenge is magnified for

the AAN because of the unprecedented rate of technological

change. As this paper periodically demonstrates, much of the

foundation of the AAN concepts is based on predicted technological advances. This paper assumes that even if technology

does not completely fulfill expectations, the end result will be

a concept that closely resembles the AAN and its requirement

for theater airlift.

The success of the AAN concept relies heavily on both strategic and tactical mobility. Several futuristic strategic mobility

concepts (e.g., the Lockheed Advanced Mobility Aircraft, USAF

Strategic Mobility Aircraft, transatmospheric vehicles, and fast

ships) are worthy of study and debate as they relate to the AAN.

Technological advances will allow greater cross-utilization of

theater and strategic mobility assets. To examine its topic with

sufficient depth, this paper is limited to the discussion of future theater airlift requirements. Strategic mobility is not completely avoided but is viewed as a secondary advantage in the

fulfillment of AAN theater mobility requirements.

In investigating and evaluating future airlift concepts and

their adequacy in supporting the Army After Next, this study

does not deliver a detailed cost assessment. This is not to say

that cost is disregarded as a factor when considering options.

However, because most of the programs and concepts are still

in the think-tank phase, a detailed cost analysis would be inappropriate. Instead, the criteria used to evaluate the adequacy of future airlift systems are mission capabilities. These

3

ALLVIN
capability criteria include austere operations, cargo-handling

capability, situational awareness, and defensive systems.

Notes

1. US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States,

1998 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1998), 358; and

US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1980

(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1981), 366.

2. Charles L. Johnson, “Acquisition of the C-17 Aircraft: A Historical

Account,” Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) student paper (Maxwell

AFB, Ala.: ACSC, April 1986), xvii.

3. Jacques S. Gansler, Defense Conversion: Transforming the Arsenal of

Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), 10.

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Chapter 2

The Army After Next Concept

Where there is no vision, the people perish.

—The Holy Bible

––King James Version, Proverbs 29:18

The Army After Next vision is intended to be more than

merely a technology-based strategy for future land warfare. It

is a holistic framework designed to reshape methods for the

conduct of all future US Army operations. Some of these

changes will directly affect the airlift capabilities required to

support and sustain such an army. This chapter presents a

synopsis of the genesis of the AAN concept, describes the fundamental scope of the project and assumptions therein, gives

notional force structure, and lays out a rough sketch of the

CONOPS in a future employment scenario. This primer is important because it provides the “what” and “how” of future operations as seen by the AAN planners and establishes the

foundation for the derivation of theater airlift capabilities necessary to support the vision.

Genesis

In February 1996 amid the force downsizing, defense budget

reductions, and an intimidating Quadrennial Defense Review,

Army Chief of Staff Dennis J. Reimer tasked the US Army

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop a longrange strategic vision. Specifically, he tasked TRADOC to

“conduct broad studies of warfare to about the year 2025 to

frame issues vital to the US Army after about 2010, and to

provide those issues to senior Army leadership in a format

suitable for integration into TRADOC development programs.”1

This tasking signified the birth of the AAN project and later

became the project’s official mission statement. The project

rapidly expanded, and by year’s end involved more than two

hundred planners and representatives from all areas of the

Department of Defense (DOD).2 This rapid start provided the

project with the visibility and legitimacy it needed to leap into

such a potentially controversial endeavor.

5
One of the possible sources of controversy stemmed from

the fact that the Army was already pursuing a force modernization program in the Force XXI project. USA planners believed that this effort was not enough to ensure the maintenance of the Army’s status as the world’s elite fighting force

well into the twenty-first century, and cited three reasons for

a new approach.3 First, Force XXI was designed to integrate

new technologies with the current systems. Even with modifications, the systems built in the 1980s will have completed

their usable service life by 2010. Second, the pace of technology suggests that it will not only change military hardware but

also the organizations around which it is built. Force XXI initiatives primarily affect information systems and equipment,

with significantly less attention paid to structure. Third, the

planners felt that the rapidly changing geopolitical environment will eventually produce one or more “major competitors.”

This term intentionally does not mean “peer competitor,” but

rather a power that will be strong enough to require something

more than obsolescent equipment to challenge it.4

Scope

In an effort to avoid the “technology trap” and develop a comprehensive study, the AAN project organized around four basic

research areas: the geostrategic setting, human and organizational issues, evolution of military art, and technology trends.5

Geostrategic Environment. As expected in an endeavor that

entails looking to the future, USA planners were forced to make

some assumptions about the nature of the security environment in 2025. Among the most important were the following:

• The international system will continue to be based on a

nation-state power base where sovereignty counts.

• Most armies will continue to exist to fight other armies.

• By 2025, there will be at least one major security competitor.6

As with any assumption, the validity of the list above is certainly open for debate. However, the inclusion of these assumptions is solely for the purpose of presenting an accurate

framework within which the AAN concepts have emerged.

Human and Organizational Issues. The value of the technological advances and equipment improvements for the AAN

will rest heavily on structure and personnel. With this in

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CADRE PAPER
mind, the AAN team developed the Army Imperatives, described as “an institutional culture that is receptive to change

and a broad framework for managing the change.”7 Three of

the six imperatives (force mix, material, and doctrine) pertain

to the organizational constructs, and three (quality people,

leader development, and training) address personnel issues.8

Among organizational challenges identified by the AAN are

providing “flat” organizations, streamlining producer-to-user

distribution systems, and effectively integrating an expanded

civilianized/contracted force. These organizational imperatives

were developed under the rubric of combat support, where the

AAN focuses primarily on efficiency.9 Research objectives regarding human elements include soldier selection methods,

“cognitive congruity” between the digitized systems and human

mental structures, and biomedical intervention studies attempting to maximize mental and physical performance.10

Evolution of Military Art. Military art applies to the entire

realm of warfare from strategic planning to tactical application. The AAN’s focus is primarily operational art, which is

subsumed by military art. Operational art is the ability to integrate “key activities at all levels of war” and ensure that tactical victories lead to the attainment of strategic objectives.11

With this in mind, the AAN project team identified “evolution

of military art” as one of the four focused research areas. This

area addresses the application of principles of war in ways

that maximize the potential of emerging technologies within

the projected future geostrategic environment.12 The primary

elements that make up this link between technology and the

environment are the characteristics of the force structure and

the CONOPS.

The AAN hybrid force idea integration team (IIT) was created

to conduct research into both future force structure and operational concepts. This team conducts feasibility assessments

of AAN concepts based on emerging technological advances. It

also works with the Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency (DARPA), the Army Research Lab, and industry experts to exploit new technologies and create “spin on” military

capabilities. Such coordination aids in redefining force structure and characteristics. The hybrid force IIT investigates future concepts of force employment to include fire support,

mounted and dismounted operations, and maneuver support.13 By continuously updating and refining concepts

against the backdrop of an evolving new strategic environ7

ALLVIN
ment, the AAN is attempting to account for unpredictability in

the face of unanticipated technological advances. As a senior

TRADOC staff officer put it, “With technological progress, organizational changes are (or should be) inevitable. . . . It is not

proven that organizations and doctrine based on the M1A2

tank will be obsolete by 2020; it seems prudent, though, to

forecast what effect emerging technologies might have on the

way the future Army fights.”14

Technology Trends. While making a concerted effort to develop a comprehensive long-term vision, the AAN team realizes

that technological advances will be necessary if such bold

thinking is to bear fruit.15 One risk inherent in staking a longrange plan on something as unpredictable as technology is the

potential cost of being wrong. This possibility is very real for

the AAN. In an attempt to mitigate such an eventuality, the

AAN team has taken steps beyond pursuing traditional hardware improvements and seeks out emerging technologies that

exploit advantages in operational concepts as well as tactical

engagements. The annual reports to the Army chief of staff

clearly define the two central themes of the AAN as knowledge

and speed. To support these themes, there are three main

areas in which technology is being actively pursued: information systems, materials, and logistics capabilities.16

One technological category that the AAN is most dependent

upon (and appears most blissfully optimistic about) is information systems. Exploitation of information technology is the

cornerstone of the AAN concept, as well as the joint vision. The

AAN definition of information dominance coincides exactly with

the Joint Vision 2010 definition of information superiority: “The

capability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”17 In this arena, the AAN project is pursuing technologies that will acquire and process

significant amounts of information, as well as robust capabilities to minimize vulnerabilities. For example, while future intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems will

integrate heavily with space-based assets, the AAN is pursuing such alternative concepts as advanced unmanned aerial

vehicles (UAV) and anti-UAV technologies for situations in

which space systems might be degraded.18 Such redundant

systems are intended to protect the “unblinking eye” of surveillance against potential asymmetric threats, thus preserving the information advantage.19

8

CADRE PAPER
“Data correlated becomes information. Information converted into situational awareness becomes knowledge.

Knowledge used to predict the consequences of actions leads

to understanding. Thus the cognitive hierarchy.”20 To provide

the necessary situational awareness, the AAN project is investing in “advanced information processing, employing automatic filters, decision support aids, comparative analysis, and

distributed by multiple communications routes, . . . the means

by which information is turned quickly into knowledge.”21

Such an investment might indeed be worthwhile, but the goal

of turning information into knowledge might be somewhat

lofty. As one Army officer who played on the enemy “red” team

in an AAN war game put it, “Even with a dramatic improvement in the ability to ‘see’ the battlefield, it will remain possible to ‘show’ a course of action and then do something else.

Time, speed, and distance factors will then determine if the

target of the deception can react fast enough to counter the

true intent.”22

Materials technology investments have many different applications in the AAN vision, but the primary product is weight

reduction. The mission-need statement the USA presented in

1996 for an Abrams tank replacement called for a 40 percent

weight reduction.23 To achieve such a reduction while maintaining sufficient protection will require significant advances

in composite materials. The smaller advanced fighting vehicle

concept will also exploit materials technology, not only in its

lighter weight (15–20 tons) but also through the use of lowobservable (LO) technology.24 As information technologies

most directly support the central theme of “knowledge,” so

material technology supports “speed,” especially when coupled

with advances in propulsion. With more power underneath a

lighter frame, the goal of the advanced fighting vehicle is a 120

kilometer-per-hour road speed.25 In addition to increased

power, the AAN looks to propulsion technology to provide efficiencies well beyond current systems. Assuming they are

achievable, such efficiencies can significantly reduce the logistic tail required for force sustainment.

Changes in the strategic environment resulting in reduced

forward-basing capability highlight the importance of a more

streamlined logistics system with a smaller footprint. The

changes required are so broad and sweeping that the concept

of a revolution in military logistics (RML) has been accepted as

a prerequisite for achieving the desired capabilities of the

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ALLVIN
AAN.26 Investigations into future logistics requirements primarily focus on the logistics principles of responsiveness, sustainability, and survivability.27

Responsiveness, or providing “the right support in the right

place at the right time,”28 presents a greater challenge to a

largely CONUS-based force than to one that is forward deployed. Providing the right support to the right place requires

knowledge of the location and status of supplies and weapon

systems. The AAN is pursuing advances in information technology and refinement of total asset visibility (TAV) projects

currently under way to provide this knowledge.29 By merging

this concept with the organizational imperative regarding “flattening” the command structure, the project is looking to new

technologies such as “brilliant” computer cards and database

replication to push logistic situational awareness down to the

soldier level.30 Determination of the appropriate level of information throughout the chain of command will be necessary to

make this flattening effective.

Providing the support at the right time requires agile systems capable of rapid response. Many of the technological endeavors in the fields of materials and propulsion will have a direct impact on logistics. Any system that can be made lighter

can be more easily transported. Likewise, reducing the size of

equipment provides the opportunity to move more of it by a

given mode of transportation. The pursuit of weight reduction

in fighting vehicles, precision munitions, and power sources

supports a more effective logistics system while enhancing

maneuverability. Such advances in materials and propulsion

will not only affect the fighting equipment but the systems designed to transport them as well. “A logistician that cannot

keep up or see the friendly forces, cannot adequately support.

If the combat platforms dramatically increase in speed and

maneuver, support vehicles must have commensurate improvement. The two systems are inextricably linked.”31 With

this in mind, the AAN has spelled out the need for speed and

mobility in its tactical combat support elements, as well as enhancements in ultrafast sealift and airlift. “Although the Army

is not directly responsible for the last two, no service has a

greater interest in them.”32

Technologies related to responsiveness and sustainability

are complementary in nature. Fossil fuel improvements and

alternatives, lighter armor and automotive materials, and

lighter precision munitions not only reduce the logistics foot10

CADRE PAPER
print but also provide for greater efficiency and reduced sustainment requirements. To enhance sustainability further, the

AAN project is addressing maintenance issues through the

concept of “ultrareliability” needed to support the fielded

forces. The goal is to give operators of all systems the capability to repair most equipment. This concept will require onboard spares and technical instructions for repair work. The

technology piece to this puzzle consists of developing “capabilities for anticipatory maintenance-self-diagnostics, programmable sensors, failure warning, etc.”33

Survivability implications of combat equipment on the logistics system are apparent. The longer a system can last in combat, the less will be the ongoing sustainment requirements. The

AAN is pursuing technologies in LO material, active protection

systems, and advanced missile defense systems to enhance system survivability.34 However, as a principle of logistics, survivability speaks to the “capacity of the [logistics] organization to

prevail in the face of potential destruction.”35 The best way to

ensure survival is to keep critical components of the system out

of harm’s way. “Although the United States should enjoy dominant battlefield awareness, there is a recognition that centers of

gravity and critical points need to be reduced. For logisticians,

this will provide additional incentive to avoid large static piles of

material within the battlespace. Tactical and operational logisticians will ‘reach back’ as far as necessary, even to the CONUS

base, to fulfill requirements while keeping the battlespace logistical footprint small.”36 Coming full circle, this aspect of survivability must compete with the principle of responsiveness. The

AAN seeks advances in airlift, coupled with increased logistical

situational awareness to provide the projection and sustainment capabilities, while decreasing system exposure to attack.37

Force Structure—The Hybrid Force

The hybrid force of 2025 will be forged from a range of

functions, force structures, and capabilities spanning

20–25 years, from modernized AOE [Army of Excellence]

organizations to AAN battle forces, each optimized for a

specific set of missions and circumstances, but adaptable to meet a broad range of conditions.

—Knowledge and Speed 1998

––Training and Doctrine Command

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One of the primary threads running through the AAN vision

is the necessity to integrate force structure through the age of

rapid technological change. In doing this, there is a risk of limiting potential through incremental change. To avoid such

detrimental compromise, the AAN has conceptualized the future force structure by dividing it into three discrete entities.

The Army of Excellence (AOE) represents the current force

structure. Force XXI is a projected force structure for the

2010–15 time frame. The AAN force is planning to make its

concept fully operational by 2025. The distinguishing features

of each are the technology-enhanced capabilities and the operational concepts by which the force will be employed. The

AAN project monitors the developments of each and contributes to the integration of concepts. The ultimate goal is to

maximize the capabilities of the hybrid force at every stage of

its development.

The current AOE force structure is largely a product of the

modernization program of the 1980s. Developed during the

cold war era, the force emphasizes mass and overwhelming

firepower. With the technology of the time, these characteristics of the mechanized force came at the cost of maneuverability and strategic mobility. With the abundance of forward

basing at the time, strategic mobility was not a significant

issue. The present force has made technological advances but

must be lighter and more strategically mobile if the United

States is to continue with its policy of engagement.

Force XXI “aims to exploit information technologies in order

to fight more efficiently and maintain higher performance levels in both good conditions and bad.”38 Advanced war-fighting

experiments (AWE) such as the “digitization of the battlefield”

have been under way for several years and are yielding results

that will enhance future systems.39 These systems, which will

be lighter and faster than the current AOE structure, are designed to be integrated in a comprehensive operational concept. The idea is to make Force XXI “more of a process than a

‘force’ in that the incorporation of information technologies

opens the door to new and innovative ways to perform military

tasks.”40 Force XXI will attempt to bridge the gap between

aging AOE systems and newly arriving AAN systems.

The AAN force structure represents the final stage of the

metamorphosis. The planners’ hope is to field elite forces possessing capabilities made possible by technologies either just

now emerging or not yet existent. Such forces will have strate12

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gic strike capability accompanied by exceptional speed and

lethality. These will be known as the Battle Forces.41 The most

capable Force XXI forces will provide the second echelon

strength of the AAN. These medium weight assets will be the

maturing systems fielded in the 2010 time frame and will

make up the Strike Forces.42 The leading edge of today’s force

structure will comprise the heaviest system, requiring the

greatest logistics and sustainment requirements. These forces

will serve as the Campaign Forces in the AAN concept of the

hybrid force.43 Each will fulfill a specific role in the projected

concept of operations in 2025.

Concept of Operations

The AAN is developing an operational concept for its hybrid

force that will provide significant effectiveness throughout the

life cycle of a conflict. This concept is elaborated through the

six patterns of operations developed by TRADOC to characterize land combat in the twenty-first century.44 These patterns

(project the force, protect the force, gain information dominance, shape the environment/set conditions for success, conduct decisive operations, and sustain the force) are “mutually

supportive and nonsequential. They are conducted simultaneously and continuously through all phases of conflict.”45 It is

within each of these patterns that the AAN seeks advantages.

Project the Force. From the end of World War II to the end

of the cold war, the Army’s ability to project the force was facilitated by the availability of forward basing. Today’s environment does not allow such forward presence, forcing the Army

to deploy largely from CONUS. To accommodate this deployment requirement, the AAN is developing the concept of revolutionary strategic mobility. Its technology strategy is in line

with this concept, as its weight reduction would reduce the

strategic airlift burden. In addition, the AAN is pushing for

technologies in fast ships and ultraheavy airlifters to assist in

the force projection role. The Battle Forces will be the first elements deployed, arriving rapidly with the lethality and maneuverability designed to accomplish “strategic preclusion” (deterring further provocative action by a demonstration of will and

capability). This potential flexible deterrent cannot be accomplished organically, and the AAN realizes that “the primary responsibility for projecting the Army of 2025 will rest solidly on

advanced deployment capabilities resident in the U.S. Air Force

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and Navy.”46 For success, such a scheme would necessitate an

expeditionary mind-set and require either a radical reduction

in logistics buildup or tremendous strategic mobility.

The Strike Forces will follow the Battle Forces during projection. The Strike Forces will not be as nimble, but the technologies forged during the Force XXI era will produce a combat capability with high maneuverability and a lean logistics

tail. These forces will assist the Battle Forces in shaping the

environment. Finally, the Campaign Forces will arrive intheater to provide increased strength and staying power to the

hybrid force.

Protect the Force. To accomplish this difficult task, the

AAN is placing emphasis on information systems ranging from

human intelligence to complex ISR capabilities. These systems

will allow the AAN to identify potential asymmetric threats

against vital systems. In addition, planners are calling for an

improved missile defense system to mitigate weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) threats, claiming that “for U.S. Joint Forces

in 2025, few technological challenges will be as important as

creating an effective missile defense” (emphasis in original).47

Gain Information Dominance. This area is critical because

information dominance must not only be attained but also

maintained. The multilayered systems that are proposed present daunting tasks of fusing, processing, analysis, and dissemination. Through this network of systems, there must be

multilayered situational awareness, which means decision

makers must know if they are operating in an environment of

information dominance. If they are not, they must be aware of

which information systems are under attack and adjust their

perception of operations accordingly.48

Shape the Environment/Set Conditions for Success.

This pattern is suited for all phases of conflict. As a potential

conflict emerges, Army special operations forces (ARSOF) will

be uniquely qualified to operate within the specified region

and be a valuable resource to the joint force commander.

Before hostilities, rapid deployments and demonstrations of

force will be exercised to improve the chances of strategic

preclusion as well as for battle preparation. During combat

operations, the AAN foresees operations to maintain dominance in all areas, with special emphasis on information and

degradation of the enemy’s precision strike capability.49

Conduct Decisive Operations. Through the force projection

strategy, the AAN plan is to be postured to take advantage of

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opportunities for swift and decisive victory as well as to prepare

for extended operations. Extended operations do not mean attrition warfare. In fact, one of the underlying premises of the

AAN is that due to the preponderance of high-value assets, attrition warfare must be avoided.50 In extended conflicts,

Campaign, Strike, and Battle Forces will operate synergistically

against enemy objectives. Information dominance will provide

commanders a picture of enemy positions and capabilities, giving them the advantage of directing each element against the

type of objective for which it is best suited. Figure 1 illustrates

the way in which several combat elements can be positioned to

provide strike potential against several different objectives.

The most capable units of this hybrid force will be the Battle

Forces. These forces will possess an unprecedented combination of maneuver and lethality, made possible primarily

through near vertical maneuver. “At the tactical level, AAN research indicates that speed must be increased by a factor of

two or more to overcome the strength of a knowledge- and precision-based defense . . . achieving this level of improvement

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Source: TRADOC briefing slides, on-line, Internet, 5 March 1999. Available from

http://www.monroe.army.mil/dcsdoc/fbdaan/briefings/aan/aanslidepool/newmodule/knowledge&speed.ppt.

Figure 1. Decisive Operations across the Battlespace
will only be possible by rotating the traditional two-dimensional orientation of forces into the vertical dimension.”51

When combined with information dominance, this increased

tactical mobility provides the foundation for a new, nonlinear

battlespace environment. Small maneuver units will possess

the advantages of traditional concept of mass (increased

lethality), without its traditional drawbacks (lack of agility).

One other vulnerability commanders will be able to mitigate is

exposure. The maneuverable Battle Forces will be dispersed,

thus decreasing the probability of detection. Through enhanced battlespace awareness, the commander can synchronize the forces, mass combat effects, and disperse the units to

increase survivability. Through the successful orchestration of

move-strike-move throughout the battlespace, “Battle Force

operations will resemble an ambush dynamic.”52

Sustain the Force. The success of sustaining the AAN operations will depend heavily on the much-needed revolution in

military logistics. The AAN planners are attempting to tackle

the problem in two ways: increase the efficiency of the logistics

system and decrease the requirements for logistics. Efforts for

increased efficiency include improved command and control

systems and better in-transit visibility. Both of these pursuits

will rely on information technology improvements to achieve

the desired capabilities and on information dominance to

maintain those capabilities during AAN operations.53 The importance of logistic efficiency to operational success and the

dependence on unproven capabilities highlight the risk involved in formulation of the AAN concept.

Sustaining the Battle Forces of the AAN will also present

unique challenges. In order to increase survivability, the

ground forces will be dispersed when they are not engaged.

The airlift system responsible for maneuvering the units will

become the primary line of resupply at the dispersed locations.

“The constant massing and demassing of forces is possible

only with the maturation of the operational concepts of Joint

Vision 2010 and the necessary technology. It suggests that the

bulk of critical logistical support (fix, fuel, arm) [is] provided

during those times when the battle force is demassed. It suggests that logistical support forces will have many of the characteristics of the battle forces.”54

One such characteristic is increased survivability. Future resupply operations will be conducted throughout the battlespace,

16

CADRE PAPER
not confined to the safe areas on the friendly side of the forward

line of own troops (FLOT), as is the case with current doctrine.

Summary

The Army After Next is a far-reaching concept that relies

heavily on emerging technologies. To the planners’ credit,

they have realized that technology is only as good as the system in which it operates. With this in mind, the AAN team has

created a vision for the entire system, to include the world in

which the technologies will exist (geostrategic environment),

the use of the technologies (evolution in military art), as well

as the users (human and organizational issues). With these

primary areas of interest in mind, the AAN project is attempting to provide a path for successful application of land

power in support of national objectives well into the twentyfirst century.

As holistic as this concept may be, it is still heavily dependent on technology for its success. Among the major areas of

technological pursuit are information systems, materials and

propulsion, and logistics. As the concepts of operations evolve,

the logistics concepts must evolve with them. Advances in the

conduct of patterns of operations by light, lethal Battle Forces

allow orchestrated concentration and dispersal during combat

operations. These advances drive new sustainment requirements for those forces.

Notes

1. Quoted in Robert B. Killebrew, “The Army After Next: Defining Future

Landpower Challenges,” Army, February 1998, 23.

2. Anne W. Chapman et al., Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview

of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973–1998, chap. 6, “Doctrinal

Renaissance,” 1998, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 23 February 1999, available from

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/historian/pubs/TRADOC25/chap6.htm.

3. Robert B. Killebrew, “The Army After Next; TRADOC’s Crystal Ball

Eyes the Service’s Shape Beyond Force XXI,” Armed Forces Journal

International, October 1996, 38.

4. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Knowledge and

Speed: The 1997 Annual Report on the Army After Next Project to the Chief of

Staff of the Army, July 1997, n.p. Hereinafter referred to as Knowledge and

Speed 1997; on-line, Internet, 23 February 1999, available at “Papers” from

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/dcsdoc/fbdaan/aamframe.htm.

5. Ibid., 1.

6. Killebrew, “The Army After Next; TRADOC’s Crystal Ball,” 44.

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7. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed: Battle Force and the U.S. Army of

2025, The 1998 Annual Report on the Army After Next Project to the Chief of

Staff of the Army (Fort Monroe, Va.: TRADOC, 1998), 37. Hereinafter referred

to as Knowledge and Speed 1998.

8. Ibid., 39–41.

9. See “The Human and Organizational Characteristics of AAN (2025)”

within the “Knowledge & Speed” slide pool, 20 February 1999, available at

“Briefings” from http://www.tradoc.army.mil/dcsdoc/fbdaan/aanframe.htm.

10. Michael Drillings, “Enhancing Soldier Performance: The Core of

Combat Effectiveness” briefing slide no. 8, 8 June 1998, on-line, Internet,

23 February 1999, available on “SRO Briefings” at “Projects” from

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/dcsdoc/fbdaan/aanframe.htm.

11. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February

1995, GL-10.

12. Ibid., II-1.

13. James G. Bray, “Army After Next Hybrid Force IIT,” briefing, 4 January

1999, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 22 February 1999, available at “Hybrid Force IIT

Project Room” at “Projects” from http://www.tradoc.army.mil/dcsdoc/fbdaan/aanframe.htm.

14. Killebrew, “The Army After Next; TRADOC’s Crystal Ball,” 37.

15. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1997, “Technology: The Path to

Knowledge and Speed.”

16. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1998, A-6, A-7.

17. Ibid., 23; and Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of

Staff, 1995), 10.

18. Joint Vision 2010, 25.

19. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1997.

20. Jeffrey Cooper, “DBK and Future War,” in Dominant Battlespace

Knowledge, ed. Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C. Libicki (Washington D.C.:

National Defense University Press, 1996), 89.

21. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1998, 24.

22. John M. House, “The Enemy After Next,” Military Review,

March–April 1998, 23.

23. Jason Sherman, “21st Century Tank,” Armed Forces Journal

International, October 1996, 48.

24. Daniel Bourgoine, “AAN FY98 Insights Brief,” 24 February 1999,

slide no. 22, on-line, Internet, 28 February 1999, available from “Briefings”

at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/dcsdoc/fbdaan/aanframe.htm.

25. Ibid.

26. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1998, 28.

27. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, 27 January

1995, II-1.

28. Ibid.

29. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1998, B-9.

30. Ibid., B-12.

31. Col Gary J. Motsek, USA, “Logistic Support to the Army After Next

Warfighters: A Time for Fundamental Change,” in AY 97 Compendium Army

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After Next Project, ed. Douglas V. Johnson II (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.:

Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 96.

32. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1997.

33. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1998, 29.

34. Ibid., A-6.

35. JP 4-0, II-3.

36. Motsek, 99.

37. Ibid., 37.

38. “Land Forces,” Strategic Assessment 1996: Elements of US Power,

n.d., n.p.; on-line, Internet, 23 February 1999, available from 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa96/sa96ch14.html#subhead2.

39. Mark Hanna, “Task Force XXI: The Army’s Digital Experiment,” in

Strategic Forum 119, July 1997, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 17 February 1999,

available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum119.html.

40. Earl H. Tilford, reviewing the paper of Gen David M. Maddox, USA,

National Defense into the 21st Century: Defining the Issues, 6 June 1997,

n.p.; on-line, Internet, 22 February 1999, available from http://carlislewww.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs97/natdefns/defnsp2.htm.

41. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1998, 17.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 18.

44. “Characteristics of Force XXI Operations,” Land Combat in the 21st

Century, n.d., n.p.; on-line, Internet, 24 February 1999, available from

http://www-tradoc.army.mil/text/landcmbt.htm.

45. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1998, 19.

46. Ibid., 20.

47. Ibid., 22.

48. Ibid., 23.

49. Ibid., 25.

50. Killebrew, “The Army After Next; TRADOC’s Crystal Ball,” 45.

51. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1998, 15.

52. Ibid., 27.

53. Ibid., 29.

54. Motsek, 102.

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Chapter 3

The Army After Next Implications

for Theater Airlift

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in

the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt

themselves after the changes occur.

—Giulio Douhet

Army After Next concept developers envision a significant

transformation in the composition of forces and the makeup of

the battlespace. Despite this, the fundamental logistics function of “planning and executing the movement and sustainment of operating forces in the execution of a military strategy

and operations” will still exist.1 It is very likely that the future

challenges will be greater. The increased complexity of the environment will demand a sophisticated logistics support structure in which precision and anticipation will take the place of

stockpiling and surplus. The nature of the changes that must

occur for implementation of the theater airlift piece of this new

logistics system is derived from the changes that will take

place in operational employment of the AAN hybrid force.

The concept of vertical envelopment is a shift in operational

employment that will require a significant change in logistical

support. Vertical envelopment involves using airborne assets

to transport combat forces rapidly into positions most advantageous for massing fires. Primarily, the Battle Forces will accomplish this movement, allowing them to “use ground tactically without relying on it for mobility.”2 Reorienting maneuver

into the third dimension implies moving entire fighting units.

Granted, the Battle Forces will have a significantly better

weight to firepower ratio than the current force, but such a

shift in transportation medium will put substantially more reliance on airlift. This shift represents an expansion of current

air assault operations and the role theater airlift will play in

combat maneuver.

To accomplish vertical envelopment, airlift must be able to

place the Battle Forces at or near the required location to optimize fire synchronization and effects massing. Because the

objective areas will often lie in regions far from prepared run21
ways, the airlift system must be sufficiently robust to deliver

combat power to austere locations.

By its very nature, dispersal places an increased burden on

resupply efforts. Though each element requires fewer supplies, there are more destinations to support. Airlift doctrine

currently proposes a “hub and spoke” concept in which supplies are delivered to a single location, then distributed

throughout the theater as needed.3 Future sustainment operations will require a system in which a single platform can deliver to several operating locations throughout the battlespace.

Such an employment concept implies an increased exposure

time for the sustainment platform. Also, the dynamic nature

of the battlespace will necessitate greater flexibility on the part

of the delivery system to account for situational changes that

may occur during mission execution.

The changes in operational concept in the AAN do not alter

the fundamental requirement for logistical support. The principles of logistics as described in Joint Publication (JP) 4-0,

Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, will remain

valid. Responsiveness will continue to be the keystone, but

survivability and flexibility in airlift operations will increase

significantly in importance.4 These logistics principles can also

be defined as characteristics of an effective theater airlift support system. In evaluating airlift platforms, it is useful to identify capabilities required to exhibit the desired characteristics

of the system. This paper identifies and analyzes four capabilities: austere operations, cargo-handling capability, situational awareness, and defensive systems.

Austere Operations

Aircraft operations were born in an austere environment.

The Wright brothers first took flight in a field at Kitty Hawk.

The very name “airfield” implies a patch of pasture that accommodates airplanes. The evolution of propulsion technology

and aerofoil design brought with them the promise of increased lift capability. The demand for more payload capacity

expanded at a greater rate than propulsion and wing technology, requiring increased takeoff and landing distance. Largely

because of this phenomenon, the airfield has grown from a

piece of open and cleared land to the 15,000-foot runways

with sprawling concrete taxi and parking areas built to support the intercontinental bomber force.

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As airfields grew in size and complexity, they developed an

inherent weakness. The combination of high value assets and

a fixed location made them lucrative targets. Such early airpower theorists as Guilio Douhet recognized the importance of

attacking the enemy air forces on the ground in an effort to

“kill the eggs in the nest.”5 AAN theater airlift operations at

austere locations will reduce this vulnerability, as airfields will

be temporary and will resemble those in use during the infancy of powered flight. Two specific capabilities will be required for aircraft to succeed in operations at austere locations: super short takeoff and landing (SSTOL) capability and

the ability to identify adequate opportune landing sites (OLS).

Super Short Takeoff and Landing

The call for a theater transport aircraft with reduced runway

requirements went out long before the development of the AAN

concept. The C-130 has been the mainstay of theater airlift

throughout its service life. Experiences in Vietnam illustrated

the value of the payload capacity of the C-130 and the desire

to operate out of smaller airfields.6 In the early 1980s, the persistence of low intensity conflict throughout the world called

attention to the importance of tactical airlift. This was especially evident in the development of AirLand Battle Doctrine. In

studying such airlift requirements, “exceptional takeoff and

landing performance” was identified. “Under today’s emerging

doctrine and even more so under future concepts, the need to

rapidly move and resupply units and their equipment on a

battlefield indicates that the flexibility of landing at almost any

location will probably be a high priority requirement.”7

With the demise of the cold war, several studies concerning

future tactical airlift also identified the need for significant improvements in runway performance. The assumptions about future operations that drove these recommendations were similar

to those envisioned by AAN planners: nonlinear battlespace, increased dependence on maneuver, and deep strike operations.8

Though the concept of SSTOL is relatively easy to grasp, the

capability is more difficult to quantify. Runway requirements

for conventional airlift aircraft vary with gross weight. Aircraft

advertising short takeoff and landing (STOL) capability claim

operational capabilities on runways of approximately fifteen

hundred feet. SSTOL provides a measure of significant distinction between STOL and vertical takeoff and landing

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(VTOL). Runway distance requirements for aircraft in this category vary, but for this paper SSTOL capability will be associated with runway operations into locations of less than one

thousand feet.

From a purely logical standpoint, it would appear that

SSTOL is still a second-best solution to VTOL transport. VTOL

is not new to the airlift world and has been an integral part of

land combat mobility and sustainment in the form of the helicopter. The CH-47D Chinook (and MH-47E variant) serves as

the current frontline Army transport helicopter. It is a very capable platform, able to lift more than 36,000 pounds of fuel

and cargo.9 The V-22 Osprey is the newest vertical short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft, able to lift a fuel and cargo

load of nearly 44,000 pounds.10 Though each of these aircraft

has formidable lift capacity, they possess neither the required

cargo compartment dimensions nor the lift capability to support the AAN concepts of maneuver and sustainment.

Changing the body shape and increasing the shaft horsepower

required to improve the lift capacity on propeller-powered

VTOL airframes have significant implications for disc loading

on the propellers and foreign object damage (FOD) due to increased downwash.11 SSTOL offers the promise of fulfilling the

Army’s future requirement to deliver 30 tons into a runway of

750 feet or less without the added difficulties associated with

vertical lift operations.12 One disadvantage accompanying a

SSTOL option is that the need for a ground roll necessitates a

degree of smoothness and firmness on the landing site not required for VTOL operations. Such a requirement increases the

difficulty in identifying suitable landing surfaces.

Opportune Landing Sites

Finding a patch of land the right size to accommodate takeoff and landing is essential, but it represents only part of the

solution to austere operations. To be suitable, the surface at

the site must have certain characteristics. One that is critical

to safe operations is the absence of any significant obstacle

along the takeoff and landing area. Such an obstacle could

pose a threat to the landing gear and render aircraft inoperable.13 In unprepared landing areas, obstacles might not be

readily visible, especially in areas with low-lying vegetation.

Obstacles do not have to be prominent to be harmful.14

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In addition to obstacles, the type and condition of the soil is

of paramount importance. Soil that has a large amount of silt

will not withstand an aircraft’s weight as well as a hardpacked surface and will cause the aircraft to sink slightly. The

sinkage results in a larger surface around the tires, increasing

the coefficient of friction and requiring more power (and distance) to achieve takeoff speed. Currently, the standard unit

of measurement for aircraft weight bearing capacity of surfaces is known as the California Bearing Ratio (CBR). To ensure safe operations at austere locations, it will be necessary

to obtain the CBR or an equivalent to assess site adequacy.15

Information on the suitability of austere locations will be required on relatively short notice. It would be ideal to have an

existing, accurate global database on hand for operational

planning and execution. In reality, such an idea is not feasible

for several reasons. First, creation of a database to include all

(or even most) potential sites would most likely be cost prohibitive. Second, potential future enemies would certainly balk

at the idea of a US site survey for combat support operations

on their sovereign territory. Third, the value of such a

prepackaged database would diminish over time. Seasonal climatic changes, precipitation, animal migratory behavior, and

human activities are but a few of the variables that would require frequent updates. Therefore, analytical tools must be in

place to respond quickly to changes in the prosecution of the

battle. Identification of several potential suitable landing sites

based on the existing disposition of forces and scheme of maneuver will provide the commander more flexibility in operational decision making.

Cargo-Handling Capability

To exploit the advantages gained through austere airfield

operations, cargo delivery systems must be both fast and efficient. The ultimate measure of merit in sustainment operations is safe, timely delivery. Resupplying AAN forces in dispersed locations will present significant challenges for future

theater airlift forces. Aircrews can expect to service several

destinations on a given mission, requiring more time in a hostile environment. Rapid loading and unloading of cargo at each

destination will minimize ground time, when aircraft potentially will be most vulnerable. “Austere and hastily prepared

landing sites in the future will not have the right amounts and

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types of traditional materials handling equipment needed to

unload the ATT [Advanced Theater Transport], and unloading

operations in exposed forward sites must be accomplished

quickly in order to reduce risks to the ATT, its crew, and the

ground unit receiving the cargo.”16

To accomplish the mission in austere locations, the airlift

platform must have some level of autonomous cargo-handling

capability. In this case autonomy means accomplishing the

mission without the use of external materials handling equipment (MHE). This action implies the ability to drive the cargo

off the aircraft, push it off, or use organic aircraft equipment

to accomplish the offload. The same capabilities will be required for onload, as the future theater airlifter will be used as

a maneuver element as well as a sustainment provider.

Three features of the AAN battlespace combine to increase the

requirement for flexibility. These features are speed of operations, fluidity, and reduced sustainment requirements for the

AAN Battle Forces. Fewer requirements for sustainment increase

the potential for one aircraft to carry cargo for multiple destinations. The speed and fluidity of the environment can drive

changes in destination priorities in flight. If such a scenario unfolds, the airlift platform must be able to rapidly reposition cargo

to allow the quickest offload at the updated destination.17

Situational Awareness

The ability to operate effectively in the nonlinear battlespace

of the future is of little value without the situational awareness

to guide when, where, and how to adapt to the changing environment. The required capability for theater airlift directly correlates with the concept of gaining information dominance.

The technologies the AAN is seeking (e.g., advanced information processing, distribution, and display) will directly support

the information requirements for the theater airlift platforms.

The airlifters will need to be plugged into the information dominance system where “speed and quality of decision making for

current and subsequent operations are the ultimate outputs.”18 This integration would help the entire logistical system from tooth to tail.

The joint total asset visibility (JTAV) concept currently being

pursued by the Joint Staff seeks the ability to track aircraft location and status from the point of origin to the offload destination.19 Real-time information on equipment status will also

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CADRE PAPER
increase flexibility for commanders in the conduct of operations.

Such information will facilitate timely redirection of forces and

combat support, allowing the AAN forces to retain initiative.

For the aircrew, being connected to the AAN information

network will increase responsiveness and enhance survivability. With an accurate picture of the battlespace, crews can respond to orders to divert more effectively. Through ingress and

egress threat analysis, they will have a greater capability to

plan the best way to deliver the goods in a safe and timely

manner. “Admittedly, the attainability of such complete situational awareness is subject to the same caution as the AAN’s

dependence on information dominance. The Institute for

National Strategic Studies (INSS) 1998 Strategic Assessment

states that “building flexibility into a software-dominated system is complex, and its ramifications can only be discovered

by experience.”20

If airlift forces can achieve such situational awareness, the reward will be the luxury of conducting operations under relative

certainty and a high potential for an inexpensive victory. On the

other hand, if such heightened awareness eludes the airlift

forces, the prospect of operating in hostile territory necessitates

improved defensive capabilities to enhance survivability.

Defensive Systems

With the exception of special mission variants, airlift platforms have until recently been largely devoid of defensive systems. One reason for this is that in the last half of the twentieth century, theater airlift doctrine evolved within the cold war

paradigm. The role of theater airlift was to move the cargo from

the strategic hub to destinations throughout the theater in

which it was assigned. During combat operations, such lift

would deliver cargo near the forward line of own troops, but in

friendly territory. Any operations beyond the FLOT would be

supported by intense suppression of enemy air defenses

(SEAD).21 Despite this doctrine, C-130 aircrews in Vietnam

were subjected to enemy fires, suffering substantial damage

and demonstrating the inadequacy of theater airlift doctrine

for unconventional conflicts.22 It was not until the “direct delivery” capability of the C-17 was promised that fleet-wide defensive systems were given significant attention. Even then, it

was determined that “sustainment missions will routinely go

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as far forward as the brigade rear area (BRA),” 20 to 40 kilometers from the FLOT.23

The need for defensive systems for theater airlift platforms

to support the AAN is self-evident. Maneuver and resupply

missions will have to be flown unescorted. The notion of diverting SEAD assets from strike operations to enhance maneuver or sustainment is a violation of economy of force.24 To

support the AAN, theater airlift aircraft will require onboard

systems to detect, avoid, and defeat enemy antiair threats.

Developing defensive systems for airlift aircraft presents

unique challenges. Many of the characteristics that enhance

the operational airlift capability degrade aircraft survivability.

The ability to deliver a large quantity of troops and materiel increases the size of the cargo compartment, making the aircraft

easier to spot. Larger aircraft also carry with them more stringent structural loading limitations, which translates into less

maneuverability. Turbofan engines are used to deliver the

thrust required for increased payloads and achieve fuel efficiency. These engines produce the majority of their thrust

through their large fans.25 These fans take time to spool up,26

which also limits responsiveness and maneuverability. The

challenge for the future will be to develop defensive systems

that can enhance survivability without significantly degrading

mission effectiveness.

Theater airlift has been an integral part of land force operations in numerous campaigns. Its use as a combat maneuver

element has not been significantly tapped, and primary airborne operations have involved troop insertion and resupply.

However, one particular operation in World War II had several

characteristics in common with AAN projected operations as

they relate to airlift. That effort, known as Operation

Thursday, involved autonomous operations behind enemy

lines and a substantial theater airlift role.

Operation Thursday—Burma, 1944

Throughout 1941 Japanese ground forces had marched

across much of Southeast Asia with alarming speed. The fall

of Burma in the spring of 1942 bore potentially grave consequences for the Allies. Japan was threatening to isolate China

from the rest of Asia and capture India, the “jewel of the

British Empire.”27

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The terrain in Burma was difficult, and ranged from mountains to dense jungle. In 1943 a British general, Orde

Wingate—taking advantage of this terrain—planned a guerrilla

warfare-style infiltration deep behind enemy lines. Resupplied

by air, the infiltrating forces were to disrupt or destroy enemy

lines of communication and cause general disarray.28 For various reasons, the campaign was only marginally successful;

however, it did demonstrate to the Allied leadership that

“properly trained and organized groups supplied from the air,

and thusly independent of normal supply lines, could operate

in the jungle far behind enemy lines.”29 In addition, the 1943

expedition allowed General Wingate’s troops to discover clearings in the jungle that could be made suitable for airfield operations. This would be critical for the infiltration campaign

that followed in 1944.30

Operation Thursday, as the aerial invasion was called, was

a much larger effort than its predecessor and relied heavily on

airlift for troop insertion and substantial aerial resupply.

Gliders towed by C-47 aircraft carried the initial forces to the

designated airfield locations to prepare the areas for takeoff

and landing operations. Though such problems as towing rope

failures, unexpected turbulence en route, and unexpectedly

harsh landing conditions degraded mission effectiveness, the

results of the initial insertion were unprecedented. “All told,

539 men, 3 animals, and 65,972 pounds of stores had been

safely put down, including such heavy items as bulldozers and

lighting apparatus, and within twenty-four hours an airstrip,

300 by 5,000 feet, was cleared and prepared.”31

Operation Thursday lasted from 5 March to 17 May 1944, although a heavy sustainment effort continued for an additional

four months.32 The overall strategic success of the infiltration

is subject to debate, but the impact of the four airlift capabilities developed in this chapter was apparent in the operation.

Austere Operations. Operation Thursday taught a painful

lesson on the importance of surveying prospective austere

sites for suitability. The relatively inviting appearance of

grassy surfaces hid the dangers of the water buffalo holes beneath them. Consequently, uneven surfaces claimed the landing gear of the first arriving gliders, creating an inability to

clear the landing zone and causing subsequent gliders to

crash into the immobile hulks.33

Once cleared and prepared, the austere airfields provided

distinct advantages over airdrop resupply operations. One ad29

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vantage, which was of great importance, was the ability to

evacuate casualties from the area. C-47 aircraft evacuated

914 casualties during the month of April.34 Air evacuation

greatly increased combat effectiveness and morale when compared to Wingate’s first expedition in which “about 30 percent

of the original force were casualties; most of the wounded and

exhausted were of necessity left behind.”35 Cargo delivery by

landing was also much more efficient than airdrop.

“Transports could carry a heavier load for dropping than for

landing, but parachutes and packing weighed more than

enough to offset the increase in gross load . . . Over a period

of more than a few days airdrop delivery could not be maintained at the same rate as delivery by landing.”36

Cargo-Handling Capability. In the 10 weeks in support of

Operation Thursday, C-47 transports flew more than one

thousand sorties, hauling some 13,000 troops, two thousand

mules, and 528 tons of supplies throughout Burma.37 This demanded substantial cargo-handling efficiency. In fact, at the

main forward operating location, known as Broadway, the average total time on the ground was 20 minutes.38 Even though

the average load was only 4,750 pounds, 20 minutes was still

an impressive aircraft turn time.39

One specific challenge was the requirement to haul mules,

as they were the prime means of moving heavy equipment on

the ground. This challenge was answered by the construction

of bamboo stalls in the cargo compartments of the C-47s.

Muleteers accompanied the mules on transport flights and

trained them to walk up the cargo ramp to improve efficiency

and speed in loading operations.40

Situational Awareness. The tactics of night operations

brought with them an inherent loss of situational awareness.

If operations had been conducted during daylight, the obstacles encountered by the initial gliders might have been

avoided, enabling the ground mobility required to prepare for

the second wave. Several airdrop missions were also unsuccessful because the drop zones were difficult to distinguish at

night, and the ground forces were not enthusiastic about

lighting signal fires that would attract snipers.41

One example of “just-in-time intelligence” that increased situational awareness occurred just before the launch of the initial gliders. An air commando photographic officer had flown

over a second prospective site named Piccadilly. The photographs (taken without consent of General Wingate, who

30

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wanted to preserve operational security) revealed that large

trees had been dragged across the landing zone, rendering it

unusable.42 This timely information led to the abandonment of

Piccadilly as a forward airfield and may have spared significant casualties.

Defensive Systems. One of the reasons the transports flew

at night was because of lack of fighter escort. This tactic

proved very successful in preserving the C-47s, with only one

seriously damaged throughout the resupply operations.43

Another factor contributing to aircraft survivability was that

the operations were conducted deep behind enemy lines, and

the majority of the Japanese fighters were focusing on the

skies near the main effort. A somewhat obvious observation,

but one that will have significant implications for future Army

After Next airlift support, was that the majority of the damage

inflicted on the transports came from small arms and automatic weapons fire around the airfields and drop zones.44

The airlift operations in support of Operation Thursday provide several lessons for future employment in hostile environments. However, it is important not to take too much from history. The primary airlift missions in Burma were insertion and

resupply. These will be important in future conflicts, but the

airlift role will be expanded to include providing mobility for

substantial AAN Battle Forces and equipment. The expanded

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Source: Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1996, 102.

Unloading the “Prime Mover” from a C-47
role will require innovative forward thinking as well as learning from history.

In summary, the AAN will provide unprecedented challenges

for USAF theater airlift systems. The logistics principles of flexibility and survivability will become more important, and the

next generation airlift system must be designed with these

principles in mind. To deliver on this requirement, future theater airlift platforms must maximize four capabilities of increasing importance in the twenty-first century battlespace:

austere operations, cargo-handling capability, situational

awareness, and defensive systems.

Notes

1. Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint

Operations, 27 January 1995, I-1.

2. Daniel Bourgoine, “AAN FY98 Insights Brief,” 24 February 1999, slides

7 and 8; on-line, Internet, 28 February 1999, available from “Briefings” at

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/dcsdoc/fbdaan/aanframe.htm. Also see

Knowledge and Speed: Battle Force and the US Army of 2025, The 1998

Annual Report on the Army After Next Project to the Chief of Staff of the Army,

US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), (Fort Monroe, Va.:

TRADOC, 1998), 15. Hereinafter referred to as Knowledge and Speed 1998.

3. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-6, Air Mobility, 24 February

1999, 50; on-line, Internet, 14 March 1999, available from 

http://www.hqafdc.maxwell.af.mil/Library/Doctrine/afdd2-6.pdf.

4. JP 4-0, II-1–II-4.

5. Giulio Douhet, Command of the Air (1942; reprint, New York: CowardMcCann, Office of Air Force History, 1983), 53.

6. George F. Hunter, “An Analysis of V/STOL Heavy Lift Logistics for the

1970’s,” Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) student paper (Maxwell

AFB, Ala.: ACSC, June 1968), 46.

7. Roy C. LeCroy, “Implications of Changing Combat Doctrine and

Evolving Threats on Future Tactical Airlifter Requirements” (Maxwell AFB,

Ala.: Air War College, 1985), 23.

8. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Progress in Military Airlift” (Flight

Mechanics Panel Symposium, France: Advisory Group for Aerospace

Research and Development, 1990), 3-1; R. E. Helmeth et al., “Analysis of

Tactical Transportation: Progress and Challenges” (paper for Defense

Systems Management College, 1988), 10-1; and Boeing, Advanced Theater

Transport Mission Analysis Study, 1987.

9. “Aerospace Source Book: Rotary-Wing Outlook/Specifications,”

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 January 1999, 78.

10. Ibid.

11. T. D. White, “V/STOL Aircraft Characteristics Affecting Behavior of

Supporting Surfaces” (US Army Materiel Command, July 1967), 8–10; and

32

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R. W. Prouty, Helicopter Aerodynamics (Potomac, Md.: Phillips Publishing,

1985), 87.

12. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66, Future Operational Capability TC 97-004:

Super Short Takeoff and Landing (SSTOL), n.d., n.p.; on-line, Internet, 6 March

1999, available from http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-66e.htm.

13. This threat is exacerbated at higher gross weights. The increase in

downward force caused by the added weight, coupled with the increase in

landing speed required for heavier gross weights increases the sheer stress

on the landing gear when striking an obstacle.

14. During dirt runway performance testing in early 1997, a C-17 flighttest crew landed short of the semiprepared surface. Though the area five

hundred feet prior to the landing zone was inspected for obstacles, the aircraft struck a boulder protruding less than one foot above the surface in the

grassy area. The result was damage to the right main gear assembly,

grounding the aircraft for more than three months and evoking a “Class A”

accident investigation. For more information on the accident, contact the Air

Force Flight Test Safety Office, Edwards AFB, California.

15. B. K. Hough, Basic Soils Engineering (New York: Ronald Press, 1957),

384.

16. Jeffrey Record, Determining Future U.S. Tactical Airlift Requirements

(Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers,

1987), 36.

17. This does not suggest repositioning cargo in flight, although that

proposition cannot be totally ruled out. Repositioning cargo in flight has traditionally been taboo, except in emergencies. One reason is that the possibility of a “loose platform” in the cargo compartment could potentially shift

the aircraft center of gravity to a point that would threaten controllability.

With the advent of electronic flight controls, this danger might be mitigated.

Another danger is the possibility of a “hung load” in which the aircraft acceleration in any of the three axes during repositioning can jam the load in

place. This could jeopardize control during landings, and hamper onload/offload operations.

18. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1998, 24.

19. Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-4, Information Fusion, J-4 Projects, n.d., 2; online, Internet, 6 March 1999, available from http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/projects/foclog/info-fus.html.

20. Institute for National Strategic Studies, “Adaptive Forces,” 1998

Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power for Peace, n.d., n.p.; on-line, Internet, 6

March 1999, available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/sa98/sa98ch15.html.

21. John A. Skorupa, Self-Protective Measures to Enhance Airlift

Operations in Hostile Environment (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press,

1989), 33.

22. Charles E. Miller, Airlift Doctrine (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University

Press, 1988), 321–26.

23. Ibid.

24. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, A-1.

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25. C-17 engine information at “Engine Gallery—F117-PW-100,” n.d.,

n.p.; on-line, Internet, 10 March 1999, available from http://www.prattwhitney.com/engines/gallery/f117.html.

26. This phenomenon is quite different from turbojet engines in which

advancing the throttle increases fuel flow to the combustion chamber that

directly produces the engine thrust. “Spooling up” involves the time from

throttle advancement to increasing fuel flow to increased energy in the combustion chamber, and the time it takes to translate that energy to rotating

the large fan. Due to principles of momentum, this time is greatly increased

at low engine power (low fan speeds).

27. Herbert Mason, Randy G. Bergeron, and James A. Renfrow,

Operation Thursday, Birth of the Air Commandos (Washington, D.C.: Air

Force History and Museums Program, 1994), 1.

28. Lee Bowen et al., USAF Airborne Operations: World War II and Korean

War (Washington, D.C.: USAF Historical Division, 1962), 30.

29. Denny Riley, “Airborne Invasion of Burma, Spring, 1944” (master’s

thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1965), 21.

30. Bowen et al., 30.

31. Wesley Craven and James Cate, Army Air Forces in World War II, vol.

4, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (1949; new

imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 505.

32. Bowen et al., 38.

33. Joe Taylor, Air Supply in the Burma Campaign (Maxwell AFB, Ala:

USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1957),

68.

34. Ibid., 72.

35. Ibid., 14.

36. Ibid., 137.

37. Bowen et al., 40.

38. Riley, 75.

39. Ibid., 74.

40. Ibid., 95.

41. Ibid., 92.

42. Craven and Cate, 505.

43. Taylor, 72.

44. Ibid., 138.

34

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Chapter 4

Current Theater Airlift Capabilities

Every tool carries with it the spirit by which it has been

created.

—Werner Karl Heisenberg

Given the capability requirements for future theater airlift

derived in this paper, it is useful here to identify the capabilities and growth potential of current systems. Such an analysis will illuminate capability gaps and pave the way for assessing future concepts to support the Army After Next. To

keep the discussion relevant to the central argument, this

chapter evaluates current systems against the criteria of austere operations, cargo-handling capability, situational awareness, and defensive systems.

Today’s Air Force airlift fleet consists of the C-5, C-17, C141, KC-10, KC-135, and C-130 aircraft. The capability analysis in this section is limited to the C-130 and C-17 aircraft.

The C-5, KC-10, and KC-135 are excluded because they support the strategic lift requirements. The C-141 conducts theater operations to include aerial delivery; it is not included in

this analysis because it is scheduled for retirement by 2006,

long before the AAN concept is realized.1 The performance differences between the C-130E/H and the C-130J variant are

significant enough to warrant a separate analysis. The analysis

also includes the CH-47 and the V-22, two non-Air Force platforms with substantial lift capability. Table 1 presents a summary of the capabilities evaluation.

C-130E/H

First rolling off the assembly line in 1961, 390 C-130E aircraft were produced for the USAF. Twelve years later, the improved C-130H took its place, and 315 of these models were

produced before the assembly line closed in late 1996.2 The

primary change with the “H” model came in the form of more

powerful engines, increasing the cruise speed from 280 to 300

35
36

A/C Austere Operations Cargo Situational Defensive

Type Handling Awareness Systems

Runway required (ft)* on Other 

prepared/unprepared surface

To carry cargo load (lb)

20,000 39,000 100,000

C-130 1,750/ 2,650/ N/A GPS retrofit 6 pallets, GPS retrofit, Radar warningE/H 2,100 2,650/ in progress external MHE 5 person and CM, IRCM

required crew

C-130J 1,400/ 2,400/ N/A HUD, 6 (8) pallets, GPS, HUD, Radar warning(J-30) 1,700 2,400/ GPS external MHE digital moving and CM, IRCM

required, ECHS map, glass

cockpit

C-17 1,560/ 1,780/ 2,490/ HUD, 18 pallets, GPS, HUD, Radar warning,

1,640 1,890/ 2,800 GPS outsized cargo, glass cockpit, IRCM

external MHE AFMSSrequired

CH-47 N/A N/A N/A V/TOL 14 K internal databus Radar warning

capacity, 26K upgrade and CM, IRCM,external (not possible 3 gun mountssimultaneous)

V-22 N/A N/A N/A V/TOL, 20K internal GPS, HUD, Radar warning

GPS capacity, 15K glass cockpit, and CM, IRCM

external (not FLIR NBC protection,simultaneous) gun mounts

Legend:AFMSS—Air Force Mission Scheduling System HUD––head up displayCM—countermeasures IRCM—infrared countermeasuresECHS—enhanced cargo-handling system MHE—materials handling equipmentFLIR—forward-looking infrared NBC—nuclear, biological, and chemicalGPS—global positioning system*Runway required data is based on the more restrictive value between takeoff and landing ground roll. In operations, takeoff distance is increased by the requirement to clear a 50-foot obstacle; for comparative integrity with the advanced theater transport contractors’ runway performance, ground roll is used here. Also note that on the C-130E/H and C-130J data, the data is thesame for prepared and unprepared at the heavier weights. This is because the C-130 performance manuals compute the degradation on semiprepared runways as a function of runway condition reporting numbers, which do not affect takeoff roll. C-17 numbers are based on actual and modeled data with respect to increased rolling friction at degraded runways. This affects takeoffroll, and the C-17 numbers reflect this.

Table 1

Current Theater Airlift Platform Capabilities
knots. The better power plants increased takeoff and landing

performance and are used to represent the C-130E/H “family.”

Austere Operations

The C-130E/H can operate with payloads of 25,000

pounds;3 it also operates through runways as short as 1,750

feet.4 Increasing to the maximum payload of 39,000 pounds

increases the runway requirement to 2,650 feet. The aircraft

has the capability for operations on semiprepared surfaces;

however, this increases the runway requirements even further, to 2,100 feet and 2,650 feet for the respective loads.5

The C-130E/H can airdrop up to 64 paratroopers, as well as

equipment ranging from container delivery system (CDS)

bundles to heavy platforms such as the 42,000-pound

Sheridan light armored vehicle.6 This aircraft can also perform precision aerial delivery through the low altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES).7 In Vietnam, this capability

was very useful for the sustainment of Khe Sanh after the

1968 Tet offensive.8

Cargo-Handling Capability

The C-130E/H can carry up to six standard 463L logistics

pallets (five for airdrop since the ramp pallet position at the

rear of the aircraft is unavailable for drop operations) and

conducts loading through the tail of the aircraft.9 It requires

the same MHE of its strategic brethren. Forklifts and “K”

loaders (so named for their cargo weight capacity, e.g., 40 “K”

for 40,000-pound capacity) handle the palletized cargo. The

C-130 possesses a combat offload capability for palletized

cargo. The procedure consists of releasing the restraint devices and locks on the load, accelerating, and allowing the aircraft to advance and the cargo to roll off onto the ramp. This

procedure is available for palletized cargo up to 15,000

pounds.10

Situational Awareness

Current flight instrumentation is relatively primitive by

today’s standards. Currently, the navigation system on most

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aircraft does not integrate with the global positioning system

(GPS), relying partially on inertial navigation systems for guidance. The radar is suitable for weather mapping and limited

identification of major geographic features. The aircraft systems require a flight engineer for operation and monitoring.

Most operations require a five-person crew.11

Defensive Systems

The defensive systems on many of the aircraft consist of the

AAN active radar missile warning system (MWS) to detect both

radar and infrared (IR) threats.12 In addition, the aircraft are

equipped with countermeasures in the form of chaff, flares,

and the ability to carry electronic countermeasure (ECM) jamming pods.13 The C-130 is also equipped with armor-protected

seats. In addition, flak curtains are available for placement in

the lower forward windows.

Growth Potential

The major objectives Air Mobility Command (AMC) is pursuing with the C-130E/H fleet reside in the areas of situational

awareness and defensive systems. Currently, there are retrofit

operations under way to integrate GPS into the navigational

systems.14 This will not only aid the crew in situational awareness but will improve airdrop accuracy at austere locations.

Defensive systems are being improved by the installation of

the ALR-69 radar warning receiver which will provide a more

robust threat identification.15 These retrofit operations will

support a very elaborate project being undertaken by AMC to

bring all the C-130 aircraft prior to the “J” model to a single

standard. This project has backing from the highest levels, as

indicated in the following passage from Gen Charles T.

Robertson Jr., Commander, AMC. “I say again: we’re going to

create a single model out of the mix: an aircraft we call the C130X. The modifications will run the gamut, from electrical

system upgrades to glass cockpits with flight management

systems and NVG lighting upgrades . . . to, in the final phase

of our three phase plan, a common engine, APU, and any

structural repairs required” (emphasis in the original).16

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C-130J (and J-30)

The introduction of the C-130J into the fleet represents a

leap ahead in technology far greater than any obtained by its

predecessors. In fact, the changes in propulsion, avionics, and

cargo handling that much of its operational support is based

upon will require training and logistics infrastructure separate

from the rest of the C-130 fleet.17 To avoid redundancy, this

section will only elaborate on the changes from the current C130 fleet that impact the evaluation criteria. The C-130J-30 is

a “stretch” version, with 15 feet added to the fuselage.18 For

the purpose of this analysis, the capabilities of the C-130J-30

are the same as the smaller version unless stated otherwise.

Austere Operations

The more powerful, electronically controlled engines and

more efficient propellers combined to significantly improve

takeoff and landing performance. This increase in thrust at

low speed brought with it the potential for control problems in

the event of an engine failure. This was overcome by the development of an automatic system that integrates the electronic engine control with aircraft control parameters to provide increased performance and control.19 On a prepared

surface, operating with cargo weights of 25,000 and 39,000

pounds requires runway lengths of 1,400 and 2,400 feet respectively. Similar operations on unprepared surfaces will require 1,700 and 2,400 feet.20 The enhanced cargo-handling

system (ECHS) interfaces with the onboard computer to provide a more accurate airdrop capability.21

Another performance enhancing system that will aid in austere operations is the head up display (HUD). This system provides the capability to control aircraft performance and navigate while retaining the ability to scan the horizon. More

important for austere operations, however, is the ability to establish a visual approach path without the use of external

navigation aids. By maneuvering the aircraft to overlay the desired glide path parameters on the appropriate aim point, aircrews can perform more accurate landings and avoid wasting

valuable landing surface.

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Cargo-Handling Capability

The ECHS aids the loadmaster in cargo-loading operations.

The automatic locking devices and system status monitoring

capability provide information essential for rapid and efficient

operations. The floor is redesigned to allow rapid configuration

changes for palletized cargo or rolling stock. The C-130J-30

has two additional pallet positions for carrying cargo, but its

increased structural weight actually decreases the payload capacity by 2,400 pounds.22

Situational Awareness

The C-130J is equipped with a state-of-the-art avionics

suite. The navigation system contains an embedded GPS capability and a digital autopilot. The HUD will also greatly aid

in situational awareness, allowing the crew to monitor performance and flight progress while retaining the ability to scan

their surroundings. The Northrop Grumman AN/APN low

power color radar is capable of supporting digital moving map

imagery.23 This translates into a capability to present known

or suspected surface-to-air threats, overlay navigation information, and adjust ingress and egress routes in hostile areas.

The potential exists for the C-130J to decrease situational

awareness from the earlier versions. The C-130J crew complement will be reduced from the previous aircraft by 40 percent.

Automation can perform several tasks formerly done by crew

members; but in a high workload environment, task saturation is an issue worth considering.

Defensive Systems

The C-130J models will enter service with all of the defensive systems described for the C-130E/H. The only real advantage these newer systems will possess is a deeper integration into the overall system. The situational awareness

advances previously discussed will enhance the effectiveness

of the defensive systems by offering the potential to avoid their

use through threat avoidance.

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CADRE PAPER
C-17

The C-17 is the most capable airlift aircraft developed to

date. Technological advances in flight control systems and

structural design provide the aircraft with the capability to accomplish both the inter- and intratheater airlift mission very

effectively.

Austere Operations

One of the main design features that gives the C-17 the capability to operate at high gross weights into small airfields is

known as “blown lift.” This concept involves positioning highlift devices such as flaps in such a manner that jet thrust is

applied to them at low speeds, offsetting the reduction in airflow across the wing.24 The C-17 can deliver the 25,000- and

39,000-pound loads into a paved surface of 1,560 and 1,780

feet, respectively.25 Delivering the same cargo into unprepared

surfaces requires 1,640 and 1,900 feet.26 The C-17 has the

ability to deliver significantly more cargo than its C-130 counterpart. For example, it can deliver equipment such as the 50-

ton M60 tank into prepared airfields as small as 2,490 feet

and unprepared surfaces of 2,800 feet.27 As with the C-130J,

the HUD in the C-17 aids greatly in precision landings on airfields with no navigational aids. The C-17 has a robust airdrop

capability, able to deliver up to 102 paratroopers. The C-17

can also airdrop single platforms of 60,000 pounds and deliver

a total of 110,000 pounds of equipment on a single pass

across the drop zone.28

Cargo-Handling Capability

The wide body of the C-17 accommodates outsized cargo

and can carry two rows of palletized cargo. Loading operations

are conducted solely through the aft end of the cargo compartment. The cargo floor does not possess the capability to

shift palletized cargo laterally. The automation in the cargo

compartment greatly reduces loadmaster workload. Standard

external MHE of forklifts and “K” loaders are required for palletized cargo operations. Traditional methods of tying down

cargo with fore and aft restraints are still required in the C-17.

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Combat offload procedures similar to those described for the

C-130 permit the offload of 85,000 pounds of cargo in less

than 450 feet.29

Situational Awareness

The C-17 is equipped with state-of-the-art avionics, including GPS-aided navigation, glass cockpit design, and onboard

computers that aid in mission planning and operations.

Improved mission planning systems—such as the Air Force

Mission Scheduling System (AFMSS)—provide aircrews the

opportunity to preplan a mission on a personal computer, include pertinent data specific to their mission, and upload it for

display.30 Though the system does not provide real-time updates, display information such as projected surface-to-air

threats will enhance situational awareness.

Defensive Systems

The C-17 defensive suite is not as robust as its C-130 counterpart. It possesses the AAR-47 MWS and the ALE-47 countermeasures dispense set (CMDS) to respond to IR missile

threats.31 These systems do not respond to radar threats.

Logic dictates that the development of a system to counter

radar threats is likely to be untenable, given the size of the C17 radar cross section. Each crew position is provided armor

protection against ordnance up to 12.7 millimeter armor

piercing incendiary rounds.32

CH-47D

This tandem rotor CH-47 transport helicopter aircraft rivals the

C-130 in its longevity, making its maiden test flight in 1961.33 The

CH-47D represents the newest and most capable variant. First

delivered in 1981, 481 of the helicopters were built.34

Austere Operations

As with any VTOL aircraft, the airfield requirements for the

CH-47D are minimal. For landing, the distance required is

slightly longer than the 99-foot aircraft length to allow for

clearance.35 Because of its capacity for external carriage,

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some operations may be done from a hover and require less

surface. The absence of a landing roll requirement also increases the options available for landing, as the consequences of touching down on uneven ground are much less

catastrophic.

Cargo-Handling Capability

Three hooks mounted on the belly of the CH-47 provide the

capability to lift up to 26,000 pounds externally. Internally,

the maximum carrying capacity is 14,000 pounds,36 including

up to 50 troops (33 fully equipped) or two high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV).37 The Army is also considering upgrades to the cargo floor, which will allow rapid reconfiguration for different load types.38

Situational Awareness

The avionics suite is basic, with dual displays and flight directors. The Army is considering a proposal for an avionics upgrade to include a digital cockpit and a central databus. This

will facilitate “updated communications and navigation, enabling the Chinook to meet U.S. Army Force XXI Battlefield requirements.”39

Defensive Systems

Having been designed to operate very near hostile fire, the

CH-47 contains a robust defensive suite. As with the previous

aircraft, it contains the AAN-47 MWS, as well as chaff and

flare dispensers and jamming equipment. In addition, the helicopter contains provisions for three machine guns or miniguns.40 This offensive capability provides an increased deterrent and enhances survivability.

V-22

The V-22 Osprey represents a great technological accomplishment. Its tilt-rotor design provides the combination of

both speed and VTOL. Having waded through funding cutbacks and technical challenges since its full-scale develop43

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ment initiation in 1986, the V-22 was scheduled for initial operational capability (IOC) in 1999.41

Austere Operations

The V-22 enjoys the same advantages as the CH-47 in this

area. The surface area required is marginally smaller, needing

only to accommodate the 84-foot aircraft width.42 As with the

CH-47, hover operations will potentially reduce this requirement further.

Cargo-Handling Capability

The maximum internal payload for the V-22 is 20,000

pounds, while external capacity is limited to 15,000 pounds.43

The cabin can carry 24 troops, and the cargo floor is equipped

with rollers to handle palletized cargo and a winch with a

2,000-pound pulling capacity.44

Situational Awareness

The avionics suite is state of the art, with GPS-aided navigation systems and onboard mission computers. In addition,

the navigation displays have the ability to overlay digital moving map images.45 The digital map is presented through an integration of a geographic database and the GPS to provide information on terrain features and potential threats.

Forward-looking infrared (FLIR) radar is also available for navigation during low visibility.46

Defensive Systems

The V-22 carries the AN/AAR-47 MWS, along with chaff and

flares. Additional defensive features include provisions for

nose and gun mounts and self-sealing fuel tanks. The V-22 is

the only aircraft in this analysis designed with an air-filtered

cockpit to provide protection from nuclear, biological, and

chemical (NBC) threats.47

Coming Up Short

Each aircraft described in this chapter possesses some satisfactory capabilities for integration into the Army After Next.

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The C-130 offers a robust defensive suite and the ability to deliver medium cargo loads into relatively small fields. The C130J retains all of the characteristics of its older counterpart

and adds value in the areas of runway performance, situational awareness, and in cargo handling (marginally).

The C-17 offers a leap in performance, cargo weight, and

cargo type with the addition of outsized cargo and battle tank

capacity. The desire for a transport that could fulfill both the

strategic and tactical mission led to an increase in the size of

the C-17. In the tactical airlift role, this resulted in an airplane

with a reduced defensive capability when compared to the C130 models.

The VTOL aircraft provide exceptional austere operations

capability, but this comes at the cost of payload capacity.

Though not analyzed within the capability criteria, the increased reach available with the V-22 tilt-rotor technology

represents a substantial increase in flexibility over the

medium-lift assets it will replace.

When all is said and done, the capabilities that exist within

today’s theater airlift force are inadequate to support the AAN

vision. None can meet the SSTOL/payload requirement. At

this point only the C-17 has the cargo capacity to carry fighting vehicles. The extensive cargo-handling equipment required

to process cargo is too cumbersome to facilitate minimum

ground times at austere locations. Situational awareness aids

do not provide a current picture of the environment, and crews

are reliant on radio communications for updates.

In general, the trend toward the required capabilities of the

twenty-first century airlifter appears healthy. The C-17

demonstrates the technological advance fitting of its relative

operational infancy. The biggest detriment to a greater advance by the C-130J is the fact that it is trapped in the body

of a 45-year-old aircraft design. The V-22 brings a tremendous

capability to its niche mission. However, that niche mission

does not support the AAN vision as it relates to operational

maneuver and sustainment.

The area that has perhaps benefited the most from recent

technology is situational awareness. Upgrades in navigational

accuracy, HUDs, mission computers, and cockpit displays producing imagery from massive databases provide the crew with

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timely information. Conversely, defensive systems for cargo aircraft have advanced relatively slowly despite technological advances. Perhaps this is because in the cost-benefit analysis, the

very size and characteristics of a cargo aircraft drive its design

to something that is a relatively easy target. That size and relative lack of maneuverability also make the rudimentary countermeasures relatively easy to defeat from the air.48

As the caretaker of the Air Force airlift fleet, AMC is currently taking steps toward realizing some of the future capabilities identified in this paper. Each year, AMC provides an

updated air mobility master plan (AMMP) that provides information on vision and strategy to support future requirements.

One capability being pursued is real-time-in-the-cockpit

(RTIC) information. “The RTIC is a situational awareness capability to receive, process and display real-time and nearreal-time information overlaid on photos and charts. The technology includes flight following, two and three-dimensional

threat displays, terrain perspective views, and mission rehearsal.”49 The technology for RTIC has been in existence for

several years and is being designed into the F-22. Such a system on airlift platforms will provide the architecture required

for integration and display of the AAN battlespace picture.

The AMMP also addresses modernizing MHE. These improvements are in the form of upgrade and standardization of

the current “K” loader fleet. Though such advances are limited

by the configurations and offload capabilities of the current

platforms, the AMMP concedes that “changes in user profiles,

aircraft configurations, and expected operating parameters

will likely make it necessary to identify and procure follow-on

and replacements for all loader types.”50 Defensive systems

initiatives are limited to the fleet-wide upgrade to the more advanced AL-69 radar warning receiver and retrofit of any applicable aircraft with chaff and flare capability.51

Between existing capabilities and proposed improvements,

AMC is providing a theater airlift system as robust as the airframes will allow. It is important to remember that the four desired capabilities identified for analysis were chosen because

they support the increasingly important logistics principles of

flexibility and survivability. Though the current system supports these principles in today’s environment, the operational

46

CADRE PAPER
concept for theater airlift to support the AAN expands both

principles’ scopes.

Flexibility will include the capability to operate at several locations throughout the battlespace. Current runway requirements and the need for significant external cargo-handling

equipment inhibit such flexibility. Survivability on the ground

will become a greater concern in supporting AAN operations,

as the onload/offload mission will presumably be conducted

in hostile areas. Current cargo-handling systems are not responsive enough to enhance survivability on the ground. The

situational awareness enhancement of an RTIC system is the

one capability that in and of itself will accommodate both flexibility and survivability, perhaps making it the greatest current theater airlift contribution to the AAN vision.

There is clearly a gap between the AAN concept and the theater airlift system to support it. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66,

Future Operational Capability, provides several glaring shortfalls.52 To enhance the future joint war-fighting effort, the theater airlift force must develop its capabilities with the support

of the AAN in mind. It is time to bridge the gap.

Notes

1. Charles T. Robertson Jr., “Keynote Address to the Airlift/Tanker

Association,” 24 October 1998, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 6 March 1999, available from http://public.scott.af.mil/hqamc/speeches/ata_98.htm.

2. Paul Jackson, ed., Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1997–98 (Alexandria,

Va.: Jane’s Information Group, 1997), 652.

3. Payload weights for evaluation were chosen to represent a mid-range

capability and one for maximum weight operations. To retain operational

relevance, calculations were made factoring in sufficient fuel onboard for

two hours of flight plus required reserves.

4. Robins Air Logistics Center, Technical Order (TO) 1C-130H-1-1, C130H Performance Manual, May 1986, 3–56.

5. Ibid., 9–19.

6. Jackson, 653.

7. Michael P. Davis, “Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System

Approach to Extraction Zone Procedures” (Scott AFB, Ill.: Air Mobility

Command [AMC], June 1993), 1.

8. David R. Mets, interviewed by author, 10 March 1999. Dr. Mets was a

C-130B pilot and also a gunship pilot during the Vietnam War and conducted LAPES operations into Khe Sanh.

9. Jackson, 653.

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10. Multi-Command Regulation (MCR) 55-130, vol. 2, C-130 Tactical

Operations, 1 August 1993, 31.

11. MCR 55-130, vol. 1, C-130 Operations, 15 April 1993, 8.

12. Robins Air Logistics Center, TO 1C-130H-1, C-130H Operations

Manual, October 1998, 4-287.

13. Ibid., 4-357, 4-359.

14. AMC, “Combat Operations,”1998 Air Mobility Master Plan Update,

n.d., n.p.; on-line, Internet, 10 March 1999, available from

http://public.scott.af.mil/hqamc/about/ammp/EQUIPMNT/8_AMCwep/4

_C_130.htm.

15. Ibid.

16. Robertson.

17. General Accounting Office (GAO), Intratheater Airlift: Information on

the Air Force’s C-130 Aircraft: Report to the Honorable John McCain, U.S.

Senate (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1998), 11.

18. Jackson, 652.

19. Lyle H. Schaeffer, “Automatic VMC Protection in the C-130J,” Society

of Experimental Test Pilots Forty-First Symposium Proceedings (Lancaster,

Calif.: Society of Experimental Test Pilots, 1997), 235–52.

20. The C-130J performance data is still being developed. Numbers for

prepared surfaces are based on performance specification requirements in

Lockheed C-130J Manufacturer Model Specification, Document No. ER/S7100M/J-0, Revision E, 28 August 1996. Semiprepared runway data estimated based on runway condition reporting calculation used on C-130E/H.

21. ECHS still in development for the Air Force. I attended several design/integration meetings as the Air Force test pilot representative between

November 1996 and May 1997. For more information, contact the C-130J

Test Team, 418th Flight Test Squadron, Edwards AFB, California.

22. GAO, 19.

23. Jackson, 656.

24. W. H. Deckert and J. A. Franklin, Powered-Lift Aircraft Technology

(Washington, D.C.: Scientific and Technical Information Division, National

Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1989), 5.

25. Data computed from C-17A Mission Computer Block 10, #P601H;

and Wright-Patterson AFB, TO 1C-17A-1-1, Performance Manual, 15 August

1995, change 8, 1 September 1998.

26. Ibid.; and Peter Bouras and Pamela A. Melroy, “C-17A Unpaved and

Matted Runway Operations,” report no. AFFTC-TR-95-22 (Edwards AFB,

Calif.: Air Force Flight Test Center, October 1995), 13, 21.

27. Ibid.; and Wright-Patterson AFB, TO 1C-17A-1-1, 342.

28. Scott M. Bailey, 60,000 Pound (60K) Linked and 110,000 Pound

(110K) Sequential Platform Low Velocity Airdrop (LVAD): Follow-on

Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) of the C-17 Aircraft (Fort Dix, N.J.:

AMC, Air Mobility Warfare Center, 33d Flight Test Squadron, 1998), 5.

29. Michael J. Kamosa and Michael J. Welch, “Evaluation of C-17

Combat Offload Capabilities,” report no. AFFTC-TR-94-24 (Edwards AFB,

Calif.: Air Force Flight Test Center, October 1995), 15.

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30. AMC, 1997 Air Mobility Master Plan (Scott AFB, Ill.: AMC, October

1996), 5-68.

31. Jeffrey E. Gates, C-17 Defensive System (DS) 1553B Bus Interface:

Combined Developmental/Operational Test and Evaluation (D/OT&E),

Detailed Test Plan, T/WR 98-02 (Fort Dix, N.J.: AMC, Air Mobility Warfare

Center, 33d Flight Test Squadron, 1998), 5.

32. Rodney L. Cleary and Franklin L. Spear III, C-17 Crew Armor

Protection,” report no. T/WR 96-02 (Fort Dix, N.J.: AMC, Air Mobility Warfare

Center, 33d Flight Test Squadron, 1997), 5.

33. Jackson, 583.

34. Ibid., 584.

35. “Aerospace Source Book: Rotary-Wing Outlook/Specifications,”

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 January 1999, 78.

36. Jackson, 587.

37. “Army Technology—CH-47D/MH-47E Chinook—Heavy Lift Helicopter,” n.d., n.p.; on-line, Internet, 11 March 1999, available from

http://www.army-technology.com/projects/chinook/index.html.

38. Jackson, 585.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., 588.

41. Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of

Defense. V-22 Osprey FY97 Annual Report, n.d., 2; on-line, Internet, 10

March 1999, available from 

http://www.dote.osd.mil/reports/FY97/navy/97mv22.html.

42. Jackson, 580.

43. Ibid.

44. “Air Force Technology—V-22 Osprey—Medium Lift Multi-mission

Tilt-Rotor Aircraft,” n.d., n.p.; on-line, Internet, 11 March 1999, available

from http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/osprey/index.html.

45. Jackson, 580.

46. Ibid.

47. “Air Force Technology—V-22 Osprey—Medium Lift Multi-mission

Tilt-Rotor Aircraft.”

48. Tom Bergeson, interviewed by author, 12 March 1999. Major

Bergeson is an F-15C pilot and a graduate and former instructor at the

USAF Fighter Weapons School.

49. AMC, 5-67.

50. Ibid., 5-71.

51. AMC, “Operations,” 1998 Air Mobility Master Plan Update, n.d., n.p.;

on-line, Internet, 10 March 1999, available from 

http://public.scott.af.mil/hqamc/about/ammp/ROADMAPS/24_ds.htm.

52. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66, Future Operational Capability, “TC 97-

004, Super Short Takeoff and Landing (SSTOL),” “TC 97-001, Logistics

Mobility,” “TC 97-002, Resupply,” “AV 97-009, Improved Aircraft

Performance,” “TR 97-032, Sustainment Logistics Support,” n.d., n.p.; online, Internet, 6 March 1999, available from

http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-66e.htm.

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Chapter 5

Bridging the Gap—Future Theater

Airlift Concepts

Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.

—Arthur C. Clarke

Identification of capability deficiencies contains little utility

if not accompanied by alternatives on how to rectify them. This

chapter presents several concepts that attempt to provide satisfactory alternatives. Two concepts in direct competition with

each other are the ATT aircraft designs of Boeing and

Lockheed. Other concepts described may be complementary to

one, both, or neither of these designs. Because of the diversity

in the breadth and extent that each concept supports the

Army After Next, the alternatives will be categorized under the

four previously identified capabilities of austere operations,

cargo-handling capability, situational awareness, and defensive systems.

Austere Operations

The ability to operate from semiprepared and unprepared

surfaces is key to supporting the AAN vision. Though there are

several variables in the equation, two of the primary capabilities necessary for austere airfield operations are exceptional

aircraft performance and the ability to identify suitable landing surfaces. The key to operating at small airfields is the ability to maintain controlled flight at low airspeeds. Such capability allows a reduced ground speed at touchdown and a

reduced stopping distance.

Super Short Takeoff and Landing

The key to operating at small airfields is the ability to maintain controlled flight at low airspeeds. Such capability allows

a reduced ground speed at touchdown and a reduced stopping

51
distance. To accomplish the slow-speed flight required at

small airfields, the aircraft must either have the capacity to

generate tremendous lift or reduce the requirement for lift at

the lower speeds. One way to increase lift is to apply airflow

across the portions of a fixed wing that would otherwise stall.

This application allows the aircraft to fly at higher angles of attack and is known as boundary layer control.1 The other

method for reduced speed flight is to transfer the thrust vector from a fore/aft direction to the vertical. This method essentially puts it more in line with the lift vector, similar to that

of a helicopter. This concept is known as tilting.

Tilt Wing. As opposed to the V-22 tilt-rotor concept, in the

tilt-wing design the engines and propellers are fixed relative to

the wing. In transitioning from normal to slow-speed flight, the

entire airfoil tilts, and rotates the thrust axis with it. In addition, because the engines are in the same position relative to

the wing, the propeller airflow across the wing is still creating

lift. This concept was first tested over 30 years ago, most notably in the XC-142 and XL-84 aircraft.2

The Boeing Company is using the tilt-wing design as the

basis for its ATT design. The wing is designed to tilt up to 45

degrees from its cruise configuration. The aircraft also employs high-lift devices such as externally blown flaps similar to

those used on the C-17.3 Initial analysis on this concept concluded that with the fly-by-wire flight control system and design of the body, the control effectiveness at slow speed offered

by an elevator is marginal. For this reason and in the interest

of weight savings, the present design calls for a tail-less configuration.4 Though the program still primarily consists of a

“paper” airplane (no full-scale prototype), simulation and modeling analysis has determined that the proposed design configuration will meet the AAN requirement to deliver 30 tons

into and out of a 750-foot runway.5

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Source: This photo was extracted from a promotional brochure provided by the Boeing Company.

Mike Rohrlick, Boeing, Inc., granted permission for

use in March 1999.

Boeing Tilt-Wing Advanced Theater

Transport
Circulation Control Wing. This concept is a subset of

boundary layer control. In order to provide continued control

at low speeds, the circulation control is basically designed to

prevent the wing from stalling. This is done by “introducing a

high-energy jet onto the upper, trailing edge region of a blunt

trailing edged airfoil (occasionally leading-edge blowing is also

used).”6 This method to produce lift at low speed, combined

with other advanced high-lift devices and the lift efficiency of

a blended wing-body design, is the cornerstone of the

Lockheed ATT strategy for SSTOL. As with the Boeing concept, the concept has not been funded to allow for a prototype. Current analysis shows that to operate with the 30-ton

payload set by the Army, the aircraft can land in the required

distance but would require nearly 1,200 feet for takeoff. The

750-foot runway would allow payloads for takeoff of up to

20,000 pounds.7

Opportune Landing Sites

To maximize theater airlift flexibility, it is important to be

able to provide the battlespace commander several options to

support operations. In the AAN environment this will become

even more important as theater airlift evolves from a delivery

and sustainment force to a combat maneuver element.

Currently, there are several restrictions placed on runway operations based on surface hardness, smoothness, and distance. Even in a potentially austere environment, members of

a ground combat control team (CCT) must perform a significant evaluation of the surface environment before operations

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Source: This photo was extracted from a

promotional brochure provided by

Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems

(LMAS) Company. John Nichols, Lockheed

Martin, Inc., granted permission for use in

March 1999.

Lockheed Advanced

Theater Transport
are permitted.8 In the future as envisioned by the AAN, such

evaluations are not practical. The time and resources invested

in investigating possible landing sites will detract from the

primary missions. Such operations are likely to increase the

vulnerability of the airlift missions by potentially alerting the

enemy of intended future use of a particular area. The opposing needs of providing flexibility in a fluid combat environment

and ensuring safe airlift operations in the forward area present a challenging dilemma.

A study group made up primarily of members from Boeing

and Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio, was

established to solve this problem. The basic concept being developed involves the use of commercially available and relatively inexpensive satellite imagery, combining it with advanced modeling techniques and identifying locations suitable

for landing within an area of interest.9

The process is far too complex to elucidate fully within the

framework of this paper. Many of the details are still proprietary, but a brief synopsis is possible. Analysts obtain 30-

meter resolution satellite imagery of the area of interest. They

then exclude known unusable geographic features such as

mountain peaks and bodies of water. During the first “filtering” exercise analysts identify pixels on the imagery containing large amounts of chlorophyll, indicating areas of lush vegetation or forests. This narrows the field of study and allows

the analysts to pick various landing candidate areas for further investigation. They then assess parameters such as

brightness and “shading” to model the surface type. By applying known characteristics of surface types to surface conditions, the analysts can then predict suitable landing sites

without the need for actual on-site inspection.10

Though the concept may appear far-fetched, the preliminary

results to date have been quite impressive. During a field

study in South Dakota in 1998, the test team sought to predict suitable landing surfaces based on requirements for minimal slope, no obstacles, no standing water, no thick vegetation, and weight-bearing capacity. At the 36 sites analyzed,

the test team predicted which were suitable and which were

unsuitable with 100 percent accuracy.11 Though this technol54

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ogy is in its infancy, it possesses the potential to provide the

battlespace commander with flexibility in employment options

and schemes of maneuver.

Precision Airdrop

Andrew C. Braunberg recognized that “from the ground, the

C-130 flying at 30,000 feet is a mere speck in the sky, and the

payload kicked out the back is invisible in the early morning

darkness. The transport airplane is well on its way home by

the time the delivery drops into its target zone; the 20-minute

descent is autonomous, silent, passive and purposeful.”12

Such a scenario is possible through the development of a precision air-droppable capability. This capability would allow resupply in austere areas without subjecting the aircraft to

enemy fire. If done in periods of reduced visibility, it will also

prevent alerting the enemy of the whereabouts of friendly

forces. Current low-level airdrop in the C-17 requires the crew

to navigate to an area, program the known information about

the cargo and parachute, and obtain current surface wind

conditions from ground personnel on the drop zone. The crew

then flies to the computed air release point (CARP) and releases the load. From there the load becomes a free-fall, passive system with accuracy dependent on factors such as wind

predictions, navigation accuracy, actual load exit time, and

chute deployment time. Precision airdrop improves on this capability by adding GPS-aided guidance and control to the system, essentially steering the load to the target.

One basic design, known as the guided ram-air parafoil,

consists of a large rectangular parachute (similar in shape to

those used by demonstration teams) with a guidance and control package attached to the base of the risers.13 After release

from the aircraft and subsequent parachute deployment, the

guidance would “fly” a programmed descent profile, adjusting

for current conditions. Recent test efforts have set a near-term

goal of a 42,000-pound platform delivered from an altitude of

approximately 25,000 feet at a horizontal distance of more

than 10 miles, landing within 30 feet of its intended target.14

Another precision air-droppable design under investigation

is a deployable fabric-wing vehicle. This system consists of a

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folded wing package with guidance and control sitting atop the

standard load. Upon release, an extraction chute deploys and

unfolds the wing, allowing for guided gliding flight to the target. This system is not as robust as the guided parafoil and is

only capable of delivering 2,200 pounds of cargo with an accuracy of one hundred feet. It increases standoff capability,

with the increased glide ratio of the wings allowing cargo deployment over 30 miles from the target.15

Cargo-Handling Capability

Two areas of emphasis emerge when designing cargo-handling

capabilities of a future theater airlift platform: speed and autonomy. In projected AAN operations the combat troops receiving the cargo will be highly mobile, and it is unlikely they

will travel with any cargo-handling equipment except for the

strength of their own backs. Each of the following concepts is

being developed with speed and autonomy in mind.

One design, known as the robotic transport system (RTS),

consists of a crane-type mechanism designed to pick up loads

and move them forward or aft to the appropriate position. Two

rails on the fuselage ceiling run the length of the cargo compartment to secure this mechanism. Robotic arms hang from

these points and are manipulated to secure the cargo at its

base (fig. 2). For cargo offload the RTS then lifts the cargo off

the floor, transfers it aft until the cargo clears the aft portion

of the floor, and deposits it in the bed of a waiting vehicle or

on the ground.16 For this crane-type operation to work, there

must be enough upper fuselage “overhang” to allow vehicles to

maneuver into offload position or cargo to be lowered to the

ground without interference from the aft portion of the fuselage floor. To facilitate this the design that accompanies the

RTS consists of a double-hinged ramp. This ramp is connected

to both the cargo floor and the ceiling by retractable hinges.

This connection provides the capability to raise the ramp from

the upper hinges and provide more overhang for the RTS rails

to manipulate cargo (fig. 3).17

Another approach to improving cargo loading involves the use

of an automated manipulator arm. This arm hangs from a

turntable mechanism that is secured to the top of the fuselage

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in a manner similar to the RTS (fig. 4).18 The function of the arm

is to be a central mobile attachment point for various tools being

used for onload/offload operations. Such tools as trailer and

flatrack dollies provide the hydraulic lifting and pulling power,

and the mechanical arm provides the guidance and stability. In

this same cargo compartment concept, the cargo ramp is double hinged but in a different manner than the RTS. One hinge

connects the ramp to the floor, and a second hinge is in the middle of the ramp, thus allowing it to adjust to different vehicle

heights.19 Once the cargo is loaded, the system uses a combination of retractable rollers and belts to position the cargo.

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Ceiling

Fuselage

Cargo

Crane Arm

Source: James Gibson, “Technologies for Airlift Cargo Handling (TACH)” (WL-TR Wright-Patterson AFB,

Ohio: Wright Laboratory, May 1993), 22.

Figure 2. Robotic Transport System

Loaded

Loading Operations with

Ramp on Upper Hinge

Loading to/from ground

Loading to/from truck

Source: James Gibson, “Technologies for Airlift Cargo Handling (TACH)” (WL-TR Wright-Patterson AFB,

Ohio: Wright Laboratory, May 1993), 25.

Figure 3. Loading with Double-Hinged Cargo Ramp
Advances in cargo floor design will greatly help cargo restraint operations. Currently the loadmaster must manipulate a myriad of chains and straps to ensure adequate

fore/aft restraint. Even in the C-17—with the most advanced

cargo compartment in the inventory—the various restraint

devices are encumbering and contribute to an increased aircraft reconfiguration time.20 One design worthy of investigation includes a floor with multiple retractable tie-down devices. These devices are equipped with nearly all of the

apparatus required to secure cargo, including a strap and

hook. Embedding such devices throughout the cargo floor will

greatly enhance loading efficiency, especially for cargo of nonstandard size and weight.

The newest and most comprehensive concept is known as the

load-by-wire (LBW) system currently being developed by Boeing.

This system combines and updates many of the features of

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Rail

Top View

Aft View

Isometric View

Upper Arm

Lower Arm

End Effector

Section A-A

Turntable

Source: M. A. Rohrlick, B. K. Rawdon, “Advanced Cargo Restraint System (ACRS) Project” (Wright-Patterson

AFB, Ohio: Wright Laboratory, July 1994), 4-1.

Figure 4. Automated Manipulator Arm
other designs.21 An articulated ramp (fig. 5) permits transfer of

cargo from vehicles of varying heights, thereby increasing loading efficiency. The LBW contains a container crane system designed primarily to load or unload the larger nonrolling stock

from trucks. Two of the primary pieces of cargo in this category

are the 8-by-20-foot International Standards Organization (ISO)

container and the palletized loading system (PLS) flatrack of the

same dimensions. Once these cargo types are loaded, prepositioned retractable locks set for the ISO and PLS dimensions are

engaged, and the cargo is instantly secured. For palletized

cargo, tines extend to lift the cargo off the truck (the pallets will

sit on shoring to allow room for tines to fit between the pallet

bottom and truck bed), and power rollers reel the cargo onto the

ramp. From there a pneumatically operated system of rollers,

belts, and chains will manipulate the cargo to the appropriate

location, where the retractable restraint devices will secure it in

place. The crane system will also be used to lift any palletized

cargo off the ground or any other surfaces that do not provide

space for the ramp tines to operate.

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Articulated Aircraft Ramp

Offload to Any Ground Forces

Transport Vehicle in Minutes

Load Directly to Bare Truck

or Trailer Floor (No Rollers Required)

Aircraft Ramp Adjusts to All Truckbed Heights

Load Low

Load High

Source: This figure was extracted from a promotional brochure provided by the Boeing Company. Mike

Rohrlick, Boeing, Inc., granted permission for use in March 1999.

Figure 5. Load-by-Wire Articulated Ramp
Situational Awareness

AMC appears to be posturing adequately in this area for future airlift operations. Integration of GPS into all navigation

systems greatly increases accuracy. Display technology has

enabled such systems as digital moving maps and HUDs to

provide accurate information to the aircrew in a timely and effective manner—a good foundation for situational awareness.

The next step is to enhance the ability to react in a dynamic

environment. This enhancement is the idea behind the concept of RTIC information.

AMC is moving toward fielding an RTIC capability.

Operational testing is under way on the design of the airborne

battlefield intelligence (ABI) system. “In layman terms, ABI

will display signals the satellites, the RC-135 and AWACS are

picking up and broadcasting such as the location of surfaceto-air missiles, radar locations, airborne aircraft and other

dangers. . . . If a threat such as a surface-to-air missile becomes active, a crew will be able to change their flight path as

needed for safe mission operation.”22 The ABI adds a second

piece to the situational awareness puzzle. In addition to the

increased positional awareness provided by navigational accuracy, the aircrew will have more information about enemy

positions.

The next step in improving situational awareness is being

addressed through the concept of automated data fusion. In

this instance fusion is defined as “the evaluation of data from

one or more sources to extract knowledge about events or objects of interest.”23 Such a concept goes beyond the realm of

information gathering and display and attempts to interpret

the data to predict intentions. This task is daunting; and the

Scientific Advisory Board recommending its pursuit recognizes

the difficulties due to “its immense computational requirements, and because robust interpretations of sensor data are

hard to develop from mathematical considerations alone.”24

On the positive side, situational awareness is not an all-ornothing proposition; and even incremental changes will help

the aircrew of the future to accomplish the increasingly demanding mission.

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Defensive Systems

Figure 6 illustrates the concept of layered survivability.

Success on the outer layers diminishes the requirement for expending effort on the inner layer capabilities. This simplified

construct will provide the framework for describing new defensive systems concepts.

Don’t Be Encountered

This objective implies conducting operations in nonhostile

territory. The AAN requirement for theater airlift is in conflict

with this concept. The best approach to support this layer is

through the use of situational awareness and opportune

landing sites in an attempt to avoid any encounter with

enemy forces.

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Don’t Be Encountered

Don’t Be Seen

Don’t Be Hit

Don’t Be Penetrated

Don’t Be Killed

C3I Info RFI

Survivability Awareness

Signature Control

Visual, Acoustic, Thermal, Radar

Countermeasures

Early Warning

Sensors / CMs

Ballistic Protection Structure

System

Separation / Redundancy

Chemical / Biological

Protection

HRAM

Prevention

Automatic Fire Suppression

Opportune

Landing Site

Situation

Awareness

Legend:

C3I—command, control, communications, and intelligence

CMs—countermeasures

HRAM—hardened random access memory

RFI—request for information

Source: Adapted from a briefing on Aircraft Threat Protection and approved by Paul Barr, senior engineer/

scientist, Advanced Transports and Tankers Program, Boeing Company, Long Beach, California.

Figure 6. Layered Survivability
Don’t Be Seen

Perhaps the most effective method of accomplishing this

goal is in the form of stealth. The Lockheed teams have incorporated this heavily into their ATT concept. They propose that

much of the stealth technology development costs have been

paid; and for the incorporation of LO capabilities on the ATT,

“F-22 levels of signature reduction will work.”25 Another approach to this objective is through passive navigation, which

involves the use of digital moving maps in place of traditional

emitting navigation aids.26

Don’t Be Hit/Don’t Be Penetrated

These objectives have gained emphasis in recent years,

sparked by such events as the Italian Air Force transport shot

down approaching Sarajevo, Bosnia–Herzegovina, in 1993.27

AMC has identified the increasing surface-to-air threat and is

scheduled to have all C-17 and C-130 aircraft equipped with

current defensive systems by FY 2006.28

One deficiency in current defensive systems is the lack of IR

missile detection capability. The Scientific Advisory Board has

acknowledged this shortfall and claims that the technology is

just around the corner.29 Though insufficient in and of itself,

identification is a necessary step to survivability because it allows more efficient use of the onboard defensive systems.

Defensive countermeasures also have room for growth.

Though it is not trivial, solving the problem of detecting missile launch and trajectory provides the opportunity to defeat

the missile by destruction, rather than spoofing, jamming, or

evading. One such countermeasure is a directed-energy

weapon. This capability involves the use of an onboard laser

or high-power directed microwave system to defeat the missiles. This offensive capability offsets the lack of maneuverability and takes advantage of the fact that “ transports have

much more space and power available than tactical aircraft

and hence [a directed energy system] is more feasible.”30

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Don’t Be Killed

This objective is one that aircrews obviously will not want to

depend on but will be grateful it was considered if the time

comes. Primary areas for consideration when designing a new

theater airlifter will include durable composite structures and

separation and redundancy of critical systems. One example

of a unique approach to redundancy is a study conducted by

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration known as

the propulsion controlled aircraft (PCA). The concept involves

programming the flight controls to interface with the electronically controlled engines to provide aircraft control in the event

of loss of hydraulic power to the flight controls.31

It All Sounds Good

The list and description of future concepts in this chapter is

by no means complete. It is, however, an attempt to identify

feasible paths to bridge the gap between the theater airlift system as it is and the system as it should be to support the Army

After Next. Future concepts are exciting and spark interest in

all that is possible. It is important for planners to focus on the

application of those concepts and not be lured by the soothing

sounds of the technological sirens. Within the four criteria for

evaluation, some concepts were in opposition to others while

some were complementary to any future system. After seeing

what is possible, the next step is to determine what is best.

Notes

1. USAF Test Pilot School, “Performance Flight Testing Phase, Subsonic

Aerodynamics” (Edwards AFB, Calif.: Air Force Flight Test Center, November

1992), 2.61.

2. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Applications of C-142 V/STOL Transports

(Dallas, Tex., 1965); and David Mondey, ed., International Encyclopedia of

Aviation (New York: Crown, 1977), 362.

3. W. H. Deckert and James A. Franklin, Powered-Lift Aircraft Technology

(Washington, D.C.: Scientific and Technical Information Division, National

Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1989), 5.

4. Interview with Mike Rohrlick, ATT program manager, Boeing Co., 18

February 1999.

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5. Briefing delivered by the ATT team on 18 February 1999. The briefing

slides are Boeing proprietary. Information released under the approval of

Mike Rohrlick at the Boeing Co., Long Beach, Calif.

6. John W. Trainor, “A Wind Tunnel Study of a Sting-Mounted

Circulation Control Wing” (master’s thesis, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Air

Force Institute of Technology, December 1989), 2.

7. Limitations are based on takeoff performance. Briefing slides prepared

by Lockheed Martin. Information released under the approval of John

Nichols, senior specialist engineer, Advanced Concepts Team, Lockheed

Martin Corp., Smyrna, Ga.

8. Briefing delivered to C-17 test team by the combat control team prior

to semiprepared runway testing, August 1996.

9. Briefing delivered by Don Jennings, principal engineer, Advanced

Transports and Tankers, the Boeing Co., 18 February 1999.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Andrew C. Braunberg, “Parachute Guidance Empowers Programmed

Payload Placement,” Signal, May 1996, 83.

13. A. W. Bennett and C. L. Wood, “Precision Airdrop System Development”

(Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Air Force Materiel Command, March 1996), 4-36.

14. Ibid., 4-37.

15. Ibid., 4-41.

16. James Gibson, “Technologies for Airlift Cargo Handling (TACH)” (WLTR Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Wright Laboratory, May 1993), 17.

17. Ibid., 34.

18. M. A. Rohrlick and B. K. Rawdon, “Advanced Cargo Restraint System

(ACRS) Project” (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Wright Laboratory, July 1994),

4-1.

19. Ibid., 4-13.

20. Miguel Lopez and Michael Dodson, “Evaluation of C-17A Cargo

Loading and Transport, Ground and In-flight Reconfiguration and Troop

Transport Capabilities,” AFFTC-TR-93-34 (Edwards AFB, Calif.: Air Force

Flight Test Center, March 1994), 16.

21. Briefing and paper by Mike Rohrlick, ATT program manager, the

Boeing Co., Long Beach, Calif., on 18 February 1999. Released under the

authority of Mr. Rohrlick.

22. Linda P. Meyer, “Increasing Situational Awareness in Air Mobility

Command Aircraft,” Airlift/Tanker Quarterly, Winter 1998, 19.

23. Charles L. Morefield, New World Vistas, Air and Space Power for the

21st Century, Information Applications Volume (Washington, D.C.: USAF

Scientific Advisory Board, 1995), 1.

24. Ibid., 5.

25. Briefing slides by Lockheed on ATT concept received 4 March 1999.

This briefing was proprietary and the quote is cited under authorization of

John Nichols, senior specialist engineer, Advanced Concepts Team,

Lockheed Martin Corp., Smyrna, Ga.

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26. John A. Skorupa, Self-Protective Measures to Enhance Airlift

Operations in Hostile Environment (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press,

1989), 100.

27. Nick Cook, “Shielding the Airlifters,” Interavia, October 1997, 41.

28. AMC, “Combat Operations,” 1998 Air Mobility Master Plan Update,

n.d., n.p.; on-line, Internet, 10 March 1999, available from

http://public.scott.af.mil/hqamc/about/ammp/EQUIPMNT/A_operln/3_

COMBAT.htm.

29. Scientific Advisory Board, New World Vistas, Air and Space Power for

the 21st Century, Mobility Volume (Washington, D.C.: USAF Scientific

Advisory Board, 1995), 18.

30. Ibid., 19.

31. I participated in the study and flew as a guest test pilot to evaluate

the system on the MD-11 on 30 November 1995.

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Chapter 6

Analysis and Conclusions

The color of the cat doesn’t matter as long as it catches

the mice.

—Chinese Proverb

The ATT should be a supersonic aircraft capable of all-spectrum stealth even as it slows to a hover and feathery-soft

touchdown, shortly after which it nearly instantaneously onloads the awaiting mechanized battalion for transit and offload

one hundred kilometers away.

Fiction aside—when charting a course for the future of theater airlift—it is important to focus on the ultimate aim. The

goal is not merely to develop a system that outperforms any

other in accomplishing the current mission, but rather one that

can best accomplish the missions forecast throughout its service life. The Army After Next is pursuing a concept of operations

that makes even our newest theater airlift assets inadequate.

Analysis

Before delving into the analysis, there is a point that bears

repeating. An entering assumption to this paper was that the

future operational concept of the AAN—or something that

strongly resembles it—would become a reality. This assumption is not a blind leap of faith. The AMMP, the Air Force 2025

study, Marine Corps Operational Maneuver From the Sea, and

Joint Vision 2010 are pursuing and planning for substantial

technological advances, and current trends are encouraging.

In keeping with the theme of this paper, the following analysis

is structured around the four evaluation criteria.

Austere Operations

Based on collected data presented to this point, the Boeing

tilt-wing aircraft provides the greatest capability for austere

operations. The powerful propellers, wing tilt, and body design

67
enable the SSTOL capability to meet the Army’s 30-ton/750-

foot runway requirement described in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-

66.1 The Lockheed ATT design data shows the ability to land

with a payload of 30 tons within the required distance, but

takeoff distance requires another four hundred feet.2 The

Lockheed design would be adequate for the SSTOL capability

if the future theater airlift force mission continues to be delivery and sustainment, as it is today. The AAN concept, however, calls for theater airlift to become a maneuver element,

which would require the ability to deliver and retrieve ground

personnel and equipment. Only the Boeing tilt wing provides

the capability to take off with 30 tons in the required distance.

The precision air-droppable approach is another option that

greatly enhances the current airlift mission. Precision standoff

delivery is an excellent way to increase aircrew survivability

and place equipment very close to where it is needed. However,

this technique presents new issues. The expense of the guidance and control unit on the parafoil (estimated at approximately $50,000) dictates that it not be left behind.3 The unfolded wings on the glided system must also have the capability

to be easily refolded if it is to be transported with the ground

personnel. Both of these systems become dead weight traveling

with a force attempting to be as light and mobile as possible.

Even if these problems are no more than an annoyance, the

precision air-droppable systems do not present satisfactory

austere operations capability in themselves. They also only fulfill the delivery requirement of future theater airlift.

At least as important as the platform for supporting the AAN

is the system that enables that platform to operate in its intended fashion. The opportune landing site (OLS) concept—or

similar technology—is critical to the complete fulfillment of the

AAN support requirements. An operative OLS system directly

supports both flexibility and survivability. Determination of

suitable landing areas throughout the battlespace provides

the commander with multiple options for orchestrating the

“ambush dynamic” the AAN seeks.4 Eliminating the need for

extensive ground site surveys enhances the principles of surprise and security.

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Cargo-Handling Capability

In his 1987 book, Determining Future U.S. Tactical Airlift

Requirements, Jeffrey Record points out: “Austere and hastily

prepared landing sites in the future will not have the right

amounts and types of traditional MHE needed to unload the

ATT, and unloading operations in exposed forward sites must

be accomplished quickly in order to reduce risks to the ATT,

its crew, and the ground unit receiving the cargo.”5

Each system described presents a vast improvement over

current capabilities to handle cargo in an austere environment. The advantages presented by an autonomous, self-contained system are glaring; they give cause to question why

such systems have not been integrated into current aircraft. In

point of fact, there were earlier cargo aircraft designed with

limited enhanced cargo-handling capability. Both the Douglas

C-74 and its more widely produced follow-on, the C-124, had

an internal elevator system to accommodate the split-level

cargo compartment. Each also had a built-in crane to aid in

cargo loading.6 These aircraft were designed in 1942 and

1949. The cargo aircraft of today were designed later in the

cold war. During that time, forward basing provided aerial

ports from which external MHE could be used for cargo operations. This alleviated the need for robust onboard systems,

saving development costs and aircraft weight. Since that time

forward basing has dried up, and MHE has become an Achilles

heel. “An airlift system is only as capable as the materials handling equipment (MHE) supporting it. Our current MHE fleet’s

inventory, age, and reliability hinder our ability to fully support 2 MRCs.”7

The load-by-wire (LBW) system provides the most robust

cargo-handling capability. By combining the best features of

other designs, the LBW promises the ability to autonomously

onload/offload nearly any cargo. The articulated ramp adapts to

various truck heights for faster load transfer. When combined

with a wide-body design, the LBW will be capable of laterally

transferring cargo, if necessary. Depending on the type and

quantity of cargo onboard, this could be very useful. For example, in its role of sustaining the smaller, dispersed forces, it is

conceivable that one ATT may have cargo A, B, and C for desti69

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nations X, Y, and Z, respectively. Proper load planning would

ensure that if destination X was reached first, cargo A would be

positioned closest to the ramp. Any diversion to destination Y on

a narrow-body ATT without an LBW system would involve a significant ground delay. Cargo A would have to be offloaded, then

cargo B, followed by a reload of cargo A. Depending on the type

and quantity of cargo, such a scenario on a wide-body ATT with

LBW would involve less delay. With the aid of an automated lateral and fore/aft system of belts, chains, and rollers, the LBW

could potentially move cargo along the floor similar to a Chinese

puzzle. A wide-body ATT also offers more rapid handling capability simply because of the increased surface area at the rear of

the aircraft for cargo transfer.

The key to obtaining such a comprehensive cargo-handling

system is to integrate it fully into the aircraft design. This concept brings with it several challenges. Cost is always an issue

in the development of any revolutionary system. In addition,

planners must closely monitor the aircraft weight increase

caused by such a system and evaluate that against required

performance. The use of lightweight composite structures may

significantly alleviate the weight problem. The increased potential for operations in hostile environments dictates that survivability and redundancy issues are addressed with any critical

system. With its essential role in supporting the AAN, the LBW

cargo-handling system certainly qualifies as such a system.

Situational Awareness

This evaluation did not produce significantly alternative

paths to achieve the desired situational awareness capability

for the twenty-first century theater airlifter. The collective

thinking is that more is better. To this point, current systems

such as GPS and HUDs have been integrated into airlift platforms without regard for other users. This has not interfered

with the enhancement of basic situational awareness—knowing where you are. Knowing where the enemy is involves interaction with other system users and as such requires a

highly adaptable architecture. The current rate of technological change suggests that new systems’ potential capabilities

might be artificially limited by the need for interoperability. An

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adaptive architecture will alleviate this setback by building

“growing space” into the system.

The current ABI system will provide lessons for future RTIC

information systems, and those must be rolled into the ATT concept. Because the ATT will be one of many users of a large system, the designers will not have to devote significant time and

energy to developing an entire system. Instead they must focus

on tailoring the ATT avionics and information suite to integrate

with the overall network. The ATT team does not have to build

the boat, but they need to be on board when it leaves the dock.

This paper has described (with guarded optimism) the extent to which the AAN will exploit information technologies to

achieve battlespace awareness. By integrating into the system,

the ATT can enhance combatant commanders’ flexibility by

providing them real-time information on the status of potential maneuver assets. Such situational awareness capability

supports the focused logistics piece of Joint Vision 2010 providing “the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation

technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and

shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics

packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations.”8

Defensive Systems

Applying the concept of layered survivability, the use of LO

technology provides the most advantageous defensive capability by accomplishing the objective of “don’t be seen.” Based on

this statement alone, the Lockheed ATT design has an advantage over the tilt-wing aircraft. Operations in support of the

AAN “move-strike-move battle rhythm” will be conducted

throughout a disputed battlespace.9 The ability to maneuver

and sustain combat forces without being detected enhances

not only survivability but also the security of the supported

ground forces. The unique mission of the future theater airlift

force raises questions on the utility and feasibility of a lowobservable design.

One of the primary missions of the ATT will be operating at

austere airfields. This implies a semi- or unprepared surface

with a potential for FOD. In conventional aircraft FOD is most

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hazardous if the debris impacts flight control surfaces or is ingested into the engines. In stealth aircraft FOD takes on a

whole new meaning. The entire surface integrity is essential to

retaining LO capability.10 Operations through these austere

fields may significantly increase the radar cross section and

make the aircraft more vulnerable.

To date, stealth has been an integral part of the design of

three US aircraft: the F-117, B-2, and the F-22. Each of these

was designed to operate in a high-altitude environment where

radar cross section reduction is a significant enhancement.

From its infancy the ATT concept has been developed for a

mission in which its ingress and egress are flown at altitudes

as low as two hundred feet.11 In this environment the ATT

crew must also be concerned with small arms fire, antiaircraft

artillery (AAA), and IR and optically guided man-portable air

defense missile systems. The stealth answer to such a problem is that if enemy forces cannot see the aircraft on radar,

they cannot alert forces within its predicted flight path. Those

forces would then be reduced to small arms fire or AAA they

can bring to bear in an impromptu manner, greatly increasing

the ATT chances for survival.

Such a strategy might be very effective for an aircraft constantly maneuvering through the battlespace. The ATT will not

have this luxury, as its primary mission will be to pick up and

deliver troops and equipment throughout the disputed area.

During its approach and landing, the ATT must reconfigure,

which includes extending its high-lift devices and landing

gear. This reconfiguration will greatly increase the radar cross

section—a factor not considered in designing current stealth

assets. Regardless of this fact, the Lockheed LO design for its

ATT offers a greater level of survivability than its tilt-wing

counterpart. Is it enough?

The potential for LO degradation and the diversity of the potential threats at low-altitude demand that the ATT have more

than just a stealthy shell. Current countermeasures are a step

in the right direction, but low-altitude operations compress

the time between identification, reaction, and CM deployment.

The directed-energy weapon concept offers the most encouraging solution to this problem. The ability to defeat the missile

threat by destroying it is more comforting than relying on out72

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smarting it. The methodology of intercepting the missile

through computing its trajectory suggests a follow-on capability of locating and targeting its source. This capability could

enhance survivability through destruction and deterrence.

This concept also brings with it a certain amount of risk.

More so than the previous concepts under analysis, the success of the design depends on projected technological advances. Specifically—“Next generation fast computing will be

required to solve the difficult pointing and tracking problem

for a directed energy defensive system to be successful.”12

Thus this method of aircraft defense should be treated with

the same guarded optimism required when considering several

of the AAN information dominance prospects. Its potential

value demands that it not only be given consideration but also

genuinely pursued for any aircraft with a mission similar to

that of the ATT. As with several other concepts, weight and development costs will be important considerations.

A load-by-wire (LBW) cargo-handling system will indirectly

provide aircraft defense. By efficiently managing the cargo operations at the austere locations, the LBW can significantly

reduce ground time. This action provides an increased measure of security to the aircrew, cargo, and supported ground

personnel.

Other Key Considerations

In the interest of limiting variables to provide more depth of

focus, this paper has defined value primarily in terms of capability. However, to neglect the element of cost completely would

be irresponsible. Nearly all of the new airlift concepts have been

demonstrated to some extent. The future costs will be realized

in the expansion of these concepts into an actual operational

system. At this point it is unknown if the costs of developing

and fielding a tail-less, tilt-wing, turboprop aircraft will be more

expensive than to do the same for a stealthy, blended wingbody, highly lift-augmented, turbofan aircraft. Each aircraft

company possesses its own unbridled enthusiasm and optimistic projections, but further independent research involving

a developmental cost comparison would be invaluable.

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One strategy that Lockheed is pursuing to reduce costs is to

make the basic aircraft design capable of multiple roles, including a tanker and a special operations variant. This modular design concept would allow all aircraft variants to share a

single production line for the bulk of the construction. The aircraft-specific modifications would include fuselage and wing

plugs designed to readily attach to the basic structure.13

Additions such as LO skin appliqué would only be included on

the aircraft whose missions require it. This addition would

provide cost savings by producing more of the basic aircraft

and enabling economies of scale. Such modularity is also envisioned for the interior of the aircraft, allowing for reconfiguration to support different operations. Modularity has been

identified by the Air Force 2025 project as an important attribute of future systems.14

In pursuit of swing-role capability, Boeing is developing a

“tail package” for its design to accommodate the air refueling.

In this system the aft portion of the articulated ramp can be

removed and replaced by a similar plug equipped with an extendable aerial refueling receptacle. The new plug connects to

the aircraft plumbing and allows for refueling from the aircraft

wing tanks. The same remote system used by the loadmaster

for refueling will be adaptable for use by a boom operator or

an automated system. With the tilt-wing top speed of four

hundred knots (true airspeed), it is speed compatible with all

of today’s refuelable assets.15

Interoperability is also of interest when designing a new airlift capability. Supporting the operational forces in times of

conflict is essential, but the aircraft possesses little overall

utility if it is unable to integrate with the rest of the transportation system while carrying out its peacetime mission.

Integration into the system includes the ability to accept and

deliver cargo from other transportation modes expeditiously.

The Army has recognized the need for such an intermodal capability in its requirements documents.16 The Air Force 2025

project determined that:

Intermodality is a basic requirement for basic airlift systems.

Cargo must be configured for direct transfer between air, land,

sea, and space lift systems and operational use at delivery destination. Because we anticipate the requirement to transfer mili74

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tary cargo on commercial carriers of all mediums when possible,

military payload configuration must comply with national and international standards. Through cooperative international development, these configurations also allow direct synergistic support among operational allied, coalition, and U.S. forces.17

An LBW cargo-handling system will greatly enhance intermodal operations. The ISO 20-foot container is becoming a

more popular transport tool because it not only transfers readily to large truck beds but also is conducive to stacking, which

saves precious volume aboard ships. An aircraft cargo-handling

system with autonomous loading capability and prepositioned

restraint devices on the cargo floor will increase efficiency and

maximize throughput at transfer locations.

Enhanced cargo-handling system and SSTOL capabilities

also integrate well with emerging naval concepts for offshore

bases. This idea may become increasingly necessary as diplomatic clearances and access to foreign soil for military operations become more difficult. One such concept consists of a set

of hinged, semisubmersible modules designed to accommodate

both ships and aircraft. The length of the offshore base can be

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Source: This photo was extracted from a promotional brochure provided by McDermott, Inc. Permission for

use was granted by Adm “Bat” LaPlante, McDermott, Inc., March 1999.

Mobile Offshore Base
adjusted to support the size and type of aircraft designed to operate through it. With each one-thousand-foot module currently estimated to cost approximately $1 billion, the advantage of SSTOL capability becomes readily apparent.18

Conclusions

For nearly a decade, victory in the cold war has allowed the

United States to operate in the international environment as

the sole superpower. This “strategic pause,” to use the popular vernacular, presents a unique opportunity to “prepare now

for an uncertain future” in support of the national security

strategy.19 The US Army has taken this opportunity to develop

a new force structure and doctrinal concept to respond rapidly

and decisively throughout the spectrum of conflict. The AAN

vision is far-reaching in its implications. Many of its critical

enablers such as information dominance, ultrareliability, and

total logistical situational awareness are unproven concepts. 20

Despite this the AAN is an evolving concept; and even if the

high-end goals are not attained, the spirit of the vision will be

reflected in future doctrine. This change includes more reliance on information, dispersed forces, and increased dependence on maneuver.

As the Army system evolves, the theater airlift system supporting it must also change. New logistical challenges will

emerge, placing increased importance on the principles of flexibility and survivability. Added to this, future theater airlift will

become an element of combat maneuver more than ever before. This paper posits that increased emphasis will be required in developing four particular capabilities of a future

theater airlift system: austere operations, cargo-handling capability, situational awareness, and defensive systems. From

analysis of current capabilities shortfalls and alternative

paths to meet the AAN requirements, this paper draws several

conclusions. The following is a brief summary of those conclusions and areas for suggested further research:

1. Given the design information from the various systems

under development, the tilt-wing aircraft best meets the

AAN SSTOL needs. Its airfield performance provides the

ability to deliver and pick up the tonnage of cargo re76

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quired, better enabling it to function as a maneuver element. Further research involving a cost comparison between the tilt-wing and stealth ATT design would add

value to this analysis.

2. The opportune landing system concept is critical to realizing the level of maneuverability the AAN desires. The

necessity of diverting ground forces to conduct site surveys significantly inhibits the combatant commander’s

ability to orchestrate a move-strike-move campaign effectively. Further development of this technology might also

provide the commander better information to analyze terrain more effectively when planning horizontal maneuver.

3. Given the operating environment for future theater airlift, an automated load-by-wire (LBW) cargo-handling

system offers essential capabilities. Its versatility and

autonomy provide rapid cargo-loading operations that

enhance survivability of the aircrew, cargo, and supported ground forces. The ability to handle nearly any

standard load type minimizes the need for external MHE.

This provides cost savings as well as increased lift capacity as it frees up cargo space otherwise required for

moving the external MHE. When coupled with a widebody ATT, the LBW provides even more rapid cargo onload/offload capability. In addition the ability to laterally

transfer cargo in a “double-wide” compartment increases

handling flexibility.

4. Situational awareness initiatives currently under way

are adequate. The most important consideration in developing further systems is integration with the overall

“information dominance” network.

5. Several variables cloud the issue for defensive systems,

making the conclusions less clear. Stealth is a proven

technology, and as such it is very attractive. The projected mission of an ATT is unique in that a significant

portion of its mission is at low altitude, sometimes slow,

and occasionally static on the ground. The resulting susceptibilities are not adequately addressed by stealth, although it is sure to help in the en route cruise portion of

the mission. An offensive capability such as a directedenergy weapon would greatly enhance crew survivability.

Since such a system is currently not operational, research into the costs and feasibility of fielding such a

weapon on an ATT would greatly aid decision makers.

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Research to explore the maintainability of stealth on aircraft operating in austere environments would also be

very valuable.

Regardless of which type of platform or system is chosen, it

is absolutely critical that tomorrow’s systems be built to support tomorrow’s missions. For the advanced theater transport

platform, this means developing a new paradigm and measures of merit for mission accomplishment. If this paper has

provided sharper focus and general direction to that end in

any way, then it has served its purpose.

Notes

1. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-

66, Future Operational Capability, TC 97-004: Super Short Takeoff and

Landing (SSTOL), n.d., n.p.; on-line, Internet, 6 March 1999, available from

http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-66e.htm. Boeing ATT information released under the approval of Mike Rohrlick, ATT program manager, Boeing Co., Long Beach, Calif.

2. Lockheed Martin ATT information released under the approval of John

Nichols, senior specialist engineer, Advanced Concepts Team, Smyrna, Ga.

3. Andrew Braunberg, “Parachute Guidance Empowers Programmed

Payload Placement,” Signal, May 1996, 83.

4. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed: Battle Force and the US Army of

2025, The 1998 Annual Report on the Army After Next Project to the Chief of

Staff of the Army (Fort Monroe, Va.: TRADOC, 1998), 27.

5. Jeffrey Record, Determining Future U.S. Tactical Airlift Requirements

(Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers,

1987), 36.

6. René J. Francillon, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Since 1920 (London:

Putnam, 1979), 407, 467.

7. AMMP: Air Mobility Master Plan (Scott AFB, Ill.: AMC, 1997), 1–31.

8. Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 16.

9. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1998, 27.

10. Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My

Years at Lockheed (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1994), 69. Rich relates a

story in which the protrusion of three screws of less than one-eighth inch

above the low-observable surface showed up on radar “like a barn door.”

11. R. V. Wible, “Technology and Design Considerations for an Advanced

Theater Transport” in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Progress in

Military Airlift (France: AGARD, 1990), 19-7.

12. New World Vistas, Air and Space Power for the 21st Century, Mobility

Volume (Washington, D.C.: USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1995), 18.

78

CADRE PAPER
13. Briefing slides by Lockheed Martin on ATT concept received 4 March

1999. The information is presented under the authorization of John Nichols,

senior specialist engineer, Advanced Concepts Team, Smyrna, Ga.

14. “Airlift 2025: The First with the Most,” Air Force 2025 Final Report,

August 1996, n.p.; on-line, Internet, 14 March 1999, available from

http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025.htm.

15. Interview with Mike Rohrlick, ATT program manager, Boeing Co.,

Long Beach, Calif. Information released under the authority of Mr. Rohrlick.

16. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66, Future Operational Capability, TR 97-

033: Sustainment Transportation, n.d., n.p.; on-line, Internet, 6 March

1999, available from http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-

66e.htm.

17. “Airlift 2025: The First with the Most.”

18. Briefing by Adm J. B. LaPlante, US Navy, Retired, from the

McDermott Co., to the Air Mobility Symposium, Robins AFB, Ga., 29

January 1999.

19. United States, Executive Office of the President, National Security

Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October

1998), 23.

20. TRADOC, Knowledge and Speed 1998, 33, 28, 36.

79

ALLVIN
Glossary

AAA antiaircraft artillery

AAN Army After Next

ABI Airborne Battlefield Intelligence

ACSC Air Command and Staff College

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document

AFMSS Air Force Mission Scheduling System

AMC Air Mobility Command

AMMP Air Mobility Master Plan

AOE Army of Excellence

APU auxiliary power unit

ARSOF Army Special Operations Forces

ATT Advanced Theater Transport

AWE advanced warfighting experiment

BRA brigade rear area

CARP computed air release point

CBR California Bearing Ratio

CCT combat control team

CDS container delivery system

CM countermeasure

CMDS countermeasures dispense set

CONOPS concept of operations

CONUS continental United States

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DOD Department of Defense

ECHS enhanced cargo-handling system

ECM electronic countermeasure

FLIR forward-looking infrared

FLOT forward line of own troops

FOD foreign object damage

FY fiscal year

GAO Government Accounting Office

GDP gross domestic product

81
GPO Government Printing Office

GPS global positioning system

HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

HRAM hardened random access memory

HUD head up display

IIT idea integration team

INSS Institute for National Strategic Studies

IOC initial operational capability

IR infrared

ISO International Standards Organization

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JFC joint force commander

JP Joint Publication

JTAV joint total asset visibility

kph kilometers per hour

LAPES low altitude parachute extraction system

LBW load by wire

LO low observable

MANPAD man-portable air defense

MCR multi-command regulation

MHE materials handling equipment

MWS missile warning system

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

NVG night vision goggles

OLS opportune landing site

OMFTS Operational Maneuver from the Sea

PCA propulsion controlled aircraft

PLS palletized loading system

RCR runway condition reporting

RFI request for information

82
RML revolution in military logistics

RTIC real-time-in-the-cockpit information

RTS robotic transport system

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses

SSTOL super short takeoff and landing

STOL short takeoff and landing

TAV total asset visibility

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command (Army)

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USGAO United States General Accounting Office

V/STOL vertical/short takeoff and landing

VTOL vertical takeoff and landing

WMD weapons of mass destruction

83
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94
Paradigm Lost

Rethinking Theater Airlift to 

Support the Army After Next

Air University Press

Chief Editor

Hattie D. Minter

Copy Editor

Rita B. Mathis

Book Design and Cover Art

Daniel M. Armstrong

Composition and

Prepress Production

Linda C. Colson