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Library of Congress Catalogiing-in-Publication Data

Fischer, William Edward.

The development of military night aviation to 1919 / William Edward Fischer, Jr.

p. cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1 . Atrwarfare-History . 2. Nightflying-History . 3. World War, 1914-1918-Aerial

operations . I . Title .

UG625.F57 1998

358.4-dc21 98-44145

CIP

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the

author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency . Cleared for public release:

distribution unlimited.

For Sale by the Superintendent ofDocuments

US Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C . 20402

11
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

1 NIGHT AERONAUTICS TO AUGUST 1914 . . . . 1

Aeronautics Clubs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Military Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Airship Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Military Trials of Airships . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1

Airplane Night Flying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Military Night Flying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2 THE EMERGENCE OF NIGHT BOMBING,

1914-1916 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

The First Night Aviators . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Night Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Bombardment Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Hazardous Aspects of Night Flying . . . . . . . 31

Differences in Day and Night

Bombardment Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Organizational Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

3 TACTICAL NIGHT BOMBARDMENT . . . . . . . . 41

Germany's Opening Offensive . . . . . . . . . . 42

French Night Flights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

The Battle of the Somme . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Changes in French Aviation . . . . . . . . . . 49

Britain's No. 100 Squadron . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Amerikaprogramm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

iii
Chapter Page

French Bombardment Aviation

Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Spring Offensives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

The Minor Role of Tactical Night

Bombardment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

4 STRATEGIC NIGHT BOMBARDMENT . . . . . . . 63

Bombardment by Airship . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

R-Planes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Turk's Cross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

British and French Joint Offensives . . . . . . 69

British Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Briey Basin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

US Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

5 THE FOUNDATIONS OF NIGHT FIGHTING . . . . 89

British Home Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Night Airplane Bombardment . . . . . . . . . . 92

Night Pursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

6 NIGHT OBSERVATION AND

RECONNAISSANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Balloon Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Airship Intelligence Gathering . . . . . . . . . 102

Night Aircraft Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . 103

Visibility Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Reorganization Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

7 MEN AND MATERIEL FOR NIGHT FLYING . . . . 115

French Bombardment Training . . . . . . . . . 116

British Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

German Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

The Americans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

Aircraft Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

lU
Chapter page

Targeting and Landing Illumination . . . . . . 125

Radio Direction Finding . . . . . . . . . . . , 129

Airfield Illumination . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 130

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

8 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . 143

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Photographs

French Army Balloon . . . . . . . . . . . , , , , , , , 2

Signal Corps Dirigible . . . . . . . . . . . . , , , , , , g

Farman Longhorn . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . 30

Handley Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 33

Gotha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Caproni . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Breuget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

DeHaviland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Bristol Scout . . . . . . . . . . . , . . , , , , , , , , , g3

Spad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Voisin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Friedrichshafen . . . . . . . . . , . . , , , , , , . . . 120

U
Illustrations

Figure paye

1 Flying School Advertisement from 1916

Showing Night Looping Exhibition . . . . . . . . 17

2 French Night Bombardment Aviation,

July-December 1916 . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 46

3 Types of Objectives for French Night Bombardment

Aviation, July-December 1916 . . . . . . . . . . 47

4 German Bombardment on the British Front,

May-October 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

5 Trade Advertisements for Self-luminous

Compounds, 1917 . . . . . . . . , . . , , . , . 123

6 Sketch Showing Wing Tip and Parachute

Flare Use for Night Landings . . . . . . . . . . . 126

7 Sample German Lighthouse Signals, 1914 . . . . 12?

8 Plan for German Airfield Illumination, 1915 . . . . 131

9 British '"I'EE" Electric Airfield Light System . . . . 132

Table

1 Bennett Cup International Balloon Races

to 1913 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2 Spherical Balloon Pilot Requirements,

1909 and 1911 . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , , , , 5

3 Distribution of French Bombardment,

19 January 1916 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

4 Distribution of French Bombardment,

September 1917 . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

ui
Table Page

5 Order of Arrival for British Night Bombardment

Squadrons in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

6 Royal Air Force Night Bombardment on the

Western Front, 11 November 1918 . . . . . . . . 58

7 Distribution of German Bombardment Aviation,

28 July 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

8 US Air Service Night Bombardment Squadrons,

1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

s

. 59

9 United States Naval Aviation Forces in Europe,

Northern Bombing Group, Night Wing . . . . . . 60

10 Comparison of Allied and Enemy Night

Bombardment Aviation Aircraft Strengths . . . . 60

11 German Strategic Raids Against

Great Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

12 Groupe de Bombardement 4, Strategic Night

Bombardment in Conjunction with RNAS No. 3

(N) Wing, October-December 1916 . . . . . . . . 71

13 Comparison of British Day and Night

Bombardment Squadron Activity,

1 January-21 May 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

14 British Bombardment Objectives,

1 January-19 May 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

15 British and French Strategic Bombardment

of Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

16 Location of French Lighthouses,

10 June 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

17 Specifications for Night Reconnaissance

Planes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Uli
About the Author

Maj William E. Fischer Jr., USAF, is an air and air defense

capabilities analyst serving on exchange with the staff of the

Canadian Forces Director General of Intelligence at National

Defence Headquarters in Ottawa . Enlisting in 1976, he

became an Air Weather Service observer, with tours in Ohio

and Alaska fpllowed by duty at Fort Bragg, North Carolina,

where he completed parachute training with the 7th Special

Forces Group and was a member of the XVIII Airborne Corps

and 82d Airborne Division weather teams. Separating from

active service, Major Fischer later became a distinguished

graduate of Air Force Reserve Officer Training Center and was

commissioned in 1984 . From 1985 to 1989, he was a

Minuteman II launch officer with the 12th Strategic Missile

Squadron at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana . Missile

crew duty culminated with personal appointment as the

squadron command post flight commander and unit

recognition as the 1988 outstanding missile squadron in

Strategic Air Command . After an Air Force Institute of

Technology school assignment, Major Fischer served on the

faculty of the US Air Force Academy where he taught military,

world, and American history. During this period, he was a

visiting research associate at the Smithsonian Institution's

National Museum of National History. Major Fischer then

served as senior watch officer and air analysis section chief

during a two-year tour of duty in the Republic of

Korea/United States Combined Force Command Intelligence

Operations Center in Seoul before beginning his current

assignment in 1996 . He earned an associate in applied

science degree in weather technology from the Community

College of the Air Force, a bachelor of science in natural

resources from the Ohio State University, a bachelor of arts in

history from the College of Great Falls, Montana, and a master

of arts in American history from the University of Georgia.

Major Fischer is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and

Air Command and Staff College and is the author of more

ix
than 40 articles, encyclopedia entries, and reviews for the

Dictionary of American Biography, Air Power History, and the

Journal of Interdisciplinary History, among others . He has

presented papers at several conferences, including the annual

meeting of the Canadian Historical Association. This is his

first monograph. He and his wife Margaret are the proud

parents of three children, Henry, Molly, and Nicholas .

s

x
Preface

This study examines the development of military night

aviation from its origins through the First World War .

Emphasis is on the evolution of night flying in those countries

which fought on the Western Front, namely France, Germany,

Great Britain, and the United States . While night flying

occurred in other theaters, the most intense air effort was

clearly in t°he west. There, belligerents pressed aviation

technology and tactics to the limits ; the skies of northern

France and Flanders offered the only opportunity for

movement across the stagnated front. Another important

consideration was the availability of rich documentation

concerning night aerial activity in the theater.

To appreciate the rapid development of night military

aviation during the First World War, one first needs to

understand the state of night flying prior to August 1914.

Numerous aeronautical journals of the period offer articles

exploring the technical problems associated with night flight.

Additionally the New York Times provides a useful but more

general day-to-day account of the evolution of flying during

darkness . Source material for the war period is quite

extensive.

Aviators' memoirs provide a personal glimpse into the trials

and tribulations of night flying under hostile conditions.

Contemporary journals contain numerous articles dealing

with developments in the field . Yet archival materials offer the

most wide-ranging information on the evolution of military

night aviation.

The National Archives has an extensive assortment of World

War I era United States Air Service documents embodied in

Record Groups (RG) 18 and 120 . However finding night

aviation materials among the holdings is a rather timeconsuming proposition . Within RG 120 is a collection of

documents known as Gorrell's History of the American

Expeditionary Forces Air Service, 1917-1919. Col Edgar S .

Gorrell directed the assembling of data on all aspects of Air

xi
Service experience during the First World War. Only a small

portion of the 282 volumes of material was ever published due

to military budget reductions in the 1920s .

The United States Air Force maintains its archives at the Air

Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base,

Alabama. While World War I night aviation information is

limited, it is nonetheless accessible. Similarly, the French

Service Historique de 1'Armee de 1'Air maintains numerous

documents dealing with aviation de nuit during the First

World War. The official French air service correspondence is

especially useful for understanding the difficulties of early

night aerial combat operations and training . Materials

maintained at the British Public Records Office and in

German archives would have further enhanced this study.

Unfortunately, they remained beyond my reach .

xii
Acknowledgments

As with any undertaking of such proportion and consequence, this study is the result of input, assistance, and

direction by a host of people. Professors Roger P. Snow and

William J. Furdell of the University of Great Falls (Montana)

supported my goal of a graduate degree in history through

instruction at the undergraduate level . Col Carl W. Reddel, Lt

Col Mark Clodfelter, and the staff at the United States Air

Force Academy Department of History believed in my abilities

as an historian and provided sponsorship to attend graduate

school . Hopefully this study does not disappoint them. An

unexpected bonus with my academy teaching assignment was

the warm friendship and wise counsel of then visiting

professor Dennis E. Showalter.

The support provided on numerous visits to the United

States Air Force Historical Research Center was most appreciated; a special thanks to Col (Retired) Elliot V. Converse III,

former commander, and Dr. Richard Morse for their assistance.

Gen Lucien Robineau, former director of the Service Historlque

de 1'Armee de 1'Air, kindly provided French archive material

which greatly broadened the scope of this study. Tom D. Crouch

and Karl Scheide of the National Air and Space Museum

provided keen insight on the challenges faced by period aviation .

Col George Williams, former deputy Air Force historian,

became a strong supporter in getting this work published. Our

mutual interest in Great War aviation made for stimulating

conversation .

At the University of Georgia, the interlibrary loan staff

performed yeoman work in fulfilling my endless requests.

Professor John H. Morrow Jr. and Professor James Colvert

(who was Professor Emeritus when he sat on my reading

committee) graciously took time from their busy schedules to

review and comment on the study as part of my reading

committee. Most of all I owe a great debt to Professor (now

Emeritus) Lee Kennett for agreeing to be my major professor .

His direction and guidance sustained me through the many

xiii
travails of research and writing. Unfortunately all I can offer in

return for the many hours spent on this project is a most

heartfelt thanks .

And through it all, my wife Margaret's patience and

unbending support enabled me to complete this study on a

very tight schedule all the while grappling with the demands

incumbent with three gregarious and loving preschoolers

under foot. Her unselfish devotion as spouse and mother is

hereby publicly recognized and ever appreciated.

s

xiu
Chapter 1

Night Aeronautics to August 1914

The earliest aeronauts to venture into the darkened sky did

so by means of balloons . While possibly not the first

documented case of a free balloon aloft at night, the ascent

from London of Charles Green, Monck Mason, and Robert

Holland in the balloon Royal Vauxhall, on 7 November 1836,

is nevertheless epic . Boldly crossing the English Channel in

fading twilight, the aeronauts were soon welcomed by the

lights of Calais, France. Liege, Belgium, was easily recognized

by the flames from its many furnaces. For most of the night,

Mason commented in his book, Aeronautica, that "we could

scarcely avoid the impression that we were cleaving our way

through a mass of black marble ." After sailing through the

moonless night, the balloon finally descended near Nassau,

Germany, after traveling 500 miles .'

That free ballooning distance record stood until John Wise

and three other aeronauts embarked from St. Louis, Missouri,

on 1 July 1859. Their ascent in the balloon Atlantic was in

anticipation of a future transatlantic voyage. The flight ended

the following day in Henderson Township, Jefferson County,

New York, 800 miles distant. Though coming dangerously

close to ditching in Lake Erie, Wise and John La Mountain,

who also took part in the epic journey, remained riveted to the

goal of crossing the Atlantic by balloon. Both men continued

to experiment with endurance ascensions. Wise would finally

meet his end in Lake Michigan during the night of 28-29

September 1879 on his 463d ascent. 2

Also in 1859, Thaddeus S. C. Lowe, a rival of Wise and La

Mountain, built the City of New York specifically for a

transatlantic voyage . Unfortunately the balloon, rechristened

Great Western, burst on 8 September 1860 . While Lowe's

transatlantic ambitions never came to fruition, he nevertheless achieved notable success with balloons during the

American Civil War. 3

Lowe apparently made history in August and September

1861 by making the earliest recorded captive balloon night

1
ascensions for military purposes. His mission was to count

Confederate campfires . La Mountain made numerous free

balloon flights over enemy lines for the Union army, but the

honor of the first military free balloon night flight appears to

belong to Capt John R. Bryan, serving for the Confederate

States of America under Gen Joseph E . Johnston in eastern

Virginia. In mid-April 1862, Bryan, on his first captive balloon

ascension, soon found his cable cut. Drifting back and forth

across the lines during the night, the captain was much

relieved when he finally landed back on the Confederate side.

Unfortunately, American military ballooning ended before

termination of the war. 4

Night ballooning stirred the imagination of those who

ascended into the starlit sky. Part of the enjoyment clearly

resulted from the stable atmospheric conditions often

encountered at night. Such stability made the aeronaut's job

easy, as Eugene Godard demonstrated on a night ascension

when he "passed from one point of Paris and its environs to

another, picking up his passengers." During the FrancoPrussian War, a besieged Paris kept in contact with the

outside world by means of free balloons. Sixty-six balloons left

Paris between 23 September 1870 and the armistice four

months later. The hazards of passing over enemy troops

during daylight soon resulted in numerous night ascensions

from the city . Carried in the balloons were 1 .5 million

letters-the first overnight airmail service . 5

European military balloon experimentation increased

greatly after the Franco-Prussian War, with the British,

French, and German armies all evaluating balloon use by the

mid-1880s. The United States Army lagged behind, obtaining

its first balloon in 1893 . These military balloon branches were

clearly the forerunners of twentieth-century military aviation. s

A great revival in free ballooning occurred in the United

States after the record-setting ascension of Count de la Vaux

during the Paris International Exposition of 1900. Cheered

during departure by a crowd estimated at one million strong,

the count remained airborne for more than 35 hours, finally

coming to earth near Kiev, Ukraine . The flight covered a

distance of 1,193 miles, surpassing Wise's 1859 journey.'

3
Aeronautics Clubs

Aeronautics clubs and contests grew rapidly in the first

decade of the new century. The first club in the United States,

the Aero Club of America, was founded in 1905 and was

modeled after European organizations . Safer and more

accessible than heavier-than-air flying machines and less

costly and more easily maintained than dirigible balloons, the

free spherical balloon proved to be a satisfying airborne

medium. Free balloon experiences furthered support for

military aeronautical developments. 8

The first 'international balloon race, the James Gordon

Bennett Coupe Internationale des Aeronautes, was held in

Paris under the auspices of the Federation Aeronautique

Internationale (FAI) on 1 October 1906 . The balloon

achieving the furthest distance from the ascension point

would be declared the winner (see table 1) . With much

foresight, the FAI had selected for the competition a day

whose night would be brightly lit with moonlight and was

known through meteorological records to routinely have

prevailing westerly winds . Such conditions were supposed to

assist the aeronauts in making long flights . but ultimately

Table 1

Bennett Cup International Balloon Races

Location Winner

1906 Paris Frank P. Lahm

to 1913

I Distance

(Miles)

402.4

1907 St . Louis Oscar Erbsloh 872.5

1908 Berlin M. Schaeck 808

1909 Zurich Edgar W. Mix 696.5

1910 St . Louis Alan R. Hawley 1,172.9

i 1911 Kansas City Hans Gericke 468

1912 Stuttgart Maurice Bienaim~ 1,364

1913 ~ Paris- - -Ralph H-Upson_ - 383.2

Source: Adapted from Tom D. Crouch, The Eagle Aloft' Two Centuries of the Balloon in America (Washington, D.C : Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983), chap . 17 .

4
did not . Lt Frank P . Lahm of the US Army Signal Corps won

the competition with a flight of barely 400 miles. Unfavorable

winds forced Lahm to cross the English Channel, then land

before being swept out over the North Sea.`'

With the amazing growth of aeronautics clubs, concern for

safety likewise increased . By 1909 the FAI established criteria

for the award of a spherical balloon pilot license, one night

ascension being part of the requirements. While licensing was

not enforceable, earning one gave the aeronaut public

credibility (see table 2) .1°

The broad appeal of these early organizations can be seen in

the composition of America's third club, the Philadelphia

Aeronautical Recreation Society (PARS) . Organized in the

latter half of 1906, the PARS prohibited "professionals" from

membership, yet eagerly welcomed women, who made up

roughly one-third of the organization by mid-1908 . Therefore,

5

Table 2

Spherical Balloon Pilot Requirements, 1909 and 1911

1909

The applicant must

" be 21 years of age, and

" make 10 ascensions-one at night, one alone, and two conducted

by the applicant under supervision of licensed pilots (with no

interference) who report on handling to board.

1911

~, Applicant must pass the following tests:

II " five ascensions without any conditions,

" an ascension of one hour's minimum duration undertaken by the

candidate alone, and

" a night ascension of two hours' minimum duration, completed

between the setting and the rising of the sun.

The issue of a certificate is always discretionary .

Source : Juliette A Hennessy, The United States Army AirArm, April 1961 to April 1917 (Washington, D.C . :

Government Prinfinn Wfice 195A1 91A
it is not surprising that two society dames (M. E. Lockington and

Minnie Appelbach) were the first women in the United States to

make a night flight by balloon ."

Military Applications

"Free balloons [were] of little practical use in the service ."

However, as few people had flown an airplane by the end of

1907, ballooning provided the military with an outlet for

expanding aeronautical experience .' 2

Free ballooning enabled an aviator candidate to "acquire

familiarity with dangling his toes in space." Lt J . N. Fletcher

of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), believed that airplane pilots

and observers who had first plied the skies in a balloon

would have greater confidence in their ability to fly

heavier-than-air craft . Additionally, he contended that if

Great Britain's balloonists were better organized, and had a

central registry to collect meteorological information

obtained during balloon ascents, night flying by airplanes

would in five years be as safe as navigating on the sea. As

early as 1909, Fletcher expressed the opinion held in British

military circles concerning the high vulnerability of airships

in combat and the need for operating under cover of

darkness . The lieutenant had his own idea for training

pilots . "If night flying is to be a principal role of airships,"

Fletcher insisted that, "the pilot must be trained first in

night ballooning. When real flying, away from illuminated

aerodromes, becomes a possibility for aeroplanes, some

regulation should be adopted to make each pilot do at least

two night balloon runs before he attempts to cross unknown

country by night."' s

Even after the Airship Company of the Air Battalion (formed

in April 1911 to consolidate British military aviation) had

become No. 1 Squadron, RFC, in 1912, free balloons were

used for "reconnaissance training of aeroplane pilots when

aeroplanes were in short supply." Barely a month after the

First World War started, a Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) pilot

trainee wrote home about a night ascension in a free balloon

from Hendon. He had not expected that flight training "should

come down to ;an old (1902) gas bag."' 4

6
Once war production geared up and airplanes became more

numerous, free balloon training of airplane pilot candidates

declined. However, both the British and German armies did

instruct captive balloon observers in the art of free ballooning.

Such training prepared the observer to safely land a runaway

captive balloon-witness Captain Bryan's Civil War experience .

The British also used such vessels for reconnaissance and

bombing training during the last decade of the nineteenth

century. In the United States Army, free balloons were used

for training airship pilots well into the postwar years,

presumably w~ ith requisite night ascensions. ` 5

There is little doubt that the steady improvements in airship

and airplane performance in the decade prior to 1914

redirected military emphasis away from ballooning. The

French army disbanded its captive balloon companies by 1911

in favor of dirigibles, while at the same time in Britain "the

spherical balloon was drifting into obsolescence without

anything comparable replacing it ."'s

The United States Army recognized the military operational

value of free balloons as being "of little use" for anything but

conveying information from a besieged position-apparently

the lessons of 1870 Paris were not completely lost. Only

Germany continued to actively experiment with balloons,

having earlier developed the captive Drachen, often referred to

as a "sausage" because of its shape, which could remain aloft

in high wind conditions ."

Airship Development

During the first decade of the twentieth century, airship

development caught the attention of the military. Whether

nonrigid, semirigid, or rigid, the airship seemed destined for

success . Its capacity for better stability than nascent airplanes,

great lifting power, ability to remain aloft for lengthy periods,

and the awe inspiring sight of the massive vessels aloft made

the airship a likely candidate for military consideration .

The nonrigid La FYance, built by Capt Charles Renard and

Lt Arthur Krebs, became the archetype for the new class of air

vessel. First flown on 9 August 1884, La FYance made seven

demonstration flights . These French exhibitions convinced at

7
least one man of the military possibilities for such a vehicle.

Fueled by patriotic fervor, Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin

worked with an undivided devotion on rigid airship

development . Sixteen years after the La France, the LZ 1

(Luitschiff Zeppelin 1) made its maiden voyage on Lake

Constance. While not an unqualified success, the LZ1 ushered

in a new era in military aeronautics .' 8

The French army was the first to incorporate a dirigible, Le

Jaune, into its inventory in 1905. The German army added its

first airships of semirigid design in 1906-7 and commissioned

a nonrigid airship in August 1908. Since the German military

was thinkii-~g of the airship in regard to tactical operations as

with an observation balloon, it is not surprising that they

had no interest in rigid airships until the LZ3 made an

eight-hour flight in 1907 . The army then agreed to buy one

from Zeppelin provided it could fly continuously for 24 hours

and demonstrate its ability to navigate. Rather than give up

against such outrageous demands, the count continued his

difficult work.' 9

Because of the early experimentation with dirigible airships

on the Continent, the British Committee on Military

Ballooning recommended that the British balloon factory

begin immediate research . The semirigid Nulli Secundus

became operational in 1907. Across the ocean, the exhibitions

of Thomas Baldwin, America's most famous prewar airship

pilot, caught the attention of the US Army, whose Signal

Corps Dirigible No. 1 would be supplied by Baldwin in 1908.

Within a decade of LZl's first flight, the military in Europe and

the United States made a commitment to dirigibles. Expectations varied widely among the nations, but the myth of

British home isle impregnability lay shattered by the

remarkable flights of Zeppelin's rigid airships. 2°

Volatile hydrogen and fragile envelopes made dirigibles an

inviting target. The need for airships to develop operational

night capabilities to overcome such vulnerabilities was clearly

evident . On the evening of 17 August 1908, a dirigible

ascended from Tegel, Germany, the location of German

military ballooning headquarters, and rumors abounded that

the trip was simulating anticipated wartime conditions. A

month later, Major Gross, the commander of the Luftschiffer

8

Bataillon, made a 13-hour flight in a semirigid airship, most

likely Militarluftschiff 1 (M1) . Winds aloft increased well above

25 miles per hour, bringing the ship to "a stand-still for two

hours over the village of Rathenow." Also during this period,

German naval officials began to express confidence in the

ability of airships to carry out strategic reconnaissance at sea.

The fear of blockade was already apparent. 2 '

Col J . E. Capper, superintendent of the British balloon

factory, believed that two categories of airships were suitable

for military use . One class would be comparatively harmless

dirigibles of ~0,000 to 100, 000 cubic feet capacity, useful for

scouting and tactical bombardment activities including night

attacks on enemy bivouac areas. He posited that only during

darkness might a dirigible "descend with safety to within a few

hundred feet of the ground . . . . Even on a bright moonlight

night it is difficult to see a balloon at 500 feet." Such an idea

might well have been feasible in 1908 when there were no

airplane or heavy antiaircraft defenses, but such a low-flying

target at the outbreak of the war would have brought new

meaning to the words "sitting duck."22

Capper's second class of airships were large, between

500,000 and 1,000,000 cubic feet capacity, and in his

opinion, "may revolutionize the strategy of war." Their targets

were to be such strategic targets as dockyards, arsenals,

storehouses, and railway centers . Descending under cover of

darkness, the airships could bomb their targets then escape

the blast by using extended-delay fuses. Finally, he regarded

the possibility of enemy invasion of Great Britain by airships

to be "chimerical." On the contrary, Capper opined that a

strong home fleet of airships was essential to prevent

seaborne incursions from succeeding. While he undoubtedly

bore a lot of grief from the Royal Navy for his remark, copies of

Colonel Capper's address were eagerly acquired by the US

Signal Corps. 23

It should not be surprising, therefore, that several months

later MaJ George Squier, in an address before the American

Society of Mechanical Engineers, defined the role of airships

in a very similar manner. Having only recently acquired Signal

Corps Dirigible No. 1, Squier readily incorporated the ideas of

someone more experienced in airship strategy . 24

10
Problems continued to mount for Count von Zeppelin,

with weather, engine trouble, and accidents preventing his

rigid airships from successfully flying for 24 continuous

hours. Obviously, such endurance attempts required night

flying during some portion of the test. Notably in one instance,

during a planned long-distance journey from Friedrichshafen

to Munich, Germany, several cities and towns along the

route were "brilliantly lighted with electricity" to serve as navigational aids for the airship . 25

Finally on 29 May 1909, when Zeppelin lifted off from

Friedrichshafen on what was to be his first successful

attempt to best the 24-hour mark, local residents thought

little of the unannounced ascension, having already become

"accustomed to night flights." The expedition ended 37 hours

and 700 miles later. 2s

No doubt caught up in the emotion of Zeppelin's success,

Gen James N. Allen, the US Army's chief signal officer, insisted

that he favored the rigid airship over the airplane for military

purposes, although the Signal Corps had but one dirigible in

its inventory. Immediately, the War Department requested

plans for the aerial defense of the east coast of the United

States. One proposal divided the coast into a string of 250

mile-long ellipses with an airship station housing two to three

dirigibles to be located in the center of each ellipse and a

searchlight network for night patrol navigational aids. With

greater perception than exhibited by the United States military,

the New York Times called Zeppelin's journey a great feat, but

nevertheless one that "will not convince those persons who

have most closely studied modern aeronautics that the

dirigible balloon is to be the flying machine of the future." 2'

Military Trials of Airships

In Great Britain as early as March 1909, many English

citizens, living mainly in the eastern counties, had begun to

hear "phantom" airships at night. Ostensibly, the increasingly

aggressive posture of Germany, in concert with Zeppelin's

endurance records, Bleriot's crossing of the channel in an

airplane, and the inability of British naval and military forces

to offer protection against aerial invasion, brought many

11
British citizens to the realization that their island fortress was

no longer impregnable. Combining that fear with the image of

destruction wrought against New York City and elsewhere by a

German air armada in H. G. Wells' The War in the Air, led to a

sort of Zeppelin hysteria during the spring of 1909 . Wells

called forth a vision of warfare where old methods of limiting

destruction were ineffective and resulted in social disorganization. Little wonder so many people were hearing a new

bogeyman in the night. 2~

With regard to fiction, a more tranquil account of airship

development was offered by Rudyard Kipling, in a book that

came out during the year of the phantoms . Set in the year

2000 A.D., With The Night Mail envisioned a worldwide system

of postal packet airships, plying the night skies along

designated air routes . Other commerce carriers similarly

dotted the skies, while large freighter submarines hauled

cargo through the ocean depths . Perhaps Kipling's vision of

peaceful employment of the new warfaring technology

manifest in airships and submarines helped settle the

British hysteria of 1909 . For better or worse, such writings

undoubtedly kept the public interested in aeronautical

developments.

Airships were nevertheless soon involved in night military

operations and training. On 3 November 1909 three German

airships, the M2, P2, and Z2 (formerly LZ5), departed

Cologne, Germany, under cover of darkness to execute mock

attacks against the gamson at Coblenz and the fortress of

Ehrenbreitstein .

Londoners truly did hear an airship in the early morning

hours of 3 June 1910. The Beta flew a 70-mile round trip from

the balloon factory at Aldershot, England, circling Saint Paul's

Cathedral from 1,000 feet .

French airships and airplanes participated for the first time

during the 1910 army maneuvers. In the process a ClementBayard dirigible successfully reconnoitered the positions of

bivouacked armies at night. 29

Once again, rumors of German airships flying over England

were sounded. According to the New York Times, a dirigible

was plainly observed by members of the RFC over Scheerness,

a garrison town and naval seaport, on the night of 14 October

12
1912 . The new German naval airship, L1 had indeed left

Friedrichshafen the previous day on an endurance flight that

lasted 30 hours and covered 900 miles, but the Germans

steadfastly denied such an intrusion . Certainly this disavowal

met with skepticism, but in the end the importance of the

"scare" was that "Germans were capable of such a foray and

there was nothing the British could do about it ."s°

Night airship experimentation increased as airship capabilities improved. The British made at least one attempt with

the Beta in 1913 for night artillery spotting . In the last days of

peace, Germany's L3 made a 22-hour endurance flight during

which experiments in radio direction finding were presumably

conducted. Convinced that airplane development remained in

an immature state, German war planners recognized the

utility of night operations but insisted that their airship fleet

was intended mainly for daylight operations. Nevertheless

night airship flights had become almost routine for the

British, French, and Germans on the eve of Sarajevo. 3 '

As hostilities opened in August 1914, the combatants were

clearly unequal in airship strength and ability. The Germans

had 12 airships available-10 rigid and one each nonrigid and

semirigid. France could muster only six dirigibles, many

having previously become obsolete . The first French rigid ship

was unavailable, needing further modifications . In Britain all

army airship assets had previously been transferred to the

navy. Only seven nonrigid and semirigid airships were

available. In fact building of the first rigid-designed ship had

not even begun by this time, "those valuable years from July

1908 had been frittered away." 32

Airplane Night Flying

Understandably, the development of night flying by

airplanes was a slow process . Unable to fly in the slightest bad

weather, fragile early craft could scarcely be expected to

venture into the nighttime sky with any degree of safety. The

first recorded night flight occurred on 22 October 1909 at

College Park, Maryland, though others may have taken place

earlier . Wilbur Wright and his student, Lt Frederic E .

Humphries, a Signal Corps aviator trainee, flew for 42

13
minutes "under a bright moonlight." Wright flew a two-minute

night solo 10 days later. The only other recorded Wright

brothers night flight took place at Hempstead, Long Island,

New York, on 7 August 1911, with Orville flying a model R.

Unfortunately, the Wrights failed to record their impressions

or reasons for flying after darkness . 33

Airplane night flying manifested itself for the first time in

Europe on 28 April 1910, during The Daily Mail's London to

Manchester, England, race. Only five days earlier, Claude

Grahame-White abandoned his first attempt at the $50,000

prize, "recognizing the danger of approaching Manchester in

the darkness." On this attempt, Grahame-White had competition for the purse from Louis Paulhan, a French airman . The

French pilot landed in the dark near the village of Lichfield,

having run out of fuel after covering 117 miles . Well behind

Paulhan, Grahame-White descended near the village of Roade

(in the vicinity of Northampton, England) since "the light was

getting too bad."3a

In an unsuccessful bid to overtake his rival, Grahame-White

decided to leave the ground in the early morning hours, but

not until the moon had risen . The fear of losing the $50,000

prize no doubt influenced his decision to fly in the dark.

Commenting on his harrowing experience the following day,

Grahame-White recalled that,

I felt-well, I scarcely know how I felt . I did not know whether I should

lose myself flying through the night. My start was a confused jumble

of scattered lights, which swept away swiftly below me. I could not

judge my run along the ground, but I rose as speedily as possible.

Directly I was in the air, the lights of the railway station showed

clearly below me, and I headed for them. I could see absolutely

nothing of the ground below me; it was all a black smudge. . . . Great

difficulty presented itself in knowing in the darkness whether I was

ascending or not. I had done no night flying before . 3s

The British, while giving Paulhan credit for winning the

race, lauded the night flying of Grahame-White even more .

One journalist who witnessed the event "saw him pass

overhead like a great black bat ." Apparently the loss of a

second coveted air record to a Frenchman, the first being

Bleriot's channel crossing in 1909, injured the pride of

many British . Hence they extolled Grahame-White's accom14
plishments at the expense of Paulhan's victory . Being a bit

more objective, the New York 1~mes cautiously noted that

night flying "will have to receive much consideration from the

navigators of the future, and the problems they will have to

solve are many." ss

Nonetheless, sailing through the night sky caught the

imagination of many pioneer heavier-than-air aviators, just

as it had with balloon and airship aeronauts . Exhibition

pilots began to add night flights to their repertoire before the

end of 1910 . Charles K. Hamilton, one of America's premiere

stunt pilots, amused himself by chasing a bat during one

night flight. Ralph Johnstone and Walter Brookins flew by

moonlight for over an hour. Arch Hoxsey went so far as to

cover his aircraft with metallic aluminum paint. Ascending

into the nocturnal sky, his aircraft "became as bright under

the silver of the moonbeams as if it had been phosphorescent." 3 ' However, such folly had its consequences.

Accidents were commonplace for exhibition pilots during

the day, and night only compounded the dangers involved

in stunt flying. At a meet in New Jersey, several Wright

exhibition team members ascended into the darkness,

equipped with port and starboard lights, as well as

automobile horns to "honk each other out of the way." By

1912 so many of these pilots had been killed or injured in

trick flying that Brookins, a well-known daredevil, formed

the "Safe and Sane Club," in which pilots pledged not to

stunt . Howard Gill, who had been seriously injured while

attempting a night landing, joined the club . However, as the

American public's demand for stunt flying remained

insatiable, it was not surprising when Gill was killed in a

twilight midair collision during an exhibition in Chicago. 38

The first organized night flying exhibition in Great Britain

occurred around this time. Grahame-White and Louis Noel

flew as part of a pyrotechnic display at Hendon, England .

Their airplanes were equipped with multicolored electric light

bulbs. Leon Morane made night flights in a Bleriot monoplane

from Etampes aviation camp in France in August 1910. Other

French pilots soon followed his example . 3s

Through 1912, with the exception of the London to

Manchester race, flying remained limited to the immediate

15
confines of the aerodrome and at low altitudes . Such

restrictions, besides the obvious need to stay within range

of the paying multitudes at flying exhibitions, appear to

have been dictated by the unreliability of aircraft engines.

While such flying was sure to please a crowd, one author felt

assured that "in reality they were easy and hardly dangerous." Whether or not he had flown at night during this

period is unknown. In the United States exhibition flying

became bolder, with night loop-the-loops the crowd pleaser

of 1916 (fig .l) . 4 °

With improvements in aircraft capabilities, more and more

pilots began attempting long-distance and endurance flights.

The Frenchmen Ernest F. Gaillaux and Maurice Gaillaux

made long-distance flights from Biarritz, France, during 1913 .

But the exploits of two German pilots, Bruno Langer and Karl

Ingold, early the following year remain phenomenal accomplishments even today. 4 '

On 3 February 1914, Langer flew an incredible 14 hours

and seven minutes nonstop, setting a new duration record .

Not to be outdone, Ingold departed Mulhouse in Alsace, four

days later for a long-distance flight . Flying near the Allgau

mountains in the dark, he "perceived on the horizon a light

which drew him like a moth"-Munich. Ingold landed his

Aviatik biplane there after flying 16 hours and 20 minutes

and covering 1, 700 kilometers. Langer quickly reciprocated

with another attempt on 11 February, leaving Johannistal

aerodrome in a Roland biplane loaded with 655 liters of gas

and 60 liters of oil . On landing at Kreuz near Posen, Langer

was only 20 minutes short of tying the record . 42

The journal, 1 Aerophile, argued that the robust nature of

German aircraft, with their water-cooled engines, inspired

"absolute confidence" in their pilots . Many German fliers

therefore became determined to "systematically practice night

flights" in the hopes of winning the large prizes offered by the

National Flugspende (National Aviation Fund) . Without the

excessive fear of mechanical failure, and with the innovations

in airborne and ground lightning systems, which are

discussed later, the Germans led in the attack for the

conquest of the night. 4 s

16

Military Night Flying

Organized military night flying was slow to germinate in the

prewar period. Simply stated, the operational usefulness of

such flights was not foreseen. In fact, the RFC specifically

prohibited night flying in its original standing orders of April

1912, as did various French regulations as late as 1913. Even

so, the boldness of many early aviators dictated night

experimentation . Maj Wilhelm Siegert established German

military night flying experimentation at Metz, in the winter

and spring of 1913 . He would remain a driving force for

German night activity during the First World War. 44

The first F~'C military wing night flight occurred on 16 April

1913, when Lieutenant Cholmondeley flew a round trip from

Larkhill to Upavon. No. 3 Squadron made further pilgrimages

into the night, but organized, meaningful night training before

August 1914 was resisted by higher authority-the only

mission of the military aviation wing remained daylight

reconnaissance. Speaking at a meeting of the Aeronautical

Society of Great Britain in February 1913, Maj Frederick H.

Sykes, commander of the military wing, RFC, argued against

too much reliance on airplanes, in part due to their limitations

in night work. Yet, he foresaw an increasing likelihood that

ground armies would mask their movements in darkness,

owing to the daylight presence of observation aircraft. He

believed that night reconnaissance might become "one of the

most important duties of aircraft."45

Sykes spoke again to the Aeronautical Society the following

year. While progress was being made, he declared,

To sum up the question of observation, although a very solid all-round

advance has been made in day work, night work, in so far as the

aeroplane is concerned, has shown no tangible results. Night work at

present lies in the scope for the aeroplane which can, for certain, fly

for 14 hours with two engines and fuel for this endurance. 4s

Motors remained unreliable and undercarriages not strong

enough to withstand hard landings while inadequate lighting

further hampered night operations.

As already mentioned, a US Army Signal Corps officer

accompanied Wilbur Wright on the first night flight in 1909 .

Apparently, nearly two years transpired before night flying

18
reappeared at the aviation field at College Park, Maryland.

Lieutenants Thomas DeW. Milling and R. C . Kirtland landed

by signal fires after a short flight from Chevy Chase on 21

August 1911 . Similarly, Capt Charles DeF. Chandler, the field

commander, returned from the Naval Academy one summer

night in 1912 to land by beacon fire . He had followed the

signal lights along the Baltimore and Ohio Railway line to

College Park. In November 1911, night scouting was attempted

at the field using two airplanes equipped with acetylene

searchlights . Lt Henry "Hap" Arnold flew on one of these

experimental aircraft, yet two years later declared that "the

use of aeroplanes at night need not be considered at the

present time, even if there are fanciful pictures of aeroplanes

fitted with searchlights ."4'

Interestingly, an article appeared in the Austrian journal

Fachzeitung fur Fluptechnik immediately after the US night

scouting experiments of 1911, extolling such efforts . Trials of

airplane-mounted spotlights, while not completely successful,

nevertheless had shown that night reconnaissance might

become an important future function of airplanes . With

remarkable insight, the author of the article even posited the

idea of night photographic reconnaissance . If airmen used

sensitive cameras in conjunction with airborne searchlights,

the darkness would no longer hide enemy activity. During the

French army maneuvers of 1912, a squadron of 15 airplanes

was equipped with searchlights, presumably for night observation activities. Yet few aviators were convinced of the value

of night airplane reconnaissance in the prewar era. Such a

scheme would not find useful implementation until the closing

months of the First World War. 48

US Signal Corps night activity remained unorganized until

Europe had been at war for quite some time. United States

Naval Aviation, established in July 1911, similarly incorporated

experimental night flights before the war . The Belgian M. V.

De Jonckheere performed a mock night attack on the USS

Massachusetts docked at Philadelphia in 1912. Searchlights

attempted to illuminate his plane before it reached the ship.

He contended that he "could have blown the warship to

atoms ." On the opposite coast, naval officers had earlier

watched a similar attack as well as a mock bombing of a

19
miniature city by several civilian aviators, including Glenn

Martin . Additionally, naval aviators flew night scouting

missions at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, finding the wind

conditions more favorable than during the day. 49

By 1914, though man had been roaming starlit skies for

nearly a century, the conquest of the night had scarcely

begun. The First World War would change all that as necessity

spurred innovation in flying under the cover of darkness.

Indeed, night flying could no longer be ignored .

Notes

a

1 . Quoted in Leonard Cottrel, Up in a Balloon (New York: Phillips, 1970),

90. A drawing by Mason showing the balloon over Liege, Belgium, is found

in Erik Norgaard, The Book of Balloons, trans. Erik Hildesheim (New York:

Crown, 1971), 63.

2. William Hyde, "The Aeronautic Expedition," New York Times, I 1 July

1859; Tom D. Crouch, The Eagle Aloft: Two Centuries of the Balloon in

America (Washington, D.C . : Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983), 247-55,

449-50.

3. "A New Aerial Ship," New York Times, 10 September 1859; Thaddeus

S. C. Lowe, letter to the editor, New York Times, 19 November 1859;

Crouch, 273-76. The Atlantic Ocean would not be successfully crossed by

balloon until August 1978.

4. '"The French made the first daylight military captive balloon ascension

on 2 June 1794, at Maubeuge." Crouch, 355; John R. Bryan, "Balloon Used

for Scout Duty," quoted in Crouch, 383.

5. "Balloon Excursion by Moonlight," Scientific American, 29 November

1851, 80 ; Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarague, A History of FYench

Military Aviation, trans. Francis Kianka (Washington, D.C . : Smithsonian

Institution Press, 1986), 16-17. An illustration of a night mail balloon being

readied in Paris is found in Norgaard, 68 .

6. A late-nineteenth century illustration shows a French balloon on

night military maneuvers in Norgaard, 50. Christienne and Lissarague, 18;

Peter Mead, The Eye in the Air: History of Air Observation and

Reconnaissance for the Army, 1785-1945 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery

Office, 1983), 19; Alex Imrie, Pictorial History of the German Army Air

Service, 1914-1918 (Chicago : Henry Regnery, 1973), 11 ; Crouch, 520.

7. "Race of 16 Balloons Is Started at Paris," New York Times, 1 October

1906; Cortland F. Bishop, "Importance of St . Louis Balloon Race," New York

Times, 20 October 1907; Crouch, 533 .

8. Crouch, 533-42.

9. "Race of 16 Balloons," New York Times, 1 October 1906; "Great

Balloon Race Won By an American," New York Times, 2 October 1906;

Bishop, 5; Crouch, 546-47.

20
10 . Juliette A. Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm, April 1861 to

April 1917 (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office [GPO], 1958),

18.

11 . "Women In Balloon Fall 3,000 Feet," New York Times, 28 June 1908;

`Moonlight Balloon Party," New York Times, 16 August 1908; "Women Enjoy

[rip in Balloon at Night," New York Times, 17 August 1908. Cottrell, 79-83,

totes that Madame Blanchard, wife of Pierre Blanchard, made many night

:ree-balloon ascensions throughout Europe between 1809 and 1819. There

,vere 66 women on the PARS roles in 1909 according to Crouch, 540.

12 . "German Aeronauts Win Balloon Race," New York Times, 24 October

1907; Hennessy, 14, 200.

13. Griffith Brewer and J. N. Fletcher, "The Value of Ballooning as a

Training for Flyipg," The Aeronautical Journal 18, no. 71 (July 1914): 232,

237-39; "Looking Forward to Warfare in the Air," New York Times, 21 March

1909.

14. Mead, 42; Harold Rosher, In the Royal Naval Air Service: Being the

War Letters of the late Harold Rosher to his Family (London: Chatto and

Windus, 1916), 20-21 .

15 . Imrie, 11 ; Mead, 20; Crouch, 527 .

16 . Christienne and Lissarague, 25-26; Mead, 39.

17 . War Department, Fieid Service Regulations, United States Army,

1914, corrected to 31 July 1918 (Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1918), changes

nos. 1 to 11, extracted in Maurer Maurer, The US. Air Service in World War

f, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C . : The Office of Air Force History, 1978), 23;

~hristienne and Lissarague, 26. The United States Army Signal Corps

added a Siegsfeld drachen balloon to its roster in 1899, Crouch, 527 .

18. Christenne and Lissarague, 20-21 ; Douglas H. Robinson, The

Zeppelin in Combat: A History of the German Naval Airship Division,

1912-1918, 3d ed. (Seattle : University of Washington Press, 1980), 12. The

first flight of the LZ1 occurred on 2 July 1900.

19. Christienne and Lissarague, 23; Imrie, 12 ; Robinson, 14.

20. Mead, 30; Robin Higham, The British Rigid Airship, 1908-1931 : A

Study in Weapons Policy (1961 ; reprint, Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press,

1975), 13 ; Crouch, 528.

21 . "Secret Night Trial of German Airship," New York Times, 18 August

1908; "Dirigible Up Five Hours," New York Times, 19 August 1908; "Major

Gross Flies 13 Hours," New York Times, 13 September 1908; Robinson,

19-20.

22 . "Big War Balloons for Offensive Work," New York Times, 2 August

1908.

23 . Ibid .

24. "Air Warship Near, Says Major Squier," New York Times, 3 December

1908.

25. "Disabled Airship Drlfts for Hours," New York Times, 2 April 1909;

Robinson, 14.

26. "Zeppelin Flies Over 24 Hours," New York Times, 31 May 1909.

21
27. "Zeppelin Craft Badly Wrecked, New York Times, 1 June 1909;

"Airship Patrol For Our Coast," 3 June 1909, 1 : "Zeppelin's Long Voyage,"

New York Times, 1 June 1909.

28. Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air

Policy in the First World War (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 1 ; Alfred

Gollin, The Impact ofAir Power on the British People and their Government,

1909-14 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 49-63 ; H. G. Wells,

The War in the Air (1907; reprint, New York: Dover, 1963), 157-59.

29 . "Airships Surprise Fortress," New York Times, 4 November 1909;

Mead, 36; "Army Airship Over London," New York Times, 5 June 1910;

"Night Flight Without Lights," New York Times, 17 September 1910;

Christienne and Lissarague, 38-39.

30. "A Strange Airship Seen In England," New York Times, 17 November

1912; "Sure 7kppelin Ship Sailed Over England," New York Times, 18

November 1912; Robinson, 21-22 ; Gollin, 223-25.

31 . Higham, 15; Robinson, 31 ; Imrie, 19.

32 . Imrie, 21 ; Christienne and Lissarague, 25; Higham, 72-73 .

33 . "Wright Flies By Moonlight," New York Times, 23 October 1909, 1 ;

"Makes Night Flight," Dayton Journal, 23 October 1909, 1 ; Arthur G.

Renstrom, Wilbur and OruUie Wright: A Chronology Commemorating The

Hundredth Anniversary of the Birth of Oruille Wright, 19 August 1871

(Washington, D.C. : Library of Congress, 1975), 205-6.

34. "Flies 113 Miles, But Loses Big Prize," New York Times, 24 April

1910; "Paulhan Win $50,000 Race," New York Times, 28 April 1910.

35 . "Mr. Claude Grahame-White's Attempt," Times, 29 April 1910;

"Aviators Tell of Great Race," Times, 29 April 1910.

36. Philip Gibbs, "Watching the Early Travelers in the Air," U.S . Air

Service 8, no. 11 (November 1923) : 23; "Aviators Lose Their Way," New York

Times, 30 April 1910.

37. "Hamilton Chased Bats in Night Flight," New York Times, 28 June

1910 ; "Schriever In A Long Moonlight Flight," New York Times, 19

September 1910, 1 ; "Airmen Play Tag With Moonbeams," New York Times,

20 August 1910.

38. "Night Ascension for Aeroplanes," New York Times, 18 August 1910;

"Aviators Form Club To End Air Follies," New York Times, 6 April 1912; "Gill

Badly Hurt At Night," Aero 3, no. 18 (3 February 1912) : 355; "Aviator Killed

In Midair Collision," New York Times, 15 September 1912.

39. Mahgni-Eltten, "Night Flying-Ancient and Modern," Aeronautics

(London) 10, no. 138 (7 June 1916) : 367; "Gary Is Charmed With Night

Flight," New York Times, 28 August 1910; "Makes Night Flight," New York

Times, 10 September 1910; "Night Flight Over Paris," New York Times, 12

February 1911 .

40. "Les Vols de Nuit Avant la Guerre," January 1917, Conferences sur

les vols de nuit Escadrille F 25, Service Historique de 1'Armi:e de 1'Air

(SHAA); Captiane Jean-Baptiste Personne, "Vols et bombardements de

nuit," 31 December 1917, World War I Night Aviation Collection, SHAA;

22
"Hero Club of Pennsylvania," Flying 5, no. 7 (August 1916): 302. The cover

of the issue of Flying 5, no. 4 (May 1916) featured a photograph of a night

looping exhibition .

41 . "Aviation and Sports," and "Noteworthy Events in the World's

Progress In 1913," New York Times, 31 December 1913 .

42. "Vols de Nuit: Les records de distance et de duree et la signalisation

nocturne des Aerodromes en Allemagne," L'Aerophile 22, no. 5 (March 1914):

109.

43 . Ibid .

44. Personne; Bill Gunston, Night Fighters: A Development and Combat

History (New York: Scribner, 1976), 13; "Vols de Nuit," 110; Maj Georg P.

Neumann, The German Air Force in the Great War, trans. J. E. Gurdon

(London: Hodder and Stoughton, [ 1920]), 176.

45. Christopher Cole and E. F. Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain

1914-1918 (London: Putnam, 1984), 5; Gunston, 13; F. H. Sykes, "Military

Aviation," The Aeronautical Journai 17, no. 67 (July 1913): 131-33.

46. F H. Sykes, "Further Developments of Military Aviation," The

Aeronautical Journal 18, no. 70 (April 1914) : 90-91 .

47 . "Army Airmen Land at Night," New York Times, 22 August 1911;

"Breaks Army Altitude Flight," New York Times, 2 June 1912; Charles deF.

Chandler and Frank P. Lahm, How Our Army Grew Wings: Airmen and

Aircraft Before 1914 (New York: Ronald Press, 1943), 225-27 ; "Fly At Night

With Lights," New York Times, 19 November 1911; Henry H. Arnold, "Arnold

Shows Use Of Air Craft In War," New York Times, 8 September 1913.

48 . "Ueber nachtliche Rekognoszierungsfliige," Faczeitung fur

Flugtechnik 5, no . 50 (10 December 1911) : 19-20; "Squadron of

Aeroplanes," New York Times, 17 September 1912.

49. "Aviator Foils Searchlight," New York Times, 7 April 1912; "Night

Flying Successful," New York Times, 11 February 1912 ; "Scouts Fly At

Night," New York Times, 31 January 1913.

23
Chapter 2

The Emergence of Night Bombing,

1914-1916

Aerial bombardment was in its infancy as the First World

War spread across Europe . Experimentation had taken place

in the prewar era, most notably manifest in the Michelin

bomb-dropping competitions, the Aero Cible, which began in

France in 1x+12 . Germany had examined the possibility of the

use of Zeppelins as bombing platforms, while in Great Britain,

the Royal Naval Air Service actively pursued such activity with

airplanes . The RFC did some experimentation but insisted

that reconnaissance remained the primary function of aircraft.

The Canadian official historian notes that there was much

"visionary writing" about aerial bombardment yet there existed

"little connection between theory and reality." By August

1914, the very idea of night aerial bombardment by airplanes

was given little thought.'

Pilots began to carry small bombs in their aircraft during

daylight scouting missions . The bombs were dropped into the

massed troop formations encountered daily during the "war of

movement." Though this aerial bombardment made little

impact on the advance or retreat of troops, it caused shortterm disruptions as soldiers took cover during the bombings.

The primary purpose was to harass the ground forces.

Nevertheless, aerial bombardment soon found sanction with

higher authorities who wanted to strike the enemy by all

possible means . Bombardment hence became a second

specialized function of the military airplane, though it would

remain in a primitive state of development for some time. 2

French leaders were so impressed with the possibilities of

aerial bombardment that they created Groupe de Bombardement (GB) 1 on 27 September 1914 after less than two

months of combat. In October the Grand Quartier General

(GQG) ordered the formation of 16 bomber escadrilles to be

organized under four GBs. The advancement of French

bombardment aviation had begun . With grand designs of its

own, the German air service formed the Brieftauben Abteilung

25
Ostende (BAO) to bombard England from Calais. Yet Russia

made the most audacious attempt to acquire a bombardment

capability for its air service by incorporating Igor Sikorsky's

giant four-engine Ilya Murometes airplanes into the Squadron

of Flying Ships. 3

With the exception of Sikorsky's large aircraft, early

bombardment planes were simply converted observation

platforms with little capacity for carrying bombs . Often they

were pusher aircraft (with the propeller situated behind the

aviators pushing the plane through the air) which afforded

excellent forward visibility. Tractor aircraft (propeller in the

front), withP their more restricted field of vision, were found

less useful as early bombers . As one example, the French air

service developed the Voisin pusher into its first bomber. With

good visibility for the aircrew, the airplane apparently was

selected because its bomb-lifting capacity exceeded that of any

other airplane in the French inventory. With engine

improvements and use as a night bomber, the Voisin

remained active throughout the First World War. 4

Prewar theorists of airpower regarded the airship with its

great lifting capacity as the ideal instrument for aerial

bombing. It is not surprising then, that a Zeppelin following

quickly on the heels of the German infantry advance into

Belgium carried out the first night bombing operation of the

First World War. During the night of 6-7 August 1914, the

German army's Z6 attacked the fortress of Liege. However, the

airship was damaged by gunfire during the assault and

subsequently removed from service . In the following weeks,

three more German army airships were lost during low-level

daylight operations.s

The long-feared German airship blitz had proven to be

myth. Soon after these stunning losses, German military

authorities restricted the remaining dirigibles of prewar

construction to night use . Nevertheless in night operations

against Antwerp, and Ostend, Belgium, during September, the

airship confirmed its usefulness . Experience in night

employment began to show that flights under bright

moonlight were exceedingly hazardous for the slow-moving

dirigibles. By November 1914 German craft were restricted to

operating only on dark nights associated with the new moon.

26
Such a policy limited airship operations to a maximum of

about 14 nights per months

The French fared little better with their airships in the early

months of the war. While carrying out night missions, the

French dirigibles Conte and Dupuy de Lome suffered heavy

damage from friendly fire . Influenced by preexisting fears of

the German dirigibles, French troops saw in every airship the

spectra of the "Zeppelin ." Unable to stop their troops from

indiscriminate firing, French authorities discontinued airship

operations . Airship operations would not resume until April

1915 . Once missions recommenced however, the French

military found their airships increasingly vulnerable during

night operations . By autumn, missions were carried out only

on the darkest nights-a lesson the Germans had learned

nearly a year earlier. Disregarding the risks, the airship Alsace

continued to fly at low altitudes, even on moonlit nights, in

the hope of improved bombing accuracy. Such daring turned

to tragedy on 2 October 1915 when the dirigible was destroyed

during a night operation.'

The First Night Aviators

During this time, the first bombing planes penetrated the

nighttime sky. Several aviators claimed to be the first to

undertake such a mission. Sous-Lieutenant Vincente Almandos

Almonacid, commander of Escadrille MF 29 at the end of 1915,

declared that he had made a trial night flight in September

1914 . For this, he was punished by higher authorities .

Ignoring his superiors, Almonacid made another night flight

after which he "obtained authority to make raids and bombing

on the North Sea coast." Unfortunately, no other source has

corroborated his assertions, though they may well be fact . 8

Another aviator who claimed the first night bombardment of

the war was Wing Commander Charles Samson, commander

of No . 3 Naval (N) Squadron, RNAS at Dunkirk. 9 Samson

relates that while he was heading to the aerodome on the

night of 27 January 1915 for his next night bombing mission,

an unseen German machine bombed the airfield . Maj Wilhelm

Siegert, the organizer of BAO, insists that the bombardment

occurred the following evening. For this BAO operation, 14

27
mixed-type aircraft, including at least one Otto pusher-an

"antediluvian machine"-departed one after the other from

Ghistelles airfield . Siegert noted later that "every once in a

while we saw below us or to our side the fiery exhaust lain

gases of other airplanes ." Amazingly there were no midair

collisions during the mission and all aircraft returned home

safely . Later, to reduce the possibility of collision, night

bombers were individually dispatched at intervals of roughly

five minutes .' °

The BAO found itself stranded at Ghistelles airfield when

the German offensive ground to a halt in northern France .

Without a abase at Calais, the unit could not carry out a

protracted bombing campaign against England with existing

aircraft. The BAO was sent to the Eastern Front for a time,

only to return to Ghistelles airfield in early 1916."

Within a month of Siegert's night bombardment mission

against Dunkirk, a Friedrichshafen FF 29 floatplane assigned

to the German Navy's Seeflieger Abteilung (Sfa) at Zeebrugge,

made an unopposed night penetration 25 miles into England .

After dropping three bombs which caused no effect, the plane

made a forced landing in the channel . The crew was later

rescued and interned by the British .' 2

Night Attacks

The FF 29's sortie had not been Germany's first night

incursion over British soil. Several days earlier, on 19 January

1915, Navy Zeppelins L3 and L4 set off from HamburgFuhlsbilttel, each carrying its maximum loads of 16 men,

eight 110-pound explosive bombs, and 10 or 11 25-pound

incendiaries to attack targets along the Humber River. Unable

to reach their objective, the airships bombed targets of

opportunity before turning for home. The mission demonstrated

to German authorities the need for a more advanced base of

operations before London could be attacked .' 3

Such was not a prerequisite for attacking Paris. The capital

was assaulted on the night of 20 March 1915 by two German

airships flying at 7,000 feet. Heavy antiaircraft fire crippled

one dirigible as it passed over the city. Another raiding airship

was damaged while attacking the French army headquarters

28
at Compiegne. Though Gen Ernst von Hoppner, later the

kommandierender general der Lufstreitkrafte, remembered the

operation as a success, further similar "successes" would have

decimated the German airship fleet. Additional night raids

occurred in the first half of 1915 against Dunkirk, Nancy, and

Calais .' 4

The Germans tried a novel method for navigating airship

Z12 over Calais on the night of 17 March 1915 . Due to poor

visibility, the crew had been unable to locate their objective .

Therefore a singly manned observation car was lowered from

the airship's bomb compartment by means of a thick steel

cable. Steering blindly by directions telephoned to the control

car from the observer 1,000 feet below, Z12 was able to

complete its bombing mission.' S

Naval zeppelins carried out two more night attacks against

England before the first appearance of a German army airship

over the British Isles. The army's four-engine, one millioncubic-foot capacity LZ38 attacked East Anglia on the night of

29 April 1915 . Little more than a month later, this same

airship made the first night raid on London. Airship LZ38 flew

five more missions over England before being destroyed on the

ground by RNAS bombing.' 6

Bombardment Aircraft

Airships had easily adapted to a night bombardment role

during the first year of fighting; such was not the case for

existing limited capability airplanes . Converted observation

aircraft would simply no longer suffice for aerial bombardment. Specialized aircraft specifically designed for such a role

had become a necessity . One author believed 1915 was the

"Year of Decision" for German aviation, and certainly that

motto was fitting for other air services as well."

The need for greater aircraft range was immediately evident

with the failure of the BAO to implement cross-channel

bombing from Ghistelles airfield. Another related problem was

the lifting capacity of aircraft. The Maurich Farman (MF) 7

"Longhorn" and MF 11 "Shorthorn" are prime examples,

neither type could carry more than 300 pounds of bombs. The
answer to these challenges appeared in the development of

multiengine bombers.' 8

Sikorsky had already demonstrated such a capability with

his four-engined Ilya Muromets airplanes. Additionally, Giovanni

Caproni's trimotor prototype was flying before the end of 1914.

The belligerents pushed for multiengined development, two of

the boldest schemes being the Riesenflugzeug (R-plane) and the

British Handley Page 0/ 100 programs. Progress was slow as

immense difficulties had to be overcome before prototypes

became operational . Neither plane would play a role in

Western Front aerial bombardment until late in the war.' g

Ventures less ambitious than the Handley Page and R-plane

programs were undertaken as short-term solutions for

bombardment. Une example was the German C-planes,

armed, single-engine biplanes which, though devised for

observation, became useful bombers in 1915 . These aircraft

continued to be used as bombing platforms through much of

30
the war. Grossflugzeuge (G-planes) were an outgrowth of the

German failure to capture Calais . They were the first

twin-engine aircraft of World War I, and quite possibly the first

aircraft specifically designed for bombardment to go into

large-scale production. However, they remained in insufficient

numbers until 1917. 2°

Another critical challenge to the development of bomber

aircraft in 1915, the Year of Decision, came from increasingly

effective air and ground defenses. Antiaircraft artillery (AAA)

had been practically nonexistent at the start of World War I .

By the spring of 1915, Germany had 138 such weapons .

Furthermore, the entry into the daytime skies of tractor

monoplanes with fixed forward-firing machine guns spelled

trouble for bombardment aviation. Bombers no longer had

comparatively free passage to their objectives. Burdened by

added weight, the bombers had little chance to outmaneuver

the smaller, faster-flying, quicker-climbing fighters. 2 '

The Morane-Saulnier Type N gave the Allies a great offensive advantage in the sky. Metal deflectors were attached to

the propeller for protection against its forward-firing machine

gun. Yet the first airplane specifically designed for aerial

fighting was the Fokker Eindekker used by the Germans. It

had the distinction of being the earliest airplane with a

synchronizing gear to prevent bullets from striking the

propeller. Pushers like the Voisin were vulnerable to attack by

these airplanes since they had no defense against attacks

from the rear. By the end of 1915 daylight bombardment

aviation was sustaining heavy losses due to the combination .

of pursuit aircraft and antiaircraft artillery; the only immediate solution was to fly under the cover of darkness . 22

Hazardous Aspects of Night Flying

In the increasingly high threat environment of 1916, night

flying provided bombers with freedom of action on the Western

Front . Few fighter pilots were willing to fly their unstable

machines at night. The opportunity for intercepting bombers

at night appeared insignificant . AAA was more inaccurate at

night than during the day. Unless a plane was caught in a

searchlight beam, AAA could offer only feeble resistance to the

31
unseen night fliers . Ranging remained difficult even when

searchlights illuminated aircraft for short periods .

Another advantage for the bombers was that they could fly

at lower altitudes than during daylight operations, increasing

the likelihood of scoring direct hits against targets . Night

bombing had a great effect on morale . What could be more

terrifying than bombardment by an unseen enemy against

whom there was no defense?

Yet there were a multitude of disadvantages to night bombardment. Navigating to the target area and distinguishing

the target were especially difficult on dark nights or in bad

weather. Sdme targets could not be seen. Therefore, only

large, readily identifiable targets that could not be camouflaged, such as railway yards and cities, were suitable

objectives. Since the enemy knew the probable targets for

night bombers, elaborate ground defenses were soon

established . Hence the fliers often had to dodge searchlights

and shrapnel on their bombing runs, often with the

consequence of decreased bombing accuracy.

Probably the most hazardous aspect of night flying was

landing safely. Since fog or mist often obscured the ground at

low altitudes, landings remained dangerous even after the

advent of standardized airfield lighting in 1916 . Additionally,

forced landings because of motor failure were a persistent

threat to plane and pilot .

Differences in Day and

Night Bombardment Aircraft

Part of the difficulty in night bombardment operations

stemmed from the use of day bomber planes. Just as early

bombers were limited because they had been designed for

observation, there were disparate requirements for day and

night bombardment aircraft . The Handley Page, Gotha, and

Caproni dominated World War I strategic night bombardment,

yet these planes had not been designed for night operations .

Size and slowness limited them to night flights, where they

performed admirably.

One of the first aviators to make a clear distinction between

day and night craft was Wing Commander Samson of the

32

RNAS. In a letter to the British Admiralty early in 1915,

Samson argued that these requirements were necessary for a

successful night bombing capability:

l . a reliable engine,

2. a speed of 70 miles per hour or more,

3. the capability to carry 300 pounds of bombs,

4. pusher biplanes, and

5. a silenced engine. 23

These were modest requirements, clearly fulfilling tactical

rather than strategic purposes . Though the introduction of

fighter aircraft had made pusher aircraft obsolete for daytime

use, the pusher's wide range of visibility made it useful at

night. The concept remained in vogue throughout the war,

even for strategic bombers. By means of multiengine design,

the nose of such craft remained open, providing the requisite

visibility for night operations.

The French put great stress on visual field . They claimed

that German night bombing was no serious threat so long as

the Germans used C-planes .

The lack of progress in enemy night bombardment has been due to the

type of airplane it used, with the motor in the front. Only exceptionally

is it possible to do something worthwhile with this type of aircraft at

night. You need a night with particularly good visibility, an easy route

to follow, and obJectives easy to find . . . . A full and unobstructed field

of view, both front and straight down is the first requirement of a night

aircraft . . . . No airplane with the motor in front can be a good plane

for night use .za

34
The German Nachtflugzeug (N-plane) was the first aircraft

particularly designed for night bombardment. With abnormally

cambered wings capable of lifting heavy loads over short

distances, the N-plane was a compromise between the C- an

G-planes . The unusual wing configuration also yielded a

shorter takeoff roll with obvious benefits for night flying.

However, only about 200 of these airplanes were produced

between 1916 and 1918, as aircrews preferred the proven

abilities of the G-plane. 25

Nighttime bombardment could never completely replace the

day function hpwever . Daylight bombing was favored over

night employment simply because it could be carried out

against a wider array of military targets . If the night bombers

could not see the target, they could not bomb it . Many military

leaders considered night bombardment's primary worth to be

its nuisance value. Attacks on bivouacs disrupted sleep, and

token raids on cities bred dissension among civilians . Night

attacks on factory complexes and blast furnaces achieved little

long-term effect due to their limited scale. Hence, military

authorities pressed for establishment of credible daytime

bombardment even as enemy defenses increased. 2s

Organizational Changes

In 1916, the increase in French night bombing activity

coincided with organizational changes (see table 3). By 11

March 1916, GB 3 was officially recognized as the first French

night-bombardment unit, and by May practically all French

bombers flew under cover of darkness .

Even the new types of bombing aircraft added to the French

inventory at this tirrle-the Breguet-Michelin (BM) IV, Caudron

G-4, and Caproni--could not compete against the Fokker in

daylight operations. They too were assigned to night bombing. 2'

German bombardment also underwent modification in late

1915-early 1916. BAO was redesignated Kampfgeschwader 1

der Obersten Heeresleitung, or Kagohl 1 . In all, five kagohls

were formed, each with six kampfstaffeln. The kampfstaffeln

were individually equipped with six C-planes, the multipurpose airplane type dominating the German air inventory by

the end of 1916 . Kagohls were used for tactical bombing

35
Table 3

Distribution of French Bombardment, 19 January 1916

Group Looatlon Escadrilles Assignment

VB 101

VB 102

GB 1 Malzeville VB 103 GAE

VB 112

VB 114

VB 104

VB 105

GB 2 f Malzeville VB 106 GAE

N65

C66

VB 107

GB 3 Breteuil VB 108 GAN

VB 109

VB 111

GB 4 Belfort ~619GAE

Luxeuil MF 25?

C?

GB 5 ~ Ochey BM ? GAE

mot formed until February 1916)

Group d'ArmEe de fEst (GAE) (Army Group of the East)

Group d'ArmBe du Nord (GAN) (Army Group of the North)

Source: Adapted from "ORDER NO 1302, G.Q.G DES ARMEES DE L'EST," in Les Armees Francaises

Dans La Grande Guerre, Tome 111, vol 4e (Paris : s.n ., 1926), 656, annex 3276, quoted in "Wind Soc,"

Cross and Cockade Journal (US) 12, no. 4 (Winter 1971): 380.

operations but could not be considered strictly bombardment

units like the French GBs . When required, the kagohls

performed daylight observation, escort, and defensive patrol

work. With only 24 G-planes on active duty in late 1916,

German aviation continued to lack a heavy-bombardment

capability. However this situation was soon to change. 28

In October 1916, increasing availability of aircraft enabled

the German army air service to reorganize its force structure

again. By then seven kagohls were in existence due to the

boost in C-plane production . As the war dictated further

specialization of aircraft duties, the Germans reduced the

36
ntlmbel- of kagohls to three (Kagohls 1, 2, and 4), which

became bombardment units . Their bombers increasingly flew

under cover of darkness . The excess kagohls performed such

nonbombing missions as escort duty, formerly required of the

bombardment squadrons. 29

By early 1916, new units and aircraft joined the RNAS at

Dunkirk, France . Sopwith 1 1/z Strutters and French-built

Caudron C=-4s joined Breguets and Farmans in the RNAS

bomber force . No . 1 (N) Squadron had been reorganized into a

wing by the end of 1915 . Several months later, the unit was

joined at Dunkirk by No. 4 and No . 5 (N) wings. These units

performed all types of airplane missions, including

bombardment, which by this time was usually carried out at

night. Additionally, RNAS plans called for No. 3 (N) Wing to be

developed into a strategic bombardment force. 3o

'Through 1915 the RFC stressed reconnaissance as its

primary duty. However, apparently due in part to losses

against the Fokker, Gen Douglas Haig, the British

Expeditionary Force (BEF) commander, authorized night

bombing of objectives "up to a distance of five or six miles over

the lines" by two airplanes per army per night . The first such

RFC mission occurred on 19 February 1916 when two pilots

flying BE2c aircraft from No . 4 Squadron attacked the

Cambrai aerodrome. During the mission, one of the British

pilots bombed airplane sheds from a height of only 30 feet.

Maj Gen Hugh Trenchard, the RFC commander-in-the-field,

directed his pilots to gain experience in night flying on the

British side of the lines . Quite understandably, these airmen

were required to fill out reconnaissance reports . 3 '

Inevitably, the disparity between the perceived roles of the

RFC emphasizing observation and the RNAS pressing for

bombardment led to conflict. Such confrontation later erupted

over RNAS land-based strategic bombing. Foreseeing the

availability of Sopwith 1 1/a Strutters, the Admiralty made plans

in early 1916 to assault German war industry in Essen, and

Dusseldorf. Fearing that proposed flights from Detling, near

Maidstone, England might inadvertently violate Dutch

neutrality, the Admiralty approached the French with the idea

of a joint venture on the continent.

37
Support of the BEF commander was sought and easily

obtained. In fact, General Haig insisted that unless the flights

would cross the British licies, he was "not concerned and [saw]

no necessity for his concurrence to be obtained ." Yet

Trenchard and Lt Gen David Henderson, the director of

Military Aeronautics, prevailed upon Haig to reverse his

stance toward the RNAS wing at Luxeuil, France . The conflict

between the RNAS and RFC had only just begun. 32

Notes

1 S. F. Wise Canadian Airmen and the First World War: The Official

History of the Royai Canadian Air Force, vol. 1 (Toronto : University of

Toronto Press, 1981), 9; "Les Vols de Nuit Avant la Guerre," January 1917,

Conferences sur les vols de nuit Escadrille F 25, SHAA.

2. Lee B. Kennett, The First Air War, 1914-18 (New York: Free Press,

1991), 47-48 .

3 Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarague, A History of French

Military Aviation, traps. Francis Kianka (Washington, D.C . : Smithsonian

Institution Press, 1986), 81-82 ; Georg P. Neumann, The German Air Force in

the Great War, traps . J. E. Gurdon (London: Hodder and Stoughton, [ 1920]),

157; Kennett, 46.

4. Christienne and Lissarague, 83 .

5. Alex Imrie, Pictorial History of the German Army Air Service,

1914-1918 (Chicago : Henry Refinery, 1973), 23-24.

6. Ibid ., 24; Ernst W. von Hiippner, "Germany's War In the Air: A

Retrospective on the Development and the Work of Our Military Aviation

Forces in the World War," traps. J. Hawley Larned (Leipzig : Kohler, 1921),

bound typewritten translation in the Air University Library (AUL), 40.

7. Christienne and Lissarague, 62-64.

8. Sous-Lieutenant Vincente Almandos Almonacid, "Etudes Relatives a

1'Aviation de Bombardement" (Studies Relative to Aviation Bombing)

[late-1917?] traps. no. 107, RG 120, National Archives (NA) .

9. C. F. Snowden Gamble, The Air Weapon: Being Some Account of the

Growth of British Military Aeronautics from the Beginnings in the Year 1783

until the End of the Year 1929, vol. 1 (London : Oxford University Press,

1931), 238; Air-Commodore Charles R. Samson, Fights andFlights (London:

Ernest Benn [ 1930]), 177-79.

10. Samson, 188; Neumann, 176-77; Wilhelm Siegert, "First German

Bomber Squadron Attack on Dunkerque," traps. Ursula E. Wolff, Cross and

Cockade Journal (US) 13, no. 4 (Winter 1972): 322-24; '"The Necessity for a

Profound Study of the Bombing Section of Aviation with a View to

Determining Rules for Employment," n.d . [19 January 1918 on folder in

pencil], World War I Night Aviation Collection, United States Air Force

Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) . One author found that German air

38
units did sporadic night bombing as early as December 1914, see Kennett,

52-53. A photograph of an Otto pusher is found in John H. Morrow Jr.,

Building German Airpower, 1909-14 (Knoxville, Tenn. : University of

Tennessee Press, 1976), 98.

11 . C. M. White, The Gotha Summer: The German Daylight Air Raids on

England, May to August 1917 (London: Hale, 1986), 33-34.

12 . Christopher Cole and E. F. Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain

1914-1918 (London: Putnam, 1984), 28-29.

13. Zeppelin L6 started on the mission but was forced to turn back due

to engine problems. Cole and Cheesman, 4-25; Douglas H. Robinson, The

Zeppelin in Combat: A History of the German Naval Airship Division,

1912-1918, 3d ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1980), 58-60.

Forward bases werg soon established at Brussels, Maubeuge, and Controde.

See Imrie, 29-30.

14. Hoppner, 40.

15. Ernest Dudley, Monsters of the Purple Twilight : The True Story of the

Life andDeath of the Zeppelins, First Menacefrom the Skies (London: George

G. Harrap & Co ., 1960), 36-37. A photograph of an observation car is on

page 32.

16. Cole and Cheesman, 51-53; Robinson, 74.

17. John H. Morrow Jr., German Air Power in World War I (Lincoln :

University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 36.

18. J. M. Bruce, The Aeroplanes of the Royal Flying Corps (Military Wing)

(London: Putnam, 1982), 238-46.

19. Kennett, 45-46; G. W. Haddow and Peter M. Grosz, The German

Giants : The Story of the R-Planes, 1914-19 (London: Putnam, 1963), 1 ;

Bruce, 261-68 .

20. White, 34-35; Morrow, 74-75.

21 . Kennett, 52 .

22. Ibid ., 69-70 ; Bruce, 296-03 .

23. Charles Samson to Admiralty, letter, 6 February 1915, quoted in

Samson, 191-93

24. Capitaine Jean-Baptiste Personne, "Bombardements de nail," 30

April 1917, World War I Night Aviation Collection . SHAA.

25 . Neumann, 49, 180 ; Robert Casari, "The Development of German Air

Aircraft, 1914-18," Cross and Cockade Journal (US) 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1960):

7-8; Hoppner, 75.

26. Christienne and Lissarague, 89-90.

27 . Ibid ., 89-90, 100-2; Peter Kilduff, "The History of Grouper de

Bombardement 4 and 9," Cross and Cockade Journal (US) 15, no. 1 (Spring

1974): 3.

28. Imrie, 31 ; Morrow, 74-75.

29. Imrie, 40-41 ; Neumann, 164-65, 179 .

30. Wise, 133-34, 139, 143-48.

39
31 . Walter A. Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the

Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, vol. 2

(Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1928), 183-84.

32. Policy statement on air bombing issued by GHQ BEF, 3 June 1916,

quoted in Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing: A Study of the

Development of British Air Strategic Thought and Practice up to 1918

(London: William Kimber, 1973), 79-81, 97-98.

e

40
Chapter 3

Tactical Night Bombardment

Tactical bombardment pertains mainly to those objectives

located in or near the ground battle zone . In 1917 Col William

"Billy" Mitchell defined tactical bombardment as bombing

occurring within 25,000 yards (15 miles) of the front. Targets

typically include enemy airfields, railway lines, supply dumps,

munitions depots, troop and convoy movements, cantonments,

bivouacs, assembly points, command posts and headquarters

of frontline units, and similar objectives which have an

immediate bearing upon the ground campaign . Bombardment

aviation attacks these targets by day and night.'

Tactical aerial bombardments had been carved out from the

opening days of the First World War. When it was first

organized, the French GB 1 was considered an extension of

ground artillery. As such, the bomber crews limited operations

to within 30 miles of the front lines. Yet, since the desire to

take the war to Germany could not long be contained, strikes

were soon carried out against targets at Freiburg, Essen, and

Ludwigshafen . Unfortunately, the limited bomb load capacity

and inadequate endurance of operational bombers reduced

the effectiveness of strategic raids. When increasingly competent German air defenses were factored into the equation,

such forays proved too costly to continue . By the second half

of 1915, the French were among the first to turn toward

routine tactical employment of bombardment aviation. 2

Several benefits could be gained by using early bombing

craft against objectives within the battle zone. Since less fuel

was needed, more bombs could be carried . Moreover, it was

possible to send the bombers on more than one mission in a

single day or night. For example, one RFC pilot made six raids

against German billets "immediately behind the line" during

one night late in 1917. Briefer penetrations over hostile

territory reduced exposure to enemy fighter and AAA defenses,

and a switch to night, tactical bombing narrowed the threat

even further since fighters rarely flew at night and AAA was

41
much less accurate. The opening of the 1916 campaign along

the Verdun, France, sector demonstrated these advantages. 3

Formation flying became standard for day bombers as did

attempts to provide fighter escorts in the high-threat daytime

skies over Verdun . However, flying under the cover of

darkness offered the greatest opportunity for successful

tactical bombardment.

Germany's Opening Offensive

The Germans carried out numerous night bombardment

missions against French railway yards and airfields during the

opening stages of their offensive. In one such operation, 18

C-planes dropped approximately 1,500 pounds of explosives in

the vicinity of Amiens, France, without losing a single airplane .

Yet for all the heroic efforts of German aviation, only 4,500

pounds of bombs were dropped during day and night missions

in support of the February ground advance. Such limited

tonnage could do little to stem the continuous flow of supplies

into the French sector. The task of isolating the French fell to

German heavy artillery . The lack of specialized German

bombardment aircraft was clearly evident at Verdun-only two

early-model G-planes were available during most of the

offensive . 4

As a supplement to the limited-capacity C-planes, the German

high command incorporated dirigibles into its air plan for

Verdun, designating them for night missions against enemy

supply lines. However, as attested by the assault on Nancy,

France, during the night of 22 February 1916, the German

airships were not up to the task when faced with a combination

of heavy French AAA defenses and poor winter weather. Of four

airships employed during the operation (SL7, LZ77, LZ88, and

LZ95), only one was able to bomb the objective. The other three

were either destroyed or forced to turn back. Already overburdened, the kagohls would receive little lighter-than-air

bombardment support during the battles

Slowly the tide turned toward French air superiority in the

sector. Germany's effort to deny French use of the airspace over

Verdun had required continuous daytime employment of its air

assets along the front. Such flying fatigued both men and

42
materiel. Eventually the French gained superiority in fighter

strength and forced German airpower on the defensive . While

kagohl strength had increased to four units by April, the

squadrons were nevertheless obliged to give up bombardment

for defensive support missions . Their main duties now became

daylight contact patrol and aerial combat. Even the G-planes,

designed specifically for bombardment, flew defensive

missions behind the German lines . With the loss of air

superiority, the German air service could do little to prevent

resupply of the French defenders.s

French Night Flights

French bombardment units fared somewhat better than the

kagohls during the fighting at Verdun . Though German

pursuit aircraft initially inflicted a high loss rate on the

outclassed pushers, the French compensated by increasingly

flying under cover of darkness . As one example, Escadrille MF

25, the first French bomber unit to arrive in the Verdun

sector, became a fully operational night bombardment unit in

April 1916 . Interestingly GB 3, the first French night bombing

group (recognized as such on 11 March 1916), did not

participate at Verdun . The group remained at Malzeville until

April when it moved to Esquennoy in the Somme sector.'

While the French were able to continue bombing the 14 rail

lines feeding into the Verdun sector, little lasting success was

achieved ; "continuous" day and night bombardment was

necessary yet impossible with existing capabilities . An

experimental British study performed in the last year of the

war illustrates the difficulty of putting railroads out of

commission through aerial bombardment. The study found

that the damage caused by the direct hit of one 112-pound

bomb could be repaired in "one to one and a half hours ." The

track would be out of operation for the added time required to

get repair crews to the scene. Night bombings might have

increased the time delay further if crews were compelled to

wait for daylight before starting their repair work. Given

German reliance on its rail net for resupply, it seems likely

that sufficient laborers would have been close at hand for

repair of important track sections.

43
Interestingly, the British tests disclosed that only one bomb

in four (112 or 230 lb?) dropped from a height of 500 feet hit

close enough to destroy a double track railway. Only night

fliers could attempt such a low pass, and only along

undefended sections of track. French night bombers likely

delivered many of their bombs from a higher altitude .

If the bombing accuracy noted in the British tests were an

indication of French night bombardment performance at

Verdun, then German resupply was little hindered . Only six to

12 French planes (each with a 200-kilo bomb load) could

routinely be employed in night bombing raids, weather

permitting . As the fighting at Verdun waned by late

September, most of the French bomber units had already been

transferred to the Somme sector. 9

The Battle of the Somme

Applying lessons learned at Verdun, the French dispersed

their bomber bases more widely over the Somme sector; the

planes then flew different routes to their objectives . Thus they

achieved a more complete reconnaissance of the region while

at the same time complicating the task of the German air

defense system. Additionally, the French often sent Voisin or

Breguet-Michelin gunships (equipped with 37-mm guns) ahead

of the main night assaults in an effort to neutralize enemy

searchlight defenses. Finally, the French air service brought

German airfields under systematic night bombardment.

Presumably this was to aid the day fliers in gaining and

maintaining air superiority . At the same time, French night

bombers continued to give attention to German rail targets and

troop concentrations . `°

British bombing efforts on the Somme remained primarily

daylight operations. Though both the British (RFC) and the

French had been able to keep air superiority over the front for

much of 1916, the French increasingly preferred to bomb at

night. Here was a fundamental difference in bombing philosophy between the Allies . French authorities supported an

expansion of night bombing while the RFC leadership did not.

Fortunately the accomplishments of French night bombardment aviation in the last six months of 1916 were

44
preserved and offer valuable insight . Probably the most

striking observation to be gained from figure 2 is the limited

capacity of French bombardment . Remember that night

bombardment during this period represented nearly the

totality of French air service bombing operations . Aerial

bombardment was carried out an average of only nine nights

per month, with poor winter weather a likely factor in

reducing operations to a low of four nights in December .

Additionally, the 13 sortie average per flying night delivered

less than 2,000 kilos of bombs against only four targets .

Railway objectives were overwhelmingly targeted from late

summer to eanly fall, especially in the opening weeks of the

offensive, in an attempt to reduce the flow of supplies to the

German battlefront (fig . 3) . Enemy troop concentrations and

command facilities in towns and cantonments were similarly

targeted during the period of fighting.

During October the Germans began to turn the tide in the

air battle over the Somme . In response, the French air service

commenced systematic night bombing of German airfields.

The only previous aviation-related objective was the airfield

hangar at Tergnier bombed on the night of 16-17 September.

Attacks against German airfields reached their peak in

November 1916.

These attacks constituted the first time in the study period

that railways were not the most frequently targeted objectives

of French night bombardment. As the offensive came to an

end and winter weather set in, the French turned their night

bombers against more strategic targets . While French

bombardment played a minor role in the events of July

through December 1916, night flying allowed it to operate with

relative ease . The extremely low loss rate exacted during

combat missions shows the value of night flying (fig . 2) . As a

means of comparison, more French bombers were lost during

the daylight raid against Oberndorf, Germany on 12 October

1916 (eight, including three gunships) than during six months

of night operations. If the figures are accurate, the combination of lost and damaged aircraft amounts to less than 2

percent of the total sorties flown during the period!

During the battle of the Somme, RFC bombers were mostly

used in daytime to support artillery and infantry and to interdict

45
tactical targets such as railroads and lines of communication.

Many of the tactical bombing missions were nuisances,

designed to divert German fighter strength from the front

lines . Such action assisted the British in maintaining ailsuperiority and increased the effectiveness of ground artillery .

The introduction of Roland and Halberstadt fighters during

the fall of 1916 made RFC daylight bombing increasingly

costly. Instead of turning toward the night skies, the British

continued day operations with a new emphasis on targeting

German airfields. Additionally the RFC secured Sopwith l','2

Strutters, which had been destined for RNAS No. 3 Wing at

Luxeuil, to redress the growing imbalance over the front ."

Due to improvements in the British fighter arm, German

kagohls were again forced into a defensive role during most of

the battle of the Somme. Kagohl 1 was present at the start of

the offensive in July 1916 . Three additional kagohls moved

into the sector with the end of active fighting at Verdun. Their

most important contribution during the fray was in providing

protective escorts for observation planes. As at Verdun, the

German air service was unable to provide wide-ranging

tactical bombardment in support of the ground war.' 2
Changes in French Aviation

At the beginning of 1917, French bombardment aviation was

far from reestablishing extensive daylight capability. The Paul

Schmitt bombers which performed day work in four escadrilles

(PS 125-128) proved too slow and cumbersome . Equally

unsatisfactory for night operations, the Schmitt bombers were

a procurement failure and soon removed from service . The

French air service had to await the arrival of the Breguet 14 B

2 late in 1917 before day bombing would gain equal footing

with night bombardment. The Voisin Type 8 replaced the less

capable Type LA 5 for night use during this time. While the

Voisin 8's moxe powerful Peugeot engine offered greater lifting

capacity, it was subject to chronic breakdown causing night

aviators to worry about forced landings. The problem with

French night bombardment aviation in 1917 was not one of

quantity of aircraft but one of quality.' 3

Much tactical night bombing occurred in the Champagne

region during the first half of 1917, followed by operations in

the Argonne, and Verdun sectors . Aerodrome attack and

counterattack between French and German night bombers

became almost routine during the latter half of the 1917

campaign, with each side trying to knock out the other's aerial

bombardment capabilities . Not surprisingly, the German

attacks, with their heavy-bombardment G-planes, produced

greater damage . As an example, Senard, Lemmes, and Osches

aerodromes were hit hard by German bombers on the night of

26 September 1917 . Twenty-five French aircraft were

destroyed with approximately 20 more damaged.' 4

German night attacks forced the French to more widely

disperse their Bessoneau shelters on many aerodromes. Some

landing fields could no longer support their full complement of

aircraft. After housing up to five escadrilles during the August

1917 offensive, Lemmes could now only handle one or two

flights, and Osches was now suitable for two escadrilles-half

its previous complement. Many airfields either had to be

enlarged or abandoned . Often both French and German

planes retired before nightfall to airfields distant from the

front, returning to their home base early in the morning. This

way men and machines did not fall victim to the enemy's

49
night attacksat a cost of increased fatigue and decreased

operational efficiency (see table 4) .'S

The increasing amount of airfield bombardment led to the

establishment of false aerodromes. These false fields gave the

appearance of active aerodromes by day and night in the hope

that enemy bombers would be fooled into releasing their bomb

loads a mile or two from the real airfields . At night, active

fields remained concealed in darkness until an airplane was

properly identified through flare signals. Often the aircraft

also signaled a unique Morse identifier from a light on the

plane . Once ground personnel were satisfied with the identity

of the airplane, they illuminated the landing grounds . The

Table 4

Distribution of French Bombardment, September 1917

_ -- ----

EscadNlles

~~Group ~,T LocM]an Day- ~Nlght

GB 1 SBnard Sop 66 VB 110

VB 114

GB 2 Malzeville Sop 11 VB 101

CEP 115

MF 130

GB 3 Champion Sop 128 Sop 107

VB 113?

VB 125

PS 126

PS 127

GB 4 Luxeuil Sop 29

Sop 123

Sop 129

Sop 131

GB 5 Ochey BR 117

BR 119

BR 120

Independent Unlts

Vadelaincourt MF 25

Dunkirk V 116

GB 5 increasingly was used for day operations as the transition to the BrBguet 14 B 2 neared canpletion Capitiane Bouchet

commanded GB 1 in 1917.

Source : Adapted from a transation of Capitiane Bouchet, "Chaalis's Classes For Advanced Students," n .d

[but pre-1 October 1917], 25-26, RG 120, NA.

50
lights were extinguished as soon as the airplane had landed.

False aerodromes were likely most effective during periods of

poor visibility when ground details were indistinct.' 6

Britain's No. 100 Squadron

British night bombardment advanced in February 1917

with the formation of No. 100 Squadron. As the first RFC

squadron dedicated strictly to night bombardment, the unit

learned its vocation through practical experience-flying night

missions behind the lines . In using obsolete FE2b and BE2e

aircraft, the $quadron paralleled French night bombardment

escadrilles which also flew aircraft with limited capacity for

destruction . For much of the war, Allied night bombardment

was the "poor relation," receiving hand-me-down aircraft no

longer fit for day use.

The FE2b had first flown in 1915 and had a maximum

ceiling of 9,000 feet, a lifting capacity of three 112-pound

bombs, and no more than three hours endurance under its

maximum load. Nevertheless, British aviators carried out

many audacious night attacks with their FEs."

No . 100 Squadron's first wartime mission was an attack

against Douai aerodrome on the night of 5 April 1917. Manfred

van Richthofen, assigned to the field at the time, noted that the

planes came in as low as 150 feet to drop their bombs. He also

found that the attack was something to be enjoyed, declaring

that many pilots, himself included, manned machine-gun

posts as if at a turkey shoot. The FEs and their paltry payloads

caused some physical damage to the airfield but failed to

reduce German morale . If one is to believe Richthofen's story,

the attack enhanced the "Red Baron's" spirits .' 8

The squadron flew nine missions during the month of April

1917, attacking airfields, railway stations, trains, and

cantonments. Night operations continued at the greatest

possible pace throughout the summer and fall in support of

the Battles of Arras, Messines, and Third Ypres . On the night

of 3-4 July 1917, No. 100 Squadron struck Ramilies Chin and

Chateau du Sart aerodromes. Thirty German aircraft were

destroyed on the ground . With the termination of the Third

Battle of Ypres in October, No . 100 Squadron moved from

51
Trezennes aerodrome, near Aire, to Ochey. By that time Nos .

101 and 102 Squadrons had already been performing night

bombardment duties with the FE2b . Organized British night

bombardment, nonexistent for the first two- and one-half

years of the Great War, would constitute nearly half of British

bombardment aviation by war's end.' 9

Amerikaprogramm

German military aviation was profoundly influenced by the

United States's declaration of war in April 1917 . While German

authorities fully appreciated the limited capacity for American

aircraft production in 1917, they were nevertheless concerned .

Skilled American technicians and business leaders sent

overseas might be able to immediately increase the output of

existing British and French aero industry. To counter this

possibility, the Germans began a rapid buildup of air assets

under the Amerikaprogramm. The plan was simple: use all

available resources to force a decision on the Western Front

before American industry was fully geared to war production. It

was Germany's only chance. 2°

The kagohls had increasingly become night bombers as the

transition to G-planes neared completion . Aerodromes and

troop concentrations remained important targets throughout

1917 . With the buildup resulting from the Amerikaprogramm,

the kagohls took a new designation in late 1917 as part of an

overall redesignation of German aviation: Bombengeschwader

der Obersten Heeresleitung (Bogohl) . Seven Bogohls were in

existence by the end of the year, each containing three

Bombenstaffeln with an individual strength of six G-planes.

The only exception was Bogohl 3, the Englandgeschwader,

which contained six staffeln . For the first time in the war,

Germany had air units employed strictly for bombardment. 2 '

French Bombardment Aviation Reorganization

The Breguet 14 B 2 was the long-awaited French daylight

bomber. The plane began to enter the French air inventory in

quantity by the end of 1917. While the Breguet transformed

many existing escadrilles into daylight units, other escadrilles

52
within the same group remained dedicated to night bombing.

These GBs were known as mixed groups. Since problems

resulted in the mixed units from trying to combine two distinct

functions within one organization, French bombardment

aviation was reorganized in January 1918. The mixed GBs

were separated into unique day-flying and night-operating

units. Each GB contained three escadrilles as follows :

GB 1 became GB 1 (night) and GB 6 (day),

GB 3 became GB S (night) and GB 3 (day), and

GB 7 became GB 7 (night) and GB 5 (day).

Additionally, GB 4's five Sopwith-equipped escadrilles began

converting to the Breguet the same month. As the aircraft

changeover neared completion, three escadrilles were taken

from the group to form GB 9.22

Further refinement came with the instruction of 11 February

1918 when most of the French GBs became components of a

larger organization, the escadre . The escadres were formed by

order of General Petain to make mass employment of day or

night bombardment easier to coordinate and carry out.

Escadre 11, containing the French night GBs, was assigned to

the strategic blockade of the Briey Basin. GB 8 remained

independent to provide tactical night bombardment against

targets during the upcoming German spring offensive. In April

1918 the second night bombardment escadre (no. 14) was

formed by grouping together GBs 2 and 8. 23

Spring Offensives

Tactical bombardment intensified on both sides of the front as

the 1918 spring offensives approached . Supply depots,

railroads, lines of communication, and choke points (such as

bridges) close to the front became critically targeted objectives as

Allied and German bombardment aviation sought to gain the

advantage for their comrades on the ground. The British were

forced to abandon nearly two dozen airfields between 21-25

March 1918 as the Germans rapidly advanced westward .

However most were damaged and not immediately available for

forward staging of German aviation . Once repaired, some of

these airdromes became bases for German bombardment

53
aviation. For example, Bogohl 6 took up residence at Matigny

aerodrome in April. Many Allied positions previously safe against

German air attack were now subject to bombardment. 24

Indeed, the number of targets exceeded the capacity of the

72 German bombers committed to the offensives. The lack of

an effective day bombing capability was clearly felt. Due to the

scarcity of raw materials, German aviation production under

the Amerikaprogramm had been limited to existing aircraft

types . Resources could riot be spared to develop a day

bomber. The official British historian conceded the gravity of

the situation, declaring that with more aircraft the bogohls

might possibly have changed the outcome of the war. While

inflicting serious damage, notably the destruction of two

British ordnance depots in May, German bombardment

aviation nevertheless failed to turn the tide. 25

To cope with the German offensives, the British reorganized

their tactical bomber units in March 1918 . Day and night wings

were organized with 54th (Night) Wing containing Nos. 58, 83,

101, 102 Squadrons, all flying the FE2b . The overriding objective

of British tactical night bombing missions was to hamper

German resupply. However the light bombardment aircraft of

the 54th Wing were unable to frustrate enemy activity of such

enormous scale. Even had the weather cooperated and allowed

British bombing every night, the damage inflicted would likely

have little changed the final outcome-a massive German push

into Allied territory. The FEs, with their small payload, proved to

be little more than a nuisance. 2`'

On the ground, Allied forces prevailed and began counterattacking in July 1918 . By then an American army was on the

front. British and French day and night tactical bombardment

aircraft flew in support of the United States Army during its

ground offensives, especially against the Saint Mihiel salient.

To be expected, numerous railway and airfield objectives were

targeted to reduce the German ability to respond to the

American assault. 2'

As the offensive kickoff time neared, Allied aerial bombardment progressed from outlying objectives to those closer to the

battle zone. However for purposes of deception the tempo of

bombing remained constant prior to the start of the campaign .

During the day of attack, enemy troop concentrations and

54
command posts in support of the ground forces were priority

targets . Interestingly, the Metz-Sablon railway was targeted

through all stages of the offensive .

An important addition to bombardment aviation occurred

during the war of movement in 1918. Belligerents mounted

bomb racks on observation and pursuit aircraft for attacks

against personnel . Rather astonishingly, 67 percent (900 long

tons) of bombs dropped by the British between 1 January and

15 May 1918 were Cooper 25-pound antipersonnel fragmentation bombs. In fact, fighter and reconnaissance squadrons

accounted for 46 percent of all British bombardment during

the period . While few enemy casualties resulted from

antipersonnel bombings, these bombings were important for

impeding movement and creating disorganization. 28

Though aerial opposition remained intense, the Allied air

services' ability to mount both day and night bombardment

helped keep the German ground forces on the defensive until

the armistice of 11 November 1918 . The German night

bombers continued tactical operations at a feverish pace (fig .

4) Rarely did a night go by without bombardment missions.

Many G-plane crews carried out more than one sortie per

night. Again, most striking is the low loss rate. Even if the

total number of German bombers reported during the period

is in error by 50 percent (1857 instead of 3714), the overall

loss rate to British defenses amounts to little more than 5

percent of all German bombing sorties. Such results (in the

face of stiff defenses) reveal the security of flying at night (see

tables 5-10) .

The Minor Role of

Tactical Night Bombardment

Tactical night bombardment clearly played a minor role

during the First World War. Limited aircraft capabilities

reduced the effectiveness of the bombardments, while poor

weather conditions often prevented follow-up raids. Therefore,

only short-term isolated gains seemed possible . Yet tactical

aerial bombardments supported the ground forces by striking

targets that could not be effectively targeted by artillery .

Bombardment aircraft were first of all more mobile than

55

ground batteries . They could provide covering fire while

artillery units moved into new positions . Additionally bomber

planes could strike troop concentrations protected from

artillery behind hills or in ravines. Finally tactical bombardment

could strike such fleeting targets of opportunity as trains or

motor convoys out of sight of artillery spotters.

Though the results of tactical bombardment aviation were

small, the capability to perform such missions was nonetheless

important, since bombers increased the options available to

ground commanders. Flying under cover of darkness increased

the flexibility of air operations and kept bomber losses at an

acceptable rate. Yet the impact of tactical bombardment was

hampered without daylight bombing capacity. Gains made

during the night were often lost without rapid follow-up .

57

Table 5

Order of Arrival for British Night Bombardment

Squadrons in France

Date ~ Squadron A[rcratt

1916

? (night bomb by 10 Nov 5 (Naval) Sop 1'/z

1916)

? 3 (N) Wing Sop 1'/z

1917 100 28 March e 101 FE2b, BE 2e, HP

25 July FE2b, BE12

24 September A' (Naval) FE2b

17 October later 216 HP

1918

10 January 58 FE2b, HP

3 March 207 HP

4 March 83 FE2b

1 April 214 HP

26 April 148 FE2b

2 June 149 FE2b

4 August 297 HP

31 August 115 HP

Source : Adapted from Walter A. Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the Story of the PaR

Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), appendix XXIX ; C. P. O.

Bartlett, Bomber Pilot, 1916-1918 (London: Ian Allan, 1974), 29, 53 Gordon Burge, The Annals of 100

Squadron: Being a Record of the WarActivities of the Pioneer Night Bombing Squadron in France during the

period March 1917 to November 1918, including its Operations against German Towns, whilst serving in the

Independent Force oithe R.A .F. ([1919]; reprint, London : Bivouac Books [1975]), 3.
Table 6

Royal Air Force Night Bombardment on the

Western Front, 11 November 1918

Briga de ~ Wlng Squadron, Locatlan Alrcrait Type

~

+ 83 I IX (HQ) 54th Estree-en-Chaussee FE2b

I 207 HP

' 82d 58 Provin HP

214 Chemy HP

I 10th (Army) 148 Erre FE2b

II 11th (Army) 149 St . Marguerite FE2b

65th 38 Harlebeke FE2b

III 90th 102 Bevillers FE2b

V 22d (Army) 101 Hancourt FE2b

VIII 83d 97 Xaffrevillers HP

(Independent Force RAF)

100 Xaffrevillers HP

115 Roville HP

215 Xaffrevillers HP

216 Autreville HP

The FE/2b was used for short-range night bombing . Each squadron had an average of 18 .5 aircraft assigned . Handley Page

(HP) 0/100 or 0/400 were used for long-range night bombing. Each squadron had 10 aircraft assigned .

Source : Adapted from Walter A. Raleigh and H A. Jones, The War in the Air.' Being the Story of the Part

Played in the Great Warby the Royal Air Force (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), appendices XXVI, 125-129.

58
Table 7

Distribution of German Bombardment Aviation, 28 July 1918

__~._`.

-_~

_ _-

Bogohl ~ Staffein{ Region Airfields

1 1-3 Sedan Malmy

2 10-12 Laon Clermont-les-Fermes, Goncourt

3 13-18 Ghent Gontrode, Mariakerke, Oostacker

4 19-21 Somme ~ Giizancourt

5 4-6 Rethel Seraincourt

6 7-9 Topurnai Froidmont, Marquain, Templeuve

7 22-24 Somme Estrees-en-Chaussee

8 25-27 Lorraine Boulay (Bavarian unit)

- _ ~--.-___-_ -_ .i_- . _..__..-_-_.-.._- -_._ ___

Rfa

~

500 - Ghent I Scheldewlndeke

501 - ~ Dinant ~ Morville

- _-_ L_ . . . . _ _-_ __-..-_ _ .-

Source : "Summary of Air Information," no . 37, 2dS GS, 4 August 1918, AUL; "Vizefeldwebel Kurt Weil,"

Cross and Cockade Journal (US) 3, no 4 (Winter 1962) : 327

Table 8

US Air Service Night Bombardment Squadrons, 1918

Squadron Organized Training Location Arrived Front

92 1 Sep 1917 Ford Junction, England -

140 1 Nov 1917 Ford Junction, England -

155 1 Dec 1917 RAF Lake Down, England 9 Nov 1918

326 7 Jul 1918 Ford Junction, England -

The 92d and 140th Aero Squadrons did not begin training for night bombardment until mid-August 1918 . The 155th Aero

Squadron originally trained as a day bombardment squadron and was ordered to report to Colombey-les-Belles on 11 November

1918 to serach for missing planes

Source: Lucien H. Thayer, America's First Eagles: The Official History of the U.S. Air Service, A.E.F

(1917-1918), Donald G McGee and R. James Bender, eds (San Jose, Calif. : R James Bender, 1983), 243 AEF

Progress Report, 9 April 1919; Capt J. Stuart to Col A. Monell, memorandum, 20 November 1918, in Edgar S

Gorrell, Gorrell's Historyof the American Expeditionary Forces AirService, 1917-1919, National Archives Microfilm Publications, no. 990, vol. B-9 (Washington, D.C . : National Archives and Records Administration, 1974),

97-101 ; "American Air Service in Training With R.A .F ., British Isles," Gorrell, vol. B-5, 45-46, 60

59
Table 9

United States Naval Aviation Forces in Europe,

Northern Bombing Group, Night Wing

_.-_ ~-.-_-_-__,--. - _T_ -.-__

Squadron Estimated Date o1 Operation Proposed i.ocatlon

1 15 Jul 1918 Saint In elverts

2 1 Au 1918 Saint In elverts

3 15 Au 1918 Cham a ne

4 1 Se 1918 Cham a ne

5 1 Sep 1918

6 15 Sep 1918

Squadrons 3 and 4 were not organized before the armistice Squadrons 5 and 8 were elminated by the Department of the Navy

after the original projections

Source: Adapted from a memorandum to Captain Hutch Cone, 21 May 1918, quoted in a report by Lt

Col Arthur Christie (for Joint Army and Navy Board on Aeronautic Cognizance?), 17 August 1919, 8, RG

18, NA; Roger M Emmons, "The First Marine Aviation Force, Part Two,' Cross and Cockade Journal

(US) 6, no . 3, 272.

Table 10

Comparison of Allied and Enemy Night Bombardment

Aviation Aircraft Strengths

30 July 1918

American Belgian British French Italian German Austrian

0 10 169 210 47 222 67

Total 436 289

11 November 1918

American Belgian British French Italian German Austrian

0 8 190 247 80 268 11

Total 525 279

Source : AEF Progress Report, 7 May 1919, RG 18, NA.

60
Notes

1 . William "Billy" Mitchell, "Air Service : Its Part in Warfare," 20

November 1917, stencil no . 664, Information Section, Air Division, Office of

the Chief Signal Officer (IS-AD OCSO) record group (RG) 18, NA; Col C. H.

Hunter, traps . "Night Bombardment and Provisional Air Service Drill

Regulations," World War I Night Aviation Collection, AFHRA.

2 . Lee Kennett, A History of Strategic Bombing (New York: Schribner,

1982), 27-28; Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarague, A History of

French Military Aviation, traps . Francis Kianka (Washington, D .C. :

Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986), 89-90 .

3 . D. H. Montgomery, Down the Flare Path (London: John Hamilton,

[1937]), 54.

e

4. Georg P. Neumann, The German Air Force in the Great War, traps . J .

E. Gurdon (London: Hodder and Stoughtion, [1920]), 178-179; Alex Imrie,

Pictorial History of the German Army Air Service, 1914-1918 (Chicago : Henry

Regnery, 1973), 32-33.

5 . Imrie, 37 .

6. Christienne and Lissarague, 95-96, Imrie, 32-33.

7 . Christienne and Lissarague, 100-102 .

8 . Statistics Branch, General Staff, War Department, "Statistical

Analysis of Aerial Bombardment," report no . 110, 7 November 1918, in

Edgar S. Gorrell, Gorrell's History of the American Expeditionary Forces Air

Service, 1917-1919, National Archives Microfilm Publications, no. 990, vol.

B-7 (Washington, D.C . : National Archives and Records Administration,

1974), 99.

9 . Christienne and Lissarague, 102 .

10. Ibid.

11 . S. F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War: The Official

History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, vol. 1 (Toronto : University of

Toronto Press, 1981), 363, 368, 376-81 .

12. Imrie, 34-35.

13 . Christienne and Lissarague, 114-15 ; Commandant Orthlieb,

Laeronautique Hier-Demain (Paris: n.p ., 1920), 58-59; Simone PesquiesCourbier, "Le Groupe de Bombardement 1 Durant la Guerre de 1914-1918:

Analyse du Journal de Marche," Reuue Historique des Armees 152, no. 3

(1983) : 97 .

14. Christienne and Lissarague, 116-18; Orthlieb, 56-57; Commandant

Andre Voisin, "Report on the Bombardment of the Aviation Fields in the

Second Army Zone on the Nights of September 26/27, 1917," stencil no.

718, Information Section, Air Division, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, NA.

15. Orthlieb, 57; Voisin, 1 .

16. United States, Army, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), General

Staff, "Summary of Air Information . Second Section, General Staff, [General

Headquarters, AEF] G.H.Q.A.E.F. (2dS GS)," 8 April 1918; Montgomery,

20-21 .

6 1
17. Gordon Burge, The Annals of 100 Squadron: Being a Record of the

War Activities of the Pioneer Night Bombing Squadron in France during the

Period March 1917 to November I 1 th 1918, including its Operations against

German Towns whilst Serving in the Independent Force of the R.A .F. ([ 1919] ;

reprint, London: Bivouac Books, [1975]), 2-3; Wise, 287.

18. Burge, 51-54.

19 . Ibid ., 55-56, 67-70; Walter A. Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in

the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air

Force, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), appendix XXIX.

20. Morrow, 95-96.

21 . Imrie, 46-49 .

22. Christienne and Lissarague, 123; Orthlieb, 60 ; Peter Kilduff, "The

History of Grouped de Bombardement 4 and 9," Cross and Cockade Journal

(US) 15, no. 1 (Spring 1974): 17.

23. Gen Andre Voisin, La Doctrine de IAviation Fran~aise de Combat Au

Cours de la Guerre (1915-1918) (Paris : Ed. Berger-Leurault, 1932), 66-67;

Commandant Henri Langevin, " `Action de masse' aerierme daps une bataille

defensive," Revue des Forces Aeriennes, January 1930, 30; Commandant

Jean Brumelot, "Le l le Regiment d 'Aviation de Bombadement," Revue des

Forces Aeriennes, January 1930, 132-33 .

24. Wise, 483, 494; United States, Army, AEF, General Staff, "Summary

of Air Information, no. 13, 2dS GS," 15 May 1918.

25. Imrie, 52-55; Raleigh, vol. 6, 419-23, appendix 16; United States,

Army, AEF, General Staff, "Summary of Air Information, no. 8, 2dS GS," 9

May 1918.

26. Wise, 483 .

27 . Col Edgar S. Gorrell, The Measure of America's World War

Aeronautical Effort (Northiield: Norwich University, 1940), 42; "The Plan of

Bombardment Aviation," appendix no. 2 to annex no. 3 (Field Orders No. 9)

Plan ofEmployment ofAir Service Units, 1st American Army, HQ First Army,

AEF, 7 September 1918, RG 120, NA.

28 . Statistical Analysis of Aerial Bombardment Report, No. 110, Gorrell,

vol. B-7, 75, 92-93, 114.

62
Chapter 4

Strategic Night Bombardment

Strategic bombardment deals with the destruction of

targets which are not supporting the immediate ground

battle . These targets are often located at a distance from the

front. During the First World War, the industry and civilian

population of enemy cities were important strategic targets.

Other areas of strategic value included marshalling areas

and arteries for moving manpower and materiel to the front,

supply and ordnance depots, arsenals, interior airfields,

military and naval bases, mobilization centers, and similar

objectives.'

Destruction of industry would result in long-term reduction of war reserves ; destruction of stockpiled reserves

would have a near-term impact on the front when resupply

could not keep pace with battlefield attrition . Both types of

destruction limited the ability of a nation's armed forces to

wage war . However strategic bombardment had another

important purpose; it brought the war to the home front.

Such bombing was believed to have an important psychological effect on the civilian population . Hence the overarching purpose of strategic bombardment during the First

World War was to damage a belligerent's capacity and

willingness to wage war by targeting the military, economic,

and civilian segments of society.

The idea of strategic aerial bombardment predates 1914.

Though dirigibles appeared the only viable facilitators of such

bombardment as the war neared, that great prophet of

airpower, Clement Ader, had foreseen the day of the great

bombing planes. Ader, writing in the 1890s, noted their use

against tactical military targets . Yet he proclaimed an

important strategic role for bomber aircraft:

Unfortunately their work will also require them to bomb enemy cities .

And how can we expect to avoid such catastrophes? Dorit battleships

bombard port cities? Since airplanes will drive away or destroy these

naval monsters, they maybe excused for a few misdeeds of their ownl

63
The great bombing planes will become veritable terrors! I am

convinced that their awesome power and fear of seeing them appear

will provoke salutary reflections among the statesmen and diplomats

who are the real dispensers of peace and war, and that in the final

analysis these planes will serve the cause of humanity.2

Although Ader's hope for a peaceful outcome of bomber

development failed, his vision of strategic terrorizing did

become reality-but not until an airplane with great lifting

capacity, extended endurance, and the ability to drop bombs

with precision came into existence .

For want of such a plane, the first air strikes at strategic

targets werti missions made by daring individuals who were

willing to take risks to achieve small gains . One example was

the attack by Escadrille MF 29, flying the Maurice Farman 7

Longhorn, against the poison gas facilities at Rossler, Germany

on the night of 29 July 1915 . The MF 7 could lift only about

300 pounds of bombs, and less on long-distance flights .

Widespread destruction was beyond the capabilities of such

an aircraft. The Farmans inflicted only minimal damage to the

Rossler installation. 3

Bombardment by Airship

The airship appeared as the ideal strategic bombardment

platform when war first erupted . On the night of 19-20

January 1915, German dirigibles began a strategic bombing

campaign against Great Britain. But British defenses forced

the airships to ever-increasing altitudes, making accuracy

against military targets impossible ; therefore civilian

casualties continued to mount with each raid . The nightflying Zeppelins visited England 20 times during 1915. The

following year saw a slight increase in the number of

successful airship bombing operations flown over the island .

Airship losses mounted during the period due to improved

British defenses and the hazards of flying into unforeseen

bad weather. 4

Weather forecasting proved difficult for the Germans since

most weather patterns move from west to east across

Europe . Analysis of pressure changes, wind direction, and

cloud patterns over occupied Belgium offered the best

64
means available to forecast future weather conditions over

the British Isles . But these forecasts proved to be inaccurate

at times and were often ignored, sometimes with disastrous

consequences . 5

Douglas H. Robinson contends that the raid over England

on the night of 23 September 1916 was "for the German Naval

Airship Division . . . a turning point in the war." Two of their

newest Zeppelins were destroyed during the operation . Several

other airship crews watched one of the craft burn. In the clear

night sky, the fire could be seen as far as 125 miles away.

Pessimism pervaded the division as many flying personnel

began to discuss "not their chances of survival, but what they

could do when the inevitable catastrophe should overtake

them." By the time strategic operations against. England were

put on hold at the end of November 1916, nine dirigibles had

been lost in 43 night raids over the island . Eight were lost in

the last seven months alone .s

For the German army, 1916 had demonstrated the

costliness of airship raids . In June 1917 after airship no .

LZ107 raided England, the army suspended all dirigible

operations . German army airships had performed 232

strategic and tactical bombing sorties during almost three

years of warfare. Twenty-six army airships were destroyed .

Refusing to admit defeat, the German Naval Airship Division

continued to mount occasional raids over the British Isles

until the night of 5-6 August 1918. On that night, Fregattenkapitan Peter Strasser, chief of the Naval Airship Division,

and the crew of Zeppelin L70 were lost when the airship

went down in flames off the coast of England (table 11) .

Soon after the division became ineffective even for reconnaissance work.'

Germany would no longer depend upon its airships for

strategic operations against Great Britain once the G-plane

became fully operational. By flying tactical missions, the

G-plane crews gained valuable night experience which

would later be needed for strategic operations against

England . The G-plane proved to be a useful bomber for the

duration of the war . 8

65
R-Planes

On the Eastern Front, German s~rategic air operations were

carried out by a unique aircraft type-the Riesenflugzeug

(R-plane), an aircraft with a wingspan of more than 138 feet.

Later fully functional in the West, R-plane prototypes were

flying in the East as early as April 1915 . Interestingly, the only

specification that put the R-plane in a class by itself was the

requirement that the engines had to be "fully accessible,

serviceable and capable of being repaired in flight" [authors'

emphasis]. As engine breakdowns were frequent, such

66

Table 11

German Strategic Raids Against Great Britain

_ -

Year ~Ralds

Number Number Dlspatchedl I?estroyed Number Attacked

__ _._

Airships

1915 20 49/39 1 bombed by plane

23 164/123 5 by British fighters

1916 2 by British AAA

1 by weather

e

7 46/29 1 by British fighter

1917 2 by French AAA

4 by weather

1918 4 18/11 1 by British fighter

Total 54 277/202 17

Airplanes

Daylight Phase May-August 1917

8 193/143 6 British fighters

2 British AAA

4weather

Night Phase September 1917-May 1918

19 253/187 7 British fighters

7 British AAA

2 Forced landed in UK

Total 27 446/330 28

Source : Adaptedfrom Cole and Chessman, TheAbDelence o/Britain, 1914-1918(London : Putnam, 1984), 448.
capability was critical for successful long-range operations .

Through the various stages of R-plane evolution, the number

of motors per plane varied up to a maximum of six. 9

Early R-plane experimentation by the firms of ZeppelinWerke Staaken and Siemens-Schuckert Werke (SSW) was

viewed with much skepticism by German military

authorities . However by mid-1916, the realization of airship

limitations under combat conditions led these same officials

to support an expansion of R-plane production. Nevertheless, only 55 to 65 such aircraft would be manufactured

before the end of the war, with roughly 30 performing

combat operations . Clearly the R-planes were amazing

technological achievements . Two British authors contended

that they "would have earned lavish praise had they been

British products ."' °

Even on the less hostile (for aircraft) Eastern Front,

R-planes were soon forced to fly under cover of darkness .

During these missions, the aircraft flew at an altitude of

between 6,500 and 7,800 feet, and carried up to a 1, 700-

pound bomb load . Missions routinely lasted from three to five

hours. As the number of available aircraft increased during

1915, they were formed into two independent flights .

Riesenflugzeugabteilung (RfA) 500 was assigned to Alt-Auz,

while RfA 501 was stationed at Vilua. Later the R-planes

would commence operations along the Western Front. l '

Strategic airplane operations against London began with an

incredibly audacious solo attack by the crew of a German

Albatros C VII aircraft on 5 April 1917 . Aided by favorable

winds and a full moon, the aircraft reached the capital and

dropped five 22-pound bombs. While the British official

historian argues that the event was "without particular

significance," the mission must have made British home

defense personnel take notice that a new threat might not be

far over the horizon.' 2

Turk's Cross

In an effort to divide the French and British alliance after

the bloodletting of 1916, German authorities began serious

consideration of bombarding London by airplane. The plan

67
came under the code name Turkencrenz (Turk's Cross) . The

central London business and government district was to be

the principle target area for the daylight bombing campaign

envisioned in Turkencrenz. Notably included were the

newspaper offices on Fletcher Street. As the primary objective

of the offensive was to bring about a separate peace with

Great Britain, what better way to spread the panic than to

bring the bombing home to the press?'s

Halbgeschwader 1, made up of Staffeln 1, 4, and 6 of

Kagohl 1, was the unit selected to carry out this elite

operation. The army pilots trained at Heligoland and on the

Isle of Sylt, whlere they learned how to navigate over the North

Sea. Surprisingly, German naval pilots who were accustomed

to such flying were never incorporated into the army scheme.

Interservice rivalry had struck again. On closer observation,

this situation appears as a complete reversal of the British

RFC-RNAS squabbling over strategic bombardment from

Luxeuil . There naval pilots were making long flights over

land, while operation Turkenkrenz had military pilots flying

across water.' 4

Kagohl 1 was redesignated Kagohl 3 after being reequipped

with the improved G.IV-type aircraft . The squadron was

informally referred to as the Englandgeschwader because of

its strategic mission. Subordinate Staffeln (13-18) were

authorized six G.IVs each, although the full complement of 36

aircraft was slow to materialize. In April 1917 the unit moved

to new aerodromes at Melle-Gontrode and Saint Denis-Westrem

in preparation for the offensive . Engine problems delayed

operations against England until 25 May, the date of the first

mass daylight airplane raid. The daylight campaign lasted for

approximately three months, causing considerable damage to

structures in isolated areas. The cost in German aircraft was

high, though due mainly to poor weather and not British

defenses. Clearly the campaign could not continue indefinitely

at a loss rate of roughly 20 percent.' S

The Gotha night bombing of England began in earnest on

the eve of 4 September 1917 . Four Englandgeschwader

aircraft hit Chatham, England, killing and wounding over 200

naval recruits . Before the month was out, the Germans

launched a combined operation utilizing G- and R-planes

68
against the British Isles. An Allied reconnaissance plane had

photographed a R-plane at St. Denis-Westrem three days

before the raid, however both RNAS and RFC bombings failed

to neutralize this new threat .' 6

Bad weather prevented systematic strategic raids against

England during the last quarter of 1917 . Though Germany

had begun to concentrate all of its available air assets on the

Western Front in late 1917/early 1918 in preparation for the

spring offensives, raids across the channel continued into the

spring. Somewhat surprisingly, only 19 night raids could be

mounted by tY~e Englandgeschwader during the eight-month

campaign which came to an end in mid-May 1918 (table 11) ."

German air service night bombers also struck many

strategic targets in France during 1917 . Bogohl 2 bombed war

industry in the vicinity of Nancy. The unit attacked factories

at Neuve Maison during four night raids . Dunkirk was a

favored German target, with sporadic bombings lasting for

upwards of six hours per night. During one such bombing of

Petite Synthe aerodrome (near Dunkirk), a RNAS night

bomber pilot refused to get out of bed to take cover. He had a

mission in two hours (using a Sopwith 1 1/2 Strutter) and was

going to get all the rest he could.'$

British and French Joint Offensives

The British RNAS had flown strategic bombing missions

from Dunkirk against the German naval bases and Zeppelin

sheds in Belgium from the early weeks of the war . Yet the

limited ability airplanes achieved only minor successes . It was

not surprising that strategic bombing operations were

suspended in June 1916. The campaign resumed later in the

year when improved equipment became available . By then, the

strength of German air defenses forced the RNAS bombers to

fly under cover of darkness .' 9

The RNAS and the French air service planned a joint

bombing offensive designed to destroy steel manufacturing in

the Saar-Lorraine-Luxembourg region. Decreasing the U-boat

threat at its source was the primary reason for RNAS interest.

To begin the offensive, the RNAS argued that it needed 50

heavy bombers, 80 light bombers, and 50 long-range fighter

69
escorts . The RFC took issue with the estimate, and ultimately

diverted at least 60 Sopwith 1 1/2 Strutters previously destined

to the RNAS when fighting intensified on the Somme in mid to

late 1916 . Additionally, the French units involved in the

strategic offensive sought the use of 1 1/2 Strutters, further limiting the RNAS buildup . Throughout the spring and summer, GB

4 and RNAS No. 3 (N) Wing, stationed at Luxeuil, carried out

sporadic joint and individual missions, by day and night, while

waiting for enough aircraft to begin a general offensive . 2°

Surprisingly, a long-distance daylight raid against the

Mauser arms factory at Oberndorf, Germany, was selected as

the first large-scale joint mission of the untested (in combined

operations) Allied units. After suffering heavy losses during

the 12 October 1916 raid, GB 4 restricted the operation of its

obsolete Farman and Breguet aircraft to darkness . Both units

then moved to Ochey airfield to concentrate on the German

steel industry of the Saarland, Germany. The French unit

conducted several night missions during November and

December 1916 against these targets (table 12) . 2 '

No . 3 (N) Wing continued to perform mainly daylight

missions, and received its first Handley Page 0/ 100 during

this time . The aircraft had a cruising speed of 60 to 75 miles

per hour, an endurance of 9 1/2 hours with a load capability of

ten 112-pound bombs, and a bombing altitude of 6,000 feet.

Up to sixteen 112-pound bombs could be carved internally for

shorter-distance missions . The aircraft's slow speed and lack

of maneuverability necessitated duty as a night bomber . 22

RNAS plans called for the development of a squadron of

Handley Page bombers within No . 3 (N) Wing.

Since factories were not producing the planes in any quantity

during the winter of 1916-17, the unit had only two by March

1917 . The first night mission with one of these aircraft occurred

on 16-17 March, against the Moulin-les-Metz railway station.

The Handley Pages were used on several more individual night

missions before the wing was disbanded in April 1917 . 23

Poor weather and limited availability of aircraft hampered

the performance of the Allied strategic offensive from Luxeuil

and Ochey. Though one author indicates the campaign was

"remarkably successful," another contends that the "low

operational effectiveness . . . only supports the case against the

70
raids ever having been attempted in the first place." Nonetheless, the latter concedes that regardless of the results,

"bombing attacks on German cities were becoming a necessary feature of a popular [British] war policy ." RNAS bombing

operations continued from the Dunkirk aerodromes against

heavily defended German positions along the occupied Flanders

coast-Ostend, Zeebrugge, Bruges, and Blankenberghe. 24

71

Table 12

Groupe de Bombardement 4, Strategic Night Bombardment

in Conjunction with RNAS No. 3 (N) Wing

October-December 1916

-

__

Date Escadrille Number of Wetght

Sorties Bombs

._ . .

of

{k9) ~._

Tsn~

__ ~.-

October

9/10 F 123 1 200 Mulheim rail depot

10/11 F 123 1 120 Stuttgart rail depot

11/12 F 29 e 4 480 Oberndort factories

F 123 5 580

BM 120 8 1790

22/23 F 29 4 520 Hagendingen blast-furnaces

2

BM 20 4 1248 -

November

10/11 F 29 & 4 480 Volkingen steel mills

F 123

BM 120 4 960

11/12 F 29 & 8 780 Volkingen steel mills

F 123

BM 120 3 792

23/24 ? 4 360 Volkingen steel mills

December

F 123 & 9 600 Factories and blast furnaces

27/28 BM 120 of Brebach, Bous, Durbach,

- Neunkirchen, Volkingen

Source : Operations de Bombardement de Nuit Effectuees par (Aviation de Bombardement, OctoberDecember 1916, World War I Night Aviation Collection, SHAA `Kilduff lists the target as the Dilligen blast

furnaces in "History of troupes de Bombardement 4 and 9," Cross and Cockade Journal (U .S .) 15, no. 1

(Spring 1974): 9.
British Reorganization

The mobilization of No. 100 Squadron as the first RFC night

bombing squadron in February 1917 likely resulted from No. 3

(N) Wing activities at Luxeuil . The RFC had sought the

disbanding of the RNAS wing on the grounds that bombardment operations against Germany were not the responsibility of naval aviation. Yet the RFC was forced to organize a

unit whose utility, from the official RFC perspective, was at

best questionable. For without such a night bombing unit, the

RFC might well have had difficulty in convincing the home

government df its capacity to successfully replace No. 3 (N)

Wing. 25

Having suffered through three months of daylight attacks,

the British public was outraged by the country's seeming

defenselessness against night raiders. Reorganization of home

defense swiftly followed, leading to an improvement in

capabilities especially for the region around London .

Additionally, politicians, press, and the public clamored for

reprisals against German cities . 2s

The British selected Ochey aerodrome in October 1917 as

the home field for the 41st Wing, RFC, their answer to the

Gotha bombings. At Ochey, No . 100 Squadron was joined by

`A' Naval Squadron, flying the Handley Page bomber. To these

night squadrons was added No . 55 Squadron, flying the DH4

daylight bomber. The complementary nature of the wing, with

a day unit and short- and long-distance night elements, made

the reprisal effort extremely flexible . Unfortunately only 14

missions (five by night) were executed by the end of the 1917;

adverse weather conditions prevented more extensive

operations . Rather appropriately, the RFC strategic bombardment of German cities met with the same meager results that

had characterized No. 3 (N) Wing strategic operations from the

same airfield six months earlier. 2 '

By this stage of the war, bombardment aviation was on the

increase, regardless of actual operational results . On 22

December 1917 Maj Gen Hugh M. Trenchard announced

British plans for a strategic bombardment force to strike at

German industrial centers (the eastern limit of operations

being roughly Cologne-Frankfurt-Stuttgart) during a meeting

72
with Maj Gen Maurice Duval, chef du Service Aeronautique,

and an American representative. General Duval explained that

France considered the blockade of raw material movement out

of the Briey Basin most crucial . France would continue

bombing the rail lines in an effort to hamper German war

production. Duval also reminded Trenchard that reprisals

against French cities was easier than Allied attacks on

German cities . France clearly did not want to bear the brunt of

German reprisals caused by indiscriminate British activity. 23

RFC plans called for the expansion of night bombing by

eight additional squadrons . Work began on airfields at

Xaffevillers afld Roville, France, to accommodate the increase .

In February 1918, 41 st Wing came under VIII Brigade

command, later becoming part of the Independent Forces,

Royal Air Force (RAF). 29

The British strategic bombers of VIII Brigade continued to

strike the industrial centers of western Germany in the early

months of 1918 . Once the Ludendorff offensive began in

March 1918, the squadrons began bombing tactical targets

(especially the rail supply lines to the German front) in

support of the British ground forces . The planes were able to

resume strategic operations once the offensive stalled in

mid-May 1918. Two day-bombing units were added to VIII

Brigade during the offensive. With the increasing mix of day

and night units, a reorganization was necessary to maintain

efficiency. The 41 st Wing controlled the day squadrons, and

the newly formed 83d Wing took charge of the night elements .

Further recognition came with the title Independent Forces,

RAF on 6 June 1918 . 3°

Table 13 compares the activity of British day and night

bombardment units between 1 January and 30 June 1918 .

Only three squadrons, Nos. 55, 100, and 216 were specifically

apportioned for strategic operations. Yet most of their missions

during the period were against targets in support of units

resisting the German spring offensives (table 14). Not surprisingly,

the British bomber force was most active in March.

Of interest is the operational capability of the short-range

night bombers that carried out operations only two fewer days

per month on average than their daytime compatriots. Among

the night aircraft, the limited operations of Handley Page

73
Squadron Number 18 252749 55 57 205206 211 

ota

O

Number of days

in commission 137 138 137 70 129 139 74 49 37 910

r

Number of days l

of activity

z

January87702 14000 38

February73 1104 11000 36

v

,p March 24 17 22

9 10 18 1900 119~

y

April 19677379 10 10 78

May 149 1187 14 11 12 12 98

Total 72 42 58 24 26 64 39 22 22 369z

Avg/month 15.89.1 12.7 10.36 .0 13.8 15.8 13.5 12.2 12.2

Total tons 68.3 37.6 54.6 29.6 27.2 76.0 61 .5 26.4 12.0 393 cfl

dropped

Avg/month 14.98.2 11 .9 12.7

6.3 16 .4 24.9 16.2

9.8 13.0

Avg/day of

activity0.950.090.941 .231 .051 .191 .581 .200.55

1 .07
Number of days

in commission 88 60 135 140 138 3 564 I 50 118 164

Number of days

of activity

January 0 0 7 9 8 0 24 0 2 2

v February 3 0 5 7 12 0 27 0 2 2

March 18 9 3 15 13 0 58 1 2 3

April 9 8 4 9 10 0 40 2 3 5

May 9 8 3 11 10 2 43 8 1 9

Total 39 25 22 51 53 2 192 11 10 21

Avg/month 13.3 12.5 4.9 10.9 11 .5 20.0 15.8 6.6 2.5 3.8

Total tons 67.1 45.0 22.8 111 .1 111 .1 76.0 358.5 33.1 9.6 42.7

dropped 

Avg/month 22.9 22.5 5.1 23.8 24.2 16.4 19.1 19 .8 2.7 7.6 

Avg/day of

activity 1 .72 1 .80 1 .04 2.18 2.10 1 .19 1 .87 3.01 0.96 2.03 

Squadrons 103 and 207 are not included, as they made only one raid each.

British long tons (1 ton =2,240 pounds)

Source: Adapted from Table No. 4, "Statistical Analysis of Aerial Bombardment," Report No. 110, Statistics Branch - General Staff, War Department, 7 November 1918 ;

Edgar S. Gorrell, Gorrell's History of the American Expeditionary Forces Air Service, 1917-1919, National Archives Microfilm Publications, no . 990 (Washington, D .C . :

National Archives and Records Administration, 1974), vol . B-7, 115 .
Firstraid ', Jan3 I Jan1 ; Jan3 'l Mar 11 ~~ I Jan 14 Jan 1 i May 19 Mar7 Apr1 Apr 11

Last raid~ May 19 ' May 18 ~! May 19 May 19 I May 22 I May_ 19 I May 19 I May 19 May 19 May 19

O

Number of towns ~!~

24 17 II 1 14 18 14

with objectives ~ i I ~ I _ T - ~ J,

'I

Objectives ~, ~, ~ ~ "

C

II z

Railwa

Y stations

5 19 265 1831 ~ 23 I 3

Rav IwaYs idm 9s32

I~

511180 101

0

Docks and Canals I 000310000

9

9

Factories0000 120000

0 ( Dumps 6 3 II 1 I, 14 0 I! 17 0 4 'I 2 I 3 I Aerodromes 7 6 7 2 0 4 0 16 9 2 I Billets 12 3 ~ 5 1 8 5 0 6 0 1

z

Unknown

_y

93

.-

19

~~ 42

~` _150 53 ~ 0 ~ 8

__L-

14

-~~ 12

~O
Last raid May 18 May 18 May 17 May 21 May 18 May 18 Mar 31 May 18 May 17 Night

Number of towns 33 15 22 2 2 9 10 -

with objectives

Objectives

Railway stations 21 2 22 19 1 2 1 5 8 166

v Railway sidings 5 0 13 0 2 0 0 0 7 68

~1 Bridges 0 0 2 ~ 2 7 0 0 0 1 12

Docks and Canals 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 1 25

Factories 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 2 4 24

Dumps 2 5 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 66

Aerodromes 11 0 3 28 20 0 0 0 0 115

Billets 3 1 0 2 12 0 0 0 0 59

Unknown 12 20 2 48 60 2 0 3 0 403 

'Activities widely dispersed 

"41st Wing strategic bombers 

Source : Adapted from Table No. 5, "Statistical Analysis of Aerial Bombardments," Report No. 110, Statistics Branch - General Staff, War Department, 7 November

1918; Edgar S. Gorrell, Gorrell's History of the American Expeditionary Forces Air Service, 1917-1919, National Archives Microfilm Publications, no . 990 (Washington, 

D.C . : National Archives and Records Administration, 1974), vol . B-7, 116 .
squadrons is clearly evident. Had larger numbers of the

planes been available, their heavy bomb load, which was more

than five times that of the FE2b, would certainly have helped

in the effort to hamper German resupply. During this period,

no more than two of the large aircraft in No . 216 Squadron

participated in specific missions. 3 '

Night bombardment units flew only one-third of all 41st Wing/

VIII Brigade missions up to the creation of the Independent

Force . Yet the loss of night fliers was proportionally greater

than that of day bombers . The Canadian official historian

argues that difficulty in night navigation and the lack of an

effective Getlnan daylight defense were the main factors in

such a disparity between British day and night strategic

bombardment aviation. 32

From the time the Germans were put on the defensive in

July 1918 until the end of the war, the Independent Force was

able to concentrate on strategic bombardment. By the end of

August, the force had expanded to nine squadrons, of which

five were night bomb squadrons . General Trenchard decided

"to attack as many large industrial centers as possible instead

of concentrating the Independent Force on the most important ." He felt that the moral effect would be greater, as no

inhabitants of western Germany could feel immune from

attack. Additionally, the German military would have to build

up and maintain more home defense, thereby taking men and

material away from the front. It was further decided that when

conditions prevented distant strikes, attacks on railroads

would receive priority. Next on the list were blast furnaces

since they were "easy to find at night." s3

In September and October 1918, Independent Force bombers

supported the French and American ground offensives by

bombing railway targets . Weather often hampered strategic

operations in the closing months of the war. When long-distance

missions were undertaken, the day bombers had to fend off

stiff German fighter opposition and heavy antiaircraft fire . As

an example of the capability of German night defenses, four

Handley Page bombers were lost on a raid against Cologne. An

estimated 173 searchlights were involved and over 16,000

AAA rounds were fired. 34

78
Briey Basin

The French continued strategic operations against targets in

the Briey Basin after the demise of No. 3 (N) Wing in early 1917.

As an estimated 75 percent of Germany's iron ore was being

mined in the Saar-Lorraine-Luxembourg region, the strategic

operation deserved high priority. Additional estimates declared

that 10,000 railroad cars moved through the basin daily.

These cars funneled through three critical choke-pointsThionville, Bettembourg, and Metz, all in France-which were

regularly targeted. Blast furnaces and steel mills were also

important targets in the Briey Basin. 35

The basin remained the strategic concern of French

bombardment aviation into 1918. With the exception of GB 8,

all night bombing groups, under Escadre 11, continued to

pound the region until the German March offensives diverted

their attention . Soon afterwards, strategic operations in

Lorraine resumed their preoffensive intensity. Two factors led

the French air service to concentrate strategic aviation against

the Briey Basin during the last two years of the war. 3 s

First, the Lorraine-Luxembourg iron-ore region was the

only important center of German war industry that could

effectively be targeted by the short-range Voisin pushers (the

majority of French bombers for most of the war) . Fear of

German reprisal against French civilians should the French

bomb German municipalities was just as important. French

short-range bombers could not effectively carry out retaliation

against German cities. Hence it made sense not to get into a

"war of reprisal ."

When the Inter-Allied Independent Air Force (IAIAF) was

established on 3 October 1918, the war remained "business as

usual." The Independent Forces RAF bombed interior German

industrial centers, French GBs 2 and 18 struck the Briey

Basin. Table 15 shows the increasing importance of strategic

strikes against Germany. In a memorandum sent by Marshal

Ferinand Foch, the commander in chief of the Allied Armies,

to French President Georges Clemenceau on 13 September

1918, Foch made it clear that the proposed raids on German

population centers by the IAIAF were not reprisals, but "like

poison gas [were] a means of warfare which was first used by

79
the enemy and which we are therefore forced to use in our

turn." Foch then reiterated that the "best way of affecting the

German metal industry at the present date" was at "the very

source of production, i .e. localized supplies of iron ore, the

transport of which takes place via certain obligatory routes

[emphasis in original] ." 3 '

In view of maximizing efficiency, Marshal Foch declared that

only long-distance bombing aircraft should be incorporated

into the IAIAF. Once sufficient heavy bombers were in place,

the Briey Basin iron district would no longer be targeted by

the force . "These raids will be carried out by French

aeroplanes having an average load [the Voisin 10 and Breguet

14 B 2 for instance] ." The French were clearly unwilling to

relinquish control of bombing activities in the region,

especially to the British . For two years, French bombers had

attempted to blockade the basin by destruction of the rail net.

Minimizing collateral damage to territory the French

considered their own had remained a constant concern. At the

time of the armistice, Escadre 11 had 245 bombers committed

against the Briey Basin, an increase of 100 airplanes since 1

March 1918. However, the number of F 50 and C 23 heavy

bombers still remained limited at the end of the war . With the

formation of the IAIAF in October 1918, Allied strategic

bombardment changed in name only. 38

80

Table 15

British and French Strategic Bombardment of Germany

Year f)ay Missions Night Missions ~

estimated Number

Bombs

1915 44 7 940

1916 21 75 917

1917 45 130 5,234

1918 119 234 7,117

Total 229 446 14,208

-

a

Source : German official figures listed in H. A. Jones, Warin the Air, vol . 6 (Oxford : Cfarendon Press, 1928), 152.
US Assistance

The United States was anxious to assist its Allies in the air

war . Two months after declaring war on Germany, an

aeronautical commission headed by Maj Raynal Boning was

sent to Europe to gain a better understanding of Allied

requirements for American aviation. The final report of the

commission, filed on 15 August 1917, contained interesting

ideas regarding the use of night bombardment aviation. Major

Boning declared that as there was "practically no effective

means of preventing night-bombing . . . [c]ould night bombing

be conducted on a sufficiently great scale, there seems good

reason to believe that it might determine the whole outcome of

military operations ." 3o

One author contends that Boning was overly influenced by

then Lt Col William "Billy" Mitchell's concept of airpower, the

major having talked with Mitchell in Paris . Upon visiting a

French night bombardment group, Mitchell found great esprit

among its crew members. They insisted that with enough

equipment "there would be nothing left of Germany." Boiling

suggested in his report that more than one-third of all

American aircraft American aircraft production should be

night bombers . Gen Benjamin Foulois, chief of the Air Service,

believed that Germany was preparing to secure "air

supremacy in night bombing" in 1918. He surmised that the

solution to the problem was simply "to build more night

bombing squadrons than the enemy and carry out a greater

offensive bombing campaign against him." 4°

Preparations for a night bomber arm within the United

States Air Service (USAS) began when Handley Page 0/400

drawings were received by the US War Department in August

1917 . The Caproni Ca 5 was believed superior to the Handley

Page, but drawings were not readily available . Additionally,

Glenn Martin began designing and building a bomber that

ultimately proved faster and higher flying than either of the

other two models . Unfortunately, the Martin bomber was not

in full production at the time of the armistice . 4 '

As American production of Handley Page aircraft was

proceeding slowly, General Foulois tried to obtain 12 French

Voisin aircraft to establish a USAS night bombardment

81
squadron. Six were delivered by the end of March 1918, but

their disposition is uncertain. Adding further to the night

bombardment dilemma was the reinstatement in early June

1918 of the 260-Squadron Plan, which was originally

formulated in September 1917 .42

The plan called for the formation of 60 night bombardment

squadrons, with an estimated need for 21 replacement

squadrons to maintain a full complement of service squadrons.

To improve coordination of many different activities, the USAS

organized the Night Bombardment Section on 28 June 1918.

Yet for all the effort, only one bombardment squadron, the

155th, arriveii at the front on 9 November 1918, too late to

carry out combat missions . 43

The United States did carry out a strategic night bombardment during the First World War through the US Naval

Aviation Forces Northern Bombing Group . Organized in April

1918, the Northern Bombing Group was the US's answer to

the RNAS effort against the submarine bases in Germanoccupied Flanders . Initial requirements called for establishment

of six night bombardment squadrons using either Handley

Page or Caproni heavy bombers; additionally plans called for

the formation of six day squadrons equipped with DH 9 or

Bristol aircraft. Naval aviators manned the night squadrons

while Marine aviators staffed the day units . 44

Unfortunately the Caproni Ca 5s provided to the Northern

Bombing Group Night Wing were equipped with faulty Fiat

motors; only eight of the 17 Ca 5s survived the ferry flight

from Italy to the night wing base at Saint Inglevert . On 15

August 1918 the night wing carried out its only operation of

the war with one Caproni . The airplanes simply could not be

kept in usable condition . Nonetheless several naval aviators

performed night missions as observers with RAF No . 214

Squadron, flying Handley Page bombers. The United States

failed in its attempts to join the Allies in strategic bombing. 45

Conclusion

The French were constrained by geography and aircraft to

the strategic bombardment of the Briey Basin. Limited

capability bombers that were forced to fly at night could carry

82
out an extended campaign nowhere else. Even had extendedrange bombers been available early in the war strategic

targeting would likely have remained the same . The basic

problem was that French cities were vulnerable to German

reprisal. Paris was little more than 50 miles from the front.

France would have lost a war of "city busting." In this

situation, the railways and industry of the Briey Basin

appeared to be the only strategic option for France .

Great Britain had two distinct opinions regarding strategic

bombardment. The RNAS minority opinion pressed for

strategic targeting of German steel production as well as of

naval related objectives along the Belgian coast. The RFC

believed its bombing assets were best used in a tactical role

over the battle zone. The RFC was forced into accepting a

strategic role because of RNAS strategic activity.

Only grudgingly did the RFC incorporate the Handley Page

heavy bomber into its inventory. The French feared the British

would use its strategic capacity for indiscriminate bombing of

German targets. Yet fully 40 percent of Independent Forces

RAF bombs (220 of 543 tons) were directed at German airfields

to damage and subdue German night bombing and fighter

squadrons . These were usually the target of the FE2b-equipped

night bomber squadrons .

Additionally railway targets constituted a main objective of

the British strategic campaign. The bombing of industrial

targets in German cities was simply not as widespread as the

French had feared . Therefore on closer examination, the

French and British strategic campaigns were not as disparate

as they might appear. 46

German airship and airplane raids against England proved

ineffective in reducing British war resolve. Were the campaigns

wasteful expenditures of limited German resources? Certainly

the airship program was extremely expensive for the results

achieved. However the number of airplanes flying against

England remained a minority of the German bomber force.

Additionally the bombers of Bogohl 3 and Rfa 501 were often

used for tactical missions, especially during the spring 1918

offensives. It seems unlikely that their exclusive use for

tactical bombing operations in 1917 and 1918 would have

made a greater impact on the outcome of the war. 4 '

84
The British were forced to invest heavily in defending their

island. One author contends that the equivalent of 10 fullstrength fighter units and two or three short-range bombardment squadrons (that could have been formed and used

on the Western Front) were tied up in home defense duties.

Germany, already outnumbered on the front, could have

ill-afforded such an addition to the enemy camp. Thus the

decision to carry out the strategic bombardment campaign

against England was not totally in error. 48

World War I strategic night bombardment evolved from

daring individual missions in converted observation airplanes

into highly developed operations using large aircraft capable of

carrying a heavy bomb load into the enemy's heartland. Urban

civilian populations far from the front could now have a

first-hand view of the horrors of war.

Notes

1 . Col C. R. Hunter, trans. "Night Bombardment and Provisional Air

Service Drill Regulations," 7 (n .d ., late 1918?) World War I Night Aviation

Collection, Historical Research Agency.

2 . Clement Ader, Military Aviation (Paris : n.p ., 1909); Lee Kennett, A

History of Strategic Bombing (New York: Schribner, 1982), 31-32.

3. Peter Kilduff, "The History of troupes de Bombadement 4 and 9,"

Cross and Cockade Journal (US) 15, no. 1 (Spring 1974): 3; J. M. Bruce, The

Aeroplanes of the Royai Flying Corps (Military Wing) (London: Putnam,

1982), 241 .

4. Douglas H. Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat: A History of the

German Naval Airship Division, 1912-1918, 3d ed. (Seattle : University of

Washington Press, 1980), 57-64 ; Christopher Cole and E. F. Cheesman,

The Air Defence ofBritain 1914-1918 (London: Putnam, 1984), 24-25, 448.

5. C. M. White, The Gotha Summer: 71ie German Daylight Air Raids on

England, May to August 1917 (London: Hale, 1986), 136; Robinson, chap. 19.

6. Robinson, 189; Cole and Cheesman, 172, 448.

7. Cole and Cheesman, 199-200, 229; Robinson, 331, 337-39.

8. Georg P. Neumann, The German Air Force in the Great War, trans. J.

E. Gurdon (London: Hodder and Stoughton, [ 1920]), 178-79.

9. G. W. Haddow and Peter M. Grosz, The German Giants: T9~e Story of the

R-Planes, 1914-19 (London: Putnam, 1963), 6; Coleman and Cheesman, 308.

10 Haddow and Grosz, xii, 1 1 ; Cole and Cheesman, 308.

11 . Haddow and Grosz, 12 .

12 . Walter A. Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the

Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, vol. 5

(Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1928), 60 ; Cole and Cheesman, 200-201 .

85
13 . White, 36-39.

14 . Ibid ., 35; Raymond H. Fredette, The Sky on Fire: The Flr'st Battle of

Brttain 1917-1918, and the Birth of the Royal Air Force (1976; reprint,

Washington, D.C. : Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 38.

15. Later two Staffeln were based at Mariakerke airfield . Fredette, 52, 79.

16. Ibid ., 83, 301-2; "Germany's Night Bombing Activities," 15 December

1917, stencil no. 761, 2, Information Section, Air Division, Office of the

Chief Signal Officer, Record Group 18, National Archives (NA) 2; Raleigh,

vol . 4, 197.

17. Raleigh, vol . 6, 425; Cole and Cheesman, 414, 446.

18. Ernst W. von Hoppner, Germany's War In the Air: A Retrospective on

the Development and the Work of Our Military Aviation Forces in the World

War, trans. J. Hawley Larned (Leipzig: Kohler, 1921), bound typewritten

translation ins the Air University Library (AUL), 76; "Germany's Night

Bombing Activities ;" C. P. O. Bartlett, Bomber Pilot, 1916-1918 (London : Ian

Allan, 1974), 68.

19. Neville Jones, The Origins of Strategic Bombing: A Study of the

Development of British Air Strategic Thought and Practice up to 1918

(London: William Kimber, 1973), 59, 63, 82-83.

20. Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air

Policy in the First World War (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 49; Jones,

103-4, 108-9.

21 . S. F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War: The Official

History of the Royai Canadian Air Force, vol. I (Toronto : University of

Toronto Press, 1981), 264-68; Kilduff, 8.

22 . Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarague, A History of French Military

Aviation, trans. Francis Kianka (Washington, D.C . : Smithsonian Institution

Press, 1986), 104-5; Jones, 113-16, 122; Kilduff, 8-9; Wise, 271 .

23. Jones, 122; Paul Bewsher, "Green Balls" The Adventures of a Night

Bomber (London: William Blackwood, 1919) . Chap. 3 comments on the first

Handley Page raids from Luxeuil.

24. Jones, 123; Cooper, 64-65 .

25. Gordon Burge, The Annals of 100 Squadron : Being a Record of the

War Activities of the Pioneer Night Bombing Squadron in France during the

Period March 1917 to November 11 th 1918, including its Operations against

German Towns whilst Serving in the Independent Force of the R.A.F. ([1919];

reprint, London: Bivouac Books, [1975]), 1.

26. Raleigh, vol. 5, 64-65; Cole and Cheesman, 302, 306-7.

27. "A" Naval became No. 16 (N) Squadron on 8 January 1918. Raleigh,

vol. 5, 56; Wise, 286-87; Maurice Baring, Flying Corps Headquarters, 1914-

1918 (London: Buchan & Enright, 1920), 275; Jones, 165; Raleigh, vol. 6,

122-23 .

28 . Edgar S. Gorrell, "Early History of the Strategical Section, Air

Service," in "History of the Air Service, AEF," in Edgar S. Gorrell, Gorrell's

History of the American Expeditionary Forces Air Service, 1917-1919,

National Archives Microfilm Publications, no. 990, vol. B-6 (Washington,

86
D.C. : National Archives and Records Administration, 1974), 390-91 ;

Raleigh, vol. 6, 122-25.

29. Wise, 290.

30. Ibid ., 292-93; Raleigh, vol. 6, 135.

31 . "Statistical Analysis of Aerial Bombardment," Report No. 110,

Statistics Branch, General Staff, War Department, 7 November 1918,

Gorrell, vol. B-7, 80, 84.

32. Wise, 295-97.

33. Raleigh, vol. 6, 136-37, 142.

34. Ibid ., 146-52.

35. Jones, 107-9; Lecture IV, untitled (dealing with bombardment

aviation), n. d. (late 1917-early 1918?), RG 120, NA.

36. Gen Andre Voisin, "La Doctrine de 1'Aviation fran~aise de combat en

1918: L'aviation de combat independente (2e periode), Revue des Forces

Aeriennes, 26 September 1931, 1035.

37. "An agreement reached between the British and French Governments and transmitted, through the Supreme War Council, to the American

and Italian Governments for approval," 3 October 1918, quoted in Raleigh,

appendix 11 ; Memorandum, Marshal Foch to Georges Clemenceau, 13

September 1918, quoted in Raleigh, appendix 10, 33, 35, 37.

38. Memorandum, Foch to Clemenceau; Commandant Orthlieb,

Laeronautique Hier-Demain (Paris : n.p ., 1920), 65.

39. Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United

States Air Force, 1907-1960, vol. 1 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. : Air

University Press, 1989), 19-20; "Report of Aeronautical Commission, 15

August 1917," quoted in Maurer Maurer, The U.S . Air Service in World WarI,

vol. 2 (Washington, D.C . : Office ofAir Force History, 1978), 132-33.

40. Futrell, vol. 1, 20; William "Billy" Mitchell, Memoirs of World War I:

"From Start to Finish of Our Greatest War" (New York: Random House,

[1960]), 48-51 ; Report of Aeronautical Commission, 15 August 1917,

quoted in Maurer, vol. 2, 133. Benjamin D. Foulois, "Report on Air Service

Problems, A.E.F., and Recommendations re Same," 23 December 1917, in

Maurer, vol. 2, 161-63 .

41 . Theodore M. Knappen, Wings of War: An Account of the Important

Contributions of the United States to Aircraft Invention, Engineering,

Development and Production during the World War (New York: Putnam's

Sons, 1920), 162-70.

42 . Letter, Foulois to Monsieur Le Sous, 23 January 1918, RG 120, NA;

Airplane deliveries by foreign governments to USAS 28 March [ 1918],

memorandum, 10 April 1918, Henry H. Arnold Collection, Library of

Congress (LC) .

43. Maurer, vol. 2, 195-96; The Adjutant General of the Army to M/G

W. L. Kenly, letter, 14 June 1918, Arnold Collection, LC ; Kenly,

memorandum, subject: American Program, n.d ., Arnold Collection, LC;

Office of Chief of Air Service, memorandum, 28 June 1918, Gorrell, vol.

B-6, 47-48; Maurer, vol. 1, 76.

87
44. Capt Hutch Cone to Adm W. S. Sims, telegram 17 April 1918, quoted

in Ralph D. Paine, The First Yale Unit : A Story ofNaval Aviation, 1916-1919,

vol . 2 (Cambridge, Mass. : Riverside Press, 1925), 185-86; "Naval Aviation

Overseas," Cross and Cockade Journal (US) 4, no. 1 (Spring 1963) : 66.

45. "Naval Aviation Overseas," 66 .

46 . Raleigh, vol. 6, 158-59.

47 . United States, Army, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), General

Staff, "Summary of Air Information, no. 8, Second Section, General Staff,

[General Headquarters, AEF] G.H.Q.A.E .F . [2dS GS]," 9 May 1918, AUL.

48. Imrie, 48; Cole and Cheesman, 446-51 .

a

88
Chapter 5

The Foundations of Night Fighting

Aerial combat proved to be the most frustrating of all night

flying attempted during the First World War. Night bombers

flew to their objective, unloaded their cargo, and returned

home. Night reconnaissance aircrews similarly flew over a

designated route to expose hostile activities. But night pursuit

aviators had np set itinerary-they patrolled the skies looking

for an illusory enemy whose black-painted aircraft blended

into the darkness . Sometimes the hunter saw his quarry

momentarily illuminated by searchlight ; other times the prey

was but a fleeting shadow against the lighted moon ;

occasionally brightly colored engine exhaust gases were the

only indication that the game was nearby. Most often the

hunter came home without firing a shot. Yet by the end of the

war, night pursuit pilots were often successful at stalking

their quarry.

Paris and London were of vital importance to both the Allies

and Germany. German bombardment of the capital cities

would bring the war right to the halls of government .

Additionally many civil and military authorities feared that

such bombings would damage civilian morale, thereby reducing

popular confidence in national leadership . The capitals had to

be defended day and night by all possible means ; pursuit

aviation was part of that defense. From the opening days of

the war, the French air service dedicated large numbers of

airplanes to the defense of Paris. By the summer of 1916, over

100 airplanes were performing such duty. These planes

maintained a constant daylight patrol against German

incursions and supplemented searchlight and antiaircraft

defenses when German airships threatened the city by night .

During the summer of 1916, six aviators and their Nieuport

Bebe aircraft stood by on night alerts. The remaining Paris

defense pilots were expected to answer a call as soon as

possible. Aviators flew over the city, which was divided into three

sectors for night defense, at designated altitudes between 1,200

and 4,000 meters. They met with little success.'

89
British Home Defense

The British expected a massive Zeppelin attack against

London soon after the outbreak of hostilities . Airplanes were

quickly assigned to supplement the few antiaircraft guns

available for home defense, even though the Admiralty and

War Office had little faith in their capacity for night interception. Nevertheless on the night of 5-6 September 1914,

Claude Graham-White and Richard Gates flew a Farman on

the first nighttime Zeppelin patrol over London . They returned

to Hendon after searching for the phantom airship for over an

hour. 2 '

Two RFC crews assigned to Joyce Green Field ventured into

the blustery night of 19-20 January 1915 to oppose the first

genuine Zeppelin intrusion against England . Both airplanes

experienced engine problems and made forced landings

without sighting the airships. By the end of January 1915,

RNAS coastal airfields each had three airplanes on alert status

while the RFC stations east of Farnborough maintained two

airplanes for anti-Zeppelin missions . Emergency night landing

fields were soon established throughout London to provide a

safeguard in the event of engine failure over the city. 3

Interservice bickering between the RFC and RNAS over

home defense responsibilities limited the effectiveness of night

airplane operations during much of 1915. Even the question

of airplane armament remained unsettled . RNAS Flight

Sub-lieutenant R. A. J . Warneford downed a Zeppelin on the

continent in the early morning hours of 7 June 1915 by

dropping bombs on the airship . While some British authorities

henceforth discounted the use of machine guns and

incendiary bullets against airships, others were not so sure.

When the Board of Invention and Research Sub-committee for

Aeroplanes filed its report on night flying in September 1915,

board members complained that night navigation and landing

facilities remained inadequate-a year after the war had

begun. Research and experimentation with British night

pursuit continued at a fast pace but produced little tangible

results during 1915. By the end of the year, the RFC had but

a total of 20 aircraft, mainly of the BE2c type, on alert at 10

airfields (two per field) across southern England . The only

90
results from 115 night home defense sorties flown during the

first full year of fighting were negative . Three British aviators

were killed and 18 aircraft damaged. 4

In March 1916 British home defense reorganization called

for the establishment of 10 squadrons ; only five squadrons

(Nos . 33, 36, 38, 39, and 51) were in existence when the Home

Defense Wing came into being in June. During the summer of

1916, a major change in night employment occurred .

Formerly home defense pilots patrolled only in the immediate

vicinity of their airfield . New arrangements called for a barrage

line of searchlights and airplanes running near the British

east coast from Dover to Edinburgh, with home defense

airfields roughly 20 miles apart. Pilots would now patrol

between stations in their hunt for enemy aircraft.

Along with the increasing efficiency of home defense

organization and employment came a major advance in

armament. Incendiary and explosive bullets brought within

sight "the end of the Zeppelin as a raiding weapon ."

Additionally No. 11 Reserve Squadron, the primary night

flying training unit, was transferred to the Home Defense

Wing in August. The unique demands of home defense were

finally being recognized . 5

On the night of 2 September 1916, Lt William Leefe

Robinson was flying his BE2c on patrol between Hornchurch

and Joyce Green when he spotted German airship SLl l . Flying

through the AAA barrage, Robinson emptied three drums of

the new explosive and incendiary ammunition into the

German ship. The airship quickly turned into a roaring

inferno as it fell from the sky. Robinson won the Victoria

Cross for this first victory against an enemy dirigible over

England . Morale soared for the home defense pilots and

British populace. Further victories followed in rapid succession during September and October. By the end of November,

Germany temporarily halted airship operations against Great

Britain. s

The RNAS claimed a secondary share of the home defense role

during 1916 but seemingly carried out its duties with little

enthusiasm. The Canadian official historian declares that:

In the RIVAS scheme of things, the home defense establishment was

really coterminous with its night-flying training. In April 36 per cent of

91
the 304 aeroplanes on active RNAS duty were being used for this

combination of home defense and night-flying duties By the end of

the year the number of aeroplanes on such duties had increased only

slightly ; more significant, all but ten had been downgraded to the

category of second-class aircraft . In other words, the Admiralty

reordered priorities for its air service, the home aeroplane element lost

most of its experienced pilots and its aircraft were allowed to become

largely obsolescent.

With the exception of a few veteran pilots retained for night flying, the

RNAS used the home aeroplane organization as a graduate course for

inexperienced pilots .

The night training on the home front gave the RNAS a large

pool of expet~ienced pilots for duty on the continent.

In early 1917, with the British Isles now "safe" from Zeppelin

attack, the RFC reduced home defense by conscripting pilots for

No . 100 Squadron, the newly formed night-bomber unit.

Presumably most of the personnel were more than happy at

the opportunity to fly on the Western Front. Most home

defense patrols were lonely solo affairs searching for an

elusive, or often phantom, airship . As the Germans had sent

but 42 airship missions against England during 29 months of

fighting, anxious borne defense pilots awaited notifications

which often never came .$

Night Airplane Bombardment

Airships had proven to be a difficult target for night pursuit

pilots during 1915 and 1916, and night dogfights between

airplanes still appeared unfeasible. Yet night airplane bombardments had become routine by 1917, and searchlight and AAA

defenses seemed impotent to stop them . In a chance encounter

during the night of 11 February 1917, Leutnants Peter and

Frowein of Feldfiliegerabteilung 12, flying a C-plane, succeeded

in shooting down two French bombers as they returned to

Malzeville aerodrome. Wingtip navigation lights gave away the

location of the French planes and made them easy targets .

Loitering over enemy night bomber aerodromes would become a

favorite tactic of the First World War night fighterr9

The Germans formed kampfeinsitzerstaffeln in a fashion

similar to the British home defense units. These staffeln of

single-seat fighters originally defended Alsace and Lorraine

92
against French night bombers . With the extension of Allied

bombardment into Germany during the final year of warfare,

new units were organized further to the rear. The Jagdstaffeln

increasingly were responsible for night fighting close to the

front; Jasta 73 alone shot down seven Voisins between 20

August and 25 September 1918 . Additionally two special

squadrons (one army, one navy) of six C-planes each were

formed in June 1918 for the express purpose of attacking

Allied night bombers as they were landing at their aerodromes . German night fighters performed admirably during

the closing stages of the war.' °

French pilots made several bold night pursuit flights during

the battle of the Somme in 1916, but French air service

officials remained skeptical over the possibilities of night

fighting. In the summer of 1917, Capitaine Henri Langevin,

the commandant of Escadrille 313, began night pursuit flights

on his own initiative by flying Nieuport 15-meter single-seat

aircraft from Couderkque near Dunkirk. This effort appears to

be the first systematic testing of fast fighter aircraft for night

work by any of the belligerents during the First World War.

Night fighting had been performed with fairly stable, slowflying planes since military authorities believed that planes

landing at high speed were likely to crash."

Langevin began his experimental work on moonlit nights

over the North Sea since German bombers used a water route

along the coast to Dunkirk. He was able to spot Voisins from

Escadrilles V 109 and V 116 returning from night missions.

From above they were silhouetted by moonlight reflecting off

the sea. The French aviator succeeded in locating a G-plane

by this method while flying at an altitude of 3,200 meters

during the early morning hours of 3 September 1917 .

Unfortunately the plane was lost to view when it passed over

the coastline. The following night, Langevin spotted two more

planes flying at roughly 3,000 meters. French AAA batteries

began to score against the German bombers after realigning

their barrage fire to this altitude .' 2

Initially Langevin recommended two-seaters for night

pursuit work. He believed that an observer was critical for

successful operations as the pilot was occupied with flying the

plane . He also advocated a standing patrol over Dunkirk in

93
advance of anticipated German bomber activity. With further

experience, Langevin refuted both concepts ; fast single-seaters

were needed to close quickly on enemy planes and standing

patrols wore down both men and materiel. Commandant Felix

Brocard, commander of Groupe de Combat 12, forwarded

Langevin's report of 29 July 1917 to General Duval with his

endorsement . Interestingly Brocard argued that a practical

solution might be the transfer of an existing night

bombardment escadrille to night pursuit work. He apparently

believed night flying experience was more valuable than

acrobatic skills ; nighttime dogfights did not exist in the same

sense as dayacombats between pursuit planes.' 3

The French air service began night instruction with

Nieuport aircraft at its training center at Avord as Escadrille

313 expanded its night activities . GQG ordered the escadrille

to take up night pursuit on a full-time basis in late

September. Delays in adapting the flight's Nieuport and

Sopwith 1 1/a Strutters for night work kept the escadrille out of

action during the most intense period of German night

bombing of Dunkirk. The unit was ready for action at the end

of October 1917, but enemy bombing declined as the battle of

Flanders came to an end.' 4

Apparently the unit maintained single-, two-, and three-seater

aircraft for three distinct night missions during 1918. The

single-seaters provided point defense over Dunkirk and

Calais ; the two-seaters flew patrols between the two cities;

while the three-seaters were used to attack German bombers

over the enemy's aerodromes. During the spring offensives,

the unit also performed night reconnaissance missions.' S

The French air service organized a detachment at Pars-lesRomilly for night fighting experimentation in mid-September

1918 . Just three weeks before the armistice, the detachment

became the Centre d' Instruction pour 1 `Aviation de Chasse de

Nuit. The center assured liaison with the antiaircraft school,

instructed pilots destined for night pursuit units, developed

night fighter tactics, and assisted in antiaircraft training and

experimentation .

Coordinated training with antiaircraft units had begun by

July 1918 (at the latest) . Such instruction usually featured

ground searchlights attempting to illuminate a decoy Voisin

94
bomber, followed by aerial intercept by Nieuport, Spad, or

Breguet fighters.' 6

Unfortunately the instruction center experienced a critical

shortage of planes equipped for night flying . Capitaine

Jacques de Lesseps, the school commander, even requested

that Spad pilots begin training at the Centre d'Instruction de

1'Aviation de Chasse et de Bombardement (CIACB) at la

Perthe, but the CIACB also had no night-ready aircraft .

Presumably no night pursuit pilots completed the program of

instruction at Par-les-Romilly before the end of the war. The

school was finally closed in February 1919. At the time, it had

10 Spad 7s, five Breguet 14 A 2s, three Nieuport 120s, three

Voisin Renaults, and one Voisin Peugeot aircraft-a case of

too little too late."

The RFC had been hesitant to try fast fighters for night

pursuit work . However, on the night of 3 September 1917,

Sopwith Camels were used by three pilots from No. 44 (Home

Defence) Squadron for the first time against the German

G-planes attacking London. Two RFC pilots on the continent

flew Camels the same night. Maj Gen E. B. Ashmore, the

commander of British home defense, considered the accomplishment "perhaps the most important event in the history of

air defense." By the end of the year, Camels were being

modified for home defense work along with SE5a and Bristol

fighters.' 8

No. 44 Squadron Camels later were used to form part of No.

151 Squadron, the first British night pursuit unit to go to

France . The late date of formation-12 June 1918-is rather

surprising since the Germans had been carrying out night

bombardment of British rear areas for many months. Nevertheless No. 151 Squadron "very nearly exterminated the Boche

night bombers of the 1 st and 3rd Army fronts," tallying at

least 25 victories . No. 152 Squadron was sent to France in

October 1918 but was barely operating when the armistice

came . Another squadron was preparing to leave England by

mid-November.' 9

The United States had high hopes for night pursuit in the

closing weeks of the war. Plans were developed for the training

of 300 night pursuit pilots . The 185th Aero Squadron was

formed in early October 1918 for night fighting and equipped

95
with Sopwith Camels . Maj Harold Hartney, commanding the

First Pursuit Group, decided to learn about night fighting

through first-hand experience . On the night of 22 October, he

encountered a G-plane at 12,000 feet. Engine exhaust flames

gave away the bomber's location . Being unaccustomed to

night flying, the aviator nearly rammed the German bomber,

then stalled his machine and fell out of position. After

recovering, Hartney succeeded in firing on the Gotha, but the

bomber continued to fly. In the excitement of the moment, the

major had switched off his engine and was forced to give up
the chase. Yet he apparently succeeded in crippling the

bomber. A G-plane full of bullet holes was found on the

ground not far from the area of Hartney's encounter. This

would be the 185th's only victory. 2 °

Night Pursuit

Night pursuit proved most successful when fighter aircraft

and ground searchlight defenses performed coordinated

actions. Searchlights were of great importance in locating

enemy bombers since night pursuit pilots could rarely locate

other aircraft a~ distances beyond 700 meters even in bright

moonlight. On dark nights identification was reduced to one

hundred meters or less and was usually limited to spotting

the glowing engine exhaust gases. Even when the searchlights

failed to illuminate hostile aircraft, they provided the night

fighter with a smaller search area. 2'

Additionally, advanced listening posts near the front

provided early warning, thereby negating the need for

standing patrols . Information concerning hostile aircraft

crossing the lines was telephoned to searchlight and night

pursuit locations. Such coordinated defenses increased night

fighter efficiency. Because of the difficulties in locating aircraft,

night pursuit pilots also needed to study and recognize aircraft

by their unique silhouettes ; friendly bombers returning from

across the lines might otherwise be mistaken . 22

By the end of the First World War, night bombers could no

longer disregard the threat of pursuit aviation . The British

were the most successful at night interception . With years of

experience in home defense, the RAF pilots of No . 151

Squadron proved their skills in the darkened skies over

northern France . Similarly, the aerial defenders of Germany

took an increasing toll against French and British night

bombers . Night pursuit could indeed no longer be overlooked.

Notes

1 . Christopher Cole and E. F. Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain

1914-1918 (London: Putnam, 1984), 37; "Defence of Paris (18 July 1916),"

15 August 1917, Stencil #281, IS-AD OCSO, RG 18, NA.

2 . Cole and Cheesman, 7.

97
3. Ibid ., 15-16, 26-28.

4. Ibid ., 31-33, 45-46, 448; R. A. J. Warneford, "Official Report of 7

June 1915," in Stanley M. Ulanoff, ed., Bombs Away: True Stories of

Strategic Airpower from WorG~ War I to the Present (New York: Doubleday,

1971), 14-15; Walter A. Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being

the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, vol. 3

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), 160-62.

5. Raleigh, vol. 3, 164-68; Cole and Cheesman, 153 .

6. Cole and Cheesman, 162-63 ; Bill Gunston, Night Fighters : A

Development and Combat History (New York: Scribner, 1976), 21 .

7. S. F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War: The Official

History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, vol. 1 (Toronto : University of Toronto

Press, 1981), 144.

8 . Cole and ~heesman, 188-89 .

9. Georg P. Neumann, The German Air Force in the Great War, trans. J.

E. Gurdon (London: Hodder and Stoughton, [1920]), 180-81 ; Gebhard

Aders, History of the German Night Fighter Force, 1917-1945 (London:

Jane's, 1979), 2.

10. Summary of Air Information No . 41, 2dS GS, 1 September 1918,

AUL; Aders, 3-4; Erich Frintrop, "Nachtluftjagd : Aus den letzten Tagen des

Weltkrieges," Der Luftweg, 18 November 1920, 1-2.

11 . Capitaine Henri Langevin, "La Chasse la Nuit," Rapport No. 59, 29

July 1917, 1 ; Langevin, "Les premeces de la `Chasse de nuit' en France,"

Revue des Forces Aeriennes, April 1930, 400-2.

12. Langevin, "Les premeces," 407-8.

13. Ibid ., 408, 410; Letter, Commandant Felix Brocard to Maj Gen

Maurice Duval, 23 Augusti 1917, World War I Night Aviation Collection,

SHAA.

14. '"Training (French), Organization of Aviation School at Avord [sic], 27

July 1917, stencil no. 271, IS-AD OCSO, RG 18, NA; Langevin, "La Chasse

la Nuit," 408-9.

15. Langevin, "La Chasse la Nuit," 414; Aders, 5.

16. "Constitution du Detachment d' Aviation de Nuit de Pars-lesRomilly," 18 September 1918, Ordre No. 25.145; "Note fixant le But,

1'Organisation et le fonctionnement du Centre d' Instruction pour 1' aviation

de Chasse de nuit," 22 October 1918; "Essais de Chasse de Nuit," 15 July

1918, 17 July 1918; "Note pour le Service de D.C .A .," 3 August 1918. All

entries in this note are in the World War I Night Aviation Collection, SHAA.

17. Capitaine Jacques de Lesseps to Maj Gen Maurice Duval, letter, 17

October 1918; "Dissolution du Centre d'Instruction pour 1'Aviation de

Chase de Nuit (C .LA.C.N .)," 8 February 1918, Ordre No. 13.740; "Compte

Rendu de dissolution du Centre d'Instruction pour I'Aviation de Chasse de

nuit (C.LA.C .N.)," 23 February 1918 . All entries in this note are in the World

War I Night Aviation Collection, SHAA.

18. Raleigh, vol. 5, 62; Gunston, 25-26; Maj Gen E. B. Ashmore, Air

Defense (London : Longmans, Green and Co., 1919), 53.

98
19. Raleigh, vol. 5, 151 ; Group Captain A. J. L. Scott, Sixty Squadron

R.A.F. : A History of the Squadron, 1916-1919 (1920; reprint, London:

Greenhill, 1990), 71-72; Ashmore, 105 .

20 . Harold E. Hartney, Wings Ouer France, ed. Stanley M. Ulanoff

(Folkestone, UK: Bailey Brothers and Swinfen, 1974), 221-27 .

21 . Harold E. Hartney, "Observations on Night Pursuit," n.d . [late 1918],

World War I Night Aviation Collection, AFHRC.

22 . Doyen P. Warden, "Night Pursuit Flying," Air Power Journal 6, no. 2

(June 1920): 173; "Report on Pursuit Training, Office of Chief Training

Section, Air Service, AEF," n.d . [ 1918?] Edgar S. Gorrell, Gorrell's History of

the American Expeditionary Forces Air Service, 1917-1919, National Archives

Microfilm Publications, no . 990, vol . J-6 (Washington, D.C . : National

Archives and Records Administration, 1974), 312.

99
Chapter 6

Night Observation and Reconnaissance

In the opening weeks of the First World War, aircrews

darted back and forth across the skies of Flanders and

northeastern France to discover the intentions of enemy

ground forces. Airplanes had one mission-reconnaissance .

While many, if not most, military leaders regarded the

airplane as little more than a supplement to cavalry, early

successes led to acceptance of the airplane as an independent

information gatherer . Only aircraft could provide timely

reconnaissance across such a broad, fluid front. Yet no night

reconnaissance missions were flown in 1914 or for that matter

for most of the war. This is the great paradox of World War I

night flying: while reconnaissance was the perceived duty of

aviation, night observation was one of the last organized

functions to appear as a specialized task during the First

World War. Why was this true?

The advent of trench warfare brought an abrupt end to

cavalry's contributions on the Western Front. Military leaders

were now forced to depend on aviation for intelligence of

enemy activities behind the lines. At the same time, the need

for immediate knowledge of enemy operations subsided . Face

to face on a heavily defended front bounded by impassible

geographical features, there was no possibility of being

quickly outflanked by an unseen opponent. In addition to the

ongoing daylight reconnaissance, airplanes began to make

dusk and dawn patrols to determine changes made under

cover of darkness . Therefore, daylight airplane observations

provided adequate intelligence gathering with one very

important addition .

Balloon Reconnaissance

The captive balloon, clearly the oldest method of aerial

intelligence gathering, reappeared behind the battlefront .

Although the Allies considered the balloon obsolete for military

use in 1914, the Germans maintained a usable inventory of

101
Drachens when hostilities erupted . Soon afterwards the

French engineer Albert Caquot developed a balloon superior to

the Drachen for Allied use . These balloons provided stable

platforms for observation across the trench lines . From several

thousand feet in the air, balloon observers could watch

activity up to 15 miles behind the lines and provide real time

information to ground forces through the use of telegraph or

telephone .'

Balloons were also easily employed at night. Though many

details were obscured by darkness, observers nevertheless

were able to determine the limits of an enemy attack, report

infantry signals during artillery barrage fire, and report enemy

marker signals for hostile bombardment aircraft. The

observation balloon was in fact so useful that opposing

aircraft and artillery continually sought its demise.

In less than nine months of operation, 35 companies of the

USAS Balloon Section tallied 3,111 hours of frontline observation, including night work. The section was first commanded

by Cal Frank P . Lahm, the winner of the 1906 James Gordon

Bennett balloon competition. The combined system of captive

balloons with their limited night capability and daylight airplane

reconnaissance provided adequate intelligence gathering during

the period of static warfare-specific night aircraft reconnaissance was not needed. 2

Airship Intelligence Gathering

For much of the First World War the airship was used for

intelligence gathering at sea. The first operational British

aircraft of the war was the nonrigid Parseval airship No. 4,

which conducted a patrol at the mouth of the Thames River

on the night of 5-6 August 1914 . British blimps were to fly

more than 86,000 hours in the course of the war. Owing to

their lack of endurance, the blimps could provide only

short-range fleet support, convoy escort, and submarine

patrols . Additionally, due to the failure of the British rigid

airship program, aerial convoy escort duty along the

dangerous western approaches was never adequately filled . 3

German airships likewise performed in a reconnaissance

role over the North Sea. As early as 1908, some German naval

102
officials believed that the airship would make a fine strategic

scout, especially if Germany were blockaded. In the last year

of the war, routine night reconnaissance flights were carried

out toward the coast of Norway and to within 50 miles of the

British coast. However the airships, flying at an altitude of

13,000 feet, garnered little usable information on these

patrols . Fear of British airplanes evidently prevented the

vulnerable German airships from flying at lower elevations. 4

Although 971 reconnaissance flights were made over the

North Sea during the course of the war, weather greatly

hampered German airship operations . On the average,

airships performed scouting missions on one day in four. The

lack of regular reconnaissance led Douglas H. Robinson to

conclude that German airships were improperly employed in

North Sea scouting, especially late in the war . Strategic

scouting missions along the western approaches, he argues,

were feasible for the high-speed L70 class of airships . Clearly

a coordinated effort with German submarines against Allied

convoys during the period of unrestricted submarine warfare

might well have had a decisive outcome . 5

Night Aircraft Reconnaissance

Night bomber crews were expected to perform aerial reconnaissance during their missions over the lines. The French

quickly recognized the importance of such duty.

During the flight pilots and passengers will try to collect all possible

information on the enemy, noting very exactly the time and the place.

Upon return this information will be collected by the commander of

the group, who will collate it and immediately make a report by

telephone to army headquarters . A written version in two copies will

then be sent to the Deuxieme Bureau and to the commander of the

army's bombardment aviation .s

One of the earliest efforts to achieve systematic results

occurred in 1916 during the Battle of the Somme. There,

French night bombers made detailed observations after

unloading their bombs. RFC airmen similarly undertook

occasional night reconnaissance missions . During this period

and in early 1917, GB 3 performed reconnaissance in con103
junction with bombing missions 15 to 50 kilometers behind

the lines .'

Night artillery spotting was tested by both the French and

Germans in late 1917. The French found that large targets

were clearly visible in moonlight and offered the best opportunity for success . Attempts at ranging cannon fire against

enemy batteries were less effective due to the difficulty in

determining their exact coordinates in the darkness. During

the night of 25 September 1917, a German airplane flying over

the North Sea between Coxyde and Dunkirk directed fire from

the infamous Lengenboom cannon via radio.e

Unable to Jprevent Allied day observation behind their lines,

the Germans began moving troops and supplies at night . By

masking their spring 1918 offensive preparations in this

manner, the Germans successfully limited Allied information.

French air service commanders reminded night bombers to be

ever vigilant.

Observers should not lose sight of the fact that the reconnaissance,

which is part of each bombing mission, has a very great importance

and that the information it provides can have broad consequences . In

flying over a zone of attack, the bombardier with experience in night

observation can sometimes tell at a glance in which sector the enemy

will direct his efforts, simply by noting the differences in lighting and

in rail activity. 9

Yet the night bombers proved incapable of supplying enough

information. Fully expecting a German offensive but unable to

determine when or where enemy troops would go "over the

top," Allied commanders called for a series of night reconnaissance flights .'°

Not surprisingly, the British called on their old workhorse,

the FE2b, with RFC airmen carrying out 13 night reconnaissance missions during the week of 13-18 March 1918.

However, the Germans were prepared to meet these nighttime

probes with the utmost discipline. One German aviator

moving with ground forces toward the front noted in his diary

the effect of flares dropped from these British scouts: "all

traffic stops, and the troops crouch lifeless under the shelter

of trees and houses. Nothing must be given away.""

Discipline was apparently so great that during the spring

the British reported no use of artificial light for troop and

104
materiel movements within 15 miles of the front. Captive

balloons were blind to German activities. Main roads were

little used and some conjectured that "flaming onion" batteries

firing phosphorescent shells were used to warn ground forces

of the approach of hostile aircraft. Few lights were noticed in

villages 40 miles from the front.' 2

The French likewise were performing night reconnaissance

along their sector, the work being performed by the bombers

of GB 8. Yet the Allies remained unable to gain a clear understanding of enemy intent. As the magnitude of the offensive

became apparent, Escadre 11's night GBs (1 and 7) quickly

shifted from P,orraine to the Groupe d'Armees du Nord (GAN)

to supply added night reconnaissance capability.' 3

The Germans were able to make great progress during their

March 1918 offensive in large part due to the night movement

of troops . With the stalling of the offensive, surprisingly little

was done by the Allies to establish a permanent night

reconnaissance capability-even though the Allies could not

hope to stop many more German offensives of the magnitude

of the March assault without better preparation. For the two

and one-half months between 25 April and 9 July 1918,

General Henri Petain, general comandant en chef of French

forces, lacked firm intelligence of German offensive movements and intentions. An order from the German army chief

of staff reinforced the importance of night preparations . "Large

troop movements and marches incidental to a change of billets

will, as a rule, only take place at night . When troops on the

march are taken by surprise at night by parachute flare

dropped by a hostile airplane they will stop ir.Imediately and

not move."' 4

As the situation became critical, Major General Duval, on 3

July 1918, ordered the establishment of night reconnaissance

detachments for all French armies as a means to improve

information gathering. These detachments, composed of four

planes, four pilots, and the necessary ground elements, were

attached to army escadrilles for administrative and materiel

support. Day observation pilots with night flying experience

were drafted for rapid implementation of the night

reconnaissance program. Additionally, the order required two

observers, specializing in night observation, to be attached to

105
the individual armies. Five such detachments were established

immediately, while night bombardment escadrilles (V 25, V 101,

and V 118) provided provisional support as needed.' S

Between 7 and 9 July 1918, French night reconnaissance

units had great success, noting "abnormal illumination of

railroad stations and railway, and numerous movements on

the roads ." This time the Allies knew the German offensive

was not far distant and readied themselves to meet it . So

critical was the information gained in the week before 15 July

that Brig Gen Mason Patrick insisted the Allies "owed mainly

to night reconnaissance" the knowledge of the attack on the

Marne. Agaihst a prepared opponent, the German offensive

quickly stalled .' 6

Though limited in resources and planning, French night

reconnaissance units performed quite admirably during the

German advance in Champagne . Soon after the tide turned,

General Petain reiterated his support for continued expansion

of French aviation units specializing in night reconnaissance.

Clearly the GBs could no longer be expected to execute two

separate missions of critical importance . The need for

comprehensive intelligence of enemy dispositions was simply

too crucial to the continued success of the Allied advance that

had begun with a counterattack on the heels of the German

offensive . The seeds of night reconnaissance had begun to

bear fruit."

Impressed with the possibilities of such activity, Col William

Mitchell, then chief of the Air Service, US First Army, directed

the formation of the 1 st Night Reconnaissance Flight. Three

experienced day observation teams were selected to fill the

new unit, as plans called for the rapid formation of an entire

night reconnaissance squadron . Training immediately

commenced at Vandey aerodrome under French direction,

with the Breguet 14 B2 selected for use. Additionally, at least

one observation squadron, the 90th, attempted night flying in

early August 1918. After several crashes the practice was

apparently stopped.'S

The 1 st Night Reconnaissance Flight was absorbed into the

9th Aero Squadron on 2 September 1918. Twelve days later

the squadron, flying from Amanty aerodrome, recorded its first

successful operational night reconnaissance mission during

106
the Allied advance against the Saint Mihiel salient. Soon after

the offensive, the unit moved to Vivancourt aerodrome. The 9th

remained the sole USAS squadron specifically charged with

night reconnaissance in the final two months of the war.

`s

Both French and American night reconnaissance units

obtained their operations directives from the aeronautical

commander at army level. Aircrews were then assigned specific

routes to be flown to and from their objectives . Assignment of

routes reduced the possibility of collision with other Allied night

fliers . Additionally, a more complete reconnaissance of the sector

could be achieved through set routes. Furthermore, strategic

missions wE+re usually carried out at night because of the

decreased efficiency of enemy defenses. With the ability to

penetrate further into hostile territory, night scouting was

complementary to day activity-both were needed for a comprehensive picture of enemy activity . 2°

Visibility Problems

Visibility dictated the altitude employed during night

reconnaissance. The ability of aircrews to locate objects on the

ground depended on several factors, including the amount of

moonlight and the clarity of the atmosphere. These factors

influenced the capacity to distinguish even the most basic

ground features. The British found that three components were

essential for successful night scouting without artificial

illumination. In addition to the absence of fog or mist near the

ground, bright moonlight was important because it increased

the contrast of ground features and cast distinct shadows that

aided aerial identification. Finally, low flying simplified the

observer's task and was a necessity for visual reconnaissance . 2 '

Ground features were recognizable under full moonlight.

Woods and forests appeared black, towns and villages looked

gray, while less traveled open roads seemed whitish. Canals and

waterways reflected moonlight, and were quite visible . Likewise

railroads could be easily identified . Factories in operation cast a

luminous glow that could be seen for miles . Finally, aerodromes

and camps and bivouacs in open ground were identifiable under

bright moonlight. Reconnaissance crews could cut down on

107
glare by flying with the moon shining from the back of the

airplane . 22

During periods of bright moonlight, detailed movements

along broad open roads could be observed from a height of

between 1,500 and 2,000 feet . Such activity could be

identified up to 15 kilometers distant from the aircraft. When

first detected, transports appeared as black dots, troop

movements as oblong masses. Additionally, road movements

during dry spells often resulted in a visible dust cloud . The

billowing smoke emitted from steam engines made trains easy

to recognize. 23

During tlfe half-moon phase, diminished light forced

reconnaissance flights to an altitude of 1, 500 feet and often to

1,000 feet for useful information gathering. Using only natural

lighting, which often was presumed adequate for observation, an

observer would frequently miss concealed movements .

Half-moon periods resulted in more inaccurate reconnaissance

than any other time of the month . Hence the parachute flare

provided an important tool during such missions. 24

Natural land features remained distinguishable in quartermoon light, but were hardly recognizable on totally to dark

nights. In fact, on moonless nights with overcast skies, fog, or

mist, the challenge was simply for the scouts to remain on their

intended course. Concealed movements on the ground were

nearly impossible to detect. As an aid, special night maps

showing only the most visible ground features-roads, rivers,

towns, forests, and "permanent" lights-were used for night

navigation during these periods. Obviously such conditions

required the artificial light provided by parachute flares. 25

Among the Allies, the Bourges flares were favored for target

illumination . When ignited at a height of roughly 1,800 feet,

these flares provided optimal ground illumination over an area

ranging between one-quarter square mile to one square

kilometer . These flares burned for approximately four

minutes. Typically, for complete road reconnaissance several

flares, dropped at intervals, produced an overlapping coverage

that proved valuable in determining any abnormal activity.

Additionally, reconnaissance observers found flares useful in

illuminating such stationary objectives as railroad yards . 26

108
Reorganization Efforts

The German army recognized the need for increased night

reconnaissance to enhance its defensive posture soon after the

Allied counteroffensive commenced in late July 1918 . As with

the French, German night scouting had been a secondary role

for bombardment aircraft. However, German leaders believed

that twin-engine G-planes were too noisy for the low-level

missions required once the Allies began a concerted effort to

carry out night movements . If the loudness of the engines

betrayed the German presence, Allied troop and supply

convoys could quickly disperse and take cover, thereby

preventing effective reconnaissance. 2 '

Occasional night flights by day observation units occurred

throughout the summer, and by late summer Obersten

Heeresleitung was seriously considering the organization of

special night reconnaissance units . One major concern driving

the use of night scouting was the need to locate Allied tank

assembly areas . Tanks, if properly employed with infantry and

artillery support, provided the Allies with weaponry capable of

smashing through the German defenses . Hence the Germans

needed to know the advance location of tanks. With such

information, the Germans could target the tanks and hopefully

destroy them before they could be used in a ground offensive . 28

Meanwhile, the French were expanding their night reconnaissance capabilities. Since accurate information of German

defenses would be critical for the impending Allied assault on

the Saint Mihiel salient, more night reconnaissance units were

needed. To resolve the shortage of night scouts, General

Petain authorized the creation of a training center for special

missions at Herbisse. 2 ~

Organization of the Center of Instruction for Long Distance

Night Reconnaissance Aviation called for five instructors and

between 12 and 15 trainees. Additionally, a night bombardment

escadrille was to furnish 10 Voisin Renault aircraft . The training

escadrille was designated V 200. The school had barely begun to

function when its work was interrupted by the armistice. Six

days later, the school at Herbisse was dissolved. 3 o

A few French night reconnaissance escadrilles did come into

existence before the end of the war. For example, in October

109
the First Army detachment was expanded into Escadrille V

293 . With the training center in operation, Major General

Duval announced that escadrilles would replace all existing

detachments. Additionally, when these units were equipped

with faster, more capable aircraft (most likely the Breguet 14

B 2), operational effectiveness would greatly improve. 3 '

The Americans were less successful. As their projections for

the formation of night reconnaissance squadrons had not

been met, the USAS was forced to rely on French night

bombardment aviation for reconnaissance assistance during

the Saint Mih~el offensive. Soon after, on 27 September 1918,

all USAS observation and two-seat pursuit planes were

authorized to be equipped for night flying. Standard provisions

for night scouting planes, as well as day observation aircraft,

included bomb carriers for eight to 10 fragmentation bombs.

Clearly these were meant for troop concentrations, convoys, and

other soft targets . Allied airpower sought to maintain the ground

initiative through round-the-clock harassment of the enemy. 32

The USAS also had contemplated the use of FE2bs for night

reconnaissance work during July 1918. The British had agreed

to deliver a total of 114 of these aircraft to the Air Service, with

roughly one-third of the number being delivered per month,

beginning in September.

Since the USAS had been unable to secure any Handley

Page aircraft, it considered the Voisin aircraft as a night

bomber. Although USAS leaders recognized that the FE2b and

Voisin aircraft were obsolete, the urgent need for night

reconnaissance and bombing planes dictated such action. 33

Night bombardment aircraft had performed satisfactorily in

a reconnaissance role for much of the First World War.

However, once the war of movement began during the spring

of 1918, the Allies found day observation planes and night

bombers could no longer supply their reconnaissance needs.

The development of specialized Allied night reconnaissance

units was essential for meeting Germany's next advance.

Germany also recognized the valuable contribution that night

observation offered when forced onto the defensive in the

latter half of 1918. Night reconnaissance had become an

integral element of air employment by war's end.

11 0
Notes

1 . Lee Kennett, The First Air War, 1914-18 (New York: Free Press, 1991),

23-25.

2. "Instructions for Balloon Observers," in Maurer Maurer, The U.S . Air

Service in World War I, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C . : Office of Air Force History,

1978), 257; "The Balloon Section," pt . 13 of "Final Report of Chief of Air

Service," in ibid ., vol. 1, 137-38; `"Tactical History of American Observation

Balloons," in ibid ., 379.

3 . Robin Higham, The British Rigid Airship, 1908-1931 : A Study in

Weapons Policy (1961 ; reprint, Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press, 1975),

63, 123.

4. Douglas Ha Robinson, The Zeppelin in Combat: A History of the

German Nauai Airship Division, 1912-1918, 3d ed. (Seattle : University of

Washington Press, 1980), 19, 315-16.

5. Ibid ., 350-51 .

6. Capitaine Faure, "Instruction Relative aux Bombardements Par

Avions," 10 July 1915, World War I Night Aviation Collection, SHAA.

7. Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarague, A History of French

Military Aviation, trans . Francis Kianka (Washington, D.C . : Smithsonian

Institution Press, 1986), 103 Walter A. Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in

the Air: Being the Story of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air

Force, vol 2 (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1928), 184; Capitaine Etournaud,

"Rapport Sur les Reconnaissances et Bombardements de Nuit, 6 March

1917, World War I Night Aviation Collection, SHAH.

8. "Artillery Control by Night," 29 January 1918, stencil #902, IS-AD

OCSO, National Air and Space Museum (NASM) Library ; "German

Aeronautics," 24 January 1918, stencil #867, IS-AD OCSO, RG 18, NA.

9. Commandant Ernest Armengaud, "Conference sur le bombardment

de nuit," 21 February 1918, World War I Night Aviation Collection, SHAA.

10. Muir S. Fairchild, "Notes on Type VIII Night Observation," 26

October 1922, Muir S. Fairchild Collection, HRC; D. H. Montgomery, Down

the Flare Path (London: John Hamilton, [1937]), 142-45; Hiram S. Bingham,

An Explorer in the Air Service (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press,

1920), 109-11 .

11 . Capt Thomas A. Box, "Night Bombardment," n.d . [post 11 November

1918?], in Edgar S. Gorrell, Gorreil's History of the American Expeditionary

Forces Air Service. 1917-1919, National Archives Microfilm Publications, no.

990. vol . J-3 (Washington, D.C . : National Archives and Records

Administration, 1974), 391 ; "Supplement to Summary of Air Information," 6

April 1918, 2dS GS, AUL: Rudolph Stark, Wings of War: An Airman's Diary

of the Last Year of the War, trans. Claude W. Sykes (London: John

Hamilton, 1933), 29.

12 . "Notes on Night Reconnaissance and Bombing (July 1918)," Bulletin

of the Information Section, AS, AEF, 6, no. 251, 21 August 1918, in Gorrell,

vol. L-10, 7-8.

11 1
13 . Gen Andre Voisin, La Doctrine de L'Auiation Fran~aise de Combat

Au Cours de la Guerre (1915-1918) (Paris : Ed. Berger-Leurault, 1932),

67-68 .

14 . "Summary of Air Transportation," no. 31, 2dS GS, 29 June 1918,

trans . of document signed by Brig Gen von Sauberzweig, AUL.

15 . Maj H. H. C. Richards, `"The Use of Observation at Night," 15 May

1928, World War I Night Aviation Collection, HRC; "Constitution de

Detachments d'Avions de Reconnaisance de nuit dans les Armees," 3 July

1918, Ordre No. 2 .011, GQG, SHAA; Ordre No. 2.011, World War I Night

Aviation Collection, SHAH; Commandant Henri Langevin, "Action de masse

aerienne dans une bataille defensive," Revue des Forces Aeriennes, January

1930, 24-28.

16 . Richards, 8; Commandement de 1'Aeronautique, VIII Armee, Ordre

d'Operations pour la journee du 10juillet [ 1918], RG 120, NA; "The Changing

Methods of Aerial Warfare," in the "Final Report of Chief of Air Service," in

Maurer, vol. 1, 81 .

17 . Ordre 27.717, translation titled, "Practical Instruction upon the

Execution of Aerial Reconnaissance," 22 July 1918, quoted in Richards, HRC.

18. Charles Woolley, "History of the Ninth Aero Squadron," Cross and

Cockade Journal (US) 12, no. 2 (Summer 1971): 146; "Minutes of the

Second Meeting of the Strategic Section, Air Service," 23 July 1916, 6, RG

120, NA; Peter Kilduff, ed., "Observations: The War Diary of Lt Gustaf L.

Lindstrom," Cross and Cockade Journal (US) 13, no. 2 (Summer 1972) : 107.

19. The organization of night reconnaissance units can be found in

"Routine Procedure of Air Units," Air Service Bulletin 7, no. 305 (24

December 1918): 15, HRC; Wooley, 147-48; "History of the 9th Aero

Squadron," in Gorrell, vol . E-2, 3-4 .

20 . Brig Gen William "Billy" Mitchell, "Provisional Manual of Operations,

23 December 1918," in Maurer, vol. 2, 280; Chef d'Escadrons Carl Marie

Francois de Vergnette de Lamotte, "Projet de constitution du Detachment

d'Avions de Reconnaissances de Nuit de la II° Armee, G.Q.A., 6 August

1918, World War I Night Aviation Collection, SHAH; Capt W. W. Thomas,

"Night Reconnaissance and Observation: First Lecture," Air Service Bulletin

7, no. 314 (21 December 1918): 4; "Night Bombardment and Provisional

Regulations," trans. Col Hunter, 4, [n.d ., late 19187] World War I Night

Aviation Collection, HRC

21 . "Summary of Air Information" No. 77, 2dS GS, subsection titled, "Night

Reconaissance," 17 October 1918. 2, AUL; Thomas, 3; "Notes on Night

Reconnaissance and Bombing," Bulletin no. 251, Gorrell, vol. Ir10, 1-2.

22 . Thomas, 3-4 ; "Notes on Night Reconnaissance and Bombing."

Bulletin no. 251, Gorrell, vol. L-10, 1-2 ; Mitchell, vol . 2, 283.

23. "Notes on Night Reconnaissance and Bombing," Bulletin no. 251,

Gorrell, vol. Ir10, 2.

24. Ibid ., 3-4.

25. Ibid ., 4-5; "Night Observation," 1-2.

112
26. 'Thomas, 3; 2d Lt W. H. Leininger to commanding officer, 9th Aero

Sq., AEF, letter 20 November 1918, Gorrell, vol. E-2, 143-144.

27. Summary of Air Information no. 77, 17 October 1918, 2, AUL.

28 . Ibid ., 2; Hanns-Gerd Rabe, "Night Reconnaissance: A Personal

Memoir of Hanns-Gerd Rabe, Flieger-Abtetlung (A) 253," Cross and Cockade

Journal (US) 14, no. l (Spring 1973) : 65-71 .

29 . Chef d'Escadrons de Vergnette to chef du service aeronautique,

GGA, letter 4 August 1918, World War I Night Aviation Collection, SI--IAA;

"Constitution de Detachment d'Abions de Nuit de la 2e Armee, GQG," 21

August 1918, World War I Night Aviation Collection, SHAA; Le general

commandant en chef a le general commandant le GAC [GQG?], letter,

September 1918, SHAA.

30 "Fixant le But, I'Organization et le Fonctionnement de Centre

d'Instruction pour ies Reconnaissance de Nuit a Longue Portee, GQG," note

no. 6796, 5 September 1918 ; "Constitution de Centre d'Instruction pur les

reconnaissance de Nuit a Longue Portee, GQG," ordre no. 6425, 5

September 1918 ; "Dissolution du Centre d'Instruction d'Aviation pour les

Reconnaissance de Nuit a Longue Portee et de 1'Escadrille 200, GQG," ordre

no . 26549, 17 November 1918, all entries in this note are in the World War I

Night Aviation Collection, SHAA.

31 . "Constitution de 1'Escadrille 293, GQG," ordre no. 13.003, 10

October 1918; "Note Sur 1'emploi des Escadrilles de nuit d'Ar -mee, GQG,"

order no. 24.581, 17 October 1918, both in the World War I Night Aviation

Collection, SHAA.

32. The USAS planned to have nine night reconnaissance squadrons on

active service by the end of December 1918. "History of the Aircraft Armament

Section Including Description of its Organization and Functions," Gorrell, vol.

I-2, 29-33 ; "Plan for the Employment of the Observation Aviation of the First

U.S . Army," appendix no. 4, to "Plan of Employment of Air Service Units, 1st

American Army, Annex No. 3," Field Order No 9, 7 September 1918, World

War I Night Aviation Collection, HRC.

33. Thirty-one FE2bs were delivered to the USAS by 17 November 1918.

"Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Strategic Section, Air Service," 23

July 1918, 6, RG 120, NA; "History of the Aircraft Armament Section," in

Gorrell, vol. I-2, 55-56; Fairchild, "Notes on Type VIII Night Observation,"

26 October 1922, 2, Muir S. Fairchild Collection, HRC; Memorandum, Capt

Aver-ill Tilden to assistant chief, Supply Section, 19 November 1918, Henry

H. Arnold Collection, LC .

113
Chapter 7

Men And Materiel for Night Flying

Night flying placed special demands upon both the airmen

and the machines they flew. Takeoffs, landings, cross-country

navigation, indeed the basics of flight could no longer be taken

for granted . During the First World War, belligerents had to

overcome immense challenges for successful military night

aviation. Flying over the Western Front was difficult enough

without the compounding factor of darkness . Yet by November

1918, sophisticated night navigation systems were developed

and in place; an increasing variety of aircraft were being fitted

and employed in night flying ; and aviators were graduating

from comprehensive training programs as night aviators. In

the space of four years, night flying had gone from being a

stunt of foolhardy exhibition pilots to an indispensable

component of military plans for bombardment, pursuit, and

reconnaissance aviation.

The evolution in night flying training may be understood by

reviewing the developments in bombardment instruction since

bombardment was the first and most widespread form of night

aviation employed during the First World War. When war

erupted in August 1914, France had two military aviation

schools, Pau and Avord. Expansion quickly followed, with the

aviation training centers becoming collectively known as the

"Schools of the Interior." During 1915 the schools conceived

the idea of graduating mission-ready pilots capable of day or

night flying for pursuit, bombardment, and observation . Yet

Avord did not have advanced bombardment and night flying

training until April 1916 . By this time, GB 3 was already

recognized as a night unit. The group either developed its own

unique training or had night instruction at the Groupe de

Division d'Entrainement (GDE), the center for assigning

aviators to escadrilles .'

11 5
French Bombardment Training

French bombardment training, like that of all the

belligerents, was in a state of continuous evolution as the

demands of combat and increasing technological capabilities

required better trained, more specialized aviators . In 1917 the

school at Avord offered advanced night bombardment training

for Voisin and Caproni aircrews. Instruction included ground

work on bombardment theory, navigation, and the rolling

carpet. The rolling carpet was a treadmill painted to look like

the ground ~yhen seen through a bombsight from a height of

several thousand feet. Bombardiers sat on a wooden platform

overlooking the carpet and released small darts (simulated

bombs) to gain experience in bomb-sighting. Aerial instruction

included bombing practice with live and dummy projectiles.

Additional French bombardment schools were located at

Cernon, Clermont-Ferrand, he Crotoy, and Villeneuve. 2

Due no doubt to the growing dependence on night

bombardment, the French conducted night tests of Michelin

and Gros bombs at Clermont-Ferrand during July 1916 . The

Michelin illuminating bombs proved satisfactory for lighting

the target area . A longer lead time, to allow at least 200 to 300

meters vertical descent was recommended before flare

ignition. This lead would ensure that the airplane was well

away from the illuminated sky and remain undetected . 3

The Gros Andreau 115 mm short-bomb testing was

conducted from a height of 2,000 meters against illuminated

targets one hundred meters in diameter. No bombs hit the

target areas. The nearest strike was 90 meters distant. In the

end, the trial "proved nothing conclusively, as to the accuracy

of night bombing." The difficulties of precision night bombing

were known from an early date . Undeterred by results,

Ferdinand Gros, the bomb builder, attempted to justify the

inaccuracy of night bombing. He asserted that targets of

500-square-meters size could be successfully bombed. Such

objectives included cities, railway marshaling yards, camps,

aviation grounds, and other open targets . 4

Clermont-Ferrand offered training on the BM IV aircraft. By

late 1917, the plane had become obsolete and was removed

from French GBs. After basic . and advanced flying instruction,

116
the bomber pilot entered the bombardment training division

and was paired with a bomb thrower (bombardier) recruited

from the School of Aerial Gunnery at Cazaux. Notably only the

bombardiers with the "most serious general education" were

selected due to the "delicate nature" of bombardment, especially

night bombardment . The crew made three 150-kilometer

cross-country flights navigating by map and compass . Quite

likely these trips were made at night since the BM N flew

operationally only under cover of darkness. 5

The concern with high-quality observers is a recurring

theme in French night bombardment development during the

war. Few pilots'sought assignment to night bombing units. In

fact many pilots considered it a disgrace. Most pilots wanted

the glory associated with pursuit aviation; few looked forward

to flying obsolete aircraft through the darkness . Because there

were never enough volunteers to fill the requirements of night

bombardment escadrilles, many pilot trainees of marginal

capability were retained in flight instruction. With many pilots

having a sour attitude toward night bombardment, authorities

selected only the best observer-bombardiers. s

In addition to an "unshakable calmness and coolness"

observers needed "a firm determination to reach the target,

and a scrupulous conscience ." Night missions were individual

affairs whose results could not easily be verified . Authorities

were forced to rely on the crews sense of duty to see that

missions were accomplished . Since "the value of a night unit

[was] never any more than the sum of the values of the

individuals of the crew that compose it," high-caliber

observer-bombardiers were a necessity .'

British Training

Apparently the situation was not much different in other

countries. Upon being informed of selection for Handley Page

training, an RFC pilot trainee could only ask, "Why me?" The

reason was simple enough ; he had an excellent record of

takeoffs and landings. Certainly not all night bombardment

pilots were frustrated fighter pilots-it only seemed that way.

By the spring of 1916, General Trenchard decided his RFC

aviators might benefit from night flying. The official British

117
historian notes that Trenchard was afraid that the Germans

were getting too far ahead of the RFC in gaining such

experience. Indeed both the Germans and the RNAS had been

carrying out night bombing operations, albeit sporadic, for 12

months, and the French for better than sixl Even the tiny

Belgian L'Aviation Militaire carried out a night bombing

mission against German bivouacs in the Houthoulst Forest

during the previous summer. At the time, Trenchard was more

concerned about the possibilities of aerial reconnaissance

under the cover of darkness than with developing a night

bombardment capability. 9

The RNAS~ led the way in British night bombardment instruction. By October 1917 at least three RNAS schools, Cranwell,

Frieston, and Manston, offered such training. One trainee

recalled his first night flight in a Handley Page (at Manston)

with nonchalance; it was of "thirty-three minutes duration

and at an altitude of 2,000 feet." The RFC performed experimental night bombing work at Oxford, yet as late as October

1917 did not have an active bombardment training school.'°

RFC pilot trainees saw little night flying in basic flight

schools. Apparently, in early 1917, only BE2 and FE projected

pilots were required to make two landings in the dark to

graduate as flying officers. One such trainee, A. R. Kingsford,

had 10 solo hours in FEs when "requested" to make the night

landings. He was not pleased with the idea of "groping around

in the dark trying to find the ground at its right level ." Even

less gratifying was his posting to No. 33 Home Defence

Squadron. On arriving at the squadron, Kingsford was

informed that the adjutant was away at a funeral-the result

of night flying!"

RFC night bomber crews were usually drawn from home

defence squadrons in 1917. The crews went to France with an

abundance of night flying but little formal bombardment

instruction . Such was the case for Kingsford, who was

transferred to No. 100 Squadron. He flew the same airplane,

the FE2b, in both units.' 2

The RNAS often selected bombing teams from its aviators at

Dunkirk. Once back in England, the teams progressed

through several separate schools . The course contained the

following stages:

118
1 . ground work on bombs, carriers, and gears;

2. rolling carpet;

3. flights over bachelor mirror or camera obscura (for

bombing practice without bomb-dropping) ;

4. cross-country flying by day and night;

5. bomb dropping; and

6. formation flying for day bombers.

In 1918, the RNAS bombardment course was consolidated in what

became (on 1 April) Royal Air Force No. 1 School of Navigation and

Bombing, located near the ancient monoliths of Stonehenge.' 3

German Training

Similarly, the German air service developed a specialized

Nacht-Bombenflieger-Schule at Paderborn, Prussia, for

G-plane instruction . Training was given on the Gotha,

Friedrichshafen, and Allgemeine Elektrizitats Gesellschaft

(AEG) versions of the bomber. Such training enabled crew

members to quickly adapt to aircraft at the front. Aviators

entering the school had already completed basic flight training

at one of the numerous Flieger Ersatz Abteilungen or Militar

Fliegerschulen.' 4

Students first took the G-planes into the air during daylight

to gain experience in handling the large aircraft. Then came

twilight flights in smaller dual-controlled C-planes ; eventually

the trainee made takeoffs and landings during total darkness.

With this experience, the bomber students began G-plane

night flights accompanied by an instructor. Finally solo flights

commenced, sometimes with fatal results .'S

Apparently the citizens of Paderborn appreciated night

flying as much as many of the trainees-it disturbed their

sleepl Responding with typical Prussian candor, the deputy

general commanding the Seventh Army Corps suggested that

the townspeople compare their lack of sleep due to aviation

training to that experienced by the citizens of Metz, where "not

only is the night's rest disturbed by their own aerial activity,

but also by bomb raids by enemy airmen." In other words, get

used to the noise.' 6

119
R-plane training was totally separate from the instruction at

Paderborn. The Riesenflugzeug Schulabteilung was formed at

Vilna during the summer of 1917 after Rfa 501 had transferred

from the base to the outskirts of Berlin. Rfa 501 personnel

learned how to operate the new Staaken R.VI aircraft. The

training section at Vilna used older SSW R-planes for

instruction . Additionally a Riesenflugzeug-ersatzabteilung

(Rea) was established at Doberitz with three SSW R-plane

training ships . The R-Schulabteilung at Vilna closed around

January 1918, being replaced by a new Rea at Cologne."

The Americans

In June 1916 the United States Army began night flying in

earnest, and included it for the first time in the training

cumculum at the Signal Corps Aviation School, North Island,

San Diego . Such instruction was initially limited to moonlit

nights . Later, training was carried out on dark nights with

only the lights of San Diego harbor for landing assistance . The

Signal Corps aviation school at Mineola, New York, conducted

120
bombing experiments and had planned extensive research

into night flight at the time of America's entry into the war.

Day and night bombardment training was eventually limited

to Ellington Field, Texas.'e

Several American air officers went to Paris in April 1917 to

coordinate the US entry into the air war. Since US facilities

were incapable of meeting the rapid influx of trainees, Capt

Joseph Carberry recommended the establishment of American

flying training in France . Four specialized schools were

envisioned, with one for day and night bombardment

instruction. Until the schools could be established, the United

States made an agreement for training of night bombardment

units at the French school at Cernon . After completing

instruction, the USAS night bombers were to be sent to the

front for battle training with GB 1 commanded at that time by

Commandant Victor Jean-Marie Chabert.' 9

Ostensibly, the transfer of the French bombardment school at

Clermont-Ferrand to the USAS in November 1917 made such a

scheme unnecessary. Clermont-Ferrand became known as the

Seventh Air Instruction Center (AIC), with the first night flying

attempted during February 1918 . Unfortunately the

mountainous terrain surrounding the field made forced landings

too risky, and night instruction was soon discontinued . Night

training at the Eighth AIC, Foggia, Italy, proved even less

satisfactory. 2°

On 26 January 1918 General Foulois entered into an

agreement with the British air minister for the training of

American night bombardment personnel. Additionally facilities

were to be supplied for the assembly of US-manufactured

Handley Page component parts. The original accord called for

30 long-distance night bombardment squadrons to be

organized in Great Britain. However progress was slow; the

prototype American-built Handley Page bomber, the Langley,

was not completed until July 1918 . 2'

The British allowed the USAS to open an American-operated

Handley Page training school in England . Four aerodromes in

varying stages of completion (Emeworth, Ford Junction,

Rustington, and Tangemere, collectively known as the

Chichester Area) were turned over to the USAS until Handley

Page night bombardment training schools were fully

121
operational in the United States . The objective of the Chicester

Area was to furnish completely trained night bombardment

squadrons for the front. 22

The school at No . 1 Field (Ford Junction) was opened on 15

August 1918 although instruction was delayed until at least 20

September due to lack of aircraft . Of 20 to 30 airplanes

received at Ford Junction, only one was a Handley Page and it

arrived just before the armistice. Activities at Ellington Field

were realigned to provide Ford Junction with trainees well

versed in night flying . The final three weeks of the Texas-based

program included advanced night flying, night bomb-dropping,

and practice night bombing raids . Nevertheless the United

States failed to attain its goal of operational night

bombardment squadrons before the armistice . 23

Aircraft Instrumentation

Just as the training of airmen for night flying advanced

throughout the war, so to did the capabilities of night-flying

aircraft. The most basic necessity for night-flying aircraft was a

simple means of instrument illumination. The use of

hand-held flashlights proved cumbersome and inconvenient for

aircrews, yet the pilot needed to know what his instruments

were reading . Much experimentation was required since

individual aviators complained that the illumination was either

too strong or too weak .

One of the earliest methods involved placing small electric

light bulbs behind translucent instrument dials . During the

war, the most extensive research involved the use of selfluminous materials, namely a combination of zinc sulphide

and radium. These were applied to instrument dials as paint,

and the instruments could then be read solely by their

phosphorescent glow. 24

Luminous materials were well-known before the First World

War. Adding a small amount of radium caused a responsive

base to remain in a state of continuous stimulation due to

alpha particle bombardment, hence the term self-luminous .

Controlling the brightness of self-luminous material proved

quite difficult. A host of other limiting factors, including the

resolving power and sensitivity of aviators' eyes, confounded

122
the scientists. Nevertheless self-luminous paints were used

widely for night instrument illumination during the First

World War (fig . 5) . zs

The final scheme for night illumination of aircraft instruments

was the use of small, shielded incandescent lamps placed next

to the dials. Importantly, these lamps could be turned on and off

as needed. However engine vibrations often caused light bulbs

or electrical connections to fail . Even the small amount of light

emitted by such lamps could cause great difficulty for novice

night aviators since it could be too dazzling. 26

Willis Fitch recalled that on his first Caproni night solo, the

plane kept rolling into steep dives for no apparent reason.

Frantically trying to figure out what was wrong, Fitch caught a

glimpse of light above his head as he was trying to pull the

aircraft out of yet another dive . Glancing up at what he

presumed to be the moon, Fitch was shocked to discover the

light was being emitted from an aircraft hanger . He was flying

upside downl Turning the wheel for all he was worth, the pilot

found great relief after the hanger lights once again "rested on

the ground where they belonged." Fitch's control problems

resulted from inadvertently having left the instrument board

illuminated during flight, and the glare hampered his night
vision. One can only wonder how many crashes resulted from

similar circumstances . 2'

Special aircraft instruments were developed specifically for

night flying. One example is the Jenkins Night Altitude

Indicator. The indicator, developed in Great Britain, determined height above ground level (to 500 feet) through the use

of three optical projectors, two of which were fixed in positions

parallel to each other. The third projector was rotatable ; its

light shaft moved between the two fixed projectors as the

plane decreased in altitude. Plans called for incorporation of

the Jenkins indicator as standard equipment on Handley Page

night bombers . Nearly five years after the war, experiments

were still being conducted to determine its value to civil

aviation. 28

Signaling devices were necessary for communications with

the ground. The flare gun provided the most basic means of

signaling. The Allies used the Chobert, more commonly known

as the Very pistol . British and American night squadrons used

three different colored Very cartridges, red, white, and green .

Each cartridge had a different milling along its metal base

flange so that aviators could quickly feel for the correct shell

in the dark. 29

To determine friend or foe, Allied AAA batteries challenged

planes by using a searchlight to signal the Morse code letter of

the day. The aircrew responded by firing a Very pistol loaded

with the color of the day, which was changed at least daily. If

the wrong color was fired or the plane failed to respond, the

AAA was authorized to fire on the aircraft. The signal pistol

was also a key element for communication between ground

personnel and aircrews during the takeoff and landing phases

of night operations. 3o

During the war, aircraft-mounted searchlight experimentation

and application were extensive. The lights, powered by

dynamo or battery, offered adequate means for night landing,

communication between aircraft, and signaling from air to

ground . However their use by night pursuit planes for

sweeping the sky to locate enemy aircraft proved quite

unsatisfactory . 31

More often than not all that was accomplished was showing

oneself to the enemy. One author noted that in the Paris

124
nighttime sky, it was a common sight to see aircraft flying with

their projectors (searchlights) illuminated. He contended that the

hunter had now become the hunted, sarcastically noting that

with "all these luminous targets, it would be possible to become

a Guynemer in a single night." Nevertheless, airplane-mounted

projectors became standard equipment for many aircraft during

the war. 32

Targeting and Landing IIlumination

Illuminating flares were developed for target acquisition and

landing assistance. One of the most important was the Holt

wingtip landing flare. Useful in an emergency or under

inadequate field lighting conditions, the Holt flare was ignited

electrically (by dry cell battery) from a push button in the

cockpit. Typically the flare would burn for a maximum of two

minutes at up to 20,000 candlepower. However, the flares

were used cautiously, as a crash or hard landing could bend

the bracket and cause burning magnesium to ignite the wing.

To reduce this hazard, brackets were later devised with a

hinged base and elastic cord. The flare could move backward

if the plane rocked on landing and the wingtip touched the

ground, and the elastic cord would spring the bracket back

into its original position. 33

Obviously once the flare ignited, it continued to burn until its

fuel was exhausted. Such lack of operational flexibility ensured

that its improper use could have serious consequences . At least

one instance was noted of a Holt flare being inadvertently lit over

enemy territory. Pilots flying tractor aircraft found themselves

blinded by the glare reflected off the propeller . Henceforth

propellers were painted a dark, flat brown or black. Additionally,

pilots found that one burning flare worked best since they could

look over the opposite wing during approach without being

blinded . Due to the ever present danger that a flare might burn

out before the plane landed, Holts were ordinarily used in

conjunction with larger parachute flares, sometimes referred to

as illuminating bombs (fig . 6) . 34

The Michelin parachute flare was the most widely used Allied

flare of its type. Because the flare burned for seven to 11

minutes when deployed at altitude, it was very useful during

125
forced landings; however, the flare was primarily intended for

target illumination. Another French-designed illuminating bomb,

the Bourges lighting grenade, was favored by night

reconnaissance aircrews because of its smaller size. The British

and Americans experimented with illuminating-type bombs but

relied upon the Michelin for wartime night operatfons. 35

Germany developed similar flares for night operations. Their

Leuchtbombe mit Fallschirm was produced in 60 cm and 90 cm

varieties and burned for about two minutes when deployed from

a height of 300 to 400 meters. Another flare was much used by

naval airships over the North Sea; the flare illuminated only

upon contact with water. The use of parachute flares was crucial

for exploiting night operations to their fullest. 3 s

Ground-based systems provided necessary assistance for

night navigation and landing. One of the most interesting

developments was the system of aerial lighthouses on both

sides of the Western Front. Germany built the first such

lighthouse at Johannistal, in October 1913 and later improved

on the idea with the creation of intermittent beacons.

Individual lighthouses could emit a unique light sequence

which made identification simple . The sequence could be

changed as the situation warranted . Lighthouses flashed

either Morse code letters or numbers during the war (fig . 7) .

Even though electrical power was the preferred power source

for lighthouse operation, many lights were powered by

acetylene or other gases. 3'

The French established a string of high-powered light

stations located between 15 and 25 kilometers behind the

front and 30 kilometers apart. The radiance from these sites

was visible for up to 100 kilometers under optimum

atmospheric conditions. Less intense lights (visible for 40

kilometers) were located at emergency airfields further behind
the lines. These lights acted as intermediate guides for night

fliers, directing them toward the front. Although mobile, the

lights were nevertheless cumbersome to move, difficult to install,

and fragile . Under poor climatic conditions, the ground lights

were often "barely visible from ten miles." Yet they were a

welcome sight for the aircrews returning from missions. One

aviator recalled that "France, from the air at night, was . . . a sea

of blackness, except for the `dummies' and the `lighthouses"' (see

table 16) .38

The German system of navigational aids was much more

elaborate . In addition to a series of lighthouses, lights in the

shape of star, crosses, triangles, or the letter "T"

were used to

steer night bombers toward their objectives. These lights were

visible from 10 to 60 kilometers depending on weather

Table 16

Location of French Lighthouses, 10 June 1918

No. Location of Lighthouse Hili No. Orientation To Front

1 . Mont des R~coltes 167 N.78 .E 20km

2. 5km S.20.W. of Houdain 191 N.85 .E 20km

3. 8km S.20.W. of Doullens 170 S.69 .E . 22km

4. 4km W. of St. Just-en-Chaussese 178 N.51 .E 18km

5. 9km N .60 .W. of Villers-Cotterets 238 N .61 .E . 16km

6 4km E. of Montmirail 235 North 24km

7 . 11km N of Chalons 152 N.18 .W. 20km

8. 1 km S of Clermont-en-Argonne 308 N.12 .W. 15km

9. 12km N of Bar-le-Duc 375 N.34 .E . 20km

10. 12km S. of Nancy 402 N.16 .E . 20km

11 . Mount d'Essey 420 N.43 .E 15km

12. 4km S.20.W. of St . Did 768 N.60 .E 20km

13. Balloon Alsace ? 1248 N.76 .E . 25km

14. 4km E. of H~rimoncourt 614 N .66 .E . 18km

Source : Adapted from "Emplacements des Phares de 100 Kilometres, a la date du 10 juin 1918 ;" and

"Balisage de Nuit du Front," 12, World War I Night Aviation Collection, SHAA.

1 `Z 8
conditions. The German system also employed aerial signals .

Luminous balls, commonly referred to by Allied aviators as

"flaming onions," fired from a 20-millimeter cannon reached an

altitude of up to 2,000 meters. The "onions," or "lovely necklaces

of flaming jade" as one RNAS aviator referred to them, could be

fired in thick chains or spaced to form Morse code letters so that

each location could Ue identified. Furthermore, luminous shells

of various colors were fired from heavy-caliber guns. The shells

deployed a parachute and were visible from 50 to 100

kilometers. The Allies lacked a similar aerial scheme . 3 ~

a

Radio Direction Finding

Any discussion of aids to night aviation during the First

World War would be incomplete without commenting on the

use of radio-direction finding (RDF) for long-distance flying .

German prewar radio experimentation with zeppelins paid off

on the night of 15 June 1915 when airship L10 used bearings

from the RDF stations at Nordholz and Borkum to triangulate

its position over England . Curiously, the airship called the

stations which then plotted the direction of the signals and

radioed them back to the zeppelin. Though the British were

also able to intercept the airship transmissions and determine

its position, the system remained in effect until 1918 . Then

German RDF stations began to send transmissions to the now

silent airships . The French had considered a similar system

for its bombardment aviation, with ground RDF personnel

making calculations from signals emitted by the aircraft, but

considered the mode too unreliable. Presumably the French

went along with British developments in the field . 4o

In early 1918 the British experimented with RDF systems

for night-flying airplanes at Andover Junction and Cranwell.

Guiding Allied bombardment aircraft to and from Berlin was

to be the main purpose of British RDF. The USAS ordered 550

sets of direction finding apparatus for its night bombers.

Additionally, students at the bombardment school at Ford

Junction were instructed in night navigation by means of

RDF. The armistice prevented widespread Allied use of 1ZDF .a'

An aviator could now take off at night, fly to the objective

with the assistance of ground and aerial air navigational aids,

129
illuminate the target with parachute flares, drop bombs, fly

back across the lines, answer challenges from friendly AAA

batteries, and arrive t ome . A simple landing was all that

remained for successful mission completion. Unfortunately

night landings often proved more hazardous than the enemy

searchlight and AAA barrage. Holt flares were useful but safer

airfield lighting was needed .

Airfield IIlumination

When Cast Charles DeF. Chandler flew to the US Signal

Corps airfield at College Park, Maryland, late on 1 June 1912,

the ground mechanics, not expecting the aviator to return to

the field after dark, resorted to throwing "oil and gasoline on

the field" and igniting it to aid in his landing. Such temporary

measures for lighting landing fields were as common as night

flying was rare. The lack of any systematic airfield illumination

was a limiting factor in the development of military night

aviation . However, experimentation with aerodrome lighting

soon began to pay dividends . Organized airfield illumination

rapidly matured in the decade between Wilbur Wright's first

night flight and the end of the war. 42

Remarkably, one man, Clement Ader, had foreseen the

importance of military night aviation as early as the 1890s and

set out to develop a permanent system of airfield illumination.

During night operations, Ader called for outlining an airfield's

landing zones with "beacon fires of special color, placed in

little holes and covered at ground level by grills ." Smoke from

fires near the landing zone would provide a visual indication of

wind direction. Furthermore, electric lamps could replace the

fires so the entire field could be illuminated or darkened as

"tactical considerations" warranted . 43

Supplementary beacons located at a distance from the

aerodrome and oriented due north, south, east, and west of

the field could serve as directional aids for night cross-country

flying. Unfortunately French military leaders failed to take

Ader's recommendations seriously since extensive night flying

appeared impractical . Undoubtedly to Ader's chagrin, his

ideas found expression in a similar scheme enacted by the

Germans during the First World War. 44

130
An illumination system consisting of a series of sunken

electric lamps, providing the night flier with both airfield location

and wind direction, was developed at Johannistal aerodrome. A

large square glass window, flush with the ground and thick

enough to withstand the impact of an aircraft landing, was

positioned at the center of the airfield . At night an electric lamp

located beneath the glass continuously radiated white light into

the darkened sky, acting as a beacon to guide the night flier.

Located at a distance of 250 feet from the central lamp were

eight smaller submerged red lamps (fig . 8) . Connected by

underground cable to a weathervane, these outer lamps

automatically stuitched on or off as the vane turned into the

wind, thereby offering a visual indication of the wind direction.

For instance, if the wind was from the east, in addition to the

central white lamp, only the red lamp located to the east would

be illuminated. If the wind was blowing in a direction between

cardinal points, the two outer lamps closest to the actual wind

direction would light up . The fixity of such a system

undoubtedly limited its use to permanent aerodromes in the

interior of Germany, such as Johannistal. 45

Petrol flares (cans filled with petrol and waste, later

asbestos and parrafin) were the standard fare for British
aerodrome illumination for much of the war. The flares were

routinely placed in the shape of an L, with the long side of the

letter positioned parallel to the wind . Takeoffs and landings

were then made toward the base of the letter. The scheme

provided an inexpensive and mobile system of night airfield

lighting. 46 Various airfield lighting schemes using electric

lamps were developed by the Allies . By the end of the war, the

most widely used system was the electric "TEE" (fig. 9) .

Approximately 100 meters in length by 50 meters wide, the

TEE proved quite successful. As in the L flare system, the long

side of the T was situated parallel with the wind with the top

of the letter facing into the wind. 4 '

The French regularly used the Crochat Electric Field

Illuminating Truck. The system was completely mobile. In

addition to spotlights mounted on the vehicle, six portable

33-cm Brandt projectors, placed atop adjustable tripods,

provided enough lighting for night aviation operations . The

USAS tested its own prototype of an airfield lighting truck at

Ellington Field only months before the armistice. Such mobile

lighting systems were important during the "war of movement." 4s

Aviators were now able to bring their planes home safely.

Improved training requiring hours of ni>;ht flying have airmen
the experience necessary for successful military operations

under cover of darkness. Advances in ground and airborne

aids improved the efficiency and security of such missions.

Night military aviation was clearly dependent upon the

progress in both technology and training for its mastery

during the First World War.

Notes

1 . `"IYaining (French)," 14 August 1917, stencil no . 269, IS-AD OCSO, RG

18, NA; "Object and Organization of the French GDE," in Edgar S. Gorrell,

Gorreil's Histor~ of the American Expeditionary Forces Air Service,

1917-1919, National Archives Microfilm Publications, no. 990, vol. B-9

(Washington, D.C. : National Archives and Records Administration, 1974), 45.

2 . `"Training (French), Organization of Aviation School at Avord [sic]," 27

July 1917, stencil no. 271, IS-AD OCSO, RG 18, NA.

3 . '"Pests at the Military Aviation School at Clermont-Ferrand with the

Michelin and Gros Andreau Bombs made on July 29, and 30, 1916," 5

December 1917, stencil no. 708, IS-AD OCSO, RG 18, NA.

4. Ibid . ; "Aerial Bombardment," Ferdinand Gros, trans ., stencil no. 699,

IS-AD OCSO, 4 December 1917, RG 18, NA.

5. "Training (French), Note on the General Inspection of Aviation

Schools," Stencil no. 269, 8, RG 18, NA; "Training: Purpose and

Organization of the Military Aviation School of Clermont-Ferrand," 22

August 1917, stencil no. 301, IS-AD OCSO, RG 18, NA.

6. Lieutenant Paul des Forts, "Le Bombadement de Nuit," Conference sur

le bombardement de nuit, GB 1, 27 December 1917, World War I Night

Aviation Collection, SHAA; "Night Bombardment and Provisional

Regulations," trans. Col C. R. Hunter, [n.d ., late 1918?] World War I Night

Aviation Collection, AFHRA.

7. "Night Bombardment."

8. Lt Hugh B. Monaghan, The Big Bombers of World War I, Jack R. Eder

ed . ( s.l . : JaaRE, 1985), 71 .

9. Walter A. Raleigh and H. A. Jones, 7Tie War in the Air: Being the Story of

the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, vol. 2 (Oxford :

Clarendon Press, 1928), 183; Lt Col AvI Bem M. F. Terlinden, "Mass Bombing

in 1915," Cross and Cockade Joumal (US) 14, no. 3 (Autumn 1973): 244-47.

10. F. T. Blakeman, "Report on Aerial Bombardment Instruction in

England, from Data Collected by Lts. Blakeman and Ellis Acting under

Special Order No. 45, paragraph 5, Paris, Sept. 22nd, 1917," 13 October

1917, RG 120, NA; Geoffrey Linnell, "Big Bird Jockey," Cross and Cockade

Journal (US) 4, no. 2 (Summer 1963): 180.

1 1 . Stencil # 127, AS-ID OCSO, 19 June 1917, 4, RG 18, NA ;

"Reminiscences of Lieut. G. S. B. Fuller," Cross and Cockade Journal (US)

10, no. 1 (Spring 1969): 36; A. R. Kingsford, Night Raiders of the Air, Being

133
the Experiences of a Night Flying Pilot, Who Raided Hunland on Many Dark

Nights during the War (London: John Hamilton, [ 1939]), 66. 69-70.

12. Kingsford, 79, 85, 98-99 .

13. Blakeman, 3-4; "Royal Air Forces No. 1 School of Navigation and

Bombing," Bulletin of the Information Section, AS, AEF, 4, no. 169 (4 June

1918) in Gorrell, vol. L-8, 87

14. John H. Knauer, "Flying the A. E. G. G. N," Cross and Cockade Journal

(US) 15, no. 2 (Summer 1974) : 120; '"IYaining of Bavarian Aviation Personnel,"

28 September 1918, Summary of Air Information, no. 58, 2dS GS, AUL.

15. "Vizefeldwebel Kurt Weil," Cross and Cockade Jourmai (US) 3, no. 4

(Winter 1962): 312-15.

16. "Night Flying Over the Town of Paderborn," Weekly Training Bulletin, no.

4, Oillce of the C~ief of Air Service Training Section, Gorrell, vol. J-1, 165.

17. G. W. Haddow and Peter M. Grosz, The German Giants: The Story of

the R-Planes, 1914-19 (London: Putnam, 1963), 25 .

18. Juliette A. Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm, April 1861 to

April 1917 (Washington, D. C. : GPO, 1958), 73, 158, 181 .

19. "History of the Training Section, Air Service, A.E.F .," in Gorrell, vol.

J-1, 3; "Final Report of Chief of Air Service," in Maurer Maurer, The U.S . Air

Service in World WarI, vol. 1 (Washington, D. C. : Office of Air Force History,

1978), 55-58, 93 .

20. "History of the Training Section," Gorrell, vol. J-1, 41, 56-57; "Final

Report of Chief of Air Service," Gorrell, vol. A-29, 82-83; Lt Lucien H.

Thayer, America's First Eagles: The Official History of the U.S . Air Service,

A.E.F. (1917-1918), Donald J. McGee and R. James Bender, eds. (San Jose,

Calif. : R. James Bender, 1983), 68-69.

21 . "Rothemere-Foulouis Agreement," 26 January 1918, in "Appendix to

History of the Night Bombardment Section in France," Gorrell, vol. B-6,

21-25; "1Yiumph of America's Handley Page Bomber," Air Service Journal 3,

no. 2 (11 July 1918): 41-45.

22. A fifth aerodrome, Goring, was originally included in the Chichester

Area but was subsequently dropped from the plan. Brig Gen Mason Patrick,

memorandum to chief of staff, GHQ, AEF, subject: Instruction Center for

Night Flying and Bombardment Training in England, 27 June 1918, in

Gorrell, vol. B-9, 16-17; General Order No. 60, HQ Base Section No. 5, SOS,

AEF, London, 21 August 1918, in Gorrell, vol. B-9, 17.

23. Col Ambrose Monell, memorandum to coordination staff, 3 September

1918, Gorrell, vol. B-6, 61 ; "Report of the Activities of the Mobilization and

Training Department of the Night Bombardment Section," Gorrell, vol. B-9,

22-23; "Ellington Field," Air Service Journal 3, no. 10 (5 September 1918) : 349.

24. Mayo Hersey, "General Classification of Instruments and Problems,

Including Bibliography," Technical Report No. 125 of the National Advisory

Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), included in the Seventh Annual Report

of the NACA, 1921 (Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1923), 487 ; William J.

Hammer, "Phosphorescent Aircraft and Landing Stages," Aeronautics (New

York) 14, no. 6 (31 March 1914): 94.

134
25 . A . L. Hamlin, "Efficient Instrument Illumination for Military Fliers,"

Aviation and Aeronautical Engineering 1, no. 5 (October 1916): 152; N. E.

Dorsey, "Self-luminous Materials," Report No. 33 of the NACA, in the Fourth

Annual Report of the NACA, 1918 (Washington, D.C . : Government Printing

Office, 1920), 339-43; "Luminous Metals," in Summary of Air Information

No. 20, 2dS GS, 26 May 1918, AUL; An example of luminous instrument

requirements is "Treatment of Aeroplane Instruments with Luminous

Paint," Royal Aircraft Factory Specification No. 157, 14 February 1917, File

M3006800, National Air and Space Museum Library (NASM) .

26. Hersey, Report No. 125, 487; "Instruments Used on Aeroplanes :

Comments on Their Functions and Defects," Scientific American, supplement no. 2062, vol. 80 (10 July 1915): 23; Kingsford, 162.

27. Willis S. Fit~h, Wings in the Night (Boston: Marshall Jones, Co.,

1938), 104-10.

28. "Instructions for the Use of the Jenkins Night Altitude Indicator,"

Bulletin of the Intelligence Section, Training Department, AS, AEF, vol. 1,

no. 39 (9 February 1918), in Gorrell, vol . L-5, 300; "Schedule of I:

Equipment for Handley Page Bombing Machines; Schedule B," Gorrell, vol.

B-6, 248; John A. C. Warner, "An Optical Altitude Indicator for Night

Landing," Aerial Age 16, no. 6 (June 1923) : 274-75.

29. "Pyrotechnica," Gorrell, vol . I-2, 72; Lecture IV (Bombardment

Aviation), 7th AIC, n.d . [late 1917-early 1918], 4, RG 120, NA.

30. Paul Bewsher, "Green Balls" The Adventures ofaNight Bomber (London:

William Blackwood, 1919), 140; Col Thomas Milling, First Army Air Service,

memorandum to group commanders, subject: Letter from Headquarters

Anti-Aircraft Defense, APO 731-A, 27 October 1918, RG 120, NA.

31 . "A Sperry Night Flying Equipment," Aviation and Aeronautical

Engineering 1, no. 5 (1 October 1916) : 164; "Searchlights on Airplanes," 14

June 1917, stencll no. 104, IS-AD OCSO, RG 18, NA; "Airplane Searchlights,"

14 July 1917, stencil no . 228, RG 18, NA; Capitaine Gilbert Louis Petitalot,

"Utilisation de 1'Electricite a bord des Avions," in L'Aeronautique Pendant la

Gwerre Mondiale, M. Brunotf ed. (Paris : n.p ., 1919), 240-53; "Catalogue ofRadio

and Electrical Equipment on Order June, (1918)," Gorrell, vol. U3, 13-15.

32. Commandant Bernard Joseph Jean Orthlieb, Laeronautique HierDemain (Paris : n.p ., 1920), 157; Bewsher, 121-22. A photograph in Flying 5,

no. 9 (October 1916): 375, shows the vulnerability of using projectors .

33. "Making a Safe Landing at Night From an Airplane," Popular Science

Monthly 91, no . 5 (November 1917) : 752; Benedict Crowell, America's

Munitions, 1917-1918 (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office,

1919), 316; "Catalogue of Radio and Electrical Equipment on Order June

[1918]," Gorrell, vol. L-3, 13-15 .

34. 1st Lt Muir S. Fairchild, memorandum to chief engineer, subject:

"Observations on Night Flying Tests Conducted at Wilbur Wright Field, Nights

of Feb. 24th, and 25th, 1921," 7 March 1921, 1-2, Fairchild Collection, AFHRA;

Doyen P. Warden, "Night Pursuit Flying," Air Power Journal 5, no. 2 (June

1919): 56; Capitaine H. Langevin, "Rapport sur la Chasse la Nuit," 29 July

135
1917, SHAH; Capitaine de Lesseps a chef du Service Aeronautique, letter,

17 October 1918, World War I Night Aviation Collection, SHAA.

35. Lt Frederick T. Blakeman to chief, Instruction Bureau, letter, 21

September 1917, RG 120, NA; "'B' Course in Bombs for Instrument

Repairmen, Riggers, Fitters, and Carpenters," Gorrell, vol. B-5, 384;

"Illuminating Bombs," stencil #567, IS-AD OCSO, 6 November 1917, RG 18,

NA; "Bourges's Lighting Grenade for Dirigibles," stencil #603, IS-AD OCSO,

26 November 1917, RG 18, NA; "Pyrotechnica," Gorrell, vol. I-2, 71-76;

Hennessy, 134-35; "Experiments in Signalling," Aviation and Aeronautical

Engineering 1, no. 7 (1 November 1916): 233.

36. "Ordnance," stencil no . 416, IS-AD OCSO, 18 September 1917, RG

18, NA; Summary of Air Information No. 22, 2dS GS, 31 May 1918, AUL.

37. "Lighthouse for Airships," New York rimes, 12 October 1913 ; Alfred

Gradenwitz, "Lighthouses for the Aerial Navigator: Guiding the Airman at

Night," Scient~ American 110, no. 20 (16 May 1914): 411-12 ; "German

Searchlights for Aeronauts," Flight (London) 6, no. 41 (9 October 1914) :

1030; "La signalisation nocture des aerodromes," La Revue Aerienne 7, no.

134 (10 May 1914) : 263-64.

38. "Organisation Lumineuse des Routes Aeriennes de Nuit sur le Front,"

n.d . [1918?], World War I Night Aviation Collection, SHAA; "Signalisation de

Nuit," Escadre 14, 5 October 1918, World War I Night Aviation Collection,

SHAA; D. H. Montgomery, Down the Flare Path (London: John Hamilton,

[1937]), 21-22; Monaghan, 93.

39. "Signalisation de Nuit," 5 October 1918, World War I Night Aviation

Collection, SHAH; Bewsher, 127.

40. Robinson, 72; Petitalot, 241 .

41 . "Final Report of Chief of Air Service, AEF," Gorrell, vol . A-29, 128; 1 st

Lt Henry N. Wolff memorandum to 1st Lt J. Parker Van Zandt, 3 September

1918, Gorrell, vol. B-6, 258-59; "Navigation to be used in connection with

radio direction finding for aircraft," lecture, Gorrell, vol. J-5; "Direction

Finding by Radio: Maximum Method Using Two Coils Especially Adapted to

Use on Airplanes," Air Service Bulletin 4, no. 175, Gorrell, vol. J-5 .

42 . Hennessy, 61 .

43. Ader, 36-37.

44. Ibid .

45. "Signals For Night Landings," Aeronautics (London) 9, no . 91 (14 July

1915) : 19.

46. Raleigh, vol. 3, 170-71 ; Montgomery, 10, 20; W. G. McMinnies,

Practical Flying : Complete Course of Flying Instruction (London: Temple

Press, 1918), 203-4; Mahgni-Eltten, "Night Flying-Ancient and Modern,"

Aeronautics (London) 10, no. 138 (7 June 1916) : 367.

47 . "Catalogue of Radio and Electrical Equipment on Order June,

(1918)," Gorrell, vol . L-3, 34-37; "Aviation Field Illuminating Outfit," Air

Service Bulletin 7, no. 316 (16 December 1918); Gorrell, vol. L-10.

136
Chapter 8

Conclusion

Bold individuals first tackled the darkened skies in balloons

and dirigibles . Airplane pilots later thrilled crowds with

intrepid nighttime exhibitions. Although such demonstrations

were considered foolhardy and even eccentric by many

segments of society, they nevertheless provided the impetus

for military experimentation in night flying. The fragile nature

of prewar aircraft and the unsophisticated state of support

equipment limited night capabilities . Hence, military

authorities remained unconvinced of the usefulness of flying

airplanes under cover of darkness . Only the rigid airship

appeared to be a practical nocturnal voyager.

The First World War quickly exposed the vulnerability of

airships both day and night. Even small arms fire proved

hazardous to the early low-ceiling dirigibles . Bright moonlit

nights offered little refuge to these lumbering giants. While

improvements allowed the airships to climb higher into the

nighttime skies, bombing accuracy decreased. The airship,

although remaining a terror weapon for much of the war,

ultimately proved inferior to the airplane for military use.

Night airplane activity in the early days of the First World

War was limited to sporadic bombing raids that were mainly

individual actions with the sole purpose of harassing the

enemy. As improving technology caused rapid obsolescence of

aircraft, the nighttime skies began to become a safer haven for

such airplanes . The synchronized forward-firing machine gun,

perhaps the most significant development in aerial armament

during the war, banished an entire class of aircraft, the

pushers, into the night . For the balance of the war, aerial

bombardment remained heavily nocturnal .

Still night military aviation was a "poor relation" to its

daytime counterpart. Air service leadership failed to press for

development of strictly night-capable aircraft since obsolete

airplanes performed adequately in such a role . Unfortunately,

the outdated aircraft often possessed unreliable motors which

made forced landings a perennial concern of aviators . Night

137
flying was further hampered by a lack of such complementary

equipment, as illuminated cockpit instruments (see table 17) .

Finally night bombardment, which was the essential element

of night military aviation along the Western Front until 1918,

was commonly considered by military authorities as a

"dumping ground" for mediocre pilots . Could there be much

surprise that morale was often poor in night bomber units?
Germany suffered from a deficiency of bomber aircraft due

to a preference in military circles for airship development. The

Zeppelin was an extremely visible symbol of German

ascendancy in the heavens. Yet 17 airships were lost over

Great Britain and more than 60 others were destroyed

through hostile and nonhostile action during the course of the

war. In the end, the night offered the dirigible little protection.

Had much of the massive monetary investment drained by

airship construction been used for increased research,

development, and deployment of heavy bomber aircraft,

German night bombardment aviation might well have played a

more decisive role in the events of 1914-1918.'

France was constrained by geography and aircraft limitations to the strategic bombardment of the Briey Basin . The

basic problem was that numerous French cities were vulnerable to German reprisals . Hence the railways and industry of

the basin were the only strategic options for the night

bombers of the French air service . Tactically German airfields

were important targets for French bombers .

Slow to switch to night operations, the RFC was forced to

adopt a strategic role for its bombardment aviation due to

RNAS successes and the British desire for reprisals against

German cities. Only grudgingly did the RFC incorporate the

Handley Page heavy bomber. As late as August 1917, General

Trenchard opposed the use of the twin-engine bombers. Fully

40 percent of Independent Forces RAF bombs (220 of 543

tons) were directed at German airfields . Railway targets

constituted a primary objective for the short-range FE2b

aircraft. Bombing of industrial targets in German cities was

simply not a major activity. Therefore on closer examination,

the French and British bombing campaigns were not as

disparate as would first appear. 2

The German bombing campaign against Great Britain failed

to reduce British war resolve. Sporadic night attacks, which

were thought to be especially demoralizing, could not break

the will of the people. The German strategic campaign was

continually hampered by the need for tactical bombing on the

continent. The number of aircraft flying against the British

Isles was always a minority of the German bomber force. In

139
fact the bombers of Bogohl 3 were often used for tactical

missions, especially during the spring 1918 offensives .

Since the British were compelled to invest heavily in home

defense, they had an early background in night interception .

One author contends that the equivalent of 10 full-strength

fighter squadrons and two or three short-range bombardment

squadrons (that could have been formed on the Western

Front) were tied up in home defense duties. Germany, already

outnumbered on the front, could have ill-afforded such an

addition to the enemy camp . Thus the German decision to

conduct the strategic bombardment of Great Britain was not

totally in error.

Night reconnaissance and night pursuit both performed

important duties during the last year of fighting. The airplane

brought about a fundamental change in warfare by forcing

armies to make their movements and preparations under

cover of darkness. Additionally, concealment and deception

had to be carried out far behind the lines to mask intentions .

Four years after the war, a young USAS test pilot, Lt Muir S .

Fairchild, argued that "in a future wax Night Reconnaissance

[would] be of fundamental importance." Such an assessment

was supported by the operations of 1918. Yet Fairchild lamented

that the USAS did not "seem to regard Night Observation

aviation as deserving of the importance" it clearly warranted . 4

Night pursuit was a logical supplement to searchlight and

antiaircraft artillery defenses . Airplanes illuminated by

searchlight were attacked with little difficulty by fighter

aircraft. Interception without searchlight assistance was more

difficult, yet possible . At the time of the armistice, night

pursuit was evolving rapidly. Unfortunately the hard-earned

lessons of night flying along the Western Front appear to have

been lost with the military force reductions after the First

World War.

Strategic bombardment aviation experienced a reduced loss

rate during night operations, with little apparent difference in

bombing accuracy as compared to that of daylight missions .

Yet both the British and American air forces insisted on

emphasizing daylight strategic bombing operations during the

interwar period and into the Second World War. Aircraft losses

quickly forced the British to return to the nighttime skies ;

140
however, the United States steadfastly refused to alter tactics

even after it became apparent that the "bomber would not

always get through." Was this attitude due in part to the fact

that the United States had no combat night bombing legacy

from the First World War`? Here perhaps is the great paradox

of World War I night flying .

Night fighting received scant attention in the interwar years.

The French closed their night fighter instruction center three

months after the armistice . The British failed to exploit the

advances produced by years of home defense activity. One

author contends that the first true night fighter did not enter

the RAF inventory until 1956 . Both the Germans and

Americans made great strides in night fighting during the

Second World War. These achievements were not due to a

systematic study of night fighting during the interwar years .

Especially in the case of Germany, night pursuit was once

again too little too late . s

It should now seem obvious that the Western Front belligerents failed to appreciate or conserve the lessons of night

flying learned during the First World War. Diminished military

budgets in the interwar period inhibited air service development

and training, and resulted in a reduction of night flying.

Additionally, there appeared to be a subtle implication that

aerial combat operations under cover of darkness were less

chivalrous than in open daylight. For these reasons, and

undoubtedly many others, western military aviation entered the

Second World War unprepared to exploit the nighttime skies.

Notes

1 . Christopher Cole and E. F. Cheesman, The Air Defence of Britain

1914-1918 (London: Putnam, 1984), 446-51 .

2. Walter A. Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in the Air: Being the Story

of the Part Played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force, vol 6 (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1928), 158-59, 167 .

3. Alex Imrie, Pictorial History of the German Army Air Service,

1914-1918 (Chicago: Henry Refinery, 1973), 48; Cole and Cheesman,

446-51 .

4. Muir S Fairchild, "Notes on Type VIII Night Observation," 26 October

1922, Fairchild Collection, HRC.

5 . Bill Gunston, Night Fighters: A Development and Combat History (New

York: Scribner, 1976), 9-11 .

14 1
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15 1
"Airmen Play Tag with Moonbeams ." New York rimes, 20

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"Hamilton Chased Bats In Night Flight ." New York Times, 28

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a

"Makes Night Flight ." Dayton Journal, 23 October 1909 .

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August 1910.

"Night Flight Over Paris ." New York Times, 12 February 1911 .

"Night Flights Without Lights ." New York Times, 17 September

1910 .

"Night Flying Successful ." New York Times, 11 February 1912 .

"Paulhan Wins $50,000 Race ." New York Times, 28 April

1910 .

"Race of 16 Balloons is Started at Paris ." New York Times, 1

October 1906.

"Schriever In A Long Moonlight Flight ." New York Times, 19

September 1910.

"Scouts Fly At Night." New York Times, 31 January 1913.

"Secret Night Trial of German Airship ." New York Times, 18

August 1908.

"Squadron of Aeroplanes ." New York Times, 17 September

1912 .

"A Strange Airship Seen In England." New York Times, 17

November 1912 .

"Sure Zeppelin Ship Sailed Over England ." New York Times,

18 November 1912 .

"Women Enjoy Trip In Balloon At Night." New York Times, 17

August 1908.

153
"Women In Balloon Fall 3,000 Feet." New York Times, 28 June

1908.

"Wright Flies By Moonlight." New York Times, 23 October

1909.

"Zeppelin Craft Badly Wrecked." New York Times, 1 June

1909 .

"Zeppelin Flies Over 24 Hours." New York Times, 31 May

1909 .

"Zeppelin's Long Voyage." New York Times, 1 June 1909.

i

154
Index

151 Squadron : 97 Bolting, Maj Raynal: 81

185th Aero Squadron : 95 bombardiers : 116-117

260-Squadron Plan: 82 bomber bases: 44

bombing accuracy : 44

Ader, Clement: 63, 130 Breguet: 37, 53, 70, 95

aerial bombardment: 25, 43 Breguet 14 A 2s: 95

aerial combat: 89 Breguet 14 B 2: 49, 52, 106

aerial instruction : 116 Breguet-Michelin : 44

aerial intelligence 101 Breguet-Michelin (BM) N: 35

aerial lighthouses : 127 Brieftauben Abteilung Ostende: 26

Aero Cible : 25 ~ Briey Basin: 73, 79-80, 82

Aero Club: 4 Bristol : 82

Aeronautical Society of Great Britain : 18 British balloon factory: 10

Aeronautics clubs: 4

British bombardment : 55

aircraft instruments: 124 British Committee on Military

airfield bombardment: 50 Ballooning : 8

airfield lighting truck: 132 British home defense: 95

airship : 64 British home defense reorganization: 91 Airship Company of the Air Battalion : 6 British night bombardment: 51 airships : 6, 12, 29, 92 British night bombardment instruction :

Allen, Gen James N. : 11 118 Almonacid, Sous-Lieutenant Vincente British night pursuit: 90 A. . 27

Alsace: 27 British strategic campaign : 84

American aircraft production: 81 Brocard, Commandant Felix: 94

American aviation : 81 Brookins, Walter : 15

American Civil War: 1

BiYan, Capt John R. : 3

American Society of Mechanical

Engineers : 10 C-plane: 30, 34, 36, 42, 92, 93

Amerikaprogramm : 52 Capper, Col J. E. : 10

Antiaircraft artillery : 31 Caproni : 32, 35, 82, 116

antiaircraft units: 94 Caproni Ca 5: 81-82

Arnold, Lt Henry "Hap": 19 captive balloon: 101

Ashmore, Maj Gen E B . : 95 captive balloon night ascensions : 3

Atlantic: 1 Caquot, Albert: 102

Carberry, Capt Joseph: 121

Baldwin, Thomas: 8 Caudron G-4: 35, 37

balloon pilot license : 5 Centre d' Instruction pour (Aviation de

balloon race : 4 Chasse de Nuit: 94

balloon training : 7 Centre d'Instruction de (Aviation de

balloons : 1 Chasse et de Bombardement : 95

Battle of the Somme: 45, 103 Chabert, Commandant Victor

BE2c: 37. 91 Jean-Marie: 121

BE2e: 51 Chandler, Capt Charles DeF: 19,130

Beta: 12-13 Cholmondeley, Lieutenant: 18

BM I`~ aircraft : 116 City ofNew York 1

Bennett, James Gordon : 4 Confederate States of America: 3

Board of Invention and Research Conte: 27

Subcommittee for Aeroplanes : 90 Coupe Internationale des Aeronautes : 4

155
Crochat Electric Field Illuminating German military ballooning : 8

Truck: 132 German night bombers : 55

German night fighters : 93

De Jonekheere, M. V. : 19 Gill, Howard: 15

DH 9: 82 Godard, Eugene: 3

DH 4: 72 Gotha: 32, 96

dirigible : 4, 7, 10, 26, 42 Gotha bombings : 72

distance record: 1 Gotha night bombing: 68

Drachens : 102 Grahame-White, Claude: 14, 90

Dupuy de Lome: 27 Great Western: 1

duration record: 16 Green, Charles : 1

Duval, Maj Gen Maurice : 73, 110 Gros Andreau 115 mm short-bomb : 116

Gros, Ferdinand: 116

electric lamps: 131-132 Gross, Major: 8

Escadrille MF 25: 43 Grossflugzeuge (G-planes) : 31

Groupe de Bombardentent (GB) l : 25

Fairchild, Muir S. : 140 Groupe de Division d'Entrainement : 1 I5

false aerodromes : 50

Farman, Maurich : 29, 37, 70, 90 Haig, Gen Douglas : 37-38

FE2b: 51, 104 Halberstadt 48

Federation Aeronautique Internationale : 4 Hamilton, Charles K. : 15

First Pursuit Group: 96 Handley Page: 30, 70, 72-73, 81-82,

"flaming onion' batteries : 105 117-118, 121

17are gun : 124 Handley Page training school: 121

Fletcher, LL J . N. : 6 Flartney, Maj Harold: 96

Foch, Marshal : 80 Henderson, Lt Gen David : 38

Fokker: 31 Holland, Robert: 1

Franco-Prussian War: 3 Ilolt flares : 130

French air service : 89, 94 Holt wingtip landing flare : 125

French airships : 12 home defense: 92

French army: 7 home defense organization: 91

French bombardment aviation: 49, 79 Hoxsey, Arch 15

French bombardment training: 1 16 Humphries, Lt Frederic E. : 13

French daylight bomber: 52

Friedrichshafen FF 29: 28 Illuminating flares : 125

Frowein : 92 illumination system: 131

Foulois, Gen Benjamin : 81, 121 Ilya Muromets airplanes: 30

Independent Forces RAF: 79. 84

G-plane: 36, 42-43, 52, 93, 95, 109, 119 industrial targets : 84

Gaillaux, Ernest F. : 16 Ingold, Karl 16

Gaillaux, Maurice 16 instrument illumination : 122

GB 1 : 41 intelligence : 101

GB 3 : 43 Inter-Allied Independent Air Force: 79

Gates, Richard: 90

George, Maj Squier: 10 James Gordon Bennett balloon

Georges, Clemenceau : 79 competition : 102

German aircraft : 16 Jenkins Night Altitude Indicator 124

German airship and airplane raids : 84 Johnstone, Ralph: 15

German airships : 12, 89, 102

German arnry : 8 kampfeinsitzerstaffeln : 92

German army airships : 26, 65 Kingsford, A. R. : 1 18

German bombardment : 89 Kipling, Rudyard : 12

German military aviation : 52 Kirtland, R. C. : 19

156
Krebs, Lt Arthur : 7 night flying exhibition : 15

night landing fields : 90

L1 : 13 night military operations : 12

L'Aviation Militaire : 118 night navigation systems: 115

Lahm, Col Frank P. : 5, 102 night operations : 26, 51

Langer, Bruno: 16 night pursuit : 89, 97

Langevin, Henri: 93 night pursuit aviators : 89

Langley : 121 night reconnaissance : 104-107, 109

Le Jaune: 8 night reconnaissance missions : 101

Lesseps, Capitaine Jacques de: 95 night reconnaissance squadrons : l li

Leuchtbombe mit Fallschirm : 127 No. 100 Squadron : 51

light stations : 127 No. 151 Squadron : 95

lighthouse : 127 No. 152 Squadron : 95

lighting landing Helds: 130 No. 44 Squadron Camels: 95

listening posts: 97 Noel, Louis: 15

Longhorn : 29 ~ Northern Bombing Group Night Wini

loss rate : 45 Nulli Secundus : 8

Lowe, Thaddeus S. C . : 1

observers : 117

M2: 12 Organization of the Center of Instruc

Martin, Glenn: 20, 81 for Long Distance Night

Matigny aerodrome : 54 Reconnaissance Aviation: 109

Maurice Farman 7 Longhorn : 64

Mauser arms factory : 70 P2 : 12

Michelin bomb-dropping competitions: 25 Paris International Exposition: 3

Michelin illuminating bombs: 116 Parseval: 102

Michelin parachute flare : 125 Patrick, Gen Mason: 106

Militarluftschiff 1 : 10 Paul Schmitt bombers : 49

military night flying : 18 Paulhan, Louis: 14

Milling, Thomas DeW. : 19 Petain, General Henri: 105-106, 109

Mitchell, Col William "Billy" : 41, 81, 106 Petrol flares : 131

Monck, Mason: 1 Philadelphia Aeronautical Recreation

Morane, Leon: 15 Society : 5

Morane-Saulnier Type N: 31 pursuit aviation : 89, 97

Nach-Bombenflieger-Schule: 119 R-plane: 67, 120

Nachtflugzeug (N-plane) : 35 race: 14

National Flugspende : 16 radio-direction finding : 129

navigational aids: 128-129 RAF: 97

Nieuport : 93-95, 120 railroads : 43

Nieuport Bebe: 89 railway targets : 45, 78, 84

Nieuport, Spad : 95 railways: 45

night airplane bombardment : 92 RDF systems : 129

night airplane operations: 90 reconnaissance : 101-103

night airship experimentation: 13 Renard, Capt Charles : 7

night artillery spotting : 13, 104 RFC : 37, 41 . 44, 48, 51, 69, 72, 84, !

night bombardment aircraft : 110 92, 104, 117-118

night bombardment training : 121 RFC night bomber crews: 118

night bombardment unit: 43 Richthofen, Manfred van: 51

night bombers : 73 Riesenflugzeug (R-plane) : 66

night bombing: 94, 116 RNAS: 37, 48, 69, 84, 90-91, 118

night fighting: 96 RNAS bombardment course: 1 19

night flying : 89, 115 RNAS bombing operations: 71

157
Robinson, Douglas H. : 65, 103 tactical bombardment : 41

Robinson, Lt William Leefe : 91 tactical night bombardment: 55

Roland : 48 The Daily Mail: 1 4

rolling carpet: 116 Third Battle ofYpres: 51

Royal Flying Corps: 6 Trenchard, Maj Gen Hugh M. 38, 72,

Royal Naval Air Service : 6 78, 117

Royal Vauxhall : 1 Turkencrenz (Turk's Cross): 68

Safe and Sane Club: 15 United States Air Service: 81, 110, 121

Samson, Wing Commander Charles : 27, United States Army: 7, 120

32 US Army: 8

Schmitt bombers: 49 US Army Signal Corps: 5, 18

School ofAerial Gunnery: 117 US Naval Aviation Forces Northern

searchlight experimentation: 124 Bombing Group: 82

searchlights : 97 US Signal Corps: 19

self-luminous : 12$ USAS Balloon Section: 102

Seventh Air Instruction Center : 121 USS Massachusetts: 19

Shorthorn: 29

Siegert, Maj Wilhelm: 18, 27 Vaux, Count de la : 3

Signal Corps: 11 Very pistol : 124

Signal Corps Aviation School: 120 visibility : 107

Signal Corps Dirigible No. 1 : 8 Voisin: 26, 44, 79, 81, 94, 116

signaling devices : 124 Voisin Peugeot: 95

Sikorsky, Igor: 26 Voisin Renault: 95, 109

Sopwith : 53 Voisin Type 8: 49

Sopwith 1 ~/z Strutters : 37, 48, 94 von Hoppner, Gen Ernst: 29

Sopwith Camels: 95-96

Spad 7: 95 Warneford, R. A. J. : 90

Strasser, Peter: 65 Wells, H. G. : 12

strategic bombardment : 63, 84 Willis Fitch: 123

strategic bombardment platform: 64 Wise, John: 1

strategic bombing missions : 69 Wright, Wilbur: 13

strategic campaigns : 84

strategic night bombardment: 85 Z2 : 12

strategic operations: 65 Zeppelin : 8, 25, 64, 90

strategic targets : 63 Zeppelin attack: 90

Sykes, Maj Frederick H. : 18 Zeppelin, Count Ferdinand von: 8, 11

Zeppelin-Werke Staaken : 67

158

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The Development ofMilitary

NightAviation to 1919

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