1

Filed 7/25/11 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTUARDO ARDON, )

) S174507

Plaintiff and Appellant, )

) Ct.App. 2/3 B201035

v. )

) Los Angeles County 

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ) Super. Ct. No. BC363959 

 ) 

 Defendant and Respondent. )

___________________________________)

In this case, we must decide whether Government Code section 910 (section 910)1

allows taxpayers to file a class action claim against a municipal governmental entity for 

the refund of local taxes. In City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 

455 (City of San Jose), we held that section 910 permits a litigant to bring a class claim 

against a local government. We later held in Woosley v. State of California (1992) 3 

Cal.4th 758, 792 (Woosley), however, that class claims to recover tax refunds are not

permitted in certain situations because article XIII, section 32 of the California 

Constitution prevents the judiciary “from expanding the methods for seeking tax refunds 

expressly provided by the Legislature.” As we explain, neither Woosley, which 

concerned the interpretation of statutes other than section 910, nor article XIII, section 32 

of the California Constitution, applies to our determination of whether section 910 

permits class claims that seek the refund of local taxes. We therefore conclude that the 

reasoning of City of San Jose, which permitted a class claim against a municipal 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise noted.
2

government in the context of an action for nuisance under section 910, also permits 

taxpayers to file a class claim seeking the refund of local taxes under the same statute. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Estuardo Ardon (Ardon) is a resident of defendant City of Los Angeles 

(City). In October 2006, Ardon filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and 

similarly situated individuals challenging the City‟s telephone users tax (TUT) and 

seeking refund of funds collected under the TUT over the previous two years. Ardon 

asserted that the City‟s municipal code exempts all amounts paid for telephone service 

from the TUT to the extent that those amounts are also exempt from the federal excise tax 

(FET). Ardon contends that since the FET was improperly collected, so too was the 

TUT. In December 2006, Ardon received a notice from the Los Angeles City Attorney 

rejecting his attempt to present a tax refund claim on behalf of a class due to lack of legal 

standing. 

Ardon‟s complaint against the City sought, inter alia, injunctive and declaratory 

relief to prevent continued unlawful collection of the TUT, declaratory relief alleging the 

unconstitutional amendment of the TUT by the Los Angeles City Council,2 money had 

and received in unjust enrichment, and violation of the due process clauses of the 

Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The complaint 

sought certain remedies, including certification as a class action, an accounting of the 

TUT funds collected by the City, and return of money wrongfully taxed. 

 

2

Subsequent to Ardon‟s filing his complaint, the City amended Los Angeles 

Municipal Code section 21.1.3 to remove all references to the FET. The city council 

passed the amendment to the ordinance on January 9, 2007. (L.A. Ord. No. 178,219.) In 

the Court of Appeal, the City contended that Ardon must file the refund claim under Los 

Angeles Municipal Code section 21.07 and former section 21.1.2 governing claims for 

refund of overpayment of business or use taxes. As the court observed, however, those 

code sections do not apply to Ardon‟s claim that the City‟s TUT was an illegal tax. The 

City does not renew its claim here. Therefore, we do not address any issues involving 

preemption of the municipal code provisions in this case. 
3

The City demurred to Ardon‟s complaint and moved to strike all class action 

allegations on the grounds that Woosley prohibited Ardon from filing a claim against the 

City for the refund of taxes on behalf of a putative class. Instead, the City argued, each 

member of the alleged class must file a government claim with the City before Ardon 

could proceed with a class action lawsuit. The superior court granted the City‟s motion 

to strike all class allegations. It also partially overruled and partially sustained the 

demurrer without leave to amend, and stayed other causes of action. Ardon filed a timely 

appeal from the interlocutory order striking the class allegations. 

A divided Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court‟s order refusing to certify the 

class. In so doing, the panel specifically rejected its own reasoning and contrary holding 

in a factually similar case, County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2008) 159 

Cal.App.4th 353 (Oronoz). The Court of Appeal dissent would have followed the 

opinion in Oronoz, which held that under City of San Jose’s construction of section 910, 

a “claimant” could be an entire class as well as an individual. (Oronoz, supra, at p. 367.) 

We granted review to resolve the conflict in the appellate courts regarding permissible 

class claims under section 910.

DISCUSSION

Before 1959, taxpayer and other claims against the state, local, and municipal 

governments were governed by myriad state statutes and local ordinances. Finding this 

system too complex, the Legislature enacted the Government Claims Act (the Act), 

which established a standardized procedure for bringing claims against local 

governmental entities. (Stats. 1959, ch. 1724, p. 4133, enacting former Gov. Code, § 700 

et seq. [replacing more than 150 separate procedures for directing claims against local 

governmental entities]; now § 900 et seq.) 3 

 

3

Section 910 states: “A claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a person 

acting on his or her behalf and shall show all of the following: [¶] (a) The name and post 

office address of the claimant. [¶] (b) The post office address to which the person 

presenting the claim desires notices to be sent. [¶] (c) The date, place and other 

circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted. [¶] 
4

Section 910 does not specifically apply to tax refunds, but to all claims against 

governmental entities. (See City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 454.) The purpose of 

the claims statutes “is to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to 

adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of 

litigation.” (Id. at p. 455.) As originally proposed, the standardized procedures of the 

Act embodied in section 910 would not have applied to “[c]laims under the Revenue and 

Taxation Code or other provisions of law prescribing procedures for the refund . . . of any 

tax . . . .” (Recommendation and Study Relating to the Presentation of Claims Against 

Public Entities (Jan. 1959) 2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1959) p. A-12 (proposed 

former § 703, subd. (a), italics added.) However, the Legislature specifically rejected this 

proposal and instead enacted former section 703, subdivision (a) (now § 905, subd. (a)), 

which exempted from section 910 “[c]laims under the Revenue and Taxation Code or 

other statute prescribing procedures for the refund . . . of any tax . . . .” (Stats. 1959, ch. 

1724, pp. 4133-4134, italics added.) 

The issue in City of San Jose was whether a class claim could satisfy the claim 

requirements of section 910, or whether such class action claims could not be maintained 

against governmental entities. (City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 455.) The 

plaintiffs had filed a class claim against the City of San Jose under section 910, alleging 

that aircraft noise, dust, vapors, and vibration arising from operations at the San Jose 

Municipal Airport were a nuisance and diminished the market value of their property. 

(City of San Jose, at pp. 453, 455.) This court adopted a two-part test for determining 

whether the claim satisfied section 910: “Is there some compliance with all of the 

 

(d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred 

so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim. [¶] (e) The name or 

names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if 

known. [¶] (f) The amount claimed if it totals less than ten thousand dollars ($ 10,000) as 

of the date of presentation of the claim . . . together with the basis of computation of the 

amount claimed. If the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar 

amount shall be included in the claim. However, it shall indicate whether the claim 

would be a limited civil case.”
5

statutory requirements; and, if so, is this compliance sufficient to constitute substantial

compliance?” (City of San Jose, at pp. 456-457.) 

In addressing the section 910 class claim, City of San Jose concluded that the word 

“claimant” referred to “the class itself,” not to an individual class member. The court 

“reject[ed] the suggested necessity for filing an individual claim for each member of the 

purported class.” (City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 457.) The court reasoned that 

“[t]o require such detailed information in advance of the complaint would severely 

restrict the maintenance of appropriate class actions—contrary to recognized policy 

favoring them.” (Ibid.; see Code Civ. Proc., § 382; see also Vasquez v. Superior Court 

(1971) 4 Cal.3d 800.) The court did not believe that section 910 was “intended to thwart 

class relief.” (City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 457.) Because satisfaction of 

section 910‟s procedural requirements obliged a representative class plaintiff to supply 

information detailing his or her name, address, and other specified information, any 

information beyond this requirement to identify the class itself was sufficient to satisfy 

the “ „some compliance‟ test.” (City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 457.) “Beyond 

this, the sufficiency of the identifying information must be measured by the substantial 

compliance test.” (Ibid.) A claim substantially complies with a claims statute if the 

parties have stated sufficient information “to reasonably enable the public entity to make 

an adequate investigation of the merits of the claim and to settle it without the expense of 

a lawsuit.” (Id. at p. 456.)

Woosley was a constitutional challenge to the state‟s vehicle license fees and use 

taxes imposed on passenger vehicles sold outside California. The numerous issues 

included the question of whether the trial court had erred in certifying the claim as a class 

claim. Woosley held that article XIII section 32 of the California Constitution compelled 

an action for tax refunds against the state to be brought in the manner that the Legislature 

specified under the statutes at issue. (Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 789.)4 The court 

 

4 Article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution reads, “No legal or equitable 

process shall issue in any proceeding in any court against this State or any officer thereof 
6

concluded that statutes dictating the procedural requirements for obtaining refunds of 

vehicle license fees and use taxes did not authorize class action claims. (Woosley, at p. 

788; see Veh. Code, § 42231; Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 6901 et seq., 6486.) Rather, the 

language of those statutes indicated that “a claim for a refund of vehicle license fees must 

be filed by „the person who has paid the erroneous or excessive fee or penalty, or his 

agent on his behalf.‟ . . . [T]he term „person‟ does not include a class, and a class 

representative who files a claim on behalf of all others similarly situated, without the 

knowledge or consent of such other persons, is not the agent of the members of the 

class.” (Woosley, supra, at p. 790, quoting Veh. Code, § 42231.) Because article XIII, 

section 32 of the California Constitution requires tax refund claims to be made in the 

specific manner prescribed by the Legislature, we concluded that the particular statutes at 

issue in Woosley did not authorize class claims.

Regarding class-based refunds for use taxes, Woosley observed that “[a]n 

examination of the entire statutory scheme that governed requests for refunds of sales and 

use taxes when Woosley's claim was filed in 1977 reveals . . . that class claims were not 

contemplated. If the [State Board of Equalization] denied a claim, that entity was 

required, within 30 days, to „serve notice of its action on the claimant in the manner 

prescribed for service of notice of a deficiency determination.‟ ([Rev. & Tax. Code,] § 

6906.) [Revenue and Taxation Code] [s]ection 6486, in turn, provided in 1977 that the 

[State Board of Equalization] shall give written notice of a deficiency determination „to 

the retailer or person storing, using, or consuming tangible personal property,‟ either by 

mail or by „delivering it to the person to be served.‟ The language of section 6486 

suggests that notice must be given to each individual taxpayer. No mention is made of 

notice to a class representative. The requirement that notice of the denial of a claim must 

be given to each individual taxpayer thus is inconsistent with the use of a class claim.” 

 

to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax. After payment of a tax claimed to be 

illegal, an action may be maintained to recover the tax paid, with interest, in such manner 

as may be provided by the Legislature.”
7

(Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 790-791.) Woosley, therefore, addressed the limited 

question of whether Vehicle Code section 42231 and Revenue and Taxation Code 

sections 6901 et seq. and 6486 permitted class actions by citizens seeking refunds of 

taxes and fees from the state. When construed in light of article XIII, section 32 of the 

California Constitution, we concluded that the Legislature did not intend to authorize 

class claims for the refund of fees and taxes under those particular statutes. (Woosley, at 

pp. 789-792.)

Woosley also stated that “the holding in City of San Jose . . . should not be 

extended to include claims for tax refunds.” (Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 789.) 

However, we did not mean that City of San Jose forbids all class action claims for tax 

refunds; rather, Woosley precluded class claims for tax refunds where the Legislature has 

explicitly set forth procedures for obtaining those refunds and has refused to authorize 

class claims under those procedures. Specifically, Woosley criticized “[s]everal decisions 

of the Court of Appeal [that] extended the holding in City of San Jose to permit the filing 

of class claims seeking tax refunds, reasoning by analogy to the claims statute construed 

in City of San Jose that the existing tax-refund statutes could and should be interpreted to 

authorize the filing of class claims.” (Id. at p. 788, italics added.) It is important to note 

that none of the Court of Appeal decisions this court criticized in Woosley either 

construed or applied section 910. (See Schoderbek v. Carlson (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 

1029, 1033 [property tax statute]; Lattin v. Franchise Tax Board (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 

377, 381 [income tax statute]; Santa Barbara Optical Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization

(1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 244, 249 [sales tax statute]; Javor v. State Bd. of Equalization

(1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 939, 948 [sales tax statute].)

Several cases decided after Woosley have concluded that article XIII, section 32 of 

the California Constitution bars class claims and class actions for the refund of locally 

adopted taxes absent specific state statutory authority. (See Batt v. City and County of 

San Francisco (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 65, 74-75 [sustaining demurrer to plaintiff‟s class 

action challenging city‟s transient occupancy hotel tax]; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. 
8

v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 242, 249 [rejecting taxpayer suit 

challenging a municipal home occupation ordinance]; Neecke v. City of Mill Valley

(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 946, 961-962 [rejecting property owner‟s action challenging a city 

property tax].) As Oronoz observed, however, these cases are distinguishable, because 

they all considered statutes or municipal ordinances enacted to provide specific 

procedures for filing tax claims against governmental entities — procedures that are not 

applicable or required in this case. (Oronoz, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 365, fn. 9.) In 

addition, like the Oronoz court, we specifically disagree with the overbroad statement in 

Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. that “class-action-type lawsuits seeking a refund of fees 

and taxes are barred unless each plaintiff has first filed an administrative refund claim 

with the City.” (Id. at p. 249.) The statement is especially incorrect “as applied to claims 

against local public entities that are not governed by specific tax refund statutes.” 

(Oronoz, supra, at p. 365, fn. 9.) 

The Court of Appeal here determined that the applicable claims statute in the 

present case is Government Code section 910. Ardon asserts that section 910 claims 

against government entities are to be presented by the claimant or by a person acting on 

his or her behalf and that, as noted above, in City of San Jose this court held that the word 

“claimant” in section 910 must be equated with the class itself and therefore permits the 

filing of class claims. Ardon also claims that the Court of Appeal improperly extended 

the reach of article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution “beyond state entities 

and their agents to a local government.” 

By contrast, the City asserts that equating the term “claimant” with “the class 

itself” is inconsistent with the strict compliance standard set forth in Woosley, supra, 3 

Cal.4th 758, for tax refund claims. But, as Ardon observes, Woosley does not require 

strict compliance with claims statutes in tax refund cases. The case requires that a court 

analyze the claims statutes before it to determine whether the Legislature intended to 

allow class claims under those statutes. Here, as City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d 447,

held, a class claim by taxpayers for a tax refund against a local governmental entity is 
9

permissible under section 910 in the absence of a specific tax refund procedure set forth 

in an applicable governing claims statute. Contrary to the City‟s argument, Woosley 

simply does not apply here because section 910 allows the class claim. 

Our conclusion recognizes the limitations of both City of San Jose and Woosley in 

addressing the availability of class claims for the tax refunds in this case. City of San 

Jose simply held that section 910 does not preclude class claims against government 

entities. (City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d at pp. 456-457.) The action there did not 

involve a challenge to a local tax, but instead asserted nuisance and inverse condemnation 

claims. (Ibid.) All that Woosley demands is that a court first examine the claims statutes 

at issue in a claim for a taxpayer refund to determine whether the Legislature 

contemplated a class claim under the applicable California code. (Woosley, supra, 3 

Cal.4th at pp. 790-792.) The court did not analyze the applicability of section 910, and, 

in contrast to the City‟s contention, there is no reason to construe section 910 in light of 

Woosley. As we have discussed, the relevant governing claims statute here is section 

910. In contrast to the two statutes at issue in Woosley, section 910 states specifically 

that a “claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a person acting on his or her 

behalf.” While the Act contains an exemption for “[c]laims under the Revenue and 

Taxation Code or other statute prescribing procedures for the refund . . . of any tax,” the 

claim here did not involve any applicable municipal code or statute governing claims for 

refunds. (Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (a), italics added.) City of San Jose held that class 

claims are permitted under section 910. (City of San Jose, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 

367.) Therefore, class claims for taxpayer refunds against local governmental entities 

brought under section 910 are also permitted in California.

In addition, the City contends that article XIII, section 32 of the California 

Constitution mandates that the Legislature must expressly authorize actions for tax 

refunds, and section 910 does not expressly authorize class claims. Article XIII, section 

32 of the California Constitution states, “No legal or equitable process shall issue in any 

proceeding in any court against this State or any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the 
10

collection of any tax. After payment of a tax claimed to be illegal, an action may be 

maintained to recover the tax paid, with interest, in such manner as may be provided by 

the Legislature.” Despite the first sentence‟s reference to tax actions against the state, the 

City asks us to read the second sentence of article XIII, section 32 to also preclude tax 

actions against local governments in the absence of express legislative authorization. 

But even assuming article XIII, section 32 is equally applicable to tax actions against 

local governments, we have already determined that section 910 provides the necessary 

legislative authorization for class claims of taxpayer refunds against local governmental 

entities. Indeed, there is nothing in the constitutional provision that would preclude the 

present action.

The City further asserts that the public policy underlying article XIII, section 32 

precludes the present action. In Woosley, we held that article XIII, section 32 “rests on 

the premise that strict legislative control over the manner in which tax refunds may be 

sought is necessary so that governmental entities may engage in fiscal planning based on 

expected tax revenues. [Citation.]” (Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 789.) The City 

argues that this policy is thwarted where the local government is faced with a potentially 

huge liability in the form of a class action. But article XIII, section 32 simply prohibits 

courts from “prevent[ing] or enjoin[ing] the collection of any tax” during the pendency of 

litigation challenging the tax. (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 32.) In fact, article XIII, section 

32 does not purport to limit a court‟s authority to fashion a remedy if it determines a tax 

is illegal, including its authority to issue an injunction against further collection of the 

challenged tax. As Ardon observes, we have held that the important public policy behind 

article XIII, section 32 “ „is to allow revenue collection to continue during litigation so 

that essential public services dependent on the funds are not unnecessarily interrupted.‟ ” 

(State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 633, 638, quoting Pacific 

Gas & Electric Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1980) 27 Cal.3d 277, 283.) This policy 

is intended to ensure the uninterrupted flow of tax revenue, so that refunds that are 

authorized must be processed in orderly procedures that the Legislature allows. That 
11

policy favoring fiscal responsibility, however, does not justify precluding legitimate class 

proceedings for the refund of allegedly illegal taxes, and is indeed satisfied here because 

section 910 allows the present taxpayer class claim.

CONCLUSION

Woosley, supra, 3 Cal.4th 758, does not apply to a potential taxpayer class claim 

brought under section 910. In addition, neither the explicit language nor the policy 

underlying article XIII, section 32 applies to prevent the present action. City of San Jose,

supra, 12 Cal.3d 447, is entirely consistent with our conclusion here. Class claims for tax 

refunds against a local governmental entity are permissible under section 910 in the 

absence of a specific tax refund procedure set forth in an applicable governing claims 

statute. Consequently, we reverse the Court of Appeal judgment, and remand the matter 

for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

CHIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

KENNARD, J.

BAXTER, J.

WERDEGAR, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

JACKSON, J.*

_____________________________

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 

Seven, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Ardon v. City of Los Angeles

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 174 Cal.App.4th 369

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S174507

Date Filed: July 25, 2011

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Los Angeles

Judge: Anthony J. Mohr

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, Francis M. Gregorek, Rachele R. Rickert; Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, Jon 

Tostrud; Chimicles & Tikellis, Nicholas E. Chimicles and Timothy N. Mathews for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Wolf, Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, Francis M. Gregorek, Rachele R. Rickert; Cuneo Gilbert & LaDuca, Jon 

Tostrud; Chimicles & Tikellis and Timothy N. Mathews for Willy Granados and Jon W. McWilliams as Amici 

Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Patricia Sturdevant; Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, Kevin P. Roddy; and Timothy Bittle for NASCAT, Howard Jarvis 

Taxpayers Association, Consumer Federation of California and Utility Reform Network as Amici Curiae on behalf 

of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Patricia Sturdevant; Richard Holober; Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah, Patrick A. Klingman; Huskinson, 

Brown, Heidenreich & Carlin and Paul E. Heidenreich for Consumer Action, Consumer Federation of California 

and NASCAT as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Edward M. Teyssier; and Joseph D. Henchman for the Tax Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Alan M. Mansfield for Utility Consumers‟ Action Network as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, Noreen S. Vincent and Michael Nagle, Assistant City 

Attorneys, Brian I. Cheng, Deputy City Attorney; Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe, William Molinski, Valerie M. Goo 

and Frank D. Rorie; Colantuono & Levin, Michael G. Colantuono, Sandra J. Levin, Amy C. Sparrow and Erwin M. 

Benedicto for Defendant Respondent.
Page 2 – S174307 – counsel continued

Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney (San Francisco), Julie Van Nostern, Chief Tax Attorney, and Peter J. Keith, Deputy 

City Attorney, for The League of California Cities, The California State Association of Counties and The California 

Special Districts Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel (Los Angeles) and Albert Ramseyer, Principal Deputy County Counsel, 

for the County of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Francis M. Gregorek

Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz

750 B Street, Suite 2770

San Diego, CA 92101

(619) 239-4599

Sandra J. Levin

Colantuono & Levin

300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2700

Los Angeles, CA 90071

(213) 542-5700