United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 10, 2020*

Decided February 11, 2020 

Before 

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

Nos. 19-2052 and 19-2415 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

PETER M. BERNEGGER, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeals from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin. 

No. 18-CR-223 

William C. Griesbach, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

In these consolidated appeals, Peter Bernegger challenges modifications to the 

conditions of his supervised release requiring him to make monthly restitution 

payments and to disclose information about his finances. But his term of supervised 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
Nos. 19-2052 and 19-2415 Page 2 

release has already ended, and he cannot show that he suffers any collateral 

consequences, so we lack jurisdiction to review the orders he challenges. 

Bernegger was convicted of mail fraud and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1344, 

in the Northern District of Mississippi and sentenced to terms of imprisonment and 

supervised release. The trial court also ordered him to pay $1,725,000.00 in restitution 

and, though it did not set a payment schedule, required him to make equal monthly 

payments towards restitution as a condition of his supervised release. After he 

completed his prison term (during which he paid $575 towards restitution) and 

obtained permission to move to Wisconsin, the Eastern District of Wisconsin accepted 

jurisdiction over his supervised release in December 2018. See 18 U.S.C. § 3605. 

Four years after Bernegger’s release, he had paid no additional restitution. As a 

result, the Probation Office petitioned the court to modify his conditions of supervised 

release to include a restitution payment schedule. At a hearing on the petition, the 

district court set a monthly payment schedule of $100 or 20 percent of his after-tax 

income. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). It later held two hearings to assess his compliance, 

where it also ordered him to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney’s Financial Litigation 

Unit about his financial status. 

Bernegger filed notices after the first and last hearings (appeal Nos. 19-2052 and 

19-2415), appealing all rulings made during the hearings, and another notice of appeal 

after the district court discharged him from supervised release in September 2019 

(appeal No. 19-2845). We consolidated the first two appeals at his request and 

dismissed the third as unnecessary because the district court made no rulings after he 

filed his second notice of appeal. 

Because Bernegger’s term of supervised release has already ended, we must first 

determine whether his two direct appeals are moot. See United States v. Larson, 417 F.3d 

741, 747 (7th Cir. 2005). Though neither party addressed mootness in their briefs or their 

amended jurisdictional statements, we have an independent duty to assess our 

jurisdiction. See Minnesota Life Ins. Co. v. Kagan, 724 F.3d 843, 846 (7th Cir. 2013). 

A justiciable case or controversy must exist at all stages of review, and in 

criminal cases, “this requirement means that a defendant wishing to continue his 

appeals after the expiration of his sentence must suffer some ‘continuing injury’ or 

‘collateral consequence’ sufficient to satisfy Article III.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 

564 U.S. 932, 936 (2011). Bernegger’s appeals therefore present a live controversy only if 

he continues to face a “collateral consequence”—a legal disadvantage—because of the 
Nos. 19-2052 and 19-2415 Page 3 

modification orders he challenges. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1998); Lane v. 

Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631–33 (1982). We can discern none. 

The modification orders did no more than require Bernegger to pay a portion of 

what he already owed as part of the judgment in his criminal case, see United States v. 

Sawyer, 521 F.3d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 2008), and facilitate his inevitable contact with the 

Financial Litigation Unit. Bernegger’s restitution obligation survived his completion of 

his term of supervised release, and that obligation has been previously affirmed on 

direct appeal. See United States v. Bernegger, 661 F.3d 232, 242 (5th Cir. 2011). In these 

appeals, we cannot grant him any effective relief from supervised-release conditions to 

which he is no longer subject. See Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996); cf. Pope v. 

Perdue, 889 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 2018) (criminal appeal not moot if there is “any 

potential benefit” to defendant (quoting United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1152 

(7th Cir. 2001))). Insofar as he seeks the return of $300 he believes he paid according to 

an improperly entered payment schedule, we cannot undo the court’s condition after it 

has expired. And he cannot argue that he did not owe the money. Bernegger asserts that 

he was forced to go into debt to satisfy the payment schedule, but that is not the type of 

ongoing injury that would save these appeals. See Lane, 455 U.S. at 632–33 (explaining 

qualities of “civil disabilities” and legal consequences that can keep a direct criminal 

appeal live). 

DISMISSED