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*********************************************** 
BROOKSTONE HOMES, LLC, ET AL. v.

MERCO HOLDINGS, LLC, ET AL.

MERCO HOLDINGS, LLC, ET AL. v.

CT KARKA, LLC, ET AL.

(AC 44704)

Bright, C.J., and Alvord and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

In this joint appeal, the appellants were the plaintiffs in a breach of contract

action and the defendants in a separate action brought by various limited

liability companies to discharge lis pendens filed against their properties

in connection with the breach of contract action. The appellees were

various limited liability companies with rental properties. Sixteen of the

appellees filed an application pursuant to statute (§ 52-325a) to discharge

the lis pendens. The trial court granted the application, concluding

that the appellants had not shown probable cause that their breach of

contract case was an action intended to affect the real property on

which the lis pendens had been filed. Pursuant to the applicable statute

(§ 52-325c), the appellants appealed to this court from the order discharging the lis pendens and indicated on the appeal form that the appeal

was also being filed in connection with their breach of contract action.

Thereafter, the appellants filed a motion to stay the order discharging

the lis pendens pending the appeal pursuant to § 52-325c, which the

trial court denied. The appellants then filed a motion for review pursuant

to the applicable rule of practice (§ 66-6), challenging the denial of their

motion to stay, but failed to request a stay of execution of the trial

court’s judgment until this court had ruled on their motion for review.

The appellees recorded the order discharging the lis pendens on the

land records. Thereafter, this court dismissed the appellants’ motion

for review and ordered the parties to file memoranda to address whether

the appeal should be dismissed as moot as to the lis pendens case and

for lack of a final judgment as to the breach of contract case. The

appellants filed a memorandum of law opposing dismissal. The appellees

did not file a response to the order. Held:

1. The portion of the appeal challenging the trial court’s judgment in the lis

pendens case was moot: pursuant to § 52-325c, a stay is automatic for

only seven days from the date of the court’s order discharging the lis

pendens unless, during that period, the aggrieved party appeals the order

and applies for a further stay pending appeal; moreover, because the

trial court denied the appellants’ motion for stay and the appellants

never sought a stay from this court, there was no stay in effect when

the clerk delivered the order discharging the lis pendens or when the

appellees recorded the order on the land records; furthermore, that the

appellants timely filed their appeal within the seven day period mandated

by § 52-325c did not overcome the fact that this court could not grant

the appellants any practical relief in the appeal because the appellees

effected the discharge of the lis pendens on filing the trial court’s order

on the land records, when there was no appellate stay in effect, and

the lis pendens could not be resurrected after they were discharged;

additionally, the question presented in this appeal did not qualify for

review under the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to

mootness because the appeal was rendered moot not due to the inherently limited duration of the proceeding but due to the appellants’ failure

to seek the appropriate remedy from this court and, therefore, the

appellants failed to demonstrate that the substantial majority of appeals

from orders discharging lis pendens would become moot before those

appeals could be decided.

2. The portion of the appeal with respect to the breach of contract case

was not taken from a final judgment and, accordingly, this court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to entertain it: at the time the appeal was filed,

the appellees had not filed any pleadings in response to the complaint

and the trial court had not issued any order from which an appeal could

be filed.
Considered August 31—officially released November 23, 2021

Procedural History

Application, in one case, to discharge lis pendens filed

against certain of the plaintiffs’ real property, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford,

where the court, Noble, J., granted the plaintiffs’ application to discharge the lis pendens and rendered judgment thereon, and, action, in a second case, to recover

damages for, inter alia, breach of contract, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury and transferred to the judicial district

of Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket; thereafter, the

defendants in the first case and the plaintiffs in the

second case filed a joint appeal to this court; subsequently, the court, Noble, J., denied the motion to stay

the order discharging the lis pendens filed by the defendants in the first case; thereafter, this court dismissed

the motion for review filed by the named defendant

et al. in the first case, and ordered the parties to file

memoranda to address whether the appeal should be

dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

Taryn D. Martin, for the appellants (defendants in

the first case and plaintiffs in the second case).

Robert M. Fleischer, for the appellees (plaintiffs in

the first case and defendants in the second case).
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. This joint appeal was filed in two trial

court cases to challenge the trial court’s order in one

case granting an application to discharge the lis pendens

filed against multiple properties. We ordered the parties

to file memoranda to address (1) whether this appeal

should be dismissed as moot as to the order granting

the application to discharge the lis pendens because

that order has been recorded on the land records and

(2) whether the appeal should be dismissed for lack of

a final judgment as to the portion of the appeal taken

as to the underlying breach of contract case that is still

pending before the trial court.1 Having considered the

memorandum submitted by the appellants, we dismiss

the appeal.2

This appeal involves two related cases, though the

cases were not consolidated at the trial court. In Merco

Holdings, LLC v. CT Karka, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-21-6149041-S

(breach of contract case), five plaintiffs, who are the

appellants here, filed a complaint against twenty-six

limited liability companies (LLCs) sounding in, inter

alia, breach of contract.3 The plaintiffs in the breach of

contract case are Merco Holdings, LLC; DetailManagement, LLC; Elite Investment Properties, Inc.; David Merenstein; and Esther Merenstein. The defendants in the

breach of contract case are CT Karka, LLC; CT Deros,

LLC; Meknes, LLC; Farmington Real Estate Holdings,

LLC; Renwood Real Estate Holdings, LLC; North Haven

Apts, LLC; Bunker Hill Properties, LLC; Austin Heights

CT, LLC; Diamond Court CT, LLC; Waterbury Plaza,

LLC; Valley View Townhouse, LLC; Pine Meadow Townhouse, LLC; Forest Park Apartment Homes, LLC; Briarwood Hills, LLC; Hunters Crossing, LLC; Renwood

Apartments, LLC; Oakridge Realty, LLC; Brookstone

Homes, LLC; Ivy Woods CT, LLC; Forest Park Office

Green, LLC; Fieldside Apartments, LLC; Seramonte

Estates, LLC; Seramonte Estates AB, LLC; Alabama

Brook, LLC; Alabama Brook #2, LLC; and Orohena, LLC.

The claims in the breach of contract case are essentially

that the five plaintiffs were partial owners of, had interests in, or provided management services to the twentysix defendant LLCs but had been deprived of their share

of the profits from or management fees related to the

rental properties owned by the LLCs. In connection

with the filing of the complaint, the five plaintiffs filed

eleven lis pendens against sixteen properties owned by

the LLC defendants. No judgment had been rendered in

the breach of contract case when this appeal was filed.

In Brookstone Homes, LLC v. Merco Holdings, LLC,

Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No.

CV-21-6139513-S (lis pendens case), sixteen of the LLCs

named as defendants in the breach of contract case,

namely, those owning the properties that are the subjects of the lis pendens in the breach of contract case,
filed as an independent action an application pursuant

to General Statutes § 52-325a to discharge the lis pendens filed against their properties.4 The application to

discharge the lis pendens named as defendants the five

plaintiffs in the breach of contract case. The defendants

in the lis pendens case filed an objection to the application to discharge the lis pendens. On May 6, 2021, the

trial court granted the application to discharge the lis

pendens on the basis of the court’s finding that the

defendants had not shown probable cause that their

breach of contract case was an action intended to affect

the real property on which the lis pendens had been

filed.

On May 12, 2021, the appellants timely filed this

appeal within seven days of the judgment in the lis

pendens case granting the application to discharge lis

pendens, as required by General Statutes § 52-325c (b).5

The appeal form also indicated that the appeal was

being filed in connection with the breach of contract

case.

Also on May 12, 2021, the appellants filed in the lis

pendens case a timely motion to stay the order discharging the lis pendens pending appeal, pursuant to § 52-

325c (b). The appellees objected to that motion. The

trial court denied the motion for stay on June 14, 2021.

The appellants filed a timely motion for review pursuant to Practice Book § 66-6 on June 23, 2021, challenging

the denial of their motion for stay. The appellants, however, did not file a request, pursuant to Practice Book

§ 61-14, for a stay of execution of the trial court’s judgment until this court had ruled on their motion for

review. On July 6, 2021, the appellees filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for review in which

they stated that they already had recorded the discharges of lis pendens on the land records. We dismissed the appellants’ motion for review on July 28,

2021, and ordered the parties to file memoranda to

address whether the appeal should be dismissed as

moot as to the lis pendens case and for lack of a final

judgment as to the breach of contract case. The appellants filed a memorandum of law opposing dismissal.

The appellees did not file a memorandum in response

to our July 28, 2021 order.

I

We first address whether the portion of this appeal

challenging the trial court’s May 6, 2021 judgment in

the lis pendens case is moot. The appellants argue that

we should not dismiss the appeal as moot because (1)

they timely filed a motion for review of the order denying their motion for stay, (2) they have a statutory right

to appeal the judgment granting the application to discharge their lis pendens, and (3) even if this appeal is

moot, the appeal satisfies the exception to mootness

for matters that are capable of repetition yet evading
review. We are not persuaded by the appellants’ arguments.

A

The appellants argue that, because they filed a timely

motion for review of the trial court’s order denying their

motion for stay, they have complied with the necessary

requirements to preserve their appellate rights and their

appeal is, therefore, not moot. Essentially, the appellants’ argument is that, in light of their timely motion

for review, the trial court’s judgment discharging the

lis pendens could not be recorded on the land records

until this court decided the motion for review. The

problem with the appellants’ argument is that it is predicated on the erroneous premise that, after the trial court

denied their motion for a discretionary stay, there was

an automatic stay of that order while the motion for

review was pending. A discussion of the interplay of

the applicable statutes and rules of practice makes clear

the appellants’ error.

Section 52-325c provides the procedures by which a

party whose lien has been ordered discharged pursuant

to General Statutes § 52-325b (b) may stay the effect

of that order. Section 52-325c (b) requires that an appeal

be taken within seven days of the court’s judgment and

provides for an automatic stay during that period. The

appealing party may also, within that seven day window,

apply for a stay of the effect of the order pending appeal.

See General Statutes § 52-325c (b). The filing of an

application for a stay automatically extends the initial

seven day stay until a decision on the application is

rendered. See General Statutes § 52-325c (b). Accordingly, a stay is only automatic, under § 52-325c, for seven

days from the date of the court’s order discharging

the lis pendens unless, within those seven days, the

aggrieved party appeals the order and applies for a

further stay pending appeal, in which case the seven day

stay automatically is extended until the court renders

its decision as to whether to stay the effect of its order

until the appeal is decided. If the court denies a request

for a stay, however, there is no further automatic stay

provided by § 52-325c. Once the trial court denies a

motion for stay, the clerk of the court may deliver to

the parties certified copies of the order discharging the

lis pendens. General Statutes § 52-325c (d).

The automatic appellate stay generally provided in

noncriminal cases by Practice Book § 61-11 (a) does

not apply to orders discharging lis pendens because the

stay of execution in lis pendens cases is provided by

statute.6 The appellants’ motion for review filed pursuant to Practice Book §§ 61-14 and 66-6 did not create

a stay of execution because the trial court had denied

the appellants’ request for a discretionary stay pursuant

to § 52-325c (b). If the appellants wanted a further stay

while their motion for review was pending before this

court, they needed to file a motion directed to this court
requesting a temporary stay of execution until their

motion for review was decided. Indeed, Practice Book

§ 61-14 provides in relevant part: ‘‘In any case in which

there is no automatic stay of execution and in which

the trial court denies, or refuses to rule on, a motion

for stay, an aggrieved party may file a motion requesting

a stay of execution of the judgment from the court

having appellate jurisdiction pending the filing of and

ruling upon a motion for review. . . .’’

The clerk of the court delivered the order discharging

the lis pendens to the parties on June 23, 2021, nine

days after the trial court had denied the appellants’

motion for stay. On June 29, 2021, the appellees recorded

the order discharging the lis pendens on the land

records. Because the trial court denied the appellants’

motion for stay on June 14, 2021, and the appellants

never sought a stay from this court pursuant to Practice

Book § 61-14, there was no stay in effect when the clerk

delivered the order discharging the lis pendens or when

the appellees recorded the order on the land records.

Thus, the appellees were well within their rights when

they filed on the land records the order discharging the

lis pendens.

B

The appellants also argue that we should not dismiss

their appeal as moot because they timely filed their

appeal within the seven day appeal period mandated

by § 52-325c. This argument, however, does not overcome the fact that we cannot grant the appellants any

practical relief in this appeal because the appellees

effected the discharge of the lis pendens on filing the

court’s order on the land records on June 29, 2021,

when there was no appellate stay in effect.

‘‘Mootness implicates [this] court’s subject matter

jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to

resolve. . . . It is a [well settled] general rule that the

existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of

appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the

determination of which no practical relief can follow.

. . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the

time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency

of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an

appellate court from granting any practical relief

through its disposition of the merits, a case has become

moot. . . . [A] subject matter jurisdictional defect may

not be waived . . . [or jurisdiction] conferred by the

parties, explicitly or implicitly. . . . [T]he question of

subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . .

and, once raised, either by a party or by the court itself,

the question must be answered before the court may

decide the case.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Lichtman v. Beni, 280 Conn. 25, 30,
905 A.2d 647 (2006).

The timely filing of an appeal does not, by itself,

preclude an appeal from becoming moot. See, e.g., id.,

31–33 (appeal was dismissed where plaintiffs recorded

order discharging mechanic’s lien on land records after

defendant filed timely appeal of order); Lucas v.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 103 Conn. App. 762,

767–68, 931 A.2d 378 (appeal was moot where defendant

recorded certified copy of order discharging judgment

lien after plaintiff filed timely appeal of order), cert.

denied, 284 Conn. 934, 935 A.2d 151 (2007). Without a

valid stay in effect, the appellants were able to perfect

the court’s order of discharge by recording it on the

land records. See Lichtman v. Beni, supra, 280 Conn.

31–33; Lucas v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.,

supra, 767–68. That action renders this appeal moot as

to the appellants’ lis pendens. The lis pendens cannot

be resurrected after they have been discharged.

Our Supreme Court’s decision in Lichtman v. Beni,

supra, 280 Conn. 25, is instructive. Lichtman concerned

a trial court’s order discharging a mechanic’s lien pursuant to General Statutes § 49-35b. Id., 29. Our Supreme

Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal as moot

because the plaintiffs had properly filed the certified

copy of the court’s discharge order on the land records

after the defendant failed to request a stay following

the trial court’s order discharging the mechanic’s lien.

Id., 33. The court concluded: ‘‘Because the discharge

order was duly issued and recorded, the lien no longer

exists. We are unwilling to undermine the integrity of

the land records and, therefore, are unable to provide

the defendant with any practical relief.’’ Id., 36.

Practice Book § 61-14 provides appellants challenging judgments discharging lis pendens with a remedy

of receiving a temporary stay from this court pending

the filing of and ruling on a motion for review. In failing

to avail themselves of that option, the appellants bore

the risk that the appellees would record the discharge

order on the land records before their motion for review

could be decided. As with the mechanic’s lien in Lichtman, because the order discharging the appellants’ lis

pendens was duly issued and recorded, the lis pendens

no longer exist. We are, therefore, unable to provide

the appellants with any practical relief.

C

The appellants argue that, even if their appeal from

the order discharging the lis pendens is moot, we should

nevertheless consider the merits of their appeal because

it presents a matter that is capable of repetition yet

evading review. We do not agree.

‘‘We note that an otherwise moot question may qualify

for review under the capable of repetition, yet evading

review exception. To do so, however, it must meet three

requirements. First, the challenged action, or the effect
of the challenged action, by its very nature must be of

a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood

that the substantial majority of cases raising a question

about its validity will become moot before appellate

litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a

reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the

pending case will arise again in the future, and that

it will affect either the same complaining party or a

reasonably identifiable group for whom that party can

be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question must

have some public importance. Unless all three requirements are met, [the appeal] must be dismissed as moot.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tappin v. Homecomings Financial Network, Inc., 265 Conn. 741, 747,

830 A.2d 711 (2003). We conclude that this lis pendens

case does not meet the first requirement for review

under the capable of repetition yet evading review

exception.

The appellants claim that an order discharging lis

pendens is necessarily of limited duration because the

party challenging the order must move quickly to prevent the order from being recorded on the land records.

They note that in this case the same trial court discharged the lis pendens and then denied their motion

to stay. They argue that, ‘‘[w]hen it denied the motion

to stay, the trial court also effectively denied the [appellants] an opportunity to appeal the ruling on discharging

the lis pendens.’’ We disagree.

As set forth in parts I A and B of this opinion, the

appellants had procedures available to them to prevent

their appeal from becoming moot. Although they

availed themselves of many of those procedures by

taking a timely appeal, filing a timely motion for stay

in the trial court, and seeking review from this court

of the trial court’s denial of their motion for stay, the

appellants failed to take the necessary next step of

seeking a stay from this court pursuant to Practice Book

§ 61-14. Thus, their appeal was rendered moot not due

to the ‘‘inherently limited duration’’ of the proceeding

before the trial court but due to their failure to seek

the appropriate remedy from this court. Consequently,

the appellants have failed to demonstrate that the substantial majority of appeals from orders discharging lis

pendens will become moot before those appeals can

be decided.

II

We also ordered the parties to file memoranda to

address why this appeal should not be dismissed as to

the breach of contract case because a final judgment

had not been rendered in that matter. The appellees

did not file a memorandum, and the appellants’ memorandum did not address this issue. We conclude that

the portion of this appeal filed in connection with the

breach of contract case was not taken from a final

judgment and, therefore, we lack subject matter juris-
diction to entertain it.

The subject matter jurisdiction of this court and our

Supreme Court is limited by statute to final judgments.

General Statutes § 52-263. Our appellate courts lack

jurisdiction to hear an appeal that is not brought from

a final judgment. See State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30,

463 A.2d 566 (1983). ‘‘Thus, even where the appellee

fails to bring to our attention the lack of [a] final judgment, either by motion to dismiss or in its brief, or at

oral argument, we must, nonetheless, act sua sponte.’’

Mac’s Car City, Inc. v. DiLoreto, 33 Conn. App. 131,

132, 634 A.2d 1187 (1993).

The appellants’ appeal form indicated that they were

challenging the trial court’s order in the lis pendens

case granting the application to discharge the lis pendens, but the appellants also listed the case name and

docket number for the breach of contract case in the

section of the appeal form entitled ‘‘Additional Trial

Court Docket Numbers Appealed.’’ The appellants had

filed an amended complaint in the breach of contract

case fewer than two weeks before they filed this appeal.

The appellees had not filed any pleadings in response

to the amended complaint when this appeal was filed,

and the trial court had not issued any orders from which

an appeal could be filed in the breach of contract case.

Thus, no final judgment had been rendered in the breach

of contract case when this appeal was filed.

The appeal is dismissed as moot to the extent that

it challenges the judgment in Brookstone Homes, LLC

v. Merco Holdings, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district

of Hartford, Docket No. CV-21-6139513-S; the appeal is

dismissed for lack of a final judgment to the extent that

it was filed in connection with Merco Holdings, LLC

v. CT Karka, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Docket No. CV-21-6149041-S.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Our July 28, 2021 order reads as follows: ‘‘In the following matter, counsel

are hereby ordered, sua sponte, to file memoranda of not more than ten

(10) pages on or before August 27, 2021, giving reasons, if any, why the

portion of this appeal challenging the trial court’s May 6, 2021 judgment in

Brookstone Homes, LLC v. Merco Holdings, LLC, Docket No. HHD-CV-21-

6139513-S, should not be dismissed as moot because the order discharging

the lis pendens has been recorded on the land records (see Lichtman v.

Beni, 280 Conn. 25, 905 A.2d 647 (2006); Lucas v. Deutsche Bank National

Trust Co., 103 Conn. App. 762, 931 A.2d 378, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 934,

935 A.2d 151 (2007)); and why the portion of this appeal from Merco Holdings, LLC v. CT Karka, LLC, Docket No. HHD-CV-21-6149041-S, should not

be dismissed because a final judgment has not entered in that matter. (See

General Statutes § 52-263; State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30, 463 A.2d 566

(1983)).’’ (Footnote omitted.)

2 The appellees did not file a memorandum in response to our July 28,

2021 order. After the appellants filed a memorandum and the deadline

imposed by our order had passed, the appellees filed a motion for leave to

respond to the appellants’ memorandum. Because we are dismissing this

appeal, no action is necessary on the appellees’ motion for leave.

3 Most of the defendants in the breach of contract case are plaintiffs in

Brookstone Homes, LLC v. Merco Holdings, LLC, Superior Court, judicial

district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-21-6139513-S (lis pendens case). The

sixteen plaintiffs in the lis pendens case are Brookstone Homes, LLC; Bunker

Hill Properties, LLC; Austin Heights CT, LLC; Diamond Court CT, LLC;
Waterbury Plaza, LLC; Valley View Townhouse, LLC; Pine Meadow Townhouse, LLC; Forest Park Apartment Homes, LLC; Forest Park Office Green,

LLC; Briarwood Hills, LLC; Hunters Crossing, LLC; Renwood Apartments,

LLC; Oakridge Realty, LLC; Ivy Woods CT, LLC; Fieldside Apartments, LLC;

and Seramonte Estates, LLC. These sixteen plaintiffs are the appellees in

this appeal.

CT Karka, LLC; CT Deros, LLC; Meknes, LLC; Farmington Real Estate

Holdings, LLC; Renwood Real Estate Holdings, LLC; North Haven Apts, LLC;

Seramonte Estates AB, LLC; Alabama Brook, LLC; Alabama Brook #2, LLC;

and Orohena, LLC are not parties to the lis pendens case but are appellees

in this appeal.

4 See footnote 3 of this opinion.

5 General Statutes § 52-325c provides: ‘‘(a) Any order entered as provided

in subsection (b) of section 52-325b shall be deemed a final judgment for

the purpose of appeal.

‘‘(b) No appeal shall be taken from such order except within seven days

thereof. The effect of such order shall be automatically stayed for such

seven-day period. If an appeal is taken within such seven-day period, the

party taking such appeal may, within such period, file an application with

the clerk of the court in which such order was issued, requesting a stay of

the effect of such order pending such appeal, which application shall set

forth the reasons for such request. A copy of such application shall be sent

to the adverse party by the applicant. Upon the filing of such application,

the effect of such order shall be further stayed until a decision is rendered

thereon. A hearing on such application shall be held promptly. Such order

shall be stayed if the party taking such appeal posts a bond, as provided in

subsection (c) of this section.

‘‘(c) Upon the hearing on such application, the court shall: (1) Upon

motion of the party taking the appeal set an amount of bond with surety

for the stay of such order as provided in subsection (b) of this section,

which amount shall be as the court deems sufficient to indemnify the adverse

party for any damages which may result from the stay. If the party taking

the appeal gives such bond the order shall be stayed; or (2) grant the stay;

or (3) deny the stay; or (4) condition the granting of the stay upon the giving

of such a bond.

‘‘(d) Any order of discharge or any order of any stay shall take effect

upon recording of a certified copy thereof in the office of the town clerk

in which such notice of lis pendens was recorded. The clerk of the court

in which any such order is issued shall not deliver any certified copies

thereof until the time for taking an appeal has elapsed or, if an appeal is

taken and an application for a stay of such order is filed, until such time

as a decision granting or denying such stay has been rendered.

‘‘(e) When a certified copy of such order of discharge of notice of lis

pendens has been recorded, such discharged notice of lis pendens shall not

be deemed to constitute constructive notice of the claim of the party

recording such notice to any third party who acquires his interest in the

particular property either before or after the recording of such discharge.’’

6

‘‘Except where otherwise provided by statute or other law, proceedings

to enforce or carry out the judgment or order shall be automatically stayed

until the time to file an appeal has expired. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Practice

Book § 61-11 (a).