of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts . The views

expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position

of the Department of Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for

public release.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Brungess, James R.

Setting the context : suppression ofenemy air defenses andjoint war fighting in

an uncertain world / James R. Brungess .

p. 242.

Includes index.

1 . Air interdiction-United States. 2. Unified operations (Military science)-

United States. 3 . World politics-1989-

I . Mile.

UG703.1378 1994 94-19404

355.4'22-dc20 CIP

For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents

US Government Printing Office

Washington, DC 20402

1.1.
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

1 HISTORY AND DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Evolutionary Construct . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Bekaa Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Persian Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

The Larger Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

2 CRITERIA FORASSESSING SEAD

EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Methods of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

The Historical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 55

The Engineering Approach . . . . . . . . . . 58

The Commonsense Approach . . . . . . . . . 65

The Objective-based Approach . . . . . . . . 69

Setting the Context: Continuums as

Assessment Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Challenges for Objective-based Criteria . . . . . 89

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

3 SERVICE APPROACHES TO SEAD . . . . . . . . 93

Navy SEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

Air Force SEAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Army SEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Marine SEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

4 THE MERITS OF JSEAD: THE QUESTTO

ACHIEVE EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

The Personality of JSEAD and the Threat . . . . 129

The World of "Joint" and JSEAD . . . . . . . . 135

iii
The Four Continuums: How to Use Them . . . . 143

The Need-/Resource-based Continuum . . . 144

The Threat-/Capability-based Continuum . . 147

The Piecemeal/Integrated Tactics

Continuum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

The Defensive/Offensive Continuum . . . . . 150

The General Context: ANew Way of Looking

at JSEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

5 JSEAD: STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND THE

CHANGED THREAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

The Essence of the Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Requirements of the Information-based IADS . 170

Detecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Locating and Identifying . . . . . . . . . . . 171

Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Weapons Allocation and Employment . . . . 176

Defeating the LADS: Information Denial . . . . . 180

Detection as Information . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Locating and Identifying as Information . . . 183

Information Denial in the "Endgame. . . . . . 184

Adjusting to Fiscal Reality . . . . . . . . . . . 187

SEAD Tactics: Variations, Combinations,

and Innovations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

Variations : The "IADS Sweep. . . . . . . . . 192

Combining Old Tactics: SEAD and the

Modern Long-Range SAM . . . . . . . . . . . 196

Innovations: Information Denial via

Computer Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Joint SEAD Strategy: Dividing the Turf . . . . . 200

JSEAD Tactics: So What? . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

6 WHERE TO NEXT: CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

SEAD as an Evolutionary Concept . . . . . . 208

Requirement for a Paradigm Shift . . . . . . 208

The Lead/Lag Issue: Joint Doctrine and

JSEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

iv
Stg te ocus oCtea 

Overall Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

Full Circle : The Strategy-Doctrine-Tactics

Continuum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

Illustrations

Figure r

1 Real versus Perceived SEAR Threat . . . . . . . . xiv

2 Historical Benchmark/Variable Matrix . . . . . . 4

3 Doctrine/Strategy/Tactics Relationships . . . . . 10

4 Evolution of Air Force SEAR Relationships . . . . 12

5 Hierarchical/Linear Decision-making Model . . . 64

6 Evolution of Criteria/MOE Approaches . . . . . . 71

7 Traditional Vertical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

8 Cybernetic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

9 The Cybernetic Process and the Four

Continuums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

10 Piecemeal/Integrated Continuum . . . . . . . . . 82

11 Need-based/Resource-based Continuum . . . . . 84

12 Threat-based/Capability-based Continuum . . . 86

13 Defensive/Offensive Continuum and

Clausewitzian Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

14 Structural Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

15 Effects of Rapid Change on SEAD . . . . . . . . . 103

16 Linear versus Nonlinear SEAD Tactics Evolution . 133

17 Differences between Vertical and Cybernetic

Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

18 The Tension between Joint and Single-Service

SEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

V
eed/esoucebased Cotuu

20 Threat-/Capability-based Continuum . . . . . . . 148

21 Piecemeal/Integrated Continuum . . . . . . . . . 149

22 Defensive/Offensive Continuum . . . . . . . . . 151

23 JSEAD Planning Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

24 Evolution of Information-based LADS . . . . . . . 166

25 The Integrated Air Defense System Sweep . . . . 193

26 Attacking the Modern Long-Range SAM . . . . . . 197

27 Evolution of Army/Air Force SEAD Turf . . . . . . 201

28 The JFACC's JSEAD Organization . . . . . . . . 218

Table

1 Vietnam War Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2 Bekaa Valley Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

3 Libya Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

4 Gulf War Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

5 Evolutionary Trends in SEAD : ABrief

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

6 Comparison of Cold War to Post-Cold

War SEAR Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

7 Comparison of Critical MOE Approaches . . . . . 73

8 Airlnand Battle-Future Key Systems . . . . . . . . 116

9 Differences between Airlnand Battle and

Airland Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

10 Traits of Modern LADS Weapons . . . . . . . . . . 177

11 Comparison of Old to New SEAD Paradigm . . . . 209

Vi
Foreword

Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAR) has long been a

critical concern to advocates of air power. It is especially

critical to Pacific Air Forces because air power offers a primary

means of responding rapidly and effectively to areas of conflict

within the Pacific arena.

Lt Col James R. Brungess was selected in February 1991 to

conduct research into developing joint SEAD tactics that

would be useful in the Pacific Command area of

operations-specifically for the Far Eastern Military District of

the Soviet Union. We deemed it an important subject, and

Colonel Brungess had the necessary credentials to conduct

the study. The world, however, changed dramatically while he

was conducting his study. This altered both the character and

direction of his research effort . In a few short months from

March to December 1991, the United States entered a new era

heralded by Desert Storm and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the span of less than a year, the United States Air Force

vindicated the time-honored doctrine and strategies of air

power in Desert Storm and lost its most powerful adversary

with the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991 . While

the same weapons continue to exist, these events have

irreversibly changed the context in which they will be used.

Both events have not only changed the shape of the world;

they have forever altered the way we look at air power and,

more importantly, the way we must use air power.

Setting the Context: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and

Joint War Fighting in an Uncertain World explains why SEAD

has changed the basic fabric of air warfare. In discussing the

familiar themes of the past and the emerging paradigms of the

future, Colonel Brungess weaves a web of changing interrelationships among services, politico-military structures, and

research and development strategies, as well as developing a

novel methodology for assessing events critical to air power's

future. It places SEAD within the context of a changed world

by defining relationships, explaining evolutionary patterns,

and establishing a criterion to measure success, as well as

pointing the way for future acquisitions, research, and joint

Vii
eed to go 

This is an important book. It not only provides scholarly

research on historical and pragmatic issues, it grapples with

key issues affecting real warfighters fighting real wars-the

kind of information that tacticians and strategists can use to

save lives and win wars. You will find the book intellectually

challenging and exhilarating; Colonel Brungess has provided

new ways of looking at new phenomena as well as an iterative,

logical way of relating SEAR to the past.

Without a doubt, the most important feature of the book is

its emphasis on the continued importance of SEAD to air

power. Colonel Brungess provides a compelling argument that

the technological cat-and-mouse game between air attacker

and ground defender will accelerate over the next several

decades. This will occur, paradoxically, during times of peace,

and not because of national policy but because of

international market forces. The evolution of air defense

technology is only beginning to share in the same technology

that has made air power preeminent, and, in times of

dwindling fiscal resources, this is something for the air warrior

to worry about. We need to make the most of what we have .

Setting the Context gives us some good ideas to get the most

from our air power defense dollar in terms of electronic combat

and SEAD.

I urge you to read this book carefully. It provides a unique

and original view into the world of electronic combat and

SEAD that will enrich as well as inform. To use the author's

words, "For the brief while that the world may give us, now is

the time to reflect on our purposes and the time to create

visions of the future-a future we have a golden opportunity to

influence, to build, and to protect."
Lt Col James R. Brungess holds a master of arts degree in

international relations from the University of Southern

California, United Kingdom Program. He is a career electronic

warfare officer (EWO) with extensive experience in tactical

aviation. He has flown in all three tactical air forces-Tactical

Air Command (TAC), United States Air Force Europe (USAFE),

and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)-and served on the staffs of two

of them. Colonel Brungess began his EWO career as an

AC-130A/H gunship "black crow" in Thailand . He was

responsible for the defense of the AC-130 from radar-guided

weapons. Colonel Brungess served from 1975 to 1986 as a

squadron EWO for four separate F-111 and EF-111 squadrons,

among numerous other responsibilities . In 1981 he was

selected for the EF-111 initial cadre where he helped to

develop EF-111 tactics and spearheaded major initiatives to

integrate EF-111 aircraft into the general tactics schemes of

other fighter aircraft. Since 1986, Colonel Brungess has served

on the staffs of TAC and PACAF as a functional manager for

the EF-111 and F-4G. In 1988 he was selected as chief of the

electronic combat division, and he became deputy director of

tactical operations for the Pacific Air Forces in 1990. Having

completed Air War College (AWC) as a member of the class of

1992, Colonel Brungess formerly served on the AWC faculty as

a defense economics instructor and currently serves as

director of the AWC Professional Writing Program and chief of

the Curriculum Support Branch.

ix
f,
Preface

This study is conceptual. Originally, it was to focus on the

specific air defense suppression problems that Pacific

Command (PACOM) would face over the next few years with

specific attention being paid to North Korea and the Far

Eastern military district of the Soviet Union . In December

1991 the Soviet Union disappeared. It no longer makes sense

to focus on the specifics of joint suppression of enemy air

defenses (JSEAD) strategies and tactics in PACOM when the

entire world has changed. It makes much more sense to

establish a context where new relationships between strategy

and tactics-and between the evolutionary trends in

technology and the uncertain international environment-can

be illustrated as a first step in reclaiming a rational grip on a

radically changed world.

No matter what the traditional underpinnings of suppression

of enemy air defenses (SEAD) have been, the changed world

has not diminished SEAD's increasing importance . If

anything, SEAD's stock has increased dramatically. Air power

has become the hallmark of executing national military power,

and, consequently, SEAR fords itself as a precious commodity

in a shrinking military larder.

The technological revolution of the late twentieth century

seems to be gradually giving way to the information

revolution-a revolution that will propel us into the twentyfirst century. The speed of information interchange and the

compelling power of international economic interdependence

have reshaped the way we-and the rest of the world-can

acquire military power, the way we look at "the threat," and

the basic way air power relates to the changed world.

There is nothing new about suppressing air defenses as a

strategic or tactical concept, but the changed world environment

has radically altered the traditional relationships SEAD once

had . SEAD still performs its classic roles, but because it is

part of the information revolution itself, it performs them

pervasively and quickly. Other functions simply have not had

time to catch up .
reality using terms that probably no longer apply; more than

anything else, we need measurement tools to make sense of

what has happened . This study is an attempt to provide those

tools and to seek a context that helps us understand our

changed circumstances.
Introduction

Defense suppression is nothing new. It has existed as a

concept ever since warriors sought to destroy the enemy's

ability to defend against attack. Suppression of enemy air

defenses (SEAD) is the latest iteration of the defense suppression

concept; its application to air power as a fundamental element

in protecting friendly air attackers and destroying the enemy's

ability to defend against air attack is the result of a long and

natural evolutionary process. The evolution of war, however,

has harnessed technology itself and accelerated SEAD's

evolutionary process almost immeasurably. The impacts of

technology, environment, available resources, national

objectives, and time have influenced what SEAD is and-more

specifically for this study-what it can and should become.

Air power, as a product of technology, has grown from

oblivion to become a key element of power projection in 80

short years . SEAD, having grown along with it, has become

one of air power's prime enablers. SEAD has been propelled by

the same evolutionary forces that shaped air power, but it was

the surprising growth of enemy air defense technologies and

defensive tactics that gave SEAD its special impetus and its

growing importance as an element in air power application.

Just as air power has enabled immediate military force

projection, SEAD has enabled air power by giving it

untrammeled use of the skies over the battlefield . Denial of the

SEAD tool-or even diminished emphasis-in modern war would

be devastating to the nation's power projection capability.

The purpose of this study is to make sense of what is

happening in the world US forces face now and will face in the

future. The threat may be unknown, it may be diffuse and

undefinable, but it exists. As long as war is a feature of the

international geopolitical landscape, the likelihood of US

involvement is very high. Characteristics of the modern world

are its immediacy and the speed with which events move. This

makes air power a natural instrument of national power in

influencing events . But air power's effect is blunted

significantly when adequate SEAD measures are not taken.

XL11
teat ease eateat s epeseted by te apd

growth of sophisticated air defense technologies worldwide.

There is at the same time a tangible movement to divest US

forces of SEAD technologies and assets required to suppress

the modern-if diffuse and undefined-air defense threat.

Figure 1 shows the dilemma clearly. In the top graph, the

perception of the diminished threat leads to the logical

conclusion that forces can be cut back. The bottom graph

shows the real threat with respect to SEAD. While relative US
unknown time in the future-assuming the trend continuesUS SEAD will be unable to defend US air power. Clearly, the

SEAD community must prevent this from happening.

There are several themes that pervade this study. One of

these is that SEAD is at the leading edge of air power's

technological revolution. Another is that SEAD is expanding

its traditional boundaries and is gradually infusing itself into

the basic day-to-day tactics and strategies of air power

practitioners. A third is that our basic way of looking at

decision-making structures and measuring effectiveness with

respect to SEAD needs to change to fit the real world; in short,

we need to build a new frame of reference. A fourth theme is

that SEAD forces a focus on objectives rather than authority,

resulting in a natural bridge to conduct true "joint" SEAD

applications . Greater joint cooperation among the services is

not only mandated, it is desirable and necessary for effective

future SEAD application on the battlefield .

There are six chapters in this study. Chapter 1 begins by

taking a historical look at the foundations of SEAD, identifying

pertinent variables, and tracing them through to the present

to determine how they have changed.

Ten variables are traced through four historical benchmarks

in the evolution of SEAD. The historical examination also

explores the relationship between SEAD's growth and SEAD

doctrine development.

Chapter 2 examines the development of meaningful criteria

and measurements of effectiveness by which SEAD can be

assessed . The chapter offers some suggestions on new criteria

constructs-called "objective-based" criteria-that may prove

useful in assessing the relative value of SEAD doctrine,

strategy, tactics, and equipment. The examination details the

evolution of approaches to SEAD criteria development by

building four categories and following the growth and decline

of each. The chapter also introduces a new tool for assessing

change : the use of four specific continuums where the

services' SEAD contributions can be placed with respect to

each other. These continuums are distillations of the 10

variables in chapter 1 and form the basis of evaluation of both

single-service andjoint SEAD in subsequent chapters.
of SEAD has implications for joint SEAR application . It:

primary themes are that each service applies SEAD accordin¬

to its view of air power and that these views are converging

This knowledge is beneficial in two ways. First, by knowin¬

how each service views the contribution of SEAD to its fighting

doctrine, other services can employ their SEAD asset:

accordingly. Second, by each service knowing how SEAD fit:

into the other services' doctrinal frames of reference, all car

gain a clearer view of what joint SEAD may look like .

Chapter 4 assesses the value ofjoint SEAD and shows ho,"

each of the services fits with respect to the continuum:

introduced in chapter 2. The principal themes of this chapter

are that the movement toward joint SEAD is a natura:

outgrowth of converging service views on the use of air power

and that JSEAD offers opportunities for enhanced air power

effectiveness not available under single-service SEAT

applications .

Chapter 5 is an analysis of the future threat and of holA

JSEAD strategies and tactics can be galvanized to defeat the

threat. The key theme is that the integrated air defense

systems (IADS) of the future will combine with enema

command, control, and communications (C3) functions intc

one gigantic, cohesive net. The primary driver of this net is the

ability to transfer information rapidly. Information is the

lifeblood of the future threat; therefore, tactics and strategie:

aimed at information denial will cripple the future LADS net

The chapter goes on to suggest some specific JSEAD tactic :

based on information-denial strategies .

Chapter 6 is divided into three sections. The first section tie:

the themes together through a series of conclusions. The

evolutionary theme predominates, but the chapter suggest:

that SEAD practitioners need to build an entirely ne'"

paradigm that accounts for the world as it really is, not as ii

was, or as SEAD practitioners wish it to be. This section alsc

suggests that criteria development must focus on visionar3

objectives rather than short-term goals .

The second part of chapter 6 offers a series of recommendations that follow the general "train, equip, and organize'

purpose statements of the peacetime military . These

recommendations also suggest that education as well a:

Xvi
and military environment and to retain competence in

developing, building, and operating sophisticated SEAD

weapons. The chapter recognizes that there is a bonding

among strategy, tactics, and doctrine that seems to have gone

full circle when viewed against the entire backdrop of military

history. Maybe-as fundamental as the changes are in the

world of SEAD-a larger framework is in operation that seeks

equilibrium according to a set ofvariables that are imperceptible,

perhaps unknowable .

If air power is a child of technology, then SEAD is surely a

stepchild. Arguably, the most important technological advance

in warfare-excepting aerospace and nuclear weapons-is the

employment of the electromagnetic spectrum in the service of

warfare. Just as aircraft reduced the field of combat from the

context of distance and refrained it in terms of time, electronic

combat has refrained the air power world of minutes and

seconds into microseconds and nanoseconds .

SEAD's job in the future will be to cripple the informationbased LADS net of a potential adversary before it has a chance

to react and to keep it off balance until air power objectives

can be met. The job will not be easy in light of political and

economic challenges to the robust technology base needed to

support the future effort. SEAD practitioners must state their

case in terms of overall objectives and final outcomes rather

than in technical jargon and short-term desires .

The stakes are high and getting higher. US military power

faces its biggest challenge in a world where technology access

continues to level the playing field. We will need every edge to

maintain air superiority in future conflicts ; having a potent,

viable SEAD option may well be the determining factor.

Xvi
F
History and Doctrine

Embedded in the concept of suppression of enemy air

defenses' (SEAD) evolutionary process is the historical viewthe idea that SEAD began at an identifiable point in time and

progressed through identifiable transitions . More pertinent is

the idea that the process continues, that it has trends, and

that it can be directed as a function of rational action.

The Evolutionary Construct

This chapter examines four points in time to establish

milestones by which discrete comparisons of similar variables

can be made. An appreciation of these milestones will reveal

where SEAD fits in the larger framework of aerospace warfare

and where it "needs to go" (directed evolution) to meet the

larger objectives of military strategy in the context of defending

the nation. The four periods of time chosen as benchmarks

are : (1) the Vietnam War (1965-73), (2) Israeli operations in

the Bekaa Valley (June 1982), (3) Operation El Dorado

Canyon, Libya (April 1986), and (4) Operation Desert Storm,

Iraq/Kuwait (January-March 1991) .

In defining the time periods, we also must identify measurable

variables to ascertain what changed and in what directions

these changes impelled SEAD concepts . Because the time

periods span almost 30 years of intense political, economic,

and technological change, some of the variables will defy

precise description. Nonetheless, they are precise enough to

convey verifiable changes in direction and to portray a clearly

discernible evolutionary process . These 10 variables are as

follows.

The threat. Ultimately, SEAR is a contest between "us and

them." By understanding and analyzing the enemy's ability to

defend against air attack, we can configure tactics, define

equipment requirements, and establish force and munitions

1
levels . In knowing how the threat has changed, we can better

understand why SEAD has reached its current preeminent status .

Definitional changes. The ways SEAD has come to be defined,

both de facto and institutionally, show the direction and

breadth of its growth.

Tactical application changes. The functional use of concepts

and weapons at this basic level of modern combat is usually

the first place pragmatic fixes to real problems become

apparent. SEAD is no different on this account.

Organizational changes. Using a time-honored dictum from

sociology-that viable constructs exist informally long before

they become institutionalized-we will see how SEAD grew

from necessary informal structure to `institutional status and

how it was composed as a function of the American war-fighting

apparatus in its evolutionary process.

Force structure changes. This is a more specific subset of the

organizational framework that delineates what types of

equipment were purchased to solve the SEAD problem and

how, over the 30-year period of time analyzed, the mix of

aircraft, weapons, and tactics has altered the force structure

with respect to SEAD.

Strategy changes. We will concentrate on general military

strategy as much as possible, though it is in some respects

impossible to ignore the effects of national strategy. SEAD has

had enormous impact on air power strategy both from the

perspective of building a tactical framework to execute it and

as a concept with which to view a potential adversary.

Doctrinal changes. Defined as "what we believe about the

best way to conduct military affairs,"i doctrine has been slow

to change-glacially slow according to some. As doctrine is the

defining enunciation of a large and conservative military

institution, this is understandable . Nonetheless, what changes

have been made reflect the general tenor of SEAD's evolutionary

path.

Technological changes. The forces of technology have

propelled many aspects of warfare, but the most important

advances in air power have been in the uses of the

electromagnetic spectrum and the harnessing of computer

technology. An analysis of how each element of technology has

contributed to the evolution of SEAD is beyond the scope of

2
ts studye most teg eoutoay eatue of tecoogy,

however, may be its unwitting (and often seductive) influences

on weapons acquisition and fiscal resource allocation in the

SEAR arena.

Political changes. These changes are both international and

national. The will of the people as expressed through public

opinion and governmental power structures has modified the

ways in which military force can be applied and has affected

the way SEAD has evolved in some unanticipated ways.

Economic changes. The general health and direction of the

national and international economic milieu have had profound

effects on the amount of capital available to pay for implements

of war, and, consequently, the military has been forced to

prioritize its shopping list. The effects this prioritization has

had and still has on SEAD's evolutionary path is ironic . On the

one hand, it limits the amounts and types of equipment that

may be purchased . On the other hand, since the SEAD task

must be accomplished to prosecute war to a favorable

planner's conclusion, limiting resources has forced SEAD

planners to become more creative in their approaches.

Isolating each of the above variables would be impossible as

each is related in some way to the others. Numerous authors

indicate that the relative influence of each of these variables

on strategy, doctrine, operational art, and tactics changes

dramatically from situation to situattonn 2 Very few authors,

however, delineate what forces determine the factors that

dictate which variable will be preeminent in which

situation-except with the obvious benefit of historical hindsight. Also, not all the factors pertain to the historical situations

analyzed.

The matrix in figure 2, which is formed by combining

historical benchmarks and pertinent variables, not only plots

change over time but indicates the direction of each variable,

defines trends, and shows how some basic relationships

among the variables have changed over the last 30 years . The

matrix can provide realistic options open to us in the

refraining of SEAD concepts. The matrix maps some general

concepts and examines the historical references in an attempt

to substantiate the general trends presented. The matrix's

structure is presented in figure 2.

3
Vietnam

SEAD in Vietnam grew from a very simple fact: US forces

were losing a large number of aircraft to various elements of

he North Vietnamese air defense structure . There are three

phases of the air war in Vietnam with which we will deal:

Rolling Thunder, Linebacker 1, and Linebacker 11 . Each was

accompanied by a shift in military strategy and tactical focus . 3

Each phase also illustrated the growth of SEAD . Rolling

Thunder had as its military objective an interdiction campaign

to restrict the flow of supplies to the Vietcong inside South

Vietnam. The national command authorities (NCA) hampered

this effort by restricting American forces from attacking key

targets and by failing to define a strategy in more precise

military terms. The NCA's military objectives were unclear. 4

This period extended from December 1964 to the summer of

1968 and was characterized by piecemeal SEAD tactics. The

defenses around the immediate target area were attacked as a

function of the target, not as an element of the enemy's overall

air defense structure .

As early as November 1964, American intelligence knew of

Hanoi's efforts to build an air defense system based on "air

deniability" wherein

4
tey used their total air defense system as an integrated entity to

prevent the US Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps from doing what

they wanted to do in the skies over North Vietnam. Air deniability, as a

strategy, was a lower, more basic form of warfare constituting, in its

essence, a people's war in the air. 5

The American tactical response to "air deniability"

considerably lagged the intelligence estimate . American

tacticians and strategists apparently did not see the need to

develop an air campaign against the North Vietnamese

integrated air defense system (IADS) . In fact, they did not create

specific SEAD tactics against any of the various elements of

the North Vietnamese LADS until American air power began

losing large numbers of aircraft to "the threat." 6 On 24 July

1965, an SA-2 brought down an F-4C. By the end of 1965, the

North Vietnamese had constructed more than 60 surface-to-air

missile (SAM) sites in the North and had brought down 25 of

the 171 aircraft lost over the North that year. The North

Vietnamese scored a hit for every 13 missiles fired.?

The definition of SEAD was tied directly to the immediate

threat in order to protect fighter-bombers tasked against

specific targets . The definition was defensive and reactive in

nature . This definition, however, gradually expanded to

include the development of a special mission-the "Wild

Weasel" mission and the introduction of specially modified

F-100s . The first Wild Weasels were equipped with

rudimentary detection equipment to locate the radar-directed

SAM and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and to bomb the sites.

This mission was extremely hazardous, and aircraft losses

kept mounting.

The excessive loss of American aircraft to surface-to-air

missile systems spurred the deployment of a special task force

that delineated SAM vulnerabilities in 1966. The results were

threefold: (1) the continued development of specialized aircraft

and equipment dedicated to suppressing the radar-directed

threat (SA-2, SA-3, various AAA radars) by detecting,

identifying, and locating the emitter; (2) the continued use of

antiradiation missiles (ARM) that used the emitters'

electromagnetic signature as a homing point; and (3) a

detailed analysis of the enemy systems' vulnerabilities, which

could be used by fighter-bomber aircrews to defend themselves

5
when under attack. For instance, the SA-2 Guideline missile

was known to be slow-reacting in flight. If detected, certain

aircraft maneuvers at the appropriate time would cause the

missile to overshoot. Additionally, these early vintage systems

were observed to have poor low-altitude capability (a range

extending from ground level to about 1,500 feet) .

Unfortunately, the tactical "cure" to this essentially medium

altitude threat (nominally 1,500 feet) was to develop bombing

tactics in the low-altitude regime. The reaction of pursuing

low-altitude tactics in the target area appears peremptory in

hindsight. As the medium-altitude regime was "denied" to

them, aircrews avoided the threat by flying less than 1,500

feet above the ground. This "cure" placed American fighter

aircraft in the heart of numerous AAA batteries' lethal

envelopes . During Rolling Thunder, AAA accounted for

approximately 85 percent of all aircraft losses .$ The US

"tactical response" that drove American attack aircraft to these

daytime low-altitude operations appears, in retrospect, to have

worked more to the advantage of the North Vietnamese's "air

deniability" strategy than it did for air superiority as espoused

by US air doctrine of the time.

After a series of modifications to various other aircraft

proved undesirable for the specialized SEAD role, the Air Force

chose the F- 105G to perform the Wild Weasel mission. The

F-105G was equipped with specialized electronic devices that

allowed it to detect, identify, and locate SA-2 sites, some

radar-directed AAA sites, and, later in the war, SA-3 sites.

Armed with the AGM-45 Shrike ARM (a relatively short-ranged

missile with a low single-shot probability of kill against the

targeted emitter) and the longer-ranged, much more capable

AGM-78 Standard ARM, the F- 105G proved to be a very

formidable system . Studies performed by the Air Force

Electronic Warfare Center indicate, ironically, that the greatest

suppression element the Wild Weasel possessed was

psychological . 9 As much as 95 percent of its effectiveness may

have been attributable to this phenomenon . When SAM

operators suspected an F-105G to be in the area, they would

simply turn off their radar rather than be a willing target.

Although turning off the radar prevented the site's destruction,

it also gave the attacking aircraft safe passage to and from

6
their targets . No matter what positive effect this tactic had, the

primary focus of the SEAD mission at this stage of the war was

strictly as a function of the individual mission, not part of a

concerted, coherent plan to destroy the enemy's air defense

assets prior to mounting an offensive air campaign.

The narrow tactical focus used by tactics planners

espousing piecemeal tactics directed at single sites-one at a

time-is curious in that American intelligence knew how the

North Vietnamese configured their IADS. US intelligence knew

that these systems were the nascent manifestations of an

integrated structure, not just random point-defense systems

for high-priority targets. Intelligence ' analysts also suspected

the reason for configuring the North Vietnamese air defense

net in that way well before the bulk of US air power was

committed to purposeful action. Oddly, US intelligence either

failed to tell battlefield commanders the effects of such an

IADS structure on attacking aircraft or battlefield commanders

failed to appreciate the implications of such an enemy

structure. The US failure to appreciate the overall strategic

picture the North Vietnamese concept of air deniability

represented was also a failure to adjust American doctrine and

strategy to the realities of an enemy's changing technological

environment. Even though US tacticians knew the enemy had

made an effective move in the technological chess game,

American decision makers, while apparently possessing

knowledge of the overall picture, knowingly remained a move

behind. The Korean doctrine, which drew a clear distinction

between air superiority and interdiction missions-and did not

even address SEAD per se-obscured the integrated nature of

the threat, rudimentary though it may have been. The overall

mental construct, which would have allowed a truer picture of

events, did not exist during the early phases of the Vietnam

War, and while there were visionaries among some tacticians,

these visionaries were not yet among the generals.

The implications of air deniability were important to the

definitional growth of SEAD . Gradually, US technological

capability enabled aircraft to receive equipment that

significantly altered SEAD tactics . These technological

advances were represented by the introduction of the F-105G

Wild Weasel, the AGM-45 Shrike, AGM-78 Standard ARM, the

7
EB-66, and the EA-6 radar jamming aircraft. These additions

made it possible to develop a wide array of tactics ranging from

the relatively unsophisticated Iron Hand tactic of using aircraft

to find and bomb SAM sites to more elaborate "hunter-killer"

defense suppression tactics that teamed fighter bombers and

Wild Weasels.)° With the new equipment and tactics, SEAD

expanded to include attacking the enemy's radars using

electromagnetic means (jamming) as well as destructive means

(ABMs and iron bombs). However, strategists still considered

SEAR as a one-on-one function-one SEAD asset for a specific

target defense system-rather than a concept that sought to

degrade the entire IADS apparatus. Not until the development

of more formal organizational structures that specialize in the

SEAD and electronic warfare (EW) functions will more

encompassing tactics have an institutional voice with which to

espouse these concepts .

Linebacker I (around April-October 1972) did little to alter

the basic definitions even though tactics and equipment had

undergone considerable evolution . Decision makers still

labored with a conceptual framework mired in strategic dogma

that lagged behind the tactical realities of air deniability.

During the technological chess game between the US and

the Soviet-equipped North Vietnamese, a qualitative change

took place in the North Vietnamese IADS that the US was slow

to recognize. The strategy of air deniability in mid-1968

included 250 ground controlled interceptors (GCI), 1,500

radar-directed and optical AAA sites, and over 300 SAM sites

netted together by a centrally controlled and directed

integrated structure ." A sophisticated early-warning radar net

consisting of the latest Soviet radars, communications

apparatus, passive detection nets, and intelligence-gathering

agencies fed an increasingly integrated air defense network.

From the North Vietnamese view, the IADS was an indivisible

organization composed of interdependent, interlocking parts

comprising a complete "nervous system" and associated

striking "muscle." 12

By the end of Linebacker I, the North Vietnamese had

reduced American air-to-air kill ratios from 2.2-to-1 to less

than 2-to-1 .5. During the summer and fall of 1968, there were

periods when the North Vietnamese enjoyed a better than

8
toato3 s as a dect 

IADS efficiency and an apparent American inability to adjust

tactics to meet the situation. On the positive side of the scale,

only 14 aircraft losses between 10 May and 23 October 1968

(when Linebacker I ended) were due to SAMS while 27 were

lost to enemy interceptors . 14 Wild Weasels and defense

suppression raids against particular SAM sites were effective.

The dilemma this situation posed-where one aspect of the

enemy IADS was beaten down only to be supplanted by

another-might better have been approached if SEAD had

been directed at the entire LADS-including ground controlled

interception-as opposed to an arbitrary separation of missions

imposed by the "roles-and-missions" doctrine of the time .

Linebacker II (the 11-day air campaign over North Vietnam,

18-30 December 1972) introduced a new element into the

already muddled arena: the use of Strategic Air Command

(SAC) B-52s against the North Vietnamese IADS using

SAC-only tactics . While the B-52 possessed a formidable EW

capability against specific radar threats, it had never faced the

wrath of the integrated North Vietnamese IADS of Hanoi and

Haiphong. While Tactical Air Force (TAF) assets had amassed

a wealth of knowledge on how to deal with the SA-2 threat,

little of this knowledge was transferred to SAC aircrews. SAC

carried the preponderance of the campaign. Unfortunately, the

combination of poor tactics, a strong dose of overconfidence, 15

and a failure to integrate tactical SEAD resources with

strategic assets resulted in the loss of 11 B-52s to SA-2s by

the end of the fifth night of operations.

16 It was not until 26

December 1972 that air campaign planners made the decision

to commence "an all-out attack on the North Vietnamese air

defenses." 17 Once the LADS was defeated, it took three days to

bring the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table. A curious

footnote to the history of SEAD is that the first all-out SEAD

campaign against an enemy LADS came at the very end of the

Linebacker II air campaign as opposed to the beginning of it .

The recognition that by making the enemy defenseless to air

attack one was in a much better position to bargain and to

fight came very late to those who waged air war against

Vietnam. As clear a lesson as it appeared to be at the time, it

9
as a essote saes oud eea

in the Yom Kippur 

a

of October 1973.

The extensive use of the electromagnetic spectrum as an

aid to prosecuting war reached maturity with the Vietnam

War. Electronic warfare-as waged by both the North

Vietnamese and the Americans-was a harbinger of events to

come. SEAD, as a concept, appears to have been a bonding

element in tactics, strategy, and doctrine between electronic

warfare and air superiority. In some ways, SEAD as practiced

at the end of Linebacker II laid the groundwork for JSEAD in

the post-Desert Storm military. Figure 3 shows how the

war-fighting relationships among doctrine, strategy, and

tactics were affected by SEAD.

SEAD also seems to have undergone parallel (and convergent)

evolution in doctrine, strategy, and tactics. As a strategic

element, it made sense. A concerted effort to destroy or deny

the enemy's ability to detect, track, and fire on attacking

aircraft would have a withering effect on the enemy's ability to

pursue war aims as well as the enemy's will to continue. As a

tactical element, the rapid suppression of enemy SAM

emplacements and AAA sites using unpredictable patterns of
epoyet oud peet te eey oeeseg te

tactical initiative . At the doctrinal level, a blend of SEAD

strategies and air superiority tactics seems to offer an effective

alternative to blunting an enemy's ability to wage war by

neutralizing the enemy's means of protection from air attack.

SEAD patterns from Vietnam offer a pattern of convergence.

As figure 3 shows, SEAD is a function of electronic warfare as

well as a function of overall strategy and doctrine . Oddly, the

conclusion of Linebacker 11 serves as an example of

SEAD-driven doctrine. The tactical requirements of the war

forced the use of piecemeal tactics that gradually worked their

way into strategy and ultimately surfaced as part of the

doctrinal lexicon. In short, SEAD poihted the way to how the

campaign would be won not as a function of doctrine but as a

"nuts-and-bolts" method of getting the job done (tactics) .

Unlike electronic warfare and command, control, and

communication countermeasures (C3CM) which emphasize the

technical aspects of manipulating the electromagnetic

environment, SEAD's initial impetus stemmed from the

fighter-bomber community's need to answer a specific

defensive requirement. The recognition that SEAD served both

"tactical" and "electronic warfare" interests may have served as

a catalyst in bonding EW, C3CM, and SEAD under the

umbrella of electronic combat (EC). The enemy's use of the

electromagnetic spectrum to track and shoot down friendly

aircraft was a serious problem, and the requirement to

neutralize it spurred vigorous activity in both the traditional

technical EC areas and the pragmatic world of fighter tactics .

The fusion of SEAD concerns to strategy also created a natural

bridge to transmit strategic objectives to clear tactical goals .

Figure 4 shows the evolutionary relationship among EW,

C3CM, and SEAD. The evolutionary trend shows that the

separate areas had come much closer together by the end of

the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War was a vehicle for the

evolution of SEAD mostly because it spanned such a long

period of time. For that reason, we can compare what SEAD

was at the beginning with what it became by the end of the

conflict .

Table 1 is a matrix of SEAD's evolution during the Vietnam

War. A number of patterns emerge from this presentation.

11

First is the concept that SEAR evolved from a one-on-one

defensive tactic of protecting friendly aircraft prosecuting

offensive strategies to a strategy aimed at destroying the

enemy's defensive ability during an air attack. Second is the

effect accelerating technology had on the cost of war and the

integration of operations. Third is the tactical emphasis SEAD

placed on seizing the initiative-that is, obligating the enemy

to behave in predictable ways and taking advantage of the

opportunities provided . Fourth is the fact that SEAD, because

of its target-specific nature, obliged decision makers to define

objectives in terms that were translatable to targets, times,

and specific rules of engagement. Fifth is that in the debate

between defensive and offensive precepts of waging war, SEAD

brought back into balance a strategy that had been shifted

toward unprotected use of air assets .

Table 1 summarizes the development of SEAD during the

Vietnam War against each of the 10 variables given earlier in

figure 2. Because the war was so long, reaction to technological

innovation by Soviet and US weapons designers had a profound

impact on SEAD. For this reason, the matrix portrays SEAD's

development at the beginning and end of the conflict.

Table 1

Vietnam War Matrix

Air Deniability versus Air Superiority : 1965-73

1965 1973

Threat Limited SA-2 coverage (60 sites), Fully integrated air defense system ; ingrowing AAA presence, beginnings troduction of SA-3, SA-7 radar-directed

of air interceptor force (less than AAA; better trained pilots. More than

100) . 300 SAM sites, 1,500 AAA sites, 250

MiG-7, -19, -21 .

Naval presence limited to gun boats.

Definitions SEAD not defined as a role or mission. Related to destruction of ground-based

radar-directed air defense systems via

antiradiation missiles.

Clearly a support role .

Tactics Reactive, not part of overall plan . Still reactive, but becoming more integrated . Innovations of Iron Hand and

Piecemeal; specific target and mis- hunter-killer teams. SEAD campaign of

sion related. 26 Dec 72 first concerted effort to target TADS .

13
Table 1 (contd)

1965 1973

Primarily defensive . Stand-off weapons preferred . Jamming

viewed as separate tactic.

Organization None. SEAD, per se, did not exist ex- F-105Gs/EB-66s organized separately .

cept as a defensive consideration . No integration . Specialized planning

cell developed to task both assets.

Electronic surveillance measures

treated separately.

Overall command and control structure

very complex . Chain of command and

authority confusing, not clear-cut .

Force Air Force aircraft optimized for strate- Afr Force adapts F-4, A-7 aircraft for

Structure gic warfare . F-105 not configured as tactical operations . Specialized aircraft

maneuverable fighter . F-100, F-102, modified from F-1 00s and F-1 05s.

configured as strategic interceptors,

not fighter bombers . Navy aircraft (F-4, F-105Gs/EB-66s formed as separate

A-4, A-6, A-7) configured for tactical squadrons.

warfare . Strategic aircraft (B-52)

used in area interdiction .

Strategy Nuclear deterrence . Defense sup- Strategic conventional war, using tactipression function of B-52 nuclear cal and strategic assets interchangeably .

strike, self-contained . Carry over SEAD integrated into destruction of

from Mitchell/Douhet, the impregna- N . Vietnamese infrastructure as funcble bomber. tion of overall plan .

Initial Vietnam air strategy indetermi- SEAD strategy responsive to technolnate . Could not bomb critical supply ogy. Initially restricted to Iron Hand

targets due to political restructions . strategies to get close enough to emLimited to interdiction of supply ploy ARMs.

routes in S. Vietnam.

No clear objective . No way of determining effectiveness of strategy.

Dec 72 destruction of IADS seen separate from SEAD; campaign used more

than SEAD assets .

Failed to recognize/respond to "air

deniability" strategy of N. Vietnamese.

Doctrine AFM 1-1, dated 14 Aug 64, stressed AFM 1-1, dated 28 Sep 71, stresses

strategic nuclear strike and deter- flexible response . Seeks to balance

rence concepts . Tactical offensive/ conventional/strategic options . Dedefensive considerations in conven- fense suppression/ electronic warfare

tional war treated lightly . noted as support roles.

Technology Introduction of large-scale radar-di- SA-2s increase frequency coverage,

rected threats . Pulsed radars, no circuit design, and radar features to dejamming-protection circuits . feat missiles and jamming.

14
Table 1 (contd)

1965 1973

Introduction of AMG-45 Shrike (1964) Frequency coverage of radars exARM. Carried by F-1 00F to defeat SA- panded by addition of newer radars

2. Short-range and limited flexibility . such as SA-3 Low Blow and higher

frequency AAA radars .

MiG-17/19 N. Vietnamese point de- US responds by adding AGM-78 ARM

fense fighters . and introducing EB-66 radar jammer

and F-105G, increasing complexity of

self-protection jammer pods.

Rudimentary N . Vietnam communication net, very limited range, coverage,

and redundancy .

F

Not critical to supply of Vietcong, MiG-21s with better IR and radar mishence shortfall not crucial to strategy siles and GCI control close out war.

of S. Vietnamese government .

US responds by introducing special

warning aircraft with specially developed

detection equipment (still classified) .

Political Maintain viability of S. Vietnamese Maintain viability of S. Vietnam by degovernment by halting N . Vietnam- stroying N. Vietnamese capacity to

supplied Vietcong . wage war.

Honor treaty commitments under Turn war over to Vietnamese ; graduSEATO. ally reduce active participation .

Justified under basis of "domino the- Domino theory largely discounted; poory" to protect national interest. litical justification to protect national

interest tenuous.

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gained

strong support from Congress, public

opinion .

Strong public opinion opposition ; loss

of support most directly correlated to

US casualties .

Economics War competed with LBJ "Great Sock US economic position precarious ; off

ety" plan . US in reasonably solid gold standard ; dollar floats on currency

economic position . market. Great Society in shambles.

Congress continues to authorize

funds without oversight into military

expenditures .

Congress threatens to withdraw funding for war effort; exercises more and

more oversight.

War seen as a momentary drain on War costs set at several hundred billion

resources. dollars for nine-year commitment of

forces .

15
Bekaa Valley

During the early 1980s, the Syrians, in support of their

operations in Lebanon, constructed an elaborate LADS in the

Bekaa Valley. Despite repeated diplomatic gestures from the

Israelis stating they considered this an infringement of their

sovereignty, the Syrians persisted in expanding their LADS

structure .

The Bekaa Valley is located immediately to the north of

Israel . The SAM sites were placed in such a way as to impede

Israeli air operations projected into southern Lebanon. More

seriously, they provided a corridor of access to Israel that the

Syrians could use to attack. 18 With the bitter memory of the

October 1973 Yom Kippur air war seared into their memories

(the Israelis lost more than a quarter of their combat air

force-150 aircraft-in the first three days of fighting to

radar-directed AAA and SAMs), 19 the Israelis were loathe to

permit a second occurrence of such devastating proportions .

The Yom Kippur War had badly surprised the Israelisespecially the new SA-6 with its Straight Flush tracking radar

and Gainful missile, which could avoid detection by Western

electronic sensing devices or antiradiation missiles. 2° Oddly,

the Israelis had lost only six aircraft in air-to-air engagements,

a testament to their air-to-air acumen and an indication of the

Arab league's poorly trained fighter crews. Even though the

Israelis inflicted 456 aircraft losses on the enemy,21 the

Israelis resolved never to allow their air force to enter a war

against such a lethal LADS net again.

On 6 June 1982, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) commenced

"Operation Peace for Galilee," as the Israelis dubbed the war in

Lebanon. During the 1-10 June air portion of the campaign,

the Israelis destroyed more than 20 SAM sites and shot down

90 Syrian MiG-21s and -23s in aerial combat. 22 The key to

their success began, conceptually, where the war against the

North Vietnamese LADS ended. The lesson was clear: the first

order of business was to destroy the Syrian ability to defend its

armies and territory from air attack. Several features of the

Israeli air campaign in the Bekaa Valley stand out. Lt Gen

Kelly H. Burke, USAF, Retired, pointed out that "Lebanon was

16
the war of the futurea war in which electronic combat was a

central and dominant theme."23 The full range of electronic

combat was used in support of this SEAD operation :

ground-launched and air-launched drones, antiradiation

missiles (air-launched and ground-launched), airborne

jamming of communications and radars, and special detection

and location equipment. More importantly, the SEAD

operation, though primarily a function of electronic combat,

was a concept that placed the entire military apparatus at its

disposal in order to achieve the rapid, total destruction of the

Bekaa Valley LADS.

The doctrinal shift from Vietnam-and the Israelis' own

experience in the Yom Kippur War,was piercing. SEAD was

not a support role performed by specific aircraft, nor was it a

piecemeal application of assets to support a specific mission.

The destruction of the Bekaa Valley LADS was the goal; a

significant part of the total Israeli military apparatus was

mobilized for the SEAD effort as an integral facet of the war.

A cursory analysis of the Syrian LADS in the Bekaa Valley at

the time of the Israeli attack reveals a level of sophistication

undreamed of 10 years before . Added to the Soviet-designed

net used by the North Vietnamese and adapted for Syrian use

were advanced, high-rate-of-fire AAA (ZSU-23-4) weapons

capable of spewing in excess of 4,000 rounds a minute of

accurately aimed 23-mm ammunition more than 9,000 feet

with the use of their highly mobile gun dish radar firing

control system. 24 Additionally, the Syrians possessed 13

squadrons of MiG-21 and -23 aircraft in their inventory which

were tied to a redundant, highly cohesive command, control,

and communications (C3) net that used Soviet state-of-the-art

radars for advance warning. 25 There were more than 20 SAM

sites in the Bekaa Valley, consisting of SA-2s, SA-3s, SA-6s

and even a sprinkling of SA-8s. 26

Military analysis publications differ on the exact numbers

and types of weapons the Israelis possessed at the outbreak of

the Bekaa Valley campaign. A brief examination of Israeli

acquisitions and improvements in the area of electronic

combat illustrates their appreciation of its importance. As a

ratio of defense expenditures, the purchase of electronic

surveillance, detection, and antiradiation missiles increased at

17
a much higher rate than other types of defense expenditures

even higher than the rates of the United States or the Soviet

Union in the same time frame . So successful, in fact, were the

Israelis in their improvements to US and Western Europeanbuilt systems that Israeli armament industries sold their

systems on the international market before and especially

after the Bekaa Valley campaign. For a time, a variation of the

Israeli harassment drone, the Scout, could have been a

contender for the US antiradiation harassment drone program

(Tacit Rainbow) as a complementary system to the AGM-88

high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM), based on advertising

claims made for it in arms trade journals. 27

The relationship of political objectives and economic factors

to strategy and technology cannot be overlooked, for it is here

that several strands in the variable matrix converge. Unlike US

political-military mismatches of objectives and strategy in

Vietnam, the Israelis had clearly defined political objectives in

their Lebanon operation, which were relevant and translatable

to military strategy and amenable to the creation of tactics.

Defense Minister Ariel Sharon delineated three objectives. First,

evict the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) military and

political organs from Lebanon. Second, engineer the election of

Bashir Gemayel as the new Lebanese president (Gemayel

being more receptive to Israeli policy than the Syrian

surrogate) . Third, bring about the withdrawal of the Syrian

Army from Lebanon. 28 Curiously, in a rough parallel to US

experience in Vietnam, the military appeared to have exceeded

its mandate of 5 June 1982 which charged the IDF "with taking

all the northern settlements out of the range of fire of the

terrorists concentrated . . . in Lebanon." 29 Prime Minister

Menachem Begin was specific in his instructions concerning

Syrian Army troops, noting that they were not to be attacked

unless they fired on Israeli forces . Depending, of course, on

how one defines "terrorists," "range of fire," and "attacked unless

fired on," one could argue that the language was sufficiently

vague to allow the preemptive offensive action on the Israelis'

part that commenced the following day. Since the air offensive

was a thoroughly planned and practiced operation, one could

easily conclude that the ambiguities were intentional.

18
ubeodetaed aayses ote eaa aey capag

exist. By piecing the various accounts together, one can gain a

view of events as they probably unfolded, and gain a sense of

the force structure utilized, the tactics involved, and the impact

ofvarious elements on the outcome of the SEAR campaign.

At some point prior to the opening of hostilities, the Israelis

were faced with a series of strategic and tactical problems . As

indicated, the largest strategic problem for their air force was

the existence of an extensive and relatively sophisticated

Syrian LADS in and around the Bekaa Valley. Syria's LADS

capabilities allowed its early-warning system, located

throughout the Bekaa Valley, on the Shouf Mountains and the

border areas of Syria and Lebanon, to have a "deep look" into

Israeli operations at medium altitudes. Total strategic surprise

was therefore improbable . Nonetheless, if the Israelis were

going to attack the LADS, they needed clear information about

it. Probably for this purpose, the Israelis placed their

electronic surveillance and jamming aircraft (four specially

modified Boeing 707 aircraft plus E-2C Hawkeyes)30 where they

could listen and locate potential enemy radar sites without

being placed at risk or appearing threatening to the Syrians.

A three-phase campaign ensued: the first phase was

deception; the second, harassment with minor destruction (a

continuation, in some respects, of the deception campaign);

and the third, the actual destruction of the sites. Timing (time

compression and sequencing), precision, and integration were

critical . Presumably, through the use of tactical deception

(habituating an enemy to see what you want the enemy to see

and then doing something else), false targets (decoy drones

and certain jamming techniques associated with equipment

the Israelis possessed), and a series of false leads by attacking

air forces, the Israelis might obtain effective tactical surprise.

Massive, simultaneous, multiple-axis attacks might also have

been employed because of the nature of the commitment to

destroy the LADS target array. The combined effect of these

tactics might have complicated an already overloaded and

confused Syrian command structure's decision-making ability,

making timely or correct decisions in allocating weapon

resources against airborne targets increasingly improbable.

These tactics would, essentially, have paralyzed Syrian LADS

19
central control leaving firing units u

cetaat tey were

shooting at-if they were shooting at all-and allowing

attacking aircraft a considerable degree of immunity from the

Syrian IADS weapons while at the same time delivering

weapons on the sites . 31

From the Israeli view, orchestrating such a large number of

aircraft would have required precise timing and positioning of

aircraft in order to perform their tasks in the correct sequence.

The total numbers of aircraft involved in this effort and their

relative contribution to the task is not known. It is clear,

however, that the Israelis had decided that the destruction of

the IADS was the primary objective of their air offensive and

that they would commit whatever forces were necessary to

accomplish the objective. 32

The Israeli choice of weapons also seems to have shown a

great ability to select the correct weapon for the correct target.

The Bekaa Valley IADS' SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, and SA-8

radar-directed SAMs as well as a variety of infrared (IR) SAMs

(SA-7, SA-9 vintage) were configured differently, and each had

vulnerabilities which could be used against them. 33 These

SAM systems were supported by radar-directed AAA (23 mm

and 57 mm). 34 Completing the air defense net were the Syrian

ground-controlled interceptors based in Syria only minutes

away. 35 SA-2 and SA-3 systems, while transportable (can be

dismantled, moved, and reassembled in 12 hours by a

competent crew), are normally "fixed" sites and serve more

strategic and point-defense purposes .

That being the case, the Israelis would not have had to

employ sophisticated antiradiation missiles such as those

used in the Wild Weasel role, where the site's location is not

known. Nonetheless, the Israelis did use a large number of

antiradiation missiles (presumably "to make sure") against

location-known radars that continued to radiate .

Standoff weapons or free-falling bombs could have been

used against these relatively static sites if any number of

criteria were met. If the site was not radiating and AAA was

not a factor, the site posed no threat to bomb droppers, thus

alleviating the requirement for antiradiation missiles . In fact,

these sites may not have been radiating for fear of being

attacked by antiradiation missiles which home in on the

20
electromagnetic emissions of the associated radars .

Alternatively, the radar site may not have been radiating

because its parent control center had not told it to emit

(because the control center itself had been destroyed or

jammed). The Soviet-designed Syrian systems, being quite old

even in 1982, might also have had significant maintenance

difficulties which kept them "off the air."

In the case of the SA-2s and SA-3s, another alternative

tactic was employed to ensure a benign target environment. By

selectively letting the Syrian LADS see exactly what they

wanted them to see, the Israelis stimulated the SAM

fire-control radars. Then they launched Samson decoy drones

which looked to the Syrian radars very much like attacking

aircraft.36 The Samson drone, which the Israelis have

marketed to the US Navy, is a lightweight, bomb-shaped drone

with wings and a radar reflector fitted to mimic the radar cross

section (RCS) of the aircraft carrying it. It glides at sufficient

speed to decoy as an aircraft. Its purpose is to draw fire. The

theory behind employing it is very simple: fill the sky with

drones, force the enemy to expend all SAMS, and while the

adversary is reloading, attack in force from an unexpected

direction.

The tactical problem the SA-6, SA-8 and ZSU-23-4 systems

pose is that they are mobile. They can be moved at a moment's

notice so that targetting information that is only hours old

may be useless. Curiously, the Syrians obliged the Israelis by

positioning their SAMs-including the SA-6s-in fixed-site

configurations. From a weaponeering and tactics viewpoint,

the Israelis approached this problem in several ways. First, by

utilizing real-time intelligence gathering, the Israelis were able

to locate mobile systems by using a remotely piloted vehicle

(RPV) mounted with a camera and a transmitter (the Mastiff)

that allowed the battlefield commander instantaneous view of

areas of interest. 37 By acquiring such data, they could use the

same tactics that were successful against the older SA-2 and

SA-3 systems. Second, the Israelis used the electromagnetic

signature of the emitter itself to locate the emitter with

equipment designed to detect, identify, and locate the specific

Syrian SA-6, SA-8, or ZSU-23-4 radars, no matter where they

were on the battlefield (providing they could get the radar

21
operators to emit) . Specially modified antiradiation missiles

designed to track these specific radars were fired from both

airborne platforms and probably from prepared ground-launch

sites. 38 These systems were especially effective during the first

stages of the campaign when all radar sites were radiating.

Radar jamming was used in a variety of ways to support the

operation. First it was used to blind selected corridors of

attack. Then it was used to deceive the Syrian early-warning

and acquisition radars . By jamming a specific area, the

Israelis were able to obligate the Syrian IADS into committing

forces against a phantom attack force . The result of

alternating between real and phantom corridors was

catastrophic to the Syrian SAM battery commanders and

sector controllers . 39 Third, a combination of selective

communications jamming and radar jamming enticed Syrian

fighters tied to GCI controllers into an ambush. The Israelis,

once again, apparently allowed the Syrian IADS to see what

they wanted them to by allowing the Syrians to direct fighters

to an area where they would be vulnerable to Israeli attack (a

"kill zone"), and then initiating jamming to sever the

communication links with their Syrian GCI controllers .

Because the Israelis knew how dependent Syrian fighter pilots

were on GCI, severing the Syrian link in this way resulted in

the Israelis' shooting down 90 Syrian aircraft without a single

loss. 4° The IDF also aided in the SEAD campaign by providing

selected helicopter assault and artillery fire against some of

the closer SAM sites in the southern Lebanon area and by

launching both ARM and RPV assets to support the effort. 41

The combined effect of these tactics in support of the SEAD

campaign strategy was devastating . After the fttrst hour of

combat, the overwhelming majority of the Bekaa Valley LADS

lay in ruins. Repeated forays into the area prevented the

Syrians from ever reacquiring a defensive initiative. With their

ability to defend against air attack destroyed, the Syrians' will

to press the fight evaporated . More important was the latent

threat that the Israelis could repeat the performance on

demand against the Damascus homeland's LADS and lay Syria

proper open to unopposed aerial attack. The Syrians

understood the latent threat and responded by withdrawing

the remainder of their forces .

22
What is clear from the Israeli experience is that they used

the assets they had on hand to accomplish their purposes.

What they did not have, they improvised . The strategy was

driven by the ultimate objective of the campaign-the

destruction of the Bekaa Valley IADS-not by the technology

or the doctrine. US strategy and tactics are often seduced by

technological gimmickry and often substitute the technological

quick fix for a lack of clearly defined military objectives. Also,

political objectives as filtered through existing doctrinal and

strategic concepts are not generally translatable into usable

military tactics.

Two notes of caution are in order when using the Bekaa

Valley as a model of the future-which, for the most part, it

became. First, the Bekaa Valley campaign-as successful as it

was-was conducted only after exhaustive practice, only after

precise intelligence requirements were met, and only when the

needed material was on hand to accomplish the task. The

initiative belonged to the Israelis from beginning to end.

Second, the environment of the desert was uniquely suited to

the weapons used. The same systems and tactics would not

have worked as well in a damp, forested, hazy environment, or

in one where the enemy was able and/or willing to mount a

substantial counterstrike . Both these caveats obtain in much

of the world where future American forces may be employed.

The Bekaa Valley matrix reveals notable changes in

emphasis and direction when compared to the Vietnam

matrix. Although the Bekaa Valley campaign was not an

American experience, its impact on tactics and electronic

combat in US operations in Libya and Saudi Arabia is

undeniable . SEAD had become the initial, primary task to be

performed-even before the traditional "air superiority"

mission was executed. In some ways, in fact, air superiority

was subsumed under SEAD as a function of defeating the

interceptor portion of the enemy IADS. This defmitional growth

of SEAD may be presumptuous, but it serves to illustrate the

growth of SEAD from a defensive, protective, reactive tactic to

a campaign objective in which all other missions and roles

contributed until the task was accomplished.

Table 2 shows the results of evolution across the 10 SEAD

variables when compared to Vietnam. One can begin to sense

23
the growing meld of technology and tactics in the 

chess game

for air superiority or air deniability and the movement toward

more eneomnassin0 ennnentc of gFAn

Table 2

Bekaa Valley Matrix

Operation Sea of Galilee: June 1982

Threat Bekaa Valley IADS consisted of 19+ SAM batteries comprising SA-2, -3, -6,

and, after 10 Jun 82, some SA-8 batteries . These were supported by ZSU-23-4

gun dish batteries as well as optical AAA and older radar AAA.

A 450-combat-aircraft Syrian Air Force consisting of late-generation Soviet fighters netted to the latest generation GCI air defense network .

Long-range, modern Soviet-designed radars capable of detecting operations

throughout most of Israel at medium/high altitudes .

Definition SEAD is functionally defined according to military objectives and needs. Objective of operation was access to terrain via vehicles and air. Therefore SEAD

defined as campaign to facilitate objective . Defensive/offensive aspects defined

accordingly .

Tactics Coordinated plan based on deception and total force concept. Army, Air Force,

Navy assets directed by single individual . ?replanned aspects, plus dynamic

assets, integrated .

Tactical deception using drones, feints, and jamming utilized to "bait" IADS.

Offense-oriented . Stressed objectives of campaign tied to strategy.

Jammer assets (communication and radar) coordinated in creating kill zone for

Syrian interceptors .

ABMs mixed with drones and fighters just in front of main attack force . Complicated SAM operator's decision-making process .

Simultaneous use of drones, ABMs, fighters, and selective jamming of principal

early-warning radars paralyzed and/or deceived IADS controllers .

Thoroughly rehearsed and practiced .

Time compression and suddenness of attack critical .

Organization Centrally controlled, centrally executed . Command and control links directed

from single location by single commander using unified force structure plan .

Clear, protected command and control links.

Endemic to total force . No specialized SEAD organizations.

Force SEAD assets distributed throughout Army, Navy, Air Force . Assets dedicated to

Structure Bekaa Valley campaign consisted of air/ground launched AGM-45/78s,

air/ground launched drones (decoy, etc .), standoff jammers, field communication jammers, real-time intelligence, remotely piloted vehicles .

SEAD campaign configured forces for "one-time" execution of specific plan . No

permanent SEAD structure resulted .

24
Strategy Offensive ground/air blitzkrieg with specific military objectives . Destroy Syrian

ability to defend themselves from air attack, force withdrawal of Syrian Lebanese forces.

Designed to achieve quick victory because of uncertain political support.

SEAD campaign designed to protect entire force as opposed to defense of

attacking aircraft. Relied on self-protection of aircraft and maneuver tactics for

individual aircraft defense.

Doctrine To gain air supremacy over battlefield using whatever means necessary. SEAD

subsumed under overall air supremacy concept.

Technology Major improvements in electronic receiver technology and miniaturization of

computers allowed greater flexibility in locating/targeting radar emitters .

Extensive use of drones and RPVs extended visualization of battlefield .

f

F-15/F-16 proved more effective against MiG-21/23 in radar and IR missile

engagements.

Technological advantage shifted to offensive SEAD weapons if used in concert

with adequate strategy and executed with proper tactics .

Political First war fought as a "power projection" war outside of Israel without Israel

having been attacked .

Military objective (withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon) clear, but other

political objectives not clearly influenced by military-only means.

Clear military victory via SEAD campaign but uncertain political outcome.

Military activity exceeded stated political mandate; support for military strike

ambiguous.

US/international response not universally supportive ; much opposition . Isolated

Israeli government, Defense Minister Sharon ousted .

Economic Resource-restricted budget . Dependent on US aid and favorable loan treatment

to obtain military hardware .

Many workarounds in hardware due to fiscal constraints .

Because of political problems, future major military requirements uncertain.

Libya

State-sponsored terrorism spawned by a number of middle

eastern nations was responsible for the deaths of several

hundred people worldwide during the mid-1980s. One of these

perpetrator nations was Libya. Because of Libya's flamboyant

leader, Muammar Qaddafi, the state policy supporting terrorism

remained boisterous and unrelenting. Libya provided training,

refuge, and materiel for these terrorist operations. United

25
States ctes ee a primary target of many of these activities,

and in March 1986 the Reagan administration issued what

amounted to an ultimatum to the Libyans. In early April 1986,

a terrorist bomb exploded in a German nightclub that catered

to American servicemen. It killed several people, including an

American serviceman. It cannot be ascertained whether this

incident occurred because of a blatant disregard for the

American warning, a falsely held belief that the Libyan air

defense network-buoyed by years of extravagant spending on

the latest Soviet LAD systems-made them invulnerable to

attack by the Americans, or a belief that the United States was

bluffing. What is certain is that the US did respond . During

the early-morning darkness of 15 April 1986, an armada of US

Air Force aircraft that were launched from the United Kingdom

flew around the Iberian peninsula through the straits of

Gibraltar and attacked the city of Tripoli while elements of the

US Mediterranean Fleet simultaneously attacked the city and

surrounding area of Benghazi to the east. The attack lasted 11

minutes . The targets were precisely defined prior to the raid

and explicit instructions were given to attacking aircrews on

the rules of engagement to be followed. The raid had been

practiced in bits and pieces prior to the attack, following the

Israeli experience of the Bekaa Valley. The equipment required

to accomplish the mission, the routes to be flown, the

composition of the forces, and the tactics to be employed had

all been predetermined and exhaustively planned.

Changes in technology-especially electronic technologyplayed a major role in the Libya raid. The changes were large

enough to create a qualitative difference between how SEAD

was accomplished during the Libya raid and during the Israeli

experience in the Bekaa Valley. These differences revealed

themselves in several ways . Intelligence gathering and

advance strategy/mission planning were greatly enhanced by

computer application. The use of advanced high-speed

antiradiation missiles (the AGM-88 HARM)-especially during

the Benghazi raid-made direct attack of the sites largely

unnecessary. The numbers and sophistication of radarjamming

aircraft available altered the way tactics were applied . 42

Mission planners made extensive use of the latest technology.

Computer simulations of the Libyan LADS, fed by information

26
that wasmany timesonly minutes old via worldwide satellite

communications, were developed to show the best routes to fly

to evade the detection and lethal envelopes of Libyan air

defenses . Unlike computer models of the immediate

post-Vietnam era, these models represented the "most likely

case" scenario, as opposed to the "worst-case" scenario

popularized throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Military

intelligence experts had now reached a point where their

confidence in the data they displayed did not require the

"what-if-we're-wrong-and-the-enemy-is-stronger" reflex action

of the worst-case scenario. Computer models also aided in

determining how many and what type of weapons would best

accomplish the task. American aircrews entered the fight with

an excellent idea of what they faced and with the confidence

that they could overcome the obstacles placed in their path by

a formidable Libyan LADS. 43

US Navy aircraft employed the HARM since the

Germany-based F-4G aircraft were not utilized in the raid. 44

HARMs could be launched well outside the lethal envelope of

the intended SAM target . So long as the site continued to

radiate, the missile would guide on the radar. This allowed

mission planners to place HARM missiles on SAM sites

immediately prior to friendly aircraft penetrating the lethal

envelope of the SAM battery without endangering the attacker

or the HARM shooter.

The employment of the EF-111 and EA-6 aircraft, however,

was the key difference between Israeli and American SEAD

tactics. Radar jamming of the entire LADS, as opposed to

destructive means of suppression or piecemeal jamming, was

to play a larger role than it had for the Israelis in 1982.

American SEAD tactics of the period were still threat-based,

though the threat was seen in more systemic terms than the

one-on-one proposition that characterized SEAD operations in

the Vietnam War. The basic fabric of attack was balanced

between achieving the objective by the most direct means

possible and the requirement to protect friendly aircraft from

destruction by the LADS.

Largely because of the unpopularity of the Vietnam War, a

growing unstated objective of American combat became driven

by political concerns. This objective has emerged as a corollary

27
to committing American forces to armed action : the requirement

to limit American casualties. As a result of this largely political

undercurrent, SEAD's importance to overall military objectives

seems accentuated by its emphasis on reducing attrition.

Further proof of the effects of this phenomenon's evolution is

found in Desert Storm. The corollary to reduce American

casualties in the pursuit of limited objectives played a

significant role during Desert Storm in decisions to employ

SEAD as a primary campaign objective .

Abrief description of the Libyan LADS at the time of the raid

reveals a concentration of radars, AAA, and SAM density the

equal of any in the world. The quality of their air force was

suspect, though they possessed frontfine Soviet aircraft.

What is not widely appreciated among historians and

strategists is the proliferation of Western technologies to

potential adversaries . The Libyan LADS consisted not only of

Soviet-designed equipment but French, German, and English

systems as wel1. 45 Because these systems were considered

"friendly," there was little knowledge on how to counter some

of them. Additionally, the Libyans adapted many specialpurpose radars . For instance, British, German, and Russian

manufactured naval surface-search radars were drafted to

serve as coastal early-warning radars . These radars performed

quite well and posed some unique jamming problems to the

EF-111 and EA-6 aircraft.

The lesson of the Bekaa Valley for the Libyans-more

precisely for their Soviet advisors-was to create a credible

technical IADS structure to counter known US strengths. The

task involved four major challenges . First, the Libyans were

compelled to build a system with more density of coverage

where the destruction of one radar would not leave a gap.

Second, they were obligated by the existence of American

jamming aircraft to field radars with greater diversity of

frequencies where the jamming of one operating frequency

would not disrupt total early-warning, SAM, and AAA

operations. Third, the Libyans ascertained that by employing a

greater variety of systems utilizing differing electromagnetic

waveforms they might be able to complicate and confuse

attacking aircraft's detection and electronic self-protection

equipment. Fourth, through creating redundant C3 links by

28
building hardened landlines as well as multiple radio links

(since the Libyans adhered to Soviet close-control doctrine,

this was especially important to them), they might complicate

American plans to decapitate the decision-making structure .

As can be clearly discerned, the technological chess game

continued to accelerate in the SEAD dimension.

A brief analysis of the Libyan LADS shows that they placed

their defensive sites mostly toward the sea, the presumption

being the aircraft would not attack from the landward side.

They placed their most capable systems along anticipated

corridors of attack, and even employed extremely long-range

SAMS. AAA systems were sprinkled throughout Tripoli and

Benghazi in overlapping coverage . Early-warning radars, GCI

radars, fire-control acquisition radars, and target-tracking

radars were netted together through an intricate web of

redundant systems and links . Several fighter bases were

within minutes of the target areas and, given appropriate

warning and direction, these aircraft could be launched at a

moment's notice.

Unlike the Bekaa Valley campaign, the Libyan SAM sites

and interceptor air fields were not the primary targets for the

raids on Tripoli and Benghazi . The raids were designed as a

measure to punish Libya for sponsoring terrorism and to

deliver a strategic blow at terrorist training conducted in the

area. As a result, radar jamming could be used as a primary

means of degrading the overall performance of the Libyan

IADS as American fighter-bombers needed only to have the

LADS neutralized for the period of the attack.

In some cases, because jamming aircraft did not possess the

correct frequency coverage for the specific intended radar or

because destructive means of removing the threat were judged

more effective, the attackers employed a combination of

antiradiation missiles and direct bombing to suppress specific

sites (shades of Iron Hand and hunter-killer tactics from

Vietnam) . 46 This was especially true for the Navy attack on

Benghazi. 47

The raid on Libya marked the incipient stages of a deliberate

effort to combine Navy and Air Force SEAR assets in the

prosecution of a battle. The bounds of SEAD expanded again

this time to assume the complexion of an integrated force

29
opeatoe Libya raid also provided a comparison of Air

Force and Navy applications of SEAD and insight into the

tactical, strategic, and doctrinal vantage points from which

differences in SEAD employment since Vietnam SEAD sprang.

Navy SEAD doctrine was-and is-largely unwritten. The

roles naval SEAD plays are tied directly to missions of the

Navy-these being sea control, strategic sealift, and power

projection ashore. The corollary to these is an exceptionally

strong emphasis on fleet defense in comparison to either Air

Force or Army doctrine. The Navy's attack on Benghazi and

their support of Air Force operations on Tripoli illustrate the

tactics involved, but no strategy per, se can be gleaned from

their operations . Clearly, the Navy was concerned with power

projection and fleet defense .

The primary differences between Navy and Air Force

applications of SEAD stemmed from two sources . First, the Air

Force, in the Libyan operation, was resource-limited and could

not deliver fighter cover or Wild Weasel support because of fuel

constraints, security concerns, and political considerations.

Second, Navy SEAD concepts dictated that they employ their

jamming and antiradiation missile assets differently, even

though the equipment was similar to Air Force assets. A

comparison of US Navy and Air Force jamming aircraft used in

the Libya operation-the EA-6 and the EF-111-is illuminating.

The EA-6 uses essentially the same jamming subsystem

employed by the EF-111 ; both are variants of the ALQ-99

jammer. The EA-6 is an aircraft more than 10 years older than

the EF-111 and is itself a variant of the Navy's primary heavy

attack aircraft, the A-6. Even though the aircraft share similar

systems, only in the power-projection role do they have similar

missions and tactics, and even here, the tactics of the EA-6

reflect its blue-water heritage. The jammer the EA-6 employs

has much greater computer capacity, much more

sophisticated jamming techniques, and response to a wider

variety of radar types to include early-warning/GCI,

acquisition, and specific fire-control/target-tracking radars.

The EA-6 has the capability to fire HARMs, though in a way

much different than an F-4G. It is designed to protect the fleet,

fight the war at sea, and project power.

30
The EA6 system is versatile, but it sacrifices spec

c

capabilities to achieve this versatility. While the Navy would

doubtless prefer to use F-4G-type tactics in employing the

$200,000-plus HARM, it has neither the space aboard its

carriers to support the addition of such a specialized aircraft

nor the fiscal resources to alter existing aircraft to perform the

Weasel role . A naval air wing's aircraft must be multiroled for

efficiency.

Nonetheless, the ALQ-99 and the formidable HARM are

mated to an EA-6 aircraft with subsonic speed, 1950s-vintage

aerodynamics, and limited range. This restricts the flexibility

of the aircraft in that it cannot escort higher speed fighters

into a target area and it is limited by the range to which it can

penetrate into enemy airspace without aerial refueling. In its

power-projection role in Libya, the EA-6 performed limited

escort of Navy fighters to the edge of the Benghazi target area

where it assumed an orbit outside the lethal range of enemy

systems. The EA-6 also performed with the EF-111 in strategic

jamming of the Libyan primary early-warning/GCI radar grid

from a standoff orbit providing support for the Air Force attack

on Tripoli. 48

The EF-111 is also a variant of an existing aircraft, the

F-111A. It is a high-speed (Mach 1+ at sea level, Mach 2+ at

medium and high altitudes), all-weather, day or night fighter

that retains the F-111's low-altitude, terrain-following

features. It has greater absolute jamming power than the EA-6

and greater unrefueled range. Whereas the EA-6 has a crew of

four, the EF-111 has a crew of two . The ALQ-99 subsystem

employed by the EF-111 in the Libya raid was not as

sophisticated as that employed by the EA-6, but for the

purposes of the raid, it was more than sufficient for most of

the targeted radars. 49

For the Libya raid the US Air Force appears to have opted

for jamming as the primary element in their SEAD operation.

We can deduce this from three features of the attack. First, the

primary attack aircraft needed only to evade the SAM sites to

accomplish their primary bombing mission . Second, the

low-altitude, high-speed, night attack would limit the radar

horizon. At 200 feet, an attacking aircraft would be first

detectable at about 25 miles (assuming the radar is at ground

31
level) because the curvature of the earth blocks the radar

s line

of sight. At attack speeds, given no advance warning, an

enemy radar would have less than three minutes to locate,

identify, track, and allocate a weapon before the attacker

would be overhead the site, even if no jamming were present.

Third, the primary radars the Libyans employed were

composed largely of older generation radars for which the

EF-111 and EA-6 jamming systems were optimized .

Jamming the older generation of radars that comprised the

bulk of the LADS would deprive the Libyans of information with

which to cue their fire-directors and air defense sites . More

importantly, because of Soviet-style command-and-control

doctrine, no information equated to no decision. Since the

Libyans were not trained in autonomous operations (operating

without instructions from above), a "no-decision" order would

result in the general collapse of their air defense net.

The nonlethal jamming SEAD option was extremely

effective . Interviews with several El Dorado Canyon

participants revealed that, to their knowledge, not one F-111

was acquired by enemy target-trackers, nor were any enemy

interceptors observed. 5o

The Navy's use of HARMs and EA-6s on the Benghazi attack

proved equally effective. As noted before, the US Navy does not

have a pure Wild Weasel-type aircraft, though many of their

aircraft have the capability to launch the HARM (the A-6, A-7,

EA-6, and F/A-18). The Wild Weasel, with its specialized and

very sensitive APR-38 radar detection, identification, and

location gear, was able to distinguish if a specific radar was

operating, where it was, and what it was, and to relay this

information directly to the guidance section of the HARM it

was carrying. The HARM was (and is) a resource that needed

to be used as efficiently as possible because of its relatively

limited numbers and great cost. Because the Navy had the

missile but not an APR-38-equipped aircraft from which to

launch it, their tactics required the aircrews to fire multiple

missiles at a general target area in a preemptive mode. These

aircraft have limited to no capability to detect whether their

intended target is radiating . The Navy concept is

straightforward: if a radar comes on the air, one of the missiles

will guide toward it . If the sites under attack practice emission

32
control and shut down their radar, the missiles have still

accomplished their purpose of suppressing the radar by

keeping it off the air. Discussions with Navy HARM shooters

reveal that the cost of the missile (and their-from the US Air

Force's view point-inefficient use of them) was not their

concern; they had the missile and this was the most effective way

they had of using it. The raid was a one-time shot, and the use

of many HARMS to take down a handful of SAM sites was

perfectly justifiable in their eyes. Exhausting the inventory

was not a serious concern . Besides, as one Navy pilot

indicated, the supposed inefficient use of the HARM depends

on how one defines efficiency in combat. 51 The Libya raid

experience presented two major e olutionary features for

SEAD when compared to the previous benchmarks (see table 3).

One was the continued, deliberate, and integrated use of Navy

and Air Force assets to accomplish a single purpose as

opposed to dividing up the turf and fighting separate wars.

While the Israelis had melded their services together brilliantly

in achieving their successful Bekaa Valley SEAD campaign,

they did not do it as a function of force projection from great

distances. Also, SEAD was an integral part of the attack plan,

not a separate phase. The Israeli SEAD attack was a separate

phase that, once accomplished, enabled unobstructed access

to the land and air. The American use of SEAD was very

specifically tailored to the tactics and strategy that supported

the objectives of the raid.

Table 3

Libya Matrix

Operation El Dorado Canyon: 15 April 1986

Threat Qualitatively/quantitatively different from Vietnam/Bekaa Valley . Use of Soviet

and Western-designed radars and air defense weapons systems unique Increased importance of intelligence role for SEAD to acquire data .

Density of threat equivalent to East Europe, but with many systems more advanced and technologically capable than Soviet-only systems.

Tactics/strategy heavily influenced by nature of threat .

Definition Functionally directed at radar components of [ADS as a function of protecting

friendly attackers

33
Table 3 contd

Tactics Significant changes since Vietnam . Use of specialized assets to accomplish

SEAD. "Electronic combat triad" established as core of SEAD F-4G, EF-111,

and EC-130H Compass Call communication jammer .

Political/economic/logistic constraints limit triad to EF-111 . Navy EA-6 and other

HARM shooters complement EF-111 jammers and perform quasi-Wild Weasel

role.

Timing key to success Jamming commences just prior to strike, immediately by

launch of HARMs. Maximum confusion, indecision for Libyan controllers .

Navy EA-6/HARM shooters folded into USAF SEAD tactics scheme. USAF Wild

Weasel planners/analysts critical of "wasteful use" of HARMs.

EA-6/EF-111 proved very compatible/complementary during raid .

Complexity of threat forces-like Bekaa/alley-rehearsal of key features of

SEAD attack plan .

Organization As function of electronic combat, 66th Electronic Combat Wing, 65th Air Division,

17th Air Force, USAFE, formed consisting of all USAF European-based electronic combat assets (EF-111 s at RAF Upper Heyford, F-4Gs and Spangdahlem

AB, Germany, and EC-130Hs at Sembach AB, Germany) . Separate squadrons

of EF-111 s, F-4Gs, EC-130Hs under 12th Air Force, Tactical Air Command.

Pacific Air Forces maintained a squadron of F-4Gs in the Philippines .

Force Epitome of SEAD as specialized electronic combat function . Force structure

Structure mirrored tactical division of labor at time of Libyan raid .

Navy electronic combat assets supporting AF assets folded into USAF force

structure/strategy scheme.

Strategy Intent was to use SEAD to prevent loss of US air assets to SAM/AAA. Resulted

in neutralizing SAM/AAA as well as the GCI threat . Implication toward use of

SEAD as element of offensive counter air.

Doctrine Subtle shifts in doctrine . Tactical use of SEAD had significant impact on strategic

campaign . Integrated use of Navy/Air Force electronic combat assets affect both

airland battle concepts and power-projection ashore .

Technology Threat driven primarily by technological advances . Increased power, frequency

diversity, electromagnetic waveforms of TADS radars complicate US tactical

planning . Entered raid with some "best guess" measures and workarounds .

For first time, TADS assessed as capable of night operations . For variety of

reasons, Libyan TADS proves completely ineffective .

Political Strong backing of American people, reluctant backing of Europe, strong negative

response from third world . American Barbary Coast action of 1803, and the

Pedicaris affair of 1905 provided sufficient precedent for American action

against international terrorism .

Achieved desired effect . Raid nature of attack matched punitive objective of

strategy .

Economic Multifaceted influences and effects . Fear of oil embargo froze some European

political support of operation . Cost of equipment and military operation prohibitive for extended military activity . Cost of specialized assets and electronic

equipment required to neutralize threat increasing faster than perceived payback. DOD began to explore more cost-effective SEAD options .

34
The other evolutionary feature was t

e effect ote

balance of lethal and nonlethal means of SEAD. Jamming, as

a primary element of SEAD, began to assume a more

prominent role. The Bekaa Valley attack used jamming as a

means of obscuring attack intentions in order to destroy the

sites. While it is difficult to compare Libya and Bekaa Valley on

this account because the target objectives were different, it

seems probable that the Israelis would have opted for

destruction of the sites under any conditions as a function of

doctrine . American SEAD tactics evolved with the recognition

that a disabled enemy IADS, whether by jamming or

destruction, is the object of SEAD, and if jamming can

accomplish the task more effectively, efficiently, and safely

than destructive means, then the jamming option should be

chosen.

The matrix input for the Libyan operation allows us a

broader comparison than before . Clear trends, areas of

convergence, and interior relationships among the variables

emerge with greater clarity .

Persian Gulf

Many of the studies concerning Operation Desert Storm are

not yet complete . In fact, the Air Force's Studies and Analysis

Branch at the Pentagon has amassed 1,200 separate studies

and after-action reports (which they call "data points")

comprising several hundred thousand pages, and this is only

the beginning. 52 Separate studies are being conducted at

Tactical Air Command (now Air Combat Command), Air

University (now a part of the Air Education and Training

Command), the Air Force Electronic Warfare Center, and the

Joint Electronic Warfare Center; and a separate Desert Storm

Study Office has been chartered by the secretary of defense .

For such a public war, however, surprisingly little data. is

available on SEAD's contribution to the effort. A great deal has

been written about the Persian Gulf War, but much of it is a

rehash of bits and pieces of the same data-not new data.

35
s pobes especay eg oaaayss oSs

evolution . The data available is incomplete . That we won the

war in dramatic fashion does not, in itself, vindicate the tactics

or all of the strategies involved, nor does it establish the

doctrine that brought this victory about as the final word.

However, Desert Storm does represent a unique opportunity to

explore a process as it takes place in much the same way as a

biologist examines a living organism and compares it to the

fossil record .

During the night of 2 August 1990, Iraqi armed forces

invaded the country of Kuwait. After a brief struggle, that

country's small forces were crushed, and Kuwait was

occupied. Saddam Hussein declared that Kuwait had been

reclaimed and that it was always part of Iraq. This subterfuge

disguised the fact that Iraq owed Kuwait more than $20 billion

it borrowed during the devastating Iran-Iraq conflict that had

ended indeterminately . There were also disputes concerning a

major oil field that overlapped Kuwait and Iraq.

From a military point of view, Iraqi forces were poised on the

doorstep of Saudi Arabia. Hussein's acquisitive taste for

oil-bearing real estate appeared insatiable and belied his

stated intentions with regard to Saudi Arabia. On 3 August

1990, elements of the USAF 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (Langley

AFB, Virginia) were deployed to Saudi Arabia at the request of

the Saudi government. Curiously, there is little these aircraft

could have done in a substantive way other than to show

American resolve . The 48 F-15Cs deployed were air superiority

fighters with no air-to-ground weapons delivery capability. But

these were followed within two weeks by 26 F-15Es

(air-to-ground, two-seater variants of the F-15) and 48 F-16Cs,

which can perform air-to-ground and limited air-to-air roles.

Shortly thereafter, the Saudi government invited a huge

international force into their country to protect the precious

Saudi oil resource and to provide a base of operations from

which to evict Saddam Hussein's now firmly entrenched

military in Kuwait. Operation Desert Shield, the deployment

operation that preceded Desert Storm, consumed almost six

months of intense logistics activity in order to prepare for

active military action and was unopposed . Apparently, Iraq

preferred to adopt a purely defensive posture . In all, more than

36
2,000 combat aircraft were stationed in or around the Arabian

Peninsula to support what would become Desert Storm.

53

As a coalition leader, the United States decided around

November to double the size of American forces in response to

a perceived increase in the buildup of Iraqi forces in Iraqi

territory adjacent to Kuwait and northern Saudi Arabia. By

mid-January 1991, more than 500,000 Americans were

committed to the Desert Shield effort along with more than

200,000 military members from the other coalition forces.

With the sanction of the United Nations and the consent of the

US Congress, Operation Desert Storm commenced in the

early-morning hours of 16 January 1991 .

The catalogue of forces was impressive . More than 46

percent of Tactical Air Command's assets were deployed.

Almost 100 percent of the Marine Corps' and a very sizable

portion of the Navy's air power were deployed. Significant

levels of munitions, aircraft, and personnel were borrowed

from the United States Air Force Europe and the Pacific Air

Forces. The overwhelming bulk of Military Airlift Command's

C-141s and C-5s were committed to the Persian Gulf theater of

operations as well as the bulk of Strategic Air Command's

tanker forces.

Sheer numbers and overwhelming firepower, however, do

not always ensure victory . The quality of the equipment, the

appropriateness of that equipment to the task, a thorough

knowledge of the enemy's strengths and vulnerabilities, and a

plan which matches resources to specific, clear objectives in

accomplishing overall strategy are required to triumph on the

battlefield . Above all, the soldiers who were deployed had to be

well trained, committed, and well led.

That the Iraqi capacity to wage war was crippled so swiftly

and completely belies the great complexity and severe

challenge they actually posed for coalition air forces. The Iraqi

integrated air defense system was in many ways the finest in

the world . Netted together with an extremely sophisticated

system of landlines and microwave systems as well as

standard relay radios, the Iraqi LADS was fed by a system

consisting of literally thousands of radars and observation

posts . 54 The radars were some of the most advanced in the

world, including the latest family of French surveillance radars

37
as well as radars of modern Soviet design. They even had tried

to adapt a French land-based radar for airborne surveillance

purposes. 55 The net included radars and communications

equipment of German and English design. The C3 structure

was assessed to be the most hardened in the world after the

former Soviet Union and one of the most capable. At the heart

of the C3 system, then, was an Iraqi system that probably

combined Soviet with Western European systems and

developed and adapted it with doctrine forged in waging the

eight-year war with Iran. Like the Libyans', the Iraqi system

was an extremely capable hybrid of Iraqi, Soviet, and Western

design . An accurate intelligence assessment of intentions,

capabilities, and concept of employment was both critical and

extremely difficult.

The Iraqis employed a full range of air defense weapons.

Prior to the start of Desert Storm, they possessed the sixth

largest air force (750 combat aircraft) in the world with some of

the most advanced aircraft-including the latest French F-1

variants, the latest Soviet fighter-the MiG-29 Fulcrum, the

MiG-25 Foxbat, and a plethora of other fighter and ground

attack aircraft . They possessed between nine and 10 thousand

AAA pieces and as many as 17,000 SAMs consisting of

SA-2/3/6/8/9, Roland, and even the American I-Hawkpresumably stolen from Kuwait. 56

The more important question, then, is, given the fact the

Iraqis possessed formidable resources and a very competent

air defense doctrine, why did they not acquit themselves

better? Like the events of the war, the answer is complex.

Most of the answer is found in how the coalition's forces

acquired and used intelligence compared with their Iraqi

counterparts. Immediately after the Iraqis attacked Kuwait, US

intelligence agencies expended enormous effort to learn as

much about the Iraqi air defense system as possible. The Joint

Electronic Warfare Center published detailed reports

concerning the disposition of the Iraqi IADS and updated it as

events required. Not only did intelligence agencies gain a deep

appreciation for the LADS, but they transmitted this knowledge

to a decision-making structure that understood the

implications of tackling such a sophisticated LADS without

sufficient protection. This situation was markedly different

38
than Vietnam. In comparison, the Bekaa Valley intelligence

gathering effort and the Libyan operation were more limited in

scope due to the limited nature of the objectives . The primary

difference was the all-encompassing nature of the intelligencegathering effort. The most important difference among the four

historical benchmarks in this respect, however, had to do with

the outputs and analyses of the intelligence data. In the

previous campaigns, the data was used to target specific

systems or avoid exposure to attacking aircraft. In the Iraqi

assessment, intelligence was used to identify critical

weaknesses which could be exploited for the express purpose

of causing maximum damage to the Iraqi structure with the

smallest expenditure of resources. In' electronic combat, this

process is known as "critical node analysis."

Critical node analysis was made possible by several factors .

First, the technology was available in the form of electronic

surveillance of enemy emitters that could relay data to

decision makers in nearly real time . Second, through the

application of improved computer technology and software

programs, decision makers could visualize the way the enemy

worked and would likely respond to a variety of proposed

coalition tactics. Third, with the development of specialized

aircraft and tactics, the results of analysis could be

transferred readily to reality rather than be condemned as

wishful thinking (as many SEAR studies of the 1970s and

early 1980s were) . In short, even though the Iraqis possessed a

formidable net, they were unable to translate technological

capability to purposeful action because they did not fully

understand the system's capabilities and because US SEAD

strategy was aimed at ensuring they could not use their

technical capabilities even if they did.

Throughout the evolution of SEAD runs a deeper current

that is much more subtle. It does not become apparent until

Operation Desert Storm. Beginning in the late 1970s, the Air

Force began a concerted effort to integrate and apply electronic

combat to day-to-day training. Much of this training was

traditional and concentrated on the use of self-protection

equipment used in the event an aircrew should find itself

under attack by a hostile target-tracker. More importantly, the

training was directed at developing a more encompassing

39
concept of waging war against the enemy using integrated

electronic combat as the focus of a coordinated air-land-sea

attack against the totality of the enemy's force structure.

By 1981, with the advent of the Air Force's "EC triad" (the

F-4G ARM shooters, the EF-111 EW/GCI radar jammers, and

the EC-130H communication jammers), the US Air Force was

in an excellent position to orchestrate such an attack.

Unfortunately, much of the tactical air force was unfamiliar

with what electronic combat could provide for them and they

habitually failed to include these aspects in their overall

tactical planning. Beginning in 1981, the USAF Tactical Air

Warfare Center, at Tactical Air Command's direction, established

Exercise Green Flag, which stressed the importance of

electronic combat to a variety of aircrews in a realistic warfare

environment over the air gunnery ranges of Nellis Air Force

Base in the Nevada desert . In the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF),

Cope Thunder exercises provided the same sort of training in

the Philippine Islands, and, in the late 1980s, the creation of a

large electronic combat range in France and Germany allowed

USAF Europe (USAFE) aircrews the same opportunity.

Through the course of 10 years of integrated electronic combat

exercises, thousands of aircrews experienced coordinating

with electronic combat assets, especially SEAD assets, in the

prosecution of their tactics. In fact, many of the aircrew who

served in Desert Storm indicated that without the experience

gained in exercises like Green Flag and its counterparts in

Europe and PACAF, their individual flight tactics would have

been much less effective . 57

It was the intrusive influence of electronic combat-and its

SEAD stepchild-that, perhaps, enabled a smooth transition

from the piecemeal, one-on-one application of SEAD in Vietnam

to the total-force application of SEAR in Desert Storm. It is

this integrated, total-force application that will serve as the

basis for "true" joint SEAD operations of the future .

The overall strategy of Desert Storm also was influenced by

the use of the total-force concept to employ SEAD . The Desert

Storm air campaign plan, as originally intended, was to be

accomplished in four phases:

1 . Gain air superiority.

2 . Suppress enemy air defenses in Kuwait.

40
3eep te pessue 

gg

the emphasis to the Kuwait field army.

4. Support ground operations. 5s

In reality, the first three phases were executed

simultaneously. 59 Air superiority and SEAD, in fact, merged as

a function of how the war was fought: the war against the

LADS consisted of attacking elements of the Iraqi C3 structure,

its air interceptor force, its early warning/acquisition net, and

its radar-directed SAMS all at once, not as abstractions of a

written plan that may not have applied. The campaign was not

restricted to using electronic combat assets only, but used the

entire available array of aircraft and weapons to suppress the

totality of the Iraqi LADS, not bits and pieces of it .

Centralized joint command and decentralized execution

were the hallmark of the campaign. F-117s were employed in

striking key C3 structures; F-15Es and F-111 Fs destroyed key

sites in concert with F-4Gs and EF-111s; EC- 130Hs jammed

critical battlefield communication links with Iraqi fighter

aircraft and radio-dependent firing units. What could not be

jammed was targeted with ARMS; what could not be attacked

by either jamming or ARMS was slated for destruction using

standoff ordnance.

The overall SEAR strategy was initially pulled from each of

the services. From the Navy, EF-111s employed the concept of

limited escort. From the Army, Apache helicopters using

infrared missiles were dispatched to destroy selected SAM

sites in the Kuwait theater of operations. The Army multiple

rocket launch system (MRLS) and other artillery were used to

support the SEAD campaign before and during the ground

offensive in support of air operations. The Air Force concept of

integrated electronic combat was the glue that cemented the

campaign. The joint force commander used Air Force

electronic combat decision-making concepts and structures in

formulating and executing day-to-day JSEAD operations . Navy

EA-613s and EF-111s were used interchangeably in many

operations, and Navy HARM shooters accounted for

approximately half of the HARM missiles fired in the war.so

SEAD also adhered to the concepts of the airland battle, the

three-dimensional "shaping of the battlefield," and the concept

41
o

EC rollback(electronic combat) . By the end of Desert

Storm, a clearly definable trend toward adapting both the

Army AirLand Battle doctrine and the Navy's philosophy of

letting the situation dictate the tactics and weapons selection

had resulted in the creation of an integrated, cohesive

war-fighting instrument that viewed the total battlefield all at

once. Use of this concept would obligate the enemy to behave

in predictable patterns and would physically define the

dimensions in which the enemy was constrained to operate.

Another feature of SEAD operations in Desert Storm was

its adaptation of both Bekaa Valley and Libyan-style

operations. The prosecution of the SEAD campaign against

Iraq was, in a sense, an extension of the raid mentality of

Libya. The application of SEAD during Desert Storm was

continuous and unrelenting, it destabilized the IADS and

never allowed it to recover. The Libyan operation lasted only

11 minutes; the air operation in Iraq six weeks. But the

pressure exerted on the LADS was continuous during both.

The Bekaa Valley campaign, likewise, was a model in that it

was a closely coordinated, intricately timed operation involving

all the services at once in the initial phases of combat. After

the first 20 minutes of combat, the Iraqi LADS-even though

much of its structure lay intact-ceased to contribute

effectively to the Iraqi war effort in much the same way that

the Bekaa Valley IADs lay in ruins after the first 20 minutes of

air operations .

SEAD had evolved to the point where its concepts and

influences became precursors to other aspects of the air power

mission . The distinction between command, control, and

communications countermeasures, SEAD, offensive/defensive

counterair, and battlefield air interdiction appear to have been

permanently blurred by the integration of total-force

structures in the achievement of total-force objectives. SEAD

had started to become JSEAD.

Table 4 implies a correlation between the evolution of SEAD

and the convergence of tactics, strategy, and doctrine for the

US armed forces. The influences of politics and economics

seem to have accelerated rather than moderated the

importance of SEAD (and JSEAD) as a major player in future

wars .

42
Gulf War Matrix

Operation Desert Storm: Jan-Mar 1991

Threat Most formidable faced by American military based on capability, numbers, command and control structure, and modernization .

Country-wide radar-warning net consists of multiple Western-designed and Soviet radar systems tied together with redundant and hardened command,

control, and communications (C 3) net . Advanced computer technology employed in target-tracking, weapons allocation, and sector control .

Iraqi air force, AAA, and SAM systems fully integrated .

Frontline personnel well trained, secondary back-up echelon poorly trained .

Doctrinally tied to "weapons close-hold" use; poor discipline results in random,

wasteful use of weapons .

Definition Campaign-based SEAD. Use of all aircraft to execute SEAD campaign . Difference between way campaign was defined and way it was executed . Definition

separated offensive counter air (air-to-air) and SEAD (suppression of radars) .

Executed as single, coordinated IADS attack plan

Distinction drawn between tactical and strategic SEAD. Tactical SEAD related to

day-to-day suppression of battlefield operations against Iraqi field army. Strategic SEAD directed at degradation of overall Iraqi IADS.

Tactics Full spectrum. Electronic combat-based tactical deception, integrated use of

EF-111/EA-6, HARM shooters (F-4G, F-1 6C, Navy aircraft) . Near real-time relay

of critical electronic combat data coordinated through AWACS E-3, RC/EC-135,

E-2C, prototype JSTARS.

Neo-Iron Hand tactics against known sites using combination of jamming ARMs,

standoff ordnance (glide bombs, Mavericks, Hellfire missiles, cluster bomb units,

or general-purpose bombs).

Organization Centralized control, decentralized execution . Strategy, general battle plan tactics

developed by joint coalition staff. Specific elements of plan tasked to specific

units .

Developed as war-planning organization as opposed to raid or campaign of

Libya or Bekaa Valley operations. Heavily dependent on reliable, efficient communications among forces to make organization viable.

Force Very heavy emphasis (above 50 percent of force) dedicated to SEAD effort

Structure during initial phases. Actual percentage of SEAD-specific assets very small

(EF-111 s, EA-6s, F-4Gs, EC-130Hs accounted for less than 3 percent of total

air forces) . Specialization of SEAD assets diminished, emphasis on object of

SEAD campaign with whatever assets could perform task .

Strategy Highly evolved SEAD strategy. Multileveled from strategic to tactical, from specialized function to general campaign . Integrated with doctrine .

Plan : destabilize the Iraqi IADS and keep it destabilized . Neutralize those portions that pose a threat to attackers, deny their IADS the use of electromagnetic

spectrum, while exploiting other elements of the spectrum for deception and

intelligence-gathering purposes.

43
abe cotd

An extended use of Libyan raid mentality . By relentlessly keeping pressure on

TADS through jamming, ARMS, selected Iron Hand attacks, seized the initiative

by maximizing confusion . Instead of 11 minutes of confusion, there were six weeks.

The intentional shaping of the electronic battlefield. A use of airland battle concept extended to three dimensions and encompassing the use of the

electromagnetic spectrum.

Variation of Navy's "electronic combat rollback" emphasizing versatile use of

aircraft in executing SEAD.

Based on striking first, prepared to repel attack if it came and retake initiative .

Doctrine AFM 1-1, 16 Mar 84, still in force . SEAD subsumed as elemet of counter air,

and also element of electronic combat . Joint doctrine separated JSEAD from

C3 CM, and subsumed electronic warfare under C3CM. Desert Storm combined

elements of both in strategic/tactical applications .

Technology Very sophisticated technology used by both sides . Technology fairly evenly

matched .

SAMs employed latest SovieVWestern guidance techniques and electronic counter-countermeasure advances .

Fiber optics, highly directional microwave communication net, state of the

art .

Iraqi fighters practiced fully coordinated night GCI operations using latest

Soviet and French fighters and air-to-air missiles.

Technology too sophisticated to tackle immediately; months-long preparation required, in some cases, to design specific counters .

US use of digitally reprogrammable equipment critical to success of adapting to

rapid changes in Iraqi use of electromagnetic spectrum, especially for HARMs

and radar warning receivers .

Political Strong support throughout. Well-orchestrated coalition to acquire needed

authority to use armed force.

Unspoken objectives politically motivated ; minimum US casualties, rapidly moving war with clearly visible, continued successes terminating in unconditional,

unambiguous military victory .

Political objective to "stabilize regional relationship" unclear in pragmatic terms.

Possible result: reintroduction of armed force to region at later time .

National interest defined in economic and altruistic terms : "Free Kuwait' and

"Protect the oil resource" used interchangeably.

Economic Increasingly strong determinant in military/political behavior . Cost of military venture borne by coalition (corollary: destructively expensive to US economy to

bear alone) .

Cost of developing, acquiring, and maintaining specialized SEAD mission equipment seen as prohibitive . Advanced upgrades for EF-111, follow-on Wild

Weasel cancelled in favor of subsuming SEAD as role of multimission aircraft.

Only brief hiatus in general economic downward trend . Defense spending under

continued fire to reduce in post-cold-war era. Will place increasing pressure on

SEAD technology and tactics to "do more with less."

44
The Larger Context

The matrix shown in table 5 illustrates that SEAR has

evolved through use in combat on its own in much the same

way as other forms of aerial warfare, except that the evolution

has been much faster . In its development, SEAD has grown to

encompass or influence many other facets of the air power

mission such as strategic bombardment and air superiority. It

has had the odd effect of blurring distinctions between

previously clear categories .

Table 5 x

Evolutionary Trends in SEAD:

A Brief Summary

Threat Movement from preeminence of strategic power over defense to credible use of

air deniability air defense systems to balance between strategic offensive and

IADS defensive; return to preeminence of strategic/tactical air power of air defense (if tactics properly executed).

Definitions Moving from specific applications (defense against SAMs) to more generalized

applications of neutralizing an enemy's ability to defend from an air attack.

Moving from purely tactical uses of SEAD to a mix of strategic and tactical uses

to (1) neutralize the ADSfor strategic bombing and (2) protect friendly aircraft .

Moving from a purely support role to a campaign objective in direct proportion to

growth of "air deniability" strategies and IADS/organic air defense capabilities.

Tactics Movement from brute-force attacks with no specialized equipment to use of

specialized-only assets, to mixture of specialized defensive/offensive tactics .

Organizations Moving from no organization at all (prior to Vietnam) to very specific organization (66th ECW, Twelfth AF EC assets) to SEAD organizations diffused

throughout the TAF that are mission based.

Movement to complex, multistranded, confusing organization to simplified, specialized organization ; to complex, integrated, streamlined organization .

Force Movement from none to limited specialized, mixed general-purpose forces to

Structure specialized, highly defined forces to specialized mix of special-purpose aircraft

and mixed joint-force assets .

Strategy Movement away from strategic nuclear doctrine to flexibility of air power applications in rapidly changing world. Responsiveness, versatility, flexibility will be key

components of future SEAD strategy .

Changes in economics forcing less sophisticated applications of SEAD. Movement away from specialization and toward pooled joint resource applications of

existing technologies to accomplish SEAD functions.

Doctrine Movement from specific area/ground-based applications for defending aircraft to

major element of counter air to campaign objective

45
For instance, the destruction of the Iraqi strategic LADS and C3

net was a function of air superiority, strategic bombardment, and

SEAD all at the same time. In a sense, the fabled "MiG-sweep"

concepts of the Korean and Vietnam wars have been replaced by

the more encompassing "IADS sweeps" of Desert Storm. It would

be shortsighted to point to any one variable in the matrix as the

primary determinant, but certainly technology stands out as a key

factor in forcing the evolution of SEAD and in propelling formerly

separate categories and missions toward a more integrated,

convergent sum of concepts now assumed under JSEAD.

In the larger context, as the world becomes increasingly

complex, as military strategists and international relations

theorists struggle to create paradigms that define the "new

world order," a real US military must live and operate in the

real world . Whatever role is crafted for the US military in the

new world order, US forces' basic traditional role in fighting

46

Table 5 cont

d

Probable movement to encompass Navy concept of multiple-role SEAD (ARM)

and application of three-dimensional shaping of electronic battlefield.

Technology Exponential growth in quality/quantity . Rapid changes make whole families of

equipment/tactics obsolete . Accelerated change has dramatic impact on nature

of tactics and force structure Overall strategy lags tactics as function of technology. Doctrine lags strategy. By time of Desert Storm, strategy and doctrine

driven by tactics derived to defeat specific technologies. Impact of economic

drawdown will have general stabilizing effect on technology. Result: technology

will have less influence on tactics, hence strategy and doctrine become preeminent .

Political Movement from bipolar-influenced, regional conflicts to regional conflicts where

superpowers exerted secondary influence (Bekaa Valley) to superpower/third

world confrontation tenuous to negative support (Libya) to coalition, multipolar,

regional conflicts.

Economic prerogatives becoming more determinative in international behavior.

National actions exert increasing pressure of politico-military affairs .

Economic Movement from relatively inexpensive equipment (quantity) to large amounts of

relatively specialized equipment (much of it rendered obsolete by rapid technological change) to smaller and smaller amounts of extremely expensive,

adaptive equipment to the creation of a mixture of some expensive equipment

and inexpensive equipment because of extreme costs of higher technologies .

Cost no longer justifiable in terms of anticipated threat .

Some aspects of SEAD to become generalized function of multirole aircraft

(F-16, F-22) in order to save money. Optimum solution no longer tenable; minimally acceptable solution to SEAD problem more and more likely due to fiscal

constraints .
and winning wars is not likely to be changed for some time.

Nonetheless, there is a clear-and troubling-shift from a

military which defends America to one which defends the

national interest. The former is much clearer, the latter much

less so. The "national interest" is dependent on definitions that

are no longer clear.

Clarity in defending the national interest has direct

relevance to joint war fighting in the future and to how joint

SEAR must be configured to be meaningful in the execution of

military strategy. That is why an understanding of SEAD's

evolution is so critical to air power application.

F

Notes

1 . Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy : An

Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell AFB, Ala. :

Air University Press, 1988), 163. Italics in original .

2. William P. Snyder, Military Studies Course, Book 1 (Maxwell AFB,

Ala. : Air War College, 1991), 49-55.

3. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of

North Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 203-10.

4. Earl H. T1lford, Jr., Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and

Why (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Press, 1991), 89-95.

5. Ibid ., 122-23.

6. Ibid ., 125-27.

7. Ibid ., 124.

8. Ibid ., 241 .

9. Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the

United States Air Force, 1961-1984, vol. 2 (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University

Press, 1989), 291 .

10. Mario de Arcangelis, Electronic Warfare: From the Battle of Tushima

to the Falklands and Lebanon Conflicts (Dorset, UK: Blandford Press, 1985),

168-70 (translated from the Italian) . Arcangelis' comments give an apt

description of hunter-killer tactics and their predecessor, Iron Hand sorties.

Hunter-killer tactics were characterized by two Wild Weasels working in

concert: one would stimulate the site and keep it on the air while the other

acquired the signal, identified it, located it, and fired either an AGM-45 or,

later in the war, the AGM-78 Standard ARM. The Iron Hand strikes were

usually characterized by direct attacks on the SAM sites with iron bombs

and little or no Weasel support. The combination of the two proved very

effective in the latter stages of the war. The situation posed by combining

tactics of both hunter-killer and Iron Hand teams resulted in a "lose-lose"

proposition for the SAM site operator . If he turned on his radar, the

hunter-killer ARMS would target him; if he turned off his radar, the Iron

Hand bombers would destroy him since, out of fear of being targeted

himself, he would have decided not to use his radar to defend against the

attack.

47
11 . Tilford, 240.

12. Ibid .

13. Ibid ., 241 .

14. Ibid ., 255.

15. Ibid .

16. The Battle for the Skies over North Vietnam (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air

Command and Staff College, 1978), 95.

17. Tilford, 257.

18. Ze'ev Schiff, The History of the Israeli Army 1974 to the Present (New

York: Macmillan, 1985), 239-45.

19. Futrell, 556.

20. Arcangelis, 190-91 .

21. Schiff, 217.

22. Paul S. Cutter, ed. "ELTA Plays aDecisive Role in the EOB Scenario,"

Military Electronics/Countermeasures, January 1983, 136.

23. Lt Gen Kelley H. Burke, USAF, Retired, "Electronic Combat: Warfare

of the Future," Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs Newsletter,

February 1983.

24. Kenneth P. Werrell, Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM: A Short Operational

History of Ground-Based Air Defense (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University

Press, 1988), 140-42 . The Syrian ZSU-23-4 AAA weapon employed by the

Syrians enjoyed a good deal of exposure, and a considerable body of

apocrypha has grown up around it . A favorite story told by Israeli pilots is

that, on a road reconnaissance mission, a formation of four Israeli fighters

flew over a ridge line to discover a column of Syrian troops protected by a

ZSU-23-4. They immediately maneuvered to avoid the system, but in the

pull (a period of 15-25 seconds, so the story goes) three fighters were shot

down outright, and the fourth badly damaged.

25. Ronald T. Pretty, ed., Jane's Weapon Systems, 1982-83 (London:

Jane's Publishing Company, 1982), 480-87.

26. Chris Heath, "Electronic Warfare: The Lessons of 1982," Paces

Defence Reporter, December 1982/January 1983, 68.

27. John V. Cignatta, "A U.S . Pilot Looks at the Order of Battle, Bekaa

Valley Operations," Military Electronics/Countermeasures 9, no. 2 (February

1983) : 107.

28. Schiff, 245.

29. Ibid.

30. David Clary, "EW in the Bekaa Valley: A New Look," Journal of

Electronic Defense, June 1990, 38-39.

31 . Paul S. Cutter, "Lt. Gen. Rafael Eitan: 'We Learned Both Tactical and

Technical Lessons in Lebanon,' " Military Electronics/Countermeasures 9,

no. 2 (February 1983) : 94.

32. David Clary, The Bekaa Valley: A Case Study (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air

Command and Staff College, 1988), 12-14.

33. Charles E. Mayo, "Lebanon : An Air Defense Analysis, Air Defense

Artillery, Winter 1983, 22; and Philip J. Mills, "RPVs over the Bekaa Valley,"

Army, June 1983, 49. It is difficult to determine the exact types and mixes of

weapons from the record. Some note that there may have been as few as 15

SA-6 sites (Mayo), others indicate a number greater than 20. The literature,

48
yppy

a

low of 15 total sites to as high as 31 over a period of six weeks.

34. Arcangelis, 190.

35. Clary, The Bekaa Valley, 11-14.

36. Clary, "EW in the Bekaa Valley," 38.

37. Clary, The Bekaa Valley, 15.

38 . "IAF vs SAM: 28:0," Defence Update International 78, no . 12

(December 1986) : 54. Again, the reader may note that the number of SAM

sites this article cites is 28 as opposed to 19 or 31 . The source Defence

Update International cites in support was a Soviet defense analyst, a Col V.

Dubrov.

39. Mayo, 24.

40. Schiff, 250.

41 . Clary, The Bekaa Valley, 11 .

42. "Modern War Wizards," Defence Update International 78, no . 12

(December 1986) : 45-50.

43 . The proliferation of the use of computer-aided decision-making

devices by the mid-1980s was widespread among battle-planning staffs . The

electronic combat community, being more technically oriented than many,

was quick to exploit the systems available. This enabled types of planning

undreamed of before. Some of these computers could very accurately depict

an enemy radar's detection capabilities and overlay US jamming aircraft's

capabilities to degrade it . Using the computers also saved many man-hours

of work formerly accomplished with a grease pencil on a map that was

manually updated with information of unknown origin and unknown

timeliness .

44. Frank Elliot and Len Famiglietti, "Planning, Precision Make Libya

Raid Succeed," Air Force Times, 28 April 1986.

45. The trade journals openly advertised their sales to foreign nations,

and Libya was abuyer. The Libyans apparently were able to mate dissimilar

systems into a more or less coherent net, though it is not understood how

well this system worked.

46. The tactics used against specific sites resembled a combination of

Iron Hand and hunter-killer methods. The tactics appeared also to have

been altered by the technologies available at the time.

47. Elliot and Famiglietti, 30.

48. "US Airpower Hits Back," Defence Update International 73, no. 8

(August 1986): 27-33.

49 . John W. R. Taylor, ed., Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1987-88

(London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1987), 428-29; and Jane's All the

World's Aircraft, 1982-83, 380.

50. Interviews with United States Air Force Europe El Dorado Canyon

participants, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Va., 1

August 1991 .

51. Interviews with US Navy aviator participants of El Dorado Canyon,

Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, March 1991 .

52. Fact-finding trip, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington,

D.C ., 28 July 1991 . During a visit to HQ USAF/SA (the former title for

Studies and Analysis), I discovered that most of the analysis being

49
peoed as oed pocessg ad cataogg te 

that was being collected on Desert Storm.

53. James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert (New York: Bantam Books,

1991), 96; and Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait

(Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1991), 74-108.

54. "After the Storm," Jane's Defence Weekly, 6April 1991, 529-31.

55. International Air Forces and Military Aircraft Directory (Essex, UK:

Aviation Advisory Service, July 1991), 209-10; and Jane's All the World's

Aircraft, 1991-92, 145.

56. Bert Kinzey, The Fury ofDesert Storm: The Air Campaign (Blue Ridge

Summit, Pa. : TAB Books, 1991), 15.

57. Interviews with USAF participants in Desert Storm, Maxwell AFB,

Ala., August 1991 .

58. Kinzey, 12.

59. Col John Warden, USAF, Headquarters, USAF, Washington, D.C .,

interview with author 30 July 1991 .

60. Kinzey, 120.

50
Chapter 2

Criteria for Assessing SEAD Effectiveness

Few subjects in electronic combat (EC) frustrate tacticians,

as much as that of developing meaningful criteria to assess

electronic combat effectiveness. As an integral part of EC,

suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) also has defied

attempts to measure its effectiveness . Most strategists and

tacticians assent to the great value of SEAD as an element of

modern warfare. Though strategists agree that SEAD will

increase in importance as a war-fighting tool, few of them

agree on how to assess its value.

This chapter outlines traditional models used in shaping

criteria as a precursor to developing criteria that better assess

SEAD's effectiveness . The latter portion of this chapter

develops some contextual themes that provide a bridge

between the traditional models used today and some

suggested ways of assessing SEAD's value in the uncertain

world of tomorrow.

Suppression of enemy air defenses-as an agglomeration of

high-technology weapons and apparatus, old and new tactics,

and traditional forces and concepts-engenders the same

paradoxes that befell the tank, the airplane, the submarine of

World War I, and nuclear weapons of World War II . Modern

SEAD weapons and concepts arrived on the scene long before

holistic patterns of use were developed for them. The impetus

to develop SEAD weapons unwittingly brought about

war-fighting technologies that had unforeseen consequences

on the modern battlefield . SEAD weapons and tactics

accelerated modern warfare's evolutionary process so much

that traditional methods of determining effectiveness for SEAD

no longer make much sense. SEAD evolved from the Iron Hand

tactics of Vietnam to the sophisticated multiphased,

multispectrum SEAD tactics used in Desert Storm in the short

space of 27 years . SEAD effectiveness in Vietnam was

measured generally by counting destroyed SAM sites and

radars. Applying that criteria to the SEAD technologies used in

51
Desert Storm yields a confused, possibly irrelevant picture .

SEAD weapons and tactics evolution has outpaced the

development of criteria to measure SEAD's total contribution

to combat.

War effects traditionally have been fairly easy to discern: so

many tanks destroyed; so many troops killed, wounded, or

missing; so many bombs dropped; so much space occupied by

friendly troops. These are tangible, measurable effects . When

effects yield easily to quantifiable, observable means of analysis,

developing meaningful methods of assessing effectiveness is

straightforward . One can measure how far away a bomb hit

from the intended target to determine accuracy. One can

assess number of hits per try-or number of targets destroyed

per mission-to develop understandable criteria for effectiveness .

Unfortunately this is not true for SEAD . Since the

electromagnetic spectrum is the medium with which modern

defense suppression works, the criterion of counting bomb

craters, measuring distances from intended impact point, or

assessing hits per try is more difficult to apply. Wave fronts of

electromagnetic radiation are invisible; the theory of their

propagation is not easy to explain-nor is it easy to counter an

adversary's use of the spectrum. Electronic combat literature

is replete with references to this difficulty, and several

approaches have been offered . Most of these approaches,

however, still attempt to assess SEAD effectiveness as a

function of observable phenomena. Many tactics and strategy

analysts try to place SEAD effects in the realm of the

observable without clear reference to the overall objective

SEAD supports. This assumption, while understandable, can

result in unrealistic appraisals of SEAD effectiveness . For

instance, a traditional measure of effectiveness is probability

of kill (Pk). This measure is a combination of historical and

engineering test data that tells the user what the probability is

of destroying a specific site under specific conditions. Let us

assume an antiradiation missile has a Pk of .4 against a

specific enemy system. If one wanted to guarantee a kill on the

enemy system of .9, at least three missiles would have to be

employed against each site. To arrive at the total number of

missiles required for theater operations, one determines the Pk

desired and the number of sites slated for destruction via

52
antiradiation missiles (ARMS), and performs the appropriate

mathematical calculations . Employing this empiricalappearing process seems to be completely rational; however, it

ignores the specific objectives a battlefield commander may

have, the situations in which the antiradiation missiles

systems may be employed as part of a larger plan, the

capabilities of other SEAD systems at the commander's

disposal, or ancillary effects that ARMS may have on the

enemy that outweigh system Pk (i .e ., psychological warfare

against enemy site operators via intimidation).

Methods of Analysis

In a medium where the effects are not easily observable,

often not directed at destruction, nor related to factors given to

quantifiable analysis, the attempt to force a straightforward

"hits-per-try" analysis model may fall short. The SEAD

quandary is a classic case of trying to fit a square peg (SEAD)

into a round hole (counting bombs and bullets) . Nonetheless,

previous approaches that have grappled with assessing SEAD

effectiveness provide an excellent place to start . These

viewpoints represent a broad spectrum of thought, and many

are not even "formal" methods of analysis.

We will place these approaches into four categories : (1) the

historical model, (2) the engineering model, (3) the

commonsense model, and (4) the objective-based model. These

models represent, like the trends presented in chapter 1, an

evolutionary pattern of development. Each successive method

of evaluating SEAD's effectiveness is the result of multiple

historical factors propelled primarily by technological

developments . The evolution of measurements of SEAD

effectiveness and the criteria that generate these measures are

interrelated and complex. Each successive model builds on its

predecessor in the attempt to relate a meaningful criteria to a

relevant, usable measure of SEAD effectiveness.

The historical, engineering, and commonsense models

represent the evolutionary process to the present. While

elements of each exist in the attempt to measure SEAD

53
effectiveness, there are traceable trends in the relative blend of

these approaches over time. The shock of winning the cold war

so suddenly-with the resultant paradox of having relatively

less SEAD capability to fight an increasingly sophisticated

future adversary-creates a distinct watershed for SEAD . It no

longer makes sense to use measures of SEAR effectiveness

and criteria meant to assess the military worth of strategies,

doctrine, weapons, and tactics during a cold war that no

longer exists .

Providing sufficient SEAD capability for future conflictsand a means of determining what SEAD options are more

effective than others-will be problematic. A new model-the

objective-based model-is emerging to help solve this dilemma.

The objective-based model is both a combination of the other

three and a bridge into the future. It is an attempt to assess

where measurements of SEAD effectiveness are going as a

result of evolutionary trends. The objective-based model offers

an alternative view of the traditional criteria-building process

by adapting a popular political science model, a variation of

Karl Deutsch's "cybernetic" process described in his book The

Nerves of Government.) In very general terms, the cybernetic

process refers to self-adjusting mechanisms that respond to

multiple factors in an environment to achieve equilibrium. The

thermostat on an air conditioner is a simple example.

An objective-based criterion for measuring SEAD effectiveness

is based on a process which relates SEAD employment directly

to overall objectives . The objective becomes the driving element

in achieving equilibrium, and all other factors in the

equilibrium equation are related to the objective.

The objective-based criterion, as the product of evolution,

also provides a framework in which future SEAD weapons and

tactics may be set into an overall context. In setting the

context, four continuums combine to explain the general

trends facing the development of objective-based criteria. The

continuums provide a context, a way of determining what

SEAD strategies, tactics, doctrines, weapons acquisitions and

resource allocation plans will be more effective . More

importantly, because of the speed of the evolutionary process,

the continuums provide a mental construct with which to

anticipate future SEAD needs and changes. These continuums

54
define a range of options as well as depict an evolutionary

trend in SEAD. These are

1 . the piecemeal/integrated continuum,

2. the need-based/resource-based continuum,

3. the threat-based/capability-based continuum, and

4. the defensive/offensive continuum.

The continuums provide a way of assessing SEAD

effectiveness by describing the changed context of the world .

They describe an evolutionary process that provides a way of

comparing one criterion with another and shows that criteria

development itself is subject to the same forces of

disequilibrium that affect the revolutionary growth of SEAD.

The Historical Approach

The historical approach is usually the first approach

decision makers turn to when confronted with the problem of

criteria development and measures of effectiveness (MOE) .

This approach suggests that the lessons of history can serve

as a basis for viewing the future and can provide a model of

assessment. The initial use of fighter-bombers for direct attack

in suppressing surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites during the

early phases of the Vietnam War is an example of this

approach and the conditions under which this approach might

be used . There was no systemic analysis conducted, no

elaborate mathematical model used in developing this

relatively crude SEAD tactic. This Iron Hand defense

suppression tactic was an outgrowth of World War II and

Korean War tactics to silence antiaircraft artillery sites; the

Iron Hand tactic was used because similar tactics were

effective in the European theater of World War II and in Korea.

The recourse to historical comparison was the initial

response to developing a SEAD criteria . While the direct-attack

method worked in World War II and Korea, it soon became

obvious that this particular historical approach would not

work in Vietnam. Exposure to the Soviet SAM in Vietnam was

the first experience American tacticians had had with a

relatively sophisticated technological threat. Recourse to

historical comparison, while useful in conditions where

technological breakthroughs were not critical to war-fighting

55
outcomes, rapidly proved to be of limited value as a source of

BEAD criteria in Vietnam.

Chapter 1 of this study could also be viewed as an example

of the historical approach. In viewing "what worked before,"

however, one must be wary of the assumptions used in

recounting the history itself. The intent of chapter 1 was to

show the evolutionary nature of SEAD combat by tracing the

main elements of its growth and scope, not to establish history

as a model of the future .

There are problems in using the historical model as a

primary vehicle in developing criteria for measuring SEAD

effectiveness. SEAD, as a technologically driven aspect of war

fighting, requires a certain amount of prediction for its

effective use. History does not seek to predict; it intends to

recount facts and explain why an event occurred as a function

of hindsight. SEAD application is often quite technical and

needs data on what will work next as much as it needs data on

why a particular weapon or tactic did or did not work last time.

As a tool in proactive analysis-perhaps even as a basis for

creating a criterion for comparing one period of time to

another-the historical approach is of limited use. .

Examples of the misapplication of the historical approach

are revealing. Using the historical approach, a criterion for

SEAD effectiveness in Desert Storm might be to compare the

loss rates of Desert Storm aircraft which flew across enemy

radar-directed SAM complexes to similar missions in Vietnam.

But recounting the pertinent events of these periods only

explains what happened, not why, and offers no substantive

construct upon which a criterion for evaluating effectiveness

can be built. The historical comparison reveals another

weakness: one period of history cannot be compared directly to

another unless all the pertinent variables are held relatively

constant. As Karl Popper points out in his book, The Poverty of

Historicism, "For strictly logical reasons, it is impossible for us

to predict the course of future history. "2

Using another avenue of comparison, the analyst may wish

to compare EB-66 jamming in Vietnam to EF-111 /EA-6

jamming in Desert Storm. The record suggests, based on loss

rates, that EB-66jamming in Vietnam was not as effective, but

this does not necessarily mean that the tactics employed in

56
Desert Storm would have worked better in Vietnam, or that

Desert Storm SEAD tactics will work as well "the next time."

Therefore, a straightforward comparison of the historical record,

from the criteria development vantage point, can be misleading.

It would be imprudent to discount the historical method

altogether because it can offer compelling arguments as to why

one course of action might be pursued over another. As pointed

out, some of the lessons learned in the past and apparently

applied during the Desert Storm SEAD campaign seem to have

enabled friendly force planners and tacticians (1) to use

jammers in places where they would do the most good at the

times they would do the most good; (2) to identify what could

and could not be done with the jamming aircraft; and, (3) to

balance tactics and force application with sister "lethal" SEAD

assets (Wild Weasels and Iron Hand bombers) .

The unspoken assumption, nonetheless, is that the

historical "facts" recounted represent a "truth," and that the

assumptions surrounding the selection of similar situations

for comparison can stand on their own without scrutiny. To

criteria developers who use the historical model as their

primary determinant, one should attach a "user-beware"

notice to match the "right" historical model with the "right"

situations. This will become especially important for the

development of SEAD criteria in the future .

Another outgrowth of the historical method is the "lessonslearned" approach. A great deal of emphasis has been placed

on this approach as a result of Desert Storm; it is a classic

example of what Popper would call "the poverty of historicism" :

we have no way of knowing whether the lessons learned will

apply in the future because we have no way of knowing the

future. 3 The danger of the "lessons-learned syndrome" is that

it focuses attention on the events of the past as a function of

hindsight, not on the possibilities of the future as a function of

foresight. No matter how hard we attempt to project ourselves

into the future and no matter how accurate the data we are

given in the attempt to project history into the future, we must

use today's paradigm in the projection. Even if the conditions

of the "real world" remain relatively stable (an unlikely

situation), the peculiarities of bureaucracy, force structure and

organization, the personalities of leaders, and the reordering of

57
priorities caused by purely nonmilitary factors make it

improbable that these "lessons learned" will provide the basis

for developing sound criteria.

While "lessons learned" are doubtless valuable, they have an

irritating tendency to be forgotten. The "rediscovery" of the

need for on-the-spot suppression of battlefield SAMs and AAA

was a recurrent theme for the close air support (CAS) and

battlefield air interdiction (BAI) roles flown by F- 16s, A-6s,

A-10s, and F/A-18s. Yet the after-action reports and "lessons

learned" from major exercises held over the last 10 years

highlighted the need for integral battlefield SEAD . The more

important question in this regard is not what the "lessons

learned" were, but why warriors have to keep relearning them.

The answer is found in the nature of the historical model itself.

The historical approach provides direction and trend, but not

necessarily immutable truths to which we might apply criteria

of measurement.

The Engineering Approach

The engineering approach is characterized by the attempt to

measure, precisely, what can be measured. The approach is

influenced strongly by scientific methodology and technological

innovation. The clearest examples of the engineering approach

manifest themselves in systems analysis and the compulsion

to reduce information to quantifiable data. The process is, like

modern SEAD, highly technical and complex. The complexity

of the engineering approach often obscures the objectives for

which SEAD exists with the technical process of assessment.

The principal problem is that the engineering approach does

not seek to relate conclusions to overall SEAD objectives nor

does it ask questions on its own. The engineering approach is

designed to answer questions that are posed to it from people

outside the assessment process. Actors exterior to the process

give SEAD engineers specific tasks-for example, determine

the effectiveness of this weapon system-and, from the context

of the given objective, engineers create a methodology for

answering the critical question, "Exactly what is it that you

want to know about this?" Responsibility for ensuring that the

overall objective is germane to the general SEAD problem is

58
rarely a major issue; consequently, many measurements of

effectiveness assess variables which mean very little in terms

of overall objectives. For instance, studies of the effectiveness

of the AGM-88 antiradiation missile (the HARM), which tracks

radar emissions of hostile radars to their source, take into

account many of the pertinent variables (ballistic flight path of

the missile ; angles and speed of flight ; time required to

acquire, identify, and track a target; parametric data of the

intended target; etc.) . The results of such studies (both before

and after conflicts) yield probabilities and other statistical

measurements . In the parlance of the tactics community, one

wishes to arrive at a credible probability of kill figure, which,

by inference, would reveal how "effective" the weapon is. As

accurate as these models are, specific system Pk will explain

only part of the puzzle. Just because such a study examines

data which is quantifiable and represents discretely defined

variables does not mean it has examined all the critical

determinants bearing on the problem. Determining real

effectiveness is more complex than this.

The engineering approach led to a practice quite common in

the late 1970s/early 1980s : the substitution of efficiency for

effectiveness as the criteria for establishing military worth .

This led to an acquisition and testing process that often

divorced the purpose for which a SEAR weapon was developed

from the measuring stick used to determine its worth. As long

as the weapon met the efficiency standard set by the

engineering community, decision makers judged it a worthy

system.

Herein lies a key danger in applying the engineering

approach as the principal source of SEAD criteria selection: it

is not designed to build an overall framework that relates

objectives to methods of assessment. As a result, the outputs

are only as good as the assumptions going into the model and

the relevance of the variables selected for examination.

As the engineering approach is the most dominant method

used by the military in determining measures of SEAD

effectiveness and criteria formation, it is worth scrutinizing

closely. We will use the Air Force's problem-ridden ALQ-165

advanced self-protection jammer (ASPJ) program as an

example of the engineering approach in criteria selection.

59
The story of the ALQ165 begins with an examination of the

definitions used by the engineering community. Such an

examination reveals the complexities and difficulties one

encounters in employing the engineering approach as a

primary determinant in criteria selection. What do we mean by

"criteria" and "measure of effectiveness"? "Criteria," oddly, is

not defined by itself in the military lexicon . It is identified,

however, in association with "evaluation criteria" and defined as

standards by which required technical and operational effectiveness

and suitability characteristics or the resolution of technical or

operational issues may be addressed. 4

This definition is very narrow in that it specifies "technical

and operational effectiveness and suitability" as critical items.

Operational effectiveness and suitability are further defined

and subdivided in a laundry list of smaller and smaller facets .

This has the ironic effect of making the job of quantification

less and less credible as the respective elements become more

and more vague. Operational effectiveness and suitability are

defined, respectively, as

the overall degree of mission accomplishment of a system when used

by representative personnel in the environment planned or expected

for operational employment of the system considering organization,

doctrine, tactics, survivability, vulnerability, and threat (including

countermeasures and nuclear threats) ; 5

and

the degree to which a system can be placed satisfactorily in field use,

with consideration given to availability, compatibility, transportability,

interoperability, reliability, wartime usage rates, maintainability,

safety, human factors, manpower supportability, logistic supportability

including software supportability, documentation, and training

requirements .6

It is not surprising, based on the complexities involved in

official definitions, that no sped criteria. were ever set down

by the USAF Tactical Air Warfare Center or the Air Force

Electronic Warfare Center for developing an ASPJ measure of

effectiveness (MOE) . In fact, one of the criticisms of the process

by the Tactical Air Warfare Center was that "selecting an MOE

solves only a portion of the problem. A criterion for that MOE

is required . .

. . .. 7

60
The word criterion, as defined in a standard dictionary, is

broad and captures the more essential elements of the

development process: a standard, rule, or test on which a

judgement or decision can be based. Rather than focusing on

the elements of "technical and operational effectiveness and

suitability," this definition implicates the decision maker as

part of the process and provides a broader plane of application

via the use of rules and tests.

A measure of effectiveness is the functional element of

applying criteria. It denominates the standards, rules, or tests

in quantifiable, measurable terms. For the ASPJ program,

these were manifested as (1) projectile miss distance generated

by jamming, (2) hits per projectiles shot, or (3) number of

times projectile failed to fire due to jamming per times

jamming present. Even if the system performed within the

specified limits defined by the criteria, there was no way to

determine whether the criteria upon which the measurements

were based were relevant . The requirement to establish

quantifiable and technically measurable variables of the

ALQ-165 was so compelling that the focus of the criteria was

on the process of measuring rather than on the objective for

which the self-protection system was developed.

The regulations governing the MOE process and definitions

also reflect the engineering approach's preoccupation with

quantifiable criteria. The definition of MOE in AFR 55-43,

Management of Operational Test and Evaluation, is "a

qualitative or quantitative measure of a system's performance,

or a characteristic that indicates the degree to which it

performs the task or meets a requirement under specified

conditions."8 The definition focuses on specifics: a system's

performance or a characteristic . The definition also indicates

that the measure specifies the degree to which systems or

characteristics perform a task or meet a requirement without

identifying who stipulates the requirement, why they want the

system to perform the task, or what overall objective is met.

The gulf between decision maker and engineer that is

created by this methodology in the development of relevant

SEAR criteria is as much the result of the scientific mystique

as it is the failure of users and testers to ensure the relevance

of their work to overall objectives . It is relatively easy in technocratic

61
culture to 

sellresults couched in quantifiable terms. The

"experts" are the builders of the graphs and charts and are

generally well versed in scientific research/test methodologies .

Conversely, decision makers are versed in the overall business

of managing competing objectives, bureaucracies, and

generalized problem solving . Generally, they are not versed in

research methodologies, preferring instead to hear the bottom

line . Unfortunately, the bottom line as understood by the

technician often is considerably different than that understood

by the decision maker. What often happens in the interchange

between the decision-making and the engineering bureaucracies

is a failure on both sides to communicate the assumptions one

community has of the other . The decision maker often

assumes the tester knows how the specific criteria fit into an

overall scheme of things, and the tester assumes the decision

maker knows the limits of the developed criteria in

determining overall effectiveness . The result is that decision

makers often fail to define the framework into which a specific

criterion for testing SEAD effectiveness fits, and the analystsbecause it is not in their job description to set overall

objectives-do not challenge the assumptions upon which the

tests are based.

At the more technical level, the specific measures

themselves belie their narrowness. The basic formula upon

which comparative engineering testing is based is very simple

when written out in plain English but has an ominous

appearance as a mathematical formula. In plain English it is:

SEAD effectiveness equals the difference between what

happens when one uses a particular SEAD weapon/tactic in

combat condition as compared to what happens when one

doesn't. In mathematical terms, this equation appears as

E=Po -P1

where PO is the probability (expressed as percentage) of

survival in conditions where a system or tactic was not used

("dry") . P1 is the probability of survival where the system or

tactic was used ("wet")-all other pertinent and controllable

variables being held constant. The difference, E, is expressed

as a measure of how much more or less effective the

weapon/tactic was in the survival of the aircraft.

62
The measurement of effectiveness in this case is the

assessment of the "probability of survival" in given situations

as a function of ASPJ jamming being present or not. The

salient point here is that the measurement is only as good as

the assumptions which underlie it, and these are wanting in

many cases.

The narrow mathematical version of the MOE accounts for

variables only insofar as they can be quantified and only

insofar as they relate to the principal measure of probability of

survival. The effects of nonquantifiable variables can have a

decisive impact on SEAD measures of effectiveness. Therefore,

the mathematical interpretation of effectiveness-as

authoritative as it may appear-may be very misleading.

The ALQ-165 ASPJ program serves as an example of what

can go wrong with using the engineering approach as the

primary determinant in criteria selection. The SEAD effectiveness

of the system was related to very specific tasks given to the

engineering community. The requirements levied on the

system were never challenged by the engineering community,

nor were the standards of measuring effectiveness adequately

scrutinized by decision makers. The questions relating total

system effectiveness-its interoperability with the systems in

which the ASPJ was to be used, its viability in the real world,

and the political acceptability of its price tag-were addressed

after the engineering approach had completed its SEAD

effectiveness assessment of the ALQ-165, not as part of the

assessment process .

Both decision makers and the engineering community are

aware of the problems that separate them and are making

attempts to rectify the situation. The chart (fig . 5) shows the

traditional relationship between the engineering and decisionmaking community. 9 The hierarchical, linear structure

depicted shows the difficulty of translating decision makers'

objectives into testable criteria beyond a certain level.

National security objectives are translated to national

military objectives . These objectives are, in turn, translated to

regional and theater objectives . There is a disconnect in the

process that occurs between objectives and operational art. It

is not clear how a national military objective supporting

national security policy can be translated into a criterion for

63
assessing the military worth of SEAR, especially in uncertain

times.

The measures of SEAD effectiveness have no meaning if they

are not tied to military operations, yet the engineering

approach does not address these issues. It can aid the process

only at the most fundamental level (engagement level) . As long

as decision makers understand the limits of the engineering

approach in answering SEAD effectiveness questions, the

engineering approach can be a useful decision-making aid. As

long as engineers understand the context of the objectivebuilding process, they can construct tests that best answer the

questions decision makers ask.

Dialogue between decision maker/tasker and the engineering

community are an encouraging step toward establishing a

more encompassing method of criteria development and

measure of effectiveness. The dialogue promises to define the

limits of what each community can do for the other. Hopefully,

this will reduce the gulf which separates the two by

demystifying the engineering approach, and by bringing

greater incisiveness to defming overall objectives .

64
Engineering measures serve to explain observable variables,

but do not generally provide the basis in and of themselves for

criteria selection-especially if the critical variables are not easily

translatable to "objective" observation and quantification . In

combination with other approaches, the engineering approach

serves a very useful function, but it should notbecause of its

servant nature-be drafted as the lead element in developing

criteria.

The Commonsense Approach

SEAR criteria must be able to pass the "commonsense" test.

Yet, while SEAD criteria must be understandable, there is an

insidious danger in using common sense as the basis of SEAD

criteria development. SEAD, while serving straightforward

combat objectives, is not simple. No amount of attempting to

"simplify" the inherently complex processes in modern SEAR

will make it any less complex. Beware the man who appeals to

commonsense as his sole reference of authority, wrote nineteenth century American sociologist William Sumner. 10 Common

sense is often neither "common," nor does it necessarily

represent "sense." Criteria selected from among the realm of

"commonsense" elements suffer many ambiguities and errors

in logic . First, the commonsense approach suggests a central

frame of reference that is assumed to be universally

understood and applicable. Second, it fails to account for

perceptual differences and assumes that there is only one

credible paradigm with which to view the world.

The principal attractive element of the commonsense

approach in selecting SEAD criteria is its appeal to simplicity .

The commonsense approach for SEAD criteria came into vogue

largely as a reaction to perceived shortcomings in the

engineering and historical approaches and the belief that

these approaches had needlessly complicated the assessment

process. The historical and engineering approaches had not

successfully delivered systems or tactics that meshed with the

perceived needs of the military in an increasingly austere

political and fiscal environment.

Many different SEAD and EC systems of the 1980s suffered

from the perceived failure of the historical and engineering

65
approachesmeasurements of effectiveness . The failure of

ASPJ to meet "spec" integration problems with the electronic

defensive suite of the B-1, quality control problems with the

Tacit Rainbow SEAD harassment drone, and numerous cost

overruns throughout SEAD-associated weapons development

and acquisition programs cause considerable frustration

among the decision-making bureaucracy. In the late 1980s,

therefore, there was a general call for a return to "old-fashioned

common sense."

On the surface, the "return-to-commonsense" argument has

the feel of soundness . In reality, it is very dangerous. The

commonsense approach assumes that any complex problem

can be stated in simple terms. For SEAD, this is not the case.

Simplification of the technological and financial complexity of

modern SEAD can be taken only so far. The commonsense

approach tends to develop criteria and measure effectiveness

on the basis of logic that is generally very superficial. While

attractive to the frustrated decision maker, the proposition

that "if it is simple, it must be correct" is a clear error in logic.

The appeal is to simplicity and the easily understood, not to

the issues themselves.

The neutralization of the modern integrated air defense

system by SEAD weapons/tactics and the criteria that assess

the neutralization's effectiveness promise to be increasingly

complex. The range of complexity is increasing while the

commonsense approach's impetus attempts to force simplicity.

"Neutralizing" a SEAD target in the future will cover a large

range of options. Destruction and brute-force jamming are no

longer the only means available . More sophisticated air

defense systems employing multiple sensor arrays and

tracking systems netted together by an advanced information

management mechanism, because of their complexity, offer

many more vulnerabilities to exploit for the SEAD tactician.

The combinations of weapons and tactics that might possibly

"work" against the modern LADS can be quite complex. The

commonsense approach can militate against a realistic

appraisal of alternatives because they are "too complicated,"

leading decision makers to opt instead for the simple,

straightforward answer. This limits the ranges of more

66
relevant means of assessing SEAR effectiveness by restricting

criteria development to superficial goals and objectives.

Commonsense approaches in SEAD criteria development

have usually been the results of two separate kinds of

behavior, both related to decision makers . The first is a

response to being surprised by events that do not fit the

commonsense paradigm in vogue. The second response is the

result of decision-maker frustration when directed action fails

to yield expected outcomes .

The SAM defense nets of North Vietnam and the integrated

air defense structures the North Vietnamese developed to

counter American air power, while known quantities, were

technical surprises to decision makers . The information

concerning the North Vietnamese capability that decision

makers dealt with did not fit their view of the world at the

time . Only the reality of mounting American aircraft losses to

the enemy LADS net forced a response. The word went out to

"solve the problem" without decision makers knowing precisely

what the problem was. The result was a string of separate,

reactionary responses that solved the immediate, short-term

problem at the expense of assessing the evolutionary development of a more and more complex enemy air defense system.

The second behavioral response that results in the appeal to

the commonsense approach is generated by the decision maker's

frustration when SEAD options do not meet expectations. The

SEAD weapons programs of the late 1980s suffered badly as a

result of this response. The upgrade programs for the F-4G

and EF-111, the improved internally mounted self-protection

jammers for the F-111 and F-15, the program to acquire a

follow-on Wild Weasel replacement for the F-4G, and the

advanced follow-on integrated electronic warfare suites of

advanced bombers and fighters were severely curtailed-or

even cancelled in some cases-because of this frustration . The

frustration-and the apparent compulsion to find a simpler,

commonsense approach-was the result of poor communication, unrealistic expectations, and obsolete paradigms as

much as it was the result of complexity. Development of sound

SEAD criteria in an atmosphere charged with such frustration

led to a destructive spiral between decision makers and the

engineering community. The commonsense criteria developed

67
from frustration created measurements of SEAD effectiveness

that did not adequately address the complexity of SEAD

weapons and tactics or the way SEAD fits into overall modern

military strategy and tactics. This yielded SEAD approaches

and weapons choices that also fell short of expectations,

leading yet again to another round of "commonsense" solutions.

Communication between the electronic combat technician

who has been charged with developing SEAD measures of

effectiveness and the decision maker charged with criteria

formation has been hampered by the inherent complexity of

the subject. Technicians' single-minded focus on very specific

elements and the failure of the decision makers throughout

the bureaucratic structure to streamline communication

channels have resulted in significant disconnects. The case of

the EF-111 serves as an example. The specifications for the

EF-111 improvement program were related to technical system

performance, not overall capability. The failure to deliver a

high-risk, beyond state-of-the-art piece of equipment for the

EF-111 upgrade on time (it was actually three and a half years

late) was the root reason the Air Force cancelled the

contract." In retrospect, however, an alternative engineering

architecture using state-of-the-art computers could have

possibly achieved operational and objective goals for the

EF-111 upgrade, but the decision makers' frustration at

complex technicalities and the failure of the engineering

community to deliver what it had promised resulted in a

backlash of "return to basic commonsense" approaches.

There was a disconnect between the user community, which

established SEAD requirements for the EF-111, and the

engineering community to understand what the user "really"

needed. Decision makers correctly interpreted the disconnect

as a failure of the engineering approach to provide overall

criteria for SEAD effectiveness but incorrectly determined its

cause as unnecessary complexity and technicality . The result

was the backlash commonsense approach. Though not totally

responsible for the cancellation of some very critical SEAD

programs that may have far-reaching impact on US SEAD

capability in the future, the return to "old-fashioned common

sense" may have done far more harm than good in the long term.

68
Each of these hindrances to communication-as with the

EF-111 and F-4G upgrade programs-has resulted in decision

makers becoming frustrated and resorting to a system that

"makes sense" in the short term. The damaging element in the

commonsense approach is that it tends to inhibit a broader

view and excludes more sophisticated treatment of the criteria.

As SEAR systems and tactics become more encompassing

and technical, they become increasingly complex. The

complexity may have reached a point where decision makers

feel defeated before they start. When this occurs, decision

makers often resort to the commonsense approach out of

desperation and the half-whimsical belief that "if it's that

complex for us, the enemy will never understand it either ."

The commonsense approach does serve a very useful

function. It tends to focus the technician's attention on the

task as well as clarify the objectives of the decision maker.

Unfortunately, what makes sense to the decision maker may

not make sense to the tactician or technician . While the

commonsense approach may lead to the development of

criteria that is counter to long-range interests in the pursuit of

short-range goals, it can also serve as a catalyst for needed

dialogue between the tasker and the tasked .

In short, the commonsense model is both a curse and a

blessing . The appeal to common sense serves to focus a

community on basic objectives and to build a consensus for

future directions. However, as a standard of measure for

SEAD, it is especially insidious because requiring it curtails

more sophisticated treatment of the SEAD problem. The

commonsense approach continues to be a convenient tool in

applying pragmatism, but it is dangerous as a primary

standard of measurement.

The Objective-based Approach

The objective-based approach not only embodies elements of

each of the previous approaches as tools but also suggests

that any criterion or measurement of effectiveness be related

to overall objectives that are traceable throughout the entire

process. The objective-based approach is a commonsense test

in that it answers fundamental questions about SEAD's

69
purpose and role in the application of military power in clear,

easily understood ways . The objective-based approach is

empirical in that many of SEAD's tools have measurable

effects and is historical because it compares a particular

tactic, weapon, or strategy that has been used before to

determine whether it is applicable-and effective-for potential

SEAD use. Most importantly-because it is all encompassingthe objective-based approach provides a more adequate

contextual framework with which to assess joint SEAD in the

joint war-fighting arena.

The objective-based approach is-like the historical, the

engineering, and the commonsense approaches-a product of

an evolutionary process . It is not new; rather it is the most

current manifestation of a continuing process which seeks to

achieve equilibrium with its surroundings . SEAD has

undergone dramatic changes in a world which has also

undergone dramatic changes . Finding a SEAD criterion that

relates to the real world and measuring SEAD effectiveness in

relevant terms in an altered environment call basic objectives

into question. The objective-based approach focuses the

process on basic questions. What is it all about? What is it

that needs to be done? What is the best way to do it? Does

everyone know what to do?

The objective-based approach forces those who provide

objective guidance into a continuous cycle of reclarifying and

defining precisely what they want done; it forces those who

execute the strategies into a continuous cycle of ensuring that

their equipment and tactics meet the objectives. The standard

of measure is denominated in terms of the objective. The

criteria developed using the objective-based approach "make

sense" throughout the decision-making process from

national-level decision makers charged with defining national

security policy to war fighters using the SEAD weapons and

tactics developed from the process.

Figure 6 places the objective-based approach in relation to

the three previous approaches. The evolutionary blends are

discernible over time. The graph shows that the SEAD criteria

development was initially propelled by historical comparison.

There were elements of each of the other approaches present

with the historical approach. As the process evolved, historical

70
approaches were gradually replaced with engineering approaches.

Technology propelled the process so quickly that it rapidly

outstripped decision makers' ability to control it . This eventually

resulted in a backlash reversion to commonsense approaches.

The commonsense approach used to develop Vietnam SEAD

criteria, however, differs qualitatively from that used in the

late 1980s. The commonsense approach used in Vietnam was

a function of the historical approach, while the one used in the

late 1980s was a result of decision-maker frustration . In the

case of Vietnam, the commonsense approach led to a greater

use of empirical methodology. In the backlash case of the late

1980s, the commonsense approach forced the SEAD process

of criteria development and measurement of effectiveness to

evolve into the objective-based approach.

Table 6 outlines the characteristics of each of the approaches.

Many of these features reflect the evolutionary trends outlined

in chapter 1 . The objective-based approach, however, differs in

major respects from all the others: it is proactive and

prescriptive . Because it is process oriented, the objectivebased approach focuses on how the decision-making process

aids in the development of SEAD criteria and measures of

71
effectiveness . Because it is all encompassing, the objectivebased approach focuses on JSEAD applications as opposed to

single-service SEAD employment options . Because it is

decision maker-driven, the objective-based approach stresses

the requirement for clear channels of communication and a

streamlined chain of command with clear lines of authority .

The major impetus for the objective-based approach was the

demise of the Soviet Union as a threat. Even more than Desert

Storm, the sudden removal of the Soviet threat as a key

element of national security policy forced a radical reappraisal

of how we measured military worth-especially as far as

defense suppression was concerned . The sudden demise of

the Soviet threat was the watershed event which forced a

qualitative change in the emerging objective-based approach

to SEAD criteria/MOE development. The reappraisal had farreaching impacts on SEAD tactics and weapons development

as a function of war-fighting strategy. Table 7 compares cold

war SEAD criteria/MOE practices to the uncertain world of the

future.

Until now, the use of the vertical, linear model defining the

SEAD criteria/MOE development process-which begins with

72

Comparison of

Cold War

Table 6

Cold War to Post-Cold

Transition

War SEAD Environment

New Environment

- Clearthreat - Threat perceived as gone ; -Threat exists at same or higher level

- Resource-rich undergoing changes - - Diffuse

-- Specific weaponsfor - Resources dwindling - -Sophisticated

specific targets - - Residual assets available - Resources scarce

-- Service oriented during Desert Storm --Available assets must perform

- Technology dependent - - Integration of services multiple roles

- Deterrent defensive strategies - Technology gap closing --Jointwarlighting arequirement

- Relative economic health - Collective coalition security - US overwhelming force application

- Political support strategies desired unlikely

- Economy shaky - Technology gap close

- Political support ambiguous -Collective/coalition strategies required

- Economy integrated with world

- - Interdependent

- - Unstable

- - Less able to control

- Political support ambiguous
technological change proactive

- Integrative

Objectivedriven

- Not predictive

- Piecemeal application

-Threat-based-Seeks best overall soluti

- Threat-based

- Deductive

- Integrative

- Deductive

- Short-sighted

-Capability-based

- Piecemeal application

- Long-term goals

- Threat-based

- Influenced by overall goal
leadership defining objectives and ends with the execution

phase, which achieves those objectives through successive

stages-has served the electronic combat community well .

However, the integrative forces of SEAD evolution and the

speed of the technology/communications revolution now bring

the relevance of the vertical, linear model of the process into

question. Figure 7 compares the traditional vertical model to

"reality." The vertical, linear depiction of the criteria/MOE

development process is a product of an earlier time, and it

responds to a paradigm that no longer fits the facts. The

vertical model reflects a paradigm that is superfluous to the

emerging new world . Attempts to modify or to restructure it

but retain its linear, iterative nature hinder the evolution of

the SEAD criteria/MOE development process.

What model, one might ask, does "fit reality" in the attempt

to build the proactive, objective-based criteria model needed

for determining future SEAD options? Needed is a process that

VERTICAL MODEL "REALITY"

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY -REAL PROCESS HAS FEEDBACK BETWEEN

ALL LEVELS SIMULTANEOUSLY

DECISION -TACTICS NOT NECESSARILY DRIVEN BY NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVE STATED OBJECTIVES; DRIVEN 8Y WHAT WORKS

DECISION SEAD ASSETS -ALLOCATION OF ASSETS PRODUCT OF

REGIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES NEGOTIATION, NOT DECISION

SEAD ASSETS -OBJECTIVES CHANGE AS A RESULT OF WHAT DECISION f CAN BE DONE AS MUCH AS WHAT IS DESIRED.

THEATER MILITARY OBJECTIVES -SCARCITY OF SEAD ASSETS FORCE

iy

SEAD ASSETS

DECISION CENTRALIZED CONTROL

-DYNAMICS OF SEAD ENVIRONMENT FORCE

ENGAGEMENT LEVEL DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION.

OPERATIONAL ART

TACTICS -OBJECTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT

INTERPRETATIVE, NOT REAL.

-GOAL-ORIENTED

-NO PROCESS INDICATED

-STATIC

-NONRESPONSIVE TO CHANGE

-FEEDBACK LINEAR, ITERATIVE

Figure 7. Traditional vertical model.

74
focuses on dynamics, accommodates change, transfers

information fluidly from one portion of the process to the next

regardless of direction, and relates relevance of activity to

objective accomplishment.

The objective-based SEAR criteria of the future will be

process-oriented as well as goal-oriented . This is required

because the potential threat facing future US SEAD assets is

growing in sophistication, size, and composition. The range of

capabilities represented by the new threat will require a SEAD

criteria/MOE process that can assess the threat's capabilities

and select the most appropriate aggregate weapons and tactics

mix to meet itand the process must respond rapidly to be

meaningful. The process will need to be self-adjusting to

unanticipated changes and events .

Of the many models available in the physical, engineering,

and social sciences, the one which comes closest to combining

what the objective-based SEAD criteria/MOE model needs to

be with the evolving reality of the future world is Karl

Deutsch's cybernetic model . The model was introduced in the

late 1960s to explain the function of feedback in the political

decision-making process. The model was an attempt to depict

the processes as they really occurred, not as decision makers

idealized them. The cybernetic model is well suited for a SEAD

objective-based model for many reasons. It is process-oriented,

it characterizes objectives as the primary drivers of the

process, and it describes a self-adjusting process where

equilibrium is achieved when all of the individual parts of the

process have contributed to achieve the overall objective .

Figure 8 compares the JSEAD objective-based cybernetic

process to the reality around it . One can also compare the

vertical model in figure 7 to the cybernetic model to illustrate

the apparent shift from a reactionary cold-war paradigm to the

more proactive, process-oriented, objective-driven paradigm.

The cybernetic process is primarily a political science

construct, and applying it to the technical world of JSEAD and

joint war fighting is difficult. But its relevance to SEAD's

situation is compelling. Several situations currently facing

JSEAD decision makers serve as examples of why we need an

objective-based approach . First, the basic mental construct of

viewing reality (paradigm) used to address JSEAD concerns

75

lags behind reality. More disturbing, there is positive

resistance to adopting a more adequate paradigm. Second, the

requirement statements for technically advanced SEAD

systems to meet the proliferating and expanding technical

threat of the future are couched in cold-war concepts and

jargon. Third, the requirement for true joint approaches to the

SEAD problem are bogged down in service parochialisms and

disputes over authority . Fourth, decision makers have not

addressed criteria which meetjoint SEAD requirements.

The SEAD criteria currently used are defined in archaic

terms that have little to do with the reality of the uncertain

world . Current SEAD criteria reflect service-oriented SEAD

concepts that militate against measurements of effectiveness

that would test combined uses of SEAD weapons and tactics

to achieve overall objectives.

In Deutsch's modified cybernetic model, the overall objective

is the primary input driving the process. The process achieves

equilibrium when the objective is being met. The

objective-based approach to developing JSEAD criteria

recognizes decision making as a process where all the parts

work together to achieve overall equilibrium . JSEAD objectives

are driven by an accurate appraisal of reality, an appreciation

of the world as it really is, not as a decision-maker's decree.

Therefore, the first paradigm that must be discarded is the

vertical, linear model of decision making.

The revolution in communications technology and

information transfer has made data available to the entire

decision-making structure simultaneously. This makes the

opportunity for feedback a constant reality. As a consequence,

the decision-maker's responsibility in the JSEAD process has

shifted from one of directing to one of determining whether or

not the objectives are being met. The criteria used to evaluate

whether the objectives are being met is driven by the objectives

themselves, not by the process. Agencies within the process

adjust their activities with one another to achieve the objective

using a criterion that defines measures of effectiveness that

are quantitative, qualitative, and dynamic . This means

establishing priorities and the conditions under which they

might change . By ensuring feedback throughout the process,

decision makers and process participants can maintain

77
dynamic equilibrium and adjust to changing circumstances .

Given criteria that specify objectives in unambiguous

language, decision makers and process participants can

develop measurements of effectiveness that define whether or

not objectives are being met and then can alter their activities

accordingly.

Suppression of enemy air defenses during Desert Storm

illustrates the transition to the cybernetic paradigm. At the

macro level, Desert Storm SEAD objectives were encompassing

and broad ranging. In fact, the SEAD objectives were so broad

ranging that a SEAD campaign plan had to be drawn up .

Strategists did not consider Iraqi SEAD targets as individual

nodes or specific locations linked in a sequential, linear

manner to a master command-and-control center. All SEAD

targets were considered in light of their contribution to the

whole Iraqi IADS-as part of a system. In other words, the

objective was the degradation of the entire system. Rather

than attack the Baghdad SAM complex first, which a linear

"high-value target" thought process would lead a Vietnam-era

tactician to do, the first SEAD target in Iraq was a radar

complex located on the southern Iraqi border. Its destruction

denied the Iraqi C3 structure information . The objective was

the degradation of the total system, not the destruction of

high-value SAM sites . Objective-based criteria in the Iraqi

campaign, however, were spotty. In the translation from macro

concept to tactical application, several disconnects were

noticeable.

First, tactical fighters discovered the need for tactical

suppression of enemy battlefield air defenses . This was

especially true for A- lOs, F/A-18s, and F-16s flying in the

daytime in northern Kuwait and the Basra region of southern

Iraq. Oddly, tactical suppression of organic air defense-other

than hostile, emitting radar trackers which were quickly

quieted with HARM-shooting Air Force, Marine, and Navy

aircraftwas not considered in the original SEAD campaign.

Iraqi gunners and SAM operators-even though they had

successfully been severed from the Iraqi command and control

net-continued to operate autonomously and often blindly .

The fact that Iraqi fire was grossly inaccurate was of no great

comfort to the average coalition aircrew that observed multiple

78
SAM launches and AAA bursts in their general direction.

Hence, members of fighter missions, amongst themselves,

designated specific sorties within their flights to take on a

tactical defense suppression role. Using the strict vertical,

linear model, the development of such a tactic cannot be

explained easily . Where did the direction come from? How did

the decision-making process work that resulted in the ad hoc

creation of the tactic? Using the cybernetic model easily

explains the development of the ad hoc tactical defense

suppression tactic . The objective-driven process needed to

make an adjustment to reach equilibrium, and the

development of the ad hoc tactic was it .

The second disconnect was the failure to recognize paralysis

of the enemy as a valid SEAD objective. The SEAD campaign

was enormously successful, but coalition tacticians, in

identifying target objectives with great precision, did not

identify a precise means of determining how successful their

tactics and weapons were . Consequently, there was no way to

tell how effective SEAD weapons and tactics were because

analysts were not sure what they were looking for. It was not

until after Desert Storm that analysts discovered that the

primary effect of coalition SEAD was paralysis of the Iraqi

IADS and C3 system. Paralyzing a system that depends almost

entirely on command and control for effective use of the LADS,

as many analysts pointed out afterwards, is virtually as

effective as destroying the collective IADS weapons

themselves-provided that the paralysis is maintained over the

course of the war. The initial massive assaults on selected

critical IADS and C3 nodes shocked the Iraqi IADS into

paralysis, and persistent attacks on the IADS structure 24

hours a day ensured the Iraqi system never recovered

sufficiently to be effective. The important point to remember

here is that analysts identified paralysis of the Iraqi LADS as a

valid SEAD objective after thefact.

12

The evolution to objective-based criteria using a cybernetic

paradigm will overcome disconnects like the ones mentioned .

More importantly, objective-based criteria provide a basis for

proactive weapons and tactics development as well as a

framework with which to view the overall SEAD process.

79
Setting the Context:

Continuums as Assessment Tools

SEAR effectiveness criteria historically have been specific,

empirical, and related to tactics. The realities of the emerging

world order and the uncertainties it brings make this

methodology increasingly suspect. We may have reached the

point where the traditional methods of analysis are applied to

conditions that no longer pertain.

The 10 variables traced in chapter one can be distilled into

four evolutionary continuums. These continuums are

1 . piecemeal/integrated,

2. need-based/resource-based,

3. threat-based/capability-based, and

4. defensive/offensive.

The continuums give us a sense of historical perspective in

SEAD development, a way of assessing where we are going and

what forces are at work in shaping future SEAD concepts.

They represent the environment in which the cybernetic

process operates. Figure 9 shows the cybernetic process

superimposed on the continuums scale as SEAD objectivesand the process itself-attempt to reach equilibrium in rapidly

changing realities . The evolutionary trend forces the process to

change its objectives based on reality. Not only are the

continuums forcing the process to adapt rapidly, but the

continuums themselves change at different rates .

The four continuums attempt to assess the changing context

of criteria development. Clearly, if the old paradigms no longer

apply, their continued use will yield-at the very bestindeterminate measures of overall effectiveness . The

continuums attempt to place specific types of measurement

and criteria selection in a more relevant construct.

The piecemeal/integrated continuum relates to the way

JSEAD assets are employed in combat. Sometimes resource

limitations, doctrinal predisposition, or situation-dependent

factors might dictate the use of forces along lines indicated by

this continuum. For instance, defensive applications of some

JSEAD assets have usually been examples of the piecemeal

80
employment approach. Using this approach, F-4Gs would be

tasked a few at a time to defend specific aircraft elements, or

Navy EA-6s would be tasked for specific defense of a group of

aircraft entering a target area. Piecemeal employment of the

F-4G, F/A-18 HARM-shooter, EA-6B, and the EF-111 were

standard practice-when used in a defensive mode-during

Desert Storm. When resources are available, the piecemeal

approach is an efficient way of gaining maximum defense for

high-value assets .

When resources are limited, using the piecemeal approach

forces the battlefield commander to prioritize missions by

sorting out who is to be defended and who is not. Alternatively,

the commander may be forced to select a different way of

employing JSEAD assets to make the most of their abilities.

Offensive applications of JSEAD tend to present an integrated

approach to employing the assets . The collective and

81
integrated efforts of many different types of weapons systems

to neutralize an enemy war-fighting structure, for example,

lead to a more integrated approach in achieving the objective.

Achieving the SEAD objective in rapidly changing

circumstances sets up a relationship among desired SEAD

outcomes, feedback loops, and the environment. The piecemeal approach is gradually giving way to a more integrated

method of SEAD application because of fiscal constraint,

limited resources, technological sophistication, immediate

access to pertinent information, and societal pressures .

The key point is that SEAD's cybernetic process will seek an

equilibrium to the evolutionary pressures pushing the

continuum toward the integrated end of the spectrum. Just

because the equilibrium reached may not be the equilibrium

desired does not mean that the process is dysfunctional ; in the

absence of proactive direction, the process will make whatever

adjustment to reality fits the situation .

The integrated approach represents the evolutionary trend.

Continued piecemeal applications, no matter how desirable

they may be, must be viewed in the reality of the evolutionary

trend. Figure 10 shows the evolutionary trend from piecemeal

to integrated and its relative impact on the SEAD criteria-
development process. Objectives need to be defined as a function

of the integrated use of concepts and SEAD weapons not only

because doing this makes sense but because it represents the

most appropriate adaptation to changing realities .

The need-based/resource-based continuum represents two

different approaches to resources and objectives that can be

graphed, roughly, as a spectrum. On one side is the question:

"Given the objective, what resources do I need to accomplish

the objective?" On the other side is the question, "Given the

resources I have-and am likely to receive-what can I do to

achieve the stated objective?"

The continuum's effect on JSEAD becomes more relevant in

a resource-constrained environment. JSEAD has been moving

steadily toward the resource-based end of the continuum. Very

specific requirements were driving the acquisition of specific

systems to fill the need. In a resource-rich environment, filling

specific needs made more sense. A justifiable military need

drove the system to acquire required resources . From these,

the users derived very distinctive tactics and weapon

combinations to deal with the threat.

An altered political and economic environment forced a

change in the continuum . The military need no longer carries

the priority it once did, and weapons and tactics employment

concepts are becoming objective-driven. SEAD is especially

hard hit by this change . The general military threat is

diminished, but the specific SEAD threat of the future

continues to grow.

Evolutionary trends show that, no matter what the threat,

SEAD objectives must be tempered with a recognition of the

facts . Even as SEAD resources become more scarce, the

requirement to perform the SEAD mission in a more

sophisticated, threatening electromagnetic environment

remains . This paradox creates a significant challenge for SEAD

criteria development. Rather than make the blanket statement

that US forces need to maintain the technological edge, the

SEAD community needs to specify what kind ofedge is needed

given the resources available. Rather than ask for general

technological improvement programs, the SEAD community

needs to assess how it can use what resources it is likely to

receive to achieve objectives . More pertinently, the objectives

83
themselves may need to be redefined in terms of what is

achievable with the given resources. The fact is that future

SEAD may not be able to achieve objectives as they are

currently understood. The resource-constrained environment

will force integration of SEAD resources and shift the

emphasis from specific threat coverage to general capabilities

against a broad spectrum of air defense threats.

Figure 11 shows the need-based/resource-based continuum

and its impact on objective-based criteria development. The

shift from criteria developed in need-driven, resource-rich

surroundings for force structure and weapons acquisition to a

resource-constrained environment that is forced to use what it

has to achieve SEAD objectives is noteworthy. Desert Storm,

as dramatic an event as it was, was not the watershed event

for this continuum. The critical event was the demise of the

Soviet Union, and its impact has accelerated the evolution of

this continuum toward the resource-based end of the

spectrum. Clear objectives are impossible to define because

the transition from a need-based to a resource-based SEAD

environment was virtually instantaneous. The shock to the

process used in determining SEAD effectiveness is numbing;

the system is out of balance and will remain so until decision

makers and the SEAD community can define the relationship
between achievable SEAD objectives and adequate SEAD

resources in concrete terms.

The threat-based/capability-based continuum is closely

related to resource availability and the changing nature of the air

defense threat. As it attempts to define achievable objectives and

a means of determining effectiveness in a resource-constrained

environment, the SEAD community has been forced to

discontinue developing tactics and weapons based on specific,

identifiable enemy systems and to begin using a method which

acknowledges the proliferation of sophisticated air defense

technology among many potential enemies . Rather than

Soviet-style weapons and the massive Central European

land-war scenarios of the cold war with troops and weapons in

place, the US SEAD community faces an unknown potential

enemy that can field the best weapons Western arms industries

are capable of selling them. Rather than in-place forces, the US

SEAD community must be able to deploy a defense suppression

capability as soon as requested. Air power, as a critical

determinant of national power projection, cannot be employed

prudently without the protection offered by SEAD .

The movement from threat-based to capability-based

tactics and weapons is a general evolutionary trend faced by

the entire military, but it is especially problematic for SEAD.

EF-111/EA-6B jamming works against specific radars.

Antiradiation missiles have capabilities against a specific

range of emitting targets . Bombers and fighters have

differing-and specific-susceptibilities to enemy air defense

nets. Intelligence collection, target selection, and damage

assessment for SEAD objectives are specific. There is very little

that is "general" about achieving SEAD objectives. Yet the

evolutionary trend propels the SEAD community toward

acquiring a capability-based SEAD force . How the SEAD

community will develop capability-based objectives and a

means of measuring effectiveness promises to be vexatious.

Figure 12 shows the impact the evolutionary trend toward

capability-based SEAD weapons and tactics has on the

development of objective-based criteria. The major impact

relates to threat definition. Defining the threat in terms

specific enough for tacticians to know what weapons to use in

what circumstances while retaining SEAD force structure and

85
THREATBASED

RELATIVE

CONTRIBUTION

TO SEAD

CRITERIA

CAPABILITY-BASED

RELATIVE

CONTRIBUTION

TO SEAD

CRITERIA

VIETNAM BEKAA LIBYA DESERT COLLAPSE OF

VALLEY STORM SOVIET UNION

Figure 12. Threat-based/capability-based continuum .

strategies that encompass a broad range of capabilities will be

a challenge .

The depiction of the threat-based/capability-based continuum

is the same as that of the need-based/resource-based

continuum in general form. The other two continuums are

reasonably linear and smooth in their transitions from one

side to the other. Threat-based forces, strategies, and tactics

versus their capability-based counterparts have a more

distinctive nature : they tend to be one or the other.

Capability-based and resource-based SEAD approaches are

directly related . The combination of a perceived diminution of

the threat and subsequent loss of resources has accentuated

trends toward the capability-based and resource-based end of

the spectrum-regardless of the true nature of the threat

SEAD forces face . The attempt to make the transition smooth

and linear may be more indicative of hopeful outcomes than of

concrete reality. Nonetheless, the abstraction is useful as a

tool for developing JSEAD criteria and assessing effectiveness.

The defensive/offensive continuum reflects the movement of

SEAD from its original orientation in a defensive support role

for protecting friendly aircraft to its current status as both a

defender of air power and an offensive weapon in its own right.

The movement has been inexorably pushed toward the

offensive end of the spectrum by the logic of technology and

86
superior firepower. Advanced antiradiation missile design,

advances in electromagnetic power generation, remotely

piloted vehicles, unmanned aerospace vehicles, stealth fighters

and bombers, enhanced communications technology, true

24-hour-a-day attack capability, precision-guided munitions,

and the growth of space-based surveillance and targeting

systems buttressed by digital computer technology have

created SEAD capabilities undreamed of even 10 years ago.

These capabilities have far more implications for enhancing

power projection than they do for solidifying defensive

positions. Hence, there has been a positive movement toward

the development of offensive uses of SEAD that has, until

recently, been unchecked.

Assessing the defensive/offensive continuum's impact on -

the development of objective-based criteria for measuring

SEAD effectiveness is difficult. The terms defensive and

offensive represent war-fighting concepts as well as describe a

tactical situation faced by one side or the other in combat.

While it is clear that technology has given SEAD a distinct

boost toward the offensive end of the spectrum, changes in the

politico-military environment seem to have slowed the pace .

Resource constraints and the ambiguous nature of the future

air defense threat, coupled with pressures to integrate SEAD

plans into a single, cohesive plan, have slowed the evolution of

SEAD's offensive dimension.

The objective-based criteria for SEAD may call for either a

defensive or offensive application depending on the situation

US forces face. The current military proclivity indicates a

strong preference for decisive use of military power to

overwhelm an enemy. Desert Storm SEAD application was a

premier example of using overwhelming technology and

superior firepower to neutralize an air defense system . It was

also an apt example of the use of SEAD as an evolved offensive

concept. Yet US reluctance to provide an adequate tactical

defense suppression over the battlefield shows that strategic

SEAD planners may have gone too far toward the offensive

side of the spectrum. Fortunately, there were few coalition

aircraft losses to Iraqi battlefield air defense systems.

Nonetheless, the judicious use of the defensive/offensive

spectrum might provide a way of bringing SEAD objectives into

87
clearer focus and provide a broader perspective against which

to measure SEAR effects .

Figure 13 shows the defensive/offensive continuum-a

variation of the Clausewitzian model.

13 The primary difference

is that Clausewitz used four discrete categories rather than a

continuum stretching across a spectrum. SEAD's evolution

from defensive to offensive has been very rapid until recently.

The movement in the piecemeal/integrated SEAD continuum

toward integrative uses of SEAD has enabled more offensive

applications of SEAD weapons and concepts. The movement to

the integrative end of the spectrum provided the impetus to

bring the separate SEAD weapons and concepts together into

a coherent whole, and, for the first time, tacticians could see

the possibilities SEAD provided as a total concept for the

offensive . The movement toward integrative methods also

began the incipient movement towards the development of

joint SEAD objectives and criteria for measuring effectiveness .
At the same time, the transition to a capability

based and

resource-based orientation for SEAD have slowed the

development of offensive SEAD concepts because of a slowdown

in technology research and in weapons procurement. The net

result of these forces is a gradual slowing of SEAD's evolution

toward the offensive end of the spectrum.

Challenges for Objective-based Criteria

The four continuums in chapter 1 serve as a way of converting the 10 variables into evolutionary trends. They provide

a sliding scale for viewing objective-based criteria

development. Nonetheless, the objective-based criteria must

undergo the same "reality checks" that every emerging scheme

experiences . The challenges are daunting.

The relationship between technology and SEAD development

has been crucial . The challenge for objective-based criteria will

be in the formation of proactive criteria-criteria that not only

can select the general areas of research required for

maintaining a US lead in critical electronic combat technology

but that can define the kind of edge American SEAD will need

to have in the future.

The gradual withering away of cold-war force structures will

have enormous impact on the general ability of the military to

project American power when and where it is needed. Air

power's stock as a key component of national military power

will grow in the new world order-a world order which will

value prompt, decisive responses to crisis situations . The US is

not the only nation to recognize the importance of air power.

The lessons of Desert Storm taught observers as well as

participants, and SEAD's lesson was clear. With SEAD,

modern air power can cripple a nation's ability to wage war.

Without it, air power's effectiveness is greatly diminished.

The challenge is to determine how much SEAD force

structure is enough to meet the challenge posed by the

growing air defense capability of the potential enemy. How

much SEAD force structure represents "overwhelming"

capability`? What mix of SEAD weapons will be adequate to

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protect American air power and cripple the enemys ability to

defend from air attack?

Continued fiscal constraint and the accompanying military

drawdown have already forced a major reorganization among

the services. Many more changes will follow. The challenge in

developing objective-based SEAD criteria will be to create or

adapt organizations to accommodate the reality of "doing more

with less." Rather than wait for the decision-making process to

decree the shape of future SEAD organization, SEAD tacticians

and practitioners must take an active part in the creation of

the reorganized American military to ensure SEAD objectives

can be met.

Military doctrine-both single-service doctrine and joint

doctrine-poses a huge challenge to SEAD. As SEAR criteria

development shifts more and more to an objective-based

approach, SEAD tacticians and strategists have an excellent

opportunity to take the lead in determining how SEAD can

best be used to achieve overall objectives.

Military doctrine is undergoing significant change . SEAD

practitioners need to get in "on the ground floor" to establish

criteria for developing effective defense suppression measures

that relate directly to overall objectives rather than to the

narrow ranges dictated by formulators of doctrine, who have

little understanding of SEAD's contribution to the war-fighting

effort.

The tactics of Desert Stormwhile vindicating much of the

investment of SEAR technology-will gradually fade as a

model because the weapons, the expertise, and the

organizational structure supporting them will change

radically. Objective-based criteria will help the changed SEAD

force use its capabilities to best advantage by balancing what

can be done with what needs to be done in accomplishing its

tasks. Pragmatism and innovation will be key to the process.

The greatest challenge for emerging objective-based criteria

will be to relate overall strategy to concrete activity. The setting

of clear SEAD objectives and the constant refining that will

take place must take into account far more variables than the

current paradigm allows for. Improvements in managing SEAD

intelligence information and its timely distribution will be

90
required for the emerging objectivebased criteria to take hold

and make a meaningful difference .

The hallmark of the emerging new age seems to be the

growth of information-its management and distribution-as a

determinant of power. As a direct consequence of the age of

computers, information itself may become the key to power in

the twenty-first century. The nation that can control data,

deny it to others, or willfully shape it will be preeminent in the

wars of the future. In this context, SEAR criteria may be

couched more in terms of information denial and shaping than

in the more traditional concepts of radar destruction and

jamming. Whatever the outcome, in order for SEAD criteria or

measures of effectiveness to be meaningful in the uncertain

world of the future, they must show clear linkage between the

objective and the desired result .

Notes

1. Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: The Free Press,

1966), 75-94. The cybernetic model Deutsch presents has undergone

considerable change since its original introduction, but the concept of a

process which seeks equilibrium through self-adjustment is an extremely

useful one in criteria development.

2. Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge &

Kegan Paul, 1976), v.

3. Ibid .

4. US Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC),

Proposal for Determination and Application of Measures of Effectiveness

(Kirtland AFB, New Mex. : AFOTEC, 1991), 3.

5. Ibid ., 4.

6. Ibid .

7. AFOTEC, "OAY/OAN Point Paper on TAWC [Tactical Air Warfare

Center] Response to AFEWC [Air Force Electronic Warfare Center] ASPJ

[Advanced Self-Protection Jammer] MOE Study," (Kirtland AFB, New Mex. :

AFOTEC, 1991), 2.

8. AFOTEC, Proposal for Determination and Application of Measures of

Effectiveness, 4.

9. AFOTEC, "Air Force Cost and Operational Effectiveness (COEA)

Process," briefing to AFOTEC/OA, February 1992, slide no. 7-2.

10. William Graham Sumner, Folkways (Boston, Mass. : Ginn and

Company, 1906), 521-30. Sumner introduces the concept of "mores" in his

book, which lays the foundation for the concept of "common sense" and the

potential dangers it implies.

11 . The author was the EF-111 functional manager for the Tactical Air

Forces (Tactical Air Command, United States Air Forces Europe, Pacific Air

91
Forces) during this time and was deeply involved with attempts to upgrade

the EF-111 .

12. This is an example of the uses of hindsight to discover the "objective

behind the objective." It may be an unfair criticism of the SEAD planning for

Desert Storm because no one at that time could have predicted the

synergistic effects of simultaneous attacks on the Iraqi LADS and the effect

of subsequent around-the-clock harassment of the IADS/C3 structure to

paralyze it using the SEAD criteria of the time . The challenge for

objective-based criteria is to foresee, as much as possible, the unforeseen

objectives as away of economizing and using SEAD efficiently.

13. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and

Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J . : Princeton University Press, 1984), 357-67,

523-26, 528-32, 611-13. Clausewitz's views on offensive and defensive

war-fighting concepts are spread throughout his book. While there is

evidence Clausewitz was influenced by Hegelian views of history, he did not

at that time view defensive and offensive aspects of war as aspects of a

continuum or a thesis-antithesis-synthesis process.

92
Chapter 3

Service Approaches to SEAR

Service culture and doctrine play a significant role in the

formation of single-service SEAR strategy and tactics. By

understanding how the interplay of service culture and

doctrine has influenced each service's evolution of SEAD, we

can gain a clearer appreciation of SEAD's growing importance

in the prosecution of modern war strategy and tactics. This

understanding will also provide insight into opportunities for

and problems with the growth of future JSEAD programs.

An analysis of each US military service's specific SEAD

strategies, tactics, and procedures will help determine which

SEAD elements of each service are most relevant to conducting

wars in the future . How each service characterizes the threat

through the lens of its doctrine and service culture is key to

understanding how each employs SEAD .

As retired Air Force general Michael Dugan pointed out, the

air/sea/land (and now space) roles define the basic

operational turf of the services, and from these roles have

developed the basic fabric of the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and

Army.l With the creation of the institutions came the creation

of the service cultures that supported them and the paradigms

that charged their individual service view of the strategic and

tactical environment. The parochialisms that often

characterize individual service advocacy stem from this growth

of service culture as well, and individual service applications of

SEAD are both an example of this phenomenon and a bridge

to future opportunities for true joint focuses on objectives

common to all.

It is a curious fact that while each service seems obliged to

advocate the primacy of its role over others, the services have

each acquired elements of the others in their evolutionary

processes. The Navy acquired its own "army" in the Marines

and has its own "air force ." The Army has its own "air force"

(helicopters and special purpose aircraft) and a limited

number of amphibious vehicles. Even the Air Force has made

93
inroads into using the naval medium with its Cobra

Dane-shipborne missile tracking system and has its own

"army" via specially trained security police units and special

forces . The key element here is not that these particular

"services-in-miniature" exist but that they exist to enable their

parent services to perform the tasks most directly related to

the use of their medium.

SEAR is a special case in this respect because each of the

services has evolved an elaborate use of the air medium in the

prosecution of its war-fighting goals. Each service has a real,

internal stake in employing SEAD beyond the achievement of

overarching joint objectives .

Navy SEAR

We will begin with the pertinent characteristics of Navy

strategy. The following is a compilation of characteristics

gleaned from NWT-1, Strategic Concepts of the US Navy (the

naval warfare publication that is their closest equivalent to

written doctrine), observations made by scholars, and Navy

tactics publications. 2

Characteristics of the Navy

Missions:

sea control

power projection

strategic sea lift

Command and Control:

decentralized

independent

War-fighting Mentality:

decentralized execution

wars fought as series of battles

primarily, araid mentality

secondarily, a limited campaign mentality

long-term, continuously waged war unsuited for battles of short duration due

to limited storage capacity for materiel and arms and vulnerability

"power-projection" function of specific, limited objectives

94
The Navy perceives a dilemma in the function of SEAD as

manifested in the disposition/employment of its air power in

combat. The dilemma is a result of having to defend the fleet

first before aerial power projection can be accomplished.

Defense absorbs a considerable amount of force structure

prior to allotting forces for power projection and makes the

ratio of support/defensive aircraft to strike aircraft much

higher than an "equivalent" Air Force unit. 4

When one considers the vulnerability of naval craft without

dedicated protection, it is easily understandable why the Navy

places such emphasis on fleet protection. The destruction of a

carrier has more impact on naval aircraft than the destruction

of a particular airfield has on land-based aircraft.

A second feature of this dilemma is manifested in the way

naval SEAD equipment is designed . Naval SEAD aircraft and

weapons are multipurpose, whereas certain aspects of SEAD

require very specific treatment. A direct comparison of the

EF-111, F-4G, and EC-130H aircraft to their "equivalents" in

the Navy is unfair largely because of this facet. To compensate

for lack of specificity, the Navy merges a variety of tactics and

equipment.

Navy EA-6s, for instance, can perform early warning/

acquisition radar and communication jamming, and targettracking radar jamming and can fire the high-speed antiradiation

95

Doctrine/Tactics :

informal, very general doctrine, links between tactics and doctrine tenuous

tactics formulated on case-by-case basis

lack of formal doctrine enables flexible tactics

lack of formal doctrine frustrates strategists

tactics vary widely ; no apparent framing principles other than accomplishing

specifics of mission

Threats:

sea threat :

viewed primarily as threat to the fleet

defensive strategy accentuated because of nature of medium (i .e., destruction

of ship means survival in hostile medium of ocean)

power-projection threat:

target and raid specific

concerned with specific area of attack

overall land TADS not primary focus

use of "rollback"3 (sequential destruction of SEAD targets) concept, but only

within area of specific interest
missile (the AGM-88 HARM)-a task which normally requires

three separate kinds of Air Force aircraft. Navy fighters and

attack aircraft (with the exception of the F-14) can fire the

HARM as well as deliver other more conventional standoff

ordnance. Naval ships can fire the TLAM-C (Tomahawk land

attack missile-conventional) at known SEAD targets with great

accuracy and devastating effect. The difficulty is that, prior to

the strike, friendly forces may not know the key locations of

enemy emitters and fire-control nodes.

Navy aircraft that employ the HARM, however, lack the

specialized traits of the F-4G, which can detect, identify, and

locate very precisely its target, whether its location is known

(or suspected) ahead of time or not. The Navy compensates for

this by salvo-firing HARMs "in the blind," using enough

missiles to "blanket" the prospective threat area. At the same

time, Navy attack aircraft fly through the SAM belt to the

target. This tactic/equipment meld, which stresses versatility,

presumably allows the Navy to achieve maximum use of

aircraft while minimizing exposure to enemy fire.

SEAD tactics for the Navy are not focused on specific radar

targets ; they are focused on "corridor clearing" to open a path

for attacking aircraft or specific target-area suppression for a

very limited geographic area. The destruction of the radar site

is not the object of Navy SEAD tactics ; the object, rather, is

usually to suppress the radar for the period of time it takes the

attacking aircraft to fly through the lethal envelope of the

radar-directed weapon system en route to their targets.

Because it must use nonspecific tactics and weapons (due to

the multiple-duty nature of its aircraft), the Navy is more

closely aligned with the piecemeal portion of the "piecemeal/

integrated" continuum.

These piecemeal tactics serve the needs of Navy SEAD so

long as the objectives of military power are specific, of short

duration, and do not require resources needed for a long-term

effort. Piecemeal tactics are suited for raids and battles, not

campaigns and wars of lengthy duration that require

integration with a larger combined force.

The Navy raid on Benghazi, Libya, during Operation El

Dorado Canyon and some of the attacks into southern Iraq

during Operation Desert Storm portray both the strengths and

96
weaknesses of the piecemeal approach. The raids on Benghazi

were extremely effective largely as a result of Navy SEAD

tactics. The attacks were brief and specific, and the use of

"blanket' tactics in a small geographic area overwhelmed the

very surprised Libyan defenses . The criteria of specific

objectives, short duration, and limited force were met. During

Desert Storm, however, piecemeal tactics only worked for

areas that were isolated from the main area of battle .

Prosecution of single-minded piecemeal tactics in the overall

campaign, while effective for the short term, was not an

efficient use of SEAD resources . An integrated approach to

shutting down the entire system may have required fewer

sorties to accomplish the objective and, consequently, required

much less exposure to hostile fire .

Using the defensive/offensive matrix as an analysis tool to

ascertain Navy SEAD effectiveness yields mixed results. The

prevailing philosophy of the Navy is to protect the fleet first,

then project power. SEAD, as part of power projection, is used

as a defensive measure to protect attacking aircraft (even

though the attacking aircraft are performing an offensive role) .

The SEAD role, therefore, could be categorized as "defensive

offense." This would limit the Navy's capability in that its

SEAD forces would have to be split between protecting the fleet

and protecting the attackers in the power-projection role.

As the credible threat to the US naval carrier groups

diminishes, JSEAD planners are likely to see a major shift in

emphasis into the power-projection category with concomitant

shifts to offensive-offensive tactics . We may be seeing signs of

this already. Rear Adm Riley D. Mixson, who commanded

Carrier Group Two during Desert Storm, in comments written

for a magazine article, detailed five areas where he felt the

Navy could do better . Three of the five were directly concerned

with power-projection capabilities : (1) the acquisition of

longer-range attack aircraft (or tankers), (2) the need to "revise

our thinking on ordnance requirements" with a focus on

acquisition of more powerful, hardened-target weapons such

as the I-2000 laser-guided bomb, and (3) the admonishment

that the "Navy should be more aggressive in attending to the

J-factor-as in joint warfare." 5 If the Navy is to focus more

squarely on air power as a key feature of its force employment

97
in power projection, then the next logical step is to adopt an

offensive-offensive posture in achieving SEAD objectives.

It is equally likely that, as a function of allocating a greater

portion of Navy resources to power projection, both naval

equipment and strategies will grow closer to the Air Force's

"global reach, global power" concepts and the Army's AirLand

Battle-future (ABLF) concept of "the extended battlefield ." 6

Both these concepts stress rapid response and flexibility and

acknowledge air power as a key ingredient in shaping the

three-dimensional, nonlinear battlefield of the future. The

Navy's transition, in this sense, is a logical response to the

evolving world environment and the military's role within it.

The implications for integrated use of single-service SEAD are

clear: Navy SEAD will change to accommodatejoint SEAD .

Air Force SEAD

Over the last three years, the Air Force's analysis of SEAD

has grown from one of examining single-system, enemy

capabilities to assessing the damage a total enemy LADS can

bring to bear on an attacking friendly force. The transition

from single-system to holistic analysis of the SEAD threat was

easier for the Air Force than for its sister services because the

Air Force has always dealt with the concepts of threedimensional space and time as corollaries to its strategy. The

Air Force, being more technology-driven than its sister services,

has tended to be more responsive to technological change. The

Air Force was the first to adapt digitally reprogrammable

electronic combat (EC) equipment and to recognize that

integrating electronic combat into tactical thought does not

occur without instituting practice in exercises like Green Flag

and Cope Thunder, which stress integrating EC and SEAD

into day-to-day tactical training. However, the proclivity of the

Air Force to change rapidly- maybe too rapidly-and adapt to

its perceived new environment has some negative aspects where

SEAD effectiveness is concerned.

The primary negative effect of the extremely rapid

technological changes brought about by SEAD across an

98
institution as large as the Air Force has been asymmetric

evolution: technically based agencies grew so fast that

linkages between them and other less technically oriented

structures were weakened, perhaps even shattered. The

overall tactical structure has had difficulty adapting to the

changes created by Air Force SEAD; tactical equilibrium was

disrupted. This created a paradoxical situation: in order to

adapt, Air Force SEAD institutionalized change itself as the

primary control mechanism for achieving equilibrium . As soon

as a change in the enemy LADS order of battle was detected,

Air Force decision makers mandated the creation of newer

pieces of hardware to "meet the threat." The mandate to build

technology to counter the threat became an unchallenged

axiom that created disconnects among many Air Force tactics

communities that resulted from "level-of-technology"imbalances .

The spectrum of evolutionary development caused by rapid

technological change in SEAD was uneven; the criteria for

measuring effectiveness in one area of growth may not have

applied to another . For instance, measuring bombing

effectiveness was relatively straightforward no matter how

sophisticated the bomb: it hit the target or it didn't. Such a

criterion may have applied to SEAD during the use of relatively

unsophisticated SEAD tactics in Vietnam, but the subsequent

evolution of the LADS threat and the Air Force's response to it

made such a simplistic criterion irrelevant. The criteria to

evaluate SEAD's effectiveness-even in Desert Storm-are called

into question because they were created for a technological and

political world at a different stage of evolution.

The imbalance that technology has on the evolutionary

development of Air Force SEAD forced a nonlinear pattern of

growth in other areas as well. The balance between doctrine

and strategy was destabilized . Doctrine and strategy

development tended to be ahead of or behind technological

reality, but rarely in consonance . In the absence of a bonding

doctrine that tied SEAD strategy to SEAD tactics, tactical

thought and application tended to become specialized,

fragmented, and parochial. This caused significant schisms

between users and builders at a very fundamental level. Entire

engineering initiatives and programs were often implemented

without reference to actual tactical or strategic needs. For

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example, one Air Force engineer, when asked why there were

no representatives from the tactical flying community (those

with engineering backgrounds and training) in his major

weapons system program, responded, "I don't want to corrupt

the pure engineering environment with extraneous influences."

The institutionalization of change in Air Force SEAD has the

ironic effect of estranging the "thinkers" and the "doers." Those

charged with creating SEAD strategy and tactics, even though

they sense the changing world around them, are seemingly

doomed to lag behind technological reality in creating

forward-looking concepts for the future. Those writing doctrine

are forced into ever more visionary statements in an attempt to

bond SEAD's technological reality to a view of the future far

enough ahead to provide a framework that accommodates the

changes taking place in the technical world. Unfortunately, in

order to provide the required "leap of vision" into the future,

writers of Air Force doctrine must use a paradigm of the world

that may not apply when the future arrives .

Air Force-applied SEAD-as the leading edge of technical

and tactical thoughtis both the beneficiary and a victim of

this situation . The Air Force's specialized aircraft,

sophisticated tactics and methods, and community of

expertise surrounding Air Force SEAD has resulted in a

capability of staggering tactical effectiveness . Air Force SEAD

tactics and methods change with each new technological

capability; doctrine and strategy formulation have difficulty

making the appropriate adjustments . Hence, doctrine and

strategy are in danger of being driven by SEAD technology

rather than defining the turf where technology is harnessed to

achieve overall objectives.

The most recent pronouncement of written Air Force

doctrine, the March 1992 Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic

Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, postulates a

three-dimensional application of power using speed (as a

function of time), flexibility, range, accuracy (a combination of

some specific "principles of war," namely, objective, mass, and

economy of force), and firepower as primary elements. The

manual deals with the uncertain world environment and with

rapidly changing technologies by crafting a vision of air

power's future and linking it to past doctrinal thought. While

100
such visionary doctrine is a usable construct for developing

strategy at the macro level, it is likely to draw a cynical

response from the SEAR tactician at the "nuts-and-bolts"

tactical level. The link between strategy and tactics, implied

though it is, is tenuous because of the allowances that must

be made for technological change.$

To frame the positive and negative aspects of Air Forceapplied SEAD, it is necessary to detail the relevant characteristics

of the Air Force in much the same way as was done with the

Navy.

Characteristics of the Air Force

Missions :

- aerospace control

-- power projection

- - airborne defense against air attack

-aerial support of ground forces

Command and Control:

-centralized

- strong emphasis on preserving command and control

- (C) structures indicates relative dependency

War-fighting Mentality:

- decentralized execution geographically; centralized execution by function

- wars fought as function of objective; duration function of logistics,

sustainability, and attrition

- prefer use of overwhelming force, decisive force, and sufficient force

respectively9

- offensive: seize the initiative ; exploit speed, range, flexibility of air power

- bold in planning, cautious in execution

- global power projection supporting full range of objectives from very general

to very specific

DoctrinefTactics:

- formal, general doctrine, visionary and complex; not well understood by rank

and file

- very specific tactics that tend toward dogma

- formal doctrine often ignored at tactical level

-- doctrine not part of tactical education

-- perception exists that doctrine doesn't apply

- written doctrine often lags tactical development because of technical

change ; attempts to "universalize" unchanging principles ; removes doctrine

from tactical use

-- dynamic relationship between doctrine and tactics idealized

-tactics support both specific target and theater objectives . Pragmatic link

between doctrine and tactics implicit, not explicit strategy holistic; sees war

objectives "all at once"

101
- direct threats are to airborne assets ; viewed as function of power projection

(tactical offensive)

- protection of airfields important, but since primary war-fighting impetus on

power projection, protection of airborne assets accentuated

- indirect threats to airborne assets (early warning systems, C3, importance

of nonlethal elements of IADS to enemy scheme of battle) considered as a

function of campaign/war objectives

The dilemmas which plague the Air Force are more

complicated than those that face its sister services both

because the Air Force views SEAD differently and because of

the impacts of changing technology. The Air Force defines

SEAD as a part of electronic combatunlike the Army and

Navy, which generally subscribe to the joint definition and

categorize SEAD as separate from command, control, and

communications countermeasures (C3CM) and electronic

warfare (EW) . To complicate matters further, current joint

definitions do not recognize the existence of the Air Force's

"umbrella" concept of electronic combat under which SEAD is

defined. In fact, joint definitions of electronic warfare (which is

also part of the Air Force lexicon but is defined differently)

consider EW to be a subset of C3CM.I 0 These differences are

presented in figure 14.

The second dilemma concerns the Air Force's perception that

it must change quickly to adapt to newer technical environments .
Depicting this phenomenon is difficult; an approximation

appears at figure 15.

Figure 15 shows the growth of SEAR and C3CM, and the

gradual submersion of EW. This is a reflection of the evolving

nature of the threat : the distinction between the enemy's C3

process and the weapons the C3 apparatus directs has

essentially disappeared. Therefore, SEAD and C3CM-as far as

suppression is concerned-tend to become the same thing

because the target sets are increasingly the same. Only the

approaches are different. C3CM practitioners approach the

target set from the perspective of degrading the enemy's ability

to direct his forces ; SEAD practitioners approach the target set

with the view of neutralizing the enemy's ability to bring

weapons to bear.

To wage a separate C3CM campaign using the same resources

that are used against SEAD targets when they are, in fact, the

same targets is to waste assets . The campaign is the same, the

targets are largely the same, and the weapons employed

against them are the same . The Air Force structural definition

seems the more appropriate choice because it (1) makes the

best use of available assets for the given target sets, and (2) is

more adaptable to war-fighting constructs. While there does

appear to be some agreement among the services to adopt the

Air Force's definition, there has been no corresponding

structural change."
The integrated electronic combat approach has 

led the way

in the development of Air Force operational theater art. As early

as 1985, with the publication of The Tactical Air Force Guidefor

Integrated Electronic Combat, the Air Force determined that as

a functional part of electronic combat, SEAD can be an

integrating concept as well as a meld of weapons systems . 12

The concept applies not only to Air Force assets but also to the

SEAD assets of all services . The Air Force's "EC triad" (the

F-4G, EF-111, and EC-130H) is the core of SEAD power

projection. This triad represents two-thirds of the electronic

combat picture and, until recently (with the retirement of more

than one-half of the F-4Gs), almost all Air Force SEAD. The Air

Force's EC-130H Compass Call aircraft performs the major

share of C3CM, and it contributes heavily to the SEAD mission

as well when it jams specific links to deny the enemy the

ability to bring weapons to bear on friendly aircraft . The

EF-111A Raven performs active jamming of enemy earlywarning and acquisition radars to deny detection of friendly

aircraft and pointing information of fire-control units . The

F-4G Wild Weasel, with its ability to identify and locate specific

emitters, provides lethal suppression of active radar emitters

(mostly, but not limited to, fire-control radars) in either

offensive or defensive roles .

The EC triad has developed into a constellation and has

grown to include the airborne warning and control system

(AWACS) E-3, the EC-130E airborne command and control

center (ABCCC), and the RC/EC-135 (strategic electronic

surveillance aircraft that can identify and locate specific

emitters), as well as several other specialized aircraft.13 The

Air Force-directed JSEAD constellation can also include the

Navy's E-2 Hawkeye surveillance aircraft and the EP/P-3

Orion electronic surveillance and communications aircraft, as

well as the EA-6B jammer and other Navy/Marine aircraft that

have the HARM-shooting capability and Army assets that

perform battlefield SEAD . These include the Quick Fix and

Guard Rail airborne systems, which serve to detect and

locate-as well as jam-selected enemy radars from airborne

platforms, 14 the MLRS, and the new, extremely precise Army

tactical missile system (ATACMS), along with other long-range

artillery. Even the SAM-D Patriot system has been included in

104
the extended net (because of its extremely long range) in the

anti-interceptor/air defense role. The key feature in the growth

of the SEAD concept, as envisioned by Air Force SEAD

strategists and tacticians, is that it provides an encompassing

framework in which all air power SEAD assets can be

combined to achieve a theater commander's objectives.

The growth of this intricate net would not be possible using

a piecemeal approach. Yet as successful as it is in executing

broad objectives over the long term, an extended net may not

be suited for raids and campaigns of short duration and

limited objectives because of its complexity and required

support infrastructure . It is neither a concept nor a system

that can be set up overnight .

The EC cell that worked during Desert Storm used the Air

Force concepts of integration employed over the last 10 years

in various exercises . US Navy, Marine, and Army specialists

augmented the Air Force Desert Storm EC cell team with their

expertise, but the structure through which the team operated

was generated by Air Force concepts of EC and SEAD

integration. The approach seems to have been responsible for

nascent developments currently taking shape for the creation

of true JSEAD strategies and tactics .

The integrated SEAD approach the Air Force employed is

largely a result of the Air Force view of land-based war. The

Navy's war-fighting mentality is geared primarily to the raid or

the short campaign as projected from the sea. The Air Force's

war-fighting mentality, while desirous of a quick conclusion to

warfare, prepares for wars of longer duration-especially

where power projection is concerned. In this long-term

calculus, the Air Force has determined that overall SEAD

objectives, achieved through the integrated use of its air power

resources, is the most effective avenue . Although the

integration of numerous aircraft of widely differing SEAD

capabilities is difficult, Air Force experience indicates it is

manageable and effective for the long term.

A criterion continuum currently discussed among strategists

at the macro level-as well as tacticians at the micro levelis the "threat-/capability-based" force structure spectrum.

Previously, during the cold war, force planners knew who the

enemy was and what capabilities the enemy possessed.

105
Planners developed force structures, organizations, and

weapons to counter a clearly defined threat. Since SEAD

planners no longer have such a clear criterion against which

to measure, they have no clear way of determining what is

needed. A physical threat to US aircraft, however, becomes

immediately tangible when US forces are called upon to fight,

regardless of whether the adversary is known. The change in

planning philosophy is that strategists and tacticians no

longer know how the threat will manifest itself or exactly

where it will be. A capability-no matter how diffuse-must

exist to counter it.

The Air Force, being firmly entrenched in "threat-based"

tactics and equipment, is at a disadvantage. The nature of the

future threat precludes the precise knowledge of enemy

systems to which Air Force SEAD planners are accustomed.

Nonetheless, even a totally capability-based force structure

must be geared to a threat of some known dimension. The Air

Force is moving reluctantly toward the capability-based side of

the continuum but still maintains that more effort must be

expended to determine the nature and content of the future

SEAD threat. The Air Force also maintains that, because the

future threat is tending towards highly complex, integrated

weaponry netted together with increasingly sophisticated

technology, emphasis on research and development for new

weapons must continue to enhance the viability of our

shrinking inventory. The difference between the Air Force and

other services on this account is one of emphasis. The Air

Force is willing to commit considerably more resources than

the other services to achieve this goal.

Additionally, the Air Force is moving from a purely threatbased criteria in both strategy and tactics to one which contains

an overall balanced approach. Because the Air Force's tactical

heritage is largely technological, it has focused on countering

the purely technical aspects of the enemy's order of battle. The

evolution of many separate systems to counter separate

threats was the outgrowth of this thought process.

The Air Force's general fixation on the threat has driven an

acquisition process which may have overstated its case in

that, with the demise of the Soviet threat, the requirement to

acquire specific systems designed to counter specific Soviet

106
threats disappears . In an environment where there is a clearly

defined threat, there is justification for a commitment of

resources to meet the specific threat. In an environment where

the threat is diffuse, it becomes more difficult to justify a

commitment of resources to develop systems designed to

counter specific threats. There is a dilemma here. On the one

hand, because Air Force acquisition strategies have been tied

to building systems geared to defeating specific Soviet threats,

SEAD systems have been specifically tailored. They have also

been relatively expensive. On the other hand, the lack of a

specific threat upon which to tether future acquisitions has

severely curtailed the Air Force's acquisition strategy. A SEAR

threat exists, but its form and nature have yet to be defined in

terms clear enough to justify expenditures on the basis of the

cold war paradigm. Because of this, there is a movement away

from the acquisition of specific systems to a more generalized

use of existing platforms to meet the diffuse, complex SEAD

threat of the future.

The case of the Wild Weasel mission is illuminating in this

respect. The F-4G Wild Weasel is the only aircraft in DOD that

was designed to identify, locate, and destroy specific radar

emitters by mating an extremely sophisticated radar homing

and warning receiver to an equally sophisticated antiradiation

missile. (The Weasel community uses the phrases "smart

plane, smart missile"-as opposed to "dumb plane, smart

missile"-to distinguish the Weasel from aircraft that can fire

the HARM but that do not possess the F-4G's formidable

detection and location system.) Because the F-4G represents a

one-of-a-kind system, it delivers an extremely specific, technical

capability that has proved extremely valuable to SEAD

operations. Nonetheless, the Weasel community's single-minded

focus of performing a lethal aspect of the SEAD mission

militated against acquiring a general HARM-firing capability

on other Air Force aircraft-until very recently. The F-16

already has acquired this capability, and the F-15E may soon

acquire it. Apparently, the "dumb plane, smart missile"

combination represented by the current F-16 and its naval

equivalents, the F/A-18 and EA/A-6, cannot match Weasel

standards. But these "dumb aircraft" do not cost as much and

can be used for many other missions besides SEAD. In a

107
resource-constrained environment, less costly multipurpose

aircraft, while not as effective as the F-4G, are more attractive

to the military community. While a SEAR threat clearly exists,

it cannot be defined with enough precision to justify the

expense of maintaining a specific-mission aircraft.

The specificity of the F-4G mission, along with the F-4G's

age and costlike the natural selection process in evolutionmay have led to "selecting" the Weasel aircraft and much of its

mission out of existence as a way of accomplishing SEAD in the

future. This "dinosaur syndrome" appears to be the case as the

Air Force evolves from threat-based to capability-based criteria.

15

Another important example of the Air Force's move toward

capability-based SEAD was the joint forces air component

commander's (JFACC) decision to use the F-117 as a SEAD

asset during Desert Storm. The SEAD role for the F-117 is an

unconventional one, but the F-117's unique "radar invisibility"

characteristic makes it ideally suited for some types of SEAD

missions. By being "invisible" to radar and infrared detection,

the F-117 pilot needs only know where the target is in order to

attack it . 16 The F-117, however, was never designed to replace

the Weasel because it has no way of detecting mobile (position

unknown) emitters and is totally dependent on exterior

sources of information to accomplish the SEAD role . Without

extensive and expensive modifications, the only essential

difference between the F-117 and other non-F-4G HARM-firing

aircraft is the F-117's stealth capability and accurate bombing

system. With respect to SEAR targets (active emitters), the

F-117 is in precisely the same position as the F-16 and the

marginally better-equipped F/A-18s and EA-613s, which have

limited capability to detect and locate emitters.

Nevertheless, the F-117 is capable of performing some

extremely innovative SEAD tactics. Its stealth feature makes it

an ideal platform for destruction of known strategic LADS

facilities, and it very impressively demonstrated these

capabilities during Desert Storm. The F-117 can make a

significant contribution to the SEAD effort, but SEAD planners

should consider the capabilities of the F-117 as a tool, not the

tool, for destructive SEAD.

The use of separate aircraft to perform specific functions in

the SEAD environment seems to be an outgrowth of the

108
threatbased, threatspecificresource use of the Air Force.

By using the capability and integration approaches in this

continuum, the Air Force could probably make its F-15s,

F-16s, and F-111s virtual stealth aircraft with extensive

EF-111/EA-6 jamming. Multiple tactical deception scenarios

that used both stealth and jamming to confuse the enemy's

targeting calculus would degrade the enemy's ability to

conduct air defense operations .

By comparison, the Navy appears always to have followed a

"capability-based" approach to tactics and weapons systems

acquisition for SEAD . Air Force SEAD tacticians need to open

a dialogue with the Navy on this account. Navy air assets must

be capable of responding simultaneously to a wide variety of

threats ; the luxury does not exist-either as a matter of space

or budgetto have tailored forces for specific threats .

17

Even so, there are some aspects of SEAD that cannot be

accomplished effectively by multiple-role aircraft even though

they are technically "capable" of achieving the objective .

"Capability-based" criteria demand an effectiveness threshold

that satisfies the long-term SEAD requirements of the forces

employed and that has the desired level of effect on the enemy.

The Air Force stands at the far end of the offensive side of

the defensive/offensive continuum. There is, perhaps, no other

concept so deeply ingrained in the Air Force aviator as the

concept of the strategic offensive led by air power. It is an

intuitive assumption on the part of the Air Force SEAD

planner to support the "air power" effort. That "effort," though

not often explicitly identified, is the use of air power as the

decisive element in destroying the enemy's capability and will

to wage war. Air Force doctrine has never changed on this

matter and never will.

The evolution of SEAD within the offense-based strategy and

tactics of the Air Force, however, weaves a curious web. The

initial use of SEAD was defensive . As the threat to air

superiority moved from the threat posed by other aircraft to

the threat posed by the integrated use of ground and air assets

(air deniability), SEAD took on greater meaning for the

prosecution of the superiority mission. Initially, SEAD assets

proliferated piecemeal to protect specific missions against

specific threats. Air Force SEAD evolved into a lone concept

109
whereby the SEAD mission supported air superiority. Finally,

Air Force SEAD seems to have evolved to the point where it is

an offensive element of strategy which recognizes that a "SEAD

campaign" is essential to achieving air superiority when

prosecuting a war against an enemy possessing a sophisticated

LADS. As this trend toward sophisticated LADS appears to

increase, the offensive application of SEAD also appears to be

increasing.

The Air Force, because of the encompassing manner with

which it views the battlefield, tends to view SEAD as a

multiple-level application of assets and tactics. The current

lexicon refers to this as an "attack in depth" similar to the

Navy's EC rollback concept, except that it extends to the entire

IADS and mobile air defense array. The multiple-level

application of SEAD manifests itself most clearly in the SEAD

campaign. It is both iterative and simultaneous. This means

that, while the campaign is built in "phases," these phases can

occur simultaneously . The phasing occurs as a matter of

emphasis. The heavier emphasis flows from one phase to

another as the situation dictates. The phases of the campaign

are usually set out sequentially to destroy/disrupt enemy

1 . command, control, and communications,

2 . early warning systems (including associated enemy air

interceptors),

3 . acquisition systems dedicated to fire control, and

4. fire control and air defense systems.

18

At each point, the intent and direction of the strategy are

clearly offensive in nature. The "offensive-offensive" development

of Air Force SEAD is a product of the Air Force's doctrine, its

emphasis on technology, its intuitive grasp of threedimensional warfare, and its sensitivity to changing realities.

On each of these accounts, Air Force SEAD differs from other

services' SEAD .

The Air Force, however different it may have become in its

SEAR outlook when compared to other services, is the offspring

of the Army Air Force (AAF) . Historically and recently, the most

common bonding of services with respect to the development of

SEAD has been between the Air Force and the Army.

11 0
Army SEAR

In his 1978 master's thesis for the US Army's Command and

General Staff College, Air Force major James L. Hendrickson

made these observations:

The difference between U.S . Army and U.S . Air [Force] employment of

electronic countermeasures (ECM) affects the doctrine, internal

procedures, and organizational structures of each component service.

The Army employs ECM as an offensive combat support measure

much like artillery. The Air Force employs ECM primarily as an aid in

penetrating enemy air defenses and protecting aircraft for maximum

weapons delivery effectiveness.

Therefore, Army operational units are less dependent on the

deployment of ECM to operate their organic weapons systems then

[sic] are Air Force airborne weapons systems. . . . is

While these comments apply to electronic countermeasures,

they hold true for SEAR as well. Until very recently (i .e., with

the acquisition of force-level numbers of Blackhawk

deep-strike troop transport and the deadly firepower of the

day-night-capable Apache helicopters), Army SEAD was a

purely "support air power" concept viewed by many Army

operatives as a drain on their combat power. A historical

feature of Army SEAR was to retain control of assets used to

support the JSEAD campaign and release them to the theater

commander only after Army requirements had been met .

During Desert Storm, however, the theater commander had

virtual control over all assets, and-as often as not-directed

Army support for Air Force SEAD operations, even at the

expense of withdrawing support from some frontline US Army

units to bolster the JSEAD effort. 2°

The Army's use of SEAR since the mid-1980s has evolved

rapidly both as a function of its own modernization and of

pressures to pursue jointness . The Goldwater-Nichols Initiative

of 1986 probably had some influence on this as well. The

history of Air Force/Army cooperation in SEAD, however,

predates Goldwater-Nichols by at least seven years with the

establishment of institutionalized links between the Army's

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Air

Force's Tactical Air Command (TAC) . Two organizations, the

Airland Forces Agency (ALFA) and the Center for Low Intensity

111
Conflict (CLIC), were the result of TAC commander Gen Wilbur

Creech's efforts to form a bond between "natural allies" in the

prosecution of the land war. The AirLand Battle concept so

eloquently espoused in the Army's basic manual, Field Manual

(FM) 100-5, Operations, reflects the results of General Creech's

efforts.

The arrangements the Army and Air Force made are

reflected in their participation in each other's larger exercises,

such as the Army's Cobra Gold in Pacific Air Command,

Twelfth Air Force's Sagebrush series of exercises, and TAC's

Green Flag/Blue Flag exercises . ALFA produces numerous

documents on Air Force/Army joint tactics in ground

maneuver and combined arms with a focus on the close air

support rendered directly to ground troops in contact with the

enemy. With the advent of Army systems that can reach

farther with great speed and accuracy, the distinction between

close air support and interdiction (formerly defined by the fire

support coordination line, or FSCL)21 is no longer limited by

the range of fire of the ground forces' systems. With the

acquisition of extremely long-range artillery weapons-the

MLRS, advanced 155-mm weapons, and the extremely

accurate advanced tactical missile system, along with the

mobile extension afforded by Blackhawk and Apache attack

helicopters-the area in which Army CAS and interdiction

aircraft operate has expanded. Additionally, because of the

expanding battlefield, exposure of friendly aircraft to enemy

organic air defense systems has increased. With more Army

assets now exposed to the same general threat as their Air

Force counterparts, the impetus to develop truly joint SEAD

procedures has gained full force.

This evolution of Army battlefield strategy and tactics has

caused difficulties in defining time-honored concepts such as

the fire support coordination line and the "deep area" of the

battlefield. With the acquisition of artillery of much longer

range, warheads of greater precision, and other weapons that

can operate with virtual impunity anywhere on the battlefield,

it is uncertain whether any of these former terms can be used

to differentiate division of labor in the AirLand Battle for

combat air support and interdiction, let alone SEAD .

11 2
The Army is wrestling with the issue of the expanding

battlefield and the impact of air power. The resulting Army

SEAD concept is its new AirLand Battle-future concept. It

extends the nonlinear battlefield where attack can be

accomplished nonsequentially based on time-sensitive

objectives . Previous battlefield concepts of attack were based

primarily on geographic objectives . Oddly, the newer AirLand

Battle-future concept (vice AirLand Battle) appears to be an

adaptation of the Air Force's three-dimensional concept of the

battlefield expressed in the Army's terms.

During Desert Storm, the standard Air Force air tasking

order (ATO) identifying targets beyond the FSCL were often

considered interdiction sorties when, in fact, they may have

been in support of strategic targets, SEAD, or other related

functions. Both the Air Force and Army suffered the same

difficulty identifying where interdiction stopped and battlefield

SEAR began. Army SEAD is put in perspective when we detail

the Army's general characteristics .

Characteristics of the Army

Missions :

='deterrence through readiness"22

--prepared to fight high-, medium-, and low-intensity conflicts

-land control

--defend the homeland

- -defeat the enemy in battle

Command and Control:

-centralized, but fully capable of independent action

-adherence to plan critical

War-fighting Mentality:

-strong preference for the offensive, but heavy emphasis placed on defensive

aspects of war

--primary tenets : initiative, agility, depth, synchronization

--separates battlefield into close, deep, and rear. AirLand Battle-future

changes this to a more fluid concept of "the extended battlefield" in

which this area is defined more as a function of time and purpose

than location23

-conditioned to fight wars "over the long haul," but constituted to fight rapid,

combined arms, maneuver warfare to achieve rapid victory

-dependent on huge logistics infrastructure requiring emphasis on defensive

strategies and tactics

113
Modern Army SEAD is more a tactical concept than a set of

specific weapons and procedures. Artillery, special forces,

heliborne assault, or electronic jamming are used to perform

the suppression function. The distinction between JSEAD and

SEAD, for the Army, is largely a function of who does what for

whom rather than what is done. If the Army performs the

function for itself, it is SEAD; if it performs the function in

support of another service or at the direction of a joint

commander, it is JSEAD. The same holds true if the function

is performed by another service for the Army.

A comparison of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine SEAD

tactics reveals that the Army is closer to the Navy in its

piecemeal approach to the use of SEAD-not because of a raid

mentality, but because the Army is not tactically constituted

to see the total war area "all at once" in the same way air

power users might see it . The Army, being restricted primarily

to the ground, is constrained to think of territory and miles

gained per day. The functional frame of reference still appears

to be denominated in "chunks of land" rather than the

enemy's ability to fight over a period of time . Therefore,

meeting SEAD objectives tends to be seen as a function of

acquiring specific territory.

11 4

Doctrine/Tactics :

-formal doctrine, very specific, and well understood throughout force;

pragmatic links to tactics both implicit and explicit

-tactics and strategies clearly driven by doctrine ; extremely strong

relationship among doctrine, command, execution of plan, and tactics

-heavy dependence on doctrine as reference for tactical operations-even

in novel situations

-tactical flexibility restricted by adherence to formal doctrine

-strategic planning enhanced by doctrinal clarity and clear relationships

between plan and ability to execute

Threats:

-complex; vulnerable to air attack and heavy artillery ; tactical defeat through

being outmaneuvered (positional advantage)

--offensive destroy the enemy's ability to inflict damage

--defensive: retain force enough to slow enemy advance by gradual attrition

of enemy forces, making the price too dear to pay; train forces to absorb

offensive blows by practicing "ability to operate in survival situations"

-threat viewed both strategically and tactically as function of "high-to-low"

level of conflict

-destruction of TADS per se not major focus; concerned with SEAD as
The piecemeal approach suits the Army

s purpose as well as

the Air Force's in areas where the SEAD target is of critical

interest to both. It is only in situations where other service

assets are not available to perform SEAD against a target and

SEAD does not suit the immediate objectives of the Army's

plan that difficulties along the piecemeal/integrated

continuum occur.

Army SEAD on the defensive/offensive continuum shows a

balance in spite of the strong offensive overtones of FM 100-5.

The increasingly complex threats the Army faces have

sensitized the Army's view of SEAD. The threat the Army faces

may consist of both enemy field-army air defenses and

elements of the enemy's strategic IADS. To this threat may be

added enemy battlefield air interdiction aircraft as well as the

entire array of enemy artillery and ground troops. When SEAD

gives the Army relatively uninterrupted use of the ground

because of localized air superiority brought about by SEAD

actions, it is a positive element in Army offensive strategy.

When SEAD defends forces so that Army elements may "fight

another day" (whether or not they are engaged in offensive

actions), it is a positive element in the Army's defensive

strategy. Again, the balance is dictated by the scope of the

battlefield rather than the overall objectives of the battle itself.

Using the resource continuum shows that the Army, being

very deliberate in its processes as a function of doctrinal

adherence, ensures that it has what it needs before entering

the battle . This is also a function of the "initiative, agility,

depth, and synchronization" tenet scheme that characterizes

AirLand Battle doctrine . One does not seize the initiative

without the required tools or a well-thought-out plan of

execution.

A detailed, comprehensive JSEAD plan is of little value if it is poorly

executed. The planning step is but half the requirement. On

tomorrow's battlefield, combat plans will require aggressive,

synchronized execution if we are to accomplish the mission and inflict

our will upon the enemy. An operation's success must be "rapid,

unpredictable, violent and disorienting. . . ." More than any other

factor, synchronization of forces is an operational necessity in the

execution of JSEAD. 24

11 5
The Army can bring to bear significant SEAD resources,

though they are composed differently than those of the Air

Force and Navy. The Army possesses no antiradiation missiles,

though it does possess a detection and location system that

can provide the general locale of a threat emitter. The Army

also possesses a formidable capability to insert special forces

to accomplish numerous tasks-support for the SEAD effort

being one of them . The first SEAD action of Desert

Shield/Desert Storm was performed with the aid of Army

helicopters. The Army has artillery that is extremely accurate

to ranges exceeding 30 kilometers (sufficient to destroy enemy

air defense systems that are threats to friendly CAS/battlefield

air interdiction sorties, providing the enemy system's exact

location is known) .

The Army's capabilities supporting the AirLand Battle future

are largely in place or have been funded. These forces promise

to provide a much wider range of tactical options and

opportunities for joint tactics development in JSEAD. Table 8

shows some of these weapons. 25

Additionally, there is strong congressional pressure on the

Army to acquire a ground-launched version of the Tacit

Rainbow radar harassment weapon. This system is designed

to loiter over the radar elements of an enemy's IADS

(battlefield or strategic), wait for a radar to emit, detect it,

locate it, and attack it. The air-launched version of this system

was cancelled by the Air Force in 1991 because of technical

and contractual difficulties, but the requirement for a system

that performs the Tacit Rainbow's functions still exists.

The addition of a radar harassment system such as the

Tacit Rainbow to any of the service's SEAD inventoriesespecially the Army's and Air Force's-complicates the enemy's

defense calculus enormously, both in real terms and

psychologically. The Tacit Rainbow drone was designed to be

launched in large numbers to saturate specific areas of the

enemy's defensive array. Since it loiters for long periods over

its intended victims-waiting for them to radiate-it obligates

the enemy site operator to decide whether to use radar. An

enemy site operator who elects to radiate becomes a likely

candidate for targeting by the drone. An enemy site operator

116
who does not radiate is effectively neutralized for the period

the radar remains off.

The Air Force also has the opportunity to integrate Army

concepts into its SEAD strategy . There is congressional

pressure on the Air Force to field a ground-launched version of

the Tomahawk (conventional warhead ground-launched cruise

missile), and this offers considerable opportunity to integrate

manpower and concepts between the Army and Air Force in

bilateral SEAD operations. 26

Army SEAD seems to fall in the middle of the threat-/

capability-based continuum. The application of artillery is

generic, and, so long as the enemy site can be identified and

located, the use of weaponry is not tailored to the specific

threat. Communication and radar jammers can be tailored to a

specific threat array, but forces and tactics are not driven by a

jammer's characteristics . The Army order of battle is designed

such that its tactics and weapons can be tailored to meet a

117

Table 8

AirLand Battle-Future Key Systems

FIELD ARTILLERY OTHERS

ADVANCED FIELD ARTILLERY JOINT SURVEILLANCE TARGET

SYSTEM/FUTURE ARMORED ATTACK RADAR SYSTEM

RESUPPLY VEHICLE

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE

MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEM

COMMON GROUND STATION

TERMINALLY GUIDED PROJECTILE

ENHANCED POSITION LOCATION

TERMINALLY GUIDED WARHEAD REPORTING SYSTEM

SEARCH & DESTROY ARMOR MOBILE SUBSCRIBER EQUIPMENT

ARMY TACTICAL MISSILE SYSTEM IMPROVED HIGH FREQUENCY RADIO

GROUND-LAUNCHED TACIT RAINBOW ATTACK HELICOPTER

FIREFINDER
specific threat while remaining generic enough to apply to

most situations.

The key to understanding Army SEAD is in the perception of

what is at stake. As Army assets become more and more

vulnerable to elements of an enemy's LADS array, the Army

becomes increasingly sensitive to protecting its investment.

The primary impetus ofAirLand Battle future, however, is that

the extended battlefield shifts the formerly indirect

consequences of SEAD action as performed by other services

into the direct-consequences category because of the speed of

battle and the nonhnearity of the battlefield . The "new reality"

promises to give added incentive in hastening the conversion

to a truly joint application of SEAD tactics and weapons. Table

9 shows the differences between the current AirLand Battle

concepts and the proposed concept of AirLand Battle-future/

AirLand Battle operations contained in TRADOC Pamphlet

525-5, AirLand Operations : A Concept for the Evolution ofAirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond.27

The changes are dramatic. The concepts of flexibility and

speed have transformed the Army's view of the battlefield and

the role SEAD will play upon it .

The distinctions between Army uses of the electromagnetic

medium and those of the Air Force are also deeply affected by

the movement towards true JSEAD . Army electronic warfare

had focused principally on C3CM. Army SEAD was primarily

the application of artillery and rockets to destroy identified

enemy air defense positions in the forward edge of the battle

area. Like the Air Force, the Army's ability to make clear

distinctions between C3CM and SEAD is diminishing. A more

holistic process has evolved which views the problems posed

by the enemy's air defense apparatus in the context of the

expanded battlefield .

As the battlefield distinctions separating near from far and

weapon from weapon controller become more diffuse, so do the

definitions of C3CM and SEAD. In this sense, US Army

electronic warfare and SEAD, though officially subscribing to

the separation mandated by joint definitions, are evolving to a

functional use of electronic combat as currently defined by the

Air Force.

118
Marine SEAR

Marine doctrine and tactics present an ironic set of circumstances with respect to SEAR . On the one hand, the Marines

operate routinely as a combined arms force integrating their

land, sea, and air assets . They adhere to clear doctrine that is

119

Table 9

Differences between AirLand Battle and AirLand Operations

DECADE OF CHANGE - CHALLENGE FOR THE 1990'S

ALB VERSUS ALB-F/AIRLAND OPERATIONS

Key Points AirLand Battle AirLand Battle - Future/AirLand Operations

Joint & Combined Joint, Combined and Interagency

Orientation Warfighting Operations across the Operational

Continuum

Levels of War Tactical/Operational Tactical Insights, Operational Focus,

Focus Operational to Strategic Link

Forward Force Projection (from CONUS/OCONUS) -

Mission Focus Deployed/Reinforcing Deploy then Employ

Mature Theater Immature Theater (possibleforced entry)

Soviet-style Region Specific

Threat Array Echeloned Forces Linear/Nonlinear

Linear Approximate Force Parity

Superior Numbers

Defensive Offensive

Battle Focus Close-Deep-Rear One Extended Battle

O erations

Task Organization Standard Corps Tailored Corps (METT - T Dependent)

Reactive Anticipatory

CSS Supply Point Unit Distribution (with tailored, agile CSS

Distribution forces

Initiative, Agility Increased Premium on Initiative and Agility

Tenets Depth Increased Depth (Extended battlefield)

Synchronization Critical Synchronization More a complex)

TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

Source : TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, "AirLand Operation : AConcept for the Evolution of AirLand Battle for the

Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond ."
comprehensible to the rank and file and use it often during

exercises and in real-world situations. The doctrine is reflected

at every point in their strategy and tactics; application of

combined arms is consonant from overall doctrinal theory to

specific weapons' application use by the smallest tactical unit.

Marine doctrine and employment concepts represent a

microcosm of "jointness" within the confines of their combined

operations.

On the other hand, Marine Corps use of SEAR can be

construed as parochial and very limited when compared to

other services' . 28 The SEAD resources the Marines use are

limited, and the SEAD objectives that define their tasks are

designed primarily to support Marine-controlled operations.

The paradox is that, even though Marine SEAR is consonant

within the "minijoint" coordination involved in its combined

arms operations-it is two-dimensional. Marine SEAD strategy

uses the three-dimensional capability of Marine SEAD to

support two-dimensional land warfare objectives. As such, it is

considered a lower level tactical support element. The Marines'

primary doctrinal manuals don't even mention SEAD as a

concept, and the term is not contained within the glossary of

Fleet Marine Field Manual (FMFM) 1-2, The Role of the Marine

Corps in the National Defense. 29

Nonetheless, Marine Corps SEAD does existnot at the

doctrinal level but at the tactical level, where it serves as a tool

in the achievement of combined arms operations. Marine

doctrine's staunch emphasis on using combined arms

maneuver warfare to accomplish land warfare objectives

creates difficulty for integrating Marine SEAD with more

encompassing concepts that accentuate the three-dimensional

qualities of SEAD in achieving overall war objectives.

Marine military thought is tactical and is based primarily on

the concept of maneuver. The Marine Corps' scheme of battle

relies on the use of combined arms to "shape the battlefield,"

and it is through these lenses that Marine tacticians view SEAD.

Marines are generally most familiar and comfortable with the tactical

realm of war, which is concerned with defeating an enemy force at a

specific time and place. The tactical level of war is the world of combat.

The means of tactics are the various components of combat power at

our disposal. Its ways are the concepts by which we apply that combat

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pgy

tactics-in our case, tactics founded on maneuver. Its end is victory:

defeating the enemy force opposing us. In this respect, we can view

tactics as the discipline of winning battles and engagements. 3o

The US Marines provide a unique function among the

services. One of the primary roles that distinguish the Marines

was pointed out by a former ambassador to the Soviet Union

who noted, "The Marines are a kind of military crisis action

team for the Department of State." 31 Though his words were

no doubt intended as a quip, the ambassador struck at the

core of the difference between the Marines and all other

services: the Marines are required-as a matter of mission-to

respond quickly to any contingency with the resources they

have at the time. "Ultimately, the Marine Corps' true mission

must meet the recognized needs of the nation while ensuring

flexibility to adjust for unanticipated requirements." 32 Meeting

requirements has led the Marines to develop "tactics as

doctrine" and to acquire forces that can combine all elements

needed to project power quickly, flexibly, and decisively in the

pursuit of specific goals. Therefore, it is not peculiar that such

a specific application of power as SEAD would not be

mentioned in doctrinal documents on warfighting,

campaigning, and roles .

However, SEAD, as a tactical concept, is addressed in

support of specific Marine objectives, but not as an objective

itself. Marine EA-6B and F/A-18 aircraft employ some of the

most sophisticated SEAD target area tactics in the air power

community, but these tactics are developed conceptually as

supporting measures for Marine operations. As there is no

framing Marine doctrinal concept exterior to Marine

war-fighting concepts, the use of Marine SEAD assets exterior

to Marine operations has no doctrinal basis: SEAD is a direct

outcome of what the air tasking order dictates (target,

time-on-target, general nature of task) .

Though Marine SEAD concepts derive primarily as a result

of supporting Marine operations, there is considerable

discussion in their professional journals about what other

services are doing doctrinally and tactically. One of the most

illuminating articles, in fact, on the Army's new AirLand

Battle-future concept surfaced in the Marine Corps Gazette. 33

121
Marine tactics publications on SEAD, mostly classified,

display a keen awareness of what other services think and do.

On the surface, the Marines would seem to be more open than

other services to ideas ofjointness because of the framework of

their -combined arms scheme of battle, but, curiously, this is

not the case.

Precisely because the Marines perform their combined arms

scheme of battle so well, they tend to be cautious of adopting

joint procedures that are not nearly as well developed nor

integrated as those already employed internally . While the

Marines display a superb ability to combine the elements of

their land, sea, and air assets into a truly cohesive fighting

force, it is difficult to divest separate elements of their SEAD

assets as an integral part of a "_joint force ." Desert Storm

showed that it is likely to take some time for the Marines to

embracejointness as a preferred method of SEAD employment. 34

Marine SEAD tactics present an irony. Though these tactics

are not mentioned as part of an overall campaign element,

when they are written they are so specific they tend to be

classified and out of the mainstream of tactical thought. The

irony is that Marine SEAD is a topic not "important" enough to

be a part of published war-fighting doctrine, yet it is "too

important" as a tactic to be public knowledge.

Marine SEAD tactics at the "nuts-and-bolts" level are mostly

a blend of Air Force, Army, and Navy approaches to employing

air power on the battlefield, with some unique Marine twists .

The following synopsis of Marine service culture, doctrine,

tactics, and salient viewpoints helps explain why the Marines

perceive SEAD as they do.

Characteristics of Marine SEAD

Mission:

- flexible application of military power as directed and required to meet

specific objectives through integrated use of land, sea, and air assets

-- in association with the fleet, meet worldwide power-projection needs in

-- peace and war readiness for expeditionary service

-- reliable performance

Command and Control:

- centralized command; stresses single commander in charge of war-fighting

operations

- execution can be centralized and decentralized depending on the situation

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War-fighting Mentality:

-aggressive, straightforward ; specific-task oriented by geography or function

-can be defensive or offensive based on direction of higher authority

- highly disciplined

- offensively constituted to achieve objective quickly and occupy for as long

as required

- defensively constituted to "hold the course" for as long as required

- trained to improvise both tactically and strategically given limited resources

Doctrine/Tactics :

- formal, specific, pragmatic; required to be, and is, well understood by rank

and file ; tactics are direct outgrowth of doctrine ; significant consonance

among doctrine, strategy, and tactics

-doctrine appears to enable flexible use of tactics within confines of Marine

use; ground warfare tactics heavily influenced by Army; air tactics heavily

influenced by both Navy and Air Force; sole owner of amphibious tactics

-heavy allusion to historical traditions ; very slow to change fundamental

doctrine

-reluctant to adopt technological changes unless they fit into overall doctrinal

scheme

- "Joint operations are a means to an end-not the end in itself . Joint

operations in their larger application are essential when one strategic task

requires the coordinated employment of continental and maritime

operations ."36

- air power is specific and integrated as a function of combined arms activity ;

it is subsumed under maneuver warfare

Threat:

- most complex of all services. Threat perceived to entire force as function

of overall objectives.

-Forces adapt to land, sea, air threat as situation dictates

-SEAD is a function of protecting forces in area of Marine interest so they

may prosecute the objective (a specific place or piece of territory at, for,

or by a particular time)

- applies generic tactics and weapons to suppress the threat as doctrine

demands global flexibility and versatility

Marine SEAD theory is tactical, pragmatic, and designed

primarily to be used in conjunction with Marine operations. The

FMFM 1-2 reference to "continental and maritime" operations

shows that Marines view joint warfare primarily as a function

of two-dimensional warfare. The phrase "continental and

maritime," as opposed to land and sea, is an allusion to

traditional constitutional language. In an attempt to bind

Marine doctrine to historical tradition, Marine doctrine may

have slighted the reality of the three-dimensional twentieth

century. Marine SEAD, therefore, is designed to support land

or sea operations from the air as an extension of artillery and

troop cover on the two-dimensional battlefield . An analysis of

i9R
the effectiveness of Marine SEAD tactics and strategies using

the four continuums discussed in chapter 2 reveals much

about general Marine applications of air power and its relation

to SEAD .

The need-/resource-based continuum, both as a function of

doctrine and historical record, shows that the Marines operate

from the limited-resource basis . Their SEAD tactics are driven

largely by the availability of resources. The emphasis is on

achieving the objective with assets at hand; as a result, Marine

tactics tend to be very creative given the limited resources with

which they often must work.

Directly related to the need-/resource-based spectrum is the

threat-/capability-based continuum. Largely because the

Marines have close affiliation with the Navy and because their

doctrinal tradition dictates it, Marine SEAD is heavily

capability-based . They have neither the resources nor the

threat-specific mentality of the Air Force, or, to a lesser degree,

the Army. Therefore, to accomplish SEAD, they tend toward a

meld of tactics and weapons matching the best overall

capability to achieve battlefield objectives.

With respect to the defensive/offensive continuum, the

Marines-like the Army-exhibit strong characteristics at both

ends of the spectrum because the dynamics of battle often

require both capabilities . The Marines, because they are

usually the first land forces available to prosecute American

foreign policy interests, are often directed to perform purely

defensive roles even though their doctrine shows a strong

preference for seizing the initiative. Marine SEAD's primary fimction is protecting aircraft, not projecting power in and of itself.

On the piecemeal/integrated tactics continuum Marine

SEAD exhibits elements of both extremes . In application,

Marine SEAD is target- and area-related and, thus, tends to be

piecemeal in its application . This tendency is especially

noticeable when Marine SEAD is employed to support other

services while operating under Marine authority, but much

less so when operating as an integral part of a Marineconducted operation.

JSEAD, as both a composite of different services' doctrinal

views, strategies, tactics, and equipment, and as a concept

greater than the sum of its parts, is deeply influenced by the

124
respective service cultures. Some war

fighting situations

clearly call for the application of one service's war-fighting view

over another's . Ajoint commander's JSEAD formulators on the

JFACC staff (usually the EC planning cell) must be thoroughly

familiar with each service's way of doing business in order to

prosecute a "joint" war. As Desert Storm demonstrated, we

have come a long way toward a "true" joint application of

JSEAD, but we still have a long way to go .

Notes

1 . Gen Michael J . Dugan, USAF, Retired, "Air Power Concentration,

Responsiveness, and the Operational Art," Military Review, July 1989, 21 .

2. As noted in chapter 1, the US Navy has no equivalent to the Air

Force's AFM 1-1, the Army's FM 100-5, or the Marines FMFM 1- series of

doctrine documents. The most recent iteration of their closest equivalent,

NWP 1 (rev . A), Strategic Concepts of the US Navy, is dated May 1978 and

reflects an extremely flexible, independent nature. Comments made by two

Navy admirals speaking under nonattribution rules in January 1992

indicate this is likely to change soon. The new Navy doctrine will continue to

be flexible, but not nearly so independent. Navy SEAD doctrine, per se, does

not exist, and what can be said of it must be extrapolated from context. The

interpretation thus rendered is deeply subjective .

3. Both Navy and Air Force SEAD tacticians use the term "roll back," but

they mean significantly different things by it . The Navy sees "EC rollback"

primarily as a defensive measure to protect its attacking aircraft . The Air

Force concept of "EC rollback," contained in the Tactical Air Force Integrated

EC Guide, reflects an offensive-oriented use of EC "layering"-the

coordinated efforts of jamming aircraft, antiradiation missiles, and

deception to attack the enemy's total capacity to defend from air attack.

4. Estimates for the support aircraft/strike aircraft ratio between the Air

Force and Navy vary based on the war situation, availability of assets, and

specific combat objectives . Generally speaking, Air Force ratios during

Desert Storm were quite high (because of tanker, airlift, and electronic

combat support) compared to Libya. Navy ratios, however, are constrained

by what is aboard the carrier and the requirement to protect the fleet from

air attack . Additionally, it is difficult to determine ratios based on what

constitutes a "combat" sortie and a "support" sortie .

5 . RAdm Riley D. Mixson, "Where We Must Do Better," US Naval

Institute Proceedings, August 1991, 38-39.

6. The concept is discussed in numerous Marine and Army publications,

and at least one joint Army/Air Force document: TRADOC pamphlet 525-5,

AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of AirLand Battle for the

Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond (Fort Monroe, Va. : Army Training

and Doctrine Command, 1 Aug 91) . This pamphlet is signed by the Army

Training and Doctrine commander and Tactical Air Command's commander.

Articles in Military Review (Maj Gen Stephen Silvasy, Jr., USA, "AirLand

125
,y , ; 

Frederic J. Brown, USA, Retired, "AirLand Battle Future: The Other Side of

the Coin," February 1991, 13-29) point to the evolution of Army doctrine to

encompass the nonlinear, extended battlefield that is now reachable by

Army air weapons as well as Air Force weapons.

7 . Interview with an electronic combat laboratory engineer,

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, January 1988.

8. There is considerable emphasis on Air Force doctrine at present

among the academic community and upper echelons of command. There is

much less discussion at the tactical level where it needs to be if doctrine is

to have significant impact on a day-to-day basis.

9. During a roundtable discussion on the changes in tactical air power,

with members of the CADRE Airpower Research Institute, an Air Force

general discussed the differences in the use of sufficient, decisive, and

overwhelming force as a result of Desert Storm. He indicated that, oddly, the

success of Desert Storm may have done air power a disservice in future

conflicts. The use of overwhelming force may not be physically possible in

the future, based on projected drawdowns of US military strength, even

though the American public will expect it.

10. Several papers have been written on the subject, one of which was

presented to the TAF Electronic Combat Symposium held at Eglin AFB,

Florida, in 1987. It is a perennial issue among the services, but while there

is agreement that Air Force definitions are functionally more appropriate,

there has been no change in the structure of the joint staff which plans-or

would execute-JSEAD operations .

11 . The primary joint memorandums that govern C3CM and electronic

warfare (Memorandum of policy nos. 185 and 95 respectively, both Secret)

establish relatively firm relationships . It takes one to two years to coordinate

among the various services an acceptable position that all will "sign up" to.

This means that, even though the document may carry a very current date,

it may be as much as two years old in thought process. This long cycle

militates against a structure that is flexible and responsive to rapidly

changing conditions .

12. Tactical Air Forces Guidefor Integrated Electronic Combat (S) (Eglin AFB,

Fla. : October 1987), 3-1-3-3 . (Secret) Only unclassified paragraphs are cited.

13. The acquisition of the launcher avionics package (LAP), which is a

computer-enhanced LAU-118 missile launch rail for the AGM-88 HARM,

allows the F-16 to fire the HARM. On earlier F-16 models, the I.AP computer

"tricks" the F-16 into thinking the HARM is a Maverick AGM-65 missile and

thus can use the Maverick firing logic and circuits. The more recent versions

of HARMed F-16s (block 50-plus) have a more elaborate LAP program which

interfaces directly with the F-16 fire director system and significantly

improves the launch parameters. It is important to note that the F-16 HARM

capability is not comparable in any way with the very elaborate and

formidable capability represented by the F-4G. Current F-16 capability is

more comparable to the Navy F/A-18 or A-6E HARM-firing capability. There

are programs in motion to give the F-16 a more F-4G-like capability, but

these are several years from fielding .

126
14. Janes Avionics, 

(

g py

1987), 149, and Martin Streetly, World Electronic Warfare Aircraft (London:

Jane's Publishing Company, 1983), 25-26.

15. While undeniably better suited for the SEAD environment than any

other single aircraft in the world, the F-4G is also a very specific,

single-mission weapon system. The airframe which houses the Wild Weasel

capability is a modified F-4E that has been fitted with antennas and very

sensitive electronic detecting equipment as well as airframe modifications

that allow it to fire the AGM-88. Considering that it is very expensive to

operate and performs only a single mission, the F-4G appears less and less

likely to survive in a fiscal and strategic environment that stresses economy

and general capability.

16. Bert Kinzey, The Fury of Desert Storm: The Air Campaign (Blue Ridge

Summit, Pa. : TAB Books, 1991), 50-51 .

17. Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Annapolis,

Md. : Naval Institute Press, 1991), 149-52 .

18. "Iraq Attacks SEAD Plan Briefing" (S), Hickam AFB, Hawaii, August

1990. (Secret) Excerpted from unclassified portion of briefing .

19 . Maj James L. Hendrickson, USAF, Joint U.S. Army/Air Force

Planning and Employment ofElectronic Countermeasures (Fort Leavenworth,

Kans. : US Army Command and Staff College, 1978), 21 .

20. Lt Gen Thomas W. Kelley, USA, Retired, Distinguished Lecture

Series, speech, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 5 September 1991.

21. The fire support coordination line, or FSCL, is the boundary to which

army artillery fire can reach into the battle area. The Air Force has

responsibility for the battlefield CAS beyond the FSCL. With artillery of

longer and longer range and helicopter-delivered firepower projected beyond

these traditional lines, the division of responsibility among Air Force, Army,

and Marine SEAD is becoming extremely difficult to determine .

22. FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D .C. : Department of the Army,

1986), 1 .

23. TRADOC pamphlet 525-5, 15.

24. Maj Kenneth L. Travis, USA, The Integration of US Army Electronic

Warfare Capabilities in JSEAD Operations (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air Command

and Staff College, 1988), 19.

25. The AirLand Battle-future chart is presented in a Marine Corps

publication, which further shows the evolutionary trend toward tactical and

doctrinal convergence among the services in many areas. See Col Kent O.

Steen, "AirLand Battle Future," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1991, 45-46.

26. This is another indication that the distinction between Army and Air

Force SEAR roles is blurring as the future battlefield becomes more and

more nonlinear.

27. TRADOC, US Army briefing, "Decade of Change-Challenge for the

1990s," Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Va., October

1991 .

28. The Marine Corps is not the only service to exhibit parochialism as

far as SEAR tactics are concerned . Parochial Marine viewpoints with regard

to SEAD highlight the irony between a Marine philosophy that has

traditionally melded land, sea, and air operations thoroughly and a Marine

127
p, y, y resisted using the same

concepts with sister services .

29 . The new Marine FMFM 1- series shows a peculiar mixture of pure

Clausewitzian war strategy doctrine (FMFM 1, Warfighting) and classic

Marine "nuts-and-bolts" combined-operations tactics (FMFM 1-1,

Campaigning) . FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National

Dense, also does not define many other features of joint warfare such as

C CM, EW, or joint air attack team (JAAT) . The Marine concepts are

integrated and keyed to maneuver (ground) warfare and, as inferred from

the omission of SEAD as a "shaping" element in the battle, still are

conceptually two-dimensional.

30 . FMFM 1-1, Campaigning (Washington, D.C . : Headquarters US

Marine Corps, 1990), 4.

31 . Speech at Maxwell AFB, Ala., 17 January 1992 . The Air Force's Air

University subscribes to a nonattribution policy which precludes identifying

the speaker by name for certain presentations.

32 . FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense

(Washington, D.C . : Headquarters US Marine Corps, 1991), 1-1 .

33 . Steen, "Airl:and Battle Future." Doctrinal issues currently proliferate

all four services' professional journals, presumably in response to the

radical changes in the fiscal and threat environment. It is clear that all

services are moving toward each other in general warfare strategy and all

use similar capability assets.

34. Speech at Maxwell AFB, Ala., Winter 1992. Nonattribution policy

precludes identification for this particular presentation.

35. FMFM 1-2, 1-1 .

36. Ibid ., 6-2.

128
p

The Merits of JSEAD:

The Quest to Achieve Effectiveness

Previous chapters have established five main points . One,

SEAD's growing importance in air warfare is the product of a

natural evolutionary process. Two, this importance is likely to

grow as air power increasingly becomes a key element of

national military strategy. Three, SEAD will grow in complexity

as technology improves, and, paradoxically, will diminish as a

specialized task because the costs of improved technology may

prove prohibitive . Four, traditional measures of SEAD's

effectiveness do not adequately address the reality of the

changing world. Five, since we will need SEAD, we need to

apply relevant criteria to determine which courses of action

will yield the most effective results. Hence, criteria developed

for SEAD must relate effectiveness to clearly defined objectives

to be meaningful.

This chapter examines the personality of JSEAD by

assessing some of its distinguishing features and determines

the impact of individual military service cultures by using the

models presented in chapter 2 . The relationships among

national strategy, theater strategy, operational art, tactics, and

doctrine also play a key role in our quest for an adequate

context in which to frame JSEAD.

The Personality of JSEAD and the Threat

Where does JSEAD fit, and why is a discussion of its

personality important? JSEAD has many factors which

distinguish it from other war-fighting skills.

First, JSEAD reflects a war-fighting mentality. It is more

suited as a concept to fight wars than as a concept to maintain

peace. As a concept and a tool, JSEAD exists primarily for the

purpose of defending against or defeating an enemy in battle

129
As such, the linkages between military strategy and tactical

application are often more developed in JSEAD than in many

other aspects of war fighting. JSEAD practitioners and staffs

tend not to experience the steep relearning curve suffered by

many other combat skills in the transition from peace to war.

Second, JSEAD is technical and highly specialized and

focuses on specific, quantifiable, measurable phenomena.

Because the language of JSEAD is electromagnetic physics,

JSEAD tactics appear shrouded in mathematical equations

and arcane phrases. This "personality trait" of the JSEAD

community is a major contributing factor in isolating it from

the mainstream of tactical thought where it needs to be.

Third, JSEAD planners' insistence on precision in definitions

and objectives also has contributed-both negatively and

positively-to JSEAD's personality profile . What appears to the

general strategist as a precise objective statement often does

not satisfy the requirements of a JSEAD planner. For example,

a general objective of a strategic planner may be to "destroy

the LADS structure of the Iraqi military." This is as precise an

objective as the JSEAD planner is likely to get. The JSEAD

planner's immediate concern will be the nature of the threat

and how to neutralize it. This concern will most likely be

framed in questions like : In what order do you want the

enemy's IADS destroyed? How many resources will you

allocate for this purpose? What is your eventual goal with

respect to JSEAD? Will all services be included in the

campaign, and, if so, what relationships do you want

established? This is a level of detail the general strategist is

often unable to deal with.

The decision makers in Desert Storm-unlike SEAD

applications in Vietnam and Libya-answered these questions,

and, largely because these questions were answered with the

precision requested, SEAD planners were able to deliver a

devastating SEAD campaign on the Iraqi LADS. The success of

the Desert Storm JSEAD campaign demonstrates the

successful linkages between strategic concept and tactical

application forged as a result of forcing sufficient precision

into tactical objectives . These procedures worked for Desert

Storm, but the process was not institutionalized to codify

these successful outcomes .

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unlikely that JSEAD's quest for precision will ever be codified .

JSEAD planners' insistence on timely data and precisely

defined objectives-because of the variety of factors and

dynamics involved-may have created a requirement for a

permanent ad hoc JSEAD planning structure. The dynamics of

change militate against the creation of any structure that may

hinder responsiveness to the rapid tempo of modern combat.

JSEAD is fundamentally pragmatic and realistic in its

approach to the LADS threat ; it is concerned with the survival

of friendly air power assets while neutralizing the enemy's

ability to defend from air attack at the most basic level. The

JSEAD planner focuses on what enemy weaponry can and

cannot do and what will and will not "work" against the

enemy's LADS array. The JSEAD practitioner is trained to

make a realistic appraisal of the enemy's ability to deny air

superiority to friendly aircraft. This appraisal must be devoid

of bravado, timidity, or exaggeration. As a pragmatist, the

JSEAD planner's first course of action is to locate, define, and

analyze the threat in terms that make sense to tactical

planners. In this process, JSEAD planners attempt to bond

strategy to tactics in a way which allows decision makers to

determine how to wage the air campaign most effectively.

Nowhere is the difference between JSEAD strategist and

JSEAD tactician shown more clearly than in the initial questions they ask of the war-fighting situation. The first question

the JSEAD strategist asks is "What is the objective?" The first

question the JSEAD tactician asks is "What is the threat?"

Military lexicon has elevated some phrases to almost

metaphysical levels . 'The mission" is such a phrase for tactical

aviators ; "the threat" is such a phrase for JSEAD planners and

the electronic combat community. The threat's characteristics,

general nature, inner workings, technical aspects, doctrinal

use by the enemy, and role in the enemy's intention to wage

war and defend attacks are at the heart of the JSEAD

planner's concerns.

The evolutionary nature of the threat, described in chapter

1, illustrated that the threat changes in identifiable ways over

time and exhibits a sense of direction. However, the LADS

threat's evolutionary process is not linear; evolution, as a

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particular situation is different, the general evolution of

defensive capability against air attack has accelerated so

rapidly that the term "revolution" may be more appropriate .

Figure 16 depicts linear versus nonlinear evolution and shows

the problems revolutionary change poses for the tactician

preparing for the threat.

Figure 16 is not intended to give quantitative measurement

but to show the effect revolutionary change has on one's

ability to predict and prepare for the future. As one can see

from the graphs, revolutionary change produces a much larger

area of unpredictability than evolutionary change . This

unpredictability makes classical methods of developing tactics

and theater war strategy largely suspect because there is

increasingly no definitive baseline against which to plan. We

need a more relevant way to measure desired effects, and, in

light of an increased inability to predict future needs, we may

have to reconsider acquisition strategies directed at countering

anticipated capabilities.

The future threat will be highly integrated. Strategy and

tactics analysts will find it increasingly difficult to distinguish

where air defense ends and command, control, and

communications begins. This has enormous implications for

developing target lists and planning strategy. In previous wars,

critical node analysis was a straightforward process of

identifying targets to bomb, aircraft to destroy, bridges to

blowup, and SAM and radar sites to neutralize, among other

things. The emphasis was placed on physical identification

and destruction of specific sites, not on a systematic analysis

of the overall enemy air defense structure .

As the future threat becomes less a "place" and more a

collection of possible scenarios, total LADS degradation will

become very important as a principal goal. A SEAD campaign's

objectives, therefore, must consider many more courses of

action because of the expanding nature of "the turf."

Destruction will need to be considered as part of an overall

plan to degrade the enemy LADS rather than an end in itself.

The future air defense threat will have at its disposal the

most sophisticated technology available in the world. The

proliferation of high-technology air defense systems132

including entire networked arrays complete with trained

technicians to operate them-is likely to increase for two

related reasons: the demise of the Soviet empire (which has a

need for hard currency and is willing to sell off much of its

weaponry cheaply) and the entrepreneurial impulses of

Western arms producers. Together these have produced an

explosive situation where virtually any nation wishing to arm

itself with state-of-the-art weaponry may do so . Even

lesser-developed nations of insufficient means and great

internal instability-with the acquisition of an inexpensive

IADS and rudimentary ballistic missiles of moderate rangecan pose credible threats to anyone anywhere.

The days of the totally "Red" threat (systems of Soviet-Warsaw

Pact manufacture-from telephone to tactical missile) are

gone. In their place are potential enemy LADS systems that are

a highly technical hybrid composed of Soviet (now fragmented

into nearly a dozen arms-selling entities), French, British,

German, Italian, Japanese, and even "frontline" American

systems.

An analysis of currently existing weapons systems, radars,

communication nets, and computers sold to "potential

adversaries" shows literally thousands of different systems

scattered across the planet in unique configurations that

change on a daily basis.' For instance, the communication net

built by "friendly powers" in Panama prior to Operation Just

Cause was a hybrid system of great complexity and technological sophistication . The net posed enormous tactical

problems for the electronic combat community, most of whose

plans dealt with systems built by Warsaw Pact manufacturers. 2

The future threat is making a subtle shift from three to four

dimensions in its application to war. This shift has ominous

implications for air power and theories of maintaining air

superiority over the battle area. Time (speed, duration of war

effort, pace, etc.) has qualitatively changed the character of

war. The speed of war as driven by computers, detection and

tracking systems that relay data at the speed of light,

hypersonic ballistic missiles, and large numbers of supersonic

weapons systems capable of pinpoint accuracy has introduced

time itself as a critical dimension of the future threat. In the

continuing contest between offensive air power and defensive

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appears the defensive is asserting itself. The future IADS may

soon forge ahead of air power in its ability to defend

successfully against air attack largely as a result of its success

in making the transition to a true four-dimensional

war-fighting doctrine . The technological chess game between

air superiority and air deniability continues unabated .

Strategists must approach the sophisticated IADS of the

future respectfully if offensive air power projection capability is

to retain its military worth.

According to the defensive/offensive matrix in chapter 3, as

it evolves, JSEAD appears more effective as an offensive tool.

However, war planners and practitioners alike traditionally

have viewed SEAD as a defensive mechanism to defend -

aircraft conducting offensive operations . While this defensive

application of SEAD has been the norm, the increasingly

technical and integrated nature of the potential enemy's air

defense structure and command-and-control apparatus

mandate a more encompassing and proactive role for JSEAD

in the future if the air offensive is to maintain credibility.

The proactive JSEAD role envisages a transition from

"defensive-offense" to more "offensive-offense" applications of

JSEAD. In this capacity, JSEAD's aim is to strip away the

totality of an enemy's ability to defend from a generalized

aerial attack. The action is designed as an active measure to

force the enemy into predictable modes of behavior. JSEAD

takes the initiative away from the enemy and obligates

manageable behavior by limiting the enemy's range of options .

While recognizing that SEAD will always retain a defensive

role, we must also consider the potential use of JSEAD as a

primary element of offensive strategy.

The World of "Joint" and JSEAD

Retired Air Force general Michael Dugan pointed out in a

magazine article that, while each service fills specific niches

associated with its fundamental role, the requirement for joint

cooperation is compelling.

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fully committed themselves to orchestrating and synchronizing

operations-along with those of the US Navy and Marines-to fight the

theater commander's war. At the same time, all recognize that aerial,

naval and land warfare are fundamentally and necessarily different. To

maximize the contributions of each, the key commanders must exploit

the services' different capabilities . In the profession of arms, teamwork

is fundamental to success. It results not only from a thorough

knowledge of our ownjobs, but from understanding the strengths of all

andwhere each fits to best contribute to victory.3

The analysis of how each service perceives and uses SEAR

in the execution of its strategy and tactics (presented in

chapter 3) serves both as a test of SEAD's effectiveness and as

a gauge of whether the overall needs of the theater commander

are met. Furthermore, the evolving nature of war demands a

more authentic joint approach in the application of SEAD than

has been the case in the past. Even though practitioners of

SEAD at the tactical level have been "doing it jointly" for at

least a decade, individual service doctrine has lagged this

effort considerably .

Many military observers of Desert Storm seemed puzzled at

the rapid adaptability JSEAD displayed during war operations.

JSEAD did not suffer the steep learning curve many other

elements of the joint staff experienced. While Desert Storm

was a "success story" for jointness, that JSEAD's rapid

adaptability came as a surprise is revealing. 4 An obvious

information shortfall existed between those who formulated

general theater strategy and those who executed specific SEAD

tactics. This paradox seems to support the concept that tactics

execution on the battlefield and strategy formulation at

headquarters tend to operate in cycles isolated from one

another. Put another way, the fact that strategists were

surprised by the ease with which electronic combat-supported

SEAD adapted to joint operations supports the oft-quoted

proposition that the study of American fighting doctrine by a

potential enemy is useless because American warriors will

abandon doctrine and strategy if they assess it not to be

working. Strategy and doctrine are conceptual; operational art

and tactics are pragmatic. Nonetheless, if a criterion of

effectiveness linking SEAD strategy to tactical objectives is to

have combat merit, doctrine and strategy need to be connected

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make true JSEAD a reality.

From a functional perspective (i .e ., waging war effectively), it

does not matter where the impetus to integrate strategy,

doctrine, operational art, and tactics comes from with respect

to JSEAD. The impetus can stem from directives generated by

the command structure from the top down or mandated by

tactical success (or failure) from the bottom up . A strong

argument can be made that the apparent success of SEAD

tactics to influence overall strategy from "the bottom up"

indicates that tactical imperatives-not doctrine-were the real

drivers during Desert Storm. If substantiated, such a

revelation would raise serious questions about the relevance of

traditional models used to explain the flow of command and

the SEAD decision-making process in the post-cold war era.

The cybernetic model introduced in chapter 2, where each

element of the decision-making mechanism influences the

others in achieving balance, explains more readily why the

process appears to be influenced from the bottom up . Figure

17 depicts the process.

A comparison of the traditional vertical model and the

cybernetic model describing the SEAD process shows several

differences which may account for JSEAD's surprisingly

rapid but effective transition from peace to war. First, the

traditional vertical model is an idealized concept. It shows

how a perfect system, with perfect leaders, perfect

information, and a perfect data-transfer system from one

level in the decision-making process to the next should

operate. The "real" JSEAD process is far from this idealized

concept. Because it is imperfect, the JSEAD process requires

a feedback mechanism to assess whether it is accomplishing

the task decision makers set before it . Defense suppression

and the JSEAD process that evolved in Desert Storm were

based on tactical pragmatism and drove strategy based on

what really worked as opposed to an idealized concept of

what decision makers desired.

The role feedback plays is significantly different in the

cybernetic model. The traditional vertical model allows for

feedback only where the edges of each layer of the decision

making process meet. The cybernetic process is interactive

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meeting the objective set before it. Feedback within the

process itself adjusts the behavior and choices of the system

to meet the overall objective . For instance, let us assume

that 10 F-15Es were lost during the first night of the IADS

campaign in Desert Storm . The loss of so many high-value

aircraft would have had a simultaneous effect on all aspects

of the process and the entire system would have readjusted

itself to solve the problem-not just the bottom end of the

vertical stack.

The JSEAD process, as it evolved in Desert Storm, was

interactive, not vertical. The electronic combat planning cell

was able to translate overall military objectives into

meaningful SEAD tasks that, once accomplished, could be

measured against the objective set by the joint force

commander. A relevant criterion based on clearly defined

objectives provided-in most cases-feedback that kept the

JSEAD process focused on the real problems of defense

suppression at the most basic levels of combat.

The cybernetic model presented in figure 17 provides a

frame of reference to assess effectiveness and to define the

evolving JSEAD process at work. The objective criteria at the

macro level ask some penetrating questions about the nature

of JSEAD decision making in the war-fighting context. A

return to basics, using an adaptation of Philip Crowl's model,5

will help us define what we need to evaluate JSEAD effectiveness in meaningful terms . Crowl stresses the primary dictums

of classical military thought expressed clearly from Clausewitz

to Norman Schwartzkopf: define the objective, know the

objective, achieve the objective. This is a conceptually elegant,

simple, and easily understood primary dictum.

Part of the difficulty in assessing how to evaluate JSEAD

effectiveness lies in the disconnect between JSEAD's strategic

purpose and its tactical application. Fundamentally, JSEAD

application seems to be a tactics-driven activity, but the

reasons for its application are strategic . Both strategic JSEAD

and tactical JSEAD are influenced by doctrine, but in different

and oddly contradictory ways . Joint doctrine, a concept

generated to aid overall national military and theater strategy

where more than one service is employed, pulls national and

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doctrine, however, tends to pull theater operational art and

tactics in another. The disconnect this creates is the result of

two competing cycles' being polarized by doctrinal outlooks

that work at odds with one another.

It is ironic that ",joint" doctrine and "service" doctrine should

operate in opposition in the war-fighting process, but they

appear to do just that. The links are tenuous.

The disconnect between JSEAD strategy formulation and

single-service-applied SEAD tactics is obscured if we use the

vertical model to analyze the process but is clearly visible if we

use the cybernetic model. Figure 18 shows the tensions

created by joint strategy JSEAD doctrine and single-service

tactical SEAD doctrine.

The tension between joint doctrine and single-service

doctrine often pulls the SEAD decision-making process apart.

The disconnect, for JSEAD, most often occurs when high-level

decision makers attempt to translate national military strategy

into theater strategy and operational art. The differences

between the joint perspective and individual services'

perspectives make this translation very difficult. The result is

that JSEAD "results" often tend to be ambiguous; the linkage

between tactical effects and achieving overall objectives is

often obscured by the transition from jointly formulated

strategies to single-service applied tactics.
Brave New World: True

Joint SEAD

In the transition from a military force built on the collective

capabilities of each of the separate services to one which will

likely require a pooling of resources, the basic definition of

"joint" appears to be changing. The definitions currently used

range from "the application of force to meet specific objectives

which require the assets of more than one service" to "an

encompassing concept embracing holistic patterns of systems

and tactics application in the prosecution of overall objectives

which may employ the assets of one or more of the respective

services." The requirement for a definition of "true" JSEAD is

critical for setting the JSEAD context of the future world.

Perhaps the best way to arrive at a definition of "joint" in

modern warfare, for JSEAD purposes, is to describe some of

the things it is not. "Joint" is not merely the sum of all

weapons, tactics, strategies, doctrines, histories, traditions,

and parochialisms of the respective services. It is not the total

domain of a joint, unified commander and staff. It is not a

series of iterative SEAD strikes using "the right tools in the

right way to achieve the objective," though this comes close.

Each of the services contributes-by its mission and

roles-to the joint menagerie of tools and tactics, but the

process which melds them together is more than the sum of

their parts. Jointness is an evolving paradigm. It is more a

working concept than a "nuts and bolts" allocation of weapons

to target sets, more a dynamic process which relates specific

means to general ends than a checklist of tasks to be

performed by various joint battle staff agencies.

General Dugan's statement that "modern warfare is joint

warfare"6 compels us to seek the characteristics in the modern

realm that separate us from previous times. Succinctly, these

are limited resources, growing technological diversity and

complexity among friends and enemies alike, unstable

economies, regional instabilities, and an American military

that is shrinking to an indeterminate size because of the

demise of the Soviet Union and the accompanying perception

that the threat has diminished.

14 1
pgjy jy

attractive and politically palatable ; it is one of the only effective

ways left to the US military to fight wars of the future. Because

air power will become a critical factor in future US military

power projection, JSEAD becomes all the more crucial .

Therefore, an understanding ofjointness as it applies to SEAD

takes on a special meaning for future American

power-projection capability.

Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces,

which defines the general view of joint doctrine and how it

relates to war fighting, is quite clear in that principles of warincluding those to which SEAD contributes-are decisive only

as a result of unified, coordinated effort. The publication goes

on to state:

The principles of war represent the best efforts of military thinkers to

identify those aspects of warfare that are universally true and relevant.

The principles of war currently adopted by the US Armed Forces are

objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of

command, security, surprise, and simplicity. These principles deserve

careful study by all who practice the military art, because the insights

suggested by their analysis span the entire range of military

operations . . . . In all cases, the principles are applied broadly,

avoiding literal or dogmatic construction, and with due regard for the

unique characteristics ofjoint warfare.

The first application is unity of effort. Success in war demands that

all effort be directed toward the achievement of common aims.?

JSEAD, as a process of convergent evolution among the

services, reflects the essence of unity at the tactical level.

However, the concept cannot be applied until each level of the

decision-making process-from national command authorities

(NCA) through the joint chiefs to lowest tactical levels-can

translate its objectives into operational terms usable by the

next successive level in the process.

The difficulty for JSEAD planners and tacticians is bridging

the gap between strategic concepts and tactical execution. The

criteria of success which enable the NCA to determine if they

have met their objectives and the measurements of

effectiveness that an electronic combat cell of a war-fighting

commander's staff employs to determine whether their JSEAD

campaign was successful look much different . Yet they must

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ypp

to obtain. Note that the objective ofjointness is, through unity

of effort, to achieve an objective. The imperative is not who

commands but how we use our resources together to meet the

objective. This is why a measurement of effectiveness that

encompasses the entire process is required.

Effective JSEAD must, first and foremost, translate overall

objectives into usable terms that employ the collective assets

and tactics of all the services. There must be a single point of

contact and a single command structure that directs the

efforts of pooled resources .

The scale of measurement JSEAD planners use must satisfy

the overall objectives of the battlefield commander. The scale

must be able to answer the question "What is the most

effective way of employing JSEAD to protect air power

projection and neutralize the enemy's capability to defend from

air attack?" The measurement scale also must be able to

determine, after the fact, whether a particular weapon or tactic

"worked ." Additionally, the scale must be able to determine not

only if the SEAD weapon, tactic, or strategy was effective but

how effective a particular employment option was.

The evolving nature of JSEAD indicates that the entire

framework we have used to evaluate JSEAD's military worth

may have outlived its usefulness. A new JSEAD criterion that

relates to "the world of jointness" is emerging, and it appears

more suited to cybernetic process analysis than to traditional

vertical "chain-of-command" models.

The Four Continuums : How to Use Them

The determination of criteria in the JSEAD process can best

be approached by analyzing the four continuums outlined in

chapter 2 and placing each of the services within the context to

determine effective employment options . These continuums

were the "need-/resource-based" continuum, the "threat-/

capability-based" continuum, the "piecemeal/integrated tactics"

continuum, and the "defensive/offensive" continuum. Each of

the services fits somewhere in each of the continuums, and

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service's SEAD approach. Each continuum is related to the

others, but the relationships are characterized by variables

which change in nonquantifiable and often unforeseen ways.

Nonetheless, we can make some guarded assessments about

how these general relationships alter the measures of

effectiveness . By analyzing what is needed to meet the specific

SEAD objectives for the specific situation, one can gain a

clearer idea of what service's (or combination of services')

assets, techniques, procedures, and tactics would best suit the

war-fighting theater's purposes.

The Need-/Resource-based Continuum

The need-/resource-based continuum shows a wide variation

among the services . The Marines and Navy are more

accustomed to making do with what they have (Given what I

have, what can I do?) . This leads to more innovative

approaches to SEAD, but the tactics/weapons mixes may tend

to cause higher attrition or narrow the range of capability

against the LADS . Army doctrine commits them to a course of

acquisition based on perceived needs (Given what I have to do,

what do I need?) . Nevertheless, the Army is practiced in the art

of executing tactics and strategies based solely on what they

possess . The fact that Army leaders are familiar and

comfortable with their doctrine enables them to use what they

have, though doing so may limit their tactical flexibility. Air

Force SEAD practitioners, being more technologically oriented,

tend to view the future in terms of what assets they need to

accomplish the goal. While this approach provides the Air

Force with superb SEAD equipment, it often places its leaders

in the unenviable situation of fighting today's wars with

tomorrow's weapons . Additionally, with the shrinking military

budget, the mandate to purchase sophisticated hardware

based on a visionary doctrine will become more difficult to

justify when older or existing technologies appear sufficient.

Nonetheless, it is clear that advanced technology is required

for the application of decisive force in the power-projection role

as enemy air defense represents one area that, ironically, will

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Soviet empire.

Figure 19 depicts the need-/resource-based continuum. The

scale is not intended to reflect a quantitative measure; it is

intended to provide a basis of comparison of each service . The

horizontal axis displays the relative range between

resource-based and need-based approaches to the SEAR

problem. The vertical axis shows the relative effect that limited

resources have on innovation with respect to SEAD weaponry

and tactics.

Two conclusions can be drawn from figure 19. First, a

need-based approach (represented by the traditional Air Force

position) tends to exist only in a relatively resource-rich

environment. Second, limited resources force a more creative

approach to solving SEAD problems. The corollary to these

observations is the tendency for resource-rich, need-based

approaches to SEAD to be relatively less innovative than

resource-poor, resource-based approaches.

There is a notable exception to the creativity-resource

relationship noted above . The Air Force's impetus to integrate

electronic combat and SEAD assets was-and is-an innovative

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Ironically, it was spurred

by factors that have little to do with this continuum. Because

the Air Force had developed so many separate EC and SEAD

systems (the result of resource-rich, need-based concepts), the

EC community was forced to develop a scheme to integrate

them to make maximum use of their expenditures.

Political and economic pressures promise to force JSEAD

toward the resource end of the continuum . The Navy

philosophy of "multiroling" aircraft for SEAR functions is being

adopted by the Air Force and Army. The next step in the

process will occur when traditional single-service SEAD assets

can no longer provide even minimum protection for their

forces given resource constraints. This will compel the military

to move toward a "truer" JSEAD-not because politics (the

Goldwater-Nichols initiative) mandate it but because necessity

will demand it .

A key question for JSEAD practitioners related to the push

toward the resource end of the continuum concerns the

absolute limits of innovation to compensate for constrained

resources. For JSEAD, "doing more with less" has absolute

limits . The difficulty lies in defining those limits, and once they

are defined, convincing decision makers that they are real.

Unfortunately, the only way to verify that resource-based

JSEAD tactics and assets might not be effective is after the

fact, after friendly forces suffer attrition rates that blunt the

effectiveness of air power as a power-projection tool in a

shooting war.

Another important related issue in the analysis of the resource

continuum is the question of goals in power projection: Do

decision-makers choose JSEAD forces that are merely

sufficient to meet objectives, or do they construct forces which

reflect decisive-even overwhelming-superiority over the

potential enemy? More importantly, how does the decision

maker determine what "sufficient," "decisive," or "overwhelming"

mean in operative terms with respect to JSEAD? Desert

Storm's success seems to indicate a strong preference for

building and using overwhelming force in the prosecution of

war. In this context, the decision maker either composes

forces that are "overwhelming" by number and firepower or

develops strategies and tactics that use available resources in

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power (and JSEAD by implication) was the thesis of an

Aviation Week and Space Technology article .$ More

fundamental still is the issue that surfaces when, having

reached the limits of innovation in the resource-constrained

environment, the US military determines that it is no longer

able to guarantee even sufficient JSEAD for air superiority.

When faced with the political decision to commit American

military power in these situations, how will military leaders

respond?

In order to avoid crossing the line from sufficient to

insufficient JSEAD capability, JSEAD strategists must clearly

define what constitutes the absolute limits beyond which-no

matter how we reorganize, innovate, or reconstitute pooled

JSEAD assets, tactics, and strategywe are no longer effective

in neutralizing the enemy LADS.

The Threat-/Capability-based Continuum

The threat-/capability-based continuum is closely related to

the need-/resource-based continuum. In response to the

perception of a diminished Soviet threat, the American

political process has mandated significant reductions to the

military. The same process that is responsible for pushing

JSEAD toward the resource end of the need-/resource-based

continuum is also responsible for pushing JSEAD toward a

philosophy that emphasizes general capability over specific

threat-based strategies . The JSEAD threat, unlike the

uncertain world of the future, has identifiable characteristics.

The requirement for a generalized capability is a military

requirement against the relatively sophisticated JSEAD threat

of the future. The diversity of technology available to regions

where US forces will most likely be engaged will require

electronic equipment, weaponry, and tactics that will be able

to respond to a wide range of enemy capabilities. But, oddly,

the impetus driving JSEAD towards capability-based concepts

is the politico-economic environment.

The threat-/capability-based continuum displayed in figure

20 shows an interesting distribution. As a function of time, the

services are moving toward each other-toward the

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capability-based end of the spectrum. The Navy and Marines

have always tended to this end. The Army has always tended

toward the middle range and the Air Force toward the

threat-based end of the spectrum. The Air Force is moving

toward the capability-based end for two primary reasons: an

uncertain threat and diminishing fiscal resources that militate

against acquiring mission-specific weaponry. A generalized

capability-based JSEAD-though explainable on the basis of

economic pragmatism-is dangerous because it makes

American air power vulnerable to technological surprise and

increases the amount of assets (hence the potential for

increased casualties and attrition) required to perform a given

function. However, the move toward capability-based JSEAD

provides opportunities in much the same way as the resourcebased criteria does in that it forces a more flexible distribution

ofassets and it aids in the development of more innovative tactics.

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The piecemeal/integrated tactics continuum presented in

figure 21 is complex. The Air Force clearly stands at the

integrated end of the spectrum, and the Navy and Army tend

toward the piecemeal end of the spectrum. The Marines fit,

oddly, at both ends of the spectrum. They exhibit piecemeal

tactics and weapons in their SEAD application because they

tend to use capability-based tactics like the Army and Navy, but

they also use a fully integrated tactics approach as a function

of Marine combined-arms strategies. The strength for JSEAD

is clearly in the integrated category, though piecemeal applications may suffice in situations where holistic approaches are

not required (very limited threat array or very limited force

objectives) . Air Force approaches to JSEAD, though not

completely consonant with jointness, do meet the criteria for

the most effective consolidation of assets, if not tactics.

The Air Force lead in this area provides a natural rallying

point for general JSEAD integration concepts. However, the Air

Force's integrated-tactics concept will need to be modified by

resource-based and capability-based concepts of the other

services to make full use of this Air Force EC concept.
The defensive/ offensive continuum poses some unique

problems in applying measures of SEAD effectiveness . The

Navy understandably represents the more defensive end of the

spectrum, while the Air Force tends toward the offensive. The

Army and Marines tend toward the center. This continuum

reflects the doctrinal predisposition of each of the services. The

effectiveness of the offensive or defensive predispositions, in

real terms, depends on what the war-fighting situation calls

for. When the NCA determines a defensive posture to be in our

best interest, Navy-Marine conceptual frameworks would

apply best. If overall objectives require the application of

sudden, strategic offensive power, the, Air Force concept of

operations would be better suited for JSEAD.

Figure 22 is an adaptation of the Clausewitzian defense/

offense matrix contained in chapter 2. The principal concept

shown is that, through the application of JSEAD measures, all

of the services' offensive capabilities are enhanced. This is

because JSEAD's general evolutionary path has proceeded

from a defensive to an offensive posture .

The four continuums, when taken together, enable us to

build a more encompassing picture of JSEAD applications and

potential effectiveness as a tool in war. The continuums set

the context, give the tactician a way of placing JSEAD in

perspective in a changing, turbulent time, and provide a

means of comparison in bridging the gap between the old,

familiar world and the uncertain one we live in.

The General Context:

A New Way of Looking at JSEAD

Currently, JSEAD is described in three categories: campaign,

localized, and complementary. 9 These are broad concepts that

coincide with the planning process in the development of joint

operations and contingency operations plans. JSEAD campaigns

are related primarily to theater strategy which targets the

LADS infrastructure of the enemy. Localized JSEAD is related

to the tactical level of theater operations and is geographic and/or

150
ppy 

with "pop-up targets" (targets of opportunity) and the sudden

need for self-defense from an unforeseen enemy air defense

system. These macroconcepts are explained in the JSEAD

Multi-Service Proceduresfor the Joint Suppression ofEnemy Air

Defenses manual published in 1990. 1° Theater strategic

(campaign) JSEAD is generally the province of Air Force
g, 

p

Air Force and Army, and complementary JSEAD is used most

commonly by Marine-Navy aviators in the power projection

and fleet defense role.

Another way of viewing applications of JSEAD is by

assessing what would be most effective in a high-, medium-, or

low-intensity conflict (within the context of FM 100-5) .

Depending on the complexity, size, quality, and disposition of

the enemy IADS and organic field army air defenses in each of

these cases-and what the friendly theater commander

specified as the key military objectives against the enemy-the

meld of SEAD forces, sequencing, tactics, and weapons could

vary considerably.

"Intensity of conflict" (another way of categorizing SEAD

applications)-as clear a term as it appears-is complicated for

JSEAD. The intensity of a war is related to tempo, size,

violence (lethality), and politico-military ramifications for

world/regional stability. The mixture of influences, only some

of which the military has the power to control, defines not only

how intense a war is but who controls the assessment of

intensity. The level of effort that will be brought to bear during

a war of a specific level of intensity is often beyond the purview

of the military-at least during the initial stages of conflict. A

"high-intensity war" is not necessarily ",just a major war"

requiring large numbers of forces . It could be a short war

requiring a relatively small number of forces which expend

ordnance with extreme violence.

For JSEAD, however, a high-intensity conflict invariably

means the application ofjointness in its prosecution. Mediumintensity conflict may require JSEAD or single-service applied

SEAD, and low-intensity conflict may or may not require SEAD

at all . It is not peculiar, therefore, that various squadron SEAD

assets (especially among the Air Force and Navy) possess some

of the most complex, incremental "packages" for contingency

operation plans (CONPLANS) and operations plans (OPLANS)

that exist. 11

Both measurements-the determination of intensity and the

characteristics of the threat-require a tool to determine how

to allocate, organize, and direct SEAD assets to prosecute the

theater commander's objectives . Making such an assessment

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q

p

variables and criteria at work.

Using "high, medium, low" as a scale on one side and

"complexity, size/quality, disposition" across the top, we form

a three-by-three matrix. By using the matrix, one can

establish a context from which to make a decision based on

the criteria at work.

The matrix in figure 23 accommodates all the variables and

criteria needed to identify the most effective tactics, strategy,

and resource combination in a given situation. The terms

require explanation to increase the matrix's usefulness .

Complexity: The extent to which an enemy system is integrated,

contains state-of-the-art systems, is trained according to a doctrine,

and possesses a sustainable, reliable logistics apparatus to maintain

the IADS.

Size/Quality: The number of systems the enemy employs and the

quality of the individual systems. Density of threat is also covered

under this category. From a planning/fighting perspective, one must

balance available resources against needed resources in order to

achieve specified ends. Often times, tacticians discover that a

straightforward comparison of an enemy's size/quality SEAD index to

our own is invalid because the enemy may be vulnerable in areas that

have nothing to do with quantitative/qualitative comparisons .

Disposition: An estimate of the relative distribution of assets over space

and the composition of the enemy's air defenses . An enemy IADS

consists of discrete pieces of equipment located on specifically

identifiable territory . Its distribution is affected by geographic size and

type of terrain . EC specialists can ascertain a great deal about an

enemy's thought process and LADS firing doctrine by analyzing this

attribute . Disposition of enemy IADS also answers the more pragmatic

targeting questions concerning critical node analysis, distances to

targets, what to avoid, and what to suppress .

This matrix provides aframework to assess the relationship

between the objective and how it is to be met. The matrix also

attempts to consolidate graphically the concepts which

account for the impacts of service culture, doctrinal

differences generated by role, and the requirements of the

theater commander to meet war objectives by using combined

resources .

It is entirely possible for the war situation to contain mixed

elements within the matrix: a high-complexity threat array

does not necessarily also have to be a high-size/quality or

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LOW -Mixed tactics indicated F --Not enough resources for

sortie-by-sortie defense of mission packages

--Destroywhat cannot be jammed

--Deceive what cannot be jammed or destroyed

HIGH -slam what does not need to be destroyed

-Phased use of resources baesd on what

LO IVIED

is available indicated

LOW

Figure 23. JSEAD planning matrix.
highdisposition array. It may even be possible for the

intensity to change from one element to the other. The

assessment of intensity is often dictated by "higher authority"

(NCA) or by circumstances that call for a specific level of effort .

For instance, a "low-intensity conflict" with "high-size/quality"

may require "high-intensity conflict, high-complexity" JSEAD

measures, depending on the guidance the theater commander

receives and passes on to the battle staff.

We will use North Korea as an example of how the matrix

might be used in a war-fighting situation. The North Korean

LADS is well integrated and heavily redundant. It is based on a

1950s to 1960s-style Soviet IADS and not nearly as sophisticated as the Iraqi LADS. We could assess the complexity as

medium when compared to other LADS systems worldwide. If

the North Koreans were to upgrade to more advanced SAMs or

surveillance radars, the IADS' complexity could easily be

assessed as high. Additionally, the North Koreans do not place

heavy emphasis on radar-directed organic air defense for their

offensive ground forces, apparently preferring to extend their

strategic IADS infrastructure to cover the geography in which

their offensive operations will occur.

The North Koreans possess large numbers of air defense

weapons and maintain them in good order. The density and

overlapping coverage of their systems is excellent (i .e ., destruction of a single system will not harm the LADS significantly) .

Thus, the North Korean IADS can be assessed as "high" in the

size/quality index.

The North Korean IADS net is disposed countrywide, especially

around their major industrial centers and along their borders.

They have placed large numbers of their most capable systems

along obvious avenues of approach to targets they consider

valuable . The North Korean IADS disposition reveals a

sensitivity to protecting urban industrial complexes and

detecting attack from all directions early (at the expense of

spreading these assets thinly) . Aside from the obvious

high-disposition index indicated, this assessment reveals a

potentially critical weakness in their LADS structure based on

Soviet doctrine: degradation of their early-warning system

through jamming or selected destruction could easily cripple

their air defense net along selected avenues of approach. We

155
could assess the North Korean IADS, then, as one of medium

complexity, high size/quality, and high disposition.

The intensity of a potential conflict is generally a "given," at

least for planning purposes and during the initial phases of

hostilities . Nonetheless, the characteristics of the intensity are

helpful to JSEAD planners. The decision to use overwhelming

offensive force, for instance, allows the JSEAD planner greater

latitude in planning "phases" of the campaign. The virtually

simultaneous accomplishment of the four phases of the Desert

Storm air campaign (of which JSEAD was a phase) was

achieved by the possession and use of overwhelming force .I 2

In retrospect, SEAD planners discovered that there were great

synergies created by the simultaneous attack on the enemy's

C3, strategic infrastructure, and LADS. JSEAD emerged as a

critical element in enabling the air campaign's success .

The synergy created by JSEAD and the strategic attack on

the Iraqi military infrastructure enabled a numerically

equivalent force (ground units and total military personnel) to

project crushing military power far out of proportion to its

relative size. JSEAD possesses the curious property of being

able to turn a "sufficient" force into an "overwhelming" force. If

the enemy is defenseless from aerial attack, any aircraft capable

of bringing weapons to bear against the enemy's unprotected

centers of gravity represents an overwhelming force.

The best way to use JSEAD is to focus on objectives, not

resources. Doing so does not make the question of resource

availability, quality, or quantity immaterial; it merely places

these factors in a perspective which subordinates them to

overall objectives. There will be situations where the joint force

commander will have to fight with limited resources and other

situations where the commander will be able to acquire

whatever is needed. It is impossible to overemphasize, in either

case, the requirement that all criteria. of effectiveness be related

to attainment of overall objectives, and JSEAD, as a primary

tool in attaining and keeping air superiority over the battle

area, is no different in this respect.

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1. A simple number and line plot from Jane's Weapon Systems

(London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1972-73 forward) shows an almost

geometric growth rate among command-and-control systems, early warning

radars, and acquisition systems . Not only are the individual systems

proliferating but the combinations and permutations of the systems are

growing as well. To develop specific weapons systems to counter such a

proliferation of numbers and types of future systems seems an imprudent

and financially ruinous course to follow .

2. The author was a member of the Operation Just Cause planning staff

and participated in the planning of the electronic combat portion of the

operation.

3. Gen Michael J. Dugan, USAF, Retired, "Air Power: Concentration,

Responsiveness, and the Operational Art," Military Review, July 1989, 21 .

4. Interview with Col John A. Warden III et al., Headquarters, USAF,

Washington, D.C., 31 July 1991. As mentioned earlier, Colonel Warden

expressed surprise that the Desert Storm EC planning cell was able to

"ramp up" so quickly when compared to other portions of the staff.

5. Derived from Philip A. Crowl's "The Strategist's Short Catechisms:

Six Questions without Answers" contained in Military Studies Course Book 1

(Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air War College, 1991), 180-85. The questions are:

1 . What is it about?

2. Is the national military strategy tailored to meet the national

political objectives?

3. What are the limits of military power?

4. What are the alternatives?

5. How strong is the home front?

6. What have I overlooked?

6. Dugan, 21.

7 . Joint Publication 1 : Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces

(Washington, D.C. : Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 November 1991), 21 .

8. "Tactical Bombing of Iraqi Forces Outstripped Value of Strategic Hits,

Analyst Contends," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 27 January 1992,

62-63.

9. JSEAD: Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Suppression of Enemy

Air Defenses (Langley AFB, Va. : Headquarters Tactical Air Command, ALFAs

1990),2.

10. Ibid.

11 . The "SEAR" package formations used in Operations El Dorado

Canyon, Just Cause, and Desert Storm varied from the simple use of

jamming aircraft to suppress radars as a separate formation with area

fighter protection cover, to an elaborate series ofjammers, HARM-shooters,

Wild Weasels, special forces, F-117 bomb droppers, and fighter-bombers

carrying cluster bombs to suppress poorly defended radar sites-all as part

of an overall SEAD campaign to neutralize the enemy's total capability to

use air defense .

12. Interview with Colonel Warden.

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Chapter 5

JSEAD: Strategy, Tactics, and the

Changed Threat

This chapter explores the opportunities that the changing

world provides for developing joint SEAD strategies and

tactics . The changed nature of the world's military

environment has enormous implications for the role an enemy

LADS will play in any future conflict. The changing nature of

the American military provides both opportunities and

limitations that developers of JSEAD must keep in mind when

formulating plans to deal with the increasingly sophisticated

IADS threat. In dealing with JSEAD strategy and tactics

issues, this chapter discusses how a joint approach to SEAD

tactics can reshape the way we think about and fight emerging

enemy air defense structures.

The enemy LADS of the future will undergo fundamental

changes . Universal access to advanced technologies will

accelerate the pace in leveling the SEAD battlefield . While

fiscal constraints slow the pace of US technological growth in

SEAD equipment, the rest of the world-to the delight of

electronics and arms entrepreneurs worldwide-has the

opportunity to catch up . Ironically, the forces that controlled

the proliferation of advanced electronics technologies during

the cold war are evaporating with the demise of the Soviet

Union. The US "edge" in SEAD combat, therefore, can no

longer rest upon superior technology as the key element in

achieving overwhelming advantage. The US edge-if it is to be

maintained-will be held by integrating existing SEAD

resources and combining the joint skills of all the services'

SEAD expertise.

The evolution of SEAD paints a pattern of convergence-a

convergence that will eventually make JSEAD a functional

reality. JSEAD for US forces does not exist yet because each of

the services' doctrinal, strategic, and tactical applications of

SEAD has prevented it . This observation is not pejorative;

functional joint warfare has not evolved far enough to allow an

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application of doctrine, strategy, and tactics that is universally

shared by the respective services. Nonetheless, convergence

among the various services' views on SEAD application is a

prerequisite if joint SEAD is to become a reality. Fortunately,

evolutionary forces are propelling SEAD strategies and tactics

in that direction already.

Operation Desert Storm, while it applied each of the

services' assets in a joint SEAD campaign, did not suffice as a

true JSEAD venture . Individual service paradigms of warfare

and tactics were applied to achieve joint objectives . The Desert

Storm SEAD campaign was a very cleverly crafted

amalgamation of single-service SEAD assets and tactics to

achieve overall goals . The Air Force-dominated electronic

combat cell that directed SEAD operations created a

quasijoint SEAD strategy where all services worked through

the existing Air Force electronic combat structure. This was

especially true for Air Force EF-111 and Navy/Marine EA-613

radar jamming operations. Differences between Navy/Marine

F/A-18 and Air Force F-4G capabilities and basic tactics,

however, prevented similar uses of these HARM-shooting

assets at the tactical level.

Future JSEAD will differ significantly from Desert Storm

applications because individual joint war-fighting doctrines,

strategic paradigms, and tactics are converging . For a variety

of reasons, the basic capabilities of service-held SEAD assets

and tactics are becoming more similar. The F-4G will probably

go out of service soon. The military budget cannot afford a

replacement for the kind of capability the F-4G represents .

Future lethal SEAD capability will reside in HARM-shooting

aircraft that will have some of the capabilities of the F-4G, but

Wild Weasel tactics in the joint arena will change. The

institution of a single information-processing net linking all

the services on the battlefield in real time will also allow a

more fluid use of each of the services' assets as a function of

overall joint objectives rather than service objectives. The

movement of evolutionary forces towards convergence not only

aids the transition from the quasijoint SEAD strategies and

tactics of Desert Storm to true joint SEAD, it establishes the

ground work for it.

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Four major evolutionary forces contribute to the movement

towards convergence:

1 . The uncertainty of the future . Planners do not know what to plan

for. Who is the threat, where is the threat, what is the threat, and

when is the threat? The range of uncertainty circumscribed by these

questions is pushing all services toward general capability-based

concepts that are "good enough" to meet the threat as a whole, but not

good enough to meet the threat individually .

2. The nature of the future threat's air defenses. The availability of

sophisticated and relatively inexpensive air defense systems by nations

inimical to US interests is growing. The mercantile instincts of the

world's arms industries promise to accelerate this growth.

3. The rapid dwindling of SEAR combat resources. The traditional

threat to Western survival has diminished, but, curiously, none of the

conflicts in which US SEAD assets have been employed have been

against the central threats for which they were designed . Ironically,

regional conflicts where SEAR assets have been employed promise to

continue, and the enemy air defense systems promise to grow as a

function of what is available on the open market. We have reached the

limits of doing "more with less" ; future JSEAD will have to

acknowledge these limits as a function of pooling resources and being

smarter in the "more-with-less" game.

4. The relationship between forward-deployed forces and US-based

power-projection forces . The requirement to respond quickly and

decisively anywhere in the world against potential enemies of varied air

defense capabilities places an absolute limit on what US forces will be

able to do to the enemy, especially if American forces must employ

military force directly from the continental US. By forging common

links through mutually understood and thoroughly practiced JSEAD,

US forces will be able to overcome weaknesses that individual service

weapons and tactics might not be able to. Global reach, global power,

the JSEAD way, may presage a novel way of packaging the available

forces .

Uncertainty, diminishing SEAD capability against a

relatively more capable SEAD threat, and a changed basing

posture for US forces compel the movement toward sharing

SEAD resources . This pressure has raised penetrating

questions about SEAD force structure, organization,

composition, command and control, authority, and unity of

effort. For SEAD practitioners, these questions are well on

their way to being answered. However, the general inertia

associated with institutional change is slowing the process.

Vested institutional interests in each of the services has

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dampened the evolutionary movement of SEAD. The service

cultures lag behind the incipient movement toward "true"

JSEAD. Unfortunately, the answers to the JSEAD questions

cannot become reality until the institutional vested interests

overcome this inertia.

Not all evolutionary trends will enhance the transition to

JSEAD strategy and tactics application. Part of the problem

concerns the differing foci of strategy and tactics. Unlike SEAD

strategy, which deals largely with objectives and concepts,

SEAD tactics deal with physical reality and pragmatic

application. The strategic requirement to maintain a general

capability-based force runs headlong into the equally strong

tactical requirement to meet specific objectives. To SEAD

tacticians, the LADS threat exists as a physical entity in a

specific place with specific properties and capabilities, and the

LADS threat is netted together in very specific ways . The

enemy personnel who operate the air defense systems are

trained to employ their systems with a specific doctrine and

are commanded by leaders who operate through a specific

organizational structure. These "specific factors" make up the

world of the SEAD tactician. The problem is that American

SEAD tacticians no longer know ahead of time which specific

systems to plan for.

As air power continues to gain importance as a principal

element of power projection for each of the services, JSEAD

tactics will become more and more important at the "nuts-andbolts" tactical level . The problem for SEAD strategists in

adapting capability-based, resource-scarce forces to meet the

threat is compounded because US forces no longer know

who-or exactly what-the threat is. SEAD strategists must

plan for more general contingencies. Tacticians, on the other

hand, must configure existing forces and weapons in

employment schemes that counter a specific-and likely

undefined-threat. The paradox is daunting. The traditional

paradigm of pairing a specific friendly weapons system against

a specific enemy target set or weapon capability is no longer

tenable; yet when war comes, the US "general-capability SEAD

force" must become specific enough to defeat a unique-and

specific-enemy LADS threat.

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The requirement to counter specific threats with specific

weapons and the fact that US forces will have fewer resources

with which to counter these threats poses a classic dilemma.

We pit the resource-scarce "general" force against the

tactics-driven "specific" threat. On the one hand, SEAD forces

must be able to deal with the specific threat effectively enough

to accomplish the combat objective and maintain sufficient

survivability. On the other hand, because resources are

scarce, the SEAD resources themselves must be flexible and

versatile enough to perform as many functions as they

realistically can.

Clearly, if JSEAD tactics are to be applied in any meaningful

tactical way, we must develop a viable solution to the dilemma.

Since the LADS threat is the primary driver in JSEAD strategy

and tactics formulation, we must first understand its nature.

The Essence of the Threat

Paradigms change because the world changes. When it is

obvious old ways of looking at reality no longer fit, new ways

must be invented. The same reality that compels American

single-service SEAR strategies to evolve into JSEAD strategies

also compels our potential enemies to evolve. LADS structures

with which American forces must deal have undergone radical

change in response to the changed world . The transition in

concepts from a linear to a nonlinear battlefield and from a

vertical, sequential decision-making process to one using a

cybernetic model also applies to the potential enemy.

The principal factor altering the nature of the threat posed

by the modern LADS is the treatment of data and information.

As a direct descendant of the technological revolution, the

introduction of information and data-processing networks has

transformed the modern LADS.

The transition from technology-based to information-based

LADS has occurred rapidly. The transition is traceable through

three distinct phases. Each of these changes flows from the

way technological innovations have been applied to

information processing technology. Through these changes,

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the modern LADS has undergone an unwitting transformation

where information processing seems to have supplanted the

technology that spawned it.

The first phase of the transition occurred when radar was

mated with the analog computer. The second phase occurred

when more advanced radars were netted to a central system of

command and control made possible by more advanced analog

computers. The third phase was (and is) the introduction of

digital computer technology and its application to radar

technology as well as to information processing. The digital

computer enabled major qualitative advances in computer

design and radar technology and gave real impetus to the

creation of the information-based modern LADS.

In the Vietnam era, systemwide information gathering and

distribution played a secondary role to the physical ability of

individual systems to destroy invading aircraft . North

Vietnamese SA-2 sites, for instance, were initially responsible for

acquiring and tracking their own targets . Available computer

and radar technology limited the ability to coordinate a

systemwide information gathering and dissemination net.

With the advent of computer technologies that could link

detection systems to provide timely warning and accurate

tracking data, information gathering and dissemination began

to play a more significant role in the application of air defense

weapons. Gradually, command and control assumed a greater

role in the use of air defense assets by channeling information

to desired locations . This was especially apparent during the

Israeli use of SEAD in the Bekaa Valley. Computer technology

formed the basis of the system, and that technology was still

limited in the amounts of data it could process and transmit in

a timely manner. The demand for data was still greater than

the technology could produce.

The LADS/C3 systems used prior to the introduction of digital

computer technologies were still linear because information

was restricted by the technology available to a generally

sequential flow. Information traveled a specific path. From the

early-warning radar, detection information went to a filter

center. From the filter center it was relayed to a command

center. The command center sent a decision to the filter center

and fire control site. The fire control center acquired the target

164
and shot it down. The total air-situation picture was not

available to the early-warning radar site, the filter center, or

the fire control director. It was even difficult to acquire a

complete air-situation picture at the command center because

the data presented tended to be a mixture of information

gained over different segments of time . The communication

path used by this IADS/C3 generation was iterative and

sequential; consequently it tended to be time-consuming and

cumbersome.

With the advent of digital technologies, most prominently

displayed in the Iraqi LADS, the information flow became

nonlinear. The inherent makeup of the digital computer-based

system made huge amounts of information immediately

available to any part of the LADS on demand. Any part of the

system had the technological capability to access the

information any other part of the system possessed. Feedback

loops were part of the technology, not a process controlled by

decision makers . Information accessibility dominated the

entire IADS/C3 structure as an unwitting by-product of the

technology itself. The application of digital computer

technology catapulted information processing into the

preeminent role it now plays. The simultaneous transmission

of pertinent data throughout the entire LADS array makes it

virtually "nodeless" in the classical targeting sense .

Figure 24 shows the rapid transition from shooter-based to

information-based LADS . The relationship between technology

and the evolution of the LADS, while undeniable, tells only part

of the story. The evolving air defense system's technological

capabilities metand then rapidly exceeded-the paradigms

that generated their creation. The multiple uses of digital

computer technology and the myriad permutations resulting

from netting the thousands of communications, radar, and air

defense weapons available together by software makes the

concept of a single SEAD weapon for a single LADS threat

obsolete.

The modern LADS is multilayered and linked through an

intricate, redundant command-and-control structure. It is

heavily information-dependent. Because the IADS is heavily

dependent on information, information denial becomes a key

ingredient in modern LADS suppression.

165

Figure 24 shows that an exchange of information takes

place at every point in the modern IADS. This has not always

been the case. Classic SEAD strategy focused on the United

States' ability to destroy key points of the IADS, preferably the

shooters. Current SEAD strategy, while noting the importance

of applying a wide array of disruptive and destructive tactics to

the enemy IADS, has not departed significantly from this

paradigm. The reason for this is pragmatic: there is nothing so

comforting to the warrior as the physical destruction of enemy

forces-even when disruption may be all that the situation

requires.

JSEAD must evolve beyond the classic "destroy and jam"

strategies of resource-rich times when US SEAD technology,

personnel training, and firepower outstripped virtually any

opponent. In adapting to the IADS's transition from shooterbased to information-based orientations, JSEAD must focus

increasingly on information denial as its primary task. The

unwitting transition from a shooter-based to an informationbased LADS provides modern SEAD strategy with the key

vulnerability of the modern LADS structure: paralyze the

enemy by denying the ability to acquire, process, or transmit

data.

In hindsight, Operation Desert Storm marks the first time a

SEAD campaign based on information denial was undertaken.

Ironically, SEAD strategists and tacticians, when analyzing

key elements of the war, discovered after the fact that

information denial was the principal focus of the SEAD

campaign. It is clear from the sequence of observed events that

the initial phases of the SEAD campaign were directed at the

Iraqi LADS/C3 net's ability to acquire, process, and transmit

pertinent data (information-based) . The follow-on objective was

suppression of AAA, SAM, and Iraqi interceptors (shooterbased) through a mixture of intimidation, confusion, and

occasional physical destruction, butfrom an overall strategic

view-the shooter-based view was subsumed as a function of

information denial. One of the primary differences in SEAD

application between Desert Storm and previous military

operations was the discovery that disrupting or denying data

flow-without ever physically challenging the shooting

apparatus of the air defense network-cripples the modern LADS.

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The modern IADS-with redundant communication nodes

and instantaneous access to data-presents an almost

impenetrable barrier to Vietnam-era SEAD strategists. Viewed,

however, as an evolved information-gathering network

attached to air defense weapons, the modern IADS reveals its

key vulnerability. In order to acquire the speed and efficiency

the total net demands, the modern LADS has unwittingly

become dependent on electronic information gathering and

dissemination; it is as effectively neutralized by information

denial as it is by destruction.

The technological revolution in LADS equipment designfrom radar-based to communication-based networks, from

simple radar-guided AAA to "fire and forget" modern SAM with

on-board, terminal-homing radars-has pushed the evolution

of the modern LADS faster and farther than most other aspects

of warfare. This asymmetrical evolution of the LADS threat has

also propelled SEAD strategies and tactics to meet it . Because

of this asymmetrical evolution, the tactics supporting modern

JSEAD operations may not seem to make sense in relation to

tactics that support other mission areas. Some aspects in the

evolution of modern JSEAD tactics may even appear bizarre or

contradictory when viewed from more traditional air power

tactics perspectives .

Speed is the essence of the modern LADS threat. While

modern aircraft penetrate enemy air defenses and fly over the

battlefield at speeds measuring in the thousands of miles per

hour, the modern LADS reacts at the speed of light. The future

LADS will provide the enemy a virtually instantaneous picture

of the aerial situation. This picture combines the traditional

IADS responsibilities of detecting, locating, identifying,

tracking, allocating weapon systems, and issuing firing

instructions, but it accomplishes these tasks as part of a very

rapid, fluid process. The difference is more than speed and

amount of data flow, more than streamlined command and

control ; it represents a qualitative leap in capability for the

modern LADS.

Modern LADS structures available on the world market-of

Warsaw Pact origin, Western, and (increasingly) indigenous

manufacture-have track capacities (the electronic computer

"tag" given an aircraft that has been detected, located and is

168
being tracked) in the tens of thousands. The overall picture

advanced information-processing systems present can be

manipulated to focus on a specific area--or a larger area-on

demand, and this picture can be transmitted instantly to any

location within the command-and-control net.

The redundancies offered by conventional telephone cable,

coaxial cable, or fiber optics, in addition to different types of

highly directional microwave and radio links, make targeting

the modern C3 structure an ambiguous task. Because the

system is inherently nodeless, it is difficult to know what

constitutes a "critical C3 node" or how to determine where the

critical node is . Even defining what constitutes destruction is

a difficult task for the SEAD/C3CM tactician. "Bombs on

target" no longer carries the certainty of desired system

destruction it once did.

The speed with which a modem enemy IADS adapts to attack

poses some special problems for the intelligence communityespecially as it relates to collection, assessment, and

dissemination. Collection equipment must be able to pinpoint

emitters and data transmission arrays in real-time .

Assessment of enemy intentions and capabilities must be

quick, accurate, and disseminated rapidly to SEAD strategists,

tacticians, and users.

The SEAD community's intelligence requirements have

changed in direct response to the qualitative changes in the

modern LADS . Tacticians must have a clear picture of enemy

information-processing capabilities as well as weapons

characteristics. Because the modern IADS can adapt so quickly

to changing circumstances, it can present a chameleon-like

target. This ability to adapt quickly places stress on an

intelligence system that was not designed to collect, analyze,

and disseminate pertinent data to US SEAD tacticians at the

speed with which the modern LADS changes.

Timely data-real-time data-is crucial to the development

of a clear picture of the enemy net. Relevant day-to-day tactics

development and targeting priorities require rapid feedback

and analysis to be effective in the information denial campaign

against the modern IADS, and it is uncertain whether

traditional intelligence collection means and processes are up

to the task. The rapid evolution of the modern LADS seems to

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have caught the intelligence community-usually one of the

stalwart supporters and enablers of the SEAD communityflat-footed . Until this shortcoming is corrected, the intelligence

community's limited capabilities with respect to the modern

LADS will have a constraining effect on JSEAD.

The LADS' transition to an information-based system has

also created changes in its requirements. Examining these

information-based requirements-and the way the modern

IADS treats them-will reveal some lucrative areas for

exploitation .

Requirements of the Information-based IADS

To bring air defense weapons to bear, an enemy IADS must

be able to detect the presence of attackers, locate and identify

them, establish a record of the attacking aircrafts' tracks, and

finally, allocate and employ air defense weapon systems

against the attackers. The process itself remains essentially

unchanged since World War II, but the volumes of information

and the speed with which the process operates have made

qualitative differences in the capabilities of the modern IADS .

Examining how the detection-to-weapons-employment air

defense procedure has evolved-through the lens of informationprocessing technology-reveals the extent to which the

modern LADS has been transformed.

Detecting

Traditionally, visual spotters and spies were used for

detecting enemy aircraft. They are still used, but as a

complement to electronic means of detection. Electronic

means are both active and passive . Active radars emit a

characteristic waveform to detect aircraft at great range (150

to 300 nautical miles, depending on atmospheric conditions

and line of sight) . However, what constitutes a "characteristic

long-range radar waveform" is changing rapidly. Some newer

radars do not even have to worry about line-of-sight problems .

Bistatic radars, for instance, use one site to bounce radar

waves off the ionosphere and the other to receive the data. By

170
comparing the data at transmission-the known characteristics

of the ionosphere and the received signal-a prospective

enemy might be able to detect aircraft well beyond the horizon.

Other modern radars radiate signals spread over a wide

frequency spectrum and use stretched-out pulses (which are

very difficult to jam) to clarify the radar picture at extreme ranges.

The most troublesome electronic long-range detection

"threat" of the modern IADS, however, is the passive receiver.

It is troublesome because friendly aircraft have no way of

knowing if they are being tracked passively. Worse, because

passive detection sites do not radiate, it is extremely difficult

to identify or locate them. This makes the traditional point

"jamming/destroying" tactic unusable . In fact, the attempt to

jam or destroy such a site may be exactly what a passive array

needs to locate and identify intruders .

Not only do airborne radars and radios emit detectable electromagnetic radiation, so do computers in modern aircraftalbeit at very low power levels. Passive detection arrays may

have evolved to the point where they are sensitive, accurate,

and persistent enough to locate and identify aircraft at long

range . They may come to supplant the radar as the primary

means of detecting ingressing friendly aircraft. They may even

become accurate enough to aid in the locating, identifying, and

tracking portions of the LADS process . At the very least, adding

passive detection arrays to an enemy IADS net would

complicate the SEAD planner's job .

The modern LADS has many countermeasures that do not

rely on sophisticated technology. Possessing large numbers of

radars, using varied frequencies and different radar waveforms

of various complexity, turning radars on and off to confuse the

intelligence collection effort or complicate targeting-all of

these enemy countermeasures have been reasonably effective

in the past. Even in the transition to a SEAR strategy based on

information denial, these countermeasures will still pose

problems to the SEAD planner.

Locating and Identifying

There is a considerable difference between knowing that

something is out there and knowing where and who it is.

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Detection need not be precise; it need only determine if something is out there and about where it is. Locating and identifying

a target is a more complicated and precise venture than

detecting one. The radar waveforms used by location and

identification systems also are changing rapidly because of

technological innovation . Current waveforms used in locating

and identifying vary from the type used in early-warning

detection radars to those employed by short-range acquisition

radars.

The important distinction between the detection and location/

identification phase is the treatment of the information .

Detection energizes the IADS structure to prepare for the

intruders. Location and identification data is more precise and

there is more of it per time bit . The IADS structure

transmitting this data requires a system that can handle the

increased volume at higher rates . A key characteristic

distinguishing the modern LADS from its earlier forms is its

ability not only to locate and identify intruders with very

capable radars and passive arrays, but to transmit the high

volumes of data required at the very fast rates required by

decision makers. The capability to locate and identify targets

in the information-based IADS is important only to the extent

that the system is capable of transmitting the information to

the appropriate places in the LADS decision-making apparatus.

The type of equipment responsible for the location/identification of detected aircraft is in a state of radical redesign.

Digital computer technology makes it possible for some radars

to customize their own waveforms to suit the task. The advanced

radar/digital computer combination-like the tracking system

supporting the American SAM-D Patriot surface-to-air

missile-is capable of altering its radar characteristics

thousands of times a second to accomplish the tasks set

before it by the Patriot's computer software programming. More

importantly, the radar can share its information with other

radars via data link or receive enhanced data from long-range

exterior sources through the same link. Patriot-like systemssystems that meld advanced computer technology to advanced

radar and data transmission design-are apt examples of the

kinds of systems employed by the location/identification phase

of the information-based LADS.

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The problem this poses for traditional SEAD strategy is that

it is difficult to distinguish where the location/identification

function ends and the communications function begins. The

problem arises because in traditional SEAD strategy, the

weapons and tactics choices employed against location/

identification systems and the C3 structure tend to be separated

as if they were dissimilar entities . In the modern IADS, C3 nodes,

radar nodes, weapons nodes, and location/identification

nodes are becoming indistinguishable.

The enemy's requirements for location/ identification

equipment also create a curious technology problem for the

SEAD planner. The availability of differing technologies has

been complicated, ironically, by the removal of a common

enemy technology to which the US SEAD community had

grown accustomed. The familiar lexicon of electronic combat

and SEAD has been transformed by the demise of the Soviet

Union. The classic early-warning, acquisition, and fire-control

radar waveforms of the past, while still the location/

identification mainstay of many potential enemy LADS, are

rapidly being replaced with newer generation radars-many of

mixed Western and Soviet design.

The change is qualitative; the location/identification systems

of the modern LADS have allowed potential enemies to leapfrog

ahead in technologies . The radar and communications

systems that future US forces may face will likely be hybrid

melds using state-of-the-art complex radars similar to the

SAM-D Patriot . These radars-unlike those of cold war-era

potential enemies-will probably be manufactured by

companies such as Raytheon, Westinghouse, CSF Thompson,

Marconi, Plessey, or Siemens and be supported by the most

modern communications technologies marketed .

As complex and advanced as location/identification radar

technology has become, it is pushing the limits of what it can

do physically . The next quantum leap in locating and

identifying attacking aircraft for the enemy IADS is occurring

right now in networking. The broad applications of digital

computer technology to information processing open vast

possibilities at reasonable cost to the potential buyer of a

modern IADS . Relatively small, inexpensive computers

complete with high-resolution displays and high data-rate

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mechanismsare being netted together through

master computers that can interpret data from radars, passive

detection arrays, visual observation posts, and spies; these

systems can even suggest weapons allocation options to the

battlefield commander. The new information systems are

capable of netting old radars with new ones, combining old

systems into a larger array, or revitalizing previously existing

systems. The revolution in information systems qualitatively

changes the capability of the IADS net, and that revolution is

just beginning. This gives a disquieting tone to the fact that it

was a 1950s-vintage Soviet SAM netted to an Iraqi-designed,

hybrid communications net using both Western and Soviet

equipment that brought down a US Navy fighter during Desert

Storm.

What does all of this mean to the SEAD planner? First, there

is an absolute physical limit (meaning "set by the laws of

physics)" to what current friendly SEAD weaponry can do.

There is a proliferation of advanced radars on the open market

designed to locate and identify aircraft without the capability

to detect and target such radars. Second, the evolution from

traditional pulsed radars as key nodes of a crude information

net to modern radars reliant upon an elaborate network driven

by digital computers has produced a key LADS vulnerability.

The new location and identification segments of the modern

LADS network, though more resistant to traditional forms of

SEAD and electronic combat, are perhaps more vulnerable

than the older system in a number of ways. First, computer

processors are vulnerable to overloading. For example, one

needs only find a way to force the processor to process the

data it considers information but which is, in fact, something

else. Microchip processors are "bit counters." So long as the

software program that directs the processor to count bits

remains in force, the processor will count until it burns out.

The challenge to the SEAD tactician is to determine how to

trick the software into believing the data bits counted by the

microchip processor constitute "real" data.

Second, almost all computer-driven systems present

synthetic displays. If the computer program does not recognize

the patterns the radar is sending, it will not display them, or it

will display them incorrectly . This provides the SEAD planner

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an opportunity to employ the most effective type of electronic

j amming available: jamming that is undetectable to the enemy.

Third, computer-driven systems have not evolved to the

point where they are hardened to environmental hazards such

as rain, dust, and extreme temperature or humidity changes.

They tend to break down more often than older systems in

inclement conditions and, from a tactical point of view, provide

conditions that are more opportune for attack.

Tracking

Tracking is the single element that computers and modern

networking have aided the most. Electronic tracking in a

modern IADS has eliminated the requirement for scores of

people to move figures around a giant situation table at

command centers and for specially trained personnel to

update ungainly greaseboards to keep the battlefield

commander informed . Modern tracking techniques have also

eliminated middle-level filter centers because there is no

longer the requirement to screen the data coming to the

command center. All data can be transmitted immediately to

the command center as soon as the locating and identification

system has tagged it. Modern tracking techniques not only

provide enemy commanders a real-time, dynamic picture of

the air war, they identify which airplanes are going where and

what air defense weapons systems are available to counter the

attacking aircraft.

Once the enemy LADS has detected, located, and identified

the target, the LADS system must keep track of attacking

aircraft to allocate available air defense weapons to them.

Modern computer technology enables the detection net to

determine if a formerly detected aircraft is the same one

another system sees or a different aircraft. The tracking

system assigns a track number and refreshes the data

periodically, depending on the priority the tracking system has

assigned the target. Higher priority targets have a more

frequent data-refresh rate than those with lower priority. The

enemy IADS' tracking system assesses what air defense

weapons are available to counter attacking aircraft. It may

then select the appropriate type and number of weapons to

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ensure a reasonable probability of kill against the target. The

electronic display of the LADS tracking systems presents this

data to the battlefield commander for a weapons commitment

decision, or, if the air defense net is set to automatic operation,

the tracking system will allocate the appropriate weapons to

kill the tracked target according to its programmed priorities.

Weapons Allocation and Employment

The US aviator is more interested in air defense weapons

allocation and employment in the LADS process than in any

other. This is understandable because the aviator's stake

takes on physical meaning at this stage of the process. This is

where the US aviator meets the enemy LADS face to face: it is

no longer the unseen maze of electronic equipment and

electromagnetic waveforms, it is a personal threat. If the

modern IADS completes a successful transfer of data to

selected air defense weapons, then aviator survivability will be

low. Ironically, it is the unseen portion of the modern IADS

process prior to air defense weapon allocation and

employment that is responsible for the increased lethality of

the modern IADS array. The persistent refinement of data on

the US attacker's air speed, altitude, location, type of aircraft,

and probable target allow the enemy the luxury of time to

determine how to eliminate the attacker. It allows the enemy

LADS to take the initiative by choosing the time and place to

employ weapons.

The modern LADS capacity to allocate and employ its air

defense weapons is related directly to its informationprocessing capability. This makes the unmolested modern

LADS more lethal to the aviator in the weapons employment

phase of the LADS operation because the enemy system has

more time and information available to prepare a kill zone for

the attacker. What makes this situation especially anxious for

the aviator is that there is no way to know if the enemy air

defense weapons engaging the aircraft are the end product of a

fully coordinated process or a blind, last-minute desperation

shot by a frustrated enemy weapons operator.

The weapons the enemy can bring to bear will be well suited

to the information-sharing environment. Table 10 provides a

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brief overview of the type of weapons that the future US

attacker will face. The systems available will cover every niche

of the battlefield. The ranges indicated show the general

environment in which the air defense weapons were designed

to operate-not the system limitations .

Table 10

Traits of Modern TADS Weapons

Long-range systems (50-100 nautical miles)

- Multiple target track/multiple simultaneous launch

- Track via missile (on-board radar) to enhance low-altitude capability at range

- High speed, high maneuverability

- Resistant to jamming countermeasures

- Highly dependent on computers

- Very complex

- Identification friend or foe aproblem

- Very expensive

- Few in number

- Not very mobile

- Usually a strategic system

- Not very vulnerable to antiradiation missiles

- Designed to present ambiguous picture to radar detection equipment

Medium-range systems (10-50 nautical miles)

- Large numbers available

- Large variety from old and unsophisticated to new and very sophisticated

- Most are targetable by antiradiation missiles at standoff ranges beyond lethal

envelope of defense system

- Most are detectable by Western electronic warning equipment

- Most have excellent low-altitude capability (below 500')

- Many are mobile, can be set up in new locations in minutes

- Many have multiple-mode capability to include radar, optical, and infrared

tracking/guidance

- Dependent on radio communication in mobile mode

- Newer models extremely difficult to jam; most, however, vulnerable to jamming

- Reaction time critical to target acquisition for most medium-range systems

- Traditionally allotted to sectors; under new IADS command-and-control

arrangements, can be controlled by central command; weapons-firing doctrine

dependent on training, organization

Short-range systems (0-10 nautical miles)

- Designed primarily for point defense and organic air defense protection of field

armies, navies

- Excellent low-altitude capability

- Almost all radar systems have optical or infrared backup, or both

- Some pure optical-, laser-, and infrared-only systems

- Extremely quick-reacting ; but prior warning alert significantly increases probability of

kill

- Usually late warning to aircrew that they are under attack

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Radardirected systems vulnerable to antiradiation missiles, infrared systems

vulnerable to being decoyed by infrared flares (so long as the intruder is aware of

attack by an infrared system)

- No current countermeasure to optical- or laser-guided systems, other than

maneuvering the aircraft once under attack

- Usually less than 10 seconds from launch to impact in the point-defense mode

- Extremely mobile, difficult to detect

- Autonomous and/or centrally controlled ; more effective in autonomous mode, but will

probably be used in centrally controlled manner because of nature of modern TADS

C3 structure

Fighter-Interceptors

- Modern fire-control systems netted to sophisticated GCI; all-weather/day or night

capability

- Range dependent on warning time

- Accuracy dependent on ground-controlled intercept instructions and onboard

fire-control systems

- Will likely consist of full range of modern fighters (to include F-16s, F-Is, Mirage

2000s, Fulcrums, Flankers, etc.) as well as full array of older aircraft

- Numbers and composition dependent on situation

- Training of aircrews likely to be deficient in comparison to US

- Doctrinal adherence, air discipline uncertain

- Tight GCI control will compensate for deficiencies in training, doctrine, and discipline

The air defense weapons of the future IADS make sense when

viewed from the information-processing perspective . The tech

nological revolution that created separate digital compute:

applications for radars, communications, and weapons system,

has created another more ominous application of the digita

computer. Instead of perfecting separate systems, the revolution

has created a separate technology dedicated to melding th(

separate computer, radar, and data transmission technologies

together. Information technology's aim is building devices tha

tie other systems together so as to exchange data efficiently

This makes the entire IADS process even more fluid an(

dynamic and presents SEAD its biggest challenge since Vietnam

The contrasts between traditional SEAD strategies an(

tactics employed up to Desert Storm and those required t(

defeat the modern IADS are revealing in this regard . Thei

reveal changes in the way we look at the battlefield, th4

timeliness of our responses to changes in the enemy LADS

and even the way we conceive of the LADS target .

First, traditional SEAD strategies and tactics are based on,

division of labor which postulates a clear distinction of SEAI

responsibilities by mission type. In traditional SEAD strategy

the offensive counter air (OCA), defensive counter air (DCA)

close air support (CAS), battlefield air interdiction (BAI), an(

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interdiction missions are supported by SEAD. The distinctions

among these missions is blurring. Both the nature of modern

US equipment and the nature of the modern LADS dictate

multiple uses for the same pieces of equipment. Consequently,

it is no longer clear when an F-15E destroys a SAM site en

route to bombing an enemy airfield whether it has performed

an OCA and a SEAD mission, a SEAD-supported OCA

mission, or a SEAD mission with two targets . However, the

destruction of the SAM site as part of an enemy geographically

oriented information-processing system makes more sense

because it denominates the destruction of the SAM site in

terms of the enemy system as it exists, not as the SEAD

tactician would like to see it .

Virtually every mission described in AFM 1-1, Basic

Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, is growing to

encompass elements of other missions. SEAD is no different ;

as the IADS threat becomes more sophisticated and more

integrated into the enemy's strategic structures, SEAD, as

described in AFM 1-1, has also grown to encompass the

appropriate areas. Therefore, it is not surprising that many

Desert Storm SEAD missions were actually executed as OCA,

DCA, CAS, BAI, interdiction, or strategic missions because

facets of the LADS had grown to influence the total Iraqi

military establishment.

Second, the speed with which the LADS can react, given the

data and available weapons resources, makes most classic

SEAD employment patterns obsolete. Classic SEAD patterns

are geographic in orientation : clear this corridor, suppress this

area, protect this formation to this target. The orientation of

the modern LADS is systemic: the LADS will shift to meet the

threat where it is with the totality of the resources that the

entire system can bring to bear.

Third, old SEAD patterns were threat-system driven, not

IADS-structure driven. The focus was to destroy the enemy's

lethal capacity rather than to suppress the enemy's ability to

bring the lethal capacity to bear. Old SEAD patterns of

employment had the luxury of numbers and capabilities over

very specific target sets. New SEAD patterns-both because of

the nature of the threat and diminished resources-must

concentrate on neutralizing the IADS as a function of

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degrading its overall ability to bring weapons to bear. Destruc

tion of key critical nodes-if they can be located-will no doubt

play a major role in this new pattern, but the primary focus

can no longer be the destruction of LADS' shooters; it must be

the degradation of the LADS information-processing network.

This brings us full circle . The objective of the new SEAD

concept is to stymie information flow, thus paralyzing the

enemy IADS . The site-specific, geographic orientation of

"destroy and jam" classical SEAD strategies and tactics is

neither cost effective nor strategically viable as a primary focus

of SEAD strategy. The focus of JSEAD strategy should be

objective-oriented, not resource-oriented . The irony of JSEAD

is that, since Desert Storm SEAD resources were so

successful, the likelihood of acquiring better weaponry for the

future threat-perceived as diminished-has lessened. The US

military may find itself in the position of fighting a superior air

defense system with relatively inferior weapons. SEAD

objectives may have to be pared down because US SEAD

assets may not have the physical capability vis-a-vis the

enemy's new LADS structure. This does not mean US SEAD

will be powerless, but it does call for a realistic appraisal of

what can and cannot be done to the modern IADS with

weaponry we currently possess and are likely to possess.

Defeating the IADS: Information Denial

Applying what we know about the nature of the modern IADS

threatwhat has changed, how it has evolved-to strategy and

tactics development reveals the modern LADS vulnerabilities

and provides some pertinent insights. Interpreting the modern

LADS process from detection through air defense weapon

employment and applying the strategy of information denial

will set the stage for some innovative tactics.

The evolution of the LADS net has made communication and

information the key elements of its structure. While the

weapons themselves are still very important, the process

linking the net together seems to have supplanted the parts as

the primary mover. This changes the SEAD calculus from one

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of attack on the physical air defense weapon to one of attack

on the information gathering, processing, and transmitting

aspect of the net . The information-denial approach also

provides a different vantage point from which to view the

enemy's air defense structure . Defeating the modern LADS is

more than an attack on the technological base of the system; it

is an attack on the doctrine the technology has forced the

modern LADS users to employ.

Detection as Information

Curiously, SEAD-using Desert Storm as the latest

milestone-seems to have employed the "information-denial"

strategy more as a matter of intuition than forethought. Maj

Gen John Corder, director of operations for Central Command

Air Forces during Desert Storm and commander of the USAF

Tactical Air Warfare Center (responsible for the Tactical Air

Forces' electronic combat equipment and tactics), made the

following return in response to this comment and question,

"Iraqi radar-directed air defenses proved singularly ineffective .

How much of that was attributable to EW [electronic

warfare]?"

Well, if you think electronic combat, not EW, I would say that it all was

. . . because we went out and we did everything. We did SEAD . . . . we

did C3CM and we had our own on-board self-protection EW. We set

about in a very deliberate manner to take that thing apart as the first

order of business, the price of admission. That's what you do. So we

bombed all the operations centers, we jammed everything we could on

the first day. We knew the jamming would be very effective early, but

we knew that you couldn't rely on that for the whole war. So we went

into a very aggressive campaign to beat up on all [the] EW GCI sites we

could find (I'm talking about direct attack). . . . We sent A-10s out the

first day and the A-10s just had a field day on a lot of EW GCI plants,

which were essentially undefended, and just really blew them apart. So

we took away much of the EW GCI that way. Of course Compass Call

[EC-130H] was doing its thing in the command and control business to

keep [those Iraqi assets] under control until we could bomb the

communications facilities and the other stuff that they needed to

communicate with. To me, it was a classic campaign, not really a lot

different from those we practice in a microcosm out at Nellis during

Green Flag.'

General Corder's comments are classic testimony to SEAD's

evolution . Described is tactics-driven strategy at its best. With181
out ever identifying the strategic or doctrinal source, the

statement cements tactics to objectives in a series of clear

observations . First, the distinction between C3CM, SEAD, and

EW was incidental to getting the job done (the objective) .

Second, since the IADS was a connected entity, attacking any

one of these aspects had an effect on the others. Third, the

SEAD plan was a deliberate effort to take apart the IADS in a

sequenced, iterative manner. Fourth, the choice between

disruptive means (jamming, harassment, deception) and

destructive means (antiradiation missiles, standoff ordnance,

direct attack) was based on a logical criterion: what was most

effective at the time and place compared to what was available

to perform the task. Fifth, SEAD was effective early because its

practitioners were prepared through exercises such as Green

Flag. This lends credence to the proposition that today's SEAD

(as part of electronic combat) provides the tactical models that

might be used by other mission areas tomorrow.

The enemy's detection network is critical to kill-zone

preparation time. Denial of the information will not destroy

enemy ability to bring weapons to bear but will buy time . In

some instances, however, this may effectively destroy the

enemy's ability to bring weapons to bear because (1) the time it

takes for the enemy to prepare for battle depends on timely

detection, or (2) the speed with which friendly forces move is

such that the enemy cannot complete preparations for battle

prior to friendly aircraft attacks.

Information denial of the enemy's detection apparatus

carries with it a whole litany of questions . How long is it

necessary to deny the information? Is it more convenient,

permanent, or tactically viable to jam, deceive, or destroy the

asset? In some cases, one might infuse false data directly into

the system (computer warfare) in an effort to confuse,

frustrate, or deceive the enemy. In the case of Desert Storm,

since the war was assessed as "taking some time" to

accomplish, jamming was used as a cover to bomb defended

sites, and A-10s (and other area munitions-carrying aircraft)

were used to destroy undefended sites. The key to the plan

was that the detection net was the first layer to be dealt with

and neutralized.

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Locating and Identifying as Information

Acquisition systems' primary responsibility is to locate and

identify intruders . While they may perform this task fairly

easily for themselves and the fire-control/interceptor systems

they are directly tied to, the matter is greatly complicated

when the data must be processed and transmitted via an

elaborate net. Digital computer technology-while enhancing

the speed and capacity of the acquisition radar-makes

information denial an ideal strategy.

The modern IADS' acquisition systems enhance centralized

command because they make this critical data immediately

available to key decision makers . Modern information

technology significantly shrinks the organizational distance

and time between enemy agencies responsible for locating and

identifying air intruders and key leaders responsible for

making weapons allocation decisions.

The LADS net's ability to locate and identify the actors more

rapidly and transmit the information quickly to the appropriate

key decision makers and weapons systems provides the

combined C3/IADS net considerable flexibility. The enhanced

exchange of location and identification data makes a

distributed decision-making system unnecessary if the enemy

command structure can secure the communication apparatus.

Conversely-because location and identification data flows so

fluidly in the digital computer-enhanced LADS net-the enemy

command structure can exercise centralized command

through several different communication paths and from

different locations. In the process of enhancing command-andcontrol opportunities for enemy IADS decision makers,

however, the enhanced LADS has insinuated key enemy

commanders and political leaders into the US SEAD calculus

because they have become a relevant-perhaps key-part of

the LADS process. The technology of the information-sharing

LADS makes data that was previously difficult for leadership to

obtain immediately accessible, thus making the decision maker

a valid-and vulnerable-target.

The timely availability of location and identification data to

the enemy command structure of the future IADS will tend to

involve enemy leadership more and more in the weapons

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allocation process. This may have the effect of making the

LADS process more reliant on direction "from the top ." A

central "big picture," refreshed by constant new location and

identification data, is much more efficient for allocating

weapons systems. Therefore, the "big picture" has replaced the

limited autonomous capabilities represented by cumbersome

intermediary structures such as filter centers or midlevel

command-and-control facilities that characterized older

analog computer-aided location and identification systems. It

also induces leadership into a more direct command-andcontrol role because the direct links to the total LADS become

more tangible. Therefore, the centralized decision-making

process enabled by the information-sharing IADS has the odd

effect of making the enemy leadership itself a prime SEAD

target, especially for those LADS which are-or may becomedependent on direct command and control from key military

and political leaders.

Location and identification are information-intensive

activities. They are directly related to the capacity of the

systems to process and transmit the data. The radars that

perform these functions are increasingly indistinguishable as

separate detection, location/identification, or tracking radars.

No matter how sophisticated the communications net, the

data itself is vulnerable. No matter what type of radar the IADS

employs, the data it would transmit to the net would be critical

to the efficient operation of the enemy LADS. Denying access to

transmission of the acquisition data through jamming,

deception, or using special forces to physically sever ground

and microwave links or alter the data's characteristics within

the computer net will severely degrade the LADS' overall ability

to conduct air defense.

Information Denial in the "Endgame"

The "endgame" is an appropriate phrase to frame the

culminating events that occur as a result of enemy IADS

tracking, air defense weapon employment, and friendly aircraft

actions to avoid being shot down . No matter what the

outcome, there will be an end result in the process. Denying

information to enemy weapons systems at this point of the

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IADS process, while increasingly difficult, can still be

accomplished. Information denial as a SEAD strategy expands

the opportunities for friendly aircraft survival in the endgame.

Allocation of the enemy weapon system to destroy the

intruder is the final contribution of the enemy decision maker,

assuming the required data reaches the decision maker. Once

the enemy decision maker relays the pertinent data and the

decision to engage to the SAM site, the AAA site, or the

fighter-interceptor base, and the intruder comes into weapons

range, the final engagement sequence ensues.

In a sense, the endgame portion of the LADS process has

changed little since Vietnam. The character of the weapons

themselves may have changed, but the context pitting

individual flyer against individual air defense system remains

the same. Using information denial as the basis of SEAD

strategy, however, opens a broader array of options to the

American aircraft finding itself in this situation.

Information denial in the endgame takes many forms.

Self-protection jammers can deny critical tracking and fusing

data to enemy fire-control radars or projectile fuses. Some

forms of jamming and deception can prevent the launch of a

missile or the firing of some AAA systems. Specific communications jamming can sever the links between fire-control and

command units or confuse the situation until it is too late to

bring air defense weapons to bear. Physical removal of the

radar or critical communication link via antiradiation missile or

bomb is also a form-albeit very direct-of information denial.

The most effective employment of SEAD against the LADS to

ensure a favorable outcome in the endgame, however, is an

integrated attack on all levels of the IADS process simultaneously. A resort to "last-minute" information denial applied

piecemeal against a fully coordinated IADS will-as the

enhanced IADS comes to the fore-increasingly yield

unfavorable results for the US attacker.

The reinforcing effects of information denial applied

simultaneously to the entire LADS information process would

cascade through the IADS and compound its problems

exponentially as it attempted to recover. An unwitting outcome

of the SEAD campaign against the Iraqi IADS during Desert

Storm was the discovery of the truly synergistic effects of

7 Or-
simultaneous attack. Not only were the individual elements of

the Iraqi IADS paralyzed, they were paralyzed in a way which

made system recovery almost impossible because there was no

way for Iraqi LADS decision makers to determine what had

happened to them. In systemic terms, the simultaneous

application of SEAR against all levels of the LADS process

neutralized the Iraqi internal feedback mechanism.

The entire array of the future IADS-from the most remote

early-warning radar to the point-defense AAA weapons used to

defend the command center-will be tied together. By breaking

the links that transmit data, denying the data itself from

detection, deceiving or confusing the enemy, or destroying key

sites as part of a sequential campaign, friendly forces can

overcome the threat. To successfully challenge the future

LADS, friendly JSEAD must likewise be integrated to counter

the rapidly evolving enemy IADS . JSEAD tacticians,

strategists, and key decision makers must define their

objectives in unambiguous terms to which all can agree and in

terms where each objective is translatable into a clear pattern

of action.

Lt Gen Charles Homer's observations on forming "the basis

of what happened during operations Desert Shield and Desert

Storm" serve as an excellent summary. Of the five areas that

formed the basis, two were directly concerned with classic

SEAD. If we include the expanded definition of SEAD used in

this study, then four of the five are included.z The areas

discussed were:

l . "Unity of command and the joint forces air component

commander (JFACC) ." These are a prerequisite for future

JSEAD.

2 . "The significance of strategic strikes at the heart of the

enemy's governmental and command and control structure ."

Under the expanded definition of JSEAD, both the leadership

and C3 structures are valid targets for JSEAD of the future.

3 . "The absolute necessity of suppression of enemy air

defenses." This is a classic acknowledgment of the value of

SEAD. However, as minimum friendly attrition becomes more

and more a political goal of American participation in combat,

the emphasis on SEAD may grow beyond its purely military

contribution.

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4. Increased survivability through timely use of electronic

combat." This is also within the classic realm of SEAD, as

SEAD is part of the Air Force's definition of electronic combat.

5. "A logistic train to meet the needs of fluid and dynamic

deployment and employment." This is not related to SEAD or

JSEAD per se; it is related to waging war in general.

General Homer's observations are all the more remarkable

when compared to the Vietnam, Bekaa Valley, and Libya era

operations . In former wars, battlefield commanders considered

SEAD and electronic combat as subsidiary concerns. As the

LADS has evolved, so has tactical concern. The elements of

combat embodied in JSEAD have become principal concerns.

Just as air deniability posed a poignant challenge to American

air superiority in Vietnam, the digital computer and the

information revolution will pose a challenge to American air

superiority tomorrow.

Current trends indicate that because air power was such an

effective tool in Desert Storm, potential enemies have

redoubled their efforts in reconstituting an even more

formidable LADS. This increases the emphasis we must place

on JSEAD. Success in combat may well depend on the JSEAD

strategist's ability to decode the enemy's information-based

IADs and translate the results into usable tactics.

Adjusting to Fiscal Reality

Economic and political undercurrents pervade the entire

JSEAD strategy and tactics discussion . These undercurrents

represent forces over which the military has increasingly less

influence. They prescribe a contradictory set of "facts of life" that

constrain and enable the growth of JSEAD strategy and tactics.

Of the many facts of life with which the military will have to

deal in the future, three are especially pertinent to JSEAD's

evolution. These three realities are intertwined in such a way

that they cannot be analyzed in isolation.

First, US forces are not likely to acquire the advanced, highly

expensive technology needed to defeat a highly evolved LADS

threat given the current political and economic environment

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no matter how strong a case the SEAD community makes. The

US domestic scene is preoccupied with fiscal constraint, the

first of many negative effects that will impact the military. The

political climate is focused away from the military; even as

Desert Storm was raging, the military budget was being pared

and major "needed" weapons systems were cancelled or

discontinued. USAF Brig Gen William Campbell noted in the

Journal ofElectronic Defense that the

generational advantage [enjoyed in Desert Storm] can quickly

evaporate. If we stand still, others will not only catch up but will pass

us. Just to stay even we must invest in technology to counter the same

high-tech systems that served us so well in the past war. To stay

ahead requires continuous improvements .

Ironically, the need for these investments in our future comes at a time

when the size of the resource pie is shrinking and competition for RDA

[research, development, acquisition] funds is becoming more fierce .

There will clearly be less money to build all of the capabilities we truly

need. As a result, the winners in the competition for dollars will be

those potential solutions that are affordable, are supported by solid

principle-based arguments and are demonstrably needed. 3

Electronic combat weapons that are designed for SEAD are

among the most expensive in the military . They must compete

with all other facets of the military budget, and though money

spent on SEAD systems is probably more cost-effective than

most, equipment to support JSEAD cannot be acquired using

the paradigms that motivated pre-Desert Storm acquisition

strategies . The plain truth is that we must change our

paradigm to adjust to fiscal reality. Countering the modern

IADS threat will require a shift in more than resource

allocation ; it will require a shift in the way we look at the

threat. Second, joint warfare is not just "a smart way" to wage

war against the future IADS: it is the only way. It is fortunate

that individual service doctrines are converging because the

wartime requirement to break the modern LADS will require

both joint resources and joint strategies. Curiously, the

competition for scarce resources among the services should

logically have the effect of crystallizing the identities of each

and pulling their doctrines farther apart. As far as a nascent

JSEAD is concerned, however, this seems not to be the case,

and this will make the transition to functional JSEAD tactics

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much easier. The current acknowledgment of this fact and

positive moves to make JSEAD a reality, will also help shorten

the "learning curve" when US forces are next called to battle .

We can struggle with the issues now or struggle with them later,

but we will struggle with them jointly as it is the only card we

have left to play in successfully battling the future LADS.

Third, while only tangentially related to US JSEAD strategy,

the issue of collective security through coalitions with other

nations will become more and more important to military

power application. The relative share of national power exerted

by the US military will shrink, and its use on the international

scene-without coalition assistance-will suffer some

limitations. The twin forces of a shrinking US military and the

growing sophistication of the rest of the world's military

establishment make it plain that effective application of

JSEAD strategy in the future may require the services of

friendly nations in a coalition strategy.

European SEAD assets played a significant role in the

Desert Storm effort . The United Kingdom's air-launched

antiradiation missile (ALARM), for instance, was employed

more than 100 different times. This missile, while performing

many of the same roles of the HARM, is configured somewhat

differently . It has, for instance, a loiter mode, in which the

system uses a parachute to maximize time over the target area

prior to acquiring, locking on, and tracking to the target

radar. 4 The ALARM's complementary use in overall coalition

SEAD strategy represents an evolutionary step beyond JSEAD .

The development of coalition SEAD strategy will be propelled

by international facts of life-not by US military strategy.

Jointness in this respect may be just the beginning of more

generalized forces galvanized from a coalition arrangement

which may employ the skills associated with the roles each of

the services plays, but little of their organization or doctrine.

The passage from old SEAD to new SEAD, from shooterbased to information-based IADS, and from a certain to less

certain world is fraught with ambiguity and danger. As we

resolve the uncertainties associated with the emerging world,

the paths we should choose toward developing new SEAD

strategies will also become clearer. In sharpening the focus of

the information-denial JSEAD strategy, there is an implicit

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g

While the strategy may become crystal clear, it is

meaningless unless we have created viable tactics with which

to execute it .

SEAR Tactics:

Variations, Combinations, and Innovations

Tactics are tools : old ones are as acceptable as new ones,

providing they can do the job. One changes the tools when the

environment can no longer be altered by the tools one

possesses. In this respect, the adage is only partly true that if

the only tool one possesses is a hammer, then all one's

problems will tend to be seen as nails .

The tactics formulation process is first and foremost an

exercise in pragmatism . A realistic appraisal of the

environment and the setting of achievable objectives is the

first order of business. SEAD planners must determine what

can and cannot be done with the tools at hand. Next, they

must decide how best to meet the objectives with available

tools or acquire tools that will accomplish the task. Each tool

has absolute limits, but using the tools in different

combinations may reveal hidden synergies .

Every conflict since Vietnam has yielded new SEAD tactics

based on this pragmatic process . Compared to the SEAD

strategist, the SEAD tactician defines the war-fighting

environment differently. As part of tactics development

inherent to the process, the SEAD tactician evaluates the

validity of general aerial warfare strategy as outlined by the air

tasking order-not by overall battlefield objectives stated in

more general terms by strategists. Hence, the relationship

between SEAD strategy and SEAD tactics is different than for

many other facets of war fighting. Because SEAD tactics must

respond quickly to the rapidly changing dynamics of the

enemy LADS environment to be successful, SEAD strategy

must ultimately be responsive to SEAD tactics. Ironically, this

tends to make SEAD strategy tactics-driven .

SEAD strategy began as an amalgamation of various tactics

which proved successful in combat or exercises . SEAD

strategists analyzed successful SEAD tactics and drew from

them organizing concepts that bound the tactics together.

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From this analysis, modern SEAD strategies were developed.

This developmental process differs fundamentally from

classic strategy formulation that begins with the big picture

and breaks it down into smaller and smaller components.

The reason SEAD strategy does not follow the "big-to-little"

strategy formulation process is that traditional strategy

formulation does not account for rapid technological change

or the dynamic nature of the battlefield with which SEAD

deals .

Paradoxically, successful SEAD strategy seems to have

stemmed more from its close relationship with successful

SEAD tactics than it has from a relationship with general

military strategy . The contradiction this implies is

staggering . On one hand is the requirement to match

strategy with overall objectives and build tactics to support

the strategy. On the other hand, historical evidence supports

the fact that SEAD tactics traditionally have driven SEAD

strategy. This situation must be resolved by creating SEAD

tactics that can be translated in terms of SEAD strategies

generated by overall objectives. Further, SEAD tactics must

be formulated such that their effects can be measured in

terms of SEAD strategy. Tying the information-based LADS

into an overall military scheme in a meaningful way aids in

resolving this contradiction .

Dwindling SEAD resources and the changing nature of the

LADS threat force a reevaluation of SEAD tactics. Nonetheless,

many tactics used in the past provide a solid foundation for

developing new SEAD tactics with which to challenge the

formidable modern IADS . Other new tactics will be

agglomerations of older proven tactics developed to capitalize

on weaknesses perceived in the evolving LADS. Some SEAD

tactics will be truly new, having evolved from an entirely

different vantage of the military environment. These tactics

will require an array of advanced weapons that the SEAD

community must be able to justify in order to acquire . The

following suggested SEAD tactics are examples of an approach

that seeks to combine elements of SEAD's evolutionary nature,

modifies existing tactics to new circumstances, and introduces

some new tactics based on information-denial strategy.

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Variations : The IADS Sweep

The LADS sweep is a variation of the MiG sweep of Korean

and Vietnam War-era vintage. The primary threat of the MiG

sweep was the enemy interceptor. The MiG sweep is classic

Douhet theory in that the only real threat to the airplane is

another airplane, but it goes beyond that. The MiG sweep

recognized the potency of the enemy air defense structure as a

threat to aerial superiority over the battlefield and in the

pursuit of strategic objectives.

The MiG sweep embodies a sense of timing, place, and

sequencing. Timing must be such that the maximum number

of interceptors would be scrambled, creating a "target-rich"

environment. The air battle must be fought in a place of the

tactician's choosing lest the enemy gain the initiative . Lastly,

the sweep must be sequenced such that the interceptors

engage the MiG sweepers and not the friendly bombers

following closely behind.

SEAD, in a sense, provides a natural bridge between air

superiority doctrine and tactics-driven strategy. Douhet did

not foresee the threat to air superiority stemming from

advanced, integrated ground systems represented by SAMs

and AAA; nor did he foresee the integrated structure that

would tie interceptors, AAA, and SAMs together in a lethal,

coherent network. SEAD is the "other side of the coin," the

answer to the unforeseen challenge to air superiority portrayed

in the modern LADS.

The objective of air superiority supersedes who accomplishes

it or how it is to be accomplished (i .e ., with fighters) . The

objective in air warfare is to reign supreme over the battlefields

and strike at the enemy's strategic center of gravity with

impunity. A precursor to this is neutralizing the enemy's

ability to defend against air attack.

The LADS sweep combines elements of the MiG sweep and

offensive uses of SEAD to achieve air superiority . The sweep

consists of fighters, jamming aircraft, antiradiation missile

shooters, stealth attack aircraft, attack helicopters, unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAVs), long-range artillery (MLRS, A-TACMS,

etc.), and very accurate cruise missiles netted together with a

C3 structure, warning net, and real-time intelligence . One

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might argue that the opening Desert Storm strike was, in reality,

an unwitting IADS sweep. Figure 25 depicts the concept.

Note that the EF-111/EA-6 would be in front of the fighters.

The reasons for this are twofold. First, the placement of the

jammers would project the jamming as far forward as possible

without interfering with other aircraft. Second, the jamming

aircraft would blind enemy fighters while allowing friendly

fighters to detect and track the enemy interceptors. The

modern interceptor threat of the future will likely have

avionics, range, and firepower equivalent to the United States'.

The ability to deny the enemy interceptor absolute radar range

in comparison to friendly fighters would give friendly fighters

the ability to detect, identify, track, and fire on the enemy

before the enemy even realizes where the friendlies were.

Enemy ground controlled intercept radars would be jammed

by the same aircraft that escorted the fighters . The jammers

would obtain protection from the fighters placed immediately

behind in a symbiotic relationship . The use of an LADS sweep

tactic, to use the Army term, would build a designed kill zone

entrapping the enemy fighters.

The jammers would also provide jamming protection against

most of the acquisition radars, thus reducing the enemy's

response time . HARM-firing aircraft (hopefully with

capabilities similar to the F-4G) would target selected sites

along the area or corridor to the general target set. If enemy

radars did not radiate, they would be unable to supply the

appropriate information to the fire-control system. The

combination ofjamming and ARM-firing would create another

symbiotic relationship . The ARM-firing aircraft would be

concealed from the radars by the jamming. This would achieve

two tactical objectives. First, the jamming would be protective .

The second would be that, since the enemy radar operator

cannot detect the presence of an ARM launch, the site would

continue to radiate, greatly enhancing the probability of the

radar's destruction. This site's destruction would remove the

danger the enemy fire-control system posed to the jamming

aircraft and the follow-on friendly attack aircraft. Stealth

aircraft would attack critical known sites of highest priority,

usually command-and-control facilities . Immediately behind

the LADS sweep-before the enemy could recover sufficiently to

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organize the air defense structure-would come the bulk of the

attack force. The difference between the first night of Desert

Storm and the depicted LADS sweep, however, is that the

primary target of the LADS sweep would be the LADS net itself.

Unlike Desert Storm, the LADS sweep would be conducted

sequentially by geographic area. While sequential in reality,

the sweep's timing would appear to the enemy LADS as a

simultaneous attack on all phases of the LADS informationprocessing network. Rollback of the enemy's LADS structure

would be physical as well as psychological. The LADS structure

would be jammed, disrupted, then destroyed piece by piece,

element by element, with mutually reinforcing packages. The

objective would be to wear away at the enemy and illustrate

the enemy's powerlessness to the adversary's leadership . The

knowledge that the enemy's entire country and defense

structure were laid open to unopposed strategic bombardment

with precision guided munitions would be a powerful

inducement to come to terms quickly.

The IADS sweep brings to bear several principles of warfare:

objective, concentration of forces, maneuverability, surprise,

the use of the offensive, and economy of effort. The LADS

sweep would strike at the heart of the enemy's defensive

capability by using an overwhelming concentration of forces

that would move through volumetric space and time to

overcome local LADS defenses. The sweep would use surprise

as a function of deception (EF-111/EA-6 jamming of enemy

interceptor's radar after giving a "free look." The innate ability

of aircraft to move rapidly as a cohesive element illustrates

how an IADS sweep could maneuver rapidly throughout the

enemy's territory as well as throughout the electromagnetic

spectrum.

As an element of force designed to do something to the

enemy, to seize the initiative, and to force enemy compliance

to a prescribed set of behavior, the IADS sweep concept

epitomizes offensive aerial warfare. Finally, by concentrating

forces sequentially through the use of rollback tactics

(reminiscent of the relationship between air power and

sea/land power during the Pacific campaigns of World War II),

we would make the most efficient use of our combat assets.

The type of LADS American forces are likely to deal with in the

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future will possess a formidable array of long-range SAMs-a

situation coalition forces in the Gulf did not face. The

long-range SAM presents special problems for the LADS sweep

and may even make the use of this tactic undesirable . This

dictates the development of special tactics to deal with the

modern long-range SAM.

Combining Old Tactics:

SEAD and the Modern Long-Range SAM

The capabilities of newer long-range SAMs will exceed any

single aircraft's ability to attack the missile with impunity,

including traditional SEAD aircraft. The lethality of these

systems, left unchallenged, is already extremely high and

promises to get worse (depending, of course, on whose side it

is deployed) . If friendly forces encounter a modern long-range

SAM system as part of a critical target set protected by the

LADS, neutralizing it becomes a key task. To make matters

worse, future acquisition systems for the long-range SAM may

also include limited stealth-detecting capabilities.

Modern long-range SAMs have ambiguous radar signatures

that make them difficult to detect or identify; thus, friendly

jammers and fighters may come under attack without knowing

they are being tracked. The modern long-range SAM is likely to

possess a self-contained terminal homing mechanism that will

make it autonomous of its parent radar once the missile has

established lock-on. Its extremely high speed and maneuverability make it almost undetectable to the intended target.

An attack against the new-generation long-range SAM will

require the use of multiple types of aircraft and other assets in

the prosecution of this JSEAD mission. The JSEAD attack

against the long-range SAM must employ a combination of tactics

to include deception, brute-force jamming, antiradiation

missiles, insertion of special forces in nonconventional warfare,

and-as with any tactical operation-precise timing. Figure 26

diagrams the operation against the SAM.

The purpose of the jamming aircraft in suppressing the

long-range SAM differs from the LADS sweep. The jamming in

the SAM attack would be designed to place maximum jamming

on a very small geographic area against very specific radars to

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deny range information to the SAM's acquisition radar. This

would reduce the absolute detection range of the radar on a

specific azimuth, thus enhancing an antiradiation missilecarrying aircraft's ability to fire its missiles without becoming a

target itself by "hiding" in an area of reduced radar range .

Many long-range SAMs have lethal envelopes that could

potentially place the antiradiation missile carrier at risk using

normal stand-off antiradiation missile profiles. The jamming

would be designed to shrink the acquisition/target tracking

radar's detection range along a selected azimuth to allow the

antiradiation missile-carrying aircraft to launch the missile

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undetected. Additionally, since most modern SAMs present their

detection data via a computer-processed imaging technique, it

may be possible to jam the radar without the operator's being

aware of the "hole" in the radar coverage.

Modern SAM acquisition radars generally rely on acquisition

data from sources other than the multiple-mode radar that

characterizes the modern long-range SAM. Even though

modern long-range SAM target-trackers have the capability to

perform both acquisition and tracking functions, the preferred

method is to acquire the information from a related system

designed specifically for that purpose . Therefore, it is

conceivable that specific jamming programs, tactics, and

procedures would be moderately effective against even the

most sophisticated radars. The objective for the jamming

aircraft is to be effective enough in placing the antiradiation

missile carrier in a firing position without jeopardizing either

aircraft.

The jamming aircraft and the antiradiation missile carriers

would be only part of the attack on the long-range SAM. At the

same time that the EF-111 /EA-6 would be preoccupying the

SAM's interest, stealth aircraft would approach the site from

an entirely different azimuth. Timing would be critical to the

success of this ruse. If the stealth aircraft arrived too early, the

SAM radar might not be neutralized by the antiradiation

missile and the stealth aircraft might come under attack itself.

If the stealth aircraft arrived too late, the LADS might have

sufficient time to recover and bring other weapons to bear. The

antiradiation missile in the SAM attack should be in flight

during the time the attack aircraft would be closing on the

target . Detonation of the antiradiation missile's warhead

should occur just prior to the aircraft's arriving at the target.

By timing the attack to coincide-nearly-with the antiradiation missile's arrival, the attackers would take advantage

of the confusion caused by the blast and the sudden removal

of the acquisition/target-tracking radar.

There is no such thing as a perfect plan. This set piece is

not meant as the presentation of a surefire way to kill SAM

systems that outrange, outgun, and outperform US singlesystems' ability to neutralize them. The presentation of the

SAM attack combining old tactics in a new way serves to

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illustrate the synergistic effects that a SEAD team would

achieve-even against a system that is technically superior.

Innovations:

Information Denial via Computer Warfare

Information denial as the basis of SEAD strategy leads to

the creation of an entirely new family of tactics. At the base of

the modern IADS network is the information network

supported by the digital computer. SEAD tacticians, aware of

this fact, could develop tactics that attack the heart of the

LADS structure itself: the digital computers that support the

LADS network.

SEAD tactics developed from following this line of logic take

on an almost science fiction aspect, yet clearly they are

achievable within the bounds of current technology. Direct

attack on the computer network could be conducted by

attacking critical power-generation equipment or fuel supplies

that support the power generation . Since the technologies that

support the LADS network will likely be international in nature

and share a common industrial base, resupply of used or

damaged parts must necessarily come from these same

international sources . It should be fairly easy to gain access to

these sources in the interdependent international computer

industrial infrastructure. By introducing a device with

embedded software containing an undetectable computer

virus, the IADS structure would collapse once the infected

hardware was tied into the IADS network.

Another method of direct attack on the computer network

takes advantage of the nature of modern semiconductor

technology. In order to achieve rapid processing speed, the

wafers making up the semiconductor must be very thin. This

makes them vulnerable to a phenomenon known as electromagnetic pulsing. This phenomenon induces very high levels

of power across the computer's microcircuits, effectively burning

them out. Current technologies are capable of producing

weapons that can focus electromagnetic pulses against

selected enemy computer centers to render them useless.

A more indirect form of attacking the computer could focus

on the microprocessor itself. Certain types ofjamming are known

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to affect microcircuit processing by deceiving the software into

passing false data to other portions of the computer network. By

developing jammers and jamming techniques specifically for

this purpose, a whole range of LADS networking from radar

processing to data transfer could be neutralized.

The intent of suggesting attacks on the LADS computer

network characterizes the type of innovation required to defeat

the modern LADS. The innovative techniques described here

are direct logical outcomes of information-denial strategy

based on a realistic appraisal of the modern IADS's strengths

and weaknesses .

Joint SEAR Strategy: Dividing the Turf

It is not likely-or desirable-that the SEAD functions each

service performs on its own behalf be stripped away in the

name of JSEAD. What is desirable is the identification of the

most likely areas where each service can help the others and

the areas where JSEAD as an overall binding concept will

enhance the war-fighting capability of the entire force .

The AirLand Battle (or airland operations in the parlance of

the AirLand Battle future) and the "land-sea interface" (a term

appearing in several naval publications) provide examples of

how JSEAD concepts can apply. The airland operations

concepts are driven by the idea of the extended, nonlinear,

fluid battlefield that is reachable by long-range Army/Air

Force systems-both defensively and offensively. The area

beyond the fire support coordination line has traditionally

been the responsibility of the Air Force (see fig. 27). However,

the acquisition of new systems has given the Army an

air-delivered power-projection capability that has radically

altered the way the Army perceives the battlefield. Since Army

and Air Force aircraft and long-range missiles will operate in

this fluid area, the boundary line that formerly provided a

relatively clear division of turf is not as distinct . The division of

turf now appears more defined by weapons ranges, lethality,

and the ability to fix an enemy force to create a momentary

combined air/ground kill zone. Creating this kill zone seems

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dependent on bringing as much firepower together as rapidly

as possible to destroy the enemy enclave.

There is irony in the new Air Force and Army concepts of the

battlefield . The new Army concept has strong overtones of

flexibility, speed, range, lethality, and precision-which are Air

Force concepts found in the 1992 AFM 1-1, the Air Force's

primary doctrine document. This Air Force conceptwith respect

to ground operations-has strong overtones of initiative, agility,

synchronization, and depthwhich are found in Field Manual

100-5, Operations, the Army's primary doctrine document.

It is important for the Army to deny the enemy the use of the

air space over the battlefield to protect ground forces. It is

important for the Air Force to destroy the enemy's defensive

capability against air strike so the Air Force can control the air

space over the battlefield . Therefore, it is important to both the

Army and the Air Force to cooperate in the destruction of the

portion of the enemy LADS that affects both on the fluid

battlefield . Figure 27 shows the evolution of the cooperative

measures in SEAD (JSEAD, as defined by the Army) over time

and provides a speculative view of how the turf should be

divided to meet the future threat. Notice that the essential

features that have changed are (1) the range and accuracy of

the weapons, (2) the requirement for precise, timely

intelligence, (3) the priority assigned to SEAD support by the

Army, and (4) who controls the SEAD assets.

The range of the newer Army systems places them in an arena

with which the Air Force has been familiar for at least two

decades. The types of mobile firepower executed essentially

through air power in support of ground operations can benefit

from an understanding of air power strategies, especially

where SEAD is concerned . The Army's air power projection

capability on the nonlinear battlefield depends on how well the

enemy's battlefield air defense is suppressed. Air Force SEAD

concepts, tactics, and strategies seem an excellent starting

point for greater success in combat in these areas .

The requirement for precise, timely intelligence is not limited

to the new airland operations concept, though its effects will

be much greater on the extended battlefield . The paradox of

the "precision-guided war" is that it rests on precise, timely,

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relevant intelligence . The precision

guided munition 

y 

precise as the intelligence concerning the target.

JSEAD's intelligence requirements are especially vulnerable

in the dynamic war against future air defense structures. The

speed with which radars turn on and off, the speed with which

they relocate, the rapidly changing frequencies and waveforms

enemy radars emit, the rapid rerouting of entire communication paths-all require near-real-time (nominally five-minute-old

data) intelligence updates at the very least. While most

attacking aircrafts' intelligence requirements can be met by

near-real-time information, radar jammers and Weasel-like

aircraft will require the data described above on demand.

When they need it, they will need it immediately.

The presumption that Army/Air Force assets will be able to

maintain the initiative and that part of that initiative will be to

drive the battle at a pace the enemy cannot adapt to is driven

directly by knowing what center of gravity to hit next. The

ability to acquire and distribute timely, relevant intelligence

becomes critical to the JSEAD effort in airland operations, no

matter how the turf is divided.

The priority assigned to JSEAD support has gradually

increased as a function of the stake the Army has invested in

air operations. JSEAD appears to have reached a threshold

that forces traditional concepts of fire support to change. As

air power becomes more critical to Army operations, fire

support requests for JSEAD may come to supersede all but

life-threatening, battle-losing propositions .

The airland JSEAD venture is no different than any other

joint venture in one respect: there can be only one

commander. Assets identified for JSEAD must be controlled by

one agency, allocated by one agency, and employed at the

direction of one agency.

The joint forces air component commander currently

controls the EC cell, which is the responsible agency for

JSEAD. The composition of that cell is not the exclusive

province of the Air Force; in fact, as JSEAD matures and the

war-fighting concepts embedded within it become better

understood, its composition and leadership will reflect its

objective-oriented nature irrespective of service. There will be

fewer and fewer turf battles in the airland operations JSEAD

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arena for the simple reason that the turf will be defined by

function and objective more than by geography.

Operations in the "land-sea interface" pose some intriguing

problems. First of all, how far does the air power portion

extend over the land-sea interface? How far inland does the

land-sea interface extend? Who has operational control over

the assets and the battle that rages in the land-sea interface?

The same general questions concerning division of the turf

that plagued airland operations prevail in the land-sea

interface.

Navy EA-6s, A-6s, F-4Gs, EF-Ills, and F/A-18s operating in

the narrow land-sea margins could have a devastating effect

on the enemy's localized ability to detect, locate, identify, or

track any friendly aircraft being projected from the sea. The

360-degree attack from the land and sea against the enemy

coastal IADS would doubtless overload the informationprocessing network and confuse enemy decision makers

preparing for a frontal sea assault. The rapid projection of

helicopter-borne land forces to specific locations to seize key

terrain or destroy certain critical nodes under JSEAD cover

would greatly enhance seaborne power projection ashore.

JSEAD Tactics: So What?

The requirement to match abstract concept to concrete

reality is especially poignant in the SEAD strategy-tactics

debate because so much is at stake . The logic of the debate is

straightforward . If a major portion of US military power

becomes invested in power projection via air power, then

SEAR will take on a proportionately greater meaning. If the

modern IADS emerges as preeminent in the ceaseless struggle

for air superiority over the battlefield, much of the American

military prowess currently enjoyed will be at risk. If US forces

go to war under such conditions, not only will many

Americans die but the United States will have failed to exercise

its national power to achieve desired outcomes . Because so

much is at stake, the roles of SEAR tactician and strategist

take on new meaning in this argument.

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The SEAD tactician, as ultimate pragmatist, lives in a

"black-or-white" world. JSEAD strategic concepts and holistic

paradigms mean nothing if they cannot be translated into

tactics that are tangible at the war- fighting level. If the tactics

that derive from the JSEAD concepts do not pass this

"gut-level" commonsense test, the effort will have been wasted

from the tactician's point of view. The purpose of presenting

the joint scenarios is to show that applying a "unity-of-effort"

concept does make a significant difference in the way we plan

for and fight wars-even at the relatively simplistic levels

presented here. JSEAD strategies and tactics do make a

difference .

The LADS sweep could never be developed using current

paradigms because no one has the authority to mandate it,

nor is there a battle-staff planning function capable of

managing it . The attack against the modern long-range SAM

with the weapons we will likely possess could not be

accomplished without the assets of all the services. The turf

wars of the past do not make sense in the long view.

The SEAD strategies and tactics described in this chapter

are possible only under true joint war-fighting constructs

where each of the services has pooled its resources for the

common objective of neutralizing the enemy IADS . The

strategies and tactics presented are not mission/role-driven ;

they are objective-driven . There is no quibbling over who does

OCA or interdiction, SEAD or C3CM, AirLand Battle or land-sea

interface. The objective is to neutralize the enemy IADS with

the resources at hand, to win one war with one commander,

one chain of command, and one plan.

Notes

1 . Hal Gershanoff, "EC in the Gulf War: An Exclusive JED Interview with

the Director of Air Operations for Desert Storm [Maj Gen John Corder,

USAF]," Journal ofElectronic Defense, May 1991, 44.

2. Lt Gen Charles A. Homer, USAF, "The Air Campaign," Military Review,

September 1991, 17-27.

3. Brig Gen William H. Campbell, USAF, "Electronic Defense on the

Modern Battlefield," Journal ofElectronic Defense, October 1991, 43.

4. Martin Streetly, "HARM and ALARM in the Gulf," Jane's Defence

Weekly, 30 March 1991, 500-501 .

205

p

Where to Next:

Conclusions and Recommendations

JSEAD, because it is increasingly becoming a leading edge

of military power application in all services, represents a

prescriptive model for the future. SEAD planners can hold the

paradigms and strategies that are evolving in JSEAD up to

other mission areas that are struggling with the transition

from single-service applied doctrine to joint applications. One

might be able to glean today from JSEAD what the shape of

future war-fighting doctrine and strategy will look like five to

10 years from now.

As advanced as it is in some respects, JSEAD still falls short

as a "true" joint war-fighting capability . Nonetheless, it is

closer to this goal than many other joint endeavors . There are

three principal reasons for this. First, technology has tended

to impact electronic combat (and hence SEAD) before it affects

many other war-fighting skills . Second, SEAD has tended to be

a war-only thought construct; there have been virtually no

peacetime or deterrence roles implied in its use. Third, air

power is rapidly becoming the primary power-projection

weapon of all services, not just the Air Force. JSEAD, as the

key enabler of air power projection, would logically be the first

of the war-fighting concepts to become more fully developed.

Conclusions

The suppression of enemy air defenses is the result of a

logical evolutionary process whose engine continues to be

technology. As technology has accelerated, so has SEAD . The

nonlinear and asymmetric application of technology across the

varied elements of war fighting has given SEAD an

evolutionary boost when compared to many other elements of

war fighting. Therefore, SEAD tactics and equipment may be

207
y 

g

reflect the same level of evolutionary development. The

asymmetric growth of JSEAD may pose some integration

problems in its future application. Its mode of operation may

not coincide with the role given it by strategic and tactical

concepts that belong to previous iterations .

SEAD as an Evolutionary Concept

SEAD has evolved from a purely defensive concept to one

that encompasses a more offensive outlook. By analogy, SEAD

has evolved from protecting a two-ship fleet of F-4s in

Vietnam, as a primary role, to destroying the fabric of an entire

Iraqi nation's ability to defend itself from air attack in Desert

Storm. From single-ship "bombs on SAM-site" technology and

tactics, SEAR now encompasses sophisticated jamming and

antiradiation missiles that disrupt and destroy the SAM and

its associated connections to the LADS without ever entering

the air defense system's lethal envelope . It has evolved from

single-site, one-on-one concepts of operation to integrated force

application involving hundreds of aircraft, cruise missiles,

helicopters, and artillery systems attacking an entire LADS.

Requirement for a Paradigm Shift

Threats to US interests clearly exist, but using the paradigms

of the cold war to counter them has limited relevance. The

international community's transition from "what it was" to

"what it is going to be" provides an opportunity for creating a

proactive, capability-based paradigm that encompassed mobility,

flexibility, and cooperative peacetime military measures to

ensure stability in areas of the world that threatened the peace.

The new paradigm needs to reflect the realities of the emerging

world order. First, trends indicate that military power as an

element of national power-any nation's power-will continue

to diminish compared to its historic role . National power has

been supplanted by economic and regional considerations.

Second, as an instrument of national power, military power

must have precisely defined objectives that are clearly

translatable to military action. While military power as a whole

208
p

national relations, when it is used, it will be absolutely critical.

Third, the availability of very sophisticated weaponry and

integrated air defense structures to virtually any nation will

have a leveling effect among potential adversaries as time goes

on. The relative ability to coerce by threat of overwhelming

force or technical capability-either as an aspect of deterrence

or pressure-will diminish.

JSEAD, as the evolutionary successor to single-service SEAD,

can provide a transitional model for proactive, capability-based

war-fighting strategy and tactics. Because JSEAD has evolved

from a reactive to a proactive strategy, its outlook is more

suited to the uncertain threat environment of the future . JSEAD

is flexible and mobile and can be tailored rapidly to meet the

changing needs of the battlefield. There are many "tools" in the

JSEAD inventory-both hardware and concepts that can be

rapidly reroled, recombined, and retasked to perform their

missions.

JSEAD is not just the integrated application of multiservice

SEAD assets and concepts . The political and economic

realities of the US domestic scene will probably diminish each

of the armed forces' individual capability to project power

below what it requires to accomplish its traditional, individual

worldwide responsibilities . This will require more than a "smart

way" to integrate assets; it will require some new strategic

constructs that are couched in more relevant paradigms. Table

11 compares the old paradigm to the emerging new one.

Table 11

Comparison of Old to New SEAD Paradigm

OLD SEAD NEWSEAD

- Employed as collection of individual - Pooled resources; single binding concept

service assets

- Resource rich - Resource constrained

- Weapons driven - Tactics driven

- Employment by geographic target - Employment by functional set

- Iterative, sequential, geography oriented - Nonlinear, nonsequential, objective

oriented

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The Lead/Lag Issue:

Joint Doctrine and JSEAD

JSEAD can do more for the joint force commander than

current doctrine allows because it is more technically and conceptually capable than current joint doctrine. The synergies

created in Desert Storm by simultaneous jamming, launching

of HARMs at specific and area targets, special operations

applications against specific sites, MiG sweeps, and fighter

protection zones formed the core of proto-JSEAD operations

and literally paralyzed the Iraqi IADS/C3 net. An extension

of SEAD concepts-mostly Air Force SEAD concepts-into the

four-dimensional shaping of the battlefield has profound

implications for overall joint doctrine. JSEAD is growing faster

than the doctrine that supports it, and the gap between the

two is growing.

JSEAD concepts are moving rapidly away from defining

objectives in terms of places or things. The evolving objectives

of JSEAD are systemic. These objectives use a framework of

time and three-dimensional maneuver across the entire

battlefield. Sequential attack, while often desirable, is not a

requirement. Depending on the particular case and the war

objective set by the battlefield commander, JSEAD concepts

may mandate tactics that fly in the face of convention.

The key is to recognize that JSEAD concepts follow holistic and

radical approaches to strategy and tactics problems encountered

on the battlefield . Both JSEAD practitioners and battle

management staff must adjust their mind-sets accordingly.

Shifting the Focus of Criteria: Overall Objectives

The criteria by which SEAD is adjudged effective need to be

changed, as do the ways SEAD effectiveness is measured. The

engineering approaches to SEAD and the application of

mathematical models no longer make sense when assessing

the overall effectiveness of SEAD because SEAD is evolving

faster than the means to assess it . JSEAD concepts have

evolved to holistic concepts with specific application across a

broad spectrum. The criteria that have measured SEAD's

effectiveness have been denominated in numbers-numbers

210
that indicate how many aircraft were saved or the p

y

of kill against a specific site. A criterion is needed that can

measure SEAD's ability to degrade the total capability of the

enemy to defend against an attack. Current approaches to

criteria formulation and measurements of effectiveness cannot

provide an insight into the best way to combine SEAD assets

to achieve the maximum benefit of JSEAD, nor can they

assess force-on-force effects that utilize different types of

aircraft, special forces, artillery, helicopters, or munitions in

different combinations against different aspects of the IADS.

The current criteria do not assess the impacts of timing of

SEAD application (e .g., sequential waves; random waves of

moderate size ; simultaneous, mass attacks with relatively

large gaps of time in between; etc.) .

An assessment of effectiveness demands a comparison of

some sort, and the measure of effectiveness must be

denominated in some understandable and preferably concrete

way. SEAD effects have never been easy to measure in any

concrete way. Acomparison of a control set (without benefit of

SEAD) to a variable set (with SEAD) is not a precise measure.

Unfortunately, future criteria will probably require the

addition of more subjective and interpretive measures to the

empirical methods now employed. In short, the criteria need to

be focused on relating overall objectives at every stage of the

strategy-to-tactics continuum and using measures of

effectiveness that can answer the statesmen's questions as

well as the tactics practitioners' .

- Recommendations

As technologically based and complex as JSEAD will

become, it still serves the interests of winning wars. This

means it must be demystified. The value of JSEAD is lost if it

cannot be understood by the decision maker.

Education

Battlefield commanders need to know more about JSEAD.

The best way to accomplish this is through exercises that force

211
the electronic combat cell of the planning staff to spell out

what they can and cannot do for the commander. This would

expose the EC cell to the overall priorities and strategic

decisions the battlefield commander faces .

The key, not surprisingly, is to increase the opportunities of

information exchange and to exercise the system that

coordinates JSEAD efforts. Increasing the numbers of

exercises that include JSEAD as an integral part of their

scenarios is clearly indicated .

The electronic combat community must educate battlefield

commanders and their staffs on the utility of JSEAD in

unambiguous language . This will require aggressive and

positive action. The creation of a series of relevant briefings

that could be shown worldwide on JSEAD capabilities would

be helpful to tacticians and planners at the very highest levels .

There is a spinoff effect that enhances the tactical thought

processes of the entire community in such exchanges .

Training

JSEAD will require extensive cross-service training and

knowledge. Currently, training is restricted to specific unit

exposure . The wars of the future will demand a more thorough

ability to work together immediately. It took six months to

prepare the "multiple service applied SEAD" observed during

Desert Storm. The six-month preparation time was a luxury

not likely to be repeated.

When exercises such as Green Flag are offered, joint

commands should require a mixture of JSEAD forces and

staffs to work together. This will force the use of joint doctrine

and require aircrews and staffs to build a joint plan rather

than four separate plans dictated by current tasking

procedures. This means, for instance, that Air Force SEAD

assets will work with Army, Navy, and Marine SEAD assets to

build a joint plan aimed at providing the best defense for

friendly air assets while at the same time destroying the

enemy's defensive capability-as part of a component exercise.

JSEAD should be part of all services' exercises in the future.

If it is critical to battle success, then it is worth doing right the

first time and worth allocating the resources to do it . The

212
pyy yy

Storm, is worth it.

The move towards a multiple-role force structure has

enormous implications on training. Most units will be required

to perform multiple missions that call for additional training.

The addition of a JSEAD-motivated training load demands

simplicity and efficiency. The capability-based solution has

already been applied to PACAF's F-16 SEAD assets with full

knowledge that the HARM-firing system can provide greater

capability than aircrews train for. To use that capability,

however, would have required training at unsupportable

levels . Therefore, PACAF made the decision to balance limited

SEAD capability against training time for other missions and

roles.

Likewise, JSEAD technology application must simplify the

training process, not add to it . Any addition to most frontline

fighting units' current training calendars will result in

diminished overall readiness if new systems require an

extensive amount of time to learn and use.

Equipment

There are several categories under the recommendations for

equipment, and these are all tied to technology. The

technology base itself tops the list, but it is-as a result of

rapidly changing realities-difficult to distinguish where

general technology research and development ends and

military research and development begins. It is also difficult to

distinguish between the sophisticated industrial base which

supports SEAD technologies and the equipment the industrial

base produces.

Three areas of SEAD technology are critically important. First

is guaranteeing the health of the sophisticated technology base

that supports the advanced research needed for the future .

Second, the SEAD community needs to evaluate the long-range

requirements of new SEAD equipment with respect to the

information-based LADS. Third, the SEAR community needs to

establish clear guidelines on requirements for maintaining what

it already has for the short term. The SEAD community must

develop plans for exploiting current technologies to their

213
extent before undertaking the 

p

into new technological vistas.

Protecting the SEAD Technology Base. The technological

base is under threat of extinction because there is no clear

and present danger to justify its existence . The old paradigm

that related a specific weapon system to a specific threat as

justification for the weapon's procurement died and left

nothing in its place. Clearly, the sophisticated informationbased IADS of the future constitutes a threat-even if SEAD

strategists are unable to identify who the threat is. This poses

significant difficulties for the SEAR community. While it

appears to be true that US SEAD forces will continue to

maintain a sufficient edge over the sophisticated threat, these

SEAR forces will not have the overwhelming technological

superiority witnessed in Desert Storm . The only way to

guarantee an overwhelming technological edge is to invest in

technologies that exploit principal weaknesses of the potential

enemy's LADS. The information-based LADS provides the focus

for advanced SEAR weapons development.

Procuring Advanced SEAD Equipment. The key to

electromagnetic radiation propogation and electronic

equipment operation is electrical power. To jam future IADS

radars or computer networks that link the LADS structure

together will require new power-generation equipment capable

of producing much more power than is currently available .

This will enable the creation of a new family of SEAD weapons

that can physically damage radar and computer microcircuit

components from great ranges-including space-with

extremely high levels of focused electromagnetic radiation. The

Army, Navy, and Marines could develop high-power microwave

weapons for ships and ground vehicles and extend firing range

by mounting them on telescoping masts to extend their

line-of-sight range.

Computer warfare offers a whole new vista of technology

development. Software programs could be developed to be

inserted via hardware substitution, or perhaps new

electromagnetic radiation technologies might be created to

imprint programs on critical enemy LADS information net

components from a distance .

214
g 

pgy 

to potential enemies mandates newer radar detection

equipment for US forces . This will include some ground and

shipborne SEAD forces as well. As the enemy LADS expands to

target weapons designed to neutralize it, these physical

components of US JSEAD strategy will be exposed to enemy

tracking radars of great complexity . US aircraft and

SEAD-specific ground and shipborne units must have

adequate warning to defend themselves.

Current radar-warning equipment is designed primarily to

detect Soviet-designed radars and will have limited capability

against the hybrid advanced IADS . It is likely that new

technologies and radical engineering approaches will be

needed to develop these systems . This will, unfortunately,

necessitate long lead times and great expense.

New technologies guaranteeing that US forces maintain the

overwhelming edge in future combat will not be cheap. If the

new technologies are required to achieve air superiority over

future battlefields, then the SEAD community must develop

sufficient arguments to convince acquisition and procurement

agencies.

New Acquisitions Using Current Technology. Current

on-board capability of US aircraft to detect, locate, and identify

enemy IADS equipment and bring weapons to bear has

considerable room for growth . The technology to accomplish

the tasks of locating most enemy emitters is still relatively

inexpensive and is accessible over the short term (three to

seven years) . Because the general threat has diminished, we

have some time to deliberate on how much and what type to

acquire-as well as how much to spend.

For the Air Force, retaining the F-4G is a requirement until

sufficient capability is built up in the F-16/F-15E fleet to

accomplish this much-needed task. Without the Wild Weasel

capability represented by the F-4G, friendly attacking aircraft

would be severely limited in their ability to detect and destroy

an emitter whose location was unknown.

For JSEAD in the long term, it means defining services-wide

requirements to develop a means of disrupting and/or

destroying pertinent components of the enemy LADS emitting

array. For reasons imposed by fiscal constraint, JSEAD

215
yp

gy

The advent of digital computer technology and high-speed

electronic buses for aircraft gives US aircraft a flexibility hitherto

undreamed of, and there is no reason why a good Navy idea

cannot also become a good Air Force or Army idea.

As force levels shrink, the equipment we currently possess

must become multiroled. Multicapable aircraft, admittedly, is

not the most efficient for specific roles. But we no longer have

the luxury of designating specific systems for specific roles .

The acquisition of easy and ready-to-use systems would

reduce the preparation time for combat. Systems of this type

are easier to store and maintain, have greater reliability, and,

because they are ready to use sooner, provide the tactician

with a greater range of options. The canisterized Army multiple

rocket launch system and the Patriot missile are examples of

this type of packaging. Future Air Force weapons systems

could benefit from this type of packaging, especially advanced

antiradiation missiles and air-launched (or ground-launched)

radar harassment drones.

Under joint auspices, the SEAD community should pursue

efforts to acquire a common radar harassment drone. The

requirement for an electronic harassment system such as the

defunct Tacit Rainbow still exists even though this particular

system has fallen from favor. The synergistic effects of using

both ARMs and harassment weapons on the battlefield would

be devastating to the enemy IADS and would give the US war

planner tremendous flexibility in choosing weapons and

tactics.

Current technologies offer significant capabilities in relaying

pertinent data on the dynamic modern battlefield to US

combat aircraft . The SEAD community needs to pursue

off-board sensing systems that can relay data to combat

aircraft in near real time. There are technical and pragmatic

problems with the approach, but for aircraft which do not need

"on-demand" data and are not in a position to be jammed by

enemy countermeasures, the concept is solid .

Current technology can also be galvanized to produce a

much-needed precision location system . A system was

designed to perform this function (the precision location strike

system) and was cancelled after it failed to meet specifications

216
in the early 1980s, but the 

q

y

that can precisely locate a hostile emitter or site. A precision

location system takes on new meaning in the age of precision

guided munitions. If we are to reap the benefits of precision

guided weaponry for SEAD as well as general targeting

purposes, a system such as this is well worth acquiring .

Current technology also allows the SEAD community to

provide more aircraft with an ARM-firing capability. In light of

the Navy experience with their ARM-firing EA-6 radarjamming

aircraft in Desert Storm, the Air Force decision not to provide

the EF-111 an ARM-firing capability (made in the late 1970s)

deserves another look. Considering the SEAD role played by

Army and Air Force helicopters during Desert Storm, JSEAD

strategists might also want to consider the possibility of

ARMing a select number of attack helicopters .

Organization. JSEAD structures will be limited by human

resources and equipment. There will be less and less of both.

The mandate to create structures where each service has

access to the other's SEAD apparatus is clearly indicated . This

applies to common equipment, battle-management procedures,

tactics, and basic knowledge. Current organizational structures

propagate procedures that are cumbersome, fraught with

parochialism, and needlessly time-consuming . Speed is part of

flexibility, and organizational inertia of this sort has an

absolute limiting influence on JSEAD's ability to respond

meaningfully in conflict.

Three adjustments should alleviate some of these shortfalls.

First, the EC cell, which works for the JFACC on joint staffs,

should be composed of members of all services by aircraft

type, weapon type, and organization type. This may sound like

an enormous staff, but it is actually quite small compared to

the way all of the services currently organize themselves to

conduct SEAD operations. The proposed EC cell/JSEAD staff

structure appears in figure 28.

Second, there should be considerably more interservice

exchanges in the area of JSEAD and electronic combat. As

F-4G expertise disappears from the Air Force, an exchange of

SEAD tactics and strategy concepts will become criticalespecially for the Air Force. As we move toward a more

capability-based US armed force structure, emphasis on

217
tactics and specific weapons application against an enemy

LADS will also become more important. The Air Force expertise

for destructive, lethal SEAD resides with the Wild Weasel

community. It is uncertain whether the corporate memory of

other strategic and tactical communities could compensate for

its loss . Therefore, the separate SEAD communities of each of

the services need to pool their knowledge and expertise so that

the tactical expertise gained over almost 30 years of using the

Wild Weasel is not lost.

To this end, the individual services should authorize an

increased number of JSEAD-based exchange tours, and the

JCS should authorize those officers selected to be given

JFACC

INTELLIGENCE -------

EC CELL

CHIEF (2)

JSEAD CCM EW

(1) (1) ECM ECCM ESM (t)

NAVY LMAR ARMY AF NAVY MAR ARMY AF NAVY MAR ARMY

1 (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) (3) (4)

Abbreviations/Acronym Key

C3CM -Command, control, communications, and countermeasures

EC - Electronic combat

ECCM -Electronic counter-countermeasures

ECM-Electronic countermeasures

ESM - Electronic support measures

Ew-Electronicwarfare

JFACC-Jointforce air component commander

SOF- Specialoperations force

-JSEAD/CCM functions sometimes similar enough that same

people can perform both functions; other times need

separate staff .

-Individual functions manned by trained personnel, can be as

many as 36 or as few as four. Ideal number in 8-12 range.

-Manning depends on situation, complexity of force structure,

threat/IADS.

-Parentheses indicate prospective manning of full staff.

Figure 28. The JFACC's JSEAD organization .

218
j

j

JSEAD and provide needed incentive in the electronic

combat/SEAD-related career profiles.

Third, a JSEAD branch should be established at the joint

staff J-3/J-2 level. This critical element is not currently

addressed as a specific organizational function, and it ought to

be . Sufficient expertise exists, but it is scattered and

disorganized. It was fortuitous that the Air Force already had a

proto-JSEAD staff in its EC cell during Desert Storm,

otherwise those functions may never have been performed .

We cannot count indefinitely on American ingenuity and the

apparent ability of the American warrior to create very effective

ad hoc mechanisms when we need them. There is no reason

why such an important function cannot be codified and

institutionalized in a coherent manner.

Full Circle:

The Strategy-Doctrine-Tactics Continuum

The overall direction of foreign policy is diffuse and

wavering. There is no substantial guidance . The period of

transition brought on by the demise of the Soviet Union

presents an unparalleled opportunity for creating cohesive

JSEAD strategies and tactics . The elements that belong to the

natural evolutionary processes imbedded in SEAR make it

ideal as a vehicle to enhance the change from single-service

applied concepts to a true joint application of military power.

For the first time in a long while, service doctrines are

converging. The realities of dwindling resources have forced us

to review the basic questions : What are the legitimate

functions of the military in an uncertain world? What are the

limits of military power? How can the military-and

SEAD-contribute more meaningfully? Do our methods and

actions support the overall objectives of the system we are

sworn to serve? For the brief while that the world may give us,

now is the time to reflect on our purposes and the time to

create visions of the future-a future we have a golden

opportunity to influence, to build, and to protect.

219

Advanced self-protection jammer (ASPJ) program: 59-61, 63,

66

Aircraft (type)

A-10: 58, 78

B-52 : 9

C-141 : 37

E-2C : 104

EA-6: 8, 27-28, 30-32, 41, 56, 81, 85, 95, 104, 160, 204

EB-66 : 8, 56

EC-130: 40, 95, 104

EF-111: 27-28, 30-32, 40-41, 56, 67-69, 81, 85, 95,

104, 160, 204

F-4: 5-6, 8-9, 27, 30-31, 67-69, 81, 95-96, 104, 107-8,

160,204

F-15: 36, 41, 67, 107

F-16: 36, 78, 107

F-100: 5

F- 105G: 6-7

F-117: 41, 108

F/A-18: 32, 58, 78, 81, 107, 160, 204

Air deniability: 4-8, 109, 135

AirLand Battle: 42, 112, 115, 118, 200. See also Doctrine

AirLand Battle-future (ALBF) : 98, 113, 116, 118

Air power: 4-5, 37, 85-86, 89, 97-98, 100, 105, 109, 111,

113, 124, 131, 134-35, 142, 146, 162, 187, 202

Air Superiority : 6-7, 10-11, 23, 41, 109-10, 115, 131,

134-35, 147, 187, 192

Antiaircraft artillery (AAA) : 5-6, 10, 17, 20, 28-29, 79

ARM. See Missiles : antiradiation

Begin, Menachem: 18

Bekaa Valley campaign: 16-23

Benghazi raid: 26, 32, 96-97

Burke, Kelly H. : 16

Carrier Group Two: 97

Command, control, and communications (C3) : 17, 38, 41,

78-79

Command, control, and communication countermeasures

(C3CM) : 11, 42, 102-3, 118

221
Creech, Wilbur: 112

Critical node analysis: 39, 132

Cybernetic process analysis : 54, 78-80, 82-83, 137-40 . See

also Deutsch, Karl

Desert Storm. See Operations

Deutsch, Karl: 54, 75-77

Doctrine: 6-7, 11, 30, 32-33, 38, 100-101, 109

joint: 139-40

Drones

Israeli

Samson: 21

Scout: 18

United States

Tacit Rainbow: 18, 66

Dugan, Michael: 93, 135

Exercises

Cope Thunder: 40, 98

Green Flag: 40, 98

Evolutionary continuums . See Measurement

Future threat: 132-35, 147

intensity of conflict: 152-56

Gemayel, Bashir: 18

Green Flag. See Exercise

Ground controlled interception (GCI) : 8-9, 20, 22

HARM (high-speed antiradiation missile) . See Missiles:

AGM-88

Hussein, Saddam: 36

Information denial: 91, 165, 167-69, 180-85, 199-200

Integrated air defense system (IADS) : 66-67, 156, 164

Bekaa Valley: 17, 20, 22-23, 42

information-based: 167-70

Iraqi: 37-38, 41-42, 78-79, 130, 155, 167

Libyan: 26-29

North Vietnamese: 5, 7-9, 16, 67

Soviet : 8, 26, 155

222
technology-based: 164-65

Intelligence gathering. SeeTechnology

Iran-Iraq conflict: 36, 78

Israeli Defense Force: 16, 18, 22

Joint

definition: 141-42

doctrine: 139-40

Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC): 38

forces air component commander (JFACC) : 108, 125, 203

objectives: 160-205

Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces: 142

SEAD: 129-56, 160-205

Korea, doctrine: 7

Libya raid: 25-32, 96-97

Measurement

defensive/offensive: 80-81, 86-88, 97, 109, 115, 124,

134-35, 150

evolutionary process models: 55-79

need-based/resource-based : 83-85, 107, 115-16, 124,

144-48,162

piecemeal/integrated: 80-82, 88, 96-97, 109, 114-15,

124, 149

threat-based/capability-based: 85-86, 88, 105-6, 108-9,

117-18, 124, 147-49, 162

Military Airlift Command (MAC): 37

Missiles

AGM-45: 7

AGM-78: 6-7

AGM-88: 18, 26-27, 30-32, 59, 78

antiradiation : 5, 20, 22, 53, 85-86

SA-2: 5-6, 9, 16-17, 20-21, 38

surface-to-air : 5, 8, 10, 20, 22, 27-29, 55, 67, 78-79,

196-98

TLAM-C: 96

Multiple rocket launch system (MRLS): 41, 104, 112

National command authorities (NCA) : 4, 142, 155

North Vietnam: 4-5

223
Desert Shield/Storm (Iraq/Kuwait) : 28, 36-37, 40, 42,

56-58, 72, 78-79, 81, 84, 87, 89-90, 96-97, 111, 116,

125, 130, 136-37, 146, 160

El Dorado Canyon (Libya): 96

Just Cause (Panama) : 134

Linebacker I and II (Vietnam) : 8-11

Rolling Thunder (Vietnam) : 4, 6

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF): 37, 40

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) : 18

Persian GulfWar: 35-42

Power-projection: 3, 30-31, 87, 97-98, 104-5, 144, 146, 152,

162,200

Qaddafi, Muammar: 25

Radar: 28, 37-38, 170-75

electromagnetic means: 5, 8, 10-11, 21-22

jamming: 22, 27, 29-32, 35

Remotely piloted vehicle (RPV): 21-22. See also Drones

SAMs. See Missiles: surface-to-air

SEAD

Air Force : 29-31, 98-110, 144-46, 148-49

Army: 111-18, 144, 146, 148-49

and budget: 188-89

definitions: 5, 7, 23

evolutionary trends in: 45-46

and JSEAD: 10, 42, 58, 70, 75, 77, 81, 86, 88, 105,

111-12, 114, 116, 124,129-56, 159-205

Marine Corps: 119-24, 144, 148-49

military doctrine: 90, 144

multiple-level application of. 110

Navy: 29-32, 94-98, 144, 146, 148-49

objectives : 6-7, 28, 79, 82-85, 87, 90, 114, 132

tactics : 4-7, 27, 35, 90, 96, 114, 162, 190-98

threat : 5-6, 72, 83, 85, 99, 103, 129-56

total-force application of 40-42

Sharon, Ariel: 18

Shrike . See Missiles: AGM-45

Standard ARM. See Missiles: AGM-78

Strategic Air Command (SAC) : 9, 37

224
190-91

JSEAD: 129-56

Syrian Army: 18

Tactical

Air Command (TAC) : 35, 37, 40

Air Force (TAF): 9

Air Warfare Center (TAWC) : 40, 60

applications : 6-8, 19-21

cure: 6

deception: 19-20

suppression: 78-79

Tactics: 6-9, 11, 22-23, 96-97

hunter-killer: 8

Iron Hand: 51, 55

Technology: 5, 26, 52, 71, 74, 77, 87, 99, 144, 147, 207-17

electronic combat (EC): 8-11, 17-18, 26-28, 38-41, 52,

65, 68, 74, 89, 98, 102-3, 105, 118, 134, 139, 142,

145-46

information processing: 170-80

intelligence gathering: 21, 26, 38-39

Tomahawk land attack missile-conventional. See Missiles:

TLAM-C

United Nations: 37

United States

Air Force: 5-6, 26, 30-31, 40, 68, 78, 98-110, 124,

144-46,148-50

Air Force Europe (USAFE): 37, 40

Army: 41, 98, 103, 111-18, 124, 144, 146, 148-50

Congress : 37

Marine Corps: 5, 37, 78, 119-24, 144, 148-50

Mediterranean Fleet: 26

Navy: 5, 21, 27, 30-32, 37, 41, 78, 94-98, 124, 144, 146,

148-50

Unity of effort: 159-205

Vietnam War: 4-13, 27

225