United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

September 1996 BATTLEFIELD

AUTOMATION

Army Land Warrior

Program Acquisition

Strategy May Be Too

Ambitious

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-190

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-272314 

September 11, 1996

Congressional Committees

In November 1995, we reported to the Congress on the Army’s efforts to

automate a number of battlefield functions through creation of a vast

network of computers, sensors, and communications systems that would

provide a common, simultaneous picture of the battlefield from soldier to

commander.1

 More recently, we examined the Army’s Land Warrior soldier

system, estimated to cost in excess of $1.4 billion, and its role in the

“digital” battlefield.

The objectives for this report were to (1) determine the status of various

technology and human factor problems associated with system

development, (2) evaluate the acquisition strategy for the Land Warrior

system, and (3) assess plans to integrate the system with the digital

battlefield. We conducted this review under our basic legislative

responsibilities and are addressing it to you because the matters discussed

in this report fall within your committees’ jurisdiction.

Background The Army developed the Land Warrior program to improve the lethality,

mobility, survivability, command and control, and sustainability of infantry

soldiers on the battlefield through the integration of a variety of

components and technologies. Under the Land Warrior program, the Army

is developing a computer/radio, software, integrated headgear (including

an imaging display), weapon subsystem, and protective clothing and

equipment to be integrated on the individual soldier (see fig. 1). When

developed, this equipment is expected to allow soldiers to interface

electronically with other battlefield systems. The Army also plans to

include a number of additional technologies later that are intended to

further enhance the soldier’s battlefield performance.

1

Battlefield Automation: Army’s Digital Battlefield Plan Lacks Specific Measurable Goals

(GAO/NSIAD-96-25, Nov. 29, 1995).

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Figure 1: The Land Warrior System

Source: Soldier Systems Command, Project Manager—Soldier.

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B-272314 

Land Warrior, which is currently in engineering and manufacturing

development, evolved from the Soldier Integrated Protective Ensemble

(SIPE) Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD). SIPE was the Army’s

first attempt at demonstrating the concept of the soldier as a system.

According to the Army, SIPE successfully demonstrated the feasibility of

the soldier system concept.

The Army originally planned to demonstrate advanced capabilities in

another system known as Generation II Soldier System (GEN II). The GEN II

system technologies would have been incorporated as block or component

upgrades to Land Warrior, which was considered an interim system.

In November 1995, a Defense Appropriations conference report criticized

the Army’s plans to acquire what appeared to be two competing systems;

the conference report directed the Army to submit a revised acquisition

strategy by March 1, 1996, and to accelerate development of the GEN II

program. On March 1, 1996, the Army submitted a revised acquisition plan.

However, the plan terminated GEN II as a separate program merging it into

Land Warrior as a supporting science and technology component.

Results in Brief Land Warrior is in development, but the program faces a number of

technical and human factor problems—including some discovered during

the SIPE demonstration—that have yet to be adequately addressed.

Although the Army regarded SIPE as successful, for many test conditions,

the SIPE-equipped soldiers failed to outperform soldiers using standard

equipment. Moreover, the Army has not yet demonstrated that it has

overcome this deficiency. Further, the Army may not have fully developed

prototypes to test until Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E),

currently scheduled for August/September 1998. The impact of lingering

development problems could affect the system’s ability to meet critical

performance requirements. In addition, the Army has compressed the

schedule by planning overlapping development and operational testing.

This could lead to further compromises.

The Army has changed its acquisition strategy to permit more rapid

production and deployment. However, according to Army officials, they

are still determining which soldiers should receive Land Warrior

equipment, and what equipment complement each soldier should carry.

Depending on the outcome of such decisions, program procurement could

exceed $l.4 billion. Moreover, the program is not receiving the appropriate

management attention because it is incorrectly classified.

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Because Land Warrior prototypes have not been available when the Army

has tested other components of the digital battlefield, the Army has not

demonstrated that Land Warrior can successfully operate in this

environment. Thus, there is no assurance that Land Warrior will perform

as intended. Further, the Army plans to begin fielding Land Warrior

systems before other hardware and software components of the digital

battlefield have been proven. According to Army officials, work is in

progress to synchronize the fielding of Land Warrior with other digital

battlefield elements.

Technology and

Human Factors

Problems Are Yet to

Be Solved

The Army intends to commit to significant Land Warrior production before

addressing certain technical and manpower and personnel integration

(MANPRINT) problems first identified during SIPE and Land Warrior

development. Although the Land Warrior program is scheduled to

continue in development for over 2 more years (December 1998) and there

is still time to work on solutions, there are some problems that will not be

resolved until after production begins.

The Land Warrior program, which evolved from SIPE, has not

demonstrated that it has resolved the problem of SIPE-equipped soldiers

not performing as well as standard-equipped soldiers, particularly in

daylight. For example, the helmet assembly was so heavy and unbalanced

that soldiers were typically unable to lift their heads and fire from a prone

position. Land Warrior also inherited other SIPE problems involving target

recognition, hit performance, navigation, health and safety, and other

factors. Moreover, the Army does not plan to address other problems such

as the need for micro-climate cooling, further weight reductions in the

helmet and helmet mounted display, and laser rangefinder, and enhanced

hearing technology2

 until well after production approval for Land Warrior.

Land Warrior components will be tested before production approval, but

the overall system will not be measured against standard-equipped

soldiers, as was SIPE. The system will be evaluated against requirements

and critical operational criteria outlined in the operational requirements

document (ORD). This approach, however, does not require the same

“head-to-head” evaluation that SIPE underwent—that is, comparing the

performance of SIPE-equipped soldiers with that of soldiers using standard

equipment to see which showed greater capability under a variety of

conditions.

2

Enhanced hearing technology enables the soldier to overhear enemy conversations and detect

movement at longer ranges than permitted by natural hearing.

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MANPRINT issues disclosed during SIPE and later during Land Warrior

development have not yet been resolved, partly because of the

development status of the program. These issues include cognitive and

physical soldier overload, adverse psychological effects on the soldier,

electromagnetic signature emission of the equipment, cumbersome

equipment configuration, and other health and safety issues. In April 1996,

a MANPRINT risk reduction exercise indicated that although soldiers liked

the Land Warrior concept, there were problems with system complexity,

government-furnished equipment (GFE) integration, and component

interface. For instance, the location of the thermal weapon sight, the laser

rangefinder, and close combat optics interfered with certain firing

positions. Overall, according to the report, the full complement of Land

Warrior equipment was rated very bulky and cumbersome.

Because of development problems, the Army could easily fail to meet its

interim goal of having 70 percent capable prototypes available for early

operational experimentation (EOE), scheduled for November 1996.

Accordingly, production-ready prototypes would not be available for

testing until IOT&E, which is just prior to the planned production decision.

For example, the Modular Weapon System, which is comprised of

mounting rails for sensor attachments, grips, and carrying handles, may

not be available for EOE. According to Army officials, this key component

of the Land Warrior weapon subsystem recently failed operational testing.

The impact is that a surrogate arrangement will be used and Land Warrior

sensors will not be tested on their production-configured mounting rails.

The risk of not being able to resolve critical technical problems is

increased because of Land Warrior’s compressed testing schedule.

Although Land Warrior production approval is not scheduled until

January 1999, a 6-month bid protest delay in the start of engineering and

manufacturing development caused the Army to overlap development

testing and operational testing at the end of the development phase. In

overlapping development and operational testing, the Army is risking that

remaining developmental problems will not be resolved until after

production begins.

Land Warrior development has identified other problems that must be

resolved prior to production. For example, according to a Land Warrior

program official, it is unclear whether the Single Channel Ground and

Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)3

 can handle high-volume compressed

3

The SINCGARS radio is the backbone of the Army’s tactical internet and serves as the

communications link, or “gateway,” between the warrior in the field and higher command levels.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-190 Battlefield Automation
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data transmission. Another critical function—weapon boresighting and

zeroing—had been taking days to complete because of all the sensors that

are mounted on the weapon (for example, the thermal weapon sight, laser

rangefinder, laser aiming light, and image intensifier). Each sensor must be

boresighted (aligned) with the weapon and then the weapon must be

“zeroed” for shot accuracy. The proliferation of sensors on the weapon

greatly complicates the process. Under battlefield conditions, boresighting

and zeroing have to be accomplished very quickly. According to Army

officials, the time required for boresighting has recently been reduced to

minutes.

Land Warrior Is a High

Risk and Costly

Acquisition Strategy

The Army estimates total procurement cost for Land Warrior to be 

$1.4 billion—exclusive of the cost of GFE—which easily exceeds the

threshold for a major system acquisition category (ACAT) II requiring

greater oversight.4

 However, the Army currently regards Land Warrior as

an ACAT III program, thus, of less significance than an ACAT II program.

Therefore, Land Warrior is not receiving the management attention that it

would were it correctly classified as an ACAT II acquisition.

Although correct program classification does not ensure appropriate

management attention, it does provide the framework for more intensive

oversight and monitoring. The Army requires a higher level milestone

decision authority and milestone review forum for ACAT II programs. For

example, the milestone decision authority for an ACAT II program would

change from the Program Element Office equivalent within Army Material

Command to the Army Acquisition Executive.

Land Warrior is a high risk program because the production quantities,

system configuration, and testing approach have not been adequately

defined. According to the ORD, the Army intends to equip the entire

contingency corps, consisting of certain high-priority Army divisions, with

Land Warrior systems. As of May 1996, the Army had not determined its

Land Warrior acquisition objective:5

 that is, how many systems will be

needed for each unit equipped, including support units; which soldiers

should receive them; and what equipment each soldier should carry.

4

Part I of the Acquisition Management Process Regulations requires that programs for which total

production cost exceeds $645 million in constant fiscal year 1996 dollars be classified as ACAT II, or

major systems, and receive greater oversight and monitoring.

5

During the report commenting period, the Army developed a draft of its acquisition objective.

According to Army officials, preliminary estimates now being considered are for 34,000 Land Warrior

systems at a cost of $1.4 billion.

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According to the Army, it wants to get whatever improved capabilities it

can into soldiers’ hands as soon as possible. Therefore, plans are to have

Land Warrior proceed into production with the technologies that are

mature at the time of the production decision. Further, the Army planned

to produce and field 4,800 soldier systems, at a cost of about $300 million

before the more advanced technologies are expected to become available

through the GEN II science and technology effort. Subsequent Land Warrior

systems would begin to reflect GEN II technologies, and the first 4,800

systems would be retrofitted through a preplanned product improvement.

Army officials commenting on a draft of this report told us that

$300 million was just a funding “buy-in” sufficient to equip perhaps one

division.

Ability to Function

With Other

Components of the

Digital Battlefield Has

Yet to Be

Demonstrated

To demonstrate successful digital battlefield integration prior to fielding,

Land Warrior was to participate in ongoing advanced warfighting

experiments. However, the Army does not plan to test whether the Land

Warrior can successfully communicate through SINCGARS to the rest of the

digital battlefield until after the production decision.

The ongoing advanced warfighting experiments, which test digital

battlefield integration, have not had Land Warrior prototypes available for

testing, as had been planned. In the Warrior Focus advanced warfighting

experiment in November 1995, for example, Land Warrior participated

only as an “observer.” Because of the Land Warrior development schedule

and the unavailability of prototypes, the Army procured less capable

substitute soldier systems for the experiments. According to program

officials, the Army has used various hybrid systems for its experiments.

The Army plans to begin fielding Land Warrior systems before other

hardware and software components of the digital battlefield have been

proven. However, according to Army officials, they are trying to

synchronize the fielding of Land Warrior and “applique”—applications—

software.6

 Although Land Warrior may have some stand-alone value, it will

not be fully utilized until other soldier system digital technologies have

matured and are ready for insertion.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of the Army defer or restrict the

purchase of Land Warrior systems until the Army (1) determines the Army

6

“Applique” is the name in general use for what is formally known as the Force XXI Battle Command

Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System. It consists basically of a laptop computer, FBCB2 applications

software, a Global Positioning System receiver, and a communications interface.

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acquisition objective, (2) resolves critical technical and human factor

problems, (3) demonstrates successful digital battlefield integration with

prototype systems, and (4) ensures that Land Warrior-equipped soldiers

will outperform standard-equipped soldiers in head-to-head testing.

Because the cost to equip the contingency corps could exceed $1.4 billion,

we also recommend that the Secretary ensure that Land Warrior receive

the monitoring and oversight appropriate for an ACAT II major weapons

system.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense (DOD)

concurred with our recommendations. According to DOD, action is now

being taken to determine user requirements—the Army acquisition

objective and action is now underway to reclassify the Land Warrior

program as an ACAT II, which requires a higher level of oversight and

management attention. DOD’s position is that the Land Warrior program

will develop a system that meets performance requirements, to include

human engineering and safety issues, before a production decision is

made. DOD added that performance will be tested and evaluated according

to requirements in DOD regulations.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix I, along with

our evaluation.

Scope and

Methodology

We interviewed cognizant officials and examined pertinent documents

related to Army policies and procedures concerning the Land Warrior

program and its predecessor, the SIPE ATD. Additionally, we reviewed

documents related to the GEN II and 21st Century Land Warrior initiatives.

Materials examined included Land Warrior and SIPE test and evaluation

reports that discussed various technical and MANPRINT issues and rated

overall performance; program office and contractor reports and briefing

summaries discussing program progress of Land Warrior and GEN II, and

budget and user requirements documents.

We examined pertinent documents and interviewed officials closely

affiliated with the Army’s acquisition strategy as it existed before and after

the November 1995 Defense Appropriations conference report directing

the Army to submit a revised acquisition strategy by March 1, 1996, and

accelerate development of the GEN II program. Finally, we reviewed plans

and interviewed program officials to compare the timing of the Land

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Warrior acquisition with other elements of the digital battlefield with

which it must interface.

Locations visited included the Soldier Systems Command, and the Natick

Research and Development Center, Natick, Massachusetts; Project

Manager-Soldier, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Department of the Army, Secretary

for Research, Development, and Acquisition, Arlington, Virginia; and U.S.

Infantry Center’s Combat Development Directorate, Dismounted Battle

Space Battle Laboratory, including the Land Warrior Modeling and

Simulation Center, and the Training and Doctrine Command Systems

Manager—Soldier, Fort Benning, Georgia. In addition, we met with various

Land Warrior contractor officials at a technical conference in Orlando,

Florida.

Our review was conducted from August 1995 to August 1996 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to other appropriate congressional

committees; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the

Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the

Commandant of the Marine Corps. Copies will also be made available to

others upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Thomas J. Schulz,

Associate Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues. Please contact me at

(202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this

report. The major contributors to this report were Charles F. Rey,

Arthur S. Fine, Robert J. Dziekiewicz, and John M. Ficociello.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-190 Battlefield Automation
B-272314 

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Sam Nunn

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

Unites States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

Unites States Senate

The Honorable Floyd Spence

Chairman

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-190 Battlefield Automation
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-96-190 Battlefield Automation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-190 Battlefield Automation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-190 Battlefield Automation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-190 Battlefield Automation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-190 Battlefield Automation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-190 Battlefield Automation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-190 Battlefield Automation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated August 14, 1996.

GAO Comments 1. Suggested technical changes have been incorporated in the text of the

final report.

2. The congressional concerns expressed in the conference report also

dealt with which system architecture—Generation II Soldier System 

(GEN II) or Land Warrior—would be chosen as the Army’s future soldier

system. The conference report called for GEN II to be continued as the

objective system, with Land Warrior providing interim support. The

Army’s revised strategy made Land Warrior the primary system and

relegated GEN II to the science and technology component of the Land

Warrior program.

We recognize that efforts will be made to reduce engineering and technical

problems over the remaining 2 years before engineering and

manufacturing development is to be completed. However, our purpose

was to point out that solving all the engineering and technical problems in

the relatively short time established to field the Land Warrior system

presents significant challenges. This, coupled with the many, not yet

developed technology insertions planned for Land Warrior under GEN II

creates such elevated risks that close scrutiny is appropriate. To date,

most of Land Warrior’s presumed ability has been based on the results of

Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATD), computer modeling, and

experiments using surrogate or other hybrid equipment configurations.

This approach may be sufficient to predict the feasibility of a system but

cannot be relied upon to gauge the extent to which Land Warrior will

improve existing soldier capabilities. We believe that a strong focus on

prototyping and testing before a production decision is made is essential

to ensure program success and determine the worth of the Land Warrior

system.

3. Report text has been changed.

4. Although the Army is attempting to address a number of problems, we

point out that not all the technology and human factor problems

associated with the Army’s integrated soldier system are reflected in the

Land Warrior Organizational Requirements Document. These include such

problems as cognitive and physical overload, heavy and cumbersome

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-190 Battlefield Automation
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

equipment configuration, and other health and safety issues. These issues

may well transcend the Land Warrior acquisition.

5. While it may be true that the Army has no current requirement to solve

some of these problems, they are problems nonetheless. It is precisely the

significant technological challenge they impose that dictated their

postponement. For example, the microclimate cooling system, which was

part of the GEN II system architecture, was deferred because of power

requirements plus weight and cost considerations.

6. We recognize that DOD is trying to address the Soldier Integrated

Protective Ensemble (SIPE) problems, to the extent possible during Land

Warrior development. Nevertheless, both sets of problems—those that are

part of the current Land Warrior effort and those that are being

deferred—must be resolved at some point. For example, during SIPE,

helmet weight and balance resulted in soldiers experiencing difficulty

lifting their heads to fire from the prone position. DOD plans to resolve this

problem during Land Warrior development. However, enhanced hearing,

still considered an important technology component, was deferred until

after production because the device interfered with the soldier’s ability to

move quietly and avoid detection.

7. Although the Test and Evaluation Master Plan makes reference to the

use of comparative testing under certain limited conditions, much of the

required testing would use standardized test results and not require the

same “head-to-head” testing that SIPE equipment experienced.

8. DOD indicates that Land Warrior is required to demonstrate compatibility

with Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) at

battalion level and below. However, Land Warrior must communicate with

higher command levels as well. The ability of Land Warrior to successfully

demonstrate interoperability through SINCGARS has been limited by two

factors—(1) advanced warfighting experiments to date have been at

battalion level or below and (2) only hybrid or substitute equipment has

been used in these experiments because of the unavailabilty of Land

Warrior prototype components.

(707116) Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-190 Battlefield Automation
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