Are We Cleaning Up? 10 Superfund Case

Studies

June 1988

NTIS order #PB89-139018
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Are We Cleaning Up? 10 Superfund Case Studies–Specia] Report, OTA-ITE-362 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, June 1988).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 88-600545

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form can be found in the back of this report)
Foreword

In a few years, Superfund became part of the American vocabulary because

so many people feel so strongly about toxic waste. and cleanup of contaminated

sites. They remain worried about environmental and health effects, but a new concern has come to the fore: the enormous amount of money and the long times to

clean up an ever-growing list of Superfund sites. Yet, even while the public demands effective cleanups, nearly everyone speaking and writing about Superfund

seems to feel that serious problems exist. And the focus of public attention has

shifted from how much money ought to go to Superfund to how to achieve environmental results and efficiency. Right now there are more questions than answers

about diagnosing and f!xing Superfund.

Four committees of Congress asked the Office of Technology Assessment to

assess how Superfund is being implemented under the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act. They asked OTA to examine a number of technical

issues that arise near the beginning of the complex Superfund process. The study

was to assess the impacts of statutory provisions and program policies on environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. The requesting committees were:

the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation and its Investigation

and Oversight Subcommittee; the House Energy and Commerce Committee and

its Oversight and Investigations, and Transportation, Tourism, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittees; the Subcommittee on Superfund and Environmental Oversight of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee; and the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources of the House Government

Operations Committee.

During our Superfund Implementation assessment we realized that we could

learn much by finding out how sites progress through the Superfund program and

how—and when—critical decisions about their cleanup are being made. Before we

could answer tough but general questions about making Superfund work better,

we had to know more about what was actually going on. This special report presents

10 case studies of recent Superfund decisions at sites which OTA believes, from

surveying over 100 recent cleanup decisions, to be representative of a broad range

of contamination problems and cleanup technologies. We hope that everyone affected by Superfund can learn as much as we have from these case studies.

Many people have helped OTA with these case studies, especially Environmental

Protection Agency staff around the country who provided us with primary information about the sites. Several companies that are responsible parties at sites also

provided key documents. Responsibility for the contents of this document, of course,

rests with OTA,

 JOHN H. GIBBONS

Director

. . .

Ill
Superfund Implementation Advisory Panel

David Marks, Panel Chairman

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Kirk Brown Robert G. Kisse]]

Texas A&M University E.I. du Pent de Nemours & Co., Inc.

Richard Brownell Steve Lester

Malcolm Pirnie, Inc. Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous

William Child Waste

Illinois Environmental Protection &encv William Librizzi “

Henry Cole

Clean Water Action and National

Campaign Against Toxic Hazards

E. William Colglazier

Waste Management Institute

University of Tennessee

William B, DeVille

Louisiana Department of Environmental

Quality

Deborah Hankins

General Electric Corp.

Bob Harris

ENVIRON Corp.

William N. Hedeman

Beveridge & Diamond, P.C.

New Jersey Dqpt. of Environmental

Protection

George Muhlebach

Ciba-Geigy Corp.

Robert N. Ogg

CH2M Hill

Robert B. Pojasek

ChemCycle Corp.

Frank J. Veale, Jr.

Texas Instruments,

James N. Welsh

Thermal Kinetics

Inc.

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory

panel members. The panel does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA

assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents,

iv
OTA Project Staff–Are We Cleaning Up: 10 Superfund Case Studies

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA

Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Audrey B. Buyrn, Manager

Industry, Technology, and Employment Program

Joel S. Hirschhorn, Project Director

Kirsten U. Oldenburg, Deputy Project Director

David A. Dorau, Analyst

Karen L. Jordan, Research Assistant

Lynn M. Powers, Editor

Administrative Staff

Edna M. Thompson, Administrative Assistant

Diane D. White, Administrative Secretary

v
Page

Summary and Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Importance of the Record of Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . z

The Usefulness of Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Superfund’s Better Side. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Summary of Trends From 10Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

IO Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Format for Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Case Study l: Chemical Control Corp., Elizabeth, NJ; EPA Region 2 . . . . . . . . . 18

Case Study 2: Compass Industries, Tulsa County, Oklahoma; EPA Region 6 . . 25

Case Study S: Conservation Chemical Company, Kansas City, Missouri,

EPA Region 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Case Study 4: Crystal City Airport, Crystal City, Texas, EPA Region 6 ......, 34

Case Study5: Industrial Excess Landfill Uniontown, Ohio, EPA Region 5 . . . 41

Case Study6: Pristine, Incv Reading, Ohio, EPA Region5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Case Study7: Renora, Inc; Edison Township, New Jersey, EPA Region 2... . 55

Case Study 8:Sand Springs, Petrochemical Complex, Tulsa County,

Oklahoma, EPA Region6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Case Study 9: Schmalz Dump Site, Harrison, Wisconsin, EPA Region 5...... 66

Case Study 10: Tacoma Tar Pits, Tacoma, Washington, EPA Region 10.. . . . . 71

Boxes

Box Page

l. How Does Superfund Operate? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. 10)Case Study Sites With Capsule Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Table

Table Page

l. Times for Sites To Reach Points in the Superfund Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

Are we cleaning up the mess or messing up

the cleanup? In the eighth year of Superfund,

this central question is still being asked. These

10 case studies illustrate how the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) is implementing the

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization

Act (SARA) of 1986. OTA has examined a great

many more sites and believes these case studies

are representative of what is happening nationwide in the Superfund program.

This report examines two fundamental questions about using technology to cleanup toxic

waste sites. First, is the Superfund program

consistently selecting permanently effective

treatment technologies which, according to

SARA, are preferable because they reduce “toxicity, mobility, or volume” of hazardous wastes?

The answer OTA finds is that it is not.

Second, are land disposal and containment,

both impermanent technologies, still being frequently used? The answer we find is yes. Future cleanups are likely for the wastes left in

the ground or shipped to landfills.

The Superfund program promised a lot. People’s expectations have been high, perhaps too

high for such a new, complicated, large-scale

effort. Frustration often makes it difficult to see

real Superfund accomplishments. Since its inception at the end of 1980, Superfund has received a great deal of money, over $5 billion

so far, to clean up the Nation’s worst toxic waste

sites. But OTA’S research, analysis, and case

studies support the view shared by most observers—including people in affected communities and people in industry paying for cleanups

—that Superfund remains largely ineffective

and inefficient. Technical evidence confirms

that, all too frequently, Superfund is not working environmentally the way the law directs it

to. This finding challenges all those concerned

about human health and the environment to discover what is wrong and fix it. Whether Superfund will work cost-effectively over the long

term depends on how cleanup technologies are

evaluated, matched to cleanup goals, selected,

and implemented and how permanent the cleanups will be. People want their cleanups—the

ones they live near or pay for—to last. Improving public confidence in Superfund can be approached from different directions, including

the one taken in this report: making better decisions about cleanup technology.

Too much flexibility and lack of central management control are working against an effective, efficient Superfund program. EPA Regions,

contractor companies, and workers have substantial autonomy. In principle, flexibility can

lead to benefits. But the case studies show the

Superfund program as a loose assembly of disparate working parts; it is a system of divided

responsibilities and dispersed operations. There

is no assurance of consistently high quality

studies, decisions, and field work or of active

information transfer. The need for cleanups,

the newness of the technological challenge, and

the growth of Superfund mask the inexperience

and mobility of the work force. Program managers have not offset inexperience in technical

areas and management with tight management

controls and intensive educational programs

for government and contractor workers. Oversimplified “bean counting” of results instead

of evaluations of what those results mean technically and what they accomplish environmentally provides too little incentive for quality work. The current decentralized system also

does not assure higher levels of program efficiency over time, even though some workers

and offices may become much more effective

and efficient.

A widespread belief among Superfund workers is that “every site is unique.” There is a kernel of truth to this belief. Yet uniqueness has

been carried to an extreme and has blocked understanding of common site characteristics,

1
I . common cleanup problems, common solutions,

and common experiences with site studies and

decisions. Identifying these commonalities is

necessary to understanding how Superfund is

being implemented nationally and understanding how to improve the program. At the beginning, when only a few cleanups were addressed,

sites looked very different from each other.

Now, with hundreds of cleanups examined, it

is easier to see the commonalities and to benefit from the experiences to date. The case studies

discuss similar experiences at various Superfund sites and help illustrate the link between

identifying commonalities and achieving consistent cleanups.

Cleanup costs are major issues in the case

studies. In site cleanup decisions, many people in government and industry want to keep

costs as low as possible. Hence, there is a

tradeoff between environmental protection

goals (How clean is clean?) and the cost of the

remedy selected (Is it cost-effective?). There is

also a tradeoff between effective cleanup at

some sites versus no action at others. These

tradeoffs are getting more difficult as more and

more sites requiring cleanup are identified.

SARA’s preference for permanently effective

treatment technologies—not a requirement that

they always be used—makes these tradeoffs

even harder; it also places more importance on

the accuracy of cost estimates and on evaluations of the permanency of different cleanup

technologies. By understanding the capabilities

of different cleanup technologies, it is easier

to understand how compromises between cost

and environmental performance can lead either to “gold plated” or “band-aid” cleanups.

The Importance of the Record of Decision

A crucial step in the complex process of moving a site from discovery to remediation (see

box 1) is the ROD’s technology selection.1

Cleanup technology determines whether conIEpA hag said ‘gThe Record of Decision ., , is the centerpiece

of the administrative record against which the Agency’s decisionmaking maybe judged by the courts.” [U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, “Interim Guidance on Superfund Selection

of Remedy,” Dec. 24, 1986.]

lamination will be eliminated or reduced to a

safe level and environmental protection achieved,

as well as determining cleanup cost. Technology selection is the primary focus of this OTA

report. But the ROD decision is not everything.

Just as a map is not the territory, a ROD is not

the cleanup. Future analysis of the environmental results of cleanups is necessary to see

how the ROD strategic plan is implemented.

Because cleanups have been fully implemented

at so few sites and the data are so sparse, this

study does not fully examine actual cleanup effectiveness and consistency with ROD goals.

But the case studies examine the entire history

of the sites. And for some of the sites discussed

here, the technologies selected have failed or

early work to clean up immediate threats has

made matters worse for final cleanup.

By examining RODS in detail, the functioning of Superfund comes into focus because

everything that was done before the ROD must

be considered and everything to come later

must be anticipated. Analysis of RODS offers

enormous educational value to improve Superfund implementation because they represent

the critical junction between extensive studies

and expensive remedial cleanups. Cleanup

costs vary widely, from several hundred thousand dollars to tens of millions of dollars. To

put cleanup costs in perspective, consider the

simple concept of acreage. Data on 15 of the

cleanups reviewed in this study indicate that

total cleanup costs can reach $500,000 to $1

million per acre,

The Usefulness of Case Studies

In Superfund, case studies are particularly

important because, even after 8 years, cleanup

technology is a new and fast-changing field and

the work force is relatively young and inexperienced. Recent college graduates are often put in

charge of multimillion-dollar projects at EPA.

These people have had no direct experience and

no coursework on cleanup, and they have almost

no one to learn from, as turnover is high. People

in contractor firms also lack experience. Research

papers and technical manuals have significant

limitations too. They are quickly outdated, are
3

Box 1.-How Does Superfund Operate?

The Superfund system is complex. Sites are identified and enter an inventory because they may

require a cleanup. At this point, or at any time, a site may receive a Removal Action because of emergency conditions that require fast action or because the site could get a lot worse before a remedial

cleanup could be implemented. (Most of SARA’s requirements for remedial cleanups do not apply

to removal actions, even though removal actions can cost several million dollars and resemble a cleanup.)

In the pre-remedial process, sites receive a Preliminary Assessment (PA); some then go forward to

a Site Inspection (S1), with some of those sites scored by the Hazard Ranking System (HRS). If the

score is high enough, the site is placed on the National Priorities List (NPL) and becomes eligible

for a remedial cleanup paid for by the government, if necessary, or by responsible parties identified

as having contributed to creating the uncontrolled toxic waste site. Under current procedures, only

about 10 percent of sites which enter the system are likely to be placed on the NPL. Some States

have their own lists of sites which require cleanup; these often contain sites not on the NPL.

NPL sites receive a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RIFS) to define contamination

and environmental problems and to evaluate cleanup alternatives. The public is given an opportunity

to comment on the RIFS and EPA’s preferred cleanup alternative. Then, EPA issues a Record of Decision (ROD) which says what remedy the government has chosen and the reasons for doing so; the

decision may be that no cleanup is necessary. A ROD may only deal with part of a site’s cleanup

and several RODS may be necessary for a site. The ROD also contains a summary of EPA’s responses

to public comments. EPA chooses the cleanup goals and technology in the ROD. In actual fact a number of actions involving different technologies are likely to be chosen for any but the simplest sites.

The ROD is like a contract in which the government makes a commitment to actions which will render the site safe. If responsible parties agree to clean up the site, they sign a negotiated consent decree

with the government; this stipulates the exact details of how the responsible parties will proceed.

If the cleanup uses Superfund money, the State must agree to pay 10 percent of the cleanup cost.

In the post-ROD process, the site receives a Remedial Design (RD) study to provide details on

how the chosen remedy will be engineered and constructed. The whole process ends with the Remedia]Action (RA), the actual implementation of the selected remedy. Many cleanups include long-term

monitoring to determine whether the cleanup is effective and if more cleanup is necessary. A ROD

may be reopened and amended because of new information discovered or difficulties encountered

during the design and remedial action. When a cleanup is deemed complete and effective, the site

can be delisted by EPA from the NPL.

too theoretical, assume substantial technical grants. These grants have not been available, howknowledge, are either too detailed or too general, ever; EPA only began accepting applications in

and may be biased to boot. Attending conferences April 1988.

where new cleanup technologies are discussed

in detail is difficult because of heavy workloads

and limited funds. Moreover, helping to inform

the public is also critical, especially because

SARA increases the participation of communities in the program through technical assistance

The case studies examine the decisionmakingprocess, the quality of the information used

in it, and how well the decision and its technical support are communicated by EPA to the

public. Unlike “bean counting” statistics, which

give quantitative program results for a large

number of sites, case studies show how the

2For example, at EPA’s annual research SYmPOShm in MaY complex Superfund system really functions and

1988 dealing-with treatment of hazardous waste only nine EPA illustrate the quality-of its environmental perstaff people who may be implementing Superfund (i.e., not in formance. Case studies cannot totally describe the Office of Research and Development) were registered out

of a total of over 700 people. the extensive site studies (the RIFSS) which pre-
4

cede the ROD. Nor can they go behind the

scenes to investigate all the reasons for decisions. But the ROD and its supporting RIFS are

intended to stand alone in making the government’s case for the selected remedy and are the

primary information sources in the 10 case

studies.

This report does not aim to prove whether

a technology is good or bad, or whether a decision is unequivocally right or wrong. Cleaning

up toxic waste sites is fraught with technical

uncertainties and surprises which cannot be

eliminated entirely. The issue of quality of

RODS is not a black or white situations Each

one will have good and bad points. Any cleanup

technology can be used effectively for some applications, and every complex cleanup decision

has strong and weak points. There is no problem finding important, correct statements in

case study RODS. Indeed, this report often uses

statements from one case study RIFS or ROD

to illustrate inconsistency or to underscore a

point about a problem in another ROD, Generally speaking, the decisions made in these 10

case studies are questionable because, for

example:

If different and readily available technical

information had been used, the decision

would have changed significantly,

The range of cleanup alternatives was too

narrow.

The analysis was not comprehensive and

was not fair to different technologies.

The study work was not internally consistent.

Mistakes were made in calculations and

estimates. .

Critical assumptions were false.

Conclusions were stated without analysis

and documentation.

3An experienced attorney advises responsible parties: “Legal

issues, scientific and technical findings, plus the all-important

policy component all affect EPA decisions, Nowhere is this more

clearly shown than in the context of a Superfund Record of Decision . . . the statute calls on EPA to make decisions based on

which remedy is cost effective or which ‘adequately’ protects

public health. Applying these terms entails a degree of subjective judgment,” [P.H. Hailer, Zfazardous Mderids, January/February 1988,]

On a broader scale, other questions are important: Are government policies and EPA’s

organization getting in the way of solid, defensible technical work? Is the timing of key pieces

of work, such as testing technologies, poor?

Looking across sites, are there trends for problems in Superfund technology selection?

The last question is especially important. It

is crucial not to look narrowly at single sites

but across sites. This is key to central, national

oversight of Super fund. While individual case

studies can address technical soundness in a

specific ROD, all of them together show how

consistent the program is nationwide in understanding the advantages and disadvantages of

cleanup technologies and in responding to the

statutory requirements on cleanup technology

selection. As does other information, RODS

show that Superfund is being implemented in

a highly decentralized manner. There is inconsistency in ROD format and presentation of information, examination of cleanup alternatives,

and technology selections. In itself, this is not

necessarily bad, but it does mean that central

management oversight and controls by EPA are

necessary to avoid inconsistency leading to confusion, unnecessary costs and, for some sites,

ineffective cleanup. Lack of consistency among

hundreds and, eventually, thousands of sites

is not an academic issue. Harm to human health

and the environment, loss of public confidence

in government, and wasting money are what’s

at stake.

The following case studies also show how a

site moves through the Superfund system. General perceptions about delays are documented.

Rarely has so much information been assembled on individual sites, possible here because

EPA has provided OTA with several databases.

RODS do not contain such comprehensive information, which itself is an important obser- .

vation. On the other hand, there are many areas

of interest which are not covered in these case

studies. Documents on a Superfund site can fill

file drawers. There are many legal and procedural aspects of Superfund; these case studies

focus on technical areas and issues. While legal and liability issues get enormous attention,

environmental protection is the reason for
Superfund and ultimately it is technology which

must get the cleanup job done.

Superfund’s Better Side

A small fraction of RODS meet SARA’s requirements. Six recent well-done RODS are

briefly summarized below. While not perfect,

each ROD sets a good remedial action plan,

each selects what is likely to be a permanently

effective treatment technology, and each provides adequate data and discussion to justify

the technology choice. These six RODS contrast

sharply with the 10 case studies which are the

focus of this report.

Cooper Road Dump, Voorhees Township,

New Jersey

EPA Region 2; NPL #473/7704–The ROD of 9/30/87

decided to take no further action at the site. A

detailed technical case, based on substantial site

sampling, supported the conclusion that previous removal actions at the site had 1eft it permanently clean. The only question this ROD

raises is why the site scored so high on the HRS

and wound upon the NPL. In hindsight, Cooper

Road Dump illustrates a “false positive,” a site

that went through the Superfund system unnecessarily. Indeed, in a survey of EPA Regional staff, this site was included on a list of

“sites on NPL that should not be.”s No significant Federal or State money was spent to prove

that no cleanup was necessary; the responsible party paid for the work.

Davis Liquid Waste Site, Smithfield, Rhode Island

EPA Region 1; NPL #216/770; estimated cost, $28 million.—The ROD of 9/29/87 selected a comprehensive remedial action plan. The plan included:

1) onsite thermal destruction of 25,000 cubic

yards of excavated raw waste and contaminated soil with greater than 2 parts per million

(ppm) of volatile organic chemicals; 2) placement of incineration ash and pollution control

4Ranking on National Priorities List and total number of ranked

sites as of July 1987.

W.S. Environmental Protection Agency, unreleased contractor report written by CH2MHill, November 1986.

residues that are found toxic through testing

in an onsite RCRA hazardous waste landfill;

3] provision of alternative water for affected

offsite residents; and 4) restoration of groundwater by onsite treatment using air stripping

and carbon adsorption.

The supporting Feasibility Study (FS) was a

textbook example of careful analysis, which included alternative technologies and citations

of experiences at other cleanup sites. Most striking was the early elimination of nontreatment

options, such as landfilling the hazardous waste,

because, as stated in the FS, they “do not provide for any treatment of contamination. ” The

analysis also reviewed costs for substantial pilot treatability studies during the post-ROD design phase (the RD) as well as acceptable cancer risk levels as cleanup goals. However, a I

in 100,000 cancer risk level was used rather

than the 1 in 1 million level more frequently

used. Another, and probably related, reason

why this ROD is not perfect is that some untreated hazardous material will be landfilled

onsite instead of being treated. The higher risk

level seems to have been a.compromise made

to reduce cleanup costs. Also, the delay of the

treatability testing until after the ROD is undesirable; although for this site there was more

information available to justify the technology

selection than in some of the case studies.

The Davis remedial plan used an excellent

interpretation of cost-effectiveness for making

technology choices: “an alternative which has

a similar public health and environmental benefit to other alternatives can be screened out

due to costs that are higher in order(s)-of-magnitude, ‘e

Love Canal, City of Niagara Fails, New York

EPA Region 2; NPL#142/770; estimated cost, about $30

mifllon.—The ROD of 10/26/87 altered an earlier

Wompare this to EPA’s guidance which lacks the concept of

comparable environmental protection: “[cost-effectiveness] requires ensuring that the results of a particular alternative cannot be achieved by less costly methods. This implies that for any

specific site there may be more than one cost-effective remedy,

with each remedy varying in its environmental and public health

results.” [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Interim Guidance on Superfund Selection of Remedy,” Dec. 24, 1986.]
6

decision at Love Canal to use onsite land disposal for dioxin contaminated sewer and creek

sediments. Now, a mobile thermal destruction

unit will be used onsite to destroy and remove

dioxin with an efficiency of 99.9999 percent.

The cost for treatment will be twice that for

land disposal, but the ROD selected thermal destruction on the basis of its ability to meet statutory requirements by eliminating toxicity and

mobility. In addition, several site demonstrations elsewhere had successfully destroyed

dioxin-contaminated soil with mobile thermal

destruction units. EPA responded to extensive

community comments against landfilling the

contaminated material onsite and also decided

not to attempt to separate materials with less

than 1 part per billion dioxin (EPA’s cutoff for

acceptable contamination) because of uncertain reliability in doing so.

Operating Industries, Inc., Monterey Park,

California

EPA Region 9; NPL #71/770; estimated cost: $4.8 million.—The ROD of 11/16/87 concerned an interim remedial action required to manage contaminated Ieachate at the site, which had a long,

complex cleanup history. The ROD selected an

onsite Ieachate treatment system with several

proven technical steps that can reduce a diverse

set of organic and inorganic contaminants to

levels low enough to permit discharge to a local water treatment plant. The key steps will

be gravity separation, coagulant addition, dissolved air flotation, filtration, air stripping with

vapor phase carbon adsorption, and liquid

phase granular activated carbon adsorption.

The analysis of alternatives was first rate.

Two constraints were applied that ruled out

more innovative approaches. First, the action

had to be implemented easily and rapidly. Second, it had to be able to cope with major fluctuations in the composition of the leachate.

Thus, some technologies that would actually

destroy organic contaminants, such as plasma

arc thermal destruction and wet air oxidation,

both followed by stabilization of solid residues

containing toxic metals, were not considered

because they would probably face delays because of State regulatory requirements and possibly public concerns. The disadvantage of the

selected remedy is that the technologies used

rely almost entirely on separation. Therefore,

significant amounts of concentrated hazardous

residues will have to be moved offsite for disposal or treatment.

There was some laboratory testing of site

leachate during the FS. Also, the process leading up to the ROD was rigorous, including an

extended public comment period with an unusual opportunity for local citizens to review

a draft ROD. (Normally, the public gets a very

brief statement of EPA’s preferred remedy to

review.) Although there was keen community

interest, little of it dealt with the selection of

technology, but rather with the specific location on which the leachate treatment facility

would be built.

he-Solve, Inc., North Dartmouth, Massachusetts

EPA Region 1; NPL#206/770; Mimated cost, $19.9 million.—The ROD issued on 9/24/87 is one of the

most technically detailed and complete RODS

reviewed for this study. A previous cleanup

based on an earlier ROD was stopped when four

additional hot spots of contamination were

found. The newly selected remedy consisted

of: 1) the source control phase of onsite treatment of 25,500 cubic yards of excavated PCB

contaminated soils and sediments in a mobile

dechlorination facility (volatile organic compounds will also be reduced); and 2) aquifer restoration by pumping, repeated flushing, and

treatment involving air stripping and carbon

adsorption, particularly for volatile organic

compounds. The site will be evaluated every

five years because some hazardous substances

will remain there; curiously, there are no land

use restrictions.

While dechlorination was considered an innovative technology, its selection was based on

positive pilot test results on an actual Superfund site with similar contamination and climatic conditions.r (Other work by EPA shows

the approach effective in getting residual levels

The technology is sold by six vendors according to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “A Compendium of Technologies

Used In The Treatment of Hazardous Wastes,” September 1987,
7

of PCBS in soils down below 1 ppm.)a Additional

pilot study results will be obtained onsite prior

to use, and if dechlorination is unsuccessful,

the ROD specified that onsite incineration will

be used instead. Similar treatability and pilot

tests will be performed for the groundwater

cleanup phase prior to full-scale use,

Cleanup goals at Re-Solve were based on risk

analysis on the basis of possible residential use

of the site. A 1 in 100,000 excess (over background) cancer risk level was chosen for the

soil and groundwater cleanup instead of the

more common 1 in 1 million level. Accordingly,

PCBS in the soil will be reduced to 25 ppm,

which is a higher concentration than goals set

at other sites.e For example, 20 ppm was chosen at the Ottari and Goss/Great Lakes Container Corp. site in New Hampshire; 5 ppm,

at the Renora site in New Jersey; 1 ppm, at the

Tacoma Tar Pits site in Washington; and 1 ppm,

at the Liquid Disposal site in Michigan (where

a 1 in 1 million risk was used). A recent EPA

document refers to cleanup to “the desired

background levels (1 to 5ppm) or less.”lo In addition, an assessment by EPA’s Office of Health

and Environmental Assessment concluded that

a range from 1 to 6 ppm PCBS in soil is equivalent to 1 in 100,000 cancer risk.11 The Re-Solve

ROD, therefore, illustrates the compromise between level of cleanup and acceptance of cost

by the government and responsible parties. The

FS noted that “the voIume of PCB contaminated

soils increases exponentially as the cleanup

levels become more protective.” While the final decision may be disputed by some people,

particularly on the issue of residual PCB level,

~A. Kernel et al,, “Field Experience With the KPEG Reagent,”

paper presented at EPA’s Fourteenth Annual Research Symposium,” May 1988.

Whe PCB concentration level corresponding to the 1 in 100,000

risk level is 30 ppm, but EPA decided that the uncertainty of

the approach allowed them to use 25 ppm as being representative of that risk level. The PCB level for the 1 in 1 million risk

level was 3 ppm. Also, it was estimated that onsite groundwater

may contain 10 to 1S ppb PCB after cleanup, which is far in excess of 0.08 ppb, the health-based cleanup level for a 1 in 100,000

cancer risk for PCBS,

IOU. S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Report on Decontamination of PCB-Bearing Sediments,” January 1988,

llAs reported by EpA in its ROD for the Liquid Disposal Site

in Michigan, Sept. 30, 1987.

the decisionmaking process is clear and there

is public accountability.

Seymour Recycling Corp., Seymour, indiana

EPA Region 5; NPL #57/770; ostimateid cost, $18 million.—The ROD issued on 9/30/87 was the second one for the site. The selected remedy has

several key components: 1) a full-scale vapor

extraction system to reduce the substantial presence of volatile organic compounds; 2) the extraction and treatment of contaminated groundwater at and beyond the site boundaries; 3) the

application of nutrients to remaining contaminated soil to stimulate biodegradation; 4) the

installation of a multimedia cap to restrict direct contact and limit water intrusion; 5) deed

and access restrictions; and 6) a detailed monitoring program and technical criteria to detect failure and to plan future action if necessary.

A good technical analysis supported the selection of this remedy over alternatives such as

incineration and in situ soil washing. Incineration would have cost $37 million and in situ

soil washing would have cost $17 million, while

the chosen plan will cost $18 million. But technical impediments—the large size of the site (14

acres), the large quantity of contaminated materials (about 100,000 cubic yards), and the

dangers of excavating soil with large amounts

of volatile compounds—not cost, were the reasons for rejecting alternatives that may have

provided more substantial treatment and detoxification. In addition, the groundwater treatment is estimated to take from 28 to 42 years,

but there is no faster alternative available. Of

some concern is that treatability studies were

not done before the ROD. But the extraction

technology is well proven and the final Seymour implementation plan is well thought out.

Summary of Trends From 10 Case Studies

As a rule, RODS are fraught with problems.

The 10 case studies, chosen out of over 100

RODS reviewed, illustrate in concrete ways

some disturbing trends among these problems

—trends that compromise the ultimate protection of human health and the environment (see

.
8

box 2 for capsule findings). These trends are

summarized below.

Evaluation and Selection of Permanent

Treatment Technologies

Many good, permanently effective waste

treatment technologies are on the market but,

too often, are not fully examined, or are not

selected for use. A ROD may simply opt not to

treat a site at all but rather to bury waste in a

landfill or to cap the hazardous area, both impermanent options. A site’s having too little or

too much contaminated material is often cited

as a reason for not choosing a permanent treatment technology. Too little material and too

much material both mean high cost for treatment relative to costs for nontreatment alternatives, but cost alone should not guide decisions.

Describing a cleanup technology as a 6

’treatment” can be misleading. SARA sees a treatment as a technology “that, in whole or in part,

will result in a permanent and significant decrease in the toxicity, mobility, or volume” of

hazardous materials “to the maximum extent

practicable,” but SARA’s “treatment” allows

much interpretation. Furthermore, EPA has not

established a hierarchy of preferred results and

types of treatment.

Not all treatments accomplish the same things.

For example, thermal destruction and some biological and chemical treatment can irreversibly

destroy or detoxify nearly all of some toxic substances and therefore reduce their mobility and

volume. But a number of physical and chemical

treatments can separate organic and inorganic

materials and release the hazardous material

collected and concentrated to the environment

(e.g., air stripping) or place it in a landfill (e.g.,

carbon adsorption, precipitation, soil washing,

solvent extraction). The preferred use of separation technology uses treatment to destroy the

hazardous material collected.

Chemical fixation, stabilization, and solidification treatments usually only reduce mobility, particularly for toxic metals, (but usually

increase volume) and they nearly always leave

some uncertainty about long-term effectiveness

because laboratory tests can neither fully duplicate field conditions over long periods nor

establish what actually is happening to the contaminants. 12 EPA has said that “There is, at

present, no set protocol for evaluating the efficacy of stabilization technologies.”13 The use

of stabilization technologies for high levels of

organic contamination is particularly unproven.14

A recent EPA review of stabilization technology said:

Although S/S [solidification/stabilization]

technologies have been used for more than 20

years, there exists little information on longterm physical durability and chemical stability of the S/S mass when placed in the ground

.., . Generally, S/S technology is recognized

effective for inorganic waste, while organic

wastes have the potential to cause problems

. . . . The long term effects of organics on S/S

performance are important, however, little research has been performed. . . . the capability

of the technology to perform satisfactorily over

long periods of time has yet to be determined

... , uncontrolled air emissions are a potential problem to workers and the environment.15

These EPA views are inconsistent with current

EPA decisions that choose stabilization and call

them permanent remedies.

l~he attractiveness of stabilization type technologies is oftened

expressed in noncost terms, such as: “Long term effectiveness

of incineration, stabilization, and solidification are comparable.”

IARCO Petroleum Products Co., “Critique of Sand Springs Operable Unit Feasibility Study,” Aug. 31, 1987,)

WLO Weitzman, L,EO Hamel, and E. Barth, “Evaluation of Solid.

ification/Stabilization As A Best Demonstrated Available Technology,” paper presented at EPA’s Fourteenth Annual Research

Symposium, May 1908.

ItFor example, a recent EPA study found “large losses of organics during the mixing process” [L. Weitzman et al,, op. cit.].

Another EPA study showed that stabilization was not competitive with thermal and chemical treatment technologies and soil

washing for organic contamination [R,C. Thurnau and M.P. Esposito, “TCLP As A Measure of Treatment Effectiveness: Results of TCLP Work Completed on Different Treatment Technologies for CERCLA Soils,” paper presented at EPA’s Fourteenth

Annual Research Symposium, May 1988]. A demonstration of

a stabilization technology under EPA auspices concluded that

“for theorganics, the leachateconcentrations were approximately

equal for the treated and untreated soils” [P.R. de Percin and

S. Sawyer, “SITE Demonstration of Hazcon Solidification/Stabilization Process,” paper presented at EPA’s Fourteenth Annual

Research Symposium, May 1988].

IsC,C. Wiles and H,K. Howard, “U.S. EPA Research in Solidification/Stabilization of Waste Material,” paper presented at EPA’s

Fourteenth Annual Research Symposium, May 1988.
9

Box 2.-10 Case Study Sites With Capsule Findings

Case Study 1

Chemical Control Corp., Elizabeth, New Jersey

EPA Region 2; NPL rank: 223 out of 770

Estimated cost: $7,4 million

Unproven solidification (chemical fixation) technology

was selected to treat in situ highly contaminated subsurface soil, which previous removal actions had left below

the water table and covered up with gravel. No treatability

study was used. The cost of incineration was overestimated.

The cleanup will leave untreated contamination onsite.

Case Study 2

Compass Industries, Tulsa County, Oklahoma

EPA Region 6; NPL rank: 483/770

Estimated cost: $12 million

Capping (containment) of waste was chosen over incineration. Capping was called a cost-effective, permanent cleanup even though it does not provide permanent protection

comparable to incineration. No commitment was made to

treat contaminated groundwater.

Case Study 3

Conservation Chemical Co., Kansas City, Missouri

EPA Region 7; NPL rank pending

Estimated cost: $21 million

Capping of the site and a hydraulic containment system

to pump and treat some contaminated groundwater were

chosen over excavating and treating contaminated soil and

buried wastes, which was recommended in an EPA study

and by the State. Water treatment cannot remove all the

diverse contaminants at the site. The ROD said that no estimate could be made for the duration of the cleanup.

Case Study 4

Crystal City Airport, Crystal City, Texas

EPA Region 6; NPL #639/770

Estimated cost: $1.6 mijlion

Excavation of contaminated soils and wastes (which were

buried in a previous removal action) and their disposal in

an unlined landfill with a cap over it were selected over

incineration. No treatability study supported the conclusion that the selected remedy is permanent on the basis

of the adsorption of diverse contaminants to site soil. Major failure modes for the landfill were not examined.

Case Study 5

Industrial Excess Landfill, Uniontown, Ohio

EPA Region 5; NPL #164/770

Estimated cost: $2 million

Providing alternate water to houses that have or are likely

to have contaminated wells was a satisfactory interim remedial action. However, actions to address the source of

contamination and to stop and treat contaminated groundwater are long overdue.

Case Study 6

Pristine, Inc., Reading, Ohio

EPA Region 5; NPL #531/770

Estimated cost: $22 million

In situ vitrification was developed originally for radioactive soils, but its use for chemically contaminated sites

is still unproven. In situ vitrification was selected—without

treatability test results-chiefiy because its estimated cost

was about half that of onsite incineration. But the estimated

cost for incineration is probably high by a factor of 2. incineration offers more certainty and probably would cost

no more than the chosen remedy. Groundwater will be

pumped and treated by air stripping and carbon adsorption.

Case Study 7

Renora, Inc., Edison Township, New Jersey

EPA Region 2; NPL #3781770

Estimated cost: $1.4 million

The selected remedy makes use of offsite landfilling for

soils contaminated with PCBS. Also, biological treatment

was selected for soils contaminated with diverse organic

compounds and toxic metals and for contaminated groundwater, but no treatability study supported its selection.

Case Study 8

Sand Springs Petrochemical Complex

Tulsa County, Oklahoma

EPA Region 6; NPL #761/770

Estimated cost: $45 million

EPA originally said that solidification technology was

ineffective for the high organic content wastes and that

on site incineration was effective. EPA then reversed itself

and selected solidification for most of the cleanup, which

the responsible party had claimed effective based on its

treatability study. Incineration is to he used if solidification technology is not successfully demonstrated or fails

after solidified material is landfilled on the floodplain site,

but criteria for failure are unspecified.

Case Study 9

Schmalz Dump Site, Harrison, Wisconsin

EPA Region S; NPL #190/770

Estimated cost: $800,000

A simple compacted earth cover over the soil contaminated with lead and chromium was selected. Solidification/stabilization treatment was rejected, although this was

a textbook example of appropriate use of the technology.

Voluntary well abandonment and monitoring was chosen

over pumping and treating contaminated groundwater.

NO treatabilty study results supported the selection of

chemical stabilization. Significant amounts of untreated

contaminants as well as the treated materials will be left

onsite. The effectiveness of the treatment is uncertain. Incineration was said to offer no better protection and was

reiected because of its higher cost. “
10

*

Moreover, a cleanup may consist of many

different operations in which treatment may

be only a small part. Removal actions may send

hazardous waste to landfills, perhaps much

more than may be treated subsequently. Or action may be taken on contaminated soil but not

on contaminated groundwater or vice versa.

Too many RODS assume that any use of any

technology is a treatment that meets the letter

and spirit of the statutory requirement. General Superfund statistics on treatment can be

misleading because they do not distinguish

among different technologies used at a site for

different amounts of material.

There is no clear line between sufficient and

insufficient technical and economic data for selecting among cleanup technologies. A ROD

may choose an unproven or inappropriate technology or both with the claim that it is a permanent remedy, or a ROD may eliminate a technology because it remains untried on a large

scale. It is not uncommon to have a multimillion-dollar cleanup decision made without any

technical data to support it, either from the technical literature or from tests done on site material.

Information used to compare treatment technologies is often inaccurate and incomplete.

Poor information compromises the RIFS, the

selection of remedy, and public support of certain remedies. Alternative treatment technologies that are practical are sometimes ignored

or not chosen. Costs for innovative technologies

may be unreliable, either too low or too high.

Good or bad experiences at other sites are not

studied. An example is the failure, discovered

in 1985, of chemical stabilization treatment at

the Conservation Chemical Co. site after only

a few years of use; nevertheless, RODS are selecting chemical stabilization for similar problems more than ever before.

Contractors may quote a wide range for direct costs per unit of material treated for any

given treatment technology. For example, quoted

unit costs of onsite incineration ranged from

a low of $186 per cubic yard for Seymour Recycling to $730 per cubic yard at Pristine for the

same amount of treated material; both sites are

in the same EPA Region. 2 Le unit cost quoted

for mobile, onsite incineration in the Chemical Control case in New Jersey and at the Pristine case in Ohio (where the technology was

rejected) was twice the unit cost used at the

Davis Liquid Waste site in Massachusetts (where

the technology was selected). At the Chemical

Control site, both $500 and $750 per cubic yard

unit costs were quoted for two cleanup alternatives using the same onsite incineration. In

both cases, the material burned was essentially

the same and the type of incineration technology was the same (the difference in the options

was where the residuals were disposed).

Such variations make it hard to establish a

technology’s cost-effectiveness—or lack of it—

relative to other technologies. Even when a contractor uses the same burden rate (see below)

among ROD cleanup alternatives, inaccurate

unit costs can distort the comparative analysis. For example, with Pristine, if direct cost

had been $186 per cubic yard instead of $730

(with the same 83 percent burden), the total cost

for incineration would have been $15 million,

not $51 million; Pristine had rejected incineration and selected in situ vitrification for $22

million. If total estimated costs have any effect

on post-ROD activities, then actual cleanup

costs for clients—and profits to contractors—

may vary substantially and some may be much

greater than they could be.

Contractors estimate cleanup costs by adding

to direct costs substantially different levels of

indirect cost (burden or markup). In the Pristine case, the burden—various contingencies, construction services, and design costs—amounted

to 83 percent of direct costs, while for Davis

and Re-Solve, involving the same RIFS contractor, the burden was 35 percent; the Davis and

Re-Solve indirect costs explicitly included pilot study work, while the costs for Pristine did

not. For Seymour Recycling, the burden was

60 percent; for Chemical Control, 56 percent;

and for Crystal City, 29 percent. The range in

burden rates over different sites and across and

within contractors illustrates an important

management problem in Superfund.

RODS cannot always depend on the results

of tests done for other sites. Treatability studies

refer to tests on site material and are supposed

- J
.

11

to bridge the gap between general information

about the technology and the more specific information needed for technology selection in

the ROD. Results of treatability studies on one

site, particularly for innovative technologies,

do not necessarily mean that a given treatment

will work or not work for some other waste site,

unless the conditions are nearly identical or the

technology’s performance is not waste specific.

The problem is that some technologies are very

waste specific, and it is impossible to accurately

extrapolate positive test results from one waste

to another, especially because Superfund sites

often have very complex, site-specifc wastes.

Incineration of organic contaminants is nonspecific, whereas biological treatment is quite

waste specific. Onsite treatment technologies

(in which the waste is brought to the technology) perform more predictably than in situ technologies (in which the technology is brought

to the waste) because the latter’s effectiveness

depends on site conditions, such as chemical,

physical, and biological properties of the soil.

These can vary widely from site to site.

When they are done, most treatability studies

are not done early enough. It is critical that they

be done during the RIFS before the ROD, but

most are done during the design phase after I

the ROD. Treatability studies will improve the

RIFS by providing technical data to support the

ROD’s analysis of cleanup alternatives and to

ensure that the ROD’S cleanup choice is effec-.

tive and satisfies statutory requirements. However, EPA now often speeds up RODS, apparently to meet fiscal year goals; thus treatability

tests during the RIFS are sacrificed. This sacrifice can backfire. Negative test results after

the ROD would indicate the wrong technology

choice and the waste of a lot of time and money.

Worse, altering a ROD at this point, even for

good reasons, may meet some resistance. Finally, when responsible parties or technology

companies conduct these tests, EPA may need

to assure their objectivity by independently

verifying the results.

Some RODS choose technologies that are in

EPA’s Superfund Innovative Technology Evaluation (SITE) program, an indication that a technology has not yet been proven. For example,

the Chemical Control ROD chose a new type

of in situ stabilization, the Pristine ROD chose

in situ vitrification, and the Sand Springs ROD

chose a stabilization technique in the S E pro- &

gram. If, as EPA says, the SITE program exists

to obtain “sound engineering and cost data”

and to “resolve issues standing in the way of

actual full-scale application, ” then how can

such ROD selections be justified? If they are

justifiable, are the SITE demonstrations really

necessary?

The chemical character and complexity of site

contaminants and how they affect the use of

some technologies do not get enough attention.

A few indicator compounds, used to represent

all site contaminants for risk assessment, may

be inappropriate for technology evaluation because physical and chemical properties may

differ from the way health effects vary. The result can be a poor technology choice. Also, site

sampling may be insufficient to detect hot spots

of contamination that would facilitate using

limited treatment to cut cleanup costs. In addition, groundwater monitoring may not be

reliable.

Impermanent Technologies

When wastes are left in the ground or in

groundwater or are redisposed in a landfill, a

ROD may claim that the remedy is permanent

when, in fact, it is not. Permanence may be

claimed even when technical factors suggest

a high probability of failure, that is, of release

of hazardous substances, and of another cleanup.

In such cases, the ROD would be more credible if it acknowledged the remedy as impermanent and defended it on its own merits relative

to truly permanent ahernatives. Moreover, an

impermanent remedy and a false sense of security could lead! for example, to land use that

would only complicate future cleanup and pose

unacceptable risks.

Contrary to the law, containment/land disposal decisions seldom analyze the risk of future failure, damages, and further cleanup.

While some RODS claim that containment/land

disposal techniques are proven and reliable

technologies with no implementation problems,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.
12

there is evidence to the contrary. For example,

the RCRA clay cap being installed at the Winthrop Landfill Superfund site in Maine failed

in September 1987 before its construction was

completed. The ROD of November 1985 said

the technology was proven, routinely used, and

posed no construction difficulties. There had

been no analysis of potential failure; under the

original Superfund statute-the Comprehensive

Emergency Response and Liability Act of 1980

—such analysis was not required. Under SARA

it now is.

Sometimes a ROD does not commit to a definite outcome even though it appears to have

selected a technology. Contingencies, uncertainties, and multiple future options do not assure the public that there will be a permanent

remedy and that it will be fully implemented

in a timely and effective way. Often, the ROD

does not provide specific technical criteria for

subsequent decisions, such as for groundwater

cleanup or land use, nor are there necessarily

assurances of independent validation of data

and effective EPA oversight of activities by responsible parties and contractors. Specific

groundwater monitoring requirements are particularly important because recent EPA research has found that “low sampling frequency

coupled with the generally smaller sampling

networks suggest that efforts to characterize

groundwater contamination at [Superfund]

sites may be inadequate.

Impermanent remedies, which provide less

protection than permanent ones and do not assuredly meet cleanup goals, are often selected

purely because they are cheaper in the short run;

in the long run they are very likely to be more

expensive. Regarding cost-effectiveness, when

two or more cleanup options offer the same

level of environmental protection and can meet

established cleanup goals (from risk assessment

or existing regulatory standards), everyone will

agree that the lowest cost option should be chosen. Impermanent technologies are not costl@R.H. Plumb, Jr., “A Comparison of Ground Water Monitoring Date From CERCLA and RCRA Sites,” Ground Water Monitoring Research, fall 1987, pp. 94-100.

effective remedies and do not satisfy SARA,

therefore, when permanent technologies are

practical. The average estimated cost of the

cleanups in the six good RODS noted earlier

was $20 million. In contrast, the average estimated cost of not-so-good cleanups in the 10

case studies below was $12 million. (In the 10

case studies, the average for the five treatment

remedies is $16 million and the average for the

nontreatment remedies is $7.5 million.) It is true

that a permanent cleanup based on treatment

technology is likely to require a larger initial

outlay than an impermanent cleanup based on

land disposal. Even a modest cost difference

can mean a lot added up over thousands of sites.

EPA is less responsive to community concerns

about a remedy being impermanent than to interests which favor a lower cost impermanent

remedy. Thus community concerns about impermanence are not very likely to lead to a more

expensive cleanup technology. There are many

incentives for various parties to keep cleanup

costs low by using onsite containment/land disposal or even some relatively inexpensive forms

of treatment, such as stabilization and separation technologies. These parties include potentially responsible parties (PRPs) that may have

to pay for the cleanup, States that have to provide 10 percent of the cost (unless PRPs pay),

and EPA which wants to distribute available

funds as broadly as possible and which wants

to obtain settlement agreements with PRPs to

reduce calls on Superfund money.

In selecting cheap, impermanent remedies,

claims of comparable estimated costs may hide

the truth that low cost was the key deciding factor. Getting accurate costs to compare cleanup

alternatives is crucial. Overestimates or underestimates may be used to justify a choice or a

rejection. For example, at the Conservation

Chemical Co. site in Missouri, where a settlement with PRPs was involved, an EPA contractor and the State recommended one remedy (rejected) which was said to cost $24 million over

another remedy (selected) which cost $21 million. But available EPA data suggest that the

rejected remedy would actually cost from $40

million to $150 million.
13 —

Program Efficiency

EPA pushes most RODS to completion by the

end of the fiscal year and this kind of bureaucratic pressure can lead to poor cleanup decisions. To meet deadlines, EPA may reemphasize public comments that would otherwise lead

to reevaluation of facts and technologies; EPA

may make a hasty, technically unsupported decision as it did at the Sand Springs site in Oklahoma. Typically, there is less than one month

between the end of the public comment period

and the issuance of the ROD. (See table 1 for

summary data from the 10 case studies on times

to reach certain stages in the cleanup process.)

The RIFS may also suffer from hurried review

by EPA because of pressure to issue a ROD by

the end of the fiscal year or quarter.

The pm-remedial process has received little

attention even though sites can be releasing hazardous substances into the environment and,

during the time they are unexamined and unattended, get worse. The time from site identification through placement on the NPL is

about 3 years for the case studies (and often

much longer for other sites examined by OTA).

The time between a site’s placement on the

NPL and the start of the RIFS varies greatly,

averaging about 16 months. Nationwide, there

is no apparent relationship to the site’s HRS

score; a high score does not necessarily speed

cleanup (e.g., three sites with similar high HRS

scores waited 39, 15, and 3 months). For sites

within an EPA Region, however, the HRS score

does seem to matter; this time the waiting

period decreased with decreasing score or hazard level (e.g., in Region 6, the HRS scorehime

to RIFS start were 47/39, 32/12, and 29/-3).17

That is, the more hazardous the site according

to the HRS, the longer it takes to start the RIFS

on the site. This seems opposite to what might

be desirable; but in Region 6, the French Limited site ROD said that “The position (rank) of

a site on the [National Priorities] list is inconsequential.”

The RIFS process, from start of the studies

through issuance of the ROD, takes from 2 to

3 years. Within this time, early decisions to

eliminate some technology alternatives and perform treatability studies for others could be, but

usually are not, made. Studying more technologies than necessary increases the time and cost

of the RIFS, makes it more difficult to decide

to do treatability testing on the most viable techl~he last scoreltime is an example of a site for which the RIFS

was started 3 months prior to the site’s placement on the NPL,

Table I.-Times for Sites To Reach Points in the Superfund Processa

Average Range

From entry into Superfund inventory until:

Preliminary Assessment completion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 months 1-45

Site Inspection completion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 months 1-44

Placement on National Priorities List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......36 months 4-75

Start of RIFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 months 20-68

Completion of RIFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 months 47-103

Signing of ROD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 months 50-104

Completion of ROD remedy (ESTIMATED) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 years 6-20

Between Preliminary Assessment completion until:

Site Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 months O-39

Placement on NPL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 months 3-73

Start of RIFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 months 13-68

Between placement on NPL and start of RIFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 months –3-39

Duration of RIFS:

Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 months 21-38

Total period (studies through ROD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 months 24-39

Between signing of ROD and ROD estimate of completion of remedial action . . . . . . . . . . . .......38 months 20-120

Duration of public comment period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......33 days 24-44

Time between end of public comment period and signing of ROD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......34 days 15-122

aB~sgd on the lo cage studies in this OTA special report.
nologies, and sometimes contributes to poor

RODS.

After the ROD, actual cleanup action, including remedial design, takes 2 to 3 years, Sometimes there are repeated RODS and new actions

on different parts of the cleanup (called operable units) and sometimes on the same part of

the cleanup.

The entire process from site identification

through final (estimated) remedial cleanup can

frequently take about 10 years. Unexpected

findings sometimes complicate the process. For

example, remedial cleanup stopped at the Conservation Chemical site in Missouri and at the

Re-Solve site in Massachusetts when new information about the sites’ contamination showed

a need for more studies, another ROD, and new

cleanup strategies. Some risks to health and

environment are likely during such long regrouping periods. Contaminants are likely to

migrate from areas of high to low concentration, increasing the extent and complexity of

cleanup, particularly for groundwater.

Risk Management and Cleanup Goals

There are often problems with how risks are

assessed and how cleanup goals are met. Different levels of risk maybe used and very different cleanup technologies may be said to be comparable, because EPA allows a broad range

from 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 10 million excess lifetime cancer risk.la Sometimes compromises are

made to reduce cleanup cost by allowing a

higher risk than the 1 in I million cancer risk

commonly used in Superfund. A cleanup can

be deemed complete even though significant

contamination remains onsite or migrates offsite. Regarding cleanup goals, a cleanup technology can be justified in superficial ways. Hazards (the source of the risk) may not be

eliminated through permanent technologies but

exposures to the hazard—i.e., the risk—may be

reduced through impermanent actions, such as

IWancer risk assessment is not the only way cleanup goals

are established. Current regulatory standards for acceptable levels

of contaminants are also used, but these are not available for

many contaminants. When risk assessment is used, probable,

worst case, or other levels of risk are calculated. Sometimes precleanup risks are also calculated.

capping a site, or institutional controls, such

as deed restrictions that have uncertain future

implementation.

RODS do not consider cumulative exposures

and risks from multiple sources of similar hazardous substances. Cleanup levels may look

acceptable on a site basis but might not when

two or more Superfund sites are close together.

An example is the two Superfund sites in Oklahoma on opposite sides of the Arkansas River;

neither ROD evaluates risks from the other site.

Environmental risks seem to take a back seat

to bureaucratic definitions of Superfund sites

and to constraints imposed by seeking funds

from responsible parties.

The risks of transporting hazardous materials offsite for land disposal or even treatment

are not considered. Furthermore, SARA’s requirements to use permanent treatment technologies are not applied by EPA to waste sent

offsite. The ROD can say that the cleanup will

be permanent, even though the site was originally a land disposal facility, and the wastes

are slated for a landfill that itself might become

a Superfund site. Moving hazardous waste from

one hole in the ground to another is the nonsolution that was behind SARA’s preference for

permanent cleanup. For the purpose of many

Superfund cleanups, EPA’s assumption seems

to be that hazardous waste sent to a regulated

landfill will never fail and require cleanup even

though there is widespread agreement, even

within EPA, that landfill technology will ultimately fail. There are also many widely recognized uncertainties about regulatory compliance and future corrective action.

Most RODS seem uncertain about or do not

address future land and water use in judging

whether a selected remedy will be safe and permanent. In some cases, there is a lot of interest

in reusing the land for productive purposes. For

example, at the Schmalz site in Wisconsin,

where contaminated soil is to remain in place,

the ROD makes no land use restrictions. Any

remedy that leaves hazardous waste in place

or caps it suggests the need for explicit attention to future land and perhaps groundwater

use.
15

The Record of Decision Document

The technical content and quality of RODS

varies substantially across and within EPA Regions. Supporting RIFSS generally lack citations to the technical literature, important data,

and discussions of actual experiences, good and

bad, at sites that have used the technologies under consideration. Multimillion-dollar decisions

are often made without any significant technical data to support them. A ROD may drop or

choose a cleanup technology with little or no

discussion or justification.

Probable causes for the meager level of technical detail are: enormous public pressure to

clean up sites sooner; attempts to compensate

for delays; bureaucratic pressures to produce

RODS faster; poor contractor performance; lack

of central, national oversight; and some attempts to carry out activities after the ROD

when there is less public scrutiny. Conflicts of

interest also may be a problem. Does the RIFS

contractor own a cleanup technology or will

it or some affiliated company stand to profit

if a particular cleanup technology is selected?

Is the RIFS contractor also a responsible party

at the site? Does a responsible party own the

cleanup technology selected for the cleanup?

EPA Regions are not using a standard format

for RODS. Lack of uniformity makes RODS difficult to analyze and compare for oversight and

quality control purposes. Of particular importance is the way alternative cleanups are evaluated. Different criteria are used.lg Sometimes

IOA july Ig87 directive from EPA’s Assistant Administrator

for Solid Waste and Emergency Response outlined nine “key

criteria which should be considered in evaluating and comparing alternatives. ” An earlier directive contained essentially the

the evaluation focuses on each alternative

separately with very little comparison. When

comparative analysis is used, it often is superficial and qualitative or semi-quantitative with

only rankings for alternatives.

Even for a technical expert, the basis for a

cleanup decision is often hard to understand;

the public has an even greater problem. RODS

often lack much key information, such as test

data, other nearby sources of contamination,

earlier actions, or even an earlier ROD. In hindsight, earlier actions are frequently ineffective

from a longer term perspective and often make

subsequent attempts to permanently clean sites

more costly and difficult. At the Crystal City

site in Texas, for example, a previous action

buried hazardous materials which must now

be excavated and re-buried onsite in a final

cleanup. The ROD offers an opportunity—not

yet used—to evaluate past site actions and to

learn from them.

Sometimes a remedy and its implementation

constitute a research or demonstration project

because there is no treatability study data or

the technology isn’t proven for the site. But the

cleanup is not publicly presented as experimental or highly uncertain. While the technology selected may, in some cases, make sense,

the public may ultimately think it unfair of the

government to hide the uncertainty and risk.

Moreover, making the claim that a permanent

remedy has been selected is questionable if the

technology is experimental.

same evaluation criteria, although they were not presented as

clearly. [U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid

Waste and Emergency Response, directives 9355.0-21 (July 24,

1987] and 9355.0-19 (Dec. 24, 1986)].
10 CASE STUDIES

Each of the 10 case studies in this report is

drawn from a Record of Decision (ROD), which

is EPA’s official understanding of the facts from

site studies and EPA’s explanation of how the

facts support its selection of a cleanup technology. Each ROD also includes a summary of

how EPA responded to public comment and

generally includes a summary of the administrative record (related documents) for the site.

EPA can and sometimes does reject, change,

and supplement the findings of the contractor(s)

who prepare the RIFS and draft the ROD.

Methodology

These 10 case studies were selected from recent RODS, from September 1987 through December 1987, which EPA has acknowledged

came under SARA. OTA identified issues in

its 1985 study Superfund Strategy and in the

ongoing Superfund Implementation study of

which the case studies is just one part. This

other work helped in the selection of representative case studies. The 10 cases here were chosen to illustrate different technology selection

problems, none of which are unique to these

sites, and to illustrate different types of sites

and hazards. This report discusses about 10 percent of all recent RODS to which EPA has applied SARA. OTA examined nearly all recent

RODs—over a hundred—to verify that the case

study sites are representative.

Format for Case Studies

The case studies are presented in a standard

format. Following is a sample of the format with

explanations, where necessary, of the categories and of the terms and sources used in the

case studies. Unless noted otherwise, the quotations in the case studies are from the site’s

ROD. Statements from other RODS, from other

case studies, and other Superfund sites are often

used in the case studies to illustrate program

inconsistencies. To complete each site’s history,

two EPA data management systems were needed:

1) the CERCLIS inventory of all sites reported

to EPA, and 2) the Superfund Comprehensive

Accomplishments Plan (SCAP). The latter is a

budget management system; OTA used data

from SCAP NPL Site Summary reports dated

October 27, 1987.

Sample Format

Name, location of site, and EPA region:

Capsule OTA findings:

Key dates:

Entered Superfund system: EPA maintains

an inventory of sites called CERCLIS. The date

when the region gets notification of a site is

recorded is the site discovery date. Many sites

new to Superfund come with long histories of

contamination and cleanup efforts.

Preliminary Assessment: The Preliminary

Assessment is the first screening step in the preremedial process; it consists mostly of examination of existing records. It is done by EPA

contractors or by States. Sometimes a PA is

done after other actions which are supposed

to come before it, apparently to satisfy the requirement that it be done.

Site Inspection: The Site Inspection involves

some field work and testing to define the nature and scope of the hazard. The S1 is the second screening step in the pre-remedial process and leads to Hazard Ranking System (HRS)

scoring of the site. The S1 is done by EPA contractors or States; the initial scoring is by EPA

contractors, EPA regional staff, or States.

National Priorities List

. proposed date:

● final date:

. site rank:

Sites that get an HRS score of 28.5 or more

go on the NPL and become eligible for remedial cleanup. Initially EPA proposes a site for

the NPL, and, after an opportunity for public

comment, the site can become a final NPL site.

Final sites are ranked by their HRS score; the

ranks in the case studies are from the NPL as

of July 1987. Then the NPL had 770 ranked sites

16

.
17

and more than 200 proposed sites. EPA revises

the NPL only periodically, approximately once

a year. The significance of the rankings for taking action has not been made clear by EPA. A

site can receive various Superfund actions without being on the NPL.

RIFS start and completion: The Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RIFS) provides

the information base for the ROD. RIFSS are

done by private engineering consulting firms,

paid by EPA, responsible parties, or States.

Public comment period before ROD: EPA is

required to make available certain documents

for public review for 21 days prior to the ROD;

the period can be extended.

Signing of ROD: EPA Regional Administrators officially sign RODS, although in a few

cases the EPA Headquarters Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency

Response, may do so,

Estimated complete remediation: The ROD

normally estimates when the final action or,

if the action is not final, when the whole

cleanup will be done.

Total time: The total elapsed time of above

dates.

Brief description of site:

Major contamination/environmental threat:

HRS scores: EPA’s policy is that a site score a

minimum of 28.5 to be placed on the NPL.

(Once only, States can nominate one site for

the NPL regardless of its score.) The maximum

subscores for groundwater, surface water, and

air are 100, and a formula is used to combine

the subscores so that the maximum total score

is also 100. (This calculation applies to the version of the HRS used for the case study sites;

a newer HRS version, required by SARA, may

change this methodology.) There are many concerns about the accuracy of HRS scores and

their use in ranking NPL sites; an HRS score

may not paint an accurate picture of a site’s

original or current environmental threat. Sites

are not rescored after removal actions or interim remedial measures.

Removal actions: Removals are site actions on

non-NPL sites and on NPL sites before (or during) a remedial cleanup. They are usually handled by a different office within the Superfund

program than that which handles the remedial

cleanup. A variety of removal actions can be

taken as emergency or time-critical measures.

SARA authorizes more time and money for

removal actions than did CERCLA.

Cleanup remedy selected:

Satisfaction of SARA statutory requirements:

1) Selection of permanent cleanup.—The

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization

Act of 1986 (SARA) states that EPA shall: 1)

“select a remedial action that . . . utilizes permanent solutions and alternative treatment

technologies or resource recovery technologies

to the maximum extent practicable,” and, 2)

if this is not done, “publish an explanation as

to why a remedial action involving such reductions [in the toxicity, mobility, or volume of the

hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant] was not selected.” (SARA Section 121)

Z) Accurate assessment of land disposal and

containment alternatives.—SARA states that

EPA shall “take into account:” . . . the longterm uncertainties associated with land disposal; . . . short- and long-term potential for adverse health effects from human exposure;. . .

the potential for future remedial action costs

if the alternative remedial action in question

were to fail . . . “ (SARA Section 121)

RIFS contractor: Information on time, cost, and

company is normally available from the ROD;

if not, OTA obtained it from other EPA sources.

State concurrence: Only information reported by

EPA in the ROD was used.

Community acceptance: The ROD’s responsiveness summary was chiefly used. It does not necessarily reflect the full range of public opinion

about a site because it only describes direct interactions through the official public comment

process between the community and EPA.

Special comments:

General conclusions:
18

Case Study 1

Chemical Control Corp., Elizabeth, NJ;

EPA Region 2

Capsule OTA findings. -Unproven solidification

(chemical fixation)technology was selected to

treat in situ highly contaminated subsurface

soil, which previous removal actions had left

below the water table and covered up with

gravel. No treatability studywas used.The cost

of incineration was over estimated. The cleanup

will leave untreated contamination on the site.

Key dates:

Entered Superfund system: 5/1/79

Preliminary Assessment: 5/1/79

Site Inspection: 4/1/79 - 8/1/82

National Priorities List

–proposed date: 10/1/81

–final date: 9/1/83

—site rank: #223 out of 770

RIFS start and completion: 12/31/84 -

6/30/87 (ROD says it began in 11/86, but

SCAP has earlier date)

Public comment period before Record of

Decision: 7/6/87 - 8/14/87

Signing of ROD: 9/23/87

Estimated complete remediation: 28 to 32

months after R-OD (around 4/90)

Totai time.—ll years

Briaf description of site.—“The site consists of this

2.2-acre property and the portion of the

Elizabeth River adjacent to the property, . . . the

water table aquifer at the site [is] saline and tidally influenced. The site is flat and barely

above sea level. Chemical Control Corp. operated from 1970 until 1978 hauling, treating, and

disposing of a wide variety of industrial wastes.

Throughout its operations, it was cited for violations thet included discharging liquids onto

the ground adjacent to the Elizabeth River and

accumulating thousands of drums of incompatible wastes.”

Major contamination/environmontai tlnat.–” . . . soils

beneath those removed by the NJDEP [New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection]

are highly contaminated with a variety of organic compounds and to a lesser degree with

metals. . . . these contaminants are strongly adsorbed to the soil and are present in the groundwater in relatively low concentrations. The contaminants found in the [river] sediments ., . are

not all attributed to the Chemical Control site.”

The contaminated layer “averages approximately ten feet thick. . . . some of the more

mobile chemicals continue to leach into the

groundwater. Significant health threats are

posed by direct contact, fugitive dust emission,

and volatilization. Contaminants are only leaving the site via the groundwater. . . . direct contact with sediments as well as ingestion of contaminated shellfish are both potential exposure

routes. Flooding happens occasionally at the

site now . . . “ The ROD indicated a volume of

contaminated material of 18,000 cubic yards.

HRS scores.—groundwater O; surface water

18.18; air 79.49; total 47.13

Removai actions.—State removal of large quantities of wastes began in March 1979 and was

interrupted by a major fire in April 1980. After

the fire, the State removed more material,

including 3 feet of surface soil which was

replaced with gravel. Also, from November

1980 until July 1981, the State operated a

groundwater recovery and treatment system.

This action plus groundwater movement and

not just the adsorption of contaminants to soil

may explain why the subsequent Remedial Investigation found little contamination and why

the HRS groundwater score in 1982 was zero.

Overall, the State of New Jersey has spent $25

million on the site.

After the site became a Superfund site, four

additional initial remedial measures were carried out (in 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987) to remove more materials from the site.

Cieanup remedy selected.—Other than containment, treatment alternatives considered were

soil washing, solvent extraction, and incineration, The selected remedy was in situ fixation

(chemical fixation, stabilization, and solidification often are used to describe similar treatments). Fixation chemicals would be injected

though an expandable bit drill which would

pass through the gravel layer: “A series of over-
19

lapping columns would be formed converting

all of the contaminated soil at the site into a

solid mass. This would inhibit water from flowing through the site, thereby preventing the

production of leachate. In addition, some contaminants may be chemically altered and incorporated in the solid matrix formed by this

action, reducing the toxicity as well as the mobility of the contaminants. The potential for exposing the contaminated soil would be eliminated. The treatment] will create a solid matrix

that will have extremely low permeability. . . .

because it is implemented primarily below

ground, [the treatment] offers protection against

releases during a flood. ”

The estimated cost for the selected remedy

is $7.4 million, while the cost for excavation,

onsite treatment, and onsite disposal of residues

is $14.5 million for fixation and soil washing

and $22.3 million for incineration. The ROD

also commits to some other relatively minor

removal actions and environmental monitoring, “including an evaluation after five years

to assess its protectiveness to public health and

the environment. ”

Satisfaction of SARA statutory requirements.

1) Selection of permanent clean up.—’’The remedial alternative presented in this document

is a permanent solution for closure of the Chemical Control site. . . . this remedy satisfies the

preference for treatment that reduces toxicity,

mobility, or volume as a principal element. . . .

this remedy utilizes permanent solutions and

alternate treatment technologies to the maximum extent practicable. Based on the input received during the public comment period, this

alternative has been selected by the EPA and

the NJDEP as the final permanent solution for

the site. [The selected remedy] also utilizes an

alternative treatment technology that offers a

more cost-effective remedy. ”

The fact that the ROD met SARA’s requirement for a five-year review indicates that EPA

recognizes that the selected remedy would leave

untreated, undestroyed, and toxic wastes onsite. EPA normally responds to the statutory

requirement for review for land disposal/containment remedies and when only partial destruction treatment technologies are used at a

site. The review has implications for future land

use because use of the land might interfere with

reviews and because results of reviews might

reveal hazards that would block land use.

A major issue with the selected remedy of

in situ fixation is that it is not a proven technology; no data exist to show effectiveness for

cleanup of a hazardous waste site comparable

to Chemical Control. No treatability study was

conducted prior to the ROD to provide evidence

of effectiveness in terms of resistance to longterm leaching or actual toxicity reduction. The

diverse set of contaminants at the site would

pose a challenge to conventional chemical fixation techniques. The use of in situ fixation beneath the water table in saline conditions may

exacerbate the difficulty of achieving an effective cleanup. Various ROD statements on this

issue include:

●

●

●

●

●

●

“Although in-situ fixation is not yet a standard construction practice, several vendors

are available that provide this service. ” 64 .*, the in-situ process described in this

document is currently being studied for use

at other hazardous waste sites. ”

“The long-term reliability of this alternative is especially promising” (emphasis

added).

“A treatability study and field test will be

required during design to prove the technology . . . “ 64 environmental samples will be collected to monitor the effectiveness of the

remedy.” (No specific technical criteria are

given.)

“Although such an application of this technology is fairly new, promising results have

been obtained in laboratory tests, and it is

being tested at other hazardous waste sites

and evaluated under the Superfund Innovative Technology Evaluation program.

The Chemical Control project will benefit

from the experience gained at these sites.”

Despite the last comment, OTA has been only

able to identify the evaluation within the SITE

program. A vendor in conjunction with Gen-
20

eral Electric has demonstrated its technology

at a GE site in Hialeah, Florida, in April 1988.

PCB contaminated soil was treated. A demonstration report is supposed to be available approximately four to six months after the demonstration. OTA contacted the vendor of the

in situ chemical fixation technology for the GE

site and was told that no tests have been conducted on materials from Chemical Control but

preliminary laboratory tests have been successful on material from the Hialeah site. GE will

be using the technology to actually clean up

the Hialeah site; the cleanup will constitute the

SITE demonstration. GE plans to do this cleanup even though EPA has not officially sanctioned its use at Hialeah; the agency has problems in issuing regulatory permits for an

innovative treatment technology, necessary because the cleanup is not at a Superfund site.

Given the timing of the Hialeah demonstration,

it is difficult to understand how the selected

remedy can be already judged to satisfy requirements for Chemical Control. Officially, there

are no performance criteria to prove the effectiveness of the technology. Moreover, one of

the objectives for the SITE demonstration is to

determine the “integrity of the solidified soil

over a period of five years.” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Superfund Innovative Technology Evaluation (SITE) Program,”

HWERL Symposium, May 9-11, 1988.)

But when will the technology be completely

evaluated? Some innovative technologies have

been demonstrated several times and still have

uncertainties for broad use. The information

available on the SITE demonstration is inconsistent with the schedule for implementation

of the selected remedy given in the Chemical

Control ROD and seasonal constraints may also

delay cleanup.

Moreover, the SITE demonstration will not

be performed on a comparable contaminated

material. The presence of volatile organics and

metals, for example, makes the Chemical Control project significantly different. A positive

SITE demonstration result will not, therefore,

substitute for a treatability study on Chemical

Control material nor should it justify performing a pilot study at Chemical Control.

The EPA decision to use incineration at the

Southern Crop Services site in Florida at about

the same time of the Chemical Control decision undercuts the use of stabilization for

Chemical Control. In justifying its selection of

incineration, EPA said: “Solidification and fixation of pesticide contaminated soil was found

to be technically unacceptable due to the high

detected concentrations and because organic

pesticides tend to leach from solidified material. This technology was deemed unacceptable.” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

Region 4, memorandum, Sept. 8, 1987.) Pesticides are among the many different types of

organic contaminants present at Chemical Control. The FS for the Re-Solve site in Massachusetts rejected stabilization because “there has

been limited success in chemically fixing organic

contaminants such as solvents and PCBS. ”

The ROD for the Liquid Disposal site in Michigan, which also selected stabilization for soil

contaminated with organic chemicals, said that

the hazardous substances “will not be permanently destroyed” and “hazardous chemicals

still remain in that [treated] mass. ” And the FS

for the site said: “Considerable research data

exists demonstrating the effectiveness of this

technology in immobilizing a wide range of

contaminants, primarily inorganic. A substantial amount of data does not exist, however, to

accurately judge the long-term reliability of the

process.” Of particular significance to the use

of stabilization at Chemical Control, the Liquid Disposal ROD also selected a slurry wall

and impermeable cap around and over the

treated material, in part because it is necessary

to “protect the solidified soil/waste from degradation by upgradient ground water that is

slightly contaminated with chemicals” (emphasis added).

A recent EPA study found “large losses of

organics during the [stabilization] mixing process.” (L. Weitzman et al., “Evaluation of Solidification/Stabilization As A Best Demonstrated

Available Technology,” paper presented at

EPA’s Fourteenth Annual Research Symposium, May 1988.) Another EPA study showed

that stabilization was not competitive with thermal and chemical treatment technologies and
21

soil washing for organic contamination. (R.C.

Thurnau and M.P. Esposito, “TCLP As A Measure of Treatment Effectiveness: Results of

TCLP Work Completed on Different Treatment

Technologies for CERCLA Soils,” paper presented at EPA’s Fourteenth Annual Research

Symposium, May 1988.) A demonstration of a

stabilization technology under EPA auspices

concluded that “for the organics, the leachate

concentrations were approximately equal for

the treated and untreated soils.” (P.R. de Percin and S. Sawyer, “SITE Demonstration of

Hazcon Solidification/Stabilization Process,”

paper presented at EPA’s Fourteenth Annual

Research Symposium, May 1988.)

Senior EPA people have made an important

observation about in situ stabilization:” . . . the

decision to use a stabilization technique should

be made only after the chemical and physical

properties of the solidified waste have been extensively tested to insure that the required properties have been developed. ” (D.E. Sanning and

R.F. Lewis, “U.S. EPA Research on In-Situ

Treatment Technology,” Anatomy of Superfund, proceedings of the 8th National Ground

Water Quality Symposium, September 1986.)

The ROD for Chemical Control does not meet

these requirements.

An educational short course and two recent

EPA documents on cleanup technologies make

no reference to the selected technology. (U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency, “Remedial

Engineering of Hazardous Waste Sites,” The

National Hazardous Materials Training Center, October 1987; “A Compendium of Technologies Used in the Treatment of Hazardous

Waste,” September 1987; “RCRA/CERCLA

Treatment Alternatives for Hazardous Wastes,”

October 1987.) The latter EPA document is used

to teach people implementing hazardous waste

programs about waste treatment and says:

“Solidification technologies are designed to be

used for final waste treatment. This means the

technology should be applied only after other

treatment techniques have been applied, i.e.,

incineration, chemical treatment or other.”

Another observer has commented on this approach: “Experimental studies have been conducted in the field. The level of treatment

achievable is variable, depending on the waste

and soil conditions. The potential for long-term

immobilization is unknown at this time. The

reliability of the treatment is unknown since

there is no information on its long-term effectiveness.” (R. Sims et al., “Contaminated Surface Soils In-Place Treatment Techniques,”

Noyes Publishers, 1986.)

The Feasibility Study for the Crystal City site

rejected in situ chemical stabilization: “Immobilization, chemical treatment, and physical treatments have not been shown to be feasible for in situ treatment of these contaminants

as it is not possible to get a good, uniform, well

distributed treatment.” The focused FS for the

Conservation Chemical Co. site in Missouri rejected in situ stabilization: “Technology [was]

attempted and [was] found not feasible at other

similar sites. Technology is not sufficiently developed.” An addendum study also rejected in

situ immobilization (which cannot be differentiated from stabilization): “Technology would

not effect organic and other non-metallic contamination; thus, these substances would continue to be a source of contamination. Immobilization reactions are reversible.” The FS for the

Pristine site in Ohio rejected in situ chemical

detoxification: “Treatability study is required

to assure effectiveness. It is difficult to ensure

proper reactant mixing and verify effectiveness.”

The same contractor that prepared the Chemical Control FS has tested in situ chemical

stabilization elsewhere. (“Feasibility Study Saltville Waste Disposal Site, Smyth County, Virginia,” August 1986.) Successful laboratory and

pilot tests led to the fieldtesting of a particular

in situ treatment; however, the fieldtests failed

and the approach was dropped. This twist illustrates the uncertainty of a technology, even

after successful laboratory tests.

The ROD said that the selected remedy “offers

a level of long-term protection comparable to

or exceeding that of any of the other alternatives.” However, if the selected remedy has not

been shown to destroy the organic contaminants the way incineration could, is this assertion of comparable permanence correct? In-
22

cineration followed by chemical fixation of the

residue to immobilize toxic metals offers a

higher level of protection. Therefore, the additional estimated cost for the incineration option (three times more than fixation) does not

eliminate its cost-effectiveness. Also, the cost

estimate for the selected remedy is unreliable

because the technology has not been used before on such a site.

This ROD illustrated the benefit of examining the supporting Feasibility Study. In this

case, the FS introduced several new elements:

1. The ROD did not reveal several facts about

the site and the selected remedy that were in

the FS: a) the curing time for the fixation material is about one month; b) there is a volumetric increase in the waste after treatment that

depends on site materials and conditions; c) “It

is unlikely that solidification can be effected

in contaminated areas at the interface between

the river and the site. This residual contamination will continue to flush from such areas

surrounding the solidified mass”; d) “This alternative will not reduce any potential human

health or environmental impacts associated

with the contamination detected in the gravel

cover atop the site”; e) “ . . . even under nonflood conditions, the water table is quite close

to the surface of the site”; and f) The estimated

costs for the bench test and pilot test for the

in situ fixation alternative are $770,000.

Z. The FS analysis of the selected remedy suggested that there is reliable information on

which to base conclusions. The text contained

phrases such as: “has been demonstrated,” “the

available literature, ” and “it is reported,” suggesting that technical literature and EPA reports were used. But, all the information came

from a single vendor (identified in figure 3-6

in the FS). The FS also referred to the GE Hialeah site as a Superfund site, which it is not,

and the FS said (in June 1987) that “a field application of the emerging technology is presently underway, ” which it was not.

3. The FS analysis of incineration is poor. The

unit cost for incineration only (with other costs

figured separately) was $750 per cubic yard for

the combination of onsite incineration and offsite disposal (where a baseline of 21,000 cubic

yards of soil was used) and $00 per cubic yard

for the combination of onsite incineration and

onsite disposal (where a baseline of 27,000 cubic yards of soil was used). These differences

in unit cost and soil volume do not make sense.

Other vendors are now quoting less than $3OO

per cubic yard for the volume of work at this

site and, indeed, $3OO per cubic yard was quoted

in the FS for the Davis Liquid Waste site in

Rhode Island (where onsite incineration was

selected) and $186 per cubic yard was quoted

in the FS for the Seymour Recycling site. The

Chemical Control FS also stated that “Rotary

kiln and fluidized bed incinerators are the only

types of mobile units currently available.” This

statement is not true. According to EPA, there

are three other types of full-scale mobile thermal technologies available: circulating bed, infrared, and wet air. (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “RCRA/CERCLA Treatment

Alternatives for Hazardous Wastes,” October

1987.) If $300 per cubic yard were used (with

other costs factored in separately) for onsite mobile incineration of 18,000 cubic yards (the same

amount of material as for the selected remedy),

then the cost would be about $14 million. This

cost compares to the ROD cost for onsite incineration with onsite disposal for 27,000 cubic yards at $22 million. The ROD omitted FS

low and high cost estimates for the options.

Since there is no field experience within situ

fixation, its high cost estimate of $14 million

is significant as an estimate. Thus it is possible

that incineration at $14 million might be about

the same cost as the selected remedy and not

three times more. More recently, after the ROD,

a news story reported that the cleanup project’s

estimated cost is $10 million, with $750,000 ah

located for the one-year design job, an amount

which could not account for the cost of the treatability study. (Superfund, Feb. 1, 1988.)

4. The analytical framework used to evaluate alternative cleanup approaches is inconsistent with commonly accepted practice and with 

EPA’s recommendations. A July 1987 EPA

directive clearly recommended the use of nine

criteria; an earlier directive was less clear. Only

four criteria were used in this FS: technical fea-
23

sibility, public health and environmental concerns, institutional considerations, and cost.

However, analysis using additional criteria,

particularly factors such as reliability and implementability which are normally stressed,

would have worked against the selected remedy. (Indeed, this analytical result happened in

the ROD for the Conservation Chemical Co. site

in Missouri, in which the only soil treatment

alternative faired poorly on reliability and implementability and thus was rejected.) The

Chemical Control ROD evaluated each cleanup

alternative separately. An explicit comparison

of alternatives weighing relative advantages

and disadvantages was not done in the FS or

the ROD. (At Conservation Chemical, the ROD

comparative analysis of cleanup alternatives

was done within individual discussions of

evaluation criteria, a very useful approach compared to discussing each alternative for all

criteria.)

To sum up, an analysis of the FS shows that

there was little basis to select the in situ chemical fixation alternative and that the FS analysis was biased in favor of the selected remedy

and against using onsite incineration. Onsite

incineration is a proven, more cost-effective,

and more reliable cleanup alternative than the

FS and ROD indicated.

2) Accurate assessment of land disposal and

containment alternatives.—To a significant extent, the selected remedy is a land disposal/containment approach because, unless shown

otherwise with positive test results, chemical

fixation cannot be assumed to detoxify all contaminants. Leaving the contaminated soil onsite and beneath the water table raises questions about future failure. No technical criteria

were established to determine failure of the

selected remedy. Failure is a real possibility,

since the same generic treatment failed at the

Conservation Chemical Co. site. A volume increase in the treated waste with the addition

of fixation chemicals raises questions about the

integrity of the resulting solidified mass within

the site with in situ use. Costs were not estimated to repair a failure of the selected remedy.

A traditional containment wall was examined, but the ROD said that a containment wall

might need replacement in the future. But the

ROD noted that a wall “would offer effective

protection if institutional controls were imposed to prohibit any future digging at the site.”

Interestingly, in the Chemical Control situation, a containment approach might have made

sense—as an interim measure—because there

are many other sources of river contamination

around the site that could reduce the effectiveness of a remedy that leaves site material vulnerable to recontamination. The ROD noted the

risk of recontaminating clean material backfilled into the site. Contaminants from the river

might also affect the effectiveness of chemical

stabilization.

RIFS contractor.—State-led; NUS Corp. under

subcontract to Ebasco Services, Inc.; about $1

million obligated. SCAP indicated a RIFS from

9/28/83 - 2/15/85 at a cost of $208,000, a subsequent ROD on 2/15/85, a Remedial Design at

$504,000, and a Remedial Action at $485,000.

There was no information in the 1987 ROD’s

site history on the earlier RIFS, ROD, and remedial action, and SCAP listed separately the

interim remedial measures and removal actions

with their costs. To confuse things still more,

a master EPA list of all Superfund RODS

showed an earlier ROD on 9/19/83.

State concurrence.—New Jersey agreed with the

selected remedy.

Community acceptance.—The ROD said: “The

main concern of local officials is that a thorough, permanent remedy be expeditiously implemented.” The responsiveness summary also

indicated some public concern about the effectiveness of the selected remedy, particularly because of its inattention to toxic metals.

Special comments.—The ROD did not address

the problem of highly contaminated river residues. The chief reason is the other sources of

contamination: “ . . . remediation of the river

sediments is premature. ” If the river residues

are considered part of the Chemical control

site, then this ROD does not offer a final permanent cleanup of the entire site.
24 ●

Why did the State leave the contaminated soil

in place in a previous site action and cover it

up with permeable gravel? This action complicates a permanent remedy and will contribute

to continued leaching of contaminants into the

river and its sediments for about 10 years. Even

though EPA said that the contaminants adhere

to the soil, not all the contaminants could behave so ideally nor, as discussed in the FS, will

all contaminants be treated to reduce their mobility. The ROD gave no data to support the contention that all the contaminants are tightly

bound to the soil. The ROD noted: “The NJDEP

has also indicated that contaminant concentrations in the soil at Chemical Control exceed

State guidelines.” It is not clear why an interim

containment action at the site, such as a slurry

wall and cap, was not implemented years ago.

Other innovative in situ treatment technologies—including biological treatment and

vitrification—could have been considered in

treatability studies as viable candidates, but

were not. The FS rejected in situ vitrification

(ISV) on grounds that also could have been used

to reject the selected remedy. Yet ISV was

selected for the Pristine site, and the Crystal

City FS evaluated ISV favorably, although it did

not select ISV or any treatment alternative:

“[ISV] has been successfully demonstrated in

laboratory and bench testing. IISV] was determined to be feasible given the existing information available and is retained for further

evaluation. ” A recent NJDEP report’s discussion on innovative/alternative technologies

said: “various technologies presently exist

which can adequately address contaminated

soil and other contaminated media. For example, waste vitrification (imbedding waste in

glass) can immobilize organic or inorganic contaminants while generating residuals that are

delistable and environmentally safe.” Moreover, the NJDEP report also noted that treatability studies are done during the RIFS to “fill

data gaps . . . and supply information needed

to select a design alternative.” (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, “Comprehensive Management PIan 1988-1992,” October 1987.) The point here is not whether ISV

is the best cleanup technology for the site but

that a case could have been made to evaluate

it as the ROD did for in situ stabilization.

The ROD had no summary of the administrative record which, because of the inconsistent information on dates, would have been very

useful.

General collusions.–EPA’s high confidence and

certainty about the selected remedy is unsupported by analysis. In this case as in several

other case studies, the ROD did not follow

EPA’s guidance that ROD analysis “must be

based on a specific process within [a] technology category . . . to ground the analysis in hard

data.” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

“Interim Guidance on Superfund Selection of

Remedy,” Dec. 24, 1986.) The ROD package

contained a letter of August 31, 1987, in which

EPA told the City of Elizabeth’s Director of

Health, Welfare and Housing:” . . . we feel that

in-situ fixation will protect public health and

the environment from any hazards posed by

the site.” As with the statements in the ROD

about the selection being permanent, the statement in the letter was inconsistent with the

need to prove the effectiveness of the remedy,

through a treatability study, after it was selected

but before it is fully applied. In the same letter

to the city official, EPA said: “In the event that

these tests show that in-situ fixation would fail

to offer protection of public health and the

environment, the ROD would be amended as

necessary. ” Examining alternatives, selecting

another remedy, amending the ROD, and implementing another remedy would, of course,

take considerable time. Indeed, this scenario

has happened at other Superfund sites, including the Re-Solve site in Massachusetts, the Conservation Chemical Co. site in Missouri, and

at Love Canal in New York.

A systematic bias against incineration was

suggested in the site FS evaluation, particularly

for cost. Use of mobile incineration might not

cost significantly more than the selected remedy,

but it would offer more certain effectiveness.

The Chemical Control site illustrates the problem of delaying a treatability study until the design phase. While chemical fixation is consid-
25

ered a treatment, it cannot be assumed to

detoxify all contaminants. A treatability study

during the design phase should be limited to

obtaining data necessary for the detailed, engineering design of the selected technology and

also to develop technical criteria to guide potential bidders on the project. If a treatability

study is necessary to show effectiveness, as in

this case, then it should be done, as it sometimes is, during the RIFS process. If it is delayed, then “Such a deferral may result in a

premature (and administratively ‘irreversible’)

commitment to a technology that may not be

appropriate for a given site.” (D. Truitt and J.

Caldwell, “Evaluation of Innovative Waste

Treatment Technologies,” Waste Management

Conference-Focus on the West, Colorado State

University, June 1987.)

The selected remedy for Chemical Control

can be considered a land disposal/containment

approach. OTA does not mean to challenge the

merits of the in situ chemical fixation technology but does question the decisionmaking process used at this site. Making the remedy selection before treatability test results are available

may mean that EPA was in a hurry to promote

innovative treatment technology and to issue

the ROD.

The ROD also did not assure a permanent

remedy for the site because it ignored the

cleanup of the highly contaminated river sediments, ignored the contamination in the gravel,

and ignored the untreated material at the river’s

edge. The ROD over estimated the cost of onsite incineration, which could achieve more

permanent, more complete, and more certain

cleanup at a cost of about $14 million, instead

of the ROD’s $22 million estimate.

The serious complication of other nearby

sources of contamination shows that Superfund

sites cannot be seen in isolation. The ROD noted

that recontamination of the site is a p~tential

problem. Therefore, a case could have been

made for coordinating this cleanup with others

to assure an overall, permanently effective solution for all of them.

There seems to be an unusual interest in the

RIFS and ROD process in reusing the site and

constructing something on it, despite the uncertainty of the selected cleanup, despite the

contaminated materials to remain onsite, and

despite the other nearby sources of contamination. The FS indicated that the State of New

Jersey owns the land and that, with the selected

remedy, New Jersey’s own law regarding real

estate transfer would be violated if the site was

put into commercial reuse “Since some residual contamination will exist in the gravel cover

under [the selected remedy], and since the subsurface contamination will still be present (although immobile), it is unlikely that this alternative ,will comply with the concentration

requirements of ECRA [New Jersey’s Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act]. It is felt

that this alternative will be consistent with the

intent of ECW, however.” The FS noted a cancer risk above 1 in 1 million for contact with

the contaminated gravel, a risk that has implications for future use of the site and onsite

workers.

Case Study 2

Compass Industries, Tulsa County, Oklahoma;

EPA Region 6

Capsule OTAfindings.-Capping (containment) of

waste was chosen over incineration, capping

was called a cost-effective, permanent cleanup

even though it does not provide permanent protection co~arable to incineration. Treatment

of contaminated groundwater is not yet planned.

Kay datas:

●

●

●

●

a

●

●

●

●

Entered Superfund system: 10/1/80

preliminary Assessment: 4/1/80

Site Inspection: 7/1/82

National Priorities List

–proposed date: 9/83

–final date: 9/84

—site rank: #483 out of 770

RIFS start and completion: 6/29/84- 7/13/87

Public comment period before Record of

Decision: 7/22/87 - 8/31/87

Signing of ROD: 9/29/87

Estimated complete remediation: 9/90

Totai time.—lO years

.
26

Brief description of site.-The site is” . . . an abandoned landfill located west of Tulsa, Oklahoma.

The site occupies an abandoned limestone

quarry. From 1972 to 1976 the site was permitted and operated as a solid and industrial

waste landfill. physically, the site is situated

on a bluff approximately one-quarter mile south

and zoo feet above the Arkansas River. An

elementary school lies within one-half mile and

a major regional park is immediately adjacent

to the site.”

Major contamination/environmental threat.—” . . . a

large number of organic and inorganic priority

pollutants were detected. They include a total

of 12 inorganic priority pollutants and at least

33 organic priority pollutants . . . pathways of

possible off-site contaminant migration are surface water, groundwater, and air. The possibility also exists for direct contact at the site

with contaminated source materials, such as

sludge, soil, or sediments. The majority of the

contamination in the groundwater is confined

to the upper aquifer. Samples of groundwater

from monitoring wells on the site are highly

contaminated. This indicates a degradation of

groundwater quality due to waste disposal in

both the perched and deep aquifers. The volume of waste was determined to be approximately 620,000 cubic yards. The average groundwater flow rate of both aquifers is 720 gallons

per day or an estimated 263,000 gallons of water

per year [into Arkansas river]. The most recent

fire burned for several years before it apparently burned out in 1984. . . . there exists a potential for future fires. . . . [During fires] elevated levels of air contaminants may present

a health hazard.”

HRS scores .—groundwater 11.05; surface water

18.46; air 59.49; total 36.57

Removai actions.—None indicated.

Cieanup remedy selected.—Two major alternatives

were considered: 1) leaving waste in the ground,

capping the site, and treating groundwater; and

2) incineration of excavated wastes. There are

three parts to the selected remedy: 1) capping

the site; 2) if deemed necessary through compliance, monitoring after installation of the

cover material, collecting and treating onsite

the contaminated groundwater in the upper,

perched water bearing zone; and s) installing

fences and signs along the perimeter of the cap.

“This alternative consists of site grading, cap

placement, diversion of surface water, and air

emissions monitoring. The site cap will be required to meet RCRA specifications. Groundwater will be treated at a later date if found to

be necessary. The site will be monitored for a

period of at least so years . . . to ensure that no

significant contaminant concentrations migrate from the site” (emphasis added).

Estimated cost: $12 million.

Satisfaction of SARA statutory requirements:

1) Selection of permanent cleanup.—The

ROD said that “ . . . [the selected] remedy utilizes permanent solutions and alternative treatment technologies to the maximum extent practicable.” The ROD acknowledged that capping

only reduces the mobility of contaminants;

groundwater treatment would also “reduce the

volume and toxicity of wastes on site to some

degree.” Hazardous residues from water treatment would be shipped offsite to a landfill.

Full onsite thermal destruction was examined

as an alternative and was given highest ratings

“because this process would destroy the organic compounds in the waste.” Partial onsite

thermal destruction of 2 percent of the waste,

coupled with capping and groundwater treatment, would have been an improvement over

capping and groundwater treatment alone. Regarding full onsite thermal destruction: “ . . .

this remedy is not cost-effective ($339 million

vs. $12 million). ” However, the ROD acknowledged that full incineration would give the best

overall environmental protection. Regarding

partial thermal destruction: “ . . . the increase

in cost does not justify the negligible increase

in protection to human health and the environment.” Also, regarding implementability: “Onsite incineration remedies . . . will require relatively more attention during design than other

remedies . . . and were therefore rated lower

than the other alternatives.” That is, treatment

requires more work than waste containment.

2) Accurate assessment of land disposal and

containment alternatives.—Regarding short-
27

term health effects for capping, there are” . . .

essentially no risks to workers or residents.”

For long-term effectiveness, the remedy “ . . .

will successfully reduce long term risks to human health and the environment.” Standard

operation and maintenance for site and cap was

planned. Regarding future actions: No future

remedial actions are anticipated. The selected

remedial action is considered permanent” (emphasis added).

The selected capping remedy, was given two

higher levels of ranking for reduction of toxicity and volume of waste as compared to the no

action alternative, even though capping does

no more to waste than no action. Ratings for

the reduction of mobility for the selected

remedy are probably too high, especially because it is not certain whether or not groundwater movement would be affected.

Several other areas of uncertainty remain:

●

●

●

“Future land use considerations will be

evaluated in the upcoming design phase

based on the needs of protection of the

cap. ”

That some water infiltration through the

cap, which would cause migration of contaminants into groundwater, might happen

is indicated by the possible use of a synthetic liner in the cap: “The long term

advantage to the liner is that less water

would be generated from the seeps” (emphasis added).

With regard to long-term impacts: “The potential for future fires and continued offsite migration of contaminants pose adverse human health and environmental impacts. Other impacts which the site may

pose cannot be effectively predicted, A

RCRA cap and groundwater treatment

would mitigate these problems as well as

most of the unseen, long term problems”

(emphasis added).

In the FS for the Pristine site in Ohio, landfilling the contaminated soil was rejected “Because there is no treatment of soils to reduce

the mobility, toxicity or volume [it] is not a permanent remedy. . . and [it] is the least preferred

under SARA” (emphasis added). In the FS for

the French Limited site (in the same EPA region as Compass), use of a slurry wall and cap

to contain hazardous waste was described as

a “temporary solution” for which the “volume

and toxicity would not be affected” and “the

potential would always exist for failure of either the cap or the slurry wall allowing for the

movement of unstabilized wastes contained

onsite. ”

RIFS contractor. –State led, $624,000; John

Mathes & Associates.

State concurrence.—“The State . . . has concurred

with the capping portion of this remedy. . . . the

State did not support any of the other proposed

remedies.”

Community acceptance.—” . . . the public was in

favor of [capping] over thermal treatment of the

waste. . . . the public concern was that the thermal treatment unit would create hazardous

emissions and increase the potential for exposure.”

Special comments:

●

●

●

●

No treatment technology other than thermal destruction was considered in the final analysis, although other possibilities

existed.

No commitment to using a liner was made

even though “ . . . Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,

which requires a cap with liner, is relevant

and appropriate. ”

No specific technical criteria were used for

deciding what types and levels of contamination found via groundwater monitoring

would trigger actual groundwater treatment. There was no comment on level of

certainty that groundwater monitoring

would in fact detect plumes of contamination.

No consideration was given to the effect

of leaving wastes in the ground and to the

effect of contaminants that have already

migrated into the subsurface. These subsurface contaminants can cause future

contamination of groundwater that moves

into and through the site area and eventually into the Arkansas river, even though
28

capping reduces water infiltration through

the site surface.

● Although the ROD acknowledged the SARA

requirement to review the chosen remedy,

which leaves waste onsite, every five years,

there is no explicit commitment to doing

so.

General conclusions.-The remedy selected (capping) and its supporting analysis do not satisfy

statutory requirements on remedy selection.

The selected remedy is not, as the ROD asserted, a permanent remedy. A number of statements in the ROD contradict the claim of permanency. For example, the possibility clearly

exists for future remedial action because wastes

are left untreated in the ground: “If however,

future migration does occur appropriate remedial actions will be taken.” The long-term uncertainties, the potential environmental risks,

and future cleanup costs for capping have not

been examined. Moreover, the perspective on

land disposal and capping in this ROD is inconsistent with work at other Superfund sites.

EPA said that the selected remedy is less environmentally effective than thermal destruction;

therefore, the chosen remedy is less cost-effective. Despite the extremely high cost of total

incineration, the issue of the environmental effectiveness of capping remains. If capping is

not effective, then its lower, more attractive cost

does not make it cost-effective and does not

make it a permanent remedy. It is not an eitheror situation.

To reduce cost, the partial incineration option of hot spots of contamination could have

been a compromise option. Perhaps spending

two to three times more money than capping,

instead of 20 to 30 times more for complete incineration, could have provided a permanent,

cost-effective remedy. The ROD suggested that

the site area is some 100 acres, but a statement

in the responsiveness summary refers to 32

acres for the cap. In either case, the amount

of soil sampling at the site—28 locations—was

insufficient to accurately characterize contaminant distribution. (Assuming there are 32 acres,

sampling is about one location per acre. For

comparison, at the Renora site in New Jersey,

sampling was done in 12 locations per acre;

at the Seymour Recycling site in Indiana, it was

six locations per acre; and at the Tacoma Tar

Pits site in Washington, it was one-and-a-half

locations per acre.) Hence, there was insufficient data to consider how partial excavation

and incineration for the most contaminated

areas might be cost-effective.

Doing enough soil sampling to assess a site

accurately enough to detect hot spots has been

studied by EPA. Soil sampling is a major effort: “Systematic sample site selection is normally used when attempting to determine areal

extent of contamination or when evaluating

spatial variations. Sampling locations are defined by a grid or coordinate system and samples are collected at preselected locations in

a uniform pattern. ” (R.J. Bruner, “A Review

of Quality Control Considerations in Soil Sampling,” Quality Control in Remedial Site Investigation, American Society for Testing and Materials, 1986, pp. 35-42.) The critical tradeoff

between the cost of taking more or less cleanup

action has been summed up by EPA: “If the

cost of a false positive (incremental cleanup of

additional area) is less than the cost of a false

negative (health risk due to not cleaning an

area), then the larger probability of false positive is acceptable. If the [contaminant concentration action level] were raised, the probability of false positives (unnecessary cleanup]

would be lessened, but with an increase in the

probability of a false negative (leaving a ‘dirty’

area).” (G.T. Flatman, “Design of Soil Sampling

Programs: Statistical Considerations,” Quality

Control in Remedial Site Investigation, American Society for Testing and Materials, 1986,

pp. 43-56.) The latter happens when average

site concentrations are used to decide what

cleanup to perform, because the average value

is below the action level. If hot spots are found,

their concentrations will be above the action

level and false negative (dirty) areas, as well

as false positive (clean) areas, are avoided; that

is, dirty areas are cleaned, but clean areas are

not.

At the Compass site, another strategy could

have been to delay cleanup or to see capping

as an interim remedy until more work could

be done to fully examine alternative treatment
29

technologies. The large amount of waste at the

site poses a difficult problem for which some

innovative cleanup technologies, including in

situ techniques to avoid excavation, could have

been considered and examined in treatability

studies.

Why the State and the community chose capping, an impermanent and incomplete remedy,

over incineration and groundwater treatment,

which are permanent and complete, is not entirely clear. But avoidance of higher costs and

pessimism about the safety of incineration seem

to be the critical factors. Concerns about incineration can be addressed through effective

communication of state-of-the-art incineration

technology including effective pollution control technology. The concern about enormous

cost for incineration could have been addressed

through either the hot spot or search for alternative treatment strategies.

Actually, the groundwater contamination

problem did not get enough attention, as capping cannot completely stop further contamination. (The ROD had a tacit acknowledgment

of a carcinogenic risk factor of 1 in 100,000 for

contaminant migration through groundwater

seeps entering the Arkansas River. It is not certain that the cap alone, or even in combination

with groundwater cleanup, would permanently

reduce this to EPA’s typical goal of limiting risk

to 1 in 1 million.)

This site also illustrates a subtle and largely

ignored issue in Superfund cleanups—cumulative risk. To what extent is a cleanup at one

site planned relative to neighboring cleanup

sites that can contribute environmental risk to

the same population? Assessment of environmental risk at only one Superfund site seldom

acknowledges human exposures from another

site and, therefore, what seems for one site to

be a safe level of contamination, exposure, and

risk may not be so cumulatively. The Compass

Industries site and the Sand Springs petrochemical Complex Superfund site face each other

across the Arkansas River. The migration of

contaminated groundwater into the river from

both sites would increase the danger to the same

downstream users.

Case Study 3

Conservation Chemical Company, Kansas

City, Missouri, EPA Region 7

Capsule OTA findings.—A hydraulic containment

system to pump and treat some contaminated

groundwater and capping of the site were chosen over the alternative of excavating and treating contaminated soil and buried wastes, which

was recommended in an EPA study and by the

State. Water treatment cannot remove all the

diverse contaminants at the site. No estimate

was said to be possible for the duration of the

cleanup.

Key ~atm:

Entered Superfund system: 1/1/79

Preliminary Assessment: 3/1/79

Site Inspection: 3/1/79 - 11/1/80

National Priorities List

–proposed date: 4/1/85

—final date: none

—site rank: none

RIFS start and completion: Complex history of studies by PRPs and EPA

Public comment period before Record of

Decision: 3/26/87 - 5/8/87

Signing of ROD: 9/30/87

Estimated complete remediation: none

possible

Total time.—Unpredicted but probably a very

long time–decades.

Brlaf description of site.–”The site is approximately 6 acres in size and is situated on the

floodplain of the Missouri River near the confluence of the Missouri and Blue Rivers, on the

river side of the levee. [The aquifer under the

site] is used as a source of drinking water by

both private residents and public water supply companies.”

“Waste disposal operations began [in 1960]

and continued until approximately 1980. CCC

employed a variety of waste handling practices,

including but not limited to solvent incineration, solvent resale, pickle liquor neutralization,

cyanide complexation, chromic acid reduction,

and ferric chloridelferric sulfate recovery. Residual materials from the various treatment

processes were generally disposed of on site
30

in the basins. Drums, bulk liquids, sludges, and

solids were buried at the site. Some wastes, such

as drummed cyanide wastes and arsenic and

phosphorus containing wastes, were disposed

of on site without treatment. . . . approximately

93,000 cubic yards of materials are buried on

site. ”

Major contamination/environmmtal threat.—There are

21 substances “substantially in excess of applicable criteria or standards for water quality.

These include six metals, cyanide, four phenolic compounds, and 10 volatile organic compounds (VOCS).” Other substances “cause concern for aquatic life.” Also, dioxin was detected

at levels up to 29 parts per billion (ppb). (A level

of 1 ppb has been EPA’s guideline for soil

cleanup.)

The greatest risk comes from the use of contaminated groundwater. Next is the risk from

contaminated soils, which may be “transported

by precipitation runoff into surface water bodies or the groundwater. Contaminated soils also

present hazards from direct contact and wind

dispersion of particulate.”

T~he] groundwater is considered to be a current drinking water source since groundwater

is used for drinking water within a two mile

radius of the site.”

HRS scores .—groundwater 51.02; surface water

9,45; air 0.00; total 29.99.

Removal actions.–None indicated in ROD; SCAP

indicated over $2 million spent on removal,

starting in 1985.

Cleanup remedy selected.—This remedial cleanup

is the third selected for the site. The first cleanup, done by the original owner, was discovered

in 1985 to have failed. The State had approved

a closure “which called for the addition of absorbents and cementing materials to the waste

in the uppermost 5 feet of each basin. Waste

acids, predominantly pickle liquor, and fly ash

were mixed with the upper layer of waste materials in the basins. Tests conducted in 1985

indicated that the desired pozzolonic cementlike properties have not formed. Also there are

indications that this material has deteriorated

and will continue to deteriorate. ”

The 1987 ROD indicated a previous ROD in

mid-1985 that adopted a circumferential containment approach with interior pumping. But

its implementation was stopped in 1986 when

geotechnical investigations found that the depth

to bedrock ranged so high (to 160 feet) that “the

construction of a circumferential impermeable barrier could be more difficult than originally believed, ” (Neither SCAP or EPA’s master list of all RODS indicates an earlier ROD

for this site.)

Many cleanup alternatives for the Conservation Chemical site have been examined, and

most have been eliminated. Because the enactment of SARA came after the initial studies,

EPA performed two more studies in 1987. However, the current ROD evaluated only three

main cleanup alternatives in what is a wellstructured and well-presented analysis: 1) the

1985 remedy, 2) onsite containment of contaminants by onsite pumping and groundwater

treatment, and 3) excavation followed by soil

treatment.

The 1987 ROD chose a remedy that includes:

1) the use of a permeable cap to allow water

intrusion to assist groundwater cleanup; 2) a

withdrawal well system to achieve an inward

groundwater gradient; 3) a groundwater treatment system based on several unit operations,

including “at a minimum, such treatment processes as metals precipitation (utilizing both

hydroxide and sulfide precipitation), filtration,

biological treatment, and carbon absorption”;

and 4) offsite groundwater monitoring. Some

descriptions of the chosen remedy from the

ROD on the selected remedy are:

●

●

●

●

66

. . . relies on hydraulic, rather than structural, containment to prevent migration of

contaminants from the site. ”

“Although designed primarily for containing the on-site contaminants, [it] would also

clean up a portion of the off site contamination. ”

“while the treatment technologies that will

be employed provide high levels of treatment, they do not remove 100 percent of

the contaminants. ”

“This cleanup process could take a substantial time period. ”
31

●

●

●

●

“There is no methodology available to estimate the length of time required for

cleanup.”

“This cleanup would include the discharge

of acceptable levels of contaminants remaining in the groundwater after treatment to surface waters and the need to dispose of solid wastes resulting from the

groundwater treatment processes.” < 6 .0. because an active pumping system

relies upon the use of currently available

technology, which can be constructed in

the shortest time frame, this alternative

would provide expeditious implementation

of the remedial action with substantial certainty as to its effectiveness in protecting

public health and the environment.” 66

. . . may prove to be the least costly

remedy that would meet the environmental

goals and requirements of CERCLA.”

Satisfaction of SARA statutory requirements:

1) Selection of permanent cleanup.—The

ROD said the selected remedy “is cost-effective,

consistent with a permanent remedy [and]

applies permanent solutions and alternative

treatment technologies to the maximum extent

practicable.” On the issue of permanency: “Contaminants present at the site will be contained

at the site, thereby eliminating further uncontrolled releases into the environment.” Also:

“Treatment of hazardous substances to reduce

their volume, toxicity and mobility by treating

the extracted groundwater is the principal element of [the selected remedy] . . . the uncertainties of [the soil treatment alternative’s] technical feasibility at this site raise substantial

question as to its practicability. Extensive research would be necessary prior to its implementation to resolve this question. For these

reasons, [the selected remedy] offers treatment

to the maximum extent practicable.”

The selected groundwater treatment part of

the remedy, however, does not involve destruction technology to a large extent. Most of the

unit processes are separation technologies. The

result is the generation of hazardous sludges

requiring management and the discharge of

contaminants to the air. Moreover, no attempt

was made to estimate the duration of the groundwater cleanup. Such estimates have been made

at other Superfund sites. If there is insufficient

data to make such an estimate, then there is

a remarkable degree of uncertainty about the

functioning of the groundwater pump and treat

approach.

The important feature of the selected remedy

is that it does not directly deal with the contaminated soil and buried wastes on site. Drawing water through the site, or flushing, is not

likely to remove all contaminants. Depending

on soil conditions and what chemicals are

present, some contaminants are difficult to remove by flushing. It is difficult to conceive of

water drawn through the site’s hazardous materials being able to dissolve or otherwise remove all the diverse contaminants at the Conservation Chemical site. And what will happen

when the pumping is stopped? Indeed, the ROD

did not claim complete removal of the site’s contamination.

The ineffectiveness of flushing was shown

at tests at the Volk Field Air Force site in Wisconsin. EPA laboratory research on the use of

surfactants to remove organic contaminants

from soil had been successful. However, the

field study found that in situ soil washing with

aqueous surfactants “was not measurably effective,” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

“Project Summary—Field Studies of In Situ Soil

Washing,” February 1988.)

The selected remedy leaves a very large

amount of untreated hazardous material on the

site. The ROD said that protection against the

risk posed by contaminated soil will be addressed first by the permeable cap on the site

during the pump and treat stage and second

by the placement of a RCRA cap upon completion of the groundwater cleanup. Limiting site

access is also offered as a means of minimizing risk. Regarding the dioxin contamination:

“Since all the [dioxin] containing samples were

obtained from sludge and surface soil samples,

the waste containment strategy and surface cap

will minimize possible contact with TCDD. ”

A major issue for the Conservation Chemical site is the rejection of the alternative of excavation followed by soil treatment, which an
32

EPA contractor recommended in a special

study for Superfund’s enforcement program

(Jacobs Engineering, “Analysis of Alternative

Remedial Action For The Conservation Chemical Co. Site, Kansas City, MO,” March 1987.).

The study concluded: “The only treatment

method which would meet the environmental

protection goal (of permanent removal or detoxification of contaminants), and therefore the

only method likely to gain public acceptance,

is excavation followed by soil treatment. Therefore, we recommend that excavation followed

by soil treatment be considered as an alternative treatment technology, under the requirements of SARA, for implementation at the CCC

site.” Admittedly, the study dealt with soil treatment or washing in general terms. Moreover,

even this treatment is a separation technology

which would, like the selected groundwater

treatment, produce concentrated residues which

would have to be managed. Overall, the study

was an excellent analysis of cleanup alternatives and carefully considered the pros and cons

of a number of options including in situ bioreclamation, in situ soil flushing, and excavation followed by landfilling. The ROD included

the recommended alternative but consistently

evaluated it more negatively than the selected

remedy. Some relevant ROD comments supporting rejection of soil treatment are:

●

●

●

●

On reliability: “while [it] could be implemented, extensive testing and studies would

be necessary to verify this prior to implementation. ”

On implementability: “[it] applies a new

technology and, as a result, there are substantial uncertainties associated with implementation of this alternative which may

take considerable time to resolve before

this alternative could be implemented”

On technical effectiveness: “There are still

unresolved uncertainties associated with the

technical effectiveness of [soil treatment].”

On environmental concerns: The ROD noted

that there would be short-term impacts because of excavation which could be minimized but not eliminated. “The option also

involves the discharge of low levels of contaminants and the generation of treatment

plant sludges requiring disposal.”

On safety: “The potential safety risks for

[it] appear to be greater.”

On public acceptance: “the alternatives are

generally equivalent based on anticipated

public acceptance.” (Avery different statement than one in the Jacobs Engineering

report.)

On cost: The ROD’s estimated cost of the

selected remedy is $21 million and for soil

treatment $24 million. “While there are a

number of uncertainties for each alternative . . . [they are] the greatest for [soil

treatment].”

On operation and maintenance: “[Soil

treatment], if feasible, should require a’substantially shorter period of operation and

maintenance than [the others].”

Z) Accurate assessment of land disposal and

containment alternatives.—Although there is

a groundwater treatment component to the

selected remedy, the cleanup rests on containment of the hazardous materials that are the

source of the groundwater contamination.

There was no significant analysis of the longterm uncertainties and possible failures of the

containment and capping aspects of the cleanup. Considering the proximity of the site to both

surface and groundwater, this lack of analysis

is a major shortcoming of the selected remedy.

In the FS for the French Limited site in Texas,

use of a slurry wall and cap to contain hazardous waste was described as a “temporary solution” for which the “volume and toxicity would

not be affected . . . [and] . . . the potential would

always exist for failure of either the cap or the

slurry wall allowing for the movement of unstabilized wastes contained onsite. ”

RIFS contractor.—Information on the complex

RIFS history is missing, However, the SCAP

notes that on 5/21/87 there was an EPA takeover

of the RIFS, but the takeover came after the

RIFS reports were completed.

State concurrence.— The front of the ROD said:

“The State of Missouri has been consulted on

the selected remedy.” In the responsiveness

summary at the end of the ROD, reference was

made to a written comment by the Director,

Division of Environmental Quality, Missouri
33

Department of Natural Resources: “The Missouri Department of Natural Resources recommends the alternative incorporating excavation

of the wastes and soil washing with downgradient groundwater pumping and treatment be

utilized for the remedial action at the CCC site.

The commentor stated that this recommendation is consistent with the final recommendation contained in an EPA contractor’s report

on alternative remedial action technologies at

the CCC site.” The ROD contained a copy of

an internal EPA memo stating that EPA headquarters and the Department of Justice support

the selected remedy.

Cominunity acceptance.—The ROD said that there

was a “low level of community concern. No

major public concerns have been received at

this time.” One comment noted in the responsiveness summary is from the Coalition for the

Environment, Kansas City. The questions touched

upon the length of time for the groundwater

cleanup.

Special comments.—The ROD says: “Total risk

from all carcinogens should be between one

in ten thousand to one in ten million. ” This is

a very broad range which could mean that actual risks associated with cleanup goals might

be 100 times as great as the 1 in 1 million 1evel

used most frequently by EPA.

The site’s HRS groundwater score seems low

in the context of the information in the ROD

on what contaminants are present and the use

of the aquifer for drinking water.

General conclusions.–Contrary to what the ROD

concludes, the selected remedy does not offer

a permanent remedy which effectively reduces

the toxicity of the site’s contaminants. Contaminant volume would decrease somewhat through

groundwater treatment, because groundwater

moving through the site would flush some contaminants from the soil. Groundwater treatment, for the most part, removes some unknown amount of contaminants which maybe

landfilled somewhere else or may be discharged

into the air.

Although the soil excavation and treatment

alternative is not a true destruction approach,

it is more consistent with the intent of SARA,

as the EPA contractor report also concluded.

The cleanup selected for the Seymour Recycling site in Indiana sets a better example because it includes two components to treat site

contaminants in addition to the pump and treat

component for the groundwater.

The rejection of the soil excavation and treatment alternative seems to be based on uncertainty about its effectiveness. This uncertainty

exists because no treatability study was conducted as part of the RIFS. But this uncertainty

must be balanced against the uncertainties of

the selected pump and treat remedy: How long

will water be pumped and treated? What contaminants in what amounts will be removed

and what will remain on site? How protective

is the capon the site? What is the ability of the

hydraulic containment system to prevent contaminants from moving off site in the groundwater? Also, although the pump and treat can

be started sooner, the ROD acknowledged that

the soil treatment remedy could be completed

in a much shorter time.

Many uncertainties weaken the claim that the

selected remedy is cost-effective. Even if a treatability study for soil treatment was successful,

the selected remedy—with its comparable uncertainties—would not offer the same overall

level of long-term environmental protection.

Therefore, regardless of cost, it would not be

cost-effective.

The rejected soil treatment alternative ($24

million) was estimated to cost about the same

as the selected remedy ($21 million). However,

because soil treatment was only discussed in

general terms, its cost is highly uncertain, especially when compared to the selected remedy

which uses off-the-shelf equipment, The estimated cost of the soil treatment alternative was

probably underestimated. Indeed, for a similar cleanup at the Chemical Control site the cost

of soil treatment was about the same as for Conservation Chemical, even though the amount

of material treated at Chemical Control (some

20,000 cubic yards) was a small fraction of that

at Conservation Chemical (the ROD indicated

about 100,000 cubic yards).

EPA’s contractor report on alternative remedial action at Conservation Chemical used a
34

figure of 298,000 cubic yards for contaminated

soil to be treated and included about $5 million (out of about $20 million) for groundwater

pumping and treatment. Thus, the average cost

for cleaning the excavated soil was about $0o

per cubic yard, a very low price for any kind

of contaminated soil treatment. (The ROD did

not contain any theoretical or experimental

data to show that a very simple form of soil

washing could be effective in removing a diverse set of contaminants.)

The cost of the rejected alternative can be

recalculated in two ways. First, the unit cost

of the treatment can be altered and a range considered for the amount of material to be treated.

A figure of $5OO per cubic yard is comparable

to an estimate for a similar cleanup in the FS

for the Chemical Control site and for the ReSolve site. The FS for the Crystal City site had

a cost of over $1,000 per cubic yard for a soil

washing alternative for both organic contaminants and arsenic. And a company with a mobile soil washing technology, not applicable to

metal contaminants, has indicated a cost of

$450 to $1200 per cubic yard. (Tufts University, “Transportable Treatment Unit Technologies,” July 1986.]

The ROD acknowledges the uncertainty about

onsite contaminants. If it is assumed that about

100,000 cubic yards of material would be excavated and treated (a figure consistent with

information in the ROD), then, at a unit cost

of $5OO per cubic yard, the total cost would be

about $5o million, about twice what was estimated. For the figure of 298,000 cubic yards

from the 1985 and 1987 studies and the cost

of $5OO per cubic yard, the ● otal cost is $150

million. Thus, the range is $5o to $150 million.

A second way to recalculate is to ask whether

an estimate closer to the ROD’s can be obtained? If a volume of contaminated material

halfway between the two estimates in the reports is assumed (200,000 cubic yards) and the

calculation is based on a un”it cost of soil treatment at $2OO per cubic yard (between the optimistic value of $5o per cubic yard and the

above $5OO per cubic yard), the total is $4o million. In this conservative scenario the cost is

still about twice that used in the ROD.

The attractiveness of the selected remedy,

therefore, rested in part on its certain cost of

$21 million relative to the underestimated cost

of $24 million for the soil treatment option. The

comparable ROD costs appear to remove low

cost as a deciding factor, Would the selected

remedy seem less attractive from the SARA perspective of preferring a permanent remedy if

the soil treatment option was significantly

higher in cost? True, there is a legitimate issue

for excavating materials and the risks associated with it. But such excavation has been

selected at other sites because there are established techniques to mitigate such risks (e.g.,

wetting materials to avoid dust). A technical

case for not excavating materials, given for the

Seymour Recycling site in Indiana because of

large amounts of volatile chemicals, was not

made for Conservation Chemical.

Finally, this case may illustrate the lack of

management oversight of RIFSS and RODS in

the Superfund program (even if the case does

not indicate a high level of interest in reaching

a settlement with the PRPs). Even a cursory examination of the data for and of the uncertainties about the volume of treated material and

cost would probably have spotted the cost under estimate for the soil treatment alternative.

Case Study 4

Crystal City Airport, Crystal City, Texas,

EPA Region 6

Capsule OTA findings. —Excavation of contaminated soils and wastes (which were buried in

a previous removal action) and their disposal

in an unlined landfill with a cap over it were

selected over incineration. No treatability study

supported the conclusion that the selected

remedy is permanent on the basis of the adsorption of diverse contaminants to site soil. Major

failure modes for the landfill were not examined.

Key dates:

. Entered Superfund system: 8/1/83

● pre~iminary Assessment: 3/1/87

● Site Inspection: 9/1/84

● National Priorities List
35

●

●

●

●

–proposed date: 10/84

–final date: 6/86

—site rank: #639 out of 770

RIFS start and completion: 9/28/85 to

7/13/87

Public comment period before Record of

Decision: 8/10/87 to 9/14/87

Signing of ROD: 9/29/87

Estimated complete remediation: 8/89

Total time.—6 years

Brief description of site.—”The site is comprised

of approximately 120 acres of land. Surrounding the airport property . . . is land used for

grazing animals . . . a municipal landfill . . . an

elementary and high school as well as a residential area . . . Since 1949 the city has operated the facility as a municipal airport. Several

private companies conducted aerial pesticide

applicating businesses at the airport untiI

1982.”

Major contamination/environmental threat.—’’The estimated volume of contaminated soil exceeding

100 parts per million (ppm) total pesticide is

12,000 cubic yards.” Although a large number

of contaminants have been detected, “The contaminants of greatest concern at the site (toxaphene, DDT, and arsenic) were chosen from

the compounds detected based on their widespread distribution over the entire site as well

as the relative toxicity and concentration. ”

There are also buried materials from an earlier

removal action and contaminated buildings. Direct contact, surface water, and air emissions

are major routes of exposure. The ,worst case

exposure scenario is for residents of a.nearby

housing project.

HRS scores.—ground~ater 33.01; surface water

12.92; air 43.08; total 32.26

Removal actions.—Immediate removal: 10/31/83

to 11/8/83 for $33,000; 40 cubic yards of waste

and between 50 and 70 drums of material were

buried in two onsite landfill cells. Second removal: 4/24/84 to 4/25/84 for $25,000; 19 drums

(FS says 21 drums) were buried in an offsite

landfill, the site was fenced, warning signs were

posted, and according to the FS: “eroded areas

of the clay caps were repaired. ”

Cleanup remedy selected.—In addition to a number of containment alternatives, incineration

and critical pressure fluid extraction were

evaluated. The ROD described the remedy as:

“Onsite consolidation of alI material which exceeds the health-based criteria of 100 milligrams

per kilogram (mglkg) total pesticides. Placement

of a RCRA cap over the consolidation cell. Monitor site for a minimum of 30 years following

construction bf selected remedy. Deep-well injection of decontamination liquids. Five year

review of selected remedy. ” The argument was

made that “By consolidating the contaminated

soil away from the runway and taxiways, land

use could be maintained.” Estimated cost: $1.6

miIlion.

Satisfaction of SARA statutory requirements:

1) Selection of permanent cleanup.—’’The

selected remedial action is considered permanent. consolidating this ‘naturally treated’

waste under a hazardous waste cap is . . . considered permanent. ” However, while the ROD

did not say that an alternative treatment technology was selected, which it was not, the ROD

did suggest that alternative treatment would be

“inappropriate,” No reduction in toxicity or volume was claimed and the ROD correctly noted

that these reductions are “not a requirement

of the [SARA] provision. ” The ROD said that

incineration ’did not conform with the Superfund statute as well as the consolidation/capping remedy” and that health and environmental protection is equal for incineration and

consolidationl/capping alternatives.

The ROD’s case for permanency for consolidation/capping rested on these facts:

●

●

●

●

"

. . . soils [are] characterized by high clay

content and extremely low permeabilities.” "

. . . [the] aquifer is located 750 feet below

the surface of the site and is isolated from

the contaiminated surface soils of the site

by thick clay layers.”

"

. . . contaminants are already highly immobilized and fixed within a solid soil

matrix." "

. . . arsenic and organic pesticides [are]

locked into [the] top foot of the alkaline soils

at the site. ”
36

Ž “The degree that contaminents are bound

up is of the same degree that would have

been achieved if the pure contaminants had

been’ processed by a solidification technology.”

The permanence of consolidation/capping is

uncertain for two reasons. First, no sound technical case was made that all of the diverse range

of contaminants would be adsorbed tightly to

the site soil. A treatability study could have been

conducted to demonstrate whether significant

leaching of contaminants is likely. No liner will

be used to separate the waste from underlying

soil. Data on the contaminants and the soil are

pertinent. For example: “The primary indicator used to determine the degree to which an

organic contaminant binds to soil particles is

the organic carbon partition coefficient (Koc),.

A higher Koc for an organic compound indicates a greater tendency to adsorb to organic

particles in soils, although migration may still

occur throughout the site.” [Feasibility Study

for the Renora site in New Jersey.) K.OC ‘data

are in the FS for Crystal City ut were not fully b

discussed; site contaminants vary remarkably

(by a factor of a million) and some contaminants

have low Koc values which suggest poor absorption and the ability to migrate.

Mineral surfaces can also greatly affect the

mobility of an organic contaminant. A research

paper that found no adsorption of phenol to

a mineral has noted the problem of uncertainty

about adsorption of organic compounds to

clays: “Hemphill and Swanson found phenol

adsorption on untreated kaolinite, montmorillonite, and illite. Others did not find any phenol adsorption on untreated clays. Luh and

Baker, however, did discover significant adsorption by clays for substituted phenols . . . “

(E.C. Yost and M.A. Anderson, Environ. Sci.

Technol., vol. 18, pp. 101-106, 1984.) Another

research paper that examined the interactions

between organic compounds and clay minerals

concluded that in relation to ideal, laboratory

conditions “rates and selectivity maybe different and difficult to predict under environmental

conditions.” (E.A. Voudrias and M. Reinhard,

Geochemical Processes, at Mineral Surfaces,

ACS Symposium Series 323, September 1985.)

This uncertainty about adsorption is why a

treatability study on actual site contaminants

and site materials would be necessary to verify that some form of effective natural stabilization would take’ place at’ the site.

(’

A complication at the Crystal City site is the

presence of solvents that can affect be adsorption of other contaminants. EPA research concluded that” . . . the effects of solvents in hazardous waste contaminated soils may include

two fadtors: 1) decrease in total sorption’to soils,

nd 2) increase in leaching potential through al

changes in soil struture’U.S: Environmental

Protection Agency, Review Of In- Place Treatment Techniques for (Contaminated Surface

Soils, vol. 2, Novembern

1984] Also, the FS did

not say whether any work was done to ideni

-

tify.the forms) of arsenic at the site. The ability of arsenic to remain immobilized because

of adsorption to soil is not’straightforward. Of

the two Chemical forms of arsenic, the more

toxic arsenite is more mobile,than arsenate and

adsorption,is affected by the presence of certain metals in the soil and by the pH which can

change overtime. (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Review of In-Place Treatment

Techniques for Contaminated Surface Soils,

vol. 2, November 1984.)

‘Second, not all the site’s contaminants are

planned to be consolidated. The FS indicated

that only half the site’s contaminated soil might

be capped. The choice of the cleanup criterion

of 100 ppm of total pesticide in combination

with the decision to continue to allow the site

to be used as a municipal airport is questionable. The ROD said that the cancer risk approaches 1 in 100,000 for onsite exposure of

22o days a year, which is possible for onsite

workers and which is a higher risk than is the

1 in 1 million usually sought by EPA. Moreover, the FS indicated that a significant health

threat would persist if site use was not “limited

to 10 to 15 days per year.” This issue is important because of the absence of future land use

restrictions.

Moreover, no cleanup criterion was established for arsenic, which is significant because

in correspondence to government officials EPA
37

said: “Of the two types of contaminants, arsenic compounds predominate, are more toxic,

and more persistent in the environment [than

organic pesticides].” EPA also described arsenic as “the most toxic contaminant” at the.site.

Also, risks for inhalable dust particles maybe

incorrect because such small particles were not

tested to determine actual level of contamination. 

 On the subject of incineration, the ROD said:

“Treatment ‘will not significantly reduce ‘the

mobility of the contaminants due to both the

characteristics of the contaminants as well as

the impermeable nature of the soils." In fact,

incineration would have offered more certain

permanence. The case against incineration is

flawed for several reasons.

The ROD said: “A secondary treatment technology (soil washing) would be necessary toremove the arsenic compounds from the ‘treated’

soil.” However, no consideration was given to

the proven feasibility of using chemical fixation or stabilization for arsenic in incinerator

ash followed by landfilling. There is considerable information to support this approach. In

August 1987, EPA published extensive information in the Federal Register on effective treatment of arsenic in the context of the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act regulatory program. EPA said that “all the available data show

that the [Extraction procedure] regulatory level

of 5.0 [milligrams per liter] for arsenic can be

achieved.” (52 Federal Register 29992; Aug. 12,

1987.)

Treatability tests for solvent &traction and

chemical fixation of arsenic contaminated soil

and sediment from the Vineland Chemical Co.

Superfund site in New Jersey have been successful. (These tests were done for the same

RIFS contractor as at Crystal City. The reports

were filed in December 1987, although the tests

were probably planned and executed ‘much

earlier.) For some time, a commercial chemical fixation company has made available extensive data on the effectiveness of its treatment

on relatively high levels of arsenic in incinerator

ash. Treatment costs were said to be between

$30 and $55 per ton. (Chemfix Technologies,

Inc., testimony before House Subcommittee on

Transportation, Tourism; and Hazardous Materials, Dec. 7, 1987.) Arsenic is a contaminant

at the Tacoma Tar Pits site in Washington,

where stabilization was, selected. Moreover,

within the same EPA region as Crystal City,

the ROD for the French Limited site in Texas

said: “The PCBs and arsenic can be controlled

by stabilization of the treatment residues.”

Biological treatment for arsenic is another

alternative that could have been examined in

a treatability study. Then it would be unnecessary to design a “custom [innovative) system, ”

A recent report said: “Arsenic compounds tend

to be converted by bacteria into volatile forms

that disperse to harmlessly-low concentrations. ”

(R.U. Ayres, et. al., Toxic Chemicals, Health,

and the Environment, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, pp. 38-70.) However, not

all bacteria could treat arsenic and some development would probably be necessary.

A third alternative is a thermal treatment and

recycling facility in Louisiana which has been

used to treat a number of cleanup waste soils

and sludges. The treatment facility can handle

very large volumes of hazardous waste. Its

unique process would result in a residual material which appears to safely contain residual

metals, such as stabilization does. Moreover,

the cost is reported to be relatively low; transportation costs must be added, but even then

the total costs might be competitive to mobile

incineration with the added advantage that the

cleanup at Crystal City might be done quickly.

Moreover, OTA has examined a removal action at Southern Crop Services in Delray Beach,

Florida, (not an NPL site) in which mobile incineration was selected for cleanup of the same

type of pesticide and arsenic contamination.

The Florida kite has the same history as Crystal City Airport. EPA noted that a “naturally

rich organic layer near the surface of the soil”

explains why the pesticides are concentrated

and localized and why downward migration

of the pesticides into groundwater has been

slowed; (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

Region 4, “Action Memorandum” for Southern Crop Services site, Sept. 8, 1987.) As much

as 5,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil over

2.5 acres will be incinerated at a maximum cost
38

of $2.5 million. The EPA document made no

mention of any problem with arsenic in the incinerator ash. The cost of the incineration is

estimated at $300 to $500 per cubic yard. Setup

of the mobile incinerator was to begin in November 1987 with completion in August 1988.

An EPA Headquarters review on October 9,

1987, of the memorandum by the Regional office added the following: “It was determined

that on-site incineration was the most suitable

method to cleanup the site because it destroys

the hazardous waste and eliminates the need

to transport the waste off-site.” This memorandum also added that, relative to offsite land disposal at half the cost of incineration, the “additional cost is considered reasonable because

incineration provides a permanent solution.”

Moreover, EPA said: “The disposal of the waste

in a landfill represents a less permanent solution to the problem than incineration, and is

therefore less desirable in light of SARA emphasis on more permanent solutions.”

At Crystal City Airport, the estimated cost

of the incineration option of $10.8 million may

have been over estimated; $2.9 million was for

the arsenic treatment (about $200 per cubic

yard). Without the special arsenic treatment,

the cost of the alternative would be $7.9 million; thus the incineration option would cost

about $575 per cubic yard (total, not unit cost),

which is more than the cost range used for the

Florida site but which agrees with the FS data

for the Davis Liquid Waste site, where incineration was also selected at a cost of about $600

per cubic yard. If the expensive arsenic treatment could be substantially cut, the cost for the

incineration alternative at Crystal City might

decrease by more than $1.5 million. As noted

above, use of the facility in Louisiana would

probably reduce costs significantly more.

Moreover, there are instances where the ROD

was biased against incineration and its commonly accepted benefits. For example: “organic

contaminants may be reduced through an integrated incineration system,” and “incineration would remove the organic contaminants

from the solid” (emphasis added). The truth is

that incineration would definitely destroy the

organic contaminants.

Curiously, the alternative using chemical

stabilization was analyzed for cost assuming

that a lined landfill would be used for the treated

material. The selected remedy uses an unlined

landfill for untreated material. Use of a lined

landfill adds an extra $700,000,j a cost that was

included in the stabilization option but excluded in the selected remedy of onsite consolidation.

2) Accurate assessment of land disposal and

containment alternatives.—“Failure of this

remedy is unlikely as long as proper maintenance of the cap is conducted. ” Nevertheless,

many failure modes are possible but were not

examined, including the gross, disruption of

landfilled material (disposal cell will be about

190 by 190 feet) and its dispersal due to an airplane crash, perhaps with fire and explosion;

a natural disaster such as an earthquake, flood,

drought, and cracking of the soil that are applicable to the site; the uptake of contaminants

by biota, bioaccumulation, and ingestion by animals in the food chain; the undetected or uncorrected erosion of the cap; greatly increased

downward transport through highly permeable soils due to large-scale pathways such as

cracks and root holes; and the perforation of

cap liners by animals and bugs and the subsequent intrusion by water. Without considering

these possibilities, the ROD overrates the technical feasibility of the selected remedy,

This ROD and its FS also illustrate another

common problem in technology selection—the

technical literature, including EPA’s own, is

rarely researched and cited to support conclusions. For example, in a recent’ report, EPA

summed up good practice with caps over landfills: “Major storm events must also be considered, since even an arid region can be subjected

to infrequent but major storms that cause anomalous ground saturation and percolation to a

depth ordinarily not reached. Accordingly, a

rather complete review of expectable storm

events and their frequencies should be required

in preparing the background on the hydrological system.” (U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, “Project Summary—Design, Construction, and Maintenance of Cover Systems for
39

Hazardous Waste: An Engineering Guidance

Document,” November 1987.)

The ROD was ambiguous about the permanence of the selected remedy: “If however, future migration does occur, appropriate actions

will be taken. ” The term “significant unforeseen offsite contamination” was also used.

In contrast, the ROD for the Pristine site was

realistic: “The lifetime of a RCRA multilayer

cap is finite, and the contaminated soils will

be left in place to contribute to groundwater

contamination at some future time should the

cap fail. . . . there are no data available on the

long term effectiveness and permanence of

RCRA caps.” In the. FS for the French Limited

site (in the same EPA region as Crystal City),

use of a slurry wall and cap to contain hazardous waste was described as a “temporary solution” for which the “volume and toxicity would

not be affected . . . [and] . . . the potential would

always exist for failure of either the cap or the

slurry wall allowing for the movement of unstabilized wastes contained onsite. ” In comparison with Crystal City, these are prime examples of inconsistency across Superfund sites.

RIFS contractor.—State led; $218,000 ($726,000

obligated); Ebasco Services Inc.

State concurrence. —The ROD said the State “has

remained silent. ”

Community acceptance.—The ROD indicated that

the community favored incineration. There is

also a lot of other evidence, because of a Congressional hearing in Crystal City on this issue

(Apr. 11, 1988), that the community and others

strongly opposed and continue to oppose the

remedy chosen by EPA. A large number of local, State, and national government officials

and organizations have requested EPA to change

its decision.

Special comments. —The Preliminary Assessment

was completed several years after the Site Inspection, according to CERCLIS; but SCAP indicates that the preliminary assessment started

on 9/26/84, slightly after the site inspection,

The first removal action (in 1983) that buried

hazardous materials set the precedent for an

impermanent remedy and contributed to the

need for remedial cleanup today.

Although the ROD said that “the organic compounds will continue to degrade under the cap

into less toxic compounds,” no actual data or

analysis was given to support natural biodegradation under the conditions expected at the site.

The FS gave data that “suggests that the contaminants are migrating offsite through water/

sediment transport.” This observation merits

more attention and an explanation of the exact mechanism of transport.

The case for concluding that RCRA is not

applicable was that “the contaminated material will be consolidated in the unit or area of

contamination from which they originated. ”

This conclusion is inconsistent with decisions

at other Superfund sites and means that certain relevant aspects of RCRA on regulatory

requirements for hazardous waste landfills,

such as liners and leachate collection, were not

applied as required by SARA.

The data on contaminant detection frequency

in table 2 of the ROD were different than the

data given in the FS.

The ROD said no groundwater was encountered, yet the HRS groundwater subscore is not

zero.

General conclusions. —No sound technical case

supported the conclusion that containing the

wastes onsite constitutes a permanent remedy

according to the intent of SARA, All of the contaminants may not bind tightly to the site soil,

relevant regulatory requirements will not be

met, health risks may be greater than normally

acceptable levels, and a number of major failure modes of the containment system were not

examined;,

The cost of the incineration’ alternative was

over estimated because of the residual arsenic

contamination in the ash. In fact, stabilization

of such a contaminant has been successfully

demonstrated and is relatively low cost; biological treatment is also known to be feasible.

The advantages of incineration over the selected remedy for the organic contaminants
40

were discounted. Moreover, in comparison to

the decision to use mobile incineration at the

Southern Crop Services site with a nearly identical type of pesticide and arsenic contamination, the negative view of incineration at Crystal City Airport seems inconsistent and even

contrived.

Since incineration is proven for the organic

contaminants at the Crystal City site and “provides better overall protection than consolidation/capping—contrary to the ROD’s claim th`at

the two choices are equal—a cost-effective

remedy was not chosen. The justification used

by EPA for picking incineration at Southern

Crop Services, in terms of its greater benefits

over land disposal, particularly regarding permanency of remedy, undercuts the evaluation

by EPA at Crystal City Airport.

The FS analysis of treatment technologies for

the Crystal City Airport illustrates a nationwide

problem–current technology evaluations and

the decisions based on them are not explainable by site-specific conditions. Several technologies rejected for Crystal City could have been

justified as well as they were at other sites where

they were chosen (and are discussed in other

case studies in this report). For example, at

Crystal City, in situ chemical stabilization was

rejected: “Immobilization, chemical treatment,

and physical treatments have not been shown

to be feasible for in situ treatment of these contaminants as it is not possible to get a good,

uniform, well distributed treatment.” (This

technology was selected for the Chemical Control site in New Jersey and elsewhere.) Biological treatment was rejected: “[it] is generally ineffective for destroying these wastes as the

treatment is not performed in a controlled environment. Several processes are being developed

which show potential However, none of these

processes have been developed past the laboratory stage. Therefore, biological treatment has

been ruled out.” (This technology was selected

for the Renora site in New Jersey.) In situ vitrification was rejected; it was selected for the Pristine site in Ohio.

The Crystal City site illustrates the problem

of using a small number of indicator contaminants not just for risk assessment but also for

technology selection. The effectiveness of some

cleanup technologies depends on specific physical properties which can vary substantially

among contaminants. There were a number of

contaminants identified-at Crystal City that are

not likely to adsorb tightly to the soil. For example, toxaphene is far less likely to bind tightly

to soil than DDT. Both DDT and toxaphene pose

a problem’ for safeguarding water quality because both have laboratory detection limits

which are above their water quality limits. (R.H.

Plumb and J.R. Parolini, “Organic Contamination of Ground, Water Near Hazardous Waste

Disposal Sites: A Synoptic Overview,” paper

presented at a Geological Society of America

conference, Phoenix, October 1987.) Moreover,

some chemicals—particularly solvents-may affect the adsorption of others present. Adsorption of contaminants to soil was asserted to

make the case that containment was similar to

solidification treatment, but no analysis or treatability tests were made to confirm the hypothesis. Without such efforts, it is not reasonable

to assume adsorption of all the contaminants

under all future conditions.

Keeping the cost of remedial cleanup low

seems to have been an important goal. The ROD

indicated that no responsible party is available

to pay for, cleanup. The cost for the selected

remedy was estimated at $1.6 million, while incineration was estimated at $11.4 million, The

FS contained an unusual statement: “The cost

of a cleanup technology is also a factor of concern in the primary screening step.” Alternatives were kept in the analysis “if their estimated costs are not more than an order of

magnitude higher than an alternative technology which performs to the same approximate

extent.” Generally, FSS do not cut cleanup alternatives from preliminary screening on the basis of cost.

Invoking cost is done in the ROD when a

sound case can be made for equivalent environmental protection among different alternatives. Then, the issue of cost and when to estimate it takes on new importance because of

SARA’s requirements on technology selection.

“It is difficult enough to estimate costs at this

early [screening] stage of the feasibility study
41

when ‘old’ technologies are involved; it is hardly

prudent to try to estimate the costs of innovative technologies before a much more detailed

analysis (not to mention extensive pilot testing)

is performed.” (D. Truitt and J. Caldwell; “Evaluation of Innovative Waste Treatment Technologies,” Waste Management Conference-Focus on the West, Colorado State University,

June 1987.) At Crystal City, the big difference

between the RIFS obligation ($726,000) and the

actual money spent ($218,000), if the data are

correct, may also indicate that less work, such

as treatability studies, was done than could have

been done and should have been done to better evaluate cleanup alternatives.

Case Study 5

Industrial Excess Landfill, Uniontown, Ohio,

EPA Region 5

Capsule OTA findings.—Providing alternate water

to houses that have or are likely to have contaminated wells was a satisfactory interim remedial action. However, actions to address the

source of contamination and to stop and treat

contaminated groundwater are taking a very

long time.

Key dates:

Entered Superfund system: 12/1/80

Preliminary Assessment: 12/1/83 (from

CERCLIS); 12/9/83 (ROD)

Site Inspection: 8/1/84 (CERCLIS); 3/5/84

(ROD)

National Priorities List

–proposed date: 10/1/84

–final date: 6/1/86

—site rank: #164 out of 770

RIFS start and completion: 12/28/84 to 8/87

(final focused FS)

Public comment period before Record of

Decision: 8/12/87 to 9/10/87

Signing of ROD: 9/30/87

Estimated complete remediation: 12/89 for

this interim remedial action. (According to the

ROD, it will take 5 years to design and implement an aquifer restoration remedy. If a ROD

for the final cleanup is issued by October 1988

as scheduled, the complete remedy would end

in late 1993, but this estimate maybe optimistic.)

.

Total time.—13 years

Brief description of site.—This ROD addresses an

operable unit or interim remedial action of the

overall remedy. “The Industrial Excess Landfill is a closed sanitary landfill . . . From 1968

to 1980 the site was operated ., . for the disposal of a variety of solid waste materials. During this time, the landfill accepted municipal,

commercial, industrial, and chemical wastes

of substantially undetermined and unknown

composition, primarily from the rubber industry in Akron, Ohio. Large quantities of chemical and liquid waste were dumped onto the

ground either from 55-gal@ drums or from

tanker trucks. Although much of the liquid

wastes were listed as latex and oil at the time

of disposal; witnesses have described the disposal of solvents and volatile industrial chemicals with foul odors. ” The county ordered a

stop to the dumping of chemical wastes in January 1972. It was not until 1980 that a court

ordered closure and a closure plan was engineered and implemented; the site was covered

and seeded.

“The IEL [Industrial Excess Landfill] site is

located on a tract of approximately 30 acres

which had previously been the site of mining

operations (sand and gravel and possibly coal).

The landfill has a relatively pervious soil cover.”

Major contsfnination/environmental threat. -’’About

80 percent of the site is believed to be underlain by buried solid waste materials. There are

over 400 residential homes located within a 0.5

mile radius of the landfill. . . . over long periods

of time, the sand and gravel and immediately

underlying bedrock at IEL will act as a single

aquifer.” The landfill “is located in permeable

soils without an impermeable liner.”

Citizen complaints prompted testing in 1983

that verified contaminated drinking water. ” . . .

EPA discovered contamination of several private drinking water wells near the site. The

Agency determined that the cause of the contamination was the migration of hazardous substances from the Industrial Excess Landfill. . . .

contaminants have migrated approximately 600
42

feet from the western edge of the landfill, impacting the groundwater of 10 homes. Some

of the residential wells sampled contained organic contaminants (vinyl chloride and chloroethane) which are attributable to the landfill

and inorganic contaminants (barium, copper,

cadmium, and nickel) above background levels,

also attributable to the landfill. In March 1987,

U.S. EPA found levels of vinyl chloride and barium exceeding federal drinking water standards in approximately ten residential wells near

the landfill.”

Contamination was also found in samples

from shallow monitoring wells onsite near the

site borders at “levels which exceed standards

the observed levels of vinyl chloride [2 to

7 parts per billion (ppb)] in 3 of the 51 wells

sampled are equal to or exceed the Safe Drinking Water Act Maximum Contaminant Level

(MCL) of 2 ppb ..."

A risk assessment found risks greater than

1 in 1 million excess lifetime cancer risk.

HRS scores.—groundwater 88.46; surface water

0.00; air 0.00; total 51.13.

Removal actions.-EPA performed interim emergency actions to protect residents in the short

term. The Superfund Comprehensive Accomplishments Plan (SCAP) showed that work

started on 12/2/85 at a cost of $973,000. T h e

ROD contained no summary description of exactly what was done, but there were indications

of several actions, including air stripper treatment for contaminated groundwater, methane

venting, and some evacuation of houses. “While

the air strippers effectively deal with vinyl chloride contamination, they will not remove other

hazardous substances, such as heavy metals

and semi-volatile organics, which threaten to

migrate from the IEL site. . . . the Agency determined to go forward with a permanent alternative water supply, rather than continuing to

proceed on a piecemeal basis with air strippers,

whose long-term liability to protect public

health cannot be guaranteed.”

Cleanup remedy selected.–’’Provide alternate

water to an area comprised of approximately

100 homes . . “ The cost was estimated to be

around $2 million.

“The primary objective . . . is to protect human health by providing a reliable supply of

safe, potable water to residents whose groundwater is currently contaminated or has the potential for being contaminated by IEL before

the site itself is remediated. If unchecked, contamination will continue to migrate westward,

affecting the groundwater of approximately 100

homes in a 15 year time period. U.S. EPA expects to implement a remedy for the IEL site

before contaminants can migrate beyond this

projected area.”

Satisfaction of SARA statutory requirements:

I) Selection of permanent cleanup.—Because

of its goal to provide alternative water as an

interim measure, this ROD did not examine or

select treatment technologies. “A permanent

remedy at IEL will almost certainly involve

some sort of groundwater treatment to reduce

the level of contamination.”

To support the plan to provide new water for

homes not yet contaminated, the ROD correctly

stated that " . . . groundwater flow and contaminant migration predictions are not exact sciences, and that predictions concerning the timing and effectiveness of remedial action are not

always fulfilled ., . “

But why wasn’t anything done to stop the

movement of the contaminated groundwater?

Beyond actual source control or treatment and

groundwater treatment, several interim measures would have been consistent with a final,

permanent remedy. Examples include: 1) vacuum

extraction and destruction of volatile organic

chemicals from the site, 2) testing for and excavation of hot spots of contamination, 3) installation of a containment wall or barrier, 4)

plume stabilization pumping, and 5) placement

of a more impermeable cap or cover. Land use

restrictions could also have been considered.

Such actions might well have been taken earlier;

the site has contaminated local water supplies

since it was closed by court order in 1980. The

site’s HRS groundwater score, determined in

1984, is exceptionally high.
43

The ROD granted that “The statutory preference for treatment is not satisfied because this

action constitutes an operable unit for the overall site remedy. Treatment alternatives for the

overall site will be addressed in the comprehensive RI/FS documents.”

Z) Accurate assessment of land disposal and

containment alternatives.—The ROD did not

consider these types of alternatives, except that

a de facto no action on the buried wastes meant

that the original land disposal remained in

effect.

RIFS contractor.—Camp Dresser and McKee;

about $1 million obligated.

State concurrence. —The State of Ohio concurred

with the selected remedy.

Community acceptance. —It was the community

that called on government officials to take serious action in the first place. For this ROD, intense community concerns focused on getting

new water for more houses and on identifying

the exact source of the water.

A local newspaper, the Akron Beacon Journal, November 15, 1987, reported: “Recently

the EPA agreed to connect 110 homes in

Uniontown to a new water supply when 1,500

were in possible danger. Fortunately, Gov.

Celeste saw no reason to threaten the rest and

agreed to spend state money to build a new

water system for all the homes. Gov. Celeste

rightly saw that any error should be on the side

of safety. The federal EPA’s approach seems

to be the opposite. A telling example was the

release of documents showing the air tests had

been bungled. The documents became public

only after citizens invoked the federal freedom

of information law to obtain them. Information

about mistakes in the air tests had been know

to the EPA since Oct. 21. A responsible EPA

would have informed the public immediately. ”

Special comments.–Any ROD signed on 9/30/87,

the end of the Federal fiscal year, may have been

a rush job; the ROD for IEL may have suffered

accordingly. It contained an incomplete summary of the administrative record, and it did

not decide on the actual alternate water source,

a contentious issue locally. EPA was responding to community concerns by deferring the

water decision.

In the responsiveness summary, EPA made

a very interesting statement on cost-effectiveness: “U.S. EPA is required to select the less

expensive alternative, given that effectiveness

and implementability are equal” (emphasis

added). Adding some factor other than effectiveness is new. It could, however, act against

selecting newer cleanup technologies, which

usually have not been used on a large scale.

The argument for not relying on air strippers

was technically sound in view of the chemical

complexity of the site contaminants.

General conclusions.—It probably will be closer

to 20 years than 13 between the time the IEL

site was closed and the time some form of

source control and groundwater treatment is

applied to the site. Is EPA correct that the selected interim remedy “is fully consistent with

a permanent remedy?” Although the ROD referred to aquifer restoration, it does not mention removal of the source of contamination.

While providing alternate water does not stand

in the way of a permanent remedy, neither does

it do anything to make the permanent cleanup

easier, Indeed, this ROD acknowledged that the

groundwater contamination will get worse.

Thus, because additional interim measures

would stop or slow down the migration and

help to alleviate the source of the problem, this

interim measure is not fully consistent with an

ultimate permanent remedy.

The assertion that it will take 5 years to design and implement an aquifer restoration remedy was probably too optimistic and is not

likely to build community confidence. Experience at similar sites suggests that groundwater

cleanup can take considerably longer. For example, at the Seymour Recycling site in Indiana the groundwater treatment was estimated
44

to take from 28 to 42 years; at the Davis Liquid

Waste site in Rhode Island, it was estimated

to take from 5 to 10 years; and at the Re-Solve

site in Massachusetts, it was estimated to take

10 years. There is, however, no obvious alternative for groundwater cleanup at IEL, EPA

has said: “The actual performance of a ground

water remedial action is difficult to predict until

the remedy has been implemented and operational data have been assessed.” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Guidance on Remedial Actions for Contaminated Ground Water

At Superfund Sites,” draft, October 1986.)

Before a permanent remedy is implemented,

more wells may become contaminated. Also,

contaminants can migrate at substantially different rates, and, therefore, the nature of the

spreading contamination can change over time.

Such changes are well verified by research.

(See, for example, R.L. Johnson et al., Ground

Water, September/October 1985.) Wells that are

contaminated early can get worse as new, more

slowly moving contaminants reach them; wells

not yet contaminated eventually see the effects

of the most rapidly moving contaminants, On

this point the ROD noted: “Since the publication of the FFS [Focussed Feasibility Study], recent data revealed that levels of nickel exceeded

Ambient Water Quality Standards.” Also, “vinyl chloride has migrated off-site quickly . . .

while its parent compounds pose a threatened

release from the site because they are migrating at a slower rate. “ The ROD also noted: “the

shallow and deep aquifers are continuous and

linked to one another.” Therefore, the complexit y of groundwater contamination and its cleanup could worsen significantly. The possibility

of upgradient chemical migration should not

be ruled out. (See R.H. Plumb, Jr., Proceedings

Second Canadian/American Conference on

Hydrogeology, 1985, pp. 69-77.)

The long history of the site, the extensive

groundwater contamination offsite, and the delay in addressing the source of the problem is

feeding community lack of confidence in government efforts and demands for new water

to more houses.

Case Study 6

Pristine, Inc., Reading, Ohio, EPA Region 5

Capsule OTA findings.—In situ vitrification was

developed originally for radioactive soils, but

its use for chemically contaminated sites is still

unproven. Without treatability test results, in

situ vitrification was selected for this site chiefly

because its estimated cost was about half that

of onsite incineration. But the estimated cost

for incineration is probably high by a factor of

two. Incineration offers more certainty and

probably costs no more than the selected remedy.

Groundwater will be pumped and treated by

air stripping and carbon adsorption.

Key dates:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Entered Superfund system: 4/1/79

Preliminary Assessment: 1/1/83

Site Inspection: 9/1/82

National Priorities List

–proposed date: 12/1/82

–final date: 9/1/83

—site rank: #531 out of 770

RIFS start and completion: 9/5/84 to 11/87

Public comment period before Record of

Decision: 11/13/87 to 12/11/87

Signing of ROD: 12/31/87

Estimated complete remediation: 8/91; 2 years

for source control, 5 to 10 years for groundwater cleanup (August 1991 is given in ROD,

but this seems optimistic and inconsistent with

other groundwater cleanups; 10 years for groundwater cleanup is more realistic)

Total time.—2O years

Brief description of site.—The site is in a suburb

of Cincinnati. The site is 2.2 acres and “is bordered by residential and industrial areas. There

are two aquifers under the site.” In the late

1970s, a liquid waste incinerator was operated

at the site. “In April 1979, as many as 8,000

to 10,000 drums and several hundred thousand

gallons of bulk liquids were on site, consisting

of acids, solvents, pesticides, PCBs and other

chemicals. ” A consent order shut down the facility in September 1981.
45

Major contamination/environmental threat.—” . . . over

90 compounds were detected in the groundwater, soil, sediment, and surface water. ”

“Groundwater in the upper aquifer is contaminated primarily with volatile organic compounds (VOCs) such as benzene, vinyl chloride,

tetrachloroethene (TCE), and 1,2-dichloroethane.

Semi-volatile compounds (semi-VOCs) and pesticide compounds occurred in relatively lower

concentrations. The lower aquifer is contaminated with benzene and 1,2-dichloroethane.

There are also elevated levels of lead and

fluoride.”

"

. . . the presence of VOCs in the [Reading

municipal wells] indicates that the groundwater

quality in the vicinity is compromised and continued monitoring is recommended . . . The

lower aquifer is the source for the regional

water supply [13,000 people]. ” This route of exposure poses the largest risk.

“Sediment . . . and soil in the upper two feet

of the site are contaminated with a variety of

VOCs semi-VOCs, and pesticides. Principal

contaminants in surface soils are benzene, dieldrin, and DDT.” Low levels of dioxins and

furans were also found.

“Subsurface soil contained VOCs . . . There

were also elevated levels of cadmium, lead, mercury and zinc. ”

“Surface water was contaminated with VOCs,

semi-VOCs and pesticides . . . There were also

elevated levels of inorganic compounds (cadmium, chromium, and mercury).”

A good risk assessment established cleanup

goals at 1 in 1 million risk level. The RIFS calculated how much soil would have to be removed

to “eliminate both the risk associated with adsorption and ingestion of soils and ingestion of

groundwater contaminated through leaching

from the soil.”

HRS scores.—groundwater 60.00; surface water

10.91; air 0.00; total 35.25

Removal actions.—The site operator removed

waste from June 1980 to November 1983 under a consent decree. Some responsible parties

removed waste and soil from March 1984 to

July 1984 under an administrative order. The

ROD did not say how much material was removed, nor its disposition, but it was probably

landfilled.

Cleanup remedy selected.—This ROD was a final

source control remedial action but also included groundwater cleanup. Another ROD

might be issued for additional groundwater

cleanup.

The key component of the selected remedy

is in situ vitrification (ISV) for 37,700 cubic

yards of contaminated soil and sediment. ISV

was chosen over onsite incineration. ISV is an

innovative technique that uses electrodes in the

ground to pass electricity through soil, melt it,

vaporize and at least partially destroy organic

chemicals, and leave in place a chemically inert, stable, glass-crystalline mixture. Temperatures in the range of 2,000 to 3,6000 F are possible. Different cells of soil are melted in order

to cover a site. The melt grows downward and

outward as power is applied. As the vitrified

zone grows, it incorporates nonvolatile elements

and destroys organic components by pyrolysis.

The pyrolysis byproducts migrate to the surface of the vitrified zone, where they combust

in the presence of oxygen. “The estimated time

required to complete the vitrification process

is two years assuming the use of one vitrification unit.”

Groundwater will be pumped and treated

with an air stripper and carbon adsorption.

That is, separation, not destruction, technology was selected. Groundwater monitoring was

set up. The possibility of deed restrictions was

raised. "It is estimated that it will take five to

ten years to extract and treat the contaminated

groundwater,”

Estimated cost: $22 million.

Satisfaction of SARA statutory requirements:

1) Selection of permanent cleanup.—In its initial two screening stages, the FS examined a

large number of treatment technologies. How-
46

ever, after more detailed screening, many of

the treatment technologies said to be applicable were dropped without much justification.

For example, three in situ treatment technologies passed the initial screening, but solution

mining and soil vapor extraction were dropped

and only vitrification was retained for more

detailed analysis. Onsite treatment technologies

that passed the initial screening included fixation/solidification, soil washing, and dechlorination, but only incineration was analyzed

further.

The ROD said that the selected ISV remedy

“will significantly reduce the mobility, toxicity, and volume of hazardous substances in the

soil through treatment. The mobility of the contaminants will be reduced significantly, such

that no leachate is expected to be produced

from the vitrified material. This is a permanent

technology, the results of which are expected

to last for a million years. The toxicity of organic components will be decreased because

the organics are destroyed or changed to other

forms by pyrolysis or vaporization. The volume

of the soil will be reduced by 25 to 30 percent

because the vitrification causes the soil mass

to consolidate.”

A chief issue is whether or not ISV is a proven

technology. ISV is an alternative treatment and

an innovative technology that was developed

originally for treating radioactive contaminated

soils, but its use for chemical contamination

raises new questions. How should ISV be classified? Is it thermal destruction or stabilization?

EPA’s SITE technology demonstration program categorizes it as stabilization, as do others.

(N. Nelson et al., Toxic Chemicals, Health, and

the Environment, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, pp. 205-279.) Stabilization is

a reasonable label because metal contaminants

remain in the final glass-like material and because the leaching of metals and the complete

destruction and removal of organic contaminants are uncertain. Although very high temperatures are reached, not all organic contaminants will either be destroyed or be able to

escape and be captured. However, EPA also

calls ISV thermal destruction. (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Technical Resource

Document: Treatment Technologies for Halogenated Organic Containing Wastes, vol. 1, January 1988.) This EPA report describes ISV as:

“Not commercial, further work planned. No

[performance] data available, but DREs [destruction-removal efficiencies] of over six nines

reported. ”

ISV’s developer, Battelle Pacific Northwest

Laboratories, which supports ISV’s inclusion

in SITE, has commented on treatability testing: “While the results are promising, feasibility testing to confirm applicability is strongly

recommended prior to any commitment to deploy the process on a site that contains significant quantities of organics that are unconfined

in the soil column. . . . feasibility testing is relatively inexpensive [a few thousand dollars]. The

focus of the feasibility testing is the performance requirements for the off-gas treatment system and the type and quantity of secondary

waste generated. Experience with low boiling

point organics that are uncontained in the soil

column is very limited, and feasibility testing

with actual site samples prior to application is

strongly recommended” (emphasis added).

(V.F. Fitzpatrick, “In Situ Vitrification–A Candidate Process for In Situ Destruction of Hazardous Waste,” Proceedings of the 7th Conference on the Management of Uncontrolled

Hazardous Waste Sites, December 1986, pp.

325-332.)

ISV depends on the effectiveness of the collection and treatment system for released gases

to keep undestroyed organic contaminants (or

products of incomplete combustion) from entering the environment, This off-gas system is

like a separation technology; hazardous residues

can be either destroyed or landfilled after carbon adsorption. The greater the volatility of contaminants, the greater their release into the offgas collection system. At Pristine, many of the

contaminants are highly volatile at relatively

low temperatures. By the time the soil is melted,

therefore, many contaminants have moved.

What happens to organic contaminants in

ISV is crucial to understanding its cleanup effectiveness relative to other technologies, such

as incineration. A published paper reported on
47

a test of ISV on PCB contaminated soil: “Small

quantities of PCBs, furans, and dioxins were

detected in the untreated off-gas, but none were

detected in the vitrified mass. A few samples

directly adjacent to the block contained measurable concentrations up to 0.7 ppm PCBs. ”

(R.R. Battey and J.T. Harrsen, “In Situ Vitrification for Decontamination of Soils Containing PCBs,” Proceedings of the Oak Ridge Model

Conference, February 1987, pp. 233-245.) In

another report on the same experiment, the

“process destruction was slightly greater than

99.9 percent. The small amount of material released to the off-gas system was effectively removed, yielding an overall system DRE of

>99.9999 percent.” (V.F. Fitzpatrick, “In Situ

Vitrification—A Candidate Process for In Situ

Destruction of Hazardous Waste,” Proceedings

of the 7th Conference on the Management of

Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, December 1986, pp. 325-332.)

The ROD responsiveness summary said:

“with worse case conditions, 97 percent of all

organics are destroyed. Most tests indicate that

99 to 99.99 percent destruction is achieved.”

Another ROD statement is more optimistic

about destruction versus removal: “The test results [on PCBs] indicate that the organics are

destroyed and not merely collected in the offgas system.” All this information shows that

ISV might be very effective but that the issue

of total destruction of organics through both

thermal treatment and off-gas collection, removal and possible treatment needs clarification. Lateral migration of vaporized organics

into adjacent soil or perhaps downward into

groundwater is also important and needs detailed resolution for application of ISV to any

large, uncontained site.

This last issue has received major attention

by Larry Penberthy, who calls it vapor retreat.

While Penberthy is a competitor of ISV, he

makes a good technical arguement: “Instead

of being destroyed, the vaporizable chemical

contaminants simply move away from the hot

core melt by Vapor Retreat, unaltered. They

move downwardly below the melt core as well

as horizontally away from the melt core. This

vaporizing/condensing action is progressive,

building up concentration in the isotherm

layers corresponding to each chemical’s boiling point. This writer expects the DRE to be

only 25-50 percent.” (Larry Penberthy, letter

to Laura A. Ringenbach, attorney for responsible parties, Mar. 28, 1988; Pyro 32A and 32

newsletter of Penberthy Electromelt International, Inc., Apr. 7 and 13, 1988.) This vapor

retreat phenomenon could lead to increased

contamination of groundwater. Moreover, in

order to test for this effect it would be necessary to test a rather large volume of soil so that

temperatures away from the molten zone are

low enough to have condensation of vaporized

contaminants, However, most testing is done

on too small a volume of contained material

to see this effect.

Penberthy has a number of other criticisms

of the tests performed by Battelle which, even

after examination of Battelle’s comments on

Penberthy’s analysis, seem important enough

to require additional study and testing. Moreover, Penberthy has raised important safety

questions, such as effects from soil heating and

subsidence, about using ISV at such a heavily

industrialized area as the one around Pristine.

No significant examination of the risks posed

by ISV has been made.

The ROD did not focus on the depth of ISV.

The plan is to go down to 8 feet for half the

site and 12 feet for the other half. The Battey

and Harrsen article (see above) noted that the

greatest efficiencies for ISV occur when it is

used to depths of 10 to 20 feet. The technology

does not work well when contaminants are on

the surface and therefore, soil covers are sometimes used, The ROD also noted: “The equipment must be specially designed and produced, ”

The depth and equipment issues are possible

causes of underestimated costs.

The other big issue for the Pristine site is the

rejection of onsite incineration. The ROD acknowledged: “incineration is a proven technology. “ “Incineration ., . is fully protective of human health and the environment since the

ingestion and leachability threats are eliminated.” The ROD did not acknowledge that

some stabilization of the incinerator residues
48

might be necessary because of toxic metal contaminants. But overall, the ROD did not note

any disadvantages of incineration: “The use of

mobile incinerators is common and the performance of these systems has been demonstrated. It is relatively easy to operate the system

although a trained operator will be needed.”

Nevertheless, incineration was not selected.

The ROD said: “vitrification is the lower cost

alternative. Therefore, incineration is not recommended for implementation at the Pristine,

Inc. site.” However, the costing for incineration seems too high. The ROD’s total cost estimate of $51 million for incineration was based

on a unit direct cost of $730 per cubic yard (for

37,700 cubic yards). Meanwhile, the FS said that

the unit cost ranges from $350 to $500 per cubic yard. Several other recent FSS (for the Davis

Liquid Waste and Re-Solve sites) by the same

RIFS contractor provided detailed vendor costs

and analysis for onsite incineration. From those

two FSS, OTA used the cost data for three different technologies for a range of contaminated

soil to be treated (4,300 to 57,000 cubic yards)

and obtained a (conservative) estimate of a unit

cost of about $300 per cubic yard for the level

of effort at Pristine. This range is consistent

information that other vendors gave to OTA.

EPA said recently that mobile infrared incineration of contaminated soils costs “from

$120 to $225 per ton [which could be as high

as $180 to $340 per cubic yard], depending on

the number of tons incinerated per day.” (U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency, memorandum from John H. Skinner, Office of Research

& Development, Dec. 10, 1987.) The FS for Seymour Recycling gave costs for onsite incineration over a very broad range of amounts of contaminated soil: for 35,000 cubic yards the cost

was $186 per cubic yard; at the smallest scale

(18,000 cubic yards) the unit cost was $349 per

cubic yard. In the Crystal City FS the unit cost

for onsite incineration was $240 per cubic yard

for about half the amount of material at Pristine. In a recent decision for a Superfund removal action at the Southern Crop Services site

in Florida, where mobile incineration was selected, EPA said that it expected bids at from

$300 to $500 per cubic yard for less than 5,000

cubic yards of soil.

Actual (bid) costs for incineration can vary

but do not explain the high estimate used for

Pristine. A recent report showed a cost of about

$750 per cubic yard (comparable to the Pristine ROD estimate) for a cleanup, but the soil

quantity was under 10,000 tons and there was

more than just soil to clean. (J.F. Frank et al.,

“Use of Mobile Incineration to Remediate the

Lenz Oil Site,” paper presented at Superfund

’87, 1987, pp. 459-464.) At another site, a vendor (a subsidiary of the Pristine FS subcontractor) got $250 per ton under a turnkey arrangement; total costs probably were about $450 per

cubic yard for cleaning between 7,500 and

10,000 tons of PCB contaminated soil. (J.W.

Noland, remarks at Weston Environmental Forum, Washington, DC, February 1988.) Mobile

incineration was used to incinerate materials

at the Nyanza Superfund site in Massachusetts.

The vendor charged about $600 per cubic yard

for a very small quantity, about 200 cubic yards.

At the Prentiss Creosote Superfund site in Mississippi, a vendor charged about $200 per ton

($300 per cubic yard) for mobile incineration

of 7,500 tons; at the Southern Crop Services

Superfund site in Florida, the vendor charged

$360 per ton for 3,000 tons,

The Pristine ROD cites no technical factors

to explain a $730 per cubic yard cost the site.

For example, no mention has been made of

buried drums. Even if the ash were to be chemically stabilized because of toxic metal content,

the additional cost would not account for the

cost discrepancies noted above. Moreover, in

an internal inconsistency the FS calculation for

a cleanup of only 8,100 cubic yards used a unit

cost of $658 per cubic yard; instead of the expected higher unit cost for a smaller volume,

a lower figure was used.

In the groundwater cleanup, the ultimate disposition of the collected hazardous substances

is uncertain because it is not clear how the carbon that becomes contaminated by removing

organic substances will be managed. The ROD

said: “Bench scale studies will be done to de-
49

termine the need for metals treatment.” Air

stripping only removes volatile organics and

carbon adsorption is not likely to be effective

for the metals. Maximum reported values of

lead in groundwater are 178 ppb and 148 ppb

in the upper and lower aquifers; the drinking

water Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) for

lead is 50 ppb and the proposed MCL Goal is

20 ppb. For cadmium the corresponding groundwater levels are 39 ppb and 9.4 ppb and the

standards are 10 ppb and 5 ppb. The complexity and intensity of groundwater contamination

are great enough to warrant more detailed analysis of groundwater treatment, as was done for

the Operating Industries site in California.

Any cleanup of contaminated surface water

at Pristine is left uncertain by the ROD.

2) Accurate assessment of land disposal and

containment alternatives.-The ROD contained

an excellent rationale for not leaving contaminated material onsite: “It may leach into the

groundwater at levels that will exceed ARAR’s

[regulatory standards] at some future time and

thus increase the groundwater treatment time

or require additional future remedial action.

The lifetime of a RCRA multilayer cap is finite,

and the contaminated soils will be left in place

to contribute to groundwater contamination at

some future time should the cap fail.” The

responsiveness summary said: “there are no

data available on the long term effectiveness

and permanence of RCRA caps.”

By its very nature, ISV leaves treated contaminated material onsite. The ROD acknowledged

uncertainties about ISV:

●

●

●

“Vitrification is expected to be effective on

the soil type present. . . “(emphasis added).

“Air monitoring will be conducted to ensure that the hood is collecting and treating the gases.” (Such monitoring is not routine when mobile incinerators are used.)

“Some limited monitoring of the vitrified

mass will be required to assure that it is

a reliable and permanent remedy.” (Such

monitoring is not routine when stabilization is used.)

●

●

●

●

“[There is] limited demonstrated performance. 99.9999 percent DRE [destruction

removal efficiency] are expected for dioxin

and PCBs.”

“Because this is not a proven technology,

prior to implementation of this remedial

action, bench and/or engineering pilot

scale studies will be required to confirm

the effectiveness and applicability of this

technology to site conditions.”

“If this treatment method is found to be

ineffective, this Record of Decision may

need to be reopened.”

“Monitoring will be conducted during the

treatment process to determine if contamination is migrating through the soil as a

result of the treatment.” (Such monitoring

is not routine with in situ techniques.)

ISV is not easy to implement—at least, the

technology costs more—when water content is

high. Thus the ROD noted: “Because of concern over the effectiveness of vitrifying the upper outwash lens, consideration will be given,

during these bench and/or pilot studies, to

whether the lens should be drained prior to

vitrification. ” Also, the responsiveness summary said twice that the site’s soil has “high

moisture content” when it defended why vacuum

extraction of VOCs was not feasible. However,

when the selected ISV remedy was defended,

the responsiveness summary—four pages later

—said “the moisture content . . . is not high. ”

Either high is high, or actual measured values

could be used to show it is high for one technology but not too high for the other technology, if that was the case; however, no actual

data were used. (This may illustrate a lack of

ROD quality control and ROD rushing at the

end of a fiscal year quarter.)

To its credit, the Pristine ROD specified: “The

Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure

(TCLP) is the testing mechanism that should

be used to verify the complete treatment. If this

treatment method is found to be ineffective, this

Record of Decision may need to be reopened. ”

However, a recent technical report said that

vitrified contaminated soil performed poorly:
50

“The vitrified product as evaluated with these

standard leaching tests did not perform well.

The reason for this is not known. It maybe that

the nature of the tests maybe inappropriate for

monolithic, vitrified masses, or vitrification

might not be as effective as chemical stabilization for simple metal systems.” (J.J. Barich et

al., “Soil Stabilization Treatability Study at the

Western Processing Superfund Site,” paper presented at Superfund ’87 conference, 1987, pp.

198-203.) According to the report, for example,

leaching of zinc–over a short period in a standard EPA leach test—was about 10 times greater

than for conventional stabilization. The responsiveness summary portrayed much more certainty: “the metals are encapsulated and bound

up in the ISV process.” The responsiveness

summary also said: “ISV has been tested on hazardous waste and has been successful.” These

two statements contradict the Barich findings.

Battelle has said that the TCLP is technically

inappropriate for monolithic waste forms.

Their principal concern is that reducing treated

material to fine particles—and exposing unbonded contaminants–is based on the false assumption that treated material may not maintain monolithic properties. Does this mean that,

if Battelle is successful in making its point about

the TCLP, the Pristine ROD will be reopened

because the TCLP will not be used to test ISV’s

effectiveness?

A recent EPA study that examined eight

emerging treatment processes for decontamination of PCB contaminated sediments ranked

ISV last by using two sophisticated methodologies. The report said: “all the processes except In Situ Vitrification appear to merit further development for this application.” (U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency, “Report on

Decontamination of PCB-Bearing Sediments,”

October 1987.) While PCB contamination is not

the dominant problem at Pristine and sediments

pose a special problem for ISV unless they are

dewatered, this report is important because

almost all previous information on ISV has

come from its developer, including a lot of emphasis on tests on PCB material. The Pristine

ROD said: “An additional application [of ISV]

is being planned by EPA for a PCB contaminated site.” In August 1987 it was reported that

EPA Region 5 had “conditionally accepted”

ISV for an emergency response action for PCB

contaminated materials at the Greiner’s Lagoon

site in Fremont, Ohio. (Hazardous Waste News,

Aug. 24, 1987.) As of May 1988, OTA was informed by EPA that no date had been set for

the test—the actual removal action at the site—

and EPA confirmed that this site action would

constitute the ISV test for EPA’s SITE program.

Only if new test data confirm the presence of

high concentrations of PCBs will ISV be used

at the Greiner’s Lagoon site and, even then,

probably not before Spring 1989. If the PCBs

are low, then another site would probably be

selected, delaying the SITE demonstration still

more. The Pristine responsiveness summary

said that the demonstration will be performed

prior to use of ISV at Pristine.

Failure of the vacuum off-gas collection system is possibile and of concern because of the

high population density near the site. The responsiveness summary said: “Should this occur, the organics will be rapidly dispersed in

the air, allowing for a very low probability of

any adverse impacts through inhalation downwind of the site. ”

ISV received very detailed examination in the

FS for the BF Goodrich and AIRCO site in Kentucky, which was completed several months after the Pristine ROD. ISV was not selected at

the BF Goodrich/AIRCO site, primarily because

its high cost made it not cost-effective. Several

of the comments about ISV in that FS (from a

different EPA region and contractor) are important relative to the decision to use ISV at

Pristine:

●

●

●

“The effectiveness of off-gas collection and

treatment is not known. ”

“The complexities of this repetitive process [incremental movement across a site]

are not known since it has not been fully

demonstrated on a large site.”

“There is very little data available as to

whether vitrification is a reliable technology.” (Compare this to the Pristine ROD:

“results indicate vitrification to be a reliable technology.”)

1--- ----- --
51

“The mass could take several years to cool,

depending on the size; therefore, a temporary fence should be constructed to prevent physical contact with the cooling material.”

“Implementation of the vitrification process has yet to be demonstrated on a commercial scale . . . It is probable that the

frequency of operation and maintenance

problems would be higher than for a proven

technology. As a result, reliability would

be lower than for proven technologies.

Emissions during implementation would

require extensive control for both VOCs

and dust. ” These concerns are especially

relevant to Pristine because of its location

in a highly industrialized area.

Similarly, ISV was rejected at several Superfund sites in Colorado in 1987 (Denver Radium

Operable Units: Open Space, Card Property,

1000 West Louisiana Properties, and 12th and

Quivas Properties). What is especially interesting is that contamination by radioactive materials would seem to be an ideal application of

ISV because it was originally developed as a

cleanup technology for radioactive materials.

However, all three RODS say the same thing:

“[ISV] was eliminated during the initial screening because its implementability for this particular application is unproven. [ISV] has not

been demonstrated on a large scale of utilized

in a highly-populated urban area like that of

the Card property.” Moreover, in these cases

ISV was also rejected because of the possible

“escape of radon gas and associated radon decay products.” This would seem to also be applicable to escape of trapped gaseous organic contaminants at a site like Pristine, and the concern

undermines the belief that monolithic, solidified ISV material offers secure, tight, and permanent encapsulation.

RIFS contractor. –Camp Dresser and McKee

(CDM); the cost was at least $500,000. The ROD

did not indicate who did the FS, but a copy of

the FS shows it was CDM with Roy F. Weston

performing the FS as a subcontractor. The ROD

said that several figures in the FS were wrong

and recalculated figures were used in the ROD.

The ROD also said that after the RI was completed “several gaps were identified” and additional work was done which took another

year.

State concurrence.—The ROD said that Ohio’s

letter of concurrence is forthcoming. This suggests that the ROD was rushed to get it out by

the end of the fiscal year quarter.

Community acceptance.–“The community and

PRPs are generally in agreement with the groundwater extraction and treatment component of

the alternative. Some members of the community have fully supported U.S. EPA’s recommended alternative, while the PRPs rejected

vitrification and have proposed installation of

a RCRA cap with soil gas venting. The City of

Reading prefers that U.S. EPA fund a less expensive remedial action and give it the remaining funds to build a new municipal treatment

plant.”

Special comments.—The FS had an initial discussion of the two main treatment alternatives

where unit costs and other data were presented.

For in situ vitrification the sole technology developer, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, was acknowledged and was the source

of the data. For onsite incineration, the source

of information is described as “Firm A.” Only

rotary kiln incineration is used in the detailed

analysis. Because a wholly-owned subsidiary

of the FS subcontractor, Roy F. Weston, Inc.,

does cleanups with a transportable rotary kiln

incinerator it seems likely that subsidiary was

Firm A.

The ROD acknowledged some uncertainty

about the groundwater cleanup: “The extent

of contamination from Pristine, Inc., will be

determined by additional studies during the remedial design.” However, this ROD addressed

the final source control remedy and should not

be expected to be definitive about the groundwater cleanup. The ROD also noted that contamination in the lower aquifer may be the

result of “a multi source groundwater contamination problem in the area. ” According to the

ROD, a variety of other types of actions might

be used, including RCRA corrective action.

The responsiveness summary had an interesting interpretation of the provision in SARA
52

Section 121(b)(2) that says that a technology can

be selected even if it has not “been achieved

in practice” elsewhere. The interpretation was

that the provision allows a technology selection without directly applicable data on its effectiveness before the ROD. Legally, this position seems correct because congressional intent

was not to prevent full-scale application just

because there has been no prior full-scale application of a new technology. But traditional

engineering practice does not condone choosing or using a technology without supportive

site-specific test data. The issue is that ISV has

not been tested sufficiently at Pristine nor on

large, unconfined contaminated soil not the absence of successful full-scale use of it at a similar site.

The responsiveness summary would have

been more useful had it provided the sources

of specific comments, which is normally done.

General conclusions.—There area number of outstanding aspects to the Pristine ROD. The commitment to meeting SARA’s preference for permanent treatment technology is excellent. The

commitment to an innovative technology is

commendable. The risk assessment is exceptionally good, detailed, and well presented. For

example, using a 1 in 1 million risk for ingestion and direct contact, the cleanup targets for

soil are 3,182 ppb and 15,041 ppb for benzene

and trichlorethylene; but, when removing the

threat to groundwater from leaching of the contaminated soil was used, the targets for the two

chemicals decreased to 116 ppb and 175 ppb

to meet drinking water standards.

Unlike most FSS, the Pristine FS presented

a preferred alternative that was recommended

for implementation. It is OTA’s understanding,

from speaking to RIFS contractors, that EPA

usually directs them not to give a recommended

cleanup. Why was ISV so strongly supported

for Pristine, especially before the use of it in

the removal action planned by Region 5?

As reported in Pristine’s responsiveness summary, EPA’s selection of ISV got a poor reception, apparently from responsible parties, because of its unproven state, high cost, and

preferential handling in the FS and ROD: “Because of its obvious bias in favor of ISV . . . the

FS does not properly evaluate all existing relevant technologies . . . “ EPA was accused of being “arbitrary and capricious. ” EPA defended

its selection at great length, including a discussion of why vacuum extraction of VOCs, apparently considered a viable alternative by the responsible parties, is not applicable to the site.

(The technology was not analyzed in the FS.)

However, EPA’s discussion did not resolve the

questions raised here about ISV, nor did EPA

go into any technical depth in discussing vacuum

extraction. Extensive work done for the responsible parties indicates that vacuum extraction,

which has been selected for cleanups elsewhere, may be feasible and cost-effective at

Pristine (see below). To the extent that ISV reduces risk mainly through removal of volatile

organic contaminants, it performs functionally

like vacuum extraction removal of volatile organics. But vacuum extraction is intrinsically

a lower cost technology that uses less capital

intensive equipment and energy than does ISV.

The problem is the decisionmaking process

and the accuracy of crucial data upon which

it is based, As with so many sites, treatability

tests for Pristine were postponed to the postROD Design Phase even though test data are

necessary to fully support the selection of

remedy. This criticism is not directed at the ISV

technology itself, which might eventually work

at the site and which is an important new

cleanup technology. But the wisdom of choosing ISV for the Pristine site remains questionable for several reasons.

Consider the following initial criterion to be

complied with for a technology to pass the initial screening in a feasibility study: “There must

be a demonstrated history of successful use of

the technology in environments similar to the

. site. All technologies of a research and development nature, and which cannot be reasonably said to be in common use, are rejected.”

This criterion is from the 1987 ROD for the

Northern Engraving Corp. site in Wisconsin

in the same EPA Region as Pristine. ISV technology could not meet that criterion, nor is the
53

criterion consistent with SARA, but the point

here is inconsistency within the Superfund

program.

Either EPA’s SITE program needs to prove

in situ vitrification or the technology should

be released from the demonstration program

and accepted as proven technology in ROD

selections. Without treatability study results,

the uncertainty about ISV’s effectiveness, when

coupled with no cost advantage over proven

incineration (see below), weakens Pristine’s

ROD and the government’s attempts to get responsible parties to take over the cleanup. Although SARA allows the use of new innovative

cleanup technologies, there is little engineering or public support for selecting an unproven

technology without supportive data. Data are

necessary to substantiate a technology’s ability to meet specific cleanup goals, especially

when other proven and cost-effective permanent treatment technologies are available. Moreover, in the Pristine FS, treatment technologies

other than incineration were eliminated from

detailed evaluation with no technical basis. Although the FS and ROD were clearly committed to using a treatment technology, the alternatives became very restricted. Aside from ISV

and conventional incineration technology, no

consideration was given, for example, to above

ground vitrification of excavated soil in a furnace. This technology was said, by its developer

(Penberthy Electromelt International, Inc.), to

cost $180 per ton ($280 per cubic yard) in direct unit costs; a transportable furnace would

take about 500 days to perform the work at Pristine. These figures are competitive with ISV.

Is EPA prepared to alter its decision in the

Design Phase if test results are negative? The

ROD said that manufacture of the specially designed equipment “will occur concurrently

with the remedial design. ” In other words, a

big investment will be made before test results

can support the selection.

The cost of the ISV choice may have been

under estimated for several reasons discussed

earlier (depth of treatment and building special equipment). The range of unit cost for ISV

given in the FS is $250 to $350 per cubic yard.

The FS used a mid-range value of $290 per cubic yard. If a unit cost of $350 is used, it leads

to a total cost of $26 million instead of the ROD

estimate of $22 million. (Total costs include burdens and groundwater cleanup.)

The FS contained initial screening costs for

the two treatment options: ISV and incineration. At the screening stage, the two costs

looked comparable: ISV at $13 million and incineration at $18 million. These figures seem

to come from using the upper range of the unit

costs given in the FS ($500 for incineration and

$350 for ISV, with no burden added). But the

ISV cost increased by 70 percent in the final

cost calculations in the FS, while the incineration cost increased by 183 percent, with no explanation provided. There is more uncertainty

about the cost of the ISV option, however, than

about incineration and just the opposite change

in cost would have seemed more plausible.

As discussed earlier, the cost of onsite incineration was seriously over estimated and beyond EPA’s standard allowable range of +50/

–30 percent. (This allowable range, itself, is

large enough to invalidate a technology decision based on cost.) The FS did not use the $425

per cubic yard mid-range value from its own

incineration data ($350 to $500); data which appears higher than reliable cost estimates. OTA

recalculated the cost of the onsite incineration

option. Instead of using $730 per cubic yard

(which the ROD used to calculate incineration

costs), OTA used $300 per cubic yard (see discussion above). Including all the other costs for

the incineration alternative, such as groundwater cleanup, as done in the FS, the total cost

for the incineration alternative then becomes

$23 million (close to ISV’s cost). If the cost of

the ISV option is also recalculated to reflect the

high end of the cost range supplied by the vendor, then its cost is $26 million. The conclusion is: onsite incineration is not likely to be

more expensive than ISV at Pristine.

In these recalculations the indirect or burden costs (83 percent) are those used in the Pristine FS; however, these are much higher than
54

those in the FSS for the Davis and Re-Solve sites.

At Pristine, various contingencies, construction services, and design costs amounted to a

burden of 83 percent, while in the Davis and

Re-Solve FSs the burden is 35 percent; the latter explicitly included costs for pilot study

work, while the figures for Pristine did not. For

Crystal City, the burden was 29 percent; for

Chemical Control, 56 percent; and for Seymour

Recycling, 60 percent. For the BF Goodrich/

AIRCO site in Kentucky where ISV received

extensive examination, the total overhead on

the ISV direct costs was 60 percent (and the

unit cost was $275 per cubic yard). The markup

at Pristine was substantially higher than the

markups in these other recent FSs. That is, both

treatment estimates at Pristine would have been

lower if a lower burden were used; with 35 percent, used by the same RIFS contractor in other

FSs, the cost for ISV becomes $16 million instead of $22 million and the incineration option (at $730 per cubic yard) becomes $38 million instead of $51 million.

Indeed, mobile incineration might be less

costly; if the low $186 per cubic yard figure from

the Seymour site (which is in agreement with

other data given above for recent actual contracted costs) is correct and is used for Pristine, with the same high burden rate as the other

alternatives, the total cost of the rejected incineration option is about $15 million [instead

of the estimated $51 million) versus $22 million for the selected remedy of in situ vitrification. With the lower, more typical burden rate

of 35 percent, the incineration option comes

to about $11 million (versus $16 million for ISV

at the same, lower burden rate). The Seymour

site is in the same EPA Region as Pristine. These

two sites illustrate that more regional oversight

is necessary to catch inconsistencies in data

critical to technology selection.

The lower figures for incineration are important in the context of the government obtaining a settlement with the responsible parties;

if this estimate proves correct on closer scrutiny and true costs of incineration at Pristine

are indeed much lower than the cost of ISV,

then incineration becomes the more attractive

cost-effective permanent remedy. However, onsite incineration is likely to cost more than

vacuum extraction of volatile organic contaminants, which the responsible parties favor. But

vacuum extraction is a separation technology,

and an important issue (as it is for ISV) is what

is done with the extracted contaminants. If they

are destroyed rather than landfilled after carbon adsoption, the costs increase. Moreover,

the diversity of contaminants at Pristine requires careful analysis of vacuum extraction’s

ability to remove them; it might be able to do so.

Although at Pristine ISV was rated comparable in effectiveness to incineration and better

for cost, its implementability is lower than that

for incineration because ISV has not been routinely used for chemical waste cleanups. ISV

has a higher level of uncertainty with regard

to site conditions, and there is a need for sitespecific design. Indeed, the FS said, “There is

more data to support incineration . . . Of the

soil contaminant destruction alternatives, only

[incineration] has a demonstrated performance

and reliability, ” Incineration offers considerably more certainty as to effectiveness, reliability, and cost.

Cost aside, incineration is a less risky selection at this time in the absence of treatability

study data that could remove uncertainties

about ISV for the Pristine site, especially with

regard to off-gas collection and treatment, the

migration of contaminants into surrounding

soil, the degree of destruction of all organic site

contaminants, and safety uncertainties for the

surrounding community.

There is another uncertainty about the implementation of ISV. Battelle has exclusive

rights from the Department of Energy to market ISV for nonradioactive sites. The ROD acknowledged that “ISV is a patented process

which requires a license.” Other companies

who do actual cleanup work are not familiar

or experienced with the technology. However,

the Pristine responsiveness summary said:

“The selection of ISV is not patently unfair

since the developer will be licensing firms to

carry out the process and the bid process will

be competitive.” Subsequently, Battelle changed

the way it offers the technology such that its
55

availability and, hence, competition may be restricted. Rather than supplying the technology

to cleanup companies, which has not proven

a successful strategy, Battelle has helped form

a new company with startup capital. The new

company, the GeoSafe Corp., will seek additional venture capital and will enter the hazardous waste cleanup business directly with

ISV; it has the exclusive worldwide rights for

this market. No competitive bid process now

‘ appears possible.

The ROD omitted any commitment to SARA’s

requirement for 5-year reviews when hazardous material remains onsite, a requirement

which applies in this case because of the stabilization aspect of the technology. For example,

the 5-year review was called for in the Chemical Control ROD, which selected in situ stabilization, and at the Tacoma Tar Pits, which selected stabilization.

The Pristine case illustrates how different

offices of the same EPA contractor and how

different Superfund contractors can use substantially different data. One contractor’s office used a cost for incineration for Pristine of

about twice what another of the contractor’s

offices used for the Davis Liquid Waste and ReSolve sites. A close examination of the calculations for estimated costs at Pristine reveals

that a very high indirect or cost burden was

used, compared to indirect costs in FSs for several sites. Such cost variations have no technical basis.

Case Study 7

Renora, Inc., Edison Township, New Jersey,

EPA Region 2

Capsule OTA findings:-The selected remedy makes

use of offsite landfilling for soils contaminated

with PCBs. Biological treatment was selected

for soils contaminated with diverse organic

compounds and toxic metals and for contaminated groundwater, but no treatability study

supported its selection.

Key dates:

● Entered Superfund system: 5/1/81

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Preliminary Assessment: 8/1/82

Site Inspection: 9/1/81 to 8/1/82

National Priorities List

–proposed date: 12/1/82

–final date: 9/1/83

—site rank: #378 out of 770

RIFS start and completion: 5/85 to 8/87

Public comment period before Record of

Decision: 8/18/87 to 9/10/87

Signing of ROD: 9/29/87

Estimated complete remediation: 1 to 2

years after signing

Total time.—8 years

Brief description of site.–The site “is an approximately one acre parcel of land in an area zoned

for light industrial use. The surrounding area

is residential with three sensitive uses (a nursery school, senior citizens center, and an apartment complex) within two thousand feet of the

site. . . . two residential developments [were]

built in close proximity to the site during the

period of time the RI/FS was conducted. From

1978 to 1982 Renora Inc., transported and accepted materials containing hazardous substances for transfer, storage, blending and ultimately, disposal through abandonment at the

site [in 1982].”

Major contamination/environmental threat.—Evidence

of contamination problems started in 1978. In

1985, the Remedial Investigation (RI) said: “Surficial soils (0 to 2 feet) are primarily contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)

and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs)

and to a lesser extent with volatile organic compounds (VOCs), acid extractable compounds

(AECs), other base/neutral organic compounds

(BNCs) and heavy metals. Shallow groundwater

beneath the site is contaminated with low levels

of chloroethane, (a volatile organic compound)

and heavy metals. Surface water and sediment

samples show levels of heavy metals, tetrachloroethene, phenols and pesticides. No evidence of air contamination was found at the

site, No buried drums were found at the site. ”

The RI concluded that the significant pathways of exposure are direct contact and subsequent incidental ingestion by children tres-
56

passing the site, future onsite workers, and

future site residents.

According to the ROD:” . . . there are no offsite impacts directly attributable to site operations. Therefore, no management of migration

measures were selected as part of the overall

remedy for any environmental media. Although

groundwater does not pose a public health risk,

achievement of target treatment/residual levels

will result in restoration of groundwater quality to potable water standards. ”

HRS scores.-groundwater 69.32; surface water

9.4; air 0.00; total 40.44

Removal actions.-The ROD said: “A removal action was initiated in October 1984 and continued through April 1985. During the cleanup,

approximately 33,000 gallons of liquid waste

and 28,000 gallons of PCB contaminated waste

oil along with approximately 500 cubic yards

of non-PCB contaminated soils and 560 cubic

yards of PCB-contaminated soils were shipped

off-site for proper disposal [presumably in a

landfill].” The SCAP shows a Federal removal

action 10/23/84 to 10/31/84 at a cost of $27,000

and that the responsible parties performed one,

9/28/84 to 4/16/85. Data from the New Jersey

Department of Environmental Protection indicates that the responsible parties spent $4 million for their removal action.

Cleanup remedy selected.—The remedy has four

key components:

1. “ . . ● excavation of all PCB-contaminated

soils containing concentrations above 5

ppm [parts per million] (approximately

1,100 [cubic yards]) and off-site land fill

disposal . . . “

2. “. . . biodegradation of all PAH-contaminated soils containing concentrations

above 10 ppm (approximately 4400 [cubic

yards]) . . .“

3. “ . . . use of groundwater as an irrigation

medium for the bioremediation system

. . . “ [and]

4. “ . . . backfilling, grading and revegetation.”

The cost of the selected remedy was estimated

at $1.4 million.

A number of cleanup alternatives were examined, including containment approaches,

treatment of less material, use of incineration

instead of landfilling, and conventional groundwater treatment.

Satisfaction of SARA statutory requirements:

1) Selection of permanent cleanup.—The ROD

said: “Overall, [the selected remedy] is protective of public health and the environment. An

innovative treatment technology would be utilized as a major portion of the remedy. There

is complete reduction of the toxicity, mobility,

and volume of the contamination. The remedy

is permanent and would not require long-term

management” (emphasis added). More cautiously, the ROD said the remedy “significantly

reduces the toxicity, mobility and volume of

contaminants” (emphasis added). Also: “Upon

completion of the remedy future site uses will

be unrestricted.”

There is no specific technical information in

the ROD or Feasibility Study to support the

selection of biological treatment for the Renora

site. There are no test data, no citations to the

technical literature, nor reference to previous

use at specific sites. The ROD stated: “A prerequisite to implementation of the bioremediation

portion of the alternative is a pre-design treatability study to refine parameters of the operation.” There are a large number of contaminants, and many of the organic contaminants

and heavy metals are considered difficult to biodegrade. The biological approach is not offthe-shelf cleanup technology, except for a few

simpler types of cleanups.

A key issue is the extent of destruction by biotreatment. While it can be easy to get some

destruction, it can be very difficult to get complete destruction or as much, for example, as

required for incineration (99.99 percent destruction). Finding ways to enhance biodegradation for a complex set of chemicals and for

recalcitrant contaminants can be difficult. For

example, a recent research paper discussed the

“degradation of Benzo[a]pyrene and other

recalcitrant PAHs” and explained its failed attempt to foster biodegradation by noting that

I
57

“organic amendments which are readily utilized for carbon and energy are often ineffective in stimulating degradation of recalcitrant

organic compounds.” (M.P. Coover and R.C.

Sims, Hazardous Waste & Hazardous Materials, vol. 4, No. 2, 1987, pp. 151-158.)

The current state of technical knowledge and

experience does not support the cleanup selection in the absence of site-specific data to prove

effectiveness in meeting the cleanup goals.

There are substantially different forms of biological treatments, ranging from simple land

treatment to the sophisticated use of bioreactors using a variety of additions to promote and

sustain biological destruction to desired residual levels of contaminants, but the ROD dealt

with the technology only in its simpler, generic

terms.

Biodegradation was selected for the French

Limited site in Texas, but the ROD emphasized

that “biodegradation of PCBs to the criterion

(23 ppm) has not been demonstrated.” EPA required, therefore, that a secondary stabilization

treatment be used on the residue from the biotreatment.

The FS for the Liquid Disposal site in Michigan examined biological treatment in more detail than most studies and did not select it. A

chief reason was: “The level of effectiveness

of the biodegradation technologies on a nonhomogeneous waste stream is unknown.” The

study noted that extensive testing would be necessary to prove the technology effective for the

site.

Biological treatment was rejected in the Feasibility Study for Crystal City because “[it] is

generally ineffective for destroying these wastes

as the treatment is not performed in a controlled

environment. Several processes are being developed which show potential. However, none

of these processes have been developed past

the laboratory stage. Therefore, biological treatment has been ruled out. ” Biodegradation was

also rejected in the ROD for the Tower Chemical Superfund site in Florida: “Biodegradation

does not address the metals contamination

found at the site and would require long term

operations before full clean-up is effective.

Other technologies, e.g., incineration, would

provide equal destruction efficiencies in a

shorter time frame. ”

The Renora ROD said:

●

●

●

"

. . . bioremediation of soils is considered

an innovative treatment technology in the

field of hazardous waste management.”

“Although available scientific literature indicates implementation of the bioremediation portion of the alternative is feasible;

a pre-design treatability study would be required to confirm the operational reliability of the alternative. ” "

. the bulk of the contaminated soils (approximately 60 percent of the total) which

remain are amenable to onsite bioremediation. Available scientific literature and its

use in the oil refining industry indicate that

the bioremediation aspect of the selected

alternative will achieve the target treatment/residual levels.”

“The prospect for long-term reliability of

the alternative would be established by the

pre-design treatability work and subsequent verification sampling. However, as

this remedy is permanent and substantially

reduces the toxicity, mobility and volume

of contamination the likelihood of remedy

replacement is low” (emphasis added; compare to different statement above).

The choice of offsite landfilling over incineration was not discussed in detail in a direct way

for the alternative selected. Other alternatives

which would include more use of incineration,

because no bioremediation would be used, were

said to “not result in providing any greater protection of public health or the environment that

would justify the incremental cost increase. ”

Z) Accurate assessment of land disposal and

containment alternatives.—The use of offsite

landfilling for the PCB contaminated soil instead of treatment is contrary to the intent of

SARA, even though the amount is relatively

small. A recent EPA study on PCB cleanup concluded: “Landfilling of such materials, where

legal, is a potential source of groundwater con-
58

lamination, and only a temporary measure at

best.” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

Office of Research & Development, “Bengart

& Memel PCB Site Soil Decontamination

Project,” undated but apparently 1987.) The FS

 for the Liquid Disposal site in Michigan said:

“However, moving wastes from one site to

another does not constitute a permanent remedial action” (emphasis added). For Renora,

there was no discussion of the negative aspects

of using offsite landfilling. The Renora ROD

looked strictly from the perspective of this site:

“Excavation of PCB contaminated soils and offsite landfilling will physically remove hazardous substances, pollutants and contaminants

from the site.”

RIFS contractor.—The RIFS was paid for by a

group of potentially responsible parties and

conducted under contract by BCM Eastern Inc.;

$250,000; an endangerment assessment was

done by Camp Dresser and McKee under contract to EPA.

State concurrence.—The State of New Jersey concurred with the selected remedy.

Community acceptance.—The responsiveness summary gives little information on what the community felt about the selected remedy.

Special comments. –The analysis of cleanup alternatives was somewhat confusing because

some options, including the selected one, referred to offsite disposal consisting of either

landfilling or incineration. Except for cost,

there were no distinctions made within an alternative for the use of landfilling versus incineration. Therefore, the selected alternative might

have received overly high evaluations because

incineration was included as an option but ultimately not selected.

The ROD contained a good statement on capping: “[it] would not be considered permanent

since the toxicity and volume of contaminants

in the soil would remain essentially unchanged.”

The ROD did not commit to groundwater

monitoring after the selected remedy is implemented, which seems relevant, since it says that

the groundwater will be restored to a potable

condition and since the HRS groundwater

score was quite high. However, the responsiveness summary did include a monitoring step

in its description of the selected remedy.

General conclusions.—A key issue is the choice

of offsite landfilling over offsite incineration

for the PCB contaminated soil. A major driving force behind SARA’s requirements for permanently effective treatment technologies was

the long-term ineffectiveness of moving buried

hazardous waste from Superfund cleanup sites

to other land disposal sites. This ROD, considering only this site, implied that offsite disposal

results in maximum protection. It did not consider the long-term consequences at another site

of landfilling materials transported from this

site. In addition to the two EPA sources already

noted, the FS for the Pristine site in Ohio rejected the option of sending contaminated soil

to an offsite landfill because “ . . . there is potential for the contaminated soil to cause a problem at the off-site facility. . . . the alternative is

not permanent and is the least preferred under

SARA.” The reasons for ruling out offsite incineration of the PCB contaminated soil at

Renora were not given.

The Renora remedy also perpetuates a trend

started by the major removal action completed

at the site in 1985. A viable alternative, as examined in the ROD, was to incinerate the waste

instead of landfilling it. Indeed, the ROD contained an important statement on this point in

the discussion of the alternative that was selected: “If the excavated PCB contaminated

soils are incinerated instead of landfilled, there

would be a permanent reduction in the toxicity, mobility and volume of contaminants in

soils.” The clear implication is that landfilling

is not comparable in meeting SARA’s requirements. The chief reason for not selecting incineration of the PCB contaminated soils appears to be its greater cost, an additional $4.6

million. The ROD noted: “it is likely that the

[potentially responsible parties] will implement

the selected remedy.” In other words, approval

of offsite landfilling by EPA may have facilitated getting an agreement from the responsible parties to clean up the site.
59

The interest in using innovative treatment

technology is commendable, and some biological remedy may, in fact, be found effective. But

the ROD decision was made without supporting technical information. The ROD and the

FS contained no details about the technology.

There are many forms of biological treatment,

and it is still too new a cleanup technology to

make assumptions on effectiveness at a site

with so many organic contaminants, some at

relatively high concentration. Technology

specificity is high for biological treatment,

which means that it is difficult to extrapolate

success from one waste to another. Delay of

treatability testing until after the ROD creates

considerable uncertainty and the potential for

actions which are not fully protective of public health and environment because of either

substantial loss of time or a compromise of

cleanup goals if the testing shows problems in

the biotreatment. Indeed, because of the need

for extensive treatability testing, the estimated

time for complete implementation seems overly

optimistic. Such biological treatment (both aerobic and anaerobic processes) of contaminated

soil was rejected at an early screening stage in

the Pristine FS because “Mixed wastes and low

concentrations (less than 100 ppm) are difficult

to treat. ” The same condition exists at Renora.

Because of the use of landfilling and the selection of an unproven treatment technology, the

selected remedy cannot be assured to be permanent. Moreover, compliance with SARA’s

requirement on the reduction in toxicity, mobility, or volume was described in three different ways: complete, substantial, and significant.

This puzzling situation may indicate end-offiscal-year ROD rushing or confusion over the

capabilities of the selected remedy.

Case Study 8

Sand Springs Petrochemical Complex,

Tulsa County, Oklahoma, EPA Region 6

Capsule OTA findings.–EPA originally said solidification technology was ineffective for the high

organic content site wastes and incineration

was effective. Nevertheless, EPA reversed itself and selected solidification for most of the

cleanup, which the responsible party had found

effective in its treatability study. Incineration

is to be used if solidification technology is not

successfully demonstrated or fails after solidified material is landfilled on the floodplain site,

but the criteria for failure are unspecified.

Key dates:

●

●

●

●

•

●

●

●

Entered Superfund system: 8/1/80

Preliminary Assessment: 6/1/80

Site Inspection: 11/1/80

National Priorities List

–proposed date: 10/84

–final date: 6/86

—site rank: #761 out of 770

RIFS start and completion: 6/29/84 to 5/4/87

Public comment period before Record of

Decision: 7/29/87 to 9/1/87

Signing of ROD: 9/29/87

Estimated complete remediation: 11/91

Total time.—11 years

Brief description of site.–”The site operated as a

refinery from the turn of the century through

the 1940s. The property has since been developed as an industrial area and consists of an

abandoned solvent and waste oil recycler, an

active transformer salvage/recycler, active

chemical manufacturers and various other industries. . . . the site is located on the northern

bank of the Arkansas River, immediately west

of Tulsa, Oklahoma. The site encompasses approximately 235 acres [and] includes unlined

acid sludge pits, a surface impoundment, surficial sludge contamination, solvent and waste

oil lagoons and contaminated sediments. The

[site] is located in the alluvial floodplain of the

Arkansas River.”

Major contamination/environmental threat.—’’Total

known waste volume is approximately 130,000

cubic yards. During the period of operation hazardous substances were stored or disposed of

in drums, tanks, unlined pits and lagoons or

buried on-site. These substances include various volatile and non-volatile organics, chlorinated solvents, and sludges containing heavy

metals. Waste pits have contaminated local
60

groundwater and caused migration of surface

contaminants. ”

EPA concluded that there are four major

sources of risks: direct contact with organic carcinogens and highly acidic wastes and surface

waters; air emissions of acid fumes and volatile organic compounds; surface waters polluted by runoff during heavy rains; and groundwater being contaminated directly by lagoons

and indirectly from site runoff: “in heavy rains

the site is submerged.”

According to the FS: “It is believed that contaminants from the pits, ponds, and lagoons are

leaching into the alluvial aquifer, therefore, a

major pathway for migration is probably groundwater. However, by definition this pathway has

been excluded from consideration during the

FS for the Operable Unit.” The same contamination problem exists for surface water migration offsite. The FS also said: “Several on-site

ponds and lagoons have a history of breaching

their containment structures: there have been

incidents of dike walls breaching for one of the

Glen Wynn lagoons, as well as flow of materials from the river acid sludge pits into the Arkansas River, which have occurred in the past

. . . . the contents of the large and small acid

sludge pits had breached their dike walls on

several occasions.”

HRS scores.-groundwater,44 .90; surface water

21.82; air 0.00; total 28.86

Removal actions.—A private party performed a

removal action in 1984; there are no details in

the ROD.

Cleanup remedy selected.—EPA designated this

cleanup as a source control operable unit that

covered surface liquids, sludges, and heavily

contaminated solids but not minimally contaminated soil or groundwater. The latter is to be

addressed in a subsequent ROD. Originally,

before the ROD was officially signed, EPA

selected onsite incineration of wastes and

solicited public comment on it as part of the

RIFS public comment period; the agency had

already evaluated solidification and onsite landfill and solvent extraction, all of which were

rejected. EPA changed its mind and selected

solidification, accepting a five-part proposal by

Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO), a responsible party, that included:

1. excavation and offsite thermal destruction

of some unspecified volume of surficial

sludges;

Z. solidification and/or stabilization of all remaining sludges and containment of the

resulting material in an onsite RCRA hazardous waste landfill;

3. demonstration that solidification technol4

5

ogy meets EPA approved criteria and,

should it not do so, use thermal destruction [apparently onsite];

no liability release for the site or from future maintenance and monitoring; and

repair or restoration of the landfill to ensure no migration or destruction or treatment of all or a portion of its contents, as

EPA deems appropriate, should monitoring show that the solidification/stabilization remedy fails.

It appears that ARCO is anticipated by EPA

to sign a consent decree, agreeing to pay for

the cleanup.

Cost data on the selected remedy is absent

because the combination of solidification and

incineration was not evaluated in the FS. It is

unclear how much material will be incinerated

offsite initially. But if solidification is used it

will cost less than incinerating all the waste.

Incineration was estimated in the ROD to cost

$67 million and complete solidification was

estimated at $38 million (the comparable figures

in the FS are $54 million and $31 million). OTA

estimates that the probable comparable cost of

the five-part remedy is $45 million, but this figure is highly uncertain because there are many

different forms of solidification.

Satisfaction of SARA statutory requirements:

I) Selection of permanent cleanup.—EPA said

in the ROD that the selected remedy, based

mostly on solidification, fulfills the statutory

preference. However, as EPA stated: “on-site

thermal destruction of wastes . . . appears to

meet more statutory selection criteria than the

other remedies evaluated. ” With solidification,
61

“unlike on-site thermal destruction, the toxicity of wastes would not be reduced and the volume of wastes would be increased.”

EPA views in the ROD on the chosen solidification option at this site included the following:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

"

. . . [there was a] lack of demonstrated

permanence.” "

. . . the capability of solidification or

stabilization techniques to permanently

bind with high organic wastes, such as

those found at Sand Springs, has not been

demonstrated in the pilot studies conducted

on-site. ” "

. . . without further treatment free liquid

contaminant concentrations were not reduced to meet RCRA land ban restrictions.” "

. . . the unconfined compressive strength

of the stabilized material . . . does not meet

the recommended disposal criteria. ” "

leaching tests conducted by EPAs

Cincinnati laboratory show that the solidified material leaches contaminants.” "

. . . leaching of contaminants, and incomplete encapsulation [small globules of waste

were seen] raises questions about the long

term effectiveness and permanence of the

process.”

the waste” . . . contains 50 percent organic

compounds raising doubts about the abilit y of stabilized or solidified waste to meet

RCRA requirements in the long term.”

samples “ . . . show obvious degradation

of the solidifying matrix following analysis for total organic content. ”

"

the net assessment is that solidification or stabilization processes present difficult problems with respect to meeting

ARARs [standards].” "

. . . possible air emissions.” "

. . . volumetric increase of 50 [to 200

percent].” "

. . . the potential for failure was determined to be greatest for the on-site solidification remedy.”

"

. . . the source of the contamination will

not be destroyed.”

additional “ . . . studies will need to be

performed on the subsurface petroleum

wastes. ”

The FS summed up its evaluation of onsite

solidification: “Not a proven technology for

high organic waste. Contaminant source isolated, may not be rendered nonhazardous. May

not meet ARAR.” It remains unclear whether

the test results supplied by ARCO removed all

of the above concerns for EPA; but the inclusion of the third provision in the five-part

remedy which requires demonstration of solidification technology suggests that EPA was not

fully convinced by the ARCO test data or that

it did not have enough time to fully evaluate

it prior to signing the ROD.

EPA has tied the environmental acceptability of the solidification remedy to two conditions: “if the effectiveness of this concept is adequately assured or if ARCO undertakes the

corrective actions deemed appropriate by EPA

should the remedy fail.” No such conditions

would have been attached to the originally chosen thermal destruction remedy, which ARCO

also examined in its treatability study and

which was found to work effectively. Cause for

EPA rejecting the incineration option in the

ROD was said to be its “serious implementation problems,” but EPA’s FS analysis also said

that all the processes that would treat waste onsite “are judged to each have the same degree

of implementability.” Moreover, the ROD stated:

“Actual implementation time for solidification

and thermal destruction is comparable . . . “

EPA said: “The proposed remedy is considered permanent.” And that it “is cost-effective

compared to equally environmentally protective alternatives.” But EPA also said that the

thermal destruction alternative offered more

overall protection than solidification. The FS

summed up its case for onsite incineration:

“Proven technology destroys hazardous material, Containment source worker health and

safety addressed in remediation. Meets ARAR.”

2) Accurate assessment of land disposal and

containment alternatives.—With regard to future operation and maintenance, the ROD said

that these “will be minimized since the source

of the contamination will be removed.” But,

as the ROD also stated, solidification does not

destroy the source of contamination that will
62

be left onsite. The ROD contained a replacement cost of $100 million should failure occur

for the onsite solidification and landfilling option but no cost for the incineration alternative. For these two pure (single technology) options, the reduction in cost of about $30 million

for solidification is offset by a possible future

re-remediation cost of $100 million. And, that

tradeoff still exists.

The onsite landfill is supposed “to reduce

groundwater infiltration and the chances of any

contaminants migrating off-site. ” But if “ . . .

significant, unforeseen, off-site migration or

contamination occurs as a result of the site,

appropriate remedial measures will be taken, ”

No detailed analysis of future failures was

given. The ROD did not express concern about

having the onsite landfill in a location that is

submerged in heavy rain and that is in a floodplain adjacent to the river. The ROD stated further: “While a hazardous waste landfill of solidified waste would protect health in the short

term, the long term stability of this material is

not proven. ”

For Sand Springs, the importance of the

water level to remedy selection is striking. The

ROD for the Tower Chemical Superfund site

in Florida, for instance, commented on the use

of chemical stabilization followed by onsite

land disposal, a remedy the ROD rejected. The

comments apply directly to the Sand Springs

site: “Although this process is effective in addressing inorganic contamination, the volume

of materials would increase, thus causing increased disposal facility requirements. In addition, the soils being solidified contain significant amounts of organic compounds which

could affect the integrity of the cement monolith. The presence of organics will require containment of the monolith within an on-site landfill built above the land surface due to the locally

high water table. This technology would also

require long-term (30 years) monitoring which

is less favorable than technologies which provide permanent destruction of wastes. . . . a

high water table at the site makes it infeasible

to solidify or build an on-site landfill which

meets the design specifications outlined in

RCRA.”

The issue of effectiveness of solidification

technology for organics is critical for Sand

Springs. The FS for the Re-Solve site in Massachusetts rejected stabilization because “there

has been limited success in chemically fixing

organic contaminants such as solvents and

PCBs.” The ROD for the Liquid Disposal site

in Michigan, which also selected stabilization

for soil contaminated with organic chemicals,

said that the hazardous substances “will not

be permanently destroyed” and “hazardous

chemicals still remain in that [treated] mass. ”

And the FS for the site said: “Considerable research data exists demonstrating the effectiveness of this technology in immobilizing a wide

range of contaminants, primarily inorganic.

A substantial amount of data does not exist,

however, to accurately judge the long-term

reliability of the process. Long-term leaching

and volatilization can be expected for soluble

and volatile organic wastes.” Although, stabilization was selected for Liquid Disposal, so was

the use of a slurry wall and impermeable cap

around and over the treated material, as a second level of control. The ROD for the French

Limited site in Texas (same EPA region as

Sands Spring) said: “Fixation is questionable

due to high organic content of untreated soils.”

An EPA report’s observations on halogenated

organic wastes also apply to the selection of

chemical stabilization for Sand Springs: “the

area of solidification/encapsulation is one requiring additional study before it can be considered viable technology. ” (U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency, Technical Resource Document: Treatment Technologies for Halogenated

Organic Containing Wastes, vol. 1, January

1988.)

Another EPA document, used to teach cleanup

workers about waste treatment says: “Solidification technologies are designed to be used for

final waste treatment. This means the technology should be applied only after other treatment

techniques have been applied, i.e., incineration,
63

chemical treatment or other. ” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “RCRA/CERCLA

Treatment Alternatives for Hazardous Wastes,”

October 1987.)

A specific type of solidification tested for

Sand Springs was mentioned in the FS for Crystal City, but the solidification/landfill alternative was not selected at Crystal City. Data provided by the vendor, on waste from some other

site, and reported in the Crystal City FS on two

contaminants also present at Sand Springs (2-

methylnaphthalene and phenanthrene] showed

high levels in the leachate. A demonstration of

the same stabilization technology under EPA

auspices concluded: “for the organics, the

leachate concentrations were approximately

equal for the treated and untreated soils.” (P.R.

de Percin and S. Sawyer, “SITE Demonstration of Hazcon Solidification/Stabilization Process,” paper presented at EPA’s Fourteenth Annual Research Symposium, May 1988.)

A recent EPA study found “large losses of

organics during the mixing process.” (L. Weitzman et al., “Evaluation of Solidification/Stabilization As A Best Demonstrated Available Technology,” paper presented at EPA’s Fourteenth

Annual Research Symposium, May 1988.)

Another EPA study showed that stabilization

was not competitive with thermal and chemical treatment technologies and soil washing for

organic contamination. (R.C. Thurnau and M.P.

Esposito, “TCLP As A Measure of Treatment

Effectiveness: Results of TCLP Work Completed on Different Treatment Technologies for

CERCLA Soils,” paper presented at EPA’s

Fourteenth Annual Research Symposium, May

1988.)

RIFS contractor. —State led; $1.1 million; John

Mathes & Assoc.

State concurrence.—The State of Oklahoma favored solidification over incineration,

Community acceptance. –EPA judged that the

community was more in favor of solidification

than incineration. The community was very

concerned about the future use of an incinerator for waste from other sites, the worsening

of the area’s air pollution, and harm to the local economy. (Building an incinerator for industrial waste is frequently sold by industry to

communities as a local economic advantage;

several efforts to site a hazardous waste incinerator in Oklahoma are underway.) Although

EPA tried to allay the community’s concerns

about incineration, ultimately the community

preferred the uncertainties of the solidification

technology and accepted the assurances that

incineration would be used if solidification was

less effective.

On this issue of the safety of mobile incineration, Sand Springs can be compared to the

Davis Liquid Waste site in Rhode Island where

there also was substantial, documented community concern about onsite incineration, concern to which EPA responded with good technical points but, unlike Sand Springs, did not

alter its choice of incineration. Also, in the ROD

for the French Limited site (in the same EPA

region as Sand Springs), EPA defended mobile

incineration: “Performance standards for air

emissions from incinerators would be met, minimizing the risk from these emissions. EPA considers the implementation of an incinerator to

be relatively simple in comparison to the other

alternatives evaluated in the summary. ”

Moreover, it is not clear that the community

was totally aware of air pollution problems with

solidification. EPA’s responsiveness summary

said: “Pilot studies have shown that some volatile compounds are driven off during excavation and mixing of the waste with the solidifying agent. Mass emission rates have not been

quantified.”

Special comments.—The ROD’s analysis of cleanup alternatives said that for any alternative it

will be necessary to pump and treat surface impoundment liquids and to discharge them into

the Arkansas” River; no details were given.

Moreover, the accepted ARCO proposal made

no mention of these needs.

General conclusions.—Sand Springs has some

good points: 1) pilot treatability studies were

used to evaluate treatment technologies; 2) alter-
64

native treatment remedies were analyzed; 3)

EPA responded to the concerns and interests

of responsible parties, the community, and the

State; and 4) some preferred treatment technology was selected by EPA.

But Sand Springs has many problems too, including a lot of confusion about what test data

were used by EPA and when. The ROD selected

not a reliable permanent remedy but a plan with

several contingencies, with no assurance of a

permanent remedy. Over a short period of time

—about one month—EPA reversed a well-supported, technically sound decision to use incineration rather than solidification/stabilization

technology. In the ROD, EPA said: “Solidification was considered in detail during the Feasibility Study and actual pilot studies. Adequate

information is available on which to base a decision.” Was EPA talking about the information

available when it signed the ROD, including

the ARCO test results, or information obtained

by EPA prior to the RIFS public comment

period? The ROD suggested that EPA had conducted its own tests on solidification of site materials. But it may have used a very different

type of solidification technology. In the ROD

responsiveness summary EPA said: “The [ARCO]

pilot studies had a major influence on the remedy selected. ” If that was so, then why did the

ROD still contain so many negative comments

about solidification? Part of the answer may

be revealed in another statement by EPA in the

ROD’s responsiveness summary: “Solidification pilot tests [presumably ARCO’s] were only

conducted on the surficial acid sludge waste.

Additional waste characterization and pretreatment studies will need to be performed on the

subsurface petroleum wastes.” Another part of

the answer is that EPA had conflicting test data

from two different sources on several solidification technologies. Therefore the question persists: Was there enough test data to justify the

ROD’s selection of remedy?

The ROD contained no details on how EPA

will assure that independent, detailed, and

timely testing will track progress on the selected

remedy and detect ineffective performance in

the long term, if that occurs. If the treatment

technology is ineffective, contaminants will

leach out of the solidified mass, because the

treated material will be placed into a landfill

on a floodplain adjacent to the Arkansas River.

Landfill failure was not considered, nor is its

location compatible with regulated use of land

disposal. Moreover, cause for concern about

independent testing and verification of solidification’s effectiveness is driven by ARCO’s position that any form of waste treatment is unnecessary: “Improved site security and a clay

cap would mitigate this [accidental direct contact] potential risk.” (ARCO, letter to Carl Edlund, EPA Region 6, Aug. 31, 1987.) ARCO’s

critique of EPA’s FS of August 31, 1987, said

that fencing and a cap “could be a sufficient

remedy.” Moreover, in this document ARCO

also said: “Long term effectiveness of incineration, stabilization and solidification are comparable.” These views of ARCO suggest that

the selection of solidification, with costs much

lower than incineration, was a compromise

made by both EPA and ARCO and that future,

post-ROD actions require close EPA scrutiny.

ARCO’s effort to get EPA to retrench from

its original decision to use incineration probably was helped by its apparently successful

criticism of the quality of the RIFS. Indeed, a

number of ARCO’s comments are consistent

with OTA’s observations in this report for

RIFSsin general. For example, ARCO said: 1)

“significant gaps exist in the data presented and

considered in the FS”; 2) “The analysis reflected

by the FS is cursory and of limited detail”; 3)

“The lack of back-up, the limited detail and the

lack of references suggested that the analysis

may not have involved the development of any

additional information beyond that provided

by the authors’ experience”; and 4) “The FS

is characterized by an over-reliance on assumptions rather than actual performance data.”

A big question still remains. Who bears the

burden of proof that a treatment technology

works before EPA officially endorses its use

at an actual cleanup? There is no basis in the

technical literature for concluding that solidification/stabilization technology is likely to be

effective for wastes with so much and so many

different kinds of organic contamination. The

presence of negative laboratory results, which
65

EPA suggested it had prior to the ARCO test

data, would normally prevent application of a

cleanup technology at the site in question. It

is true that unusual conditions might justify an

unproven technology; for example, in an emergency situation and where all other treatment

technologies are less applicable. But this site

is not generally considered to require emergency attention, and the pilot study on incineration was successful. (Note that stabilization

of incinerator residue contaminated with metals only is proven technology.) It may well be

that, as EPA says, the technology proposed by

ARCO is “a promising innovative technology,”

but sanctioning its full-scale application

through a ROD on the basis of limited data obtained by the responsible party that conflicts

with data obtained by the government, is a big

step, especially because the data are inconsistent with what is generally understood about

the capabilities of the technology. In fact, there

are a number of very different proprietary

forms of solidification and stabilization (ARCO

actually tested two and got similar results), and

it is not clear that either ARCO or EPA has considered or evaluated enough of them and their

performance relative to the technologies used

in the ARCO treatability study.

The degree to which the ARCO data support

EPA’s decision also raises the issue of how accurately current EPA tests—in this case for hazardous waste treated by stabilization—predict

long-term environmental effectiveness. Much

more rigorous testing appears necessary to

make the case that stabilization of hazardous

organic material, such as at Sand Springs, assures insignificant leaching of organic contaminants under long-term conditions at the site.

Therefore, although the ARCO test data do look

good, they are limited by the test procedures

themselves. Nor were the ARCO test data obtained by using standard test protocols and

quality assurance procedures to assure the public and the government that the data are reliable. Doing this is a major effort and an important characteristic of EPA SITE program and

most treatability testing done by or for the government.

After the ROD was issued, a news publication reported: “Solidification poses ‘very little

risk whatsoever,’ says an EPA headquarters

source, who is encouraged that the agency is

willing to allow its use at a Superfund site. The

technology has not been proven to ‘truly bind

organics,’ but any release of organic substances

would be slight, the source explains. ” (Inside

EPA, Nov. 27, 1987, p. 13.)

Moreover, the solidification technology evaluated by ARCO appears to be one which is in

EPA’s SITE technology demonstration program to “resolve issues standing in the way of

actual full-scale application, ” The demonstration was conducted October 13-16, 1987, at the

Douglassville Disposal Superfund site in Pennsylvania, but results of the test were not made

available before the ROD and EPA made no

reference to them for Sand Springs. Results recently made available were negative for organic

contaminants.

The way the remedy selection was made illustrates what can happen when there is much

pressure to issue a ROD by the end of the fiscal

year. ARCO submitted its treatability study results to EPA on July 15, 1987. As late as August 21, 1987, results from ARCO’s pilot tests

were still being obtained and disseminated

among EPA staff. Several formal ARCO reports

are dated August 31, 1987, including one criticizing EPA’s RIFS. This site, like a very high

percentage of all Superfund sites, had its ROD

issued in the last days of the fiscal year (September). In this case, EPA might have stayed

with its original, technically supported decision

and kept on schedule or delayed issuing the

ROD while it: 1) designed more tests for ARCO

to carry out to convincingly demonstrate, before actual use, the long-term effectiveness of

solidification/stabilization technology for the

diverse wastes at the site; and 2) developed

detailed protocols for future testing and monitoring as well as technical criteria which would

trigger the switch to incineration, if solidification failed. In this case, the responsiveness of

EPA to local pressures seems to be related to

selecting a lower cost technology and facilitat-
ing the government’s attempts to have a private party fund the cleanup.

As with the Compass Industries Superfund

site directly across the Arkansas River from

Sand Springs, little attention was given to possible groundwater contamination from the remedial action for the present hazardous material and to the risks to downstream water users

from cumulative discharges into the river.

Case Study 9

Schmalz Dump Site, Harrison, Wisconsin,

EPA Region 5

Capsule OTA findings.-A simple compacted earth

cover over the soil contaminated with lead and

chromium was selected. Solidification/stabilization treatment was rejected, although this

was a textbook example of appropriate use of

the technology. Voluntary well abandonment

and monitoring was chosen over pumping and

treating contaminated groundwater.

Key dates:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Entered Superfund system: 5/1/83

Preliminary Assessment: 5/23/83; (5/1/83 in

CERCLIS)

Site Inspection: 5/23/83; (5/1/83 in CERCLIS)

National Priorities List

–proposed date: 9/1/83

–final date: 9/1/84

—site rank: #190 out of 770

RIFS start and completion: 12/28/84 to

8/14/87

Public comment period before Record of

Decision: 8/17/87 to 9/8/87

Signing of ROD: 9/30/87

Estimated complete remediation: 20 months

(around 6/89)

Total time.—6 years

Brief description of site. –The ROD said: “The

Schmalz Dump Site is located on the north

shore of Lake Winnebago in the Town of Harrison, The site occupies approximately 7 acres

in the Waverly Beach Wetlands area. The neighboring city of Appleton, with a population of

60,000, has its drinking water intake approximately 1200 feet from the shore of Lake Winnebago, in close proximity to the site.” Various types of waste were disposed there from

1968 to 1979.

Major contamination/environmental threat.—According to the ROD, there was “Initial on-site sampling by the State of Wisconsin and the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers in early 1979 . . . Lead

and chromium were also detected in relatively

high concentrations at several sampling stations. Lead and trivalent chromium [the least

toxic form of chromium] were found throughout [soils at] the site at concentrations ranging

from detection limits to 1940 milligrams per

kilogram (mg/kg) and 964 mg/kg respectively

. . . . lead and [trivalent] chromium in soils

. with concentrations greater than 14 mg/kg

and 100 mg/kg respectively, pose an unacceptable lifetime risk from direct contact.” The ROD

indicated a volume of contaminated material

of 8,000 cubic yards.

The second environmental threat was contaminated groundwater. “ . . . the silty sand

aquifer beneath the site appears to be separated

from the lower aquifer by a fairly thick, continuous clay layer. It is therefore unlikely that

contaminants from the site would enter the

lower aquifer and reach residential wells. The

shallow aquifer beneath the site contains levels

of trivalent chromium above background but

not above the MCL [Maximum Contaminant

Level]. ., . the water table is three to five feet

below the land surface and direction of flow

is , . . towards Lake Winnebago.” Regarding the

ability of lead and chromium to leach from the

soil, the ROD said: “Results of the tests show

that very low levels of both lead and chromium

are leachable. . . . trivalent chromium has an

affinity to fine grained, silty soils like those

found in the site area.” A groundwater modeling study “indicates that in fifty years, groundwater containing chromium would have migrated just beyond the site boundary.”

A complex technical issue for this site is that

there are two different chemical forms of chromium: the more toxic hexavalent form and the

less toxic trivalent form. The analysis for soil

contamination recognized that even trivalent

chromium is toxic. However, the analysis of
67

the groundwater threat discounted the hazard

from trivalent chromium or from it turning into

hexavalent chromium.

HRS scores.-groundwater 27.62; surface water

80.00; air 0.00; total 48.92

Removal actions.—Earlier operable unit cleanup

involved removal of PCB contaminated materials in 1987; Remedial Design, $81,000 and Remedial Action, $2.6 million.

Cleanup remedy selected.—This ROD is the second one for the site. The first ROD in August

1985 addressed PCB contamination at the site

and selected “removal of construction debris

and sediments containing elevated concentrations of PCBs. ”

Alternatives examined included: 1) groundwater pumping with treatment, slurry wall and

cap; 2) a RCRA cap; and 3) solidification/stabilization treatment of soil and onsite disposal of

residues. The ROD said: “The preferred alternative involves the installation of a low permeability, compacted earth material cap over approximately seven acres of lead and chromium

contaminated soils, and implementation of

groundwater monitoring for lead and chromium. A voluntary well abandonment program

for nearby wells is also proposed.”

Estimated costs for the groundwater treatment alternative were $3.4 million; for solidification and/or stabilization, $2.8 million; for a

RCRA cap, $2.4 million; and for the selected

remedy of a soil cover $800,000. (In the body

of the ROD the selected remedy is called a soil

cover, but in the beginning of the ROD it is

called a cap. Soil cover is more accurate because a cap implies a more complex, engineered

approach to containing hazardous waste.)

Satisfaction of SARA statutory requirements:

1) Selection of permanent cleanup.—The

Schmalz ROD was straightforward: “The statutory preference for treatment set forth in . . .

SARA is not satisfied because treatment was

found to be impracticable due to questionable

technical feasibility, inadequate short-term protection, and inappropriate site conditions.”

With regard to overall environmental protection, the ROD said the selected remedy “would

provide adequate protection from contaminated soils on site.” Treatment was rejected for

both contaminated groundwater and soil. The

ROD noted for both treatment approaches:

“Treatability or compatibility testing is required . . . prior to design and construction.”

EPA has said, however: “Toxic metals represent a long term threat in the soil environment. This threat can be reduced considerably if the heavy metals can be permanently

immobilized by either chemical or physical

methods.” (U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, Review of In-Place Treatment Techniques for Contaminated Surface Soils, vol. 2,

November 1984.)

The ROD acknowledged that solidification/

stabilization of excavated soil could be “a permanent remedial action to limit the off-site mobility, volubility [an unusual term instead of volume] and toxicity of the heavy metals.” The

selected remedy “is expected to significantly

reduce the mobility of lead and chromium by

containment in the site soils, but do nothing

to reduce toxicity or volume of contaminants.”

The chief reasons for rejecting solidification/stabilization were that:

●

●

●

✌

●

Excavation is risky “due to potential airborne migration of dusts from the site.”

“The reliability ., , is unknown principally

due to the lack of data documenting longterm success or failure of similar projects.” It “ . . . is not expected to significantly minimize risks associated with ingestion of

soils without additional restrictions on use

of the site (e.g., additional fencing).” "

. . . there is considerable research data

to suggest that silicates used together with

a cement setting agent can stabilize a wide

range of materials including metals. However, the feasibility of using silicates for

any application must be determined on a

site specific basis, particularly 

in view of

the large number of additives and different sources of silicates which maybe used, ”

(Interestingly, the paragraph is verbatim

from the book Hazardous Waste Treatment

Technologies, by Gerald Rich and Kenneth
68

●

●

●

Cherry, 1987; the statement is a good explanation of the need for a treatability study

for solidification.)

“Based on the content of soils on the site

. [the alternative] maybe difficult to implement. Contaminated soils consist of

solid waste, wood, brick, and car bodies,

which would make implementation difficult.”

its “ . . . reliability. . . is unknown. ”

it” . . . is not conducive to a wetlands environment. Capping and vegetation of the

site is. ”

With the groundwater problem, there are two

subtle issues. First, the ROD emphasized the

sampling data for chromium concentration in

the shallow aquifer, which ranged from 14 to

48 micrograms per liter (μg/l) and the fact that

the values are below the MCL of 50 μg/l. However, the highest value is close enough to the

MCL value to worry about the precision of sampling and the possibility of future increases in

concentration. Indeed, EPA work indicates that

chromium can be underreported by more than

enough to make the 48 μg/l observation above

the standard. (K.A. Aleckson et al., “Inorganic

Analytical Methods Performance and Quality

Control Considerations,” Quality Control in Remedial Site Investigation, American Society for

Testing and Materials, 1986, pp. 112-123.) The

ROD said: “Groundwater was determined not

to be a public threat because chromium concentrations are below [Safe Drinking Water Act]

drinking water standards. However, leaching

of chromium and/or lead to groundwater could

potentially cause drinking water standards to

be exceeded. Based on the above discussions

[of small amount of leaching according to standard tests and affinity to soil], onsite soils are

not likely to ever increase chromium and lead

concentrations in the ground water to greater

than the drinking water MCLs of 50 μg/l. However, because there is a remote possibility that

this pathway could later become a concern, it

was determined that groundwater should be

monitored over time. In addition, residents in

the vicinity of the site will be asked to voluntarily abandon any existing wells. This is a

precautionary measure to ensure that no potential for exposure exists should contaminant

levels in groundwater increase in the future.”

The ROD’s case is supported by the results

of leachability tests which found low levels of

both lead and chromium; however, the test employed does not necessarily describe long-term

effects under actual site conditions. The ROD

also noted that the background groundwater

level for chromium is 5 μg/l; therefore, there

is contamination from the site. However, the

ROD also said: “groundwater contamination

is not above MCLs and there is no leachate

release.”

The ROD for the Tower Chemical Superfund

site in Florida, where there is chromium contamination in the groundwater, had a target

cleanup level for the treatment of 100 million

gallons of water of 0.05 μg/l even though the

groundwater standard is 50 μg/l. The public

health threat there is considered minimal.

The second groundwater issue is a second

plume of contamination which the ROD described as “an isolated off-site anomaly west

of the Schmalz Site.” Two concentrations reported for the location are 185 μg/l and 1140

μg/l of dissolved chromium. The contamination

“appears to emanate from a localized point

source. Based on the history of dumping in the

area, this phenomenon is not unusual.” It seems

that a narrow definition of the site boundary

kept these higher concentrations from being

considered a significant factor in selecting the

cleanup remedy. Information in the ROD clearly

indicates that the second plume would also flow

into Lake Winnebago.

Overall, the critical ROD conclusion was:

“Based on the rate of groundwater movement,

and taking into consideration the dilution that

would occur once ground water discharges to

the Lake, the levels of chromium in the groundwater should never pose a threat to Appleton’s

water supply. ” Groundwater treatment was

also rejected because “several problems can occur at each component stage. This could result

in delays or inability to implement the alternative. ”
69

In summing up its comparison of alternatives,

EPA said that groundwater treatment “does not

protect against direct contact” and that the

solidification/stabilization treatment of the soil

“would be protective upon implementation,

however, there are several problems associated

with implementation of this alternative that

make it undesirable.” The use of a slurry wall

and cap or a RCRA cap are “not cost effective

because they provide excess protection for

groundwater.”

2) Accurate assessment of land disposal and

containment alternatives.—The word permanent was not used to describe the overall selected remedy. The ROD said that the cap is

protective and that the groundwater monitoring “will provide protection from potential future releases. ”

Regarding permanency of the selected remedy,

the ROD said that” . . . the only potential need

for replacement is seen to be that of the cap

or soil cover. This need could occur if the original cap was washed out by some storm event,

if heavy equipment were to abrade the cover,

or if unforeseen subsidence were to occur.” No

restrictions on future land use were set, and

the ROD noted that EPA has legal authority “to

issue an order for corrective action, should the

owner make an attempt to damage the cap.”

A letter from the State said, “the cap could be

damaged by the landowner, who has indicated

a desire to build on the site.” The ROD for the

Tower Chemical site in Florida eliminated the

alternative of using a soil mixture cap because:

“This technology is unproven and has extensive monitoring requirements. Development of

dessication cracks could cause failure. High

failure potential” (emphasis added).

In the FS for the French Limited site (in EPA

Region 6), use of a slurry wall and cap to contain hazardous waste was described as a “temporary solution” for which the “volume and

toxicity would not be affected . . . [and] . . . the

potential would always exist for failure of either the cap or the slurry wall allowing for the

movement of unstabilized wastes contained

onsite. ”

The decision not to use a RCRA cap was inconsistent with statutory requirements about

satisfying current regulations, and it raises significant uncertainties about future failure, Official EPA guidance notes: “A key task of cover

design is the selection of suitable materials. The

cover usually will include a synthetic membrane and a large volume of soil or soil-like material . . . “ (U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, “Project Summary-Design, Construction, and Maintenance of Cover Systems for

Hazardous Waste: An Engineering Guidance

Document,” November 1987.) The selected

cover is very simple and poses substantial uncertainty about future risks. In the ROD for the

Pristine site EPA defends its rejection of capping by saying” ., . there are no data available

on the long term effectiveness and permanence

of RCRA caps. ” Clearly the situation is worse

for a simple soil cover.

With regard to groundwater monitoring:

“Any increase in existing levels of chromium

or lead will be evaluated as to whether corrective action is necessary based on levels found.”

The ROD did not give any specific technical

criteria for deciding when other remedial actions will be necessary.

There was no discussion of the possible future oxidation of trivalent chromium to the

more toxic and mobile hexavalent chromium.

EPA research has noted: “under conditions

prevalent in many soils, Cr(III) can be oxidized.” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

Review of In-Place Treatment Techniques for

Contaminated Surface Soils, vol. Z, November

1984,) Such oxidation constitutes a potential

mode of failure for the selected remedy, especially in the context of future land use. Although

OTA does not know whether the site soil poses

this problem, it is an important enough issue

to have been examined by EPA. Another potential effect is that trivalent chromium in water

can be oxidized to the hexavalent form in certain types of chlorination treatments; therefore,

leaching of trivalent chromium into groundwater that eventually enters a drinking water

supply can be a problem, especially if it is unexpected.
70

RIFS contractor.—Camp Dresser and McKee;

over $600,000 for all of the RIFS work.

State concurrence.— “The State of Wisconsin

supports our preferred alternative, however it

has several concerns related to implementation

of the remedy. . . . due to the excess cost involved, they do not feel that a groundwater

treatment alternative is warranted. The State

has concerns over whether adequate cap protection is available for alternatives involving

capping the site. . . . the State has agreed to attempt to obtain a voluntary agreement from the

landowner.”

Community acceptance.—The ROD said the “community does not perceive the site as an immediate danger. . . . at least some residents feel

that a full RCRA Subtitle C Cap should be installed.”

Special comments.—Although the ROD said the

selected soil cover had a low permeability, unlike some other RODS no specific permeability

value was given.

Documents obtained from EPA on the use

of treatability studies show that a study was

completed for the Schmalz site in April and

May 1987; the study focused on “surface water

contaminated with PCBs, Cr [chromium], and

Pb [lead].” This attempt to verify physical and

chemical treatment may have been done as part

of the earlier operable unit cleanup for PCBs,

but the results are relevant to groundwater

cleanup for the Schmalz ROD, which does not

mention the study.

In the RIFS, the detection limit for hexavalent chromium was 20 times higher than for

trivalent chromium, which might explain why

hexavalent chromium was not found, if it was

present.

Some of the estimated costs for the rejected

cleanup alternatives look high. For example,

the estimate of $2.8 million for stabilization is

higher than estimates at other Superfund sites.

With a figure of $200 per cubic yard for total

stabilization costs, consistent with data at the

Sand Springs and Liquid Disposal sites where

stabilization was selected, the correct value for

Schmalz is probably about $1.6 million.

The body of the ROD includes a part of the

selected remedy that is not in the remedy’s

description at the beginning of the document.

That is the recommendation that “adjacent

property be evaluated under the pre-remedial

program.” Presumably this action refers to the

hot spot of contamination just outside the site

boundaries used by EPA. Such an examination

might, therefore, open up the possibility of

another site cleanup, but the ROD only recommended the evaluation instead of requiring it.

General conclusions.-The Schmalz site is definitely not one of the worst Superfund sites. But

even though the environmental threat from the

site is not severe, the handling of the remedial

cleanup raises important questions. The degree

of certainty expressed by EPA for the long-term

effectiveness of its selected remedy is inconsistent with the technical limits of the remedy.

A good example of EPA’s over optimism is in

the responsiveness summary: “Following implementation of the selected remedy, exposure

to contamination from the Schmalz Site will

be eliminated” (emphasis added). This statement is inconsistent with the technical limitations of a soil cover and with uncertain failures,

responses to monitoring results, and land use.

Moreover, ROD statements that the “groundwater is not contaminated” are incorrect. The

issue is whether the risks estimated by EPA are

correct and stable or whether groundwater

cleanup is warranted now or whether it may

become necessary. EPA seemed to place heavy

emphasis on a technicality, namely that contamination within the bureaucratic boundaries

of the site was slightly below the current regulatory standard for allowable chromium contamination in drinking water. What if the measured chromium contamination goes up the 5

percent necessary to bring it over the standard? Moreover, the ROD’s selected remedy

omits the statutory requirement of reexamining the site at least every 5 years because untreated hazardous waste will be left onsite.

The volume of contaminated soil (8,000 cubic yards) at Schmalz is relatively small for a

cleanup site. Nevertheless, various ROD statements indicate that minimizing cleanup costs

I
71

was a significant motivation in the remedy

selection. Selecting both soil and groundwater

treatment was estimated to cost eight times as

much as the soil cover. The ROD said alternative treatment remedies for both contaminated

soil and groundwater were rejected because

“they are more costly while achieving the same

desired results” as the selected remedy. Only

by using a narrow, short-term objective of limiting exposure to the hazardous waste are there

comparable environmental results of soil treatment and a soil cover.

For the soils problem, the rejection of the

solidification/stabilization alternative is inconsistent with generally understood capabilities

of the technology. Indeed, having soil contaminated with only two toxic metals, lead and chromium, offers a textbook example of when chemical fixation works best. None of the arguments

given in the ROD against using this soil treatment describe especially unique or difficult

problems. For example, the presence of large

buried objects is faced routinely; they can be

washed and reburied. Regarding implementation risks, wetting excavated materials for dust

suppression is routine and, in exceptional

cases, inflatable domes have been used. The

technology has been selected for Superfund

sites posing much more challenging kinds and

levels of contamination for which solidification

is unproven.

The argument that stabilization technology

needs to be verified for a site is an argument

for conducting a treatability study, preferably

during the RIFS, not for rejecting the alternative. If, as the ROD acknowledged to be the case,

the soil is contaminated enough to pose a true

environmental risk, then the selected remedy

of a soil cover is not permanently effective. The

absence of land use restrictions is particularly

worrisome.

The rejection of groundwater treatment does

not consider several factors: 1) values for chromium contamination very close to the MCL;

2) the hot spot of high chromium contamination apparently just outside the site boundary;

and 3) the exact environmental and health effects, which might not be eliminated by dilution, resulting from likely continued leaching

and migration of contaminants into Lake Winnebago, even if water intrusion is curtailed

through the surface of the site. The problem

is that groundwater movement will still occur

beneath the surface where the contaminated

soils reside. At the Liquid Disposal Superfund

site in Michigan, a RCRA hazardous waste cap

and a containment wall will be built around

chemically stabilized material, landfilled onsite,

to prevent just this type of leaching and movement of contaminated groundwater.

Moreover, in the Schmalz ROD, no specific

criteria were given for groundwater monitoring or for triggering a decision that a groundwater remedy and a better soils remedy are

needed. This site highlights a problem found

by recent EPA research: “many [Superfund] investigations are not producing sufficient data

to adequately characterize ground water conditions near these sites.” (R.H. Plumb, Jr., “A

Comparison of Ground Water Monitoring Data

From CERCLA and RCRA Sites,” Ground Water

Monitoring Research, fall 1987, pp. 94-100.)

Case Study 10

Tacoma Tar Pits, Tacoma, Washington,

EPA Region 10

Capsule OTA findings:–No treatability study results supported the selection of chemical stabilization. Significant amounts of untreated contaminants as well as the treated materials will

be left onsite. The effectiveness of the treatment

is uncertain. Incineration was said to offer no

better protection and was rejected because of

its higher cost.

Key dates:

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●

Entered Superfund system: 2/1/82

Preliminary Assessment: 4/1/82

Site Inspection: 3/1/83

National Priorities List

–proposed date: 10/81

–final date: 9/83

—site rank: #347 out of 770

RIFS start and completion: 11/84 to 9/87

public comment period before Record of

Decision: 11/6/87 to 12/6/87
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● Signing of ROD: 12/30/87

● Estimated complete remediation: Assume

2 years after ROD

Total time.—7 years

Brief description of site.-The site is approximately

30 acres and “within a heavily industrialized

area . , . [the] site is part of the Commencement

Bay-Nearshore/Tideflats Superfund site located

within the Tacoma Tideflats industrial area

near Commencement Bay.” (The ROD does not

describe this action as an operable unit, but that

is what it appears to be. However, Tacoma Tar

Pits is listed as a separate site in CERCLIS, three

years after the large Commencement Bay site

entered the system.) “A coal gasification plant

was in operation on site from 1924 through

1956. The study area currently contains a metal

recycling facility . . . a natural gas transfer station . . . a rail freight loading yard . . . a meat

packing plant . . . and a railroad switching

yard . . . “

Major contamination/environmental threat.—"The site

currently contains two ponds, a small tar pit,

and various surface-water drainage ditches.

The study area is located near several major

surface water bodies [waterways]. . . the Puyallup River, and Commencement Bay. Although

none of these water bodies are used for water

supply, the bay and river do support extensive

fish and shellfish populations. Several portions

of Commencement Bay have been identified

as being severely contaminated, resulting in adverse biological effects . . . contamination of the

local groundwater resource is also of concern.

Many local industries use groundwater from

on-site wells . . . “

With regard to site contaminants, first found

in 1981: “Many of these organic compounds

are toxic and several are considered to be carcinogenic. These compounds include aromatic

hydrocarbons (i.e., benzene, toluene), polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons collectively

known as PAHs (i.e., napthalene, benzo(a)pyrene), as well as numerous other classes of

hydrocarbons and cyanide. Heavy metals . . .

include arsenic, mercury, and lead.” The automobile recycling facility has also caused lead

and PCB contamination. The estimated volume

of tar is 5,000 cubic yards; it is mostly in three

areas at depths of several feet and more. PCBs

are found up to 204 parts per million (ppm),

and lead in soil in the 2,000 to 8,000 ppm range.

Three shallow aquifers have varying degrees

of contamination, and the ROD noted the “current lack of understanding of local groundwater

hydrology.” ●

Four indicator compounds were used to estimate risks and establish cleanup goals: benzo(a)pyrene, PCBs, benzene, and lead. For the

most part, the cleanup levels are consistent with

a 1 in 1 million cancer risk level, except for lead

in soil which seems high relative to the MCL

value. The major emphasis was correctly put on

exposure of onsite workers over short periods.

HRS scores.—groundwater 6.12; surface water

10.91; air 71.92; total 42.20

Removal actions.—None indicated.

Cleanup remedy selected. –This ROD apparently

is for an operable unit of the larger Superfund

site of which it is a part, even though it did not

use the term. Besides the selected remedy,

cleanup alternatives examined included containment and landfilling, incineration, in situ

vitrification, and groundwater treatment.

“The preferred remedial alternative . . . is a

combination of source control measures, measures to control contaminant release, and also

measures to reduce human exposure to contaminants. This alternative consists of the excavation of the most severely contaminated

soils, stabilization of these soils using a technique which immobilizes contaminants, capping of the stabilized material [with asphalt],

treatment of the surface water, continued groundwater monitoring, regulatory controls on water

usage for both surface and groundwater, and

restrictions on site access. ” Thoroughly mixed

excavated materials will be “fed to a mixing

vessel where silicate polymers, cement, and

water from the site ponds is added.”

However, in site areas that are not severely

contaminated with PAHs, soils and sediments

“will be excavated to a depth not to exceed 3

feet.” This requirement means that significant

amounts of contaminants may not be excavated
73

and treated. Exactly what amount will not be

excavated cannot be judged from the information given in the ROD, but the site’s history and

complex contamination suggests that this may

bean important limitation to the selected remedy. Many of the contaminants have been

present long enough to have migrated downward a significant distance. “The total estimated volume of material to be excavated is

45,000 cubic yards.” The total cost for the

selected remedy is $3.4 million. This cost implies a rather low cost for the stabilization part

of the cleanup of about $50 per cubic yard.

Satisfaction of SARA statutory requirements:

1) Selection of permanent cleanup.—The

ROD said: “This remedy satisfies the preference expressed in SARA for treatment that reduces toxicity, mobility, and volume. . . . it is

determined that this remedy utilizes permanent

solutions and alternative treatment technologies to the maximum extent practicable.”

The uncertainty about contaminants left untreated onsite means the selected remedy may

not be permanent. The intent to comply with

SARA’s requirement for 5-year review confirms

that the selected remedy is not assuredly permanent. This situation raises questions about

future land use. Further uncertainty about permanence is indicated by the ROD’s comment:

“If as a result of this frequent reassessment,

the remedial action is shown to have decreased

performance, the nature and extent of additional actions will be considered.”

An important issue for Tacoma Tar Pits concerns the cleanup of contaminated groundwater. Although the ROD contained cleanup

standards for groundwater, “the remedial action does not currently provide for groundwater

extraction and treatment.” The basis for this

lack of cleanup was that the selected remedy

will reduce surface water intrusion and contaminant flow into the water, that existing contamination will be swept away and into its ultimate discharge, and that “Action levels of

contaminants in groundwater have not been

consistently exceeded at off-site locations. ” A

claim of permanence at this time is premature

because the ROD said that it may become necessary to evaluate and implement an alternative remedial action that includes groundwater

extraction. A commitment to groundwater

monitoring was made, but given the acknowledged complexity of local hydrogeology and

given EPA’s interest in minimizing cost, it necessitates a major, carefully planned effort.

With regard to the selected stabilization treatment technology: “No bench or pilot studies

have been performed to date, these being left

until the Remedial Design is commenced . . . “

The diverse and highly concentrated contaminants pose a major challenge for a chemical

stabilization technology. The current state of

knowledge and experience does not support an

assumption of effectiveness for the Tacoma Tar

Pits site. The ROD noted: “Laboratory experiments will be performed to ensure that the

stabilization process effectively immobilizes

contaminants. Following this activity, a larger

scale ‘pilot study’ will stabilize a larger volume

of contaminated material from the site. This

pilot study will determine the effectiveness of

the stabilization process.” The uncertainty

about effectiveness means that the selected

remedy did not merit the high (maximum possible) rankings it received for effectiveness in

the ROD’s analysis of cleanup alternatives.

Moreover, there is no basis for saying: “The

chemical stabilization process should significantly reduce the toxicity and leachability of

site soils,” The ability of any chemical stabilization technology to reduce toxicity of a wide

range of organic and inorganic contaminants

has not been proven nor is it generally accepted

in the technical community, But it is reasonable to claim that the mobility of the contaminants might be reduced through stabilization;

to claim more than that would require actual

test data on site materials, Elsewhere the ROD

said: “Permanent treatment can be provided

through the immobilization of contaminants.”

This statement is, however, overly emphatic at

the current stage of knowledge about the site.

An important statement on the selected

stabilization technology was in the responsiveness summary, given in response to a concern

about its effectiveness: “Although the cement/

polymer stabilization process is a proven tech-
74

nique for immobilization of heavy metals, this

technique has not been conclusively proven to

be effective in immobilizing organic contaminants in coal tars, Therefore, both laboratory

and bench scale treatability studies will be

performed during the design phase of the remedial action to ensure the process will be effective and permanent. . . . the soils/tars containing the highest tar content . . . may be

considered for an alternate type of treatment/

disposal (i.e., incineration) if the stabilization

process is found to be ineffective for the waste

matrix” (emphasis added). Also: “Criteria to be

used to evaluate the effectiveness of the stabilization process during laboratory and bench

scale studies . . . “ will be addressed in the design phase.

The FS for the Re-Solve site in Massachusetts

rejected stabilization for organic contamination

because “there has been limited success in

chemically fixing organic contaminants such

as solvents and PCBs,” The ROD for the Liquid Disposal site in Michigan, which also

selected stabilization for soil contaminated with

organic chemicals, said that the hazardous substances “will not be permanently destroyed.”

And the FS for Liquid Disposal said: “Considerable research data exists demonstrating the

effectiveness of this technology in immobilizing a wide range of contaminants, primarily

inorganic. A substantial amount of data does

not exist, however, to accurately judge the longterm reliability of the process.”

The ROD for the Tower Chemical Superfund

site in Florida said the following about chemical stabilization processes, which it rejected:

“This technology would also require long-term

(30 years) monitoring which is less favorable

than technologies which provide permanent destruction of wastes.” The inference is that the

technology does not provide permanent destruction of wastes.

Another EPA document, used to teach people about waste treatment said: “Solidification

technologies are designed to be used for final

waste treatment. This means the technology

should be applied only after other treatment

techniques have been applied, i.e., incineration,

chemical treatment or other. ” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “RCRA/CERCLA

Treatment Alternatives for Hazardous Wastes,”

October 1987.)

A recent EPA study found “large losses of

organics during the mixing process.” (L. Weitzman et al., “Evaluation of Solidification/Stabilization As A Best Demonstrated Available Technology,” paper presented at EPA’s Fourteenth

Annual Research Symposium, May 1988.]

Another EPA study showed that stabilization

was not competitive with thermal and chemical treatment technologies and soil washing for

organic contamination. (R.C. Thurnau and M.P.

Esposito, “TCLP As A Measure of Treatment

Effectiveness: Results of TCLP Work Completed on Different Treatment Technologies for

CERCLA Soils,” paper presented at EPA’s

Fourteenth Annual Research Symposium, May

1988.) A demonstration of a stabilization technology under EPA auspices concluded that “for

the organics, the leachate concentrations were

approximately equal for the treated and untreated soils.” (P.R. de Percin and S. Sawyer,

“SITE Demonstration of Hazcon Solidification/Stabilization Process,” paper presented at

EPA’s Fourteenth Annual Research Symposium, May 1988.)

The rejection of other treatment technologies

for Tacoma Tar Pits did not have much technical analysis behind it. The analysis in the ROD

rests mainly on a very simple rating system.

For example, all 10 alternatives, including capping the waste and incinerating it, received the

same rating of high for technical feasibility (including effectiveness, useful life, operation and

maintenance requirements, possible failure

modes, constructability, implementation time,

worker safety, and neighborhood safety). All

but the two no action or nearly no action options received the same high rating for public

health impacts (including minimization of

chemical releases, exposures during remedial

action, and exposures after remedial action).

But sound technical bases exist for finer distinctions among such abroad range of alternatives. For example, the incineration options

offered substantially greater effectiveness, reliability, permanency, and certainty of destruc-
tion of toxic substances than capping the waste

or the selected remedy.

The estimated costs of the alternatives probably weighed heavily: two incineration options

(including stabilization of residue) had total

 costs of $17 million (only surface soils) and $243

million (all soil with contamination with a risk

greater than 1 in 1 million cancer risk); both

options included groundwater pumping and

treatment. In comparison, the selected remedy

(stabilization) would cost $8 million if groundwater treatment is included in the calculation.

The cost will be only $3.4 million, however, because groundwater treatment was excluded.

2) Accurate assessment of land disposal and

containment alternatives.—There is a statement

on future land use: “Land use restrictions will

be imposed to prevent or require stringent control of future excavation on the site, to prevent

future use of surface water and shallow groundwater, and to prevent site access by personnel

other than site workers. ” However, there is no

detailed analysis of possible future failures of

the landfill in which the contaminated materials will be re-buried after stabilization.

The ROD for the Tower Chemical site made

a good point about concrete or asphalt caps (as

selected for Tacoma Tar Pits): “The risk of failure . . . is high due to the potential for fracture

formation.” The FS for the Pristine site says:

“Asphalt is photosensitive, and subject to cracking due to settling, chemical action, and vegetation. Frequent inspections are required to ensure cap integrity. ” The asphalt cap option was

rejected at both of these sites.

RIFS contractor. –The studies were paid for by

responsible parties. The ROD noted that, although EPA and the State found the documents

acceptable, “EPA has prepared an addendum

for each document addressing issues that the

studies have inadequately or incompletely addressed.” Geotechnology, Inc., performed the

RI; Envirosphere Company (Ebasco) performed

the FS. For the entire Commencement Bay/

Nearshor/Tideflats site, the SCAP indicates

three different RIFSs with the last one labeled

Tar Pits started on 9/23/83 and then taken over

by the PRPs on 11/1/84. It is not clear what actions resulted from the two earlier RIFSs and

no completion dates for them are indicated; $2.5

million was spent by the government on the

first one in 1982 and 1983.

State concurrence.—”The State of Washington

has been consulted and has verbally concurred

with the selected remedy.” Verbal concurrence

may indicate a rushed ROD at the end of the

fiscal year quarter.

Community acceptance.—The ROD noted that

community interest “has not been actively demonstrated.” The reasons given for the lack of

community interest are the site’s location within

the larger Commencement Bay Superfund site,

the lack of private residences nearby, and a

number of cleanup actions already taken in the

area.

Special comments.—Although there are statements about restricting future land use, there

are also statements that suggest that those restrictions may be applied only in the short term,

For example: “The [stabilization] reagent composition is formulated to provide a high-strength

surface capable of supporting trucks and other

vehicles. ”

Cleanup goals were set for indicator contaminants. While these goals make risk assessment

more manageable, there can be problems with

using them for analysis of the effectiveness of

a cleanup technology that is chemical specific,

such as chemical stabilization. Moreover, the

cleanup very much depends on data that reveal areas of high tar concentration, where

there is no excavation depth limit. However,

there may be other areas that have high concentrations of other contaminants and that may

be either overlooked or fall under the provision

of the excavation depth limit. Compounding the

problem is the relatively small amount of soil

sampling that has been reported, averaging only

about 1.5 locations per acre.

The administrative record indicated a large

number of contractors have performed studies

on the site. It is not clear whether EPA had independent work done to verify work done for

the responsible parties. There is also some confusion about the relationship between Tacoma
76

Tar Pits and the larger Commencement Bay

site because the former is listed separately in

CERCLIS and the ROD does not use the term

operable unit.

General conclusions.—The technical information

obtained prior to and used in the ROD did not

support claims that the selected remedy is

permanent nor even that it will be effective. Delaying testing of the chosen stabilization technology and setting of criteria for its effectiveness until after the ROD undercuts the claim

that a permanent remedy has already been

selected. The scope and depth of analysis of

alternative cleanup technologies was less than

seen in any other ROD examined in this report.

This shortcoming directly affected technology

selection; it maybe related to the strong involvement of the responsible parties, particularly in

conducting the RIFS. (An experienced attorney advises responsible parties: “Participation

in the IRIFS] study provides an opportunity to

generate information that can sway EPA decision makers on important issues. We all know

that one can interpret the same data a number

of ways. Differing conclusions can be made and

supported from the same data. A company that

uses its experts to argue convincingly in favor

of one conclusion often can influence the ultimate decision.” [P. H. Hailer, Hazardous Materials, January-February 1988.])

While the ROD’s interest in alternative treatment technology is commendable, the chief

driving force for selecting the remedy appears

to be cost: “The final selected remedy meets

the requirement of cost-effectiveness as this

alternative provides for permanent treatment,

and contaminant release minimization for a

cost significantly less than other alternatives

exhibiting a similar level of protection. Additional cost of these [other alternatives] is the

result of the use of more costly technologies

such as incineration . . , or the excavation of

larger volumes of soils coupled with off-site

landfilling.” But no data support the contention of similar or equal levels of protection for

stabilization and incineration; therefore, the

claim that the selected remedy is cost-effective

is unsupported.

However, incineration for a comparable volume of contaminated soil definitely would be

much more expensive ($242 million) and, therefore, this site, like many others, shows how

important it is to examine the issue of comparable environmental protection for a cost-effectiveness decision. Moreover, Tacoma Tar Pits .

illustrates the need to consider a broader range

of treatment technologies to reduce cleanup

costs. Biological treatment for such a site

deserves attention. The case for its consideration at Tacoma Tar Pits, for example, was as

good, if not better, than for the Renora site

where it was chosen without treatability test

data to support the decision. A research program on developing biotechnology for cleaning up old manufactured gas plant sites such

as Tacoma Tar Pits is underway at the University of Tennessee with support from the Gas

Research Institute, The choice at Tacoma Tar

Pits could have included postponing the remedial action or conducting treatability studies

for biological treatment.

Moreover, the cost of the selected remedy

may have been significantly under estimated.

Data from a vendor of the stabilization technology most likely to be effective on this site

suggests a cost of about $150 per cubic yard

instead of the $50 indicated in the ROD. If major costs for treatability studies are added in,

the cost of the selected remedy could be about

$5 million more than the $3.4 million estimated

in the ROD for a total of $8.4 million. The higher

cost matches the low range of the ROD’s incineration options without groundwater treatment.

The lack of a commitment to groundwater

cleanup may be linked to the location of the

site in a highly contaminated area, including

contaminated major water bodies. This is a situation where analyzing the cleanup in isolation may be misleading and ultimately inefficient.