* The Honorable Jo hn T. Curti n of th e United St ates Distr ict Court for

the Western Distr

ict of New York, sit tin g by designati on. 1 UNITED STATE S COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE S ECOND CIRCUI T August T erm, 2005 (Argued: O ctober 21,

2005 Decided: Apr il 3, 2006 Errata Filed: June 1, 2 006) Docket No. 0 5-1596-cr U NIT ED S TATES OF A MERICA ,

Appellee ,

v. M AYRA F ERNANDEZ , also kno wn as Frank Morena, a lso known as La J efa, Defendant-Appellant.

B EFORE : M INER and C ABRANES , Circuit Judg es, and C URT IN , District Judge

. * Defendant contends that her sentence, imposed by the United States District Court for the Southern Distric t of New Yor

k (Denise Co te, Judge

) after her conviction for participation in a narcoticsdistrib ution cons piracy, was u nreasonab le because th e Distri ct Court f ailed to cons

ider certain arg

uments made pursua

nt to the s entencing f

actors s et forth

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—co ncerning he r effort s to cooper ate with the

Governmen

t and the dis parity bet

ween her sentence and

that of a co- conspirat

or—and becau se a 151-mo nth perio d of impr isonment is

unreason ably long in t

he circums tances pre sented. Affirmed

.1 18 U.S.C . § 3553(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) Fac tors to be consid ered in imp osing a se ntenc e.— The cour t shall imp ose a se ntenc e sufficie nt, but n ot gre ater than nec essa ry, to c om ply w ith the pur pose s set fo rth in p arag rap h (2) o f this subsection. The co urt, in determining the particular senten ce to be imp osed, shall consider—

(1) the nat

ure and ci rcumstances of the offens e and the hi stor y and charact eris tic s of t he defe nda nt; (2) the need f

or t he se nten ce i mposed— (A) to ref lect the se riousne ss of the o ffense , to prom ote resp ect for th e law, an d to provide j ust puni shment for the of fense; (B) to affo rd ad equ ate de terren ce to cr imina l cond uct; (C) t o prote ct t he publi c from furt her cri mes of the def

endant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed edu cational or vocational t raining, med ical care, or other correctional treatm ent in the most effective m anner; (3) the ki nds of s entences avail able; (4) the kind s of se nten ce a nd the se nten cing rang e esta blishe d [in the S ente ncin g G uid eline s;]

. . . 2

L ANCE C ROFF OOT -S UEDE , White & Case L LP, New Yor

k, NY, for Defendant-Appellant. R AYMOND J. L OHIER , J R ., Assist ant United S tates Att

orney (David N. Kelley, United States Attorney, Harry Sandick, Assistant United Stat

es Attor ney, on the brief

), United S tates Att

orney’s Office fo r the Sout

hern Dist rict of Ne w York, New Yor

k, NY, for Appellee. J OSÉ A. C ABRANES , Circuit Judge : We address here several questions relating to our review of sentences in the post- Booker era,

see United States v. Booker

, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), including whether: (1) we possess statutory authority to review a sentence within the relevant United States Sentencing Guideli nes (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines ”) range fo r reasona bleness; (2) a sent ence within t

he relevant G

uidelines r ange is entitled t o a presum

ption of r easonablene ss; (3) the duty to consider the senten cing factor s of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(

a) 1 requires a sentencing judge to discuss on the record during the sentencing(5) an y pe rtine nt po licy sta tem ent . . . issu ed by th e Se nten cing Co m m ission . . . ; (6) the need t o avoid unwarr anted se ntence di spari tie s among defendant s with simil ar records who ha

ve been found gui

lty of si milar c onduct; and (7) the need t o provi de rest itut ion t o any vic tims of

the of fense.

2 U.S.S. G. § 5K1.1 pr ovides,in per tin ent par t, that “[u]pon motion of

the gove rnment st ati ng that the defendant ha s provi ded subst anti al as sis tance in the i nvesti gati on or pros ecuti on of anot her pers on who has committ ed an o ffen se, the cou rt m ay d epa rt fro m the g uid eline s.”

3 It i s unla

wful “t o manufacture,dist ribut e, or dispens e, or

posses s with int ent t o manufacture,dist ribut e, or dispens e, a co ntrol

led subs tance. ” 21 U.S. C. § 841(a)( 1). When a defendant vi olat es tha t provi sion with “ 1 kil ogram or more of a mixt

ure or subs tanc e cont ain ing

a det ecta ble amount o f her oin ,” she i s su bje ct t o a mandat ory mi nimum senten ce of t en years of impri sonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b )(1) (A)( i). Pursuant

to 21 U.S. C. § 846, “[a]n y person who attempts or con spires to comm it [the above-described ] offense . . . s hall be subject to the same penalties as those pre scrib ed for th e off ense .” 3 proceeding

each of the f

actors or each argument

that a defen dant makes r

elating to t

hose facto rs; (4) 18 U.S.C. § 355 3(a)(6), w

hich obligat

es senten cing judges to consid er unwarr anted disp arities in sentencin g, applies t

o differently situ

ated defend ants; (5) we may review a s entencing judge’s decision regarding what, if any, weight to ascribe to any particular argument made pursuant to a § 3553(a) fa ctor, when t

he sentence

ultimately

imposed is

reasonable; (6) a sentencing jud ge may take a defend ant’s coop eration wit h authorit ies into acc ount purs uant to 18 U .S.C. § 3553(a ), even though th e Governmen

t has not m ade a motion p ursuant to U.S.S.G . § 5K1.1; 2 and (7) in the circumst ances pres ented, defe ndant’s s entence is u nreasonably long. On March 7, 2003, defendant Mayra Fernandez (“Fernandez”) was convicted by a jury in the United Stat

es Distr ict Court f

or the Sou

thern Dis trict of

New York (D enise Cote, Judge ) of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute at least one kilogram of substances or mixtures containing heroin. 3 At the sent encing proc eeding on Mar ch 17, 2005, J udge Cote determ

ined that t he advisor y Guidelines

range was 151 to 188 mont hs and sen

tenced Fernandez p rincipally t

o 151 month s of impr

isonment followed by

five years of super

vised rele ase. Fernandez, who does not challenge on appeal her convic tion or the calculation of the4

advisory G

uidelines r ange, contend s that th e Distri ct Court f ailed to cons

ider certai n 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fa ctors in

connection

with Fern andez’s eff

orts to assist authorit ies and with

the fact th at her father, Elias Fernandez (“Elias”), who was a co-conspirator in the charged conspiracy, receive d a lesser s entence pri

ncipally of 1 35 monthsof impris onment. I n addition, Fernandez m aintains t

hat the length of her sentence was unreasonable. We find that Fernandez’s arguments lack merit, and we therefo re affirm

the judgmen

t of the Di strict Co urt.

B ACK GRO UND Fernandez and Elias cond ucted negot

iations wi th Joaquin Hernandez, a p aid confiden tial informan t for the Drug Enfo rcement Adm

inistrat ion (“DEA”) who was posing as a dru g dealer with the abi

lity to tr ansport cocaine and her

oin from the Domini can Republic t o New York. El

ias met with Hernandez virtually every day in July and August 2001. Fernandez , who was introduced to Hernandez by Elias, met with Hernandez approximately four times in the spring of 2002. At the first meeting, Hernandez and Elias went to Fernandez’s apartment so that Elias could pick up heroin he was storing there. At the second meeting, Elias and Hernandez again we nt to Fernandez’s apartment so that Elias could pick up heroin, but the heroin to be acquired was found to be damp. F ernandez br ought out approximat

ely 50 to 100 g

rams of h eroin, dr

ied the hero

in using a hair

dryer, and

gave Elias devi ces to cut and weigh the he roin. Eliasand Fernand ez determine d that the h eroin was n ot fit fo r distr ibution, and Elias did n ot complet e the contem

plated sale. At th e third mee ting of Her nandez, Elias , and Fernandez, which was also held at Fernandez’ s apartment , the three discuss ed a plan whereby Hernandezwould trav el to the Do minican Repub lic and retur n to New Yor

k with two ki

lograms o f heroin an d thirty k ilograms of cocaine. I t was understood that upon Hernandez’s return, Fernandez would store the drugs in her apartment and4The par ti es s ubseque ntl y agr eed t hat the off

ense lev el s houl d be re duced by t wo lev els becaus e th e PSR m iscalc ulate d the am oun t of na rco tics inv olve d. 5 would help t

o distri bute them. At a fourt

h meeting, H ernandez and Fernandez d

iscusse d Fernandez’ s drug con

tacts in Ecu

ador. Before He rnandez’s projected s muggling tr ip to the Do minican Repub lic, an apparently unrelated s hooting occurred out side of F ernandez’sapartment . The New Yor k City Police Departmen

t (“NYPD”) searched t

he building

and discove red in the h allway outside Fernand ez’s apartment a box contain

ing, inter alia

, a metal press, latex gloves with the fingers cut off, and glassine envelopes, some of which were stamped “Last Chance.” NYPD detectives found similar glassine envelopes i

n Fernande z’s bedro om. The following day, a m ore extensive search o f Fernand ez’s apartment was conduct

ed and additi onal drug p araphernal ia, includin

g a digital s cale, a dust m ask, and more glas sine envelo pes stamp ed “Last Cha nce” were reco

vered. On August

27, 2002, DEA a

gents arr ested Fer nandez. A one- count indi ctment char ging her with parti cipation in

a conspira cy to dist

ribute and to poss ess with i

ntent to d istribu te one kilogr

am or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 was filed on October 29, 2002. Trial began on March 3, 20 03, and it end ed four day s later, o n March 7, wh en the jury r eturned a gu

ilty verdic t against Fernandez on the sole count of the indictment. In connection with Fernandez’s impending sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), wh

ich concluded

that under

the Guideli

nes the of fense level

was 36, 4 the criminal history category wasI, and the G

uidelines r ange was 188 t

o 235 month s. In Fernandez’s sentencing submission, she sought the statutory mandatory minimum sentence, 1 20 months , either pu rsuant t o a downward d eparture w ithin the G

uidelines s cheme or as a non-Guid elines sen

tence. See United

States v. Crosby

, 397 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that a sentencing judge must consider the advisory Guidelines range and determine whether “([i]) to impose th e sentence t

hat would hav

e been impos ed under th e Guidelines , i.e. , a sentence within the6

applicable Guidelines range or within permissible departure authority, or (ii) to impose a nonGuidelinessentence”) . She claimed t hat a decreas ed sentence

would be appr

opriate bec ause she had provided assistance to the Government and because an unwarranted disparity would otherwise be created by the fact that Elias, who had pleaded guilty to charges stemming from the same drug conspiracy, had been sentenced by Judge Harold Baer, Jr. principally to 135 months of impriso nment. Fer

nandez also c

laimed that

her culpabi

lity was dim

inished on

account of “ cultural factors of physical and sexual abuse” and “mental manipulation and coercion,” De f.’s Sentencing Mem. at 26, 31, but these arguments, which the Government contended were not proper bases for leniency here and which th e Distri ct Court rejected at s entencing, h ave not been p ursued on appeal. In its s entencing s ubmissi on, the Gov ernment ex

plained that

it had fir st met wit

h Fernande z concerning

potential c ooperatio n in Febru ary 2004, near

ly a year after

her convict

ion, in the b elief that she had participated in a 2001 robbery that resulted in a homicide and had been a witness to another homicide. In her initial proffer sessions with the Government, Fernandez admitted to participat ing in the co nspiracy u

nderlying t

he instant conviction

and to othe r criminal

activity, including t

he 2001 rob bery and hom icide. She pr

ovided inf ormation that led to

the arres t in March 2004 of her co-conspirator in the 2001 robbery, Juan Carlos Vargas. According to the Government, the information that Fernandez supplied was important, but was not alone enough to support the

arrest o f Vargas. F ollowing Var gas’s arr est, the G overnment

claims, Fer

nandez began t

o withhold informat ion relatin g to her pr

ior crimi nal activity. In April 2004, Fernandez threatened to kill another inmate in prison. When prison authorit ies conduct

ed an invest

igation, Fe rnandez appar

ently was no t entirely

forthr ight in recounting the circumstances of the threat. The Government then suspended its proffer sessions with Fernandez, but eventually held one final session in September 2004. At that last session, Fernandez admitted to certain criminal activity about which she had withhe ld information in prior7

session s, but th e Governmen t remained u

nsatisf ied with her

characteri

zation of t he threat s he had made against

the other inmate, as w

ell as of th e circumst

ances that h ad led to her

earlier tr ansfer between prisons. Consequently, the Government decided not to offer Fernandez a cooperation agreement. The Government’s sentencing submission encouraged the District Court not to accord Fernandez an

y benefit f or her coo peration. Because of her lapsesin truth fulness and her err atic behavior, Fernandez was, according to the Government, “useless as a witness for purposes of indicting Vargas and other co-conspirators,” and she amounted to a “serious impediment to the Government’s prosecution.” Gov’t’s Sentencing Mem. at 19. Furthermore, the Government maintained that in light of Fernandez’s behavior, it was “clear that her rehabilitation has not progres sed to the

point where her effor

ts at coop eration s hould lead t o a reduced s entence.” Id. at 20-21. Th e Governmen

t did not s pecifically r

efer to Fe rnandez’s argument t hat she sh ould receiv

e a reduced se ntence so as

to avoid a dis parity with

the senten ce imposed o n Elias. At sentenc ing on Marc h 17, 2005 , after not ing that sh e had rea d the sente ncing subm issions, Judge Cote asserted that the “principal arguments made by defense counsel in terms of a departure or nonguid eline sentence are cultu ral factor s, physic al and sexual abuse suf fered by M s. Fernandez, mental manipulation, coercion from loved ones and assistance she has provided to the government.” Tr. of Sentencing Hr’g, Mar. 17, 2005 (“Tr.”), at 4. Judge Cote explained that the advisory G

uidelines r ange was, at le ast preli

minarily, 1 51 to 188 mo nths, see note 4, ante , and then invited th e parties t

o make oral ar

guments. In connect

ion with Fe rnandez’s request f or a reduced

sentence in

recognitio n of her cooperatio n, her coun sel explaine d that “[w] e’re not as king . . . for a [U.S.S.G. §

] 5K1.1 lett

er.” Tr. at 18. Instead, counsel explained that Fernandez sought either a “downward departure” or a “nonguideli

ne sentence

to a term o f 120 mont

hs,” the s tatutory

mandatory m

inimum. Id. at 19. In8

relation t o Fernande z’s effor

ts to coop erate, coun sel specif ically argued

that “under

[18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a)( 1)” the Cour

t could take

into account

her “newfou

nd respect for the law

and her per sonal circumst ances” and that she would “not need to

show the t

ype of cooper

ation that a normal cooperator

shows” t o receive a mo re lenient s entence. Id. Judge Cote refused to depart downward or to impose a non-Guideline sentence. She addressed F ernandez ’s coopera tion as foll ows:

I guess I should also address the issue about cooperation. I think it’s fair to say that it was fitful. Ms. Fernandez, facing mandatory minimum term of impriso nment and gu

idelines r ange above that

—I mean, th e governmen t was arguing for a guidelines range at level 36, I believe, and the PSR came in with a guidelines range at a level

36—decided i

t was in her

interest to try to cooperate. But she d id not do s o in a way that s uggests t o me that it

should be u sed to lighten her sentence. I mean, cooperation has many components to it. There is the obvious componen t of assisting the gove rnment in th e prosecut ion of othe r wrongdoe rs, but I think that’s really only the beginning. Of course there is a significant failure with resp ect to that

component . But in terms of sentencing, I think cooperation is important because of what light it might shed on the character of a defendant, whether it shows the defendant has recognized the full implications of the choices they made in the past; whether th ey have decided t o make a clean and

full break with that and change their life in a si gnificant wa

y. On occasio n cooperation really isa reflectio n of a dramat ic change in the person’s life. And that resonates in a way, in all the ways that one must consider a sentence, including the likelihood of rehabilitation, the necessity for individual deterrence, the need for additional punishment beyond that already imposed an d suffer

ed by a defend ant. And so the fact that Ms. Fernandez was not able ultimately to follow through i n a full and co mplete admi ssion abo ut her cri minal activi

ties, was n ot able to live in an approp riate wa y within t he prison se tting, dif ficult as I’ m sure that i s, again, undercuts using that brief exploration of what it was like being a cooperator as someth ing that s hould indi cate in thiscase an alter ation to a gu

idelines s entence. I’m fully aware that I have the power to depart and that I have the duty to determine what a reaso nable sentence is and to consider all the facto rs under 3553(a). And the sentence I am imposing is based on a consideration of all the evidence befo re me, the h istory o f Ms. Fer

nandez in my co urtroom , what I lear ned at trial and

my consider

ation of my

discreti on under t

he law.5 The parti es did not rais e thi s is sue, b ut we do so nostra sponte because o f our indepe ndent obligation to ensure that w e ha ve su bjec t ma tter ju risdic tion. See, e. g. , Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc. , 424 F.3d 267 , 274 (2d Cir. 2 005 ).

9 Id. at 22-24. The argument in Fernandez’s sentencing memorandum that she should receive leniency to avoid a disparity between her sentence and that imposed on Elias was never raised at her sentencing hearing, des pite the fac t that, as the record makes clear,

both part ies were aff

orded ample opportunity to make arguments. Judge Cote did not specifically address the disparity argument on the record

.

D ISCUS SION Fernandez contends that the District Court committed procedural error in imposing sentence and

subjected her to unr

easonable pu

nishment . According t

o Fernande z, the Dist

rict Court failed to comply

with its o bligation t

o consider

the senten cing factor s outline d in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), see

note 1, ante , because th e Court did not less en her sent

ence on account

of (1) her cooperation with law enforcement authorities and (2) the disparity between the sentence she was to receive and t

hat impos ed on Elias. M

oreover, s he contendsthat, in th e circumst ances pres ented, a sentence in cluding a 151- month ter m of impr isonment was unreas onably long. We conclude th at Fernandez h as failed t

o show that

the Distr ict Court’ s sentenc

ing procedu

res were im

proper or that the resul ting sent ence was unreasonable.

I. Our St atutor

y Author ity To Revi ew a Senten ce for Reas onablene ss As a prelim

inary matt er, we addres s the sou

rce of our authorit y to review a s entence in conformi ty with the G

uidelines, which includ es any prop erly applied departures (a “Guid elines

sentence ”), for rea sonablen ess. 5 Like the Supreme Court in Booker , we have previously ass umed6 18 U.S.C . § 3742(a) provides: A d efe nd ant m ay file a no tice o f app eal in the d istrict c our t for re view of an othe rwis e fina l sente nce if the se ntence— (1) was impo sed in vi ol at io n of la w; (2) was impo sed as a result of an incorrec t application of the sentencing guide lines; or (3) is g reater than t he sent ence speci fied in the appl icabl e guidel

ine ra nge . . . ; or (4) was imposed f

or an off ense for which t here i s no sen tenci ng guidel ine and i s pla

inl y unreason able. 10 such autho rity, see, e.g. , Crosby , 397 F.3d 10 3; see also United States v. Cooper , 437 F.3d 32 4, 328 n.5 (3 d Cir. 2006) (collectin

g cases that

have assum ed without

express ly deciding t

hat courts of appeals have jurisdic tion to review senten ces for r easonablene ss), but

we now specif

ically locate o ur author

ity in 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), 6 which provides, inter alia , for review of sentences “imposed in violation of law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1 ). We hold th at when a defendant challeng es the pro cedures of

his sentencing proceeding or the reasonableness of the sentence imposed, he effectively claims that the sentence, whether a Guidelines sentence or a non-Guidelines sentence, was “imposed in violation of law,” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1 ). We theref ore have auth ority to r

eview senten ces, whether

Guidelines

sentencesor non-G

uidelines s entences, f

or reasonableness. See Cooper , 437 F.3d at

327 (“We believ

e

an unreaso nable sentence is ‘imp osed in violation of l aw’ under 18 U .S.C. § 3742(a )(1).”); United States v. Martinez

, 434 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Although the Supreme Court in Booker did not identify which provision of § 3742(a) provided for appeals for ‘unreasonableness,’ we conclude that a post- Booker

appeal based on the ‘unreasonableness’ of a sentence, whether within or outside the advisory guidelines range, is an appeal asserting that the sentence was imposed in violation of law pursua

nt to § 3742 (a)(1).”) ; United States v. Frokjer , 415 F.3d 86 5, 875 n.3 (8 th Cir. 2005 ) (“After Booker , . . . we will review a defendant’s argument that even a sentenc e within the advisory guideline range is ‘u nreasonab le’ with reg

ard to the f

actors s et forth

in 18 U.S.C. § 3 553(a), and an7 We need not, a nd do not, reach t he questi on of wheth er we are aut horiz ed to revi ew sentence s for reasonab lenes s indepe ndently pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 1291 (

providing that

courts of appeal s may revie w final jud gm ents ). See Cooper , 437 F.3d at 32 7 n.4

. 11 unreason able senten ce would be im posed ‘in v

iolation of law’ within t

he meaning of

§ 3742(a).” (citation omitted)). 7

II. Standa

rd of Revi ew The Supreme Court’s landmark holdings in Booker were handed down in two opinions. The opinion o f Justice St evens add ressed the m erits of the c onstitution al chal lenge to the Guide lines, concluding t

hat the for

merly mandat

ory nature of the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendmen t. Booker , 543 U.S. at 243-44. The opinion of Justice Breyer set forth the remedy, which consisted of “sever[in g] and excis [ing]” fr

om the Sent

encing Refor

m Act the pr

ovision m aking the Gu

idelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), and the provision containing the relevant standards of review on appeal, 18 U.S .C. § 3742(e)

. Booker , 543 U.S. at 258-59. Pursuant to the “remedy opinion,” the now-advis ory Guidel

ines are to be consider

ed, togethe r with the o ther facto rs set f orth in 18U.S.C. § 3553(a), b y judges fas hioning sentences. See id. at 261-62. In Crosby , we outlined a procedure for the implementation of

the Booker remedy. See Crosby , 397 F.3d at

113. We explain ed that a sen tence will satisfy the requirements of Booker and the Sixt

h Amendment

if the sen tencing jud

ge (1) calculates t

he relevant G

uidelines r ange, includi

ng any applicab le departur e under the

Guidelines system; ( 2) consid ers the calculated Guid elines ran ge, along with

the other § 3553(a) fa ctors; an d (3) imposes a reasonable sentence. Id. Accordingly

, while we revi ew a sentence f or reasonableness, see Booker , 543 U.S. at 2 61-62, that review

involves co nsiderat

ion not onl

y of the sen

tence itsel f, but als o of the pr ocedures employed in ar

riving at t he sentence

. See Crosby

, 397 F.3d at

114; see also United States v. Selioutsky , 409 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2005). Reasonableness review does not entail the substitution of our12

judgment for that of the sentencing judge. Rather, the standard is akin to review for abuse of discreti on. See Crosby

, 397 F.3d at 114 (comparing reasonableness review to review for abuse of discreti on). Thus , when we deter mine whether

a sentence is

reasonable, we ought t

o consider whether th e sentencin

g judge “exceed ed the bound s of allowable discret ion[,] . . . committed

an error of law in the cou

rse of exe rcising d

iscretio n, or made a clearly erro neous fin ding of fact .” Id. (citations omitted). We recognize t

hat in the ov

erwhelming

majority o f cases, a G

uidelines s entence will f

all comfort ably within t

he broad ra

nge of sent

ences that w

ould be reas onable in th e particular circumst ances. See United State

s v. Myk ytiuk , 415 F.3d 60 6, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (

“While we full

y expect that

it will be a r

are Guideli

nes sentence that is unreason able, the [Su preme] Cour

t’s charge that we measure each defendant’s sentence against the factors set forth in § 3553(a) requires the door to be

left open f

or this p ossibil

ity.”). No netheless , we have expre ssed a comm itment to avoid the formulation of per se

rules to govern our

review of s entences f

or reasonableness. See Crosby , 397 F.3d at 115; see also United States v. Fairclough , 439 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2006). We therefore decline to establis h any presu

mption, r ebuttable o r otherwi se, that a G uidelines s entence is r

easonable. See United States v. Jiménez-Beltre , 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc) (explaining that “[w]e do not find it hel pful to ta lk about th e guidelinesas ‘presu mptively’ co ntrollin

g or a guideli

nes sentence as ‘per se re asonable,’”

because, “[a] lthough mak ing the guid elines ‘presumptiv e’ or ‘per s e reasonable’ does not make them mandatory, it tends in that direction; and anyway terms like ‘presumptive’ and ‘per se’ ar e more ambig

uous labels

than they at

first ap pear”); Cooper

, 437 F.3d at

331-32 (rejecting a non-rebuttable presumption because it would effectively restore the mandatory nature of the Guidelines and rejecting a rebuttable presumption because “[a]ppellants already bea r the burden of proving t he unreaso nablenessof senten ces on appeal”). But see United States v. Kristl , 437 F.3d 10 50, 1054 (10th

Cir. 2006) (

“[I]f we de termine under the appr opriate s tandard of

review that

the distr ict13

court cor rectly dete rmined th e relevant G uidelines r ange, and if t

he defendant

was subs equently sentenced t

o a term of

impriso nment with

in that ran ge, then the

sentence is

entitled t o a rebutta

ble presump tion of reasonablene ss on appe al.”); United State s v. Lewis , 436 F.3d 93 9, 946 (8th

Cir. 2006) (“A sentence falling within the applicable guidel ine range is presumptively reasonable.”); United States v. Green , 436 F.3d 44 9, 457 (4th Cir. 2006) (

“[A] sentence imposed

within the p roperly calculated Guidelinesrange . . . ispresump tively reas onable.” (el lipsis in original and

internal q uotation m arks omitted)); United State

s v. Williams

, 436 F.3d 70 6, 708 (6th

Cir. 2006) (

“We . . . credit [ ] senten ces properly calculated under the Guidelines with a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.”); United States v. Alonzo , 435 F.3d 55 1, 554 (5th Cir. 2006) (

“We agree with o ur sist

er circuit s that have

held that a sentence within a properly calculated Guideline rang e is presumptively reasonable.”); Mykytiu k , 415 F.3d at

608 (“The b est way to ex

press t he new balance, i

n our view, i s to acknowledge that any sen

tence that i s proper

ly calculated u

nder the Gu

idelines is entitled t o a rebutta

ble presump tion of reasonablene ss.”); United State s v. Lincol n , 413 F.3d 71 6, 717 (8th

Cir.) (con sidering

a sentence wit

hin the appl

icable Guidel

ines range t

o be “presu

mptively reasonable”) , cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 840 (200 5). Althou

gh the Guid elines ran

ge should s erve as “a ben chmark or a point of r eference or depart ure,” United State

s v. Rubenst

ein , 403 F.3d 93 , 98-99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied

, 126 S. Ct. 38 8 (2005); see also Crosby

, 397 F.3d at 113 (“[I]t is important to bear in mind that Booker [ ] and section 3553(a) do m ore than render the G uidelines a

body of cas ual advice, to

be consult

ed or overl

ooked at the whim o f a sentenc

ing judge.”) , for the r

eview of sen

tences, as well as for

their imp osition,

we examine the r

ecord as a wh ole to deter

mine whether

a sentence is

reasonable in a specif

ic case. Accordingly, we do not hold that a G uidelines s entence, wit

hout more, is “pres umptively” reasonable.14

III. The Disp arity Bet

ween the Re spective S entences o f Fernan dez and El ias Fernandez contends that the District Court committed procedural error by allegedly failing to consider the disparity between the sentence she received and that imposed on Elias. According to Fernan dez, Elias had

a much more e

xtensive r ole in the relevant cons piracy and yet was subject

ed to a shor ter perio d of impr

isonment . We conclude t

hat Fernandez has made n o showing t hat Judge Cote failed to consider the disparity. Moreover, we hold that such a disparity between non-similar ly situated co-defend ants is n ot a valid basis for a cl aim of err or under 1 8 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(6). In her sentencing memorandum, Fernandez raised the projected disparity as a consideration pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), which provides that a sentencing court must take into account “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have bee n found gui lty of simil ar conduc t.” She a rgued tha t this provisi on counsel ed in her c ase against th e imposit

ion of a Guidelines s entence, which would caus e her to be p unished significant ly

more sever

ely than Elias , who received a sentence pr

incipally of

135 months

of impris onment. Fernandez ac knowledged t hat the Dis trict Cour

t imposed on Elias what

it calculated

to be a Guidelines sentence, but argued that his “real offense conduct extends far beyond the amount provided i n his guilt y plea.” Def.’ s Sentencin

g Mem. at 44- 45. Fernande z insists tha t the Distric t Court fai led to con sider the di sparity ar gument be cause there was n o discuss

ion of it d uring the s entencing pr

oceeding, des pite the fac t that it h ad been raised in h er written submis sion. Alth ough affor ded ample opp ortunit

y at sentenc

ing to make whatever ar

guments s he desired

and, toward

the end of t

he proceedin

g, to rais e any issues

that Judg e Cote had not

address ed, Fernand ez did not pr esent the ar

gument dur

ing the sen

tencing proceeding. The Government suggests that as a result of Fernandez’s failure to raise the argument during the sentencing proceeding, we may be limited to reviewing “ for plain error.” Gov’t’s Br. at 27. The15

Governmen

t fails to point to an

y authorit y, however, f

or the propositio n that a defendant who has properly p resented a n argumen t in a writt en submissio n is under a n obliga tion affirm atively to raise it again at a hearing in order to preserve the point for ordinary appellate review, and we a re not inclined to create such a requirement. On the other hand, we may take the fact that the a rgument was not expl

icitly rais ed by the par

ties dur ing the sen

tencing proceeding int

o account when evaluating Fernandez’s contention that the District Court’s failure to discuss the argument on the record du ring the s entencing pr

oceeding ind

icates that the Distr ict Court f

ailed to cons

ider that argument. When an argument is not raised during a sentencing proceeding, the failure of the sentencing judge to a ddress that a rgument ex plicitly on the rec ord does not , without more, demonstrate a failure of consid eration by t

he judge. Rath er, we enter tain a str ong presu mption that the sent

encing judge has considered all ar

guments p roperly pr

esented to her, unles s the reco rd clearly s uggests o therwise. This presumptio n is especially forcef ul when, as was

the case her

e, the sent encing judge m akes abundantly clear that she has read the relevant submissions and that she has considered the § 3553(a) fa ctors. Fernandez contends that because a judge cannot satisfy her obligation to consider the Guidelines“by a general r eference to

the entire ty of the G

uidelines M

anual,” Crosby

, 397 F.3d at 111, but r ather mus t, in the or

dinary case,

calculate the

applicable Gu

idelines r ange, “[p]resumably, the converse is true—a sentencing court fails to ‘consider’ the other factors listed in § 3553(a) by making gener

al referen ce to them an d then choos ing to impo se a Guideli

nes sentence.” Def.- Appellant’s

Br. at 15. Although t

here is s ome surf

ace appeal to t

hat argumen

t—essent ially, that i f “consider ” usually im

plies spe cific discu ssion on the record

in the cont

ext of the ap plicable Guidelinesrange, it pr

obably meansmuch the s ame thing in the context

of the oth er § 3553(a)16

factors—the argument conflates what are, in fact, distinct procedural requirements. A sentencing judge’s obligation to consider the advisory Guidelines range generally amounts to a duty to take into account a par

ticular re commended s entencing r ange. If th e judge impr

operly calcul

ates that r ange, she cannot be said to have genuinely considered it. We therefore ordinarily require a sentencing judge to put

her Guidel

ines calculat

ions on th e record. See Crosby , 397 F.3d at

112. We have impos ed no simil ar requirement that

a sentencin

g judge precisel

y identify either the factors set fort

h in § 3553(a) or specif

ic argument s bearing o n the implem entation of those fact

ors in order to comply with

her duty t

o consider

all the § 3553(

a) factors along with t

he Guidelin es applicable r

ange. See id. at 115 (“[A] sentencing judge would commit a statutory error in violation of section 35 53(a) if t

he judge failed to ‘consider’ the ap plicable Guidelines ra nge (or arg

uably applicable ranges) as well as the other factors listed in section 3553(a).”). Consideration of the § 3553(a) fa ctors isnot a cut-and-dried p rocess o f factfin ding and calcu lation; ins tead, a dist

rict judge must contemplate the interplay among the many facts in the record and the statutory guideposts. That context calls for us to “refrain[ ] from imposing any rigorous requirement of specific ar ticulation by the sent

encing judge. ” Crosby

, 397 F.3d at

113; see also Jiménez-Beltre , 440 F.3d at 519 (“[A] court’s reasoning can often be inferred by comparing what was argued by the parties or contained in the pre-sentence report with what the judge did.”). As we have expla ined,

We appreciate t

hat lexicogr

aphers, co ntemplatin

g various c ontexts i

n which the word “ consider” is used, mig ht infuse th e word wit h a meani ng that im plies a measure of

sustain ed reflection. But ou r context i s that of

experienced

district judges, fa miliar with

both the s ubstanti

ve content o f relevant

law and proced

ural requirem ents, who f

ace the daunt

ing task of

administ ering heavy cas eloads. In

this context, we continue to believe that no specific verbal formulations should be prescribed to demonstrate the adequate discharge of the duty to ‘consider’ matters relevant to

sentencin g. As long as

the judge is aware of bo

th the statut

ory requ irements and the sentencing range or ranges that are arguably applicable, and nothin g in the record indicates misunderst anding about s

uch materials

or misper ception abo ut their re levance, w e will acce pt that the requisite consider ation has oc curred.8 Of course, we conti nue to encour age sent encing j udges to f acil ita te our r eview by pr ovidi ng complete and de tailed exp lana tions r ega rdin g the ir sen tenc ing d ecisio ns. See Crosb y , 397 F. 3d at 116 ( “Distr ict judges will , of course, appreci ate that what ever th ey say or writ e in explaini ng their reas ons for elect ing t o impose a Guidel

ines senten ce or for deciding to i mpose a non-Guidel ines senten ce wil l si

gnif icant ly ai d this Court i n perfor ming it s duty t o revi ew the sent enc e for reas ona blen ess.”); United S tates v. Fuller , 426 F. 3d 556, 567 (

2d Cir. 2005) (urgi ng that “for t he purpose of facil ita tin g reaso nablenes s revi ew, the bett er pract ice i s for the di str

ict court t o record i n it s written order of judgment

an exp lana tion fo r all G uid eline s de par ture s”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c ) (mandat

ing t hat a di str

ict court “ stat e in open cou rt the reas ons f or its im positio n of th e pa rticu lar se nten ce” ); id. § 3553(c )(2) (requi ring a dist

rict judge t o sta te “t

he spec ific re ason ” for imp osing a sen tenc e tha t refle cts a d epa rtur e fro m the o ther wise app licab le G uid eline s ran ge). 17 United State

s v. Flemi ng , 397 F.3d 95 , 100 (2d Cir . 2005) (em phasis add ed). Accordingly, we presume, in the absence of record evidence suggesting otherwise, that a sentencin g judge has f

aithfully d ischarged h er duty to

consider the statu tory facto rs. See Williams

, 436 F.3d at 708 (commenting that consideration under the post- Booker regime “need not be evidenced explicitly” and rejecting the a rgument that the District Court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors where the defendant “fail[ed] to point to any indication that the district court ignored th ose factor s”); United States v. Ayers , 428 F.3d 31 2, 315 (D.C. Ci r. 2005) ( explaining t

hat when a defendant fails to object to the lack of an explanation on the record for the imposition of a sentence wit

hin the Guidelines ra

nge, “we begin o ur review wi th the pre sumptio n that the d istrict court knew and applied the law correctly” and also establishing a presumption that a judge i mposing a non-Guid elines sen

tence “took

into account

all the facto rs list

ed in § 3553(a

) and accord ed them the approp riate sign

ificance” (i

nternal qu otation mar

ks omitt ed)); see also Walton v. Ar

izona , 497 U.S. 639, 653 (19 90) (“Tr

ial judges ar

e presumed

to know the

law and to appl

y it in makin

g their decisions .”), overrul

ed on othe r grounds by Ring v. Ari

zona , 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). In other words, no “robotic i ncantation s” are requ

ired to pr ove the fact

of consid eration, Crosby

, 397 F.3d at

113 (internal quotation marks omi

tted); see also Lewis

, 436 F.3d at 946 (stating that “sentencing courts are not obligated to provide robotic incantation [about] each statutory factor . . . considered” (alteration in original and internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), 8 and we will not conclude that a district judge shirked her obligation to consider the § 3553(a) factors simply because she did not18

discuss eac h one indi viduall y or did not expressly parse or ad dress every argument relating to those factors that the def

endant advanc ed. Our hol ding is con sistent

with thos e of other

Circuits t hat have consid ered thisquestion

. See United States v. Martinez-Martinez , 442 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Although the district court did not specifically articulate its view on the weight to be accorded th e issue of

sentencin g disparit y in light of

§ 3553(a)(6

), it was no t require d to discu ss each factor’s effect on the sentence.”); United States v. Walker , 439 F.3d 89 0, 892 (8th

Cir. 2006) (“Although a district court is required to consider each of the § 3553(a) factors in determining the proper sentence to impose, it need not categorically rehearse each of the [§] 3553(a) factors on the record when

it impose s a senten ce as long as it is clear that they wer

e considered.” (alter

ation in original and

internal q uotation m arks omit

ted)); United States v. Eura , 440 F.3d 625, 634 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that a sentencing judge “was not required to discuss each § 3553(a) factor on the record”); United States v. Smith , 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2 006) (comm enting th at “a che cklist recitation of the section 3553(a) factors is neither necessary nor sufficient for a sentence to be reasonable”); United States v. Sylvester Norman Knows His Gun, III , 438 F.3d 91 3, 918 (9th

Cir. 2006) (explaining that consideration of § 3553(a) factors “does not necessitate a specific articulation of each factor

separately

”); Cooper , 437 F.3d at 329 (To comply with the obligation to consider the § 3553(a) fa ctors, a “c ourt need n ot discus s every arg ument made b y a litigant i f an argumen t is clearly with out merit .”); Williams , 436 F.3d at 708- 09 (“Althou gh the dist

rict cour t may not hav

e mentioned all the [§ 3553(a)] factors . . . explicitly, and although explic it mention of those factors may facilitate review, this court has never required the ritual incantation of the factors to affirm a sentence.” (alterati on in origi

nal and inter

nal quotati on marks o mitted)) ; United States v. Scott , 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) (“We now . . . squarely hold that nothing in Booker or elsewhere requiresthe distr

ict court t o state on the record

that it hasexplicitly co nsidered each of the § 3 553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.”); United States v. Contreras-Martinez , 409 F.3d 12 36,9 The plai n langua ge of § 3 553(a) (6) seems not t o prohi bit judges from consi dering di spari tie s between c ode fen dan ts. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a )(6) (dir ecti ng that

sente ncing j udges consi der “the need to avoi d unwarrante d sent enc ing d ispar ities am ong def end ants w ith sim ilar re cor ds w ho h ave bee n fou nd guilty of sim ilar co nd uct” ). However, as we hav e recogni zed in t he context

of eval uati ng the pr opriet y of a depar ture wi thi n the Guidel ines scheme, the Sent encing Ref

orm Act of 1984 ( “SRA”), Pub. L. 98-473 , Chapte r II , §§ 211-238, 98 Stat . 1987 ( 1984), whence the lang uag e in § 3 553 (a)(6) c om es, see SRA § 212(a),

98 Stat . at

1990, was int ended to “el iminat [e] di spari ty on a nati onal level. ” Unite d State

s v. Tej eda , 146 F.3d 84, 8 7 (2d Cir. 1 998 ) (em pha sis in or igina l); see also U.S.S. G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, int ro. cmt. ( discus sing

Congress’ s int enti on in pas sing the SRA to r educe the “wi de dispar ity in s entences imposed by di fferen t federal cou rts for similar criminal condu ct by similar offende rs”). In li ght of the SRA ’s goal of nati onal con sisten cy in senten cing, there is di sagreement over whethe r § 3553(

a)( 6) may support

a non-Guidel

ines senten ce for t

he purpose of pre ven ting a disp arity b etw een sente nce s im pose d on co-d efe nd ants. Com pare United States v. Boscarino , 437 F. 3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2006) ( suggest

ing t hat “t he kind of

‘di spari ty’ with whi ch § 3553( a)( 6) i s concern ed is a n unjust ifi ed diffe rence acr oss ju dge s (or d istricts) r athe r than am ong def end ants to a sing le ca se”), with Unite d State s v. Orti z-Zayas , No. 02 C r. 0837, 2005 WL 1430489, at *3 (S. D.N.Y. June 17 , 2005) (“Si nce Booker , a gr owing number of c ourts have hel d that sentencing j udges are no longer prohibi ted from considering the dis parity bet ween codefend ants in f ashioning a 19 1242 (10th

Cir. 2005) (“[T]he sentencing court is not required to consider individually each factor listed in § 3553(a) before issuing a sentence. Moreover, we do not demand that the district court recite any mag

ic words t o show us that it fu

lfilled it s respon sibility t

o be mindfu

l of the fac tors th at Congress has inst

ructed it t o consider .” (citatio n and inter nal quotati on marks o mitted)) ; United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 472-73 (7th Cir.) (“Judges need not rehearse on the record all of the consider ations th at 18 U.S.C. § 3 553(a) lis ts; it isenough to calculate the r ange accuratel

y and explain why (if the

sentence li es outside it) this defendant d eserves m ore or les s.”), cert. denied , 126 S. Ct. 63 6 (2005); cf. Jiménez-Beltre , 440 F.3d at 528 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that a sentencing judge cannot rely on “formulaic invocation of the words of the statute,” but rather must provide “explanations that are responsive to the sentencing issues raised by the parties and that relate the court’s decisions on those i ssues t

o the multi

ple purpos es and facto rs of s ection 3553” ). In sum , our pract

ice in reviewing co nsiderat

ion of the § 3553(a) fac tors isto exercis e “restr aint, not m

icromanagem ent.” Fleming , 397 F.3d at

100. Fernandez has made n o showing t hat the Dis trict Cour

t failed to consider her dispar ity argumen

t. In any event, even assu

ming arguendo

that 18 U.S. C. § 3553(a)(

6) can supp ort a redu cedsentence designed to eliminate or diminish disparity between the sentences imposed on codefenda nts, 9 those co-defendants would have to be similarly situated because the provisionreasonab le se ntence. ” (i nterna l quota tio n marks omitt ed)). In l ight of our conc lusi on that

Fernandez and El

ias were not sim ilarly situ ated , we le ave reso lution of tha t issue for a noth er d ay. 20 mandates that sentencing judges take into account “ unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar

records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 1 8 U.S.C. § 3553(a )(6) (empha ses added) . Elias a nd Fernand ez were n ot similarl y situate d for many re asons, not the leas t of which was that Elias,

unlike his daughter, q

ualified un der the Gui

delines fo r a threelevel reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and a two-level “safety valve” reduct

ion purs uant to U.S .S.G. §§ 2D1. 1(b)(7) a nd 5C1.2. See United State

s v. Bos carino , 437 F.3d 634, 63 8 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] sentencin g difference is not a forbidden ‘disparity’ if it is justified by legitimate c onsiderat

ions, su ch as reward s for coo peration. ” (emphasi s in origi nal)); United States v. Vasquez , 433 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2006) (determining that a sentencing disparity was “not

unwarrant ed” where def

endant “was r

esponsible for a lar

ger quantit

y of drugsand had a great er criminal history than [his co-defendant]”); United State s v. Schne iderhan , 404 F.3d 73 , 83 (1st Ci r.) (finding no unwarranted sentencing disparity where the co-defendants who were subjects of comparis on “pleaded gu

ilty to obs tructing

justice, el iminating t

he ‘lack of remorse’ r

ationale tha

t influenced

the senten ce imposed o n defendant ”), cert. denied

, 126 S. Ct. 38 1 (2005); see also JiménezBeltre , 440 F.3d at 519 (“As with departures, the proponent of a factor that would work in the proponent’s favor has to pro vide the basis to sup port it.” ). Moreov

er, even if § 3553(a)(6

) were a lawful basi s for len

iency here, t

he require ment that a s entencing judge conside r an 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a ) factor is not

synonymous with a requirement that the factor be given determinative or dispositive weight in the particular case, inasmuch as it is only one of several factors that must be weighted and b alanced by the s entencing judge. See Martinez-Martinez , 442 F.3d at 543 (“That some courts have chosen to avoid disparity does not mean that all district courts are compelled to adjust a sentence downward from the advisory guidelines range in order for that sentence to be reasonable.”). The wei

ght to be af

forded any

given argum ent made pur suant to o ne of the § 35 53(a)10 Whil e Fer nand ez’ s co uns el limit ed hi s ar gument reg ardi ng t he r el evan ce of

coop era ti on t o § 3 553( a) (1) , we note that c oop era tion m ay b e rele van t to oth er § 3 553 (a) fac tors a s we ll. 21 factors is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge and is beyond our review, as long as the s entence ulti mately impo sed is re asonable in light of all

the circum stances presente d. See Jiménez-Beltre , 440 F.3d at 419 (“Ass uming a plaus

ible explanat

ion and a defensible overall res ult, sent

encing is t he respon sibility o f the dist rict cour t.”). In sum, we

conclude th at Fernand ez’s claim of procedur al error b ased on the

Distric t Court’s sil ence on o ne of her a rguments (re lating to the dispar ity betwe en her sent ence an d Elias’s) is unpers uasive. Th e absence of explicit dis cussion o f Fernand ez’s specif ic argument

—which was not raise d at the sen

tencing hear

ing—does n ot overcom e our str ong presu mption th at the Dis trict Court fait hfully per formed it s statut ory obligat

ion to consider the § 35 53(a) facto rs.

IV. Fernandez’s Cooperation with the Government Fernandez argues that the District Court “may not have appreciated its discretion to consider Ms. Fer nandez’s coo peration wi

th the gover

nment” pur suant to 1 8 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(1). Def.-Appe

llant’s B r. at 21. Acco rding to F ernandez, even though t he Governm ent did not

make a motion re garding su bstantial assist ance pursu

ant to U.S.S .G. § 5K1.1, see note 2, ante , she may nonetheless benefit from her efforts to cooperate insofar as they shed light on her “history and characteristics.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 10 At Fernandez’s sentencing hearing, the Government conceded that

“under 3553 (a) the Cour

t’s empowe red to cons

ider virt ually any fact

or in sent encing.” Tr. at 12. We agree that in formulating a reasonable sentence a sentencing judg e must consider “the history and character

istics o f the defen dant” withi n the meanin

g of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1 ), as well as the other fa ctors enume rated in § 3553(a), and should take unde r adviseme nt any rel ated arg uments,22

including the contention that a defendant made efforts to cooperate, even if those efforts did not yield a Gover

nment mot

ion for a d ownward depa

rture pu rsuant t o U.S.S.G. § 5 K1.1 (“non -5K cooperat ion”). Se ction 355 3(a)(1), i n particu lar, is wor ded broad ly, and i t contain s no express limitations as to what “history and characteristics of the defendant” are relevant. This sweeping provisio n presum ably includes the histo ry of a defe ndant’s co operation and character

istics ev idenced by cooperat

ion, such as

remorse or rehabil itation. Fernandez argues that Judge Cote did not comprehend her post- Booker authorit y on the bas is of the judge’s statement that Fernandez’s conduct in prison and her inability to cooperate in a manner that

satisfi ed the Gover

nment “und ercut[ ] u sing that brief exploration of

what it was l

ike being a cooperator as something that should indicate in this case an alteration to a guideline

sentence .” Tr

. at 24. According to Fernandez, that statement shows that the District Court “neglected to address the defense’s argument that Ms. Fernandez’s efforts should be taken into account und er 18 U.S.C. § 3 553(a)(1) .” Def.-Ap pellant’s Br. at 20. We disagree. Even if, as Fernandez argues, the District Court’s reference to “an alteration to a guideline sentence,” standing al

one, might b e interpreted as a mis apprehens ion that a Gu idelines s entence should presumptively be imposed, that phrase could not overcome the clear indication in the record that the Court was well aware of its authority to impose a non-Guidelines sentence and its duty to consider “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), as well as all the other § 355 3(a) facto rs. Jud ge Cote discu ssed Fer

nandez’s coo peration at

length and r

ecognized “that I have the power to depart and that I have t

he duty to d etermine wh at a reasona ble senten ce is and to consider all the

factors under 3553 (a).” Tr. at 24 (empha sis added ). The jud

ge thought fully evaluated Fernandez’s cooperation, including “what light it might shed on the cha racter of a11 It was not er ror for Judge Cote t o employ the Guidelin es rang e as a s tart ing poi nt and then to det ermine whether t

he arguments present ed pursuant to t he § 3553( a) fa ctors warrant ed “lighten[ ing] ” of, Tr. at

23, or fashi oning of an “alterat

ion to, ” id. at 24 , the a dv isory Gu idelin es se nten ce (o r, in oth er w ord s, imp osing a no n-G uid eline s sen tenc e). See Crosb y , 39 7 F

. 3d at

11 2 ( di re ct

i ng t ha t “[ t ]h e a pp l i ca bl e Gu i de l i ne s r an ge i s n or mal l y t o b e d et er mi ne d i n the sa me manner as bef

ore Booker [ ]”); see also Rub enstein , 403 F .3d at 98 -99 (ch aracte rizing the G uide lines in post- Booker sente ncing as “a ben chm ark or a p oint o f refe ren ce o r de par ture ”). 23 defendant, ” concluding

that the coo peration was

“fitful” and that it

should no t “be used t

o lighten her sente nce.” Id. at 22-23. 11

As discus sed above, we

do not req

uire any “sp ecific arti culation by t he sentenci

ng judge,” Crosby , 397 F.3d at

113, to prove that a jud

ge has cons idered the § 3553(a) fac tors. J udge Cote’s explanation made clear that she fully understood her duty and her authority in the post- Booker sentencing regime, considered Fernandez’s particular efforts to cooperate and what those efforts showed abou

t this def endant’s “ history

and character

istics,” 18 U.S.C. § 355 3(a)(1), a

nd dutifu lly exercised her discretion in formulating a reasonable sentence. In addition, we underscore that the requirement that the sentencing judge consider a § 3553(a) factor that may cut in a defendant’s favor does not b estow on t

he defendant

an entitlem ent to recei

ve any partic ular “credi

t” under t hat factor

. If the ult imate sent ence is reas onable and th e sentencin g judge did no t commit p rocedural error in imposing that sent ence, we will no t second gu ess the wei ght (or lac k thereof

) that the j udge accorded to

a given facto r or to a s pecific argu ment made pu

rsuant t o that fact or. Althou

gh Judge Cote had the p ower, as lo ng as the s entence impo sed was rea sonable, t o reduce Fer

nandez’s sentence in light of “non-5K cooperation” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), she was under no obligation to provid e any such ben efit.

V. The Reason ableness of the Sent ence Impo sed In connection with the arguments discussed above, Fernandez argues that the 151-month term of im

prisonm ent to which

she was pr

incipally sentenced was “ unreason ably long.” D ef.-24

Appellant’s

Br. at 25. The term o f impris onment imp osed, which was at the f

loor of t he applicable Guidelines range, was thirty-one months above the mandatory minimum, but far below the statutory maximum of life imprisonment. Upon a consideration of the entire record, we conclude that the

sentence was

well within t

he broad ra

nge of reas onable sent

ences that t

he Distr ict Court co uld have imposed in

the circum stances p resented

.

C ONCLUSIO N In conclusion, we hold that: (1) the Court of Appeals has authority to review a sentence for reasonableness pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 374

2(a)(1); (2) the s entencing ju

dge need not address o n the recor d each of the

18 U.S.C. § 355 3(a) factors , nor each ar

gument that

a defendant m akes with reference to those fact

ors, in o rder to comply with her ob ligatio n to consid er the fac tors; (3) in the absence of record evidence suggesting the contrary, we entertain a strong presumption that a sentencing judge has taken properly presented arguments into account and consid ered all the § 3553(a) fac tors in t he course o f imposi

ng a sentenc e; (4) though we do not reach whether § 3553(a)(6) may support a non-Guidelines sentence for the purpo se of prev

enting a dis parity bet

ween senten ces impos ed on co-def endants, t hat provision re lates onl y to “unwa rranted” d isparity b etween si milarly si tuated de fendants; (5) a sentencing judge may take “non-5K cooperation” into account whe n considering the § 3553(a) fa ctors;25

(6) the requirement that a sentencing judge consider a § 3553(a) factor does not mandate that a defen dant actuall

y be granted “ credit” un der that f actor, and t

he weight to

be afford ed any given argu

ment made pu

rsuant t o one of th e § 3553(a) f

actors isbeyond our

review, as long as the

sentence ul

timately im

posed is r easonable in

light of all

the circum stances presented; and (6) in the particular circumstances presented here, a sentence including a 151-month term of impriso nment was n ot unreas onable.

* * * * Accordingly, we conclude that Fernandez has failed to show that the sentence imposed on her was unr

easonable. We t

herefore AFFIRM t

he judgment

of the Dis trict Cour

t.