UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ TIMOTHY L. BEALS, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. SCOTT JAY, Sheriff of Beckham County; DIANE BILBO, Captain of Detention; GINA WEBB, Assistant District Attorney Beckham County; DONNA HOWELL, Court Clerk of Beckham County; BECKHAM COUNTY ; STATE OF OKLAHOMA; DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Defendants - Appellees. No. 17-6163 (D.C. No. 5:15- CV-00922-C) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , HARTZ , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Timothy L. Beals, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 11, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I. Background Mr. Beals alleges that multiple public offici als violated his First Amendment rights by interfering with hi s incoming and outgoing mail during his pretrial detention at the Beckham C ounty Detention Center (BCDC). Those defendants-appellees include Scott Jay (sheriff), Diana Bilbo (jail administrator), 1 and Gina Webb (assistant district attorney). 2 Mr. Beals was subjected to courtimposed mail restrictions after he tried to send letters to his family and friends that identified the witnesses who were scheduled to testify against him and urged the recipients to publicize the witnesses’ cooperation with law enforcement on Facebook. Jail employees intercepted the corresponde nce during routine scanning and alerted Ms. Webb, who advised the state district cour t. That court ulti mately directed BCDC to hold all non-privileged ma il pending resolution of the criminal proceedings, at which point the incoming mail was distribut ed to him and the outgoing mail was sent

1 Although Mr. Beals identifie s Ms. Bilbo as “Diane,” sh e refers to herself as “Diana” in her response brief and in an earlier affidavit.

2 The notice of appeal designates the judgments entered against Mr. Beals on June 28 and 29, 2017, but the following de fendants are not proper appellees: Donna Howell (court clerk), Beckha m County, the State of Ok lahoma, and the Beckham County District Attorney’s Office. Mr. Beals failed to object to the magistrate judge’s findings and dismis sal recommendation as to Ms. Howell and Beckham County so he waived appellate review of them. See Morales-Fernandez v. INS , 418 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Ci r. 2005) (explaining and applying the “firm waiver rule”). His appellate briefs do not address the dismissal of the claims against the remaining defendants during screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. “[T]he omission of an issue in an opening brief ge nerally forfeits appellate cons ideration of that issue.” Bronson v. Swensen , 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007).3 to the addressees. In the interim, Mr. Beals pled gu ilty to witness intimidation based on the letters. Mr. Beals also alle ges that Ms. Bilbo violated his Sixth Amendment right to access the courts by denying him access to an off-premises law library and by refusing to give him stationa ry, legal forms, and extra stamped envelopes for legal mail. He makes these allegations even t hough he was represente d by court-appointed counsel during his incarceration. In a series of reports a nd recommendations, the magi strate judge recommended the dismissal of all claims. The distri ct court adopted the recommendations in separate orders. It grante d summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Jay and Ms. Bilbo on the ground that Mr. Beals failed to exha ust his administrative re medies. It granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. We bb based on prosecutorial immunity. Mr. Beals filed this timely appeal.
II. Analysis A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Although Mr. Beals submitted some grie vance forms (mostly to Ms. Bilbo), the district court concluded that he never completed the appeals process as set forth in BCDC regulations. Those regulations re quire a dissatisfied inmate to submit a written grievance form to sta ff, to be forwarded to the shift supervisor. After the shift supervisor responds, the in mate must then “appeal, in writing, to the next higher level in the chain of command . . . all the way to the Sheriff. ” R., Vol. 2 at 350. “If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Sheriff’s response, he/she may then seek a judicial4 remedy.” Id . The district court found no evidence that Mr. Beals appealed the denial of his grievances to Sheriff Jay, so it dismissed his claims ag ainst the sheriff and Ms. Bilbo. We review the district court’s fa ilure-to-exhaust ruling de novo. See Jernigan v. Stuchell , 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10t h Cir. 2002). Because Mr. Beals is proceeding pro se, “we construe his pleadings liberally.” Ledbetter v. City of Topeka , 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003). We make some allowan ces for deficiencies, such as unfamiliarity with pleading requirements, failu re to cite appropriate legal authority, and confusion of legal theories. See Garrett v. Selby Con nor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). But we “cannot take on the responsibility of serving as [his] attorney in constructing arguments a nd searching the record.” Id. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (P LRA) provides that a prisoner cannot bring an action “with respect to prison co nditions under section 1983 . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhauste d.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Jones v. Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (“[E ]xhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA . . . .”). The exhaustion doctrine protects administrati ve agency authority and promotes efficiency. Woodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006). Because the exhaustion doctrine is an affirmative defe nse, the defendants- appellees “bear the burden of asserting and prov ing that [Mr. Beals] did not utilize administrative remedies.” Tuckel v. Grover , 660 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011). But once they prove failure to exhaust, “the onus falls on [Mr. Beals] to show that remedies were unavailable to him.” Id.5 Mr. Beals argues that he exhausted hi s administrative re medies by submitting numerous grievance forms. However, “s ubstantial compliance is insufficient.” Fields v. Okla. State Penitentiary , 511 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir. 2007). Proper exhaustion requires compliance with all of the prison’s grievance procedures, including “deadlines and other critical proc edural rules[,] be cause no adjudicative system can function effec tively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford , 548 U.S. at 90-91. Thus, “[a]n inmate who begins the grievance proce ss but does not complete it is barred from pursuing a § 1983 claim under PLRA for failure to e xhaust his administra tive remedies.” Jernigan , 304 F.3d at 1032. Alternatively, Mr. Beals seek s to excuse his failure to exhaust on three bases. First, he contends that the defendants obs tructed his exhaustion attempts by failing to provide him with the requisi te paperwork and by denying his request for the rules that govern the grievance process. It is tr ue that exhaustion is not required “[w]here prison officials prevent, thwa rt, or hinder a prisoner’s effo rts to avail hi mself of an administrative remedy.” Little v. Jones , 607 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2010). But Mr. Beals’ unsupported contentions are not enough to excuse his noncompliance; indeed, the record shows, to the contrary, that Ms. Bi lbo and other BCDC officials generally responded to his grievance fo rms and frequent correspondence promptly and thoroughly. Nor can Mr. Beals re ly on his purported confusion about the grievance process: “[I]t is well established that ignoran ce of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.” Marsh v.6 Soares , 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see, e.g. , Hobbs v. Okla. State Penitentiary , 673 F. App’x 837, 841 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (applying this concept to uphol d dismissal of a § 1983 action based on a prisoner’s failure to exhaust). Second, Mr. Beals claims that it would ha ve been “futile” to appeal to Sheriff Jay—both because the sheriff already “has to sign off on all grievance decisions” and because the defendants were following a cour t order in confiscating his mail and thus had “transfer[red]” their power to the court. Aplt. Opening Br. at 12, 16. It is well established, though, that exhaustion is requi red “[e]ven where the ‘available’ remedies would appear to be futile at providing the kind of remedy sought.” Jernigan , 304 F.3d at 1032. The courts “will not read futility or ot her exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements [lik e § 1997e] where Congress has provided otherwise.” Booth v. Churner , 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). Finally, Mr. Beals argues that exha ustion was unnecessary because the defendants were fully awar e of his complaints. See, e.g. , Aplt. Opening Br. at 13 (stating that “[a]ll defendant s . . . were placed on full no tice, numerous of [sic] times through grievances and/or letters in regard s to the issues above” but failed to provide him relief); see also id. (“It is fair to say that all de fendants were fully aware of the above complaints being that these individuals seeked [s ic] Court orders to have Plaintiff’s mail withheld, thus prompting internal investigati ons.”). He cites no authority from our circuit for this propos ition, and “the PLRA does not enable judges, by creative interpretation of the e xhaustion doctrine, to prescribe or oversee7 prison grievance systems,” Jernigan , 304 F.3d at 1032 (br ackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “[ M]andatory exhausti on statutes like the PLRA establish mandatory exhaustion regimes, for eclosing judicial discretion.” Ross v. Blake , 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1857 (2016). In recommending dismissal, the magistrate judge outlin ed the requirements for BCDC’s grievance process and explained th e ways in which Mr . Beals failed to comply with those requirements. We disc ern no error in that recommendation or the district court’s order adopti ng it. Because we affirm based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, we need not c onsider the parties’ arguments about the merits of the underlying § 1983 claims.
B. Prosecutorial Immunity Mr. Beals alleges in his complaint that Ms. Webb vi olated his constitutional rights by operating in concert with Sheriff Jay and Ms. Bilbo to rest rict his mail. The district court granted summar y judgment in Ms. Webb’s favor , finding that her role in restricting the mail wa s intimately associated with the judicial process such that she is entitled to prosecu torial immunity. See Gagan v. Norton , 35 F.3d 1473, 1475 (10th Cir. 1994) (“State pros ecutors are entitled to absolu te immunity against suits brought pursuant to § 1983 for activities in timately associated with the judicial process, such as initiating and pursuing criminal prosecuti ons.” (emphasis, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted)). We do not review that ruling because Mr . Beals does not challenge it in his opening brief. An appella nt’s opening brief must iden tify “appellant’s contentions8 and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). “Consistent with this requirement, we routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant’s opening brief.” Bronson , 500 F.3d at
1104.
III. Conclusion We affirm the district court’s judgment. We grant Mr. Beals’ motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), does not permit litigants to avoi d payment of filing an d docketing fees, only prepayment of those fees. Though we have disposed of this matter on the merits, Mr. Beals is reminded of his obligation to continue making partial paymen t until his appellate filing fee is paid in full.

Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge