Conflict, Culture, and History

Regional Dimensions

by

Stephen J. Blank

Lawrence E. Grinter

Karl P. Magyar

Lewis B . Ware

Bynum E . Weathers

Air University Press

MaxwellAir Force Base, Alabama 36112-6428

January 1993
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Conflict, culture, and history : regional dimensions / by Stephen J. Blank . . . [et

al .]

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1 . War. 2. War and society. 3. Ethnic relations. I. Blank, Stephen,

1950-

U21.2 .C645 1993,;-~

303.6-dc20

ISBN 1-58566-043-4

First Printing January 1993

Second Printing June 1996

Third Printing January 1998

Fourth Printing March 1999

Fifth Printing December 2000

Sixth Printing March 2001

Seventh Printing September 2002

Disclaimer

92-40526

CIP

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views

expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or

position of the Department of Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared

for public release.

For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents

US Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402
Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V

ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X111

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XV

CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE:

THE LENINIST CULTURE OF POLITICAL CONFLICTDr Stephen J. Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Erosion of the Nation-State System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Lenin's Revolutionary Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

The Conceptual Realignment of International Politics . . 16

Some Global Implications of the Brezhnev Doctrine . . . 28

Leninism as Permanent Low-Intensity Conflict . . . . . . . . 39

New Thinking and the Crisis of Leninism . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT IN ITS

HISTORICAL CONTEXT-Dr Lewis B . Ware . . . . . . . . . 57

The Evolution of an Islamic Concept of Conflict . . . . . . 61

The Varieties of Islamist Jihad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Some Observations on Jewish Fundamentalism . . . . . . . 96

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Page

CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES ON

CONFLICT IN SINIC ASIA : CHINA, JAPAN, AND

VIETNAM-Dr Lawrence E . Grinter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA:

MYTH OR REALITY?-Dr Bynum E. Weathers . . . . . . . 193

The Iberian Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

Conquest of the Indies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

Colonial Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

Formation of the Nation-States : The Nineteenth

Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Development and Modernization Practices :

The Twentieth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

The Cold War and the Communist Challenge to

Hegemony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

Low-Intensity Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224

CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY:

THE TRANSITION TO THE MODERN ERADr Karl P. Magyar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Africa's Conflict Environment: The Analytical

Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

Africa's Conflict Environment : The Evolutionary

Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

The Historical Legacy in Africa's Contemporary

Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

Conflict in Africa: American Policy Implications . . . . . . 282

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

IV
Foreword

The essays presented in this volume suggest that, in the

foreseeable future, the spectrum of conflict will encompass war

in forms and on levels of intensity that render ineffectual

conventional means to resolve them . In many cases, the reasons

for a growing spectrum of conflict are directly related to the

ideological and civilizational factors present in rapidly

evolving cultures under the impact of internal and external

political, economic, and social forces .

For the Soviet Union such conflict takes the form of the

classical problem of disaffected minorities unable to satisfy

their demands for autonomy within a federated structure

without destroying the structure itself . On the other hand, in the

Far East the cultures that underlie Sinic societies are well

meshed with the state . The majority of Middle Eastern political

communities, founded on the Western concept of the

nation-state, coexist tenuously with a politicized religious

culture ready at any moment to wage war against them in the

name of extirpating their secular European roots.

Although Africa leads the world in the number of prolonged

struggles, there is little evidence that such conflicts are

motivated by the war-like African cultures . What most

prolonged conflicts in Africa share in common is the degree of

external intervention, whether such intervention comes in the

form of funds, weapons, training, refuge, or leadership . In the

contemporary era Latin American conflicts have been fueled by

external ideologies rather than by purely internal cultural

tensions . Negotiations, mediation, arbitration, and conciliation

have been the hallmark of Latin American foreign policy

initiatives for nearly two centuries .

As diverse as their approaches to the issue of culture and

conflict may be, the authors all agree on one important point :

that without basic research into the sociocultural causes of
strife, the understanding of what constitutes the spectrum of

conflict will fail to include the kinds of war that we may expect

to see in the foreseeable future . And this cannot help but affect

adversely the development of political and military means for

their solution .
About the Authors

Dr Stephen J. Blank is an analyst with the Strategic Studies

Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania, and a former associate professor of Soviet

studies in the Political-Military Affairs Division, Airpower

Research Institute (ARI), at Air University Center for

Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (AUCADRE),

Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He has been an assistant professor of

Russian and Soviet history at the University of Texas, San

Antonio, and a visiting assistant professor of Russian history at

the University of California, Riverside . He serves as a

consultant on Soviet affairs to GE TEMPO (a General Electric

think tank) and the Center for Strategic Technology at Texas

A&M University . He has published many articles on Soviet

nationality policy, foreign policies, and, more recently, military

policy. Dr Blank is completing a manuscript on the first years

of Soviet nationality policy and the Commissariat of

Nationalities under Joseph Stalin .

Dr Lawrence E. Grinter is professor of Asian studies in the

Political-Military Affairs Division of ARI. A former faculty

member of the National War College and the Air War College,

Dr Grinter has published widely in his field, including

Asian-Pacific Security : Emerging Challenges and Responses

(1986, coeditor) and East Asian Conflict Zones : Prospects for

Deescalation and Stability (1987, coeditor) ; and he has

undertaken numerous studies for the National Security Council

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Dr Karl P. Magyar, associate professor of African studies in

the Political-Military Affairs Division of ARI, came to

AUCADRE directly from South Africa. He taught at the

University of Witwatersrand and the University of

Durban-Westville-where he headed the Division of Political

Science . Dr Magyar also served as economic adviser to the
president of Bophuthatswana. In the United States, Dr Magyar

has taught at the American Graduate School of International

Management and at Bowdoin College, and for the University

of Arkansas under contract to the US Air Force . His research

specialties and publications include topics on Nigeria, South

and southern Africa, Namibia, and Africa's strategic

environment.

Dr Lewis B . Ware is professor of Middle East studies and

chief of the Political-Military Affairs Division of ARI. Before

entering service with the Air Force, he taught at New York

University, Boston State College, and Northeastern University .

He has published numerous articles on a wide range of subjects

in such journals as the Middle East Journal, Military Review,

and the Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies . Dr

Ware has also produced a series of monographs on the Middle

East .

Dr Bynum E. Weathers is associate professor of Latin

American studies in the Political-Military Affairs Division of

ARI . He has taught at the University of Puerto Rico ; the US Air

Force Academy; Northeast Louisiana University ; Saint Mary's

University of San Antonio ; University of Alabama,

Montgomery ; and Huntingdon College, Montgomery . Dr

Weathers's research has taken him to Argentina, Uruguay,

Mexico, and Central America. He has published several studies

on low-intensity conflict, including Guerrilla Warfare in

Nicaragua, 1975-1979 .
Preface

The nation-state is the concept from which the modern

Western political order has been constructed . This political

order accounts, in turn, for the particular ways countries relate

to each other, ideally under a regime of international law which,

by delimiting the boundaries between war and peace, has

established a theoretical and practical measure for the stability

of nations . Because these boundaries have been institutionalized by law, the modern Western political order has

evolved in an atmosphere of relative peace. At least such has

been the case until the latter part of this century . Under the

influence of the third-world independence movements and the

breakup of the communist monolith, the absolute validity of the

concept of the nation-state may have been reaffirmed for the

creation of durable political communities . Yet many European

countries still remain uncomfortable with the concept of the

nation-state as an organizing principle for the polis and have

reverted to older ethnic and religious ways of defining national

life . As a result, the boundaries determining war and peace

among peoples and between nations are becoming

progressively more fluid. It is a supreme historical irony that

the concept of the nation-state, with its demand that loyalty to

the state supersede loyalty to narrower ethnoreligous identities,

has been generalized to areas of the non-Western world where

the nation-state is sometimes an alien proposition but where

it, nevertheless, constitutes the basis for international

relationships .

The recognition that conflict may have more enduring roots

in ethnic and religious culture than in the quarrels of

nation-states over issues of relative standing in the international

political order has received its seminal treatment by Professor

Adda B . Bozeman in her article, "War and the Clash of Ideas ."

The essays of this volume expand Professor Bozeman's thesis
and attempting to pinpoint where peace ceases and war begins .

The results of the following research are as wide as they are

variable, but they add to a more comprehensive cultural

perspective on this important issue.

In his contribution Stephen Blank argues that since 1917 the

concept of the nation-state and its related notion of a stable,

legitimate international order has been under attack by the

Soviet Union. The perversion of the nation-state concept has

suited the Soviet need to lead a revolutionary international

movement upon which the USSR has founded its imperial claim

to world domination. Until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power,

this entailed the reconceptualization of international politics

and conflict to accommodate the idea of a militarized,

permanent "state of siege" between the USSR and the rest of

the world . The state of siege overlapped the cold war and

provided an ongoing threat to both the emerging nation-states

of the third world and to the spread of substate ethnic and

religious nationalisms, even within the Soviet Union itself.

Because the political future of Gorbachev's initiatives may be

in doubt today, the possibility for further attacks on Western

political concepts is by no means exhausted.

Lewis Ware explores the evolution of an Islamic concept of

conflict by tracing the function of jihad-as a legal means of

accommodating the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds-from

earliest Islamic times to the latter days of political Islamism .

He finds that not only does the function of jihad change over

time according to the intensity of the historical exchanges

between West and East, but jihad also reflects the cultural views

toward war of the various peoples to whom Islam was

preached-but in ways that do not compromise the immutable

tenets of Islamic dogma and religious culture. Thus a tension

exists between the concept of perpetual conflict dictated by a

religious culture unaffected by time and the concept of conflict

as a relative phenomenon dependent on historical change . This

tension gives jihad its characteristic shape and provides the
environment for the contemporary struggles of political

Islamism with Western-inspired secular Muslim regimes .

In his essay Lawrence Grinter applies the two principal

Bozeman theses to China, Japan, and Vietnam : that the state,

with its Western legal characteristics and boundaries, has a

greatly reduced influence compared to culture in explaining the

causes and conduct of conflict in Sinic Asia; and that, unlike

Western societies in which force and violence are viewed as

aberrations, conflict in Sinic societies is viewed as politically

legitimate. Grinter first treats China, Japan, and Vietnam in

terms of their historical experience with internal and external

warfare and then examines the particular styles of war, the

historical security concerns, and the conflict goals of each

society .

Bynum Weathers's article claims that Latin America has

accepted the concept of political and social integration under

the nation-state system . Latin American society is

homogeneously Christian where the clash of ideas has resulted

not from within, through cultural competition, but from exterior

sources . During the past century, Latin America has employed

measures for pacific settlement of disputes and has relied on

regional security organizations to avoid war. This has permitted

the strength of the nation-state to increase and leads to the

observation that political and economic rather than cultural

factors have been the primary cause of Latin American

conflicts .

Finally, Karl Magyar's essay poses a number of questions

which address the particular challenges of studying African

conflicts in their cultural context. The primary challenge is that

of conflict definition : whereas social strife in developed

societies is frequently labeled "ethnic conflict" the same kind

of conflict in Africa is called "tribal warfare ." This somehow

connotes that Africa's conflicts are not as "civilized" as ours .

Thus the paramount question regarding African conflict culture

concerns the reasons for its endemic violence . Magyar ponders

whether Africans are particularly prone to war and whether the

fundamental nature of their conflict culture has changed over
history . The answers he gives consider the external impact of

Arab Islam, European Christianity, and the competitive

international economic environment on the continent's many

cultures. He focuses especially on the problems of fragile

political units in their early consolidative stage of evolution.
Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge with thanks the tireless

efforts of our editor, Bessie Varner, and those of the entire Air

University Press Production Division, without whose devotion

to their work the publication of this volume would have been

impossible.

Introduction

War and the Clash of Ideas

by

Adda B. Bozeman*

"The War of All Against All" is the title of an analytical

review of papers that were published in the Journal ofConflict

Resolution from 1957 to 1968 . 1 Within the protective covers of

these volumes, contributors contend for different causes ; yet

the clash of their ideas is significantly muffled by basic accord

on two great issues. The scholars are at one, the reviewer notes,

in regarding international war as the category ofcentral interest,

and they are united also in stressing conflict control rather than

conflict itself. Moreover, they are found to be nearly unanimous

in assuming that violence is something to be avoided if at all

possible, and in attaching connotations of illegitimacy to the

phrase "organized violence ."

Given these shared dispositions, it is not surprising to learn,

then, that arms control is a heavily favored research subject and

that the literature on this topic is pervaded by several common

impulses, among them the following : repugnance for

*Adds B. Bozeman is Professor of International Relations at Sarah Lawrence College and the

author ofseveral studies ofintercultural relations, among themConflict in frica (1976), TheFuture

of Law in a Multicultural World (1971), and Politics and Culture in International History

(1960) .

Reprinted with permission from Orbis: A Journal ofWorld Affairs 20, no. 1 (Spring 1976):

61-102. Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute .
"untraditional" methods of warfare or for weapons "which a

given nation has not yet had a chance either to arm itself with

or to develop counterweapons against"; 2 disdain for "sham

bargaining" and psychological warfare, the latter generally

being viewed as sneaky and immoral; the strong conviction that

humane-ness ought to be accepted as an important criterion in

the evaluation of weaponry ; a deep commitment to the

distinction between "just" and "unjust" wars ; and considerable

preoccupation with guilt and responsibility with regard to the

actual resort to violence or war.

The same exhaustive survey also instructs us that JCR

authors have not paid much attention to the relationship

between the cause of national survival, on the one hand, and

arms control, on the other, and that inquiries into the

antecedents of military aggression have been conspicuously

absent . In fact, the preferred time dimension has very definitely

been the present, amplified by strong overtones of futurist

concern. The historical approach is missing, and statistical

treatment is stressed; what is more, the data considered relevant

to such statistical processing are drawn almost exclusively from

American and European records . And finally, it appears that

findings by specialists in military science and strategy have

been seldom exploited.

Analogous trends have been found to dominate international

relations research . Chadwick Alger, in a research review

published in 1970, 3 pointed out that concern with the causes of

war had given way to study of the causes of peace and the

construction of "alternate futures," and that knowledge of the

destructive power of nuclear weapons had sparked a revival of

interest in disarmament and arms control. He also noted that the

peace research movement has been "international in

composition, being comprised mainly of North Americans and

Western Europeans," that these participants have had high

value-commitments to the nonviolent solution of international

conflicts and have endeavored to do work with policy
relevance, and that they have stressed "scientific work,"

including systematic data collection techniques and rigorous

methods of analysis . Here, however, as in the field of conflict

resolution, the demands of rigorous analysis can obviously be

satisfied without methodically utilizing data from non-Western

societies .

The processes of theory- and model-building that have been

perfected in recent years are certainly impressive, and so are

many of the actual mental constructions that have issued from

these labors . Yet it is questionable whether objective validity

can be claimed for much of this work, if only because it is

permeated by paradox . It is necessary, then, to note that most

scholarly architects profess to be value-neutral social scientists.

This is true even though they admit, directly or indirectly

through the medium of their accomplishments, that the major

motivation for their sustained efforts clearly originates in the

compelling force of their own feelings, impulses and values,

notably those that feed their hopes for, and images of, a peaceful

world society .

Now there is no reason why social scientists should not have

values ; nor is there any reason that they should not be concerned

with the improvement of the lot of man. But in this case, we

discover that personal value preferences have not been checked

out objectively before they were judged to be appropriate

building blocks for theory. More important, perhaps, few

modern theorists in the fields of international relations or

conflict resolution have bothered to explore the value content

of conflict, war and violence . The configuration of the enemy

they profess to fight is thus not clearly rendered-a

circumstance that may explain why this "war against war" can

be perceived by others as a kind of shadowboxing. Indeed,

explicit definitions are missing for both war and peace, perhaps

because the ruling supposition is that the one is everywhere

known to be the opposite of the other, war being universally

xvII
disclaimed as a thoroughly bad idea and peace being just as

generally accepted as mankind's natural state and birthright .

The clash of ideas over how to control conflict, avoid war

and build the structures of peace seems to have proceeded in

the calm of an academic environment within which the clash of

arms and the clamor of war-affirming rhetoric are not readily

heard. Some future nonacademic parliament of man, however,

may well entertain the motion that these theorists fiddled while

nations burned . Whether an armed conflict today is classified

as an insurrection, a civil war, a war of national liberation, a

guerrilla war or a war-by-proxy, a UN war to preserve the

peace, an international socialist war to serve the cause of

revolution, or a traditional interstate war-and the lines of

differentiation are becoming increasingly blurred in response

precisely to the high incidence of violence and the steady

proliferation of types of warfare-the fact remains that the

post-1945 world can fairly be viewed as a conglomerate of

theaters of war, some self-contained and localized, others

contiguous and interdependent .

A simple inventory of bare and incontrovertible facts is

revealing : Irish groups seem bent' on changing the political

order of the island by resort to indiscriminate violence ;

relations between Israel and the Arab states and peoples have

been characterized from 1948 onward by warfare; factional,

national and international affairs in the Islamic Middle East

have been marked by bloody revolutions, armed interventions,

takeovers and ethnic uprisings ; several North African Muslim

regimes have consistently warred against the non-Islamic

populations to their south; Africa south of the Sahara has been

convulsed by interstate and intertribal violence, civil wars,

coups d'etat and political assassinations, as well as by military

and paramilitary activities on the part of anti-white liberation

armies and their Rhodesian and Portuguese opponents ; Greeks

and Turks cannot resist fighting over Cyprus ; the armies of the

Soviet Union have crushed numerous national uprisings among
the allegedly sovereign states of Eastern Europe ; India has

chosen force over available peaceful methods in order to

establish or retain her dominion over Hyderabad, parts of

Kashmir, Goa, Sikkim and such non-self-governing territories

as those occupied by the Naga hostiles; India and Pakistan have

not had any scruples about settling their conflicting claims and

interests on the field of battle; there would have been no

Bangladesh had there not been ruthless warfare ; it was China's

armed might that subdued Tibet and successfully asserted

control over the Paracel Islands; generations of Koreans have

known nothing but the actuality or the threat of civil and

international war; the destinies of all peoples in the vast

Southeast Asian region have long been molded by war, whether

in the form of armed uprisings and revolutions, jigsaw

movements of insurgency and counterinsurgency, belligerent

confrontations between neighbors, or military interventions by

great powers; terrorist organizations of one hue or another

operate freely throughout Latin America; the United States,

which is the academic center of the search for a warless world,

has not only warred against communist forces in Korea and

Indochina but is itself the troubled scene of terrorist activities

by self-styled liberation armies, urban guerrilla bands and other

violence-espousing groups.

War's overwhelming and variegated presence would seem to

be at odds with some of the major assumptions relayed

explicitly or implicitly by leading theorists of international

relations and conflict resolution. Doubt may thus be cast on the

proposition that "international war," the category of foremost

concern, can be convincingly extricated from the maze of other

'types of warfare in which modern nations are enmeshed.

Likewise, and for the same reasons, it is questionable whether

distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, or

d

between humane and inhumane weapons, can be maintained

effectively, or whether one can endorse the proposition that

clear-cut lines between aggression and defense (and thus
between just and unjust wars) are always readily discernible .

Specialists in military science have closely studied just such

issues ; however, as the aforementioned analyses suggest, their

findings do not seem to have had a vital impact on present

trends in political science, peace research, arms control or

conflict resolution .

Other incongruities between theory and reality are suggested

by the raw evidence of modern war and violence. A glance at

the embattled and conflict-ridden regions of Africa, Asia,

Latin America and parts of Europe leaves one with the strong

impression that human dispositions toward stress, violence and

death are by no means everywhere the same, and that basic

orientations toward war and peace are therefore greatly various

also . For example, nowhere outside North America and

Northern Europe does one encounter the overriding desire to

avoid armed conflict and to seek peaceful settlement of disputes

that leading peace-minded scholars in our society assume to be

generally present.

Furthermore, evidence is totally missing that recourse to

armed force evokes feelings of guilt and self-recrimination

among the intellectual elites of non-Western societies, or that

the high incidence of organized and unorganized violence

induces doubts about the appropriateness of ruling moral or

political systems. Indeed, the strife-filled records of the past

twenty-five years, together with the conflict-laden language so

often employed by spokesmen for African, Asian and

communist societies, point to the possibility that conflict and

violence may well be accepted in most areas outside the

Occidental world as normal incidents of life, legitimate tools of

government and foreign-policymaking, and morally sanctioned

courses of action .

Propositions such as these have not been thoroughly tested

in the laboratories of peace research, perhaps because they

relate, in the final analysis, to values ; and values may resist the

kind of "rigorous analysis" that has been aimed at by scholars .
At any rate, it is noteworthy that eminent theorists in the fields

here under review have refrained altogether from probing the

mental and psychocultural roots of war, that they have not been

much interested in the historical antecedents of actual conflict

situations, and that they have not thought of war as a complex

of possibly quite disparate, even irreconcilable, norms, values

and ideas . Just why these matters have not surfaced in the

mainstream of their investigations is in itself a significant

thematic motif in the clash of ideas detonated by modern

warfare, and as such it should be scrutinized before going any

further.

Several learned commentators on conflict and its resolution

have drawn attention to the fact that today's scholars are uneasy

in the face of all, not merely armed, conflict. They are inclined

to view it negatively-as an unfortunate interruption of the

normal flow of social life, a failure in communication, an

unregulated and hence possibly illegitimate transaction, or an

aberration from patterns of rational behavior that should be and

can be reduced, transformed or eliminated because it is

situational rather than instrumental, pathological rather than

sane . 4 The exact norms, patterns and models against which

motives and actions are judged normal or abnormal are not

usually set out. The argument in almost every case appears to

be that they are generally known or, to put it differently, that

we are here in the presence of some universal givens that need

only be implied.

Moreover, and in striking contrast to scholars from an earlier

time (notably, Georg Simmel and Robert McIver), conflict

today is generally not associated with sentiments, values or

psychic states of being . The stress is rather on concrete

struggles or overt episodes in which individuals or groups
contend for tangible rewards . Thus conceived in terms of

antagonistic poles representing two or more mutually

incompatible positions, conflict is suspect at the very start, for

it is presumed to spring from some kind of discord that could

have been avoided.

This neglect of psychological and intellectual factors in

situations of social stress seems to have attached itself almost

automatically to scholarly thought about those international

conflicts that fall short of military war, known in history as cold

wars or wars of nerves. Here again, the premise is widely

accepted today that clashes of ideas are somehow either

irrational departures from the ground rules of normal behavior

or ruses to cover up peace-defying policies . In either case it

seems to be supposed, particularly in so-called revisionist

academic circles, that the Cold War between this country and

the communist states was somehow officially initiated in much

the same way that hot wars have been declared, and that it could

therefore be called off by political authorities in an equally

expeditious manner . In other words, conflict is presented as a

willed event, rather than a process or relationship, perhaps in

deference to the controlling conviction that "war" and "peace"

are always absolutely polarized, mutually exclusive, strictly

factual conditions, and that total peace must naturally take over

when the fighting stops .

It is difficult to find precedents for this modern, chiefly

American orientation toward chronic international discord. The

history of Europe, which is very much a history of ideas, and

therefore also one of clashing ideas, is replete with such wars

of nerves. None has been more protracted or more richly

documented than the uneasy coexistence of Christian and

Muslim in the lands of the Mediterranean, for which

contemporary Spaniards coined the term guerra fria . This

early model of the clash of ideas in international relations has

obviously not been examined by today's schools of peace and

conflict studies . Nor have they taken note of the unremitting,
politically and intellectually poignant collision of beliefs in

the minds of statesmen, scholars and ordinary citizens that

was set off by the French Revolution and continued unabated

long after the smoke had cleared . There is thus considerable

justification for describing this state of affairs as "the case of

the missing historian ."

Explanations for the absence of this dimension of inquiry

may range from a lack of interest in history and doubt about its

relevance for future-directed peace research to the premonition

that rigorous historical research would not support some of the

theorists' most favored visions . And, no doubt, they also

include the related inclination to treat each and every conflict

as a clearly discernible, and hence definable, factual

circumstance that can be undone as quickly and purposively as

it has been conjured up .

At any rate, few present-day specialists in conflict resolution

seem prepared to associate conflict with mobility and flux, or

to think of it as a process not always easily defined or arrested

by decisive action . Not many among them, then, would agree

with Jessie Bernard, who in 1949 argued that conflict may exist

in latent form for years before there is a formulation of issues,

a showdown or a crisis. Bernard believed that it is therefore a

mistake to limit our thinking about conflict to its overt phase;

we should instead accustom ourselves to think of conflict as

going on day in, day out in varying degrees of intensity, whether

the issues are clearly formulated or not . 6 Yet it is this

explication of social conflict, rather than the ultramodern one,

that can be translated convincingly into the language of

international relations to cover that indeterminate continuum of

"no war/no peace" commonly known as cold war.

Furthermore, as later sections of this paper suggest, the

Bernard concept comes close to explaining the types of

discord and disorder most commonly found in the local and

international affairs of non-Western societies . Finally, and

most important from the humanist's perspective, it captures

XXIII
certain constant motifs in Occidental biography and history,

among them the proposition eloquently stated by Ortega y

Gasset in his meditations on Don Quixote, namely, that life is

uneasiness .

The discomfort experienced by many social scientists in the

presence of cross-national ideological strife is paralleled by

deep apprehension when their thought turns to what, in the

language of the trade, is known as international war. Analysts

of research trends in disarmament, arms control and peace

studies see this reaction as a function of their preoccupation

with the awesome specter of nuclear war. 7 This preoccupation

is understandable ; but the fact remains, first of all, that millions

of lives have been extinguished since 1945 not by nuclear

weapons but by conventional arms employed in all manner of

warfare, terrorism and outright massacre and, second, that

political theorists are not nearly as troubled about these

actualities as they are about possible future horrors .

To justify their concern, analysts often point to the use of the

atomic bomb against Japan in World War II, and their argument

is usually heavily encumbered by an insistence on America's

"guilt" 8-an indictment, incidentally, that is seldom softened

by the reminder that conventional bombs had in fact visited

even greater devastation on some European cities during the

same war. Some - of this literature thus leaves one with the

uncomfortable impression that the fear of that which may be,

and feelings of guilt over that which was, have come close to

paralyzing analysis of that which is.

Further reflections on the tangle of sentiments and

cerebrations in which so much of our supposedly value-neutral

work on war is imbedded confirm this impression . Thus we see

that today's intense academic concern about the morality of

military operations was activated by the war in Indochina, and

not any other past or present war, and that ever since it has

expressed itself almost exclusively in revulsion against the

war-related policies of the United States and some of her allies .

xxIv
Nor has this massive volume of accumulated professorial

indignation been strained and sifted in an objective, methodical

manner in order to salvage those elements germane to theory .

In fact, there are indications that the opposite tendency is being

favored, in the sense that sentiment is being allowed to drift.

For now that the international war in Indochina is officially

terminated, and now that it is possible, in virtue of spellbinding

legal or moral fictions, to view military activities in Asia as

"unofficial" or "illegitimate," scholarly offensives are directed

against noncommunist Asian governments, which continue to

be embattled.

A group of renowned American experts on East Asian

history, government and culture has thus felt justified, "in the

name of humanity and human rights," to protest "the injustice

and the inhumanity" of certain judicial and administrative

measures that South Korea has taken against some of her

citizens. 9 Since similarly severe protests have not been lodged

against the dictatorships of North Korea, North Vietnam or the

People's Republic of China, one can only conclude that some

private bias is at work here . In this case, as in others, 1° the

"missing historian" is an important factor-particularly

puzzling here since the changes are formulated with the consent

of East Asian historians who must be presumed to know that

human rights and civil liberties are not part and parcel of

traditional administration in Korea, China or the states of

Southeast Asia.

The overwhelming presence of private sentiments and values

that one detects in war-related literature today does not favor

the refinement of ideas into reliable, universally applicable

theories about the place of war in human existence . Yet it is

definitely theory that students of international relations, war

and conflict want most fervently . Indeed, the search for this

type of intellectual certainty has been so ardent and compulsive

in recent decades that the nontheorist is left with the intriguing

image of war-weary troops of academics beating a hasty
retreat-away from the unnerving uncertainty of life on the

fields of battle and back to the secure shelters of ideationally

perfect castles in the mind . But here the refugees are also faced

with most demanding problems. After all, social science theory

is best attained today if the number of variables is reduced as

starkly as possible and if only readily quantified data are

considered . Primary attention is therefore usually directed to

specific yet sufficiently simple events that can be counted,

compared and categorized with relative ease .

Is modern war susceptible to this kind of academic

processing? If it is true, as the UNESCO Charter states, that

"wars begin in the minds of men" and that "ignorance of each

other's ways and lives has been a common cause . . . of that

suspicion and mistrust between peoples of the world through

which their differences have all too often broken into war,"

should it not follow that one must probe the minds of men in

search of all the images, beliefs, sensations, values, concepts

and modes of reasoning that relate to war?

The data thus collected would of course be infinitely various

as well as precarious-the kind not easily stored in data banks

as these are now constructed. For just how does one quantify

pride, prestige or prejudice, moral outrage, insistence on

survival, vanity and vengeance? What does one do with killing

in obedience-to spirits of the earth or living ancestors? Where

in the theoretician's charts and models is there a place for hatred

of the enemy or love of country? Are tools available for a

rigorous analysis of self-discipline, cowardice, disaffection or

daring? And what are the criteria for an objective, transnational

comparison of human inclinations or capacities to inflict

violence and sustain war-induced uncertainty, suffering and

death? If we have no answers to questions such as these, should

we then assume that the meanings of war carried in the minds

of the Sudanese and the Bengalis, the Israelis and the Kurds,

the Arabs and the Poles, the Hutu and the Greeks are one and
the same? Or would it be more prudent not to wonder what men

think of war and why they fight?

The latter course seems to be the favored response today in

that intense quest for generally valid norms and standards to

which priority is being attached . Ultimately, the challenge

implicit in the task of theory-building calls for the reduction

rather than the addition of variables; and on balance one can

say that this challenge has been met. It may well be that the

decision to overlook sentiments, beliefs and values-in short,

the intangibles that resist quantification-explains why

international conflict, including war, is now being treated by so

many theorists as a special case of social conflict whose

paradigm is economic conflict, the category most amenable to

data-processing techniques . This choice of emphasis, again,

can be traced to the simple but ruling supposition that the norm

for the organization of all societies is the modern industrial

society of the West, and that the typical human being is

therefore rightly envisaged as a man functioning rationally in

such an economic environment.

In this kind of theoretical scheme, Hans Morgenthau

explains, nations confront each other not as living historic

entities, with all their complexities, but as rational abstractions

after the model of "economic man"-playing games of military

and diplomatic chess according to a rational calculus that exists

nowhere but in the theoretician's mind." Nor is it surprising,

in light of such pervasive assumptions, that past and present

data from non-Western societies have not been analyzed on

their intrinsic merits and that a recent volume containing no

substantive references to non-American or non-European

manifestations of human conflict could yet be entitled The

Nature of Human Conflict.

12

This strong trend to constrict the frames of inquiry for the

study of modern war has been reinforced in recent years by the

steady impact of other firmly held beliefs : trust in the territorial,

democratic nation-state as the prototype for political
association everywhere on earth ; trust, therefore, in the

existence of an organizationally unified world society of

essentially equal and analogous political units ; and trust in the

compelling logic and validity of laws of interstate behavior that

assign authoritative meanings to all transactions regarding

peace, war, neutrality and conflict resolution .

Now, these propositions have had a rather brief and

geographically restricted history . They matured in Europe from

about 1648 onward in the vortex, it is interesting to note, of

almost continuous war. But there, under the auspices of what

later became known as the "modern European states system,"

they did not carry the fixed, exclusive connotations assigned to

them today. International history instructs us, too, that our

modern, systematized approaches to war, peace, diplomacy and

conflict resolution have no precedents in classical, medieval or

Renaissance Europe, or in the traditional realms of Africa and

Asia. Finally, the actualities of present world affairs strongly

suggest that the supposedly pivotal concepts in international

relations-that is, the nation-state, the unified world society

and international law-are either in need of radical revision or

beyond repair, casualties as it were in the endless war of ideas

on which life appears to feed .

The implications of this obsolescence for any reasoned view

of war can be seen most clearly by concentrating one's analysis

on the state. It is doubtful indeed whether we are justified in

thinking that the territorially delimited, independent nationstate is still universally accepted as the core norm of political

organization and, therefore, as the measure by which one

distinguishes different types of violence . Surely, nothing

comparable to this particular associational form had existed in

pre-seventeenth century Christian Europe (which supplied the

framework for the coexistence of numerous, quite disparately

fashioned, politically active units), in precolonial Africa south

of the Sahara, in the Arab/Islamic realm, or in the different

civilizations of South, East and Central Asia. Lines of

XXVIII
demarcation between local and international milieus of conflict,

and between internal and international warfare, were not

clearly drawn in traditional societies before the installation,

from the nineteenth century onward, of nation-states and legal

systems modeled on Western prototypes .

These unifying grafts have atrophied in recent decades under

the impact of the following developments : the waning of

Western influence and power; the reactivation, in the Orient

and Africa, of older, locally respected focuses of authority and

communal solidarity ; and the successful diffusion of

communist doctrines of statecraft, in the context of which the

"bourgeois" state is appreciated as a tactical device rather than

a value or norm. In short, the concept of the state as a sovereign

community, unified politically, morally and territorially, is

being subjected to processes of erosion in all parts of the

world-not excluding Western Europe and North America. Its

substance is being worn away by fragmentation and separatism

along narrow ethnic or linguistic lines ; by civil disobedience

and a faltering faith in law; and by internal war, covert foreign

interventions or military aggression from without.

Singly or in combination, these trends account for the

dismantlement, division or satellitization of numerous formerly

unified and independent polities, on the one hand, and for the

creation of new, fully operational political units, on the other

hand, which are antithetical to the state in terms of both

intention and activity. This is true, for example, of the national

and international liberation front, the "provisional" government

that functions year in, year out, or the "independent national

authority"-the latter a Middle Eastern guerrilla term denoting

the embryo of a future Palestinian state . Each of these

organizational types is mobile and fluid in the sense that it has

'no fixed territorial boundaries and no determinate human

substance . Furthermore, each exists in virtue of its commitment

to violence and war.
The term "international war," then, no longer refers

exclusively to violent conflicts between states . Rather, as

suggested earlier, it now stands also for a broad spectrum of

armed belligerence within the state, ranging from sporadic

urban guerrilla activities to civil wars, wars of liberation and

secession, insurrections and other revolutionary uprisings,

many of which are initiated and maintained in behalf of causes

espoused by foreign principals . Moreover, this interpenetration

of the domestic and foreign environments effaces altogether the

conventionally accepted lines between legitimate and

illegitimate force, and puts in question the theoretically

established distinctions between war and peace. These

interlocking conditions support the conclusion that the state,

having forfeited important controlling functions customarily

ascribed to it in world affairs, can no longer be regarded as a

reliable medium for realistic differentiation among types of war

and between the conditions of war and peace.

Next, the erosion of the state as the fundamental, shared norm

of political organization, together with general acquiescence in

the coexistence of states and anti-state bodies as equal actors in

foreign policy arenas, has gradually but ineluctably led also to

the devaluation of the two state-based superstructures that

provide the context for official foreign relations : (1) the world

society of sovereign, equal states and (2) the law of nations,

which stipulates the rights and obligations of these states .

Theoreticians in the field of war and peace studies have made

scant allowance for these revolutionary developments. Some

proceed as if the situation had not changed at all in past decades,

while others, heartened by a belief in progress, retreat into the

security of self-made legal and political systems that will be

actual, they think, in the future . For as the late Martin Wight

notes in his essay "Why Is There No International Theory?" the

conviction usually precedes the evidence in progressivist

international theories . "And when the conviction is analysed or

disintegrates," he continues, "one is apt to find at the centre of
it what might be called the argument from desperation ." In

modern times, Wight suggests, this may well be the fear of

nuclear war.' 3 The argument that the hydrogen bomb has made

war impossible thus usually contains two propositions : first,

war waged with the new weapons will destroy civilization ;

second, it is therefore too horrible to happen.

Thus confined, discussion cannot move on either to

international actualities or to history, where corrective evidence

is readily available. For example, the indisputable fact that the

flood tide of modern nonnuclear war has washed away the

categories reserved for it by international law and the UN

Charter is seldom, if ever, recognized by theorists . Likewise,

belief in the polarity of war and peace is still widespread, even

in policymaking circles, and many thoughtful men believe that

every war must end-a proposition negated by the reality of

continuous armed struggles. Furthermore, it is astonishing that

international theorists, notably those committed to the cause of

international law, see no purpose in consulting the records of

diplomatic and intellectual history .

The international environment to which American and

European theorists address themselves today is certainly more

vast and diversified than that of either the seventeenth or

nineteenth century, when Grotius and Clausewitz, respectively,

reflected on the world. And yet, a comparative study of theories

then and now leaves the definite impression that war was both

being perceived more keenly and explained more accurately by

earlier observers, and that the major findings registered in the

seventeenth and nineteenth centuries are in harmony with

today's reality, whereas those set out mgst recently are not .

Grotius, writing in a time when the outlines of the modern

European states system were becoming apparent, concluded

from his reflections on classical, Jewish and Christian thought

and action that war per se is not condemned either by the

voluntary law of nations' or the law of nature, that states may

well reduce each other to subjection, that the boundaries of

XXXI
states, kingdoms, nations or cities can often be settled by the

laws of war, that wars must employ force and terror as their

most proper agents, and that the arguments in favor of war are

as numerous as those for the rule of law. "For where the power

of law ceases," he writes, "there war begins ." 14

Enduring international peace, by contrast, is presented by

this pioneering theorist of international law as a remote

condition. The prophesy of Isaiah that the time shall come when

"nations shall beat their swords into plowshares, and turn their

spears into pruning hooks," when "nation shall not lift up sword

against nation" nor "learn war any more," is in Grotius' opinion

(as in that of the Jewish prophet) irrelevant insofar as the justice

of war is concerned. In the Grotian perspective, the passage

merely describes the state of the world that will result if

all nations would submit to the law of Christ . Pending

consummation of this utopian dream, peace is perforce limited

in time and space.

In fact, a significant passage in Dejure belli ac pacis suggests

that it may not always be easy to distinguish between war and

peace. War, Grotius notes, is a term for a situation that can exist

even when warlike operations are not being carried on.

Belligerent powers may agree on a cease-fire or truce in the

course of war, and no period need be fixed for the continuance

of such an arrangement, described by one of his classical

authorities as "a transitory peace, in travail with war." "And I

shall add," Grotius writes, "that [truces] are made too for years,

twenty, thirty, forty, even a hundred years ." 15 In other words,

a state of belligerency may well be semipermanent or

protracted .

Theorists after Grotius held rather steadfastly to his major

axioms . Clausewitz, whose work On War laid the basis (in the

Occidental world of thought) for the systematic study of war as

a field of human knowledge, thus restated Grotius when he

defined war as the conduct of political intercourse by other

means, a form of human enterprise belonging to social
existence, and a conflict of great interests that is settled by

bloodshed. But he also inveighed against the folly of viewing

war as an act of unrestrained violence, a mere passion for daring

and winning, or "an independent thing in itself." To Clausewitz,

it was quite clear that war is a serious means to a serious end,

only a part of political intercourse, and therefore always subject

to the political design . And this design, whether understood as

referring to a particular foreign policy or to the realm of politics

in general, is here decidedly not being viewed as "war by other

means"-a theoretical construct in communist conflict doctrine

that was to be elaborated several decades later by Lenin, when

he stood Clausewitz "on his head."

All histories of diplomacy and the law of nations point to the

conclusion that modern Occidental war- and conflict-related

thought favors the rule of law and peace. However, they also

fully bear out Clausewitz' conclusion : "Peace seldom reigns

over all Europe, and never in all quarters of the world ." 16

The image of the world that is being rendered today by those

social and political scientists with a strong interest in war, peace

and conflict resolution is one of a global order of states that are

structurally alike in essence or destined to become so under the

impact of irresistible leveling forces . In the logic of this tight

and finite scheme, all international relations-including

belligerent confrontations-are seen as manifestations of

national interests that converge on three main unifying themes:

the survival of the state, the maintenance of the international

system and the avoidance of war . Most of the leading

educational texts, syllabuses, and gaming or simulation

exercises in the field are therefore elaborations of truths and

abstractions that the theoreticians have worked out as if with

one mind-and that they therefore seldom question. Thus, since

XXXIII
there is no essential difference between State A and State B,

there can be none between A's war and B's war.

This explains why conflicts and wars can be added up rather

simply to yield some grand total that in turn will point to another

universally valid, generally accepted proposition-a process of

fact-finding illustrated in the following passage by Robert

McNamara :

In the eight years through late 1966 alone there were no less than 164

internationally significant outbreaks of violence, each of them

specifically designed as a serious challenge to the authority or the very

existence of the government in question. Eighty-two different

governments were directly involved, and what is striking is that only

15 of the 164 significant resorts to violence were military conflicts

between two states, and not a single one of the 164 conflicts was a

formally declared war. Indeed, there has not been a formal declaration

of war anywhere in the world since World War 11 .

The planet is becoming a more dangerous place to live on not merely

because of a potential nuclear holocaust but also because of the large

number of de facto conflicts and because the trend of such conflicts is

growing rather than diminishing . At the beginning of 1958 there were

23 prolonged insurgencies going on around the world. As of February,

1966, there were 40. Further, the total number of outbreaks of violence

has increased each year : in 1958 there were 34; in 1965, there were

58 . 17

The exclusive reason for this increase in international

violence, we are told, is the obvious fact that so many new

states are still economically underdeveloped, a premise

evidently no longer subject to verification, as earlier

references in this paper have suggested . Again, no allowance

is made for the possibility that war-related phenomena are

also, perhaps even predominantly, aspects of locally prevalent

values, images, traditions and mental constructions . Indeed,

explorations of the ways of thought that make or do not make

for war, or of the meanings assigned to war and violence in

culturally different parts of the world, would quite logically be

out of place in the conceptually closed circuit of modern war

and peace studies ; for how can cultural diversity be perceived

XXXIv
if "culture" (or "civilization") is not accepted as a relevant

variable or factor?

The student embarking on war and peace studies today will

look in vain for rigorous analyses of Occidental, Oriental or

African philosophies, ideologies, myths and religions . Each

volume he consults is likely to contain scores of crossreferences to the works of other Western theorists of our era,

and scarcely any (in most cases none) to source materials that

would tell him how the Chinese or the Indians or the Persians

have related to war in the millennia preceding the present

moment. Missing, then, are referrals to the writing, for

example, of Han Fei Tzu and Mao Tse-tung ; to the

Mahabharata, which our contemporaries in India continue to

read with veneration; to the Koran, which is replete with

commentaries on warfare that are eternally relevant for

Muslims; or, in the case of Africa south of the Sahara, to the

memoirs of modern literate Africans, oral history and the field

work of anthropologists .

Anyone interested in uncovering the roots of war-related

policies and practices will thus search in vain among today's

works on political science or international relations, for access

to primary sources is not being stressed anymore. The student

in search of authenticity must look elsewhere in the academic

universe-notably, it is here suggested, to the humanities,

where the uniqueness of men, events and ideas is still

recognized and where clashing ideas on war can still be

disentangled. Furthermore, in the pursuit of this kind of

learning, he may come to accept the world as a "manifold of

civilizations" even as he continues to perceive it as a "manifold

of states ." 18

"Culture," or "civilization" if one prefers, has been variously

defined. Here it will be considered to be all that is fundamental

and enduring about the ways of a group ; that is to say, it

comprises those norms, values, institutions and modes of

thinking in a given society that survive change and remain

xxxv
meaningful to successive generations . This point is well

illustrated by Paul Verhaegen's discussion of the relation

between the "basic psychology" of an African people, on the

one hand, and the effects of "cultural transition," on the other.

Those characteristics are basic to a culture, he writes, that are

dominant in the bush and that remain obvious in even the most

Westernized Africans . 19 Similar formulations can be devised

for the Islamic realm, notably its Middle Eastern nucleus, India,

Southeast Asia, China, Japan and possibly Mongolian Central

Asia, including Tibet. Other areas in which distinct norms and

values have developed in counterpoint to those brought forth

in the West include the communist orbit of the Soviet Union

and the Latin American region .

Today, several factors combine in support of civilization as

the proper focal point of war research . As preceding comments

on the variegated forms of war and violence throughout the

modern world have suggested, the Occidental model of the state

has ceased to be a reliable indicator or measure of such

phenomena as international war and internal war. Indeed, a

survey of actually functioning power centers makes it doubtful

whether one can still legitimately view the nation-state as the

politically controlling, and hence unifying, organizational

norm in international relations . Observations such as these,

together with reflections on the conspicuous failure of recent

American war-related policies, imply rather that we have

entered an era in which the interacting, independent units are

so disparate that references to an "international order" are

invalid . These symptoms of the erosion of the state seem to

make it mandatory that we find other or additional ways to

determine the configuration of an alien society.

Civilization recommends itself in this respect because it is

more comprehensive as an ordering concept than the state : it

can cover a host of political formations-armed bands,

liberation fronts or empires; anarchies or despotisms ;

transterritorial commonwealths of commodity producers,
financiers or religionists ; as well as multinational political

parties . Next, also in contrast to the state, a civilization is more

enduring in time, even as it is usually less precisely defined in

space . And finally, civilization is today a more neutral reference

than the state because, contrary to the latter, it is not associated

with typically Occidental norms and values . In short, there

continues to be great truth in Alfred North Whitehead's remark

that a political system is transient and vulnerable by comparison

with the principles and forces of the society and culture that

have produced it . These principles and forces require explicit

recognition before the elements of the political system-in our

case, war-can be understood.

It is much harder for Americans than for other peoples to

accept such a worldview because the United States, almost by

definition, stands for the denial of cultural differences and

the neglect or irrelevancy of the past. America long ago

departed from the European tradition-inaugurated by

Herodotus when he explained the Persian Wars as a

confrontation between the rival civilizations of Europe and

Asia-and today is reluctant to differentiate between wars

fought within a culturally unified sphere and those between

societies of disparate cultures or idea systems . In fact, after

allowance is made for occasional romantic infatuations with

insurgencies and wars of liberation in Africa and Asia, it

appears that American suspicion of the role of ideas in

international relations and foreign -policymaking is so

widespread that few wars in either category are accepted as

reflecting a clash of ideas .

The voluminous literature on war in the traditional world

provides some contrasting perspectives on this age-old

human contrivance and, at the same time, yields explanations for the incidence and tolerance of war in each

non-Western region. The following brief summaries of

culturally and historically basic ideas about war are confined

XXXVII
to sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia

and China.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Since traditional Africa has not produced an organizational

form comparable to the Occidental state, "foreign relations"

have consisted in interaction among a number of differently

organized but self-sufficient units : tribes, clans, villages and

other subgroups or divisions . To the extent that so-called

empires, hieratic chiefdoms and kingdoms were merely

conglomerates of these communities, they were also the scenes

of "foreign relations" in which each socially cohesive group

was apt to pit itself against the other, even though the "other"

would appear to have been part of the "self" from the

non-African point of view. This state of affairs, along with the

absence of writing and other reliable communications, explains

why the radius of intercommunity relations has always been

very limited . Furthermore, no widely shared, regionally valid

Pan-African institutions for conducting intercommunity

relations-along the lines of the modern European states

system-could develop here, for each small community

projected its own social order onto the stage of what we call

foreign relations. Black Africa, however, is unified by its

culture and a mode of thinking not found elsewhere in the

world, and it should therefore not be surprising that we can

identify certain uniquely African dispositions with regard to

war and peace.

Ethnographers have found that warfare was endemic in all

regions of sub-Saharan Africa and that it did not elicit moral

qualms . In fact, resort to warfare was logical and necessary in

terms of certain deeply held beliefs . War, and organization for

war, thus assured the continuous identity of the group as it had

coalesced around its own ancestors, origin myths, customs and

rites . Moreover, warfare contributed to continual displacements

XXXVIII
and migrations, resulting in a lack of interest in strictly

territorial jurisdiction and thus inhibiting the evolution of a

reliable political structure on the order of the European state.

Furthermore, war and martial activities embodied the meaning

of manhood in tribal life and symbolized the workings of the

universe, which was envisioned throughout the continent as the

abode of constantly contending, essentially malevolent forces .

Two additional factors need be considered if the role

assigned to war and violence in this culture is to be appreciated

on its own terms . First, death was not personalized as it is in

thought systems that regard the individual as an entity

transcending the bounds of the community to which he belongs.

Second, death was not objectified as it is in the Western system

of causality : in the common African understanding, death was

always occasioned by superior, surreal causes, not by a physical

weapon; the paramount frame of reference in life was power,

particularly magical power, which was associated with

ancestral spirits, witchcraft or other supernational forces .

All traditional structures of African political organization,

whether associated with empires, kingdoms, chiefdoms,

"anarchies," villages, secret societies or sub rosa governments

based on fetishism, have been grounded firmly in the view

that death is an aspect of society rather than biography, and

that conflict, properly staged and manipulated, helps

maintain the mythic charter by which a community is ruled.

These motifs as well as their organic interaction have found

different local expressions, but in certain areas of

government-notably the succession to authority and the

allocation of power-the separate records converge on a

common pattern of institutionalized hostilities, intrigues and

internal wars . For example, since it was rare in Africa to find

rules that clearly indicated a single heir, succession usually

raised rival claimants, resulting in wars for the kingship after

an incumbent's death . Whether in the tribal societies of

southern Africa, the conquest states of the Interlacustrine

XXXIX
Bantus, the kingdoms of the savanna, or among the Mossi and

Yoruba in West Africajust a few of the recognized political

systems-ruling circles were rent by quarrels, jealousies and

intrigues that were expected to erupt in dynastic, fratricidal or

civil wars, and to lead to prolonged periods of anarchy, during

which the contest for power would be temporarily resolved.

Not only was this violence often preceded by

institutionalized regicide, but internal peace did not necessarily

follow once the issue of succession had been decided. Since

revolts by subordinate princes and chiefs were always expected

in East Africa's kingdoms, for example, potential rebels or

aspirants to power were routinely murdered or banished .

Violent internecine conflict was customary also in Nuba

country ; among the Nuer, the Kamba, the Masai, the Nandi and

other East African peoples; as well as among such territorial

groups as the Zulu, the Swazi and the Barotse in southern

Africa. Likewise, war was waged regularly by the central

governments of most of the imperial domains of West Africa,

in order to quell unruly behavior on the part of subordinate

regimes.

No agreement exists among specialists in African social

organization on just what constitutes rebellion, in which

circumstances one can speak of civil war, which episode is

properly described as a mere raid or which qualifies as

full-fledged aggression . There is general agreement, however,

on the proposition that peace was not regarded necessary for

the maintenance of the inner order in traditional Africa, that

conflict was allowed to express itself in violence, and that

warfare among component units of a community was accepted

as an organic part of the inner law-provided, of course, that it

was employed for purposes considered permissible in a given

society . But whether the allowable end was cattle, slaves,

women, vengeance or punishment, grazing or water rights,

aggrandizement, or the allocation or reshuffling of power, the

fact remains that violence has been endemic almost

XL
everywhere. Sanctioned by value and belief systems, violence

provided, in one form or another, the structural principles for

the education of men and the administration of society . Indeed,

one might justifiably conclude that internal war was more likely

to sustain than to disrupt existing organizational schemes .

Relations between socially or tribally united communities

reflect the same fundamental dispositions . Military power,

even when wielded by formidable armies, was thus always

closely associated with magical power; although concrete

rewards such as the capture of cattle or slaves were as prized in

the extended martial contest as in the limited engagement, it

was the sensation of success left by the investment of superior

power that mattered most. And success, again, savored of the

enjoyment of a situation in which the enemy of the day was

slain or routed and his habitat reduced to ruin . That is to say,

victory here was not controlled by expectations of permanent

aggrandizement, redemption of lost territories, the extension of

a way of life or-with a few exceptions-the installation of a

moral system. For those who fought, the end of war was war

itself.

All this was in strict accordance with the logic of nonliterate,

essentially behavioral thought, present-centered time concepts,

and the spatial characteristics of African societies . Shrewd

calculations of advantage are certainly not missing from the

historical records, and particular campaigns, such as the

nineteenth-century Ashanti wars, which culminated in the siege

of Kumasi, are known to have been planned most methodically .

But this sort of comprehensive, long-range planning was not

the rule, if only because the future was not seen as separate from

the present or the past, and because political identity did not

depend on territorial boundaries . Thus strategic thinking, if the

term is applicable at all, did not aim at the consolidation of

victory by rehabilitating devastated areas, integrating

conquered peoples or establishing definite frontiers .

XLI
The same ways of thought naturally obtained in defeat since

the vanquished were at one with the victors in their basic

understanding of the meaning of war in life . Generals might be

expected to commit suicide if they lost a battle and warriors

might have to be instantly dispatched if they returned home

without their spears, as was the custom among the Matabele,

but the governments for which they had fought were rarely

moved by the calamities of battle to refashion their defensive

posture or redesign their fundamental orientation . Not every

society was as totally confident, for example, as the Sukuma of

present-day Tanzania, who believed that a victorious enemy

could not defeat the spirits of the conquered group or alter their

enduring influence on the land, no matter how great the

devastation or loss . Yet all accepted with equanimity the ebb

and flow of endless war.

Today, Africans in all walks of life continue to be guided by

many of these traditional values and institutions, even as they

affirm new interests and commitments associated with the

lifestyle of the modern age. Intellectually persuasive syntheses

of the traditional and the new orders are still rare in African

politics . In fact, scholarly analyses of events throughout black

Africa (that is, coups d'etat, mutinies, guerrilla operations,

revolutions and civil wars) suggest that the two frames of

reference may not be easily reconcilable . As Aristide Zolberg

rightly notes, "values, norms and structures have survived to a

significant extent everywhere, even where their existence was

not legally recognized during the colonial era ." 21

The Middle East

Twentieth-century Jews and Arabs are probably more closely

tied to traditional religious beliefs than most other literate

peoples . Furthermore, their holy texts are different from other

sacred literature in an important way: they are not merely

intended to be depositories of religious truth, but also serve as
comprehensive manuals of instruction in all secular matters . In

other words, they are primary and definitive value-references

and major resources of normative thinking and policymaking

for their respective communities ; and in this general context,

one cannot read the Old Testament or the Koran and its

attendant Islamic traditions without being overwhelmed by the

prominence given to the subject of war .

According to the Old Testament, which is accepted by the

faithful not only as the official history of the Jews but also as

a timeless sanction or constitution for the establishment of a

Jewish state, there is only one Chosen People; all others are

subservient outcasts, subject if necessary to extermination . In

Isaiah, chapter 60, the tribal deity advises (in its most benign

mood) that "the sons of strangers shall build up thy walls

and their kings shall minister unto thee ." But elsewhere

(Deuteronomy 7, 12, 20; Joshua 1-3, 6, 8 ; Judges 21 ; II Kings

3 ; Psalm 135 ; and Isaiah 61), we find injunction after injunction

on how best to cast out, smite, utterly destroy and extirpate the

many "others," great and small, especially those in the region

adjoining the River Jordan.

In all the literature exhorting and ennobling war, nothing

comes to mind that is quite so chilling as these passages from

Deuteronomy, chapter 7 :

5 . But thus shall ye deal with them: ye shall destroy their altars, and

break down their images, and cut down their groves, and burn their

graven images with fire ;

6. For thou art a holy people unto the LORD thy God: the LORD

thy God hath chosen thee to be a special people unto himself, above all

people that are upon the face of the earth.

16 . And thou shalt consume all the people which the LORD thy God

shall deliver thee; thine eye shall have no pity upon them; neither shalt

thou serve their gods; for that will be a snare unto thee .

22. And the LORD thy God will put out those nations before thee

by little and little ; thou mayest not consume them at once, lest the beasts

of the field increase upon thee .

XLIII
23 . But the LORD thy God shall deliver them unto thee, and shall

destroy them with a mighty destruction, until they be destroyed.

24. And he shall deliver their kings into thine hand, and thou shalt

destroy their name from under heaven : there shall no man be able to stand

before thee, until thou hast destroyed them .

25 . The graven images of their gods shall ye burn with fire ; thou

shalt not desire the silver or gold that is on them, nor take it unto thee,

lest thou be snared therein : for it is an abomination to the LORD thy God.

26. Neither shalt thou bring an abomination into thine house, lest

thou be a cursed thing like it : but thou shalt utterly detest it, and thou

shalt utterly abhor it ; for it is a cursed thing.

These guidelines for methodical genocide are repeated in

Deuteronomy (chapters 12 and 20). With regard to the total

destruction of cities delivered by God's will and sword to his

people, we read : "Thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth :

But thou shalt utterly destroy them, namely, the Hittites, and

the Amorites, the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, the Hivites,

and the Jebusites; as the LORD thy God hath commanded thee"

(Deut. 20 :17) . The same divinely sanctioned policy is given

expression in II Kings, chapters 22 and 23, where King Josiah

is told to break down the enemy, reduce the land to desolation,

defile the sepulchers and impoverish all who refuse to

acquiesce in the rule of the Chosen Race, and again in Judges

21, where the Chosen are ordered to smite all, including women

and children, who do not join them.

Traditional Jewish attitudes toward war and its pursuit must

be seen in the context of Near Eastern culture as a whole:

throughout the long centuries of ancient history, few if any

nations differed from the Jews in their ideas about the conduct

of international relations. In other words, war, enslavement and

imperialism, unmitigated by considerations of "collective

security," "peaceful coexistence" or the "balance of power,"

combined to make up the real as well as the ideal or preferred

system.

In the vast Arab/Islamic domain of West Asia and North

Africa, war was idealized and institutionalized in many forms,

XLIV
notably in the jihad, or "holy war." Defined in one hadith

(tradition) as the "peak of religion," the jihad is part and parcel

of Koranic sacred law. In particular, it denotes the mandate

incumbent on each believer to prepare his way to paradise by

exerting all his power, including that of the sword, in the service

of Allah and the Islamic creed, which is universalist in contrast

to the ethnocentric Judaic faith . Consequently, one may view a

Muslim's entire life as "a continuous process of warfare,

psychological and political, if not strictly military," and

conclude that Islamic precepts advance a doctrine of permanent

war regardless of whether or not believers are actually engaged

in military activities .

22 And, in fact, as the power of the

Arabized and Islamized states declined, this doctrine became

largely dormant, leaving Muslims in a condition roughly

comparable to what is known in international law as a "state of

insurgency ."

In the context of normative thought, value orientation and

foreign-policymaking, then, war is a dominant motif in this

culture. Peace, by contrast, being associated with essentially

otherworldly, metaphysical concerns, has no overriding

positive meaning in temporal affairs, except perhaps as a

description of that time when the world will have become

Islamized. Pending this outcome of the historic struggle,

mankind is divided into the Realm of Peace, whose denizens

are engaged in rightful combat at the service of Allah, and the

Realm of War, which is the abode, by definition, of all

unbelievers regardless of their actual conduct or intentions . It

follows logically that diplomacy is viewed more readily as an

auxiliary to war, a device serving the cause of belligerence and

expansion, rather than an avenue leading toward peace.

Islamic theory grew out of and confirmed the lifestyle of the

Bedouin nomads, as shown so convincingly by the biography

of the Prophet, the Koran itself, and Charles Doughty's

masterful Travels in Arabia Deserta. The dominant masculine

image or heroic ideal in this harsh world was the warrior,

XLV
engaged in both great and petty ventures . Camel raids,

brigandage, attacks on the despised world of the sedentary and

the sown, tribal wars, far-flung military expeditions and, above

all, endless wanderings in a hostile environment-all this

epitomized the allure and excitement of life that was to

compensate for the stark and tedious task of eking out a

livelihood . What could peace on earth mean here except sheer

boredom, sterility and stagnation?

The political history of the Arabic-speaking peoples from the

seventh century to the present corroborates the value system

that inhabits their lifestyle and doctrine . Vast expanses of

the dar al-harb (Realm of War)-in Europe, Africa and

Asia-were conquered by force of arms to become integral

parts of the Islamic Realm of Peace. Furthermore, Islamic

administrations, civil and military, reinforced and perfected

their own understanding of the function of diplomacy,

borrowing heavily from the sophisticated "warrior diplomacy"

of the Persians and Byzantines . This type of statecraft relied on

psychological warfare, espionage and subversion in its

relentless pursuit of victory over neighboring lands and rulers.

In short, nowhere in this region was "peace" accepted as a

realizable goal in the conduct of international relations .

The inner order of the Realm of Peace, meanwhile, has also

been rent by continual violence and war, even though the ruling

idea-system calls for, indeed assumes, peace and unity . The

major source of this incongruity has been, and continues to be,

the absence of effective fundamental principles of political

organization . The caliphate, vaguely conceived by the

Prophet's successors, notably the learned ulema (that is, the

scholarly divines trained in Muslim law), as the exclusive,

indivisible administrative scheme for the governance of the

entire community of believers, actually never got off the

ground . Instead, commensurate with the swift extension of the

faith and culture, we have had multiple caliphates, sultanates

and emirates, competitive dynasties, ambitious and contentious

XLVI
aspirants to power, plots and counterplots, assassinations and

revolts .

The establishment by conquest of the Ottoman Caliphate in

1453 brought a respite in the divisiveness and anarchy, but its

dissolution in 1918-1919 has returned the Arabized Near

Eastern Muslims (Turks and Persians can draw from cultural

reserves in political organization that are not at the disposal of

the Arabs) to more familiar patterns of political thought and

action. Contemporary possessors of executive power are thus

always tempted to foment or condone violence and intrigue in

inter-Arab relations in order to protect their tenuous personal

positions or promote their particular dreams of a unity to come.

India

India has experienced the impact of the Middle East (as have

parts of Southeast Asia) in a variety of ways, most poignantly

perhaps in the fields of statecraft and international relations.

Northern India, after all, had been a satrapy of the Persian

Empire, and even more extensive portions of the subcontinent

were ruled for many centuries by Persianized Mongols . In

addition, Islam penetrated through diverse channels to find

political expression in the Sultanate of Delhi, the Mogul Empire

and, more recently, the Islamic republics of Pakistan and

Bangladesh . And yet, many prominent members of the

Anglicized elite continue to insist in their scholarly discussions

of India's political system that the pre-Islamic Hindu order is

still the principal influence, despite massive borrowings-first

from the Near East; then, in modern times, from Anglo-Saxon

Europe. One of the most ardent Indian nationalists, the late

diplomat and historian K. M. Panikkar, thus never tired of

reminding his contemporaries in the East and the West that "the

society described in the Mahabharata is not essentially different

from what holds its sway today in India," and that if the "Indian

administration of today is analysed to its bases, the doctrines

XLVII
and practices of Chanakya [or Kautilya] will be found to be still

in force." 23

Kautilya's Arthasastra, to which Panikkar refers, has been

acclaimed as the greatest piece of literature surviving from the

Maurya dynasty (322-185 B .c .?) . Although other treatises in the

same genre exist, the Mauryan chancellor's text is considered

exemplary because it explains in systematic fashion how

Hindus must think and behave when they are engaged in

government, economics and foreign relations. In all these

activities, summarily described as the domain of artha (defined

by Kautilya as that science which treats of the means of

acquiring and maintaining the earth), winning is all that counts .

Artha norms are thus carefully set apart in Hindu logic and

metaphysics from the codes of conduct mandatory in the pursuit

of the three other major ends of life : namely, kama (pleasure),

dharma (duty, especially as it relates to caste regulations) and

moksa (the assiduous quest for release from life and its

illusions) . In government and foreign relations, however, the

precepts of artha are inextricably enmeshed with the dharma

obligations of the warrior caste, for this caste supplies the kings

and other secular officers of state, including the armed forces .

The fundamental question-how should men be

governed?-was answered in traditional Indian thought and

practice by unqualified recourse to danda, the rod of

punishment. According to the theory of coercive state authority,

the king must wield danda if he is to enjoy prosperity and

acquire not only this world but also the one to come . The

Dharmasastras, or Books of the Law, notably the remarkable

compendium assigned to Manu; 24 the Arthasastras ; the

Mahabharata (India's great national epic) ; and the popular,

didactic beast-fables (the best known collection of these

being the Pancatantra) thus converge on the doctrine of

matsyanyaya-the Principle or Law of the Fishes-in

accordance with which the king must enforce his government and punish those who deserve it, lest the strong torment

XLVIII
the weak as fish are fried on a pike or as in water they devour

each other. In deference to the same pessimistic view of human

nature, the royal administration relied on espionage as its

major agency . As explained in the Mahabharata, a kingdom

has its roots in spies and secret agents ; therefore, as the wind

moves everywhere and penetrates all created beings, so

should the king penetrate everywhere by sending his spies to

report disloyalty among subjects, ministers and heirs .

Danda, then, rules all; danda is awake while others are

asleep; and danda insists that warriors fight to acquire spiritual

merit. These truths are relayed by all the sacred texts (which

continue to be widely read), but most eloquently by Krishna's

discourse with Arjuna in the Bhagavadgita section of the

Mahabharata. The exchange takes place immediately before the

great battle at Kurukshetra. We read that Arjuna, on reaching

the battlefield, was so distressed at the thought of having to

fight and kill revered members of his family, whom he saw

ranged on the opposite side, that he resolved to forsake war.

Krishna then turned him from this resolution by reminding him

of the inexorable law of his caste : a ksatriya (member of the

warrior caste) must fight and kill his enemy, and the attainment

of victory requires total concentration on the task at hand,

including total disregard of other moral or emotional restraints .

The same moral teachings have been passed on through the

centuries by other sages and authorities on artha and

rajadharma (royal duties) . The king is created to commit cruel

acts, we learn from Bhishma, legendary guru in the

Mahabharata; whereas ordinary men, not made of such stern

stuff, seldom succeed in worldly affairs. Like a snake that

devours creatures living in holes, the earth swallows up the king

who does not fight and the Brahman who does not go abroad

(for study).

The history of interkingdom relations before and after the

Muslim conquests faithfully reflects the dictates of the artha

philosophy ; its annals speak of endemic anarchy and warfare .

XLIX
True to the law, inequality was postulated as the everlasting

condition of political existence, power as the only measure of

political worth, and war as the normal activity of the state . On

the authority, again, of the Mahabharata:

Might is above right; right proceeds from might. . . . Right is in the

hands of the strong. . . . Everything is pure that comes from the strong .

. . . When thou findest thyself in a low state, try to lift thyself up,

resorting to pious as well as to cruel actions . Before practicing morality

wait until thou art strong . . . . If men think thee soft, they will despise

thee. [Book XII 134 :5-7, 2-3 ; 140:38; 141 :62; 56:21] .

A king or politician who has no power is a conquered king, the

Arthasastra tells us, and in such a lamentable state of inferiority he

is reduced to peace-defined in the Hindu world as stagnation .

Each king, then, was to chart his course of aggression and

withdrawal scientifically and realistically. He was to view his

own domain as the center or target in the mandala (a design

symbolic of the universe) of concentric rings of states . His

immediate neighbors were by definition his worst enemies ; the

kings in the second circle were to be viewed as natural friends .

The third ring included his enemy's friends, while the fourth

was composed of the friends of his allies, and so forth. The

science of artha instructed the king to be particularly careful

when he measured his distance from the dominant state-that

is, the state ruled by the king who had the capacity to fight

without allies and who was known therefore as the "neutral"

king.

Neither the mandala nor the particular positions and relations

abstracted from it were ever to be trusted completely, however.

An arsenal of intelligence tricks and diplomatic techniques,

together with a standing and alert army, were regarded as the

best security. Artha taught the king how to bribe his ally or

enemy by gifts, promises and decorations ; how to lull him into

a sense of false security through conciliation, negotiation and

other forms of appeasement, while systematically preparing a

military attack on him. Simultaneously, he was of course
expected to sow dissension in the frontier provinces of his

enemy, in order to soften resistance when he was ready to stage

the final armed invasion. In fact, the skills of intrigue were more

highly prized by theoreticians and rulers than was material

power, as this passage from the Arthasastra illustrates :

He who has the eye of knowledge and is acquainted with the science

of polity, can with little effort make use of his skill for intrigue and

can succeed by means of conciliation, and other strategic means, by

spies and chemical appliances in over-rZaaching even those kings who

are possessed of enthusiasm and power.

Under such general headings as "Government Based on

Deceit," "The Administration of Subversion" and "The Work

of an Invader," no subject is given more detailed and devoted

attention than that of espionage and "dirty tricks ." Brahmans,

widows, individuals trained to pose as cripples, saucemakers,

dwarfs, eunuchs, courtesans posing as high-class ladies, and

merchants are only some of those listed as potential spies or

experts in the art of infiltration and sabotage; and complete

instructions are provided for their specialized training and

deployment. The most favored and talked about category of

personnel in this conspiratorial system is that comprising the

"shaven heads," ascetics, monks and holy men who have

license to conspire and kill in the holy places, and who know

how to foment rebellions among the enemy and create other

"annoyances in the rear." In "The Battle of Intrigue," it is

interesting to note, the Arthasastra makes special mention of

"fiery spies"-Asia's earliest guerrillas-who conceal

"weapons, fire and poison" under their various disguises .

Trained "to take advantage of peace and friendship with the

enemy," they were charged with the elimination of supply

stores, granaries and commanders-in-chief .

To summarize, war was the normal state of affairs in Indian

interstate relations until the British unified and pacified the

subcontinent . But this episode of Occidental imperialism was

a mere moment in the Asian reckoning of time . Hence, many

Ll
thoughtful and knowledgeable Indians express doubt whether

the alien rule of law, including international law, will or should

prevail over traditional law.

Southeast Asia

In the course of the fascinating process of cultural diffusion

known as the "Indianization" of Asia, the principles of artha

penetrated much of Southeast Asia . One might even

characterize the phenomenon as "cultural imperialism," at least

if one were to adopt the parlance currently used by some to

describe the impact of European/American culture on the rest

of the world. This vast region, which now encompasses Burma,

Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, North and South Vietnam,

Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, was

previously dotted with separate kingdoms, each remarkable in

its commitment to deeply rooted indigenous beliefs as well as

in its talent for integrating appropriate motifs from Hindu,

Buddhist, Confucian or Islamic idea-systems .

In pre-nineteenth-century times, the most important

regionally unifying themes were the cults of the devaraja, or

god-king, who could do no wrong so long as he was successful,

and the acceptance of rebellion, subversion, war and the threat

of war as a normal part of everyday life . Scholars specializing

in Southeast Asian history have pointed out that political

identity was nowhere a function of secure frontiers, concrete

material power, a unifying legal system, or even legitimate

royal succession ; rather, it depended on an individual ruler's

compliance with the cosmo-magical "constitution" of his

realm. What mattered in this context-whether in Java,

Cambodia, Laos, Thailand-Siam or Burma-was physical

possession of the capital, the palace and symbolically

significant royal regalia; and these sources of prestige could be

rightfully seized by cunning or by such acts of violence as the

murder of an incumbent prince .
The traditional coexistence of the principles of divine

kingship and insurrection explains why the usurper was entitled

to obedience and respect, why the idea of the state was

associated in the final analysis with the successful ruling

personality, and why these kingdoms were locked for centuries

in combat of one type or another. Full-scale wars, limited

invasions or guerrilla fighting thus marked relations among the

rulers of Thailand, Burma, Laos and Khmer-Cambodia, as well

as between those of Java and Sumatra. Kingdoms rose and fell,

and empires crumbled, only to be resurrected later in some other

form . Cambodia, for example, was once part of a Vietnamese

empire; the Mekong Delta was constantly in contention ; Assam

was part of an aggressive Burmese state ; and the Khmers,

probably the most martial of all these warrior-peoples,

tirelessly staked out their claim to what is today Burma. While

most principalities and empires were racked by domestic

rebellion and subversion, some (notably in present-day

Indonesia) are reputed, in modern nationalist texts, to have had

vassals as far afield as Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and

Malaysia . Other allegedly unified kingdoms-Laos and Burma,

in particular-were actually conglomerates of separate,

warring states .

In this region, then, as in the Middle East and Africa south

of the Sahara, internal war merged with external war to form

intricate webs of conflict and violence. Hallowed by myth,

sanctioned by religion, accepted by the people, and celebrated

in legend, art and architecture, this theme has been oft repeated

in recent history-in the 1933 "Royalist Rebellion" of Siam,

the reinstallation in Burma of the traditional Buddhist trappings

of power politics, the elaborate staging by Indonesia's Sukarno

of confrontations with Malaysia and the Philippines, and the

complex, ongoing interplay of animosities among Cambodia,

Thailand and Vietnam.

To be sure, one can point to a few nonintervention agreements; for example, in the twelfth century an accord was

LIII
concluded between Tonkin and the Indianized state of Champa.

(It was conceived, by the way, as a reinsurance device that

would permit Champa to capture and destroy with impunity the

temple of Angkor.) But here, as elsewhere in southern Asia,

enmity remained the norm in interkingdom relations . This was

true even when China's persistently aggressive policies could

have been checked by the organization of collective security

measures; instead, each kingdom usually offered separate,

ferocious resistance when Chinese forces interfered too

blatantly. In short, peace, as a value, had no place either in the

metaphysical order of ideas from which these societies derived

their identities or in the intricate, artistic processes of statecraft

that issued from the royal palaces .

Two thoughts, in particular, impose themselves as one

follows the relentless seesaw movements of attack, victory and

defeat that have passed like the forces of nature over this

culturally complex area. First, in the context of comparative

history and religion, there seems to be no doubt that recourse

to warfare and palace revolution was hallowed as an integral

principle of the ruling cosmic order. And second, this ancient

civilization has indeed been the theater in which numerous rival

ideas about war-emanating, above all, from India and

China-have clashed throughout recorded time . With respect

to modern world politics, meanwhile, it is as irresistible as it is

ironic to note that American ideas about war were thoroughly

discredited precisely here.

China

The Pax Sinica that in recent decades has been descending

on Tibet and elsewhere in Central Asia, on the Himalayan

region of the Indian subcontinent, and on parts of Southeast

Asia is a function both of traditional Chinese statecraft and of

Mao Tse-tung's adaptations of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism to

the needs of revolutionary China. Contrary to the view held in

LIV
some American intellectual circles, there is no gulf of

discontinuity 28 between the old and the new China when it

comes to the politics of war and peace.

With respect to ancient China, as with India, Westerners have

long pleased themselves in imagining a spiritually superior

civilization, anchored in Confucianism and Taoism, in which

men shunned violence and all things uncouth, if only because

their attention was riveted on etiquette, sincerity, civility,

humanism and the search for harmony . Just why such exalted

views of Oriental society should have become so fixed in the

Western mind may well be a question that only ethnopsychiatrists can answer as they become adept at dealing with

the symptoms of pathology in intercultural relations . Suffice it

to say, "[T]here was never a Taoist State as conceived by Chuang

Tsu, nor a Confucian State as conceived by Mencius ." 29 Indeed,

the source materials-which have long been available in

excellent translations-teach something else entirely : namely,

that China, whatever its geographic configuration and official

ideology, has traditionally depended heavily on a judicious

investment of war effort, both at home and abroad .

Ping-ti Ho, an authority on Confucian China, and Lucian W.

Pye thus agree that the Chinese state has always derived its

ultimate power from the army-a circumstance that has largely

predetermined its authoritarian character from the days of

empire to the rule of Mao Tse-tung. 30 History also instructs us

that dynasties usually came to power through armed force ; that

revolts-and they were commonplace-were staged and

smashed by military means ; that the science of besieging walled

cities was highly developed even in very early times ; 31 and that

the conduct of all these military operations was organically

linked not only to the perfection of weaponry but also, and more

importantly, to such official nonmilitary pursuits as the

cultivation of crops, the organization of hydraulic works, and

the building of walls-occupations without which war could

not have proceeded as successfully as it did .

32

LV
War and agriculture, in fact, have consistently been viewed

in China as two fundamental, mutually dependent occupations,

perhaps never more so than in the Epoch of the Warring States

(ca. 450-221 B.c .) and in the Maoist Period .

Accounts from the earlier period can thus be cited to the

effect that successive generations of Chinese were decimated

by war with methodical regularity, that breathing spaces were

allowed only so that the peasant armies might be replenished

after having been cut to pieces, and that the army was made to

labor on public projects and "in the countryside" when not

campaigning.

All-under-Heaven, which consisted of numerous separate

provinces, was thus in total disarray during the Epoch of the

Warring States ; big states ate up lesser ones as systematically

as silkworms eat mulberry leaves . Yet China-her contours

forever indeterminate-survived mainly, it appears, because

the art of war had here reached a mature form by the beginning

of the fourth century B .C . By this time, Samuel Griffith notes,

the Chinese possessed weapons not at the disposal of other

societies and were absolute masters of offensive and defensive

tactics and techniques that would have enabled them to cause

Alexander the Great a great deal more trouble than did the

Greeks, the Persians or the Indians.

33

All Chinese schools of thought accepted the idea of war,

usually as part of the fa dimension of government, which

existed to supplement what rule by benevolence (li) could not

accomplish. As Arthur Waley explains, the duty to punish badly

ruled states, or to chastise unruly barbarians on the frontiers of

the Middle Kingdom, was emphasized consistently by the

Confucians and was acknowledged also by their rivals, the

Mohists. 34 Just as the principle of filial piety could rightfully

be enforced by the killing or mutilation of offspring who

resisted paternal guidance, so might the art of persuasion in the

community of unequal states be supplemented by the rod of

war. In contrast to the domain of internal and family affairs,

LVI
however, for which legal codes were periodically promulgated

by the imperial keeper of Heaven's Mandate, there was no

international law and no court or arbitral commission to

indicate which state was "badly ruled," or to compose

differences impartially . The principle of the "righteous war"

thus usually served as a moral cloak for open acts of aggression,

which often occurred after atrocity stories had been spread

concerning the society singled out for punishment.

The theoreticians and generals who perfected this side of

Chinese statecraft, and who then succeeded in bringing about

the first unification of China in 221 B .c ., are collectively known

as the Legalists or Realists . The essence of their science,

discernible as early as the seventh century B .c ., but which is seen

fully developed in the fourth and third centuries in the writings

of Sun Tzu, Lord Shang and Han Fei Tzu, is the uncompromising recognition that war and organization for war are the

mainstays of government. "How to get the people to die" is the

problem that continually occupies the Realists . According to

this school of martial thought, it is a misfortune for a prosperous

country not to be at war; for in such a state of peace the country

will breed the "Six Maggots ." In The Book of Lord Shang, the

parasites that attack in peacetime are enumerated : "rites and

music, odes and history, moral culture and virtue, filial piety

and brotherly love, sincerity and faith, chastity and integrity,

benevolence and righteousness, criticism of the army and being

ashamed of fighting . If there are these . . . things, the ruler is

unable to make people farm and fight, and then the state will

be so poor that it will be dismembered.",35 Vagabonds and draft

dodgers, merchants and artisans who deal in nonessential

goods, scholars who spread doctrines at variance with Legalist

teachings-these are the "Vermin of the State," we learn from

Han Fei Tzu. 36 As such, they must be unmercifully quashed so

that the people can be kept in ignorance and awe while the king

extends the frontiers of the state.

LVII
Han Fei Tzu's and Lord Shang's admonitions-that the ruler

must make certain everyone within his borders understands

warfare, that there can be no private exemptions from military

service, and that the people must be concentrated on

warfare-were faithfully followed by China's first unifier, Shih

Huang Ti . The notorious Burning of the Books in 213 B.c. was

thus conceived and executed as "the logical last step in

unification," as Derk Bodde puts it, 37 and it may now be seen

as the precedent for numerous other "cultural revolutions" in

imperial and Maoist China.

From time to time, subsequent generations of Chinese

scholars have professed to be shocked by these doctrines, but

there has never been an age when the martial classics, especially

the works of Sun Tzu and Han Fei Tzu, have not been read . Not

only did imperial edicts in later dynasties prescribe the study

of these works for the aspirant to an army commission, but Sun

Tzu's Art of War alone stimulated more than fifty commentaries

and interpretative studies between 1368 and 1628 . Western

nations were long ignorant of the treatise's existence, and when

it did become known in the West, the reception was one of

neglectful scorn . Japan, by contrast, took Sun Tzu's work most

seriously, as did Russia after the Mongol-Tatars brought it

there .

In China proper, The Art of War continues to be considered

a classic to this very day.

38 Conceptually, Maoist strategic

doctrine is closely related to the thought of the great master,

and Mao Tse-tung's most elegant maxims and most poetic

metaphors-which may be found in Strategic Problems of

China's Revolutionary War, On Guerrilla Warfare and On the

Protracted War-recall those formulated in The Art of War.

Indeed, reflection on the continuity of Chinese history and ideas

about war lead to the conclusion that the Sinification of

Leninism could proceed as swiftly and smoothly as it did

primarily because of the pervasiveness of Legalism .
Legalist and Maoist ideas converge ; they do not meet by

chance . And Maoist elites make use of Legalist references

deliberately, not in a casually metaphorical way . The struggle

between the Legalists, openly identified today with progressive

forces in China's past, and the followers of Confucius, who

stand for all that is reactionary and regressive in the country's

affairs, is thus mentioned in the most improbable contexts . For

example, a lengthy stricture on the seemingly mundane subject

of traffic safety (broadcast in September 1974 from Haikow,

Hainan Island) begins as follows :

In order to raise traffic-safety work in Hainan to a new level, it is

necessary first of all to do a good job of criticism of Lin [Piao] and

Confucius . It is necessary to study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung

thought seriously and unfold activities to evaluate [sic] the Legalists

and criticize the Confucianists.

And nothing in Chinese intellectual history suggests that the

Chinese communist digestive system would be overburdened by

this governmental linkage of traffic-safety work to criticism of Lin

and Confucius. After all, as one of the foremost students of Chinese

military, political and psychological strategy has pointed out, the

present system is only the latest manifestation in more than 2,000

years of Chinese strategic thought-a continuity found nowhere

in the West. 4o

Chinese commissars, however faithfully schooled in

Leninism-Maoism, can thus be expected to use traditional

military philosophy to justify both their worldview and the roles

assigned them in warfare and society. 41 The easy congruence of

these frames of reference is nowhere more impressively

demonstrated than in Mao Tse-tung's own writings . Here,

elaborate expositions of communist dialectics and discourses on

the tactical and strategic doctrines employed during the

revolutionary war mingle freely with allusions to Mao's favorite

classical novels, traditional boxing precepts, the rules of the

ancient game of wei-ch' i (in Japanese, go) and, above all, to the

LIX
writings of Sun Tzu, the most esteemed of the Legalist

philosophers of war. A few illustrations must suffice.

The Maoists and the Legalists share a militarist, militant

vocabulary-one that conveys the unqualified thesis that

organization, whether of the village or the world, is war

organization, to be established and maintained by the same

tactical and strategic rules that apply to the battlefield . Mao

thus writes : "In China the main form of struggle is war and

the main form of organisation is the army . Other forms, like

organisations and mass struggles are also extremely important

. . . but they are all for the sake of war.",42 The pervasiveness

of this conviction explains the stress consistently placed by

Legalist and Maoist alike on the need to create agromilitary

communes and to maintain rural base areas under strict military

control. It also explains the striking concurrence of certain

poetic metaphors: "The people are like water, and the army is

like fish," Mao writes, and the tactics of Chinese statecraft

"constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of war." The

challenge, as Mao sees it, is "to drown the enemy in the ocean

of a people's war . . . [to] lure him into the deep," 43 just as it

was when Sun Tzu wrote:

Now the shape of an army resembles water. Take advantage of the.

enemy's unpreparedness ; attack him when he does not expect it ; avoid

his strength and strike his emptiness, and like water, none can oppose

you. . . .

Just as water adapts itself to the conformation of the ground, so in war

one must be flexible.

44

Whoever or wherever the enemy is, says Mao, he must be

moved "to help in his own destruction," or, as the party

chairman puts it elsewhere, he must contribute to his own

encirclement. Eventually, "a worldwide net will be formed

from which the fascist monkeys can find no escape." 45 Just as

"tunneling operations"-vividly described in Sun Tzu's and

Mao's manuals-are designed to undermine the physical

foundations of the enemy's military position, so are

LX
psychological offensives meant to subvert his moral and

intellectual bases. Confuse the enemy's leaders ; if possible

drive them insane, advised Sun Tzu . Costly battles would then

become unnecessary. And among the techniques employed to

achieve these ends, none has received so much careful

elaboration in Legalist and Maoist strategy as the art of

dissimulation, simulation and deception . Indeed, as Scott

Boorman notes, this concept of stratagem goes far beyond mere

attempts to outwit the enemy : it involves the much more

sophisticated task of directly manipulating his perception of

reality, particularly the values he attributes to various outcomes

of the conflict . Sun Tzu's exhortation to "hit the enemy's

mind" has thus traditionally been viewed as the prerequisite of

victory .

The Legalist master's axiom that "war is based on deception" 47

has been paraphrased often by Mao Tse-tung, who also

advocates the intricate, indirect approaches to successful

combat and maneuvering outlined in The Art of War. Mao's

instructions to guerrillas, for example-that they must be as

cautious as virgins and as quick as rabbits, mobile and forever

changing in appearance-are prefigured in some of Sun Tzu's

verses, notably those dealing with offensive strategy and the

use of spies and double agents . Furthermore, Sun Tzu's rule

that the enemy must be deceived by "creating shapes" or by

concealing one's own shape from him is paralleled in Mao's

commitment to the consummate skill of creating "illusions" :

Illusions and inadvertence may deprive one of superiority and the

initiative . Hence, deliberately to create illusions for the enemy and

then spring surprise attacks upon him is a means . . . of achieving

superiority and seizing the initiative . What are illusions? `Even the

woods and bushes on Mount Pakung look like enemy troops'-this is

an example of illusion. And `making a noise in the east while attacking

the west' is a way of creating illusions for the enemy . . . . It is therefore

extremely important . . . to seal off his information . . . . keeping the

enemy in the dark . . . and thus laying the objective basis for his

illusions and inadvertence . We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have

LXI
no use for his stupid scruples about benevolence, righteousness and

morality in war. In order to win victory we must try our best to seal

the eyes and the ears of the enemy, making him blind and deaf, and to

create confusion in the minds of the enemy commanders, driving them

distracted .

48

History suggests that the fundamental ideas in a given

civilization are often conveyed better by homo ludens-"man

the game-player"-than by "man the theory-maker." In China,

the idea of war is eloquently expressed in wei-ch' i, the game of

strategy favored by Chinese statesmen and literati from the

early Han dynasty to modern times. 49 Quite unlike the

Occidental game of chess, in which the goal is total victory

through the capture of a single figure, wei-ch' i involves a

protracted attempt to extend control slowly over dispersed

territory . Play is diffused, and the similarity between this

pastime and Maoist guerrilla warfare is quite obvious . The

basic strategy in wei-ch'i is encirclement and counterencirclement-all aimed at setting up spheres of influence

within enemy territory in order to undermine the opponent

gradually by attacks from within . Maoist tactics of "enclosing"

or "forming" territory (in the psychological as well as

geographic sense) are thus readily comparable to what counts

in wei-ch' i. Chairman Mao explains :

Thus the enemy and ourselves each have imposed two kinds of

encirclement on the other, resembling in the main a game of weich' is

campaigns and battles between us and the enemy are comparable to

the capturing of each other's pieces, and the enemy's strongholds . . .

and our guerrilla base areas . . . are comparable to the blank spaces

secured on the board.

50

In the Maoist theory of insurgency, as in wei-ch' i, time is

long, the grid is large and warfare is continuous, shifting from

one sub-board to the next . In either case, success in combat

hinges squarely on abiding by Sun Tzu's rule :

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will

never be in peril .

51

LX11
Or, if one prefers to be up-to-date, by observing Mao

Tse-tung's dictum:

. . . war is nothing supernatural, it is one of the things in the world that

follow the determined course of their development; hence, Sun Tzu's

law, "know your enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a

hundred battles without disaster," is still a scientific truth .

52

IV

The foregoing reflections on war and the clash of ideas

support certain general propositions in the fields of

international relations and foreign-policymaking .

(1) There are different cultures in the world. Consequently,

there are different modes of thinking, value systems and forms

of political organization .

(2) Within a given society, norms, normative ideas, and

notions about what is normal evolve from a continuous

interaction between the ruling value system, on the one hand,

and the society's perception of social and political reality, on

the other.

(3) A society is virile and effective if it can count on stable

patterns of perception, judgment and action . If, by way of

contrast, the interaction between the commitment to certain

values and the common perception of reality is seriously

disturbed, the normative system becomes unreliable ; in such

circumstances, the society is apt to be morally confused and

politically ineffective.

(4) For any society, success in the conduct of international

relations turns on two characteristics : (a) confidence in the

norms and values that control the inner order of the society and

(b) accurate perception of the world in which the national

interest must be defined and furthered. Failure ensues when

confidence in the nation's integrity is eroded and when the

vision of the international environment becomes defective.

LXIII
(5) In the multicultural environment of the twentieth century,

foreign-policymakers must recognize and analyze multiple,

distinct cultures as well as political systems that differ from

each other significantly in their modes of rational and

normative thought, their value orientations, and their dispositions in foreign affairs .

(6) The fundamental foreign policy-related themes running

through the histories of sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East,

India, Southeast Asia and China converge on conflict and

divisiveness as norm-engendering realities . The evidence

shows, in particular, that peace is neither the dominant value

nor the norm in foreign relations and that war, far from being

perceived as immoral or abnormal, is viewed positively .

(7) This broad concurrence of non-Western traditions stands

in marked contrast to the preferences registered in modern

Western societies . It is also at odds with the priorities officially

established in the charters of the United Nations and affiliated

international organizations . To the extent, then, that the United

Nations is supposed to reflect universally valid norms, it is a

misrepresentation of reality . And insofar as the United Nations

was conceived as a norm-creating agency, it has been

unsuccessful, particularly with respect to the incidence of war.

What is normal in world politics should in these conditions have

been inferred pragmatically from the facts .

The challenge of understanding the multifaceted nature of

modern warfare has not been met by the academic and political

elites of the United States . This failure in the perception of

reality has been aggravated by a widespread acquiescence in

essentially irrational trends-the inclinations, namely, to

dissociate values from facts, to treat values as if they were

norms, and to assume that privately or locally preferred values

are also globally valid norms. These intellectual developments

have contributed not only to many recent foreign-policy errors

but also to widespread uncertainties about America's role in

world affairs . They also suggest that the United States has

LXIV
begun to resemble Don Quixote : like the Knight of the

Mournful Countenance, it is fighting windmills and losing its

bearings in the real world .

Notes

1 . Elizabeth Converse, "The War of All Against All : A Review of The

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1957-1968," Journal of Conflict Resolution

(hereafter cited as JCR), December 1968, pp. 471-532 .

2. Ibid., p. 479.

3. Chadwick F. Alger, "Trends in International Relations Research:

Scope, Theory, Methods, and Relevance," in Norman D. Palmer, editor, A

Design for International Relations Research: Scope, Theory, Methods, and

Relevance (Philadelphia : The American Academy of Political and Social

Science, Monograph No. 10, October 1970), pp. 7-28 . Also see Philip P.

Everts, "Developments and Trends in Peace and Conflict Research,

1965-1971 : A Survey of Institutions," JCR, December 1972, pp. 477-510.

Everts shows (p. 499) that "Peace research itself," "United Nations

problems" and "International organization" scored highest as research topics

(67%, 66%, 65%, respectively) . Cf. Berenice A. Carroll, "Peace Research :

The Cult of Power," ibid., pp. 585-616 : "If there is any distinguishing

common feature among the highly varied works in the field of peace

research, it is an avowed commitment to `peace' ." (p. 599.) Carroll's remarks

on "conceptions of power" are particularly interesting .

4. See Converse . Also Norman A. Bailey, "Toward a Praxeological

Theory of Conflict," ORBIS, Winter 1968, pp. 1081-1112. Further see

Clinton F. Fink, "Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social

Conflict," JCR, December 1968, pp. 412-460. Fink defines social conflict

as "any social situation or process in which two or more social entities are

linked by at least one form of antagonistic psychological relation or at least

one form of antagonistic interaction." (p. 456 .) For another flexible

approach, see Robert A. LeVine, "Anthropology and the Study of Conflict:

Introduction," JCR, March 1961, pp . 3-15. LeVine distinguishes among

intrafamily, intracommunity, intercommunity and intercultural conflict, and

points out that there are pervasive conflict types that spread to several levels .

5. Converse, pp. 476-477 .

6. Jessie Bernard, American Community Behavior: An Analysis of

Problems Confronting American Communities Today (New York: Holt,

Rinehart & Winston, 1949), p. 106. For an early commentary critical of

conflict theory, see Raymond Mack and Richard C. Snyder, "The Analysis

LXV
of Social Conflict: Toward an Overview and Synthesis," JCR, June 1957,

pp . 212-248 .

7. Converse, p . 479; Alger, p. 13 .

8. See above, notes 1-4.

9 . "U.S . Urged to Cut South Korean Aid : Group Calls for a Protest on

Seoul's `Inhumanity'," New York Times, July 15, 1974.

10. See the scholarly surveys of the literature on war and conflict cited

previously .

11 . Hans J . . Morgenthau, "International Relations : Quantitative and

Qualitative Approaches," in Palmer, p . 70 .

12. Elton B . McNeil, editor, The Nature ofHuman Conflict (Englewood

Cliffs, N .J. : Prentice-Hall, 1965).

13 . Martin Wight, "Why Is There No International Theory?" in Herbert

Butterfield and Martin Wight, editors, Diplomatic Investigations : Essays in

the Theory of International Politics (London : Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp.

17-34.

14 . Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Including the Law of

Nature and of Nations (Washington: Walter Dunne, Publisher, 1901);

translated by A. C . Campbell; Book I, Chap. 2, pp. 4, 8; Book 11, Chap . 1,

p. 2 ; Book III : Chap. l, p. 6 ; Chap . 8, p. l ; Chap. 21, p . l ; Chap. 25, p. 1 .

15. Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace : De jure belli ac pacis

(New York: Classic Club, 1949); translated by Louise Ropes Loomis ; Book

III, Chap. 21, p. 1 .

16. Karl von Clausewitz, On War (New York: Modern Library, 1943) ;

translated by O. J . Matthijs Jolles ; Book I, Chap. 8, p. 57 .

17. Robert S . McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office

(New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 145 .

18 . See Harold D . Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, a new edition

with afterthoughts by the author (New York: Viking Press, 1960), p. 240 ff .,

for a discussion of the state as a "manifold of events ."

19 . Paul Verhaegen, "Study of the African P6rsonality in the Belgian

Congo," in F. R. Wickert, editor, Readings in African Psychology from

French Language Sources (East Lansing, Mich. : Michigan State University

Press, 1967), pp. 242-248 .

20. For an extended discussion of the nature of civilization and

intercultural relations, and of the historical impact of war on the identity of

particularly significant cultures, see my "Civilizations Under Stress:

Reflections on Cultural Borrowing and Survival," Virginia Quarterly

Review, Winter 1975, pp. 1-18 .

21 . Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New

States of Tropical Africa," American Political Science Review, March 1968,

p. 70 ff. My own analysis of African orientations to war and conflict is set

LXVI
forth in Conflict in Africa : Concepts and Realities (Princeton, N.J . :

Princeton University Press, 1976) .

22. Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law ofIslam (Baltimore, Md. :

The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955); pp. 55 ff., 62 ff., 144 ff.

23. K . M. Panikkar, A Survey of Indian History (Bombay : Asia

Publishing House, 1954), pp . 2, 29.

24. The Books of the Law and the later didactic portions of the

Mahabharata may be taken to represent the post-Mauryan Brahmanic

renascence. Miiller dates this code later than the fourth century A.D. ; Buhler

places it in the second century.

25 . Upendra N. Ghoshal, A History of Indian Political Ideas: The

Ancient Period and the Period of Transition to the Middle Ages (London:

Oxford University Press, 1966), pp . 188 ff, 235 .

26. B . Shamasastry, editor, Kautilya's Arthasastra (Mysore : Sri

Raghuveer Press, 1951), Book IX, Chap. 1, p. 368 .

27. But see Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: John F.

Kennedy, 1962 (Washington : GPO, 1963), pp. 453-454, for the text of a

speech in which this interaction of different ideas about war was intimated,

albeit faintly.

28 . See, for example, John K. Fairbank, "China's World Order : The

Tradition of Chinese Foreign Relations," Encounter, December 1966, pp.

14-20; also, by the same eminent scholar, "Introduction : Varieties of the

Chinese Military Experience," in Frank A. Kierman, Jr., and John K.

Fairbank, editors, Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, Mass . : Harvard

University Press, 1974). In Professor Fairbank's view, all Chinese warfare,

traditional and modern, is strictly defensive, quite in contrast to that waged

throughout the centuries by the Occidental nations, especially the United

States, which-he alleges-is invariably aggressive and expansionist. The

other essays in this collection provide contrasting views.

29. Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (London:

Allen & Unwin, 1939), p. 248 ; also see pp. 175, 141 .

30. Lucian W. Pye, in the foreword to William W. Whitson with

Chen-Hsia Huang, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist

Military Politics, 1927-71 (New York : Praeger, 1973), p. xiii .

31 . Numerous references may be found in Kierman, Jr ., and Fairbank;

note especially Herbert Franke, "Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval

China," pp. 151 ff., 192, for a summation of the technical, administrative

and psychological aspects of siegecraft and for comments on the continuity

of military strategy and technology in Chinese history . In the same volume,
see Charles O . Hucker, "Hu Tsung-hsien's Campaign Against Hsu Hai,

1556," pp. 273 ff., 305 ff.

32. Edward L. Dryer notes that the regions of China were administered

from walled cities, which were centers of government as well as places in

which large grain reserves were stored. Administrative control of the land

was a precondition for further conquest, yet such control could be gained

only by capturing the walled cities . These cities thus became the principal

military objectives in wars fought within China. The authority of the

government over the peasantry, then, extended downward from the walled

cities . "Military Continuities : The PLA and Imperial China," chapter 1 in

William W. Whitson, editor, The Military and Political Power in China in

the 1970's (New York : Praeger, 1972), p . 15 .

33. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (New York: Oxford University Press,

1963) ; translated and edited by Samuel B . Griffith, p. 38 .

34. Waley, pp. 141, 152 ff.

35. Yang Kung-sun, The Book of Lord Shang: A Classic of the Chinese

School ofLaw (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928) ; translated with

introduction and notes by J. J . L. Duyvendak, p. 256. For the proposition

that "an intelligent prince . . . strives for uniformity, . . . restrains volatile

scholars and those of frivolous pursuits and makes them all uniformly into

farmers," see p. 194 .

36 . Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings (New York : Columbia University Press,

1964) ; translated by Burton Watson, pp. 96-117 .

37 . Derk Bodde, China's First Unifier: A Study of the Ch'in Dynasty as

Seen in the Life ofLi Ssu 280?-208 B .C. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University

Press, 1967), pp. 11, 80 ff.

38. See Franke, p. 192. Also see Griffith's remarks on the diffusion of

this work, p. 45 ff. and appendix III .

39. Joseph Lelyveld, "In China, It's Politics by Allegory," New York

Times, September 30, 1974. Further see the laudatory essays on the Legalists

in Selected Articles Criticising Lin Piao and Confucius (Peking : Foreign

Languages Press, 1974) . This collection includes a "Publisher's Note" to the

effect that Lin Piao, being "an out-and-out devotee of Confucius," opposed

the Legalist school and attacked the "First Emperor" of the Ch'in dynasty.

40. Scott A. Boorman, The Protracted Game : A wei-ch'i Interpretation

of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press,

1969), p . 182 .

41 . Whitson with Chen-Hsia Huang, p. 438 .

42 . Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (Revised edition ; London : Lawrence

& Wishart, 1958), Vol . II, p. 224. And Mao adds : "Every Communist must

grasp the truth : `Political power grows out of the ~barrel of a gun.' Our

principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun will never be

LXV111
allowed to command the Party. . . . Some people have ridiculed us as

advocates of the `omnipotence of war' ; yes, we are, we are the advocates of

the omnipotence of the revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good

and is Marxist." Ibid., p. 228.

43 . Ibid., pp. 158, 180.

44. Sun Tzu, pp . 89,43; see Griffith's editorial comments ("Sun Tzu and

Mao Tse-tung"), pp. 45 ff.

45. Mao Tse-tung, pp. 100, 186 ff. The concept of "encirclement," or

wei-ch' i, relates to the physical as well as the psychological annihilation of

the enemy; see Boorman.

46. Scott A. Boorman, "Deception in Chinese Strategy," in Whitson,

editor, The Military . . . , pp . 313-314. Boorman also points out that current

strategic thinking in the United States places comparatively little stress on

stratagem.

47 . See Sun Tzu, pp. 66-67, 93-94, 97, 106.

48 . Mao Tse-tung, pp. 172-175 . Also see Samuel B . Griffith, Peking and

People's Wars (New York : Praeger, 1966), p. 33, for a discussion of Mao's

advice to guerrillas that they be as cautious as virgins and as quick as rabbits,

and for this general approach to tactics : "When you want to fight us we won't

let you and you can't even find us . But when we want to fight you, we make

sure you can't get away and we hit you squarely on the chin and wipe you

out." Cf. Sun Tzu, p. 140.

49. Boorman, The Protracted Game . . . , p. 6; for historical references

to the pervasive influence of this game, and the suggestion that Sun Tzu's

theories bear a distinct similarity to wei-ch'i dicta, see p . 208 (note 8) .

Boorman's thesis is significant : Chinese communist policies and wei-ch'i,

he argues, are products of the same strategic tradition-one without a

parallel either in Occidental military tradition or in the Western game of

chess-and wei-ch'i is an important, if little recognized, model of the Maoist

system of insurgency.

50. Mao Tse-tung, pp. 151-152.

51 . See Sun Tzu, pp. 84-129.

52. Mao Tse-tung, p . 171 .

Class War on a Global Scale

The Leninist Culture of Political Conflict

Dr Stephen J. Blank

Today's international order is undergoing a profound

transformation, and any such transformation in the world's

order issues from and engenders deep-going transformations

in the component parts of the system, the so-called nationstate of classical diplomatic history in the West. In both

Europe and the third world, new and old nations and

communities are either coming together or splitting apart or

demanding the breakup of larger units in which they are

found . Examples are the reunification of Germany, the

disintegration of Yugoslavia and Lebanon, and ethnic unrest

in Israel, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

These revolutionary movements and trends constitute a

standing challenge to theories or policies of order and

liberalism in world politics as well as to the American-led

effort to construct a system whose point of departure is

Wilsonian liberalism or some variant thereof. The crisis

shaking these states is of such magnitude as to suggest to some

(an American official in the Defense Department asserted this

point outright) that in the nineties the lack of governability of

many third-world states (one could include Yugoslavia and

suggest tentatively the USSR as well) will be so great as to

cause their disappearance as functioning nation-states .

The foregoing observations highlight a cardinal point of

Professor Adda Bozeman's work,* that is, the enduring and

profound challenge to the existence of the nation-state, that

*Adda B. Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas," Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 20, no. 1

(Spring 1976), 61-102.
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

classical avatar of Western political theories . That challenge

exists due to the conflicts launched by various revolutionary

theorists and practitioners of international politics . One of the

primary axes of their challenge has been an effort to overcome, diminish, transcend, or break up the existing order to

make room for new formations whatever their provenance . In

most cases, these revolutionaries have been inspired by

Leninist and Soviet practices of political conflict, what the

strategists call low-intensity conflict (LIC). We, however, can

call such political warfare class conflict on the global scale,

or, as was popular a generation ago, the strategy of protracted

warfare, or still again, revolutionary war.

However one labels it, there can be no doubt that the

Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 institutionalized a schism in

world politics that World War I had already created and

perpetuated it in the form of an ideological as well as political

war against liberalism . Without exculpating Hitler and

Mussolini, it is safe to say that bolshevism provided both the

techniques upon which they built and the ostensible threat as

well as the model that they were both drawn to and fought

against . Since then this global schism has been expanded into

first, the cold war and second, the techniques of threatened

warfare by or against states in the third world. In other words,

the instrumentalities used in the practice of this war have long

since become transnational-not an illogical conclusion when

one considers Leninist strategies of the national question.

Indeed, Lenin's earliest adversaries in the Russian socialist

movement complained that he had introduced a "state of siege

into the movement" (their terms) . That phrase is a convenient

metaphor for post-1917 developments because it combines the

protracted and all-encompassing nature of the warfare with

the harassment of "enemy supply lines" in the third world and

the use of constant psychological warfare and even "fifth

columns" inside the besieged fortresses as major tools of this

war.
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

Although the literature on the Soviet style of armed and

political conflict is immense and Professor Bozeman has made

a distinguished and acute contribution to it, this study will

pursue a seemingly eccentric course in the beginning, but one

that has lasting significance for the present period. I intend to

look at the multiple uses made of the concept of the

nation-state as the actor in world politics and as an axial point

of the Soviet struggle to unhinge the entire international order

built up by liberalism and European political thought.

Erosion of the Nation-State System

Soviet thought and practice made for a transnational, that

is, multistate challenge to the international order-a challenge

whose salience is growing, not diminishing, despite the

euphoric tone of some that history and international politics

appear to be over. Quite the opposite is the case. New

challenges to our values and interests are dawning which

make liberal use of those techniques and ideas originated by

Lenin and refined by his epigone, and which combine them

with their own indigenous traditions-Arab, Vietnamese,

Cuban, and so forth. Even the Soviet challenge is not dead;

rather its previous incarnations are bankrupt . But new

challenges to the status quo are by no means ruled out. In fact,

Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" calls for collective

security in Asia and Europe and calls for primacy of human

interests . The deideologization of interstate relations poses

clear ideological/political challenges to the international

order-even if we do not fully grasp the implications that

these programs present.

Indeed, the fundamental purpose of Leninist doctrine is to

seize the intellectual initiative in world politics and influence

the conceptualization of an emerging world order that

Moscow cannot influence except by force-whose scope for
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

use has narrowed dramatically . What is going on here is a

largely successful attempt by the Soviet Union to insinuate

itself into the ongoing Western security dialogue and obtain

a legitimate position . In other words, whether the cold war is

or is not dead, the global struggle for power, influence, and

resources will continue in changed circumstances, and it will

be conducted by multiple actors with their own cultural

tradition of sanctified conflict and their experience of Leninist

and other totalitarian modes of political struggle . One of the

advantages bequeathed by the Soviet Union to its clients and

emulators is precisely this method of confusing the issues

surrounding the viability of nations and states and thereby

destabilizing them . Thus, Leninist models of political and

armed struggle, including the unhinging of states by using the

nationalism issue, have become transnational. This is an

appropriate irony for an ideology that billed itself from the

outset as supranational and which is now threatened again by

nationalism as well as by Pan-Islamic calls for Muslim

self-determination and exclusivity over minorities in their

territories (Pan-Islamic here means across the areas of

Muslim majority, not the political doctrine of the same name).

Professor Bozeman has presciently fastened upon these

aspects of international conflict. In her lecture to CADRE on

17 October 1989 she observed that the concept of the state is

becoming a worn-out reference point in international

relations . Traditionally the state was a sovereign,

independent, territorially limited entity and, in Western

thought, a more or less ethnically homogenous one, as for

example England or France. One state ended where another

began. Thus the concept implied boundaries and was a

limiting one as it developed out of the works of Grotius and

the practical construction of Europe-after religion failed by

1648 to embrace all of the European world under a single

concept. Therefore the concept of the state is not particularly

relevant to non-West European experience. That includes
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

Russia, which was a kind of Caesaro-papist regime onto which

Western concepts of natural law and enlightened absolutism

were grafted in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries .

An example of this tradition is not just the multiconfessional

nature of the Russian state from its inception as it manifested

its abiding imperial vocation . Equally telling is the fact that

until the revolution, Russian public law, with few exceptions,

recognized as Great Russians members of any ethnic group

that adopted Orthodox Christianity . In short, Russian

citizenship denoted a creedal, ideological conception of the

state. This notion was revived in secularized form by the

Bolsheviks after a modernizing nationalism began to erode

those ancient distinctions starting with the freeing of the serfs

in 1861 .

Professor Bozeman's lecture also noted that war, like all

human contests, is, in the final analysis, a mental and

psychological struggle in which victory goes to whomever

best understands and penetrates the enemy . In our time the

concept of war has taken on attributes that render it no longer

a military conflict . Instead we live in an era of total war,

largely, but not by any means exclusively, manifested by

so-called low-intensity conflicts . These are long-term

continuing acts of intentional violence and resistance across

the entire spectrum of conflict . These wars last for years

(e .g ., the Arab-Israeli conflict, the cold war, or the

Eritrean-Ethiopian struggle, to name three widely differing

ones) and continue in both military and nonmilitary forms of

action .

Conflict, in this situation, is no different from peace ; indeed

the concepts of peace and war have been turned inside out by

foreign dialecticians . Since 1775 every major, internal war or

revolution has been one in which foreign intervention played,

or threatened to play, a major role as well-a fact that has led

to the erasure of the formally delimited boundaries among

states . Thus domestic and foreign origins of and participation
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

in wars are not easily, if at all, separable . Nor does conflict

resolution and mediation become easier; if anything quite the

opposite . Those too go on for a long time until a solution is

reached.

As Professor Bozeman observes, increasingly, movements

claiming to be states in embryo, operating transnationally

across recognized borders, and often behind fronts or dummy

organizations, act as challengers to the state system . The

concept of the state is impaired because it is used promiscuously to cover new types of multinational and multiconfessional political organizations whose leadership, as in

the Soviet case till now, has insisted that its boundaries,

internal and external, are merely provisional . Or, as was

previously the case in Eastern Europe, states acting under

conditions of externally diminished sovereignty claimed and

received full recognition of their statehood.' Therefore the

result is a system of clashing political entities all claiming the

attributes of statehood but also being incommensurate with

each other. In Bozeman's view, this condition makes it

impossible to systematize and generalize about the international system . 2

Mainly, but not exclusively in the third world, wars are

going on over decades in which continuing efforts are made

to define and then overthrow established political boundaries .

This brings about a situation of political arrangements that are

mobile, fluctuating, and susceptible to any territorial

boundary. Moreover, every one of these movements exists

"in virtue of its commitment to violence and war." 3

Accordingly, as Bozeman states, the concept of international

war has also been rendered invalid ; it no longer pertains solely

to interstate conflicts that are violent. Rather the term now

connotes a broad spectrum of "conflict acts" ranging from

sporadic guerrilla strikes to civil wars, wars of liberation,

secessionist movements, invasions, or insurrections, among
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

others . Often foreigners are the inspirers, supporters, and

occasionally the intended beneficiaries of these conflicts .

Moreover, this interpenetration of the domestic and foreign

environments effaces altogether the conventionally accepted lines

between legitimate and illegitimate force [as well as between

legitimate and illegitimate polities], and puts in question the

theoretically established distinctions between war and peace. These

interlocking conditions support the conclusion that the state, having

forfeited important controlling functions customarily ascribed to it in

world affairs, can no longer be regarded as a reliable medium for

realistic differentiation among types of war and between the conditions

of war and peace.

Finally the erosion of the state as the fundamental form of

political organization, alongside the acquiescence in the

coexistence of states with "antistate bodies" as equal and

legitimate actors in world politics, has led to the devaluation

of the world society of sovereign and formally equal states

and the law of nations that stipulates their rights and

obligations . Examples of the latter events abound in today's

world. The acquiescence of the international community in

the Anschluss, the Munich accords, and the Stalin-Hitler Pact

of 1939 signified the easy devaluation of sovereignty and the

legitimation of antistate bodies on the grounds of ideology or

national attributes . Similarly, the 1975 Zionism-Is-Racism

Resolution of the United Nations (UN) demonstrated the

renewed viability of such ideological delegitimization of

states . In short, we live in a time when the plain meaning of

our political vocabulary has been dialectically distorted to the

degree that, as in Alice in Wonderland, "words mean what I

want them to mean ." And these words have become the

context and subject of violent belligerent wars and conflicts

that show no sign of really abating-the current euphoria to

the contrary.
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Lenin's Revolutionary Approach

Confucius demanded of the good ruler that he rectify the

language . Lenin's entire political career testified to his belief

that politicizing the language and forcing an ideologically

driven perspective on all sociopolitical events was the rightful

modus operandi of a Marxist leader. By rearranging the

cognitive map and by means of relentless political and

military warfare he hoped to overthrow the bourgeois order,

not only in Russia, but globally . Remember that until 1985

Lenin's successors still advocated his belief (1) that the shape

of world politics revolved around Soviet Russia's global

struggle with imperialism, (2) that all political events (and

their definition was vastly expanded and extended) must be

viewed in this light, (3) that this struggle (war until 1956) was

fatalistically inevitable, (4) that in the period of nuclear

weaponry this struggle was diverted into political and military

struggles in the third world, and (5) that all means which

served socialism were of themselves good. In Lenin's own

words the Communist party was the "mind, honor, and

conscience" of the contemporary world. Thus all means the

party sanctioned were ethical since they advanced socialism .

As stated, a principal means of advancing socialism was the

use of the national question to unhinge opposing states and

communities whose existence blocked the advance of Soviet

Russia. Lenin's attitude to the question of nationality as it

pertained to questions of internal and foreign policy was

wholly instrumental . In 1915 he quoted Engels on the subject.

The whole thing (the national principle) is an absurdity, got up in a

popular dress in order to throw dust in shallow people's eyes and to be

used as a convenient phrase, or to be laid aside if the occasion requires

. 6

It .
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

In his theses on the national question in 1913, Lenin was even more

explicit in laying out the principles that governed subsequent

Soviet approaches to the issue.

The recognition by Social Democracy of the right of all nations to

self-determination by no means signifies negation by the Social

Democrats of an independent evaluation of the expediency of state

separation of this or that nation in each individual case . On the

contrary, Social Democrats must give just this independent appraisal,

considering how, under the conditions of developing capitalism and

oppression of the proletariat of various nations by the united

bourgeoisie of all nationalities, such that in the general tasks of

democracy and at the head of them the most important of all will be

the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat for socialism.

More succinctly, he wrote elsewhere that "we must unite the

revolutionary struggle against capitalism with revolutionary

programs and tactics in relation to all democratic demands"

(including self-determination) . 8 In effect the entire national

question was regarded as a combat instrument to be wielded and

deployed where a profound assessment of its political context

dictated either supporting or opposing its placement on the

international agenda. 9

Moreover, Lenin and his followers were never able to shake

the idea that self-determination only applied to the proletariat

of each nation (an idea that became incarnated in the

Communist party) and not to the rest of the nation. In 1903

Lenin stated that self-determination applied only to the

proletariat and that the party must, as a rule, aspire to the

closest possible union of workers . Only in exceptional

circumstances was the party permitted to support demands for

a new class state . 10 The idea that self-determination was a

class phenomenon rather than a national one was adopted by

Stalin in his report to the III Congress of Soviets in January

1918 and served as the basis upon which he carried out

Lenin's directive to sovietize the borderlands after October

1917 . 11
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

In practice this idea denied the concept of the nation and its

substitution by a class or a vanguard party masquerading

under cover of Marxism as the embodiment of a class . Such a

concept and the attempt to conduct foreign policy by

revolutionary propaganda abroad ensured that in foreign

states or non-Russian communities the "center of gravity" of

the struggle for socialism would be the national-political

cohesion and legitimacy of the government in question . In

multiethnic or homogeneous areas, the organizational weapon

and the appeal to a domestic "fifth column" made certain that

the struggle for socialism would be a total one conducted by

all means. But given Soviet military weakness, Soviet leaders

naturally preferred all means short of war.

Under conditions where national statehood, self-determination, autonomy, or federation were viewed as tactical

instruments of war, we can readily understand how

Clausewitz fascinated Lenin and Stalin . Simply put, his

doctrines gave them a theoretical justification for extending

the definition of war to the international theater of class

struggle .

12 By subjecting nationality phenomena to purely

political criteria as to whether they benefited socialism, Lenin

reduced nationality issues to the role of a tactic in this new

form of warfare. In Lenin's 1906 work on partisan warfare he

stated that

Marxism asks that the various types of struggle be analyzed within

their historical framework. To discuss conflict outside of its historical

and concrete setting is to misunderstand elementary dialectical

materialism . At various junctures of the economic evolution, and

depending upon changing political, national, cultural, social, and other

conditions, differing types of struggle may become important and even

predominant. As a result of those (sociological) transformations,

secondary and subordinate forms of action may change their

significance . To try and answer positively or negatively the question

of whether a certain tactic is usable, without at the same time studying

the concrete conditions confronting a given moment at a precise point

of its development, would mean a complete negation of Marxism.

13

1 0
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

Two immediate conclusions readily emerge from the

foregoing statements and discussion . Firstly, the call for

self-determination-the proclamation of one group or another

as the authentic bearer of the revolution-was a tactic to be

used as circumstances demanded . Secondly, the significance

of resorting to that or any other tactic-political or

military-was the aim of retaining in all circumstances a free

hand to advance in any direction deemed necessary and

possible . In other words, the legendary tactical flexibility of

the Soviet regime derives from their conceptualization of

conflict as being waged on all fronts or across the boardwhence the internal structure of the protagonists becomes the

center of gravity . The Bolshevik vision of politics as another

form of warfare endowed its practitioners with the maximum

feasible number of instruments with which to wage their

struggle even in the face of superior enemy military power.

Politically, Bolshevik acumen, determination, and

resolution backed up by propaganda and the appeal to internal

constituencies in the enemy's "rear" made up for much of the

deficiency or blinded enemies to the real military strength of

the Soviet Union.

Having at its disposal a multitude of new and relatively

unused instruments for the conduct of political warfare, Lenin

and his successors lost no time in consolidating the concept

and deployment of those instruments. Lenin's 1920 work on

"Left-Wing Communism an Infantile Disorder" insisted that

communist parties make use of every possible tactic and

exploit every conceivable rift in the world. Rifts occurring

within bourgeois society between political factions and

between bourgeois states-contradictions in his terms-as

well as tensions between imperialist states and their colonies

in the third world must be exploited out of ideological

conviction and practical necessity.

14 Moreover, this struggle

must be joined on the world scale .
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Even before coming to power, Lenin had discovered the

potential for conflicts in the third world to inhibit resolute

bourgeois action if led by a Russian socialist regime . The

same result derived from the interimperialist contradiction

based on the then leading powers (Germany and England),

each of whom strove for domination of Europe . In June 1917

Lenin expressed his certainty that Germany and Britain could

not combine against bolshevism because of their own

antagonism, just as a year later he saw salvation in the Pacific

from the fact of American-Japanese rivalry there-a

penetrating insight for those times . In this same address of

June 1918 he expressed his fundamental insight concerning

the potential relationship that should inhere between

revolutionary Russia and the colonies .

The Russian Revolution, which as early as 1905 led to revolutions in

Turkey, Persia, and China, would have placed the German and British

imperialists in a very difficult position if it had begun to establish a

truly revolutionary alliance of the workers and peasants of the colonies

and semi-colonies against the despots, against the khans, for expulsion

of the Germans from Turkey, the British from Turkey, Persia, India,

Egypt, etc.

15

By 1920 in his theses to the Communist International, an

organization established to disseminate revolution and

subversion on a global scale and to bring about this

militarization of politics abroad, these insights had both

deepened and become sharper. Lenin now contended that the

pivotal point of all world politics was the struggle between

socialist Russia and the rest of the world, thereby legitimating

a Russocentric and doctrinally paranoid view of the world .

To break the enemy it was the bounden duty of all parties to

ally themselves with anti-imperial forces in the colonies even

if they were merely "bourgeois nationalists" because

objectively they spelled the doom of the capitalist order. At

the same time this alliance, founded on the sheerest

realpolitik, ultimately had to provide for the freedom of

1 2
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

Communist parties in these countries to maneuver freely and

win control over the liberation movements taking shape there .

To achieve this end, these parties had to cooperate in the most

intimate form of union with the Soviet party around which

they were grouped and whose revolution had a general

significance (an implicit avowal of its model-building

potentialities) for all peoples .' 6

The rigorous consistency of this approach to world politics

continued in the period of the new economic policy (NEP) .

Soviet spokesmen since 1956 proclaim this period-when

Russia sought to reenter the state system on equal grounds

without yielding on its ,prerogatives-one of peaceful

coexistence . However, Lenin's speeches on the issues of

foreign economic concessions to capitalists agree with the

previous outlook. In a major speech of 21 December 1920 on

foreign policy, he stressed that capitalists approached Russia

out of fear of their rivals and that Moscow must exploit these

contradictions and make them the cornerstone of its policies .

Moreover, the policy of economic concessions was a new kind

of war; indeed, the very existence of the capitalists constituted

an anti-Socialist war.

17 Hence we see the breakdown between

the realms of international economic intercourse and

international war. It is out of this kind of thinking by a

potentially chauvinistic Russia, which saw itself conducting

a global war of liberation on all fronts, that the cold war

materialized . As early as 1915 Lenin called for transforming

the First World War into an international civil war; ever since

then, the world has experienced just that kind of strife with

episodes of conflict occurring either concurrently in many

places or sequentially . Frequently the participants in these

conflicts have resorted to or are resorting to an increasingly

wide array of means that has obliterated the distinction

between front and rear, war and peace, and nation and class .

Regarding the national question, this scenario was already

utilized during 1918-21 . Not only did the Soviet regime

1 3
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

foment revolutions abroad, it also shamelessly manipulated

sovereignty and republican borders in the Soviet state in order to

undermine Polish claims to sovereignty and territory in the wake

of Polish independence after 1919 . 18 Thus Wiktor Suchecki

observed that after the October Revolution, the Ukraine was

treated in a fourfold way: (1) as part of the Russian Soviet

Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), (2) as a state having

federal relations with the RSFSR, (3) as a state confederated

to the RSFSR, and (4) as an independent state .' 9

The attitude that the sovereignty of any given Soviet

republic is a flexible, transitory, and malleable phenomenon has persisted down to Gorbachev . This attitude

has been fundamental to the Soviet experience, which has

sought to exploit all the manifold possibilities opened up

by international law and its own ideology for the

manipulation of fictitious entities . Certainly during the

border settlements of the 1920s between Moscow and its

neighbors, Moscow sought to craft the settlements in such

a way as to incite possibilities for irredentist pressure

against Romania and Poland . 2° In this vein, the attempt in

1920 to substitute a rump, Polish workers government,

organized from the Polish Communists serving the Soviet

regime, and present it as an authentic Polish group became the

basis for a theoretical postulate of strategy in the international

revolution . The 1949 Historicus article commented on the

now-established Stalinist theory of foreign revolution .

Support is not confined to the boundaries of one country, [and] the

local bourgeoisie must to a considerable degree be isolated

internationally ; while the proletariat receives direct or indirect support

from the proletariat of other capitalist countries and from the

proletarian state already in existence in the USSR. Hence a further

condition for successful revolution is that the balance of outside aid

for revolution as against potential outside aid for counterrevolution

must be sufficiently favorable.

21

This point was confirmed by an interested Western observer,

No Ducachek, a former high official in the postwar

14
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

Czechoslovakian government. Writing after the Soviet invasion of

1968, he observed that

for a successful revolution, the Communists must have, among other

things, a clearly favorable balance of potential outside aid. The

democratic majority must feel isolated internationally, while the

Communist minority is sure of direct or indirect support from Soviet

Russia or other Communist states.

Countless Soviet writers have invoked the Leninist solution

of the national question as a guide to the resolution of

fundamental international tasks and as a model of SovietEast European relations until 1989. Until 1985, the national

question as conceived by Lenin and Stalin was not only an

instrument for socializing Russia; it was a lever with which to

unhinge the worldwide international political order. The Leninist

conceptualization of nationality problems abroad was and

remains, in altered form, a major instrument of the continuing

global civil war that Lenin inaugurated in 1917.

Yet this was an international or civil war with a difference .

The main weapons were not those of the conventional set piece

battle or large-scale conventional war. Precisely because it is

the hallmark of Soviet thinking to introduce novel refinements

into their traditional meaning, so too has the Soviets' practical

approach to international issues of global civil war been unlike

any previous conceptions. This is true for all the borrowing

from the tsarist state (invocation of religious and national

liberation in the Balkan Wars after 1711) or other models like

imperial Germany's "Rev oHuts ionierungs Politik"-

revolutionizing policy vis-a-vis tsarist Russia in World War I.
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

The Conceptual Realignment of

International Politics

The totality of Soviet thinking on war since 1917 would

form a magnum opus; there are, nevertheless, significant

commonalities across time which affect Soviet thinking even

in today's era of new thinking . These commonalities are of

interest to us mainly in the political sphere . One can already

find them in Lenin and Trotsky . Trotsky's prerevolutionary

military writings are mainly on the revolution of 1905 and the

Balkan Wars of 1912-13 . There are indications he grasped

that in such situations the center of gravity of the country is

the army's and government's morale and will . 23 Here strikes

and incitement to revolutionary activity could neutralize or

counter the technological advantages of industrialization .

Trotsky also gave considerable thought to the problem of

revolutionary military action against the enemy. Should such

action take place, it would be a direct result of the masses'

psychological influence motivated by economic and political

considerations rather than purely military ones . Thus, the

requirement not to engage in a trial of strength with superior

forces might be overridden, and the revolutionary leadership

might not be able to choose the time and place of their action .

Indeed, reliance upon purely military actions of a guerrilla

nature might not lead to victory but rather to defeat.

24 These

reflections as of 1906 did not lead out of the impasse involved

in devising revolutionary strategy then, especially as Trotsky

intuited that the revolutionary army must always be on the

offensive to keep up its morale. Under such conditions, the

resort to force became decidedly problematic .

Though Trotsky continued to believe in the superiority of

class solidarity as a morale builder, by 1913, owing to his

experience as war correspondent in the Balkans, he came to

see the success of nationalist antienemy indoctrination as a

means of Mobilizing peasants . Here, too, the importance of

16
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

morale for a modern army was crucial . 25 Through this

experience he began to disdain the activity of uncontrolled

partisan groups as having merely local significance as

opposed to the effect of regular armies .

26 Lenin, too, later

viewed the matter in this light . Political morale was

fundamental to military success, and precisely because

partisan groups could not be controlled adequately, Soviet

military policy had to concentrate on building up a regular

military as fast as possible . This was the source of major

convergence of causes for the creation of the political

commissar system to this day.

Trotsky and Lenin posed the dilemma of how a revolutionary force contends for power at home and abroad in the

face of superior force and technology . Both men realized that

a revolutionary movement must remain on the offensive lest

its morale collapse . Moreover, the likelihood of the struggle

being a protracted one, whatever its venue, imposes on the

leadership the utmost caution before going to war . Indeed,

during the Brezhnev era, writers argued that going to war is

an invitation to a popular referendum on a regime . In Soviet

terms, the political objective and goal in the resort to war is

always the fundamental defining characteristic . Thus the

brandishing of the Leninist ideological tactic with regard to

the national question allows a group or movement to believe

with perfect sincerity that it alone constitutes the real nation

fighting for its liberty and self-respect, a condition which

habitually can inspire the utmost sacrifice .

Lenin, Stalin, and their successors all insisted upon the

morale or political consciousness of the troops and the

masses-Stalin's concept of stability of the rear-as essential

to victory. Indeed, this concept of the centrality of the political

consciousness of the troops posed the way out of the

conundrum facing Lenin and Trotsky . If the party could

maintain its morale-building and ideological leadership

capability intact, it could inspire and organize a mass

1 7
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

movement that could fight a protracted war on any scale

necessary . The ideological redefinition of the universe and its

reshaping by a consciously organized vanguard, an example

of which is the approach to issues of nationality, was a force

multiplier. These related processes of thought and practice

even allowed in advance for retreats and defeats which were

visualized as having only tactical or temporary significance .

Therefore the first and fundamental question that Soviet

leaders asked themselves was, What is the political character

of the war? Similarly, the first question Soviet leaders asked

concerning a national movement or phenomenon was, What

is its political character? That character is the major criterion

for defining war and nationality issues and is the basis of the

Soviet attitude towards war. In Brezhnev's time this outlook

had grown substantially, but its roots were the dilemmas that

faced the founding fathers of the USSR. These dilemmas were

severe ones; at the same time as the USSR declared war on

the international order, the Soviets had to fight a desperate

civil war . After winning that war, the leadership remained

convinced that it lived in the perpetual shadow of capitalist

encirclement, which could only temporarily remain peaceful .

War, which was inevitable, would be a large-scale theater

conventional war of machines where Russia was technologically backward and where Stalin was deeply unconvinced

of the loyalty of his people. The lessons of Russian history

demonstrate that long wars-victorious and unsuccessful ones

alike-strain the social fabric to the point of revolt if not

revolution . Thus war must be avoided without giving the

appearance of weakness . Soviet options were limited since

this war was inevitable .

Diplomacy could only keep enemies off balance for a time;

it could not effect lasting solutions . Indeed, its purpose, as

stated by Soviet specialists under Stalin and after, was only a

limited one in the overall conduct of foreign policy. Every

state's foreign policy and diplomacy were class ones .

1 8
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

Accordingly, Soviet diplomacy and foreign policy were class

ones that aimed to perpetuate, strengthen, weaken, terminate,

expose, or suppress international conflicts as the situation

required .2s Foreign policy's purpose-the protection of

Soviet security-entailed the perpetuation of conflict

everywhere else ; rather than being an instrument for the

resolution or adjustment of conflicts, it was a tactic in a

never-ending struggle . For Stalin, diplomacy was

synonymous with deceit . Everywhere the term diplomacy is

mentioned in his published works, it is in a context of deceit

that he took for granted as the norm of bourgeois and Soviet

diplomacy .

29

This unfavorable "correlation of forces" facing the USSR

imposed certain requirements . Foreign policy, not just

diplomacy, had to cause trouble and stir up conflicts

everywhere but near the USSR in order to exploit imperialist

contradictions and impose an ideologically dictated

conception of the world upon foreign actors . At the same time,

the Soviet military had to be strong enough to deter outsiders

from launching a war. Thus Soviet deep-strike operational

planning in the thirties was more a doctrine of the

counteroffensive than of the offensive . In effect it stated that

if you start a war, you will be digging your own grave because

it will lead to a revolution in your own lands backed up by our

triumphant counteroffensive . During and after the interwar

time, the main political purpose of the Soviet army-for all

of its offensive, military-technical, and operational

doctrine-has been to deter outsiders from invasion and to

intimidate them.3° Even under Brezhnev, when the military

arm was most enhanced, Moscow never intervened militarily

when it thought this would lead to wider conflict . As Ken

Booth points out, if Moscow were to go to war, it would be

the result of accident, miscalculation, or direst necessity, not

rational choice . 31 That has been the case .

1 9
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

The Soviet war upon the international system has been one

that deliberately avoided force against its main enemy in favor

of an attritional, low-intensity, global struggle while

simultaneously mobilizing a deterrent capability on the scale

of conventional and nuclear war. Having chosen to compete

on all fronts simultaneously, Stalin and his successors had to

maintain in perpetuity what the socialist economist Oskar

Lange called "a permanent war economy sui generis ."

Because a true detente was ruled out except for averting a

nuclear war, the assets of the Soviet state perforce had to be

deployed in a permanent state of war readiness . The highest

dictate of this state of being included the ideological creation

of a universe that could mobilize followers. By defining and

organizing a reality in its own terms, Moscow sought to hold

that vital political consciousness of its friends and subjects in

harmony with the ultimate objective that could only be

obtained through a long period o~ global low-intensity

conflict. Fundamental to all Stalinist thought was the notion,

derived from Lenin, that class conflict constituted the basic

force of both internal and world politics, a notion that

logically entailed a dichotomous worldview of two worlds

locked in endless struggle and that substituted class for

nation-an effect already achieved domestically in 1917-18.

Thus, on the international scale, world politics replicated the

national struggle at home. Or, to put it differently, the Soviet

"solution" to the national question at home replicated itself as

the mainspring or ideological basis from which the Soviet

state sought to achieve its international aims .

Professor Evgenii Tarle classifies the preferred method

Stalin and his successors employed until Gorbachev as a

combination of the techniques of both Fascist and Nazi

diplomacy on the one hand and bourgeois diplomacy on the

other . As Aspaturian comments, these are tactics of Stalinist

diplomacy inverted to simulate Western tactics and disguise

their original provenance :

20
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

1 . Systematic employment of lies and extortion-Fascist

and Nazi diplomacy.

2 . Aggression masquerading as self-defense.

3 . Aggression camouflaged by "disinterested" motives.

4 . Peace propaganda employed to deceive the adversary .

5 . Concluding friendship treaties for the purpose of

subverting the vigilance of the adversary .

6 . Aggressive plans disguised as a struggle against

bolshevism and the USSR.

7 . "Localized conflicts" disguised to facilitate the

successive elimination of victims.

8 . Diplomatic exploitation of internal antagonisms in the

camp of the adversary.

9 . Exploitation of national differences and conflicts of

interest in the camp of the enemy .

10 . Demagogic appeal to struggle against the hegemony of

the victorious group of imperialist powers.

11 . Systematic employment of threats to terrorize the

adversary.

12. The "protection" of weak states as a pretext for

32 aggression.

Virtually all of these techniques not only involve the

effacing of the boundary between war and peace, they also

implicate diplomacy as a tool for aggression and demand the

ideational overturning of reality as a means towards attaining

their objective . The conspiratorial redefinition of reality and

its continuous tactical manipulation through a centralized

structure of political organization is apparent everywhere .

These techniques, combined with peace propaganda at home

and abroad, and the subvention of terrorism added after

Stalin's death constitute the abiding hallmarks of a perpetual

low-intensity conflict . They constitute the hallmarks of such

conflicts because they avoid direct confrontation and

unremittingly pursue indirect and long-term attritional

strategies .

2 1
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

The Semantics of Attritional Warfare

Recall that Lenin's rivals accused him of launching a state

of siege within Russian social democracy. Low-intensity

conflict, the cumulative bringing to bear of a series of

political, economic, psychological, and military pressures

against first remote and then direct targets is also a state of

siege-in this case on a global scale-against "imperialism ."

In his writings, T. E. Lawrence observed the need in such

conflicts for a strategy that finds strength in weakness and

attacks the weakness in strength . Insurgencies and

revolutionary warfare embrace all means of struggle and

conflict. As a contemporary student of the LIC phenomenon

observes, the principles of insurgency are motivation or cause,

preparation for prolonged struggle, recruitment of both

popular and external support, establishment of an alternative

society, and a multifaceted strategy to undermine the enemy's

power, authority, and morale . By the same token, counterinsurgency's hallmarks are will, time, and patience; initiatives

to sustain and extend popular and external support; provision

and enforcement of law; minimum resort to force; and

superior intelligence.

33

Targets of communist insurgency and political warfare

have traditionally been countries short of the required

capacities to deal with those challenges, so they have to

borrow them from outside-as in Europe (1942-48) with

Anglo-American support, or in the third world with American

support, generally, or as in Malaya or Indochina (1946-54)

with the regimes presently occupying power. Moreover, by

resorting to such an indirect strategy, Communist parties

foster in Western democracies an ambiguity directly at odds

with the cultural pattern of policy-making and force upon the

West the onus of seeming aggression, thereby seeking to

preserve their own identification with defense and peace.

Despite the fact that Moscow and its satellites always have

categorically rejected the status quo until now, they always

22
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

have maintained that they are victims of aggression .

Imperialism is condemned historically and foredoomed

simply because it exists; therefore, war is its fault. This

attitude prevails among the Soviet defense establishment to

this day, as a 1988 article by Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov

indicates . He states,

As for the wars that we have waged, they were imposed on us from the

outside by imperialist reaction. They were in defense of the socialist

fatherland. And the victories secured by the Soviet people and their

Armed Forces in these-on our side-wars of liberation were a natural

phenomenon. They were in accordance with the vital, crucial interests

of all peoples because they heralded the defeat of the forces of

aggression and militarism, restricted their potential for unleashing new

wars, and strengthened the hope of man's final deliverance from them .

Both in their sociopolitical nature and in their worldwide historical

significance, they were victories for the sake of progress, for the sake 34 of peace.

This formulation is a direct result of the ideological mystification

indulged in since Lenin seized power in 1917 . The tactic is

fundamental to waging the attritional warfare that has gone on

since 1917. A recent study of terrorism, a major tactic in such

warfare, testifies to the global expansion of this process. Donald

Hanle stresses two major concepts of Soviet warfighting, namely

the "correlation of forces" and the war of national liberation. He

quotes academician Sergeev, who points out that, for Moscow,

correlation of forces goes far beyond the bean counting beloved

by American military analysts. A state's foreign policy potential

goes far beyond its own internal and external resources to include

the existence of reliable sociopolitical allies among other states,

"national contingents of congenial classes," mass movements

abroad, and other worldwide political forces .

35 Force, directly

applied, is conspicuously absent from this definition . Wars of

national liberation are just wars because they mandate a Soviet

requirement to help without committing to the direct application

of force .

36

23
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Hanle's two concepts illuminate the manner in which

national revolutionary tactics can be raised to a global level

of "stable," long-term, international struggle without major

war. In many cases terrorist strikes are substitutes for actions

at the operational or strategic level that are rendered both

impossible and unnecessary by the revolutions in warfare,

media, and political struggle . Additionally these tactics can

be taken over from groups that are anything but Leninist and

used successfully by them or by non-Soviet forces . The

Middle East, and fascist and Nazi foreign policies before 1939

provide many examples of this copying and refinement of

Leninist political warfare-a process which continues today,

mainly in the Middle East and Latin America.

Inasmuch as Lenin and Stalin mobilized the USSR for

perpetual wartime readiness, the USSR was admirably

situated to wage such a war. Such "Lawrencian" strategies

were relatively cost free compared to the task of keeping a

conventional military machine in readiness . The instruments

were foreign communist parties and front organizations;

financial subventions which were bearable ; and the

deployment abroad of increasing but always relatively few

direct Soviet assets, weapons, technicians, KGB men (or their

institutional predecessors), Comintern armies (as in Spain,

1936-39), and small quantities of Red Army men, until

Afghanistan .

These techniques, tactics, and strategies of global political

conflict, punctured by spasmodic resorts to violence and

terror, built upon the original ideological mystifications

inherent in Leninism, particularly regarding national

questions . As the resort to terror at home and abroad declined

in gross figures after 1953, the Soviet Union expanded its

covert, intelligence, and ideological-organizational means of

warfare abroad as much as it did its conventional and strategic

military arms, which were designed to intimidate the West and
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

hold it at bay. After 1945 the cold war was a war on two

fronts-a classic example of attritional warfare.

Redefining Sovereignties

In the postwar period, as in the one preceding it, Soviet

leaders and commentators resorted to the time-tested

principles of ideological warfare described above. Just as the

Soviet government confounded national issues and questions

in its own domain, so too did it exemplify the conduct of what

had to be an ideological-political and generally nonmilitary

war by its approach to those very questions in new areas . Both

recent and earlier studies of Soviet handling of these issues

illustrate the fundamental slipperiness of Soviet concepts . For

Soviet scholars under Stalin and until the advent of new

thinking under Gorbachev, the model of the emerging

"socialist commonwealth" in Eastern Europe was the model

for the new states in their internal policies regarding minority

peoples .

37

Then, as now, Soviet analysts proceeded from a class

analysis of sovereignty and related issues that turned these

nationality phenomena inside out. They derided bourgeois

concepts of sovereignty for excessively relying upon a

formal-legal concept rather than a political-legal concept.381n

1947 Konstantinov, a Soviet jurist and analyst, observed that

"in the present historical situation of transition from

capitalism to socialism [in Eastern Europe, sovereignty] is

primarily the right of the peoples to build Socialism and

Communism." 39 Sovereignty and related phenomena were

malleable concepts subject to historical revision depending on

the circumstances . The party, given its "superior" insight into

history, necessarily had the exclusive rights to revision of

these phenomena. As Jones observes, Soviet analysts divided

sovereignty into both internal and external manifestations .

Internally it meant proletarian (read party) supremacy at

home; externally it meant independence from capitalism . In

25
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

spite of this denigration of sovereignty and substitution of

party for class and state, foreign audiences only received the

message that Soviet-type sovereignty was the only authentic

form .

40

The knowledgeable student of Soviet history will recognize

that in 1920-21 these same arguments were used to justify the

incorporation of sovereign states and unwilling republics into

the Soviet Union and were explicitly invoked by Stalin and

Ordzhonikidze . During this interwar period, Soviet scholars

formulated the doctrine justifying military intervention to

assist other socialist movements or save endangered ones .

41

By proclaiming that the USSR alone had abolished

antagonistic classes and that its sovereignty alone was popular

at the same time as the doctrine of proletarian internationalism established the superiority of the interests of

socialism-popular sovereignty-over those of national

solidarity and sovereignty, the USSR fashioned a formidable

instrument of ideological warfare. This instrument became a

blanket justification for intervention abroad by claiming that

Moscow or its clients alone represented the "democratic will

of the peoples." After Stalin's death, Soviet spokesmen ruled

out the possibility that true sovereignty could inhere in any

class state . Inasmuch as Leninism has rigorously adhered to

the notion that war and imperialism are the inherent

birthmarks of capitalist states and, therefore, the external

manifestations of class struggle, it can only be with their

extinction that socialism comes about, as well as the true

sovereignty .

43

The stress on imparting a class character to sovereignty has

allowed the USSR to adhere to a notion of its sovereignty and

rights as a state and simultaneously endorse a diminished

sovereignty and utterly transformed notion of that concept for

other states . Aspaturian cites two sharply contrasted examples

indicating the flexibility of the USSR and its effort to assume

many guises as a subject and object of international politics .

26
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

In 1948 Stalin denounced Tito and Kardelj's attacks on Soviet

ambassadors to Yugoslavia for seeking to foment intrigues

within the Yugoslav party and to recruit anti-Tito followers

on the grounds that they treated Soviet embassy personnel like

bourgeois ambassadors. Soviet representatives were socialist

comrades who had an international duty to discuss matters

with their Yugoslav conferees . In the sixties the Soviets

accused Chinese diplomats of doing the same thing, which

was then interpreted as a violation of Leninist norms and of

international law, despite Chinese efforts to hide behind

proletarian internationalism.

44 Of course, had matters become

violent the aforementioned doctrines would have protected

Soviet interests outside its legal boundaries by virtue of a

doctrine of justified extended deterrence and defense.Or, as

a prominent Soviet jurist of the postwar period, Korovin,

stated, "A legal norm that has positive (progressive) value in

relations between capitalist states may, in a number of cases,

acquire the opposite (reactionary) character when transferred

to the relations between socialist states ." 46

It should be obvious that such ideological acrobatics

furnished Moscow with an inexhaustible repertoire of tactical

instruments for waging incessant ideological-political war

during the cold war period . Indeed, Soviet analysts made no

bones about the fact that while nuclear weapons ruled out the

inevitability of a military clash with imperialism, they only

made the ideological-political one more likely and more

intense . Peaceful coexistence accepted the danger of war and,

after 1977, even ruled out Soviet first strike in a nuclear

conflict in Brezhnev's Tula speech, but it expressly affirmed

the necessity of carrying on the struggle by all other means

wherever possible . Thus, during the Khrushchev and

Brezhnev periods, the instruments of ideological

warfare-the KGB and the International Department (ID) of

the Central Committee as well as the fronts and agents they

manipulated-were steadily expanded in range, scope, and

27
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

number . Further, enormous military spending brought the

USSR to at least a point of strategic parity and of conventional superiority to threaten and intimidate Western forces

even as the Soviets exploited every avenue of access to

Western societies .

Although the USSR accepted an explicit mandate to wage

ideological warfare everywhere, the Soviets, nonetheless,

staunchly displayed outrage at any such effort directed against

them from the outside . The patent to this technique was theirs,

and as long as they could maintain it, they would succeed

greatly in world affairs . This foreshadowing of the Brezhnev

Doctrine was meant to convey the impression that the Soviet

bloc was off limits . The struggle was to be waged on neutral

or enemy territory, another example of the operational

offensive by nonmilitary means under the guise of a defensive

and perhaps preemptive doctrine.

This struggle-known as the cold war-may have ended

with the revolutions of 1989-90 in Eastern Europe and

Nicaragua, but it engendered the worldwide diffusion of these

techniques of ideological political warfare so that now every

insurgent group has access to them . They are no longer of

strict Soviet provenance . Also, there are reasons for

suspecting that lurking inside the new thinking of the

Gorbachev regime and its policies is much of the old

technique uneasily coexisting with a new approach to world

politics .

Some Global Implications of

the Brezhnev Doctrine

From a cursory examination of Brezhnev's overall foreign

policies, we can see the taking up of old ideas and the

reworking of them for the purposes of prosecuting the ongoing

struggle globally . Khrushchev and Brezhnev built their

28
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

policies around the same set of inherited principles

concerning the nation and the class as political manifestations,

the inevitability of global struggle (if not nuclear war or

intersystemic war), and the substantial upgrading of the

instruments and techniques of subversion, proxies,

intelligence, covert operations, terrorism, and so forth.

Though the Brezhnev Doctrine was the most notorious

example of the revision of sovereignty by Leninist leaders, it

was hardly created anew in 1968 . Indeed, many of the

elements that went into its fabrication in 1968 emerged in

Soviet commentary about the abortive Hungarian revolution

of 1956. These statements portrayed that revolution as an

anti-Soviet act of the bourgeois class and not of the nation .

Moreover, the revolution was strongly supported and

inspired, so commentators said, from abroad; thus, it was

essentially an act of class warfare. Such commentary again

exposed the Soviet attempt to fuse for itself the idea of nation

and class inherent in Italian Fascism while denying the reality

of nationhood to its subject states . As part of this ideological

operation, the concept of proletarian and/or socialist

internationalism was reborn. This concept's touchstones were

loyalty and fidelity to the socialist fatherland, exactly as in

Stalin's time . As Jones observes,

In the aftermath of the Hungarian crisis, the Soviet theory of "socialist

international relations" was reformulated on the basis of the following

assumptions : firstly, the qualitatively superior nature of socialist

international relations ; secondly, harmony, deriving from an absence

of "antagonistic contradictions" between and within socialist

countries; thirdly, the "drawing together" of socialist countries,

resulting from objective processes of development ; fourth, mutual

fraternal aid, given disinterestedly and not deriving from motives of

self-interest; fifth, the beneficent role of the Soviet Union within the

camp . The enunciation of these concepts showed that, far from causing

a "retreat from ideology" bloc crises are more likely to precipitate a

shift in Soviet theory towards concepts putatively derived from

Marxist-Leninism .

29
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Thus, as he notes, innovations in Soviet theorizing tend to derive

from crises in the bloc which precipitate a return to earlier motifs,

form a relaxation of controls, andenlarge the space wherein public

debate may occur-both of the latter being the twin catalysts of

Gorbachev's new thinking .

As part of the new doctrine, Soviet international lawyers

asserted that socialist internationalism, like proletarian

internationalism previously, was a higher sphere whose

precepts took precedence over the mundane precepts of

bourgeois international law. Thus concepts of political life

such as sovereignty meant entirely different things to socialist

than to nonsocialist states . 49 The proclamation of the

Brezhnev Doctrine as rationalization ex post facto of the

invasion of Czechoslovakia and its defense a week later by

Gromyko at the United Nations reflected this Soviet effort to

graft ideological principles onto established juridical codes of

international conduct and transform them into something

opposite than what they were. The socialist commonwealth

became a distinct ideological and political community that

operated under its own dispensation making it immune from

normal rules of intervention and sovereignty. Socialist states,

individually and collectively, have invisible ideological

frontiers which may be violated if it is determined that

outsiders, through equally invisible means, transgress against

them . Moscow arrogated to itself the right to violate the

formal legal state sovereignty to preserve the higher

political-legal ideological sovereignty.

50 In this connection

Robert Jones cites several sources which compare the

Brezhnev Doctrine to other doctrines legitimating ideological

intervention : the Holy Alliance, the Monroe Doctrine after

1900, Nazi doctrines associated with Karl Schmitt, imperial

Japanese doctrines, and others of that stripe . 51 The significance is not the fact of their comparability but the fact that

this indicates the ideological process of transplantation or

borrowing from one brand of dictatorship to the other. Just as

30
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

Soviet and fascist doctrine intersected when Soviet

ideologists fused class with nation, so too did they begin a

process of ideological commingling that has continued with

the advent of third-world states whose rulers indiscriminately

amalgamate the legacies of Lenin, Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler,

and Mao for their own purposes .

The significance of the Brezhnev Doctrine is that it

constituted the ideological-political rationale for a policy

which married ideology, instruments of subversion, and direct

force in Europe, the US, and the third world. The aggressive

policies of 1967-82 were all undertaken in the name of that

doctrine and those that spawned as a result of the search for

means of power abroad, such as states of socialist orientation,

vanguard parties, the international mission of the Red Army

abroad, and so forth . Although today Brezhnev's policies are

under withering attack, it is clear that the instruments he

perfected are still being used, and the ideological principles

upon which he based himself are, to some extent, only

reformulated and partially revised. They coexist uneasily with

new ideas that may well be new and, in the Soviet context,

revolutionary concerning world politics .

Under Brezhnev, an extensive superstructure was

constructed upon the foundations that had previously existed .

This "building program," parallel with the "peace program"

enunciated at the XXIV Party Congress in 1971, comprised

many military, political, institutional, and ideological

elements that helped to permanently institutionalize a

collective security scheme for the promotion of Soviet aims

abroad (revolutionary and nonrevolutionary) and the

promotion of the instrumental infrastructure for carrying it

out. These elements were as follows:

l . An extensive and continuing buildup of tactical and

strategic nuclear weapons systems, both offensive and (in

research) defensive, to obtain parity with the United States and
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

deter the US from using nuclear weapons against Moscow for

fear of equivalent retaliation .

2. An equally extensive conventional buildup and

modernization that not only sought to obtain an enduring

conventional superiority in Europe to intimidate the NATO

allies but also invested heavily in the accoutrements of power

projection in order to develop a capacity for intervention

beyond the USSR's security glacis . This capacity was then used

in a long-term, graduated program of increasing military

intervention abroad from 1965 to 1979 .

3. A similarly extensive and unremitting buildup of both the

status and the intensity of the KGB's role in foreign affairs. This

systematic effort entailed not only the gathering of espionage

agents and information but also gun running; triggering of

coups by covert agents of influence; manipulation of various

fronts and media abroad ; the use of the International

Department of the Central Committees of the Communist Party

of the Soviet Union as a constant source of contact with foreign

Communists; oversight of the satellite states' security services

operations to gain control or train new Communist countries'

elites in security service operations ; penetration of the UN and

its associated agencies; the provision of training, financial, and

arms support to terrorist groups; and the creation of a "solar

system" of organizations to camouflage Soviet involvement in

terror operations, drug running, and finally "wet affairs" (i .e .,

assassinations of enemies of the USSR including heads of state

and the Pope).

4. As a result of the isomorphic duplication by satellite

states of Soviet institutional structures, those states were called

upon to provide major logistic and institutional support along

the same lines . Cuba and East Germany particularly

distinguished themselves in the intensity and ubiquity of their

provision of soldiers or security personnel to new conquests of

socialism . In so doing they replicated the structures of the

USSR and demonstrated the fundamental continuity with their

32
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

predecessors in the twenties who also created secret police and

party organizations within the "open" or overt organization to

exercise terror and ideological control, and to further extend

subversion and recruit covert agents for the apparat. 52

5 . The Brezhnev regime vastly altered Soviet aid programs

abroad to place an enormous stress on the transfer of arms to

key states and areas both by overt sales and credits and by

covert transfers-often done through terrorists or other

clandestine operations .

These were the instruments and the players depicted in

brief, and from this outline one can see the elaboration of a

global struggle of unremitting steadiness and intensity to

expand the Soviet sphere abroad . Despite the critiques of the

Brezhnev era and the new policies of the Gorbachev era

associated with the new thinking, this infrastructure has only

been tuned down in its intensity and frequency, not

fundamentally disbanded . For instance, North Korea and

Vietnam, not to mention the worldwide fronts providing cash

to the Philippine New People's Army, actively abet the

revolution in the Philippines . The same holds true for

Nicaragua's Sandinista front operations and support for El

Salvador's revolution, which may be diverted with the

anti-Sandinista election outcomes there .

This strategy-clearly an integrated one-went on despite

the sincere protest of Moscow that it was interested in and

faithful to a policy of peaceful coexistence . And by its lights,

so 'it was. The difference with our understanding lies in the

fact that ideas are utterly subservient to their political meaning

and context for Moscow and are thus always relativized to suit

the needs of the cause at the time . Any study of the uses or

definitions of the term "peaceful coexistence" under Brezhnev

demonstrates a wide conformity in policy-making circles of

understanding that it pertained only to nuclear and

high-intensity theater conventional warfare, not to the

advancement of socialism by all means abroad . Moreover,

3 3
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

violence, if needed, was clearly sanctioned as a legitimate

instrument for attaining these goals .

As part of the ramified network of agencies and institutions

carrying out these policies, Soviet leaders and commentators

also fashioned a series of interlocking ideological precepts

which both explained and justified these organizations'

activities . The observations on peaceful coexistence were

buttressed by the following notions :

1 . It was primarily due to the Soviet Union and particularly

its rise to military power and parity with America that thirdworld countries owed their independence-the implication

being that Moscow-centered policies and outlooks determined

events in the third world .

2 . The worldwide correlation of forces was inevitably

moving towards the superiority of socialism, and imperialism

had been forced to recognize that it could not easily export

counterrevolution or compete with the USSR on military

grounds alone. Thus "the forces of peace and progress" were

gradually conquering position after position.

3 . Opposing the "export of revolution," the USSR nonetheless regarded itself as the exclusive and natural supporter in

active terms of the worldwide revolutionary process and also

resolutely opposed the export of "counterrevolution" by

imperialism .

4. Although third-world states could not become socialist

overnight, they could succeedparticularly by control through

a radicalized army-in erecting "states of socialist orientation"

and forming vanguard parties to rule in these states. These

parties and states then qualified for Soviet assistance .

5 . They qualified for such assistance because of the mission

of proletarian internationalism which subsumed the Brezhnev

Doctrine of limited sovereignty and which granted the right of

intervention abroad to Moscow .

6. This right of intervention abroad to materialize

proletarian internationalism found its realization in the

34
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

"internationalist and liberating mission" of the Soviet armed

forces . Now released from inhibitions of competing with

the US due to the attainment of parity and American

post-Vietnam demoralization, the Soviets could, when

conditions were favorable, decide a contest as in Angola and

the Horn of Africa, and seek to do so in Afghanistan.

At the foundation of all these outlooks were the fundamental irreconcilability of socialism with the international

status quo, the need to devise a total strategy to unhinge this

status quo even while using it for maximum advantage, the

reliance on political and ostensibly nonmilitary factors in

order to militarize world politics and domestic politics

everywhere if possible, and the re-creation of a counterreality .

This re-creation of reality along imposed ideological lines can

be glimpsed from Nicholas Podgorny's observations in 1977

when, while surveying the lands of Southern Africa, he said

that the boundaries of Zimbabwe and South Africa were not

national ones but class boundaries . In other words, the usual

confusion of class and nation lay at the bottom of Soviet

perceptions here as well .

The power such perspectives exercised over not only

Moscow but the entire movement globally can be found in a

study done for the journal of the movement and the

International Department, World Marxist Review, concurrently with the 1979 revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan

that sought to explain those revolutions and recommend their

successful prosecution. The authors of this study were at pains

to refute the idea that the end of formal colonial empires

rendered the need for "anti-imperialist struggle" superfluous .

The rulers of Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan then shared a

common tendency to impose capitalism from above and

thereby to tie their countries into the world capitalist system

in an artificial, nonindigenous manner. The revolutionary

process in these countries is a blend of universal "laws" with

national peculiarities in each state .

35
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Among these peculiarities are national relations and

religious beliefs of the masses, which are the "new material"

of politics, the character of whose political use depends on the

stage of the revolution, the alignment of political forces, and

so forth . For example, in Afghanistan's case, its sovereignty

was distinguished by its being independent from imperialism,

a situation stemming from its ties with the USSR, and one

materially influencing the key political actor, the army . The

authors of this study emphasized the critical importance of

bringing about a national revolutionary crisis in social and

economic life to undermine the traditional religious

consciousness of Afghanistan while also co-opting Islamic

clergy wherever possible, exactly as in the case of Soviet

Central Asia. An equal stress was laid on the nationality

question there . It was singled out as the motivating factor in

antigovernment rebellions which were-as is always the

case-stimulated from abroad. "In this situation it is of special

importance to achieve real national unity and equality, whose

institutional forms can be diverse ." 54 This unity would result

from a comprehensive publishing, education, and socioeconomic policy to raise all nationalities to the same

socioeconomic level, more precisely, social engineering on a

grand, revolutionary, and coercive scale . Such policies are of

significance not only for Afghanistan but throughout the

Middle East where national issues are salient, particularly the

targets of Soviet designs: Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and

Israel .

The predictable reaction of the Afghans to such programs

was not seen officially, at this time, as the fault of Soviet

policy or that of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

(PDPA) . The same concept held true for other regional

conflicts . Philip Nel identified six linked notions that

supported this ideological superstructure .
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

1 . Stability in the third world is artificial . Anticolonial

revolutions are historically inevitable and inherently

progressive, and therefore they merit Soviet support.

2 . Wars of national liberation have a similar justification

and provenance .

3. Imperialist meddling and intervention alone are

responsible for the diversion of "the natural course" of

third-world development into wars and the stimulation of a

threatening international environment.

4. No connection exists between Soviet behavior in the

third world (or Europe) and detente .

5 . Regional conflicts need not necessarily escalate into

superpower confrontations .

6. In some regional conflicts, "political solutions" are

desirable.

Since Brezhnev, all of these points have either been refuted

or come under serious attack. But lasting damage was done

to the world order by the Brezhnev policies described herein.

Two examples are the insurgencies continuing in Central

America and in the Philippines . These highlight the collective

security or use of surrogates to promote global revolutionary

war. In the Philippines there is mounting evidence of North

Korean, Vietnamese, and Soviet arms transfers, training,

financial subventions, expanded intelligence operations, and

massive Soviet propaganda to the area in the last five years .

At the same time, if one examines the revolutionary movements

in Grenada to 1983, and El Salvador's and the Sandinistas's

record in Nicaragua, one finds a long-standing organizational

network involving Cuba, Libya, Iran, North Korea, Vietnam,

the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Colombian

M-19, the Basque terrorists, Italy's Red Brigades, the West

German Baader-Meinhof gang, the Irish Republican Army

(IRA), and even-many claim-international drug figures .

Manuel Noriega's laundering of Cuban currency and stockpiling of weapons in Panama may well have been tied in to

37
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

this kind of activity.

58 In Cuba's case the provision of arms,

troops, and advisors-both technicians and security

services-brought about a situation in both Central America

and Africa of microdependency, to use Ali Mazrui's term .

This microdependency of the host countries upon Cuba was

both organizational and ideological . Its explicit aim was to

further the "anti-imperialist cause." But inasmuch as Cuba's

constitution, in direct violation of the UN charter, calls for

open support for wars of national liberation, such a process in

effect (and Mazrui's evaluation was a favorable one for

Africa) made Africa and Central America ideological and

international battlegrounds . 59 This was Castro's-if not

Moscow's-aim; and from 1975 to the present, the wars in

both locales decidedly fanned the flames of international

conflict . But however one cuts it, dependency remains

dependency (i .e ., the undermining of national sovereignty,

exactly the point we made earlier) . Confusing issues on

questions relating to national and international affairs lead

thinkers and politically influential elites to lose sight of reality

and substitute others' terms and definitions for reality or to

whitewash what they normally condemn.

Apart from the globalization of the international state of

siege and its intensification under Brezhnev, a second major

tactic was the creation and support of an extensive terrorist

network depicted in works by Claire Sterling, Paul Henze, and

many others . For instance, Theodore Draper noted in 1981 that

the Soviet embassy in Washington confirmed that Moscow

transshipped arms to Cuba for further shipment abroad with

no restrictions on their ultimate destination .

60 Similarly,

Spanish officials reported in 1980 that Gromyko told them

that Moscow would help with their terrorist problem if they

refrained from joining NATO, but Gromyko also implied that

entry into NATO might leave Spain vulnerable to more

terrorism . 61 By April 1980 the Soviet ambassador to Paris,

Stepan Chervonenko, who had served as ambassador to

3 8
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

Prague in 1968, warned a French audience that Moscow could

"not permit another Chile" and further stated that any country

on the globe "has the full right to choose its friends and allies,

and if it becomes necessary, to repel with them the threat

of a counterrevolution or foreign intervention ." 62 Thus the

Brezhnev regime, towards the end of its life, staked a claim

to the universalization of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the

concepts of foreordained struggle and proletarian internationalism upon which it was based. From this vantage point,

one could easily foresee a global civil war-but one fought

with psychological, political, covert, and small-scale

operations characteristic of low-intensity conflicts or fought

by conventional conflicts among superpower proxies-in

other words a universal version of the state of siege introduced

by Lenin.

Leninism as Permanent Low-Intensity Conflict

A recent article on low-intensity conflict uses the work of

Alexander Atkinson and reflections on Maoist doctrines of

warfare to make the point that, in our times, war is an invasion

of the social order-what Gen J . F. C. Fuller called the

"retribalizing of warfare." In this view the point of warfare is

the forcible effort to dissolve one social order and its moral,

social, and political foundations . If the insurgent succeeds in

tearing apart the fabric of relations upon which a society or

the society of states rests, then, in this view, violence can

serve as the midwife of a new order legitimized by military

success. Thus low-intensity conflict, applied globally,

becomes a basis for the raising of this conception of warfare

to the global level . If the ultimate goal of such warfare is the

creation of a new social order, we encounter a total war

targeted against the legitimacy and consensual basis of a

society or the international order as a whole, not just soldiers .

39
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Everyone is somehow drawn into this war either physically or

psychologically.

63 Certainly this kind of warfare is more

analogous to the overall pattern adduced above for the

Brezhnev period than the scenarios of conventional theater

war or strategic nuclear warfare.

The importance of the moral factor so heavily stressed by

the Soviets, and now seen to be unraveling rapidly, stems from

the awareness that morale is the key to the endurance needed

to win such wars . Hence the decision to commit forces in bulk

to combat is the most dangerous one of all for a state . For such

a war to be successful, it is imperative that the populace be

convinced of the justness of the war. Should the opposite be

true for the population or the army, disaster is in the

air-witness Afghanistan. Accordingly the Soviet Union has

tried-generally, with the exception of the Brezhnev period's

delusions of grandeur-to limit the use of its troops abroad.

As Christopher Jones points out, Soviet writers before 1975

knew that motivating the troops needed for limited wars with

the belief in its justness is inherently difficult and

problematical. With the aftermath of Afghanistan ringing in

our ears as the Soviet army undergoes its greatest internal

crisis in decades, the justness of his observation is telling .

"The military experts of the USSR come close to stating that,

in going to war, Soviet leaders run the risk of a domestic

political crisis if Soviet citizens come to view the war as an

aggressive unjust campaign ." 64 In Christopher Jones's study

of the Russo-Polish War of 1920 as a case in which the Soviets

mistakenly underplayed or underassessed the political

dimension and stressed military conquest, he states the views

offered by the military historian P. V. Suslov in 1930 .

What Suslov offers is a demonstration of the proposition of Soviet

military theory that war is the pursuit of specific political objectives;

that the political objectives of the war determine the moral-political

factor on both sides of the battlefield ; that this factor has a great impact

on the success of military operations ; that nationalism is one of the

most important components of the moral-political factor; and that

40
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

Soviet leaders will not pursue a war that appears to be "unjust" if they

are worried about the stability of the home front .

The foregoing analysis indicates just how intimately

ideological revisions of national issues are bound to the sole

available Soviet strategy of limited but continuous revolu

tionary struggle on the world scene. As the lessons and

techniques of such warfare are diffused to insurgents and

terrorists the world over, the opportunities for strikes across

borders (terrorism on the high seas or at airports) become too

temptingly easy to reject. But the oversight of such a strategy

by the USSR on a daily and global basis requires a functioning

organization of great scope and extension. Before 1943 this

role was played by the Comintern, operating in tandem with

the secret services, party, and army ; since then it has been the

function of the International Department of the Central

Committee.

During the Brezhnev years, under the long-time Comintern

and ID stalwart, Boris Ponomarev, this organization built up

and monitored on a daily basis an enormous infrastructure

binding European and third-world parties, fronts, and terrorist

organizations into an apparently cohesive network. A recent

article detailing the ID's role in the eighties notes that its

activities were so subtle, quiet, "benign," and incremental that

they largely eluded foreign commentary .

66 Apart from formal

state relations conducted through embassies, the USSR,

operating through the ID, instituted a regular and extensive

practice of party-party ties through which it could exercise

much greater supervision over parties as far away as Grenada

than it could through state channels . Often treaties of

friendship with selected third-world states provided the basis

for such regularized party-party contacts and subventions. A

veritable solar system-Comintern veteran Otto Kuusinen's

term-of peace and front groups including doctors and rock

musicians provides another channel of influence and control .

The pervasive tendency towards isomorphic reproduction of

4 1
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Soviet-type structures found an echo here in that the Grenada

regime sought to duplicate these kinds of activities in seeking

to establish influence over Belize and Suriname, another

instance of microdependency. 67 The heavy work load led to

the increasing bureaucratization of the ID, whose mandate

was the expansion of contacts and insertion of agents, as

Stanislav Levchenko testifies from his own experience in

Japan. This fit in well with Ponomarev's uncompromising

adherence of global class war and with the institutional regime

that evolved thereby. Thus by the time of Gorbachev's advent

to power, a well-oiled-if over-bureaucratic-machine was at

his disposal . 68 The ID, as exemplar of world revolution,

remained convinced of the power of Communist ideals and

ideology-as does Castro today, sitting in increasingly

unsplendid isolation-and missed no chance to use it to win

over, or to appear to win over, third parties .

69

New Thinking and the Crisis of Leninism

In the eighties, crises due to economic and technological

stagnation, arteriosclerosis of the apparat, the costs of arms,

the technological arms race against the US and the entire

West, and the failure of the war in Afghanistan forced an

accelerated process of reassessment upon the Soviet

leadership . This reassessment, the new thinking, was forced

upon the USSR as a result of the spreading awareness that not

only was its superpower position endangered, but that its

competitive status as one of many great powers was equally

at risk. This realization, abetted by a vigorously reforming

leadership, has led to what Shakhnazarov calls "a ruthless

scuttling of dogmas ." As a result, the new thinking and the

policies associated with it since 1985 in many ways constitute

a revolutionary break with the past. But side by side with those

elements, there exist compelling traditional or unresolved

42
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

elements that introduce a cautionary or contradictory tone into

this thinking . Moreover, as uprisings in El Salvador in

November 1989, the continuation of the war over Eritrea, the

intifadah in Israel, the Cambodian civil war, and Korean

tensions raised by the discovery of a fourth tunnel into the

Republic of Korea all indicate these techniques and policies

of revolutionary warfare are still with us . Should a reversal

occur in world politics, there are actors like Fidel Castro who

would be only too willing to revert to past practices and

policies .

Gorbachev's policies are undoubtedly fundamentally

different and more concessionary than what was the case

before . The new thinking also lays claim to being a

revolutionary departure in policy perspectives . Several

ideational strands comprise this fabric of perspectives on

international relations .

1 . Security is mutual, that is both superpowers' security is

interdependent with each other's. The actions of one naturally

impinge directly upon the other . Accordingly, they cannot act

in isolation from one another. Events in one sector-for

instance, the Horn of Africa-affect others .

2. Security cannot be achieved unilaterally by purely

military means. Indeed, such a course fuels the arms race and

military confrontation, which could lead to nuclear catastrophe,

to use the voguish Soviet term . Instead both superpowers must

seek to negotiate and achieve political solutions to problems

ranging from regional conflict to conventional and strategic

disarmament.

3. Regional conflicts must be resolved by purely political

means that sanctify freedom of choice for the states involved

to pursue whatever line of domestic politics they choose . The

process by which these conflicts must come to an end is

renamed a "balance of interests," which means that all the

combatants and regional powers affected by conflict in their

area must jointly participate in the process of bringing about

43
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

solutions . Equally importantly, arms transfers and foreign

intervention in these conflicts must be ruled out. The UN and

its component agencies can play important roles in the conflict

resolution process. These conflicts are seen as dangerous

because they could lead to exacerbation of superpower tensions

across the board as they did a decade and more ago.

4. All states must enjoy freedom of choice-the Soviet

term-in choosing their form of government free of outside

intervention .

5. The processes of conflict resolution and intensified

dialogue must be buttressed by a deideologization of foreign

relations which sees the other side's interests as legitimate ones

that merit consideration and serious dialogue . This

deideologization entails a rethinking of peaceful coexistence,

which is now altered (or so it is claimed) from previous

understandings of the term that saw no difference between

-classes -and- states -hrthisregardannn-wwhich also-sam-Wfe_nte as

furthering class struggle abroad.

6. The process should culminate in a system of universal or

comprehensive security, including economic security from

foreign intervention, joint cooperation, a strengthened UN,

total nuclear disarmament, and greater authority for

international legal agencies.

7. Underpinning the entire conception is not only the

realization of the changed nature of superpower security

outlined in paragraphs 1 and 2, but also an awareness of the

primacy of the human interest in peace, which transcends that

of the class struggle and obliges the USSR to wage a struggle

for peace and take a responsible stance for the common interest

of all peoples.

70

Much of this perspective is a radical departure from past

rhetoric . Firstly, no longer is class struggle transposed from

internal politics of states to nations, as in Stalin's case .

71

Secondly, no longer is the world fatalistically divided into a

struggle based on ideology between two camps. Collaboration

44
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

with the United States expands to include a broader agenda

than simply averting nuclear war. Not only is reconciliation

with the US and the West possible, for many it is positively

indicated and necessary. Some analysts like Kortunov go so

far as to see the US and USSR as natural partners-his term .

Others like Georgii and Aleksei Arbatov also endorse a more

collaborative approach to the US ranging from issues of

ecology to strategic weapons programs . This series of views

did not originate magically with Gorbachev . They were

already present among analysts' writing during Brezhnev's

and Andropov's tenure in the less prominent journals where

they might elude careful scrutiny by the powers that be . The

ideas of economic interdependence and the need to

collaborate with the United States to shape a new global order

antedate 1985 .3

Even so, these ideas came into play as the USSR faced a

conjuncture of a profound socioeconomic and moral crisis at

home, not to mention an inability to sustain its great-power

role in military-technological competition or the ideological

one . Indeed, one of the reasons for the new thinking is

precisely the need to find a new means by which to manage

the terms of ideological debate with the West . Hamann and

his interlocutor, Evgeni Novikov, observe that the need to find

a language in which to address the West forced this reversion

to new thinking which appropriates terms from Western

writers, radicals and nonradicals alike .

74 Soviet militarypolitical commentators agree that the unprecedented threat the

USSR faced at the time and the dead end to which previous

policies had led forced a revision of the USSR's political

thinking . Indeed, by 1988, Soviet writers were penning

apocalyptic essays stating that it was the last chance for the

USSR to remain a great power, not a superpower, if they

adopted the new spiritual and intellectual perspectives

associated with perestroika .

76 Today the signs of a real

decline in Soviet international power are evident everywhere

45
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

and acknowledged-a fact which underlies the concessionary

basis of Gorbachev's policy in Europe .

Nonetheless the points outlined as being the essential ones

of new thinking do not validate many of the techniques and

policies of the past. Calls for overall denuclearization, claims

that Soviet military doctrine is defensive, calls for a common

European home, and so forth are all ideas that go back to

Brezhnev's time . Indeed, many of the same commentators as

then are the ones promoting such goals today. In many cases

their mission is just the same as before: disinformation and/or

propaganda, telling the West what it wants to hear. Thus,

despite calls for denuclearization, the Soviet nuclear arsenal

and strategic systems are being modernized and improved;

and the same is true of their navy and air forces . Although the

ground forces are being reduced numerically, the intention is

to upgrade their actual quality and striking power by use of

new technologies and automated systems.

The KGB abroad has not been clipped, although its

orientation towards technological espionage evidently has

been reinforced . The Soviet security service still takes an

active role in spreading disinformation through active

measures and forgeries . Drug running and arms transfers to

third-world clients, though down in some cases, are up in

others-Cambodia and Afghanistan. What does seem to be the

case in policy terms is retrenchment and retreat, as Kortunov

and Izyumov put it, to prepared defensive positions .

77

Novikov observes that the cardinal tenet in practice of the

policy of new thinking is to seek rapprochement with

influential elites everywhere regardless of their ideology .

78

The ideas and practices of the new thinking exhibit the

intention to put forth an ideological program and insinuate it

into the public debate to advance rather traditional goals. This

becomes clear when one examines the words of the leaders of

Soviet foreign policy . Foreign Minister Shevarnadze

explicitly unlinked peaceful coexistence from class struggle

46
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

in his speech to the July 1988 Ministry of Foreign Affairs .

Class struggles constitute the stuff of domestic politics ; but

they must not rule interstate politics, which is based on

searches for common ground-overall human interests .

Although this contrasts sharply with Ligachev's call for

continuing the class-based foreign policy, over 20 years ago

Brezhnev observed that the struggle for peace had moved to

the forefront of the struggle for socialism . 79 Both Yakovlev

and Gorbachev intimate that they see themselves as purveyors

of an ideological program that is in a state of contest with the

West . Gorbachev, at his Sorbonne speech in July 1989,

charged that socialism still had to contend with the misplaced

bourgeois belief that socialism was no more than a mistake

whose time had come. Instead, while disclaiming an effort to

reinterpret history, Gorbachev states that the West even

borrowed ideas and concepts from bolshevism to better fight

against it . 80 Yakovlev also charged that the West is seeking to

insinuate the destruction of socialism-a charge that he

refuses to believe . He points to Western social welfare

practices as being borrowed from socialism .

81

This line of argument indicates a consciousness of

ideological struggle precisely because it seeks to evade the

real issue of democracy versus totalitarian dictatorship .

Moreover, the social welfare reforms of the West preceded the

October Revolution and far surpass what the USSR offers its

citizens in terms of quality of life. Henry Trofimenko, in a

recent article, develops this line and exclaims that Marx's

thought, untainted by Stalinism, is an integral part of the

liberal tradition much as the thought of such Russian thinkers

as Herzen, Tolstoy, Dostoevskii, Berdyayev, and so on.

82 The

fact is that none of these men were liberals, and all had nothing

but scorn and derision for liberalism-and Trofimenko knows

it . Trofimenko and both Arbatovs have, like many others,

adapted their line to the instructions of the hour and to the task

of talking to Westerners in their own language . The message

47
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

is that ideological conflict should be superseded and that all

peoples should adopt the new version of peaceful coexistence

which rests on the universal acknowledgment of the

superiority of general human interests . Similarly, both the

Reagan and Brezhnev doctrines should be abandoned, with

strict freedom of choice for all peoples being implemented. 83

These recommendations and those of many other

commentators indicate that new thinking aims to advance

many of the same interests as before : a Soviet point of view

and Soviet-imposed regimes in the third world. Soviet aid to

its clients in Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Angola has grown

steadily in the last five years. Deputy Foreign Minister

Pyadyshev recently commented to a roundtable of Soviet and

American former officials that the key to resolving these

regional conflicts is the removal of the foreign element (which

does not mean removal of foreign party-party relations) and

implementation of the made-in-Moscow formula of national

reconciliation governments .

84

Were the aforementioned sources not evidence enough of

an ideological struggle, the fact that Gorbachev and his coterie

are so active in engaging the foreign and Soviet media with

accounts of new thinking should lead one to suspect that we

have a strongly intellectualized approach to political struggle .

The relentless attack of Soviet writers against the ideas

associated with nuclear deterrence as well as their critique of

the Brezhnev era's policies as ideologically unsound should

alert us to the tremendous appeal of an attractive, realistic,

and Western-sounding program . Indeed, much of the

outpouring of argumentation on the part of Soviet military

intellectuals and civilian analysts represents an officially

sponsored effort to manage the terms of doctrinal debate better

than in the seventies when the offensiveness of Soviet

doctrine was used against Soviet interests .

85
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

Conclusions

The language of freedom of choice in the new thinking has

a Western ring to it . But essentially it is an effort to get the

West to sign onto a principle that is solidly established in

Soviet thought about its national interests, namely that its

sovereignty will not be diminished by outside intervention or

pressure . Thus while the Soviets desperately seek Western aid

and material assistance, the USSR still demands a sanction to

do as it pleases and deceive the world about its actions-as in

Lithuania, where it is ostensibly refraining from the "use of

force ." 86 Whereas one might point to the Soviet decision to

renounce its empire in the course of the revolutions of 1989

in Eastern Europe as evidence of a revolution, it is enough to

observe that though the changes are real in Soviet foreign

policy, there is much evidence for suspecting that this restraint

was a calculated strategy . After all, Gorbachev played a major

role in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, and

Hungary in facilitating change or undermining the old regime,

a fact which inclines one to see Soviet policy as a deliberate

strategy there . By the same token, the exhaustion of Leninist

ideas about foreign relations and the export of revolution

coincides with the open bankruptcy of the internal approach

to the national question . Thus the dialectics of both sides

of this question have dropped away-as in Lithuania-to

reveal a struggle framed linguistically not by assertions of

proletarian internationalism but by the more traditional

language of power and sovereignty . Despite the exhaustion

of Leninism as an inspiration in Europe, the prevalence of

these techniques of revolution, terrorism, and flouting of

traditional norms of international law has migrated to

third-world revolutionaries and regimes and has been

solidly assimilated into their native traditions .

Though the Marxist-Leninist spirit has departed, its

techniques and operational code have passed into history and

49
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

thus are available to all who wish to utilize them, a factor

which explains the continued intensity of the struggle in

El Salvador (until last year), Cambodia, Angola, and

Afghanistan, as well as the many conflicts in the Near and

Middle East . Analysts who foresee continuing resort to

low-intensity conflict in the third world as the distinct form

of combat in this decade or worry about higher-intensity

forms of warfare among powerfully armed third-world

states have reason to be concerned for the future . In

international affairs, the main thrust of Leninism was to

impose a regime of total war on Russia as a means of

putting the non-Socialist world under a permanent

condition of a "state of siege ." So, too, these potentially

belligerent states reject a Western-derived order and

impose quasi-Leninist systems of rule upon their peoples

in order to remain highly militant and belligerent regimes .

In many ways many of these states are in a permanent state

of war against their own and other peoples . This condition

is not likely to end soon as nationalist and ethnoreligious

disputes probably will intensify during this decade .

It would be a great dialectical irony if a doctrine of war and

technique of rule whose avowed aim was internationalism

becomes the textbook for concurrent conflicts of a funda

mentally nationalist basis . But such a turn of events would

reflect nothing more than the fusion of class with nation

imminent in the October Revolution's "theology" and Stalin's

practice . Even in the USSR these techniques of struggle are

now harnessed to a system whose leader talks in terms of

permanent national interests, not internationalist ones. In any

case, the damage is done and probably irreversible given the

conceptual confusion and short attention span of Western

societies . No consensus on international order exists or is

likely to exist soon. Even the idea of such an order resting on

shared values seems quixotic for all the talk of new thinking.

While the Leninist virus is dying out, its newer strains are

50
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

already on the scene, and the continuing inability to uproot it

from the third world or even potentially from Eastern Europe

suggests a continuing invasion of the Western order by alien

germs .

Though one chapter is closing on Russian and Soviet

approaches to conflict, there is no guarantee that another is

not opening . Its potential, in tandem with what is developing

in the third world, does not necessarily inspire confidence . If

LIC is the wave of the future and Moscow still supports its

clients strongly and arms others, then gentlemen may cry

peace, but there is no peace . There are only intermittent truces

in a long night of rising and ebbing conflict . The USSR may

well retreat from center stage as a sponsor of global conflict,

but the drama goes on with other actors . Conflicts and the

states of siege they involve may become more localized and

less global in scope, but they will be much more intense and

stubbornly rooted affairs than previously . Indeed, they may

even spread to the soil of the USSR itself; and the outbreak of

ethnoreligious and national conflict whose roots are centuries

deep, in a land of 25,000 nuclear warheads, portends

something far more terrible than a state of siege .

Notes

l . Adda B . Bozeman, "Political Intelligence in Non-Western Societies:

Suggestions for Comparative Research," in Comparing Foreign

Intelligence : The US, the USSR, the UK & the Third World, ed. Roy Godson

(Washington, D.C. : Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987), 135-36 .

2. Ibid.

3. Adda B . Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas," Orbis 20, no. 1

(Spring 1976) : 73 .

4. Ibid.

5 . Ibid.

6. Leninskii Sbornik (Moscow : Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo,

1924-1980), 30, 194.

7 . Ibid., iii, 461 .

8. Ibid., vi, 9 .

51
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

9. Ibid., xii, 58-59.

10. V. 1. Lenin o Natsional'nom i Natsional'nom-Kolonial'nom

Voprose (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1956), 13 ; V. I . Lenin, Polnoe Sobranie

Sochineniia (Moscow : Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi

Literatury, 1958-1965, 28), 16.

11 . 1 . V. Stalin, Sochineniia (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1946-1951), iv,

7-9, 31-32, 85-96.

12. Vernon V. Aspaturian, Power and Process in Soviet Foreign Policy

(Boston, Mass. : Little, Brown, & Co ., 1971), 411 .

13 . Cited in Alvin Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, "Western and

Communist Attitudes Toward Conflict" (PhD diss ., University of

Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1960), 51 .

14. Robert C. Tucker, ed ., The Lenin Anthology (New York: W. W.

Norton & Co ., 1975), 550-618 .

15. Ibid., 538 .

16. Ibid., 619-27.

17. Ibid., 634 .

18. Stephen Blank, "Soviet Nationality Policy and Soviet Foreign Policy:

The Case of Poland 1917-1921," International History Review 7, no. 1

(February 1985): 103-28 .

19. Wiktor Suchecki, "Controversial Problems in Research on Soviet

Federalism" (Paper presented to the VI World Congress of the International

Political Science Association, Geneva, Switzerland, September 1964), 8 .

20. Robert Kelley, "Soviet Policy on the European Border," Foreign

Affairs 3, no. 1 (September 1924) : 92 .

21 . Historicus, "Stalin on Revolution," Foreign Affairs 27, no . 2 (January

1949): 189.

22 . Cited in Jan T. Gross, "Social Consequences of War: Preliminaries

to the Study of Imposition of Communist Regimes in East Central Europe,"

Eastern European Politics and Societies 3, no. 2 (Spring 1989) : 287 .

23. Harold Walter Nelson, Leon Trotsky and the Art of Insurrection

(London : Frank Cass, 1988), 9-10, 18.

24. Ibid., 23-25 .

25 . Ibid., and also 56.

26. Ibid., 65 .

27 . Christopher Jones, "Just Wars and Limited Wars : Restraints on the

Use of Soviet Armed Forces," World Politics 28, no . 1 (October 1975):

46-47.

28 . Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Diplomacy in the Mirror of Soviet

Scholarship," in Contemporary History in the Soviet Mirror, ed . John Keep

and Liliana Brisby (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964), 252-53 .

29 . Ibid., 255-56 .

52
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

30. Ken Booth, The Military Instrument in Soviet Foreign Policy

1917-1972 (London: Royal United Service Institution, 1973), 9.

31 . Ibid., 41 .

32. Aspaturian, "Diplomacy," 258.

33 . Rosemary Hollis, "Tactical Dynamics of the Intifada and Israel's

Response," RUSI Journal, Winter 1989, 23-24.

34. Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS), Soviet Military Affairs,

"Yazov Article Views Defense Building," 12 August 1988, 1 (hereafter cited

as JPRS) .

35. Donald J . Hanle, Terrorism : The Newest Face of Warfare

(Washington, D.C. : Pergamon-Brassey, 1989), 95 .

36. Ibid., 96.

37. Robert A. Jones, The Soviet Concept of Limited Sovereignty from

Lenin to Gorbachev: The Brezhnev Doctrine (New York : Saint Martin's

Press, 1990), 4-24.

38. Ibid., 21-22, 87-88.

39. Ibid., 21-22 .

40. Ibid., 24-25.

41 . Ibid., 36-38.

42. Ibid., 87-90.

43. Ibid., 91 .

44. Aspaturian, Power and Process, 605, 659-61 .

45 . Booth, 25 .

46. Cited in Aspaturian, Power and Process, 391 .

47 . Robert Jones, 121-27 .

48 . Ibid., 127 .

49. Ibid., 131-39.

50. Aspaturian, Power and Process, 661-64 .

51 . Robert Jones, 163 .

52 . James S . Ward, "Terror, Revolution, or Control : The KPD's Secret

Apparat During the Weimar Republic," Crossroads 7, no. 3 (1984) : 257-97 .

53. David Rees, Peaceful Coexistence : A Study in Soviet Doctrine

(Washington, D .C . : International Security Council, 1989); Adda B .

Bozeman, "The Nuclear Freeze Movement: Conflicting Moral and Political

Perspectives on War and Its Relation to Peace," Conflict 5, no. 4 (Winter

1985): 271-305 .

54. "Political Shifts in the Middle East: Roots, Factors, Trends," World

Marxist Review, no. 2 (1980) : 58 .

55. Ibid., 58-64.

56. Philip Nel, "The Current Soviet View of Regional Conflicts: How

Much of a Change?" African Insight 18, no. 2 (1988) .

53
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

57. Leif Rosenberger, "Philippine Communism : The Continuing Threat

and the Aquino Challenge," in East Asian Conflict Zones: Prospects for

Regional Stability and Deescalation, ed . Lawrence Grinter and Young Whan

Kihl (New York : Saint Martin's Press, 1988), 177-205 .

58. Maj Victor M. Rosello, "Vietnam's Support to El Salvador's FMLN:

Successful Tactics in Central America," Military Review (January 1990):

71-78 ; United States, Department of State, "The Sandinistas and Middle

Eastern Radicals," August 1985 ; John Norton Moore, "The Struggle for

Peace in Central America and the Deterioration of the Global Deterrent

System" (Washington, D.C. : Washington Institute for Values in Public

Policy, 1989) .

59. Ali A. Mazrui, "Micro-Dependency : The Cuban Factor in Southern

Africa," India Quarterly 38, no. 3 (July-September 1981): 330-A5.

60. Theodore Draper, "Rolling Communism Backward," The New

Republic, 7 March 1981, 25 .

61 . James M. Markham, "Spain's Terror: Onus on the Soviets," New

York Times, 11 May 1980.

62. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Anatomy of the Soviet Empire :

Vulnerabilities and Strengths," in Military Strategy in Transition : Defense

and Deterrence in the 1980's, ed . Keith A . Dunn and William O .

Staudemaler (Boulder, Colo . : Westview Press, 1984), 138 .

63. Col D. Dennison Lane and Lt Col Mark Weissenbloom, "Low

Intensity Conflict: In Search of a Paradigm," International Defense Review,

January 1990, 35-39.

64. Christopher Jones, 57-59.

65. Ibid., 68.

66. Jan S . Adams, "The Role of the International Department of the

CPSU Central Committee," Slavic Review 48, no . 4 (Winter 1989) : 616 .

67. Ibid., 619 .

68. Ibid., 620.

69. Ibid.

70. Ambassador Viktor P . Yakunin, "The USSR Foreign Policy:

Concepts, Priorities, and Relations With Pakistan," Pakistan Horizon 42, no .

1 (January 1989) : 68-75 ; JPRS, World Economy and International

Relations, "Objections to New Political Thinking Addressed," 5 October

1989, 1-10; JPRS, Soviet Military Affairs, "Defining Prerequisites of State

Security in Light of New Thinking," 7 November 1988, 9-16; Vladimir F .

Petrovsky, "New Thinking: Questions and Answers," PS, March 1990,

29-32; JPRS, USSR International Affairs, "Petrovsky Stresses Enhanced

Role for International Law," 13 November 1989, 2-4; JPRS, "Shevarnadze

Links Foreign Policy, Domestic Reform," 13 November 1989, 1-2 ; Foreign

Broadcast Information Service, Soviet Union, "L'Unita Interviews

54
CLASS WAR ON A GLOBAL SCALE

Shevarnadze," 4 December 1989, 3-10 (hereafter cited as FBIS, Soviet

Union) .

71 . Silviu Brucan, "Globalism and Class Struggle," New Times, no. 7

(1990) : 17 .

72. Georgii Arbatov, "A Soviet View of Using Force as Foreign Policy,"

Los Angeles Times, 24 December 1989; Aleksei Arbatov, "New Military

Thinking in East and West," New Times, no. 1 (1990) : 24-25; Andrei

Kortunov, "Natural Partners, Not Bored Consorts," New Times, no . 1 (1990) :

25-26; FBIS, Soviet Union, "Jurist Discusses Human Rights, International

Law," 13 July 1989, 11-14, annex.

73. Ronnie D . Lipschutz, When Nations Clash : Raw Materials, Ideology,

and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass . : Ballinger Publishing Co., 1989),

198-207 ; Henry Hamann, "Soviet Defector on Origin of `The New

Thinking'," Report on the USSR, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 20

October 1989, 14-16.

74. Hamann .

75. JPRS, Soviet International Affairs, "Discussion of Peaceful

Coexistence as a Form of Class Struggle," 18 July 1989, 42-50.

76. Herbert Romerstein, Soviet Active Measures and Propaganda

(Toronto, Canada : Mackenzie Institute for the Study of Terrorism,

Revolution, and Propaganda, 1989), 7-8 .

77. Hamann, 15 .

78. Ibid.

79. Peter Clement, "Shevarnadze's Foreign Ministry : The

Institutionalization of New Thinking" (Paper presented to the XXI Annual

Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic

Studies, Chicago, November 1989), 8 .

80. FBIS, Soviet Union, "Gorbachev Address at Sorbonne," 6 July 1989,

28 .

81 . FBIS, Soviet Union, "Yakovlev : `Old Aspirations Dictate New

Thinking'," 5 October 1989, 78 .

82. Henry Trofimenko, "Ending the Cold War, Not History,"

Washington Quarterly 13, no. 2 (Spring 1990) : 26.

83 . Ibid., 28 .

84 . "Regional Conflicts : Round Table Discussion," International

Affairs, November 1989, 95.

85. Robbin F. Laird and Betsy A. Jacobs, "European Nuclear Deterrence

After INF," in The Future of Deterrence : NATO Nuclear Forces After INF,

ed. Robbin F. Laird and Betsy A. Jacobs (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press,

1989), 1-10.

86 . Robert Jones, 232-35 .

55

An Islamic Concept of Conflict in

Its Historical Context

Dr Lewis B. Ware

At no time since the end of the Second World War have the

basic presuppositions governing the East-West conflict been as

seriously questioned as at the present . For the Western

democracies, peace has always been a normative category of

global political existence . For the socialist countries of the

Eastern bloc, on the other hand, revolutionary war provided

the conceptual basic for the systematic expansion of the

Marxist-Leninist political and economic world order. For a

half century these presuppositions have shaped the policymaking of the American and Soviet states, and both have used

conventional armed forces as a principal instrument of policy

implementation .

In the autumn of 1989, Marxism-Leninism began to crumble

in Eastern Europe. The effect on Soviet communism has been

profound . The Soviet Union no longer stands in the vanguard

of progress towards international communism . The United

States no longer has the enemy against which it exercised

continual vigilance. The decrease in palpable threat has made

it necessary to redefine the concept of conflict .

The easing of superpower tensions may bring about a

US-Soviet condominium for resolving third-world conflict .

But for now it appears that, partly because of the diffusion of

power that has accompanied the readjustment of superpower

relations, conflict will increase in the third world before the

results of any significant shifts toward global perestroika are

realized. The attention of the United States, the Soviet Union,

and Western European powers will be drawn inexorably toward

the containment of these peripheral wars . For decades, the

57
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

endemic nature of these wars has been veiled by the superpowers' preoccupation with each other.

The difficulty Westerners have in comprehending the nature

of conflict on the global periphery lies in the tenacious grip

we have on the Europocentric theory and practice of a

normative international political order. Our view takes for

granted that political life is organized around a secular

nation-state, whose citizenry exhibit loyalty to and insure the

legitimacy of the state by their ongoing consent to be

governed . The Western political order requires national

interests to evolve from the necessity to secure the integrity

of the nation-state . Consequently, the state is obligated to

defend its territory against all invaders . Issues of war and peace

are tied to maintaining sovereignty through laws that govern

interstate political, military, and socioeconomic relationships.

This represents a problem for the third world, where neither

the capitalist nor the communist model of political order has

successfully taken root.

In countries where ideology is unresponsive to the

consideration of political consensus, struggles may be

waged under a broad spectrum of unorthodox conditions and

therefore may be very destabilizing . These conditions blur

the distinction between the national, domestic, regional, and

international interests of warring societies, rendering the

already weakened secular state highly vulnerable to

insurgencies . I

During the last decade such a conflictual environment has

marked events in the third world and may well prevail into

the next century. 2 Adda Bozeman's contribution to an

understanding of this environment has been to analyze its

nature and development long before its presence impinged

upon the consciousness of policymakers . She suggested that

the study of the culture of conflict must perforce play a more

important role in formulating the future global order.

5 8
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

Today's cultural conflicts accentuate the urgency to refine

what Professor Bozeman foresaw almost two decades ago and

to present her analysis in a context that clarifies the present-day

situation. Moreover, her analysis must be accessible to

military thinkers who face the task of integrating the idea of

culture into the doctrine, strategy, and tactics of future wars . 3

The primary purpose of this study is to analyze the Islamic

dimension of conflict in the Middle East and to demonstrate its

conformity to the Bozeman thesis . This study will also

underscore the usefulness of Professor Bozeman's work in

understanding the contemporary political varieties of religious

confrontation .

Professor Bozeman keenly appreciates the normative

value of conflict in the evolution of Islamic dogmatics and

law. From Islamic law flows a dualistic view of the universe .

The Muslims, who have submitted to the One God, and the

Kafirun, those who have not accepted Islam, share the earth in

a state of constant historical tension . Thus the resolution of this

tension and the subsequent establishment of peace hinges, in

the classical Islamic view, on the Islamization of all humankind. In terms of international law this dualism posits a

religious definition of nationhood which excludes an equality

of relationships between states of differing confessional

persuasions . 4 Despite differences regarding the rules for the

declaration and the execution of conflict, the same historical

tension is readily discernible in both Sunni and Shi'i law. In

this way both denominations reinforce the tendency towards

Islamic universalism . Yet it is important to note that historical

and cultural specificity also characterize the Islamic

experience . For this reason, the expansion of Islam among

non-Arab peoples, both territorially and societally, has limited

the practical application of a universal Islamic concept of

conflict.

By examining Islamic behavior over time, this study lays

emphasis on a concept of conflict which evolves in response to

59
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

the impact of both Islamic and Western history on the cultures

for which Islam defines the predominant worldview . Although

this concept informs a theory of Islamic international law that

appears in principle to oppose that of the West, in practice that

theory makes it possible to mitigate conflict between the

Muslim and the non-Muslim worlds . If we bear in mind that

history teaches us culture is not static, we will understand better

the meaning that contemporary Islamist movements give to the

notion of religious militancy . The Iranian, Lebanese, Egyptian,

and Tunisian experiences of Islamism will illustrate this

assertion .

The secondary purpose of the study is to compare an Islamist

concept of conflict with its Hebraic counterpart. This comparison

will disengage the component of conflict embedded in the new

Israeli nationalism . We will see how traditional Jewish attitudes

toward conflict produce not only dogmatic and legal prescriptions

for contact between Jewish and non-Jewish peoples but also have

a significant impact on an Israeli view of collective security,

regional relations with the Arabs, and international political

commitments. 6

Lastly, this study seeks to relate its conclusions to the

probabilities for future conflict implicit in a restructuring of the

present global order and the role the US military may have to

play in defending American national interests in the Middle

East. Before those national interests can be expressed in terms

of military doctrine, strategy, tactics, and force configuration,

they must be redefined to reflect an environment where the

concepts of war and peace are more fluid and imprecise than

ever. Without policies to address this environment, hasty

intervention will surely lead to disaster. It is against such

unpremeditated actions that this study sounds a warning .

Religion is everywhere today an ideological force on the

march. Even in Eastern Europe it will make its contribution to

the new nationalism that is forming in the wake of the collapse

of Marxism-Leninism . We in America have celebrated the

60
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

defeat of Marxism-Leninism as the triumph of good over evil,

of civic virtues over tyrannical vice, and of God's divine plan

for the salvation of his chosen people over satanic imposture .

The millenarian tones of the American popular reaction

conform to the nation's abiding faith in the moral efficacy of

its history and the enduring legitimacy of its right to defend for

the past half century the global cause of personal liberty .

Ironically Marxism-Leninism, which likewise laid claim to

universal moral preeminence, expressed itself in the same

religious terms transmuted into a secular language. It is fair to

say, then, that the civilizational values which both sharpened

and simplified the conflict between the superpowers owed

much to the religious nature of their respective ideological

worldviews . What follows in the future will certainly confirm

that in the political acts of men the presence of God remains a

factor to be reckoned with.

The Evolution of an

Islamic Concept of Conflict

All that is secular is consequently given over to rudeness and

capricious violence . The Mohammedan principle-the enlightenment

of the Oriental world-is the first to contravene this barbarism and

caprice .

6 1

-Hegel

Wherever in the world there is a cryfor Islam we are obliged to defend

it, and we do not regard this as interference in the internal affairs of

another country. Our intention is to defend the values and ideals ofthe

[Islamic] revolution in the remotest corner of the world.

-Kayhan, October 1989

The Islamic concept of conflict is jihad. Loosely called "holy

war," jihad actually means "striving in the path of the one God."

Conceived broadly, jihad signifies the obligation of every
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Muslim to strive for both the physical and spiritual defense of

the ummah, the true community of belief and of salvation.

Death in the pursuit of jihad assures that the believer will enter

paradise absolved of the sins for which he would have

accounted before God on the day of reckoning .

The Koran, which is the immutable, eternal, and final

revelation of God, enjoins the faithful to accept the burden of

jihad. So jihad derives its force from the principle that Islam is

universal and true. Since the Koran is also the principal

material source of Islamic law (sharia), jihad is more than just

sanctioned according to universal religious precepts; it enjoys

full legality as just war. 8 To call jihad "holy war," as Bernard

Lewis asserts, is, nevertheless, a distortion .

In Western parlance the adjective "holy" preceding the word "law" is

necessary, since there are other laws of other origins . In Muslim

parlance, the adjective is tautologous . The sharia is simply the law and

there is no other. It is holy in that it derives from God .

The Sunni Perspective

The various Islamic denominations place a different

accent on the martial and the moral aspects of jihad . The

classical Sunnism of the Arabo-Islamic empire emphasized

the defense of the faith through its territorial expansion while

Shi'i traditions demand that jihad "be declared vehemently

against the agents of discrimination, injustice, deprivation,

oppression, strangulation, `taghutism' (acts of Satan) and

subservience to other-than-God ." I° But the result is the same:

jihad is both a legal instrument and a means of litigation with

which the Sunni and Shi'i ummahs define and conduct their

relations with the non-Muslim world."

The emergence of a concept of conflict from the moral

imperative to assure the supremacy of the true and just faith

presupposes an idea of peace that achieves permanency only

when Islam becomes the universal religion explicit in Koranic

revelation . In the Islamic view, the world is thus divided

62
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

into two spheres . Where sharia holds sway and right belief is

assured, the dar al-Islam (abode of submission) guarantees a

perfect moral order of whichjihad is the instrument of hegemony.

Wherever disbelief is, the dar al-harb (abode of war) exists,

implying an absence of liberty to embrace self-evident truths.

12

These worlds have always been contiguous in historical time and

space, but, as the Pakistani scholar Muhammad lqbal points out,

Islamic "like-mindedness" attaches to the dar al-Islam the

characteristic of "borderlessness ." 1

3

Inasmuch as non-Muslims have ruled at times over

Muslims and have alienated Muslim territory from the dar

al-Islam, 14 the believer cannot carry out his Koranic duty to

"command the good and to forbid evil" without the

possibility of enjoying the liberty to avoid the oppressiveness of the disbelievers . In classical terms, then, jihad

ceases when the dar al-harb is absorbed into the dar

al-Islam, that is, when universal religious liberty is

restored .

15 Until that time, jihad persists as Islam's struggle

against "persecutors in order to end persecution ." 16 Syrian

scholar Bassam Tibi contends that in this permanently

evolving cosmic imbalance there can be little latitude for

absolute toleration because Islamic tolerance refers

exclusively to the Jews and Christians inside and outside the

ummah . 17 The Jews and the Christians are "Peoples of the

Book," scriptuaries whose imperfect revelations prefigure

the perfected Koran. Hence they must be respected. But this

does not imply that Islam possesses either a concept of, or

guarantees the right to, an equality of one religious group

with another. This was certainly the case with the polytheists

of the dar al-harb against whom jihad was applied without

the compunctions reserved for the tolerated peoples .

Thus the distinction between defensive and offensive

aspects of the concept of jihad is unclear. Likewise a

people's absolute right of recourse to violence under a state

of war that marks de jure and de facto aspects of conflict in

63
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Western international law is also absent . Since jihad is a

religious duty, it cannot be dictated by contractual conventions defining a legal state of war without hostilities nor

by hostilities without a legal declaration. I8 Although jihad

certainly possesses defensive and offensive aspects that relate

strategically and tactically to the conduct of conflict, jihad is

always offensive war in its intention . 19 Therefore to claim that

the various reasons for proclaiming jihad are acts of selfdefense in the Western sense (such as punishment against

Islam's enemies, support of oppressed Muslims in the dar

al-harb, subjugation of Muslim rebels in the dar al-Islam, or

idealistic war to "command the good and forbid evil") begs

the question of the nature of Islamic conflict.

So long as there was a clear understanding of what

constituted internal peace and external war between the two

abodes of belief and disbelief, an offensive and defensive

concept of jihad was not a matter for great controversy. The

authority for the religious definition of peace and war came

from God and was declared by God's executor for his ummah,

the caliph. That authority, as Montgomery Watt argues, gave

internal legitimacy to the early Islamic confederation in

Medina under the Prophet Muhammad and his successors,

while military expansion held it together externally .

20 so

during the first two centuries of Islam's history, the Muslim

faith pushed steadily outward under jihad toward the

realization of a "Pax Islamica" which Muslims deemed

inevitable for the triumph of God's "best" community .

This is not to say that the Koran decreed, or Muhammad

himself demanded, that jihad be waged continually. In the

Koran and in the Hadith (sayings and deeds of the prophet

Muhammad) the verses pertaining to jihad often contradict

themselves about maintaining truces and armistices

indefinitely . The problem was that the method of Koranic

interpretation by abrogation permitted the substitution of

earlier revelatory verses declaring peace by later ones that

64
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

declared war. This led to the "atomization" of the historical

situations that jihad was obliged to define . Therefore, by

avoiding an examination of the historical context in which the

concept of jihad evolved in the Koran, jurists assured that

permanent hostility between the dar al-Islam and dar al-barb

could be maintained as the norm .

21

But history was eventually to have its effect on the norms

of jihad . By the eleventh century, Islamic expansion had run

its course and a triumphal Christianity took the counter

offensive in Spain and in the Holy Land. On the heels of the

Christians, the pagan Mongols followed. While adapting to

the nature of its adversaries and the types of wars they fought,

the Islamic imperium found itself fighting defensive wars

against invaders-an act which departed from the classical

doctrine of jihad . 22 The result was a shrinking and a

stabilization of the boundaries between the Muslim and

non-Muslim worlds. This new stability demanded that Islamic

thinkers reformulate the notion of a binomial world to take

into account the many non-Muslim states and principalities

on its periphery with which Muslims were not actually at

23 war .

Thus between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb there

came a "third world," called the dar al-sulh or the "abode of

armistice," which, under treaties of coexistence, was not

subject to sharia law .

24 These arrangements between Islamic

and non-Islamic states were undertaken for the protection

of the ummah. Muslims and non-Muslims crossed the

frontiers under protection of personal immunity and

negotiated directly with each other . Although these temporary

privileges did not imply recognition by Islam of the states the

holders of safe-conduct represented, the dar al-Islam was able

nevertheless to interact directly with the outside under

conditions of relative security . With the impetus for offensive

jihad effectively dormant, the defensive nature of "striving in

the path of the one God" evolved a less ambiguous meaning .

65
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

The eminent scholar Majid Khadduri contends that the nearest

equivalent to this state of affairs under the Western law of

nations was insurgency because Islam's tacit acceptance of the

dar al-sulh, while not precluding a later recognition of the two

parties, certainly did not exclude a return to hostilities on a

limited scale.

25 But neutrality played no role in this equation,

since in Islamic law conflictual relations with a non-Muslim

belligerent could not be postponed indefinitely .

The process of historical interpenetration of the Muslim and

non-Muslim worlds inevitably accelerated and brought new

ideas to bear on their respective worldviews . Not only did

borders form and have to be defended, the universal values of

sharia and the assumption that the classical Islamic imperium

vouchsafed God's political authority within those borders also

came under the assault of alien ideas at a time when Islamic

imperial power was in a state of rapid decay. The military and

ideological challenge from the Christians and later from the

Mongol horde was one aspect of that decay; the other challenge

occurred when the Muslim periphery attempted to wrest control

from the central institution of the caliphate causing both the

empire and the unity of the ummah it represented to fragment

from the inside.

The influence of these events on the concept of jihad was

immense. So long as a central Muslim power backed by military

force existed, jihad could be accomplished as a collective duty.

This meant that certain categories of people were exempt from

army service, and the declaration of jihad was limited to the

head of state.But when the validity of the sharia was put into

question as the true moral order for society, the attack was

perceived to be directed against Islamic values . In this case,

jihad came to mean more than simply jihad of the "sword"; it

became also jihad of the "tongue and of the heart" and

therefore required the individual obligation of each Muslim

to prevent further depredations of Islamic society and its true

beliefs . Such was the view of the twelfth-century jurist

66
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

Ibn Taymiyya, who in later centuries was to have a profound

ideological impact on reformist Islam and radical Islamism .

The myth of Islamic unity was further eroded as clashes

among Muslims themselves increased over time . These

clashes were also called jihad since only jihad is just and no

other concept of war was permitted. But the Koran forbids

jihad between Muslims. In point of fact, these conflicts were

secular. Many Muslim jurists called them simply barb (war),

disapproved of them, and endeavored to explain them away

as social aberrations inconsistent with sharia. However, the

fourteenth-century North African jurist Ibn Khaldun, who laid

the groundwork for Western historical sociology and

philosophy of history, saw war as inherent in man. Because

Ibn Khaldun believed that human nature made war the norm

and not the exception,2g the concept of jihad as the just means

for the territorial expansion of God's preordained moral order

became more and more a problematical issue .

The Sunni perspective on jihad depended for its cogency on

the inseparability of religion and politics . Theoretically

speaking, the ummah and the state were unified under the

divinely instituted caliphal office . The caliphate executed

God's design for the universalization of Islam. But once the

caliphate was disestablished (when the first Turkish republic

replaced the successor state to the old Arabo-Islamic

imperium, the Ottoman Turkish Empire) the imposition of an

Islamic world order, as an extension of the imperial ideal, was

moot . The process of imperial disintegration had in fact

spanned the past 500 years of history-during the last century

and a half of which European colonialism dominated the

relationship of the dar al-Islam and dar al-harb .

Colonialism offered the Islamic world a vision of the secular

state in which dogmatics, sharia, and ritual practice were

relegated to the domain of personal conscience. Material and

human improvement were elevated through science to the status

of social virtue . Being a practical rather than an abstract faith,

67
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Islam responded to these new circumstances by attempting to

bring the sharia into line with modernism. This adaptation

extended also to the concept of jihad. To Sunni modernists,

jihad was a purely defensive principle of war. They accepted

the prevalent Western view that international relations were

grounded in a peaceful intercourse between nations . The

modernists proposed that disbelief alone was not a sufficient

cause for conflict but imposed the additional requirement of

physical oppression of Muslims by non-Muslims before jihad

could be declared. In this way the modernists defended

themselves against the Western accusation that Islamic jihad

was aggressive . Rather they insisted on a "greater" jihad of the

heart and mind, which, through reflection, would defend and

strengthen Islamic values under the assault of Western belief

systems and lead eventually to the West's acceptance of the

self-evident truth of Islam.

For this to happen, the ummah had first to reform itself. Such

a reformation did not demand, however, that the conditions of

Muslim backwardness be addressed in structural terms .

Inasmuch as the normative, moral orientation of Islam

remained the decisive element of modernist discourse, the

problems of Islam could be solved by behaving according to

the literal dictates of holy scripture purified of non-Islamic

accretions . 30 Thus modernist jihad meant war against the

immoral base instincts of the self; it presupposed the individual

obligation to make oneself better by defending oneself

intellectually against falsehood; it proposed that Islam could

master Western science, turn it to the advantage of the ummah,

and raise Muslims to the ranks of the Europeans while

simultaneously preserving their faith. Jihad was the highest

form of knowledge . The body of the faithful had complete

command over the development of a formula for progress and

the elimination, through the reeducation of youth, of pernicious

Western influence. 31 The relationship between jihad and

resurrection of the body of the faithful was, as the sociologist

68
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

Desroches put it, set out in terms of religiosocial monisms : that

is, because Islam had positive social significance, a return to

religiosity by means of an "inner" jihad was beneficial for the

development of the community.

32 To recap, the Sunni view of

jihad depended on a ruler who declared war and the instrumentality of a state that executed his orders insofar as they were

consistent with sharia law . When Islamic lands fell under the

sway of Europe and direction by a divinely appointed executor

was no longer possible, each Muslim was obliged to view jihad

defensively as an individual act to protect the Muslim way of

life . Under such conditions Islam could coexist with secular

Europe on the legal plane because it, too, was grounded in a

just and merciful law of nations . Furthermore, Islam could meet

the requirements of European scientific positivism and live

under the institutions of popular democracy without the

separation of church from state . Therefore, Sunnism

emphasized the ethical value of the law as it applied to jihad

and not the elaboration of rules for the conduct of conflict.

33

This, in turn, confirmed a civilizing mission for Islam.

The Sunni modernists' view of jihad collapsed with their

failure to render compatible the values of Islam and modernism

within the institutional framework of the contemporary secular

Sunni Muslim state. Radical religious movements responded to

the state's inability to provide for the moral and material

welfare of the ummah by turning to politics . In this way the

reformism of the modernists slowly gave way to the activism

of the Islamists whose position on jihad was fundamentally

militant but not unaffected by the political cultures of the

various peoples to whom this new militant jihad was

preached . To understand the evolution of Islamist jihad, we

must first appreciate its links to the Shi'ite perspective .

The Shiite Perspective

The seeds of the Sunni-Shi'ite split were nourished by a

political quarrel during the first 30 years of Islamic history as

69
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

to who possessed the legitimate authority to exercise both

spiritual and temporal successorship to the prophet and to

execute God's will for his ummah. Those who backed as his

successor Mu'awiya, the governor of Damascus, believed that

the prophet favored the devolution of his authority on the most

qualified of his tribe through an election by peers. Those who

opposed the concept of egalitarian election from among the

prophet's tribe believed that Ali, the fourth caliph and the

prophet's cousin and son-in-law, had the right to govern the

ummah by virtue of his pious character and his blood

relationship to the prophet's immediate family. The "partisans

of Ali" contested the pretensions of Mu'awiya to the office of

caliph and, in the ensuing struggle, lost a decisive battle to

him. Declaring their actions to reflect, after the fact, the

prophet's normative behavior (sunnah), Mu'awiya's men

established egalitarian election as the norm underpinning

the institutional legitimacy of the classical Sunni AraboIslamic caliphate . Thus the Sunni-Shi'ite split was caused both

by a conflict of personalities and of theories of governance.

At the moment when enthusiasm for Ali's political cause

was transferred to his person and, after his death, to the

persons of his designated successors in direct line through his

martyred sons, we can say that Shi'ism has its religious

beginnings . To Shi'ites, Ali and his successors are like the

Prophet, both caliphs and imams; that is, the epitome in one

individual of secular and religious leadership . Although

schisms arose concerning the right of the fifth and the

seventh imams to lead the Shi'i community, the imamic line

continued uninterrupted until the disappearance of the

twelfth in the late ninth century. This twelfth imam was said

to be in a state of occultation . Out of the sight and hearing

of humankind, the twelfth imam was in hiding, but would

return at a time of great troubles to right the wrongs of the

world. Muslims who adhere to a messianic belief in the

efficacy of the Hidden Imam are called Twelver or Imami

70
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

Shi'ites . They constitute the mainstream of the Shi'i

community and are, for the most part, ethnically Persians .

For centuries the Imami Shi'ites lived among the majority

Sunnis without the power to make decisions affecting the

political autonomy of their ummah. To the Shi'ite mind the

Sunni were usurpers who had perpetrated evils on the Shi'ite

ummah on its own territory . Sunni control over Shi'ite

territory made that territory technically dar al-harb. The

Shi'ite concept of conflict against the dar al-harb differed

from the Sunni concept as to who could lead jihad and

against whom jihad could be waged . With no state of their

own and no political leader to serve as the agent of jihad, the

Shi'ites were forbidden to wage legitimate war until the

Hidden Imam emerged from his occultation and gave his

consent to jihad . When the imam reappears, the object of

Shi'ite jihad will be to cleanse the world of the injustices

inflicted upon the Shi'ite community by the unbelieving

Sunnis and other heretics . As in Sunnism this duty conforms

with the Koranic injunction to "command the good and

forbid evil" in pursuit of which the Hidden Imam will

declare jihad . But that declaration can be made only if the

unbelievers first refuse a call to accept the true faith, that is

to say, if they fail to obey the Imam .

34

Not only is the declaration of offensive jihad the

prerogative of the infallible Hidden Imam, it is also linked

to the concept of walayah through which absolute allegiance

to the Hidden Imam is expressed . Since all true believers owe

walayah to the Hidden Imam, a jihad declared without such

allegiance could never constitute iman, that is, a necessary

requirement for salvation .

35 Therefore jihad, in principle, has

been suspended indefinitely . The suspension of offensive

jihad, to the Sunnis, is a response to the end of imperial

expansion; to the Shi'ites jihad has been declared in abeyance

as an answer to the Hidden Imam's absence .
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Early Shi'ite historiography is filled with suffering and martyrdom at the hands of the Sunnis. Suffering engendered pietistic

expectation of final vindication and personal preparation for

the millennium . Transposed to a spiritual plane, jihad came

to mean the greater spiritual struggle for knowledge of right

from wrong and of mastery over base instincts . As the noted

Shi'ite philosopher Sayyid Hossein Nasr proposes,

Jihad [is] not simply the defense or extension of Islamic borders . . .

but the constant inner war against all that veils man from the truth

and destroys his equilibrium . The greater holy war (aljihad al-akbar)

is . . . like the "unseen warfare" of orthodox spirituality, the very

means of opening the royal path to the center of the heart .

This mystical vision of jihad as self-discipline in the

expectation of the imminent end of time favored nonviolence .

In giving physical representation to this view of jihad, Shi'ite

thinkers envisaged a "frontier" between the dar al-Islam and

the dar al-harb. On this frontier, called the dar al-iman (abode

of faith), Shi'ism would vie for the souls of the infidels.

37 In

the form of proselytization such conflict was thought to

postpone the onslaught of unbelief. But it could not be

conceived as aggressive jihad . Rather it was an ethical holy

war of defense against those who do not accept the imamic

principle (the Sunni world and other heretics) ; thus, the dar

al-iman was both licit and commendable in the absence of the

Hidden Imam .

38 For moral reasons, then, every true believer

had the duty to wage a defensive war by resisting the

imposition of tyrannical rule .

39

The elaboration of true nature and conduct of conflict fell

ultimately to the most learned Shi'ite clerics (mujtahidun)

of each historical period . The authority to explore these

questions did not emanate from the incommunicado Hidden

Imam, however . Rather it emanated from the clergy who,

because of their knowledge of imamic sharia, gradually

arrogated to themselves-in the absence of autonomous

Shi'ite secular power-the right to legislate for the Shi'ite

72
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

ummah in all religious and sociopolitical matters . Thus, over

the centuries of political powerlessness, the imamic Shi'ite

clergy developed a theory of general agency which justified

their claim to be the representatives on earth of the Hidden

Imam and which necessarily encompassed all manner of

speculation regarding jihad .

Until the restoration of Shi'ite imperial power under

the Safavid Persian shahs at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the clergy seemed content to assign jihad

either an eschatological value or one that encouraged

passive resistance to usurping infidel authority . When the

Safavid shahs made Shi'ism the official cult of their empire,

the rulers assumed the prerogative to declare and execute

jihad since they claimed descent from the family of the first

imam Ali .

The consolidation of this prerogative within the framework of an imperial Shi'ite state and political culture put

the clergy in an ambiguous position . Safavid imperial

expansion had reactivated the need for political and military

aspects of jihad as the cornerstone of an aggressive foreign

policy . In subjecting the concept of jihad to the principle

of political expediency, the shahs blurred the classical legal

distinction between aggressive and defensive conflict. As

long as secular imperial power remained strong and the

shahs officially patronized the clerical class, the clergy

acquiesced in the usurpation of their right to interpret the

Hidden Imam's law . The result was an uneasy accommodation of religion to imperial political ethics .

40 Yet once

imperial power began to wane in the middle of the eighteenth

century with the replacement of the Safavids by the Qajar

dynasty-which did not make the same claim to imamic

descent-the clergy reasserted its primacy in the domain of

legal interpretation of jihad.

The decadence of imperial Iran gave the clerics opportunities for greater political influence. The clergy associated

73
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

this decadence with the external pressure of Britain and

Russia on the frontier and European domination of

domestic economic life . The manipulation of jihad was an

important key in the pursuit of these opportunities and to

the gradual transformation of de facto clerical authority

into de jure clerical power.

When the clergy called for jihad against the Russians in

the early nineteenth century, they were acting to protect the

ummah in the absence of a strong state . They reasoned that

jihad in times of national danger was more praiseworthy in

the absence than in the presence of the Hidden Imam.41 This

reasoning, which was contrary to classical Shi'ite theology,

was extended to the struggle against internal domination of

an already weakened ruling establishment by foreign

powers . Clerical reinterpretation of jihad tended to cast

doubts on the legitimacy of the shahs but did not challenge

that legitimacy . The clergy now clearly thought of

themselves as both deputies of the Hidden Imam and chief

guardians of Shi'ite society and its values . Whereas in the

past jihad had a single aggressive purpose bound up in the

working out of the messianic eschatology of the Hidden

Imam, it now had a purpose more in line with the Sunni

perspective : to repel the physical and spiritual attacks on the

Shi'ite ummah from outside and inside the nation . But

whatever the circumstances of the various jihads the

clergy proclaimed, they considered each to be defensive in

intent if not in actual nature .

From the Shi'ite point of view, jihad was to be waged in

the service of self-preservation whenever strong secular

power proved unable to defend the ummah . For this reason

Shi'ite doctrine was less restrictive and more flexible in the

conduct of jihad than was its Sunni counterpart.

Kohlberg gives the following examples from the abundant

Imami Shi'ite literature of jihad.

74
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

l . It mattered little who granted permission to go on

defensive jihad, only that a respected mujtahia' take the

responsibility.

2 . No exemptions were possible . Under conditions of

offensive jihad, where the state had an army at its disposal,

jihad was a collective duty ; but in the defensive mode, war

was every believer's obligation.

3. As opposed to the Sunni conception, Shi'i jihad for the

defense of the faith operated under no constraint of time .

4. Everyone had to pay for jihad.

5. The spoils of such a jihad had to be used for its

continuation.

6. If adequate funds were not available, they could be

coerced .

7 . In order to prosecute jihad, treaties impeding it could be

revoked.

8 . Under defensive conditions, no distinction was made

between unbelievers and Muslims who rendered them aid.

9 . It was not necessary to call first on the unbelievers to

accept the true faith, thus losing the element of surprise .

10. Believers did not necessarily have to outnumber

unbelievers.

11 . All stratagems were acceptable.

12 . All cease-fires could be violated .

From the above we can see that the historical evolution of

the Twelver Imami Shi'ite community, even after Shi'ism

eventually gained official status in Iran, left traces of a marked

minority mentality on its concept of just conflict and defensive

and offensive war. Imami Shi'ism placed its emphasis more on

right belief, adherence to the law, social justice, messianism,

community solidarity, and individual responsibility than on the

state's role in the legitimation, protection, and propagation of

these benefits for humankind . Imami Shi'ism was encouraging

a kind of conflict that approximated most closely what in the

West would be called revolutionary warfare . This important

75
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

distinction, born from the marriage of Iranian political culture

and the Persian ethos to Shi'ite millenarianism, had a profound

effect on the development of radical Islamism throughout the

contemporary Muslim world .

The Varieties of Islamist Jihad

Khomeini's Shi'ism may be called a variant of radical

Islamism . As suggested earlier, Islamism is political ideology .

All religions are political ideologies inasmuch as they are

intended to control the behavior, mood, sentiments, and values

of a society on behalf of the whole community; to this end,

religious rituals act as instruments of instruction and

direction . 43 The ultimate objective of religion, from that

perspective, is utopian since it proposes that the purpose of

human history may be found in an ideal and perfected cosmic

order through which God makes meaningful the chaos of the

temporal world. It is when religion rejects expectation for

action in its endeavor to overcome an existing situation that

faith begins to lose its otherworldly, utopian characteristic . Put

another way, when religion includes a program that seeks to

resolve a given issue by mobilizing popular sentiment, it

crosses the boundary into political ideology.

Jihad and the Khomeinist Worldview

In mobilizing the Persian people behind him in the name of

Islam, Khomeini radicalized Shi'ism and put it at the service of

sociopolitical transformation . Khomeini's Islamism was

nourished by a political culture that evolved from the long

struggle between the Persian imperial state and the clergy for

social control and which, once Iran fell under the influence of

the colonial West, established the clerics as the general agents

of the Hidden Imam . But the historical consolidation of this

doctrinal tendency in Imami Twelver Shi'ism is not sufficient

76
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

to explain Khomeini's worldview . Khomeini's personality, as

a reflection of the Persian cultural ethos, played an equally

important role in the evolution of his thought.

Khomeini was a radical moralist who applied the literal

law (nomos) of the twelve Shi'ite imams to Muslim society .

From his point of view, the divine origin of Shi'ite sharia law

rendered all that did not emanate from it satanic . Thus it is

every Muslim's duty to participate in nomocratic politics

and combat the will of Satan.

45 If the roots of this view were

not imbedded in the Zoroastrian ethos of Persian culture, it

would have been possible to have dismissed the Ayatollah

psychologically as an aberrant personality .

46 The prophet

Zarathustra was obsessed with the punishment of evildoers . In

Zoroastrianism, light and darkness reifies in the free choice of

every person to engage in the struggle against the devil and

secure the paradise the Lord Ahura promises to the righteous .

Lord Ahura shows his appointed servant, Zarathustra, the

pattern of behavior that will cure existence of all its terrors and

transfigure the world. 4g Zarathustra, whose holiness is a

manifestation of Ahura's goodness, could tolerate no evil, no

division between virtues and their opposites, and no breach

between spirit and things material . 49 Zoroastrianism was a

religion of moral considerations par excellence in which the

techniques of transfiguration took the final form, as in Shi'ite

Islam, of esoteric knowledge.

50

It is not difficult to perceive in Imami Twelver Shi'ism the

ethical and cultural legacy of Zoroastrianism, nor in the person

of Khomeini an emanation of the Zoroastrian savior

transmuted into a holy imam-prophet. Zoroastrian and Shi'ite

Islamic ethics both apotheosize justice and make it the moral

imperative without the attainment of which there can be no

salvation in history . For man to comprehend the significance of

justice for salvation in both religions, prophecy is needed

because man's corruption disbars him from legislating

rationally in his own behalf. Although Khomeini never claimed

77
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

for himself such a role-in Shi'ism that would be tantamount

to the heresy of proclaiming oneself the Hidden Imam

returned-nevertheless he acted as if he were indeed the savior

of all Muslims.

Khomeini's view of the place the state system occupies

in the international order is closely modeled on this eschatological interpretation of Shi'ite history and the fulfillment of

the law as its driving force . Khomeini constructed an

international order of three state systems: the liberal, capitalist

West; the atheistic, communist East; and the moral, divine

Islamic system, neither East nor West. The first two systems

may, as sovereign systems, be in competition with each

other . But, they are both antithetical to the Islamic third system

because they represent political blocs whose ideological roots

take nourishment not from the divine source of perfect justice,

but from the satanic desire for lust and power.

51 Capitalism and

communism both answer to mammon; they must necessarily

fail because, as quintessentially human ideologies, they recognize

only the physical domination of man over man and his law

over God's law.

52 The divine, universally valid moral law of

Islam transcends the territorial and national limitations which

an anthropocentric philosophy of history imposes on

communism and capitalism . As Khomeini said: "The world is

the homeland of humanity," by which he meant a spiritualized,

triumphalist dar al-Islam, the homeland of all true believers.

53

So defined, the international system is in a constant state of

flux and conflict . To pursue jihad within such a system is to

pursue the permanent revolutionary struggle for universal

justice and freedom since only jihad can bring about the moral

conditions lacking in Western positivistic international law.

This message transparently clothes the classic Islamic

argument for jihad in the modern garb of religiopolitical

progressivism . But it does not otherwise disguise the

correspondence of the sacred and the political, which are the

7 8
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

hallmark of cultures such as Khomeini's that lack domination

over their socioeconomic environment. 54

Since Islam is the only state system based on the morality of

divine law, it stands to reason that Islamic law, as an expression

of the international order, is clearly superior to its Western

counterpart . For if God requires man to defend the superiority

of sharia through jihad, then the use of force to combat

universal evil accords perfectly with the right of every nation

to defend itself. 55 And since every government acts as judge of

its own cause, then the Islamic Republic of Iran, representing

a step in the evolution of the Islamic state system, has always

fought defensive jihads . Thus the eight years of war between

Iran and Iraq can be seen as an attempt by the rebellious Baath

polytheists of Iraq to destroy the evolving Islamic order. Since

a contest between Muslim and non-Muslim nations cannot be

arbitrated within the framework of Islamic law, a perpetual state

of war will exist between Iran and her neighbor until Iraq

accepts Khomeini's faith.The present armistice in the Iranian

war against Iraq may be observed for practical reasons.

Furthermore, the moral basis of Islamic international law

demands that, under the rules of jihad, all such agreements be

honored; but the resumption of hostilities remains inevitable .

57

The universalism of Khomeinist Islamism, its ideological

radicalism, and the absence of a specifically national Islamic

territory in which it operates, guarantee the exportation of

revolution beyond the , Iranian frontier. Yet, if the Iranian

constitution forbids interference in the internal affairs of other

countries-except as self-defense-under what conditions can

Khomeinist jihad foment revolution in the world? Can force be

used short of war and be called, at the same time, jihad? Is

subversion or terrorism permissible in jihad? R. K. Ramazani

remarks that what Khomeini exported abroad was jihad in the

form of proper Islamic "behavior." His clerical diplomats

propagated Islamic behavior guided by the directives of the

Council of the Revolution in Tehran . Their activities were

79
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

meant to safeguard the Islamic revolution at home . 58 The

decision regarding the definition of Islamic "behavior" was left

to the practical clerical politicians in the field and often

contravened the prescripts of sharia.

As Mohamed Elbakry says, terrorism and jihad, for instance,

are contradictory; terrorism has no religious basis in sharia but

reacts to despair over civil circumstances . Therefore, terrorists

cannot be mujahidun (people involved in jihad). Yet, in

Lebanon where Islamic "behavior" has been recently transmogrified into an active ideological force, the Lebanese Shi'ite

Hizbullah party called its 1983 terrorist attack on the US Marine

compound a defensive jihad against an aggressive military

enemy. Mustansir Mir points out that it matters little whether

jihad represents an offensive or defensive posture but whether

such jihad makes a difference in the quality and character of an

outward Islamic movement as it was destined to be. 60 put into

sociological terms, this means that the dogmatics of jihad are

supposed to furnish answers to given situations . These

dogmatics deal with functionally unanalyzed abstractions

such as "justice," "revolution," "aggression," and "defense"

and thus are unreflective categories of thought incapable of

"thematizing" social functions . They rest instead on the

context-free availability of material, that is, on a distance from

the connections dogmatics are supposed to interpret.

61 In the

case of Hizbullah, the group's political aims have led to a

moral ambiguity with respect to what the dogmatics of Shi'ite

sharia render permissible in the pursuit of defensive jihad.

Terrorism, permitted as a just military operation against an

enemy of the faith under the rules of jihad, was considered an

aspect of self-defense . But the issue of suicide, abhorrent to

Islamic sensibilities, was somewhat more difficult to justify .

In the final analysis, Lebanese Shi'ite clerics would condone

the terrorist attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut by a suicide

bomber on the grounds of extenuating circumstances, an

argument not normally accepted in Islamic law. Sheikh

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AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

Muhammad Fadlallah, the head of the Lebanese Shi'ite

community and the "spiritual guide" of the Hizbullah, reasoned

that because of the imbalance of power between the Hizbullah

and American forces and, furthermore, since defense of the

Lebanese ummah was mandatory under jihad, suicide was a

commendable moral, if not necessarily licit, act . The sheikh

argued that suicide differs little from the death of a mujahid

who knows he will be killed in the service of his cause . Only

the circumstances are different. Thus, if the act of suicide will

have a political effect on the enemy, it is considered an act of

jihad .

Fadlallah's reasoning not only demonstrates how flexible

the Shi'ite doctrine of jihad can be in fluctuating political

situations but also underscores the psychological disposition

under which the mujahid acts. In the Western mind, suicide

occurs in a state of mental derangement and moral disengagement ; to the mujahid, suicide sanctifies the act of annihilating

oneself in God. 63 If it is possible that the act of suicide can

bring success against the enemy, then Fadlallah insists that it

is provisionally valid . This signifies that the legitimacy of

suicide for jihad rests on the ends it attains but still requires a

cleric to disengage the believer from his actions .

64

From this we see that the mujahid's sacrifice of his life in

jihad makes him a martyr (shahid) . In Shi'ite theology, the

death of the martyr puts him on an equal footing with the

greatest of all Shi'ite martyrs, the third Imam, Hussein, as an

intercessor for believers on the day of judgment . To take this

conclusion a step further, martyrdom is not merely another

more spiritualized aspect of jihad ; it represents an alternative

that remains after jihad because the martyr is able, by making

jihad his "mission," to inspire those who follow him with

revolutionary fervor.

66

It is possible here to disengage a notion of the contemporary Shi'ite philosophy of history . Revolution may be

defined as the resurrection of the mujahid-shahid in every

8 1
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

generation to do battle against the people of taghut (evil) so

that God may revenge himself on evildoers . Because revolution

can only lead to good, God has determined that man is the

agent of goodness in history. Therefore, revolution is not only

man's obligation ; it is his divine inheritance.

67

It is clear from the above that these ideas conform neatly to

Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamist view of the world . Khomeini,

too, did not distinguish defensive from offensive jihad, and

what he called self-defense he invariably defined as such

himself. He acted in this manner because he was a "just" ruler

who declared all forms of jihad legitimate in the name of

defending God's chosen community . So long as Khomeini

interpreted God's sharia without error and applied it to the

governance of the ummah, the possibility of jihad remained a

given in the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims . The

fundamental condition for waging jihad was the Ayatollah's

rightly guided intention to close the gap between believer and

nonbeliever by "drawing the evil-doers nigh to God." In the

ethos of Persian Zoroastrianism, in classical Shi'ite Islam, and

in Khomeini's Islamist recension, moral intention, especially

in the execution of war, distinguishes the praiseworthy from

the damnable action .

69

Egyptian Islamism

Although popular reverence for the Imam Ali and his lineage

has engendered in the Shi' ite imagination an unbridgeable

chasm of belief between Muslims of the two principal Islamic

sects, on the theoretical level no dogmatic and creedal

differences separate Sunnism and Shi'ism. As mentioned

above, the Sunni-Shi'ite split revolves around the questions of

the ummah's nature and purpose and of the political authority

to lead God's chosen community . Because of the Iranian

Islamic revolution, the Shi'ite clergy has laid exclusive claim

to the right to govern the ummah in the absence of the Hidden

Imam. Command of the instruments of sharia legitimizes that

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AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

claim. From the Shi'ite clerical point of view, sharia does not

exist independent of its interpretation by the religious

establishment . In Sunnism, on the other hand, sharia has

evolved as an expression of the ummah's adaptation to

historical circumstances. For this reason, its implementation

reaffirms the Sunni view that the ummah's solidarity must

remain the supreme Islamic social value. Although this view

does not preclude clerical interpretation, interpretation of

sharia must always be subordinate to the perceived need to

maintain the ummah's unity . Thus Sunni Islamism goes further

than its Shi' ite counterpart in reinstating the primacy and

autonomy of sharia over all other sociopolitical and economic

forms of organization . Sunni Islamists look forward to a

renewal of the Golden Age of Islam when the caliphs were

rightly guided andjust in their application of the perfected word

to all aspects of social and political life .

This worldview gives Sunni Islamism its distinctive

characteristic . Its fullest contemporary expression resonates in

the writings of the Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb, who

languished and ultimately died in Gamal Abd al-Nasser's

prisons . Qutb's magnum opus, Milestones, set out the

theoretical premises on which Egyptian Islamists would

attempt to elaborate a practical program for the regeneration of

the Islamic community . Qutb's preoccupation with sharia

reveals his need to "save" Islam from the depredations of

modernity and to return the dar al-Islam to a purity purged

of the pernicious accretions of Western philosophical

values . But Qutb was no reactionary; he had no bone to pick

with modernization, which he believed-like Abduh and

al-Afghani, the great Muslim reformers before him-was

thoroughly consistent with Islamic law. Qutb saw modernity in

terms of the degradation of Islamic moral values . He also

equated modernity with transcendent political loyalty to the

secular Middle Eastern state, which explained his desire to

eliminate all vestiges of the dar al-harb among Muslims.

83
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Because of his disgust with the secular West, Qutb was unable

to tolerate any competing ideology based on Western political

tenets, such as Arab socialism, or narrow one-state or pan-Arab

nationalisms . These Westernized ideologies, of which

Nasserism represented perhaps the greatest travesty in his eyes,

were "superstructures without an actual sociological substratum ." 7° They interfered with the repoliticalization of Islam

as the fundamental belief system of native Muslim cultures . But

Qutb did not insist, like Khomeini, on Islam's universalizing

mission to purge all mankind of secular, Western evil . He

recognized that in the classical Islamic sense, his actions

would apply to Muslims alone. Nor did Qutb trust the

state-appointed Sunni clergy to take a prominent part in the

re-Islamization of the ummah since he accepted the clergy only

as servants of sharia and of a truly purified Islamic state under

a rejuvenated caliphate .

Qutb's concept of jihad portended the "moral rearmament"

of Islam for the sake of which Muslims must be determined

to wage war against modernity, nationalism, the secular

state, and the domination of "official" clerics so that the sharia

could once again reign supreme in the dar al-Islam .

71 In

Qutb's view, the events between the phases of Islamic

"spiritual maturation" and the final assault against degenerative

Muslim society possessed the potential for nascent violence .

Because Qutb saw no peaceful way of dealing with such moral

depravity-he likened modern Muslim society to the Jahiliyyah

or Age of Ignorance before Islam=jihad was to be the weapon

of man's liberation . The Muslim modernists could never

succeed in a defensive war against Jahiliyyah society through

apologetic literature nor could the pietists effect change

through an inner, spiritual jihad of the heart; the answer lay with

complete, total, and absolute revolution led by a vanguard

movement of the saved.

Qutb's militancy rejected all possibility of autonomy for

Islamists within the Jahiliyyah ; they had to completely

84
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

master corrupt society in order to propagate their message free

of constraint, even if they were obliged to apply force to

remove the restrictions that impeded their progress . The

individual was always free to reject the truth but never to stand

in the way of its declaration . Legitimate violence raised

jihad to the level of a formerly neglected pillar of faith whose

practicants must replace Jahiliyyah with Hakimiyyah (the

rule of God's justice) through conflict or death . In the final

analysis, sharia would regulate society once again after the

destruction of the heretical rulers of the ungodly state and

their more ungodly Western-inspired laws . Peace ensues

when a caliph is reinstalled to administer God's word .

Qutb's philosophy of history made no room for the Islamist's

gradual accession to political power. Jihad was Qutb's

instrument to proclaim the militant message of revolution in

social and political mores . Preaching a "return to the roots" of

a true Islamic life by slowly changing the character of

Jahiliyyah society from within held no appeal for him.

Jahiliyyah societies merited complete destruction . This view

separated Qutb from the earlier Islamic reformers and from his

rivals, the Muslim Brothers, who were prepared to forgo

revolutionary transformation in order to accept Anwar Sadat's

offer permitting the Brothers limited participation in the

Egyptian political process.

76

The zeal of the Muslim Brothers for the immediate

Islamization of society had dissipated over the years of

Nasser's and Sadat's repression so that they no longer saw the

usefulness of making a collective judgment concerning the

moral health of the ummah or the rectitude of its leaders .

Following in the footsteps of the earliest Sunni legalists, the

Muslim Brothers preferred to reserve for God the decision to

excommunicate a Muslim from the community for lack of faith .

Whether a Muslim was ignorant or not was not a matter for

human judgment; and hurling the accusation of Jahiliyyah on

Muslim societies was, in their view, absurd since they believed

85
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

that the Jahiliyyah represented a phenomenon relating solely to

an epoch in Islamic history and not to a recurrent state of

mind . The gradual reformation of the state through their

efforts would ensure the education of the believer in the true

faith . The Brothers argued that the carrying out of this

obligation was not the exclusive province of an Islamist

counterculture nor did Islamists have the right to reserve to

themselves the definition of true belief. 78

The gulf, then, between Qutb and the Brothers existed on

both the theoretical and the practical level. The Brothers

believed that they could work within Muslim society for its

edification, which implied a tentative acceptance of the state,

whereas Qutb contended that society must be transformed from

without, which implied a separation from the state . As Qutb

died before he could fashion for the secular Jahiliyyah an

Islamist theory of state, the work of erecting a practical

framework around his concepts fell to his heirs . Thus the

Islamists fragmented into a number of competing factions over

this issue of separation from society .

By separation Qutb seemed to have meant a spiritual

distance. On the other hand some, like Shukri Mustapha, who

took his words literally, strove for total physical detachment.

Mustapha's group appeared in the 1970s as a loose organization

of Muslim societies among the students at the Egyptian

universities . The most prominent of groups was the Takfir wa

Hijra (expiation and flight) in Asyut, which between 1971 and

1973 pronounced openly their anathema of the state and

withdrew from the Jahiliyyah to live totally self-contained

lives on the fringes of the Egyptian body politic . 79 This counterculture, in forbidding normal intercourse with "corrupted"

Egyptians and in accentuating the interdependence of believers

for all the group's needs, was not yet revolutionary. Rather

Takfir was living, in Qutb's words, a "phase of weakness" while

waiting patiently for conditions that would herald a "phase of

power." "Separation" in their lexicon, signaled a political

86
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

strategy for dealing with social decadence during this "phase

of weakness ." s° With the coming of the "phase of power,"

jihad would erupt from outside the society. In 1977 radical

elements of Mustapha's group carried out the assassination of

an important government cleric for which they were

incarcerated, tried, and executed.

The vacuum left by the demise of Takfir wa Hijra was filled

by a group named simply "Jihad ." Having infiltrated the army,

Jihad was able to carry out the assassination of Anwar Sadat

in 1981 on the occasion of the Armed Forces Day celebration

of the October War. Tried and executed like the Takfir group,

Sadat's killers left behind an extraordinary testimony to the

pervasiveness of their beliefs in the form of a treatise called

"Al-Faridah al-Gha `ibah" (the neglected duty) . Written by one

of the conspirators against Sadat, Muhammad Abd al-Salam

Faraj, the treatise outlines the ideology of the Jihad

organization . In Nemat Guenena's analysis this document

performed all the functions ideologies must carry out to be

effective .

It was perceived by a segment of society to be explanatory of its own

private sufferings . Objective grievances were acknowledged, and

personal shortcomings were minimized by a process whereby blame

was shifted from the individual to the collective level: in this case the

political system, and to a lesser degree society . Thus, this had the effect

of preserving or restoring its adherents' self-esteem . Hope was infused

through a proposed course of action, the "Jihad." The sense of

superiority resulting, the feeling of being chosen, was directly

proportional to the commitment entailed by that course of action . Also,

the more substantial was the reward promised . In this world, a better

society and a more powerful people ; in the hereafter, paradise

(al-Janna) . The fact that this reward is not an either/or is characteristic

of Islam, which professes to be both worldly and otherworldly (din wa

donya) . 81

We can see, as Kepel points out, that the treatise deals with

questions of how to seize power in the state while simultaneously ignoring an analysis of society .

82 To justify their right

to this course of action, the Jihadists had first to declare what

87
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

they were not. In Al-Faridah al-Gha `ibah they break with the

other Islamists. They deny the efficacy of bringing into being

an Islamic state by means of benevolent activities, Islamic

reeducation, philosophic reformism, political participation,

political influence among the elites, or separation from

society. 83 For the Jihadists, conflict, which represents the

highest form of devotion, is not an alternative to the problem

of the Jahiliyyah, but its solution.

84 Consequently, jihad must

be waged within the community because the enemy is found

in the midst of the Muslims.

85 The movement was to prepare

for the crushing of the enemy by employing the Khomeinist

tactic of indoctrination through the use of mass-produced

tape recordings, for instance . For once it became obvious

to the ummah that the secular leaders were infidels and

perverters of the sharia, the miscreants would be slaughtered,

and the victory of the Jihadists would be vouchsafed by God.

In the words of the Jihadists themselves :

To build an Islamic state is to carry out God's order. . . . We do not

insist on this or that result . . . . The mere fall of the infidel will bring

everything within the reach of Muslims.

87

When jihad breaks out, nobody will shirk his responsibility .

Individual suicide may even be required . The consent of parents

to permit minor children to fight as demanded by classical

Sunni jurisprudence will be nullified. $$ A guide will appear to

lead the jihad . He need not be from the tribe of the prophet nor

of the lineage of the Shi'ite Imams; but he shall not be an

"official" cleric because the

vanity of a man of religion makes it impossible for him to command

soldiers . . . . Religious types do not form the elite from which military

commanders should be chosen .

89

He need only be the best of Muslims. 9° And as the struggle

develops and enlarges, all stratagems will be acceptable in the

eyes of God. 9I

88
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

What emerges from the Jihadist view of the world is the

picture of an alien society far removed from its original source

in Sayyid Qutb's writings. The Jihadist lives in a community

permanently effervescing, submerged in radical action, with

little conception of perceptible boundaries between stages of

political "weakness" and "power." 92 The Jihadist hope is for

the fulfillment of God's will to reestablish a perfected order that

represents the founding myth of the early Islamic community

and to graft the Golden Age of the past onto the prurient present

by means of the literal acceptance of God's ordinances . This

ahistorical attitude rejects all of the Muslim past between the

perfected Then and the disquieting Now. In so doing, the

Jihadist rejects the principle of accommodation by which

Sunnism has maintained its remarkable sociopolitical

flexibility and mastery of historical conditions . 93 Jihadists are

not, in the classical Durkheimian sense, alienated types

suffering from the anomie of a world in economic upheaval;

they are primarily people whose identification and recognition

of traditional values have so far decayed under the impact of

unassimilable foreign cultures that their sense of self has been

impaired, and with it, all notion of legitimate authority and

protest .

94

The resemblance between Jihadist and Khomeinist Islamism

should be clear. Both varieties of Islamism claim to interpret

the world in a way that mobilizes the energies of the ummah

toward a redefinition of its role in global civilization and

militates for an activist role in social transformation ; both

substitute the traditional, historical high Islam of clerical

consensus for a popular, low Islam which requires

unquestioning adherence to textual literalism; both take the

moral high road in rejecting modernity as a Western-inspired

conspiracy against the true faith and the true community while

clinging to the myth that literalism is no impediment to the

power that inheres in modernization ; both reject Western

international law by glorifying jihad as the ummah's

89
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

revolutionary mission and the instrument of the ummah's

inevitable historical rebellion against the nation-state; both

suspend the classical Islamic rules of conflictual conduct and

level all social distinctions by making jihad a universal

responsibility. In so doing, both create a ready supply of

martyrs willing to seek paradise for their cause.

The success of this kind of Islamist ideology relates directly

to the skill of its followers in manipulating the environment of

the political cultures in which they operate and in exploiting

the symbols of religious culture to their benefit. The Iranian

Shi'ite revolution has imbued the entire Muslim world with the

prospect of triumphal historical possibilities . Khomeini has

furnished the example of the successful conservative

revolutionary .

This being said, bear in mind that the Shi'ite revolution

remains anchored in the ethos of clerical leadership as an

instrument of messianic eschatology. This idea is foreign to

Sunni Islam where the evolution of the clerical establishment

rarely occurred independent of the secular state . For this

reason Sunni Islamists, although they share with their Shi'ite

brethren a basic outlook on the world, still harbor suspicions

about the role of the clergy in bringing about the millennium .

It is over the issue of leadership that Sunni Islamism no doubt

will founder as did the early seventh-century Muslim

community before it .

North African Islamism : The Tunisian Model

So far this essay has analyzed jihad as it pertains to the most

militant contemporary Islamist movements, explained the

development of jihad in classical Shi'ite and Sunni juris

prudence, and examined jihad's continuing historical evolution

within specific Muslim cultures . Islamist's extraordinary

accommodation of a concept of jihad to new circumstances

affirms Islam's flexibility in meeting the challenge of change

for contemporary Muslim cultures . In North African societies,

90
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

however, and in Tunisia particularly, this accommodation has

not implied the appearance of the most radical forms of

Islamism nor the most uncompromising attitudes toward jihad .

Former president Habib Bourguiba is responsible for the

creation of a modern political personality for Tunisia .

Bourguiba was able to make Islam a crucial element in the

Tunisian struggle for independence from France. His great

genius was to elevate popular Islam to a "political" religion,

portraying it as a repository of purely Tunisian values . At the

same time he reconstructed "official" Islam as an arm of the

secular Tunisian state .

95 This secular marriage of temporal and

spiritual religiosity, with Bourguiba as "imam" of both state and

cult, succeeded because Bourguiba understood intuitively the

interrelationship between the assimilativeness of Tunisian

culture and its liberalism in religious affairs .

Bourguiba accepted the Sunni modernists' view that since

peace should characterize the international relations between

Islamic and non-Islamic nations, jihad had a "home mission"

to transform Muslim social backwardness into progress along

Western lines .

96 Bourguiba's act of turning away from the

conflictual meaning of jihad to a notion that jihad offered

the means for the realization of justice and equality favored

the opinion that the Koran could be preached as a kind of

Islamic "social gospel ." Modern communications made it

possible for Bourguiba to preach the "home mission" of jihad,

which equated, in classical Islamic terms, to jihad's external

mission of propagating the faith . When, in the early days of

Tunisian independence, Bourguiba appeared on television

during the month of Ramadan and drank a glass of orange juice,

he was suggesting to all his countrymen that work was more

important than the holy fast and that the sharia permitted them

to break the fast in order to go on jihad against "underdevelopment." In this way Bourguiba was attempting to

secularize religion without cutting off Tunisian Muslims from

the source of their religious values.

9 1
So long as the state could furnish access to the prosperity that

religious faith promised but failed to deliver, Bourguiba's

ingenious synthesis of Tunisian cultural values, liberal Islam,

and Western ways of approaching issues of modernization

endured . In the late sixties, however, after the debacle of

Tunisian socialism and the state-guided economy, a discernible

Islamist trend began to emerge which showed just how deeply

even the opposition to Bourguiba had been marked by the

modern political culture that he had fashioned from his native

roots .

CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Bourguiba coupled his aggressive modernization program

with a psychological assault on traditional Tunisian

socioreligious values . His almost monomaniacal prejudice for

modernity manifested itself in an obsession to change the

Tunisian mental structures . On one hand, he pursued a clear

policy of separating Islam from the state by bringing all

religious activities under strict government control. On the

other, he promised his people political pluralism which

assumed an independent role for religion in an expanded

multiparty system. Tunisian Islamism drew its sustenance from

the cultural impoverishment that followed Bourguiba's failure

to furnish an autonomous institutional framework for the

transformations he wished to engineer in the Tunisian

self-perception .

The reaction began innocently enough in the early seventies

as a drive among members of the official religious class to

preserve the sharia from further depredations and, by

extension, to maintain their own position as traditional social

elites . But this sentiment quickly affected the disenchanted

student population-the very people Bourguiba was grooming

to become the next generation of secular elites . Initially

Bourguiba encouraged student religiosity as an antidote to the

more dangerous secular alternatives that leftist ideology

presented . The Khomeinist revolution, the emergence of

distinguishable Islamist forces elsewhere in the Middle East,

92
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

and the national labor unrest of the late seventies hardened the

new Islamic position .

When Bourguiba began to repress the same current he had

helped to create, Islamic sentiment took on an Islamist

coloration . As a consequence, the Movement of Islamic

Tendency (MTI) was organized in 1981 . The government

forced the MTI to function clandestinely whereas it preferred

to operate openly in response to Bourguiba's promise to

provide the political opposition with access to power. 9 ' The

MTI adopted this position because it believed that the

implementation of sharia was the best means to answer

Tunisian national needs . In other words the sharia could reply

to all the needs of the contemporary Muslim by being

reformist, melioristic, and humanistic ; thus, like Bourguibism,

the sharia could change mental structures in a truly modern

way .

To Bourguiba, however, religion did not complement his

political philosophy but offered an alternative to it . The

Tunisian state was a Muslim state . Its president was a Muslim.

For a party to propose for itself a political identity based on

Islam and a program based on Muslim values was a

contradiction in terms since Bourguiba's Destourian Socialist

Party and the government that expressed the party's will

already encompassed those ideals . Bourguiba could tolerate the

MTI's political opposition to secularism, but he could not

accept it as an alternative national social identity. The paradox

was, of course, that when the MTI agreed to contest at the polls

the dominance of Bourguiba's secular, nationalistic, one-party

system, it was obliged to insist on its fundamental ideological

difference with the founding national philosophy lest it appear

to be a warmed-over, reformist version of Bourguibism . This

resulted in MTI's fragmentation and the formation of a radical

wing.

99

During the decade of the eighties, Tunisian society was

infected on three occasions by the virus of radical Islamism .

93
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

In 1983 a small cell of the Islamic Liberation Party, a Jordanian

offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, was discovered in

the bosom of the Tunisian air force . In 1986 an army lieutenant

and two adjutants claiming allegiance to the "Islamic Jihad"

attacked a police post with the intent of obtaining arms for a

future revolution . In 1987 a group of Tunisians with alleged

Khomeinist connections was apprehended and linked to radical

Tunisian Islamists operating from Paris. 100 The relationship of

these groups to the MTI remains shadowy, but the government

had no doubts about the MTI's participation in these events .

Disgusted with his former prime minister Muhammad Mzali's

appeasement of the MTI and the MTI's constant badgering for

political participation in order to deal with the threat of its own

left, Bourguiba decided to extirpate the Islamists root and

branch. IOI The trials of 1987 that sought to prove the Iranian

Islamist connection brought unexpected judgments favorable

to the MTI. It is ironic that when Bourguiba tried to retry the

Islamists he was deposed by his prime minister and former

armed forces security chief, Zayn al-Abdine Ben Ali, the very

man on whom he had depended to rid the country of its Islamist

menace.

Bourguiba's legacy haunts President Ben Ali who must

decide whether-in the face of the MTI's extraordinary success

in the 1989 municipal and assembly elections as independent

candidates-he should legalize their party . For their part, the

MTI must decide whether they will continue to demand

constitutional access to the political system or whether they will

adopt a confrontational position under pressure from their

radical left, which has been ready for some time to declare a

holy war.

Whatever the politics of the individual Islamists may

be, they all agree that the Western model of social organization,

based on the rationalism of the Western technological and

scientific order, has caused the decay of Western civilization .

They feel this degenerate civilization pressing in on them daily

94
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

through the proxy of Ben Ali's European- and Americanoriented politics . And they seek to reject its consumerist

orientation by rejecting its material basis . They do not believe,

however, that this signifies a rejection of modernization, which

they strive to give a Tunisian-Islamic specificity by returning

to a thoroughgoing self-reliant material and social puritanism .

Only in this way-and this is ultimately a principal aim of all

Islamists of whatever stripe-can they hope to recover their

Islamic authenticity . That the majority of Tunisian Islamists

have chosen to compete under Western democratic conditions

speaks not only of the accommodation of Tunisian-Islamist

ideology to secular Bourguibism, however fragile, but of the

immense elasticity of Sunni Islam with respect to matters of

governance and state power.

While it is true that the majority of Tunisian Islamists

contend that democratic contestation of state power for the

purpose of re-Islamicizing state and society is the most

efficacious way to proceed, a minority holds itself aloof from

direct involvement. Among them there exists a progressivist

left wing which refuses to pose as a governmental alternative

but concentrates on issues of doctrinal reformulation.' 02 These

Islamists are intellectuals interested more in political culture

than in political action . The radical right wing has been

described, and the success of its uncompromising revolutionary

jihad depends very much on the correlation of forces between

government and Islamist moderates . Lastly, the moderates

themselves, whose interests center on political accommodation,

social action, and the creation of an Islamic society under

sharia, answer the need for solidarity and unity of the ummah.

Even though they recognize the urgency to improve the

material conditions of the faithful, they have disregarded the

practical programmatic issues of social reconstruction . On the

whole, then, Tunisian Islamism projects more an image of

religious revival than religious revolution .

95
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

However radical their position may be regarding the

secular state, Tunisian Islamists exhibit the salient Sunni

characteristic of a leadership which claims no divinely inspired

right to lead the ummah in a jihad toward the millennium. This

lack of institutionalized leadership contrasts sharply with the

Shi' ite view of a predominant role for the clergy and makes

Sunni Islamism more prone to political fragmentation. On the

other hand, the greater emphasis in Sunni Islamism on worldly,

as opposed to Shi'ite otherworldly, preoccupations implicitly

rejects a static concept of the interaction of religious and

indigenous culture . For this reason, Sunni Islamism may

promote a future political culture rooted in the synthesis of

secular and religious values . This cannot help but have an

important influence on the evolution of a concept of jihad.

Some Observations on Jewish Fundamentalism

The similarity of the Hebraic and Muslim concepts of conflict

is striking. In early Israelitic history, war served to extend the

faith of the Hebrews over the land of Canaan . God instituted

war as an instrument to advance the consolidation of the

Israelitic kingdom and its constitution under his law. Therefore

conflict defined the relationship of the Israelites and the

non-Hebraic peoples living around them and in their midst. As

both a raison d'etat and a raison d'etre, war represented the

Israelitic army's obligations to enlarge the boundaries of the

state and each individual Israelite's duty to defend the society

from invasion. The code of warfare defined permissible acts

during offensive and defensive military encounters.' 03

If jihad represented a legal instrument of Islamic

universalism, the preservation and extension of the state

through war affirmed for the Israelites their divine election as

God's light unto the gentiles . For if God made Jewish history

the moral vehicle through which he revealed his design for

96
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

cosmic order, chosenness endowed Israel, as a people and as a

state, with messianic significance . Thus Israel's temporal and

spiritual meaning for human salvation sanctified the state's

physical expansion much in the same way that the imperial

extension of God's "best" community, the ummah, confirmed

the value of the Muslims' sociomoral order. When the Israelitic

state finally crumbled and the exilic period began, the

aggressive aspect of conflict was suspended, just as the

offensive drive of jihad waned with the disintegration of the

Arabo-Muslim empire . Even so, this did not signal for the Jews

a compromise with their chosenness; nor did the collapse of the

Arabo-Muslim empire compromise the universality of Islam .

During the exile, the rabbinical institution assumed the task

of explaining the inscrutability of God's purpose in depriving

his people of a primary role in the unfolding of the eschatological meaning of history. The rabbinate also reinterpreted the

meaning of chosenness and its relationship to the concepts of

peace and war under such circumstances of powerlessness and

adversity . What emerged was a doctrine of divine retribution

for Israel's sins and the creative infusion into that doctrine of

hopes for a reborn state under the messianic inspiration of

rabbinical guidance . Therefore the rabbis could reason that to

suffer at the hands of one's enemies was as much a sign of

election as the gaining of victory over them. In Shi'ite Islam,

the clergy similarly justified their preeminent sociopolitical

position in the ummah by constructing a theory of general

agency that allowed them to speak in the place of the Hidden

Imam . The important difference was that under the Safavid state

the Shi'ite clergy became an official stratum of imperial

society, whereas the rabbis, in their European exile, continued

to represent a pariah community among Christians . This

accounts in part for the differing attitudes of Jews and Shi'ite

Muslims toward secular power.

The growth of European secularism, especially the

separation of temporal from spiritual power, had an ambiguous

97
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

effect on the Jews . Secularization reduced the political power

of the rabbinate because it destroyed the separate corporate

Jewish life through which that power was exercised. To many

Jews this meant freedom from rabbinical provincialism. But if

secularization led to a loss of corporate Jewish identity, by

means of which Christendom had determined the collective

position of Jews as a "nation" in the medieval synthesis, it did

not, on the other hand, compensate the Jewish individual with

a guarantee of full political and social assimilation into the

modern European nation-state .' 04 However great the reliance

Jews put on gaining the right to citizenship, periodic

anti-Semitism and partially achieved assimilation retarded the

process of redefining Jewish status under the secular European

state . But just because secularization did not guarantee certain

rights and privileges, it did not disqualify secularism as an

ideological solution for the Jewish collectivity . It simply meant

that political Zionism would answer the need to reconstruct the

medieval Jewish collectivity on a Jewish national basis

whose goal was the creation of a Jewish state physically and

spiritually removed from Europe . This political act returned the

Jews to active participation in modern history.

105 However

antisecular its political ideology may be, Islamism similarly

strives to insert Muslims into the contemporary historical

current.

The founders of political Zionism, issuing themselves from

the crucible of European nineteenth-century nationalism,

believed wholeheartedly in the secular concept of the

nation-state . They wanted to create a Jewish republican

commonwealth in no way different from its European

counterpart. In seeking the instruments of sovereignty for a

"normal" Jewish state, the Zionists thought they could resolve

by political means the historical anachronism that had made the

Jews the scapegoat of European quarrels and which had

created for the Europeans a "Jewish question." Like good

Western thinkers, these Zionists perceived that only national

98
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

power could guarantee peace, survival, and international

equality for the Jews .

But the evolution of political Zionism was not able to destroy

anti-Semitism. In fact, it contributed to an even more savage

repression of the Jews. By the same token, the creation of an

Israeli state dedicated to a national ethos of survival did not

allow the state to be normal but emphasized its continuing

abnormality . The wars Israel fought in the name of its

powerlessness, particularly the June War of 1967, which

exacerbated its problem with the Arabs, seemed to support the

opposite image of a state dedicated to aggressive selfaggrandizement . From this perspective, abnormality became

the "normal" state of affairs, and the ethos of the struggle for

survival became the essence of Israeli national life . On the

level of international relations, this struggle for survival had

the advantage of explaining to the Jews the behavior of

powerful vengeful states toward a beleaguered Israel. On the

level of religious belief, it gave further positive significance to

what the secularists had hitherto considered the aberration of

Jewish historical suffering.' 06

It was not difficult to see in the evil the gentiles perpetrated

upon the Jews and Jewish resistance to that evil the working

out of a messianic design for Jewish redemption . This design,

harbored in the bosom of traditional rabbinical Judaism, had

been co-opted by political Zionism and given the shape of a

state that, by offering a safe haven for Jews, complemented

biblical prophecy. Despite the fact that the state was secular,

its wars for survival, nonetheless, were considered events

permeated by religious expectation . War prepared the terrain

for the coming of the Messiah and for the revelation of the

meaning of God's covenant with his anointed people. In that

war overcame the evil threatening to thwart this messianic

design, it hastened the progress of redemption, and was therefore undeniably good.

107 So long as the Israeli state succeeded

in winning its wars for security, secularism and religion could

99
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

coexist. Together they were cooperating in reifying God's plan

for the Jewish people . But when the state failed to provide

absolute security for its Jewish citizens, the compatibility of

the secular and religious ideals began to dissolve, and national

cohesion was seriously weakened .

A watershed was reached after the June War of 1967 when

Israel absorbed the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which

comprised much of what religious Jews believed to be the

traditional Land of Israel . The state expected the Arabs to make

permanent peace and to offer Israel security guarantees in

exchange for conquered land, thereby cooperating in the

"normalization" of the Jewish state. However, the war failed to

bring the Arabs to the bargaining table; and the continuation of

low-intensity hostilities by Palestinian nationalists brought

home to the Israeli government and people the realization that

there was no ultimate military solution to the security issue . The

Arabs intended to fight on by conventional or unconventional

means. In the eyes of many Israelis, the state-unable or

unwilling to end the Arab threat by force majeure-began to

lose its legitimacy . Thus conditions were conducive for

Judaism, as a religious response to these problems, to become

a radical political ideology .

In Judaism, as in Islam, there had always existed a core of

religious modernists who saw no inherent contradiction

between traditional values and the modern state. Their number

was few in comparison to the majority of conservatives who

expressed various degrees of ambiguity toward the Israeli state

and the role its secular philosophy should play in the

redemptive process. In principle, the conservatives were

distributed among the parties of the Israeli religious right

according to their understanding of the meaning of secular

Zionism. Among those who believed that God's law (halakah)

reigns supreme over man's law-again a position analogous to

Islamism in general-some held that the state was historically

providential. But the state only heralded the redemption which

100
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

a return to life according to halakic standards would complete.

This middle-of-the-road position acknowledged the temporary

importance of the state for survival against gentile wrath and

invested it with normative moral significance . 108

In addition to believing that halakic ordinances were

sufficient for the organization of the state, others denied that

the sovereignty of the state possessed any meaning for the

coming of the Messiah .' o9 This archconservative position was

more classically rabbinical because it claimed that secular

Zionism failed to recognize that Jewish suffering was the

consequence of exilic history through which God punished

the sinfulness of his people . The state's effort to establish equal

political relations with the gentile world blurred the distinction

that gentile oppression was instrumental to God's design for

Jewish redemption and, by extension, a confirmation of

Jewish chosenness . Hence, the state itself was sin incarnate,

could never herald redemption, and was illegitimate because

it deigned to disturb God's plan by negotiating with the

enemies of the Jews . To such archconservatives the Israeli

state furnished an "exile among Jews" who have an affinity

not for the state but for the religious Land of Israel . Their

hatred of the Israeli state enabled them to identify the state as

a Jewish "society" only.' Io

Seen, then, as a "state of Jews" and not a "Jewish state," Israel

will play a minor part in the redemptive drama of reconquering

the Land of Israel, much of which fell to the state by virtue

of the June War. But even though the archconservative position

may consider the state heretical, that position does not allow

for the withdrawal of the state from the occupied territories

nor does it permit the state to impede the settlement of Jewish

exiles in the Land of Israel. In this way, the messianism of

the extreme religious right is based partly on Jewish

sovereignty over the occupied territories while still negating

the legitimacy of the Israeli state."'
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Since 1967 the settlement of the occupied territories by

zealots, organized in a loose federation called the Gush Emunim

(the Bloc of the Faithful), has proceeded steadily . Members of

the Gush belong to the various political parties on the right .

Their religiosity, which informs their political attitude toward

the land and toward an eventual conflict with the Palestinians

over the right to make it totally Jewish, unites them and tends

to cut across the well-defined rabbinical positions on the issue

of state and its relation to society .

Because they share a broad spectrum of attitudes on this

issue, the Gush's politics can be both flexible and inflexible at

the same time. But they all agree on certain basic ideological

principles . They concur that the identification of the state with

Western cultural and political values has gone too far. The state

has a religious mission to end exilic history and to prepare for

the redemption of the Jews by restoring halakic law. Halakic

law cannot be restored without first reabsorbing the biblical

Land of Israel and Judaizing it . Because secular Zionists are

willing to negotiate issues of sovereignty with their former

European persecutors, Zionism has betrayed God's cosmic

design for Jewry. This includes negotiations with the

Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

over a formula for Arab rights . To the Gush, the Palestinians

have no rights ; possession of the land by continuous habitation

is a secular concept. As such, habitation has no validity

measured against the moral imperative to ensure the redemption

of the Jews . To work actively against the Abrahamic covenant

that confirms Jewish redemption-either by evacuating the

land or by yielding it to the Palestinians as part of a peace

settlement-is a mortal sin . Only true Zionism, the political

value of which is self-evident, acknowledges these imperatives .

If the aims of true Zionism bring opprobrium down upon the

heads of Jews and upon the state, then Jews must accept that

opprobrium because God wills it . The obligation of state is to

stand alone and firm against any attempt to reverse God's plan

102
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

for Jews in human history. Under international law, normal

relationships can be carried out only between equal partners .

Given its role in Jewish redemption, the Jewish state cannot be

the equal of other states . In fact, to the archconservatives any

effort by the state to act as a peer of other states is the work of

Satan to subjugate the Jews. This means that the Jewish state

must accept its abnormality in the international system as a

prevailing fact of Jewish life . The state serves the higher

purpose of redemption . Therefore the Palestinians have no

other recourse but to accept their role in the unfolding of these

millenarian events; otherwise they must be expelled forcefully from the land they occupy. If the Jewish state does not

accept its role in the cosmic drama, it must be overthrown .

Renewing conflict for this purpose is ordained and holy . For

individuals or the state not to take up arms for this cause

opposes divine revelation .

In many respects the political ideologies of radical Islamism

and fundamentalist Judaism complement each other. Both fear

the disintegrative influence of the godless West on human

society and make Western sociopolitical values the author of

all human woes . Both reject Western modernization while

accepting the instrumental value of Western modernity . Both

have revived their universalist mission and are endeavoring to

impose it on their immediate neighbors . Both show tremendous

ambivalence toward the ability of the secular state to improve

humankind. Both wish to substitute a culturally and religiously

based concept of society for secularism. In response to the

weakness of a global political system that at one time was able

to impose a relative peace on the international order, both have

redefined the efficacy of conflict according to their traditional

religious cultures .

It would be instructive to compare the Islamic and Judaic

views of conflict with a historical Christian perspective. If

Islam preaches a permanent jihad against unbelievers through

imperial expansion and Judaism preaches a defensive war for

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

God's chosen people through the agency of a divinely

instituted, nomocratic, imperial state, then we would expect

Christianity, as a redemptive and historically nonstate religion,

to present a pacifistic face to the world.' 12 Indeed, Jesus

exhorted his followers to exercise humility before their enemies

by turning the other cheek. But we know that all religion is

influenced by the political and socioeconomic cultures of its

practitioners .

Christian pacifism and its nonstate orientation held sway

until Paul initiated the process of abandoning the Mosaic

synthesis between the historical experience of the Jews and

their longing for God. He created a new synthesis which

directed Christianity toward its eventual conversion of the

Roman Empire ; for if Jesus based his glory on his earthly

failure, the medieval triumph'alist and imperial church,

conversely, looked askance at political weakness .' 13 Similarly,

as noted above, the concept of a Jewish messianic state

grounded in postexilic rabbinical tradition compensated for the

perception among Jews that they were powerless before gentile

persuasion .

114 From these newfound historical connections to

Roman culture and its imperial tradition of state power arose

the understanding in Christendom that legal equality could be

established only between Christian nations . Similarly for Jews

and Muslims, a legal interest was possible only in their relations

among themselves rather than in the relationship between

themselves and other religions ." 5

The long historical struggle between the Roman Catholic

church and European secularists forced certain concessions in

Christian thinking regarding an aggressive pursuit of Christian

universalism . But the decline of secular political culture and

values in contemporary Western Europe and of MarxismLeninism in Eastern Europe has favored a reevaluation of the

traditional Christian position . European Christianity is today

reasserting its triumphalism and may reassume a posture that

104
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

aligns it everywhere in Europe with the forces of resurgent

nationalism .

Regarding the present Middle East situation, however, and

in particular the Arab-Israeli issue, it is not the Catholic but the

Protestant evangelical interpretation of events that represents

the dominant Christian position . Like his fundamentalist

Jewish counterpart, the Evangelical focuses on millenialist

theology and the apocalyptic scenario . In the last days of

history all the Jews will return to the biblical Land of Israel,

reestablish their political sovereignty over it, and rebuild their

temple . Christ will lead a battle between the godly nationsIsrael and the United States-and the satanic nations-either

communist or Arab Muslim-and in the ensuing struggle

144,000 Jews will be converted . Other infidels will be

destroyed . In the evangelical view, Christianity will reign first

over Israel and then over an earth purged of non-Christians .

Despite long-range conversionist and genocidal attitudes

toward the Jews, Evangelicals agree provisionally to Israeli

expansion because the Muslims form Satan's cohorts.

116

These apocalyptic scenarios, which we find not only among

the various Jesus movements worldwide but among the

charismatic offshoots of many mainline Christian denomi

nations, do not convince either the Jews or the Muslims of

Christianity's traditional benevolence toward the nonChristian. On the contrary, Jews and Muslims suspect that

Christendom will embark on new crusades against them once

the time is ripe for an open confrontation.

No wonder, then, that contemporary apologists such as the

Tunisian scholar Hichem Djait weigh the depiction of Islam as

a combative religion against both the ideal Christian view of

history and its existential reality . To Djait's mind, the spirit of

jihad is "only a military fiction, a source of energy and

enthusiasm at the outset, an ideal mobilization of defensive

reflexes in the second Islamic period."' 17 Djait goes on to argue

that Islam has always preferred the "cohesion of essence" to the

105
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

need for Christian "rationality" but that Muslims were driven

by Western Christian colonialism to pursue aggressively the

Western option. For this reason, Djait continues, Islam is

paying the price of infidelity to itself that the West, in diluting

its own Christian spiritual essence for the sake of rational

activity, imposed upon the Muslim world.' 18 Djait's argument

is interesting in that it also plays down the conflictual character

of jihad by redirecting its existential energy toward the

rediscovery of a Muslim "soul ." Whether Djait's views

accurately describe the objectives of ordinary Muslim religious

revivalism or the uncompromising goals of political Islamism

is a matter which only future events can determine .

Conclusions

A moral peace . . . armed to the teeth with ideas.

-Robert Musil

In the period between WWI and WWII, Eastern Europe

flirted briefly with the nation-state concept before the Soviet

Union fixed its populations in the orbit of Leninist inter

nationalism. Free from Soviet domination, the former Russian

satellites are working now to reconstruct a democratic basis for

their national institutions . There is no certainty that the

experiment in interwar democracy sufficed to root the fragile

nation-state concept in the soil of Eastern Europe and to protect

it from disintegrative values of cultural and ethnocentric

nationalism . Can we, then, be more hopeful for the third world

where, because democracy has no indigenous roots, it is failing

to marshal the necessary political resources for significant

social improvement? In Eastern Europe one can be sure that

whatever form the nation-state may ultimately assume or

whatever content the new nationalism may express, religion

will play a dominant role in determining political directions . In

106
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

the third world, especially the Middle East, religion is already

an accepted factor in the political equation .

This study has demonstrated how deeply Islam has sunk its

roots into the cultures of the peoples to whom it was preached

and how profoundly those cultures have, in turn, influenced

Islam . Islam expresses itself in a universal religious culture

that not only has influenced the Muslim's view of state, nation,

and society, but has given a decisive political form to the

conduct of peaceful and conflictual international relations

between Muslims and non-Muslims . The political expression

of this religious culture has never been static . Adaptive and

flexible, it has run the gamut from simple revivalism to a

revolutionary Islamist ideology that aims at the complete

transformation of Muslim sociopolitical values . Varieties of the

radical Islamist message have been the subject of this study

because, among all the forms of religious cultural expression,

they alone purport to have a blueprint for the future

sociopolitical reconstruction of the Middle East. That blueprint

makes it abundantly clear that conflict is an essential part of the

political process.

Radical Islamism perceives in conflict a legal instrument for

the militant revival of Islamic power unaffected by the events

that established the historical equilibrium between the Muslim

and non-Muslim world . As Elbakry suggests, Islamism does

not accept war as a state of law . War for Islamists exists

exclusive of hostilities because it is a religious duty which

renders null and void the contractual conventions defining legal

or national states of conflict. Treaties are temporary . The legal

position of a Muslim state under these conditions is irrelevant

because conflict defends religious principles, not national

boundaries . In a word, war as jihad is a concept totally

independent of peace .

119

Khomeini's contribution to the Islamist concept of conflict

was to raise war to the level of a universal moral crusade by

reaffirming the connection between jihad and walayah, the

107
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

United States to disengage from the regime and prepare for the

transfer of power to more flexible political elements without

excluding the possibility of a coalition with the Islamists.

Theoretically speaking, this requires American diplomacy to

rethink its basic operating principle that so long as a sitting

government prevails, it is legitimate . Finally, the use of

diplomatic, economic, and intelligence resources to support the

regime has to be the adjunctive arm of a policy that eschews

under any circumstances massive conventional military

intervention in conflicts that cannot be won.

Such conflicts will be waged by Islamists as periodic

insurgencies against the regime in both rural and urban areas.

If the United States has any role to play in the control of these

insurgencies, it will be to support tactically the forces it has

trained with the intent of assuring that a US intervention has

the object of regime maintenance rather than larger, extraregional goals . Small US tactical combined armed units can

realize such limited political-military missions if backed by

over-the-horizon reserves ready to react to any widening of the

conflict beyond the country's borders . These units will have

special liaison assets . Because liaison between American and

local forces will be crucial to every aspect of American

involvement, officers and men schooled in the language, ethos,

and political culture of the local population will far outweigh

the usefulness of those with unidimensional training in

weapons systems.

In future Middle East conflicts of these kinds there will be a

role for the United States Air Force. That role will be primarily

limited to surveillance and information gathering in its lowand high-tech aspects, from outer space, or from small, light

aircraft . We may be sure, however, of one thing : No matter

what the individual or joint role of the American military

services may be in our encounter with Islamism, the conflicts

our military will fight must cease to reflect the technological,

political, economic, and legal biases that mark our parochial
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

Western social and intellectual worldview . If we want to win

the moral peace that Islamism seems determined to impose

upon us, we will have to arm ourselves to the teeth with

countervailing ideas on the basis of which the war for the hearts

and minds of men can be successfully waged.

Notes

1 . Adda B . Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas," Orbis 20, no. 1

(Spring 1976): 61, passim.

2. For detailed case studies and projections of the third-world

low-intensity environment, see Lewis B . Ware et al., Low-Intensity Conflict

in the Third World (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Press, August 1988).

3 . An initial analysis has been made establishing the connection

between the low-intensity environment and the formulation of third-world

military doctrine, strategy, tactics, and force employment. See Stephen

Blank et al ., Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges (Maxwell

AFB, Ala. : Air University Press, December 1990) .

4. Bozeman, 85-86.

5 . Ali E. Hilal Dessouki, ed., Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World

(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 14 .

6 . Bozeman, 85 .

7 . "Djihad," The Encyclopedia ofIslam, 2d ed., vol . 2 (London : Luzac

and Co ., 1960), 538 .

8 . Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore :

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), 57 . In international law this is the

difference between bellum plum and bellum justum.

9. Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1988), 72.

10. Ayatollah Murtaza Mutahhari, Fundamentals of Islamic Thought:

God, Man and the Universe, ed. Hamid Algar, trans. R. Campbell (Berkeley,

Calif. : Mizan Press, 1985), 93 .

11 . Khadduri, 59.

12. Mustansir Mir, "Jihad in Islam," 115 ; and Hadia Dajani-Shakeel, "A

Reassessment of Some Medieval and Modern Perceptions of the

Counter-Crusades," 44, in Jihad In Its Times, ed . Hadia Dajani-Shakeel and

Ronald A . Messier (Ann Arbor, Mich. : University of Michigan Center for

Near East and North African Studies), series no . 4, forthcoming.
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

63 . On meeting annihilation in God, see the Ayatollah Taleqani on jihad

in Taleqani and Mutahhari, 68 .

64 . Kramer, 14-16, 22-23 .

65 . Ayatollah Mutahhari on shahid in Taleqani and Mutahhari, 128-29,

137 .

66. Ali Shariati on jihad, ibid., 200, 207-8 .

67. Shariati on thawrah (revolution), ibid ., 258, 260-62.

68. Ibid., 20.

69. Ibid., 21 .

70. Tibi, 43 .

71 . Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern

Politics (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1985), 25.

72. Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh

(Berkeley, Calif. : University of California Press, 1985), 54-55.

73 . Nemat Guenena, The Jihad: An Islamic Alternative in Egypt, Cairo

Papers in Social Science, vol . 9, monograph 2 (Cairo : American University

in Cairo Press, 1986), 9, 41 . Elbakry says that the view of jihad described

by Guenena resembles the classical Kharijite conception of conflict which

requires the imposition of belief on reluctant people without recourse to

debate or to the interpretation of the material sources of revelation. He sums

up the Kharijite attitude by quoting one of their principal maxims: "My fate

is under the shadow of my spear." Elbakry, 51-52 .

74. Guenena, 43-44.

75 . Kepel, 62 .

76 . Ibid., 126.

77 . Sivan, 109.

78 . Ibid., 108-10 .

79. Kepel, 75-77 .

80. Ibid., 84, 90.

81 . Guenena, 45-46.

82. Kepel, 193 .

83 . Johannes J . Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's

Assassins and the Resurgence ofIslamic Militance in the Middle East (New

York: Macmillan, 1982), 9, 11, 13 . Jansen provides a translation of jihad's

treatise as an appendix. Also see Elbakry, 62, who furnishes a typology of

the forms of Islamist activity that the Jihadists castigate . The trend of

preaching and guidance, by which jihad of the tongue is supposed to change

attitudes, is to Elbakry's mind the most prominent characteristic of North

African Islamism, in particular the Tunisian al-Nahda party. He sees the

trend of spreading Islamic thought, by which jihad aims at restoring faith in

the correctness of Islamic concepts, as the characteristic of the Egyptian

Islamic Liberation Party . The Muslim Brothers exemplify the
AN ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CONFLICT

comprehensive trend where jihad attempts to force adherence to sharia in

order to instill proper Islamic behavior. And Takfir wa Hijra and the Jihad

organization represent the revolutionary trend where jihad endeavors to

impose an Islamic regime on society.

84. Jansen, 10; Guenena, 70.

85. Jansen, 10, 21 ; Kepel, 199.

86. Jansen, 10-12, 16.

87. Kepel, 204.

88. The Jihadists even use the New Testament to justify this contention :

"I come not to send peace but a sword . . . he that loveth his father or mother

more than me is not worthy of me . . ." (Matthew 10:34, 37), as cited by

Jansen, 17, 22 .

89. Ibid., 30.

90. Ibid., 25 .

91. Like the Shi'ite concept of conduct in conflict, the stratagems of

deceit, violation of armistices, surprise, assassination, infiltration,

destruction of civilian life and property, and purging from the ranks of the

unreliable are all permissible acts. Ibid., 26-29.

92. Kepel, 202.

93. Ibid., 228 .

94. Tibi, 45 .

95. Lewis B . Ware, "Low-Intensity Conflict in the Middle East," in Ware

et al ., Low-Intensity Conflict in the Third World (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air

University Press, August 1988), 25 .

96. Shaltut, 118-19.

97. Ibid., 119 .

98. Francois Burgat, L'Islamisme au Maghreb (Paris : Editions

Kasrthala, 1988), 213 .

99. Ibid., 226 .

100. Ibid., 227, 231-33 ; also see Ware, Low-Intensity Conflict, 29-30.

101 . Burgat, 243 .

102. Ibid., 235 .

103 . A reading of Deuteronomy, chapter 20, is especially instructive in

this regard. See Bozeman, 83-85, and Taleqani and Mutahhari, 5 .

104. David Biale, Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History (New

York : Schocken Books, 1986), 110-13.

105 . Ibid., 133, 137.

106 . Ibid., 164.

107 . Ibid., 166-67 .

108 . Menachem Friedman, "Israel as a Theological Dilemma," in The

Israeli State and Society : Boundaries and Frontiers, ed. Baruch Kimmerling

(Albany, N.Y. : The State University ofNew York Press, 1989), 183, 187-88 .
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

109 . Ibid ., 194-95 .

110 . Ibid., 196, 198 .

111 . Ibid., 202-3, 208 .

112. Khadduri, War and Peace, 63 .

113. Hichem Djait, Europe and Islam, trans . Peter Heinegg (Berkeley,

Calif. : University of California Press, 1985), 58-59 .

114. Ibid.

115 . Shaltut, 136 .

116. The Christian fundamentalist scenario is summarized in Rosemary

Radford Ruether, "The Christian Churches and the Intifada,"

Arab-American Affairs, no. 30 (Fall 1989) : 74 .

117 . Djait, 70.

118. Ibid., 147.

119. Elbakry, 46-47, 57 .

120. Taleqani and Mutahhari, 50.

121 . Ibid., 53.

122. Korkut Ozal, Islamic Concept ofSecurity (London : Islamic Institute

of Defence Technology, 7 February 1979), 6.

123 . Maj Gen Mohamed Gamal al-Din Mahfouz, Military Thought in

Islam (London: Islamic Institute of Defence Technology, 7 February 1979),

3-4.

124 . Ibid., 7 .
Cultural and Historical

Influences on Conflict in Sinic

Asia : China, Japan, and Vietnam

Dr Lawrence E. Grinter

Professor Adda Bozeman's insightful analysis argued that

people in the developing regions of the world view war and

conflict differently than North Americans and North

Europeans . Furthermore, Bozeman argued that nation-state

driven causes of conflict, so prominent in the West, are less

important in the third world than cultural, psychological, and

ethnic-racial causes . l

This study applies the Bozeman thesis to three countries of

East Asia: China, Japan, and Vietnam. All are "Sinic" or Sinoinfluenced societies . Some elements of the Bozeman thesis

apply to these Sinic countries, some do not. For example,

Professor Bozeman argues that the "state," with its Western

and legalistic characteristics and boundaries, has a greatly

reduced relevance in explaining the causes and conduct of

modern warfare, especially warfare in the third worldintrastate warfare, political warfare, psychological warfare,

guerrilla warfare, internal warfare, insurgency, terrorism, and

so forth. As a more powerful explanatory factor, Bozeman

offers "culture"-the ways a society thinks, acts, and reacts

that survive change and remain meaningful to successive

generations . Cultures go to war; cultures assign values to

strife and conflict, not states . Or, in Professor Bozeman's

words, "the Occidental model of the state has ceased to be a

reliable measure of such phenomena as international war

and internal war." 2 Thus it is cultures which ultimately make

war; states simply act out cultural predispositions . In short,

cultures-and their broader construct, "civilizations"-are
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

better variables for understanding how nations behave in peace

and war than governments . They are more enduring in time, more

comprehensive, deeper. This is Professor Bozeman's basic

position.

Sinic Asia presents problems with the Bozeman thesis. Writ

large, "Sinic" Asia comprises eight countries : China, the two

Koreas, Japan, Vietnam, and the Chinese offshore StatesSingapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan . What is so striking about

these eight East Asian nations is that each one has both a

tradition of strong governments ("state") and strong (and

usually historic) "cultures ." A third commonality is also

evident: each of the eight Sinic countries has a population with

few ethnic minorities . In a word, state, culture, and ethnicity

are essentially synonymous and very strong in Sinic Asia. To

be "Korean" is to identify with either the Republic of Korea or

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and to

have recognizable personality and ethnic characteristics . The

Vietnamese people are also distinguished by their language

and by special cultural/ethnic characteristics. The same is true

for the Japanese, the most ethnically cohesive major

population in the world. The Chinese are a bit more

complicated because the Chinese are a comparatively heterogeneous people . But there is no doubt what is meant by

"Chinese civilization"; it is the accumulated characteristics,

accomplishments, and unique complexities of the people who

developed over a 25-century period in the Yellow River basin,

spread to the Yangzi River basin, and affected every society

they came into contact with . Chinese civilization embraces

one-quarter of the world's population . The attributes of

China's Sinic culture (strong governments ; bureaucratic

traditions ; reliance on military force; a reverence for art,

nature, and education) strongly affected the historical

development of peoples near the Chinese: the Vietnamese,

Japanese, and Korean peoples, as well as the Chinese that
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

populated the offshore entities of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and

Singapore.

Consequently, exploring Sinic Asia's predispositions

toward violence and conflict and their historical experiences

with warfare must begin with the fact that Sinic societies have

strong and thoroughly intermeshed states, cultures, and

peoples . Thus state and culture are not unrelated or

antagonistic variables in explaining Sinic societies' conflict

behavior; rather they are complementary and reinforcing . This

is the major analytical divergence Sinic Asia presents to

Professor Bozeman's thesis and her contrast between state and

culture. This divergence also may explain why Sinic societies,

when adopting free market economies, have proven to be such

extraordinary competitors on the global scene. I have in mind

Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore .

This study examines China, Japan, and Vietnam in two

portions : first a short analytical history of each society's

experience with internal and external warfare, then, the

particular characteristics and style of that society's war

experience and for what it has fought . An analytical

conclusion completes the study.

China

Chinese history and culture are the oldest in East Asia.

While records on the Nile valley, the Tigris-Euphrates area,

and the Indus civilization predate Yellow River archives,

Chinese civilization is the most continuous and homogeneous

major culture in the world. This fact is all the more

remarkable when one considers that China's frontiers touch

the main areas of East and South Asia and that massive

mountain ranges internally divide the country. One result has

been that China's preeminent national security concern has

been its frontiers . China borders on 12 countries, and it has
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

by far the longest land frontiers in the world. Yet these border

areas have also protected China-the Pacific Ocean to the

east, Tibet and the Himalayas to the west and south, the arid

deserts of central Asia to the northwest-granting physical

barriers to the introspective Chinese culture usually

preoccupied with its own affairs . Indeed, where geography

was insufficient, the Chinese built walls; the greatest example

is over 1,400 miles of them that were linked together in a

strategic barrier in the third century B .c .-the Great Wall-to

keep northern non-Chinese nomads out of the Yellow River

valley. Of course China had contact with the outside: the silk

route to the Mideast and Europe, Buddhism from India,

seaborne trade with Southeast Asia and then-in the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries-the impact of Europe

by sea and land .

But the predominant facts, long recognized and still true, are that China

developed her own culture from the beginning in her own way with

few decisive influences from abroad. s

Basic to the development of Chinese civilization were three

important rivers : the Yellow River and its flood basin in north

China; the Yangzi River in central China; and the West River

flowing in southwest China and separated from the Yangzi by

steep mountain ranges . Early Chinese civilization formed

along the Yellow River and its contiguous smaller valleys .

Connected to Tibetan mountain ranges, the river would often

flood, replenishing the soil's fertility but also creating serious

crop and irrigation problems . As the river and its floods went,

so often did each year's productivity . 6 Thus the Yellow River

was the cradle of Chinese civilization from which the Han

Chinese people, who constitute over 90 percent of China's

population, spring . This area, which constitutes the modern

provinces of Shensi, Honan, Shansi, Shantung, and Hopei,

was able to culturally and politically dominate the rest of

China, although not, as we shall see, without violent episodes

of dynastic warfare and armed foreign intrusions .

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By about 1000 B.C. the peasants of the Yellow River valley

were working the land in small communities governed by

local lords to whom they submitted part of their harvest as tax .

By the seventh century B.C. permanent fields began to take the

place of temporary clearances. This more stable system of

cultivation involved the institution of private ownership of

land; large amounts of land were bought and sold . Thus we

see very early the emergence of a Chinese gentry class that

became further systematized as all Chinese men, rich and

poor, were legally permitted to own land. Yet the gentry class

created a rural social structure that became a curse to China:

the landlord-tenant relationship whereby rich men bought up

land and leased it at usurious rates to indebted and often

hungry peasants . The practice was violently shattered in the

twentieth century by Mao Zedong's Communist revolution . 8

Politics, Culture, and Warfare in Traditional China

The start of the first formal Chinese dynasty, the Zhou

(1027-221 B.C.), began with warfare . Situated on the western

reaches of the Yellow River, Zhou warlords conquered the

Shang people where the Yellow and Wei rivers meet. Two

Zhou generals, Wen and Wu, led their armies east bringing

the Shang territories under their control. Called a "feudal"

period, the Zhou period is actually one of nepotism, fief

landholding, and decentralized authority . The Zhou period is

also the longest in Chinese history ; philosophical schools

of thought, art, scholarship, and a bronze culture flourished. 9

Yet it was characterized by violence, intrigue, and shifts in

geopolitical power. By 400 B .C., the Zhou had fallen into

anarchy, then open warfare, known as the "Warring-States"

period . 10

This period of political violence marks a kind of dividing

line in Chinese affairs-during and prior to it, warfare was a

kind of free-for-all among family-controlled states, not unlike

Japan's feudal period 12 centuries later. In China something
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

like 150 small family-ruled states or areas were gradually

reduced to a dozen or so big states, which were finally reduced

to a half dozen until the final unification in 221 B.C . Violence

was esteemed, and victory in war was the ultimate criteria of

a ruler's worth." In the midst of this grinding free-for-all Sun

Tzu wrote his classic, The Art of War, which sums up the

ancient military advisor's wisdom on strategy, tactics, and

deception . But after 221 B .C ., the Chinese man on horseback

became a target of political authority; if he was not brought

under control, the state would always be at the sword's mercy.

Subsequent Chinese dynasties attempted to control the sword

with bureaucracy and philosophy-the civil service and

Confucianism to be exact-as well as to rewrite history to try

and derogate the warrior's role.

The anarchy of the Warring-States period ended with the

conquest and unification of the Yellow River feudatories by

the warlords of the Qin state in the year 221 B.C. Having

achieved unification by the sword, the new Chinese emperor's

problem was how to keep the sword tamed-a problem that

would bedevil China the rest of its existence. As John King

Fairbank, in a little-known work, wrote:

After the appropriately titled Warring States were unified by force in

221 B.C., each of the dozen major dynasties and an equal number of

smaller ones were all founded by military means . Central power grew

out of the sword . Unity thereafter depended partly on force held in

reserve and partly on nonmilitary factors that military historians

cannot disregard. 12

One is reminded of Mao's statement that political power grows

out of the barrel of a gun.

The dramatic conquest of the entire Yellow River basin by

the state of Qin (pronounced "chin" and from which the name

China derives) and the consolidation of China into an

absolutist political system was accomplished by "an efficient

military machine under strong leaders, possessing cavalry and

superior iron weapons." 13 The country was divided into

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military districts run by representatives of the central government. Sections of walls already built were strengthened and

extended, using convict labor, to form the celebrated Great

Wall of China shielding the entire Yellow River valley-all

1,400 miles-from northern predators .

With the Yellow River valley secure, the Qin emperor's

armies pushed south-into the Yangzi valley and down the

coast as far south as Hanoi, securing Canton as well-in a

blitzkrieg extension of Chinese frontiers ; their "demonic

energy" compressed the enterprise into 15 years and extended

China's borders almost to their present position . In 206 B.C .

another Qin general, Liu Bang, declared himself emperor of

the "Han people" and solidified the empire that would last 400

years .

Led by this prudent but forceful man, the Han dynasty

prospered; an era of pride, stability, and prosperity was

ushered in that motivated the Chinese ever since to refer to

themselves as "sons of Han." 14 Expansion continued to the

northwest and to the northeast; into these tribal areas went

Han Chinese military expeditions, some numbering 300,000

infantry and cavalry . Millions of other Chinese were sent out

to colonize the northwest. Manchuria and northern Korea also

were occupied. To the south the empire launched 25 armed

expeditions between 136 and 56 B.C., ultimately bringing the

whole southern region under northern control .

15 Early Han

China was a model of garrison state and empire combined :

The army became organized and developed in Han times to a degree

not known before. A garrison was kept on duty at the capital, Changan.

Expeditionary forces were dispatched for particular campaigns as

required. And a permanent defense of the Great Wall and other frontier

posts was maintained .

16
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

The wall was extended in Han times out to where the Silk Road

parted to cross the Gobi desert. Colonies of veterans, pardoned

convicts, and mercenaries manned the military supply routes and

lonely outposts .

In foreign policy Han energy sent expeditionary forces as

far across central Asia as the Caspian Sea, where contact with

the Roman Empire increased and the silk trade flourished .

17

But the central foreign policy preoccupation of the later

Han period remained territorial stability on the northern

frontiers ; military expeditions and large sums of financial

aid, indeed outright bribes, were paid regularly.

18 Then in

A.D. 184 disastrous floods in the north created mobs of homeless, hungry peasants . The Han emperor granted excessive

powers to his generals to put down the insurrections-a fatal

mistake. Not long afterward the kingdom fell apart in the midst

of quarreling and intrigues, the type of which continued for

almost 350 years.

The anarchy in the late Han period, which allowed Turkic,

Mongol, and Tungus nomads to cross the wall and raid into

the Yellow River basin, lasted from about A.D . 280 to 320.

Such raids ushered in China's "Dark Age" as nomad horsemen

seized the northern half of the empire and ruled it until the

early sixth century. This period is called the Six Dynasties era

and formally spans the years A.D . 222 to 589. Unlike Europe's

Dark Ages, however, in which the Roman Empire was

destroyed by the Huns, the Chinese Middle Kingdom proved

more resilient .

In China the conquerers soon found themselves outnumbered by the

Chinese subjects, and were forced to cooperate with them to retain

power. The period of ravage and violence was relatively brief.

19

Chinese society was not fundamentally transformed by the

barbarian intrusions . Northern China numbered almost 20

million people; the barbarians were, at the most, two hundred

thousand . In southern China weak and short-lived indigenous

dynasties occupied the throne as military men rose to

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dominate affairs. Chinese historians, adhering to the dynastic

and Confucian framework, have tried to characterize these

short-lived regimes as typical dynasties invested with the

virtues of the Mandate of Heaven . In fact, they were military

dictatorships . As the Horizon history observes :

Ever since the confused times at the end of the Han dynasty, it had

been the military profession that led to power. A young man of ability

sought to attach himself to a successful commander and rise in his

service . One day, with luck, he might become a great commander

himself ; perhaps even the throne would not be beyond reach. Some

men of this stamp did, in fact, attain supreme power. Even if the

military leaders never managed to reach the throne, they established

themselves and their families with large landed estates, exercised great

influence, and monopolized high command . A new aristocracy

emerged, not founded on feudal privilege, but securely based on

military power, and only marginally dependent on imperial favor.

20

While the old forms of empire survived, the leading warlords

dominated China's official posts-civil and military .

China recovered from its dynastic turmoil in the late sixth

century with the country's reunification in A.D . 589 under the

Sui military family. The Sui pulled together the many separate

power centers and laid the basis for the Tang dynasty 29 years

later, which opened 300 years of flourishing Chinese peace

and economic development at home (including the building

of the Grand Canal linking the Yellow and Yangzi rivers), and

the expansion of frontiers to the north and west. 21 But the

effort to repacify Korea in the northeast, which had been lost

following the collapse of the Han dynasty, was less

successful .

Both [Sui] invasions were disastrously repelled, partly by the severity

of the Korean winter and partly by the obstinacy with which the

Koreans defended their walled cities, cities the Chinese needed to

capture in order to winter in.

22

The costs and unpopularity of the Korean invasions broke the back

of Sui power, and a new aristocratic warlord family, the Li, took

power, ushering in the Tang dynasty in 618 .

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Early Tang leadership came from the northwest where Chinese

cavalrymen and Sinicized nomad troops established a strong

working alliance .

Fortified by this military system, the Tang emperors pushed

Chinese power into Tibet, established suzerainty over what

today is Afghanistan, manipulated the northwestern Turkic

and Uighur tribes, and brought Chinese overlordship to the

Korean Peninsula in 668. Northern Vietnam also came under

Chinese protectorate status . Tang power founded a Chinese

"Golden Age." The Horizon history of China draws a parallel

with Europe :

What happened in China at this time could have been paralleled in the

West if the sixth-century Byzantine Emperor Justinian had fulfilled his

ambition to reconquer all of the former Roman empire and hand it to

his successors intact, enabling Rome to continue down to modern times

as a great imperial state .

23

Such a development would have completely altered the course

of European history and civilization . In China, unlike Europe,

a cohesive central empire thrived, the barbarians were held at

bay, and one-fourth of mankind came under one state's control.

Tang expansion and triumph produced another turning

point in Chinese history : Warfare again became disesteemed,

and the military caste was seen as representing civil war or

frontier defense. The army was labeled the "force of the

frontier," and garrisons were split up and posted on China's

peripheries . Encouraged by the emperor Xuan Zong, the

scholar-bureaucrats (called "Mandarins" by Europeans), who

despised the warlords, increased in power with profound

results for China. Coming from poorer and more obscure

families than the warlords, the scholar-bureaucrats' climb to

power was aided by a competitive examination system, the

basis of China's civil service, in which candidates had to

memorize classical Chinese literature . 24 The scholarbureaucrats depended for their careers on government. The

best became highly competent decision makers ; the worst

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CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

were simply courtiers and flunkies . Overall this civil service

system was remarkable for its quality and stability. Writes W.

Scott Morton,

It was a serious attempt to recruit an elite corps for the government based

not upon birth or wealth, as in so many other societies [and, certainly at

other times, in China], but upon brains and character .

25

The year 755 marks the start of decline of the Tang, whenin keeping with the literati disesteem of the military

profession and reminiscent of the Han dynasty's decline-a

variety of non-Chinese generals were put in charge of Chinese

armies . One of them, a Turkic warlord named An Lushan,

resentful of the court's wealth, launched a rebellion that lasted

eight years and cost the government much prestige.

26 The Tang

collapsed in the great famines of the late ninth century as

hundreds of thousands of desperate peasants, formed into

insurgent bands, roamed the country sacking cities andultimately

ruining Changan, China's capital, after an enormous slaughter.

Once again China devolved into a multiple power center,

characterized as the "Many-Dynasties" period (907-1279),

with five dynasties in the north and 10 in the south.

Governments became puppets of warlords who, in turn,

fought each other. The anarchy was temporarily put aside

under the unified Song dynasty (960-1126) only to see the

country split again into northern (the Jin) and southern

(Southern Song) dynasties . The Southern Song became a

temporary bastion of Chinese culture and scholarship : poetry,

the fine arts, landscape painting, and carving thrived .

But the literati and their values could not physically defend

China, and in the early twelfth century nomads from

Manchuria-the Khitan and the Jurchen-precursors of the

Mongols, pressured northern China until the dynasty

collapsed . Sweeping south, the Jurchen overwhelmed the

Song capitol at Kaifeng in 1126 and set up their own capitol

in Peking, calling their dynasty the Jin (or "gold" in their

language). The Song court retreated southeast and set up a

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

new government at Hangzhou (near modern Shanghai) paying

mercenaries for protection and relying on rivers and rice

paddies as barriers against nomad cavalry.

29

What followed next was the Mongol conquest of all of

China in the early thirteenth century-something entirely new

for China: the whole country was brought under foreign

domination . The Jin dynasty was overrun in 1215, and Peking

was captured . In 1271 Kublai Khan took the Chinese throne .

Cities were annihilated ; hundreds of thousands of refugees hit

the roads. Great areas of land went out of cultivation to

become hunting preserves for Mongol khans. But the Mongol

interruption was brief. The formal period lasted only 108 years

to be exact, and Chinese civilization withstood the Mongol

(Yuan) dynasty well. In the end the Mongol occupation made

only a slight impression on Chinese civilization . The Mongols

found that their ruthless methods of colonization were

irrelevant in trying to control a great state in peacetime.

Tranquility was needed in China so the collection of taxes

there would free the Mongols to conquer other lands. The

Mongols ended up adapting to the Chinese more than the

Chinese to them .

The Pax Mongolica which Kublai Khan fashioned and

which eventually extended from the Pacific Ocean through

Turkestan and Tibet to Russia, eastern Europe, and the

Mideast, did not last more than 75 years after his death in

1294 . The Mongols were a land people ; their seaborne

invasions of Japan and Java failed or proved unsustainable .

Internal dissension among Mongol khans, rising opposition to

Mongol rule among the Chinese, and disastrous floods and

famines accelerated the collapse of Mongol rule in China.

In 1368 the Mongols fled Peking under pressure from a

southern Chinese army of a quarter million troops . Led by

Zhu Yuanzhang, an ambitious commoner turned bandit,

turned general, this Chinese army threw out the Mongols in

1368 and founded the Ming ("brilliant") dynasty. General

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CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

Zhu made himself emperor and took the name Hung Wu.

Hung Wu chose Nanjing as his capital and fortified it with a

massive defense wall 60 feet high . Hung Wu's armies pursued

the Mongol remnants to the death, eventually dominating all

corners of the empire by the late 1380s. As with so many other

Chinese generals turned emperor, Hung Wu then settled large

portions of his bloated armies out on the frontiers to avoid

having them challenge his authority .

30

Early Ming accomplishments under Hung Wu justify the

name brilliant : the economy was rekindled, huge land areas

were brought back into cultivation, fiscal policy was

rationalized, and the traditional Confucian examination

system was reinstituted. Hung Wu died in 1398, his successor

further stabilizing the northern territories in the early fifteenth

century . Turning south, the Ming autocrats then went too far

and, in a brutal pacification campaign of northern Vietnam,

provoked a Vietnamese national uprising led by Gen Le Loi

whose troops finally drove the Ming forces off Tonkinese soil

in a humiliating defeat in 1427 . 31

Concurrently the Ming dynasty entered into a remarkable

aberration for Chinese foreign policy-extensive maritime

expeditions . Long a continental people, with an official

tradition of disesteem of sea power and maritime commerce,

the Chinese, under the Ming dynasty, nevertheless sent out

seven major expeditions between 1405 and 1433 led by Adm

Zheng He, a Muslim and a eunuch from Yunnan . Zheng's

fleets radiated out across the South China Sea and Indian

Ocean. The admiral took China's trade and diplomacy out to

Muslim South Asia and Southeast Asia . Champa, Vietnam,

Java, Sumatra, Malacca, Ceylon, Hormuz, Jedda, even

Mogadishu on Africa's east coast were all visited by Zheng's

fleets . Then, suddenly, Ming maritime explorations simply

ended. In Morton's interpretation :

After these spectacular displays of power, the reasons for the sudden

cessation of the expeditions are not much more evident than the

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

reasons for their commencement. Doubtless motives of economy

predominated, for by 1433 the treasury was becoming depleted and

external threats were still present. The official class was in any case

opposed to the two elements in the state which profited by these

expensive overseas ventures, the eunuchs and the merchants . Trade

with the not-too-distant regions of Southeast Asia continued, but the

technical achievements of voyages across the open ocean thus begun

were not exploited by the Chinese and were left, with fatal

consequences, to the upstart European nations .

32

Other developments during the Ming period are also

notable. Construction of the Forbidden City, seat of the

Emperor's throne in Peking, began in 1421, eventually

extending for 14 miles in a square with nine gates and walls

40 feet high. Exquisite Ming porcelain and lacquer ware met

the demands of Europe and Asia . Jesuit priests and scholars

entered China propagating Western science and education to

a receptive court .

33 But when the Japanese challenged China's

control of Korea in 1592, the Ming government had to put

great resources on Korea's defense. Although the Japanese

withdrew seven years later, the war cost the Chinese and

Koreans a great deal . China was left as suzerain of a badly

devastated Korean Peninsula. More importantly, the war

enabled Manchu tribes, potentially more dangerous than the

Japanese, to grow strong and rebellious . Gradually Ming

control of the northern borders disintegrated and enterprising

barbarian generals struck at Peking. The principal Manchu

leader was General Li Zicheng, who took Peking in 1644 and

proclaimed himself "emperor," only to be thrown out by other

Manchus. It was 1683 before the internal anarchy ended.

While the new Qing dynasty took 40 years to establish

itself, eventually it became stable and prosperous and was

consolidated for the long term by two brilliant emperoradministrator-generals : Kang Xi (1654-1722) and Qian Long

(1736-95). The Qing (or Manchu) dynasty was the tableau

upon which China's confrontation with the West began.

Europe's commercial and cultural invasion of China had

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CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

started with the Portuguese, who made first contact with the

Chinese at the Macao trading post in the early 1600s.

Predictably, the Ming Court ordered them walled off from the

interior. The British followed next, establishing in the late

1600s at Canton a large trading post run by the British East

India Company. The Americans were not to follow until the

1750s. Officially trade with these foreigners was illegal, but

it boomed nevertheless . Ming treated it all as a nuisance since

his main border concern had swung back to the north, where

a new foreign power had replaced the Mongols and was

making inroads on Chinese territory: the Russians . Yet it was

the seaborne trade invasion from the south rather than the

czarist cavalry from the north that had the greatest impacteconomic, social, and ultimately political-on the Chinese;

the most acute factor in that impact was a drug: opium.

As the Napoleonic wars convulsed Europe and drained the

British treasury, London sought substitutes for the bullion it

was shipping to China in return for tea, silk, porcelain, and

lacquer. Those bullion substitutes ultimately were raw cotton

from Bombay then raw opium from Bengal . 34 Chinese

middlemen jumped to the challenge, everyone made money,

and by the early 1800s, millions of new Chinese had become

addicted. Peking tried to curtail the opium flow . In 1839

Emperor Qian Long sent a forceful administrator down to

Canton to stop the opium trade . His agents seized and burned

20,000 chests of opium. Tensions rose with the British .

Several short wars were fought between 1839 and 1842, and

another in 1850, over the whole range of trade issues,

privileges, and opium. The result was increasing British

control of the export trade . Hong Kong was ceded to Britain .

Five more coastal cities were forced open for trade. More

European countries followed the scramble . Gradually the

British took over China's customs and postal services .

Shanghai became an international city with protected foreign

enclaves from which the Chinese were banned except as
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

servants . In 1851 British and French troops occupied the

Summer Palace near Peking . In 1858 Britain bombarded

Canton then captured it outright . In 1860 British and French

troops burned the Summer Palace. In 1861 the court was

forced to establish a Ministry of Foreign Affairs . In 1884

Japan essentially annexed Taiwan . Ten years later Tokyo won

a naval and land war against Peking. In 1900, 20 thousand

foreign troops put down the Boxer Rebellion in Peking and

occupied the Forbidden City .

In the midst of these European pressures on China, the

Taiping Rebellion broke out; this and related rebellions would

claim at least 20 million Chinese lives between 1850 and

1864 . Both a symptom and a cause of China's dynastic

decline, the rebellion combined peasant discontent, religious

zealotry, hatred of foreigners, anti-Confucianism, secretsociety intrigue, and old-fashioned banditry . Capturing

Nanjing in 1852, the Taipings took control of the Yangzi

River basin. Ultimately the government was able to put down

the Taiping with some help from Western guns, ships, and

troop training . 35 Relaxing in the 1860s and 1870s, suddenly

China was threatened again-this time by Japan.

The shock waves of defeat in 1894 by Japan and her

territorial acquisitions reverberated into Chinese politic :

Reform was in the air. But the cumulative humiliations at the

hands of the West, and now Japan, also stirred rebellion . Like

the Taiping Rebellion 50 years earlier, the Boxer Rebellion

was peasant-based, lodged in secret societies, and populated

by hungry and disposed peasants .

Beginning in Shandong in 1898, the Boxers spread over north China,

attacking railways, factories, and shops which sold foreign goods.

They killed missionaries and Chinese converts. . . . In Peking itself

Christians were massacred and buildings burned.

36
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

Ultimately an international force of 20,000 troops-half of them

Japanese, all under a German field marshal-defeated the Boxers .

The Manchu dynasty lasted 11 more years collapsing of its own

weight and decay on October 10, 1911 .

The year 1900 marked the acceleration of China's search for

a national revolution. The country could not control its own

destiny; the imperial government hardly functioned; and trade,

taxes, and military security lay at the mercy of foreigners. Of

all the contending Chinese forces which sought to steer

China's destiny and put things right, the most prominent grew

to be the Nationalists, first led by Sun Yat-sen' . Born in

Canton, educated in Hawaii, trained as a doctor, and envious

of Japan's modernity, Sun became a revolutionary . Accepting

the post of province president of the Chinese Republic, Sun

Yat-sen was inaugurated on 1 January 1912 . The successor

regime to that republican governor is found today on Taiwan

and led by President Lee Teng-hui .

But for all of Sun's promises China soon descended into

warlordism as regional military chiefs, gangsters, and

peasant-based extortion operations tore at the country .

Armies lived off the land while a formal government resided

in Peking . In the midst of this turmoil a young student working

in the library of Peking University, from a family with a harsh

father, became influenced by the ideas of Karl Marx . Soon he

was at work in the Hunan province and by 1926 had joined

the Communist Party, which already had forces in the field .

His name was Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) . Sun Yat-sen's

successor, Gen Chiang Kai-shek, took control of the

Nationalist forces and then turned on the Communists . In two

of China's great cities-Shanghai and Canton-the

Communists had sought to provoke urban uprisings . Chiang's

forces retaliated . The Nationalists massacred the Communists

in Shanghai in April 1927 . 3 From that point on the war

between communism and nationalism in China would be a

fight to the finish .

13 3
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

The period from 1928 to 1937 was high tide for the

Nationalists . Although dependent on bankers and

industrialists, Chiang Kai-shek-who married the sister of

Sun Yat-sen's widow-became China's premier strongman .

The Communists, set back five to 10 years by the Shanghai

massacre, set to rebuilding their organization in the countryside . Chiang's armies made five separate attempts between

1930 and 1934 to encircle and destroy communist forces .

Even the fourth attempt using 250,000 Kuomintang (KMT)

troops failed. Finally in 1934 Chiang launched 750,000 troops

against the Reds' 150,000 men. Seeing disaster, the

Communists broke out of the encirclement ; and in the autumn

of 1934, some 90,000 began a 6,000-mile Long March to

northwestern China and the caves of Yenan, where they ended

up with 30,000 survivors under Mao Zedong's political

leadership .38

Then two years later, in July 1937, came the event which

probably saved Mao's revolution : Japan formally attacked

China . The devastation and shock effect on China's

population eventually provided an enormous manpower

recruitment flow for both the Nationalists and the

Communists . Launching their attack from Manchuria, and

using bombers against northern Chinese cities while

bombarding Shanghai from the sea, the Japanese quickly

occupied China's principal cities . The KMT government and

armed forces vacated Nanjing, thus moving the seat of

government back to China's interior. Nanjing became the

scene of horrendous episodes of Japanese-provoked murder,

rape, and looting . 39 To this day Beijing claims 340,000

Chinese perished in Nanjing's occupation .

Resistance to the Japanese was now lodged in the KMT

armies-which controlled the southwestern areas of China

and received US aid-and the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) armies, which were lodged principally in the northwest

and were growing. Both forces used conventional and

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CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

guerrilla warfare, although the KMT emphasized cities and

roads while the Communists relied on the countryside .

Japanese occupation policies gradually strengthened the

Chinese resistance : the ferocity of their mopping-up

campaigns and reprisal actions played into Chinese hands. As

Chalmers Johnson writes :

In actual fact, the devastation and exploitation that accompanied the

Japanese invasion produced a radical change in the political attitudes

of the northern Chinese. The peasants of north China gave very strong

support to Communist organizational initiatives during the war, and

the largest number of Communist guerrilla bases was located in the

rural area of the north.

40

And further:

Virtually all on-the-spot observers were agreed that Japanese

treatment of all Chinese peasants, both the hostile and the cooperative

ones, was disastrous to the long-range Japanese oals and favorable to

the development of resistance on a mass scale. 4

One is reminded of Nazi behavior in the Ukraine. In northern

China, where Japanese field army general Okamura Yasuji

commanded from July 1941 to November 1944, the general issued

a "kill all, burn all, destroy all" policy utilizing, among other

weapons, poison gas . While creating millions of refugees, this

policy also drove the peasants and Mao's Eighth Route Army

together in an environment of sheer survival .

Shortly after the 1937 attack, the KMT and the CCP formed

an anti-Japanese Second United Front. While this grouping

did produce a few coordinated actions against the invaders,

it also allowed both parties to pursue their separate interests

and infiltrate each other's organizations .

42 By the start of

1941 the two Chinese armies were back to fighting each other

again . "The Japanese," said Chiang Kai-shek in a private

observation, "are a disease of the skin . The Communists are

a disease of the heart." 43

As the war stabilized and then appeared to stalemate

between 1939 and 1942, Chinese recovery and resistance to

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

the Japanese threatened to make it an "endless military

operation" for Tokyo. 44 Although the Japanese retained

control of the major cities and transportation routes and

installed a puppet government, they could not control the

countryside . Moreover Tokyo's Nanjing client government

never had any real legitimacy, despite a variety of Japanese

peace offers, because the Japanese army continued to treat the

Chinese so harshly .

45 In the summer of 1941, Tokyo extended

its attack into Southeast Asia, invading Indochina in

preparation to seizing Dutch Indonesia's oil fields . Six

months later Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Manila, and

Singapore, hoping to prevent US and British entry into the war

as it sought to complete its operations in China. Although the

furthest territorial expansion of Japan's Pacific empire would

not occur until mid-1943, by late 1942 Japan's expansion

inside China had stopped and was beginning to gradually slip .

The last Japanese massive offensive inside China began in

November 1943 with 1 .8 million men thrown into the effort .

46

Eight months later, in July 1944, the Japanese homeland came

under sustained US air attack. In the end, 60 Japanese cities

were destroyed, Tokyo was repeatedly fire-bombed, and

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were incinerated. On 14 August

1945, with 1 .5 million troops still inside China, Japan

surrendered unconditionally .

No sooner had the war ended than in China the KMT and

the CCP squared off. In late 1945 the Truman administration

sent out Gen George C. Marshall in a continuation of a

previous US effort to try to mediate an end to China's civil

war. It would end a year later in failure as the Americans

finally realized the struggle between Chiang and Mao was

total and without compromise .

47 American aid to the Chinese

nationalists amounted to almost $2 billion between 1945 and

1948, and the US remained supportive, if also critical, of

Chiang's government to the end. 48 The final showdown

between the Communists and the KMT occurred in the midst

136
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

of skyrocketing inflation, heavy corruption, and enormous

fighting and casualties . Manchuria and the Huai River basin

in north central China were the main battlefields . In October

1948 over 300,000 KMT troops surrendered in Manchuria to

the Red Army. In central China, after a prolonged campaign,

the Communists captured almost 500,000 KMT troops in

December 1948 . 49 As 1949 arrived, China's remaining major

cities fell to the Communists : Beijing, Nanjing, Shanghai,

then Canton . In December 1949 the last ragtag remnants of

Chiang's KMT army fled across the Formosa Strait to Taiwan

and eventual protection under a US security guarantee . The

Chinese civil war was over.

The Chinese Way of War

Traditional China's way of war reflects China's values and

beliefs about itself as well as calculations about its security

challenges . However, the Chinese have vigorously debated

these values themselves over the centuries . One result has

been a recurrent tension in Chinese affairs between the

warrior and the scholar or, to put it in the framework of the

June 1989 Tienanman Square killings, between autocrats and

students . For centuries in China neither the warrior nor the

scholar reigned permanently supreme, unlike Japan where the

shoguns and martial values prevailed for 700 years . In

Vietnam and Korea-small Sinic states-the same tension

was evident ; but the warrior predominated, partly because the

two countries were so often mauled by Chinese armies and

other armed forces as well . In China, by contrast, society had

a choice . The more frequent preeminence of the warrior over

the scholar in the founding and collapse of every major

dynasty was due less to external pressure than to the character

of Chinese society itself, which so often broke down into

anarchy and violence .

In sum, Chinese civil-military relations were unstable, and

this became the dynamic by which dynasties rose and fell .

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

This fact has often been ignored in Western scholarship on

China, which frequently emphasizes the Confucian, pacifist

idealization of Chinese affairs over the warrior-anarchy

reality . Western scholarship, in turn, often echoed Chinese

official histories composed by the scholar-literati with their

own versions to tell . As Professor Bozeman remarked :

With respect to ancient China . . Westerners have long pleased

themselves in imagining a spiritually superior civilization, anchored

in Confucianism and Taoism, in which men shunned violence and all

things uncouth, if only because their attention was riveted on etiquette,

sincerity, civility, humanism, and the search for harmony. Just why

such exalted views of Oriental society should have become so fixed in

the Western mind may well be a question that only ethno-psychiatrists

so can answer.

Compared to traditional China's civil-military instability,

it is interesting to note Mao Zedong's and the communist

approach to civil-military relations. While they did not invent

the Leninist model, they soon adopted it (as did Chiang

Kai-shek) . The Communists saw war and politics as all part

of the same continuum of policy . By blending everything

toward the goals of their revolution and the administration of

the state and by placing civilian authority (the party) over the

Red Army (the gun), Mao brought an end, temporarily, to the

instability, if not the tension, in the Chinese civil-military

system . But with the coming of the cultural revolution and

then the post-Mao struggles to remove the Gang of Four and

subsequent tensions, we have seen a crosscutting, even

confused pattern in party-army affairs . These tensions go

deep into Chinese society reflecting questions of expertise

versus ideology and market economic approaches versus

collectivist command models .

Part of the explanation for the traditional Chinese

reluctance to acknowledge the role of coercion in their

internal affairs derives from their peculiar ethnocentrism and

its official interpretation, which became almost a national

ideology : Sinocentrism . Sinocentric thinking prompted the

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CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

Chinese to view themselves as the most important (indeed

only) civilization on earth, the center of the universe under

heaven, and an admirable system of government and society

ruled by the Sons of Heaven under conditions of order, justice,

and prosperity . When ugly realities crowded in-rebellions,

peasant mobs, anarchy, coups d'etat, and regional wars-they

were described by the Confucian historians as aberrations and

abnormal disturbances, as it were, to the natural order of the

Middle Kingdom. The scholar-literati wrote (or rewrote)

Chinese history arguing that superior men extolled the

classics-not warfare. Virtue came from moral conduct and

learning-not from violence . The contrast with Japan is

striking . As interpreted by Fairbank, in China:

This disesteem of physical coercion was deeply imbedded in the

Confucian teaching. The superior man, extolled in the classics as the

highest product of self-cultivation, should be able to attain his ends

without violence.

This was especially true for the One Man at the top of the social

pyramid. For the emperor to resort to violence was an admission that

he had failed in his own conduct as a sage pursuing the art of

si government.

Possibly this helps explain why so many Chinese warriors, once

they had taken power and proclaimed themselves emperors,

sought to disband or quarantine their armies . (We also can

understand the sheer practicality of not keeping an unemployed

army around .) For all its utility in China, war was not glorified .

Ideally, as far as the Confucian scholars were concerned, war

should neverhave happened at all. Unlike Japan and unlike Rome,

warfare was notamajorindustry or honorable occupation in China,

even though it became a frequent andnecessary occurrence . There

was little honor or status (as distinct from money) in it . Chinese

youths were not given equivalents of Alexander, Caesar, or

Napoleon to admire or study.

However, China's Sinocentrism, when translated into

foreign policies and disseminated to other peoples on the

13 9
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

peripheries of the realm, had a way of provoking strong

reactions and, indeed, warfare. The Chinese officially defined

the Mongols, other nomads, the Koreans, and the Vietnamese

as inferior people . To legitimize Beijing's view, it was

necessary for the outsiders to subordinate themselves,

hopefully voluntarily but by coercion if necessary, to the

Middle Kingdom's writ . While the military might have been

officially disesteemed inside China's Confucian citadels, the

frontier armies kept China free . In Fairbank's words:

Emanating outward from the center of civilized order, the emperor's

example thus commands obedience not only from his immediate

subjects within China but also from non-Chinese rulers roundabout,

although this influence may naturally decrease with distance . The

result is that any violent armed infractions of the social order that may

occur, either within China or abroad, are of concern to him .

52

Thus China defined her foreign relations, like her internal

society, as hierarchical and nonegalitarian . In China's

preferred concentric hierarchy of foreign relations first came

the "Sinic zone": Korea, Vietnam, and, for a while, Japan.

Second came the "inner Asian zone," consisting of the armed

non-Chinese peoples and tribes nearby : the Manchus,

Mongols, Uighurs, Turks, and Tibetans . Third was the "outer

zone," populated by outer barbarians usually at a distance

over land and sea : Europeans, Indians, Arabs, and Southeast

Asians . All states were expected to pay tribute and to

acknowledge China's superiority . The worst calamities

occurred when the non-Chinese warriors of inner Asia crashed

into Chinese civilization, as in the Six Dynasties period of the

fourth century A.D. and the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty of

1279-1368. Whereas Europe saw interstate relations as

theoretically equal in sovereignty and independence, the

Chinese worldview specified hierarchy with China at the top .

In seeking to maintain influence over the Sinic zone, the

Chinese, as we have seen, were perfectly willing to resort to

physical occupation and military conquest-sometimes of the

140
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

most brutal character, which inevitably produced equally

brutal retaliations . Military control of northern Korea up to

the tenth and eleventh centuries was altered with indirect

tribute rule, and then renewed Chinese or Chinese/Mongol

invasions in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries . In the

twentieth century, Chinese armies intervened in Korea and

Vietnam.

The inner-zone states on the northern rim of China required

more careful handling, and accordingly the Chinese used a

variety of means-physical separation (the Great Wall),

bribes, economic assistance, and colonization, as well as

outright punitive expeditions . The inner zone's stability most

preoccupied the Chinese over the centuries, close as it was to

the Yellow River valley heartland and to Peking . As Gerald

Segal writes :

The Manchurian territory just north of the wall was of acute

importance because it could serve as a training ground and jump off

point for a serious challenge to core China. Thus the Sinicization and

control of Manchuria was a special concern. China tended to be drawn

into the northern territories rather than seeking them for colonial

occupation . . . . In general, though, the pattern was forward defense

and expansion of territory so as to create buffer zones.

54

In the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and twentieth centuries,

the Chinese fought numerous skirmishes with the Russians on

China's northern territories. To this day the Chinese maintain their

largest defense forces on that border. And it was from Manchuria

that the Japanese launched their full-scale invasion of China in

1937.

Toward the outer zone, China's ability to control tributary

relations and hierarchical order gradually disintegrated as

European arms and trade exacerbated Qing dynasty decay.

With their attention on the north, the Chinese sought to

maintain the boundary between themselves and the barbarians

encroaching from the south via rituals of tribute, kowtow, and

a variety of compromises on trade and administration
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

practices . The Chinese also sought to severely limit contact

with those foreigners . But China's mistake was to underestimate

the technological superiority and cultural-economic

aggressiveness ofthe Europeans. With so much attention focused

north on combined territorial and ethnic problems, it is perhaps

not surprising that Chinese defense strategy deemphasized

maritime security and strategies . "In striking contrast," writes

Segal,

to the western use of sea-based travel as a mode of expansion and

combat, China was distinctly unconcerned about defense from the

sea. . . . In the sixteenth century the Mings had to cope with seabased

attacks on China's long undefended coast and they responded with the

mentality of the Great Wall. Walled cities and forts along the coast

were supplemented by coastal patrols in a passive effort to hold a

coastline tightly. . . . In the end the enemy was defeated by bribes and

tactics of skill and cunning.

55

Two centuries later western-based sea power would intervene

again in China, and the final collapse of the imperial order

would begin.

In the twentieth century, Chinese armed forces have been

employed in two major struggles and several minor ones . The

war against Japan was both a struggle to defeat an invader and

the arena in which the struggle between the Chinese

Communists and the Nationalists was heightened. None of the

anti-Japanese war was fought outside of China's borders by

Chinese forces . But the Korean War of 1950-53 involved a

massive number of Chinese troops-perhaps 2 million entered

Korea (of which perhaps 800,000 died) . Chinese Communist

troops also invaded Tibet in 1950, shelled Quemoy and Matsu

in the 1950s, were stationed in Vietnam between 1965 and

1972, fought against Indian forces in the Himalayas in 1962,

fought Soviet troops in the Ussuri River basin, then returned

to Vietnam in a short, putative invasion in 1979 . What do

these fights tell us about China's objectives and use of force?

Are they in keeping with the Chinese strategy of border

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CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

maintenance? Were they ideological, geographic, or

motivated by national security?

The more limited commitments of Chinese Communist

armed forces occurred against Tibet in 1950, Taiwan in

1954-55 and 1958, Indian troops in 1962, Soviet troops in

1969, and Vietnam in 1979. The heaviest of these involved

the brief People's Liberation Army (PLA) invasion of

northern Vietnam. Chinese casualties were about 20,000-an

important but still small loss compared to the Korean War,

which stands in a class by itself for huge Chinese casualties .

PLA operations in Tibet were the first deliberate use of

communist Chinese military power beyond China's de facto

frontiers.

56 Certainly the Tibetans were no threat to the

Chinese, being an introverted, shamist, mountain people . But

their interests were promoted by India, and part of the Tibet

tangle can be viewed as Chinese-Indian rivalry for control of

the Himalayas. The Chinese were cautious in advancing on

Tibet, working a variety of diplomatic, military, and security

measures during 1950 and 1951 while simultaneously being

preoccupied with the Korean War . In October 1951, when

serious fighting commenced in Tibet, the Chinese sent in

about 30,000 troops . Resisted by 9,000 Tibetans, the PLA

quickly occupied Lhasa.

57 Chinese objectives in Tibet?

Certainly the area, like Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, was a

traditional target for internal Chinese colonization . 5 ' Also,

command of this high-frontier territory and access to its

strategic resources appealed to China.

By contrast the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-55 and 1958

were examples of China using force to probe another

country's intentions (the US) and then, under foreign pressure

(the US and the Soviets in 1958), keeping the crises at

acceptable levels of operational risk despite highly

inflammatory Chinese rhetoric . In 1954-55 China's pressure

against Taiwan provoked the US into signing a bilateral

defense treaty with the KMT government on the island . In

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

1958 China's actions convinced Khrushchev in Moscow that

Mao was either unstable, naive, or both, and the Sino-Soviet

dispute soon broke out into the open . In each situation China

went looking for what it could get . In 1955 it gained the

Dachen Islands . In 1958 the US Navy prevented a Chinese

blockade of Quemoy . "In both cases" writes Segal,

the Chinese kept their aims, and propensity to take risks, under close

control. All the while the military instrument was strictly subordinate to

the essential political goals of the Chinese probe.

9

China's 1962 fight with India was an interstate conflict

fought on the Tibetan border where China pushed against a

weaker opponent and, finding her wanting, aggressively

increased the punishment. It began in Tibet, where Chinese

occupation bordered on India's Himalayan frontier . In 1959

Tibet flared into another rebellion against Chinese rule, this

time with possible Indian connivance. 60 For the next two

years, India and China claimed territory around the disputed

McMahon Line . By the fall of 1962 skirmishes had begun. In

October and November, the Indians foolishly launched

outmanned offensives and the Chinese, now with 150,000

men in the area, hit back hard breaking the Indian lines . With

the Indians in panic, China declared a unilateral cease-fire

which the Indians implicitly accepted, thus ending the war.

The 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes and the ensuing

threats of nuclear war shook the world. The January-March

1969 events occurred in the Ussuri River basin, an area long

disputed between China and Russia . Since 1965 Soviet leader

Brezhnev had authorized a determined military buildup on the

Chinese border. At the same time China had descended into

Mao's Cultural Revolution and Lin Biao's challenge to

Mao's leadership . Then, in 1968, the Soviets invaded

Czechoslovakia. By the fall of 1968, Chinese decision makers

became convinced the Soviet threat on their borders was

real. They shifted into aggressive patrolling tactics at the

Zhenbao area of the Us suri River. On 2 March 1969 fighting

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CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

broke out with the Chinese losing 20 men, the Soviet guards

losing more . On 15 March the Soviets counterpunched with

a deadly ambush ; in nine hours of fighting, hundreds of

Chinese died . On 21 March the Soviets proposed talks .

The Chinese held off joining into talks-partly because of

continuing Soviet nuclear threats-until October. The

fighting pointed up Chinese weaknesses and superior Soviet

firepower and maneuverability.

China's short punitive expedition into northern Vietnam in

February 1979 revealed that 10 years after being outclassed

by the Soviets on the Ussuri River, the Chinese still had

substantial logistical and command and control problems .

Moreover, they took on Asia's finest infantry on its soil. In

late February 1979, Deng Xiaoping stated:

We would not mind military achievements. Our objective is a limited

one-that is to teach them that they could not run about as much as

they desired .

62

So punishing Vietnam for its Cambodian invasion was China's

primary objective. And by punishing Vietnam, which Beijing

called Moscow's "Asian Cuba,' the Chinese also were sending

the Soviets a message. After testing the diplomatic waters in

Japan and the US, Deng authorized the invasion on 16 February

1979, six weeks after Vietnam had invaded Cambodia. Crossing

the Vietnamese border at five points, Chinese troops soon

captured Lang Son, the provincial capital just above the plains

of the Red River Delta and Hanoi. At the climax of the combat,

China had 80,000 troops inside Vietnam faced by 75,000 to

100,000 Vietnamese border troops and militia.

63 Notably,

however, Hanoi held its best troops in reserve and did not

transfer any troops from Cambodia to the theater. Despite initial

tactical surprise, the PLA attack quickly ground to a near halt;

logistical problems and antique weaponry confronted a

sophisticated Vietnamese defense as cumbersome Chinese

columns headed down main roads towards provincial towns.

Interestingly, neither side employed air power, a deliberate and

145
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

mutual restraint . The Chinese admitted to about 20,000

casualties, half of them deaths .

64 Estimates are that the

Vietnamese suffered half that number of casualties . By 16 March

all Chinese troops were out with Deng simply quoting Mao that

"you can't know the reaction of the tiger if you don't touch his

arse." 65 This was not the first time China had been bitten by the

Vietnamese.

The Korean War was an altogether different experience for

Communist China. Here she intervened in a traditional "Sinic

zone" state against a rapidly advancing foreign enemy who,

equipped with nuclear weapons, seemed possibly intent on

moving against Chinese territory . China's motives in entering

Korea in mid-October 1950 were different from her

subsequent objectives in staying in and enlarging the war. In

this regard, both China and the US allowed battlefield

conditions to change their original policy objectives, with

very painful results for both . China went into the Korean War

after US and United Nations (UN) forces under General

MacArthur had blunted North Korea's invasion, achieved

complete surprise at Inchon, liberated Seoul, crossed the 38th

parallel, occupied Pyongyang, and were racing toward the

Yalu River with a UN mandate to reunify all of Korea under

Syngman Rhee . Naturally China's initial objective was to

save the North Korean regime and reconstitute North Korea

as a buffer state between itself and Republic of Korea, US,

and UN forces . From mid- to late October 1950, between

200,000 and 300,000 Chinese PLA "volunteers" crossed the

Yalu River at night and then hit the US 8th Army on 26

October.

66 Withdrawing for three weeks to test Washington's

reaction, the Chinese then struck again on 26 November. US

Marines at the Chosin Reservoir barely escaped as allied

forces retreated south pell-mell .

Flushed with success, the Chinese changed their objective

and sought to push US/UN forces out of Korea. In December

1950 Seoul fell for the second time. Then US air power and

146
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

artillery turned the tide in the winter of 1950-51 . By March

1951 Seoul was recaptured . Despite serious casualties, the

fighting began to stabilize along the territory between Seoul

and Pyongyang while the US government actively considered

using atomic weapons .

67 Gradually both sides grew to accept

the possibility of a fighting stalemate with reunification

denied to either side. The Chinese settled down to what they

thought would be a war of attrition ; the US, with air and naval

superiority, to a war which firepower would win . In terms of

sheer casualties the communist forces were decimated, losing

perhaps 1 .5 million men.

68 Segal makes a telling appraisal:

US troops took advantage of the fact that the Korean war was a major

war fought in a small area. The absence of much room for maneuver

meant that defense in depth could thwart Chinese attempts to infiltrate

and ambush. . . . Superior US firepower from land, sea and above all

air, coupled with superior communications and logistics, meant that

Chinese forces were denied any substantial breakthrough .

69

In March 1953 Stalin died in Moscow and peace talks soon

produced a cease-fire in Korea. Chinese casualties were at least

800,000 killed compared to 38,000 Americans . Approximately 2

million Korean civilians died.

In looking back on Chinese Communist's use of force on or

outside its borders since 1949, we do not find Beijing pursuing

any prominent ideological objectives . Instead territorial and

political objectives were paramount. The Chinese sought to

teach India and Vietnam "lessons" in 1962 and 1979 . They

succeeded in the first, failed in the second . Events in Tibet

were a natural, if brutal, extension of China's traditional

"inner zone" policies . The Sino-Soviet clashes could have

been much more serious ; here we see the Chinese leadership

actively fearing what the Soviets might do on their immediate

northern border. Korea was different again . First, attempting

to restore the status quo (by saving the Pyongyang regime),

then attempting to change the status quo (by destroying the

Seoul regime), the Chinese took huge casualties, more than

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

they could sustain due to eventual US military superiority

and tactics and callous "human wave" tactics by PLA

commanders . The Chinese eventually settled for a return to a

divided Korea, as did the United States . But most impressive

about Chinese Communist's use of force since 1949 is how a

totalitarian regime like Beijing, as distinct from democratic

governments, can send tens, even hundreds, of thousands of

its young men to their certain death with such little

accountability . Perhaps, in that regard, we are all fortunate

that the Chinese are basically a stay-at-home people .

Japan

Japan is a violent land. It lies across the path of hurricanes

and typhoons . Underground there are active volcanoes, and

earthquakes shake the islands periodically . Japan's people

also have a violent past . The Japanese have been East Asia's

most ferocious warriors ; the Samurai could legally kill other

Japanese for the slightest "offense ." Japanese nationalism

developed by means of a rough internal politico-military

history and was manifested in attempts to conquer other Asian

peoples . For seven centuries, from about 1180 to the late

1860s, Japan was organized as police states where absolute

values and absolute loyalties were commonplace. When Japan

modernized and industrialized after 1868, this was soon

accompanied by imperialism and fascism, which propelled

the Japanese into the total disaster of WWII. Recovering

from the war to become the world's second largest economy

without militarism, the Japanese people continue to display a

social cohesion, technical competence, and single-minded

competitiveness that can be described as "martial" in

intensity .
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

Fuedalism, the Samurai, and Ethnic Superiority :

Underpinnings of Japanese Militarism

The ancestors of the Japanese people emerged some 25

centuries ago as one of several armed tribes near the Altaic

mountain range area in what today is the country of Mongolia.

Mixed in with other tribal peoples, Japanese ancestral tribes

gradually separated from the others and began migrating east

and then south, slowly sliding into the Korean Peninsula

where they further intermingled with Korean ancestral

groups . About the third century A. D., large numbers of mixed

Japanese-Korean clans began migrations across the Tsushima

Strait to the islands they would eventually call "Nippon." A

distinctive aristocratic and warrior culture emerged among the

Japanese in the islands .

These early people were mounted, armed with swords, and

used helmets and iron artifacts similar to those used by the

Korean and Manchurian people remaining on the mainland.

These primitive, martial Japanese clans contrasted sharply

with the more literate, advanced, and geographically

sedentary Han Chinese people . The Japanese were Asia's

"Vikings"-accustomed to migration, exploration, and

conflict; and they were skilled practitioners of the martial arts .

For them, war, conflict, and violence were routine aspects of

daily life . As waves of these hardy settlers came across the

Tsushima Strait and settled the islands in the third through

seventh centuries, they encountered, and quickly dominated,

small aboriginal groups and Malay-Polynesian settlers . The

Japanese warriors claimed the valleys and crevices of the

highly convoluted terrain of Kyushu, Shikoku, and Honshu.

By the fifth century, write Fairbank and Reischuauer, "the

Japan that emerged slowly into the light of history was

essentially a tribal society, like that of early Korea and

perhaps somewhat comparable to the Germanic tribes of

Roman times or to the later Scottish clans . "' I This emerging

militarized culture, on the fringe of East Asia, underwent a

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

long internal pacification and homogenization process. The

Japanese would ultimately produce one of the most cohesive,

most militant, and more isolated societies in Asia, alternating

between closing off all foreign contact and then exploding in

militarism or colonial conquest starting in the late sixteenth

century and recurring in the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries.

The emergence of the precursor of the Japanese state

appeared in the fifth through seventh centuries A. D. when the

Yamato clan achieved a vague supremacy over surrounding

clans and family groups . The Yamato chiefs organized the

tribes of the Kanto Plain, and, drawing on myths reaching

back a thousand years, made their particular divinity-the

sun-goddess-superior to the others ; this was the basis of

Shinto, which eventually became a national religion and

which combined the functions of ruler and cult priest in a

single man-the emperor.

72 But the growing Yamato state also

continued to absorb influences from the mainlandparticularly emigres from the Korean Peninsula-who

brought to Japan the Buddhist philosophy from China and

Korea and a variety of practices and social structures . The

Japanese borrowed and absorbed at their own pace-a trait

which characterizes them today. This cultural borrowing

added sophistication not otherwise attainable to the martial

Japanese culture .

By the early seventh century, the Yamato state's leadership

was looking for ways to affect a more centralized control of

the population, and it adopted a variety of Chinese ideas:

divine supremacy of the ruler, centralization of government,

a merit bureaucracy, Chinese calendars, taxation, weight, and

measures .

73 Nevertheless, these were surface adaptations;

underneath, Japanese society remained based on clans and

personal loyalties, not bureaucracy or gentlemen-scholars .

Moreover, the development of Japanese feudalism-so

different from Chinese society with its bureaucratic scholar150
gentry and stratified social characteristics-had striking

parallels to the feudalism of Western Europe. But there was

no contact between the two; the roots of Japanese feudalism,

with its coercive, filial, and violent qualities, were

indigenous. Like the Germans in Europe, the Japanese clans

were trained in warfare, and they produced a military

aristocracy with highly personalized bonds of loyalty . By the

eleventh and twelfth century, Japan's emerging feudalism had

crystallized ; the emperor was essentially a figurehead while

real political and economic power was lodged in the localities

and protected by armed retainers ("samurai") whom the

regional lords employed for battle against their rivals .

Using their fiercely belligerent spirit and aggressive

behavior in personal and aristocratic power struggles to

protect and enlarge their overlords' control of territory, the

samurai were the instruments of hundreds of clan wars that

reverberated across the Japanese landscape between the

eighth and eleventh centuries . Inevitably, as this free-for-all

aggression became organized on larger scales, the most

influential warrior groups began competing for control of the

fragile central government at Kyoto run by the Fujiwara

family. In 1159-60, the first national Japanese struggle, the

Heiji Rising, began. The war was accompanied by the

emergence of two huge warrior family coalitions-the Taira

and the Minamoto-whose battling leagues swept across

Japan.

By the middle of the [twelfth] century conflict among these ambitious

leagues intensified, and the warrior became supreme; before the 12th

Century was over he had firmly imposed on Japan a system of military

rule that was to persist, with various modifications, for some 700

74 years .

CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

Thus the samurai warrior class emerged as the most critical

element of Japanese society. Set apart from the rest of the

population and owing absolute (if temporary) devotion to their

overlords (who competed in hiring and retaining them), the
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

samurai were armed men for hire, quick to take offense, and able

to strike terror in their enemies' hearts .

The final phase of the Minamoto-Taira civil war, formally

called the Gempei War, seesawed across Japan between 1180

and 1185 in an orgy of devastation and slaughter . In 1185,

the Taira were finally crushed in a great battle, including naval

warfare, on the Inland Sea.

75 The Minamoto leader, Gen

Minamoto Yoritomo, set up a warrior-based government for

the whole country that was a military dictatorship . Ultimately

called the "Kamakura Shogunate," Yoritomo's dictatorship

was headquartered at the seaside resort of Kamakura apart

from the intrigues of the imperial court at Kyoto.

Beginning in 1185 with the Kamakura, for the next 700

years Japan was ruled by a succession of miltary-police states

called "shogunates." There were three major shogunates, and

considerable violence surrounded changes of command.

Theoretically, the country's formal government resided in the

imperial court at Kyoto, much later at Edo (Tokyo) ; and the

shoguns were careful to preserve this illusion . But the real

power rested in the hands of the shoguns and their vassals .

Toward the end of the Kamakura Shogunate (1185-1333)

there came a serious external challenge : The Mongols

under Kublai Khan had gained control of China and Korea

and were threatening Japan. In 1274 and again in 1281,

combined Mongol/Korean/Chinese armies attempted

seaborne invasions of Japan, the second propelling between

50,000 and 100,000 troops against northwestern Kyushu in

the greatest attempted seaborne invasion prior to modern

times . It failed due to samurai bravery and due to weather; a

monster typhoon roared over Kyushu wrecking the enemy

fleets, and most of the invaders drowned or were slaughtered

on shore-thus the "kamikaze," or divine wind, whose

intervention further convinced the Japanese they were

protected by the gods .

152
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

At the start of the fourteenth century the Kamakura

Shogunate fell into civil war . Great landholders in distant

parts of the country, now armed and openly defiant, launched

attacks on the government and burned Kamakura to the

ground. An ambitious general, Ashikaga Takauji, allied

himself with the emperor against Kamakura power. Ashikaga

then set up a puppet emperor at Kyoto and set in motion a

decentralized feudalism which was to produce a new critical

element in Japanese society-the daimyo-noblemen who

ruled their fiefs essentially as independent satrapies .' $

The Ashikaga period (1358-1578) was one of decentralized

feudalism-more than 60 semi-independent, often fractious,

principalities were involved. Central authority weakened.

Emperors were reduced to selling their autographs for money .

Shoguns could not collect taxes . Interestingly, however, the

country prospered economically . There were no invasions

from abroad, and Japanese society transitioned from the

extreme militarism and central power structure of the

Kamakura period to a more developed society in which an

economically productive system was based on the daimyo, or

regional oligarchs, who were also entrepreneurs . The samurai

moved back and forth between warfare and farming,

sometimes provoking serious agrarian unrest.

In spite of these disturbed conditions, considerable

economic expansion occurred, spurred by foreign trade with

China. Japan's exports were profitable, her swords, lacquer

ware, copper, and sulphur sold for many times their domestic

value .

79 Merchants and craftsmen formed guilds . Businesses

and trades expanded, goods moved-throughout Japan . It was

this China trade, coupled with the decentralized political

system during the Ashikaga period, that established the basis

of a national commerce in Japan.

Towards the end of the sixteenth century the country again

declined into regional warfare . Competing strongmen rose to

power and one of them-the great warlord Toyotomi

15 3
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Hideyoshi-ultimately gained control of about two-thirds of

Japan's actual land area. By 1590 Hideyoshi was supreme in

Japan.

so

Hideyoshi ultimately allowed his confidence and megalomania to go too far and, believing he could take on China,

challenged Chinese suzerainty in Korea. In 1592 Japan

launched a 160,000-man invasion of Korea. Opposed by

innovative Korean naval tactics, nevertheless, Hideyoshi's

troops got all the way to the Yalu River before the Chinese

intervened. 81 For seven years the war raged, but not until

Hideyoshi's death in 1598 did Japan quit its Korean

occupation. The war all but ruined Korea. Shortly thereafter,

one of Hideyoshi's vassals, Tokugawa leyasu, became

shogun; and the start of 250 years of internal stability,

uncomplicated by foreign adventures, began. Morton puts

Japan's development into perspective :

This period in Japan happened to coincide roughly in chronology with

the solidifying of the nation-states in Europe, and particularly with the

centralizing power and skill of the Tudor monarchs in England.

However in Japan it was not the monarchs but the generals who were

the architects of unity . This unification ushered in the most peaceful

and homogenous period in Japanese history, the Tokugawa Shogunate,

lasting also for 250 years . It must be recognized, nevertheless, that this

internal peace was characterized by some of the rigidity of a police

state and was purchased at the cost of free development and

unhampered intercourse with other nations. Japan went into an

isolation that was almost but not quite total .

82

The Tokugawa police state was the foundation upon

which Japan would modernize in the nineteenth century. The

Tokugawa period was characterized by the growth of

commerce, migration to the cities, the rise of the middle class,

and critical mergers among daimyo and merchants . Large

ancestral farms broke into smaller, more manageable units .

Kyoto, Edo, and Osaka became major commercial cities .

Numerous other towns grew up in the center of regional

154
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

fiefdoms. Merchants and commercial activity became the

new focus of Japan's economy .

83

Nevertheless, sociopolitical life in Japan was rigidly

regulated . Taxes were heavy . Laws prescribed types of

clothing, permissible alcohol consumption, and procedures

for marriages and funerals . Literature was regulated . Nobles

attending the shogun at Edo were required to leave their wives

and families in Edo as hostages . No daimyo could enlarge or

improve his castles without the shogun's permission .

Christians were persecuted and went underground . Japan

was deliberately cut off from the rest of the world for over

200 years .

Most critically, the samurai began to lose their functions.

With Tokugawa class structure freezing the differences

between warrior and peasant and warrior and merchant, more

and more samurai became ronin-masterless wandering men.

Morton describes the situation.

Upward social mobility was very difficult, in part owing to lack of

money among the lower grades of samurai. Indeed fluctuations of the

rice market, in which their stipends, paid in rice, were converted to

cash, made any social movement for the samurai likely to be a

downward one . The classic means for a warrior to enrich himself by

fighting to gain possession of the lands of others was totally denied to

him by the overwhelming power of the Tokugawa police state . It is no

wonder there was a deep sense of frustration in the samurai ranks .

84

Then came the shock which changed Japan forever; in 1853 the

"Black Ships" of the American commodore, Matthew Perry,

steamed into Edo Bay and demanded trade with Japan.

Commodore Perry's visit propelled Japan into the modern

world by setting off a political scramble inside Japan on how

to cope with the West . The result was that a group of

modernizing samurai, educated and talented, toppled the

Tokugawa Shogunate in 1868 and, under the guise of

restoring the emperor's power, began the forced-draft

modernization of Japan at breakneck speed . For the next 30

years the Japanese government stimulated and pushed the

15 5
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

industrialization of the country; broke the power of both

daimyo and samurai (largely by buying them out) ; undertook

compulsory education ; created a national army ; adopted a

Prussian-style constitution; decreed legal equality of all

classes ; and set up national banking, transportation, and

industrial ventures . This was "revolution from above" :

state-directed rapid modernization . It was not a peasant

revolution, which ultimately would be China's reaction to the

West . It was an elite revolution that exploited Japanese

society's natural strengths and forced the country's

industrialization .

Twentieth-century Japanese militarism and fascism was, in

part, a result of the tremendous "pressure cooker" changes that

the revolution of 1868 had wrought . Foreign outlets in the

form of trade, territorial expansion, then militarism-all

harkening back to Japan's warrior ethic-were the

by-product . In 1875 Japan colonized Taiwan . In 1894 Japan

fought China for influence over Korea and won. In 1904-05

Japan fought and beat Russia for deeper control in Korea and

rights in Manchuria . In 1910 Japan annexed Korea outright .

By the start of World War I, Japan was the dominant power

in East Asia; in 1917-18 she led the allied occupation of

Russia's Far Eastern territory, putting 70,000 troops into the

Vladivostok area .

These external moves encouraged political radicalism from

both the Right and the Left in Japan. The Right won, of

course, eventually laying the basis for General Tojo's

military-industrial dictatorship . In the late 1920s, a powerful

army and navy emerged with leverage over the civilian

cabinets . The major external prize became Manchuria with its

huge mineral deposits . The Japanese army staged a series of

pretexts to allow them to overrun central and eastern China

from their Manchurian base . In July 1937 Japan declared war

on China. In September 1940 Japan signed the Tripartite Pact

with fascist Germany and Italy . In April 1941 she signed a

156
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. Tojo became prime

minister in October 1941 and on 7 December 1941 Japan

attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor.

The Pacific war saw imperial Japan send close to 3 million

troops overseas, most of them to China. In mid-1943 the

furthest extent of Japan's Asian empire reached from the

western Aleutian Islands in the northeast to Guadalcanal in

the southeast, to Burma in the west and the Manchurian/Soviet

border in the north . By July 1944, with major armies tied

down in China, the Japanese home islands came under steady

air attack by the United States Air Force . Thirteen months

later it was all over, following the US atom bombing of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki . On 14 August 1945 Japan

surrendered unconditionally aboard the US battleship

Missouri .

The American military occupation of Japan lasted seven

years . Over 2 million US occupation troops rotated through

Japan . They encountered a country in ruins . Over 60 cities had

been bombed . There was no heat for two years . One million

civilians had perished. Close to 2 million soldiers had died.

Two and a half million buildings and homes were destroyed.

General MacArthur's administration was only mildly

punitive. Japan was completely demilitarized. The rightist

political forces were prosecuted. The Communist party was

made legal. The United States allowed the Japanese to have a

police force of up to 75,000 personnel . This eventually

became the basis of the Self Defense Forces . The

American-dictated constitution prohibited Japan from

maintaining forces "for purposes of war." Thus ended Japan's

most recent experience with militarism.

From Bushido to Imperialism and Fascism:

The Japanese Style of Warfare

The aggressive, often fanatical, behavior of Japanese troops

in World War 11, frequently commented upon in allied

157
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

accounts and soldiers' personal experience, is traceable to

the absolutist warrior tradition in Japan and soldiers ,'

uncomplaining willingness to die for their superiors-be they

emperor or feudal lord . Evolving in the seventh through ninth

centuries, the samurai became armed men for hire . Protecting

their superior's domains and honor to the death, they were the

instruments through which thousands of battles were waged

between competing oligarchs and warrior clans. Edwin

Reischauer described the phenomenon :

Organized to protect their own interests, the local groups were in

essence vigilante bands of warriors. Their members formed a petty

local aristocracy, somewhat like the knights of early feudal Europe,

for they too were mounted, armored warriors. Their chief weapons

were the bow and arrow, skillfully used from horseback, and the

curved steel sword, which came to be the finest blade in the world .

86

However, there were important differences between the

Japanese samurai and the European feudal warriors . Japan's

fierce, grim, aristocratic horsemen, while resembling outwardly the knights of medieval Europe, with their devotion

to their overlords, were motivated by principles very different

from the Europeans:

The ideal of chivalry and the glorification of womanhood that underlay

European knighthood had no counterpart among the samurai. Nor were

the Samurai inspired by religious fervor. As a Samurai warrior plunged

into battle he was no crusader invoking heavenly aid in his war cries .

Instead, he sought to strike terror in his enemies by shouting his own

prowess and the names and exploits of his illustrious ancestors .

87

Thus, we see the roots of the Japanese culture's particular

predispositions toward war and conflict. Violence was a

profession . Battle was an honorable, spirited enterprise .

Warriors rode into battle armed with family ties and clan

loyalties and assumed divine protection . This was the fierce

"Bushido" spirit; and the aristocratic structure it served was

honed and glorified in hundreds of battles . Political and

economic power in Japan rested on this martial culture . When

15 8
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

the Japanese invaded other nations, as in the Korean Peninsula

expeditions in the late sixteenth century and then in Taiwan,

Korea, and China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,

they brought this uncompromising sense of cultural

superiority and fanatical spirit to their imperial and colonial

enterprises . They saw themselves as a chosen people, superior

in all ways and intent on proving it .

One extraordinary episode of proof to the Japanese that they

were protected by the gods occurred when the Mongols

invaded in the late thirteenth century. Samurai competed to

throw themselves first against the Mongols. For two months

they kept possibly 100,000 enemy troops contained on the

rocky coasts of Kyushu, and then, when the invaders began to

win, the huge typhoon-the "kamikaze"-smashed their

assault forces to pieces . The Japanese never forgot that

rescue. When another invasion threatened Japan in 1945 and

Japanese pilots flew their bomb-loaded planes into American

warships in a vain effort to save the country, they were

labeled "kamikaze" for the divinely inspired wind of the

thirteenth century.

In the 1590s, after four centuries of internal violence and

military-feudal national governments, the Japanese warrior

state sought to prove its superiority against Korea and China.

After all, the Chinese had earlier caved in to the Mongols

while they, the Japanese, had not. The Japanese put 200,000

troops into Korea. What turned the tide was a Chinese

counterinvasion, and soon the Japanese had both Korean and

Chinese hostile forces to contend with-as would the US/UN

command in Korea after October 1950 . The invasion proved

too costly for Japan, and they left the mainland and began an

isolationism that would close Japan off for over 250 years .

The seeds of Japan's twentieth-century authoritarianism

and absolutism can be linked to the Tokugawa period . By

the midnineteenth century, the country had become a

repressive police state . It was illegal to leave Japan, and it was

159
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

illegal to return . The population was divided into classes, the

classes into families, the families into households. But as

commercialized agriculture began to spread across the

country, the samurai began to lose their stipends . As Moore

describes the change :

Under the enforced peace of the Tokugawa, the warrior had no

obviously important social function to perform. In the meantime, other

forms of prestige, based on the wealth of the merchants, were

beginning to compete with the martial virtues . . . . The loss of their

functions as warriors, together with the inroads of commerce, placed

a severe strain on the loyalty of many samurai, setting them adrift .

88

As aresult, "many warriors simply cut their ties and became ronin,

wandering masterless men, often ready for violent enterprize . . .

a free-floating source of violence, a `lumpenaristocracy' available

for a variety of reactionary purposes ." 89

Thus, by the 1850s Japan was an unsettled agrariancommerical police state with hundreds of thousands of

marginally employed violent young men. She was ripe for

revolution or reaction. She would get both and in that order.

Commodore Perry's opening of Japan was the stimulus which

set in motion Japan's extraordinary industrial revolution and

modernization . But modernization would not liquidate

Japan's martial instincts, which went back for centuries, as

much as it would channel them in~o big power competition in

Asia. The modernizers had a society with a great deal of

cohesion to continue working with . Again, Moore:

One gets the strong impression that [Japanese society] when it was

working well, consisted of a series of descending and spreading chains

of influential leaders and their coteries of close followers, linked all

the way from the top to the bottom by patriarchal and personal ties,

enabling those in superior positions to know just how far they could

push those beneath them.

90

It is doubtful that this extraordinary social cohesion of Japanese

society has changed very much in spite of the enormous stresses

160
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

of the twentieth century . They are still the most cohesive,

ethnically undiluted, and competitive people in the world.

The recurrence of overt Japanese militarism in the twentieth

century coincided with the breakdown of liberal democratic

experiments at home and the rise of colonial enterprises on

Asia's mainland . Political radicalism at home-in the form of

extreme right-wing and left-wing political parties-resulted

in the assassination of two prime ministers . The Japanese

army developed a vested interest in Manchuria as early as the

1920s . Soon the chief of staff of the Army, General Tojo,

became the shadow shogun.

The Japanese attack on China was, of course, where

two-thirds of Japan's actual war effort went. It was too often

accompanied by particularly brutal Japanese troop behavior

toward the Chinese . Beijing maintains that one-third of a

million Chinese died at Nanjing, for example. Americans have

a view of the Pacific war as largely naval battles, island

hopping, and some jungle warfare . In fact, while Japan put

out a strong naval and air barrier to shield her mainland

operations and protect her economic dependenciesparticularly Manchurian coal and iron and Indonesian oilthe bulk of her combat effort and resources were expended in

China, where she had to fight both Communists and

Nationalists . Although the sustained American B-29 air

attacks and then the atom bombs ultimately wrecked Japan's

cities, Japan became trapped on the East Asian mainland,

overextended in another attempt to prove her superiority over

other Asian cultures .

Vietnam

Unlike the Japanese, who became protected from

continental East Asia's turmoil by the Tsushima Strait, the

Vietnamese people could seldom escape pressure from the
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Chinese, the Mongols, and other peoples . Vietnamese

territories were repeatedly invaded and occupied by Chinese

armies between the third and fourteenth centuries, experienced three Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century, were

colonized by France in the nineteenth century, and were

militarily occupied by Chinese, Japanese, French, and

American forces in the midtwentieth century. Today, in the

early 1990s, Vietnam's military and economic dependence on

another country, the Soviet Union, remains evident .

Caught between and often battered by more powerful

forces, and prone to civil wars when free of outside pressure,

Vietnamese culture reflects attitudes and behavior charac

teristic of people who have been victimized : hostility,

suspicion, xenophobia, and a negative kind of nationalism. A

hardy, tough people who have endured centuries in China's

shadow, the Vietnamese often responded by fighting back.

When not exacting a high price from foreign occupiers, the

Vietnamese sought to colonize or dominate their weaker

neighbors.

Like the Koreans, the Vietnamese modeled their official,

scholarly, and artistic life after China. The Vietnamese court,

the Mandarinate, and the institutions of higher learning all

reflected the formal Chinese system and taught the Chinese

classics . Hanoi paid formal tribute to Peking in return for the

Vietnamese sovereigns' legitimation and investiture by the

imperial seals issued in Peking by the Sons of Heaven .

91

However the Vietnamese also retained a fiercely independent

national spirit and ethnic identity . "If there is one proposition

that unites all Vietnamese, whatever else divides them,"

writes Dennis Duncanson, the British authority on

Vietnamese and Chinese culture and politics, " . . . it is the

negative one that [Vietnam] is not to be regarded on any

account as a dependency of China." 92
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

The Caldron of Vietnamese Nationalism

Originating like many other Southeast Asian peoples in

what is today the hill territory of southwestern China, the

early Vietnamese tribes were established there before Han

Chinese settlers appeared. Probably about the sixth or fifth

century B.C . ancestral Vietnamese pioneers began moving out

of the Yunnan hills and south to the coastal areas around

Canton . The Yunnan area contained other tribal groups

besides the Vietnamese who also eventually migrated into

the river valleys of mainland Southeast Asia: the Khmer, the

Thai, the Burmese, and the Lao being the most prominent .

But the Vietnamese were the southernmost of these original

migrators and not as numerous as the Thai . Subsequent

Vietnamese-Thai rivalry (continuing today in Cambodia)

shows the Vietnamese were not always on good terms with

the warrior Thais . Indeed, although the Vietnamese ultimately

sharpened their national identity against occupying Chinese

and Mongol-Chinese armies, their first immediate enemies

were the Thais . This Thai-Vietnamese rivalry, which occurred

almost two millennia ago in the Yunnan area, may well be the

origin of much of the peculiar hostilities and aggravations

reflected in the Vietnamese mind-set. Thai pressure, for

example, seems to have provoked the original Vietnamese

migrations south to the coasts and ultimately into Tonkin . 93

Nevertheless, the emergence of a distinctive "Viet" national

area in the eastern corner of mainland Southeast Asia

coincides with China's projection, in the third century B .C ., of

a cultural and political assimilation culminating in an imperial

annexation. The little territory of Tonkin and portions of

adjacent Canton were long referred to by the Chinese as "Nam

Viet," meaning the southern Vietnamese area, and Chinese

rule eventually extended down the Tonkinese coast to the

Annamese midlands .

94 Then, after 150 years of Chinese

tutelage and cultural Sinicization, came the first Vietnamese

national revolt . In the year A.D. 39 two titled sisters with the

163
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

surname Trung led a revolt against Chinese authorities ." The

revolt was crushed, the sisters committed suicide, and with a

few interruptions in Chinese rule (which the Viets took

advantage of), Tonkin was administratively incorporated into

the Chinese state.

By the year A.D. 800 a variety of changes were impacting on

the Viets which would reawaken and energize their dormant

nationalism-the most immediate being renewed pressures

from the Thais . In 862 and 863, as Tang Chinese power

weakened, temporarily removing the "Pax Sinica" from the

region, Hanoi was sacked by marauding Thai 6migres seeking

relief from overcrowding and hunger in upland territories .

96

The Vietnamese became caught between the temporary

rampage of the Thais and the larger strategic presence of the

Chinese. Gradually, Vietnamese pioneers began moving south

where they encountered a peninsula largely open for

settlement.

In the thirteenth century the Mongols invaded Vietnam

three times only to be turned back each time ; the last

resistance battles were led by Vietnam's illustrious general,

Tran Hung Dao. As these threats from the north finally

receded, the Vietnamese again swung their attention south;

contact and conflict with the Cham kingdom now absorbed

their energies . A contest was inevitable : the Sinicized, tough,

"chip-on-the-shoulder" Vietnamese versus the Indianized,

animist, aggressive Malay-stock Champans . The Viet-Cham

contest seesawed back and forth for almost two centuries .

Both Hanoi and Indrapura, the Cham capital, were sacked and

burned . Before it was over the Vietnamese were reinvaded

by a new Chinese army; the brutal Ming occupation took 20

years to dislodge and produced the legendary Viet nationalist

leader, Le Loi. 97 Free to settle the Cham problem once the

Chinese had left, the Vietnamese won the contest in 1471 and,

using armed settlers and colonies of soldiers, evicted the

164
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

Chams from their remaining capital, Vijaya, massacring tens

of thousands who could not get away .

98

With the elimination of the Cham kingdom, the Vietnamese

soon came into direct contact and inevitable conflict with the

Khmer people . Khmer-Viet animosity actually preceded the

Cham's defeat. As early as the 1120s, nearing the height of

Angkor's splendor, Khmer forces had invaded Annam. But

under Thai pressure from the west in the twelfth century, the

Khmers began migrating south and east towards the Mekong

Delta at which Vietnamese pioneers (now led by independent

southerners) simultaneously were advancing down the

coast. 99 By the midfifteenth century these Vietnamese

advance parties were claiming lands occupied by the Khmer;

150 years later they had occupied the Mekong Delta between

Saigon and the Bassac River.

Thus ended, with some violent border "adjustments,"

particularly with the Laotions, the drama of Vietnam's

territorial conquests and cultural expansion . This expansionism was the outlet for a strong, nationalistic, and

revenge-prone culture harboring centuries of resentment and

inferiority feelings at the hands of the Chinese and ready to

become regional overlord at the expense of the Khmer, Cham,

and Laotians . As the historian Alexander Woodside put it, the

Vietnamese expansionist attitude resonates with a kind of

Confucian "cultural evangelism" and "hierarchical vision of

interstate relations" reinforced by a "psychologically

defensive imitation" of the way Vietnam had been treated by

stronger powers . 100 Towards the Khmers, in particular, whose

territory both the Vietnamese and the Thais have digested

chunk by chunk, there always has been a Vietnamese attitude

of cultural superiority and paternalism (or maternalism-see

below) . Thus communist Vietnam's foreign minister, Nguyen

Co Thach, has described the client regime in Phnom Penh as

a "child" that Vietnam had to put on its feet and encourage to

165
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

walk alone-language strikingly similar to that of Emperor

Gia Long (1802-19), who said:

Cambodia is a small country. . . . And we should maintain it as a child.

We will be its mother, its father will be Siam. When a child has trouble

with its father, it can get rid of suffering by embracing its mother.

When the child is unhappy with its mother, it can run to its father for

support .10 1

Given that the genocidal Khmer Rouge have been dependent on

Thai (and Chinese) support, Vietnam's "maternal" instincts may

have become overpowering in December 1978 .

The French encountered the Vietnamese on their way to

China in the early nineteenth century. Thinking that the

Mekong River would take them to "Cathay," France

discovered that the Mekong had created the great rice deltas

of Indochina. Diverted from China by this prize, realizing the

British had most of China's critical ports, and with

Catholicism and profits driving their zeal, the French sailed

into Indochina in 1853 . French Indochina lent itself to

division into five sections : Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina,

Cambodia, and Laos .

Vietnamese bandits and guerrillas quickly opposed the

French, and by 1859 they were carving out sanctuaries in the

Plain of Reeds north of Saigon and in the Camau Peninsula at

the tip of the Mekong Delta-infested swampy areas the

Vietcong would thrive in 100 years later. As Admiral Bonard,

the French commander in 1862, wrote:

We have had enormous difficulties in enforcing our authority. . . .

Rebel bands disturb the country everywhere. They appear from

nowhere in large numbers, destroy everything and then disappear into

nowhere.

102

For the next 25 years as sporadic banditry andVietnamese imperial

court resistance occupied the French ; rebel groups were hunted

down and executed with well-publicized brutality. However, the

repression simply sowed the seeds of future resistance . For,

while the French built new roads, hospitals, and schools and

166
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

introduced rubber and better rice-cultivation methods, the peasants

inexorably fell into deeper debt and hunger. Moreover, few

natives, however qualified, could rise above very junior

positions. Politically, Indochina was the special preserve of

Frenchmen.

103

The Vietnamese national revolt against France began in the

year 1900 with the emergence of Phan Boi Chau . Born in

Nghe An, also the birthplace of Ho Chi Minh, Chau was a

radical monarchist who traveled around Vietnam, wrote

books, sought foreign aid, and established the first

Vietnamese patriotic league : The Association for the

Modernization of Vietnam. His radical tracts, including

"Letters Written in Blood," made Chau a marked man; French

agents finally captured him in Shanghai in 1925 . He died

under house arrest in Hue in 1940 .

104

The most prominent revolutionary to follow Chau was, of

course, Ho Chi Minh . A furtive, brilliant conspirator with a

dozen aliases, Ho Chi Minh wandered the world before

settling in Paris during WWI, where he emerged as the most

articulate and dedicated expatriate Vietnamese revolutionary .

Propagandizing among the hundreds of thousands of

Indochinese who had been shipped to France as soldiers and

laborers during WWI, Ho and his colleagues joined the French

Communist Party, which had Soviet Bolshevik support. In

1924 Ho moved to Moscow, where he attended Lenin's

University of Oriental Workers, an agitprop school for Asian

revolutionaries.

105 Later Ho Chi Minh traveled to Canton

where, as a deputy to Mikhail Borodin, Moscow's man in

China, he mobilized expatriate Vietnamese students, labor

leaders, and radicals.

Alternating between Moscow, Paris, Bangkok, and Hong

Kong, Ho Chi Minh formed the Indochinese Communist Party

in 1929 . After being arrested in Hong Kong, escaping to

Singapore and being rearrested, then escaping to China, by

the mid-1930s, he was weakened by tuberculosis and malaria.

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

When the Japanese tidal wave swept across Southeast Asia in

1940-41, Ho was betrayed and jailed in a succession of

Chinese prisons during 1941-42 .

106 Finally free, Ho Chi Minh

entered Vietnam, his first return in 30 years, to join forces

with Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, communists who

had never left Vietnam and had spent years in French colonial

jails . Together they formed the Vietnam Independence

League-soon simply the Viet Minh . The final struggle with

France had begun .

When Japanese authority collapsed in Indochina in the

summer of 1945, the Viet Minh moved into the power vacuum

and on 2 September 1945, declared Vietnam independent .' 07

The Viet Minh then proceeded to promise democratic

elections but began murdering non-Communist nationalists,

socialists, educators, and religious leaders . They also sought

aid from the United States, China, the Soviet Union, Britain,

and France while seeking to erode the influence of both France

and China. Tortuous negotiations with the resurgent French

colonial regime endured, but they ended after the 23

November 1946 Haiphong bombardment, which produced

6,000 Vietnamese deaths . 108 On 19 December 1946 the

French-Viet Minh War broke out in earnest.

French war aims, prompted by the lingering humiliations of

the Second World War, were to achieve the full colonial

reconquest and reincorporation of Indochina into the French

Union . By contrast the Viet Minh sought to completely

liberate and administer Vietnam with friendly governments

set up in Cambodia and Laos . By 1947, the political

intractability of the situation in Indochina was widening the

splits in France's fragile coalition governments . Short of

troops and supplies, Fourth Republic prime ministers (there

were 13) told the French commanders in Hanoi to improvise

in Indochina-using combinations of area pacification

techniques and urban security measures . In short, France was

16 8
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

fighting herself as well as the Viet Minh . Bernard Fall

remarked on France's unresolved dilemma.

The leveling-off at a minimal level of French effectives in 1948-49

gave the French High Command very little choice of strategy. It

cleaned up much of Cochinchina, with the help of the religious sects,

whom the Viet-Minh had alienated, and also consolidated its hold on

the Tonkinese delta by occupying the hitherto-"neutral" Catholic

bishoprics of Bui-Chu and Phat-Diem ("Operation Anthracite"). But

despite French control, the Sino-Tonkinese border had become

virtually a sieve through which equipment for the Communist forces

filtered at an ever-increasing pace. When Red China occupied all the

provinces bordering on Tongking, late in 1949, and thus provided the

Viet-Minh with a "sanctuary" where its troops could be trained and its

supplies stored and replenished, the war had, for all practical purposes,

become hopeless for the French.

'o9

By late 1949 the French had lost the strategic initiative and

were conceding large portions of northwestern and northeastern Vietnam to the Communists . In France political

support for continuing the war was beginning to crumble . The

French high command went through eight commanders in

chief in the eight years between 1946 and 1954 . With the

exception of Viet Minh overconfidence in 1951, when

General Giap's forces launched a premature "general

counteroffensive" and lost thousands of troops, Viet Minh

military strategy advanced fairly steadily.' Io The Communists

spread out their attacks to draw the French off to the

Vietnamese highlands and central Laos . The Red River Delta

and the Mekong Delta, while still the major prizes, were no

longer the major theaters of operations .

In 1953 the new French commander in chief, Gen Henri

Navarre, temporarily invigorated the French effort, but it only

delayed the final result. General Giap continued to spread out

French forces while holding central and southern Laos

hostage. The showdown came at an outpost 200 miles from

Hanoi on the northwest Vietnamese-Lao border called Dien

Bien Phu. While the French continued to fritter away their

169
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

reserves protecting a dozen air strips around Indochina,

suddenly in the spring of 1954 the Viet Minh sprang their trap

on Dien Bien Phu. General Navarre rose to the bait, and the

French increased the men at the garrison to 16,000. The Viet

Minh relied on Chinese, Viet, and tribal porters and drivers to

haul large numbers of heavy artillery pieces and at least

100,000 artillery shells down from the Chinese border to

pummel the camp .' 11 The Viet Minh timed the conclusion of

the battle for the Geneva peace negotiations, and US and

British air intervention were denied .' 12 Therefore, the Viet

Minh achieved the surrender of the French garrison on 8 May

1954, although at a cost of four times as many dead as the

French forces .

113 The war ended 10 weeks later on 21 July

with Vietnam being split at the 17th parallel into two states :

the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and the Democratic Republic

of Vietnam (DRVN) .

The Second Indochina War may be said to have started as

soon as the first war ended-at least politically . Groups of

special Viet Minh guerrillas-about 8,000 men-stayed

behind in the south as the Vietnamese Communist Party put

the north under an iron grip and began emptying Tonkin of

class enemies .' 14 In the south the fledgling regime of Ngo

Dinh Diem sought to bring order out of chaos as it battled

religious sects, armed bandits, and communist revolutionary

actions, as well as a resistant receding French regime .

By what seemed a miracle, the Diem government gradually

bested its enemies and put the southern economy and

administrative infrastructure back into working order. But at

the center of Ngo Dinh Diem's government was his brother,

Ngo Dinh Nhu, who relied on coercion, bribery, and police

tactics to intimidate the regime's challengers . Nhu and his

vitriolic wife would become the government's most hated

symbols .

Hanoi waited through the mid-1950s, preoccupied with

bringing Tonkin under its Marxist-Leninist order, before

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CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

deciding on a policy for South Vietnam. By 1957 Le Duan had

emerged as the chief advocate of renewed revolution in the

south, and in May 1959 the Hanoi politburo accepted Le

Duan's proposals to brace political action in the south with

guerrilla warfare.

115

Fifteen months later the Vietnamese Communist Party set

up its underground organization in the south: the National

Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLFSV). In February 1961

all communist armed forces were merged into a People's

Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF), which was soon made a

direct appendage of the Communist party's Central

Committee-the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), II6

By early 1962 COSVN was exercising control over about

17,000 mainly southern troops with mixed southern/northern

cadres-who came to be known as the Vietcong .

During Ngo Dinh Diem's early years, the balance of foreign

support for his fledgling regime shifted from France to the United

States .

117 On the military side, the United States' advisory

team, the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG),

operating within the Geneva Accords stipulations on size,

focused principally on South Vietnam's army-creating an

organizational clone of the recently Korean War-tested

American Army . But while US military advisors were edging

into an increasing commitment to South Vietnam, they were

doing so without related reform by the Saigon government.

Again and again the US government brought up the matter of

reform with Diem and, later, with his successors, generals

Thieu and Ky. Repeatedly, they ignored the Americans . As

US ambassador to South Vietnam Elbridge Durbrow cabled

Washington in March 1961 :

I stated [to Diem] we [were] still receiving allegations and rumors

about Can Lao Party [Nhu's organization] secret activities which . . .

are harmful to GVN [Government of Vietnam] . I again urged that

party come out in open or dissolve itself. . . . Diem made no its promises .
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

United States Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor told Thieu and Ky

after they had overthrown the civilian-led (and carefully US

nurtured) High National Council:

I told you all clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner that we

Americans were tired of coups . Apparently I wasted my words . . . .

Now you have made a real mess. We cannot carry you forever if you

do things like this . . . why don't you tell your friends before you act? 119

In November 1963 Diem and Nhu were killed by army

officers . Three weeks later President Johnson found himself

presiding over a US semicommitment to South Vietnam in the

wake of President John Kennedy's death. In August 1964, at

the time of the Maddox and Turner Joy Gulf of Tonkin

incidents, US intelligence concluded that regular North

Vietnamese combat units had appeared in the central

highlands of South Vietnam. The People's Army of Vietnam

(PAVN) independent 808th battalion was now in the country.

In. December the PAVN 95th regiment also infiltrated South

Vietnam. Between then and May 1965, three more PAVN

regiments were detected entering the south, bringing the

number of northern-born regulars in the south to perhaps

6,500 120

In February 1965 the Johnson administration launched air

strikes against the north as reprisals for communist attacks on

US installations at Pleiku and Qui Nhon. In March the

sustained air campaign known as "Rolling Thunder" began.

US Marines went into Da Nang, and by June there were 75,000

Americans in the Republic of Vietnam. The United States'

most difficult military experience had begun.

As the Saigon governments went through the political

revolving door during the chaos following Diem's assassination, both Hanoi and Washington escalated the violence

in the spring of 1965 . Led by Gen William Westmoreland, the

US advisory effort planned a huge logistical buildup that

would take at least a year with a concurrent combat effort in

which US and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)

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CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

main force units would search out and destroy communist

main force units while shielding the South Vietnamese

population .

121 Hanoi, however, had its own strategy . Bracing

COSVN (whose original chief, Nguyen Van Linh, would

become secretary general of the Vietnamese Communist Party

in 1988) with more resources, Hanoi sent the charismatic

four-star general, Nguyen Chi Thanh, to take over in 1965 .

122

By mid-1965 large numbers of northerners were infiltrating

South Vietnam. By late 1966 General Westmoreland's

command estimated there were close to 200,000 communist

actives-political and military-inside the RVN.

123

The war that developed in South Vietnam and the US air

war against North Vietnam enveloped all of Indochina. While

the conventional military aspects of the war clearly consumed

the most physical resources and lives, the war remained at

heart a revolutionary political struggle . The insurgency and

village-level military actions never disappeared even as the

big-unit war and the bombing escalated.

124

Concurrently with the ground war's escalation in the South

was the US air war against the North . Designed by

Washington to compel Hanoi to drop its policy of subverting

South Vietnam, the air war's effectiveness proved limited.

Political constraints in the US, North Vietnam's ability to

adjust during the seven-year campaign, and overconfidence in

the Pentagon and the White House regarding graduated air

strikes against an agricultural society contributed to the

realization by 1966 that the bombing, as conducted, would not

break Hanoi's Will. 125 Gradually, the US changed its goal

against the DRVN to one of simply exacting a heavy cost to

Hanoi of supporting and directing the war in the South.

126

Ultimately, under President Nixon, the bombing goals were

to force Hanoi to sign an accord which would allow the United

States and its captured airmen an honorable exit from the

war.

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Nevertheless, the US Air Force's and Navy's bombardment

set new records in the annals of air warfare. A total of 7.8

million tons of bombs was dropped on Indochina targets

greater than the total US tonnage dropped in both theaters in

WWII. One-third of the tonnage was from B-52s which flew

against targets in both South Vietnam and North Vietnam. A

majority of the bombs, about 4 million tons, fell on targets in

South Vietnam, principally in remote areas or in tactical

support of ground operations . About 1 .5 million fell on

logistical targets in Laos, and over 500,000 tons on Cambodia.

North Vietnam absorbed more than 1 million tons of

bombs. I28 Although they cost North Vietnam greatly, the

bombing campaigns did not fundamentally alter Hanoi's

policy; and they actually strengthened the party's control of

the society.

129 In South Vietnam and Cambodia, by contrast,

the bombing and related artillery fire contributed to the

creation of millions of refugees whose misery and needs

critically weakened the Saigon and Phnom Penh governments' legitimacy and control .

130

The communist Tet offensive of January-May 1968 was

the strategic act that forced the American disengagement

from Vietnam and sent the two Vietnams down the road of

negotiation and fighting which ended in their violent

reunification in April 1975 . While Tet was a tactical loss for

the communist side-they would lose 45,000 men in the first

month and perhaps 160,000 killed by the end of the year 131

-the shock of Tet broke the back of the Johnson administration's war policy . Ironically Tet also galvanized the South

Vietnamese defense effort for several years until the

communist forces were replenished . Four years later, in the

midst of accelerating American withdrawals, Hanoi laid

another great shock on South Vietnam during the so-called

Easter offensive of 1972 . This time the Nixon administration

reacted with tactical, then strategic, bombing of the DRVN

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CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

heartland, producing great destruction to North Vietnam's

remaining industrial/communications complex .

President Nixon's reaction to the communist offensive of

April/May 1972 was to lay an enormous tactical, then

strategic, military reprisal onto the DRVN, while at the same

time-with creative diplomacy-actually improving US

relations with Hanoi's two primary allies: the USSR and the

People's Republic of China (PRC) .

In November 1972, following six months of new bombing

and Nixon's landslide reelection, the president gave Hanoi an

ultimatum : either negotiate seriously or suffer the

consequences . When Hanoi balked, the president ordered

"Linebacker I1," the massive 11-day, December strategic

bombing campaign of North Vietnam's heartland . The

bombing worked. Hanoi became flexible, and by the second

week of January 1973, Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger

produced a final version of the peace plan. American POWs

were soon airlifted out of North Vietnam to a great wave of

relief and patriotism in the United States .

Though the peace accords extricated American POWs from

Hanoi, they were seriously flawed regarding political and

military realities on the battlefield . First, they did not

acknowledge the presence of perhaps 150,000 regular North

Vietnamese troops left inside South Vietnam, an issue about

which President Thieu in Saigon made furious objections.

Secondly, the accords stipulated that while the two

Vietnamese regimes could replace war material on a

one-for-one basis in the South , these restrictions did not apply

to military assistance flowing into the North .

132 Then in the

summer of 1973, as PAVN infiltration of the South increased,

the US Congress passed the Cooper-Church amendment,

which forbade any more use of American air power in

Southeast Asia .

By late 1974, with US aid to South Vietnam cut by

Congress, North Vietnamese combat forces inside South

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Vietnam were up to 200,000 with an additional 100,000

support and logistics troops . Communist armored vehiclesmainly tanks-had risen to 700, or twice the ARVN's

inventory. In March 1975 as the North Vietnamese divisions

began to pour over the border, the ARVN panicked ; and in six

weeks the 15-year war ended, and Saigon surrendered.

Vietnam's Way of War

As we have seen, the Vietnamese approach to warfare grew

out of their long and difficult experiences with outsiders : the

Chinese, Thais, Mongols, Chams, Khmers, and later the

French, Japanese, and Americans. Few countries have so

routinely been the object of other peoples' ambitions and

animosities . Vietnamese authorities have reflected thoroughly

about warfare and its relationship to politics . They accept

struggle and violence as aspects of policy . By virtue of

Vietnam's geography, and of the frequent invaders, the

Vietnamese have been unable to escape . Unprotected, as were

the Japanese, for example, from mainland Asia's turmoil, the

Vietnamese fought back, usually relying on guerrilla warfare.

In turn, the Viets invaded and occupied other lands to the

south, using conventional armed invasions and soldiercolonialist thrusts to take the land . This dual Vietnamese

approach to warfare-guerrilla war when defending,

conventional war when conquering-defines the spectrum of

Vietnam's approach to war. As demonstrated in the Second

Indochina War between 1961 and 1975, Vietnam's

communist authorities blended both guerrilla war and

conventional war in fighting the nationalist South.

Long before the Vietnamese doubled the size of their

national territory at the expense of the Chams and the Khmer,

they had to defend their Tonkinese homeland from repeated,

massive, and brutal Chinese and Mongol-Chinese invasions .

Although portrayal of the Trung sisters revolt in A.D. 39-40

has benefited from patriotic embellishment, the real start of

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CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

Vietnam's tradition of guerrilla warfare begins in the tenth

century when the Vietnamese threw off a Tang Chinese

occupation force . At the battle of Bach Dang in 938, in the

Red River Delta near Haiphong, Vietnamese guerrillas

combatted the Chinese invasion force. As flotillas of armed

Chinese junks approached the tidal waterways of the Bach

Dang River, General Ngo Quyen, a Vietnamese warlord,

resorted to trickery : he had his men drive iron-tipped spikes

into the riverbed, their points concealed just below the water's

surface. At high tide, Ngo's guerrillas lured the Chinese up

the river. Then, attacking the Chinese from the banks, the

Viets forced the Chinese to flee back down the river where

they became impaled on the spikes while the Vietnamese

slaughtered them.' 33 With victory in hand, Ngo Quyen

declared Vietnam's independence .

In 1284, during a fight against 150,000 Mongol-Chinese

forces seeking to repacify the southern regions on Kublai

Khan's orders, northern Vietnam's legendary Tran Hung Dao

mustered every available resource in Tonkin against the

invaders . Like Vietnamese generals before and after him, Tran

relied on mobile methods of warfare, abandoning the cities, avoiding

frontal attacks, and harassing his enemies until, confused and

exhausted, they were ripe for final attack .

134

In the last great battle in 1287, squads of Vietnamese guerrillas

once again drew the Mongol-Chinese flotillas into the heat and

disease of Tonkin's river tributaries and, repeating the Bach Dang

River debacle of 350 years earlier, used the same underwaterspike technique to trap and slaughter the enemy. Thereafter, the

Mongol (Yuan) dynasty in China lost interest in Vietnam.' 35

When the Mongol grip on China was sundered and a new,

energetic Chinese dynasty called Ming was in place in Peking,

it was inevitable that the Chinese would turn their attention to

the rebellious South . In 1407 the Vietnamese fell victim to a

major and brutal Ming occupation force which essentially

enslaved Tonkin, extracted much of the country's wealth, and

177
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

re-Sinicized Vietnam's literature and art . Ming harshness

provoked a great insurrection eventually led by a third

legendary Vietnamese general, Le Loi, who in a battle in 1418

proclaimed Vietnam free and himselfemperor. Wearing down

the Chinese, Le Loi's forces ambushed their troops and

surrounded their garrisons and forts . Mixing guerrilla warfare

with frontal assaults, Le Loi's patriots harassed the Chinese

constantly . Adopting defenses that would fail the French five

centuries later, the Chinese built fortified towers along the

main routes . The showdown came in 1426 .

Fighting in rain and mud, the Vietnamese finally routed the Chinese

on a field at Tot Dong, west of Hanoi . In an accord signed two years

later, the Chinese recognized Vietnam's independence and Le Loi

resumed the tributary tie to China as insurance. .

In a final face-saving measure, Le Loi's army provided the Chinese

with hundreds of junks and thousands of horses to transport them

home .

For the next 400 years Vietnam was free of external

occupation . Vietnam's Le dynasty and its successors presided

over the country as it expanded its writ in an energetic march

southward. But by the middle of the sixteenth century, the

Vietnamese fell into civil wars as the southern pioneers, led

by the Nguyen oligarchs, broke away from the Trinh warlords

who were propping up the Le dynasty in Hanoi. One hundred

and fifty years of sporadic fratricide followed with the rivals

partitioning Vietnam roughly along the same line-the 17th

parallel-as was done during the Geneva Accords of 1954 .

The war between North and South Vietnam after 1954

reflected more of this unfinished regional animosity,

although, obviously, it was overlaid with new ideological,

technical, and foreign policy factors, as well as the occupation

by a half million Americans and the greatest air bombardment

between World War II and the 1991 Desert Storm operation .

But despite the introduction of sophisticated warfare

technology into Vietnam in the two Indochina wars, the

178
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

communists-who harnessed the nationalist cause better than

the pro-French and pro-American Vietnamese-never lost

sight of the fact that they were fighting a revolutionary

political struggle against more heavily armed foreign

occupiers . Thus, as Ho Chi Minh predicted after the breakdown of the Viet Minh-French Fontainebleau negotiations of

July-August 1946 :

It will be a war between an elephant and a tiger. If the tiger ever stands

still, the elephant will crush him with his mighty tusks. But the tiger will

not stand still . . . . He will leap upon the back of the elephant, tearing huge

chunks from his side, and then he will leap back into the dark jungle and

slowly the elephant will bleed to death . That will be the war in

Indochina.

137

In the 16 years since the fall of Saigon in April 1975,

communist authorities in Tonkin, the historic seat of

Vietnamese nationalism and chauvanism, have employed

every technique to try to bring southern Vietnam, that is

Annam and Cochinchina, under their political control :

encadrement of the southern administrative apparatus,

occupation by 10 PAVN divisions, incarceration or

elimination of the southern noncommunist elite (and

numerous communist cadres too) in a vast prison system, 138

creation of gulag-style "special economic zones," and

presiding over (usually for a price) the flight from Vietnam of

1 .5 million people willing to take their chances on the high

seas rather than return to a country whose government's

behavior they could no longer endure. But as the ruined

economy, hyperinflation, official corruption, and, later,

disastrous war in Cambodia would prove, Hanoi won the war

but, so far, has been unable to win the peace.
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Conclusions

Chinese, Japanese, and Vietnamese experiences with

internal violence and external warfare show that each of these

Sinic cultures produced numerous warrior-leaders who

took over the state and redefined its policies . These

warrior-emperors established dictatorships and dynasties,

passing them to their offspring until a competing family or

overlord replaced them . There was, at times, little

differentiation between the warrior elites, the state, and the

cultures which produced them . In China, the warrioremperors were the principal agents of change as dynasties rose

and fell . The twentieth century's Mao Zedong sought to

destroy Confucianism but established a personality cult as

intense as anything in Han, Ming, or Ching times. In Japan,

the Yamato elite made its deity the national deity, and the

three great shogunates epitomized the blend of warrior,

state, and culture . In Vietnam, generals founded dynasties

in war and peace whether fighting outsiders or each other.

The three Sinic societies investigated here have long

military traditions-traditions that began 10, 15, even 20

centuries before the industrial revolution hit Asia in the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries . By contrast, the

United States is a European-settled country with a much

shorter, and largely Jominian, military tradition that became

reinforced in the American Civil War and the accompanying

industrial revolution . But Sinic societies had 10-20 centuries

of experience with warfare, and the interplay of warfare and

politics, before they industrialized. Not surprisingly, Sinic

peoples seldom think about war in Jominian ways . They think

like the Asian strategist Sun Tzu and his interpretation by their

subsequent strategists . Sinic cultures acknowledge the often

constant interplay between war and politics, rather than their

separation . "Peace" is not the opposite of war for Sinic

cultures as it tends to be for North American and North

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CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

European societies . For Sinic cultures, peace usually has been

no more than a temporary absence of anarchy and turmoil

because a current leadership-usually absolutist and usually

ruthless-happens to be dominating . Such stability carries its

own legitimacy, its own celestial mandate, in the Sinic world.

Chinese, Japanese, and Vietnamese (and Korean) societies

are by tradition authoritarian, patriarchal, militarily rooted,

and undemocratic. Accordingly, they see conflict as routine,

war as legitimate, and power and force as the basis of political

authority . Or, as Professor Bozeman writes in a broader

context,

Evidence is totally missing that recourse to armed force evokes

feelings of guilt and self-recrimination among the intellectual elites of

non-Western societies, or that the high incidence of organized and

unorganized violence induces doubts about the appropriateness of

ruling moral or political systems. Indeed, the strife-filled records of

the past . . . point to the possibility that conflict and violence may well

be accepted in most areas outside the Occidental world as normal

incidents of life, legitimate tools of government and foreignpolicymaking, and morally sanctioned courses of action.' 39

In China Mao put it succinctly : "Political power grows out

of the barrel of a gun." This is true whether we are talking

about the warring-states period of China's fifth through third

centuries B .C . ; the Han, Ming, or Yuan dynasties ; Mao

Zedong's People's Republic ; or Li Peng and Deng Xiaoping's

Tienanman Square debacle. This fact has also been true in

Japan, where political power firmly rested on armed force,

whether in the Kamakura, Ashikaga, or Tokugawa Shogunates

or in Tojo's fascist state . In Vietnam, dynastic power and

authoritarian political structures depended on coercion,

whether in the Le dynasty, or Nguyen Van Thieu's Republic,

or Ho Chi Minh's People's Republic. (In Korea, whether we

are speaking of the Three Kingdoms period, the Yi dynasty,

Syngman Rhee's First Republic, Park Chung Hee's Third

Republic, or Kim 11-sung's People's Republic, political power

depended on the armed forces and the police .) Thus, at most
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

every historic juncture among Sinic societies, political power

has depended upon force or the threat of force.

Although Sinic cultures have all incorporated and

legitimated the use of force, we find that the Chinese, the

Japanese, and the Vietnamese have each used force in special

ways for their own unique purposes . The Chinese remain

essentially an agricultural people and a "stay-at-home"

people . Being Sinocentric by definition, they believed the

world should come to them . Gradually it did-and, by force

of European arms, gradually it sped their own collapse in the

late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries . But in spite of

the European intrusion, the Chinese always have had serious

border problems and a tendency towards internal anarchy.

Because China borders 12 other countries, the Chinese

security instinct (and most often their strategy) was to use

force-after they tried other kinds of policies-to stabilize

their borders, freeing them for more important internal tasks .

Basically defensive in their approach, in practice the Chinese

can be very rough on smaller neighbors like the Vietnamese

and the Koreans (and more recently the Tibetans) who have

experienced repeated occupation by Chinese armies,

including those led by renegade Chinese warlords .

Since China's foremost external security goal always has

been boundary maintenance and border stability, the Chinese

paid serious attention to military and diplomatic techniques

to secure their borders. The first, and most obvious technique

(and one you can visit today) was a physical technique-the

Great Wall . The wall was begun in the fifth century B.C. and

was expanded and linked up by succeeding dynasties . The

wall shields the Yellow River valley, which is the heart of Han

Chinese civilization, from non-Chinese, nomad predators .

However, predators had ways of getting across the wall, often

by killing or bribing the guards .

The Chinese also made punitive expeditions into tribal

areas to the northwest and the northeast. Recently one is

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CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

reminded of their "Pax Sinica" in Tibet . Chinese colonists

were sent out as far as the Silk Road, which allowed contact

with Europe. When the Chinese could not protect their borders

and barbarians swept in, the foreign conquerors soon

discovered they were greatly outnumbered by their Chinese

subjects and were forced to cooperate with them to retain

power.

In the twentieth century, the Korean and Vietnam wars

showed the Chinese again emphasizing boundary maintenance. Chinese forces occupied northern Korea in late

October 1950 after signaling Washington that General

MacArthur should not approach the Yalu River. During the

Second Indochina War, the Chinese put 50,000 to 70,000

troops into northern Vietnam at the request of their

Vietnamese ally . In 1979, 50,000 Chinese troops went back

into northern Vietnam to "teach Hanoi a lesson" (which

proved costly to Beijing) about its meddling in Cambodia.

Thus China continues its two-millenia tradition of using force

on its borders.

Japan's experience with war and politics demonstrates how

a fringe culture, organized around feudal-later policestate-structures and imbued with martial values and a sense

of national destiny, tried to prove itself at the expense of other

peoples. Possessing an authoritarian-at times absolutistculture, the Japanese have known "democracy" for only about

70 years of their 12 centuries of organized social-ethnic

identity . Between the twelfth and nineteenth centuries, their

internal warfare and militarism were punctuated by limited

external contacts-which in dramatic form merged into

warfare and colonial aggression on the Asian mainland in the

sixteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries . For the last 45

years the Japanese have been behaving as international

pacifists under American security protection . All East Asia

conveys its satisfaction with this arrangement. Given the US

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

security guarantee, the Japanese pursue, in highly competitive

fashion, "pure" economic goals on a global scale .

Was Japan's ultimately devastating experience in WWII,

culminating in the Tokyo fire raids and then the nuclear

attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, sufficiently catastrophic

to extinguish the Japanese martial instinct and permanently

turn the country away from internal authoritarianism and

external military conquests? I believe the answer can only be

learned if the American security tie to Japan is removed and

a period of time passes-perhaps 50 years-long enough for

the security context and power realities of East Asia to

completely alter themselves . Fifty years after Pearl Harbor,

no East Asian country, nor the United States, seems desirous

of fostering a truly independent Japan. Nor, evidently, do the

Japanese .

Vietnam's way of war and the cauldron of national struggle

within which the Vietnamese defined their nationalism is a

tragic legacy among the Sinic cultures . In the shadow of more

powerful countries and with a tendency towards internal

fratricide, the Vietnamese were repeatedly subjugated by the

Chinese, and later the French, only to throw off those yokes

in terrible struggles . In the twentieth century it was again

Vietnam's tragedy that those native patriots, who finally led

the Vietnamese to independence against the French and then

to reunification against the southern nationalists and their

American ally, were totalitarian Marxist-Leninists. Among

all the competing nationalist groups which sought to steer

Vietnam's revolution, the most radical and merciless, the

communists, won out. The price Vietnam has paid for

communist control of its affairs has been terrible . Over a

million and a quarter people died in the Second Indochina

War, punished by over 5 million tons of American bombs . The

industrial complex of Tonkin was completely ruined. Perhaps

a half million southerners were incarcerated in communist

prison camps. Another million and one-third Vietnamese fled,

184
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

taking their chances on the high seas, with one-third of them

perishing .

Now that Vietnam has been unified for over 15 years and

the moral and administrative bankruptcy of the Communist

party is evident to all, perhaps a new generation of Vietnamese

leaders will emerge. Hopefully these will be men and women

who can put their country's struggle culture behind them

and lift Vietnam's deserving people into an economic future

commensurate with their demonstrated, if so often

squandered, courage.

Finally, what are the implications for the future of these

historical and cultural influences on Sinic societies' conflict

behavior? And what are the lessons for Western military

planners and academics? The United States has been involved

in four wars in East Asia in the twentieth century . A fifth

experience was the attempt, under General Marshall in the

Truman administration, to mediate an end to the Chinese civil

war. The record shows mixed results . Japan was totally

defeated . The Korean War was at best a draw . Vietnam ended

in an American failure . The Chinese civil war did not resolve

itself the way Washington wanted . These experiences should

tell Americans that culture and society in the Sinic world are

very different from ours . They have viewed the use of force

as legitimate, warfare as normal and often protracted, and

violence and coercion as acceptable means of statecraft .

Conversely, the strong desire one finds in North American and

North European cultures to avoid armed conflict or to seek

quick resolutions of conflict has not been shared in Sinic

Asia-a vast area comprising 30 percent of the world's

population . I think US security planners and academics

would do well to reflect on these facts . American conduct in

Asian conflicts tends to validate for that region Professor

Bozeman's conclusion that the challenge of understanding the

multifaceted nature of modern warfare and how it varies by

region and by culture has not been met by the governmental

185
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

or intellectual elites of the United States . Or, as Michael

Howard, the Oxford University professor of the history of

war, wrote : "Wars are not tactical exercises writ large. . . .

They are . . . conflicts of societies, and they can be fully

understood only if one understands the nature of the society

fighting them [emphasis added] ." 140

Notes

1 . Adda B . Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas," Orbis 20, no. 1

(Spring 1976) .

2. Ibid., 78 .

3 . W. Scott Morton, China : Its History and Culture (New York :

Lippincott & Crowell, 1980), 2 .

4. Gerald Segal, Defending China (New York: Oxford University Press,

1985), 12.

5. Morton, 5-6.

6. Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, East Asia: The Great

Tradition, vol . 1 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), 32.

7 . Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past: A Social and Economic

Interpretation (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1973), 24.

8. C . P . Fitzgerald, The Horizon History ofChina (New York: American

Heritage Publishers Co., Inc ., 1969), 54 .

9. Morton, 22-30.

10. Fitzgerald, 50-54.

11 . John K. Fairbank, "Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience," in

Chinese Ways in Warfare, ed. Frank A. Kierman, Jr ., and John K . Fairbank

(Cambridge, Mass . : Harvard University Press, 1974), 4.

12. Ibid., 2.

13. Morton, 45 .

14. Ibid., 51 .

15 . Ibid ., 54.

16 . Ibid., 56.

17 . Ibid., 59-61 .

18. Ibid., 60-61 .

19. Fitzgerald, 136.

20. Ibid., 137-38.

21 . The mammoth canal runs from Beijing to Shanghai, thus allowing

produce and military traffic to flow more easily between the principal

18 6
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

administration centers of north and south China. Morton, 80-81 ; and

Fitzgerald, 141 .

22. Fitzgerald, 141 .

23 . Ibid., 162.

24. Ibid., 163 .

25. Morton, 88 .

26. Fitzgerald, 168-69.

27. Morton, 96.

28. Ibid., 103-12.

29. Ibid., 102-3 .

30. Fitzgerald, 249-52.

31 . Joseph Buttinger, The Smaller Dragon : A Political History of

Vietnam (New York : Praeger, 1958), 153-58; and Morton, 125.

32. Morton, 129.

33 . Ibid., 126-34.

34. Ibid., 151-52.

35 . Ibid., 158-60.

36. Ibid., 173 .

37 . Ibid., 186,189-91 .

38 . Ibid., 193-97.

39 . Ibid., 198 .

40. Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power:

The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 (Stanford, Calif. :

Stanford University Press, 1962), 31 .

41 . Ibid., 49-50.

42. Ibid., 113-14; and Brian Crozier, The Man Who Lost China (New

York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), 217-19, 235-38.

43 . Crozier, 236.

44. Johnson, 42.

45 . Ibid., 43-45.

46. Crozier, 254-55.

47 . Ibid., 296-97.

48. Morton, 202.

49. Ibid., 201 .

50. Bozeman, 93 .

51 . Fairbank, "Varieties of Chinese Military Experience," 7 .

52. Ibid., 8 .

53 . John K . Fairbank, ed ., The Chinese World Order: Traditional

China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press,

1968),2-3 .

54. Segal, 36 .

55 . Ibid., 37 .

187
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

56. As early as 1936 Mao Zedong told Edgar Snow that Tibet and

Xinjiang would be brought under Chinese control. Segal, citing Snow, 80.

57. Segal, 81-82.

58. Arthur Huck, The Security of China: Chinese Approaches to

Problems of War and Strategy (New York: Columbia University Press,

1970), 36.

59 . Segal, 136.

60 . Ibid., 143 .

61 . Ibid., 180-83 .

62. Ibid ., 211, citing a 26 February 1979 British Broadcasting

Corporation (BBC) translation of Deng's remarks.

63. Ibid ., 219 .

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., 211, citing a 11 March 1979 BBC translation of Deng's

remarks.

66. Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea : The Unknown War (New

York: Pantheon Books, 1979), 121 ; and Allen Whiting, China Crosses the

Yalu : The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford

University Press, 1960), 118-39.

67 . See the discussion in Halliday and Cumings, Korea : The Unknown

War, 126-30, 155, 163 .

68. Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster,

1987), 329, estimates that at least 500,000 Chinese died. Halliday and

Cumings put it at 1 million . The South Korean army lost about 415,000, the

North Korean army perhaps 700,000. Civilian deaths were at least 2 million.

Halliday and Cumings, 200.

69. Segal, 102 .

70. John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East

Asia: Tradition and Transformation (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973),

325-29 .

71 . Ibid ., 330.

72. Floyd Hiatt Ross, Shinto : The Way ofJapan (Boston : Beacon Press,

1965), 16, 26, 29. Although Shinto was to become eclipsed at the court level

by Buddhism, it retained its strength as the commoners' religion with all its

pantheistic, indigenous, and ethnonationalistic characteristics. Also see

Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 330-32 and 334-35 .

73 . Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 336-37.

74 . Jonathan Norton Leonard, Early Japan (New York : Time-Life

Books, 1968), 55.

75 . W. Scott Morton, Japan : Its History and Culture (New York: Thomas

J. Crowell, 1970), 57-58.

76 . Ibid., 65-67 .

18 8
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

77. Leonard, 63 ; and Morton, Japan , 71-73,.

78. Leonard, 64.

79. Morton, Japan, 93-94.

80. Ibid., 112 .

81 . See Maj Karl W. Eikenberry, "The Imjin War," Military Review 68,

no. 2 (February 1988) : 74-82.

82. Morton, Japan, 105 .

83 . Ibid., 129-30.

84. Ibid., 128.

85 . One of the most analytically provocative and powerful, comparative

treatments of this phenomena, which includes Japan, is found in Barrington

Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and

Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston : Beacon Press, 1967),

228-313 .

86. Edwin O . Reischauer, The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity

(Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1988), 53.

87 . Leonard, 57.

88 . Moore, 235 .

89 . Ibid., 236.

90 . Ibid., 266.

91 . The last Vietnamese tribute mission sent to Peking was in 1877, but

traditional sentiment and Vietnamese ceremonial pride in the arrangement

persisted right up to the time when the Chinese Throne of Heaven itself went

under during the collapse of the Quin (Manchu) dynasty in 1911 . Dennis J .

Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1968), 24.

92. Duncanson, 23 .

93 . Ibid., 27-29 .

94 . Buttinger, 92-96.

95. Duncanson, 33; and Buttinger, 97-98 .

96. Duncanson, 34.

97. Buttinger, 153-58 .

98 . The surviving Chain migrated west en masse, blending into the

Indianized Khmer population or assimilated into the Annamese hill tribes

from whence they have periodically demanded the revival of an autonomous

Chain state . Duncanson, 35-37 .

99. Buttinger, 161-72.

100. Alexander Woodside, "Vietnam and Laos : The Continuing Crisis,"

a paper presented at the American Historical Association, Washington, D.C.,

December 1969, as cited by William J . Turley in his "Vietnam's Strategy

for Indochina and Security in Southeast Asia," in Security, Strategy, and

189
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Policy Responses in the Pacific Rim, ed . Young W. Kihl and Lawrence E.

Grinter (Boulder, Colo . : Lynne Rienner Publishers 1989), 178-79.

101 . Turley, 179, citing a quotation of David P. Chandler in Chandler's A

History of Cambodia (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1983), 116.

102. Stanley Kamow, Vietnam : A History (New York: Viking Press,

1983), 107.

103. R. E. M. Irving, The First Indochina War: French and American

Policy, 1945 to 1954 (London: Croom Helm, 1975), 9-10.

104. Karnow, 110.

105 . Ibid., 122-23.

106 . Bernard B . Fall, The Two Viet-Nams : A Political and Military

Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1963), 62.

107. A border patrol of over 100,000 Chinese nationalist troops mauraded

across northern Tonkin that summer. Ho's smaller forces sought to appease

them as they kept their eye on the bigger prize in Hanoi. Ibid ., 63-64 .

108 . Ibid., 76.

109 . Ibid., 108 .

110 . Ibid ., 116-17.

111 . Bernard B . Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege ofDien Bien

Phu (New York: J. B . Lippincott, 1967), 451-52 .

112. Irving, 120-21 .

113 . Fall, Hell, 448.

114 . See US Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, vol.

4 A.4, 7-8 and vol . 4 A.5, 16-17, hereafter cited as "The Pentagon Papers."

115. William S . Turley, The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and

Military History, 1954-1975 (Boulder, Colo . : Westview Press, 1986),

23-24.

116 . Ibid., 28-30 .

117 . Having already poured $3 .5 billion into the French-Viet Minh War,

the US averaged $200 million per year in aid to Diem. Turley, The Second

Indochina War, 16-17; and Lawrence E. Grinter, "Bargaining Between

Saigon and Washington," Orbis, Fall 1974, 839 .

118 . Grinter, Orbis, 840, citing Pentagon Papers .

119 . Ibid., 858, citing a Saigon airgram to the State Department on 29

December 1964 as reprinted in New York Times, 14 June 1971, 29-30.

120. Turley, The Second Indochina War, 58 .

121 . Adm U. S. G. Sharp and Gen W. C. Westmoreland, Report on the

War in Vietnam (Washington, D .C. : Government Printing Office, 1968),

97-100.

122. Turley, The Second Indochina War, 69.

123 . Sharp and Westmoreland, 100-114.

190
CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES IN SINIC ASIA

124. This complexity remains a source of considerable debate about the

war's actual nature. The debate is joined and explored in The American War

in Vietnam: Lessons, Legacies, and Implications for Future Conflicts, ed.

Lawrence E. Grinter and Peter M. Dunn (Westport, Conn . : Greenwood

Press, 1987).

125 . The DRVN's adjustment to the air attack is treated in excellent detail

in Jon M. Van Dyke, North Vietnam's Strategy for Survival (Palo Alto,

Calif. : Pacific Books, 1972) . Air power enthusiasts' overconfidence is

assessed in Earl H. Tilford, Jr., "Air Power in Vietnam : The Hubris of

Power," in The American War in Vietnam, 69-83.

126. Compare, for example, CINCPAC's stated goals for the air strikes at

the start of the campaign in March 1965, with its reevaluation of the

campaign and statement of more limited goals as the years wore on up to the

campaign's end on 31 October 1968 . Sharp and Westmoreland, 16, 54.

127 . A superb recent study is Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower :

The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989).

128. Turley, The Second Indochina War, 89 .

129. After the war, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) revealed that

the bombing had destroyed most of the industrial, communications, and

transportation facilities built since 1954 and erased 10 to 15 years of

economic growth. Turley, The Second Indochina War, 95-96, relying on a

VCP Central Committee report of December 1976.

130. Lawrence E. Grinter, "Vietnam: The Costs of Ignoring the Political

Requirements," in The American War in Vietnam, 37-39 .

131 . Ibid., 40, 47, citing Richard A . Hunt, "The Challenge of

Counterinsurgency," in Second Indochina War Symposium, ed . John

Schlight (Washington, D .C. : US Army, 1986), 136.

132. Gen Bruce Palmer, Jr., The Twenty-Five Year War: America's

Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington, Ky. : University Press of Kentucky,

1984), 130-32.

133 . Karnow, 101 .

134. Ibid.

135. Duncanson, 40-41 .

136. Karnow, 104 .

137 . Ho Chi Minh to David Schoenbrum in Schoenbrum's As France

Goes, 234, as cited in Irving, 29, 36.

138 . Hanoi's totalitarian dragnet in the South threw hundreds, possibly

thousands, of southern Communist party members into jail as well. See Doan

Van Toai and David Chanoff, The Vietnamese Gulag (New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1986).

139. Bozeman, 65 .
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

140 . Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History,"

Parameters, March 1981, 14 .
Culture and Conflict in Latin America:

Myth or Reality?

Dr Bynum E. Weathers

What Rome didfor Spain, Spain didfor Spanish America .

-Edward G. Bourne

It has been postulated that war is the normal state of human activity.

Peace is an ideal inferredfrom the existence ofintervals between wars.

-Unknown

Professor Adda B . Bozeman's article forms the backdrop of

this study, which seeks to test the validity of the Bozeman

thesis for this region .' The Bozeman thesis is focused on

cultural aspects of third-world societies that appear to have a

propensity for bringing about war. The erosion of the

nation-state system as an organizing norm of society is

deemed generic to her thesis inasmuch as war in the West is

attributed to political and economic causes associated with the

nation-state . 2 Professor Bozeman characterizes the nature of

war as obscure and suggests that a conceptualization of war

in terms of its cultural components is needed for the purpose

of clarification . 3

Is the Bozeman thesis applicable to Latin America? Before

answering this question, it is necessary to examine

developments on the Iberian Peninsula prior to 1492 ; to gain

insight into the culture and characteristics of the indigenous

population in the New World during the pre-Columbian era ;

to reflect on the impact of the clash between Iberian and

Indian cultures during the conquest and establishment of the

Spanish and Portuguese empires in America; and to review

developments in the Latin American republics following

193
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

independence-including their relations with the United

States . This review seeks to identify cultural determinants, if

discernible, that might indicate a propensity for war.

In her seminal article, Professor Bozeman sets forth seven

general propositions to support her thesis . According to her

sixth proposition :

The fundamental foreign policy-related themes running through the

histories of sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia

and China converge on conflict and divisiveness as norm-engendering

realities . The evidence shows, in particular, that peace is neither the

dominant value nor the norm in foreign relations and that war, far from

being perceived as immoral or abnormal, is viewed positively . 4

It is significant that this proposition omitted Latin America. The

reason for this omission will become understandable as the writer

examines the uniqueness and complexity of the region.

The Iberian Connection

In contrast to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa,

India, and China, Latin America is a product of Western

civilization . The Iberian Peninsula was the fountainhead of

European culture brought to the Indies in the fifteenth century .

It is easier to understand the nature and thrust of this cultural

transmission if one examines events that occurred prior to the

discovery and conquest of the Indies .

North African Moslems invaded the Iberians in A.D. 711 and

deprived them of the exclusive use of their territory, on a

gradually reduced scale, until the expulsion of the invaders in

1492 . During eight centuries of occupation, inhabitants of the

peninsula were the recipients of the rich Eastern and

Mediterranean cultures brought over by the Moslems as well

as the contributions these cultures made to science, industry,

and agriculture . 5

194
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

The recovery of the native lands by the military forces of

Spain and Portugal, the Reconquista, is quite significant. This

event, resulting in Portugal's independence, prepared the way

for the monumental voyages of discovery and the establishment of the Luso-Hispanic empires in America. By the end of

the thirteenth century, the Moslems had been driven to the

southeastern kingdom of Grenada through the combined

efforts of the kings of Castile and Aragon . There they

remained until their expulsion in 1492 . 6

The crown and the church achieved national unity by

working hand in hand, the cape and the sword alongside the

gown . Religious fervor was a vital ingredient of the

Reconquista in the contest between Christianity and the

Islamic faith . The purity of the church was as essential to

national unity as the dominance of the royal houses of Castile

and Aragon in the secular realm. Fernando de los Rios, a Latin

American scholar, has expressed this interdependence most

effectively .

Spain was impelled to two kinds of militant action at that momentous

period of her history : the one militarist the other spiritual, both

combative and eager to conquer; in the former the purposes to conquer

power, territory, and riches prevailed ; in the latter the prime aim was

to win adherence to Christianity . There was an interweaving between

the two, a mutual aid that engendered phenomena of social symbiosis

of great juridical and political importance . A realization of that

permanent interrelation between two organisms, each of which

depended for its existence on absorbing a part of the vital juice of the

other, is quite fundamental for the understanding of Spanish

colonization. The will to power and the will to imperium, in the double

dimension so loved by the Renaissance, material and spiritual, reached

through Spain to its apex .

Following the first voyage of Columbus, Pope Alexander VI

divided the Indies between Spain and Portugal; the 1494 Treaty

of Tordesillas clarified this division by specifying a line of

demarcation . $

195
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

It is appropriate to examine the impact of the Reconquista

on certain cultural traits of the Spanish and Portuguese

societies . Although located on the European continent,

Spain and Portugal are situated remotely in the extreme

southwestern corner of the continent, hemmed in by the

Pyrenees to the north and the Atlantic and Mediterranean

waters on the west and south respectively, and in close

proximity to North Africa. Thus, both Spain and Portugal

developed eclectic cultures within the mainstream of

Western civilization . For the most part, they directed their

energies toward regaining lost territory, establishing viable

political entities, and preserving traditional cultural values

threatened by alien intrusions . In the process of attaining

these national goals, Spain and Portugal were compelled to

wage a prolonged war; as a consequence, they experienced

a heightened martial spirit that became embedded in their

cultures . 9

This martial spirit was likewise reflected in the actions of

the Roman Catholic church, which regarded the Reconquista

as a just war undertaken to protect Christianity from Islamic

contamination . On the religious front, support of military

actions against the Moslem invaders was fully in consonance

with Christian doctrine and beliefs . Indeed, such support was

deemed essential to ensure control of the church by the

faithful . The heretic always ran the risk of being apprehended and subjected to punishment . The inculcation of

religious fervor intensified the Iberian fighting spirit and

helped them develop a formidable warrior propensity . The

military character of the Iberian warrior, molded in the

nearly 800-year struggle on the peninsula, was epitomized

in the conquistadores and soldiers who would bring much of

the New World under Spanish and Portuguese dominion . I0
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

Conquest of the Indies

The Luso-Hispanic cultural traits were transferred to the

New World with the conquest of the Indies and fused with

those of the indigenous peoples. In Portuguese America, large

numbers of unaffiliated Indian tribes were scattered along the

coast from the Amazon River to the Rio de la Plata, but no

civilization comparable to those in Spanish America had

emerged. In Spanish America, three large Indian civilizations

confronted the conquistadores : the Aztecs, the Incas, and the

Mayas.

Within the Aztec civilization, the warrior held a position of

great honor and prestige as would be expected in a society that

thrived on warfare and conquests. The religion of the Aztecs

centered on human sacrifice, and one of the major objectives

of warfare was the capture of enemy tribesmen for sacrificial

purposes . Rewards for the successful warrior included

membership in honorific military orders and grants of tribal

lands. I

I

At the time of the arrival of the conquistadores, the Aztec

confederation consisted of approximately 30 tributary

villages extending from present-day Mexico City to the Gulf

of Mexico . Several million Nahua-speaking people paid

homage to Montezuma II, who ruled from the capital of

Tenochtitlan (present-day Mexico City) . Their military

prowess may be attributed to their service as mercenaries in

the armies of a neighboring Indian civilization, the Toltecs .

In battle, the Aztecs acquired a reputation for bravery, deceit,

and cruelty which spread rapidlyand made them feared among

neighboring tribes .

12

As the Aztecs grew in power and prestige, they no longer

functioned as a tribal society but rather as a militaristic,

aristocratic state . Class stratification occurred with a

hereditary nobility at the top and slaves (prisoners of war) at

the bottom. Indian subjects were not integrated into the Aztec

197
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

culture but remained vassals with the obligation to pay tribute

to their masters . The profession of warrior was the highest and

most honorable calling in Aztec society .'

Some distance to the south, the Incan civilization expanded

from its base at Cuzco to encompass an area of nearly 350,000

square miles . Stretching 3,000 miles from present-day

Ecuador in the north to Chile in the south, the Incan empire

embraced some 6 million inhabitants . Communication

between Cuzco and the rest of the far-flung empire was

provided by a system of runners or couriers who could cover

a thousand miles in approximately one week . Post houses

were situated at intervals along the routes . Without a written

language (Quechua was the spoken language), the Incas left

their heritage in drawings on pottery and designs on textiles

and metals, as well as knotted strings (quipus) used for

numbers and accounting purposes .

14

The success of the Incan empire may be attributed to its

superior military organization and strategy . The absence of

vindictiveness toward the conquered, in contrast to the

Aztecs, was also a positive factor in the growth and viability

of the empire . Captured Indians were taken from their

scattered locations and settled in communities where they

could be controlled and imbued with Incan culture. The

captive leaders were systematically removed and taken to

Cuzco as hostages to be indoctrinated by royal tutors . Incan

society was highly stratified, and a rigid caste system

existed . Is

When the Spaniards arrived, the Incan empire was on the

decline following its division between two ruling heirs and

the eruption of civil war. Although the Incas viewed warfare

as a natural activity, their warrior efforts were effective only

with those Indians of similar cultural achievements . The

superior weaponry of the Spaniards was overpowering.

16

The Mayan civilization, the third of the triad, was the most

culturally advanced of any Indian society of the New World

198
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

in the pre-Columbian period. Having roots going back to the

pre-Christian era, the Mayans reached their cultural apogee

during the Classic Period (A.D . 325 to 925) in the central

highlands of Guatemala and Belize, and in the southern

Yucatan Peninsula. 17

In contrast to the empires of the Aztecs and the Incas, the

Mayan empires were organized in city-states with few

political bonds among them . Operating independently, these

city-states were ruled by an elite class of nobles and priests .

The surplus of corn produced in the outlying areas provided

the necessary revenue for sustaining the nobility, intellectual

pursuits, and elaborate religious ceremonies of the city-state

inhabitants . In contrast to the Aztecs and the Incas, the Mayas

excelled in mathematics, astronomy, cosmology, and

hieroglyphic writing . 18

War and conflict were ,virtually absent from the daily lives

of the Mayas. Despite trade rivalries and other disruptive

events, the Mayas were able to avoid combat and resolve

potential conflictive issues peacefully through negotiations .

By the tenth century, however, with the ending of the Classic

Period, Mayan society faced a cultural decline that continued

until the arrival of the Spanish conquistadores in the early

sixteenth century.

19

The Mayan sites in the south were abandoned with the

collapse of the city-states, and a new civilization dominated

by the Toltecs arose in northern Yucatan. The explanation for

the demise of the Classic Mayan civilization has yet to be

verified conclusively. Unlike the earlier culture, the new

Mayan society was characterized by intermittent tribal wars

and violence occasioned by the introduction of militarism . 2°

By the time the Spaniards arrived, the warrior concept was

well established in the Indian civilizations of the Indies . The

encounter between these divergent cultures, both imbued with

a military propensity, served to reinforce the fighting spirit in

each . In the ensuing combat encounters, however, the

199
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

numerically larger Indian forces were no match for the

conquistadores, whose superior weaponry and equipment

were overwhelming . The horse, previously unknown in the

Indies, served not only as a means of transportation but as a

psychological warfare element for the conquistadores . While

the Indians' weapons consisted of spears, clubs, bows and

arrows, slings, and stones, the Spaniards were equipped with

crossbows, muskets, broadswords, and artillery-basically

steel versus stone.

Beginning as early as the voyages of Columbus, the

Spaniards adopted a confrontational attitude toward the

Indians . Having an aversion to manual labor, the new settlers

looked to the Indians for their labor supply on a compulsory

basis. Large-scale exploitation and, in a number of cases,

extermination of native laborers occurred in the process of

subjugating the indigenous population. Exposure to European

diseases, overwork in mining operations, and lack of proper

food and shelter contributed to the decimation of the Indians .

The conquest of the Indies dispossessed the Indians of their

sovereignty and the free use of their territory ; violated their

freedom of choice in the determination of their way of life ;

deflected their historical evolution by mixing their lineage

with that of an alien people (the Spaniard) and producing a

new ethnic group, the mestizo (a mixture of Spaniard and

Indian) ; and undoubtedly traumatized large numbers of the

inhabitants in the process.

22

In view of the mass extermination of the Indians in the first

25 years of colonization, Friar Bartolome de Las Casas

recommended-and the crown agreed-that African slaves

should replace the Indians as laborers . The African slave

traffic to the Spanish colonies had begun in 1510, but traffic

to Brazil began some two decades later. The Spanish and

Portuguese, who had earlier monopolized the slave trade to

the New World, were joined in the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries by the British, French, Dutch, and Danes. Following

200
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

the Wars of Independence, the heaviest concentration of

African slaves was in the Caribbean islands, Central America,

the northern coast of South America, and Brazil . 23

In contrast to the exploitative type of colonies Spain

established in the New World, the British settlements in North

America were farm colonies . The farm colonies were situated

in temperate zones where agricultural products were similar

to those produced in the home country . The settlers were

refugees fleeing from undesirable conditions in the Old

World and seeking a new start in life . They were usually

accompanied by their families and acquired freeholds to

maintain themselves economically . The Indians in North

America were less numerous and had not attained the level of

cultural development found among the Mayas, Incas, and

Aztecs . In addition, settlers continually pushed the North

American Indians back and confiscated their lands . The North

Americans believed in the work ethic and, unlike the

Spaniards, had no objection to manual labor. The Indian was

not integrated into North American society and remained

outside the mainstream of cultural development .

24

Yet, in terms of the motives for colonization, the English

and the Spaniards did not differ . The discovery of the

unknown and the desire for adventure have been compelling

forces from time immemorial . The quest for wealth, if

successful, could move individuals up the socioeconomic

scale and could enhance the power and prestige of the

governments abroad. Spreading the benefits of national

cultures or civilizations to remote regions would justify

religious proselytism and the establishment of institutional

controls practiced in the mother country. Dissatisfaction

with life in the Old World played a major role in English

migration, but not so much in the case of Spain .
Colonial Society

From the beginning of their colonizing efforts in the New

World, the Spanish crown and legal scholars were concerned

with resolving several key issues . Did the king have just title

to dominion in the Indies? Was the conquest of the Indies a

just war? Was the Indian inferior by nature or a rational being?

Should the Indian be reduced to slavery? These questions gave

rise to a number of debates among theologians and laymen

and were the subject of several convocations called by the

26

CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

crown .

In regard to the question of dominion, the crown had no

doubts about this right since it was based on the famous bulls

of Pope Alexander VI, issued soon after Columbus's first

voyage to the New World . With respect to the free-versusslave status, a crown committee of jurists and theologians

pronounced the Indian free by nature and not a candidate for

slavery . As to the matter of a just war, the chief crown jurist

concluded that while the Indian should not be deprived of

his property, generally speaking, the sanctioning of the

conquest by the church eradicated preexisting political

sovereignties and justified such deprivations .

27

In order to ensure the conduct of a just war, the chief

crown jurist prepared a curious document, known as the

Requerimiento (requirement) . All Spanish conquistadores

were directed to have it read to the Indians before hostilities

could begin and to have a notarized certificate of compliance

forwarded to the crown within a specified period . The

Requerimiento was a recitation of biblical history from

creation to the donation of Pope Alexander VI. At the

conclusion of the recitation, the Indians were given the option

of acknowledging the supremacy of the pope and the king

or engaging in battle with the Spanish forces . 28

The interrelated problems of labor supply for the settlers

and the protection of the rights of the Indians continued to

202
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

plague the crown throughout the colonial period. The Indians

were placed under the crown's special protection with

provision for severe penalties against those who might restrict

their freedom. Compulsory labor was permitted in the royal

mines or public works, and the Indian was not exempt from

the payment of tribute-a requirement for all Spanish subjects

in the Indies . The Indians reacted by fleeing into the interior

and isolating themselves from the Spaniards. In the royal

order of 1503, the crown responded to the protests of the

settlers over the loss of labor, tributes, and candidates for

conversion to Christianity by permitting free Indians to be

subjected to forced labor under conditions of moderation and

for the payment of fair wages. It was further stipulated that

the Indians would be brought together in villages where their

secular and religious needs could be accommodated . The only

Indians who were allowed to be sold in slavery were the

cannibals captured in combat.

The interpretation and execution of the royal orders of

1503 resulted in the development of the encomienda, a

controversial socioeconomic institution that survived to the

end of the colonial period . Originally employed in Spain

during the Reconquista, the encomienda conferred on the

holder patronage over prescribed Indian villages with the right

of the encomendero (patron) to receive tribute or labor from

the natives . In return, the encomendero was required to defend

his charges and see to their care, education, and religious

instruction . The encomienda was a means of rewarding the

conquistadores or crown favorites for their colonization

efforts in the Indies and was inheritable for a generation

after the death of the recipient . In practice, the encomienda

became an instrument of oppression and led to wholesale

destruction of Indian populations throughout the Indies .

30

The fundamental question of the nature and legal status of

the Indian became entwined with disputes over the legality of

the encomienda . The Laws of Burgos (1512-18) represented

203
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

the first effort by the crown to ameliorate the condition of the

Indian under the encomienda following complaints by the

religious orders to the king . In effect, the encomienda system

was sanctioned even though safeguards were included which

served to prevent unlimited exploitation .

31

The most persistent champion of native rights was Friar

Bartolome de Las Casas-awarded the title of Protector of the

Indians by the crown-who supported the liberty of the

Indians and the establishment of a free labor market. The high

point of his efforts was the royal order of 1520 calling for the

abolition of the encomienda throughout the Indies. In keeping

with its vacillating course, the crown rescinded the order soon

thereafter in the face of strong opposition on the part of the

settlers, but the crown remained uncomfortable with its

toleration of the encomienda . However, as Spanish control

was extended into South America with the conquest of Peru

in 1535, the encomienda once more came into royal favor. The

need for a labor supply and other rewards emanating from the

institution to attract settlers received a higher priority than the

removal of impediments to Indian freedom.

The continued efforts of the religious orders on behalf of

the Indian cause were rewarded in 1537 by the issuance of

a papal bull and five years later by the promulgation of the

New Laws of 1542 . In both cases, the Indian was declared to

be a free and rational being and not a subject for enslavement .

The New Laws also prohibited the further granting of

encomiendas, required existing encomenderos to live in the

same provinces with their encomiendas, and forbade the

collection of tributes above the amount owed to the crown.

One of the most controversial provisions eliminated the right

of the encomendero to bequeath legal title to the encomienda

to his heirs.

33

Efforts to enforce the New Laws came to naught. A civil

war resulting in the death of the viceroy in Peru and the threat

of rebellion in the viceroyalty of New Spain made it necessary

204
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

for the crown to compromise on the bequeathment provision

and to permit the encomienda to be passed to the wife or child.

In the event of no heirs, the encomienda reverted to the crown .

Until the end of the colonial period, two trends may be

discerned in the operation of the encomienda system : (1)

efforts continued to be made by the crown and viceroys to

prevent abuses, and (2) the number of privately held

encomiendas decreased at the expense of those reverting to

the crown .

Throughout three centuries of the Spanish-American

Empire, the crown emphasized order, stability, and

protection of the Indian; the Creole settlers engaged in conflict, self-aggrandizement, and exploitation of the Indian ;

and the Peninsulares (born in Spain), who came as

government or church officials were caught up in the

corrupt colonial environment and helped to perpetuate it by

their unwillingness or inability to change it . Christianity

represented the only cultural element that provided a

common ground on which the Spaniard, the Indian, and the

African slave could meet . The emergence of the mestizo,

the mulatto, and the zambo (a mixture of Indian and

African) served to diversify the ethnic composition still

further and to introduce a new cultural outlook, which was

unique to the Americas and decidedly different from that

of Spain . The participation of the church alongside the

crown was essential for the conquest to be successful .

Religious unity coupled with Spanish political uniformity

paved the way for the development of the nation-state

systems that emerged following independence .

Of all the social classes in Spanish American colonial

society, the Creoles were the ones who portrayed incipient

nationalism . They were quite open in identifying themselves

as Americans, not Spaniards . This nomenclature was

reinforced by the attitude of the Peninsulares who looked

upon the Creoles as second-class citizens . The higher

205
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

positions in the government and society were reserved for the

Peninsulares . Only at the municipal levels of administration

could the Creoles participate to any substantial degree . Yet,

even among themselves, the Creoles felt a difference . They

identified themselves as Peruvians, Mexicans, Colombians,

and so forth according to their national residence-not as

Spaniards. Under these circumstances, it was logical that the

Creoles would be the leaders in the revolt against their mother

country.

35

Formation of the Nation-States:

The Nineteenth Century

Independence was achieved from Spain in the early nineteenth century following a bloody conflict that lasted some 15

years. The new Hispanic states began the long, tortuous struggle

to establish order and stability in their societies . Brazil's smooth

and virtually bloodless transition to independence stood in

marked contrast to its Spanish neighbors .

Under the umbrella of empire, Brazil gained the backing

of the landed aristocracy in return for protecting their

economic interests and providing a secure and orderly

government . Pacification was achieved in scattered,

short-lived revolts ; and a civil war in the state of Rio Grande

do Sul was brought successfully to an end. The emperor, Dom

Pedro 11, succeeded in attaining victory in the war with

Argentina (1854-59) and with Paraguay (1864-70) . The

controversy over slavery resulted in its abolition in 1888 . One

year later, the emperor was overthrown and forced into exile

by revolutionary forces, and the Brazilian republic was

proclaimed. Again, as in the achievement of independence,

Brazil donned the republican mantle with practically no

bloodshed.
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

In contrast to Brazil, Hispanic America failed to consolidate

its new fledgling states and weld them into a single nation .

Following the Wars of Independence, 16 nation-states

emerged from the Spanish American colonial holdings ; the

liberation of Cuba after the Spanish American War and the

secession of Panama from the republic of Colombia in 1903

raised this total to 1'8 . When Portuguese Brazil and French

Haiti were added to this number, a total of 20 Latin American

nation-states had emerged. One of the most divisive issues to

arise in the national period was the delineation of boundaries

between the new states . The process of boundary settlements

was directly related to the growth of militarism and the

development of intensive nationalism in these republics .

37

Following independence, the colonial way of life

remained largely intact . The Creole aristocracy occupied

the positions of importance and responsibility. The Indians

and the Africans continued to perform menial tasks and to

live barely at a subsistence level . The mestizo was a little

better off both socially and economically . Even though

republican constitutions were adopted in the new states, such

features as factionalism, despotism, and the lack of experience

in governmental affairs served to make a mockery of the

republican ideal . Progress was impeded by difficulties in

establishing orderly political, economic, and social

institutions .

38

Political life was dominated by the caudillo (strong man),

who relied on violence to gain power and governed as if his

constituency were a personal fiefdom . Whether military or

civilian, the caudillo depended on personal loyalties for his

tenure of office . With respect to economic life, the change

from colonialism to independence had little effect on the

status of the lower classes . Although the encomienda ceased

to exist, it was replaced by debt-slavery and a lack of

landownership, creating a dependency on Creole haciendas

(plantations) . From the viewpoint of social life, the caste

207
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

system and the array of special privileges so prevalent in

colonial society survived and were carried over into the

national period . Slavery was not abolished in many of the

Latin American republics until after the middle of the

nineteenth century .

39

After the midnineteenth century, the accelerating industrial

revolution in the United States and Europe called for

increased supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs from Latin

America. This demand had the effect of making political

institutions in the region more stable so that production quotas

could be met. Capital investments also poured into the area

from Western sources . Because of their one-sided nature,

however, the economies of the Latin American states became

subject to fluctuations in the price of commodities . In

addition, foreign corporate control over sectors of the regional

economy increased, and the profits from these endeavors were

not widely disbursed throughout society . Instead, the local

and foreign entrepreneurs monopolized these returns . 4o

Peace and Security

As the Latin American republics continued to react to

internal political and economic challenges, the concept of

nationalism grew rapidly during the nineteenth century .

Disputes over boundaries were a manifestation of this growth.

Likewise, contests between rival political factions and

attempts to consolidate political units by force revealed the

citizens' strong attachment to their native lands .

Although the embryonic Latin American states were

involved in numerous skirmishes, those skirmishes were

generally minor in nature and seldom escalated to fullscale warfare . The exceptions were the conflicts between

Argentina and Brazil (1825-28) ; Chile and the Peru-Bolivian

Confederation (1835-39) ; Mexico and the United States

(1846-48) ; the Triple Alliance (Argentina, Brazil, and

Uruguay) and Paraguay (1864-70) ; and Chile versus Peru and

208
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

Bolivia in the War of the Pacific (1879-83) . In addition, there

were several instances of European interventions in the

region . Mexico defeated a Spanish expedition seeking to

regain its former territory in 1829; Great Britain seized

Argentina's Malvinas Islands in 1833 ; between 1838 and

1850, France and Great Britain on several occasions intervened in the Rio de la Plata estuary, threatening Montevideo,

Uruguay and Buenos Aires, Argentina ; France, Great Britain,

and Spain intervened in Mexico in 1861 (after the departure

of the British and Spanish forces, the French remained until

their expulsion in 1867) ; Spain regained control of the

Dominican Republic through diplomacy in 1861 but was

expelled in 1865 ; and, finally, Spain seized Peruvian offshore

territory in 1864 but was driven out after a few months of

occupancy .

41

Contrary to other third-world regions, which viewed war

as a normal and legitimate activity, Latin America, reflecting

its adherence to the nation-state concept in the Western

tradition, after independence sought to avoid war through

the pacific settlement of disputes . Appeals to such procedures

as conciliation, arbitration, and mediation through the good

offices of other states became a standard practice of the

Latin American republics . Pacific actions were taken before

parties to the controversy made an appeal to arms . European

countries-most often Great Britain-and the United States

were usually called upon to act in the resolution of conflictive

issues . By the end of the nineteenth century, most of the

boundary controversies had been settled-some 16 by

arbitration and approximately eight by direct negotiation.

The Pan-American Movement

A much broader, more systemized, and decidedly unique

approach to preventing war in the Americas was contained

in the Pan-American movement . Beginning at the Congress

of Panama in 1826, immediately following the conclusion of

209
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

the Wars of Independence, the Pan-American movement

continued for nearly a century and a quarter until it was

formalized as the inter-American system at the end of World

War II . Again, recalling their Western cultural heritage, the

American republics reasserted their belief that war is

abnormal and illegitimate .

43

During the nineteenth century, there were four general

conferences and a number of specialized, ad hoc convocations

conducted under the banner of Pan-Americanism and devoted

to mutual security problems . The movement was bolstered in

1889 when the United States joined all of the Latin American

republics in the first International Conference of American

States, held in Washington, D.C . Its significance rested more

with the establishment of the International Union of American

Republics and the conclusion of the first in a series of

meetings than with the accomplishment of arbitral matters .

44

Development and Modernization Practices :

The Twentieth Century

In the first half of the twentieth century, the Latin American

republics continued to strive for political stability, economic

development, and social justice with the United States and, to

a certain extent, Western Europe as the role models . Between

1900 and 1950, Latin America integrated itself more fully

with the global community and experienced both the positive

and negative effects of the special relationship with the

"colossus of the North." Pan-Americanism, World War I, the

Great World Depression, and World War II had profound

effects on the nature and direction of Latin American society

during this half-century . Modernization became the goal of

the 20 Latin American republics as they strove to cast aside

the cloak of colonialism. Evidence of modernization could be

21 0
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

seen in the economic, social, political, and military

transitions .

From an economic viewpoint, Latin American countries

increased the production of commodities for export to

Europe primarily . In turn, manufactured goods were imported

from the more industrialized nations, particularly Great

Britain . Also, European investors placed their funds in

profitable Latin American ventures . For example, British

investments in the region increased ninefold in the four

decades prior to World War I, and by the outbreak of this war,

two-thirds of Latin America's total foreign investments rested

in British hands .

45

The impact of modernization efforts on social change was

significant . As late as World War 1, the upper social stratum

of society sought to imitate European culture rather than rely

on its distinctive native heritage . With the growth of

nationalism and an appreciation of their own indigenous

culture, the elite began to view the accomplishments of their

own society in a different light. An entrepreneurial spirit

began to replace that of a provincial outlook. Although a

middle class was slow in development, the outlines of change

could be discerned. The rumblings of discontentment among

the laboring force began to be heard but received little

attention from the elite until the post-World War I era.

European immigration was encouraged to fill the labor gap

and to make contributions to the national culture. The vast

majority of the population, some 90 percent of the total,

remained on a bare subsistence level with little prospect of

change .

Political modernization resulted in large part from the

changes taking place in the economic and social sectors of

the Latin American states . Such attitudinal characteristics

as elitist privileges, family cohesiveness, and nepotism

continued to be reflected in political circles even as

observable changes were taking place in political institutions .
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

The large landowning elite, formerly content to remain

within the confines of their haciendas, began to seek

political power. Heretofore, political power was controlled

by a caudillo or chieftain who had gained a local following,

then established dominance over neighboring chieftains,

and finally obtained control of the central government by

revolution . As the twentieth century progressed, the

traditional nineteenth-century caudillo was passing from the

scene.

47

The new ruling elite in their quest for political power in the

twentieth century usually adhered to two state models . The

first was oligarchical but blended with shades of democracy,

such as in Argentina. The other model was strictly dictatorial

with the strong backing of military forces to ensure the

maintenance of law and order, such as in Venezuela . In both

cases, the route to the presidential palace was limited to a

small privileged group . Thus, the creation of dominant

nation-states with highly centralized powers and immune

from the throes of public opinion became the alternative to

caudillismo and regional fragmentation . Political stability

was deemed essential to the attraction of investments and the

promotion of trade abroad. 4g

The Mexican Revolution of 1910, the most comprehensive

reform movement in the region, sought to remove those

aspects of the colonial heritage that impeded progress and to

ameliorate social justice for the inhabitants . Although

idealistic in its objectives, the Revolution of 1910 sought to

come to terms with foreign economic interests, to alleviate the

ills of industrial and peasant workers, and to cripple the power

of the Roman Catholic church in secular matters . The

reformist constitution of 1917 provided the framework of a

representative, republican government and incorporated the

socioeconomic safeguards achieved during the revolution .

According to Professor Alfred B . Thomas, the 1917

constitution "not only laid the basis for the reconstruction of

21 2
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

Mexico's national life ; it also opened the way for a flowering

of Mexican culture.

,49

Before World War 1, large numbers of European immigrants settled in Latin America . Some 3 million Spaniards

became permanent settlers, principally in Argentina, Cuba,

and Mexico. Approximately 700,000 Germans migrated,

primarily to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile . Substantial

numbers of Italians moved their households to Argentina and

Uruguay, and smaller colonies settled in Brazil . The European

immigrants provided the nucleus of an emerging middleclass sector and applied their much-needed skills to

enterprises in the embryonic stage of development.

s o

World War I and Pan-Americanism

The outbreak of World War I in Europe in 1914 presented

a crucial challenge to the Pan-American movement. Although

four general conferences had been held up to this time, none

had been concerned with contingency plans in the event of

foreign war. Despite the absence of such plans, eight of the

Latin American republics joined the United States in a

declaration of war, and five broke diplomatic relations with

Germany . Even though the United States did not join the

postwar League of Nations, all of the Latin American states

eventually became members and at various league meetings

did not hesitate to champion the Pan-American movement and

the concept of inter-American cooperation. Sl

As a result of World War 1, Latin America began to move

from its earlier position on the margin of international life to

a more active interface with foreign governments . Not only

did the Latin American republics become more interdependent, but they also became more self-reliant in view of

the severance of contacts with Europe during the war. In

addition, they gained a pronounced sense of national

responsibility and public conscience since the severance of

European economic ties made it necessary to rely on their own

21 3
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

resources and ingenuity . At the same time, the Latin American

republics sharply increased their economic relations with the

United States . During the period from 1913 to 1919, US

commerce with Latin America jumped from some $750

million to almost $3 billion as the region eagerly sought

investment capital and manufactured goods from the United

States. In essence, World War I was the watershed for US

displacement of Great Britain as the major trading partner in

the region.

52

The subsequent Great Depression accelerated the growth

of economic nationalism as the Latin American states

attempted to remove the yoke of economic colonialism . The

positive effect of the depression was to bring about the genesis

of industrialization in Latin America through import

substitution-a process that would receive even greater

impetus during and after World War II. Since many countries

in the region had monocultural economies, the drastic drop

in prices for the one or two staple commodities during the

depression meant poverty and destitution and deprived

these countries of funds to purchase finished goods abroad .

Consequently, industrialization was fostered and imports

restricted in order to build up foreign exchanges. The thrust

of industrialization set into motion developmental

undertakings that impacted on the political, economic, social,

and cultural aspects of the Latin American societies. In short,

it simultaneously bolstered modernization efforts and

enhanced self-sufficiency in the region .

53

Pan-Americanism reached its nadir during the 1920s due

largely to US domination of the general conferences and US

refusal to include political issues on the agendas . An upward

turn occurred in the closing years of the Hoover

administration . With the inauguration of Franklin D.

Roosevelt in 1933 and his proclamation of the Good Neighbor

Policy, the Pan-American movement headed toward its

apogee . The formal renunciation of the right of intervention

214
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

in the Latin American republics and the institution of

favorable trade agreements with several of the countries in the

region served to underscore fundamental political and

economic changes in US policy toward the southern

republics.

54

World War II and the Inter-American Security System

The first half of the twentieth century also witnessed the

acceleration of efforts, begun in the latter part of the

nineteenth century, to professionalize and modernize the

armed forces of Latin America. German, British, French, and

Italian military missions were dispatched to Latin America to

assist the fledgling services . The expansion and improvement

of the regional forces, however, did not result in an epidemic

of interstate conflicts . Except for border skirmishes between

Peru and Ecuador in 1941, the only outbreak prior to World

War II was the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay

(1932-35), which was settled peacefully through mediation

by outside nations .

With the outbreak of World War II in Europe in the fall of

1939, the United States began the process of replacing the

German and Italian missions with its own. The Latin

American governments were amenable to these replacements .

The shortage of US Army and Navy officers with the

prerequisite mission training initially presented a problem;

after 1938, however, US missions in the region were expanded

from two to seven and by December 1941 had reached 12 with

some 32 officers on board. More success was achieved in

providing military attaches, with their number increasing

threefold between June 1940 and Pearl Harbor day.

56

The true test of Pan-Americanism and the Good Neighbor

Policy arrived with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7

December 1941 and the United States' entrance into World

War II . Hemispheric solidarity had progressed to the extent

that, in contrast to the eight Latin American republics that

21 5
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

declared war on Germany in the First World War, all of them

eventually did so in World War II . The contributions of the

Latin American countries to the defeat of the Axis powers

were forthcoming and multifarious in nature . These consisted

of actual military operations (Brazil and Mexico), the

provision of strategic metals and raw materials, the use of

military bases by authority of the host governments, and

cooperation in defense against espionage and subversion

engendered by pro-Axis elements . Thus, by the end of World

War II, continental unity had been achieved and the American

republics looked to the perfection of the inter-American

system to meet the challenges of the postwar era .

57

With the coming of the cold war, the American states gave

priority to hemispheric security through the promulgation of

the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio

Treaty) in the fall of 1947 . Based on the "one for all, and all

for one" principle, the Rio Treaty has the dual distinction of

being the first regional security pact included under Article

51 of the United Nations charter as well as the prototype for

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and similar

collective security agreements . The Rio Treaty was

considered the capstone of the inter-American military system

that took shape during World War 11 .58

Earlier, in January 1942, an Inter-American Defense Board

(IADB) had been created with advisory powers but not

enforcement powers to serve as a coordinating agency for the

United States and Latin American military arms . Chaired by

a US general officer, the board consisted of representatives

from the armed forces of the Americas, usually the defense

attaches assigned to their embassies in Washington . In

addition, Joint Mexico-United States Defense Commission

(JMUSDC) and Joint Brazil-United States Military

Commission (JBUSMC) were established to further military

cooperation bilaterally. Both Brazil and Mexico engaged in

21 6
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

Allied military operations abroad while most of the other

Latin American republics were supportive in noncombative

endeavors .

At the meeting of the American republics at Bogota,

Colombia, in the spring of 1948, two treaties were signed that

were to have an important bearing on the future of the

Pan-American movement . The first was the charter of the

Organization of American States (OAS) which formalized the

inter-American system and ensured its permanency. The

Council of the OAS and its secretariat, the Pan-American

Union, were located in Washington, D.C . The second treaty

sought to bring together those treaties, conventions, and

declarations related to the peaceful settlement of disputes

previously executed and to place them in a single instrument .

Known as the Treaty on Pacific Settlement, it might have been

implemented if the drafters had not departed from their

original purpose; however, the addition of controversial

measures such as obligatory peaceful settlements in disputes

among the states, doomed its ratification . But all was not lost

in this regard. A few months following the meeting in Bogota,

the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC), originally set

up in 1940, was incorporated in the OAS. The Council of the

OAS chooses its membership, consisting of representatives of

five member governments ; and the IAPC is charged with

"keeping constant vigilance to insure that states between

which any dispute exists or may arise . . . may solve it as

quickly as possible . . . and [with] suggesting the measures

and steps that may be conducive to a settlement ." 60

At the Bogota Conference of 1948, the delegates also

considered the replacement of the IADB with a permanent

military organ under the direction and control of the OAS . The

result was the establishment of a watered-down version,

known as the Advisory Defense Committee, that could

function only when called upon to do so by the Rio Treaty

apparatus . Significantly, this committee has not been

217
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

convened or asked to furnish military advice since its

establishment.

61

The Cold War and the Communist

Challenge to Hegemony

For some four decades after World War 11, the cold war

provided the setting for an upgrading of the Latin American

armed forces. Beginning in the early 1950s, the United States,

through military assistance agreements, became the

predominant supplier of professional/technical training and

arms for the regional military forces . In view of the large

stockpiles of military arms and equipment remaining from

World War II and the Korean conflict, the United States was

able to supply the Latin American republics with significant

quantities of military hardware required in the modernization

process .

62

Yet, the expansion, modernization, and professionalization

of the Latin American armed forces did not result in an

epidemic of interstate wars . On the contrary, Latin America

continued, even up to the present time, to resolve interstate

disputes by pacific settlements rather than resorting to war.

Latin America has the lowest per capita expenditure on arms

of any region of the world. Except for the Chaco War

(1932-35), minor skirmishes stemming from boundary

controversies have characterized the region's military

involvement in the twentieth century. These include the

conflicts between Peru and Ecuador (1941, 1981), Nicaragua

and Costa Rica (1955), and El Salvador and Honduras (1969) .

The only arms clash with extraregional opponents in the

twentieth century occurred between the United States and

Mexico (1914, 1916) and between Argentina and Great

Britain (1982) in the Falkland/Malvinas War.

21 8
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

As the cold war progressed into the 1960s and early 1970s,

US hegemony in Latin America was increasingly challenged

and the inter-American system was subjected to additional

stress. The Latin American military let it be known that the

outdated arms of World War 11 and the Korean conflict were

obsolete and difficult to maintain and adversely affected their

modernization process . The success of Fidel Castro in

establishing a communist regime less than 100 miles from US

shores and the subsequent shipments of sophisticated military

weapons to Cuba by the USSR gave substantial credibility to

the regional arms concern . The ill-fated Bay of Pigs operation

and the Cuban missile crisis further underscored these

concerns.

64

The United States had used the criteria of cost, balance, and

limitation in the supply of armaments to the region . By the

late 1960s and the early 1970s, the demand for more modern

conventional weapons, particularly sophisticated aircraft and

weapon systems, by such nations as Chile and Peru was

followed shortly by similar requests from the republics of

Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. Nationalistic

pride and traditional rivalries appeared to play a great role in

the desire to acquire modern arms by the Latin American

governments .

65

A complicating factor from the viewpoint of the United

States was the availability of alternate weapons suppliers .

For example, when the United States refused the requests of

Chile and Peru for supersonic aircraft, the former turned to

Great Britain and the latter to France for delivery . Of greater

concern to US security interests was the purchase of Soviet

fighter-bombers in the mid-1970s by Peru-the first

American republic, except for Cuba, to acquire armaments

from a communist state .

66

The availability of alternate weapons suppliers, combined

with President Jimmy Carter's linkage of human rights

performance to arms sales in Latin America, brought an end

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

to US domination of the regional arms market. During the

five-year period between 1975 and 1979, total US arms sales

to Latin America amounted to $725 million, compared to $1 .5

billion by the Soviet Union and a combined total of $3 billion

by Western Europe and Israel . Soon after taking office,

President Ronald Reagan reversed Carter's arms policy and

focused attention on security assistance and arms sales to

Latin America. In the next five-year period between 1980 and

1984, US arms sales to the region increased to $1 .3 billion

while Soviet sales catapulted to $5 .7 billion. Western Europe

and Israel provided approximately $7 billion in arms to Latin

America during the same period . The previous domination of

the arms market by the United States continued to recede .

Low-Intensity Conflict

The 1960s ushered in a concept of warfare that would

continue to rage throughout Latin America, even up to the

present time-low-intensity conflict (LIC) . Even more than

the loss of regional arms markets, LIC was to present a

challenge to US hegemony in Latin America. Spearheaded by

Fidel Castro's expert on guerrilla warfare, Ernesto ("Che")

Guevara, and backed by huge Soviet subsidies, Cuban-trained

and -equipped insurgents were dispatched to the Latin

American republics for the purpose of overthrowing existing

governments and replacing them with communist regimes

controlled from Havana . The multilaterally sponsored

Alliance for Progress, initiated in 1961, sought to counter the

guerrilla movement by a two-pronged attack . First, a heavily

financed program to stimulate economic growth and institute

social reform in the Latin American republics would be

undertaken during the decade of the 1960s . Second, increased

emphasis on internal security would be implemented by

bolstering counterinsurgency capabilities in the region .

220
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

Conventional military forces would have to be augmented

with counterinsurgents employing new strategies, tactics,

and force composition, somewhat akin to the successful

British campaign against the guerrillas in Malaya.

68

The proliferation of low-intensity conflict in the 1970s

and 1980s has caused serious problems throughout Latin

America. While the goals of the Alliance for Progress were

not accomplished insofar as economic growth and social

reform were concerned, the Alliance did provide a platform

for the launching of concerted counterinsurgency efforts in

the region. In 1989, more than two dozen recognized guerrilla

organizations composed of some 25,000 regulars were

operating in nine Latin American republics . Only one country,

Nicaragua, capitulated to Marxist-Leninist guerrillas, and

that country's Sandinista regime recently has been replaced

by a popularly elected government. El Salvador is presently

engaged in a life-or-death struggle with the Farabundo Marti

National Liberation (FMLN) insurgents, and Peru has been

brought to the brink of collapse by the Sendero Luminoso

(Shining Path) and Tupac Amaru guerrillas .

69

LIC operations in Latin America continue to receive

support from external sources, primarily the Cuban-Soviet

bloc, in return for ideological compliance . Internal factorssuch as inflation, unemployment, substandard living

conditions, and heavy debts-exacerbate unrest and ill

feelings toward the national authorities . Economic and

social conditions in the region have worsened during the

1980s, and constantly rising expectations among the

populace remain unfulfilled . A more recent phenomenon,

drug trafficking, has become a major factor of internal

dissension, terrorism, and disintegration of national

authority as guerrillas and drug dealers form linkages .

Furthermore, the three major underpinnings of Latin

American society in the colonial period-the landowners, the

military, and the church-are now in a state of flux . The threat

22 1
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

of confiscation, nationalization, and land redistribution as

well as the growth of the business, finance, and investment

sectors have served to reduce the power and influence of the

large landowner . The military has been compelled to

reexamine and modify its role as almost all of the Latin

American republics make the transition to democracy . The

authority of the church has been weakened by the emergence

of liberation theology-a movement away from its close

alliance with the elite to a position of preferential concern for

the dispossessed-and the upsurge of secularism in Latin

American society .

71

Conclusions

Except for certain aspects of the early colonial era, the

Bozeman thesis is not applicable to the Latin American

region . An analysis of the region reveals that the nationstate continues to grow stronger and more institutionalized

as the years pass . Growth and expansion rather than erosion

and contraction would more accurately describe the

modern Latin American nation-state system . Conflict in the

region, as in other Western societies, may be attributed to

politico-economic crises resulting from such causes as

unstable governments, underdeveloped economies, and

unfulfilled social aspirations instead of a clash of ideas among

divergent cultures .

Latin America, in contrast to other third-world regions,

reflects the Western heritage. It is not faced with having to

resolve a "complex of irreconcilable norms." Prior to the

conquest of the Indies, the inhabitants viewed war as a natural

and legitimate activity . The colonization process incorporated

the Indians into an alien society, repressed their warrior

propensities, and reduced them to a subservient way of life .

Transculturation brought about by the conquest served to

222
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

divert the Indian civilizations from their natural course by

such practices as intermarriages with the conquerors, forced

work requirements, and replacement of native religions with

Christianity . On the other hand, the Spanish crown and church

leaders carried out a relentless search for ways to ensure the

proper treatment and care of the Indians, although the needs

of the colonists for labor overrode many of the palliatives .

Rationalization for the importation and employment of

African slave labor was based on the need to spare the Indians

from further abuse .

The behavior of the Latin American republics toward the

settlement of disputes and their avoidance of conflict further

illustrate their Western-style belief that war is an aberration

and peace a major goal to maintain . The birth of the

Pan-American movement in the early independence era gave

validity to this concept. The formalization of the movement

in the post-World War II period with the establishment of the

OAS and the inter-American security system further

underscored adherence to this concept. In the contemporary

era, the efforts of the OAS and the UN to reach a peace

settlement in the Central American conflicts serve as a

continuum of this process .

Although the military has played a prominent role in Latin

American affairs since independence, wars have been

infrequent, and the armed forces have become increasingly

professional . Whereas in the earlier period entry into the

officer corps was limited to the elite, in more recent times

membership has been open to the best-qualified candidates

regardless of social status. Furthermore, the rapport between

the military and the populace has increased over the years

despite accusations of human rights violations . The implementation of civic action programs and the involvement in

community projects on the part of the armed forces in several

Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Guatemala,

account in large measure for this attitudinal change .

223
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

For the past three decades, Cuban-Soviet initiatives have

resulted in a proliferation of LIC throughout Latin America .

Economic deficiencies, developmental problems, social

unrest, and political rigidity, among other facfors, have made

large numbers of the inhabitants restive and amenable to

insurgent propaganda. Revolutionary ideology from abroad

has acted as a catalyst in the organization of guerrilla forces

to undermine and overthrow national authorities in the region .

Countermeasures running the gamut from diplomatic and

economic sanctions to the use of military force have been

employed as responses to LIC . Yet, insurgency continues in

several of the Latin American republics, not as a result of

clashes of culture but rather as a derivative of external

ideological pressures . In sum, the premise that cultures in

Latin America make war for the promotion of values that are

purely cultural in nature cannot be substantiated .

Notes

l . Adda B . Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas," Orbis, Spring 1976,

61-102.

2. Ibid., 61-79, 101-2.

3 . Ibid.

4. Ibid., 102.

5 . Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America (New York: Alfred A .

Knopf, 1968), 69-72.

6. Ibid.

7. Fernando de los Rfos, "The Action of Spain in America," in

Concerning Latin American Culture, ed. Charles C. Griffin (New York :

Columbia University Press, 1940), 53 .

8. German Arciniegas, Latin America: A Cultural History (New York :

Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 94-95 .

9. Fernando de los Rfos, "Spain in the Epoch of American

Colonization," in Concerning Latin American Culture, 25-27 . Donald E.

Worchester, "The Spanish American Past-Enemy of Change," Journal of

Inter-American Studies, 67-68 .

10. C. H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1947), 8-9, 179; J . C . M. Ogelsby, "Soldiers and Power:

224
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

The Hispanic Warrior Tradition," International Journal, Winter 1981-82,

150 .

11 . Herring, 45-51 .

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 51-63 .

15 . Julian H. Steward, ed., Handbook of South American Indians (New

York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1963), 8-24.

16. Ibid. ; Herring, 51-63 .

17 . Herring, 33-36.

18 . Ibid., 36-37 .

19 . Ibid.

20. Ibid., 37-39 .

21 . Steward, 8-24; Bernal Diaz del Castillo, The True History of the

Conquest ofNew Spain (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1908), 1, 237-40.

22 . Charles C . Griffin, "The Significance of Native Indian Culture in

Hispanic America," in Concerning Latin American Culture, 104-13 ;

Thomas Gage, The English-American : A New Survey of the West Indies

(London: A. P. Newton, 1946), 230-33 ; Antonio Vasquez de Espinosa,

Compendium and Description of the West Indies (Washington, D .C. : The

Smithsonian Institution, 1942), 623-25.

23 . Griffin, 104-13 ; Gage, 230-33 ; de Espinosa, 623-25.

24. Haring, 30-36 .

25 . Herring, 96, 104-6.

26. Haring, 36-41 .

27 . De los Rios, "The Action of Spain," 55-59; Salvador de Madariaga,

The Rise of the Spanish American Empire (New York : The Macmillan Co .,

1947),12-14 ; Haring, 8-10.

28 . De los Rios, "The Action of Spain," 55-59; de Madariaga, 12-14;

Haring, 8-10.

29 . De los Rios, "The Action of Spain," 55-59; de Madariaga, 12-14;

Haring, 8-10; Leslie Bethell, ed., Colonial Latin America (Cambridge :

Cambridge University Press, 1984), 287-339 .

30. Haring, 42-44 .

31. Ibid., 44-47; de Madariaga, 16-17 ; de los Rios, "The Action of

Spain," 66-68 .

32, Haring, 44-47 ; de Madariaga, 16-17 ; de los Rios, "The Action of

Spain," 66-68 .

33. Haring, 47-50; de Madariaga, 12-14.

34. Haring, 51-57 .

35. Ibid., 57-67, 71-73.

36. Ibid., 210-12.

225
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

37 . Alfred Barnaby Thomas, Latin America: A History (New York:

Macmillan, 1956), 341-54 .

38 . J . Fred Rippy, Latin America: A Modern History (Ann Arbor, Mich. :

The University of Michigan Press, 1958), 176-78 .

39. Ibid., 181-84 ; Bynum E. Weathers, Strategic Appraisal of Latin

America (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air War College, December 1984), 5-6;

Charles Gibson, "Colonial Institutions and Contemporary Latin America:

Social and Cultural Life," Hispanic American Historical Review, August

1963,381-89.

40. Weathers, 5-6 ; William W. Pierson and Federico G. Gil,

Governments of Latin America (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.,

1957), 135-59 ; Woodrow Borah, "Colonial Institutions and Contemporary

Latin America: Political and Economic Life," Hispanic American Historical

Review, August 1963, 371-79.

41 . Rippy, 331-35 ; Pierson and Gil, 452-56 .

42. Rippy, 378-79 .

43. J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American

Relations (Boston : Houghton Mifflin Co ., 1965), 86-87 .

44. Ibid., 89-96.

45. Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 44-45.

46. Ibid., 42, 46.

47. Ibid., 47; Gibson, 382-83 ; Pierson and Gil, 139-40.

48. Skidmore and Smith, 47-48.

49. Thomas, 664-71 .

50. Pierson and Gil, 456-60.

51 . Mecham, 101-3 ; Pierson and Gil, 460-62.

52. Federico G. Gil, Latin American-United States Relations (New

York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc ., 1971), 49-52; Dana Gardner Munro,

The Latin American Republics: A History (New York : AppletonCentury-Crofts, Inc ., 1960), 498-99.

53 . Federico G. Gil, "United States-Latin American Relations in the

Changing Mid-70s," SECOLAS Annals, March 1976, 8 ; Munro, 501-2;

Rippy, 390-96 .

54. Gil, Latin American-United States Relations, 151-56, 166-68;

Mecham, 114-15, 122-23 ; Rippy, 526 .

55. Pierson and Gil, 454 ; Gil, Latin American-United States Relations,

41-42.

56. William L. Langer and S . Everett Gleason, The Challenge to

Isolation : The World Crisis of 1937-1940 (New York: Harper & Brothers

Publishers, 1952), 273 ; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework

226
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA

of Hemisphere Defense (Washington, D.C . : Government Printing Office,

1960), 184-85.

57 . Pierson and Gil, 462-64; Gil, Latin American-United States

Relations, 180-84; Mecham, 145-55 .

58 . Mecham, 165-67 .

59. Dennis F. Caffrey, "The Inter-American Military System: Rhetoric

vs . Reality," in Security in the Americas, ed. Georges Fauriol (Washington,

D.C . : National Defense University Press, 1989), 42; Mecham, 148-49.

60. Mecham, 167-70, 178-79.

61 . Caffrey, 43 .

62. Weathers, 11 ; Skidmore and Smith, 350.

63 . US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military

Expenditures andArms Transfers (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing

Office, August 1985), 4 ; Jorge I . Dominguez, "The United States and Its

Regional Security Interests : The Caribbean, Central, and South America,"

Daedalus, Fall 1980, 125; Gil, Latin American-United States Relations,

207-8.

64. Skidmore and Smith, 356-59 ; Mecham, 226-36.

65 . Weathers, 11-12.

66. Ibid., 12-13.

67 . US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 44; Weathers, 12-13 .

68 . Skidmore and Smith, 356-59 ; Gil, "United States-Latin American

Relations in the Changing Mid-70s," 5-7 .

69. Caffrey, 49; Bynum E. Weathers, "Factors Affecting the Emergence

of Low-Intensity Conflict in Latin America," in Low-Intensity Conflict in

the Third World, Lewis B . Ware et al . (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University

Press, August 1988), 81-82, 84-87, 93-98 .

70. Caffrey, 49-52.

71 . Ibid., 49-50.

Culture and Conflict in Africa's History

The Transition to the Modern Era

Dr Karl P. Magyar

There is no dearth of literature regarding violent conflicts

in Africa today . Whether insurgencies, rebellions, lawlessness, secessionism, military mutinies, coups d'etat, or transnational wars, Africa ranks as the most unstable continent.

Historians relate in substantial volumes accounts of Africa's

traditional indigenous wars, and the colonial period and the

rush to independence produced many devastating and

protracted anticolonial battles .

A compendium of international crises notes that 41 percent

of crises during the period 1963 to 1979 occurred in Africa.

The great powers were more likely to intervene in crises in

Africa than on any other continent) In the 30-year period

following 1948, nine African countries ranked among the top

20 in the category of "deaths from political violence." That

list is headed by Nigeria with nearly 2 million casualties .

However, conflict may also have a nonpolitical dimension,

and if we include the data of standard violence stemming

from lawlessness, we have a portrait of a continent

perennially ablaze and verging on the point of perpetual

anarchy.

Available analytic sources are only now unraveling the

quantitative dimensions of such volatile social relations . The

statistical stress is on numerical evidence, and the gravity of

the problem has not been assessed in sociohumanitarian

terms . In essence, wide media coverage is given to the

consequences of violence expressed in terms of hunger,

disease, and refugees . But analyses of the direct, as well as

the broader, underlying causes of these conditions are sadly

229
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

in short supply and certainly not in sufficient agreement to

offer a basis for a massive response . The dark continent may

have become independent and the subject of many academic

and institutional studies, but interpretations of events are no

less controversial today than they were before these analytic

efforts got under way .

Many questions concerning Africa's conflicts need to be

answered. Were such conflicts endemic features throughout

Africa's history? Did the conflicts begin at the time of initial

contact with Muslim and European societies? Are Africans

more prone towards violent conflicts than other international

societies? Can we elicit from the psychology of individual

Africans a unique attitude towards conflict? Are Africans'

wars against each other more vicious than they were against

their colonial masters? Finally, what are the consequences of

this conflict syndrome, and what are the interests of external

powers in this milieu? Certain conflicts such as those in

Rwanda and Burundi, although resulting in hundreds of

thousands of casualties, have hardly involved external

intervention . But other conflicts such as those in Chad,

Ethiopia, and Angola have introduced substantial levels of

foreign participation-direct and indirect.

Clearly, to understand conflicts in Africa, we need to go

beyond statistical data and a few speculative attempts to

explain them. If the future of Africa's perennial instability is

to be addressed, explanations of such violence would be most

helpful . As we are dealing with a problem well known

throughout the history of all cultures, we should not expect

to attain a definitive statement . What we can expect,

however, is a greater understanding of the environmental

context of such violence and, perhaps, a synthesis of

prevailing analytic theories that may advance our

understanding another notch . With these we may hope to

better inform our own policy-making apparatus regarding

potential intervention .

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

Africa's Conflict Environment

The Analytical Context

Whether traditional, indigenous, tribal conflicts or

modern-equipped, externally allied, full-scale, transnational

wars, Africa's conflicts can be analyzed within a universal

theoretical framework. The categories presented here are not

absolute or exclusive; rather, a certain mix should elicit the

unique character of each African conflict and its relation to the

conflicts of other societies .

The categories chosen reflect broad typologies of

explanations offered by the analytic literature, although few

would discount the conclusion of a composite perspective .

Of course, analyzing one individual may be more easily

accomplished than analyzing entire societies, but no

psychoanalytic explanation will be attempted. Three categories

of explanations may be identified in the attempt to explain

Africa's conflict history .

1 . Global Structuralists . Global structuralists maintain that

violence today-and much of it during the thousand years of

contact with first Arabic then European civilizations-is the

result of the coercion exercised by these external invaders .

Arabs sought to develop the trade routes along the east coast

of Africa and across the Sahara Desert . Europeans then

penetrated inland from the coasts of west and central Africa.

Finally, Dutch colonists expropriated the lands in southern

Africa and moved inland from the Cape of Good Hope .

Today, all of Africa has attained independence, but the first

three decades of this new era have been shaped by continued

external interests-be they private traders, European former

colonial governments, or the great powers and their

surrogates . Africa is the unwitting victim of international

financial, ideological, and strategic interests, all of them

manipulating African people against each other regardless of

the ensuing wars and social disruptions . Africa presents

23 1
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

primarily geographic and material value for which external

interests compete in total disregard of the human dimension .

Arms, training, and leadership are offered by external

powers, but it is the Africans who do the dying-and who

bear the reputation of being aggressive. 2

2 . Evolutionists . The evolutionist perspective offers

explanations that do not single out Africans as being

particularly or inherently violence prone . All societies that

undergo a rapid transition from traditional to modern forms

experience the disintegration of their established social

institutions, which offer communal security when undisturbed. Africa's transition suffers from a greatly compressed

time frame which exacerbates the impact of such disruptive

forces . Early contacts with external civilizations merely

engendered this process . Unlike European or American

societies, which allowed for a slow and progressive evolution

of balanced social structures, Africans are expected to leap

over centuries in only a few decades and under very

constrained socioeconomic conditions .

Africans became independent not as the result of gradual

sociopolitical development, as did the American colonies,

but due to Europe's debilitating involvement in World War

Il . Africans are presently in only the initial stages of their

consolidative phase-the most volatile and often the most

protracted period in the evolution of all nations as they

advance towards the rank of major powers . In the absence of

established internal legitimacy, opposing factions and

diffused concentrations of power are fertile ground for

external intervention, which retards the nationwide

emergence of indigenously balanced and legitimate

structures . The United States fought its own Civil War nearly

one hundred years after attaining independence ; only

thereafter did politically induced internal violence cease . In

Africa, there is an equally troublesome challenge as the

countries were created arbitrarily by colonial interests, and

23 2
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

national borders do not coincide with indigenous national

or geographic divisions . Violence will no doubt abate as

Africans evolve towards political legitimacy and socioeconomic viability . 3

3 . Historicoculturalists . Advocates of historical and

cultural determinism argue that violence in modern Africa is

the display of continuous historically based cultural attitudes

towards conflict . Such attitudes are ingrained in the

psychosocial makeup of a people and, as such, are not easily

transcended. Africa's pervasive inclination towards war and

violence was well established before contact was made with

outsiders . Outsiders only offered greater opportunities for

alliance and for more technologically advanced weapons . But

the proclivity to inflict damage remains the same .

Historicoculturalists identify Africans as being particularly

violent . They discount the negative influence of external

powers and the analysis by the evolutionists . Hence their

assessment of the future of the African continent remains

bleak.

These are not mutually exclusive categories, as certain

dimensions of all three can be incorporated into a

synthesized version . The utility of these categories

emerges in their differing emphases, which facilitate

philosophical and methodological attempts at explanation .

The global structuralist perspective is especially of interest

to neo-Marxist analyses and to developmental theories

emphasizing the center-periphery paradigm . On the other

hand, those who argue along the orthodox bipolar system

theories of international relations would also accept the

"victimization of the third world" argument, as the third

world serves the requirements of the global strategic balance .

By contrast, historicoculturalists represent an analytic

position which may be excessively dogmatic in its assertion

that the fundamental nature of humans does not change

and that evolution is only of technological means, not of

23 3
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

psychological foundations . Historicoculturalists make a

valuable contribution with their anthropologically derived

analyses of Africa's societies, which may be difficult to

challenge . But they are vulnerable in their transference of

such historical characterizations to the modern era, which

depicts most instances of violence as irrationally based and

nonproductive, as judged by our own present-day Western

standards . Yet we may demonstrate that Africa's contemporary conflicts are indeed rational and goal oriented, and

that these goals do not differ from those of other societies at

this particular stage of development . Certainly there are

elements of traditionalism manifest throughout Africa today,

but these hardly characterize official state policy in all but

the exceptional cases of a Bokassa or Amin . We can also

argue that conflict and violence today is hardly unique to

Africans . The great powers also have exercised such official

violence periodically since 1945, and in light of their

voluntary extrications from Vietnam and Afghanistan

without victories, more than a touch of the irrational and a

tinge of atavistic urges may have been in evidence.

Conflict and War: The Adda Bozeman Thesis

To the issue of conflict in Africa, Professor Bozeman has

offered an entire volume : Conflict in Africa : Concepts and

Realities . She treats the same topic in the article "War and

the Clash of Ideas ." 5 In the article, she addresses more than

the African context-she seeks to illuminate the broad role

of conflict in international relations . Bozeman cautions

against the misguided assumption that war elicits universally

negative attitudes. Few modern theorists "have bothered to

explore the value content of conflict, war, and violence ." The

prevailing Western bias in the study of war misleads, as

elsewhere one does not "encounter the overriding desire to

avoid armed conflict and to seek peaceful settlement of

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

disputes that leading peace-minded scholars in our society

assume to be present." 6

Professor Bozeman's analysis of Africa's conflict

environment touches on numerous aspects of Africa's

contemporary attempts at state building. She questions if we

are justified in thinking "that the territorially delimited,

independent nation-state is still universally accepted as

the core norm of political organization ." For Africans

especially, this is a relevant point of inquiry due to the

almost totally haphazard construction of such states, if

viewed from their own perspective . Indeed, many cultural

traits cut across most of Africa's borders as they are

established today . Most current conflicts in Africa are

between neighboring social groups within the modern

national borders, and very few wars are fought transnationally . Wars such as those fought in Ethiopia, Angola,

and Sudan are between opposing sides within countries

whose cultural differences are as diverse as those of Europe's

nations . In this environment, we may justifiably expect that

before the continent stabilizes, the concept of nationalism

will undergo severe transformation-in accordance with

Bozeman's analysis .

Professor Bozeman's characterization of Africa's warfare

ranks that continent alongside other societies whose

historical militarism is well established . War was endemic

throughout sub-Saharan Africa, and "it did not elicit moral

qualms ." In fact, war was "necessary in terms of certain

deeply held beliefs ." Participation in war ensured group

identity with traditional myths, customs, rites, and one's

ancestors . Fighting affirmed man's essence at the cosmic

level, which was rent by malevolent forces . Bozeman refers

to Africa's prevalent tendency towards group identification ;

hence, she maintains, "death was not personalized," nor was

it "objectified ." One died not at the behest of a weapon but

due to "superior, surreal causes ." Even life was enabled by

23 5
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

magical powers, ancestral spirits, or witchcraft . Society as an

institution was perpetuated by continuous struggle for rule

among its own internal aspirants, thus ensuring that

perpetual conflict prevailed . Violent conflict was tolerated,

if not encouraged, for the acquisition of cattle, slaves,

women, grazing and watering rights, and vengeance .

Bozeman stresses that material gain as the object of war may

have been valued, but the fight had innate value .

Such militaristic behavior was exhibited within a unique

metaphysical context according to Professor Bozeman .

This includes different time concepts and spatial characteristics, the unity of temporal periods, and strategic

thought unencumbered by the usual needs to service the

requirements of the nation-state . Bozeman observes that

what is to us a vital concern-the distinction between

victor and vanquished-is within the traditional African

conception greatly obscured . War was a continuous

business ; as such, victor and vanquished would be part of

a greater alternating rhythm of the universe .

"War and the Clash of Ideas," as summarized above, offers

the essence of Professor Bozeman's contention that African

societies-as do other international societies-demonstrate

ideas about and attitudes towards violent conflict that are

different from ours and that these attitudes are shaped by

nonoccidental cultures well grounded in their own

histories . Her book, Conflict in Africa, is a lengthy

investigation and elaboration of the same theme and offers

more detailed empirical and theoretical bases . The book

must be appreciated within the context in which it was

formulated and written-at a time when African states

were attaining their independence under some very

volatile conditions . (Of course, we may contend that

Africa was attaining its independence once again . This

more precise wording buttresses the claim regarding

Africa's historical continuity, in contrast to those views

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

which hold that Africa had no respectable history prior to its

coming under the influence of the Europeans .)

Professor Bozeman offers her contentious observation that

after independence had been gained, "the goal of transcending tribalism was indeed the most intractable of the

many problems faced by all African governments" and that

occidental types of democratic rule and public law would be

"fundamentally incompatible with long-established native

patterns of transacting politics ." 7 The fact that the new

political institutions introduced by the departing colonial

powers soon faltered is not disputed here; the reasons offered

for this demise are . We may question once again whether

imported institutions tend to have a short life span in most,

if not all societies, or whether this characteristic is unique to

Africa. Regardless of the answer, Bozeman notes the inherent

incompatibility of certain modern occidental practices with

Africa's own traditions .

Despite the availability of Western-style political

institutions such as parliaments, political parties, and

elections, political succession and relations between rival

leaders in modern Africa is not a peaceful matter according

to Professor Bozeman, but is marked by "plot and counterplot, assassination or regicide, abduction, expulsion, or

arrest, and . . . changes of regime have usually been brought

about by coups d'etat ." This characteristic feature, which

Professor Bozeman points out, remains uncontestably true to

this day . Only a half dozen of over 50 countries in Africa have

not experienced a successful or attempted coup as of 1990. 8

The military plays an active role in running governments and

engaging in wars or counterinsurgency exercises throughout

most of sub-Saharan Africa. Bozeman observes-again

correctly-that today, it is difficult "to isolate a military coup

from the mutiny, rebellion, movement of secession or

liberation, civil war, interracial massacre, or other flight into

violence with which it was entangled ." She also notes that in

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

modern Africa, "warfare of one kind or another has been

conducted on a prodigious scale" and that fighting in Africa

tends to be "uninhibited, ruthless, and protracted ." 9

The discourse on Africans' mythical vision, states,

society, order and disorder, ritual violence, war and identity,

and the problems posed by linguistic communications of

modern concepts applied to a traditional context are all

explored in great depth and with impressive scholarly

authority . Her concluding comments bear emphasis :

"Africans are more at ease with conflict in its multiple

manifestations than their contemporaries in Europe and the

United States ." Furthermore, Bozeman notes, Africans view

conflict "positively, as a source of major values and as a

determining or integrative factor in life ." Africans don't see

as mutually exclusive our distinctions between "conflict and

accord, aggression and defense, and war and peace," and

conflict in Africa is traditionally accepted as "ongoing or

latent in social and interstate affairs ."

These are Professor Bozeman's major thrusts, which offer

an unglamorous portrait of an entire continent's present

dilemma. Nor are the future prospects cause for more positive

expectations . 'A wealth of evidence and a number of other

analysts support her interpretation . But the historicoculturalists also have their detractors .

Historicoculturalist Perspectives on Conflict

Ali A. Mazrui ranks as the most notable African writer who

presents a historicoculturalist perspective . His analysis, as

well as those of other African and non-African writers, are

developed in the volume The Warrior Tradition in Modern

Africa. I° Subjects he reviewed include the state, warriors,

masculinity and war, cultural roots of aggressive behavior,

dance and the warrior tradition, and warriorhood and sex.

23 8
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

These topics alone form a substantial portion of the agenda

of the historicoculturalist perspective .

Mazrui attacks the notion that Africans lack a continuous

history apart from that of Europe's historical determinism on

the African continent . The problem, he notes, lies with

political scientists and economists, while the anthropologists

and historians are better informed. This, of course, validates

the central thesis of the historicoculturalist category . Mazrui

observes that "political scientists were so preoccupied with

studying political change that they virtually forgot how to

study political continuity ." Mazrui also offers a useful

identification of the warrior tradition as

that sub-system of values and institutionalized expectations which

define the military role of the individual in the defense of his society,

the martial criteria of adulthood, and the symbolic obligations of

manhood in time of political and military stress . I

I

The eligible individual is ready to sacrifice his life for society,

and each household is linked to the wider community. The

warrior tradition also links culture and war. A man becomes a

man when he kills an opponent . "Armed struggle, dance,

romantic courting, betrothal, the right to sire children, and

protecting cattle and status in the community can all become one

interrelated subsystem of values ." Mazrui also notes that the

mere formation of a tribe is sufficient politicization to engender

militarization .

12

With reference to Buganda, Bunyoro, Oyo and the Yoruba

states, Kikuyu, and the Zulu states, G. N. Uzoigwe develops

the notion of the traditional African state as a fusion of state

power with the warrior structures . "The warrior, in a

traditional society, was a political animal," he says . Uzoigwe

stresses the formation and maintenance of the great kingdoms

at the behest of devoted warriors, among which the king

himself was "the great warrior, larger than life." In South

Africa, Shaka, the famed Zulu ruler in the early nineteenth

century, epitomized such a chief of a military state . In what

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

is today Nigeria, the Oyo empire also federated a number

of hitherto dispersed Yoruba chiefdoms when its ruler,

Oranyan, combined them with forces centering on his own

personal bodyguards . The African warriors, contends

Uzoigwe, were "an indivisible element of the central

government ." They were the leaders as well as the

administrators .

13

Socializing the individual into the warrior culture was a

well-established tradition-with variations-but recognized

throughout most of Africa . Uzoigwe refers to Kenya's Tikiri

tribe in which a boy became a man in a ceremony usually

lasting up to six months and signified by circumcision . In

such a social transformation, "communal undertakings were

encouraged ; individualism was discouraged ." Entry into

warrior status took another 15 years of demonstrated martial

abilities . Only at the age of 40 would a man be eligible, on

the basis of his record, to become a member of the "elder

warriors" who ruled the state . The two notable features of this

episode are that the individual is rigorously socialized into

communal conformity and that the community standard

concentrated almost exclusively on warrior values . We also

need to be aware of the size of such armed forces lest we be

lulled into assuming that these were not substantial efforts .

W. E . Abraham contends that the Ashantis, who defeated the

British on several occasions in the Gold Coast, "could field

a hundred thousand men at a time ." They failed only at

adapting rapidly to the new weapons the British introduced .

14

In general, the traditional African state and the military

were inseparable, as is convincingly argued by the historicoculturalists . But there were other cultural characteristics

contributing to this alleged "warrior tradition" in Africa's

rich history . However, we are confronted with a caveat: it is

dangerous to range broadly across such a diverse continent

in order to elicit uniform patterns . The choice of one set of

examples may lead to conclusions quite contrary to those of

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

another set being investigated.

15 The mere identification of

what is Africa can be a sufficiently contentious geographic

exercise, as Mazrui so expertly demonstrates .

16 Africa's

societies may be divided into a number of racial, linguistic,

historic, tribal, and other characteristics referring to their

traits such as herders, gatherers, pastoralists, and stateless or

centralized societies . Many Africans have been notable

migrants, a characteristic which leaves little evidence of their

historical social patterns and usually results in continuous

syntheses of various cultures ; this obscures the very notion

of "traditionalism ."

Allowing for this analytic impediment, if we are to

generalize broadly, most analysts agree on the fundamental

underlying unity of all African cultural values, divine and

secular. Janheinz Jahn quotes Abebayo Adesanya, a Yoruba

writer, in his reference to the harmony of African conceptions, which Jahn notes is valid for most of Africa.There

exists a coherence of all disciplines ; God cannot be removed

from the secular daily world. Adesanya notes :

Philosophy, theology, politics, social theory, land law, medicine,

psychology, birth and burial, all find themselves logically

concatenated in a system so tight that to subtract one item from the

whole is to paralyze the structure of the whole.

17

This unity of Africans' worldview has the effect of

reducing the responsibility of an individual's actions as his

behavior is inevitably the result of a wider social purpose,

or alternatively, the product of the surreal causes-as

Professor Bozeman offers . Axel-Ivar Berglund presents an

analysis of the two conceptions of death in Zulu society . He

notes that a "timely death" is an expression of passing on-a

continuation-and an "untimely death" implies a breaking

off of life . In the former case, a timely physical death is a

natural continuation of man's existence . When old people

die, they are not mourned . 18 As is common in Islamic nations,

24 1
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

a warrior dying honorably on the battlefield is eligible to

move to the head of the line for his heavenly rewards .

Africa's indigenous animist religious tendency, according

to Mazrui, blurs "the distinction between man and nature,

between the living and the dead, between the divine and the

human, between the natural and the supernatural." 19 From

this, it follows that the traditional resort to violence is not a

rational act calculated by an individual to enhance personal

advantage. On the contrary, the individual derived his status

as well as his existential relevance and personal legitimacy

from the collective fortunes of his society-including those

who have gone before him and those who are yet to follow .

But once again it is advisable to allow for the evolution of

changing perceptions . Paul Bohannan and Philip Curtin note

that "it is impossible to overemphasize the influence that

Christian missionaries have had in Africa ." They suggest that

the major influence was not felt by the theological

replacement of traditional beliefs, but by the accompanying

cultural baggage,of the Christian proselytizers .

20

Much as we would be mistaken to stress the impermeability

of Africa's traditional culture, we must also guard that we do

not make rash assumptions regarding modern Africa's total

rejection of the past and unquestioned adoption of foreign

systems of thought . What we will encounter is a synthesis

whose evolutionary direction points to an elite-fed modernization tendency which uses-and at times capitalizes on-the

vestiges of traditional style and exuberance for martial

activities . Episodes of this have emerged in the darker days

of protracted conflicts with the accompanying deterioration

of the modern symbols of state. This has been demonstrated

first in the anarchic environment of the Congo rebellion

following independence in 1960 . Thereafter, occurrences of

reversions to traditionalism were exhibited in the Rwanda

and Burundi civil wars ; in Uganda under the despotic days of

Amin ; in the complex antagonisms of southern Sudan; and

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

currently, by the savagery of the Resistencia Nacional

Mozambicana (RENAMO) movement which operates in a

near-perfect state of nature . Within South Africa, the absence

of effective law in the larger black townships has facilitated

the occasional emergence of similar atavistic practices .

Meanwhile Chief Buthelezi, as the modern, governmentbacked leader of the government-created KwaZulu homeland, skillfully manipulates his rural-based Zulu followers by

an impassioned appeal to their traditional cultural and

warrior identities . In essence, traditional forces emerge in the

absence of a decisive and early resolution to a conflict or

when the effective rule of the central state does not directly

extend to the outer provinces .

Modern African institutions often demonstrate their finite

limitations and their inabilities to exert effective controls

over the state. This naturally results in the reversion to

parochialism as it can more likely offer immediate security

to a specific community than can the distant and ineffective

symbols and the paltry efforts of the national state . In the case

of most countries in Africa, the evolutionary process has been

strained by the limitations of time and - by the magnitude of

rising expectations . But in South Africa the government has

incorporated traditionalism in its unfortunate attempts to

exploit ethnic divisions and to ensure, thereby, its own

predominance.

Africa's Conflict Environment

The Evolutionary Context

Professor Bozeman's elucidation of the African

weltanschauung is superbly portrayed and should inform

all interpreters of Africa's conflict history . However, for

purposes of addressing Africa's conflict potential at the

modern global systemic level, Africa's conflicts must be

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

viewed within historical parameters on which globalstructuralist and evolutionist perspectives may also shed

light . Such a presentation will not detract from the insight

offered by the historicoculturalist view ; it will, however, aim

at a synthesis which should provide an understanding of the

nature of Africa's modern conflicts as they impinge on the

security interests of external powers .

We need not take issue with the extant interpretations of

Africa's conflicts if they are waged at a purely parochial

level as in the case of the present-day nonpolitically

motivated faction fights among historically rival clans of

South Africa's rural Zulus . However, as Africans respond to

externally originated military involvement and interference

on the African continent or wage full-scale transnational

wars among themselves using modern arms and battlefield

tactics, we need to go beyond traditional explanations for

violence in this new environmental context. At the microlevel, an individual warrior may still perceive his mission

within a mythical worldview derived from ancestral cultural

values and attitudes towards conflict. But at the macrolevel,

such traditional characteristics may not be sufficient bases

for explanations of vital strategic responses today . Have

African attitudes towards conflict changed as the result of

external influences? If so, how? Such changes, if evident,

should provide a stimulus to arguments favoring the

global -structuralists' and the evolutionists' interpretations .

Conflict in Africa's history corresponds to evolving

environmental circumstances as external forces penetrated

the continent . In this respect, Africa did not differ

fundamentally from most other traditional societies as

they advanced to the transitional phase on the way

ultimately towards modernity. In this respect, academic

analyses that compare the development of societies as they

progress through certain identifiable and pervasive patterns

present an evolutionist perspective .

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

Monte Palmer offers a useful characterization of three

phases based on the scholarly work of numerous analysts

who have "dichotomized human society into antithetical

ideal types : the traditional and the modern ." The period in

between is the transitional phase .21 Traditional societies are

universally marked by a number of characteristics . Palmer

summarizes some of the more important general features of

such traditional societies .

l . They are marked by affectivity . They view others in

emotional terms, colored by personal values . Social relations

are never neutral, but are reduced to questions of good or bad .

2. They are self-oriented . Social compliance is out of fear

of punishment. (There is no conception of a rational social

contract.)

3 . They tend to be particularistic . The universal society

holds no superior value to particular segments ranging from

family to tribe or even to a religious group .

4 . Status accrues via ascription. Regardless of age, sex, or

lineage, status is not based on individual competitive

achievement but on birthrights .

5 . Different rules emanate from kingship and custom .

Relations among individuals are regulated by norms and not

by codified laws .

22

Palmer notes that these descriptions apply to traditional

societies, which are identified today as the world's least

economically developed countries . Modern societies, by

contrast, are the more advanced industrial societies . They are

marked by being affectively neutral, collectively oriented,

and achievement-based, and by having greater social

universalism . Modern-day social obligations are marked by

specific legal and contractual terms . There are, of course, a

series of other characteristics which differentiate traditional

from modern societies as well. In general, these differences

flow from the physical environment and technological

245
attainments . A few examples characterize modern societies

as being those with high urbanization and literacy, horizontal

and vertical mobility, low disease and birthrates, and high

differentiation . In addition, modern societies have very

different economic systems, socialization characteristics,

and political practices .

Palmer's framework is instructive as it reflects the

academic study of political development and modernization

which is ultimately based on an evolutionary paradigm .

These are broad characteristics . At the individual societal

level, he concedes that "vestiges of traditional behavior are

clearly evident in economically advanced societies .,,2' This

admission is vital for the analysis of conflict in modern

African society, which could perhaps be described as an

amalgam of traditional and modern attributes . In order to

develop an evolutionary perspective, we may divide

sub-Saharan Africa's history into five distinct periods when

analyzing the changing nature of the purposes of conflict .

Traditional Period

CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Mazrui refers to Africa as a "cradle of civilization," a

historical reference alluded to by many writers of African

history .

24 There existed an isolated African culture at one

time, but Africa today is the product of that ancient heritage,

of Islamic culture, and of Western influence . No uniform

continentwide developmental pattern can be discerned . Areas

of sub-Saharan Africa were penetrated as early as A.D. 800,

with the Sahel experiencing wide Muslim contact the

following century . Arab traders had also made extensive

contacts along the coast of East Africa, where trade ties had

been established long before European contact was made in

West Africa. Yet some obscure parts of Africa have hardly

been incorporated into the modern state system to this day .

25

246
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

As of today, most of Africa has been penetrated for 12

centuries . However, direct Islamic and Arab influence was

limited initially in its geographic scope to the Sahelian belt,

the Nile valley, the Horn region, and the coastal areas of East

Africa. That left the greatest part of the continent untouched

and in pristine traditional cultural condition . Certainly the

trading influence of Arab commercial interests was felt

inland, but only indirectly . Foreign traders did not at first

penetrate inland, and goods were assembled only at certain

sanctuaries in the Sahel or along the East African coast,

especially on the island of Zanzibar.

Unfortunately for the analyst, there remains little reliable

historical evidence of social relations, political systems,

economic activities, or relations among the various tribes .

Oral history and early accounts of Muslim writers, and

subsequently of Europeans, do offer valuable insight into

what must have been impressive social systems-if judged

by sparse archeological evidence . But on the whole, our

knowledge of traditional Africa emerges only in the last 100

years by direct observation and studies of Africans who have

had only minimal contact with external cultural influences .

European Exploration and Trade Period

The Portuguese began the explorations of the West

African coast in 1434, and within five decades they had

sailed as far as the mouth of the Congo River . For the next

350 years, Europeans traded along the coast, and the strong

African rulers rarely allowed them to penetrate inland . As

M . Kwamena-Poh et al ., note : "Until the 19th century,

Europeans were the masters on water, but Africans were the

masters on land.

,26 Although the Europeans initially came in

search of gold, ivory, and spices, they would subsequently

capitalize on commercial slavery . And though Africans

traded for a variety of European products, Birmingham,

247
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

England, was soon producing 100,000 guns a year for sale in

West Africa alone .

For our purposes, this European penetration of Africa,

although purely commercial in origin, introduced both

foreign cultural contacts and technologically superior

military weaponry . Little evidence indicates that the

Africans altered their social relations as the result of initial

contact with foreign literate and Christian societies . But the

hitherto prevailing conflict environment would soon change

as the vast commercialization of slavery resulted in wars

being fought solely for the acquisition of slaves . Previously,

wars had usually been the by-product of conflicts . The

availability of guns plunged Africa into a vortex of requiring

guns in order to supply more slaves who, in turn, would be

sold for more guns . New purposes for fighting, as well as new

means, were introduced . Of course, guns could be acquired

from Arab traders, who were also the source for horses .

Horses accounted for military successes such as that of the

Yoruban Oyo state's cavalry, which defeated several other

surrounding states, as well as powerful Dahomey in the late

eighteenth century .

At this stage, we may still speak of a traditional culture of

conflict. But this culture was rapidly adapting to a new

conflict environment which saw traditional African social

systems greatly disrupted . Political and economic structures

were radically altered to accommodate foreign commercial

influence and the introduction of foreign military weapons

and fighting tactics . Where foreign cultures and religions left

no major impact in the initial stages, guns and commerce

would soon accomplish this . In the Sahel of West Africa,

Islamic influence altered traditional societies as much as

Europeans increasingly influenced the coastal areas . In

between these two belts were powerful kingdoms with

communications and trade links to the Arab and European

contact points, but these kingdoms steadfastly pursued their

248
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

traditional hegemonic interests . In most cases, Africans were

quick to adapt the availability of Europe's technological

weaponry in pursuit of traditional objectives but also in

pursuit of modern economic requirements . Or, on occasion,

Africans would ally with the British against their own old

enemies . This was the case of the Fante in their battles with

the Asante in what is today Ghana. Both foreigners and

natives used each other in pursuit of their varied objectives .

European Colonization Period

Official controls by Europeans were extended over all of

Africa in this period, culminating in the Berlin conference of

1884-85, which formalized Africa's division . Africa's

"triple heritage," as identified by Mazrui, was firmly

established . The continent's indigenous cultures had mixed

with Islamic and European elements, but each respective

component demonstrated some diverse orientations . Africans

still pursued predominance over traditional enemies ;

Muslims sought expansion, consolidation, security, and

conversions ; Europeans pursued commercial expansion,

lands on which to settle, pacification of warring tribes, and

Christian souls .

Of the three cultural components, that of Europe was

perhaps the most problematic. Private interests would be

ensured, but by governmental intervention . Slavery was

developed as a commercial enterprise, after which it was

actively curtailed . European armies would take African lives

while missionaries would save their souls . Guns were

introduced in vast quantities, after which colonial

administrations launched wars to attempt to quell their use .

Traditional economic patterns were totally altered and

replaced with systems that did not address native needs . The

colonial powers never envisaged the outcome of it all, nor its

actual purpose . Could the colonies produce the fabled

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

profits? Would Europe's surplus population be exported to

Africa? Was the fate of the natives to be sold, killed, or

saved? And, did "greatness"-which was to accrue to all

those with overseas empires-lead to the ultimate weakening

of the imperial powers? Is not Portugal today paying for her

imperial ambitions?

The popular image of Africa's colonization episode fails

to portray the almost universal pattern of resistance to

Europe's process of subjugation . Kwamena-Poh et al .,

identify two types of resistance in this phase : that which

preceded formal establishment of controls and that which

resisted the effects of such controls, once imposed . 28 Active

resistance in the subjugation period was offered by the

traditional warrior structures, especially of West Africa's

well-established tribal kingdoms . Their armies were at times

large in number, formidable, equipped with European

weapons and cavalry, and configured in a professional style

often copied from the French. Europeans lost several major

engagements such as the British encounters with the Asante

or the battle of Isandhlwana in South Africa in 1879 against

the Zulus-one of the worst defeats for the British up to that

time.

Invariably, superior military weapons technology, better

training and battlefield tactics, and the notorious Maxim guns

would wreak decisive revenge where an initial encounter

with African warriors had resulted in defeat . Africans

resisted Europeans for very rational reasons such as their

aversion to the imposition of forced labor and but taxes, or

their displacement from their lands. Although Europeans

demanded compliance with colonial administration and

European standards such as the abolishment of slavery and

sacrifices and the termination of incessant warring among

inland tribes, they also began to respect native structures and

customs . This was manifested most notably in Lugard's

policy of "indirect rule," which introduced an economic

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

method of extending controls . By our standards today,

Africans' resistance to this infringement of their rights to

self-determination and an independent existence was a more

rational act than was the European acquisition of far-flung

empires for the sake of dubious glory and high-risk economic

ventures .

Preindependence Formative Period

That Africans would organize to oppose colonial subjugation with its ambiguous goals, but ruthless exploitative

means, should not be surprising . Americans had set the

precedent almost two centuries earlier . Africans began to

organize political movements whose objectives included

greater political autonomy, indigenous political participation, and independence .

We believe that Africa's greatest export in the modern

period was minerals, but we are popularly less aware of

Africa's major export in this century-namely, its men who

would fight as soldiers in distant battles in Europe and the

Far East . The precedent for this had been the standard

colonial practice of utilizing native troops to overcome

resistance in colonies other than those of their own origins .

Brian Catchpole and I. A. Akinjobin list 160,000 West

African soldiers as having been sent to fight in Europe during

World War I, with other West Africans being used militarily

in other parts of Africa . 29 Ruth First noted that the French

had used Senegalese troops throughout the nineteenth

century in the Napoleonic wars, the Crimean War, in

Madagascar, and even against Mexico . 30 Four-fifths of the

troops killed in the French subjugation of central Africa were

African troops . Fifteen thousand African troops fought in the

French Indochina War, with other Africans having been used

at Dien Bien Phu and Suez and in Algeria. Several hundred

thousand Africans fought for the British as far afield as

25 1
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Burma and Europe, as well as in Africa, during World War

II.

With Africans becoming cosmopolitan by exposure to the

external world of Europe's battlegrounds and universities, it

was only a matter of time before Europe's devastated war

economies ran headlong into Africa's political ambitions. In

most cases, especially in the French territories, independence

was gained after only minimal agitation. The British had

encountered the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya in the early

1950s, which did exhibit some traditional characteristics of

ritualistic war-but in the modern pursuit of lands that had

been confiscated from the native populations . 3l In fact, Philip

Curtin et al ., note that it was this European encroachment

which unified the hitherto dispersed members of the Kikuyu

tribe and thereafter built the foundations for Kenya's

independence movement.

32 But it was the Portuguese who

were to encounter the greatest independence wars by

Africans who were equipped with a full arsenal of modern

weapons, guerrilla tactics, allies, and Marxist ideology .

These latter wars continue in Mozambique and Angola to this

day, long after the inhabitants attained independence .

Independence Period

Independence came rapidly to Africa once Ghana was

set free in 1957 . The formative period had been well spent

on developing the intellectual foundations for selfdetermination, but its final translation into reality soon

demonstrated that Africans, once again, had adapted rapidly .

Liberation was mostly by negotiation, but force utilized by

purely modern insurgent methods was an available

alternative in the recalcitrant region of southern Africa .

Liberation forces such as those in Guinea-Bissau, Angola,

Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South-West Africa were

constituted along modern guerrilla structures reflecting

25 2
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

Asian and Latin American influences . Certainly particularistic tendencies were present as geographic regionalism

played an important role . Zimbabwe's two separate

movements, the Zimbabwe African National Union and the

Zimbabwe African People's Union, were an example of this .

But in general, at the leadership level, revolutionary ideology

did not officially tolerate such divisions, and most

movements worked to overcome such potential natural

divisiveness . Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique

(FRELIMO) in Mozambique, South-West African People's

Organization (SWAPO) in South-West Africa, and the

African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa demonstrated this tendency .

Where regionalism did manifest itself-as in Angola,

where Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola

(UNITA) did come to represent mostly the Ovimbundu

people-one must not automatically conclude that tribal

forces were at play . Any protracted liberation struggle may

naturally bifurcate as the fortunes of war change . In the

case of Angola, the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola

(FNLA) movement of Holden Roberto was heavily tied to

Zaire due to geography and common ethnicity . The

Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) was

heavily urban-based and soon allied with the Cuban

foreigners . That left well over half of that huge country

unrepresented until Jonas Savimbi organized his UNITA

movement. All three movements attracted external alliance,

and all utilized modern weaponry and battlefield tactics

extensively .

The present independence period of Africa is characterized

most concisely by the phenomenon of sociopolitical

consolidation. This is usually a protracted period in which an

indigenously derived, equilibrated power distribution

emerges . In many African countries, the governments at the

time of independence were either hurriedly formed by the

25 3
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

departing colonial power or were virtually installed by

external interventionists . Comparatively few attained

nationwide legitimacy before challenges emerged from

geographically based insurgencies, or the military staged the

first of a series of coups d'etat . As the state faced the dual

threats of internal violence and economic deterioration,

central authority then gave way to parochialist identities . The

result was the urban-rural split, center-periphery division, the

emergence of dualistic economic structures, the introduction

of external allied interests by ideologically opposing forces,

and the disintegration of nationwide political authority . In

this unstable environment, violent conflict is demonstrated

in various forms, including coups d'etat, attempts at

secession, insurgencies, transnational wars, and a variety of

forms of domestic lawlessness . The objectives are

unequivocal : the seizure of power and control of modern

political institutions, but not the reversion to or the retention

of a traditional historical system .

Recalling Monte Palmer's analytic model of societies in

evolution, his description of traditional society is an apt

paradigm of the social culture on which the historicoculturalists focus . External contacts advance these societies

to Palmer's transitional phase, which, in the case of Africa,

is divided into several distinct periods corresponding to the

external contact and trade phase, the colonial period, and the

preindependence formative phase . Independence itself does

not offer entry into Palmer's "modern society" category as

that is reserved for those societies which have attained de

facto advanced socioeconomic modernity, and not mere de

jure sovereign status in the world of nations . Hence,

independence only introduces these fledgling countries to the

early stages of the consolidative phase, which for many

countries proves to be a period of insurmountable and

incessant internal conflict .

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

As for the issue of violent conflict, its most notable

characteristic is that its rationale and method changes

fundamentally in each of the evolutionary stages . We cannot

take issue with the historicoculturalists in their descriptions

of the structure of traditional conflict and attitudes towards

war . However, in the subsequent phases, they may have

greatly underestimated the influence of external ideas,

weapons, military forces, education, economic interests, and

political interference, which have totally and permanently

changed Africa's traditional conceptions of conflict. The

atavistic underlying psychosocial belief system of the

individual warrior may occasionally reflect in good part

traditional values ; but the organized military efforts, whether

those of the conventional armies of today's states or of their

insurgent enemies, are best understood within a modern

global context . This may be even more so the case for Africa

and Latin America than for South and Southeast Asia, which

have not experienced the great disruption and penetration of

their traditional societies by distant foreigners in such a short

time frame.

As the modern African governments fail to answer the

pervasive security, political, and economic challenges, the

greatly deteriorating conflict environment does facilitate the

reemergence of residual atavistic forces such as those

demonstrated by Uganda's Amin or Equatorial Guinea's

Macias Nguema. But those aberrations do not describe the

fully modern conflict context as those exhibited in Nigeria,

Angola, Chad, or Ethiopia. In fact, if we consider the great

degree of ethnic fragmentation, artificial boundaries, number

of countries, and the generally poor state of Africa's

economies, we can just as easily be struck by the relative

paucity of violent conflict on the African continent. Until

recently, this was especially the case in West Africa where

the population density, ethnic fragmentation, and history of

traditional warrior kingdoms are the most extensive but

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

where peace has reigned mostly since independence. Only

Nigeria offered the major exception, in the form of the

Biafran war .

The Historical Legacy in

Africa's Contemporary Conflicts

This study's objective is to gain insight into Africa's

historical conflict environment in order to better understand

our contemporary global security situation . That Africa has

had a tumultuous conflict history is well established, but

disagreement centers on the explanations for the causes of

the perennial and multivaried conflicts .

Historians and anthropologists take interest in the

premodern wars as they may contribute to the full portrait of

Africa's historical societies . However, the modern strategic

analyst must develop an understanding of Africa's conflict

history. Only with an assessment of Africa's role in the global

security situation can policies be made regarding

intervention in newly emerging conflicts . Also, the foreign

private sector, so vital to today's developing states, needs to

be informed about the prospects for stability in order to guide

economic transactions .

It is reasonable to argue that not all conflicts in Africa are

grounded in the same originating causes and that, ultimately,

different responses may be counseled . A proper assessment

may avoid the pitfall of involvement in a war with only

limited external implications. A common tendency among

the great powers during the last three decades has been the

failure to distinguish between liberation conflicts and

ideologically inspired modern third-world revolutionary

wars . A liberation conflict suggests that historically

evolutionist forces are in evidence while ideologically

inspired wars imply global- structuralist origins . Different

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

responses may be counseled for these types of conflicts with

their fundamentally different (though not necessarily

mutually exclusive) characters .

A comprehensive review of Africa's varied contemporary

conflicts cannot be undertaken in this study, but to place the

threefold explanatory framework into a productive analytic

context, we may allude to certain conflicts under way in

Africa .33 Several protracted full-scale conventional wars

have been raging in Angola, Chad, and Ethiopia, while

Somalia, Sudan, and Mozambique have faced substantial

insurgencies with little prospect for their early termination .

Numerous less-intense conflicts prevail, either between at

least two countries or, more likely, between several

protagonists within the same country .

Global structuralists point to the dissolution of the colonial

empires in the midst of the cold war as the major problem .

This environment encouraged neocolonial forces to exploit

the fragility of these new countries either for economic or

strategic purposes . Evolutionists express no surprise at the

contagious conflicts following on the heels of independence. But they lament that so many neighboring countries

have undergone the same developmental phases

simultaneously ; hence, entire regions are influenced by

the same phenomena . Historicoculturalists see the

continuity of Africa's historical social behavior in this

modern period . They point to repeated instances of

traditional behavior and modern references to tribally

grounded beliefs today as proof of traditional martial

forces at work .

In fact, all three categories of explanations offer insight.

Most present-day conflicts .i n Africa experience extensive

international involvements at a time when Africa's fragile

states are working towards internal consolidation .

Traditional forces may be involved in certain conflicts, but

in most cases, these emerge only after the conflict has

25 7
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

gotten bogged down or has deteriorated without resolution

after a protracted time span . In other cases, traditional forces

help to form a conflict environment based on cultural

clashes, but within the context of modern political forms

in order to shift or to reverse an existing power distribution . The means employed may reflect traditional

cultural attitudes and warrior styles, but the objective

remains the pursuit of modern political power .

Somalia

In Somalia, the combatants are not different ethnic/

linguistic units ; both sides are Somali people representing

distinct clans . These clans form the base of the warring

factions . Somalia is comprised of only a part of the territories

traditionally occupied by Somalis . In Ethiopia, one of the

conflicts concerns irredentism in that substantial numbers of

Somalis live on a large part of neighboring land that is

formally part of Ethiopia . Somalia's objective does not

include the ouster of another government nor does it concern

tribal warfare . Somalia is trying to build a modern nationstate-indeed, a rare instance in which the state would be

populated by only one ethnic nation .

But Somalia's internal conflict also has a more traditional

veneer, and evolutionists may draw a parallel with the

American Civil War. The aged president, Siad Barre,

established his power base around the southern Marehan

clan-that of his family . This clan was opposed in the south

by the Hawiye clan and in the distant north by the Ishaq clan.

The Ishaq clan formed the core of the Somali National

Movement (SNM), an insurgent force that engaged the

government in large-scale battles resulting in thousands of

casualties and 1 million refugees . 34

Evident in the war against Ethiopia has been substantial

external involvement in which the Soviets and Americans

258
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

switched sides in the mid-1970s . Cubans also participated

directly in combat-related activities on the side of Ethiopia.

In this respect, Somalia's external conflict seems to be a

modern war in pursuit of nationalist objectives, within global

structuralist dimensions . Somalia's internal war, however,

may be described more in terms of evolutionist theory in that

the utter poverty of the country has exacerbated the central

government's inability to integrate the disparate regions into

a cohesive political community . The evident north-south split

in the country also reflects the colonial division of this region

into Italian and British Somaliland . Under the circumstances

of external and internal conflicts, the consolidation of

Somalia and the establishment of widely accepted legitimate

modern political institutions should not be expected in the

near future .

Liberia

Liberia's internal conflict of 1989-91 represents most

acutely the problems of unsuccessful internal consolidation.

Independent since 1847, the country has been ruled by an

American-Liberian oligarchy, comprised primarily of

ex-slaves from America who had returned to Africa and who

constituted only 5 percent of the population . In 1980, Samuel

K. Doe overthrew the elitist government in a particularly

brutal military coup and installed himself as the country's

first indigenous native-descended ruler. The following

decade of incompetent administration and lack of economic

progress contributed to a deteriorating domestic situation .

Several anti-Doe coup attempts failed, but a full-scale

insurgent movement was introduced into Liberia at the end

of 1989 with surprising ease .

The international dimension of Liberia's conflict involved

several participants . The US had extended Doe considerable

financial and expert aid, which had the effect of supporting

259
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

his incompetent regime . Then Charles Taylor, an exiled

former government official, entered Liberia with allegedly

but 100 Libyan-trained troops from the neighboring Ivory

Coast. 35 Rumors also implicated Burkina Faso as playing a

role on the side of the insurgents . Taylor, himself half

American and half Liberian, capitalized on the deteriorating

situation and on the broad dissatisfaction with Doe's regime

ever since Doe's military men brutally put down an attempted

coup in 1985 . As his regime began to falter, Doe increasingly

relied on his own tribal people, the Krahn, who were allied

with the Mandingo . The relatively small Krahn tribe

benefited inordinately from governmental advantages . This

caused great resentment among members of the Mano and

Gio tribes, who were the victims of loyalist Krahn troops who

had dominated the military at the time of the attempted coup.

Before Doe overthrew the American-Liberian elite, the

major ethnic tensions concerned relations between the elite

and the rest of the indigenous population. But the ascension

to power of an indigenous leader, and the commensurate

general deterioration, opened the contest among competing

indigenous social groups .

36 The Krahn, who comprise only 4

percent of the population but dominated the weak and inept

government, would soon face limitations to their authority.

Taylor was easily able to ally with the hitherto victimized Gio

and Mano people near the border of the Ivory Coast. With the

newly attained authority of Taylor's insurgent status, the Gio

and Mano evened the score against the Krahn government

troops and officials .

It may be ironic that in Liberia, the only outpost of

America's historical influence in Africa, the historicoculturalists find great evidence of traditional forces at play .

When Doe toppled the government in 1980, 13 top

government officials were killed in a public execution on the

beach in Monrovia for "high treason, rampant corruption, and

gross violation of human rights ." 37 We may contend that the

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

language was modern, but the beatings, humiliation, torture,

and finally the executions-all in public-were a display of

historical forces at work . Subsequently, the usual attempt by

a new government to consolidate legitimate power and to

address the desperate need for socioeconomic progress

encountered the realities of the lack of development . The

ensuing deteriorating climate exposed the government's

vulnerability to internal dissident forces, to sheer opportunism, and to external interests in line with globalstructuralist configurations . The opposing combatants in

Liberia aligned along tribal lines, but they represent only four

of the 16 ethnic groupings . The leader of the insurgents is an

American-Liberian whose commander of rebel forces, Prince

Johnson, had served in the American forces and reportedly

participated in the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 . 38 The

conflict in Liberia is an excellent example of the problems

associated with protracted conflicts in an environment of

general socioeconomic deterioration and of the influence

of foreigners-including the American-Liberians who were

perceived as a colonial elite despite years of residence in

Liberia. Finally, Liberia illustrated the ease with which an

unresolved protracted conflict can degenerate into tribal

animosities, where the initial objective had been a contest for

the domination of modern political institutions .

Uganda

Perhaps the most perplexing of Africa's conflicts has

been that of Uganda. While a colony, this territory had the

reputation of being the "Switzerland of Africa"-an allusion

to its scenic beauty and general tranquility . However, after

attaining independence, the attempt to consolidate modern

rule, especially over the historic Buganda kingdom, led to

a vortex of warfare . Ieuan Ll . Griffiths sees the origins of

modern conflict stemming from the colonial period, which

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

suggests a global structuralist perspective. But he also lists

other sources of instability which include Idi Amin,

politicians, civil servants, soldiers, policemen, and political

party thugs who were "corrupt, greedy, ruthless, and

cruel ." 39

The disruptive role of British colonialism included the

introduction of an alien sectarian religion ; the extension of

imperial protection ; the administration of various kingdoms

and tribal areas as one unit, in disregard of traditional

differences ; and the submission of independence to the

colony . The modern Uganda People's Congress party vied for

authority with the hereditary ruler, the kabaka of Buganda.

Modern constitutional engineering had created a federal

constitution and distributed power between the kabaka and

the new prime minister, Milton Obote . But the modern

army, which was northern-based, soon put an end to the

kabaka's attempt to retain his traditional authority . That

army was led by a northern Acholi : Idi Amin. He subsequently overthrew Obote in 1971 .

Amin's dubious rule included the ouster of most Asians,

and he soon embarked on the wholesale decimation of

political opponents and previous government officials .

Griffiths writes : "Virtually a whole elite disappeared. . . .

Thousands were killed, their bodies thrown into the Nile or

Lake Victoria, or simply dumped into a forest." 4° The foreign

element also manifested itself when Amin employed a

Palestinian bodyguard, and the Libyans offered aid and

intervened militarily on his behalf. Amin's territorial

ambitions then involved him in a war with Tanzania,

which, surprisingly, invaded Kampala, the capital, and

ousted Amin from power . Kenya too had been involved as

that country cut the flow of supplies to Uganda-a

landlocked country .

Amin's ouster hardly quelled Uganda's conflicts,

which, if anything, intensified during the state of anarchy

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

that ensued . A succession of rulers failed to exert effective

central control while remnants of various armies and

insurgent groups remained armed and pillaged a number

of regions . 41 Nor were the disturbances caused only by

the poorly controlled government military and by rebel

groups . The bizarre Holy Spirit movement, founded in

1987 by a visionary, Alice Lakwena, mixes pagan beliefs

with quasi-political objectives in the lawless northern

region . Hundreds may have been killed to date in Holy

Spirit movement attacks on noncompliant villagers and

on Sudanese refugees who had escaped civil war in their

own country . The movement's members use supposed

magic ointments to ward off bullets of the government's

soldiers . 42 Recently, this peculiar rebel group adopted a

more political name: United Democratic Christian

Movement .

President Yoweri Museveni has had his hands full in

combating this group . Several simultaneous but

independent rebel attacks on a variety of targets-often

against each other-inevitably have led to alignment along

tribal lines . The largely unknown National Resistance

Army has been responsible for an expensive 5,000 deaths

of members of the Teso tribe as part of the ongoing history

of retaliation for acts emanating from the two-decade-long

chaotic situation .

Perhaps Griffiths is correct in pointing to British

colonial practices as the major problem, since that period

gave rise to a poorly constructed modern state . Elements

of traditional authority confronted modern political

national institutions in an open conflict, which in other

African states had not been won by the traditionalists . But,

as in the case of Liberia, the fragile structure of modern

authority soon exposed the government to a series of

armed opportunists with only vague political programs .

This is an unfortunate characteristic of the early consoli263
dative stage in which the attainment of institutional

legitimacy constitutes the major challenge . Once under

way, and exacerbated by external interventions, the

conflict degenerates and facilitates the reemergence of

traditional forces . Individuals, recogniz!ling the ineptitude

of the government, seek security in their traditional,

parochial community, which closes ranks in the face of

adversity . We may conclude that the origins of the modern

conflict in Uganda lie in history, but the immediate

objectives are modern : power, survival, socioeconomic

advancement, and the pursuit of institutional legitimacy .

Mozambique

CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Mozambique's protracted conflict originated as an

anticolonial struggle in 1964 when FRELIMO insurgents

crossed into the northern region of Mozambique from

Tanzania . They had been inspired by the independence

movements in Angola and Guinea-Bissau, two other

Portuguese colonies . FRELIMO organized itself with help

from China and the Soviet Union into a guerrilla force

intent on establishing a modern third-world socialist

society .

43 Just as they succeeded in making territorial gains

in Mozambique's central region, Portugal's empire collapsed

and FRELIMO took power-although it was poorly prepared

to do so . Then, shortly after independence in 1975, the

Rhodesian central intelligence organization formed the

Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana (RENAMO)-a bushfighting force that was to serve Rhodesia's military purpose

in Mozambique, where one of the two main Rhodesian black

guerrilla movements had been based .

FRELIMO's policies were ambitious, poorly supported,

and resisted by many peasants in the distant rural areas

where Portuguese colonial rule had barely been extended .

RENAMO took advantage of this opportunity and, after

264
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

reorganization, extended a loosely knit guerrilla movement throughout the land . (The degree to which the movement is in fact a cohesive insurgent force is disputed .)

The ensuing conflict between the government and

insurgents soon became a confrontation between a modern,

internationally affiliated, third-world socialist regime and

an opportunistic collection of dissidents, gangsters, and

semifeudal warlords parading under the guise of insurgent

respectability .

Both sides in the conflict have relied on external support ;

hence, the global structuralists find ample evidence that

the essence of the conflict was motivated by external

interests . Besides Portugal and Rhodesia, other major

participants included the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, East

Germany, and North Korea, which supported the government side ; and South Africa, the primary force behind

RENAMO. 44 Others who played a role at various points

include Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Tanzania-all of which had

troops in Mozambique-Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom,

the United States and, allegedly, even Ethiopia, Morocco,

and Comoros, which were involved in training, advising,

supplying arms, or financing one or the other side .

Obviously, this is neither a tribal nor a traditional war.

Considering the vast size of Mozambique and the fact that

Portugal exercised effective administration over only a

restricted area of cities and farming lands, that RENAMO

was able to expand its conflict came as no surprise . A

Mozambican official assessed the conflict : "This is a war

from the Middle Ages. In some areas the government is seen

as an intruder into a world of age-old traditions . It breeds a

very vicious reaction, a desire to destroy any vestige of

central or modern authority ." 45 It is appropriate to speak of

the Mozambican situation as a continuation of tribal life, but

now disturbed by the movement of marauding guerrilla bands

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

armed with modern weapons and characterized by an

all-but-total absence of humane considerations .

If Mozambique's distant northern tribes harbor resentment towards the government, it is because they are Muslim

and because the government embarked on an antireligious

campaign after altering independence . Other rural inhabitants are Christians, and they, too, expected that RENAMO

would eventually be in a position to reinstate freedom of

worship. Afonso Dhalkama, RENAMO's leader, stresses his

devout adherence to Christianity in sharp contrast to the

original atheistic position of government officials . Still, the

allegedly devastating brutality of RENAMO belies such

religious pretensions . What little and sketchy information

emerging from Mozambique's rural combat zone suggests

that RENAMO uses an opportunistic interpretation of

modern third-world guerrilla and terrorist tactics . Ostensibly,

these tactics are implemented in pursuit of an antisocialist

revolution, but, realistically, these tactics are implemented in

pursuit of the advantage presented by the state of virtual

anarchy.

Although both FRELIMO and RENAMO pursue the same

objective-modern control over the entire country's political

affairs-the two protagonists exercise different approaches

in dealing with traditional institutions . During its initial

anticolonial struggle, FRELIMO had barely extended its

influence over 20 percent of the country. In fact, large areas

of Mozambique were never effectively brought within even

Portuguese colonial control . In power, FRELIMO moved

quickly to eradicate all local authority and to replace it with

modern, centrally dominated rule . This included the

weakening of religious institutions, the collectivization of

agriculture, and the incorporation of large tribal areas into an

ambitious socialist plan. These changes were very disruptive

of traditional structures which had offered personal security

to its hitherto politically neglected members . FRELIMO

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

had gotten its start in the far north of the country, but once

in power, the ruling elite quickly assumed a southern tinge

and an urban power base resulting in the disproportionate

influence of whites, Indians, and mulattoes of the cities .

Within months of FRELIMO's ascension to power, 400

(northern) Makonde soldiers attempted a march on the

capital as an early demonstration not only of the new

country's fragility but also of dissent emerging along

ethnic line s . 46

RENAMO capitalized on this early resentment

towards FRELIMO's heavy-handedness and ineptitude .

RENAMO established itself as a national rural-based

organization in defense of traditional structures . While

this may have been little more than a pragmatic strategy,

it did respond to the widespread disenchantment with

FRELIMO's rigorous ideology-driven requirements for the

creation of a socialist society . Some estimates list 70 percent

of RENAMO's operational structure to be comprised of rural

Shona speakers, especially Ndaus, but regional tribal

commanders also represent the Macuas and Shangaans .

RENAMO keeps its forces largely in their traditional areas

of origin ; this portrays them as locals who are aware of tribal

concerns . Traditional chiefs and animist religious figures

also are respected ; hence, it is not difficult to perceive

FRELIMO as a distant, ambitious, disruptive, and almost

foreign force .

There is no firm indication of any value in such traditional

authority structures since RENAMO also adopted thirdworld revolutionary strategies to attain power, and their

leaders speak of modern political and economic forms . But

little can be certain in this regard in view of the lack of

information concerning that organization . Their modern

organizational structures, guerrilla tactics, and weaponry

hardly suggest that RENAMO would reintroduce traditional

African culture . Nor can we expect that RENAMO would

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

have had an existence were it not for the Rhodesian war and

had South Africa not subsequently sponsored them.

The Mozambican conflict demonstrates a particularly

disturbing example of a colony that had been poorly

administered then abandoned in the midst of a liberation

struggle . The formative period preceding independence had

not solidified before foreign interests quickly aligned with

the respective internal protagonists, thus making available

sufficient arms to ensure a protracted war . Consequently, the

present, early consolidative phase is extremely painful .

Historic oculturalists may find the tribal alignments of

interest, as well as the magnitude of the atrocities-most of

which are attributed to RENAMO and to other antigovernment dissidents . 48 However, such brutality must be

appreciated within the contest for power between two

irreconcilable adversaries, each bent on the extension of

controls throughout the land. The evident anarchic element

and the ruthless subjugation of rural areas attest to an

ineffective central authority . In such an environment, sheer

terrorism and the possession of guns determine political

legitimacy . One side futilely seeks to govern while the other

side prevents this . But neither side respects traditional

structures for other than pragmatic tactical reasons .

Somalia, Liberia, Uganda, and Mozambique are but four

countries that have suffered extensive social disruptions

emanating from protracted civil wars . These countries hardly

exhaust a list of Africa's currently raging battles . Wars in

Ethiopia, Chad, Sudan, Angola, and Western Sahara match

or exceed the intensity of those in the former group . Each

case offers a unique mix of underlying motives, and each is

characterized by foreign interference at a time of great

internal fragility which marks their early consolidative

phases. But another source of disturbance needs comment as

it also belies, in part, cultural attitudes, namely, religious/

268
ethnic differences . These factors may play an increasing role

in the future and bear watching closely .

Except for the Coptic Christian northeast corner, Africa

had been animist prior to the introduction of Islam more

than a thousand years ago . Christianity was introduced in

the fifteenth century with the arrival of Europeans along

the western and central African coast . Islam had brought

with it a well-developed war culture that inspired Islamic

control throughout the Sahel, into the northern reaches of

west and central Africa, and along the east African coast .

But equally important, Islam coincided in large measure

with Afro-Asiatic people who ranged from the Sahel of

West Africa to the Middle East . West African Negroes and

the Bantu of central and southern Africa were distinctly

different racial types and cultures. Colonial boundaries,

however, did not respect such geographic and historical

factors ; hence, today the legacy of such divisions is conflict

in Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, and emerging tension

between Mauritania and Senegal .

Ethiopia

CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

In the case of Ethiopia, the predominantly Muslim

dissidents in Eritrea seek not to secede but to regain their

traditional independence from the Coptic Christian Amhara

rulers . This country was pieced together in the early 1950s

by a combination of external interests, a four power

commission, and a United Nations commission . 49 The

conflict in Ethiopia is, of course, much more complex in

that other regions, such as Oromo and Tigre, are also

pursuing various degrees of autonomy or outright

independence . But for our purposes, Ethiopia's conflict

may best be seen in the context of the continentwide

disruptions introduced by colonial wars or imperial controls

followed by the sudden departure of the Europeans after

269
having pieced together very tenuous political units out of

greatly disparate parts . Thereafter, ethnic/religious

animosities emerged, with each side supported by external

interests . Eritrea is heavily backed by Middle Eastern Muslim

interests, while Ethiopia had been allied with the US until

1974 when the Marxist government, in a radical turnabout,

opted for the Soviet Union . The subsequent protracted war

saw the reemergence of age-old ethnic, religious, and tribal

animosities, with the dissidents seeking power reversals-in

many cases, just sheer survival . The central government, on

the other hand, is buttressed by a history of being the only

African country to have defeated a European power in the

modern era .

The Eritrean war, which has been raging for 30 years,

has allowed the Eritreans to develop one of the most

capable armies in Africa and has solidified Eritreans'

feeling of national union . The Ethiopian government forces

occasionally have resorted to brutal retaliations against

nonmilitary villagers out of sheer frustration as their

battlefield tactics failed. Perhaps these retaliations could be

a reflection of a distinct historical or cultural attitude towards

war and human life rooted in tribal traditions . But the battle

is very much a modern one, as are the weapons, and the

number of casualties has been immense. In most other newly

formed countries such civil wars have been no less brutal . We

need not go beyond America's Civil War or the Bolshevik

Revolution for examples .

Sudan

CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

A similar ethnic/religious division characterizes the

Sudanese civil war, a protracted conflict whose brutality

easily matches that of the Ethiopian conflict . All the

continentwide disruptive elements are present : race, religion,

tribal animosities, refugees, starvation, external intervention,

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

and prolonged fighting . The external analyst will quickly

conclude that Sudan is poorly equipped to comprise an

integrated political unit-the largest one in Africa, at that .

Sudan ranks among the top of a list of African countries

whose conflicts are best explained in global- structuralist

terms. Long before British subjugation, the northern Arabs

enslaved the Nilotic peoples of what is today Sudan's

southern regions-an area which ought to be considered more

a part of black Africa than of Arab Africa . Even the British

recognized the fundamental distinction between Khartoum,

the seat of the governor-general, and the southern provinces,

which the British mostly ignored during the colonial era .

Even in places where the Christian missionaries were allowed

in the south, they were assigned to different regions . The

British encouraged the retention of traditional institutions

and kept the Arab and black portions administratively

separate . However, in 1946, in a hurried decision, the country

was united in its present form largely to serve British political

interests in the Middle East . After independence, the

Arab-dominated central government attempted to extend the

Arabic language and Islamic influences in the south . In the

early 1980s, in response to Islamic fundamentalist pressures

in Khartoum, the government tried to impose Islamic sharia

law even on the non-Muslim provinces .

In a sense, despite Sudan's independence, the country is

still in its formative stage because of never integrating into

a coherent political unit . The origins of this country lie

firmly in the colonial days when the inhabitants came

under the control of foreign interests . Foreign influence is

still evident in Egypt, Libya, Chad, Ethiopia, Cuba,

Israel-and various Arab nations involved on one or the

other side of a conflict-with each foreign power pursuing

its own interest, but in the process, only fueling the

extended war . The superpowers sense the dismal prospects

for direct intervention; hence, they are concerned more with

27 1
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

humanitarian aid and a diplomatic presence than with massive

direct military involvement .

Traditionalism is obvious in the Sudanese conflict and

is a deliberate government tactic . The southern region has

been dominated by the Dinka tribe, one of whose members,

John Garang, is the able leader of the Sudan People's

Liberation Army (SPLA)-which also finds support among

the black Nuer people . Government forces have been unable

to extend peace in the southern region . Meanwhile the

SPLA's strategy of frustrating food deliveries to the

starving rural masses has resulted in hundreds of thousands

of southern refugees fleeing towards Khartoum-which in

turn, exacerbates racial tensions there. The 2-million-strong

Dinkas have been by far the most active dissidents to

Khartoum's nationwide domination, but the Dinkas in turn

have been distrusted by other black southerners . In 1988 the

government armed various tribes in order to encourage them

to do its bidding against the Dinkas . Several thousand died

in subsequent clashes between the government-armed Fertit

and the Dinkas . 5l This renewed tribal conflict led to the

emergence of several other dissident movements. One such

movement is the equatorian province's Imatong Liberation

Front, which pursues secession in contrast to the SPLA,

which seeks merely to redress grievances against the Arab

north .

Khartoum may be described as intransigent in its adamant

stance towards centralized, nationwide domination and

Islamic political culture . The south remains isolated,

impoverished, and fragmented . Khartoum focuses its

foreign policy on a pro-Egyptian stance that respects

Egypt's vital Nile water requirements and on Middle East

financial resources . The south has welcomed aid from a

variety of sources . In the mid-1960s, a preceding dissident

movement had received military support from Israel at a

time when Sudanese troops participated in combat against

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

Israel in the Sinai as allies of Egypt .

53 More recently, the

SPLA has received its most important support from

Ethiopia, a country that is retaliating against the Sudanese

government's support of Eritrea and Tigre . 54 John Garang

has also had successful meetings with several black

African states which, in view of his status as the leader of

an insurgency movement, could portend the emergence of

tensions between Arabs and black Africans in other parts

of the continent.

The fighting in Sudan has been intermittent but has

extended over three decades . In Sudan-as in many

protracted African conflicts-when the conflict environ

ment deteriorated, atrocities were committed by all

protagonists . Airplanes reportedly have bombed southern

villages with chemical weapons, while the SPLA has been

accused of starving whole villages as one of its tactics of

war. A century ago, the Arabs had enslaved the southern

black populations ; now slavery has reemerged in all but pure

form once again .

56 The conflicts between southern tribes

facilitated by the government have resulted in large

massacres . Yet Robert M. Press observes that the most

notable conflict among black southerners was among two

tribes "with no previous record of inter-tribal hostilities ." 57

Though we may be tempted to reduce the conflict to a

religious war, the SPLA's John Garang has openly called for

the toleration of all religions and states that "worshipping

Allah is not the issue, but political elitism and the national

constitution is ." 58

Sudan is an excellent example of what appears to be a

conflict grounded in historical forces, yet the essence of the

various disputes is modern . Even so, some of the military

means employed resemble historical forces because of the

war's protraction .

It is tempting to assume the existence of irreconcilable

political differences between Africans of Islamic and

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

non-Islamic persuasions, but this would not be correct. At

issue is the coincidence of such religious differences with

ethnic, historical, and often racial differences . In history,

Christians have confronted other Christians in Europe, and

Muslims confront other Muslims in the Middle East . If

Muslims were to confront non-Muslims on religious issues

in the future, however, it would probably be in Africa .

Nigeria

In northern Nigeria during the Kano riots in 1985,

thousands died in clashes between the Muslim followers of

Maitatsine and troops of the secular government .

Maitatsine's sect disdained any aspects of modern life and

considered him to be the true prophet of Allah . 59 Nigeria also

encountered large-scale civil disturbances at the ascension of

Ibrahim Dusaki to the position of 18th sultan of Sokoto-an

event traditionally marked by violent clashes among

supporters of competing claimants to that powerful position.

Dusaki's family ties to Usman Dan Fodio, responsible for the

founding of the Sokoto caliphate, and rumored intrigues with

top government officials fused this religious event with the

affairs of state. The government could not help but take an

interest in the outcome, despite its avowed secular mandate.

60

Dusaki's ascension, the Muslim domination of the

military's ruling circle, the occasional government threats

to extend Islamic sharia laws to the southern Christian and

animist states, and the legacy of the Biafran war in the late

1960s all combine to keep religious and ethnic relations in

Nigeria tense. An ill-conceived coup attempt of April 1990

was ostensibly explained by its perpetrators with reference

to ethnic and religious differences and resentment towards

Muslim political domination .

61 Christians and Muslims

confronted each other in violent clashes in Kaduna in 1988

and in Bauchi in 1991 . Obviously, religion plays an

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

important role in Nigeria's recent history, but underlying

the religious differences are also vital ethnic factors which,

when combined, carry political implications . In the Biafran

war, for example, the Muslim northerners combined with

the Christian Yoruba to defeat the secessionist attempt by

Christian Ibos-who would have profited immensely from

exclusive access to the vast oil deposits on their territory .

Hence, we see that mere religious differences are not an

automatic basis for clashes ; often they combine with other

factors .

Senegal and Mauritania

Another conflict, that between Senegal and Mauritania, is

based on ethnic differences, but both sides are predominately

Muslims . Historical forces are at work-but within the

context of modern border violations by Mauritanian herders .

Citizens of each country residing in the other country become

targets for revenge . Mauritania was once ruled by the

Beydane, descendants of the "White Moors ." The Harratine,

blacks who were also Muslims, were enslaved by the

Beydane until only recently (some say to this day) . Today's

overt conflict between Senegal and Mauritania concerns

border transgressions and violations of each other's citizens

residing in each other's countries . But the conflict would well

reflect historical legacies and an attempt to break the

traditional master-slave relationship . Complicating the

conflict is a political secessionist movement in Senegal's

south and an active dispute with neighboring Guinea-Bissau

over possible oil resources along their common border.

Should any one conflict break out full-scale, there is little

doubt that the other conflicts would quickly break out as well .

Again, there is evidence of historical forces underlying the

disputes, but secessionism, border transgressions, and oil are

all very much modern concerns that characterize this dispute

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

more properly as a mix of some traditional, but mostly

modern, forces .

Rwanda and Burundi

If judged by sheer ferocity, the civil wars in Rwanda and

in Burundi may be Africa's clearest cases of a national

conflict motivated by tradition . Such an evaluation is

validated by the fact that two combatants, aligned along tribal

lines, face each other with minimal external involvement.

Before the independence of both countries, the minority

Tutsis had dominated . They excluded from power the

85-percent-majority Hutus, who had traditionally been

subservient to the Tutsi overlords in a classic African tribal

symbiotic relationship . Colonialism and independence

brought modern Western institutions to the two countries,

along with a modern struggle for power. In the face of

continued Tutsi monarchic rule, Burundi soon experienced a

military takeover from a new Tutsi king who had himself

deposed his father. An attempted but failed Hutu coup against

the Tutsi-dominated military government led to an outright

violent confrontation between these two ethnically distinct

tribes in which hundreds of thousands of people were

massacred or dispossessed. In neighboring Rwanda, by

contrast, independence had come with the majority Hutus

dominating the modern political institutions . But they were

soon opposed by a Tutsis guerrilla movement. The ensuing

war saw thousands of Tutsis slaughtered by government

troops and in public confrontations between members of the

two tribes .

63

The two combatants in each country were aligned along

purely tribal lines, and each suffered accordingly .

Involved were issues such as traditional Tutsi monarchical

affairs, historical master-servant relations, ethnic and

cultural differences, the traditional warrior nature of the

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

Tutsis, and tribal subgroup rivalries on each side . This is the

pure stuff of the historicoculturalists . However, we misassess the nature of the conflict if we fail to go beyond the

tribal dimension . First, Hutus and Tutsis had lived

together for centuries ; indeed, each relied on services

provided by the other. Hence, violent conflict between

them is mostly modern . Second, the colonial power-in

this case Belgium-fabricated a modern state along with

modern institutions in which the domination of central

government ensured great advantage to those who

managed to assume control . Understandably, the Tutsis

preferred to retain their traditional authority, but that had

derived from the protection they had exchanged for mostly

labor services of the Hutus . Now the modern police and

armed forces would supply such protection . With the

introduction of foreign ideas concerning majority rule, the

Hutus saw no need to maintain their traditional subservient

position . They would be qualified to rule by virtue of their

majority and would relegate the Tutsis to the obscurity of

minority status in a very impoverished country .

In this conflict, certain social patterns reflect historical and

traditional forces-the ensuing atrocities being one-yet the

reason for battle was indeed a modern one . Another problem

is the unfortunate continuation of this conflict without

resolution . In 1988, the conflict in Burundi flared anew,

based this time not on a calculated political objective but on

the failure to achieve peace in this country . It appears that in

the ongoing state of mutual suspicions, Hutus and Tutsis

attacked each other preemptively or out of revenge. The

Hutus believed that the Tutsi government troops were about

to embark on another campaign as must have been evident to

them by renewed military exercises . After the Hutu attack

began, the Tutsi soldiers struck back massively to discourage

a repeat of their near extermination in the early 1970s . Other

factors played a part, such as smuggling rights, high coffee

277
profits, and returning refugees ; but the polarization that had

been introduced in the early postindependence clashes

demonstrated the fragility of Africa's social relations in the

consolidative period .

64

South Africa

CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

Finally, South Africa requires comment as that country

demonstrates yet another dimension of tribal-based

animosities . Occasional analytic reference is made to the

alleged violent struggle for black power between the Xhosa

and Zulu peoples . Many analysts maintain that after majority

rule is attained, animosities between the 10 different black

ethnic groupings will break out into violent conflict . Others

argue that the whites keep the peace among blacks in the land,

and that indeed the Afrikaners are the great white tribe of

Africa .

Thousands of blacks died during the last few years in

prolonged clashes in South Africa's central Natal region .

In fact, the protagonists are all Zulus and not distin

guished by any tribal or clan alignments . Instead, the two

opposing sides represent, on the one hand, members of the

United Democratic Front aligned with the ANC and, on the

other hand, Inkatha, the political movement of Chief

Buthelezi, the chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland-a

government-created institution . That the ANC has many

Xhosas among its top leadership is true, but that does not

make the conflict a tribal confrontation . Buthelezi relies

for his appeal primarily on the traditional, rural,

impoverished sector of Zulus who respect his traditional

title as one chief (among many chiefs) and his

government-derived authority in the homeland . This

respect is denied him by the UDF, which is comprised of

the young, more urbanized, and educated Zulus, who

denounce Buthelezi's authority and who do not recognize

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

the legitimacy of the homeland . In this regard, the conflict

is within the same ethnic group and is motivated by the

struggle for modern power. Inkatha has had a history of

encouraging the retention of traditional warrior symbolsas heirs to the bloody legacy of Shaka. Few in South Africa

would dispute the existence of this atavistic martial

character for a substantial portion of pro-Inkatha Zulus.

But, as elsewhere in Africa where a conflict is not resolved

(in this case the conflict inherent in apartheid), modernday leaders find it advantageous to exploit this vestige of

traditional attitude towards war, but in pursuit of modern

objectives .

A lesser-known ongoing conflict in South Africa, which

does indeed reflect a much greater degree of traditionalist

forces, concerns "faction fights ." These conflicts kill

dozens or more annually, and most participants are Zulus.

Typically, bands of warriors representing families or

clans fight these battles in distant rural areas, usually

during the holiday season when men return from their

jobs in the distant cities . They bring with them a variety

of modern weapons, but they also employ spears,

machetes, and traditional fighting sticks .

66 Their numbers

may comprise all the men of a village who confront their

enemies in equal numbers in protracted, hit-and-run

tactics, which occasionally include pitched battles . The

motives are obscured due to the revival of such ongoing

battles at yearly intervals, but occasional analyses suggest

that such battles are fought in revenge for losses in the

previous year . Perhaps the precipitating cause may have

originally concerned women, cattle, or a transgression on

valued grazing lands.

Observers of this phenomenon have noted that the

emphasis is more on the need to continue the battles

than on supplying articulated justifications for them .

Men and boys confront credible enemies in well-planned

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

preparations for war and battlefield tactics . Certainly,

historicoculturalists find a great deal of evidence of

Africa's warrior legacy in these periodic conflicts .

It is ironic that these faction fights occur in South Africa,

a country that popularly advertises its advanced level of

social welfare . As such, they affirm that South Africa's

progress does not necessarily filter to all social sectors .

Whites in South Africa refer to these fights as proof of the

blacks' general lack of modern standards and their natural

proclivity towards uncivilized martial conduct.

67 However,

critics of South Africa's racial policies point to apartheid as

the cause for the perpetuation of these battles .

In South Africa's system of labor, black men leave their

rural homes for a great part of the year, which disrupts the

traditional social patterns and old systems of traditional

authority . With whites owning 87 percent of all lands in

South Africa, there is an obvious scarcity of good lands

for blacks . This pits the rural farmers against each other

in competition for grazing lands for their traditionally

valued cattle . The white-dominated government has seen

little reason to step into the fray as their interests are not

directly threatened. Critics of apartheid have pointed to

the government's abstention from the political battles and

faction fights in Natal as another reason for the government's illegitimacy as it does not serve the basic security

needs of all members of society . The ANC, as the most

visible liberation organization in South Africa, has

vehemently denounced all vestiges of traditionalism in

KwaZulu and has laid the blame for the faction fighting

at the government's door, citing its unwillingness to bring

them to a halt.

68

This analysis of different types of conflict within the

context of several examples is not meant to serve as a

comprehensive review . This analysis does, however, illus

trate the complexity of African conflicts and attempts

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

to strike a balance between the various explanations for

them . Most conflicts-including those which threaten

external security interests-have origins which may not be

traced to Africa's history of traditional warfare . However,

elements of such tradition-grounded behavior do manifest

themselves during the course of many conflicts, especially

where they become protracted. In other cases, governments have encouraged the reversion towards traditionalism, usually as a last resort or in their frantic search for

survival . Younger leaders universally condemn any

retention of tribalism as, invariably, it serves non-African

interests, and it decimates the masses but does not touch the

offending governments .

This review of Africa's diverse conflicts today has

verified the contention of the global structuralists who

focus on the active and destructive role of foreign inter

ventionists . Yet, other than Cubans, few other external

interventionists have lost their lives in Africa's wars,

while African casualties have numbered in the millions .

Whether interventionists supplied arms, training, battlefield advisors, or nonlethal economic aid to prolong a war,

the result usually has been to fuel the war, which allowed

Africa's warrior tradition to reemerge . The historicoculturalists contend that this is proof of the continuity of

Africa's warrior culture . Adda Bozeman states it most

concisely : "Today, Africans in all walks of life continue

to be guided by many of these traditional values and

institutions, even as they affirm new interests and

commitments associated with the lifestyles of the modern

age," 69

The evolutionists have stressed the general tendency of

all states, as they transit from the traditional to the modern

era, to enter into prolonged tumultuous periods . Neither

peace nor development will be attained until the inner

equilibration process advances these states through well28 1
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

established evolutionary stages . Ideally, states should

experience no external interventions as these pervert a

society's purpose by serving external interests . Guns and

finances are introduced, and the course and the outcome of

the battle is dictated by foreign objectives with Africans

paying for it not only in lives but also in terms of a

thoroughly negative image .

If both the global structuralists and the historicoculturalists are right, there is little basis to hope for an

early resolution of Africa's conflicts . Evolutionists expect

that eventually the conflicts will end-as they did in the

developed world . However, in light of Africa's serious

developmental problems, sociopolitical differences in

their multinational societies, and their vulnerability to

external influence, the evolutionists also expect that

African conflict may intensify, rather than diminish, in the

future .

Conflict in Africa

American Policy Implications

As befits a global power, the US properly takes an

interest in all conflicts . This, of course, does not imply

intervening in all of them, but does suggest that

monitoring the vicissitudes of the changing international

strategic environment is essential . Strategic planners must

be aware of the growing capabilities of emerging actors .

New issues take on new values and can lead to disruptions

of regional balances . The employment of new weapons and

tactics by a host of new expansionists requires intelligence

and a constant analysis of power shifts .

Sub-Saharan Africa poses no great challenges to

America's nuclear might nor to vital American strategic

interests . But the continent serves as an important opera28 2
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

tional base for conflicts in the Mediterranean and the Middle

East and for international shipping routes and communications links . Sub-Saharan Africa is the location of some of

the greatest human tragedies and the most numerous active

wars in the world today . Africa has become very vulnerable

to a variety of external forces, which seek their own

advantage in this delicate security environment and which

may disturb the balance of power and threaten our security

interests .

Fidel Castro has been an energetic presence on the

continent since the first contingent of Cuban troops

arrived to buttress their ideological allies in the Algerian

war for independence . Muammar Qadhafi has been an

active interventionist in over a dozen African countries,

often using his Islamic legion troops . The Israelis have

given substantial military aid, and the Palestinians have

offered bodyguards and military training . French troops

have installed or protected several governments . The

Soviets have sold huge quantities of arms to numerous

African countries and have deployed thousands of military

personnel, some of whom have been captured by forces

opposing Soviet-backed governments . China, North

Korea, East Germany, and Bulgaria all have supplied

military and security aid along with technical personnel .

Now in the postcontainment world, with a receding Soviet

presence in Africa, new powers are already moving into

the apparent void . Both Iran and Iraq have embarked on

aggressive diplomatic initiatives that may result in their

next confrontation being fought in Africa via surrogates .

No other area of the world offers so much constant active

external intervention and new development as does Africa .

No other area is as vulnerable to and as defenseless against

such new encroachments .
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

How can the US identify conflicts that impinge on our

security interests and require intervention? The analytic

context presented in this study may be of particular utility .

The historicoculturalists argue that the basic cultural

nature of Africans will ensure that conflicts of one type or

another will continue . They suggest these conflicts will be

mostly local ones among members of the same communities

or within single states . However, whether secessions,

transnational wars, insurgencies, coups and mutinies, or

civil disturbances sparked by a variety of pretexts, the

instability of the continent is assured. Hence, Africa will

attract external interventions by powers with their own

agendas .

Global structuralists focus on Africa's position in the

world and on the immense attraction of the continent for

those seeking economic, strategic, political, cultural, and

religious objectives . Africa is constantly manipulated,

external financial interests induce African governments to

support their economic activities, and the cold war

introduced greater interest in the continent's physical

resources than in its human resources . Little will change in

the new era . Should the Soviets vacate the entire continent,

there will be little reason for the US to sustain its substantial

strategic interest there . But this will only invite new powers

to fill the gap, and the victimization of Africa will continue .

In fact, these new external interests lack the financial

resources to seriously engage in anything other than military

involvements .

The evolutionists also see little prospects for improvement.

For them, Africa is in the early consolidative stage, an

inherently tumultuous period . Africa is weak with no

prospects for the early provision of its own security

capability . Where other societies in their early stages had

developed mostly in isolation on the distant periphery of

global concerns, for Africa this period is made especially

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CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

violent by the combination of extracontinental interests and

the availability of substantial quantities of modern arms .

These ensure the continuation of conflict and that Africa's

political evolution will not reflect its own internal power

equilibration . Cuban, French, and Middle Eastern financial

support have already determined the existing complexion of

a good portion of Africa .

The US would do well to monitor each conflict in Africa

and to evaluate the sources of disturbances . In the rare cases

of tradition-based animosities or cultural origins of such

wars, we may counsel the need for those countries to

modernize rapidly and to transcend hostilities . But a

policy of abstention from direct or even supportive

involvement may allow the natural internal forces to

emerge in which the victors may also be suitably equipped

to introduce stability into the country . Installing our

preferred contestant into power will require the perpetual

support of his regime and assure popular resentment

towards that regime . The East European governments that

were put in power and supported by the Soviets are

excellent examples of this . In Africa, few Soviet-backed

regimes have survived for prolonged periods despite the

massive costs expended in their support .

White rule has all but disappeared from Africa, and

relations between Arabs and blacks may yet be redefined .

Should Eritrea succeed in its total separation from

Ethiopia, several other countries could face similar

internal disruptions . Leading candidates include Sudan,

Chad, and Nigeria, while several others could experience

periods of tension among religious and ethnic factions .

This religious/ethnic issue, more than any other, could

begin to divide Africa into new political units . Our natural

tendency will be to involve ourselves in the retention of

the status quo, but again, evolutionists would argue that

this may only exacerbate tensions and consume funds that

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

could better be put to developmental use . We must face the

fact that Africa's present nations have not been constructed

to suit their own needs .

Beyond that, we will hardly encounter traditional African

martial forces of sufficient magnitude to threaten a major

realignment or regional balance which would determine our

need to intervene . We demonstrate our ignorance, however,

and risk misassessing more important underlying forces

when we mistakenly label some conflicts in southern Africa

as "ethnic tribal conflicts," as does the January 1988 issue

of the National Security Strategy of the United States . (In

fact, no tribal conflicts were raging at that time, much less

any that would pose a threat to our security interest .)

Our historical evaluation of events on the African

continent has focused too much on the anthropological

factors coloring our public perceptions of events that have

shaped modern Africa. Africans fighting each other with

allegedly primitive weapons in frequent small-scale

skirmishes were of greater interest to writers of travel and

adventure books than to our scholarly audiences . Yet as we

demonstrated, the introduction of modern guns, fighting

tactics, foreign political systems, economic competition,

subjugation, and the cold war all greatly disrupted Africa's

traditional societies .

We must also be sensitive to modern Africa's own

perceptions . In a review of francophone Africa-until

recently, a traditionally stable area-made in early 1990,

the Ivory Coast, Benin, Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Niger

were listed as exhibiting various forms of internal tension .

Yet in none of them was there evidence of tribal or

traditional rivalries as the precipitating cause .° All their

conflicts reflected the problems of modern rule, succession,

and impatience with the slow pace of development .

Similarly, the University of Lubumbashi in Zaire experienced violent campus turmoil in April 1990 . A certain

28 6
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

element of tribalism was in evidence in that, allegedly,

students attacked members of President Mobuto's own

tribe whom the students accused of spying on behalf of

the police . Still, the students' major concern was the

advancement of pluralistic democracy, the right to wear

western clothes of their choice, and the improvement of

conditions at the university . On their placards they had

written : "Down with tribalism, down with corruption,

long live freedom, long live democracy . " 7I The US must

guard against allying with the occasional African governments who do capitalize on tribalism in order to advance

their immediate fortunes, as was the case with Doe in

Liberia during the insurgency in 1990 . We must appreciate

that in the event those governments resort to that tactic,

backing them will hardly endear us to the younger

generations but will ally us with the weak governmentsones which have to resort to dubious means to stay in

power .

A different policy may be counseled with respect to

external interventionists in Africa's conflicts . Foreign

involvements may be of the type wherein an external

power expends its own military, financial, and human

resources . This has occurred numerous times, especially

in the case of Cuban and Libyan interventions . At best,

they make few permanent gains, they do not threaten our

vital security interests, and they expend enormous

resources of their own. Africans have hardly remained

gratified by such largess for long . Such incursions may

require US monitoring but may need no response . Other

interventions may demonstrate more comprehensive

ambitions, such as economic and strategic objectives .

These require responses, and the first should be to seek an

immediate end to such advances by diplomatic and

economic means before balancing or neutralization measures

are introduced . Such a policy can be presented to Africans

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CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

as being one which respects their sovereignty, until their

actions-motivated for whatever reasons- carry with them

theconsequencesfornotonly their ownnational interests but

also for other external powers . At the same time, Africans

must appreciate the inherent interests of a global power.

The evolutionists counsel that Africa will be beset by a

variety of conflicts for some time to come . Most of these

conflicts will emanate from the lack of a sufficiently long

formative phase that would have enabled African societies

to form into viable national units . Attempting to direct the

course of such consolidative efforts may be utterly futile .

Yet, to let the ongoing violence take its course and respond

after the fact is to risk eventually responding to a global

crisis . We may find it more productive to encourage

Africans to redesign their national boundaries, develop

regional cooperative structures, establish economic

integrative institutions, and introduce new political and

economic forms than to deal with the consequences of

conflicts which often begin as little more than elitist or

oligarchic self-perpetuation measures . Can we accept

repeated instances such as that in which Liberian president

Doe's prolonged resistance to rebel demands that he leave

office resulted in thousands of deaths and wrecked the

fragile economy?

Finally, policymakers must be sensitive to another factor:

the problem of perception and bias . We lament the violence

in Africa, which the historicoculturalists inform us is an

all-but-inherent African cultural attribute . However, we must

recall the sordid practices the white man introduced into

Africa . Colonial accounts are replete with barbaric practices

in Africa where whites engaged in the genocide they so

frequently accuse Africans of perpetrating . In 1904, the

German general Von Trotha issued an extermination order

against the Herero people who were native inhabitants of

the colony of Southwest Africa : "Every Herero, whether

28 8
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

found armed or unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot .

I shall not accept any more women and children ."7a White

South Africans were no less generous to the bushmen they

encountered, nor towards many blacks to this day. In the

current tense racial situation, the leader of the most vocal

right-wing extremist movement expressed his historically

well-grounded sentiment regarding blacks : "They want war.

We will give it to them and chase them . . . back to the

homelands . War is the only answer for such people . There are

only winners or losers .

,73

These are hardly isolated occurrences . History awaits

African historians' evaluation of the white man's culture of

violence. Writing of Nigeria's civil conflict, Colin Legum

observes :

To dismiss them simply as acts of political vengeance or as another

example of "African savagery" is Monday Club mumbo-jumbo. In the

last two decades, the Asians have shown greater savagery than the

Africans, and in the decades before that the Europeans in Germany

surpassed all .

74

Above all, these latter observations suggest that we

reevaluate our own established perceptions of Africa. This

may be essential before we embark on a new relationship with

that continent.

Notes

1 . Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Sheila Moser, Crises in

the Twentieth Century, vol. 1 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988), 4.

2. Some analysts who belong in this category include Kenneth W.

Grundy, who observes : "Thus Africa has been penetrated, ruled, exploited,

and proselytized ." Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, "The Impact

of Region on Contemporary African Politics," in African Independence :

The First Twenty-Five Years (Bloomington, Ind. : Indiana University Press,

1985), 99. In the same volume, Richard L. Sklar writes: "Despotic forms of

government were imposed upon Africans in the Belgian Congo, Portuguese

Africa, and the white settler states of Kenya, Rhodesia, and South Africa."

289
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

"The Colonial Imprint on African Political Thought," in African

Independence, 12. Crawford Young portrays African nationalist thought

which depicts Africa's "economic incorporation as a subsidiary part of the

complex of western economic institutions and relationships collectively

labeled as capitalism ." "African Relations with the Major Powers," in

African Independence, 119 .

Walter Rodney assumes a dogmatic ideological position in his analysis

of Africa's colonial history . His position is summarized: "African

development is possible only on the basis of a radical break with the

international capitalist system, which has been the principal agency of

underdevelopment of Africa over the last five centuries ." Walter Rodney,

How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, rev . ed. (Washington, D.C. : Howard

University Press, 1982), preface.

3. The evolutionist strain in historical analysis is evident in both

economic and political interpretations . Karl Marx offered his historical

dialectic as a comprehensive universal model of political economy. Eugene

Rostow presented his well-known "stages of economic growth" model .

Much of the thinking regarding evolutionary development I've presented in

this study derives from my attendance at lectures offered by Professor

George Liska, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., 1964-1966 .

4. Adda B . Bozeman, Conflict in Africa. Concepts and Realities

(Princeton, N .J. : Princeton University Press, 1976).

5 . Adda B . Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas" Orbis 20, no . 1

(Spring 1976) : 61-102.

6 . Ibid., 63, 65 .

7 . Bozeman, Conflict in Africa, chap. 3, passim.

8. Karl P. Magyar, "Intervention and Withdrawal in Africa: Problems

and Perspectives," in Military Intervention and Withdrawal, ed. Constantine

P. Danopoulos (London: Routledge, forthcoming) .

9. Bozeman, Conflict in Africa, 369-72.

10. Ali A. Mazrui, ed., The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa (Leiden,

Netherlands: Brill, 1977) .

11. Ibid., 1-2.

12. Ali A. Mazrui, "Armed Kinsmen and the Origins of the State," in

Mazrui, 10.

13. G. N. Uzoigwe, "The Warrior and the State in Precolonial Africa,"

in Mazrui, 23ff.

14. W. E. Abraham, The Mind ofAfrica (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1962), 84.

15 . Christian P. Potholm refers to this problem in "The Impact of

Traditional African Political Systems on Contemporary Political Patterns,"

in African Society, Culture and Politics, ed . Christopher Chukwuemeka

290
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

Kojekwu et al . (Washington', D .C. : University Press of America, 1978),

chap. 7 .

16 . Ali A. Mazrui, The Africans : A Triple Heritage (Boston: Little,

Brown and Co ., 1986), chap. 1 .

17. Janheinz Jahn, Muntu : An Outline of the New African Culture (New

York: Grove Press, 1961), 97.

18. Axel-Ivar Berglund, Zulu Thought Patterns and Symbolism

(Bloomington, Ind. : Indiana University Press, 1976), 79 .

19. Mazrui, The Africans, 135 .

20. Paul Bohannan and Philip Curtin, Africa and Africans, rev. ed.

(Garden City, N.Y. : National History Press, 1979), 186-87.

21 . Monte Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development, 3d ed. (Itasca,

Ill . : F. E . Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1985), 23 .

22. Ibid., 42-43 .

23. Ibid., 43.

24. Mazrui, The Africans, 41 .

25. Philip Curtin et al., African History (London : Longman, 1978), 90.

26. M. Kwamena-Poh et al ., African History in Maps (Essex, England:

Longman Group, 1982), 12 .

27. Curtin et al ., 242-43.

28. Kwamena-Poh et al ., 52.

29. Brian Catchpole and I . A. Akinjobin, A History of West Africa in

Maps and Diagrams (London : Collins Educational, n.d.), 106-7.

30. Ruth First, Power in Africa (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970),

74-75 .

31 . A sordid description of atrocities is offered in the preface of Robert

B . Edgerton, Mau Mau: An African Crucible (New York: Free Press, 1989) .

32. Curtin et al ., 580.

33. A typology of current conflicts in Africa is offered by Karl P.

Magyar, "Low-Intensity Conflicts: The African Context," in Responding to

Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University

Press, December 1990), 177-243 .

34. John Laffin, The World in Conflict, 1989, War Annual 3 (London:

Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989), 89-99 . Also, refer to Georg Brunold,

"The Horn of Africa: Trembling on the Brink," Swiss Review of World

Affairs 39, no . 6 (September 1989) : 22-24.

35. Richard Mackenzie in Insight 6, no. 21 (21 May 1990) : 34-36.

36. Ibid. ; Kenneth B . Noble in New York Times, 5 June 1990 and 13 June

1990.

37. The Arizona Republic, 22 April 1980.

38. Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 7 June 1990.

29 1
CONFLICT, CULTURE, AND HISTORY

39. Ieuan Ll . Griffiths, An Atlas of African Affairs (London: Methuen,

Inc., 1984), 70-73 .

40. Ibid., 72.

41 . A listing of the numerous political factions and rebel leaders is

offered in New African, no. 273, June 1990 .

42. Washington Times, 12 April 1990 ; and Foreign Broadcast

Information Service, Daily Report: Africa (hereafter cited as FBIS, Africa),

20 October 1989, 18 April 1990, 30 April 1990.

43 . Thomas H. Henriksen, "Lusophone Africa: Angola, Mozambique,

and Guinea Bissau," in Politics and Government in African States, ed. Peter

Duignan and Robert H. Jackson (Stanford, Calif. : Hoover Institution Press,

1986), chap . 9.

44 . Laffin, 167-73 .

45 . The Independent (London), 24 February 1988 .

46 . Edward P. Cairn, "Mozambique's Hidden War," in Combat on

Communist Territory, ed . Charles Moser (Lake Bluff, Ill . : RegneryGateway, 1985), 45.

47 . A report in Lisbon's Diario de Noticias, 6 December 1988, indicated

a split in RENAMO due to the nomination by Ndaus. See also FBIS, Africa,

30 January 1989, 23 .

48 . The "Gersony Report" has had the widest circulation in Washington

on the topic of RENAMO's atrocities . "Summary of Mozambican Refugee

Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experiences in Mozambique," US

Department of State, 20 April 1988 .

49 . Laffin, 89ff.

50. International Security Council, The Strategic Stakes in Sudan (New

York : International Security Council, 1985).

51 . See the reports by Jane Perlez, New York Times, 20 October 1985,

and by Robert M. Press, Christian Science Monitor, 9 August 1988 .

52. Reported in Africa Confidential 31, no. 2 (26 January 1990) : 5-6.

53 . Robert O . Collins, "Civil War in Sudan," Journal of Third World

Studies 5, no. 1 (1988): 77 .

54. The Economist 310, no. 7592 (4 March 1989).

55 . Carol Berger, "Khartoum Loses Its Grip," South, May 1988 .

56 . See the report by Robert M. Press, Christian Science Monitor, 27

July 1988 .

57 . Press, Christian Science Monitor, 9 August 1988.

58 . Lucy Hannan, "SPLA Victories in the South," New African, no . 261,

June 1989, 11-12.

59 . Natal Mercury, 1 May 1985 .

60. Reported in Africa Confidential 31, no . 7 (6 April 1990) : 3-4.

61 . FBIS, Africa, 4 June 1990, 28 .

292
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA'S HISTORY

62 . The Economist 311, no. 7601 (6 May 1989): 41-42.

63. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Africa, ed. Roland Oliver and

Michael Crowder (Cambridge, Mass . : Cambridge University Press, 1980),

226, 248. See also A. T. Grove, Africa, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1978), 255-58.

64. See the excellent analysis by Jane Perlez, New York Times, 29 August

1988 .

65. See "The Buthelezi Factor," The Economist 314, no. 7642 (17

February 1990) : 43 .

66. One report, which includes reference to the weapons employed, is

presented in FBIS, Africa, 28 March 1989, 8.

67. Graham Linscott, writing of the faction fights in Star writes : "Whites

tend to ascribe the conflict of the Zulu `warrior tradition' to an innate

propensity for violence." Reproduced in FBIS, Africa, 20 July 1989, 10.

68 . The ANC's position on tribal chiefs is complicated as they do make

distinctions between those chiefs who cooperate and those who do not

cooperate with the government. See Thando Zuma, African Communist,

reproduced in FBIS, Africa, 25 June 1990, 51 .

69. Bozeman, "War and the Clash of Ideas," 83 .

70. FBIS, Africa, 6 March 1990, 1 .

71 . FBIS, Africa, 2 May 1990, 9.

72. Reader's Digest Illustrated History of South Africa: The Real Story

(Pleasantville, N.Y. : Reader's Digest Association Press, 1989).

73 . FBIS, Africa, 15 June 1990, 8 .

74. Irving Leonard Markovitz, "The Tragedy in Nigeria," in African

Politics and Society : Basic Issues and Problems of Government and

Development (New York: Free Press, 1970), 250 .

Afghanistan: 24, 35, 36, 40, 42,

46, 48, 126, 234

Africa: XVIII, XX, XxIX, XXXV-XLVI,

LXIV, 35, 38, 43, 229-89;

militarism in : XLI, 236-38,

241-42, 250, 279; tribalism :

237, 252, 270, 276, 287 ; warrior

in traditional societies : xviii,

xx, 235, 238-40, 242, 245, 254,

276, 279-81 . See also Europe;

evolutionist, global structuralist,

and historicoculturalist theories

of African conflict; individual

country names

African National Congress (ANC):

253,280

African National Union: 253

Algeria: 251

Amin, Idi : 234, 242, 255, 262

Angola: 35, 48, 230, 235, 252,

255, 257, 268

Anti-Semitism : 98-99

Antistate : xxx, 7

Arab culture: XLII, XLIV-XLV,

xLvii, 140, 231, 247-48, 271,

273,285

Arab-Israeli conflicts : XVIII, 5

Argentina: 206, 208-9, 213,

218-19

Arms control studies : xV-xvi, xx

Ashanti (Asante): 240, 249

Asia: XX, XXVIII-XXIX,

XXXVI-xxxvII, 255

Atavism: 243, 255, 279

Bangladesh: xix, xLvii

Belize: 42

Biafran war: 274

Bloc of the Faithful. See Gush

Emunim. See also Israel ;

Judaism; Zionism

Bokassa : 234

Bolivia : 208, 215

Bolshevism : 2, 5, 10-12, 47

Index

295

Bourguiba, Habib: 91-96

Boxer Rebellion : 132

Bozeman theory of conflict,

violence, and war: xv-xLiv, 1,

3-6,58-59,117-19,193-94,

222,234-38

Brazil : 206-8, 213, 216, 219

Brezhnev Doctrine: 28-39, 48

Brezhnev, Leonid 1 . : 17-19,

27-28,31,33,37-40,45,48

Buddhism: 120

Buganda: 239

Bulgaria : 49

Bunyoro: 239

Burma: LII-L111

Burundi : 230, 242, 276-78

Buthelezi: 243, 278

Cambodia: LII-LIII, 43, 46, 48,

163, 166, 168

Carter, Jimmy: 219-20

Castro, Fidel: 38, 42-43, 219-20,

283

Central America. See Latin America

Chaco War: 215, 218

Chad: 230, 255, 257, 268, 271, 285

Chiang Kai-shek: 133-38

Chile : 198, 208, 213, 219

China: XIX, XXV, XXXVI, LIV-LXII,

117-48,159,181,264-65 ;

Chinese Communists/Communist

Party: 134-36, 138, 142,

146-47, 181-82; Chinese

concept of war: 137-48;

government, politics, and state

rule, concepts: LIV, LVI-LVII,

Lx, 121-22, 126, 137, 140-41 ;

People's Liberation Army

(PLA): 143, 145-46;

Sinocentrism: 138-40 ; war and

warfare in Chinese society :

LV-LVII, 122-24, 126, 137;

warlords : 125-31
Christianity : 66, 103-6, 195-96,

205, 212, 242, 265, 269

Clausewitz, Carl von: xxxl-xxxili

Cold war: XXII-XXIII, 4-5, 13,

27-28,218-19,284,286

Colombia: 37, 219

Communism: xxix, 8-9,11,13,

22,57,133-38

Comoros : 265

Conflict resolution studies: xv,

XVIII, XX-XXI, Yam, XXVIII

Confucianism : LV, 122, 129,

138-40,180

Confucius : LIx, 8

Congo: 242

Costa Rica: 218

Counterinsurgency: 22

Cuba: 32, 37-38, 213, 219, 253,

265,271

Czechoslovakia : 15, 30, 49

Diem, Ngo Dinh: 170-71

Diplomacy: xxviii, 18-19,109

Disarmament studies: XVI, XXiv

Doe, Samuel K. : 259-60, 287-88

Don Quixote: XXIV, LXIV

East Asian-Sinic cultures:

117-19,137,140,180-86

Ecuador: 215

Egypt : 82-90, 271-72. See also

Muslim Brothers

El Salvador: 37, 43, 218, 221

Engels, Friedrich : 8

Eritrea : 5, 43, 270, 273, 285

Ethiopia: 5, 230, 235, 255,

257-58,265,268-71,285

Europe: XVIII, xx, xxviii, 230;

colonialism in Africa: 231,

249-56; Eastern: XVIII, 6, 15,

25, 28, 49, 57, 106

Evolutionist theory of African

conflict: 232-33, 243-56,

281-82,284-85,288

Fascism: 20-21, 24, 29, 31 ;

Japan: 156-61

296

FNLA (Frente Nacional de

Libertacao de Angola): 253

FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacao

de Mozambique) : 253, 264,

266-67. See also Mozambique

Gasset, Ortega y : xxiv

Germany, East: 32, 49, 265

Ghana: 249, 252

Giap, Vo Nguyen: 168-70

Global structuralist theory of

African conflict: 231-33,

243-56,281-82,284-85

Gorbachev, Mikhail: 3, 14, 20, 25,

28,30,42-43,45,47,49

Grenada: 37, 41, 42

Gromyko, [Andrey] : 30, 38

Grotius, [Hugo] : xxxi, xxxH, 4

Guerrilla conflict and warfare :

XXIX, L1, 16, 37, 117, 221, 276

Guevara, Ernesto ("Che") : 220

Guinea: 255

Guinea-Bissau : 252

Gush Emunim: 102. See also

Israel; Judaism; Zionism

Haiti: 207

Han Fei Tzu: XXXV, LVII-LVIII

Hinduism: xLvu-Liv

Historicoculturalist theory of

African conflict: 233-34,

238-42,244,254-82,284,288

Hitler, Adolph: 2

Hizbullah: 80-81

Ho Chi Minh: 167-68,179

Holy war: See Jihad

Honduras: 218

Hong Kong: 118-19,131

Hungary : 29, 49

Ideological warfare: 25-28, 47-48,

256

Imperialism : 8, 22-23, 146

India : XVIII-XIX, XVVII-LIV, LXIV,

140, 144, 147. See also Hinduism

Indochina : xviii, xxiv-xxv,

L11-LI11, 136, 166, 184, 251

Indonesia: LII
Insurgency : xxxvi, 22, 117, 254

Inter-American security: 216-17,

219,223

Internal war: XXVIII, LIII, 5, 117

International law: xxv,

XXVIII-xxxlI, LI, 7, 59, 64,

78-79; Islamic concept: 59,

60. See also Grotius, [Hugo]

International relations, theories/

models of: xvI-xvII, xix-xx,

xxv, xxx-xxxi, 58, 233

International war and conflict: xv,

XIX, XXII, xxIv-xxv, xxvII,

xxix-xxx, 6-7, 59, 64, 78-79

Intifadah: 43

Iran: 35-36, 73, 76, 79, 90, 283

Iraq: 36, 79, 283

Islam: XXVVI, XLIV-XLVII, 8,

57-111, 269, 271-72; caliph,

role of: x, XLVI, 66-67, 83, 85;

conflict, concepts of: 69-76 ;

Egyptian: 82-90; Tunisian :

90-96. See also Arab culture;

Muslim culture

Israel : 36, 43, 99, 100, 105, 283.

See also Judaism; Zionism

Japan: xxiv, xxxvi, 67, 117-19,

130,134-36,139-40,148-61,

181-83; imperialism: 157-61 ;

feudalism: 149-56; militarism

of: 148-57, 161, 196, 242;

shoguns/warlords : 152-55,

159, 160-81 ; war and warfare :

150-54,157-61

Java: LII-LIII

Jihad: xLiv, 61-82, 84-85, 87-89,

91,95-96,105,107-9;

martyrdom: 81, 90. See Islam

Judaism: xLii, 97-106; conflict

and war, concepts of. XLIII--XLV,

60, 97 ; Jewish fundamentalism:

96-106; Old Testament:

XLII-XLIV; state, concept of:

XLI11-XLIV, 98, 100

June War (1967) : 99-101

297

Kenya: 240, 252, 262

Khmer: LIII, 163

Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah:

76-79,82,84,88-90,92

Khrushchev, Nikita : 27-28

Kikuyu: 239, 252

Koran: XXXV, XLII, XLIV-XLV,

XLVII, 62-64, 90-91

Korea: xix, 43, 126, 130, 137,

140,146-47,159,181-83 ;

North Korea: xxv, 33, 37, 118,

146-47, 188, 265; South

Korea: xxv, 43, 118, 146-47

Korean War: 142,146

Kublai Khan : 128, 152, 177

Kuomintang: 134-37, 142-43

Laos: LII-LIII, 166, 168

Latin America: xix-xx, 37-38,

193-224, 255 ; colonialism:

197-207, 210; Iberian culture:

194-205, 203-5, 207; military

tradition in: 196, 219-20, 222;

modernization: 210-13 ;

nationalism: 205-8, 212, 222

Law of nations: xxx-xxxi, 7

Law of nature : xxxi

Lawrence, T. E. : 22, 24

Lebanon: 80

Le Loi: 164, 178-79, 181

Lenin, [Vladimir I.] : xxxiii, 2-3,

8-13,16-17,223-24,31

Leninism: LIV, LIX, 2-4, 8-10,

12-13,15-17,20,26,39-42,

44,46-47,49,57,60-61 ;

challenges to Western concept

of state: 3, 8; new thinking :

42-49

Liberalism : 1, 3, 47

Liberation fronts : xxLx

Liberia: 259-61, 268, 287

Libya: 271

Lithuania: 49

Lord Shang: LVII

Low-intensity conflict: 2, 5-6, 11,

21-22,39-42,50-51,220-22
McNamara, Robert: XXXV

Malawi : 265

Malaysia: L11-L111

Manchuria : 127, 134, 141, 156, 161

Maoism : Lv, Lviii-Lx, 39

Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung):

LIV-LV, LVIII-LXII, 31, 121-22,

133-34,136,138,144,180-81

Marx, [Karl] : 47

Marxism: LIV, LIx, 2, 5, 9-10,

15-17,20,26,47,49-50,57,

60-61

Mau Mau: 252

Mauritania : 275-76

Mencius: LV

Mexico : 212-13

Microdependency : 38

Middle East: xviii, xxix,

XLII-XLVII, LII, LXIII, 66, 92,

105,109

Mongols : 127-28, 131, 140, 152,

159,164

Monroe Doctrine: 30

Morgenthau, Hans : xxvii

Morocco : 265, 268

Mozambique: 252, 264-69. See

also FRELIMO; RENAMO

Muslim Brothers : 85-86, 94. See

also Egypt

Muslim culture: XXXV, XLVI-XLVII,

4,59,62-67,84-86,88,90,93,

96-97,106-8,194-95,230,

246-49, 266, 268, 274-75 . See

also Arab culture ; Islam

Nasser, Gamal Abd: 83-85

Nationalism: 4-5, 10, 12, 60, 84,

133-34,142,205,207-8,211

Nationalist Chinese. See

Kuomintang

National liberation front : xxix

National question. See Leninism;

Marxism

Nation-state: XXVII-xxx, xxxii,

xxxv-xxxvi, xxxviii, 1, 3-7,

9-10, 58, 90, 98, 100, 106, 117,

193, 205-12; erosion of:

298

xxix-xxx, xxvi, 6; non-Western

political units : XXIX, XXXV1

NATO: 216

Natural law: 5

Nazism: 20-21, 24, 30

New thinking : 3, 25, 28, 30,

42-49. See also Gorbachev,

Mikhail ; Leninism; Marxism

Ngo Quyen: 177

Nicaragua : 28, 33, 37, 221

Nigeria : 229, 274-76, 285

Obote, Milton: 262

Oyo: 239-40

Pakistan: XIX, XLVII, 36

Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO): 37,102

Palestinian nationalism : 100, 102-3

Pan-Africanism : xxxviii

Panama: 37, 207

Pan-Americanism : 209-10,

213-15,217,223

Pan-Arabism: 84

Pan-Islamism : 4

Paraguay: 206, 215

Partisan warfare : 10

Peace: XX, XXVIII, xxx-XXVII,

XXXV, 5 ; studies : XX, XXVIII,

XXX, XXVIII; western

psychocultural predisposition

to: XXIII-XXIV, XXX

Peaceful coexistence : 27, 33-34

Perestroika: 45, 57, 109

Peripheral war: 57

Persia: XLVII, 71, 73, 76-77

Peru : 208, 215, 219

Philippines : LII-LIII, 33, 37

Poland: 14, 49

Political warfare : 27

Portugal: 195-97

Proletarian internationalism : 26,

30,33

Protracted conflict/warfare:

17-19,261,270,281

Psychological warfare : xvi
Qadhafi, Muammar: 283

Qutb, Sayyid: 83-86, 89

Reagan Doctrine: 48

RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional

Mozambicans): 243, 264-69 .

See also Mozambique

Revolutionary tactics and war: 5,

9, 22, 24

Revolutionary war: 22, 57

Rhodesia: 252

Romania: 14

Russia: 5, 8, 12, 15, 18, 131 . See

also Soviet Union

Russo-Polish War (1920) : 40

Rwanda: 230, 242, 276-78

Sadat, Anwar: 85, 87

Sandinista. See Nicaragua

Self-determination, Communist

Leninist-Marxism doctrine of:

9-11

Senegal : 275-76

Sharia (Islamic law) : 62-63,

65-68,72,79-80,82-84,88,

91-93, 95. See also Islam

Shi'ism : 59, 69-76, 77, 80, 82, 88,

90, 96, 97, 108 . See also Islam

Siam. See Thailand

Singapore: LII

Socialism

(Marxist-Leninist-Soviet) : 8-9,

30, 33, 35, 47

Somalia : 258-59, 268

South Africa : 35, 265, 278

Southeast Asia: LII-LIV, LXIV, 140,

163. See also individual

country names; Indochina

Sovereignty : 6-7, 25-26, 49;

devaluation of: xxx;

Marxist-Leninist-Soviet

concept of: 25-26, 29-30, 50

Soviet Union: 2-4, 10-11, 14,

18-20,23-24,26-35,145,

264-65; Communist party : 9,

13, 24, 27, 31, 41 ; conflict and

war, doctrine and theories of: 2,

4, 8, 11, 13-14, 16, 18-19, 22,

299

30, 31-33, 50-51 ; strategies of

class struggle and warfare : 11,

17-20,24-26,36-39,42-49 .

See also Leninism; Marxism;

Stalinism

Spain: 24, 38, 65, 195-98, 200

Stalin, Joseph: 9-10, 17-21,

24-27,31,44

Stalinism: LIV, 14, 19-20, 44, 47;

correlation of forces : 19, 23 ;

diplomacy, techniques of: 18-21

Sudan: 235, 242, 257, 268, 270-73

Sumatra: LIII

Sunnism: 59, 62-69, 82-83,

89-91, 96. See also Islam

Sun Tzu: LVII-LVIII, LX-LXII, 122,

180

Sun Yat-sen: 133

Suriname : 42

SWAPO (South-West African

People's Organization) : 253

Taiwan: 18, 119, 143

Tanzania: 262, 265

Taoism: LV, 138

Terrorism: xxiv, 80, 117

Thailand: L11-LIII, 163

Tibet: xIX, 143--44, 147, 182

Tito, [Josip Broz] : 27

Tonkin. See Vietnam

Traditfonal societies : 234, 237,

239,241-46,254,257,263,

277, 279, 280

Tran Hung Dao: 177

Trotsky, Leon: 16-17

Tunisia: 90-96; Movement of

Islamic Tendency (MTI):

93-94. See also Islam

Turkey: XLvi-xLvii, 46, 67

Uganda: 242, 261-64, 268

Ukraine: 14

Ummah: 62,64-70,77,81-85,

88-89, 95-97. See also Islam

United Nations: xxxi, 38, 216, 269

Uruguay: 208-9, 213

USSR. See Soviet Union
Venezeula : 212, 219

Vietnam: LIii, 33, 37, 117-18, 126,

129, 137, 140, 145, 147,

161-79, 181-82, 184, 234;

Conflict, psychocultural roots :

176-79, 184; North Vietnam:

Xxv, LII, 172-75, 178-79, 183;

South Vietnam : LII; Viet

Minh/Vietcong: 168-71, 179;

warlords : 176-79

Vietnam War: 172-76

War: XV-XX, XXv-XXvIII,

XXX-XXXIV, XXXVI, XXXVIII,

5-6,23-24,39,59,107,117,

194, 234-38 . See also

insurgency ; internal war;

international war and conflict;

protracted conflict/warfare;

300

revolutionary war; terrorism ;

wars of liberation ; wars of

nerves

Wars of attrition : 22-25

Wars of liberation : 6, 13

Wars of nerves: xxii

Wei-ch' i : LIX, LXI, LXII

World War 1 : 13, 213-14, 251

World War 11 : xxiv, 214-18, 232

Yoruba: 239-41, 275

Yugoslavia : 1, 27

Zarathustra : 77

Zimbabwe: 35,253, 265

Zionism: 7, 98-102

Zoroastrianism : 77, 82

Zulu: 239, 241, 243, 244, 250, 278

*U.S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:2001-634-785120126