NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3624-13T1

LISA LOMBARDI,

Plaintiff-Appellant/

Cross-Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY A. LOMBARDI,

Defendant-Respondent/

Cross-Appellant.

__________________________________________

Argued March 1, 2016 – Decided

Before Judges Espinosa, Rothstadt, and 

Currier.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer 

County, Docket No. FM-11-113-11.

Mark H. Sobel argued the cause for 

appellant/cross-respondent (Greenbaum, Rowe, 

Smith, & Davis LLP, attorneys; Mr. Sobel, of 

counsel and on the brief; Lisa B. DiPasqua, 

on the briefs).

Brian G. Paul argued the cause for 

respondent/cross-appellant (Szaferman,

Lakind, Blumstein & Blader, P.C., and Stark 

& Stark, attorneys; Mr. Paul, of counsel and 

on the briefs).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ROTHSTADT, J.A.D.

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

AS REDACTED

September 12, 2016

APPELLATE DIVISION

September 12, 2016
2 A-3624-13T1

This appeal requires us to address the calculation of 

alimony where the parties relied on only a fraction of their 

household income to pay their monthly expenses and regularly 

saved the balance during the course of their marriage. It is 

well-established that the accumulation of reasonable savings 

should be included in alimony to protect the supported spouse 

against the loss of alimony. See Jacobitti v. Jacobitti, 135 

N.J. 571, 582 (1994); Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 354 

(1956); Davis v. Davis, 184 N.J. Super. 430, 437 (App. Div. 

1982). In this case, we consider whether the parties' history 

of regular savings as part of their marital lifestyle requires 

the inclusion of savings as a component of alimony even when the

need to protect the supported spouse does not exist.

The Family Part found that the monthly savings were part of 

the marital lifestyle, but excluded the amount from its 

calculation of alimony because savings were not necessary to 

ensure future payment of alimony. We disagree with the court's 

decision and hold that regular savings must be considered in a 

determination of alimony, even when there is no need to create 

savings to protect the future payment of alimony.

Both plaintiff Lisa Lombardi and defendant Anthony A. 

Lombardi appeal from portions of their final judgment of divorce 

(FJOD), entered after a twenty-eight day trial. Plaintiff 
3 A-3624-13T1

challenges the court's alimony award based upon its rejection of 

the savings element despite it being undisputed that during the 

course of the marriage the parties "established [a] practice of 

savings" that was "the largest component of [their] marital 

lifestyle." As to child support, she claims the court's 

"allocation . . . of the children's expenses [does] not allow 

[them] to share in their father's economic good fortune." 

Plaintiff also challenges the court's equitable distribution of 

two accounts, and its denial of her request for counsel fees and 

costs. Defendant avers that the FJOD should be affirmed in all 

respects, but argues that, "in the event any portion of [it] is 

reversed and remanded," the court's failure to provide him with 

a credit for "the active appreciation" of the funds in one of 

the two accounts disputed by plaintiff warrants reversal.

We have considered the parties' arguments in light of the 

record and our review of the applicable legal principles. We

vacate and remand for reconsideration of the determinations as 

to alimony, child support, the equitable distribution of the two 

subject accounts, and counsel fees and costs.

I.

The parties began dating in college, and married in May 

1990, three years after their graduation. Three children were 

born of the marriage, now ages twenty, eighteen, and fifteen. 
4 A-3624-13T1

Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on August 2, 2010, and 

the court entered the FJOD on March 7, 2014.

At the time of the FJOD's entry, the parties were fortyeight-years-old and healthy, and defendant was employed fulltime. Plaintiff, who holds a bachelor's degree in marketing, 

previously worked as the vice president of desktop publishing at 

Bear Stearns, reaching a salary of $80,000 per year, when the 

parties agreed that she would leave the workforce to become a 

full-time homemaker after the birth of their first child. As 

the children grew older, plaintiff obtained a certification as a 

fitness instructor and now teaches classes part-time at local 

fitness clubs for a gross income of approximately $10,000 per 

year. She is the children's parent of primary residence and 

continues to reside in the marital home.

Defendant has a bachelor's degree in finance, a master's 

degree in business administration, and is a chartered financial 

analyst. During the course of the marriage, he worked for a 

number of investment firms as an analyst or portfolio manager. 

He accepted a position with his current employer in 2004, at a 

base salary of $250,000 with a $1,125,000 guaranteed bonus for 

two years, and is now a vice president, senior portfolio 

manager. He was paid total compensation ranging from $1,087,000 

to $2,275,000 during the five years immediately preceding the 
5 A-3624-13T1

filing of the divorce complaint.

Despite defendant's substantial earnings, the parties 

routinely saved the better part of his salary. The portion of 

his earnings used for the family's expenses allowed them to 

enjoy a comfortable, but not extravagant, standard of living. 

The decision to not "live a very lavish lifestyle" was the 

result of the parties' shared desire to budget most of their 

income during the marriage. According to plaintiff, after 

watching her parents struggle financially as a result of 

unreimbursed health care expenses, she wanted to ensure that she 

had enough saved for her and defendant's care as they grew older 

so that they could still pay for their children's college 

education and "live comfortably" after retirement without the 

need to "worry" about finances or "change [the family's] 

lifestyle." According to defendant, although he was still 

working, they saved so that he could retire at forty-five, when 

the family would have accumulated $5 million in assets, a sum 

sufficient to generate enough annual income to meet the family's 

needs at their current lifestyle.

The parties spent $22,900 per month in order to maintain 

their lifestyle, exclusive of savings and gifts to the children.

Plaintiff estimated that the parties saved approximately $67,000 

per month. Consistent with their lifestyle choice, they did not 
6 A-3624-13T1

often buy extravagant clothing or dine at expensive restaurants. 

Defendant drove a BMW and then a Camaro, while plaintiff drove a 

Buick Enclave. The family usually spent vacations locally, in 

New York's Catskill Mountains or in Cape May, and sometimes took 

ski vacations during the children's winter break. They never 

hired domestic help or sent the children to daycare.

In addition to their savings, which totaled approximately 

$4.18 million at the time of the FJOD,

1 the parties owned the 

marital home. They established and funded college savings 

accounts for all three children, and avoided debt for the most 

part – at the time of the divorce complaint, they had a mortgage 

on the marital home, a lease on one car, and a loan on another.

The parties eventually settled issues of custody and 

parenting time, agreed that plaintiff would be entitled to an 

award of permanent alimony, although they disputed the amount,

and to an equal division of the marital estate by equitable 

distribution, except as to one joint account and another account 

opened by defendant in his own name. They also did not resolve 

their claims for counsel fees and costs. These remaining issues 

were addressed during the parties' twenty-eight day trial that 

began in December 2011 and concluded in 2014 when the court 

 

1 The parties also held another joint account and retirement 

accounts that they agreed should be divided equally.
7 A-3624-13T1

placed its oral decision on the record over the course of four 

days.

The court entered the FJOD and the parties filed their 

respective appeals from certain provisions thereof.

II.

Our review of the Family Part's determination in 

dissolution matters is limited. We accord deference to 

decisions of the Family Part based on its expertise in 

matrimonial matters. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 

(1998). We will not disturb its decisions if they are supported 

by substantial credible evidence and are consistent with 

applicable law. Ibid.; see also Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 

428 (2015). This standard applies equally to its decisions 

regarding alimony, see J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475, 485 

(App. Div. 2012), child support, see J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 

325-26 (2013), equitable distribution, see La Sala v. La Sala, 

335 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 167 N.J.

630 (2001), and counsel fees. See Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J.

229, 233 (1971); Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 46 (App. Div. 

2011). However, we owe no special deference to the court's 

legal conclusions. See D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245-46 

(2012).
8 A-3624-13T1

III.

A.

We begin our review by addressing the trial court's alimony 

award. According to plaintiff, she required $16,291 per month 

to support herself and the three children at a standard of 

living comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, exclusive 

of savings. She sought an additional $30,000 per month for 

savings.2 Plaintiff requested an award of child support in the 

amount of $5000 per month and a requirement that defendant be 

solely responsible for paying certain expenses for the children, 

such as extracurricular activities, tutoring, summer camps,

cars, and auto insurance.

After considering the evidence, the court established a 

permanent award of monthly alimony in the amount of $7600, 

without including an amount for savings, even though it found it 

was a component of the marital lifestyle. It determined that 

plaintiff required alimony to meet her needs at the marital 

 

2 Plaintiff's forensic accounting expert testified that the 

parties had habitually saved an average of $67,000 per month 

during the final years of the marriage. He estimated that, even 

at the $30,000 per month plaintiff was requesting as a savings 

component of alimony, she would be able to save $228,000 per 

year after taxes, while defendant would be able to save 

$705,000. At that rate, in fifteen years, when the parties 

would both be sixty-one-years-old, plaintiff and defendant would 

have accumulated approximately $3,960,000 and $12,043,000, 

respectively, assuming a three percent rate of return on 

investment compounded monthly.
9 A-3624-13T1

standard of living, which the court characterized as a "modest 

middle-class lifestyle," and found that the parties did not 

dispute the monthly amount needed to meet plaintiff and the 

children's expenses. The court concluded that plaintiff's 

proposed budget, without savings, for herself and the children 

was largely reasonable and consistent with the evidence, and 

approved a monthly budget of $14,516, excluding savings. After 

deducting the $5000 it was awarding in child support, the $3610 

monthly after-tax income it estimated could be generated by 

investment of plaintiff's equitable distribution share, and the 

$583 after-tax monthly earnings from her part-time work, the 

court found plaintiff would require another $5323 to meet her 

budget. Accounting for taxes, the court concluded that the

gross award of $7600 per month would cover the shortfall. The 

court then determined that defendant earned a sufficient amount 

to cover plaintiff's budget, including the requested savings 

component, and his own expenses.

In reaching its decision, the court observed that each

party would have the benefit of half of the roughly $5.5 million 

marital estate after equitable distribution, providing a 

significant opportunity for investment and saving for 

unanticipated expenses, although defendant's considerable income 

and earning potential conferred on him a greater opportunity 
10 A-3624-13T1

than plaintiff. Moreover, the children's college expenses were 

already provided for in amply-funded custodial accounts, and 

defendant was responsible for maintaining the children's

medical, dental, and vision coverage and paying all uncovered 

costs over $250 per child per year. Finally, the parties had no 

debt, and plaintiff, the parent of primary residence, would 

retain the marital residence unencumbered by a mortgage.3

As for the savings issue, the court observed that the 

parties' "earning[s] exceeded consumption by approximately 

$87,000 per month on average." It noted that those savings 

could be understood as a "component of lifestyle" in the sense 

that the parties had habitually saved the better part of their 

income during the marriage, whether, as defendant claimed, to 

provide for an early retirement or, as plaintiff testified, to 

enhance the couple's economic security more broadly, and lived a 

generally frugal lifestyle as a result. Nonetheless, the court 

concluded that including savings as a component of an alimony 

award was only warranted to the extent it was necessary to

ensure a dependent spouse's economic security in the face of a 

later modification or cessation of support, which were not

issues here. However, it identified factors it found allowed 

 

3 Defendant paid off the mortgage in full from a joint account 

during the litigation. According to plaintiff, he did so 

without her knowledge or consent.
11 A-3624-13T1

plaintiff to accumulate savings through means other than

increased alimony, though not to the extent the parties saved 

during the marriage. It cited to, among other factors, some 

"overlap" in the alimony and child support budgets, plaintiff's 

right to claim the children as exemptions for tax purposes, and 

"her ability to work and retain earnings to use for savings 

. . . because of the maturation of the children . . . such that 

she would have more time to spend working if she chose to do 

so." The court stated:

Furthermore, from a budget standpoint 

the plaintiff will have no obligation for 

any college expense, no obligation for any 

unreimbursed medical or health expense, all 

extracurricular activities are covered by 

the above-guideline . . . award, and if she 

chose to work more that she would be 

protected against any claim that her alimony 

should be reduced or that she has lesser 

need.

[(Emphasis added).]

Also, the court noted that defendant had been ordered to 

maintain a life insurance policy to secure his obligation to

plaintiff and the children in case of his death, and determined

defendant's substantial assets and income therefrom made it 

unlikely he would obtain a modification of his support 

obligation in the future.

The court concluded by summarizing its reasons for not 

including a savings component in its alimony calculation:
12 A-3624-13T1

The [c]ourt finds that a permissible 

savings component which it elected not to do 

or not to include was because there are 

potentials for [plaintiff] to accumulate, 

earn, and otherwise be protected from a 

reduction by virtue of, one, reasons having 

to do with the current budget and the room 

in the budget to still save, the ability to 

work more without worry about a reduction in 

alimony, the investment opportunity that 

might enhance the return on the over $2 

million that she will receive, the life 

insurance to protect against the death of

the defendant, and the likelihood of a 

continued appreciation and increase in 

assets and earnings that . . . would protect 

her against any arbitrary . . . reduction in 

alimony based upon early retirement or 

otherwise.

B.

Plaintiff argues the court erred in excluding a savings 

component from the alimony award because, among other reasons, 

the award permitted defendant to continue to enjoy the marital 

standard of living but deprived plaintiff of the same 

opportunity. She argues her position is supported by the fact 

that, although the case information statement form required by 

our courts did not initially include savings as a budget 

category, that category has since been added, reflecting the 

courts' view that savings is a fundamental element of the family 

lifestyle that must be accounted for in a support award. We 

agree.
13 A-3624-13T1

Alimony is authorized by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and is governed 

by the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b).4 It exists to 

"permit [one spouse] to share in the economic rewards occasioned 

by [the other's] income level (as opposed merely to the assets 

accumulated), reached as a result of their combined labors, 

inside and outside the home." Gugliotta v. Gugliotta, 160 N.J. 

Super. 160, 164 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 164 N.J. Super. 139 (App. 

Div. 1978); see also Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 195 

(1999). "[A]limony is neither a punishment for the payor nor a 

reward for the payee. . . . It is a right arising out of the 

marriage relationship to continue to live according to the 

economic standard established during the marriage . . . ." 

Aronson v. Aronson, 245 N.J. Super. 354, 364 (App. Div. 1991). 

"Alimony relates to support and standard of living; it involves 

the quality of economic life to which one spouse is entitled, 

which then becomes the obligation of the other." Gnall, supra, 

222 N.J. at 429.

A proper alimony award "assist[s] the supported spouse in 

achieving a lifestyle that is reasonably comparable to the one 

enjoyed while living with the supporting spouse during the 

 

4 Several significant aspects of the statute were amended 

effective after the entry of the FJOD. L. 2014, c. 42, § 1 

(effective Sept. 10, 2014). None of the amendments, however, 

impacts the trial court's decision or ours in this case.
14 A-3624-13T1

marriage." Tannen v. Tannen, 416 N.J. Super. 248, 260 (App. 

Div. 2010) (quoting Steneken v. Steneken, 183 N.J. 290, 299 

(2005)), aff'd o.b., 208 N.J. 409 (2011). "[A] judge awarding 

alimony must methodically consider all evidence to assure the 

award is 'fit, reasonable and just' to both parties, N.J.S.A.

2A:34-23, and properly balances each party's needs, the finite 

marital resources, and the parties' desires to commence their 

separate futures, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c)." Gnall v. Gnall, 432 

N.J. Super. 129, 149 (App. Div. 2013), rev'd on other grounds, 

222 N.J. 414 (2015).

The goal of alimony is to assist the supported spouse in 

achieving a lifestyle "reasonably comparable" to the one enjoyed 

during the marriage. Steneken, supra, 183 N.J. at 299; see also

Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 17 (2000); Cox v. Cox, 335 N.J. 

Super. 465, 473 (App. Div. 2000). "The importance of 

establishing the standard of living experienced during the 

marriage cannot be overstated." Crews, supra, 164 N.J. at 16. 

It is the "touchstone for the initial alimony award." Ibid.

In determining the marital lifestyle, the trial court looks 

at various elements including "the marital residence, vacation 

home, cars owned or leased, typical travel and vacations each 

year, schools, special lessons, and camps for [the] children, 

entertainment (such as theater, concerts, dining out), household 
15 A-3624-13T1

help, and other personal services." Weishaus v. Weishaus, 360 

N.J. Super. 281, 290-91 (App. Div. 2003), rev'd in part on other 

grounds, 180 N.J. 131 (2004). The ultimate determination must 

be based not only on the amounts expended, but also what is

equitable. Glass v. Glass, 366 N.J. Super. 357, 372 (App. 

Div.), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 (2004).

"[A]n appropriate rate of savings . . . can, and in the 

appropriate case should, be considered as a living expense when 

considering an award of . . . maintenance." Id. at 378 (second 

alteration in original) (quoting In re Marriage of Weibel, 965 

P.2d 126, 129-30 (Colo. App. 1998)). Thus, the court can take 

into account the marital standard of living and allow the 

supported spouse to save for the future. See id. at 379; see 

also Capodanno v. Capodanno, 58 N.J. 113, 120 (1971). This is 

particularly true when the supporting spouse can afford any 

amount paid to the supported spouse. Glass, supra, 366 N.J. 

Super. at 379.

A spouse's need for savings has long been recognized as a 

component of alimony, see Martindell, supra, 21 N.J. at 354, 

that allows for the accumulation of "reasonable savings to 

protect [the supported spouse] against the day when alimony 

payments may cease because of [the death of the supporting 

spouse] or change in circumstances." Davis, supra, 184 N.J. 
16 A-3624-13T1

Super. at 437 (quoting Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 70 (1971)). 

Savings have been used for such security in lieu of directing 

the supporting spouse to keep a life insurance policy or 

establish a trust. See Jacobitti, supra, 135 N.J. at 582 

(upholding an order to create a trust in lieu of life insurance 

to ensure "continuing alimony payments for the life of the 

dependent spouse"); Davis, supra, 184 N.J. Super. at 436-40 

(upholding an order directing the supporting spouse to obtain 

and designate the dependent spouse as the beneficiary of a life 

insurance policy). In short, savings has been a relevant and 

appropriate factor to be considered in the establishment of a 

reasonable and equitable alimony award because the amount of 

support awarded is subject to review and modification upon a 

showing of a change of circumstances, which could result in the 

supported spouse being incapable of supporting himself or 

herself. See Davis, supra, 184 N.J. Super. at 437.

However, the protection of income being derived through 

alimony is not the only reason why a supported spouse requires 

savings, especially where regular savings have been part of the 

established marital lifestyle. "[A]n appropriate rate of 

savings to meet needs in the event of a disaster, to make future 

major acquisitions such as automobiles and appliances, and for 

retirement can, and in the appropriate case should, be 
17 A-3624-13T1

considered as a living expense when considering an award of 

. . . [alimony]." Weibel, supra, 965 P.2d at 129-30; see also

Glass, supra, 366 N.J. Super. at 378.

The most "appropriate case" in which to include a savings 

component is where the parties' lifestyle included regular 

savings. Because it is the manner in which the parties use 

their income that is determinative when establishing a marital 

lifestyle, see Weishaus, supra, 180 N.J. at 145, there is no 

demonstrable difference between one family's habitual use of its 

income to fund savings and another family's use of its income to 

regularly purchase luxury cars or enjoy extravagant vacations. 

The use of family income for either purpose over the course of a 

long-term marriage requires the court to consider how the money 

is spent in determining the parties' lifestyle, regardless of 

whether it was saved or spent on expensive purchases. The fact 

that the payment of the support ultimately is protected by life 

insurance or other financial tools, does not make the 

consideration of the savings component any less appropriate.

The Supreme Court has recognized the need to consider 

regular savings in determining a marital lifestyle by including 

a line item for monthly savings in Schedule C of the case 
18 A-3624-13T1

information statement parties must file in family matters.5 See

R. 5:5-2; see also Family Part Case Information Statement,

Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix V(D) to

R. 5:5-2 (2016). While the original case information statement 

form did not include a line item for savings, it was changed two 

years after implementation to add or subtract certain budget 

items so that the form would "more closely track [a family's] 

actual expenses." Report of the Supreme Court Committee on 

Family Division Practice, 118 N.J.L.J. 117, 130-31 (July 24, 

1986). The Supreme Court's Committee on Family Division 

Practice recommended a "savings and investments" item, reasoning 

that "[a]lthough such a line might be viewed as subject to 

abuse, [it] would still appear appropriate because in many 

households savings and investments represent a fundamental 

portion of an ongoing budget." Id. at 131. The Court adopted 

that recommendation and, as stated in Rule 5:5-2(e), the revised 

form is required in all actions involving alimony, and copies 

must be preserved by the parties as evidence of the marital 

 

5 While deciding an unrelated issue in an earlier case, we also 

signaled our recognition of a trial court's need to properly 

consider the savings component. See Tannen, supra, 416 N.J. 

Super. at 277 (finding judge's consideration of lifestyle 

inadequate because he did not consider savings component, among 

other factors, as part of parties' lifestyle).
19 A-3624-13T1

standard of living at the time the award was made. R. 5:5-

2(e)(3).

We reject defendant's assertion that the court correctly 

addressed the savings component through equitable distribution 

of the parties' accounts. The argument runs afoul of the rule 

that "equitable distribution determinations are intended to be 

in addition to, and not as substitutes for, alimony awards,"

which are awarded to provide for the maintenance of the marital 

lifestyle post-dissolution. Steneken, supra, 183 N.J. at 299. 

Moreover, it is not equitable to require plaintiff to rely 

solely on the assets she received through equitable distribution 

to support the standard of living while defendant is not 

confronted with the same burden. As expressed under the alimony 

statute's current version, the court must recognize that 

"neither party ha[s] a greater entitlement to that standard of 

living than the other." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(4).

We therefore hold that the Family Part must in its 

assessment of a marital lifestyle give due consideration to 

evidence of regular savings adhered to by the parties during the 

marriage, even if there is no concern about protecting an 

alimony award from future modification or cessation upon the 
20 A-3624-13T1

death of the supporting spouse.

6 We recognize that the majority 

of other jurisdictions have not extended their courts' 

consideration of the savings component of an alimony award to 

the extent we do today, see Glass, supra, 366 N.J. Super. at 

377-78 (surveying cases awarding retirement savings as part of 

alimony award), but we believe the result is equitable, see id.

at 372, and consistent with our statute.

Having said that, we caution that a court is equally 

obligated to consider the marital lifestyle and the financial 

situation of the parties post-divorce as set forth in the 

statute, and "[n]o factor sh[ould] be elevated in importance 

over any other factor unless the court finds otherwise, in which 

case the court sh[ould] make specific written findings of fact 

and conclusions of law in that regard." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b).

We recognize that the court attempted to identify areas 

through which plaintiff might be able to save money at some 

level, but the court's suggestions did not amount to a 

consideration of savings as part of the parties' standard of 

living, especially where there was no dispute that the parties 

saved the lion's share of the family's income or that defendant 

 

6 Our holding is limited to the establishment of alimony. We 

do not decide in this opinion the extent to which the savings 

component should be considered upon a change in circumstances, 

such as the payor spouse's retirement.
21 A-3624-13T1

had the ability to continue to fund such savings. We are 

therefore constrained to vacate the alimony award and remand for 

further consideration by the Family Part consistent with our 

holding today, with the understanding that we intimate no 

suggestion as to the outcome of that reconsideration by the 

court.

[At the direction of the court, the 

discussion of the other issues in this

appeal at sections IV, V and VI has been 

omitted from the published version of the 

opinion.]

VII.

In sum, the trial court's awards of alimony, equitable 

distribution, child support, counsel fees and costs are vacated 

and remanded for further proceedings consistent with our 

decision. We do not retain jurisdiction.