19–115

108TH CONGRESS EXEC. RPT.

1st Session " ! SENATE 108–1

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS, SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON MAY

24, 2002 (‘‘THE MOSCOW TREATY’’)

FEBRUARY 20, 2003.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. LUGAR, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,

submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany Treaty Doc. 107–8]

The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred the

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed at Moscow on

May 24, 2002 (hereafter, ‘‘the Moscow Treaty’’ or ‘‘the Treaty’’),

having considered the same, reports favorably thereon subject to

two conditions and six declarations set forth in this report and the

accompanying resolution of ratification and recommends that the

Senate give its advice and consent to ratification thereof.

CONTENTS

Page

I. Purpose ........................................................................................................... 1

II. Summary of the Treaty ................................................................................. 8

III. Background .................................................................................................... 9

IV. Views of the Armed Services Committee ..................................................... 10

V. Committee Action .......................................................................................... 17

VI. Resolution of Ratification .............................................................................. 23

VII. Article-by-Article Analysis ............................................................................ 26

VIII. CBO Cost Estimate ........................................................................................ 30

I. PURPOSE

Since the end of the Cold War the United States and Russia have

had an opportunity for a new approach to arms control. The distrust and suspicion that resulted in years of acrimonious negotiation, lengthy agreements and accountability which rested on doubt,

not trust, has given way to a new relationship with the Russian

Federation that is based on more friendship and trust than in the

2

1Testimony of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, July 17, 2002, ‘‘Treaty on Strategic

Offensive Reductions: The Moscow Treaty,’’ S. Hrg. 107–622, p. 86. Hereafter, Hearings.

past. The Moscow Treaty represents a new approach to strategic

arms control, based on the changed relationship between the

United States and the Russian Federation. Secretary of Defense

Donald H. Rumsfeld, in testimony to the Committee on July 17,

2002, held up the Treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

(START) of 1991 and the Moscow Treaty. START, he said, ‘‘is 700

pages long, and took 9 years to negotiate. The Moscow Treaty, concluded this summer by President Bush and President Putin, is

three pages long, and took 6 months to negotiate.’’ 1

At the height of the Cold War, arms control agreements such as

SALT I, the ABM Treaty, and the Limited and Threshold Test-Ban

Treaties were negotiated to manage the arms race in ways that

would increase stability during times of potential crisis. These

agreements were written with an eye toward the terrible prospect

that U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals would be used against each

other. Agreements were limited by deep and mutual distrust that

led to an emphasis on detailed drafting and extensive verification

measures.

Today, our countries are no longer mortal enemies engaged in a

global ideological and military struggle. The Russian Federation

and the United States work to build a strong military and security

partnership on issues ranging from the war on terrorism to keeping

the peace in the Balkans. The Moscow Treaty reflects the changed

nature of our relationship.

In the early post-Cold War years, arms control agreements were

drafted to eliminate or reduce strategic nuclear weapons, to limit

conventional forces in Europe and open them to international observation, and to lead other nations by example in the pursuit of

peace. The range of agreements that could be reached was significantly broadened in these years, but the decades’ long legacy of distrust resulted in continued concern for far-reaching provisions, definitions and increasingly intrusive methods of verification. The price

of such agreements was the lengthy negotiations and dense texts

to which Secretary Rumsfeld referred.

The Committee received testimony from the Administration suggesting that the Moscow Treaty is a product of the new U.S.-Russian relationship. The world has become more unpredictable, not

the least because of the intersecting threats of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Officials explained that such an unpredictable world requires flexibility

in U.S. and Russian force structure and options that allow adaptability in the face of these new and shared threats. Our new foes

do not need armies, air forces, or navies, nor do they intend to adhere to a rule-governed international system.

Given the threats it faces, and the greatly improved relationship

with Moscow, the United States sought to move beyond agreements

that tightly constrained U.S. and Russian strategic forces. Accordingly, the President stated his intention ‘‘to reduce to 1,700–2,200

operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads before the Moscow Treaty was negotiated, regardless of what the Russians opted

3

2Written answer of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the Committee’s question for the

record , July 9, 2002, Hearings, p. 52. 3 Hearings, p. 10.

to do.’’ 2 Secretary of State Colin L. Powell testified to the Committee on July 9, 2002, that President Bush had told Russian

President Putin:

This is where we are going. We are going there unilaterally. Come with us or not. Stay where you are or not. This

is what the United States needs and it does not need it because you are an enemy; it needs this because of the nature of the world we live in, and we see you as a partner.3

The Treaty resulted from this atmosphere of cooperation and is

a legally binding text that reflects U.S. and Russian intent to reduce strategic nuclear warheads to the level of 1,700 to 2,200 by

December 31, 2012. The Treaty is meant to be representative of the

new U.S.-Russian relationship. The U.S. objective in concluding the

Treaty was to provide maximum flexibility in achieving strategic

offensive reductions consistent with what the 2001 Nuclear Posture

Review, issued in 2002, had determined to be the lowest levels possible, consistent with U.S. national security requirements and

given current uncertainties about future strategic trends.

The Treaty creates neither a new verification regime nor accounting rules. The Administration explained that verification

under the Treaty does not reflect Cold War animosity. During the

Cold War, such measures were seen as necessary for the purpose

of providing confidence between two sides that sought further

means to verify compliance with obligations under agreements. A

decade after the Cold War, such measures do not necessarily provide more trust or further verification, but rather become ends

unto themselves instead of a means by which obligations might be

verified and, if maintained from the standpoint of the Cold War,

could be seen as stressing process over results.

As the Moscow Treaty codifies the intent of each Party to make

reductions in force levels that it had already decided upon, irrespective of the other Party’s force levels, it was determined that

there was no need to codify the units of account or modes of reduction. Each Party may determine for itself what are its ‘‘strategic

nuclear warheads’’ and how they are to be reduced. This absence

of accounting or verification provisions does not, from the standpoint of a new relationship with the Russian Federation, represent

an abandonment of U.S. leadership, but rather signifies productive

change in U.S.-Russian relations. Additionally, verification under

the START Treaty will continue at least through 2009.

The Committee believes that the absence of verification provisions in the Moscow Treaty makes confidence and transparency a

high-priority issue. The Committee commends the statements made

by Administration officials in its hearings that negotiators were

mindful of this fact, and that there will be efforts aimed at increasing verification measures if the Parties decide not to extend the

START verification regime beyond 2009, when that treaty is scheduled to expire. The United States should not only practice transparency, but also promote it, in close coordination with the Russian

Federation. This principle is in keeping with the new relationship

4

4 Hearings, p. 79.

5 Hearings, p. 51.

that Presidents Bush and Putin are forging. Greater transparency

regarding Moscow Treaty implementation may lead, moreover, to

similar advances in other areas of great concern to the United

States, such as compliance with nonproliferation regimes. The

Committee urges the President to use implementation of the Moscow Treaty as a means to foster greater U.S.-Russian interaction

and mutual confidence in the national security field.

The Treaty does not provide for the destruction of withdrawn

warheads or delivery systems. In the briefings and hearings provided to the Senate, the Administration pointed out that while the

Moscow Treaty does not mandate the destruction of withdrawn

warheads, neither did previous arms control agreements with the

Russian Federation or the Soviet Union. As Secretary Rumsfeld

stated in testimony on the Treaty before the Committee on July 17,

2002, ‘‘no previous arms control agreement, not SALT, not START,

not the INF [Treaty], has required the destruction of warheads,

and no one offered objections to those treaties on the basis that

they did not require . . . the destruction of warheads.’’ 4

The Treaty does not place restrictions on either Party’s force

structure before December 31, 2012. The Committee was assured

that the United States will continue to implement strategic force

reductions along the path outlined in the Defense Department’s

2001 Nuclear Posture Review. Specifically, that the United States

will:

retire 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, remove four Trident submarines from strategic service, and no longer maintain the

ability to return the B–1 to nuclear service. This will reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by about 1,100 warheads by the end of Fiscal Year 2007 in a manner that as a practical matter

would be very difficult to reverse.

. . . Some warheads that are to be removed will be used

as spares, some will be stored, and others will be destroyed

or dismantled.5

Thus, although the Treaty does not require the destruction or

dismantlement of any strategic delivery vehicles or warheads, some

of the U.S. forces to be reduced by 2007 are, in fact, slated for destruction or dismantlement. The Russian Federation, for its part,

may revamp its force planning in light of the flexibility afforded by

this Treaty. Equally important, Moscow has expressed its intention

to continue to reduce various weapons platforms and warhead levels, and to continue dismantling weapons systems with U.S. assistance under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

Unlike the START II treaty, which would have required that the

Russian Federation no longer deploy land-based ICBMs with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), the Moscow Treaty would permit Russia to retain such systems. START II

was received by the Senate on January 15, 1993, and approved by

the Senate on January 26, 1996. But START II never entered into

5

6 Hearings, p. 52.

7 Hearings, p. 140.

force because the Russian Duma, in its April 14, 2000 Federal Law

on Ratification, linked the agreement’s entry into force with retention of the ABM Treaty by the United States and the modifications

of that treaty signed in 1997. The ABM Treaty modifications were

never submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, and thus

instruments of ratification were never exchanged.

The Administration noted the concern that allowing the Russian

Federation to maintain multiple-warhead ICBMs had the potential

to undermine ‘‘crisis stability’’ and increase the risk of war due to

miscalculation, but stated that this view is based on Cold War deterrence calculations that are no longer relevant. Secretary of State

Powell stated in response to a Committee question for the record

from its July 9, 2002 hearing:

Our new strategic relationship with Russia is no longer

based on a nuclear balance of terror. Because of this new

relationship, we cannot conceive of any credible scenario in

which we would threaten to launch our strategic forces at

Russia. The scenario . . . of Russia believing it faced a ‘‘use

it or lose it’’ situation with its force of MIRVed ICBMs is

therefore not a credible concern.6

The Administration points to the profoundly close and friendly

relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin and their continued statements that the United States and the Russian Federation

are no longer enemies as a further proof that Russia’s weapons do

not necessarily threaten the United States. Furthermore, Russian

actions in the past year on issues ranging from the war against terrorism in Afghanistan to NATO enlargement and last summer’s

joint operation to repatriate Russian-supplied weapons-usable uranium in a Yugoslavian research reactor are viewed by Administration officials as demonstrations of this new relationship.

Despite the reassurance provided by Administration witnesses,

former Senator Sam Nunn and other outside witnesses urged continued attention beyond the Treaty to improving crisis stability, notably by giving U.S. and Russian leaders more decision time in a

crisis. In testimony before the Committee, General Eugene E.

Habiger, USAF (Ret.), the former Commander in Chief of U.S.

Strategic Command, made a suggestion in this regard:

In the past, we have relied on the military establishment

and arms control community for ways to reduce the alert

status, and they have not provided viable options. I would

strongly recommend that the teams working on this matter be led in large measure by the people who build the

weapons systems. They built them; they understand them,

and they are the key to designing a system that moves

weapons off alert status in ways that make sense, are

transparent but non-intrusive, and do not compromise our

security.7

Members of the Committee do not know whether any ideas for

increasing decision time are, in fact, practicable, and share General

Habiger’s view that options for reducing alert status should be

6

8 Hearings, p. 58.

9 Hearings, p. 79.

evaluated by those with significant expertise on the specific weapons systems in question. If the President does not order the preparation of such analyses, Congress could require the analyses or establish a commission of weapons systems experts to undertake this

task. Such commissions have been created before, some under the

auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, and have proven

useful in considering issues of such a technical nature.

The Administration has allowed that the Treaty will not be

verifiable under the standards imposed during the Cold War. Instead, the START verification regime will be utilized and continue

to operate through December 2009, when it expires unless extended by mutual agreement of the Parties. The Bilateral Implementation Commission created in Article III of the Treaty will provide a forum in which each Party can discuss its implementation

plans and activities and raise any concerns about the other Party’s

forces. The Administration pointed out that the United States and

the Russian Federation could always adopt additional verification

or transparency measures. A U.S.-Russian working group did discuss a possible verification regime during negotiations on the Treaty, and a transparency committee has been created by the Consultative Group for Strategic Security established pursuant to the Joint

Declaration of May 24, 2002, on the New Strategic Relationship.

The Administration said additional verification could be added, but

that ‘‘specific additional transparency measures are not needed,

and will not be sought, at this time. We recognize, however, that

more contacts and exchanges of information could be useful and

that the Parties could decide to develop additional transparency

measures in the future.’’ 8 This does not foreclose the possibility

that START could be extended or that, as issues arise in the context of the Moscow Treaty, measures could be implemented to solve

any potential problems, and therefore, does not necessarily mean

that the agreement is flawed. As Secretary Rumsfeld testified before the Committee on July 17, 2002:

[B]etween now and 2009 . . . there is plenty of time to

sort through what we will do thereafter.

Second, we do have national technical means.

Third, we have agreed we will meet and work through

improved transparency and predictability with the Russians.

Now, will we be able to do something better than the

START Treaty? I hope so. Do we have a number of years

that we can work on that? Yes. . . . So I think that is not

something that ought to in any way stand in the way of

approving this treaty[.] 9

The Treaty embodies each Party’s sincere and legally binding

commitment to substantial reductions in strategic nuclear weapons,

with an eye toward flexibility and trust in the light of new threats

and our new relationship with each other. Again, the Administration cites this circumstance as the driving force behind the withdrawal clause contained in Article IV of the Treaty. The withVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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10Written answer of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the Committee’s question for the

record, July 9, 2002, Hearings, p. 67.

drawal clause requires only three months’ notice and contains no

requirements regarding the reasons for withdrawal. In briefings

and hearings, the Administration stated that the flexible withdrawal provision in this agreement is not seen by the Parties as

necessary for reasons related to the agreement or the U.S.-Russian

relationship. Instead, the withdrawal clause was drafted in light of

‘‘the likelihood that a decision to withdraw would be prompted by

causes unrelated either to the Treaty or to our bilateral relationship.’’ 10

Even if the Treaty is implemented faithfully, there is some risk

that the Russian Federation’s implementation of it could result in

the relatively insecure storage of large numbers of currently deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Given the rightful concern that

Russian nuclear weapons-usable materials be securely stored (and,

as appropriate, be made less useable in nuclear weapons) so as to

limit the risk of their theft or diversion, both members and outside

experts highlighted the need for increased Nunn-Lugar Cooperative

Threat Reduction and non-proliferation assistance to the Russian

Federation. Administration officials did not view insecure storage

of nuclear materials as a likely consequence of the Treaty, but envisioned the possibility of increased U.S. assistance as a reasonable

form of insurance.

It is the view of the Committee that the role of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction and nonproliferation assistance, while

not directly mentioned in the Treaty, is nevertheless essential for

continued strategic offensive reductions in Russia, particularly with

respect to Russia’s heavy ICBM force, bombers and submarines.

Today, when the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and related technology presents one of the greatest challenges to international peace and stability, the role of Nunn-Lugar

Cooperative Threat Reduction and other nonproliferation programs

as the foundation for preventive measures against terrorists’ use of

weapons of mass destruction and of a positive relationship with

Russia cannot be doubted.

The Committee, in recommending that the Senate advise and

consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty, accepts the Administration’s view of improved U.S.-Russian relations as a working objective. Many members agree with the Administration that such a

radically changed context is a reality, and the Committee commends the Administration for codifying this in treaty form and submitting it to the Senate for its advice and consent.

The Committee also believes, however, that the Senate and the

Administration should take steps to promote closer U.S.-Russian

relations, to smooth the way toward each Party meeting its Treaty

obligations, and to reduce any risks to world peace and U.S. national security that may result from the manner in which the Russian Federation uses the exceptional force flexibility that this Treaty provides. The Committee therefore recommends that the Senate

include in its resolution of ratification 2 conditions and 6 declarations. As is explained later in this report, these provisions are inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
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tended to ensure the success of this Treaty and to preserve the constitutional role of the United States Senate.

II. SUMMARY OF THE TREATY

The Moscow Treaty, signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002, requires

the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce their respective aggregate numbers of strategic nuclear warheads to a

range of 1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012. The Treaty shall remain in force until this same date, unless both Parties agree to an

extension or a superseding agreement. No obligations are imposed

by the Treaty on either Party prior to December 31, 2012, except

that the Parties shall hold meetings at least twice a year of the Bilateral Implementation Commission. Accordingly, no interim reduction levels are specified, and either Party may increase its numbers

of strategic nuclear warheads prior to December 31, 2012, so long

as they each manifest a force level of deployed strategic nuclear

warheads that does not exceed 2,200 on that date.

The United States shall consider the unit of account, for the purposes of its implementation of this Treaty, to be ‘‘operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads,’’ which it defines as ‘‘reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in their

launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear

armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage

areas of heavy bomber bases.’’ According to the Administration, the

Russian Federation will establish its own definition of ‘‘strategic

nuclear warhead’’ as it carries out its reductions under the Treaty.

Article II of the Treaty provides that the Parties agree that the

START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms. According to the Administration’s article-by-article analysis submitted

with the Treaty, this article ‘‘makes clear that the Moscow Treaty

and the START Treaty are separate,’’ and the provisions of either

treaty do not apply to the other.

The Moscow Treaty does not contain the traditional transparency

or verification provisions associated with past arms control agreements. The Administration plans to rely upon existing verification

provisions under the START Treaty, in addition to national technical means, to monitor Russian compliance with the Moscow Treaty, even though the two treaties use different counting rules in

measuring strategic force reductions. Administration officials have

stated that because the United States will carry out the reductions

required under the Moscow Treaty without regard to Russian actions, additional transparency provisions are not required. Article

III of the Treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), which shall meet at least twice a year ‘‘for purposes of

implementing this Treaty.’’

Article IV establishes the expiration date of the Treaty: it provides that the Treaty remains in force until December 31, 2012. Article IV also allows the Treaty to be extended by mutual agreement

or superseded by a subsequent agreement, and provides a national

sovereignty clause on withdrawal that provides for three months’

notice in such an event. Article V requires that the Treaty be registered with the United Nations.

9

11 Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at the National Defense University, May

1, 2001, (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501–10.html).

III. BACKGROUND

President George W. Bush entered office in January 2001 with

a promise to change the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national

security policy. He sought to move away from the framework of

mutually assured destruction (MAD) which had defined relations

between the United States and the Soviet Union (and then the

Russian Federation) for over forty years. One element of the President’s vision of a new strategic framework for U.S.-Russian relations involved withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

and expanded research and development on missile defense, but

another element involved reductions to U.S. strategic nuclear

forces.

On May 1, 2001, President Bush delivered a speech at the National Defense University, in which he declared:

Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies. We can, and will, change the

size, the composition, the character of our nuclear forces in

a way that reflects the reality that the Cold War is over.

I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the

lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with

our national security needs, including our obligations to

our allies. My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear

forces. The United States will lead by example to achieve

our interests and the interests for peace in the world.11

In 2001, the Department of Defense completed the congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review, a report calling for an evaluation of the size and structure of U.S. strategic nuclear forces in

light of changes in the international strategic environment. Such a

review had not been conducted since 1994. In November 2001, the

President announced that the United States would seek to reduce

its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from a current level of approximately 6,000 to a range between 1,700 and

2,200 over the next ten years. President Bush informed Russian

President Vladimir Putin and made a public announcement regarding this intention when the two leaders met at the White House

on November 13, 2001.

For a number of years, President Putin, as well as his predecessor, President Boris Yeltsin, had recognized that the changed

strategic environment and economic constraints would prevent the

Russian Federation from indefinitely maintaining a START-sized

strategic nuclear force. The START Treaty’s limit of 6,000 deployed

strategic nuclear delivery systems was no longer a realistic force

level in the present circumstance. Nevertheless, both Putin and

Yeltsin sought to maintain a semblance of strategic parity with the

United States through the completion of further arms control

agreements imposing required reductions upon both nations. Accordingly, one month after President Bush’s announcement of

planned U.S. cuts, President Putin declared on December 13, 2001,

the Russian Federation’s intention to reach a legal agreement with

the United States for ‘‘irreversible, and verifiable reductions in

10

12Statement Made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 2001, Regarding the

Decision of the Administration of the United States of America to Withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, December 14, 2001. (available at http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/

arh/5B16EB2FE9DCDAD943256B22002F6436?OpenDocument).

strategic offensive arms, which we believe should be at the level of

1,500 to 2,200 nuclear warheads for each side.’’ 12

According to press reports, these negotiations quickly bogged

down over four central issues. The definition of the unit of account

was difficult to resolve since the United States preferred the term

‘‘operationally deployed strategic nuclear warhead,’’ while the Russian Federation sought to continue to use the counting rules employed in the START Treaty, where reductions applied to the dismantlement of delivery vehicles and launchers, which in turn were

counted as containing a specified number of warheads. Secondly,

the need for new transparency and verification measures also

proved hard to reconcile for the purposes of an overall agreement.

Thirdly, there were different approaches as to whether the final

agreement would be in the form of an executive agreement, as the

United States preferred, or a treaty, which the Russian Federation

favored. Finally, the Russian government insisted on general language limiting future U.S. missile defense deployments. The Administration contends that such disputes represent the lingering

doubts of the past, not an indication of incompleteness on the part

of the resulting agreement. By resolving these disputes and agreeing to disagree where necessary, Presidents Bush and Putin were

able to sign the Moscow Treaty on May 24, 2002.

On June 20, 2002, the two Presidents submitted this Treaty to

the United States Senate and to the Russian Duma, respectively,

for their advice and consent to each country’s ratification.

IV. VIEWS OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

The Committee on Armed Services examined the military implications of the Moscow Treaty. Senators Levin and Warner submitted the following letters to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Both letters appear in this report:

UNITED STATES SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

October 21, 2002.

Honorable JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Chairman

Honorable JESSE HELMS, Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Relations,

United States Senate,

Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR BIDEN AND SENATOR HELMS:

Thank you for the opportunity to express my views concerning

the national security implications of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, also known as the Moscow Treaty, which was

signed by President Bush and Russian President Putin on May 24,

2002 in Moscow.

I strongly support the Moscow Treaty and recommend that the

Senate provide its advice and consent to ratification to the Treaty

11

with no changes and with no conditions on the resolution of ratification. The Moscow Treaty is a simple, straightforward document

which provides for the largest reductions in strategic nuclear weapons—over two-thirds from current levels—in arms control history.

This Treaty should proceed through Senate consideration

unencumbered by reservations, understandings or declarations.

Throughout its history, the Senate Armed Services Committee

has played a critical role in assessing the national security impact

and military implications of arms control agreements negotiated by

the Executive Branch. In July and August, the Armed Services

Committee conducted two hearings on the national security implications of the Moscow Treaty. The Administration witnesses at

these hearings have direct responsibility for critical national security issues related to the Moscow Treaty. These witnesses included

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld; Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Myers, USAF; Commander in

Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral James 0. Ellis, Jr., USN;

and Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of Energy, Dr. Everet H. Beckner. In

addition, the Committee received testimony from two outside witnesses.

The witnesses at the Armed Services Committee hearings unanimously supported ratification of the Moscow Treaty. According to

Joint Chiefs Chairman, General Myers, ‘‘The members of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and I all support the Moscow Treaty. We believe it

provides for the long-term security interests of our Nation. We also

believe that it preserves our flexibility in an uncertain strategic environment. Moreover, the treaty allows us to implement the recommendations that came out of our Nuclear Posture Review.’’ Admiral Ellis testified that ‘‘The Moscow Treaty is a positive step early

in our strategic journey toward a new partnership with

Russia . . . I fully support this Treaty.’’ Nongovernment witnesses

also strongly supported the Treaty. Mr. Charles B. Curtis, formerly

Deputy Secretary of Energy and now the President and Chief Operating Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, testified that ‘‘The

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which is sometimes referred

to as the Treaty of Moscow, is a truly remarkable document. I believe it deserves the Senate’s endorsement. It should be ratified without amendment or, in my judgment, without reservation.’’

In my view, the strength of the Moscow Treaty is in its simplicity. This Treaty is not like any that we have seen before. It is

the first arms control treaty to embody the post-Cold War U.S.-

Russian relationship. In negotiating this Treaty, both sides consciously rejected the Cold War mentality of distrust and hostility

that previously had required lengthy negotiations, and extensive

legal structures and detailed verification regimes to ensure that

both sides would abide by their obligations. This simplicity puts the

focus where it belongs—on the deep, equitable reductions to strategic nuclear warheads which are the centerpiece of the Moscow

Treaty.

The Moscow Treaty is the right agreement at the right time.

There are three unique features of this Treaty which are key to the

strength of this document: 1) it achieves deep reductions in offensive strategic nuclear arsenals; 2) it provides the flexibility to meet

12

new security challenges; and 3) it both takes advantage of, and provides the opportunity to, expand our new closer relationship with

Russia.

The most important feature of the Moscow Treaty is the deep redictions the Treaty will achieve in operationally deployed warheads. This breakthrough Treaty—negotiated in a period of just

several months—will reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals

from their present levels of about 6,000 strategic warheads to 1700

to 2200 operationally deployed strategic warheads over the next

decade. These reductions—which amount to about two thirds of the

warheads in the Russian and U.S. arsenals—are the most dramatic

in the history of arms control agreements.

Such reductions are clearly in our national security interest. Russia is no longer an enemy. Our strategic arsenals, swollen by Cold

War hostility with the Soviet Union, no longer need to be sustained

at such high levels. According to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in

his testimony before the Armed Services Committee on July 25,

2002: ‘‘The reductions characterized in this Treaty will help eliminate the debris of past hostility that has been blocking our way as

we build a new relationship. The Treaty President Bush has fashioned and the process by which he fashioned it, I believe, are both

models for future cooperation between our two countries. We’ve

achieved deep reductions and enhanced the security of both our

countries without perpetuating Cold War ways of thinking that

hinder a desire for better relations.’’ The second great strength of this Treaty is the flexibility it accords our leaders to meet the uncertainties both in the international security environment and in the technological status of

our nuclear stockpile. September 11 was a vivid reminder that we

are vulnerable to attack—in ways we never imagined. It is critical

to our national security that our leaders retain the maximum flexibility to respond to emerging threats and changes in the world

scene.

Many observers have correctly noted that the Moscow Treaty

does not contain features that were typical of past bilateral arms

control agreements, most of which were signed by the United

States and the Soviet Union. For example, the Moscow Treaty does

not establish interim warhead reduction goals or a detailed schedule for achieving warhead reductions. It does not define warhead

‘‘counting rules,’’ require destruction of strategic nuclear delivery

vehicles or launchers, or include limits or sublimits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or launchers.

The lack of detailed schedules, sub-limits, and counting rules,

and the absence of any requirement to destroy warheads have been

criticized by some. Yet the witnesses before our Committee consistently praised the flexibility inherent in this Treaty. Admiral Ellis

addressed this issue before our Committee at some length. According to Admiral Ellis in testimony before the Armed Services Committee on August 1: ‘‘This treaty allows me, as the Commander of

the Nation’s Strategic Forces, the latitude to structure our strategic

forces to better support the national security pillars of assuring our

allies, dissuading those who might wish us ill, deterring potential

adversaries and, if necessary, defending the nation. . . . [I]n my

judgment, this treaty provides me the ability to prudently meet those

13

national security needs and to provide a range of deterrent options

to the Secretary and the President for their consideration should the

need arise.

The Admiral continued: ‘‘[The Treaty] gives me the flexibility to

deal with the uncertainty that’s an inherent part . . . [of] the future.

It gives me flexibility with regard to the specific details of that draw

down, to the composition of our nation’s nuclear stockpile as we

draw it down in size, to hedge against the possibility of technological surprise as our stockpile ages in the future, [and] to deal

with the potential for change in the international security environment should it arise. It also gives me the flexibility to take the dual

use platforms, these strategic platforms that have such important

tactical applications, and transform them in support of the nation’s

security needs in a broader way.’’ Dr. Beckner, the official in our government most directly responsible for assuring that the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile remains

safe, reliable, and effective, confirmed that the flexibility inherent

in the Moscow Treaty is critical to our effort to maintain the stockpile. ‘‘The Treaty,’’ he said during the August 1 hearing, ‘‘provides

the United States with the flexibility to maintain an important

hedge against unforeseen . . . technical issues in the smaller enduring nuclear weapons stockpile.’’ This flexibility is particularly important in light of the fact that

the U.S. active nuclear stockpile is composed of only a limited number of warhead types—only two types of warheads for our land

based intercontinental ballistic missiles, two types for our sea

launched missiles, and two types of bombs for our bombers. These

warheads have not been tested in over a decade. The average age

of warheads in the U.S. stockpile is approaching 20 years—and

some warheads are much older. While Administration officials,

such as Dr. Beckner, are pursuing vigorous efforts to monitor the

health of the stockpile and assure its effectiveness, on occasion

these efforts reveal problems in the stockpile.

All of us on the Armed Services Committee understand that our

experience with very old warheads is limited and, although no one

can predict when, we can predict with certainty that problems will

arise. The Administration witnesses who testified before the Armed

Services Committee on the Moscow Treaty clearly believe that sustaining a substantial number of warheads in a responsive reserve,

in a status that would allow the nation to address such problems

as might arise, is in our national security interest.

The third great strength of this Treaty, in my view, is how it reflects the new relationship between the United States and Russia.

This Treaty is fully consistent with the policy goals that President

Bush outlined shortly after he took office. In a landmark speech at

the National Defense University in May 2001, President Bush

called for a new strategic relationship with Russia. ‘‘Today’s Russia

is not yesterday’s Soviet Union. This new cooperative relationship

should look to the future, not to the past. It should be reassuring

rather than threatening. It should be premised on openness, mutual

confidence and real opportunities for cooperation . . . I want to complete the work of changing our relationship from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and

common interests.’’

14

President Bush has engaged Russian President Putin on a regular and intensive basis to move the Russian-American relationship beyond Cold War hostility to a relationship built on openness,

shared goals, and shared responsibility. The Moscow Treaty is one

important measure of President Bush’s extraordinary success in

building this new relationship.

As unique as the Moscow Treaty is, the Treaty also reflects the

success and the heritage of past arms control agreements. First,

the Moscow Treaty is a legally binding document. I commend President Bush for deciding to put these strategic nuclear reductions in

the form of a legally binding treaty. This assures that the agreement will survive the personal relationship between Presidents

Bush and Putin, and that it has the weight of law. Second, in order

to achieve the required reductions, nuclear warheads will be physically removed from missiles and bombers, rendering them unusable for any near-term military contingencies. Third, the Treaty

provides the mechanisms and atmosphere to assure compliance

with its provisions and resolution of future issues related to Treaty

implementation. The terms of the Moscow Treaty—which recognize

that the START I Treaty verification regime remains in force and

which establish a Bilateral Implementation Commission—provide

the basis for the predictability, transparency, and confidence needed to assure that both sides achieve the required reductions.

A number of my colleagues in the Senate have raised concerns

about what the Moscow Treaty does not do. The Treaty does not

address warhead dismantlement or tactical nuclear arsenals. No

strategic arms control agreement has ever addressed these concerns. I would also note that all the witnesses before the Armed

Services Committee agreed that the Moscow Treaty is but a first

step. Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed in his testimony that tactical

nuclear arsenals are a concern that the U.S. Government will continue to address with the Russian Federation. Further arms control

steps, including verification issues and dismantlement, will be discussed on a continuing basis.

Based on the hearings conducted by the Armed Services Committees and subsequent analysis, I believe that the Moscow Treaty

clearly advances the national security interests of the United

States and deserves the Senate’s unqualified support. I strongly

recommend your Committee’s approval of a resolution of ratification for the Moscow Treaty that is free of any conditions.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely,

JOHN WARNER, Ranking Member.

15

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, October 7, 2002.

The Honorable JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Chairman

The Honorable JESSE HELMS, Ranking Member

Foreign Relations Committee,

United States Senate,

Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN BIDEN AND RANKING MEMBER HELMS:

As requested, this letter is to provide you with my views on the

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) signed on May 24th,

2002, between the United States and the Russian Federation, and

to offer my suggestions for issues the Foreign Relations Committee

should consider in preparing a resolution of ratification for the

Treaty.

After the President submitted the SORT Treaty to the Senate on

June 20th, the Armed Services Committee held two hearings on

the Treaty. The first hearing took place on July 25th and included

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Richard B.

Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the witnesses. We

held our second hearing on August 1 and had two panels of witnesses. The first panel consisted of Mr. Charles Curtis, former Deputy Secretary of Energy and currently President and Chief Operating Officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and Dr. Ashton

Carter, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and currently Professor of Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy

School of Government at Harvard University. The second panel

consisted of Admiral James Ellis, Commander in Chief of the

United States Strategic Command, and Dr. Everet Beckner, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs of the National Nuclear

Security Administration.

I believe the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty is a positive

step forward in U.S -Russian relations. I think it is particularly important to have a treaty that will be legally binding on all parties,

rather than unilateral steps that are not binding on future administrations. In addition, a treaty will ensure that the Senate fulfills

its constitutional role in matters of foreign relations by giving due

consideration to any treaty, and providing its advice and consent

before ratification.

I see this treaty as a starting point for further arms control and

an important element in our new relationship with Russia. But

there is much more work to be done to continue improving mutual

security and trust with Russia, work that includes further reducing

our reliance on nuclear weapons, reducing nuclear proliferation

dangers, and improving confidence, transparency and cooperation

with Russia.

Although a positive symbolic step forward, it is an unusual treaty. Its central obligation is that both nations will reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between

1700 and 2200 some 10 years from now, for one day. Then the treaty expires. Contrary to numerous media reports, this treaty does

not require reductions in either nuclear warhead stockpiles or deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
16

livery systems. It does not require elimination of a single warhead.

Under this treaty, both sides need only remove warheads from

land-based or submarine-based missiles and from bombers. Both

sides are free to keep every warhead so removed and to store these

warheads for possible redeployment.

Given the unusual features of this Treaty, I recommend a number of items be considered for inclusion in the resolution of ratification, as follows:

1. Unlike previous arms control treaties, the SORT Treaty withdrawal clause would allow each party, ‘‘in exercising its national

sovereignty’’, to withdraw from the Treaty upon three months’ written notice. There is no mention of supreme national interest. This

makes it appear as though the President could withdraw from the

Treaty for any reason short of a supreme national interest.

The U.S. should not enter into or withdraw from a treaty lightly;

both should be done only with the utmost seriousness of purpose

and with the involvement of the Senate, which must give its advice

and consent to permit ratification. Consequently, I would urge the

Committee to consider a condition to the resolution of ratification

that would require the President to consult with and obtain approval from the Senate prior to a U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty.

2. The Treaty is a starting point for further nuclear arms reductions. The Senate should encourage the President to pursue additional reductions of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, both

strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles,

to the lowest possible levels consistent with our security, and to encourage the elimination of excess nuclear warheads, rather than

their long-term storage. The Senate should also encourage the

President to consider accelerating the reductions required in the

Treaty so they are achieved in less than 10 years, if possible.

3. The Treaty includes no provisions for verification or transparency that would provide confidence that both parties are implementing their obligations. It is in our national and mutual security

interests to increase and improve such transparency and ensure

such confidence. The Senate should therefore encourage the President to pursue such steps, including an exchange of detailed information with the Russian Federation on their respective stockpiles

of nuclear warheads and fissile material, and on their safety and

security.

4. Although the Treaty makes reference in Article III to ‘‘a Bilateral Implementation Commission’’, it does not provide any detail

about such a Commission, other than to specify that it shall meet

at least twice a year. The Senate should require the President to

provide details on a regular basis on the Bilateral Implementation

Commission and its deliberations.

5. The treaty does not establish any milestones or schedule for

reductions, other than the requirement to reach the permitted limit

on warheads by December 31, 2012. As a condition for the resolution of ratification, I believe the Senate should require an annual

report from the President explaining in detail the steps taken and

planned to implement the SORT Treaty. This report should include

the planned schedule and milestones to achieve the treaty’s obligations; the strategic nuclear force levels (warheads and delivery systems) of both parties; and any measures to increase transparency

17

or provide confidence that each party will implement its obligations

under the Treaty.

6. The Treaty does not require the elimination of any nuclear

warheads, and permits their indefinite storage if removed from

operationally deployed status. The storage of potentially thousands

of nuclear warheads could lead to an increased risk of proliferation

of nuclear weapons or materials, especially if the storage facilities

are not sufficiently secure. As a condition to the resolution of ratification, I believe the Senate should require a report from the President on how our Cooperative Threat Reduction and other nonproliferation programs could best be used to reduce this risk of proliferation and to assist the Russian Federation in implementing the

Treaty.

I hope you find these recommendations useful as you prepare to

mark up the resolution of ratification for the SORT Treaty. I appreciate the opportunity to share my views with you.

Sincerely,

CARL LEVIN, Chairman.

V. COMMITTEE ACTION

The Committee held four open hearings on the Moscow Treaty,

on July 9, July 17, July 23 and September 12, 2002. The witness

at the hearing on July 9, 2002, was the Honorable Colin L. Powell,

Secretary of State. The witnesses at the hearing on July 17, 2002,

were the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, and

General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.

The witnesses at the hearing on July 23, 2002, were: the Honorable Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Senate Armed Services

Committee, now co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative; the

Honorable Kenneth L. Adelman, former Director of the U.S. Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency; General Eugene E. Habiger,

USAF (Ret.), former Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Command; Fr. Drew Christiansen, S.J., counselor on international affairs to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops; Mr. Christopher

E. Paine, co-director of the Nuclear Warhead Elimination and Nonproliferation Project of the Natural Resources Defense Council; and

Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., president of the Center for Security Policy.

The witnesses at the hearing on September 12, 2002, were: the

Honorable William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense, now at

Stanford University; the Honorable Fred Charles Ikle ́, former

Under Secretary of Defense and Director of the U.S. Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency, now at the Center for Strategic and

International Studies; the Honorable Rose Gottemoeller, former

Deputy Under Secretary of Energy for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, now a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace; Ambassador James E. Goodby, a former

arms control negotiator, now at the Brookings Institution; Dr. John

P. Holdren of Harvard University, chair of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of

Sciences; and Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.

18

13 Hearings, p. 54. 14 Hearings, pp. 54–55. 15 Hearings, p. 54.

At a business meeting on February 5, 2003, the Committee considered a draft resolution of ratification including 2 conditions and

6 declarations. After discussion and debate, this resolution was approved by a vote of 19 in favor to 0 against.

The conditions and declarations and the Committee rationale in

approving them are as follows:

Condition (1). Report on the Role of Cooperative Threat Reduction

and Nonproliferation Assistance

The Committee included in its recommended resolution of ratification a Condition (1) requiring a report on the role of Cooperative

Threat Reduction and nonproliferation assistance. This condition

requires the President to submit to the Foreign Relations and the

Armed Services Committees an annual report on the amount of

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) assistance that

the Russian Federation will need to meet its obligations under the

Treaty.

In Secretary Powell’s testimony before the Committee on July 9,

2002, and in his answers to the Committee’s questions for the

record, the need for Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction and

nonproliferation programs was continually highlighted as the primary means with which to prevent weapons, weapons-usable materials and expertise in the Russian Federation from falling into the

hands of terrorists. As the Administration stated in response to a

question for the record, the CTR program will be used ‘‘to make

[Russia’s] warhead storage facilities more secure. Such U.S. assistance will also increase the security of the Russian warheads made

excess as provided in the Moscow Treaty.’’ 13

Committee members and many witnesses stressed that NunnLugar Cooperative Threat Reduction and non-proliferation assistance to the Russian Federation could play a crucial role in helping

Russia to implement the reductions required by Article I of the

Moscow Treaty. Senator Lugar made the point that U.S. assistance

might well affect Russian decisions regarding the disposition of

warheads or of strategic delivery vehicles. Executive branch witnesses stated the Administration’s policy that ‘‘Cooperative Threat

Reduction efforts are in the national security interests of the

United States’’ and ‘‘it is in our own security interests to help ensure that remaining warheads are stored as safely and securely as

possible to protect them from terrorists or third-country theft.’’ 14

The Secretary of State added, ‘‘Even if Russia decides to store additional warheads under the Moscow Treaty, however, we are confident U.S. assistance will continue to increase the security of such

weapons.’’ 15

The Committee intends that the reports required by this condition will cover both CTR activities per se and those non-CTR program activities that could contribute to Russian Federation implementation of the Treaty. For example, it could be the case that

some activities in the nuclear Materials, Protection, Control and

Accounting (MPC&A) program of the Department of Energy would

19

be relevant to that purpose. If so, they should be taken into account and discussed in the report required by this condition.

Condition (2). Annual Implementation Report

One of the major themes of discussion in the Committee’s hearings on the Moscow Treaty was the great flexibility allowed to the

Parties in implementing the reductions required by Article I of the

Treaty. Executive branch witnesses explained that, in fact, the Administration has not yet decided how to effect all of the reductions

required by the Treaty. Neither has it determined what transparency measures might be needed to assure each Party that the

other Party will meet the force reduction requirement by December

31, 2012. On the Russian side, it is unclear how the Russian Federation will define its reduction obligations or how it will fulfill

them.

A sensible way to preserve the Senate’s role in treaty implementation is to require regular reporting to the Foreign Relations and

Armed Services Committees regarding force levels, reduction plans,

verification and transparency. This condition requires such reporting on an annual basis. It is similar in this regard to the annual

reporting requirement established by the Chemical Weapons Convention resolution of ratification, which has made a valuable contribution to the Senate’s ability to monitor progress in CWC implementation.

The report required by this condition must be submitted within

60 days of the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty

and thereafter by April 15 of each year. It will also discuss any information, insufficiency of information, or other situation that may

call into question the intent or the ability of either Party to live up

to its obligations, as well as any actions that have been taken or

are being considered to address such concerns or to improve the

implementation and effectiveness of the Treaty. Annual reporting

of such information should ensure that the Senate fulfills its role

and lessen the likelihood of miscommunication.

Requirements for reports after the exchange of instruments of

ratification are common and have assisted the Senate greatly in its

oversight of treaty implementation. Such requirements were enacted in the resolutions of ratification for the START Treaty,

START II, the CFE Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty.

Declaration (1). Treaty Interpretation

The Foreign Relations Committee has taken pains to maintain

the constitutional role of the United States Senate in the treatymaking process. To that end, the resolution of ratification of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, approved by the Senate on

May 27, 1988, included an important condition (1) that has been

cited by reference in every subsequent resolution of ratification of

an arms control treaty:

(A) the United States shall interpret a treaty in accordance

with the common understanding of the Treaty shared by the

President and the Senate at the time the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification;

(B) Such common understanding is based on:

20

16Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Hearings, p. 18.

(i) first, the text of the Treaty and the provisions of this

resolution of ratification; and

(ii) second, the authoritative representations which were

provided by the President and his representatives to the

Senate and its Committees, in seeking Senate consent to

ratification, insofar as such representations were directed

to the meaning and legal effect of the text of the Treaty;

(C) the United States shall not agree to or adopt an interpretation different from that common understanding except pursuant to Senate advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or protocol, or the enactment of a statute; and

(D) if, subsequent to ratification of the Treaty, a question

arises as to the interpretation of a provision of the Treaty on

which no common understanding was reached in accordance

with paragraph (B), that provision shall be interpreted in accordance with applicable United States law.

In 1997, a similarly important condition was added to the resolution of ratification of the Flank Document Agreement to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which condition has also

been cited by reference in subsequent resolutions of ratification for

arms control treaties:

Nothing in condition (1) of the resolution of ratification

of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27,

1988, shall be construed as authorizing the President to

obtain legislative approval for modifications or amendments to treaties through majority approval of both

Houses.

Each of these conditions applies to all treaties. For this reason,

the Senate has not needed to restate them as conditions in subsequent resolutions of ratification. Rather, it has cited them by reference in declarations of its intent, as Declaration (1) does, so as

to remind subsequent administrations of the continuing obligations

imposed by the Senate’s treaty-making role under the United

States Constitution.

Declaration (2). Further Strategic Arms Reductions

Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, signed on July 1, 1968, requires all Parties ‘‘to pursue

negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament

under strict and effective international control.’’ Given the significant reductions in U.S. and Russian deployed strategic force levels

in the Moscow Treaty, a reduction of nearly two-thirds below the

level permitted by the START Treaty, the Secretary of State testified that ‘‘the Moscow Treaty represent[s] significant progress in

meeting the obligations set forth in Article VI of the NPT.’’ 16 Cognizant of that obligation, Presidents Bush and Putin, in their Joint

Declaration of May 24, 2002, affirmed their intent ‘‘to carry out

strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance obliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
21

17 Joint Declaration, May 24, 2002, (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/

2002/05/20020524–2.html). 18 Hearings, p. 56.

gations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations,’’ and called the Moscow Treaty ‘‘a major step in this direction.’’ 17

The presidents consciously left the door open to further reductions

in the future. Declaration (2) encourages the President to continue

strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations

of the United States. This is similar to declarations in the resolutions of ratification for the START and START II treaties.

Declaration (3). Bilateral Implementation Issues

Because of the new nature of the Moscow Treaty, the need for

confidence and transparency and the absence of traditional

verification or transparency provisions in the Treaty, the Bilateral

Implementation Commission established by Article III of the Treaty may play a major role in building confidence in each Party’s

ability to meet its obligations and in maintaining confidence that

the reductions required by Article I will be completed on time.

When the Senate considered the START II Treaty, it stated its expectation that the executive branch would offer to brief the Foreign

Relations and Armed Services Committees before and after each

meeting of the Joint Consultative and Inspection Commission

(JCIC), which is the analogous body under the START regime.

Those briefings have proved very useful to the Committees. This

declaration therefore states a similar expectation of consultations

and briefings regarding meetings of the Bilateral Implementation

Commission under this Treaty, as well as any Moscow Treaty

issues that are raised in the Consultative Group for Strategic Security or in other channels.

Declaration (4). Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons

The United States has sought for over a decade to limit and secure non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). These weapons— sometimes known as ‘‘tactical’’ or ‘‘theater’’ nuclear weapons— threaten to erode the distinction between conventional and nuclear

war. If not properly secured, they also threaten international peace

and security by virtue of their small size and mobility. Numerous

concerns have been expressed about the possibility that they could

be stolen and used by a terrorist group. Last year, the Committee

on Foreign Relations was briefed in closed session on that risk.

The Secretary of State argued strongly that a formal, verifiable

agreement on reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons was not

feasible at this time. While members differ in their views on

whether the United States should pursue such an agreement in

view of the difficulties, the Committee is united in sharing the Secretary’s concern regarding Russian implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992 and, as the Secretary

noted in an answer for the record to the Committee, ‘‘how best to

assist Russia to secure its NSNW from proliferation threats.’’ 18

The Committee was pleased to receive the Secretary of State’s

assurance that, ‘‘We plan to pursue transparency discussions on

tactical nuclear weapons as a priority matter in the Consultative

22

19 Ibid.

Group for Strategic Security’’ (which then met in September 2002

and established a working group on these weapons) and that this

issue will also be pursued ‘‘in the NATO-Russia channel.’’ 19 To underscore the importance of these discussions, the Committee recommends that the Senate add to the resolution of ratification a

declaration supporting efforts to achieve ‘‘improved confidence regarding the accurate accounting and security of non-strategic nuclear weapons’’ of each Party.

Declaration (5). Achieving Reductions

Several witnesses testified to the Committee that achieving strategic offensive reductions in fewer than the 10 years provided in

the Moscow Treaty was both feasible and desirable. Accelerated reductions could contribute greatly to transparency and verification,

by removing any concern over whether the reductions required by

Article I will be completed in time. Witnesses argued that if such

reductions were to be achieved largely through down-loading warheads and airborne systems from their launchers, there was no

reason why the time line for reductions could not be reduced significantly. The Committee does not know how readily swifter reductions could be achieved, but it does note the President’s statement that ‘‘current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect today’s

strategic realities.’’ It recommends a declaration calling for accelerated force reductions, therefore, but only ‘‘where feasible and consistent with U.S. national security requirements and alliance obligations.’’

Declaration (6). Consultations

The Senate and this Committee have an institutional interest in

the close observation of arms control negotiations and the successful implementation of resulting agreements. Past Administrations

have recognized that consultations with the Senate prior to taking

actions relating to signing, amending or withdrawing from such

agreements may avert serious disagreements.

In briefing the members and staff of this Committee on the discussions that led to the signing of the Moscow Treaty, the present

Administration has continued to act in the spirit of past arms control agreements, in which the Senate has been kept informed of all

negotiations. In order that the Committee may continue to be assured of the complete and full implementation of the Treaty, two

reports have been included in the recommended resolution of ratification. The report required by Condition (2) will include information on the intent and ability of the Parties to execute their obligations under Article I of the Treaty by December 31, 2012, and any

actions taken or proposed to be taken to address any concerns that

may arise.

Should it become necessary for a Party to withdraw from the

Treaty, Article IV provides for three months’ notice of such a decision. Events could well occur between submissions of the annual

report required in Condition (2) that would warrant informing and

consulting the Senate. In any circumstance, the Senate would desire notification and consultation.

23

20 Hearings, p. 68.

Secretary Powell stated in an answer for the record that such

consultation would be forthcoming. He stated: ‘‘While it is the

President who withdraws from treaties, the Administration intends

to discuss any need to withdraw from the Treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prior to

announcing any such action.’’ 20 The Committee commends the Secretary’s answer and believes future Administrations should adopt

this policy.

To provide a formal expression of the Senate’s concerns and expectations regarding action to extend, modify or withdraw from the

Treaty, the Committee recommends a resolution of ratification containing Declaration (6), which urges the President to consult with

the Senate prior to actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article

IV. The Committee recognizes that this declaration cannot affect

any authority the Constitution grants in this regard.

Should a circumstance arise where prior consultation with the

Senate on a decision to modify, extend or withdraw from the Treaty

is not feasible, notably if the Senate were out of session, the Committee hopes that the President, to the extent that it is feasible,

will consult the leadership of the Senate and Committee. Declaration (6), while not binding on the President, is a formal request

that the executive branch maintain the consultation policy enunciated in the Secretary of State’s answer to the question for the

record (cited above).

VI. RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION

Resolved, (two thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),

SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS

AND DECLARATIONS.

The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (T. Doc. 107–8, in this resolution referred to as the ‘‘Moscow Treaty’’ or ‘‘Treaty’’), subject to

the conditions in section 2 and declarations in section 3.

SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.

The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of

the Moscow Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which

shall be binding on the President:

(1) REPORT ON THE ROLE OF COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUC- TION AND NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE.—Recognizing that

implementation of the Moscow Treaty is the sole responsibility

of each party, not later than 60 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter

on February 15, the President shall submit to the Committee

on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of

the Senate a report and recommendations on how United

States Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to the Russian

Federation can best contribute to enabling the Russian Federation to implement the Treaty efficiently and maintain the security and accurate accounting of its nuclear weapons and weapons-usable components and material in the current year. The

24

report shall be submitted in both unclassified and, as necessary, classified form.

(2) ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION REPORT.—Not later than 60

days after exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on April 15, the President shall

submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on implementation of the Treaty by the United States and the Russian Federation. This report shall be submitted in both unclassified

and, as necessary, classified form and shall include—

(A) a listing of strategic nuclear weapons force levels

of the United States, and a best estimate of the strategic

nuclear weapons force levels of the Russian Federation, as

of December 31 of the preceding calendar year;

(B) a detailed description, to the extent possible, of

strategic offensive reductions planned by each party for

the current calendar year;

(C) to the extent possible, the plans of each party for

achieving by December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the Treaty;

(D) measures, including any verification or transparency measures, that have been taken or have been proposed by a party to assure each party of the other party’s

continued intent and ability to achieve by December 31,

2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article

I of the Treaty;

(E) information relevant to implementation of this

Treaty that has been learned as a result of Strategic Arms

Reduction Treaty (START) verification measures, and the

status of consideration of extending the START

verification regime beyond December 2009;

(F) any information, insufficiency of information, or

other situation that may call into question the intent or

the ability of either party to achieve by December 31,

2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article

I of the Treaty; and

(G) any actions that have been taken or have been

proposed by a party to address concerns listed pursuant to

subparagraph (F) or to improve the implementation and

effectiveness of the Treaty.

SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS.

The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the

Moscow Treaty is subject to the following declarations, which express the intent of the Senate:

(1) TREATY INTERPRETATION.—The Senate reaffirms condition (8) of the resolution of ratification of the Document Agreed

Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional

Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of November 19, 1990 (adopted

at Vienna on May 31, 1996), approved by the Senate on May

14, 1997, relating to condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,

approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.

25

(2) Further strategic arms reductions.—The Senate encourages the President to continue strategic offensive reductions to

the lowest possible levels consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations of the United States.

(3) Bilateral implementation issues.—The Senate expects

the executive branch of the Government to offer regular briefings, including consultations before meetings of the Bilateral

Implementation Commission, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on

any implementation issues related to the Moscow Treaty. Such

briefings shall include a description of all efforts by the United

States in bilateral forums and through diplomatic channels

with the Russian Federation to resolve any such issues and

shall include a description of—

(A) the issues raised at the Bilateral Implementation

Commission, within 30 days after such meetings;

(B) any issues related to implementation of this Treaty

that the United States is pursuing in other channels, including the Consultative Group for Strategic Security established pursuant to the Joint Declaration of May 24,

2002, by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation; and

(C) any Presidential determination with respect to

issues described in subparagraphs (A) and (B).

(4) NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS.—Recognizing the

difficulty the United States has faced in ascertaining with confidence the number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons maintained by the Russian Federation and the security of those

weapons, the Senate urges the President to engage the Russian

Federation with the objectives of—

(A) establishing cooperative measures to give each

party to the Treaty improved confidence regarding the accurate accounting and security of nonstrategic nuclear

weapons maintained by the other party; and

(B) providing United States or other international

assiance to help the Russian Federation ensure the accurate accounting and security of its nonstrategic nuclear

weapons.

(5) ACHIEVING REDUCTIONS.—Recognizing the transformed

relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation and the significantly decreased threat posed to the

United States by the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear arsenal, the Senate encourages the President to accelerate

United States strategic force reductions, to the extent feasible

and consistent with United States national security requirements and alliance obligations, in order that the reductions required by Article I of the Treaty may be achieved prior to December 31, 2012.

(6) CONSULTATIONS.—Given the Senate’s continuing interest in this Treaty and in continuing strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations of the United

States, the Senate urges the President to consult with the SenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
26

ate prior to taking actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article IV of the Treaty.

VII. ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS

The President submitted an Article by Article Analysis of the

Treaty to the Senate on June 20, 2002. The text of this analysis,

which was also published by the Senate in Treaty Document 107–

8, pages 5–10, is as follows:

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (the Moscow Treaty) consists of a Preamble

and five Articles.

TITLE AND PREAMBLE

The title of the Moscow Treaty is ‘‘Treaty Between the United

States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.’’ This title was deliberately chosen to reflect the

fact that this Treaty focuses on reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, rather than on ‘‘strategic offensive arms,’’ which traditionally have been considered to be delivery vehicles and launchers.

For linguistic reasons, the title of the Russian language version of

the Treaty is ‘‘. . . on Reductions in Strategic Offensive Potential.’’ The English language text of the Treaty was agreed first, but the

phrase ‘‘strategic offensive reductions’’ could not be literally translated into Russian. The substantive meanings of the titles are the

same.

The Preamble to the Moscow Treaty sets forth the intentions of

the Parties in broad terms. The first preambular paragraph designates the United States and Russia as ‘‘the Parties’’ to obviate

the use of their full names throughout the Treaty. The second,

third and fourth preambular paragraphs set forth the Parties’

shared commitment to conducting their relations in the new century on a fundamentally different and more cooperative basis than

had characterized their relations in the past. The reference to ‘‘mutual security’’ in the fourth paragraph refers to the non-threatening

nature of the Parties’ new strategic relationship; it does not imply

a specific relationship between the Parties’ forces. The fifth paragraph reaffirms the Parties’ general, longstanding commitment to

implementing significant reductions in strategic offensive arms.

This paragraph introduces references to specific prior commitments

and obligations by the Parties in the sixth, seventh and eighth

paragraphs that immediately follow, including those in the Treaty

Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (the START Treaty) and the Treaty

on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 (the NPT).

The sixth paragraph recognizes Joint Statements made by Presidents Bush and Putin in Genoa on July 22, 2001 and in Washington, DC on November 13, 2001 that detail the new basis for reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
27

21Press conference by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The East Room,

on November 13, 2001.

lations between the United States and Russia. This preambular

language does not imply any restrictions or obligations relating to

defensive programs. The seventh and eighth paragraphs make reference to two existing agreements of the Parties with regard to nuclear weapons, the START Treaty and Article VI of the NPT. The

final paragraph sets forth the Parties’ conviction that this Treaty

will establish more favorable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation and enhancing international security.

ARTICLE I

Article I contains the central obligation of the Moscow Treaty.

The first sentence of this paragraph obligates the Parties to reduce

and limit their strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and

as stated by the President of the Russian Federation on November

13 and December 13, 2001, respectively, so that by December 31,

2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed

1700–2200 for each Party. The Moscow Treaty’s limits relate solely

to the number of each Party’s strategic nuclear warheads. The Moscow Treaty does not limit the number of U.S. or Russian inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or submarine-launched ballistic

missiles (SLBMs) or their associated launchers, or heavy bombers.

Article I, by referencing the statements of both Presidents, makes

clear that the Parties need not implement their reductions in an

identical manner.

The United States will implement Article I as stated by President Bush on November 13, 2001: ‘‘. . . the United States will reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a

level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade, a level fully

consistent with American security.’’ 21 U.S. negotiators noted to

their Russian counterparts that, in carrying out the reductions provided for in this Treaty, in using the term ‘‘operationally deployed

strategic nuclear warheads’’ the United States means reentry vehicles on ICBMs in their launchers, reentry vehicles on SLBMs in

their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy

bomber bases. The United States also made clear that a small

number of spare strategic nuclear warheads (including spare ICBM

warheads) would be located at heavy bomber bases and that the

United States would not consider these warheads to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The United States intends to reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads in a manner consistent with these statements. In the context

of this Treaty, it is clear that only ‘‘nuclear’’ reentry vehicles, as

well as nuclear armaments, are subject to the 1700–2200 limit.

The method by which U.S. warhead numbers will be determined

under the Moscow Treaty differs from the START Treaty methodology. The START Treaty contains counting rules that attribute

specific numbers of warheads to each type of ICBM, SLBM or

heavy bomber regardless of the actual number of warheads on the

missile or bomber. These numbers may be different from both the

28

22Speech of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin to representatives of the American

public and U.S. politicians, November 13, 2001, Russian Embassy in Washington [Official U.S.

translation]. 23Statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 2001, regarding the decision of the U.S. Administration to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty [Official U.S. translation].

actual capacity of the specific system and the number actually carried by the system.

Under the U.S. approach, certain strategic nuclear warheads,

such as those nominally associated with submarines in overhaul or

submarines modified for other purposes, those downloaded from

ICBMs and SLBMs, and those nominally associated with deactivated Peacekeeper ICBMs, will continue to be subject to the

START Treaty unless such ICBMs or SLBMS and their associated

launchers are eliminated or converted in accordance with START

Treaty procedures. At the same time, however, under the Moscow

Treaty, once such warheads are no longer in operationally-deployed

status, they will be included as part of the United States’ reductions. Thus, among other things, missiles from which some warheads have been removed will be considered for purposes of the

START Treaty as carrying more warheads than they in fact carry.

By contrast, under the Moscow Treaty, the United States will limit

its strategic nuclear warheads based on the actual number of warheads on missiles in their launchers and at bomber bases (other

than spare warheads).

President Putin. for his part, stated at the Russian Embassy in

Washington, DC on November 13, 2001:

Russia is stating its readiness to proceed with significant

reductions of strategic offensive arms. That is why today

we are proposing a radical program of further reductions

of SOA—at the least, by a factor of three—to the minimum

level necessary to maintain strategic equilibrium in the

world.22

and in a statement on December 13, 2001:

a particularly important task in these conditions is to legally formalize the agreements that have been reached on

further drastic, irreversible, and verifiable reductions in

strategic offensive arms, which we believe should be at the

level of 1,500–2,200 nuclear warheads for each side.23

President Putin did not state explicitly how Russia intends to implement its reductions. During the negotiations the Russians suggested that they anticipated reducing warheads by eliminating or

converting missiles, launchers and heavy bombers. As noted above,

Russia, like the United States, may reduce its strategic nuclear

warheads by any method it chooses. Russia did not state conclusively during the negotiations how it intends to carry out its reductions.

The Moscow Treaty does not provide for sublimits or interim reduction levels or require a Party to reach the final reduction level

prior to December 31, 2012. Therefore, prior to December 31, 2012,

each Party is free to maintain whatever level of strategic nuclear

warheads it deems appropriate, consistent with its obligations

29

under the START Treaty and its obligation to meet the specified

limit by the specified date.

The second sentence of Article I states that each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads. As noted earlier, the Moscow Treaty does not

limit the total number of strategic offensive arms, or contain either

numerical sublimits or bans on categories of forces. Under the Moscow Treaty, each Party will thus have flexibility in structuring its

forces to reach these new low levels for strategic nuclear warheads.

The Treaty does not restrict a Party’s decisions regarding how it

will implement the required reductions.

ARTICLE II

In Article II, the Parties recognize that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms. The purpose of this Article is to make clear that the Moscow Treaty and the START Treaty are separate. The START Treaty’s provisions do not extend to

the Moscow Treaty, and the Moscow Treaty does not terminate, extend or in any other way affect the status of the START Treaty.

The START Treaty will remain in force until December 5, 2009,

unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended.

ARTICLE III

Article III establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission

(BIC), a diplomatic consultative forum which shall meet at least

twice a year, to discuss issues related to implementation of the

Moscow Treaty.

ARTICLE IV

Article IV consists of three paragraphs covering ratification,

entry into force, duration and withdrawal.

Paragraph 1 of Article IV provides that the Moscow Treaty shall

be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party and shall enter into force on the date of the

exchange of instruments of ratification.

Paragraph 2 of Article IV provides that the Moscow Treaty shall

remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be extended by

agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent

agreement. Extension of the Treaty is not automatic but must be

done by agreement of the Parties. Since such an extension is authorized by the Treaty, it would constitute an agreement pursuant

to the Treaty and would accordingly not be subject to Senate advice

and consent.

Paragraph 3 of Article IV provides that each Party, in exercising

its national sovereignty, may withdraw from the Treaty upon three

months written notice to the other Party. Unlike some other arms

control agreements, this withdrawal clause is not tied to a Party’s

determination that extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national interests exist. Rather, the Moscow Treaty includes

a more general formulation that allows greater flexibility for each

Party to respond to unforeseen circumstances.

30

Unlike several earlier arms control agreements, including the

START Treaty, there are no specific provisions for either amending

the Moscow Treaty or for making ‘‘viability and effectiveness’’

changes to the Treaty. Such provisions were not seen as necessary

given the structure and content of this Treaty.

For international agreements submitted to the Senate that do

not have specific amendment procedures, U.S. practice has been to

submit amendments to the Senate for its advice and consent unless

the Senate agrees that submission is not required.

ARTICLE V

Article V sets forth standard provisions for registration of the

Treaty pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

VIII. CBO COST ESTIMATES

In response to a request from Senator Biden, the Congressional

Budget Office (CBO) supplied the Committee with information on

the possible budgetary impact of implementing the reductions mandated by Article I of the Moscow Treaty. In addition, the CBO responded to a request for estimates of the cost of various alternative

strategic force structures and reduction rates. This correspondence

is included in this section.

The CBO estimates the Administration would need to remove

over the next ten years approximately 2,600 to 3,100 warheads

from U.S. strategic offensive forces in order to meet the Treaty requirement of 1,700 to 2,200 deployed strategic nuclear warheads by

December 31, 2012. Because the Administration has not yet determined how to achieve these reductions, the CBO looked at two possible paths.

Under the first path, the Administration would not retire any

strategic platforms (beyond those already announced in the FY

2003–2007 defense planning), but instead remove warheads from

Minuteman missiles, Trident submarines, and military bases where

bombers are deployed. CBO estimates that these actions would cost

$105 or $115 million through 2012, depending upon whether the

final level is 2,200 or 1,700 warheads. Under the second path, the

Administration would remove both warheads and delivery platforms from the U.S. strategic inventory, including retiring 150 Minuteman missiles and two of the oldest Trident submarines, and

converting B–2 bombers to a conventional role only. Although costs

would be incurred in the removal of warheads and the retirement

of certain delivery systems, these costs would be more than offset

by the savings from forgoing development and procurement of new

systems to upgrade the two Trident submarines and 150 Minuteman missiles. Accordingly, the estimated net savings associated

with this path are approximately $5.1 billion through 2012.

The Committee recommends that the President give particular

attention, as Moscow Treaty implementation proceeds, to the possibility that modest further reductions in strategic delivery systems

after 2007 could lead to significant cost savings without endangering the national security.

31

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC, July 8, 2002.

Mr. DAN L. CRIPPEN

Director, Congressional Budget Office,

U.S. Congress, Washington, DC 20515

DEAR MR. CRIPPEN:

The Committee on Foreign Relations will begin in July its hearing process on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, which

the President submitted to the Senate on June 20 for its advice and

consent to ratification. The Committee would appreciate an analysis by the Congressional Budget Office of the costs associated with

the implementation of this treaty.

In particular, I ask your Office to include in its analysis the following information:

• Costs that the United States will incur or avoid by taking the

steps required under this treaty. Does the treaty require any

steps which the Administration had not already planned?

• Projected costs of the various options the United States may

choose in order to reach a level of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally

deployed strategic nuclear warheads by December 31, 2012.

• Projected costs of possible verification and transparency measures, beyond those utilized under the START Treaty, that may

be incurred in association with this treaty. One example of

such a measure would be the separation of spare warheads

from non- deployed warheads currently co-located at heavy

bomber bases.

• Projected costs to the United States if all of the U.S. warheads

taken out of operational deployment to meet the Treaty’s reduction requirement are placed in storage, with half those warheads maintained in readiness for a speedy re-armament.

What are the projected costs if all of these warheads are eliminated? If half are eliminated? Please include in this analysis

the impact of warhead reductions on the costs associated with

the Department of Energy’s requirements for warhead re-manufacturing and tritium production.

• Projected costs of increasing U.S. assistance under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and/or nonproliferation assistance programs to help Russia eliminate warheads that are removed from deployment pursuant to this treaty and secure any

resulting fissile material. How will these projected costs change

if Russia stores its downloaded warheads and U.S. assistance

focuses on the security of the warheads?

• Costs to the United States of converting U.S. strategic bombers

and ballistic missile submarines to non-nuclear missions, but

maintaining a ready capability to revert to nuclear missions.

What are the alternative costs of eliminating these delivery vehicles or irreversibly converting them to conventional capability?

• Implications for overall costs if the United States reduces its

operationally deployed warheads to a level of 1,700 to 2,200 by

2007 instead of 2012, as called for under the treaty.

32

• Implications for overall costs if the United States, within 1–2

years of the treaty’s entry into force, lowers the operational

status of forces scheduled for reduction by 2012.

I look forward to receiving a cost analysis by your Office on the

implementation of this treaty by September 3, 2002, so that the

Committee can make its recommendations regarding action on the

treaty during this legislative session.

If you have any questions regarding this request, please feel free

to contact the Committee’s staff director, Mr. Antony Blinken, or

professional staff members Edward Levine or Jofi Joseph, at 224– 4651. I understand that Committee staff have already discussed

our needs with staff of the Defense, International Affairs, and Veterans’ Affairs Cost Estimates Unit in your Budget Analysis Division.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Chairman.

U.S. CONGRESS,

CONGRESSONAL BUDGET OFFICE,

Washington, DC, September 24, 2002.

Honorable JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., Chairman

Committee on Foreign Relations,

United States Senate,

Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

As you requested, the Congressional Budget Office has prepared

the attached estimate of the budgetary impact from implementing

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian

Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed at the Moscow Summit on May 24, 2002. Under that treaty, the United States

and Russia would reduce their number of strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200, about two-thirds below current

levels, by December 31, 2012.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we would be pleased

to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Raymond J. Hall (in

the Budget Analysis Division), and J. Michael Gilmore (in the National Security Division).

Sincerely,

DAN L. CRIPPEN, Director.

Attachment.

ESTIMATED COSTS AND SAVINGS FROM IMPLEMENTING THE MOSCOW

TREATY

SUMMARY

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) limits the United

States and the former countries of the Soviet Union (Russia,

Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) to 6,000 accountable warheads.

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian

Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (informally known as

the ‘‘Moscow Treaty’’) calls for both countries to reduce that numVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
33

ber of warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. The Administration first announced its intention to pursue those reductions at

the conclusion of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in January

2002. That review also set an interim goal of reducing the number

of warheads available for immediate use to approximately 3,800 by

2007.

To meet the interim goal set by the NPR, the Administration

would need to remove about 2,100 warheads from U.S. strategic offensive forces. The Administration’s fiscal year 2003–2007 defense

plan would partially achieve that goal by retiring all 50 Peacekeeper missiles, removing four Trident submarines from strategic

service and converting them to a conventional (non-nuclear) role,

and permanently converting all 81 B–1 bombers to a conventional

role. In total, about 1,100 warheads would be removed by implementing that plan. To fully attain the NPR goal, however, the Department of Defense (DoD) would need to remove about 1,000 more

warheads from delivery platforms. The Congressional Budget OFfice (CBO) estimates that the costs to remove those additional warheads would amount to roughly $25 million over the 2003–2007 pe- riod and $55 million over the 2003–2012 period. (Costs and savings

provided in this estimate are expressed relative to the costs of operating strategic offensive nuclear forces and supporting activities

under the Aiministration’s fiscal year 2003–2007 defense plan. All

cost estimates are in current dollars of budget authority.)

Achieving the Moscow Treaty goal of having no more than 1,700

to 2,200 warheads available for immediate use by 2012 would require the Administration to remove a total of 2,600 to 3,100 warheads from service. Those reductions could be achieved in many

ways. In the absence of definitive plans from the Administration,

CBO has examined two paths for achieving those reductions. The

first path would keep most of the delivery platforms that were

planned to be in place in 2007, whereas the second path would remove or retire some missiles and submarines. Implementing the

first path would cost about $25 million over the 2003–2007 period and about $105 million over the 2003–2012 period, CBO estimates,

if the United States reduced warheads to the 2,200 level (see Summary Table 1). Removing or retiring delivery platforms, in contrast,

offers the potential for significant savings. CBO estimates that the

second path would save about $2.2 billion over the 2003–2007 pe- riod and $5.1 billion through 2012. Reducing the number of available warheads to the lower level of 1,700 would not necessarily result in significant costs or savings beyond those estimated for the

2,200-warhead level, CBO estimates. Accelerating the warhead reductions to achieve the Moscow Treaty target by 2007 might necessitate some additional spending beyond that estimated for the

paths mentioned above.

Summary Table 1.—Costs or Savings (–) of Two Paths to Achieve the Moscow Treaty’s WarheadReduction Goal

[In millions of dollars]

Total, 2003–2007Total, 2008–2012Total, 2003–2012

Reduce warheads to Moscow Treaty Levels by 2012:

Without Retiring Delivery Platforms ................................................................... 25 80 105

34

1 A modern thermonuclear weapon consists of a primary and a secondary. The primary uses

fission (the splitting of atoms) to create enough energy to start a fission reaction in the secondary. The pit is a key component of the primary and is composed of fissionable material such

as plutonium.

Summary Table 1.—Costs or Savings (–) of Two Paths to Achieve the Moscow Treaty’s WarheadReduction Goal—Continued

[In millions of dollars]

Total,

2003–2007

Total,

2008–2012

Total,

2003–2012

Reduce warheads to Moscow Treaty Levels by 2012:

By Retiring Some Delivery Platforms ................................................................. –2,165 –2,920 –5,085

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Costs and savings shown in this table are associated with approaches to reduce the number of warheads to the Moscow Treaty goal

of 2,200.Reducing the number of warheads to 1,700 would not necessarily result in significant additional costs or savings.

CBO also investigated the possible budgetary impact of dismantling, instead of storing, weapons removed from service. Because

warheads stored in a status preventing their immediate use by

strategic forces would not count against the Moscow Treaty’s numerical limitations, no warheads would need to be destroyed. Dismantling one-half or more of the warheads removed to meet Moscow Treaty requirements could have substantial costs, dcpending

on when the efforts might be scheduled. According to information

provided by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)

of the Department of Energy, dismantling one-half of the warheads

by 2012 would exceed the planned capacity at its Pantex nuclear

weapons production facility in Amarillo, Texas. If completion of dismantlement could be delayed until the 2020–2025 period, the

planned capacity at Pantex would probably be sufficient.

CBO currently has insufficient information to estimate the effects that dismantling (instead of storing and maintaining) warheads might have on needed tritium and pit production capacities.1

But because the NNSA’s current plans are based on maintaining

an inventory consistent with levels under START, dismantling a

significant fraction of that inventory ought to imply a concomitant

reduction in needed steady-state tritium and pit production capacities.

CBO also examined issues relating to treaty verification. According to statements made by the Administration, the Moscow Treaty

contains no additional verification provisions beyond those implemented for START. Other supplementary measures, including

transparency measures, could be agreed to in the future, but CBO

has no basis for predicting the nature or cost of such additional

measures.

As part of this cost estimate, CBO also looked at the costs of converting strategic bombers and submarines to conventional missions

while maintaining a ready capability to revert to a strategic role.

The Administration has announced no plans for converting bombers and submarines to a conventional-only configuration while retaining the option to restore their nuclear capability. The details of

such plans would be key in determining the costs for initial conversion as well as those to restore nuclear capability. Without that information, CBO has no basis for definitively estimating those costs,

35

which could be either negligible or significant depending on the approach taken.

Lastly, CBO examined the possible savings from lowering the

operational status of, or taking off high alert, strategic forces

scheduled for retirement. The Administration has announced no

plans to retire any delivery platforms beyond the Peacekeeper missiles that would be retired by 2005. The savings associated with

lowering the operational status of such forces would probably be

small.

INTRODUCTION

For most of the past 40 years, the Department of Defense has

maintained a triad of strategic offensive nuclear forces consisting

of missiles, submarines, and bombers. Those forces have been subject to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty since it took effect on

December 5, 1994. That treaty limits the United States and the

former countries of the Soviet Union (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,

and Ukraine) to 6,000 accountable warheads following the sevenyear reduction period that ended on December 4, 2001.

Under START, the size of U.S. strategic offensive nuclear forces

declinedsignificantly, from over 8,800 accountable warheads at the

treaty’s inception to fewer than 6,000 warheads today. The declared force structure consists of 1,200 warheads on 500 Minuteman III missiles, 500 warheads on 50 Peacekeeper missiles, about

3,200 warheads on C4 and D5 missiles carried on 18 Trident submarines, and roughly 1,000 nuclear bombs and cruise missiles deployed on nearly 200 strategic bombers (see Table 1).

Table 1.—Comparison of Various Strategic Offensive Forces

(In numbers of delivery platforms and deployed warheads)

Weapon

Forces Planned for Deployment in 2007

Strategic Forces Under

START Counting Rules

The Administration’s

FY 2003–2007

Defense Plan

An Approach

to Achieve

the NPR Goal

Quantity Warheads 1

Quantity Warheads 2 Quantity Warheads 3

ICBMs:

Minuteman III ................................................... 500 1,200 500 1,200 500 800

Peacekeeper ..................................................... 50 500 0 0 0 0

SLBMs:

Trident Submarines

Carrying C4 Missiles ................................... 6 864 0 0 0 0

Trident Submarines

Carrying D5 Missiles ................................... 12 2,304 14 2,304 14 1,656

Bombers:

B–1 .................................................................. 81 81 (4) 0(4) 0

B–2 .................................................................. 21 21 21 256 21 256

B–52 ................................................................ 94 940 76 1,056 76 1,056

Total ........................................................ ................ 5,910 ................ 4,816 ................ 3,768

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.

Note: FY = fiscal year; ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; NPR = Nuclear Posture Review; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile; START = Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. 1 Under START, warheads are counted as follows: three warheads on each of 350 Minuteman missiles and one warhead on each of the remaining 150 Minuteman missiles; 10 warheads on each Peacekeeper missile; six warheads on each C4 missile and eight warheads on each

D5 missile (each Trident submarine carries either 24 C4 missiles or 24 D5 missiles); one warhead on each B–1 and B–2 bomber and 10

warheads on each B–52 bomber.

36

2 Under the Administration’s plan, warheads are counted as follows: three warheads on each of 350 Minuteman missiles and one warhead

on each of the remaining 150 Minuteman missiles; eight warheads on each D5 missile (for a total of 192 warheads on each of the 12 operationally deployed Trident submarines); 16 nuclear bombs on each of the 16 operationally deployed B–2 bombers; and from 12 to 20 cruise

missiles on each of the 56 operationally deployed B–52 bombers. 3 Under this approach, warheads are counted as follows: three warheads on each of 150 Minuteman missiles and a single warhead on

each of the remaining 350 Minuteman missiles; either five or six warheads on each D5 missile (for a total of 138 warheads on each of the

12 operationally deployed Trident submarines); 16 nuclear bombs on each of the operationally deployed 16 B–2 bombers; and 12 to 20 cruise

missiles on each of the 56 operationally deployed B–52 bombers. 4 All B–1 bombers would be permanently converted to a conventional role.

The total number of accountable warheads on ballistic missiles is

determined by the number of missiles, submarines, and bombers as

well as the number of warheads declared on each of them. The

original declarations were announced during the December 1987

Washington Summit between Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev.

Since that time, the number of warheads on two missiles (the C4

and the Minuteman III) has been lowered; warhead counts on the

other strategic platforms remain unchanged. Currently, the older

C4 ballistic missile is declared to carry six warheads, and the

newer D5 missile has eight warheads. The land-based Minuteman

III ballistic missile currently has one or three warheads, depending

on the Air Force base at which it is deployed, while the Peacekeeper missile carries 10 warheads. Under the provisions of

START, warheads on strategic bombers are counted in one of two

ways. Strategic bombers that are declared to carry long-range airlaunched cruise missiles (the B–52s) count as 10 warheads each.

Strategic bombers that are declared to not carry cruise missiles

(the B–1s and B–2s) count as one warhead each.

The Administration’s 2003–2007 Defense Plan

The Administration’s fiscal year 2003–2007 defense plan would

reduce the number of nuclear warheads, compared with today’s levels, immediately available to U.S. strategic forces. The plan would

lower the warhead count to about 4,800 by 2007 (see Table 1). The

intent to pursue those reductions was first announced at the conclusion of the Nuclear Posture Review in January 2002. That review concluded that strategic forces equipped with between 1,700

and 2,200 warheads would be sufficient to maintain the security of

the United States. The review also set an interim goal of reducing

the number of nuclear warheads to approximately 3,800 by 2007.

According to information provided by DoD, the fiscal year 2003–

2007 defense plan would partially achieve that interim goal

through:

• The retirement of all Peacekeeper missiles,

• The conversion of the four oldest Trident submarines to a conventional role, and

• The elimination of the capability to return the B–1 bombers to

a nuclear role.

The Moscow Treaty

President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin signed

the Moscow Treaty on May 24, 2002. That treaty, which is consistent with the results of the NPR, calls for both countries, by

2012, to maintain no more than 1,700 to 2,200 warheads in a status such that they are capable of immediate use by strategic offensive forces. (DoD and the National Nuclear Security Administration

37

refer to warheads in that status as ‘‘operationally deployed warheads.’’) Under the terms of the treaty, each country would determine the numbers and types of bombers, submarines, and missile

launchers that would constitute its strategic offensive forces and

determine the number of warheads on each type of delivery platform. Warheads stored in a status preventing their immediate use

by strategic forces would not count toward the treaty’s numerical

limits. Thus, there is no requirement for any warheads to be destroyed under the terms of the Moscow Treaty. That treaty would

also use the verification procedures of START to provide confidence

and transparency in warhead reductions.

THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTING THE MOSCOW TREATY

CBO has prepared estimates of the costs and savings that would

result from reducing the U.S. arsenal of strategic weapons to comply with the Moscow Treaty. Specifically, CBO has estimated:

• The costs of reducing the U.S. arsenal to achieve the Administration’s goal to deploy about 3,800 warheads by 2007, and

• The costs and savings of reducing the U.S. arsenal to achieve

the Moscow Treaty’s goal of between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads

by 2012.

This paper also discusses the potential to accelerate the reductions in the number of warheads to achieve the Moscow Treaty’s

goal by 2007. CBO’s estimates do not include any costs to build additional facilities to store the warheads and nuclear weapons that

would be removed from delivery platforms because, according to

DoD, the available storage capacity would be sufficient to accommodate all warheads removed from service.

Costs of Meeting the Administration’s Goal of 3,800 Nuclear Warheads by 2007

Achieving the goal of having about 3,800 warheads available for

immediate use by 2007 wDuld require that the Administration reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal below the levels set forth in its fiscal

year 2003–2007 defense program. On the basis of information provided by DoD, CBO assumes that those reductions would be

achieved by removing about 1,000 warheads from Minuteman and

D5 missiles (see Table 1). The costs to remove those warheads

would amount to about $25 million over the 2003–2007 period and

$55 million over the 2003–2012 period, CBO estimates.

Remove Warheads from Minuteman Missiles. Today, the Air

Force deploys 500 Minuteman III missiles at three bases: 150 missiles at F.E. Warren Air Force Base (AFB) in Wyoming, 200 missiles at Malmstrom AFB in Montana, and 150 missiles at Minot

AFB in North Dakota. Under START, the missiles at F.E. Warren

AFB each carry a single warhead, whereas the missiles at the

other two bases each carry three warheads, for a total of 1,200 warheads.

To reduce the number of warheads deployed on Minuteman missiles, the Air Force would convert an additional 200 missiles to a

single-warhead configuration, CBO assumes. In all, 400 warheads

would need to be removed and transported to storage facilities. According to the Air Force, it would need to replace the existing hardVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
38

ware on the missiles (primarily hardware called bulkheads that

would be used to deploy the warheads on the missiles) with new

hardware to accommodate the single warhead. It would need to

augment squadron personnel with contractor support to accomplish

that effort. The costs to remove the 400 warheads would total

about $15 million over the 2003–2007 period, CBO etimates—about

$10 million to replace the bulkheads and about $5 million to place

the warheads in shipping and storage containers and then transport them to storage facilities. The estimate does not include any

costs to buy the new bulkheads because the Air Force has already

purchased that hardware. Also, it does not include any costs to buy

shipping and storage containers because the Air Force now has

about 620 of those containers available for use and plans to purchase an additional 250 containers.

The Air Force has indicated that the number of personnel at the

storage locations might need to be increased to support the maintenance activities associated with the storage of additional warheads,

but it has not provided CBO with estimates of those staffing requirements. CBO believes that those costs would be negligible,

however.

Remove Warheads from D5 Missiles. Today, the Navy deploys

432 C4 and D5 missiles containing roughly 3,200 warheads on 18

Trident submarines. Eight of those submarines are based at the

Naval Submarine Base (NSB) in Bangor, Washington, and the

other 10 are stationed at the NSB in Kings Bay, Georgia. The Navy

plans to convert four of the Trident submarines to a conventional

role. By 2007, under the Administration’s plan, each of the remaining 14 Trident submarines would be equipped to carry 24 D5 missiles and—assuming that eight warheads were loaded on each D5

missile—could carry a total of 192 warheads. According to the

Navy, an average of two submarines a year would undergo a major

overhaul and thus would not carry any missiles. The 12 operationally deployed Trident submarines would carry a total of 2,304 warheads (see Table 1). The C4 missiles that would be removed from

the submarines would be transported to a DoD facility for disposal.

The warheads that would be removed from those missiles would either be reloaded onto the newer D5 missiles or stored at a DoD facility.

In order to achieve the NPR goal, CBO expects that the Navy

would reduce the number of warheads on the D5 missiles. CBO assumes that the 12 operationally deployed sthmarines would each

be equipped with 18 missiles loaded with six older warheads (these

older warheads are deployed on Mk4 reentry vehicles) and six missiles loaded with five newer warheads (these warheads are deployed on Mk5 reentry vehicles), for a total of 138 warheads on

each vessel. In all, CBO estimates that 648 warheads would need

to be removed from those vessels—54 warheads from each of the

12 Trident submarines. On the basis of information provided by the

Navy, CBO estimates that removing the warheads from the missiles would not involve additional costs because that task would be

accomplished by existing personnel as part of regular periodic

maintenance. CBO also estimates that storing more warheads

would not result in any significant additional costs. Finally, the estimate does not include any costs for modifying the existing misVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:11 Feb 20, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 MOSCOW.WPD SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
39

siles because, according to the Navy, the missiles can accommodate

a load of five or six warheads without modifications.

As stated in the NPR, the Administration aims to retain the capability to reconstitute U.S. strategic forces with larger numbers of

warheads than the Moscow Treaty permits. This means that the

Navy must have the capability to take all of the Mk4 reentry vehicles that would be removed from the C4 and D5 missiles and

placed in storage and reload them back onto the D5 missiles quickly. The hardware used to put the Mk4 reentry vehicles on D5 missiles is called a release assembly. The Navy has purchased sufficient quantities of Mk4 release assemblies to support the lower

number of deployed warheads but not enough to support a higher

level of reconstituted warheads. To provide this reconstitution capability, the Navy has indicated that roughly 600 Mk4 assemblies

would need to be purchased over the 2004–2012 period. CBO esti- mates that the costs for those assemblies would total about $40

million through 2012.

Costs and Savings from Meeting the Moscow Treaty’s Goal of 1,700

to 2,200 Nuclear Warheads by 2012

Achieving the goal of having no more than 1,700 to 2,200 warheads available for immediate use by 2012 would require the Administration to remove another 1,600 to 2,100 warheads from service by that date. CBO has examined two paths for achieving those

additional reductions. The first path (see Option 1, below) would

keep all of the strategic delivery platforms that were planned to be

in place in 2007—500 Minuteman missiles, 14 Trident submarines,

76 B–52 bombers, and 21 B–2 bombers. That path is consistent

with the goals outlined by the Administration in the NPR. The second path (see Option 2, below) would remove or retire some warheads and delivery platforms: it retires 150 Minuteman missiles

and two additional Trident submarines, and it converts the B–2

bombers to a conventional role, removing them from the arsenal of

U.S. strategic offensive nuclear forces. Table 2 shows the delivery

platforms associated with the Administration’s plan and the two

options.

Table 2.—Comparison of CBO’s Options to Achieve the Moscow Treaty Goal of 2,200 Warheads

by 2012

(In numbers of delivery platforms and deployed warheads)

Weapon

The Administration’s

FY 2003–2007

Defense Plan

Option 1:

2,200 Warheads,

No Retirements 1

Option 2:

2,200 Warheads,

Fewer Platforms 1

Quantity Warhead 2 Quantity Warheads 3 Quantity Warheads 4

ICBMs:

Minuteman III ....................................... 500 1,200 500 500 350 650

Peacekeeper ......................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0

SLBMs:

Trident Submarines

Carrying C4 Missiles ....................... 0 0 0 0 0 0

Trident Submarines

Carrying D5 Missiles ....................... 14 2,304 14 1,152 12 1,110

Bombers:

B–1 ...................................................... (5) 0(5) 0(5) 0

B–2 ...................................................... 21 256 21 128 (5) 0

40

Table 2.—Comparison of CBO’s Options to Achieve the Moscow Treaty Goal of 2,200 Warheads

by 2012—Continued

(In numbers of delivery platforms and deployed warheads)

Weapon

The Administration’s

FY 2003–2007

Defense Plan

Option 1:

2,200 Warheads,

No Retirements 1

Option 2:

2,200 Warheads,

Fewer Platforms 1

Quantity Warhead 2 Quantity Warheads 3 Quantity Warheads 4

B–52 .................................................... 76 1,056 76 420 76 420

Total ................................................. .................. 4,816 .................. 2,200 .................. 2,180

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.

Notes: FY = fiscal year; ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile.

1 CBO has also postulated approaches to achieving the 1,700-warhead level in the Moscow Treaty. See Appendix A for detailed descriptions

of the force structure for those approaches. 2 Under the Administration’s plan, warheads are counted as follows: three warheads on each of 350 Minuteman missiles and one warhead

on each of the remaining 150 Minuteman missiles; eight warheads on each of the 24 D5 missiles (for a total of 192 warheads on each of

the 12 operationally deployed Trident submarines); 16 nuclear bombs on each of the 16 operationally deployed B–2 bombers; and from 12 to

20 cruise missiles on each of the 56 operationally deployed B–52 bombers. 3 Under Option 1, warheads are counted as follows: one warhead on each of 500 Minuteman missiles; four warheads on each of the 24 D5

missiles (for a total of 96 warheads on each of the 12 operationally deployed Trident submarines); eight nuclear bombs on each of the 16

operationally deployed B–2 bombers; and about eight cruise missiles on each of the 56 operationally deployed B–52 bombers. 4 Under Option 2, warheads are counted as follows: three warheads on each of 150 Minuteman missiles and a single warhead on each of

the remaining 200 Minuteman missiles; either four or five warheads on each of the 24 D5 missiles (for a total of 111 warheads on each of

the 10 operationally deployed Trident submarines); and about eight cruise missiles on each of the 56 operationally deployed B–52 bombers. 5 All B–1 bombers would be permanently converted to a conventional role. Under Option 2, all B–2 bombers would also be permanently

converted to a conventional role.

Specific information about those two paths, which would reduce

the number of warheads available for immediate use to 2,200, is

presented below. Similar paths to reduce the number of available

warheads to 1,700, which are discussed in detail in Appendix A,

would have almost identical budgetary consequences.

Option 1: Reduce the Number of Warheads to 1,700 or 2,200

Without Retiring Delivery Platforms from the Strategic Inventory.

This option illustrates how the Administration could reduce the nuclear arsenal to either 1,700 or 2,200 warheads available for immediate use without retiring any strategic platforms beyond those

changes already set out in the 2003–2007 defense program. One

way of reducing the nuclear arsenal to 2,200 warheads could involve the following actions:

• Reconfigure the remaining 350 Minuteman missiles to carry

one warhead instead of three.

• Deploy only 96 warheads on each of the 12 operational Trident

submarines (four warheads for each of the 24 missiles), and

• Remove warheads from military bases where bombers are deployed so that only eight nuclear weapons are available for immediate use on each operational strategic bomber.

CBO estimates that the costs to take those actions would amount

to about $25 million over the 2003–2007 period and $105 million

through 2012 (see Table 3). That estimate includes the $55 million

in costs to meet the Administration’s goal of 3,800 warheads by

2007. The details are outlined below.

In another version of this option, the United States could reduce

the number of nuclear warheads further, to about 1,700, if it deployed only 72 warheads on each Trident submarine, instead of the

96 warheads indicated above, and converted the B–2 bombers to a

conventional non-nuclear role. CBO estimates that the costs to

achieve this lower warhead level would amount to $115 million

41

through 2012. (See Appendix A for details of this estimate, which

is labeled Option 1A.)

Missiles. CBO assumes that the Air Force would reconfigure the

remaining 350 missiles that currently carry multiple warheads to

a single-warhead configuration by replacing the existing bulkheads

with new ones. After that, the warheads would need to be prepared

for transport to storage sites. The costs to remove the 700 warheads would total about $25 million over the 2003–2012 period,

CBO estimates—about $15 million to replace the bulkheads and about $10 million to place the warheads in shipping and storage

containers and to transport them to storage facilities.

Submarines. In order to achieve the 2,200-warhead level, CBO

assumes that by 2012 the Navy would load only four warheads on

each of the 24 D5 missiles on each Trident submarine, for a total

of 96 warheads per submarine. In total, 1,152 warheads would

need to be removed. The cost to remove missiles from the submarines and warheads from the missiles would be negligible, CBO

estimated, because these actions could be done as part of regular

maintenance.

Table 3.—Costs or Savings (–) of Various Approaches to Achieving the Moscow Treaty Goal

Relative to the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2003–2007 Defense Program

(In millions of dollars)

Warhead

Removal

Reduced

Operations

Canceled

Upgrades/

Purchases

Total,

2003–2012

Achieve Nuclear Posture Review Goal of 3,800 Warheads by 2007:

ICBMs ............................................................................................ 15 0 0 15

SLBMs ............................................................................................ 40 0 0 40

Bombers ........................................................................................ 0 0 0 0

Subtotal .................................................................................... 55 0 0 55

Option 1: Reduce the Number of Warheads to 2,200 by 2012 Without

Retiring Delivery Platforms 1

ICBMs ............................................................................................ 25 0 0 25

SLBMs ............................................................................................ 40 0 0 40

Bombers ........................................................................................ 40 0 0 40

Subtotal .................................................................................... 105 0 0 105

Option 2: Reduce the Number of Warheads to 2,200 by 2012 by Retiring Some Delivery Platforms 1

ICBMs ............................................................................................ 245 –1,760 –1,000 –2,515

SLBMs ............................................................................................ 260 –730 –2,150 –2,620

Bombers ........................................................................................ 50 0 0 50

Subtotal .................................................................................... 550 –2,490 –3,150 –5,085

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile. Numbers may not add up to totals because

of rounding.

1 Costs and savings displayed reflect approaches to reducing current levels of warheads to the Moscow Treaty goal of 2,200 warheads. The

costs to remove the warheads for Option 1 and 2 include the $55 million to achieve the Nuclear Posture Review goal of 3,800 warheads by

2007. CBO estimates that reducing the number of warheads to the 1,700 level would not necessarily result in significant additional costs or

savings beyond those estimated for reducing to the 2,200-warhead level. See Appendix A for a breakdown of those costs.

As mentioned above, to comply with the NPR, the Navy would

need to purchase additional equipment to maintain the capability

to reload eight warheads on each missile at some future time. The

costs of that equipment would total about $40 million over the

2003–2012 period, CBO estimates.

42

Bombers. CBO assumes that the Air Force would retain for immediate use on its bomber bases only eight nuclear weapons for

each of the 16 operational B–2 bombers and 56 operational B–52

bombers to achieve the overall warhead level of 2,200. In that ease,

128 nuclear bombs and the warheads on 636 cruise missiles would

need to be removed from bomber bases. CBO estimates that the

costs to remove the warheads and bombs, to purchase containers

to place them in, and to transport them to facilities away from the

bases would total about $40 million in 2012. That estimate does

not include any additional costs for shipping and storing the cruise

missiles because, as under current Air Force plans, those missiles

would be stored at the bases. (If the Air Force chose to store the

cruise missiles away from the bomber bases, CBO estimates that

shipping and storage costs for those cruise missiles would total

about $5 million in 2012.)

Option 2: Reduce the Number of Warheads to 1,700 or 2,200 by

Removing Delivery Platforms from the Strategic Inventory. Another

way to reduce the nuclear arsenal to 1,700 or 2,200 warheads

would be to remove some warheads and delivery platforms from

the strategic inventory. One approach for achieving the 2,200-warhead level could involve the following actions:

• Retire 150 Minuteman missiles,

• Reconfigure 200 of the remaining 350 Minuteman missiles to

a single-warhead configuration,

• Retire two of the oldest Trident submarines,

• Deploy only 111 warheads on each of the remaining 10 operational Trident submarines,

• Convert the B–2 bombers to a conventional role, and

• Provide only eight nuclear weapons for use on each operational

B–52 bomber.

CBO estimates that the costs to remove the warheads and nuclear weapons from the missiles, submarines, and bombers; transport the warheads and weapons to storage facilities; and retire 150

missiles and two submarines would amount to about $370 million

over the 2003–2007 period and $550 million through 2012 (see

Table 3). However, those costs would be more than offset by the

$5.6 billion in savings over 10 years that would result from forgoing development and procurement of new systems to upgrade the

two Trident submarines and 150 Minuteman missiles retired under

this option (saving $3.1 billion) and from reduced operations costs

(saving $2.5 billion). In total, the net savings associated with this

option would be about $5.1 billion over the 2003–2012 period, CBO

estimates. (That estimate is relative to the Administration’s fiscal

year 2003–2007 defense plan and includes the $55 million in costs

to meet an interim goal of 3,800 warheads by 2007.) The details of

this estimate are outlined below.

In a similar manner, the United States could reduce the nuclear

warhead levels further, to about 1,700, if it equipped all 350 remaining Minuteman missiles to carry only one warhead and deployed only 96 warheads on each of the 10 operational Trident submarines, instead of the 111 warheads indicated above. CBO estimates that, relative to the Administration’s 2003–2007 defense

plan, the net savings associated with attaining that level would

43

also total $5.1 billion over the 2003–2012 period. (See Appendix A

for further information about the details of this estimate, which is

labeled Option 2A.)

Missiles. CBO assumes that the Air Force would retire the Minuteman wing that is currently composed of 150 single-warhead

missiles starting in 2005 and that the retirements would be completed by the end of 2007. The savings from retiring those missiles

would total about $2.5 billion over the 2003–2012 period, CBO estimates. Of that sum, savings of $1.8 billion would result from reduced operations costs over the 2005–2012 period, or about $225

million a year. That estimate of savings includes the offsetting

costs associated with securing and maintaining the empty silos. An

additional $1 billion in savings over the 2003–2007 period would

result from canceling planned propulsion upgrades (about $450 million) and guidance system upgrades (about $550 million) for those

150 missiles (see Table 3). (If the upgrades were canceled for the

150 missiles, those missiles could not be reconstituted at some future time.)

However, those savings would be partially offset by one-time

costs of about $230 million for two activities. First, to retire the

missiles, the Air Force would have to remove the warheads and

guidance sets from the missiles and then dismantle the booster

stages. According to the Air Force, it would need to augment

squadron personnel with contractor support to accomplish that effort and prepare the components to be moved from the launch site.

On the basis of information provided by the Air Force, CBO estimates that the costs to dismantle the missiles would total about

$90 million over the 2005–2007 period. Second, the Air Force would

need to transport the warheads, guidance sets, and booster stages

to storage sites. CBO assumes that the Air Force would transport

the boosters and guidance sets to Hill AFB in Utah and the Utah

Test Range and that the Air Force would reimburse the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration to

transport the warheads to DoD storage facilities. The costs for

transportation and storage would total about $140 million over the

2005–2012 period, CBO estimates. Alternatively, the Air Force

could choose to destroy the guidance sets. In that case, the Air

Force would transport the guidance sets to the Boeing Guidance

Repair Center in Ohio for their eventual destruction. CBO has not

included those additional costs in the estimate because the Moscow

Treaty does not require that the guidance sets be destroyed.

CBO also assumes that the Air Force would convert an additional 200 missiles with multiple warheads to a single-warhead

configuration, removing 400 warheads as a result of that conversion. According to the Air Force, it would need to supplement

squadron personnel with contractor support to accomplish that effort. CBO estimates that removing those warheads would cost

about $15 million over the 2004–2007 period, reflecting the costs

of replacing the bulkheads (about $10 million) and transporting the

warheads to DoD storage facilities (about $5 million). The estimate

does not include any costs for buying the replacement bulkheads

and buying more containers to ship and store the warheads because these items have already been purchased.

44

2 Under the Administration’s defense plan, these submarines would be upgraded to carry D5

missiles, with a total of 384 warheads on the two vessels.

Submarines. By retiring two Trident submarines carrying the

older C4 missiles when they would otherwise enter an overhaul

(one in 2005 and another one the following year), the Navy would

remove a total of 288 warheads (144 warheads for each submarine)

from operational status.2 The savings from retiring the submarines

would total about $730 million in reduced operations costs through

2012, CBO estimates, although those savings would be offset somewhat by one-time costs of about $220 million to retire the submarines. CBO estimates no additional costs to transport the C4

missiles to DoD storage locations and eventually dispose of them

because those missiles would be eliminated under the Administration’s defense plan.

Retiring two Trident submarines by 2007 would save an additional $2.2 billion in planned upgrades and purchases (see Table 3).

Not overhauling the two submarines to accommodate the newer D5

missiles would save about $0.9 billion over the 2003–2007 period,

and not buying the 48 D5 missiles that would be deployed on the

overhauled submarines would save about $1.3 billion through 2012.

Alternatively, the Navy could choose to convert those two Trident

submarines to a conventional role instead of retiring them. Based

on recent experience, the conversion costs, which also include the

cost to equip the submarines with 154 Tomahawk missiles, would

total about $2 billion, or roughly $1 billion for each submarine,

CBO estimates.

As in Option 1, CBO assumes an average of two submarines a

year would undergo a major overhaul and thus not carry any missiles. Each of the 10 operationally deployed Trident submarines

would deploy 111 warheads, or four to five warheads on each submarine’s 24 D5 missiles as part of the approach to achieve the treaty’s 2,200 level. (CBO assumes that 15 of the missiles would carry

five W76 warheads and nine missiles would carry four W88 warheads.) In total, CBO calculates that 810 warheads would be removed from service, and the costs to remove them would be negligible.

To maintain the capability to redeploy eight warheads on each

missile at some future time, the Navy would need to purchase additional hardware. CBO estimates that the costs of that hardware

would total about $40 million over the 2003–2012 period.

Bombers. Under this option, CBO assumes that the Air Force

would convert all 21 B–2 bombers to a conventional role by the end

of 2012. In that case, 256 nuclear bombs would be moved from the

B–2 bases to storage facilities, at a total cost of about $10 million

in 2012, CBO estimates. But because the aircraft would continue

to be used for non-nuclear missions, CBO estimates that there

would be no savings from reduced operations.

As in Option 1, CBO assumes that the Air Force would retain for

immediate use on its bomber bases only eight nuclear weapons for

each of its 56 operational B–52 bombers. CBO estimates that the

costs to remove the 636 warheads from service, purchase the containers to place them in, and store nuclear warheads at facilities

away from the bases would total about $40 million in 2012.

45

Accelerating Warhead Reductions to Achieve Moscow Treaty Goals

by 2007

The United States might be able to download warheads from

strategic platforms more quickly than envisioned in either Options

1 or 2 described above (or Options 1A or 2A, which are described

in Appendix A) to achieve Moscow Treaty goals by 2007. However,

both the Air Force and the NNSA have indicated that accelerating

the downloading of warheads could be difficult given current plans

to retire Peacekeeper missiles and current capacity to transport

warheads. Any resources required to overcome those constraints

would increase the estimated costs of options that simply download

warheads (Options 1 and 1A) and decrease the savings attributed

to options that both download warheads and retire delivery platforms (Options 2 and 2A). In the absence of specific plans from the

Air Force and the NNSA describing how they might work to

achieve this accelerated goal, CBO has no basis for independently

estimating those additional resource requirements.

In particular, the Air Force has indicated that current plans to

retire the Peacekeeper missiles and upload the warheads from

those missiles onto Minuteman missiles at F.E. Warren AFB would

probably fully utilize all personnel at that base through 2007.

Thus, additional efforts to download warheads from Minuteman

missiles to achieve reductions five years earlier than assumed by

CBO could prove difficult. The Air Force has also indicated that

there may be insufficient space available to temporarily store the

warheads while awaiting removal by the NNSA. That potential

shortage of space could require either that DoD build more storage

space or that the NNSA expand its fleet of transport vehicles.

Currently, the NNSA has about 25 transport trailers, around 56

armored tractors (for pulling the trailers), and 86 escort vehicles

(for security). In addition, about 210 trained federal agents support

those transport efforts. The NNSA plans to double those resources

by 2008 to support refurbishing the arsenal of nuclear warheads

and transporting plutonium from the Hanford Site in Washington

and the Idaho Laboratory to the Savannah River Site in South

Carolina. Therefore, efforts to meet the Administration’s current

plan and accelerate the warhead reductions to achieve Moscow

Treaty goals by 2007 might require the NNSA to purchase more vehicles and hire more agents. Moreover, the 2,200-warhead goal established by the NPR is predicated on DoD and NNSA completing

several other infrastructure initiatives. CBO does not have sufficient information to independently determine if those initiatives

could be completed by 2007 or to estimate the costs to accelerate

those efforts.

OTHER BUDGETARY ISSUES

CBO has also reviewed:

• The impact on the nuclear weapons production complex of dismantling, instead of storing, weapons removed from service;

• The costs of additional transparency measures associated with

the Moscow Treaty, beyond those measures existing under

START;

46

3 NNSA’s written responses to questions asked by CBO staff on July 22, 2002.

• The costs of converting strategic bombers and submarines to

conventional missions but maintaining a ready capability to revert to a strategic role; and

• The savings from lowering the operational status of (taking off

high alert) strategic forces scheduled for retirement by 2012.

Impact on the Nuclear Weapons Production Complex of Dismantling

Warheads

Tie NNSA’s plans for inspecting and refurbishing warheads and

producing tritium and pits are based on maintaining an inventory

of nuclear warheads consistent with the U.S. nuclear forces permitted under START and the Administration’s fiscal year 2003–

2007 defense plan. There might not be any additional costs to

maintain those warheads in a condition for speedy redeployment

should they be removed from the missiles and stored at a DoD facility to meet the Moscow Treaty’s reduction requirements. Such an

approach to implementing the treaty would simply change the locations of warheads, not the total number that must be maintained.

But dismantling, instead of storing, one-half or more of the warheads removed to meet the Moscow Treaty requirements could

have substantial costs depending on when that task was performed. According to the NNSA, dismantling by 2012 one-half of

the warheads that might be removed would cause a significant increase in workload at its Pantex facility. That increase would place

the workload above current projections and beyond the capacity

that will be provided once the three currently planned capital construction projects at Pantex are completed in 2007. If, however,

completion of dismantlement could be delayed until the 2020–2025

period, the planned capacity at Pantex would probably be sufficient. The NNSA has not provided a specific estimate of the additional capacity that would be needed to complete dismantlement by

2012, and CBO currently lacks sufficient information to independently estimate that needed additional capacity and its cost.

Also according to the NNSA, changes in the nuclear stockpile associated with implementing the Moscow Treaty should have no significant effect on its current plans for pit and tritium production.

That conclusion is not surprising because the total number of warheads stored and maintained under the Moscow Treaty would probably not differ significantly from the number maintained under

START. The NNSA states that ‘‘the modern plutonium pit production facility that is planned to be operational by 2018 will provide

a minimum single-shift capacity of 250 pits per year.’’ 3 The NNSA

states further that ‘‘this minimum capacity will be needed to support the stockpile associated with the Moscow Treaty.’’ Similarly,

the NNSA states that ‘‘there will be no near-term reduction in the

immediate demand for tritium.’’ Thus, it is ‘‘committed to its plan

to begin tritium production in Tennessee Valley Authority reactors

in fall 2003, and to complete construction and begin operations of

a new tritium extraction facility at the Savannah River Site so that

tritium can be delivered to the stockpile in advance of need and

maintain the five-year reserve.’’

47

CBO currently lacks sufficient information to estimate in detail

the effects that dismantling warheads instead of storing and maintaining them might have on needed tritium and plutonium pit production capacities. But if the NNSA’s current plans are based on

maintaining a START inventory, dismantling some fraction of that

inventory ought to imply a concomitant reduction in needed steadystate tritium and pit production capacities. If all or one-half of the

warheads removed from operational status under the Moscow Treaty were dismantled, the resulting inventories would be about onethird to two-thirds of the START inventory. This implies that the

capacity needed to produce pits and tritium might be one-third to

two-thirds of currently planned levels. Under those circumstances,

the NNSA’s current plans for the modern plutonium pit production

facility and the tritium extraction facility might need to be reevaluated. Any savings that might be achieved by redesigning these facilities could be offset by the costs to expand the capacity at the

Pantex facility to ensure that warheads could be dismantled in a

timely manner, however.

Transparency Measures

The Moscow Treaty contains no additional verification provisions

beyond those in START because, according to the Administration,

U.S. security and the new strategic relationship with Russia do not

require them. On the basis of funding levels for START program

activities over the 1997–2002 period, CBO estimates that the costs

for future transparency measures associated with the Moscow

Treaty would total about $50 million a year, assuming no change

in the scope of verification efforts. CBO has no basis for estimating

the costs of any additional measures that might be agreed to in the

future.

Costs of Converting Bombers and Submarines to Non-Nuclear Missions But Retaining the Option to Restore Nuclear Capability

Apart from its previously announced intent to convert four Trident submarines to a conventional role and to retire the Peacekeeper missiles, the Administration has not yet developed detailed

plans for implementing the reductions called for in the Moscow

Treaty. In particular, it has announced no plans for converting

bombers and submarines to a conventional-only configuration while

retaining the option to restore their nuclear capability. The details

of such plans would be important in determining both the costs for

initial conversion as well as the costs to restore nuclear capability.

For example, as mentioned under Option 2, converting two additional Trident submarines equipped with C4 missiles to the conventional configuration now planned for four of the 18 submarines

would cost about $1 billion per submarine. Those conversions

would modify space currently used for other purposes to accommodate special operations forces and would alter the existing missile

tubes to accommodate missiles armed with conventional warheads,

including Tomahawk cruise missiles. Although those modifications

could probably be reversed, CBO has no basis for estimating the

costs of doing so.

Converting existing nuclear-armed Trident submarines to a conventional configuration could also be accomplished in other ways.

48

The Administration has requested funds to explore converting the

nuclear-armed, intercontinental range Trident ballistic missile to a

version armed with a conventional warhead. Equipping Trident

submarines with such a missile might require minimal modifications to the submarines. But again, CBO has no basis for estimating the costs to develop, modify, and test such a missile.

Similarly, the costs of converting bombers to a conventional-only

configuration and subsequently restoring their nuclear capability

depend on details not yet provided by the Administration. For example, one way that conversion could proceed in accordance with

the Moscow Treaty would be to leave the existing physical configurations of the bombers unchanged while halting the training and

other activities associated with nuclear missions and removing to

remote storage all bomber-delivered nuclear warheads. In that

case, costs associated with the subsequent restoration of nuclear

capability would probably be negligible. But if the Administration

decided to convert all B–52 bombers to a conventional-only configuration by removing the physical and electronic interfaces they now

have for carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles, conversion and

restoration costs would probably be significant.

Lowering the Operational Status of Strategic Forces Scheduled for

Retirement by 2012

Today, the United States and Russia keep hundreds of nuclear

warheads in inventory, ready to launch within minutes. Lowering

the operational status—sometimes called ‘‘dealerting’’—increases

the time that both countries have before they must decide whether

to launch missiles in response to an attack. In general, lowering

the operational status of strategic offensive forces would involve

measures such as keeping the Trident submarines in patrol areas

that are not within range of Russian targets, shutting off the

switches in Minuteman missile silos, and keeping the strategic

bombers off high alert. CBO expects that inplementing any of those

actions would not significantly change the current deployment

schedule of those forces and, therefore, would have a negligible impact on the costs of operations.

APPENDIX A

CBO has also assessed the budgetary impact of reducing the

number of warheads to about 1,700 under two scenarios—one without retiring delivery platforms and the other assuming retirement

of 150 Minuteman missiles and two Trident submarines. Table A1 shows the delivery platforms associated with the Administration’s plan and these two scenarios. The costs or savings are very

similar to those that would result from a reduction to 2,200 warheads. This appendix describes the basis for that estimate.

Option 1A: Reduce the Number of Warheads to about 1,700 Without Retiring Delivery Platforms from the Strategic Inventory. The

Administration could reduce the number of warheads to about

1,700 by taking the following actions:

• Reconfigure the remaining 350 Minuteman missiles to a singlewarhead configuration,

49

• Deploy only 72 warheads on each of the 12 operational Trident

submarines,

• Convert the B–2 bombers to a conventional role, and

• Remove operational weapons from storage areas at the bomber

bases so that only eight nuclear weapons would be available

for use on each operational bomber.

CBO estimates that the costs to implement those reductions would total about $115 million over the 2003–2012 period, includ- ing the $55 million necessary to meet an interim goal of 3,800 warheads by 2007 (see Table A-2). This cost is about $10 million higher

than the cost of Option 1, because it involves the removal of an additional 128 nuclear bombs from B–2 bombers. The costs for removing the additional 288 warheads from the Trident submarines

would be negligible.

Missiles. The Air Force would remove 700 warheads by converting the 350 missiles that are currently configured to carry multiple warheads to a single-warhead configuration. The costs to remove those warheads would total about $25 million over the 2003– 2012 period, CBO estimates.

Submarines. Under this scenario, CBO assumes that the Navy

would remove six D5 missiles from each Trident submarine, leaving only 18 D5 missiles per submarine, and would deploy four warheads on each of those missiles, for a total of 72 warheads on each

submarine. In all, CBO calculates that 1,440 warheads would be

removed. The costs to remove the missiles from the submarines

and the warheads from the missiles would be negligible, CBO estimates, because those tasks could be done as part of regular maintenance activities.

To maintain the capability to reload eight warheads on each missile at some future time, the Navy would need to purchase additional equipment. CBO estimates that the costs of that equipment

would total about $40 million over the 2003–2012 period.

Bombers. As in Option 2, CBO assumes that the Air Force would

convert all 21 B–2 bombers to a non-nuclear role in 2012. Removing 256 nuclear bombs, buying the containers to place them in, and

transporting them to storage facilities would cost about $10 million

in 2012, CBO estimates. The Air Force would retain on its bomber

bases for immediate use only eight nuclear weapons for each of its

56 operational B–52 bombers. CBO estimates that the costs to remove and store the 636 warheads at facilities away from the bomber bases would total about $40 million in 2012.

Option 2A: Reduce the Number of Warheads to About 1,700 by

Removing Delivery Platforms from the Strategic Inventory. Another

way to reduce the number of warheads to 1,700 would be to remove

some existing delivery platforms from the strategic inventory. One

approach for implementing this option could involve the following

actions:

• Retire 150 Minuteman missiles,

• Equip all remaining Minuteman missiles to carry only one

warhead instead of three,

• Retire two of the oldest Trident submarines,

• Deploy only 96 warheads on each of the 10 operational Trident

submarines,

50

4 Under the Administration’s defense plan, these submarines would be upgraded to carry D5

missiles, with a total of 384 warheads on the two vessels.

• Convert the B–2 bombers to a conventional role, and

• Provide only eight nuclear weapons for use on each operational

B–52 bomber.

This approach involves the same number of delivery platforms as

Option 2, but 450 fewer warheads.

CBO estimates that the costs to remove the warheads and nuclear weapons from the launchers and bomber bases, transport the

warheads and weapons to storage facilities, and retire 150 Minuteman missiles and two Trident submarines would total about $560

million over the 2003–2012 period. Those costs would be more than

offset, however, by the significant savings from reduced operations

costs and from canceling upgrades and purchases for the submarines and missiles that would be retired under this option. As

with Option 2, CBO estimates that the net savings associated with

this option would total about $5.1 billion over 10 years (see Table

A-2).

Missiles. CBO assumes that the Air Force would retire 150 Minuteman missiles starting in 2005 (as in Option 2) and that the retirements would be completed by the end of 2007. The net savings

from retiring the missiles would total about $2.5 billion through

2012, CBO etimates. CBO also assumes that the Air Force would

convert the remaining 350 Minuteman missiles to a single-warhead

configuration. Removing the 700 warheads would cost an estimated

$25 million over the 2003–2012 period.

Submarines. CBO estimates that the net savings from retiring

two Trident submarines, one in 2005 and another one the following

year, would amount to about $0.9 billion over the 2003–2007 period

and about $2.6 billion through 20l2.4

Assuming that the Navy would deploy 96 warheads on each remaining Trident submarine, or four warheads on each of the submarine’s 24 D5 missiles, CBO calculates that 960 warheads would

be removed. The costs to remove those warheads would be negligible. However, to maintain the capability to redeploy eight warheads on each missile at some future time, the Navy would need

to purchase additional equipment, which CBO estimates would cost

about $40 million over the 2003–2012 period.

Bombers. As in Option 2, CBO assumes that the Air Force would

convert all 21 B–2 bombers to a conventional role in 2012, resulting

in costs of $10 million in that year to remove 256 bombs, buy the

containers to place them in, and transport them to storage facilities. Similarly, the Air Force would provide only eight nuclear

weapons for each of its 56 operational B–52 bombers. CBO estimates that the costs to remove the 636 nuclear weapons, purchase

containers to place them in, and store them at facilities away from

the bomber bases would total about $40 million in 2012.

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Table A-1.—Comparison of CBO’s Options to Achieve the Moscow Treaty Goal of 1,700 Warheads

by 2012

(In numbers of delivery platforms and deployed warheads)

Weapon

The Administration’s

FY 2003–2007

Defense Plan

Option 1A:

1,700 Warheads,

No Retirements 1

Option 2A:

1,700 Warheads,

Fewer Platforms 1

Quantity Warhead 2 Quantity Warheads 3 Quantity Warheads 4

ICBMs:

Minuteman III ........................... 500 1,200 500 500 350 350

Peacekeeper ............................. 0 0 0 0 0 0

SLBMs:

Trident Submarines

Carrying C4 Missiles ........... 0 0 0 0 0 0

Trident Submarines

Carrying D5 Missiles ........... 14 2,304 14 864 12 960

Bombers:

B–1 .......................................... (5) 0(5) 0(5) 0

B–2 .......................................... 21 256 (5) 0(5) 0

B–52 ........................................ 76 1,056 76 420 76 420

Total ..................................... .................... 4,816 .................... 1,784 .................... 1,730

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.

Notes: FY = fiscal year; ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile.

1 CBO has also postulated approaches to achieving the 2,200-warhead level in the Moscow Treaty. See Table 2 for detailed descriptions of

the force structure for those approaches. 2 Under the Administration’s plan, warheads are counted as follows: three warheads on each of 350 Minuteman missiles and one warhead

on each of the remaining 150 Minuteman missiles; eight warheads on each of the 24 D5 missiles (for a total of 192 warheads on each of the 12 operationally deployed Trident submarines); 16 nuclear bombs on each ofthe 16 operationally deployed B–2 bombers; and from 12 to

20 cruise missiles on each of the 56 operationally deployed B–52 bombers. 3 Under Option 1A, warheads are counted as follows: a single warhead on each of the 500 Minuteman missiles; four warheads on each of

the 18 D5 missiles (for a total of 72 warheads on each of the 12 operationally deployed Trident submarines); and about eight cruise missiles

on each of the 56 operationally deployed B–52 bombers. 4 Under Option 2A, warheads are counted as follows: a single warhead on each of the 350 Minuteman missiles; four warheads on each of the 24 D5 missiles (for a total of 96 warheads on each of the 10 operationally deployed Trident submarines); and about eight cruise missiles on each of the 56 operationally deployed B–52 bombers. 5 All B–1 bombers would be permanently converted to a conventional role. Under Options 1A and 2A, all B–2 bombers would be permanently converted to a conventional role.

Table A-2.—Costs and Savings (–) of Alternative Approaches to Achieving the Moscow Treaty

Goal Relative to the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2003–2007 Defense Program

(In millions of dollars)

Warhead

Removal

Reduced

Operations

Canceled

Upgrades/

Purchases

Total,

2003–2012

Option 1A: Reduce the Number of Warheads to 1,700 by 2012 Without

Retiring Delivery Platforms: 1

ICBMs .................................................................................................... 25 0 0 25

SLBMs ................................................................................................... 40 0 0 40

Bombers ................................................................................................ 50 0 0 50

Subtotal ............................................................................................ 115 0 0 115

Option 2A: Reduce the Number of Warheads to 1,700 by 2012 by Retiring

Delivery Platforms: 1

ICBMs .................................................................................................... 250 –1,760 –1,000 –2,510

SLBMs ................................................................................................... 260 –730 –2,150 –2,620

Bombers ................................................................................................ 50 0 0 50

Subtotal ............................................................................................ 560 –2,490 –3,150 –-5,080

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile. Numbers may not add up to totals because

of rounding.

1 Costs and savings displayed reflect approaches to reducing current levels of warheads to the Moscow Treaty goal of 1,700 warheads. CBO has also postulated approaches to achieving the 2,200-warhead level in the Moscow Treaty. CBOs estimates for achieving that level are not significantly different in total from the costs displayed above.