alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8468 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8468

To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to terminate the eligibility 
  of certain individuals for student loan forgiveness, and for other 
                               purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 21, 2024

  Mr. Yakym introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                Committee on Education and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to terminate the eligibility 
  of certain individuals for student loan forgiveness, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No Debt Forgiveness for Self-
Centered Pupils at Overpriced Institutions Lacking Effectively 
Disciplined Students Act'' or the ``No Debt Forgiveness for SPOILED 
Students Act''.

SEC. 2. TERMINATION OF LOAN FORGIVENESS ELIGIBILITY FOR CERTAIN 
              EXPULSIONS OR FIRINGS.

    Part G of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1088 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 494. TERMINATION OF LOAN FORGIVENESS ELIGIBILITY FOR CERTAIN 
              EXPULSIONS OR FIRINGS.

    ``(a) In General.--Beginning on the date of the enactment of this 
section, a covered individual who is expelled or fired, as applicable, 
from an institution of higher education for a reason described in 
subsection (b)--
            ``(1) shall not be eligible, with respect to any loan 
        received under this title, for any loan forgiveness, 
        cancellation, or discharge programs under this Act or any other 
        provision of law; and
            ``(2) shall repay such a loan under a standard repayment 
        plan under section 455(d)(1)(A), based on a 10-year repayment 
        period.
    ``(b) Reasons Described.--The reasons for expulsion or firing are 
as follows:
            ``(1) Hate crime.
            ``(2) Disorderly conduct.
            ``(3) Trespassing.
            ``(4) Creating a public disturbance.
            ``(5) Violating titles IV or VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
        1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000a et seq.).
    ``(c) Covered Individual Defined.--For purposes of this section, 
the term `covered individual' means, with respect to an institution of 
higher education--
            ``(1) an enrolled student; and
            ``(2) a faculty member.''.
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT  10.2
TERMINATION  AGREEMENT


                  [UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION FOR INFORMATION ONLY]


                      WUHAN DONG FENG PAPER COMPANY LIMITED

             JOINT VENTURERS' AGREEMENT OF JOINT VENTURE TERMINATION


Party  A      :         Wuban  Dongfeng  Paper  Mill  Company

Party  B      :         Orient  Packaging  Limited

We, after detailed discussion,  hereby mutually resolved and agreed to terminate
the joint venture operation in accordance  with Article 68(2) & (5) of the joint
venture's  Article of Association  and relevant provisions  in the joint venture
agreement,  and that we undertake not to pursue or claim  against each other any
damages,  compensation  and  liabilities  thereof.

This agreement shall replace all agreements,  letter of intent and other related
letters  or  fax  signed  after  20  December  1996.


Party  A:                                Party  B:
Wuhan Dongfeng Paper Mill Company        Orient Packaging Limited

Representative:                          Representative:

/s/Deng  Xiong                           /s/Wu  Wai  Leung,  Danny
--------------------                     ---------------------------
Deng  Xiong                              Wu  Wai  Leung,  Danny
Manager                                  Director

Company  sign  and  chop                 Company  sign  and  chop


<PAGE>
Before the Second Division,

December 15, 1960

No. 64964.

#### Bloomingdale Bros. (a Div. of Fed. Dept. Stores, Inc.) et al. *v.*United States,

protests 59/26488, etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Lawrence, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of log fires similar in all material respects to those the subject of *United States*v. *S. P. Skinner Co., Inc.*(46 C.C.P.A. 105, C.A.D. 708), the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 18 , 2020.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 18

- 00817

- CR

DEADRIAN KORTRY MCCLENNON , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 263rd District Court

Harris County, Texas Tri al Co urt Cause No. 1515120

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Deadrian Kortry McClennon appe als his conviction for sexual
assault
, challenging in one issue the trial court ’ s admission at trial of a purported hearsay statement

. W e affirm.

In his sole issue on appe a l, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his counsel ’ s hearsay objection to testimony from a paramedic who was dispatched to treat the comp la inant

. Appellant also contends that his “ cons titutional2

right of confrontation was violated w hen t he hearsay wa s allowed before the jury. ”
To preserve err or for appellate review, a defendant must timely object to the error during trial. Tex. R. App. P. 33. 1 ; Taylor v. State , 572 S.W.3d 8 16, 822 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref ’ d) . De fense counsel m ust object every time allegedly inadmissible evidence is offered unless counsel obtains a running objection or requests a hearing outside the presence of the jury. Martinez v. State , 98 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ; Taylor , 572 S.W .3d a t 822

. The
fail ur e to object to a violation of the Confrontation Clause waive s the argument on appeal unless the specific grounds are apparent from the context

. Wright v. State
, 28 S.W.3d 526, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ; Ayala v. State , 267 S.W.3d 428 , 437 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref ’ d )

.
T he paramedic testified two times
, “ We were dis pa t ched to an assault. ” After the second time the par amedic made the statement
, defense counsel objected to the following question on hearsay grounds : “ And d id you have any other type of information on the type of assault that you were responding to? ” Defense counsel did not object on the b asis that appellant ’ s right to confrontation was violate d

. T he trial court overruled the objection and the paramedic answe re d
, “ We ju st got an assault. Can ’ t recall what the com puter notes were s aying, it ’ s been quite some
time. ” Later during the trial, the paramedic testified that he treated the complainant
for “ sexual assault. ” That testimony di d not draw an objection.

Def ens e counsel did not object to the para medic ’ s testimony regarding an assault. He objected to the question in volving the type of ass ault for which the

par a medic had been called to the scene

. He did not seek a running objection, and

e vidence of the type of ass ault cam e in later during the trial without an objecti on. Defense counsel , mo reover, did not argue th at his rights under the Confrontation
Clause were violat ed

. Therefore , appellant did not preserve this com plaint for3

appeal. See Taylor , 572 S.W.3d at 8 22 ; Ayala , 267 S.W.3d at 437 . W e overrule appellant ’ s sole issue

.

/s/ Frances Bourliot Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher
, Bourliot , and Hassan

. Do Not Publish

— T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2( b).
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, March 16, 2016.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of

the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, March 16, 2016

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A16I0148. ALL AMERICAN QUALITY FOODS, INC. d/b/a FOOD DEPOT v.

BARBARA HOOD.

Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

12SV315
# TVA's John Sevier Combined Cycle Plant

Begins Commercial Operation

April 30, 2012
ROGERSVILLE, Tenn. - The John Sevier Combined Cycle Plant, located near Rogersville, Tenn., began commercial operation on Monday, April 30, a month ahead of schedule and about $30 million under budget. The plant uses natural gas to produce 880 megawatts of electricity, enough to power approximately half a million homes.

Click to download high-res version "The John Sevier Combined Cycle Plant is a testamen t to TVA's commitment to provide cleaner, lower-cost generatio n," said Bob Deacy, senior vice president, Generation Construction, theorganization within TVA responsible for the construction project. "Cred it for this great success goes to the workers and the project management team for implementing the construction plan with a tireless eye toward qu ality work while beating our commitments for timing and budget."
The first cycle of a combined cycle plant uses thre e combustion turbines similar to jet engines to produce electricity. The heat from the exhaust of the turbines is captured in a secondary system to p roduce steam that is sent to a steam turbine, which generates additional elec tricity.
The John Sevier Combined Cycle Plant not only uses clean natural gas as fuel, but also is constructed with equipment that r educes emissions to a very low level. This supports TVA's vision to be a national leader in improving air quality.
"During start-up and testing the plant proved consi stent and reliable in its electricity production, meaning it is going to be a dependable addition to our generating fleet," said Bob Dalrymple, vice pre sident of TVA's Gas Generation fleet. "It serves a critical role in TVA 's transmission system in northeast Tennessee."
The plant will be managed by a TVA staff of approxi mately 30 employees. It is located next to the John Sevier co al-fired plant, where two of the four units will be retired and two units idl ed at the end of this year. 

## Page 1 of 2 TVA: News Release

7/23/2012 http://www.tva.com/news/releases/aprjun12/johnseviercc.htmThe plant is the second combined cycle facility to operate within the state

of Tennessee, and the second new generation site co nstructed by TVA since 2002. It is the fifth combined cycle site for TVA. TVA's other combined cycle plants are Caledonia, Magnolia and S outhaven, all located in Mississippi; and Lagoon Creek near Brownsville, Tenn.
The Tennessee Valley Authority, a corporation owned by the U.S. government, provides electricity for business custo mers and distribution utilities that serve 9 million people in parts of s even southeastern states at prices below the national average. TVA, which recei ves no taxpayer money and makes no profits, also provides flood con trol, navigation and land management for the Tennessee River system and assists utilities and state and local governments with economic developme nt.

Media Contact Scott Brooks, Knoxville, (865) 632-8031 TVA Media Relations, Knoxville, (865) 632-6000

TVA Newsroom 

## Page 2 of 2 TVA: News Release

7/23/2012 http://www.tva.com/news/releases/aprjun12/johnseviercc.htm
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Derrick M. Luchey, Appellant.

[634 NYS2d 304]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree (Penal Law § 220.21 [1]; § 20.00), conspiracy in the second degree (Penal Law § 105.15) and criminal solicitation in the second degree (Penal Law § 100.10).

The contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove defendant’s knowledge of the weight of the controlled substance has not been preserved by a motion to dismiss " 'specifically directed’ ” at the alleged defect in the proof *(People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10,19, quoting *People v Cona,*49 NY2d 26, 33, n *2; see, People v Cedeno,*219 AD2d 828), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice *(see,*CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).

The contention that County Court erred in admitting into evidence audio tapes of defendant’s conversations with Patrick Sullivan on February 21 and 23, 1990, has not been preserved for our review because defendant failed to object to the admission of that evidence at trial *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, that contention lacks merit *(see, People v Maderic,*142 AD2d 892). Moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the People to use the transcripts of those conversations to refresh the recollection of a witness *(see, People v Di Loretto,*150 AD2d 920, *lv denied*74 NY2d 739).

Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel *(see, People v Hobot,*84 NY2d 1021, 1022; *People v Flores,*84 NY2d 184). Furthermore, the court did not err in denying defendant’s request to dismiss a sworn juror. Contrary to the contention of defendant, the record establishes that the juror was not incapable of rendering an impartial verdict *(see, People v Buford,*69 NY2d 290, 298-299). Additionally, there is no merit to the contention that defendant was denied his fundamental right to be present at all material stages of the proceedings against him when the court questioned three jurors for possible disqualification in defendant’s absence *(see, People v Torres,*80 NY2d 944, 945, *rearg denied*81 NY2d 784; *People v Spataro,*202 AD2d 1005, *lv denied*84 NY2d 833; *People v Williams,*202 AD2d 1004).

Defendant was not denied his constitutional *(see, People v Taranovich,*37 NY2d 442, 445) or statutory *(see, People v Kendzia,*64 NY2d 331, 337) right to a speedy trial. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the sentence is neither unduly harsh nor severe.

*937We have reviewed the remaining contentions advanced by defendant, including those raised in defendant’s *pro se*supplemental brief, and we conclude that they are lacking in merit. (Appeal from Judgment of Erie County Court, Rogowski, J.—Criminal Possession Controlled Substance, 1st Degree.) Present—Pine, J. P., Fallon, Wesley, Doerr and Davis, JJ.
No. 58096.

protests 154363-K/13059, etc. (New Orleans).

#### Geo. Wm. Rueff, Inc., et al. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Rao, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise is the same in all material respects as that the subject of *United States*v. *Geo. Wm. Rueff, Inc.*(41 C. C. P. A. 95, C. A. D. 535), the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
(Reap. Dec. 8479)

#### Spratt’s Patent (America), Ltd. *v.*United States

Entry No. 6308.

(Decided August 25, 1955)

*Sharretts, Paley & Carter*for the plaintiff.

*Geo. Stephen Leonard,*Acting Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Lawkence, Judge:

This appeal for a reappraisement presents the question of the proper value of certain metal bird cages and stands imported from England.

The respective parties hereto have submitted said appeal for decision upon a stipulation to the effect that the metal bird cages and stands, and the issues, are the same in all material respects as those before the court in *Spratts Patent America, Ltd.*v. *United States,*32 Cust. Ct. 583, Reap. Dec. 8285, the record in which case has been incorporated herein. It has been further agreed that there is no foreign, export, or United States value, as those values are defined in section 402 (c) (d) and (e) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1402 (c) (d) and (e)), as amended by the Customs Administrative Act of 1938, for such or similar merchandise, and that the statutory cost of production of the subject importation is equal to the invoice prices, less discounts of 2 per centum and *2/*per centum.

*404Upon the agreed facts’, I find that cost of production, as that value is defined in section 402 (f) of said act (19 U. S. C. § 1402 (f)), is the proper basis for the determination of the value of the metal bird cages and stands here involved and that such value is equal to the invoice prices, less discounts of 2 per centum and 2% per centum.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Hector Leon, Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 951]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Steven Lloyd Barrett, J.), rendered on or about February 28, 1994, unanimously affirmed.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted. *(See, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders, 52*AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no non-frivolous points which could be raised on this appeal.

Pursuant to CPL 460.20, defendant has the right to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals by making application to the Chief Judge of that Court and by submitting such application to the Clerk of that Court or to a Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of this Department on reasonable notice to the respondent within thirty (30) days after service of a copy of this order, with notice of entry.

Denial of the application for permission to appeal by the Judge or Justice first applied to is final and no new application may thereafter be made to any other Judge or Justice. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Ellerin, Wallach, Asch and Tom, JJ.
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 98-3849

___________ Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, a * Minnesota nonprofit corporation; * Randall Tigue; Kathleen Hauser; * Robert Lee Johnson; Edward Clark; * * Plaintiffs, * * Beck, formerly known as David * Appeal from the United States Wayne Vanderbeck, * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. Appellant, * * [UNPUBLISHED] v. * * Kenneth Schoen, individually and as * Commissioner of Corrections for the * State of Minnesota; Frank Wood, * individually and as Warden of the * Minnesota State Prison, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: March 5, 1999 Filed: March 19, 1999

___________ Before McMILLIAN, LOKEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.1 The HONORABLE PAUL A. MAGNUSON, Chief Judge, United States

DistrictCourt for the District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendation of the HONORABLE JONATHAN G. LEBEDOFF, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.
-2- Beck appeals from the district court’s 1 denial of his motion for contempt in this
case involving a prison’s inmate mail regulations. We grant Beck’s motion to proceedin forma pauperis, assess the $105 appellate filing fee against Beck, and directthe district court to calculate his initial partial appellate filing fee and to order collection of that fee and the remaining installments from him in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and the procedures outlined in Henderson v. Norris , 129 F.3d 481, 484-85 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). We also deny his motion for appointment of counsel. Finally, after careful review of the record and Beck’s brief, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
May 17, 1954

No. 58123.

Suit 4725.

#### Garcia & Vega, Inc. *v.*United States.

C. D. 1378 reversed November 2, 1953, it having been stipulated by counsel that the facts and issues relating to the refunds of duties claimed by appellant herein are the same as those claimed in Henry Clay and Bock & Co., Ltd. *v.*United States, suit 4724, decided June 3, 1953 (C. A. D. 527). (No C. A. D. number will be assigned to suit 4725.)
year of the issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal or the filing of the 

judgment of conviction unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause for the 

delay and undue prejudice. See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court 

(Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 231, 112 P.3d 1070, 1074 (2005) ("Application of the 

statutory procedural default rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is 

mandatory."). 

Here, the district court considered appellant's claims on the 

merits and did not refer to the fact that appellant's motion was filed more 

than 11 years after the filing of the judgment of conviction on December 6, 

2001. As discussed in Harris, the district court should have construed 

appellant's motion as a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

and then permitted appellant a reasonable time period to cure any defects 

with respect to the procedural requirements of NRS Chapter 34. See 130 

Nev. at , P.3d at (Adv. Op. No. 47, June 12, 2014, at 19). We 

reverse the decision of the district court and remand for the district court 

to construe the motion as a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus and to provide appellant an opportunity to cure any defects within 

a reasonable time period as set by the district court. Accordingly, we 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 1947A e 
Chute 

Cherry 

J. 

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND 

REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with 

this order. 1 

J. 

Hardesty 

J. 

Douglas 

'In light of our decision to reverse and remand this matter for 

further proceedings before the district court, we decline to consider 

appellant's remaining arguments regarding the district court's decision to 

deny relief. This order constitutes our final disposition of this appeal. 

Any subsequent appeal shall be docketed as a new matter. 

In addition, appellant sent a letter to this court that was received on 

June 26, 2014. In that letter, appellant asks this court to sanction counsel 

for failing to file an opening brief with this court and to appoint alternate 

counsel Counsel had already filed an opening brief by the time this court 

received that letter and appellant was not given permission to file proper 

person documents with this court. See NRAP 46(b). Therefore, we will 

take no action on appellant's requests. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) 1947A 
cc: Chief Judge, Tenth Judicial District 

Hon. Robert E. Estes, Senior Judge 

The Law Office of Jacob N. Sommer 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Churchill County District Attorney/Fallon 

Churchill County Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 4 

(0) 1947A
Exhibit 32
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Manhattan Scientifics, Inc. Annual Report on Form 10-KSB
for the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Marvin Maslow, Chief Executive
Officer, President and the person performing similar functions to the Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to
the best of my knowledge:

(1) Fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

(2) The information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-KSB fairly
presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, another
document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to Manhattan Scientifics, Inc. and
will be retained by Manhattan Scientifics, Inc. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


                                    /s/ Marvin Maslow
                                    -------------------------
                                    Marvin Maslow
                                    Chief Executive Officer, President and
                                    Principal Financial Officer

April 12, 2004