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THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA:

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS

AND SECURITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

SEPTEMBER 24, 2002

[CSCE 107ñ2ñ8]
(ii)

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

LORNE W. CRANER, Department of State

JACK DYER CROUCH II, Department of Defense

WILLIAM HENRY LASH III, Department of Commerce

HOUSE

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

Co-Chairman

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama

STENY H. HOYER, Maryland

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

SENATE

BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado

Chairman

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

BOB GRAHAM, Florida

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
(iii)

THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA:

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS

AND SECURITY

SEPTEMBER 24, 2002

COMMISSIONERS

PAGE

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman .................................................... 1

WITNESSES

IHon. B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ..................... 3

His Excellency Levan Mikeladze, Ambassador of the Republic

of Georgia to the United States ............................................................... 11

Bishop Malkhaz Songulashvili, Evangelical Baptist Union of Georgia ..... 21

Genadi Gudadze, Chairman, Union of Jehovahís Witnesses in Georgia .... 23

Dr. Ghia Nodia, Director, Caucasus Institute for Peace,

Development and Democracy, Tbilisi, Georgia ........................................ 24

Stephen Jones, Professor, Mount Holyoke College, Massachusetts ........... 27

APPENDICES

Prepared Statement of Hon. Ben Nighthorse Campbell,

Chairman .................................................................................................. 34

Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith .................................... 35

Prepared Statement of Hon. Steny H. Hoyer, Ranking Member ................ 37

Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Commissioner ..................... 38

Prepared Statement of Hon. Gordon H. Smith, Commissioner .................. 39

Prepared Statement of B. Lynn Pascoe ........................................................ 40

Prepared Statement of H.E. Levan Mikeladze ............................................ 44

Prepared Statement of Bishop Malkhaz Songulashvili .............................. 53

Prepared Statement of Genadi Gudadze ..................................................... 56

Prepared Statement of Dr. Ghia Nodia ........................................................ 57

Prepared Statement of Stephen Jones ......................................................... 66

Transcript of Video Presentation, ìTerror in the Name of Religionî ........... 69

Letter from Members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation

in Europe to Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Georgia,

Dated October 17, 2000 ............................................................................ 71

Letter from Members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation

in Europe to Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Georgia,

Dated May 15, 2002 ................................................................................. 73

Letter of Reply from Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Georgia, to the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Dated June 3, 2002 ................................................................................... 75

ìSearching for an End to Religious Violence,î by Hon. Christopher

H. Smith, reprinted from 24 SAATI [24 Hours] and RESONANCI

[RESONANCE], August 27, 2002 ............................................................ 77
THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA: DEMOCRACY,

HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY

SEPTEMBER 24, 2002

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

 WASHINGTON, DC

The Commission met in Room 334, Cannon House Office Building,

Washington, DC, at 2:00 p.m., the Hon. Christopher H. Smith, CoChairman, presiding.

Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman;

and Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Commissioner.

Witnesses present: Hon. B. Lynn Pascoe, Deputy Assistant Secretary

of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State;

His Excellency Levan Mikeladze, Georgian Ambassador to the United

States; Bishop Malkhaz Songulashvili, Evangelical Baptist Church of

Georgia; Genadi Gudadze, Union of Jehovahís Witnesses in Georgia;

Dr. Ghia Nodia, Director, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Development

and Democracy; and Stephen Jones, Professor, Mount Holyoke College,

Massachusetts.

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CO-CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Mr. SMITH. The hearing will come to order. I want to welcome all of

our distinguished panelists and welcome the audience and thank you

for coming. My name is Chris Smith. I am co-chair of the Commission

on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I have been on the Commission

now for 20 of the last 22 years that I have served in Congress and will

be joined by some of our other Commissioners momentarily. Again, I

want to thank all of you for being here today.

This is a Commission hearing on democracy, human rights, and security in Georgia. Much has happened since 1995, the last time we

examined the situation in that country. On the positive side, a great

deal of progress has been made: there are hundreds, if not thousands, of

NGOs, scores of political parties, a parliament that has actually developed a role as a legislature, and some feisty, hard-hitting media outlets,

especially Rustavi-2 Television.

These developments give us cause to hope, reasons to take pride in

the people of Georgia and are indicative of the grounds for continuing

U.S.-Georgian relations. Nevertheless, in the last few years much of

the optimism about Georgiaís future has dissipated. Last year, a Georgian official devoted a large part of his public address in Washington to

refuting a notion that was being discussed at the time that Georgia is a

failed state.
2

I reject that characterization, but todayís hearing is a good opportunity to discuss the serious problems that Georgia does face. Preeminent

among these is systematic rampant corruption, which has impeded economic reforms and has sickened the body politic.

Despite lectures from the International Monetary Fund, the World

Bank, and the U.S. Government, Georgiaís Government has proved

incapable or unwilling to do what is necessary to stamp out this evil,

although President Shevardnadze himself has called corruption a threat

to Georgiaís security.

There are also grounds for concern about democratization. The last

few elections have clearly not met OSCE standards which makes us

worry about the important parliamentary election scheduled for 2003,

and the 2005 presidential election will usher in the post-Shevardnadze

era in Georgia with all of its attendant uncertainties.

Meanwhile, the media and the NGOs have been under severe pressure. Last fall, a foolish ploy by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to intimidate Rustavi-2 Television backfired, resulting instead in the fall of

the government. While societyís response was heartening, thousands of

people came out into the streets to defend the station. The attempt to

silence one of the countryís most popular media outlets indicated that

some Georgian officials are still mired in Soviet patterns of thinking.

I am especially concerned and appalled by the ongoing religious violence in Georgia. Since 1999, there has been a campaign of assaults

against members of minority faiths, especially Jehovahís Witnesses,

which Georgian authorities have tolerated. Occasionally, policemen have

even participated in attacks on defenseless men, women, and children

who have congregated for the purpose of worship.

Attempts to bring the perpetrators to justice have foundered as throngs

of fanatics hijacked the trial and proceedings. If such travesties are

allowed to continue, the countryís entire judicial system is at risk of

falling victim to mob rule.

Though Jehovahís Witnesses have borne the brunt of this savagery,

other religious minorities have suffered as well, including Baptists,

Pentecostals and Catholics. Earlier this year, for example, a mob invaded a Baptist warehouse, threw the religious literature outside and

burned it. How awful to think the events in Georgia today remind us of

Germany in the 1930s.

Georgians have a long tradition of religious tolerance of which they

are rightly proud. It is even more puzzling, therefore, why religiously

based violence has erupted and continues only in Georgia of all the postSoviet states. There may be many explanations for this peculiar phenomenon, but there can be no excuse for state tolerance of such barbarity. It must end, and it must end now.

In this connection, I would like to single out another point of concern.

President Shevardnadze in his response to our letter last May about

religious violence mentioned the anticipated passage of a law on religion as evidence of government responsiveness. However, a law on religion is not the answer to ending the violence as current criminal law is

sufficient if the authorities would only apply it.

Also drafts of the religious law currently circulating in the Georgian

Parliament are problematic in light of Georgiaís OSCE commitments

as they would create intrusive bureaucratic hurdles for minority groups

to overcome, thereby constructing avenues for the government to ban

unpopular religious communities.
3

The answer to the violence is not regulation of the persecuted groups

through a new law but, it seems to me, its enforcement of current criminal statutes. Consequently, we will carefully follow the legislative process and if a religious law is eventually adopted, it should meet all the

OSCE standards on religious freedom.

Turning now to another issue, I have been watching with growing

alarm Moscowís campaign of intimidation against Georgia. Russia has

been leaning on pro-Western strategically located Georgia for years but

the temperature has, in the last few weeks, approached the boiling point.

President Putinís request for United Nations backing for Russian

military action against Georgia was not any less objectionable for having been anticipated. Georgian Parliamentarians on September 12 unanimously approved an appeal to the U.N., the OSCE, the European Union,

the Council of Europe and NATO for protection from anticipated Russian military aggression.

Georgian lawmakers should know that their American colleagues have

heard their appeal and will stand with them. While we are cooperating

with Russia in the war against terrorism, we have in no way given

Moscow a green light to attack Georgia, nor will we do so.

The United States is now more than ever directly engaged in the

Caucasus and is stepping up its military cooperation with the regionís

governments, especially Georgia. This hearing offers a timely opportunity to examine Georgiaís prospects for democratization, its security

situation, and how Washington can help advance democracy, human

right, and economic liberty in Georgia while leading the battle against

international terrorism in defending Georgiaís sovereignty.

To discuss these issues, we have assembled an international group of

experts. In addition, before our panelists speak, we will show a brief

video prepared by the Jehovahís Witnesses that highlights the cruel

brutality of the ongoing mob attacks.

[Video entitled ìTerror in the Name of Religionî shown.]

Mr. SMITH. That was indeed a very powerful video and we will get

into that further in terms of the impunity that police complicity or lack

of action helps to spawn.

I would like to introduce our very distinguished first panel. Our distinguished State Department witness, Ambassador Lynn Pascoe, the

Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, a Career Minister in the Senior Foreign Service. Mr. Pascoe was most recently U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia and was previously U.S. Special

Negotiator for Nagorno-Karbakh and regional conflicts and the U.S. cochair of the OSCEís Minsk Group.

Ambassador Pascoeís other postings have included Moscow and Beijing.

He has testified before the Helsinki Commission before, including at

the Commission hearing last December on Kyrgyzstan, and we welcome him back today and look forward to his comments.

HON. B. LYNN PASCOE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Amb. PASCOE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee and to offer up

the administrationís views. Also let me say that I was very impressed

with your excellent opening statement. It wraps all of the issues up

together.
4

The last thing I would like to say before I start is that we are talking

today about a very close friend of the United States. We and Georgia

have worked quite closely together and in very friendly terms on a whole

range and host of issues, and very much plan to continue to do so.

I would like to discuss with you and your colleagues our policies in

Georgia aimed to promote democracy, protect human rights, and enhance the nationís security. We view these three goals as interrelated.

I would like to begin my testimony with a brief discussion of Georgiaís

security situation because it has a bearing on the ability to carry out

political and economic reforms.

In a much publicized September 11 statement, President Putin asserted what he claims as Russiaís international right to take unilateral

military action against Chechen fighters and other terrorists in Georgiaís

Pankisi Gorge if Georgia did not carry out more active measures against

these fighters. He followed his statement with a letter to President Bush,

which he copied to the United Nations and other world leaders.

The U.S. Government immediately responded through public statements and high level diplomatic channels, stating our unequivocal opposition to any unilateral military action by Russia inside Georgia. We

repeated our strong support for Georgiaís sovereignty and territorial

integrity and our belief that security problems in the Pankisi Gorge

should be addressed by the Georgians themselves. We believe that this

Russian pressure is due in part to the presence of armed Chechens and

international terrorists in Georgian territory and Georgiaís efforts to

avoid entanglement into the Chechen war.

I would also have to add, Mr. Chairman, that it reflects Russian efforts to find a justification for their continued failures of their policy in

Chechnya. We should not discount also the fact that there are many in

Russia who simply do not like President Shevardnadze.

Since July 29, there have been five instances of Russian cross-border

aerial attacks of Georgia. During the most recent attack on August 23,

which was witnessed by OSCE border monitors and which we confirmed

through our own means, Russian bombs claimed the life of a Georgian

civilian and wounded seven others.

We have strongly urged Georgia to regain control of the Pankisi Gorge

where we also believe there are third-country terrorists who have links

to Al Qaeda. They threaten Georgiaís security and political stability as

well as Russiaís stability. We understand the Russiansí concerns to

this degree, but we believe this is a problem for the Georgians to resolve, not the Russians.

Thus, the United States is attempting to help Georgia address internal security problems through our assistance and cooperative programs

including the Georgia train and equip program. This is intended to help

the Government of Georgia eliminate terrorists, secure its borders, reassert central control over its territory and deny the use of it to foreign

militants and international terrorists.

The Georgia Train and Equip Program is a four-phased effort designed to help the Georgians establish a National Crisis Action Center,

to field an operational headquarters, and to train and equip specific

units. The effort is very much on track. Headquarters and staff training began in late May with 120 students receiving classroom instruction.
5

In early June, additional staff training through the land forces command began and ended with a successful command post exercise. Earlier this month, U.S. trainers began the programís third phase in which

they are conducting unit-level tactical military training of Ministry of

Defense and other security forces. As noted earlier, the intent of the

program is to strengthen Georgiaís ability to fight terrorism, control its

borders, and increase internal security.

Georgia is already attempting to do this. In recent weeks, it has deployed interior ministry troops into the Pankisi Gorge to establish checkpoints and root out Chechen fighters and criminal and international

elements. These efforts signal Georgiaís commitment to restoring Georgian authority in the Pankisi Gorge and dealing seriously with the international terrorist link to Al Qaeda.

Moscow, however, has dismissed these efforts as cosmetic and asserted its right to unilateral military action or the joint Russian-Georgian military operations in Georgian territory. We believe, in fact, contrary to these statements that Georgiaís action represents a serious

effort to reassert control in the Pankisi Gorge.

The United States is encouraging Georgia and Russia to work together to promote regional security within their respective territories

and to find negotiated political solutions to their many disagreements.

These latter include Russiaís periodic cutting-off of Georgiaís winter

gas supply, Russians stalling their negotiations on political settlement

in the breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia and its delaying of negotiations to mediate CFE Istanbul commitments for the withdrawal of

Russian military forces still on Georgian territory.

Resolution of the conflict in Abkhazia is of particular importance. We

are working with the United Nations-sponsored Friends of Georgia group

to move forward on the Abkhazia peace process. We continue to press

Russia to persuade the Abkhazia leadership to accept the Boden paper,

a proposal supported by all of the friends and by the Security Council,

as a basis for political negotiations.

Mr. Chairman, despite its security problems, Georgia is a potential

leader in political and economic reform in the region. It has created a

strong framework of legal reform and institutional structures. Georgiaís

laws are among the regionís most compliant with Council of Europe and

the World Trade Organization norms.

With our assistance and encouragement, Georgia has made significant progress in passing democratic reform-oriented legislation, although

its implementation has been slower than we might have wished. Corruption continues to be a serious obstacle to economic reforms and development. Georgia also still has serious human rights problems, especially police misconduct, torture in pre-trial detention, and harassment

of non-traditional religious views.

More positively, despite these ongoing problems Georgia has a free

press. We are concerned, however, that the murder of an independent

journalist, Georgy Sanaya, has not yet been solved. It is also essential

that next yearís parliamentary elections, as you rightly pointed out in

your opening statement, meet OSCE standards. We are discussing with

Georgian officials now how to ensure that it will be a free and fair election.

Georgiaís tradition of religious tolerance has been severely challenged

by an increasing number of attacks by Georgian Orthodox extremists

against human rights activists, as well as against Protestants and non-
6

traditional religious groups, especially Jehovahís Witnesses. Mr. Chairman, we are deeply concerned about acts such as those presented on

your video today.

In public statements and in the State Departmentís annual report on

human rights and religious freedom, we have deplored such attacks.

The Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary Mr. Armitage and our

ambassador in Tbilisi are forcefully pressing the Government of Georgia to take effective measure to punish those who perpetuate such acts,

and to promote respect for human rights and freedom of religion.

We have stressed to President Shevardnadze and his government

again and again that poor records on human rights and freedom of

religion not only undermine Georgiaís efforts at economic and democratic reform and, I might add, it is reputation abroad, but also has a

negative effort on the kind of assistance we can give if the problems are

not addressed.

Let me say in this latter regard that we have devoted a large portion

of our Freedom Support Act budget for Georgia, which totals $89.6 million in FY í02, to fund activities that directly promote the building of

democratic institutions and practices in Georgia. For example, the Departments of State and Justice are sponsoring anti-crime training and

technical assistance programs that fund the Justice Department legal

adviser in Tbilisi.

Through this office, the Department of Justice has carried out training for Georgian prosecutors, investigators, judges, members of Parliament, and policy makers on various law enforcement and related subjects, including transnational crime, money laundering, public

corruption, criminal procedures, excessive force and human rights violations and interrogation techniques.

Through the American Bar Associationís Central and East European

Law Initiative, the U.S. Government has provided significant resources

to support human rights through legal clinics and legal service organizations. We are carrying out programs this year in Georgia for activities that combat the trafficking of persons, a growing problem throughout the region. Other initiatives promote leadership programs that seek

to empower Georgian women in areas such as civic activism, community development, public health, and education. As part of its democratic reform efforts, the U.S. Agency for International Development

supported the drafting of Georgiaís first unified electoral code which

was signed into law in August of 2001. The code was first implemented

during recent parliamentary elections. As a result, international observers and domestic monitors alike noted improved election administration.

The United States is also providing local government officials with

training in financial management, constituent outreach, service delivery and budget training skills to maximize the limited resources available to local governments in Georgia. We are also focusing programs

that have as their goal creating a strong citizenry that is able to hold

government officials accountable for government services.

Our democracy program has provided small grants to help establish

neighborhood committees of residents to monitor and ensure transparency in government. Other Freedom Support Act grants underwrite

the development of independent grants and broadcast media throughout Georgia.
7

Through our education and other exchange programs, we send every

year a growing number of talented young Georgians to the United States.

We see this as a crucial investment in the creation of a new generation

of western-trained Georgians who will be the future leaders of their

country.

The United States is helping Georgia integrate into the wider community of nations based on a commitment to democratization, the rule

of law, market economies, and adherence to the Helsinki Final Act and

other OSCE documents of which Georgia is a signatory.

As I have noted during this presentation, Georgia has serious security problems and must improve its record in areas including human

rights, religious tolerance, and economic and political reform. This is

our message, which is very much one of tough love. We send this message because our bilateral relationship is a strong and close one. Sustaining these relations requires continued progress in all these areas.

We have particularly appreciated Georgiaís support as a partner of

the United States and other coalition members in the global war against

terrorism. We certainly recognize the challenges ahead as we work to

help Georgia through the process of political and economic reform and

development.

Georgia is a fulcrum for east-west energy pipelines, for example, which

will include significant U.S. private sector involvement. Standing as it

does in the historic crossroads among regional powers, including Russia, Iran and Turkey, a stable and democratic Georgia will have geostrategic importance for our international relations far into the future.

Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer any questions that you or

other members of the Commission may have.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, and I appreciate

the thoroughness of your testimony and the good work that you and the

Department are doing in that relationship and in consistently raising

the issues of mob violence and human rights abuses. As you put itó

tough loveóand friends do not let friends commit human rights abuses.

I think we help not only the government but obviously we help the

people when we are so consistent, so I want to congratulate you on that

consistency. Watching that video and looking at the bruises and the

burning buildings and convention centers, it is worth noting I issued or

wrote an op-ed piece that appeared in some Georgian newspapers on

August 27 and made a point of underscoring the fact that Orthodox

belief, Christianity in its essence, does not ever condone that kind of

abuse and made note of the fact that His Holiness Ilya II who heads the

Georgian Orthodox Church recently called the violent incidents that

had taken place on religious grounds ìtotally alien to our way of life and

traditions.î

The hope is that with added focus, both from the government, from

other co-religionists who are there and, of course, the Orthodox Church,

that this impunity that we have seenóI think the video pointed out 133

mob attacksóthese arenít ancient history. I saw one attack on August

15, another in September, this month.

We are talking about a cruelty and a barbarity that you know Father

Basil and others absolutely need to be held to account for and I am

wondering if you might want to spend some time on what we can do

further to help those that are being attacked in such a malicious way.
8

I know that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, Republican and

Democrat, abhor and detest this kind of activity and when there is

complicity or acquiescence by the government and by the police, that is

contemptible and that needs to change. Perhaps you may want to elaborate on what further steps we ought to be taking.

Amb. PASCOE. Well, Mr. Chairman, one thing that I think was very

valuable was your op-ed piece, which helped people to understand how

strongly we feel about this issue. We ourselves have made the statement many times at all levels of our government with the Georgian

Government and we believe that they understand that this is a very

serious issue.

In fact, following the August talks on the Jehovahís Witnessesí meeting in Kaspi and Odoshini, the Office of Georgiaís procurator, at our

urging, identified and began legal proceedings against suspects in both

cases. We continue through our embassy to monitor these proceedings

very closely.

I think the term abhor is not too strong in relation to these terrible

instances. We believe that the actual effect on the other side, even if we

are beginning to have a little bit of movement toward prosecution of

those involved, is far short of what is really needed.

Our training program that I talked about in my statement is very

much a part and parcel of the effort to try to develop the kind of police

operations and court system that will eliminate the kind of impunity

that you are talking about and an understanding by the police of the

absolute necessity not to take sides in this kind of fight.

Mr. SMITH. How much power does the central government have in

mitigating and, hopefully, effectively prosecuting? There are no prosecutions, as you pointed out, and I am very glad to hear of our actions.

Will there be prosecutions of these cases?

Amb. PASCOE. We certainly hope so.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Amb. PASCOE. We are certainly urging that, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. SMITH. Hopefully from this hearing again that message will be

sent clearly and unambiguously to the government because you know

as we come around, you know budgets get tight. You know if there is

not movement on this, I can assure you, I and others will take action

when it comes to foreign aid, notwithstanding the friendship we enjoy

because again this is totally intolerable.

Some analysts argue that outside forces, especially Russia, want a

destabilized Georgia and have helped instigate the acts on minority

faiths. For example, Georgian Parliamentarian Guram Sharadze has

been accused of having KGB connections. What do you make of that? Is

this some kind of conspiracy theory or is there something to this that

they are trying to foment that kind of instability?

Amb. PASCOE. Well, we certainly at this point, sir, do not have any

evidence that this is the case. I think it is true that throughout the

former Soviet Union we have seen actions that established churches

and others often going after groups like the Jehovahís Witnesses. It has

been all too widespread. We have seen it in several places.

We do, however, I think the video made it quite clear, suspect that

there are certainly parts of the Georgia police force that have been

complicit in helping nationalists. We do not believe theyíve been coordinated by central intelligence organizations or by outsiders. There certainly seem to be enough local problems to allow this to occur. But we

are watching this very closely.
9

I would agree with you, to go back to your earlier statement, that the

real issue is not where these incidents come from but how they are

stopped. I think this is the critical part of it and there has to be prosecutions in these cases.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you about the Russian Defense Minister, as

you know, who said on September 19 that Russia has ìtons of evidence

that terrorists from Chechnya, as well as from Arab and Muslin countries are operating in Georgia, some of whom have links to Al Qaeda.î

Does the U.S. Government agree that Al Qaeda affiliate terrorists are

operating on Georgian territory?

Amb. PASCOE. There have been some, sir, that clearly do have ties

and have gotten some money out in the past and this is part ofóone of

the reasons that we have been working very closely with the Georgian

Government to try to eliminate these people.

On the tons of evidence charge, we have gotten you know some material from the Russians, most recently that we will look at and I do not

really want to characterize that one way or the other. Nevertheless, I

think we have a pretty good idea of what is really going on in the Pankisi

Gorge and there the actions of the Georgian Government have been

really quite serious and quite effective I think in trying to get control of

this region.

Mr. SMITH. Do you harbor any concerns that as a pretext for additional incursions that they may use the alleged appearance or lack of

resolve by the Georgian Government to go after these individuals?

Amb. PASCOE. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have been at this almost,

sometimes almost daily, but certainly weekly since last year with the

continuing run of accusations and assertion that somehow our actions

make it OK for Russian action in the Pankisi Gorge.

We have been categoric in discussing this from the president on down

with the Russians that this is not acceptable, that clearly the Georgian

Government is trying to work on this issue, that we will help the Georgian Government with its issue, that to the extent that the Georgians

work with Russians, and we have been strongly encouraging that for

the two sides to work together and to exchange information, that that is

an excellent thing to do but that any sort of unilateral Russian action is

totally unacceptable.

The concerns from the Georgians, I think, of having Russian military in the Pankisi is the concern that this would be another area which

they might see that they would lose control of when they went to establish that control themselves; and secondly is they do not want to see the

war in Chechnya expanded to Georgian soil, and both of those strike me

as very valid arguments from their point of view.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask one final question. Train and equip obviously

is a very ambitious military cooperation program in the Caucasus, what

is your assessment? Whatís the departmentís assessment of the deficiencies as well as the strengths in the Georgian military?

Amb. PASCOE. Well, let me say in the first instance that the Georgia

train and equip operation has been working very well. We are quite

pleased with it. The delay, if there was any delay in the early part, was

due to our scrambling around to make sure we got the pieces of the

money together under the legislative authority we had from Congress.

When this was done, we then moved quite quickly because UCOM

had a plan developed to move in and do this early on. The parts of the

training, as I mentioned in my testimony, have actually gone very well.
10

We would expect that by December we will have the first unit out.

Right now some of the officer corps that were trained earlier have taken

part in some of the planning in the Pankisi, so we have seen this process moving forward.

So, I think that I would not say that the various Georgian military

forces at this point are strong or anything like as good as we would like.

We have been working with the border forces now for several years

trying to give them training and some equipment.

Amb. PASCOE. We are now working through the Georgia train and

equip program with the regular military, the regular army, to move

that to a higher level of training than it was before.

Mr. SMITH. I think in a way you have already answered this, but let

me ask you, the Chairman of Russiaís Council on Foreign and Domestic

Policy suggested in mid-September that it would be good for Russia and

Washington to conduct joint military operations to combat terrorism in

the Pankisi Gorge. Have we responded to that officially or have we indicated to them our view on that?

Amb. PASCOE. As I mentioned, sir, one thing, our very strong position on this has been that this is a Georgian problem. We are happy to

help the Georgians with it. This is not a sort of Russian and U.S. problem that we should go in and somehow solve without the Georgians

being there. We are carrying on very detailed conversations. We have

been encouraging Georgia to carry on detailed conversations with the

Russians to show exactly what is happening on the ground and the

successes that they are having.

Mr. SMITH. One final brief question and, again, I want to thank you

for your appearing here, but more importantly for the remarkable and

outstanding work you are doing. Dr. Nodia in his testimony has expressed concern about the tendencies in Georgia to use the ethic or

religious background on politicians to discredit them. Is that something

that we have raised that somehow your affiliation with a certain religious organization or faith is then used as if this is somehow a bad

thing?

Amb. PASCOE. Well, obviously it is a bad thing and we would be

deeply concerned about it if it were the case. We do not really have

much persuasive evidence that this is the case but that may be just

that we do not know. We have not pursued it far enough but certainly it

would be something that would concern us and Iówell we have an open

mind on it, sir, but obviously the concern is if we did, in fact, think that

was the case.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that, and anything you would want to add?

Amb. PASCOE. Let me say again, Mr. Chairman, thank you very

much for the opportunity to come today. These are important issues.

We think that the Commission does important work. We want to work

very closely with you and we commend you for this entire series of

hearings because we think it is very important to get American views

out there on the table.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much and we look forward to continuing working with you. We appreciate your efforts. I

would like to invite our second panel to the witness table, His Excellency Levan Mikeladze, Georgiaís Ambassador to the United States,

Mexico and Canada. He has been well known to the Helsinki Commission for many years since his service in the Georgian Embassy in Washington in the 1990s.
11

Before taking up his duties in Washington from 1996 to 2000, he was

Georgiaís Ambassador to Austria and the OSCE in Vienna. Previously,

the Ambassador was Counselor for Political Affairs in the Georgian

Embassy to the United States, Mexico, and Canada and from 1992 to

í95, he was State Adviser to the Head of State of the Republic of Georgia, and in 1992 head of the European Department of Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Now with a tremendous amount of credentials and knowledge about

the issues of import to this Commission, we welcome you, Mr. Ambassador, and look forward to your testimony. We are joined, I would point

out, by one of our distinguished Commissioners from Pennsylvania,

Mr. Pitts. Mr. Pitts, do you have any opening comments?

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time, I will

submit this for the record.

Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Mikeladze, please proceed.

HIS EXCELLENCY LEVAN MIKELADZE,

GEORGIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

Amb. MIKELADZE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, allow

me to extend my personal and my governmentís gratitude to you and

the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe for inviting me

to this meeting, which on the one hand speaks on the growing interest

to my country and the existing problems there and in the whole region,

but also concerns with the deteriorated security conditions caused the

aggressive and threatening actions of the Russian Federation toward

Georgia.

Based on the problems described in your letter, Mr. Chairman, I will

first elaborate on the state of affairs in the field of democratic institutions and human rights and then address the present relations between

Georgia and Russia. I have submitted a written statement for the record,

and at the conclusion of my remarks, I would be glad to include any

questions you might have.

After having looked at those pictures, video, it is of course hard to

speak about the achievements in the field of human rights in Georgia,

but nevertheless I would like to stress that the protection of human

rights is one of the key priorities of Georgia. A series of measures have

been implemented to provide the human rights protection.

After the adoption of the Constitution of Georgia, real legislation has

been created which is in line with international law. The Constitutional Court, which plays a significant role in the implementation of

constitutional guarantees of human rights was established. The Office

of Public Defender of Georgia has performed serious activities. Georgia

became a full member of the Council of Europe, ratified the European

Convention on Human Rights, and other important instruments in the

field of human rights protection. Judicial reform has been implemented.

NGOs are active, and they with the media seriously participate or actively participated in political life of the states.

In my view and this is not only my view, since it has been shared by

a number of experts, all of the former Soviet Republics and especially

among the CIS countries, Georgia has been a leading country in protecting human rights. Georgiaís commitment to a free press and respect of political rights has been remarkable in a region of the world not

yet know for ensuring respect of basic human rights to their whole

extent.
12

That is why in diplomatic circles, expectations for Georgia are so

high. At the same time, it has to be mentioned that serious difficulty

still exists in the protection of human rights. The particular matter of

concern is the growth of the number of facts relating to religious intolerance, so far there are many complaints on the violations of constitutional human rights.

We fully recognize the existing problems in this area and all these

cases are publicly discussed in the parliament, government, and media.

First, I will say a couple of words about the local elections. In the

light of upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, the local

elections were viewed by the majority of the political parties as ìsome

sort of warm-up before the bigger elections.î

Unfortunately, in Tbilisi, Rustavi, Zugdidi and Khashuri, many incidents occurred that resulted in violations of the leftover procedure. The

Central Electoral Commission declares elections held there null and

void and appointed a date to hold new voting.

At the request of major political parties, Central Electoral Commission issued an ordinance to recount electoral bulletins to finalize the

results of elections held in Tbilisi. This procedure is underway.

I do want to say a few words about the unacceptable attack on the

Liberty Institute. The president thought that the attack was criminal

and barbaric and he conveyed his strong intent to bring the criminals

to justice with all speed. Investigation is also underway.

Speaking about the religious intolerance, until recently there were no

signs of religious intolerance in Georgia, including those against

Jehovahís Witnesses, on the contrary. For centuries in the capital of

Georgia, temples of different religions coexist peacefully in the vicinity

of each other. Not only Orthodox believers live in Georgia. Hundreds of

thousands of Catholics, followers of the Armenian Church, Muslims,

Israelites permanently reside in our country and neither Orthodox believers nor the Georgian state have had instances of intolerance. Some

problems have recently arisen relating to certain non-traditional religious groups. This is a rather new phenomenon for our country. To

explain the origin of intolerance directed against religious minority

groups, let me offer my perspective on the matter.

For ages, the Georgian Orthodox Church has played a significant role

in the preservation of our countryís statehood and the Georgian nationhood itself. This role is reflected in the Constitution but it also declares

complete freedom of religious belief and stresses the independence of the

church from state. The public feels strongly about keeping the Georgian Orthodox Church as a keystone of the independent Georgian State.

For many, it is an instrument to protect its historical and cultural

heritage and traditions.

A certain part of our society has recently expressed its disapproval of

the activities of non-traditional religious groups since in their own opinion these groups are seeking to undermine the foundations of our state.

Obviously, such an approach is erroneous. We need to change this

mentality and we are sure that this is only a matter of time before

doing so. We want to ensure that the activities of various religious

groups, including both traditional and non-traditional are fully protected.

I have to add also that some populist politicians fuel these problems.
13

I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the president is fully committed to stopping acts of religious discrimination and the violence. A series of criminal proceedings was instituted following incidents of religious extremists that entailed the mob violence against representatives

of various religious minorities.

In accordance with the decision of the Prosecutor Generalís office,

seven criminal cases were joined in a single case against a defrocked

priest whom we have seen on the screen now and his accomplices and

these persons have been charged with committing the following crimes,

beating and battery, coercion, and illegal obstruction of performance of

religious rights.

In an unrelated event, we have brought charges against those who

burned a great deal of books belonging to the Baptist community of

Georgia. The investigative department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs instituted criminal proceedings against the suspects. These criminal cases were transferred to the Tbilisi Circuit Court but no decision

has yet been rendered.

In conformity with the principle of separation of powers, the court is

at least independent in our country. Neither the President of Georgia,

nor other officials are allowed to influence the judgment it makes in

any way.

But in conformity with the decree of the President of Georgia, the

Council of Justice of Georgia is expected to attach particular attention

to the consideration of court cases related to violence, torture, or degrading treatment against religious minority groups so that these cases

are tried without any obstacles and undue delay.

We hope that the effect of this effort allows us to say that religionbased intolerance has no future in Georgia. Respect for human rights

and recognition of their importance is one of the criteria that cannot be

neglected in Georgia.

We could not even imagine that somebody would enjoy basic human

rights and freedoms and I would like to take this opportunity and express my hope that freedom of speech and expression, as well as other

civil and political rights, will not be jeopardized in the future.

Now, let me shift to Georgiaís security and its relations with Russia.

Mr. Chairman, I appear before the Commission at a very dangerous

time for my country. As you know, relations between Georgia and Russia have entered a very troubling phase and we are doing everything

diplomatically politically possible to prevent President Putin from making good on his threat to wage attacks in Georgia. We, along with the

Bush administration, would regard such an attack as violation of our

sovereignty and our territorial integrity.

I would like to review some difficult but important facts pertaining to

the present crisis between Georgia and Russia. I share them with you

in the spirit of promoting a more developed understanding of the situation that my country finds itself in. Russia has violated sovereign Georgian airspace repeatedly despite our warnings to cease. In the last 2

months, we have been bombed half a dozen times. International observers from the OSCE and the United States have confirmed those violations.

The Russian Federation not only brazenly denies conducting air raids

which have resulted in casualties, but it also blames the Georgian side

that its aviation has bombed its own citizens. Russia has repeatedly

attempted to send and deploy units of paratroopers in the northern re-
14

gions of Georgia. Only President Shevardnadzeís personal involvement

in the case and his courageous visit to these regions resolved the situation.

Russia has nurtured separatist movements in the northern regions

of Georgia.

It supports separatists militarily and integrates these regions into

the Russian Federation, unilaterally introducing the visa regime with

Georgia and exempting separatist regions from it. The international

community has condemned these attempts to annex parts of Georgia by

Russia. Russia, without any sense of responsibility and discrediting its

own role of mediator, facilitator, and peacekeeper, openly supports separatists outside and fights it inside the Russian Federation.

Russia still has three military bases in Georgia and has defied decisions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to

withdraw its base in Abkhazia and negotiate withdrawal from others.

Russiaís refusal to withdraw its bases violates international commitments it made in Istanbul in 1999 to close and withdraw them. One of

the key principles of CFE Treatyófree consent of host nation on deployment of foreign troopsóhas been violated.

Russia which has control of gas lines has arbitrarily shut off gas to

Georgia, including in winter time. Russia has also attempted to gain

full control over the national energy infrastructure, thus undermining

our independence and sovereignty.

I also regret to report of the propaganda Russia continues to spread

against my country through its government and the media spreading

falsehoods about Georgia and its activities. The current crisis ostensibly stems from the presence of Chechen fighters in Pankisi Gorge.

From the very beginning of the second Chechen war, Russia has accused Georgia of sheltering Chechen terrorists, although despite

Georgiaís warning of the danger of spillover of Chechen conflict onto

Georgia territory, the Russian side could not or did not prevent the

infiltration of Chechens into the Pankisi Gorge.

On September 11, 2002, President Putin gave orders to the Ministry

of Defense to prepare, also to the general staff, to prepare and present a

plan of a military operation to be carried out in Georgia. The timing

was chosen very carefully. Mr. Putinís statement came one day before

President Bushís speech in New York at the U.N. General Assembly. It

was evidently aimed at trading Russiaís support of U.S. intervention

into Iraq for U.S. support for Russiaís invasion of Georgia.

President Putin made many analogies between the situation he faces

in Georgia with what President Bush faces in Iraq. The Warsaw Journal called the analogies preposterous and Senator John McCain stated

that: ìPresident Putin of Russia has appropriated American rhetoric in

the war against terrorism to justify Russiaís subversion of the Georgian state. A free Russian hand on Georgia is apparently the price President Putin believes the United States is willing to pay for Russiaís support for military action against Iraq.î

The leadership of the Russian Federation has misled its population

and the international community asserting that Georgia hampers

Russiaís fight against terrorism. This is not true. We have been and

continue to root out the Chechen fighters through a major anti-terrorist operation in the Pankisi Gorge.
15

As we speak, U.S. Special Forces are training our forces to accomplish this objective. I speak about the train and equip program. As the

Bush administration has stated, we believe firmly that problems in

Pankisi Gorge should be addressed by the Georgian Government and

they are doing so.

We have been working to resolve the conflict with Russia by peaceful

means. In his letter to President Putin, President Shevardnadze appealed to Putin to find common ground, to rise above the existing problems, and develop good neighborly relations between our two peoples.

We have also indicated readiness to receive and OSCE group of experts,

international monitors, including representatives of the Russian Federation that will be provided with an opportunity to visit any site at any

time.

We are appealing to the entire international community and particularly to the United States with the hope that they will not allow the

violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of my country by aggression from one of the mighty military powers of the world. I thank

you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me again to appear before the Commission and I would be glad to take your questions now.

Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Mikeladze, thank you very much for your

testimony and for the very strong statements you have made regarding

your governmentís concern about the human rights abuse, especially

the actions taken against minority religious believers, and for reminding us that this is indeed a dangerous time for Georgia.

Let me ask a first question: if the United States were to move against

Iraq, do you have concerns that at that time, perhaps because of a diversion of eyes averted from Georgia, the Russians might move on Georgia?

Amb. MIKELADZE. Mr. Chairman [inaudible].

Mr. SMITH. If the United States were to move against Iraq in a war,

do you harbor concerns that during that time when eyes are fixed on

Iraq that the Russians might use that as a diversion and move on Georgia?

Amb. MIKELADZE. Mr. Chairman, of course such danger exists. We

think that Russia would like to use the U.S. campaign against Iraq as

an excuse of an attack to invade Georgia and all developments in the

recent last 2 or 3 weeks indicate such a danger. But, again, we appreciate very much the U.S. Governmentís support, which indicated clearly

that any unilateral actions undertaken by the Russian Government

against Georgia would be unacceptable.

Another clear indication to that theoretical hypothetical, let us say,

possibility is the letter of President Putin to the Secretary General of

the United Nations and the members of the Security Council where he

tried, letís say, to get the international support for unilateral actions in

Georgia. But fortunately, neither the United Nations nor the U.S. Government has supported this idea.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned in your comment, your

government was fully committed in trying to eradicate this religious

persecution thatís occurring through mob violence and complicity by

the police. You pointed out that defrocked priest, Father Basil, was

brought to trial.

My understanding is there have been at least seven instances where

the proceedings by the judiciary were delayed because the government

was unwilling to send police to stop the mobs from invading the court-
16

house. It seems to me that if people mob a courthouse, they get arrested

and they get held to account for impeding a judicial proceeding. Obstruction of justice might be leveled against them and certainly the

violence that they use would be a crime in and of itself.

Can we get assurances that that trial in particular and any other

trials will proceed? If examples are set, the crowd becomes less enthusiastic if they do not ìget rewardedî for their activity of stopping the trial.

The impunity goes on and on.

Some examples, it seems to me, would be very much in order. Hold

this defrocked priest to account and it also seems that the Orthodox

Church would owe the government a very sincere thank you. As it says

in the Bible that a good name is to be sought after great riches. It is

much more important than great riches, and his is giving Georgia a

black mark. It is also giving the Orthodox Church something of a black

mark because there seems to be an impression that somehow they are

at fault as well.

So, I would hope that all due effort be made here because this matters

so much to this Commission. Perhaps we have the unique position as

you know living here as Americans in a country that has been a refuge

for religiously persecuted people and they have flocked to our shores

from all over the world. The experience gives us almost a unique standing when we speak out against such intolerance

I would hope that the trial against Father Basil and the others will

proceed. If people try to bust it up, arrest them. Send, deploy sufficient

resources to stop that and that step could have a chilling effect on others from disrupting similar proceedings. Mr. Ambassador.

Amb. MIKELADZE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would

like to assure you and the Commission that my authorities are also

extremely concerned with this development and I can state also that

they are not sitting idle and looking what is happening there on the

ground. Nevertheless, there are some objective difficulties and certain

aspects that should be taken into account.

First, as I stated already, it is a completely new phenomenon for our

society and having the very long experience of peaceful coexistence of

different religions and faiths in Georgia, now the authorities simply

reach the experience of dealing with such new and very unusual phenomenon that appeared recently in our society.

The parliament and president, they have strongly condemned these

actions and they have tasked the Prosecutor Generalís office, the investigative bodies, particularly the Ministry of Interior, to investigate the

case and they on their side, they have finalized the investigation, transferred them to the court, but unfortunately for again a number of reasons, the court did not take any punitive decision against the perpetrators.

The Prosecutor Generalís office three times appealed to the court to

revise the case but again, the court has rejected it because of less than

enough, let us say, evidence. Although, another aspect that is also very

important for me, but unfortunately, and I stress unfortunately, these

people they have certain grounds, certain sympathy also in the society

that is again instigated and supported by a number of populist politicians.

Speaking about the police, this is one institution that did not undergo

the fundamental reforms for different reasons. During these last several years, unfortunately we had some other priorities having in mind
17

the threats coming from outside Georgia. That is why my authorities

were more focused on the border guards, on the army, and some other

structures, and of course I accept the criticism and I accept the necessity of transforming of the reforming of our law enforcement bodies and

particularly police.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Amb. MIKELADZE. But again I would like to...

Mr. SMITH. Sure.

Amb. MIKELADZE. ...add a couple of words. Police also have difficulties to use force because they managed, by the way, a number of times

to avert the bloodshed and to stop the mob, but unfortunately we had

also cases when they were not successful.

Mr. SMITH. Just let me add, and I thank you for those assurances, I

cannot stress enough how injurious it is to Georgiaís reputation that

these kinds of events continue to happen against innocent people whether

they be Baptists, Jehovahís Witnesses, or other minority faiths.

If the courts are being complicit or not helpful in prosecuting justice,

perhaps they need to be looked at very carefully. Perhaps a special prosecutor could be impaneled or empowered to bring the kind of evidence

that would be the requisite evidence to garner convictions. You know

the idea of zero tolerance; these people should not be targeted simply

because of their faith. It is hurting. I have to tell you this, the reputation of Georgia in a very real way around the world and especially in the

halls of Congress, we want to be supportive.

We are supportive of Georgiaís democracy, but this is something that

we hold so dear and like I said, it is both sides of the aisle, Democrats

and Republicans. Again, I think actions do speak louder than words. I

can make all the pronouncements I want about something but until I

actually concretely do something, that is where the real merit is. I want

to encourage you in the strongest terms to get a handle on this because

there will be more victims. There will be more people with black eyes

and stitches and broken legs and all kinds of other injuries, perhaps

death and the destruction of property. The imposition of certain punishment will deter these mobs from this impunity that they have embarked

upon, so I strongly encourage you. Mr. Pitts.

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, Russiaís

Defense Minister said on September 19 that Russia has ìtons of evidenceî that terrorists from Chechnya, as well as from Arab and Muslim

countries, are operating in Georgia, and some of them have links to Al

Qaeda. What is the position of your government, the Government of

Georgia, on the presence of foreign terrorists in your country?

Amb. MIKELADZE. Thank you. First, I would like to respond to Mr.

Chairman, to your comments. I fully share what you have said but

there is one thing that I would like also you to consider and to take into

account. Of course, we do not have the direct evidence of some outside

forces backing these people, but of course all these events, all these

attacks in our view are part of the overall attempts, overall policy of the

destabilization of the situation in Georgia. That is why it is so serious

and that is why it is so disturbing for my authorities and for my people.

But again, what can we do? I think here the United Statesí role can

be really immense. In my view, we can, first of all we have to move in

the direction of the increased awareness of this problem, the increased

knowledge about the religious tolerance, the freedom of the faith of the

religion and so on and so on.
18

There are a number of programs that are now going on in Georgia

and I think that we can add some new ones and they would, of course,

help us to increase the knowledge about the values, about the philosophy of this approach.

As for the second question, Congressman, yes we hear these accusations very often coming from very high-level Russian officials. What

can I say? Of course, one cannot deny that there may be terrorists, Al

Qaeda people among them on the Georgian territory, and this was the

reason we asked for the support of the United States.

That is why we have initiated the program of the train and equip.

That is why we have just launched a couple of weeks ago a very serious

anti-terrorist military operation in the Pankisi Gorge and my government is doing its best to root out any terrorist elements if they exist in

Georgia.

But these accusations coming from Russia are really ironicówe, of

course, do not accept any criticism and any accusations coming from

our Russian colleagues since I think they do not have any moral right

to blame Georgia in sheltering terrorists, since Russia itself is doing so.

For years, we asked them to transfer the Georgian terrorists who

attacked President Shevardnadze and who then found refuge in Russia

to be transferred to Georgia, but unfortunately all our attempts have

failed. Sometimes Russians remind me of the priest who does not practice what he preaches.

I think that the Russian authorities themselves have developed the

most friendly and warm relations with those countries associated with

the axis of evil. I think that last week in The New York Times we read

an article about the sanctions imposed by the U.S. Government on the

Russian state-owned industries that have developed very intensive relations, trade, arms deals with the terrorist organizations and terrorists in some Middle Eastern countries.

So, that is why, of course, we recognize the existence of this problem

in Georgia. We do everything possible. We try our best to resolve this

problem, but again I do not think that the Russian accusations have

any grounds or any moral ground to be directed against Georgia.

Mr. PITTS. So, has your government found any evidence, any hard

evidence of the presence of foreign terrorists or any terrorist groups

that are linked to Al Qaeda in Georgia?

Amb. MIKELADZE. No. We have some suspicion that there might be

people associated with Al Qaeda but when our Russian colleagues speak

about terrorists, of course first of all they have in mind the Chechen

fighters, although there are different views about them. There might

be the fighters for the freedom of independence of Chechnya but there

might be also peopleóthese people may be blended up letís say with the

terrorists which conducted the terrorist acts on the Russian territory.

But the main problem in our view are the Chechen gunmen, Chechen

armed people on the Georgian territory, although there are some suspicions. Again, I would like to stress that we do not exclude that there

were elements of Al Qaeda but we do not have direct evidences of that.

Mr. PITTS. Some analysts argue that outside forces, especially Russia,

want to destabilize Georgia and have helped instigate the attacks on

minority faiths. For example, the extremist Georgian parliamentarian

Guram Sharadze has been accused of having KGB ties. Do you find

convincing any such theories about religious violence in Georgia?
19

Amb. MIKELADZE. Congressman, I am almost sure that behind all

these terrorist attacks, there is someone who is very much interested

in the destablization of the situation in Georgia, and if we analyze who

may be the most interested in the deterioration of the situation there on

the spot, of course first who comes to my mind is the Russian Federation.

As for the second part of your question, of course we do not have

direct evidences or proofs of this but, again, I do not exclude that our

society and the politicians also, among the politicians there might be

people who are directly linked with the special services of foreign countries.

Mr. PITTS. Finally, President Shevardnadze has issued several statements condemning religious violence and calling for police action. Why

have the perpetrators of violence, for instance against the Jehovahís

Witnesses and other religious minorities, not been arrested? Why hasnít

the government done something and what does your government plan

to do to ensure that police actively intervene to protect these groups

from further violence?

Amb. MIKELADZE. These people who are associated with the attacks

of Jehovahís Witnesses, a number of them were arrested the other day

were taken under the custody and as I have reported, the president and

parliament have appealed to the investigative bodies to investigate the

cases. They have done their job, transferred the results of the investigation to the court, but unfortunately court has released them, and here

president and parliament were unable to affect the courtís judgment.

But, of course, Shevardnadze was extremely critical, like our media

or our parliament toward the police and I would like to assure you that

they will beóthat police under the pressure coming from the society,

from the media, from the government and parliament, they will be more

effective in the nearest future.

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. One final question, Mr. Ambassador, if I could. What

would you say are the short-, medium-, and long-term goals of Russia

vis-a-vis Georgia?

Amb. MIKELADZE. To swallow Georgia to be very brief, in short, medium- and long-term perspective. But to be more serious, in shorter

perspective of course all these problems which we speak now about are

directed against existing governments and, to be again very open, President Shevardnadzeís personality. They, of course, aim to undermine

the existing government.

As for the medium-term perspective, I think that the Russia Federation aims to keep the Russian military presence there to gain the political influence, to increase the political and economic influence on Georgia, to get the full control over the gas and energy infrastructure and so

on. But in long-term perspective, in my view, Russiaís main goal is to

make Georgia a permanent satellite, obedient servant to the Russian

Federation.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much Ambassador Mikeladze, for your

testimony. We look forward to hearing of developments in the area of

religious freedom. I would note that in half a year or less, I plan on

calling another hearing on Georgia, the purpose of which would be to

focus on these developments.
20

Our hope is that through friendship and cooperation and accountability, we will see significant progress in this area because we do care

deeply for Georgia on this Commission. You are a great friend but we

also are concerned about this impunity. As you said, out of kilter, if you

will, with Georgiaís long history and again I think much more can be

done that I hope will be done to end it.

So, we will look forward to hearing from you in a few months, and I do

again want to thank you for coming before this Commission and being

a part of this proceeding. We do appreciate it.

Amb. MIKELADZE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Believe me I will count

very much on very close cooperation with the Commission, with your

able staff, and will continue in this spirit. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so much, Ambassador.

I would like to invite our third panel to the witness table, beginning

with Bishop Malkhaz Songalashvili, a Baptist minister since 1990. He

has taught medieval history and the history of Christian theology at

Tbilisi, a state university. From 1985 to 1988, he was a member of the

committee for modern Georgian translation of the Bible at the Patriarchy of the Georgian Orthodox Church. The Bible, released in 1989, was

the first translation of scripture in the modern Georgian language.

In 1993, the bishop founded the first Protestant theological seminary

in Georgia where he has been teaching Hebrew and the Old Testament.

Since 1994, he has been the leader of the Evangelical Baptist Church of

Georgia, the largest Protestant denomination in Georgia.

Our next witness will be Genadi Gudadze, who was baptized as one of

Jehovahís Witnesses on June 17, 1983. At the age of 19, he was sent to

prison in Georgia as a conscientious objector to military service. He

served a one and a half year term starting in January 1985. He was

arrested again for the same reason and was sentenced for a 3-year term.

Initially, he was sent to prison in Georgia, but was later transferred

to a prison in Siberia. He was released on October 15, 1987. Since February1998, Mr. Gudadze has served as an administrator at the Georgia

Office of Jehovahís Witnesses.

In February 2001, he was appointed Chairman of the Union of

Jehovahís Witnesses in Georgia. Translating for Mr. Gudadze is Mr.

Lasha Chokheli. He serves as the branch office in Jehovahís Witnesses

in St. Petersburg in Russia.

Our next witness after him will be Dr. Ghia Nodia, who is Chairman

of the Board of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development in Tbilisi. He is the author of four books and more than 40

articles focusing on the interdependence of democracy and nationalism

in light of the Caucasus regionsí communist and post-communist experience, as well as political and social aspects of democratic transition

and institution building in post-communist countries.

Dr. Nodia is a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Democracy, the steering committee of the World Movement for Democracy

and the advisory board of the Eurasia Foundation office in Georgia.

Finally, Stephen Jones is an associate professor in Russian and Eurasian studies at Mt. Holyoke College. He is the author of more than 50

publications on 19th and 20th Century Georgia. He regularly briefs the

State Department and other U.S. Government agencies, as well as the

UNHCR, the World Bank, and other institutions on the current situation in Georgia.
21

He has just completed a book, Georgian Social Democracy 1893 to

1917, and is currently writing another book on democracy building in

Georgia and U.S. policy toward the Caucasus since 1991. Bishop, if you

would begin.

BISHOP MALKHAZ SONGULASHVILI,

EVANGELICAL BAPTIST UNION OF GEORGIA

Bishop SONGULASHVILI. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, first

let me greet you, all of you on behalf of the Evangelical Baptist Church

of Georgia, which is the largest Protestant Church in this Orthodox

majority country.

It is already 10 years since Georgia has reemerged as an independent

nation. We gained independence but we still have to reach freedom. Old

values have gone. New values have not come yet. There will be a very

long way to go before we fully appreciate the values of democracy, freedom, basic human rights, and general sense of dignity of the human

being.

The question of religious liberty has become a matter of political manipulations in Georgia. It seems that most of the political parties have

come to realize that a true Orthodox policy can be very beneficial in

their free election campaign.

On the other hand, the other fundamentalist Orthodox groups are

taking their opportunity to increase their war against religious minorities. I have been invited here to the United States to bring some clarity

about religious liberty, religious violence in Georgia, to answer some

questions coming from you, but I am afraid I have more questions than

answers myself.

I do not understand why the fierce religious intolerance crept into the

country of Georgia where religious intolerance was not a big issue in

the past. In fact, religious tolerance used to be a matter of national

pride.

I do not understand why the Orthodox Church and Orthodox believers do not clearly and boldly condemn when sacrilegious actions are

carried out in the name of Orthodox Christianity when the leaders of

non-Orthodox people are shaved in the name of the most Holy Trinity in

an attempt to humiliate them, when Bibles and other Christian books

are burned publicly with wild joy and Catholic, Evangelical Baptist,

and non-Christian clergy are attacked physically and are publicly maltreated.

I do not understand why the police are almost completely inactive

when people are beaten up for their religious beliefs, when peopleís properties are violated and belongings stolen because they belong to a nonOrthodox church or religious group.

Very often, they say if there is no law about religion, we cannot do

anything about religious violence. What is the explanation? It is not an

absence of religious legislation that causes religious violence and persecution but the absence of [inaudible] law, justice and general rule.

I do not understand why the authorities do not put an end to the

violence. The Georgian Constitution does make provision for freedom of

conscience and belief. Why is the Constitution violated by the authorities? Why are the presidential decrees not implemented? Why do not

the authorities realize that sidelining of religious minorities is not contributing to the integrity and unity of the country which is not homogeneous neither ethnically nor religiously?
22

I do not understand why the Georgian mass media is so reluctant to

contribute to the peace and harmony of the society. Why are the criminals who are spreading moral terror in the society given so much time

on TV programs to propagate their obscurant ideas and to stir people up

against religious minorities?

The same mass media is very reluctant to pay any attention to what

is happening in different religious communities. Why do the positive

things in the life of religious minorities have no value for them to be

reported? Obviously, there are far more things that I do not understand

or I pretend I do not understand, but there is one thing that I understand very well.

This should not continue this way. We have to deal very strictly with

every single expression of terrorism everywhere and by all means. It is

clear that religious or moral terrorism is one of the ugliest faces of

world terrorism. Unfortunately, it is not endemic for Georgia.

It is everywhere in every religion, in every culture, but I as a Baptist

clergyman declare that religious persecution and discrimination, which

is carried out in the name of orthodoxy has nothing to do with the true

Orthodox faith, which is a part of the worldwide Body of Christ,

Christendom.

My experience with three children tells me that it is easier to take

children from the street, but it is much more difficult to take the street

attitude out of children. Similarly, our society has come out of communist regime but the old mentality has not come out of our minds.

We, as Georgian Christians, and here I represent not only the Baptist

Church but a group of other churches like Evangelical Lutheran Church

of Georgia, Armenian Apostolic Church in Georgia, and Roman Catholic Church in Georgia. We are determined to fight back the religious

and moral terror in Georgia.

Obviously, our means are limited but our desire to see Georgia prospering both spiritually and materially will help us to overcome all those

difficulties we face now.

There are four targets of strategic significance that could be efficient

in fighting against religious terrorism; one, family. Understandably, it

is as hard a job to implement the post-communist family to such an

extent that it nudges its members with the ideas of tolerance, human

rights, and democracy.

Nevertheless, if we are serious to develop an open society, we should

target the family. Obviously, mass media, school, and religion should

be considered as means to reach the above-mentioned results in the

family. It will certainly take some time before first positive fruits appear.

The second is mass media. The fastest way of changing the public

opinion in relation with religious tolerance could be reached through

the mass media, but the mass media is not ready to play such a role

simply because their representatives belong to the film society. Considerable work needs to be done to involve them in the work against any

expression of religious terrorism.

Third, school and teaching institutions, very often schools play a very

negative role. Sometimes some schoolteachers think that the communist ideology has been replaced by orthodoxy. Therefore, they think they

should empower the Orthodox faith and religious intolerance for the
23

children. The Ministry of Education and schools should prepare a curriculum so that both pupils and teachers learn how to respect religious

diversity in the society.

Four, is religious congregations, we may call them the Sanctus of

moral influence. Religious leaders should help their constituencies to

realize that in this post-modern world, it is impossible to live with medieval principles. It may seem easiest to prosecute the clergy that have

been responsible for the violence in Georgia, but this will not solve all

the problems. They will be considered as martyrs for the Orthodox faith.

If we seek lasting results for religious tolerance, we should work with

theological students and their teachers. They should be exposed to reality. They have to be encouraged to learn more than languages, but the

one source of their theological education very often is 19th Century ultra fundamentalist theological literature in Russian.

Without diligent work on these four targets, it will be very difficult to

fight not only religious terrorism but terrorism in general. The process

of mobilization in this respect can be the ally for fighting terrorism

globally. That is to say that the problem of religious persecution and

terrorism in Georgia should be considered a part of global issues.

I believe that with common efforts of all people of good will, we can

handle the problem. Peaceful development in every nation of the world

with due respect of religious liberty should not have any alternatives.

Our hope is the future should not be overshadowed by the turmoil of

religious persecution of present time.

Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, ladies and gentlemen, in conclusion

let me summarize the concerns of religious minorities and all men and

women of good will in the Republic or Georgia. Bible burning, destruction and desecration of churches and places of worship, physical attacks on bishops, pastors [inaudible.], false propaganda on media, government inability to act, police not willing to protect, the fear of the

unknown, these are the things that should not be tolerated in any country or in any culture.

We are pleased that the United States of America has been the champion in the world for religious liberty and we also would like to experience the same full religious liberty in Georgia. Thank you very much

for your concern and determination to ensure religious liberty and human rights all over the world. God bless you.

Mr. SMITH. Bishop Songulashvili thank you very much for that statement. It was very powerful and very comprehensive. I would like to ask

Mr. Gudadze if he would make his presentation.

GENADI GUDADZE, CHAIRMAN, UNION OF

JEHOVAHíS WITNESSES IN GEORGIA,

TBILISI, GEORGIA

Mr. GUDADZE [through translator]. Thank you. My name is Genadi

Gudadze. I would like to thank the members of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe for allowing me to testify on behalf of the 15,000 Jehovahís Witnesses in Georgia. My family

has been associated with Jehovahís Witnesses since 1959.

Under the Soviet government, we were officially banned. Personally,

I spent 3 years in the Georgian prisons and 11⁄2 years in Siberia because

of my faith.
24

However, even during those difficult times, there was no violence

against Jehovahís Witnesses such as we are experiencing presently in

Georgia. Since 1991, Jehovahís Witnesses were usually able to meet

peacefully throughout Georgia.

However, the situation changed suddenly in October 1999. Since then,

there have been 133 separate incidents involving either mob attacks,

individual attacks, or destruction of property. More than 745 criminal

complaints have been filed.

During the last 3 years, Jehovahís Witnesses have been attacked while

meeting privately in their homes and assaulted while walking on the

street. Elderly people have been savagely beaten and injured, along with

pregnant women and children. Large mobs, in the presence of police,

have carried out massive attacks, blocked main highways, and attacked

busloads of people.

The reign of terror continues. What is the solution? I assume it is not

presidential decree, because Georgian courts, prosecutorís office, minister of interior do not obey it. Then what is solution?

It is very simple. Apply the law, arrest the criminals, and among

them, those policemen who cooperate with them.

Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your excellent statement.

I would like now to ask Dr. Nodia if he would make his presentation.

DR. GHIA NODIA, DIRECTOR,

CAUCASUS INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, DEVELOPMENT AND

DEMOCRACY, TBILISI, GEORGIA

Dr. NODIA. Mr. Co-Chairman and ladies and gentlemen, I have prepared longer written testimony, where I address issues of security problems, general political development, and several more specific human

rights issues. Here, I will mostly focus on the security situation and its

implications for the human rights situation and the political situation

in Georgia. Considering that we have other witnesses who have spoken

more on the religious violence issue, although I want, from the very

beginning, to say that religious violence is probably the single most

outrageous instance of human rights violations in Georgia and a deeply

embarrassing matter for our country. I also want to say that this trend

is dangerous not only because religious violence is bad by itself, but also

because the impunity of this violence spreads into other spheres of life.

I think thatóI personally consider it a very dangerous and only starting trend, the spread of political violence, which has already showed

itself in the elections in 2001 and local elections this June. There are

quite serious concerns that this trend may spread further in certain

developments when some groups take the liberty to decide who can meet

their supporters or who can address people or who cannot.

When some people openly say that, ìI will not allow this and this

person to be elected,î it recalls of the period of early 1990s, when the

competition for power was mainly with arms rather than through democratic procedures. Of course, we are luckily still quite far from that

period of warlords and anarchy, but still some very disturbing analogies can be drawn.
25

But as I said, I will focus on the issueówhich is at this moment most

painful for the country, and this is the problem of the Pankisi Gorge.

First of all, I will say that while this issue is mostly publicized for its

role in the crisis in relations between Russia and Georgia, Pankisi has

been a problem for Georgia not only because of relations with Russia.

It has mostly been a big problem for the country during the last 2 or

so years, because it has become a lawless area. There is a very high

level of criminality. It has become a safe haven for the arms trade, drug

trade, and especially the business of kidnapping people. Exactly because

of that, the Pankisi Gorge has caused very great indignation among the

public, and it has highlighted the weakness of the Georgian state and

the corruption in law enforcement agencies.

So, of course, this problem started after the second Chechen war and

the wave of refugeesóinflow of refugees from the war zone, and it brought

along some kind of objective problems. It was very difficult, really difficult for the Georgian Government to deal with these problems, because

it was very hard to define who is a terrorist or fighter and who is just a

young Chechen male. Of course, the Georgian Government had no material possibility to seal the border between Chechnya and Russia, as

Russia has not had that possibility, either.

But, of course, still, the Georgian Government, I think, should take

the blame for the failure to tackle this problem in a timely and adequate manner. The main reason was not only insufficient capacity of

the Georgian law enforcement but the rampant corruption in those institutions and the complicity of high-ranking leaders of security and

police forces in the criminal business that was thriving in Pankisi.

Of course, these kidnappings could not have been perpetrated by only

Chechens or Kisti. It included also several more Georgian criminal rings.

Also, there is widespread belief that officers of Georgian law enforcement were implicated in this. But having said that, I do not want to

imply that somehow Russiaís threats and ultimatums have any justification with relation to the problem of Pankisi, especially because now,

it is a time when the Georgian Government has at last started really to

address the issue and do something there. I think that, in itself, is a

very good development and is probably highly indicative that Russia

has stepped up its pressure exactly when Georgia started to address the

issue.

So I think that while Russia has understandable and legitimate security concerns about Pankisi Gorge because of its relation to the problem

of Chechnya, I do not think the real motivation of the Russian Government here is about addressing this issue. I think Russia has several

motivations.

First, I believe that the Russian strategy here is to transfer their

war, or, at least in part, outside the territory of Russia. It started to

pursue this goal from the very beginning of the war, when it demanded

the rights to pursue the Chechens to Pankisi Gorge. Of course, these

terms of cooperation that no Georgian Government would accept, because it would mean the transfer of the war onto Georgian territory,

and Georgia somehow fighting the Russian war, which was also morally quite dubious to say the least.

At this point, in the last period, I think the main problem is that

Russia is not successful in fighting this war, and it really looks for a

scapegoat, for somebody else to blame for its failure to finish this war in

such a way that would be acceptable to the Russian public. Georgia is a
26

most likely scapegoat for this. Russia also appears to be looking for a

pretext to punish Georgia for allowing the West, especially the United

States, to play an active role in the Caucasus, something that the Russian politicians call squeezing Russia out of the region. This is obvious

when you look at Russian television and listen to Russian politicians

across the political spectrum.

So I think that this new crisis between Russia and Georgia over Pankisi

really started this spring, when the train-and-equip program was announced. I remember watching Russian television on that date where

the message was that Georgia will be punished for this, although officially, of course, Russian president endorsed this program in some way.

Of course, the most disturbing thing for Georgia is that Russia very

openly and consistently links this issue of Pankisi with the issue of

Iraq. Again, we see discussions with Russian politicians when they say

all of them agree that if the United States hits Iraq, then, of course,

Russia should go into Georgia. If not, then we can discuss the issue

first. That is the message that we hear from Russia.

Of course, this causes very grave concerns in Georgian society, and

under the circumstances, main hopes are usually pinned on Washington, because people in Georgia think that our bargaining position with

Russia is very weak in that sense. So what does it mean for internal

politics of Georgia? I think the general situation is such that in the last

2 years, we have seen the trend toward more active public politics in

Georgia, so to say, when the opposition is strengthened, vis-a-vis, an

unpopular President Shevardnadze and his government. So the political life has become more tense, but also more participatory at the same

time, and this trend toward greater participation is, I think, maybe the

most encouraging trend in the last 2 years in Georgian politics.

However, I think that these Russian ultimatums and threats have

somehow halted its development. It was to some extent good, quote,

unquote, for the government, in the sense that now, large parts of the

political elite have consolidated around the president, It is less likely

that very harsh anti-government political campaign will continue.

But, of course, in the middle and long run, we do not know how that

will turn for the Georgian Government, and democracy in Georgia, because if the government does not show that it is really consistent and

decisive in this political crisis, it may play against it.

So I think that this Russian threat, on the one hand, increases the

possibility, in the long run, at leastóthe probability of greater instability in Georgia if the government really fails to meet these Russian threats

in due manner, or, on the other hand, it may give an excuse to the

government to somehow behave in a more authoritarian manner. Although at this point, it is more a possibilityóI do not think that the

lastóthe last developments would not give me the possibility to say

that these trends are already working.

Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Nodia, thank you very much for your testimony. Your

full statement will be made a part of the record, as will those of all the

witnesses at todayís hearing.

Professor Jones?
27

STEPHEN JONES, PROFESSOR,

MOUNT HOLYOKE COLLEGE, MASSACHUSETTS

Prof. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Co-Chairman, for inviting me to the

Commission to present my statement. I have been studying Georgia for

more than 23 years, and I am very concerned about the situation in the

country, and I must admit that it pains me to see what is happening

today.

I did testify to this Commission in 1995, and I concluded then that

ìthe concentration of power in Shevardnadzeís hands and the retention

of conservative apparatchiki in policy-making positions is undermining

popular faith in institutions of democracy and the market. Shevardnadze

may have managed to save the Georgian ship of state, but has given it

little direction.î

Well, after 7 years, I am back here in 2002. More than $700 million of

U.S. aid has been spent on Georgia between 1995 and 2002, I am afraid

that today, I might use those very same words when I conclude my

statement. In the year 2000, USAID spent $52 million in Georgia, restructuring its energy system. That same year, the U.S. Government

spent $35 million on border defense and on the Georgian armed forces;

$7 million on conflict resolution; and $14 million on judicial reform,

rehabilitation of the health system, and privatization. Yet thereís little

indication that this investment has made much difference in Georgia.

When I was in Georgia in the fall of 2001, there were blockades on the

streets by citizens angered at electricity blackouts. There was an occupation of Rustavi, the most popular independent TV channel, by security ministry officials. There were prolonged protests outside Parliament, leading to the mass resignation of government ministers; the

bombing of Georgian villages by Russian planes; an incursion of Chechen

fighters into the Kodori Valley; and the election of a new South Osetian

president in December, more antagonistic, it seemed, to reintegration

with Georgia than his predecessor.

Conflict resolution in secessionist Abkhazia remained at a dead end.

The judicial reform that was greeted with such fanfare in 1998 had

petered out. Corruption in the process of privatization or the obscure

process of privatization continued to undermine the faith of ordinary

citizens in economic and political reform in Georgia.

It would be absurd, however, to suggest that there has been no progress

in Georgia since I was last here in 1995. Shevardnadze has ended the

para-militariesí rule in Georgia. Civil strife has largely come to an end.

He cured hyper-inflation and stemmed territorial fragmentation. He

has, if you like, de-radicalized the Georgian nationalist revolution. He

has introduced economic reforms and established a Constitution that

still stands and still works.

Nevertheless, this progress, in which Western governments and international organizations have invested so much, is built on the thinnest of ice. The fragile stability in Georgia today is maintained by social

and political forces that, in the long term, are going to bring it down,

and along with it U.S. hopes of a sturdy, liberal, democratic ally in the

region.

Thus, corruption and migrationóand migration is an important safety

valve for the unemployed and discontented in Georgiaópublic cynicism,

and a poorly organized civil society sustain the systemís stability today.

But tomorrow, these same phenomena will undermine any future prospect of sustainable reform in Georgia. That means unless something
28

changes in the current Georgian Government policy, I am going to be

back before this committee in 7 yearsí time repeating what I said in

1995 and what I am saying today.

By most criteria, we might call Georgia democratic, although, in my

mind, there are serious questions as to whether elected officials have

effective power over the government and whether elections, such as the

2000 presidential election, can be described as fair and honest. Other

attributes of democracy, though imperfect, are basically in place in

Georgia, such as free expression, the right to create political parties

and associations, the right to run for elective office, and the existence of

alternative sources of information.

Nevertheless, despite these gains, for the ordinary Georgian citizen,

the expectations of democratic life, such as accountable officials, defense against corrupt judges and police, a responsive government and

electoral power, have not been fulfilled. Civil liberties are inadequately

protected or inadequately understood. In the regions, talk of local selfgovernments, I am afraid, is just that, talk.

There are many reasons why Georgia is failing its citizens, but I will

mention only three, and I am going to focus on these areas, because I

think Western governments have also failed to establish an effective

strategy for helping Georgia in these areas.

The first concern is economic security. Undoubtedly, impoverished

democracies exist. But studies do show that moderate growth, a higher

per capita income, and declining inequality are the best means for sustaining democratic institutions.

Even with estimates, taking into account popular participation in the

shadow economy in Georgia, 40 percent of the Georgian population has

a combined monetary and non-monetary income below subsistence level.

J.K. Galbraith has remarked that ìnothing sets a stronger limit on the

liberty of a citizen than a total absence of money.î

In Georgia, Western policies of democracy building, I think, have

overlooked this basic tenet. Until Georgian citizensí economic and physical

security is mediated in some way, democratization in Georgia will have

little chance of success, and the successful integration of national minorities into the Georgian state is unlikely to occur.

The second issue concerns Georgiaís state capacity. No government

can sustain reform without the proper institutional means to follow

through on the reformís implementation. A few figures, I think, illustrate the problem.

Compared to 1989, Georgiaís current economy has shrunk 67 percent. Industry is working at 20 percent of its capacity. Between 1997

and 2000, expenditure on defense decreased from $51.9 million to $13.6

million; education from $35.6 million to $13.9 million; and I could go

on. The stateís inability to fund its social insurance and employment

funds; maintain it is army, education, and transport; or stimulate agriculture and industry has led the majority of the population to view the

state as irrelevant, unrepresentative, and corrupt.

Supplying Western aid, such as the U.S. train-and-equip program for

the Georgian army, which is aimed to help Georgians fight Chechen

terrorists, will not be effective if the Georgian state cannot do its part

and pay its soldiers and feed them properly. A strong fighting force to

defend Georgiaís borders cannot be built on the base of an impoverished

and demoralized army. Any action is unlikely to be effective in Pankisi

until many very serious social and economic problems are tackled there

which were present before the start of the second Chechen war.
29

The transition to democracy and the effective impact of aid must start

with the premise of a coherent and functioning state. A weak state is

unable to promote good government, cannot control bad government,

and will inevitably misspend Western aid.

The third issue is political and public support for reform. There are

scattered reformers in the Georgian Government, even ministers, but

they are powerless, and they do not have the support of the president.

Sound opinion poll research suggests that even if state elites wish to

reform, they would find it very difficult to convince a profoundly alienated population that they were genuine. Data suggests that 56.8 percent of the population do not trust the courts, 64 percent do not trust

Parliament, 79 percent do not trust the tax administrationómaybe

thatís not so surprisingóand 65 percent do not trust the president.

Such degrees of alienation will kill most attempts at reform before

they even begin. The cycle of distrust can only be broken with visible

government measures taken to end the control of corrupt, political, and

economic networks, and the U.S. Government must play its role here

by strongly urging Shevardnadze to do so and the possible use of sanctions if he does not.

A poll in December 2001, conducted by the Georgian Research Firm

SOCIOGEO suggested that Georgiaís cumulative problems and the ineffective backing of the United States for reform could decrease faith in

the United States among Georgian citizens. Forty-three percent of Georgians polled ó and the figure was 24 percent in 1999ófavored closer

security ties with Russia and the CIS, rather than the USA.

Now, after the recent bombing, it is likely that those figures have

changed. But they are an indication that the United States itself cannot take popular support in Georgia for granted if it backs a government seen by many as indifferent to its citizensí welfare.

Ultimately, of course, Georgians are responsible for building a sustainable democracy. But Western aid is an important instrument in

shaping, stimulating, and sustaining reform, and so far, this aid has

largely been ineffective in doing so.

I would like to mention four or five possible recommendations in conclusion. I would like to see much stronger and focused strategies of

Western aid in Georgia that combine democracy promotion with poverty eradication. I think that is extremely important. The two go together.

Secondly, I would like to see a major expansion of programs like the

World Bank Social Investment Fund for infrastructural and employment projects in Georgia; thirdly, Western aid agencies need to promote Georgiaís needs rather than donorsí needs; and, fourthly, an emphasis on results rather than, again, donorsí institutional goals. Finally,

what I would like to see would be a program to rebuild Georgiaís schools

and to launch civil rights education from a very early age.

Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Jones, thank you very much for your testimony, and

there seems to be some overlap in terms of concern and where part of

the focus ought to be. The Bishop earlier had mentioned the importance

of school and teacher institution training, which was your last point in

terms of civil and human rights training at the school level.

So I do thank you all for your testimony. It has been very helpful and

enlightening. I do have a couple of questions.
30

Bishop Songulashvili, you mentioned that we have focused much of

this hearing on government and what we can getóor the efforts to prod

and to admonish the Government of Georgia to be more proactive and

more results oriented. You know, it is one thing for President

Shevardnadze to make a good statement. It is quite another thing to

translate that into an actual concrete plan of action to end this horrific

harassment and persecution of people of faith.

I noted, Bishop, in your statement, you said, ìI, as a Baptist clergyman, declare that religious persecution and discrimination carried out

in the name of Orthodoxy has nothing to do with the true Orthodoxy,

which is a part of the worldwide Body of Christ.î I, too, am a believer,

and I am a Catholic, Roman Catholic, and I am outraged when anyoneís

faith is attacked, especially when it is attacked in the name of faith.

I noted with great sadness the statement made on February 10 of this

year by Metropolitan Atanase, when he said, talking about our friends

in the Jehovahís Witness belief:

We do not want a peaceful way. We want war. No peaceful

way will help them. They are a crazy sect. Mkalavishvili is

acting bravely. I have much esteem for his priesthood. We do

not expel him. Do I expel him? I am a very important person in

Georgia. I do not expel him. No sect, neither Jehovahís, neither Baptists, neither Sectarians, neither Anglicans, neither

Protestants, neither Pentecostalsówe do not want any sect.

We are a nation of Orthodox chalcedonic faith.

A crazy man spoke about him, says Mkalavishvili, is it from

Liberty or whatÖ help me. Somebody crazy from Liberty Institute that tells him, ëyou break our computers and the other

things.í It is not only the computers that you have to break.

They should be shot. If it were the old times, I would have

them put in a dungeon.

There can be no tolerance. Neither can there be ideological

calmness. We must carry on warfare. We must annihilate them.

Thatís the end. I wanted you to come so I could say these things

to you.

All this was said on public television. These statements are the ravings of the lunatic fringe, and when we can juxtapose that to His Holiness, Ilya II, who said that persecution on religious grounds is totally

alien to our way of life and traditions.

My question, frankly, is how does someone who has the rank and

continues to have that rank, Metropolitan, in good standing, make these

kinds of statements that are absolutely filled with hate? These are the

kinds of things you would expect from the Nazis and from others who

waged war against believers, and yet he seems to have some following.

I wonder if you might want to comment on this.

I mean, if he would likeóand I would issue an invitation to come and

testify, I am sure we would have every member of this Commission

here to take him to task for that kind of hate speech that incites others

to acts of barbarism and terrorism. How is this reconciled? Why does

he remain in the church in good standing? It baffles me.

Bishop SONGULASHVILI. I have to answer, Mr. Chairman, with great

sadness that Metropolitan Atanase does express feeling of most clergy.

Mr. SMITH. Did you say most?
31

Bishop SONGULASHVILI. Yes. I did maintain in my address that what

is being done in Georgia has nothing to do with true Orthodoxy. The

problem with the Georgian Orthodox Church is that the churchóthe

clergy has no opportunity to train the clergy. Most of the clergy have

very little, if any, theological education. Therefore, they do not have

wide understanding of Body of Christ.

The Orthodox Church belongs to the wideóChristendom. This lack

of educationóI think this is a key wordólack of education, not only for

clergy, but wider society as well, is a main problem for religious violence and economic situation and problems we are facing now in Georgia.

I wish there was an easier way to educate them and integrate them

into wider Christian body. But I am afraid it is going to take some time

and patience from this side of the world community and different

churches until the Orthodox Church gets rid of narrow understanding

of Christianity and its role in the culture of Georgia.

Mr. SMITH. What can be done by the government, though, to end this

kind of hatemongering speech, which incites people to take mob action

against Jehovahís Witnesses and others? Would a new law, the law

that is under considerationóis that part of the solution, or does that

exacerbate the problem? Why canít a government that has, as one of

our witnesses saidóMr. Jones, I believeóProfessor Jones, I think you

said itóyou knowóShevardnadze concentrated his power. He does have

power. He has significant power. Why canít he use it more effectively to

end this kind of hatemongering?

Bishop SONGULASHVILI. Well, this is a very good question. Why the

government doesnítóit is very hard to tell, because it should not be

difficult, especially in the beginning of these atrocities, to put this chap

or other people following him into jail. But the government did not react

adequately, did not react in time, so it allowed this group of people to

grow and find more followers.

In this society, where the economy is down, where there is poverty,

there is hunger, it is very easy to appeal to feelings of people, appealing

to fight against religious minorities and looking at them as scapegoats

for all the bad things and all the atrocities happening in the country.

Mr. SMITH. Let me askówould anybody like to comment?

Dr. NODIA. That is, of course, the main question, maybe, why the

government does not do anything. So the issue that Shevardnadze has

poweróit depends on how you interpret it. Shevardnadze has been successful in others not having power. But it does not mean necessarily

that he has effective power in the way to design and implement policies.

His power is based on balancing different power centers against each

other, so that he has the power of the arbiter, the role of the arbiter. But

he is not so effective in implementing policies.

So when you speak in private with different government ministers,

who may be personally very much appalled also by what is happening,

their explanation is that there is quite strong public support of some

large part of the public for religious violence, or at least there is the

support of the idea that religious groups, especially so-called new sectarian groups, should be restricted. Until the government does it, until

then, such kinds of violence is justified or has some kind of excuse.

Unfortunately, this kind of view is quite popular.
32

So the government would say, maybe not in public, but in private,

that they are afraid that if they really do something against these groups,

then that will cause some kind of backlash, which they are afraid of. So

I think this inaction in the issue of religious minorities is just one instance of governmentís general indecision and ineptness in addressing

many other issues. Their strategy somehow when there is some conflict

situation or potential conflicts on how to avoid itóto calm it down and

so on.

Of course, there is also another that some civil society activists share;

that the government is really interested in religious tensions developing, because it somehow takes attention away from the social and economic conditions and difficulties Professor Jones has mentioned. This

problem with electricity and shortage of electricity has led to large scale

public turmoil, really, and the government is very much afraid that if

these socially-based protests develop and are somehow led by some politicians, that may lead to some very unfortunate developments for themselves.

So they may have some interest in shifting the public attention toward other issues that are not so threatening to them, personally. I do

not think that there is a very specific strategy of the government to do

this, but maybe instinctively, also, this motivation also plays some role.

Mr. SMITH. Should we be doingóProfesseor Jones? I am sorry.

Prof. JONES. Could I very quickly comment on what Dr. Nodia said?

I am not sure whether it is entirely the question of power. I do think

that Shevardnadze has the power, but I think that the way that

Shevardnadze deals with issues is different from, for example, the way

he dealt with them from í92 to í96, í97.

I think that Shevardnadze is no longer interested in taking the sorts

of risks that he was capable of doing before. So maybe power is not the

word. Maybe it is the willingness to take risks or even courage to take

political risks, and that is the way I would look at it rather than an

absence of power.

Mr. SMITH. You know, Ambassador Mikeladze, in his statement, made

a very strong statementóI do not recall if he read it in its entirety, but

it is in his written statementóquoting President Shevardnadze, saying

all acts of harassment and physical violence will be prosecuted, and the

perpetrators will be held accountable before the law. He pointed out

that there has been this long-standing traditionóand I would ask you

to comment on that as wellóof religious tolerance in Georgia, and he

said until recently, there were no signs of religious intolerance in Georgia.

Is that accurate? Again, President Shevardnadze, as he says in his

statement, is stating that he will prosecute the perpetrators before the

law.

Yes, Bishop?

Bishop SONGULASHVILI. Unfortunately, we have become witnesses

of religious intolerance and violence recently. A Russian-speaking Pentecostal congregation was attacked recently several times, this time

not by the followers of [inaudible.] and others, but representatives of the

(OFF-MIKE) Orthodox Church.

A couple of weeks ago, the bishop of a Catholic Church in Georgia was

also attacked along with his clergy physically, and again, it was not

done by the representatives of the breakaway group from the Orthodox

Church, by the defrocked clergymen, but rather representatives of one
33

of the Eastern Georgian Orthodox parishes belonging to the (OFF-MIKE)

Orthodox Church. I am regretfully recording these recent developments,

recent violence and attacks, on religious minorities.

Mr. SMITH. One thing that I heard a moment ago was how there

might be a backlash if bold and effective action were to be taken. Those

same kinds of statements were made, particularly in the southern part

of the United States, when efforts were being made by Martin Luther

King, Jr. and others to bring civil rights and to get rid of the segregation laws that were two-tiered and very unfair and prejudicial.

But the backing of the military and the backing of sufficient law

enforcement to say there is a standard, and it will be followed, and if

arrests need to be made, they will be madeóand that did break the

back of the segregationists. Law coupled with proper enforcementóit

seems that in their statements, whether it be by the Parliament or by

the President, they have got it right in terms of rhetoric.

Mr. SMITH. Now, it seems to me that if you break the hatemongers

and break the leadership, the masses that are easily aroused to violence

will be without a leader, like chopping off the head of a snake, the rest

of it is of no useóthey will dissipate, I would respectfully submit. I

would hope that more boldness rather than less would be emanating

from Tbilisi and from the Shevardnadze government, because this will

become an increasing, not a lessening, impediment to a closer U.S.-

Georgian relationship.

We plan, in this Commission, as we have in the pastówe plan to

accelerate our focus on this, I can assure you. You have bravely come to

this hearing. You have bravely spoken out, and we plan on doing whatever we can in every forum possible. Perhaps it means linking aid to

Georgia, as you pointed out, Professor Jones, $700 million in aid since

1995óyou know, perhaps it is time to start looking for some linkages to

an ending of this religious persecution, and I think we need to proceed

on that track.

We planóit will not be seven years before the next hearing. Itíll be

less than 7 months. We hope within about 6 months or so to convene

another hearing, and if some of the antagonistsóif the Metropolitan

himself wants to come and testify, he is welcome to give an account for

his hatemongering among the people of Georgia, and we would look

forward to hearing him and, frankly, grilling him on that kind of hate

speech and hate actions.

Would any of you like to add anything before we conclude this hearing?

If not, I would like to thank you again for coming forward. We look

forward to working with you, and our only hope here is to try to promote human rights, democracy, and to protect the sovereignty of Georgia, as we spoke about earlier, from any forays by the Russians. I do

want to thank you, and we appreciate your testimony.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:37 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
34

APPENDICES

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

HON. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

We convene todayís hearing as developments in the Republic of Georgia appear almost on a daily basis in our newspapers. Given the involvement of scores of Coloradans in the U.S.- sponsored train and equip

program, I am particularly concerned over threats to the sovereignty

and independence of Georgia that could impact U.S. forces deployed in

that country.

As Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I am concerned over a myriad of problems that plague Georgia a

decade after restoration of its independence. This year also marks 10

years of Georgiaís participation in the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

In the human dimension, I am especially concerned about the ongoing campaign of violence against Jehovahís Witnesses and members of

other minority faiths. The leadership of the Helsinki Commission and

other members of the Senate and House have been in correspondence

with President Shevardnadze about this disturbing pattern of attacks.

The Georgian President has assured us that the problem will be appropriately addressed and the perpetrators arrested. So far, however, the

culprits remain at liberty. I hope that growing international attention

to this issue will have the desired effect of quelling mob violence. Whatever difficulties might ensue from the arrest, indictment and sentencing of these criminals, allowing them to continue targeting innocent

believers of another confession is an even greater threat to Georgian

democracy and, indeed, stability.

Precisely that stability, I fear, is at risk from outside the country as

well. In the security dimension, we have heard the recent saber-rattling from Moscow with alarm; Russian planes have already bombed

Georgian territory, killing Georgian civilians. Meanwhile, the Russian

Federation continues to maintain military bases on Georgian territory.

Any unilateral Russian military action on Georgian territory, which

Russian generals constantly threaten, would cause a crisis not only in

Russo-Georgian relations but would greatly complicate ties between

Moscow and Washington.

In this regard, let there be no mistake concerning our strong support

for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. The OSCE, which

has significantly increased its presence on the ground in Georgia, can

play a valuable role in addressing the current crisis as well as

longstanding conflicts that pose a threat to an independent Georgia.
35

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CO-CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Ladies and Gentlemen, welcome to this Helsinki Commission hearing on democracy, human rights and security in Georgia. Much has

happened since 1993, the last time we examined the situation there. On

the positive side, a great deal of progress has been made. There are

hundreds, if not thousands, of NGOs, scores of political parties, a parliament that has actually developed a role as a legislature, and some

feisty, hard-hitting media outlets, especially Rustavi-2 Television. These

developments give us cause to hope, reason to take pride in the people of

Georgia and are indicative of the grounds for continuing U.S.-Georgian

relations.

Nevertheless, in the last few years much of the optimism about

Georgiaís future has dissipated. Last year, a Georgian official devoted a

large part of his public address in Washington to refuting the notion ñ

which was being discussed at the time ñ that Georgia is a ìfailed state.î

I reject that characterization. But todayís hearing is a good opportunity

to discuss the serious problems Georgia does face.

Preeminent among them is systemic, rampant corruption, which has

impeded economic reforms and sickened the body politic. Despite lectures from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the

U.S. Government, Georgiaís Government has proved incapable or unwilling to do what is necessary to stamp out this evil ñ even though

President Shevardnadze himself has called corruption a threat to

Georgiaís security.

There are also grounds for concern about democratization. The last

few elections have clearly not met OSCE standards, which makes us

worry about the important parliamentary election scheduled for 2003.

And the 2005 presidential election will usher in the post-Shevardnadze

era in Georgia, with all the attendant uncertainties. Meanwhile, the

media and NGOs have been under severe pressure. Last fall, a foolish

ploy by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to intimidate Rustavi-2 Television backfired, resulting instead in the fall of the government. While

societyís response was heartening ñ thousands of people came out into

the streets to defend the station ñ the attempt to silence one of the

countryís most popular media outlets indicated that some Georgian officials are still mired in Soviet patterns of thinking.

I am especially concerned and appalled by the ongoing religious violence in Georgia. Since 1999, there has been a campaign of assaults

against members of minority faiths, especially Jehovahís Witnesses,

which Georgian authorities have tolerated. Occasionally, policemen have

even participated in attacks on defenseless men, women and children

who have congregated for the purpose of worship. Attempts to bring the

perpetrators to justice have foundered, as throngs of fanatics hijack the

trial proceedings. If such travesties are allowed to continue, the countryís

entire judicial system is at risk of falling victim to mob rule.

Though Jehovahís Witnesses have borne the brunt of this savagery,

other religious minorities have suffered as well, including Baptists,

Pentecostals and Catholics. Earlier this year, for example, a mob invaded a Baptist warehouse, threw the religious literature outside and

burnt it. How awful to think that events in Georgia today remind us of

Germany in the 1930s.
36

Georgians have a long tradition of religious tolerance, of which they

are rightly proud. It is all the more puzzling, therefore, why religiouslybased violence has erupted and continued only in Georgia, of all the

post-Soviet states. There may be many explanations for this peculiar

phenomenon but there can be no excuse for state toleration of such

barbarity. It must end, and it must end now.

In this connection, I would like to single out another point of concern.

President Shevardnadze, in his response to our letter last May about

religious violence, mentioned the anticipated passage of a law on religion as evidence of government responsiveness. However, a law on religion is not the answer to ending the violence, as current criminal law is

sufficient, if the authorities will only apply it. Also, drafts of the religion

law currently circulating in the Georgian Parliament are problematic

in light of Georgiaís OSCE commitments, as they would create intrusive bureaucratic hurdles for minority groups to overcome, thereby constructing avenues for the government to ban unpopular religious communities. The answer to the violence is not regulation of the persecuted

groups through a new law, but enforcement of current criminal statutes. Consequently, we will carefully follow the legislative process, and

if a religion law is eventually adopted, it should meet all OSCE standards on religious freedom.

Turning now to another issue, I have been watching with growing

alarm Moscowís campaign of intimidation against Georgia. Russia has

been leaning on pro-Western, strategically-located Georgia for years,

but the temperature has in the last few weeks approached the boiling

point. President Putinís request for United Nations backing for Russian military action against Georgia was not any less objectionable for

having been anticipated.

Georgian parliamentarians on September 12 unanimously approved

an appeal to the United Nations, the OSCE, the European Union, the

Council of Europe, and NATO for protection from anticipated Russian

military aggression. Georgian lawmakers should know that their American colleagues have heard their appeal and stand with them. While we

are cooperating with Russia in the war against terrorism, we have in

no way given Moscow leave to attack Georgia, nor will we do so.

The United States is now more than ever directly engaged in the

Caucasus and is stepping up military cooperation with the regionís governments, especially Georgia. This hearing offers a timely opportunity

to examine Georgiaís prospects for democratization, its security situation and how Washington can help advance democracy, human rights

and economic liberty in Georgia while leading the battle against international terrorism and defending Georgiaís sovereignty.

To discuss these issues, we have assembled an international group of

experts. In addition, before our panelists speak, we will show a brief

video prepared by the Jehovahís Witnesses that highlights the cruel

brutality of the ongoing mob attacks.
37

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

HON. STENY H. HOYER, RANKING MEMBER,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Mr. Co-Chairman, I visited Georgia in September 1991 with a Congressional Delegation and I am sure that nobody who took part in that

trip will ever forget it. I applaud your holding these hearings on a country about which we have been reading a lot lately. Unfortunately, the

coverage has focused on serious domestic and foreign problems. To begin with the former, The New York Times and the Christian Science

Monitor published troubling articles on the ongoing violence against

religious minorities and NGOs, whereas the Washington Post recently

reported on President Shevardnadzeís slipping position in the country.

Politicians, of course, come and goóeven those such as Eduard

Shevardnadze, who has played an indisputably important role in recent

history. But Georgia is more than one politician-statesman and that is

why we are so concerned about the overall trends. Whether in regard to

elections, corruption, abductions, conflict resolution and general stability, Georgia often seems on the wrong trackósometimes, in fact, Georgia seems to be headed off the tracks entirely.

Surely President Shevardnadze, who well understands the value of

an international reputation, sees the harm done to Georgiaís image and

position by the continuing campaign of violence against religious minorities. It is frankly mystifying to me why the assaults continue. Is

Georgiaís Government incapable of acting against hooligans who attack

defenseless members of another faith? Or even worse, is Georgiaís Government unwilling to protect all its citizens, as Georgiaís law and OSCE

commitments demand?

The other subject that has drawn much attention is the alleged presence of terrorists in Georgiaís Pankisi Gorge, both al-Qaeda and Chechen

fighters fleeing from Russia. Russian generals and President Putin have

offered assistance in hunting them down, and have insisted on participating in the effort, claiming that Georgia cannot manage on its own.

While Georgia surely has a way to go in developing modern, well-equipped

military forces, any Russian incursion into Georgia would only worsen

the situation and possibly destabilize the entire region.

In this connection, I would like to observe that in the context of the

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the U.S. Delegation has tried to help

Georgia cope with Russian attempts at intimidation. Most recently, at

the Annual Meeting in July in Berlin, we supported the Georgiansí effort to include the Abkhazia issue on the agenda as a ìquestion of urgency.î

In conclusion, we have real concerns about domestic issues in Georgia. As friends of Georgia, we are obligated to raise these issues with

Tbilisi in a spirit of constructive criticism.

Nevertheless, let there be no misunderstanding. When it comes to

Georgiaís sovereignty and territorial integrity, there is no more ardent

supporter than the United States. That has been the case for the last

ten years and it will be the case in the future as well.
38

 PREPARED STATEMENT OF

HON. JOSEPH R. PITTS, COMMISSIONER,

 COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this timely hearing on The

Republic of Georgia: Democracy, Human Rights and Security. It is vital that throughout the world, as we focus on our war against terrorism, that we as a government and nation do not ignore human rights

violations for reasons of expediency or cooperation. In a number of nations, governments believe that they can now, because of their cooperation on terrorism issues, violate fundamental rights with impunity.

Unfortunately, in Georgia, there are officials both there and in Russia who have used the war on terrorism as an excuse to violate the

rights of the people. Corruption issues make it difficult to crack down

on those responsible for the criminal activity.

One issue of particular concern is the attacks on religious minorities.

In July of this year, six people were injured in an attack on the Liberty

Institute, an organization that works to promote freedom of conscience

for all people in Georgia. Reports reveal that the attack was not a random act of crime but was a deliberate attempt at intimidation. There

are indications that the dominant religious group in the country desires that other religious groups have no room to operate or practice

their faith. In addition, the government proposed draft legislation that

some groups feared could severely limit their freedom of speech as well

as their ability to practice the relief and social work aspect of their

faith. These concerns, and many others, must be addressed thoroughly,

effectively, and appropriately by the Government of Georgia.

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses, particularly regarding their recommendations for how the U.S. government

can best assist the people of Georgia as they seek to live in peace and

freedom.
39

 PREPARED STATEMENT OF

HON. GORDON H. SMITH, COMMISSIONER,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

How long will the Government of Georgia allow the ugliness of unrestrained mob violence to continue? For three long years, non-Georgian

Orthodox religious communities have suffered needlessly. Police continue to fail in their fundamental duty of protecting individuals from

violence. Efforts by Congress, the State Department, the Council of

Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to

move the Georgian Government to end the cycle of religious-based violence have not seen real success. While President Eduard Shevardnadze

repeatedly makes statements and proclamations condemning the religious violence, more than rhetoric is needed.

One of the most recent attacks against Jehovahís Witnesses took place

in the town of Kaspi. As we have seen repeated all too often, the followers of defrocked Orthodox priest Vasili Mkalavishvili crashed the convention site of Jehovahís Witnesses. However, some Georgian politicians also chimed in beforehand, making incendiary and bigoted

statements regarding Jehovahís Witnesses. Thugs reportedly arrived

by bus, then ravaged the personal home of the individual hosting the

event. Hooligans burned Bibles, religious pamphlets and the hostís personal belongings in the yard, even filling the baptismal pool with diesel

fuel. Despite explicit communication from the US Embassy in Tbilisi

and other human rights groups, Georgian authorities did nothing to

prevent the attack or to intervene during the rampage. Reportedly, police, including the local police chief, stood and watched.

Of course, while we expect the Georgian Government to conduct a full

investigation that ends with the perpetrators brought to justice, the

outstanding 700 plus criminal complaints stemming from over 100 separate attacks is not encouraging. I understand that the Georgian Government is in a precarious position, and fears the unrest that might

spring forth if the mob leaders and their followers are arrested. However, I believe that average Georgians would welcome the sight of police

officers acting pro-actively. Rule of law is one of the most tangible benefits a government can provide its people.

As an OSCE participating State, the responsibilities of the Georgian

Government toward individuals wishing to practice religion or belief

are clear. The Helsinki Final Act itself declared States must ìrecognize

and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice, alone

or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance

with the dictates of his own conscience.î The 1983 Madrid Concluding

Document speaks to the situation in Georgia. It declares participating

States ìagree to take the action necessary to ensure the freedom of the

individual to profess and practice, alone or in community with others,

religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.î Unfortunately for all Georgians, their government is not upholding its commitments.
40

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

B. LYNN PASCOE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate this opportunity to represent the

administration today to discuss with you and your colleagues our policies in Georgia to promote democracy, protect human rights and enhance that nation's security.

We view these three goals as inter-related. For this reason I would

like to begin my testimony with a brief discussion of Georgia's security

situation, because it has a bearing on its ability to carry out political

and economic reforms.

In a much publicized September 11 statement, President Putin asserted what he claimed was Russia's international right to take unilateral military action against Chechen fighters and other terrorists in

Georgia's Pankisi Gorge if Georgia did not carry out more active measures against these fighters. He followed his statement with a letter to

President Bush, which he copied to the United Nations and world leaders.

The U.S. government immediately responded through public statements and high-level diplomatic channels, stating our unequivocal opposition to any unilateral, military action by Russia inside Georgia. We

repeated our strong support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial

integrity, and our belief that security problems in the Pankisi Gorge

should be addressed by the Georgians themselves.

We believe that this Russian pressure is due, for the most part, to the

presence of armed Chechens and international terrorists on Georgian

territory, Georgia's efforts to avoid entanglement in the Chechen War,

and perhaps because of Russia's displeasure with Georgia's commitment to the East-West energy transportation corridor. Further, we

should not discount the fact that some in Russia viscerally dislike

Shevardnadze. Since July 29, there have been five instances of Russian

cross-border aerial bombardment of Georgia. During the most recent

attack on August 23, which was witnessed by OSCE border monitors

and which we confirmed through our own means, Russian bombs claimed

the life of a Georgian civilian and wounded seven others. We have strongly

urged Georgia to regain control of the Pankisi Gorge where we also

believe there are third-country terrorists who have links to al-Qa'ida.

They threaten Georgia's security and political stability, as well as Russia's

stability. We understand the Russians' concern, but believe this is a

problem for the Georgians to resolve. Thus, the United States is attempting to help Georgia address its internal security problems through

assistance and cooperative programs, including the Georgia Train and

Equip Program (GTEP). The latter is intended to help the Government

of Georgia eliminate terrorists, secure its borders, reassert central control over its territory and deny the use of it to foreign militants and

international terrorists.

GTEP is a four-phase effort, designed to help the Georgians establish

a National Crisis Action Center, to field an operational headquarters,

and to train and equip specific units. The GTEP is on track. Headquarters and staff training began in late May with 120 students receiving

classroom instruction. In early June, additional staff training for the

Land Forces Command (LFC) began and ended with a successful command-post exercise.
41

Earlier this month, U.S. trainers began the program's third phase in

which they are conducting unit-level tactical military training of Ministry of Defense and other security forces. As noted earlier, the intent of

the program is to strengthen Georgia's ability to fight terrorism, control its borders and increase internal security. Georgia is already attempting to do this. In recent weeks, it has deployed Interior Ministry

troops into the Pankisi Gorge to establish check-points and root out

Chechen fighters and criminal and international terrorist elements.

These efforts signal Georgiaís commitment to restoring Georgian authority in the Pankisi Gorge, and dealing seriously with international

terrorists linked to al-Qa'ida. Moscow, however, has dismissed these

efforts as "cosmetic," and asserted its right to unilateral military action

or joint Russian-Georgian military operations in Georgian territory. We

believe Georgia's action represents a serious effort to reassert control in

the Pankisi Gorge.

The United States is encouraging Georgia and Russia to work together to promote regional security within their respective territories

and to find negotiated, political solutions to their many disagreements.

These latter include Russia's periodic cutting off of Georgia's winter gas

supply, Russia's stalling of negotiations on political settlement in the

break-away Georgian region of Abkhazia, and its delaying of negotiations to meet CFE Istanbul commitments for the withdrawal of Russian military forces still on Georgian territory.

Resolution of the conflict in Abkhazia, which has used armed conflict

as a means of seeking independence from Georgia, is of particular importance to us. We are working with the United Nations-sponsored

Friends of Georgia group to move forward on the Abkhazia peace process. We continue to press Russia to persuade the Abkhaz leadership to

accept the Boden Paperóa proposal supported by all the Friends and by

the Security Councilóas a basis for political negotiations.

Despite its security problems, Georgia is a potential leader in political and economic reform in the region. It has created a strong framework of legal reform and institutional structures. Georgiaís laws are

among the region's most compliant with Council of Europe (COE) and

World Trade Organization (WTO) norms. With our assistance and encouragement, Georgia has made significant progress in passing democratic reform-oriented legislation, although its implementation has been

slower than we have wished. Corruption continues to be a primary obstacle to economic reforms and development. Georgia also still has serious human rights problems, especially police misconduct, torture and

pre-trial detention, and harassment of non-traditional religious groups.

More positively, despite these ongoing problems, Georgia has a free

press. We are concerned, however, that the murder of independent journalist Sinaya has not yet been solved. Also, it is essential that next

yearís parliamentary elections meet OSCE standards, and we are discussing with Georgian officials how to ensure a free and fair election.

Georgia's tradition of religious tolerance has been severely challenged

by an increasing number of attacks by Georgian Orthodox extremists

against human rights advocates as well as against Protestants and

non-traditional religious groups, especially Jehovah's Witnesses. Mr.

Chairman, we are deeply concerned about these acts. In public statements and in the State Department's annual reports on human rights

and religious freedom, we have deplored such attacks. The Secretary of

State, Deputy Secretary Armitage, and our Ambassador in Tbilisi are
42

forcefully pressing the Government of Georgia to take effective measures to punish those who perpetrate such acts and to promote respect

for human rights and freedom of religion. We have stressed to President Shevardnadze and his government again and again that poor

records on human rights and freedom of religion not only undermine

Georgia's efforts at economic and democratic reform, but will also negatively affect our assistance if such problems are not addressed.

Let me say in this latter regard, that we have devoted a large portion

of our FREEDOM Support Act budget for Georgia, which totals $89.6

million in FY-02, to fund activities that directly promote the building of

democratic institutions and practices in Georgia. For example, the Departments of State and Justice are sponsoring anti-crime training and

a technical assistance program that funds a Justice Department Legal

Advisor in Tbilisi. Through this office, the Department of Justice has

carried out training for Georgian prosecutors, investigators, judges,

members of parliament, and policy makers on various law enforcement

and related subjects, including transnational crime, money laundering, public corruption, criminal procedures, excessive force/human rights

violations and interrogation techniques. Through the American Bar

Association's Central and East European Law Initiative, the U.S. Government has provided significant resources to support human rights

through legal clinics and legal service organizations.

We are carrying out programs this year in Georgia for activities that

combat the trafficking of persons, a growing problem throughout this

region. Other initiatives promote leadership programs that seek to empower Georgian women in areas such as civic activism, community

development, public health and education. As part of its democratic

reform efforts, the U.S. Agency for International Development supported

the drafting of Georgia's first Unified Electoral Code, which was signed

into law in August 2001. This code was first implemented during recent

parliamentary by-elections. As a result, international observers and

domestic monitors alike noted improved election administration.

The United States is also providing local government officials with

training in financial management, constituent outreach, service delivery and budget training skills to maximize the limited resources available to local governments in Georgia. We are also focussing programs

that have as their goal creating a strong, active citizenry that is able to

hold government officials accountable for government services. Our

Democracy Commission program has provided small grants to help establish neighborhood committees of residents to monitor and ensure

transparency in government. Other FREEDOM Support Act grants

underwrite the development of independent print and broadcast media

throughout Georgia.

Through our educational and other exchange programs we send every year a growing number of talented young Georgians to the United

States. We see this as a crucial investment in the creation of a new

generation of western-trained Georgians who will be the future leaders

of their country.

The United States is helping Georgia integrate into a wider community of nations based on a commitment to democratization, the rule of

law, market economies and an adherence to the Helsinki final acts and

other OSCE documents of which Georgia is a signatory.
43

As I have noted during this presentation, Georgia has serious security problems and also must improve its record in areas including human rights, religious tolerance, and economic and political reform. That

is our message of tough love, and we send that message because our

bilateral relationship is a strong and close one. Sustaining these relations requires continued progress in all these areas. We have particularly appreciated Georgia's support as a partner of the United States

and other coalition members in the global war against terrorism.

We certainly recognize the challenges ahead as we work to help Georgia through the process of political and economic reform and development. But Georgia's importance to the West cannot be overstated. Georgia is a fulcrum for east-west energy pipelines, which will include

significant U.S. private-sector involvement. Standing as it does at the

historic crossroads among regional powers including Russia, Iran and

Turkey, a stable and democratic Georgia will have geo-strategic importance for our international relations far into the future.

Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer any questions that you

and other members of the Commission have.
44

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

HIS EXCELLENCY LEVAN MIKELADZE,

AMBASSADOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA

TO THE UNITED STATES

Allow me to begin by extending my personal and my Governmentís

gratitude to you Mr. Chairman and the Commission on Security and

Cooperation in Europe for inviting me to this meeting which, on the one

hand, speaks on the growing interest to my country and the whole region, but also, coincides with the deteriorated security conditions caused

by the aggressive and threatening actions of the Russian Federation

towards Georgia. Based on the problems described in your letter, Mr.

Chairman, I will first elaborate on the state of affairs in the field of

democratic institutions and human rights. The protection of human

rights is one of the key priorities of Georgia. A series of measures have

been implemented to provide the human rights protection. After the

adoption of the Constitution of Georgia new legislation has been created

which is in line with international law. The Constitutional Court, which

plays significant role in the implementation of constitutional guarantees of human rights, was established. The Office of Public Defender of

Georgia has performed serious activities. Georgia became a full member of the Council of Europe, ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and other important instruments in the field of human

rights protection. Judicial reform has been implemented; NGOs are

active and the media seriously participate in political life of the State.

In my view, and this is not only my view, since it has been shared by a

number of western experts, among the former Soviet republics, and

especially among the CIS countries, Georgia has been one of the leading

countries in protecting human rights. Georgia is to be given recognition for its achievements in the democratization of the political, social

and economic aspects of its development. Georgiaís commitment to a

free press and respect of political rights have been remarkable in a

region of the world not yet known for ensuring respect of basic human

rights to their full extent. That is why in diplomatic circles expectations for Georgia are so high. At the same time, it has to be mentioned

that serious difficulties still exist in the protection of human rights.

The particular matter of concern is the growth of the number of facts

relating to religious intolerance, so far there is a lot of complaints on

the violations of constitutional human rights. We fully recognize the

existing problems in this area and all these cases are publicly discussed

in the Parliament, Government and media. Local Elections.

In the light of upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections,

the local elections were viewed by the majority of the political parties as

some sort of warm up before the ìbiggerî elections. According to the

preliminary data available, the two parties in opposition have taken

leading positions in the local elections 2002. These are the ìLabor

(Shromis) Party of Georgiaî (Sh. Natelashvili) and the ìNational Movement-Democratic Frontî (M. Saakashvili). The next places have been

won by ìThe New Rightsî, so-called ìEntrepreneursî, the Christian

Conservative Party (Z. Zhvania), etc. Unfortunately, in Tbilisi, Rustavi,

Zugdidi and Khashuri many incidents occurred that resulted in violations of electoral procedure. The Central Electoral Commission declared

elections, which had been held there, null and void and appointed a date

to hold new voting. On 4 June the Central Electoral Commission issued

an ordinance #82/2002, which was supported by a vast majority of its
45

members (14 vs. 4), to re-count electoral bulletins in order to ìclarify

final results of the electionsî held in Tbilisi. This procedure is underway.

ATTACK ON THE NGO ìLIBERTY INSTITUTEî

Immediately following this intolerable accident the President of Georgia issued Ordinance #982 (12 July 2002) entitled ìOn attacks committed against members of the Liberty Institute.î This normative act instituted the criminal proceedings and tasked the appropriate

law-enforcement agencies, particularly the Ministry of Interior and the

Prosecutor Generalís Office of Georgia to ensure immediate and qualified investigation of the fact in question, exploit every legal means available in order to timely disclose the crime and establish perpetrators,

and keep society periodically informed regarding the course of the investigation and its results. In conformity with its domestic legislation

and international treaties to which it is a State party, Georgia has assumed an obligation to protect the right to freedom of expression. Georgia has acceded to the ICCPR and ECHR, which protect the right of

freedom of expression, according to their articles 19 and 10, respectively. In particular, this right includes the right to criticize elected

representatives and public servants, who should tolerate a greater degree of criticism than ordinary citizens, as established by the case law

of the European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, the Constitution of

Georgia (Article 19) also protects the right to freedom of expression;

provisions contained in the article under review are fully in line with

widely recognized norms and principles of international law. The Government of Georgia has already taken certain legal and practical steps

to hold individuals who committed this crime accountable before the

law. Respective bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been investigating the criminal case linked to the attack on the Liberty Institute. A suspect has already been apprehended and the investigative

agencies are working now to collect evidence to establish his guilt or

innocence. We shall inform all interested institutions in due course concerning results of the ongoing investigation. The Government of Georgia is going to continue to strengthen its efforts to protect free speech.

RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE: MANIFESTATIONS AND MEASURES

TO OVERCOME IT

BACKGROUND

Until recently there were no signs of religious intolerance in Georgia.

On the contrary, for centuries in the capital of Georgia temples of different religions coexist peacefully, in the vicinity of each other. Not only

Orthodox believers live in Georgia. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims,

followers of Armenian Church, Catholics, and Israelites permanently

reside in our country and neither Orthodox believers, nor the Georgian

state have ever had instances of intolerance. Some problems have recently arisen relating to certain non-traditional religious groups. This

is a rather new phenomenon for our country, and some things in this

respect proved to be unexpected. It is obvious now that the activities in

question have become unacceptable for a significant part of Georgian

society. We have uncovered a series of unpleasant incidents, which are

linked closely to religious motives. In order to explain the origins of
46

intolerance directed against religious minority groups, let me describe

some recent events. For ages the Georgian Orthodox Church has played

specific role in the preservation of our countryís statehood and the Georgian nation itself. This role is reflected in the Constitution of our country. (NB. The Constitution of Georgia (Article 9) states that the State

recognizes the special role of the Georgian Orthodox Church in the history of Georgia, but simultaneously declares complete freedom of religious belief and confessions and the independence of the Church from

the State.) That is why the public feels very strongly about keeping the

Georgian Orthodox Church as a keystone of the independent Georgian

state, an instrument to protect its historical and cultural heritage and

traditions. As a result, certain part of our society expresses its disapproval of the activities of non-traditional religious groups, because, in

their opinion, these groups are seeking to undermine the foundations of

our state. Obviously, such an approach is erroneous. We need to change

this mentality, and we are sure this is only a matter of time. In our

opinion, this is the most important prerequisite to put an end to religion-based extremism, in order to restore the traditions of tolerance for

which the West is rightly famous. We will ensure that the activities of

various religious groups, including both traditional and non-traditional

ones, are legally regulated by passing a specific law. Steps made in this

regard are being discussed below.

THE PRESIDENTíS APPROACH

When talking about the current situation, we would like to quote

first the President of Georgia to emphasize his attitude toward religious

tolerance: ìI must say that the issue of religious minorities has been

the focus of serious concern among our people and the government.

Respect for all religious faiths has always been an inseparable part of

Georgiaís historical heritage. /Ö/Yet in the process of building a new

democratic society, Georgia has encountered problems involving the

members of minority faiths. The relations with Jehovahís Witnesses

have become particularly complicated. /Ö/ In Georgia, I regret to say,

the strong sentiments of some groups against Jehovahís Witnesses have

on several occasions sparked violent confrontations. Particularly outrageous manifestations of such hostile behavior were the assaults by the

defrocked Orthodox priest and his followers on the Jehovahís Witnesses.

I strongly condemned this act and called for the punishment of the

perpetrators to the fullest extent of the law. /Ö/ All acts of harassment

and physical violence will be prosecuted and the perpetrators will be

held accountable before the law.î

The Georgian Orthodox Church has made a public statement qualifying the acts of violence against Jehovahís Witnesses as an attempt to

discredit the Orthodox Church. In seeking solution to these problems,

the Government is currently considering urgent steps to guarantee the

equality and freedom of all religions before the law. Promotion of interfaith dialogue has been widely discussed at Government meetings as

well as at the committee hearings of the Parliament. Intensive work is

underway on drafting the Law on Religion.

Recently, in his letter to the Members of the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the President of Georgia has reiterated

his attitudes in this respect: ìI strongly condemn any form of religious

extremism and religion-based violence. They are absolutely inadmissible and should not go unpunished in any society that calls itself demo-
47

cratic, let alone civilized. Georgia has always been a tolerant country

and it is imperative that this tradition must be continued in the future.

I am fully aware that no valid arguments can be advanced to justify

acts of violence committed against religious minorities. Any act of this

kind is a crime under Georgiaís criminal legislation and persons committing them ought to be held responsible. The same is true of law

enforcement officials who refuse to perform their duties and look on as

angry crowds resort to violence. Let me assure you that I am fully

determined to eliminate any further manifestations of religious extremism. As a matter of fact some appropriate steps have been taken to

properly investigate all cases, bring perpetrators to justice and punish

them in accordance with the existing law.î On 16 January 2002 the

President of Georgia issued Ordinance entitled ìOn Measures to be

Implemented in Connection with the Public Defenderís Six-Month report 2001.î According to this document, the Ministry of Justice of Georgia was tasked with elaborating a draft law on the freedom of conscious

and religious organizations, in compliance with international obligations of our country in the field of human rights.

STEPS TAKEN BY THE PARLIAMENT

On March 30, 2001 the Parliament of Georgia adopted its Resolution

on manifestations of religious extremism. I quote: ìThe Parliament of

Georgia resolves:

- The law enforcement bodies of Georgia should act in full conformity with the Constitution of Georgia and eliminate any manifestations of religious extremism;

- The Public Defender of Georgia should pay particular attention to

the manifestations of religion-based crimes and make sure that

the religious freedoms of Georgian citizens guaranteed by the Constitution of Georgia, are protected;

- The Parliamentary Committees on the Rule of Law and Administrative Reforms, on Human Rights and Petitions, on Civil Society

Building and Integration should elaborate appropriate legislative

proposals to regulate the activities of various religious groups;

- The Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and Petitions

and the Committee on Civil Society Building and Integration are

responsible to report, on a regular basis, on the implementation

of this Resolution.î

STEPS TAKEN BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL BODIES

WITH RESPECT TO THE CASES RELATED TO RELIGION-BASED

INTOLERANCE

A series of criminal proceedings were instituted following the facts of

religious extremism that entailed mob violence against representatives

of various religious minorities (not only Jehovahís Witnesses). The Prosecutor-Generalís Office has already investigated these cases, and conclusions to indict have been directed to the court. Unfortunately, the

court trial has not yet resulted in punishing perpetrators. According to

the Prosecutor-Generalís Office of Georgia, the Tbilisi Prosecutorís Office investigated several criminal cases initiated against defrocked priest

B. Mkalavishvili and his accomplices P. Ivanidze and others, and these

persons have been brought to criminal responsibility because of committing the following crimes: beating and battery, coercion, illegal obstruction of performance of religious rites, etc. On 5 October 2001 this
48

criminal case was transferred to the Tbilisi Circuit Court. No decision

has yet been rendered. Nevertheless, some quite unacceptable incidents

of religion-based violence still persist. The most alarming events are

connected with the burning of a great deal of books belonging to the

Baptist community of Georgia, in February 2002. NB. According to the

data provided by the Prosecutor-Generalís Office of Georgia (28.08.2002),

in connection with various offences committed against religious minoritiesí interests, 22 criminal cases were instituted in 2000-2002, along

with 5 more files on analogous inquiries. Out of these cases 3 were

suspended due to failure to disclose them, 7 cases were transferred to

the court based on relevant conclusion to indict, 9 cases were joined

together and preliminary investigation on it is being performed by the

Department of Investigation, Tbilisi Prosecutorís Office. 3 cases are being

investigated by Kaspi and Gori MIA investigative services and the MIA

Department of Investigation, respectively. On May 17, 2002 the President of Georgia issued a special Decree #240 ìOn measures aimed at

strengthening human rights protection in Georgia.î In particular, the

President of Georgia has tasked the Procuracy, the Ministry of Justice

and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia with taking corresponding measures to: ensure the implementation of freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; investigate and submit to the court each act

of violence committed against religious minorities in order to have the

perpetrators punished; train personnel in the field of human rights,

including the matter of inadmissibility of religion-based intolerance. As

you may be aware, in conformity with the principle of separation of

powers, the court is independent in our country. Neither the President

of Georgia, nor other bodies or officials are allowed to influence the judgments it makes in any way. But, in conformity with the Decree of the

President of Georgia, the Council of Justice of Georgia is expected to

attach particular attention to the consideration of court cases related to

violence, torture or degrading treatment against religious minority

groups, so that these cases are tried without any obstacles and undue

delay. We are hopeful that after all these assignments are executed, we

will be in a position to say ñ religion-based intolerance in Georgia has

no future and manifestations of religiously motivated violence no longer

occur. Respect for human rights, recognition of their importance is one

of the criteria that cannot be neglected in Georgia. In our past we could

not even imagine that somebody could enjoy basic human rights and

freedoms. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity and express

my hope that freedom of speech and expression, as well as other civil

and political rights, will not be jeopardized in the future. These freedoms are a result of our long-lasting struggle and we are not going to

give them up.

GEORGIA'S SECURITY AND RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

The great majority of Georgia's domestic and foreign political problems, particularly those related to its security are, with different intensity, linked to our relations with Russia. Interstate relations today have

reached the worst and most dangerous phase in our history.

Georgia is not alone among the post-soviet states. During and after

the breakup of the USSR, Russia had a number of serious problems

with almost all of this states, particularly, with those who made the

establishment of independent statehood their utmost priority.
49

At issue is what does Russia want from the post-soviet states? Or to

change the emphasis, what does Russia not want and will not accept

from them? There is only one answer - Russia does not like and does not

accept the statehood and sovereignty of its former "junior brothers". Of

course this is an oversimplified response. The situation is more complex and intricate. It has a lot of very deep and complex aspects. I am

not in a position to speak on behalf of others, but in the case of Georgia,

the Russian policy towards us is extremely aggressive, hostile and humiliating. These are the facts: 1) Russia has violated sovereign Georgian airspace repeatedly against our warnings to cease. The Bush administration has condemned these violations of our air space. We have

been, in the last two months, bombed half a dozen times. International

observers (including Russians) from the OSCE and the United States

confirmed those violations. The Russian Federation not only brazenly

denies conducting air raids which have resulted in casualties, but it

blames the Georgian side that its aviation has bombed its own citizens.

2) Russia has repeatedly attempted to send and deploy units of paratroopers in the Northern regions of Georgia. Only President

Shevardnadzeís personal involvement in the case and his courageous

visit to these regions resolved the situation; 3) Russia says publicly that

it recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring

Georgia. But its actions tell a different story. Russia has nurtured separatist movements in the northern regions, supports militarily separatists and integrates Abkhazia and South Ossetia into the Russian Federation, unilaterally introducing the visa regime with Georgia and

exempting separatist regions from it. The international community has

condemned these attempts to annex parts of Georgia by Russia. 4) Russia is successfully dragging out peace negotiations on the so called "frozen" conflicts. Russia having the status of facilitator in negotiations on

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is blocking the process of negotiations and

effectively creating obstacles for rapprochement of conflicting parties.

Russia, without any sense of responsibility and discrediting its own role

of mediator, facilitator and peacekeeper, openly supports separatism

outside and fights it inside the Russian Federation. 5) Russia has not

implemented its international commitments made in Istanbul in 1999

regarding the closure and withdrawal of the Russian military bases in

Georgia. Russian military base at Gudauta, Abkhazia plays particularly negative role by backing Abkhaz separatist regime since the beginning of the conflict. One of the key principles of CFE Treaty ñ free

consent of host nation on deployment of foreign troops ñ has been violated. Russia completely ignores all suggestions of the Georgian side to

continue negotiations on the withdrawal of RMBs from Georgia, thus

hampering the ratification process of the adapted CFE Treaty. 6) Russia, as a main gas supplier, has arbitrarily shut off our gas lines, especially in wintertime. Russia has also attempted to gain full control over

the national energy infrastructure, thus undermining independence and

sovereignty. 7) The psychological warfare ñ another favorite tool in

Russiaís arsenal, is underway. All official mechanisms and structures,

including the Parliament and the President are mobilized. Various progovernmental printing media and TV are daily full of misinformation

and false materials on Georgia.

It is well to ask why Russia commits acts of unprovoked aggression

against Georgia. I believe four reasons predominate:
50

ï Georgiaís movement towards the West;

ï Economic projects bypassing Russia in favor of Georgia.

ï Georgiaís demand for the withdrawal of the Russian military bases

and fulfillment of its International commitments;

ï President Shevardnadze's personality

I will abstain from presenting of counter-arguments due to the absurdity of these accusations. From the very beginning of the second Chechen

war, Russia has accused Georgia of sheltering the Chechen terrorists.

Ever since Georgia started its anti-terrorism operation, Georgia has

been accused forcing Chechen terrorists to withdraw to the Russian

territory.

In the statement of September 11, 2002 the President of the Russian

Federation Vladimir Putin gave orders to the ministry of Defense, General Staff and the Federal Services of Security and Boarder Defense of

Russia to prepare and present a plan of a military operation to be carried out in Georgia.

The timing of the above-mentioned action was chosen very carefully.

Mr. Putinís statement came one day prior to President Bush's speech in

New York at the UN General Assembly. Obviously, it was aimed at

gaining a trade-of on Iraq and Georgia with USA.

Here I would like to refer to the statement made on September 20th

by Senator John McCain: ìPresident Putin of Russia has appropriated

American rhetoric in the war against terrorism to justify Russian subversion of the Georgian state. A free Russian hand on Georgia is apparently the price President Putin believes the US is willing to pay for

Russiaís support for military action against Iraq.î

The leadership of the Russian Federation tries to mislead its population and the international community, asserting that it is Georgia that

hampers Russia's fight against terrorism. In fact, it is clear that the

source of terrorism is in the territory of the Russian Federation itself,

which seeks to justify its inability to cope with this problem by putting

responsibility for the failure on the neighboring state. Pro-Western

Georgia with its President serves very well to this aim.

Russia is shaping public opinion to make the world believe that problems existing in Pankisi beget and fuel troubles in Chechnya and elsewhere in southern Russia. It is hard to imagine a clearer example of

confusing the cause and the effect. In reality, problems in Pankisi Gorge

have arisen specifically as a result of the military operation conducted

in Chechnya, during which Russian armed forces could not or would

not keep military actions within the boundaries of Russia and allowed

the spreading of the conflict into the territory of a well disposed, friendly,

sovereign neighboring nation.

Georgia has repeatedly voiced public warnings regarding inadmissibility and danger of a spillover of the conflict into its territory. Relevant

statements were made to all major international organizations. Regrettably however, our appeals never evoked a due response from the Russian side. Moreover, according to the available materials, armed individuals were in fact allowed to enter the territory of Georgia through

the official Russian border checkpoints.

Russia's mass media and public officials have exacerbated the problem by asserting that Georgia is the main supplier of armaments to the

conflict zone; ignoring the fact that the origin of the weapons that

Chechens possess is Russian and are spread out from the Russian military bases. This announcement was made by the country that develops
51

most friendly relations with the states associated with the axis of evil.

It is also worth to mention that for arms dealing with terrorists in

Sudan, Syria and Lebanon the US Government recently has imposed

sanctions on a number of Russian state-owned industries.

Georgia has demanded and achieved the establishment of international control of the Chechen and Ingush segments of the GeorgianRussian State Border. Even Russian experts recognize that Georgian

segment of the Russian State border is better protected compared to

other sectors of the Chechen border. The activities of the OSCE monitoring mission, which includes a number of Russian observers as well,

have clearly demonstrated that there has been no threat to Russia emanating from Georgia. On the other hand, during the same period of

time, OSCE observers have recorded numerous violations of Georgia's

sovereignty by Russian bombers and military helicopters as they attacked adjacent villages, which caused wounds and loss of life among

innocent civilians.

All of the above gives one sufficient ground to think that the issue of

the Pankisi Gorge is artificially sustained in order to pressure Georgia

to damage its international reputation, to provoke destabilization, to

disrupt the implementation of the major economic projects of the Europe-Asia transport corridor and transit of the energy resources from

the Caspian region through Georgia, and to discredit an active member

of the international anti-terrorist coalition, whose positive contribution

to the struggle against terrorism has been noted on many occasions by

the leading nations of the aforementioned coalition. The Russian Federation has not been subjected to armed aggression by Georgia, while

those armed individuals penetrating the territory of Georgia from Russia and then have been moving back, are mostly citizens of the Russian

Federation, who have been methodically "squeezed" out onto the Georgian Territory.

Incidentally, it is worth recalling that some of those who fought in

Chechnya had previously received combat experience in 1992-1993 in

Abkhazia, in the war against Georgia. At the time, many organized

groups of the Chechen fighters led by Basaev, who is currently regarded

by Russia as the chief terrorist, were dispatched to Georgia with the

assistance of the Russian special services. Any protest on the part of the

Georgian Government was inevitably met with a cynical remark that

the Russian authorities did not bear any responsibility for the penetration of "volunteers" from the territory of Russia and that Georgia must

unilaterally provide the security on its borders. Then all this boomeranged to the Chechen conflict against Russia when those fighters turned

their guns against their own patrons.

Today the opposite is asserted regarding the Pankisi Gorge. Repeated

attempts are being made to blame Georgia for its inability to provide

security for Russia on the Chechen Segment of the Georgian-Russian

State Border.

On our part, we have been trying to resolve the conflict by peaceful

means. In his letter to the President of the Russian Federation Mr.

Putin, President Shevardnadze has once more appealed to the leadership of Russia and the President himself to find common ground, to rise

above the existing problems and develop good neighborly relations between our two peoples. We have also indicated readiness to receive an

OSCE group of experts, including representatives of the Russian Federation that will be provided with opportunity to visit any site at any
52

time and will be expected to present a report on the actual situation on

the ground. Yet we are convinced that only with an active support of

the world community of nations will we manage to maintain territorial

integrity and provide security for the Georgian people.

Georgia is open for a real assistance from real friends ñ we welcome

and appreciate the ìTrain & Equipî program ñ proper support by the

USA to prepare Georgian units for fighting against terrorism, drugs

and arms smuggling.

Iíd like also to inform you that the Georgian authorities have launched

a major antiterrorist operation in close cooperation with the US military advisers to root out terrorists from Pankisi. During a very short

period of time the Georgian Armed forces have established full control

over the region and we will have more tangible results shortly. President Shevardnadze has proposed expanding international monitoring to

prevent fighters coming back and finding shelter in Georgia in the future but it needs also Russia's political will to contribute to it.

We are appealing to the entire international community and particularly to the USA with the hope that they will not allow the violation of

the territorial integrity and sovereignty of my country by aggression

from one of the mighty military-political powers of the world.
53

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

 MALKHAZ SONGULASHVILI,

BISHOP, EVANGELICAL BAPTIST UNION OF GEORGIA

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all let me greet all of you on behalf of the Evangelical Baptist

Church of Georgia which is the largest Protestant Church in this Orthodox majority country. Our church was established in Georgia 135

years ago and represents today an indigenous community of 18 000

people. Local congregations and smaller groups of the denomination are

spread all over the country. By culture the Georgian Baptists remain in

many ways Orthodox but by the principles of faith they are Protestants. The Church has always been active in two areas of Christian

ministry. On one hand they are committed to evangelism and education, and on the other hand they are deeply involved in social activities

for the benefit of the poor and destitute, internally displaced people,

refugees, handicapped children, single mothers and street Children.

For 135 years the church suffered a lot of persecution, discrimination, physical and moral harassment. 75 years of communist regime

were particularly difficult. In the beginning of the Soviet regime most

of the male leadership of the Church became martyrs or were exiled to

the Siberia. Due to the faithfulness of the women the church continued

to exist and grow. By the end of the Soviet period the Church gained

considerable strength.

During the communist time the official dialogue between the Orthodox and Evangelical Baptist churches was initiated. Friendship between

the two churches developed to such an extent that there were regular

pulpit exchanges between them. Baptist leaders regularly preached at

the main Orthodox cathedral in Tbilisi. A Baptist choir regularly sung

during the Sunday liturgies. All of this now seems absolutely incredible. With the rise of nationalism a lot of things have changed.

It is already 10 years since Georgia has reemerged as an independent

nation. We gained independence but we still have not reached freedom.

Old values have gone. New values have not come yet. There will be a

very long way to go before we fully appreciate the values of democracy

and freedom, basic human rights and a general sense for dignity of the

human being.

The question of religious liberty has become a matter of political manipulations. It seems that most of the political parties have come to

realize that a pro-Orthodox policy can be very beneficial in their preelection campaign. On the other hand ultra fundamentalist Orthodox

groups are taking their opportunity to increase their war against religious minorities. I have been invited here to bring some clarity about

religious violence in Georgia, to answer some questions. But I am afraid

I have more questions than answers myself.

I do not understand why the fierce religious intolerance crept into the

country of Georgia where religious intolerance was not a big issue in the

past. (In fact religious tolerance used to be a matter of national pride.

Here I can remember a song which used to be very popular during the

eighties: ìIt does not matter where you pray, just be a gentlemanî).

I do not understand why the Orthodox church and Orthodox believers

do not clearly and boldly condemn when sacrilegious actions are carried

out in the name of Orthodoxy, when the heads of non Orthodox people

are shaved in the name of the Most Holy Trinity, in order to humiliate
54

them, when Bibles and other Christian books are burnt publicly with

wild joy, when Catholic, Evangelical Baptist and non Christian clergy

are attacked physically and are publicly maltreated.

I do not understand why the police are almost completely inactive

when people are beaten up for their religious belief, when peopleís properties are violated and belongings stolen just because they belong to a

non Orthodox church or religious group. Very often they say since there

is no law about religion we cannot do anything about religious violence.

What a silly explanation. It is not an absence of religious legislation

which causes religious violence and persecution but rather absence of

culture, justice and general law.

I do not understand why authorities do nothing to put an end to the

violence. The Georgian Constitution does make provision for freedom of

conscience and belief. Why is the Constitution violated by the authorities? Why are the presidential decrees not implemented? Why do not

authorities realize that sidelining of religious minorities is not contributing to the integrity and unity of the country which is not homogeneous neither ethnically nor religiously?

I do not understand why the Georgian mass media is so reluctant to

contribute to the peace and harmony in the society. Why are the criminals, who are spreading moral terror in the society, given so much time on

TV to propagate their obscurant ideas and to stir people up against religious minorities? The same mass media is very reluctant to pay any attention to what is happening in different religious communities. Why do the

positive things in the life of religious minorities have no value for them to

be reported? For instance, just recently on September 11th, we celebrated

a tremendous memorial service at Central Baptist Church to mark the

first anniversary of the worldís most dreadful tragedy. The service was

carried out with the participation of Christians (Orthodox, Catholic,

Lutheran, Armenian Apostolic, Baptist), Muslim and Jewish leaders. That

was the first occasion when all the religions prayed for peace and reconciliation. Most of Georgian TV channels rigidly refused to film the service. But

the same day they gave enough time to speak and show how the day was

observed in the rest of the world. This is just a very small example.

Obviously there are far more things that I do not understand but

there is one thing that I understand very well: it should not continue

this way.

We have to deal very strictly with every single expression of terrorism everywhere and by all means. It is clear that religious or moral

terrorism is one of the ugliest faces of world terrorism. Unfortunately it

is not endemic for Georgia. It is everywhere, in every religion, in every

culture. I as a Baptist clergyman declare that religious persecution and

discrimination which is carried out in the name of Orthodoxy has nothing to do with the true Orthodoxy which is a part of the worldwide body

of Christ. My experience with street children tells me that it is easier to

take children from the street but it is much more difficult to take the

street attitudes out of children. Similarly our society has come out of

communist regime but the old mentality has not come out of our minds.

We as Georgian Christians (here I represent a group of Churches of

which the Evangelical Baptist Church of Georgia is a part along with

Lutheran, Armenian Apostolic and Roman Catholic churches) are determined to fight back the religious and moral terror in Georgia. Obviously our means are limited but our desire to see Georgia prospering

both spiritually and materially will help us to overcome all those difficulties we face now.
55

There are four targets of strategic significance which could be efficient in fighting against religious terrorism:

1. Family. Understandably it is the hardest job to influence the

post communist family to such an extent that it nurtures its

members with the ideas of tolerance, human rights and democracy. Nevertheless if we are serious to develop an open society we

should target the family. Obviously Mass media, school and religion should be considered as means to reach the above-mentioned

results in the family. It will certainly take some time before first

positive fruits appear.

2. Mass media. The fastest way of changing the public opinion in

relation with religious tolerance could be reached through the

mass media. But the mass media is not ready to play such a role.

Simply because their representatives belong to the same society.

Considerable work is to be done in order to involve them in the

work against any expression of religious terrorism.

3. School and Teaching institution. Very often schools play a very

negative role. Sometimes some schoolteachers think that the communist ideology has been replaced by Orthodoxy therefore the

think they should impose the Orthodox faith and religious intolerance over the children. The Ministry of Education and schools

should prepare curriculum in such a way that both pupils and

teachers learn how to respect religious diversity in the society.

4. Religious congregations. We may call it the center of moral influence. Religious leaders should help their constituencies to realize

that in this postmodern world it is impossible to live with medieval principles. It may seem easiest to prosecute the clergy that

have been responsible for the violence in Georgia but this will not

solve all the problems. They will be considered as martyrs for the

Orthodox faith. If we seek for lasting results for religious tolerance we should work with theological students and their teachers. They should be exposed to reality. They have to be encouraged to learn modern languages since the only source of their

theological education very often is the 19th century ultra fundamentalist literature in Russian.

Without diligent work on these four targets it will be very difficult to

fight not only religious terrorism but terrorism in general. The process

of globalization in this respect can be the ally for fighting terrorism

globally. This is to say that the problem of religious persecution and

terrorism in Georgia should be considered as a part of global issues. I

believe that with common efforts of all people of good will we can handle

the problem. Peaceful development of every nation of the world with

due respect of religious liberty should not have any alternative. Let me

conclude this speech with the words of an English mystic, Julian of

Norwich: ìAll shall be well, all shall be well, and all manner of things

shall be well.î Our optimism for the better future should not be overshadowed by the turmoil of the present time.
56

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

GENADI GUDADZE, CHAIRMAN,

UNION OF JEHOVAHíS WITNESSES IN GEORGIA

My name is Genadi Gudadze, and I would like to thank the members

of the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe for allowing me to testify on behalf of the 15,000 Georgian Jehovahís

Witnesses in Georgia.

My family has been associated with Jehovahís Witnesses since 1959.

Under the Soviet government, we were officially banned. Personally, I

spent three years in the Georgian prisons and one-and-a-half-years in

Siberia because of my faith. However, even during those difficult times,

there was no violence against Jehovahís Witnesses such as we are experiencing presently in Georgia. Now, it is safe to say that if you attack

one of Jehovahís Witnesses, you will not be prosecuted.

Since 1991, Jehovahís Witnesses were usually able to meet peacefully

throughout Georgia. However, the situation changed abruptly in October 1999. The attack in the Gldani region of Tbilisi came as a surprise

to all of us. We expected that the perpetrators, who were well known

and recognized, would be prosecuted, and that would end the matter.

Instead, two victims of the Gldani attack were prosecuted and convicted.

Since then, there have been 133 separate incidents involving either mob

attacks, individual attacks or destruction of property.

In your May 15, 2002, letter to President Shevardnadze, you called

for vigorous prosecution to punish the perpetrators of mob attacks. Since

the Gldani attack on October 17, 1999, 746 criminal complaints have

been filed. To date, not one person has been punished. The violence

continues.

During the last three years, Jehovahís Witnesses have been attacked

while meeting privately in their homes, and assaulted while walking on

the street. Teenagers have been beaten by policemen. Individuals have

been kidnapped, dragged into the woods, threatened with rape; others

have suffered serious injuries. Attempts have been made to murder an

entire family. Elderly people have been savagely beaten and injured,

along with pregnant women and children. Large mobs, in the presence

of police, have carried out massive attacks, blocked main highways,

and attacked busloads of people. I was present at many of the attacks,

and have personally interviewed many of the other victims. Attacks

continue on a weekly basis.

Despite numerous ìpaperî investigations by the police and the prosecutor, Vasili Mkalavishvili, his followers, and the group, Jvari, with

their leader Paata Bluashvili, have not been brought to justice. As recently as August of this year, both of these religious extremists led

their followers to attack and destroy two of our convention sites.

The reign of terror continues. What is the solution? It is very simple.

Apply the law, arrest the criminals, and punish policemen who cooperate with them.

Please allow me to introduce a video presentation showing a small

portion of the 133 attacks against Jehovahís Witnesses. Please note

that the attacker themselves have filmed most of the video footage.
57

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

DR. GIA NODIA, DIRECTOR,

CAUCASUS INSTITUTE FOR PEACE,

DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY, TBILISI, GEORGIA

My initial understanding was that I would testify on human rights

situation in Georgia. I now realized, however, that the situation of grave

crisis in relations between Georgia and Russia over Pankisi Gorge requires some comments and analysis with regards to what this crisis is

about. Therefore my remarks will start with that subject. Later I will

also analyze the latest internal political developments in Georgia and

its implication for the human rights situation.

Pankisi Gorge is a small mountainous region in Georgia, on the border with Chechnya. It is populated by the ethnic group of Kisti, who are

Muslims and ethnic kin of Chechens, but also fairly integrated into the

Georgian society: they speak Georgian, have Georgian-sounding names,

etc. The Kisti population in the Gorge is estimated at 7-8 thousand.

Until the second war in Chechnya, Pankisi was a remote area of which

many Georgians probably had never heard. In the period of struggle of

independence, when ethnic relations aggravated in several parts of the

country, Pankisi was not mentioned as a region that was problematic

for any ethnic tensions. In periods of Dudaevís and Maskhadovís rule in

Chechnya, many young Kisti went to Chechnya since even extremely

volatile situation there promised them better economic and career opportunities than their native region. We did not hear much of Pankisi

also during the first Russian-Chechen war in the first half of the 1990s.

Pankisi was propelled to international fame since 1999, after the second Chechen war started. The war brought an estimated 4-5 thousand

refugees to Pankisi. Many of them were actually Kisti who had moved

to Chechnya several years ago. The Georgian public met this inflow of

refugees with understanding. These refugees, however, included not

just women and children (although these were the majority) but also

young and often armed males, who could be described as ìfighters.î I

am not in a position to claim any first-hand knowledge on the number

of such ìfightersî or their activities. But based on the sources that I

have I can say that certainly there existed groups of Chechen fighters

who that used Pankisi Gorge as safe haven for regrouping and, probably, venturing back over the border for military/subversive operations.

I also know that there were some Arabs who went to Pankisi, married

local girls and settled there. I canít say how much their agenda was

religious or military (probably, both) and whether they were linked to

any international terrorist organizations. The emergence of Chechens

and Arabs led to tensions within the Kisti society based on differences

between more traditional Islam characteristic for the the region and

the new, more radical Wahhabi version of it professed by the newcomers andóunder their influenceóby some young Kisti.

Such developments led to creation of a set of problems in this tiny

region. The main problem was that the Georgian authorities failed to

establish any kind of state control in the region. The main reason of

that was institutional weakness of the Georgian state. But it was probably not less important that Georgian authorities were wary of any

possible incidence of violence that any such attempts might lead to, as

they thought that such incidents could eventually take on ethnic coloring and implicate Georgia as some kind of a party to the war. Naturally, Georgians did not want to fight the Russiansí war. I also believe
58

that the syndrome of military failures in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

also influenced the Georgian failure to act in Pankisi adequately on the

first stage. The Chechen presence in the region created two sets of problems. One was internal: Pankisi soon became a lawless area, a safe

haven for illicit business such as drug and arms trafficking as well as

kidnaping of people. It soon also became obvious that Pankisi could not

play such a role without cooperation with Georgian criminal groups

and, most importantly, with Georgian law-enforcement, in particular

the police and security forces. Numerous investigative reports in the

Georgian media, as well as elite opinion suggested that high level leadership of the law-enforcement agencies were implicated in this illicit

business. Numerous instances of kidnaping people, both Georgians and

foreigners, caused great public indignation and even prompted the creation of paramilitary groups in the nearby regions who threatened to

enter Pankisi and act on their own if the government continued to do

nothing. In the eyes of the Georgian public, Pankisi thus became a

major metaphor for general inefficacy and corruption of the Georgian

government. Its failure to tackle the Pankisi problem contributed a lot

to sharp drop of popularity of President Shevardnadze during the last

two years. Another set of problems was related to Russia. It is fully

understandable that the presence of Chechen armed groups on Georgian territory who could use this territory as a base for attacks against

Russia raised legitimate security concerns of the latter. However, from

the onset of this situation Russia posed demands to Georgia that it could

not accept. Namely, Russia demanded a right to pursue Chechen fighters into Pankisi Gorge and fight them there. This effectively meant

enlarging the theatre of the Chechen war into Georgiaóand there was

no guarantee that this enlargement would be limited to the Pankisi

Gorge, or that Russian military engagement in Georgia would be limited in time. No Georgian political leader in his right mind would accept that. Russia responded to the Georgian refusal by introducing visa

regime with Georgia. This was obviously intended to be just a punitive

measure against Georgia, since it was obvious that the visa regime

would be no deterrence for terrorists (or ëfreedom fightersíówhatever

term one prefers) who tend to prefer mountainous passes to official checkpoints. Russiaís visa regime did not prove to be an effective punishing

measure. Some people in Georgia actually welcomed it as strengthening the countryís independence. However, Georgia protested strongly

against exempting from this regime the separatist territories of Abkhazia

and South Ossetia. Georgia considered it a creeping annexation of those

territories by Russia. This year, Russia made the next step in the same

direction by introducing some simplified procedures for people leaving

in breakaway territories to obtain Russian citizenship.

Now, to the recent crisis. I would argue that the new stage started

with by the announcement of the US ìTrain and Equipî program. Officially, the Russian president accepted this American initiative since

his previous rhetoric did not allow any rational justification for opposing it: through this program Americans were to help Georgians to do

what Russia wanted them to do. However, the first reaction of the Russian political elite across the political spectrum was an outrage: It was

seen as the US squeezing Russia out of yet another zone of influence in

its immediate neighborhood. On the evening when the news broke out,

Russian politicians and commentators went on TV publicly saying that

this would dearly cost Georgia and might even lead to the end of Geor-
59

gian stateóa hardly concealed threat implying that Russia would and

should use its vulnerabilities to destroy it. Shevardnadze personally, of

course, took a lot of flak as the major promoter of western interests

against Russia. The real crisis started in late August. On August 23rd,

Russian military planes bombed Georgian territory hitting a group of

peaceful civilians, killing one and injuring several others. However,

Russia disowned this attack despite the fact that OSCE monitors saw

planes coming from the Russian territory and returning there. Two

days later, on August 25th, Georgia moved troops into Pankisi Gorge in

what it pointedly called anti-criminal rather than anti-terrorist operation. Soon after this, on September 11 Putin issued an ultimatum, in

which he threatened Georgia to militarily invade it unless it solved the

Pankisi problem. The most paradoxical aspect of this is, of course, that

Russia toughened its stance after Georgia actually started doing what

Russia had asked it to do. What kind of sense can we make out of this?

I will sum it up in several points:

ï The Georgian government carries blame for not addressing the

problem of Pankisi adequately and in a timely manner. It should

take blame primarily for failing to curb rampant corruption in its

law-enforcement agencies that led to aggravating the problem.

However, change of leadership in police and security agencies, as

well as the US ìtrain and equipî program allowed considerable

progress with regards to Pankisi that expressed itself in the current anti-criminal operation. One cannot rule out instances of

corrupt activities also in the course of the current operation, but

it seems to me that this time the Georgian forces are really motivated to achieve some success.

ï Russia has legitimate security concerns about Pankisi and natural expectations that Georgia will cooperate with it in addressing

this issue. However, so far Russia has been proposing cooperation

on the terms that no Georgian government could accept. Russian

behavior vis-‡-vis Abkhazia and South Ossetia also suggests that

Russia is hardly oriented towards genuine cooperation with Georgia on security issues if the term ìcooperationî implies recognition of mutual interests. ï What is the real Russian motivation then? I have three complementary considerations. First, I believe that the Russian strategy

was to transfer the war, at least in part, outside Russiaís territory.

More recently, taking into account the reality of the protracted

war in Chechnya and the difficulty of selling the failure to end it to

the Russian public, Putin and his military are in a need of a scapegoat. It seems that the entity to blame is found in Georgia.

ï Russia also appears to be looking for a pretext to punish Georgia

for allowing the West, especially the United States, to play active

role in the Caucasus. In the words of Russian politicians and the

media, this is spelled out as ìsqueezing Russia out of the region.î

Public reactions of the Russian public to projects like Baku-TbilisiCeyhan pipeline and, more recently, the ìtrain and equipî program, convinces me that the Russian political elite is far from

being reconciled to these developments. In this sense, Russian

policies with regard to Georgia have the same root as its opposition to NATO enlargement. Russia singles out Georgia rather

than, say, Azerbaijan, because the former is more vulnerable andó
60

in the Russian viewómore likely to crack down under its pressure. Scenarios are often discussed in the Russian media that

this pressure would eventually help ouster of President

Shevardnadze, who is especially hated by the Russian political

establishment, and his replacement by a more pro-Russian political figure.

ï Russia seems to be using the Pankisi issue as a bargaining chip

with the US in relation to the Iraq issue. Russian politicians and

strategists systematically link the two issues. On Russian talkshows, almost all Russian politicians representing different political groupings agree that in the event USA attacks Iraq, Russia will certainly be justified in attacking Georgiaóand should do

this. Whether Russia is justified to do this even if USA does not

attack Iraq, opinions differ. This means that in reality the issue

of Pankisi is related not so much to Russiaís immediate security

concerns vis-‡-vis war in Chechnya, but rather to a wish to

strengthen Russiaís standing and bargaining position on the global arena. Naturally, there is lots of talk about possible trade-off

between Russia and the US: the US would accept Russiaís invasion in Georgia in return to Russiaís acceptance of the US attack

against Iraq. More conspiracy-oriented minds may mean an explicit back-door deal with Russia supporting certain resolution in

the Security Council. This, however, seems too unlikely in modern policies. What is more plausible, however, is a some kind of

de-facto trade-off: Russia would issue some grudges about US actions in Iraq without any consequence, US would criticize a Russian invasion in Georgia, but will not be able to do much because

its hands will be tied by a war in Iraq. This is the scenario that

Russians seem to hope for (and openly discuss)óand the Georgians are afraid of.

ï Under the circumstances, Georgia pins its hopes mainly on Washington, because Georgians thinkóI believe, rightly,óthat nobody

else has any negotiating power with Russians with regards to

this issue, and because Russia, while issuing her threats against

Georgia, certainly and explicitly links these threats to American

political behavior, whether in the South Caucasus or against Iraq.

This means that it would be difficult for the Americans to stay

dispassionate about the affair. Georgian military capabilities would

hardly allow her to hold off a Russian attack, and Georgia can

hardly do in Pankisi qualitatively more than Georgia already does.

Moreover, no Russian military involvement, whether in the form

of air strikes or ground troops are likely to actually put an end to

the Chechen conflictóit will just extend it to the Georgian territory and allow the Russian authorities to buy time by saying to

their public that the conflict just entered another phaseóthis

time having moved outside Russia.

The Russian-Georgian problem caught Georgia in the middle of quite

tense internal political situation. In order to explicate the major dimensions of these internal tensions, I will give first some background information on the political development of the last 2-3 years. The period

since 2000 has been notable for dramatic drop of popularity of President

Eduard Shevardnadze. The reasons of this are a slow down of economic

development, the governmentís inability to do anything about rampant
61

corruption, and continuing inefficacy of the government in virtually all

the areas in which the state is supposed to serve the society. Of course,

these trends were building up earlier, but before the government lived

off the credit of trust that had been gained by successfully overcoming

the period of turmoil and warlordism of which the first half of the 1990s

consisted. In the second half of the 1990s, the government was also seen

as doing something for reforming the economy and the political system,

and there was a brief period of high economic growth, albeit against the

very low starting point following dramatic decline. This all stalled after

1999óno visible attempts to improve the situation were made any more,

and it became obvious that extremely notorious and obviously corrupt

figures like Minister of Internal Affairs Kakha Targamadze were gaining political ground. The weariness of the figure of Eduard Shevardnadze

who has been dominating Georgian politics since 1972, and the context

of the struggle for succession is also to be taken into consideration.

According to the Georgian Constitution, 2005 is the year when

Shevardnadzeís last term expires. Given the Russian example of YeltsinPutin succession and Shevardnadzeís domination of power politics, many

people assumed that handpicking a successor by the incumbent president would be the formula of power transfer in Georgia as well. Therefore, immediately after the 2000 presidential elections, an intense power

struggle within Shevardnadzeís camp for the position of a successor

started. Since Zurab Zhvania, then chairman of parliament and in control of the machinery of the government party, the Citizenís Union of

Georgia (CUG), was considered to be the frontrunner in this race of

succession, he became the primary target of the struggle. These two

trends led to open rifts and an eventual break-up within the ruling

coalition. On the one side stood the so-called ìreformistî part of the CUG

who were in control of Parliament, took credit for most legislative reforms of 1995, and were some kind of a visiting card of Georgia demonstrating that this was a reform-minded country oriented towards western values. Against the backdrop of obvious lack of progress in Georgia,

their supporters, especially those from active civic groups, pressured

them to openly distance themselves from Shevardnadze. This prompted

them, specifically Zhvania and Mikheil Saakashvili, who became first

the leader of the CUG faction and then the minister of justice, to take

more a aggressive position in pushing Shevardnadze to support reforms

and, especially, to get rid of his most notorious ministers. They thoughtó

correctly, I believe,óthat being associated with increasingly unpopular

Shevardnadze without having real power would eventually undermine

their political prospects, so they aimed at gaining ground in the executive. Namely, they wanted introduction of a position of a prime minister and the creation of a cabinet under the prime minister rather than

directly under the president, with Zurab Zhvania taking that position.

However, the respective constitutional amendment failed, and what they

got was several ministerial positions. This only led to open divisions

within the existing cabinet under the president and weakened the ìreformistî group. Their opponents represented a motley coalition of different forces all of whom had a common interest in not allowing Zhvania

to become too powerful. The most important of them were heads of law

enforcement agencies, different Tbilisi-based or regional elite groups,

and, most conspicuously, the New Faction (later New Right) group,

that consisted of defectors from Zhvania-Saakashvili camp. The strategy of the opponents of the ìreformersî seemed to be to discredit them
62

and at the same time to widen a rift between them and President

Shevardnadze. The fall of 2001 became a turning point. First the CUG

formally broke up in September 2001 (although legally the process continued until May 2002, when the court finally gave victory to

Shevardnadzeís supporters in a battle for the CUG brand name). In late

October, the government attempt to raid the most popular independent

TV station, Rustavi-2, was followed by student protests who demanded

resignation of the heads of law enforcement agencies at a minimum and

of Shevardnadze himself as the maximum. Shevardnadze had to sacrifice the formeróthus he actually did under the public pressure what

Zhvania and Saakashvili had been demanding for a long time. Lastly,

the new opposition also split into two groupings that had different strategies though were not mutually antagonistic. The charismatic

Saakashvili created the more radically oppositionist National Movement

and actually positioned himself as the main opposition candidate for

presidency, while Zhvania took more conciliatory stance and tried to

continue negotiating with Shevardnadze until the above-mentioned court

decision. Later, he created the more moderate New Democrats party.

The government, on the other hand, decided to recreate the CUG as the

party of the ruling bureaucracy, headed by Minister of State Avtandil

Jorbenadze, the number two in the presidentís administration. The nadir

of Shevardnadzeís popularity so far may have coincided with the June

2002 local elections, when the CUG took a pitiful 2% in elections for

Tbilisi city council (and did not show any better in most other regions).

That may be considered not sufficiently indicative since the CUG, which

resolved its internal legal struggles just two weeks before elections, did

not have time to put up a serious campaign. Most importantly, however, the campaign developed into a competition for the harshest way to

denounce Shevardnadze, with the two parties that demonstrated most

radical rhetoric, the National Movement and the Labor party, emerging as winners in Tbilisi. Outside Tbilisi, two business-oriented parties, the Industrialists and the New Right, were most successful. They

also considered themselves oppositionist, though were much more timid

about attacking Shevardnadze personally. In any case, distinctly distancing oneself from the government was a mast for any electoral success. The last summer partly diluted the sense that Shevardnadzeís

government is in a grave crisis. The government took credit for the

ìTrain and Equipî program that is quite popular and approved even by

the most radical opposition, and starting the recent operation in Pankisi

is also to its benefit. Not less importantly, the opposition demonstrated

its weaknesses. First, this weakness was exposed by a growing rift between Zhvania and Saakashvili. A misguided move by Saakashvili who

demanded recount of the vote although he was poised to become the

chairman of Tbilisi City Council, confused people about his real motives

and his real political skills. His not well calculated remarks about his

plans to start a campaign of public protest in the fall helped Shevardnadze

to present him as a dangerous radical who is after destabilization of the

countryóa prospect that most Georgian citizens dread, however much

they may dislike the incumbent government. Zhvania, on the other

hand, presented himself as somebody more sophisticated than the public politics require, and his different political maneuvers were not convincing about his ability to create a strong political force on his own.

But most importantly, it was Putin with his airstrike and ultimatums

that really came to rescue for Shevardnadzeís sinking support. Having
63

an obviously threatening external enemy is always a wonderful resource

for any unpopular government, and Shevardnadzeís is no exception.

The Russian pressure put the opposition into a difficult position: Putinís

attacks were targeted not just against Georgia but against Shevardnadze

personally, so it became easy for the government to say that the opposition and Russia has one goal in common. This is only one step short of

alleging that opposition is really secretly allied with Russiaóallegations that some government supporters were fast to issue. Most opposition forces (including Zhvania) decided to suspend or weaken antiShevardnadze rhetoric for the time being. Conversely, Saakashvili (who

recently held the founding congress of his National Movement as a political party) decided to keep up pressure on Shevardnadze, though he

no longer talks of any plans to organize Ukrainian-style public protest

campaign demanding the presidentís early resignation. However, the

Pankisi situation will help Shevardnadze internally only until the tension continuesóit may continue for some time, of course. We cannot

say what will happen thenóor will a possible Russian invasion lead to

a greater consolidation of the public around him or that he eventually

be blamed for it. Having an external enemy only helps when the leader

is strong and decisiveóand we cannot be sure that Shevardnadze shows

such qualities in face of Russian danger.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

What do these developments mean for the situation in democracy and

human rights in Georgia? I think, here we have a mix of positive and

negative trends, although I believe on the balance bad news clearly

outweigh good news.

The main good news is, I believe, the return of public politics and, as

a result of that, a somewhat higher rate of political participation. After

several years of extremely Byzantine power politics that mostly consisted of maneuvering and back-stage deals between different groups

within the ruling oligarchy, there is some political completion in the

public space. The level of cynicism towards the political elite as well as

towards the electoral process that most Georgians consider full of irregularities and fraud continues to be high. However, the last local

elections demonstrated that people have some belief in public politics,

that they consider political participation as meaningful to some extent,

and are even ready to fight for their right to vote when attempts were

made to deny them this right.

More open political competition, however, also increased the level of

tension in the society and fears that these tensions would allow political

competition to stay within constitutional limits. The opposition parties

are often quite populist in their rhetoric and do not move far beyond

denouncing their opponents. But most disturbingly, since the government is extremely unpopular and appears to have slim chances of success in open political competition, it reverts to forbidden tactics. The

trend that is most threatening to the prospects of democracy is a mounting

trend towards use of violence in the political process. Georgia was notorious for warlordism in the early 1990s, but in the mid-90s Shevardnadze

managed to overcome it, and this is deservedly considered to be his

greatest success. Now, however, different paramilitary or purely criminal groups are trying again to openly disrupt the political process, and

the government either is not doing anything to punish and curb this

violence, or, most probably, directly or indirectly encourages it as much
64

as it is targeted against its political opponents. This trend started in

November 2001, when Mikheil Saakashvili, who ran on a radically oppositional ticket, very convincingly defeated his opponents in by-elections to Parliament. At the end of the day, groups of thugs (most probably from the National Democratic Party) tried to steal ballot boxes

from precincts, and succeeded in four of them. The aim was obviously

to invalidate elections by the party whose candidate did not win. No

attempt was made to punish the culprits. In spring 2002, during the

local election campaign, this violence took a more systematic character. In Zugdidi, western Georgia, a paramilitary group headed by one

Badri Zarandia, disrupted Saakashviliís pre-election meetings several

times, and Zarandia said on television several times that he would not

allow people like Saakashvili to ìdeceive people.î Other thugs in other

parts of Georgia then made similar statements. Again, no attempts

were made to punish anybody. Rumors are circulating that some groups

close to the government are creating other paramilitary groups. This

allows a plausible assumption that while the government does not want

to be seen openly restricting political opposition, it uses its criminal

proxies to intimidate the opposition or disrupt democratic political process altogether.

One more disturbing trend of the last two years consists of playing

ethnic card in politicsósomething we also have not seen since the early

1990s. [Ethnic Armenians and Azeris are the two largest ethnic minorities in Georgia] This card is mainly used against same Zhvania and

Saakashvili: Zhvaniaís mixed ethnic ancestry (his mother is half-Armenian and half-Jewish) is increasingly used by his opponents to discredit him. Articles are being concocted in the media that argue they

are part of some ìJewish-Armenian conspiracy.î Rumors are spread

among the Azeri community that these will be pro-Armenian forces

therefore hostile to the Azerbaijani diaspora in Georgia. All this is openly

discussed not just in tabloids, but by politicians close to the government. Naturally, ethnic Armenian citizens of Georgia take offense: Armenian-ness is seen as something demeaning. While these attacks are

immediately motivated by a desire to discredit political opponents rather

than by ethnic nationalism, it clearly encourages greater ethnic tensions.

The issue of religious violence, that constitutes an especially dangerous trend in todayís Georgia, can also be considered in this aspect. In

the last several years, different religious minority groupsómost often

Witnesses of Jehovah, but also othersówere attacked by groups of religious fanatics. The group of a defrocked Orthodox priest, Basil

Mkalavishvili, was the most active in this, but sometimes also some

other groups, including people associated to the mainstream Church,

took active part. There has been no single precedent of such attacks

being punished. Moreover, police officers sometimes encouraged the attacks or even took part in them. The roots of this violence are not only

political. Unfortunately, public opinion is especially hostile towards socalled new sectarian groups (especially, but not only them), whose proselytizing activities are largely seen as a threat to Georgian identity.

Most people think the state should do something to curb activities of

these ìsectsî by introducing more restrictive legislation in religious

matters. However, while legislation stays fairly liberal, many people

think that Mkalavishvili does (even in an unseemly way) what the state

should be doing. Therefore, the failure of the state to act against
65

Mkalavishvili may be interpreted as the fear of a weak and unpopular

government of undermining its popularity even more. Even many police officers are open admirers of Mkalavishvili. This, of course, cannot

justify inaction, but provides somewhat more sympathetic explanation

of it. However, there are also signs that the governmentóagain, indirectly or through its proxiesóis trying to discredit its political opponents by saying that their advocacy of western-style democratic values

also implies defense of Jehovahís witnesses. I have heard more than

once casual remarks made by the presidentís supporters and addressed

to the opposition representatives like ìbut you support Jehovahís witnesses.î This is an indirect but unambiguous indication by high-level

politicians associated with Shevardnadze that defending rights of

Jehovahís Witnesses is a bad thing in itself, while attacks against them

may be justified. Thus religious card is played by the government alongside the ethnic one and this obviously contributes to religious tensions.

Not only religious groups are victims of violent attacks, but also media and NGOs who in one way or another come to the defense of civic

rights. This summerís violent attack against the Liberty Institute, that

is both the most vocal and well-known defender of religious freedoms,

but also extremely critical of President Shevardnadze personally, was

the most dramatic expression of this trend. Several staff members of

the Institute were hospitalized as a result.

On the ìgood newsî side, it should be noted that of late the government appears to have recognized the influence of the media and NGOs

and has chosen a policy of engagement rather then alienation or repression towards them (of which there had been some signs before this summer). Soon after the attack on the Liberty Institute the Minister of

State Avtandil Jorbenadze visited this organization in person and proposed cooperation. After that, several meetings between NGOs and highlevel government representativesósuch as law enforcement agencies

and educationótook place where plans were discussed about reforming

those agencies and increasing public control over them. Most recently,

on September 14, a large meeting lead to signing a pledge that the

government and the leading parties would support a new legislation

strengthening freedom of the media. Mr. Jorbenadze also held a meeting with representatives of Jehovahís Witnesses and proposed them help

in defending their rights. Whether this is just a temporary appeasement of the human rights groups that could create trouble by supporting opposition, or some genuine actions will result from this, remains

to be seen.
66

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

STEPHEN JONES, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,

RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN STUDIES,

MOUNT HOLYOKE COLLEGE, MASSACHUSETTS

When I testified to this committee in March 1995 at a hearing on

Georgia, I concluded: ìthe concentration of power in Shevardnadzeís

hands Ö and the retention of conservative apparatchiki in policy making positions, is undermining popular faith in the institutions of democracy and the market. Shevardnadze may have managed to save the

Georgian ship of state Ö but has given it little direction.î After seven

years, and over $700 million of US government aid between 1995-2000,

today I might conclude in much the same manner. In 2000, USAID

spent $52 million in Georgia restructuring its energy system, implementing business and democratic reforms, and funding social and humanitarian programs. That same year, the US government spent

$35,000,000 on border defense and on the Georgian armed forces,

$7,000,000 on conflict resolution, and $14,000,000 on judicial reform,

rehabilitation of the health system and privatization. Yet there is little

indication that this investment had made much difference. When I was

in Georgia in the fall of 2001, there were blockades on the streets by

citizens angered at blackouts, there was an occupation of Rustavi 2, the

most popular independent TV channel by Security ministry officials,

prolonged protests outside parliament leading to the mass resignation

of government ministers, the bombing of Georgian villages by Russian

planes, an incursion of Chechen fighters into the Kodori valley, and the

election of a new South Osetian President in December more antagonistic to re-integration with Georgia than his predecessor. Conflict resolution with secessionist Abkhazia and South Osetia remained at a dead

end. The judicial reform greeted with such fanfare in 1998 had petered

out. Corruption and the obscure process of privatization of middle and

large companies continued to undermine the faith of ordinary citizens

in economic and political reform.

It would be absurd to suggest no progress has been made since 1995.

Shevardnadze ended private armies, civil strife, prevented a catastrophic

economic collapse, and stemmed territorial fragmentation. He deradicalized the Georgian nationalist revolution, introduced tough economic reforms, established a constitution and initiated a process of reconciliation in a country torn apart by civil war. But this progress, in

which Western governments and international organizations have invested so much, is built upon the thinnest of ice. The fragile stability in

Georgia today is maintained by social and political forces that in the

long term will bring it down, and along with it, US hopes of a sturdy

liberal democratic ally in the region. Thus corruption, migration ( an

important pressure valve for the unemployed and discontented), public

cynicism, and a poorly organized civil society sustain the system today,

but tomorrow these same phenomena will undermine any future prospect of sustainable reform. That means I will likely be back before this

committee in seven years time repeating what I said in 1995.

By most criteria, we might call Georgia democratic although in my

mind there are serious questions as to whether elected officials have

effective power over the government, and whether elections, such as

the 2000 Presidential election, can be described as fair and honest. Other

attributes of democracy, though imperfect, are basically in place such

as free expression, the right to create political parties and associations,
67

the right to run for elective office and the existence of alternative sources

of information. But despite these gains, for the ordinary voter, the expectations of democratic life, such as accountable officials, defense against

corrupt judges and police, a responsive government and electoral power,

have not been fulfilled.

There are many reasons why Georgia is failing its citizens, but I will

mention only three. I focus on these because they are areas where Western governments have also failed Georgia.

The first concerns economic security. Impoverished democracies exist, but studies show moderate growth, a higher per capita income and

declining inequality are the best means for sustaining democratic institutions. Even with estimates taking into account popular participation

in the shadow economy, 40 percent of the Georgian population has a

combined monetary and non monetary income below the subsistence

level. J.K.Galbraith has remarked that ìnothing Ö sets a stronger limit

on the liberty of the citizen than a total absence of money.î In Georgia

Western policies on democracy building have overlooked this basic tenetóand until Georgian citizensí economic and physical insecurity is

mediated in some way, democratization in Georgia will have little chance

of success.

The second concerns Georgian state capacity. No government can

sustain reform without the proper institutional means to follow through

on implementation. A few figures illustrate the problem: compared to

1989, Georgiaís current economy has shrunk 67 percent; industry is

working at 20 percent of its capacity. Between 1997-2000, expenditure

on defense decreased from $51.9 million to $13.6., education from 35.6

to 13.9, agriculture forestry and fishing from 13.4 to 7.2. The stateís

inability to fund its social insurance and employment funds, maintain

its army, education and transport in rural areas, or stimulate agriculture and industry, has led the majority of the population to view the

state as irrelevant, unrepresentative, and corrupt. Its functionaries are

despised, its structures unworthy of trust or support, including the police and the army. Throwing in Western aid such as the US train and

equip program for the Georgian army ñ which is aimed to help Georgians fight Chechen terroristsówill never be effective if the Georgian

state cannot pay its soldiers and feed them properly. A strong fighting

force cannot be built on the impoverished base of Georgiaís army. The

transition to democracy and the effective impact of aid must start with

the premise of a coherent and functioning state. A weak state is unable

to promote good government, and cannot control bad government or

misspent aid.

The third issue is political and public support for reform. There are

scattered reformers in the Georgian government, even ministers, but

they are powerless and do not have the support of the President. Sound

opinion poll research suggests that even if state elites wished to reform,

they would find it very difficult to convince a profoundly alienated population that they were genuine. Data suggests that 56.8 percent of the

population do not trust the courts, 64 percent do not trust parliament,

79.4 percent donít trust the tax administration, and 65.6 percent do not

trust the President. Such degrees of alienation will kill most attempts

at reform before they begin. The cycle of distrust can only be broken

with visible government measures taken to end the control of corrupt

political and economic networks. The US government should be strongly

urging Shevardnadze to do so with sanctions if he does not.
68

A poll in December 2001 conducted by the Georgian research firm

SOCIOGEO suggested that Georgiaís cumulative problems and the ineffective backing of the US for reform has decreased faith in the US

among Georgian citizens. Forty three percent of Georgians polled (24

percent in 1999) favored closer security ties with Russia and the CIS

rather than with the USA.

Ultimately Georgians are responsible for building a sustainable democracy, but Western aid is an important instrument in shaping, stimulating and sustaining reform. So far, Western aid has been largely ineffective in doing so.
69

TERROR IN THE NAME OF RELIGION

TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEO PRESENTATION

SLIDE [TEXT]: ìAttack on Gldani Congregation on October 17, 1999î

NARRATOR: Attackers viciously beat Mirian Arabidze and others while

encouraging each other with the words, ìbeat them; they deserve it.î

Some witnesses inside the building are not allowed to leave. Sixteen of

the victims require medical aid. One woman, Pati Tabagari, a mother

of two, suffers permanent damage to one eye due to a blow to the head.

Mirian Arabidze and Vladimer Kokosadze attempt to calm everyone

down. Followers of Mkalavishvili attack Mirian Arabidze again.

SLIDE [TEXT]: ìAttack on Courtroom in Gldani on August 16, 2000î

NARRATOR: They attack Jehovahís Witnesses, foreign observers and

journalists. They expel them from the courtroom.

SLIDE [TEXT]: ìAttack on Zugdidi Convention September 8, 2000î

NARRATOR: Convention site located on private property is looted and

burned to the ground. Police armed with machine guns stop the convention and send some 700 Witnesses in attendance out of the area by

bus.

SLIDE [TEXT]: ìAttack on Marneuli Convention on September 16, 2000î

NARRATOR: Police block the road and stop Jehovahís Witnesses. Witnesses are turned back. Vasili Mkalavishvili with his followers are allowed to proceed through the road blocks to the convention site in

Marneuli, which is located on private property. Mkalavishvili and his

followers loot and destroy the convention site. They burn nearly two

tons of religious literature belonging to Jehovahís Witnesses. The followers of Vasili Mkalavishvili pray and chant in front of the burning

literature.

SLIDE [TEXT]: ìThe culture of impunity created by the inaction of state

authorities led to numerous attacks against congregations of Jehovahís

Witnesses throughout the country.î

SLIDE [TEXT]: ìAttack on Ombudsmanís Office on January 22, 2001î

NARRATOR: Vasili Mkalavishvili along with Gia Ivanidze and others

of his followers disrupt a press conference held in the Ombudsmanís

office. The purpose of the press conference was to release a petition signed

by 133,375 Georgians, most of whom are Orthodox, asking the president to put an end to the violence.

SLIDE [TEXT]: ìPolice complicity and religious extremism has led to a reign of

terror where individuals are attacked and injured because of their faith.î

VASILI MKALAVISHVILI: When I went to Marneuli, I warned everyone. I warned them officially. I warned Targamadze, I warned Alavidze,

I warned state security. I told them that I was going there, and just try

to prevent me. I will come by buses, and I will run over you. Yes, of

course there was a little opposition but they let us go there anyway.
70

Slides [text]: ìSome of the victims of various attacks.î

CAPTION: ìEyewitnesses to fire, with police presence at Kaspi convention site.î

EYEWITNESS NARRATION: Isnít that the police chief there? Yes. He is

Ramazi.

NEWS REPORTER: They are saying that you are in alliance with the

police.

VASILI MKALAVISHVILI: The police always support us in our fight

against the Jehovists.

EXCERPT FROM THE NEWSPAPER ìGEORGIA TODAY,î DATED AUGUST

23-29, 2002: ìThe local Kaspi force joined the worshipping Witnesses

for lunch and apologized for the lack of police action, saying that they

were simply carrying out orders from above.î

SLIDE [TEXT]: ìAs of 9-23-02 there are 133 mob attacks, 746 criminal

complaints have been filed with law enforcement officials. NOT ONE single

individual has been punished for these criminal acts. The culture of impunity

continues.î

[The End]
71

 October 17, 2000

PRESIDENT EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE

The Republic of Georgia,

Tbilisi, Georgia

DEAR PRESIDENT SHEVARDNADZE:

We write because of our deep concern over the recent violence against

members of minority religions in Georgia, which has specifically targeted Jehovahís Witnesses and Baptists, but has also caused deep anxiety among practitioners of other faiths. These events indicate a precipitous decline in religious liberty and raise questions about the stateís

willingness and ability to maintain law and order, to protect all citizens

and to guarantee their rights on an equal basis.

As you are undoubtedly aware, over the last year there has been a

series of violent attacks against Jehovahís Witnesses, who have been

threatened, attacked by mobs, and beaten severely, to the point of injury

requiring hospitalization. These events have occurred in Tbilisi,

Lanchkhuti, Abasha, Senaki, Kutaisi, Zugdidi, and Pirveli Maisi. Most

appalling has been police complicity in these assaults. Police refused to

stop a violent attack on Jehovahís Witnesses, their lawyers, and a reporter from Radio Liberty on August 16, 2000, in the Gldani-Nadzaladevi

courtroom. Most recently, police and local officials violently dispersed an

assembly of Jehovahís Witnesses in Zugdidi on September 8, and on September 16, police joined followers ofan ultra-nationalist, defrocked Orthodox priest in attacking Jehovahís Witnesses in Marneuli and looting their

convention site. Eyewitnesses report that police beat at least two Jehovahís

Witnesses and the assailants burned the library of a church member.

In addition to these threats and attacks, religious literature of the

Jehovahís Witnesses has also been confiscated. Georgia, as a participating State in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,

has made commitments to ìallow religious faiths, institutions and organizations to produce, import and disseminate religious publications

and materialsî (1989 Vienna Concluding Document section 16.10). Georgia has also reaffirmed that ìeveryone will have the right to freedom of

expression including the right to communication. This right will include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information

and ideas without interference by public authority...î (1990 Copenhagen

Concluding Document section 9.1)

Jehovahís Witnesses are not the only minority religion to have been

harassed and assaulted. On August 20, the chief of the Tianeti district

police and three other policemen broke up a Baptist service, took away

the chairs and a Bible, threw aside the pulpit and damaged a large cross.

Mr. President, multi-ethnic, multi-national Georgia has long prided

itself on its reputation for tolerance. The events described above are not

only a violation of Georgiaís OSCE commitments, they shame the Georgian people. We know of your public condemnation of the October 17,
72

1999 attack on a gathering of Jehovahís Witnesses in Tbilisi, but it is

our understanding that few, if any, of the perpetrators of that assault or

more recent outrages have been prosecuted to date.

The latest events are genuinely alarming and raise fears that the

situation in Georgia is getting out of hand. If nothing is done, those

calling for violence against religious minorities will be encouraged to

continue their rampages. We hope that you, as head of state, would set

an example for the public and Georgiaís officials and send two strong,

clear messages: whatever oneís views of other religions, it is impermissible to use any form of violence against its practitioners; and individuals who engage in such violenceóespecially policemen who either facilitate or actually participate in these disgraceful actionsówill be

prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. Finally, the Jehovahís Witnessesí confiscated literature should be released and Georgiaís commitments on free religious expression must be upheld in the future.

We view Georgia as an ally and friend of the United States and Georgia

has received considerable assistanceómaterial, financial and moraló

from the American people. However, U.S. support for Georgia could come

into question if attacks on members of minority religions continue and

the perpetrators are not punished. We urge you to take quick action to

reassure members of minority religions in Georgia, as well as interested

observers in other countries, of the sincerity of Georgiaís commitments

to international standards of human rights and religious liberty.

SINCERELY,

cc: The Honorable Zurab Zhvania, Speaker of Parliament

The Honorable Kenneth Yalowitz, U.S. Ambassador to Georgia

The Honorable Tedo Japaridze, Georgian Ambassador to the United

States
73

May 15, 2002

HIS EXCELLENCY EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE

President, Republic of Georgia

Tbilisi, Georgia

DEAR PRESIDENT SHEVARDNADZE:

Alarmed by reports of continued organized mob violence against

minority religious groups, we want to express our concern about the

apparent inability of your government to end the attacks and provide adequate redress. Permitting these ongoing and egregious violations eviscerates Georgiaís commitments as a participating State in

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). We

urge you to take concrete steps to provide for the security of all Georgians without distinction as to religion.

For more than two years, mob attacks against members of minority religious communities have repeatedly occurred, often with police refusing to restrain the attackers or actually participating

in the violence. Since October 1999, nearly 80 attacks against Jehovahís Witnesses have taken place, most led by a defrocked Georgian

Orthodox priest, Vasili Mkalavishvili. Other minority religious

communities have also been targeted by Mkalavishvili, including

a Pentecostal church, an Evangelical church, and a warehouse

owned by the Baptist Union. Reports cite religious services being

raided, people being dragged by their hair and then summarily punched,

kicked and clubbed, as well as buses carrying Jehovahís Witnesses

being stopped and attacked. To date, these transgressions have

gone unpunished, despite the reported filing of over 700 criminal

complaints.

While the commencement on January 25, 2002 of criminal proceedings against Mkalavishvili and one of his top lieutenants

for two mob attacks gave pause for hope, that hope quickly faded.

The charges brought in the Didube-Chugureti District Court

are for minor offenses, and, since the initial hearing, postponement of the case has occurred five times due to Mkalavishviliís mob,

sometimes numbering in the hundreds, overrunning the court. With

police refusing to provide adequate security, lawyers filed a motion asking for court assistance, but the judge ruled the maximum security

allowed would be 10 policemen, while no limit was placed on the number of Mkalavishviliís followers permitted to enter. In contrast, the Ministry of Interior has protected its own officials by reportedly providing

more than 200 police when Mkalavishvili was brought to trial under

different charges.

Certainly the Georgian Government could provide adequate security in such a setting, but your government is not taking effective

steps to deter individuals and groups from employing violence against
74

minority faith communities. Failure to confront these transgressions will only lead Mkalavishvili, as well as other criminals, to

continually flout Georgian laws. Accordingly, we call upon you, Mr.

President, to put an end to these attacks, and to honor Georgiaís OSCE

commitments to promote and protect religious freedom. We ask you to

ensure concrete steps are taken to punish the perpetrators through vigorous prosecution, thereby demonstrating that such violence will not be

tolerated.

SINCERELY,
75

LETTER FROM EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE,

PRESIDENT OF GEORGIA, TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY

AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,

DATED JUNE 3, 2002

PRESIDENT OF GEORGIA

THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

June 3, 2002

DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE:

I share your concern expressed in your letter of May 15, 2000 regarding the treatment of religious minority groups in Georgia. Regrettable

as it may be, you had every ground to raise this issue, since manifestations of faith-related intolerance and religious extremism have really

taken place in Georgia recently. I have discussed these problems many

a time in the past and yet find it necessary to reiterate my position on

this matter: I strongly condemn any form of religious extremism and

religion-based violence. They are inadmissible and should not go unpunished in any society that calls itself democratic, let alone civilized.

Georgia has always been a tolerant country and it is imperative that

this tradition should continue in the future.

That said, I still find it useful to provide you with some background

information that might help explain the sentiments that trigger those

acts of violence. For centuries the Georgian Orthodox Church has played

a very special role in preserving our countryís statehood and Georgian

nation itself. So much so, that, in fact, generations of Georgians perceived the Church as a symbol of nationhood. This attitude is reflected

in the Constitution of our country. Today, much as was the case in the

past, public regards the Georgian Orthodox Church as a bedrock institution of the independent Georgian state, an instrument meant to protect its historical and cultural heritage as well as to uphold its traditions. Aside from the Orthodox Christians hundreds of thousands of

Muslims, Gregorian Armenians, Roman Catholics and Jews have long

lived in Georgia without causing or encountering any serious problems.

The appearance of the various new, non-traditional religious groups,

little known in Georgia until now, has proved somewhat unexpected

and has eventually resulted in causing a significant part of our society

to view them in a negative light, since many tend to think that these

groups, by trying to win over converts, seek to undermine foundations

of our state. This mentality is obviously wrong and we need to have it

changed, which, I am certain, is only a matter of time. Having done

this we will be able to put an end to religion-based extremism and fully

restore traditions of tolerance I referred to earlier. Also I firmly believe

that the activities of the religious groups, both traditional and nontraditional, are to be legally regulated by enacting relevant legislation.

I am fully aware that no valid arguments can be advanced to justify

acts of violence committed against religious minorities. Any act of this

kind is a crime under Georgiaís criminal legislation and persons committing them ought to be held responsible. The same is true of the law

enforcement officials who refuse to perform their duties and look on as

angry crowds resort to violence.
76

Let me assure you that I am fully determined to eliminate any further manifestations of religious extremism. As a matter of fact some

appropriate steps have already been taken to properly investigate all

cases, bring perpetrators to justice and punish them in accordance with

the existing law.

On May 17, 2002 I issued a special Decree aimed at strengthening

human rights protection in Georgia. More specifically, the President of

Georgia has instructed the Procuracy, the Ministry of Justice and the

Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia to take necessary measures to

ensure that every individual in our country can fully exercise the entire

set of freedoms guaranteed by the Georgian Constitution, that each act

of violence committed against religious minorities is investigated and

submitted to the court so that the perpetrators are duly punished, that

training of personnel in the field of human rights is conducted, wherein

inadmissibility of religious intolerance is particularly stressed.

As you are aware, in Georgia which fully adheres to the principle of

separation of powers, court is independent. Neither the President of

Georgia, nor other governmental bodies or individual officials are allowed or, in fact, able to influence the judgments it makes. The above

Decree, however, tasks the Council of Justice of Georgia (consultative

agency headed by the President of Georgia) to give special attention to

the consideration of court cases related to violence, torture or degrading

treatment of religious minority groups, so that these cases are tried

without any obstacles and undue delay.

Strict control is established over the implementation of the assignments listed above. The Decree and my statement entitled ìHuman

rights protection is a key priority of Georgian stateî have been published and made available to law enforcement officials and all those

interested in the issues of human rights protection.

Besides, previously I assigned the Ministry of Justice of Georgia a

task of elaborating a draft law on religious organizations, in compliance

with international obligations of our country in the field of human rights.

This draft is to be submitted to the President of Georgia no later than

mid-July 2002.

I firmly believe that after all these assignments are implemented

within the strictly established time frame, we will be in a position to

sayñreligious intolerance in Georgia has no future and manifestations

of faith-related violence can occur no more.

SINCERELY,

Eduard Shevardnadze
77

ìSEARCHING FOR AN END TO RELIGIOUS VIOLENCEî

BY HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CO-CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

REPRINTED FROM GEORGIAN NEWSPAPERS

24 SAATI [24 HOURS] AND RESONANCI [RESONANCE],

AUGUST 27, 2002

A disturbing pattern of escalating violence against non-Orthodox religious communities in Georgia and the failure of government authorities to deal effectively with these actions have become a matter of significant concern to many Members of the U.S. Congress, myself included.

I have been in Congress for over 20 years and appreciate the importance of good relations between Georgia and the United States. The

United States has done much to assist its friend in the transition from

the horrors of Soviet domination. This was the case before September

11 and is even more so today, as U.S. forces provide training and technical assistance to the Georgian military in our common war against

terrorism.

Sadly, as the Georgian and U.S. Governments have increased cooperation to root out terrorists, we have witnessed another very disturbing, negative trend of domestic terrorism. Over the past three years in

Georgia there has been a sharp increase in the number of violent attacks on minority religious faiths and their Georgian adherents.

Non-Orthodox religious groups in Georgia have endured escalating

harassment and frequent brutal assaults. Peaceful citizens have been

beaten with clubs and, in at least one incident, dragged by their hair

without provocation, with Jehovahís Witnesses being singled out as a

particular target. Pentecostals, Baptists, and Jehovahís Witnesses have

been attacked during worship services and their religious material, including Bibles, have been burned. These attacks have resulted in numerous injuries, although, miraculously, no one has been killed thus

far. The provocateurs behind the mob attacks are well known, with

their brutality documented and widely seen on Georgian television. Nevertheless, Georgian authorities have failed to arrests the culprits. As a

result, with the violence spreading unchallenged, Georgia is in danger

of succumbing to mob rule.

Particularly shocking is the claim by the perpetrators of these attacks that they are defending Georgian Orthodox Christianity. I am

certain the church would never condone such violence and bigotry, which

are so obviously at odds with Christís teachings. In fact, His Holiness

Ilia II, head of the Georgian Orthodox Church, recently called the violent incidents that have taken place on religious grounds ìtotally alien

to our way of life and traditions.î Indeed, such criminal behavior is

inconsistent with the church ís long, distinguished tradition and sullies

the international reputation of Georgia.

Yet, in early July, following nearly two months of relative calm, Georgia experienced a new outbreak of mob violence against Pentecostals,

Catholics, Jehovahís Witnesses and the political think tank, the Liberty Institute. Unfortunately the government has continued to demonstrate its unwillingness or inability to deal with the violence.

The religious violence perpetrated on August 15 in the town of Kaspi,

Shida Kartli, follows the pattern of previous incidents. Inflammatory,

bigoted utterances regarding Jehovahís Witnesses by leading Georgian

politicians, which can only be described as incitement to violence, pre-
78

ceded a violent arson attack on a peaceful meeting place leaving the site

-- and the private dwelling of the property owner -- destroyed. Despite

explicit advance warning and requests for assistance from human rights

advocates and the American Embassy, the Georgian authorities did not

intervene to prevent this most recent attack against a religious minority. We expect the Georgian Government to conduct a full and transparent investigation and bring the perpetrators in this and previous

cases to justice without delay and to finally bring a halt to this cycle of

religious violence.

Together with 14 other Members of Congress, I had initiated a letter

to President Shevardnadze urging him to take concrete steps to end the

ongoing religious violence. Ambassador Miles has also repeatedly raised

this issue with the President and at all levels of the Georgian government. Although we have received positive replies, the continuing violence makes clear that the government must take more direct measures to protect all Georgians, regardless of their faith. The perpetrators

of violence must be arrested and brought to justice. Until this happens

we will continue to raise our concerns.

Clamping down on minority religious communities is not the answer.

A draft law on religion limiting free speech and imposing new burdensome registration requirements on religious groups should be shelved.

By restricting free speech, whether religious in nature or viewed as

ìproselytism,î the Republic of Georgia violates its international commitments. Therefore, I urge Georgian legislators to not pass the draft

law, as well as urge all Georgians to be tolerant of all their fellow citizens, even those who do not share the prevailing religious beliefs.

Additionally, some have argued that creating a law on religion will

end the violence. However, in my opinion, the answer to mob violence

against religious minorities is not heavy regulation of religious organizations. I believe that criminal law is most effective in dealing with

criminal actions, rather than trying to use some specially crafted law

on religion.

Make no mistake, I have great respect for the Republic of Georgia,

the Georgian Orthodox Church, and the people of Georgia. As Co-Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I

appreciate the long history of Georgiaís people, culture and its valiant

effort to cope with multiple challenges after emerging from eight decades of Soviet Communist rule.

The United States has demonstrated its support for Georgiaís transition to democracy, committing sizeable resources, both in money and

training. Part of a successful transition must be the growth of religious

freedom in the country. For these reasons I respectively ask President

Shevardnadze, the Georgian Government and the people of Georgia to

stand up and put an end to mob violence and the harassment of your

fellow citizens. We want to help build a Georgia where all people, regardless of religious belief, can live and worship in peace and security.

Rep. Christopher H. Smith has served in the U.S. Congress for over

20 years. He is currently Co-Chairman of the U.S. Commission on

Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Commission),

Vice-Chairman of the House International Relations Committee and

Chairman of the Committee on Veterans Affairs.
 	








  	

 

	
 	 



  

  




   

 


    


	



	
  
  


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