NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CATERINA W., Appellant,

v.

ANTHONY R., S.R., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 17-0558 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS518175

The Honorable Steven P. Lynch, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Gerald D. Sherrill, Attorney at Law, Scottsdale

By Gerald D. Sherrill

Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James P. Beene delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

FILED 5-24-2018
CATERINA W. v. ANTHONY R., S.R.

Decision of the Court

2

B E E N E, Judge:

¶1 Caterina W. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s ruling 

denying her request for severance of the parent-child relationship of S.R. 

(born in 2012) and Anthony R. (“Father”). For the following reasons, we 

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father are the biological parents of S.R. and were 

not married at the time of S.R.’s birth. During the first years of S.R.’s life, 

Mother and Father lived together and raised S.R. as co-parents. Both before 

and after S.R.’s birth, Father had several DUI arrests that led to him being

incarcerated from September 2014 through May 2015. In March 2015, 

Mother filed a petition to establish Father’s paternity in family court.

¶3 After Father’s release in May 2015, he visited S.R. multiple

times before an incident in August 2015, in which he showed up to Mother’s 

residence intoxicated and Mother refused him access to S.R. In August 

2015, Father received a default order for custody and child support from 

their family court case that gave Mother sole legal decision-making 

authority over S.R. (the “family court order”). The family court order also

required Father to satisfy the terms of his probation, pay all his fines, and 

participate in an alcohol treatment program before the court would 

reconsider his parenting time. After receiving the family court order, 

Father had no physical contact with S.R.

¶4 Between August 2015 and March 2016, Father spoke with S.R. 

on the phone several times. However, after March 2016, Father did not 

attempt to contact S.R. in any way, including by phone, letters, cards, or 

gifts. Father was again incarcerated from October 2016 through October 

2017.

¶5 In March 2017, Mother filed a petition for termination of 

Father’s parental rights to S.R., in which she alleged abandonment due to

Father’s failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with S.R. 

without just cause for six or more months under Arizona Revised Statutes

(“A.R.S.”) section 8-533(B)(1). In November 2017, the superior court held a 

two-day contested termination hearing and subsequently denied Mother’s 

request for severance of Father’s parental rights to S.R., finding that Mother 

had not established by clear and convincing evidence abandonment under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235, 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).
CATERINA W. v. ANTHONY R., S.R.

Decision of the Court

3

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

¶6 The right to parent one’s child is fundamental but not 

absolute. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 24 (2005). The superior 

court may terminate parental rights if it finds, “by clear and convincing 

evidence, at least one of the statutory grounds set out in section 8-533,” and 

by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests 

of the child. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248-49, ¶ 12 

(2000); Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 22.

¶7 “[W]e view the evidence and reasonable inferences to be 

drawn from it in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s decision,” 

Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009), and 

we will not reverse unless there is no reasonable evidence to support the 

order, Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 

2004). Because the superior court “is in the best position to weigh the 

evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make 

appropriate findings,” we will accept its findings of fact unless no 

reasonable evidence supports them. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 

Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002).

II. Abandonment

¶8 Mother argues that the superior court erred by using an 

incorrect standard of abandonment to determine whether Father had 

abandoned S.R. She specifically argues that, regarding Father’s 

relationship with S.R., the court erred by considering Father’s subjective 

intent instead of his conduct.

¶9 One statutory ground for termination is abandonment. A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(1). “Abandonment” is defined as:

the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to 

maintain regular contact with the child, including providing 

normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial 

finding that a parent has made only minimal efforts to 

support and communicate with the child. Failure to maintain 

a normal parental relationship with the child without just 

cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie 

evidence of abandonment.

A.R.S. § 8-531(1).
CATERINA W. v. ANTHONY R., S.R.

Decision of the Court

4

¶10 We assess abandonment objectively based on the parent’s 

conduct, not subjective intent. Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249-50, ¶ 18. “What 

constitutes reasonable support, regular contact, and normal supervision 

varies from case to case.” Id. at 250, ¶ 20 (citation omitted). “Questions of 

abandonment and intent are questions of fact for resolution by the trial 

court. Unless there is no reasonable evidence to support the juvenile court’s 

finding of facts, we must accept them.” Yuma Cty. Juvenile Court Action No. 

J-87-119, 161 Ariz. 537, 539 (App. 1989) (internal citation omitted).

¶11 Here, reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s 

finding that Father had not abandoned S.R. The court determined that 

Father had not contacted S.R. in any way since March 2016. However, the 

court also found that Father “believed he could not see [S.R.] until he 

completed the terms of the Family Court order” and “that his lack of contact 

was based on his good faith belief that he was complying with the terms of 

the Family Court Order.”

¶12 Father repeatedly testified at the termination hearing that he 

thought that (1) the family court order prevented him from seeing S.R. until 

he “fulfill[ed] the requirements” of his probation, and (2) Mother could 

prevent him from interacting with S.R. because the “court order gave her 

the parenting rights to tell [Father] whatever she wanted [him] to not do.” 

Moreover, the guardian ad litem argued at the termination hearing that 

abandonment had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence 

because “if [Father was] under the impression that he can’t have contact” 

with S.R. pursuant to the family court order, then Father “was doing what 

he thought the Court and the Mother wanted.”

¶13 While Mother argues it was error for the superior court to 

consider Father’s subjective intent regarding his understanding of the 

family court order as opposed to his conduct of not having any interactions

with S.R. for a period greater than six months, the court’s evaluation of a 

parent’s efforts “will depend on the circumstances of the particular case.” 

Kenneth B. v. Tina B., 226 Ariz. 33, 37, ¶ 19 (App. 2010). Here, the court 

considered all the evidence and concluded that all testimony was credible, 

including Father’s. Abandonment questions are questions of fact for the 

superior court to decide, J-87-119, 161 Ariz. at 539, and we must accept the 

court’s findings of fact unless no reasonable evidence supports them, Jesus 
CATERINA W. v. ANTHONY R., S.R.

Decision of the Court

5

M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 4. Because reasonable evidence supports the court’s 

determination, we find that the court did not err.1

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

 

1 Mother also argues that the superior court’s finding that Father 

believed he was complying with the family court order was contrary to the 

evidence, citing several instances of Father’s failure to comply with that 

order. However, the court’s finding only pertains to Father’s belief that the 

order gave Mother the authority to prevent him from contacting S.R., not 

that Father believed he was complying with all aspects of the order. 

Therefore, we do not consider this argument.