SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2766-22 

WILLIAM COBURN, 

 Appellant, 

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE 

PAROLE BOARD, 

 Respondent. 

___________________

Submitted April 30, 2024 – Decided May 14, 2024 

Before Judges Paganelli and Augostini. 

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board. 

William Coburn, appellant pro se. 

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2766-22

William Coburn, currently an inmate Northern State Prison, challenges an 

April 26, 2023 final agency decision by the New Jersey State Parole Board 

(Board) denying him parole and imposing an eighteen-month future eligibility 

term (FET). We affirm. 

In March 1985, Coburn was convicted by a jury of the following: firstdegree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3; second-degree possession of a weapon for 

unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); third-degree unlawful possession of a 

weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); possession of a controlled dangerous substance 

(CDS) with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 24:21-19(a)(1) (repealed by L. 1987, c.

106, § 25); and possession of marijuana, N.J.S.A. 24:21-20(a)(4) (repealed by 

L. 1987, c. 106, § 25). In July 1985, Coburn was sentenced to an aggregate term 

of life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of thirty years for the murder 

conviction, nine months for the unlawful possession of a weapon charge, and 

six years for the possession of CDS with intent to distribute to run concurrently 

with the life sentence.1 

Coburn became eligible for parole on the first-degree murder offense in 

November 2014. Defendant received an initial parole hearing in December 

1

 The judge merged the second-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful 

purpose conviction into the murder conviction and the possession of marijuana 

conviction into the possession of CDS with intent to distribute conviction. 
3 A-2766-22

2022, after becoming parole eligible for the fifth time. After a hearing in 

January 2023, a two-member Board panel denied parole and established an 

eighteen-month FET. In finding there was a substantial likelihood Coburn 

would violate conditions of his parole if released, the panel cited: the facts and 

circumstances of the offense; prior opportunity on probation failed to deter 

criminal behavior; commission of institutional disciplinary infractions which 

were serious in nature and which resulted in loss of commutation time, with the 

most recent infraction occurring in December 2015; insufficient problem 

resolution, specifically, lack of insight into criminal behavior and minimization 

of conduct, as demonstrated by panel interview and documentation in the case 

file; and the results of an objective risk assessment indicating a "moderate" risk 

of recidivism. 

The panel also acknowledged the following mitigating factors: minimal 

prior record; all opportunities on community supervision committed without 

violation; infraction free since last panel hearing; participation in institutional 

programs; participation in program(s) specific to behavior; institutional reports 

reflect favorable institutional adjustment; minimum custody status achieved/ 

maintained; and correspondence in support of parole. 
4 A-2766-22

Coburn appealed to the full Board from the two-member Board panel's 

decision. On April 26, 2022, the full Board affirmed the two-member panel's 

decision to deny parole and impose an eighteen-month FET. In its 

comprehensive written opinion, the Board addressed each of Coburn's 

contentions and concluded it "concur[red] with the determination of the Board 

panel that a preponderance of the evidence indicate[d] that there is substantial 

likelihood that [Coburn] would commit a crime if released on parole at this 

time." 

On appeal, Coburn argues "three essential points" to support his assertion 

the Board erred in denying parole: first, the Board "incorrectly equate[d] a 'status 

offense' . . . with criminality"; second, the Board failed in not relying on "new 

information"; and third, the Board utilized an incorrect standard to deny him 

parole. 

 Our review of final decisions of the Board is limited. Malacow v. N.J. 

Dep't of Corr., 457 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Circus Liquors, 

Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 9 (2009)). The Board's 

parole determinations are entitled to deferential review given its expertise in 

rendering "'highly individualized' appraisal[s]" of an inmate's future behavior. 

Acoli v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 250 N.J. 431, 454 (2022) (quoting Trantino v.
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N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino VI), 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The Board's decision, as with other final agency 

decisions, will not be overturned unless it is "arbitrary, capricious or 

unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record 

as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980) (citing 

Campbell v. Dep't of Civ. Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)). The Board's decision 

is entitled to a presumption of validity and reasonableness. In re Vey, 272 N.J. 

Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993). The burden of overcoming this presumption 

falls on the inmate to demonstrate the Board's actions were unreasonable. 

Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 304-05 (App. Div. 1993). 

 At the time of Coburn's offenses, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) provided the 

Board should generally grant parole to an inmate on their parole date unless it 

can be shown by "a preponderance of the evidence . . . there is a substantial 

likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime under the laws of this State if 

released on parole at such time." Perry v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 459 N.J. Super. 

186, 194 (App. Div. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams 

v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 336 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 2000)).2 In making its 

2

 The 1997 amendment to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) regarding parole eligibility 

states that an inmate shall be released on parole "unless information supplied in 
6 A-2766-22

parole decision, the Board must consider the factors set forth in N.J.A.C. 

10A:71-3.11(b)(1) to (24). In considering this non-exhaustive list of factors, the 

Board's "prediction as to future conduct and its opinion as to compatibility with 

the public welfare [must] be grounded on due consideration of the aggregate of 

all of the factors which may have any pertinence." Beckworth v. N.J. State 

Parole Bd., 62 N.J. 348, 360 (1973). 

 In evaluating whether Coburn should be released on parole, the Board 

considered several aggravating and mitigating factors. The Board reviewed 

Coburn's entire record in rendering its decision, which contained a juvenile 

truancy adjudication for which he received probation. The Board rejected 

Coburn's contention that it was not permitted to consider this adjudication given 

the passage of time. However, there is no evidence that the Board gave undue 

weight to this prior adjudication or that it was a significant factor in the Board's 

decision to deny parole. 

the report filed . . . or developed or produced at a hearing . . . indicates by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the inmate has failed to cooperate in his or 

her own rehabilitation or that there is a reasonable expectation that the inmate 

will violate conditions of parole imposed . . . if released on parole at the time." 

However, because Coburn committed his crimes prior to the amendment, the 

pre-1997 version of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a) applies to his case. 
7 A-2766-22

 The Board properly rejected Coburn's contention that it was limited to 

considering only "new information" since the last parole determination. 

Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd. (Trantino V), 331 N.J. Super. 577, 610-11 

(App. Div. 2000) (Board's consideration of all relevant information does not 

violate ex post facto clause). Coburn argues that the Third Circuit Court of 

Appeals in Holmes v. Christie, 14 F.4th 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2021) overturned the 

holding in Trantino V, which provided "that application of the 1997 amendments 

to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.56c . . . [does] not violate the ex post facto clause since 

this change in the law is a procedural modification that does not constitute a 

substantive change in the parole release criteria." Trantino V, 331 N.J. Super. 

at 610 (citing State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 56-57 (1996)); Cal. Dep't of 

Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, (1995). However, Holmes did not overrule 

Trantino V. Rather, the Third Circuit reinstated Holmes' ex post facto claim, 

permitting his claim to proceed and "remand[ing] for discovery to determine 

whether the retroactive application of the 1997 [a]mendments [specific] to 

Holmes 'create[d] a significant risk of prolonging [his] incarceration.'" Holmes, 

14 F.4th at 268 (fourth and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Garner v. Jones, 

529 N.J. 244, 251 (2000)). 
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Based upon Coburn's responses to questions posed by the Board at the 

hearing and the documentation in the file, the Board determined Coburn 

exhibited insufficient problem resolution, specifically, that he "lack[ed] insight 

into [his] criminal behavior, and that [he] minimize[d] [his] conduct." The 

Board further noted that "while [Coburn] acknowledge[d] the serious 

consequences of [his] criminal activity . . . it represent[ed] only an initial effort 

at rehabilitation." 

In response to his failure to comply with the prior Board panel's 

suggestion that Coburn participate in "Focus on the Victim" and "Thinking for 

a Change" programs, Coburn advised the Board that the Focus on the Victim 

program was unavailable at the prison. Contrary to Coburn's assertion, the 

Board confirmed during the parole hearing that this program was in fact 

available to inmates at Northern State Prison. 

 Thus, the Board considered the appropriate factors in rendering its parole 

decision and applied the correct legal standards. Moreover, there is sufficient 

evidence in the record supporting the Board's denial of parole. We are persuaded 

that the Board's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and we affirm 

substantially for reasons given by the Board in its thorough written decision. 
9 A-2766-22

 Any remaining arguments advanced by Coburn lack sufficient merit to 

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

 Affirmed.