J-S45023-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TISEIM WILLIAMS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1859 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 31, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0000424-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2019

Tiseim Williams (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order dismissing his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court detailed the pertinent facts and procedural history of 

this case as follows:

On November 22, 2015, [Appellant] and two other men decided 

to rob Jonathan Mervin while he was asleep in his car. [N.T., 

10/27/16, at 16-17]. During the course of the robbery, the victim 

was shot five times and died as a result of his wounds. Id. at 17. 

Later, [Appellant] gave a statement to police admitting that he 

participated in the robbery, but only as a lookout. Id. One of the 

co-conspirators told police that [Appellant] was the one who shot 

the victim. Id. The murder weapon was recovered and 

[Appellant’s] DNA was found on the weapon, though police were 

told the gun was passed between several people before the 

robbery occurred. Id. at 17-18.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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On November 22, 2015, [Appellant] was arrested and charged 

with the shooting death of Mr. Mervin. . . . [Appellant] agreed to 

plead guilty to one count of third-degree murder, one count of 

conspiracy, and one count of robbery. In exchange, the 

Commonwealth agreed to recommend a sentence of 30 [to] 60 

years [of] incarceration. The negotiated sentence for each charge 

was as follows: 1) 20-40 years on the charge of third-degree 

murder; 2) 10-20 years on the charge of conspiracy, consecutive 

to the murder charge; and 3) 10-20 [years] on the charge of 

robbery, concurrent to the murder charge. Id. at 3-4.

On October 27, 2016, this matter was listed before [the trial 

court] in order for [Appellant] to plead guilty and be sentenced. 

Id. . . . Before [Appellant] pled guilty to the charges, the [trial 

court] asked if he read and reviewed the Written Guilty Plea 

Colloquy form with his attorney. Id. at 5-7. [Appellant] stated 

that he read and understood the document, that he understood 

the terms of the guilty plea, and that he signed the document. 

Id. The [trial court] then conducted a colloquy which, inter alia, 

advised [Appellant] that he was not required to plead guilty, he 

had the absolute right to a trial, and by accepting the guilty plea 

he gave up the rights he would have if the matter went to trial, as 

well as most of his appeal rights. Id. at 7-11. [Appellant] stated

that he understood that: 1) he did not have to plead guilty; 2) he 

had a right to a trial; and 3) by pleading guilty he gave up the 

rights he would otherwise have if the case went to trial. Id. at 

11-12. Finally, [Appellant] stated that he wished to accept the

negotiated guilty plea. Id. The Court asked if his decision to 

plead guilty was made voluntarily. Id. at 14. [Appellant] stated 

that his decision to plead guilty was voluntary and made of his 

own free will. Id.

The Commonwealth explained the elements of the offenses the 

Appellant was charged with committing, as well as the maximum 

penalty and fine each charge carried. Id. at 12-15. The 

Commonwealth presented a summary of the facts in the case. Id.

at 16-18. [Appellant] acknowledged the summary of facts 

accurately reflected what happened and based upon the facts he 

was prepared to plead guilty to the charges. Id. at 19. 

[Appellant] stated that, except for the terms of the negotiation, 

no one offered him anything in exchange for his guilty plea and 

no one threatened him in order to force him to plead guilty. Id.

[Appellant] stated that he was making the decision to plead guilty 

voluntarily and of his own free will. Id.
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[Appellant] was arraigned and pled guilty to one count of thirddegree murder, one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, and 

one count of robbery. Id. at 20-21. [Appellant] waived a 

presentence investigation and a mental health evaluation. Id. at 

22. . . . [The trial court] sentenced [Appellant] in accordance with 

the negotiated guilty plea. Id. at 41-42. [Appellant] was advised 

of his post-sentence and appeal rights. Id. at 42-45.

[Appellant] did not file a post-sentence motion or a direct 

appeal. On September 28, 2017, [Appellant] filed a timely pro se

PCRA petition, seeking release from custody and discharge 

because: 1) [the trial court] did not have jurisdiction over this 

matter; 2) the sentence was illegal; 3) ineffective assistance of 

counsel; and 4) he did not enter the negotiated plea deal 

voluntarily or knowingly.

[PCRA Counsel] was appointed . . . for [Appellant] on

December 11, 2017. On February 20, 2018, [PCRA] counsel filed 

a motion to withdraw as counsel and a no merit letter pursuant to 

[Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en 

banc),] which only addressed [Appellant]’s ineffective assistance 

of counsel and voluntariness of the plea agreement claims. On 

April 18, 2018, counsel filed an amended no merit letter which 

addressed [Appellant]’s jurisdictional and illegal sentence claims. 

On April 26, 2018, after an independent review, [the PCRA court] 

filed, and sent via certified mail to [Appellant], a “Notice of Intent 

to Dismiss Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure

907” (“907 Notice”). [The PCRA court] found that all claims 

asserted by [Appellant] were without merit.

On May 3, 2018, [Appellant] sent a response to the 907 Notice, 

asserting that his PCRA counsel was ineffective. After 

consideration of [Appellant’s] response and further finding his 

claims lacked merit, [the PCRA court] formally dismissed this 

matter and granted [PCRA] counsel’s motion to withdraw on May 

16, 2018 pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. [] 907.

[Appellant] filed a “Notice of Appeal,” pro se, pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 905, on June 12, 2018. [The PCRA court] ordered 

[Appellant] to file a concise statement of matter[s] raised on 

appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), on June 26, 2018. 

[Appellant filed] his “Statement of Matters Complained of on 
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Appeal Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

1925” (“1925(b) Statement”) on August 20, 2018.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/24/18, at 2-6 (footnote omitted).

Appellant presents a single issue for our review:

Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Appellant’s] PCRA 

petition deeming his guilty plea as knowingly[,] intelligently[,] 

and voluntar[ily] entered.

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unnumbered).

We review the denial of PCRA relief by “examining whether the PCRA 

court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its 

conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Busanet, 

54 A.3d 35, 45 (Pa. 2012). “Our scope of review is limited to the findings of 

the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the party who prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding.” Id.

Appellant’s sole issue on appeal challenges Plea Counsel’s effectiveness 

in relation to Appellant’s guilty plea. In deciding ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims, we begin with the presumption that counsel rendered effective 

assistance. Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1188 (Pa. 2014). 

To overcome that presumption, the petitioner must establish: “(1) the 

underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for 

counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as 

a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a 

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Id. (citation omitted). To demonstrate prejudice in an ineffective 
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assistance of counsel claim, “the petitioner must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v. King, 57 

A.3d 607, 613 (Pa. 2012). If the petitioner fails to prove any of these prongs, 

the claim is subject to dismissal. Bomar, 104 A.3d at 1188.

“Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty 

plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the 

defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. 

Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 531 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quotations and citation 

omitted). “Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the 

voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the 

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id.

(quotations and citations omitted). “Thus, to establish prejudice, the 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 

going to trial.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (quotations and citations omitted). “The reasonable probability test is 

not a stringent one; it merely refers to a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

With respect to valid guilty pleas, this Court has explained:

A valid guilty plea must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 

entered. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate 

that pleas be taken in open court, and require the court to conduct 

an on-the-record colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is 
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aware of his rights and the consequences of his plea. Specifically, 

the court must affirmatively demonstrate the defendant 

understands: (1) the nature of the charges to which he is pleading 

guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) his right to trial by 

jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible ranges 

of sentences and fines possible; and (6) that the court is not 

bound by the terms of the agreement unless the court accepts the 

agreement. This Court will evaluate the adequacy of the plea 

colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining 

the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of that 

plea.

Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations 

omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590.

Appellant argues that Plea Counsel was ineffective because he informed 

Appellant that the negotiated sentence was 15 to 30 years of incarceration 

when the trial court ultimately sentenced Appellant to 30 to 60 years of 

incarceration. Appellant asserts that Plea Counsel’s ineffectiveness resulted 

in a guilty plea that was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent because he 

would not have pled guilty if he knew he was going to receive the 30 to 60 

year-sentence.

There is no record support for Appellant’s claim. As recounted by the 

PCRA court, Appellant received an extensive colloquy at his guilty plea 

hearing, during which the court informed Appellant of the nature of the 

charges to which he pled, the factual basis for the plea, his right to a jury trial, 

the presumption of innocence, and the permissible ranges of sentences and 

fines. N.T., 10/27/16, at 5-20. Additionally, at the outset of the hearing, the 

trial court explicitly stated that the negotiated sentence Appellant would 
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receive was 30 to 60 years of incarceration. Id. at 4. Appellant did not 

express any misunderstanding regarding his sentence. See id. at 15, 19. It 

is well settled that “[a] person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the 

statements he makes in open court while under oath and he may not later 

assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he 

made at his plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Pier, 182 A.3d 476, 480 (Pa. 

Super. 2018) (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, not only did the trial 

court engage Appellant in an extensive guilty plea colloquy which covered all 

of the factors set forth in Kelley, but the court expressly informed him of the 

terms of the negotiated sentence.

Further, the record contains no evidence that Appellant ever received 

an offer of 15 to 30 years of incarceration. See Turner/Finley No-Merit 

Letter, 2/20/18. In sum, there is no record support for Appellant’s claim that 

he entered his guilty plea based on the improper advice of Plea Counsel. 

Therefore, the PCRA court correctly determined that Appellant’s guilty plea 

was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See Kelley, 136 A.3d at 1013; see 

also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590. Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim is meritless, and the PCRA court did not abuse its 

discretion in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. See Bomar, 104 A.3d at 

1188; Barndt, 74 A.3d at 192.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/28/19