STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ: THE MIDDLE EAST,

NORTH AFRICA, AND TURKEY

Dr. W. Andrew Terrill

March 2003
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The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not

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Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report

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ISBN 1-58487-115-6

ii
FOREWORD

War with Iraq will signal the beginning of a new era in

American national security policy and alter strategic

balances and relationships around the world. The specific

effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. In

some, America’s position will be strengthened. In others, it

may degrade without serious and sustained efforts.

To assess this dynamic, the Strategic Studies Institute

(SSI) has developed a special series of monographs entitled

Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq. In each, the

author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position

that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military

action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after

the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the

region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with

Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.

This monograph is one of the special series. SSI is

pleased to offer it to assist the Department of Army and

Department of Defense in crafting the most effective

strategy possible for dealing with the many consequences of

war with Iraq.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

Dr. W. Andrew Terrill joined the Strategic Studies Institute

in October 2001, and is SSI’s Middle East specialist. Prior to

his appointment, he served as a senior international

security analyst for the International Assessments Division

of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). In

1998-99, Dr. Terrill also served as a Visiting Professor at the

U.S. Air War College on assignment from LLNL. He is a

former faculty member at Old Dominion University in

Norfolk, Virginia, and has taught adjunct at a variety of

other colleges and universities. He is a U.S. Army Reserve

lieutenant colonel and a Foreign Area Officer (Middle East).

Dr. Terrill has published in numerous academic journals on

topics including nuclear proliferation, the Iran-Iraq War,

Operation DESERT STORM, Middle Eastern chemical

weapons, and ballistic missile proliferation, terrorism, and

commando operations. Since 1994, at U.S. State Department invitation, Dr. Terrill has participated in the Middle

Eastern Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Track

2 talks, which are part of the Middle East Peace Process. He

holds a B.A. from California State Polytechnic University

and an M.A. from the University of California, Riverside,

both in Political Science. Dr Terrill also holds a Ph.D. in

International Relations from Claremont Graduate

University, Claremont, California.

iv
STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ THE MIDDLE EAST,

NORTH AFRICA, AND TURKEY

1

Conclusions:

A U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq will place

popular pressure on a number of moderate Arab states

to reduce high profile military cooperation with the

United States.

Following a war, Saudi Arabia will probably seek to

reduce substantially or eliminate the U.S. military

presence in the kingdom due to a more limited regional

threat and the domestic difficulties with a U.S.

presence.

Other Arab nations may continue to cooperate with

the U.S. militarily but seek to do so with reduced

visibility following an Iraq war.

Radical Middle Eastern states are deeply concerned

about a U.S. presence in Iraq but will probably be

constrained from opposing it through subversion due

to fear they may become a future target in the war on

terrorism.

The politically powerful Turkish military will seek to

ensure that U.S.-Turkish ties will remain intact

despite disagreements over Iraq.

Israel will consider using an invasion of Iraq to expel

Palestinian Authority (PA) officials, increasing Arab

speculation about U.S.-Israeli coordination against

the Arab world. The likelihood of Israel expelling PA

leaders will depend upon how the Israelis perceive

Washington will respond to such an act.
Regional Overview.

The populations of the Middle East and North Africa are

among those groups most likely to become uncontainably

angry and violent over any U.S. invasion of Iraq, prompting

their governments to seek political and military distance

from Washington. The best case for the United States in the

event of an Iraqi invasion would be a rapidly passing storm

of popular anger that has no lasting influence. This

alternative is not likely. The worst case would be an angry

radicalization of Arab politics which leaves the United

States with a huge number of new enemies in the region and

widely legitimizes the concept of global anti-U.S. terrorism,

including attacks against civilians. Under these circumstances, many local governments would have to consider

ways in which they might limit political and military

cooperation with the United States or at least further

reduce the visibility of such cooperation. Moreover, this

worst case analysis may be closer to the expected outcome

unless the United States wages a short war with few civilian

casualties followed by a well-managed occupation that is

welcomed by the Iraqi population.

Even in the most extreme cases of popular anger, it is

doubtful that friendly and moderate Arab governments

would fall in the immediate aftermath of an invasion, but it

is likely that the long-term viability of these governments

will be wounded by a pro-U.S. record and especially by any

pro-U.S actions taken during the invasion. Also, since

Islamic militancy is now widely seen as the most effective

way of opposing the United States, militant groups in many

Arab countries would probably be strengthened by a rise in

popular anger generated by a U.S. invasion and occupation.

The factors that will be most important for minimizing

an angry response across the Middle East include: (1)

acquisition of a U.N. Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force, (2) targeting regime infrastructure

while minimizing collateral damage, etc., and (3) a rapid

and decisive effort to remove U.S. troops from Iraq and leave

2
a stable and prosperous government in place. The Arab

World is also maintaining that Saddam is currently

operating in good faith, so continuing publicity for strong

public proof that Iraq systemically has violated U.N.

resolutions on disarmament would also help minimize

wartime political fallout. A bloody war will bring out the

true depths of Arab emotions on these issues.

Additionally, many, if not most, Arabs currently regret

the Arab support provided to the United States in defeating

Saddam in 1991. A straightforward interpretation of this

campaign is almost nonexistent in the Arab World. Rather,

overwhelmingly popular conspiracy theories suggest that

Saddam was tricked into invading Kuwait by the United

States, which wanted an excuse to attack and humiliate a

rising Arab leader. Many Arabs who supported the United

States in 1991 feel guilt about their actions and are

determined not to be too easily led by the United States in

this new situation.

Under the best of circumstances, the U.S. message

justifying the invasion of Iraq will be lost and distorted by

many Arab audiences who will obtain the majority of their

news from a skeptical Arab media. Civilian casualties will

be exaggerated, and fabricated charges of war crimes can be

expected, as occurred with the Israelis in Jenin in 2002. The

worst anti-American propaganda will find a receptive

audience, and many of the actions that Saddam did to bring

this war on himself will be minimized by at least some Arab

states. This situation will dramatically increase the

possibility of anti-U.S. agitation and terrorism throughout

the region, and perhaps reaching once again into the U.S.

heartland.

Key Moderate Arab Nations.

Moderate Arab nations have been placed in a

particularly difficult position by the current crisis. In 1990,

Islamic jurists in Egypt and Saudi issued fatwas that

sanctioned the use of foreign troops to liberate Kuwait. No

3
such justifications exist at this time, and the need for

military action against Iraq, as noted, is widely doubted in

the Arab World. Most moderate Arab states therefore have

been weighing carefully the costs and benefits of

cooperating with the United States during an upcoming

war, while considering any possible middle ground that will

allow such cooperation without offending domestic public

opinion. Postwar Arab cooperation may be more likely since

this can be justified as a response to Iraqi needs for

humanitarian help and postwar security.

Saudi Arabia is one of the most important U.S. allies,

and its behavior will influence the behavior of a number of

Arab states. The strength and resilience of the Saudi

monarchy is subject to tremendous disagreement among

Middle Eastern scholars. The regime should certainly

survive the immediate aftermath of an invasion of Iraq,

although anger over this issue could fuse with other popular

concerns to become regime-threatening at a later point.

Such concerns include widespread corruption, poor

economic planning, and the inability of the monarchy to halt

a declining standard of living. A basic characteristic of the

current regime is that it is controlled by a relatively proWestern elite ruling anti-American masses. The fear of

significant popular anger and increasing government

dissent will thus be a significant consideration for the Saudi

rulers, and strengthen Saudi resolve to stay out of the war in

any visible way.

In the aftermath of a U.S. victory in Iraq, the Saudis will

look for ways to reduce or eliminate the U.S. military

presence in the Kingdom. Previously, Riyadh has

reluctantly accepted the problem of domestic dissent over

this issue due to concerns about the threat from Iraq and, to

a lesser extent, Iran. After a war, the Saudis will probably

assume that they can be protected adequately from Iran

(with which they have no direct border) or other regional

threats without a significant U.S. military presence in the

Kingdom. Anti-American emotions within the Kingdom

may also increase during the war should U.S. military

4
conduct become controversial within the Arab World. Such

controversy would add urgency to Saudi interest in reducing

U.S. military presence.

Saudi leaders are mindful of their current extremely

strained relations with the United States, and the public

statements by some pro-war U.S. commentators about the

need to extend democratic government from Iraq to Saudi

Arabia. This situation may give them pause about pushing

too forcefully for a U.S. withdrawal for fear of further

alienating Washington and losing influence with the U.S.

Government. Nevertheless, Saudi leaders profoundly fear

domestic unrest and will accept a further battering of

U.S.-Saudi relations, if this is seen as the alternative to

domestic crisis. If serious domestic unrest results from the

war, the Saudis will pressure the United States to withdraw

its forces soon.

Another important U.S. ally is Egypt, although the aid

granted to Egypt over the past several decades has bought

little good will. Rather, a surprising level of hostility and

distrust exists in that country. This mistrust is nurtured by

middle class suspicions that the United States seeks a

weak, dependent, and grateful Egypt that is willing to bend

to the will of the Israelis. It is also quite stunning how

popular Egyptian bin Laden lieutenant Ayman Al-Zawahiri

has become in Egypt in intellectual and Islamist circles.

Bin-laden himself has strong street appeal in some of

Egypt’s more impoverished neighborhoods. In response to

anti-U.S. opinion, Egyptian leaders maintain that U.S. ties

are important to help manage and moderate U.S. power.

The Egyptian government is, nevertheless, loath to be seen

as comprised of U.S. followers.

Egyptian leaders, like the Saudis, have counseled

strongly against a war. Unlike Saudi Arabia, however, the

Egyptians greatly depend on U.S. economic aid and thus

have special reasons not to offend the United States too

deeply. Moreover, Egyptian President Mubarak dislikes

Saddam Hussein, and the pro-government media strongly

5
maintains that Egypt should not suffer for Saddam’s follies.

Pro-government sources consistently maintain that Egypt

has done a great deal to avert war, while Saddam, through

stubborn arrogance, has gone out of his way to incite it.

Therefore Saddam is portrayed as possibly meeting a fool’s

end despite Cairo’s best efforts to prevent conflict. Street

demonstrators and radical students are only contributing to

the possibility that Egypt will suffer a crippling halt of U.S.

aid in order to support Saddam’s foolishness.

The Egyptian leadership thus seems poised to continue

long-term cooperation with the United States, including

some military and intelligence cooperation. Intelligence

sharing along with logistical support for U.S. forces will

probably continue as usual after any U.S-Iraqi war. It is also

likely that Egypt will consider placing some of its own forces

in Iraq as peacekeepers should the U.N. so request. This

action can be presented as an effort to speed the departure of

U.S. troops and return sovereignty to Iraq.

The Jordanian leadership is probably more frightened of

a war than any of Iraq’s other neighbors. With a depressed

economy, 30 percent unemployment, a large number of

refugees, and a huge youth bulge, there is no shortage of

frustrated, unhappy people who may be tempted to go into

the streets when the invasion starts. Moreover, the

Palestinian two-thirds of the Jordanian population consider

Israel a more important threat than Iraq. These

Jordanian-Palestinians are already passionately unhappy

with U.S. policy, and massive demonstrations in Jordan are

probably inevitable. Severe violence and widespread rioting

are much less likely. Should Israel take advantage of the

U.S. invasion to act against the Palestinians or the

Lebanese Hizballah, popular anger will deepen. Also, any

war, but especially a long war, threatens to disrupt

Jordanian fuel needs which are currently met by Iraq.

Jordan’s response to a war and its aftermath will be

problematic. Amman greatly depends on U.S. aid and is

expected to become more dependent as a result of the loss of

6
Iraqi oil. The Jordanians will consequently need to seek

more help from the United States and the Gulf Arabs. Saudi

oil may become particularly important to the Jordanians as

oil supplies from Iraq are disrupted. King Abdullah will, to

the greatest extent possible, seek to retain good ties with

both the U.S. and the Gulf Arabs while managing domestic

public opinion. Long-term U.S.-Jordanian military

cooperation will continue once a stable postwar government

is in place in Iraq, and domestic passions in Jordan become

calm. Jordan will nevertheless continue its policy of seeking

to keep a low public profile for its cooperation with U.S.

forces. The Jordanians will also prefer exercises and

interactions with small numbers of elite forces (such as U.S.

special forces) rather than large numbers of more visible

conventional forces.

The most visible Arab backers of the United States are

Kuwait and Qatar. Anger at Saddam in recent months has

been escalating from its already high levels due to the Iraqi

dictator’s aggravating half apology over the 1990 invasion

and the continued issue of unaccounted Kuwaiti prisoners

of war. Saddam’s linking of his apology to an appeal to

Kuwaiti citizens to oppose their government’s policy of

supporting the U.S. presence in their country was

particularly insulting. Kuwait called the action a

declaration of war, and short-term Kuwaiti cooperation

with the United States seems assured. Longer-term

U.S.-Kuwaiti cooperation will probably survive the Saddam

regime, since the Kuwaitis will not assume that any

post-Saddam Iraqi governments will inevitably be friendly

to them and since Iraqi designs on Kuwait pre-date

Saddam. Even Islamists in Kuwait have sometimes favored

a U.S. presence, although this approach may erode over

time.

If the war and occupation go well and clearly benefit the

Iraqi population, Qatar will probably seek to continue with

strong U.S. military ties. Qatar traditionally has been more

concerned about Iran than Iraq and therefore is unlikely to

become complacent about security in the aftermath of an

7
Iraqi defeat. Additionally, Qatar has sometimes had a tense

relationship with Saudi Arabia, and would like to be able to

call for U.S. support in the event of future Saudi bullying.

Moreover, Qatar sits atop some of the largest natural gas

reserves in the world and could clearly benefit from a

powerful ally ready to protect Qatar’s territorial integrity.

Yemen, which is currently cooperating with the United

States in the war on terrorism, would face severe public

pressure to halt all support for the United States in the

aftermath of an Iraqi invasion. Yemen is already a reluctant

ally whose cooperation is based primarily on fear of U.S.

actions if Sanaa does not support the war on terrorism.

Nevertheless, a U.S. invasion of Iraq may make it politically

impossible for any Yemeni government to engage in high

profile cooperation with the United States on terrorism

related issues. Unmanageable terrorism against the

government by significant elements of a well-armed Yemeni

population will become a serious possibility if Sanaa fails to

distance itself from U.S. actions. Unpublicized cooperation

is, nevertheless, likely to continue as the Yemeni

government seeks to insure that it is not labeled as a rogue

state supporting terrorism.

Oman has been a valuable ally for both the United States

and U.K. and has also been able to resist the excesses of

Arab nationalism on a variety of occasions. It is likely that

the U.S.-Omani relationship will withstand the storm of an

Iraqi invasion, and access to Omani airport, seaport, and

military storage facilities are expected to continue in a

post-Saddam Middle East. Elsewhere, the United Arab

Emirates will probably not suffer for its military ties to the

United States since these ties are more modest and confined

to such links as naval visits, use of port facilities, and some

modest pre-positioning of military supplies.

Bahrain, conversely, has extensive military ties to the

United States as well as a restive Shi’ite population that has

been known to become enraged over Arab nationalist as well

as Bahraini issues. The Bahraini monarchy may therefore

8
face popular pressure to reduce ties to the United States in

the aftermath of an Iraqi invasion. While it is possible that

the king would yield to such pressure, this is unlikely.

Bahrain is vulnerable to pressure from a variety of regional

states, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, and would not wish

to sacrifice its influence with the United States except under

the gravest of circumstances.

Other moderate Arab regimes in North Africa, such as

Morocco and Tunisia, will probably face significant amounts

of anti-American agitation on the streets without any

serious long-term consequences for either the relevant

governments or U.S. ties with those governments.

Radical Arab States and Iran.

Elsewhere in the Middle East it is likely that various

radical regimes, including Syria and Iran, will allow but

control anti-U.S. demonstrations by their populations. Both

nations are, nevertheless, currently on their best behavior

due to a fear that the War on Terrorism will expand to

include them in the near future. Therefore it is likely that

they will be reluctant to do anything to help the Iraqis in a

serious way such as allowing the transit of weapons through

their countries. It is also possible that behind-the-scenes

intelligence cooperation between the United States and

these countries could continue as both Damascus and

Tehran seek a hedge against the possibility of U.S. military

action against them.

Most Iranians detest Saddam, but they also fear a U.S.-

dominated Iraq. Additionally, the widespread Arab view

that Iraq is being attacked by the United States as a partial

favor to the Israelis is of concern to Tehran. Iran is

frequently and accurately described by Israeli sources as a

greater threat to their country than Iraq. If the United

States is attacking Iraq as a favor to Israel (according to the

logic of Middle Eastern radicals) then where does that leave

Iran? At a minimum, the United States might seek to

destroy key Iranian nuclear and defense facilities in the

9
aftermath of a struggle with Baghdad—particularly if the

struggle goes well for the United States and the idea of

preemptive war becomes more widely accepted. The

Iranians hope that a U.S.-Iraqi conflict will end in such a

way that the United States has little appetite to continue on

to other countries.

Syria is concerned about a U.S. intervention, but is not

prepared to sacrifice much to help Iraq. The Syrian

leadership has strongly criticized the Arab World for

refusing to move beyond “theoretical” plans to prevent the

war and to take more tangible action. Such “action” would

mostly consist of moderate Arab states refusing to cooperate

with the United States on Iraqi issues. The Syrians are

clearly suggesting that the moderates are partially

responsible for the possible occupation of Iraq, and such

criticism will undoubtedly increase should a U.S. invasion

take place. In raising their rhetoric, the Syrians will also

note their much invoked self-designated role as the

spokesmen for Arab nationalism. Syrian criticism of other

regimes, nevertheless, probably will be viewed as nothing

more than a manageable irritant by these regimes. Likely it

will have only a limited effect on most moderate regimes as

they consider the pros and cons of future U.S. military

cooperation issues.

Libya is strongly opposed to a U.S. occupation of Iraq,

and the Qadhafi regime often feels a need to be especially

critical of anything viewed as tainted by colonialism.

Despite these concerns, Qadhafi also dislikes Saddam

Hussein and recently referred to him as irrational (despite

the irony of Qadhafi making such a remark). Libya also feels

deeply vulnerable to a U.S. invasion since its military is

weak and its reputation with the United States is abysmally

low. Moreover, Libya has relatively little influence with

other Arab populations. Thus, Libya will probably engage in

steady but controlled criticism of the United States, and this

criticism will be of almost no interest to Arabs outside of

Libya.

10
Israel and Turkey.

Israel strongly favors a U.S. attack on Iraq, although the

Israeli leadership also recognizes that their country may be

attacked as a result of such a strike. Most Israelis would

rather deal with such an attack now, rather than in the

more distant future when they believe Saddam may be

stronger. Additionally, many Israelis appear to have

embraced the theory that the United States can install a

pro-Western democracy in Iraq which will then serve as a

model to undermine the current regimes of other Arab

countries. According to this speculation, Arab democracies

will be more accepting of Israel and less sympathetic to the

Palestinian point of view. The reason that many Israelis

believe in such unlikely eventualities is that their country is

currently under siege by suicide bombers. The fantasy of

relief from such a burden is easy to surrender to under such

dire circumstances.

Israeli actions during a U.S.-Iraq war also will have an

important effect on how the region responds to a U.S.

attack. Allegations of U.S.-Israeli intrigue permeate the

Arab media, and any actions hinting at anti-Palestinian

coordination will further anger the region’s population.

Such actions might include the expulsion of leading

Palestinian Authority figures from the Palestinian

territories, a sustained military offensive against these

territories, or an action that would not involve the

Palestinians, a military offensive against Hizballah in

southern Lebanon. Moreover, Israelis would feel severely

tempted to take such measures as their population is

currently desperate for any type of response to the

Palestinians that hints at restoring normalcy to daily life.

Any disruption of U.S.-Arab relations resulting from these

actions will probably be viewed as a bonus by the Likud

government.

The Turkish leadership is opposed to a war with Iraq,

and Turkish public opinion consistently has run over 80

percent against. These high negative numbers are not solely

11
based on political factors. Turkey lost $100-150 million in

annual income as a result of the 1991 Gulf War due to the

closure of two key oil pipelines across that country.

Turkey, nevertheless, wishes to be seen as a reliable

NATO ally by the United States and also wishes to have a

voice in determining the future of Iraq should the Saddam

regime be removed from power. For these reasons, the

Turkish leadership has been looking for the absolute

minimum cooperation with the United States that is

necessary on this issue to prevent a decline in the

relationship. They are also seeking as much aid as possible

for the help they do offer. In the aftermath of a U.S. invasion

of Iraq, Turkey will probably continue to seek ways to

consolidate good relations with the United States while

making a simultaneous effort to avoid the appearance of

excessive complicity in supporting a U.S. invasion. The

Turkish military will remain the ultimate decisionmaker on

the future of U.S.-Turkish military ties and to the extent

possible will seek to keep these ties intact.

Conclusion.

The prospect of a U.S. invasion of Iraq is wildly

unpopular throughout most of Middle East and will be

especially problematic for moderate Arab states with U.S.

ties. These governments will face the danger of a long-term

erosion of domestic public support and a short-term

eruption of popular anger, which they should be able to

manage. U.S.-Arab military ties will suffer but not collapse.

One of the most serious regional results of a U.S. victory in

Iraq will probably be a near-term Saudi effort to reduce or

eliminate the stationing of significant numbers of U.S

troops in the kingdom. The possibility that moderate

regimes will be weakened for some time as a result of U.S.

actions also suggests that most aspects of U.S. military

cooperation with these regimes will come under more

frequent and agonizing scrutiny. Nevertheless, the relationship with the United States is too important for these states

12
to relinquish and important military cooperation will

continue with a variety of states.

Additionally, the United States must continue to value

and consolidate its security role in a post-Saddam Middle

East. This presence will help control potential aggressors

such as Iran and will allow the United States to respond to

internal or external threats to Middle Eastern energy

sources. U.S. ties to key Middle Eastern governments will

also be necessary for joint cooperation in the ongoing war

against anti-Western terrorists and most especially

al-Qaida. U.S.-Middle Eastern ties may focus increasingly

on elite troops, anti-terrorism training, and other forms of

cooperation below that of stationing large elements of

conventional forces in Arab countries.

Nevertheless, some states such as Qatar and Kuwait

may seek the continuing presence of U.S. forces in their

countries, and such requests should not be dismissed due to

the collapse of the Saddam Hussein threat. Middle Eastern

energy remains vital to the West, and to remove U.S. forces

from that theater now may tie Western hands in a future

crisis. Moreover, ongoing Middle Eastern instability seems

likely as a variety of countries cope with rapidly expanding

youth populations, a dearth of employment opportunities,

potential rising of Islamic movements, and chronically

dysfunctional economies. Ideally, the United States should

help friendly states address these problems, while

recognizing that future threats are likely even if their exact

source is uncertain.

In struggling to maintain important ties, Washington

must balance its need for long-term partners with some

near-term understanding when friendly Arab states

criticize any U.S. military occupation of Iraq. Criticism of a

U.S. military occupation of any Arab country is inevitable,

and U.S. policymakers must not overreact to such

disapproval. Rather calm, methodical rejection of hyperbole

will be appropriate.

13
Some Arab states (notably Egypt) take pride in their

ability to influence the United States, and strong, visible

military-to-military contacts remain especially important

in times of crisis. Additionally, visits by top Arab

policymakers to the United States allow these individuals to

claim U.S. ties are paying off because the Arab point of view

is being represented in Washington. You are “with us or

against us” rhetoric was exceptionally useful in dealing

with al-Qaida terrorists, but is not appropriate to apply to

Arab allies who have differences with the United States

over Iraq.

14
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. W. Andrew Terrill

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell-Jacoby