****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service andinthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************IN RE NEVAEH W. ET AL.* (SC 19447)
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js. Argued May 19—officially released July 28, 2015 Carolyn Signorelli, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, andBenjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (petitioner).
Erich H. Gaston, with whom was Patrick Heeran, for the appellee (respondent mother).Howard J. Wicker, for the minor children.Opinion EVELEIGH,J. Inthiscertifiedappeal, wemustdecide whethertheAppellate Courtproperlyreversedthejudgmentsofthetrialcourtterminatingtheparentalrightsof the respondent mother as to her two minor daughters, Nevaeh W. and Janiyah A.1 On appeal, the petitioner, the CommissionerofChildrenandFamilies, assertsthat theAppellate Court improperlyreversedthejudgments of the trial court terminating the parental rights of the respondent on the ground that the trial court failed to address, in writing, each segment ofall seven statutory factors containedin General Statutes § 17a-112 (k).2 We agree with the petitioner and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.3
The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. ‘‘The respondent gave birthto [Nevaeh] inJuly, 2008. Shortly thereafter, on September 4, 2008, the petitioner

. . . invoked an administrative ninety-six hour hold as to Nevaeh due to the respondent’s alleged ‘substance abuse, unaddressed mental health issues and unstable housing.’ An order of temporary custody subsequently
was issued on September 8, 2008, and sustained on October 23, 2008. The respondent later engaged in substance abuse treatment at CoventryHouse, aninpatient facility, where Nevaeh was returned to her care and custody under an order of protective supervision on January8, 2009. OnApril3, 2009, thepetitionerinvoked
a second ninety-six hour hold as to Nevaeh after the respondent was discharged from Coventry House for noncompliance with program rules. ‘‘In March, 2010, after Nevaeh’s recommitmentto the petitioner, therespondentgavebirthtoJaniyah. Several months afterJaniyah’s birth, inJanuary, 2011, Nevaeh’s commitment was revoked and she was reunited with the respondent under an order of protective supervision. On July 2, 2012, the respondent was arrested [for interferingwithanofficerandfailureto appear], whereupon an order of temporary custody was granted by the court as to both children. The July 2, 2012 removal
was Nevaeh’s third removal andJaniyah’s first removal fromtherespondent. OnOctober24, 2012,bothchildren
were adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the petitioner. On November 30, 2012, the children were placed in a preadoptive home that had previously served as a placement for Nevaeh in 2009 and 2010. ‘‘On February 22, 2013, the petitioner filed termination petitions with respect to the two children, alleging that the respondent’s parental rights should be terminated onthe grounds that she hadfailedto rehabilitate, and that she had abandoned the children. Ajoint trial
on the two petitions took place over two days, commencing on October 15, 2013, and ending on November20, 2013. The respondent was represented at the trial by counsel, as were the children.4 The petitioner called four witnesses to testify in support ofthe petitions for termination, and the respondent called two witnesses to testifyonherbehalf. Thereafter, onJanuary27, 2014, the trial court

. . . rendered its decision. In a seven page memorandum of decision, the court granted both petitions on the grounds that the respondent had failed to achieve asufficient degree ofpersonal rehabilitation to encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of her daughters, she could assume a responsible position in their lives, and that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of her children.’’ (Footnotes altered.) In re Nevaeh W., 154 Conn. App. 156, 158–60, 107 A.3d 539 (2014). Thereafter, the respondent appealed from the judgments of the trial court to the Appellate Court.
On appeal to the Appellate Court, the respondent claimed, inter alia, that in the dispositional phase of the proceeding, the trial court improperly determined that termination of her parental rights was in the best interestsofhertwo childrenwithoutmakingthewritten findings required under § 17a-112 (k) (4). Specifically, the respondent asserted that the trial court improperly based its finding under § 17a-112 (k) (4) solely on ‘‘the children’s positive relationship with and likely future adoption by their preadoptive foster parents, without considering or making written findings as to the children’s feelings and emotional ties with respect to her,
as expressly required by [§ 17a-112 (k) (4)].’’ Id., 172. The Appellate Court agreed with the respondent, concluding that the trial court’s finding with respect to § 17a-112 (k) (4) was ‘‘utterly unresponsive to the mandatory statutory requirement that the court consider and make written findings as to the feelings and emotionalties ofthe childwithrespecttothe child’sparents

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 175. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed in part the judgments ofthe trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings on the dispositional phase of the termination proceeding. Id., 176. This appeal followed.5
On appeal to this court, the petitioner asserts that theAppellate Court improperlyreversedthejudgments of the trial court for failure to make written findings pursuant to § 17a-112 (k) because it made findings regarding the factors set forth in § 17a-112 (k). The petitioner further asserts that any possible failure by the trial court to state its findings regarding the factors setforthin § 17a-112 (k) was curedbysubsequentarticulations. Finally, the petitioner asserts that, in any event, the alleged failure would be harmless. In response, the respondent asserts that the Appellate Courtproperlyreversedthejudgments ofthetrial court
as they related to the determination that termination
was inthe best interest ofthe children. Specifically, the respondent asserts that the Appellate Court properlyconcluded that the trial court failed to make written findings as to the factor enumerated in § 17a-112 (k) (4), and that such a failure requires reversal ofthe trial court’s judgments. We agree with the petitioner.
We first set forth the applicable standard of review. To the extent that the petitioner’s claim requires us to interpret the requirements of § 17a-112 (k), our review is plenary. See In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 499, 78 A.3d 797 (2013). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent ofthe legislature.

. . . In other words,
we seekto determine, in areasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.

. . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning ofthe statute shall not be considered.

. . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 499–500.
In the present case, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court failed to comply with § 17a-112 (k) (4) becauseitfailedto setforthexpresswrittenfindings
as to the children’s emotional ties with the respondent. We disagree.
Section 17a-112 (k)providesinrelevantpart: ‘‘Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determiningwhetherto terminateparental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding

. . . (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control ofthe childforatleast one yearandwithwhom the child has developed significant emotional ties

. . . .’’6
Inthepresentcase, thetrial courtentitledapartofits memorandum of decision: ‘‘Written Findings: General Statutes §§ 17a-112 (k) and 45a-717 (1).’’ In this part of the decision, the trial court listed each of the seven factors enumerated in § 17a-112 (k) and included written findings underneath each factor. The trial court prefaced the portion of its opinion pertaining to § 17a112 (k) (4) with the following language: ‘‘Feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the parents andanypersonswho have exercisedphysical care,custodyand control ofthe childrenforatleast one year andwithwhomthe children have developed significant emotional ties.’’ Immediately following that passage, the trial court reached the following conclusion: ‘‘Both children have been placed together with a preadoptive
resourcewhohas expressedawillingnessto adoptboth girls. They are comfortable, secure and safe.’’
The plain language of § 17a-112 (k) (4) directs the trial courtto considerthe children’s emotionaltieswith
alonglistofpeopleindeterminingwhetherthetermination of the respondent’s parental rights is in their best interest. Nothing in that statute, however, required the trial courtto consideronlythe children’s emotionalties with the respondent. To the contrary, at the time of trial, both children had been living in the preadoptive foster home for more than one year, and Nevaeh had also been placed with the same family for approximately one additional year before that time. Therefore, it was appropriate for the trial court to consider the children’s emotional ties to the preadoptive foster family in considering whether termination of the respondent’sparentalrightswasinthe children’sbestinterest. Accordingly, we disagree with the Appellate Court that the trial court’s finding as to § 17a-112 (k) (4) was ‘‘utterly unresponsive to the mandatory statutory requirement

. . . .’’ In re Nevaeh W., supra, 154 Conn. App. 175. To the contrary, this court has repeatedly recognized that, in the dispositional stage, it is appropriate to consider the importance of permanency in children’s lives. ‘‘This court has ‘noted consistently the importance of permanency in children’s lives. In re JuvenileAppeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 646, 436 A.2d 290 (1980) (removing child from foster home or further delaying permanency would be inconsistent with his best interest); In re VictoriaB., 79 Conn. App. 245, 263, 829A.2d855 (2003) (trial court’s findingswere not clearly erroneous where much of child’s short life had been spent in custody of [petitioner] and child needed stability and permanency in her life); In re TesheaD., [9 Conn. App. 490, 493–94, 519A.2d 1232 (1987)] (child’s need for permanency in her life lends added support to court’s finding that her best interest warrantedterminationofrespondent’sparentalrights). Virtually all experts, from many different professional disciplines, agree that children need and benefit from continuous, stable home environments.’

. . . In re Jeisean M., [270 Conn. 382, 400–401, 852 A.2d 643 (2004)].

‘‘ ‘Stable and continuous care givers are important to normal child development. Children need secure and uninterrupted emotional relationships with the adults who are responsible for their care.’ 3 D. Kramer, Legal Rights of Children (2d Ed. Rev. 2005) § 29:11, p. 185;
see also J. Goldstein et al., The Best Interests of the Child: The Least Detrimental Alternative (1996) p. 19(‘[c]ontinuity of relationships is essential for a child’s healthy development’); see also In re Hanks, 553 A.2d 1171, 1178 (Del. 1989) (‘[N]o childcangrowemotionally while in limbo, neverreallybelongingto anyone except
on a temporary and ill-defined or partial basis.

. . . To grow, the child needs at least the promise of permanency in relationships and some continuity of environment.’

. . .). ‘Repeatedly disrupted placements and relationships can interfere with the children’s ability to form normal relationships when they become adults.’ 3 D. Kramer, supra, p. 185.’’InreDavonta V., 285 Conn. 483, 494–95, 940 A.2d 733 (2008). Indeed, this court has explicitly recognized that ‘‘[i]n regard to children who have bonded with their foster parents, ‘[o]nce new psychological relationships form, separation from the newparents becomes no less painful and no less damaging to a child than separation from natural or adoptive caregiving parents. Indeed, to the extent that such separations are repeated (as in multiple foster care placements), they make the child
more vulnerable and make each subsequent opportunityfor attachment lesspromising and less trustworthy than prior ones.’ J. Goldstein et al., supra, pp. 104–105. Termination of a biological parent’s rights, by preventing further litigation with thatparent, can preserve the stability a child has acquired in a successful foster placement and, furthermore, move the child closer toward securing permanence by removing barriers to adoption. See 3 D. Kramer, supra, § 28:2, p. 17. Even if
no adoption is forthcoming, termination can aid stability and lessen disruptionbecause aparentwhose rights have been terminated no longer may file a motion to revoke the commitment of the child to the custody of the [petitioner]

. . . or oppose an annual permanency plan.’’ (Citation omitted.) In re Davonta V., supra, 285 Conn. 495–96.
In the present case, while the trial court’s memorandum of decision was not a model of clarity, the testimony before the trial court, on which it was privileged to rely, essentially reflected these considerations in relationtothe children’sbestinterest, specifically, their need for permanence and stability. Furthermore, in considering the trial court’s findings pursuant to § 17a-112 (k) (4), we are mindful that ‘‘an opinion must be read as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding.

. . . Furthermore, we read an ambiguous trial court record so as to support, rather than contradict, itsjudgment.’’ (Citationomitted; internalquotation marks omitted.) In re Jason R., 306 Conn. 438, 453, 51 A.3d 334 (2012). Reading the trial court’s memorandum ofdecision inthe present case as awhole, we conclude that the trial court did consider the factor set forth in § 17a-112 (k) (4), includingthe children’s emotionalties totherespondent. Specifically, thetrial court explainedat the beginning ofthe memorandum that ‘‘Nevaeh

. . . has been in [the petitioner’s] care on three separate occasions. On September 4, 2008, Nevaeh

. . . was placed [on a ninety-six hour hold because the respondent] was homeless and had no way to care for the child. Shewas committedto [thepetitioner] in October, 2008andreunifiedtothe [respondent’s] careinJanuary, 2009. In April, 2009, the child was placed in another [ninety-six] hourhold and again committedto [the petitioner] after [the respondent] was discharged from a drug treatment program for noncompliance. The child
was reunifiedwith [the respondent] in December, 2010. OnJuly2, 2012, Nevaehwas removedfrom [the respondent] forathirdtime.’’ The trial court continued: ‘‘[Janiyah] resided with [the respondent] until [Janiyah was] removed with Nevaeh

. . . on July 2, 2012. On November30, 2012, bothchildrenwereplacedinapreadoptive foster home. Nevaeh

. . . has previously been placed with this family for [more than one] year.’’ These findings by the trial court demonstrate that the trial court did consider the children’s relationship with the respondent. Moreover, to the extent that there is any ambiguity inthetrialcourt’smemorandumofdecision,thatcourt’s subsequent articulations sufficiently clarified its ruling. ‘‘It is well established that [a]n articulation is appropriate where the trial court’s decision contains some ambiguity or deficiencyreasonably susceptible ofclarification.

. . . [P]roper utilization of the motion for articulation serves to dispel any

. . . ambiguity by clarifying the factual and legal basis upon which the trial court rendered its decision, thereby sharpening the issues on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Priest v. Edmonds, 295 Conn. 132, 140, 989 A.2d 588 (2010).
In the present case, after this court granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal and prior to the appellate briefs being submitted by the parties, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 60-2 (1)7 and 60-5,8 this courtorderedthetrial courtto ‘‘completethetrial court record’’ by responding to, inter alia, the following question: ‘‘Initsjudgmentgrantingthe termination ofparental rights petition as to the [respondent], did the trial court consider [§ 17a-112 (k) (4)]?’’ The trial court answered this question in the affirmative and further articulatedasfollows: ‘‘Astothefeelings andemotional ties of the children with respect to their parents, any guardians of such children’s persons and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the children for at least one year and with whom the children have developed significant emotional ties, the court found that [Nevaeh] and [Janiyah], as siblings,
are placed together and appear to be doing very well and are comfortable in their current placement. The current placement is a preadoptive resource for both children. On April 25, 2013, this court

. . . granted thepetitioner’s motion to cease visitation of [the respondent] asto [Neveah] uponthe recommendationof [Nevaeh’s] therapist citing Neveah’s refusal to see [the respondent or her] father and her need to feel more
secure andto process hertrauma. The children’s foster mother, who was a credible witness, described [Neveah’s] reactions when being picked up for visits with [the respondent] or [her] father as ‘crazy, screaming, kicking, crying, yelling I don’t wanna go.’

. . . The foster mother described [Neveah] and [Janiyah] as each other’s best friend.’’9 Thereafter, thetrial courtfiledasupplemental articulation. In the supplemental articulation, the trial court further clarified that it relied on the credible testimony ofsocial workers from the Department ofChildren and Families, and the foster mother detailing the instability in the children’s lives, positive changes made while in the foster home, Neveah’s negative reaction to the respondent and the very strong bond between Neveah and Janiyah. The trial court further clarified that it had relied on testimony by Ines Schroeder, a psychologist who was qualified as an expert in clinical and forensic psychology. The trial court detailedthat Schroeder had testified as follows: ‘‘Given the information I received during the evaluation as well as finding out a bit more about what’s happening with the children at that point I felt it was much more important to provide stability and permanency for the children than to consider continued attempts to reunify.’’ ‘‘Parentalterminationlitigation, includingthepresent case, often involves testimony from various child welfare professionals. ‘The testimony of professionals is given greatweightinparentalterminationproceedings.

. . . It is well established that [i]n a case tried before
acourt,thetrialjudgeisthesolearbiterofthecredibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony.

. . . The credibility and the weight of expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and thetrial courtisprivilegedto adoptwhatevertestimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible.

. . . On appeal,
we do not retry the facts or pass on the credibility of witnesses.

. . . It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any expert testimony.

. . . The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other.’

. . . In re Carissa K., 55 Conn. App. 768, 781– 82, 740A.2d 896 (1999). Nevertheless, althoughthe trial court may rely on expert testimony, it ultimately must make its own independent determination as to the best interest ofthe child. InreJeiseanM., [supra, 270 Conn. 398] (‘[a]lthough we often consider the testimony of mental health experts

. . . such expert testimony is not aprecondition ofthe court’s own factualjudgment
as to the child’s best interest’

. . .). In sum, we must defer to both the trial court’s weighing of the experttestimony presented and the trial court’s independent factualdeterminationastowhatwasin [thechild’s] best interest.’’InreDavonta V., supra, 285 Conn. 488–89. On the basis ofthe record before us, we conclude that the foregoing articulations clarify any ambiguity inthe trial court’s original memorandum ofdecision and establish that the trial court considered the emotional ties ofthe children pursuant to § 17a-112 (k) (4).
The respondent asserts that we should not rely on the articulations by the trial court because they are improper attempts by the trial court to revise its decision. Having fully considered the respondent’s claim,
we decline her invitation to ignore the articulations. PracticeBook §§ 60-2 and60-5 givethis courtthepower to order the trial court to articulate the basis of its decision and to further perfect the record for our review. Indeed, the importance of the role of articulations is highlighted by Practice Book § 61-10 (b), which
was recently amended in 2013 and presently provides in relevant part: ‘‘The failure of any party on appeal to seek articulation

. . . shall not be the sole ground upon which the court declines to review any issue or claim on appeal. If the court determines that articulation of the trial court decision is appropriate, it may remand the case pursuant to Section 60-5 for articulation by the trial court within a specified time period.

. . .’’ As the commentary to § 61-10 explains: ‘‘Subsection (b) was adopted to effect a change in appellate procedure

. . . . In lieu of refusing to review [an] issue, when the court determines that articulation is appropriate, the court may now remand the case to the trial court for an articulation and then address the merits ofthe issue afterarticulation isprovided.’’ Inthe interest ofjudicial economy andproperpresentation of the issues on appeal, this court has repeatedly ordered the trial court to articulate the factual and legal basis for its decisions and this court has relied on those articulations to resolve the issues on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 313 Conn. 1, 4, 95 A.3d 1081 (2014); Redding Life Care, LLC v. Redding, 308 Conn. 87, 94, 61 A.3d 461 (2013). Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial court failed to make the appropriate findings under § 17a-112 (k) (4).
The petitioner also claims that the trial court was not obligated to make explicit written findings as to each aspect of the seven factors enumerated in § 17a112 (k) as these factors are only guidelines. In support ofher claim, the petitioner relies on In re EdenF., 250 Conn. 674, 741 A.2d 873 (1999). In In re Eden F., this court concluded that, ‘‘[a]lthough [General Statutes (Rev. to 1999)] § 17a-112 (d) (1) and (2)10 mandated that the trial court make written findings regarding the timeliness, nature, extent and reasonableness of the efforts made to reunifyparent and child, § 17a-112 contained nothing to indicate that any such finding was aprerequisite to the termination ofparental rights. Thus, when the petitions in this case were filed, the factors to be considered under [that statute] served only to guide the trial court in making its ultimate decision whether to grant the termination petition. See, e.g., In
re Christine F., 6 Conn. App. 360, 369, 505 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 809, 508 A.2d 769 (1986) (terminationinbestinterestofchilddespitetrialcourt’s conclusion that strong emotional ties existed between mother and child).’’ (Footnote added.) In re Eden F., supra, 690–91. Although we have not had the occasion to explicitly address whether a trial court is obligated to make explicit written findings as to each aspect ofthe seven factors enumerated in § 17a-112 (k) since In re Eden F., we take the opportunity to do so herein. As we explained inIn reEdenF., ‘‘the fact thatthe legislature [had interpolated] objective guidelines into the openendedfact-orientedstatuteswhichgovern [parentaltermination] disputes

. . . should not be construed as a predetermined weighing of evidence

. . . by the legislature. Where

. . . the record reveals that the trial court’s ultimate conclusions [regarding termination of parental rights] are supported by clear and convincing evidence, we will not reach an opposite conclusion
on the basis of any one segment of the many factors considered in a termination proceeding

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 691. Indeed, as this court has previously explained, ‘‘[t]he balancing of interests in a case involving termination ofparentalrightsisadelicatetaskand, whensupporting evidence is not lacking, the trial court’s ultimate determination as to a child’s best interest is entitled to the utmost deference.

. . . Although ajudge [charged with determining whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest] is guided by legal principles, the ultimate decision [whether termination isjustified] is intensely human. It is the judge in the courtroom who looks the witnesses in the eye, interprets their body language, listens to the inflections in their voices and otherwise assesses the subtleties that are not conveyed inthe coldtranscript.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Davonta V., supra, 285 Conn. 497. Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in In re Eden F. that, although a trial court shall consider and make written findings regarding the factors enumerated in § 17a-112 (k), a trial court’s determination of the best interests of a child will not be overturned on the basis ofonefactorifthatdeterminationis otherwisefactually supported and legally sound.
Inthe present case, we conclude thatthe trial court’s finding as to the children’s best interest is factually supported and legally sound. Therefore, we will not substitute ourjudgment for that of the trial court.The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed in part and the case is remanded to that court with direction to affirm the judgments of the trial court.
In this opinion the otherjustices concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers ofthis case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the Appellate Court.

1 We note that the trial court also rendered judgments terminating the parental rights ofthe minor children’s respective fathers. Those judgments

arenot, however, atissueinthepresentappeal. Consequently, intheinterest ofsimplicity, we refertothe motheroftheminorchildrenasthe respondent. See In re Nevaeh W., 154 Conn. App. 156, 157 n.1, 107 A.3d 539 (2014).

2 General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides: ‘‘Exceptinthe casewheretermination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent ofservices offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitatethereunionofthechildwiththeparent; (2)whethertheDepartment of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,

as amended; (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control ofthe child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (5) the age ofthe child; (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child toreturnsuchchildhomeintheforeseeablefuture, including, butnotlimited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child

as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.’’

3 On appeal to the Appellate Court, the respondent claimed that two of the trial court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. See In re Nevaeh W., 154 Conn. App. 156, 160–71, 107 A.3d 539 (2014). The Appellate Court rejected those claims and, accordingly, affirmed the judgments of the trial court in part. Id., 158. That portion ofthe Appellate Court’sjudgment is not, however, at issue in the present appeal.

4 We note that counsel forthe minor children has adopted the petitioner’s appellate briefs before both the Appellate Court and this court. See In re Nevaeh W., 154 Conn. App. 156, 159 n.3, 107 A.3d 539 (2014).

5 This court granted the petitioner’s amended petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issues: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that

. . . § 17a-112 (k) provides that the trial court is deprived of authority to enter a dispositional order of termination of parental rights if it fails to address in writing each segment of all seven statutory factors?’’; and (2) ‘‘Ifthe answerto question one is in the affirmative, did the Appellate Courtproperly conclude thatthe remedyforatrial court’s failure to address in writing each segment of all seven statutory factors is reversal of the judgment?’’ In re Nevaeh W., 316 Conn. 915, 113 A.3d 69 (2015).

6 For the full text of § 17a-112 (k), see footnote 2 of this opinion.

7 Practice Book § 60-2 (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The supervision and control of the proceedings on appeal shall be in the court having appellate jurisdiction from the time the appeal is filed, or earlier, if appropriate, and, except as otherwise provided in these rules, any motion the purpose of which is to complete or perfect the record of the proceedings below for presentation on appeal shall be made to the court in which the appeal is pending. The court may, on its own motion or upon motion of any party, modify or vacate any order made by the trial court, or a judge thereof, inrelation to the prosecution of the appeal. It may also, for example, on its

ownmotionoruponmotionofanyparty: (1) orderajudgetotake anyaction necessary to complete the trial court record for the proper presentation of the appeal

. . . .’’

8 Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘If the court deems it necessary to the proper disposition of the cause, it may remand the case for a further articulation of the basis of the trial court’s factual findings or decision.

. . .’’

9 On appeal to the Appellate Court, the respondent asserted that the trial court’s findings as to § 17a-112 (k) (1), (2) and (4) were improper. See In

re Nevaeh W., supra, 154 Conn. App. 172 n.8. The Appellate Court did not reach the respondent’s claims regarding the trial court’s findings under § 17a-112 (k) (1) and (2) because it reversed thejudgment ofthe trial court

as it related to the dispositional phase on the ground that the trial court’s findings under § 17a-112 (k) (4) were improper. Id. In the orderfor articulation, this court orderedthe trial courtto articulate its decision as it related to § 17a-112 (k) (1), (2) and (4). In its response, the trial court further articulated its findings as to § 17a-112 (k) (1), (2) and (4). On appeal to this court, the respondent does not renew her claims related to § 17a-112 (k) (1) and (2) and neitherparty addresses these claims in their brief. Accordingly, we address the trial court’s findings only as they relate to § 17a-112 (k) (4). We note, however, that even if we were to consider the respondent’s claims regarding the trial court’s findings under § 17a-112 (k) (1) and (2),

we would conclude that the trial court’s memorandum of decision and articulations demonstrate that its findings under § 17a-112 (k) (1) and (2)

are factually supported and legally sound.

10 We note thatsubsection (d) of§ 17a-112 was redesignated as subsection (k) in 2000. See Public Acts 2000, No. 00-137, § 1.