alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-7340

JOHN W. MCKENZIE,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

R. WOLFE, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at 

Wheeling. John Preston Bailey, District Judge. (5:22-cv-00123-JPB)

Submitted: August 29, 2023 Decided: August 31, 2023

Before KING, AGEE, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John W. McKenzie, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-7340 Doc: 9 Filed: 08/31/2023 Pg: 1 of 3
2

PER CURIAM:

John W. McKenzie seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 

28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. When the United States or its officer or agency is a party in a 

civil case, parties are accorded 60 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment 

or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the 

appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. 

App. P. 4(a)(6). However, if a party moves for an extension of time to appeal within 30 

days after expiration of the original appeal period and demonstrates excusable neglect or 

good cause, a district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. 

App. P. 4(a)(5)(A); Washington v. Bumgarner, 882 F.2d 899, 900-01 (4th Cir. 1989). The 

district court may also reopen the time to file an appeal if the moving party did not receive 

notice of the entry of the order sought to be appealed within 21 days after entry, the motion 

is filed within the earlier of either 180 days after the order is entered or 14 days after the 

moving party receives notice under Fed. R. App. P. 77(d) of the entry, and no party would 

be prejudiced. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

The district court entered its order on September 1, 2022, and McKenzie did not file 

his notice of appeal until November 18, 2022.

*

 However, because McKenzie’s notice of 

appeal included a manifest request for additional time to appeal and stated that he did not 

receive timely notice of the entry of the district court’s order, we construe it as a request 

* McKenzie’s notice of appeal did not contain any indication of the date it was 

mailed. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).

USCA4 Appeal: 22-7340 Doc: 9 Filed: 08/31/2023 Pg: 2 of 3
3

for an extension of time under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or for a reopening of the appeal 

period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for the limited purpose of 

determining whether McKenzie is entitled to an extension or a reopening of the appeal 

period. The record, as supplemented, will be returned to this court for further 

consideration.

REMANDED

USCA4 Appeal: 22-7340 Doc: 9 Filed: 08/31/2023 Pg: 3 of 3
Case No. 7,970.

#### In re LACY.

[4 N. B. R. 62 (Quarto, 15); 1 3 Am. Law T. 215; 1 Am. Law T. Rep. Bankr. 226.]

District Court, W. D. Texas.

Nov., 1866.

Liens — Record of Priority — Mortgage Recorded Puiok to Judgment Recovered Prior to the Execution of the Mortgage — Prefer-exce.

Where a creditor claims a lien by virtue of a judgment against the bankrupt, recovered on 5th November, 1800, but which was not recorded in the clerk’s office until 10th October, 1807: and another creditor holds a mortgage executed by bankrupt, and recorded 7th April, 1807, *held,*the mortgage lien has priority over the judgment.

[In the matter of W. Y. Lacy, a bankrupt.]

1

 [Reprinted from 4 N. B. R. 62 (Quarto, 15), by permission.]

DUVAL, District Judge.

In this ease, the question certified to me for decision by the register, G. W. Whitmore, Esq., grows out of a controversy between D. A. Calhoun and J. M. Swanson, creditors of said bankrupt, m regard to the priority of their respective liens upon certain lands of said bankrupt in Anderson county. Calhoun claims a lien by virtue of a judgment recovered against the bankrupt in the district court of Anderson county, on the 5th November, 1800, but which was not recorded in the county clerk’s office of said county, until the 10th October, 18G7. The lien claimed by Swanson accrues under a mortgage on the land, executed to him by the bankrupt, and recorded in said county, on the 7th April, 1S07. On the 12th December, 1808, Calhoun proved up his judgment debt without security, and filed the same with the register, and subsequently, to wit, on the 14th August, 1869, he made new proof of his debt with security. Construing together the three acts of January, 1842, 14th February, 1860. and 9th of November. 1800. in regard to the liens of judgments on real estate, it seems to me there can be no doubt that the mortgage lien in this case had priority over that of the judgment. This construction, I think, is fully borne out by the late decision of the supreme court of Texas in the case of Scogin v. Perry [32 Tex. 21]. The decision of the register is, therefore, in all respects affirmed; and the clerk will certify this judgment in the usual manner.
(V. D. 51)

Entry No. 4600.

#### Manca, Inc. *v.*United States

(Decided November 14, 1957)

*Eugene B. Pichrell*for the plaintiff.

*George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Oliver, Chief Judge:

This matter is before me on a remand from classification proceedings decided by the first division of this court in *Manca, Inc.*v. *United States,*38 Cust. Ct. 400, Abstract 60453, and it has been submitted for decision on, a written stipulation reading as follows:

> IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the attorneys for the parties hereto that the merchandise covered by the above remand of protest consists of Binoculars and Cases, containers for said binoculars, which were the subject of a judgment and decision by the First Division of this Court in the case of *Manca, Inc.*v. *United States,*Abstract 60453, on January 16, 1957, wherein it is stated “* * * remand the matter, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, U. S. C. § 2636 (d), for further proceedings before a single judge sitting in reappraisement for determination of the value of the imported merchandise in the manner provided for by law.”

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States, the price at which such or similar merchandise was freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the country from which exported in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade for exportation to the United States was as follows:

> *Merchandise United States dollars ‘per each*

> 20 binoculars (prism glasses) 6 x 30 Bidoxit No. 536839-858- $50. 40*

> 12 binoculars 7 x 50_ 73. 20**

> 20 leather cases to fit_,- 7. 20*

> 12 leather cases to fit_ 8. 88**

> *less 35 percent discount for each item.

> **less 43 percent discount for each item.

> *530IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that there was no higher foreign value for such or similar merchandise.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the above remand of protest may be deemed to be submitted for decision upon this stipulation.

On the agreed facts, I find export value, as that value is defined in section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for appraisement of the merchandise in question, and I hold such dutiable value for each of the articles to be as hereinabove set forth in the stipulation of submission. Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report of Ivision Group Ltd. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Michel Bourbonnais, President and Principal Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







Date:  December 4, 2006

By:  /s/ Michel Bourbonnais

Name:  Michel Bourbonnais

Title:    President (Principal Executive Officer)
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

No. 21

- 10767 Summary Calendar

**United States of America,** Plaintiff

— Appellee **,**

versus **Jose Medina**

**- Fuerte,**  Defendant

— Appellant

**.**

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 5:20

- CR

- 158

- 1

Before **Southwick, Oldham,** and **Wilson,** Circuit Judges

. **Per Curiam :**  * The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Jose Medina

Fuerte has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Medina

- Fuerte has not filed a response. We have

* Pursuant to **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in **5th Cir cuit**  **R ule**  47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED March 3, 2022 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 21-10767 Document: 00516223041 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/03/2022No. 21

- 10767

2 reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is **GRANTED** , counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the **APPEAL IS DISMISSED**

. See **5th Cir. R.**  42.2

. Case: 21-10767 Document: 00516223041 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/03/2022
Before the First Division,

October 24, 1949

No. 53647.

protest 149564-K (New York).

#### R. J. Saunders & Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Cole, J.

It was stipulated that the merchandise in question is the same in all material respects as the estrogenic hormone passed upon in *Roche-Organon*v. *United States*(35 C. C. P. A. 99, C. A. D. 378). The claim at 5 percent under paragraph 34, as amended, was therefore sustained.
(Reap. Dec. 9178)

#### Bluefries New York, Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. 841028.

(Decided June 27, 1958)

*Barnes, Richardson & Colburn*for the plaintiff.

*George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

DoNLON, Judge:

This appeal for reappraisement is submitted for decision upon the following stipulation by counsel for the parties:

*475IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED that

> 1. The merchandise covered by the above-entitled appeal for reappraisement consists of orange milk bars exported from Holland, the same in all material respects as those in *Bluefries New York, Inc.*v. *United States,*Reap. Dec. 8470, wherein it was held that cost of production as defined in Sec. 402 (f), Tariff Act of 1930, was the proper basis of value.

> 2. The record in said Reap. Dec. 8470 may be incorporated herein.

> 3. At the time of exportation of the merchandise involved in the above-entitled appeal for reappraisement, there was no foreign value or export value or United States value for such or similar merchandise as defined in Sec. 402, Tariff Act of 1930 as amended, and the cost of production is therefore the proper basis of value.

> 4. The cost of production, as defined in Sec. 402 (f), (1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Tariff Act of 1930, for the said orange milk bars is 104.34 Netherlands Guilder per carton and is limited to the orange milk bars, and abandoned as to all other items.

The stipulation is not acceptable as stipulation of an issue of law, namely, that cost of production is the proper basis of appraisement of this merchandise. However, inasmuch as the incorporated case is before me and in it the record shows facts on which the court there held that cost of production is such basis, the error in this stipulation does not leave the record so defective as to make impossible a decision on the merits.

Accepting the stipulation only as an agreed statement of facts, and on the record before me, including the record in the incorporated case, and on authority of the decision therein, I find and hold that cost of production, as defined in section 402 (f) of the Tariff Act of 1930, is the proper basis for determining value of the merchandise orange milk bars described in the invoice and entry covered by this appeal, and that such cost of production value is 104.34 Netherland guilders per carton.

The appeal is dismissed as to all other merchandise.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 13, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-51673

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DIEGO PEREZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 2:05-CR-471-ALL

--------------------

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Diego Perez

raises arguments that are foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v.

United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), which held that 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal

offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is

GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
NO. 07-00-0249-CV

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 

	SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL C

	MAY 25, 2000

	EX PARTE STEPHEN MICHAEL MURPHY,

									Relator

	ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

Before QUINN and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.

	Pending before the Court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Stephen Michael Murphy.  He contends that his liberty is being unlawfully restrained via a void enforcement order and as a result of a proceeding wherein he was denied his right to a jury.  By letter dated May 10, 2000, this court informed all interested parties of their opportunity to respond to the petition “not later than May 22, 2000.”  The only interested party who responded was the entity which initiated the enforcement proceeding, the Texas Attorney General.1  We grant the writ for the reason which follows.

	Through his first point, Murphy argued that the enforcement order which mandated his incarceration was void.  It was allegedly void because the master who conducted the hearing which led to issuance of the order never informed him of his right to appointed counsel should he be indigent.  See Ex parte Acker, 949 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. 1997) (holding that the failure to provide such an admonishment renders the ensuing commitment void).  In it’s response, the Attorney General agreed with Murphy and conceded that “the Court should grant the writ on the basis of Point of Error One.” 

	Our independent review of the record confirmed that Murphy was not informed of his right to appointed counsel even though he indicated that he desired counsel.  Because of this, the enforcement order is void as per Ex parte Acker.  

	Accordingly, we conclude that the “Order Enforcing Child Support Obligation” signed on August 17, 1997 is void and we order Stephen Michael Murphy discharged.2

							Brian Quinn

							     Justice

Do not publish.
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 56 (Friday, March 23, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13823-13824]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-5401]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration


Manufacturer of Controlled Substances; Notice of Registration

    By Notice dated November 21, 2006, and published in the Federal 
Register on December 1, 2006, (71 FR 69592), Johnson Matthey, Inc., 
Custom Pharmaceuticals Department, 2003 Nolte Drive, West Deptford, New 
Jersey 08066, made application by renewal to the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) to be registered as a bulk manufacturer of the 
basic classes of controlled substances listed in schedule I and II:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Drug                               Schedule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tetrahydrocannabinols (7370)...............  I
Dihydromorphine (9145).....................  I
Difenoxin (9168)...........................  I
Propiram (9649)............................  I
Amphetamine (1100).........................  II
Methamphetamine (1105).....................  II
Methylphenidate (1724).....................  II
Codeine (9050).............................  II
Dihydrocodeine (9120)......................  II
Oxycodone (9143)...........................  II
Hydromorphone (9150).......................  II
Hydrocodone (9193).........................  II
Meperidine (9230)..........................  II
Morphine (9300)............................  II
Thebaine (9333)............................  II
Oxymorphone (9652).........................  II
Alfentanil (9737)..........................  II
Sufentanil (9740)..........................  II
Fentanyl (9801)............................  II
------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 13824]]

    The company plans to manufacture the listed controlled substances 
in bulk for sale to its customers.
    No comments or objections have been received. DEA has considered 
the factors in 21 U.S.C. 823(a) and determined that the registration of 
Johnson Matthey, Inc to manufacture the listed basic classes of 
controlled substances is consistent with the public interest at this 
time. DEA has investigated Johnson Matthey, Inc to ensure that the 
company's registration is consistent with the public interest. The 
investigation has included inspection and testing of the company's 
physical security systems, verification of the company's compliance 
with state and local laws, and a review of the company's background and 
history. Therefore, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 823, and in accordance with 
21 CFR 1301.33, the above named company is granted registration as a 
bulk manufacturer of the basic classes of controlled substances listed.

    Dated: March 19, 2007.
Joseph T. Rannazzisi,
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Diversion Control, Drug 
Enforcement Administration.
 [FR Doc. E7-5401 Filed 3-22-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, John A. Scarlett, M.D., certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Tercica, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31,
2004 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and
results of operations of Tercica, Inc.



By:

/s/ John A. Scarlett, M.D.John A. Scarlett, M.D.Chief Executive Officer




A signed original of this
written statement required by Section 906 has been provided by Tercica, Inc. and will be retained by Tercica, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 31 (d)**CERTIFICATION**I, Craig D. Abolt, certify that:1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of MSW Energy Finance Co., Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:  a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared; b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date:November 9, 2005         By:  /s/ Craig D. Abolt Craig D. Abolt   Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer