Assessment of Community Planning for

Mass Transit: Volume 11—Technical

Report

February 1976

NTIS order #PB-253641
UNITED STATES CONGRESS

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMEENT

An Assessment of Community Planning

for Mass Transit

Technical Report

Prepared at the Request of

The Senate Committee on Appropriations

Transportation Subcommittee

Prepared under Contract OTA C-4 by

Skidmore, Owings & Merrill

System Design Concepts, Inc.

Washington, D. C.

Final Report

November 10, 1975

Note: This report will be published in a typeset, bound volume

with illustrations. This edition of the final text,

therefore, did not strive for excellence in typography

and qraphic design.

L
I

L

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The Purpose. . ● ***.* .****~** ● ****em* ● *9*e*0e e*n*.ee* 0* i

Scope ● *..*.. .*.**-* ● ***..*. a*e**eo* 0.8*00** oa iii

Organization ● .m*mm* ● *.***-* ● .eo.oe. ● a eqoaemee eeoemeee o v

PART I THE NATIONAL SETTING

Chapter 1 Evolution of the Transit Industry

The Street Railway Era ● *..**. ● 909*4909 eeeaeesm o 1

Trends in Transit Ridership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Causes of Decline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The Rapid Increase in Operating Deficits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Chapter 2 Evolution of the Federal Role 10

Early Evolution of Federal Transit Legislation . . . . . . . . 10

Efforts to Expand Transit Support in the Late 1960s. . . 12

Attempts to Obtain Operating Subsidies . . . . . eemoooe qee o 14

The National Mass Transportation Assistance Act

of 1974 . . . . . . ....... ● 000040 ● 0000098 O*O Q

- OOe OeOO O 16

PART II METROPOLITAN DECISIONMAKING ISSUES

The Study Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Descriptions of the Nine Metropolitan Cases . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Chapter 3 Institutional Context for Transit Decisionmakinq 29

General Guidelines for Metropolitan Assessment . . . . . . . . 30

Metropolitan Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Chapter 4 Technical Planning Process 61

General Guidelines for Metropolitan Assessment . . . . . . . . 62

Metropolitan Experience ● ... ● ● ✎✎ . 72

‘Chapter 5 Financing for Public Transportation 92

General Guidelines for Metropolitan Assessment . . . . . . . . 93

Metropolitan Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

*
(Table of Contents -- continued)

PART III NATIONAL POLICY FOR MASS TRANSIT

Chapter 6 Major National Policy Issues 112

Institutional Issues. . . . ● ●☛▲❅✝✎☛ ● ● 113

Technical Planning Process Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Transit Financing Issues ● **m*** ● *=***** ● *m**m** ● **8**** 132

The Role of National Goals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Chapter 7 Options for National Transit Policy 143

Policy Option A: Maintain the Present

Mass Transit Policy and Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

Policy Option B: Strengthen the National

Mass Transit Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

Policy Option C: Create a Policy-Oriented

Balance Among All Forms of Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . 152

Policy Option D: Make Multimodal Planning and

Development an Integral Element of Community

Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Chapter 8 Summary of Major Findings 160
.

INTRODUCTION

THE PURPOSE

Mass transit is beginning to stage a comeback. After

decades of declining ridership, a modest upswing is in progress, at least in some metropolitan areas. Perhaps more

importantly, there is growing popular interest in mass transit.

Major issues of the 1960s -- traffic congestion, the plight of

the poor and other minorities -- are combining with the issues

of the 1970s -- degradation of environmental quality, energy

shortages, and increasing gasoline prices -- to kindle more

broadly based political support for mass transit.

Nearly all of the nation’s metropolitan areas have some

type of mass transit system. Six of them are served by rapid

rail transit on rights-of-way that are separated from automobile

traffic. The rest use streetcars, buses, and trolleybuses.

Many of these systems were built by private entrepreneurs

during the period when transit was a profitmaking business.

Routes were laid where they would serve the most people and

bring the highest returns, or they were extended to promote

new real estate developments that, in turn, provided captive

markets for these lines in the preauto era.

Thirty years ago transit operations in U.S. cities averaged

a decent 11% profit. Then, a downward spiral in ridership and

income began that led to an average loss of 23 cents per paying

passenger (not including transfer passengers) by 1974. Eventually, ailing operations were sold to city governments, and by

fall 1975 almost every major private transit enterprise in

metropolitan ‘areas of more than half a million population had

been transferred to public ownership. In 1974, 90% of all

revenue passengers were carried on publicly owned systems.

The public sector dominates transit now. New public agencies

have assumed responsibility for transit operations, and they are

pumping public dollars into the effort. The greatest commitment

of both responsibility and money is occurring in the metropolitan

areas that either operate rail transit systems or are building

new regional rapid transit systems.

The Federal Government entered the transit business

along with metropolitan areas. The Federal interest was spurred

by the parallel concerns of making urban transit competitive

with urban highways, which had been receiving Federal support

since 1944, and shoring up the financially pressed transit

operators. Federal participation began in 1961 with a modest

program to support first-time applications of innovative transit

concepts; by 1970 the Urban Mass Transportation Administration

was able to begin providing substantial financial assistance to

both existing and major new transit projects in metropolitan areas.
ii

Since then, through the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 and

the National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974,

Congress has greatly expanded the capacity of the Federal

Government to aid urban transit. ----------- --

When San Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit system --

BART -- began operating in 1972, it was the first new regional

transit system to come on line with the aid of Federal funds.

UMTA’s $304 million contribution to BART was the largest sum

the Federal Government had committed to a single transit system. 1/

The new BART was a natural focal point for public attention, and

considerable debate has ensured over whether BART has been a

wise investment. Much of the BART controversy centered on

technology issues. BART was designed as the most highly automated

transit system in the United States, but a series of unanticipated

technological setbacks and financial limitations has kept the

system from performing at the expected service levels.

BART also raised questions that went beyond the merits of

its technology. With employment in the suburbs growing faster

than downtown employment, is a radial transit system focusing

on the downtown the best approach for meeting the region’s

transit needs? Does a high-speed regional rapid transit system

unfairly benefit the white-collar commuters who use it most

often, while everyone pays a share of the costs? Some BART

critics charge that the system was conceived and brought into

being by self-interested property owners in downtown San

Francisco who wanted to stimulate a rise in property values.

BART was the first major new transit program to request

aid from the Federal Government. By the early 1970s a number

of metropolitan areas were drawing up plans that included much

higher price tags for the Federal share. Atlanta, for example,

wanted over $1 billion to build its regional rapid rail system.

Requests from Los Angeles were expected to reach as high as

$11 billion. During the same period, a number of researchers

began to report findings that rail systems were not costeffective -- that is, for the same cost, other transit programs

would provide more service.

The issue of how decisions about new transit systems should

be made underlies all these concerns. The purpose of planning

is to put decisionmaking on a rational basis so that public

investments (and other public policy decisions) can be made

wisely and in the public interest. A particular type of transit

technology, route configuration, or level of service may have

different impacts in different metropolitan areas and even in

parts of one metropolitan area. One of the important functions

l

-/ BART was conceived and construction begun without the expectation of Federal support, and although the Federal contribution was great compared to the amount granted to other

new transit programs, it represented only 19% of the total

BART cost.
iii

of planning is to provide enough information about these impacts

and the impacts of alternative courses of action to provide a

solid basis for making decisions. ---

The effectiveness of planning depends on several factors.

One variable is the structure of the technical planninq process -- the activities that are undertaken in doing the planning

work. The past decade has witnessed an evolution in planning

toward opening the door to public participation, toward broadening

both the range of options considered and the range of goals they

are intended to meet, and toward developing more practicable

schemes for putting plans into effect.

A second factor is the extent to which constraint

are put on the technical planning

process by those who set it in motion. For example, the

lative mandates of the agencies responsible for planning

legiscan

seriously limit the range of alternatives that will be examinea.

Similarly, the controls political leaders and the public exert

over these agencies influence the choice of options to consider

and the means of considering them. where and how the money comes

has an especially powerful influence on the planning work.

The availability or unavailability of financing and the conditions

under which the financing is provided limit the range of options

that are feasible.

Federal policy has influenced and will continue to influence

all the factors that shape transit planning. Federal regulations

affect the structure of regional planning organizations and the

scope of the technical planning process. The level and type of

Federal financing affects what a community can afford to build.

The central question is how to shape Federal policy so it

will strengthen community transit planning. What are the factors

that help communities facing critical technological choices make

wise decisions that are consistent with both local and national

goals for transit? Answering the question entails looking at

how transit decisions have been made in the past.

Thus, the objective of this assessment has been to obtain

a better understanding of the impact of different financing

mechanisms, institutional arrangements, and technical planning

procedures. The ultimate purpose of the work has been to cast

light on prospective changes in national transit policy programs

and administration that might improve, in different ways and to

different extents, the way communities plan mass transit systems.

SCOPE

The study focuses on the planning of transit systems rather

than broader transportation programs. Yet because transit

planning is closely related to other regional planning functions,

particularly highway and land use planning, the study takes

account of these interrelationships.
iv

The assessment also concentrates on rail rapid transit

rather than bus or other types of mass transportation. 1

/

The focus has two explanations. First, the impact of the new

BART and its technological difficulties tended to frame a

particular concern about the way communities make decisions

about transit: namely, were they capable of correctly judging

● the impact and appropriateness of costly new transit technologies? Bus systems, in contrast, involve a less awesome commitment.

A more important reason for focusing on rail rapid

transit is the fact that until recently, conventional "heavy

rail" fixed-guideway transit, or technological improvementson it such as personal rapid transit, have dominated the

imaginations of U.S. transit planners. Only within the past

five years has serious attention been given to the potential 

for bus or “light rail” (sophisticated streetcar) transit,

using parts of existing highways, to meet transit needs. There

is yet no example of a planning process that has resulted in

a final decision to build one of these innovative systems to

serve a metropolitan area. 2

/

This report is based on a review of transit planning and

decisionmaking in nine metropolitan areas that have, or have

been considering, rapid transit systems. The areas were

selected to represent the full range of issues that arise at

different stages in the overall process of planning and

developing a transit system:

e

● Boston and Chicaqo have long established rapid transit

systems for which extensions and other improvements are

currently being planned.

● San Francisco’s BART is the first new regional rail

transit system in recent decades.

1/ The term “rapid transit " is most commonly used to denote - electrified rail transit operating on exclusive rights-of-way,

although it is sometimes broadened to encompass bus or other

fixed-guideway transit operating on exclusive rights-of-way.

The term “fixed-guideway transit” is a broad term used to refer

to any public transportation system operating on exclusive

rights-of-way under direct lateral control, including conventional rail technology of any kind, monorail, or any of the

several types of automated new technologies.

.

2/ On the other hand, several cities soon will introduce new

light rail rollinq stock on existing routes (Boston and San

Francisco) , several other cities are seriously considering

new light rail systems (Dayton, and Portland, Oregon), and

there are a large number of cities that have begun express

bus service on highway rights-of-way.
—-

V

Washington, D.C., and Atlanta have regional rapid

transit systems under construction. The Washington,

D.C., Metro system is scheduled to begin service on

a 4-1/2-mile segment in 1976. Groundbreaking for

Atlanta’s regional rail transit system occurred in

February 1975.

Denver has planned a fixed-guideway transit system

but has not yet started construction. In June 1975,

Denver requested Federal financial aid to build the

first segment of its system.

In Seattle and Los Angeles, voters twice defeated rail

transit proposals in referendum, but serious planning

activity continues.

The ninth metropolitan area, Minneapolis-St. Paul, is

attempting to make a final decision after several years

of studying alternative transit schemes.

ORGANIZATION

The assessment involved three basic steps, and these

steps provide the structure for this report.

Step 1: Establishing the National and Historical Context.

A brief review of the historical trends in transit development

and of the Federal Government’s response to the changing- urban

transit situation provides a context within which the findings

of the assessment can be more realistically interpreted.

This review is contained in Part I of the report, which is

titled “The National Setting.”

Step 2: Assessing the Metropolitan Experience. The bulk

of the study effort was an evaluation of the transit planning

and decisionmaking process in the nine case metropolitan areas.

The evaluation identified a number of problems that affect

the performance of community planning for transit. The discussion

of these problems, grouped in three categories according to their,

roots in financing, institutional, and technical planning considerations, is contained in Part II of this report, called "Metropolitan

Decisionmaking Issues.”

Step 3: Developing Options for Public Policy. The

lessons learned during the metropolitan case assessments lead to

several courses the Federal Government could follow in taking

steps to improve transit planning. The major issues for Federal

policy and potential ‘remedies for these issues are described in

“Part III: National Policy for Mass Transit.”
PART I

THE NATIONAL SETTING

.
CHAPTER

THE EVOLUTION OF THE

1

TRANSIT INDUSTRY

The history of public transit in the United States covers

a period of nearly I50 years. During the first part of this

period transit was the dominant form of transportation in American cities, but since the 1920s the use of transit has been

declining steadily. The decline was interrupted only during the

years of World War II when the supply of fuel and new vehicles

was severely constrained.

THE STREET RAILWAY ERA

The street railway was the predominant form of public

transportation prior to the 1920s. The first fixed-route, urban

public transit in the United States was a horse-drawn, eightseater omnibus that began operating on New York City’s Fourth

Avenue in 1831. The cable car, which was introduced in 1873,

more than doubled the horsecar’s speed, but the cost of burying

the cable limited use of this system to already densely developed corridors. In the 1880s, however, the electrification of

the streetcar expanded the range of public transit in the cities,

and until the end of World War I public transit ridership grew

more rapidly than the urban population.

The extent of urbanization kept pace with the evolution

of transit technology. Until the late 1880s a typical city

had a two-mile radius, the distance a horsedrawn streetcar could

cover during the 30 minutes most people were willing to spend

to reach their destinations in the city core.

The electrification of the streetcar helped push the

development horizons of the city five miles away from the center.

During the height of the street railway era, lines leapfrogged

past the densely developed part of the city to outlying areas

and even satellite towns. The spaces in between soon were filled

with new buildings, in part because of the new transit links.

In the typical development sequence, the appearance of

electric streetcar lines helped precipitate the conversion of

old residential streets to commercial and lower-income housing

areas. Higher-income residents, who were offended by the

noise and overhead wires from the streetcars sought property

in outlying areas those same streetcars had made accessible.

The densest retail and industrial development occurred where

lines intersected and at their termini. Commercial activity

continued to focus on the historic core, but important subcenters

grew where new crosstown lines met the older radiating routes.
-2-

The Decline of Public Transit

L

Although the ridership on street railways held steady

until the end of World War I, by the late 1920s a pattern of

serious competition between the private automobile and public

forms of transportation in urban areas had begun to emerge.

The automobile had begun to assert itself as a major form

of transportation by the middle of the 1920s. With gradually

increasing personal income and the efficiency of mass production, automobile ownership and use expanded quickly. In 1900,

there were only 8,000 registered automobiles in the United States,

but by 1925 the number had risen to 17 million.1-/

The rising popularity of the automobile threatened the

transit industry in three main ways. First, the automobile

directly competed with transit for riders, particularly for social

and recreational trips. Second, the widespread use of automobiles

meant there was less incentive to extend streetcar and other

transit to serve new housing and industrial development. Third,

automobiles ‘increased congestion on the city streets and created

a situation in which the public transportation industry had to

compete for patronage on the private automobile’s own ground,

where the latter performed considerably better.

In response to growing suburbanization and the growing

competition from the private automobile, the public transportation industry in the 1920s began to shift from rail to buses.

In 1922 almost all transit patrons were carried by streetcar and

rapid rail, but by 1925 over a billion passengers were being

carried annually by buses. By 1930 this number had risen to

2.5 billion.

The shift to buses was at least partially an unintended

secondary effect of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of

1935. This act prohibited utility companies from holding financial interest in street railways. Utility companies had been

buying into streetcar operations since the turn of the century,

and profits from their other more solvent businesses offset the

financial setbacks transit operations were suffering. By removing the remaining underpinnings of financial stability from

many of the relatively few surviving streetcar lines, the Holding Company Act accelerated the modal conversion process.

TRENDS IN TRANSIT RIDERSHIP

The results of the transit/auto competition and other

economic pressures are illustrated clearly by the trend in total

number of passengers carried by public transit. Ridership on

1/ Us. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, Summary to 1965, p. 12.
-3-

street railway operations more or less held steady during the

1920s but fell during the early 1930s. By the time of the Depression, the privateautomobile ha d corneredthe pleasure and

social trip market. Transit therefore depended increasingly

on work trips for revenue, and rising unemployment cut into work

travel. The losses might have been even greater if two other

forces had not come into play: a temporary halt in the rapid

growth of the automobile industry and an influx of potential

patrons into the cities from failed farms.

The rally in transit ridership during the World War II

years, when a surge in employment coincided with gasoline shortages, gave way to a steady decline that lasted nearly 25 years.

Between 1945 and 1974 the total passengers carried by all forms

of public transit had fallen from over 20 billion to just over

7 billion. There has been a slight increase in passengers

during the past two years, a large part of which is due to

fuel shortages-and rising prices. Figure 1 illustrates this

trend dramatically.

25

2a

15

10

.

.

.

1 1 v , I

T

1 1

1 , , 1

1 , 1 , 1

1 1 , T

1

1 I I

1

YEAR “ 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970

FIGURE 1: TOTAL TRANSIT PASSENGERS 1924-1974

Source: Wilbur Smith and Associates, Future Highways and Urban Growth, 1961

American Public Transit Association, ‘74-’75 Transit Fact Book
-4-

CAUSES OF DECLINE -

In the almost three decades since World War II, the urban

public transit industry in the United States has continued its

economic decline. Even though average fares nationally have

risen faster than the consumer price index, passenger revenue

has not grown rapidly enough to offset increased costs. More

and more systems have experienced operating deficits and many

privately owned systems have either ceased to operate or sold

their depleted operations to the municipalities they served.

The basic causes of the decline in mass transit can be attributed

to a number of interdependent factors:

● The urban population has grown rapidly outside the

central cities in which most public transportation

systems are located and where service is concentrated.

(From 1960 to 1970 alone the population outside central

cities in the United States increased by about 34%

compared to a 1.5% population gain in central

cities. Most of the older central cities suffered decreases.)

● Suburban living in the United States is largely

automobile-oriented, in part because housing and population densities are low and parking space is usually

freely available. Moreover, because of these low population densities and the wide dispersion of origins

and destinations, conventional public transit cannot

operate profitably and often is not even available to

the suburbanite.

● Automobile ownership has increased dramatically.

Even over the last decade there continued to be marked

change. Automobile ownership per household between

1960 and 1970 increased from 1.09 to 1.27; the number

of two or more automobile households rose from

13% in 1960 to over 30% in 1972. By 1972 only

20% of all households were without automobiles.

These, of course, were concentrated among the poor, old,

or too young -- the groups that are frequently considered to be “captive riders” of public mass transit

. systems -- as well as among dwellers in the centers of

the largest cities.

● Public transit fares have escalated while the user’s

perception of the cost of driving has gone down.

● Lack of innovative management and marketing in the

transit industry and conservative attitudes toward change

generally have contributed to the difficulties of public

transportation.

- -
-5-

.

● Federal programs have

unevenly, giving impetus

another. The support of

been enacted and administered

to one form of transportation over

highway construction from the

Highway Trust Fund, for exmple, has provided relatively

certain annual funding at relatively high levels for

highways. Transit, in contrast, has no comparably dependable and ample source of funding.

● Federal planning funds for comprehensive urban planning available from the Department of Housing and Urban

Development have been only partly coordinated with transportation programs within metropolitan areas. Coordinated

planning is necessary to locate transportation services

where they will get the most use and, conversely, to locate

new development where it will be best served by public

transportation. Much of the effort at coordination that

has occurred has been thwarted by the lack of development controls and other powers necessary to implement

the plans.

● During most of the period in which the nation’s urban

mobility problems were developing, the state and Federal

governments were largely concerned with the problems of

transportation between urban areas. It is only in the

last few years that attention has increasingly focused

on the transportation needs within these areas, although

this shifting interest and concern has not yet caught

up with the needs. e

THE RAPID INCREASE IN OPERATING DEFICITS

Although ridership has declined sharply and continuously

since 1945, it was not until 1963 that the industry as a whole

first experienced operating costs in excess of revenues. By

1973 (the most recent year for which published data are available),

despite a small increase in revenue passengers for the first year

since World War II, the revenue deficit nationally had grown to

two-thirds of a billion dollars and was growing at a rate of over

33% per year.

1

/ The deficit stood at 13 cents per revenue

passenger.

Recently published data show that the annual

percentage growth rate in 1974 was more than double the 1973

number as indicated in Table 1.

2

/ Because

of these dramatic increases and the major implications of a

continuation of this trend, a 1975 national projection has been

obtained based on up-to-date

1/ '73-'74 transit Fact Book,

Table No. 1, p. 4.

2/ Ibid. .-

experience in major metropolitan

American Public Transit Association.,
-6-

TABLE 1 -- NATIONAL ANNUAL TRANSIT DEFICIT

.

Net Operating Annual

Deficit After Percent

Year Taxes ($Millions) Change

)

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975 (projected)

Source: American

$161

$221

$288

$411

$513

$738

$1,271

$1,702

Public Transit Association

37%

30%

43%

25%

44%

72%

33.9%

, ‘74-’75 Transit

Fact Book for 1968 through 1974; System Design

Concepts, Inc. forecast for 1975 (see text for

explanation).

areas. Metropolitan transportation officials in each of the

cities listed are the sources of data for the forecasts of

deficits indicated.

The total 33.9% projected increase for 1975 in

the metropolitan areas was used as the basis for projecting the

national figures shown in Table 2. This projection is presented

with some reservation, recognizing that the basis for the individual figures varies widely. On the whole the individual estimates are likely to be on the conservative side, tending to

reflect operators’ optimism regarding their ability to manage

costs. Nonetheless this analysis does clearly demonstrate that

the rapid rate of growth of operating costs in excess of operating

revenues is reaching an order of magnitude of major national consequences -- $1.7 billion. A recent
-7-

TABLE 2 -- TRANSIT OPERATING DEFICITS IN 1974 AND PROJECTED

FOR 1975 IN SELECTED MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS

(Millions of Dollars)

Percent

Metropolitan Area 1974 1975 Increase

New York* (Calendar Year)

Boston (Calendar Year)

San Francisco** (F.Y.)

Los Angeles (F.Y.)

Chicago (CTA only - Calendar Year)

Philadelphia (Septa only)

Washington, D.C. (Bus only - F.Y.)

Pittsburgh

Atlanta (F.Y.)

Seattle

Minneapolis-St. Paul (Calendar Year)

Denver (Calendar Year)

315.0

141.6

87.6

66.8

62.6

58.5

17.5

23.4

17.0

14.3

12.0

7.4

421.7

159.0

109.9

97.1

93.6

75.1

38.4

30.4

24.3

19.5

24.3

10.4

33.8%

12.3%

25.5%

47.2%

49.5%

28.4%

121.1%

29.9%

43.0%

36.4%

102.5%

45.4%

Totals 823.7 1,103.7 33.9%

*N.Y.C.T.A. only; based on interpolation of data for 11 months of F.Y. 1974

and prior years and projections of 1975 and 1976 calendar years by MTA.

**Based on data from five principal operators covering all estimated 95 percent of area’s transit system and extrapolated to cover the entire transit

service area in the San Francisco region.

Source: Telephone contacts with officials in each metropolitan area in

March 1975. In each city, the numbers for the two years use

common assumption,~ although some of the numbers are inconsistent

with more recently reported data.

U.S. Department of Transportation projection of a $2.5 billion

deficit in 1990 is unrealistically optimistic in light of

this trend.

1

/

Recent growth in deficits reflect, to an increasing extent, the financial impacts of public takeovers of declining

Private systems coupled with extensions and improvements in the

quality of service. In addition, in contrast to a few years ago

1/ A Study of Urban Mass Transportation Needs and Financing, U.S.

DOT, July, 1974, pp. 4,5.
$

-8-

operators have been tending to hold the line on fares despite

rising costs.–&/ Average fares have been declining in real dollar

terms nationally during the last few years. Thus, in contrast to

earlier years, the financial problem is more and more a result

of conscious policy decisions rather than a reflection of

neglect and deterioration in the level and quality of service.

The financial impact of service improvements was

illustrated during fiscal years 1974 and 1975. Transit operators

responded to the oil embargo and higher fuel prices with new

routes, route extensions, and more frequent service, placing “

greater emphasis than before on innovative services. Ridership

increased, but the gap between operating costs and farebox

revenues generally grew wider. For

example, WMATA here in Washington reported that the expanded

service increased operating costs by 12% while ridership grew

only by 2%.

The National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974

provided a total of $3.975 billion over six years, through the new

Section 5, for optional use to pay operating costs. The funds

authorized are not to exceed $300 million for fiscal year 1975,

increasing annually to $900 million in fiscal year 1980.

The results of a telephone survey of major metropolitan

transit operators indicate their need for operating assistance

is so great that most of them plan to use their entire allocation

of Section 5 funds for this purpose despite the requirement of

much greater local matching share (see Table 3 ) . The local share

for operating assistance is at least 50% compared to

20% if the same funds are used for capital improvements. It

is apparent that in at least some of the metropolitan areas surveyed the present level of transit service cannot be maintained

under the existing fare structure through the remainder of this

year without the operating assistance funds authorized in the

1974 act.

1/ During the period 1949 to 1970 transit fares rose 3% per year

 greater than the consumer price index; however, between 1971

and 1974 transit fares rose less than 2% per year, While the

consumer price index rose more than 6% per year.
- 9 -

.

In summary, the financial stability of the transit industry has undergone a dramatic reversal since 1945. As shall be

discussed in the next chapter, the decline has spurred the continuing efforts for the Federal government to develop a sound

public policy for supporting transit operations.

— .

1

TABLES

NATIONAL MASS TRANSPORTATION ACT 1974

PROPOSED DISPOSITION OF SECTION 5 FUNDS F.Y. 1975

SELECTED METROPOLITAN AREAS I

METROPOLITAN F.Y. 1975 ALLOCATIONS TRANSIT OPERATIONS CAPITOL DEVELOPMENT TRANSIT OPERATIONS

AREA (MILLIONS (PERCENT) (PERCENT) (TOTAL)

ATLANTA $2.4 100 0 $2.4

!

BOSTON $6.5 0 $6.5

CHICAGO $18.1 100 0 $18.1 k

DENVER $2.4 0 100 0

L0S ANGELES $24.0 100 0 824.0

NEW YORK $42.7 100 0 $42.7

SAN FRANCISCO $1O.1 99 1 $10.0

SEATTLE $ 2.7 0 100 0 .

d

TWIN CITIES $ 3.3 0 100 0

WASHINGTON D.C. $6.9 100 0 $ 6.9

TOTAL $119.10 92% 8% $110.60
1 0

CHAPTER 2

EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL ROLE

The evolution of Federal transit assistance is characterized by a short but rapidly changing history. In a

little over a dozen years Federal involvement has grown

from tentative and small-scale support for demonstration

projects to a long-term commitment to provide a major

source of funds for all aspects of public transportation

operations and improvements. The following account considers

four major periods in this history: the early evolution of

Federal transit legislation; efforts to expand transit support

in the late 1960s; attempts to obtain operating subsidies; and

passage of the National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of

1974.

EARLY EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL TRANSIT LEGISLATION

The Federal government became involved in supporting

urban mass transit about 15 years ago. As discussed, at

that time a severe post-World War II decline in transit

patronage was curtailing transit operations throughout the

country.

The first serious efforts to enact Federal transit

legislation occurred in the late 1950s, stimulated by concern

over the future of urban commuter rail services. In 1958,

Congress passed the Transportation Act, which was an attempt

to help the railroads out of financial difficulties they had

experienced since the end of the war. The act gave the Interstate Commerce Commission power to discontinue

unprofitable passenger service. This gave rise to legislative

pressure from mayors of large cities who could foresee serious

consequences from (1) a decrease in commuter services previously

provided by the railroads and (2) an increase in city automobile

use.

1

/

Despite protransit lobbying by the National League of

Cities and U.S. Conference of Mayors, an urban mass transportation bill introduced by Sen. Harrison Williams of New

Jersey in 1961 failed to pass. Financial support for mass

transit wound up, instead, in the 1961 Housing Act, at the

modest level of $25 million for 2/3 Federal share demonstration projects and an additional $43 million for low-interest

capital improvement loans. In the same act, transit planning

became one of the half dozen eligible activities under the

comprehensive urban planning program (Section 701) .

1/ George M. Smerk, Urban Mass Transportation: A Dozen Years

of Federal Policy, Indiana University Press, Bloomington

and London, 1974, p. 36.
-11-

The following year, Section 134 1/ was added to the

Highway Act, in recognition that highway planning should

be integrated with other transit and land use planning in

cities. At this time, 25% of highway funds were being spent

on urban highways. Effective in 1965, the act required

“continuing, comprehensive and coordinated transportation

planning,” in cities greater than 50,000 people, as a precondition for Federal aid to highway projects.

The 1962 act made no additional funds available for

either highway or transit planning. However, it tended to

increase the amount of transit planning undertaken and to

improve coordination between the system planning studies

for the two modes. Actual project and program decisions

continued to be made separately by the two Federal agencies

involved: the Bureau of Public Roads, then part of the

Commerce Department; and the Housing and Home Finance

Administration, where transit responsibilities were lodged.

During this period, local officials and the public became

aware that balanced planning for urban transportation modes

was fruitless in the absence of balanced Federal funding for

improvements. Highway planning during this period focused

on developing long-range network plans for interstate highways

and connecting arterial systems in metropolitan areas to accommodate rapid increases in auto traffic. Funding for the

interstate program, in the form of 90% Federal support for

specific routes, tended to create an incentive for maximizing

traffic estimates in order to have reason to build more of

these high-capacity highways. In response, those interested

in reducing the scale and impacts of the highway systems to

protect the urban environment sought financing for transit

facilities that could compete with the interstate highways,

particularly for work trips from suburban areas to downtown.

In 1962, a bill initiated by the executive branch to

provide $500 million in capital assistance to transit over

a three-year period failed to pass Congress. In the aftermath

of this defeat, a growing coalition of major cities, organized

labor, the transit industry, the railroads and equipment

manufacturers went to work to build support for legislation

that became the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (49 U.S.

Code, Section 1601, et seq.) . When it became law in July 1964,

this act representedtie first Federal commitment to mass

transit capital needs. It increased the demonstration program

to $30 million and authorized

1967 for capital improvements

$375 million through

and demonstrations.

fiscal year

The 1964

1/ Title 23 U.S. Code.
I act provided money in the form of capital grants and loans to

states and local governments to assist them with traditional,

fixed-route transit services. The Federal contribution to a

given project was limited to 2/3 of the net project cost.

Between 1966 and 1969, Congress expanded the scope of

its interest in transit, reflecting a growing recognition

that construction of new facilities and preservation of

existing systems were not the only approaches needed to

remedy transit’s ills. Amendments to the Urban Mass Transportation Act in 1966 (PL-89-562) made technical studies,

managerial training programs, and university research projects eligible for assistance. In 1968, Housing and Urban

Development Act amendments (PL-90-448) widened the definition

of mass transportation to make services other than fixed-route

bus and rail projects eligible for Federal funds.

During the same period, Congress took action that put

the transit program on an equal basis, in terms of organizational structure, with other Federal transportation programs.

In 1966, Congress created the U.S. Department of Transportation

(DOT), and, in 1968, the Urban Mass Transit Administration

(UMTA). UMTA was lodged in DOT, and the transit program was

transferred there from the Department of Housing and Urban

“ Development. Although this move gave transit status as a permanent,

independent program -- it was no longer merely an adjunct to the

housing program -- the transfer marked the beginning of the program’:

gradual drift away from comprehensive planning and community

development activities, to which it previously had strong ties.

EFFORTS TO EXPAND TRANSIT SUPPORT IN THE LATE 1960s

The 1966 amendments, followed by others in 1968 and 1969,

raised the authorizations by $790 million and extended them

through fiscal year 1971. The total commitment, therefore,

was $1.165 billion over six years, for a potential spending

average of just less than $200 million per year. Nevertheless,

by the late 1960s there was a growing conviction that the

Federal program was too weak to encourage many cities to make

major commitments to new systems. Bond issues for new rail

system plans developed under the UMTA program failed in 1968

in Los Angeles, Atlanta, and Seattle and again in 1970 in

Seattle. Two causes were postulated: (1) the small size

of the Federal program (each of these individual area plans

was estimated to cost several times the annual national

appropriations) , and (2) UMTA’s inability to make a multiyear

commitment.

The Institute for Public Administration, working for UMTA,

extrapolated from planning underway at the beginning of the

decade to estimate that a total capital expenditure for transit

improvements of at least $35.6 billion and possibly $41.5 billion,
-13-

in current dollars, would be required during the period from

1970 to 1979. 1/ The projections implied that UMTA would be

called upon to finance as much as two-thirds of this amount,

or up to $27 billion over the decade.

Congress began to consider two main options for providing

this support. One possibility was to open up the Highway Trust

Fund, established to finance the Interstate System and other

Federal-aid highway programs in 1956, for transit use on a

local choice basis. The alternative was to establish a

separate transit trust fund.

Early. in the Nixon Administration, Secretary of Transportation Volpe endorsed and promoted the transit trust fund

plan developed by James D'Orma Braman, then DOT'S Assistant

Secretary of Environment and Urban Systems. The proposal

would have committed Federal automobile excise taxes to the

new fund. The National League of Cities-U.S. Conference of

Mayors and all the transit interest groups backed the plan

and managed to obtain support from prohighway groups, who

believed that the alternative was a "raid" on the Highway

Trust Fund, which at that time was due to expire in 1972. 2

/

However, the Council of Economic Advisors and the Office of

Management and Budget blocked the proposal in 1969 by arguing

that it would limit the Administration's power to manage the

economy.

The compromise worked out among all groups was the 1970

Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act, which authorized $3.1

billion over five years and gave UMTA contract authority (i.e. power

to obligate future appropriations), and a promise of $10 billion

over 12 years. This meant a verbal commitment to spend about $850

million per year -- four times the authorizations of preceding years.

However, no special fund was established and Congress retained

authority for annual appropriations. 3/

Even SO, many transportation Professionals believed the

1970 act would rescue mass transit from the vagaries of the

annual budget process. As former Secretary of Transportation

Claude S. Brinegar wrote in a November 1974 article ~/, the

Institute of Public Administration “Estimates of Prospective

Capital Investment in Urban Public Transportation" n.d., reprinted in House Appropriations Hearings F.Y. 1973, pp. 618-644.

George M. Smerk, "An Evaluation of Ten Years of Federal Policy

in Urban Mass Transportation,” Transportation Journal, Winter

1971, p. 46.

Public Law 91-453,’ 15 October 1970.

Automotive Engineering, Vol. 82, No. 10, November 1974;

pp. 57-59, 69.
-14-

the $3.1 billion authorization brought mass transit into the

“big leagues” of Federal funding. Early in 1971, however,

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) confirmed the transit

industry's fears by setting the capital grant approval ceiling

for fiscal year 1971 at, $269.7 million, plus a $57 million

loan to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

(WMATA). The figure, obviously, was well below the $850

million figure the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA)

had told Senate and House appropriations committees it could

obligate in fiscal year 1971.

ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN OPERATING SUBSIDIES

Meanwhile more and more cities began to feel the need for

Federal operating assistance. The impacts of inflation, popular

demands to hold the line on fare increases, and rapidly increasing

labor costs were keenly felt, particularly in metropolitan areas

where there had been recent public takeovers. Spokesmen for

these cities argued that operating assistance was needed to

permit a necessary public service to continue. In response,

Senators Williams and Percy introduced an emergency operating

assistance bill in 1971 that would have provided $75 million

a Year for five years to ease operating costs indirectly through

payment of interest on loans to support operations. 1

/

The Nixon Administration strongly opposed direct operating

assistance during this period. A November 1971 DOT report to

Congress presented the spectre of an ever-growing heed or a

“bottomless pit” for Federal operating assistance. Operating

subsidies were expected to lead to high administrative costs

and create incentives for inefficiency on the part of operators. 2

/

The initial alternative to operating assistance proposed

by the Nixon Administration was transportation revenue sharing.

The proposed plan would have provided approximately $2 billion

per year by 1975, to be given to municipalities on an unrestricted

basis for use in urban transportation. 3

/ This approach would

have provided no special priority for public transportation

over other transportation uses.

The alternative of tapping the Highway Trust Fund had

not been discarded. Since 1968 the range of projects eligible

1 / “Percy-Williams Measures Reintroduced,” Passenger Transportation, Vol. 29, No. 9, February 26, 1971, p. 1.

2/ U.S. DOT, Federal Assistance for Urban Mass Transportation,

November, 1971.

3/ I.R.T. Digest, September-October 1972, p. 18.
for Trust Fund support had been widened to include a few

activities related to bus transit. In that year, the FederalAid Highway Act (PL-90-495) allowed cities with populations

exceeding 50,000 to allocate highway funds to fringe parking

demonstration projects. This program was based on a 50%

Federal share. Federal-Aid Highway Act amendments in 1970

(PL-91-605) made preferential bus lane and fringe parking

projects eligible for 50% Federal aid and raised the Federal

share for these projects to 70% starting in July 1973.

The Highway Trust Fund issue was addressed more squarely

in 1973, when a Federal-Aid Highway Act (PL93-87) was passed

that opened the door for transit capital grants from the

Highway Trust Fund. The 1973 act provided the option to

use all Urban Systems funds (up to $800 million from the

Trust Fund) for transit projects, as well as for highways,

and to substitute transit capital projects for urban interstate highways. The same act increased the $3.1 billion

UMTA contract authority to $6.1 billion and raised the Federal

share of transit projects from two-thirds to 80% of "net

project costs.”

The new law came after more than a decade of effort

by local governments who wanted to be able to exercise

flexibility of choice among modes of urban transportation.

According to Brinegar's article, as of fall 1974 the

overall effect of the 1973 legislation had been to siphon

off about 20% of otherwise allocated Highway Trust Fund

monies to urban mass transit capital projects. By that

time, according to Brinegar, Boston, New York, Philadelphia,

and St. Louis had diverted $785 million of their interstate

highway system money for mass transit uses.

However, the 1973 Federal-Aid Highway Act stopped short

of addressing the operating subsidies issue. Bills for

operating assistance passed both houses of Congress late

in 1973 but died in conference after strong Administration

opposition and promise of a veto. In his 1974 State of the

Union Message, President Nixon again advocated special revenue

sharing, with augmented funding. ~/

Shortly after this the Administration proposed the Unified

Transportation Assistance Program (UTAP) , which would have

consolidated the highway and transit programs in urbanized

areas and provided a common 70% Federal share. Sixteen billion

dollars in Federal assistance would have been available through

UTAP for fiscal years 1975 through 1980. In the first year,

1 / "Nixon Offers a Program for Progress," New York Times,

January 31, 1974, p. 20.

I
-16-

$700 million in capital grants would have been disbursed at

the discretion of the Secretary and another $700 million by

a formula based on population. The second sum would be

available for either capital neeeds or operating assistance

at local option. Another $1.1 billion would be distributed

by formula for capital improvements only. The annual amount

would increase by 1980 to $2.7 billion. l\ This proposal would

have provided much of the additional flexibility desired by

transit interests -- local flexibility between highways and

transit and between operating subsidies and capital projects.

THE NATIONAL MASS TRAMSPORTATION ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1974

UTAP was not destined for passage intact. In November

1974, after a long and complex legislative process involving

issues of funding levels, allocation formulas, degree of

state versus local control, and many others, the compromise

National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1975 (PL-93-5C3)

emerged. Although it draws heavily on the Emergency Commuter

Relief Act introduced by Senator Harrison Williams and Congressman

Joseph Minish, the act incorporates several aspects of UTAP,

including a section of funds to be allocated by formula and

a focus on urbanized areas as the planning and funding basis.

The National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974

(PL-93-503)added a $4.825 billion authorization to the capital

. program, for total grant authority to date of $10.925 billion

-- $7.825 billion of it unobligated as of spring 1975. UMTA

was instructed to administer these funds on a discretionary

basis between 1976 and 1980. Up to $500 million is reserved

for capital assistance to rural transit programs.

The act added a new section (Section 5) to the UMTA Act

of 1964 that authorized the allocation of $3.975 billion to

cities in a block sum. The sum is calculated on a formula

that takes into consideration both the population and

population density of each metropolitan area. The formula

grant money can be used either for operating costs, on a

50% Federal share basis, or for capital project costs, on an

80% Federal share basis.

Formula grant provisions in the Act result in an automatic

subsidy of elderly and handicapped riders by requiring that

these people be charged no more than half the normal fare

during off-peak hours. The act also set aside $20 million

in fiscal year 1975 and again in 1976 for a study of the

advantages and disadvantages of “no fare” transit systems.

1/ A Study of Urban Mass Transportation Needs and Financing,

U.S. DOT report to Congress, July 1974, p. I-12.
- 17 -

The Secretary is obligated to report back to Congress on this

by June 30, 1975. The 1974 act also expanded the definition

of facilities eligible for capital grants to include land and

property in the vicinity -of the transit corridor that is neede

to integrate transit with socially, economically, ‘and environmentally sound patterns of land use.

d

In summary, from small beginnings in a program of

demonstrations and loans, the Federal Government's involvement

in urban transit has grown into a major financial commitment.

While this step represents a major expansion of Federal support

for public transit, the findings of the assessment

indicate that a number of issues are still outstanding. The

major issues among them are discussed in the following sections

of this report.

5
PART II

METROPOLITAN DECISIONMAKING ISSUES

.

This part of the report compares the findings of separate

assessments of transit planning and decisionmaking in nine metropolitan areas.&/ The following sections outline the assessment

methodology and briefly describe each metropolitan area by way of

providing-an introduction.

THE STUDY APPROACH

The Assessment of Community Planning for Mass Transit has

been an inquiry into an evolving social process. The

methodology for such an inquiry not only must be able to describe

and analyze the many institutional, economic, political, and

technical forces that shape the process but also must be capable

of studying the ‘changes that occur in these processes over

time. .

The study results, consequently, more closely resemble

historical analysis than classical technology assessment. The

information on which the assessment is based was drawn from interviews with major public and private participants in the planning

process and from examination of key plans and documents.

The nature of this kind of investigation makes it difficult

to develop explicit standards on which to base the evaluation of

the experience of each metropolitan area. In examining planning

for mass transit or any other type of transportation, the history

of the setting in which the process occurs, the personalities

of the different participants, and the interrelationships of

local social and economic factors with happenings and trends in

the national scene all come to play in different ways. General

conclusions and trends can be drawn from a comparison of the

metropolitan cases, but their experience is not susceptible to

numerical evaluative measures.

. .

1/ The findings of the case assessments are contained in de--

—

tailed reports that have been prepared for each metropolitan area. These reports are contained in an appendix to

this volume.
-19-

Nonetheless, the data collected in this study supported

the formulation of alternative policies addressing major transit

issues for Congress to consider. The findings yield guidance

as to both the probable effectiveness of each policy option

and the obstacles to its accomplishment.

This assessment employed a set of evaluation guidelines to

orient the investigation in the nine metropolitan areas selected

for study and to provide the basis for comparative judgments

about them. The guidelines were developed following preliminary

visits to the metropolitan areas that provided a general sense of

the major issues affecting the transportation planning process.

The guidelines were derived in light of these issues, a review of

Federal requirements for transit planning, and an investigation

via the literature into the state-of-the-art in the field.

The evaluation guidelines covered major topics for investigation during the case assessment process. They dealt with

the character of the institutional arrangements, the conduct of

the technical planning process, and the influence of financing

policy on transit decisionmaking.

During visits to each of the nine metropolitan areas, the

study team interviewed the principal representative of the transportation planning institutions and other main participants in the

local planning process. The visits were supplemented by interviews

with UMTA officials in Washington. Pertinent documents --official

plans, reports, studies, and other material --were reviewed in each

case.

The information thus collected was used in compiling a history

of the transit planning process in each case area, organized around

key decisions, such as the decisions to study transit, the selection

of a particular transit system, and public ratification of the decision to pay for and build the system. The main political, institutional, financial, and technical characteristics affecting the

conduct of the planning process were then assessed against the specific guidelines.

The same set of guidelines used in assessing each ‘case metropolitan area was employed in making a comparative evaluation of

the metropolitan experience. The comparative evaluation allowed

insight into lessons learned from the metropolitan case assessments. These findings are compiled in the three chapters in

this part of the report. Each chapter corresponds to one of the

three categories of evaluation guidelines: Institutional Context,

Technical Planning Process, and Financing for Public Transportation.
w

●

-20-

DESCRIPTIONS OF THE NINE METROPOLITAN CASES

Special care was taken in choosing the metropolitan areas

to be studied. As explained earlier? the nine cities were selected because they are characteristic of different stages in the

long process of planning, engineering, building, operating, and

modernizing a rail transit system. These stages are: (1) planning new extensions to long-established rail rapid transit systems (Boston and Chicago) or a recently completed transit system

(San Francisco); (2) constructing new rapid transit systems

(Washington, D.C., Atlanta), or awaiting Federal approval to

begin final design (Denver); (3) conducting a transit system

planning effort with no system selection decision to date

(Minneapolis-St. Paul) or after repeated setbacks at the polls

(Seattle, Los Angeles).

Although the entire history of transit planning in each case

was examined, the fact that they represented different stages

in the planning process offered two distinct advantages. First,

at each stage different issues arise and different decisions

have to be taken by policymakers. By selecting metropolitan

areas whose current or recent status of transit planning fell

into different stages, the study team could be assured of the

opportunity to interview key participants in each case whose

memories of the events under study were still fresh and who

often might still be active in the process. Second, the approach allowed the team to study how the same kind of decision

was made at different points in history and thus to better

understand how changes in Federal policy and the planning stateof-the-art affected the decisionmaking process.

The following descriptions summarize the status and focus

of transit planning in each of the cases and briefly describe

their population and transportation characteristics. The accompanying tables (See Table 4, Table 5) show contrasts and

similarities among the metropolitan characteristics and place

the nine cases in the broader context of the nation’s 33

largest SMSAs.
.

TABLE 4: COMPARATIVE METROPOLITAN CHARACTERISTICS NINE SMSA’s

0

Density

Population (people per % Change Land Area

(000s) square mile) Population

1970

(square miles)

1970 1960-1970 1970

Atlanta SMSA 1,390 20 804 18 36.7% 7 1,720 24

Center City 496 3,779 26 1.8% 131.5

Suburban Ring 894 560 68.7% 1,596.5

Boston SMSA 2,754 8 2,791 3 6.1% 31 987 30

Center City 641 13,936 5 -8 .1% 46

Suburban Ring 2,113 2,245 11.3% 941

Chicago SMSA 6,979 3 1,077 6 12.2% 23 3,719 10

Center City 3,369 15,136 4 -5.1% 222.6

Suburban Ring -

3,609 1,032.3 35. 2% 3,496.4

Denver SMSA l,228 27 335 29 32.1% 9 3,660 8

Center City 515 5,406 23 4.2% 95.2

Suburban Ring 713 200 63.7% 3,564.8

Los Angeles SMSA 7,037 2 1,729 8 16.5% 17 4,069 7

Los Angeles 2,810 7,364 20 13.3% 463.7

Long Beach 359 6,059 16 4 .2% 48.7

Suburban Ring 3,869 1,088 20.3% 3,556.6

San Francisco SMSA 3,108 6 1,253 11 17.3% 16 2,480 15

Center City 716 15,764 2 -3 .3% 45.4

Suburban Ring 3,392 983 25. 4% 2,434.6

Seattle SMSA 1,422 17 336 28 28.4% 12 4,226 5

Center City 531 6,350 19 -4.7% 83.6

Suburban Ring 891 216 63.0% 4,142.4 

Twin Cities SMSA 1,814 15 860 15 22.4% 14 2,108 20

Minneapolis 434 8,135 14 -l0.0% 53.4

St. Paul 310 5,935 21 -1.1% 52.2 .

Suburban Ring ‘ 1,070 534 56.0% 2,002.4

Washington, D.C. SMSA 2,862 7 1,216 12 37.8% 6 2,353 16

Center City 756 12,321 6 -1.0% 61.4

Suburban 2,106 919 60.4% 2,291.6

I J Rank among 33 most populous SMSAS.

1There figure reflect the annexation of 27 miles by Denver City between 1960-1970.

-Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners

and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers of the U.S., Inc., March 1974.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area.
-22-

TABLE 5: COMPARATIVE METROPOLITAN TRAVEL CHARACTERISTICS 1960-1970

City

Atlanta SMSA ‘

City Residents (13)

Suburban Residents

Boston SMSA

City Residents (12)

Suburban Residents

Chicago SMSA

City Residents (6)

Suburban Residents

Denver SMSA

City Residents (26)

Suburban Residents

Los Angeles SMSA 1/ City Residents (25)

Suburban Residents

San Francisco SMSA

City Residents (8)

Suburban Residents

Seattle SMSA

City Residents (21)

Suburban Residents

Twin Cities SMSA

~/city Residents (8)

Suburban Residents

Washington, D.C. SMSA

City Residents (5)

Suburban Residents

% Change

Work Trip Work Trip

Distribution Distribution

1970 1960-1970

to city/to suburb To city/to suburb

27% 7% -14% 171%

28% 38% 64% 117%

18% 5% -18% 14%

20% 57% 1% 21%

39% 8% -20% 132%

14% 39% 8% 61%

36% 7% o% 79%

24% 34% 72% 83%

34% 12% 1% 41%

17% 37% 6% 26%

31% 5% -12% 29%

19% 45% 32% 22%

35% 6% - 2% - 3%

21% 38% 7a% 64%

340 8% ] -19% 180%

25% 33% 48% 114%

I

i

20% 5% -18% 44%

25% 50% 28% 129%

2Minneapolis and St. Paul. 1Los Angeles and Long Beach.

I % Change

Work Trip Work Trip

Mode Mode

1970 1960-1970

I

auto/transit auto/transi

82% -20%

71% 21% 34% -23%

92% 3% 113% - 98

T

34% - 9%

44% 38% 13% -14%

74% 14% 38% 5%

I

1

46% -13%

53% 36% 18% -17%

78% 11% 71% 4%

1 61% -37%

80% 8% 28% -43%

89% 2% 94% 2’

32% -21%

82% 9% 30% -21

89% 3% 34% -24

33% 1

56% 30% 18% -9

84% 7% ~ 37% 19

50% -19

74% 15% 11% -21

90% 2% \ 88% - 4

~ 52% ) —. —-16

69% 17% ; a% -20

89% 3% ; 99% -3

84% 4

49% 36% 22% 8

83% 8% lo?% 34

Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners,

Automobile Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area.
-23-

Boston

Boston is the nation’s eighth largest metropolitan area

and its third most densely settled. Its rapid transit system

is one of the oldest and most extensive in the country and

includes the first subway in the United States, built in

1897.

The Boston area developed an ambitious plan for a radialcircumferential expressway system and suburban rapid transit

extensions in the 1950s and early 1960s. In the wake of an

explosive reaction to these plans, a moratorium was called

on most of the expressways in the early 1970s and, as a result

of the Boston Transportation Planning Review, the first transfer of interstate highway funds to transit was achieved.

A major new commitment to transit improvements has been made

with more emphasis on improving inner-city services and reconstructing aging transit facilities.

Boston's center city lost population at an 8.1% rate

between 1960 and 1970. Suburban population grew at a modest

pace of 11.3%. Although it has a relatively high percentage of

both suburban and city transit riders (14% and 38%, respectively),

transit ridership declined by 9% in the Boston SMSA between

1960 and 1970.

Boston has received the second highest total amount of

UMTA transit assistance among the nine case metropolitan areas.

Chicaqo

Like Boston, Chicago is a densely populated, large metropolitan area with a longstanding transit system. It ranks

third in population and fourth in density in the nation.
-24-

The Chicago area has had a long history of master planning

of transit and highway systems with successful implementation and

competent management of operations. Most recently, emphasis has

focused on (a) coordinated rail extensions within expressway corridors, (b) the successful establishment by referendum of a new

Regional Transportation Authority, with taxing power, to coordinate

all services and to provide new services where needed, and (c) efforts

to plan, design, and finance

rail line defining Chicago’s

serve as the rejuvated heart

a new subway to replace the elevated rapid

downtown “loop.” The new subway would

of the regional rail system and link all

elevated, subway, and commuter rail lines with all of the hiqhdensity central business district activities.

Chicago experienced a decline of over 5% in center city population between 1960 to 1970, while suburbs grew by 35%. The suburban

growth was reflected in a more than doubling in the number of cityto-suburb “reverse” commutes. Intrasuburban trips also grew, by

61%. During the same period, transit ridership declined in the

SMSA at a 13% rate. The level of UMTA support to Chicago transit

programs is third highest among the nine metropolitan cases.

San Francisco

San Francisco, the nation’s sixth largest metropolitan area,

‘ranks eleventh in density. Its transit system is the first new

regional system put into operation* in recent years.

The 1974 opening of the last link in the San Francisco Bay

Area Rapid Transit system, the tube under the Bay, climaxes more

than 20 years of system planning and implementation for the largest

single urban transportation development project completed to date

in U.S. history. More has been written about this process than

almost any urban planning project, providing a wealth of lessons

for other areas. Interesting planning issues include local

versus regional control of transit development, the conduct of BART

extension studies, coordination of BART with several other well

established transit systems in the Bay Area, and the establishment of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission with authority

to veto projects of regional consequence and to allocate transit

development funds among the many transit operators of the region.

San Francisco’s center city lost 3.3% of its population between

1960 and 1970, while its suburbs grew by more than 25%. Intrasuburban, suburb to city, and city to suburb work trips all increased. The fastest growth rate, 32% occurred in trips to the

city from the suburbs. While auto use increased 33% in the SMSA,

transit ridership barely held steady.

San Francisco has received more UMTA support than any other

of the nine metropolitan cases.
-25-

Washington, D.C.

Washington follows immediately behind San Francisco in both

population size and population density, ranking seventh in

population and twelfth in density among the nation’s largest

metropolitan areas.

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority is

within a few months of opening the first section of what may eventually be the largest single urban transportation development program in U.S. history, if the area can find a way to refinance the

.$2 billion cost overrun. Almost 20 years of intensive technical

planning studies have included highly sophisticated indepth analytical work. Most of the serious consideration of alternative systems was carried on Within a complex Political

and institutional framework peculiar to the capital, involving

Congress and the various ad hoc and standing agencies of the

Federal executive branch. A variety of interesting issues have

been associated with implementation of the system: route locations,

improved service to the inner city, joint development around stations, potential extensions, and the complexities of multistate

and local financing.

Washington was among the nation’s’ fastest growing areas

between 1960 and 1970, ranking in sixth place. The center city

lost a bare 1% of its population, but suburbs grew by over 60%.

This relatively high suburban growth rate led to an increase of

129% in intrasuburban work trips. The region showed the

largest increase in transit ridership among the nine cases, although the figure was only 4%.

Atlanta

Atlanta has less population than any other area studied except

Denver, and only the Denver and Seattle areas are lower in density.

Even so, planning of its regional transit system was begun relatively

early, in 1960.

Groundbreaking for Atlanta’s 40-mile regional system took

place in February. The planning history has been strongly influenced by two factors. First, a business-oriented powerelite with a mission to make Atlanta a focus of international

business activity played the dominant role in Atlanta transit

decisionmaking. Second, there was a close correspondence between

the timing of the planning effort and the evolution of Federal

transit programs, which meant that Atlanta always expected to be

the first major recipient of UMTA funds for a new regional system.1

/

1/ Construction had begun on BART before it received Federal

assistance; Atlanta expected to have the first new system

to be supported by UMTA funds from the start.
-26-

The recent activities in Atlanta have centered on whether or

not the transit system would receive UMTA support, and how

much.

The Atlanta region grew at a relatively fast pace between

1960 and 1970, second only to Washington among the nine cases.

Changes in travel patterns reflect a 117% increase in intrasuburban work trips and a 171% growth in work trips from the city

to the suburbs. The percentage of suburban residents who drive

to work--92%-- is highest among the metropolitan cases. Transit

use declined by 20% in the region between 1960-1970.

Denver

Denver ranks near the bottom of the large SMSAs in population

and density and is the least densely populated area among the nine

cases. It is served by a regional bus system and has requested

UMTA support to begin final design and construction of a first

link in a regional rapid transit system.

Denver took steps to become the first region in the nation to

build an advanced technology rapid transit system. In 1973, voters

approved a sales tax levy to permit further work on a tentatively

defined personal rapid transit system. At that point, UMTA intervened to require a more thorough analysis of alternatives, and

Denver responded ‘with a proposal for an automated rapid transit

system that could build in demand-responsive features.

The entire process has been characterized by close cooperation

between regional transit planners and land use planners.

Denver’s population gained at a relatively fast pace (over 32%

between 1960 and 1970. The number of work trips grew as well,

and at a particularly rapid rate between suburban origins and

destinations (83%) and from the city to the suburbs (79%).

Relatively more workers commute by auto in Denver than in any

of the cases except Los Angeles, and it has the lowest rate of

transit use. The region lost transit riders at an overall rate

of 37% between 1960 and 1970.

To date, Denver has received the smallest amount of UMTA

financial support among the nine cases.

Seattle

Among the nine metropolitan areas only Denver is less

densely settled than Seattle, and it ranks seventeenth in population among the nation’s largest SMSAs. It operates a regional

bus transit system that includes several lines of trolley buses.
-27-

The double defeat of the proposed Seattle rail system

in 1968 and 1970 was followed by a successful referendum in

1972, which provided new regional taxes and authority to take

over the regional bus system and to implement the short-range

bus transit improvement program. Cautious efforts are underway

to initiate new long-range system planning for fixed guideway

transit, considering a wider range of technologies and system

configurations.

Seattle’s center city declined in population between 1960

and 1970, while the suburbs grew by 63%--the third fastest rate

among the nine cases. Work trips originating in the suburbs

grew significantly, while city commuters declined in numbers. A

high ‘percentage of the area’s workers drive, and their ranks

doubled between 1960 and 1970. The number of transit commuters

fell 19% over the same period.

Los Angeles

Los Angeles, second largest metropolitan area in the United

States in terms of population, has a center city that is less densely

populated than any of the case cities except Denver and Atlanta.

Although it is a region known for sprawl and smog, Los Angeles once

supported the nation's most extensive interurban streetcar system.

The Los Angeles area has experienced two defeats of very

ambitious fixed-guideway system plans, in 1968 and 1974. Planning for the last of these two referenda brought to sharp focus

the issues of local versus regional service and control, the incremental approach to implementation versus the grand long-range master

plan, and the need to carefully evaluate a range of alternative

technologies and system configurations. Los Angeles now wrestles

with changes in its planning process and institutional structure

as it moves toward a first-stage implementation of some type of

fixed guideway system.

Between 1960 and 1970, both the suburban areas and the two

cities in the Los Angeles SMSA (Los Angeles and Long Beach)

gained population at a moderate pace. Changes in distribution

of work trips saw relatively high growth in intrasuburban and

city-to-suburb trips. Auto use grew both in the cities and in

the suburbs, while transit ridership declined by 21%.

Minneapolis-St. Paul

Minneapolis-St. Paul/ or Twin Cities, falls midway down the

list of large SMSAs in terms of population and density. The

area has taken a strong interest in transit improvements over the

past decade and a half, as is witnessed by the trend-setting

Nicollet Mall transitway that was opened in Minneapolis in 1965.
-28-

Twin Cities is the only one of the nine cases that has not

yet officially proposed a fixed guideway transit system. Planning

bodies in the region have been engaged in system planning studies

since 1967. At present there is debate among proponents of a

conventional rapid rail transit system, supporters urging utilization of advanced technology such as a group rapid transit

concept, and others who argue for placing emphasis on community-

. level service and policies to promote fewer and shorter trips.

Twin Cities suburbs gained in population between 1960 and

1970, but their two central cities both suffered losses. Significant

gains occurred in work trips within the suburbs and from the two

cities to suburban destinations. All the increased travel was

accommodated by automobiles, whose users nearly doubled in number

between 1960 and 1970. Meanwhile transit use declined at an

overall rate for the region of 16%.

Next to Denver, Twin Cities has received the smallest portion

of UMTA funds among the nine cases.

Summary

●

The nine case metropolitan areas vary widely in status of

transit system planning and operation and illustrate a range

of population and travel pattern characteristics. However,

each of the case metropolitan areas experienced a more rapid

rate of growth in their suburban areas than in their central cities

between 1960 and 1970, and in six of the nine cases, central city

population fell. The pattern of suburban growth was accompanied

by a surge in auto work-trip travel--ranging from a low of 32%

to 84%-- and a corresponding decline in transit use in all case

regions except Washington, D.C. and San Francisco.

These changes in population distribution and travel patterns

can be correlated with the national decline in transit ridership

and corresponding decrease in operating revenues. The situation

underlines the difficulties the nine metropolitan area cases, and

many other U.S. cities, have been facing in the course of planning

new or improved transit systems --and it points to the urgency of

the reasons for doing so.
.29 -

CHAPTER 3

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT FOR TRANSIT DECISIONMAKING

The metropolitan cases examined in this study adopted a

variety of institutional arrangements for urban mass transportation

planning and decisionmaking. These arrangements have been shaped

by the historical setting of each case, local politics and

institutional factors, and Federal legislation and administrative

requirements. Despite the variations that exist among the metropolitan cases, their common experience underscores a number of

issues that have affected the planning and decisionmaking process.

During the past two decades a fundamental shift has occurred

in the institutional character of the process. With the decline

of the private transit industry, the role of the public sector

has come to dominate the transit field. On the local level, there

has been a vast increase in the number of public authorities in

district planning, developing, and operating mass transit systems.

On the Federal level, there has been a major increase in the level

of Federal assistance to localities for mass transit.

The Federal policy, procedures, and regulations accompanying

this assistance have emphasized a distinctly regional approach to

urban transportation decisionmaking. The intent of current

Federal policy is that planning should be done by -- and planning funds should go to -- a single Metropolitan Planning

Organization, representative of all the political jurisdictions

in the urban area. By executive branch requirement, all capital

project and technical study grant requests are also subject to

review by a single areawide agency. This chapter discusses the

inadequacy of most regional planning organizations, as they are

presently structured, to deal effectively with more localized

needs and concerns.

Along with this regional orientation Federal policy also has

sought to promote multimodal planning and a greater integration

of transportation planning with other metropolitan policymaking

and planning functions. Achieving a more closely integrated

relationship between transportation and land-use planning has

been one of the canons of policy for some time. Likewise,

Federal policy has sought to achieve an integrated, multimodal

approach to urban transportation planning in order to bring mass

transit, highway, aviation, and other modal agencies into an

integrated regional forum for decisionmaking.

One of the central issues discussed in this chapter is the

inability of Federal policy to accomplish either of these latter
-30-

two objectives. Neither effective integration of highway and

transit planning nor meaningful coordination between transit

and land use decisionmaking has yet occurred except in a limited

way.

Instead, partly due to their emphasis on regionwide planning and partly due to a combination of other reasons, Federal

policy and programs have given rise to an institutional structure

for transit decisionmaking that often lacks the political or

statutory authority to develop and carry out responsive and effective programs. Most of the organizations that have been

created or designated to assure multimodal and multifunction

coordination do not have the statutory power to finance or administer the programs they plan. Thus, in spite of Federal

requirements, transit decisionmaking responsibility remains fragmented among regional and local agencies of government. The

resulting competition and confusion makes it difficult for the

public to identify the public officials and institutions responsible for the process and hold them accountable for their actions.

This chapter describes these issues more extensively.

Following a general review of the generic institutional structure

and the evolution of the Federal role, the basic guidelines that

shaped the assessment are defined and the experience of the metropolitan areas is reported. .

.

GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR METROPOLITAN ASSESSMENT

The institutional context for transit planning and

decisionmaking was assessed according to a number of broad

guidelines. These guidelines were derived by examining the

general characteristics and functions of the types of partipating organizations in light of Federal legislative and administrative requirements and current planning theory.

Basic Elements of the Institutional Structure

The variety of institutions that participate in the decisionmaking process for mass transit include Federal, state, and local

governments, as well as special purpose units of government and

coordinating agencies. The participants in. the metropolitan

decisionmaking process interact through policymaking and technical coordination committees tied together by statutes or formal

agreements.

Organizations. The principal organizations on the regional level

are Metropolitan Planning Organizations and special purpose

metropolitan transit authorities. The Metropolitan Planning

Organizations (MPOs) are set up to meet Federal requirements for

linking the transit authorities (and special purpose organizations) with areawide comprehensive planning. Local and state
-31-

governments also play an important role in metropolitan transit

decisionmaking.

Metropolitan Planning Organizations. Most MPOs are regional

councils of government or metropolitan planning commissions.

These organizations usually have responsibility for areawide

comprehensive planning and for reviewing areawide applications

for all Federal grants. In the past, most transportation planning was done by other agencies, and in some cases this practice

has been continued. Recent Federal legislation has given these

bodies increasing strength, and they may begin to play a more

significant role in developing integrated regional multimodal

work programs than they have in the past.

Metropolitan transit agencies. Created by state legislation, metropolitan transit authorities or special districts

usually are empowered to plan, design, construct, and operate

transit systems. The number of these special purpose authorities has increased with the widespread public acquisition of

transit properties. Many of the responsibilities of transit

operating authorities overlap to some degree with those of the

Metropolitan Planning Organizations. However, the operating

authorities are more involved with day-to-day problems and are

often limited in their authority to plan and to finance the implementation of significant new capital facilities.

.

Local governments. The role that local municipal governments play in the transit planning and decisionmaking process

varies. Traditionally, the large central cities whose leaders

first promoted rapid transit systems have played a commanding

role, but the growth of suburban areas has eroded the influence

of the center city. Nevertheless, several ma]or cities still

control transit operations, while municipal powers over land use

and traffic management also make local governments important

participants in the process. ●

State governments. Traditionally state governments have

played a key role in the urban transportation planning process

through state highway departments. In recent years, a greater

number of states have established departments of transportation

(DOTS) with mandates for multimodal transportation policymaking

and planning, and, in a few cases, transit operations. As the

state role in providing financial assistance to localities increases, state DOTS will have more leverage over local and

metropolitan areas.

Responsibilities. The following paragraphs briefly describe the

key responsibilities of the different agencies involved in transit decisionmaking. Some functions typically are shared by

several agencies; others usually are assigned to one organization. The pattern varies in every metropolitan case.
—

-32-

. Comprehensive planning. This responsibility usually is shared

by the areawide planning agency and local city, town, and county ‘L governments. While the powers that the areawide agency holds over

the local governments may vary it usually is limited to coordinating

local land use plans while actively pursuing plans for regional services (sewers, water, health, and other programs). There-is some

give and take over housing, schools, transportation, and other issues

of both local and regional significance, although the importance of

the regional role is becoming more widely recognized.

Long-range regional transportation planning. The areawide plan- ,

ning agency and/or another Federally designated body usually takes

responsibility for formulating regional, multimodal transportation

plans. Components for that plan often are developed by the state,

transit authorities, and/or local units of government.

Transit system planning. Areawide transit planning usually has

been the responsibility of special purpose transit agencies. When

this is the case, transit plans become subelements of long-range regional comprehensive plans and transportation plans. In some regions,

the transit planning function is performed by areawide planning

organizations.

Transit programming. Transit programming -- setting priorities

among projects, developing schedules, and budgeting -- is a pivotal

activity. Like transit planning, it traditionally has been done by

transit agencies, but in recent years areawide planning organizations

have begun assuming this responsibility. .

Hiqhway proqramming. Responsibility for scheduling

and budgeting urban highway projects traditionally has been lodged instate highway departments, although regional planning organizations

have played a bigger role in recent years.

Transit financing. Decisionmaking responsibilities for transit

financing are held by those agencies and units of government with

authority for operating and for raising funds for transit projects.

Power for taxing, bonding, and expenditure of Federal funds usually

is held by transit authorities or special districts, the state, and

local governments. Increasingly Metropolitan Planning Organizations

are becoming involved in finance policy by virtue of their function

as the regional channel for Federal transit funds.

Final. design, implementation, operation, and maintenance. Once

a project is planned and programmed, and financing has been arranged,

the final design, construction, operation, and maintenance functions

are the responsibility of transit authorities or of local government.

Transit improvements requiring changes in traffic management and

parking, for example, are the domain of local governments.

.

Urban development implementation and land use controls.

Although UMTA does not require these functions to be part of .

transit decisionmaking, the relationship between transit and land

use development is widely considered to be a critically

important consideration. In most areas, local governments
-33-

possess the basic land use controls, but in some cases regional

commissions are developing review powers over land use planning.

Federal Legislation and Administrative Regulations

The amount of Federal legislation that has some bearing on

the institutional context for mass transit decisionmaking is

considerable. Some of these policies and requirements have been

discussed in earlier sections of the report. Others include

the specific laws and programs relating to areawide comprehensive

planning, housing, air pollution, relocation assistance, elderly

and handicapped provisions, transportation research and development, and civil rights. In one form or another all these can

directly or indirectly affect the procedures of the planning

process.

The Federal legislation and requirements discussed in this

section have a direct bearing on the institutional context for

urban transportation planning and development process. Within

the past two decades, Congress has taken steps to centralize

local planning efforts within regional organizations. The

Federal Government also has attempted to structure the institutions to maximize cooperation between transit and highway planning, and between these transportation functions and other areawide planning functions. Finally, the Federal Government has

developed more detailed requirements to enhance the accountability of the decisionmakers to the public and to strengthen

community participation in transportation planning.

Forum for decisionmakinq. Federal policy has encouraged a

regional framework for transit planning in order both to improve

coordination between planning functions and to give all affected

jurisdictions a voice in making decisions whose impacts cross

jurisdictional boundaries. t

.

When transit money for capital costs first became

available through the Urban Mass Transportation Act

of 1964, no requirements for organizational structure were specified in the law. The administering agency, which at that time

was the Housing and Home Finance Agency, had to determine only

two general facts about an applicant to approve the application:

(1) did it have the legal, financial, and technical capacity to

carry out the proposed project; and (2) would it exert satisfactory continuing control over the use of the facilities and

equipment.

The Urban Mass Transportation Administration Planning

Requirements Guide of February 1966 elaborated on the directives

of the act. The guidelines list criteria for relating the transportation function to areawide comprehensive planning, as is

described in the subsection on coordination among organizations.

They also indicate that whenever possible transportation planning

should be the responsibility of the same agency carrying on

comprehensive planning for the urban area.
-34-

Section 701 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of

1965 put teeth into the regional planning concept by requiring

that planning grant allowances "for the solution of metropolitan

or regional problems" should be distributed only to "organizations composed of public officials. . . representative of all political jurisdictions within a metropolitan area or urban

region. . . .“

Several Federal acts in recent years have recognized

the need for coordinating the planning and development

of burgeoning metropolitan and urban activities. The

most important acts are the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962; the

Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Act of 1966, and the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973.

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 established a significant provision for coordinating highway planning and development

with other metropolitan planning activities in urbanized areas

of more than 50,000 population. Section 134 of the act required

highway projects to be based on a "continuing, comprehensive

transportation process. . carried on cooperatively by state and

local communities.. .." This provision is often called the 3-C

planning requirement. It resulted in the creation of new planning organizations to certify that regional transportation planning conformed to the 3-Cs.

The Urban Mass Transportation Act amendments in 1966 required

technical studies for urban mass transportation projects to fit

into "a unified or officially coordinated urban transportation

system” which was, in turn, part of the comprehensive development

plan of the urban area.

The UMTA planning requirements guide also mandated an areawide approach. Legislation for Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development in late 1966 (Section 207) reinforced the

concept of regionwide coordination by requiring an areawide planning agency to certify that regional transportation projects are

consistent with an official comprehensive plan acceptable to

state, regional, and local governments. Somewhat redundantly for

transportation planning, the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act

of 1968 extended the requirement to all Federally assisted projects. , Guidelines for the clearinghouse-type grant review

process were provided by the Office of Management and Budget’s

Circular A-95 three years later, in 1969.

Circular A-95 is to date the single most important statement of Federal policy regarding comprehensive planning for

metropolitan areas. The A-95 process requirements specify

important interrelationships for information exchange between

planning organizations.
-35 -

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 expressed the intent

of Congress to encourage better coordination of the various

transportation services within each city. To implement that

policy, in September 1975 the administrators of the Federal

Highway Administration and UMTA issued joint regulations

requesting governors to designate a single Metropolitan Planning

Organization in each metropolitan area for receipt of available

planning funds. 1

/ Accompanying the letter were guidelines stating

that:

● The agency should be a metropolitan organization

responsible for continuous comprehensive planning

(including transportation).

● The agency should have sufficient resources to coordinate the development and

a unified work program for

activities, and to produce

transportation service and

grams for the area.

monitor the execution of

all transportation planning

short- and long-range

capital improvement pro-

. The agency should be the same organization performing

the functions established in accordance with Circular

A-95. .

This joint communique was one of the steps planned by

UMTA and FHWA to work cooperatively in establishing a coordinated approach to the new urban planning process. Most of

the designated Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) are

now receiving funds. Ultimately, the agencies seek to achieve

a unified, integrated multimodal transportation planning process.

Since the passage of the National Mass Transportation

Assistance Act of 1974, the importance of the MPOs has increased,

as they may be the recipients of new Section 5 funds (for

optional use to meet operating or capital costs) channeled by

UMTA through the states.

Accountability of decisionmakers. UMTA’s 1966 guidelines

also outline who should be represented on the planning

body. These requirements reflect the earner provisions of

Section 701 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965.

1/ Draft regulations were published in November 1973, and

by the time of final publication most metropolitan areas

had designated a Metropolitan Planning Organization. The

final regulations appeared under the title "Planning

Assistance and Standards: Urban Transportation Planning”

in the Federal Register, Vol. 40, No. 181, September 17,

1975.
-36-

. .

--

As explained, the UMTA guidelines specify that local units

of general government should be represented on the planning

body receiving funds. The quidelines require elected officials

or their appointees to provide the representation. Recent provisions outlining the requirements for the designation of MPOs

reinforce UMTA’s commitment to seeing that local elected officials are adequately represented on the decisionmaking body.

Public involvement. The 1966 guidelines call for involving

transit agencies or operators, state and local transportation and

planning agencies, and major private interests in the planning

process through technical or special advisory committees.

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 provides for

citizen and public agency review of all major Federally sponsored projects, including transit projects. The environmental

impact statement and review process gives the public and governmental agencies the formal opportunity to comment upon all

aspects of a project’s effect on the environment.

Recent UMTA guidelines also call for commomity participation

through official public hearings. . ‘Specific statutory requirements for public hearings are contained in the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended in 1970. These provisions

formally tie together the environmental assessment and public

input aspects of the planning process.

None of the statutory requirements of administrative regula-

● tions spell out how to put citizen participation into practice.

UMTA guidelines, including the recent proposed policy 1

/,

emphasize the importance of obtaining community input in the

early stages, but there are no specific directives for doing so.

In summary, these Federal statutes and administrative guidelines have shaped the organizational structure of urban transportation planning. They either explicitly mandate the participation of specific actors and agencies or require a particular

structure in which specific program responsibilities can be

accomplished.

Guidelines for Metropolitan Evaluation

In evaluating the various metropolitan, local, and state

institutional structures for transit decision-making, a number of

general guidelines were applied. These guidelines, listed below,

were derived from Federal eligibility requirements and a review

of institutional characteristics that would promote continuous,

cooperative, and coordinated planning and decisionmaking in an

efficient and timely manner. These guidelines help illuminate

the variations and problem areas among the cases.

1 / “Proposed Policy on Major Urban Mass Transportation Investments,

Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Federal Register,

vol. 40, No.. 149, August 1, 1975.
-37-

The forum for decisionmaking should be clearly designated and

should involve all The institutional

structure has been exam ine the extent to which

responsibilities of each participating institution have been

stated at all levels of planning and implementation. Interagency coordination should include other local, state, and

regional agencies as appropriate to provide the necessary policy

and technical information. Cooperation with comprehensive land

use planning bodies is particularly important. The relationship

of these agencies within the decisionmaking forum should be

cooperative, not negatively competitive.

.Decisionmakers should have authority and account

ability. The participants operating in the forum should have

properly designated decisionmaking authority, and the public

should have formal channels for holding decisionmakers accountable for their actions. Under some circumstances, direct election of decisionmakers may provide a greater degree of accountability. planning agency boards filled by elected officials from

local governments are more directly accountable bodies than those

with boards composed of appointed local officials or private

individuals.

The general public should be effectively involved. Citizens

should participate in the transit planning process from its

beginning and should have open lines of communication with final

decisionmakers. A responsive process includes representatives

of all interested and affected groups including the business and

financial community, labor organizations, environmental groups,

representatives of the handicapped and the elderly, and the

citizens of impacted neighborhoods. The planning and design

program should be structured in such a way that citizens can have

an input into the formulation of goals and objectives and the

evaluation of alternative transportation solutions. Direct communication with decisionmakers should be possible throughout the

process, and the decisionmakers should not rely exclusively on

public hearings to provide

METROPOLITAN EXPERIENCE

This section examines

decisionmaking in the nine

subdivided into categories

discussed above.

citizen input.

the institutional structure for

metropolitan cases. The evaluation is

corresponding to the guidelines

Forum for Decisionmaking

During the last decade Federal policy has fostered a

distinctly regional approach to urban transportation and decisionmaking. Recently this orientation has been coupled with an

effort to achieve a more unified multimodal planning process

that would be closely coordinated with areawide comprehensive
-38-

planning. However, the institutional devices that the nine metropolitan areas have adopted in response to them are distinguished

by their compliance with the form rather than the substance of

the law.

Although the forums for decisionmaking in most of these

metropolitan areas are designated clearly in a formal or official

sense, the real process of decisionmaking is characterized by

a lack of clearly specified responsibilities for policymaking,

planning, and implementation and a considerable amount of competition for these functions among regional, local, and state

agencies. The institutional mechanisms devised by each metropolitan area reflect the interplay of these competing forces.

The Metropolitan Planning Organization forum. In four of the

metropolitan cases, the principal forum for decisionmaking is

provided by the traditional council of governments or regional

planning commission. In Twin Cities, Atlanta, Seattle, and Los

Angeles, local governments and modal agencies negotiate agreements on regional transportation policy inside the boardrooms

of these agencies or within their subcommittees. The four agencies are the official Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs)

in their respective regions.

Among the nine cases, these four forums, with the land use

planning organization in nominal command, adhere most closely in

structure to the Federal guidelines for MPOs. In theory, this

type of institutional. structure offers the possibility for integrating comprehensive areawide development policy and plans,

including long-range regional transportation plans, with mass .

transit planning and project implementation.

As the following examples illustrate, however, the division

of responsibilities is not always so neatly drawn, and competition exists over policymaking and priority-setting responsibilities. In addition, because most Metropolitan Planning Organizations do not have statutory authority to raise funds and implement projects, they often are at a disadvantage in relation to

special purpose transit operating agencies.

Minneapolis - St. Paul. Minneapolis - St. Paul offers an ,

example of a relatively clearly defined decisionmaking structure.

In 1974, the state legislature acted to clarify the responsibilities of the two main actors in the transit field, the Metropolitan Council (the MPO and A-95 agency) and the Metropolitan

Transit Commission. The Metropolitan Reorganization Act of

1974 directed the Metropolitan Council to prepare a comprehensive

development guide for the area. The guide was to include policies for all forms of transportation and constitute a policy

I
-39-

evaluation framework for reviewing the plans and programs of the

Metropolitan Transit Commission (as well as the-other areawide

commissions) . In turn, the Commission was required to prepare

a transportation development program that implements the Metropolitan Council’s policy plan. This explicit relationship sets

mass transit plans and priorities firmly within the context of

overall metropolitan growth and land use policy and draws the

distinction between "policy decisions" and "technical decisions."

However, full resolution of past conflicts between the two

organizations will not occur until the present process of selecting a transportation development program is worked out. The

Commission has developed several plans for automated fixedguideway transit systems, while the Council has supported a

regional bus system. The Commission argues that the choice involves a “technical decision” and therefore is the Commission’s

prerogative; the Council says it is a question of policy and

therefore should be decided by the Council.

Atlanta= In Atlanta, the forum for transit planning also

is distinguished by a relatively close integration of comprehensive regional planning and transportation planning. The

Atlanta Regional Commission is the official MPO and A-95 review

agency for the area. It is empowered to prepare a Development

Guide to shape regional growth. Regional transportation policy

and priorities are formulated within the ARC, although the process occurs through a complex structure of special committees

whose members still enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy.

The process is spelled out in the Atlanta Region Transportation Planning Program. It allows the Metropolitan Atlanta

Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), the Georgia State Department of

Transportation, the mayor of Atlanta, and the representatives

from ARC’s member counties to reach policy decisions within

ARC’s Transportation Policy Subcommittee. The members of this

subcommittee formulate the area’s annual work program; and

although the ARC board reviews the work program and sets priorities among its elements, neither the state DOT nor MARTA always

adheres strictly to them.

Thus, the forum permits a relatively close integration of

comprehensive areawide planning and urban transportation planning, but it is not likely to place ARC in a commanding policymaking position as long as MARTA and GDOT have their own powerful project implementation authorities. As an operating

authority in the midst of developing a major rapid transit

system, MARTA can exercise a powerful voice in the regional

forum.

Seattle. In Seattle, the major participants in the transit

planning process have not clearly defined their respective responsibilities. From the official point of view, the Puget Sound
-40-

-

Council of Governments (PSCOG), which is the designated MPO and

A-95 review agency for the region, is responsible for areawide

comprehensive planning, including transit planning. Despite its

regional policymaking and planning authority and its role as a

channel for Federal funds, PSCOG exercises little effective

control over Metro, the primary transit operator.

Covering the metropolitan area of Seattle and empowered

with voter approval to levy taxes, Metro has the potential to

assume a broader range of functions than the special purpose

transit districts found in other cities. Its enabling legislation

gives it planning and development authority over solid waste,

water supply, metropolitan planning, and parks and recreation,

as well as transit, pending approval in referenda for each function. Although Metro has not received voter approval to carry

out all these functions, its potential role in the metropolitan

area is considerably more powerful than that of PSCOG.

In terms of mass transit, which Metro was empowered to operate in 1972, the two agencies are in sharp disagreement over

which one is responsible for transit planning and policymaking in

the area.

Los Angeles. Like Seattle, Los Angeles is a case in which *

the regional comprehensive planning organization provides a

poorly integrated forum for regional policymaking. The Southern

California Association of Governments (SCAG) is the officially .

designated MPO. It has A-95 review powers, a state mandate to

develop the Southern California component of the statewide transportation plan, and authority to review and approve state

assistance funds for the region’s transit operators.

Within the six-county region covered by SCAG, the major

transit operator is the Southern California Rapid Transit

District (SCRTD) . Although SCAG’s powers have grown over the

past few years and it can influence the rapid transit planning

activities of SCRTD, it has no direct power to shape SCRTD’s

policymaking and planning activities. As a single-purpose

agency with an explicit mandate from the state legislature to

design and implement a rapid transit system within Los Angeles

County, SCRTD traditionally has acted independently. Prior to

the November 1974 referendum, neither UMTA nor SCAG was able to

get SCRTD to effectively coordinate its rapid transit activities

with the county or any of the other counties in the region, and

disagreements between SCAG, the Board of Supervisors of Los

Angeles County, the city, and SCRTD made it impossible to

reach a workable consensus on the nature of the rapid transit

policy and plan.
.-

-41-

Legislative initiatives now being taken in California may

create a new structure for policymaking and priority setting for

transit that would clarify and rationalize the fragmented forum

in Los Angeles. Under the proposed Assembly Bill No. 1246, SCAG

would retain responsibility for long-range regional transportation planning and coordination, but the primary forum for decisiopmaking would be placed on the county level in a Los Angeles

County Transportation Commission that would have responsibilities

for policymaking, transit service coordination, short-range

transportation planning, and the approval of a public mass transit system. The responsibilities of SCRTD would be clearly

limited to operating the transit system.

Other kinds of forums. The other five cases provide examples of

a range of types of decisionmaking forums. None of them are as

directly linked to land use planning organizations (and MPOs) as

the previously described case examples. San Francisco’s Metropolitan Planning Commission, which is separate from the region’s

comprehensive planning agency, is a strong multimodal forum.

Denver and Boston represent ad hoc solutions to the problem of

establishing an integrated metropolitan planning organization.

In both these cases, the idea of making the regional planning

organization the umbrella for areawide transportation policymaking gave way in the face of competition between relatively

independent agencies; and each of the public agencies, while

preserving their fundamental autonomy, joined together in a

forum in which they could achieve negotiated agreements. Washington is a case in which the metropolitan transit authority has

provided the decisionmaking forum, while in Chicago the forum is

in flux.

San Francisco. In the San Francisco area, the Metropolitan

Transportation Commission represents a clearly designated regional

forum for transportation decisionmaking which many critics nevertheless believe has not yet lived up to its potential. Created

by the state legislature, MTC is mandated to prepare a regional

transportation plan that should include highway and transit

elements. MTC is the MPO for the region 1/ and, as such, prepares the annual list of projects for which UMTA funds are solicited. It has policymaking and priority setting authorities

and is empowered to allocate state transit funds to operators

within each county of the region. Aside from the Bay Area Rapid

Transit District, MTC’s responsibilities cover four other major

transit operators. Two of these operators, East Bay's A.C.

Transit and San Francisco's Muni, are larger than BART.

1/ The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) , not MTC, is

the A-95 review agency with land use planning responsibilities

for the region. By agreement, MTC acts as the transportation

review agency for ABAG, although ABAG retains final review

authority.
-42-

The MTC has come under criticism for not exercising its

authority more forcefully. Although the Commission does have

priority--setting and project approval powers, it is sometimes

reluctant to curb the demands of the transit operators. Some

observers speculate MTC’s reluctance to exercise the power it

does have stems from fear of legislative reprisals. In the

eyes of these critics, MTC is too concerned with protecting the

organization and too little concerned with setting any basic

policy direction. Another interpretation of MTC’s cautious

stance may be in order, however, as the Commission only has had

since 1970 to organize itself and establish credible control

over the activities of transit operators like BARTD that have

policymaking, implementation, and financial powers of their own.

It should be noted that the MTC is one of many regional

special-purpose districts in the Bay area. Although the

Association of Bay Area Governments is supposed to coordinate

their activities, it is too weak to do so, and there are periodic movements to establish an effective regional government

within the area.

Denver. Denver’s forum for transportation decisionmaking

is called the Joint Regional Transportation Planning Program

(JRPP) . Established in 1971, the JRPP is made up of the

Regional Transportation District (RTD) , the Colorado Department

of Highways (CDH) , and the Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG). Although DRCOG is the A-95 agency for the area,

the JRPP itself is the designated MPO. Within it, however, each

agency retains independence. The JRPP board consists of the

executives of the three agencies, and it approves funding

requests and allocates funds among the three agencies. But the

RTD has full responsibility for all aspects of-transit decisionmaking,and the CDH holds sway in highway matters. DRCOG,

responsible for preparing long-range regional transportation

plans, takes a strong position vis-a-vis the other agencies on

many issues. The situation makes it difficult for the agencies

operating within JRPP to establish priorities among their programs.

Boston. In the Boston area the Massachusetts governor

recently designated a Metropolitan Planning Organization which,

like Denver’s, is based on an association of statutory agencies

joined together by a memorandum of understanding. Unlike the

Denver’s JRPP, however, the Secretary of the Executive Office of

Transportation and Construction (EOTC) of Massachusetts has a

central role to play in the MPO. The MPO is composed of the

five agencies that, under state law, have responsibilities for

some aspects of the 3-c transportation planning process. Aside

from the state EOTC, these are the Department of Public Works

(DPW), the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA)?

the Advisory Board to the MBTA, and the Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC).
-43-

The MPO includes the requisite planning functions and is

representative of local and state Officials. Transportation

planning and implementation activities are covered by four of

the agencies, and comprehensive land use planning and A-95

review functions are the responsibility of the MAPC. In addition, the membership of the MAPC and the Advisory Board of the

IMBTA represent local cities and towns within the Boston area as

well as the City of Boston and state officials.

The central role played by the Commonwealth Secretary of

the EOTC sets this forum apart from the others described. AS

chairman of the Committee of Signatories, the Secretary can

coordinate the activities of the members and play a pivotal

role in negotiating priorities for the annual list of projects

seeking Federal funds and for the allocation of both state and

Federal funds. The EOTC’s influence is enhanced by its close

working relationship with the Central Transportation Planning

Staff (CTPS), which is the technical planning arm of the EOTC.

Washington, D.C. The Washington case is special due to

the involvement of Congress and the jurisdictional peculiarities

of the multistate national capital region. The Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority was created by interstate

compact to plan and operate a regional transit system. At the

time the, Metro system was adopted in 1968, there were no A-95

requirements, and 3-C coordination was still largely focused

on highways. The Transportation Planning Board (TPB) , which is the

3-c agency and a part of the Washington Metropolitan Council of

Governments (COG) , accepted the Adopted Regional System as

given in its long-range plan. COG (with TPB) is now the

regional A-95 and MPO body, but its reviews of WMATA’s plans

for changes in the Metro system tend to be rubber-stamp exercises. Most of the members of the Transportation Planning Board

-- representatives from the region’s jurisdictions -- also sit

on the WMATA board, and almost all transit decisions are reached

in that forum.

The opportunity will be presented for TPB to exercise its

potential role when the current effort to update the long-range

transportation plan moves further along and begins to deal with

the question of extensions to the Metro system. ●

Chicago . . . . . Chicago historically has had an array of transit

planning and decisionmaking institutions with overlapping and

competing responsibilities. This situation allowed the City of

Chicago to retain paramount control over the decisionmaking

process. A number of factors recently have altered this

situation.
-44-

-

The creation of the Illinois Department of Transportation

(IDOT) introduced a new force on the scene which is increasing

it-s power. IDOT has replaced the city as the dominant force on

the Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS) , the body that has

temporary status as the region’s MPO. The governor still has

not made a final designation.

In addition to the establishment of IDOT, the Chicago Transit Authority has become dependent on state, county, and Federal

subsidies and has consequently lost a measure of its autonomy.

Finally, the creation of the Regional Transportation Authority

(RTA) has-introduced a new force on the scene.

The Regional Transportation Authority was established by

the state legislature in 1973 and approved in a referendum in

March 1974. Charged with setting fares, determining schedules,

contracting for the management of transit services in the region,

and preparing the five-year transit development program, the

RTA commands an array of transit funding mechanisms and has

power of eminent domain. On matters of service and policy,

the RTA is advised by the Metropolitan Area Transportation Council, whose members, appointed by local officials, can adopt

resolutions and hold public hearings. The direction in which

the Chicago area institutional structure is evolving suggests an

increasingly powerful role for the state and the RTA.

Discussion. This review of the different institutional patterns

for decisionmaking suggests several trends or issues that appear

in one form or another in the metropolitan cases. One is the

growing influence of state governments in the process; another

is the adequacy of traditional councils of governments to

effectively perform the additional responsibilities many of them

have been asked to assume; and a third is rooted in the way

decisionmaking powers generally are distributed among the state,

regional, and local agencies that participate in the process.

The role that state governments are playing in the transit

planning and decisionmaking process is becoming increasingly

important. Although state highway departments traditionally

have played a key role in the urban transportation planning process,

the advent ‘of more state departments of transportation with responsibility for mass transit indicates a strong trend toward a

multimodal role. This role will be expanded as more states begin

to provide more financial assistance to transit authorities facing

increasing operating deficits and as state DOTS begin to intercede

as policy mediators in the fragmented regional decisionmaking

process. The Federal Highway Act of 1973 and the NMTA Act of

1974 have both enhanced the influence of state governors by way of

MPO designation requirements and the stipulation concerning

Section 5 funds for optional capital or operating assistance.
-45-

There is a need for involvement by the state-level executive branch, backed by strong legislative direction, to deal with

several typical problems:

●

•

●

●

●

In the absence of a paralleling involvement with transit,

the major state role in highway programs often has led to

biases in transportation planning that have worked

against transit.

Opportunities for localities to improve public transportation through traffic engineering and highway

management measures often have been foreclosed by the

state, when they should be creatively and energetically

pursued.

The creation of land use control powers necessary at the

metropolitan level to carry out the land development

objectives associated with transit requires state legislation.

State action is needed to rationalize the tangle of special

purpose independent transportation agencies and the various

metropolitan planning functions.

State legislation is generally required for transit matching

monies -- even when they are to be collected only within

metropolitan areas. States are becoming increasingly

involved in providing financial assistance for transit

-improvements and operations.

The National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974

delegates significant responsibility to states in

allocating operating subsidies. This will place even

greater pressures on states both to review the performance of local transit operations and to provide

financial assistance for the local match.

The metropolitan cases in which the state role has begun

to be felt most clearly are Los Angeles, San Francisco, Boston,

Chicago, and Washington, D.C. California’s CALTRANS is responsible for the preparation of a statewide transportation plan under

Assembly Bill 69, and the state provides funds for both transit

capital and operating assitance. The Illinois DOT has an increasing role in the Chicago metropolitan area. In Massachusetts,

the Executive Office of Transportation and Construction provides

an effective centralized forum for establishing and coordinating

transportation policy. As head of the MPO, it can play a lead

policy role in transit decisionmaking, while the Massachusetts

Bay Transportation Authority functions more and more as a transit operating agency. In the Washington, D.C., area, the

Maryland Department of Transportation is assisting suburban

counties with their share of the capital costs of constructing

the Metro system.
-46-

.-

Another issue involves the controversy that developed in

some areas over the official designation of Metropolitan Planning Organizations, Since the passage of the Highway Act of

1973 which required -governors to designate official Metropolitan —.

Planning Organizations in areas receiving Federal transportation

assistance, UMTA has generally favored the designation of the

traditional A-95 review agencies and areawide comprehensive

planning organizations. This approach has met with criticism from

many local public officials and transit operators.

On one level the criticism stems from a common political

and bureaucratic desire to protect institutional prerogatives.

Some local officials are concerned that the law gives the state

(and, by implication, the state highway departments) too much

power over local decisionmaking issues. They fear highway

interests will predominate if decisions are made in one multimodal forum.

Other local officials have different concerns. For example,

transit operators argue that they should have the responsibility

for making transit decisions since they produce up to 70% of

operating revenues. They feel their practical experience in the

field qualifies them above regional planners to be able to

represent their customers’ best interests. On the other side,

it is said that transit operating agencies are too narrowly

concerned with transportation alone and tend to be unresponsive

to the public. To the extent that they have independent sources

of funding, they can operate with a degree of freedom that may

override local interests or disregard coordination with other

regional or local entities.

A different kind of criti

tional regional planning agenc

sit decisionmaking responsibil

cies have had to depend on the

implement decisions reached in

seldom have direct statutory a

local government. The MPO des

fundamental weaknesses.

sm questions the ability of tradiies to effectively carry out tranities. Historically, these agenparticipating jurisdictions to

the regional forum, because they

uthority over the activities of

ignation did not alter these

It also has been argued that regional planning agencies

should become MPOs because they can provide the mechanism for

integrating regional land use planning and transportation planning. This argument is difficult to connect with experience.

The record suggests that truly effective coordination is not yet

commonplace. Highway and transit modal agencies operate under

separate policies and programs, and neither transit nor highway

planners have established effective coordination between their

activities and comprehensive land use planning. Although there

was some sharing of data base and assumptions, in none of the

metropolitan cases can the rapid transit plan developed by a

regional agency be said to rest on strong commitments from local

municipal authorities to implement complementary land use plans.
-47-

The question of cooperation between regional, local, and

state agencies leads to the issue of the manner in which policymaking, priority setting, and other powers are distributed in the

metropolitan areas. The major source of these conflicts lies in

the fact that the separate responsibilities of each of the levels

of government in the metropolitan areas are not clearly enough

defined for any one agency to have decisive responsibility for

resolving conflicts and establishing budgeting and programming

priorities. There is a broad spectrum of responsibilities among

the agencies ranging from regional comprehensive planning to detailed

project engineering and construction of capital projects or the

implementation of operational improvements General agreement

exists about the distribution of responsibility at the extremes

of the spectrum but the area of priority setting and budgeting is

the subject of much competition.

HOW this competition is resolved will depend on establishing

a forum in which one lead institution has well defined and well

supported responsibility for formulating policy and priorities.

Such an institution could be a metropolitan planning agency, a

special purpose agency, a local government body, or a state

agency. NO one institutional framework will be appropriate for

every metropolitan area. Aside from enhancing the effectiveness

of the decisionmaking process, defining the locus of these

responsibilities more clearly will make that process more

responsive and accountable.

Accountability and Authority of Decisionmakers

Historically, the question of how accountable and responsive

transit operators were to the public was not a pressing concern.

Most transit companies were privately owned, and though they were

regulated by public utility commissions, they were concerned

primarily with the requirements of the private market. In the

1960s, however, an increasing number of transit companies came

under public ownership, and people began to pay more critical

attention to the factors contributing to the accountability and

responsiveness of these public entities. The formal powers of the

transit agency, the method of selecting its governing board, its

source of funds, and the extent to which it was subject to the

control or oversight of other public institutions are all subjects

critics have begun to examine more closely.

These concerns also have appeared in the nine metropolitan

cases. Although each case has a different history and different

traditions of leadership, a review of some of their common characteristics shows that the question of the accountability and

responsiveness of their transit decisionmaking institutions

is an increasingly important issue.

In general terms, the institutions for decisionmaking in

the nine metropolitan cases have several characteristics that

bear on the issue. First, they are usually regional entities

with special mandates from state legislatures to perform transit

planning and operating functions. Second, with the exceptions of

San Francisco’s BART and A.C. Transit, they are all governed by
-48-

either directly appointed boards or boards composed of local

elected officials. Third, although they tend to need legislative and voter approval to secure financing for major public

works projects such as rapid rail transit systems, once that

financing is sucured, they are able to operate with relatively

unrestrained autonomy. Obviously these three characteristics

are not reflected equally in each of the cases, but some aspects

of one or the other do appear in all the metropolitan cases. .

In most of the metropolitan areas, the agency responsible for

mass transit planning and operations is a special-purpose

organization with an appointed board that tends to regard its

mandate from a regional-perspective. Although variations exist,

these organizations are generally public authorities or special

districts, and, in all the cases, critics have raised questions about

their representativeness and their ability to respond to changing

times. In many cases, the agencies were established to carry

out transit programs on which local consensus had already been

reached. Under these circumstances, the agency’s programs tend

to gather such momentum that they are difficult to check or

change. This problem is most serious when a transit agency has

difficulty responding to special local concerns or requirements

because it is focusing on its mandate to build a regional rapid

transit system.

The following paragraphs discuss the transit decisionmaking

institutions in the nine cases in terms of the measures they

● employ to gain accountability. The descriptions are grouped in

categories by type of transit agency.

Public authorities. The two predominant types of specialpurpose agencies found in the metropolitan cases are public

authorities and special districts. In general, public authorities are nonprofit public corporations established by state

legislatures. They have appointed boards and do not normally

have independent powers of taxation. Atlanta’s MARTA, Boston's

MBTA, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

are examples of this type of special body. Chicago's RTA is a

transit authority that does have taxing powers.

Atlanta . The Metropolitan Atlanta Regional Transit Authority

(MARTA) was created by the Georgia legislature in 1965 expressly to

design, construct, and operate a rapid transit system. The MARTA

board is made up of 10 members appointed by local officials

representing the City of Atlanta and the four suburban counties.

The question of fair representation on the MARTA board has

been as issue since its creation. The business and civic leaders

who were the driving force behind the creation of MARTA in the

1960s were not directly accountable to any particular constituency. When MARTA was established, the appropriate composition

of the board became a point of contention between the City of

pl
——.

Atlanta and the suburban counties. The decision was made to

diminish the influence of local politics on MARTA's board by

excluding elected officials. Instead, the members are appointed

by local county officials and the mayor of Atlanta.

The City of Atlanta and Fulton County, which encompasses

the city, dominate the MARTA board with six members, but there

is new pressure to increase the representation of suburban

DeKalb County because it produces 40% of the sales tax revenues

that support MARTA. Although Clayton and Gwinnett voted against

the MARTA referendum in 1971, they retain voting representation

on the board.

Washington, D.C. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

“Authority (WMATA) iS an interstate compact approved by Congress

and created to cut through the institutional jungle of theWashington metropolitan region. The WMATA compact clearly

spells out WMATA's powers to design and construct the regional

Metro rail system.

Within WMATA, decisionmakers can be held accountable due

both to the realities of the Metro financing situation and the

composition of its board. The board is made up of two delegates

from each of the three major political subdivisions of the

national capital region. They are appointed from the membership

of the District of Columbia City Council, Maryland’s Washington

Suburban Transit District, and the Northern Virginia Transportation District. The Maryland delegation can include two “qualified residents,” but all the rest of the delegates to WMATA must

be local officials accountable for their actions to their constituents.

WMATA'S financing plan is a negotiated agreement among all

the participating local governments. Board members must have

backing from their jurisdictions before the financing plan can be

changed. Financial aspects of WMATA decisiomaking, therefore,

have tended to be kept in the public view.

Boston. Public checks on transit decisionmaking in Boston

are now exercised more throuqh the state executives than through

the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA). Since -

the reorganization of the transportation functions in the Boston

region, the responsibility for transit decisionmaking has

shifted more and more to the Secretary of Transportation and

Construction. As the Secretary serves at the pleasure of the

governor of the Commonwealth, this structure makes the governor

ultimately accountable for major transit policy decisions.

This shift of responsibility to one clear y designated elected

official has increased the formal control that the public may

have over the mass transit decisionmaking process.

● Chicago. In the Chicago region, the exact source of accountability is difficult to pin down. As noted earlier, the

City of Chicago has sought to maintain a dominant role in the

planning and decisionmaking process, but the influence of both

the State of Illinois and the Regional Transportation Authority

has grown. With regard to public authorities, the Regional

Transit Authority has major powers that neither Atlanta nor WMATA

possess.
-50-

. . . . —

The RTA was approved by the voters of six northern Illinois

counties in 1974. The margin of the vote showed a majority of

support for the authority in the City of Chicago rather than the

suburban counties, and the question of suburban versus city representation on the RTA board became an issue. The resolution was

to establish a nine-person board in which four members are

chosen by the city, four are chosen by the suburbs, and the

ninth member is selected by the other eight to serve as chairman.

The current chairman of the RTA was chairman of the Chicago

Transit Authority before assuming his new post.

The RTA possesses extensive powers. Aside from being

authorized to contract for the management of transit services

and set fares and schedules, it can levy a motor fuel tax and

tax parking lot revenues. It also receives a portion of the

state sales tax and is empowered to commit up to $500 million

in general obligation bonds. Although it is too early to

evaluate the record of the RTA, it is clear that it has a

unique set of powers that may make it a model for regional

transit authorities.

Special districts. The second major institutional form that

special-purpose agencies take is the special district. Like

public authorities, special districts are created by state

legislatures, but they usually have broader independent powers.

Their governing boards usually are made up of representatives

of local municipal and county governments, and often they have

powers of taxation and eminent domain. Special districts must

still go before the voters for approval of general purpose bonds.

The metropolitan cases offer two primary examples of the

special district form: the Southern California Rapid Transit

District and the Bay Area Rapid Transit District. The first is

a Prime example of the problems of accountability and responsiveness

that can arise in such cases, while the second represents the

attempt to overcome some of these problems through the direct

election of the BARTD board members.

Los Angeles. The Southern California Rapid Transit District

was created by the California state legislature in 1974 with an

explicit mandate to design and implement a mass rapid

transit system with Los Angeles County. SCRTD is

governed by a board appointed by local officials. The

composition of the board is such that the City of Los

Angeles, which is the jurisdiction most interested in

obtaining mass transit service, is underrepresented in

comparison to the County Board of Supervisors and the suburban jurisdictions within the county. The 11 member board

has five members appointed by the Los Angeles County Board

of Supervisors, four appointed by a special city selection

committee representing 76 cities in the county, and only two

appointed by the Mayor of Los Angeles.
,

“,,

-51-

The SCRTD board has been unable to produce a plan for rapid

transit that responds to all the needs of its constituents.

Predisposed to building a large-scale regional system, SCRTD

has been caught between the needs of the city and the demand

for equal treatment from outlying jurisdictions. As a result,

SCRTD sought to develop a rapid rail system for the entire

region instead of a more flexible plan with only one short

segment of a rapid rail system in the city. The cost of the

adopted system ultimately defeated it, and only recently have

the City of Los Angeles, SCRTD, and SCAG begun to investigate

an incremental approach to developing a plan. Both the city

and the County Board of Supervisors have sought ways to make

SCRTD more representative of the area.

San Francisco. The Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BARTD)

was established in 1957 to plan, construct, and operate a regional

rapid transit system. Unlike SCRTD, BARTD has secured approval

of its bond issue and receives special earmarked local taxes

provided by the state legislature. Originally, BARTD’s 12-

member board was appointed by local officials in Alameda, Contra

Costa and San Francisco counties. But controversies over lack

of responsiveness to local needs, cost overruns, and the management of the District led to a directly elected board whose

members represent nine sub-BART districts. This is the first

example of such a transit board for a regional rapid transit

district. However, A.C. Transit has had a directly elected

board for many years and has been considered by most observers

to be a competently managed, responsive transit operator.

Denver. Denver's Rapid Transit District (RTD) bears

mentioning because so far it has managed to be reasonably

representative of the area. Although RTD'S board can be

said to have been predisposed to designing a particular type

of system for the Denver area, the system won solid voter

approval in the local referendum in 1973.

Denver’s RTD, which bears the responsibility for the bulk

of decisionmaking~ has a board that is structured to reflect

the will of elected officials. RTD’s 21-person board is

appointed by the officials of the participating jurisdictions.

The mayor of Denver appoints 10 delegates and the suburban

counties appoint a total of nine. Within each county the

appointees are subject to confirmation by a majority of the

municipalities in that county, a procedure that provides an

additional degree of public responsiveness. The remaining two

board members are appointed by the other 19 to represent the

region at large. Due to the dominating number of Denver representatives, the RTD board is able to bear greatest allegiance

to people who produce the bulk of the sales tax revenues that

will be used to finance the RTD transit proposal.
- 5 2-

Variations. Among the metropolitan cases, Seattle and

Minneapolis-St. Paul offer variations on the common pattern

that should be noted.

Seattle. In the case of Seattle, the transit institution

is similar to a special district in its representativeness and

authority, but unlike the other cases, Seattle’s Metro has

powers over programs other than transit. This makes it more

like a general purpose government.

Minneapolis-St. Paul. Minneapolis-St. Paul provides a

unique example of a transit operator, the Metropolitan Transit

Commission, whose board members are directly appointed by the

areawide comprehensive planning organization, the Metropolitan

Council. The provisions for accountability, therefore, are

found in both agencies.

Both MTC and the Council were created in 1967. The

Metropolitan Council was created to establish a framework

to coordinate regional development in the Minneapolis-St. Paul

metropolitan area. Sixteen members of the Metropolitan Council 

are appointed by the governor on a nonpartisan basis, after

consulting with members of the legislature from the candidate’s

Council district (a regional subdivision that corresponds to

legislative districts rather than county lines) . The chairman

of the Metropolitan Council is appointed by the governor as

the seventeenth voting member of the Council and must be

experienced in the field of municipal and urban affairs.

●

Minnesota’s recent Metropolitan Reorganization Act( 1974) has

designated the Metropolitan Council as the policymaking body

with final approval power for transportation development in

the metropolitan area. The Metropolitan Transit Commission

covers the same seven-county area as the Council. It is

empowered to plan, construct, equip, and operate a transit

system in accordance with the Council’s policy plans. The

act directs the Metropolitan Council to appoint the members

of the Metropolitan Transit Commission as terms of present

members expire. The governor still appoints the chairman of

the Commission.

Discussion. This review of the patterns of accountability

found among transit agencies raises a number of issues. One

issue concerns the effectiveness of the different approaches

for providing formal public control over decisionmakers. A

related, but more important, question examines how the decisionmaking forum can be made equally responsive to local needs as

well as broad, regionwide concerns. A final issue points up the

advantages of increasing the state legislature’s role in overseeing

community transit activities.

.
-53-

The main formal channel for accountability is the mechanism

by which the transit decisionmakers are placed in (or removed

from) office. UMTA regulations call for adequate representation

of local elected officials on the agency that receives UMTA

grants, and most boards of transit agencies and Metropolitan

Planning Organizations alike are composed of local officials

who are elected or appointed to office. The experience in the

nine cities shows that elected officials -- mayors, commissioners -- and high-level appointed officials of local governments tend to be responsive because they owe their office to

the public. Board members who bear primary responsibility for

a functional area such as transit or highways or other special

purpose agencies tend to look out for their subject area interest

rather than more generalized expressions of the public will.

The experience of San Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit

District (BARTD) offers a different model for board representation: direct election of board members. BARTD is the

only example among the cases of a regional transit district

with a directly elected board. Conversion to an elected board

was effected in fall 1974 in an effort to make BARTD more

responsive to the concerns of the public. However, because

the board members are elected from large districts, each

containing several political jurisdictions, there may not be

a clear sense of common interest among the constituents of

any one board member. A.C.'s board members have little public

identity; no incumbent board member has ever been defeated.

BART likely will continue to generate greater public interest

than A.C., but seats may go to special interests that can

afford to support candidates’ campaigns. Unlike elections for

general-purpose government office, such elections may not

attract enough interest to ensure significant popular support.

Thus, the effectiveness of using an elected board to improve

accountability is not proven.

In BART’s case, as in several others, an important accountability issue has been the dominating role played by the engineering

contractor. To the extent that transit decisions are made by

hired consultants and not the members of the board, the process

cannot be responsive. Consultants are unlikely to place top

priority in conserving public funds unless appropriate contract

incentives are created. They are more likely to seek to continue

to work in their field of specialization, and this self-interest

may provide incentives to bias the results of planning studies in

the direction of projects which will utilize their expertise.

Another means for gaining accountability is illustrated

by the Boston case. There the public has the recourse for

holding the Massachusetts governor responsible for the transit

policy formulated by his appointee, the Secretary of the

Executive Office of Transportation and Construction. The

governor and the secretary are not only accountable, but they also

bring visibility to the decisionmaking process, and to their

role in it. However, the transfer of decisionmaking power to

the state executive grew out of circumstances somewhat peculiar

to the Boston region -- the location of the state capitol in the
-54-

city and its tradition of involvement in city affairs, the

power vacuum created by the weak regional planning body, and

other considerations. Although in every case there is room

for stranger state leadership, the Boston model might not be

appropriate in many regions.

Visibility is a key ingredient for creating an accountable

decisionmaking process. Cases in which major decisions are

reached in forums dominated by competing modal agencies offer

particularly little recourse for the public. In Atlanta and

Denver, for example, regional transportation policy tends to

be decided in a’ process of negotiation between mode interests.

In Atlanta, the Georgia Department of Highways and the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority have equal status with

the representatives of local governments when they do business

in the Transportation Policy Subcommittee of the Atlanta Regional

Commission. Decisions tend to reflect the trade-offs between

the two powerful agencies; yet, these trade-offs are rarely

debated publicly by the board of the subcommittee’s parent

organization. The structure of Denver's Joint Regional Planning

Program offers less accountability, because this agency does

not include political representatives. It is strictly a forum

for negotiation between, the state highway agency, the transit

district, and the comprehensive planning body.

The question of fair representation on the boards of the

decisionmaking agencies is another issue. There is a trend

toward more representation for suburban jurisdictions vis-a-vis

the center cities. In Atlanta, this issue involves a further

dimension: the suburban jurisdiction (DeKalb County) that has

requested more representation on the MARTA board provides a substantial

portion of the sales tax revenues that support the agency. In

San Francisco, the representation issue was resolved by applying

the one man-one vote principle, on which basis BARTD has been

divided into nine districts principally on the basis of population.

At the heart of the representation question is the issue of

structuring decisionmaking bodies to represent both local interests

and regional interests in a fair manner. To date, several factors

have kept the process from responding adequately to the needs of

regional subsections. One reason involves the structure of the

transit agency boards. Each local elected official (or high

level appointee) who sits on a board is responsible to his constituents for making certain that they get a fair share of any

transit improvement plan. The pressures of competition tend to

produce overextensive plans that serve everyone more or less

equally, rather than smaller plans focused on parts of the region

that may have specific transit problems. The Los Angeles case

is a particularly good example of this problem. Atlanta’s MARTA

has attempted to avoid this kind of distortion by forbidding board

members to hold local office, but in practice delegates have remained responsive to the local jurisdiction by which they were

appointed.
-55-

The procedures for obtaining local financing have reinforced the regional perspective. In almost all the cases,

the transit agency has had to secure the lion’s share of its

local funding from an areawide referendum. In San Francisco,

Los Angeles, Denver, and Atlanta, among others, the approval

of plans for regional rapid transit systems depended on the

voters’ approval of a mechanism for financing these plans.

Requiring voter approval of such mechanisms is an ultimate

means of assuring accountability. At the same time, however,

it may oblige transit planners to devise plans that satisfy

local demands but are too large to be financially feasible.

The need to get the suburban vote in order to raise the money

for a rapid transit system may force the planner to make the

system more extensive than it need be. Again, this is most

clearly demonstrated in Los Angeles.

The most promising approach for removing the distortion

is to make changes in the financing basis for transit improvements. The changes, discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, .

basically involve providing transit agencies with the means

to finance systems without having to go to the voters. The

formula grant program authorized by the National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974 is a step in this direction.

In addition, UMTA’s recently proposed investment policy would

help accomplish this goal by requiring metropolitan areas to

build (and obtain financing for) transit proposals in separate

subsystem increments.

The examination of the metropolitan areas also underscored

the need for more state legislative oversight of urban transit

programs. California has taken the lead in this area, largely

in response to the problem of finance, administration, and

technological development at BART. Extensive staff work has

been undertaken by the Legislative Analyst’s office and the

Assembly Committee on Transportation. Georgia has established

the MARTA Overview Committee (MARTOC), a legislative committee

to oversee, MARTA’s program. The Minnesota Legislature has

moved to resolve the controversy between the Metropolitan

Council and Metropolitan Transit Commission.

Legislative oversight is an essential part of a responsible 1

state transit program. Arguments in favor of a strong state

role in transit have been explained. For these same reasons,

highly competent state legislative review should be encouraged

in areas where major Federally funded transit development

programs are undertaken.

In summary, several actions might be taken to increase the

extent to which transit decisionmaking organizations can be held

accountable. Decisionmaking bodies should fill their boards with

high-level officials representing local governments, not modeoriented interests. Direct election of board members is a

possible course, although not a panacea. Local financing

mechanisms should be made available that remove the need to
-56-

overextend plans to gain regionwide financial backing. Increased state participation in financing and decisionmaking

could provide an additional measure of accountability. Finally,

establishing a procedure for legislative review at the state

level could provide a range of benefits.

INVOLVEMENT OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC

Good citizen participation programs allow public participation in an effective way without unnecessary disruption or

delay in the planning process. Experience proves that unless

adequate public participation occurs, programs are likely to

be stopped or to result in projects that later will be

recognized as ill conceived.

The extent and effectiveness of public participation in

transit decisionmaking has evolved over time. Elections --

the ultimate form of public participation, at least in the

sense of numbers -- have been a recourse throughout the period

of planning in the nine cases. During the past decade, public

information programs aimed at civic organizations gradually

came to be supplemented by citizen advisory groups. Recently,

partly in response to Federal requirements, efforts have been

made to bring citizens from all major constituencies into the

planning process to help define goals and evaluate alternative

solutions. Yet, although public officials increasingly regard

public participation as an integral part of the planning and

decisionmaking process, well structured participation programs

have not yet become a common feature of that process in many

areas.

Early programs: the sales-bitch approach. The experiences in

Washington, D.C. and Atlanta provide excellent illustrations

of earlier approaches to citizen involvement.

rai

D.C

Washington, D.C.

1 system in 1968,

. area public in

, Prior to

the progr

the planni

adoption of the

am for involving

ng process relied

reg

the

on

ional Me

Washing

public

tro

ton,

information techniques followed by public hearings. The

planners gave slide shows and made speeches at various clubs

and organizations throughout the region. After the region’s

jurisdictions had approved a "proposed regional system," the

plan was presented at a series of 11 public hearings, most of

which were sparsely attended. Voters from only five communities (out of some eight jurisdictions) had the chance to register

their will at the polls.

Even after the system was adopted and moved into final

design, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s

● approach to public involvement remained defensive and reactive,

and citizens had to resort to legal action to win the chance

to review route and station area plans.

Atlanta. The failure of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid

Transit Authority to bring the public into the decisionmaking

process except in a perfunctory way was cited as a major reason
-. — .

-57-

for the defeat of the transit issue in 1968. Shortly after

it was established in 1966, MARTA began an informal public

information effort that was, like Washington’s, a campaign

to sell rapid transit. The approach reached an audience

composed mostly of businessmen and public figures -- not the

general public. Public hearings, which were required by

MARTA'S enabling legislation, occurred at the end of the

planning process, after preliminary engineering had been

done and the plans already had been presented to local

jurisdictions.

To gain support for its 1971 transit proposal, MARTA

undertook a much wider-reaching public information campaign

that was considered to have been an important factor in

MARTA'S success at the polls that year.

Later, more participatory programs. Denver, Twin Cities, San

Francisco’s BART extension studies, and, especially, the Boston

Transportation Planning Review provide examples of more

thoroughly participatory public involvement programs.

Denver. Denver citizens were involved in planning its

regional transit system from the beginning, although the

effectiveness of the public role diminished during the course

of the process. Citizens and public organizations actively

participated in formulating goals and objectives for both the

regional transportation plan and the complementary land use

plan that was being developed simultaneously. The Regional

Transportation District organized citizen advisory councils (CACs)

for this purpose, and they worked closely with the RTD consultants.

However, after the 1973 referendum the CACs were reorganized,

and they were provided little opportunity to contribute to the

evaluation and selection of alternatives.

Twin Cities. The early phases of long-range planning

conducted by the Twin Cities Metropolitan Transit Commission

in cooperation with the Metropolitan Council. relied on a 41-=

member Advisory Committee on Transit (ACT) , a volunteer group

composed of representatives chosen by the commissioners themselves. The group heard presentations on all projects but

due to poor attendance at meetings and other reasons they did

not have significant influence on the Commission's decisions.

However, when the Metropolitan Reorganization Act of 1974

placed responsibility for long-range comprehensive transportation

planning with the Metropolitan Council, it also contained a

provision for public agency and citizen involvement that led to

the establishment of a Transportation Advisory Board. Overall,

the Transportation Advisory Board appears to have the potential

for being a more effective channel for agency and community input

inasmuch as it has been assigned its own staff coordinator and

appears to have better access to the Metropolitan Council.
-58-

San Francisco. Corridor studies for proposed extensions

to the BART system in San Francisco provided a well-structured

approach to community participation, quite in contrast to the

original BART planning process. (That process had been a sales

campaign with limited interest group involvement in the planning,

similar to the Washington, D.C., and Atlanta experiences described

above.)

The extension studies, conducted over the past few years,

employed a structure in which each study was governed by a

"board of control" comprised of representatives from BART,

from the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, and -- after

pressure was applied -- from affected local jurisdictions.

Citizens’ advisory committees were set up to advise each board,

although they had bigger roles in some studies than in others.

In the Northwest Extension BART study in San Francisco"s Geary

Street corridor, which was considered a model for citizen

participation, a community advisory consultant was hired to

assist the citizens’ council. The citizens enumerated goals

and evaluation criteria and used them to evaluate and select

final options from among about 40 preliminary alternatives.

The process was relatively open and fluid; the participants

generated new options in the course of the evaluation.

Boston. The Boston Transportation Planning Review was a

major experiment of nationwide significance in its approach

to developing an open, participatory study process. It greatly

expanded and refined the process of citizen and public agency

participation in the transportation planning process. Numerous

individuals, groups, and agencies that previously had had

little interest or means for becoming involved in transportation

decisionmaking were provided with a forum in which conflicting

views could be debated and resolved, or at least thoroughly

explored to identify commonality of interest and bases for

compromise.

The Steering Group that developed the BTPR study design

was a broadly based body representing cities and towns, state

agencies, and private organizations throughout the Boston area.

It continued in operation throughout the 18-month BTPR planning

period in a policy advisory capacity as the BTPR "Working

Committee,” where it had a significant role in decisionmaking.

Many of the same groups continue to be involved in Boston

regional transportation planning through membership on the

Joint Regional Transportation Committee.

Citizen reaction. One of the lessons learned from the experience

of the nine case metropolitan areas with community involvement

is the difficulty in stimulating interest among citizens during

the early stages of systems planning. Typically, the public

,remains generally approving of system plans until final design
—

-59-

and construction begin. Then, long after the system selection

decision has been made, communities

to make improvements -- and in some

or citizens launch efforts

cases, significant changes.

Experiences in San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and Atlanta

illustrate this situation well.

San Francisco. The Berkeley subway/elevated fight was

the most prolonged and costly battle of the many that occurred

during the BART-building years. It received national attention and involved expert witnesses from Canada and other U.S.

metropolitan areas. After several ultimatums and extreme

polarization between the community and BART, Berkeley overwhelmingly approved a bond issue (by an 82% margin) to finance

the extra cost of several miles of subway. The fight cost

BART heavily because of over two years’ delay in construction,

because of the loss of credibility of its engineers, and because

of the polarizing effect it had in communities throughout the

area. .

Atlanta. Several transit station area plans in Atlanta

have come under attack by local citizens whose homes or

businesses would be displaced. The Decatur Street Station

plan, for example, is tied up in three lawsuits.

Washington, D.C. Washington's adopted regional Metro

system is being challenged at several points, and a formal

study has already recommended one alignment shift (on the

Greenbelt line) . Another such study is underway (in Anacostia),

and others are likely to follow in the wake of outspoken citizen

opposition to portions of the system plan.

Discussion. There are several explanations for the tendency

for public reaction to occur after plans have been approved.

The most obvious reason is that people tend to discount all

but the most immediate and most direct threats. Planning

involves the intangible future, while the bulldozer at the

door cannot be ignored. However, neither BART, MARTA, nor

WMATA provided adequate channels for citizen review during

the system design and planning process, so little opposition from

the affected groups and individuals might be expected.

Also, awareness of the potential undesirable side effects of

transit construction was slow in coming. Throughout the period

of system planning in Washington, the public believed generally

that transit was a harmless alternative to destructive highways --

underground and out of sight. Likewise, Atlantans in 1968 did

not oppose the transit system because it threatened disruption.

Merely providing better opportunity for public participation --

even after citizens have learned through experience, as in San

Francisco, that transit systems can bring undesirable changes to

neighborhoods -- does not guarantee that a broad range of citizens
9

-60-

will participate significantly in system planning. Experience

in Washington, Atlanta, San Francisco, and Denver shows a

marked increase in number of participants and level of participation once corridors have been defined and citizen groups

are organized according to neighborhoods that will be affected.

This fact points Up a general inadequacy of the transit system

planning process as it has been performed in many of the cases,

which is its tendency to make system-level decisions before

any attention is placed on corridor-level issues.

Even at the corridor level, however, structuring a good

program for citizen participation does not assure that all

interest groups will participate, or that those who do

participate will never withdraw their support from the compromise transit program that is negotiated in the study process.

Time brings change to the balance of interests in any community.

Groups that may have kept out of the process -- due to other, more

pressing concerns at the time, or due to culturally based

reluctance to participate in a process involving on the whole

an educated and articulate group of people -- may be motivated to

take action -by subsequently occurring events.

Another issue brought to light by the metropolitan experience

points to one of the pitfalls inherent in the concept of

citizen participation. The purpose of encouraging citizen involvement is to be able to understand the range of public values

and objectives that bear on the project being planned. The

planning process can provide the forum for discerning the

trade-offs between objectives that conflict and for reaching a

consensus between decisionmakers and the public over how to

balance these trade-offs. It is important, therefore, to

avoid allowing the interests of any one group of citizens to

dominate decisionmaking unfairly.

.

In summary, building community participation into transit

planning consumes time, and if the process is poorly managed,

it can waste time. On the other hand, it is a vitally important

task. Community participation should be regarded as a procedure

for collecting necessary data -- the values and opinions of the

constituency the plan is being made to serve.

.
-61-

CHAPTER 4

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

In each of the metropolitan areas examined by the study, the

rapid transit proposals put before the public rested upon a

complex process of technical planning and design work. This

‘technical planning process,” performed by professionals, plays

an important role in decisionmaking. It provides the information

that the responsible public officials draw upon in making plans

and decisions. There is a constant interplay between decisionmakers and planning professionals during a planning study, so

that the resulting plans and recommendations are the joint products of the two groups. For the purposes of this assessment,

the distinction between them is drawn as clearly as possible.

The influence that decisionmakers exert in shaping transit plans

was discussed in the previous chapter; the effect of the adequacy

of the technical planning work itself is discussed here.

The quality of the proposals presented to decisionmakers in

the nine case cities was largely influenced by the comprehensiveness (or lack thereof) of the scope of the proposals. This

comprehensiveness varies tremendously from city to city, reflecting a number of factors, including the state-of-the-art of the

technical planning process at the time of the study; changing

images of mass transit and its impact; changing Federal guidelines

and requirements, coupled with the availability of technical

study funds; and the amount of local pressure applied in support

of a given transit alternative.

Many of the proposals for modern fixed-guideway transit systems originated in the early 1950s. At that time, heavy rail

rapid transit of conventional technology (except for the use of

advanced train control technology) was basically the only form of

major transit system under consideration. This form of transit

was aimed primarily at saving the ailing downtowns of major metropolitan areas and providing an alternative to major new radial

freeway construction.

Increasingly the tendency has been to consider several alternative types of technology for mass transit systems including

light rail, personal rapid transit (PRT) and group rapid transit

(GRT), and several types of bus systems ranging from extensive

networks of busways to low-capital improvements on existing street

systems. The range of objectives and impacts of concern for

transit system planners has also been increasing rapidly. Typical

concerns now include not only the revitalization of downtown but

also service to suburban centers and neighborhoods, mobility of
-62-

nondrivers, reduction of air pollution, and conservation of energy.

Technical aspects of the transit planning process have

undergone corresponding similar increases in complexity over the

last 25 years. Early transit studies usually relied upon data and

techniques developed in connection with highway studies to justify

the need and determine the corridors of a rail system. Recent

studies have used data and techniques developed more specifically

for the-evaluation of several alternative transit systems.

Federal guidelines and requirements have become more demanding over this period. They have begun to exert a profound effect

on the conduct of the technical work, although to date they have

been distinctly unsuccessful in implementing the long-held

Federal policy of integrating transit, highway, and land-use

planning in a single, interrelated process. Nevertheless, these

requirements already have become too great a burden in the eyes of

many metropolitan officials, and some metropolitan officials have

expressed strong resistance to the recent efforts of UMTA to substantially increase the planning requirements.

Throughout the past 25 years the influence of the proponents

of one transit system or another also has had a great effect on

the technical work. Many studies, especially early ones, were

designed to justify an already favored type of system and thus

were biased in one manner or another. In some cities where no

one transit system was the clear favorite, the technical process

has produced much more impartial information concerning the merits

of alternative transit proposals.

These themes highlight the lessons learned in the metropolitan cases, and this chapter will describe them more extensively.

Following a general discussion of the basic elements of the

technical planning process and the Federal policies and guidelines that have shaped it, the relevant experience in the nine

metropolitan cases will be reported. The chapter ends with a

concluding discussion of the significant findings and their

implications for UMTA’s recently proposed transit investment

policy.

GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR METROPOLITAN ASSESSMENT

The technical transit planning work in the nine case study

metropolitan areas was assessed according to a number of general

guidelines. These guidelines were developed to conform to the

state-of-the-art of technical planning and the requirements of

Federal agencies. This section describes the general context of

the technical planning process, as it is currently understood.

Next, it outlines the Federal role in local planning efforts.

Finally, the general guidelines derived from this information are

set forth.
—— .— --

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Basic Elements of the Technical Planning Process

Transportation planning generally is performed

context of the comprehensive planning process. The

within the

comprehensive planning process strives to encompass the aggregate of urban

area goals and plans involving all of the elements of the urban

environment: land use, transportation, other major public works,

the regional economy, conservation of open space and other aspects

of the physical environment, housing and community facilities, and

often is extended to encompass various elements of social welfare

planning. Since none of these factors is static during the sevento 20-year planning period for large-scale rapid transit systems,

it is generally recognized that work programs for transportation

systems planning and their urban context must be continuously

integrated during all phases.

The process of planning a major new transit system is often

termed "system planning" to distinguish the process which leads

up to a formal- commitment to a new system, or major component

thereof, from the more detailed type of transit planning associated with implementation and

system. System planning has

● The determination of

its communities;

operation of an existing

several objectives:

transit needs within the

transit

region of

● The selection of modes and routes;

● preliminary engineering and architectural design;

● Multiyear programming of construction; and

● Identification of related general corridor and station

area development opportunities.

The implementation phase of the planning process follows

after system selection and programming decisions have been made.

It generally includes final design and construction and is not of

primary concern in this assessment. However, certain elements of

both implementation and transit operations decisionmaking need to

become involved in the system planning process. For example,

large system plans are almost certain to require significant

changes during the process of making final system design and construction decisions. Likewise system planning must concern itself,

at least at a general level, with intermodal coordination --

through transfer arrangements and levels of service and capacity --

as well as with the system’s ability to meet the changing transit

requirements of the region within the limits of a variety of

practical operating considerations.
-64-

Within the system planning phase, there are six basic work

steps. Although these steps imply discrete stages in the system

planning process, they are in fact closely interconnected. Step

1 is determination of transit goals; Step 2, data collection,

analysis, and model building; Step 3, development of alternative

systems; and Step 4, evaluation of alternatives. The completion

of these tasks leads to Step 5, the system selection decision.

This decision is closely related to Step 6, which involves programming and initial design of the selected system.

Step 1: Determination of transit goals. The goals to be achieved

by the proposed new transit system provide the basis for the

evaluation of alternative transit systems and should strongly

influence the entire transit planning process. Goals include not

only transportation objectives, but also land use, social, and

economic objectives. They should be developed through a participatory process and should provide for identification of groups

most affected by options to be studied.

Step 2: Data collection, analysis, and model building. The

availab ility of data for transportation planning purposes had

increased dramatically by the mid-1960s as a result of the highway and comprehensive metropolitan planning processes that were

established in most metropolitan areas during that period. Prior

to that period early system planning studies, such as those for

San Francisco’s BART and the Chicago Area Transportation Study.

(CATS) , both of which were initiated in 1955, had to assemble

their own land use data, conduct traffic surveys and make forecasts of travel on the test networks, all within the framework

of the system planning process.

Today much of the data base being used in comprehensive

planning, particularly the origin-destination data, dates from

that period. In contrast to the massive data collection programs

of the major metropolitan highway programs, more recent transit

and highway system planning has relied on data from published

sources such as the census or on small sample surveys. In

addition, local and regional planning agencies have provided data

on existing and future land use and related subjects.

The availability of this comprehensive data base on urban

travel during the 1960s made possible an enormously improve understanding of the complex relationships involved in trip

generation, travel patterns, choice of modes, and their relation

to such factors as land use, travel- time, and various aspects of

travel costs. A host of forecasting models for every aspect of

planning has been developed to a fairly high level of sophistication. The fact that these models are sophisticated does not

necessarily imply that resulting forecasts are assured of accuracy, of course, since this depends on several, factors:

-
-65-

The validity of the assumptions made as inputs to the

forecasts. These typically include forecasts of land use (the

geographic distribution of population and employment) and measures

of performance and cost of traveling on each link of the transit

system and the competing highway system (such as fares, times for

each portion of the trips, parking costs, fuel costs, and tolls) .

If these input assumptions are in error, the forecasts of ridership can be expected to be in error as well.

The accuracy with which current behavioral relationships are

measured and incorporated in the model. Predicting transit ridership involves several basic forecasting steps. Measurements of

trip generation and trip distribution yield an estimated total

number of future daily and peak hour trips. Using these numbers,

modal split forecasts predict the proportion of future travelers

who will use transit instead of auto.

Simply stated, the key statistical measurement in modal split

looks at the average proportion of travelers between any two

points who use transit instead of auto, assuming a given set of

comparative travel time and cost conditions for a given purpose of

travel (work versus other) or time of day (peak versus off-peak) .

The models used for forecasting the modal split can take a variety

of specific mathematical forms, but a common, simple form is a set

of "diversion curves" that relate modal split (percent who go by

transit) to. comparative times and costs, with different curves for

different trip purposes or times of day, and perhaps for different

income classes of the travelers.

Generally speaking, the ability to measure these relationships improved during the 1960s as experience was passed from one

study to another. A degree of standardization of procedures

occurred largely as a result of Federal Highway Administration

efforts, thus providing comparability and improvement in the confidence with which these measurements were made. This is much

less true, however, regarding transit and modal split relationships. Major transit planning studies generally came along later,

were fewer in number, and tended to be more peculiar to the local,

technological, institutional, and political circumstances than the

major highway studies. They were often less oriented to objective

technical assessment of market potential and were performed comparatively independently because, unlike FHWA, UMTA did not provide a strong technical coordinating role.
-66-

One of the remaining relationships that has not yet been

assessed, but is of major importance in transit system planning,

is the effect of various amenity aspects of new transit technologies on patronage -- i.e. how much additional transit travel

can be expected (either in new trips or diversion from autos)

due to such factors as air conditioning, smoother riding qualities, reduced noise, reduced crowding, and more pleasant design

of the stations and vehicle interiors. The models that have been

developed for transit forecasting provide a framework for incorporation of such factors once the necessary empirical investigations are done, but until recently there was little opportunity

to carry out those investigations because of the lack of transit

facilities and services that possessed these amenities. Research

of this type will be performed under the BART Impact Study.

The stability of all of these relationships over time. There

is relatively little evidence regarding the long term stab ility

of these relationships because the comprehensive data bases

required to measure these relationships have been assembled only

once for major original system planning efforts in most metropolitan areas, and most of these data collection efforts occurred

during a relatively short period in the late 1950s and early

1960s. There is a limited amount of evidence from the Washington,

D. C., area, where repeat surveys were conducted, that some of

these behavioral relationships are fairly stable over a mediumrange time period even under rapidly changing conditions --

growth in population, affluence, auto use and suburbanization,

decline in transit use, and other factors. However, no empirical

knowledge exists as to how stable they will be under the different

of changes that are taking place today.

Step 3: Development of alternative systems. The development of

alternative systems to meet transit needs is the heart of the

creative design process. It involves an effort to search for

different strategies to combine existing transit and other elements of the transportation system with a wide range of potential

improvements including elements of existing, evolutionary, and

new technologies. These can be combined in a variety of geographic configurations and levels of service. The systems should

be developed to provide transit services for all major functions

and needs of the area and all segments of the transit market,

including CBD- and non-CBD-oriented travel, peak and off-peak,

regional line-haul and community level short-haul travel, ‘commuters, nondriving groups, and others. The process of developing

these alternatives should be guided by the transit goals, by

interaction with interested participants, and by feedback from the

evaluation process. .
— —

-67-

Step4: Evaluation of alternatives. The evaluation of alternative

urban transportation systems iS becoming much more complex in

response to four trends or pressures. First, the surge of public

concern for human equality and environmental enhancement during

the 1960s led to the consideration of nontransportation goals

addressing social, economic, environmental, and urban design

considerations. Second, some of the same pressures, institutionalized in the National Environmental Policy Act, gave rise to a

need to give serious consideration to several system alternatives

rather than simply justifying one alternative. Third, the desirability for an interactive transportation planning process was

recognized, as described. Fourth, UMTA’s efforts to require

cost effectiveness analyses also influenced the approach to alternatives evaluation.

The evaluation process previously had been seen as a onetime comprehensive assessment of all alternatives considered,

leading directly to system selection. For several reasons,

this approach is being replaced by a two- or three-phased

evaluation process. For one thing, most project budgets cannot

afford to fully develop and evaluate all feasible alternatives.

An initial evaluation effort might be performed in very little

depth to “screen out” options that are far too costly or disruptive,

or fail to meet minimal standards of service, or other criteria.

This effort might be simply designed to narrow down the large

range of possible alternatives and to aid in packaging various

components of the existing system with components of new systems

or service improvements. Decisions to adopt and move forward

with early implementation of a selected component might possibly

be made at this early stage if it were found that a clear consensus

was reached.

This might be followed by the major comprehensive round of

system development and evaluation, wherein all evaluation criteria

would be applied to the alternative systems in depth, followed by

an effort to select a preferred system. However, this period will

almost always fail to obtain consensus in any major system planning effort involving diverse interests and alternatives. Thus

it is usually desirable to program a conflict resolution period

that may involve development of compromise systems, packaging of

components in different combinations, efforts to set priorities

among competing components of a system, and the like. The evaluation work at this stage may concentrate on very Particular impacts

(and their amelioration) that have given rise to greatest concern

among participants.
-68-

A resolution of conflict process is a phase of planning that

always occurs in any complex planning process involving diverse

interests. However, it is unfortunately almost never anticipated

in planning work programs. Because this is so the resolution of

conflict almost always takes place under the worst type of conditions: deadlines are not met, staff resources are not available

to assist in developing compromise plans or performing special

analyses, and opportunities are missing to continue the interaction that is required in order to resolve the conflict. These

activities should be recognized as essential parts of system

planning work programs.

Step 5: Selection of the system. The technical transit planning

process cannot be designed to present a definitive answer as to

what transit system is best for an area. The technical process

should provide information on the forecast success of transit

alternatives in achieving goals. This estimated performance as

well as other pertinent data should be used by the decisionmakers

in their selection of alternatives. Therefore, the major responsibility of the technical planning process is to ensure that all

those who should have an opportunity to participate in

decisionmaking are adequately informed of such data.

Step 6: Programming and initial design. Most transit planning

has a ~ producing a single, regionwide, long-range

plan. Little or no attention was paid to several important program planning questions. planners have done little analysis of

how best to proceed in reaching the end stage of implementation,

which components to build first, and how to coordinate early components with existing transit and other systems. Their plans have

tended to be inflexible instead of preserving options both to deal

with conceivable, if not predictable, future problems and for

taking advantage of future technological developments. Neither

have they considered how implementation might be staged over time.

Analysis of all of these program planning considerations

should be an important and continuing part of system planning.

Indeed there is growing recognition among leaders in the transit

field for system planning to take on this type of emphasis. UMTA’s

new draft policy regulations require “incremental” planning with

an emphasis on setting priorities, considering mixed-mode systems,

and establishing multiyear improvement programs. Despite this

recognition of the direction that system planning must move,

however, actual accomplishments are few.

Federal Planning Guidelines and Requirements.

Federal legal and administrative guidelines influence the

content and practice of technical planning. Metropolitan

areas seeking financial assistance from UMTA for both technical

study grants, under Section 9, and capital development grants,

under Section 3, must comply with a variety of administrative

requirements and procedures. The bulk of these are prescribed
——.— . . . .

—. . — - . . .

-69 - .

by administrative guidelines rather than by Federal legislation.

However, Federal legislation- has strongly influenced the planning

process, and most administrative regulations have roots in

legislative directives.

The UMTA administrative guidelines are derived from

statutory provisions set forth in Section 4 of the Urban Mass

Transportation Act. They are embodied largely in the agency’s

External Operating Manual. More specifically, the UMTA Planning Requirements Guide sets out an extensive listing of factors

to be covered in both urban comprehensive planning and transportation planning. These requirements are primarily concerned

with the scope of concerns to be dealt. with in the planning

process and with the qualifications of the public agencies that

sponsor the work. The Guide defines required elements for comprehensive planning and transportation planning, describes how

the two processes must interrelate, and outlines the format

and content of a transit development program. It explains

requirements for preparing grant applications. The Guide does

not describe or require technical procedures for accomplishing

any of the planning elements.

Like the Guide and the External Operating Manual, the

recently published joint UMTA-FHWA regulations for urban

transportation planning are limited to descriptions of the

required plans. 1/ The new regulations require metropolitan

planners to prepare (.1) a long-range general transportation plan,

including a separate plan for improvements in management of the

existing transportation system; (2) an annually updated list of

specific projects, called the transportation improvement program

(Tip), to implement portions of the long-range plan; and (3) a

multiyear planning prospectus supplemented by annual unified

planning work programs.

Federal environmental laws also have shaped the technical

planning process. The most significant statutory requirement

is contained in Section 14 of the Urban Mass Transportation

Act. This section requires a detailed assessment of the significant social, physical, and economic effects of a proposed

UMTA project that includes development of alternatives to the

proposal. The assessment process must provide ample opportunity

for public participation. Section 14 was added by the Urban

Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970 apparently in response to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)

and the Department of Transportation Act of 1966. It expands

the legislative intent of Section 4(f) of the Department of

Transportation Act. which was intended for the protection of

significant publicly-owned land of a public park, recreational

1 / UMTA-FHWA "Planning Assistance and Standards: Urban

Transportation Planning," op. cit.
-70-

are a, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historical sites.

Following the NEPA language, Section 14 requires the Secretary

to find that "no feasible and prudent alternative" exists to

a project where any adverse effect results.

The effect of the environmental requirements is to

call for a transportation system planning approach that embodies

thorough consideration of alternatives. These requirements are

similar to the approach described in the earlier discussion of

the elements of the technical planning process. However, when

the new regulations were promulgated, they were applied to

already selected systems. This resulted in delays probably -

well beyond the intent of the NEPA legislation.

UMTA recently took steps toward defining more clearly

a general approach for developing and evaluating alternatives.

The agency promulgated a draft policy statement

that requires each community to determine which alternative transit improvement "best serves the area’s needs, taking

into account. the social, economic, environmental, and urban

development goals.”1/

UMTA’s new policy calls for transit alternatives to be

developed in packages of combinations of transit modes, each

appropriate to the service requirements of a specific corridor.

Improvements must be considered that employ effective management and operation of existing transportation systems as well .

as construction of new facilities. The plan should be

implemented in increments, based on analysis of projected 5-

to 10-year transportation needs, with priority given to the

area’s more immediate needs. The evaluation of the alternatives

must indicate which one is the most cost-effective plan for

meeting the area’s goals. It must provide

full opportunity for public involvement from the early stages

of the process.

UMTA proposes to base the extent of Federal commitment

on "the cost of the initial increment of the plan which provides

for the transportation needs of the community in a cost-effective

manner.” The locality could opt to apply the Federal grant toward

a more costly alternative so long as the coverage

of transportation service is essentially the same.

The approach UMTA adopts in administering the new

guidelines is critically important to their ability

to improve the quality of urban transportation planning --

and the quality of urban transportation as well.

Guidelines for Metropolitan Evaluation

The metropolitan cases were selected to represent diverse

planning issues that arise in different types of situations.

1/ UMTA, "Proposed Policy for Major Urban Mass Transportation

Investments," op. cit.
-71-

These situations ranged from decisions regarding reconstruction or extension of long-standing public rail transit operations; to decisions regarding the planning and evaluation of

new rail or new technology systems or the rejection of such

systems; and, finally, to decisions involving the implementation

of entirely new rail systems.

, Although a variety of technical planning activities were

underway in each case. four categories of crtically important

planning activities were defined for purposes of the assessment. A set of guidelines was formulated for evaluating how

these steps were carried out. The four categories

are not all-inclusive and that they are meant only to provide a

framework for focusing the assessment on key elements of the

planning and decisionmaking process. The categories and

their corresponding assessment guidelines are discussed below:

Broad, explicit goals and objectives should guide technical

planning and decisionmaking. The technical process has been

examined to determine the explicitness of the goals and

objectives, the extent to which they were employed as criteria

in-evaluating alternative systems, who participated in goal

setting, and the relationship of goals to other regional

objectives, insofar as these have been defined in the comprehensive metropolitan planning program. In addition, the

goals and objectives should reflect the interests of all major

constituencies and types of travel needs. They should also

encourage a multimodal transportation strategy appropriate to

the area and not be merely designed to lead the evaluation

process toward a predetermined solution.

A range of realistic alternative solutions should be developed.

The rationale for their development has been examined to

evaluate their technical relationship to the projected transit

market, the relationship to areawide goals, and the degree

to which the alternatives were determined by narrowly defined

political considerations, as distinct from political decisions

based on solid technical evaluation of how the alternatives

affect, or serve the objectives of, various constituencies .

Assumptions that were made for each alternative have been

examined to determine if they are unnecessarily restrictive or

costly for the efficient functioning of the proposed system

and thus if they had a significant negative influence on the

results of the evaluation.

The evaluation of alternatives should be thorough and fair.

The investigation considered both the effectiveness of evaluation techniques and the validity or reasonableness of the

, data, particularly the forecasts, used for testing the alternatives. The range of factors used in the evaluation and the
.

-72-

. weight attached to important considerations such as cost effectiveness and the achievement of defined goals and objectives

also have been examined. A critical question was the extent to

which balanced consideration was given to the full range of

goals and objectives as opposed to excessive concern with a

particular class of them, such as those that are quantifiable,

those relating only to system users, or those relating only to

particular land development interests. Similarly, the evaluation should consider the effects on all major interests. It

should make technical information available to decisionmakers

and the public and provide sufficient opportunities for the

results of the evaluation to be reviewed by all interests.

These comments should be given appropriate consideration in the

course of planning.

A practical and flexible plan of implementation should be

developed. The Implementation plans have been examined to determine the influence exerted by availability (or lack of availability) of Federal financing as well as the effect of local

finance requirements on decisionmaking. The ability of the

plan to respond to changing circumstances and permit staging of

implementation also have been considered.

One factor that has been considered throughout is the

participation of the public in each of these phases. Public

participation is discussed in greater detail in the decisionmaking chapter and is only briefly mentioned here as it relates

directly to the technical process.

METROPOLITAN EXPERIENCE

This section evaluates the technical

procedures that planners in the nine case metropolitan areas

followed in developing transit plans. The information is

subdivided into categories corresponding to the guidelines

used in assessing the metropolitan experience and described

in the preceding section.

The assessment of technical planning processes looked at

the following study activities in the nine metropolitan cases:

• The Boston assessment focused on the Boston Transportation Planning Review, carried out between 1971 and

1973. This study was established to reevaluate major

highway proposals.
, —. ——-. . .

-73-

● Recent planning for Chicago transit improvements has

called for extensions to existing commuter rail lines

into suburban counties, expansion of regional bus

service, and additions to the central city-focused

rapid transit system, including proposals to depress

the elevated loop and add new "distributor" links.

The loop and distributor subway proposals have been

evolving since 1965. The first plan was published in

1968. It was updated in 1971 and subsequently subjected

to an environmental impact analysis, completed in

1973, that reaffirmed the same scheme. In June 1974

these proposals -- and other subway, commuter rail, and

bus improvements -- were included in the 1995 Transportation System Plan.

● planning for San Francisco’s rail system was grounded in

a 1947 joint Army-Navy study of alternative bay crossings. In 1956 the Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission

prepared a preliminary engineering study for a rapid

rail transit system. In 1961 principal technical

studies were completed that led to a plan for a

five-county Bay Area Rapid Transit system. In 1962

the system was trimmed to three counties, and a bond

issue to build it won approval in referendum. In

recent years, technical studies have been undertaken

to plan BART extensions.

● Seattle’s major transit plans were proposed in 1967,

1970, and 1972. The 1967 plan, published by the Puget

Sound Governmental Conference, called for a 47-mile, fourleg rapid rail system focused on the CBD. Voters

rejected the proposal in 1968. Two years later the

same plan, bolstered by evaluation and discard of

several bus alternatives, was again presented to voters

and defeated. In 1972 a new study produced a short-term

bus improvement program that won approval in referendum that fall.

● Like Seattle, Los Angeles took rail transit proposals

to the polls twice, in 1968 and 1974, and both times

the proposals were turned down. Several plans were

produced prior to 1968, but the system placed before

voters was based most directly on an engineering

study begun in 1967. Planning for the recently

rejected system began in 1972. A plan for a 116-mile

system was published in July 1973 and was followed

by another round of alternatives analysis leading to a

proposal for a 145-mile rapid rail system, published

in March 1974. This plan was defeated in a referendum

vote in November 1974, and subsequently a new system

planning effort was begun.
-74-

●

●

●

●

Washington, D.C. , initiated transit system planning

with the 1959 Mass Transportation Survey, which made

preliminary proposals for a 33-mile rail transit system

and a network of new highways. Between 1960 and 1962

a new study team, using new data and incorporating

preliminary engineering, produced a new plan that

recommended an 83-mile rail transit system and reduced

the highway mileage proposed earlier. Subsequently,

transit planning and highway planning took separate

courses. The 1962 transit plan was trimmed to a 25-mile

"bobtail" system for the District of Columbia only and

was approved for construction in 1965. A new technical

study process began in 1967 to extend the system to the

suburbs; it produced the 98-mile regional system that

was approved for construction in 1968.

Atlanta’s early technical plans were developed in 1960-

1962. In June 1961, the regional comprehensive planning body called for a 60-mile rapid rail system.

Preliminary engineering studies resulted in a plan for

a 66-mile rail system which was published in 1962.

in 1967 an update of this plan recommended a 54-mile

rail system, which was cut back to 40.3 miles and

presented to voters in 1968. The plan was rejected.

Earlier in 1968 an alternatives analysis was begun

that led in 1969 to a draft recommendation for a busway

system. By 1971 the busway system had been rejected,

and a modification of the earlier rail plan -- coupled

with a program for short-term bus improvements and a fare

reduction -- was approved that year in referendum.

Denver began transit system planning in 1971, and in

1972 a first phase plan was published that laid forth

a concept for future land-use configuration and a

complementary regional transportation concept. It

was the goal-setting phase of a transit planning process

that recommended in 1973 a 98-mile personal rapid

transit system. Voters that year approved a sales tax

measure to finance an early action bus improvement

program, further study of the PRT proposal, and,

ultimately, construction. At UMTA’s request, Denver

proceeded with an alternatives evaluation study and, in

April 1975, recommended an 80--milc automated rapid

transit system (a considerable modification of the

earlier PRT concept) supplemented by express bus.
-75-

● The Twin Cities Metropolitan Planning Commission

(the regional transit authority) began a series of

long-range planning studies in 1968-1969. In 1970

conventional rail rapid transit was recommended to

serve as the backbone of a regional system. A subsequent

study evaluated alternatives and proposed a 37-mile

rail system. Meanwhile, the Metropolitan Council

 (the regional comprehensive planning agency) produced a

plan calling for exclusive busways; and private

organizations were promoting study of advanced technology systems. The state legislature stepped in to

arbitrate and requested both regional agencies to

cooperate in planning an automated small-vehicle

system. The resulting plan, published in January 1975,

recommended a 16-passenger group rapid transit concept

to replace conventional rapid transit as the region’s

backbone system. No system selection decision has been

made as yet.

Goals and Objectives

Generally speaking, the technical approach to goal setting

in the case metropolitan areas has corresponded to the historical

period during which the planning was initiated. Thus, goals

articulated during the 1950s and early 1960s were more narrowly

focused than the goals developed since the late 1960s. Between

that period and the present, two main factors have led to a

broader range of goals for transit plans: growing popular concern

for equal opportunity and environmental protection, and a more

participatory approach to goal setting. Only in recently initiated studies have goals been translated into evaluation criteria

for use during the course of the planning process. And although

every case shared the goal of reducing forecasted automobile .

traffic, none represented a truly multimodal planning approach.

These points are amplified in the discussions that follow.

In each discussion, summary examples are cited from relevant

metropolitan cases.

Early plans . During the 1950s and early 1960s transit was

viewed as a means for dealing with several of the most serious

urban problems perceived at the time. Transit promoters and

others expected major new systems to (1) revitalize the ailing

central cores of older metropolitan areas, (2) reduce auto

congestion and the need for new highways serving commuters,

and (3) help counter the trend toward suburban sprawl. The

land use focus of these goals rightly indicates that in most

cases early transit proposals were shaped by a close relationship between land use goals and transit goals (and their

respective planners) .
-76-

---

At this time, although goals were often established as a

first step in developing a comprehensive plan, a formal goalsetting procedure was not usually incorporated into the transit planning process. Thus, areas that initiated transit plans

during this period usually did not solicit public input into

goal setting.

With these factors at work, the goals for transit programs

begun in the 1950s and early 1960s tended to imply a particular

type of system. Indeed, two of the three plans started by the

case cities “during this period were undertaken with the clear

assumption that their product would be a rapid rail transit

system.

Atlanta. Atlanta initiated transit planning out of a

desire to reduce highway congestion, channel regional growth,

and enhance the center city, although these goals were not

explicitly laid out as such, and were not employed

directly in evaluating transit alternatives in the

early plans. (The first early transit plan, Atlanta

Region Comprehensive Plan: Rapid Atlanta, 1961,

or Plan and Program for the Atlanta Metropolitan

Region, 1962.) Both plans were expected to propose

rapid rail systems at the outset, and both did. -

San Francisco. AS early as during the 1941-1947 Joint Army

Navy Board Study, San Francisco planners viewed rail transit as

potential substitute for additional bridges across the

a

bay

the

was

the

and as a means for preserving San Francisco from

effects of additional automobile traffic. This work

followed by a series of studies specifically addressing

need for rail rapid transit.

Washington, D. C. In Washington, D. C., the earliest transit

study pursued a more broadly framed goal than in the other

two cases. This goal, nonetheless characteristic of

the period, was to accommodate the future transportation

needs of an expanding population. In the 1959 report of the

Mass Transportation Survey, transit was not predetermined

to be included in the plan. However, the 1959 survey

was completed during a period of growing public concern

about the unwanted effects of highways on neighborhoods and

parks. Critics thought it called for too many highways and

too little transit. That report, prepared by the National

Capital Transportation Agency, spelled out the need

for an improved transportation system to enhance the

welfare of the District of Columbia, enable the orderly

growth and development of the national capital region,

and preserve the beauty and dignity of the nation’s

capital, although these goals were not employed in

the planning process.
—. — -— -

-77-

Recent plans. During the 1960s and 1970s, the scope of national

concerns expanded to include a range of new issues that made their

way into statements of goals for transit systems. One of the

issues was reflected in campaigns for providing equal opportu- .

nity -- to ethnic minorities, the poor, the elderly, and the

handicapped. Another issue, spawned by urban growth and particularly the increased use of the automobile, was created by the

threat of environmental degradation as measured principally

by air pollution, energy consumption, and suburban sprawl. In

devising ways to deal with suburban development and the

paralleling increase in suburban-oriented work trips, public

attention began to focus on the desirability of encouraging

nodal growth with clustered land uses.

New transit goals responding to these issues called for

maximum mobility for transit dependents; reduction in auto use

to improve air quality, conserve energy, and control growth;

and new attention to suburban-oriented transit service. Landuse-oriented goals usually were borrowed from regional land-use

plans, a step that reflected a high degree of apparent coordination during this period -- as earlier -- between transportation and regional planners.

Until about 1970, most of the goals were developed by

planners with the aid of public officials. Since then, citizens

have played an increasingly direct role in the development of

goals. This formal establishment of a gOal-Setting process

was accompanied by the development of evaluation criteria,

based on the goals, to assist in the planning process.

Examples from the case metropolitan areas that illustrate

most or all of these changes are:

Seattle. Seattle’s 1967 transit plan adopted the goals of

the regional land use plan without structuring a participatory goal-setting process. After rail plans were

defeated twice at the polls, Seattle planners modified

their approach. The bus transit plan subsequently

developed (and approved) encouraged public participation

in formulating goals through a series of public meetings.

A wide-ranging set of four goals was listed: (1) improved mobility for the general population and especially

for the transit dependent; (2) furthering the region’s

environmental and development policies; (3) a flexible

transit system in which routes could be added and

changed with ease to meet changing demand; (4) providing

channels for citizen participation during both planning

and operations phases. These goals reflect the trend

toward placing priority on serving suburban locations,

and they were used to select a system that provided

express bus service to four "high volume service

areas” (including three non-CBD areas) . (The rejected

alternative concentrated service to the CBD.)
.— —— -. . — . — . . . . ——

-78-

L —— Denver. Denver’s goal-setting procedures embodied all the

characteristics of recent planning efforts. General transit

goals were developed in parallel with land use goals in

\ the first phase of the transit planning process, which

was completed in 1972. These goals included: (1) directing

. growth into designated areas; (2) providing access to employment and activity centers; and (3) supporting national

energy programs. The regional land use plan, which grew

out of the same goal-setting process as Denver’s transit

‘plan, called for encouraging growth in 12 suburban

nodes in addition to the CBD.

These goals were expanded during Denver’s recent (1975)

 analysis of alternatives to the PRT-type system proposed in 1973. Community values expressed during public

meetings and incorporated as goals included mobility

issues, minimization of disruption, environmental

enhancement, esthetic concerns, and cost minimization.

Many of these goals were later used in evaluating

alternatives, although the one most important goal --

shaping growth to conform to the land-use plan --

was not effectively applied.

Minneapolis - St. Paul. The Twin Cities 1968-1969 longrange transit study established a comprehensive set of goals

using inputs from major local agencies and citizens. The goals

included: (1) ease of movement throughout the area;

(2) provision of a variety of transit modes to meet

needs of different people; and (3) achievement of

"a higher quality of life." Evaluation criteria were

derived from these goals for application to each study

alternative.

Boston, The 1971-1973 Boston Transportation Planning

Review incorporated a broadly participatory goal-setting .

process that led to a comprehensive set of formal

objectives intended to guide the refinement of proposals

for transit improvements. Although the citizen participation procedures in Boston are typical of recent

trends, Boston is atypical in its CBD orientation. One

of MBTA’s current principal goals calls for emphasizing

improved access to existing areas of dense development,

particularly the downtown.

Discussion. Due to the interest in limitinq suburban sprawl and

channeling growth into activity centers, one might have-expected

a greater degree of focus on neighborhood-level service. HOWever, all of the transit studies examined gave priority to

regional needs, and most did not attempt to consider intraneighborhood types of service.
-79-

Each of the nine cases has held the goal of reducing auto- .-.——. .——.—----

mobile use as an important purpose for developing a transit

system. One might expect this goal to have led to multimodal

planning -- simultaneous study of transit and highway alternatives to serve a single set of travel demand projections. However, none of the cities pursued multimodal planning in the

strictest sense.

Highway-oriented transportation plans in Atlanta and

Seattle included transit proposals, but these were

rejected in favor of the recommendations of transitoriented studies.

Washington, D.C., began transit planning with a study --

the 1959 Mass Transportation Survey -- that was multimodal in concept. However, highway planning responsibilities were eventually claimed by the region’s highway

agencies. “

A number of cases, including Washington, Atlanta, San

Francisco, and Seattle, proposed joint use of planned

highway facilities for transit and automobiles.

Boston offers the best example of metropolitan wide

coordination of transit and highway planning. The

BTPR’s sketch-planning process evaluated both highway

and transit alternatives. However, the transit options

were not studied to the same level of detail as the

highway options.

summary, the use of goals as an evaluation tool is

a recent development and has occurred only when active citizen

participation has been a part of the planning process. In

spite of goals for coordinated transportation systems, transit

plans are usually developed independent of highway planning.

Development of Alternatives

Like goals, the concept of alternatives has evolved over

the decades of transit planning in the nine cases. Planning

begun prior to the late 1960s typically did not develop as

broad an array of alternatives as occurred in more recently

initiated plans.

Early studies. The early transit studies in San Francisco and Atlanta and the 1962 study in Washington, D.C., viewed transit fundamentally as an alternative to the automobile. At the time,

rapid rail transit was popularly considered the only transit

option. Typically, a rail system was compared to an all-highway

system; in a few studies comparisons were made also to an allbus system.
-80-

A major impetus behind the early tendency to polarize

the transportation options into expressway versus extensive

rapid rail was provided by the highway-oriented transportation

studies conducted in most large urban areas during the 1950s

and the 1960s. These studies included CATS 1

/, BATS 2/, AATS 3/,

PSRTS 4/, and DMATS 5/. They usually constituted their region’s

first effort at areawide urban transportation planning. These

studies typically forecast rapid urban growth and called for

an expanded highway construction program to cope with the

increased travel demand. In this way they alerted regional

planners and the public to the growing urgency of the need to

provide an alternative to the automobile.

Seattle, Denver. The 1967 Seattle study and the 1973

Denver study presented transit-oriented alternatives to the

PSRTS and DMATS studies, respectively. The transit studies

developed land-use as well as transportation alternatives

to the earlier plans. The highway studies assumed

trend growth patterns -- sprawl -- while the transit

plans called for containment of growth in designated

nodes. It ‘is interesting that the population and economic growth predicted in the transit studies reflects

the same optimistic growth forecasts as the highwayoriented plans. These forecasts, especially the predictions for the CBD, tended to build a case for largecapacity transit systems. *

Later studies. Later studies looked at alternatives to heavy

rail systems. The growth in low-density suburban areas, which

could not easily be served by conventional rail modes, was a

major factor influencing the-examination of such alternatives

as-bus, PRT, and light rail. The range varied greatly among the

case metropolitan areas, from two to over one hundred. Most of

the studies compared two fixed guideway alternatives with a lowcapital alternative and an improved version of the existing bus

system. Examples of the quality and breadth of alternatives

are listed here. The Twin Cities boasts the most complete

range; several cases display unrealistically expensive or otherwise inadequate choices of alternatives; while most of the cases

fall somewhere in between.

1/ Chicago Area Transportation Study.

2/ Bay Area Transportation Study.

3/ Atlanta Area Transportation Study.

4/ Puget Sound Regional Transportation Study.

5/ Denver Metropolitan Area Transportation Study.
. . —. —

-81-

Seattle. In the 1970 Seattle plan four alternatives were

tested, including (1) buses in mixed traffic, (2) buses with

metered freeways, (3) busways, and (4) rail and bus. The plan

assumed growth forecasts that were optimistic, especially in

light of the recession that Seattle was

experiencing at the time. (More recent studies have

projected greatly reduced growth.) The first two

alternatives were eliminated because they could not

carry the traffic that would be generated by the forecasted growth. The busway alternative required a

double-deck tunnel in the downtown to handle the load.

The tunnel cost helped raise the total cost for the

busway system to $350 million more than the cost of

the rail-bus alternative. Therefore, the bus-rail

alternative was selected, but it met defeat in referendum later that year. *~-

‘

Denver. The 1973 Denver study evaluated four alternatives:

(1) all b us (2) all fixed guideway, (3) PRT with bus,

and (4) rail with bus. The PRT alternative used advanced

technology that had not been demonstrated in operation

at the time (and that still has not been tested)- It

was demand-responsive, with 7.5-second headways, and

made few intermediate stops. The system easily outperformed the conventional alternatives.

Twin Cities. The 1969 Twin Cities study developed a range

of alternatives that represent both hiqh- and low-capital

systems. From a field of over 100 alternatives, the

selection was narrowed to include (1) intermediate

capacity rapid rail transit, (2) rapid rail with

extended station spacing, (3) buses in mixed traffic,

(4) commuter railroads, (5) busways without downtown

subways, (6) busways with downtown subways, and

(7) buses with metered freeways. Although this array

is relatively comprehensive, it omits any automated

system. A later study examined automated systems and

compared their performances against the 1969 results.

Los Angeles. The Southern California Rapid Transit

District in Los Angeles was mandated by the state legislature

to develop a regional “mass rapid transit system." SCRTD

interpreted the phrase narrowly to imply a rapid rail system.

In its 1972-1973 study, SCRTD did not consider a full range

of bus alternatives until pressured to do so by UMTA

Discussion. In summary, most examples of impartial and comprehensive

selection of alternatives have occurred in cases where no one

transit system is the local favorite. Cases in which rapid

rail transit was assumed to be the solution predominate among

system planning efforts that began during the 1950s and 1960s.
I

.—

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.

A major reason for much of the narrowness of early transit

planning was the mere lack of knowledge among U.S. professionals

of what options were available and what their capabilities were.

The contrast between the record in this country and European

accomplishments during the 1950s and 1960s is notable in this

regard. We grew unsophisticated as a result of long public

neglect.

Evaluation of Alternatives

Alternatives evaluation is designed to produce sufficient

technical information for decisionmakers to be able to understand

the advantages and disadvantages of alternative transit systems.

The product is used to guide decisionmaking but not to determine

the decision; other factors, such as political considerations,

come into play in selecting a system from among alternatives.

However, it is important that these external factors not bias the

technical evaluation. This discussion focuses on the content of

the technical procedures in each case.

The conduct of alternatives evaluation has changed over time,

responding to advances in the state of the art and to new Federal

requirements. Thus, cases that began system planning 10 years

or more ago built fewer factors into the process than occurred in

more recent studies. The current UMTA emphasis on determining

relative cost-effectiveness of alternative systems has already

influenced the evaluation process in one case (Denver) .

Although the type and range of factors used in evaluation

has changed over time, the quality of the process has not necessarily improved. Studies initiated recently as well as earlier

ones illustrate both poor and commendable approaches to alternatives

analysis.

The discussion that follows examines first the changing

character of the technical procedures for alternatives evaluation.

The quality of the process in the case cities is described next.

Importance of economic factors. The relative importance

of economic factors—i-n the comparison of alternatives

has varied greatly over the approximately two

decades of transit planning in the case metropolitan areas. Early

studies for the San Francisco, Atlanta, and Washington, D.C. systems

relied chiefly on benefit-cost analysis to justify the selected

rail systems. Following this period and up to a year ago, most

systems were evaluated on the basis of a wide range of environmental

and social factors as well as economic considerations, which

were no longer of primary importance. However, since UMTA began

requesting a determination of cost-effectiveness , economic

factors are once again assuming greater importance in alternatives

analysis.
—. .-

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The following examples describe the changing approaches

within the metropolitan cases to alternatives analysis.

Chicago. The Chicago CATS (1958) , like most other studies

of its type, used only a limited n-umber of factors to evaluate

the transit proposals. Most of them were expressed in monetary

terms. They included costs of capital, interest, and annual

operations; benefits of time savings to existing transit riders;

and accident reduction.

Washington, D.C. The 1968 study that led to selection of the

Washington, D.C., adopted rail system justified the recommended

system with a benefit-cost analysis that quantified benefits due

to time savings by transit and auto users, auto insurance and

operating cost reduction, conservation of land for better use,

reduction in job tardiness and early departure, reduction in dismissal for inclement weather, elimination of second and third

cars, and reduction in employer-provided parking facilities.

Boston. The Boston Transportation Planning Review (1971-

1973) provides a good example of an alternatives evaluation using

a variety of factors that reemphasize economic considerations.

Each alternative was evaluated by factors grouped in 10 categories:

(1) capital costs; (2) transportation service; (3) housing relocation needs; (4) effect on regional economic patterns, (5) community economic impact; (6) impacts on landscape, open space,

and historic resources; (7) impact on air quality; (8) noise

levels created; (9) effect on community quality; (10) impacts on

natural ecosystems.

Denver. The 1975 Denver plan represents the first attempt

to build community goals into the process of identifying a costeffective transit alternative. The evaluation used a wide range

of considerations, many reflecting community goals, to evaluate

alternatives. A low-capital alternative was rejected because it

could not achieve community goals, and the most cost-effective of

the remaining high-capital alternatives was selected.

Quality of the analysis. The quality of the alternatives analysis

varied greatly from study to study, and not necessarily with respect to time. Even if the changes in the state-of-the-art over

time are considered, examples of inadequate procedures can be

found among recently initiated studies as well as those begun

early, and vice versa. A good technical evaluation should measure

the comparative capacities Of the alternatives to meet goals established

by the community in question. If the evaluation process is biased,

decisionmakers are given incomplete information and they may not

be able to identify all of the potential problems inherent in the

various alternatives or to identify the steps necessary to overcome these problems. In many cases, the technical work was used
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to justify an already selected (or strongly favored) alternative.

Washington, D.C. The first transit plan in Washington, D.C.,

grew out of a regional transportation study that addressed both

highway and transit needs. This study, the Mass Transportation

F

of 1959, laid the groundwork for future transit planning

a though its transit proposals were not directly represented in

the system that was eventually adopted. The

study began with no preconceived solution and conducted a

thorough and fair evaluation of alternatives.

Boston. The BTPR process, initiated in 1971, is an example

of a comprehensive analysis, as has been explained. However, as

the study began, there was strong political support for the

decision that was ultimately made not to build the highways under

study, and the prevalence of this antihighway attitude tended to

distort the otherwise well-structured evaluation process. If the

BTPR process had placed more emphasis on the development of

transit alternatives, rather than concentrating on the elimination of highways, some of the subsequent delays in selecting

particular transit alternatives within each corridor tight have

been lessened.

San Francisco. BART planners assumed from the beginning that

their plan would be a "heavy rail" system. If their evaluation of

the proposed BART system had been more careful, it should have

identified the proposed automatic train control system as a potential source of problems because it was a technology still under

development . ●

Atlanta. Atlanta’s early plans in 1961 and 1962 did not

formally test alternative transit systems. The Metropolitan

Atlanta Transit Study Commission briefly investigated improved

bus service concepts and the use of commuter rail but discarded

these without rigorous analysis. The first serious look at

alternative concepts occurred with the Voorhees study that began

shortly before the defeat of Atlanta’s first transit proposal at

the polls in 1968.

Denver. The analysis of alternatives published by Denver’s

Regional Transit District in 1975 demonstrates a recent case in

which questions have been raised about the validity and reliability

of the assumptions and procedures used. To the extent that the

process did not provide complete, accurate information about a

full range of feasible alternatives, it illustrates the difficulty

in accomplishing this ideal in a metropolitan area where, with

few exceptions, there was solid support from public officials and

private citizens for a specific transit system. Few forces were

pushing for a thorough analysis of alternative transit improvements

in Denver when, to meet a requirement imposed by UMTA, the ART

study was begun. In the view of most Denver residents, the time

for alternatives analysis had passed.

/
. — —

-85 -

-

1

Discussion. One of the limitations on the range of alternatives

developed in a number of cases was exerted by the engineering

consultants hired to do the planning work. Engineering consultants

were selected for their previous experience in transit rather than

for their ability to conceive or evaluate alternative technologies.

Their mission and their approach was more "design" than development and evaluation of alternatives.

Engineering consultants who were hired to do transit system planning could look forward to being hired for larger, more

lucrative engineering design contracts, particularly if the system selected was one in which they had extensive previous experience. Engineering design contracts were generally written so

that there was no incentive to develop a lower cost transit system. Many contracts were written so that the fee increased as

the system cost increased, thus tending to create an incentive to

design conventional heavy rail of highest performance standards

and complete grade separation.

One of the most important lessons learned from the metropolitan experience concerns the ability of a predetermined

solution to distort the technical planning work. Throughout the

past 25 years the influence of the proponents of one transit system or another has had a great effect on the degree of 

objectivity of the technical work. Many studies,

especially early ones, were designed to- justify an already

favored type of system and thus were biased in one manner or

another. This bias can also be seen in some of the system

evaluations that were performed at UMTA’s insistence after a

basic system planning effort had been completed. In some cities

where no one transit system was the clear favorite, the technical

process has produced much more impartial information concerning

the merits of alternative transit proposals. .

d

●

In addition, the level of public involvement has been shown

to have an important effect on the technical work. The inclusion

of a formal, participatory goal-setting process as a step in

technical process is likely to lead to the use of the goals in

the evaluation of alternatives. The findings show that--
.

-86-

evaluating options for entire transit-only systems in many

situations may be less effective than conducting a large portion of the work program on a subregional basis. The Boston

Transportation Planning Review (BTPR) provides an example of

this approach.

.

For the BTPR, the area under study was

broken down into several sectors or corridors that were relatively

independent of each other but that each contained highly interrelated transportation elements (existing facilities and services,

controversial expressways, and proposed transit facilities and

services). Within each subregional area various options were

conceived, refined, and evaluated. Typically, these options included a diverse array of public transportation improvement possibilities, such as rejuvenation of commuter rail service,

extension or relocation of rail rapid transit, conventional local

surface transit service improvements, establishment of new crosstown routes and special services for the transit dependent.

Considerable emphasis was placed on short-term improvements as

well as long-range capital improvements, the timing of implementation, funding sources, associated changes required in operating policies in legislation or in institutional arrangements in

order to carry out each promising element of the options.

The process allowed early decisions to eliminate from further

consideration or to approve for implementation certain elements

for which a clear consensus was formed. This weeding-out step

resulted in a narrowing of the number of options, plus a redefinition of some of them, that would be subjected to further

study. The BTPR also merits attention for having set aside

periods of time for the critical work that was expected to be

needed to help resolve the conflicts that inevitably develop in

the course of planning.

Implementation Plan

In addition to generating information to help the system

selection decision, planners must create a detailed plan to guide

implementation. The success of an implementation plan depends

largely on three factors. First, a secure source of construction

funds must be obtained. Second, a flexible implementation schedule must be drawn up that can respond to changing regional and

local circumstances. Third, means must be developed for directing and controlling transit-related effects, particularly development impacts.

Financing. The metropolitan experience in creating the financing

portions of implementation plans shows a clear pattern of historical development. Other aspects of the experience in planning

for implementation have been more anomalous.
-87 -

Financing plans have been an integral part of new system

proposals in every city studied. Since UMTA began funding capital

programs in 1966, planners in all of the case cities assumed they

could tap UMTA for its share and concentrated instead on generating

the local share. Five of the cases had to win voter approval

for their financing plans. 1/ Transit plans in three Of the

cases (Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Seattle) were defeated at least

once; and only three cases have approved fixed guideway transit

systems (Atlanta, Denver, San Francisco) . The experience of these

five cities in attempts to gain public support show an evolution

in both the financing measures used and the nature of the transit

plan they are intended to support.

One of the more obvious changes in financial planning has

been the nature of the local taxing mechanism proposed. Bond

issues supported by property or sales taxes have been the principal methods suggested for financing new systems. Property

taxes were recommended by early studies. However, after initial

success in San Francisco, property taxes were defeated in

Seattle and Atlanta. Sales taxes were substituted and led to

voter approval in Atlanta and Denver -- but to defeat twice 

in Los Angeles.

Changes also have occurred in the nature of the transit

plan itself. One of the factors common to the most recent successful fixed guideway transit financing referendums -- in Atlanta

(1971) and Denver (1973) -- was the inclusion of short-term

bus transit improvements to accompany the long-term transit

plan. Immediate transit improvements were not associated with

most of the previous financing referend

Another recent trend is incorporating a provision for

operating assistance to support existing service as part of

the financing plan for a new system. Early proposals had

assumed new transit systems would be able to offset at least

part of the construction costs with operating surpluses.

Case examples representing a range of approaches to and

successes with different financing proposals are summarized

below:

1/ These five cases are Atlanta, Denver, Los Angeles, San

Francisco, and Seattle. Only a few participating jurisdictions

in the Washington region had to vote approval of the financing

plan; Boston and Chicago can plan on existing authority; and

the Twin Cities has not yet selected a system or financing plan.
- — . ..— . . -.——

-88-

Seattle. In 1968 and 1970 Seattle voters rejected bond issues

backed by property taxes to finance construction of

a new rail system. In 1972, however, voters approved

the use of auto excise tax money to support a short-range

bus transit plan.

Atlanta. In 1968, Atlanta voters rejected a rail transit

system to be financed by property taxes. However in 1971

Fulton and DeKalb county residents approved a sales tax

increase to finance a similar rail system and cover bus

operating deficits. Part of the financing plan assumed

a reduction to 15 cents in the transit fare and increased

bus service. An unexpected drain was placed on the

new tax fund due to high operating deficits. Even though

the state legislature acted to restrict the portion

that can be spent on operating deficits, paying for

the remainder of the short-term bus improvements and the

first segment of the rail system will require careful

budgetary management.

Denver. In 1973 Denver area voters approved a sales tax for

the operation and construction of a regional transit system.

The financing plan was closely associated with an extensive short-range bus improvement plan and implied the

construction of a PRT system. .

@ Los Angeles. In 1968 Los Angeles area voters rejected a sales

tax-based financing plan for an extensive rail system.

Again in 1974 Los Angeles voters rejected a sales tax

plan that would have financed an extensive (although

ill-defined) new system and the operation of a large

short-term bus improvement program.

Washington, D. C. In 1968 WMATA approved a rapid rail system

for Washington, D. C., to be financed by local government contributions, revenue bonds guaranteed by the Federal and local governments, and a Federal contribution to pay two-thirds of the total

cost. The financing plan was approved by local jurisdictions,

which legally committed themselves to contributing a share of the

initial estimated costs of the system. Cost escalation

has plagued WMATA since then. The source of funds to

cover increased construction costs has not been determined

at this time.
—

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Staging of construction. The second element of an implementation

plan concerns the staging of construction. All of the major transit programs proposed to schedule implementation over time, and to

this end staging plans were designed. However, the new UMTA

guideline for building in increments casts the concept in a different light. 1

/ Traditional construction stages directly follow one

after another. According to UMTA, the incremental approach means

placing fixed-guideway systems initially only in high density

transit corridors, and waiting to build in other corridors until

demand develops. Thus existing or near-term needs would be served,

while additional service would be held back until future growth

had generated enough demand to justify a transit system. Meanwhile, other transit modes could serve the corridor. Inherent in ●

this kind of implementation plan is the flexibility to respond to

future growth.

Examples of proposed staged implementation of new systems

along these lines are limited, and all are UMTA inspired.

Denver. RTD has prepared an 80-mile Automated Rapid -

Plan for the Denver area. The initial segment is to be

only 28 miles long with additional segments to be

constructed as transit demand warrants and as local

citizens and governments take actions favoring their

construction. RTD’s position reflects UMTA’s implementation guideline. It also responds to the existence

of neighborhood opposition to several potential future

segments, although not to the initial segment.

Transit

Los Angeles. A March 1974 report in LOS Angeles proposed

several options for building the initial segment of the proposed

system. These options ranged from an initial 33-mile

segment to be constructed in six years to an initial

124-mile segment that would require eight years. The

proposal, called the "building block" approach, responded

to UMTA suggestions. However, all of the building

blocks were rejected in favor of building the entire

145-mile system (which met defeat in public referendum

later that year) .

Atlanta. UMTA has pledged funding for only a segment

proposed Atlanta system and has made no commitment to

support the entire system. By controlling the amount

and timing of Federal money committed to the Atlanta

system, UMTA will be able to initiate a policy of

staged implementation.
—

-90 -

Shaping urban growth. The final concern of an implementation plan .

involves procedures for controlling and shaping development impacts. None of the cases has faced this matter squarely. Transit

is typically expected, in effect, to influence future land use in

a beneficial manner on its own power through the market place.

Transit’s role in shaping development in the pre-automobile

age is undisputed. However, at this time the effect of transit on

shaping future development patterns has not been proven to be

significant. None of the cases has demonstrated convincingly that

its proposed transit system could have sufficient influence on

land use development to achieve land use benefits. In the case

of BART, there is widespread belief, backed by little

evidence to date, that the intensification of growth in San Francisco’s CBD is due in part to BART. However, there is growing

disenchantment over this trend even though it was widely viewed

as an objective in the 1945-to-1962 planning period.

In order to achieve potential land use benefits, other governmental actions (such as zoning restrictions and incentives,

sewer service -limitation, and auto restraints) must be combined

with the provision of transit service. Some localities in the

Atlanta, Washington, and San Francisco metropolitan areas have

taken steps to encourage high density development around rapid

transit stations. But to date none of the cases has adopted

or proposed to adopt a package of effective governmental actions

to assist a new transit system in creating preferred land use

patterns for the entire region.

The following examples cover a representative set of

experiences:

Atlanta. In Atlanta the rail system conceived by the

‘1 planning organization during the 1960s was

part of an overall metropolitan growth plan, but no

practical means of shaping the land uses accompanied it.

In March 1968, before the first referendum, a study

entitled Impacts of Rapid Transit on Metropolitan Atlanta

was done for the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning

Commission (MPC’s successor). It covered land use impacts,

effect on community facilities, social impacts and

relocation. It also laid out methods for coordinating

urban renewal and transit station development. The report

was not carried out to the letter, but the Metropolitan

Atlanta Regional Transit Authority (MARTA), the Atlanta

Regional Commission, and the City of Atlanta are doing

station area impact studies which are designed to plan and

control the development around the station areas.

.
.-. —.—

-91-

Los Angeles. In Los Angeles, the Southern California

Rapid Transit District’s plans paid little attention to

the Southern California Association of Government’s regional

land use concept during most of the planning period. Recently

SCRTD has shown some recognition of the relationship, but

there has been no evidence of any mechanisms to implement

SCAG’s plans as part of the transit implementation program.

CACORT (a blue-ribbon community involvement process) raised

the issue of joint development at transit station areas

because it had not been built into SCRTD’s Phase 111 plan.

Boston. In Boston, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority (MBTA) and the Metropolitan Area planning council

(MAPC) have produced generally compatible plans and

proposals over the years, reflecting the traditional

interlocking relationship between these two agencies. At

the project scale, the experience in the Boston area has

been mixed. Quincy Center is a good example of joint

development that has been implemented pursuant to state

legislation with the aid and encouragement of local officials.

Developers have responded and a major public parking facility

at the station is well utilized. At Wellington Station, by

contrast, the MBTA designed a railyard/maintenance facility

in the heart of an otherwise excellent, publicly owned

development site.

San Francisco. In the San Francisco Bay Area, despite the

excellent work in developing a regional land use concept plan

as part of the original BART system planning, the implementation

of the plan has been characterized by a number of missed

opportunities for joint development, one major clash (with

Berkeley), and several lesser ones. Significant instances

of coordinated development ultimately have been achieved (e.g.

at Embarcadero Station, along Market Street, and in downtown

Oakland) and subsequent corridor extension studies have been

well coordinated with local planning.

Discussion. In summary, successful implementation plans depend on

workable financing plans, construction schedules, and development controls. Most recent successful financing referendums

have been closely tied to short-term transit improvements. The

necessity of achieving areawide support at the polls has

encouraged the development of large systems that are to be

implemented in one long-term construction effort. Staging of

system implementation has been largely in response to UMTA

policy. Although all of the new transit systems claim significant land use benefits, none of the systems has been presented

as part of a package of governmental actions that would assure

achievement of these land use goals.
CHAPTER 5

FINANCING FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION

The influence of financing mechanisms on transit decisionmaking

is profound and cuts across the two major categories of investigation (institutional context and technical planning work) in this

assessment. For this reason, discussions of financing issues appear

in several places in the report. This chapter was written to consider

the subject in the depth it deserves.

The chapter focuses on the impact of the Federal program for

transit support. The amount of funds that has been available, the

purposes for which their use has been authorized, and the means by

which they have been allocated all have contributed to shaping the

transit planning and decisionmaking process on the regional and local

level. The availability of aid from the state and the mechanisms

for raising local funds also have had important influences and will

be discussed.

One of the central issues has involved UMTA’s attempts to develop

a fair allocation procedure for distributing funds. As of 1974 a

portion of the transit program has been allocated by formula, a set

amount to each metropolitan area. However, the bulk of the money

is “discretionary;” that is, it is distributed to applicants at the

discretion of the UMTA administrator.

Fair distribution has been a concern at least since 1970.

In order to gain broad support for the new UMTA bill being debated

(and later approved) that year, a limitation on the amount that could

be spent within any state was proposed at 12 1/2% of the total funds

obligated. 1/ This provision offset concern that the New York metropolitan area or a handful of the largest rail systems would be

granted most of the funds. 2/

The debate intensified with passage of the 1973 Federal-aid

Highway Act. Perhaps the greatest immediate importance of this act

was to virtually guarantee strong competition among urban areas

for the available funds by substantially increasing the leverage

of a local matching dollar. Until this time UMTA had been able to

provide all funds for projects that met the rather moderate grant

duplication requirements .

1/ It became Section 12 of the 1964 Act. Later legislation permitted

an additional 2 1⁄2% under certain conditions.

2/ Federal Transit Subsidies, the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Program, George W. Hilton, th e American Enterprise Institute for Publ ic Policy Research, June, 1974, p. 8.
..-

-93-

During the past two- years, UMTA-has been examining an- approach

for allocating its now-scarce funds that would involve establishing

criteria to be used in judging the relative merits of grant applications. The recently. published policy for transit investments

is the first published product of its investigations . 

1

/ Although

the policy sets forth conditions that applicants must meet before

they will be eligible for Federal assistance, it stops short of

proposing criteria for apportioning a limited amount of money to

several equally deserving applicants.

The need for stable, predictable funding levels and related

issues are discussed in greater detail in later sections of this

chapter. The next section describes the general guidelines that

were established to guide the metropolitan case assessments; it is

followed by a discussion of the metropolitan experience and, finally,

by a summary of conclusions and lessons learned.

GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR METROPOLITAN ASSESSMENT

The financing issues affecting the nine case cities were

identified with the aid of a number of general guidelines for assessment. These guidelines were based on interpretation of Federal policy

as stated in the law, interpretation of common state and local objectives, and an evaluation of the evolution and current status of

transit finance. A summary of the Federal financing program is

followed by a description of the guidelines.

Federal Transit Financing Programs

The purpose of this section is to summarize the financing

mechanisms used to implement the Federal urban mass transportation

program. Chapter 2 provides a detailed account of the evolution of

the program.

Capital assistance. The first Federal capital aid for transit was

provided in the form of capital loans through the Housing Act of

1961. The Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (PL 88-365) authorized the first Federal matching grants for local transit capital

improvements. Typically these funds have paid for public takeover

of private transit companies, for acquisition of new bus or rail

transit rolling stock, and for construction of new transit systems

and supporting facilities.

1/— UMTA, “Proposed Policy for Major Urban Mass Transportation

Investments,” op. cit.
-94 -

.

Until 1973, the Federal share of capital grants was two-thirds

of the total project cost. In 1973, the ratio was changed to 4-1,

with the Federal Government providing 80% of the total.

Funding levels in the capital assistance program have increased

since the initial legislation was passed. From 1965 to 1967, $375

million was made available. Amendments in 1966, 1968, and 1969

raised the authorizations by $790 million and extended them through

fiscal year 1971. In 1970, Congress amended the Urban Mass Transportation Act again, this time authorizing $3.1 billion for a longrange capital program. Table 6 shows the total Federal transit support

to all transit systems in the nine case areas between 1962 and May, 1975

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 provided $3.1 billion in

new authority for transit capital grants, along with the option to

use $800 million of highway urban systems money and to exchange

allocations for unbuilt urban interstate highway segments for

transit projects. In 1974, $4.825 billion new authority was provided

by the National Mass Transportation Assistance Act. In addition,

that act authorized $3.975 billion for a new formula grant program

whose allocations could be used both for capital programs and to

pay operating costs. The capital grant program is administered

on a discretionary basis.

Technical assistance. The first Federal aid specifically earmarked

for transit technical studies, which were defined to include system

engineering and design, was authorized by the UMTA amendments of

1966 (PL-562). Since 1961, transit planning had been one of the

half-dozen urban planning activities supported under the "Section

701” housing program. The 1966 legislation, however, shifted transit planning to UMTA, and further authorizations for the technical

studies have been provided in all subsequent UMTA legislation.

Technical studies grants have been administered on a discretionary

basis.

Guidelines for Metropolitan Evaluation

In order to guide the assessment, a set of guidelines

was formulated. These guidelines reflect Federal, state, and

local policy as well as informed professional judgment. 1

/

These guidelines provide a framework for focusing the assessment on key financing issues.

1/ One of the major sources for these guidelines was a set of

"Criteria for a Desirable Financing Mechanism," contained in

A Study of Urban Mass Transportation Needs and Financing, U.S.

DOT, July 1974, p. VI-42.
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41

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-96-

The four guidelines for assessing the financial questions

L are:

Financinq policy should support national, regional, and local

goals. Financing mechanisms should allow development of transit

systems that advance current Federal policy for preserving

existing transit systems and revitalizing them to provide

efficient, economic, and convenient transportation; for providing

moderate fare service to increase the mobility of transit-dependent

persons; and for attracting new riders regardless of their social

or economic status or the purpose of travel. At the same time,

the financing arrangements should allow equal responsiveness to

local and regional goals for influencing and supporting desired

development patterns, improving environmental conditions, and

other objectives.

Financinq mechanisms should provide a stable and predictable

source of funds. This stability should extend to sources of

funds to pay operating costs as well as capital needs, and to

Federal financing policy as well as to means for raising the

local matching share.

Financing mechanisms should encouraqe a balance between shortterm and long-ranqe planning and an unbiased choice of mode

technology The financing approach should not force rigid

commitment to a fixed long-range plan but should allow attention to near-term improvements and an incremental approach to

development. They should provide equal access to support for

operating needs and low-capital improvements as for conventional

capital-intensive systems. They should encourage development

of local short-haul, community-level transit service as well as

line-haul systems. The financing mechanisms should avoid

stimulating competition among grant applicants.

Financinq mechanisms should avoid creating unnecessary administrative delays. Policies for administering transit funds should

be developed that streamline the grant application review process and minimize the need for bureaucrats to make technological

decisions.

METROPOLITAN EXPERIENCE

This section summarizes the impact of the procedures that

were available to finance transit programs in the nine case

metropolitan areas. The information is subdivided into categories corresponding to the guidelines used in assessing the

metropolitan experience and described in the preceding section.
—. .

-97-

Ability to support National, Regional, and Local Goals

National qoals. The policies and arrangements for distributing

Federal transit funds have had (or possess the potential to have)

different degrees of success in meeting national objectives

for preserving and revitalizing existing transit systems,

minimizing fares to benefit the transit-dependent, and attracting

new riders. However, the absence of operational criteria for

measuring “success” makes judgment about these matters difficult.

The objective of revitalizing existing systems to provide

more efficient, economical, and convenient service and the

objective of attracting additional riders are generally recognized in planning reports at the Federal (and local) levels.

However, there are no guidelines for how to evaluate alternative plans or technologies at the local level, or how to allocate

funds at the Federal level in ways that will meet those objectives.

Although the Federal transit program has recognized the

mobility problems of disadvantaged groups for a number of years,

keeping moderate fares for the benefit of lower-income groups

did not become an explicit legislative goal until 1974. The

National Mass Transportation Assistance Act provides (for the

first time) Federal operating assistance, which will help

localities subsidize low fares, and it requires localities

to set fares for elderly and handicapped at one-half of

regular levels during nonpeak hours. 1

/ Until this time funds

had been available for capital investment only, and every effort

(including raising fares) had to be made to maximize farebox

revenues. This situation tended to put lower-income groups at

a disadvantage. 2/

However, the new act does not guarantee maximum relief.

Under the new funding program about three-fourths of the

funding is still committed to capital investment, and there

are no explicit criteria or incentives for keeping fares at

a moderate level. Continuing inflation, particularly in labor

—

1 / Section 103(a) of the National Mass Transportation Assistance

Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-503), which was added to the UMTA Act

of 1966 as Section 5m.

2/ During the period 1949 to 1970, transit fares rose at a rate

that was 3% per year faster than the consumer price index,

according to A Study of Urban Mass Transportation Needs and

Financing, op. cit., p. I-9. Hilton (op. Cit., pp. 55 56

and III) present several arguments and some evidence for how

the UMTA program has tended to inflate costs of transit

services.
-98-

costs, can be expected to cause renewed pressures for increases

in transit fares unless policies on fare increases are restrained

to a greater extent than at present.

Local and regional goals. Financing mechanisms for both

Federal and local shares significantly limit the ability of

local governments to use transit as a means for achieving

land use and development objectives. UMTA’s main contribution in this regard has been to channel transit system planning

funds through the regional planning agencies. This step indeed

has led to "coordination" on the local level between transit

system planning and regional comprehensive planning. But this

kind of coordination has not been adequate to assure that

development will occur where planners want it to occur, in

the vicinity of transit stations or corridors.

One of the main causes of this problem is the type of

funding mechanism used to raise the local share. Typically,

the local share is provided by bond issues or specially

earmarked taxes, for which public approval must be gained in

a referendum. In order to show the voters what they are being

asked to buy, the plan put before them usually is well defined

in terms of routes, grade, and station location. Costs are

estimated on the basis of the specific system plan, allowing

for inflation and contingencies. However, due in part to the

desire to keep costs as low as possible -- and maximize the

chance for voter approval -- the estimates do not provide for

many of the costly activities that are necessary to take full

advantage of development opportunities, if they exist.

For example, one of the major lessons of the BART

experiment, and one that has not been exphasized in most of

the reviews of the history of BART, is that the long-term

large-scale bond issue financing of a highly specific rail

transit system tended to create strong incentives for the implementing agency to miss opportunities for coordinated development planning because of the necessity to adhere to a predetermined

tight budget and time schedule.

Thus, the plans approved in referenda typically do not

provide for assembly of land in vicinity of stations; design

work other than for stations and transit facilities; or development of detailed land use plans for sites around stations.

Neither do they deal with formation of development mechanisms

for sites (such as special districts, other development finance

mechanisms, quasi-public development corporations) , the need

to work with communities to evaluate and select from among

different design configurations, or the desirability of negotiating with local governments to work out arrangements for

development of associated community facilities.
.

- 99-

Needless to say, the plans also fail to take into account

the time delays that would be required to undertake these activities. Because the need for such activities is not generally

recognized until after funding is fixed, the transit agency

and its consultants tend to find themselves pressured into

a crash program to design and build in an inflexible manner

with minimal coordination with local government and potential

developers.

Another cause of the inadequate coordination between

transit and land use planning is the lack of statutory authority

that might allow either transit agencies or metropolitan

planning agencies to control where development should or should

not occur. This issue, which is less directly related to

financing mechanisms, is also discussed in earlier chapters.

Stable and Predictable Sources of Funding

An effective transit program level requires a steady and

predictable flow of funds for planning, capital development

and operating purposes. However, the experience since World

War II in the transit field indicates that funds have frequently

not been available when or in the amounts needed. Inadequacies

in both the Federal program and the financing mechanisms

available at the local level have contributed to this problem.

Federal funding policy. A number of transit agencies in the

case metropolitan areas have been faced with changing UMTA

policies and uncertain levels of funding. Without some degree

of certainty about the amount of funds and when they will be

available, localities have a difficult time planning transit

systems, gaining local public financial support for them, and

realistically staging their development.

The charge is commonly made in conversations that UMTA

went around the country promoting the planning of big systems
-1oo-

.

and promising that they would be funded without providing

any realistic appraisal of what the long-term fair share for

any metropolitan area might be. Regardless of the merits

of this charge, in recent years UMTA has backed off from

previous support in several areas and called for more studies,

prior to commiting support for construction.

The complaint that UMTA has been causing unnecessary restudy is reinforced by a fear on the part of some local officials that UMTA has developed an overly negative and unjustified

attitude toward rail rapid transit. This fear has been based

in part on the fact that UMTA has backed away from commitments

to new fixed guideway systems in Los Angeles, Denver and elsewhere, and because of the tone of many reports, speeches, and

private conversations, particularly during 1974.

Although UMTA may have had legitimate grounds for this

kind of action in certain cases 

1

/ some major local transit

officials feel that UMTA’s shift has been too great and may

be damaging to public transportation as a whole. They urge

UMTA to implement the new planning requirements embodying the

shift in policy in such a way that they do not delay local

support.

Seattle. Several persons interviewed in the Seattle area

felt that the lack of any specific level of Federal commitment

to assist in financing the proposed rail plan was a significant

reason for lack of support in the bond issues that failed in

1968 and 1970.

It is not suprising to many that UMTA has had a shift in

its thinking regarding rail transit. The attitude toward

rail transit that existed in UMTA and within the transportation planning community as a whole a few years ago was

overwhelmingly positive. Since then, inflation in the

costs of systems under development has been dramatic.

The costs of some proposed new systems have been so great

that they have threatened to swamp UMTA’s budget. Several

studies completed over the last few years also have influenced UMTA’

into question

rapid transit

s policy. Some studies have tended to call

the cost-effectiveness of conventional rail

(as compared with other medium capacity

transit systems) under a wide variety of conditions

commonly encountered in major urban corridors where such

systems have been planned. Other studies have shown that

some rail system investments tend to result in a negative

income redistribution -- i.e. that upper-middle income

suburbanites tend to receive more net benefit than others

from some of these projects.
-101-

Los Angeles. The fact that UMTA administrator Frank

Herringer had made statements in Los Angeles questioning the

justification for the extensive rail system plan is cited as

a factor underming support at the polls in 1974. Similarly,

uncertainty over Federal support was a factor in the 1968

plan’s defeat. Prior to the last vote, UMTA made it clear

publicly that it would not commit itself to fund the full

system. This announcement probably helped encourage other

critics of the 1974 plan and sent SCRTD back to the drawing

board.

Denver. In Denver, local officials believed that UMTA was

supportive of PRT and a large capital-intensive system in

general. This provided confidence to go to the voters in

September 1973 and win approval of financing for both a shortrange bus improvement program and a long-range fixed-guideway

system. Subsequently, confidence was set back by UMTA’s

unwillingness to consider supporting the plan until

more analysis of alternatives had been completed.

Washington, D.C. In the Washington, D.C., area, there

has been much confusion over the Federal responsibilities

 regarding the financing of cost increases in the approved 98-

mile rail system. The resolution depends on the outcome of a

political process that bears no real relationship to any measure

of the area’s needs or its fair share of a national program.

Boston. In Boston, UMTA has called for study of additional

alternatives in the southwest corridor and for additional impact analyses in the northwest corridor, while local and state

officials feel they have built the required support for these

projects and have satisfied all Federal requirements under a

reasonable interpretation of the law and regulations. They

argue that both of these and perhaps other projects have received sufficient study under previous planning studies funded

by UMTA, and that therefore the projects should move forward

to implementation without further delay.

Atlanta. Atlanta has reported a similar experience.

Local planners feel inordinate delays have been caused by procedures in the environmental impact statement process. Furthermore, UMTA has committed itself to finance only the initial 13

miles of the rail system under current financing authority,

although Atlanta and Georgia state officials insist that former

DOT Secretary John Volpe had pledged full Federal aid for the

entire system. .

Local share. Another major attribute of the funding stability

issue involves the availability of local matching funds. Some

metropolitan areas have been required to obtain the approval

of 60% of the electorate on bond issues in order to provide

large-scale funding for new rail systems. These include
—. —.. ———. - —..

-102-

Seattle (1968 and 1970), Los Angeles (1968),

(1962 ) . The last-named case may be the only

and San Francisco

example where

a metropolitan-level vote with this much support (61%)

has been obtained. (This vote occurred under the most favorable

circumstances in many important respects.)

Stability of funds required to plan and program effectively has been best achieved when the localities do not have

to rely primarily on local taxing powers and particularly

on the property tax. One means for avoiding these requirements is to provide greater levels of state support. The

examples of state financing mechanisms cited below vary

widely as to the proportion of transit costs covered:

on

in

of

California. In California, part of the state sales tax

gasoline is—being used for transit development purposes

several urban areas under one of the most important pieces

state legislation in the transit field in recent years.

In addition, the state has given San Francisco’s BART

the authority to use bridge toll facility funds for the BART

transbay tube. The area still has had to rely primarily on

local taxes, however, for the vast majority of BART’s construction. Additional examples of diversion of bridge tolls

to transit are Philadelphia (PATCO) and New York (PATH) , where

interstate compact agreements established port authorities

‘for this purpose.

Maryland. In Maryland, state gas taxes and other fees

are earmarked for a general purpose transportation fund, which

is being used to finance part of the Maryland portion of the

Washington, D.C., system as well as the entire local matching

share of the Phase I Baltimore rail system.

Massachusetts. In Massachusetts, both debt service and,

more recently, general operating deficits have been subsidized

by the state’s general fund. However, the operating deficits

subsidy is currently on an annual basis, which detracts

from the funding stability objective.

Minnesota. In Minnesota, the state legislature has been

asked by the governor to enact a two-year, $9 million appropriation for transit operating subsidies statewide in which

a total of $6 million over the two-year period would be used

by the Twin Cities Metropolitan Transit Commission. In addition the governor has proposed a $100 million bond issue

to be backed by state general revenue bonds for initial construction of the selected fixed-guideway system. Evidence for

the legislature’s acknowledgment Of the need for direct state

assistance in the Twin Cities area is provided by its direct

involvement in the ongoing transit alternatives study and the

serious consideration it is giving to the governor’s proposals.
-- —.

-103-

Discussion. In general only state and Federal governments

have the power to levy taxes that meet several of the criteria

necessary for sound transit financing. Localities tend to

have authority over only such revenue sources as property

taxes, sales taxes, and various licensing fees. These sources

are often inadequate for major transit development purposes

for a variety of reasons including their regressive character;

lack of public acceptance; prior commitment of the tax to

its limit for other purposes; and the limited amounts that

can be obtained from the sources in question.

The Federal-aid highway program has always been considered

a prime example of a successful program from a standpoint of

stability of funding. The earmarking of fuel and other taxes

to a trust fund at the Federal level over a long period is

a major part of this success of course, but the long-term

commitment of gasoline taxes, licensing fees, and other highway

user taxes to the program at the state level is also a major

part of its effectiveness. The success of the highway program

leads one to the conclusion that funding stability would be

enhanced if more states could be persuaded to provide a tax

base for support of transit in urban areas.

Long-Range, Regional Planning Versus Short-Term, Local

Responsiveness

Whereas long range planning is essential to achieving

a rational and effective transportation system, some aspects

of the current Federal funding mechanism may have encouraged

too early a commitment to a fixed plan. In many metropolitan

areas uncertainty about levels of UMTA funding, and the need

to secure local funding through regional referenda on bond

issues have forced transit authorities to commit themselves

to long-range plans for overly extensive regional systems.

Part of this tendency has to do with the necessity of providing

the same technology and service to all the voters in the region

and part of it has to do with trying to make sure that the

locality gets its "fair share" of Federal funds. UMTA’s

discretionary grant approval process may foster this kind

of competition.

Overly extensive plans. As has been noted, bond issue finance

mechanisms in metropolitan areas have tended to force a rigid

commitment of the transit development agency to a fixed longrange plan. In general, any metropolitan-level vote tends -

to overextend the commitment to a long-term plan.

San Francisco. In the case of San Francisco, commitments

to extend the BART system in several directions beyond the -

limits of the system authorized in the 1962 election were

made during the campaign and are still having a substantial

effect on the planning-process.
-104-

Seattle, Los Angeles. In these and other metropolitan

areas, political considerations and the need to get a victory at the polls resulted in transit plans that had greater

track mileage than would probably be justified by any rational

investment criteria. (The most recent vote in Los Angeles,

however, may not have forced a commitment to such a very

rigidly fixed system as most previous referenda, partly

because it was not a bond issue.)

Often the problem is that referenda must occur on a countywide basis. If the county boundaries form a rational relationship with possible configurations of a regional transit

system, then a local option as to joining or staying out of

participation in a bond issue may be a sound basis for

adoption of a long-range plan. This can be argued in the .

San Francisco region in the case of the decision by Marin

and San Mateo counties to stay out of the original BART bond

referendum; and also in the case of the decision by Cobb and

Gwinnett counties in the Atlanta area not to participate in

MARTA. -

The Los Angeles example can be used to illustrate a

fairly typical process that occurs in putting together a

financing plan for a referendum. Although it is hard to pin

down precise causes, it appears that a logrolling effort led

SCRTD to opt for a very extensive system. The real support

for the system was in the City of Los Angeles; and the fact

that it was extended farther out into the county caused its

defeat. The role that the County Board of Supervisors and

municipal officials in the rest of the county played is not

entirely clear, but it can be surmised that they negotiated

for a more extensive system. The process became a vicious

circle in which the more SCRTD had to extend the system into

suburban areas to get the officials’ support, the more it

had to depend on potentially nonsupportive voters.

Distortion in the choice of technology. The mere lack of

widespread knowledge and understanding regarding the variety

of different transit technologies available and the ways in

which each can best be used within a given metropolitan area

also has tended to encourage commitment to a single regional

rail technology and hence a fixed long-term plan . 

1/ When a

nation grows very unsophisticated in a field as a result of

long neglect, a danger arises that such long-term single-minded

1/ The awareness of the variety of options that exist has

been aided by preferential bus experiments, the development

of light rail transit and personal rapid transit systems,

and by innovative mixing of different technologies in

Toronto and in many European cities. (See Vukan Vuchic,

“Rail Transit: Characteristics, Innovations and Trends,”

paper presented at 1975 Transportation Research Board

Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C.)
——

-105-

.

planning will become the norm in an all-out effort to catch

up and get ahead (not unlike the commitment to the interstate

highway system after more than a decade of neglect of the

highway system) .

There can be little doubt that the availability of Federal

funds for capital improvements only has created a bias in local

decisionmaking in favor of heavy rail rapid transit systems or

other fully grade-separated fixed-guideway systems. The availability of secure, long-term funding for highways has created a

similar bias toward highways over transit, although the funding

flexibility provisions in the 1973 Federal-aid Highway Act may

help right the balance.

Very few examples exist of serious efforts to search for

ways in which transit systems with lower capital costs (e.g.

light rail transit, conventional bus or trolley or partially

grade-separated bus systems) might suffice when transit

planning agencies believed that funding might be obtainable

for the more costly option. In addition, transit planners

have tended to prefer capital-intensive rapid rail to commuter

rail, which involves primarily operating expenses, partly because of the unavailability of operating assistance.

The main reason lower-cost options were ignored in the

past was a belief (without much supporting factual evidence)

that the more capital-intensive systems have lower operating

costs per passenger. This assumption generally has held true

for comparisons of conventional bus and rail transit systems,

when each system had roughly comparable and fairly high load

factors, because rail systems need fewer operators per passenger.

However, when passenger volumes are moderate, and under certain

other conditions, bus systems can have lower operating costs.

In a similar vein, newer technology systems have been expected

to reduce operating costs due to automation, but the need for

higher maintenance costs and higher salaried staff are likely

to offset or even exceed these reductions under a wide range

of circumstances.

The tendency of the program to bias the choice of technology

can be expected to change significantly in the near future with

(1) the availability of about a quarter of the Federal UMTA funds

for operating subsidies, (2) growing awareness that less capitalintensive transit systems can have lower operating costs per

passenger under a wide variety of conditions, and (3) growing

awareness that operating subsidy requirements are probably going

to become more of a limiting factor than capital costs in determining how much transit service a metropolitan area can, and

wants to, support.
-106-

Local versus regional needs. One of the related concerns that

has begun to develop, particularly in the San Francisco and

Los Angeles areas, is that the focus on metropolitanwide

transit issues tends to work toward the disadvantage of local

or community transit service. The Federal program has strongly

emphasized regional-level planning in recent years, and this,

in tandem with the bias toward capital intensive systems, has

resulted in focusing attention on the trunk system serving

major long-haul commuter movements. Only in Minneapolis-St.

Paul and perhaps one other metropolitan area (Cleveland) has

there been a major effort as part of an areawide transit study

to develop plans for satisfying local, short-haul, communitylevel transit service oriented to the transit-dependent

population. 1

/

There seems to be increasing awareness of the pitfalls of

premature commitment to extensive long-term plans and a trend

toward an emphasis on short-range programming. UMTA is now

encouraging an “incremental” approach in its proposed transit

investment policy. The incremental philosophy was strongly

articulated and adopted in the Boston Transportation Planning

Review in 1970, which itself was influenced by reaction to

excessively rigid long-term planning. Los Angeles took steps

to shift to a more incremental approach after the 1974 election

loss.

By no means are all welcoming the change of focus. Many

. major transit authorities are still growing in power and independence and are oriented primarily to long-term regional

planning. There has been a fairly common tendency for regional

transit operators in large, all-bus system areas to downplay

short-term improvements in favor of more appealing long-range

fixed-guideway system planning. 2

/

Thus, even as the program changes under the 1974 law,

and as new UMTA guidelines requiring analysis of alternative

types of systems are implemented, there is still the danger

that this analysis will continue to focus on regional, longhaul, trunk-line transit service. This is true partly because

it is the primary type of transit service for which there are

theoretically large potential diversions from automobiles, and

finally because it is the type of service for which there is a

potential choice of transit technology.

1/ Alan M. Voorhees & Associates, Inc., Ten-Year Transit Development Program, Five-County Transit Study, Cleveland Metropolitan

Area, August, 1974; and System Design Concepts, Inc., CommunityOriented Transit Services for the Transit-Dependent Population. *

Cleveland Metropolitan Area, February, 1974.

.

~/ Boston Transportation Planning Review Study Design, Prepared by

System Design Concepts, Inc. for Boston Transportation Planning

Review Steering Committee and Governor Francis Sargeant, 1970.
— . . . —

-107-

Competition for qrant applications. The national program’s

discretionary grant approval process has had the effect of

encouraging many metropolitan areas to compete with each other

in preparing and submitting plans for larger rail systems in

order to obtain "their share" of the funds. This competition

tends to build a metropolitan commitment to a very expensive

and fixed long-term plan. The 1973 increase in the Federal

share from two-thirds to 80% increased the incentive

for this type of competition.

Not surprisingly, competition for UMTA grants has grown

as the size of the program increased, as the first rounds of

major planning studies were completed and metropolitan areas

began trying to implement plans. Consequently, the political

pressures on UMTA have grown at a time when most people in

the field, including UMTA staff, are increasingly convinced

that grant decisions should respond to rational criteria based

on relative metropolitan needs.

Discussion. The need to strike a balance between long-term

regional scale, capital-intensive systems and shorter-term,

less costly improvements, perhaps for subregional areas, is

clear. For there is danger in both extremes. Long-range

planning should continue to shape transit development, but

more attention should be devoted to near-term improvements,

integration with local transportation and land development

planning, staging of development, and the maintaining of

flexibility for future decisions, including potential technological developments.

In achieving this objective, it

will be necessary to avoid shifting policy too much in the

direction of short-term responsiveness to local needs or the

result will be that either (a) nothing gets accomplished,

or (b) that limited resources are squandered on ineffective

improvements spread all over the map. Some rational planning

criteria must guide programming of improvements to a greater

extent than they have in the past in the expanded UMTA program

or either of these extremes is likely to prevail in any given

metropolitan area, depending on the local political, institutional, and financial circumstances.

In the end, new financing arrangements have a great

potential to achieve the proper balance as well as diminish

competition for Federal funds. Movement in the direction of

stability of funding under some type of allocation formula

would tend to avoid some of the problems that have tipped the

scales to favor long-range plans.
I -. .—— -—- - - - .— - -

. — — . --

/

Administrative Delays

The staff of almost all of the transit planning and

agencies surveyed complain about the amount of time that

UMTA to approve grants contracts or amendments.

operating

it takes

Technological judgments. As the funding is now structured, the

amount of funds allocated to a metropolitan area is heavily

dependent on the choice of technology for trunk line systems, and

UMTA staff have been placed in the position of making the judgments

as to which type of technology is "best". This requirements may

have the effect of forcing UMTA to require, and to overemphasize,

narrowly defined cost-effectiveness analysis as the basis for

allocations for funds. UMTA staff thus is put in the position of

making technological assessments in every major corridor of every

metropolitan area.

The problem of

aspects:

UMTA is too

program administration seems to have several

centralized; field officials don’t have

enough authorization to act; many decisions take too long

because they have to go back to Washington, D.C.

The staff is small relative to the size of the program;

the paperwork often exceeds the capacity of the staff to

handle it. If UMTA is to assess relatively minor local

transportation planning matters, as it seeks to do under

current administrative procedures for the discretionary

grant program, the staffing level is inadequate.

The program is still basically managed on project-by-project basis rather than on a continuing program basis, although UMTA has moved in the latter direction. This

approach necessitates close attention to relatively minor

program decisions and thus increases the work load for

the UMTA staff.

Complaints are made that UMTA follows an equally rigorous

administrative process to grant requests (e.g. routine

bus purchases and small planning studies) as it does for

applications for major new systems.

I

.

.

.
—— . . .

-109-

}

Denver. Within a matter of days after the Denver Regional

Transportation District (RTD) was officially established, a capital grant application was submitted by RTD to UMTA for an early

action bus program (purchase of 93 buses) . Almost one year later

UMTA finally approved the request without any public explanation

of the reasons for the long delay. In another instances, RTD

requested an UMTA technical study grant in April 1974, intending

to begin the project in July 1974. Staff claim that as of spring

1975, Denver had received no word from UMTA about the request

made almost one year earlier. On one occasion, an RTD inquiry

to the UMTA Washington office concerning this request reportedly

resulted in identifying a problem with the request that was solved

within a matter of minutes over the telephone.

.—

Emergency needs. The UMTA program generally is perceived as having

been successful in responding to the emergency needs of communities

to save failing private systems. 1

/ However, one cause of unnecessary

delay in responding to emergency needs in some small metropolitan

areas is that requirements for areawide planning written into the

law are oriented to larger metropolitan areas. An amendment could

be enacted to make it possible for UMTA to waive these requirements

in emergency circumstances. There is no important reason to delay

aid to a small metropolitan area that has a failing private operator in situations where no previous need has existed to develop

areawide transit plans and programs.

In summary, UMTA's discretionary grant program nd the procedures a 

under which it has been administered, have combined to hamper

the transit planning process in a number of ways. Mechanisms

typically used to provide the local share also have tended

to distort decisionmaking.

1/ Hilton noted, as has been mentioned, that 49 cities had systems

preserved between 1965 and 1973. Hilton notes that unfortunate.

ly UMTA has no estimate of the amount of funds used for these

public takeovers (Hilton,@. cit., p. 53).
.

t

PART III

NATIONAL POLICY FOR MASS TRANSIT

.
— .

Part III

NATIONAL POLICY FOR MASS TRANSIT

The assessment of community planning for mass transit identified a number of factors that have interfered with sound planning.

Up to this point, the report has examined the way these factors

have operated on the metropolitan level. The role of Federal

policy has been reported only insofar as it influenced the metropolitan experience.

This part of the report considers how policy changes at the

national level might remove some of the obstacles to a sound transit planning process. It is not an evaluation or assessment of the

Federal program per se, because that would have required far more

attention to the legislative process in Congress and the process

of administration within the executive branch than has been possible

in this study. Instead, this part of the report summarizes the issues

that were raised in the metropolitan cases --and potential remedies

for them-- as they appear from a national perspective.

One aspect of Federal policy is treated in relatively greater

depth here. The goals, or formal objectives, of Federal policy

potentially can exert a powerful influence on the metropolitan

planning process. This potential, which to date has not been

effectively employed, is examined in both the following chapters.

Chapter 6 summarizes the major national issues confronting

transit planning, discussing their implications for public policy,

and describes Federal policy dealing with national goals and objectives. Chapter 7 discusses alternative courses for changing

public policy to address the issues and encourage improvements in

the transit planning process. Chapter 8 provides a brief summary

of the study’s major findings.

.
CHAPTER 6

MAJOR NATIONAL POLICY ISSUES

The nine metropolitan areas subjected to assessment in this

study conducted major transit system planning studies at various

times over the past 25 years. Changes in the Federal program, in

professional planning theory, and in the general climate of public

concern during this period led to numerous differences in the ways

these nine metropolitan areas performed their planning efforts.

Because each metropolitan area faced unique circumstances, no

single planning effort provides a model worthy of emulating in its

entirety. However, the cumulative experience in the nine cases

points to a number of significant issues that should be addressed

by public policy to provide a context in which communities can

plan transit systems best suited to their needs. These issues have

been described in Part II of this report. They are summarized

in this chapter under the three chapter headings used in Part II:

institutional context, technical planning process, and financing.

The description of the issues under each heading is introduced

by a brief account of the Federal policy that has been in effect

. while these issues have arisen. The issues themselves are grouped

in categories corresponding to the guidelines used in assessing the

metropolitan experience. The issues all derive from observations in

the nine metropolitan study areas, as the examples cited in Part II

indicate. Following each group of issues is a discussion of how

Federal policy might address them.

At the conclusion of the sections describing the issues is

a discussion of one major issue for Federal policy that underlies

all of them, which is the need for developing criteria

that can be used to measure progress toward national transit goals.

INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

In spite of efforts by the Federal Government to create a

structure for effective, coordinated regional planning, the context

for transit decisionmaking in all the metropolitan areas examined

falls short of this mark. Several major issues for national policy

remain unresolved.

Since the early 1960s the Federal Government has been

encouraging local governments in urban regions to cooperate

in planning for the future development of their metropolitan

areas. Within the past 15 years several Federal agencies have

introduced requirements calling for existing or newly created

organizations to take on regionwide planning responsibilities.

The regulations were intended to help coordinate among a proliferating number of Federal programs aimed at urban development

of various types and to help counter a trend toward fragmentation

of local governments that was accelerating with the growth of

suburban population and employment during the 1950s.
— . —

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In advance of the Federal requirements, during the 1950s,

local governments in many urban areas began forming metropolitanscale organizations to undertake land use and comprehensive planning. The activities of these- planning agencies and, later, those of

regional councils of government were supported by a succession

of Congressional acts during the 1960s, primarily the several

housing acts. The plans attempted to cover a full range of

urban concerns, at least in broad terms, including land use/

zoning, water supply/sewerage, and aspects of transportation.

With rare exceptions, the comprehensive planning agency was not

responsible for putting any part of the plan into effect.

“Meanwhile, in many areas, Federal requirements led to

creation of other organizations to deal with specific elements

of areawide plans. Following enactment of the Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1962, regional "3-C" agencies were set up to

assure that highway planning was part of a "continuing, comprehensive transportation planning process. . . carried on cooperatively

by state and local governments. In many areas, as local governments

purchased failing private transit operations, new public agencies

were created to plan for and operate mass transit.

By the end of the 1960s, an institutional structure characterized in many cases by overlapping responsibilities, wasteful

competition, and poor coordination had grown up. To a large

extent, this fragmentation resulted from the proliferation of

Federal programs with separate policies and separate administration. These separate programs provided differing amounts of

funds, from different sources, and at different intervals of

time, to agencies at the state, regional, and local levels of

government.

In 1969, the Office of Management and Budget issued

Circular A-95 ~/ in an attempt to clarify the relationships

between the regional agencies responsible for Federal programs.’

This regulation called for designating the region’s comprehensive

planning agency to take on the responsibility for reviewing whether

area projects proposed for Federal capital assistance were consistent with the region’s comprehensive plan. The governing

boards of these "A-95" agencies had to be comprised of local

elected officials or of other officials appointed by elected

officials. The plans reviewed were to be made with extensive

citizen input.

In 1974, responding to the mandate of the Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1973, the U.S. Department of Transportation

moved to strengthen the links between transportation planning

(including transit planning) and other regional planning efforts.

~/ Circular A-95 was the final regulation for implementing

directives contained in the Demonstration Cities and

Metropolitan Development Act of 1966.
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A new regulation, published in final form in September 1975, 1/

required designation of a Metropolitan Planning Organization In

each area to take charge of assembling the requests for Federal

highway and transit assistance into one application, and to

distribute the Federal grants when they were made. Wherever

possible, the A-95 agency was to be designated the Metropolitan

Planning organization to encourage coordination between transportation]

planning and land use planning.

Although the Federal Government has attempted in these ways

to put regional transportation and land use planning on a sound

basis, its efforts have not had great success. The major Federal

policy issues rooted in these institutional inadequacies are

grouped under three categories corresponding to the guidelines

for assessment of the institutional context: forum for decisionmaking, accountability of decisionmakers, and public involvement.

Forum for Decisionmaking

Although on paper the organizational structure of the

decisionmaking forum in each metropolitan area is well defined,

assessment findings show that in practice decisionmaking

authority and responsibility is fragmented among a great number

of local, regional. and state agencies of government.

The separate responsibilities of each of the levels of government

are not clearly enough defined for any one agency to have decisive

authority either for setting policy or for obtaining financing

and other commitments necessary to implement a plan. Experience

shows this kind of fragmentation may lead to the following types

of problems:

• Inability to set priorities and distribute resources.

In the absence of a single lead agency with power to

set and implement policy, competition often develops

over the power to set priorities among the transit

improvement projects proposed for a region. The

pressure of competition can lead to development of

extensive transit plans. While such plans may offer

something for everyone, they tend to be financially

inefficient and to ignore community- or neighborhoodlevel needs (as these needs might be measured by a

well-structured rational set of criteria)

1/ Federal Highway Administration and Urban Mass

Administration, Department of Transportation,

.

Transportation

“Planning

Assistance and Standards: Urban Transportation Planning,”

Federal Register, Vol 40, No. 181, Septemb(~r 17, 1975, pp.

42976-42984.
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●

•

Underemphasis on use of highways for transit. Institutional fragmentation also leads to lack of effective

integration among planning for different transportation

modes. Both transit agencies and highway/street agencies

avoid planning for improvements they do not have the

authority to put into effect. only rarely do institutions

with responsibility for highway and street planning and

management also have responsibility for transit planning

and operations. Due to this situation, important

opportunities have been lost for improving transit

service through highway management techniques.

Ineffective integration of transit planning and land

use planning. The fragmentation of decisionmaking

responsibilities also affects the degree to which

transit plans can be integrated with land use plans.

At present, municipal and county governments jealously

guard- their authority over zoning and other development

controls, and there is no coordinated, comprehensive

development planning on a regionwide basis. In the

absence of strong regional land use planning, the burden

of coordinating transit and land use planning has fallen

to the agency responsible for transit planning. It is

unrealistic to expect a transit agency to control land

use, and no transit agency has effectively done so.

Implications for public policy. The experience in the nine case

metropolitan areas indicates that Federal policy to date has been

unsuccessful in improving the adequacy of the institutional arrangements for metropolitan transit decisionmaking.

The assessment findings provide no indication that Metropolitan

planning organizations will be more successful than previous Federal

attempts to consolidate the institutional context for transit

decisionmaking. The effort to create MPOs ignores the fundamental

reality that numerous agencies with separate legal authority and

responsibility, and separate financing, are already in existence.

Any agency such as an MPO that is superimposed on the existing

structure must have legal authority and responsibility for these

programs and a secure source of financing to implement them (or,

through use of financing incentives, to elicit cooperation among

agencies that do have implementation powers) .

. -

Experience in the metropolitan areas shows several different

approaches that hold potential for eventually becoming effective

transit decisionmaking forums. Increased participation at the
— —-.— .——-—. — ..- . . — -—

-

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state level looks promising in some cases where states have

traditionally been deeply involved in metropolitan affairs; in

at least one case (Minneapolis-St. Paul) a multipurpose regional

organization is making headway; in still other cases, single

purpose transit agencies appear to be more appropriate to provide.

the forum. No single type of decisionmaking forum would appear

likely to succeed in every metropolitan area, due to the wide

variety of governmental structures that exist in different areas.

Based on a review of the variety of decisionmaking arrangements in the nine metropolitan areas, four alternative models

have been developed for how decisionmaking authority might be

effectively distributed. The decisionmaking forums in the nine

metropolitan areas have been evolving in these four directions,

although none have achieved the ideal conditions represented

by the four models.

The four alternative models identify the division of

decisionmaking responsibilities among (1) the metropolitan

planning agency, (2) the state, (3) the metropolitan transit

operating agency, and (4) city and county governments. Within

each alternative scheme, an agency at one of these levels of

government would be delegated the lead decisionmaking role,

and the other three would be given appropriate supporting roles.

Each scheme would provide the principal agency with the necessary

authority and financing powers to carry out its transit responsibilities effectively.

In each of the alternative approaches, the agencies would

be assigned primary or shared responsibility for nine basic

decisionmaking tasks:

● Comprehensive planning

• Long-range regional transportation planning

. Areawide transit planning

. Transit programming and budgeting

● Highway programming and budgeting

● Transit project planning
--- . . . —— .—

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. Transit financing

● Final design, implementation, operation and maintenance

, Development plan implementation and land use controls

(The scope of each of these tasks and the current agencies

responsible for them were outlined in Chapter 3.)

Under each alternative, the lead agency would be exclusively

responsible for transit programming and budgeting, although the

other agencies could contribute advice. Responsibility for the

remaining tasks would be divided among the agencies or shared in

such a way that the lead agency always had principal, or at least

shared, decisionmaking authority for highway programming/budgeting,

areawide transit planning, and transit financing. Table 7

shows the assignment of responsibilities more specifically.

Following is a summary of the circumstances

each of the four models would be appropriate and

extent of the effectiveness of each in providing

for transit planning:

under which

the general

a strong base

• Alternative 1: Strong Local Government Role. A local

government may be appropriate to take the role of lead

transit decisionmaker in regions with a strong central

city or county government that holds jurisdiction over

most of the region’s population. This alternative offers

the advantage of potential close liaison between transit

policy and traffic management/parking policy, the latter

of which usually is the prerogative of local governments.

addition, most local governments also have ultimate

authority over land use policy and urban development

controls, and thus this alternative provides the

opportunity for better coordinated transportation/land

I use policy. The local government would not be able to

raise sufficient financing for its transit projects and

would have to rely on the state. It would need to share

responsibility for certain regionwide projects, such as

comprehensive planning and multimodal transportation

planning, with regional agencies.

In

● Alternative 2: Strong Metropolitan Transit Authority.

In cases in which the metropolitan transit authority

has a representative and politically accountable board

and a good track record for project implementation, it
—— .— - - .— -

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is a candidate for the role of lead decisionmaker.

The advantages of putting the transit authority in the

lead role are twofold: (1) it can make policy decisions

from the perspective of extensive practical knowledge

and experience, and (2) it receives the bulk of transit

financial resources -- operating revenues. It would

have to depend on the state for additional financing.

Because of its single-purpose scope, it would not be

able on its own to improve transit/highway and transportation/land use coordination, except perhaps in a

limited way in the immediate vicinity of transit

stations and corridors.

● Alternative 3: Strong State Role. In states with

strong urban representation and a state department of

transportation with genuinely multimodal structure,

the state might assume the lead decisionmaker function.

The traditional involvement of many states in regional

highway planning and programming provides a precedent

for expanding state participation in multimodal

regional transportation planning and, in turn, transit

programming. The access to state revenue sources would

be another advantage. The state role, however, would

not significantly improve land use,transportation

coordination, because few states have assumed any

responsibilities for local or regional land use.

● Alternative 4: Strong Metropolitan Planning Agency

Role. Placing the metropolitan planning agency in the

role of lead decisionmaker would offer the best

opportunity for genuinely coordinating both transit/

highway decisionmaking and transportation/land use

decisionmaking. For years Federal policy has aimed

at strengthening the role of metropolitan planning

agencies, although with limited success, since only

where metropolitan Planning agencies have been given

additional responsibilities by state governments

do they have sufficient local authority and credibility

for leading transit decisionmakinq.

Whereas the lead agency in each model occupies a different

tier of government, each approach requires more effective

distribution and coordination of responsibilities among the

various governmental levels. In each model, metropolitan

planning agencies would ensure that transit plans are coordinated

with areawide comprehensive planning and regional transportation

planning. The state would become more actively involved by way

of providing financial assistance and coordination with the highway

program. Metropolitan transit authorities would ensure that

proposed capital and operating projects are feasible and would

coordinate them with current operations. Local governments would

coordinate local land use programs and traffic management programs

Preceding page blank
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.

with the planning process. Under each model, variations in

the relative strengths of the three levels of government could

occur.

Each of the models would clarify the respective decisionmaking responsibilities of the various organizations involved.

Each thus would relieve the competition and conflict that were

found to characterize transit decisionmaking in metropolitan

areas and would allow the lead agency to set priorities among

available funds and see that available funds are used most

economically. However, the models differ in the extent to which

they could improve coordination between highway and transit

planning and implementation, on the one hand, and transportation

and land use planning on the other hand.

Depending upon the type of agency that might assume the

lead role, differing degrees of integration between highway and

transit planning and implementation would be made possible.

Joint administration of the Federal transit and highway programs

would be required to permit a multimodal approach at every level

of decisionmaking.

With respect to integration of transit and land use,

fundamental changes in the powers of metropolitan planning

agencies would be necessary before integrated regional land use/

transit programs are likely to be implemented. More modest

additions to the authorities and responsibilities (and financing

resources of transit planning institutions could lead to joint

transit/land use strategies in the immediate vicinity of transit

stations and corridors.

The Federal Government cannot impose any one of these

model structures for a transit decisionmaking forum on a

metropolitan area in the absence of legal changes in the

statutory authorities, responsibilities, and funding capabilities

of the existing institutions that might be necessary at the state

and local levels. To encourage evolution of the regional decisionmaking arrangements in the direction of one of the four models,

the Federal Government alternatively could:

● Make establishing a lead agency with adequate statutory

power, responsibility, and financing, a precondition

for receiving Federal transit support; or devise

financing incentives that provide additional assistance

to regions with adequately structured decisionmaking

forums;

• Develop a policy of providing greatly increased aid to

transit in order to greatly increase transit use, and

channel that aid directly to transit operators, who would

be responsible for programming its use and thus would be

more likely to take on lead decisionmaking responsibilities

Use of transit funds could be broadened to include land in
.——— — .— — .

—.

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●

●

vicinity of stations and corridors, and as long as they

also had sufficient formal authority, transit agencies

could have a greater impact on shaping future land use

and development.

Merge the Federal highway and transit programs at all

levels of government. This could expand the involvement

of the state in metropolitan transit planning and might

encourage more states to take lead decisionmaking roles.

Expand Federal support for regional land use and

development, making the Federal transportation program

a line item in a comprehensive community development

program. This could provide metropolitan planning

agencies with the financing necessary to implement

plans; and if statutory authority were provided through

state and local action, these planning agencies could

assume the lead transit decisionmaking role.

These alternative potential Federal policy initiatives will

be explored more fully in Chapter 7.

Accountability of Decisionmakers

Federal requirements have called for adequate representation

of local governmental officials on the boards of agencies

receiving transit planning funds, and recent regulations have

extended this requirement to cover Metropolitan Planning

Organizations. However, Federal policy has been ineffecitve

in dealing with a range of limitations on accountability that

have been experienced in metropolitan transit planning:

. Closed-door compromising between decisionmakers. Boards

dominated by representatives of special-purpose agencies,

rather than-delegates from local governments, tend to

trade favors in exchange for support. When this negotiation process takes place out of public view, the

decisionmakers cannot be held accountable.

● Domination by consultants. The planning of San Francisco’s

BART and more recent experiences in Other metropolitan areas

raised questions about the appropriate role of consultants

vis-a-vis transit planning agencies. If decisions are

made by the consultant, while board members give rubber

stamp approval, accountability is reduced. Experience in
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.

I

●

.

the case cities indicates that engineering consultants

(1) may be biased toward a particular technology because

they are experienced in it, and (2) may have a vested

interest in producing a plan they would be qualified

to design and construct.

Imbalances in representation. The metropolitan experience

ShOWS there is public interest in structuring boards to

be genuinely representative of their constituencies. One

reflection of this interest is the demand in several

regions to balance suburban and city representation on

the board. In general, the case studies indicate that

the most accountable decisionmakers are those who are

closest to the elective review

F

recess. The move to directly

elect the board members of San rancisco’s Bay Area Rapid

Transit District was another kind of effort to create a

more representative board. (However, although direct election may prove to increase the accountability of the

BARTD board, in general there is a risk that directly

elected board members will be responsive to special interests

and not to their public constituencies.)

Overly parochial concerns of decisionmakers. A problem

related to the question of fair representation involves

the difficulty of structuring a decisionmaking process

to take a broad, regional perspective rather than pursue

a variety of narrowly defined parochial interests.

Negotiations between board members to make sure

each gets his constituency’s "fair share" of transit

improvements can lead to extensive plans that serve

everyone while perhaps failing to focus improvements

where they are needed. This problem is directly related

to the means used to finance transit plans, and resolving

it is as much a question of financing policy as institutional policy.

● Need for legislative oversiqht at the state level.

Experience shows establishment of legislative oversight

committees at the state level can provide an important

degree of accountability, but only a few state legislatures have taken this initiative. Legislative oversight

is appropriate where states created or are helping

finance the agency in question. (In cases where the

state legislature is not actively involved in supporting

a metropolitan transit program, transit opponents

potentially could use the oversight function as a platform

for obstructing progress in transit development; although

the opposite situation is also possible, and the oversight

committee might be used as a platform by reformers.)

Implications for public policy. Formal provisions to allow

public accountability of decisionmakers are the result of statutory

action at the state and local levels. A number of different means

could be used, as long as the decisionmakers are close to the
.-

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elective review process. Given the complex character of the

difficulties that- must be faced in structuring an accountable

decisionmaking process, the main issue for Federal policy is

that no information about the effects of different approaches

has been available.

If key transit decisions are being made at the state level,

the decisionmakers could be high-level gubernatorial appointees,

and thus the governor could be held accountable in direct election.

If local governments take on a key decisionmaking role, the tie

to the electoral process could be equally direct, through the

mayor or elected city or county council. If, on the other hand,

the decisionmaking organization is a regional transit operator

or planning agency, its policy board could be comprised of local

elected or appointed officials whose term in public office is

determined by a public vote.

Distributing the number of representatives on the one man,

one vote principle would create a board that is more truly representative of-a region’s interests than if each jurisdiction, regardless of population, were represented equally.

Transit agencies have sought planning assistance from consultants primarily due to the general lack of trained and experienced personnel that might be hired permanently. In recent years,

however, planning and construction experience in San Francisco,

Washington, D.C., and Atlanta have added somewhat to the nation’s

reservoir of transit planning professionals. Staffing transit

planning agencies with sufficient independent technical expertise

to review and direct consultant activity might be a step toward

reducing opportunities for consultants to dominate. Similarly,

transit agency personnel skilled in day-to-day transit operations

should be encouraged to oversee consultants who are unlikely to

be knowledgeable about critically important transit operations

and management considerations. Where appropriate, state legislative review committees could provide an additional check on the

decisionmaking process on behalf of the public.

In the end, the inability of Federal policy to lead an

adequate decisionmaking forum is at the heart of the accountability

issue. The key to an accountable decisionmaking process is for

the decisionmaking agencies to have clear authority to carry out

their responsibilities. The Federal Government could encourage

accountability in the course of encouraging establishment of a

more clearly defined forum for decisionmaking in the ways

described earlier in this chapter.

By attempting to focus decisionmaking in the Metropolitan

Planning organization and making certain that it has an accountable

board, the Federal Government is not squarely addressing the

accountability issues and, in fact, may be compounding them. If

the public believes decisions are made in one forum when they

really are reached outside that forum, the entire decisionmaking

process tends to occur out of public view and thus is less

accountable than it would be if the public at least knew where

decisions were being reached.
—. .—- . —-— —. -

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Citizen Involvement

Since the mid-1960s, Federal requirements have called for

giving the public the opportunity to be heard in the transit planning process. However, even though public officials increasingly

have come to regard public participation as an integral part of

the planning and design process, only a few programs -- such as

Boston Transportation Planning Review, Denver’s development of its

transportation land use concept in 1972, and the BART extension

studies -- have been structured to solicit citizen participation

from the beginning. Several factors have helped keep planners

from taking adequate approaches to citizen participation:

● preelection of transit technology. Metropolitan

experience indicates that decisionmakers who favor

a particular type of technology or transit system

configuration from the beginning of planning are

unlikely to design citizen participation programs

that are successful in identifying and resolving

disagreements and conflict among members of the

affected community. If citizen participation programs

are regarded as public relations campaigns, there is

a danger that public commitment will be made to a

particular technology without full consideration of

all its potential impacts.

● Unawareness of potential ill-effects of transit.

Experience shows a tendency for the public to assume,

as transit planning begins, that transit systems , unlike

proposed highways, pose no potential serious threats to

their neighborhoods. The assumption can help keep down

the level of participation and range of issues debated

until late in the planning process, after construction

has begun and more citizens become aware the project is

real. Unless the public is given adequate information

from the beginning about all the potentially positive

and negative side effects associated with construction

and operation of a transit system, planners increase

the likelihood that opposition will be voiced later on

in the process, when delay and restudy is more costly.

Processes that consider issues on a subregional basis

rather than systemwide are likely to attract a greater

number of participants.

● Risks incumbent in citizen participation efforts.

Planners may be reluctant to encourage citizen participation because the programs are time consuming and

costly, and if the interests of a small group are

allowed to dominate, they can bias decisionmaking.

Implications for public policy. Citizen participation programs

are a means for collecting data about public values and needs

that are essential for making sound transportation plans. The
- -

.

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main issue for Federal policy is that although Federal guidelines

require citizen participation, they do not provide adequate guidance

for how and when to conduct a-citizen participation program.

There is no one way to conduct a successful citizen participation program, and Federal guidelines cannot be expected to

spell out a magic formula for approaching citizen participation

in a way that will either achieve a high level of participation or

ensure that the resulting plan will be accepted by the public.

However, Federal guidelines could be made more explicit with

respect to the points during the planning process when citizens

might most effectively participate. Planners could be required

to provide the opportunity for input from citizens or to allow

public review at these points in the process, which are discussed

in the next section.

Federal guidelines also could clarify the purpose of

citizen participation programs. Effective programs regard the

information collected in the course of citizen participation

efforts to be an essential aid for decisionmakers, but the

participation program itself is not a substitute for decisionmaking.

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS ISSUES

Since the UMTA program was begun following the Urban Mass

Transportation Act of 1964, Federal requirements have attempted

to guide the conduct of the technical planning process.

Whereas early requirements were limited to identifying the

products of the technical planning effort, Section 4f of the

1966 Department of Transportation Act, much augmented by the

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the Urban Mass

Transportation Assistance Act amendments of 1970, led to

requirement of more specific guidance for conduct of the

planning work. They mandated consideration of a full range of

alternatives in the course of technical planning, identification

of the advantages and disadvantages of each, and provision of

the opportunity for public involvement in the technical process.

The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, followed by the

National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974, 1

/ laid the

groundwork for integrating technical planning of highways and

transit by placing the Federal programs for the two modes under

the same statutory requirement for coordinated urban transportation planning. (This requirement had been articulated first

for urban highway planning, back in the Federal-Aid Highway Act

of 1962.)

The "Proposed Policy for Major Urban Mass Transportation

Investments” published by UMTA in August 1975 (and incorporated

in DOT Secretary Coleman’s September 1975 "Statement of National

1/ And set forth in the Septpmber 17, 1975, regulation, "Planning

Assistance and Standards: Urban Transportation Planning," op. cit.
.

-126-

Transportation Policy") takes a step toward clarifying how

alternatives analysis should be performed. Metropolitan

experience demonstrates the need for such clarification and

direction to resolve a number of issues impeding conduct of

a sound transit planning process.

The national policy issues involving the technical planning

process are grouped under four categories corresponding to

those used for the guidelines for assessment: goals, development of alternatives, evaluation of alternatives, and implementation.

Goals

The growing popular concern for equal opportunity and

environmental protection, combined with demand for public

participation in planning, has influenced the technical planning

process. The need for development of a broad range of goals

that can be translated into criteria and used to evaluate

alternatives is now widely recognized. This need is reflected

(albeit not expressly) in Federal requirements for public

involvement. However, two major factors have constrained the

use of goals for this purpose:

● Lack of public involvement. As discussed in the

previous section, experience shows that planning

programs begun with a predetermined outcome tend to

employ inadequate means for citizen participation.

This situation rarely leads to an open, participatory

transit planning process in which a broad range of

alternatives is evaluated against criteria based

on public goals.

● Difficulty of developing criteria from broadly

formulated goals. Although it is now accepted

practice to construct a broad set of goals to guide

planning, planners do not agree on how to develop

criteria based on these goals. Some goals easily lend

themselves to qualification, but many social, environmental, and aesthetic objectives present difficulties.

One aspect of the problem is that there is little definitive information about the relationship between

transit and certain social objectives, such as land use.

The main issue for Federal policy concerns the need for

more guidance on how to structure goal-setting and on the use

of measurable criteria in evaluation. Federal requirements stop

short of explaining how to go about developing specific objectives and measurable criteria, just as they fail to provide

sufficient guidance for conduct of citizen participation programs

as a whole. In fact, perhaps by oversight, the proposed UMTA

policy for major urban mass transportation investments fails to

say that the public should have the opportunity to participate in

goal and criteria formulation or in reviewing the extent to which

alternatives achieve these goals and criteria.
———

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Development of Alternatives

Documentation of the advantages and disadvantages of a

wide range of feasible options is essential to meet Federal

requirements calling for-analysis of alternatives. In the

metropolitan areas studied, four factors hindered adequate

development of alternatives:

Lack of broad experience with transit technologies.

As many of the recent transit planning activities

got underway, transit planning and development had

been ignored for so many years that there was no

body of technological information to draw on in doing

the planning. planners in the United States were

unaware of technological options that were being

investigated and employed in Europe. As a result,

much attention focused on conventional, heavy

technology transit.

Preconceived plans. Partly due to the lack of

information noted above, and partly due to the

difficulty of amassing the political support

necessary to launch transit planning, many transit

plans were begun with one system clearly the favorite.

In these cases, the other alternatives developed tended

to serve as straw men.

Automobile orientation of the public. The rise in

auto ownership, and the paralleling, rise in, trips in

the suburbs -- where transit traditionally is lacking

have increased public dependence on the automobile.

Under these circumstances, little public support for

using portions of the highway network for bus transit

can be-expected. This has been one reason why transit

alternatives that would operate on existing highways

have not been fully considered. (However, growing

interest in improving substandard air quality and,

especially, the 1973-74 gasoline shortage recently

have increased the political feasibility of such

options.)

Separate highway/transit programs. On the other hand,

as discussed in the previous section, there is little

incentive for developing the transit options that

require management or joint use of highways in the

absence of effective coordination between agencies

with power to implement highway improvements and

agencies with authority over transit.

Influence of self-interested consultants, One limitation on the range of alternatives developed in some

cities may have been exerted by the engineering consultants hired to do the planning work. Their mission
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and approach was more to design a given system than

to develop and evaluate alternatives. Engineering

consultants who were hired to do transit system planning could look forward to being hired for larger,

more lucrative engineering design contracts, particularly

if the system selected were one in which they had extensive previous experience.

Implications for public policy. Most of these problems can be

and have already been influenced by Federal policy. Federal

research and development programs, as well as private research,

have resulted in a relatively comprehensive body of information

documenting the performance of alternative technologies. In addition, the proposed UMTA policy specifically calls for greater

attention to low-capital alternatives, making this a prerequisite

for receiving Federal aid. Finally, the proposed policy’s requirement for analysis of the appropriateness of different technologies to serve the varying needs in each part of the region in

effect rules out the possibility of beginning the planning

process with a preconceived solution.

The proposed policy may not be able to achieve these

purposes, however, for several reasons. First, its success

is dependent to a large extent on the ability of. UMTA’s small, 

centralized staff to review the local planning process to

determine whether adequate consideration has been given to

a full range of feasible alternatives. The staff may not have

sufficient manpower and technological expertise to carry out

these responsibilities without causing harmful delays. (These problems are discussed in the following section on financing issues.)

Second, many of the factors leading to development of

preconceived, single-technology plans involve the kind of

financing available to transit decisionmakers, and the proposed

policy does not affect financing policy. (The specific

issues are discussed in the next section.)

Finally, in calling for improved management of existing

systems, although the proposed new policy places much higher

priority on using existing highways and streets for bus service,

it is not backed by promises of Federal support. The provisions

of the proposed new policy do not provide the necessary financial

incentives for improving coordination between transit and state

or local highway programs. Unless Federal transit and highway

programs are integrated, it will be difficult and perhaps

impossible to put highway-oriented solutions into operation

widely.

Evaluation of Alternatives

The purpose of the evaluation process is to give decisionmakers sufficient information about the advantages and disadvantages of options so that selection can be made in full

awareness of the consequences of the decision. Several issues

have arisen regarding the effectiveness of alternatives analysis

in achieving that objective:
—

.—— .

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* Reliability of forecasts of transit ridership. In

transit planning, the data and methodologies used to

forecast future transit ridership should provide

accurate, reliable information about the circumstances

under which travelers will choose transit instead of

the automobile, and one type of transit service instead

of another. Generally speaking, the ability to measure

the relationship between the respective travel

times, costs, and use of automobiles and transit

has improved since the 1960s, but there is relatively

little evidence concerning the long term stability of

these relationships. Moreover, the effect of the

attractiveness and comfort of new transit technology

on patronage is not adequately taken into account in

conventional patronage models, which give primary

consideration to relative savings in travel time.

(Indeed, there are as yet no established methodologies

for measuring the influence of such amenity factors.)

* Range of factors to be used in evaluation. To meet

a broad range of local and national goals, an equally

broad range of factors must be used in the evaluation

process. As described under the discussion of ‘goals”

issues above, some goals are more difficult to frame in

a way that is meaningful for use in evaluating alternatives. In this regard, the proposed UMTA policy is

ambiguous.

● Need for analysis of local options in addition to

regional options. Experience in Boston, San Francisco,

and other metropolitan areas indicates the advantages

of approaching alternatives analysis on a subregional

basis. The findings of the assessment show that metropolitan areas have concentrated on long-range plans too

exclusively, and thus often tended to (a) ignore

community level or neighborhood- needs and (b)

ignore demographic trends of the past 20 years in

which the greatest growth in travel occurred in

suburb-to-suburb trips.

● Need for programming a period for resolution of

conflict. The metropolitan experience shows the

desirability of including sufficient time, technical

staff, and other resources into the planning process

in anticipation of the conflicts of opinion that

inevitably occur in a complex planning process, and

the need to resolve these conflicts. The most

effective alternatives evaluation process is iterative:

public reviews are scheduled periodically over the

course of the analysis, and if more investigation of

a particular alternative is desired, or if a new

—

alternative is suggested, the evaluation process is

recycled.
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-. Implications for public policy. The main shortcoming of Federal

policy to date with respect to alternatives analysis has been

its failure to give specific guidance for how to conduct the

evaluation. The proposed UMTA policy answers this deficiency by

calling for application of cost-effectiveness criteria to alternatives and by requiring analysis of subregional components of

transit Systems. Thus, the new policy offers a potential remedy

for the issues that have been cited involving evaluation criteria

and balance between local and regional options. However, the

effectiveness of the policy in alleviating these problems is

not assured.

The proposed UMTA policy calls for analysis of the

relative cost-effectiveness of transit alternatives, and UMTA

proposes to limit the extent of Federal aid to 80% of the

most cost-effective alternative. The results of a costeffectiveness analysis provide useful information about the .

relative costs of alternative ways to meet the same objectives.

Depending upon the way it is defined and administered, however,

the UMTA policy may have two undesirable consequences.

Both potential dangers stem from the failure of the policy

to define the factors to be built into the cost-effectiveness

analysis. First, because the policy does not clearly state whether

local social and environmental goals are to be included in the

cost-effectiveness evaluation or merely "taken into account,"

the policy may lead to excessive focus on low-cost improvements

to be implemented in the short range, to the detriment of longer

range goals. In addition, because the policy does not explicitly

recognize the importance of operating costs in the evaluation of

alternatives, the true cost-effectiveness of the various alternatives may not be determined.

The policy’s emphasis on subregional analysis is potentially

an important step toward structuring a planning process that

will be able to meet community-level needs as well as the needs

of the region as a whole. However, to be most effective, it

would have to be coupled with initiatives to clarify decisionmaking responsibilities and alter the mechanisms for raising the

local share of transit financing.

Additional Federal activities might be taken to address

the other issues affecting the conduct of the analysis of

alternatives. For example, planning guidelines could describe

the need to program time and resources for conflict resolution

into the process, or a fixed percentage of planning grants
. .

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could be earmarked for this purpose. Finally, Federally

sponsored research into the question of improving the reliability

of patronage forecasts, and specifically the effect of amenity

factors, could benefit transit planning.

Implementation

In addition

making, planners

plan into effect.

has had the goal

plan. Little or

to generating information to guide decisionmust create a program and schedule for putting a

Most transit planning examined in the assessment

of producing a single, regionwide, long-range

no attention was paid to several important program

planning questions. —

planners have done little analysis of the optimal schedule

for staging of construction: which parts of the plan to implement first, and how to coordinate with existing transportation

systems. Their plans have tended to be inflexible instead of

preserving options both to respond to potential future problems

and to take advantage of future technological developments.

Another shortcoming of many plans has been their inability

to direct and control transit-related effects, particularly land

development impacts. The emphasis on fixed, long-range plans

has tended to minimize attention to short-range improvements,

despite evidence that such short-term plans are popular. Instead

of constructing systems in small, independent increments, planners

have conceived of plans as requiring one long-term construction

effect.

Failure to stage construction in increments also creates the

possibility that constructed fragments of the system will be left

isolated if steep cost escalation or other factors force a halt

to construction. Constraints that have hindered development of

optionally effective and flexible programs for implementation

include:

● Inadequacies of financing mechanisms. As will be

discussed in the next section, financing mechanisms

have tended to encourage packaging of transit

proposals into extensive, one-time construction

projects rather than subdividing them into increments,

● Inadequate decisionmaking forum. As was discussed

in the institutional section, the fragmentation of

the decisionmaking forum and the absence of a single

lead agency with appropriate authority and responsibility has discouraged the setting of priorities for

implementing proposed transit improvements.

● Politica l pressures. In the context of the constraints

imposed by financing mechanisms and the weakness of

decisionmaking agencies, political pressures for giving

equal service to everyone in the region have encouraged

simultaneous construction of as much of the proposed

plan as possible.
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--

Implications for public policy. Federal policy has influenced

the development of flexible implementation schedules by allowing

these constraints to remain in effect. Ultimately, to allow

successful staging of construction, they would need to be

removed.

The proposed UMTA policy attempts to address the issues

by requiring development of plans that can be implemented in

stages. Although metropolitan experience bears out the need

for incremental staging, the policy could have the undesirable

effect of focusing too much on the near-term, thus eliminating

opportunities for making investments that will pay off only in

the long run. In addition, it runs the risk of encouraging

metropolitan areas to concentrate the area’s requests for

transit improvement in too narrow an area.

TRANSIT FINANCING ISSUES

Issues involving transit financing policy are closely

interconnected with issues that have arisen within both the other

two categories of investigation. Institutions must have access

to sources of financing to be effective in implementing plans, while

the technical planning process must Produce plans that are

financially feasible. The sources of funds and the conditions

under which they are made available have created significant

problems for metropolitan transit planners and decisionmakers.

The current Federal program for transit support has evolved

over a period of nearly 15 years, expanding from a limited

capital loan program begun in 1961. The present program makes

$11 billion available over a six-year period to support a range

of research, planning, capital improvement, and operating activities. About $8 billion of that sum is administered on a discretionary basis, while a $4 million sum is allocated on a formula basis for optional capital or operating purposes.

A wide variety of mechanisms for financing is used on the

local level. Bond issues supported by locally levied taxes

have been perhaps the most common method of local transit support for large new systems. Some states have earmarked state

tax receipts for transit in urban areas.

Characteristics of the Federal and local financing programs

have limited the transit planning and decisionmaking process in

a number of ways. The issues raised by the assessment of

politian experience are grouped in categories corresponding to

four basic guidelines for assessment: ability of the financing

devices to achieve national, regional, and local goals; to provide

stable and predictable sources of funding; to encourage a balance

between long-range, regional, single-technology planning and

short-term responsiveness to local needs; and to avoid unnecessary

administrative delays at the Federal level.
—— —.————

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Achieving National, Regional, and Local Goals

The basic purpose for public programs of transit support,

as will be discussed in the concluding portion of this chapter,

is to meet the various goals of public policy. Whereas in a

general sense transit financing has been successful in meeting

a range of national and local goals, four issues have arisen:

●

●

Insufficiency of current funding levels. The national

goal of increasing transit ridership has led to an increase in transit service and, in turn, to soaring

operating costs. The National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974 (section 5) provided-funds for operating support, but the effects of inflation, combined

with the escalating rate of growth in operating costs,

have left many transit operators with greater deficits

now than before the operating assistance was made available. These increases in operating deficits, as well as

the costs of proposed improvements, have created new

pressure for expanding the amount of Federal support for

transit, and for increasing the flexibility in the uses

to which the funds can be put.

Lack of financing incentives. NO financing incentives

are provided for achieving certain national goals such

as the goal of optimizing the use of highway and street

space for transit.

Narrow-p urpose funding. Some goals, particularly local

and regional goals involving coordinated development of

transit systems and surrounding land uses, cannot be

met because transit systems are narrowly defined.

In part to keep the price tag low, estimates presented

to voters in regional referenda do not provide for

many of the costs of infrastructure necessary to achieve

optimal land use in the vicinity of transit stations

and corridors.

•

Implications for public policy. Several kinds of policy initiatives would be able to address these issues.

Separate funding of highways and transit. Separate

funding and administration of transit and highway 

programs at all levels of government has tended to prevent (and will continue to prevent) use of highways to

provide transit capacity, even though this is an objective of national policy.

The increasing need for operating assistance could be addressed if a greater portion of the Federal transit program were

made available for operating assistance as well as capital aid.

If the current funding levels are insufficient to continue
.

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improving the nation’s urban transit, or even to keep current

levels of service in operation, the Federal Government should

consider increasing the amount that iS available, while assuring

that funds are used most efficiently. If UMTA’s new requirement for determining the cost-effectiveness of alternative proposed transit improvements is administered appropriately, as

was discussed in the previous section, it should encourage

identification of the most cost-efficient way to meet particular

combinations of transit goals. To raise the level of total

available funds, a policy decision could be made to (1) increase

the levels of authorization in the transit program, (2) increase

the amount of Federal highway money that is made available for

transit, or (3) put the highway and transit programs on a jointly

funded basis.

The latter approach would allow the most effective planning

and implementation of transit improvements that use highways.

Expanding the existing transfer provisions for using Federal

highway money to support transit may have undesirable consequences. Currently, metropolitan areas may use funds from the

Federal-Aid Urban Systems (FAUS) portion of the highway program

for either transit or highway projects. Also, under the interstate transfer provisions, they have the option to exchange funds

earmarked for certain interstate highway segments for transit

funds. Generally speaking, there is evidence that the decision

to use the interstate transfer provision results not only from

lack of adequate transit funds, but also from the desire to

retain the large sums of Federal aid involved even when it becomes obvious that a interstate segment should not be built.

This kind of pressure has provided the incentive for hasty decisionmaking based on inadequate technical planning support.

If the highway and transit programs were put on a joint

funding basis, complementary highway and transit programs could

be undertaken, thereby reducing inefficiencies in the overall

urban transportation system and resulting in more transit service

per dollar spent. The need for this kind of economy is becoming

increasingly necessary inasmuch as in recent years the total

amount of financing available for urban transportation as a whole

has been decreasing in real dollar terms.

The issues related to goals also point to the fact that the

Federal Government has not successfully taken advantage of the

opportunity to

purposes. The

the concluding

use financial aid to achieve specific national

significance of this opportunity is discussed in

section of this chapter.

Stability and Predictability of Funding

The 1974 National Mass Transportation Assistance Act
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permitted local decisionmakers to program section 5 funds over

a three-year period with reasonable assurance that they would

receive the authorized amounts because they are based on a

statutory formula. Because most Federal transit funds are

administered on a discretionary project-by-project basis,

however, there is no assurance of the amount a local area will

receive year by year. (The recent UMTA pledge of $600 million

to Atlanta over the duration of the currently authorized program

is one of the few exceptions to this situation.)

The short term of the Federal financial commitment to

individual metropolitan areas has combined with changes in

UMTA policy and the lack of secure financing on the local level

to keep local decisionmakers from being able to determine in

advance the amount of funding support that will be available

to them. This problem has led to:

● Loss of local support. Lack of firm Federal commitment

to a specific level of funding has undermined popular

support for transit in several metropolitan areas,

particularly at the time of referenda on raising the

local share of the costs of implementing a plan.

• Repetitions and delays in planning. Several metropolitan

transit officials have complained that UMTA unfairly

imposed new planning requirements late in the planning

process, causing (or threatening to cause) delays.

● Pressure for state aid. Stability of funds required

to plan and program effectively has been best achieved

when localities do not have to rely primarily on local

taxing powers and particularly on the property tax.

In general, only states have the power to levy taxes

that can provide stable, reliable funding for the

local share of transit improvements over time, and

in recent years some states have acted to provide

that aid.

Implications for public policy. The need to remove uncertainties

about future funding availability suggests consideration of a more

systematic, rational basis for distributing Federal transit funds

among metropolitan areas. The two alternative courses are to continue to use the discretionary grant approach and tie the award of

these grants to achievement of specific program objectives, or to

allocate most or all of the funds by formula.

The alternative of having UMTA distribute funds by carefully

formulated criteria has been the subject of a year-long investigation by UMTA staff for a set of criteria to guide investment decisions. Such criteria would differ from the proposed policy by

allowing UMTA to judge directly whether a transit proposal is

justified. To date, no conclusions have been reached. Each urban area has such highly individualized characteristics that it is

difficult to devise general criteria that adequately take these

differences into account.
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-

Alternatively, a large portion of the funds could be allocated

by formula, while some funds could be retained for discretionary

distribution by the Secretary. Experience in the metropolitan areas

indicates this would be a highly satisfactory approach. If most

funds were allocated by formula, year-to-year funding levels would

be stable, and decisionmakers would have sufficient advanced notice

of future funding levels to allow sound planning and programming.

There are difficulties involved in devising and administering

an equitable allocation formula. However, a more equitable formula

could be devised if highway and transit funds are combined and distributed under one formula. This approach would allow larger metropolitan areas with relatively greater transit needs and relatively

fewer highway needs to direct most of their allocated funds to the

transit program, while smaller metropolitan areas, whose highway

needs (and needs for transit that uses highways) are likely to be

greater, could devote proportionally more of their allocated resources to highway purposes.

,

The portion of the funds that remain in the discretionary program could be distributed according to criteria for achieving

Congressionally formulated goals and objectives. Keeping some kind

of discretionary grant program is important to allow giving support

to cities beginning major transit development programs. Under most

formulas, especially if they are based on measures of existing

transit service, cities like Atlanta would not receive the large

amounts of capital assistance they would need to undertake major

new construction efforts.

Long -ranqe, Reqional, Single-technology Planning Versus

Short-term Responsiveness to Local Needs

Several aspects of Federal and local financing mechanisms have

encouraged emphasis on planning to serve the long-range needs of an

entire region, usually with a single technology, rather than specific,

often more short-term needs of subareas of the region. This problem

has been discussed in the previous two sections; the discussion here

focuses on ways in which financing policy contributes to the imbalance:

● Competition for limited Federal funds. The national program’s discretionary grant approval process has been one

of the factors encouraging many metropolitan areas to

compete with each other in preparing and submitting plans

for larger fixed-guideway systems in order to obtain

“their share” of the funds. This tends to build a metropolitan commitment to a very expensive and fixed long

term plan. The 1973 increase in the Federal share from

66-2/3% to 80% increased the incentive for large systems

because of lower local share requirements.

● Availability of financing for capital improvements only.

There can be little do ubt that the avail ability of

Federal funds for capital improvements only has created

a bias in local decisionmaking in favor of heavy rail
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●

rapid transit systems or other fully grade-separated

fixed-guideway systems. Such systems can only be justified if they attract high patronage. Since commuters

provide the bulk of transit patronage, planners tend to

extend heavy, fixed-guideway systems into the suburbs to

maximize service to commuters (and thus maximize patronage).

Need for regionwide voter support for local share. At the

regional level, the need to gain approval in referenda for

transit financing bonds or taxes also has led to fixed

long-range plans for overly extensive, single-technology

systems serving the entire region. A specific technological

concept with broad voter recognition and appeal often

was required in order for metropolitan leadership to generate sufficient interest to raise the necessary local and

state funds to initiate a transit planning program, even

with Federal funding. (Ironically, the decision to present

an extensive regional system to voters in several cases

resulted in defeat of the proposal because it was considered too expensive.)

Implications for public policy. Recent Federal policy initiatives

have taken steps to deal with aspects of these issues. The earmarking of a portion of the UMTA program for operating assistance,

at local option, removes some of the incentive to invest in capital-intensive systems, at least for smaller metropolitan areas,

The fact that these funds are available on a formula distribution

basis reduces somewhat the incentive to compete for a discretionary

grant in those areas.

Increasing the portion of the Federal aid to be allocated by

formula in the manner discussed in the previous section could extend

these advantages to larger metropolitan-areas. There would be

less of a Federal-level incentive to bypass local needs in order to

develop a regionwide plan that might gain more total Federal aid.

Avoidance of Unnecessary Administrative Delays

Many transit planning and operating agencies have complained

about the amount of time that it takes UMTA to approve grant contracts or amendments. Several aspects of the UMTA program contribute

to this situation:

o Small, centralized UMTA staff. The staff is small in

relation to the size of the program, a problem that is

exacerbated by the fact that field officials must seek

central office approval for most decisions.
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I

Project-by-project approach. The discretionary grant program has put UMTA in the position of having to judge which

types of technology are "best" in metropolitan areas,

which is a time-consuming responsibility.

Equal level of attention to major and minor decisions.

Complaints have been made that UMTA fol lows an equally

rigorous process for routine bus purchases as for major

new systems, although the availability of Section 5 formula grant money may be relieving this problem in some

areas. UMTA has urged localities to use the formula money

for routine purchases. In large metropolitan areas where

most of the formula funds will be needed to support operations, however, the problem described will persist.

Implications for public policy. Placing a portion of the funds into the formula grant category has allowed UMTA to reduce the likelihood of creating unnecessary administrative delays. By calling

for cost-effectiveness analysis on the local level, the proposed

investment policy attempts to reduce the time and effort required

for UMTA to review grant applications, but unless agreement is

reached on explicitly defined cost-effectiveness criteria, the kind

of analysis will vary from city to city, and UMTA still will be

required to assess the technical aspects of local planning.

Two approaches might be taken to reduce delays in the grant

review process. One alternative is to increase the size of the

staff, both in the central office and in the field, and to delegate

additional responsibilities to the field offices.

The more effective approach might be to put a greater portion

of the UMTA program on a formula allocation basis. Funding would be

continuous and there would be less need for time-consuming technological judgments in order to decide among grant applications.

THE ROLE OF NATIONAL GOALS

The previous sections of this chapter described a number

of issues concerning the structure of the institutions involved

in transit planning, the content of the technical planning

process, and the mechanisms used to finance mass transit systems.

These issues take on special importance today because of the

growing support the Federal Government has given public transportation, and the ongoing debate about where to go from here.
— . .

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At the root of any effort to resolve these problems is a

broader issue involving the question of establishing national

goals for public transportation. The purpose of such goals

should be to provide specific direction for Federal financing

policy, for regulations governing the responsibilities of

decisionmaking institutions, and for requirements affecting

the technical planning process. Although numerous statements

of goals are contained in Federal legislation and administrative

guidelines, critics of the current situation argue that these

goals often are formulated in a way that is too general and

broad to be useful.

In other words, existing goals offer no concrete answers

to the central questions of how much public transportation the

nation wants to buy, what purpose it should serve, and who

should pay for it. These questions underlie a national debate

over how we might go about a rational, systematic process of

setting specific objectives and developing criteria to determine

whether national policies and programs are accomplishing what

they set out to do.

The participants in the debate do not contend that

Federal policy for public transportation has not addressed

itself to any goals, or that it has failed to recognize the

broad array of purposes related to social and environmental

concerns that public transportation can serve. In general,

the Federal role in transportation has broadened from one

that placed primary emphasis on the economic regulation of

transportation activities to one that both promotes the

development and improvement of the nation’s transportation

system and seeks to protect society against the potentially

adverse impacts of transportation development.

,

Statements of current policy are found in several acts of

Congress. The Declaration of Purpose (Sec. 2 (a)) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 states that national transportation programs should provide fast, safe, efficient, and convenient transportation at the lowest cost -- as long as they are

not detrimental to the general welfare, the economic growth and

stability of the nation and its security, and other national

objectives, including those governing the utilization and conservation of the nation’s resources.

The successive acts of Congress creating Federal support for

mass transportation --- the Housing Act of 1961, the Mass Transportation Acts of 1964 and 1970, and the National Mass Transportation

Assistance Act of 1974 -- in combination call for preserving and

revitalizing existing mass transportation systems, increasing
I — . .

,

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mobility to lower-income people and transit dependents (including

the handicapped) , attracting new riders, and using mass transit

to influence and support desired development patterns and improved

environmental conditions.

Current national transportation policy, as set forth most

recently and comprehensively by the Secretary of Transportation

in "A Statement of National Transportation Policy," incorporates

these legislative goals:

1 Federal policy for urban transportation should

at once respond to locally determined transportation goals and serve such national objectives

as the enhancement of our cities as vital commercial and cultural centers, control of air pollution,

conservation of energy, access to transportation for all citizens and particularly

the disadvantaged, facilitation of full

employment and more rational use of land. 1

/

Recognizing that goals exist, the record of the debate

suggests that they must be more sharply defined if policymakers

are to be able to determine whether the aims of national policy

are being achieved. Both the record of Congressional hearings

on transportation policy and evidence gathered in the metropolitan areas examined by this study point to the need to

clarify the goals, objectives, and criteria that are applied ‘

to public transportation.

During 1974, the Appropriation Committee’s Subcommittee

on Transportation of the U.S. House of Representatives held

hearings on national transportation policy. 2/ Other hearings,

devoted to different transportation-related purposes, also

aired discussion about national transportation policy, as did

studies and publications outside the Federal Government. Although

the various statements do not reflect agreement about the

substance of particular goals and objectives that should be

established, they do show the major concern that the nation

should formulate more specific goals and objectives for what it

wishes to achieve. The problem is not that no general goals

exist, but that Congress has not directed UMTA to use goals and

objectives as a firm basis for mobilizing, dispensing, and

evaluating the use of Federal funds. Financial incentives could

be offered for achieving specific objectives.

1 / A Statement of National Transportation Policy by the Secretary

of Transportation, September 17, 1975.

2/ Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations

for 1975, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on

Appropriations, 93rd Congress, Second Session, 1975.
—

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The problem is also reflected to varying degrees in the

metropolitan areas examined by this study. While the general

goals of increasing mobility, enhancing environmental quality,

and shaping the pattern of land use remain overriding concerns

of metropolitan transit planners, more questions have arisen

regarding the best types of transit systems to reach these

goals. Alternatives such as light rail or trolleys, PRT,

busways, forms of paratransit, and conventional buses are

being explored and more information sought on the relative

merits of each.

For some, this questioning has -been spurred by UMTA’s

shifting policies. The main impact on metropolitan transit

planning of the lack of clearly defined goals has been the

difficulty of determining in advance how much Federal assistance

will be provided, and what it will pay for. The problems

related to this instability of funding were described in the ●

financing section of this chapter.

As yet neither UMTA nor the several cities that are

planning rapid transit systems have developed any one means

for weighing the advantages and disadvantages of alternatives

in order to come us with the one most suitable for their

particular purposes. One reason this is SO, and for why the

local as well as the national debate runs on, is that it is

difficult to reach agreement on specific criteria that can

measure when goals for public transportation have been

achieved. Each urban area has such highly individualized

characteristics that it is difficult to devise general

criteria that take these differences into account. Until

such agreement is reached, it will be difficult indeed to

pin down what UMTA’s investment should achieve, and how, in

turn, the local planning institutions and technical process

should be structured.

Considerations for public policy. The practical issue in the

debate about goals for public transportation may have less to

do with whether goals and objectives can be set-and more to

do with Who should set them and who should have the power to

carry out the programs to achieve them.

Setting specific national goals and objectives is not

without precedent. Although they are simplistic examples,

the interstate highway program and the space program are both

cases in which Congress has set specific goals and established

the institutional and financial means to achieve them. More
—

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appropriate examples are the goals Congress has established

for clean air and water. These have specific objectives for

limiting pollution content in maximum amounts during specified

periods and by certain dates. Criteria are being developed to

measure effectiveness.

The purposes of public transportation may not be so susceptible to specification. But there are examples to be found.

For instance, in the short term criteria could be based on increased accessibility of the population to transit. In the long

term, criteria might be derived to build links between transit

and patterns of urban growth. For example, urban areas could

be required to prepare urban growth plans, backed by incentives

and growth contours, in which transit service was provided to concentrations of housing and employment. Formulation of such criteria

merits careful study because of the complexity of the relationships between land use and urban development.

The task of exploring whether goals and objectives should

be set and, if S O, what they might be, can be approached on

either the national level or the local metropolitan level.

On the national level, a number of approaches might be

taken. DOT and UMTA could be mandated to examine the question

of goals, objectives, and criteria, and report to Congress by

a certain date; a national commission could be established

with the same mandate; or alternatively, a legislative commission

could be empowered to explore the matter and, if required, prepare

legislation for consideration by Congress. In any one of these

cases the important task will-be to bring the matter to a

legislative forum where the issues can be fully debated and

decisions, made on the appropriate course of action. Responsibility for the task might also be left to local authorities. ●

In this case, the Federal government would have to make the

requisite powers and funding available to the localities to

carry out their programs.

Regardless of the approach taken, reaching an agreement

on precise national or local goals and objectives poses

difficult questions. But the kind of goals that are set will

underlie whether more specific policies to shape transit

institutions, planning, and financing will achieve their

intended effects.
—.-

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CHAPTER 7

OPTIONS FOR NATIONAL TRANSIT POLICY

The purpose of this chapter is to formulate alternative

courses of action for resolving many of the issues named in the

previous chapter. That chapter described measures that could be

taken independently to address each of the major problems affecting

community planning for mass transit. This chapter takes the next

logical step. .

Complex interrelationships exist between many of the problems

and their potential solutions. Attempts to remedy some of the

issues also seem likely to affect -- positively or negatively --

one or more other issues. Conversely, some reform measures would

have to be pursued jointly to be feasible. One particularly

effective way to accommodate these interrelationships would be to

employ a combination of measures designed to implement a particular

national policy.

Within the framework of general guidelines derived from the

findings of the nine case assessments, this section sets forth

four broad policy options for improving mass transit programs

that could be considered by the Congress. Each package of policies

contains some of the policy initiatives described in the preceding

chapter. The general relationship of those individual initiatives

to the four policy packages is reviewed in the concluding section

of this chapter.

The four policy options can be summarized as follows:

Policy Option A -- Maintain the present mass transit

policy and program. This policy requires no major

changes in mass transit legislation and is independent

of potential changes in policy regarding highways,

energy, environment, and other areas of concern.

Policy Option B -- Strengthen the national mass transportation proqram. This policy would give much higher

priority to mass transit programs, but it would not be

dependent upon restrictive policies concerning automobile

use, energy conservation, and environmental protection.

nted balance among all forms of . . .

Policy Option C -- -Strengthen and create a policyorie transportation,

particularly in urban areas. This policy aims at

establishing a multimodal approach to transportation

and specifically addresses conservation of energy,

environmental enhancement, and other considerations.

of national priority.
. .

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Policy Option D -- Strengthen comprehensive community

development programs, making multimodal planning and

development an integral element of community development.

This policy gives urban growth managers and land use

planners the decisive role in determining the characteristics of the urban transportation system.

The range of policies is not exhaustive and they are not

mutually exclusive. They represent different degrees of potential effectiveness in shaping the community transit planning

process to conform to guidelines for financing approaches, institutional arrangements, and technical procedures developed during

the course of the assessment.

Each policy is discussed in three parts. The first constitutes an overview description of the policy. The second is a

more detailed discussion of its constituent parts, and the third

is a summary assessment of the policy option.

POLICY OPTION A: Maintain the Present Mass Transit Policy

and Program

Description

This policy option calls for taking steps to improve transit planning under the current UMTA program. Federal assistance

would be provided under current legislative authority, although

due to inflation, funding levels might decrease in real dollar

terms. Currently evolving policies for allocation of the available funds -- involving new requirements for the conduct of

technical planning and relationships between regional planning and

operating agencies -- would be implemented. -

Policy A would aim to achieve the objectives of current

national transportation policy as it relates to mass transportation.

Discussion

Goals and objectives. Even within the framework of the existing

transit program, important steps could be taken to remedy some

of the problems identified in the nine metropolitan areas studied.

One of the most significant steps would be to clarify the program's

goals .

The absense of clearly defined goals and objectives seriously weakens the present program and makes it difficult to devise a

rational system for allocating Federal financial support for mass

transportation. The lack of explicit Federally established objectives and measurement criteria has led to varying degress of confusion and other difficulties in almost all of the cities surveyed.
—.— -. — -

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To reduce these difficulties% Federal administrative policymakers could develop more explicit objectives and criteria to

measure progress toward the achievement of Congressionally

established policy. This would provide a sound base upon which

to mobilize resources and evaluate the effectiveness of the

expenditures.

Although UMTA has not established explicit objectives, the

recently proposed policy for major urban mass transportation

investments could provide the impetus for conducting further

goal-setting and evaluation procedures. UMTA is calling for the

recipients of capital grants to use cost-effectiveness techniques

to evaluate alternative plans for achieving locally established

objectives, and to develop plans that can be implemented in increments.

The overall effect of this approach could be beneficial,

so long as the program is administered appropriately. The process of evaluation might lead localities and UMTA to develop

far more explicit statements of goals, along with realistic

criteria to measure how tile goals could be achieved. In the long

run this latter course might be able to provide the basis for a

more effective and efficient national policy for mass transit.

0 Financial aspects. The major financing issue presented by Policy

A concerns whether present authorizations will provide sufficient

funds to carry out the transit program’s ‘objectives. The National

Transportation Assistance Act of 1974 increased support for the

mass transit program by authorizing $7.825 billion for capital

expenditures over a six-year period from 1975 to 1980, and $3.975

billion for the same period for either operating cost subsidy

or capital improvements at local discretion.

Maintaining the existing mass transit policy and program,

however, will not significantly increase and might in fact decrease

Federal assistance in constant dollar terms. While there is no

specific cost-price index for transit capital facilities and

rolling stock, other appropriate indices indicate that increases

in Federal capital grant funds have not kept pace with inflation.

In addition, the $300 million of Federal funds made available

for the first time in fiscal year 1975 for operating deficits

is less than the increase in total national operating deficits

between 1974 and 1975. Thus, depending upon rates of inflation

between 1975 and 1980, the programed increases in capital and

operating assistance funds may decrease in constant dollar terms.

Present policy makes no provision for establishing levels of

funding and financial mechanisms commensurate with the objectives to be achieved.
. —

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The NMTA Act of 1974

the existing mass transit

tion formula for portions

improved the stability and continuity of

policy and program by adopting an allocaof the authorized funds and by providing

contract authority. Thus, local governments are assured of the

exact amounts they will receive each year over the five-year period

for the formula grant funds.

Existing policy and programs, however, continue the discretionary authority of UMTA to allocate capital grant funds, which

detracts from the continuity and stability needed for large multiyear public improvement programs. Under the current discretionary

program, incentives for long-term, regional systems will remain in

effect.

One other financial issue cannot be addressed under present

policy. Although the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 has alleviated the pressure to achieve more flexibility in a local area’s

ability in the use of funds for either highways or transit, a

considerable ‘disparity still exists between the size of the sums

available for the two modes of transportation. Especially if the

UMTA program proves unable to meet the demand for aid to transit,

unnecessary competition between the two modes will persist in the

future.

Institutional aspects. The intent of current administrative policy

is to promote closer coordination among regional planning agencies

and transportation modal agencies. The experience in the metropolitan areas indicates further steps must be taken under Policy A

if the goal of coordination is to be achieved.

Two recent Federal actions have tended to emphasize the role

of the regional planning agency. The 1974 NMTA Act called for a

comprehensive transportation planning process identical to the

requirements of the Federal-aid highway program. Earlier, the

1973 Federal-Aid Highway Act led DOT to issue a new administrative

requirement for designating a single Metropolitan Planning Organization to channel Federal capital grant funds to regional transit

and highway organizations and prepare a joint transportation improvement program.

Whether the new MPOs will improve coordination is questionable in view of the considerable competition between regional and

. local agencies over responsibility for transit programming and

priority setting functions. Most MPO designations have gone to

regional comprehensive planning agencies, and most of these agencies

are formed by mutual agreement among member local governments
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and agencies. Most do not have statutory power to tax, finance,

or administer programs. In contrast, most agencies with’ responsibility for operating transit systems do not have the authority to

plan, develop, and finance new, expanded, os rehabilitated systems.

Division of responsibility carries with it lack of accountability. Under the present policy and program, most of the

metropolitan areas must seek biparty or multiparty approvals for

planning, financing, and implementation. The Federal requirements

providing for accountability through the MPO ignore the realities

of the decisionmaking process.

Federal administrative policy and required process cannot

convey to regional organizations a decisionmaking authority and

responsibility they do not have by statute. However, the Federal

program could be adapted to penalize regions that do not act

on their own to structure an effective decisionmaking forum,

and/or reward regions that do. The latter course would be

politically more acceptable.

If, under Policy A, MPOs with insufficient statutory powers

continue to be recognized, the current lack of effective integration between land use planning and transportation planning

may be perpetuated, regardless of the formal coordination that

might occur.

Technical planning considerations. The Urban Mass Transportation

Administration’s planning requirements until recently listed the

types of studies and analyses that were involved in the planning process. They did not stipulate specific procedures or

require that a detailed analysis and evaluation of alternative

courses of action be the basis for transit system selection,

funding, and implementation.

Over the past two years, UMTA's planning requirements have

become more rigorous, particularly since the requirement for

alternatives analysis and evaluation based on cost-effectiveness

was published in recent months. The actual procedures for this

new policy still are being developed.

The analysis of alternatives and evaluation of cost-effectiveness can bring more discipline to the planning process,

providing evaluation takes into consideration a defined and measurable set of objectives that give evenhanded consideration

to the tradeoffs involved in selecting one alternative over

another. UMTA defines the evaluation to take into consideration

a full range of goals and criteria.
— -- . . . . ..-

‘ . -

.

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UMTA also could amplify its guidelines for citizen participation under the current program and thus strengthen another

aspect of the technical planning process. Finally, it could

pursue the necessary research and development to improve forecasting methodology.

Summary Assessment

Maintaining present national mass transit policy and programs

will continue developments of the last few years on a reasonably

stable basis, but it will not provide for significant improvement and expansion of mass transit systems and services. Development of improved mass transit could be slowed if the rate of inflation is greater than the incremental increases in both capital

and operating assistance funds. The state and local governments

are not likely to provide the extra amount that would be needed;

inflation hits them harder than it does the Federal

because their revenue sources are more limited. —

In addition to these shortcomings in the realm

Government

of financing,.

Policy A would have difficulty correcting other deficiencies in

the current program. Confusion will continue if no clear definition is made of what mass transit is to accomplish, of how much

and what kind should be purchased, and of who pays for it.

State, regional, and local agencies would continue to compete for

responsibility unless they acted on their own initiative in response

to Federal incentives to bring order to these institutional conflicts.

Policy A does have the potential to improve the quality of

the technical planning work. Rigourous analysis of alternatives

and evaluation of different courses of action can and should be

a part of any policy option.

POLICY OPTION B: Strengthen the National Mass Transit Program

Description

This policy would give priority to the development of the

nation’s mass transit system independent of other public policies. The policy would aim to mobilize financial resources and

streamline institutional mechanisms and technical planning processes in order to expand the Federal mass transit program and

provide increased transit facilities and services to the nation's

urbanized areas.

In pursuit of Policy B, goals and objectives would be established that emphasize providing increasing service at lower

cost to riders without giving significant weight to social, economic, and environmental goals. The Federal Government would

provide the bulk of the increased capital and operating costs.

The transit operating agency would have primary institutional

responsibility on the state, regional, and local levels. Technical planning requirements would be somewhat simplified.
—

—.— —- ——

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To assure the policy is implemented, UMTA and the regional

or local agencies would be required to develop plans and timetables for incremental system and service improvements in order

to achieve the objectives by a target date.

Discussion

Goals and Objectives. An essential strategy for strengthening and

expandng mass transportation would be to establish a precise set

of goals and objectives for transit improvement. Specific objectives

would be established for increasing transit ridership by certain

percentages depending upon trip purpose, time of day, and origins

and destinations within the metropolitan area. Objectives would

include specified levels of service.

The new goals would give priority to transit improvement

over other national goals, such as those involving social welfare,

community development, energy conservation, and environmental

protection. In providing expanded service in combination with

fare reductions, on the other hand, Policy B would tend to respond

to current goals for providing mobility to the transit dependent

(excluding the handicapped).

The establishment of such unitary objectives would focus

attention on a readily comprehensible policy and, assuming broad

public support, would assist in marshaling resources to carry

out the program. Clear and simplified sets of objectives also

would be susceptible to periodic measurement and evaluation to

determine how resources should be allocated.

Financial aspects. To an extent that would depend on fare levels

established and the extent of service improvements, the immediate

financial effect of strengthening and expanding mass transportation would be an increase in operating deficits. Due to economic

realities, the Federal Government would have to subsidize the increase.

Neither local, regional, nor state governments have the

financial capacity to increase their support for transit. The

case studies of the nine cities, as well as information readily

available on other metropolitan areas, demonstrate that transit

agencies and local governments have exhausted their own sources

of revenue to support mass transit and increasingly have turned

to the states for financial assistance. Most states also currently are facing severe financial difficulties because of economic

conditions and are increasing taxes and curtailing services.

The amount of operating cost increase would depend upon the

fare levels established. An indication of the effect can be taken

from the experience of Atlanta, Georgia, when MARTA reduced fares
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from 40 cents to 15 cents (and, at the same time, improved Service).

The system experienced a 28% increase in ridership (along with a

dramatic increase in operating costs) .

Analysis indicates that adoption of a 15-cent fare nationally

would increase operating deficits about $1 billion based upon present

transit capacity and levels of service. This increased ridership,

however, would require increasing levels of service by approximately

15-20%.

The option of administering funds under a formula grant

program would be open under this policy. The formula could

incorporate incentives for achieving the policy’s objectives

and could permit greater flexibility between capital and

operating expenditures.

Institutional aspects. Strengthening and expanding mass transportation in line with policy objectives of increasing ridership

and subordinating social and community development goals would

place primary institutional responsibility on the transit planning and operating agency at the state, regional, or local level.

Strong financial incentives could be offered to encourage states

and localities to provide the agency making programming and operations decisions with an assured source of revenue for the local

share. -

Giving the transit agency clearcut responsibility for planning, programming, setting priorities, and budgeting would overcome much of the confusion and conflict among regional and

local agencies. It would retard the evolution of multimodal

planning, however.

This would present an obstacle to achieving the policy’s

purpose. Significant increases in ridership and expanded levels

of service would have some effect upon automotive traffic, but,

more importantly, they would require modifications in traffic

management in order to accommodate the increased number of

transit vehicles for all transit systems except those having

exclusive grade-separated rights-of-way.

By expanding the definition of facilities eligible for

capital grants to include real estate in the vicinity of station

sites and transit corridors, following the precedent set in the 1 1974 legislation,/ Policy B could expand the opportunities for

1/ National Mass Transportation Assistance Act. Public Law

93-503, Section 104(b); 49.USC 1602.
—.

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coordination between transportation investment and service, on

the one hand, and land use planning, development, and management

on the other hand. Except in this limited way, however, the

policy would not be conducive to genuine integration between

transit and land planning and development.

Technical planning considerations. In implementing Policy B,

the policies that UMTA has developed for transit planning and

decisionmaking would have to be altered somewhat, but no changes

in procedures for analysis of alternatives and evaluation of costeffectiveness necessarily would be required. The improvements

discussed under Policy A could be applied also in Policy B.

The technical planning requirements would be somewhat simplified by reducing the importance of evaluation plans in light

of social considerations and relationship to community development

plans.

Summary Assessment.

The policy option to strengthen and expand mass transportation

through fare reduction or elimination and expansion of service can

significantly increase transit ridership. Private sector savings

would tend to offset the high cost of public funds as drivers

switch to transit.

The analyses contained in a companion volume of this study,

Energy, the Economy and Mass Transit, clearly indicate that fare

reduction and expanded service are the most productive of all transit incentive concepts examined. The adoption of this policy option

would not result in significant savings in oil-based energy, but

would have environmental benefits and would offer higher quality

and less expensive transit service to the transit dependent.

placing the transit agency in control of decisionmaking would

overcome much of the confusion and conflict among regional and

local agencies. However, the policy would retard the evolution

of multimodal planning and it would be unable to bring about a

broad-scale integrated approach to transportation and land use

planning.

The policy would require a number of legislative changes.

The policy may be more likely to win acceptance than an approach

involving constraints on auto use or sharing of highway revenues.

On the other hand, it may have difficulty gaining support because

it would bypass a number of public environmental goals.
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Policy Option c: Strengthen and Create Policy-Oriented Balance

Among All Forms of Transportation

Description

The policy option to strengthen and create a policy-oriented

balance among all forms of transportation, particularly in urban

areas, specifically is intended to create transit incentives and

automobile disincentives. This policy alternative is intended to

fundamentally shift the priority and emphasis away from public

investment in facilities for private automobiles and instead place

priority on expansion and improvement of mass transportation.

This policy option would require significant changes in Congressionally enacted policy relating to mass transit, highways,

Federal taxation, and energy conservation.

The significant results which can be achieved by a deliberate

policy of transit incentives and automobile disincentives are

discussed in detail in another report in this study, Enerqy , the

Economy and Mass Transit.

Discussion

Goals and objectives. The establishment of goals and objectives

for this policy option would rely heavily upon national objectives

for energy conservation and environmental enhancement. Specific

objectives would be established for both transit and highway

facility development and system operations, but their policy base

would depend upon the allocation of energy for transportation

as compared with other energy requirements.

The goals and objectives established as a matter of national

policy would be given much more weight and priority than those

established at the state, regional, or local level because they

would be based upon the conservation and allocation of a scarce

national resource.

Financial aspects. Federal transportation funds would be combined,

I

a relatively greater portion would be devoted to transit, and

auto disincentive programs would be established to generate additional revenue.

Placing the highway and transit programs on a joint funding

basis would improve the efficiency and economy of Federal transportation spending. For one thing, joint use of facilities would

be encouraged. Secondly, although increased emphasis on mass transportation would require significantly larger levels of Federal investment, for the reasons described in the discussion of Policy B,

the total Federal assistance required under Policy C would be no

greater than the sum of the exisitng transit and highway programs,

plus the additional revenue from auto disincentive programs. The

larger urban areas would require relatively less highway funding,

partly because of the impact of auto disincentives.
— . ————. —.——.

t

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The analyses in Energy , the Economy, and Mass Transit, ‘indicate

that increasing the cost of gasoline and levying a charge on

commuter parking, particularly in the central business districts

of metropolitan areas, are the two most effective means of creating

disincentives to the use of private autos through pricing policy.

The policy-oriented development of a balanced transportation

system would not have any significant effect upon the financial

requirement for highway facilities in exurban and rural areas,

where the provision of extensive mass transit services would be

extremely costly and would not result in a significant diversion

from private transportation.

The entire program could be administered On a formula allocation

basis, with a relatively small discretionary fund to support

large-scale transit development programs. Flexibility of spending

between operating and capital costs could be permitted.

Institutional aspects. This policy option would encourage integration of transportation planning and facility development at all

levels of government.

The Federal Government would play a stronger role in planning,

programming, and budgeting than in any of the other policy options.

The fundamental policy rationale is based upon energy conservation

and allocation, and these decisions are best made at the Federal

level.

The major shift in emphasis between public transportation and

automobiles likewise would significantly shift the roles and

responsibilities of highway and transit agencies at all levels of

government. The policy encourages modal institutions at all

levels of government to merge and assume multimodal responsibilities

or at least. to develop more thoroughly integrated working relationships.

Channeling a large amount of Federal transportation aid to a

local or state agency, accompanied by explicit criteria governing .

the purposes the funds are to achieve, would provide a strong incentive for the agency to set priorities among area highway and transit

projects. In addition, more direct, financial incentives could be

offered to encourage one agency to assume this kind of effective

lead role.

Technical planning considerations. This policy option would

respond to the same kinds of Improvements in the technical planning

process described in the discussion of Policy A, although new 

methodologies might be necessitated.
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Policy C would encourage greater emphasis on low-capital alternatives because decisionmakers would be able to implement them.

Under the current program transit decisionmakers must negotiate

with street and highway agencies to be able to put traffic management improvements into effect.

The policy would encourage the Federal Government to develop

guidelines describing planning methodologies that provide information on the comparative advantages and disadvantages of investing

in facilities for the automobile and transit systems. Decisionmakers will want to understand these tradeoffs as a guide for

allocating resources among highway and transit projects. Because

Policy C emphasizes energy and environmental goals, the methodologies for comparative analysis should be oriented to these factors.

Planning procedures and methodologies also should be designed

to take into account the probably changes in land use and community

development that inevitably would result from such significant

changes in national transportation policy. With energy conservation

as a dominant factor in community growth and development, historic

patterns of residential and employment locations would be altered.

Summary Assessment

This option would carry out systematically as a matter of

national policy the experience produced by the oil embargo in late

1973 and early 1974. It would not involve a sudden shift away from

reliance on petroleum for transportation purposes, which would

have disruptive consequences, but it would recognize the eventual

limits of oil supply, and gradually shift to less energy-consuming

modes of transportation.

Systematically and over a relatively short period of years,

this policy option would essentially reverse the trend in urban

transit versus private auto use. It would provide sources for

the additional Federal financial aid to transit. It would permit

an improved technical planning process. It would respond to popular interest in environmental enhancement and energy conservation.

The principal obstacle to its accomplishment is the difficulty of gaining political consensus for a program this sweeping

in scope and effect. The approach would require significant change

in Congressionally enacted policy relating to transit, highways,

Federal taxation, and energy conservation, and it would significantly shift the roles and responsibilities of highway and transit

agencies at all levels of government.

However, such broad changes are necessary for some of the

critical issues in current transit planning to be addressed.
. — — .

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POLICY OPTION D: Strengthen Comprehensive Community Development

Programs, Making Multimodal Planning and Development an Integral Element of Community Development

Description

This policy would make urban transportation subordinate to

urban growth management and land use planning objectives. Transit

would be considered a support service similar to water, sewers,

or another element of the community infrastructure. This policy

option and pJ.arming concept is the one practiced most frequently in

many countries throughout the world and specifically in Europe.

The option would give priority to land use and community development goals oriented toward minimizing the need for transportation and

limiting the length of the trips that would be necessary.

Institutional Aspects. Policy D would fundamentally alter the

relationship between transportation agencies and land use planning

and development. Transportation agencies would not make policy or

decide upon plans for transportation facilities and services.

Instead, they would play a technical support role in designing,

constructing, and operating the transportation system, which would

be selected as an integral part o-f a land use plan.

The unit or agency of government charged with the responsibility

for growth planning, development, and management would make transportation decisions in the same way as it would make decisions about

other utility support systems. A regional unit of government or

agency would have the authority and responsibility to make decisions over aspects of land use that are regional in character.

Policy D would in effect encourage the creation of metropolitan

governments. Land use planning agencies at the city or county level

would be able to assume the general development planning and administration responsibilities necessitated under the policy, but this

is unlikely except in single-county or city metropolitan areas with

a tradition of strong leadership at those levels of government. In

these cases, the coupling of the necessary statutory powers to the

new comprehensive responsibilities of planning agencies could be

expected to occur without issue. In other areas where a gradual

transfer of planning (as distinguished from implementing) authority

to regional bodies, including regional transportation agencies, has

been occuring over the past two decades, the new responsibilities

under Policy D logically would be taken on by the regional planning

organization.
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Responsibilities for comprehensive growth management at the

regional level would require shifting of numerous statutory authorities from the local to the regional government. Although the Federal Government may not be able to accomplish this shift directly,

the availability of Federal funding for such purposes would provide a strong inducement for states and local governments to make

the necessary statutory changes.

Institutional changes also would occur at the Federal level.

Federal transportation agencies, as well as other Federal

agencies with specific program responsibilities, would assess com-

‘ prehensive development plans in relation to national priorities.

They would no longer carry out detailed oversight and step-by-step

approval of the planning process.

Technical planning considerations. The technical planning requirements to support this policy option would not be significantly

different from those widely in use today for transportation planning,

as they might be modified and improved in the ways described for

Policy A and Policy C.

A recent worldwide survey of transportation planning requirements revealed that most countries utilize planning methodologies

and techniques originally developed in this country following

World War II and subsequently improved and refined. In many nations,

and specifically in European countries, these techniques are employed

in a planning process that for years has considered transportation .

just one element of a comprehensive plan.

Summary Assessment

The policy option of considering transportation an integral

and subordinate element of a comprehensive land use and development

plan has considerable potential to overcome some of the problems

of resource allocation, scattered land use patterns, energy waste,

and inefficient transportation systems. The United States is one

of the few highly developed countries that separates transportation

planning to a major extent from general land use and development

policies and plans. .

Implementing the policy would be difficult due to the broadreaching nature of the reforms and the fact that, historically,

this country has not exercised much public control over land use.

However, a base of political support for development controls and

planning has been evolving in recent years and is reinforced by

recent awareness of the desirability of reducing energy consumption.
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UNPACKAGING THE POLICIES

The descriptions of the alternative combinations of policies highlight

the changes in the Federal transit program that would be necessary to achieve particular national objectives. Most of these

changes involve one or more of the policy initiatives described

in Chapter 6, and the policy options thus offer remedies for the

major issues identified during the course of this study. However,

the policy options do not expressly discuss each of the individual

policy initiatives described in Chapter 6, or explain when these

initiatives could be pursued independently.

In general, Policy A describes all the initiatives that

could be taken under the present program to resolve the issues

described in Chapter 6. Policy B addresses additional issues requiring availability of additional transit money for resolution.

Policy C answers the problems created by lack of joint administration of transit and highway programs, while Policy D addresses the

need for integration of transit and land use planning.

This section looks at the question from another perspective.

It briefly reviews the conditions under which the policy initiatives described in Chapter 6 would be feasible and fruitful. For

convenience, the same heading categories are used: institutional

policies, technical planning process policies, and financial policies. .

Institutional Policies

The responsibilities of organizations involved in transit

activities could be clarified, and a lead agency identified, under

any of the options. In any case, appropriate action at the state or

local level would be needed to provide the necessary shifts in

statutory authority.

However, a Federal initiative would have greater impact under

policies C and D, which would provide the example of a consolidated

transportation agency at the Federal level and could offer a substantial sum of Federal money allocated under a formula with built-in

incentives.

Integrated transit and highway decisionmaking would become

possible only under policies C and D; and integrated land use and

transportation decisionmaking could be achieved only under Policy D.

In general, whereas under each option the lead agency could be any of

the four alternatives cited in Chapter 6 (local government, transit

operator, state agency, or metropolitan planning agency) , the state agency

alternative is most likely under Policy C, and the metropolitan

planning agency alternative is unlikely to be a possibility except

under Policy D. Inasmuch as policies C and D are more likely to

lead to a strong lead agency and thus a rationalized decisionmaking

forum, these options would bring the greatest gains in accountability. ‘
—..--..—— .-. . . . . -

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Even at present, however, Federal guidelines could be modi-

— fied to recognize the need for structuring decisionmaking processes--

genuine decisionmaking processes, not just at the MPO level--to be

close to the elective review process. Federal guidances could explain the various alternative measures to gain accountability!

and their consequences, more carefully. Under any of the policy

options, Federal guidelines could be provided outlining procedures

that will provide the opportunity for citizen participation.

Technical Planning Process Policies

Improvements ‘in the technical planning process would be possible

under any of the policy options. Basically, UMTA needs to clarify

how it will administer its proposed policy on major mass transportation investments in a way that meets the criticisms that have

been made, and to augment these guidelines with more explicit descriptions for how to set goals and use measurable criteria in evaluation.

In a number of respects, the technical planning process could

be significantly improved if highway and transit programs were

merged at all levels of government, an advantage that would be provided under policy options C and D. This step would encourage more

serious consideration of transit options that use highways. It

also would permit analysis of transit-plus-highway alternatives,

in contrast to transit-only alternatives! and open the door to a

serious examination of whether integrated surface transportation

programs meet particular national goals.

These improvements also would be possible under Policy D. This

policy would provide the additional benefit of genuinely integrating

land use and transportation planning.

Transit Financing Policies

The only policy initiatives in the financing category that could be

pursued under the current program would entail modest use of financing incentives for obtaining existing Federal goals. Broader restructuring of the national goals and criteria for use in developing

financing incentives (or in building incentives into an allocation

formula) would be possible under policies B, C, and D.

Policies B, C, and D all would provide opportunities for increasing the funding levels for transit, increasing the flexibility

between capital and operating purposes, and for allocating a greater

portion of the funds by formula. These changes would address many of

the financing issues described in Chapter 6.

However, a merging of the transit and highway program would be

necessary to permit meeting national goals for using highways
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to provide transit capacity, to allow development of a more equitable allocation formula, and, in general, to provide greater economic efficiency in Federal transportation spending.

In conclusion, a great many issues affecting the conduct of

transportation planning could be addressed at the present time,

under the current program, and without Congressional action. Most

of these issues involve the technical process of transit planning--

the steps taken by planners to generate the information needed by

decisionmakers. However, to remedy the fundamental institutional

and financial issues that influence how that technical information is

used (and, to a certain extent, its content), basic changes must

be brought about through Congressional action and related initiatives

at the state and local levels.
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CHAPTER 8

SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

The assessment found three major categories of issues to

feet the conduct of transit planning and decisionmaking

sues related to the institutional’ context, (2) those related

the technical planning process, and (3) those involving means

for financing transit.

I

Some of the most significant influences

are exerted by the organizations responsible

planning and making the decisions.

The technical planning process provides

public officials and their constituents draw

and decisions.

aft o

(1) isused

on transit planning

for conducting the

the information that

upon in making plans .

Issues involving transit financing policy are closely interconnected With issues that have arisen within both the other two

categories of investigation. Institutions must have access to

sources of financing to be effective in implementing plans, while

the technical planning process must produce plans that are financially feasible. The sources of funds and the conditions under

which they are made available have created significant problems

for metropolitan transit planners and decisionmakers.

●

Effects of the Institutional Context on Transit Decisionmaking

● Responsibility for transit planning and decisionmaking

is fragmented among the many governmental agencies involved, particularly at the local and regional levels of

government.

● One of the effects of fragmentation is to encourage competition for decisionmaking authority, and particularly

for the power to set schedules and budgets for transit

improvements. The pressures of competition tend to prodube overextensive plans that serve everyone in a region

more of less equally, rather than smaller plans focused on

parts of the region with specific transit problems.

.

● Special-purpose agencies charged with transit planning

tend to have difficulty responding to local concerns if

they begin with a mandate to construct a regional system.

Agencies dominated by powerful. contractors are likely to

be especially unresponsive to the public will.

f
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● Institutional fragmentation also leads to lack of effective coordination between planning for different transportation modes, and between transportation planning and comprehensive planning. Thus important opportunities

are lost for improving transit operations

through highway management and for developing transportation systems to serve future development patterns.

● Efforts by the Federal Government to improve coordination

by lodging transit decisionmaking power in multimodal

Metropolitan Planning Organizations have not had notable

success. Most Metropolitan Planning organizations are

regional councils of government, which, although

empowered to make regional comprehensive plans,

have statutory authority or financing resources

the plans into effect.

they are

do not

to put

Effect of the Technical Planning Process on Transit Decisionmaking

● The proper function of technical planning is to provide

the objective information that is needed to guide decisionmaking. One of the most important lessons learned from

the metropolitan experience is that a predetermined solution tends to seriously diminish the objectivity of the

technical planning work.

Cities in which no one transit system was the clear favorite have produced more impartial analysis concerning the

merits of alternative proposals.

The several reasons for narrowness of early transit planning include the general ignorance of the range of technological options, the lack of UMTA support for planning,

and pressure exerted by engineering consultants with previous experience in conventional transit (and with a

vested interest in producing a plan they would be qualified to design and construct).

Lacking the technical information that might have been

provided by a continuing transit system planning process,

political and business leaders tended to settle on the

single technological alternative with which they were

familiar and to make a commitment to it at the time that

they promoted the initiation of transit system planning. ,

The pressures for predetermining plans have worked against

open, participatory transit planning that evaluates a

broad range of alternatives against criteria based on

public goals. Alternatives have been examined on a systemwide instead of subarea basis. Plans have tended to

be inflexible instead of preserving options for dealing

with future changes in technology or transportation needs.
- — .

I

,

●

●

●

*

●

●

Effects

-162-

The data and methodologies used to forecast ridership

help determine the outcome of the planning process. Nevertheless, the reliability of transit ridership forecasts over time has yet to be demonstrated.

In a similar vein, no convincing evidence has been presented that the presence of a transit system per se .

influences land use in the absence of coordinated land

use controls.

. ●

Citizen participation programs are a means for correcting

data about public values and needs that are essential .

for making good transportation plans. Although public

officials increasingly regard public participation as

an integral part of the planning and design process,

well-structured participation programs have not been

widely used. Federal requirements call for citizen

participation but do not explain how to proceed.

.

One of the difficulties in gaining public involvement,

especially during the 1960s, was the commonly held assumption that rapid transit did not threaten to create

unwanted impacts. . .

On the negative side of the issue, citizen participation

programs can lengthen the planning process, and, if the

interests of any small group are allowed to dominate, they

can bias decisionmaking. ●

UMTA’s proposed policy for its major urban mass transportation investments may go a long way toward resolving some

of these issues, particularly the overemphasis on fixed,

long-range plans. However, the policy's success is dependent

large extend on the ability of UMTA’s small, centralized

staff to review whether the local planning process has a

full range of feasible transit options. More importantly,

the policy fails to address a number of major institutional and financing issues.

of Financing Mechanisms on Transit Decisionmaking

● Financing issues cut across the other major categories

of investigation.

● Soaring increases in operating expenses and the costs

of proposed new systems have created new pressure for

expanding the amount of Federal support for transit that

is available, and for increasing the flexibility in the

uses to which the funds can be put.

● Several aspects of Federal financing policy encouraged

regional, long-range transit planning to the exclusion

of short-range, more localized planning. Because of

the early lack of UMTA support for continuing transit

system planning, transit studies were initiated in many
-163-

‘ metropolitan areas as a result of reaction to the construction of interstate highways. Heavy rail transit

technology was seen as the obvious alternative for serving the long distance commuter with less disruption to

neighborhoods. The availability of Federal funds for

capital improvements only also has created a bias for

extensive systems.

● Separate funding and administration of highway and transit programs at all levels of government, resulting in

diverse objectives and lack of coordination, has prevented

(and continues to prevent) the advancement of transit

improvements that require changes in street/highway

management policy.

● At the regional level, the need to gain approval in referenda for transit financing bonds or taxes has also led

to long-range plans for overly extensive, single technology regional systems. A specific technological concept

with broad voter recognition and appeal often was required in order for metropolitan leadership to generate

sufficient interest to raise the necessary local and

state funds to initiate a transit planning program, even

with Federal funding. Ironically, the decision to present an extensive regional system to voters in several

cases resulted in defeat of the proposal on the grounds

that it was too expensive.

● Voters in a regional transit financing referendum like

to see a very specific plan so they know what they are buying. In part to keep the price tag low, estimates do not

provide for many of the costly activities -- land acquisition and the like -- necessary to take full advantage

of development opportunities in the vicinity of transit

stations or corridors.

At the root of any effort to resolve these issues is a broader

issue involving the question of establishing national goals for

public transportation. Existing goals offer no concrete answers

to the central questions of how much public transportation the

nation wants to buy, what purpose it should serve, and who should

pay for it. These goals must be more sharply defined if they are

to be used as a firm basis for mobilizing, dispensing, and

evaluating the use of Federal funds. The kind of goals that are

set will underlie whether more specific policies to shape transit

institutions, planning, and financing will achieve their intended

effects.

●
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APPENDIX I

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF

MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION

AND

EXECUTIVE GUIDELINES

AFFECTING URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION

Name of Act or Regulation General Significant for Mass Transit Planning

Housing Act of 1961 0 Authorizes $25 million for 2/3 Federal-share

transit demonstration projects and $43 million

for capital loans.

. 1962 Federal-aid Highway Act

of 1962

1964 Urban Mass Transportation

Act

(PL 88-365)

1964 Civil Rights Act

(PL 88-352)

Housing and Urban

Development Act

(PL 89-117)

Department of

Transportation Act

(PL 89-670)

o Establishes transit planning as one of a half

dozen eligible activities under the comprehensive urban planning program (Section 701) ●

o Requires continuing, comprehensive, and coordinated planning to integrate regional highway

planning with transit and land-use planning.

o Authorizes 2/3 Federal-share capital grants

to states and local governments for

transit projects; public or private

o Authorizes $375 million, 1965-1967.

,

●

o Establishes strong labor-protective

mass

operator.

policy

for Federally assisted transit projects.

(Section 13)

o Provides for non-discrimination in all

Federally assisted projects.

o Authorizes 2/3 Federal-share planning grants

to solve “metropolitan or regional problems.”

o Recipient is metropolitan planning agency with

broad political representation. (Section 701,g.

o Creates DOT; agency appropriation follows in

1969.

0 Provides for protection of historic, park,

recreation and wildlife lands. (Section 4f.)

.

o Increases 1968 and 1969 authorizations for

capital program by $150 million each year.

o Allows grants for states and localities for

technical studies, provided they are part of a

coordinated transportation system; and grants

for job training and university research.

(Sections 9, 10 and 11.)

,
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56 Demonstration Cities and o Requires grant review and comment by metroMetropolitan Development Act politan planning agency composed of local

amendments elected officials. (Section 204; Superseded

(PL 89-754) by Office of Management and Budget Circular

No. A-95).

68 Housing and Urban Develop- o Increases 1970 authorization for capital grant

ment Act amendments by $190 million.

(PL 90-448)

o Amends definition of "mass transportation" to

include special public transit services, not

limited to fixed route services.

68 Federal-Aid Highway Act

(PL 90-495)

68 Intergovernmental

Cooperation Act

(PL 90-577) 

0 Allows 50% Federal-share demonstration project

grants for fringe parking in cities more than

50,000.

0 Requires consistency with official objectives of

cooperative state, regional and local comprehensive plan, as prerequisite for Federal assistance.

(Section 401,c.)

o Requires notification to governors of Federal

assistance to jurisdictions in their state.

968 Federal Reorganization o Transfers urban mass transportation <unctions

Plan #2 from Secretary of HUD to Secretary of DOT and

(33 Fed. Reg. 6965) creates Urban Mass Transportation Administration

(UMTA) within DOT.

969 Circular No. A-95 o Sets up detailed project notification and review

Office of Management and system (PNRS) to act as an early warning system

Budget for state and regional agencies when an applicant

first seeks Federal assistance.

969 Housing and Urban o Increases 1961 authorization for capital grants

Development Act amendment by $300 million.

(PL 91-152)

969 National Environmental o Requires that, with all Federally assisted proPolicy Act jects, methods be drawn up by executive agencies

(PL 91-19u) for insuring that environmental considerations

rank with economic and technical consideration

given in the project approval process.

o Requires environmental impact statement with

project proposals, including assessment of

impact of alternative courses of action.

o Gives state, area, and local pollution-control

agencies opportunity to comment.
(

I 1970 I

I

Urban Mass Transportation

Assistance Act amendments

(PL 91-453)

1970

1970

1970

1973

Federal-aid Highway Act

amendment

(PL 91-605)

Uniform Relocation Assistance

and Real Estate Acquisition

A c t

(PL 91-646)

Airport and

Development

(PL 91-258)

Federal-aid

(amendments)

(PL 93-87)

Airway

Act

Highway Act

o

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

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Pledges Federal commitment of $10 billion over

12-year period.

Authorizes $3.1 billion for long-range capital

program.

Limits given state to 12.5% of authorized grant

funds= (Section 15. )

Initiates DOT study of operating subsidies.

Incorporates environmental protection requirements. (Section 14.)

Encourages projects for the elderly and physically handicapped. (Section 16.)

Requires local public hearing process prior to

capital grant approval. (Section 3,d.)

Encourages industries affected by space winddown to compete for project grants.

Incorporates requirement for comprehensive

transportation planning in cities with more than

50,000 population, in order to receive highway

monies under Sec. 105 of the Act. (Section 3,c.)

Allows money from Highway Trust for mass transit

fringe parking and preferential bus lane project

Establishes Federal-share for these at 70% after

July 1, 1973.

Provides grant for Washington, D.C., to provide

accessibility to the handicapped.

Requires replacement housing for persons displaced by any Federally assisted project.

Provides relocation grants up to $15,000 for

homeowners and $4,000 subsidy to renters.

Provides for establishment of national transportation policy in connection with development

of airports.

Increases mass transit, long-term capital program to $6.1 billion with $3.0 billion new

authority.

Increases Federal-share limit on capital grants

from 2/3 to 80%. Lifts 2/3 limit on technical

study grants.
 -167-

1973 Federal-aid Highway Act

amendments (continued)

o Authorizes $800 million of urban system funds

from the Highway Trust for mass transit capital

projects: bus projects in FY 75, rail projects

in FY 76.

1973

1974

0 Authorizes use of interstate urban segment funds

for transit projects, if Secretary of DOT is

persuaded that the need for intraurban roads is

not as acute as transit needs.

Joint Communique, FHWA, o Encourages governors to designate a single agency

UMTA, & FAA in each metropolitan area as the Metropolitan

Planning Organization to receive FHWA, UMTA, end

when possible, FAA system planning funds.

National Mass Transportation o Increases mass transit long-range capital program

Assistance Act to $10.925 billion -- $4.825 billion new

(PL 93-503) authority.

I

o Authorizes $3.975 billion for a new formula grant

program and sets Federal-share for capital projects under this program at 80%, operating subsidy at 50%.

These funds offer the first Federal operating

subsidies for mass transit. (Section 5.)

o Specifies state as sole allocator of formula

grant monies in cities with fewer than 200,000

people; governor, local officials and public

transit companies as co-allocators in cities

with populations greater than 200,000.

0 Requires, under formula grant program, that

elderly and handicapped persons be charged no

more than half fare during off-peak hours.

o Allows grants for establishment and organization of public or quasi-public transit corridor

development corporations; generally encourages

joint development between transit and other land

uses.

o Sets aside $20 million in FY 74 and again in

FY 75 for study of no-fare transit systems;

requires Secretary of DOT to report annually on

his findings, beginning June 30, 1975.