The Health of the Scientific and Technical

Enterprise: An Advisory Panel Report to the

Office of Technology Assessment

October 1978

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 77-600130

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FOREWORD

The Federal Government now spends about $28 billion per year on research

and development (R&D) activities and facilities in the United States. As part of

the effort of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to acquire a thorough

understanding of the Nation’s R&D effort and of the process whereby R&D results are converted most effectively into useful innovations, we asked Dr. Donald

F. Hornig, a member of OTA’S Health of the Scientific and Technical Enterprise

Advisory Panel to coordinate this panel’s efforts in formulating a state-of-the-art

look at the health of the scientific and technical enterprise and factors for determining its vitality.

We believe this effort, as presented in this report, will assist the Members of

Congress and their staffs in dealing with the complex issues of R&D policies and

priorities over the years ahead.

RUSSELL W. PETERSON

Director

Office of Technology Assessment

i i i
OTA R&D Policies and

Priorities Program Staff

Nancy E. Abrams* Barry Barrington Roslyn Dauber

Harlan S. Finer Carolee McBee Ellis Mottur ●

John Young Christopher Wright Irene Zarechnak

Consultant

Donald F. Hornig

Director, Interdisciplinary Programs in Health

School of Public Health, Harvard University

Assisted by Vivien Shelanski

Science, Technology, and Human Values, Harvard University

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

Kathie S. Boss Joanne Heming

● Has since resigned from OTA

iv
Program on R&D Policies and

Priorities Steering Committee

Russell W. Peterson Lewis M. Branscomb

Director Chairman

Office of Technology Assessment Panel on the Applications of

Science and Technology

Jerome B. Wiesner

Chairman Harvey Brooks

Technology Assessment Advisory Chairman

Council Panel on Health of the Scientific

and Technical Enterprise

Gilbert F. White

Chairman

Panel on Decisionmaking on R&D

Policies and Priorities

Health of the Scientific and

Technical Enterprise Advisory Panel

Harvey Brooks, Chairman

Benjamin Peirce Professor of Technology and Public Policy

R. Stephen Berry

Professor, Department of Chemistry

University of Chicago

Solomon J. Buchsbaum

Vice President, Network Planning &

Customer Service

Bell Laboratories

Barry M. Casper

Professor, Department of Physics

Carleton College

James Franklin Childress

Joseph P. Kennedy Sr.

Professor of Christian Ethics

Kennedy Center for Bioethics

Georgetown University

Jewel P. Cobb

Dean

Douglass College

Harvard University

Donald W. Collier

Vice President, Technology

Borg-Warner Corporation

Richard B. Freeman

Associate Professor

Department of Economics

Harvard University

Leo Goldberg

Distinguished Research Scholar

Kitt Peak National Observatory

Donald F. Hornig

Director, Interdisciplinary Program

in Health

Harvard University

Richard M. Krause

Director, National Institute of Allergy

and Infectious Diseases

National Institutes of Health

William J. McGill

President

Columbia University

Robert S. Morison

Visiting Professor

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology

David Z. Robinson

Vice President

Carnegie Corporation

Jurgen Schmandt

Associate Dean, Lyndon B. Johnson

School of Public Affairs

University of Texas at Austin

H. Guyford Stever

Independent Consultant
Decisionmaking on R&D Policies and

Priorities Advisory Panel

Gilbert F. White, Chairman

Director, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Chicago

Robert S. Browne

Director

Black Economic Research Center

Robert A. Charpie

President

Cabot Corporation

John W. Davis

Attorney

Adams and Davis

Martin Goland

President

Southwest Research Institute

Jerry Grey

Independent Consultant

Gerald B. Grinstein

Attorney

Preston, Thorgrimson, Ellis,

Holman & Fletcher

Frederic A. Holloway

Vice President for Science

and Technology

EXXON Corporation

Edward B. Lindaman

President

Whitworth College

Richard R. Nelson

Professor of Economics

Institute for Social and Public Studies

Yale University

Don K. Price

Professor

John F. Kennedy School

of Government

Harvard University

Lola Redford

Chairman of the Board

CAN’S Council on Environmental

Alternatives

Donald B. Rice, Jr.

President

RAND Corporation

Applications of Science and Technology Advisory Panel

Lewis M. Branscomb, Chairman

Vice President and Chief Scientist, IBM Corporation

Preston T. Bankston Charles J. Hitch Arthur S. Obermayer

Deputy Director, Office of Science President President

and Technology Resources for the Future, Inc. MOLECULON Research

Mississippi Fuel and Energy Corporation.

Management Commission C. Lester Hogan

President and Chief Executive Robert M. Solow

Barry R. Bloom Officer Institute Professor

President, Central Research Fairchild Camera and Instrument Massachusetts Institute of

Pfizer, Inc. Corporation Technology

Irving Bluestone Alice Tepper Marlin Philip H. Trezise

Vice President, Director Executive Director Senior Fellow

United Auto Workers Council on Economic Priorities The Brookings Institute

General Motors Division

Claire Nader Herbert F, York

Edward E. David, Jr. Independent Consultant Professor of Physics

President University of California at San Diego

EXXON Research and

Engineering Company

NOTE: While the Health of the Scientific and Technical Enterprise Advisory Panel (listed on previous

page) served as the principal advisory group for this report, the Decisionmaking on R&D Policies and

Priorities Advisory Panel and the Applications of Science and Technology Advisory Panel also provided advice, critique, and assistance during the project for which OTA is deeply grateful. Although

these advisory panels recommended release of the report, OTA assumes full responsibility for the

report and the accuracy of its contents.

vi
CONTENTS

THE HEALTH OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ENTERPRISE

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Science, Technology, and Society . . . . . . . .

The Definition of Enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Problem-Solving, Innovation,

and Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Process of Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Organizational Components of

the Innovation Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Structure of the Scientific and

Technical Enterprise . . . . .

Diagnosis of Health . . . . . . . .

Level I–Current Maladies and

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

Afflictions:

Indicators of Overt Current Malfunctions . . .

Level II—Vital Processes: Predictors of

Basic Health in the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Level III—Optimal Performance: Assessing the

Relative to its Ultimate Potential. . . . . . . . . .

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks are extended by the author to Drs. Donald Collier and

Harvey Brooks, members of the OTA Health of the Scientific and Technical

Enterprise Advisory Panel, who made substantial contributions to the initial

formulation of ideas for this report.
The Health of the

Scientific and Technical Enterprise

An Advisory Panel Report

to the Office of Technology Assessment

by Donald F. Hornig
Introduction

Science and technology permeate every

aspect of a modern society; they are integral

parts of our cultural, economic, political, legal,

and social systems. Because national security,

the economy, and the quality of life are seen to

depend in part on the health of the scientific and

technical enterprise, large sums are spent on

maintaining and developing the enterprise, on

applying its fruits to present and future problems,

and on educating young men and women to participate in scientific and technical activities. More

than a million -and-a-half persons are trained in

fields of science, engineering, or medicine and

more than half-a-million are engaged in research

and development activities. More than $24 billion in Federal funds and $30 billion in private

funds are spent annually on research and development. At the same time that we see science

and technology as engines of progress we are

also aware of the costs of consequent changes in

the social fabric and the potential dangers inherent in reshaping nature. We look to science

for a rational basis to regulate new products and

processes, and to protect and even improve the

environment.

Against this background of reliance and faith

on the one hand and resistance and fear on the

other, it is appropriate for Congress, the administration, the scientific and technical community

and the public to ask “How are we doing?” Current assessments vary widely. Some contend that

money is being spent frivolously on basic research, while others maintain that we are neglecting to build better foundations for the future

through basic research and the nurturing of

talent. Some believe we fail to apply what we

already know while others feel we concentrate

excessively on the application of science and

technology to present needs. Many claim we

forego opportunities for lack of adequate research effort. Plainly we must find better ways to

judge both whether the needs of the country and

society are being met, and whether the money

and human effort is being well spent.

This seems straightforward but, in fact, it is

hard to define either “the enterprise” or “health”

in ways which are useful to Congress and the

public. Assessment is elusive because science

and technology have cultural and spiritual impacts as well as material ones. The difficulty is

augmented because the consequences of the enterprise relate more to the future than to the present. Thus the health of the R&D effort concerns

not only present performance, but also the capacity to anticipate and deal with future problems. For all these reasons, none of the attempts

to construct criteria or indicators has been widely

accepted as meeting the need.

This report does not attempt to judge the

health of the enterprise. It does try to develop a

useful definition of the enterprise and to present a

framework within which policy makers can assess

its health.

Science, Technology,

and Society

The most distinctive feature of a 20th-century -

developed society is the complete integration of

science and technology into its basic way of

thinking. It is taken for granted that living things,

our planet, and the history of mankind can be deciphered, Travel to the moon—an engineering

miracle—presents no conceptual novelty or surprises, especially to children. Few doubt that

eventually the biological differences between

cancer and normal cells can be utilized to prevent

or cure cancer. This confidence that nature can

be understood in terms of predictable regularities

and relationships is a recent development in

human history.

Science and technology represent not only

knowledge and skills but specific traditions and

ways of thinking about the world. It is often difficult to realize just how deeply we believe in and

rely on our capacity to manipulate as well as understand the physical world. Nearly all our thinking about energy and environment, for example,

is predicated on the capacity to manipulate the

physical world.

One of the most important consequences of

this state of affairs is that our dreams of what is

possible are shaped by science. Even our values

and ethical judgments are modified as we learn

3
and understand more. An assessment of the

health of the scientific and technical enterprise

must incorporate such significant social factors as

the continuing ability to lead and not mislead the

public. It must assess the continuing ability to inform our thinking and comprehension of what

the world is and what it might be, as well as its

ability to meet material needs.

Another consequence of the technological

character of our society is the high level of skill required to keep it going. Even if no new technologies were introduced, it would be necessary to

train succeeding generations of highly skilled

technicians simply to maintain what we have, to

diagnose problems, and to make repairs. Actually, we would have to do more. Resources run out

and have to be replaced. Nature often tends to

undo spontaneously what has been achieved.

Diseases and pests accommodate to antibiotics

and pesticides. New blights arise to attack the

food plants

knowledge

needed just

of life.

Because

methods of

society and

on which survival depends. New

and technology are constantly

to avoid retrogression in the quality

new products, procedures, and

production affect the structure of

the health, safety, and rights of its

members, laws and regulations are necessary to

diminish the potential for harm. But here too,

having contributed to the situation which requires

regulation, science and technology can also provide knowledge and techniques to inform the

regulatory process and give it a rational foundation. We need only consider the recent debates

about nuclear energy, saccharin, and laetrile to

see how immediate these questions are. The

need for an adequate knowledge base for the

regulating activities of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA), Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA), Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC), Federal Communications

Commission (FCC), and similar agencies is

becoming recognized as increasingly important.

The ability of the scientific and technical enterprise to provide that foundation is an important

criterion of its health.

The Definition of

the Enterprise

1n its broadest sense, the scientific and technical enterprise can be defined as all activities

which place new and existing knowledge and

skills at the disposal of society and which utilize

technology to maintain our society and produce

changes in the way things are done.

This broad definition incorporates many of the

factors previously discussed. However, what

concerns policy makers and the public most is the

role of the enterprise in the process of innovation: the process by which problems are identified

and solved, needs are met, materials are made

available, and new concepts are added to society. This is its role as an engine of change. With

this in mind, the scientific and technical enterprise will be more explicitly defined and described

after a consideration of how innovation occurs.

Problem-Solving,

Innovation, and Change

General Considerations

Because most societal activity is directed

toward meeting existing needs in established

ways, change occurs very slowly in traditional societies. There is no natural law which impels a

society to change independent of individual or

collective decisions. What is relatively new in our

own and other developed countries is the attempt to address needs and problems systematically by investing significant human resources and

material output in problem-solving and the development of new capabilities. The result has been

better health, a rising material standard of living,

and constant change in educational, social, and

economic activities. However, the benefits of economic growth and technological change have

been accompanied by pollution of the environment, as well as social stresses and threats to

civilized society resulting from its command over

ever more potent instruments of violence.

4
The objective of assessing the health of the scientific and technical enterprise is to provide advice on how society can decide how much to invest and how to derive the greatest benefit from

its investment in innovation. By innovation we

mean the process by which new knowledge is

generated and applied to the material and intellectual operations of society. Thus, innovation is

more than discovery and theorizing, more than

speculation or invention, and more than engineering design. For until the new “know-how”

is incorporated into what is done, innovation has

not occurred.

The Process of Innovation

The process of innovation is complicated and

takes many forms, depending on the circumstances. It is often thought of as a linear process

leading from basic research to practical results,

either because of the “push” of new scientific

knowledge or the “pull” of human needs. Both of

these simplified models have elements of truth

but neither describes the true process adequately.

In one of the common models, innovation is

thought of as a four-step process:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Basic research, which generates knowledge and understanding and builds an intellectual foundation for science and

technology.

Applied research, which expands

knowledge (science) related to specific

goals and develops technology 

(skills and

know-how) in a form which can be used.

Decisions to utilize the technology.

Application of the knowledge o r

technology to society’s operations, e.g.,

through new products or processes, new

Government legislation or regulations, etc.

Because this model directs attention separately

to each of these four steps and their independent

institutional development, it does not take adequate account of the omnipresent “pull” of

market forces which exercise a major influence

on all aspects of the scientific and technical enterprise.

Nevertheless, this “technology push” conception of innovation often appears in public discussions and is reflected in current policy and

planning for the advancement and application of

science. But it is a misconception to think that if a

new technology becomes available it will eventually and inevitably be used. To be sure, “technology push” accounts for some recent, novel industrial artifacts such as nuclear reactors, communications satellites, and lasers, but it is not the

normal mode of innovation. More commonly,

technological innovation has been the result of a

market or social “pull”, a response to identified

needs or desires in society.

Another simplified model takes account of

market “pull” but fails to recognize the prior importance of advances in scientific knowledge and

problem-solving capabilities. The “market-pull”

model, often used by industrial managers, heads

of mission agencies, and Federal policy makers,

conceives of innovation as a different linear process:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Identification of a problem, need, or demand.

A decision about the kind of technology

(skills, know-how) to be used to meet it.

Generation of the needed technology,

together with whatever scientific foundations are required.

Application of the technology to solve the

problem or meet the need.

This model, based on an initial recognition of a

particular desire or need to be met, describes a

great many cases of innovation, particularly

those that do not depart far from the existing

state of the art. However, experience has shown

that radically new technology and especially new

scientific knowledge cannot usually be developed

in response to need. Vaccines are a case in point:

although the need for them has long been recognized, their production is limited by the ability to

solve basic scientific problems and they are not

available yet for critical diseases such as gonorrhea.

Neither of these two models provides an adequate description of the innovation process. Both

recognize, correctly, that what is needed is to

match skills and know-how with needs and desires; but both imply, incorrectly, that the process

is linear. By contrast, examination of past experience suggests that the process actually involves

repeated interactions among the various steps

rather than being a one-way street in either direction.

5
Organizational Components of

the Innovation Process

Analyses of the innovation process in different

settings, including Federal and State governments, individual Federal agencies, industrial

laboratories, engineering organizations, and voluntary associations reveal that there are usually

three functionally distinct yet interrelated types of

suborganizations which work in concert and contribute to the process:

1.

2.

3.

6

Organizations that recognize needs to be

met, set goals and limits, and allocate the

necessary resources. In general, these are

the management and policymaking

groups which guide the activities of an enterprise, be it a Federal agency, industry,

or an academic institution. In industry, for

example, there are suborganizations that

assess policy options, and the technology

needed to achieve the goals. These organizations conduct a dialogue with potential

users and beneficiaries, set the level of

resources to be devoted to the innovative

process, and relate the effort to the goals

of the organization.

Organizations that do one or more of the

following: educate or train people to staff

the enterprise, generate scientific knowledge and new technology, and package

the knowledge and skills so they can be

assimilated and applied successfully and

efficiently. These organizations include

universities and Government and industrial research laboratories.

Organizations that apply the new technology. Application is typically, but not exclusively, the function of industrial development and engineering laboratories. It is

also the task of agricultural experiment stations, hospitals, and a variety of military

establishments. Much technology is actually developed in the course of application,

for example, in industrial engineering laboratories rather than in organizations established to perfect new technology for

general purposes. An example of a very

effective set of applications organizations

may be found in agriculture. A quite different form of applications is the use of

technical knowledge in the formulation of

policy. The examples of energy policy, environment policy, and regulatory decisions

illustrate the importance of such applications.

The general functions and relationships

among the organizations can be diagramed as indicated in figure 1:

Figure 1

SOCIETY

SOCIETY

‘ . . A

Apply science and

technology to

societ y’s material

and intellectual

operations

The functions associated with these three

types of organizations are characteristically different and loosely coupled organizationally. Yet,

if successful innovation is to occur in an area of

social or material need, these functions must interact closely. Innovations may originate and get

their driving force from entrepreneurship in any

one of the three organizations. However, Successful innovation is a highly iterative process and

involves repeated interplay between the organizations and between each of them and relevant

constituents of society.

It is not possible in a short report to discuss details of the systematic interrelations of these functions in all the settings in which they occur. Each

is an element of a larger system which they sustain and are in turn sustained by. In the Federal

Government, for example, the goal-setting and

resource allocation function for science and

technology is performed by the administration at

all levels, as well as in the Congress. To do so

they must be adequately informed, not only of

the needs and desires of the society which they

serve and which elects them, but also of the opportunities and costs: technical, social, and economic. Communication is essential: with the uni-
versities that train scientists and engineers and

conduct much of the basic research; with Federal

laboratories that apply science to Federal missions; with the industries that carry the principal

responsibility for the application of science and

technology to the material needs of society.

In industry it is a responsibility of management

to ascertain the needs and possibilities of the marketplace and to allocate and develop the necessary financial and human resources. However,

successful decisionmakers must be in close touch

with the technical component of the organization

to understand what is involved in an ongoing or

proposed development. At the same time, the

group responsible for applications must themselves understand the characteristics of the company’s market since additional needs (which

modify what they generate) are frequently uncovered in the process of applying technology.

Potential applications are often only recognized

by those actively engaged in research who

understand what is possible.

There are similar close links between the

generators of knowledge, the appliers of knowledge, and the educators of people. Basic research is frequently stimulated by applications,

either because new questions are raised, new

ideas come forth or new experimental apparatus

is made available. Conversely, basic researchers

are often the first to recognize practical applications of their discoveries. Moreover, because of

the apprenticeship system of graduate education

in the sciences and a university research establishment that depends heavily on the work of advanced students, basic research in universities is

closely coupled to education. Basic research and

higher education in turn are closely coupled to industry and Government because the flow of

freshly trained people provides one of the major

routes for carrying the newer results of basic

science into an environment in which they are

applied. And, there is a reverse educational link,

too. Universities are not the only source of scientific and technical education. The continuing

education of scientists and engineers takes place

in the laboratory, design shop, and the factory;

success in both ongoing activities and innovation

depends highly on training programs conducted

by industry for employees at all levels as well as

constant self-education through reading and

scientific meetings.

Finally, it must be stressed that the organizations responsible for innovation are each closely

linked to society as a whole, and this relationship

has taken on new dimensions. Society cannot be

thought of only as customers, beneficiaries, or as

an electorate which gives political legitimacy to

the enterprise. Society is increasingly aware not

only of the great potential for good but of what it

perceives as a possible threat in technologies and

even in basic science. One need only consider

the concern over pollution, chemical carcinogens, and recombinant DNA research. Our body

politic is simultaneously excited, awed, and

frightened by a scientific and technical enterprise

it does not understand. If the entire innovative

process is not to come to a halt, or at least be

badly distorted, better means must be found for

constantly informing and consulting with the

public at large concerning matters they feel may

affect them deeply.

Therefore, strong interactions and good communications between all of the three organizational segments are essential to innovation. The

fundamental rule of success in innovation is that

there must be a responsive link between the

potential users and the generators of knowledge

or technology.

If we equate the scientific and technical enterprise, for our purposes with those who generate

knowledge, generate technology, or train people, it is apparent that its health (i. e., how well it

can carry out its role) will depend strongly on the

links to the other two functions.

The Structure of the

Scientific and

Technical Enterprise

We have defined the scientific and technical

enterprise as those activities which place new and

existing knowledge and skills at the disposal of

our society and which utilize science and technology to maintain our society, to solve some of its

problems, and to produce changes in the way

things are done.

7
Specifically, we take the scientific and

technical enterprise to include:

Figure 2

1.

2.

3.

The performing organizations, chiefly

research and development organizations.

They are found in universities (including

engineering and medical departments), in

industry (research, development, and engineering activities), in Government

(agency laboratories, national laboratories)

and in various independent institutions, including hospitals.

The training organizations, both the formal

educational organizations such as universities and technical institutes, etc., and

those which provide on-the-job training.

The linking and communications organizations. These include professional and

trade journals, scientific and technical

societies, a wide variety of information

systems, and all the formal and informal

tools for transmitting knowledge and skills,

both within the system and to and from

those who are not directly a part of it. In

many cases the best links are people who

act as liaison between the various performing organizations, for example, the county

agents who have been such a key link between agricultural research organizations

and the farmer.

A further word maybe in order about research

and development, which in many ways is the

heart of the enterprise. R&D includes a variety of

functions which are conventionally separated for

budgetary and management purposes but which

in fact are closely related and often overlap.

These functions include basic research, applied

research, development, technology transfer, and

communications processes. The system can then

be represented as in figure 2.

In this diagram basic research is that which is

undertaken to turn up significant new knowledge

and relate it theoretically to what is already

known. Its value is measured by the extent to

which it strengthens the intellectual structure of

science and enhances understanding. The results

of basic research may or may not be immediately

useful, although experience suggests that almost

all good basic research is eventually useful,

directly or indirectly. It builds the foundation on

which long-term progress rests.

Applied

research and

invent ion

Applied research is undertaken to generate

knowledge or skills that are needed for some specific purpose. Its success is measured by the

degree to which it answers practical questions,

solves problems, or enhances technological

capability. Its purpose is practical but it may be,

and often is, of great theoretical significance as

well. Frequently, important theoretical questions

are raised in the course of application.

Research that is both basic and applied is classified in budgets, for example, according to the

purpose of the funding agency, even though the

primary motivations of the performer may be

quite different.

The ambiguity arising from using motive as a

criterion makes another division, illustrated in

figure 3, useful for many purposes.

Many industrial organizations are organized in

this way.

In both figures 2 and 3, development is the

conversion of the results of basic and applied

research into specific products and processes,

taking into account such further factors as cost,

reliability, safety, or convenience which are important to an end product.

Figure 3

.

I I 1 I

8
Diagnosis of Health

In addressing the health of the scientific and

technical enterprise the first question we must ask

is what we mean by health. Definitions such as,

“its ability to perform its function effectively” are

nonspecific and difficult to use as a criterion for

judgment. Although the analogy is imperfect, it

may be helpful to look at the health of the enterprise as one might look at the health of a person.

In medicine, too, “health” has a variety of meanings. Consequently, an assessment of health

may include everything from explicit disease or

injury to very general questions concerning a person’s well-being. Questions concerning the scientific and technical enterprise appear to span a

similar range; within obvious limitations, it is convenient and useful to pursue the analogy to medical diagnosis in organizing questions and developing criteria. Three levels of analysis seem appropriate:

Level 1: The Present State of Affairs: Current Maladies and Afflictions. At this level we

focus on the immediate situation and seek indicators of overt breakdowns, gaps, and malfunctions. These indicators might, for example, include cases where American technology is deficient in some respect or has been misapplied;

where people trained in specific scientific specialties are inappropriately utilized or in short supply;

where one or another communication linkage

breaks down and where the credibility of the

enterprise has eroded.

Level 11: Vital Processes: Indications of

Trends and Future Health. “Vital signs” in

medicine refer to such basic factors as blood pressure and respiration rate, which are indicative of

the long-term vitality and productivity of the

human body. Similarly, this level of analysis of

the scientific and technical enterprise focuses on

symptoms of future malfunctions and evidence

that present malfunctions are being corrected. To

illustrate, whereas the adequacy of scientific instrumentation currently available is a Level I

issue, whether there are adequate programs to

replace obsolete scientific instruments and to

develop new ones is a Level 11 issue, since it affects the long term rather than immediate viability. This level of analysis necessitates the development of “vital science indicators. ” Such criteria

relate both to the structure of the systems essential to the scientific and technical enterprise as a

whole and to research and development enterprises in particular.

Level Ill: Optimal Performance: Assessing the System Relative to its Potential and

to Idealized Goals. Analysis at Level III

assesses the quality of the performance of

healthy systems relative to what is possible. In

medicine, the comparable question might be

whether an athlete, for example, is performing

up to his/her maximum potential. With respect

to the scientific and technical enterprise we might

ask whether the creativity, productivity, and yield

of the system are as high as they might be. Level

111 involves the most subtle criteria of all, criteria

not just of present or future malfunction but of

optimal performance within human and material

resource constraints. In this context, comparison

with scientific and technical enterprises in other

countries can yield information as to whether alternative systems perform better or not so well.

Such international comparisons, admittedly imperfect, may nevertheless help us to develop criteria for improving our performance, even when

present performance is apparently satisfactory.

In the pages that follow we shall offer a

number of particular questions to illustrate these

levels of analysis. It should be emphasized that

there are no hard and fast distinctions between

the levels; with but a slight shift in perspective

almost any issue can be considered in more than

one category.

Level I

Current Maladies and AffIictions:

Indicators of Overt

Current Malfunctions

This level focuses on current concerns about

matters that are said to impair the present functioning of the enterprise. Complaints may originate with performers, managers, or members of

the public; some have been identified in the National Science Board (NSB) report, Science at

the Bicentennial. Criteria must be developed

rapidly in order to assess their validity. We must

know whether the concerns are groundless or

whether remedial actions are needed; if the latter, remedies must be identified and the impact of

9
their implementation assessed. Recently voiced

allegations include the following:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10

That research funds are improperly

allocated between projects and fields.

Some of the concerns voiced publicly by

Members of Congress fall into this category, as do the fears of many scientists

about the large sums directed to particular

applied subjects such as the cancer problem or the space shuttle.

That a disproportionate amount of time

and effort of technical personnel is spent in

writing and “selling” proposals and that

greater continuity and dependability of

funding is needed to improve the productivity of the system.

That excessive regulation and “red tape”

hamper the introduction of new technology in areas as diverse as nuclear power

and pharmaceuticals.

That too much or too little attention is

given to the environmental consequences

of new technologies.

That the scientific and technical enterprise

makes judgments about personnel on

bases other than merit, to the disadvantage of groups such as women and

minorities.

That talented young scientists are diverted

from basic research by the bleak prospects

for academic employment brought about

by the “saturation” of tenure positions in

research universities and the resulting

“aging” of the performers most engaged in

exploratory, long-term basic research.

That the productivity of governmental programs, particularly in federally funded laboratories, is adversely affected by excessively detailed “micromanagement” by

Federal officials.

That some areas of science are being retarded by the inadequate availability of sophisticated instruments.

That current tax and patent policies do not

provide industry with incentives to engage

in research, particularly long-range

research.

Level II

Vital Processes:

Predictors of Basic

Health in the Future

Level II assessments require general criteria for

health, upon which the long-term success of the

scientific and technical system depends. The

problem is to identify suitable indicators—a task

undertaken by the NSB in its Science Indicator

Series. Such indicators should not reflect merely

transient problems but be relatively stable in their

significance over considerable periods of time.

Most of the indicators cited in the literature to

date relate to input measures: e.g., national expenditures in dollars and manpower. Such indicators, while suggestive and provocative, avoid

the real question of what is being achieved and

whether we are likely to do better or worse in the

future. One would like to have data which would

allow us to ask such questions in analytical and

operational ways. Unfortunately, there is no

good model of an ideal scientific and technical

enterprise which can supply the basis for a real

systems analysis.

Despite the absence of such a model, qualitative and even quantitative measures of strength

in the system can still be sought: e.g., measures

of the capacity of U.S. science to make new discoveries, or at least the capacity of U.S. scientists

and engineers to elaborate on and exploit

scientific discoveries that have their origins

elsewhere. We can look for measures of the capacity of U.S. scientists, engineers, and artisans

to invent and create new ingenious solutions to

practical problems. This capacity, often referred

to as “Yankee ingenuity, ” was the basis for the

great surge in American productivity which surpassed Europe by the second half of the 19th

century.

More broadly we can look at the ability of U.S.

science and technology to provide intellectual

stimulus and motivation to its practitioners and

society alike. We can inquire into the capacity of

the system to exercise broad leadership in identifying problems and opportunities, and generating

institutional innovations relevant to dealing with

society’s problems. More and more we must satisfy ourselves concerning the capacity of the scientific and technical enterprise to use the world

pool of knowledge to cope with specific problems
such as energy production, food supply, environmental pollution and so on.

Finding measures that make it possible to approach these questions in analytical and operational ways is difficult. Even more so are the

questions concerning the inner dynamics of the

system such as its capacity to renew itself and to

develop, to learn from its failures and successes, 3.

to attract and provide opportunities for the

talented without regard to sex, race, or social

origin. We know that the health of the enterprise

depends on the general morale and pride of the

scientific and technical community as defined by

its self-image, self-confidence, and initiative, but

how can that be measured? Equally, the effectiveness of the enterprise depends on public con- 4.

fidence in its integrity, goals, methods, and outputs. The newest, most difficult, and very significant questions concern the capacity of the system

to respond to public concern and public needs

and to communicate with other elements of

society in understanding those concerns and

needs. 5.

There are many Level II problems that must be

addressed without delay. To cite but a single example: the flow of biologically active compounds

into our environment is steadily increasing and

the need to manage that flow and its consequences becomes steadily more apparent. One

urgent question, therefore, concerns the capacity

of the system to provide a sound scientific basis

for regulation, to indicate when it is needed, and

to resolve regulatory conflicts.

6.

The search for Level 11 indicators might include

a series of specific and researchable questions. 7.

For example:

1. How well can the system develop priorities

and order federally funded programs, both

by internal criteria and by interaction with

other parts of society? How well does peer

review work and what alternative methods, if any, could better judge scientific

priorities, not only for the purpose of mak- 8

ing grants, but in developing agency and

laboratory programs? Who is or should be

involved in setting priorities and allocating

funds; who should be consulted?

2. Is the scientific and technical enterprise

evolving to meet the changing needs of

society or is it excessively constrained by

its traditions and structure? Is there a

reasonable balance between the stability

necessary for the enterprise to function

and responsiveness to new intellectual

ideas and needs?

Does the operation of the system encourage the emergence of truth, both with

regard to science and to the impact of

technology? Does the reward system

derive chiefly from scientific truth? Are

communications with the public open and

honest and judged to be so by the public?

Is the balance between academic laboratories, industrial research and development organizations, and federally funded

research laboratories (national laboratories, agency laboratories, and independent

laboratories) appropriate to the sound

evolution of the enterprise?

Do federally funded laboratories have a

clear sense of role and purpose? Are they

carrying out the tasks for which they are

best suited? Are they productive and efficiently managed?

Is the scientific and technical enterprise

properly structured with regard to the distribution of effort among sections of the

country in which it is performed and

among institutions (e. g., is there too much

or too little concentration in the top performers)?

Is the long-range, exploratory basic research carried on at a level that will maintain the intellectual vitality of the enterprise, attract enough talented young people, or provide the intellectual foundation

for practical advances (e.g., in treating or

preventing cancer) which are currently

stymied for lack of basic understanding?

Conversely, are our industrial and other

applied research and development organizations converting the findings of basic

research into useful forms promptly and

effectively? Do Federal regulations as well

as tax and patent policies offer adequate

incentives to do so?

11
Level Ill

Optimal Performance:

Assessing the System

Relative to its Ultimate Potential

Even a healthy system is often capable of performance at a higher level than is actually attained. In humans the ability of the healthy system to perform at the highest possible level of

achievement in a specified area may be tested by

relative performance between individuals, as in

athletic competitions, or by comparing the present performance with best prior performance or

with absolutely established levels, as in some

achievement tests. In this spirit one may try to

compare the present scientific and technical system with a hypothetical ideal. The problem is that

we cannot agree on what we are trying to

achieve. Even further, what we imagine to be the

ultimate system might turn out to be far short of

what is possible, just as the 4-minute mile was

believed to be beyond the physiological limit of

humans until it was achieved and surpassed.

International comparisons offer some possibilities for comparing the performance of the pluralistically directed U.S. scientific and technical

enterprise with systems such as those in Western

Europe or Japan, which are more highly

planned, or those of Eastern Europe and the

Soviet Union, which are very highly planned and

coordinated. One source for such comparisons is

the ongoing series of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

studies on national science policies and technology gaps. OECD is also conducting comparative

studies of particular industries which can be utilized in the assessment of the health of the U.S.

system.

Other indicators that might be used to judge

the performance of the U.S. scientific and technical enterprise, and need to be interpreted and

evaluated for that purpose, include the following:

1. The fraction of major scientific and

technical advances, as judged by some

kind of world consensus such as the award

of prizes and patents, that have either

originated in the United States or been

brought to fruition in the United States and

how that fraction is changing over time.

2.

3.

The fraction of major technological or industrial advances, including advances in

the detection and control of undesirable

side-effects, as determined either by a consensus of expert judgment, by economic

impact and by social benefit, that have

either originated in the United States or

been brought successfully into use in the

United States and how that fraction is

changing.

The extent to which other systems have

found it desirable to follow the” U.S. lead in

dealing with drug registration, environmental protection, and so on.

Such comparisons are all retrospective. They

may guide us in knowing how well we have been

doing and are currently doing. The great unmet

need is for predictive indicators of how well we

will be doing in the future. That presents a most

difficult challenge. The art of prophecy is not well

developed, but it is worthy of thought and study.

Conclusion

The assessment of the health of the scientific

and technical enterprise has many facets. The

enterprise serves economic, social, and intellectual goals. It serves to advance the material, cultural, and even spiritual welfare of our society.

Given this variety of purposes, it is little wonder

that efforts to develop indicators have been

fraught with difficulty and have generated so

much discussion and controversy. Most of the

quantitative indicators now employed are ambiguous and sometimes even deceptive, and better

ways of assessing the situation are badly needed.

We have concluded that in many respects the

scientific and technical enterprise resembles a living organism in that it is composed of closely interacting organs, none of which can be meaningfully isolated from the whole. Hence, the design

of indicators, qualitative as well as quantitative,

can profit by considering the corresponding problem of diagnosis and evaluation in medicine.

There, too, health is an ambiguous term, but

separating the considerations relating to various
levels of immediacy, e.g., 25 current illness,

future prognosis, and overall long-term fitness is

a useful step in the analysis. Confusion results

when the levels are intermingled in diagnosis as

well as prescription. If the several meanings of

health are examined separately, however, we

believe that Congress and the administration, as

well as the universities and industry, will be in a

better position to assess the situation and to

develop further indicators. According to this way

of looking at things, indicators are like symptoms

and laboratory tests; some may be qualitative

and others quantitative. Taken individually, they

may or may not identify a disease or source of

future concern, but taken together in proper relation to each other, they may be very revealing.

With careful study of the collections of indicators which tell us whether something is wrong,

right now, and what it is, immediate action can

be prescribed. Similarly, indicators which purport

to show future trends can be amplified, weighed

against other criteria of advance or decline, threat

or promise, and used to change longer term programs. Lastly, measures of performance against

ideals are the least well developed, but this is not

surprising; since these depend so intimately on

political, ethical, and social values they have

meaning only in the context of national goals

which are often ill-defined and changing.

Science and technology have served the

United States well. From a Nation which utilized

the fruits of European science to build its industry

in the 19th century and sent its brightest and best

to Europe for advanced education in the first

third of the 20th century, the United States has

achieved preeminence both in its basic science

and its application of science to meeting its needs

and solving its problems. To do so it has assembled a complex net of people and organizations

in Government, industry, and universities interacting in many and complex ways. But now we

must ask whether we will do as well in the future.

On the basis of such indicators as are currently

available we have serious grounds for concern.

There are indications that we may be losing

ground to other countries. To maintain and improve the health of the scientific and technical enterprise we must constantly work at identifying

further criteria and indicators which will help to

diagnose the needs of this fragile and imperfectly

understood undertaking. As with human health,

a perennial series of checkups is unavoidable.

Then it only remains to follow the diagnosis with

action.