Caunterattack on the 

lbktong, 1950 

by Dr. William Glenn Robertson 

Combat Studies institute 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

December 1985 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Robertson, William Glenn, 1944-

Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950. 

(Leavenworth papers; no. 13) 

Bibliography: p. 

1. Naktong River (Korea), Battle of, 1950. 

2. United States. Army. Infantry Division, 24th. 

3. Korean War, 1950-1953-Regimental historiesUnited States. I. Title. II. Series. 

DS918.2.N35R63 1986 951.9’043 86-2637 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing of%&, Washinglo*, D.C. 20402 
Contents 

Illustrations ............................................................ v 

Tables .................................................................. vii 

Symbols ................................................................ ix 

Preface ................................................................. xi 

Chapter 

1. Retreatto theperimeter ........................................ 1 

2. The 24th Division Makes a Stand .............................. 13 

3. The Battle of the Naktong Bulge Begins ....................... 23 

4. The Counterattack Stalls ....................................... 39 

5. The Fight for the MSR ......................................... 57 

6. The Failure of Task Force Hill ................................. 75 

7. The Final Counterattack ........................................ 83 

8. Lessons of the Battle ........................................... 103 

Notes ................................................................... 113 

Bibliography ........................................................... 133 

L.. 

111 
1. U.S. Army infantry division (TOE No. 7N, July 1948) . I . . . . . . . . . 7 

2. Typical North Korean infantry division (Far East 

Command-Research Supplement, 19 October 1950) . . . . . . . . s . . . . . 21 

Maps (All maps are at end of text.) 

1. The retreat of the 24th Division, 5 July-5 August 1950 

2. The Pusan Perimeter, 5 August 1950 

3. The sector occupied by the 24th Division, 5 August 1950 

4. Situation, 1200, 6 August 1950, showing initial dispositions of the 

34th Infantry, the North Korean attack, and Ayres’ counterattack 

5. Situation, 2400, 6 August 1950, showing afternoon movements and 

19th Infantry counterattack 

6. Situation, 2400, 7 August 1950, showing earlier American and North 

Korean counterattacks 

7. Situation, 2400, 8 August 1950, showing the day’s counterattacks 

8. Situation, 2400, 9 August 1950, showing afternoon counterattacks 

9. Situation, 2400, 10 August 1950, showing North Korean eounterattacks 

10. Situation, 2400, 11 August 1950, showing American counterattacks 

11. Action on the main supply route, 12 August 1950 

12. Situation, 2400, 12 August 1950 

13. Operation to clear the main supply route, 13 August 1950 

14. Task Force Hill’s counterattack, 14 August 1950 

15. Situation, 2400, 15 August 1950, showing North Korean counterattacks 

16. Situation, 2400, 16 August 1950, showing North Korean ‘eounterattacks 

17. Operational Directive Number One, 24th Division, 16 August 1950 

18. Assault on Tugok and Obong-ni Ridge, 17 August 1950 

V 
22. The sector occupied by the 24th Division, 19-20 August 1950 
1. Troop list, 24th Infantry Division, 5 August 1950 . . . . IfI . . . ...1... I.. 14 

vii 
Symbols 

U.S.Amy 

1950 1985 

Signal El rsl 

Engineer I El 

Ordnance-Maintenance El E>-cC 

Quartermaster tal El 

Antiaircraft Artillery El la 

r---7 

A Displacing Unit L-J 

Friendly Axis of Advance 

Enemy Axis of Advance 

Friendly Units cl 

Enemy Units c3 

Nate: The unit symbalagy adapted for maps in this paper conforms to that 

in use in 1950. Elevations are in meters. Contour interval is twenty meters. 

ix 
One characteristic of virtually all large military establishments in the 

twentieth century has been their creation of a body of doctrinal material 

that in theory regulates the conduct of their future combat operations. Two 

sources, past experience and theoretical concepts, account for most of the 

intellectual underpinnings of this mass of military doctrine. Of great importance in the development of this doctrine is the analysis of actual operations 

that occurred during previous conflicts. This systematic analysis of past 

events usually results in the identification of doctrinal principles having 

potential validity in future wars. Military history, therefore, represents the 

raw material from which much doctrine is crafted. 

The relationship between military history and military doctrine, however, 

extends beyond that of simply source and product. Military history also 

provides a methodology for determining the validity of a particular military 

doctrine in a particular situation. By critically examining specific historical 

data from a battle, campaign, or series of operations, the military historian 

can discover the answers to a series of pertinent questions: What was the 

prevailing doctrine at the time? Was the doctrine applied? What was the 

effect of application or nonapplication ? As with all historical questions, 

definitive answers may not be available, making the historian’s conclusions 

tentative at best. Yet even tentative conclusions may provide useful guidance 

to soldiers struggling with the age-old problems of doctrine writing and 

force development for future conflicts, If battle is the true test of doctrine, 

then military history is the means by which that truth may be discovered. 

Of all the forms military history may take, operational accounts are 

among the most difficult to write successfully. First, there is the problem of 

focus. Does one concentrate upon the highest levels of command where the 

major decisions are made, upon the intermediate levels where the decisions 

are implemented, or upon the lowest levels where the cost of the decisions 

is exacted in lives and treasure? A complete account of a battle must 

encompass all of these areas in some way, but a successful mix is often 

elusive. Compounding the difficulty is a second problem-that of order. The 

nearer one approaches the top of the chain of command, the greater one 

finds a sense of order and rationality, or at least the appearance of such. 

But at the bottom of the chain, the entire world seems to be irrational and 

xi 
The genesis of this paper was the decision by the Combat Studies 

Institute to study counterattack doctrine and operations in the Pusan Perimeter campaign that occurred in Korea during the summer of 1950. Preliminary investigation showed that the most concentrated series of American 

counterattacks during the perimeter fighting occurred during the action 

known as the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge, 6-19 August 1950. Prior 

to August, American and South Korean forces had been too pressed by the 

North Korean invaders to mount a coherent defense, much less initiate 

counterattacks. Withdrawal behind the Naktong River permitted both armies 

a brief respite from combat and the opportunity to establish a conventional 

line of defense with relatively secure flanks. When the North Korean 4th 

Division breached the Pusan Perimeter in the sector of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division on 6 August, it triggered an extensive series of counterattacks that lasted for the next two weeks. Those counterattacks and the 

doctrinal foundation supporting them are the subject of this paper. 

From beginning to end, no matter how many units joined the fight, the 

24th Division was the headquarters responsible for directing the counterattacks in the Naktong Bulge. Official division records are voluminous, 

though occasional gaps appear in the files of subordinate components. In 

contrast, personal accounts at the small-unit or individual levels are minuscule in number. No doubt a major effort to locate survivors would generate 

an inspiring and instructive tale of the courage, heroism, and suffering o

the men who fought in the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge. Yet such is 

not the primary purpose of this paper. Rather, it focuses upon the levels o

command that directed the battle-division, task force, and regiment. Only 

occasionally does the focus drop to the levels of battalion, company, and 

platoon-and then only to illuminate the problems encountered in executing 

decisions made at higher levels. 

In order to analyze critically the actions of division and regimental 

commanders, the operations of battalions and companies must be studied 

in detail, because it was there, at the sharp end, that battle plans either 

succeeded or failed. Therefore, a concerted effort was made to determine 

the location of all company- or battery-size units for every day of the fight. 

Although little documentation exists below the regimental level, companylevel location plotting proved feasible through the use of surviving documents 

and map overlays found in division files. Thus, the American troop dispositions for each day of the battle have been recreated from the division’s 

own records, using information available to the division staff at the time. 

Similarly, depiction of North Korean troop movements is also derived from 

reports received by the division staff. The result of this process was a 

reconstruction of the divisional situation map at 2400 on each day of the 

battle, using only information available to the division staff by that hour. 

What the actual situation maps at division headquarters looked like is 

impossible to know at this date, but all of the information utilized in the 

xii 
Admittedly, use of official documents and situation maps to reconstruct 

an action omits much of the human element of battle and imposes an order 

on the proceedings quite invisible from the frontline positions. Nevertheless, 

contemporaneous official records, such as journals, messages, and especially 

situation maps (but not war diaries prepared after the fact) are crucial to 

reconstructing the progress of a battle from the perspective of a division 

headquarters and analyzing decisions of the higher commanders. Such is 

the purpose of this paper, and it is left to others to cover in full detail the 

story of the men in the rifle squads, both soldiers and marines. Their story 

merits telling, but it must be in a forum other than this. 

Chapter I of this study describes the counterattack doctrine existing in 

1950 and provides a brief summary of how the 24th Division came to be 

behind the Naktong in August. Chapters 2 through 7 describe the American 

operations in the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge, beginning with the 

initial battalion-size counterattack and concluding with the final coordinated 

push that erased the North Korean gains and restored the original defensive 

positions along the river line. Chapter 8 reviews the course of the operations 

in light of the prevailing doctrine on counterattack and suggests tentative 

conclusions. 

The careful study of any battle or campaign yields lessons from the 

past that can light our way, however dimly, into the future. The First Battle 

of the Naktong Bulge is no exception to this rule and, indeed, is especially 

rich in historical examples relevant to current doctrine. This study, while 

primarily an analysis of counterattack doctrine from a divisional perspective, 

incidentally raises other important issues as well. Foremost among them 

are a wide range of questions concerning the employment of light infantry. 

On paper, the 24th Division was in August 1959 a heavy infantry division; 

in reality, it had been reduced by peacetime belt-tightening and operational 

losses to approximately the size of today’s new light divisions, with a similar 

mix of weapons. Forced to fight in prime light infantry terrain, the division 

continued to operate with the mind-set of a road-bound heavy force. In contrast, the North Korean 4th Division, equally light, maneuvered freely 

through the roadless area. In addition to light infantry, other relevant issues 

raised by the study include the potential responses available to encircled 

forces, the use of ad hoc forces to protect a division’s rear, and the lack of 

existing doctrine for skeletonized units. All of these issues represent fruitful 

areas of investigation and deserve studies of their own. 

. . . x111 
1 Retreat to the Perimeter 

Military theorists have long considered the offensive to be the decisive 

and, therefore, the most favored form of warfare. Only through offensive 

operations, it is argued, can the goals of a warring state be attained. Yet 

for every attacker, there must be a defender, if resistance is to be made. 

This defensive role is usually adopted reluctantly, since it represents most 

often a condition of weakness, either permanent or temporary. If the weakness is permanent, the defender seeks only to damage and delay the 

attacker’s forces as much as possible in hopes of raising the cost of success 

beyond limits acceptable to the attacker. In such situations, the defensive 

stance becomes simply a means of self-preservation. If the defender’s 

weakness is only temporary, however, the defensive form of warfare can 

servea much greater end. Once again, the defender seeks to delay the 

attacker, but the time gained is utilized to accumulate reservesof troops 

and materiel that will ultimately be unleashed against the original attacker 

in a counteroffensive. Seen in this light, the defensive is the prelude to the 

offensive action believed necessary to achieve a decisive victory.1 

Before any counteroffensive can be undertaken, the defensive battle must 

be won. On the tactical level, the defender must deploy his forces on critical 

terrain in such a way that the attacker’s thrust is parried and hurled back, 

leaving defensive positions intact. But all too frequently, the determined 

attacker succeeds in penetrating the defender’s position, Left unchecked, this 

penetration may grow rapidly in size and threaten not only adjacent units 

but also the entire scheme of defense. Defenders faced with such penetrations 

usually attempt counterattacks, either to eject the attacker from the defensive 

position or, at worst,to contain the penetration. The timing of such counterattacks is one of the most difficult decisiona a commander must make. If 

made either too soon or too late, the counterattack may fail to check the 

enemy”s momentum, and the defensive position will be lost. If made at just 

the right moment, when the attacker has lost momentum and is disorganized, the counterattack may succeed in restoring the integrity of the 

defensive position without undue loss. In this sense, counterattack may 

indeed be “the decisive element of defensive operations.“2 

U.S. Army defensive doctrine in 1950 clearly reflected the idea that 

defensive operations should have a greater end in view than simply psPrrying 

1 
ment of more favorable conditions for undertaking the offensive, or to eco

mize forces on one front for the purpose of concentrating superior forc

for a decisive action elsewhere.” Once the defensive battle was conclud

successfully, U.S. forces would assume the offensive in order to render 

enemy’s units ineffective and destroy his will to resist. In operational term

therefore, the successful defensive operation would lead inevitably to 

counteroffensive.3 

The edition of FM 100-5 published in 1949 outlined specific reco

mendations for the defender. First, the defensive position should be selec

and organized so as to be held at all costs. Next, the main battle positi

should be screened by a covering force and supported by strong mob

reserves that could be made available instantly for a counterattack. Wh

battle wasjoined, the covering force would confuse, delay, and disorgani

the attacker prior to his reaching the main battle position. Once there, 

attacker wauld be met by the maximum firepower available to the defend

who would use terrain to assist the defense. Yet even if all these st

were executed perfectly, the manual recognized that the defender’s b

efforts might be insufficient to prevent hostile forces from entering 

defensive position.4 

In case a penetration occurred, the alert defender should have a se

of counterattack plans readily available, although FM 100-5 acknowledg

that such plans could not be minutely detailed. A limited infiltration 

relatively weak forces that had not occupied critical terrain could be isola

and easily destroyed by fire. A penetration by somewhat larger units t

had seized critical terrain should be met by a counterattack force consisti

of local reserves. A more serious penetration would have to be referred t

higher echelon, where a more elaborate counterattack plan would be 

pared. Althaugh the timing of the counterattack could not be predetermine

it should be implemented at that critical moment when the enemy was 

greatest disarray, when his momentum had lessened, and when his un

and fire support had become disorganized. 

In theory, the counterattack force should consist of all combat arms. 

armor were available, it shauld lead the counterattack and be supported 

infantry, which would exploit any success gained. No matter what for

were utilized, they should be controlled by a single counterattack command

Simply stated, his goal was to “‘close the gap created by the hostile fo

and ta isolate and destroy the enemy’s advanced elements.” This result co

be achieved in two basic ways. In the more common type of counterattac

the enemy would be struck in the flank, causing him to withdraw from 

lodgment or be destroyed. A favorable axis of advance would be requi

far this type of counterattack to be successful. The second type of coun

attack would be applicable to a mare fluid defensive scheme, in which un

would maneuver “to trap and destroy the penetration at a point particular

favorable to the counterattack.” While a greater degree of prior plannin
The doctrine published in FM 100-5 was essentially a digest of lessons 

derived from American combat experience in World War II, It was tailored 

to the standard triangular divisional system of that conflict, in which three 

infantry regiments, each consisting of three battalions, constituted the 

primary fighting power of an infantry division, The war had also shown 

that certain supporting units normaIly controlled by higher echelons 

profitably could be attached directly to a division. As a consequence, revised 

tables of organization and equipment (TOE) were published in 1947-48 that 

significantly strengthened the basic infantry division in terms of firepower. 

Under the new TOE, each infantry regiment received a heavy mortar 

company (twelve 4.2~inch mortars) and a tank company (twenty-two tanks), 

while the division as a whole was augmented by a heavy tank battalion 

(seventy-one tanks). Supporting the infantry and armor were four field artillery battalions (each with three firing batteries), along with an antiaircraft 

artillery battalion, an engineer combat battalion, a medical battalion, and 

various other support units and detachments. The aggregate strength of 

this reorganized infantry division stood at 18,804 officers and men, an 

increase of over 4,500 troops from the infantry division of World War II.6 

Unfortunately, the new TOES represented an ideal unattainable in the 

peacetime climate of the late 1940s. The complacent national mood, budget 

restrictions, and low enlistment rates had combined to lower Army strength 

by June 1950 to only 591,487 troops, barely one-tenth of the World War II 

total. Of these troops, ten combat divisions provided most of the Army”s 

war-fighting capacity, but only one of them, the 1st Infantry Division in 

Germany, had its full complement of soldiers. All of the other divisions 

wereorganized under a skeletonized system that omitted up to one-third of 

a division’s maneuver elements and much of its supporting firepower. Infantry divisions lacked one battalion in each regiment, and each field artillery 

battalion had only two firing batteries. Instead of a heavy tank battalion 

and three regimental tank companies, infantry divisions contained only one 

tank company. The antiaircraft battalion was also represented by only one 

battery.7 

Strength was not the only shortcoming evident in the U.S. Army of 

1950. Weapons development had been slow since 1945 and procurement even 

slower. Units in the field, therefore, were armed with the same basic weapons 

used to fight World War II: M-l rifles; BARS (Browning Automatic Rifles); 

.30- and &O-caliber machine guns; 2.36inch rocket launchers; mortars of 

60-mm, $1-mm, and4.2~inch caliber; and howitzers of 105mm and 155mm. 

Although the new M-26 Pershing tank had appeared in limited quantities 

as early as 1945, most tanks in service were either variants of the M-4 

Sherman medium tank or the M-24 Chaffee light tank. Food, clothing, and 

medical supplies were available in adequate quantities, but stocks of spare 

parts and ammunition had reached dangerously low levels.@ 
attractive. This was partially accomplished by permitting recruits wide 

latitude in the choice of a branch or specialty. Such a policy, however, 

inevitably !ed to reduced numbers of recruits in the less desirable combat 

arms, such as infantry. Moreover, many of the rigors of traditional army 

training and conditioning exercises were reduced or eliminated. Combat 

simulation was seldom attempted, since it was potentially dangerous to those 

involved, and accidents would adversely affect public opinion. In addition, 

most of the units stationed overseas were engaged in occupation duties not 

requiring a high degree of combat proficiency.g 

The four infantry divisions in the Far East Command that garrisoned 

Japan mirrored the Army’s state of unreadiness in all respects. The 

authorized peacetime strength for each of these divisions was 12,500 men, 

leaving each division short over 6,000 men, 1,500 rifles, three rifle battalions, 

six heavy tank companies, and four field artillery batteries. As a result, 

each division could deploy no more than two-thirds of its wartime infantry 

and artillery firepower and only 14 percent of its tank firepower. Since no 

new equipment had been received by Far East Command since World War 

II, the equipment available was warworn and, in many cases, maintained 

only with the greatest difficulty. In fact, 90 percent of the weapons and 75 

percent of the vehicles in Japan had been salvaged from materiel left on 

Pacific battlefields at the end of the war. Ammunition stocks in Japan 

amounted to no more than a forty-five-day supply. Training had been 

hindered by administrative duties incident to occupation, the lack of adequate 

training areas in Japan, inadequate leadership among battalion- and 

company-level officers, and the low quality of recruits received from the 

United States. Although a more realistic combat training program was underway by the spring of 1950, the units of the Far East Command were ‘“flabby 

and soft, still hampered by an infectious lassitude, unready to respond swiftly 

and decisively to a full-scale military emergency.“1o 

Such an emergency would be thrust upon the United States and its 

military forces in June of 1950. The crisis occurred in Korea, which long 

had been a pawn of its larger and more powerful neighbors. Controlled by 

Japan since the early days of the twentieth century, Korea had been divided 

into occupation zones by the victorious Allies in 1945. North of the 38th 

Parallel, the Soviet Union disarmed Japanese troops and established order, 

while south of that line, the United States did the same. As tensions grew 

between the occupying powers, American efforts to establish a united Korea 

failed. In 1947, the United States sought a solution in the United Nations 

that established a temporary commission to oversee free elections in both 

zones of occupation. When the Soviet Union denied the UN Commission 

entry into its zone, elections were conducted only in the south. The balIoting 

resulted in the estabhshment of the Republic of Korea (ROK) under the 

leadership of President Syngman Rhee in August 1948. The United States 
program.” 

North of the 38th Parallel, the Soviet Union was instrumental in the 

formation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, with Kim 11 Sung 

installed as premier in September 1948. Although Soviet combat units were 

withdrawn from Korea, the Soviet aid program focused on creating a strong 

North Korean military capability. As that capability grew, North Korea in 

late 1948 began to foment internal disorder in South Korea. Friction between 

the two Korea, intensified, and clashes along the 38th Parallel became 

commonplace in 1949. By June 1950, a North Karean People’s Army of ten 

infantry divisions, two independent infantry regiments, and an armored 

brigade was poised on the border of South Korea. Trained and equipped by 

the Soviet Union, this powerful force contained large numbers of combat 

hardened Koreans who had recently been released from service with the 

Chinese Communist Forces. This force was supported by a five-brigade 

Border Constabulary of 18,000 men. All told, North Korea could deploy 

approximately 135,000 ground troops against its neighbor to the south.12 

Opposing the North Korean People’s Army was the Republic of Korea 

Army of approximately 98,000 men organized in eight divisions, half of 

which were understrength. While the North Koreans could deploy 150 T-34 

tanks and considerable quantities of medium artillery, South Korean forces 

had no tanks or medium artillery whatsoever. Nor could South Korea field 

any fighter or bomber aircraft to counter the 110 combat planes available 

to support the North Korean ground forces. Although outfitted with the 

same infantry weapons as U.S.. forces in Japan and trained by the small 

U.S. Military Advisory Group, the ROK Army was by no means ready to 

repel an invasion across the 38th Parallel in the summer of 1950. 

Unfortunately, American military authorities at the time did not recognize 

this and generally believed that South Korea’s armed forces were adequate 

to meet any conceivable threat from North Korea.13 

When the North Korean People’s Army stormed across the 38th Parallel 

on 25 June 1950, it soon became apparent that the ROK Army was woefully 

unprepared to resist a full-scale invasion. Although some ROK units fought 

well with the limited equipment available to them, others withdrew in 

disorder, opening wide gaps in the defensive line. The U.S. Military Advisory 

Group barely escaped the capital city of Seoul before it fell on 28 June. 

When the Han River line was breached two days later, there seemed to be 

little hope of halting the invasion before most of the country was lost.14 

The United States government was totally unprepared for the disaster 

befalling the Republic of Korea. For some time, it had assumed that the 

only possible conflict would be a global war, and most planning had been 

devoted to that single contingency. Western Europe had received first priority 

in both personnel and equipment, leaving the Far East with lower levels of 

both. Nevertheless, General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far 
proved insufficient to halt the North Korean drive. On 30 June, Preside

Harry Truman authorized MacArthur to commit U.S. ground forces to t

struggle, a move that MacArthur had recommended earlier. As a result, 

0315 on 1 July, Eighth Army ordered the 24th Infantry Division to Korea

In some respects, the 24th Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. William 

F. Dean, was an unfortunate choice. Of the four divisions in Japan, it h

both the lowest aggregate strength (12,197 men on 30 June) and the lowe

combat effectiveness rating (65 percent on 30 May). Like the other units 

MacArthur% Far East Command, its troops ‘were not trained and equipp

for sustained combat, nor even conditioned for rigorous physical activity

Only about 15 percent of its officers and men were combat veterans

Moreover, the division lacked three infantry battalions and four field artiIle

batteries. A single company of M-24 Chaffee light tanks served as its on

armor, Since similar shortcomings were present in all of his divisions

MacArthur chose the 24th Division solely on the basis of it;s location

Stationed in southern Japan, the 24th was the nearest division to Kor

and, thus, could be deployed rapidly to that country. Several thousand m

were transferred to the 24th Division from other units, raising its strengt

to 15,965 men by the time of its departure (see figure 1).16 

The order committing the 24th Division to action provided initially 

the deployment of a small combat force by air, while the remainder of t

division followed by water. The initial force of two reinforced companie

known as Task Force Smith, arrived at Pusan on 2 July and moved nor

in an effort to delay the enemy’s advance. By 5 July, most of the 24

Division had reached Korea. On the same day, North Korean armor crush

Task Force Smith north of &an. Realizing the gravity of the situation

General Dean rushed his 19th, 21st, and 34th Infantry regiments forwar

to establish a series of blocking positions. One by one, these positions-at 

Ch’onan, Chonui, and Choch’iwon-were outflanked or overrun, and the 24

Division reeled backward in retreat. After one week of fighting, the divisio

had suffered heavy casualties, including 1,500 men missing in action. T

21st Infantry numbered only 1,100 men, less than 50 percent of its authorize

strength, and the 34th Infantry was operating under its third commande

Division strength on 14 July stood at 11,440 men (see map l).17 

As July progressed, disasters continued to strike Dean’s command. In 

series of actions at the Kum River on 14-16 July, the North Korean 

and 4th Divisions again outflanked the defenders. The 63d Field Artillery 

Battalion supporting the 34th Infantry was destroyed, while the 52d Fie

Artillery Battalion supporting the 19th Infantry lost eight howitzers. T

19th Xnfantry lost two commanders before escaping from the trap. Sever

days later, a similar debacle occurred when the same two regiments we

routed at Taejon. In that action, the 24th Division lost 1,150 men out 

3,933 engaged, including General Dean, who was taken prisoner. In som

units, the losses were staggering: Company L of the 34th Infantry lost 1
w 

cl 
thirty out of thirtyfour trucks.18 

By the time the 24th Division was relieved by the 1st Cavalry Divisio

on 22 July, its strength had been reduced to 8,660 men. During the previo

seventeen days, it had been driven back 100 miles by elements of two Nor

Korean divisions. It had suffered over 30 percent casualties, including 

especially heavy toll of field grade officers. In addition, more than 2,4

men were missing in action, among them the division commander. Durin

the long retreat, most of the division’s equipment had been destroyed 

abandoned. Their morale weakened by constant retreats, their strengt

sapped by dysentery and the heat of the Korean summer, the men of t

24th Division badly needed time to rest and refit before again entering t

fight. 

The ordeal suffered by the 24th Division brought to light many problem

that had been minimized or overlooked in the relative complacency 

peacetime. Equipment shortages that had not seemed serious for a divisio

on oeeupatian duty-the lack of telephone wire, radio batteries, and morta

ammunition-proved to be critical. The available maps frequently proved 

be inaccurate, an especially serious problem when plotting artillery fir

Furthermore, garrison duty in Japan had not physically conditioned troop

for operations in a mountainous terrain in midsummer. The large numb

of officer casualties also exposed the Army”s lack of depth in seasone

combat commanders, and inexperienced replacements had to learn their trad

under fire.19 

Of even greater importance than the Army”s physical deficiencies w

the fact that Army tactical doctrine was based upon full-strength uni

organized under a triangular system of maneuver elements. The doctrin

manuals presupposed that each regimental commander would be able 

deploy three battalions, the normal configuration being two battalions 

the line, while one remained in reserve. With only two battalions at 

disposal, a regiment either had to reduce its frontage to battalion width 

operate with no reserve. No matter which course was adopted, the regiment

tactical integrity was gravely impaired. The flexibility inherent in t

triangular system was lost, and flanks became much more difficult to prote

No American officers in Korea had previous experience with such a tactica

system, nor had the Army schools produced a modified doctrine mo

applicable to a two-battalion regiment. Commanders and staffs at eve

echelon had assumed that the peacetime formations would have their missin

companents restored before being committed to action, but this assumptio

proved false in the summer of 1950.2* 

On the day following it$ relief by the 1st Cavalry Division, the 24

Division received a new commander, Maj. Gen. John Huston Church. 

veteran of both world wars and holder of the Distinguished Service Cros

Church was no stranger to the situation confronting the 24th Division. H

had been in Korea since 27 June, first leading the GHQ Advance Comman
-Mai. Gen. John H. Church, 

Commander, 24th Infantry 

Dit&sion 

and Liaison Group (ADCCM) as MacArthur’s personal representative and 

later serving on General Dean’s staff in a similar capacity. Promoted to 

major general on 18 July, the slim and taciturn Church hoped to have a 

few days grace in which to restore the battered 24th Division to fighting 

trim.21 

On 22 July, Eighth Army assigned the 24th Division to Army reserve 

status, with residual responsibility for protecting an airfield near P’ohangdong on Korea’s east coast. On 24 July, after only one day’s respite, Lt. 

Gen. Walton Walker, Eighth Army commander, ordered the division to shift 

southward to counter a North Korean flanking drive in the vicinity of 

Chinju. Leaving the 21st Infantry at P’ohang-dong under Eighth Army control, the 19th and 34th Infantry regiments moved into positions around 

Chinju and Ko’chang respectively (see map 2). Action flared at both locations 

during the last three days of July as the North Koreans continued to gain 

ground at the expense of the 24th Division. In hopes of stabilizing the 

situation, Eighth Army returned the 21st Infantry to division control and 

that regiment relieved the 34th Infantry in the line on 31 July. So badly 

mauled by the North Koreans at Taejon that it had temporarily “‘lost its 

entity as a striking force,” the 34th passed into division reserve.22 

In the face of continued North Korean pressure, General Walker on 1 

August ordered a phased withdrawal of Eighth Army behind the Naktong 

River. This maneuver would shorten Walker’s front, while utilizing the 

natural barrier of the Naktong to shield the major port of Pusan. As part 

of the plan, the 24tb Division, which had been thinly spread cavering Eighth 
south of the 24th, while the 1st Cavalry Division extended the line to the 

north. The redeployment was to be completed during the night of 2-3 

August.23 

Although the constant retreats had been necessary, Walker feared that 

Eighth Army was losing whatever aggressiveness it once may have had

As early as 29 July, he had issued to officers of the 25th Division a ringing 

“‘stand or die” statement, which had been quickly circulated to other Eighth 

Army units as well. Walker announced that reinforcements were en route 

to Korea but that he could no longer trade space for time. With its back t

the sea, Eighth Army would have to hold its ground until help arrived.24 

Now, on 2 August, in the midst of still another retrograde movement, Walke

dispatched to all maneuver units a message regarding counterattack: 

Prior to assumption of the offensive, daily counterattacks will be made 

by all units to keep the enemy off balance, disorganized, and prevent him 

from launching a coordinated attack against our positions. Recent operations 

by ROK forces have demonstrated the value of frequent counterattacks to 

regain lost portions of the battle position and delay further advances of the 

enemy. Counterattack is a decisive element of the defense. The Buccess of a 

counterattack depends largely upon surprise, boldness, and speed of 

execution.25 

For several days, the 24th Division had little or no opportunity to 

counterattack as it completed its withdrawal behind the Naktong. First to 

move was the 34th Infantry, which crossed the river on 2 August and was 

in position west of Yongsan by 2300. The 21st Infantry and the attached 

17th ROK Regiment, which had been serving as rearguard, disengaged 

during the evening aad followed the 34th across the river. Shortly after the 

last units reached the east bank on the morning of 3 August, engineers 

demolished the Koryong-Taegu bridge. The only other span in the division 

sector, on the Ch’ogyeCh’angnyong road, had been destroyed on the previoue 

evening. With both bridges down, the Naktong became a moat behind which 

all elements of the 24th Division concentrated. Division forward headquarters 

was located at Ch’angnyong, and division rear moved northward from 

Masan to Miryang. By the evening of 3 August, all division units had 

reached the new sector except the 19th Infantry, which had just been relieved 

near Masan by 25th Division units and was en route north by rail and 

motor.zs 

The Eighth Army’s withdrawal behind the Naktong River line in early 

August marked a new phase in the Korean conflict. Previously, Walker’s 

divisions had operated independently, with their flanks unprotected, a 

situation not envisioned by the doctrinal manuals of the day. Unfortunately, 

this method of operations had facilitated flanking maneuvers by North 

Koreans. The concern by American units for their flanks had contributed 

heavily to their tendency to retreat more hastily than their commanders 

desired. Now, for the first time, the land area held by American and ROK 
then eastward 50 miles to the Sea of Japan. The western face of the 

perimeter was held by American units. From south to north, they were the 

25th Division around Masan; the 24th Division behind the Naktong covering 

Ch’angnyong; and the 1st Cavalry Division, also behind the Naktong in 

the vicinity of Waegwan. Extending the line eastward to the coast were the 

remaining elements of the ROK Army. With its flanks momentarily secured 

and with a few reserves in place, Eighth Army faced the continuing North 

Korean assaults with greater confidence than before.27 
The 24th Division Makes 

a Stand t 2 

A? 

The sector of the Pusan Perimeter occupied by the 24th Division in 

August 1950 extended from the junction of the Nam and Naktong Rivers 

northward along the Naktong to the vicinity of the village of Hyonp’ung. 

The distance from the Nam to Hyonp’ung by air was twenty-two miles, but 

via the twisting course of the Naktong, it was thirty-four miles. Although 

the river flowed through a valley that averaged 1,000 meters in width, the 

stream itself averaged no more than 350 meters across. The depth of water 

normally ranged between 1 and 3 meters. Peacetime traffic had crossed the 

Naktong in the 24th Division’s sector via the Ch’ogye-Ch’angnyong bridge 

and several small ferries, but such means were no longer available. The 

low water levels existing in the summer of 1950 exposed a number of areas 

fordable on foot, but the steep banks prevented vehicles from crossing without 

engineer preparation of the approaches (see map 3).1 

The valley of the Naktong in the 24th Division sector was flanked on 

both sides by hill masses averaging 200 meters in height but which 

occasionally rose above 300 meters. Although individual crests might be 

slightly taller than those facing them across the valley, seldom was the 

difference in elevation great enough to confer a significant military advantage. Only at the far northern end of the sector, where a 403meter hill 

stood on the east bank, was the terrain on one side of the valley dominated 

by that on the other. Elsewhere, the only notable difference between the 

valley walls was the presence of more gullies leading down to the river on 

the eastern side than on the western. All of the hills were bare except for 

occasional clumps of grass and scrub pine.2 

The width of his sector, the presence of the river, and the weakness of 

the 24th Division all influenced General Church in the preparation of his 

defensive dispositions. His plan called for the river front to be lightly held 

by units of platoon size or smaller, with gaps being covered by observation 

in daylight and by patrols at night. Regiments were to maintain local 

reserves well forward, while a mobile general reserve would be established 

farther to the rear. Defensive positions, both primary and alternate, were 

to be entrenched to the maximum extent possible. Minefields were to be 

placed at all possible crossing points. All boats and ferries were to be 

destroyed, except a handful needed for patrolling. No civilians were permitted 

13 
During the period 2 to 5 August, all elements of the 24th Division 

reached their assigned positions within the division sector. To implement 

his defensive plan, Church placed primary reliance on his major infantry 

components, the 19th, 21st, and 34th Infantry regiments, each of which 

contained only two weak battalions. In addition, the division maintained 

operational control of the 17th ROK Regiment. These units took positions 

in the line in the order in which they arrived. Two engineer combat bat

talions, the 3d and 14th, provided engineer support. Four field artillery battalions were also available, though none had more than two firing batteries, 

and two had only one battery each. The 78th Heavy Tank Battalion was 

represented solely by Company A, and the 26th Antiaircraft Artillery Bat

talion had only Battery A present (see table X).4 

Table 1. Troop List, 24th Infantry Division, 5 August 1950 

Division Troops 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company 

19th Infantry 

21 st Infantry 

34th infantry 

1 lth Field Artillery Battalion 

13th Field Artillery Battalion 

52d Field Artillery Battalion 

63d Field ArtiElery Battalion 

Company A, 78th Heavy Tank Battalion 

Headquarters Battery, 26th Antiaircraft Artillery 

Battalion (Automatic Weapons) 

Battery A, 26th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Automatic Weapons) 

3d Engineer Battalion (Combat) 

14th Engineer Battalion (Combat) 

24th Reconnaissance Company 

24th Military Police Company 

24th Quartermaster Company 

24th Signal Company 

24th Replacement Company 

724th Ordnance Maintenance Company 

24th Medical Battalion 

24th Division Medical Detachment 

24th Division Band 
3Odace ed epoCopay 

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 66th Ordnance Battalion 

8076th Surgical Hospital 

65th Engineer Company 

2d Engineer Construction Group 

Operetioffel Control 

17th RepubEic of Korea Infantry Regiment 

At 1800 on 5 August, the ration strength of the 24th Division was 9,882 

division troops, 486 men attached, and 2,000 ROK soldiers, for a grand 

total of 12,368. Even in its skeletonized form, the division had serious equipment shortages. Missing weapons included two 105mm and four 155-mm 

howitzers, thirteen 4.2-inch mortars, sixty-eight 3.5~inch rocket launchers, 

103 BARS, fifty-five 57-mm recoilless rifles, seven 75-mm recoilless rifles, 

and sixteen M-24 tanks. Division transportation lacked 335 l/4-ton trucks, 

eighty-five 3/4&n trucks, eighty-one 2 1/2-&m trucks, seventeen dump trucks, 

six 4-ton trucks, three repair trucks, 158 l/$-ton trailers, and 105 l-ton 

trailers. Ammunition stocks were low in all categories, and the shortage of 

4.2-inch mortar rounds was especially critical. Illuminating rounds in all 

calibers were scarce, making it impossible to keep the river under close 

observation at night. Shortages of tools, barbed wire, and antipersonnel 

mines also hindered the division’s defensive preparations.5 

By its own estimate, the 24th Division”s combat efficiency rating on 5 

August stood at 53 percent. This state of affairs had not gone unnoticed at 

Eighth Army headquarters, which had initiated a staff study to investigate 

the feasibility of withdrawing the division from the line. The division’s hard 

service and its losses in men and materiel were duly noted, as was the 

limited ability of Eighth Army to supply replacements of personnel and 

vehicles in the immediate future. The staff study recommended replacing 

the 24th Division with two regiments of the’newly arrived 2d Infantry 

Division on the night of 8-9 August. Eighth Army’s G3 section, however, 

disapproved this recommendation on the grounds that the division could 

not be spared from the front. The 24th Division would continue in the line, 

although General Walker remained concerned about the unit’s condition. 

On 6 August, he told a member of MacArthur’s staff that its combat value 

was minuscule and would remain so until the division was rehabilitated. 

In Walker’s opinion, the 24th Division was the most severely depleted unit 

in Eighth Army.6 

Of the division’s three regiments, the 34th Infantry was undoubtedly 

the weakest, numbering only 1,402 officers and. men on 5 August. With 

serious shortages of vehicles, 4.2-inch mortars, and BARS, the regiment had 

a combat effectiveness rating of 40 percent. Commanding the 34th was Col. 

Charles E. Beauchamp, a West Point graduate who. had arrived from Japan 
regiment even before it was committed to Korea. According to Beauchamp

the 34th had been rated the least effective of any of the regiments occupyin

Japan. Its performance in Korea had reflected that appraisal, with failure

at Ch’onan, Kum River, Taejon, and Koch’ang. In the opinion of historian 

Roy Appleman, the 34th Infantry was the ‘Cworst [regiment] of the three 

the division.“7 

As the first unit to withdraw behind the Naktong,. the 34th Infantry 

came to occupy the southernmost portion of the division sector. Although 

U.S. Army doctrine for defense on a wide frontage called for a full-strength 

regiment to cover no more than 10,000 yards, the 34th Infantry’s zon

stretched 20,000 yards up the Naktong from the mouth of the Nam. Behin

the front, the 34th was responsible for the security of a bridge over th

Naktong that led into the 25th Division’s sector at Namji-ri. Accounting 

for much of the 34th’s frontage was a prominent bulge in the center of th

regimental line where the Naktong made a wide loop to the west befo

resuming its southward course. The resulting salient, approximately 5,00

yards deep and 6,000 yards wide at the base, would come to be known a

the Naktong Bulge. Four ferry sites studded the salient, one on each sid

of the base and two near the nose (see map 4). 

With only two battahons available, Colonel Beauchamp assigned th

frontline positions to Lt. Col. Gines Perez’ 3d Battalion. Perez, who ha

just arrived from the United States, chose Companies I and K to hold th

flanks of the regimental position, with frontages of 5,000 and 7,500 yard

respectively. Re ordered Company L to occupy the salient in the cente

which extended for a total of 11,500 yards. Since his battalion numbere

only 493 officers and men on 5 August, Perez could do no more than esta

lish a series of platoon-size strongpoints on the hills overlooking the rive

Built around each company’s four machine guns, the strongpoints generall

covered those ferry sites that provided an avenue of approach to th

regimental rear via roads or trails. 

Directly supporting Perez were several additional units. The regimenta

intelligence and reconnaissance platoon occupied observation posts on tw

hills to the left of Company L’s position. The regimental heavy mortar com

pany emplaced four of its seven 4.2-inch tubes in a valley at the base 

the salient, near the battalion command post in the village .of Kogono-n

and sited the remainder 2,000 yards northward in the same valley. Part 

Battery A, 26th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) -Battalion, reinforced Compan

I as infantrymen. The battery’s four remaining half-track-mounted quadrup

antiaircraft machine guns functioned as a mobile reserve. On the road 

Yongsan, four miles behind Perez’ command post, Colonel Beauchamp 

established the 515 officers and men of Lt. Col. Warold B. Ayres’ 1st Ba

talion, 34th Infantry, as regimental reserve. Three -miles nearer the fron

the five 105mm howitzers of Battery B, 13th Field Artillery Battalion, 

operated in direct support of the 34th Infantry. Nearby, the 155mm howitzer
From his headquarters near Yongsan, Colonel Beauchamp supervised 

the 34th Infantry’s defensive preparations that had begun late on 2 August. 

During the next three days, the 3d Battalion strengthened its frontline positions, established a chain of observation posts, and sent nightly patrols 

along the east bank of the river. Fords were available, but because of a 

lack of boats, no patrols crossed the river in the 3d Battalion sector. Several 

miles in the rear, the 1st Battalion prepared counterattack plans and surveyed the road net behind the front. Company D, 3d Engineers, laid a limited 

quantity of antipersonnel mines along the river in front of K Company 

and improved the roads in the regimental sector. The artillery batteries established observation posts, registered their tubes, and developed fire plans to 

support the infantry defense. Throughout the regiment, units received limited 

quantities of new equipment as it became available.8 

Extending the division’s line northward beyond the 34th Infantry was 

Col. Richard W. Stephens’ 21st Infantry. Stephens held a much narrower 

front than Beauchamp, just under 12,000 yards, probably because his sector contained the Ch’ogye-Ch’angnyong road, as well as the division headquarters eight miles in the rear at Ch’angnyong. The ruins of the Ch’ogyeCh’angnyong bridge were in the center of the regiment’s front, and two 

ferry sites were located upstream on Stephens’ right. Fortunately, Stephens 

did not have to contend with any major salients in his line since the Naktong curved only gradually from northwest to north along his front. The 

21st Infantry numbered 1,670 officers and men on 5 August, but Stephens 

was unable to deploy that many since Company C and a section of &l-mm 

mortars were still at Yongdok on Korea’s east coast. Lt. Col. Charles B. 

Smith’s 1st Battalion consisted of 540 men, while Maj. John McConnell’s 

3d Battalion was only a shadow of its former self with 360 men. 

Although Companies I and L of McConnell’s command were so depleted 

that they were attached to Companies K and M respectively, Stephens 

assigned the 3d Battalion to defend the river line. In order to maintain a 

threecompany front, McConnell received part of the regimental Heavy Mortar 

Company, which was serving temporarily as a rifle company due to the 

severe shortage of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition. With a smaller area to defend 

than Perez, McConnell was able to deploy his platoons with interlocking 

fields of fire. From north to south, the front line was held by Companies 

M, K, and Heavy Mortar. Reinforcing the position were seven .50-caliber 

machine guns and crews from the 14th Engineer (C) Battalion, whose 472 

men were attached to the 21st Infantry. Additional fire support came from 

five 60-mm, two U-mm, and six 4.2-inch mortars emplaced just behind the 

rifle positions. 

Bolstering McConnell, as regimental reserve, was Smith’s 1st Battalion. 

Since Company C wasabsent, Stephens attached Company D, 14th Engineers, to Smith, who placed it and his own A and B Companies in separate 
y y y y 

Battalion, provided 105-mm artillery support for the regiment from position

3,000 yards behind Smith’s battalion. Companies A and B of the 14th Eng

neers established their camps near Ch’angnyong, from which they cou

also serve as a mobile reserve. 

Like the 34th Infantry to the south, the 21st Infantry spent the perio

3-5 August in strengthening its positions along the Naktong. With mor

engineer assets than the other regiments, the 2lst was better able to protec

its front with obstacles. Although antipersonnel mines and trip flares wer

scarce, a few were planted at likely crossing points. These were supplemented 

by numerous booby traps improvised from TNT, tin cans, nails, gas drums

and artillery shells. Just as in the 34th’s sector, no boats were initially 

available for patrols to use in crossing the river at night. By the afternoon 

of 5 August, Colonel Stephens, unsatisfied with this situation, had locate

several boats in the hands of the 14th Engineers. As a result, the 3d Ba

talion was directed to send patrols across the Naktong after dark.9 

North of the 21st Infantry was a 30,000-yard sector held by the 17t

Infantry of the ROK Army. Commanded by Cal, Kim Hi Chun, the 17t

was widely known among American commanders as a highly competent

aggressive unit. In early August, it numbered approximately 2,000 men, org

nized in three battalions. The 17th’s artillery support, like that accorde

the division’s other regiments, was weak, comprising only Battery A, 13

Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm howitzers), and Battery A, 11th Field Artil

lery Battalion (155-mm howitzers). To assist in the construction of defensiv

barriers, Company B, 3d Engineers, moved into the regimental sector, whil

the two companies of the 14th Engineers near Ch’angnyong were available 

for additional support if necessary.lO 

Division reserve for the 24th Division was Col. Ned D. Moore’s 19t

Infantry. This regiment, 1,910 strong on 5 August, had been the last 

arrive in the division area, closing at 2030 on 4 August. Moore’s me

immediately went into bivouac-Lt. Col. Robert L. Rhea’s 1st Battalion tw

miles northwest of Ch’angnyong and Lt. Col. Thomas M. McGrail’s 2d Ba

talion four miles south of the town. Badly depleted in weapons and equi

ment, the .regiment spent much of the next day compiling shortage list

and reequipping itself with the limited quantities of materiel reaching div

sion supply depots. Elements of the regiment conducted road reconnaissance 

throughout the division sector to accumulate information necessary for th

preparation of counterattack plans. Since the 19th Infantry was seriousl

deficient in vehicles, the 24th Quartermaster Company assigned twenty 2 l/2

ton trucks to the regiment to enhance its mobility.ll 

For purposes of counterattack, several other units were grouped with 

the 19th Infantry in division reserve. Companies A and C, 3d Engineers

retained their primary mission of maintaining roads in the division rea

but they were also alerted to serve as part of a counterattack force if needed
and two of its M-24 light tanks, while two of the five remaining tanks had 

inoperable main guns. In even worse condition, but also committed to the 

mobile reserve, was Company A, 78th Heavy Tank Battalion. That unit 

retained only two M-24 tanks as its entire armor strength, and one of those 

was attached to the 24th Reconnaissance Company. Company A, therefore, 

began classes in infantry tactics in its camp at Pugong-ni behind the division’s left flank. Finally, the 24th Division’s headquarters staff headquarters 

company, signal company, and medical section established composite defense 

platoons for either a “last stand defense” or duty as part of the division 

counterattack force, in case of an enemy breakthrough along the Naktong.12 

Behind the frontline and reserve units, the administrative and logistic 

apparatus required to support an American division slowly established itself. 

On 2 August, the division’s rear echelon began its move from Masan northward to Miryang, a distance of thirty miles. Miryang lay approximately 

twenty-five miles east of Ch’angnyong via either of two circuitous routes 

through mountainous terrain. Arriving at Miryang on 3 August, most of 

the various support units opened for business on the following day. An 

important exception was the division ammunition supply point (ASP), which 

would not open at Yuchon, seven miles north of Miryang, for several days. 

Prior to that time, the 24th Division continued to draw ammunition from 

its old ASP at Masan, an awkward process that exacerbated the existing 

ammunition shortage. In other respects, the 24th Divisions lines of communication and supply were functioning adequately by 5 August (see map 3).l3 

With his division at last in position along the Naktong, General John 

Church awaited the inevitable North Korean attack. Well aware of his limited 

resources, Church had created a defensive scheme that relied upon counterattacks by strong reserves to destroy penetrations of his lightly held front 

lines. Within that general defensive framework, the division commander had 

chosen to concentrate much of his strength on his center and right. In 

Church’s view, the northern sector of his line was harder to defend than 

the southern, primarily because of its inadequate road net, and he assumed 

that his North Korean opponent would reach the same conclusion. Acting 

upon that assumption, Eighth Army’s weakest division gave its weakest 

regiment the responsibility for holding the soon to be famous Naktong 

Bulge.14 

Opposing the 24th Division on the Naktong was the 4th Infantry Division of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA). Activated in late 1948, 

the 4th Division in the summer of 1950 consisted of the 5th, 16th, and 18th 

Infantry regiments, plus an artillery regiment and antitank, self-propelled 

gun, engineer, signal, medical, and training battalions. Each infantry 

regiment had three battalions, while the artillery regiment had a battalion 

of 122.mm howitzers and two battalions of 76-mm guns. The division’s basic 

triangular organization strongly resembled that of an American infantry 

division, except for its smaller artillery contingent and its much reduced 
Commanded by Maj. Gen. Lee Kwon Mu, a veteran of the Chinese 

Communist Forces and former NKPA chief of staff, the division had playe

a major role in the capture of the South Korean capital. Its success in tha

campaign had won it the title of “Seoul Division.” Continuing southward

the 4th Division had rolled over Task Force Smith in early July, and 

had been pushing the U.S. 24th Division backward ever since. In exchang

for the ground gained, however, the 4th Division had suffered severely. B

the time it reached the Naktong, its strength was estimated by the Eighth 

Army Intelligence Section to be no more than 8,000 men, and its artillery 

component had been reduced to only twelve guns. Nevertheless, the 4t

Division still held the initiative and began immediate preparations to launch 

an assault across the river.l5 

After withdrawing behind the Naktong, the 24th Division briefly los

contact with the North Korean formations opposing it. Information regarding 

enemy units in its front on 3 August came only from aerial reconnaissance 

and an occasional message from South Korean police. These sources reporte

small enemy troop and vehicle movements several miles west of the Naktong

which indicated a deliberate approach to the river. Division intelligence 

officers developed five possible options they believed to be within North 

Korean capabilities, ranging from attacks in specific sectors to nothing mor

than the continuation of the buildup just beginning. In light of the limited 

activity along the river, the division intelligence section considered the las

course of action to be the most likely. 

The following day brought a higher level of North Korean activity in 

the immediate vicinity of the Naktong. Although no American soldiers visited 

the west bank of the river, two separate North Korean patrols crossed th

Naktong near the right flank of the 2lst Infantry early on the morning o

4 August. Both patrols retreated quickly, one after being fired upon by ele

ments of the 17th ROK Regiment. Later that day, small groups of North 

Korean soldiers wereseen near the west bank of the river at the juncture 

of the 21st and 17th ROK Regiment’s sectors and in the 34th Infantry’s 

sector at the nose of the salient. In order to discover the extent of enemy 

activity beyond the range of its own observation posts, the division requeste

aerial reconnaissance of the area from the river westward for twelve t

fifteen miles. Although aircraft struck several villages and claimed hundreds 

of enemy casualties, this method produced little new information. The divi

sion GZ, therefore, did not significantly revise his forecast of probable enem

intentions. 

Dawn on 5 August brought further increases in North Korean activity 

along the Naktong. Reconnaissance pilots, artillery forward observers, and 

infantry observation posts all reported groups of enemy soldiers moving in 

the area just behind the Naktong’s west bank. The greatest concentration 

of observed enemy movements was in the sector held by the 17th ROK 
* f.3.% 

m 

I 

ixiI

ZlZ 

i 
limited results reported. Air support for the 24th Division remained at the 

same level as on the previous two days, with several strikes being made 

beyond the Naktong along the division’s front. Unaccountably, the results 

of the strikes were not communicated to the division. No change was made 

in the division intelligence estimate submitted at 1800, which continued to 

view an enemy buildup as more likely than a crossing. If a crossing should 

occur, the 34th Infantry sector was considered a more likely site than that 

of the 21st, but even this possibility rated no higher than third in a list of 

five. In view of this analysis, Church made no change in the disposition of 

his units. 

Unlike previous nights, which had been relatively quiet, the evening of 

5 August saw little diminution in the level of enemy activity that had 

characterized the daylight hours. On the Ieft flank of the division line, just 

before sunset, observers from the 34th Infantry saw a group of people 

stacking boxes in trees near the river. Several hours later, flares appeared 

in the hills to the west. Outposts on the right of the 2Ist Infantry line 

heard vehicles moving eastward toward the river at 2210 and reported seeing 

large numbers of men moving in the same direction at 2245. While the 

34th Infantry sent no patrols across the river, the 21st Infantry placed a 

patrol on the western shore near midnight. Landing near the sector boundary 

shared with the 34th, the men heard vehicles moving near the river and 

the sounds of enemy personnel in a nearby village. Upon recrossing the 

river, the patrol requested an artiIlery concentration on the village, which 

was delivered with unknown results16 

The events of the evening of 5 August notwithstanding, no particular 

sense of alarm was felt within the 24th Division. Battered by the pounding 

it had received during its long retreat, the division badly needed a respite 

from heavy combat in order to regain its strength. The line of the Naktong 

appeared to offer just such a reprieve by providing a barrier to the continuation of the North Koreans’ advance. As long as the North Koreans 

did not attempt a crossing, the presence of a watery barrier separating 

them from the enemy lulled the men of the 24th Division into a false sense 

of security. 
The Battle of the Naktong 3 Bulge Begins +!Q 

At 0001 on 6 August, red and yellow flares burst luridly over the Naktong. A few minutes later, the 34th Infantry’s Observation Post (OP) No. 1 

on the south side of the Bulge reported small arms fire in its immediate 

front. This apparently was a North Korean attempt to divert attention from 

the opposite side of the salient, where several battalions of the 16th North 

Korean Regiment were beginning to cross the Naktong. Large numbers of 

the enemy used rafts, constructed earlier in the hills bordering the river, 

while others simply waded across. Although a few drowned, most arrived 

safely on the east bank. There they came under scattered fire from elements 

of L Company’s outpost line, which caused them to move northward along 

the river bank before entering the hills. The initial contact, which occurred 

around 0115, ended almost immediately as the North Koreans disappeared 

in the darkness.1 

By 0200, enough scattered contacts had developed to indicate that an 

enemy penetration of unknown strength was occurring on the right center 

of L Company, near its sector boundary with I Company. Artillery batteries 

in the regimental rear were warned to watch for infiltrators. At 0205, increased firing on the right caused the 34th Infantry’s S3 to notify division 

headquarters that in his opinion an attack had begun Solid infarmation 

on enemy strength and pasitions was stil1 lacking, however, so little further 

action was taken. Left to themselves, the North Koreans already across the 

Naktong continued to move eastward through the hills, while others crossed 

the river to join them. Around 0300, their leading elements reached the 

vicinity of the village of Kogono-ni, which lay in a valley traversing the 

base of the salient. Located just off the road to Yongsan and the regimental 

rear, the village was the site of the 3d Battalion command post (CP) and a 

detachment of the Heavy Mortar Company. Overrunning the area, the North 

Koreans forced Lieutenant Colonel Perez, his command group, and the mortarmen to withdraw eastward in haste (see map 4r.2 

Around 0330, Perez arrived at Lieutenant Colonel Ayres’ 1st Battalion, 

which was in reserve near Kang-ni four miles to the rear, Perez burst into 

Ayres’ CP and informed him of what had happened at the river. This was 

Ayres’ first indication that anything was wrong. For some reason, Perez’ 

flight was not transmitted to division headquarters at Ch’angnyong. In23 
was supplied to the division until 0520, when Colonel Beauchamp reporte

that the North Koreans had made a crossing in force in the center of th

34th’s position. Beauchamp announced he was committing Ayres’ 1st Batta

ion in a counterattack at first light, and he requested an artillery liaiso

plane to assist in locating the enemy. The division G3 duty officer, in turn

notified his section chief, arranged for the liaison plane, and requested tha

Eighth Army’s Air Operations Center provide air strikes at dawn. By 054

the 19th, 21st, and 17th (ROK) Regiments, as well as division artillery, ha

all been alerted.3 

At Kang-ni, Ayres prepared to move his battalion forward at dawn

which occurred around 0630. He placed Capt. Clyde Akridge’s Company 

in five trucks with orders to drive toward the river until Ayres stoppe

them. Companies A and B followed on foot, while Ayres rode ahead of th

battalion with a small command group to discover what was happening 

near the river. By 0700, Ayres was moving-as Beauchamp informed Ge

eral Church when the latter called with orders to “clear up the situation.” 

Passing en route the position of Battery B, 13th Field Artillery Battalion, 

Ayres drove to Perez’ abandoned CP at Kogono-ni, where he saw no enem

troops. Just as the trucks carrying Company C arrived at Ayres’ position

North Koreans hidden in the hills above the village ‘directed a heavy fir

Lt. Cot. Harold B. Ayres, 

Commander, 1 st Battalion, 

34th Infantry 
In the face of increasing North Korean fire, Ayres ordered Akridge to 

assault the high ground with Company C, while he himself directed the 

fire of the company’s 60-mm mortars. Akridge, who had only been with the 

company a few days, quickly received three wounds, and C Company’s 

attack collapsed under a hail of North Korean bullets. Ayres continued to 

direct the mortars until his ammunition was exhausted and several mortarmen around him were hit. He then withdrew with his command group and 

succeeded in escaping without injury, although several of his staff were 

wounded in the process. Ayres spent the next several hours working his 

way back to the remainder of the battalion. The remnants of Company C 

took sheher around a grist mill near the ambush site.4 

Three miles to the rear, the remainder of the 1st Battalion, accompanied 

by two quad-.50 half-tracks, marched westward under the supervision of 

Colonel Beauchamp. At 0830, as they neared the village of Sangnigok, they 

encountered several platoons of North Koreans, who opened fire on them 

from the hills west of the road. Between this firefight and the one at 

Kogono-ni lay Battery B, which could hear the firing but as yet could see 

no enemy. As a precaution, the battery commander sent twenty men to a 

nearby ridgetop as a security guard. Fifteen minutes later, the battery of 

five 105-mm howitzers was attacked by an estimated 200 North Korean 

troops, who began to rake the gun positions with machine gun and mortar 

fire, The artillerymen fought back and for a time held their own.5 

By this time, General Church had become concerned about the extent 

of the North Korean penetration and the lack of progress that had been 

made in erasing it. Following a series of reports from the 34th’s OP No. 2 

that enemy units were in the rear of the Heavy Mortar position in the 

north end of the Kogono-ni valley, Church decided to reinforce the 34th’s 

sector. At 0835, he notified Beauchamp that one battalion of the 19th Infantry would be committed to assist in counterattacking the penetration. 

Beauchamp was to “clean out” the area, then return the 19th’s battalion to 

division reserve.6 

At 0900, Brig. Gen. Pearson Menoher, assistant division commander, 

reported to Church from the 34th Infantry’s sector. According to Menoher, 

Company C of Ayres” 1st Battalion was in Battery B’s position under smallarms fire, while Companies A and B were 1,000 yards to the rear but 

moving forward. Beauchamp planned to maneuver Ayres’ battalion in a 

southwesterly direction, then to the northwest to eliminate the penetration. 

Since the enemy was estimated to be in no more than company strength, 

Menoher believed the 19th Infantry’s battahon might not have to move 

beyond Kong-m. Unfortunately, conditions at the area of penetration were 

not as expected. Ayres’ battalion was a shambles; Company C was no more 

than a remnant making a last stand near Kogono-ni; A and B were held 

up near Sangnigok; and the battalion commander was making his way 

back through the hills on foot. Battery B had been encircled and was 
y g 

the situation was badly deteriorating.7 

In only one respect was there cause for optimism. North Korean 

tempts. to cross into the undefended sector of the Bulge had slackene

markedly under the pressure of air and artillery interdiction of the crossi

sites. The first air strike had occurred at 0645, just after sunrise, when fo

F-80s arrived and strafed suspected crossing points. Fifteen minutes lat

four F-51s relieved the jets and continued the search for targets. Thereafte

aircraft appeared over the area at regular intervals throughout the d

attacking enemy boats on the river and small parties of North Korea

moving through the hills. In addition, fighter-bombers made numero

strikes on targets west of the Naktong to impede the enemy buildup. T

two artillery batteries in the sector assisted the aircraft as much as possi

but were hindered by range limitations and lack of available guns. Wh

Battery B, 13th Field Artillery, became immobilized by enemy fire, the o

tubes available in the 34th Infantry sector were the six 155-mm howitze

of Battery B, 11th Field Artillery.8 

Interdiction of enemy activity in the hills east of the Naktong was n

as successful as that in the river valley. Companies A and B of Ayres’ 

Battalion remained stalled near Sangnigok throughout the morning, 

though supported by fire from two quad-50 antiaircraft half-tracks. One 

these vehicles, however, was damaged by an antitank rifle, and the batta

ion executive ofecer, directing the attack in Ayres’ absence, was wounde

With Ayres’ battalion fragmented, no aid was available for Battery 

which had been encircled since 0900. At 1030, the battery commander c

cluded that his only hope was to withdraw along a trail to the southeas

Gathering about fifty men, he managed to extricate one howitzer and s

eral trucks before enemy fire forced him to abandon the remaining fo

guns and numerous vehicles around 1100. By the time the battery reach

safety near Yongsan in early afternoon, it had lost two killed, six wounde

and six missing.9 

At approximately the same time that Battery B escaped, the right flan

of the 34th Infantry began to collapse. Although not under direct attac

the men of Company I could hear the firing on their left gradually mo

toward their rear. Apprehensive, the lieutenant commanding Company 

ordered a withdrawal northward into the 21st Infantry’s sector. Compan

I, joined by detachments from the 34th’s Heavy Mortar Company, M Ca

pany (Weapons), and Battery A, 26th AAA Battalion, crossed into the zo

of the 21st Infantry shortly after 1030. This fact was noted by the 21st Infantry

left flank unit-its own Heavy Mortar Company-and reported to regime

tal headquarters. At 1055, the 21st Infantry passed this information on 

division, which had been unaware of Company I’s retreat. A few minute

later, at 1110, another message from the 21st’s Heavy Mortar Compan

reported North Koreans moving into the positions vacated by the men 

Company I (see map 4). 
py gpp

sible for the withdrawal. He authorized Colonel Stephens of the 21st Infantry to direct artillery fire upon the North Koreans now seen to be occupying 

the hills across the valley from the 21st Infantry positions. This valley 

was crucial because it contained a road leading directly from the river to 

the division’s command post at Ch’angnyong. With this road potentially 

open to the enemy, the composite defense platoons at division headquarters 

hastily manned a perimeter around the town. To block this avenue of approach and reinforce his crumbling front, Church at 1150 dispatched the 

24th Reconnaissance (Recon) Company down the road toward the river to 

assist Company I in restoring the line. By this time, Company I had withdrawn two miles to the vicinity of one of the 21st Infantry’s reserve companies, where it reported it had been facing several thousand enemy 

troops*10 

In addition to committing the 24th Recon Company, Church also allocated part of the 19th Infantry to bolster the 34th. Alerted at 0600 and 

ordered to Beauchamp’s support at 0835, the 2d Battalion of the 19th moved 

by truck at 1000 from its camp on the Ch’angnyong-Yongsan road. It 

reached its assembly area at Yu-ri, five miles away, around 1100. Ten minutes later, Church directed Col. Ned Moore of the lath Infantry to ‘“get up 

there and clean out the enemy. I’ll send your other battalion to y~u.‘~ At 

the same time, he ordered Moore’s 1st Battalion to leave its position northwest of Ch’angnyong and follow the rest of the regiment to Yu-ri. Although 

it moved by truck, the 1st Battalion required approximately two hours to 

travel the eleven miles to its destination.” 

By early afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Ayres had managed to rejoin 

Companies A and B of his battalion, which were still stalled at Sangnigok. 

After adjusting mortar fire on suspected enemy positions, Ayres ordered 

the advance to resume. Company B assaulted a series of low hills to the 

right of the road, while Company A deployed in the rice paddies on the 

left. Although the men in the hills found the going difficult, Capt. A. F. 

Alfonso’s Company A eventually worked its way forward to the abandoned 

gun positions of Battery B. Supported by the remaining quad-.50 half-track, 

Company A deployed forward of the battery position, while a detail searched 

for survivors of the morning’s action. Satisfied that he had recovered everyone left behind, Alfonso pressed forward with his men into the valley Company C had entered earlier in the day. There he found thirty-five of Akridge’s 

men making a final stand in a small grist mill. North Koreans had approached within grenade range of the mill but had not been able to overrun 

it. Gathering up the dead and wounded they could find, Alfonso’s men 

loaded them into abandoned trucks and sent them to the rear, escorted by 

the half-track and several riflemen. By the time Company A resumed its 

advance toward the Naktong, it was late in the afternoon. Company B was 

unable to join it, having been halted by enemy resistance in the hills north 

of the abandoned artillery position. 
hills. Ahead of them, Company A soon encountered strong enemy resis

tance. Halting his column, Alfonso suppressed the North Korean fire with 

severa rounds from a 6O-mm mortar, then ordered his men forward. Th

riflemen fired left and right as they moved down the valley toward th

Naktong. Just after sunset, Company A reached the river, where it found 

elements of Company L, which had withdrawn earlier in the day from thei

original positions at the nose of the salient. Because the combined forc

numbered only about ninety men and the enemy had closed in behind them

Alfonso decided to establish a defensive position there. He opened communi

cations with Ayres by radio relay through Company B two miles in th

rear. Designated force commander by Ayres, Alfonso then requested an ai

drop of food, water, ammunition, and medical supplies for his beleaguered 

troops (see map 5).12 

Behind Ayres’ battalion, Lt. Col. Thomas McGrail’s 2d Battalion, 19t

Infantry, had moved to a line of departure northeast of Sangnigok by 150

Approximately one hour later, it began to advance slowly in a northwesterly direction in order to seal off the southern half of the area vacated b

Company I of the 34th Infantry. The plan of maneuver called for the battal

ion to seize Hill 146, about a mile west of Sangnigok, then to turn north t

another ridge a mile from the first, and finally to assault westward one

half mile to the hills overlooking the Naktong. Given the heat of a Korean 

August and the rough terrain, McGrail’s assignment was ambitious at bes

Enemy resistance, though slight, further delayed the advance. Meanwhile, 

Colonel Moore held Lieutenant Colonel Rhea’s 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, 

in reserve until McGrail’s advance clarified the situation.13 

While the 19th Infantry attempted to regain the southern half of I Com

pany’s original position, the 24th Recon Company attempted to regain th

northern half. Organizing its cooks and mechanics into an extra platoon

the 24th Recon Company departed Ch’angnyong just before noon. Meeting 

no enemy resistance, the leading elements of the company reached the rive

around 1300. After contacting Company I, the recon company commander 

drew up a plan to recapture the lost defensive positions on the hills over

looking the river. Reinforced by the recon company’s rifle squads and sup

ported by the fire of its light tanks, Company I launched a counterattack 

around 1500. The first hill was gained easily, but once on the reverse slope

the infantrymen came under heavy fire .from automatic weapons and mor

tars located on the next hill to the south. Covered by an artillery barrage

Company I withdrew once more, all the way to the position of the support

ing tanks. Although men of the company claimed they had been surrounded 

by up to 4,000 North Koreans, the commander of the 21st Infantry’s Heavy 

Mortar Company, who was observing from a hill to the north, estimated 

that the enemy force numbered no more than 150 men. Concluding tha

Company I was useless for further offensive action that day, the com

mander of the 24th Recon Company moved both units to high groun 

the road and established defensive positions for the night.14 
been. Finally committed to attack northwest from the vicinity of Sangnigok 

in late afternoon, McGrail’s 2d Battalion reached its first objective, Hill 

146, by 1715. Leaving F Company on Hill 146, McGrail turned the remainder of the battalion northward toward his second objective, Hill 174. 

Reaching that hill with E and G Companies by 1900, he estimated that 

300 North Koreans were caught in the village of Ch’ongdan, between Hills 

146 and 174. Believing his force to be too weak to assault the village, 

MeGrail directed heavy mortar and automatic weapons fire on the enemy 

position until darkness prevented further action. The North Koreans, who 

probably numbered far fewer than 300 men, then withdrew unhindered, 

while their destruction was reported to the 24th Division. 

Although Rhea’s 1st Battalion had been available to him since 1300, 

Colonel Moore did not commit it to action until 1800. The original plan of 

attack called for Rhea to follow McGrail to Hill 146, then wheel southward 

and sweep through the Naktong Bulge. With only three hours of daylight 

remaining, this proved impossible to accomplish, thus dashing General 

Church’s hopes of restoring. the river line by dark. Rhea moved westward 

with Company C on the left;xB. on the right, and A in reserve. Part of 

Company B reached Hill 146 without difficulty, but its 2d Platoon came 

under fire from Hill 165 to the south. Company C also encountered fire 

from Hill 165, causing the unit to recoil. As night approached, Rhea consolidated all of his companies in the vicinity of Hill 146, established communications with the 2d Battalion to the north, B Company, 34th Infantry, to 

the south, and waited for daylight. Thus ended the final counterattack of 

the day in the 34th Infantry sector.15 

The North Korean penetration in the 34th Infantry zone was not the 

only problem for General Church as darkness fell on August 6. North Korean units had crossed the Naktong in the sectors guarded by the 21st Infantry and the 17th ROK Regiment. An estimated two squads of North Koreans had crossed in boats on the left of the ROK sector just before dawn, 

but the battalion commander had quickly committed his reserve company 

and the penetration had been contained. Unfortunately, Eighth Army had 

decided to withdraw the 17th ROK Regiment from 24th Division control as 

part of a general reorganization of South Korean forces. The regiment had 

been scheduled to depart on the morning of 6 August, but the crisis in 

Church’s sector caused Eighth Army to delay the movement for twentyfour hours. To replace the South Koreans, Church created Task Force Hyzer 

from three companies of the 3d Engineer (Combat) Battalion, Company A 

of the 78th Heavy Tank Battalion (less tanks}, and, ultimately, the 24th 

Reconnaissance Company.16 

In the 21st Infantry’s sector, an action resulting from another enemy 

crossing remained unresolved at nightfall. At 1000 on the morning of 6 

August, a detachment of South Korean police went to the village of Sadung 

to evacuate any civilians who might remain. Located on the Naktong floodplain below the hills occupied by Companies M and K, the partially de-
were driven from the village by the North Koreans, who then fired o

nearby squad of Gompany K. In the absence of Major McConnell, the ba

ion commander, his executive officer called for mortar and machine 

fire to be placed on the village, but communications problems delayed tra

mission of the order. As the afternoon passed, more North Koreans 

tempted to join their comrades in Sadung by floating their equipment ac

the river on small rafts. Several were killed by fire from the hills, but oth

arrived safely and disappeared into the village. 

By midafternoon, artillery had finally been brought to bear on Sadu

but with little effect. At 1620, McConnell reported that K Company’s ri

flank squad was being driven back by at least fifty North Koreans fr

Sadung. In hopes of eradicating the penetration before nightfall, Colo

Stephens, at 1630, *ordered Lieutenant Colonel Smith to drive the ene

from Sadung. Although counterattack plans had been prepared earlier 

just such a contingency, it was several hours before Smith’s Company 

was in position to attack. Meanwhile, North Koreans in Sadung began 

infiltrate eastward through a draw leading into the rear of M Compa

Artillery concentrations were the only force available to suppress North 

rean activity until 1900, when Company A’s counterattack finally began

South Korean policeman captured earlier in the day managed to esc

during one of the barrages, and he reported at least 150 North Koreans 

the village. In spite of heavy enemy fire and communications difficulti

with its own supporting artillery, Company A drove the North Korea

back into Sadung but could go no farther. As darkness covered the vall

the company managed to secure a toehold in the north end of the villa

and held it throughout the night (for location of Sadung, see map 3).17 

General Church bad wanted the enemy penetrations destroyed by nig

fall, because failure to do so would allow the North Korean 4th Divis

an opportunity to reinforce the estimated two battalions of its 16th R

ment already east of the Naktong. With the results of his counterattacks 

hand, Church knew that the river line could not be restored that nig

and he regretfully informed General Walker of that fact at 2130. Ene

activity in the 17th ROK and 21st Infantry sectors, although worrisom

was sufficiently localized to cause little concern. In contrast, the North 

rean advance to the base of the salient in the 34th Infantry sector 

potentially quite serious. There, at least 12,000 yards of river frontage 

open to enemy exploitation under cover of darkness. Recognizing that 

enemy would probably seek to expand his foothold east of the Nakto

Church outlined his own plan for the next day in Operations Instructio

No. 18. The 19th and 34th Infantry regiments were to continue their coun

attacks toward the river, while the 21st Infantry defended its sector 

Task Force Hyzer relieved the 17th ROK Regiment.ls 

An analysis of the first day’s action reveals that four major coun

attacks were undertaken by elements of the 24th Division. Ayres’ coun

attack provided the best opportunity to deal with the North Korean pene
and sending one company forward in trucks.19 He thus gained speed-but 

at the expense of mass. Any advantage conferred by speed was lost when 

the company was ambushed. Not only was a company virtually destroyed, 

but Ayres himself was unavailable to control the remainder of his battalion 

for several precious hours. When he did regain control, one of his two remaining companies was isolated in the enemy rear. Coupled with the disintegration of Perez’ 3d Battalion, the fragmentation of Ayres’ 1st Battalion 

ensured the future ineffectiveness of the 34th Infantry. 

On the 34th’s northern flank, the unauthorized withdrawal of Company 

I and attached elements opened an even larger avenue into the 24th Division’s rear. The response of the 24th Recon Company to this crisis was 

prompt, but it was limited to the vicinity of the road, because the unit’s 

infantry component was small. The counterattack, therefore, depended 

largely upon Company I. However, judging from the wildly exaggerated 

reports of enemy strength emanating from this company, it was too demoralized to recover the lost ground from the small enemy force present. The 

24th Reeon Company provided as much support as possible, but Company 

I was no longer an effective unit, and the counterattack failed. 

Although slow to begin, the series of counterattacks mounted in late 

afternoon by the two battalions of the 19th Infantry made some progress 

in containing the North Korean penetration. Arriving by 1100, the 2d Battalion did not begin its attack until 1600, while the 1st Battalion, which arrived two hours after the 2d, also waited five hours before being committed. 

Both battalions advanced under a scheme of maneuver that was decidedly 

optimistic in terms of the tasks to be completed in the few hours remaining 

before nightfall, Lack of information on enemy dispositions hindered both 

units as they advanced, especially the 1st Battalion, which was forced to 

reduce its frontage due to unexpected enemy fire. Neither battalion obtained 

its ultimate objectives, but the regiment’s final position within a mile of 

the river at least established a firm shoulder on the northern flank of the 

enemy bridgehead. 

The final counterattack of the day was the attempt by the 21st Infantry 

to deal with the North Koreans occupying Sadung. Once again, much time 

elapsed between the discovery of the enemy at 1130 and any serious attempts to eliminate their penetration. When initial efforts by K Company 

proved insufficient to dislodge them, Company A from the regimental reserve was ordered at 1630 to implement a previously prepared counterattack 

plan. Company A began its assault at 1900 but was hindered by inadequate 

coordination with supporting artillery batteries. Despite Company A’s best 

efforts, Sadung remained in the hands of the North Koreans at nightfall. 

In every case on 6 August, counterattacks by elements of the 24th Division fell far short of expectations. Although General Church and his regimental commanders were aware of the necessity for regaining the river 
response is a major factor affecting the success of a counterattack, eve

counterattack, except Ayres’ initial effort, was slow in execution. This w

true even when a preexistmg counterattack plan was implemented. Unfortun

ately, the long preparation periods did not produce increased information 

on enemy dispositions for assault-element commanders. Nor did the ext

time result in improved artillery support for the attacking infantry. Becau

of its limited number of tubes, the artillery played little positive role in t

counterattacks and, in at least one case, was responsible for much of t

delay. These factors, when combined with the enervating heat, the rugg

terrain, and the general condition of the 24th Division, explain its limite

success during the first day of battle on the Naktong (see map 5). 

During the evening of 6-7 August, combat activity slackened alon

the river in the 24th Division sector. On the northern flank, enemy troop

attempted several small crossings in the zone being evacuated by the 17

ROK Regiment but apparently were dispersed by artillery fire. The 21

Infantry continued its efforts to eject the North Koreans from Sadung b

were still thwarted by failure to establish satisfactory communications wit

supporting artillery. To the south, the 19th Infantry held its ground in t

face of enemy probes against Companies B and C in the center of its lin

Within the Naktong Bulge itself, fragments of Companies A, C, and L 

the 34th Infantry maintained an uneasy vigil from their perimeter alon

the Naktong, in the enemy’s rear.20 

Disappointed that the North Korean penetration had not been destroye

by his mobile reserve on 6 August, General Church ordered the counte

attacks to be resumed on the following day. Yet the 24th Division was no

without reserves of its own to throw into the struggle. The 3d Enginee

(Combat) Battalion previously had been available for that role, but Eight

Army’s order detaching the 17th ROK Regiment from the 24th Divisio

meant that the engineers organized as Task Force Hyzer would have 

defend the sector evacuated by the departing South Koreans. As a partia

replacement for the ROK unit, Eighth Army gave Church the 1st Battalio

of the 9th Infantry and a battery of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion

These units, which had just arrived in Korea as part of the 2d Infantry 

Division, reached the battlefront on the evening of 6 August. The infantry 

battalion took a position at Ch’angnyong as division reserve, while the art

lery battery established firing positions west of Yongsan to support the 19

Infantry. In the division rear, several ordnance, engineer, and medical d

tachments from Eighth Army moved into Miryang. These support uni

would ultimately aid the 24th Division in its fight to hold the Nakton

line, but their immediate effect was to complicate the 24th Division’s alread

tenuous supply situation,21 

The absence of significant reserves on 7 August forced General Churc

to continue the counterattacks with the units committed on the previou

day. Beauchamp’s shattered 34th Infantry contributed little to this effo
their vicinity prevented them from maneuvering. In early afternoon, they 

received an airdrop of badly needed food, water, and ammunition. Approximately half of the supplies landed outside their perimeter, and several men 

were wounded in unauthorized efforts to retrieve the bundles before nightfall. A thousand yards southwest of Alfonso’s enclave, Company K continued to hold its original positions along the Naktong against only slight 

enemy opposition.22 

With most of his force pinned down, Beauchamp had only two companies available for counterattack. He ordered Company B to leave its position just east of the village of Tugok and to advance along the road leading 

to Captain Alfonso’s perimeter near the river. Understrength and exhausted, 

Company B attempted to move forward around midmorning, but heavy 

&emy fire prevented the company from making any appreciable gain. Further attempts proved equally feeble and futile. Company B would do no 

more that day, leaving only Company I, four miles to the north, to attempt 

to gain ground for the 34th Infantry. Supported by the light tanks of the 

24th Recon Company, Company I, around 1300, reoccupied the northern tip 

of the hill mass that had represented the regiment’s right flank prior to 

the North Korean attack on 6 August. An hour later, the company made 

contact with a platoon from Company G of the 19th Infantry as it advanced from the south, and both units established a perimeter for the night 

(see map 6). That evening the 34th Infantry reported its strength at 1,090 

officers and men and its combat effectiveness at only 30 percent.23 

Church’s hopes of eliminating the North Korean penetration before 

nightfall of 7 August rested primarily on ColoneI Moore’s 19th Infantry. 

The regiment’s attack plan called for the 1st Battalion to move both west 

and south in an effort to reestablish a firm shoulder on the river, while 

reducing the enemy’s maneuver space. The 2d Battalion would simultaneously advance toward the west and north, also toward the river, where it 

would seek a link with Company I, 34th Infantry. These plans represented 

nothing more than the continuation of the previous day’s scheme of maneuver. Company commanders received their attack orders at 0700 with H-hour 

placed at 0900. 

Lieutenant Colonel Rhea’s 1st Battalion moved out around 0845. Company B remained on the hill overlooking the village of Sinam-ni to provide 

a base of fire, while Company C advanced northwest across the valley toward Ohang Hill. Moving in a skirmish line formation, the troops crossed 

the valley unopposed, but half way up the hill on the far side, they came 

under fire from North Koreans on the crest. Despite this resistance, Company C continued to advance and ultimately seized the objective. Within 

ten minutes, about fifty North Koreans counterattacked the hill, but they 

were repulsed with heavy loss. 

Company A of the 1st Battalion was not as lucky as Company C. Qrdered to attack due south to seize Hill 165 and two nearby villages, the 
spur projecting from the main hill mass. A message reporting the platoon’s 

success was sent back to the company commander, but he never received 

it. Meanwhile, the 2d Platoon assaulted the north side of Hill 165. One 

squad quickly reached the crest but was violently counterattacked by North 

Koreans entrenched on the reverse slope. Harried by mortar fire, the 2d 

Platoon withdrew from Hill 165 by 0920. Their situation, in the words o

the regimental journal, was “not too good,“24 

North of Rhea’s 1st Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel MeGrail’s 2d Battalion encountered little difficulty in advancing westward to the line of hills 

overlooking the Naktong. By noon, Company F was in contact with Company C of the 1st Battalion on Ohang Hill. Company E seized the next 

hill to the north without opposition, although it later received sporadic fire 

from both American and North Korean sources. Farther northward still, 

Company G also reached the river, then sent a platoon along the ridge to 

make contact with Company I, 34th Infantry. The yawning gap created by 

the latter unit’s hasty withdrawal of the previous day had finally been 

closed, considerably reducing the maneuver space available to the North 

Koreans (see map 6). 

By noon, the advance of the 19th Infantry began to stall. At 1455, a 

regimental staff oft&r radioed to division headquarters: ‘“Had to slow down 

our attack. Lots of heat exhaustion. Men are dropping out like flies. However, it appears that we have them on the run.” During the lull, General 

Church arrived at Colonel Moore’s CP. In light of the imminent departure 

of the 17th ROK Regiment from the division sector, Church initially directed 

Moore to move the 2d Battalion north by truck to support Task Force 

Hyzer. Before this order could be executed, however, the division commander 

rescinded it, and MeGrail’s men remained on the hills above the Naktong. 

At 1700, the unit journal of the 19th Infantry recorded: “Troops suffering from heat exhaustion, lack of rations and water. Too tired to advance.” Only after the temperature began to drop as nightfall approached 

did the advance resume. Companies F and C consolidated their positions 

on Ohang Hill near the river, while Company A once again assaulted Hill 

165. Drawing two squads from his 1st Platoon on the right, the company 

commander united them with the relatively fresh 3d Platoon and sent the 

combined force forward. Although delayed briefly by snipers and machine 

gun fire, the men of Company A seized the crest. With all of his radios 

malfunctioning, the company commander sent messengers to gather up the 

remainder of his unit and consolidate, it on the hill. By sunset at 2030, 

Company A believed it was secure for the night. 

But Companies A, 6, and F were not allowed to enjoy their gains. 

About an hour after sunset, the North Koreans began a firefight with all 

three units. Twenty minutes later, at 21150, Company A reported that its 

positions on Hill 165 had been overrun and that an enemy force of un-
and reassembled near the mortar positions adjacent to the 1st Battalion 

CP. Meanwhile, the North Koreans made a similar attack on Company B, 

which had remained in position all day on Hill 146. Unlike Company A, 

this unit successfully withstood the enemy onslaught (see map 6).25 

Although the efforts of the 34th and 19th Infantry regiments to reduce 

the Naktong Bulge remained the main focus of his concern, General Church 

could not completely neglect affairs on the 24th Division’s center and right. 

‘Items of interest included a small but troublesome North Korean bridgehead 

in the 21st Infantry’s sector and also the gap created by the departure of 

the 17th ROK Regiment from the division’s right flank. Neither situation 

was as critical as Beauchamp’s and Moore’s battle to the south, but, both 

remained potentially dangerous. 

The problem faced by Colonel Stephens’ Zlst Infantry on 7 August centered around the village of Sadung, just as it had on the previous day. 

Campany A of Lieutenant Colonel Smith’s 1st Battalion had been trying, 

without success, to eject the North Koreans from Sadung throughout. the 

night of 6-7 August. The company was hindered by stubborn enemy resistance but also by its inability to achieve satisfactory coordination with its 

supporting artillery. Growing impatient, Smith decided to withdraw Company A at 01430 on 7 August if no further progress had been made by that 

time. None was achieved, although 155-mm illuminating shells were fired 

at regular intervals to prevent the North Koreans from reinforcing their 

troops in the village. Because of communications difficulties, no further artillery support was forthcoming. 

In order to cover Company A’s disengagement, Smith ordered Company 

6, 14th Engineers, to move from its reserve position to the high ground 

overlooking Sadung. Before the engineers could arrive, however, Company 

A completed its withdrawal under cover of darkness. With friendly forces 

safely out of the line of fire, Stephens and Smith hoped to destroy the 

North Koreans remaining in Sadung by a concentrated application of artillery and aerial firepower. Their maddening inability to arrange for observed 

artillery fire on the village continued throughout the morning, however, due 

to shortages of both radios and forward observers. Thus, the batteries supporting the 21st Infantry could do no more than fire occasional blind concentrations on Sadung. Nor was air support more effective. The regiment’s request for an air strike was denied at 0836 because of the higher priority 

assigned to the units farther south. Thus, the Zlst Infantry would have to 

solve the problem of Sadung on its own.26 

In midmorning, a patrol from Company K entered Sadung, where it 

found bloodstains and enemy equipment but no North Koreans either alive 

or dead. Shortly after 1100, an air strike was made available to the Zlst 

Infantry, but the disappearance of the enemy from the village made it unnecessary, and the planes were released to other missions. Fifteen minutes 
manders to resolve the Sadung problem once and for all. A platoon from 

Maj. John McConnell’s 3d Battalion counterattacked to relieve the surrounded OP shortly after 1300, but strong enemy resistance forced Smith to 

add the weight of Company C, 14th Engineers, before any ground was 

gained. By 1640, both Sadung and its satellite village had been recaptured, 

and engineer detachments moved in to mine and booby-trap the area. Fifteen enemy dead were counted. 

Nominally a simple operation, the mining of Sadung proceeded with 

difficulty into the evening. The engineers were first delayed by an infantry 

lieutenant who ordered them to halt because artillery would be firing on 

the village later. Once this matter was resolved, the engineers were harassed 

by North Korean snipers hiding in the grass nearby. Next, artillery fire 

began to fall upon Sadung, endangering the working parties. Urged on by 

Colonel Stephens, the engineers hastily finished the job and departed not 

long after sunset. Behind them, chickens began to set off the demolitions.*7 

Almost immediately after dark, the sounds of truck engines were heard 

beyond the Naktong, opposite Sadung. At 2230, the 3d Battalion reported 

that enemy troops in company strength had once more crossed into Sadung 

and were moving into the draw between Companies K and M. An additional 

crossing was reported 2,000 yards downstream near the wrecked highway 

bridge, where booby traps were exploding. The defenders fired artillery concentrations on both locations but with unknown results. Although threatened with encirclement, outposts near Sadung received orders to hold their 

positions until dawn, when a counterattack would attempt to rescue them. 

Since the companies of the 14th Engineer (C) Battalion by this time were 

all engaged in either extending the regimental line northward or providing 

security for the artillery, only Companies A and B of Smith’s 1st Battalion 

were available for the counterattack. By midnight, both companies had been 

alerted, and ten trucks were available to move them forward at dawn.2s 

Units available for counterattack missions were limited in the northern 

half of the 24th Division’s zone because of a series of unit and boundary 

changes imposed upon the division by Eighth Army. Early on the morning 

of 7 August, three companies of Lt. 601. Peter C. Hyzer’s 3d Engineer (C) 

Battalion relieved the 17th ROK Regiment from its positions along the Naktong. The departure of the South Korean regiment at 1600 left the 3d Engineers to guard a river frontage of approximately 29,000 yards. To reinforce 

Hyzer’s three available companies, General Church detached the battalion’s 

Company D from the 34th Infantry and the 24th Recon Company from its 

position guarding the Ch’angnyong-Naktong road, sending both of them to 

join the 3d Engineers. Collectively, all of these units were now known as 

Task Force Hyzer. At the same time, Church detached Company A, 78th 

Heavy Tank Battalion, from Hyzer’s control and dispatched it to support 

Beauchamp’s 34th Infantry. The tankers were currently serving as infantry, 
Fortunately for Task Force Hyzer, the North Koreans made no serious 

attempt to force a crossing in the engineers’ sector during the relief of the 

17th ROK Regiment. North Korean guerrillas and infiltrators were active, 

however, in the task force’s rear areas, where one group battled South Korean police and another harassed Battery A, 11th Field Artillery Battalion. 

As 7 August closed, Colonel Hyzer’s area of responsibility contracted as 

Eighth Army reduced the task force’s frontage by some 20,000 yards. The 

ground relinquished was to be covered by units of the 1st Cavahy Division, 

which would extend southward into the gap. To aid Hyzer further, the 21st 

Infantry extended its frontage several thousand yards northward by moving 

Company C, 14th Engineers, from its reserve position into line (for the 17th 

ROK sector, see map 3).3Q 

The end of the 24th Division’s second day of battle along the Naktong 

provided General Church with some grounds for optimism. Although his 

goal of eliminating the North Korean penetration had not been achieved, 

the river frontage available to the enemy for exploitation had been markedly reduced by the counterattack of the 19th Infantry. Equally positive, 

the North Koreans had not significantly reinforced their troops within the 

Naktong Bulge during the night of 6-7 August. Small groups had crossed 

the river during daylight on 7 August, but their numbers were minimal. 

Nevertheless, Church’s intelligence section recognized that the North Koreans remained able to reinforce their forward elements east of the Naktong, 

and they forecast just such an effort during the night.“l 

On the negative side of the ledger, the 24th Division continued to be 

stretched thin. Division strength, including attached units, totaled 11,441 

officers and men on 7 August. Combat efficiency stood at no more than 46 

percent. With every combat unit of the division either in line or in direct 

support, security of the division headquarters complex at Ch’angnyong remained in the hands of composite defense platoons drawn from service 

units and staff sections. Throughout the day, the division’s only reserve 

was the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, of the 2d Infantry Division. At 2215, 

Eighth Army ordered the remainder of the 9th Infantry (less its 3d Battalion) to move to Ch’angnyong, where it would come under the operational 

control of the 24th Division. In addition, the 27th Infantry of the 25th Infantry Division, located to the south, was alerted for possible duty in the 

24th Division’s zone. With no other reserves available to him, General 

Church hoped his own forces would suffice to drive the North Koreans back 

across the Naktong River.32 
4 The Counterattack Stalls t 

-cIQ 

The events of the night of 7-8 August 1950 demonstrated, once again, 

that the North Koreans were adept at using the cover of darkness to further 

their offensive preparations and to keep the American defenders off balance. 

Before midnight, Communist units made limited attacks on several eompanies in the 19th Infantry’s sector east of the Naktong, as well as still 

another thrust into Sadung below the hills occupied by the 2lst Infantry. 

The assaults against the 19th Infantry were repulsed in a series of firefights 

at close quarters, and the 21st Infantry believed it had broken up the North 

Korean crossing at Sadung solely with artillery fire. This latter assessment 

proved far too optimistic as Lieutenant Childers, commanding K Company, 

21st Infantry, discovered shortly after midnight. Childers, alone in the company CP around 0100, suddenly was confronted by a squad of North Korean 

soldiers. Bolting quickly into the darkness, he withdrew to the position of 

the supporting 4.2~inch mortars, where he found a detail of men from the 

14th Engineer (C) Battalion. Organizing the mortarmen and engineers into 

a roadblock team, Childers awaited the coming of dawn.1 

About the same time Childers was surprised, eight miles to the southeast the officers and men of Battery A, 15th Field Artillery Battalion, 

encountered unfriendly nocturnal visitors. Childers’ CP near the Naktong 

was an obvious target for local infiltration, but Battery A was in the midst 

of a headquarters complex five miles from the river and at least two miles 

behind the infantry positions of the 34th and 19th Infantry regiments. Nevertheless, the artillerymen were organized for defense, and in a brief firefight, 

they drove off the North Korean intruders. Daylight revealed at least thirteen enemy bodies scattered outside Battery A’s perimeter. Little notice was 

taken of this episode at 24th Division headquarters, perhaps because Battery 

A was a new arrival belonging to the 2d Division, but in retrospect, its 

significance is clear. The two-mile gap between Companies B and L of the 

34th Infantry provided an unguarded corridor leading to the cluster of headquarters, service units, and artillery batteries at Kang-ni, Yu-ri, and 

Yongsan, as well as to the 24th Division’s vital main supply route (MSR) 

leading back toward Miryang. Battery A’s action at Yu-ri meant that North 

Korean infiltrators were at best only three miles from Yongsan, with nothing to prevent them from continuing eastward, as long as they remained 

39 

I 
gg y

members of Company A, 78th Heavy Tank Battalion, were assigned 

provide local security to the artillery batteries west of Yongsan.2 

Infiltration of American lines was by no means the most significant 

activity of the North Korean 4th Division during the night of 7-8 Augus

Its commander, Maj. Gen. Lee Kwon Mu, had finally mustered enoug

troops and boats to reinforce significantly his 16th Regiment already within 

the Naktong Bulge. During the final hours of darkness on the morning 

8 August, at least two battalions quietly slipped into the water at sever

points along the four-mile section of river front still in North Korean hands

The crossing, which used more than seventy boats and rafts, continue

after daylight, when it was observed by Captain Alfonso’s isolated com

panies still clinging to their perimeter just south of one of the major Nort

Korean ferry sites. Alfonso’s men fired on the North Koreans at long rang

with a SO-caliber machine gun and called for an air strike. Upon the

arrival, the aircraft strafed the exposed North Koreans for some time, cau

ing them to disperse momentarily. Nevertheless, when the planes departed

the Communists resumed their crossing. Alfonso next called for artillery 

fire, but the number of tubes available was too small to provide a signif

cant concentration, and the enemy crossing continued. By 0815, an aeria

observer reported the Bulge area to be full of North Koreans, and at 085

Alfonso’s Company A reported it was under enemy fire. Fortunately f

Alfonso, the North Koreans for the moment were more interested in pushin

men and supplies across the Naktong ,than in eliminating his little band 

infantrymen.3 

By now it had become obvious to General Church and his staff tha

,the main thrust of the North Korean attack on the 24th Division lay 

the Naktong Bulge sector held by the 34th and 19th Infantry regiments

Enemy infiltrators in small numbers caused some anxious moments for Co

pany K of the 21st Infantry around Sadung during the morning, but the

represented only a diversion On the division’s right flank, Task Forc

Hyzer continued to patrol its enormous frontage while waiting for units 

the 1st Cavalry Division to assume responsibility for much of the sector, 

accordance with the boundary change decreed by Eighth Army. Enem

activity in Task Force Hyzer’s zone was virtually nonexistent during th

day, another indication that the North Korean 4th Division had staked 

hopes on a drive toward Yongsan through Beauchamp’s and Moore’

depleted regiments.” 

Beauchamp’s 34th Infantry remained fragmented throughout 8 Augus

The four companies on the southern flank of the enemy penetration r

mained inactive all day, trading sporadic fire with North Korean unit

slowly approaching their isolated position. Company I, separated from 

parent unit far to the south and beyond Beauchamp’s effective control, wa

officially attached to the 19th Infantry by division order. Only Compan

B, holding the ridge east of the village of Tugok, was capable of offensiv
The M-24 tank (General Chaffee) 

action. During the afternoon, it tried again to break through to Alfonso’s 

enclave on the river. The infantrymen moved through .Tugok and assaulted 

the ridge beyond, but strong enemy resistance prevented them from going 

farther. After holding Tugok for approximately four hours, they fell back to 

their original positions. Little had been gained except the rescue of some 

men from the 34th’s Heavy Mortar Company, who had been in hiding since 

6 August.5 

Supporting Company B in its abortive advance were the two remaining 

M-24 light tanks of Company A, 78th Heavy Tank Battalion As the infantry drive faltered, the tanks forged ahead and suddenly came under fire 

from several 14.5-mm antitank rifles. Hit by fragments, the commander of 

the leading tank was incapacitated. The loader, Pfc. Louis Kappler, took 

command of the tank and continued the fight, although he was wounded 

in both arms. When Kappler fainted from loss of blood, the commander of 

the second tank, Sgt. Ervin Yates, whose own vehicle had been disabled by 

a shot in the engine, raced to Kappler’s tank and took control. Blasting his 

way forward, Yates destroyed several North Korean heavy weapons emplace 

ments before nightfall forced him to withdraw. On the way to the rear, he 

attached a tow cable to the other tank and dragged it to safety. Both 

Kappler and Yates were later recommended for the Silver Star.” 

As on the previous day, the 24th Division’s primary counterattack was 

assigned to Col. Ned Moore’s 19th Infantry. Moore had arranged for an air 

strike to open the fight at 0700 and had specifically requested the use of 

napalm and rockets. At the appointed time, no aircraft appeared. Artillery 

marked the target, Hill 165 and vicinity, at 0730 but the sky remained 

empty of planes. Finally, at 0800, after 155mm white phosphorous shells 
up the target.7 

Moore’s orders from General Church required him to determine the 

enemy’s strength and dispositions while maintaining pressure through 

limited offensive action. He therefore planned to make only minor advances 

on the right near the river, while consolidating those companies scattered 

throughout the mass of hills. Accordingly, Company E moved up on line 

with Companies F and C and prepared to advance. After repulsing a probe 

by a North Korean platoon against E, the three companies began to move 

forward from their positions on Ohang Hill. They quickly encountered heavy 

fire from North Koreans dug in on the opposing ridge beyond the village 

of Ohang in the valley below. Having discovered that the enemy was 

present in force, the companies halted and consolidated their positions. 

From their new location overlooking the valley, they were able to fire on 

North Koreans attempting to remove American vehicles abandoned in the 

first day’s fighting, but this contributed nothing to the reduction of the 

enemy salient.8 

Moore reserved his major effort for Hill 165 on his left, which had 

already changed hands several times on the previous day. Once more, 

Company A was assigned to assault the hill, while Company B on a nearby 

ridge provided both direct fire support and adjustments for mortars and 

artillery. Around 0900, Company A, supported by the fire of the regiment’s 

4.2-inch and 81-mm mortars, began a methodical attack from the north. By 

noon, Ithe infantrymen had fought their way halfway up the hill. At that 

moment, a flight of F-51 Mustangs roared overhead and proceeded to bomb, 

rocket, and strafe the area indiscriminately. Company A was shattered and 

the 81-mm mortars of Company D were silenced. Seizing the opportunity, 

the North Koreans added their own heavy mortar fire to the bombardment. 

A hail of 120-mm mortar shells not only hastened Company A’s withdrawal 

but also fell among the 19th Infantry’s 4.2-inch mortar positions and on 

the road leading back to Kang-ni. Blasted by the combined friendly and 

enemy firepower, Company A reeled back in disorder to the village of Mii-ri, 

where it was finally rallied. The North Koreans pressed close behind, forcing 

the 1st Battalion CP to evacuate Mii-ri in haste. Finally, with the aid of 

accurate artillery fire, the position was stabilized, but there would be no 

further advance by the 19th Infantry on 8 August (see map 7).9 

The inability of the 24th Division to make any progress in reducing 

the North Korean penetration made it necessary for General Church to commit his last remaining reserve unit to the fight. A battalion of the 9th 

Infantry from the 2d Division had been available at Ch’angnyong for twentyfour hours, and another battalion from the same unit, along with regimental headquarters, was en route from the coast. As Cal. John G. Hill, 

the commander of the 9th Infantry, led his column over the pass between 

Miryang and Yongsan, a messenger met him with instructions to hurry 

forward to Ch’angnyong for a conference with General Church. Leaving 
At midmorning, Hill found General Church sitting on a box getting his 

hair cut. The diminutive general described to Hill the situation in simple 

terms: “This fellow has busted right through my center and is looking down 

my throat. I will give you planes for reconnaissance and my artillery to 

help. I want you to attack at once.” Hill argued that his units, on the road 

since 0200 and not yet concentrated at Yongsan, would need time to get 

their bearings before being committed to action. Church initially wanted 

the advance to begin by 1500, but after Hill vigorously pressed for a delay, 

the division commander set 1600 as the time for the counterattack. Hill 

was to take his two battalions and strike due west against the nose of the 

enemy penetration. He would be supported by Batteries A and B (the lat.ter 

just arrived) of his own 15th Field Artillery Battalion, as well as by the 

batteries from the 11th and 13th Battalions already supporting the 34th 

Infantry.lO 

With his two infantry battalions concentrated around Yongsan, Hill conferred at noon with his battalion and company commanders. At the meeting, Hill outlined his proposed plan of operations. Wnder it, the 1st Battalion 

was assigned the right of the regimental line, while the 2d Battalion was 

given the left, Company F and the regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon would aerve as regimental reserve. The goal of the attack 

was the Naktong’s east bank, and the fight was to be pressed until dark, 

although it was not to be hurried. All of these instructions were embodied 

in an attack order issued at 1315. This document took into account the 

North Korean thrust toward Mii-ri from Hill 165 by making the hill the 

initial priority of the 1st Battalion and by retaining Company F nearby as 

a reserve. 

Compared with the battle-weakened regiments of the 24th Division, the 

9th Infantry was a large unit. Although its 3d Battalion had been withheld 

as a reserve for Eighth Army, the two remaining battalions each numbered 

over $00 officers and men. Having recently arrived from the United States, 

the troops were fresh but untried. Morale was high, and the men were eager 

to get into action after the boredom of the long sea voyage and the dreary 

camps around Pusan. In general, the regiment’s equipment status was exeel

lent, although there were serious shortages of 4.2~inch mortar shells and 

3.5.inch rockets. Even salt tablets were available to help the troops survive 

the blistering heat of the afternoon sun without becoming exhausted from 

dehydration.11 

By 1445, the regiment had begun to move through the rear echelons of 

the 34th and 19th Infantry regiments in preparation for its assault. All 

was not ready, however, until 1645 when both battalions crossed the line of 

departure. The intense heat and humidity slowed the advance to a crawl 

as the men struggled to drag their heavy weapons forward with the rifle 

companies. After only a few yards, the 1st Battalion, on the right, eneoun-
of heat exhaustion, caused the attack to falter almost immediately on the 

right. Recoiling from the enemy fire, the battalion drifted to the northwest, 

away from the fight. In contrast, the 2d Battalion, on the left, made consider

able progress against no appreciable resistance, largely because it advanced 

over ground secured earlier by Company B of the 34th Infantry. Nightfall 

found Colonel Hill’s 1st Battalion tied in with the left flank of Moore’s 

19th Infantry, while his 2d Battalion dug in near the 34th’s Company B

on the hills south and east of Tugok. The yawning two-mile gap between 

that point and Alfonso’a enclave remained open for North Korean exploitation (see map 7).12 

The manner in which the 9th Infantry was employed on 8 August repre

sented a lost opportunity to make a significant contribution to the cours

of the battle. General Church’s orders to Hill had been extremely vague 

but had required an immediate response. Given the limited time available 

to familiarize himself with the terrain and situation, Hill had chosen t

use the Yongsan-Naktong road as his general axis of advance. He had also 

chosen to send his untried troops forward slowly and to pass them carefully 

through elements of the other regiments. The result was to squander the 

24th Division’s only foreseeable major reinforcement in simply bolstering 

the center of the threatened sector, while the enemy continued to exploit a

opening of major proportions on the division’s left. Had Hill been given 

more time to survey his situation and deploy his men, he might have bee

able to strike the enemy a hard blow with his two large battalions or a

least reestablish a continuous division front. Denied that time by Church

he was unable to do more than devise a hurried, pedestrian response. Thus

the potential for a decisive counterattack was dissipated as the 9th Infantry 

waa drawn piecemeal into the confused fighting for Hill 165 at the cente

of the North Korean penetration. 

Nightfall of 8 August found the 24th Division no nearer its goal o

restoring the Naktong line than it had been on the previous evening. In 

contrast, the North Koreans had materially reinforced the 16th Regiment’s 

initial penetration with most, if not all, of another regiment. Even in area

where Church’s troops had regained the river, such as the sector reoccupied 

by Company I, 34th Infantry, numbers of enemy soldiers had vanished into 

the hills only to reappear later in seemingly secure rear areas. Briefly du

ing the afternoon, some of these infiltrators interdicted the Ch’angnyongNaktong road little more than two miles from the division’s headquarters. 

The hours of darkness saw a significant increase in North Korean artillery 

fire, which fell near both Church’s CP at Ch’angnyong and the 21st Infantry’s CP three miles to the north. These incidents, alone, meant little, bu

when combined with events in the Yongsan sector to the south, they clearly 

depicted a division that had completely lost the initiative.13 

By its own estimate, the condition of the 24th Division on the evening 

of 8 August was poor, with combat efficiency standing at only 40 percent

Combat efficiency of the 34th Infantry, which numbered no more than 110
grand total to 13,476. Casualties had been heavy and the flow of replacements no more than a trickle. The division remained seriously deficient in 

machine guns, &l-mm and 4.2-inch mortars, BARS, M-24 tanks, jeeps, and 

trucks. Nor was the ammunition supply system functioning smoothly, espe

cially in regard to artillery items. “In fact, a critical shortage of 155-mm 

artillery fuses during the day was alleviated only by an emergency airlift 

of a small quantity from Eighth Army reserve stocks in Taegu. Grievous 

as these deficiencies were, General-Church had no alternative but to order 

a continuation of the counterattack an the fallowing day.14 

During the night of 8-9 August, a significant change occurred in the 

dispositions of the 34th Infantry an the south flank of the North Korean 

penetration. Ever since the initial enemy crossing an 6 August, Captain 

Alfonsa’s Companies A, 6, and L had maintained a perimeter an the hills 

overlooking the Naktong about two miles forward of the main American 

battle line. Virtually unmolested by the North Koreans an 7 August, these 

men were in radio contact with the 1st Battalion CP and had received 

supplies by air. On 8 August, this relatively tolerable situation had deteriorated markedly. Heavily reinforced, the North Koreans in the Naktong 

Bulge had begun to move toward the beleaguered Americans, while the airdrop of that date had missed Alfansa’s perimeter completely. Seeing the 

enemy massing far an attack upon his position during the night, Alfonso 

requested permission for his men to break out to the east. After checking 

with Colonel Beauchamp, Lieutenant Colonel Ayres of the 1st Battalion 

gave his approval. 

Burdened by numerous casualties, Alfonso ordered his able-bodied soldiers to take turns carrying the wounded by rotating bearers from the front 

of the column to the rear. To facilitate the withdrawal, he chase to use the 

Yangsan road as far as possible, ignoring Ayres’ suggestion to employ a 

mare circuitous route to avoid enemy contact. Assembling his men on the 

road at 2230, Alfanso led the column northeastward. No sooner had they 

left their defensive positions on the hills overlooking the road than the 

enemy attacked in strength. Finding the Americans moving away, the North 

Koreans began to interdict the road with automatic weapons fire. This fire 

destroyed Alfonso’s scheme of rotating litter bearers, as no one in front 

was willing to move nearer the enemy, who was pressing close behind. 

By the time Alfonsa’s column reached the site of the American mortar 

positions abandoned an 6 August, it had begun to lose its cohesion. Knawing that he had encountered large numbers of North Koreans in the immediate vicinity two days before, Alfonsa halted the column before it entered 

the narrow defile leading past the village of Tugok. Mistakenly expecting 

to find a guide there sent by Ayres, the captain grew apprehensive when 

none appeared. As dawn approached an 9 August, Alfanso decided to seek 

a route around the enemy positions suspected to be ahead. Taking two men 

with him and leaving the rest in a makeshift perimeter, he walked sautheast far about two miles, then turned northeast, ultimately reaching the 
Twenty-five men from Companies A and L reached the battalion CP 

1340, while other groups, after taking a longer detour, struck the road abo

a mile west of Yongsan. One group of seventy men had been pinned dow

for several hours in midmorning by machine gun fire, and no more tha

forty of them had escaped the trap, leaving behind both their dead an

wounded. The survivors of the three companies were fed a hot meal an

sent to rest and reorganize in the regimental rear.15 

The departure of Alfonso’s men from their positions on the river wid

ened the hole in the 24th Division’s line, leaving Company K of the 34t

Infantry isolated on the division’s left flank. At 0635, the company’s north

ernmost outpost was overrun by North Korean units, as was a patrol se

earlier to contact Alfonso. Within an hour, a reinforced platoon from th

company counterattacked to regain the lost position, but the attack wa

unsuccessful. Instead, Company K was forced to relinquish a mile of rive

front in the face of large numbers of North Koreans moving openly aroun

its right and into its rear. By early afternoon, the company had bent i

line into a right angle to avoid being flanked but was in serious danger 

being pinned against the Naktong as the North Koreans continued to e

ploit the gap in the 24th Division’s line.le 

The developments on the division’s southern flank in the early morning 

hours of 9 August had no effect on General Church’s plans for dealing 

with the North Korean penetration. Since Beauchamp’s 34th Infantry wa

in tatters and Moore’s 19th Infantry had been reduced to less than 30

riflemen in each of its battalions, Chureh’s primary reliance shifted t

Colonel Hill’s 9th Infantry. Fresh from the United States, this unit wa

large but green. This inexperience had been much in evidence on the prev

ous day when the regiment had failed to come to grips with the enem

because of faulty staff work and the inadequate physical conditioning 

its men. Whatever its faults, Church planned to employ Hill’s regiment o

9 August in still another counterattack against North Korean strongpoints 

around Hill 165 and the village of Tugok. The attack was to be supporte

by a diversionary air strike against enemy positions facing the 19th Infan

try, adjacent to the 9th on its right.17 

The planned air strike, however, did not materialize at the appointed 

hour because air controllers of the 1st Cavalry Division diverted it en rout

to deal with a minor breakthrough on their own front. Nevertheless, th

9th InfantryJegan its advance shortly after 0545. Once again, its mis

understanding&its position in relation to both friendly and enemy unit

hindered the- 1st Battalion. By the time its advance wilted under the mid

morning heat,bnly Company B had managed to place a platoon on th

slopes of Hill 165. ,Hostile fire soon forced even that unit to withdraw, Ieav

ing the North Koreans firmly in control of the hill. A mile to the south

the 2d Battalion encountered even greater difficulties. Companies E and 

were assigned to seize Tugok and the ridge beyond with the aid of Company 
toon from Company E reaching the ridge behind Tugok, while Companies 

B and G gained part of the high ridge across the road to the southeast. 

These gains, however, were only temporary, as a violent North Korean 

counterattack quickly sent all three companies reeling back to their original 

starting points. Casualties were especially heavy in the 2d Battalion and 

included the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Fred L. Harrison, who was seriously wounded.18 

By noon, the counterattack of the 9th Infantry had stalled, and the 

regiment’s poorly conditioned troops were exhausted. Without adequate 

water discipline, most of the men in the rifle companies had drained their 

canteens early and were now suffering severely from the effects of heat 

and humidity. Supplies of salt tablets and fresh water were sent forward 

along urith ammunition, but the troops were unable to resume their advance 

until the late afternoon. In the interim, Church ordered his assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. Pearson Menoher, to arrange a coordinated 

attack by all units later in the day. Around 1400, Menoher met with 

Beauchamp, Moore, and Hill at the 19th Infantry’s CP at Kang-ni. There it 

was agreed that the three regiments would launch a coordinated attack all 

along the line at 1700. The 19th Infantry, on the right, would strike toward 

the high ground beyond the villages of Ohang and Sinam-ni, while the 9th 

Infantry, on the left, would assault both Tugok and Hill 165. Company B 

of the 34th Infantry, with its attached tank, would assist the 9th Infantry’s 

2d Battalion in its drive on Tugok. The attack would be preceded by a tenminute artillery barrage beginning at 1650. Ominously, while the conference 

was in session, observers at the front reported small groups of North 

Koreans moving to reinforce Hill 165.19 

Hill 165 and its associated ridges now had become the focal point of 

the battle as far as the 24th Division was concerned. Although overshadowed by the hills to the west, also in enemy hands, it dominated the 

lower hills and valleys to the east. From its crest, an observer could look 

directly down the road through Kang-ni toward Yongsan, five miles away. 

North Korean snipers dug in on its slopes were able to make life miserable 

for American units located on adjacent but lower hills. Holding a position 

less than 500 yards north of Hill 165, Company B of the 19th Infantry 

suffered especially from this sniping. After eleven men of the company had 

been hit, a sergeant named Dudley organized his own sniping party and 

responded in kind. He and his men were so successful in countering the 

enemy fire that Dudley later was awarded the Distinguished Service 

Cross.20 

While the troops at the front took advantage of the afternoon lull and 

their officers planned the next counterattack, activity of a different sort 

characterized General Church’s headquarters at Ch’angnyong. The headquarters had been harassed on the previous day by reports of infiltrators 

in their vicinity and by random artillery fire. These annoyances worsened 

during the morning of 9 August. Several artillery rounds burst uneomfort-
from the composite defense platoons searched the hills for the elusive inf

trators, but little could be done about the artillery fire, which sporadicall

ranged over the area between Ch’angnyong and the river. After more roun

detonated near Ch’angnyong at 1120, Church ordered the division’s hea

quarters to relocate to Kyun’gyo, eight miles east of Yongsan and almo

fifteen from Ch’angnyong (for location of Kyun’gyo, see map 3).21 

Although executed in an orderly fashion, the displacement of Dang

Forward, as the division’s advance CP was known, necessarily interrupte

the normal functioning of its components. Defensive outposts were order

in at 1230, and the first headquarters elements departed an hour late

Among the first units to move was a detachment of the 24th Signal Co

pany, whose mission was to establish communications circuits at the ne

location. Around 1600, the division staff sections left Ch’angnyong, althoug

the section chiefs remained behind with skeleton crews to control operation

until the new CP at Kyun’gyo was open for business. Most of the convoy

arrived at Kyun’gyo after about two hours on the road, but persisten

communications problems prevented the new headquarters from being ful

operational for some time. Compounding the confusion was an unannounce

visit to Church by Lt. Gen. Walton Walker, commanding Eighth Army

Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker. 

Commander, 

Eighth U.S. Army 
crumbling of the divisions left flank.22 

At 1650, the artillery preparation began. The arrival of Batteries A and 

B, 15th Field Artillery Battalion, and the reequipment of Battery B, 13th 

Field Artillery Battalion, permitted the concentration of eighteen lo&mm 

howitzers for the first time since the battle had begun. In addition, Battery 

B, 11th Field Artillery, joined the bombardment with its heavier 155-mm 

howitzers. While the artillery fired on the North Korean forward positions, 

aircraft struck enemy targets nearer the river, including suspected North 

Korean gun positions beyond the Naktong.23 

The counterattack began promptly at 1700, but it never became the 

powerful, coordinated thrust contemplated by the officers attending the afternoon conference at Kang-ni. On the right, the 2d Battalian, 19th Infantry, 

moved off Ohang Hill and attempted to seize the ridge beyond Ohang village. Numbering no more than 280 riflemen, the battalion was unable to 

gain any ground. The effort, however, cost numerous casualties from enemy 

fire and heat exhaustion. Included among the latter were the battalion 

commander, Lt. Col. Robert Rhea and his operations officer. Even more 

depleted than its sister unit, the 1st Battalion did not even attempt to advance. On the other flank, Company B of the 34th Infantry was similarly 

inactive, although its attached light tank contributed to the preliminary 

bombardment.2* 

The inability of the 19th and 34th Infantry regiments to gain ground 

placed the burden of the counterattack upon Colonel Hill’s 9th Infantry. 

Hill 165 was to be assaulted by the 1st Battalion from the north and Company E of the 2d Battalion from the southeast, A difficult operation at best 

in terrain affording limited visibility, this simultaneous attack from several 

directions avoided casualties from friendly fire only because the timing of 

the attack broke down. Although Company E easily began climbing the 

slopes of the objective fifteen minutes after crossing the line of departure, 

the 1st Battalion delayed its own advance because of coordination problems 

with the supporting artillery. By the time the 1st Battalion went into 

action, Company E was hard pressed by the North Korean defenders and 

unable to reach the crest of the hill. Nevertheless, it grimly clung to the 

southern slope, while the three companies of the 1st Battalion fought their 

way southward onto the western slope. The crest of Hill 165, which lay to 

the east, was neutralized but not occupied. Meanwhile, a mile to the south, 

Company G of the 2d Battalion advanced through Tugok and onto the 

ridge beyond, only to find itself isolated there. With darkness rapidly 

approaching and further coordination impossible, all units dug in where 

they were for the night. Hill planned to resume the attack at first light, 

but he expected little from his 2d Battalion, which had lost its commander 

in the morning and had been roughly handled by the enemy in the afternoon assault (see map 8).25 

The initial reports reaching General Church portrayed the results of 

the counterattack in glowing terms, and it was not until 2330 that Hill 
after sunset, the 19th Infantry reported North Korean troops in various 

locations stretching all the way to Namji-ri on the Naktong, far behind the 

24th Division’s left flank. When added to similar reports from the 34th Infantry and the pilot of an artillery spotter plane, this information produced 

a disturbing picture. If true, the reports indicated that the North Koreans 

had not only isolated Company K of the 34th Infantry but were about to 

drive a large wedge between the 24th Division and the neighboring 25th 

Division to the south, Yongsan itself was in danger, as was the MSR to 

Miryang. In sum, the trickle of North Koreans through the gap in the division”s line was on the verge of becoming a torrent unless immediate correc

tive action was taken.27 

Suspecting that they were in danger of being flanked, Colonels Hill, 

Beauchamp, and Moore warned their regiments to be especially vigilant 

during the night. In addition, Beauchamp ordered Company L of his 3d 

Battalion to move to the aid of Company K on the river. Seriously depleted 

by its recent ordeal, Company L had been resting near Yongsan for only a 

few hours when it received orders at 2100 to return to the Naktong. The 

unit departed immediately, reached K Company at 0115 on 10 August, and 

took up position on K’s right three hours later. This action by Beauchamp 

narrowed the gap in the division”s front but did not close it.28 

Throughout the night of 9-10 August, the headquarters elements of 

the 24th Division remained split, with most of the staff located at the new 

CP at Kyun’gyo, while the section chiefs were still at Ch’angnyong. This 

may account for the division”s slow response to the North Korean flanking 

maneuver, already far advanced. Church and his staff planned nothing 

more for 10 August than a continuation of the previous afternoon’s eoordinated attacks against the center of the enemy’s line. Yet information available to at least part of the staff indicated a serious problem on the division 

left that called for an entirely different response.2g 

The exact sequence of events that occurred within the division command 

structure is impossible to recapture with the documentation available, but 

certain facts are known. At 2137 on 9 August, the S2 of the 19th Infantry 

transmitted to division headquarters a report indicating that significant 

numbers of North Korean soldiers were moving into the division’s rear 

through a gap in the front line. This report, later proven to be substantially 

correct, was received at 2150 by the division G2 section and at 2227 by the 

division G3 section. At 0015 on 10 August, G3, in turn, provided the information to the 21st Infantry, holding the right of the division sector. At 0400

the same report was included in an intelligence summary forwarded to 

Eighth Army headquarters at Taegu. Thus, the crucial information was in 

the hands of at least part of the division staff before midnight on 9 August, 

and it was considered important enough to be transmitted to other units as 

well as to higher headquarters. When, or if, the report reached General 

Church is not known. In any event, the division commander did not act to 

--__---__ -
The counterattack planned by the 9th, 19th, and 34th Infantry regi

ments far the morning of 10 August essentially duplicated the previous afternoon’s plan far a caardinated attack. Following a preliminary artillery 

bombardment, the 9th and 19th Infantry regiments, assisted by part of the 

34th, were to assault the hills and ridges opposite them and drive all the 

way to the river. At 0545, three batteries of 105-mm and ane of 155mm 

howitzers apened fire an the enemy frantline positions and continued their 

bombardment far fifteen minutes. Farther to the west, air strikes hampered 

North Korean movement across the Naktang.31 

On the right of the line, the 19th Infantry jumped off an time at 0606

It employed anly its 2d Battalion, since the 1st Battalion was masked by 

part of the 9th Infantry in its frant. Companies E and F began the 

advance, with G in reserve same distance to the rear. Drained by battle 

casualties, heat exhaustion, and straggling, none of the companies was 

larger than a normal platoon. Within fifteen minutes, Company E, an the 

right, was pinned dawn by enemy fire from the direction of the river. This 

effectively stalled the attack of the 2d Battalion, and the initiative passed 

to the North Kareans. At 0725, Gompany E reported that it was in “bad 

shape,” and by 0935, it had been isolated by enemy assaults. The battalion 

commander hurriedly called up the two usable platoons of Company G

which fought their way along the river in an effort to relieve Company E. 

By 1050, Company C of the 1st Battalion was also moving to the aid of 

the 2d Battalion. With this assistance, the remnants of Company E broke 

free from encirclement and withdrew to safety. The North Koreans followed 

them, seizing Ohang Hill in the process. By the time its position was stabilized on the next line of hills to the narth, the 2d Battalion had been driven 

back 750 yards (see map 9j.32 

On the left of Moore’s 19th Infantry, Hill’s 9th Infantry also crossed 

the line of departure an time. Almost at once, it came under intense artillery 

and mortar fire but continued to attack. The objectives of the 1st Battalion 

were to consolidate its hold on Hill 165, then to seize the villages of Maekkok and Sugaeri to the west. Company B spent the morning clearing Hill 

165, Company A moved into Sugae-ri with relative ease, but Company C 

was unable to wrest Maekkok from the North Koreans. To the south, the 

2d Battalion actually last ground, as Campany G was forced to withdraw 

from its exposed position west of Tugok. As for the 34th Infantry’s patiicipatian, Company B and the Heavy Mortar Company clung to the lower 

slopes of Obang-ni Ridge but did not move forward.33 

At 1000, a violent North Korean counterattack struck the units around 

Tugak and Obong-ni. Both the 2d Battalion of the 9th Infantry and the 

two companies of the 34th Infantry reeled backward under the pressure. 

The blow fell especially hard an the 2d Battalion, where only one company 

had mare than one officer, and the battalion commander, a major, had just 

assumed command. When the North‘ Koreans struck, the officers of the 2d 
battalion, Hill returned with him to the &ant. There, they found the battalion executive afficer restoring order with the relatively unshaken Company 

F. By afternoon, the situation had been stabilized, but 2,000 yards of critical 

terrain had been lost.34 

The successful Narth Korean attack further widened the hole in the 

front line and exacerbated the growing problem of infiltration on the 24th 

Division’s left flank. In this area, the Naktong ran in an easterly” direction 

and served as the boundary between the 24th and 25th Divisions. The main 

road connecting the two divisions crossed the Naktong an a bridge near 

Namji-ri, about six miles south of Yangsan. North Korean units had entered 

Namji-ri an the previous evening and by noan an 10 August were probing 

northward toward Yongsan itself. Unaware that the area was infested with 

small groups of the enemy, American troops cantinued to use the road ta 

move supplies, and they relaxed in what they believed to be a secure rear 

area. One such group, five men from Battery A, 26th AAA Battalion, spent 

the morning swimming in a pond north of Namji-ri. Returning to K C!ampany, 34th Infantry, they were halted around 1430 by a North Korean roadblock. Overpowered by the enemy, they joined several other Americans 

already captured at the same place.35 

Although he was not yet aware of the roadblock south of Yongsan, 

General Church had finally resolved to deal with the gap on the left of his 

front. During the morning, his intelligence and operations officers visited 

the various regiments to gain firsthand knowledge of the situation. By 1100, 

the division G2 had reached the new headquarters at Kyun’gyo, and the 

information he brought from the 34th Infantry may have inspired Church 

to act. At any rate, by 1240, Church had tentatively decided to transfer a 

battalion of Colonel Stephens’ 21s.t Infantry south to the 34th’s sector to 

assist in plugging the hale.. Rather than act precipitately, Church decided 

to visit Stephens at his CP north of Ch’angnyong before making a final 

decision.36 

Church reached the 21st Infantry CP around 1300. Finding only light 

enemy activity in front of the regiment, he quickly confirmed his initial 

decision and ordered Stephens to detach Lieutenant Colonel Smith”s 1st Battalion for duty south of Yangsan. Smith’s force consisted of only three 

companies, A, B, and D (Weapons), since Company C had not yet arrived 

fiam Korea’s east coast. While Stephens was concerned abaut Smith’s departure, which would be visible to the North Koreans watching from the 

heights west of the Naktong, he was assured that Company C and an 

attached artillery battery had been released by Eighth Army and were en 

route to join him. Church then departed to visit Task Force Hyzer, while 

Stephens and his staff gathered the trucks needed to move Smith’s battalion. By 1645, the 1st Battalion was on the way south. As Stephens had 

predicted, the enemy noted its departure and attempted to hasten it with 

artillery fire.37 
assistant division commander, Brigadier General Menoher, learned of the 

North Korean roadblocks on the road to Namji-ri. Momentarily without 

units to respond to the crisis, Church contacted his G3, Lieutenant Colonel 

James Snee, at Kyun’gyo. Told to seek aid wherever necessary, Snee attempted to contact both Eighth Army at Taegu and the 25th Division to 

the south, but his land lines were dead. At 1610, he drafted a Flash message 

for Eighth Army and ordered it sent in the clear. He dispatched a similar 

message at 1625 by light aircraft to the 25th Division. Both messages 

requested assistance from the 27th Infantry, a part of the 25th Division 

that had just moved into Eighth Army reserve near Masari. 

While Snee attempted to gain the use of the 27th Infantry, Church 

departed for Kyun’gyo. He left General Menoher at Yongsan to coordinate 

the activities of whatever units might be found to counter the enemy’s 

southern thrust. Initially, the only unit available was the Heavy Mortar 

Company of Beauchamp’s 34th Infantry, one of the companies forced back 

from Obong-ni during the morning North Korean attack. At 1640, the 

company received orders to move down the Namji-ri road to guard 

Yongsan’s southern approaches. Twenty-five minutes later, General Church 

ordered the 24th Recon Company detached from Task Force Hyzer and sent 

to Yongsan. At 1730, in response to Church’s earlier plea for aid, Eighth 

Brig. Gen. Pearson Men&w, 

Assistant DFvision Commander, 

24th Infantry Division 
Ever so gradually, the forces summoned by the 24th Divisions call fo

help began to arrive. While Menoher waited for the 24th Recon Compan

to appear with its light tanks, he supported the handful of heavy morta

crewmen by calling in air strikes on the road north of Namji-ri. At 185

he reported that the North Koreans were within two and one-half miles 

Yongsan. Shortly thereafter, the 24th Recon Company arrived after 

thirteen-mile journey from Sibi-ri. While it prepared to go into action

Menoher reported the situation to Church, who told him to remain 

Yongsan until the situation was stable and a coordinated plan had bee

developed for action the next day. Church also passed along the wishes 

Walton Walker, Eighth Army commander, to “get that place cleared up.“*0 

At 2000, the 3d Platoon of the 24th Recon Company began its attac

down ‘the road toward Namji-ri. Meeting no resistance for approximately 

three miles, the tankers finally encountered an enemy machine gun positio

supported by riflemen. Since they had been told that a company of th

34th Infantry was following to secure any ground gained, the tankers halte

to await its arrival. They waited until after darkness fell, but no infantry 

could be found except the mortarmen already present. Unwilling to risk h

tanks without adequate infantry support, the platoon leader pulled everyon

back about 500 yards and established his own roadblock at 2300 (see map

3 and 9).“l 

South of the Naktong, Lt. Cal. Gordon Murch’s 2d Battalion of th

27th Infantry and Battery B, 8th Field Artillery Battalion, departed at 193

for Namji-ri. Murch expected action since a patrol attempting to contac

the 24th Division via the Namji-ri bridge had been turned back by enem

fire earlier in the day, On the way north, progress was impeded b

thousands of refugees moving in the opposite direction. Trying to avoi

one of the heavy trucks, a refugee cart tipped over, revealing a cache 

guns and ammunition. Several North Koreans disguised as refugees dashe

for the hills, but most were shot down by Murch’s men. Thus delayed, th

2d Battalion did not reach the Naktong until long after nightfall. On nea

ing the bridge, the troops eneauntered light resistance. Deploying his thre

companies, Murch ordered Company F to seize a bridgehead on the othe

side of the river. While Company F fought its way over the bridge

Companies E and G took positions on hills overlooking the crossing sit

Rather than proceed farther in the darkness against opposition of unknown 

strength, Murch decided to wait for daylight before advancing beyond h

bridgehead.42 

Nightfall also brought an end to operations on the main division front

Once again, a supposedly coordinated counterattack had lacked coordina

tion. Only the 1st Battalion of the 9th Infantry had made any progress 

all, while the 19th Infantry, on its right, had only held in place, and th

units on its Ieft had been driven back in disorder. Unable to capture 

Maekkok and unsupported on either flank, the 1st Battalion withdrew 
the left.43 

The inability of the three regiments to advance in the center and the 

developing threat to his left flank caused General Church to seek a better 

solution to the problem of coordination. Previously, all three regimental 

commanders had been free to act independently. Any coordination that occurred was more the result of goodwill among Moore, Hill, and Beauchamp, 

and the tireless efforts of Assistant Division Commander Menoher, than of 

conscious design. To end the confusion, late on 10 August Church created 

Task Force Hill, under Col. John G. Hill, the senior colonel in the sector. 

Hill was given control of his own regiment, Moore’s 19th Infantry, 

Beauchamp’s 34th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion of the 21st Infantry, 

which had reached an assembly area southwest of Yongsan during the 

night. He was charged with devising a plan that would eradicate the North 

Korean penetration at the earliest possible time. When the plan was 

complete, General Menoher would bring it to division headquarters at 

Kyun’gyo,4* 

Vested with his new authority, Hill convened a conference during the 

night at a schoolhouse in Yongsan. Present were Hill, Moore, Beauchamp, 

their regimental operations officers, and the commanders of the 13th and 

15th Field Artillery Battalions. In its final form, the plan called for the 

19th and 9th Infantry to attack southwest toward the Naktong, just as 

they had been doing for several days. Meanwhile Smith’s battalion of the 

21st Infantry would attempt to roll up the right flank of the North Korean 

line. The 34th Infantry would protect Smith’s left flank as he advanced. 

The plan did not address the developing threat to Yongsan from the south 

nor the fact that Smith’s assembly area was dangerously near the enemy’s 

line of transit to Namji-ri. In effect, the plan assumed that the area southeast of Obong-ni Ridge was unoccupied territory where Smith could 

maneuver without hindrance (see map 9).45 

By midnight, Church estimated that the 24th Division was barely holding its own against an enemy continually being reinforced from across the 

Naktong. Organic division strength stood at 9755, with 5401 attached, for 

a total of 15,156 officers and men. The number of replacements reaching 

the division was slowly increasing, 247 being shipped to units on 10 August, 

although a growing number of stragglers partially negated these gains. 

Similarly, increased quantities of weapons were arriving in the division 

area, significantly reducing shortages in machine guns and mortars. While 

the division still lacked 16 M-24 tanks, 292 1 1/4=ton trucks, 88 3/4=ton 

trucks, and $7 2 1/2=ton trucks, these deficiencies were not crippling as 

long as the division remained generally on the defensive. Ammunition 

stocks, except for mortar shells, were adequate. The supply of salt tablets, 

however, was insufficient to meet consumption rates and required emergency 

efforts to increase the suppl~.*~ 
g gj

movement that the next day’s attack by Smith”s battalion of the 21s

Infantry was designed to forestall. Prudently, the 24th Division’s Head

quarters Company was ordered to patrol the roads leading from the 

Naktong to the Yongsan-Miryang MSR, and supply convoys moving toward 

the front were warned to be alert for snipers. Otherwise, no special pre

cautions were taken to safeguard either the division headquarters complex 

at Kyun’gyo or its lines of communication to the front. The 24th Division 

command structure believed it had finally caught up with the enemy, bu

events would soon show it still to be operating at least twelve hours behind 

the North Koreans.47 
The Fight for the MSR 

Dawn of 11 August marked the opening of a new phase in the 24th 

Division’s fight to maintain its position along the Naktong. The failure of 

the individual regiments to erase the North Korean penetration had caused 

General Church to create Task Force Hill in an attempt to produce a more 

united effort. Hill’s staff worked through the predawn hours planning a 

coordinated attack by the seven infantry battalions engaged in the Bulge. 

Central to the plan was a sweep by the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, to the 

northwest behind Obong-ni Ridge, a movement that the planners believed 

would roll up the North Korean right flank.1 Unfortunately, before the day 

was over, this ambitious plan would have to be cast aside. An excellent 

proposal had it been implemented several days earlier, the plan now had 

been overtaken by events occurring south of Yongsan. There, North Korean 

units were on the verge of reaching the 24th Division’s MSR. This threat, 

which grew by the hour, would soon replace Task Force Hill’s operations 

as the division’s primary concern and would remain so for several days. 

Task Force Hill’s initial attack was not scheduled to begin until 1200, 

but activity on the southern front began at first light. At Namji-ri, Lt. Col. 

Gordon Murch pushed Companies E and G of his 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, across the Naktong, where they joined Company F in its bridgehead 

north of the river. Having secured Namji-ri, Murch began an advance up 

the road toward Yongsan. The road, passing through a wide floodplain, 

initially paralleled the Naktong on the right. Murch deployed Company F 

on the road, with Company G on its left, and Company E echeloned to the 

left rear to cover the battalion’s open flank. One mile north of Namji-ri, a 

heavily diked stream crossed the road before emptying into the Naktong, 

and there Murch found the enemy. Firing from behind the dike, North 

Korean machine gunners pinned the leading platoons of Company F to the 

ditches on either side of the road. Murch called for artillery support from 

Battery B, 8th Field Artillery Battalion, which was supporting him from 

south of the river. He also requested an air strike on the enemy position. 

Under the cover provided by these diversions, Company G gained access to 

the dike west of the North Korean gunners and began to sweep down upon 

their flank. Abandoning their position in response to this threat, the North 

Koreans fled northward under a rain of shells from Battery B. By noon, 

57 
Several miles north of Murch, events were not unfolding so happily fo

the 24th Division. Primary defender of the two roads leading south from 

Yongsan was the 24th Reeon Company with its handful of M-24 tanks

Capt. John A. Kearns had detailed his 2d Platoon to work its way south

ward on the easternmost road, while his other two platoons covered th

direct road to Namji-ri. All elements left their blocking positions at daw

and headed south. On the east road, the 2d Platoon drove a party of North 

Koreans out of the village of Non-ni, but the enemy took up new positions 

on the hills to either side and prevented further movement. A mile to th

southwest, the rest of the company was similarly held up just south 

Tochon-ni. Under increasing fire from automatic weapons and antitank rifles

Kearns’ platoons could go no farther without reinforcement.3 

One and one-half miles west of the 24th Recon Company, Lieutenan

Colonel Smith’s 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was in its assembly area pr

paring for the noon attack when it was suddenly overrun by a large forc

of North Koreans. Taken by surprise, the battalion suffered at least eigh

casualties and lost several trucks and weapons before the enemy disappeare

into the hills. This occurred shortly after 0900, about the same time tha

Yongsan began to come under heavy artillery fire. Seemingly well directed

the barrage struck amidst the various headquarters and supply element

crowded into the built-up area. Hardest hit was the CP of the 24th Reco

Company, which lost two men killed and five wounded. As the shelling 

continued, men who had access to vehicles began to evacuate the town.4 

Around 1030, just as Kearns’ two platoons south of Tochon-ni were pr

paring to assault North Korean positions in the hills above the road, 

violent artillery barrage struck the Americans. Unnerved by the shelling

which probably came from Murch’s artillery south of the Naktong, the pl

toons withdrew precipitately and did not halt until they were nearly a mi

north of Yongsan. In the town itself, the North Korean artillery fire inten

sified, driving more rear echelon elements northward into the countryside

Battery B, 11th Field Artillery Battalion, and the CP of the 13th Fiel

Artillery Battalion also came under the same fire, but they remained 

place. Such was not the case with Battery B of the 13th Field Artillery 

Battalion a mite and one-half nearer the front. It was forced to displac

closer to Yongsan because of enemy small-arms fire. By 1200, all the d

vision’s elements around Yongsan, in what had once been the relatively 

secure rear, were under some form of North Korean harassing fire.5 

The problems in the rear notwithstanding, Task Force Hill launched i

noon attack on schedule. With Smith’s battalion shaken from its morning 

brush with the enemy, the main effort shifted to the 9th Infantry in th

center of the line. While the 1st Battalion provided a base of fire from th

vicinity of Hill 165, the 2d Battalion advanced about 1,500 yards across 

valley to the foothills on the right of the Yongsan-Naktong road. This a

vance, made against light enemy resistance, recovered most of the groun
1st Battalion was charged with covering the 9th 1nfantrys right flank by 

an advance of its own. Depleted by casualties, stragglers, and heat exhaustion, however, the battalion could only hold its positian, despite pleas for 

aid from the exposed 9th Infantry (see map lo).6 

While Task Force Hill struggled to make small gains, four miles to the 

rear at Yongsan, the situation continued to deteriorate. The only part of 

Kearns’ 24th Recon Company still guarding the southern approaches to the 

town was the 2d Platoon near Non-ni. At 1430, fire from North Korean 

antitank rifles set one of the platoon’s tanks ablaze and destroyed the platoon leader’s vehicle. As the enemy began to outflank his command, 2d Lt, 

J. L. Bragg ordered it to withdraw to the southern edge of Yongsan. There 

the platoan was reformed by Captain Kearns, who used it to establish a 

new blocking position just south of town. Kearns then went in search of 

the remainder of his company.? 

At 1755, Colonel Beauchamp informed Colonel Snee, the division G3, 

that he believed Yongsan’s fall was only a few hours away and that all 

available troops had been committed. Another message sent at 1845 reported 

that enemy pressure against Yongsan from the south was increasing. Shortly 

thereafter, the artillery batteries emplaced 1,000 yards west of Yongsan came 

under North Korean small-arms fire. Battery B, 13th Field Artillery, which 

had already moved ante because of enemy harassment, turned one of its 

howitzers around and fired a round toward suspected enemy positions in 

its rear. The artillerymen also sprayed the area with 40-mm and machine 

gun fire, temporarily ending the threat as the enemy faded back into the 

broken country to the south.8 

All around Yongsan similar encounters took place between surprised 

American soldiers and North Korean infiltrators. Such was the fate of a 

motor patrol from Headquarters Company of’ the 9th Infantry. Ambushed 

by infiltrators, the patrol extricated itself only when one of its members, 

Pfc. Lawrence ‘1%. Bater, remained behind to provide covering fire. The patrol 

escaped, but Bater did not. When his body was discovered several days 

later surrounded by enemy dead, it was evident that he had sold his life 

dearly. Because his “heroic and selfless action resulted in the successful 

withdrawal of his comrades,” Private First Class Bater posthumously received the Distinguished Service C~OSS.~ 

Quick action was necessary to bring more troops to the defense af Yongsan, but the sources from which to draw fresh units were rapidly being 

depleted. At 1905, General Church once more called upon Cal. Richard 

Stephens’ 21st Infantry. Church ordered Stephens to send a company to 

Yongsan as rapidly as possible. Since the telephone line from Kyun’gyo to 

Stephens’ CP was dead, the message was dispatched by light plane and 

dropped to the 21st at 1940. By the time a similar message arrived ten 

.minutes later, Stephens had already alerted the 14th Engineer (C) Battalion 
at 2030. It was followed by elements of Company A, augmented by cooks 

and staff section personnel from Headquarters and Service Company. This 

ad hoc collection of troops, numbering fewer than 100 men, reached Beau

champ’s CP at 2115.10 

The day ended with Yongsan still in American hands but shielded on 

the south and east by only a thin line of troops. Captain Kearns had finally 

located the remainder of his recon company and had united them with his 

2d Platoon on the southern approaches to the town. The detachment of the 

14th Engineers sent by Colonel Stephens moved out on the MSR severa

miles east of Yongsan, where it established a series of roadblocks connected 

by a jeep patrol. Beyond the engineers, another ad hoc formation patrolled 

the MSR toward Kyun’gyo. Consisting of Capt. George Hafeman’s 24th Di

vision Headquarters Company and miscellaneous detachments from the 24th 

Military Police Company, 24th Signal Company, 24th Division Band, 724th 

Ordnance Maintenance Company, and South Korean police, this formation 

was given the name of Task Force Hafeman (see map ll).n 

Much of the North Korean pressure on Yongsan during 11 August was 

an indirect result of the advance northward of Lieutenant Colonel Mureh’s 

2d Battalion, 27th Infantry. After forcing the enemy from the dike north o

Namji-ri, Mureh had spent several hours consolidating his position At 1530

he began a slow drive northward toward Yongsan. As the advance com

pressed the North Korean access corridor into the 24th Division’s rear, the 

enemy either moved toward Yongsan or dispersed into the hills and gullies 

on either side of Murch’s axis of advance. Nightfall found the 2d Battalion 

moving onto the high ground west of the road from Yongsan to Namji-ri. 

Unfortunately, its isolated position made it vulnerable to enemy infiltration, 

causing Murch to withdraw his companies to the vicinity of the dike by 

2300. Although a prudent move, this decision again widened the North Ko

rean infiltration corridor (see map lo).12 

The developing threat to the division’s rear caused General Church on 

the night of 11 August to reorient the thrust of the 24th Division’s counterattack. Although he was still determined to reduce the North Korean 

bridgehead in the Naktong Bulge, the security of the division’s MSR had 

now become his first priority. Accordingly, Task Force Hill was ordered to 

cease offensive operations and stand on the defensive until further notice. 

To deal with the threat to Yongsan from the south, the remainder of the 

27th Infantry was instructed to join Mureh’s 2d Battalion in its drive north 

toward Yongsan, thereby isolating the North Korean infiltrators. Until the 

27th could accomplish its mission, security of the MSR depended upon three 

small units, the 24th Recon Company, Company A of the 14th Engineer 

(C) Battalion, and Task Force Hafemanl” 

Although the 24th Division’s predicament on the night of 11 August 

was not yet catastrophic, the potential for disaster was great enough to 

influence the actions of even those division elements far in the rear. Having 
were now reappearing, and prudent soldiers acted accordingly. The division 

medical officer, noting the threat to the MSR, began to rearrange the location of his clearing platoons. War correspondents, who previously had had 

free access to the division’s @2 and G3 sections, now were summarily excluded and henceforth would receive information only through briefings 

conducted by the division’s public affairs officer. At Miryang, site of the 

division’s rear headquarters and railhead, the division’s finance section began to arrange for the evacuation of its cash reserve and military pay 

records. As yet there was no panic, but the men of the 24th Division had 

once more begun to look over their shoulders. If not arrested quickly, this 

tendency could escalate into a problem of massive proportions.le 

Adding to the 24th Division’s woes on the night of I1 August was a 

report from Eighth Army at 2150 that the North Koreans had pushed another force across the Naktong, this time just beyond the division’s northern 

flank. The sectors held by the 21st Infantry and Task Force Hyzer on the 

division’s right had been relatively quiet for several days, enabling Church 

to reduce troop strength there in order to reinforce more threatened areas 

to the south. An infantry battalion, an engineer company, and a I55-mm 

artillery battery had all moved to Yongsan from the division’s right within 

the past twenty-four hours. Thus, no units were immediately available to 

respond to the new threat. Lieutenant Colonel Hyzer of the 3d Engineer (C) 

Battalion, responsible for the 24th Division’s right flank, sent a seventeenman patrol across the Naktong during the night in hopes of discovering 

the enemy’s intentions, but it would be at least a day before an answer 

could be obtained. Beyond that, no action could be taken, and Eighth Army 

was so informed.‘5 

By midnight of 11-12 August, the pitifully small number of troops available for the defense of the MSR had all been deployed. Normally, trucks 

and ambulances moving between the division railhead at Miryang and the 

forward units near Yongsan had a tortuous journey of almost twenty miles 

along a narrow, twisting, frequently one-lane dirt road. From Miryang, the 

road ran westward through mountains for five miles before dropping into 

the valley of a small stream. Once in the valley, the road turned southward 

for another five miles, passing through several villages en route. Along this 

section were located the rear headquarters of some of the divisional units 

and several medical detachments. At the village of Kyun”gyo, site of the 

24th Division’s forward headquarters, the MSR turned west and headed for 

Yongsan, nine miles away. Quickly enveloped by the hills, the road surmounted two passes, located two and five miles respectively west of Kyun’- 

gyo. Beyond the second pass, the road traversed the bottom of a narrow 

valley for three miles until it intersected the Tochon-ni to Yongsan road, 

one-half mile south of Yongsan (see map 11).16 

Inadequate as it was, the road through Kyun’gyo was the sole route 

capable of meeting the logistical requirements of the 24th Division. The 
ppy g 

ing eastward, the section of the MSR from Kyun’gyo to Yongsan was als

the right-of-way for the telephone lines connecting division headquarters 

with the combat units at the front. Any prolonged break in the MSR wou

have catastrophic consequences for the 24th Division Ammunition and foo

stocks would be depleted, casualties would not be able to reach hospitals

and wire communications links between General Church and his maneuve

elements would be severed. Thus, the rutted dirt road that served as th

24th Division’s lifeline had to be protected at all costs.17 

Because of the division’s weakened condition, only the three and on

half mile section of the MSR nearest Yongsan was guarded. On this stretch

traffic passed through a series of small posts manned by men from divers

units. The first position, on the outskirts of Yongsan itself, was held b

the men of Captain Kearns’ 24th Reeon Company. The next mile and on

half was guarded by a detachment of the L4th Engineer (C) Battalion 

Consisting of about 100 men drawn from Company A and the battalion’s 

Headquarters and Service Company, this force was by no means a cohesiv

combat unit. Its unit integrity was further degraded by the manner in whic

it had been deployed. Four separate positions were established at roughl

8OO-yard intervals: from west to east, Post 1 under Lieutenant Henderso

with seventeen men, Post 2 under Lieutenant Moore with fifteen men, Po

3 under Lieutenant McMiltan with twenty-four men, and Post 4 under Lie

tenant Martin with twenty-five men. A five-man jeep patrol under Corpora

Hurst connected the four posts with Captain Gass’ CP in Yongsan. Th

battalion commander, Major Miller, stationed himself in Yongsan as well.‘

Five hundred yards beyond Engineer Post 4 lay the segment of th

MSR guarded by Task Force Hafeman. This ad hoc force was an eve

more varied collection of detachments than the engineers, consisting of me

from at least six different units. Capt. Hafeman had only 135 men, som

of them volunteers, like Pfc. Francis L. Baker of the 724th Ordnanee Main

tenance Company. Hafeman deployed most of his contingent in two strong

points: Post 1 at the hamlet of Simgong-ni and Post 2 at Wonjon Pas

1,000 yards to the east. Both positions had jeeps and were well equippe

with machine guns but were short of ammunition, hand grenades, and mo

tars. Behind Hafeman’s men, the MSR was unprotected all the way to Kyun

gyo, except for the headquarters detachment of Battery A, 26th AAA (AW

Battalion, located three miles east of Hafeman’s Post 2.19 

The first half of the night of II-12 August was relatively quiet. Vehicle

traveling on the MSR moved only in groups of two or more, since Nort

Korean infiltrators were known to be in the area. The only sign of the

presence, however, was a series of random shots by snipers, one of whic

killed a man at Hafeman’s Post 2 just before midnight. During the firs

hour of 12 August, Corporal Hurst of the 14th Engineers led a jeep patro

out to Engineer Post 4 without encountering any enemy. Hurst’s patrol 

turned to Yongsan at 0115 and fifteen minutes later began another tr
be other than uneventful.“” 

Filled with patients, the two vehicles of the 1st Ambulance Platoon 

departed Yongsan around 0200, passing through the roadblock of the 24th 

Recon Company and Engineer Posts 1 and 2 without incident. Ahead of 

them, Corporal Hurst’s jeep patrol neared Engineer Post 4, its turnaround 

point. Around 0220, between Engineer Posts 2 and 3, the two ambulances 

suddenly received heavy bursts of automatic weapons fire. The driver of 

the second ambulance was hit, and his vehicle careened into the ditch. Two 

medics ran back up the road to warn Engineer Post 2. Rather than continue 

into the fire, the first ambulance turned around, hastily loaded the passengers and patients of the other vehicle aboard, and headed back toward YongSan. Halting briefly at Lieutenant Moore’s Engineer Post 2, the ambulance 

continued westward, raising the alarm at the 24th Recon’s roadblock along 

the way. Moore sent a corporal following it in a 2 l/2-ton truck to inform 

Major Miller of the incident. Although the truck driver was unable to locate 

Miller’s CP in the darkness, he did alert Lieutenant Henderson’s Engineer 

Post 1 as he passed it.*l 

At the other end of the engineers’ line, Corporal Hurst had just begun 

his return patrol. Unaware of the fate of the ambulances, he and his men 

drove blindly into the North Korean ambush. When Hurst’s driver was hit, 

the jeep stopped in the road. Dragging the wounded man under the jeep, 

Hurst and two others took cover, while another soldier raced to warn Lieutenant Moore’s Engineer Post 2. By the time his warning was delivered at 

0330, it was superfluous. When Hurst’s jeep patrol did not return on schedule, 

two lieutenants from the 14th’s headquarters detachment drove out to Lieutenant Henderson’s Engineer Post 1 to learn the cause. When they arrived, 

Henderson, hearing the small-arms fire up ahead, advised them not to go 

forward until daybreak. By this time, word had already reached Yongsan 

that the MSR had been cut by fire about a mile and one-half out of town. 

At 0520, about an hour before sunrise, Lieutenant Martin’s Engineer 

Post 4 came under heavy fire from North Korean riflemen and machine 

gunners. When the fire did not diminish after several hours, Martin concluded that his twenty-five men were in danger of being trapped. Accordingly, he rashly split his force in an effort to escape. Sergeant Churchill 

and most of the men were told to make their way east to join Task Force 

Hafeman’s Post 1, while Martin and two NCOs headed for Lieutenant MeMillan’s Engineer Post 3. McMillan’s position meanwhile had come under 

attack at 0600 by North Koreans who had crawled within grenade range 

under the cover of darkness. After a grenade explosion wounded McMillan 

and several others, Sergeant Kavetsky, the ranking NCO, decided to lead 

eight men in a dash for Moore’s Post 2. So fierce was the North Korean 

fire that all except Kavetsky were shot down. Kavetsky dived into a rice 

paddy near the road to escape from the searching enemy fire. From his 

hiding place, he saw Lieutenant Martin’s party drive up to the abandoned 
East of the engineers, Task Force Hafeman participated in the actio

North Koreans estimated to be in company strength opened fire on Hafema

Post 1 at 0630, cutting it off from Hafeman Post 2. Better supplied wit

communications gear than the engineers, Hafeman maintained radio conta

with the beleaguered Post 1 until 0700, when the link failed. Pending r

establishment of communications, Hafeman sent a detail to the rear f

additional small-arms ammunition, hand grenades, and an 81-mm morta

When radio contact was restored at 0730, he learned that Post 1 had su

tained three casualties. Rather than passively await events, Hafeman 

0830 decided to try to break the enemy’s stranglehold on Post 1. He ordere

three jeeps to make a dash from Post 1 to Post 2. Armed with .50-calibe

machine guns and BARS, the jeeps set out at 0900. 

Braving the enemy’s automatic weapons fire, the small convoy fough

its way to Hafeman Post 2 at Wonjon Pass. The convoy arrived at 093

having suffered three casualties. One of the machine guns had been dam

aged, one of the jeeps had been shot up, and another had lost a tire. Neve

theless, the ‘convoy had survived, and its leader believed he had inflicted 

some damage on the enemy. At lOOO, the ammunition and grenades requeste

earlier by Hafeman arrived at Post 2, Hafeman loaded them in the jee

and at 1005 dispatched the vehicles back to Post 1. The convoy again passe

through the gauntlet of fire and delivered its cargo safely. Reinforced b

Sergeant Churchill’s detachment from Engineer Post 4 and resupplied wit

ammunition, Hafeman Post 1 was momentarily secure.23 

Back at Yongsan, supply vehicles and ambulances began to gather

waiting for the MSR to be cleared. There, they were threatened by North 

Korean infiltrators who had crossed the road in the engineer’s sector an

moved onto the hills overlooking Yongsan from the southeast. Some of them 

were spotted by the men of the 24th Recon Company, who drove the North 

Koreans back with mortar fire. Around 0800, forty-one men from Company 

B, 21st Infantry, retreated into the 24th Recon”s position from southwest 

Yongsan. Thankful for the reinforcements, Captain Kearns sent them t

occupy the hills where the North Koreans had been seen. Indicative of th

confused state of the fighting around the MSR, this intermingling of unit

and chains of command eroded cohesion at a time when unity of effor

was essential. Aware of the problem, General Church, at 0845, ordere

Colonel Hill to assume command of all units around Yongsan. Church fu

ther authorized Hill to withdraw an infantry company from the Naktong 

front and to use it to reopen the MSR. Preoccupied with the battle for th

river line, Hill, in turn, delegated responsibility for clearing the MSR to L

Col. Charles Smith of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry. Hill created Tas

Force Smith and transferred Company F of the 9th Infantry to Smith’s 

control. Smith’s own companies were already heavily involved with North 

Korean units southwest of Yongsan, so he would have to defend the town’

southeastern perimeter with Kearns’ Reeon Company and the remnants 

Company A, 14th Engineers, until reinforcements arrived. His most advance
For several hours, the lack of an offensive force to sweep the hills precluded any effort to reopen the MSR, Several attempts, however, were made 

to pass through the gauntlet of fire between Engineer Post 2 and the abandoned Posts 3 and 4. At 0900, Ist Lt. William Coghill, executive officer of 

the 24th Recon Company, and his communications chief, Sgt. James Keelen, 

attempted to reach Yongsan in a jeep from Miryang. At the North Korean 

roadblock, the jeep was struck by a 14.5-mm antitank round that caromed 

into Coghill’s leg. Instead of taking cover, Coghill ordered Keelan to continue 

through the enemy fire in order to report personally what they had learned 

to Captain Kearns. FQ~ his actions that day, Coghill later received the Silver 

Star. No further attempt was made to enter the contested corridor until 

1400, when an M-24 tank from Company A, 78th Heavy Tank Battalion, 

was sent forward from Yongsan in an effort to rescue a wounded man 

trapped somewhere beyond Engineer Post 2. Although hit by 14.5-mm antitank rounds in a gas tank and an ammunition storage compartment, the 

tank searched unsuccessfully for the casualty, then returned to Yongsan. 

After that, the enemy’s grip on the MSR remained unchallenged for several 

hours.25 

East of the North Korean blockade, Captain Hafeman received permission at 1330 to abandon his Post 1, but he delayed the attempt until the 

arrival of the mortar he had requested earlier. Unknown to Hafeman, a 

relief force was even then gathering at Yongsan to fight its way through 

to join him. He finally received the mortar at 1500 and emplaced it to 

cover the withdrawal of Post 1. Troops then were instructed to mount all 

automatic weapons on the remaining vehicles in order to provide cover for 

the foot soldiers as they withdrew. While these preparations were under 

way, the relief force could be seen advancing from the direction of Yongsan. 

This was Task Force Cody. 

Captain Cody of Company F, 9th Infantry, had reached Yongsan around 

1600 with one of his platoons There, two rifle squads were loaded on three 

M-24 light tanks and two M-39 personnel carriers from Kearns’ 24th Recon 

Company and sent forward to clear the roadblock. As this force made its 

way beyond Engineer Post 2, Sergeant Kavetsky rose from his hiding place 

in a rice paddy and scrambled aboard one of the M-39s. Kavetsky was 

unscathed, but another soldier, who attempted the same thing a few yards 

farther down the road, was killed by North Korean fire. Eventually, Task 

Force Cody reached Hafeman’s Post 1, which was then being abandoned. 

Cody’s men joined Hafeman’s detachment as well as Sergeant Churchill’s 

survivors from Engineer Post 4, and together they rolled out of Hafeman 

Post 1 in a hail of enemy bullets. At 1705, the convoy reached relative 

safety at Hafeman Post 2 in Wonjon Pass, having lost one man killed on 

the way. Although Task Force Cody had instructions to return to Yongsan, 

Brigadier General Menoher, Church’s representative on the scene, ordered 

it to remain with Hafeman.26 
M-39 armored utility vehicle, one of the 24th Division vehicles destroyed in the First Battle of the 

Naktong Bulge 

At 1800, Hafeman reorganized his command. Besides men from headquarters, signal, MP, band, and ordnance detachments, he now commanded 

detachments from both Company F, 9th Infantry, and the 24th Recon Company. Sending the military policemen to rejoin their parent unit, Hafeman 

decided to withdraw nearer to Kyun’gyo. Leaving five outposts on the hills 

overlooking Wonjon Pass, he fell back with the remainder of his force almost 

three miles to another pass just west of Kyun’gyo. Hafeman then was ordered to division headquarters to brief officers from the 1st Battalion, 23d 

Infantry, which would attempt to reopen the MSR on the following day. In 

its share of the day’s fight, Task Force Hafeman had lost one man killed 

and ten wounded. Dead was Pfc. Francis Baker of the 724th Ordnance 

Maintenance Company, a young soldier who had voluntarily left his safe 

job in the rear to help reopen the division’s MSR.27 

As darkness approached, the Americans at both ends of the MSR consolidated their positions. In Yongsan, Lieutenant Colonel Smith allowed the 

remnants of Company A, 14th Engineers, to withdraw from Engineer Posts 

1 and 2. Major Miller’s battered engineers were sent to a hill northeast of 

Yongsan, where they dug in for the night. In their defense of the MSR, 

they had suffered twenty-three men killed, four wounded, and three missing. 

Near sunset at 2030, an M-24 tank from Company A, 78th Heavy Tank 

Battalion, joined a tank and personnel carrier from the 24th Recon Company 

in making a final attempt to run the enemy blockade. The elements from 

the recon company successfully dashed through the enemy fire in the 

gathering darkness, but the other tank turned around and returned to Yongsan. At 2100, Captain Cody brought the remainder of Company F, 9th Infantry, into the lines southeast of the town to fill gaps in the position held 

by the 24th Recon Company. As the men dug in, North Korean artillery 

pounded their position. No one was hit, but four jeeps were damaged. On 

the MSR, at least 6,000 yards of road were in enemy hands (see map 12).z8 
taxed the limited facilities in the Yongsan-Ch’angnyong area. Additional 

medical support was sent forward, but it had to take the roundabout route 

via Ch’ongdo. A much more serious consequence for the division was the 

loss of the telephone lines laid along the MSR between division headquarters 

and the front. Deprived of this wire link, Church and his staff were forced 

to rely upon an inadequate radio net or on messages dropped from light 

observation planes. Radio messages had first to be encoded, then transmitted, and finally decoded-a process that increased the average time between 

dispatch and receipt to three and one-half hours. Thus, General Church 

lacked an accurate picture of events in the division sector for much of the 

day.29 

Indicative of the disruption caused by the blocked MSR was the difficulty encountered by Colonel Hill in attending a conference at division 

headquarters at Kyun’gyo. At 1015, Hill was told to go to the airstrip at 

Ch’angnyong, where a plane would be waiting to fly him over the North 

Korean blockade to Church’s Cl?. At 1245, Hill responded that he would be 

at Ch’angnyong at 1330. This message was so delayed in transit that division headquarters was still waiting for Hill’s answer over an hour later. 

Without this confirmation, no plane could be sent. At 1450, Hill was still 

awaiting transportation at the Ch’angnyong airstrip. Eventually, the plane 

arrived and transported Hill over the roadblock without incident. At Kyun’gyo, 

he found not only General Church but also General Walker of Eighth Army. 

According to Hill, Walker wanted to know if Hill’s troops could clear the 

MSR, to which Hill responded affirmatively. HilI”s answer notwithstanding, 

Walker gave Church still another of his dwindling reserve assets, the 1st 

Battalion, 23d Infantry of the 2d Infantry Division. This unit, together with 

the 27th Infantry advancing from the south, would be assigned to secure 

the road from Kyun’gyo to Yongsan.3Q 

Although the fight for the MSR occupied most of the 24th Division’s 

attention on 12 August, there was activity on other fronts as well. Standing 

on the defensive, the regiments comprising Task Force Hill made only slight 

adjustments in their lines. Meanwhile, they fended off numerous small attacks by the North Koreans, who continually probed the American positions 

for weak spots. Near the Naktong, Col. Ned Moore of the 19th Infantry 

requested and received an airdrop of propaganda leaflets on the North 

Korean lines, but there was no immediate indication of its effectiveness. 

Back at Yongsan, the near approach of the enemy caused several artillery 

batteries and unit CPs, including that of Beauchamp’s 34th Infantry, to 

displace northward a short distance. Behind them, the road to Ch’angnyong 

became clogged with the traffic diverted from the MSR. In the midst of it 

all, the medical detachments of the 21st Infantry struggled to cope with 

the increasing number of casualties arriving both from the Naktong front 

and the action on the MSR.3l 
gy yg 

sequential or had been repulsed, but Church, nevertheless, cautioned Stephens’ 

21st Infantry and the engineers of Task Force Hyzer to be on their guard. 

At 0500, five survivors of the seventeen-man patrol Hyzer had sent across 

the Naktong the previous night returned to the east bank. They told of 

being attacked by large numbers of the enemy, escaping only when their 

wounded leader, Lt. Ward Neville, sacrificed himself in a delaying action. 

This reportindicated considerable North Korean strength on Hyzer’s right 

front. At 0735, the Zlst Infantry’s Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, 

patrolling east of the Naktong, was ambushed by North Koreans near the 

village of Hyonp’ung. The platoon escaped, but at the cost of one man 

wounded and one jeep destroyed. Stephens’ men estimated North Korean 

strength at two companies, but elements of Task Force Hyzer placed the 

number at battalion size, and a patrol from the 1st Cavalry Division believed 

a regiment had crossed. Taking no chances, Stephens repeatedly requested 

the return of his 1st Battalion, but on each occasion, Church demurred.32 

Left to their own devices, Stephens and Lieutenant Colonel Hyzer of 

the 3d Engineer (Cl Battalion redeployed their limited assets to meet the 

new threat. With the division’s right flank thinly held, an enemy penetration 

in strength could quickly reach the north-south road from Hyonp’ung through 

Ch’angnyong to Yongsan. Therefore, Hyzer ordered two of his four companies 

to block the road and relocated both his CP and his Service Company in 

more sheltered positions. Stephens withdrew his only uncommitted unit, 

Company C, from behind the river positions and placed it in mobile reserve 

near the regimental CP. Battery B of the 63d Field Artillery Battalion, which 

was in the area undergoing reconstitution, now turned its six 105-mm howitzers northward. Similarly, a 155-mm tube of Battery A, 11th Field Artillery 

Battalion, was also traversed to cover Hyonp’ung. Both Stephens and Hyzer 

established observation posts to watch for any North Korean forward movement, and after dark, the artillery directed unobserved fire on the area of 

the crossing point (see map 13j.33 

Well aware of the risks he and Hyzer were running, Stephens could 

only await the enemy’s next move. With Task Force Hill locked in combat 

on the ridges west of Yongsan and the division’s MSR momentarily severed, 

Stephens could expect no more divisional assets from Church. Indeed, normal 

communications links with division headquarters still had not been restored, 

and he was similarly out of touch with the 1st Cavalry Division to the 

north. Stephens, who previously had considered the morale of his unit to 

be good, now downgraded it to fair. In his unit report submitted at 1700, 

he explained the revision was “due to [his unit] covering a 10 mile river 

front with four depleted companies and knowing unit covering right of Division had one platoon to patrol a 10 mile front in which the river can be 

crossed by wading-which happened last night by at least 2 Battalions of 

Enemy.“34 
road had to be reopened and the pressure on Yongsan reduced before another 

drive could be mounted to regain the ground lost in the Naktong Bulge, 

With the 24th Division’s own resources already fully committed, General 

Walker first had given Church Cal. John Michaelis’ 27th Infantry, then he 

added Lt. Col. Clair Hutchin’s 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry. Michaelis’ 1st 

and 3d Battalions had joined his 2d Battalion north of Namji-ri by 1100, 

and at 1440, the regiment was formally but temporarily attached to the 

24th Division. Church planned to use the 27th Infantry to sweep the enemy 

from the region south and east of Yongsan. To provide a secure jumpingoff point, the 2d Battalion, at 1930, reoccupied the high ground it had taken 

and abandoned on the previous day. Meanwhile, Hutchin’s battalion, during 

the night, relieved Task Force Hafeman in the hills west of Kyun’gyo. Both 

Michaelis and Hutchin prepared to advance toward Yongsan on the next 

moming.35 

Holding his 1st Battalion in reserve around Namji-ri, Colonel Michaelis 

sent his 3d Battalion forward on the Yongsan road at 0930 on 13 August. 

At 1100, it came abreast of the 2d Battalion, holding the high ground west 

of the road. Both battalions then drove toward Yongsan, sweeping the enemy 

before them. Supporting the advance were Battery B, 8th Field Artillery 

Battalion, and tanks from Company C, 73d Tank Battalion. Michaelis’ men 

encountered only small groups of the enemy, and these were easily destroyed 

or forced to disperse into the hills. As the battalions advanced, patrols from 

the regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon maintained contact 

between them and probed toward the MSR east of Yongsan. On the left, 

the 2d Battalion made contact with the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, southwest of Yongsan, then advanced to the town at 1500. On its right, the 3d 

Battalion moved more slowly into the hills southwest of Yongsan, searching 

for the elusive North Koreans. It reached the MSR at 1630 and two hours 

later made contact with the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, at Simgong-ni (see 

map 13).36 

Because of the nature of the terrain traversed, the advance of Lieutenant 

Colonel Hutchin’s 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, along the MSR was much 

more arduous than that of Michaelis’ 27th Infantry. Hutchin deployed Company C on the ridges south of the road, Company B on the ridges north of 

the road, and Company A on the MSR itself. Supported by a tank platoon, 

Company A advanced easily, but the companies on the hills above found 

the going extremely difficult. Scheduled to begin at 0500, the advance was 

delayed until the flank companies reached their start positions on the ridges 

overlooking the road. Part of Company B did not arrive at its line of departure until 1000. Unfamiliarity with the terrain led the battalion’s officers 

to misidentify some objectives and overlook shorter routes to others. Unprepared for the heat and humidity of a Korean August and poorly conditioned for hill climbing, the men struggled slowly from one ridge to the 

next. Few North Koreans were seen, and even fewer were engaged as the 
y y yyg 

elements debauched from Wonjon Pass and reached the village of Simgong-m, where they encountered a patrol from the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of the 27th Infantry. While the battalion consolidated its 

position at Simgong-ni, Lieutenant Colonel Hutehin led a patrol into Yongsari,, where he conferred with Colonel Hill. The battalion had lost only one 

man to enemy action, hut nine were evacuated because of heat exhaustiona 

Although Michaelis and Hutchin had not located the North Koreans 

that had cut the MSR, General Church believed there was no time to mount 

an all-out search for them in the rough terrain paralleling the road. Accordingly, he ordered the 27th Infantry to return to the vicinity of Namji-ri. By 

the end of the day, Michaelis’ 2d and 3d Battalions had been moved by 

truck to rejoin the 1st Battalion at Namji-ri, where the regiment reverted to 

Eighth Army reserve. Similarly, most of the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, 

was withdrawn to the vicinity of the 24th Division’s headquarters at Kyun’- 

gyo. Company A, reinforced by two tanks, remained behind to guard Wonjon 

Pass and patrol the MSR. Although sufficient to keep the MSR open, this 

force was unable to prevent small parties of North Koreans from harassing 

convoys and wire crews on the road during the night. Nevertheless, the 

threat to the 24th Division’s MSR had been effectively removed. Its mission 

accomplished, Task Force Hafeman was dissolved.3” 

With the threat to its supply lines resolved, the only remaining obstacle 

to an early resumption of the 24th Division’s counterattack in the Naktong 

Bulge was the new North Korean crossing north of the division’s right at 

Hyonp’ung. In midafternoon, General Church visited Colonel Stephens of 

the 21st Infantry at the latter’s CP. Stephens outlined the limited precautions 

taken by his depleted regiment, now consisting of only one weak battalion, 

one additional infantry company, and two companies of engineers. North 

of Stephens, only the four engineer companies of Task Force Hyzer stood 

between the 24th Division’s rear and the estimated 900 North Koreans at 

Hyonp’ung. Neither Stephens nor Hyzer had been able to contact major 

elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, in whose sector the North Koreans 

had originally crossed, nor did they know the location of any of the 1st 

Cavalry’s units in the vicinity.39 

Upon returning to his own headquarters at Kyun’gyo, Church learned 

that Eighth Army had decided to expand the 24th Division’s area of operations northward to include the Hyonp’ung crossing site. Church passed this 

unwelcome news to Stephens shortly after 2000, following it with an order 

for Stephens to assume responsibility for the new area at once. Task Force 

Hyzer was attached to Stephens, but since it was already deployed in the 

affected area, this represented no reinforcement for the hard-pressed 21st 

Infantry. Church also ordered Stephens to conduct a reconnaissance around 

Hyonp’ung to determine the North Korean strength and intentions there. A 

patrol from Hyzer’s Company D had already penetrated Hyonp’ung several 
at Hyonp’ung remained quiescent. For Stephens and Hyzer, this was the 

only bright spot in an otherwise gloomy situation.*0 

During the fight to clear the 24th Division’s rear on 13 August, Task 

Force Hill stood on the defensive and attempted to hold its ground around 

Yongsan. Each regiment sustained furious North Korean assaults before 

sunrise and again after nightfall. On Hill”s right, the brunt of the North 

Korean attacks fell upon the 1st Battalion of the 19th Infantry. Company 

C was assailed twice but repulsed the enemy each time, capturing weapons 

and a prisoner. On its left, Company B defended its positions against four 

enemy assaults. There, a ravine leading into the left rear of the company 

allowed the North Koreans to penetrate the defenses, A firefight then ensued 

at ranges under thirty yards. In one section of the perimeter, the fighting 

was literally hand-to-hand. Only after the company called down 8l-mm mortar fire nearly on its own positions was the perimeter restored. Four hours 

after their initial assault, the North Koreans withdrew to the opposing ridge.4l 

To the left of the 19th Infantry, the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 9th 

Infantry repelled three North Korean attacks in the early hours, of 13 August, 

but the cost was high. Enemy fire felled 140 men, and an additional 59 

were evacuated as nonbattle casualties, most suffering from heat exhaustion. 

Officer losses were especially heavy. One unit, Company E of the 2d Battalion, lost all of its officers on five separate occasions during this period of 

the battle. Each time, M. Sgt. Warren H. Jordon assumed command of the 

company and led it successfully, actions that ultimately brought him a battlefield commission, According to the unit report, the combat efficiency of 

the 9th Infantry remained high, although the adjacent 19th Infantry reported 

disturbingly that the 9th”s 1st Battalion was too exhausted to remove its 

own dead.42 

South of the 9th Infantry, the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry also 

was caught up in the general North Korean attack sweeping across the 

front of Task Force Hill. After repulsing one enemy assault, Company B 

was driven back 200 yards by a second but was able to stabilize its position 

with the aid of Company A. Two miles to the south, Companies K and L 

began to withdraw from their exposed position on the Naktong under cover 

of the nearby 27th Infantry. This withdrawal, ordered by Colonel Beauchamp 

with the approval of the task force commander, was an effort to consolidate 

the scattered units of the 34th Infantry. When Colonel Michaelis of the 

27th Infantry objected, however, General Church canceled the movement. 

Beauchamp protested, but the two companies remained a while longer in 

their isolated position, where they exerted little or no effect on the battle.43 

Behind the Naktong front, Yongsan’s defenders made limited attacks 

on the morning of 13 August in an effort to drive North Korean infiltrators 

from the high ground overlooking the town and the MSR. Task Force Cody, 

composed of most of Company F, 9th Infantry, and a platoon of Company 
a mortar round from the heavy weapons platoon of Company F fell short, 

killing two men and wounding four others. Fortunately, enemy resistance 

was light and the position was secured by late afternoon. Arrival of the 

27th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, completed the relief of 

Yongsan, freeing several units from the composite force that had defended 

it. Company A, 78th Heavy Tank Battalion, was finally allowed to send its 

two battered M-24 tanks to the rear for much needed repairs. After some 

confusion, the remnants of Company A, 14th Engineer (C) Battalion, were 

also released and permitted to return to their parent unit north of Ch’angnyong. Essentially an orphaned unit in a confused situation, this company 

had been badly placed and poorly supervised during the defense of the MSR. 

As a result, it had been decimated.44 

During the day, while the fighting raged throughout the division’s entire 

area of operations, senior officers met to plan the resumption of counterattacks by Task Force Hill. First, ColoneI Hill conferred with his regimental 

commanders, Beauchamp and Moore. Then, while he drove to meet General 

Church at the Ch’angnyong airstrip, the regimental commanders held planning sessions with their battalion commanders and staffs. The result of 

these meetings was a plan calling for a coordinated attack by the 19th, 

9th, and parts of the 34th and 21st Infantry regiments to begin at 0630 on 

14 August. As before, the objective of the counterattack was the complete 

elimination of the North Korean bridgehead. The counterattack was to be 

supported by air strikes from 100 aircraft as well as by all of the artillery 

batteries within range. Yongsan would be protected by elements of the 24th 

Reeon Company and an engineer detachment. The 24th Recon Company 

was also charged with maintaining liaison with the 27th Infantry around 

Namji-ri.45 

As night fell, General Church could look upon the events of 13 August 

with some satisfaction. The division’s MSR had been secured, North Korean 

attacks on the division’s front had been turned back, and Task Force Hill 

was preparing to resume its counterattacks. Still, there were worrisome 

problems facing the 24th Division. Wire communications forward from 

Church’s headquarters at Kyun’gyo was still nonexistent, a situation only 

partially remedied by a second radio net established by the 24th Signal 

Company. Ammunition for the division’s 4.2inch and 81-mm mortars was 

in critically short supply, as were illuminating rounds of all calibers. Although the logistical system was at last forwarding an adequate supply of 

weapons, few replacements had arrived to replenish the divisionas depleted 

battalions. By its own estimate, Church’s command had a combat efficiency 

rating of only 52 percent, with some individual units reckoned at no more 

than 20 percent. Worst of all, there was disquieting information from a 

prisoner that a fresh regiment of the North Korean 4th Division had just 

joined the battle. Aerial observation had noted a suspicious set of ramps 

on both sides of the Naktong at the tip of the Bulge, and one of the forward 
knew that the odds were not yet heavily in his favor.46 
The Failure of Task 

The counterattack scheduled to begin at 0630 on 14 August was envisioned by Task Force Hill’s planners as a powerful drive that would carry 

all the way to the N&tong, smashing the North Korean penetration and 

eliminating the bridgehead. According to Operations Order Number 5, all 

frontline units would participate in the advance, although more was expected of some units than others. On the task farce’s right, the 1st Battalion, 19tb Infantry, would push forward to the village of Sinam-ni, while 

the 2d Battalion, to the north, retained its grip an the Naktang shore. Still, 

these were secondary roles when compared with that assigned the 9th Infantry in Task Force Hill’s center. That regiment was scheduled to send its 

two battalions forward on either side of the road running from the village 

of Tugok down to the Naktong. North of the road, the 1st Battalion was 

assigned a series of hills as objectives, beginning with an extension of Hill 

165. Known to the troops as Cloverleaf because of its distinctive shape on 

the operations maps, this hill had been in North Korean hands far mu& 

of the battle. South of the 1st Battalion, the initial objective of the 2d Battalion was the heights above Tugak. When that area was secured, the 2d 

Battalion would advance along the south side of the road and assault the 

north end of a long ridge known as Obong-ni. The south end of Obong-ni 

was the objective of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry. Like Cloverleaf, 

Obong-ni Ridge had long been in North Korean hands, and recent observation flights by light aircraft had revealed the enemy building field fortifications. CampEeting the attack plan, the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, would 

sweep around the southern end of Obong-ni in a renewed effort to roll up 

the North Korean right flank.1 

Although they had been on the defensive far several days while the 

division’s MSR was being cleared, the units comprising Task Force Hill 

were by no means rested. The grueling fighting of the previous eight days 

had taken its toll on the already depleted rifle companies, as had the heat 

and humidity of the Korean summer. Nightly North Korean probes and 

company-size assaults had also deprived the weary infantrymen of much 

needed rest during the recent defensive phase. With the flow of replacements 

at a low ebb, casualties had not been replaced, leaving rifle companies no 

larger than platoons in mast regiments. The 19th and 34th Infantry regiments were especially weak, and even Hill’s strongest unit, the 9th Infantry, 

75 
y gpyy 

support. Four full batteries of 105-mm and one of 155mm howitzers we

available to support the counterattack, with the bulk of the guns allotted 

the 9th Infantry. Even mare was expected from the aerial component

Eighth Army had assigned Task Force Hill first priority for air strikes o

14 August, a situation not previously attained and one that was quite ephem

eral. This meant that up to 100 aircraft, both F-!&J and F-809, would 

available for close air support, controlled from the task farce GP. The sta

of the 24th Division, in conjunction with the Air Force and the Eighth 

Army’s Air Operations Center, had been working on the air plan for sever

days. It was hoped that this aerial assault would provide the momentum 

needed to carry the weary infantry to victory.2 

Unfortunately, the work of the planners was partially negated by th

weather. Between 0300 and 0400 on 14 August, rain began to fall in to

rents. High winds sprang up, turning the downpour into driving sheets 

water, The wind, rain, and law cloud ceiling forced postponement of th

planned aerial bombardment. Nevertheless, the scheduled ten-minute arti

lery preparatory fires began on time, Shortly thereafter, the infantrymen 

struggled out of their water-filled foxholes and began to move forward 

through the rain. What the task farce staff had intended to be a coordinate

advance quickly last cohesion and farce as same units gained ground whil

others remained stalled at their lines of departure. Colonel Hill’s early r

parts to General Church were quite optimistic, reflecting primarily the initia

success of the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, in gaining its first objective, th

hill overlooking Tugak. Soon, however, less favorable reports began to arriv

at Hill’s headquarters just west of Yongsan. What had initially promised 

be a rapid advance now mired down in a bitter fight far a few hundre

yards of Korean terrain.3 

As had so often been the case, the counterattack first began to disinte

grate an the flanks, where the weakest units were depIayed. On the tas

farce’s left, the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, successfully negotiated th

small hills in its immediate front but was stopped in its tracks by th

North Koreans entrenched on Obang-ni Ridge. The 34th Infantry, whos

combat efficiency was judged to be no greater than 20 percent, could a

vance no farther. On its left, the 1st Battalion of the 21st Infantry move

forward from its position southwest of Yangsan to a new location an th

left and rear of the 34th. It, too, was then halted by stiff enemy resistance

its goal of outflanking the North Korean line unachieved. The situation o

the right of the task farce was even worse. There, the 19th Infantry prove

entirely unable to carry out its part of the plan. Reduced to only a handfu

of men by the previous week’s fighting, the 2d Battalion did not attempt 

advance at all during the day. On its left, the 1st Battalion had a key ro

to play in supporting the advance of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, to th

south. Unwilling to move until the men af the 9th secured more of the H

165. complex, the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, remained in its original po
of the 9th, the North Koreans inflicted more than sixty casualties on that 

unit within an hour (see map 14).4 

The failure of his 1st Battalion to participate in the counterattack 

prompted the regimental commander, Col. Ned Moore, to go forward to view 

the situation for himself. At 1010, he left regimental headquarters with his 

operations officer for the CP of the 1st Battalion After explaining the situation, the battalion commander joined the party as they went forward to the 

company positions. As a result of Moore’s intervention, Company A finally 

began to move in midafternoon. The company, which numbered only forty 

men, was aided in its advance by the progress of the 9th Infantry on its 

left. Supported by fire from Company B’s positions on its right, Company 

A’s handful of men moved into the hills north of the hamlet of Maekkok. 

While they did so, General Church arrived at the command post of the 

19th Infantry to see for himself what was causing the delay. Satisfied that 

at last the regiment was in motion, Church departed after ten minutes without seeing Colonel Moore, who was still at the front with his battalion 

commander.5 

During the afternoon of 14 August, the rain ceased to fall, although 

the low cloud ceiling remained until late in the day. Many flights had been 

canceled during the morning, but now aircraft began to operate over the 

counterattack area. Braving the poor flying conditions, pilots dropped 

through the overcast for the remainder of the day to deliver air strikes on 

the North Koreans tenaciously defending the reverse slopes of Obong-ni, 

Cloverleaf, and other hills. Artillery spotter planes also roamed the battlefield, directing fire missions against enemy concentrations. Beneficial as it 

was, this assistance came too late. By late afternoon, Task Force Hill’s 

counterattack had ground to a halt almost everywhere. Company A of the 

19th Infantry was still moving forward north of Maekkok, and part of the 

9th Infantry was still battling its way up the slopes of Cloverleaf, but elsewhere the battered units of Task Force Hill were digging into the soggy 

earth, preparing defensive positions from which to face the inevitable North 

Korean counterattacks, The average gain for Task Force Hi11 during the 

day was only 500 yards. Elements of the 21st and 34th Infantry regiments 

on the left had fared slightly better, but most of the 19th Infantry had not 

moved at all. Everywhere, the North Koreans had skillfully defended the 

rugged terrain from reverse slope positions dug into the countless hills and 

ridges of the Bulge. They had suffered heavy losses, especially from the 

artillery and air strikes of the afternoon, but they had given up little 

ground and had inflicted equally serious losses on units of Task Force Hill.6 

An ominous development in the day’s fighting was the first intervention 

of North Korean armor in the area east of the Naktong River. There had 

been occasional reports of tank sightings earlier, but no tanks had been 

actually verified east of the river. The few sightings prior to 14 August 

had all been west of the Naktong, opposite the 21st Infantry. There, the 

tanks had usually fired a few rounds into the American defensive positions, 
ggg

report of enemy armor came from the 19th Infantry, which radioed word of 

a tank in its sector at 1045. Attempts to destroy this tank with both air 

strikes and artillery fire throughout the day proved futile. At 1630, the tank 

fired into the position of Company B, calling forth another effort to neutralize it with artiltery. Again, the tank was silenced only briefly, and it was 

back in action at 1800 against Company A. This time, a mortar barrage 

and another air strike were tried, all to no avail. As night fell, the beleaguered Company A, now down to twenty-five men, could hear North 

Koreans massing on the reverse slope of their hill for an attack. Under 

cover of darkness, the enemy filtered through a gap between Company A’s 

advanced position and that of Company B, to the right rear. Shortly before 

2200, the North Koreans assaulted the now isolated Company A and drove 

its few riflemen southward into the zone of the 9th Infantry, where they 

were pinned down by tank fire. Company A’s retreat, thus, brought an end 

to Task Force Hill’s counterattack on 14 August (see map 14).7 

Elsewhere in the division sector, the situation remained stable. North 

of Task Force Hill, the 21st Infantry continued to hold its section of the 

river defenses and even managed to improve its minefields. A few North 

Koreans were sighted across the river, but artitlery fire dispersed them whenever they gathered in .sufficient numbers to justify a fire mission. During 

the day, the regiment received 289 replacements, most of whom were sent 

to the badly understrength 3d Battalion. This was the first significant number of replacements to join the 24th Division, and General Church had decided they should be assigned to either the 19th or 21st Infantry regiments. 

Although the 19th badly needed reinforeement, Church believed it imperative to bolster his northern flank against the North Korean force in the 

Hyonp’ung bridgehead. Surprisingly, the enemy unit that had crossed there 

continued to show littIe initiative. In order to maintain contact with the 

estimated two-battalion North Korean force, Colonel Stephens ordered the 

3d Engineer (C) Battalion to patrol aggressively around Hyonp’ung. Since 

artillery fire from the 1st Cavalry Division was still periodically falling on 

the town, General Church requested its cessation. The 1st Cavalry Division 

agreed to halt its bombardment on the following day. Inexplicably, only 

the first part of this message was transmitted to the 21st Infantry, which 

ordered the 3d Engineers to send a patrol into the town. They did so, only 

to have it driven out at 1000 by friendly artillery fire. Other patrols later 

in tEre day were more successful, and-one even returned with a wounded 

prisoner, This man, who belonged to the l&h North Korean Division, had 

been shot by his own squad leader when he proved unable to keep up. He 

indicated that the 10th Division was very weak and lacked heavy weapons, 

which possibly accounted for its relative inaction.8 

The situation in the 24th Division’s rear areas was decidedly improved 

on 14 August. Herculean labor by the 24th Signal Company at last restored 

wire communications between the division’s headquarters at Kyun”gyo and 
the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, patrolled the MSR and adjacent trails, while 

the remainder of the battalion went into division reserve. In the south, the 

27th Infantry crossed back into the sector of the 25th Division at Namji-ri 

shortly after noon. It was replaced by a company of the 35th Infantry, 

which took up positions just south of the Namji-ri bridge. Contact with 

this unit was maintained by patrols from the 24th Recon Company moving 

south from Yongsan. The North Korean force (estimated at battalion size) 

that had earlier cut the MSR had now disappeared into the jumble of hills 

and ridges on either side of the road. Church and his staff knew that they 

had not been destroyed, only dispersed, but neither the 1st Battalion, 23d 

Infantry, nor the 24th Recon Company could find them. With a battalion 

available to protect the MSR if necessary, Church resolved to continue Task 

Force Hill’s counterattack on the following day. Even though his division’s 

combat efficiency was estimated at only 52 percent by his staff, Church 

believed he had no other course of action available. His decision, thus, became part of Operations Instructions Number 23, issued at 2400 hours.9 

In all but one particular, the plan for Task Force Hill’s counterattack, 

scheduled for 15 August, was the same as that of the day before. The 

change involved Lt. Col. Charles Smith’s 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, on 

the task force’s left. Smith’s battalion no longer was expected to sweep 

around the southern end of Obong-ni Ridge and outflank the North Korean 

line. Instead, it received the much simpler mission of remaining in place to 

protect the task force’s rear and left flank. But even this assignment proved 

impossible to accomplish as the North Koreans preempted the American 

counterattack by initiating one of their own shortly after midnight. The 

first blow fell on Smith’s hapless battalion, which was soon engulfed by 

North Korean assaults from three sides. At 0230, with at least twenty of 

his men wounded, Smith called Colonel Hill and quietly requested permission to withdraw along the line of his communications wire. Hill later recalled that he responded: “‘You sound calm and perfectly all right to me. I 

hate to see you withdraw. On the other hand you are on the ground and 

should know best. I don’t want to lose you. Think it over for half an hour 

and call me back.” Smith reluctantly agreed, warning Hill not to initiate 

the call since the ringing of the field telephone might betray Smith’s position to the North Koreans. At 0300, Smith again called Hill and again 

asked permission to withdraw since the situation had worsened. Reluctantly, 

Hill tald Smith to bring his men back to safety. To cover their withdrawal 

and subsequent reorganization, Hill moved forward the 3d Battalion, 34th 

Infantry, itself numbering fewer than 300 men.10 

As Smith’s battalion fell back in disarray, North Korean assaults spread 

across the front of Task Force Hill. In the 19th Infantry’s sector, the ubiquitous North Korean tank fired from close range into the positions of the 1st 

Battalion. Shells from the same or perhaps a second tank struck Company 

C of the 9th Infantry. Most serious of all, at 0300, four North Korean T-34 
talions immediate rear, crushing a jeep and shooting up several company 

supply points. Had the tanks continued eastward, they would have reache

a succession of headquarters, including Task Force Hill’s, as well as severa

artillery batteries. Fortunately, darkness, unfamiliarity with the terrain, an

their pause to destroy supply dumps impeded their progress. Daylight foun

them deep within the Ameriean lines but still short of the vital targets 

nearer Yongsan. 

While circuits buzzed throughout the sector raising the alarm, Cp

Robert 6. Carroll of Company H, 9th Infantry, took matters in his ow

hands. Obtaining a 3.5inch rocket launcher, Carroll stealthily approached 

to within fifty yards of the leading tank and disabled it with one shot. Th

remaining T-34s turned and fled westward to safety, but the immobilized 

tank continued to fire in all directions. Carroll next charged the tank with 

a hand grenade. Using an ax he found strapped to the vehicle, he attempted 

to force open the turret hatch cover but was driven off by an enemy crew

man. Undaunted, Carroll next grabbed a gasoline can from a nearby aban

doned vehicle and doused the tank’s deck with fuel. He then ignited th

gasoline with a rag torch and jumped clear. No exit was attempted by th

enemy tankers, who burned to death in their machine. For his initiative 

and courage that day, Carroll received the Distinguished Service Cross.fl 

By the time Corporal Carroll finally dispatched the North Korean T-3

at 0827, Task Force Hill had already attempted to resume its counterattack. 

This time the weather was clear and dry, but because the 24th Division’s 

sector had been assigned Priority Two by Eighth Army’s Air Operations 

Center, far fewer flights were available for close air support. All along th

front, the counterattack sputtered and died. On the right, the 19th Infantry 

once more made no progress. The remnants of Company A were reorganized 

under a sergeant but remained in the zone of the 9th Infantry for much o

the day. Rather than try to advance, Colonel Moore’s 2d Battalion attempted 

to scrape together a reserve to cover the hole created by Company A’s with

drawal. Next to the 19th, the 9th Infantry also was unable to move forward 

and contented itself with digging in to hold its meager gains of the previou

day. Farther south, the depleted 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, initially mad

some progress after repelling a North Korean attack before dawn. The ba

talion attacked in columns of companies. In the lead, Company A move

forward following an artillery preparation and gained the ridge in its im

mediate front. Suddenly, it was flanked from both sides. Suffering heav

casualties, the company fell back with only forty able-bodied men left. A

Company A reorganized, Company B took up the assault and called for a

air strike to soften up the enemy positions. Aircraft responded quickly bu

inaccurately, the strike falling on Company B. Thoroughly disorganized, 

Company B, too, withdrew to the battalion’s original position. The North 

Koreans followed with a counterattack of their own, but after having mad

small gains, this attack was broken up by American artillery fire. Whe
(see map 15).12 

The inability of the 24th Division to destroy or even gain ground 

against the North Korean 4th Division in the Naktong Bulge had not gone 

unnoticed by General Walker at Eighth Army headquarters. During the 

morning of 15 August, Walker visited General Church at Miryang, site of 

the 24th Division Rear. Displeased that the battle was still not successfully 

resolved after ten days of fighting, the Eighth Army commander decided to 

throw one more of his precious reserve units into the fight. As Church 

later recalled, Walker said, “‘I am going to give you the Marine Brigade. I 

want this situation cleared up, and quick.” This apparently was an impulsive decision, and Walker delayed implementing it until after conferring 

with his staff at his Taegu headquarters. Arriving there by noon, Walker 

confirmed the decision an hour later. The Marines were already en route 

from the southern part of the Pusan Perimeter to Miryang, where they had 

been scheduled to become part of Eighth Army’s reserve. Walker sent Col. 

William A. Collier, a member of his staff, to Miryang to meet the Marines” 

commander, Brig. Gen. Edward Craig, and brief him on the situation. The 

24th Division was instructed to provide the Marines with logistical support 

and transportation upon their arrival.13 

After Walker had departed for Taegu, but while Church was still at 

Miryang, the 24th Division commander received a message from Colonel 

Hill relayed through the division G3 at Kyun’gyo. Sent at 1130, Hill’s message was blunt: “The situation is serious, particularly on south flank. It is 

under heavy attack. Strongly recommend we go on the defensive.” Hill indicated that the assistant division commander, Brigadier General Menoher, 

was with him and concurred in his estimate. Relying upon Walker’s earlier 

promise of reinforcements, Church quickly agreed to cancel Hill’s orders to 

continue the counterattack. Instead, Task Force Hill would once again assume a defensive stance. At the front, where North Korean assaults continued to beat upon the American forward positions, the new posture had 

already been in effect for several hours. Throughout the remainder of the 

day and into the evening, the North Koreans maintained their offensive 

pressure, first against one unit, then against another. Each time they were 

turned back, most often with the assistance of artillery. The gunners supporting the division fired a total of 3,540 rounds during I.28 missions on 15 

August, compared with only 2,222 rounds and 91 missions on the previous 

day. Ammunition was expended at so great a rate, in fact, that the division 

artillery commander feared that infantry officers were requesting support 

too freely. No doubt much ammunition was wasted, but in several cases, 

the artillery support given the depleted and exhausted infantry units of 

Task Force Hill on 15 August was critical in staving off the violent North 

Korean assaults.14 

At the same time he learned of Colonel Hill’s plea for an end to the 

counterattack, General Church received Eighth Army’s permission to employ 
ypg, 

counter the crossing if he believed it necessary. Near Hyonp’ung, Lieutenant 

Colonel Hyzer”s 3d Engineer (C) Battalion continued its aggressive patrolling 

all day. Whenever enemy units were encountered, the patrols called down 

air strikes and artillery fire upon them, with undetermined results. 

Hyonp’ung had by this time become a deserted no-man’s-land, visited intermittently by patrols of both sides. The main North Korean strength remained concentrated around Hill 409, a short distance west of the town, 

and showed no indication of further movement. Nevertheless, Church de

cided to use the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, to cordon off the small enemy 

brideghead. At 2245, the battalion received orders to join the 3d Engineers 

near Hyonp”ung by 0430 on the following morning. Only the 24th Recon 

Company now remained to protect the division”s MSR.15 

Although the 24th Division’s counterattack ground to a halt on 15 August with no appreciable gain, there were a few indications that the North 

Korean 4th Division was also suffering the effects of ten days of continuous 

battle. The most significant sign was the increasing number of prisoners 

taken by the 24th Division. Four prisoners were captured on 15 August, 

three from the North Korean 4th Division and one from the 10th. There 

apparently would have been more if an unfortunate incident in the 34th 

1nfantry”s sector had not occurred. During that unit’s abortive morning assault, approximtitely twenty-five North Koreans threw away their weapons 

and attempted to surrender. Misunderstanding their actions, an American 

soldier fired at them, and the rest of his squad did likewise. Angered, the 

North Koreans retrieved their weapons and resumed the battle, killing several men of the 34th Infantry. Qnly one of the North Koreans in this group 

ultimately surrendered. Information from him, when correlated with that 

from other prisoners captured that day, indicated that ammunition, supplies, 

and morale were very low among the enemy. If true, this assessment gave 

new hope that further counterattacks by the 24th Division might finally 

eliminate the North Korean thrust into the Naktong Bulge.16 
7

The Final Counterattack 

+4P 

According to an operational directive issued by Eighth Army late on 

15 August, the 24th Division was to remain on the defensive until 17 

August, when it would unleash a massive counterattack with the aid of the 

1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The intervening day would be devoted to 

planning the operation and coordinating the support of U.S. Air Force elements. It would also permit the Marines to reach their assigned sector. 

Rather than a day of rest and preparation, however, 16 August proved to 

be another day of heavy combat. Unwilling to relinquish the initiative it 

had seized earlier, the North Korean 4th Division resumed its own attack 

before dawn. Out of the darkness poured hundreds of screaming North 

Koreans who advanced behind a shower of hand grenades. The attack rippled across the front of Task Force Hill in waves, from the 34th Infantry’s 

position on the left, through the 9th Infantry’s sector in the center, all the 

way to the 19th Infantry’s foxholes overlooking the Naktong. On the flanks, 

Task Force Hill lost ground, but its center held firm,1 

Since the task force’s left flank, consisting of the 1st Battalion, 21st 

Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, was refused, only the 1st 

Battalion, 34th Infantry, faced the North Korean positions on the southern 

end of Obong-ni Ridge. There, Companies B and C were dug in on Hill 91, 

about 1,000 yards east of Obong-ni. Around 0430, North Korean units, 

supported by heavy automatic weapons and a self-propelled 76-mm gun, 

assaulted the hill. After a thirty-minute firefight, the two companies of the 

34th were forced to abandon their positions and leave Hill 91 to the enemy. 

Behind them, the nearest high ground lay a mile distant across a valley 

filled with marshes and rice paddies. Under cover of artillery fire from the 

13th Field Artillery Battalion, the companies withdrew across the valley. 

When they passed the position of the artillery’s forward observer, he destroyed his radio and joined the retreat. With its left flank now open, Company A, to the north, also fell back into the valley. Eventually, the companies all gained the high ground a mile northeast of their original positions, 

and there the battalion reorganized itself after daylight (see map 16).2 

At the other end of Task Force Hill’s line, another North Korean attack 

also gained ground, For several days, the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, had 

held the southern tips of several ridges near the Naktong that faced the 

83 
pgy 

sector, the North Korean attack was preceded by artillery and mortar fire, 

which Companies E and F first believed was an American barrage fired in 

error, At 0700, the North Korean infantry rushed forward and violently 

assaulted the ridge held by the two companies. Reporting the attack to 

regimental headquarters, the battalion commander requested permission to 

withdraw but received no answer. Gradually the remnants of the two companies were forced back by enemy pressure. As the morning progressed, 

they slowly withdrew northward along the ridgetop, making the North 

Kareans pay heavily for their gains. Shortly after noon, the battalion commander informed regimental headquarters: ‘“Situation critical. E-F . . . can 

not observe river, want more troops.” Colonel Moore responded: “‘Doughboy 

[19th Infantry] will send I and R platoon. White [2d Battalion] must hold.” 

With the aid of this small reinforcement, Companies E and F finally halted 

the enemy advance after losing 600 yards of the ridge. There, they reorganized and, at 1500, mounted a counterattack. Aided by the element of surprise, as well as by flanking fire from Company G, the two companies 

regained their old positions with surprising ease.3 

In the center of Task Force Hill, the 9th Infantry sustained North 

Korean attacks all morning without giving up any ground. The attacks 

began before dawn on the positions held by the ‘2d Battalion on both sides 

of the Yongsan-Naktong road near the village of Tugok. Preceded by preparatory fires from artillery, mortars, and heavy automatic weapons, the 

attacks came in recognizable waves. During each attack, a group of North 

Koreans would stand fast, screaming, while others charged the American 

line. The North Koreans advanced fanatically, in a style reminiscent of 

many Japanese charges in World War IX. As each successive assault was 

broken, the force behind the next attack lessened, until at last the enemy 

ceased to move forward. Artillery fire from the 15th Field Artillery Battalion 

contributed heavily to the repulse af the enemy from the 2d Battalion’s 

positions. To the north, where the 1st Battalion clung to the slopes of 

Cloverleaf and Maekkok Hill, American artillery also raked the North 

Koreans as they assaulted throughout the morning. Advancing in broad 

daylight, the enemy broke into the positions of Company C on Cloverleaf 

and Company B on Maekkok. As Americans were hit, the North Koreans 

jumped into their fighting holes. In hand-to-hand fighting, they were driven 

out again and back down the slopes. To hasten their departure, the 9th 

Infantry called down air strikes upon them as they retreated. By noon, the 

North Korean will to continue attacking appeared to have been broken.4 

In only one sector of the 24th Division’s zone of responsibility did the 

North Koreans east of the Naktong remain on the defensive. Although it 

could have created serious difficulties for General Church, the 29th Infantry 

of the North Korean 10th Division continued to remain quiet in its bridgehead at Hill 409 near Hyonp’ung. Having been granted Eighth Army’s 

permission to use the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, to deal with the enemy 
position for a company-size probe of the North Korean positions. After driving enemy outposts from the low ground south of the hill mass, the battalion prepared to send Company C forward. At 1400, a heavy air strike on 

Hill 409 triggered numerous secondary explosions. Under cover of this 

activity, Company C began its advance. Like the units of the 24th Division 

earlier in the campaign, Company C soon began to lose men from heat 

exhaustion. When it encountered an enemy force in a village at the foot of 

Hill 409, the company withdrew to its original position. In late afternoon, 

it advanced again, supported by several M-4 Sherman tanks from the regimental tank company. This probe also drew heavy enemy machine gun 

fire. With the day far spent and the North Koreans evincing no disposition 

to assume the offensive, Colonel Stephens suspended operations against Hill 

409 until the following day. He was less than satisfied with the 1st Battalion’s performance, especially its inability to coordinate supporting fires from 

available artillery and mortars.5 

While his frontline units contained the North Korean assaults, General 

Church at Kyun’gyo presided over planning sessions for the 24th Division”s coming counterattack, By early afternoon, the plan was complete 

and was published formally as Operations Directive Number One. As of 

1400, Task Force Hill was abolished, with its components reverting to direct control of division headquarters. According to the plan, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade would relieve the 34th Infantry on the division’s 

left flank late on 16 August. The 34th then would move northward behind 

the lines and relieve the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry. In turn, that unit 

would enter the sector held by the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry. All units 

would then prepare to advance at 0800 on 17 August in a coordinated counterattack. The advance would be preceded by a thirty-minute artillery and 

aerial bombardment.6 

As developed by the division’s staff, the plan called for the greatest 

effort to be made on the flanks of the North Korean penetration. The 1st 

Provisional Marine Brigade”s first task was to seize Obong-ni Ridge. Next, 

the brigade was to seize another hill mass to the southwest, then turn west 

across the Yongsan-Naktong road and assault a third hill mass in the 

center of the Bulge. The elimination of approximately half of the enemy 

salient was thus entrusted to the Marines. Their left flank, meanwhile, 

would be protected by the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, from its positions 

southwest of Yongsan. At the other end of the line, the 19th Infantry’s 

mission was similar to that of the Marine brigade. It, too, was assigned 

three objectives. First was Ohang Hill, followed by two ridges deep within 

the North Korean lines. These last two objectives were to be seized in conjunction with the 34th Infantry. That unit would assist the 19th Infantry 

by fire during the attack on Ohang Hill, then join the advance toward the 

ridges that were Objectives 2 and 3. The final participant in the attack, 

the 9th Infantry, was assigned only one objective, the ridge west of the 
pgy(p )

Obviously, the 24th Division’s counterattack plan depended heavily 

upon the influx of relatively fresh reinforcements represented by the 1st 

Provisional Marine Brigade. This unit, commanded by Brig. Gen. Edward 

Craig, was unlike any of the 24th Division’s components in that it was a 

balanced ground-air team. The ground element of the brigade consisted of 

the 5th Marine Regiment (three battalions of infantry), augmented by an 

antitank company and an artillery battalion. The air element consisted of 

two squadrons of fighter-bombers (forty-eight aircraft), one squadron of 

night fighters (twelve aircraft), and an observation squadron (eight aircraft 

and four helicopters). OriginaEly numbering over 6,300 officers and men, 

the Marine brigade had already seen action in the southern part of the 

Pusan Perimeter with the 25th Division. There, it had been heavily involved 

in the counterattack conducted by Task Force Kean beginning on 6 August. 

The brigade had left that operation on 13 August and had been in Eighth 

Army reserve since that time. Like the Army, the Marines had gone to war 

only half prepared. Each of the 5th Infantry’s battalions contained only 

two rifle companies, and the entire brigade lacked much of its organic transportation. The tank company was armed with the modern M-26 Pershing 

tank, but the only experience the crews had with that weapon had been 

gained in the operation just concluded.8 

On 16 August, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was located in an 

assembly area at Miryang, having moved from the south by road and rail. 

During the day, officers from the 5th Marine Regiment went forward to 

reconnoiter the positions of the 34th Infantry and Company F, 9th Infantry. 

Lying on the south side of the Yongsan-Naktong road, these positions were 

crucial to holding the route back to Yongsan. During the planning conference at Kyun’gyo, General Church emphasized this fact to General Craig, 

who incorporated it into his own plan for the following day. While meeting 

with Church, Craig also requested the loan of 144 trucks to transport his 

infantry from Miryang to the vicinity of Yongsan. This movement was 

scheduled to begin at 1600. Meanwhile, the air support section of the Marine 

Tactical Air Control Squadron met with the air section of the 24th Division 

to devise a plan for controlling air support for the coming counterattack. 

Since organic Marine air assets heavily outnumbered those released to the 

24th Division by Eighth Army, it was agreed that the Marines would control all aircraft in the sector.9 

According to General Craig’s plan, the three infantry battalions of the 

5th Marine Regiment were scheduled to depart Miryang by truck at 1600 

on 16 August. When the 539th Truck Company arrived three hours late, 

however, it consisted of only 43 trucks, instead of the 144 requested by the 

Marines. By scavenging vehicles from various support elements, the 24th 

Division provided an additional 29 trucks, but the total was still insufficient 

to move the brigade on schedule in one lift. An improvised shuttle system 

was placed in operation after nightfall, but this had transported only two 
Brig. Gen. Edward Craig, U.S. Marine Corps, and Maj. Gen. John H. Church, U.S. Army, in conference 

battalions to Yongsan by midnight. The delay in moving the Marines forward meant that their relief of the 34th Infantry would also be delayed. In 

turn, the 34th would be delayed in relieving the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry. 

The counterattack had not even begun, and already the plan was beginning 

to unravel.lQ 

Not long after midnight on the night of 16-17 August, Lt. Col. Robert 

Taplett’s 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, began to arrive in the vicinity 

of the positions held by the 34th Infantry. Company G relieved the 3d BattaIion, 34th Infantry, on high ground about a mile south of the YongsanNaktong road, while Company H relieved the 34th’s 1st Battalion from its 

ridgetop location behind the 9th Infantry. General Church had specifically 

instructed General Craig to occupy these positions in order to protect the 

road to Yongsan. An additional reason, in Craig’s mind, for holding this 

ground was his belief that the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was too far 

away to safeguard the left flank of the Marine brigade. Thus, Craig elected 

to use one-third of his striking force to protect his flank and rear. At 0400, 

Taplett”s battalion was in position, and the two battalions of the 34th Infantry moved to the rear. By now, they were several hours behind schedule, 

and H-hour was only four hours away.ll 

FoIlowing Taplett’s men was Lt. Col. Harold Roise’s 2d Battalion, 5th 

Marine Regiment. Although scheduled to be the leading assault elements, 

Roise’s troops had to walk most of the way from Yongsan because of the 

shortage of trucks. Weary from their night march, they were nevertheless. 

able to reach their start positions and relieve Company F, 9th Infantry, 

which moved northward across the road and prepared to lead its parent 2d 

Battalion in the Sth’s attack. As for Lt. Cal. George Newtonts 1st Battalion, 

5th Marines, it was still in Miryang awaiting transportation. Its trucks did 

not arrive until 0615, and it did not reach the front until midmorning.12 
Naktong road for a mile, the ridge had at least six identifiable knobs. From 

north to south, these were Hills 102, 109, 117, 143, 147, and 153. The ridge 

had long been used by the North Koreans to cover their movements to the 

southeast, and aerial observers had noticed North Koreans entrenching o

the ridge as early as 13 August. Some of this information was available to 

Marine planners, but apparently little or none of it reached battalion level

Colonel Murray, in fact, believed that Obong-ni was not the enemy’s main 

defensive position, a distinction he reserved for Hill 207, the Marine 

brigade’s second objective. Thus, he considered Obong-ni to be the optimum 

line of departure for what he thought would be the much harder fight fo

Hill 207 (see maps 17 and 18).13 

During his reconnaissance of the North Korean positions on the previ

ous day, Colonel Murray had noted that the objective assigned to the 9th 

Infantry north of the road lay farther west than Obong-ni Ridge. Colone

Hill’s regiment was scheduled to move forward at the same time as the 

Marines and seize the high ground west of the village of Tugok. Tugok 

itself lay in a depression directly north of the tip of Obong-ni. Believing 

that Obong-ni was lightly defended, Murray reasoned that the advance 

would proceed more smoothly if the Marines seized the ridge before Hill’s 

9th Infantry began its attack, Although Hill claimed that his troops were 

in good shape and “hot to go,” Murray held a different opinion from his 

personal observation of the 9th Infantry, and this may have influenced his 

subsequent actions. In a meeting with Hill, Murray suggested that the 

Marines make their assault first, and Hill accepted the idea. The original 

plan, which had called for a simultaneous advance, was thus modified by 

the two regimental commanders. General Craig was not informed of the 

change, but apparently General Church was notified. Deferring to his field 

commanders, Church reluctantly gave his approvaLI 

Having been permitted to fight the battle his own way, Murray made 

his attack plan. Since Obong-ni’s southern end was the highest part of the 

ridge and the terrain south of it was extremely rough, Murray elected to 

make a frontal assault on Obong-ni’s northern half. The attack would b

made in column of battalions, with the 2d Battalion in the lead, the 1s

Battalion in the second line when it arrived, and the 3d Battalion guarding 

the left and rear. A platoon of four tanks from Company A, 1st Tank Bat

talion, would provide fire support with their 90-mm main guns. Also in 

support were the mortars of the 2d Battalion’s Weapons Company and the 

three batteries of 105-mm howitzers belonging to the 1st Battalion, 11th 

Marine Regiment. The artihery had been in place since late on the previous 

day and had already fired a few rounds for registration purposes. Air strikes 

were to be available as needed. By 0730, everything was in place except fo

the 1st Battalion, which was still en route from Miryang.15 

At 0730, a short artillery preparation began on schedule. It ended a

0735, so that aircraft could strike Obong-ni. Five minutes later, eighteen 

Marine F4U Corsairs appeared and blasted the target with napalm and 
had finished their runs, the artillery was scheduled to fire a ten-minute 

bombardment. It did so, but either through poor registration or mistakes 

by the forward observers, few rounds, if any, fell on Qbong-ni. Thus, the 

North Koreans gained an opportunity to recover before the 2d Battalion 

crossed the line of departure at 0300.16 

Roise’s battalion moved to the attack with Company D on the right 

and Company E on the left. Company E headed first for Obong-ni village, 

nestled at the foot of the ridge below the knobs numbered 117 and 143. 

Delayed by enemy outposts in the village, it fell behind Company D. That 

unit crossed the Yongsan-Naktong road and began to ascend the slopes 

leading to knobs 102 and 109. Company D advanced initially with two platoons in line, whiie a third remained in reserve at the line of departure. At 

first, the platoons encountered little difficulty, but as they moved higher up 

the slope, they were assailed by fire from above and on both flanks. The 

flanking fire from the left dissipated somewhat when Company E began 

its own climb up the ridge, but the fire from the right flank raked the 

Marines mercilessly. Most of it came from the village of Tugok, which remained in North Korean hands because of the preassault agreement between 

Murray and Hill. Even after the reserve platoon was committed, Company 

D was unable to gain a secure foothold on the top of Obong-ni, although 

some of its men reached the crest several times. Farther south, Company E 

experienced similar difficulties and stalled two-thirds of the way up the 

ridge (see map 18).1q 

The situation called for supporting arms to aid in breaking the impasse, 

but all efforts to employ them failed. Company E lost touch with its mortars 

and Company D’s mortars were unable to drive the North Korean machine 

gunners from Tugok. Similarly, the Marine artillery proved unable to assist 

the infantrymen. The forward observer with Company E was unable to 

make contact with his assigned artillery battery. Company D’s forward 

observer requested a fire mission on Tugok, and it was begun. Someone 

quickly noticed, however, that the target lay in the sector of the 9th Infantry, and the mission was aborted before it could do any good. Through 

either a procedural or communications lapse, the 24th Division’s artillery 

did not pick up the mission and remained silent. Only the platoon of tanks 

added their fire to that of the 2d Battalion, and they were forced to concentrate on enemy antitank gunners on Obong-ni. The four tanks were hit by 

a total of twenty-three rounds of antitank rifle fire, but none penetrated 

their armor. Although the tanks materially aided the infantry in suppressing the fire from Obong-ni, they were unable to strike the North Koreans 

in Tugok because of intervening hills. None of the aircraft circling overhead 

hit Tugok either, being directed instead to targets both south and west of 

Obong-ni.18 

By late morning, it was clear that the 2d Battalion could go no farther 

without assistance. Both companies pulled back slightly, so that an air 
M-26 tank preparing to fire in support of the Marine attack on Obong-ni Ridge 

strike could hit the North Koreans on the crest of Obong-ni. The strike w

ineffective. Only two napalm bombs were dropped: one landed on anoth

ridge, and the second failed to ignite. Companies D and E then resume

their efforts to seize the crest of the ridge, but success still eluded them. 

noon, the battalion had lost 23 killed and 119 wounded, including 5 officer

Several platoons had been reduced to no more than 15 men each. The

heavy losses only intensified General Craig’s concern about the lack of pro

ress in both his own sector and that of the adjoining 9th Infantry. Upo

conferring with Murray, he learned for the first time the cause of the 9

Infantry’s inactivity. Concluding that his original analysis of the tactica

situation had been in error, Murray attempted to contact Colonel Hill in 

effort to get some relief from the vicious flanking fire emanating fro

Tugok. Maddeningly, now that he wanted the 9th Infantry to advance, co

munications difficulties kept Murray from reaching Hill immediately. Wi

no other recourse, he decided to commit his 1st Battalion to the attack.19 

Lieutenant Colonel Newton’s 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, h

finally arrived from Miryang by midmorning. At 1245, Colonel Murra

ordered Newton to pass through the battered 2d Battalion’s positions a

continue the assault. Newton received Murray’s order at 1330 and quick

moved his men forward. Establishing his CP with that of Roise, at 1500 

sent Companies A and B across the valley and up the ridge. While t

mortars and machine guns of Weapons Company provided covering fire 

concert with the tanks on the road, the two companies of the 1st Battalio

climbed the steep slopes. Soon they passed through the depleted ranks 

the 2d Battalion and continued toward the knobs that comprised the cre
toward Hill 143 because of heavy North Korean fire, the platoon soon was 

forced to .withdraw from the top of 117 itself. Efforts by Company A’s 2d 

Platoon to gain Hill 143 were also unsuccessful. Company B, however, was 

able to secure Hill 109 to the north. Thus, by nightfall, the Marines held 

the two northernmost knabs of Obong-ni, Hills 102 and 109. From there, 

the Marine lines ran down the slope of Hill 117 toward the original line o

departure (see map 1Q20 

North of the road, Colonel Hill’s 9th Infantry finally launched its own 

attack around 1300. Led by Companies F and G, the 2d Battalion slowly 

worked its way toward Tugok. In a fight that lasted all afternoon, the battalion gradually cleared the village and assaulted the ridge beyond. Several 

attacks were thrown back, but just before nightfall, the two companies 

gained the ridge crest and were not pushed off again. Like the Marines, 

they dug in for the night on the ground gained, while Company E occupied 

a reserve position at the original line of departure. To the north, the 1s

Battalion remained in the positions it had held for several days. With its 

single objective secured, the 9th Infantry had concluded successfully its part 

of the operation. Although some facts remain obscure, available evidence 

suggests that if the regiment had made its assault in conjunction with the 

attack of the Marines, both units could have achieved their objectives more 

rapidly and at a lower cost.zl 

Around 2000, while both the Marines and the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, were preparing defensive positions for the night, the North Koreans 

mounted a counterattack straight down the road that curved around the 

north end of Obong-ni. Three T-34 tanks led the attack, followed by a fourth 

some distance behind with infantry support. From their position high on 

Qbong-ni, Marines of Company B saw them coming and sounded the alarm. 

As the Ieading tanks clanked slowly down the road, Marines from the regimental antitank company hastily prepared an ambush by positioning 3.5

inch rocket launchers and 75-mm recoilless rifles around a curve in the 

road. The Marine tank platoon, which had gone to the rear to rearm and 

refuel, was also called back to the front. The Pershings were momentarily 

delayed by several trucks that had been abandoned in the road by their 

drivers, but the tankers drove the trucks aside and continued forward. They 

arrived just as the first T-34 rounded the curve in the road.22 

As the leading North Korean tank passed through the ambush zone, it 

waB hit first by a 3.5-inch rocket but continued to advance. Several 75-mm 

projectiles from the recoilless rifles brought it to a halt, just as the leading 

Marine tank appeared and fired at a range of 100 yards. The T-34 burst 

into flames. Behind it, the second North Korean tank also took hits from 

the roeket launchers and recoilless rifles, one Qf which broke a track. The 

tank slewed off the road to the right and wen; into a ditch. Like the first 

T-34, it continued to fire its gun even though it was immobilized. A second 

M-26 Pershing now joined the first. Aligned hub to hub in the narrow road, 
Three North Korean T-34 tanks destroyed in the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge. The northern 

tip of Obong-ni Ridge is in the background. 
then to proceed on ,its own to Objectives 2 and 3. Thus, until the 19th 

Infantry jumped off, the 34th remained inactive.24 

Colonel Moore of the 19th Infantry anticipated that his 1st Battalion 

could reach its line of departure in a relatively short time, but this proved 

not to be the case. Taking a roundabout route through the tangle of hills 

behind the front lines, the exhausted men of the 1st Battalion fell further 

and further behind schedule. Their progress was marked by a succession of 

messages announcing postponement of the time for assault. The 1st Battalion did not arrive at its assembly area behind the 2d Battalion’s position 

until 1330, and only then did preparations for the assault begin. While waiting, the 2d Battalion conducted patrols toward the North Korean positions 

on Ohang Hill. These patrols found the enemy still present in force. Finally, 

the 1st Battalion’s assault was scheduled for 1700. Several attempts were 

made to arrange an air strike on Ohang Hill just before the attack, but no 

aircraft were available at that hour. Fire support was provided by several 

artillery batteries, the regimental Heavy Mortar Company, and the 1st Battalion’s own Weapons Company. Precisely at 1700, the battalion crossed 

the line of departure, with Company B on the right, Company C on the 

left, and Company A in reserve (see map 19),25 

While the heavy machine guns of Weapons Company played back and 

forth across the crest of Ohang Hill, Company B’s 117 officers and men 

left the safety of their own positions, crossed the intervening valley, and 

began to climb the slopes of their objective. The 1st Platoon was on the 

left, with the 2d Platoon on its right, while the 3d Platoon trailed the 2d 

as company reserve. When the platoons climbed high enough to mask their 

own supporting weapons, the North Koreans opened a withering fire upon 

the struggling infantrymen The 1st Platoon was immediately pinned down, 

and the 2d Platoon was halted as well. Rather than allow the attack to 

stall, a sergeant from the 2d Platoon charged forward alone and knocked 

out an enemy machine gun position on the crest. He then called his squad 

to the top of the hill. Even though the rest of the platoon maneuvered to 

the right, it remained pinned down and was unable to join the handful of 

men on the crest. When the 3d Platoon moved up between the other two, it 

also was halted by the wall of fire. Again, one man took action to break 

the impasse. The company commander ordered the 3d Platoon to pull back, 

maneuver to the left, and reinforce the 1st Platoon’s push. Energized by 

this assistance, the 1st Platoon finally forced its way to the crest. After 

driving back an enemy counterattack, the 1st and 3d Platoons wiped out 

the North Korean machine gunners holding up the 2d Platoon, and that 

platoon joined them on the crest.26 

On the southern end of Qhang Hill, Company C, 144 strong, experienced 

similar difficulties in gaining the top of the ridge. Forced to keep their 

heads down because of the covering fire, the North Koreans leaped into 

action once the machine guns of Weapons Company were masked by their 
gpp

Platoon that was not under direct fire moved laterally to the right, and 

two of its men crawled to the crest. Finding only a lone machine gun crew 

nearby, they destroyed it. The diminution of enemy fire allowed the rest of 

the company to gain the top of the hill. Unwilling to surrender the high 

ground without further struggle, the North Koreans counterattacked with 

twenty men. They were easily repulsed. As night fell, Company C tied in 

with Company B on the right and the sixty-five men of Company A, which 

had come up on their left. After enduring an hour-long barrage of shells 

from North Korean 120-mm mortars, they settled in for the night on their 

newly won ground. Even then, the North Koreans were not finished and 

counterattacked after dark with 100 men. When this assault, too, was 

thrown back, quiet finally descended on Ohang Hi11z7 

While most of the day’s fighting occurred in the Naktong Bulge, other 

elements of the 24th Division encountered the enemy as well. Both the 21st 

Infantry and the 3d Engineer (C) Battalion engaged North Korean patrols 

with fire before dawn. Several units reported small enemy groups roaming 

throughaut the division’s rear, one of which attacked a medical detachment 

of the 21st Infantry. This group of infiltrators was driven into the hills by 

the regimental I and 11 Platoon and South Korean police but was not destroyed. Around Hill 409, the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, continued to probe 

the positions held by the North Korean 29th Regiment. Supported by air 

strikes and artillery fire, Company A cautiously explored the eastern 

approaches to the towering hill mass. The enemy responded vigorously with 

small arms, machine guns, and light mortars but employed no heavier 

weapons. A prisoner captured in the area reported that his unit suffered 

from a lack of ammunition, thus providing a possible explanation for the 

strange behavior of the North Korean regiment on Hill 409.28 

The results of the day’s counterattack, while less favorable than expected, nevertheless were gratifying to General Church. The initial objectives 

of the Marines, the 9th Infantry, and the 19th Infantry had all been 

achieved, with gains of approximately 1,000 yards in each sector (see map 

20). Marine casualties had been heavy, the 2d Battalion alone losing 142 

men. In contrast, the 9th Infantry lost 73 men, while the 19th Infantry 

suffered only 10 casualties.29 As had so often been the case, the coordinated 

movements so carefully written into the plan had not been achieved. 

Instead, the attack had occurred in sequential order across the front of the 

Bulge. There had also been communications problems, since the heavy 

Marine tanks had inadvertently cut the wires leading back to the division 

headquarters at Kyun’gyo during their move to the front. This problem had 

not proved insurmountable, however, since an advance division command 

post had been established earlier at Yongsan. Other difficulties had been 

discovered in the air strike control arrangements, and several ground units 

had been mistakenly attacked by friendly aircraft. Fortunately, no serious 

damage had been done. Given the fact that ground units fZom two Army 
Although the disparate elements of his team were not yet wodcing in corn--

plete harmony, Church believed the North Korean 4th Division had finally 

lost the initiative. Accordingly, he ordered that the counterattack be resumed 

at first light on 18 August.30 

Unwilling to surrender the initiative totally to their opponents, the 

North Koreans mounted a series of limited counterattacks during the hours 

of darkness. These attacks centered on the ground gained earlier by the 

Americans on both sides of the Yongsan-Naktong road. At 0335, Company 

F, 9th Infantry, repulsed an enemy thrust against its positions on the hill 

west of Tugok, but only after withdrawing about 100 yards. South of the 

road, on Obong-ni Ridge, another enemy counterattack rolled down from 

Hill 117 and split Company A of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. 

Because of the circumstances of the previaus day’s battle, this company’s 

defensive position was badly sited on the lower slopes of Hill 117 and in 

the saddle between it and the next knob to the north. When the North 

Koreans charged down the hill behind a curtain of bullets and grenades, 

they crashed through the center of the company and drove the company 

commander from his CP. The left and right platoons clung to their positions, but the shattered remnants of the center platoon were driven to the 

bottom of the ridge. Just when the Marines’ situation appeared most hopeless, the enemy assault faltered and then receded. No attempt had been 

made to exploit Company A’s open left flank or even to destroy its isolated 

left platoon. This unusual behavior led some observers to conclude that the 

North Korean attack was not a serious offensive movement but was only a 

ploy intended to cover a withdrawal.31 

With the coming of dawn, Company A reorganized itself and began a 

new assault on Hill 117. This time, supporting fires were better coordinated 

than those of the previous day. Mortars and machine guns from the 1st 

Battalion’s Weapons Company raked the crest, while Company B added its 

fire from Hill 109 to the north. When the North Korean resistance did not 

slacken, the commander of Company A called for an air strike. A lone 

Marine Corsair roared in and dropped a 500.pound bomb within seventyfive yards of the forward positions of the Marines. The tremendous blast 

destroyed several North Korean machine guns and crews, but the concussion unfortunately also killed a Marine. Limited as it was, this strike suppressed enemy resistance on Hill 117. When Company A resumed its 

assault, it easily gained the crest. The next knob to the south, Hill 143, 

now became the focal point of the North Korean defense. Under the combined blows of the &l-mm and 4.2~inch mortar sections and supplemented 

by another air strike, the North Korean defenses were smashed, and this 

peak also fell to Company A. Hills 147 and 153 to the south next received 

similar treatment from the Marines’ supporting arms. By 0900, Company A 

was securely in possession of Hills 117 and 143, with the North Korean 

defenders in full view retreating across the valley to the hills beyond. As 
tank rifles, and 150 North Korean dead. When their own losses were tallied, 

Companies A and B of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, numbered only 216 

officers and men (see map 21).a2 

Once it was clear that Obong-ni was securely in Marine hands, Colonel 

Murray ordered his 3d Battalion to move forward from its reserve position 

and to prepare to assault Marine Objective 2, Hill 207. At 0945, Lieutenant 

Colonel Taplett passed his troops through the 1st Battalion and began the 

attack, Supported by a platoon of Marine tanks, Company H crossed the 

valley and started the climb to the crest. Initially following behind H, Company G soon swerved to the right and came into line beside it. Ahead of 

the two companies, the objective erupted in fire and smoke from the pounding of hundreds of artillery, mortar, and tank rounds. Overhead, Marine 

tactical air coordinators directed Corsairs against both Hill 207 and the 

surrounding area. When forty North Koreans attempted to outflank the 

companies toiling up the slope, the Marine Pershings opened fire on them 

from a distance of 300 yards and shattered the counterattack. Under cover 

of this pounding attack, the Marine infantry made rapid progress. Company 

H gained the summit of Hill 207 by l130, and Company G joined it an 

hour later.33 

Driven from the high ground, North Korean soldiers in large numbers 

fled toward the rear. As they crossed the valley containing the YongsanNaktong road, they made perfect targets for the Marine tanks. The Pershings fired continuously for several hours with their main guns, .50-caliber 

machine guns, and .3@caliber machine guns. Some North Koreans ran down 

the road toward the Naktong, while others climbed Hill 311 in hopes of 

making a stand. Many were so panic stricken that they threw away their 

weapons and equipment in their mad dash to safety. They were spurred on 

not only by the tanks but also by artillery fire and air strikes mercilessly 

called down upon them by both aerial and ground observers. The North 

Koreans, who had fought so tenaciously as late as the previous day, now 

seemed to have lost all cohesion and most of their will to resist.34 

While the Marines were wresting Obong-ni Ridge and Hill 207 from the 

North Koreans, the units of the 24th Division made similar progress north 

of the Yongsan-Naktong road. The two battalions of the 9th Infantry imme 

diately north of the Marines had no assigned objective on 18 August, since 

they were due to be “pinched out” by the units advancing on both flanks. 

Nevertheless, they supported adjacent units with fire. North of the 9th, the 

34th and 19th Infantry regiments intended to make a coordinated attack 

on Hill 240, but like so many of the 24th Division’s previous attacks, this 

one, too, went awry. Beauchamp’s 34th Infantry moved forward on schedule, 

but Moore’s 19th Infantry, on the right, did not immediately join it. By 

now located several thousand yards from the nearest road, the 1st Battalion of the 19th had great difficulty in transporting a fresh stock of 

ammunition forward to its assault companies on Ohang Hill. This back-
the line of departure and headed downhill into the valley separating them 

from their objective, the left end of a high ridge running northwest 2,500 

yards toward the Naktong. The immediate goal of the 3d Battalion was 

Hill 240, the highest point on the ridge, while the 19th Infantry had responsibility for the rest of the ridge and a nearby peak, Hill 223. With Company 

K on the left and Company L on the right, the 3d Battalion initially made 

good progress against moderate to light resistance. The battalion’s third 

company, I, was not available for support, since it remained detached, guarding the Naktong shore north of the 19th Infantry. Support initially seemed 

unnecessary, since both assault companies reached their assigned sectors 

of the ridge crest without difficulty around 0300. Suddenly, however, Company L was struck by a heavy counterattack on its front and open right 

flank. Hit from an unexpected direction (the sector that should have been 

covered by the tardy 19th Infantry), Company L was thrown back down 

the ridge several hundred yards. The unit sustained more than twenty 

casualties in only a few minutes. At 0920, Colonel Beauchamp was told: “‘L 

company is cut up bad-do not think they will be able to do anything, 

‘ I I They are picking L Co. off like flies.“36 

Company K made an effort to relieve the pressure on Company L, but 

the primary assistance could only come from the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry. This unit finally began its own assault just as Company L withdrew 

from Hill 240. Moving slowly down from Ohang Hill and across the valley, 

Companies A and C initially suffered little from the North Korean fire, 

which continued to beat upon the hapless Company L. Covered by the base 

of fire provided by Company B from Ohang Hill, the 1st Battalion’s assault 

companies began to struggle up the steep slope of Hill 240. By 1000 hours, 

they were one-third of the way to the top and nearly abreast of Company 

L, which was now being pounded by mortar fire. Continuing their climb, 

the sixty-one men of Company A scrambled to the top of the ridge with 

little opposition. Nearer the river, Company C encountered stiffer resistance, 

as heavy automatic weapons fire briefly halted the two leading platoons. A 

sergeant who charged forward with a .30-caliber machine gun finally broke 

the deadlock, and Company C surged to the top of the hill. By 1145, the 

1st Battalion”s two assault companies securely held their portion of the 

ridge, To their left, the badly mauled Company L, 34th Infantry, rejoined 

Company K on Hill 240. By noon, Objective 2 was in American hands, 

and troops on Hill 240 could see masses of North Korean soldiers fleeing 

toward the river. Just as in the Marines’ sector, both artillery fire and air 

strikes took a heavy toll as the North Koreans withdrew (see map 21).37 

During the afternoon, General Church’s leading elements paused to 

regroup, resupply, and pass fresh units to the front before resuming the 

drive to completely erase the North Korean bridgehead east of the Naktong. 

South of the Yongsan-Naktong road the 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines, 

continued to mop up scattered resistance on Hill 207, while Marine tanks 
Marines on top of liitl 311, with the valley of the Naktong in the distance 

pounded their final objective, Hill 311, north of the road. In the 34th 

Infantry’s zone, Colonel Beauchamp positioned his 1st Battalion to assault 

the regiment’s Objective 3, a series of slightly lower crests west of Hill 240: 

Similarly, Colonel Moore’s 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, began to displace 

forward to serve as the 19th’s spearhead in the afternoon advance. Moore 

also requested an airdrop of rations, water, and ammunition for the troops 

of the 1st Battalion Sadly, the number of individual rations required was 

only 300.88 

Shortly after 1500, the American advance toward the banks of the Naktong resumed. Each unit now moved independently of its neighbors. Previously, such a lack of coordination had caused difficulties, but by now the 

North Korean 4th Division had become so fragmented that no main line of 

resistance could be identified. Once again, the Marines were first to jump 

off. Companies G and H of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, crossed the 

Yongsan-Naktong road at 1535 and slowly began to work their way up the 

lower slopes of the towering Hill 311. As the infantry inched forward, 

massive supporting fires devastated the crest far above them. Unlike the 

previous day’s experience at Obong-ni Ridge, the Marines were now able to 

orchestrate a coordinated bombardment by mortars, recoilless rifles, tanks, 

artillery, and aircraft. Assisted by this awesome display of firepower, Corn-’ 

pany G gained the left half of Hill 311 at 1725 and easily secured its sector 

fifteen minutes later. On its right, Company H had a more difficult time. 

At -1825, the company was pinned down by automatic weapons fire from 
ing morning to conclude their mopping-up operations.39 

Fifteen hundred yards north of Hill 311, the 34th and 19th Infantry 

regiments began their assaults on their own final objectives some time after 

the Marines. Late in the afternoon, Companies A and B of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, passed through the positions of the 3d Battalion on 

Hill 240 on their way to Objective 3. Company C, now numbering only 

thirty-seven men, remained behind. The assault companies arrived at the 

objective by 1840 but then encountered several pockets of stubborn enemy 

resistance that prevented them from securing the position until after dark. 

North of them, the 19th Infantry was again late in crossing its line of 

departure. The 2d Battalion did not even begin its advance until Beau-, 

champ’s men were already on top of their half of the objective. By the 

time the 2d Battalion reached Objective 3, it had been dark for over an 

hour (see map 21).4@ 

By the end of 18 August, most of the North Korean bridgehead had 

been eliminated. Everywhere, the enemy was in frantic retreat. The hills’ 

were littered with discarded weapons and equipment. Before darkness, both 

aerial and ground observers reported hundreds of North Korean soldiers 

gathering at various points along the river bank in hopes of getting across 

to safety. Artillery fire and air strikes were directed upon them until darkness put an end to the slaughter. According to the division’s war diary, 18. 

August was “by far the most successful day of combat far the 24th Division 

in the Korean War.” Only in the division’s northern sector was there any 

cause for concern. There, the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, had continued its 

series of probes against the North Korean regiment on Hill 409. In the 

process, its Company B had run into heavy opposition and had suffered 

sixteen casualties. Yet even there, the enemy displayed no inclination to 

act offensively.41 

During the night, while artillery interdicted known crossing points, the 

24th Division staff planned a series of movements designed to complete the 

reconquest of the Naktong Bulge on the following day. The Ist Provisional 

Marine Brigade was ordered to secure Hill 311, patrol to the river, then 

assemble behind the Bulge as division reserve. After the 34th and 19th 

Infantry regiments consolidated their own final objectives, they, too, were 

to advance to the Naktong and prepare to defend their assigned zones. The 

9th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, meanwhile would sweep 

through the rough terrain south of the Marine sector and secure the lower 

pad of the Bulge from Namji-ri to the tip of the salient. North of the Bulge, 

the 21st Infantry, the 3d Engineer (C) Battalion, and the 1st Battalion, 23d 

Infantry, were all to hold their original defensive positions while closely 

wat@hing the North Korean regiment on Hill 409. The 24th Recon Company 

would continue to provide security for the division’s rear areas.42 

At 0617 on 19 August, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, launched the 24th 

Division’s final assault on the North Korean 4th Division”s shrinking posi-
py g

Throughout the morning, both Marine and Army patrols combed the foothills leading down to the Naktong. Everywhere they found evidence of the 

enemy’s hasty flight to safety, Small arms, equipment, and even documents 

were scattered over the hills and gullies. On a little knoll just off the 

Yongsan-Naktong road near the river, the Marines found a large artillery 

park. They tallied nine undamaged crew-served weapons in the immediate 

area, including 76-mm guns, U.S. 105mm howitzers, and Soviet 122-mm 

howitzers. These and other artillery pieces found elsewhere in the Bulge 

were gathered in an assembly area near Yongsan. Three of the guns were 

American howitzers captured earlier in the war or in the initial North 

Korean assault on 6 August. As for small arms, three truckloads were collected from the battlefield in the Marines’ sector alone.43 

By late afternoon, the mopping-up process was virtually finished. In 

the northern sector of the Bulge, both the 34th and 19th Infantry regiments 

completed their sweeps through the hills to the river bank, as did the 

Marines at the center of the salient. To the south, the troops of the 1st 

Battalion, 9th Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, tramped through 

similar terrain, gathering North Korean stragglers and collecting discarded 

weapons and equipment. With their task done, the 1st and 2d Battalions of 

the 5th Marines, at 1600, boarded trucks that carried them to an assembly 

area near Yongsan. Around sunset, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, was 

relieved by elements of the 19th Infantry and moved to join the rest of the 

1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The 19th Infantry occupied the southern 

half of the Bulge, while the 34th Infantry established defensive positions 

in the northern half. The 9th Infantry assembled in the afternoon near 

Yongsan as division reserve (see map 22).b4 

On 20 August, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade departed Yongsan 

en route to an Eighth Army reserve position at the southern end of the 

Pusan Perimeter. Two units of the 2d Division-the 9th Infantry and the 

1st Battalion, 23d Infantry-remained with the 24th Division. During the 

day, an operational directive from Eighth Army announced that the 24th 

Division would be relieved by the 2d Division on the Naktong line as soon 

as the remainder of the 2d Division arrived at the front. Planning for the 

change began immediately. On 22 August, the 38th Infantry of the 2d Division arrived and relieved the 21st Infantry and the 3d Engineer (C) Battalion During the next two days, the 9th Infantry of the 2d Division occupied 

the defensive positions of both the 19th and 34th Infantry regiments. The 

opposing North Korean forces remained inactive during the changeover, 

although they retained their bridgehead in the vicinity of Hill 409. On 24 

August, most elements of the 24th Division left the sector they had defended 

since early August and began their move northward to a reserve position 

near Kyongsan. There, on the next day, after fifty-five days of combat, the 

division began a much needed period of rest, refit, and rehabilitation.45 
The 24th Division cemetery, Pusan Perimeter 

Although the 24th Division had departed the Naktong Bulge forever, it 

left behind at least one tangible reminder of its victory and the cost associ-’ 

ated with it. At the Miryang Experimental Farm, in the rear of the division’s old sector, a cemetery had been established as a temporary resting 

place for American casualties of the fight. By 23 August, the cemetery 

contained 365 interments. On that date, a formal dedication ceremony was 

held, with a flag raising, rifle volleys, and taps played by a 2d Division 

bugler. Ironically, a photographer from the 24th Signal Company was 

barred from recording the ceremony because of the division quartermaster’s 

earlier prohibition of photographs of American graves. Afterward, the cemetery, like the battlefield itself, was formally transferred into the keeping of 

the 2d Division46 

The Naktong Bulge remained quiet for only a week after the departure 

of the 24th Division. On the night of 31 August, a fresh North Korean 

division crossed into the Bulge and assaulted the positions thinly held by 

the 9th Infantry. At the same time, elements of two other North Korean 

divisions forded the Naktong in the northern part of the 2d Division’s 

sector. In the south, the enemy penetrated as far as Yongsan and even 

gained control of the town briefly before being driven out. To the north, 

Ch’angnyong was threatened, but the 2d Division managed to retain possession Once again, General Walker ordered the 1st Provisional Marine 

Brigade to join the fight in the Naktong Bulge. Entering combat around 

Yongsan, the Marines advanced almost to Obong-ni Ridge before being withdrawn to prepare for the amphibious landing at Inchon. By itself, the 

depleted 2d Division proved unable to advance farther. In the First Battle 

of the Naktong Bulge, the 24th Division, with much assistance from other 

units, had restored its original front and claimed a victory over the North 

Korean 4th Division. Such would not be the case in the Second Battle of 
precipitated by the Inchon landing of 15 September 1950. Spearheading the 

breakout from the Pusan Perimeter that accompanied the landing was the 

now rejuvenated 24th Division.47 
8 Lessons of the Battle 

A3P 

The operations of the 24th Infantry Division on the Naktong River in 

August 1950 represent a case study of light infantry acting on the defensive 

in mountainous terrain. Although then-current tables of organization and 

equipment (TOE) called for an infantry division to be heavier than those 

of the World War II era, circumstances had reduced the division to a light 

infantry formation. Because of its peacetime organizational structure, the 

24th Infantry Division had almost none of the armored companents normally organic to an infantry division in 1950. Due to the rigors of its 

operations prior to 6 August, the division had lost much of its heavy equipment. The number of vehicles of all types, from prime movers to jeeps, was 

far below the total authorized in the TOE. The division’s artillery component was greatly reduced as a result of both the peacetime practice of deleting 

one firing battery from each battalion and the wartime losses associated 

with forced retrograde movements. Thus, the 24th Infantry Division”s 

fighting power was concentrated almost exclusively in its infantrymen and 

the relatively light weapons with which they were armed. Unfortunately, 

the twin processes of peacetime skeletonization and wartime attrition had 

taken their toll upon the division’s infantry component as well. Thus, the 

24th Infantry Division was not only light in equipment but also weak in 

numbers.l 

The position assigned to the 24th Infantry Division for defense in early 

August provided many theoretical advantages. The Naktong River flowed 

directly in front of the division’s defensive trace and, indeed, defined that 

trace. While the river served as something of a moat and an antitank ditch, 

it was more a hindrance to the crossing of infantry than an impassable 

obstacle. Nevertheless, its value to the defense was twofold. First, if the 

river bank could be held in strength, the attacker’s assault problem would 

be complicated by the water barrier. Second, until a bridge or ferry system 

could be established, a successful initial assault could not be rapidly exploited because of the difficulty of moving heavy weapons and supplies 

across the river. Unfortunately for the 24th Division, the Naktong’s sinuous 

twists and turns, especially in the Bulge area, greatly extended the river 

frontage to be defended. This factor, when coupled with the division’s general weakness in combat personnel, served to negate the river line as a 

defensive advantage during the initial enemy assault. 

103 
an additional advantage. Only two roads of consequence penetrated the hills 

eastward from the river. These provided relatively high-speed access to the 

division rear, but their small number did not unduly complicate the division’s defensive arrangements. Much more important were the large areas 

of hills, ridges, gullies, and small valleys that characterized the terrain be

tween the river and the lateral road connecting Ch’angnyong and Yongsan. 

Again, if sufficient numbers of troops had been available, these hills and 

ridges could have provided a succession of defensive positions to blunt and 

eventually halt any enemy attack in strength. Defense of such terrain, how

ever, was unit intensive. While lines of sight were good from the hills 

nearest the river, elsewhere they were abysmal from all but the highest 

peaks. Back from the river, dead ground abounded. A unit on one hill could 

not cover territory in any way commensurate with the effective range of its 

weapons because its lines of sight were blocked by intervening hills and 

undulations of the gro’und. Several gullies and ravines penetrated almost 

every battalion-size defensive sector that could be established. 

By the time the 24th Division reached. the Pusan Perimeter in early 

August, Eighth Army’s situation had momentarily stabilized. For the first 

time, the 24th Division’s flanks were covered by other American units, 

although divisional sectors were so large that the presence of neighboring 

units prevented only the widest enemy enveloping maneuvers. Well aware 

of his unit’s condition, terrain considerations, and his defensive mission, 

General Church adopted a defensive plan well suited to his situation, With 

three depleted American regiments and an ROK regiment at his disposal to 

guard a frontage of thirty-four miles, Church clearly saw that his forces 

were inadequate for a conventional positional defense along the Naktong 

shoreline. He therefore decided to outpost the river line lightly, while re

taining relatively large reserves for the purpose of counterattacking enemy 

penetrations. The 34th and 2lst Infantry regiments of the 24th Division 

and the 17th RQK Regiment each received a sector to defend. Since each 

of the American regiments had only two battalions, they were unable to 

deploy in the doctrinally approved and experience-tested formation of two 

battalions forward and one in reserve. Instead, the 34th and 21st Infantry 

regiments each placed one battalion in frontline positions overlooking the 

river and a second in the rear as a counterattack force. As a result, frontages of individual companies were enormous, the small number of men in 

each position being virtually swallowed up by the maze of hills and ravines. 

As a general reserve, to be used in case of a major enemy penetration, the 

19th Infantry was held by Church in a central location near Ch’angnyong. 

Church’s defensive scheme was not intended to halt a North Korean 

attack at the water’s edge. The wide frontage and the limited number of 

defenders precluded that option. Instead, any penetration would be dealt 

with by units in reserve, which would respond swiftly to the enemy thrust. 

The reserve battalions would blunt any small-scale breakthroughs, and the 

reserve regiment would repulse anything larger. The key to the 24th Divi-
provision was the manual violated-the requirement that every effort be 

made to gain “early information of hostile offensive movements.“’ Prior to 

6 August, only one ground patrol of the 24th Division intruded briefly on 

the enemy’s side of the Naktong, and aerial reconnaissance proved utterly 

inadequate to track an enemy who moved primarily at night and was a 

master at camouflage. This lapse aside, Church’s defensive plan made the 

best possible use of the means available to accomplish his mission.2 

On the night of 5-6 August 1950, elements of the North Korean 4th 

Division penetrated the front of the 24th Division in the sector defended by 

the 34th Infantry. This event precipitated the First Battle of the Naktong 

Bulge, which from the American perspective consisted of a two-week series 

of counterattacks mounted to regain the original river line. During the fourteen days of battle, elements of the 24th Division, or units attached to it, 

attempted no less than sixty-one counterattacks of battalion or company 

size. Some of these were scheduled but never executed, while others were 

delivered only halfheartedly. Most failed to achieve the objectives set for 

them by the planning staffs. Yet, ultimately, the final counterattacks succeeded in crushing the North Korean 4th Division and regaining the 24th 

Division’s original positions. What lessons, if any* can be drawn from the 

24th Division’s operations in the Naktong Bulge? How relevant are these 

lessons for today’s Army? The answers to these questions can be organized 

into two categories, the first dealing with counterattack and the second comprising more general observations on the conduct of the division’s defensive 

battle, 

In the section entitled “Conduct of the Defense,” the 1949 edition of 

FM 100-5 identified several key principles to be considered during the planning of a counterattack. First, the timing of such an attack was crucial to 

the success of an operation. If launched too soon, the counterattack might 

dissipate its force before the enemy’s momentum was spent; if launched too 

late, the counterattack would be too weak to deprive a tenacious enemy of 

the advantage and terrain he had already gained. A second major consideration was the axis upon which the counterattack should be launched. According to the manual, the defender’s response should be directed against 

the flank of the penetration if at all possible, rather than against the nose. 

Third, the manual emphasized the need for coordination of all elements 

committed to the counterattack mission. This coordination could only be 

achieved by establishing a single command structure with clearly defined 

authority over all participating components.3 

A useful method of characterizing counterattacks is by time of delivery. 

In some armies, a unit driven from a position will attempt to regain the 

lost ground almost at once, before the enemy can organize the newly won 

terrain for defense. This type of counterattack is usually conducted by the 

original defenders without the assistance of significant reinforcements. For 

want of a better term, it can be classified as a hasty counterattack. The 
Bulge. Examples are the North Korean counterattacks against the Marines 

on Qbong-ni Ridge and against the 19th Infantry during the seizure 

Ohang Hill. Units of the 24th Division almost never employed this tacti

of hasty counterattack, the sole exception being the successful counterattack 

of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, on 16 August. 

Most of the 24th Division’s counterattacks during the battle occurre

many hours after the loss of the original position. Virtually all of thes

ripostes were based upon prior planning, either prebattle counterattack plan

or plans devised after the enemy had made his gains. Such counterattacks 

can best be characterized as deliberate counterattacks, entailing significant 

amounts of planning time and elaborate efforts to coordinate both th

actions of adjacent units and available supporting fires. Unfortunately, n

matter how much planning and preparation time was available prior t

H-hour, the 24th Division proved unable to mount a fully coordinated counte

blow in which all elements jumped off at the appointed time. The reason

for this state of affairs varied widely: inability to obtain timely resupply

inadequate knowledge of the terrain, shortage of transportation, misreading 

of the tactical situation, and the debilitated condition of the assaulting 

units. Time after time, a unit would begin its assault on schedule, while 

neighboring unit, which had a crucial role to play, did not. The invariable 

result was unnecessary casualties. 

Besides being characterized as either hasty or deliberate, counterattacks 

may also vary in scope. Those with narrowly defined objectives, conducted 

by relatively small units, and lacking wide implications for the larger battle 

can be defined as local counterattacks. These often correspond to the hasty 

counterattack described above, although there are exceptions. Such counter

attacks were seldom employed by the 24th Division. The operations of th

1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, early on 6 August provide one example, an

those of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, on 16 August represent another

Counterattacks on a wider front, with larger numbers of participating units 

and with sector-wide implications, can be styled general counterattacks. 

During August 1950, this type of response became the normal method o

operation for the 24th Division. 

As the battle for the Naktong Bulge intensified and more units joined 

the fight, the task of coordinating the employment of forces available t

the 24th Division became increasingly difficult. Gradually, a command an

control system evolved to alleviate this problem, but the response coul

have been more rapid had the advice offered by FM 100-5 been adopte

from the beginning. Initially, the enemy penetration was treated as a loca

problem to be handled by the 34th Infantry. When the regimental reserv

proved inadequate to deal with the situation, General Church committed 

his division reserve, the 19th Infantry. This response, too, failed to eras

the North Korean penetration and left the division without any reserve o

its own. Fortunately, Eighth Army released a succession of units, beginning 

with the 9th Infantry, to assist the 24th Division. The three regimental 
tant division commander. This, too, failed to achieve the desired result. 

Finally, Church created Task Force Hill to impose order among the various 

units attempting to reduce the salient. This improved the planning process 

but seemed to have little effect upon battle performance, since by that time, 

most of the task force’s components were too battle weary to respond coherently. During the final stage of the battle, the arrival of Brigadier General 

Craig’s 1st Provisional Marine Brigade forced the dissolution of Task Force 

Hill. All units, thereafter, operated directly under division control, with 

coordination being arranged through the division operations officer at a 

forward CP at Yongsan. Air and artillery support for the final counterattacks were also coordinated from Yongsan. 

Since the 24th Division’s zone encompassed terrain and units some distance from the fighting raging in the Bulge, the division commander in the 

rear was hardly the man to guide the general counterattacks necessary to 

evict the North Koreans. The task force concept of a sole counterattack 

commander, as prescribed in the doctrinal manuals of the day, was sound 

and should have been implemented as soon as the initial counterattacks of 

6 August had failed to regain the river line. Such a concept, however, was 

not employed for several days, during which time the counterattacking 

forces suffered significant reductions in their fighting power without commensurate gains of territory. By the time centralized command and control 

procedures were established, the counterattacking units had suffered heavy 

losses, and the North Koreans had begun to consolidate their position east 

of the Naktong.4 

No matter at what level the counterattacks were controlled, they tended 

to violate another significant principle emphasized in FM 100-Z According 

to the manual, counterattacks should generally be directed toward the 

flanks of a penetration, rather than the nose, in order to seal the break in 

the defensive line or, at worst, to prevent it from growing wider. Little 

effort was made by the 24th Division to do this during the battle. The 

initial counterattack on 6 August, that of Ayres’ 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, struck the North Korean drive head-on. It can be argued that this 

approach was necessary in order to place a blocking force in the path of 

an advancing enemy to buy time for later attacks on their flanks. Even if 

this point is conceded, Ayres” methods, involving inadequate security and 

incomplete knowledge of the enemy’s location, temporarily wrecked his battalion and delayed the North Koreans only slightly. The afternoon counterattack by the 19th Infantry adhered to the doctrinal formula more closely 

and, indeed, established a firm shoulder north of the penetration that remained in place throughout the ba%e. Elsewhere, there was little effort to 

maneuver in accordance with doctrine. 

Both postwar authors and participants in the conflict have commented 

upon the predilection of American units in Korea to tailor their maneuvers 

to the available road net and to avoid the generally trackless regions.5 
y 

the 24th Division. In contrast, the few American units that operated in 

this region either remained passive, like Companies K and L, 34th Infantry, 

or were too small for the assignment given them, like the 1st Battalion, 

21st Infantry. Only one attempt was made to sweep around the North Koreans’ southern flank through this rough terrain. The two rifle companies 

of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, were entirely too small a force to secure 

such a Iarge area or even seriously to affect enemy operations. As it happened, they did not even make the effort, being overrun in their assembly 

area by a preemptive North Korean attack. After this abortive attempt to 

strike the North Korean penetration on its southern flank, no further operations occurred in the southern sector of the Bulge until the final mopping-up 

phase of the battle. 

American operations against the North Korean penetration almost invariably took the form of frontal attacks against the enemy positions on 

the hills flanking the Yongsan-Naktang road. The major reinforcements re 

ceived during this phase of the 24th Division’s fight-the 9th Infantry and 

the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade-were committed along this road. The 

battle thus degenerated into a series of vicious fights for hill masses in the 

center of the Bulge. North of the road, the 9th Infantry struggled to gain 

control of Maekkok Hill and Hill 165. South of the road, first the 34th 

Infantry and then the Marines fought similar battles for possession of 

Obong-ni Ridge. Both of these counterattack series, as well as those of the 

19th Infantry around Ohang Hill, were simply frontal assaults. Whenever 

a new unit arrived to reinforce the 24th Division’s general counterattack, it 

was committed near the Yongsan-Naktong road. No attempt was made to 

maneuver either the 9th Infantry or the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade 

around the North Korean southern flank. Instead, the road served both as 

a magnet and a funnel for American reinforcements. Drawn to the road 

because of their motorized transport, the American units were funneled 

along it to a point a mile and one-half beyond the village of Kang-ni, where 

they invariably established lines of departure north or south of the road 

and entered the battle. Unhampered by such a road fixation, the more agile 

North Koreans used the roadless area to the south to good advantage, 

sending units through it to sever the 24th Division’s main supply route. 

The Americans’ lack of imagination in their scheme of maneuver and their 

failure to employ existing doctrinal concepts cost them heavily in both lives 

and lost oportunities. 

The defensive doctrine found in American manuals current in August 

1950 was sound.6 For a unit forced to defend on a wide front with inadequate numbers, a defensive scheme consisting of lightly held frontline positions backed by large counterattack reserves represented a viable soIution 

to a difficult defensive problem. American counterattack doctrine also was 

sound, correctIy identifying and emphasizing certain key elements necessary 

for success: good preliminary intelligence, timely commitment of reserves, 
battle, but only with the assistance of most of Eighth Armys reserve formations. Rather than a battle of maneuver, the First Battle of the Naktong 

Bulge became a battle of attrition. In such a fight, the side with the largest 

reserves has a decided advantage. During the course of the battle, the 24th 

Division was reinforced at one time or another by six Army infantry battalions and a Marine brigade. In contrast, the North Korean 4th Division 

received no reinforcements of consequence. Had the 24th Division been more 

familiar with its own counterattack doctrine and employed it more rigorously, it might have been able to defeat the North Korean thrust without 

all of the assistance it ultimately required. Certainly, Eighth Army’s reserves need not have been depleted so severely and so unnecessarily. 

The First Battle of the Naktong Bulge is rich in lessons other than 

those involving counterattack. The battle exposed several flaws in the operations of the 24th Division’s staff. Intelligence estimates of North Korean 

capabilities and intentions were extremely conservative. Even though 

sightings of enemy groups moving progressively around the division’s left 

flank and into its rear were included in the intelligence summaries, no glimmer of what this meant is apparent in the estimates. Although notations 

on the sighting reports indicate they were posted on the daily situation 

map along with the division’s own dispositions, no one seems to have noted 

the yawning gap on the division’s left flank or that the North Koreans 

were exploiting it. Even an attack by infiltrators on an artillery battery 

some distance behind the front was disregarded. Only when North Korean 

units cut the division’s MSR was any concern shown, and even then it 

was reported in the division war diary that the intruders must have passed 

through an adjacent division’s sector. In fact, the North Korean 4th Division was simply following the same pattern of operations it had been using 

since the war’s outbreak.7 Even had the information of North Korean movement through the gap not been available, the lack of concern for an open 

flank would hardly have been excusable. With the information in their 

hands, the G2 and G3 sections were clearly negligent in failing to identify 

a serious threat to the MSR before the road actually was lost. 

A possible explanation for the lapse in the 24th Division staff’s understanding of the enemy’s operations may be the fact that the division moved 

its headquarters from Ch’angnyong to Kyun’gyo during the most crucial 

phase of the North Korean turning movement. Ironically, this movement of 

headquarters was initiated because of a potential threat to the headquarters 

at Ch’angnyong from small bands of infiltrators. But instead of making 

the headquarters more secure, the move actually brought it into the path of 

a much larger North Korean force. Indicative of the division staffs misreading of the situation, this move disrupted operations of the division 

headquarters for at least twenty-four hours. In addition, locating the division CP at Kyun’gyo meant that all wire communications ran along the 

narrow road that served as the MSR. When that road was cut by the North 
may have been, the time and manner in which it was accomplished ma

terially aided the North Koreans by distracting the division staff and dis

rupting their routine. Modern division headquarters will have to move far 

more often than General Church’s headquarters. The implications of even a 

relatively simple relocation such as Church’s should be understood by mod

ern planners as they contemplate even more rapid shifts of position. 

The fluid conditions that prevailed on the 24th Division’s left flank pro

vided opportunities for both offensive and defensive rear area combat opera

tions. Offensively, on two occasions, American units were in the rear or on 

the flank of North Korean units operating against the 24th Division’s main 

defensive positions. Units of the 34th Infantry were involved both timesCompanies A, 6, and L on 6-8 August and Companies K and L on lo-13 

August. Rather than aggressively attempt to disrupt North Korean resupply 

and troop movements, these units instead opted for passive defense of their 

enclaves, hoping thereby to remain inconspicuous until extracted. Self-preser

vation thus became paramount, taking precedence over inflicting maximum 

damage and discomfort upon the enemy. In the far more fluid situations 

envisioned for the modern battlefield, many more units will find themselves 

in positions similar to that of Captain Alfonso’s two and one-half com

panies on the Naktong. How will they respond-aggressively as the manuals suggest or passively as did the men of the 24th Division? 

Defensive operations in the rear of the 24th Division centered around 

protecting the MSR from Yongsan to Kyun’gyo and reopening it after the 

North Koreans closed the road. Initially, the situation at the front precluded 

detaching any combat units to deal with the threat to the MSR. This meant 

that units whose primary missions were noncombat were required to take 

up arms and defend the road. At the Yongsan end of the road, a company 

of engineers received the call, while at the Kyun’gyo end a far more heterogeneous organization was created ad hoc for the same purpose. Task Force 

Hafeman included soldiers from the division’s headquarters company, MP 

company, ordnance maintenance company, and band, among others. Together with the engineers, Task Force Hafeman valiantly did its best to 

preserve the 24th Division’s supply line until reinforcements could arrive. If 

nothing else, the operations on the MSR demonstrated that all units, no 

matter how far in the rear or how divorced from normal combat activity, 

should have a residual combat capability. As the 24th Division discovered 

in the Naktong Bulge, a combat unit may not always be available for rear 

area protection. In such situations, the personnel of the rear echelon must 

fend for themselves, and they should be prepared to do so. 

The 24th Division’s general performance in the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge and its relative lack of success is mitigated somewhat by the 

circumstances under which it went to war. No doctrine manuals provided 

guidance on how a tactical system predicated upon three maneuver elements 

per regiment and battalion could be made to function with only two.8 Tactical fire support doctrine presupposed three firing batteries per artillery bat-
their careers in garrison were physically unprepared for hill climbing in 

the heat of a Korean summer or for the tempo of field operations against a 

tireless and resourceful enemy. All of these problems had solutions, some 

of them relatively simple ones, but in peacetime it had not seemed necessary to think about them. The crucible of war would eventually resolve 

these problems, but until the necessary thinking was done, men in units 

committed to the fight early, such as the 24th Division, would pay a heavy 

price for the Army’s unpreparedness. Whenever the state of peacetime doctrine, war stocks, and unit conditioning is similar to that of 1950, a similar 

price will have to be paid. 

More than thirty years have passed since the 24th Division stood on 

the defensive along the Naktong River in Korea. Much has changed since 

then in terms of both technology and doctrine. Today, sensors detect an 

enemy’s approach more easily than in 1950, and new communications gear 

is available to call down upon him far greater Srepower in a much shorter 

time. Modern operations are also envisioned as being far more fluid than 

the relatively simple linear defensive scheme of the Pusan Perimeter, giving 

less meaning to such terms as “the rear.” The current editions of FM 100-5 

and supporting manuals give considerably less emphasis to topics like connterattack than do the editions operative in 1950. No longer are the principles 

of timing, centralized command, and flank attacks so explicitly set forth.” 

Perhaps, today, these principles need not be drummed so heavily into the 

minds of officers. Perhaps that is indeed the case, The long history of warfare, however, and certainly the experience of the 24th Division in the Naktong Bulge, presents evidence to the contrary. 
Notes 

%? 

* 

1. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret 

(Princeton, NJ: University Press, 19761, Book 6, passim, and Bernard Brodie’s comments, 

678-93; R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, Mi&tary Heritage of America (New 

York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., X956), 18; Ritter von Leeb, Defense, translated by Stefan T. 

Fossony and Daniel Vilfroy (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1943), 1-3. 

2. “The Counterattack,” Infantry SchooE Quarterly 34 (April 1949): 5-17; William H. Bedford, 

‘“Counterattack-Flanks or Nose,” Military Reuiero 32 (July 1952):24; William H. Hale, 

“Counterattack: The Decisive Element of Defensive Operations,” Military Reuiew 31 

(December 1951):22. 

3. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, FieM Service Regulations, Operations, (Washington, DC, August 1949), 30, 120. 

4. Ibid., 120-30, 147. 

5. Ibid., 147-53. 

6. John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, pt. I, ReguEar Army (Washington, DC: 

Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, L9?2), 72-74; Russell F. Weigley, 

History of the United St&es Army (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), 502; 

Table of Organization and Equipment No. 7N, Infantry Diwision (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Army, July 1948), 4. 

7. Mahon and Danysh, Infantry, 76; James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First 

Year, U.S. Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military 

History, U.S. Army, 19721, 43, 53; Weigley, History, 503. 

8. Weigley, History, 502; Schnabel, Policy, 45-46. 

9. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, (June-November 19KJ), U.S. 

Army in the Karean War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 

Department of the Army, 1961), 180; Schnabel, Policy, 54; Weigley, History, 503-4; Mahon 

and Danysh, Infantry, 77. 

PO. Weigtey, History, 503; Schnabel, Policy, 46, 54-59, 60. 

Il. John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War U, 3d rev. ed. (New York: 

Frederick A. Fraeger, 1968), 89-90; Schnabel, Policy, 2-36; Appleman, South, l-4. 

12. Schnabel, Policy, 24-25, 36-39; Appleman, South, 5-12. 

13. Appleman, South, IO-181 Schnabel, Policy, 38-40. 

14. Appleman, South, 19-35, 52-55. 

113 
Deans Story (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 13. 

17. Schnabel, Policy, 81, 82; Appleman, South, 59, 65-99, 122. 

18. Appleman, South, 123-79. In every instance, North Korean operational concepts and 

tactics reflected the training the North Koreans had received from their Soviet mentors. 

For a good discussion of this, see Daniel S. Stelmach, “The Influence of Russian Armored 

Tactics on the North Korean Invasion of 1950” (Ph.D. dissertation, Saint Louis University, 

1973), iv-v, 51-52, 122-27, 167-69, 252-54, 274-79. 

19. Appleman, South, 179-80. 

20. Schnabel, Policy, 89; T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness 

(New York: Macmillan Co., 1963), 128. 

21. Schnabel, Policy, 71, 80-82; Appleman, South, 180, 213; Forrest K. Kleinman, “The Tactician of Danger Forward,” Army 9 (November 195&):26, 28; “24th Infantry Division Wa

Diary, for the Period 23 July 1950 to 25 August 1950,” Daily Diary, 23 July 1950 (here

after cited as 241D WD). 

22. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 22-31 July 1950; Appleman, South, 213-50. 

23. 24LD WD, Daily Diary, 2 August 1950. 

24. Appleman, South, 205-9. 

25. 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 470, 021230 August 1950. 

26. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 2-3 August 1950, and Adjutant General Daily Diary, 3 August 

1950; “21st Infantry Regiment War Diary, for [the] Period 23 July 1950 to 25 August 

1950,” 2 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 211R WD); “21st Infantry Regiment Unit Reports,” 

no. 26, 3 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 211R URs); “34th Infantry Regiment War Diary,” 

2 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 341R WD); Appleman, South, 250-51. 

27. Appleman, South, 250, 254-55; Schnabel, Policy, 127. 

Chapter 2 

1. 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 285, 4 August 1950, and G-3 Journal, entry 519, 040800 

August 1950; Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 175. 

2. The contemporary terrain maps are Army Map Service, series L751 (Korea, 1:50,000), type 

A (AMS l), 1945, sheets 6820 I (Ch’angnyong) and 6820 II (Namji-ri}i): More accurate are 

Defense Mapping Agency, series L752 (Korea, 1:50,000), edition l-KAMS, 1970, sheets 3317 

II (Hyonp’ung) and 3816 I (Uiryong). 

3. 24th Infantry Division Operations Instructions, no. 16, 3 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 

241D 01s); 241D WD, Narrative Summary. 

4. 241D OIs, no. 17, 4 August 1950; 241D WD, Narrative Summary; Appleman, South, 254. 

5. 241D WD, G-4 Journal, Daiiy Logistics Report no. 25, 051800 August 1950, Logistical Report 

no. 7, 6 August 1950 (data for 5 August 1950 taken from “Previously Short’” column), 

Lieutenant Colonel Dixon to Lieutenant Colonel Sibert, 051915 August 1950, and Lieutenant Colonel Dixon to Lieutenant Colonel Witter, 042390 August 1950; 241D WD, Engineer 

Officer Daily Diary, 5 August 19.50; 241D WD, Narrative Summary. Tne equipment shortages as of 5 August 1950 were based on the 24th Division’s peac,time table of organization rather than on its authorized wartime strength. 

6. “24th Infantry Division Periodic Operations Reports,” no. 30, 5 August 1950 (hereafter 

cited as 24ID PORs); Eighth U.S. Army, Korea, “Daily Report from Plans Section,” 4 
health, status of supplies and equipment, and length of time the unit had been in contact. 

“‘34th Infantry Regiment Unit Reports,” no. 23, 5 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 341R 

URs); Appleman, South, 84, 147; Roy E. Appleman to Richard W. Stephens, 4 April 1952, 

in folder entitled “Correspondence 1952,” Charles E. Beauchamp to Roy E. Appleman, 20 

May 1953, in folder entitled ‘“XVI. The First Battle of Naktong Bulge,” and Roy E. 

Appleman to Charles E. Beauchamp, 25 May 1953, in folder entitled “Correspondence 

1953,” all in U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Collection on South to 

the Na&~ng, North to the Zulu (hereafter cited as OCMH Collection). 

U.S. Department of the Army, FM T-40, Infantry Regiment (Washington, DC, January 

1950), 237; “‘34th Infantry Regiment, S-3 Journal File,” Operations Order no. 6, 032200 

August 1950; 341R URs, no. 23, 5 August 1950; 341R WD, Summary and 3-5 August 

1950; 341R URs, Overlay to Accompany Unit Report 021706 August 1950, Overlay, 34th 

Infantry Fire Plan (undated but approximately 3 August 1950), Overlay, Listening Posts 

Established, 3 August 1950, Overlay, Positions of 1st Battalion (undated but approximately 

3 August l%O), Overlay Showing Positions of 3d Battalion, 031300 August 1950; “Btry A, 

26th AAA (AW) Bn War Diary, for the Period 23 July 1950 to 25 August 1950” 1-5 

August 1950 (hereafter cited as Btry A, 26AAA [AW] Bn WD); “War Diary, 11th Field 

Artillery Battalion, from the Period 23 July 1950 to 25 August 1950,” Baker Battery 

Chronology, 4-5 August 1950, and Daily Diary, 6 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 1lFA 

Bn WD); “13th Field Artillery Battalion War Diary, for the Period 23 July 1950 to 25 

August 1950,” Daily Diary, 27 July and 4-5 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 13FA Bn 

WD); “3rd Engineer Combat Battalion War Diary, for the period 23 July 1950 to 25 August 

1950,” Daily Diary, 3-5 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 3E(C) Bn WD); Overlay no. 1, 

Demolitions and Minefields, 3d Engineer (C) Battalion. 

9. 211R URs, no. 27, 4 August 1950, and no. 28, 5 August 1950; 211R WD, ‘Summary, 24 

July, 28-29 July, 3-5 August 1950; 211R WD, Situation Overlay, 051700 August 1950; 

“14th Engineer Combat Battalion War Diary, I August 1950-31 August 1950,” 1-5 

August 1950 (hereafter cited as 14E(C) Bn WD); “52nd Field Artillery Battalion War Diary 

for the Period 23 July 1950 to 25 August 1950,” 4 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 52FA 

Bn WD); “63rd Field Artillery Battalion War Diary for the Period 1 August 1950 to 26 

August 1950,” 5 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 246, 040700 August 1950, 

entry 343, 051205 August 1959, and entry 356, 051345 August 1950. 

10. Appleman, South, 250; 211R URs, no. 27, 4 August 1950; 241D WD, G-4 Journal, Daily 

Logistics Report no. 25, 051800 August 1950; 241D PORs, Overlay to Accompany POR no. 

29, 042400 August 1950; 13FA Bn WD, 4 August 1950; 1lFA Bn WD, Able Battery Chronology, 5 Auguat 1950, and Daily Diary, 6 August 1950; 3E(C) Bn WD, 4-5 August 1950; 

211R WD, 5 August 1950. 

11. “19th Infantry Regiment Unit Reports,” no. 27, 6 [5] August 1950 (hereafter cited as 19IR 

URs); “‘War Diary-19th Infantry Regiment for Period 222409 July to 252460 August 1950, 

Inclusive,” Summary and entries for 3-5 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 19IR WD); “19th 

Infantry Regiment Operations Orders,” no. 4, 041890 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 19XR 

00s); 241D WD, Daily Diary, 4 August 1950 and 6-4 Daily Summary, 5 August 1950. 

12. 241D OIs, no. 17, 4 August 1950; “24th Reconnaissance Company War Diary, from 232400 

Jul 50 to 252400 Aug 50,” 3-5 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 24th Recon Co WD); 241D 

WD, G-3 Journal, entry 458, Status 24th Recon Co (as of 29 July 1950); “Company A, 

78th Tank Battalion Medium, War Diary for the Period 23 July 1950 to 25 August 1950,” 

2-5 August 1950 (hereafter cited as Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD); “Headquarters Company 24th 

Infantry Division War Diary for the Period 23 July 1950 to 25 August 1950,” 5 August 

1950 (hereafter cited as 241D HQ Co WD); “24th Signal Company War Diary for the 
13. 241D WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 4 August 1950, G-4 Journal, Daily Summary, 3-4 August 

1950, and Quartermaster Daily Diary (Historical Report); “War Diary, 24th Medical Battalion,” 5 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 24 Med Bn WD). 

14. 241D WD, Narrative Summary; Appleman, South, 290, 293; Fehrenbach, This Kind of 

War, 176. 

15. Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, Genera1 Staff, “History 

of the North Korean Army,” 31 July 1952, 57-59, 95-96, and charts 4-7; General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, “Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Research Supplement, Interrogation Reports, Issue no. 94, 

North Korean 4th Inf. Div.,” 41-48; “Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, Korea, 

Operational Directive,” 6 August 1950, annex A (Intelligence); Appleman, South, 11, 264, 

293. 

16. 241D WD, Narrative Summary, Daily Diary, 4-5 August 1950, Air Operations Reports, nos. 2-3, and G-2 Jaurnal, entries 348, 399, 403-6, 5 August 1950; “24th Infantry 

Division Periodic Intelligence Reports,” nos, 23-25, 3-5 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 

241D PLRe); 211R WD, 4-5 August 1950; 21IR URs, nos. 27-29, 3-5 August 1950; 341R 

WD, 5 August 1950; 341R URs, no. 23, 5 August 1950; “34th Infantry Regiment Message 

Journal,” Duke 3 to CO, 34 Inf, 0600 5 August 1950. 

Chapter 3 

1. “13th Field Artillery Battalion Unit Journal,” 6 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 13FA 

Bn UJ); “34th Infantry Regiment S-2 Journal,” 0023 6 August 1950; “24th Infantry Division G-Z Order of Battle Journal,” interrogations of North Korean prisoners belonging to 

the North Korean 4th Infantry Division, August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 413, 

060105 August 1950; 341R URs, no. 24, 061700 August 1950. 

2. 13FA Bn WD and UJ, 6 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 415, 060205 August 

1950; 341R WD, 6 August 1950 and 7 August 1950 (latter entry contains 6 August 

information). 

3. Harold B. Ayres ta Roy E. Appleman, 5 June 1953, in folder entitled “XVI. The First 

Battle of Nakteng Bulge,” OCMH Collection; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 570, 060430 

August 1950, entry 571, 0520 6 August 1950, and entry 572, 060545 August 1950; 241D 

WD, Air Operations Reports, no,. 4, 6 August 1950. 

4. Ayres to Appleman, 5 June 1953, OCMH Collection; 341R WD, 6-7 August 1950; 341R 

URs, no. 24, 061700 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 574, 0710 6 August 1950; 

Appleman, South, 294-96. 

5. Ayres to Appleman, 5 June 1953, OCMH Collection; Charles E. Beauchamp, comments 

for Roy E. Appleman, 20 May 1953, in folder entitled “XVI. The First Battle of Naktong 

Bulge,” OCMH Collection; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 430, 060830 August 1950; “Headquarters 24th Infantry Division Artillery War Diary for the Period 222400K Jul 50 to 

2524OOK Aug 50,” Summary (hereafter cited as 241D WD); 13FA Bn Arty WD and UJ, 6 

August 1950. 

6. 341R Message Journal, no. 92 (lo), 6 August 1950, and no. 93, 0835 6 August 1950; 341R 

S-2 Journal, no. 17 (12), 0832 6 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 575, 0750 6 

August 1950. 

7. 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 580, 060900 August 1950, and G-2 Journal, entry 432, 060900 

August 1950; 13FA Bn WD and UJ, 6 August 1950. 
Journal, entry 616, 061725 August 1950; 341R Message Journal, nos. SO (ll), and 91 (4), 6 

August 1950; 341R S-2 Journal, no. 33 (la), 1130 6 August 1950; 341R WD, 6 August 1950. 

9. Ayres to Appleman, 5 June 1953, OCMH Collection; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 452, 

061056 August 1950, entry 477, 061350 August 1950, and entry 480, 061430 August 1950; 

A. F. Alfonso to Harold B. Ayres, 27 November 1954, in folder entitled “XVI. The First 

Battle of Naktong Bulge,” OCMH Collection; 241D Arty WD, Summary; 13FA Bn WD 

and UJ, 6 August 1950. 

la. “2&t Infantry Regiment S-3 Journal,” 6 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 21IR S-3 Journaf); 

211R WD, 6 August 1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 6 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, 

entry 592, 061115 August 1950, entry 593, 061120 August 1950, entry 594, 061130 August 

1950, entry 595, 061130 August 1950, and entry 596, 061150 August 1950; 24th Reeon Co 

WD, Summary and 6 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Daily Diary, 6 August 1950, and Crdnance Officer Daily Diary, 6 August 195@ 24th Signal Co WD, 6 August 1950; 241D HQ 

Co WD, 6 August 1950. 

Il. “19th Infantry Regiment Unit Journal,” 6 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 27, 061700 August 

1950; 1SIR WD, Operations Summary; “First Battalian, 19th Infantry, 24th Division, 

Action on the Naktong River,‘” OCMH Collection (hereafter cited as l/19 Narrative); 241D 

WD, Daily Diary, 6 August 1950, and G-3 Journal, entry 591, 061110 August 1950; 341R 

URs, no. 24, 061700 August 1950, 

12. Ayres to AppIeman, 5 June 1953, Alfonso to Ayres, 27 November 1954, and Beauchamp 

comments for Appleman, 20 May 1953, all in OCMH Collection; Appleman, Sort& 296-97; 

341R WD, 7 August 1950 (1st Battalion section contains events of 6 August); 13FA Bn 

WD and UJ, 6 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 507, 061645 August 1950; 24ID 

WD, G-3 Journal, entry 604, 061500 August 1950, entry 605, 061445 August 1950, and 

entry 618, 061745 August 1950; 241D WD, G-4 Journal, no. 7, 062350 August 1950. 

13. 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 604, 061500 August 1950, entry 609, 061600 August 1950, 

entry 613, 061715 August 1950, and Overlay, Scheme of Maneuver, 2d Bn, 19th Inf, 6 

August 1950. 

14. 24th Recon Co WD, Summary and 6 August 19501 21IR S-3 Journal, 6 August 195% 24ID 

WD, G-2 JoumaI, entry 496, 061530 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 603, 061417 

August 1950, entry 608, 061520 August 1950, entry 610, 061605 August 1950, and entry 

624, 061905 August 1950. 

15. 19IR WD, Operations Summary; 19IR URs, no. 28, 071700 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 6 August 

1950; l/19 Narrative, 241D WD, Daily Diary, 6 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 

518, 062033 August 1950, and entry 531, 062245 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, 

entry 619, 061850 August 1950, entry 623? 061950 August 1950, entry 628, 062300 August 

1956, Overlay, Scheme of Maneuver, 2d Bn, 19th Inf, 6 August 1950, and Overlay, Scheme 

of Maneuver, 1st Bn, 19th Inf, 6 August 1950. 

16. 21IR S-3 Journal, 6 August 1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 6 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 

Journal, entry 429, 060800 August 1950, entry 492, 061510 August 1950, and entry 526, 

062210 August 195S; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 573, 0545 6 August 1950, and entry 

601, 061035 August 1950; 241D PORs, no. 31, 6 August 1950; 241D 01, no. 18, 061900 

August 1950; 3E(C) Bn WD, Narrative Summary and 6 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn 

WD, 6-7 August 1950. 

17. 21IR WD, Summary and 6 August 1950; 211R S-3 Journal, 6 August 1950; ZlIR URs, no. 

29, 061700 August 1950, and no. 30, OTllQO August 1950; 241D WD, Narrative Summary; 
18. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 6 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 626, 062130 August 

1950; 241D PIRs, no. 26, 062130 August 1950; 241D PQRs, no. 31, 6 August 1950; 241D 

OIs, no. 18, 061900 August 1950. 

19. Appleman, South, ‘77; Ayres to Appleman, 5 June 1953, QCMH CoIlection. 

20. 241D FIRS, no. 27, 072130 August 1950; 241D WD, G.2 Journal, entry 547, 070150 August 

1950, and entry 553, 070555 August 1950; 211R URs, no. 30, 071700 August 1950; 211R S-3 

Journal, 7 August 1950; l/19 Narrative; Alfonso to Ayres, 27 November 1954, OCMH 

Collection. 

21. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 6-7 August 1960; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 601, 061035 August 

1950, and entry 615, 061125 August 1950; “Headquarters Second Infantry Division War 

Diary,” 6 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 2ID WD); “Headquarters 2d [Infantry] Division 

Artillery War Diary,” entry 34, 061130 August 1950, “War Diary, Headquarters Fifteenth 

Field Artillery Battalion,” 6 August 1950 (hereafter cited aa 15FA Bn WD); 241D WD, G4 

Daily Diary, 6-7 August 1950. 

22. Alfonso to Appleman, 27 November 1954, OCMH Collection; 241D WD, 6-4 Journal, Daily 

Summary, 071860 August 1950, entry 18, 070310 August 1950, and entry 14, 071305 August 

1950; 341R WD, 7 August 1950; 341R URs, no. 25, 071700 August 1950. 

23; 341R WD, Summary and 7 August 1950; 341R URs, no. 25, 071700 August 1950; 341R 

Message Journal, 071320 August 1950 and 071355 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, 

entry 565, 071030 August 1950, and entry 579, 071240 August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 7 

August 1950. The 30 percent combat efficiency figure mentioned was based on a threebattalion regiment. 

24. l/19 Narrative; 19IR UJ, 7 August 1950; 19IR LJRs, no. 28, 071700 August 1950; 19IR 

WD, Summary; 241D WD, G-2 JournaI, entry 568, 071115 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 

Journal, entry 640, 070700 August 1950, and entry 646, 071115 August 1950. 

25. l/19 Narrative; 19IR UJ, 7 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 29, 081700 August 1950; 24TD 

WD, G-3 Journal, entry 646, 071115 August 1950, entry 656, 071200 August 1950, entry 

658, 071455 August 1950, entry 662, 071830 August 1950, and entry 665, 072210 August 

1950. 

26. 211R S-3 Journal, 7 August 1950; 2lIR WD, 7 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 30, 071700 

August 1950; 241D WD, G-4 Journal, “Signal Supply, 24th Div.,” 071800 August 1950; 

14E(C) En WD, 7 August 1950. Company C, 14th Engineers, is listed in some documents 

as Company D. 

27. 211R S-3 Journal, 7 August 1950; 211R WD, Summary and 7 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 

30, 071700 August 1950, and no. 31, 081700 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 

562, 071010 August 1950, entry 570, 071115 August 1950, and entry 599, 071610 August 

1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 661, 071725 August 1950. 

28. 211R S-8 Journal, 7 August 1950; 211R URs, no. 31, 081700 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 

Journal, entry 630, 072245 August 1950, and entry 635, 072312 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 

Journal, entry 666, 072230 August 1950. 

29. 3E(C) Bn WD, .Narrative Summary and 7 August 1950; 211R WD, 7 August 1950; 241D 

WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 7 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 650, 071155 August 

1950; 24ID PORs, no. 32, 072400 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 7 August 1950; 24th 

Recon Co WD, 7 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 7 August 1950. 

30. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 7 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Daily Diary, 7 August 1950; 241D 

WD, G-2 Journal, entry 538, 070005 August 1950, entry 548, 070230 August 1950, entry 
31. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 7 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 644, 071055August 

1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 7 August 1950; 341R Message Journal, 071115 August 1950; 241D 

PIRs, no. 27, 072130 August lQ5Q. 

32. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 7 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Daily Diary, 7 August 1950; 241D 

WD, G-3 Journal, entry 634, 062255 August 1350; 241D WD, G-4 Journal, Daily Logistics 

Report no. 27, 071800 August 1950; 241D PORs, no. 32, 072400 August 1950; ZID WD, 7 

August 19.50; 241D HQ Co WD, 7 August 1950; 24 Signal Co WD, 7 August 1950. 

1. 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 649, 080230 August 1950; 211R WD, 8 August 1950; 21IR S-3 

Journal, 8 August 1950; 21IR LJRs, no. 31, 081700 August 1950. 

2. 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 663, 080700 August 1950; 15FA Bn WD, August 1950; 2ID 

Arty WD, 8 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 8 August 1950. 

3. 241D PIRa, no. 28, 082130 August 1950; 241D WD, Narrative Summary, and Daily Diary, 

8 August lQ5Q; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 661, 080630 August 1350, entry 664, 080710 

August 1850, entry 666, 080730 August 1950, and entry 668, 080800 August 1950; 341R 

URa, no. 26, 081700 August 1950; 341R S-2 Journal, 8 August 1950; 341R Message Journal, 

8 August 1950; Alfonso to Ayres, 27 November 1954, OCMH Collection; 19IR URs, no. 29, 

O&1700 August 195Q. 

4. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 8 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 709, 081719 August 

1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 680, 086330 August 1950, and entry 683, 080445 August 

1950; 2lIR URs, no. 31, 081700 August 1950; 2lIR S-3 Journal, 8 August 1950; 3E (6) Bn 

WD, 8 August 1950. 

5. 24ID WD OIs, no. 19, 082400 August 1950; 341R WD, 8 August 1950; Alfonso to Ayres, 27 

November 1954, OCMH Collection. 

6. Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, Narrative Summary, and 8 August 1950. 

7. 1QIR WD, 8 August 1950; 19IR URa, no. 29, 081700 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 8 August 1950; 

241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 688, 080830 August 1950. 

8. 241D WD OIs, no. 19, 082400 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 685, 080720 

August 1950, and entry 689, 081005 August 1950; PSIR UJ, 8 August 1950. 

9. 1SIR UJ, 8 August 1950; l/19 Narrative; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 692, 081230 August 

1950. 

10. 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 675, 080115 August 1950, and entry 679, 080510 August 

1950; Historical Section, G-2, HQ 2d Infantry Div%ion, “The 2d Infantry Division and 

the Korean Campaign,” vol. 1, “8 July 1950-31 August 1950,” 28-29 (hereafter cited as 

ZID, “Korean Campaign”); John G. Hill commenks for Roy E. Appleman, 2 January 1958, 

Appleman Ms-ExternaE Review, OCMH CoEleetion; 15FA Bn WD, August 1950. 

11. 2ID, “Korean Campaign,” 29; 9th Infantry Regiment Unit Reports, no. 1, 8 August 1950 

(hereafter cited as 9IR URs); 9th Infantry Regiment Periodic Operations Reports, no. 12, 

081800 August 1950, and no. 13, 082400 August 1950 (hereafter cited as SIR FOR& 9th 

Infantry Regiment Operations Orders, no. 4, 081315 August 1950 (hereafter cited as SIR 

00s). 

12. 21D “Korean Campaign,” 29-33; SIR URs, no. 1, 8 August 1950; QIR PORs, no. 13, 082400 

August 1950, and no. 14, 090600 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 716,081840 
13. 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 688, 081150 August 1950, and entry 729, 082255 August 

1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 694, 081330 August 1950, and entry 696, 081435 August 

1956; 2lIR S-3 Journal, 8 August 1950. 

14. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 8 August 1950; 241D PC&, no. 33, 082400 August 1956; 241D WD

G-4 Journal, Daily Logistics Report no. 28, 081800 August 1950, Logistical Report no. 9, 8 

August 1950, and entry 20, 080930 August 1950; 241D WD, Ordnance Officer DaiIy Diary, 

8 August 1950; “24th Replacement Company War Diary,” 8 August 1950 (hereafter cited 

as 24 Repl Co WD); SIR PORs, no. 13, 082400 August 1950. 

15. Ayres to Appleman, 5 June 1953, OCMH Collection; AIfonao to Ayres, 27 November 1954

OCMH Collection; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 781, 091545 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 

Journal, entry 732, 091400 August 1950; 241D WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 8 August 1950; 341R 

Message Journal, 9 August 1950; 341R WD, 9-10 August 1950; 341R URs, no. 27, 091700 

August 1950. 

16. 341R WD, 9 August 1950; 341R URs, no. 27, 091700 August 1950; 341R Message Journal, 

9 August 1950; 341R S-2 JournaI, 9 August 195Q; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 815, 091545 

August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 725, 090730 August 1950, entry 732, 091400 

August 1950, and entry 13, 091545 August 1956. 

17. 19XR UJ, 9 August 1950; SIR PORs, no 13, 082400 August 1950, and no. 14, 090600 

August 195% 

18. 241D WD, Air Operations Reports, no 7, 091700 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 9 August 1950

211R SB Journal, 9 August 1950; 2416) WD, G-2 Journal, entry 755, 090350 August 1950

entry 758, 091030 August 1950, entry 760, 691055 August 1950, entry 763, 091020 August 

1950, and entry 767,091230 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 723, 090655 August 

1950, entry 728, 090835 August 1950, and entry 731, 091210 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn 

WD, 9 August 1950; HilI comments for Appleman, 2 January 1958, OCMEI Collection; 

2ID, “‘Korean Campaign,‘” 33; Clark C. Munroe, The Second United States &fan&y Diuision. in Korea, 1950-1951 (Tokyo, Japan: Toppan Printing Co., 1952), 9. The 24ID WD 

Daily Diary entry for 9 August 1950 is especially misleading about the operations of the 

9th and 19th Infantry regiments on the date in question 

19. 2ID, “Korean Campaign,” 33; Munroe, Second Division, 9-10; 341R Message Journal, 9 

August 1950; 19IR UJ, 9 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 30, 9 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 

Journaf, entry 733, 090145 August 1950, and entry 779, 091435 August 1950. 

20. l/19 Narrative. 

21. 21IR S-3 Journal, 9 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 JournaI, entry 736, 098430 August 1956, 

entry 759, 091045 August 1950, and entry 761, 091125 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, 

entry 718, 090437 August 1950, entry 719, 090455 August 1950, entry 720, 090510 August 

1950, and entry 722, 090600 August 1950; 241D WD, G-4 Journal, entry 13, 691145 August 

1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 

241D WD, G-3 Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 241D WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 

241D PIRs no. 29, 092130 August 1950; “24th Military Police Company War Diary,” 9 

August 1950 (hereafter cited as 24 MP Co WD). 

22. 241D BQ Co WD, 8-9 August 1950 [entry for & August 1950 is misdated]; 24 Signal Co 

WD, 9 August 1950; 241D WD, Signal Officer Daily Diary, 9 August 1956; 241D WD, G-l 

Daity Diary, 9 August 1950; 24fD WD, G-2 Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 

Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 241D WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 

Journal, entry 796, 091600 August 1950, and entry 797, 091800 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 

Journal, entry 1, 091800 August 1950; 241D WD, G-4 Journal, entry 1, 091801 August 

1950. 
WD, Gl Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 9 August 1950. 

25. 9IR PORs, no. 15, 091800 August 1950, and no. 16, 092400 August 1950; ZID, “Korean 

Campaign,” 34-35; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 18, 092085 August 1950, and entry 41, 

092330 August E950. 

26. 211R S-3 Journal, 9 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 783, 091735 August 1950; 

241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 41, 092330 August 1950. 

27. 19IR UJ, 9 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 794, 092150 Auguat 1950; 241D 

WD, G-3 Journal, entry 33, 092227 August 1950; 24ID PIRs, no, 30, 102200 August 1950. 

28. 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 41, 092330 August 1950; “34th Infantry Regiment S-l 

Journal,” 10 August 19550; 341R WD, 10 August 1950. 

29. 24ID WD, G-l Daily Diary, lo-11 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Daily Diary, 9-10 August 

1950; 241D WD, G-3 Daily Diary, 9-10 August 1950; 241D WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 9-10 

August 1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 241D PGRs, no. 34, 092400 August 

1950. 

30. 19IR UJ, 9 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 794, 092150 August 1950, and 

unnumbered entry, 100490 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 33, 092227 August 

1950; 211R S-3 Journal, 10 August 1959. 

31. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 241D PORs, no. 34, 092400 August 1950; 241D 

Arty WD, 10 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 10 August 1950. 

32. 19IR UJ, 10 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 31, IQ1700 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, 

entry 799, 106730 August 1956; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 37, 100650 August 1950, and 

entry 57, 101056 August 1950; Appleman, South, 3Oln; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 10 August 

1950. 

33. 2ID, “Korean Campaign,” 35; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 798, 100633 August 1959, and 

entry 800, 100804 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 10 August 195@ 341R URs, no. 28, 101700 August 

1950. 

34. 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 807, 101003 August 1950, and entry 816, 101145 August 

1950; 341R WD, lo-11 August 1950; 341R URs, no. 28, 101700 August 1950; 9IR PORs, 

no. 18, 101800 August 1950; ZID, “Korean Campaign,” 35; Hill comments for Appleman, 2 

January 1958, QCMH Collection. 

35. 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 848, 161950 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Order of Rattle 

Journal, entry 23, 111300 August 1950. 

36, 241D WD, G-2 Daily Diary, 10 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Daily Diary, 10 August 1950; 

211R UJ, 10 August 1950. 

37. 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 20, 101346 August 1950; 21IR WD, 10 August 1950; 211R 

URs, no. 33, 101700 August 1950; 211R 5.3 Journal, 10 August 1950. 

38. 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 24, 101610 August 1950, entry 25, LO1620 August 1950, and 

entry 26, 101600 August 1950; Gordon E. Murch comments for Roy E. Appleman, 7 April 

1954, in folder entitled “XVI. The First Battle of Naktong Bulge,” OCMH Collection. 

39. 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 26, 101600 August 1950, entry 31, 101705 August 1950, and 

entry 32, 101715 August 1950; 341R WD, 10 August 1950; 341R URs, no. 28, 101709 August 

1956; Beauchamp comments for Appleman, 20 May 1953, OCMH Collection: “Historical 

Report-August 1950, 27th Infantry Regt’I Combat Team,” 2d Battalion Summary of 

Activities (hereafter cited as 27IRCT, ‘“Historical Report”). 
41. 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 46, 102210 August 1950, and entry 50; 110430 August 195

24th Recon Co WD, Summary and 10 August 1950. 

42. 27IRCT, “Historical Report,” including 2d and 3d Battalions’ Summaries of Activities, 

August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 44, 102030 August 1950, entry 49, 10220

August 1950, and entry 51, 110515 August 1950; Murch comments for Appleman, 7 Apri

1954, OCMH ColIection. 

43. 19IR UJ, 111 August 1950; ZID, “Korean Campaign,” 35; 9IR PORs, no. 18, 101800 Augus

1950, and no. 19, 102400 August 1955. 

44. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 10, August 1950; 24XD PORs, no. 35, 102400 August 1950; 241

WD OIs, no. 20, 102400 August 1950; John Church to Roy E. Appleman, 7 July 1953, 

folder entitled “XVI. The First Battle of Naktong Bulge,” OCMH Collection; 241D WD, G

Jeurnai, entry 43, 102000 August 1950. 

45. Hill comments for Appleman, 2 January 1958, OCMH Collection; 241D WD, Daily Diary

10 August 1950. 

46. 241D WD, G-4 Journal, Daily Logistics Report no. 30, 101800 August 1950, and Logistical 

Report no. 11, 101840 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 10 August 1950; 241D WD

G-3 Journal, entry 22, 101410 August 1950; 24 Rep1 Co WD, 10 August 1950. 

47. 241D PIRs, no. 30, 102200 August 1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 10 August 1950; 241

WD, G-4 Journal, entry 15, 102357 August 1950. 

1. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 10 August 1950; “191R GOB, no. 6,” 11 August 1950. 

2. 27IR URs, 111800 August 1950; 27IRCT, “Historical Report,” 2d Battalion Summary 

Activities; Murch comments for Appleman, 7 April 1954, OCMH ColEection; 241D WD

Daily Diary, 11 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 63, 110900 August 1950, entr

71, 111115 August 1950, entry 77, 111155 August 1950, entry 80, 111215 August 195

entry 81, 1113OO August 1950, and entry 90, 111530 August 1950. 

3. 24th Recon Co WD, 11 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 50, 110430 Augus

1950, entry 58, 110740 August 1950, entry 61, 110830 August 1950, entry 65, 110940 Augus

1950, entry 67, 111060 August 1950, and entry 68, 111000 August 1950. 

4. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 11 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal; entry 70, 111040 Augus

1950, and entry 85, 111330 August 1950; 211R S-3 Journal, 11 August 1950; 2lIR URs, n

34, lll7QO August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 11 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk En WD, Na

rative Summary. 

5. 24th Recon Co FD, 11 August 1950; 13FA Bn WD, 11 August 1950; 13FA Bn UJ, 

August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 904, 111350 Augwhk950; Btry A, 26AAA (AW

Bn WD, 11 August 1956. 

6. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 11 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 85, 111330 Augus

1950; 34IR URs, no. 29, 111800 August 1950; 34IR WD, 11-12 August 1956; 19IR 00s 

no. 6, 11 Auguat 1950; 19IR UJ, 11 August 1950; 191R WRs, no. 32, 111700 August 195

l/19 Narrative. 

7. 24th &on Co WD, 11 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 91, 111540 August 195

a. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 96, 111755 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 92

111845 August 1950; 13FA Bn WD, 11 August 1950; 13FA Bn UJ, 11 August 1950. 

9. Munroe, Second Division, 9. 
11. 24th Recon Co WD, 11 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operations, ll

13 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 92, 111600 August 13.50; 241D HQ Co WD, 

11-12 August 1950; 241D WD, Ordnance Officer Daily Diary, 11 August 1950; 24th Infantry Division Band War Diary, 11 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 241D Band WD). 

12. 27fR URs, 121800 August 1950; 2?IRCT, “Historical Report,” August 1950, incIuding 2d 

Battalion Summary of Activities. 

13. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 11 August 1950; 241D PORs, no. 36, 112400 August 1950; %‘IRCT, 

“Historical Report,” August 1950, including 3d Battalion Summary of Activities. 

14. 24ID WD, Surgeon Daily Diary, 11 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Daily Diary, 11 August 

1950; 241D WD, Finance Officer Daily Diary, 11 August 1955. 

15. 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 107, 112150 August 1950; 3E(C) Bn WD, Narrative Summary; 

21IR S-3 Journal, 11 August 1950. 

16. Army Map Service, series L751 (Korea, 1:50,000), type A (AMS-l), -1945, sheet 6920 III 

(Yongsan). 

17. 241D WD, Narrative Summary; 241D WD, Signal Officer DaiEy Diary, 13 August 1950

241D PIRa, no. 32, 122030 August 1950. 

18. 24th Recon Co WD, 12 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operatians, ll13 August 1950. 

19. 241D HQ Co WD, 12-13 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 129, 120900 August 

1950; 724th Ordnance Maintenance Company War Diary, 12 August 1950; Btry A, 26AAA 

(AW) Bn WD, 12 August 1950; 241D WD OIs, no. 21, 122400 August 1950. 

20. Z4ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 110, 120140 August 1950, and entry 129, 120900 August 

1950; 241D WD, G-4 Journal, entry 15, 102357 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed 

Account of Operations, 11-13 August 1950. 

21. 24 Med Bn WD, 12 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operations, ll13 August 1950; 24th Reeon Co WD, 12 August 1950. 

22. 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operations, 11-13 August 1950. 

23. 241D HQ Co WD, 13 [12] August 1950. 

24. 241D WD, G-3 Journall, entry 115, 120700 August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 12 August 

1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operations, 11-13 August 1950; 241D Arty 

WD, 12 August 1950; 211R S-3 Journal, 12 August 1950; 9IR URs, no. 5, 121800 August 

1950. 

25. 24th Recon Co WD, 12 August 1950; Appleman, South, 303n; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 13 fl2] 

August 1950. 

26. 241D I-IQ Co WD, 13 [12] August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 12 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 

Journal, entry 143, 121705 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operations, 

11-13 August 1950. Hafeman’s War Diary states that Post 1 was evacuated at 1600, but 

the preponderance of evidence suggests that the event occurred one hour later. The M-39 

armored personnel carrier was an open-topped vehicle based upon the chassis of the World 

War II vintage M-18 tank destroyer. Christopher F. Foss, Armaured Fighting Vehicles of 

the World (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 149. 

27. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 12 August 19.50; 24ID HQ Go WD, 13 [12] August 1950; 24PD 

Band WD, 12 August 1950; 24 MP Co WD, 15 [12] August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, 

entry 145, 121800 August 1950; 24ID WD, Ordnance Officer Daily Diary, 12 August 1950. 
29. 21IR S-3 Journal, 12 August 1950; 241D WD, G-l Daily Diary, 12 August 1950; 241D WD

G-2 Daily Diary, 12 August 1950; 241D WD, Medical Officer Daily Diary, 12 August 1950

2QD WD, G-3 Journal, entry 123, 121030 August 1950, entry 126, 121305 August 1950

entry 132, 121300 August 1950, and entry 151, 121955 August 1950; 211R URs, no. 36

131700 August 1950; 24TD FIRS, no. 32, 122030 August 1950. 

30. 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 121, 121015 August 1950, entry 130, 121355 August 1950

entry 133, 121245 August 1950, and entry 140, 121450 August 1950; 24ID WD, Public 

Information Officer Daily Diary, 12 August 1950; Church to Appleman, 7 July 1953, OCMH 

Collection; Appleman, So&h, 303; 24ID PORs, no. 37, 122400 August 1950. Appleman 

placed Hill’s conference with Church and Walker on 13 August, but 241D documents in

dicate that it occurred en 12 August. 

31. 9IR URs, no. 5, 121800 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 33, 121800 August 1950; 341R URs

na. 30, 12 August 1950; l/19 Narrative; 19IR UJ, 12 August 1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary

12 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 948, 120600 August 1950, entry 951, 12072

August 1950, entry 954, 120835 August 1950, and entry 960; 121045 August 1950; 13FA 

En WD, 12 August 1950; 13FA Bn UJ, 12 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Jaurnal, 12 August 195

32. 21IR S-3 Journal, 12 August 1950; 2lIR WD, 12 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 35, 12170

August 1950; 3E(C) Bn WD, 12 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 108, 12001

August 1950, entry 109, 120100 August 1950, entry 111, 120225 August 1950, entry 11

120300 August 1950, entry 117, 120810 August 1950, entry 125, 121210 August 1950, entry 

134, 121300 August 1950, entry 147, 121700 August 1950, entry 155, 122125 August 195

and entry 156, 122045 August 1950. 

33. 21IR S-3 Journal, 12 August 1950; 21IR WD, Summary, and 12 August 1950; 211R URs

no. 35, 121700 August 1950, and no. 36, 131700 August 1950; 241D WD, Engineer Office

Daily Diary, 12 August 1950; 52FA Bn WD, 12 August 1950. 

34. 211R URs, no. 35, 121700 August 1950. 

35. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 12 August 1950; 27ERCT, “Historical Report,” August 1950; 241

WD, G-3 Journal, entry 153, 121740 August 1950, and entry 158, 122305 August 195

241D PORs, ne. 37, 122400 August 1950; 241D WD .OIs, no. 21, 122400 August 195

“Headquarters, 23d Infantry, Narrative Summary of Command and Unit Historical Repor

Period Covered, 1 August-31 August 1950.“” 

36. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 213, 131605 Augus

1950, and entry 222, 131800 August 1950; 27IRCT, “Historical Report,‘” August 1950, in

cluded 2d and 3d Battalions” Summary of Activities; 271R URs, 131800 August 1950. I

some accounts, the 3d Bn, 27IR is identified as the 3d Bn, 29IR, its designation prior 

6 August. Appleman, South, 253n. 

37. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 174, 130600 August 

1950, entry 184, 13081& August 1950, entry 203, 131334 August 1950, and entry 207, 13145

August 1950; William M. Glasgow, “PIatoon Leader in Korea,‘” MS, Archives, Center o

Military History, Washington, DC, 32-40. 

38. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 27IRCT, “Historical Report,” August 1950, in

&ding 2d and 3d Battalions’ Summary of Activities; 241D WD, G-2 JournaI, entry 1054

132035 August 1950, and entry 1074, 132250 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 JournaI, entry 

190, 131120 August 1950, and entry 223, 131620 August 1950; 241D H& Co WD, 14 [13

August 1950. 

39. 21IR URs, no. 36, 131700 August 1950, and no. 37, 141700 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-

Journal, entry 1066, 132120 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 13 August 1950; 3E(C) B

WD, 13 August 1950. 
41. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 13 Augud 1950; 241D WD, G

3 Journal, entry 206, 131140 August 

1950; 241D PIRs, no. 33, 132030 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 13 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 34, 

131700 August 1950; l/l% Narrative. 

42. 241D WD, 13 August 1950; SIR URs, no. 6, 131800 August 1950; 2ID, “Korean Campaign,” 

38; 19IR UJ, I3 August 1950. 

43. 34IR WD, 13 August 1950; 341R URs, na. 30, 131800 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 

13 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 160, 130115 August 1955, entry 162, 130155 

August 1950, entry 163, 130110 August 1950, entry 164, 120125 August 1950, entry 178, 

130015 August 1950, entry 201, 130845 August 1950, entry 217, 131616 August 1955, and 

entry 226, 131040 August 1950. 

44. 24th Recon Co WD, 13 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, 13 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn, Detailed 

Account of Operations, 11-13 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 14 [13] August 1950. 

45. 1SIR UJ, 13 August 1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, 

entry 183, 130905 August 1950, and entry 197, 131242 August 1950; 9IR 00s ne. 5, 131306 

August 1950, and Overlay to Accompany Operations Order ne. 5; 24ID WD 01s no. 2.2

132400 August 1950. 

46, 241D WD, Signal Officer Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 241D WD, G-l Daily Diary, 13 

August 1950; 241D WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 24113 WD, G-4 Journal, entry 3, 

13 August lS56, and entry 22, 131800 August 1950; 24 Rep1 Co WD, 13 August 1950; 241D 

PORs, no. 38, 132406 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 34, 131700 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 

Order of Battle Journal, entry 29; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1024, 136900 August 1950; 

24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 206, 131140 August 1950. 

1. 9IR QOs, no. 5, 131306 August 1950, and Overlay to Accampany Operations Order no. 5, 

131230 August 1956; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1030, 131150 August 1950, entry 1033, 

131210 August 1950, and entry 1050, 131815 August 1950. 

2. 19IR UJ, 15 August 1950; l/19 Narrative; 341R URs, nc. 32, 141800 August 1956; Beauchamp comments for Appleman, 20 May 1953, OCMH Collection; Appleman, Soutbz, 306; 

SIR URs, na. 7, 141800 August 1950; 9IR OS, no. 5, 131300 August 1950; 24J.D Arty WD, 

14 August 1950; 13FA Bn WD, 14 August 1950; 241D WD, Air Operations Reports, no. 9, 

142100 August 1950. 

3. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, ~14 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 15 [14] August 1950; 19IR 

URs, no. 35, 141700 August 1950; 9IR URs, no. 7, 141806 August 1950; 341R WD, 14 

August 1950; 1SfR UJ, 14 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 268, 140715 August 

lS50, entry 271, 146810 August 1950, and entry 273, 141006 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 

Journal, entry 1098, 141235 August 1950. 

4. 341R WD, 14 August 1950; 341R URs, no. 32, 141800 August 1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 

14 August 1950; 1SIR URs, no. 35, 141700 August 1950; 1SIR UJ, 14 August 1950; Appleman, Soz&, 306. See also Kill comments for Appleman, 2 January 1958, OCMK Collectian. 

5. 1SIR UJ, 14 August 1550; P/19 Narrative; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, 151015 August 1950. 

6. 241D WD, Air Operations Reports, no. 9, 142160 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Janrnal, 

entry 1110, 141620 August 1950, entry 1112, 141645 August 1950, entry 1119, 141750 August 

1950, and entry 1130, 142230 August 1950; l/19 Narrative; QIR URs, na. 7, 141800 August 

1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 14 August 1950; 341R WD, 14 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 

Jaurnal, entry 293, 141900 August 1950. 
8. 21IR WD, 14 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 14 August 1950; 211R URs, no. 37, 141700 

August 1950, and no. 38, 151700 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, 14 August 1950; 241D WD, 

G-2 Journal, entry 1146, 150030 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 242, 140030 

August 1950, entry 248, 140300 August 1950, entry 249, 140315 August 1950, entry 287, 

141320 August 1950, and entry 289, 141545 August 1950; 3E(C) Bn WD, 14 August 1950; 

241D WD, G-l Daily Diary, 11 August 1950. 

9. 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 258, 140530 August 1950, entry 259, 140535 August 1950, 

and entry 261, 140555 August 1950; 341R Message Journal, 14 August 1950; Beauchamp 

comments for Appleman, 20 May 1953, OCMH Collection; 13FA Bn WD, 14 August 1950; 

34ER WD, 14 August 1950; 341R URs, no. 32, 141800 August 1950; 241D WD, Dairy Diary, 

14 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1129, 142130 August 1950; 271RCT ‘“IIistoricaI 

Report,” August 1950, including 2d and 3d Battalions’ Summary of Activities; 24th Recon 

Co WD, 14 August 1950; 24ID PORs, no. 39, 142400 August 1950; 24LD WD OIs, no. 23, 

142400 August 1959. 

10. 341R Message Journal, 14-15 August 1950; ‘“34th Infantry Regiment Telephone Journal,” 

14 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 341R Telephone Journal); 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 

306, 150415 August 1950; Hill comments for Appleman, 2 January 1958, OCMH Collection. 

Il. 19IR UJ, 15 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1144, 150545 August 1950, and 

entry 1152, 150845 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 303, 150145 August 1950, 

entry 307, 150506 August 1950, and entry 369, 150810 August 1950; 341R Message Journal, 

15 August 1950; 21IR 5-3 Journal, 15 August 1950; Munroe, Second Division, 10. The 3.5- 

inch rocket launcher had been hurriedly directed t,o the troops in Korea upon the discovery 

that the 2.36inch rocket launcher already in their hands was inadequate to stop the 

North Korean T-34 tanks. SchnabeI, Policy, 84. 

12. 24ID WD, Air Operations Reports, no. 10, 152100 August 1950; 19IR US, 15 August 1959; 

19IR URs, no. 36, 151700 August 1950; l/19 Narrative; 9IR URs, no. 8, 151800 August 

1950; 341R Message Journal, 15 August 1950; 341R Telephone Journal, 15 August 1950; 

341R WD, 15 August 1950; 341R WRs, no. 33, 151860 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, 

entry 1152, 150845 August 1950, entry 1157, 151000 August 3950, and entry 1161, 151125 

August 1950; 241D WD, G3 Journal, entry 309, 159810 August 1950, and entry 310, 151030 

August 1950. Air strikes numbered only eighteen on 15 August, compared to fifty-two on 

the previous day. For a detailed account of the actions of Company A, 34th Infantry, on 

15 August, see Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington, DC Office of 

the Chief of Military I&tory, 1970), 20-30. 

13. Appleman, So&h, 308; 241D WD, G-4 Journal, entry 8, 150830 August 1950; 24th Quartermaster Company War Diary, 15 August 1950. 

14. 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 315, 151130 August 1950; 91R URs, no. 8, 151805 August 

1950; 34IR Message Journal, 15 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 15 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 

Journal, entry 1161, 151125 August 1950, entry 1171, 151330 August 1950, and entry 1204

160050 August 1950; 241D Arty WD, 14-15 August 1950. 

15, 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 315, 151130 August 1950, entry 322, 151545 August 1950

entry 341, 151200 August 1950, and entry 343, 152245 August 1950; 211R 53 Journal, 15 

August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1185, 151830 August 1950; 3E(C) Bn WD, 15 

August 1950; 211R URs, no. 38, 151709 August 1950, and no. 39, 161700 August 1950

24th Recon Co WD, 15 August 1950. 

16. 241D PIRs, no. 35, 152030 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1162, 151125 August 

1950, entry 1163, 151155 August 1950, entry 1168, 151250 August 1950, and entry 1173

151340 August 1950. 
2. 341R WD, 16 August 1950; 341R URs, 161800. August 1950; 13FA Bn WD, 16 August 1950; 

241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1213, 160650 August 1950, and entry 1223, 161045 August 

1950. 

3. 19IR URs, no. 37, 161700 August 1950; 19IR S-3 Journal, 16 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 

Journal, entry 350, 160730 August 1950, and entry 359, 160825 August 1950. 

4. 9IR URs, no. 9, 161800 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1212, 160500 August 

1950, entry 1218, 160830 August 1950, and entry 1221, 161000 August 1950; 2ID, “Korean 

Campaign,” 39-40; Munroe, Second Diuision, 10. 

5. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 16 August 1950; 211R WD, 16 August 1950; 211R URs, no. 39, 

161700 August 1956, 21IR S-3 Journal, 16 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 

1234, 161322 August 1950, entry 1235, 161402 August 1950, and entry 1241, 161600 August 

1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 358, 161145 August 1950, entry 360, 161300 August 

1950, and entry 366, 161530 August 1950. 

6. 24th Infantry Division War Diary, Operational Directive, no, 1, 161400 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 241D WD OD); 241D PORs, no. 41, 162400 August 1950; 24ID WD 01s no. 

25, 162400 August 1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 16 August 1950; QIR URs, no. 9, 161800 

August 1950. 

7. 241D WD OD, no. 1, 161400 August 1950; “1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Operation 

Plan 13-50,” 161400 August 1950; 19IR OOs, no. 8, 16 August 1950; 341R 008, no. 8, 

161860 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 372, 161550 August 1950. 

8. Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, f955---1953, vol. 

1, The Pusan Perimeter (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. 

Marine Corps, 1954), 49-54, 103-56. 

9. “1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Special Action Report, 2 August-6 September 1950: 

Operations with Eighth U.S. Army Korea”: Basic Report; annex How, SAR, 5th Marines: 

annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn, 5th Marines; annex Easy, Air Section Report; Montross 

and Canzona, &% h&rim Operations, 1:175--T?‘. 

10. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: Basic Report; annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 

1st Bn, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 3d Bn, 5th Marines; 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Periodic Operations Reports, no. 28, 161230 August 1950, no. 29, 170500 August 

1950, no. 30, 170815 August 1950; 241D WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 16 August 1950. 

II. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SARr annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 3d Bn, 5th 

Marines; and 241D WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 382, 

170300 August 1950, entry 384, 170415 August 1950, and entry 405, 171230 August 1950; 

341R WRs, 171800 August 1950; Montross and Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations, 1~176-78. 

12. W. E. Sweeney to N. A. Canzona, 22 May 1954, correspondence file for U.S. Murine 

Operhctions in Korea, vol. 1, Washington National Records Center, National Archives; 1st 

Frov Mar Bde, SARr annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 1st Bn, 5th 

Marines. 

13. Sweeney to Canzona, 22 May 1954, and A. M. Zimnier to N. A. Canzona, 18 February 

1954, correspondence file for U.S. Marine Operations; 1st Frov Mar Bde SAR: annex How, 

SAR, 2d Bn, 5th Marines; Montross and Canzona, U.S. &&r&e Operations, 1:178; Appleman, South, 312. 

14. Montross and Canzona, U.S. IMarine Operations, 1:176--78; R. L. Murray comments for 

N. A. Canzona, 20 March 1954, correspondence file for U.S. i&rim Operations; Appleman, 
15. Montross and Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations, 1:178-79; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex 

How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn, 5th Marines; annex Item, 1st Bn, 11th Marines; annex 

How, SAR, 2d Bn, 5th Marines. 

16. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: Basic Report; annex How, SAR, 2d Bn, 5th Marines; annex 

Easy, Air Section Report; Sweeney to Canzona, 22 May 1954, correspondence file for U.S. 

&far&e Bperatians; Appleman, South, 312. 

17. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 2d Bn, 5th 

Marines; Sweeney to Canzona, 22 May 1954, Zimmer to Canzona, 18 February 1954, R. T. 

Hanifin Jr. to N. A. Canzona, 14 July 1954, all in correspondence file for U.S. Marine 

Operations; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 389, 

170935 August 1950, entry 393, 171030 August 1950, and entry 398, 171115 August 1950; 

341R Message Journal? 17 August 1950. 

18. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 2d En, 5th Marines; Sweeney to Canzona, 22 

May 1954, Zimmer to Canzona, 18 February 1954, and Hanifin to Canzona, 14 July 1954, 

all in correspondence file for U.S. Marine Operafions; let Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex 

How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn; annex Easy, Air Section Report. An extended account of 

the 2d Battalion’s action can be found in Montross and Canzona, U.S. &lurine Operations, 

1:181--$6. See also Andrew Geer, The New Breed: The Story of the U.S. Marines in Korea 

(New York: Harper & Brothers, 19521, 60-68. 

19. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 2d En, 5th Marines; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, 

entry 398, 171115 August 1950; N. A. Canzona to R. L. Murray, 11 March 1954, cormspondence file for U.S. Marine Operations; Montross and Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations, 

1:186--87. Apparently, General Craig was able to reach Colonel Hill before Murray did, 

since the 9th Infantry began its advance before Murray’s 1st Battalion attacked. 

20. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: Basic Report; annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 

1st Bn, 5th Marines; 1st Prov Mar Bde, PORs, no. 31, 172039 August 1950; 24ED WD, G-3 

Journal, entry 410, 171525 August 1950; F. I. Fenton Jr. to N. A. Canzona, 8 May 1954, 

and N. A. Canzona interview with J. R. Stevens and G. C. Fox, 24 February 1954, both 

in correspondence file for U.S. Marine Operations. 

21. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 9IR URs, no. 10, 171800 August 1950; 341R 

Telephone Journal, 17 August 1950; 341R Message Journal, 17 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 17 

August 1950; 24PD WD, G-3 Journal, entry 420, 171950 August 1950. 

22. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: Basic Report; annex How, SAR, Anti-Tk Co, 5th Marines; annex 

How, SAR, Ca A, 1st Tk Bn; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1332, 172010 August 1950. 

23. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 1st Bn, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, AntiTk Co, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn; 1st Prov Mar Bde, Special 

Report, Destruction of Enemy Tanks, 23 August 1950; 1st Prov Mar Bde, PORs, no. 32, 

172359 August 195Q; ZID, “Korean Campaign,” 40; Munroe, Second Division, 10. 

24. 34IR WD, 17 August 1950; 341R URs, 171800 August 1950; 341R Message Journal, 17 

August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 405, 171230 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily 

Diary, 17 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 38, 171700 August 1950. 

25. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1959; 191R URs, no. 38, 171700 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 

17 August 1950; 211R S-3 Journal, 17 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 17 August 

1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 387, 170845 August 1950, and entry 418, 171626 August 

1950; l/19 Narrative. 

26. l/19 Narrative; 19IR UJ, 17 August 1950. 
Journal, 17 August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 17 August 1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 1’7 

August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1274, 170500 August 1950, entry 1286, 170900 

August 1950, entry 1309, 171400 August 195Q, and entry 1329, 171840 August 195Q; 241D 

WD, G-3 Journal, entry 394, 171045 August 1950, entry 397, 171025 August 1950, entry 

406, 171350 August 1950, and entry 431, 172235 August 1950; Glasgow, “Platoon Leader,” 

51-55. 

29. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 2d 

Bn, 5th Marines; 9IR URs, no. 10, 171800 August 1950; l/19 Narrative. 

30. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 241D WD, Signal Officer Daily Diary, 17 August 

1950; 241D WD, G-3 Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex Easy, 

Air Section Report; 241D PIRa, no. 37, 172049 August 1950; 241D WD, 01s no. 26, 172400 

August 1950. 

31. 241D WD, G-2 JournaY, entry 1365, 180415 August 1950, entry 1373, 180910 August 1950, 

entry 1383, 181045 August 1950, and entry 1446, 181517 August 1950; 9IR URs, no. 11, 

1818QO August 1950; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, 

SAR, 1st Bn, 5th Marines; N. A. Canzona interview with J. R. Stevens and G. C. Fox, 24 

February 1954, in correspondence file for U.S. Marine Operations; Montross and Canzona, 

U.S. Marine Operations, 1:196-X@. 

32. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 1st Bn, 5th Marines; armex Easy, Air Section 

Report; Canzona interview with Stevens and Fox, 24 February 1954, in correspondence 

file for U.S. Marine Operations; Montross and Canzona, U.S. Marine Operatiorts, 1:200-

201; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 455, 181040 August 1950. 

33. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 3d En, 5th 

Marines; annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 461, 181300 

August 1950; 19IR UJ, 18 August 1950. 

34. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 18 

August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1398, 181340 August 1950, and entry 1402, 

181315 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 JournaI, entry 462, 181340 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 18 

August 1950; 341R Message Journal, 18 August 1950. 

35. 91R URs, no. 11, 181800 August 1950; 341R WD, 18 August 1950; 341R URs, 181800 August 

1950; 19IR UJ, 18 August 1950; 241D WD 018, no. 26, 172400 August 1950. 

38. 341R WD, 18 August 1950; 341R URs, 181800 August 1950; Beauchamp comments for 

Appleman, 20 May 1953, OCMH Collection; 2lIR S-3 Journal, 18 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 

18 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1371, 180845 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 

Journal, entry 446, 180839 August 1950, entry 450, 180848 August 1950, and entry 453, 

180$20 August 1950; 341R Message Journal, 18 August 1950; 341R Telephone Journal, 18 

August 1950. 

37. 34IR Message Journal, 18 August 1955; 341R Telephone Journal, 18 August 1950; 19IR 

URs, no. 38, 181800 August 1950; l/19 Narrative; 19IR UJ, 18 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 

Journal, entry 449, 181005 August 1950, and entry 456, 181000 August 1950. 

38. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 2d Bn, 5th Marines; annex HOW, SAR, CO A, 

1st Tk Bn; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1411, 181510 August 1950; 341R WD, 18 August 

1950; 341R URs, 1818610 August 1950; 341R Message Journal, 18 August 1950; 19IR URs, 

no. 38, 181800 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 18 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 599, 

18 August 1950. 
Journal, entry 474, 181900 August 1950. 

40. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 18 August 1950; 34JR WD, Summary and 18 August 1950; 341R 

URs, 181800 August 1950; 341R Message JournaI, 18 August 1950; 341R Telephone Journal, 

18 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 469, 181700 August 1950, entry 473, 18184

August 1950, and entry 478, 182100 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1451, 19010

August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 38, 181800 August 1950, and no. 39, 191800 August l950

19IR UJ, 18 August 1950; 241D WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 18 August 1950; 241D WD, G-

Journal, entry 3, 181845 August 1950; 241D WD, Air Operations Reports, no. 13, 18210

August 1950. Approximately 5,185 pounds of cargo were dropped to the 19th Infantry, bu

some of it landed in the 34th Infantry’s sector and was retained by the latter unit without 

authorization. 

41. 241D WD, Daily Diary, 18 August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1416, 181115 August 

1950, entry 1417, 18 August 1950, and entry 1434, 182150 August 1950; 1st Prov Mar Bde

SAR: annex Easy, Air Section Report; 241D Arty WD, 18 August 1950; 13FA Bn WD, 1

August 1950; 13FA Bn UJ, 18 August 1950; 241D WD GIs, no. 27, 18 August 1950; 21IR 

WD, 18 August 1950; 211R URs, no. 41, 181700 August 1950, and no. 42, 191700 August 

1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 18 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 448, 180950 August 

1950, and entry 477, 182030 August 1950; Glasgow, “Platoon Leader,” 56-64. 

42. 24ID Arty WD, 18 August 1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 18 August 1950; 241D PGRs, no

43, 182400 August 1950; 24ID WD GIs, no. 27, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journd, 

entry 467, 181500 August 1950, and entry 513, 181930 August 1950; 341R Message Journal, 

18 August 1950; 2d ID, “Korean Campaign,” 40. Movement of the 9th Infantry and 1s

Battalion, 21st Infantry, had already begun late in the afternoon, 

43. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 3d Bn, 5th 

Marines; annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn; 1st Prov Mar Bde, Periodic Logistic Reports, 

no. 18, 191800 August 1950, and no. 19, 202000 August 1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 1

August 1950; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1483, 191355 August 1950, entry 1485, 19150

August 1950, and entry 1505, 192020 August 1950; 241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 503, 19064

August 1950, entry 504, 190700 August 1950, and entry 505, 190703 August 1950; 241D 

WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 19 August 1950; 341R WD, 19 August 1950; 341R Message Journal, 

19 August 1950. 

44. 341R WD, 19 August 1950; 341R WRs, 191800 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 39, 191890 

August 1950; 19IR UJ, 19 August 1950; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 5th 

Marines; annex How, SAR, 3d Bn, 5th Marines; SIR URs, no. 12, 191800 August 1950

2ID, “Korean Campaign,” 40-41; 241D WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1457, 190820 August 1950

241D WD, G-3 Journal, entry 507, 190925 August 1950, and entry 508, 191016 August 

1950; 241D WD, Daily Diary, 19 August 1950; 241D WD OIs, no. 28, 191800 August 1950

24113 PQRs, no. 44, 192400 August 1950. 

45. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: Basic Report, annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; 241D WD, Daily 

Diary, 20-25 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 511: 191130 August 1950. 

46. 241D WD, Quartermaster Daily Diary, Historical Report, 23 July-27 August 1950; 241D 

WD, Chaplain Daily Diary, 23 August 1950; 241D WD, G-4 Journal, entry 8, 23 August 

1950. The number of American casuahies in the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge i

virtually impossible to determine with certainty because of the delay in discovering the 

fate of those originally listed as missing in action. Division records show the following 

casualty figures for the period 5-19 August 1950: killed in action, 71; wounded in action, 

535; missing in action, 563; nonbattle casualties, 161. Obviously, when the division reoc

cupied its original positions along the Naktong after the battle, the numbers in the killed 

in action and missing in action categories changed markedly but to what degree cannot 

now be determined. “‘24th Infantry Division Periodic Personnel Reports,” nos. 4-6, 5-29 
y y, pyg ,y pp

man, South, 317-H. 

47. General accounts of the Second Battle of the Naktong Bulge can be found in Appleman, 

Soath, 443-70; Montross and Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations, 1:207-37; Fehrenbach, 

This Kind of War, 204-29. For the 24th Division’s role in the breakout, see Appleman, 

South, 554-5s. 

Chapter 8 

1. In the context of this study, the term light infantry is defined as an infantry formation 

operating with virtually no armor support, reduced artillery support, and reduced vehicular 

support. It is not intended to suggest that the 24th Division either was trained in or fought 

in accordance with classic light infantry tactics. 

2. FM 100-5 (August 19491, 140-42. 

3: Ibid., 147-55. 

4. This aspect of counterattack doctrine was reaffirmed in U.S. Army War College, Report of 

Conference of Commandants of Army Service Schools, 29 January--l February 1951, vol. 

1, 48-49. 

5. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 154-55; Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, “Training 

Bulletin no. 1,” 8 September 1950, 16-17; 24ID WD, Summary, 23 July-25 August 1950. 

6. This was the conclusion of Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, “Training Bulletin no. 1,” 

15, and U.S. Army War College, Report of Conference, 1:33-35. 

7. The North Korean 4th Division’s usual tactics had been to Ex the defenders in front while 

outflanking them to left or right. During the campaign south from @an, the defenders’ 

left flank had been the flank most often turned. 

8. Army practice was to skeletonize its infantry units by removing a battalion from each 

regiment, while the Marines chose to remove a company from each battalion. In neither 

case were doctrinal adjustmenta made to address the new situation. No evidence exista to 

indicate that either method was markedly superior to the other. The onIy difference seems 

to have been the echelon that was required to deal with the problem. 

9. See U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC, August 1982), 

10-5 and 11-S, for the modern view of counterattack. The principle of timing receives 

the most attention, Flank attacks are recommended, but the manual emphasizee fire more 

than maneuver in such situations. The principle of centralized command of all counterattack 

elements seems to have been dropped. Lower level manuals show a similar trend. For 

example, see U.S. Department oE the Army, FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion (Washington, 

DC, March 19501, 315-25, and U.S. Department of the Army, PM 7-20, The Infantry 

Battalion (Washington, DC, April 1978), 5-36 ta 5-40. 
Bibfiograph y 

Nate on Sources 

Counterattack on the Naktong is based primarily on official documents 

created by the 24th Infantry Division during or shortly after the First Battle 

of the Naktong Bulge in August 1950. Housed in the Washington National 

Record Center of the National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, 

Maryland, these documents generally consist of war diaries, staff section 

journals, unit journals, unit reports, periodic operation reports, operations 

instructions, telephone logs, and map overlays. In addition to the official 

records of the 24th Infantry Division, a few records of component units of 

the 2d Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division have been used. 

These documents are also at the Suitland repository. All of the U.S. Army 

records are now under the custody and control of the National Archives 

and Records Service. Official records of the 1st Provisional Brigade, U.S. 

Marine Corps, while housed at Suitland remain under the control of the 

Historical Branch, U.S.M.C., which must grant permission for their use. 

Supplementing the official documents as a source for this paper are 

correspondence, notes, and interviews generated as a result of the writing 

of the US. Army and U.S. Marine Corps officia1 histories of this portion of 

the Korean War. Roy Appleman’s files relating to South to the N&t&g, 

North to the Yalu are housed in the National Archives and Records Service 

building in downtown Washington, D.C. Similar files for Lynn Montross 

and Nicholas Canzona’s The Pusan Perimeter are in the Suitland facility 

mentioned above. 

133 
LEAVENWORTH PAPERS 

1. The Evolution ‘of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, by Major Robert 

A. Doughty 

2. Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939, by Dr. Edward J. Drea 

3. “‘Not War BuF Like War:” The American intervention in Lebanon, by Dr. 

Roger J. Spiller 

4. The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During 

the First World War, by Captain Timothy T. Lupfer 

5. Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies, by Dr. Allen F. Chew 

6. Soviet Night Operations, by Major Claude R. Sasso 

7. August Storm: The Soviet ‘1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, by 

Lieutenant Colonel David M. GIantz 

8. August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945, 

by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz 

9. Defending the Driniumoc Covering Force Operations in New Guinea, 1944, 

by Dr. Edward J. Drea 

‘lo. Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American Experience, 79 I 7- T918, 

by Major(P) Charles E. Heller, USAR 

11. Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War Ii, by Dr. Michael J. 

King 

12. Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World 

War Ii, by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel 

13. Counterattack on the Naktong, 7950, by Dr. William Glenn Robertson 

RESEARCH SURVEYS 

I. Amicicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War, by Lieutenant 

Colonel Charles R. Shrader 

2. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th~Century Tactics, Doctrine 

and Organization, by Captain Jonathan M. House 

3. Rapid Deployment Logistics.‘ Lebanon, 7958, by Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. 

Wade 

4. The Soviet Airborne Experience, by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantr 
STUDIES IN PROGRESS 

Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine 

on the Russian Front During World War II 

e 

Tactics and Doctrine in Imperial Russia 

0 

U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1955 

e 

Dragon Rouge: Hostage Rescue in the Congo 

e 

Light infantry in Modern Historical Perspective 

l 

Abu-AgeiEa and Urn Katef: History and Battle Planning 

e 

Counterguerrilla Operations: Nicaragua, 1927-33 

e 

World War il Corps Commander’s Profile 

e 

Evoktion of the Corps 

e 

World War N Eastern Front Atlas 

e 

Peacekeeping Operations 

e 

Mobikation-ReEated Correlates of Success 

in American World War N lnfaniry Divisions 

ii U.S. Government Printing Office: 1991-55h-OOw203Ej 
Dr. William Glenn Robertson is an associate 

professor and research fellow at the Combat 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A graduate of the University of Richmond, he received his 

M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in history from the University of Virginia. Before joining CSI in 1981, he 

taught military history for ten years at colleges 

and universities in three states. He is the author 

of The Bermuda Hundred Campaign (1986) and 

the ButI Run chapter in American First Battles 

(1986). Dr. Robertson currentty directs the Staff 

Ride, a CGSC course that integrates classroom 

study of a campaign with an intensive visit to the 

site. He is also the author of a forthcoming Department of the Army pamphlet on the Staff Ride - Dr. William Glenn Robertson’ rJ methodology. 

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE 

Missions 

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 19 June 1979 as a department-lever activity 

within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSl has the 

foilowing missions: 

1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to doctrinal concerns of the Army and publish 

the resufts in a variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve Components. 

2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist other USACGSC 

departments in integrating military history into their instruction. 

3. Serve as the US. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s executive agent for the development 

and coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military history instruction in the 

TRADOC service school system. 

Task Force Smith 

8 July 

Ch’0natl 

7-8 Jul 

11-12 July 

Map 1. The retreat of the 24th Division, 5 July-5 August 1950 
xx 

m 8 

ROK 

lap 2. The Pusan Perimeter, 5 August 1950 

I