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15-3727-cr

United States v. Faison 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 21st day of November, two thousand sixteen. 

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 

BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 

Circuit Judges. 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA., 

Appellee, 15-3727-cr 

v. 

BURUDI FAISON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE: Charles P. Kelly (Susan Corkery, on the 

brief) Assistant United States Attorneys, for

Robert L. Capers, United States Attorney 

for the Eastern District of New York, 

Brooklyn, NY. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Burudi Faison, pro se, Fort Dix, NJ. 

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 

York (Sandra J. Feuerstein, Judge). 
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UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the District Court be and hereby is 

AFFIRMED. 

Appellant Burudi Faison, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order denying 

his motion for a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

“We review a district court’s decision to deny a motion for sentence reduction under 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Rios, 765 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2014) 

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). When considering a motion for a sentence 

reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a district court must first determine whether the defendant is 

eligible for a reduction. United States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 194 (2d Cir. 2013). If the defendant is 

eligible, the district court may exercise its discretion to reduce the original sentence after considering 

the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, id., and “the post-sentencing behavior of the defendant 

and any public safety concerns a reduction in sentence would raise,” United States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 

166, 170 (2d Cir. 2011); see Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 532 (2011) (“[E]ven where a 

defendant is permitted to seek a reduction, the district judge may conclude that a reduction would be 

inappropriate.”). A defendant’s post-sentencing conduct is an appropriate and sufficient justification 

for the denial of a sentence reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 716 F.3d 50, 52-53 (2d Cir. 

2013) (per curiam); United States v. Figueroa, 714 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 

Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Faison’s motion. Although 

Faison was eligible for a sentence reduction, “[a] retroactive amendment to the Guidelines merely 

authorizes a reduction in sentence; it does not require one.” Wilson, 716 F.3d at 52 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In considering whether a reduction was warranted in this case, the 

District Court considered the appropriate factors, particularly Faison’s criminal history and prison 

disciplinary infractions, and reasonably denied his request for a reduction. 

We reject Faison’s argument that the District Court violated his Fifth Amendment right to 

equal protection by refusing to reduce his sentence. Faison’s theory rests on a “class-of-one” equal 

protection claim, in which “‘the plaintiff alleges that []he has been intentionally treated differently 

from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” 

Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. 

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). Faison has not demonstrated that any potential comparators are 

“prima facie identical” to him, Neilson v. DiAngelis, 409 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2005), and, in any 

event, we have concluded that the District Court had a rational basis for denying Faison’s request—

among other things, his individual criminal history and misconduct while imprisoned. 
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CONCLUSION 

We have considered all of Faison’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the District Court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk