NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

KIMBERLY CONDIFF, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0842 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2014-102802-001 

The Honorable Peter C. Reinstein, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Myles A. Braccio 

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix 

By Louise Stark 

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. CONDIFF 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Judges Andrew W. Gould and Patricia K. Norris joined. 

K E S S L E R, Judge: 

¶1 Appellant Kimberly Condiff (“Condiff”) was tried and 

convicted of false reporting to a law enforcement agency, a class 1 

misdemeanor; possession or use of a dangerous drug, a class 4 felony; and 

possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 6 felony. Condiff challenges the 

trial court’s partial denial of her motion to suppress statements she made to 

police and the search of her fanny pack. For the reasons stated below we 

affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 At approximately 9:00 p.m. on January 16, 2014, police 

officers C and P (collectively, the “Officers”) were on routine patrol in an 

area known for drug activity and violent crime. They wore uniforms and 

drove a marked patrol car. The Officers observed Condiff walking alone, 

pulled up alongside the sidewalk where she was walking, and asked if she 

was willing to speak with them. She said yes. The Officers asked Condiff 

for her identifying information, and she provided a false name and 

birthdate. Officer P ran a warrant check using the information Condiff 

provided, then returned to where Condiff and Officer C were standing and 

asked Condiff to respell her name. Condiff provided a different spelling 

than she had originally provided. According to Officer C, while Officer P 

went back to the patrol car, Officer C asked Condiff if she had any weapons. 

Officer C testified that Officer P then came back a second time and said 

Condiff’s identifying information did not show up in the system, and 

Condiff then attempted to walk away from the Officers. Officer C walked 

alongside Condiff as she attempted to walk away and asked her whether 
STATE v. CONDIFF 

Decision of the Court 

3

she had any weapons or drugs.1 She initially said no, then admitted she 

had a drug pipe that did not belong to her. Officer C then stepped in front 

of Condiff, putting his arm out to stop her, and the Officers arrested Condiff 

for providing a false name. The Officers searched Condiff’s fanny pack 

where they found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. The Officers 

learned Condiff’s real name when they dropped Condiff’s possessions off 

at her aunt’s house after the arrest. 

¶3 The State charged Condiff with Count 1: false reporting to law 

enforcement agency, a class 1 misdemeanor; Count 2: possession or use of 

dangerous drugs, a class 4 felony; and Count 3: possession of drug 

paraphernalia, a class 6 felony. Condiff plead not guilty to all charges and 

moved to suppress evidence discovered as the result of an illegal stop. The 

trial court granted Condiff’s motion in part, excluding any statements 

Condiff made after being detained but before being advised of her rights 

under Miranda.

2 The court also found, however, that the first contact 

between law enforcement and Condiff was consensual; that reasonable 

suspicion and possible probable cause of an Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) section 13-2907.01 (2010) violation existed after the Officers could 

not find Condiff’s identifying information and she began to walk away; 

and that discovery of the drugs and drug paraphernalia was not fruit of the 

poisonous tree because the discovery was inevitable following the arrest for 

the false information charge. 

¶4 A jury found Condiff guilty of all three counts. The trial court 

suspended imposition or execution of sentence and placed Condiff on 

probation for one year for Count 1 and two years for Counts 2 and 3. It

required that probation for all three counts run concurrently. 

¶5 Condiff timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(1) (2010). 

 

1 The Officers provided conflicting testimony as to whether Officer C 

stopped Condiff before asking her about drugs and the number of times 

Officer P ran a warrant check using the information Condiff provided. We 

review the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s 

ruling on a motion to suppress, however, and therefore defer to the trial 

court’s factual findings. State v. Huerta, 223 Ariz. 424, 425, ¶ 2 (App. 2010). 

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996). 
STATE v. CONDIFF 

Decision of the Court 

4

DISCUSSION

¶6 When reviewing a motion to suppress, we evaluate 

discretionary issues for an abuse of discretion but review legal issues de 

novo. Huerta, 223 Ariz. at 426, ¶ 4. We look only at the evidence presented 

to the trial court during the suppression hearing, State v. Brown, 233 Ariz. 

153, 156, ¶ 4 (App. 2013), and view the facts in the light most favorable to 

the trial court’s ruling, State v. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164, 167 (1982); State v. 

Huerta, 223 Ariz. 424, 425, ¶ 2 (App. 2010). 

¶7 “Law enforcement officers have wide latitude to approach 

people and engage them in consensual conversation.” State v. Hummons, 

227 Ariz. 78, 80, ¶ 7 (2011). A consensual encounter between a citizen and 

a police officer “will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it loses 

its consensual nature.” State v. Serna, 235 Ariz. 270, 272, ¶ 8 (2014) (quoting 

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)). Whether this occurred, 

converting the encounter into a seizure, is a mixed question of law and fact. 

Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JT30243, 186 Ariz. 213, 216 (App. 1996). We 

review questions of fact for “clear and manifest error” and questions of law 

de novo. Id.

¶8 A person is seized “if, in view of all of the circumstances 

surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he 

was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 

“[T]he threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by 

an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of 

language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s 

request might be compelled” may indicate a seizure. Id. An encounter that 

ceases to be consensual may be extended only upon reasonable suspicion 

of criminal activity. See State v. Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107, 112, ¶ 17 (App. 2010) 

(Brown, J., specially concurring). 

¶9 Reasonable suspicion is less demanding than probable cause, 

requiring “at least a minimal level of objective justification” for extension 

of the encounter. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing United 

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). Determination of reasonable 

suspicion is based on “commonsense judgments and inferences about 

human behavior,” id. at 125, “considering such objective factors as the 

defendant’s appearance and conduct and the officer’s relevant knowledge, 

experience, and training,” Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 112, ¶ 22. The officer must 

be able to point to more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion 

or ‘hunch’” of criminal activity. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-24 (quoting Terry 

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
STATE v. CONDIFF 

Decision of the Court 

5

¶10 Condiff argues the initial stop was unlawful because there 

were no articulable facts creating reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 

We disagree. Police officers do not need reasonable suspicion to approach 

an individual and ask questions if the encounter is consensual. See Bostick, 

501 U.S. at 434 (“[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer 

approaches an individual and asks a few questions.”); Serna, 235 Ariz. at 

272, ¶ 9 (holding an initial encounter in which two officers called to the 

defendant from their patrol car and the defendant voluntarily answered 

questions consensual). The facts in this case are very similar to those in 

Serna, and we find the Serna holding instructive.3 In both Serna and the case 

at hand, two officers patrolled a Phoenix neighborhood late at night, pulled 

their patrol cars over, and called out to the defendant. See Serna, 235 Ariz. 

at 271-72, ¶¶ 2-3. In both cases, the defendants agreed to speak with the 

officers. See id. at 272, ¶ 9. The Arizona Supreme Court found that the 

initial Serna encounter was consensual and we similarly find that the initial 

encounter in this case was consensual. See id.

¶11 Condiff also argues that after she provided the name, the 

encounter became nonconsensual because she tried to walk away but was 

followed and questioned by Officer C. As the State correctly points out and 

the trial court held in part, by that point the Officers had established 

reasonable suspicion that Condiff had committed a crime because she had 

 

3 Condiff cites State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440 (1985), and State v. Rogers, 186 

Ariz. 508 (1996), to support her argument that her acquiescence was not 

consensual. See Winegar, 147 Ariz. at 447 (“The mere fact that a police officer 

‘asks’ a citizen to accompany him rather than commands obedience does 

not mean that a citizen can reasonably believe he is free to refuse.”). The 

facts in Winegar and Rogers are distinguishable from the facts in this case, 

however, and we accordingly find the holding in Serna to be more 

instructive than those in Winegar and Rogers. In Winegar, the defendant 

“was surrounded by six armed police officers, told to keep her hands away 

from her body, and told to step away from [another suspect], who was then 

frisked” before the police officers told her they wanted to talk to her. Id. 

None of these factors were present in this case. In Rogers, a police officer 

approached the defendant, holding his badge in his hand and saying, 

“police officers, we need to talk to you.” 186 Ariz. at 509. The defendant 

attempted to run from the police officers but the officers chased him. Id. 

Here, the Officers merely asked Condiff if she was willing to speak with 

them, rather than ordering her to do so, and Condiff did not attempt to 

leave until after the Officers had run a second unsuccessful warrant check. 
STATE v. CONDIFF 

Decision of the Court 

6

provided false information and had attempted to walk away from them.4 

Under these facts, Officer C’s pursuit and continued questioning 

constituted a valid Terry stop.5 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23.

¶12 Once the Officers arrested Condiff, the search of her fanny 

pack was valid as a search incident to arrest. See United States v. Robinson, 

414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“[I]n the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full 

search of the person is . . . a ‘reasonable’ search under [the Fourth] 

Amendment.”). 

CONCLUSION 

¶13 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

 

4 Although a “refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the 

minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure,” 

Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, “nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in 

determining reasonable suspicion,” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; see also 

Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10 (stating that although one factor by itself may not 

be proof of illegal conduct, multiple factors taken together can amount to 

reasonable suspicion). 

5 “An investigatory stop is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if 

supported by reasonable suspicion.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 

693 (1996).