HOMELAND 

SECURITY

An Overall Strategy Is 

Needed to Strengthen 

Disease Surveillance

in Livestock and 

Poultry

Report to Congressional Requesters

May 2013

GAO-13-424

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-424, a report to 

congressional requesters

May 2013

HOMELAND SECURITY

An Overall Strategy Is Needed to Strengthen 

Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Why GAO Did This Study

International animal health authorities 

have stated that disease surveillance 

in livestock and poultry has as its main 

purpose the early detection of diseases 

and disease outbreaks. APHIS has 

worked closely with states and industry 

over the past decades to eradicate 

diseases by, for example, providing 

states with funding and guidance. But 

the disease landscape has changed, 

with rapid global movement of humans 

and animals, creating new threats. 

GAO was asked to review federal 

animal disease surveillance efforts. 

This report examines (1) USDA’s new 

approach to disease surveillance in 

light of a changing disease landscape 

and challenges, if any, the agency 

faces with this approach and (2) the 

extent to which this approach is guided 

by a strategy with measurable goals 

and supports broader national 

biosurveillance efforts. GAO reviewed 

relevant presidential directives, laws, 

regulations, guidance, policies, 

documents, and strategic plans related 

to disease surveillance in animals; 

visited swine facilities; and interviewed 

federal, state, and industry 

veterinarians and other officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that as APHIS 

develops goals and measures for its 

new approach, it integrate the agency’s 

vision into an overall strategy guiding 

how this approach supports national 

homeland security efforts to enhance 

the detection of biological threats. In 

their comments, USDA concurred with 

GAO’s recommendation, and the 

Department of Homeland Security 

described its commitment to disease 

surveillance efforts.

What GAO Found

Under a new approach, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has begun broadening its previous 

disease-by-disease approach to disease surveillance to one in which the agency 

monitors the overall health of livestock and poultry and uses additional sources 

and types of data to better detect and control new or reemerging diseases. 

APHIS’s first effort under its new approach is to monitor the health of the nation’s 

swine herds and identify new sources and types of data on diseases in swine, 

among other things. In planning documents, APHIS officials have proposed 

collecting data from farms where swine are raised, markets where they are sold, 

slaughter facilities, and veterinary diagnostic laboratories, among other sites. For 

example, APHIS has been monitoring for the presence of pseudorabies—a viral 

disease of swine that may cause respiratory illness and death—at slaughter 

facilities, but under the new approach, it has proposed monitoring these facilities 

for a range of other diseases as well. Key challenges to carrying out this new 

approach are how best to obtain data from producers, who are concerned that 

health information about their herds and flocks be kept confidential, and how to 

obtain health data in sufficient quantity from some animals like feral swine. 

Resource constraints also present a challenge, according to agency and state 

officials, given the recent decrease in APHIS’s budget of about 14 percent for 

fiscal years 2008 through 2013.

APHIS has a vision for its new approach but has not integrated that vision into an 

overall strategy with associated goals and performance measures that are 

aligned with the nation’s larger biosurveillance efforts. The Government 

Performance and Results Act, as amended, requires federal agencies to develop 

performance plans that include goals and performance measures. GAO has 

previously reported that these requirements can also serve as leading practices 

for planning at lower levels within agencies, such as individual divisions or 

programs. Developing goals and measures helps an organization balance 

competing priorities, particularly if resources are constrained, and helps an 

agency assess progress toward intended results. APHIS has developed a 

number of planning documents related to the agency’s capabilities in disease 

surveillance in livestock and poultry, which acknowledge that the agency plays 

an important role in safeguarding public and environmental health. Goals APHIS 

has identified in these documents, however, focus primarily on processes or 

activities and do not specifically address outcomes the agency seeks to 

accomplish or have associated performance measures. Moreover, none of the 

planning documents indicate how they individually or collectively support national

homeland security efforts called for in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

9, which assigns several federal agencies, including USDA, responsibility for 

establishing a comprehensive and coordinated surveillance system to support 

early detection of biological threats, including infectious diseases. Agency 

officials said they plan to develop goals and measures for the new approach. 

Without integrating its vision into an overall strategy with goals and measures 

aligned with broader national homeland security efforts to detect biological 

threats, APHIS may not be ideally positioned to support national efforts to 

address the next threat to animal and human health.

View GAO-13-424. For more information, 

contact Daniel Garcia-Diaz, (202) 512-3841 or 

garciadiazd@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Letter 1 

Background 6

USDA’s APHIS Is Broadening Its Approach to Disease Surveillance 

in Livestock and Poultry and Faces Challenges in Doing So 10

No Overall Strategy with Goals and Measures Guides APHIS’s New 

Approach to Animal Disease Surveillance 19

Conclusions 24

Recommendation for Executive Action 25

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 25

Appendix I Key Stakeholders in Disease Surveillance in Livestock and 

Poultry 27

Appendix II Status of Reportable Swine Diseases in the United States, 

2011 33

Appendix III Creation of a Novel Human Influenza Virus in 2011 36

Appendix IV List of Selected APHIS Plans Related to Disease Surveillance 

in Livestock and Poultry 38

Appendix V Printable Interactive Graphics 39

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Agriculture 41

Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 43

Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 44

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Tables

Table 1: Key Stakeholders in Disease Surveillance in Livestock and 

Poultry 27

Table 2: Status of Reportable Swine Diseases in the United States, 

2011 33

Figures

Figure 1: How USDA Collects Information for Disease Surveillance

from Livestock and Poultry Producers 8

Figure 2: Examples of Sources of Data on Swine Health 11

Figure 3: Expansion of Nationwide Feral Swine Population, 1982, 

2004, and 2012 16

Figure 4: Creation of a Novel Human Influenza Virus in 2011 37

Abbreviations

APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

OIE World Organisation for Animal Health

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

May 21, 2013

The Honorable Susan W. Brooks

Chairman

Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 

Communications 

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis

House of Representatives

The agricultural sector is a critical component of the nation’s 

infrastructure. Threats to the sector may not only sicken animals used for 

food but also seriously harm the economy and human health. A 2001 

outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the United Kingdom, for example, 

resulted in the slaughter of more than 4 million animals to contain the 

disease, losses of over $5 billion to the food and agriculture sectors, and 

comparable losses to the tourism industry.1

 

1

We have reported that foot-and-mouth disease is a highly contagious viral disease of 

cloven-hoofed animals, such as cattle, swine, and sheep. Infected animals develop a fever 

and blisters on their tongues, lips, and between their hooves. Many animals recover from 

a foot-and-mouth disease infection, but the disease leaves them debilitated and causes 

losses in meat and milk production. Foot-and-mouth disease does not have human health 

implications. It can be spread by animals, people, or materials that bring the virus into 

physical contact with susceptible animals. The disease is also considered a potential 

agent for agroterrorism. A foot-and-mouth disease outbreak has not occurred in the United 

States since 1929, although the disease is considered widespread in parts of Africa, Asia, 

Europe, and South America. See GAO, Homeland Security: 

In addition, physical 

boundaries have narrowed between expanding human populations, 

wildlife, and commercial agriculture, and technological advances have 

facilitated the rapid movement of humans, animals, and food products 

around the world. As these boundaries have narrowed and these 

technological advances have taken place, the landscape for animal and 

human disease and its associated surveillance—that is, the process of 

collecting, analyzing, and exchanging information related to cases of 

infectious diseases—has also changed. In fact, the National Academies 

report that nearly two-thirds of infectious diseases affecting humans result 

from pathogens transmitted between animals and people, causing 

Actions Needed to Improve 

Response to Potential Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters Affecting Food and 

Agriculture, GAO-11-652 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 19, 2011).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

diseases known as zoonoses. Under this changing disease landscape, 

not only can the emergence of a single, highly contagious animal disease 

bring sales of livestock and poultry to a standstill, but a pathogen that is 

transmissible to humans who lack immunity can also have wide impact on 

public health. The 2009 novel H1N1 influenza virus with origins in swine 

is one example of a recent mutation of an influenza virus that affected 

both human health and the pork industry, a vital part of U.S. agriculture. 

Not only did the virus cause a worldwide influenza epidemic, or 

pandemic,2

To establish a national policy to defend against, among other threats, 

potentially catastrophic effects of disease outbreaks in animals, the 

President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 in 2004. This 

directive assigns to several federal agencies—including the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Health and 

Human Services—responsibility for establishing a comprehensive and 

coordinated surveillance system to support early detection of infectious 

diseases, among other things. Also under presidential directive 9, the 

Department of Homeland Security shall coordinate with appropriate 

federal agencies to create a new biological threat awareness capacity to 

enhance detection and characterization of an attack.

but it also led to substantial losses in pork sales when 

consumers mistakenly believed they could become infected by eating 

pork.

3 USDA exercises its 

authority under the Animal Health Protection Act to detect, control, and 

eradicate diseases in livestock and poultry through its Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection Service (APHIS).4

 

2

GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Lessons from the H1N1 Pandemic Should Be Incorporated 

into Future Planning, 

In addition, the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC), within the Department of Health and 

Human Services, has entered into a collaborative agreement to work with 

GAO-11-632 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2011).

3

The Department of Homeland Security has defined biosurveillance as “the science and 

practice of managing human, animal, plant, food, and environmental health-related data 

and information for early warning of threats and hazards, early detection of events, and 

rapid characterization of the event so that effective actions can be taken to mitigate 

adverse health, social, and economic effects.” See Department of Health and Human 

Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Biosurveillance Strategy 

for Human Health, version 2.0 (Atlanta, Ga.: February 2010). Disease surveillance in 

livestock and poultry is a component of biosurveillance.

4

Pub. L. No. 107–171, tit. X, subtit. E, §§ 10401-10418, 116 Stat. 494 (2002) (codified as 

amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8317). 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

USDA on disease surveillance for influenza, a zoonosis that infects 

humans and some livestock and poultry.

Threats from biological agents, including zoonotic pathogens, highlight 

the need for an effective agricultural defense system, including disease 

surveillance in livestock and poultry. Animal disease surveillance consists 

of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting animal health data to detect 

diseases early, enable rapid reporting and response during disease 

outbreaks, and control the spread of disease.5 As we reported in 2011, 

however, federal efforts in this regard are still in development: no 

centralized coordination effort is in place to oversee the federal agencies’ 

overall implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9.6

We also reported that the agency within the Department of Homeland 

Security designated to integrate national surveillance efforts does not 

receive from its federal partner agencies the kind of expertise it has 

identified as most critical for supporting its early-detection mission—

particularly, data generated at the earliest stages of an event or 

outbreak.7

In this context, you asked us to review the federal government’s efforts to 

conduct surveillance activities for animal diseases in livestock and 

wildlife. This report examines (1) USDA’s new approach to disease 

surveillance in livestock and poultry in light of a changing disease 

landscape and challenges, if any, the agency faces with this approach 

and (2) the extent to which this approach is guided by a strategy with 

measurable goals and supports broader national biosurveillance efforts.

To address both these objectives, we reviewed presidential directives 

regarding biosurveillance, biodefense, and homeland security, 

 

5

GAO, Biosurveillance: Developing a Collaboration Strategy Is Essential to Fostering 

Interagency Data and Resource Sharing, GAO-10-171 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2009).

6

GAO-11-652. 

7

GAO-10-171. 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

specifically, Homeland Security Presidential Directives 7, 9, 10, and 21.8

To collect information on specific disease surveillance practices, we 

selected four states for review: Colorado, Iowa, North Carolina, and 

Texas. We selected these states to ensure that our review 

(1) represented geographic variation in pork-producing regions; 

(2) included states with large swine populations, as well as states with 

comparatively smaller populations; and (3) represented a number of 

potential data sources for disease surveillance in livestock and poultry, 

such as livestock markets and veterinary diagnostic laboratories. 

Moreover, because feral swine present a potential source of infection to 

commercial food animal herds, we chose only states where feral swine 

We also reviewed USDA’s authorizing legislation, relevant regulations, 

guidance, policy documents, and strategic and other plans for disease 

surveillance in livestock and poultry, including the Animal Health 

Protection Act and the federal traceability rule for livestock moving 

between states. We interviewed officials from USDA and from the 

Departments of Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security who 

collectively have responsibilities for disease surveillance in livestock and 

poultry, surveillance for influenza and other zoonotic diseases, research, 

coordination of biosurveillance activities, and management of information 

technology used to track data on livestock and poultry diseases. We also 

reviewed USDA’s disease surveillance planning documents, leading 

practices in strategic planning that we identified in prior work, and key 

strategic planning documents regarding national biosurveillance from the 

Departments of Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security. To 

review the issue in depth, we focused on disease surveillance in swine. 

We selected swine because they represent a significant portion of the 

nation’s livestock and poultry industry and are susceptible to many 

diseases of national concern, including some that can sicken humans. In 

addition, USDA has initiated a comprehensive species surveillance 

program for swine, its first for livestock and poultry.

 

8

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 establishes a national policy for federal 

agencies known as sector-specific agencies, which are responsible for particular industry 

sectors, such as transportation, energy, and communications, to identify and prioritize 

U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attack; 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 identifies actions to bolster the nation’s 

biodefense capabilities; and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 establishes a 

national strategy for public health and medical preparedness that is aimed at transforming 

the nation’s approach to protecting the health of the American people against all disasters.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

are present.9

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to May 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Together, these four states represent 46 percent of the 

nation’s commercial swine population. Because we did not select a 

generalizable sample of states, the results from these four states cannot 

be generalized to all states, but they can provide examples of disease 

surveillance practices in the four states. Within our four selected states, 

we obtained and reviewed state guidance on disease surveillance in 

livestock and poultry; forms the states use to obtain livestock and poultry 

health information for disease surveillance purposes; and strategic plans, 

where available. We also interviewed federal and state animal, public 

health, and veterinary laboratory authorities and pork producers or their 

representatives within our selected states; we also visited a hobby farm, a 

feral swine holding facility, and two livestock markets in most of these 

states. In addition, we interviewed representatives of the American 

Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians, the American 

Association of Swine Veterinarians, the National Pork Board, and the 

National Pork Producers Council. We reviewed funding from fiscal year 

2007 through fiscal year 2013 for USDA programs supporting disease 

surveillance in livestock and poultry, including funding to modernize 

information technology systems. We also reviewed annual reports for 

fiscal years 2010 through 2011 summarizing program data collected 

through USDA’s Influenza in Swine Surveillance Program. These data 

include the number of biological submissions tested and the biological 

data analyzed. To assess the reliability of the financial data we analyzed, 

we reviewed USDA’s agency financial reports for fiscal years 2009 to 

2012 and relevant evaluations of USDA financial information by the 

USDA Office of Inspector General. We also interviewed budget officials to 

further confirm the data’s accuracy. We identified no material problems 

with the accuracy of financial data reported by USDA. To assess the 

reliability of the influenza program data, we interviewed USDA officials 

familiar with how the data were collected, entered into the database, and 

checked for accuracy. We determined that the financial and program data 

were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

 

9

The term feral refers both to domesticated animals that have escaped from domestication 

and become wild and to naturally wild animals descended from the same species as 

domesticated animals. While the Department of the Interior plays a critical role carrying 

out disease surveillance of wild animals, we did not include Interior’s activities because 

they were beyond the scope of our review.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

According to international animal health authorities, disease surveillance 

in livestock and poultry has as its main purpose the early detection of 

diseases and disease outbreaks. It also plays an important role during 

outbreaks, such as monitoring how fast a disease is spreading through 

animal populations and in what direction. Disease surveillance is also 

critical in determining how effective efforts have been in controlling and 

eradicating disease from a particular area or animal population and in 

recognizing when that disease no longer poses an immediate threat to 

animal or human health. Further, surveillance supports international 

trade, allowing officials to certify that animals are healthy and safe to 

move across borders. Disease surveillance in livestock and poultry is 

particularly important because billions of cattle, swine, poultry, and other 

animals used for food are annually moved from place to place over long 

distances throughout the food supply chain—from wherever producers 

are located and then to feedlots and local, regional, and even overseas 

markets and slaughterhouses. Thus, to prevent the spread of contagious 

diseases and protect the welfare of healthy herds, animal health 

authorities often restrict the movement of animals. Such restrictions can 

lead, paradoxically, to the destruction of large numbers of uninfected 

animals and substantial economic losses.

Federal, state, tribal, and industry entities share responsibility for carrying 

out disease surveillance in livestock and poultry (see app. I).10

 

10Throughout this report, we use the term industry to denote commercial producers of 

livestock and poultry. 

Under the 

national animal health reporting system, APHIS typically works with states 

to monitor, control, and eradicate certain animal diseases. According to 

APHIS documents and state veterinary officials, such activities include, 

for example, issuing guidance on how to identify and report particular 

diseases of national concern, developing vaccination programs, and 

providing additional staff to work alongside state investigators tracking 

outbreaks of infectious diseases. To manage these reportable diseases, 

Background 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

APHIS has worked closely with the states and industry over the past 

decades to eradicate them by, for example, providing states funding and 

guidance. According to APHIS documents, the agency has made 

significant gains in eradicating reportable diseases such as tuberculosis 

and brucellosis, which have historically plagued American livestock. State 

animal health officials work closely with industry and with state-operated 

veterinary diagnostic laboratories to monitor and protect the health of 

livestock and poultry within state boundaries, including regulating the 

entry of livestock and poultry into their states. Veterinarians accredited 

under APHIS’s National Veterinary Accreditation Program are directed to 

report to APHIS the suspected presence of selected domestic and foreign 

animal diseases that can cause significant economic, trade, or public 

health consequences (see app. II for a list of such diseases in swine).11

Industry is an important source of health data on livestock and poultry, 

privately maintaining that information and reporting it to state and federal 

officials when a reportable disease is suspected. Veterinarians working 

for livestock and poultry producers collect tissue and blood samples from 

animals and send them to a veterinary laboratory for diagnosis; these 

veterinarians are the first line of defense in disease surveillance, whether 

for detecting diseases or monitoring a disease during an outbreak. The 

laboratory returns test results confidentially to the veterinarian or person 

submitting the sample, unless the test results indicate the presence of a 

federal or state reportable disease, in which case those test results are 

reported to appropriate federal or state authorities. When a veterinarian 

suspects the presence of a foreign animal disease in a herd, the 

veterinarian contacts state and federal animal health authorities to take a 

sample and send it to APHIS’s National Veterinary Services Laboratories 

to confirm the diagnosis (see fig. 1). If state and federal animal health 

officials approve, a National Animal Health Laboratory Network laboratory 

may conduct initial screening for certain foreign animal diseases. But a 

Some states also require veterinarians to directly report to state animal 

health authorities the incidence of diseases that are not reportable 

nationally.

 

11Under the National Veterinary Accreditation Program, APHIS approves veterinarians to 

perform certain official functions on its behalf. Veterinarians may perform duties only in the 

state within which they were accredited and maintain accreditation only as long as they 

comply with standards established in federal regulations, including reporting the 

suspected presence of certain animal diseases to APHIS. 9 C.F.R. pt. 161.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

sample is also sent to APHIS’s National Veterinary Services Laboratories 

to confirm the diagnosis.

Figure 1: How USDA Collects Information for Disease Surveillance from Livestock and Poultry Producers

Note: Besides federally reportable diseases, states may monitor other diseases of interest that are 

reportable at the state level.

a

Some state laboratories may be members of USDA’s National Animal Health Laboratory Network 

and, as such, conduct routine diagnostic tests for domestic diseases and targeted surveillance tests 

for foreign animal diseases.

b

The state animal health authority and APHIS assign a foreign animal disease diagnostician to collect 

and send a sample to the National Veterinary Services Laboratories.

c

According to APHIS officials, a second sample may be sent to a National Animal Health Laboratory 

Network laboratory for preliminary diagnosis at the same time as a sample is sent to the National 

Veterinary Services Laboratories, which must confirm all diagnoses of these diseases.
 

Page 9 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Contagious diseases with the potential to harm the economy and human 

health may spread among livestock and poultry, and in some cases be 

transmitted to humans, through various methods. For example, classical 

swine fever12 may be transmitted from an infected swine to another 

directly through nose-to-nose and sexual contact or indirectly through a 

person or object, such as a farmhand’s clothing. Swine may also contract 

the disease through exposure to or consumption of contaminated pork 

products, which typically occurs when swine are fed uncooked garbage or 

meat products from a source outside the United States. The classical 

swine fever virus is known to survive in pork meat for up to 180 days. 

Although this disease affects only swine, other diseases in swine have 

the capacity to affect humans. For example, swine can become infected 

not only with swine influenza viruses but with human and avian viruses as 

well. According to recent influenza research, evidence exists that 

influenza viruses can be transmitted through the air between swine and 

humans and that either host can be contagious before showing symptoms 

of illness. When a swine is infected with more than one influenza virus at 

the same time, the viruses can exchange genetic material, thereby 

creating a new influenza virus, which may vary in its virulence and 

transmissibility between and within species (see app. III).

 

12Classical swine fever is a highly contagious viral disease of swine not currently known to 

exist in the United States, which can cause major economic damage as a result of 

excessive animal illness, death, and trade restrictions. 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

To better adapt to the changing landscape of human and animal diseases 

(including the rapid global movement of humans, animals, and food 

products), APHIS has begun to shift its disease-specific surveillance 

approach to (1) monitor the overall health of livestock and poultry and 

(2) improve its ability to analyze health information about livestock and 

poultry. APHIS faces several challenges in carrying out this new 

approach, including obtaining new data from current and additional 

sources and determining how best to deploy declining resources, given 

increasing fiscal constraints.

As funding for disease eradication programs changes, and the global 

landscape of animal and human diseases produces new threats, APHIS 

has since fiscal year 2012 begun broadening its previous disease-bydisease approach to one in which the agency monitors the overall health 

of certain livestock and poultry species. APHIS’s intention is to examine 

the nation’s livestock herds and poultry flocks in detail, using diverse 

sources of data, to better detect, monitor, and control diseases that may 

be new or reemerging, including domestic diseases of economic 

importance. Before its new approach, APHIS directed its programs for 

disease surveillance in livestock and poultry toward preventing the 

introduction of certain foreign animal diseases and to monitoring, 

detecting, and eradicating other reportable diseases already present in 

domestic herds. Information about nonreportable diseases, including 

diseases that were new or reemerging, was not always captured by the 

agency’s disease surveillance efforts.

According to APHIS documentation, beginning in fiscal year 2010, the 

agency proposed its first effort to broaden disease surveillance in 

livestock and poultry: monitoring the health of the nation’s hog, or swine, 

herds. This program—called Comprehensive and Integrated Swine 

Surveillance—identifies new sources and types of data on diseases in 

swine, among other things. Since fiscal year 2012, the agency has been 

receiving funding on a species, or commodity, basis, rather than on a 

disease-specific basis; thus, the agency’s swine health activities, 

including surveillance, were provided dedicated funding for the first time 

that year at $23 million. To begin addressing multiple and evolving 

information needs about swine health under the program, the agency 

plans to draw new data from sites where swine typically converge in large 

numbers or where information on swine health can be easily collected. In 

planning documents, APHIS officials said that they plan to collect data 

from farms where swine are raised, markets where they are sold, 

USDA’s APHIS Is 

Broadening Its 

Approach to Disease 

Surveillance in 

Livestock and Poultry 

and Faces Challenges 

in Doing So

APHIS’s New Approach 

Monitors Overall Health of 

Livestock and Poultry and 

Seeks to Improve 

Collection and Analysis of 

Information 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

slaughter facilities, and veterinary diagnostic laboratories, among other 

sites (see fig. 2). They also plan to collect data from feral swine, which 

may harbor diseases transmissible to domestic herds. Many of these 

sites are already monitored to some extent, but APHIS officials said they 

intend to expand how the sites are used in the future under the program. 

For example, APHIS has been monitoring for the presence of 

pseudorabies at slaughter facilities, but it has proposed monitoring these 

facilities for a range of other diseases as well, including classical swine 

fever.13

Figure 2: Examples of Sources of Data on Swine Health

According to agency officials, APHIS is also considering potential 

new information sources, such as data that states collect on diseases of 

regional concern, some of which fall outside the category of reportable 

diseases. APHIS has begun to take some of its planned actions under 

this program, but many of the planned actions require further coordination 

and concurrence from industry and states before they can be 

implemented.

In addition to making better use of existing data sources and identifying 

new ones, APHIS and the Department of Homeland Security launched a 

9-month pilot program designed to use volunteer veterinarians to assist in 

detecting diseases early, including new and emerging diseases. 

Scheduled to conclude in May 2013, according to Homeland Security 

officials, this pilot program involves a number of participating private 

veterinarians, working in a small area of West Texas and New Mexico, 

who are using electronic tablets to record and submit to APHIS data on 

syndromes they observe in livestock herds, that is, data on the collective 

 

13Pseudorabies is a viral disease of swine that may cause respiratory illness and death. 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

signs and symptoms of sickness that animals exhibit. According to a 

statement of work for this program, such information has not been 

systematically collected and reported before, and this pilot offers the 

opportunity to gauge the usefulness of such information.

Under this new approach, APHIS also plans to improve its ability to 

analyze information—collected from numerous sources for different 

purposes and in different formats—on the overall health of livestock and 

poultry, by standardizing how the information is reported and improving 

how the data are linked electronically. Because data standards vary 

greatly among APHIS’s numerous information systems, and within 

individual systems, APHIS has limited ability to analyze and aggregate 

information to generate a complete national picture of livestock and 

poultry health. To address these limitations, APHIS in 2009 developed a 

multiyear information technology plan to restructure and modernize how 

the agency collects and manages information for detecting and 

monitoring diseases in livestock and poultry, including new and emerging 

disease threats. The technology plan’s ultimate goal is to develop a 

centralized information repository containing health information about 

livestock and poultry from the most relevant internal and external 

databases and employing standardized data entry protocols.

The initial phase of this effort to improve efficiency and data analysis is 

already under way. APHIS in January 2013 replaced its outdated Generic 

Disease Database, which contained information on outbreaks of domestic 

diseases, with a new database management system, called Surveillance 

Collaboration Services, which establishes standardized data fields and 

codes. APHIS also plans to electronically link this new database system 

with, among others, its existing Emergency Management Response 

System, which contains information derived from investigations of 

suspected foreign animal diseases, and Laboratory Messaging Services, 

which receives and records diagnostic test results for selected diseases 

of national concern. Estimated at $5.4 million, the first phase of APHIS’s 

technology modernization effort—the deployment of the Surveillance 

Collaboration Services system—is scheduled to be completed 1 year 

ahead of its original 2014 target date, APHIS officials said.

APHIS faces key challenges in carrying out this new approach to disease 

surveillance in livestock and poultry, in particular, gathering data from 

current and additional sources, such as from industry and from state 

animal health authorities, and determining how best to deploy declining 

resources.

APHIS Faces Challenges 

Implementing Its New 

Approach 
 

Page 13 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Obtaining new data on livestock and poultry health from current and 

additional sources is likely to be a challenge for various reasons, 

including (1) industry concerns over the confidentiality of animal health 

data and (2) the sufficiency of collected data.

Data Confidentiality

APHIS’s ability to gather new data will likely be hindered by industry 

concerns that some health information on livestock and poultry should be 

kept confidential and not shared. For example, industry representatives 

and state animal health authorities we spoke with said they would not be 

willing to share information about the health of their herds beyond what is 

required by federal regulation because the information, including 

information on the incidence of influenza in swine, might be made public 

and affect sales. These officials cited as an example a 2009 H1N1 

influenza outbreak in humans, which was genetically linked to an 

influenza virus found in swine and led to millions of dollars in lost sales to 

the pork industry because people mistakenly believed they could become 

ill from eating pork. Moreover, state animal health officials from one state 

reported that their state laws prohibit them from releasing information they 

collect on the health of their state’s livestock and poultry unless the 

information is required to be reported by federal law to control an 

immediate threat to overall animal or public health.

Moreover, APHIS may have difficulty obtaining complete data identifying 

individual livestock and poultry and their locations. Generally, the states, 

not the federal government, maintain animal identification and location 

data, in part because of industry data confidentiality concerns, according

to APHIS documents. APHIS officials told us that most states will share 

this information during animal disease outbreaks, but some do not 

routinely share the information for surveillance purposes. This reluctance 

to routinely share could affect the agency’s ability to generate a national 

picture of diseased and at-risk animals and their locations—information 

essential to effectively monitor and control livestock and poultry diseases, 

including new and emerging diseases. In July 2007, we reported that, for 

a number of reasons, APHIS faced serious challenges implementing a 

comprehensive national animal identification system.14

 

14GAO, National Animal Identification System: USDA Needs to Resolve Several Key 

Implementation Issues to Achieve Rapid and Effective Disease Traceback, 

In January 2013, 

GAO-07-592 

(Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007).

Data
 

Page 14 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

APHIS published a rule establishing national standards for identifying 

animals and documenting their movement that, with some exceptions, 

made it mandatory for livestock and poultry under federal regulation that 

are moved across state lines to have official identification and 

documentation. The new rule addresses some limitations of the old 

system, giving states some discretion in administering the program, 

including managing information required and maintained on animals 

entering their borders.

The flexibility given to states with regard to how they maintain animal 

identification information under the new rule also poses challenges for 

APHIS to obtain information effectively and in a standardized manner. For 

example, states may use APHIS’s approved types of animal identification, 

including animal identification numbers, and approved official 

documentation, such as the interstate certificate of veterinary inspection, 

but they can also use alternative systems. An APHIS document on animal 

disease traceability says that although states can use a number of animal 

identification systems, they must follow certain standards, but states need 

not abide by APHIS’s suggested standards for documentation. In 

addition, states may track data in APHIS’s animal identification and 

movement information systems or may maintain their own databases 

instead, and these databases may not be compatible with APHIS’s 

systems. According to APHIS officials, standards are being developed to 

ensure future compatibility.

Data Sufficiency

APHIS will likely face the challenge of gathering sufficient data to monitor 

diseases, because agency officials and pork producers differ in their 

views on how much collected information is enough to successfully 

identify potential disease threats. For example, APHIS officials reported 

that commercial producers voluntarily and anonymously shared nearly 

9,400 swine samples with APHIS’s National Swine Influenza Virus 

Surveillance Program in 2012, a 72 percent increase over the 

5,460 samples submitted in 2011. But agency officials and pork 

producers disagree somewhat about whether collected data are sufficient 

to allow the program to successfully identify potential disease threats. 

About 66 million swine are raised on 68,300 U.S. farms. Agency animal 

and human health researchers have questioned whether enough swine 

samples and information are being submitted to APHIS’s influenza 

surveillance program. Influenza researchers also explained to us that 

because the data are submitted anonymously and cannot be linked with a 

particular farm or herd, they cannot be sure that the samples commercial 
 

Page 15 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

producers provide to APHIS are representative of the viruses currently 

circulating domestically. Several pork producers, in contrast, told us they 

believe that the data APHIS has collected have been sufficient.

APHIS also faces the challenge of obtaining sufficient data to monitor 

serious diseases that could spread to domestic herds and people from 

the nation’s sizable and widespread feral swine population. Federal and 

state animal health officials and pork producers told us that feral swine 

pose a significant risk because they carry diseases that have been 

eradicated in domestic herds, such as brucellosis and pseudorabies, 

which, if reintroduced, could hinder hog movement and trade. According 

to APHIS documents, feral swine are also susceptible to contracting and 

transmitting foreign animal diseases because they are highly mobile, at 

times crossing the border with Mexico and eating out of landfills, where 

they might encounter contaminated garbage. The introduction of a foreign 

animal disease like classical swine fever could close export markets. 

Feral swine are also carriers of zoonotic diseases, such as brucellosis 

and influenza, which can infect humans and other species. Feral swine 

are most likely to affect small backyard farms with little security, but they 

may also attempt to infiltrate larger, more secure operations.

Unlike domestic herds, feral swine are not easily accessible to 

veterinarians and wildlife biologists responsible for managing populations 

and monitoring diseases, and, according to federal and state officials, 

even when feral swine are located, they can be very difficult to capture. In 

addition, the population is growing rapidly. According to APHIS data, feral 

swine were present in 36 states as of 2010, their population distribution 

and range having increased from 28 states in 2004 and 17 states in 1982 

(see fig. 3). Officials from APHIS’s Wildlife Services told us that they have 

been sampling approximately 3,000 feral swine per year and testing for 

various diseases, including influenza, pseudorabies, brucellosis, and 

classical swine fever. Nevertheless, given an estimated nationwide 

population of 5 million feral swine, officials said that they would need to 

test significantly more animals per year to accurately portray the extent of 

diseases in this population.
Page 16 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Interactive Graphic Figure 3: Expansion of Nationwide Feral Swine Population, 1982, 2004, and 2012

Instructions: Move mouse over individual years in the legend below to reveal the related swine distribution. For a printable 

version of this figure, see appendix V.

Note: According to APHIS officials, although most of the feral swine population within specific areas in

the earlier years remained there in later years, control efforts had removed some feral swine from a 

few small areas by 2012.
 

Page 17 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Declining resources—funding constraints and a shortage of 

veterinarians—also pose a challenge to broadening disease surveillance 

and improving analysis of livestock and poultry health data, according to 

APHIS officials.

Funding Constraints

Federal and state animal health officials told us that decreased funding to 

USDA is a challenge to APHIS’s disease surveillance efforts in livestock 

and poultry. According to agency documentation, the budget for APHIS 

recently decreased by about 14 percent for fiscal years 2008 through 

2013. As a result, APHIS has seen funding for key components of its 

disease surveillance efforts decline as well, according to agency officials. 

For example, funding for federal-state cooperative agreements for 

monitoring animal health has decreased by 44 percent, from $46 million 

in 2009 to $25 million in 2012.15 We previously reported that state officials 

in agriculture and wildlife departments said that they depend largely or 

completely on federal funds to support biosurveillance efforts and that 

their capabilities to carry out disease surveillance and other 

biosurveillance activities would be limited without funding from federal 

grants and cooperative agreements.16 Funding for APHIS’s National 

Wildlife Disease Surveillance and Emergency Response System, 

responsible for disease surveillance in feral swine, has been reduced by 

71 percent, or $16 million, from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2012. 

Additionally, funding for other disease surveillance programs has declined 

or remains uncertain. For example, the Department of Health and Human 

Services provided a one-time $25.75 million in funding to APHIS in 2009 

to extend the agency’s prevention and surveillance capabilities for 

influenza virus in swine.17

 

15The decrease was due in part to the removal in 2011 of targeted funding from APHIS’s 

appropriation and the reduction in 2012 of funding for certain diseases, which affected 

funding for some cooperative agreements.

Because of a recent increase in the number of 

16GAO, Biosurveillance: Nonfederal Capabilities Should Be Considered in Creating a 

National Biosurveillance Strategy, GAO-12-55 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2011).

17In 2009, the Department of Health and Human Services transferred $27.75 million in 

supplemental funding to USDA to fund the agency’s capabilities to prepare for and 

respond to pandemic influenza after the 2009 novel H1N1 influenza A outbreak. Of that 

funding, APHIS received $25.75 million for prevention and surveillance activities, and the 

Agricultural Research Service received $2 million to develop improved prevention and 

detection tools.

Resources 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

submitted samples from swine, however, APHIS officials project that 

funding will run out by fiscal year 2015 or earlier. As a result, APHIS 

officials said, the agency might not be able to continue to offer 

stakeholders viral diagnostic testing or genetic sequencing services using 

this funding. USDA officials told us they are uncertain whether future 

funding will exist for these activities.

In addition, state officials participating in USDA’s National Animal Health 

Laboratory Network have reported that insufficient and declining funding 

is reducing their ability to effectively and rapidly identify, report, and 

respond to an outbreak of a serious disease, such as foot-and-mouth 

disease. For example, officials from member laboratories have reported 

difficulties maintaining essential diagnostic personnel and expertise. The 

network receives funding from APHIS for operational support, including 

testing, equipment maintenance, training assays, and travel. APHIS and 

USDA’s National Institute of Food and Agriculture also provide support for 

infrastructure, including personnel and maintaining and developing 

information technology. According to APHIS officials, funding from APHIS 

to pay for testing for certain diseases has decreased even though overall 

funding has increased somewhat since 2007. In addition, funding for 

laboratory infrastructure provided by the National Institute for Food and 

Agriculture has declined by 40 percent. Laboratory officials told us that 

this drop forced some laboratories to cut their staffing levels, reducing the 

number of highly trained personnel who can perform the biological tests 

needed to rapidly identify, report, and respond to diseases. Member 

laboratory officials also told us that working with an outdated National 

Animal Health Laboratory Network information system limited the 

efficiency with which data generated from laboratory testing can be 

transmitted to APHIS.

Shortages of Veterinarians

According to federal and state officials, a decrease in the number of 

APHIS field veterinarians has also reduced the agency’s ability to carry 

out critical disease surveillance activities effectively. At the time of our 

review, officials in each of the four states we visited reported a reduced 

number of field veterinarians as a primary challenge to effective collection 

of health data from livestock and poultry. Some officials explained that, in 

particular, too few veterinarians affected veterinarians’ ability to stay in 

frequent contact with farms, such as small farms having little biosecurity 

and a high risk of their animals’ contracting serious diseases. For 

example, officials in one state reported a vacant position for the state’s 

primary APHIS field veterinarian. Another state official reported that even 
 

Page 19 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

as livestock and poultry imports have increased—with the number of 

swine entering the state increasing on average by about 1 million per year 

from 2002 to 2011—the number of field veterinarians responsible for 

coordinating disease surveillance across 99 counties decreased from 

11 in 2001 to 7 in 2012. Such declines are symptomatic of a more general 

decline in the number of veterinarians, particularly livestock and poultry 

veterinarians. In 2009, for example, we reported that four of the five key 

agencies that employ veterinarians—USDA’s APHIS, Food Safety and 

Inspection Service, and Agricultural Research Service and the Army—

identified existing or potential shortages in the federal veterinary 

workforce, which agencies have begun to address, including by 

participating in the Office of Personnel Management’s veterinary medical 

officer advisory council to address the shortage.18

APHIS has a vision for its new approach but has not integrated that vision 

into an overall strategy with associated goals and performance measures 

aligned with the nation’s larger biosurveillance efforts. None of APHIS’s 

planning documents clearly define (1) the goals the agency wants to 

achieve in the long term with its new disease surveillance approach, 

(2) how the agency intends to measure results, or (3) how APHIS’s 

disease surveillance efforts support national biosurveillance efforts.

APHIS has a number of planning documents that describe a new 

strategic vision and mission for the primary division responsible for the 

agency’s new disease surveillance approach. Nevertheless, the agency 

has not integrated that vision into an overall strategy with associated 

goals and measures supporting the nation’s larger biosurveillance efforts.

The Government Performance and Results Act, as amended, requires 

federal agencies to develop performance plans that include measurable 

goals.19

 

18GAO, Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are Needed to Ensure Sufficient Capacity for 

Protecting Public and Animal Health, 

We have previously reported that these requirements can also 

serve as leading practices for planning at lower levels within agencies, 

GAO-09-178 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4, 2009).

19Government Performance and Results Act, Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993), 107 Stat. 285, 

amended by GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 142 Stat. 3866.

No Overall Strategy 

with Goals and 

Measures Guides 

APHIS’s New 

Approach to Animal 

Disease Surveillance

No Overall Disease 

Surveillance Strategy with 

Goals and Measures Ties 

APHIS’s Various Plans 

Together
 

Page 20 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

such as individual divisions, programs, or initiatives.20

A number of APHIS planning documents (see app. IV for a list of selected 

planning documents) describe a new strategic vision and mission for 

APHIS’s Veterinary Services organization—the primary division 

responsible for implementing the new disease surveillance approach. 

Veterinary Services’ planning documents acknowledge that in preventing 

and detecting diseases in livestock and poultry and protecting animal 

health, the agency plays an important role in safeguarding public and 

environmental health as well. The goals APHIS has identified in these 

planning documents focus primarily on processes or activities but do not 

specifically address outcomes the agency seeks to accomplish or have 

associated performance measures. For example, the principal planning 

document explaining the agency’s future vision and mission includes the 

following goals: transforming the culture of the organization, investing in 

technical infrastructure, and supporting readiness and response.

 Developing goals 

and performance measures helps an organization balance competing 

priorities, particularly if resources are constrained, and helps an agency 

assess progress toward intended results. Long-term strategic goals unify 

an agency’s many efforts in a coordinated framework for achieving 

results. Goals should correspond to the purposes set forth in the agency’s 

mission statement, they should cover the major functions and operations 

of an agency, and they should be measurable. Developing goals and 

performance measures helps an organization address important 

dimensions of program performance, balances competing priorities—

especially if resources are declining or constrained—and shows progress 

or contributions to intended results. Performance measures, which 

typically have numerical targets, are important management tools that 

help an agency identify the activities that work well and those that do not. 

Without such performance measures, agencies cannot determine 

whether the activities and programs they are carrying out are 

accomplishing the goals they intend to achieve.

21

 

20GAO, Homeland Security: Agriculture Inspection Program Has Made Some 

Improvements, but Management Challenges Persist, 

These 

goals describe what actions the agency intends to undertake but not what 

GAO-12-885 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 27, 2012).

21USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services: A New 

Perspective (Washington, D.C.: 2011).
 

Page 21 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

outcomes these actions are intended to achieve or how the agency will 

measure intended results.

Agency officials said that in the past, when APHIS focused its activities 

primarily on selected reportable diseases, measuring success was 

relatively straightforward: a primary performance measure of program 

success was the extent to which specific diseases had been eradicated 

and prevented from entering the United States or—in the case of 

eradicated diseases—prevented from reemerging. For example, APHIS’s 

animal disease programs have largely eradicated brucellosis in cattle and 

brucellosis and pseudorabies in domestic commercial U.S. swine; in 

addition, reentry of foot-and-mouth disease has been prevented: the 

nation has been free of foot-and-mouth disease since 1929. Officials we 

interviewed expressed concern, however, that traditional outcome 

measures like these may no longer be valid when applied to newly 

emerging diseases. For example, new influenza viruses, which may affect 

human health, are already circulating in domestic livestock and mutate so 

effectively that eradication is not considered possible.

The principal planning document for Veterinary Services establishes a 

goal to enhance the health of the nation’s animals by “anticipating and 

responding to new or emerging threats” but also states that the agency 

must still develop an effective mechanism for evaluating such threats and 

determining an appropriate response.22 Other, more-detailed Veterinary 

Services planning documents primarily communicate the key steps and 

obstacles to implementing a new approach to disease surveillance.23

 

22USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services Strategic Plan 

FY 2006 to FY 2011 (Washington, D.C.: undated).

They define issues—such as the need to develop better relationships with 

stakeholders—and identify potential ways of addressing these issues, but 

they do not tie the issues to an outcome-based goal or offer performance 

measures for gauging progress. In sum, none of these planning 

documents provide APHIS with a clear road map or overall strategy, with 

associated performance measures, for managing its new approach to 

animal disease surveillance.

23USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services 2015 Project: 

Surveillance for Action Strategic Direction (Washington, D.C.: 2011) and Centers for

Epidemiology and Animal Health, National Surveillance Unit, “Implementation of 

Comprehensive and Integrated Swine Surveillance,” (Fort Collins, Co., Jan. 22, 2010). 
 

Page 22 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Without performance measures, APHIS cannot construct the necessary 

relevant indicators of performance that ultimately reveal if the activities or 

initiatives the agency is pursuing—such as the collection of influenza data 

from swine—are the right ones and being carried out effectively. Given 

that influenza researchers are unsure to what extent the data collected 

from swine are sufficient or representative of the viruses circulating 

domestically, measurable goals could better enable the agency to 

demonstrate progress or success with the data they have already 

collected or intend to collect. But without specific measures of the 

outcomes APHIS intends to accomplish in following the behavior of novel 

diseases, the agency cannot, among other things, assess the utility of the 

data it is collecting or determine if it needs data sources other than those 

it has already identified. Neither can APHIS weigh its activities against 

one another to give higher priority to funding activities with the greatest 

potential to benefit animal and human health. APHIS, state animal health 

authorities, and publicly funded veterinary diagnostic laboratories all face 

increasing constraints on resources, which has, according to agency 

officials, impeded efforts to modernize information technology systems; 

monitor herd health; and efficiently and effectively test samples for animal 

diseases.

APHIS officials said that they recognize a need for adequate goals and 

reliable performance measures focused on outcomes. Indeed, officials 

said they have plans to develop goals and performance measures for 

their new approach but that under increasing fiscal pressure—APHIS’s 

budget decreased about 14 percent from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal 

year 2013—they have focused first on streamlining operations, improving 

efficiencies, and carrying out already-funded pilot disease surveillance 

programs. For example, APHIS has proposed restructuring how business 

units within Veterinary Services are organized across the services’ field 

offices and headquarters and to modernize information technology 

systems. According to veterinary officials, their proposed actions achieve 

cost efficiencies over time, as well as support a broader approach to 

monitoring the health of livestock and poultry. In addition, the deputy 

administrator of Veterinary Services said, several new disease 

surveillance initiatives—including the pilot program to collect animal 

health data remotely in the field on mobile electronic devices and another 

to collect and test samples submitted voluntarily by producers and 

samples taken from swine at slaughter—can help determine both the 

quality of, and ease of access to, new sources of disease surveillance 

data. Once these initiatives and pilots have been implemented and 

evaluated, he said, he believes APHIS will be better situated to develop 

the goals and performance measures needed to determine the success of 
 

Page 23 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

their new and broader approach to animal disease surveillance. APHIS 

officials did not provide a time frame for developing goals and measures.

These efforts would certainly help inform APHIS’s development of 

meaningful goals and performance measures, but resource constraints—

and the risk that the introduction of a new or reemerging disease may 

substantially harm animal and human health—suggest it would be 

prudent for APHIS to move forward quickly to develop performance 

measures focused on outcomes to guide their disease surveillance 

efforts. As the results of APHIS’s surveillance initiatives become clearer, 

the agency can adjust its approach accordingly.

None of APHIS’s various plans indicate how they individually or 

collectively support national homeland security efforts called for in 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, or additional biosurveillance 

efforts that together make up a national policy to defend the nation’s food 

and agricultural systems against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and 

other emergencies. The goals cited in these APHIS planning documents 

do not mention homeland security or tie an APHIS goal to a national 

biosurveillance effort. On the one hand, APHIS, in collaboration with the 

Department of Homeland Security’s National Center for Foreign Animal 

and Zoonotic Disease Defense, has developed an Emergency Response 

Support System (or “information dashboard”). This system aims to bring 

together multiple potential sources of disease information on livestock 

and poultry—from federal and state governments, producers, and current 

research—into a single coordinated and integrated system to complement 

the Department of Homeland Security’s broader effort to support a 

national biosurveillance system. The Emergency Response Support 

System was developed by the Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease 

Center at Texas A&M University and funded with help from the 

department.24

 

24According to Department of Homeland Security budget documents, the department has 

invested $2.2 million in developing a national web-based software platform to support 

what it calls a biosurveillance common operating picture. APHIS’s Emergency Response 

Support System is to be one component of that larger system. 

According to Disease Center officials, this information 

dashboard is intended to provide APHIS and its stakeholders the ability to 

quickly call up and display relevant sources of animal disease information 

and to nationally map producers’ farms, disease outbreaks, and animal 

movement, among other patterns, onto a computer monitor. On the other 

APHIS’s Plans Do Not 

Define Their Relationship 

with the Nation’s 

Biosurveillance Efforts
 

Page 24 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

hand, however, none of the planning documents we reviewed indicates 

how this information dashboard is to align with or support broader 

national-level biosurveillance efforts.

Similarly, the planning documents make no mention of coordinating with 

other homeland security efforts to enhance disease surveillance in 

livestock and poultry. For example, the Department of Homeland Security 

has provided funding to develop tools for disease surveillance, such as an 

assay that tests swine saliva for foreign animal diseases, which can test 

samples from more than one animal at a time and may be faster and

easier than collecting tissue or other biological samples. Officials involved 

in developing such diagnostic tools, however, told us that responsibilities 

shared between APHIS and the department have sometimes complicated 

development and use of such tools. As we have previously reported, 

federal agencies can use their strategic and annual performance plans as 

tools to drive collaboration with other agencies and partners and establish 

complementary goals and strategies for achieving results.25 Thus, an 

absence of shared measurable goals between APHIS and the 

Department of Homeland Security may be compromising both agencies’ 

understanding of how their monitoring of animal health—coupled with 

disease surveillance, control, and eradication efforts—complement 

broader national biosurveillance goals. APHIS officials agreed that it is 

important for the agency’s planning documents to show how the agency’s

efforts support national homeland security efforts to enhance the 

detection of biological threats.

APHIS has long carried out important work to protect the nation’s 

livestock and poultry against economically devastating infectious 

diseases and against the potential deadly effects of such diseases on 

people. Foot-and-mouth disease has not infected cattle or swine in the 

United States since 1929, and pseudorabies and brucellosis have been 

virtually eradicated in commercial swine and cattle. The near elimination 

of tuberculosis is considered one of the greatest animal and public health 

achievements in the United States. Moreover, given the changing disease 

landscape, APHIS has begun to craft a more comprehensive approach to

monitoring animal health—one no longer restricted to eradicating only 

 

25GAO, Agencies Need Better Collaboration to Reduce the Risk of Animal Related 

Diseases, GAO-11-9 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2010).

Conclusions 
 

Page 25 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

certain diseases. We commend the agency for its efforts (1) to develop a 

vision for its new approach and planning documents for undertaking it and 

(2) to collect better data from new and different sources and better 

synthesize and analyze information to identify potentially harmful new 

pathogens earlier. Nevertheless, APHIS has not to date developed goals 

or performance measures for its new approach; agency officials said they 

have plans to do so, but they did not provide a time frame. Even with its 

efforts to date, however, without integrating the vision in its planning 

documents into an overall strategy with associated goals and measures 

that are aligned with broader national homeland security efforts to detect 

biological threats, APHIS may not be ideally positioned to support 

national efforts to address the next threat to animal and human health.

As APHIS develops goals and measures for its new approach to disease 

surveillance in livestock and poultry, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Agriculture direct the APHIS Administrator to integrate the agency’s vision 

into an overall strategy, with associated goals and measures, that guides 

how APHIS’s new approach will support national homeland security 

efforts to enhance the detection of biological threats.

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the 

Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland 

Security. USDA and the Department of Homeland Security provided 

written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes VI and VII, 

respectively; these agencies also provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate. The Department of Health and Human 

Services had no comments.

In its written comments, USDA concurred with our recommendation that 

APHIS integrate the agency’s vision into an overall strategy that guides 

how APHIS’s new approach will support national homeland security 

efforts. USDA stated that APHIS will include better performance metrics 

in its planning efforts and develop more explicit linkages between its 

swine surveillance activities and other national homeland security efforts.

In its letter, the Department of Homeland Security thanked us for the 

opportunity to review the draft report and noted that the department 

supports developments at APHIS to advance disease surveillance in 

animal and plant populations. The Department of Homeland Security also 

stated that it remains committed to working with its many partners, 

including those in the federal government, to better mitigate and defend 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 26 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

against dynamic threats and maximize the ability to respond to and 

recover from attacks and disasters of all kinds.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Agriculture, 

Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security; appropriate 

congressional committees; and other interested parties. In addition, the 

report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or garciadiazd@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 

listed in appendix VIII.

Daniel Garcia-Diaz

Director

Natural Resources and Environment
Appendix I: Key Stakeholders in Disease 

Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Page 27 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Table 1 lists the primary federal, state, and private-sector organizations or 

groups that have a key role or stake in the surveillance of diseases in 

livestock and poultry. The list includes animal health organizations, 

human health organizations concerned with zoonotic diseases that might 

be transmitted between livestock and poultry and humans, and those 

organizations interested in monitoring diseases in livestock and poultry as 

part of broader national biosurveillance efforts.

Table 1: Key Stakeholders in Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Lead organization Agency Subagency Role 

Surveillance-related 

responsibilities

Federal

Animal health

U.S. Department of 

Agriculture (USDA)

Agricultural 

Research Service

Research to 

improve 

agricultural 

production

Veterinarians and scientists in 

the Agricultural Research Service 

do research to support diagnostic 

testing, vaccines, disease 

management systems, and farm 

biosecurity measures, among 

other tools, to help national 

efforts to detect, control, and 

eradicate animal diseases of 

national priority.

Animal and Plant 

Health Inspection 

Service (APHIS)

Lead agency for 

animal health 

surveillance

APHIS is responsible for 

implementing and conducting 

national measures to detect, 

control, or eradicate any livestock 

and poultry disease (such as 

drawing blood and diagnostic 

testing), including in animals at 

slaughterhouses, stockyards, or 

other points of concentration. 

The agency develops new and 

improves existing national 

strategies and technologies for 

dealing with intentional and 

unintentional introduction of 

animal diseases.

Veterinary 

Services 

National 

veterinary 

authority

Veterinary Services is the office 

within APHIS that manages the 

nation’s livestock disease 

surveillance, control, and 

eradication efforts. The office 

oversees the agency’s 

surveillance planning, 

management, diagnosis, and 

analytical efforts to identify and 

respond to animal disease 

incidents.

Appendix I: Key Stakeholders in Disease 

Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry
Appendix I: Key Stakeholders in Disease 

Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Page 28 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Lead organization Agency Subagency Role 

Surveillance-related 

responsibilities

Center for 

Veterinary 

Biologics

Regulation of 

biological 

products for 

diagnosis, 

prevention, or 

treatment of 

animal diseases

The Center for Veterinary 

Biologics monitors and inspects 

biological products, including 

vaccines and diagnostic tests, to 

ensure that they are free of 

disease-producing agents, 

especially foreign animal 

diseases. It also tests the 

effectiveness of, and issues 

licenses and permits for the 

commercial use of, these 

products. 

National Animal 

Health 

Laboratory 

Network

National 

coordination of 

state-level 

veterinary 

diagnostic 

laboratories

The National Animal Health 

Laboratory Network connects 

and supports state-level member 

veterinary diagnostic laboratories 

with funding, infrastructure, 

training, common testing 

methods, and software platforms, 

among other things, to provide a 

national capacity to quickly and 

efficiently respond to and report 

animal disease outbreaks.

National 

Veterinary 

Services 

Laboratories

National 

veterinary 

diagnostic 

support and 

reference 

laboratories

The National Veterinary Services 

Laboratories diagnose domestic 

and foreign animal diseases of 

national concern. They are the 

only laboratories in the nation 

with the capacity to confirm the 

presence of a foreign animal 

disease. The laboratories support 

USDA’s disease control and 

eradication programs and 

provide training and assistance 

to veterinary diagnostics 

laboratories nationwide. As the 

nation’s reference laboratories, 

they form the center of expertise 

and guidance on diagnostic 

techniques.

Wildlife Services Wildlife damage 

management and 

research 

authority

Wildlife Services, through its 

operational program and the 

National Wildlife Research 

Center, employs veterinarians, 

biologists, and epidemiologists to 

research and mitigate damage 

caused by wildlife to public health 

and safety, agriculture, and 

natural resources, including 

diseases in wildlife. 
Appendix I: Key Stakeholders in Disease 

Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Page 29 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Lead organization Agency Subagency Role 

Surveillance-related 

responsibilities

Food Safety and 

Inspection Service

Regulation of 

commercial 

animal products

Food Safety and Inspection 

Services inspectors conduct 

surveillance of livestock and 

meat and poultry products in 

slaughter facilities around the 

country, looking for symptoms or 

abnormalities that could indicate 

presence of a disease.

National Institute of 

Food and 

Agriculture 

Support of 

agricultural 

research, 

education, and 

extension 

programs

The National Institute of Food 

and Agriculture supports and 

funds agricultural research, 

education, and extension 

programs. One of the programs it 

supports is the National Animal 

Health Laboratory Network, 

through programmatic leadership 

and funding for personnel, 

training, and infrastructure.

Human health

Department of 

Health and Human 

Services (HHS)

Centers for Disease 

Control and 

Prevention (CDC)

Lead agency for 

human health 

surveillance

CDC develops strategies for 

conducting surveillance of 

diseases in humans, including 

coordinating with USDA and 

other agencies to monitor 

zoonotic diseases.

National Center 

for 

Immunization 

and Respiratory 

Diseases, 

Influenza 

Division

National human 

influenza 

surveillance 

center

The Influenza Division of the 

National Center for Immunization 

and Respiratory Diseases 

conducts surveillance of 

influenza in humans, including 

human infections of influenza of 

animal origin. Researchers use 

surveillance information to 

monitor influenza trends and 

improve rapid reporting and 

identification of novel influenzas 

of animal origin to which humans 

might not have immunity. 

Researchers also use 

surveillance to guide the 

development of diagnostic tests 

and vaccines. 
Appendix I: Key Stakeholders in Disease 

Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Page 30 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Lead organization Agency Subagency Role 

Surveillance-related 

responsibilities

National Institutes 

of Health

National medical 

research agency

The National Institutes of Health 

is made up of 27 research 

institutes and centers, including 

the National Library of Medicine, 

which houses over 200 

databases, including GenBank, a 

genetic sequence database that 

provides the scientific community 

access to the most updated and 

comprehensive DNA sequence 

data related to diseases of 

concern. 

Biosurveillance coordination

Department of 

Homeland Security

Office of Health 

Affairs 

Lead agency for 

national 

biosurveillance 

coordination

The Office of Health Affairs 

provides medical, public health, 

and scientific expertise in support 

of the Department of Homeland 

Security’s mission to prepare for, 

respond to, and recover from all 

threats. It serves as the principal 

advisor to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security and the 

Administrator of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency 

on medical and public health 

issues.

National 

Biosurveillance 

Integration 

Center

Coordination of 

information to 

support national 

biosurveillance 

capability

The National Biosurveillance 

Integration Center collects and 

analyzes reports from federal 

partners, including USDA and 

CDC, of incidents and outbreaks 

of diseases of national concern. 

The center then develops and 

provides synthesized reports and 

updates to the White House, 

federal partners, and state and 

local stakeholders on potential 

biosecurity threats, through 

analyzing aggregated information 

for animal disease, human 

disease, and environmental 

quality surveillance.

Food, 

Agriculture, and

Veterinary 

Defense

Division

Coordination of 

national activities 

to protect 

agriculture and 

animal health

The division provides expertise 

and consultation to the 

Department of Homeland 

Security to help secure the 

nation’s food, agriculture, and 

veterinary public health systems 

against potential threats.
Appendix I: Key Stakeholders in Disease 

Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Page 31 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Lead organization Agency Subagency Role 

Surveillance-related 

responsibilities

Science and 

Technology 

Directorate

Research and 

development of 

products and 

technology 

solutions to 

support 

homeland 

security activities

The Science and Technology 

Directorate provides science and 

technology research support to 

the Department of Homeland 

Security; strengthens the ability 

of communities to respond to 

disasters; and identifies and 

develops appropriate 

technologies to counter chemical, 

biological, and other threats to 

national security.

Zoonotic and 

Animal Disease 

Defense Center of 

Excellence

Consortium of 

universities 

advancing animal 

health research

Established in 2010, the Zoonotic 

and Animal Disease Defense 

Center of Excellence is 

composed of the Foreign Animal 

and Zoonotic Disease Center at 

Texas A&M University and the 

Center of Excellence for 

Emerging and Zoonotic Disease 

at Kansas State University. 

These institutions share 

responsibilities to conduct 

research on foreign animal, 

emerging, and zoonotic 

diseases; develop 

countermeasures to these 

diseases; and develop models 

and information analysis tools. 

The Department of Homeland 

Security provides funding and 

oversight.

State 

State or universitybased member 

veterinary diagnostic 

laboratories

National Animal 

Health Laboratory 

Network member 

laboratories

Animal disease 

diagnostic 

services

Network member laboratories 

provide expertise to identify 

animal disease incidents by 

performing routine diagnostic 

testing and monitoring diseases 

of concern. The laboratories 

conduct diagnostic testing in 

response to requests by 

individual veterinarians and 

producers and also to support 

federal targeted surveillance 

programs for selected domestic 

and foreign animal diseases to 

prevent and help control the 

spread of these diseases.
Appendix I: Key Stakeholders in Disease 

Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Page 32 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Lead organization Agency Subagency Role 

Surveillance-related 

responsibilities

State departments of 

agriculture

State veterinarians Principal state 

animal health 

official

State veterinarians provide 

services to support and regulate 

the health of livestock and poultry 

within their state boundaries. 

State veterinarians coordinate 

surveillance, detection, and 

reporting of diseases within their 

states. They maintain a list of 

reportable diseases that threaten 

the health of livestock, require

accredited veterinarians to report 

disease occurrences, and then 

report these occurrences to 

USDA. These officials work with 

federal veterinarians in the 

prevention, detection, and 

eradication of selected domestic 

and foreign diseases associated 

with national animal disease 

programs.

State departments of 

health

State public health 

veterinarian

Animal health 

liaison to state 

public health 

official

State public health veterinarians 

monitor, investigate, and control 

zoonotic diseases in humans to 

protect public health.

Private sector

Livestock and poultry 

industry

Livestock and 

poultry owners and 

producers

Producers 

monitor the 

health of their 

flocks and herds, 

treat for illnesses, 

and vaccinate as 

necessary

Livestock and poultry owners and 

producers regularly observe the 

health of their herds and flocks to 

diminish disease introduction, 

including monitoring for specific 

clinical signs. They work with 

private veterinarians to collect 

biological samples to test for 

diseases routinely or as needed 

when animals become ill. The 

data collected are normally 

proprietary and used to enhance 

and protect production, unless 

they pertain to a disease that is 

regulated and must be reported 

to USDA.

Source: GAO analysis of USDA and state documents and information.
Appendix II: Status of Reportable Swine 

Diseases in the United States, 2011

Page 33 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Table 2 shows the status in the United States of swine diseases that are 

to be reported to the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal and 

Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) when they are confirmed to be 

present in swine.1

Table 2: Status of Reportable Swine Diseases in the United States, 2011

Disease Description

Affects 

humans? Status 

African swine fever A viral disease endemic in Africa. The virus is highly contagious, 

spreading by direct and indirect contact, and persists for long 

periods both in pork products and in the environment. Forms of this 

virus vary in virulence from highly pathogenic forms that cause near 

100 percent mortality to low-virulence forms that can be difficult to 

diagnose. No vaccine or treatment is available.

No Freea

Anthrax A bacterial disease found most commonly in wild and domestic 

herbivores, such as cattle, sheep, and goats. It can also infect 

humans exposed to infected animals, animal products, or spores of 

the anthrax bacterium. Rapid onset of respiratory and other 

symptoms are typical in cattle and sheep, which often die shortly 

after symptoms appear. Infected humans may experience sores on 

the skin’s surface, intestinal discomfort, and influenza-like 

symptoms, which may cause death. Vaccines are available.

Yes Present 

Aujeszky’s disease 

(pseudorabies)

A viral disease found in swine that kills piglets and produces a 

lifelong infection in older pigs. It does not affect humans. Swine 

may transmit the disease to other species, such as cattle, sheep, 

cats, and dogs. In other animals, the disease causes intense itching 

and death. Vaccines are available.

No Present 

Brucellosis A bacterial disease found most commonly in swine, cattle, and 

bison. The disease is transmitted by direct contact with infected 

animals or with bodily fluids of infected animals. The primary 

symptoms of the disease are abortion in pregnant animals and 

lower fertility rates. Infected humans suffer severe intermittent 

fever. Vaccines are available.

Yes Present 

Classical swine fever A highly contagious viral disease of both commercial and feral 

swine, also known as hog cholera. Although not now found in the 

United States, the disease is found in Mexico. Pigs are infected 

through nose-to-nose and sexual contact or indirectly through a 

person or object, such as a farmhand’s clothing. The disease 

results in fever, loss of appetite, diarrhea, and hemorrhages of the 

skin and may cause death. In breeding herds, the disease produces 

abortions. Vaccines are available but do not allow animal health 

officials to distinguish between infected and vaccinated animals. 

No Free 

 

1

These diseases are also reportable to the World Organisation for Animal Health, formerly 

known as the Office International des Epizooties (OIE). The organization adopted its 

present name in May 2003 and has kept its historical abbreviation OIE. 

Appendix II: Status of Reportable Swine 

Diseases in the United States, 2011
Appendix II: Status of Reportable Swine 

Diseases in the United States, 2011

Page 34 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Disease Description

Affects 

humans? Status 

Echinococosis, or 

hydatidosis

An emerging parasitic zoonosis originating in eastern European and 

Asian countries caused by a tapeworm found in dogs, sheep, cattle, 

goats, and pigs. It produces harmful, slowly enlarging cysts in the 

liver, lungs, and other organs; can be undetected for many years; 

and may be fatal. No vaccines are available.

Yes Presence 

suspected but 

not confirmed

Foot-and-mouth disease A highly contagious disease that affects cloven-hoofed animals, 

including swine, cattle, sheep, and deer. It does not affect humans. 

Although infected animals usually survive, they are afflicted with 

fever and blisterlike lesions on the tongue, lips, and feet that cause 

severe debilitation. Nations where this disease is present face strict 

livestock export restrictions. Vaccines are available, although no 

one universal vaccine is effective against all forms, and it is difficult 

for animal health officials to distinguish between infected and 

vaccinated animals.

No Free 

Japanese encephalitis A serious viral disease found primarily in Asia and transmitted by 

mosquitoes to both animals and humans. Illness ranges from mild 

symptoms of fever and lethargy to severe brain infection. The 

disease can cause reproductive problems in pigs. Pigs and birds

can have large numbers of viruses in their blood and serve as a 

major reservoir of the virus. One in four persons infected with 

Japanese encephalitis dies; others suffer permanent brain damage. 

A vaccine is available.

Yes Free 

Leptospirosis A zoonotic disease caused by infection with a spirochete bacterium; 

about 200 variations of spirochete bacteria have been identified. 

Clinical signs vary but include abortions, stillbirth, weak piglets, and 

infertility. Accurate diagnosis is difficult. Vaccines are available but 

may not provide solid immunity. In humans, the disease can be 

lethal. No vaccines are available.

Yes Present 

New World screwworm A parasitic infection of screwworms, which are blowfly larvae 

(maggots) that feed on living flesh, usually on superficial wounds or 

mucous membranes. The parasites infest all mammals, rarely birds. 

Before its eradication from North and Central America, the disease 

caused devastating losses among livestock and wild animals. No 

vaccine is available.

Yes Free 

Nipah virus encephalitis A highly contagious, emerging disease that originates in bats and 

causes encephalitis and death in humans and neurological 

symptoms in livestock, including swine, making it a serious public 

health concern. Transmission to humans is generally through 

contact with contaminated tissues of pigs and other livestock that 

have been infected through bat urine or saliva. No vaccine is 

available.

Yes Free 

Old World screwworm Similar to New World screwworm, but the parasites are a different 

type of blowfly.

Yes Free 

Porcine cysticercosis A parasitic infection of tapeworms, which invade a host’s intestinal 

tract, muscles, brain, and other tissue, causing neurological, visual, 

and other physiological problems. The parasites are spread when 

humans or pigs consume undercooked meat or come in contact 

with flies. Vaccines are available.

Yes Absent during 

2011 reporting 

period
Appendix II: Status of Reportable Swine 

Diseases in the United States, 2011

Page 35 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Disease Description

Affects 

humans? Status 

Porcine reproductive and 

respiratory syndrome

A viral disease first identified in the 1980s and widespread globally 

at present, the syndrome is characterized by respiratory distress in 

swine and lowered birth rates, abortions, stillbirths, and weak 

infants. Not all affected swine display symptoms. Vaccines are 

available.

No Present 

Rabies A viral disease of the central nervous system of mammals, 

including feral swine, which involves an extremely high mortality 

rate. Vaccines can protect pets, as well as people exposed to these 

animals, but the maintenance of rabies viruses in wildlife 

complicates control.

Yes Present 

Rinderpest A viral disease of cattle sometimes called cattle plague. Rinderpest 

can also infect buffalo, feral swine, goats, and sheep. Most 

susceptible are cattle, which suffer from diarrhea, dehydration, and 

fever and often die.

No Free 

Swine vesicular disease A viral disease clinically indistinguishable from foot-and-mouth 

disease. This disease produces vesicles, or ulcers, on the coronary 

bands (where the skin and hide join with the hoof); heels; and 

occasionally on the lips, tongue, snout, and teats. Severe cases 

occur where pigs are housed on abrasive floors in damp conditions. 

No vaccine is available.

No Free 

Transmissible 

gastroenteritis

A highly infectious viral disease in piglets caused by a corona virus. 

Provokes vomiting and diarrhea. The disease destroys villi—small 

fingerlike structures—in the small intestine. Mortality can be 

100 percent in newborn piglets. Vaccines are available, but results 

have been variable.

No Present 

Trichinellosis A parasitic infection of adult worms in the small intestine of host 

species, including pigs, humans, and other flesh-eating mammals. 

The worms plant their larvae in the hosts’ muscle tissue. The 

disease is transmitted to humans in raw or undercooked meat from 

infected livestock or game. This disease can cause influenza-like 

symptoms and weakness and lead to death in humans. In animals, 

the infection is often unapparent. No vaccine exists.

Yes Presence 

suspected but 

not confirmed

Tularemia A bacterial disease spread by infected animals, through the air and 

by ingestion, ticks, and deer flies. Also called rabbit fever, tularemia 

occurs naturally worldwide and is considered a potential biological 

weapon. The disease can display from mild to severe influenza-like 

symptoms in humans and animals. No vaccine is available.

Yes Present 

Source: GAO analysis of USDA documents and information.

Note: The year 2011 is the last year for which data were available from APHIS.

a

The term “free” refers to the absence of a disease, meaning that the disease has been eradicated or 

never existed in a particular location. 
Appendix III: Creation of a Novel Human 

Influenza Virus in 2011

Page 36 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

When influenza viruses reproduce, they can exchange gene segments in 

a process known as reassortment—a genetic shuffling—that can create 

new influenza viruses containing gene segments that may have 

originated in different host animals. In 2011, the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed 12 cases of a novel influenza 

virus called an H3N2 variant virus, and in 2012, 309 cases of this virus 

were reported.1

 

1

According to CDC, influenza viruses that normally circulate in pigs are called “variant” 

viruses when they are found in humans. A USDA official said that APHIS had detected the 

H3N2 group of viruses in 2010 and confirmed the viruses’ ability to infect and circulate 

among swine before human infections were reported in 2012.

The genetic makeup of this virus showed that it was 

derived from (1) a virus that had been circulating in swine and (2) the 

human H1N1 virus that caused the 2009 influenza pandemic. Thanks to 

still earlier genetic shuffling, the gene segments in this novel 2011 

influenza virus came from humans, birds, and swine, as illustrated in 

figure 4. 

Appendix III: Creation of a Novel Human 

Influenza Virus in 2011
Page 37 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry 

Interactive Graphic Figure 4: Creation of a Novel Human Influenza Virus in 2011

Instructions: Move mouse from left to right over blue arrow in lower left in order to see how the segments from the existing 

viruses combine to create the 2011 human H3N2 variant virus. For a printable version of this figure, see appendix V.

aFrom 1998 to 2011, H3N2 influenza viruses were identified in U.S. swine that possessed gene 

segments derived from human, avian, and swine viruses.

bIn 2011, CDC confirmed 12 human cases of a novel H3N2 influenza variant virus containing one gene 

segment from the human H1N1 virus responsible for the 2009 pandemic (circle) and other gene segments 

from the H3N2 virus that had been circulating in swine from 1998 through 2011 (hexagons). These gene 

segments in turn had their origins in humans (blue) and birds (green), as well as swine (raspberry).

c

In spring 2009, an H1N1 influenza virus of swine origin caused a worldwide pandemic in humans.The 

virus was subsequently passed back to swine, infecting animals worldwide.

Appendix III: Creation of a Novel Human

Influenza Virus in 2011
Appendix IV: List of Selected APHIS Plans 

Related to Disease Surveillance in Livestock 

and Poultry

Page 38 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Plan name Key characteristics Date

Veterinary Services Strategic 

Plan FY 2006 to FY 2011a Recognizes potential bioterrorism threats, as well as naturally occurring threats to the 

health of animals, and establishes goals and objectives to monitor for and protect 

against these threats; does not include performance measures

Undated

Veterinary Services: A New 

Perspective 

Establishes a new strategic vision and mission for APHIS’s Veterinary Services, 

recognizing that in preventing and detecting animal diseases and protecting animal 

health, the agency also plays an important role in safeguarding the health of people and 

the environment

Undated

The Secure Pork Supply Plan Proposal to establish controls and procedures that will allow swine to continue to move 

between production facilities and processing plants in the event of an outbreak of a 

foreign animal disease

2011

Veterinary Services 2015 

Project: One Health Strategic 

Direction 

Establishes general goals and indicators of success for improving the global health of 

people, animals, ecosystems, and society but nothing specific to the new surveillance 

approach in livestock and poultry

2011

Veterinary Services 2015 

Project: Surveillance for 

Action Strategic Direction 

Recommends steps to move APHIS away from a disease eradication surveillance 

approach to a more comprehensive animal health surveillance approach, such as 

collecting a wider range of data from a greater variety of sources to improve the ability 

to detect and control emerging diseases

2011

Implementation of 

Comprehensive and 

Integrated Swine Surveillance 

Proposal to move away from surveillance activities focused on eradicating specific 

diseases of swine to a focus on activities that monitor overall swine health

2010

National Surveillance Plan for 

Swine Influenza Virus in Pigs 

Establishes objectives, sampling methods, and procedures for collecting and analyzing 

genetic information on influenza viruses found in commercial swine

2010

The Information Technology 

Roadmap 

Establishes a plan to modernize APHIS’s animal disease information systems, ensure 

data security, electronically link key data systems, and create standards for data entry

2009

Source: GAO analysis of USDA information.

Note: This table lists planning documents that USDA’s Veterinary Services and we identified as key to 

surveillance. USDA’s planning documents also include several documents that provide guidance on 

foreign animal disease preparedness and response, such as plans to address highly pathogenic 

avian influenza, foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever, and emerging disease incidents.

a

FY = fiscal year.

Appendix IV: List of Selected APHIS Plans 

Related to Disease Surveillance in Livestock 

and Poultry
Appendix V: Printable Interactive Graphics

Page 39 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Appendix V: Printable Interactive Graphics
Appendix V: Printable Interactive Graphics

Page 40 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Agriculture

Page 41 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Appendix VI: Comments from the 

Department of Agriculture
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department 

of Agriculture

Page 42 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 43 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 44 GAO-13-424 Disease Surveillance in Livestock and Poultry

Daniel Garcia-Diaz, (202) 512-3841 or garciadiazd@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above, Mary Denigan-Macauley 

(Assistant Director), Kevin Bray, Ellen W. Chu, Kirsten Lauber, Dan

Royer, Kiki Theodoropoulos, Ginny Vanderlinde, and Karen Villafana 

made key contributions to this report.

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(361355)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.