[Cite as King v. King, 2021-Ohio-2117.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Denise F. King, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 20AP-225 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 03DR-3187)

George R. King, : (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on June 24, 2021 

 

On brief: Cope Law Offices and John M. Cope, for appellee. 

Argued: John M. Cope.

On brief: Grossman Law Offices and John H. Cousins, IV, for 

appellant. Argued: John H. Cousins, IV. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Division of Domestic Relations 

NELSON, J. 

{¶ 1} This divorce case has a long and seemingly unpleasant history, stretching 

back the better part of two decades. But litigation matters appear to be winding down; 

virtually all of the conceivable issues now have been exhausted. What comes before us here 

is mainly a question of $19,000 in attorney fees as ordered by the trial court primarily with 

regard to defendant-appellant George "Roger" King's last (largely) unsuccessful appeal and 

his failed effort to gain Supreme Court review. And, without requesting a stay for that order, 

Mr. King already has paid that sum to his former wife, plaintiff-appellee Denise F. King. 

{¶ 2} Roger King does not seriously contest the particular amount of fees as 

determined by the trial court. Rather, he argues principally that after the trial court issued 

a May 6, 2019 Decision and Entry purporting to correct a "typographical error" that had 
No. 20AP-225 2 

been identified in this court's remand, accompanied by a "tie off" sheet indicating that 

Denise King's March 7, 2019 motion to enforce the to-be-clarified order as upheld and for 

fees and expenses was "GRANTED" (but with no analysis of what was to be enforced and 

no money amount then specified), it lacked jurisdiction to rule further on that motion (as 

later supplemented). As explained below, we find that nothing in the trial court's May 6, 

2019 clarifying order (and its ostensible if incomplete and unexplained grant of the pending 

enforcement and fee request) divested the trial court of jurisdiction to issue its March 18, 

2020 decision that analyzed the enforcement and fee issues and specified the amount owed. 

Tangentially to that determination, we also find that Mr. King is precluded at this point 

from contesting or relitigating the statutory interest on former support arrearages that was 

at issue in his last appeal and that by his own account he paid (again without request for a 

stay) in September 2019. See Appellant's Brief at 5-6; September 4, 2019 Notice of Delivery 

[of check by Roger King].

{¶ 3} Most of the necessary chronology relevant to this appeal dates back only to 

our court's February 28, 2019 decision that affirmed (at least in almost every respect and 

albeit with a remand) a trial court order that had issued February 2, 2018. See King v. King, 

10th Dist. No. 18AP-84, 2019-Ohio-722, ¶ 18, 32. Among other things, our earlier decision 

upheld a trial court finding of contempt against Roger King and also upheld an award 

against him of $20,000 in attorney fees (a fee award separate and distinct from the fee 

award now at issue). 

{¶ 4} Significantly for the current context, we also found that a trial court 

magistrate's order from May 11, 2016 "clearly indicated Roger still owed the sums for past 

spousal support that he did not pay pursuant to the terms of the agreement * * * [because] 

the parties' agreements in the several years of e-mails did not serve to modify the total 

spousal support owed." Id. at ¶ 27. That is, "[a]fter the [May 11,] 2016 decision, Roger no 

longer had the same 'good faith' defense to the failure to pay the full amount of spousal 

support as ordered, as the magistrate made clear in the * * * decision that he still owed the 

full amount of support." Id. at ¶ 31. 

{¶ 5} We did question, therefore, a line in the trial court's 2018 order directing that 

Mr. King "pay statutory interest on the arrearage from May 11, 2014 * * *." Id. at ¶ 29 

(emphasis added). Rather, we said, "[w]e believe the date of May 11, 2014 is a typographical 
No. 20AP-225 3 

error, and was meant to be May 11, 2016, the date of the magistrate's decision." Id. But we 

could not be "certain" of that trial court intent, and ruled that "to the extent the trial court's 

judgment needs [to be] clarified/corrected to reflect the date from which statutory interest 

must be paid," one assignment of error was sustained. Id. Therefore, we underscored: "We 

remand the matter to clarify/correct the possible typographical error discussed under 

Roger's first assignment of error, and affirm the judgment of the [trial court] in all other 

respects." Id. at ¶ 32. A Judgment Entry from this court entered the same day as the 

decision recited that "the judgment [of the trial court] is affirmed and this matter is 

remanded to that court." February 28, 2019 Judgment Entry at 1.

{¶ 6} After we returned the case to the trial court, and among other events:

 On March 7, 2019, Denise King filed with the trial court 

a "Motion for Enforcement * * * of Judge Browne's 

[largely upheld] Order of 2/2/2018 and for Fees and 

Expenses" (capitalizations adjusted). Beyond 

requesting enforcement of the earlier orders relating to 

spousal support, interest (which had not been paid at 

all, the motion asserted), and earlier attorney fees, the 

motion also requested "an Order for fees [Denise King] 

has incurred in this matter since the last hearing before 

the Trial Court on or about August 29, 2017." The 

matter promptly was set for a hearing to be held on 

April 17, 2019.

 On April 10, 2019, Denise King filed a "Supplemental 

Memorandum" in support of her March 7, 2019 motion. 

That memorandum specified that Denise King was 

requesting "additional attorney fees and expenses in the 

amount of $17,100.00 for the fees and expenses since 

the last submission of fees just prior to the hearing of 

August 29, 2017 * * *." Id. at 2. The detail provided at 

Memorandum Exhibit C showed attorney fees invoiced 

and paid in most months from February 2018 (the 

month of the order upheld on the appeal discussed 

above) through October 2018 and in March of 2019. 

The memorandum supporting the motion also 

purported to compute statutory interest due (a matter 

that would hinge on the trial court's determination on 

remand of the proper accrual date).

 On April 15, 2019 (two days before the scheduled 

hearing on Denise King's pending motion), Roger King 
No. 20AP-225 4 

appealed this court's decision to the Supreme Court of 

Ohio. His Notice of Appeal there was filed in the trial 

court on April 18th. (The Supreme Court declined 

jurisdiction on June 26, 2019.)

 On April 16, 2019 Denise King apprised the trial court of 

Roger King's Supreme Court filing, and further noted 

that no stay of either this court's ruling or the trial 

court's (largely affirmed) February 2, 2018 order had 

been requested. Denise King's lawyer also provided an 

affidavit supporting the $17,100 figure from the 

April 10, 2019 "Supplemental Memorandum." 

 Also on April 16, 2019, Roger King filed what he styled a 

"Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to 

Enforce Judgment" (capitalizations adjusted), while not 

referencing the "Fees and Expenses" portion of that 

Denise King March 7, 2019 motion. Roger King's 

memorandum argued both that the trial court could not 

entertain the motion during the pendency of his 

Supreme Court appeal, and that the motion was "not 

ripe for review" because the trial court first had to 

correct its February 2, 2018 order: "Only after this 

Court follows the Tenth District's remand instruction 

can Plaintiff seek enforcement of anything," Roger King 

contended. Id. at 3. The scheduled motion hearing did 

not go forward the next day. 

 On May 6, 2019, the trial court issued a Decision and 

Entry on the "matter [that] now comes before the Court 

upon remand[.]" The trial court prefaced the entry by 

saying: "The Court of Appeals sustained Defendant's 

First assignment of error regarding a typographical 

error and remanded the case for correction of said error. 

The typographical error has been corrected herein, and 

this Court's February 2, 2018 Decision and Entry has 

been otherwise reproduced in its entirety below." May 6, 

2019 Decision and Entry at 1. The decision as otherwise 

affirmed, now including the May 11, 2016 date as the 

start of the statutory interest period, confirmed that the 

defendant had been found in contempt (with a ten day 

jail term suspended on the condition of compliance) and 

repeated too the 2018 orders on liquidation of spousal 

support and payment of the earlier attorney fees. Id. at 

14. The body of the decision did not purport to address 

Denise King's March 7, 2019 motion for enforcement 
No. 20AP-225 5 

and fees, as supplemented. The Decision and Entry was 

accompanied, however, by a "Court Disposition" 

document providing "Motion Tie Off Information" and 

saying of the March 7, 2019 motion: "MOTION 

GRANTED." The document specified no money 

amount for the fees portion of that award, nor did it 

specify what was being enforced or to what effect.

 On August 28, 2019, Denise King filed a "2d 

Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's 

Motion for Enforcement * * * and for Fees and 

Expenses" (capitalizations adjusted). Among other 

things, she again advised the court that statutory 

interest payments mandated in the February 2018 order 

as corrected in the May 6, 2019 entry had not been 

made, and she submitted an accountant's affidavit 

setting out interest payments owed. She also repeated 

that among her requests, she was seeking "additional 

attorney fees for * * * all time and expenses since this 

court last considered the awarding of fees and 

expenses." Id. at 2. An affidavit from her lawyer filed 

September 3, 2019 updated the figure requested to 

$29,410, broken down as: $6,762.50 for work to 

enforce the 2018 order that generated the earlier appeal 

(an order "resulting from" an 8/29/17 hearing); $15,795 

for work on that appeal; and $6,852.50 "for work 

defending the motion to the Supreme Court of Ohio." 

 On September 4, 2019, Roger King filed a memorandum 

in which he argued that there was no motion to be 

considered. "As the tie-off page of the May 6, 2019 

motion [sic] makes clear, Denise's March 7, 2019 

motion was granted. If this was an inadvertent clerical 

error, the fact remains that any motions pending at the 

time of a final judgment are 'deemed overruled.' " Id. at 

3 (citations omitted). He further noted that res judicata 

would bar Denise King from seeking fees arising "before 

this Court issued its February 2, 2018 Decision and 

Entry" that had been the object of the earlier appeal, and 

then submitted that a "litigant cannot request appellate 

attorney fees for the first time after the appeal has 

concluded." Id. at 4.

{¶ 7} On March 18, 2020, the trial court issued the Decision and Entry that is the 

object of Roger King's current appeal. That decision began by noting that the matter had 
No. 20AP-225 6 

come before the trial court "on September 4 and 6, 2019 upon Plaintiff's March 7, 2019 

Motion for Enforcement * * * and for Fees and Expenses, and Defendant's April 16, 2019 

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Judgment." March 18 

Decision and Entry at 1 (also noting Denise King's supplements and exhibits and Roger 

King's further Memorandum in Response). It concluded by ordering that Roger King pay 

Denise King $19,000 of the additional $29,410 attorney fees she had sought, and by finding 

(on a question not directly at issue before us here) that Roger King had sufficiently 

"complied with the Court's previous orders [so as to] purge the contempt finding" of 

February 2, 2018 as reiterated in the order of May 6, 2019. Id. at 13.

{¶ 8} Along the way, the trial court outlined some of the procedural history recited 

above, and characterized its May 6, 2019 Decision and Entry as correcting an "obvious" 

typographical error "and otherwise reproducing in its entirety the February 2018 Entry." 

March 18, 2020 Decision and Entry at 2. The trial court further stated that the 

contemporaneous Court Disposition purporting to grant and "tie off" Denise King's 

March 7, 2019 motion for enforcement and fees and expenses (while establishing no money 

amount due her) had been a "clerical error" (and therefore was, in effect, at least 

premature); that motion, the trial court said, "is not tied off and is properly before this 

Court." Id. at 4. Additionally, the trial court wrote, "in following the remand instruction, 

this Court did not dispose of, or render moot the pending motion * * *." It purported to 

amend the motion "tie off" and grant from the May 6, 2019 Decision and Entry pursuant to 

Civil Rule 60(A) power to correct clerical error. Id. at 4. Denise King's "March 7, 2019 

Motion for Enforcement and for Fees and Expenses is not tied off and is properly before 

this Court," it ruled: "[I]n following the remand instruction, this Court did not dispose of, 

or render moot the pending motion * * *." Id. 

{¶ 9} The trial court then found that while "technically late," Roger King eventually 

had paid all spousal support arrearages, and that Denise King had advised the court at the 

September 4, 2019 hearing that the final $710 of that obligation had been paid May 6, 2019. 

Id. at 5. In August of 2019 (and within the time contemplated by the May 6, 2019 order), 

Roger King also paid the $20,000 amount of the earlier attorney fees. Id. at 7-8. And Roger 

King also had substantially complied with the trial court's orders regarding the payment of 

statutory interest, now recognized as accruing from May 11, 2016: "On September 4, 2019, 
No. 20AP-225 7 

Defendant filed with the Court a Notice of Delivery and an Acknowledgment of Receipt of 

Check signed by [counsel for Denise King] acknowledging that a check from Defendant 

made payable to Plaintiff for $15,093 was hand-delivered from Defendant's attorney on 

September 4, 2019," and that Denise King had advised the court that those funds now were 

available to her. Id. at 7. Roger King had argued "that pursuant to the May [6], 2019 Entry, 

he was given 120 days therefrom to pay the statutory interest," id. at 6; the trial court, while 

acknowledging that "the date from which interest was ordered to be paid was amended on 

remand," found that "that modified amount [had been] immediately due, either in full or 

* * * in monthly payments, following the journalization of the May 2019 Entry, not 4 

months later," but concluded in light of subsequent history that Roger King's "payment of 

statutory interest amounts to substantial compliance" with that May 2019 order. Id. at 6-

7.

{¶ 10} Turning to Denise King's attorney fee request from March 7, 2019 as later 

supplemented, the trial court properly declined to award any (of the relatively small 

amount) of the fees claimed for legal work done before issuance of the trial court's 

February 2, 2018 order that was the object of the earlier appeal here. Id. at 10 ("However, 

insofar as Plaintiff requests fees for work done to enforce the Court's [2018] Order, the 

Court will consider such a request."). The trial court concerned itself primarily with the 

$15,795 in fees that Denise King sought for work in connection with the appeal that had 

affirmed the December 2018 order (with a remand to the trial court), and with the 

$6,852.50 bill that Denise King submitted she incurred in connection with Roger King's 

unsuccessful attempt to gain Supreme Court review. The trial court observed that Denise 

King "filed her motion for appellate attorney's fees after the appeal was remanded," and 

that she "was certainly the more successful party in the appellate action." Id. at 11. 

Moreover, "[b]ecause the Ohio Supreme Court declined jurisdiction, Plaintiff properly 

moved this Court for fees sought from her attorney's work at that level." Id. at 12. In making 

its $19,000 fee award, the trial court found that "equity dictates when one party mounts a 

years-long legal battle to avoid paying sums rightly due and owing to the opposing party 

and continues to be unsuccessful at each stage of the proceeding whilst forcing the other 

party to defend (and expend) at the trial court, appellate court and supreme court levels – 

an award of attorney's fees is fair and appropriate." Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
No. 20AP-225 8 

{¶ 11} Roger King presents us with two assignments of error:

[1.] The trial court erred, abused its discretion, and acted 

without jurisdiction by sua sponte 'reactivat[ing]' appellee's 

March 7, 2019 motion and ordering appellant to pay an 

additional $19,000 in attorney fees and expenses.

[2.] Alternatively, if the trial court had jurisdiction to issue its 

March 18, 2020 judgment, the trial court erred in its 

interlocutory decision and entry filed on May 6, 2019.

Appellant's Brief at v (capitalizations adjusted). 

{¶ 12} Under his first assignment—and in some tension, perhaps, with his argument 

to the trial court that Denise King's motion for enforcement and fees would not be "ripe" 

until the trial court had corrected its February 2, 2018 order pursuant to the remand, see 

April 16, 2019 Memorandum in Opposition at 3—Roger King submits that the trial court 

had ended the case with its May 6, 2019 Decision and Entry and that it could not use 

Civ.R. 60(A) to adjust or revisit its "GRANT[]" of Denise King's motion for enforcement 

and fees. Appellant's Brief at 7 ("The trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its March 18, 

2020 Decision and Entry, and it erred by relying on Civ.R. 60(A)" in purporting to 

reanimate a closed case). We evaluate his jurisdictional argument afresh, under the de novo 

standard of review. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-997, 2012-Ohio-3973, ¶ 14 

(noting the issue of a domestic relations jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo 

on appeal).

{¶ 13} Roger King notes that Denise King's March 7, 2019 motion for enforcement 

and fees (as supplemented twice in April 2019 before being supplemented again on 

August 28, 2019 in advance of the September hearing) was indeed pending while the trial 

court was considering this court's remand to it of the trial court's earlier post-decree order. 

See Appellant's Brief at 2-3. Roger King further observes that "Denise's March 7, 2019 

motion sought [among other things] to enforce the February 2, 2018 entry [that] was the 

subject of the remand order [addressed by the trial court's May 6, 2019 entry]." Id. at 9. 

And he postulates that the "tie off page" indicating a grant of Denise King's March 7, 2019 

motion was part of the May 6, 2019 entry. Id. at 9-10. 
No. 20AP-225 9 

{¶ 14} Significantly, Roger stipulates to us: "[T]he tie-off page of the May 6, 2019 

entry made clear, the trial court had granted Denise's March 7, 2019 motion." Appellant's 

Brief at 9-10 (emphasis added). Any suggestion by the trial court's March 18, 2020 Decision 

and Entry that that particular page of the May 2019 entry was designed in fact to defer 

ruling on Denise King's March 7, 2019 motion for enforcement and fees—a motion made 

"before this Court's remand was carried out," Roger King emphasizes, Appellant's 

Brief at 2 (emphasis in original)—accomplished not the correction of a clerical error " 

'apparent on the record,' " Roger contends, but instead worked a "substantive change" " 

'where the court changes its mind, either because it made a legal or factual mistake in 

making its original thought, [or because on second thought] it has decided to exercise its 

discretion in a different manner.' " Id. at 8-9 (citations omitted). 

{¶ 15} But if the record does not adequately reflect that the "MOTION GRANTED" 

language was intended to indicate that the trial court was keeping the motion for fees and 

expenses before it, consistent with the sequence that Roger himself had counseled, and if 

as Roger asserts Civ.R. 60(A) did not authorize any such re-write, then the "GRANTED" 

language would remain. And in that event, having "made clear" (in the words of Roger's 

brief) that the motion was granted, the trial court would be required to say what was being 

enforced and what fees were being granted and in what amounts. It did so, in its March 18, 

2020 decision. 

{¶ 16} Roger also argues, in the alternative, that " '[w]hen a trial court does not 

expressly rule upon a motion, it is deemed denied' " upon final judgment. Appellant's Brief 

at 10 (citations omitted). We fail to see, however, how an express (if unexplained and 

unspecific) grant somehow can be deemed an implied denial. And we note again that the 

March 7, 2019 motion was inextricably linked with the pending remand issue. Denise 

sought enforcement of the order on statutory interest, and that calculation would depend 

on the interest accrual date to be supplied by the trial court pursuant to this court's 

instruction. 

{¶ 17} Roger devotes the bulk of his argument to urging that Civil Rule 60(A) did 

not permit the trial court to amend its language that the motion was "GRANTED" and the 

case concluded. See Appellant's Brief at 8-10 (distilled at page 9 into the assertion that 

"there was no clerical error justifying the trial court's March 18, 2020 Decision and Entry, 
No. 20AP-225 10 

and it was not 'apparent from the record' that the trial court needed to correct its May 6, 

2019 entry"). But that language purporting to grant Denise King's March 7, 2019 motion 

for enforcement and fees (without specifics and without a Civil Rule 54(B) "no just cause 

for delay" certification) was incomplete on its face. As we observed in dismissing an appeal 

for that reason in Clarke v. Royal, 10th Dist. 19AP-74 (April 2, 2019 Journal Entry of 

Dismissal): "Here, the trial court's judgment left the amount of attorney fees to be awarded 

to [the party] unresolved, and the judgment does not include Civ.R. 54(B) language." 

Compare also, e.g., Taylor v. Johnson, 1993 Ohio App. Lexis 3176, *5-6 (8th Dist.1993) 

("the trial court awarded attorney's fees, but failed to specify the amount awarded for 

attorney's fees, which leaves that issue undetermined under Civ.R. 54(B). * * * * Thus, there 

[is] no final appealable order in this case"). 

{¶ 18} Thus we do not accept the main premise of Roger King's argument—that the 

trial court's May 6, 2019 entry with its "tie off" language (which he says was unalterable) 

fully disposed of the motion it both acknowledged and purported to grant, so that "[b]y the 

time of its March 18, 2020 entry, there was no motion pending," Appellant's Brief at 9. 

Compare, e.g., Niehaus v. The Columbus Maennerchor, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-1024, 2008-

Ohio-4067, ¶ 22-23 (while judgment " 'deferring final adjudication of a request for attorney 

fees is not a final appealable order' " absent Civ.R. 54(B) language, appeal may lie with 54(B) 

certification where merits decision might obviate issue and is otherwise warranted); 

Shelton v. Eagles FOE Aerie 2232, 2000 Ohio App. Lexis 604 (4th Dist.), * 3 (entry that 

"grants a default judgment on the issue of liability and sets the issues of damages for future 

hearing is not a final appealable order"); Evanston Acquisitions, LLC v. STAG II Dayton, 

LLC, 2nd Dist. No. 27480, 2017-Ohio-5755, ¶ 10 (where trial court "recognized [the] 

request for attorney fees, and granted it" but "did not specify the amount of attorney fees 

awarded," order was not final and appealable despite inclusion of 54(B) certification). 

{¶ 19} Roger King's further arguments against the trial court's authority to issue its 

$19,000 attorney fee award also are unavailing here. First, he points out that "Denise 

sought appellate attorney fees dating back to August 2017 – six months before the trial 

court issued its February 2, 2018 Decision and Entry. Res Judicata barred her from 

requesting fees that she either did request or could have requested back then." Appellant's 

Brief at 10. But he told that to the trial court, and the trial court then did not award any 
No. 20AP-225 11 

additional fees for any work done before the February 2, 2018 entry that we reviewed in the 

last appeal. See March 18, 2020 Decision and Entry at 10 (trial court explicitly limits its 

consideration of Denise King's fee request solely to fees for work done after issuance of the 

February 2, 2018 entry: "insofar as Plaintiff requests fees for work done to enforce the 

Court's Order, the Court will consider such a request"). Indeed, the fees now at issue arose 

largely from appellate work to defend that February 2, 2018 order, and by definition could 

not have arisen "before the trial court issued" that entry.

{¶ 20} Next, Roger King argues that "[a] litigant cannot request appellate attorney 

fees for the first time after the appeal has concluded." Appellant's Brief at 11 (emphasis in 

original). Understandably, perhaps, he provides no citation for this bald proposition, and 

the trial court properly rejected it under the circumstances of this case. See March 18, 2020 

Decision and Entry at 10-11, citing, inter alia, Lepowsky v. Lepowsky, 7th Dist. No. 08 CO 

10, 2010-Ohio-1544 (trial court erred in failing to consider post-remand motion for 

appellate attorney fees); Rhoades v. Rhoades, 1991 Ohio App. Lexis 1122, *4-5 (3d 

Dist.1991) (having regained jurisdiction by virtue of a motion to modify custody, trial court 

"had jurisdiction to award appellate attorney fees relating to the first appeal"). 

{¶ 21} The governing statute does not contain the restriction Roger proposes. It 

provides, in relevant part: "In any post-decree motion * * * that arises out of an action for 

divorce * * * the court may award all or part of reasonable attorney's fees and litigation 

expenses to either party if the court finds the award equitable," and it permits the trial court 

to consider the income and conduct of the parties in making that determination. 

R.C. 3105.73(B). The trial court was fully equipped to consider the appellate fees issue. See, 

e.g., Buckingham v. Buckingham, 2d Dist. No. 2017-CA-31, 2018-Ohio-2039, ¶ 100-13 

(upholding trial court award of appellate fees under R.C. 3105.73(A) as not abuse of 

discretion where not unreasonable); see also Evans v. Brown, 34 Ohio App.3d 56, 57-58 

(10th Dist.1986) (on remand with instruction to consider whether plaintiff's original 

motion for trial-level fees and expenses in a particular amount should be sustained, 23 Ohio 

App.3d 97 at 100, trial court did not err in awarding further fees for appellate services in 

this court and Supreme Court); compare Klein v. Moutz, 118 Ohio St.3d 256, 2008-Ohio2329 (under remedial statute on wrongfully withheld security deposits: "The trial court is 

in a better position to determine a fee award, for it may hold a hearing, take testimony, 
No. 20AP-225 12 

create a record, and otherwise evaluate the numerous factors associated with calculating an 

attorney-fee award. There is no limiting language in the statute that precludes a trial court 

from considering fees incurred at the appellate level. Therefore," trial court may award 

appellate fees in that context). We have said that a "primary reason for awarding attorney 

fees for trial court proceedings is to ensure that a substantial portion of an award in a postdivorce decree action is not subsequently paid to the meritorious ex-spouse's attorney. 

Such an outcome would only injure those persons who were intended to receive the support 

necessary from a post-divorce decree award." Evans at 58. The same logic applies in the 

context of this case. 

{¶ 22} We overrule the jurisdictional argument presented in Roger King's first 

assignment of error. Having determined that the trial court did have jurisdiction to issue 

its March 18, 2020 entry, we find that to any extent the first assignment means to question 

the trial court's fee award as unreasonable or inequitable and therefore an abuse of 

discretion, it is barred to us as moot. (We actually discern in Roger King's brief no such 

argument disputing that the post-decree motion fee award was equitable under R.C. 

3105.73(B), apart perhaps from half a sentence observing that counsel for Denise King had 

filed one Tenth District brief and one Supreme Court memorandum. See Appellant's Brief 

at 10-11, with that sentence leading into a different argument.). 

{¶ 23} Roger King tells us that he already has paid over to Denise King the $19,000 

in attorney fees that are at issue in this appeal. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at 11 (asking that 

Denise "reimburse Roger for the $19,000 he has paid her while this appeal was pending"). 

He did so without seeking any stay of the effect of the trial court's March 18, 2020 Decision 

and Entry. But "[i]t is a well-established principle of law that a satisfaction of judgment 

renders an appeal from that judgment moot." Blodgett v. Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243, 245 

(1990). 

{¶ 24} As Blodgett further instructs and reiterated: " ' "Where the court rendering 

judgment has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action and of the parties, and fraud 

has not intervened, and the judgment is voluntarily paid and satisfied, such payment puts 

an end to the controversy, and takes away from the defendant the right to appeal or 

prosecute error or even to move for vacation of judgment." ' " Id., citing Rauch v. Noble, 

169 Ohio St. 314, 316 (1959), quoting Lynch v. Lakewood City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 116 
No. 20AP-225 13 

Ohio St. 361 (1927), paragraph three of the syllabus, further citation omitted. Cases cited 

in Roger King's May 18, 2021 motion for leave to submit supplemental authority are 

consistent with that principle in premising mootness on a requirement that the trial court 

judgment satisfied not be void. Here as discussed above the trial court did have jurisdiction, 

and Roger King's payment of the fees in controversy moots any abuse of discretion 

argument relating to those fees. See also, e.g., Thompson v. Lester, 10th Dist. No. 17AP898, 2018-Ohio-4298, ¶ 16 ("Under the circumstances in this case, [one side's] voluntary 

payment of the default judgment without seeking a stay of execution of that judgment 

rendered their motion for relief from that judgment moot," citing Rauch and Blodgett).

{¶ 25} The same principle, based on other facts in the record, disposes of Roger 

King's second assignment of error. There, he argues in the alternative to his first 

assignment that if the trial court's May 6, 2019 Decision and Entry did not conclude the 

case, he can challenge it along with the March 18, 2020 judgment "under the appellate 

doctrine of merger." Appellant's Brief at 12. He does so by submitting that "the trial court 

erred and abused its discretion by using [the May 2019] entry to order statutory interest 

retroactive to the date of May 11, 2016." Appellant's Brief at 12. "There was no monetary 

judgment imposed on that day," he continues, "and it violates Roger's due process rights to 

pretend that there was." Id. Our earlier decision addressed why a May 11, 2016 calculation 

start date would make sense; more fundamentally, however, and in any event, Roger King 

already has paid the amount at issue on that score, too, again without seeking a stay.

{¶ 26} Denise King's request for enforcement of the trial court's order on statutory 

interest was part of her March 7, 2019 motion (made while the case was on remand to the 

trial court for a clarification of the date from which that interest was to run—a date that 

would determine the interest payment the motion sought to enforce. The trial court's entry 

of May 6, 2019 clarified that the start date for calculation of interest was to be May 11, 2016 

(and, again, the "tie off" sheet purported to reflect the grant of Denise King's motion to 

enforce and for fees). Roger King tells us through counsel that "[i]mmediately after" the 

September 4, 2019 hearing on Denise King's motion, his lawyer "personally delivered the 

check [for statutory interest in the amount of $15,093] to Denise's attorney's office." 

Appellant's Brief at 5-6. The trial court, also and consistent with notices filed there, recited 

that "on September 6, 2019, Counsel for Plaintiff emailed this Court's Bailiff indicating that 
No. 20AP-225 14 

as of that morning the funds from the interest check were available to Plaintiff in her bank 

account balance." March 18, 2020 Decision and Entry at 7. Because of that payment and 

in light of the history of the case, the trial court found "that Defendant's payment of 

statutory interest amounts to substantial compliance with the Court's purge order." Id. 

Roger King thus satisfied in 2019 the statutory interest order (as calculated from May 11, 

2016) that his second assignment of error seeks to appeal. 

{¶ 27} It is understandable that he did not at that point further contest the 

calculation start date: Our February 28, 2019 decision had explained that May 11, 2016 was 

the date on which the trial court, through a magistrate's decision, "clearly indicated" that 

despite certain defenses attempted by Roger, he "still owed the sums for past spousal 

support * * *." King, 2019-Ohio-722, ¶ 27. The "total spousal support owed" had not been 

modified, so the "magistrate went on to explain that the defenses of waiver and laches were 

unlikely to succeed in any future enforcement actions filed by Denise for past due spousal 

support sums * * *." Id. That is why Denise King's second motion for contempt, which 

came a month after that magistrate's ruling and "concerned Roger's failure to pay this total 

spousal support arrearage since the May 11, 2016 decision," was "distinct from" an earlier 

contempt motion and ruling and, we held, not governed by res judicata. Id. at ¶ 28. "After 

the 2016 decision, Roger no longer had the same 'good-faith' defense to the failure to pay 

the full amount of spousal support as ordered, as the magistrate made clear in the 2016 

decision that he still owed the full amount of support." Id. at ¶ 31. Consequently, we 

suspected, but were "not certain" that the trial court had intended the accrual date for 

statutory interest to be May 11, 2016, not the May 11, 2014 date it had specified. Id. at ¶ 29. 

{¶ 28} But even had we not already undertaken this exegesis, Roger King could not 

prevail on his second assignment of error. We overrule that assignment because he paid 

the statutory interest back in 2019 without attempting to gain a stay of the order that he do 

so. Any controversy over the interest start date is moot. See Rauch, Boldgett, and 

Thompson, supra.

{¶ 29} Although the sentiment may be belied by Roger King's request here to be 

"fully reimbursed" for $19,000 in attorney fees he already has paid voluntarily to Denise, 

and then to garner attorney fees of his own, Appellant's Brief at 7, and by his further, 

alternative request to get "a full refund of the $15,093 that Roger paid Denise in statutory 
No. 20AP-225 15 

interest," id. at 13, Roger insists: "Enough is enough." Appellant's Brief at 7. With that 

statement, at least, few could disagree. Having overruled both of Roger King's assignments 

of error, we affirm (without remand) the judgment of the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations.

Judgment affirmed. 

KLATT and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur. 

NELSON, J., retired, of the Tenth Appellate District, assigned 

to active duty under the authority of the Ohio Constitution, 

Article IV, Section 6(C). 

_________________