1. The Ho no r a ble Russ ell W. Bench , Senior Judge, sat by speci al assi gnment as authorized by law

. Seege ner a lly Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 11-201(6)

. 2014 UT App 197

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### T HE 

### U T AH 

### C OU RT O F 

### A PPEALS

E.J. S U T T ON , P la inti ff an d A pp el la nt,
v. B OB M I LES , D efen da nt a nd Ap pe ll ee. Opini on No. 20 13 02 97 -C A Filed Au gust 14, 2014

Thi rd Di stric t Co urt, S alt Lake Depart ment The Honorable Vernic e S. Tre ase

No. 100914201

KarraJ. P orter, Na tha n R . Whi te, Jo hnEd w ard Ha ns en , a nd D avi d S. Bri dge , At torn eys for Appellant Juli anne P. Bl anch, Scott C. Powers, and Rober t T.

D enny, Attorn eys fo r Ap pe ll ee

S EN I O R J UDG E R USS ELL W. B EN CH a ut ho r e d this O p inio n, in whi ch J UDG E G REG O RY K. O R ME concu rr ed. J UDG E J. F R E D E R IC V O RO S J R . concu rr ed i n the result, wi th opini on. 1

BE NC H, Sen i or J ud ge:
¶1 E. J. Sut tonap pe al s the tri al court ’s gran t of s um ma ry j udg men t in f avor of Bob Mi le s , whi c h w as ba s ed on i ts deter minati on that M i les was an ag ent or employee o f LowellSut to n v. M ile s

20130297-CA 2 2014 UT App 197 Construction Co. (Lowell) at the tim e of the acci dent from whi ch S ut t o n’ s t o r tcl a ims a r ise a nd wa s t h e r e fo r e imm un e fr o m s uit pursuant t o a r elease si gned by Sut ton in f avo r o f Lowell (the Release). We rev erse and remand for furt her pro ceedings.

BACKGRO UND
¶2 In 2007, Sutt on was emp loyed by R

. W

. C onstruction and Mi le s w as em pl oyed byBye r Exc ava ting. Bothc om pa ni es w ere
su bc o nt r a ct o r s wo r k ing o n t he co ns t r uc t io n o f a ne w h o me in Summi t County. Although Sutt on and M i les worked for di fferent

c om pa ni es, Su ttonw as the s up erinte nd en t “in cha rge” at th e w ork

s i te.
¶3 At th e ti me Sut t o n and Mi le s w ere w orking o n th ei r s i te, constructi on of anot her new home was tak ing place o n an adj acent lot. Low el l w as the gen era l c ont rac t o r fo r the s ec ond hom e. On Au gu s t 1, 20 07

, L ow el l rec ei ved a loa d of reb ar a t i ts c ons tru c ti on si te, and Lowell’s su perintendent, Don Jo ne s, asked Sutto n i f he

an d Mi le s w ou ld as s i s t w i th un loa ding the reb ar. Wh i le mo vi ng a loa d of reb ar w i th h i s trac kho e, Mi le s accide nta ll y drop pe d i t on Sutt on, who was s eriousl y in jure d.
¶4 Sutt on i ni tiall y fi led sui t again st Byer Excavating, Lowell, and James H. Di amond Concrete. See Sut to n v. By er E xca va ti ng, In c. , 2012 UT App 28, 271 P.3d 169. Whil e t ha t li tigati on was s till ongo i ng, Sutt on fi led thi s separate sui t agains t Miles.
¶ 5 Inth e fi r s ts u i t, B y e r E x c a v a t in gm o v e d f o r s u mm ary judgment o n the gr ound that Miles w as not act ing in the course and sc ope of his emp l o y me nt at the t i me of the acci dent. Id. ¶ 4. Th e tri al c ou rt gran ted Bye r Exc ava ting’ s mo ti on, an d i ts de c i s i on
was u pheld on appeal. Id. ¶ 1.
¶6 InAu gu s t 20 10 , L ow el l and Jam es H. D i am ond Con c rete
rea c he d as ettl em en t w i th Su tton . Pursu an t to th e s ettl em en t,Sut to n v. M ile s

20130297-CA 3 2014 UT App 197 Sutt on si gned the Rel ease, di sch arg ing “Lowell Construction . . . and all of [i ts] agents, em ployees, representatives, . . . and ass i gns, fro m a ny a nd al l c la i ms an d caus es of ac ti on .
. . ari s ing o utof , or i n any way connected wit h the in ci dent of August 1, 2007.” The parties then fi led a sti pulated motion to dis mi ss the c lai ms against Low el l a nd Ja me s H. D i am ond Con c rete

. ¶ 7 S ut t o n c o nt inu e d t o p ur su e his cl a ims a g a ins tM ile s, a nd in Mar ch 2011, Mi les amen d e d hi s ans wer to assert that t he Release ba rred Sut ton ’s c la i ms aga ins t hi m. Mi le s the n fi le d amot ion f or
s um ma ry jud gm en t as s erting tha t, a s a m atte r of la w, h e w as ei the r
an agent, an employ ee, a repr esentative, or an assi gn of Lowell at the ti me of the i nc i de nt a nd w as the ref ore c overe d b y th e Re le as e. Th e tri alc ou rt gran ted the mo t i on for s um ma ry jud gm en t, de term i ning tha t “whi le un loa ding the reb ar fo r Low el l, Mr. Mi le s becam e an agent and/or employee o f Lowell.” Sutto n appeals.

ISS UES AND STANDARDS O F REVIEW
¶8 Sutt on asserts tha t g e nu ine i ssu es of fac t ex i st reg ardin g whether Miles was an agent or an emp loyee of Lowell at the t i me
o f t he a cc ide nt a nd tha tthe t r i a l co ur tthe r e fo r e e r r e d in deter mining that M i les was “an agent and/or employee” o f Lowell

as a m atte r of

la w . Su mm ary ju dgm en t i s ap prop ri ate w he re “ the re i s no genuine i s s ue as to any ma teri al fa c t an d

. . . the mo vi ng p arty i s enti tled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Utah R. Civ. P. 56( c). “Ana p p e l l a te c ou rtre vi e w s a tr i a l c ou rt ’sl e ga l c on c l u s i on s a nd ulti mate grant or d eni al of sum mary judgment for cor rectness and

v ie ws the fa ct s a nd a l l r e a so na bl e inf e r e nc e s d r a wnthe r e fr o m in the li ght most favor able to the nonmoving party .” Orvis v. Johnson , 20 08 UT2, ¶ 6, 17 7 P. 3d 60 0 (c i tati ons an d i nte rna l qu otati on m arks omi tte d).
¶9 Miles asserts that ev en i f he was not an a g e nt o r an
em pl oyee o f Lowe ll, h e c ou ld be c ons i de red ei the r anas s i gn o r a rep res en tati ve a s a m atte r of la wan d th at we s hou ld the ref oreSut to n v. M ile s

20130297-CA 4 2014 UT App 197 affi rm the tri alc our t ’s su mm ary ju dgm en t ru ling o n a lte rna ti ve gr ounds. “We may affi rm a gr ant of sum mary judgment upon any gr ound appar ent inthe re cord.” Pa rk v. St a nfo rd, 2011 UT 41, ¶ 27, 258 P.3d 566 (c i tation and internal quot ation marks omi tte d).

AN AL YSIS

I. Di sputed Iss ues of Fact on Whether M i les Was L owell’s Agent
¶10 Inorde r fo r anage ncy rel ati ons hi p to a ri s e, thre e el em en ts
mus t exis t: (1) the pri nci pal mus t mani fest i ts i ntent t hat the ag ent
ac t oni ts be ha lf

, ( 2) the age nt mu s t c ons en t to so ac t, a nd (3 ) b oth pa rti es mu s t u nd ers tan d tha t the age nt i s s ubjec t to the p ri nc i pa l’ s contro l. W

a rd ley Co rp . v. W

els h , 962 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Sutt on asserts that none o f t he se elements canbe establi shed as a matter of law. We agree with t he t rial c ourtthat t he fi rst element

was es tabli shed as a matter of law, bu t we agr ee wi th Sutt on that di s pu ted i s s ue s of

fa c t rel ating t o t he s ec ond an d th i rd e le me nts pre c lu de s um ma ry jud gm en t.
¶11 “A princ ipal’s man i festati on of assent to an age ncy relat i onshi p may be informal, impli ci t, and nonspeci fi c.” Res tate me nt ( Th i rd) of

Agen c y § 1 .0 1 c mt

. d ( 20 06 ). It i s un di s pu ted that Jones asked Sutt on to enli st Miles to a ss i st hi m in unloading the r e ba r o r, in o t h e r wo r d s, t o a ctfo r the be ne fito f L o we l l

. Th is
was a s uffi ci ent m ani festati on of in tent t o satis fy the fi rst element of t he ag en cy tes t. The onl y argu me nt Su ttonrai s es i n s up port o f hi s ass ert i on that Lo well di d not mani fest its intent for Miles to act on i ts be ha lf

i s a p oli c y argu me nt: he mai nta ins tha t on e c annot mani fest an intent for another to act on hi s behalf mer ely by aski ng for a favo r because t he n v i cari ous li abi li ty would arise any ti me
s om eon e a gree d to d o a f avor f or s om eon e el s e. As Sut tonpu ts i t,

Som eon e w ho a s ks a fri en d t o pick u p h i s drycleaning would be vi cari ously li able i f the fri end struck a pedestrian i n the park ing lot . So meone whoSut to n v. M ile s

20130297-CA 5 2014 UT App 197 asks a dinner guest to p ass a cup of c offee would be vic arious ly li able i f the gues t negli gently spi lled the hotli qu i d ona fel lowgu es t.

Bu t th i s argume nt i gno res the thi rd e le me nt o f a gen c y: th at b oth pa rti es mu s t u nd ers tan d th at th e a gen t i s s ubjec t to th e p ri nc i pa l’ s
c on tr ol. W

a rd ley , 962 P.2d at 89. The exi stence of thi s element precludes the wi despread appli cati on of vicari ous li abi li ty in the manner outlin ed by Sutt on.
¶12 Wi th respect to the second element, di sputed fac ts exis t reg ar ding w he the r Mi le s ma ni fe s ted hi s i nte nt t o ac t onbe ha lf of L ow e l l

. Mi l e s ’s te s ti m ony in d i c a te s th a t h e d i d n otw a n t t o h elp

un load t he reb ar b utdi d s o at th e reque s t of Sut ton, whomMi le s
c ons i de red to b e h i s bo s s . Mi le s ne ver sp oke to Jon es an d te s ti fi ed that t he reason he went to t he Lowell si te t o unload the r ebar was becau se hi s su perv i sor , S ut t o n, told hi m to. Thi s evi dence c ould lead a factfinder to conclu de th a t t he re was no “meetin g of t he minds” b etween Lowell and M i les r egar ding Miles ’s ass ent to act as Lowell’s agent, see id. , and t ha t M i les instead beli eved t hat he

w as ac ting u nd er th e d i rec ti on o f Su tton , who w as hi s s up ervi s or for t he proj ect he was h i red t o wor k on.
¶1 3 Likew i s e, the re w ere d i s pute d fa ct s r eg ar dingwhe the r Mi le s
w as s ubjec t to L ow el l’ s c ont r ol. Th e c ont rol e le me nt foc us es on whether the pr i nci pal “contro l s, or has the ri ght [to ] control, t he

ma nner in wh i ch the operat i ons are to be carried out,” Mallory v. Brigham Young U niv. , 2 0 1 4 U T 27, ¶ 21 (alterat i on i n origi nal) (emphas i s added) (ci tation and internal quot ation mark s omi tte d); “i f the c ont rol exten ds onl y to th e res ultt o be a ch ie v e d , the a ct o r is reg arded as an independent contracto r,” Fo st er v . St eed, 432 P.2d 60, 6 2 ( Ut a h 1 9 6 7 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. T h e ri gh t- of

- c on tr oltest consi ders sev eral factor s, none of whi ch i s “compl etely

c ont roll i ng” : ( 1) the exi s ten c e of c oven an ts or agre em en ts “concerning the r i ght o f di rection and c ontr ol ov er t he [agent],” (2) whether the pr i nci pal has “the right to hire and fi re” t he agent, (3) “th e m eth od of

pa ym en t ( i .e ., w age s versus pa ym en t f or aSut to n v. M ile s

2. This r ight- of-c ont rol te s t i s mo s t freque ntl y u s ed i n th e c ont ext of deter mining whether an in di vidu al i s an emp loyee or an ind e p e nd e nt co nt r a ct o r fo r p ur p o se s o f t he W or ker s’ Com pe nsa t ion A ct, bu tthe r ight -o f-co nt r o l co nce ptis der ive d from agency law. SeeGl o ve r exrel . D ys on v. Boy Sco ut s o f A m. , 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996).

20130297-CA 6 2014 UT App 197 completed jo b or pr oj ect),” (4) who furni shes the eq uip ment, (5) “the in tent o f the parti es,” and (6) “the b usiness of the employe r.” 2 Gl o ve r ex rel

. Dys o n v. Boy Scout s of Am. , 923 P.2d 1383, 1385–86 (Utah 1996) (c i tation and internal quot ation marks omi tte d).
¶14 The trial c ourt ’s li st o f undis puted facts inclu des that “the unloading of the r ebar by Mr . Sutt on and Mr. M i les was at the di rection of Lowell” and that “Lowell was i n charge of and

ov ersaw th e work being done inrelat i on to unloading the r ebar tha tM r
. M i l e s a n d M r
. S u t t o nw e r e h e l p in gw i th

. ” H o w ever, Sut tonc ont i nu al ly d i s pu ted the s e fa c ts in hi s opp os i ti on t o Mi le s ’s motion for summ ary judgment, ci tin g depositi on testimony i ndi cati ng that M i les fu rnis hed the equi pment used for the

un loa ding, tha t Low el l d i d n ot provi de any ins tru c ti ons to Su tton
or Miles r e g a r d i ng how the unloadi ng was to be perfor med, that Sut tonde term i ne d th e m eth ods for un loa ding w i tho uti np utor opp os i ti on from Low el l, tha t Low el l d eferred to Su tton ’s exp erti s e,
an d th at th e ind i vi du al s w orking on the proje c t c ons i de red Sut ton to b e in cha rge.
¶15 Mi le s tes ti fi ed tha t he c ons i de red Sutt o n t o b e in cha rge of the u nloadi ng. Three addi tional w i tnesses, inclu ding Miles ’s own exp ert, al s o tes ti fi ed tha t Su ttonwas in cha rge of the un loa ding. Although Jones testifi ed that L ow ell wasi n charge of the unloadin g oper ation and that S utto n and Mi les “bec ame part o f [hi s] oper ation” by helping hi m unl oad the r ebar , he also testifi ed that he did not g i ve any directi on to Sutt on or Miles as to how the unloading should be ac compli shed, that he never spoke to Miles at al l, an d th at h e was s urp ri s ed byan d e vendi s agre ed w i th s om e of the un loa ding m eth ods Sut tonus ed bu t ne verth el es s de fe rred toSut to n v. M ile s

20130297-CA 7 2014 UT App 197 Sutt on’s knowledge and ski ll becau se “he had n o doubt in h i s mind [ th a t S u t t o n h a d ] th e ab i l i t i e s t o
. . . u n d e r t a k e [ th e ] t a s k .” Both Mi le s an d Sutton c onfi rme d th at th ey h ad no d i s c us s i on w i th J one s as t o ho w the un loa ding w as to b e d one . Fu rthe rmo re, the re appears to have been no speci fi c ag reement as t o whether Lowell ha d th e ri ghtto c ont rol Mi le s , a nd the evi de nc e i nd i c ate s tha t Mi le s
w as notpa i d f or hi s w ork an d tha t he us ed hi s ow n e qu i pm en t to
un loa d th e reb ar. Th i s evi de nce rai s es genuine i s s ue s of fa c t as to whether Lowell had th e r ig ht to cont ro l the manner i n whi ch the unloading of the r ebar was to be accompli shed. SeeM a llo ry, 2014 UT27 , ¶ 2 1. Th i s fa c tu aldi s pu te prec lu de s s um ma ry jud gm en t on the questi on of whether M i les was an agent o f Lowell.

II. D i s pu ted Is s ue s of

Fac t onWh eth er Mi le s Wa s Low el l’ s Em pl oyee
¶16 Sut ton rai s es tw o argu me nts in c ont es ting the tri alco ur t ’s de term i na ti on tha t Mi le s w as Low el l’ s em pl oyee . Fi rs t, h e a s s erts that t he ter m “employee,” as used in the Release, i s amb i guous and that t he ambi gui ty pr eclude s summary judgment. Seege ner a lly R&R E ner

gie s v
. M o th er Ea rt h Indus ., In c. , 936 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1 9 9 7 ) ( “ [A ] m o t io n f o r su mm a r y j ud g me n t ma y no tbe g r a nt e d if a legal conclus i on i sreached that an ambi gui ty e xis ts i n the contract and there is a factual i ssu e as to what t he parties intended.” (c i tati on a nd i nte rna lq

u otati on m arks om i tted )) . Se c ond , h e a s s erts that ev en i f “employee” is unamb i guou s, di sputed i ssu es of fac t
s hou ld ha ve p rec lu de d th e tri alc o u r tfr o md e term ining, as a m atte r of la w, th at Mi le s w as Low el l’ s em pl oyee
.
A. The Term “Emp loyee ” Is Unambi guous.
¶17 Sutt on asserts that t he ter m “employ e e , ” as us ed i n the Rel ea s e, i s bo th fa c i al ly an d la ten tly a mb i gu ou s . W e d i s agre e w i th both contentions.Sut to n v. M ile s

20130297-CA 8 2014 UT App 197 ¶ 1 8 Con t r a c t l a n g u a g e i s f a c i a l l y a mb i g u o u s i f i t i s “ c a p ab le of

mo r e tha n o n e r e a so na bl e int e r p r e t a t io n b e ca us e o f u nc e r t a in meanings of terms, mi ssing ter ms, or ot her faci al defi ci enci es.” SM E Indus ., In c. v . T

ho mps o n , Vent ulet t, St a inb a ck & A sso cs. , Inc. , 20 01 UT54, ¶ 1 4, 28 P .3 d 6 69 (c i tati on a nd i nte rna l quo tati on m arks omi tte d). Sutto n argues t ha t “employee” is faci ally ambi guous becau se there ar e thre e possi ble reasonable interpr etat i ons of the ter m: (1) someone who i s pa id fo r his w or k, (2) someone who

w orks pu rs ua nt to a con trac t fo r hi re, an d ( 3) s om eon e ove r w hom the princ i pal has the ri ght o f control.
¶19 We di s agre e w i th Su tton ’s argu me nt tha t th ere a re th ree di ff er e n tw a y s t o i n t e r p r e tth e R e l e a s e ’ s u s e o f th e t erm “employee.” An employ ee i s “[a] person who work s in the serv i ce of an oth er p erso n (the em pl oyer) un de r anexp res s or i mp li ed

c ont rac t of hi re, un de r w hi c h the em pl oyer has the ri ght to c ont rol the details of work perf o r ma nce.” Bl a ck ’s La w D ict io na ry60 2 ( 9th ed. 2009). Thu s, Sutto n’s sep a r ate “defi ni tions ” are actually all factors that “ sh o uld be c onsi dered in d eter mining whether an employer –employee r elations hi p exis ts.” See S tamper v . Johnson , 20 10 UT26 , ¶ 2 0, 23 2 P .3 d 5 14 (i de nti fy ing w age s , c ont rac t of hi re,
an d ri ghtof

c ont rol a s el em en ts of anemploye r–e mp loye e relat i onshi p); seea lso Gl o ve r exrel . Dyso n v. Boy Sco ut s o f A m. , 923 P .2 d 1 38 3, 13 85 –8 6 ( Uta h 1 99 6) (i de nti fy ing agre em en ts be tw een the part i es and method o f payment as elements relevant t o the ri ght -o f- c ont rol a na lys i s ). We the ref ore d ete rmine tha t th e te rm “employee,” as used in the Release, i s not faci ally ambi guous and

s hou ld be i nte rpre ted ac c ording t o i ts gen era l m ea ning.
¶20 Sutt on further arg ues that there i s latent ambi gui ty in the Release’s us e of the t erm “employee ” becau se extr insi c evi dence

s ug ges ts tha t th e p arti es to th e Re le as e d i d n ot inte nd fo r i t to prot ect Miles . “A latent ambi gui ty is one wh i ch appear[s ] only as the re sult of extr insi c or collate r a l e videnc e showing that a wor d, tho ught t o ha ve b utone me an ing, ac tu al ly h as t wo o r mo re meanings,” S t a t e v . Da vis , 2011 UT App 74, ¶ 4, 272 P.3d 745Sut to n v. M ile s

3. We do ob s erve, how ever, tha t i t doe s not ap pe ar tha t the pa rti es to th e Re le as e inte nd ed fo r Mi le s to be subje c t to th e Re le as e. Mi le s asserted at or al arg ument that Sutto n had the burden of expli ci tly

r e se r v ing his cl a ims a g a ins tM ile s in the R e l e a se in o r d e r t o a v o id ha v ing the r e l e a se co ns t r ue d a s r e l e a sin gM ile s. T h i s p o sit io n is i ncon s i s te nt w i th

Ut a h l a w, wh i ch

re qu i res speci fi ci ty r egar ding the pa r t ie s t o be r e l e a se d a nd r e v e r se s t he co mm o n l a w r ul e presuming that a r elease of one to rt feasor releases all other tor tfeasors as well. SeeUtah Co de Ann. § 78B-5- 822 (Lexi sNex i s 2012) ( “A release gi ven by a pe rs on s eek i ng rec overy to o ne or m ore d efen da nts doe s not dis charge any o the r d e fe nd a nt un l e ss the r e l e a se so p r o v ide s.”); Child v. Newsom , 89 2 P .2 d 9, 11 –1 2 ( Uta h 1 99 5) (c ons tru ing s ec ti on 78B-5-822 to require “some degr ee of speci fi ci ty” in des cribing the de fe nd an ts to b e rel ea s ed an d d ete r mining tha t b oi le rpl ate language re leasing “all other persons, fi rms and c or porat i ons” was (continued...)

20130297-CA 9 2014 UT App 197 (a lte rati on in ori ginal) (c i tati on a nd inte rna l quo tati on m arks

om i tted ), an d ap pe ars onl y “in the exc ep ti ona l c as e, ” 32 A C.J .S. Ev ide nce§ 1514 (2008).
¶21 Sut tonarg ues tha t Low el l’ s atte mp t to ap porti on f au lt to Miles, Lowell’s expli ci t mention of Jones b ut not M i les in the R e l e a se , the fa ct tha tS ut t o n d id n o ta ss e r ta v ica r io us l iabil it y cl a im again st Lowell, the fact that Mil e s wa s not di scu ssed d uri ng the Rele a s e ’s n e go ti a ti on

, a n d Mi l e s ’s l a c k o f

i n vo l ve m e n t inthe

ne goti ati on ind i c ate tha t th e p arti es i nte nd ed t o e x c lu de Mi le s fro m the defi ni tion of employee. However , the fact that t he parties m ay notha ve an ti c i pa ted tha t Mi le s w ou ld fa llw i thin th e d efini ti on o f

em pl oyee as us ed i n th e Rel ea s e doe s notme antha t th ey inte nd ed

e mp loye e to m ea n “ any em pl oyee exc ep t f or Mi le s .” We agre e w i th M ile s t ha t S ut t o n’ s a r g um e nt is s imp l y a n a t t e mp t“ t o us e e x t r ins ic evidenc e to jump o v e r t he ambi gui ty po rt i on of the analysis and p r o ce e d d ir e ct l y t o d e t e r min ing the p a r t ie s’ int e nt wit h e x t r ins ic evi de nc e. ” Ac c ordingl y, w e reje c t Sut ton ’s as s erti on tha t th e te rm “e mp loye e, ” a s us ed i n th e Re le as e, c ont ains a l ate nt a mb i gu i ty. 3Sut to n v. M ile s

3. (...continued) nots uffi c i en tly s pe c i fi cto effe c tu ate a re le as e (interna l quo tati on marks omitted)). G i ven that Miles was the pri mary tor tfeasor, had the part i es intended to inclu de hi m in the Release i t is li kely t hat he would have been menti oned by na me , particu larly in li ght o f the fact that Jones was menti oned by name. Thus, if anythin g, the fact that M ile s w a s n o tme nt io ne d by na me fa v o r s S ut t o n’ s p o siti on that the part i es intended to e xclude hi m.

20130297-CA 10 2014 UT App 197 B. Whether M i l e s Was Lowell’s Employee Cannot Be Determin ed as a Matte r o f Law.
¶22 Ne verth el es s , w e a gree w i th Sutto n tha t di s pu ted i s s ue s of fa c t pre c lu de s um ma ry jud gm en t on the qu es ti on o f whe the r Mi le s was L owell’s employee. The test for deter mining whether an i nd i vi du ali s anem pl oyee i s de ri ved fro m agen c y la w an d f oc us es
on the employer ’s r i ght to contro l the employee. Gl o ve r, 923 P.2d at 13 85 –8 6 ( “[ W] he the r anem pl oyer– em pl oyee rel ati onshi p e xi s ts depen d s u p onth e e m p l oy e r’ s ri gh t t o c on tr olth e e m p l oy e e .” (c i tati on a nd i nte rna l qu otati on m arks om i tted )) . The fa c tors relev ant to thi s right-of-c ontr ol test are the same as those relev ant to the right-of-c ontr ol element in t he agency contex t. Seesup ra ¶ 13. As di scu ssed, sup ra ¶¶ 1 3– 15 , d i s pu ted i s s ue s of fa c t exi s t w i th

r e sp e ctt o wh e t h e r L o we l l ha d the r ig ht t o co nt r o l the ma nn e r in whi ch Mi les acc ompli she d t he unloading of the r ebar. Thus, the tr i al court err ed by deter mining, as a matter of law, that Miles was Low el l’ s em pl oyee
.
III. Al tern ati ve Argu me nt tha t Mi le s Wa s a Re pre s en tati ve or

Assi gn of Lowell
¶23 Mi le s as s erts tha t eve n i f w e reve rs e the t r ial c ou rt’s d e t e r mination that he was an emp loyee or agent o f Lowell as a
ma tter of

la w, w e s hou ld affi rm the tri alc ou rt’s s um ma ry judgment ruling on alter nati ve gro unds, namely, that M i les was aSut to n v. M ile s

20130297-CA 11 2014 UT App 197 rep res en tati ve or a s s i gn o f L ow el l. We agre e w i th Su ttontha t Mi le s does not necessari ly fall into either of t hese categor i es.
¶ 2 4 Th e o r d ina r y me a nin go f t he t e r m “ r e p r e se nt a t i v e ” is “[o]ne wh o stands for or acts on behalf of another ,” Bl ack ’s La w D ict io na ry 14 16 (9 th e d. 20 09 ), “e s pe c i al ly th rou gh de legate d authority,” Me rr i am–Webs ter , http://www.m err i amwebs ter .com/di cti onary /repr esentative (las t v i si ted J uly 23, 2014);

see a lso Bl a ck ’s La w D ict io na ry2 3 5 (e x p l a inin gtha to ne wh o a ct s in a “ rep resen tati ve c ap ac i ty” oftendoe s s o “th rou gh d el ega ted authority”). Generally, a s M ile s a ck no wl e d ged in hi s mem or andum to th e tri alc ou rt, th e te rms “re pre s en tati ve” an d “ age nt” are us ed synonymously. See Kenn y v. George A. FullerCo. , 450 N.Y.S.2d 551, 557 (N.Y. A p p
. Div . 1982) (indi cati ng that t he ter ms “agent” and “re pre s en tati ve” are “s ynony mo us ” ( inte rna l q uo tati on m arks omi tte d)); Texas Pow er & Light Co. v. Ada mson , 203 S.W.2d 275, 276 (T ex. Ci v. Ap p. 19 47 ) ( de term ining, in inte rpre ting a T exa s s tatu te, that “t he ter ms ‘agency’ and ‘repr esenta tive ’ a re in te rchangeable”); Bl a ck ’s La w D ict io na ry14 16 (re fe rri ng the rea de r to th e term “ age nt”

a nd ca se s f a l l ing un d e r “ Pr inc ipa l a nd A g e nt ” he a d no t e s in defining “repr esentative”); id. a t 7 2 (defining “agent ” as “a repr esentative”). Thus, f or the s ame reason di sputed i ssu es of fact exi s t as to w he the r Mi le s w as Low el l’ s agent, the y al s o exi s t as to
w he the r he w as Low el l’ s rep res en tati ve.
¶25 The ordina ry m ea ning o f the term“a s s i gn” i s “[ o] ne to whom proper ty rights or powers are transferred b y a nother .” Bl a ck ’s La w D ict io na ry13 5–36

. Th ere a re n o f ac ts , d i s pu ted or oth erw i s e, s ug ges ting tha t Low el l tra ns fe rred prop erty ri ght s to Mi le s , a nd the re i s there fore n o b as i s fo r de term ining tha t Mi le s
was an“assi gn” of Lowell.
¶26 Mi le s ne verth el es s urg es us to ad opt b road er d efini ti ons of the term s “re pre s en tati ve” an d “ as s i gn” tha t w ould pe rmi t u s to d e ter mine that he was a representat i ve o f Lowell bec ause he “s erv[ ed ] L ow el l in m oving the reb ar” an d th at h e was anas s i gn o fSut to n v. M ile s

20130297-CA 12 2014 UT App 197 Low el l b ec au s e h e w as “a s s i gne d” the tas k of un loa ding the reb ar. Mi l e sa s s e rt sthat broad defini tions are j usti fi ed becau se the Release

w as dra ft ed s o as to inte nti ona ll y inc lu de anyon e c onn ec ted w i th Low el l. Th i s argu me nt i s s i mi la r to Su tton ’s argu me nt tha t th e te rm “employee” contains a latent a mbigui ty because of the parties’ i nte nt in d rafting the Re le ase a nd i s li kew i s e w i tho utme ri t. Therefore , we cannot affi rm the t rial c ourt ’s su mma ry judgment ruli ng on the alt ernative gr ounds s uggested by M i les.

CON CL USION
¶27 We de term i ne tha t di s pu ted i s s ue s of fa c t exi s t as to w he the r Mi l e s m a n i fe s te d a ni n te n t t o a c t f orL ow e l l a n d w h e th e r L ow ell had th e r ig ht to contro l the manner i n whi ch Mi les un loaded the rebar. These di sputed is sues of fact sh ould have precluded the tr i al

c ou rt fro m det erm i ning, as a mat ter of law, that Mi le s w as Low el l’ s age nt. We al s o de term i ne tha t the term s em pl oyee, re pre s en tati ve, and ass i gn are unamb i guous; that di sputed i ssu es of fac t pre clud e
s um ma ry jud gm en t onthe iss ue s of w he the r Mi le s w as Low el l’ s employee and whethe r he was L owell’s representat i ve; and that Miles cannot be consi dered an assi gn of Lowell. We rev erse the tri al c ou rt’s s um ma ry jud gm en t ru ling a nd rem an d f or furthe r proceedings.

VOROS , Judge (c oncurring):
¶28 I c oncur w i th the ma jori ty opini on tha t the tri alc ou rt erre d i n grant i ng summ ary judgment. Howev er, in m y v iew the

s um ma ry jud gm ents h o u l d b e r e v e r s e d n o tb e c a u s e d i s p ut ed i s s ue s of fact exis t as to Mi les’s intent or Lowell’s contro l, but bec ause the Rel ea s e d oes notas a m atte r of la w i de nti fy Mi le s w i th the requi s i te
s pe c i fi c i ty.Sut to n v. M ile s

20130297-CA 13 2014 UT App 197 ¶29 Th i s ap pe alc onc ern s the en fo rc eabi li ty of a re le as e. Un de r the superseded comm on law r ule, “a release of one tor t-feasor also

re l e a s e d a l l oth e r t or t- fe a s or s.” C h i l d v. Newsom , 892 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah 1995). While Ut ah stat utor y law o nce followed thi s r ule, our current stat ute rev erses i t: “A r elease g iv e n by a person seeking

rec overy to o ne or m ore d efen da nts doe s not di s c ha rge any oth er defendant unles s the release so prov i des.” Utah Co d e A nn. § 78B-5-822 ( Lexis Nexis 2008).
¶30 In Child v. Newsom our supreme court constr ued the phrase “u nl es s the rel ea s e so provi de s .” 89 2 P .2 d a t 11 –1 2. Th e Chi ldcase
aro se from a tr affi c acc i dent i n whi ch o ne ca r hi t anot her. A pa s s en ger in th e l atte r c ar d i ed . H er f ath er b rou ghtw rong fu l- de ath

ac ti ons aga i ns t b othdri vers
. He s ettl ed the c la i m a gains t on e d ri ver
an d tha t dri ver’s i ns ura nc e c arri er. Th e rel ea s e n am ed tha t dri ver, the insu rance carrier, and all agents an d employee s o f t he i nsu rance carrier, “to get her wi t h all o ther per sons, fi rms and corpor ations .” Id. at 9– 10

. Th e s ec ond dri ver mo ved fo r s um ma ry jud gm en t onthe grou nd tha t, a s a m embe r of the c la s s of “a lloth er pe rs ons, fi rms an d c orpora ti ons,” s he too w as r el ea s ed fro m li abi li ty. Id. at 10.
¶31 Th at the s ec ond dri ver fel l w i thin th e c la s s of “a lloth er persons, fi rms and corpor ations ” could hardly be di sputed. Yet the

su p r e me co ur t r ul e d tha t un d e r the r e l e a se st a t ut e , tha tr e l e a se d id not co v e r her. Id. at 11–12. The court ex plained that becaus e the

s tatu te pr escrib es tha t a re le as e gi vento on e d efen da nt d oes not di sch arg e any ot hers “unles s the release s o pro vides,” Utah Co de Ann. § 78B-5- 822, that phrase “must be co ns t r ued nar ro wly as requiring s ome d egr ee o f s peci fi ci ty,” Chi ld, 892 P.2d at 11. The

c ou rt ad opte d the an al ys i s rea c he d b y nu me rou s oth er s tate s w i th si mi lar or i denti cal s tatut es t hat have “unequi vo cally held” that gener al releas e language suchas “all other per sons, fi rms and corpor ations” d o e s n o te nc o mp a ss “ p e rsons not speci fi cally named, described, or speci fi cally i denti fi ed there in.” Id. at 12 (collecting
cases ). Consequently, pursuant to the r elease st a t ut e, “a releaseSut to n v. M ile s

20130297-CA 14 2014 UT App 197 mus t contain lan guage either naming the defendant or i denti fyi ng the de fe nd an t w i th som e degre e of spe c i fi c i ty in orde r to di s c ha rge that defendant fro m li abi li ty.” Id.
¶32 The release before us fai ls thi s t est as to M i les. Th e release names L owell Construction, Lowell’s constructi on superi ntendant Don Jones, and i ts i nsu rance carrier

— d e scribed as “Releasees ” —tog ether wi th “all of their age nt s, employees, repr esentatives, parent compani es, i nsu rer s, sub si di aries, affi li ates, relat ed entiti es,
ow ner s, succ es s ors , a nd as s i gns .” Mi le s , a n e mp loye e of Bye r Excavating, was the prin ci pal tor tfeasor, t he person actually ha n d l ing the r e ba r tha tS ut t o n a l l e g e s f e l l o n h im— the p e r so n, in
s hort , who in Su tton ’s vi ew ac ted ne gli gen tly. Yet th e Re le as e d oes
no t na me Mi les. Gi ven this omi ssi on, I cannot ag ree t hat the Release i denti fi es hi m wi th “some degr ee of speci fi ci ty.” Id.
¶33 Admi tte dly, the phrase “some degr ee of speci fi ci ty” itself la c k s s p e c i fi c i t y
. P r e s u m ab l y o u r s u p r e m e c o u r ti n c o r p o r a ted flexibi li ty int o the r ule so that it could be adapted to t he ci rcums tance presented. I believe the rule r equi res suffi ci ent
s pe c i fi c i ty to d em ons trate an ac tu al inte nt t o rel ea s e th e u nn am ed de fe nd an t. U nd er th i s s tan da rd, the Rel ea s e’s gen era l referen c e to Lowell Construction’s em ployees, age nts, and assigns probably does reflect an i ntent t o r elease offi ce worker s atcompany he ad qu arte rs w ho h ad no i nvol vem en t in th e reb ar inc i de nt. Bu t a gener ali zed refer ence to Lowell’s agents, employees, assi gns, and so fort h cann ot, in my view, be reasonably read to reflect an intent to r elease Mi l e s. F i rst o f all, Sutto n alleges that Miles personally commi tte d the to rt i ous act. Parti es intendi ng to release the princip al tor tfeasor would not likely iden tif y hi m merely as an employee, ag ent, or assi gn of Lowell—especi ally since no evid ence
s how s tha t Mi le s w as on L ow el l’ s pa yroll, th at he re c ei ved compens ation from Lowell, that he consi dered him self a Lowell employee o n the day inq ue st io n, o r t hat he had a bus iness relat i onshi p of any descri ption w i th Lowell before o r after the i nci dent. A draft er actually intendi ng to i denti fy Miles wi th “someSut to n v. M ile s

20130297-CA 15 2014 UT App 197 de gree of

s pe c i fi c i t y ” wo uld notna me Jo ne s bu t ho pe tha t Mi le s fel l w i thin agen eri cc ate gory p opu la ted w i th L ow el l e mp loye es
un rel ate d to the i nc i de nt.
¶34 I do not di sagree with the major i ty ’ s d i scu ssi on of agent s,
e mp l o y e e s, r e p r e se n t a t iv e s, a nd a ss ig ns
. B ut in m y v ie w, e v e n if under a careful readi ng of Ut ah law Mi les fi t wit hin o ne of these catego ries, I would nevert heless hold as a matter o f l a w t hat the Rel e as e d i d n ot i de nti fyhi m w i th the s pe c i fi c i ty requi red bys ec ti on 78B-5-822 an d Chi ld

.