DEFENSE 

INFRASTRUCTURE

DOD Should Improve 

Reporting and 

Communication on Its 

Corrosion Prevention 

and Control Activities

Report to Congressional Requesters 

May 2013

GAO-13-270

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-270, a report to 

congressional requesters

May 2013

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

DOD Should Improve Reporting and Communication 

on Its Corrosion Prevention and Control Activities

Why GAO Did This Study

According to DOD, corrosion can 

significantly affect the cost of facility 

maintenance and the expected service 

life of DOD facilities. While corrosion is 

not always highly visible, it can lead to 

structural failure, loss of capital 

investment, and environmental 

damage. In response to a 

congressional request, GAO reviewed 

DOD’s corrosion prevention and 

control program for facilities and 

infrastructure. In this report, GAO 

assessed the extent that DOD (1) met 

reporting requirements, (2) maintained 

accurate return-on-investment data in 

its records, and (3) fully informed 

relevant officials of its corrosion-control 

efforts. GAO reviewed DOD policies 

and plans, met with corrosion-control

officials, and visited and interviewed 

officials at 32 installations. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends five actions to 

improve DOD’s project reporting and 

tracking, the accuracy of its return-oninvestment data, and its 

communication with stakeholders on 

corrosion-control activities for facilities 

and other infrastructure. DOD partially 

concurred with three recommendations 

and did not agree with two. DOD plans 

to implement a web-based tracking tool 

to improve data timeliness and

standardization, among other actions. 

GAO continues to believe that its 

recommendations to improve project 

reporting are warranted, that the 

Corrosion Office should use its existing 

authorities to identify and implement 

other incentives for project managers 

to meet reporting milestones and that 

DOD should revise its guidance so that 

Corrosion Executives would assist with

the oversight of project reporting.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has invested more than $68 million in

80 projects in fiscal years 2005 through 2010 to demonstrate new technology 

addressing infrastructure-related corrosion, but project managers have not 

submitted all required reports on the results of these efforts to the Corrosion 

Policy and Oversight Office (Corrosion Office). The DOD Corrosion Prevention 

and Mitigation Strategic Plan requires project managers to submit a final report 

when a project is complete, and submit a follow-on report within two years after 

the military department implements the technology. As of November 2012, GAO 

found that project managers had not submitted final reports for 50 of the

80 projects (63 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2010. Also, project 

managers had not submitted follow-on reports for 15 of the 41 projects

(37 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007. GAO found that the 

Corrosion Office’s tracking system lacks key information to help ensure that 

project managers meet reporting requirements. Furthermore, the Corrosion 

Office is not fully exercising its authority to identify and implement options or 

incentives to address funding and other reasons given for not meeting reporting 

milestones. Also, GAO found inconsistency among the military departments’ 

Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives’ (Corrosion Executives) in holding 

project managers accountable for submitting the required reports. Without 

effective actions to ensure timely submission of final and follow-on reports, 

decision makers may be unaware of potentially useful technologies to address 

corrosion. 

The Corrosion Office maintains records on its infrastructure-related corrosion 

projects, including initial and reassessed return-on-investment estimates, for 

internal and external reporting, such as in DOD’s annual budget report to 

Congress. GAO found that the Corrosion Office’s records showed updates to the 

initial estimates for the proposed projects, but the office has not consistently 

updated its records to show the reassessed estimates included in the follow-on 

reports. Specifically, GAO found that the Corrosion Office did not update data in 

its records for 5 of 25 projects (20 percent) with completed follow-on reports. 

Federal internal control standards require agencies to use internal controls to 

provide assurance that they have reliable financial and other reports for internal 

and external use. Without accurate and timely data, Congress and DOD 

managers may not have reliable information on the estimated return on 

investment as they oversee corrosion projects.

DOD’s Corrosion Executives use mechanisms, such as briefings and site visits, 

to collect and disseminate information on corrosion-control activities in their 

departments; however, GAO found that slightly more than half of public works 

officials interviewed at 32 installations were unaware of DOD’s corrosion-related 

offices and resources. Under federal statute, Corrosion Executives are tasked 

with coordinating corrosion activities in their departments. GAO found that many 

relevant service officials interviewed did not receive key corrosion-control

information because their Corrosion Executives do not have targeted 

communication strategies and accompanying action plans. Without a strategy 

and action plan, managers of facilities and infrastructure may not have access to 

all available information on efficient methods for corrosion prevention and control.

View GAO-13-270. For more information, 

contact James R. McTigue Jr. at (202) 512-

7968 or mctiguej@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

Letter 1 

Background 8

DOD Has Not Ensured the Submission of All Reports on the 

Results of Its Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects 14

Corrosion Office Has Not Updated All Records to Accurately 

Reflect the Return-On-Investment Estimates in the Military 

Departments’ Follow-On Reports 22

Corrosion Executives Have Mechanisms to Disseminate 

Information, but Have Not Ensured That All Relevant Service 

Officials Receive Key Corrosion-Control Information 25

Conclusions 30

Recommendations for Executive Action 31

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33

Appendix I DOD Studies on the Cost of Corrosion for Facilities and Other 

Infrastructure 36

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 39

Appendix III Returns on Investment for DOD’s Infrastructure-Related 

Corrosion Technology Demonstration Projects 44

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 47

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 50

Related GAO Products 51

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

Tables

Table 1: Status of Final Reports for the 80 Infrastructure-Related 

Corrosion Projects Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 through 

201015

Table 2: Status of Follow-On Reports for the 41 InfrastructureRelated Corrosion Projects Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 

through 2007 16

Table 3: Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects That Had 

Discrepancies between the Reassessed Return-onInvestment Estimates in the Follow-on Reports and the 

Estimates Contained in Corrosion Office Records 24

Table 4: Estimated Expenditures to Address Corrosion of DOD 

Facilities and Other Infrastructure (by Maintenance 

Categories for Fiscal Year 2008; $ in Millions) 37

Table 5: Military Departments’ Original Return-on-Investment 

Estimates in Project Plans Compared to Return on 

Investment Shown in Follow-on Reports 45

Figures

Figure 1: Timeline for Project Submissions 10

Figure 2: Breakout of the Number of Projects That Reached 

Various Reporting Milestones (as of November 2012) 12

Figure 3: Selected Installations Where GAO Interviewed Facilities 

and Other Infrastructure Officials 43

Abbreviation

DOD Department of Defense

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Page 1 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

May 31, 2013

The Honorable Robert Wittman

Chairman

The Honorable Madeleine Z. Bordallo

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Readiness

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable J. Randy Forbes

House of Representatives

In 2013 the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that the estimated 

cost of corrosion was about $20.8 billion annually to prevent and mitigate 

corrosion of all of its assets, including military equipment, weapons, and 

facilities and other infrastructure.1 While the vast majority of these costs 

are related to corrosion issues on military equipment and weapons, the 

cost of corrosion at DOD facilities and other infrastructure2 was estimated

to be about $1.9 billion annually.3

 

1

This cost estimate, which was produced by a DOD contractor and is based on data from 

fiscal years 2006 through 2010, is the latest estimate available on DOD corrosion costs.

The vast size of DOD’s real-estate 

portfolio of more than 555,000 facilities—including barracks, 

commissaries, data centers, office buildings, laboratories, maintenance 

depots, storage tanks, and piers—and linear structures, such as 

pipelines, roads, and runways, on more than 28-million acres provides 

additional challenges for DOD in preventing and repairing damage from 

corrosion of its infrastructure. Corrosion is defined in Section 2228 of

Title 10 of the United States Code as the deterioration of a material or its 

properties due to a reaction of that material with its chemical 

2

Infrastructure is defined in Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code as all 

buildings, structures, airfields, port facilities, surface and subterranean utility systems, 

heating and cooling systems, fuel tanks, pavements, and bridges.

3

The estimate of the annual cost of corrosion for DOD facilities and other infrastructure 

was produced by a DOD contractor and is based on data from fiscal years 2007 and 2008. 

This is the latest estimate available on DOD corrosion costs for facilities and other 

infrastructure. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

environment.4

Congress has taken a series of legislative actions aimed at enhancing 

DOD’s ability to effectively address corrosion prevention and mitigation 

and provide the Congress with greater transparency over the 

department’s efforts. In 2002, Congress passed legislation that led to the 

creation of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (hereafter 

referred to as the Corrosion Office) within the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The 

Corrosion Office is responsible for the prevention and mitigation of 

corrosion of military equipment and infrastructure.

Corrosion is not always highly visible; nevertheless, it can 

lead to structural failure, loss of capital investment, and environmental 

damage.

5

 

4

Corrosion takes varied forms such as rusting; pitting; galvanic reaction; calcium or other 

mineral buildup; degradation due to ultraviolet light exposure; and mold, mildew, or other 

organic decay.

Among other things, 

Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code requires the Secretary 

of Defense to develop and implement a long-term strategy to reduce 

corrosion and the effects of corrosion on the military equipment and 

infrastructure of the department, including, among other things,

(1) expansion of emphasis on corrosion prevention and mitigation to 

include infrastructure; (2) uniform application of requirements and criteria 

for testing and certifying new technologies for equipment and 

infrastructure with similar characteristics, missions or operating 

environments; and (3) implementation of programs to ensure a focused 

and coordinated approach to collect, review, validate, and distribute 

information on proven corrosion prevention methods and products. 

Additionally, the statute requires the Secretary of Defense to annually 

submit, along with the defense budget materials, a report to Congress on 

corrosion funding, including funding requirements for the long-term 

5

The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required the 

Secretary of Defense to designate an officer, employee, board, or committee as the 

individual or office with this responsibility. See Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 1067 (2002) 

(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2228). The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2008 amended this requirement by designating the Director of Corrosion Policy and 

Oversight as the official with these responsibilities. See Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 371 (2008) 

(amending 10 U.S.C.§ 2228).
 

Page 3 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

strategy, and including the returns on investment6

In 2008, section 903 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 required the Departments of Army, 

Navy and Air Force to each designate a Corrosion Control and Prevention 

Executive (hereafter referred to as Corrosion Executive) to be the senior 

official in each military department with responsibility for coordinating 

department-level corrosion prevention and control program activities.

for corrosion-control 

technology demonstration projects.

7

To carry out its responsibilities, the Corrosion Office took a number of 

actions, including the development of an instruction to establish policy, 

assign responsibilities and provide guidance for corrosion prevention and 

control within DOD; and development of a strategic plan to describe 

policies, strategies, objectives and plans aimed toward an effective

DOD-wide approach to prevent and mitigate corrosion of military 

equipment and infrastructure. Additionally, the Corrosion Office and 

military departments have identified and funded corrosion projects in 

which the military departments demonstrated new technology to address 

Section 903, among other things, assigned responsibility to the three 

Corrosion Executives for (1) coordinating department-level corrosion 

prevention and control activities (including budget programming) with the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the program executive officers of the 

military departments, and relevant major subordinate commands of each 

military department; (2) ensuring that corrosion prevention and control is 

maintained in each department’s policy and guidance, including military 

infrastructure design, construction, and maintenance; (3) identifying the 

funding levels necessary for accomplishing certain corrosion-related 

priorities in each department, and (4) submitting an annual report to the 

Secretary of Defense with recommendations pertaining to the corrosion 

prevention and control program of each department. Section 903 also 

designated each military department’s Corrosion Executive as that 

department’s principal point of contact with the Director of the Corrosion 

Office.

 

6

While the statute does not define “return on investment” for its corrosion-control 

technology demonstration projects, DOD defines the estimated return on investment as 

the ratio of the present value of benefits to the present value of the project’s total cost.

7

The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. 

No.110-417, § 903 (2008).
 

Page 4 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

corrosion, and the Corrosion Office has required military departments’ 

project managers to submit periodic reports on the status and outcomes 

of these projects.

We have examined DOD’s corrosion issues for a number of years and 

this is our first report focusing on DOD’s corrosion-control activities for 

DOD facilities and other infrastructure, including projects to demonstrate 

new technology that can prevent or mitigate corrosion.8 In response to 

your request, GAO reviewed DOD’s corrosion prevention and mitigation 

program for facilities and other infrastructure. This report addresses

(1) the extent to which the military services have met DOD requirements 

to submit reports on corrosion technology demonstration projects; (2) the 

extent to which the return-on-investment data submitted by the military 

departments is accurately reflected in records maintained by the 

Corrosion Office; and (3) the extent to which DOD’s corrosion-control 

officials have fully informed relevant officials within each department 

about efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion of facilities and other 

infrastructure. We also provide information on the results of the Corrosion 

Office-sponsored cost-of-corrosion studies of DOD facilities and other 

infrastructure (see app. I).9

To address our first objective, we obtained project information on 80 

infrastructure-related corrosion projects proposed by the military 

departments and approved for funding by the Corrosion Office for fiscal 

years 2005 through 2010.10

 

8

This review of corrosion issues related to DOD’s facilities and other infrastructure is part 

of a larger body of work that we are doing on DOD’s corrosion-control program. GAO also 

has an ongoing review to examine DOD’s corrosion projects involving military equipment.

We reviewed project documentation—project 

plans, bimonthly or quarterly status reports, final project reports, and 

project follow-on reports—to determine if reports were submitted and the 

data met the Corrosion Office’s reporting requirements. To assess the 

reliability of the data, we met with Corrosion Office officials to identify the 

9

DOD’s Corrosion Office sponsors a series of studies to assess the cost of corrosion 

throughout the department, including how much is spent on DOD’s corrosion activities for 

facilities and other infrastructure. These studies are conducted by LMI, a private, not-forprofit corporation, using a method approved by the Corrosion Office’s Corrosion 

Prevention and Control Integrated Product Team. We did not, however, independently 

review the methodology used by LMI or identify any limitations of these studies.

10There are an additional 25 corrosion projects funded in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, 

which were not yet completed.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

process by which DOD generated and tracked project data, and we 

reviewed the documents for any missing data, outliers, or other errors.

If the military departments did not provide the required information, we 

interviewed the Corrosion Executives and the military departments’ 

research and development officials (project managers)—who were the 

principal authors and points of contact for the facilities and other 

infrastructure projects—to determine their rationale for not completing the 

required reports. According to the DOD Corrosion Prevention and 

Mitigation Strategic Plan, a final report must be submitted when each 

demonstration project is completed. According to Corrosion Office 

officials, each demonstration project typically is completed within two 

years after the receipt of funding. For the purposes of our work in 

reviewing projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2010, we 

considered a final report to be submitted if the Corrosion Office had a 

copy of the report in its records system. We did not consider the 

timeliness of the submitted reports. Additionally, the DOD strategic plan 

requires that follow-on reports be submitted for completed projects within 

two years after the projects have been completed and transitioned to use 

within the military departments According to Corrosion Office officials, the 

transition period to implement the demonstrated technology in a military 

department can be up to one year. As a result, for follow-on reports, we 

could assess only the projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 

(41 of the 80 projects). For completed projects, we documented the initial 

return-on-investment estimates shown in the project plans and the 

resulting change, if any, shown in the follow-on reports. We determined 

that the project reporting data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

determining the extent to which the military departments met the 

Corrosion Office’s reporting requirements, but we did not determine the 

timeliness of the reports or assess elements of reports.

The DOD strategic plan uses the phrase “return-on-investment validation” 

to describe how project managers recompute the return-on-investment 

estimate included in a project’s follow-on report. This recomputation is 

based on revised cost data after the project has been completed and the 

new technology has been transitioned to the services’ use and tracked for 

two years. We are using the terms “reassessment” or “reassessed” rather 

than “validation” or “validated” because they more closely describe the 

process that the project managers are to use to review and update, if 

necessary, the assumptions used to recompute the initial return-oninvestment estimate. Additionally, Corrosion Office officials told us that 

they are planning to use the term “reassessment” in the revised DOD 

strategic plan. The reassessment is not an update based on actual results 

of the cost savings achieved by the project.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

To address our second objective, for all 105 infrastructure-related 

corrosion projects funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2012, we 

compared the return-on-investment estimates found in the project plans 

with the return-on-investment estimates maintained in the Corrosion 

Office’s records to determine if any inconsistencies existed in the data. 

When we found inconsistencies between the return-on-investment 

estimates in the project plans and the Corrosion Office’s records, we 

asked the Corrosion Office to explain the inconsistencies and provide 

additional information to help reconcile the differences in the estimates. 

Further, we compared the return-on-investment estimates maintained in 

the Corrosion Office’s records for projects funded in fiscal years 2005 

through 2007 with the return-on-investment estimates contained in the 

military departments’ follow-on reports to check for any differences 

between the two sets of records.

To address our third objective, we reviewed related guidance, documents, 

policies, and procedures regarding the management of DOD’s corrosion 

prevention and mitigation program. We interviewed officials at various 

levels within DOD—Corrosion Office officials, Corrosion Executives, the 

military services’ installation management commands, and facility and 

infrastructure managers within the services’ civil engineering and public 

works components—to discuss their corrosion prevention and control 

efforts, including challenges and successes in implementing new 

corrosion technologies. We selected a nonprobability sample of

32 installations; conducted site visits with 6 of these 32 military 

installations11 and completed semistructured interviews via conference 

calls with the other 26 military installations to collect information and 

views from facility and infrastructure management officials about their 

corrosion management efforts. In selecting the 32 installations for our 

nonprobability sample,12

 

11Site visits to three of the installations were completed prior to the development of our 

semistructured interview questionnaire.

we limited the installations for selection to those 

active-duty installations with at least 25 buildings owned by the federal 

government and ensured a range of locations were selected from each of 

the four military services and across the geographic regions of the United 

12Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a 

population because in a nonprobability sample some elements of the population being 

studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
 

Page 7 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

States.13 Our selection criteria also included the selection of installations 

with different environmental conditions,14 some joint bases, and 

installations that participated in the Corrosion Office’s corrosion 

technologies demonstration projects. The purpose of our semistructured 

interviews was to understand how the installation officials (1) use policies, 

plans, and procedures to identify and address corrosion; (2) address 

corrosion prevention and mitigation; (3) determine their maintenance and 

sustainment priorities; and (4) receive and disseminate information on 

relevant corrosion topics.15

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to May 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We determined that the data used to select 

the installations included in our review were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of selecting our nonprobability sample. We provide more details 

about installation selection methodology and data-collection efforts in our 

scope and methodology section in appendix II.

 

13We used the four geographic regions of the United States as defined by the U. S. 

Census Bureau.

14The Corrosion Office provided an environmental severity index level for each 

installation. The environmental severity index is derived from a database developed by the 

research firm Battelle with the corrosion rates of various metals exposed to different 

environmental conditions found at military bases throughout the world. The DOD 

Corrosion Office, for its fiscal year 2012 cost of corrosion study of DOD facilities and other 

infrastructure, utilized the corrosion rates for steel and developed an environmental 

severity index on a scale of 1 through 20 to show the impact of corrosion in different 

locations, with 1 being least severe and 20 being the most severe environmental 

conditions.

15The results of the semistructured interviews are not generalizable because we used a 

nonprobability sample to select participants for these interviews.
 

Page 8 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

DOD submitted the first version of its long-term corrosion strategy to 

Congress in December 2003. DOD developed this long-term strategy in 

response to direction in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2003.16

In January 2008, the department first issued DOD Instruction 5000.67, 

Prevention and Mitigation of Corrosion on DOD Military Equipment and 

Infrastructure, which was canceled and reissued with the same title in 

February 2010.

In November 2004, DOD revised its long-term 

corrosion strategy and issued its DOD Corrosion Prevention and 

Mitigation Strategic Plan. DOD strives to update its strategic plan 

periodically, most recently in February 2011, and officials stated the next 

update in planned for 2013. The purpose of DOD’s strategic plan is to 

articulate policies, strategies, objectives and plans that will ensure an 

effective, standardized, affordable DOD-wide approach to prevent, detect 

and treat corrosion and its effects on military equipment and 

infrastructure.

17 The stated purpose of the instruction is to establish 

policy, assign responsibilities, and provide guidance for the establishment 

and management of programs to prevent or mitigate corrosion of DOD’s 

military equipment and infrastructure. This instruction describes legislative 

requirements and assigns the Corrosion Executives responsibility for 

certain corrosion prevention and control activities in their respective 

military departments. It requires the Corrosion Executives to submit 

information on proposed corrosion projects to the Corrosion Office with 

coordination through the proper military department’s chain of command, 

as well as to develop support, and provide the rationale for resources to 

initiate and sustain effective corrosion prevention and mitigation programs 

in each military department.

According to statute and DOD guidance, the Director of the Corrosion 

Office is responsible for the prevention and mitigation of corrosion of DOD 

equipment and infrastructure. The Director’s duties include developing 

 

16Pub. L. 107-314, § 1067.

17Department of Defense Instruction 5000.67, Prevention and Mitigation of Corrosion on 

DOD Military Equipment and Infrastructure (Feb. 1, 2010).

Background 

DOD’s Strategic Planning 

and Guidance for 

Corrosion Prevention and 

Control 

Corrosion Office 

Operations 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

and recommending policy guidance on corrosion control, reviewing the 

corrosion-control programs and funding levels proposed by the Secretary 

of each military department during DOD’s internal annual budget review, 

and submitting recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding 

those programs and proposed funding levels. In addition, the Director of 

the Corrosion Office periodically holds meetings with the DOD Corrosion 

Board of Directors and serves as the lead on the Corrosion Prevention 

and Control Integrated Product Team.18

To accomplish its oversight and coordination responsibilities, the 

Corrosion Office has ongoing efforts to improve the awareness, 

prevention and mitigation of corrosion of military equipment and 

infrastructure, including (1) hosting triannual corrosion forums;

(2) conducting cost-of-corrosion studies; (3) operating two corrosion 

websites; (4) publishing an electronic newsletter; (5) working with industry 

and academia to develop training courses and new corrosion 

technologies; and (6) providing funding for corrosion-control 

demonstration projects proposed and implemented by the military 

departments. According to the Corrosion Office, these corrosion activities 

enhance and institutionalize the corrosion prevention and mitigation 

program within DOD.

The Corrosion Prevention and 

Control Integrated Product Team includes representatives from the 

military departments, the Joint Staff, and other stakeholders who help 

accomplish the various corrosion-control goals and objectives. This team 

also includes the seven Working Integrated Product Teams which 

implement corrosion prevention and control activities. These seven 

product teams are organized to address the following areas: corrosion 

policy, processes, procedures and oversight; metrics, impact, and 

sustainment; specifications, standards, and qualification process; training 

and certification; communications and outreach; science and technology; 

and facilities. Appendix A of the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation 

Strategic Plan contains action plans for each product team, including 

policies, objectives, strategies, planned actions and results to date.

 

18The Corrosion Executives for each of the military departments are members of the 

Corrosion Board of Directors, and they or their delegates are participants on DOD’s 

Corrosion Prevention and Control Integrated Product Team. The Corrosion Board of 

Directors is not identified in the DOD strategic plan; however, Army and Navy corrosion 

documents acknowledge their Corrosion Executives’ membership on the Corrosion Board.
 

Page 10 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

To receive funding from the Corrosion Office, the military departments 

submit project plans for their proposed projects that are evaluated by a 

panel of experts assembled by the Director of the Corrosion Office. The 

Corrosion Office generally funds up to $500,000 per project, and the 

military departments generally pledge matching funding for each project 

that they propose.19

Figure 1: Timeline for Project Submissions

The level of funding by each military department and 

the estimated return on investment are two of the criteria used to evaluate 

the proposed projects. Appendix D of the DOD Corrosion Prevention and 

Mitigation Strategic Plan includes instructions for submitting project plans, 

along with instructions for submission of final and follow-on reports. For 

the project selection process, the military departments submit preliminary 

project proposals in the fall and final project proposals in the spring, and 

the Corrosion Office considers the final proposals for funding. Projects 

that meet the Corrosion Office’s criteria for funding are announced at the 

end of the fiscal year. Figure 1 provides additional details of the project 

selection process for a given fiscal year.

As part of the project selection process, DOD’s strategic plan states that 

the estimated return on investment, among other things, must be 

 

19According to officials of the Corrosion Office and the Corrosion Executives, the military 

departments’ matching funds may be more or less than 50 percent of total costs.
 

Page 11 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

documented for each proposed project. The total cost for each project is 

based on both the funding requested from the Corrosion Office and the 

funding provided by the military departments. DOD records reflect varying 

estimated returns on investment and savings for each proposed project 

submitted by the military departments. According to the Corrosion Office, 

a senior official within each military department reviews the proposed 

projects, including the estimated return on investment, before the project 

plans are submitted to the Corrosion Office. Section 2228 of Title 10 of 

the United States Code requires the Secretary of Defense to include the 

expected return on investment that would be achieved by implementing 

the department’s long-term strategy for corrosion, including available 

validated data on return on investment for completed corrosion projects 

and activities, in his annual corrosion-control budget report to Congress.

DOD’s strategic plan stipulates three reporting requirements for approved 

projects. According to Corrosion Office officials, the project managers 

typically are responsible for completing the reporting requirements. The 

requirements are to: (1) provide bimonthly or quarterly project updates 

until the project is completed,20 (2) submit a final report as soon as each 

project is completed,21 and (3) submit a follow-on report within two years 

after a project is completed and the technology has transitioned to use 

within the military department.22

Figure 2 provides a breakout of the number of projects that have reached 

various reporting milestones as of November 2012. There were

105 infrastructure-related corrosion projects funded from fiscal years 

2005 through 2012, in which

• 41 projects had reached the milestone for submitting final and followon reports, including return-on-investment reassessments;

 

20From fiscal years 2005 through 2009, DOD’s strategic plan required the military 

departments to provide bimonthly updates for all incomplete corrosion projects. Since 

fiscal year 2010, the Corrosion Office has required updates on a quarterly basis.

21Corrosion Office officials stated that these reports typically are due within two years after 

each demonstration project receives funding.

22According to Corrosion Office officials, the transition period to implement the 

demonstrated technology in a military department can be up to one year and that they 

expect the follow-on reports to be completed within five years of a project receiving initial 

funding. 

Reporting Requirements
 

Page 12 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

• 39 projects had reached only the milestone for submitting final 

reports; and

• 25 projects were not yet complete, thus they have not reached the 

milestone for submitting final or follow-on reports.

Figure 2: Breakout of the Number of Projects That Reached Various Reporting Milestones (as of November 2012)
 

Page 13 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

In September 2012, we reported that the Corrosion Office performs an 

analysis to determine the average return-on-investment estimates for 

projects that it cites in its annual corrosion-control budget report to 

Congress.23 Additionally, we reported that the Corrosion Office did not 

use the most up-to-date data for the projects’ returns on investment or 

provide support for the projects’ average return on investment that was 

cited in its fiscal year 2013 corrosion-control budget report to Congress. 

We recommended that DOD provide an explanation of its return-oninvestment methodology and analysis, including the initial and, to the 

extent available, the reassessed return-on-investment estimates. 

However, DOD did not agree with our recommendation. In its written 

comments, DOD generally restated the methodology in its strategic plan, 

which the military departments use to estimate the projected return on 

investment of each project. DOD did not provide any additional reasons 

why it did not use current return-on-investment estimates in its report to 

Congress. Additionally, in our December 2010 review, we recommended 

that DOD update applicable guidance, such as Instruction 5000.67, to 

further define the responsibilities of the Corrosion Executives to include 

more specific oversight and review of corrosion project plans before and 

during the selection process.24 However, DOD did not agree with our 

recommendation and stated that DOD-level policy documents are highlevel documents that delineate responsibilities to carry out the policy and 

that specific implementing guidance is provided through separate 

documentation. Further, in some of our earlier work, we reported that the 

secretaries of the military departments did not have procedures and 

milestones to hold major commands and program offices accountable for 

achieving strategic goals to address corrosion regarding facilities and 

weapons systems.25

 

23GAO, Defense Management: The Department of Defense’s Annual Corrosion Budget 

Report Does Not Include Some Required Information,

DOD agreed with our recommendations to define 

and incorporate measurable, outcome-oriented objectives and 

performance measures into its long-term corrosion mitigation strategy that 

show progress toward achieving results. Additionally, in May 2013 GAO 

GAO-12-823R (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 10, 2012).

24GAO, Defense Management: DOD Has a Rigorous Process to Select Corrosion 

Prevention Projects, but Would Benefit from Clearer Guidance and Validation of Returns 

on Investment, GAO-11-84 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 8, 2010).

25GAO, Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and Increase 

Readiness, GAO-03-753 (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003).

Prior GAO Work on DOD’s 

Corrosion Prevention and 

Control Program
 

Page 14 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

issued a separate report assessing DOD’s and the military departments’ 

strategic plans.26 All the related GAO products are listed at the end of this 

report.

DOD has not ensured that all final and follow-on reports on the results of 

its infrastructure-related corrosion projects were submitted as required by 

its strategic plan. As of November 2012, our review found that project 

managers had not submitted the required final reports for 50 of the 80 

projects (over 60 percent) funded from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. 

Also, for 41 of the 80 projects that were funded from 2005 through 2007, 

we found that the project managers had not submitted the required followon reports for more than a third of the projects (15 of the 41 projects). 

DOD’s Corrosion Office, the military departments’ Corrosion Executives, 

and the military departments’ project managers cited various reasons for 

not meeting reporting milestones. DOD’s Corrosion Office has not 

effectively used its existing authority to hold project management offices 

accountable for submitting required reports at prescribed milestones and 

the office lacks an effective method for tracking reports submitted by the 

project managers. Moreover, DOD has not provided clear guidance to the 

military departments’ Corrosion Executives on their responsibilities and 

authorities for assisting the Corrosion Office in holding their project 

management offices accountable for submitting reports for their 

infrastructure-related corrosion projects.

DOD has invested more than $68 million in 80 infrastructure-related 

corrosion projects funded from fiscal years 2005 through 2010, but project 

managers have not submitted all of the required reports on whether the 

corrosion-control technologies are effective.27 DOD’s strategic plan28

 

26GAO, Defense Management: Additional Information Needed to Improve Military 

Departments’ Corrosion Prevention Strategies, 

states that project plans should include a milestone schedule for 

reporting, including quarterly status reports, final reports and follow-on 

GAO-13-379 (Washington, D.C.:

May 16, 2013). 

27DOD also invested $13 million in 25 additional corrosion projects funded in fiscal years 

2011 and 2012. These DOD expenditures have not been adjusted for inflation. We did not 

review these 25 projects because their reporting milestones had not occurred.

28Department of Defense, Department of Defense Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation 

Strategic Plan, Appendix D (Washington, D.C.: 2011).

DOD Has Not 

Ensured the 

Submission of All 

Reports on the 

Results of Its 

Infrastructure-Related 

Corrosion Projects 

Project Managers Have 

Not Submitted Many Final 

and Follow-On Reports
 

Page 15 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

reports. According to Corrosion Office officials, if a project is approved, a 

quarterly status report is required starting the first week of the fiscal 

quarter after the contract award and every three months thereafter until 

the final report is submitted.29

Corrosion Office officials stated that project managers must submit final 

reports at project completion, which is typically within two years after the 

receipt of the funding of each project. As stipulated in DOD’s strategic 

plan, final reports should include certain content, such as an executive 

summary, lessons learned, recommendations, and conclusions. However, 

we found that 50 of the 80 required final reports (63 percent) for projects 

funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2010 had not been submitted. Table 1 

shows the status of final reports submitted by each service for 

infrastructure-related projects.

Also, DOD’s strategic plan requires a final 

report at project completion, and requires a follow-on report two years 

after project completion and transition to use within the military 

departments. According to Corrosion Office officials, these reports 

provide valuable information on the results of corrosion projects and in 

planning future projects.

Table 1: Status of Final Reports for the 80 Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 through 

2010

Military department 

Total number of 

projects

Number of submitted 

final reports

Number of outstanding 

final reports

Percent of outstanding 

final reports

Army 55 21 34 62

Navy 24 9 15 63 

Air Force 1 0 1 100

Total 80 30 50 63

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Data as of November 2012.

 

29From fiscal years 2005 through 2009, DOD’s strategic plan required the military 

departments to provide bimonthly updates for all incomplete corrosion projects. Since 

fiscal year 2010, the Corrosion Office has required updates on a quarterly basis. Our 

limited review of the projects that required the bimonthly/quarterly updates found that the 

updates were submitted as required.

Over 60 Percent of Final 

Reports Have Not Been 

Submitted
 

Page 16 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

DOD’s strategic plan also requires that follow-on reports be submitted 

within two years after a project is completed and transitioned to use in the 

military department. According to Corrosion Office officials, this transition 

period includes up to one year to implement the technology in a military 

department. Corrosion Office officials also told us that they expected the 

follow-on reports to be submitted within five years of a project’s initial 

funding. Therefore, follow-on reports for 41 completed projects funded in 

fiscal years 2005 through 2007 were due on or before the end of fiscal 

year 2012. We found that project managers had not submitted 15 of the 

41 required follow-on reports (37 percent). DOD’s strategic plan states 

that the follow-on reports should include an assessment of the following 

areas: project documentation, project assumptions, responses to mission 

requirements, performance expectations, and a comparison between the 

initial return-on-investment estimate included in the project plan with the 

new estimate. Table 2 shows the status of follow-on reports submitted by 

each service. In Appendix III of this report, we provide details of the 

returns on investment for all follow-on reports that were submitted.30

Table 2: Status of Follow-On Reports for the 41 Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 

through 2007

Military department 

Total number of 

projects

Number of submitted 

follow-on reports

Number of outstanding 

follow-on reports

Percent of outstanding 

follow-on reports

Army 28 15 13 46

Navy 12 11 1 8 

Air Force 1 0 1 100

Total 41 26 15 37

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: The total of 26 submitted follow-on reports includes one Army project that did not warrant the 

completion of a follow-on report, according to its final report. Data as of November 2012.

According to officials in the Corrosion Office, final and follow-on reports 

are used to assess the effectiveness of the corrosion projects and 

determine if continued implementation of the technology is useful. As 

Corrosion Office officials review project managers’ final reports, they 

stated that they focus on any lessons learned, technical findings, 

 

30For its corrosion-control technology demonstration projects, DOD defines the estimated 

return on investment as the ratio of the present value of benefits to the present value of 

the project’s total cost.

More than a Third of Follow-On 

Reports Have Not Been 

Submitted
 

Page 17 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

conclusions and recommendations, and whether the results from the 

report should trigger follow-on investigations of specific technology and a 

review for broader applications of the technology. Officials stated that 

they review follow-on reports to assure that necessary implementation 

actions have been taken and to review changes in the return-oninvestment estimates.

The military departments and Corrosion Office provided various reasons 

to explain why project managers did not complete and submit mandatory 

final and follow-on reports within expected timeframes. For example, 

officials at the Army Engineering Research Development Center, 

Construction Engineering Research Laboratory—who are the project 

managers for Army infrastructure projects—stated that funding 

challenges, problems with contractor performance, and personnel issues 

contributed to delays in completing the final reports, but acknowledged 

that it was their responsibility to reduce their longstanding backlog. 

Additionally, according to the Navy’s Corrosion Executive, officials of the 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command (Engineering Support Center)—

who are the project managers for Navy infrastructure projects—did not 

have sufficient funding to complete and submit all required reports. 

Finally, according to a Corrosion Office official, the final report for the one 

Air Force fiscal year 2005 project was not submitted because the project 

manager did not complete it before retiring.

Additionally, Corrosion Office officials cited other reasons that a project 

manager may be late in completing the required reports, such as lengthy 

coordination processes and the lack of priority that military departments’ 

officials place on completing required reports. The officials stated that 

they expect the military departments’ project managers to complete final 

reports within two years after receipt of funds, and it is the military 

departments’ responsibility to plan so that funding is available to complete 

all required reports. To assist the military departments with their 

responsibility, the Corrosion Office in fiscal year 2011 offered personnel 

and funding resources to the military departments to conduct the returnon-investment reassessments needed to complete follow-on reports.

According to the Corrosion Office, only the Navy accepted the funds to 

complete all but one return-on-investment reassessment. According to an 

official in the Army Corrosion Executive’s office, he informed the project 

managers about the additional funding, but no one accepted the offer. We 

found at least four fiscal year 2006 projects where Army project managers 

did not use the available funding to complete and submit the required 

reports. Officials from the Army’s project management office told us that 

Corrosion Office and 

Military Departments 

Cited Various Reasons

for Project Managers 

Not Submitting Reports
 

Page 18 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

the project managers did not accept the additional funding to complete 

the 2006 projects because they had some work performance issues with 

the contractor assigned to complete the return-on-investment 

reassessments. In April 2012, these officials told us that follow-on reports 

for three projects were written but have not been submitted to the 

Corrosion Office, and the remaining follow-on report was still under 

development. As of November 2012, we found that these reports, which 

were due by the end of fiscal year 2011, still had not been submitted to 

the Corrosion Office. Further, the Air Force did not complete the follow-on 

report for its one corrosion project funded in fiscal year 2005. According 

to Corrosion Office officials, they did not require the Air Force to complete 

the follow-on report for this project because the demonstration was 

successful and the technology was implemented elsewhere within DOD.

Corrosion Office officials told us that they track each corrosion project’s 

progress and review submitted final and follow-on reports for findings and 

broad application of corrosion-prevention techniques and approaches, 

including changes in the project’s initial and reassessed return-oninvestment estimates. However, the Corrosion Office’s tracking system is 

limited and does not record the reason for late reporting or set new 

reporting deadlines. According to Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United 

States Code, the Secretary of Defense is required to report specific 

information including the expected return on investment that would be 

achieved by implementing the department’s long-term strategy for 

corrosion, including available validated data on return on investment for 

completed corrosion projects and activities, in his annual corrosioncontrol budget report to Congress. The Standards for Internal Control in 

the Federal Government require federal managers to establish internal 

control activities, such as controls over information processing, 

segregation of duties, and accurate and timely recording of transactions 

and events—including pertinent information to determine whether they 

are meeting their goals—to help ensure that management’s directives are 

carried out and managers achieve desired results through effective 

stewardship of public resources.31

 

31GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999).

Corrosion Office’s 

Tracking System Does 

Not Ensure That Project 

Managers Submit Required 

Reports 
 

Page 19 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

Specifically, the Corrosion Office employs a contractor to maintain 

electronic records about all corrosion projects. Corrosion Office officials 

stated that project managers submit copies of their reports to the 

Corrosion Office and to the respective Corrosion Executive. On a monthly 

basis, the contractor checks each project’s records to determine if the 

project managers have submitted the required reports. If a project 

manager has not submitted a required report, the contractor notifies the 

Corrosion Office and that office contacts the relevant project manager 

and that manager’s Corrosion Executive. At that point, a Corrosion Office 

official encourages project managers to submit the report as soon as 

possible, but the Corrosion Office does not record a reason for late 

reporting and does not set a new reporting deadline. Also, the Corrosion

Office officials stated that they elevate discussions about late filers in the 

three forums held each year that include meetings between Corrosion 

Office officials and Corrosion Executives. However, the Corrosion Office’s 

tracking system does not require that the project managers include 

certain information, such as stating reasons for missing a reporting 

deadline and identifying a revised deadline for submitting their reports. 

Additionally, the format developed by the Corrosion Office for completing 

the follow-on reports does not include a data field that would document 

when the project managers submitted their follow-on reports to the office. 

By not adopting an enhanced tracking system that includes revised 

deadlines, among other things, the Corrosion Office is unable to 

effectively monitor whether project managers are working toward new 

timeframes to complete overdue reports. Without effective tracking, the 

Corrosion Office will allow a number of project managers to continue the 

practice of not submitting the required reports and project managers will 

not fully inform decision makers of the latest outcomes of the corrosioncontrol projects.

Section 2228 of Title 10 of the United States Code requires the Secretary 

of Defense to develop and implement a long-term corrosion strategy that 

should include, among other things, implementation of programs to 

ensure a focused and coordinated approach to collect, review, validate, 

and distribute information on proven corrosion prevention methods and 

products. In response to this requirement, the Corrosion Office oversees 

corrosion projects and uses routine communication methods and followup to encourage the project management offices to submit the required 

reports, but the office is not employing other options that would hold 

project management offices accountable for reporting milestones. For 

example, Corrosion Office officials stated that they have initiated 

telephone conversations and e-mails to project managers to reemphasize 

Corrosion Office Uses 

Routine Communication 

Methods to Encourage 

Project Management 

Offices to Submit Required 

Reports, but Has Not 

Employed Other Options
 

Page 20 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

reporting requirements and have had limited success in obtaining some of 

the outstanding reports. However, there are other options beyond routine 

communications that the Corrosion Office could take to make project 

managers accountable for submitting timely reports, such as using 

funding incentives or changing evaluation criteria for project selection. 

Corrosion Office officials told us that they considered holding back 

funding for future projects from project management organizations that 

missed reporting deadlines, but they chose not to implement this action 

because it could delay progress in addressing corrosion control within the 

department. Although the Corrosion Office in 2011 offered the military 

departments additional funding to complete and submit follow-on reports, 

Corrosion Office officials stated that they would not set aside a portion of 

its annual funds in the future to assist project management offices in the 

completion of outstanding reports due to uncertainty in annual funding.

Further, a senior Corrosion Office official stated that the office has 

considered but not adopted criteria for new projects that would include a 

project management office’s past reporting performance as an indicator 

for assessing corrosion project plans. DOD’s strategic plan refers to 

factors that are used by the evaluation panel to assess project plans and 

determine which to approve and fund. The evaluation factors, among 

other things, include whether the proposed project can be completed 

within a two-year timeframe, the risk associated with the project, and the 

estimated return on investment. The senior Corrosion Office official told 

us that the office has considered including a factor that would assess a 

project management office’s history of reporting performance as a 

criterion for deciding whether to approve and fund the office’s future 

projects; however, the office decided not to do so. The official stated that 

a successful project is one that reduces the impact of corrosion on 

weapon systems and/or infrastructure, and a project’s report in and of 

itself does not contribute to the success of the project. However, late 

submissions of reports could delay communication of project outcomes as 

planners are considering funding new projects, as well as limit key 

information that should be included in the annual corrosion-control budget 

report to Congress. The Corrosion Office has not implemented other 

options to better ensure that project managers consistently submit 

required reports. Internal control standards emphasize the importance of 

performance-based management to ensure program effectiveness, 

efficiency, and good stewardship of government resources. Without using 

its existing authorities for oversight and coordination to identify and 

implement possible options or incentives for addressing the various 

funding, personnel, or other reasons cited by project management offices 

for not meeting reporting milestones, the Corrosion Office may be missing 
 

Page 21 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

opportunities to effectively reduce the number of outstanding reports, 

enforce requirements, and ensure that the valuable information in past 

projects is known and appropriately documented.

The three military departments’ Corrosion Executives work with project 

managers for the infrastructure-related corrosion projects to ensure that 

the reporting requirements are being met; however, they have not taken 

effective actions to ensure that all project managers submit their required 

reports on a timely basis. DOD Instruction 5000.67 describes 

responsibilities for Corrosion Executives, such as being the principal 

points of contact for each military department to the Director of the 

Corrosion Office, developing, supporting, and providing the rationale for 

resources for initiating and sustaining effective corrosion prevention and 

control in the department, evaluating the effectiveness of each 

department’s program, and establishing a process to collect information 

on the results of corrosion prevention and control activities.

While DOD’s strategic plan and other guidance—such as its corrosion 

instruction—identify the Corrosion Executives’ overall role in the 

management of each military department’s corrosion prevention and 

control program, the Corrosion Executives do not have clearly defined 

roles for holding their project managers accountable for submitting 

required reports. During our discussions with the military departments’ 

Corrosion Executives, we found that each executive varied in describing 

the extent of his work with corrosion project managers to ensure that the 

required reports are completed. For example, officials within the office of 

the Army’s Corrosion Executive told us that they are involved in all 

aspects of the corrosion demonstration project and receive updates and 

reports from the Army’s project managers. Also, these officials stated that 

they are in the process of developing additional policy on facilities and 

other infrastructure to improve the corrosion project process and provide 

an Army funding mechanism to cover costs of reporting after expiration of 

initial project funding. However, for the infrastructure-related corrosion 

projects, the other two military departments have not been as involved as 

the Army in ensuring that project managers submit required reports. For 

example, the Air Force’s Corrosion Executive stated that he coordinates 

with the Corrosion Office to track outstanding reports and can task the 

project managers to complete the required reports by going through the 

appropriate chain of command. Also, the Navy’s Corrosion Executive told 

us that he maintains a level of awareness on the status of projects’ 

reports, but does not play an active role in the submission of project 

Corrosion Executives 

Have Not Taken Consistent 

Actions to Ensure Timely 

Submission of Required 

Reports 
 

Page 22 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

reports because project managers have the responsibility to submit 

reports to the Corrosion Office.

DOD’s strategic plan and instruction assign specific responsibilities to the 

Corrosion Executives; however, these documents do not clearly define a 

role for the Corrosion Executives in ensuring that all project managers 

submit mandatory reports. Without clearly defined responsibilities for the 

Corrosion Executives to help ensure required reporting, the Corrosion 

Executives may not take a leading role in holding project managers 

accountable for completing and submitting mandatory reports. If a 

number of project managers continue to be late in completing mandatory 

reports, decision makers are unlikely to be fully informed about whether 

implemented projects used effective technology to address corrosion 

issues and whether this technology could have broader uses throughout 

the military departments’ installations.

The Corrosion Office maintains data for its infrastructure-related corrosion 

projects, but the office has not updated all of its records to accurately 

reflect the return-on-investment estimates that are provided in the military 

departments’ follow-on reports. The data maintained by the Corrosion 

Office includes the financial investments provided by the Corrosion Office 

and the military departments, the estimated savings expected, and the 

calculated return-on-investment estimates for all of the military 

departments’ funded and unfunded corrosion projects. Additionally, for 

each project, the Corrosion Office maintains data on whether the project 

managers have completed and submitted the required follow-on report 

and the value of the reassessed return-on-investment estimate in that 

follow-on report. The follow-on report shows, among other things, a 

comparison of the new estimate and the initial return-on-investment 

estimate included in the project plan. According to Corrosion Office 

officials, the data contained in its records system are used for reporting 

purposes, both internally and externally, such as the stated estimated 

returns on investment that are summarized in DOD’s annual corrosion 

budget report to Congress. According to Standards for Internal Control in 

the Federal Government,

32

 

32

agencies should use internal controls that 

provide a reasonable assurance that the agencies have effective and 

efficient operations, and have reliable financial reports and other reports 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

Corrosion Office Has 

Not Updated All 

Records to Accurately 

Reflect the ReturnOn-Investment 

Estimates in the 

Military Departments’ 

Follow-On Reports
 

Page 23 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

for internal and external use. Further, this guidance requires, in part, 

controls over information processing, and accurate and timely recording 

of transactions and events, to help ensure that management’s directives 

are carried out and managers achieve desired results through effective 

stewardship of public resources.

During our review, we found differences between the initial return-oninvestment estimates included in project plans and the initial estimates in 

the Corrosion Office’s records for 44 of the 105 projects (42 percent). The 

Corrosion Office provided reasons for correcting data. Specifically, 

according to the Corrosion Office officials, there were two main reasons 

for these differences:(1) funding-level changes between the estimate 

included in initial project plan and funding provided when the project was 

approved; and (2) incorrect computations of the estimated returns on 

investment by the project managers that required the Corrosion Office to 

recalculate the estimate to ensure consistency and accuracy. However, 

when comparing the reassessed return-on-investment estimates included 

in the projects’ follow-on reports with the reassessed estimates in the 

Corrosion Office’s records, we found that the Corrosion Office had not 

updated all of its records with the return-on-investment estimates from the 

follow-on reports. Specifically, we found that for 5 of 25 projects

(20 percent) funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007, the Corrosion 

Office had not updated its records to reflect the reassessed return-oninvestment estimates included in the projects’ follow-on reports. The 

return-on-investment estimates for these 5 projects were from outdated 

sources, such as project plans and final reports.33

 

33According to the final report for one Army project, a follow-on report was not warranted 

due to the nature of the project.

Specifically, the returnon-investment estimates for 3 Army projects were taken from final reports 

that had been submitted to the Corrosion Office in June 2007. Also, the 

return-on-investment estimates for one Army and one Navy project were 

from the project plans that had been submitted to the Corrosion Office in 

June 2004 and October 2004, respectively. Table 3 identifies the

5 projects funded in 2005 that had discrepancies in data.
 

Page 24 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

Table 3: Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Projects That Had Discrepancies between the Reassessed Return-on-Investment 

Estimates in the Follow-on Reports and the Estimates Contained in Corrosion Office Records 

Funded projects Project number

Reassessed return-oninvestment estimates in 

follow-on reports from 

the military departments 

Return-on-investment 

estimates contained

in the Corrosion 

Office’s records 

Army

Leak Detection for Pipes and Tanks AR-F-313 7.3 10.42

Surface Tolerant Coatings for Aircraft Hangars, 

Flight Control Towers, etc.

AR-F-320 6.96 11.8

Remote Monitoring of Cathodic Protection 

Systems

AR-F-321 13.5 14.41

Cathodic Protection of Hot Water Storage Tanks 

Using Ceramics

AR-F-322 8.56 10.11

Navy

Internal Pipeline Corrosion Inspection Red Hill 

Tunnel Fuel Lines

N-F-222 10.78 6.86

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Data for projects funded in fiscal year 2005, as of November 2012. 

While the Corrosion Office has created records to track the estimated 

returns on investment of infrastructure-related corrosion projects, we 

found that the office has not adopted a best practice to maintain reliable 

data with accurate and timely information throughout its records. The 

Corrosion Office may use this return-on-investment data in its reporting, 

both internally and externally, such as in DOD’s annual corrosion budget 

report to Congress. Additionally, in September 2012, we reported that the 

Corrosion Office did not use current data for the projects’ returns on 

investment or provide support for the projects’ average return on 

investment.34 Without accurate and timely return-on-investment estimates 

maintained in the Corrosion Office’s records for corrosion projects, 

Congress and DOD corrosion-control managers may not have sufficient 

and reliable information about returns on investment for their oversight of 

completed projects.

 

34GAO-12-823R. 
 

Page 25 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

All the military departments’ Corrosion Executives use mechanisms—

such as product team meetings, briefings, conferences, and site visits— 

to collect and disseminate information on infrastructure-related corrosion 

activities within their departments. Additionally, the Corrosion Executives 

host information sessions during the triannual DOD corrosion forums to 

discuss their corrosion-related issues. However, in our interviews with

installation officials who were involved with corrosion work, slightly more 

than half of the officials were unaware of DOD’s Corrosion Office, their 

respective Corrosion Executive, or the training, information, and other 

resources available through the related offices. According to the Duncan 

Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Section 

903,35

 

35Pub. L. No.110-417, § 903 (2008).

the Corrosion Executive at each military department is, among 

other things, responsible for coordinating corrosion prevention and control 

activities with the military department and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, the program executive officers, and relevant major subordinate 

commands. Additionally, DOD Instruction 5000.67 directs each Corrosion 

Executive, in coordination with the proper chain of command, to establish 

and maintain a process to collect information on the results of corrosioncontrol activities for infrastructure within its department. Further, the DOD 

Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan includes a 

communications goal to fully inform all levels of DOD about all aspects of 

Corrosion Executives 

Have Mechanisms to 

Disseminate 

Information, but Have 

Not Ensured That All 

Relevant Service 

Officials Receive Key 

Corrosion-Control 

Information

Corrosion Executives Use 

Various Mechanisms to 

Collect and Share 

Corrosion-Control 

Information 
 

Page 26 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

corrosion work36 and states that the rapid and reliable exchange of 

information is the core of DOD’s new corrosion-control culture. Also,

each military department developed documents for corrosion control and 

prevention that acknowledged the importance of communication on 

corrosion control. Likewise, internal controls have shown that 

organizations benefit from communicating timely information to 

management and others to help them achieve their responsibilities.37

During this review, we found that the military departments’ Corrosion 

Executives use various mechanisms to collect and disseminate corrosionrelated information within each department’s chain of command. 

Additionally, we learned that the Corrosion Executives have encountered 

challenges in ensuring that information about their infrastructure-related 

corrosion-control initiatives reaches all relevant service-level officials. 

Specifically, each military department identified the following mechanisms 

and challenges:

Army—In the 2012 U.S. Army Corrosion Prevention and Control 

Strategic Plan, the department established an Army Corrosion Board and 

an Army Corrosion Integrated Product Team to address corrosion issues. 

According to officials in the Corrosion Executive’s office, the board has 

held its first organizational meeting and the integrated product team 

meets as needed, often virtually. Additionally, the officials explained that 

they communicate key information on corrosion of Army facilities and 

other infrastructure through the relevant Army offices in the chain of 

command for installations, using data calls. However, one Corrosion 

Executive official stated that the Army does not have a formal process to 

communicate directly to officials in the field about lessons learned or best 

practices for addressing corrosion of facilities and other infrastructure. 

The Army’s strategic plan includes the goal to address poor 

communication and outreach that may hinder corrosion-control solutions 

from being implemented in the field.

 

36The DOD strategic plan includes a goal to “use every available communication channel 

to receive and convey all aspects of corrosion—nature, impact, approaches and results—

from and to every organization within the broad Department of Defense and industry 

sectors as well as national and international communities.” Appendix A of the plan 

includes an action plan for the Corrosion Office’s Communications and Outreach Working 

Integrated Product Team.

37GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 
 

Page 27 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

Navy—The Navy’s Annual Report on Corrosion for Fiscal Year 2011

states that a concerted awareness program is one of the cornerstones of 

improving communications about corrosion control and prevention within 

the Department of the Navy, which includes the United States Navy and 

the United States Marine Corps. The Corrosion Executive chairs the 

department’s Corrosion Cross-Functional Team, an internal group of 

subject matter experts and relevant command officials, to serve as the 

primary method for coordinating within the department. Additionally, the 

Navy’s Corrosion Executive noted that he works within the department’s 

applicable chain of command for corrosion issues for facilities and other 

infrastructure. Further, the Corrosion Executive stated that the office 

communicated its roles and responsibilities through information provided 

in regular department communications, such as bulletins, briefings and 

conferences; and also through site visits and assessments. However, he 

noted that the frequency of opportunities for conferences and site visits 

will be limited in the future due to budget constraints. The Navy’s strategic 

plan for corrosion notes that it will continue to use communications as a 

tool in its corrosion-control efforts.

Air Force—In the May 2012 Air Force Enterprise Corrosion Prevention 

and Control Strategic Plan, the department acknowledged that facilities 

and other infrastructure organizations have not been integrated into the 

department’s corrosion program. In its strategic plan, the Air Force 

highlighted the need to establish lines of communication, structures, and 

process to ensure that facilities incorporate appropriate corrosion control 

throughout each life cycle. Also, the Corrosion Executive38 stated that the 

department in June 2012 created a Corrosion Control and Prevention 

Working Group in which he serves as the lead and meets regularly with 

the working group members from the Air Force’s major commands and 

relevant components. According to the Corrosion Executive, the means 

for disseminating and collecting information from the department’s 

installations are the service organizations within the chain of command for 

the affected facilities and other infrastructure. He also stated that the 

service’s training curriculum will incorporate important information as 

needed.

 

38In April 2012, the current Corrosion Executive filled the position, which had been vacant 

for more than a year and a half.
 

Page 28 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

During our review, managers and other public works officials at 16 of 31 

installations stated that they were not familiar with the Corrosion Office.39

• Awareness of corrosion offices—In response to our questions of 

officials who are responsible for installation maintenance and would 

be involved in corrosion-control activities, officials at 16 of 31 

installations stated that prior to our work they were not aware of the 

Corrosion Office or the relevant military department’s Corrosion 

Executive.

Officials also told us that their installations could benefit from the 

additional information on corrosion control and prevention offered by 

these offices. However, Corrosion Executives stated in interviews that 

they disseminate corrosion information through each department’s chain 

of command. In response to our questions, installation officials provided

views in the following areas:

40 In addition, officials at 24 of 29 installations stated they 

had not contacted the Corrosion Office about their corrosion work in 

the last three years.41

• Knowledge of documents—Officials interviewed at 26 of 29 

installations

Also, officials at 25 of 29 installations stated 

that they had not contacted the respective Corrosion Executive during 

the same period. However, officials at 23 of 29 installations stated that 

they had contacted their services’ installation management command 

or major commands about corrosion work in the last three years.

42

 

39We spoke with the managers of the public works offices and their staff at

32 installations, representing each military service, and asked them a series of questions 

about corrosion and corrosion control efforts at their locations. For additional information 

about these interviews, see appendix II. One installation did not respond to this question.

stated that they were unfamiliar with the DOD Corrosion 

Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan and DOD Instruction 

5000.67, which addresses prevention and mitigation of corrosion for 

DOD equipment and infrastructure. Additionally, officials interviewed 

at 17 of 29 installations responded that they were unfamiliar with 

service corrosion-control plans or strategies.

40One installation did not respond to this question. Officials at 13 of the remaining

15 installations responded that since the establishment of these corrosion-control offices 

there was no change or they were unaware of any related changes at their installations. 

41We interviewed officials at 32 installations; however, three interviews took place before 

development of the semistructured interview template that included this question.

42At least four officials qualified their responses to this question by stating that other 

officials might be more knowledgeable about specific documents due to the nature of their 

positions.

All Relevant Officials

Have Not Received Key 

Corrosion-Control 

Information
 

Page 29 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

• Interest in additional information—Many installation officials stated 

interest in receiving additional information about corrosion resources. 

For example, more than half of the interviewed officials (17 of 31) 

stated that the Corrosion Office or the relevant military department’s 

Corrosion Executive could provide more communications and 

enhance awareness about corrosion issues or corrosion-related 

resources. An identical number of officials stated that DOD’s and the 

military departments’ corrosion-control offices could support 

corrosion-related training as a useful resource for installations. 

Specifically, an Army installation official noted that it would be 

beneficial for the military services and DOD to disseminate 

information about the Corrosion Office and the military departments’ 

Corrosion Executives, including their roles and responsibilities, and 

the assistance they can provide.

• Other suggestions—Officials at installations noted other suggestions 

for exchanging information about installations, such as: holding 

regular forums and highlighting opportunities for contact with 

counterparts at other installations, having a centralized source for 

accessing corrosion-related information, disseminating case studies 

or best practices relevant to DOD, enhanced use of existing serviceissued newsletters, and planning conferences or communities of 

practice. In addition, five respondents suggested providing important 

corrosion-related information to the service headquarters, regional 

command, or management commands for distribution to the 

installations.

Additionally, in interviews at the services’ installation management 

commands, we found officials who stated similar concerns about 

communications.43

 

43The term “management commands” refers to the services’ installation commands (Army 

and Navy) and major commands (Air Force) responsible for overseeing DOD installations.

Officials from installation management commands 

stated that they had little contact with Corrosion Executives. For example, 

during our interview with one Air Force major command, a command 

official stated that the most recent information he had about the Air 

Force’s Corrosion Executive was from 2008. Another major command’s 

response did not include the Corrosion Executive as an organization it 

interacts with on corrosion issues. Similarly, officials at three different 

locations—the Commander of Navy Installations Command, the Marine 

Corps Installation Command, and the Army’s Installation Management 

Command Headquarters—stated that they had limited or no interaction 

on infrastructure issues with the Corrosion Office and their respective 
 

Page 30 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

Corrosion Executive.44

In evaluating communications for corrosion issues for facilities and other 

infrastructure, we found that all relevant service officials do not receive 

key information because the military departments’ Corrosion Executives 

do not have a targeted communication strategy for their military 

department and an accompanying action plan to ensure frequent 

communications between Corrosion Executives and all service officials 

involved in corrosion activities for facilities and other infrastructure. The 

military departments mention communication in their strategic plans, but 

they do not have specific steps for communicating corrosion-control 

information for facilities and other infrastructure at every level. Our prior 

work on federal organizations identified key practices and implementation 

steps for establishing a communication strategy to create shared 

expectations and report related progress.

In addition, the Army official stated that he would 

like to receive information on training by the Corrosion Office regarding 

corrosion of infrastructure, and that the best channel for the information 

would be through the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, 

an office that works with the Army’s Corrosion Executive.

45 Without a targeted 

communication strategy and accompanying action plan, the Corrosion 

Executives cannot ensure that service managers of facilities and other 

infrastructure will have access to all information and resources available 

for dealing with corrosion and are aware of the most effective and efficient 

methods for corrosion control.

The Department of Defense relies on the outcomes of its corrosion 

projects to reduce the life-cycle costs of its facilities and infrastructure 

through the timely sharing of information about the successful projects 

with all relevant corrosion-control managers. While the Office of Corrosion 

Policy and Oversight (Corrosion Office) requires project managers to 

submit reports on corrosion projects, many reports have not been 

 

44The Department of Navy officials noted that the technical experts from the Naval 

Facilities Engineering Command may have more interaction with these offices. For 

example, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command is a member of the Navy’s Corrosion 

Cross-Functional Team. The Army official noted that he works through his chain of 

command, specifically the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation 

Management, on infrastructure issues.

45GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003).

Conclusions 
 

Page 31 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

submitted when due. In fact, the Corrosion Office has not adopted 

methods to enhance tracking, such as recording the reasons for missed 

reporting deadlines, new reporting deadlines, and the submission dates 

for follow-on reports. Further, although the Corrosion Office encourages 

project managers to complete outstanding reports, it has not exercised its 

existing oversight and coordination authorities to identify and implement 

possible options or incentives for addressing the various funding, 

personnel, or other reasons cited by project management offices for not 

meeting reporting milestones. Also, DOD’s strategic plan and other 

guidance do not clearly define a role for the military departments’ 

Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives (Corrosion Executives), 

who could assist the Corrosion Office, in holding the military departments’ 

project management offices accountable for submitting infrastructurerelated reports in accordance with DOD’s strategic plan. Without effective 

actions to ensure timely submission of reports, decision makers may be 

unaware of potentially useful technologies to address corrosion. 

Moreover, the Corrosion Office is not always updating its records to 

ensure accurate information is maintained on reassessed return-oninvestment estimates for infrastructure-related corrosion projects. Without 

accurate return-on-investment estimates for corrosion projects, Congress 

and DOD corrosion-control managers may not have sufficient information 

about returns on investment for their oversight of completed projects.

Finally, slightly more than half of the installation officials (16 of 31 

officials) whom we interviewed were unaware of DOD’s Corrosion Office, 

their respective Corrosion Executive, or the training, information, and 

other resources available through the related offices. Without a targeted 

communication strategy and accompanying action plan, the military 

departments’ Corrosion Executives cannot ensure that managers of 

facilities and other infrastructure will have access to all information and 

resources available for dealing with corrosion and are aware of the most 

effective and efficient methods for corrosion control.

We are making five recommendations to improve DOD’s corrosion 

prevention and control program:

To improve accountability for reporting the results of corrosion-control 

demonstration projects affecting DOD infrastructure, we recommend that 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics direct the Director of the Office of Corrosion Policy and 

Oversight to take steps to enhance reporting and project tracking, such as 

noting the reasons why project management offices missed a reporting 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 32 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

deadline and including any revised reporting deadlines for final and 

follow-on reports.

To improve the military departments’ submission of completed reports for

infrastructure-related corrosion-control demonstration projects at 

prescribed milestones, we recommend that the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics direct the Director of 

the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to use the office’s existing 

authority to identify and implement possible options or incentives for 

addressing the various funding, personnel, and other reasons cited by 

project management offices for not meeting reporting milestones. 

Further, to provide greater assurance that the military departments will 

meet reporting milestones for future projects, we recommend that the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics—

in coordination with the Director of the Office of Corrosion Policy and 

Oversight—revise corrosion-related guidance to clearly define a role for

the military departments’ Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives to 

assist the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight in holding their 

departments’ project management offices accountable for submitting 

infrastructure-related reports in accordance with the DOD Corrosion 

Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan.

To ensure that Congress, DOD and officials of the military departments’ 

infrastructure-related corrosion activities have the most complete and upto-date information, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics direct the Director of the Office 

of Corrosion Policy and Oversight to take actions to ensure that its 

records reflect complete, timely, and accurate data of the projects’ returnon-investment estimates.

To ensure that all relevant infrastructure officials receive pertinent 

corrosion information, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force departments direct their assistant secretaries 

responsible for acquisitions, technology and logistics to require the 

military departments’ Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives—in 

coordination with their installation management commands and in 

consultation with the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight—to 

develop a targeted communication strategy and an accompanying action 

plan for their departments to ensure the timely flow of key information to 

all relevant service officials, particularly to officials at the installation level, 

about corrosion-control activities and initiatives, such as training 
 

Page 33 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

opportunities and outcomes of the infrastructure-related corrosion 

projects.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written 

comments, reprinted in appendix IV, DOD partially concurred with three of 

our recommendations and did not agree with two recommendations.

DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation to take steps to 

enhance the tracking and reporting of its infrastructure-related corrosion 

projects. In its comments, DOD stated that it is developing a web-based 

tracking tool for the Corrosion Office, Corrosion Executives, and project 

managers to input and extract project-related data, and DOD expects the 

change to result in increased timeliness and standardization of project 

data to include revised reporting deadlines for final and follow-on reports. 

While this system may address our recommendation, DOD did not state 

when the new system would be available for use. In response to our 

fourth recommendation that DOD take action to ensure that its records 

reflect complete, timely and accurate data on the projects’ return on 

investment, DOD partially concurred with the recommendation and stated 

that this new web-based system would provide data including return-oninvestment estimates, and would be accessible to other parties, including 

the Corrosion Office, Corrosion Executives and project managers. 

DOD did not agree with our second recommendation that the Corrosion 

Office use its existing authority to identify and implement possible options 

or incentives for addressing the various funding, personnel, and other 

reasons cited by project management offices for not meeting reporting 

milestones. In its written comments, DOD disagreed with our 

recommendation, but did not state what actions it would take to improve 

submission of completed reports from the military services that DOD’s 

strategic plan requires for infrastructure-related corrosion projects. DOD 

stated that prior positive incentives to complete project reports were 

largely ineffective. However, as our report states, there are examples of 

military departments responding to incentives, such as the Navy

completing 11 of 12 return-on-investment reassessments after the 

Corrosion Office provided funding as an incentive. The reassessments 

are the main focus of follow-on reports. Also, DOD stated that its project 

management offices occasionally miss reporting milestones and generally 

have done an excellent job of meeting their reporting obligations.

However, as our report clearly shows, the project management offices 

had not submitted 50 of the 80 required final reports (63 percent) and had 

not submitted 15 of the 41 required follow-on reports (37 percent) to the 

Corrosion Office. Without timely submission of reports, decision makers 

may be unaware of potentially useful technologies to address corrosion. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 34 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

We continue to believe that the Corrosion Office could use its existing 

authorities to identify and implement other incentives or methods to 

address reasons that project management offices cite for not meeting

reporting milestones.

DOD did not agree to our third recommendation to revise guidance to 

clearly define the role of Corrosion Executives to assist the Corrosion 

Office in holding departments’ project management offices accountable 

for submitting reports in accordance with DOD’s strategic plan. DOD 

stated that further guidance is not necessary as the requirements are 

clearly stated in the strategic plan. DOD also stated that Corrosion 

Executives are given the freedom to manage their programs in the most 

efficient and effective manner. However, DOD’s strategic plan and 

guidance do not define a role for the Corrosion Executives in assisting the 

Corrosion Office in the project reporting process. Our recommendation 

was intended to fortify the role of Corrosion Executives in ensuring that 

project management offices within the Corrosion Executives’ respective 

military departments submit project reports as required in the strategic 

plan. We continue to believe that the Corrosion Executives could provide 

the additional management oversight necessary to strengthen corrosion 

project reporting.

DOD partially concurred with our last recommendation that the 

Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force direct the relevant assistant 

secretaries to require the military departments’ Corrosion Executives—in 

coordination with their installation management commands and in 

consultation with the Corrosion Office—to develop a targeted 

communication strategy and an action plan for their departments to 

ensure the timely flow of key information to all relevant service officials 

about corrosion-control activities and initiatives, such as training 

opportunities and outcomes of infrastructure-related corrosion projects. 

DOD commented that information flow to installations follows the chain of 

command to ensure that appropriate individuals receive information 

necessary for successful mission completion. The department further 

stated that the Corrosion Office would ensure that training information 

and project outcomes would be available to all relevant officials via 

publication in appropriate media; also, DOD stated that during the next 

review cycle the Corrosion Office would evaluate the military department 

corrosion prevention and control strategic plans to determine if they 

adequately address the flow of information. However, we continue to 

believe that each military department should have a targeted 

communication strategy, developed in consultation with the Corrosion 

Office and coordinated with the installation management commands 
 

Page 35 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

within the military departments, and that strategy should go beyond the 

publication of information in appropriate media and provide specific steps 

for communicating corrosion-control information to all relevant service 

corrosion officials. Such a strategy is important because, as our report 

states, we found that all corrosion officials within each military 

department, particularly at the installation level, were not receiving 

relevant corrosion prevention and control information. Also, we continue 

to believe that without a targeted communication strategy and action plan, 

Corrosion Executives cannot ensure that service managers of facilities 

and other infrastructure will have access to all information and resources 

for dealing with corrosion and are aware of the most effective and efficient 

methods for corrosion control.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees and to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, 

the Navy, and the Air Force; Director of the DOD Office of Corrosion 

Policy and Oversight, and the Director of the Office of Management and 

Budget. In addition, this letter will be made available at no charge on the 

GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-7968 or mctiguej@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this letter. GAO staff who made key 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.

James R. McTigue Jr.

Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management
Appendix I: DOD Studies on the 

Cost of Corrosion for Facilities and 

Other Infrastructure

Page 36 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

DOD’s Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight (Corrosion Office) 

sponsors a series of studies to assess the cost of corrosion throughout 

the department, including three studies—two completed and one 

ongoing—to determine how much money DOD spends on corrosion 

activities for its facilities and other infrastructure. These studies are 

conducted by LMI using a method approved by the Corrosion Office’s 

Corrosion Prevention and Control Integrated Product Team.1

In its first report in May 2007, LMI determined that spending on corrosion 

prevention and control for DOD facilities and other infrastructure for fiscal 

year 2005 was $1.8 billion.

According to 

LMI, its estimation methodology includes construction costs and actual 

maintenance expenditures for sustainment, restoration, and 

modernization that are known or can be identified, and focuses on 

tangible, direct material and labor costs as well as some indirect costs, 

such as research and development and training. In its studies, LMI noted 

that although corrosion maintenance costs are a subset of sustainment, 

restoration, and modernization costs, the tools and analysis methods 

used by planners to estimate sustainment, restoration, and modernization 

requirements do not specifically identify corrosion.

2 In its second report in July 2010 report,3 LMI 

found that spending on corrosion at DOD facilities and other infrastructure 

decreased from $1.8 billion to $1.6 billion between fiscal years 2005 and 

2007,4 and then increased to $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2008.5

 

1

LMI, located in McLean, VA, is a private, not-for-profit corporation that provides 

management consulting, research, and analysis to governments and other nonprofit 

organizations.

In its 2010 

report, LMI reported that spending on corrosion as a percent of spending 

on maintenance dropped from 15.1 percent in fiscal year 2005 to

10.7 percent in fiscal year 2007 and increased to 11.7 percent in fiscal 

year 2008.

2

LMI, The Annual Cost of Corrosion for the Department of Defense Facilities and 

Infrastructure, (McLean, VA: May 2007).

3

LMI, The Annual Cost of Corrosion for the Department of Defense Facilities and 

Infrastructure, 2007-2008 Update (McLean, VA: July 2010).

4

LMI did not assess the cost of corrosion for fiscal year 2006.

5

Throughout this section, we cite the dollar figures from the LMI reports published in 2007 

and 2010. We did not adjust these figures for inflation.

Appendix I: DOD Studies on the 

Cost of Corrosion for Facilities and 

Other Infrastructure
Appendix I: DOD Studies on the 

Cost of Corrosion for Facilities and 

Other Infrastructure

Page 37 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

Further, in its 2010 report, LMI reported that DOD spent more on 

corrosion-related maintenance for facilities and other infrastructure than it 

did on corrosion work related to military construction. Specifically, LMI 

reported that spending on corrosion for maintenance is three to four times 

higher than corrosion spending associated with construction, even though 

overall construction expenditures were nearly double that of overall 

maintenance expenditures. LMI provided two main reasons for this 

occurrence: (1) corrosion is rarely identified as a justification for the 

construction of a new facility; and (2) if estimated construction costs need 

to be reduced to obtain funding of the project, measures to prevent 

corrosion are among the first costs to be removed from the estimated 

costs. Additionally, LMI reported that DOD spent almost twice as much on 

corrective measures to address corrosion ($1,263 million) as it did on 

preventive measures to avoid corrosion ($640 million).

LMI’s 2010 report shows installations’ estimated expenditures in eight 

categories of corrective and preventive maintenance for facilities and 

other infrastructure. Table 4 shows information from that 2010 report 

about the estimated expenditures for facilities and other infrastructure by 

maintenance category for fiscal year 2008.

Table 4: Estimated Expenditures to Address Corrosion of DOD Facilities and Other Infrastructure (by Maintenance Categories 

for Fiscal Year 2008; $ in Millions)

Category

Corrective 

measures 

to address 

corrosion 

Preventive 

measures 

to avoid 

corrosion 

Total 

expenditures 

on 

corrosionrelated work

All 

Corrective 

maintenance 

All 

Preventive 

maintenance 

Total 

expenditures 

on all 

maintenance

Corrosionrelated work 

as a 

percentage 

of total 

maintenance 

General building 

maintenance 

$285 $306 $591 $3,232 $410 $3,642 16% 

Exterior plumbing $82 $47 $129 $737 $87 $824 16% 

Interior plumbing $106 $39 $145 $1,208 $93 $1,301 11% 

Fuels $12 $6 $18 $151 $17 $168 11% 

HVAC $157 $58 $215 $1,946 $136 $2,082 10% 

Exterior electric $101 $60 $161 $1,494 $126 $1,620 10% 

Roads and grounds $86 $56 $142 $1,345 $142 $1,487 10% 

Interior electric $51 $48 $99 $1,623 $129 $1,752 6% 

Source: LMI.

In August 2012, LMI began its third study of the cost of corrosion at DOD 

facilities and other infrastructure to analyze corrosion-related spending for 
Appendix I: DOD Studies on the 

Cost of Corrosion for Facilities and 

Other Infrastructure

Page 38 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011. For this report, the LMI official 

told us that the methodology for classifying the environmental conditions 

of the installations that are included in their cost-of-corrosion studies 

would be the major difference between the 2012 assessment and the 

prior reports. LMI also acknowledged that there are some challenges and 

limitations to the methodology and data used in its analysis. These 

challenges and limitations include, but are not limited to: (1) limited quality 

controls in the services’ facilities and other infrastructure work order data 

in which approximately 25 percent of the records obtained from the 

military services’ maintenance systems could not be used due to missing 

key data elements that could not be recreated; (2) the lack of tracking and 

maintaining of asset availability data for facilities and other infrastructure; 

and (3) the three-year period between the cost of corrosion studies, which 

means there will be a significant period before data can be updated.
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

To address our first objective to determine the extent that project 

managers submitted required reports to the DOD Office of Corrosion 

Policy and Oversight (hereafter referred to as Corrosion Office), we 

reviewed the February 2011 DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation 

Strategic Plan and used the reporting milestones outlined in the plan to 

identify types of reports required for each project. We obtained project 

information for the 80 infrastructure-related corrosion demonstration 

projects funded by the Corrosion Office for fiscal years 2005 through 

2010.1

After identifying the projects that required further review because the 

project managers had not completed and submitted the required reports, 

we interviewed and obtained documentation from the Corrosion Office, 

the military departments’ Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives 

(hereafter referred to as Corrosion Executives) and the respective project 

managers to determine why the required reports were not submitted at 

We requested and reviewed the project documentation— project 

plans, bimonthly or quarterly reports, final reports and follow-on reports—

to determine if the data and related reports met the Corrosion Office’s 

reporting requirements. We reviewed the corrosion project documentation 

for these projects for missing data, outliers, or other errors, and 

documented where we found incomplete data and computation errors. 

For the purposes of our work in reviewing projects funded in fiscal years 

2005 through 2010, we considered a final report to be submitted as 

required if the Corrosion Office had a copy of the report in its records 

system. We did not consider the timeliness of the submitted reports. 

Additionally, for follow-on reports, we could assess only the projects 

funded in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 (41 of the 80 projects) because 

the DOD strategic plan’s milestone requires that follow-on reports be 

submitted for completed projects within two years after the projects have 

been completed and transitioned to use within the military departments.

For completed projects, we documented the initial return-on-investment 

estimates shown in the project plans and the resulting change, if any, 

shown in the follow-on reports. We determined that the project reporting 

data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining the extent to 

which the military departments met the Corrosion Office’s reporting 

requirements, but we did not determine the timeliness of the report or 

assess elements of the actual report.

 

1

We did not review the remaining 25 corrosion projects funded for fiscal years 2011 and 

2012 because their reporting milestones had not occurred.

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

the prescribed deadlines. Also, we determined what actions, if any, they 

planned to take to complete the reports. Specifically, to complete this 

task, we met with corrosion-control officials from the following 

organizations: the Corrosion Office, Army Corrosion Executive, Navy 

Corrosion Executive, Air Force Corrosion Executive, Army Engineering 

Research Development Center, Construction Engineering Research 

Laboratory, Naval Facilities Engineering Command (Engineering Support 

Center), Office of the Air Force Logistics, Installations and Mission 

Support, and the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency. We also 

reviewed prior GAO work on DOD’s corrosion prevention and control 

program.

To address our second objective to assess the extent to which the returnon-investment data submitted by the military departments is accurately 

reflected in records maintained by the Corrosion Office, for the

105 infrastructure-related corrosion demonstration projects funded from 

fiscal years 2005 through 2012, we reviewed the return-on-investment 

estimates found in the project plans and the return-on-investment 

estimates maintained in the Corrosion Office’s records. We then 

compared the data from these two sources to determine if any differences 

existed in the estimated return on investment. Upon completion of this 

comparison, we provided a list of projects with discrepancies in the 

estimated return on investment to the Corrosion Office and asked the 

officials to explain why the inconsistencies existed and requested that 

they provide additional information to reconcile the differences in the two 

estimates. Further, we compared the return-on-investment estimates 

maintained in the Corrosion Office’s records for projects funded in fiscal 

years 2005 through 2007 with the return-on-investment estimates 

contained in the military departments’ follow-on reports to check for any 

differences between the two sets of records.

To address our third objective to assess the extent to which DOD’s 

corrosion-control officials have fully informed all relevant officials within 

each department about efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion of 

facilities and other infrastructure, we reviewed relevant legislation and 

guidance, DOD policies and publications, and the DOD and the military 

departments’ strategic plans to obtain information on the management of 

DOD’s corrosion prevention and control program. In addition, we 

interviewed officials at all levels within DOD—Corrosion Office officials, 

Corrosion Executives, the military services’ management commands for 

installations, and facility and infrastructure managers within the 

services—to discuss their corrosion prevention and control efforts, 

including challenges and successes in implementing new corrosion 
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

Page 41 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

technologies. We interviewed officials across each of the military services 

and reviewed relevant service documentation to gather information about 

corrosion prevention and control programs within the services. We spoke 

with each military department’s designated Corrosion Executive as well 

as officials in the Corrosion Executives’ offices to discuss corrosion 

control and prevention activities for facilities and other infrastructure 

across the departments. We also interviewed officials from the installation 

management commands of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, including 

the Office of the Army Chief of Staff for Installations Management, the 

U.S. Army Installations Management Command, the Commander of Navy 

Installations Command, and the U. S. Marine Corps Installations 

Command. We also interviewed officials within the civil engineering or 

facilities branches at two Air Force major commands—Air Mobility 

Command and Air Combat Command. We reviewed relevant service 

documentation, including each military department’s strategic plan for 

corrosion control and prevention, to identify efforts related to facilities and 

other infrastructure. During our review, we also met with the manager of a 

Defense Logistics Agency program for cathodic protection and corrosion 

control of submerged or underground steel structures. Other defense 

agencies were not evaluated as part of our work.

We used data obtained from Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Installations and Environment to identify all DOD facilities and 

other infrastructure by military service and geographic location. Using a 

nonprobability sample,2 we limited the installations for selection to those 

active-duty installations with at least 25 buildings owned by the federal 

government and ensured that a range of locations were selected from 

each of the four military services and across geographic regions of the 

United States.3

 

2

Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a 

population because in a nonprobability sample some elements of the population being 

studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.

From the 390 installations that met these criteria, we 

3

We used the four geographic regions of the United States as defined by the U. S. Census 

Bureau.
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

Page 42 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

selected installations with different environmental conditions,4

From April to October 2012, we conducted semistructured interviews with 

management officials of facilities and other infrastructure from 32 DOD 

installations to gather information and views about their corrosion control 

and management efforts.

some joint 

military installations, and installations that did or did not participate in the 

Corrosion Office’s corrosion-technology demonstration projects. We 

determined that the data used to select the installations for our review 

were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of selecting our nonprobability 

sample.

5 Figure 3 identifies the 32 selected installations 

where GAO interviewed officials for this review. The purpose of the 

semistructured interviews was to understand how the installation officials 

(1) use policies, plans, and procedures to identify and address corrosion; 

(2) address corrosion prevention and mitigation; (3) determine their 

maintenance and sustainment priorities; and (4) receive and disseminate 

information on relevant corrosion topics. We visited and interviewed 

officials at 6 of the 32 military installations,6

 

4

The Corrosion Office provided an environmental severity index level for each installation. 

The environmental severity index is derived from a database developed by the research 

firm Battelle with the corrosion rates of various metals exposed to different environmental 

conditions found at military bases throughout the world. The DOD Corrosion Office, for its 

fiscal year 2012 cost of corrosion study of DOD facilities and other infrastructure, used the 

corrosion rates for steel and developed an environmental severity index on a scale of

1 through 20 to show the impact of corrosion in different locations, with 1 being least 

severe and 20 being the most severe environmental conditions.

and conducted audio 

conference calls with officials at 26 of the 32 military installations. 

Although our findings from the interviews of officials of the 32 installations 

are not generalizable to the entire universe of installations, we feel our 

findings provide a range of issues related to corrosion that are 

experienced at installations.

5

The results of the semistructured interviews are not generalizable because we used a 

nonprobability sample to select participants for these interviews.

6

Site visits to 3 of the installations were completed prior to the development of our 

questionnaire for the semistructured interviews.
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

Page 43 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 3: Selected Installations Where GAO Interviewed Facilities and Other Infrastructure Officials

We conducted this performance audit from November 2011 to May 2013 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix III: Returns on Investment for DOD’s 

Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Technology 

Demonstration Projects

Page 44 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

As defined by DOD for its corrosion technology demonstration projects, 

the estimated return on investment is the ratio of the present value of 

benefits to the present value of the project’s total cost. In our December 

2010 report,1 we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), in 

coordination with the Corrosion Executives, develop and implement a 

plan to ensure that return-on-investment reassessments are completed 

as scheduled.2

During our review, we found that the Corrosion Office required project 

managers of 41 projects to submit follow-on reports, and reports were 

completed and submitted for 25

Specifically, we recommended that this plan include 

information on the timeframe and source of funding required to complete 

the return-on-investment reassessments. DOD concurred with our 

recommendation and stated that plans were underway to address this 

requirement. As of July 2012, DOD had not developed or implemented a 

formal plan that addresses this requirement.

3 of the 41 projects funded for fiscal years 

2005 through 2007.4

 

1

Of the 25 follow-on reports, 23 contained return-oninvestment estimates. We found that although follow-on reports were 

completed and submitted for the remaining 2 projects, return-oninvestment estimates were not calculated for the projects because the 

respective Army and Navy reports noted that such a calculation was not 

required. For the 23 projects that have completed and submitted the 

required follow-on reports, Table 5 provides the military departments’ 

return-on-investment estimates included in the original project plans and 

the resulting change, if any, included in the follow-on reports. We did not 

review the military departments’ calculations or their methods for 

estimating the cost and benefits of the estimated returns on investment.

GAO-11-84. 

2

According to the DOD strategic plan, the return-on-investment reassessment is the focus 

of the corrosion projects’ follow-on reports.

3

There was another Army project in which its project manager reported that a return-oninvestment computation and subsequent follow-on report was not warranted.

4

Since follow-on reporting milestones have not occurred for corrosion projects funded 

after 2007, we do not have reassessed return-on-investment data to compare to the initial 

return-on-investment estimates for the 64 projects funded in fiscal years 2008 through 

2012.

Appendix III: Returns on Investment for 

DOD’s Infrastructure-Related Corrosion 

Technology Demonstration Projects
Appendix III: Returns on Investment for DOD’s 

Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Technology 

Demonstration Projects

Page 45 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

Table 5: Military Departments’ Original Return-on-Investment Estimates in Project Plans Compared to Return on Investment 

Shown in Follow-on Reports 

Military 

Department Count Project number Project description

Return-oninvestment 

estimates from 

project plan

Return-oninvestment 

estimates from 

follow-on report

Army

2005 1 AR-F-313 Leak Detection for Pipes 10.2 7.3

2 AR-F-314 Non-hazardous Corrosion Inhibitors/SMART 

Control Systems for Heating and Cooling

8.8 13.0

3 AR-F-317 Pipe Corrosion Sensors 16.1 21.6

4 AR-F-318 Ice Free Cathodic Protection Systems for 

Water Storage Tanks

20.6 11.8

5 AR-F-319 Corrosion Resistant Materials for Water and 

Wastewater Treatment Plants

15.0 14.6

6 AR-F-320 Surface Tolerant Coatings for Aircraft 

Hangars, Flight Control Tower, and Deluge 

Tanks

11.6 7.0

7 AR-F-321 Remote Monitoring of Cathodic Protection 

Systems and Cathodic Protection System 

Upgrades for Tanks and Pipelines

15.3 13.5

8 AR-F-322 Cathodic Protection of Hot Water Storage 

Tanks Using Ceramic Anodes

10.1 8.6

2006 9 FAR02 Smart Fluorescent and Self-Healing 

Coatings for Severely Corrosive 

Environments at Vehicle Wash Facilities

14.9 14.9

10 FAR11 Innovative Thermal Barrier Coatings to 

Prevent Corrosive Environmental Effects and 

Improve Energy Efficiency in Heat 

Distribution Manholes

9.8 72.7

11 FAR15 Development of Corrosion Indices and Life 

Cycle Prediction for Equipment and Facilities

33.1 33.1

12 FAR16 Corrosion Prevention of Rebar in Concrete in 

Critical Facilities Located in Coastal 

Environments

12.9 12.9

13 FAR20 Ceramic Anode Upgrades and Remote 

Monitoring of Cathodic Protection Systems 

for Utilities in Severely Corrosive 

Environments

14.7 14.7

Navy

2005 14 N-F-221 Self-Priming Cladding for Splash Zone Steel 23.7 23.7

15 N-F-222 Internal Pipeline Corrosion Inspection Red 

Hill Tunnel Fuel Lines

6.9 10.8
Appendix III: Returns on Investment for DOD’s 

Infrastructure-Related Corrosion Technology 

Demonstration Projects

Page 46 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: Projects Were Funded in Fiscal Years 2005 through 2007. 

16 N-F-229 Integrated Concrete Pier Piling Repair and 

Corrosion Protection System

1.9 1.9

2006 17 FNV01 Corrosion Protection Utilizing IR Drop Free 

Sensors and In-Situ Data Acquisition for 

Cross Country Pipelines

13.3 11.4

18 FNV04 Modeling of Advanced Waterfront Metallic 

Material Corrosion and Protection

6.2 1.1

19 FNV06 Wire Rope Corrosion for Guyed Antenna 

Towers

36.6 36.0

20 FNV07 Solar Powered Cathodic Protection System 3.4 3.0

2007 21 F07NV03 Corrosion Inhibitor Evaluation for Concrete 

Repairs

16.8 16.8

22 F07NV04 Satellite Based Remote Monitoring Systems 

for Cathodic Protection Systems in Remote 

Locations

21.0 17.4

23 F07NV07 Low Cost Stainless Steel Reinforcing for 

Concrete Structures

2.9 2.9
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 47 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 48 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 49 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 50 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

James R. McTigue Jr. 202-512-7968, mctiguej@gao.gov

In addition to the contact name above, the following staff members made 

key contributions to this report: Mark J. Wielgoszynski, Assistant Director; 

Rebekah Boone; Randolfo DeLeon; Jacqueline McColl; Charles Perdue; 

Carol Petersen; Richard Powelson; Terry Richardson; Amie Steele and 

Michael Willems.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 51 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

Defense Management: Additional Information Needed to Improve Military 

Departments’ Corrosion Prevention Strategies. GAO-13-379. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2013.

Defense Management: The Department of Defense’s Annual Corrosion 

Budget Report Does Not Include Some Required Information. 

GAO-12-823R. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2012.

Defense Management: The Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2012 

Corrosion Prevention and Control Budget Request. GAO-11-490R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2011.

Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, 

Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-11-318SP. 

Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011.

Defense Management: DOD Needs to Monitor and Assess Corrective 

Actions Resulting from Its Corrosion Study of the F-35 Joint Strike 

Fighter. GAO-11-171R. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2010.

Defense Management: DOD Has a Rigorous Process to Select Corrosion 

Prevention Projects, but Would Benefit from Clearer Guidance and 

Validation of Returns on Investment. GAO-11-84. Washington, D.C.: 

December 8, 2010.

Defense Management: Observations on Department of Defense and 

Military Service Fiscal Year 2011 Requirements for Corrosion Prevention 

and Control. GAO-10-608R. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.

Defense Management: Observations on the Department of Defense’s 

Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request for Corrosion Prevention and Control. 

GAO-10-607R. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010.

Defense Management: Observations on DOD’s Fiscal Year 2010 Budget 

Request for Corrosion Prevention and Control. GAO-09-732R. 

Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2009.

Defense Management: Observations on DOD’s Analysis of Options for 

Improving Corrosion Prevention and Control through Earlier Planning in 

the Requirements and Acquisition Processes. GAO-09-694R. 

Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2009.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 52 GAO-13-270 Defense Infrastructure

Defense Management: Observations on DOD’s FY 2009 Budget Request 

for Corrosion Prevention and Control. GAO-08-663R. Washington, D.C.: 

April 15, 2008.

Defense Management: High-Level Leadership Commitment and Actions 

Are Needed to Address Corrosion Issues. GAO-07-618. Washington, 

D.C.: April 30, 2007.

Defense Management: Additional Measures to Reduce Corrosion of 

Prepositioned Military Assets Could Achieve Cost Savings. GAO-06-709. 

Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006.

Defense Management: Opportunities Exist to Improve Implementation of 

DOD’s Long-Term Corrosion Strategy. GAO-04-640. Washington, D.C.: 

June 23, 2004.

Defense Management: Opportunities to Reduce Corrosion Costs and 

Increase Readiness. GAO-03-753. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2003.

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic 

Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities.

GAO-03-274. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003.

(351691)
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