J-S69007-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

STAN RYALS

Appellee No. 2355 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Order Entered July 10, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0014654-2012

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JANUARY 16, 2015

Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order 

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which granted 

Appellee, Stan Ryal’s, motion to suppress. We reverse and remand for 

further proceedings. 

The trial court opinion sets forth the relevant facts and procedural 

history of this case as follows:

On July 10 2013, [Appellee’s] counsel presented a Motion 

to Suppress Physical Evidence which was filed on June 14, 

2013[,] related to a search warrant issued upon 

information allegedly derived from anonymous [citizens’] 

complaints, in conjunction with information obtained from 

a confidential informant as well as police observation of an 

alleged street drug transaction. 

The Affidavit of Probable Cause is silent as to when the 

alleged complaints were received from the citizens or when 

information received from an informant was obtained prior 
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to the application for issuance of the warrant. ... 

[The suppression] [c]ourt found that under the U.S. 

Supreme Court’s “totality of the circumstances” test set 

forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-239 (1983), 

probable cause did not exist in order to issue a search 

warrant. Based upon the information contained in the 

warrant, [the suppression] [c]ourt determined that the 

affidavit failed to establish any nexus between the 

observed drug transaction and the residence. 

Accordingly, [the suppression] [c]ourt granted [Appellee’s] 

motion and suppressed all evidence obtained against 

[Appellee] stemming from the unlawful search. ... 

The Affidavit of Probable Cause prepared by Police Officer 

Galazka stated:

I, P/O Galazka #7481, your affiant, am presently 

assigned to Narcotic Field Unit South. I have been a 

sworn Police Officer since Jan. of 1995. In my 

capacity as a Police Officer, I have been assigned to 

the Narcotics Bureau since 1999. In my course of 

assignment as a Police Officer, I have been involved 

in an excess of 2000 narcotic arrests. Since being 

assigned to the Narcotic Bureau, I have worked 

numerous investigations for violations of the 

Pennsylvania Controlled Substance Act of 1972. My 

involvement in these investigations has entailed 

surveillances, undercover purchases, and the 

preparation of search and seizure warrants by 

myself. I have received specialized narcotics-related 

training given by the Philadelphia Police Department. 

I have also been trained in courses given by the 

DEA. My training and experience have made me 

familiar with the ways in which narcotics are 

packaged for sales on the street and from houses for 

illegal sales and distribution. I have received 

training in the handling of confidential informants 

being utilized for the purpose of undercover 

investigations. 

On 10-19-12[,] your affiant interviewed P/O O’Neill 

#5786 and P/O Gorman #3778 of the 3rd district, 
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who stated the following:

P/O O’Neill #5786 and P/O Gorman #3778 received 

information from numerous citizen complaints that 

heroin and crack cocaine is being distributed from 

532 Mifflin St. by a [black male] name[d] [Appellee]. 

On 10-19-12[,] at approx. 9:17am, while working 

the 8am x 4pm tour of duty and on patrol in the area 

of the 500 block of Mifflin St., they observed a white 

female (later [identified] as Samantha Kerns), who 

was riding her bicycle and stopped at 532 Mifflin St., 

where she met with a heavyset [black male] known 

as [Appellee]. Kerns and [Appellee] had a brief 

conversation and Kerns handed [Appellee] [United 

States Currency;] [Appellee] then handed a small 

object to Kerns. Kerns noticed the Police and began 

to ride her bicycle [westbound] on Mifflin St. Police 

stopped Kerns in the 1900 block of S. 7th Street and 

she handed the officers (1) one small clear plastic 

baggie containing a blue glassine packet with the 

word “Bugatti” stamped on it in red ink, containing a 

white powdery substance, alleged heroin, which she 

had in her right hand. Det. Farrell #9243 conducted 

a field sobriety test with positive results for heroin. 

The narcotics were placed on PR#3059924. 

Your Affiant, P/O Brown #2962 and P/O Rich #9843 

also received information from a reliable confidential 

informant 01101 that [Appellee is] distributing and 

storing heroin inside of 532 Mifflin St. 

On 10-19-12[,] P/O Brown conducted a check of the 

Philadelphia Police arrest photo database, which 

revealed a photo of [Appellee] with a PPN 651845. 

P/O O’Neill positively [identified] this photo as the 

person who sold the heroin to Samantha Kerns. 

On 10-16-12[,] the 3rd district responded to an 

attempted fire bombing at 532 Mifflin St. While at 

532 Mifflin St. police could smell a strong odor of 

gasoline and a window was broken, where an

unknown person attempted to throw a fire bomb. 
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Based on the above facts and circumstances your 

Affiant respectfully requests a daytime search and 

seizure warrant for 532 Mifflin St. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed February 4, 2014, at 1-4) (some citations and 

quotation marks omitted). Appellee based his suppression motion on the 

claim that the search warrant failed to establish probable cause. On July 10, 

2013, the suppression court granted the motion and suppressed all physical 

evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant. On August 8, 2013, the 

Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal1and a voluntary concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

The Commonwealth raises the following question for our review:

DID THE [SUPPRESSION] COURT ERR BY SUPPRESSING 

EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO A SEARCH WARRANT 

FROM 532 MIFFLIN STREET WHERE THE POLICE 

CORROBORATED REPORTS OF DRUG DEALING FROM 

BOTH NUMEROUS CONCERNED CITIZENS AND A 

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT BY OBSERVING [APPELLEE] 

SELLING HEROIN AT THAT LOCATION? 

(Commonwealth’s Brief at 3). 

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, the 

relevant scope and standard of review are:

____________________________________________

1

The Commonwealth’s notice of appeal certifies that the court’s order 

granting Appellee’s motion to suppress terminates or substantially handicaps 

the prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d); Commonwealth v. Huntington, 

924 A.2d 1252, 1254 n.1 (Pa.Super 2007) (stating: “The Commonwealth 

may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end the entire 

case if the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will 

terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution”). 
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[We] consider only the evidence from the defendant’s 

witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution 

that, when read in the context of the entire record, 

remains uncontradicted. As long as there is some 

evidence to support them, we are bound by the 

suppression court’s findings of fact. Most importantly, we 

are not at liberty to reject a finding of fact which is based 

on credibility. 

The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are 

not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to 

determine if the suppression court properly applied the law 

to the facts. 

Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 305 (Pa.Super. 2011), 

appeal denied, 616 Pa. 651, 49 A.3d 442 (2012) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

The Commonwealth argues Appellee’s motion to suppress should have 

been denied. The Commonwealth contends numerous citizens, who 

identified Appellee by name, complained Appellee was selling heroin out of 

532 Mifflin Street. The Commonwealth alleges a confidential informant

(“CI”), who was identified in the affidavit of probable cause by registration 

number, corroborated these reports when the CI told police Appellee was 

distributing and storing heroin inside 532 Mifflin Street. The Commonwealth 

also asserts police surveillance of 532 Mifflin Street further corroborated the 

citizens’ and CI’s reports, when police observed a woman on bicycle stop at 

532 Mifflin Street and purchase heroin from Appellee, who was later 

identified from a police photo database. The Commonwealth claims, under 

the totality of the circumstances, that it was reasonably probable Appellee 
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was storing narcotics and/or the proceeds from drug sales at 532 Mifflin 

Street, and there was a substantial basis upon which the magistrate could 

reach this conclusion and issue the warrant. The Commonwealth maintains 

the suppression court improperly viewed each piece of evidence in isolation. 

The Commonwealth concludes we should reverse the suppression court’s 

order. We agree. 

“The linch-pin that has been developed to determine whether it is 

appropriate to issue a search warrant is the test of probable cause.” 

Commonwealth v. Clark, 611 Pa. 601, ___, 28 A.3d 1284, 1288 (2011). 

“In determining whether the warrant is supported by probable cause, the 

magistrate may not consider any evidence outside the four-corners of the 

affidavit.” Commonwealth v. Ryerson, 817 A.2d 510, 513 (Pa.Super. 

2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sharp, 683 A.2d 1219, 1223 (Pa.Super. 

1996)). “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the 

affiant’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information 

are sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution [to 

believe] that a search should be conducted.” Clark, supra at ___, 28 A.3d 

at 1288 (citation omitted). Additionally, 

the question of whether probable cause exists for the 

issuance of a search warrant must be answered according 

to the “totality of the circumstances” test articulated in 

Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921 

(1985), and its Pennsylvania progeny, which incorporates 

the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 

L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The task of the magistrate acting as 
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the issuing authority is to make a practical, common sense 

assessment of whether, given all the circumstances set 

forth in the affidavit, a fair probability exists that 

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 

particular place. A search warrant is defective if the 

issuing authority has not been supplied with the necessary 

information. The chronology established by the affidavit of 

probable cause must be evaluated according to a common 

sense determination. 

Huntington, supra at 1255 (some citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“Probable cause is based on a finding of the probability, not a prima 

facie showing of criminal activity, and deference is to be accorded a 

magistrate’s finding of probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Ryerson, 817 

A.2d 510, 514 (Pa.Super. 2003). “The duty of the reviewing court is simply 

to verify that the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding 

that probable cause existed.” Huntington, supra at 1255. Moreover, the 

reviewing court must “consider the affidavit in its entirety, giving 

significance to each relevant piece of information and balancing the relative 

weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability)” rather than 

judge “bits and pieces of information in isolation....” Clark, supra at ___, 

28 A.3d at 1289 (holding: “lower courts failed to look at the information as a 

whole, but examined and considered individual factors in a mechanical 

fashion, effectively nullifying the mandate to assess the totality of the 

circumstances”). 

“In assessing an informant’s reliability, a presumption exists that the 

information is trustworthy when it has been provided by an identified 
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witness.” Huntington, supra at 1255. “[A] totality-of-the-circumstances 

analysis permits a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the 

various indicia of reliability and unreliability attending an informant’s tip.” 

Clark, supra at ___, 28 A.3d at 1288 (citing Gates, supra at 234, 103 

S.Ct. at 2330, 76 L.Ed.2d at ___). “A [confidential informant’s] veracity and 

basis of knowledge are but factors among the totality of the 

circumstances[.]” Clark, supra at ___, 28 A.3d at 1288. 

[A]n informant’s tip may constitute probable cause where 

police independently corroborate the tip, or where the 

informant has provided accurate information of criminal 

activity in the past, or where the informant himself 

participated in the criminal activity. The corroboration by 

police of significant details disclosed by the informant in 

the affidavit of probable cause meets the Gates threshold. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

Furthermore, “[a]n affidavit of probable cause must include facts from 

which a magistrate can determine the time frame within which the 

supporting information was acquired.” Sharp, supra at 1223 (citation 

omitted). “A search warrant is defective if the issuing authority is not 

supplied with a time frame upon which to ascertain when the affiant 

obtained the information from the informant and when the informant himself 

witnessed the criminal acts detailed in the affidavit of probable cause.” Id.

“[S]tale information cannot provide probable cause in support of a warrant.” 

Commonwealth v. Hoppert, 39 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa.Super. 2012) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 158 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation 
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marks omitted). Nevertheless, “[a] showing that criminal activity is likely to 

have continued up to the time of the issuance of a warrant renders 

otherwise stale information viable.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 542 Pa. 

418, 427, 668 A.2d 114, 118 (1995). 

Instantly, the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude, under 

the totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause to support a 

search warrant for 532 Mifflin Street. See Huntington, supra. The CI’s 

information was presumptively trustworthy because the affidavit of probable 

cause identified the CI by registration number, stated the CI was reliable, 

and included the date the CI provided information to the police. See 

Huntington, supra. The police also independently corroborated the CI’s 

information, that Appellee was distributing and storing heroin inside 532 

Mifflin Street, when the police observed Appellee sell heroin in front of 532 

Mifflin Street. See Clark, supra. Moreover, the affidavit’s failure to include 

the dates the citizens’ observed Appellee’s illegal activity and relayed that 

information to the police did not render the search warrant defective. An 

attempted firebombing at 532 Mifflin Street on October 16, 2012, further 

indicated a likelihood that criminal activity continued to occur up to the time 

the search warrant was issued on October 19, 2012. See Jones, supra. 

This incident rendered the citizens’ arguably stale information sufficiently 

viable to permit the magistrate to determine the time frame within which the 

illegal activity occurred or was occurring. See id.; Sharp, supra. 
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Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate properly 

determined the affidavit of probable cause contained sufficient information to 

support the search warrant. Accordingly, we reverse the suppression court’s 

order and remand for further proceedings. See Huntington, supra at 1259 

(stating suppression or exclusion of evidence is most extreme remedy that 

can be justified only when it is necessary to vindicate fundamental rights or 

to correct or deter police abuse). 

Order reversed; case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is 

relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/16/2015