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THE BEIJING OLYMPICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

ROUNDTABLE

BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 18, 2002

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

Senate House

MAX BAUCUS, Montana, Chairman

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota

EVAN BAYH, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Co-Chairman

JIM LEACH, Iowa

DAVID DREIER, California

FRANK WOLF, Virginia

JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania

SANDER LEVIN, Michigan

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State

GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce

D. CAMERON FINDLAY, Department of Labor

LORNE CRANER, Department of State

JAMES KELLY, Department of State

IRA WOLF, Staff Director

JOHN FOARDE, Deputy Staff Director

(II)

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

STATEMENTS

Wamsley, Kevin, sports historian and expert on the Olympic Games, director,

the International Centre for Olympic Studies, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada ................................................................................. 2

Oberdorfer, Don, journalist-in-residence, School of Advanced International

Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC ...................................... 5

Beer, Lauryn, director, Human Rights and Business Roundtable, the Fund

for Peace, Washington, DC .................................................................................. 7

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Wamsley, Kevin ....................................................................................................... 30

Beer, Lauryn ............................................................................................................ 32

(1)

THE BEIJING OLYMPICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2002

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA,

Washington, DC.

The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in

room SD–215, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Ira Wolf (staff director of the Commission) presiding.

Also present: John Foarde, deputy staff director; Chris Billing,

director of communications; Tiffany McCullen, U.S. Department of

Commerce; Matt Tuchow, office of Representative Sander Levin;

J.J. Piskadlo, office of Representative Jim Davis; and Karin

Finkler, office of Representative Joseph Pitts.

Mr. WOLF. All right. Let us get started.

I would like to welcome everyone today to this staff roundtable

of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. Today our

topic is ‘‘Human Rights and the Beijing Olympics 2008.’’

There has been a lot of discussion about the Beijing Olympics

and its relationship with the human rights situation in China. We

have three people today who we hope will provide some enlightenment to us.

Kevin Wamsley, who is an expert on Olympic sociology and

sports history, is director of the International Centre for Olympic

Studies at the University of Western Ontario. We really appreciate

you coming all the way to Washington, Kevin.

Don Oberdorfer is Journalist-in-Residence at Johns Hopkins

School of Advanced International Studies and a long-time Washington Post foreign correspondent, with long expertise in Asia.

Finally, Lauryn Beer is director of the Human Rights and Business Roundtable at the Fund for Peace.

I just want to mention that we did invite representatives from

the International Olympic Committee [IOC] and from the U.S.

Olympic Committee to join us today in this roundtable discussion,

but they respectfully declined our invitation. I just want to note

that for the record.

We hope that perhaps at a future roundtable or hearing on this

issue, as we get closer to 2008, perhaps they will be interested in

giving us their views.

I am Ira Wolf, staff director of the Commission. John Foarde is

the deputy staff director. Chris Billing is the communications director of the Commission and has the substantive responsibility for

Olympics issues on the Commission staff. Karin Finkler works for

Congressman Joe Pitts, one of our commissioners, and Tiffany

2

McCullen works for Grant Aldonas, the Under Secretary of Commerce, who is also one of the commissioners.

So, Kevin, why do we not start with you? Please go ahead.

STATEMENT OF KEVIN WAMSLEY, SPORTS HISTORIAN AND

EXPERT ON THE OLYMPIC GAMES, AND DIRECTOR, THE

INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR OLYMPIC STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO, LONDON, ON, CANADA

Mr. WAMSLEY. Thank you.

First, permit me to thank you for inviting me to be here today.

Our point of departure for these proceedings is to discuss the potential influences of the process of hosting the Olympic Games in

China in 2008. Of course, we have to acknowledge that our ideas

and ruminations are purely speculative today.

With that being said, I think we can offer some comments on

these issues from my perspective, based on our knowledge of China’s history, its current political policies and practices and its

cultural connections to the Olympic Games in the past and present,

and, perhaps most importantly, some of the extant perceptions

about the role of the modern Olympics in facilitating social and

political change.

China’s sporting relations with other countries extend back almost a century, including post-World War I correspondence with

the International Olympic Committee, and participation in the

games of 1932, 1936, and 1948.

China’s return to competition in 1984, indeed the fervor of its

bidding strategies for 2000 and 2008, signal that the Olympics

have become a significant component of Chinese domestic and

foreign policy.

If the unofficial financial estimates and cost projections in the

proclamations of social preparation may be positioned as indicators,

we must conclude that not only are the games of 2008 a serious

commitment for China, they are being positioned as one of the

most important events in Chinese history.

With this in mind, we may draw some speculative conclusions on

what sort of strategies may be adopted and employed by the Chinese Government, like all other Olympic governments, to render a

public face to the international community, and further, how the

Chinese people will participate in projecting favorable images of a

modern China to a global audience.

In the post-1978 era of the commercialized Olympic Games, host

cities have employed deliberate strategies to represent themselves

as world class, stable, intriguing, vibrant, and successful. Beijing

will be no different.

Indeed, to date, Beijing’s public proclamations respecting citizen

behavior in hosting protocols entitled ‘‘Urban Civility and Building

Citizen Morality,’’ I would characterize as overt and threatening.

Arguably, it is fair to say that the Chinese Government will ensure that far beyond the level of the Olympics volunteer, average

Beijing citizens will adhere to a code of conduct for the games, including the pre- and post-Olympic periods. This is not unusual for

host cities; rather, it remains a matter of degree.

When one considers that the Olympic Games have long been a

site for political expression alongside a more recently fervent civic

3

and national boosterism by host cities, juxtaposed with intense

media scrutiny, it follows that citizen behavior and political protests are matters of significant concern for organizing committees

and national governments.

Assurances from host countries are implied in official doctrine.

Indeed, if you read the Olympic charter, you will find that ‘‘there

will be no kind of demonstration, or political, religious, or racial

propaganda permitted in the Olympic areas.’’ Further, many bidding cities and host cities from around the

world have taken steps to remove what are perceived to be unsightly individuals and groups in core areas and to ensure that political groups are not given opportunities to distribute information

or capitalize upon media opportunities.

It is fair to assume that Beijing will implement some strategies

of urban cleansing, perhaps in the form of relocating unregistered

citizens in Beijing, shutting down their businesses, or even

detaining them.

One of the most significant factors to be considered in Beijing’s

hosting of the Olympics is the potential influence of the idea of

nationalism in China, stemming mainly from a common sense of

historic and current marginalization among Chinese people in

various forms of international relations, and consequently, the galvanization of public sentiment that hosting the Olympic Games has

already inspired and will continue to escalate.

This, of course, has direct bearing on the behavior of citizens,

their support of overall government initiatives, and the reluctance

of even some dissidents to jeopardize China’s moment of

international recognition.

This nationalist sentiment should not be underestimated, particularly when one is attempting to gauge how Chinese citizens will

react to government crackdowns, urban policy initiatives dealing

with dissidents, and how they may or may not reveal information

about their lives to outsiders, and how they will actively participate

in the Olympic Games and related festivities.

Just as significantly, it is likely that the Chinese Government

will take advantage of such cultural solidarities as it launches and

conducts its programs of cultural representation for Beijing.

In addition to the period of time leading up to the games, the potential influences of an influx of some 20,000-plus journalists and

sport tourists during the games must be debated.

However, any suggestions that such social contacts between

Chinese citizens in Beijing and other parts of China and the socalled Westerners will have an immediate influence on social activism or a long-term effect on government policies are erroneously

simplistic.

Certainly, the issue of human rights in China has become a focal

point for the Western media, and journalists will be interested in

both controversy and crisis. Any immediate matters of human

rights will no doubt be dealt with expeditiously.

But with respect to long-term effects of the games, there are

many factors to consider in the hosting process which tend to polarize media interpretations of local and national events, and limit the

influence of what might be perceived as contradictory or destabilizing ideologies.

4

First and foremost, the Olympics are a brief and intense media

spectacle. Second, the Chinese Government may refuse entry to

any media personnel who have proven to be unfriendly in the past.

Third, the IOC maintains the rights to internal access for members

of the media.

Fourth, a glimpse at Olympic history demonstrates that serious

local or national problems may be focal points of international interest through media scrutiny both before and during an Olympics,

or during the bidding process, but such stories tend to fade quickly

when the Olympic caravan has departed.

Take, for example, aboriginal issues in Sydney, Calgary, Salt

Lake City, homelessness in Toronto and Atlanta. The Olympic

process that includes bidding and hosting, and of course the attendant ideological forays into peace, brotherhood and equity, have had

little impact beyond limited media exposure to such issues, and inspiring perhaps a greater solidarity toward local resistance to

mega-events.

Finally, the sheer intensity of the Olympic Games as a media

construction tends to shift focus away from national issues that

may have received significant attention before the games, effectively marginalizing the plights of individuals or groups who may

have once been central to journalistic interests.

Other international interest groups are integral components of

the legitimizing process perpetuated through the Olympic Games.

Currently, and increasingly as the games draw near, corporations,

consulting firms, specialists, and academics will trade on the economic opportunities presented by the hosting of the next games.

Groups in Sydney, for example, are now lobbying to assist China

in developing its infrastructure and Olympic programs, from buildings and facilities to cultural programs, academic exchange, and

Olympic education.

Corporations that already have a significant multi-million dollar

interest in the success of the games and those that are currently

seeking contracts are not likely to endorse any systematic critiques

that focus negative attention toward the host nation.

Indeed, they have diverse financial interest in Chinese markets,

but also the larger corporations that trade on Olympic symbolism

and ideology have a stake in promoting an image of China as an

exotic, historically stable, vital nation through which sensible and

interesting cultural links can enhance their products and the flow

of global capital.

Intellectuals who depend upon access to even limited information, travel, and financial aid for publications and educational liaisons are not likely to seriously raise issues of human rights for fear

of jeopardizing their positions of privilege.

Historically, the Olympic process has tended to provide legitimacy to host governments and their policies, endorsements to

their success in hosting the games, and furthering the so-called

spirit of the Olympic Games as opposed to drawing attention to

shortfalls and political controversies.

Well-documented examples include the economic crises of Antwerp in 1920, London in 1948, the Great Depression in 1932, Los

Angeles, Hitler’s fascism in 1936, Mexico’s slaughter of innocent

citizens in 1968.

5

Serious tragedies and atrocities have become subsidiary to the

more glamorous immediacies of the Olympic spectacle. On the

other hand, members of the international sporting community,

Olympic officials specifically, were able to exert remarkable influence through several decades over the issue of apartheid in South

Africa. These pressures, however, had more broad-based political

support and diplomatic attention.

In summary, the Olympic Games have done far more to sustain

and reproduce extant domestic policies, to reproduce mythologies

about race and equality, economic and social opportunity, and

world peace than to subvert the inequalities of the world.

In the short-term, it is likely that the Olympic process, ensconced

with its traditional diplomacies, hyperbole, and rhetoric, indeed,

the political exigencies of a host nation, will negatively affect

human rights in China. Further, the solidarities created through

extensive preparations to host the world should not be underestimated.

International initiatives that question China’s social and political

prerogatives in the years leading up the 2008 Olympics might be

viewed, even by average citizens, as efforts to undermine what is

being celebrated widely as the arrival of a modern China. International advocates for political change in China should proceed

with caution.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wamsley appears in the appendix.]

Mr. WOLF. Thanks very much.

We have been joined up here by Matt Tuchow, who works for

Congressman Sander Levin, one of our commissioners, and J.J.

Piskadlo, who works for Congressman Jim Davis, also a commissioner.

Don Oberdorfer, please.

STATEMENT OF DON OBERDORFER, JOURNALIST–IN–RESIDENCE, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. OBERDORFER. Well, thanks for inviting me to come. I am not

an expert on Olympics. I am a former journalist, as Ira said, for

the Washington Post for 25 years, and an historian of sorts about

Korea, including this book, ‘‘The Two Koreas,’’ which covered,

among other things, the impact of the 1988 Olympics in Seoul on

Korea.

There are certain parallels with China. It is another Asian country. Korea, at the time, was a fairly authoritarian government.

After the assassination of Park Chung Hee in 1979, a group of generals took over, headed by Chun Doo Hwan, who was in office at

the time leading up to the Olympics.

The 1988 Olympics in Seoul had two very powerful, beneficial,

and historical effects in South Korea. One of them is probably applicable to China; the other one, I do not think, is.

The first one was that it broke the isolation of South Korea by

various Communist countries, imposed in sympathy with North

Korea. Of 160 nations participating in the Seoul games, 24 had no

diplomatic relations whatever with South Korea prior to the OlymVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Feb 05, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 83979.TXT China1 PsN: China1
6

pics, including the Soviet Union, China, and most of the Eastern

European countries.

The Olympics provided an opportunity for those people from

those countries to come to Korea for Koreans to interact with them,

and it led, really rather rapidly, to the development of diplomatic

relations with quite a number of those countries. As I said, I do not

think that is particularly applicable to China.

The second effect, however, may be applicable to China. The fact

of the coming of the Olympics, more than the Olympic Games

themselves, had a powerful political effect within South Korea.

The designation of Korea for the 1988 games was done 7 years

before. But, as the date neared, there were increasingly important

domestic effects. There had been political turbulence in South

Korea following the assassination of Park Chung Hee in 1979, and

it was an authoritarian government under General Chun that was

in power as the Olympics neared.

For several years, and especially in 1987, the year prior to the

Olympics, which happened to be a presidential election year in

South Korea, there were periodic protests about opening the election to serious competition, ending in mass protests early in 1987.

Juan Antonio Samaranch, then the president of the IOC, made

it known that the games might be moved elsewhere in case of massive disorders in South Korea. There was also the threat of nonparticipation by a number of countries, following on the precedent

of the Moscow Olympics of 1980.

As I said, particularly in the summer of 1987, there were very

large protests demanding direct election of the president rather

than being elected by an easily controlled electoral college body.

This came to a head in June 1987. General Chun was considering declaring martial law, putting down the demonstrations with

guns and bullets. The United States played an important role in

persuading him not to do so, especially a letter written by President Reagan that was delivered by James Lilley, who was then the

Ambassador of the United States to South Korea.

But there is no doubt in my mind, or I think anybody’s mind who

was following those events, that a very major factor was concern

about the possibility of losing the Olympic Games or having them

severely downgraded by the non-participation of major countries.

This would have been, in Korean terms, a blot on all of South

Korea. The Olympics were seen as a national festival of towering

importance to all Koreans.

It was only one factor, but it was a major factor in the decision

by President Chun not to declare martial law, to agree to the holding of the elections which most of the people in South Korea wanted, and opening up the political system. June 1987 was the point

at which South Korea became the democratic country that it is

today.

The elections were opened. There was a free and fair election and

the President took office with complete approval of the people.

North Korea, by the way, did not participate in the Olympics,

tried to stop it, and particularly arranged to have an airliner blown

up in an attempt to try to persuade people not to participate, which

did not work.

7

Now, in the Sydney Olympics in 2000, North and South Korea

marched together into the stadium, one of the most dramatic

moments in those games.

What I just said, I think, is the record. I have covered some of

it in the book that I wrote. Other articles I wrote at the time were

my own observation.

What follows now is speculation about China. My view, is the

coming of the Olympics will help China to open up. The pressures

not to do drastic things, the pressures to conform with international standards, I think, will be there.

I do not know the extent to which they will be heeded, but I

think those pressures, particularly in the several years closer to

the Olympics, will be strong.

I might add that I have been in China 15 times since 1974 when

I first made my first trip to China with Secretary Kissinger. I have

seen tremendous changes in that country, enormous changes that

I never would have guessed would have happened in 1974, or even

in the early 1980s.

China certainly does not meet all the standards that I would like

to see, but considering where China has come from, it has made

enormous improvements in almost every part of Chinese life.

I personally think that the coming of the Olympics is going to assist further in having the Chinese Government, institutions, and

even people meet international standards. Thank you.

Mr. WOLF. Thanks a lot, Don.

Lauryn.

STATEMENT OF LAURYN BEER, DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS

AND BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, THE FUND FOR PEACE,

WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. BEER. Thank you very much for allowing me the opportunity

to speak to you today on behalf of the Fund for Peace. As you stated in your introduction, I am the director of the Human Rights and

Business Roundtable. I would just like to say a few words about

what we do and why it is applicable to the topic at hand here.

The mission of the Fund for Peace is to prevent war and to alleviate the conditions that cause war. Our programmatic focus is

to strengthen the capacity of the United States and the international community to respond to global internal conflicts in five

key areas: early warning, military intervention criteria, arms

control, policy integration, and constituency building.

It is this last area, constituency and consensus building, that the

Human Rights and Business Roundtable has excelled in. It is also

the focus of what I wish to speak to you about today.

The Beijing Olympics affords a timely opportunity for creative

partnering between the business and human rights communities,

both here in the United States and in China, to both improve

human rights and the climate for international businesses investing in China.

The Roundtable was launched in 1997 with the goal of bringing

together two communities that have been traditional adversaries:

multinational business and human rights advocates.

Yet, they represent two of the most important Cold War constituencies in the United States. In its 5 years of operation, the RoundVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:00 Feb 05, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 83979.TXT China1 PsN: China1
8

table has developed procedures, principles, formats, and policies to

ensure the smooth working of the Roundtable, including a set of

operational ground rules.

They stipulate that members of the Roundtable participate in

their individual capacities and not as representatives of the organizations with which they are affiliated, so they do not need to obtain

clearance from their organizations to express views and reach

consensus.

All discussions are off the record and by invitation only, and

records of the meetings are on a non-attribution basis, except when

speakers indicate otherwise.

The Roundtable offers a way to discuss hard issues in a spirit of

cooperation rather than confrontation. It has thus far convened

over 50 meetings that have engaged more than 150 individuals

from the human rights and business communities.

Over 20 multinational corporations and 30 human rights groups

have collaborated under the Roundtable’s leadership to work in

partnership on the problems and opportunities of economic

globalization.

Now, it is no secret that the success of China’s bid for the 2008

Olympics has garnered much criticism from human rights advocates. The scrutiny of the human rights community will make it

likely that businesses supporting the Olympics will be expected to

do more than simply pay for advertising space in Beijing.

Already, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and others have stated publicly that they expect sponsoring businesses to

take a proactive role in advancing democracy in China leading up

to, and during, the games.

U.S. corporations sponsoring the Olympics are tendering bids for

preparatory infrastructure development could face considerable

challenges. Sponsors could find themselves tainted by association

should the China authorities commit human rights abuses during

the games.

For example, the Olympic Committee’s mandate states that there

must be unfettered access to the press during the games. But what

will the Chinese authorities do in the face of potential protests

around the games? What might be the repercussions for business

if human rights abuses are being seen committed under corporate

banners?

Further, corporations doing business in China, not just those

sponsoring the games, have an interest in promoting the rule of

law, since predictability is crucial to sustainable business.

Businesses ignore the human rights aspects of the rule of law at

their own peril, as has been borne out by the experiences of some

companies in countries such as Nigeria, Colombia, Indonesia, India,

and, yes, China.

The new leadership in China will no doubt wish to capitalize on

the publicity and income the games generate. There are 6 years between now and the summer games in 2008, during which business,

government, and NGOs can engage in meaningful and action-oriented dialog on human rights and business issues surrounding the

games.

Our recommendations are these: The Congressional-Executive

Commission on China is charged with monitoring human rights

9

and the development of the rule of law in China, and with submission of an annual report to the President and Congress.

In its 2002 annual report, the Commission made one of its priority recommendations that the administration ‘‘facilitate meetings

of United States, Chinese, and third country companies doing business in a specific locality and industry in China to identify systemic

worker rights abuses, develop recommendations for appropriate

Chinese Government entities, and discuss these recommendations

with Chinese officials, with the goal of developing a long-term, collaborative relationship between government and business to assist

in improving China’s implementation of internationally recognized

labor standards.’’

The Fund for Peace believes that human rights organizations

and multinational business form two of the key constituencies affecting U.S. foreign policy today. The Fund, therefore, proposes

that the Commission’s recommendation on business/government

collaboration be broadened to include U.S. and international NGOs.

We further recommendation that the focus of collaboration between business, NGOs, and government be widened to cover not

only labor issues in China, but a broad range of human rights and

rule of law issues that relate to the success of the Beijing Olympics.

These would include freedom of association and assembly,

freedom of expression, security concerns, due process, and transparency.

The Human Rights and Business Roundtable offers a useful and

practical model for engagement between businesses and human

rights organizations and their partners in China.

We would propose that the goals of a dialog on the Beijing Olympics be as follows: (1) to develop a preventative strategy that would

assist businesses in avoiding being implicated in potential human

rights abuses surrounding the games; (2) to engage a broad crosssection of civil society and businesses and frank discussions of Chinese and Western perspectives on human rights and the rule of

law; (3) to involve the private sector in ongoing conversation and

education on security and human rights issues in a cooperative

spirit of corporate social responsibility; (4) to educate both constituencies and increase their knowledge of human rights and security

issues; (5) to support civil society capacity by promoting groups to

act in a collective setting and encourage collaboration where

possibly; (6) to find areas of common ground, explore channels of

potential cooperation between communities; and (7) to create

practical actions to attain mutual goals, and to use the Beijing

Olympics as a means to establish a best practices model for future

international events.

Finally, we would invite the Commission to report on such a

dialog’s progress in its future annual reports.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Beer appears in the appendix.]

Mr. WOLF. Thanks very much.

What we will do now is we will go around one by and one and

just ask you some questions, and hopefully engage in some discussion. To discipline ourselves, we will give ourselves about 5 minutes each to engage you.

10

It is a very interesting set of presentations. I think, Don, your

discussion of how the Olympics acted as one input into systemic

change in Korea was fascinating.

It is an interesting contrast, Kevin, to your approach, which I

take as saying that Olympics come and go, a lot of news coverage

during the Olympics itself, and then it is life as normal. Lauryn,

you are saying that may be true. But how do we make it so that

it is not life as normal?

I wonder, Kevin. You have looked at the Korean Olympic Games

as well. I wonder how—and I realize you are not a Korea expert—

you react to Don’s description of the Olympics has having this kind

of systemic impact on a system, as in Korea?

Mr. WAMSLEY. Well, I do not necessarily disagree with him, but

it is very difficult to discern what political and social change has

been wrought by the Olympics directly and what source of other,

broader changes were taking place at the same time, what parts

of the Olympic Games process actually had an impact on facilitating these social, political, even economic, changes.

I know in economic studies, for example, if we can draw a parallel, it is very difficult to discern what directly impacts on a specific result, and having to discern which variables we can isolate

when it comes to looking at direct impacts caused by the Olympic

Games.

It is really a network of factors and forces which happen before,

during, and after the Olympic Games. So from my standpoint, some

of the points that were raised about diplomatic relations, you could

pinpoint those very easily.

But with respect to human rights, to current local, even national

issues, they are so wrapped up with other things, domestic issues

and international issues, that it is hard to separate them.

Mr. OBERDORFER. I agree with that. As I said, it was one factor.

There were other factors, including the rise of the Korean middle

class demanding, basically, more of a say in their government,

pressures from the United States, other things that took place. But

it was, in my view, anyway, as an historian of those events, one

of the more important factors.

Mr. WOLF. This is more of a comment than a question. Feel free

to respond if you have any thoughts. The human rights groups,

today, looking at the Olympics are looking for ways that action

could be taken so there will be an impact from the Olympics. It is

quite different than Don’s description of Korea, where it was reality

and it is simply part of the flow of events.

Trying to look at how to have an impact, how to leverage the

Olympics for human rights goals, is a much different question, and

much more difficult.

Mr. OBERDORFER. In the case of Korea, it was the fact that there

was a perception that it might not happen if Korea cracked down

hard on its people, or if there was massive martial law, shooting

of people, any of these things. I think it helped persuade the government not to do that.

Ms. BEER. Yes. I do not think that that is the fear now. I do not

think anybody seriously thinks that the Beijing Olympic Games are

not going to happen. I think that it is very different now. We have

11

the Internet, which was not really around and kicking when Seoul

happened.

There are also going to be a profound number of satellite broadcast journalists present at the games, and increasingly human

rights activists have taken advantage of these two factors in other

areas.

So I think that for many of them, simply the opportunity to have

all this press attention will make it likely that a lot of them will

turn out at the Olympics themselves.

I think, obviously, you have already seen comments—I made reference to two of them—from leading human rights organizations

that have already criticized this and stated unequivocally that they

expect business to take a proactive role.

So, I think from our perspective, what we would like to see is

some creative, proactive thinking about how to utilize this to advance human rights, but as we found in our Roundtable, the advancing of the rule of law and the advancing of human rights are

part of the same process, they are not mutually exclusive by any

stretch of the mind.

In fact, you cannot really have transparency in business with a

corrupt government, and a whole host of other human rights problems will make it impossible for you to function well as a business.

Mr. WOLF. Are some of the members of your business Roundtable

included among the major sponsors of the Olympics?

Ms. BEER. No. We have a couple of companies that have some

serious investments in China. Mostly, we now have a focus that

has changed from a sort of broad array of companies to those in

the extractive industries.

But what I would suggest would be that any company that has

a serious interest, not just in sponsoring the games but in longterm investment in China, ought to be thinking strategically like

this, because it is not just that the Olympics will provide scrutiny

during the events, there is already scrutiny now and that will

increase, in my view.

In the run-up as we get closer and closer to 2008, there will be

more and more expectations, I think, particularly if something adverse happens where the Chinese authorities are seen bulldozing

thousands of people out of their homes, for instance.

Mr. WOLF. Thanks.

John.

Mr. FOARDE. This question is principally for Kevin, but also for

Don and Lauryn, if you want to step up to it.

Kevin, what is your understanding of the specific commitments

that the Chinese Government made in the bid process with respect

to such human rights as freedom of association and freedom of the

press? The actual documents do not seem to be available publicly.

At least, I have not been able to find them.

I wonder if you have any sense of what specific things they made

commitments on to be able to win the bid.

Mr. WAMSLEY. There are some standard commitments that are

available publicly, and that includes some of the things that have

been mentioned today, freedom for the press to move around reasonably in the city, and to report, and freedom of travelers to move

within the realm of Chinese law.

12

The people who are allowed to get in the country should get in

the country, and that includes journalists and members of the

press. But, like you, the information is no more made available to

me, so I do not have much more insight than you do on that issue.

Mr. FOARDE. What about freedom of religious practice for athletes and visitors? Do you know anything about commitments with

respect to that?

Mr. WAMSLEY. The Olympic Village is supposed to be a free zone

for people to practice their normal cultural practices, including religion. So, it is supposed to be set up to accommodate these things

with respect to prayers, and with respect to food, et cetera. This is

supposed to be a part of the hosting process.

Mr. FOARDE. You said in your presentation that the expectations

there would be somewhere in the vicinity of 20,000 athletes and

visitors. Did I get that number wrong? I mean, is it more than

that?

Mr. WAMSLEY. It will be more visitors. I mentioned 20,000

journalists.

Mr. FOARDE. Oh, 20,000 journalists.

Mr. WAMSLEY. Yes. Media personnel, television, radio.

Mr. FOARDE. And, roughly, what is the prediction on visitors, any

sense?

Mr. WAMSLEY. Should be roughly around the same as Sydney. It

would be, perhaps, an influx of 10,000 to 15,000. The only problem

with comparing to Sydney, was that was tourist time for Sydney

as well, so it is very difficult to discern who were Olympic tourists

and who were the regular tourists.

Mr. FOARDE. Don Oberdorfer, do you have a recollection of how

many foreign visitors, roughly, there were for the games in 1988?

Mr. OBERDORFER. I have no idea. I cannot keep those kind of

numbers in my head. But there were a lot, I can tell you that.

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you.

Mr. WOLF. Chris.

Mr. BILLING. This is for you, Don. As a former journalist, I was

wondering, first of all, if you could give us a sense of what kind

of restrictions you were up against in Seoul as far as what they allowed you as free access for reporting, and what you might expect

in China for reporters.

Mr. OBERDORFER. I did not actually cover the Olympics themselves. I was not a sports writer, so I did not go over there for that

purpose. I do know that they had extensive facilities for journalists.

I was there with Secretary Shultz some time before the Olympics

when he inspected the facilities and all that kind of stuff.

But I do not recall any big problem for journalists in covering the

games. The South Korean Government, I think, and the Olympics

Committee, made very extensive preparations for coverage.

The only problem, and I guess it will be the same with China,

is that the time zone was such that the major events took place in

the middle of the night over here, which was something that did

not bother the journalists, but it bothered the advertisers. But I do

not think there was a big journalistic problem, that I remember,

anyway.

13

Mr. BILLING. Do you know, Kevin, as far as the unfettered access

for journalists, is that restricted only to Beijing or does that mean

throughout all of China, that they can travel freely?

Mr. WAMSLEY. Presumably, once in the country, they can travel

freely. The access I spoke specifically about was governed by the

IOC to Olympic sites.

One thing I might note, is that since the scandal the IOC has

been considerably embarrassed by restricting access to any journalists. I think that that has improved so that certain journalists who

have written unfavorable things in the past might be granted

access to Olympic sites.

Mr. BILLING. Would you expect China to follow through on that

commitment to allow reporters to run around freely?

Mr. WAMSLEY. I do not think that reporters will be allowed to

run around freely, necessarily. I would not be surprised if there is

not a certain resistance to speak to reporters. I would not be surprised if people are instructed to only say certain things.

The other thing I would argue is that there may be a certain

resistance on behalf of the people who are in favor of putting on

a good show in Beijing, who would be reluctant to speak about

certain things during the games.

Mr. WOLF. Thanks.

Tiffany.

Ms. MCCULLEN. My question is for Lauryn. Lauryn, do you think

that International Olympic Committee sponsors can effectively

influence China to improve upon its human rights?

Ms. BEER. Yes. I do not think you can look at this in an isolated

way. I do not think that companies can, themselves, effect all the

change that needs to happen. Obviously that has to be done by the

government.

But I think that, yes, I do believe that corporations, particularly

if they have a big investment in China, have a lot of influence, as

they have had in many other countries. I do not know what the extent of that influence is. For a lot of the companies that are sponsoring, they are not actually invested in China outside the games.

So it is not like, because your name appears at the Olympic

Games, that that means that all of a sudden your investments in

China will be put at risk if something happens. What it does for

those sponsors, obviously, if something happens, is the potential of

association with an event that has gone wrong. So, it is a kind of

twofold set of corporate activities there that I am envisioning.

The other is also for businesses, though, who do have the longterm investments who are not necessarily sponsors, but who certainly have an interest in seeing that the Beijing games do not

backfire.

So if the implication of your question is, well, how do they do

it——

Ms. MCCULLEN. Yes. Yes.

Ms. BEER. Well, this is why I proposed engagement, because I do

not think there are easy answers to that question. I think that

there is a potential for things to change a lot between now and

2008, but that is why we think it is a good idea to start the kind

of dialog that brings to the fore questions of, well, what are you

going to do about security if there are problems? What are you

14

going to do about potential gag orders? What are you going to do

if there is protester crackdown in a violent way outside of the

Olympics site when there are 20,000 reporters with microphones in

your face? How are you going to handle it?

I think that the experience of a lot of corporations, in the midst

of violent protests, trying to say, ‘‘Well, nothing to do with us,

mate,’’ is not really a successful strategy any more.

Ms. MCCULLEN. When you say ‘‘engagement,’’ do you mean with

NGOs or engagement with the Chinese Government? Who should

the engagement be with?

Ms. BEER. I think it could take a number of different forms. Initially, I would say for businesses and NGOs to come up with a set

of issues that they would like to take, both to our government, and

then have our government take to the Chinese. That, to me, is the

strategy that personally makes most sense.

I think that bringing in governments, whether it is ours or the

Chinese, too early on, can make both corporations and human

rights people nervous. The idea is to foster a frank dialog, which

is why we do things the way we do, that is, always off the record

and it is on a non-attribution basis, because we want the frank

exchange of ideas.

But I think at that point, once you have got some common

ground established, that is when you bring in the United States

Government and you invite them into the dialog as well, with a

view to influencing the Chinese Government.

Ms. MCCULLEN. So you invite other NGOs to your roundtable

discussions?

Ms. BEER. Yes.

Ms. MCCULLEN. Which ones, if you do not mind me asking? Or

can you say?

Ms. BEER. I was wondering whether anybody would ask me that.

I do have a list of everybody that has participated. We have had,

over the 5 years, people coming and going for all sorts of reasons.

But just to give you a sampling, on the NGO side, we have had

Ashoka, the Asian Society, Brookings, Business for Social Responsibility, The Carnegie Endowment, The Carter Center, The Coalition

for International Justice, Amnesty, The Lawyers Committee for

Human Rights, The International Human Rights Law Group,

Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, First Peoples Worldwide,

The Fair Labor Association, Minnesota Advocates for Human

Rights, the RFK Center for Human Rights, The U.S.-China Business Council, Transparency International, and World Monitors.

Ms. MCCULLEN. All right. Thank you.

Ms. BEER. Sure.

Mr. WOLF. Karin.

Ms. FINKLER. Thank you. In earlier testimony, witnesses referred

to how the International Olympic Committee was willing to possibly cancel and withdraw the games from Korea.

Do you believe there is a willingness to do that now if something

happens in Beijing or somewhere in China? If not, why not? If so,

what type of horrible situation would it take for the committee to

remove the games from China?

Mr. OBERDORFER. Somebody is probably more of an authority

than I am on this. But just the possibility that that could happen

15

was enough to fix the minds of the Korean authorities. Samaranch

alluded to that possibility.

You had at that time, of course, the example of the 1980 games

and the 1984 games where there was not full participation, and nobody wanted that to spoil, in effect, the Olympics in 1988.

So I do not know what the International Committee would do

under the current circumstances. But I think, just the possibility

that something could be drastically done would fix the mind of the

people in China. I do not know how far the Olympics Committee

would go.

Mr. WAMSLEY. I think it would have to be pretty major. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. The United States called for the

removal of the Olympic Games from Moscow to another country.

That did not happen. We have a different IOC regime in place right

now. President Jacques Rogge has been fairly silent about the issue

of human rights.

I think it would have to be a fairly major incident before the

Olympic Games were removed, and I think that would only occur

after some very serious diplomatic efforts to smooth things over,

because the IOC has a long history of wishing to smooth things

over before the show comes to town.

Ms. FINKLER. All right. Thank you.

We have heard some excellent suggestions of how businesses and

human rights groups can work together to press the Chinese Government for more openness and support for human rights.

What would you recommend to Members of Congress, both as individuals or groups, that go over for inter-parliamentary exchanges,

and to the administration, et cetera, in terms of pressing for more

change?

Ms. BEER. Well, first, I think, to start encouraging this sort of

dialog amongst themselves, to join in with businesses and human

rights organizations here, and then to bring that experience with

them when they meet with their counterparts in China, I think, is

very helpful.

I mean, we actually ask some of our business members to do just

that in their own spheres because they have a lot of contact with

government officials in the parts of the world that they do business

in. We find that that kind of quiet diplomacy is often very effective.

Ms. FINKLER. Thank you.

Mr. WAMSLEY. Well, if something is to be done that is going to

be effective, I think it would be a mistake to go it alone. I think

that China has many trade partners in the world. The United

States is one of them. I think it would be a mistake for it to be

completely a United States initiative.

I think that any lobbying efforts to this end should go to the

major corporations who are the Olympic Program [TOP] sponsors

who have paid some, between $50 and $65 million over 4 years to

be official sponsors of the Olympic symbols worldwide.

So I think the most effect could possibly come from these companies who are finding themselves walking a tightrope now. They

have a major investment in the games. Right now they are spending their time thinking about how interesting their commercials

will be for 2008. So, I think this would be a bit of a burr in their

side, these sorts of things. I think it is a difficult enterprise. If the

16

United States goes it alone, I think that they run the risk of being

criticized for being show-stoppers.

In other words, China has been waiting for this kind of event for

a long, long time, and they felt marginalized as a country, internationally, for decades and decades. I think, for anything to be an

effective form of criticism, it is going to have to come from a number of major trade partners for it to be effective.

Ms. FINKLER. Thanks.

Mr. WOLF. Thanks.

Matt.

Mr. TUCHOW. What is the status of Taiwan? Is Taiwan going to

participate in the Olympics in Beijing? Are they allowed to?

Mr. WAMSLEY. To my knowledge, they will compete as Chinese

Taipei because they have a National Olympic Committee, and

China, as a country, is not entitled to prevent them from participating.

Mr. TUCHOW. Are there any countries that will not be participating now because of a political situation?

Mr. WAMSLEY. I do not know at this point.

Mr. TUCHOW. My second question is also to you, Kevin Wamsley.

It is your conclusion, which I just wanted to probe a little further.

You were just talking about it to some extent.

But you write that ‘‘international lobbying initiatives that question China’s social and political prerogatives in the years leading

up to the 2008 Olympics might be viewed, even by average citizens,

as efforts to undermine what has been celebrated widely as the arrival of a modern China. International advocates for political

change in China should proceed with caution.’’

So can you explain a little further what you are saying there?

Are you disagreeing with the types of suggestions that Lauryn Beer

is making about having engagement, or what exactly is the point

you are making there?

Mr. WAMSLEY. Well, I think it is a complicated issue. I think we

cannot just say that, if we are going to go in there and improve

things in China, we are going to do it by participating in these

kinds of events and these kinds of lobbying activities, because I

think the outcome is very unpredictable.

I think it is fair to say that a majority of Chinese people have

already voiced their support for the Olympic Games. I think that

there is a relationship between the Chinese people and the Chinese

Government, and the Chinese Government will be aware of any

solidarity that exists for the promotion of the Olympic Games.

I think that if people are lobbying intensively against Chinese

law, or detaining prisoners, et cetera, at the time of the Olympic

Games, and any kinds of threats are made, I think that there is

going to be a reaction in China that is very negative. I do not think

there would be widespread support for that kind of intense initiative. So, my suggestion is to be more subtle.

I think, for example, if there were a boycott, that would be the

most effective tool of shutting things down and getting people’s attention. But, on the other hand, you may throw back social change

another three decades if you do something like that.

So, I am suggesting that we do not know how much popular support there is going to be in China during the Olympic Games, but

17

if you look at every other nation that hosts the Olympics, for that

2 weeks we do not see any dark side of the nation, all we see is

people celebrating and being proud of themselves, and inviting the

world in front of unprecedented satellite television stations. So, I

say tread softly, or you might not get the reaction you expect from

the Chinese people for these initiatives.

Mr. TUCHOW. And Lauryn Beer, do you agree with that? Do you

think that the approach should be a subtle one, and that nationalism will play a role here, and efforts by NGOs, or even companies

that are exercising corporate social responsibility in a very overt

fashion, would backfire?

Ms. BEER. No. I do not think that what Kevin has said and what

I am suggesting are incompatible. I do not want to say that I have,

personally, a strategy for how to do this. I am suggesting a way

to arrive at that point.

I do think that companies and people with an interest in human

rights, and eventually government officials, sitting down and trying

to agree on how to go about doing this in a way that will potentially avoid pitfalls should they arise, is simply common sense. I

think the more you engage communities that do not necessarily

speak to each other, the better, for one thing.

Second, I would also suggest that at some point in this dialog

that Chinese businesses and human rights advocates are also

brought in to express their views.

One of our recommendations is just that, that there should be a

frank discussion about both Chinese and western perspectives on

human rights and on the games themselves, and what the implications for both business and human rights are.

I do not think it is up to United States businesses and NGOs,

for instance, to say to China, ‘‘This is what you should be doing.’’

I would agree that if that is what happened, that that would backfire. But what I am suggesting, is something that is more inclusive.

I think it needs to be done gradually. I do not think that you get

a group like I am suggesting together, and the next week everybody is in agreement that we should have a platform that says

this, that, and the other thing.

I guarantee you, from our own experience, the landscape always

changes anyway. But what you hope to arrive at at the end of the

day, is some common agreement on how to go about your business

that makes sense to both communities.

Mr. WAMSLEY. Could I add a little bit to that?

Mr. TUCHOW. Sure.

Mr. WAMSLEY. What you said just triggered my memory. Some

of the Chinese businesses that are being asked to come forward

during this process, there is sort of a bidding war going on in

China now for companies that will be allowed to set up in particular places for the Olympic Games.

In fact, they have to follow correct business and behavior protocols in order to get the right to set up in those places, like the airports and downtown Beijing, et cetera. The question then becomes,

well, how transparent really are these businesses practices, and

what sorts of behavior is the government watching for when they

allow certain businesses to set up and not others?

Mr. WOLF. J.J.

18

Mr. PISKADLO. Thank you.

My question is focused at Lauryn. I would appreciate your comments on this. I have always been a strong believer that businesses

can, and do, play a role in changing policies with any one country.

With regard to China, I supported awarding PNTR status to

China with the belief that China would operate within a rulesbased system, the WTO system, that would give businesses more

of a foothold there and be able to try and work for change, obviously within their own best interests.

We hear a lot about the coming Olympics, which I thought was

a good thing. We are talking about what businesses can do and

how they can work together. As you pointed out, there were some

recommendations in the Commission’s report.

But one thing that is disturbing to me, I have many organizations come to my office and, with particular reference to China,

they say businesses have not done anything. We are looking in the

future, but currently, how active have businesses been? They cannot be the only source of change, but they can play a part within

the whole dynamic within China.

So how active, to date, have businesses been in trying to influence China’s policies? You had mentioned that there are other

countries where businesses have played a role. Is there one particular model that could be used and applied to China?

Ms. BEER. I do not think that there is one particular model. You

have to, first of all, remember that corporate social responsibility,

as a kind of active movement, if you like, is a fairly new thing.

So, there is not a whole lot of anything other than anecdotal evidence to suggest where it has had an effect and where it has not.

I can only go by the experiences that I come across with the companies that I deal with and know what has been done and what has

not.

I am not an expert on China. Probably, Bob Kapp is the person

to ask about United States-China business. But I accept the fact

that probably businesses have not been as vocal in China because

it is a huge market and nobody wants to risk losing it. Also, it is

a new market compared to some of the countries that I mentioned.

Whether companies can do more, I obviously believe that they

can. I suggest that some form of dialog—again, I have given you

the example of our Roundtable because I do think it is successful

in this respect. We have been going for 5 years without anybody

throwing anything at each other, and we have actually come to

some action items that have been agreed upon by both camps.

I think that that is the key to any form of successful dialog, is

that you have to build trust. I think that is the fundamental

premise upon which any corporate social activity is going to change

any part of the world, is there has to be engagement between the

relevant stakeholders, there has to be proper relationships built.

They have to be mutually powerful in any dialog, which is, again,

one thing that I would stress. I probably have not answered your

question directly.

I think more can be done, and I hope the fact that there is going

to be so much attention 6 years from now would focus people on

the fact that we have significant time now to do something. I think

19

that if companies stick their head in the sand, again, they do so

at their own risk.

Mr. PISKADLO. I had one more question for Don. You had talked

about how South Korea was very concerned about losing the Olympics, and they were responsive to pressure not to crack down and

do something violent, so to speak.

Do you believe that the Chinese Government would be that responsive? I am no expert on China, but sometimes they seem to,

maybe more so than other countries, not really care. Do you believe

that they would be responsive to outside pressures?

Mr. OBERDORFER. Well, it is only a guess, obviously. I think they

are very responsive. By that, I mean I think they are very much

aware, not necessarily that they are going to follow the lead of outside countries. They have their own internal politics. It is a much

bigger country than South Korea. South Korea had suffered a deviation from an earlier, at least quasi-democratic regime, so it is not

totally comparable.

I was in China on occasions when they were bidding unsuccessfully for the Olympics. You could see how the government made a

big thing out of the bid. Every cab you got into, the cab driver

would say to you in some kind of quasi-English something about

the Olympics. It was a matter of incredible national interest and

pride. I do not know, if it comes down to a threat, what they would

do. They probably would not respond very well.

But I do think that, clearly, the Chinese Government and the

Chinese people are going to be looking outside to a greater degree

probably than they ever have before as the Olympics approach.

As I said before, and I think has been said earlier, it probably

is going to be mostly, in the couple years approaching the Olympics, when this is very much on people’s minds.

Whether it is going to mean an automatic action to liberalize

from the government, I am sure, is probably not true. But I do

think that they will be looking to their reputation, and that would

probably have some effect.

Mr. PISKADLO. Thank you.

Mr. WOLF. Kevin, you referred to rules for businesses setting up

in relation to the Olympics in Beijing at the airport, and so on. Are

you are talking about things like China Telecom setting up cell

phone rental facilities? Are you talking about the ice cream vendors

on the street, or both?

Mr. WAMSLEY. All of those sorts of things. Any kind of a national

program. Well, first of all, any kind of a sponsorship program, and

second of all, who is allowed to actually have a hot dog stand, if

there is such a thing, in the airport, those kinds of things.

So, there is actually a movement by the government to make

sure that Beijing is clean and has the right sort of businesses that

are representing proper Chinese character to the world when they

come.

Mr. WOLF. Lauryn, are you chairing or running a process, have

you begun a process that includes the business community or business members and human rights groups to specifically be brainstorming about this question of what may be done leading up to

the Olympics?

20

Ms. BEER. Yes. We actually had a meeting, which Chris Billing

came to, not long ago where we had a kind of cross-section of China

experts and businesses that had an interest in China to talk about

how we might do this. This is why I am proposing the sort of dialog

I am, because I want us to continue trying to sort our way through

this.

One thing that we had not done in that dialog, though, was figure out what role government should play, which is why I would

like to have some government members, whether the Members of

Congress and/or the administration, actually participate in some of

these meetings.

I think it is also important, though, for the businesses and the

human rights organizations to meet separately as well, so they can

simply agree on what the agenda should be because they are the

only ones who really know what their concerns are.

But after that point, then I think it is useful to bring in government. Yes. I mean, we have had these sorts of dialogs, not just on

China, but on other issues over the years. But this is definitely one

of our focuses now.

Mr. WOLF. Kevin, you mentioned that the current president of

the IOC has been very quiet on human rights issues. Is that different than IOC in the past?

Mr. WAMSLEY. Not necessarily. We found that after a while it

was fairly easy to predict the kind of response that President

Samaranch would have to certain issues. From my experience, I do

not know President Rogge enough to effectively predict how he reacts and how he addresses issues. But so far, he seems to be a little

more thorough in this interest with issues than President

Samaranch was.

Mr. WOLF. Do you have any sense whether, let us assume that

Lauryn’s process succeeds and the business community and the

human rights groups can come up with a set of realistic, practical

things that one could do over a several-year period.

They begin to engage the United States and other governments.

Is this something that the IOC bureaucracy or the IOC politics

would be interested in participating in, or is this simply something

that is untouchable as far as they are concerned?

Mr. WAMSLEY. Well, it was the IOC that first said, and said for

three, four decades, that sports and politics do not mix, even

though all of their actions were deeply politicized. I would be surprised if the IOC is willing to tread in these sorts of waters at this

point, unless something very serious happens.

The IOC is predominantly a European-based organization, recognizing that it is primarily funded by United States money. However, the power structure still sits in Europe, and they also have

a number of votes from other countries that support the European

vote.

Perhaps if you had some European companies on board and some

European interests represented in these sorts of things, then they

would be more likely to take notice.

Mr. WOLF. What about looking at the U.S. Olympic Committee

with the same kind of question? Have there been human rights

concerns? Would you think they might be interested in participating as a dialog partner with Lauryn and her group?

21

Mr. WAMSLEY. That would be a very difficult position for the

United States Olympic Committee, given its relationship to the

International Olympic Committee. That might be one that they,

too, are unwilling to address to a great extent, other than providing

maybe some support.

The interests of the United States Olympic Committee in the last

decade have been primarily financial. They have been spending a

lot of effort trying to get a greater percentage of the television revenues and TOP sponsorship, and not so much interested in the

necessarily human factors of the Olympic Games.

Mr. WOLF. Thanks.

John.

Mr. FOARDE. Don, your presentation was admirable in separating

what is fact from speculation. I am going to ask all three of you

to speculate on the following. But before I do, I would say that I

was in Mexico City in 1968 for the Olympics, and also in Beijing

in 1990 for the Asian Games.

So my question is really to ask you to speculate a bit about the

long-term effects, if any, of the Olympic Games on both the economy of China, but also on human rights and the rule of law.

Given what we know about the results of the Olympic Games in

developing countries since Mexico, 1968, what do you think the impact of the games are going to be on both the economy, and then

the polity of China after 2008? Total speculation, I understand. So,

go ahead.

Mr. OBERDORFER. Well, the first thing I have to say, is I do not

know. The belief, whether it is true or not, is that the Japanese

Olympic Games sort of launched Japan into becoming a world economic power. That was something very much in the minds of the

Koreans when they wanted the games.

I do not think it had that much effect on the economics of Korea.

They spent a whole lot of money getting prepared with these various venues; whether they came out ahead or not, I do not know.

It did have an effect on the political development of the country,

but as I said, it was one among several factors.

I would guess that it will have some effect in China, just

because, as I said before, the Chinese people’s vision will be broadened and the government will be very conscious of the world

watching.

Whether that will be permanent or not, I have no idea. I think

a lot depends on how the outside world deals with it, and on

things, at the moment, which we basically cannot predict today.

Ms. BEER. I would pretty much second that, but with the caveat

that I do not think that simply by opening a market or by having

an event you necessarily democratize a country.

I think that unless proactive steps are taken by those who have

influence, then probably there will not be any major changes,

either for the economy or for human rights and the rule of law.

To make changes like that, you need significant input. You need

a lot of planning, you need a lot of dedication. When the games are

over in 2008, clearly, even if the kind of dialog I am proposing has

happened, and happened successfully, it does not mean that all of

the problems all of a sudden cease.

22

So I think that sort of dialog would need to continue. I think that

there will always be room for improvement in any of the countries

in which U.S. businesses are invested. But I think what this does

do, is provide a focal point more than anything else.

Mr. WAMSLEY. I see the Olympic Games as sort of an empty cylinder. It gets filled up with something new every once in a while,

particular to the country that is hosting, or any kind of a movement that happens through it, political or otherwise.

I think, with the case of places like Sydney and Salt Lake City,

you will see some short-term gains in tourism and local economic

development. But that was paid for by the people’s money, essentially, these infrastructure developments.

I think you will see the same thing in Beijing, is some short-term

economic kick-starts. But probably the most important thing that

an Olympics does, is it kick-starts governments and people and it

really does rationalize government programs.

I do not think it necessarily creates new ones, but, good or bad,

governments use the Olympic Games to brand themselves for a period of time after the games. It also will provide you with some sort

of reputation.

But even in the case of Sydney, what are considered to be, in

spite of the massive debt, a widely successful Olympic Games, but

what has that reputation done for them economically and socially?

Has it gotten rid of the crisis they have in their government’s relationship to Aboriginal peoples? Not at all.

Mr. WOLF. Chris.

Mr. BILLING. I would like to turn our attention to the environment in Beijing for a moment. Kevin, I wonder if you have a sense

of what kind of commitments Beijing has made to the IOC as far

as cleaning up the air and other pollution problems in Beijing, and

how effective you think they could be.

Mr. WAMSLEY. I cannot speak specifically because I have not

seen their extended bid book. But I know that, as part of official

bidding, the IOC is now interested in the environment because people have told them that it is important, not because they have been

proactive.

They are very interested in bids that show environmental cleanup and that promise not to create too much environmental damage.

Now, we have seen, in spite of this, that the damages happened

anyway.

A lot of times, as part of the clean-up process in other nations,

has included getting rid of low-income housing because it is, in effect, cleaning up the vision of the city. That is not necessarily an

environmentally good thing for the people who live there.

I know they are building some new road infrastructure that is

getting rid of some of their traffic problems, but it has also increased some of their noise problems among the buildings because

they are putting up super-highways very close to buildings. Other

than that, I cannot give you any more specifics on the environment

in Beijing.

Mr. BILLING. Have you seen any instances where Beijing is tearing down low-income housing, those sorts of things?

Mr. WAMSLEY. I have not yet, no.

23

Mr. BILLING. Do any of the rest of you have any comments on

the environment in Beijing and what the games might mean to

that?

Ms. BEER. No. But if it is true that the IOC is taking the environment into account, I find it hard to believe that that is somehow

not politicized and that human rights is.

Mr. BILLING. All right.

Don, I was going to ask you, you mentioned that one of the most

dramatic moments in the Seoul games was when North and South

Korea walked in together.

Mr. OBERDORFER. This was not in Seoul.

Mr. BILLING. I am sorry.

Mr. OBERDORFER. This was in Sydney.

Mr. BILLING. All right. Of course.

Mr. OBERDORFER. North Korea did not participate in the Seoul

games.

Mr. BILLING. Along those same lines, I wonder if you could

speculate on what the Beijing games might mean to cross-straits

relations between China and Taiwan.

Mr. OBERDORFER. I do not know. You know that there is a lot

of cross-straits activity between China and Taiwan, especially economic activity. A tremendous amount. And the people moving back

and forth, there is a very large amount of that, despite the political

difficulties.

So my guess is that there will be the athletes there, and they

will participate and China will treat them well. They will go back

home. It is like the businessmen. They will go back home and it

is probably unlikely to have a very big effect.

But I am sure that they are going to participate, and there is

going to be people going back and forth. But, as I say, there are

a lot of people going back and forth already.

Mr. BILLING. I wonder if you would have a sense that, perhaps,

in the years leading up to the games, whether hostilities between

the two sides would be kept at a minimum.

Mr. OBERDORFER. Are you talking about Taiwan?

Mr. BILLING. Correct.

Mr. OBERDORFER. I think it will depend on other factors more

than the games. But who knows?

Mr. WOLF. Thanks. Tiffany.

Ms. MCCULLEN. Lauryn, I just wanted to go back to the Olympic

Roundtable that your group is, I guess, sponsoring. How many

meetings have you all had so far, and how is that planned? Who

plans the agenda, and do you plan on inviting government officials

at some point in time?

Ms. BEER. We are fairly early in the process. We have had two

meetings so far. We have not fixed the agenda. Basically, our members fix the agenda themselves.

Ms. MCCULLEN. All right.

Ms. BEER. We do everything by consensus. All I do when I chair

is try to guide the discussion to conclusions, but it is up to them

to choose what they think the important issues are to them.

At the point that they have arrived at that kind of agreement,

then we have got at least a skeletal outline of the issues we think

24

are crucial to work on. I think that is the point at which I would

want to bring government in.

Ms. MCCULLEN. And how do you determine which business

groups to bring in? Just business groups that are already doing

business in China?

Ms. BEER. We do a fair bit of research on who is invested in

China and we look at who is likely to be investing in China. Most

of the businesses that we have done outreach to in this respect are

those who already have a big stake. Clearly, all the big-name

Olympic sponsors would have to be included.

Ms. MCCULLEN. Thank you.

Mr. WOLF. Karin.

Ms. FINKLER. Chinese nationalism was mentioned a number of

times this afternoon. What do you see that looking like in the leadup to the games, in contrast to possibly the expression of it after

the accidental bombing in Belgrade? How do you think it will grow

or what will it look like?

Mr. OBERDORFER. Well, I was in China right after the accidental

bombing. I would have to say that the reaction to that, I found

appalling, both from the point of view of the United States Government, which I do not think did nearly enough to explain to the Chinese people what had happened, so the Chinese Government line

just won the day.

The Americans sent over a delegation to talk to the Chinese leadership, which got very little attention in the Chinese media, and

I think gave up too easily to try to explain the American point of

view to the Chinese Government.

Some elements of the Chinese Communist Party and Government took advantage of it to try to paint the United States as a

deliberate attacker of China, something that I’m afraid a lot of Chinese people still believe, and are going to believe forever because

we, the United States, was not effective in getting our story out.

I would hope that no such incident is going to happen again, but

I hope that if it ever does, the U.S. Government will go a lot better

job of getting its story out.

Ms. FINKLER. Do you have a response?

Ms. BEER. I do not really know how to respond to this, except

to say that I think nationalism is a factor that should be taken into

account.

Therefore, it is important to involve Chinese businesses and Chinese activists, to the extent that it is possible, in a dialog about

human rights and rule of law concerns.

Mr. WAMSLEY. The Olympic Games are often a mystifying process. That may be stating it too simply, but I would say that with

respect to nationalism, something like the Olympic Games can energize people in strange kinds of ways. People who have different

advantages in their own societies seem to forget, through different

kinds of nationalism and nationalistic celebrations in all countries,

the things that make people different economically or socially, or

people who have different rights in society.

That is why I think, when you are looking at hard issues that

are very important, you have to see through mystifying processes

like the Olympic Games and stay the course. I made the comment

today that people forget, because the Olympic Games are such a

25

media spectacle, the real important things that are going on in a

place, at a time.

I encourage people not to forget and to keep things that are important to them in the forefront and not to be caught up. Well, it

is all right to be caught up in the revelry, I suppose, and celebrate,

but at the expense of some more important things, I think that is

a mistake.

Ms. FINKLER. Thanks.

Mr. WOLF. Thanks.

Matt.

Mr. TUCHOW. Lauryn Beer gave us one potential recommendation for the Commission, but I am wondering if the panelists have

other thoughts about recommendations this Commission might

make to Congress or to the President about how to use, or how to

promote human rights and rule of law in China as a result of the

upcoming 2008 Olympics.

Mr. OBERDORFER. While I was a journalist for 38 years, I kind

of shy away from making recommendations to governments. I do

not think they necessarily would take them, and I am not sure I

am qualified to give them.

I just have kind of my own points of view. I have been asked by

government officials over the years, what would you do. My stock

answer is, ‘‘That is your problem.’’ [Laughter.]

Mr. WAMSLEY. I am in the same sort of situation. I tend to, by

my profession, watch what people do and to analyze it, to criticize

it, and to understand it. I guess you could ask me a question that

would be, well, if you could predict what you would criticize the

least, what would that be?

That would be some sort of an effort to talk about human rights

as an international concern and to go with a group, such as the

United Nations, or whatever group you would decide.

If it came from the United States president alone, that would be

problematic, I think. I think if it came from 15 or 20 other world

leaders, interested parties, I think that would be something that

would require more action.

Mr. TUCHOW. Let me ask a more specific question then. Juan

Samaranch worked with the ILO, did he not? Is that pure serendipity, or do you think there may be some effect as a result of

that on labor conditions in China? The IOC may be able to somehow utilize that in a way that others could not because of his past

experience with the Olympic Committee?

Mr. WAMSLEY. Boy, that is a difficult question. It is hard to know

what Samaranch is going to do in his retirement. But I have certainly seen what he did when he was in office, and a lot of it had

to do with self-interest. [Laughter.]

So, I am very skeptical, first of all, from the amount of power

that he now wields, which is very little, he does have a reputation.

But before he was IOC president, he also had a reputation in the

Spanish Government that was not too favorable.

I do not know how effective he will be, how good his health is,

and how really interested he is in actually making things happen

or continuing to keep his name in the press.

Mr. TUCHOW. In terms of rule of law, I assume there are Olympic

mascots and logos whose intellectual property rights, you would

26

think, would be protected. Is there going to be an issue with that

in China as a result of the fact that there are problems along these

lines in China, and could that lead to some progress in terms of

protecting intellectual property rights?

Ms. BEER. I do not know. Intellectual property has, as you know,

been a big problem for a lot of businesses. Whether the Olympics

are going to make any difference to that I think will depend, in

part, whether those businesses who are affected make a real kind

of public push about it. I do not know that I think the Olympics

itself is going to make any difference to that kind of rule of law

question.

Mr. WAMSLEY. There are rules and regulations for the Olympic

symbols and mascots, and all those sorts of things that must apply

in China, or anywhere else. Only the TOP sponsors, for example,

may use the Olympic symbols exclusively worldwide. But there are

companies in China who could, for example, pay to use Olympic

symbols.

I think that there have been some improvements with respect to

the sorts of things that are permitted in China, but it certainly is

an issue for Chinese law and the Olympic Games are not going to

affect that, I do not think.

Mr. TUCHOW. You do not think they will try to enforce it, and

therefore strengthen the intellectual property rights?

Mr. WAMSLEY. I think that one thing the Olympics does, on the

other hand, is to promote ambush marketing. This could happen in

China as well. I mean, we see it everywhere. American Express has

done it, when it did not have the rights, against Visa.

The Olympic Games provide an opportunity for people to make

money. That would tell me that there would be a lot of underground pin making that is not approved of in China, like every

other country. The unethical or illegal practices tend to win the day

when money is on the table, so I would say it may go in the other

direction.

Mr. WOLF. J.J.

Mr. PISKADLO. I have no questions.

Mr. WOLF. All right. It is 4 o’clock. This has been a very interesting session. This is actually totally different than every other

roundtable we have had. We have had about 15 of these sessions.

They have all been on issues that have been around for a long

time. There are people with very passionate or very dispassionate

views, but very well-developed views. We have got the issue of corporate social responsibility, which as you said, Lauryn, has just

been around for a short period of time.

It is one of the issues that our commissioners have committed

themselves to look into very closely to make some clear recommendations and try to take some actions in the Congress over

the next year.

But the first thing they are going to have to do, is come up with

some definitions and some understanding of exactly what it is, and

we have mixed it in with the Olympics today where, for what may

be the first time, the human rights issues are starting to come

together, at least in terms of what the human rights NGO community is concerned about.

27

I did not think we were going to come up with an agenda and

conclusions today. I think the Commission, our bosses, will be looking at this over literally the next couple of years, as is your group,

Lauryn, and a number of others, Kevin, to see, are there ways in

which the Olympics may be used to improve human rights and rule

of law in China.

I think this was a good base to start from and we appreciate the

three of you coming and giving your time to us. So, thanks very

much.

We will post, by tomorrow, the written statements that Kevin

and Lauryn had. In about 5 weeks, on our web site, we will post

the full transcript of the session today. So, thanks a lot, and especially to you, Kevin, for coming so far.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m. the roundtable was concluded.]

(29)

A P P E N D I X

30

1Dongguang Pei, ‘‘A question of names: The Two Chinas Issue and the People’s Republic of

China in the Modern Olympic Movement,’’ unpublished Master’s thesis, The University of Western Ontario, 1995, pp. iii–iv. 2See, for example, Kevin B. Wamsley, ‘‘What Price For World Class?’’ Canadian Issues, Autumn 1999, pp. 14–15; ‘‘Policy Implications For Hosting the Olympics,’’ Policy Options, Vol. 18,

No. 3, May, pp. 13–15, 1997; ‘‘Tradition, Modernity, and the Construction of Civic Identity: The

Calgary Olympics,’’ Olympika, V, pp. 81–90 with Michael K. Heine, 1996. 3See the official website: http://www.beijing–2008.org/new—olympic/eolympic/1009—e/5.htm 4Olympic Charter, International Olympic Committee, September 2001, p. 85.

5See, for example, Helen Lenskyj, The Best Olympics Ever? The Social Impacts of Sydney

2000. New York: SUNY, 2002.

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KEVIN WAMSLEY

NOVEMBER 18, 2002

First, permit me to thank you for inviting me to testify before this commission.

Our point of departure for these proceedings is to discuss the potential influences

of the process of hosting the Olympic Games in 2008 on human rights in China.

First of all we must acknowledge of course that our ruminations are purely speculative. But, that being said, we may offer some comments on these issues based on

our knowledge of China’s history, its current political policies and practices, its cultural connections to the Olympic Games in the past and present and, perhaps most

importantly, some of the extant perceptions about the role of the modern Olympics

in facilitating social and political change.

China’s sporting relations with other countries extend back almost a century, including post World War I correspondence with the International Olympic Committee

(IOC) and participation in the Games of 1932, 1936, and 1948.1 China’s return to

competition in 1984, indeed the fervor of its bidding strategies for the Games of

2000 and 2008, signaled that the Olympics had become a significant component of

Chinese domestic and foreign policy. If the unofficial financial estimates, cost projections, and the official proclamations of social preparation may be positioned as indicators, then we must conclude that not only are the Games of 2008 a serious

commitment for China, they are being positioned as one of the most important

events in Chinese history. With this in mind, we may draw some speculative conclusions on what sort of strategies may be adopted and employed by the Chinese

government to render a public face of success to the international community and,

further, how the Chinese people will participate in projecting favorable images of

a modern China to a global audience.

In the post 1984 era of the commercialized Olympic Games, host cities have

employed deliberate strategies to represent themselves as world class cities—stable,

intriguing, vibrant, and successful.2 Beijing will be no different. Indeed, to date,

Beijing’s public proclamations respecting citizen behavior and hosting protocols, entitled Urban Civility and Building Citizen Morality, I would characterize as overt

and threatening.3 Arguably, it is fair to say that the Chinese government will ensure that, far beyond the level of the Olympic volunteer, average Beijing citizens

will adhere to a code of conduct for the Games, including pre- and post periods. This

is not unusual for host cities. Rather, it remains a matter of degree. When one considers that the Olympic Games have long been a site for political expression, alongside a more recently fervent civic and national boosterism by host cities, juxtaposed

with intense media scrutiny, it follows that citizen behavior and political protests

are matters of significant concern for organizing committees and national governments. Assurances from host countries are implied in official doctrine. Indeed, it has

been the expressed interest of the IOC through its published Olympic Charter, that

there be ‘‘no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda . . .

permitted in the Olympic areas.’’ 4 Further, many bidding cities and host cities from

around the world have taken steps to remove what are perceived to be unsightly

individuals and groups in core areas and to ensure that political groups are not

given opportunities to distribute information or capitalize upon media opportunities.5 It is fair to assume that Beijing will implement some strategies of urban

cleansing, perhaps in the form of relocating unregistered citizens in Beijing, shutting down their businesses, or even detaining them.

One of the most significant factors to be considered in Beijing’s hosting of the

2008 Olympics is the potential influence of the idea of nationalism in China, stemming mainly from a common sense of historic and current marginalization among

31

6While not necessarily representative of popular opinion in China, see Dave Sheng, ‘‘Who lost

China?’’—the resurgence of Chinese nationalism,’’ Chinese Community Forum, 1996, to provide

some context for the discussion of these issues. http://www.rider.edu/phanc/courses/countrys/asia/

china/Cnatlsm/Sheng.htm

Chinese people, in various forms of international relations and, consequently, the

galvanization of public sentiment that hosting the Olympic Games has already inspired and will continue to escalate.6 This of course has direct bearing on the behavior of citizens, their support of overall government initiatives, and the reluctance of

even some dissidents to jeopardize China’s moment of international recognition.

This nationalist sentiment should not be underestimated, particularly when one is

attempting to gauge how Chinese citizens will react to government crackdowns,

urban policy initiatives, dealing with dissidents, how they may or may not reveal

information about their lives to outsiders, and how they will actively participate in

the Olympic Games and related festivities. Just as significantly, it is likely that the

Chinese government will take advantage of such cultural solidarities as it launches

and conducts its programs of cultural representation for Beijing.

In addition to the period of time leading up to the Games, the potential influences

of an influx of some 20,000 plus journalists and sport tourists during the Olympic

Games must be debated. However, any suggestions that such social contacts between Chinese citizens in Beijing and other parts of China and so-called westerners

will have an immediate influence on social activism or a long-term effect on government policies are erroneously simplistic. Certainly the issue of human rights in

China has become a focal point for the western media, and journalists will be interested in both controversy and crisis. Any immediate matters of human rights will,

without doubt, be dealt with expeditiously. But with respect to term effects of the

Games, there are many factors to consider in the hosting process, which tend to polarize media interpretations of local and national events and limit the influence of

what might be perceived as contradictory or destabilizing ideologies. First and foremost, the Olympics are a brief and intense media spectacle. Second, the Chinese

government may refuse entry to any media personnel who have proven to be ’un- friendly’ in the past. Third, the IOC maintains the rights to internal access for

members of the media. Fourth, a glimpse at Olympic history demonstrates that serious local or national problems may be focal points of international interest through

media scrutiny before and during an Olympics or the bidding process; but such stories tend to fade quickly, when the Olympic caravan has departed. Take, for example, Aboriginal issues in Sydney, Calgary, Salt Lake City, homelessness in Toronto

and Atlanta. The Olympic process, bidding, hosting, and the attendant ideological

forays into peace, brotherhood, and equity have had little direct impact beyond limited media exposure to such issues and inspiring a greater solidarity toward local

resistance to mega events. And, finally, the sheer intensity of the Olympic Games

as a media construction tends to shift focus away from national issues that may

have received significant attention before the Games, effectively marginalizing the

plights of individuals or groups who may have once been central to journalistic

interests.

Other international interest groups are integral components of the legitimizing

process perpetuated through the Olympic Games. Currently, and increasingly as the

Games draw near, corporations, consulting firms, specialists, and academics will

trade on the economic opportunities presented by the hosting of the next Games.

Groups in Sydney, for example, are lobbying to assist China in developing its infrastructure and Olympic programs, from buildings and facilities to cultural programs,

academic exchange, and Olympic education. Corporations that already have a significant multi-million dollar interest in the success of the Games, and those that are

currently seeking contracts, are not likely to endorse any systematic critiques that

focus negative attention toward the host nation. Indeed, they have diverse financial

interests in Chinese markets but also, the larger corporations that trade on Olympic

symbolism and ideology have a stake in promoting an image of China as an exotic,

historically stable, vital Nation through which sensible and interesting cultural

links can enhance their products and the flow of global capital. Intellectuals who

depend upon access to even limited information, travel, and financial aid for publications and educational liaisons are not likely to seriously raise issues of human

rights, for fear of jeopardizing their positions of privilege.

Historically, the Olympic process has tended to provide legitimacy to host governments and their policies, endorsements to their success in hosting the Games, and

furthering the ’spirit’ of the Olympic Games, as opposed to drawing attention to

shortfalls and political controversies. Well-documented examples include the economic crises of Antwerp in 1920 and London in 1948, the Great Depression in 1932

Los Angeles, Hitler’s fascism in 1936, Mexico’s slaughter of innocent citizens in

32

7See the following sources for both general and specific information on these Games: Alan

Tomlinson and Garry Whannel, eds, ‘‘Five Ring Circus: Money Power and Politics at the Olympic Games,’’ London: Pluto 1984; Richard D. Mandell, ‘‘The Nazi Olympics,’’ New York: MacMillan 1971; Arnd Kruger, ‘‘The Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda and the

Nazi Olympics of 1936,’’ in Robert K. Barney, Kevin B. Wamsley, Scott G. Martyn, Gordon H.

MacDonald, eds, ‘‘Global and Cultural Critique: Problematizing the Olympic Games,’’ London:

International Centre for Olympic Studies 1998, 33–48; Allen Guttmann, ‘‘The Games Must Go

On: Avery Brundage and the Olympic Movement,’’ New York: Columbia University Press 1984;

Kevin B. Wamsley, ‘‘The Global Sport Monopoly: a synopsis of 20th century Olympic politics,’’

International Journal, Vol. LVII, 3, pp. 395–410. 8Kevin B. Wamsley, ‘‘Laying Olympism to Rest,’’ in Post-Olympism? Questioning Sport in the

Twenty-First Century, ed. John Bale, Berg, 2004, forthcoming.

1968.7 Serious tragedies and atrocities have become subsidiary to the more

glamorous immediacies of the Olympic spectacle. On the other hand, members of the

international sporting community, Olympic officials specifically, were able to exert

remarkable influence through several decades over the issue of apartheid in South

Africa. These pressures, however, had more broad-based political support and diplomatic attention.

In summary, the Olympic Games have done far more to sustain and reproduce

extant domestic policies, to reproduce mythologies about race and equality, economic

and social opportunity, and world peace, than to subvert the inequalities of the

world.8 In the short term, it is likely that the Olympic process ensconced with its

traditional diplomacies, hyperbole, and rhetoric, indeed the political exigencies of

host nation, will negatively affect human rights in China. Further, the solidarities

created through extensive preparations to host the world should not be underestimated. International lobbying initiatives that question China’s social and political

prerogatives in the years leading up to the 2008 Olympics might be viewed, even

by average citizens, as efforts to undermine what is being celebrated widely as the

arrival of a modern China. International advocates for political change in China

should proceed with caution.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAURYN BEER

NOVEMBER 18, 2002

INTRODUCTION

Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak to you on behalf of the Fund

for Peace. My name is Lauryn Beer and I am the Director of the Fund’s Human

Rights and Business Roundtable.

The mission of The Fund for Peace is to prevent war and alleviate the conditions

that cause war. Our programmatic focus is to strengthen the capacity of the U.S.

and the international community to respond to global internal conflicts in 5 key

areas: Early Warning, Military Intervention Criteria, Arms Control, Policy Integration and Constituency Building.

It is this last area—constituency and consensus building—that the Human Rights

and Business Roundtable has excelled. It is also the focus of what I wish to speak

to you about today. The Beijing Olympics affords a timely opportunity for creative

partnering between the business and human rights communities both in the U.S.

and in China to both improve human rights and the climate for international businesses investing in China.

The Human Rights and Business Roundtable was launched in 1997 with the goal

of bringing together two communities that have been traditional adversaries: multinational business and human rights advocates. Yet they represent two of the most

important post-cold war constituencies in the United States. In its 5 years of operation, the Roundtable has developed procedures, principles, formats and policies to

ensure the smooth working of the Roundtable, including a set of operational ground

rules. They stipulate that members of the Roundtable participate in their individual

capacity and not as representatives of the organizations with which they are affiliated, so that they do not need to obtain clearance from their organizations to

express views and reach consensus. All discussions are off-the-record and by invitation only, and records of the meetings are on a non-attribution basis, except when

speakers indicate otherwise. The Roundtable offers a way to discuss hard issues in

a spirit of cooperation rather than confrontation. It has thus far convened over 50

meetings that have engaged more than 150 individuals from the human rights and

business communities. Over 20 multinational corporations and 30 human rights

groups have collaborated under the Roundtable’s leadership to work in partnership

on the problems and opportunities of economic globalization.

33

THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE BEIJING OLYMPICS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS

It is no secret that the success of China’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games has

garnered much criticism from human rights advocates. The scrutiny of the human

rights community will make it likely that businesses supporting the Olympics will

be expected to do more than simply pay for advertising space in Beijing. Already,

Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and others have stated publicly they

expect sponsoring businesses to take a proactive role in advancing democracy in

China in the lead up to, and during, the Games. U.S. corporations sponsoring the

Olympics or tendering bids for preparatory infrastructure development could face

considerable challenges. Sponsors could find themselves tainted by association,

should the Chinese authorities commit human rights abuses during the Games. For

example, the Olympic Committee’s mandate states that there must be unfettered

access to the Press during the Games. But what will the Chinese authorities do in

the face of potential protests around the Games? What might be the repercussions

for business if human rights abuses are being seen committed under corporate

banners?

Further, corporations doing business in China—not just those sponsoring the

Games—have an interest in promoting the rule of law, since predictability is crucial

to sustainable business. Businesses ignore the human rights aspects of the rule of

law at their own peril, as has been borne out by the experiences of some companies

in countries such as Nigeria, Colombia, Indonesia, India and, yes, China.

The new leadership in China will no doubt wish to capitalize on the publicity and

income the Games generate. There are 6 years between now and the Summer

Games in 2008, during which business, government and NGOs can engage in a

meaningful and action-oriented dialog on human rights and business issues

surrounding the Games.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China is charged with monitoring

human rights and the development of the rule of law in China, and with submission

of an annual report to the President and the Congress. In its 2002 Annual Report,

the Committee made one of its priority recommendations that the Administration

‘‘. . . facilitate meetings of U.S., Chinese, and third-country companies doing business in a specific locality and industry in China to identify systemic worker rights

abuses, develop recommendations for appropriate Chinese government entities, and

discuss these recommendations with Chinese officials, with the goal of developing

a long-term collaborative relationship between government and business to assist in

improving China’s implementation of internationally recognized labor standards.’’

1. The Fund for Peace believes that human rights organizations and multinational business form two of the key constituencies affecting U.S. foreign

policy today. The Fund proposes that the Committee’s recommendation on business-government collaboration be broadened to include U.S. and international

NGOs;

2. We further recommend that the focus of collaboration between business,

NGOs and government be widened to cover not only labor issues in China but

a broad range of human rights and rule of law issues that relate to the success

of the Beijing Olympics. These would include freedom of association and assembly, freedom of expression, security concerns, due process and transparency;

3. The Human Rights and Business Roundtable offers a useful and practical

model for engagement between businesses and human rights organizations and

their partners in China; and

4. We propose that the goals of a dialog on the Beijing Olympics be as follows:

• To develop a preventative strategy that would assist businesses in

avoiding being implicated in potential human rights abuses surrounding

the Games;

• To engage a broad cross section of civil society and businesses in frank

discussions of Chinese and Western perspectives on human rights and the

rule of law;

• To involve the private sector in ongoing conversation and education on

security and human rights issues in a cooperative spirit of corporate social

responsibility;

34

• To educate both constituencies and increase their knowledge of human

rights and security issues;

• To support civil society capacity building by promoting groups to act in

a collective setting and encourage collaboration, where possible;

• To find areas of common ground, explore channels of potential cooperation between communities, and create practical actions to attain mutual

goals; and

• To use the Beijing Olympics as a means to establish a ‘‘best practices’’

model for future international events.

5. We invite the Committee to report on the dialog’s progress in its future

Annual Reports.

Æ