NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

KIMBERLY B., Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY,1 P. B., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0030

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD510518

The Honorable Julia Lopez, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Christopher Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Eric K. Knobloch

Counsel for Appellee Arizona Department of Child Safety

 1 Pursuant to S.B. 1001, Section 157, 51st Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 

2014) (enacted), the Arizona Department of Child Safety is substituted for 

the Arizona Department of Economic Security (“ADES”) in this matter. 

See ARCAP 27. To maintain consistency with the juvenile court record, 

however, we refer to ADES throughout the body of our decision.
KIMBERLY B. v. ADCS, P.B.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Kimberly B. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her six-year-old daughter (the child). 

For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In October 2012, Child Protective Services received a report 

that Mother left the child at a shelter and requested that the child be 

picked up by a relative. Two days later, the Arizona Department of 

Economic Security (“ADES”) filed a dependency petition alleging that 

Mother was unable to parent her child because she abused illegal 

substances, had mental health issues, engaged in domestic violence, and 

neglected the child. The juvenile court found the child dependent and set 

the case plan as family reunification. ADES offered Mother various 

services, including substance abuse treatment, urinalysis testing, 

psychological evaluation, parent aide services, and visitation. 

¶3 Mother failed to consistently participate in reunification 

services, and in October 2013 the juvenile court approved ADES’s request 

to change the case plan to severance and adoption. ADES then filed a 

motion for termination based on chronic substance abuse and nine 

months’ time-in-care. 

¶4 On November 18, 2013, the juvenile court held an initial 

severance hearing where the court provided Mother with a copy of Form 

III, Notice to Parent in Termination Action, which informed Mother of the 

potential consequences for failing to appear at a termination pretrial 

conference. Mother confirmed that she understood the contents of the 

notice. The court set the matter for mediation on January 7, 2014, and a 

subsequent pretrial conference on January 30, 2014.

¶5 On January 30, 2014, the juvenile court commenced the 

pretrial conference at 9:06 a.m. Mother’s counsel informed the court that 

she had received two voicemail messages earlier that morning from 
KIMBERLY B. v. ADCS, P.B.

Decision of the Court

3

Mother stating that the individual from Southwest Behavioral Support, 

who had planned to assist Mother with transportation to the hearing, told 

Mother the prior evening at 5:00 p.m. that he would be unable to take her

to the pretrial conference due to an emergency. Mother’s counsel also 

stated that the 8:30 a.m. hearing was “too early for [Mother] to get here 

with the bus.” The court tried unsuccessfully to contact Mother and the 

individual from Southwest Behavioral Support. 

¶6 ADES then asked the court to proceed with conducting a 

termination hearing in Mother’s absence, explaining Mother had also 

failed to appear at the scheduled mediation and had notice of the 

consequences for her failure to appear at the pretrial conference. Mother’s 

counsel acknowledged that Mother had received ADES’s notice of 

hearing, but objected to proceeding without Mother because she had no 

transportation to the hearing. ADES responded that Mother had been 

admonished that failure to appear may result in a default, that she did not 

appear at the mediation as scheduled, and that she had contacted a 

caseworker stating she “had relapsed and wanted another three months to 

work the case.” The court then granted ADES’s request to proceed with 

the hearing in absentia. 

¶7 ADES presented testimony from a caseworker regarding 

Mother’s continuing substance abuse issues, her admission that she 

relapsed in December 2013, and that she does not have stable housing or 

income. The caseworker also testified that Mother declined her offer of 

transportation to the pretrial conference. At the conclusion of the hearing, 

the court stated its findings on the record and granted ADES’s motion for 

termination. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.2

 2 Although Mother filed her notice of appeal prior to entry of the 

signed severance order, we have jurisdiction to consider her appeal. See 

Craig v. Craig, 227 Ariz. 105, 107, ¶ 13, 253 P.3d 624, 626 (2011) (confirming 

the “limited exception to the final judgment rule that allows a notice of 

appeal to be filed after the trial court has made its final decision, but 

before it has entered a formal judgment, if no decision of the court could 

change and the only remaining task is merely ministerial”) (citation 

omitted).
KIMBERLY B. v. ADCS, P.B.

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

¶8 Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the juvenile court 

violated her right to due process by conducting the termination hearing in 

her absence because she was unable to attend due to a lack of 

transportation. 

¶9 We review alleged constitutional violations de novo. See State

v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 159, ¶ 53, 140 P.2d 930, 942 (2006). While we 

acknowledge that termination cases involve “[t]he fundamental liberty 

interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their 

child,” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), these parental rights 

are “not absolute.” See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 

248, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d 682, 684 (2000). “A court may order severance of 

parental rights under certain circumstances, so long as the parents whose 

rights are to be severed are provided with ‘fundamentally fair procedures’

that satisfy due process requirements.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 

284, ¶ 24, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005) (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754). 

Among these requirements are notice and the opportunity to be heard.

See Huck v. Haralambie, 122 Ariz. 63, 65, 593 P.2d 286, 288 (1979). 

¶10 It is undisputed that Mother had prior notice of the pending 

motion for termination of her parental rights and the scheduled pretrial 

conference. Mother was also given notice that certain rights could be 

waived if she failed to attend the pretrial conference without 

demonstrating good cause. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S) § 8–535(E)(3) 

(“At the initial [termination] hearing, the court shall . . . [i]nstruct the 

parent that the failure to appear at the pretrial conference . . . may result in 

an adjudication terminating the parent-child relationship as to a parent 

who does not appear.”). Specifically, Form III of the Arizona Rules of 

Procedure for the Juvenile Court states in pertinent part: 

You are required to attend all termination hearings. If you 

cannot attend a court hearing, you must prove to the Court 

that you had good cause for not attending. If you fail to 

attend the . . . Pre–Trial Conference . . . without good cause, 

the Court may determine that you have waived your legal 

rights and admitted the grounds alleged in the motion or 

petition for termination. The Court may go forward . . . in 

your absence, and may terminate your parental rights to 

your child based on the record and evidence presented.
KIMBERLY B. v. ADCS, P.B.

Decision of the Court

5

At the hearing on November 13, 2013, a copy of Form III was provided to 

Mother and she acknowledged that she read and understood it. The 

minute entry from that hearing also included a notice that “[i]f a party 

fails to appear for the Pretrial Conference, the failure to appear may be 

deemed as an admission to all the facts in the petition and the Court may 

proceed to an adjudication of the ultimate issues.” Mother therefore

received notice of the consequences for failing to appear. 

¶11 Furthermore, notwithstanding her failure to appear at the 

pretrial conference, Mother was given the opportunity to be heard

through her counsel, who attended the hearing, objected to ADES’s 

motion to proceed in absentia, and cross-examined the caseworker. See 

Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 299, 307, ¶ 25, 173 P.3d 463

(App. 2007) (“In the . . . scenario where the parent fails to appear but is 

still represented by counsel, the court may proceed in that parent’s 

absence because his or her rights will be protected by the presence and 

participation of counsel.”). Accordingly, the juvenile court did not violate 

Mother’s right to due process by conducting the termination hearing in 

her absence.

CONCLUSION

¶12 We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to the child.