J-A11041-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CLARK C. CRIDER AND DONNA R. 

CRIDER, HIS WIFE 

Appellants

v.

TRICIA R. BLAND AND JUSTIN S. 

KIPE

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1675 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered October 2, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Civil Division at No(s): 

2018-04723

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 02, 2020

Clark C. Crider and Donna R. Crider, h/w, (“Appellants”) appeal from 

the order entered on October 2, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of 

Franklin County, which sustained the preliminary objections filed by Tricia R. 

Bland (“Appellee Bland”) and Justin S. Kipe (“Appellee Kipe”) (collectively 

“Appellees”) in the nature of a demurrer and dismissed Appellants’ complaint 

in its entirety with prejudice. After a careful review, we affirm.

The trial court has aptly set forth the relevant facts and procedural 

history, in part, as follows:

Appellants own a tract of real property situated in Greene 

Township, Franklin County, Pennsylvania. Appellants’ property 

was landlocked when they initially purchased it in 1980. To gain 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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access to their property, [on March 31, 1980, Appellants] obtained 

a deed of easement from Nancy and Melvin Bland [(“the 

grantors”)], who owned an “L-shaped” parcel of land located to 

the west of Appellants’ property. This easement [gave Appellants 

a 50 foot right of way and] entitled Appellants to create a 26 foot

road across the grantors’ property which would provide ingress, 

egress[,] and regress to their otherwise landlocked parcel of 

property. Additionally, the grantors reserved the right to use the 

easement. The easement divided the grantors’ land between a 

southwesterly portion and a northwesterly portion.

Appellees own properties located to the southwest of 

Appellants’ property. Appellees’ properties were originally owned 

by grantors. In 1996, the grantors divided the southwest portion 

of their tract into seven smaller lots and began transferring them, 

by deed, to other individuals. Ultimately, the grantors transferred 

one lot to Appellee Kipe and four tracts to Appellee Bland

[(collectively “the outsale deeds”)]. Appellants allege that 

Appellees use the easement for access to their tracts of property 

but are not entitled to do so. Specifically, Appellants allege that 

while the grantors had rights to use the easement, once the 

grantors transferred the property to Appellees, the rights to use 

the easement did not transfer to Appellees. Appellees, through 

preliminary objections, claim that all of the rights to use the 

easement were transferred when their properties were transferred 

to them by the grantors and that Appellants have failed to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted.

This matter was initiated by Appellants when they filed a 

Complaint [in equity against Appellees] seeking injunctive relief 

on November 8, 2018. On November 27, 2018[,] and December 

3, 2018[,] Appellee Bland and Appellee Kipe filed preliminary 

objections to Appellants’ Complaint, respectively. On January 2, 

2019[,] [the trial court] sustained Appellees’ preliminary 

objections and allowed Appellants to file an Amended Complaint 

by way of [c]ourt [o]rder. On January 22, 2019[,] Appellants filed 

their first Amended Complaint with the [trial court]. Again, on 

February 7, 2019[,] Appellees each filed preliminary objections 

thereto. In lieu of filing a response to Appellees’ preliminary 

objections, [on February 18, 2019,] Appellants filed their Second 

Amended Complaint [in the trial court]. Appellees Bland and Kipe 

filed their third set of preliminary objections on March 6, 2019[,] 

and March 7, 2019, respectively. On March 27, 2019[,] Appellants 

filed an Answer to...Appellees’ preliminary objections[.] 

***
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On October [2], 2019[,] after considering all of the facts, 

relevant law[,] and arguments set forth by both parties, [the trial 

court] issued an Opinion and Order of Court sustaining in-part and 

overruling in-part Appellees’ preliminary objections[1] and 

ultimately dismissing [Appellants’ second amended complaint] 

with prejudice.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/12/19, at 2-4 (footnote added).

Specifically, the trial court concluded Appellants failed to demonstrate a 

clear right to relief (i.e., that Appellees have no valid entitlement to use the 

easement for ingress, egress, and regress with regard to their properties), 

and, therefore, the trial court concluded Appellants are not entitled to a 

permanent injunction. As such, the trial court dismissed Appellants’ equity 

complaint with prejudice. 

This timely appeal followed, and all Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements have 

been met. On appeal, Appellants set forth the following issues in the 

“Statement of the Questions Involved” (verbatim):

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1 Appellee Bland’s preliminary objection was in the nature of a demurrer and 

challenged the legal sufficiency of Appellants’ second amended complaint. The 

trial court sustained Appellee Bland’s preliminary objection in its entirety. See 

Trial Court Order, filed 10/2/19. Appellee Kipe’s preliminary objections were 

also in the nature of a demurrer but additionally challenged the specificity of 

Appellants’ second amended complaint. The trial court sustained Appellee 

Kipe’s preliminary objections, in part, and overruled, in part, Appellee Kipe’s 

preliminary objections. Id. Ultimately, while the trial court disagreed with 

Appellee Kipe’s objection to the alleged lack of specificity in Appellants’ 

amended second complaint, the trial court agreed with Appellees Bland and

Kipe that Appellants, as a matter of law, failed to state a claim for which relief 

could be granted. Consequently, the trial court dismissed Appellants’ second 

amended complaint with prejudice. Id. 
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1. Whether the Lower Court erred in granting Appellees’ demurrer 

since Appellants state a claim prohibiting Appellees’ use of the 

Easement under the facts stated in the Appellants’ Second 

Amended Complaint because the common grantor was not 

entitled to encumber the Easement by granting additional 

uses[?]

2. Whether the Lower Court erred in sustaining the Preliminary 

Objection in the nature of a demurrer based on the reasoning 

that the Appellees had received rights to use the Easement, 

under 21 P.S. § 3, as part of a conveyance from the owner of 

the servient tenement, when no specific rights were conveyed 

by deed or otherwise assigned, alternative access was 

provided, and the trial court specifically found that the rights 

were not appurtenant[?]

3. Whether the Lower Court erred in granting Appellees’ demurrer 

based on facts and factual inferences made in the Appellants’ 

Second Amended Complaint which met the extremely low 

standard for surviving a demurrer[?]

Appellants’ Brief at 4 (suggested answers omitted).2

Initially, we note the following relevant principles governing our review:

Our standard of review of an order of the trial court 

overruling or granting preliminary objections is to determine 

whether the trial court committed an error of law. When 

considering the appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary

objections, the appellate court must apply the same standard as 

the trial court.

American Interior Construction & Blinds Inc. v. Benjamin’s Desk, LLC, 

206 A.3d 509, 512 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Thus, on an appeal 

from an order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, 

our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Frank 

v. TeWinkle, 45 A.3d 434, 438 (Pa.Super. 2012). 

____________________________________________

2 We have renumbered Appellants’ issues for ease of discussion.
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This Court may affirm a trial court’s decision sustaining a demurrer only 

where it is clear that the plaintiffs are unable to prove facts legally sufficient 

to establish a right to relief. See id. In making that determination, this Court 

must accept as true all well-pleaded material averments of fact in the 

complaint and every inference that is fairly deducible from those facts. See 

id. This Court, however, is not required to accept as true conclusions of law, 

unwarranted inferences, or argumentative allegations. In re Estate of 

Luongo, 823 A.2d 942, 966-68 (Pa.Super. 2003). Further, if a claim is based 

on a document, it is the document, not averments in the plaintiffs’ complaint 

characterizing it, that determine whether the plaintiffs have stated a cause of 

action, and averments that conflict with the document need not be accepted 

as true. Jenkins v. County of Schuylkill, 658 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 

1995).

In the case sub judice, Appellants sought a permanent injunction 

prohibiting Appellees from using the easement at issue. “To justify the award 

of a permanent injunction, the party seeking relief must establish that his right 

to relief is clear, that an injunction is necessary to avoid an injury that cannot 

be compensated by damages, and that greater injury will result from refusing 

rather than granting the relief requested.” Kuznik v. Westmoreland 

County Bd. of Com'rs, 588 Pa. 95, 902 A.2d 476, 489 (2006) (quotation 

marks and quotation omitted). “Unlike a preliminary injunction, a permanent 

injunction does not require proof of immediate irreparable harm.” Liberty 
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Place Retail Associates, L.P. v. Israelite School of Universal Practical 

Knowledge, 102 A.3d 501, 506 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

Appellants’ first claim challenges the trial court’s interpretation of the 

March 31, 1980, deed of easement, which was executed between Appellants 

and the grantors. The interpretation of a deed of easement, like any contract,

concerns a question of law, and, thus, our scope of review is plenary. PARC 

Holdings, Inc. v. Killian, 785 A.2d 106, 112 (Pa.Super. 2001). 

“An easement is a right in the owner of one parcel of land by reason of 

such ownership to use the land of another for a special purpose not 

inconsistent with a general property in the owner.” Clements v. Sannuti, 

356 Pa. 63, 51 A.2d 697, 698 (1947) (emphasis, quotation marks, quotation, 

and citations omitted). “[A]n easement is an abstract property interest that 

is legally protected.” Forest Glen Condominium Ass'n v. Forest Green 

Commons Ltd. Partnership, 900 A.2d 859, 864 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quotation 

marks and quotation omitted). 

As occurred in the case sub judice, easements may be created by an 

express grant. Amerikohl Mining Co., Inc. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 

860 A.2d 547 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

To ascertain the nature of the easement created by an 

express grant we determine the intention of the parties 

ascertained from the language of the instrument. Such intention 

is determined by a fair interpretation and construction of the grant 

and may be shown by the words employed construed with 

reference to the attending circumstances known to the parties at 

the time the grant was made. 
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Ambiguous words are construed in favor of the grantee. 

Where a deed or agreement or reservation therein is obscure or 

ambiguous, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained in each 

instance not only from the language of the entire written 

instrument in question, but also from a consideration of the 

subject matter and the surrounding circumstances.

Id. at 550 (quotation marks and quotations omitted). See Southall v. 

Humbert, 685 A.2d 574, 577 (Pa.Super. 1996) (“[T]he rules of construction 

apply to deeds granting easements as to contracts generally.”) (quotation 

marks and quotations omitted)). 

Moreover, we note our cases have recognized the right of a grantor to 

reserve the right to use an easement conveyed over his land. See Piper v. 

Mowris, 466 Pa. 89, 351 A.2d 635, 638 (1976) (“A reservation may be of a 

right or interest in the particular part which it affects.”) (citation omitted)). 

“The intent of the grantor must be disclosed by the words used.” Id. (citations 

omitted). 

Here, the March 31, 1980, deed of easement between the grantors and 

Appellants (the grantees) relevantly provided the following:

[T]he Grantors do hereby grant, bargain and convey unto the said 

Grantees, their heirs and assigns, the free and uninterrupted use 

of, liberty and privilege over and passage in, along and over a 

certain parcel of real estate owned by the Grantors situate in 

Greene Township, Franklin County, Pennsylvania, for the purpose 

of an easement or right-of-way, for the purpose of ingress, egress 

and regress...described as follows:

***

BEING the same tract denoted as a proposed 50 foot 

private right-of-way on a survey of land by William A. 

Brindle Associates[.]
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RESERVING unto the Grantors, their heirs and 

assigns, the right to use said easement for 

ingress, egress and regress to and from 

Township Route 614, and between parcels 

retained by Grantors, their heirs and assigns[.]

This Deed of Easement is subject to the following 

agreements and restrictions:

1. The Grantees will establish a roadway in the middle twentysix feet of the fifty foot easement, such roadway to be of slate 

construction with a minimum of six inch drainage tile pipe at all 

low levels subject to surface drainage.

2. The twelve feet extending on either side of the twenty-six 

foot roadway shall be used to contain removed snow from the 

roadway, for road repair and drainage maintenance. The roadway 

shall not be enlarged beyond the width of twenty-six feet.

3. The Grantees shall keep the roadway and drainage areas in 

good repair and shall, at all times, keep the roadway free of snow.

4. The cost of surveys, construction, future maintenance, 

drainage, and snow removal shall be borne by the Grantees.

5. The Grantees shall have an unencumbered and free rightof-way over the roadway except that the use of the right-of-way 

shall not be extended by the Grantees or their heirs or assigns to 

serve any land use that requires the passage of public traffic, nor 

shall the roadway be used for, or the right of use be granted to 

others for, access to tracts of land other than the tract being 

purchased by the Grantees known as the Sharpe property.

6. Should the Grantors sell, assign or convey, as a separate 

parcel, that portion of land owned by them known as the Bland 

property northeast of the aforementioned roadway, being 

bounded by the Sharpe property on the south and east, the 

McKendrick property on the north and east, and White Church 

Road on the Northwest, Grantors hereby agree to convey the 

property, which is subject to the easement granted herein, to the 

Grantees, in fee simple, in consideration of One Dollar ($1.00).

Appellants’ Second Amended Complaint, filed 2/18/19, Exhibit A-Deed of 

Easement, executed 3/31/80, at 1-3 (bold added).
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Initially, in interpreting the deed of easement, we consider whether the 

deed of easement created an easement in gross or an easement appurtenant.

Our Supreme Court has described an easement in gross as follows:

An easement in gross is defined as a mere personal interest in the 

real estate of another. The principal distinction between it and an 

easement appurtenant is found in the fact that in the first there 

is, and in the second there is not, a dominant tenement. The 

easement is in gross, and personal to the grantee, because it is 

not appurtenant to other premises. The great weight of the 

authorities supports the doctrine that easements in gross, 

properly so called because of their personal character, are not 

assignable or inheritable, nor can they be made so by any terms 

in the grant[.]

Lindenmuth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corporation, 309 Pa. 58, 163 

A. 159, 160 (1932) (citation omitted). “An easement in gross is a mere 

personal interest in, or right to use, the land of another.” Loughran v. 

Matylewicz, 367 Pa. 593, 81 A.2d 879, 881 (1951) (italics omitted). See 7 

Summ. Pa. Jur. 2d Property § 18:3 (2d ed. 2019) (“An ‘easement in gross’ is 

an easement with a servient estate but no dominant estate [and] is a mere 

personal interest in, or a right to use, the land or water of another.”) (footnote 

omitted)).

Conversely, a prerequisite to the creation of an easement appurtenant 

is the “[e]xistence of a servient tenement for the beneficial use of a dominant 

tenement[.]” Brady v. Yodanza, 493 Pa. 186, 425 A.2d 726, 727 (1981)

(citation omitted).

In determining whether a particular easement created by grant is 

or is not appurtenant to land, two matters must be considered —

the nature of the right and the intention of the parties. In the first 
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place, it is a rule that nothing can be appurtenant unless it agrees 

in nature and quality with the thing to which it is claimed to be 

appurtenant.... 

Lindenmuth, supra, 163 A. at 161 (citations omitted). 

Furthermore,

An easement will never be presumed to be a mere personal right 

when it can fairly be construed to be appurtenant to some other 

estate. Whether an easement is in gross or appurtenant must be 

determined by the fair interpretation of the grant or reservation 

creating the easement, aided if necessary by the situation of the 

parties and the surrounding circumstances.

Rusciolelli v. Smith, 171 A.2d 802, 806 (Pa.Super. 1961) (en banc) (citation 

omitted).

Appellants argue that, based on the clear and plain language of the deed 

of easement, as well as the nature of the easement’s right, which gave 

Appellants access to their landlocked property, the easement is appurtenant 

to their real property, and thus, “runs with their land” as the dominant estate. 

However, they suggest that the grantors’ reservation in the easement was an 

easement in gross, personal as it relates to the grantors. Accordingly, they 

aver the easement’s reservation did not “fuse” with the grantors’ land, and 

therefore, it was not assigned to Appellees when they purchased five of the

grantors’ lots to the south of the easement. 

Based on the clear and plain language of the deed of easement, we 

agree with Appellants that the easement is appurtenant with regard to their 

real property. However, we disagree with Appellants that the grantors’ 

reservation of rights in the easement are in gross. 
J-A11041-20

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The grantors specifically reserved to themselves, their “heirs and 

assigns” the right to use the easement. “[S]uch language would not appear 

to be words of limitation or of creation of an easement in gross.” Brady, 

supra, 425 A.2d at 728. Further, the nature of the grantors’ reservation in 

the easement pertained to the use of the easement “for ingress, egress and 

regress to and from Township Route 614, and between parcels retained by 

Grantors, their heirs and assigns[.]” Appellants’ Second Amended Complaint, 

filed 2/18/19, Exhibit A-Deed of Easement, executed 3/31/80, at 1-2. This 

clear and unambiguous language reveals the grantors’ intent to reserve use 

of the easement for purposes of the specific lands at issue. See Piper, supra.

Moreover, the surrounding circumstances reveal the grantors gave the 

easement to Appellants so that Appellants could access their landlocked 

property; however, the grantors carved the easement in a manner so that it 

divided the grantors’ property such that they owned the property to the north 

and south of the easement. Subsequently, the grantors created lots out of 

the southern portion of their property. This further demonstrates that the 

grantors’ reservation in the right to use the easement was not a personal 

right; but rather, it was a benefit tied to ownership or occupancy of the 

grantors’ land, and thus, was appurtenant to their real property. See 

Lindenmuth, supra.

We note Appellants point to various provisions in the March 31, 1980, 

deed of easement for the proposition that the grantors’ reservation in the 
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easement was personal to the grantors. In this vein, Appellants contend 

paragraph 5 of the deed of easement gives them “unencumbered and free 

rights” to the easement such that permitting anyone but the grantors to use 

the easement impermissibly increases the burden on Appellants. Further, 

Appellants contend that, since paragraph 6 the deed of easement gives 

Appellants the right to purchase the property, which is subject to the 

easement, for $1.00 upon the happening of a certain condition (when the 

grantors no longer own the real estate to the northeast of the easement), it 

is unreasonable to conclude the parties intended to permit the grantors to 

assign the reservation in the easement to anyone else. Thus, Appellants 

contend paragraphs 5 and 6 in the deed of easement support their position 

that the reservation in the easement is personal to the grantors and not 

appurtenant to the grantors’ real property. 

As Appellants indicate, and as set forth supra, paragraph 5 of the deed 

of easement relevantly provides that “[t]he Grantees shall have an 

unencumbered and free right-of-way over the roadway[.]” Appellants’ Second 

Amended Complaint, filed 2/18/19, Exhibit A-Deed of Easement, executed 

3/31/80, at 2. However, in interpreting this paragraph, the trial court rejected 

Appellants’ argument that the paragraph limits the reservation of use the 

grantors made for their heir and assigns. 

Specifically, the trial court relevantly stated the following:
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Appellants...claim...that the word “encumbered” should be

interpreted to mean that Appellants have exclusive access to the 

easement.

***

[W]hen interpreting the term “encumbered” as used in the 

deed [of easement], [the trial court] found that [the grantors’ 

assigns would not be] legally encumbering Appellants’ easement 

by using it. The legal definition of “encumbrance” is a burden on 

a piece of property which lessens its value but which is not an 

ownership interest. See Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) 

(emphasis added). [Thus,]...the assignees of parcels of land from 

the grantors, retain the right to use the easement. Therefore, to 

find that [the grantors’ assigns would be encumbering] Appellants’ 

easement by using it would be in direct contravention of...the legal 

definition of “encumbrance”[] as set out in Black’s Law Dictionary.

Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, filed 11/12/19, at 13-15 (italics in 

original). 

We conclude the trial court did not err in giving the term 

“unencumbered” the common and approved meaning of the word as it is 

defined in Black’s Law Dictionary. See Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co, 630 Pa. 79, 

106 A.3d 48, 75 (2014) (“[T]he common and approved meaning of a word 

may be ascertained from an examination of its dictionary definition.”) 

(citations omitted)). Further, we conclude the word “unencumbered” was not 

ambiguous, and the provision with regard thereto did not conflict with the 

reservation of the grantors’, as well as their heirs’ and assigns’, rights. 

Additionally, we find unpersuasive Appellants’ argument that paragraph 

6 in the deed of easement, which permits Appellants to purchase the fee 

simple title to the property, which is the subject of the easement, for $1.00 

when the grantors no longer own the real estate to the northeast, somehow 
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extinguished any rights the grantors, their heirs, or assigns have in the 

easement. 

In rejecting this claim, the trial court stated the following: 

Paragraph 6 is an agreement whereby [Appellants] may take the 

easement if the grantors ever sell their property which is situated 

to the northeast of the easement. When reviewing [Appellants’] 

Second Amended Complaint, we find that [Appellants] do not 

allege that the grantors ever sold the land to the northeast of the 

easement. To the contrary, in paragraph 11 of [Appellants’] 

Second Amended Complaint, they acknowledge that the “grantors 

retained a fee simple interest in the real estate on which the 

easement is situate, conditioned upon continuing ownership of the 

real estate to the northeast of the easement, and [grantor] Nancy 

L. Bland[, who is a widow,]...holds that interest today.” 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/2/19, at 12. 

We find no error in the trial court’s sound analysis, and therefore, 

Appellants have not stated a claim for relief on this basis.3 See Kuznik, 

supra; Frank, supra.

Having concluded the deed of easement expressly created a reservation 

of right for the grantors’, their heirs and assigns, and this reservation is not a 

personal right, but one appurtenant to the grantors’ property, we note there 

____________________________________________

3 We note Appellants make a claim in their brief that equity requires the 

grantors’ assigns and heirs be prohibited from using the easement for ingress, 

egress, and regress since Appellants constructed, maintain, and repair the 

road located thereon. However, the clear and express language of the deed 

of easement specifically provides that these costs are to be borne by 

Appellants. See Appellants’ Second Amended Complaint, filed 2/18/19, 

Exhibit A-Deed of Easement, executed 3/31/80, at 2.
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is no dispute that the grantors conveyed five lots from the grantors’ property 

holdings on the southern side of the easement to Appellees. The trial court 

ruled that Appellees became the assigns of the grantors for purposes of the 

easement when they collectively purchased the five lots.4

Specifically, upon examining 21 P.S. § 3, pertaining to the grantors’ 

entire estate and rights conveyed, the trial court determined that all of the 

grantors’ rights and interests in the conveyed properties transferred to 

Appellees when they purchased the properties via the outsale deeds. 

Appellants, however, contend the trial court interpreted 21 P.S. § 3 too 

expansively to conclude the grantors’ reservation of the right to use the 

easement transferred to Appellees so that they are the grantors’ assigns for 

purposes of the deed of easement. 

We note that “the interpretation and application of a statute is a 

question of law that compels plenary review to determine whether the court 

committed an error of law.” Wilson v. Transport Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 563, 

570 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quotation marks, quotation, and citation omitted). “As 

with all questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo and the 

appellate scope of review is plenary.” In re Wilson, 879 A.2d 199, 214 

(Pa.Super. 2005) (en banc) (footnotes and citations omitted). 

We have stated:

____________________________________________

4 As indicated supra, the trial court refers to the deeds for these conveyances 

as the “outsale deeds,” and we shall do so as well.
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[We] are constrained by the rules of statutory interpretation, 

particularly as found in the Statutory Construction Act. 1 

Pa.C.S.[] §§ 1501-1991. The goal in interpreting any statute is 

to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. 

Our Supreme Court has stated that the plain language of a statute 

is in general the best indication of the legislative intent that gave 

rise to the statute. When the language is clear, explicit, and free 

from any ambiguity, we discern intent from the language alone, 

and not from the arguments based on legislative history or “spirit” 

of the statute. We must construe words and phrases in the statute 

according to their common and approved usage. We also must 

construe a statute in such a way as to give effect to all its 

provisions, if possible, thereby avoiding the need to label any 

provision as mere surplusage. 

Cimino v. Valley Family Medicine, 912 A.2d 851, 853 (Pa.Super. 2006) 

(quotation omitted). See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). 

In the case sub judice, the statute at issue, 21 P.S. § 3, provides the 

following:

§ 3. Grantor’s entire estate and rights conveyed

All deeds or instruments in writing for conveying or releasing land 

hereafter executed, granting or conveying lands, unless an 

exception or reservation be made therein, shall be construed 

to include all the estate, right, title, interest, property, claim, and 

demand whatsoever, of the grantor or grantors, in law, equity, or 

otherwise howsoever, of, in, and to the same, and every part 

thereof, together with all and singular the improvements, ways, 

waters, watercourses, rights, liberties, privileges, hereditaments, 

and appurtenances whatsoever thereto belonging, or in anywise 

appertaining, and the reversions and remainders, rents, issues, 

and profits thereof.

21 P.S. § 3 (bold in original and bold added).

In interpreting this statute, the trial court determined that the plain and 

clear language provides that, unless an exception or reservation was made in 

the outsale deeds between the grantors and Appellees with regard to the 
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grantors’ reservation of the right to use the instant easement, the grantors’ 

rights with regard to the easement transferred to Appellees (who accordingly 

are the “assigns” of the grantors for purposes of the deed of easement). See 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/2/19, at 6-7. Inasmuch as the statute is clear, 

explicit, and free from ambiguity, we find no error of law in the trial court’s 

interpretation of 12 P.S. § 3. See Cimino, supra (pertaining to statutory 

interpretation); Southall, supra (indicating an assignor is a person who 

assigns or transfers his property interests to another).

This does not end our, inquiry, however, as Appellants contend the 

outsale deeds contain “an exception or reservation” as it relates to Appellees’

right to use the subject easement. 

When construing a deed, a court’s primary object must be 

to ascertain and effectuate what the parties themselves intended. 

The traditional rules of construction to determine that intention 

involve the following principles. First, the nature and quantity of 

the interest conveyed must be ascertained from the deed itself 

and cannot be orally shown in the absence of fraud, accident or 

mistake. We seek to ascertain not what the parties may have 

intended by the language but what is the meaning of the words 

they used. Effect must be given to all the language of the 

instrument, and no part shall be rejected if it can be given a 

meaning. If a doubt arises concerning the interpretation of the 

instrument, it will be resolved against the party who prepared it.

Consolidation Coal Co. v. White, 875 A.2d 318, 326 (Pa.Super. 2005)

(citations omitted).

In rejecting Appellants’ argument, the trial court relevantly stated the 

following: 
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[Appellants] point out that 21 P.S. § 3 only applies where 

the outsale deeds do not specifically reserve or prohibit the 

grantees (Appellees) from using, among other things, easements. 

[Appellants] allege that in the instant case the outsale deeds 

implicitly restricted [Appellees’] rights to access the easement by 

giving [Appellees] a second way to access a public road.

***

[Appellants]...allege that 21 P.S. § 3 is inapplicable in this 

case because the outsale deeds implicitly restrict [Appellees] from 

using the easement by giving them access to a different 20-foot 

easement (“20’ easement”) connecting [Appellees’] properties to 

the public road.

***

[Appellants] attached to their Second Amended Complaint 

four outsale deeds between the grantors and [Appellee] Bland. 

Having read all of the outsale deeds, [the trial court] finds that 

three out of four of the deeds contain no language regarding the 

20’ easement. The only reference to the [20’] easement is 

contained in an outsale deed from [the] grantors to [Appellee] 

Bland, dated September 30, 2005, which states the following:

“SUBJECT to the use in common for non-exclusive 

ingress, egress and regress in perpetuity of the 

private 20-foot right of way for Lots 3, 4 and 5 as 

shown on the “Land subdivision for Melvin L. 

Bland”....”

[Appellants] contend that the above-cited language

precludes [Appellee] Bland from using the easement [at issue], 

because she has access to her land via the 20’ easement. 

However, the above-cited language indicates only that a different 

easement exists and that [Appellee] Bland is entitled to access her 

property from using that alternative route, not that [Appellee] 

Bland is precluded from using the easement at the heart of this 

dispute. When applying 21 P.S. § 3 to the above-cited language, 

no exception or reservation is implicated, as [Appellants] suggest. 

***

[The trial court] now turns to the outsale deed between the 

grantors and [Appellee] Kipe, dated July 7, 2005, which states, in 

relevant part:

“There herein-described lot is conveyed UNDER AND 

SUBJECT TO the terms of a “Declaration” dated May 
J-A11041-20

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20, 1996,...under which terms the grantee herein, his 

heir, successors, and assigns shall have, in perpetuity, 

the non-exclusive right of ingress and egress over and 

along a 20-foot wide right-of-way, part of which is 

located on the lot herein...the said right to be 

exercised “in a reasonable manner, so as not to 

interfere with other property owners’ use and 

enjoyment thereof....”

Again, like the outsale deed between the grantors and 

[Appellee] Bland, cited above, [Appellee] Kipe’s outsale deed 

grants him access to the 20’ easement for ingress and egress to 

his land, but does not specifically except or reserve his right to 

the easement in dispute. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/2/19, at 7-10.

Accordingly, based on an examination of 21 P.S. § 3 and the outsale 

deeds, the trial court concluded that, since no specific exception or reservation 

was made by the grantors regarding the subject easement in the outsale 

deeds, any rights the grantors had in the easement were transferred to 

Appellees via the outsale deeds. We find no error in this regard. See 

Consolidation Coal Co., supra (setting forth the relevant principles in 

interpreting a deed).

Finally, Appellants contend the facts and inferences presented in their 

second amended complaint demonstrate the grantors did not convey their 

reservation of rights in the easement to Appellees via the outsale deeds. To 

the extent Appellants re-hash the arguments presented supra, we conclude 

they are not entitled to relief. 

To the extent Appellants argue the “timing” of the conveyances to 

Appellees Bland and Kipe, which did not occur until well after the deed of 
J-A11041-20

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easement was executed, suggests the grantors did not intend that Appellees 

benefit from the grantors’ reservation in the easement, we conclude the 

argument is contrary to the express and plain language in the deed of 

easement indicating the reservation was for “the Grantors, their heirs and 

assigns[.]” 

For all of the foregoing reasons, accepting as true all well-pleaded 

material averments of fact, we conclude Appellants have failed to demonstrate 

the grantors’ express reservation of the right to use the easement was not 

transferred to Appellees when they purchased their lots. Thus, we conclude 

Appellants have not established their right to relief is clear so as to warrant 

permanent injunctive relief. See Kuznik, supra. Accordingly, since the facts 

set forth by Appellants were legally insufficient to establish a right to injunctive 

relief, we conclude the trial court properly sustained Appellees’ preliminary 

objections in the nature of a demurrer. Frank, supra. Consequently, we 

affirm the trial court’s order dismissing Appellants’ second amended complaint 

with prejudice.

5

____________________________________________

5 We note that, to the extent we have affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of 

Appellants’ second amended complaint on grounds different than those 

provided by the trial court, we are permitted to do so. Schuylkill Navy v. 

Langbord, 728 A.2d 964, 970 (Pa.Super. 1999). 
J-A11041-20

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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/2/2020