Automated Guideway Transit: An

Assessment of PRT and Other New Systems

June 1975

NTIS order #PB-244854
UNITED STATES CONGRESS

Office of Technology Assessment

AUTOMATED GUIDEWAY TRANSIT

AN ASSESSMENT OF PRT AND

OTHER NEW SYSTEMS

INCLUDING

SUPPORTING PANEL REPORTS

PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF THE

SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

TRANSPORTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

JUNE 1975

w

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

S4+70 o WASHINGTON : 1975

For sale by the Superintendent of DOCIUIN@S, U.S. Government Printing Oflice

Washington, D.C. 20402- Prtce $3.65
Congress of the United States

Office of Technology Assessment

Washington, D.C. 20510

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD

OLIN E. TEAGUE, Texas, Chairman

CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey, Vice Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina GEORGE E. BROWN, Jr, California

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota CHARLES A. MOSHER, Ohio

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania MARVIN L. ESCH, Michigan

TED STEVENS, Alaska MARJORIE S. HOLT, Maryland

EMILIO Q. DADDARIO

EMilio Q. DADDAO, Director

DANIEL V. DESiMONE, Deputy Direclor

URBAN MasS TRANSIT ADVISORY PANEL

WALTER J. BiERWAGEN, Amalgamated Transit Union Dr DORN MC GRATH, George Washington UniverROBERT A. Buaco, Public Policy Research Associa- Sity

tion Dr. BERNARD M. OLWER, Hewlett-Packard Corp.

JEANNE J. Fox, Joint Center for Political Studies SIMON REICH, Gibbs and Hill

DR. LAWRENCE A. (Goldmuntz Economics and PROF. THOMAS C. SUTHERLAND, Jr., Princeton

Science Planning University.

GEORGE KRAMBLES , Chicago Transit Authority FREDERICK P. SALVUCCI, Massachusetts DOT

DR. STEWART F. TAYLOR, Sanders and Thomas, Inc.

OTA TRANSPORTATION A SSESSMENT STAFF M EMBER S

MARY E. AMES Dn. GRETCHEN S. KOLSRUn

FREDERICK A. F. COOKE H. WILLIAM MERRITT

V. RODGER DIGILIG TERI MILES

LARRY L. JENNEY NEIL RUSSELL

BEV JOHNSON

Library of Congress Catalog Number: 7S+l1060

(II)
III

T ECHNOLOGY A SSESSMENT B OAR D Congress of tbc United States EMIL1O 0 DADD A RI O

OLIN E 7EAGUE TEXAS, CHAIRMAN 0, ”+ .,0”

CLIF FORD P. CASE, N J . VICE CHAIRMAN O FFICE OF T ECHNOLOGY A SSESSMEN T DANIEL V DE SIMONE

EDWARD M KENNEDY, MASS. MORRIS K UDALL ARIZ W ASHINGTO N, D.C. 20510

DEPUTY DIRECTW

ERNEST HOLLINGS, S.C. GEORGE E BROWN J. CALIF.

HUBERT HUMPHREY Ml NM. CHARLES A MOSHER, OH1O

RICHARD S SCHWEIKER, PA. MARVIN ESCH, MICH.

TED STEVENS ALASKA MARJORIE S HOLT, MD.

EMILIO Q. DADOARIO

May 20, 1975

The Honorable John L. McClellan

Chairman

Committee on Appropriate ions

U.S. Senate

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr, Chairman:

On behalf of the Technology Assessment Board, we are

pleased to forward to you the following report on Automated Guideway Transit: An Assessment of PRT and Other

New Systems. This report was prepared by the Office of

Technology Assessment and is based upon the findings of

five panels established to explore major topics. The

report distinguishes three classes of Automated Guideway

Transit and discusses the major institutional, technical,

economic and social implications of each class.

This report is being made available to your Committee

in accordance with Public Law 92-484, with appreciation

and thanks to the many panelists who

of their time and energy.

Sinc~ly, j

gave so generously

Sincerely, . , “

Technology Assessment Board Technolo~y- Assessment Board
IV

May 16, 1975

The Honorable Olin E. Teague

Chairman of the Board

Office of Technology Assessment

United States Congress

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to the letter of September 27, 1974, from Senator John L.

McClellan, Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations, the Office

of Technology Assessment is pleased to forward this report, Automated

Guideway Transit: An Assessment of Personal Rapid Transit (PRT) and

Other New Systems.

This assessment was conducted by OTA’S Transportation Group, headed

by Dr. Gretchen S. Kolsrud. The assessment was undertaken by five

panels of experts who addressed the following five areas:

Current Developments in the United States

International Developments

Operations and Technology

Social Acceptability

Economic Considerations

I am pleased to submit this report to you and to express my appreciation to all of the participants who contributed to it.
v

ROMAN L 9-”S-. .-=

-N 0 F. S1O-*, * 1. MOamts —. NH.

cLo, rOno v CAsc. NJ.

“co.”, c .“”0. w. v & MI”*M 1.. nnm. MAwall

aAL1 w MCGLC w-m .. W A. CI W 9-C, WA.%

M ,” C M A F.-,, CLD, MC+Cl MA”. o “Ar,, elm. Omrn.

WILLIAM .no. u! ”r., ‘#Is. w. .TKVCN*. .uuu

JOSCPM M MW07A, . MU. CMA” L[, wcc MA7”IA., JW., MD.

“<C ”*”O ● SCwtwrtllc”. Pa.

1“”C%T P 140 LLI-*, 8 C. MtNm~ ● CLL-ON. 01114-

.,”.M mAYM, IWn.

7$+094.s , ,AGLr704. Ma.

LA WTO?4 C“, L.1*, FLA

JAI.4CS * CALLOWAV

C“lC~ CWNSCL ANO 6TA*P OtWECTOM

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

W ASHINGTO N . o.C. 20510

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy

Chairman

Technology Assessment Board

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of Senator Robert C. Byrd, Chairman

of the Transportation Subcommittee, and Senator Clifford

P. Case, the Subcommittee’s Ranking Minority Member,

I am transmitting an attached suggested revision to the

Mass Transit Assessments you presently have

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

underway.

Chairman

JLM:cej
VI

JOUN L. UC LLCI.IAN. ,.. 0,.,”uAW

w..”t. 0 MA. MP.C+4. WAS- W#Lrcw m v-. u DbA

Kmu c ST SW*13, Moss n09AAN L ,, ””.... mm.

JOHN 0 PA.1OQC. m,l, NOR.*. CWU’4 W.*

ALA” OC”LC, NW CI.IVFO. O r. USE. N4.

mcmv c ● ’I.D. w. V& W..U i., -, MAW*II

**L, w Iac Grc. WYO. CDWA.O w. .-c. MA.*.

U6R1 MAB4s?tcl.o. u09tT. m... m W1. tu.o. -m.

w, LL,hM ?W.”1= WIS 1*D S?cvcws, fiusu

JOSSPM M. 9+ONTOVA, N ma. C14A*LC~ -CC MAT141AS. Jm.. MD.

D4W$SI. R I-C MAWAII ● lCHAMO W SCWWEI. ER. PA.

mmlusT v WU.,NGS, S.c Mcumv mtLo40N. Ollu

● tRC04 M“”. IMC..

Two”A, r, .Aa.m. Mo.

UWTON Cwlum. F@.

>Ah4r* ❑ . CAUX.WAV

CMOCP COUNSEL am Sr.rr mnccnu

COMMllTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

W ASHINGTO N , D.C. 20S10

September 10, 1974

Honorable John L. McClellan

Chairman

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We would like to enlist your support for an increase in the

scope of the urban mass transportation assessments currently being conducted for the Committee by the Office of Technology Assessment. As you

will recall, one of these assessments is concerned with the question of

the degree of automation which is technically feasible, economically

justifiable or otherwise appropriate to rail rapid transit. The second

assessment addresses the process by which communities select, plan and

implement a new transit system or modernize an existing one.

While the need for these studies of conventional rail transit

remains unchanged, there have been significant developments since the

date of our original request to the Office of Technology Assessment which

indicate that the coverage of the assessments should be expanded in two

directions.

--First, it seems clear that we will be required to deal

with the issue of “personal rapid transit” and related

high technology projects earlier and in greater depth

than had been anticipated.

--Second, the increasingly serious condition of the

economy suggests that these assessments should be

expanded to consider the development and potential of

urban mass transit under conditions in which federal

funding may be severely decreased -- or greatly increased in the event that unemployment becomes an

overriding problem.

To expand on the first point, communities (such as Minneapolis and

Las Vegas) are showing increasing interest in new types of fixed guideway

systems. Personal rapid transit (PRT) systems are increasingly discussed

as alternatives to more conventional rail transit. Implementation of

new technologies may be proposed such as magnetically levitated vehicles.

The considerable effort underway in other countries to advance the state

of the art in fixed guideway systems should be further investigated. The

current assessments do address some of these issues. However, if addressed
VII

they lie at the boundaries of the ongoing assessments rather than being

fully included in the scope of work.

Concerning the second suggestion for expanding the assessments

already underway, the economic picture has changed greatly since these

assessments were initiated. As you know, a major purpose of a technology

assessment is to identify policy alternatives and quantify the probable

effects of such alternatives. Certainly, these assessments should address

the full range of contingencies affecting policy alternatives and their

impacts. Examples of varying economic outlooks that should be considered

are as follows:

1. A revived fuel shortage leading to greatly increased

(and funds for) mass transit. How much of the

additional funds should be spent for fixed guideway transit,

including personal rapid transit? How would R and D be

affected? Would private industry have the capacity to

support increased demands upon it?

2. A severe recession or actual depression. Should major

On the other hand, if funds for major transit projects

were severely curtailed, how quickly could communities

,low planning or building new transit systems alter their

plans? What are the probabilities associated with such

a future? Are they sufficiently high that communities

should be encouraged to place more emphasis on staging

the development of new transit systems so that working

subsystems are obtained if development of the entire

system is interrupted?

To summarize, we feel the needs of the Committee will be best

served by extending the current assessment efforts. These extensions

would

--increase the range of technologies under assessment; and,

--permit assessment of the interrelationships between alternate

economic futures and a variety of mass transit policy

alternatives.

Chairman, Transpor~ation Ranking Minority Member

Appropriations Subcommittee Transportation Appropriations

Subcommittee
CONTENT S

Preface ----------------- ---- -------------------- ------------------

Chapter 1: Summary ----------------- ---- ---------------------- ---

Definitions --------------- ----------------------- --------------

Shuttle-LoopTransit (SLT)_------------------- ----------------

Group Rapid Transit (GET)---------- -------------------------

Potential oleof Personal Rapid Transit (PRT)------------------ R

U.S. Government Research and Develoment of AGT Systems. ----

Budget Alternatives For Fiscal Year 1976------------------------

Chapter2: The Status and Potential of Automated Guideway Transit in

Urban Areas ------------ --~.-------------------- -----

The Current Status of Urban Passenger Transportation -------- ----

Alternative Approaches to Meeting Urban Transportation Needs---- 8

Characteristics and Current Applications of AG Systems ---------- l!’

AGT Installations Studied in the United States ----------- ________

Suppliers of AGT Systems ----------------- ---- -----------------

Chapter 3: Major Problems in Automated Guideway Transit -------- ---

Institutional ------------- ---- -------------------- -_--.-___---_-

Technical --------------- ---- --------------------- -------------

Economic --------------- ---- ------------------- ---------------

Social -------------------- ------------------------ ------------

Chapter 4: Assessment of AGT Research and Development ------------

The Federal Program--- ---- --------------------- ______________

Industry --------------- ---- -------------------- --------------

Commentary ------------ ------------------------ --------------

Scenarios for Developing Market Ready Systems____ --------------

Alternative Institutional Arrangements ------------ ---------------

Other Transportation Alternatives ------------ ---- -----------------

Chapter 5: The Fiscal Year 1976 Program—Alternative Courses of Action_. 1!

A. Approve the Program as Submitted ------------ ---------------

B. Provide No New Funds -------------- ---- -------------------

C. Approve Funding Level But Restructure Program --------------

D. Increase Funding and Expand Scope of Program ------------ ___

Appendices

A. Organization and Procedure for Conducting the Assessment ------

B. Abstracts of Panel Reports ----------------- -----------------

C. Bibliography ---------------- ---- ---------------------- _____

Supporting Panel Reports

Current Developments in the United States ------------ ___________

International Developments ----------- ---- ------------------- __

Economics ------------- ---- ------------------ ---- --------------

Social Acceptability ------ ---- -------------------- ______________

Operations and Technology- ____ _____________________ ___________

(IX

Page

. . . X111

1

:

7

: ;

18

: :

34

38

41

41

48

,0“1

!59

61

64

66

68

71

; :

76

77

78

83

95

103

111

197

283

325

355
ASSESSMENT PROJECT TEAM MEMBERS

Program Direction

Frederick A. F. Cooke, Consulting Engineer.

H. William Merritt, Transportation Consultant.

Leon M. Cole, The Library of Congress.

Panel on Current Developments in the United States

Clark Henderson, Chairman Stanford Research Institute.

John K. Howell, Gerald D. Hines Interests (BRH Mobility).

John R. Jamieson, Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission.

Thomas A. Lancaster, Rohr Industries, Inc.

Roy Lobosco, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

Panel on Economics

Lyle C. Fitch, Chairman, Institute of Public Administration.

J. Edward Anderson, University of Minnesota (on leave).

Thomas B. Deen, Alan M. Voorhees and Associates, Inc.

Paul K. Dygert, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company.

Aaron J. Gellman, Gellman Research Associates.

Charles Hickox, LTV Aerospace Company.

Douglas . Lee, Fairfax County, Virginia.

Sumner Myers, Institute of Public Administration.

Panel on Social Acceptability

Jacquelyn A. Ingersoll, Chairman, Citizen Advisor, Twin Cities Area.

Ralph Jackson, Denver Regional Transportation District.

Alain L. Kornhauser, Princeton University.

Rodney K. Lay, The MITRE Corporation.

John B. Schnell, American Public ransit Association. f

Reed H. Jt-inslow, The MITRE Corporation.

George V. Wickstrom, Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments.

Panel on Operations and Technology

Robert A. Makofski, Chairman, A plied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins

University.

Richard H. Donlon, Otis-Transportation Technology Division.

Eugene Jones, Frederic R. Harris, Inc.

Thomas McGean, De Leuw Cather and Company.

David R. Phelps, Transit Development Corporation, Inc.

Stanley A. Spinwebbor, Port Authority of ew York and New Jersey. $

Vukan Vuchic, University of Pennsylvania.

Panel on International Developments

H. William Merritt, Chairman, Transportation Consultant.

Robert A. Burco, Public Policy Research Associates.

Thomas H. Floyd, Jr., D(IA International.

Howard R. Ross, Transportation Consultant.

(XI)
Preface

This assessment of Personal Rapid Transit and other forms of

Automated Guideway Transportation has been prepared in response to

a request from the United States Senate Committee on Appropriations

on behalf of the Transportation Subcommittee.

The scope of this assessment complements two other studies conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). The subjects

of these other assessments are:

. The degree of automation which is technically feasible, economically justifiable, or otherwise appropriate to rail rapid

transit; and

. The process by which communities plan, select or reject, and

implement rail rapid transit systems in conjunction with other

modes of transit.

The objectives of this assessment are threefold:

●

●

●

To provide the Senate Appropriations Committee with information on the current status and the social and economic

aspects of Automated Guideway Transit (AGT) developments,

To assess the key problems associated with Automated Guideway Transit as perceived by potential riders, the communities,

and the transit industry; and

To identify major policy issues and automated guide~way

transit program alternatives, and to explore their implications.

Dual-mode systems, moving walkways, and continuous flow systems are beyond the scope of this study. Other urban transportation

options (e.g., electric automobiles) that might contribute to overcommg some of our current difficulties are covered, but only briefly.

The assessment was accomplished during a four-month period by a

E

s ecial team of experts in the field representing divergent views on

t e subject. Study panels were organized to examine the current

status of development and implementation. Consideration was given

to the economic, social, and technical aspects of Automated Guideway

Transit in the United States and foreign countries. The panels consulted with other interested and knowledgeable individuals, including

representatives of urban planning organizations, transit operators,

industry, and other groups who could make a significant contribution.

The panel on social acceptability- invited a representative of organized

labor to participate in discussions on the impact of automation.

Members of the assessment team made visits to important Automated Guideway Transit installations in the United States. Meetings

were helcl with the urban Mass T’ransportation Administration.

Advocates and opponents of Automated Guideway Transit presented

their views to the assessment team. Research reports and technical

data were obtained from a variety of domestic and foreign sources.

This report has been prepared b}~ the C)TA Transportation Assessments Group, based upon the fin&ngs and conclusions of the study

panels and other information developed independently. The panel

reports are included in this volume.

(XIII)
Chapter 1: Summary

This report is a technology assessment of Automated Guideway

Transit s stems, undertaken b The Office of Technology Assessment at t e request of the U.S. enate Committee on Appropriations, { Se

Transportation Subcommittee. Detailed findings are presented in

Chapters 2 through 5. Major findings and conclusions are summarized

in this chapter, which is organized as follows. The first section contains definitions and brief descriptions of Automated Guideway

Transit systems. The definitions are followed by a summary of the

major technical, economic, social, and institutional issues associated

with Automated Guideway Transit. Next is a review of current R & D

programs, with emphasis on those sponsored by the Urban Mass

Transportation Administration (UMTA). 1n the last section, four

options are outlined for research and development activities by UMTA

in the coming fiscal year.

DEFINITIONS

Automated Guideway Transit (AGT) is a class of transportation

systems in which unmanned vehicles are operated on fixed guideways

along an exclusive right of way. The capacity of the vehic es ranges f

from one or two up to 100 passengers. ingle units or trains may be Si

operated. Speeds are from 10 to +10 miles per hour. Headway (the

time interval between vehicles moving along a main route) varies from

one or two seconds to a minute. There may e a single route or branch- b

ing and interconnecting lines.

This definition covers systems with a broad range of characteristics

and includes many types of technology. To provide an organizing

structure for the assessment, three major categories of AGT systems

have been distinguished:

Shuttle-Loop Transit (SLT).

Group Rapid Transit (GRT).

Personal Rapid Transit (PRT).

Definitions and descriptions are given on page 3, with an illustration

of each category on the facing age.

In selecting the terms emp eyed here, care was taken to use those F

which have already become established in the technical vocabulary.

Automated Guideway Transit, Group Rapid Transit, and their

acronyms are in general use b the Department of Transportation and

the professional community. Personal Rapid Transit is a so a common 1’

term, but it causes confusion because PRT is sometimes used in a

sense that is loosely synonymous with the whole AGT class. Restricting PRT in this report to mean a particular category of AGT is a

return to the original definition, given in Tomorrow’s Transportation:

New Systems for the Urban Future, where the term was first used.

Shuttle-Loop Transit is a new term, adopted here to describe a type of

AGT system for which there is no generally accepted designation

(1)
2

CLASSES OF AUTOMATED GUIDEWAY TRANSIT

Shuttle-Loop Transit

. simplest technology

● vehicle size varies

● little or no switching

. long headway -

seconds or more

Passenger Shu

Group Rapid Transit . more than six riders

● switching to shorten en route

delays . intermediate headway—three

60 seconds

AIRTRANS-Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport

Personal Rapid Transit

● one to six riders

● no en route delays or transfers

● short headway—less than three

seconds

to

Cabinentaxi-Hagen, W. Germany
3

Shuttle-Loop Transit (SLT).—(Example: Tampa International

Airport.) This is the simplest type of AGT system. Vehicles move

along fixed paths with few or no switches, The vehicles of a simple

shuttle system move back and forth on a single guideway, the horizontal equivalent of an automatic elevator. They may or may not

make intermediate stops. Vehicles in a loop system move around a

closed path, stopping at any number of stations. In both shuttle and

loop systems, the vehicles may vary considerably in size and may

travel singly or coupled together in trains.

Group Rapid Transit (GRT).—(Example: AIRTRANS, Dallas/Fort

Worth Airport,) These systems serve groups of people with similar

origins and destinations, The principal differences between GRT and

the simpler SLT are that GRT ten s to have shorter headways and a f

more extensive use of switching. GRT stations may be located on

sidings off the main guideway, permitting through traffic to bypass.

GRT guideways may merge or divide into branch lines to provide

service on a variety- of routes. Vehicles with a capacity of 10 to 50

passengers may” be operated singly or in trains. Headways range from

3 to 60 seconds.

Personal Rapid Transit (PRT).—(Example: Cabinentaxi in Germany is a prototype.; there are no systems in passenger service,) The

term PRT, as used in this study, is restricted to systems with small

vehicles carrying either one person or groups of up to six usually

traveling together by choice. Plans for P T systems typically include &

off-line stations connected by a guideway’ network. Under computer

control, vehicles switch at guideway intersections so as to follow the

shortest uncontested path from origin to destination without intermediate stops, Most proposed PRT systems call for vehicles to be

operated at headways of three seconds or less.
4

SHUTTL E- LOOP T RANSIT (SLT)

STATUS

In the United States there are nine SLT systems in operation and

six more under construction. Two SLTs stems are operating abroad—

one in Japan and the other in France. Five companies in the United

States have been involved in producing vehicles for SLT systems.

Westinghouse Electric and Ford Motor Company build fairly large

vehicles (20 to 100 passengers each). Rohr and Universal Mobility

build smaller and slower vehicles in the eight to 12 passenger range

whch operate in trains of varying length. A fifth company, Stanray -

Pacific, built one system for Baniff International at Love Field in

Dallas, Texas.

None of these initial SLT systems serves the general public in the

urban environment. All are found in airports, recreational centers,

and private commercial establishments. However, SLT has several

potential applications as an urban transportation system:

● Circulation in central business districts and other areas where

surface congestion impedes movement;

● Collection and distribution of passengers from transit and

commuter railway stations;

. Movement of people between remote parking facilities and

centers of activity, such as terminals, central business districts

or university campuses;

● Connection of two or more major activities, such ❁▲ a hotel

and a convention center;

. Intermediate capacity corridor service, where transfers are

acceptable and no switching is involved.

ISSUES

Technical. The SLT systems operating in the United States have

provided highly satisfactory service. They have carried a proximately

200 million passengers with only one serious accident. T e experience he

accumulate in building and operating the present systems has served $

to eliminate most of the technical problems. However, all systems

developed so far have been used in special situation:, and there are

some basic questions that must be addressed in considering SLT for

deployment m an urban setting.
5

TYPICAL SLT SYSTEMS

Ford Motor Company

Vehicle for

Bradley International

Airport

Universal Mobility

Hershey Amusement Park

Hershey, Pennsylvania

Rohr Industries

Monotrain at Houston

Intercontinental Airport
6

Can inexpensive and aesthetically pleasing guideways and stations be

built?

Can operational problems due to snow and ice be overcome inexpensively?

How can reliability of components be improved at reasonable cost? What level of ride quality is required, and what is the trade-off between

h

Guideway roughness and vehicle suspension?

ow is the evacuation of stalled vehicles best accomplished?

Economic.-SLT systems have been in operation long enough to

H

enerat.e significant quantities of capital and operating cost data.

owever, because most existing installations are not intended to

produce revenue, there has been little effort on the part of operators

to keep detailed statistics. UMTA has only recently started to compile

these data.

Preliminary indications are encouraging but not conclusive. SLT

systems can operate with a total workforce (operational, maintenance,

and administrative personnel) equivalent to one person or less. Conventional transit bus operations require about two persons per vehicle

and specialty bus operations offering 24 hour service} as SLT does,

could require as many as three to five persons per vehicle.

The tradeoffs between SLT and manned rail transit systems are

less clear. A study conducted by the Port Authority of Allegheny

County in Pittsburgh compared manpower requirements for a driverless SLT system with those for a manned trolley system. They SLT

system was projected to achieve only a small reduction in manpower

(12 positions in a workforce of about 225). Savings in manpower

achieved by eliminating the on-board operator were largely offset by a

requirement to provide station atten ants for the automated SLT i’

line.

Capital costs are heavily dependent upon the amount of exclusive

guideway

J

to be constructed. However, to put this cost in perspective,

It shoul be noted SLT guideway costs appear to be competitive with

the construction of exclusive busways.

There are two major economic issues associated with SLT.

● What are the ranges of capital and operating costs for SLT?

● For what applications, and under what conditions, is SLT a

cost-effective mode of urban transit compared to other transit

options?

Social.-Patronage of existing SLT systems is high, suggesting good

public acceptance. However, existing installations serve a captive

clientele and do not face the same requirements as public transit.

The controlled environment of an airport or a recreation park is far

different from an urban center, where passenger security, susceptibility to vandalism and security of right of way are much greater

problems.

The SLT guideway may be a visual intrusion in an urban area.

Some SLT vehicles are large and heavy and require guideways of

approximately eight to ten feet in width. he design of elevated guideways must be carefully considered, keeping mind that even small

structures could be objectionable. On the other hand, there may be

opportunities for enhancing neighborhoods through good urban design.

Careful attention to the architectural features of guideways, introduction of linear parks, and urban development in the area of stations

could create a positive and appealing environment.
7

It appears that further data on public acceptance in urban situations can best be gained from an urban demonstration project, perhap s

in an activity center or downtown district. The basic issues to eB

addressed include:

● The acceptability of ride and service characteristics,

. Effects o unmanned operation on passnger security, !

● Aesthetics of guideway and station design.

InStitutional.— UMTA has not issued performance standards or

criteria which would assist in qualifying the simple SLT systems for

capital grants. Without such standards or adequate data for evaluating the economic and social characteristics of SLT, it is difficult to

determine cost-effectiveness in relation to other transportation modes,

and those reviewing grant applications will continue to be skeptical

of their worth. Because UM A requires that system planners substantiate the cost-effectiveness of the mode selected in order to

qualify for capital assistance grants, SLT system are placed at a distinct disadvantage.

As a comparatively new technology, SLT is under a second disadvantage. Product engineering and tooling form a large part of the

manufacturer’s initial costs. These costs must be recovered in the first

project or two because a long-term market has not been established.

SLT system research and development to date has been largely

financed by private industry. However, there is little incentive for

industry to spend additional funds for follow-on development, testing

and Product improvement without positive inducement in view of

UMTA’s negative attitude regarding capital grants for new systems.

The government’s R & D program also offers little encouragement to

pursue SLT since most of the budget is devoted to the more complex

classes of AGT.

FINDINGS

SLT systems appear worthy of careful consideration as transportation

alternatives for many specialized urban transportation problems.

UMTA’S research and development program does not emphasize improvement of technical operating characteristics and reduction of SLT system

costs.

UMTA’S technological R & D is not matched by a corresponding program

to develop a better understanding of problems in the area of economics

and public acceptance. SLT systems should receive emphasis in such a

program.

An urban demonstration project for SLT appears justified. Such a project

should concentrate on gathering economic and acceptance data and on

improving the technical operation of the system.

There is a lack of criteria for qualifyinir SLT systems for capital grant

funding. There is no apparent m-echanisfi within- UMTA for the trafisfer

of R & D results to implementation under the capital grant program.

G ROUP R APID T RANSIT (GRT)

STATUS

Two AGT s stems have been built in the United States—one at

Morgantown, W est Virginia, and the other at the Dallas/Fort Worth

Airport. There are no operational GRT systems overseas. Three are

under construction in Japan, and one was started in Canada but has

been temporarily halted.
The Morgantown project is significant because it represents the

most ambitious effort thus far to build a full-scale system capable

of providing service on demand from origin to destination and to

‘1!

o crate vehicles on 15-second headways in a real life environment.

he rime contractor, Boeing Aerospace Corporation, has delivered

18 0 the 45 vehicles required under the contract and expects to r

complete the prescribed acceptance testing in mid-1975.

Vehicle and Guideway in Morgantown, West Virginia

The AIRTRANS system, built by the LTV Aeros ace Corporation

at the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, is the largest AGT project yet

undertaken. It consists of 13 miles of guideways, 55 stations, 51

passenger vehicles and 17 utility vehicles. The system was designed

to handle airline passengers, employees, interline baggage, supplies,

airmail, and trash. It was opened to the public in January 1974 and

is currently providing inter-terminal passenger and supply service.

Most of the non-passenger movements are stall handled by alternate

means.

Two major studies in the United States are noteworthy. The Twin

Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission has recommended

AGT as one of three transportation alternatives to be selected for

detailed planning . In Denver, the Regional Transportation District

has selected GRT as the preferred system for regional deployment.

Significant planning for the installation of GRT systems is also

taking lace in Japan and Europe.

UMTA is seeking funds in fiscal ear 1976 to start construction of

a prototype test facility which will carry forward the work accomplished at Morgantown and at Dallas/Fort Worth. This reject,

designated by UMTA as "High Performance Personal Rapid Transit”

(“HPPRT”), involves 12-passenger vehicles and is really an advanced version of GRT. Contracts for preliminary enginneering have

been awarded to Boeing, Rohr and Otis-TTD. UMTA’s current

10

plan is to select one of the system concepts developed by these contractors for full-scale testing. A two-mile test track, five prototype

vehicles and a sophisticated control system capable of achieving

three-second headways will be built and evaluated over a four-year

period.

Although the two GRT systems in place serve special transportation

situations (an airport and a university), GRT is technically capable

of providing basic urban transportation for low- to medium-density

tra c. With headways of 15 seconds and capacities of 20 passengers ffic

per vehicle such systems could move a maximum of 4800 people

per hour.

Along more heavily traveled routes, capacity can be increased by

using larger vehicles, coupling two or more vehicles together, or by

reducing headways. GRT is thus viewed as an intermediate capacity

system, i.e., less capacity than rail rapid transit but more than

typical bus operations. In this sense, GRT is much like light rail

transit.

The potential for evolution to greater capacity and versatility

through technological advances is an important consideration. A

relatively simple GRT system can be instal ed at the outset and later r

expanded with off-line stations and shorter headways—using the same

technology and without redesigning the basic guideway network.

ISSUES

Technical.-Both the Morgantown project and the AIRTRANS

system have experienced numerous technical problems. In the case of

Morgantown, a complete redesign has recently been completed.

AIRTRANS has not yet been finally accepted by the airport. Of

course, problems should always be anticipated in the deve opment l

and introduction of new technologies, but GRT has suffered from a

lack of research and development prior to deployment, the restrictions

of fixed rice contracts, and management problems.

The eneral Accounting Office has recently completed a detailed G

review of the cost, schedule and performance characteristics of the

Morgantown Project. Since the GAO staff study has been transmitted

separately to the Congress, it is unnecessary to cover the same ground

in this report. It is sufficient to note that an ambitious R & D effort

was attempted in an urban setting and subjected to unrealistic deadlines and design criteria. All these factors contributed significantly to f

the high cost of the Morgantown project.

During the first year of operation, AIRTRANS was plagued by

equipment failures and frequent service interruptions. In recent

months, however, reliability has improved significantly; and LTV has

been able to cut the maintenance force in half. Nevertheless, the

airport management keeps buses in standby status for use when

service interruptions exceed 15 minutes. In the first three months of

1975 the buses were called out five times because of AIRTRANS

failures.

The safety record of the system has been good. Reliability has

steadily improved, with system availability at 100 percent during a

recent six-week period. Originally, a maintenance force of 90 was
11

anticipated for the project; but 120 are currently employed, down from

B

a peak of about 250.

asic technical issues cited earlier for SLT applv to GRT as well.

There

●

●

●

The

are also the following issues specific to GRT’~

Does greater system complexity contribute to a more difficult

reliability problem?

Are there alternative engineering concepts that can reduce the

cost of GRT systems?

Can ride quality (particularly freedom from sway and jerk) be

improved over that of AI RTRANS and Morgantown?

advanced GRT program being undertaken by UMTA

(“HPPRT”) raises two additional technical concerns. “

. Reduced headways require demonstration of the feasibility of

command and control systems.

. Software must be developed for managing a larger fleet of

vehicles.

Economic.-The two GRT systems constructed have been expensive.

AIRTRANS, originally projected at $35 million, is now reported to

have cost over $53 million. The cost of the Morgantown system was

initially estimated at $18 million by West Virginia University in 1970.

The detailed estimate by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in 1971

was $37 million. So far the project has cost $64 million for a system

half as large as Initially contemplated. Even allowing a generous

amount for one-time R & D charges, these systems have proved very

costly for the amount of service that they can provide.

Conclusive data on operations and maintenance costs of GRT

systems are not available. The first year of AIRTRANS has been a

shake-down phase with costs substantially higher than could be

expected for normal operation. At current manning levels, AIRTRANS

averages about 2.5 people per vehicle, or 25 percent more than the

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority METROBUS

operation.

The economic issues are straightforward.

●

●

●

●

Is there a market for GRT systems or a transit “need” which

they would serve?

Assuming they fill a need, are GRT systems cost-effective competitors in the urban transit market?

can the Morgantown and AIRTRANS projects be used by

UMTA to gather data on GRT operating and maintenance

costs?

Is there any justification for hardware R & D (i.e., the

“HPPRT” program) before first gathering economic data such

as that described above?

Soctial.-GRT requires large, elevated, exclusive guideways that

present the same problems of visual intrusion as SLT and offer the

same opportunities for urban improvement. Because GRT is more

complex than SLT, problems of safety- and security are accentuated.

The AIRTRANS experience suggests that automated systems,

because of the inherent inflexibility of machine operations, require a

higher degree of passenger understanding and cooperation than do
12

manned systems. Airport employees and other AIRTRANS patrons

have at times disrupted operations by opening doors, or holding them

open, thereby causing the system to shut down. Also, the system

lacks good human engineering. Information is so poorly conveyed

that patrons become confused and frustrated. To compensate, it

has been necessary to add attendants in stations.

Experience with Morgantown and AIRTRANS indicates the

following needs.

. These two systems should be carefully monitored to obtain data

relating to public acceptance.

. Human engineering principles must be applied to facilitate the

patrons’ use of the system.

1nstitutional.-UMTA has put nearly all of the total $95 million

spent on AGT research and development into GRT. However, it

has concentrated on technical hardware development with little

consideration of social needs and economic considerations. As a result,

understanding of the potential role of GRT is incomplete. UMTA

does not have a demonstration program for GRT systems in an urban

situation. This should be corrected, articularly if further investment

in GRT system R & D is made. T e discussion of the issues under f

SLT applies to GRT as well.

●

●

●

●

●

●

FINDINGS

A number of localMes across the country have shown interest in installing

GRT systems,

Serious technical problems have arisen in the first two installations and

neither is yet operating as planned. These technical problems have been

exacerbated by unrealistic deadlines and management problems.

UMTA’s R & D Program does not include market and economic research

sufficient to evaluate the need for GRT and its cost-effectiveness as a

solution to urban transportation problems. Monitoring efforts for AIRTRANS and Morgantown are required to obtain data useful in evaluating GRT. UMTA could perform this service

and has initiated such a program for AIRTRANS.

Until the Morgantown system has been proved in actual operation, it

would be premature to commit funds to expand the system. Additional

funding does seem justified to complete the engineering work which is

necessary to develop realistic cost estimates. Federal assistance for this

interim operating period may be appropriate if the partial system places a

greater financial burden on the university than the full system would have.

No clear urban transportation need is apparent for the short three-second

headway Performance ?mecified for the “HPPRT” mogram. The mogram

should be- reviewed to ~ee whether modifications wo~ld not incr_eas= its

value.

P OTENTIAL R OLE OF P ERSONAL R APID T RANSIT (PRT)

STATUS

Since the term “Personal Rapid Transit” tit entered the transit

vocabula~ in 1968, this high] innovative conce t has fascinated

many transportation planners. $ RT offers persona ized service with Y

small vehicles which rovide non-stop transportation from origin to

destination at short eadways. To date, no systems which can be f

classfied as PRT are in revenue service or under construction in the

United States, but several test traclc installations have been built in

Europe and in Japan.
13

Proponents of PRT view this concept as a reasonable supplement

to the private automobile in high density urban areas Y

1 and c aim that

PRT can provide a very much higher level of service than other

modes of public transportation. Thus, it is argued that PRT systems

would attract a signi cant percentage of the rides now being made in f i

private automobiles and offer obvious benefits:

● less traffic congestion in urban areas.

● less land and fewer facilities used for automobile storage.

. reduced travel time under more comfortable Circumstance=.

. less noise and air pollution.

● reduction in consumption of petroleum-derived fuels.

● reduction in requirements for new arterial roads and urban freeways.

It is contended that PRT would provide greater mobility for the

transportation disadvantaged, i.e.,

he

the young, the elderly, the poor,

and t e handicapped.

Proponents admit that the area-wide networks with closely spaced

stations and large numbers of vehicles would be expensive to build

and, perhaps, to operate. The initial capital cost might equal that of {

rail rapid transit systems, but levels o service are envisaged to be r

much igher than with conventional modes, except perhaps hi taxicabs.

Proponents claim the higher service levels will attract significantly

greater patronage than conventional transit. Automation is expected

to allow the high service level to be delivered at a cost the pu lic is b

willing to pay.

1 k

second would be needed to move 10,000 people per hour over a single

This is roughly equivalent to the number of people moved on four

freeway lanes.

is no empirical eviwere motivated by

based u on largely

$

I Greater than 3,000 people per square mile.
14

PRT TEST FACILITIES ABROAD

CVS, Higashimurayamz Tokyo, Japan

ARAIMI~ Orly Airport, Paris, France
15

The following technical problems need to be solved.

Economic.—The economic characteristics of PRT are so unclear

that meaningful analysis is difficult. Several analyses have been

attempted, including one by the Aerospace Corporation for the Los

Angeles area, a general study by the OT Transportation Systems D

Center (TSC), and one of the Twin Cities area by De Leuw Cather.

Cost assumptions vary reatly. Proponents’ estimates for PRT

vehicles, for example, are Based upon large production runs, and the

estimated cost per unit presumably goes down with increased production. As another example, costs are related to solutions to potential

social problems. If passenger security considerations require the installation of closed circuit T.V. throughout the system, including

vehicles, then the ccsts would rise appreciably. Costs for operation

and maintenance also vary. Proponents’ estimates assume maintenance

levels that are unrealistically low for transit.

● The major economic- issue is whether research, without hardware development and urban demonstration, can answer the

economic questions, or whether hardware development is necessary to assess the economic characteristics of P T systems. E

modes, there is serious question that the associated proliferation of

particularly in residential neighborhoods. Also, the safety and security

aspects of unattended small vehicles require careful evaluation.

the service characteristics of the private automobile. he wisdom

is open to question. Whether the benefits of such a system would

only accrue to the well-to-do, or whether they would also provide

for the needs of the transit disadvantaged is worthy of exploration.
16

FINDINGS
17

RELATIONSHIP OF (GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY R & D
18

FINDINGS

B UDGET A LTERNATIVES FOR F ISCAL Y EAR 197 6

BACKGROUND
19

Funding Alternatives Fiscal Year 1976

[In millions of dollars]

No

change Reduce ture Expand

(A) (B) (c) (D)

HPPRT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.0 . . . . . . . . . . 6.0 15.0

AGT technology:

New funds (NOA). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0 . . . . . . . . . 12.0

Carryover. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 4.4 : : : 4.4

Social/economic impact studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 3.0

Total funding level (NOA and carryover). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.4 4.4 18.4 34.4
20

ALTERNATIVE A—APPROVE THE PROGRAM AS SUBMITTED
A

●

●

●

●

●

●

●
Chapter 2: The Status and Potential of Automated Guideway

Transit in Urban Areas

T HE C URRENT S TATUS OF U RBAN P ASSENGER T RANSPORTATIO N

(23)
J s J ! 1 1 I 1

‘45 ‘ 50 ‘ 55 ‘60 165 ‘70 ’73

Figure I.—Transit Patronage Trends 1945-1973

Source: 1978-74 Tran81t Fact Book—American public Transit Association.
●●●●●
26

features:

The three categories differ in degree of technical sophistication,

service attributes, vehicle operations, and readiness for use. These

differences are summarized in the accompanying table.
Characteristics of AGT Systems

SLT GRT PRT

Technical sophistication . . . . . --- _ - Simple. Needs some refinement. Intermediate, Problems in ap- Complex. Partially demonstrated.

plication.

Travel alone or with people by

are necessary. In group travel, transfers choice. Minimum en route demay be necessary. lays, no transfers.

Vehicle operations--- ------------ Vehicles follow unvarying paths. Vehicles follow multiple paths. Vehicle follows path tailored to

Switches required. needs of traveler.

Readiness-- - _ _ -------- _ _ _ _ - _ --- Available. Many systems in Emerging. 1 revenue system Conceptual. No system in use or

specialized service, none in exists and 1 is in construction. construction. Testing abroad.

urban centers.
28

SLT SYSTEMS

(Characteristics.—Shuttle-loo transit systems have a single essential

characteristic. The vehicles folow unvarying paths and make little or l

no use of switches. Vehicles may be of any size and may be used alone

or coupled together in trains. Headways are 60 seconds or more.

Capacities vary depending on vehicle size. Speeds range from 8 to 30

{

I

.

n a shuttle system, the vehicles move back and forth on a simple

guidewa , without front or rear orientation. Shuttles have stations at

oth en s of the run and may also have intermediate stations.

In a Zoo system, the veh]cles move continuously around a closed

path whic may contain any number of stations. Stations are on the h

main line. Possible variations of SLT include double guideway lines

with switches at the end and single guideway lines with multiple cars

and a by-pass near the midpoint of the line.

Combinations of shuttles and loops can be constructed.

U.S. SLT Application.—

de

In the U. S., 15 SLT systems have been

built or are un er construction. Nine are in service.

The nine systems in revenue operation are at:

1. Tampa International Airort, Florida.

2. Houston Intercontinental Airport, Texas.

3. Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Washington.

4. Love Field, Dallas, Texas (inactive at present).

5. California Exposition and State Fair, Sacramento.

6. Hershey Amusement Park, Hershey, Pennsylvania.

7. Magic Mountain, Valencia, California.

8. Carowinds, Charlotte, North Carolina.

9. Kings Island, Kin s Mill, Ohio.

Six SLT s ystems now un er construction are at: d

10. Kings Dominion, Ashland, Virgnia.

11. Pearl Ridge, Honolulu, Hawaii.

12. Bradley Field, Hartford, Connecticut.

13. Fairlane Town Center, Dearborn, Michigan.

14. Miami International Airport, Florida.

15. Busch Gardens, Williamsburg, Virginia.

Characteristics of these systems vary greatly. Examples of a

shuttle, a 100 ,

hese

and a shuttle-loop combination are briefly described

to illustrate t characteristics. For additional information, see the

Panel Report on Current Developments in the United States.

An example of a shuttle system is the SLT at the Tampa Airport

where there are two shuttles on parallel guideways connectm eac of !h

four satellite or “Air-side” terminal buildings with the h Main or

“Land-side” terminal. The longest run is 1,000 feet. Vehicle capacity

is 100 passengers. The maximum speed is 30-35 mph. The capacity is

5,000 passenger per hour in each direction—the same capacity as

two freeway anes for automobile traffic. l

A loop s stem has been installed at the Houston Intercontinental

Airport. T is eight-station system has 6,200 feet of guideway. At h

h

resent, up to six trains, each three cars lon , can run with an average

eadway of three minutes. Maximum spee is 8 mph with a capaclty d

of 720 passengers hour in each direction. The fleet can be e arged n l

to 18 trains. At eadways of 60 seconds, capacity will reach 2,160 h

passengers per hour in each direction.
.

I J

! 1 783 Ft. In .

K Leg 2 ‘

Figure 2.—Passenger Shuttle System Layout

Tampa Airport

The Seattle-Tacoma Air ort has a shuttle-loop combination.

Referred to as the Satellite ransit System, it includes two loops and f

a shuttle which provide transportation between the main terminal

/’( .

).

Figure 3.-Satellite Transit System Layout (Note: two loops and a shuttle.)

Seattle-Tacoma International AirporL

and two satellites. Nine vehicles are in service and three more are on

order. Maximum loop capacities are 14,400 passengers per hour.

Maximum speed is 27 mph.

Foreign S T Application~. L —There are only two AGT installations

in actual revenue service outside the United States. Both are SLT

s stems. One is a simpIe loop system which has been built at the

Yatsu Amusement Par in Chiba Prefecture near Tokyo, Jap an. Two E

30 passenger VONA vehicles operate on a 1300-foot trac at two E

minute headways. The other installation is the VEC system which

connects a department store in Paris with a remote parking garage

about 1,000 feet distant.
30

Potential SLT Applications.—To date, SLT systems have been installed to accomplish three kinds of specific trip purposes: travel between two major activity centers, travel within a single defined activity

center such as a park or recreation area, or travel from parking areas to

a specified destination such as an air terminal. There are a number of

additional applications for SLT which could be tested. These would

provide data on the utility of the systems outside the rather specialized

and/or novelty situations in which they have been used. Thus, SLT

systems may have high potential for use in conjunction with conventional rail rapid transit as a collector or distributor at stations

located near major activity centers, Another potential application is

the use of elevated SLT systems to provide circulation in central

business districts and other places where surface congestion impedes

movement.

GRT SYSTEMS

Characteristtis.—Group rapid transit systems are designed with

branching routes and serve groups traveling with similar origins and

destinations. GRT vehicles may e of various sizes, thou h 10 to 50

passenger vehicles are likely to be most common. Vehic es may be l

coupled together in trains.

GRT systems are likely to have stations located off the main line,

allowing vehicles to pass a station while other vehicles are stopped

there.

Switching capability allows the GRT s stem to provide service on

a variety of routes much like bus service, ut without the delays from b

traffic congestion. The traveler using a GRT system, must be careful

to board the correct car. Also, GRT passengers making relatively

long trips in metropolitan-scale systems may find it necessary to make

one or more transfers. Thus, there may be significant waiting time

involved.

GRT systems maybe designed too crate at headway s ranging from

60 seconds. to as low as three seconds or very advance versions. Since

line capaclty is a direct function of vehicle capacity and headway, a

GRT line with average headways of 30 seconds and average vehicle

loads of 20 people would carry 2,400 people per direction—about the

same as a reeway lane. Line capacity can be readily increased by f

coupling vehicles together into trains or reducing headways. However

the system complexity increases significant as headways are reduced.

U.S. GRT Applications.-Because GRT is more complex, fewer

systems have been built than SLT systems. Of the two United States

systems, one is AIRTRANS which is located at Dallas/Ft. Worth

Airport and the other is the system at Morgantown, West Virginia.

Only AIRTRANS is operational. AIRTRANS includes 13 miles of

guideway linking 55 stations. There are 51 passenger vehicles and 17

utility vehicles. Maximum speed is 17 mph. The guideway network

permits 17 different service routes with a system capacity (over all

routes combined) of 9,000 passengers, 6,000 pieces of luggage and

70,000 pounds of mail per hour. (No single part of the system would

carry this total.)

Foreign GRT Applications.—

i

No GRT systems are operational in

other countries. owever, three systems are under construction in

Japan and one in Canada.
31

AIRTRANS SYSTEM AT THE DALLAS/FT. WORTH AIRPORT

r I

r TRANS P O RTATION BRANIFF

s CENTRAL UTILITIES

PLANT ? FACILITY

(

r

,

F E

*

DELT A /

NORT H

CONTINENTAL

Figure 4.—Schematjc System Layout

Some of the 51 Passenger Vehicles

— -

One of the 17 Utility Vehicles

Potential (GRT .4pplicatiow.-GRT systems could provide a broad

range of services in major activity centers such as central business

districts. These services include a variety of schedules for peak period

use and on-demand service a times of low activity. With automatic

coupling of vehicles, a technique which is currently being perfected,

vary-ing route densities can be accommodated by selective coupling of

vehicles as they converge onto heavily traveled corridors from outlying

areas. This technique would permit a downtown loop to be fed by

several radials connecting the CBD to suburban areas. As vehicles

enter the central loop they could be automatic coupled together

into two- to four-car trains, depending on the volume of traffic. When

the: could be uncoupled, preferable- in a station, to help passengers board the correct vehicle for

the outbound trip.

An important consideration is the potential of GRT to evolve in

both capacity and versatility. A relatively simple sytem, or segment

system, could be installed and later expanded. With proper planning,

off-line stations could be added and headways reduce , without major

alterations to the basic guideway network.
32

MORGANTOWN GRT DEMONSTRATION PROJECI’

Vehicle at Engineering Station

Vehicle Operating in Downtown

Morgantown

Central Control Console Assembly of Vehicles at Boeing

Aerospace Company Plant
33

PRT SYSTEMS

Characteristics.-The basic features of the personal rapid transit

concept are small vehicles (up to six passengers) designed to carry one

person, or a small group of people traveling together, non-stop from

origin to destination over an extensive network of guideways connecting many stations. To provide convenient access or a maximum ?

number of people, guideway grids have been proposed with spacings

close enough to limit walking distances to mile or less.

The salient feature of PR is provision of maximum convenience &

and flexibility. The result would be a level of service that is truly

competitive with the private automobile. Thus, vehicles would move

to any location throughout an extensive guideway network without

enroute delays or transfers. Strangers could elect to ride together in a

PRT vehicle if the happened to get on at the same time and were

going to the same estimation.

Because of the lower vehicle capacity in PRT s stems, achieving

the same line ca acities possible mth the less compex GRT systems l

requires that P T vehicles operate at very short headways. For h

example, to move 2,500 people per hour at the average occupancy

level of the private auto (1.4 people per vehicle) would require 1,800

vehicles per hour, or one every two seconds. Intersections would be

equipped with switches enabling vehicles to make turns or continue

in t e original direction of travel much like automobiles at street h!

intersections.

United States Preapplications.—There are no PRT developments

or planned applications in the United States.

Foreign P T Applications. F

G

—Prototype systems have been constructed in Japan, ermany and France. The Japanese CVS system

is installed near Tokyo and includes a 4.8 km. test track, a sophisticated control system and 60 vehicles. These have operated at headways of six seconds and speeds of 30–40 km/h. A key objective of the

test program is achieving safe operation at one-second headways..

CVS Project Experimental Center, Higashimurayama Tokyo, Japan
34

The German system, Cabinentaxi, includes five, three-passenger

vehicles operating on a 1136 meter test track. Headways of .5 second

have been achieved in the laboratory, and passenger carrying demonstrations under manual supervision have been conducted at onesecond headways. The ARAMIS system in France which merges

individual vehicles into groups has been tested on a one-km. test

track with three vehicles operating at headways of 0.2 seconds between Yehicles and 60 seconds between grou s. This test track is no

longer m existence, but a new one will be bui t soon. Y

Cabinentaxi—Hagen, West Germany

Potential PRT Applicatioms.—The PRT concept was stimulated

partly bl” the desire to develop a public transportation s~”stcm which

would provide an attractive alternative to the automobile. Thus,

application is envisaged in well populated areas with area-wide networks, numerous stations at close intervals and large numbers of

vehicles. The Aerospace Corporation estimates that some 10,000

square miles of urban area in the United States may be approriate

for PRT service. Serving this area would require 30,000 miles o one- r

way guideway and three million PRT vehicles. In this same area,

PRT would compete with other transportation systems,

AGT I NSTALLATIONS S TUDIED IN THE U NITED S TATE S

A survey of public agencies and firms with major interest in installations of AGT systems identified 36 instances of substantial studies

completed for future AGT systems. The survey is only suggestive

and Is not intended to be complete. Some of the planned AGT’ installations may be, or may recently have been, rejected or deferred.

However, because of the sizeable planning work and expense involved

in each case, they are included to indicate the level of interest and

activity in AGT development.
35

These planned systems have not been grouped by system class

(SLT, GRT or PRT) because more than one class has been proposed

for some locations. (For example, all three types of AGT technology

have been studied for potential application m Minneapolis.) Instead,

this listing is organized by the type of location for which the system

has been proposed.

METROPOLITAN NETWORKS AND CORRIDORS (6)

Denver Region, Colorado.

Twin Cities Area, Minnesota.

San Diego Region, California.

Santa Clara County, California.

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

El Paso, Texas—Juarez, Chi., Mexico.

AIRPORTS (9)

Atlanta, Georgia.

Boston, Massachusetts.

Chicago, Illinois (O’Hare).

Detro]t, Michigan (Metropolitan).

Los Angeles, California (International).

Oakland, California.

San Francisco, California.

New York, New York (J. F. Kennedy).

Newark, New Jersey (International).

CBD/CENTRAL CITY (9)

Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Detroit, Michigan.

Las Vegas, Nevada.

Long Beach, California.

Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Mid Manhattan, New York, New York.

Lower hlanhattan, New York, New York.

Norfolk, Virginia.

San Diego, California.

MULTIPLE PURPOSE DEVELOPMENTS (8)

Crown City, Kansas.

Echelon, New Jersey.

Cameron, Alexandria, Virginia.

Plaza del Ore, Houston, Texas.

Post Oak, Houston, Texas.

Southfield, Michi an.

Interama, Dade ounty, Florida. 8

Crystal City, Arlington, Virginia.

31 EDIC!,4 I, CENTERS (4)

Detroit Medical Center Corp., Detroit, Nlichigan.

Duke Universit~’ Medical Center, Durham, North Carolina.

The Universit Health Center of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.

Texas Medic Center Inc., Houston, Texas. d

14- , ., , I - i
36

As can be seen from the above, planning studies ,of AGT cover a

variety of applications. The proposed plans for medical centers, provision of transportation in central city areas, and provision of

metropolitan network and corridor transportation are new applications.

Some of the plans under evaluation are ambitious. For examplet

there are four studies in metropolitan areas involving SLT or G T

networks. A total of about 380 miles of dual guideways and almost

the same number of stati~ns are being considered. T ese would be [

built in stages at a total estimated cost of $6.7 billion. For comparison,

there are now about 500 miles of rail rapid transit routes in the United

States and the Washington METRO system will add about 100 miles

at a cost of about $4.5 million. 5

To illustrate some of the reposed applications, a system plan

under consideration in each o the three AGT classes is summarized

below.

SLT

A “people mover” system to serve the C oastal City complex in

Arlington, Va. is the subject of a current U TA-fianced technical

study. A simple loop system with several on-line stations has been

E i $

ro osed to provide convenient transportation to and from the

TRO station (under construction), to facilitate access to remote

parking and for internal circulation within this office-cornmercialresidential development.

PROPOSED MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL GRT SYSTEM

L .-’m* t-i-l , m l

—

@ ..+,*...,, ‘,
37

Details of Network for Downtown Minneapolis

Source: Automated 8mall Vehfcle Fiaed (Wdeway 8@em8 8tudg, Technical Re ort IWO.

75-03, by De Leuw, Cather, Co., Inc., Bather, Ringnose, Wolsfeld, Inc., Honeywe 1, Inc. ; Y

hfarcb, 1975.

The Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission, based

upon detailed studies by a team of consultants led by DO Leuw Cather

and Company, Inc. has determined that a GRT system would provide

a satisfactory solution to transportation needs in the Minnea polis-St.

Paul region. One plan which has been recommended proposes uilding E

circulation systems in the two metro centers. Later extensions would

provide lines into fully developed suburbs as indicated by the map

on the preceding page.

A final decision on the system to be built awaits further detailed

engineering studies in which GRT concepts will be compared with

alternatives such as light rail.

PRT

The Aerospace Corporation, one of the strongest advocates of the

PRT concept in the United States, in a study of the Los Angeles

area, reposed 638 one-way miles of guideway, 1084 stations and 64,000

vehic es, as shown below. r
38

Proposed PRT Grid for Los Angeles

The Aerosp ace Corporation compared its proposal to a conventional

rail and exc usive busway system recommended by another group l

to the Southern Califorma Rapid Transit District, That system is

reported to include 116 miles of rail, 24 miles of elevated busways

and 62 stations. The Aerospace Corporation contends the PRT

system could be built at about half the cost and provide better service.

Further descriptive information about some of the applications

proposed are contained in the Report of the Panel on Current Developments in the United States.

S UPPLIERS OF AGT S YSTEM S

The number of existing systems and even greater number of plans

for new ones indicates the high level of interest which AGT development has generated. Six different firms have installed the existing

systems. Nine others have invested their own resources in develop-
39

SELECTED VEHICLE SYSTEMS WHICH HAVE FOUND NO MARKET

(Post-Transpo 72)

Astroglide

PRT Systems Corporation

R.omag

Monocab, Inc.

Rohr Industries

Palomino

Aerial Transit

Pullman, Inc.
40

ment efforts but have not received a contract for a revenue installation.

Clearly, many firms have believed in a market potential for AGT.

The 17 AGT systems now in existence in the United States have

been supplied by six firms who remain in the business and one group

formed for a single reject, Braniff International’s Jet-rail system for

Love Field, Dallas, exas. The firms are: T

Number of

installations

● Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pa_. ------------ 4

 Universal Mobility , Inc. Salt Lake City, Utah ---------------- --

● Rohr Industries,: Ni

6

 ( onotrain) Chula Vista, Calif - ----------- 2

. Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, .Mich - -------------------- --- 2

. LTV Aerospace Corporation, Dallas, Tex- -------------------- -- 1

. Boeing Aerospace Company, Seattle, Wash- -------------------- 1

Firms which have spent considerable time, effort and money on the

development of full-scale test tracks and vehicles, prototype systems

or temporary demonstration projects, such as Trans o 72, but have

not yet sold a revenue passenger system in the United States include:

. Otis Elevator Company, Inc., Transportation Technology Division,

Denver, Colorado.

 Rohr Industries, Inc. (Monocab), Chula Vista, California.

● General Motors Corporation, Transportation Systems Division, Warren,

Michigan. . pRT Sys,ems Corporation (associated with Braniff), Chicago, Illinois.

● Mobilit~ Systems and Equipment Company, Los Angeles, California.

. Alden Self-Transit Systems Corporation, Bedford, Massachusetts.

. Bendix Corporation (Dashaveyor), Ann Arbor, Michigan.

● Pullman, Inc. (Aerial Transit), Las Vegas, Nevada.

● Uniflo Systems Company, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

It is estimated that privately financed AGT development costs

incurred by the 15 companies listed above total about $100 million.

Lack of sales and unfavorable market conditions have caused some

firms to curtail their programs or withdraw entirely. Others are considering abandonin

%

their AGT programs. Certainly the number of

suppliers exceeds current market. One reason is that UMTA

actively promoted AGT development in the late 1960’s and early

1970’s. Firms without prior transit experience, especially aerospace

fires, perceived AGT as a potential new market to fill the gap of

declining aerospace business. It was hoped by UMTA and these firms z

that aerospace knowledge could enable significant advances in AGT

development. These factors contributed to the large number of suppliers relative to the present market.
Chapter 3: Major Problems in Automated Guideway Transit

Them are many significant issues in the development and implementation of AGT systems. These are discussed under four broad

headings: Institutional, Technical, Economic, and Social.

I NSTITUTIONA L

Compared with many other areas of entrepreneurial endeavor, the

environment for innovation in transportation should be favorable.

Urban transportation needs are extensive. Production of transportation hardware is dominated by relatively large and well en owed

companies with much experience in the research and development

process. Given these conditions, one would expect the state of the art

of urban transportation technology to be highly advanced. The actual

situation, however, is quite the opposite.

Urban transportation technology has advanced at such a slow pace

that prevailing systems are almost indistinguishable from their

counterparts of four to six decades ago (aside from some relatively

minor cosmetic changes). However, the lack of progress is not a result

of failure to advance technology. Much advanced transportation

technology exists. Rather, it is a failure to devise effective ways to

introduce the technology into urban transportation.

This failure stems from a lack of understanding by UMTA of the

capabilities of the private sector and local transportation authorities

and UMTA’S underestimation of the difficulties inherent in developing

and implementing reliable and cost effective new systems. In retrospect, t e new systems efforts have served not to stimulate interest in E

new technology but to discourage already reluctant local transit

operators from considering it. The lessons of BART, Morgantown and

AIRTRANS have not been lost on UMTA’S capital grants office

which is now, understandably, reluctant to consider forms of AGT for

capital grants funding. In addition to this limitation of the market,

certain practices of the Federal government further discourage

initiative within the supply industry

There are two areas in which the ederal government could move to f

eliminate existing barriers to AGT innovation: contractual practices

and capital grant procedures. Additionally, some of the institutional

arrangements for system development adopted abroad are worthy of

serious consideration in this country.

CONTRACTUAL PRACTICES

Many accepted Federal government research and development

practices impose negative incentives on manufacturers and reduce

Benefits from UMTA contracts:

Patent Rights (TMe).—Whenever any invention, improvement or

discovery is made or conceived, or for the first time is actually reduced

( a )
42

to practice, the contractor must notify the government Contracting

Officer. The Secretary of DOT has the sole and exclusive power to determine whether patent applications shall be filed and whether the

government shall acquire the patent rights. The contractor may be

given a free license to such patents, but if not used during three years,

the license may be withdrawn.

Background Patents (License).—After a determination that the product is required by the public in the interest of public health, safety or

welfare, the Secretary can require the contractor to license others on

reasonable terms to produce items under any background patent

necessary for the production, sale or use of the end product.

Rights in Datu (Title.—All recorded information first produced in

performance of the contract becomes the sole property of the government. Furthermore, the contractor must grant the government a

royalty-free, nonexclusive and irrevocable license to pulish or otherwise use any and all data, not first produced or composed in the performance of the contract, but which is incorporated in work furnished

under the contract.

—Current Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

guidelines require up to 50 percent cost sharing in developmental

contracts where there is a substantial commercial market.

Fixed Ceiling Limitations.—While written as cost reimbursable

contracts (with or without fees), fixed ceiling limitations on R & D

contracts make them fixed rice contracts, with an almost open-ended

scope of work. For examp e, the four system suppliers who partici- l

pated in the AGT demonstration at Transpo 72 were offered costreimbursable contracts with a ceiling of $1.5 million each. However,

each contractor exceeded this ceiling b amounts reported to be from

$1 million to, more than $2 million. Each of the three contractors

participatmg m the first phase of the Dual-Mode Program had costreimbursable contracts with a ceiling of $500,000. Actual expenditures

were reported from $600,000 to more than $2 million. This project

was cancelled at the end of phase I.

Recovery of Developmental Costs.—Depending on what is negotiated

as a fair, reasonable and equitable amount, the contractor is required

to pay the government up to five percent of sales or leases of any roduct substantially the same as that developed under the contract.

f

b e is

also required to pay up to 33 percent of unds received from technical

agreements enabling others to sell, lease or use the product. Sales or

leases of the product to the government, or its agencies, must be at a

price reduce by the equivalent of the recoverable costs. The costs

recovered under this provision are limited to the amounts paid by the

government to the contractor for the development.

The implications of the foregoing practices may be summarized as

follows.

. There is no incentive to make patentable discoveries because

rights to resulting patents are acquired by the government.

The contractor must assume the burden of protecting the

discoveries and applying for the patents.

. The contractor risks disclosure and licensing of background

patents to competitors.

● Proprietary data, even though originally prepared at company

expense, may be released to competitors, lf reported m accordmce with contract requirements.
43

● Cost sharing is an invitation to spend corporate funds in the

expectation of future returns on the investment. However,

where programs are canceled, as in the case of the Dual-mode

project, or where UMTA’S practice is to discourage capital

assistance for deployment of systems, there is no opportunity

for a return on t e non-reimbursed costs. h

● In return for a private investment which may exceed the

federal share of the project cost, a company is obliged to

relinquish nearly all proprietary rights,

CAPITAL GRANT PROCEDURES

With support from a coalition of major cities, organized labor, the

transit industry, commuter railroads and equipment manufacturers,

the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 provided funds for capital

improvements. This act made possible the preservation of bankrupt

existing systems and gave aid to public agencies and, indirectly, to

private operators for modernization and replacement of facilities and

equipment. The 1966 amendments authorized the expenditure of funds

for technical studies to plan, engineer, design and evaluate mass transit

projects. These projects would be included in a unified or officially coordinated urban transportation system as a part of the comprehensively planned development of the urban area.

The implementation of the capital improvement and planning programs has not facilitated the application of new systems to urban

needs. In particular, UMTA has failed to link its ambitious R & D

programs to the capital grant program. In the absence of a carefully

planned staged development of new systems from R & D, throug~

demonstration to depoyment, new systems get little support for l

capital grant funding

i

because they are considered untried and unproven concepts. It as been the position of the UMTA staff that

capital grant support is appropriate only for the purchase of proven

hardware or ful y operational systems suitable for revenue service.

There have been only two exceptions to this practice of discouraging

capital grants for advanced systems (AIRTRANS and the Pittsburgh

Transit Expressway Revenue Line) but neither has resulted in an

urban insta lation.

UMTA’S philosophy is that R & D is necessary to develop advanced

systems but that improvements to existing systems and urban deployment of simple AGT systems should be handled throu h the rivate marketplace and the capital grants process. However MTA[a s

been reluctant to establish equipment standards or criteria that would

qualify advanced systems for procurement throug h the capital grant

program. Without such standards there is no c ear-cut method for l

communities to seek capital assistance for AGT systems, and there is

little incentive for industry to continue to invest in systems that cannot

be deployed.

There is a critical need for UMTA to develop a sound approach to

the management of new systems technology rom concept through f

deployment,. The half measures in force today do not provide any

guarantees that the taxpayers’ dollars are well spent on R & D. The

purpose of the program should not be to develop test track hardware,

but to solve urban transportation problems.

A new UXITA requirement calls for an analysis of alternative

transportation solutions to substantiate selection of a particular sys-
44

tem for Federal capital assistance. Cost-benefitt analyses tend to

be unfavorable to new systems because they will have higher fist

costs for production engineering, tooling and federal-share development repayments than do systems which have been deployed. Careful

evaluation of service benefits and clear UMTA criteria for qualification of new systems for capital grants will be necessary to insure

consideration of AGT and other new systems.

FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

In a number of foreign countries novel arrangements between central and local governments and industry have been established to

foster the deveopment and ultimate deployment of AGT systems. l

Certain of these are worthy of consideration.

R&D Organization.—In Germany and Japan, research and technical development of AGT systems usually is not handled by the agencies having responsibilit for construction and operation of revenue

 function is advantageous in that it tends t This division of function o

PRT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN

Aerial View of CVS Test Track-Higashimurayama Tokyo, Japan
45

insure longer-term continuity of development by avoiding competition

for resources to solve immediate transportation problems. A disadvantage, however, is that system develpment tends to be isolated r

from the realities of urban deployment.

Gvernrnent-hdwstry Cooperation.—Consortia of several industries

are sometimes fostered by national governments (e.g. Germany and

Japan) to develop a particular concept. For example, in Japan a consortium of eight private industries, a trade association, the University

of Tokyo and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry are

cooperating on the development and the test facilities for the ComL

uter-controlled Vehicle System (CVS). (See illustration, page 44.)

private capital may sponsor research and development through the

concept stage. If the concept is found attractive, t e government can h

offer many incentives for prototype development and testing, including cost sharing with a 50~0 cash advance, and company retention of

proprietary rights for commercialization with payment of modest

royalties.

Government financial support for a local development and demonstration project virtually insures the company against losses for investments in production facilities and engineering. This insurance ]s a

strong incentive for a system developer to exploit his system commercially. Successful commercialization is an advantage to the Government

since royalties are paid to the government until the initial cash advances, with interest, are fully repaid. Thus, the government is motivated to encourage adoption of new systems to secure a return of the

investment in the initia development. l

Cooperation between systetem manufacturers and local vernmenti.—

In both Germany and Japan, the system developers have been in- r

volved in planning the actual installation and operation of the system.

In France, AGT development has generally been initiated by local

governments in conjunction with a hardware supplier. This arr~ement leads to early decisions as to the type of system to be incorporated

in the local transportation im rovement program. If the planned

development is deemed to be o national interest, financial assistance !

can be made available from various ministries having co

Y

“Zance of

land use, regional development, transportation and pu lic works.

Representatives of local and regional planning and th~ operat@~

agencies, in addition to representatives from these ministmes, participate in management of the project.

An advant~e of this arrangement is that lanning tends to h

more pragmatic with early, more intense invo vement of a specific Y

system supplier. Another advantage is that market uncertainties tend

to be reduced throu h commitments to a su plier so that his system

if any, will be instal ed. Once the hardware ecision is made, wastefui f f

com etition is eliminated.

T~e French procedure also has some disadvantages. System selection may be based mostly on entrepreneurial prowess or influence.

Absence of price competition may result in more costly installations.

It is too early to judge whether this French management procedure

offers a better solutlon to technical or implementation problems

associated with AGT systems.

Government Cor oration.—

6

The Ontario rovincial government has

established an rban Transportation b envelopment Cor ration

(UTDC). The Canadiin Federal government, as well as ot er pro- r
46

vincial governments, are expected to participate in the development

programs.

Establishment of the UTDC required the government to appropriate u $6-million working fund and to delegate authority to enter

into specific kinds of contracts. Once established, the UTDC is expected to proceed with developing and marketing of systems such

as AGT, depending upon the cash flow from these operations to preclude the need for extensive additional government aid. This independence provides continuity JO development programs since they

are not subject to fluctuations m annual appropriations.

Contractual Advantages.—Foreign develo ers enjoy certain advantages that are not availablo to United tates systems suppliers. !

Procedures differ slightly among countries, but common provisions

are summarized below.

. Proprietary rights to the system are retained by the developer.

● The government must wait 12 months before releasing data to third parties,

and longer if the data are company-confidential.

● Prototype hardware and software belong to the company, but may revert

to the government if the company fails to achieve commercial success.

. Development contracts are cost-shared, based on an estimate of the total

project cost. The government share may range from 50 to 80 percent, with

cash advances made at predetermined rates.

. These cash ad~’ances are later refunded to the government, with interest,

in the form of royalties from commercial sales. The government m:ty reduce the royalty rate, if a reduction would help the company win m export

sale in competition.

● To stimulate company investments in production facilities, conmlercialization and marketing acti~.ities, the government insures ag:]imt 10 SSCS. The

de~’eloper is guaranteed a minimum financial return sufficient to cover the

differences between the company’s actual sales and its lxenk-even costs.

EXAMPLES OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY U’SED IN JAPAN

Test Track built by LTV Licensees, Niigata Engineering Co. and

Sumitomo Shoji Kaisha, Ltd.
47

Kobe Rapid Transit (KRT) System for Expo ’75 on Okinawa

Built by Kobe Steel, Ltd. in cooperation with Boeing Aerospace Co.

3IULTINATIONAL LICENSING AGREEMENT

Interest in AGT systems has produced several international licensing arrangements. Three United States companies have licensing and

cooperative agreements with Japanese organizations: LTV Aerospace

Corporation, the Boeing Compan~’ and the Bendix Aerospace Corporation. The otis Transportation Technology Division has an understanding with SOCEA, an engineering and construction subsidiary of

Saint Govain-Pent ~ Mousson to collaborate on planning an AGT

system in hTancy, France, However, political and financial obstacles

have caused uncertainties about the future of this ~roject.

Krauss-Maffei of Munich, Germany, still has a hcensing agreement

with the UTDC in Toronto, Canada, despite cancellation of the

project to build R magnetically levitated demonstration system on the

Canadian National Exposition ground. This contract was terminated

when the German Government withdraw support from the Krauss

Maffei system.

Whether the AGT market will materialize sufficiently to make these

licenses profitable is not yet known. These multi-national agreements

among suppliers of AGT systems and hardware refute to some extent

arguments that continued United States government support of AGT

development would help protect the United States balance of payments. Under a typical hcensing agreement orIly a small amount of the

money spent to build a project would fmd its way overseas to the

organization which licensed the technology. Most of the materials and

labor required to build a given project would normally be obtained

domestically.
48

TECHNICAL

COMMON DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS

There are tichnical problems to be resolved for all three classes of

AGT systems. These problems become more severe as system complexity increases.

The major remaining development requirements common to all

AGTs terns are discussed below.

Control System Automation Development of computer programs for fully automating control functions aa received considerable !

attention, although only for theoretical operating conditions. (In

A

resent s stems, automation of central control functions is limited.

dvance GRT and PRT systems will require such automation.) The

most advanced work of this kind of the United States has been done

by the Aeros ace Corporation, the A plied Physics Laboratory, and

in Japan by VS. Development of rea -time communications, com u- Y

tation and display hardware for vehicle and traffic management as E

received little attention. The biggest difficult is that commercial

available technology allows rates of failures in t ese components whic i {

are much too high for transit systems. Military and space hardware

that could achieve the required reliability is available, but at much

higher costs. Development is needed to evise real-time vehicle and i

traffic management systems which tolerate individual component

faults and also can maintain some operations while the fault is being

corrected.

Headway Coni!rol.—If the full projected potential of AGT s stems

is to be realized, means must be found to reduce the relative y con- {

servative headways between vehicles now used by the mass transit

industry. Further development is necessary to:

. Im rove the quality of emergency braking s stems so that

hig er deceleration rates can be reliably and sa ely provided. [ ?

. Develop emergency braking systems which

8

rovide constant

deceleration rates with variable forces, de~en ing upon vehicle

weight and loads, grades, windage and guldeway conditions.

● Develop vehicle separation sensing systems of higher resolution than are currently available to permit vehicles to operate

at separations closer to the actual braking distance.

flystem reZidMty.—’’System reliability” to the desi n en ineer

becomes “system dependability” for the transit patron. T e pro abil- i t

ity of a system failure increases with the number of operating components in a vehicle and in the system. It also increases with the number

of vehicles on the track between the traveler and his destination.

To improve reliability for AGT systems, the following must receive

more attention.

●

●

●

Procedures need to be developed for analyzing the potential

failures in extensive networks with large numbers oi vehicles.

Additional research is required on the levgl of dependability

acceptable to the riding public.

Development is required to achieve a satisfactory level of

service dependability, including identification of critical

components, establishing allowable failure and restoration

rates, and monitoring test results.
49

Mathematical modeling alone will not improve system reliability.

Models can identify critical areas which must e given special analysis, \

but a combination of design procedures, modeling, pro uction quality d

control, and testing is necessary to gain increased system reliability

in actual public service.

Guideway cost.—Guideway costs represent 50 to 70 percent of the

total cost of an AGT system installation. The cost of tunneling such

systems could be three or more times the cost of an elevated guideway.

Areas where development work is required are itemized below:

●

●

●

●

Standardization of design and uniform loading criteria could

promote greater use of assembly line production techniques,

with resulting cost savings.

Studies are necessary to define an acceptable level of ride

comfort and to establish trade-offs between guideway roughness

and vehicle suspension systems.

Development is required to minimize the disruption and

hazards caused by snow and ice on guideways.

There are applications where an AG system would be inap- T

propriate ground. An underground installation would

require expensive tunneling and station construction. More

work needs to be done on improving the efficiency of underground construction and on the trade-offs between aerial and

underground guideways.

System integration. —System integration is necessary to insure that

careful control is exercised over system design in order for performance

requirements and design objectives to be met. This integration can be

accomplished least expensively by first simulating system performance

with computer assistance. After correcting errors in design, system

integration can be effected through ext(mslve testing of components,

subsystems, and finally the whole system. Work is needed in developing the computer simulations and preparing the related test programs

for an AGTsystem with an extensive network and large number of ?

vehicles.

Test jacility.—Because the problems described above are common to

all AGT s sterns, private industry research and development to solve

them wou d likely be redundant and hence wasteful of resources. A 1’

properly managed federal research program could address these common problems while clarifying the issues concerning ultimate urban

de loyment of AGT systems. Part of such a rogram would be an

A(!T system test facility. Such a facility could e available for: \

● Testing critical aspects of system designs.

● Establishing design and operational standards.

● Testing alternative desi n approaches and components for

comparison with standar s. f

● Identifying and defining engineering trade-offs.

● Limited ‘(check-out” of systems prior to urban deployment.

The “HPPRT” Pro~ram reposed by UMTA provides the essential

elements of such a facdity, ! ut only for a sin le manufacturer’s concept. With some additional expenditure, the “ PPRT” facility could %

satisfy the requirements outlined above for several systems.
50

SHUTTLE-LOOP TRANSIT SYSTEMS (SLT)

The greatest remaining technical and cost challenges involve product

improvements necessary to reduce capital, operating and maintenance

costs. Product improvements are also necessary to increase operational

reliability, including:

● Door operating mechanisms.1

● Communications systems.

● Automated control systems.

. Improved passenger information systems.

GROUP RAPID TRANSIT SYST E M (GRT)

Technological improvements required for GRT systems are

described in two categories: those currently developed (headways

greater than 15 seconds) and the advanced GRT systems still being

developed (headways less than 15 seconds).

Though two GRT systems have been deployed in the United States

(Morgantown and AIRTRANS), they can be regarded as still in

engineering development. The basic technology has been proven and

components have been assembled in a workable system; but additional

engineering is required to improve performance and reliability, to

reduce costs and to prepare the systems for larger scale production.

Further specific engineering developments required are:

. Achievement of a level of system reliability exceeding that of

current transit systems at an economical cost.

 Reduction in weight of vehicles and guideways.

. Development of automatic vehicle coupling for assembling

trains in stations.

● Development of techniques for detecting obstacles that may

affect passenger safety or cause damage to a vehicle.

. Development of computer software for managing the vehicle

fleet and for accommodating system failures.

Advanced GRT systems.-These systems are characterized by

headways from about three to 15 seconds. The technical development

requirements are similar to those for the current GRT systems. The

shorter headways, however, require more attention to the following:

● Improvements in the responsiveness and accuracy of the

longitudinal control system, including detection of separated

vehicles and wayside communication.

. Development of an emergency braking system providing constant deceleration independent of vehicle loading, grades,

windage and guideway condition while meeting established

safety and reliability criteria.

● Careful integration of system hardware and software in order

to meet development objectives.

Current planning for the “HPPRT” project includes most of this

work.

1 N’ote that foreign practice re uires transit patrons to activate the opening or closlng

of doors. Rear doors on United tates transit 8 buses are similarly opened by riders. Life

cycles could be extended by patron-o erated doors because these doors are operated only

when needed, rather than repeatedly a all stops. /’
51

PERSONAL RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEMS (PRT)

PRT systems are now in the exploratory development stage. Two

critical issues that are the most challenging and require the greatest

attention are:

● Sustaining high levels of service dependability with shorter

headways and more vehicles than GRT systems have, and

● Developing computer software to manage a fleet of thousands

of small vehicles safely and efficiently.

Other PRT development areas which must be addressed are:

● Basic PRT system requirements to conform to changes in

regional topography” and meet urban travel needs, defined in

terms of patronage, service, operations, network geometry, and

facilities.

● Demonstration of the feasibility of longitudinal control systems

for very short operational headways (0.5 to 2,0 seconds),

● Development of a constant deceleration emergency braking

system (in contrast to fixed brakes currently used).

● Determining requirements imposed on the vehicle and other

parts of the system in case of collisions,

● Vehicle crash-worthiness studies.

Progress toward resolving some of these issues could be made

through development of the SLT and GRT systems. Nevertheless,

a decision to initiate development and implementation of a PRT

system must recognize that deployment would be perhaps 1O–15

~rears away. The problems of management, financing, and risk would

exceed those of any other development program undertaken by the

Urban Mass Transportation Administration. Careful long-range

planning and a long-term commitment to such a program are essential

If a PRT system is to be put into service.

E CONOMI C

BETTER COST DATA NEEDED

One of the major problems facing those attempting to analyze the

merits of AGT in relation to alternative transit modes is the ]aucity

of meaningful data, Further, the limited information availble is /

interpreted differently by consultants, public agencies and manufacturers. As a result, many conflicting estimates have been made and

there is general confusion on the validity of the resulting cost-benefit

analyses.

SLT.-There are enough SLT systems in operation and under

construction to warrant a concerted effort to accumulate and interpret

information on operation and maintenance costs as well as initial

capital costs, This should, of course, be a continuing process as new

data is taken into consideration. The tabulation on the following page

summarizes the pertinent data which are currently available on the

six SLT systems which involve relatively large vehicles.

As shown, there is a wide variation in the cost of construction. Some

of this must be attributed to different guideway requirements (i.e., at

grade, elevated, or tunnel). In general it should be noted that capital

costs per mile for SLT systems are not large in comparison with other

14-37( I (1 - i> - 3
52

systems using exclusive guideway s. Operation and maintenance, exelusive of capital costs per vehicle mile vary from 72 cents to $2.08. r

This would compare to $1.45 for the Lindenwold Rail Rapid Transit

Line (1974 figures), $1.75 for the Washington, D.C. Metrobus operation, and $1.70 for the bus fleet operated by the Chicago Transit

Authority. Because SLT systems provide a lower capacity service

than rail rapid transit, the per-passenger costs seem hig and indicate E

a need for technical researc and development to reduce them. E

RZ’.-The only two GRT systems, at the Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport and at Morgantown, have both experienced major capital cost

overruns. It is difficult to derive any useful conclusions from experience to date because neither system has been in operation long

enough to establish a sound basis for projectin operation and maintenance costs. For example, after 16 months o operation, LTV was

using about 120 maintenance employees to keep the AIRTRANS

system operating—almost two per vehicle. Also, 36 station attendants,

not contemplated in the original project plan, have proved necessary

to compensate for the poor quality of information available to passengers in the system.

As more experience is gained and equipment reliability is further

improved, LTV hopes to reduce the maintenance force towards the

originally projected goal of 90. Moreover, with improvements in passenger information, systems design and station facilities, the need

for station attendants can be eliminated or drastically reduced.

Cost Data for SLT Systems Involving Large Vehicles

Fai+~#:

Sea Tac Miami Busch Bradley

R ; % Airport Airport Gardens Center Airport

Length of single lane

guideway—in feet. . . . .

Number of stations. . . . .

Number of vehicles. . . . .

Capital cost—millions...

Year completed. . . . .

Annual O. & M. costr4

thousands . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Passengers per year,

millions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vehicle-miles per year,

thousands .,...... . . . . .

Capital cost per lanefoot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0. &M. cost per passenger......, . . . . . . . . . . . . .

O.& M. cost per vehiclemile, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9,050

6

$;.7:

2,800

2

14

s $6.7

1976

7,000 3,400

2

22 3 $4.5

1976

4,400

3

$;.:

1975

3$250

3 1.0

s 230

$1,000

s $0.25

3$1.09

2

12

$4.0

1975

$275 $540 3$300 NA 3$250

12.5 5,7 35.1 NA 33.0

380 430 NA NA 3 120

$1,150 $1,550 $2,400 $600 $1,300

$0.02 $0.09 3$0.06 NA 3$0.08

$0.72 $1.26 NA NA s $2.08

I Westinghouse Electric vehicles—90 to 100-passenger capacity.

Z Ford Motor Co. vehicles—24- to 30-passenger capacity.

$ Pro”ected.

t Exc usive of capital cost. {
53

In general, operating and maintenance costs of GRT will be highly

sensitive to the number of maintenance personnel and the presence

or absence of station attendants.

The Morgantown system is not yet in operation and consequently

there are no actual operating data available. Boeing estimated that

42 people will be required to operate the system and maintain the

equipment. Judging from LTV’s experience at Dallas/Ft. Worth,

where initial operations required three times as many staff people

as originally estimated, it can be expected that during the break-in

period appreciably more people will be needed.

Both AIRTRANS an Morgantown offer excellent opportunities

to develop very useful information about the operating and maintenance costs of GRT systems. It is important that they be monitored

carefully and that data be collected in a comprehensive and coordinated fashion.

PRT-There are not enough data available on these more complex

systems to form the basis for reliable estimates of capital and O & M

costs. Automobiles cost in the order of $1 to $2 per pound. Aerospace

system hardware costs much more—for example, the 747 averages

about $65 per pound. PRT vehicles can be expected to cost somewhere in between, probably in the range of $10 to $20 per pound,

depending upon quantities produced and other factors.

Estimating the probable costs of PRT systems is a particularly

perplexing problem. For example, the Aerospace Corporation has

prepared a study which indicates that a PRT installation in the Los

Angeles area would be cost-effective. They recommend 64,000 very

small vehicles and conclude they can be produced in volume at a cost

of $10,000 each. Manufacturers contacted by De Leuw Cather and

Company, in connection with a detailed study of small vehicle systems

for the Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission, indicated

that the on-board control equipment, alone, would cost well in excess

of this amount.

Such differences in opinion on probable costs are not surprising

because no PRT systems have been built, aside from overseas test

tracks. Research is needed to assemble the best information available

and, after thorough analysis, to make data available to those who are

interested. The extensive test track installations in Germany and

Japan could provide the basis for mutually beneficial international

information exchanges.

THE INFLUENCE OF AUTOMATION

AGT transit systems which involve relatively small vehicles must

be automated in order to be economically viable. Experience in recent

years with urban bus operations indicates that the cost of providing

drivers for individual vehicles the size of a city bus or smaller has

nearly reached the limit of support from the fare box. The strong

thrusts in the past 10 to 15 years to develop systems that are less

labor intensive recognize this factor. The successful introduction of

automatic elevators is often cited as evidence that automation can

provide better service at substantial savings.
54

Experience to date with Automated Guideway Transit systems,

however, indicates that dramatic economies, through the substitution

of computers and electronic equipment for operating personnel, are

unlikely in the foreseeable future. To provide frequency, comfortable,

reliable, and safe service without human operators requires much complex electronic and mechanical equipment that must be monitored

and maintained by skilled technicians.. As the complexity of such

systems increases, opportunities for equipment malfunction increase

correspondingly, necessitating additional specialized personnel. For

example, at the Tampa International Ai.rport the eight Westinghouse

shutt e vehicles are maintained by a crew of four full-time and two f’

h

art-time employees, fewer than one per vehicle. At the Dallas/Ft.

Worth Airport, however, where a much more complex system is in

operation, about 120 maintenance employees are currently required to

kee 68 vehicles in operation.

The tabulation below illustrates how various levels of automation are related to manpower requirements. As noted in the

table, even after the AIRTRANS system shakes down and a number

Manpower Requirements for Alternative Transit Modes

Conventional

bus

Metrobus

Washington, DC

SemiAutomated

PATCO

Lindenwold, NJ

Al

Fully

automated

GRT

RTRANS

Dallas/

Fort

Worth

Number of vehicles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,.. 2,175 75 68

Number of personnel:

Administrative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 28 3

Operating. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,311 ~ 117 ‘ 58

Maintenance... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1793 ~ 131 120

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,221 276 ~ 181

Number of employees per vehicle 6

.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 3.7 2.6

1 Bus maintenance only, 726 people.

Z Includes a olice force of 20 people.

~ Includes 7 people in rail shops and 55 for way, power, and facilities. t

t Includes 36 passenger service employees requ~red to assist passengers in finding their

way around the airport.

6 The maintenance manpower should decrease to 100 or less as more experience is gained.

Also the need for passenger service employees should diminish once better graphics are

installed. Thus, a total mannin level of about 125 people for both operations and maintenance may be antici

PK

 ated, whic would amount to about 1.8 employees per vehicle, or about

the same as a bus f eet.

0 The ratio of emplo ees per vehicle is only one of several bases for comparing different

systems and modes. l?lRTRANS is a ver#com~lex system. At the other extreme, the Tampa

Airport Shuttle System requires only .7 ernp oyees per vehicle.
55

of improvements and refinements have been completed, the number

of people per vehicle required to maintain and operate It will be only

slightly less than for a typical bus system. Thus, GRT must offer a

significantly higher level of service and comfort if it is to operate as a

cost-effective mode because capital costs will prove far greater than

for buses on a highway.

A major unknown in the potential deployment of PRT systems,

which have much more sophisticated contro and r vehicle equipment,

is the amount of manpower required to keep such systems working

safel~~ and satisfactorily. Budt-in redundancy and other means can

improve PRT reliability and reduce manpower requirements. It is

unclear however, whether this reliability can be achieved at reasonable

cost, and whether maintenance requirements can truly be reduced.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF AGT TO OTHER TRANSPORTATION MODES

Not only must AGT systems compete with all other transit modes

for scarce capital, operating and maintenance funds, they must vie

for trips which are now being made in private automobiles. Conventional rail and bus systems have been steadily losing ground. At the

least, innovative applications are needed to reverse this trend.

AGT systems are a. most ambitious new alternative for public

transportation but at the same time involve great risks. These systems

will compete with the private automobile, for which drivers are ‘ifree”

and many other true costs are well subsidized. Among these costs are

traffic policemen; land consumed for roads, parking lots and service

stations; pollution; excessive travel time due to congestion; inefficient

use of energy; and urban s rawl.

Although SLT and GR are otentially more attractive than other ?

transit modes, they will probab y gain ridership in response to meas- r

ures to discourage use of the private automobile. However, their

potential for influencing the modals lit should be carefully evaluated.

I?RT, if realizable, would undoubte ly have many attractive features I

that place it in a different class from conventional transit modes. In

an~. serious consideration of PRT, which represents the most ambitious

concept yet proposed for urban mobility, three fundamental questions

arise.

● Is PRT technically feasible to build and operate at acceptable

levels of service and reliability?

● Will the public find PRT socially acceptable and will people

use it for a significant percentage of trips?

● Can the substantial capital and O & M costs be economically

justified in relation to the resulting benefits, many of which are

not readily quantified?

This last question is probably the most difficult because little hard

datti me available. Some contend that the best way to develop meaningful cost estimates is to invest heavily in test track and demonstra-
56

tion facilities. Certainly, this approach would provide much better

information than is currently available, and it would help answer the

first two questions. However, a test track program would cost a great

deal—probably well in excess of $50 million. Before making such a

substantial investment, comprehensive research is needed to develop

pertinent data. Analyses should be made with sufficient detail to provide firm answers to two basic questions:

● Would the potential use and benefit of PRT systems in the

United States warrant the cost of development, testing and

demonstration?

● Can a PRT system be built and operated at costs which riders

can afford or which local and federal agencies are willing to i

subsidize?

Until more research has been completed on the social and economic

problems involved in PRT, expenditures for hardware development

should be limited to those necessary to support the findings of these

analyses.

SOCIAL

Current studies of AGT systems indicate that planning and decisionmaking at the local level on the use of automated systems is an exceptionally difficult process. Achieving an acceptable plan involving

massive capital investment, uncertain operating costs, educated

guesses about impacts on transportation, the environment, and urban

form, and serious risks of technological feasibility is a formidable task.

The process must involve not only a complete analysis of realistic

alternative approaches to transit, it must also be responsive to a

broad range of community interest groups.

Major social issues are present. They are briefly summarized below.

Lund Use.—Urban transit systems affect land use, property values

and the character of neighborhoods they serve. The full impacts are

not well known, though the effect of urban highways are considerable.

By coupling transit and land use plannin , many of the harmful effects

could be lessened. Applying this princip e to planning AGT installa- f

tions could enhance the nature of the areas served.

In general, the land use impacts of transportation are poorly handled

in our society. Laws do not allow the optimum use of potential transit

benefits. For example, the rise in property values adjacent to transit

stations is allowed to accrue to private speculators or developers.

This can inflate housing prices and deny both housing and transit

service to the lower and middle income roups it was intended to

accommodate. The increase in values, as we 1 as the increased property 7

tax revenues, could be recaptured for public pur oses such as paying

the costs transit construction and operation. AG systems may have $

the potential to ameliorate many such land use problems, but this

potential cannot be realized without supportive legislation and intelligent urban planning that recognizes the possibilities.

~ervice.-AGT systems demonstrate superior potential service

attributes. Automated vehicles can be scheduled more frequently to

provide much higher levels of service than manned bus or rail rapid

transit. Demand service vehicles would add a further dimension, and

direct origin-to-destination service would be even more convenient.
57

At the same time, the benefits of service must be distributed among

the various populations that comprise an urban area. If maintaining

service in high crime areas is a problem, it would be difficult to distribute GRT or PRT system benefits evenly among all groups; thus,

the benefits might accrue primarily to the affluent surburban commuters. Such concerns are often voiced on rail rapid transit systems

developed in the traditional hub and spoke fashion. Service characteristics deserve careful study for capital intensive transit systems.

Safety.-+LT systems have been operatin with good safety records

which seem well established. AIRT ANS as likewise fared well in E t

this regard. Thus, AGT systems can compare favorably with conventional transit in the safety area. However, emergency procedures

and evacuation methods must be further developed.

PRT safety requires detailed investigation. or fractional second f

headways to be implemented, the “brick wall” criterion for transit

safety must be replaced, That is, under certain situations, it may not

be possible for a vehicle to be operated in such a manner as to allow it

to stop before it hits the car in front of it. Passenger safety in controlled

collisions between crashworthy vehicles could be high, or it could be

significantly lower than conventional transit.

security.—Vehicle operators, conductors and station attendants all

contribute to a feeling of security among the passengers. In high

crime areas special transit police forces are employed to enhance

system security. AGT systems, to be economically competitive, must

reduce labor costs substantially over conventional modes to justify

hi her capital costs. Current SLT and GRT deployments in nonur an settings do not reveal much about security aspects. i

Authorities have indicated that security functions can be automated

to some degree. Closed circuit T.V. and two-way voice communications can provide a great measure of personal security when coupled

with a quick-response police force and a system enforcement plan.

However, problems of security increase with increasing numbers of

stations. Mforeover, technological fixes to problems of security can

raise costs.

Automated systems must be carefully designed to reduce vandalism

and malicious mischief that will be difficu t to handle without an f

on-board operator. The early warning of intrusion on the guideway

provided b~” operators will be missing. If vandals discover that system

disruption can be caused with ease and with little chance of detection,

they will be tempted to harass the system, causing inconvenience

and danger to patrons and increasing the cost of operation.

System Design.—AGT systems must concentrate design efforts on

the passenger-system interface. Automated systems lack flexibility.

The variety of information a station attendant or driver can provide

will be missing. k system Complexity increases, the need for better

information increases because travel becomes more complicated.

While such human factors design is achievable, it should receive

priority particularly in light of the failure in this regard at AIRTRANS.

Elevated Guideways and Stations.-SLT and GRT systems rely on

relatively large and heavy vehicles which impose significant strength

requirements on the guideways. Guideway width varies from 8 to

10 feet with significant depth, The guideways must be elevated to

provide exclusivity without incurring the cost penalties of underground
58

construction. These guideways and their associated stations will

produce a major visual impact. However, they are unlikely to be

located in resi ential areas where the most serious objections might be i

expected.

PRT systems will require much smaller guideways since the vehicles

themselves are much smaller and lighter than other AGT systems.

However, the advantage of PRT is direct origin to destination service

which will require a proliferation of guideways over an urban area.

While they may be less intrusive visually than the guideways of the

larger AGT classes, their extensiveness may cause similar objections

on aesthetic grounds, particularly in residential areas.

These guideways do not have to be obtrusive however. Sound

urban design which addresses all facets of the area being served by a

new transit system can help improve the environment. Guideways and

stations can be incorporated into the cityscape in ways that could help

make the area attractive. Reducing dependence on automobiles can

eliminate many of their unsightly consequences—street congestion,

parking lots, gasoline stations, and air pollution—thus making possible

urban life styles with more amenities.

Pollution and Energy.—AGT systems are non-polluting in that the

vehicles are electrically powered. However; the electricity generating

plants will pollute at the source. The pollutlon problems may be accentuated if coal is used as the fuel.

AGT systems are presumed more energy efficient than automobiles

and competitive with conventional transit. The use of coal or nuclear

power would save scarce petroleum.

To the extent that hig er service levels involve increased energy h

consumption (i.e., fewer patrons per mile or more empty shuttle

traffic), savings will be decreased. System construction will also involve

energy and pollution costs which have seldom been taken into account

in transit or highway construction.

AGT in Non-passenger Roles.—AGT systems could be used to move

goods and to provide urban services such as trash hauling under some

conditions. Whether this is feasible or not should be studied because

multipurpose service should be incorporated in earlys stem planning.

Experience at AIRTRANS indicates that it may be di cult to achieve

mu tipurpose service, and urban environments would seem less suited Y

to A T systems than special purpose environments like airports. 8

The above summary 1s by no means complete, but it does indicate

the range of important questions of social acceptance for automated

systems which must be answered before these systems can be considered market-ready. The breadth of these questions indicates the serious

need for research in these areas as well as hardware. Urban demonstration of systems beyond the test track stage is an extremely logical approach to answering these questions.

Finally, an important but frequently overlooked art of urban demonstration and p arming for transit is the need to evelop more com- F x

munity involvement in plaming and to provide for a multi-disciplinary

approach to design and im act assessment. Transportation is not

an isolated element, the exc usive realm of technical experts, but a r

basic art of the urban fabric and community life. More efforts are

neede to involve local communities in helping to set priorities for I

research and investment decisions, particularly when so many unknown effects on the total community are involved.
Chapter 4: Assessment of AGT Research and Development

T HE F EDERAL P ROGRA M

The HUD new systems study of urban transportation, submitted

to the Congress by the President in 1968, stated that the Federal

role should be to address the broad problems of social welfare raised

by urban transportation—equal access to service, reduction in urban

lad areas consumed, elimination of noise and air pollution, and

improved urban mobility. While application of some available technology could help address these problems in urban areas, more intensive, longer-range efforts were considered necessary to develop

technology capable of meeting future demands for urban

transportation.

1t was apparent that no local public agencies at the time, had the

interest, capability or resources to sponsor and manage the research

and development pro rams required to bring new transportation

systems into being. or did private enterprise have the incentive

or the experience to grapple with the complex issues of transit user

needs and social costs. Without clearly identifiable market opportunities, large scale private investment in transit research could not be

expected. Hence, it was concluded that the Federal Government

should assume the role of a “catalyst)’ both in stimulating research

and development activities and in encouraging implementation of

the results of such R & D by state and local governments. This

philosophy has formed the basis for the research, development and

demonstration programs undertaken by UMTA during the past

seven years.

THE FEDERAL ROLE

In the area of urban mass transportation, the Federal Government

is not the final consumer of hardware produced as a result of federally

funded R & D programs, as is the case for defense and space hardware.

On the contrary, the ultimate recipients of transit equipment are the

local public agencies and private organizations providing transportation services, complicating the problems of deciding what R & D

programs will contribute the most toward achieving long term transportation goals.

It has been UMTA’S olicy in the past several years to concentrate

its R & D effort on hig risk areas, on the assumption that private {

industry will make the required investments for product improvement

and pre-production engineering. Thusj in the new systems area, which

includes Automated Guideway Transit, the emphasis has been placed

on the development of increasingly sophisticated systems such as

hlorgantown and its successor the “HPPRT” project. Basic problems

such as how to design cost effective unobtrusive guideways, how to

insure continuous operation in ice and snow, and how to improve the

(59)
60

reliability of mechanisms have received little attention. Institutional

h

problems, such as how to implement AGT in the urban environment,

ave also been neglected.

FUNDING

As indicated by the following tabulation, amounts allocated for

research and development constitute a small percentage of UMTA’S

budget.

[Amounts in millions; fiscal years]

1974 1975 1976 Research and development actual estimated estimated

Bus transit technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $13,0 $4.8 $3.6

Rail transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.0 13.0 16.4

New systems and automation,., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.4 7.9 16.0

Special projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 .8 1.0

Total R & D.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53.0 26.5 37.0

Total UMTA funding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 984.6 1,445.5 1,724.2

R & D as a percentage of total funding . . . . . . . . 5.4 1.8 2.1

By contrast, 10.6 percent of the Department of Defense budget for

FY 76 is for R & D activity. Of the total Federal budget, R & D activity comprises 5.7 percent. Thus, in com arisen with other national

programs, the current R & D funding leve in the area of urban mass Y

transportation is modest.

From fiscal year 1962 through fiscal year 1975, nearly $128.5 million

has been allocated by UMTA to new systems development, phased

over the years as indicated in the figure below.

UMTA R&D FUNDING BY PR06RAM AREA

1962-1976

1 I

50

1 -

=:’’’””’ ~’ “

40

t

10

0 t iiiiiil ’62 ’63 9 64 ’65 ’66 ’67 ’68 ’69 ‘70 ‘71 ‘72 ‘73 ’74 ‘75 ‘76 v

Source: OM2A Fiscal 1976 Budget Estimates
61

Of this, a total of $95 million (including $64 million for Morgantown)

has been spent on AGT systems development. To put this amount in

perspective, $113 million was spent closing out the Supersonic Transport Program in the four years since its cancellation by the Congress.

I NDUSTR Y

Of the nine Shuttle-Loop Transit Systems currently serving the

public in airports and recreational facihties, only two have benefited

from any significant investment of research and development funds

from the federal government.

The two Westinghouse systems at the Tampa and Seattle-Tacoma

airports can be directly traced to significant government involvement.

Westinghouse built on their experience with the Transit Expressway

development program which was initiated in 1963 with a two-thirds

R & D grant from the Urban Transportation Administration of HUD,

the forerunner of UMTA. Westinghouse reports that in the past twelve

years they have s ent about $35 million of company funds on the

follow-on Transit Expressway development. In addition, the Federal

Government and local public agencies in the Pittsburgh area have

spent about $7.5 million on this program.

The only GRT system thus far in revenue service is the AIRTRANS

system at the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport. The system supplier,

LTV Aerospace, entered the AGT field in 1971 after test tracks,

funded in part by UMTA, had been built by VARO, Monocab and

Dashaveyor. Thus, to all practical purposes, the AIRTRANS system,

which was selected on the basis of competitive biddin , did not

benefit from any Federal involvement. The system whic exists at ch

the airport is essentially the result of industry efforts.

TRANSPO STIMULATED ACTION BY INDUSTRY

Of the six SLT systems which are now under construction, the

two being built by the Ford Motor Company at Fairlane in Dearborn, Michigan, (see illustration, next page) and at Bradley Airport,

Hartford, Connecticut, are direct outqowths of the demonstration

facility built at Dunes International Awport for Transpo 72. UMTA

awarded four contracts to selected system suppliers m amounts of

$1.5 million each. Ford and the other manufacturers—Bendix-Dashave or, Rohr-Monocab and Otis-Transportation Technology-contri uted substantial com any funds to supplement the federal R & D t

investment. Thereafter, ! ord built its own test track at Cherry Hill,

west of Dearborn, to test and evaluate follow-on designs.
62

FAIRLANE TOWN CENTER PROJECT, DEARBORN, MICHIGAN

Fairlane and Transpo ’72 Prototype

Vehicles on Cherry Hill Test Track

Two of the three other manufacturers that participated in Transpo72 have also built test tracks near their plant facilities and continued

an aggressive development program. Rohr-Monocab has developed

a magnetically levitated version (ROMAG) of their suspended monorail system and Otis-Transportation Technology Division is actively

advancing its technological capabilities, including evaluation of alternatives to air cushion suspension. Only Bendix-Dashaveyor has

decided to withdraw from active competltion for the AGT systems

market. Before this decision was reac ed, however, Bendix devoted {

much effort and in-house funding to im roving the hardware system

which was demonstrated at Transpo-72. hey are currently completing f
63

TORONTO ZOO ANIMAL DOMAIN RIDE

Bendix-Dashaveyor

Forty-Passenger Vehicle

Operates on Test Track

at Ann Arbor, Michigan

Prototype Vehicle

is Assembled

at Ann Arbor, Michigan

Three-mile Guideway Layout

Conforms to the Terrain

Within 700-acre Zoological Park
64

24 vehicles for transport service at the Toronto Zoo. (See illustration,

page 63.) A guide rides each vehicle to describe the activities of the

animals along the way. Because he also doubles as an operator, full

automation is not necessary in this system.

MARKET UNCERTAINTY INHIBITS INITIATIVE

Most of the manufacturers contacted during the course of this

assessment reported uncertainty about the market for AGT systems.

Whereas there are a number of airports, recreational facilities and

commercial centers where SLT systems are being given serious consideration, current prospects for urban application are at best uncertain. There are several reasons for this situation.

●

●

●

●

UMTA has thus far given little encouragement to communities

interested in applying for capital grants for AGT systems.

The requirement that the transit mode selected be demonstrated to be the most cost-effective places AGT alternatives

at a disadvantage. This is because significant development costs

incurred by manufacturers must be spread over the first few

U

rejects.

nfavorable publicity on a few conspicuous projects involving

automation, notably BART, Morgantown and AIRTRAh~S,

has prompted a wait-and-see attitude on the part of potential

buyers of Automated Guideway Transit systems.

R;alistic cost estimates are difficult to make in lixht of the

major cost overruns experienced on several project~ Furthermore, no generally accepted formula has been developed to

quantify such benefits as lower pollution, less congestion, better

service, etc.

The manufacturers which have been active in the development of

AGT systems report that they have spent company funds totalling

ap~roximately $100 million on R & D thus far, Although muck of

this private R & D investment can be attributed to UhITA’s spending

‘fseed money,” most of these companies have indicated a reluctance

to invest additional funds on development until the present uncertainties about the potential market are resolved.

C OMMENTAR Y

Unfortunately, the Federal AGT R & D program to date has not

produced the chrect results which could reasonably be expected from

an ex enditure of $95 million. One measure of the effectiveness of

this 2 & D effort is the number of AGT revenue systems that have

::j::l .

c

?

ital F

ant assistance. On this basis, results have been

he ransit Expressway Revenue Line has received

capital

B

ant fundin for right of way acquisition and engineering

design. owever, en eavors to implement this project in Pittsburgh t

with federal capital assistance have met with considerable local

opposition and the final outcome of these discussions is uncertain.
65

The Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport also received capital assistance of

about $7.5 million for construction of the AIRTRANS system.

This installation is having difficulty satisfying airline requirements.

In short, despite seven years of effort and the expenditure of $95

million in Federal R & D funds, supplemented by $100 million

from private industry, there is at present not one AGT system in

revenue service in an urban setting.

To identify some of the factors which have contributed to this

lack, it is perhaps advisable to begin by distinguishing basic and

applied research. Basic research exists for its own sake, mostly

unfettered by considerations of need or application. Applied research

is closel~” coupled to development and real-world applications.

Although all organizations which do research generally do some of

each of these types, an agency can be characterized as primarily

supporting basic or primarily supporting applied research. Because

UMTA is organized to deal with mass transportation problems,

its orientation must necessarily’ be to applied research. In developing

new urban mass transportation systems and technology, the systems

must be evaluated in the urban environment. If they prove effective

solutions, some means for fostering their implementation should

be found. Thus an important step in the evolution of innovative

transit hardware is operational evaluation through real-life demonstrations. It is not enough to build a sophisticated system at a test

facility and run the hardware under controlled conditions. Before

volume production or large-scale urban deployment are undertaken,

an operational demonstration under typical urban conditions is

essential, Such a demonstration should evaluate the overall public

acceptance of the system and provide for the identification and

correction of its faults and shortcomings, It also would serve to reassure

city officials and transit operators that the full system will perform

as planned.

Besides the lack of attention to urban application, another characteristic of the UMTA program is its orientation toward high technology, new sy’stems. Thus, many socio-economic issues remain

unresolved, as do many immediate hardware problems.

It is clear from the above that a number of questions remain to be

resolved.

● How much support should UMTA give to urban demonstration

of new systems and what should be the source of funds for any

support provided (the New Systems R & D Program, Service

and Methods Demonstrations, or the capital Facilities and

Formula Grants Pro ares)?

● Within the UMTA & D program, what is the proper mix of #

(1) high technology, long-range, hardware-oriented work, (2)

solution of immediate hardware problems and (3) conduct of

studies in such soft areas as public acceptance and cost-benefit

analysis?

. What is the relationship between AGT and other solutions to

urban transit problem?

To assist in the resolution of these issuesj the im lications of some

courses of action and some alternatives are indicate in the remainder f

of this chapter.
66

S CENARIOS FOR D EVELOPING M ARKE T-READY S YSTEM S

As indicated, there is resently no generally accepted procedure for

converting the results o R& D tomarket-ready systems. If it were r

decided that a major commitment to develop market-ready systems

should be made, a number of steps would be required. To illustrate

these steps, the time frame and approximate cost, three scenarios are

set forth, one for each of the three classes of AGT discussed in this

report.

SCENARIO FOR DEPLOYING SLT SYSTEMS IN URBAN ACTIVITY CENTERS

As has been pointed out, five manufacturers have built SLT systems at 15 locations in the United States. None are in service in urban

communities and no clear procedure exists for achieving urban deployment of cost-effective systems. To correct this problem, while at

the same time accomplishing product improvement, reduced system

costs, and a sufficient number of competitive suppliers, the following

steps might be considered.

. In consultation with SLT system owners, manufacturers, urban

communities and consultants, UMTA initiates a program of

near-term development and product improvement to reduce

costs and improve reliability. This development can be accomplished in conjunction with a demonstration installation in

an urban activity center.

. Criteria are developed and standards are set by UMTA, possibly supported by APTA, which qualify SLT systems for capital

grant funding. These standards would include the extent of

operational testing of actual hardware necessary to insure that

k

erformance specifications can be met.

● conomies in production are achieved through standardization

of performance criteria, vehicle sizes (possibly two or three

sizes to. suit different applications) and guideway shape.

. Guidehnes are issued covering cost-effectiveness analyses and

other procedures which public agencies must follow in justif ying

a ca~ltal grant project covering an SLT system.

. Apphcations for capital grants are submitted, processed, and,

if found acceptable, approved. Contracts would be awarded,

based on competitive bidding, for procurement and installation

of SLT systems.

It is estimated that this scenario would require from two to four

years and would cost about $10 million. The costs of product engineering, product improvement and tooling would be shared by private

industry.

SCENARIO FOR DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING GRT SYSTEMS IN

METROPOLITAN AREAS

This scenario begins with the technology available from Morgantown and AIRTRANS, and extends the state of the art of GRT

systems. For purposes of this example, the UMTA ‘{ HPPRT” program

is the point of departure.
67

. Test vehicles, a control system, guideway and supporting facilities are build on a government site as proposed in the

“HPPRT” program. A case can be made for continuing more

than one candidate system through the prototype testing phase,

but this scenario assumes that only one hardware concept will

emerge from the proving-ground phase. Parallel urban deployment studies define the control system logic and methodology necessary for simulating an urban installation.

. To determine public acceptance and assess how well GRT

meets urban transportation needs. UMTA arranges a demonstration project in a willing city. The site should be one in

which planmng suggests a full revenue system could eventually

be worthwhile.

● A 100 vehicle demonstration system with 10 to 15 miles of oneway guideway is built with costs shared among participants.

The design of the guideway and other fixed facilities would overlap the final phase of prototype testing. Construction would be

b~: competitive bidding. The previously selected vehicle suppher would incorporate all changes and improvements resulting

from prototype testing in the vehicles supplied. He would serve

as demonstration system manager and would be required to use

competitive procurement to the maximum extent feasible for all

subsystems.

. The demonstration system would be operated for three years

with meticulous records kept on all aspects of performance,

safety, reliability, maintainability, and costs as well as social

consequences. Transit operators, planners, city administrators,

legislators, and the general public would be afforded an opportunity to use the s}:stem with thorough records kept of their

attitudes towards possible use of the system in their communities.

. At the end of the demonstration, under UMTA’S supervision

the system manager incorporates all design changes and improvements into a comprehensive set of performance and system specifications which competent suppliers could respond to.

The local public agency could apply to extend the demonstrated

s~’stem under provisions of the capital grant program.

s Thereafter, local public agencies could decide whether to apply

to install the demonstrated system in their communities under

provisions of the UMTA capital grant program.

This scenario will take eight to 10 years to accomplish and is estimated to cost about $150 million to complete. These costs include a

two-phase prototype design and test program, an urban demonstration, and preproduction engineering, tooling and product improvement for a revenue installation. Private industry could be expected

to share the cost of this work.

SCENARIO FOR DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING PRT SYSTEMS IN

METROPOLITAN AREAS

This scenario assumes a long-range commitment to PRT with

intermediate check points such that development can be stopped if

progress slips, costs are drastically overrun, analyses indicate there

-)4-37( I ( ) - i , . 4
68

are no apreciable benefits, or if development does not prove technically feasi le. Based on these assumptions, several scenarios are possi- t

ble but one approach is outlined below.

. Establish an in-house project team or select a s ~tem development contractor from among the non-hardware, L gh technology

organizations to manage the project.

. Conduct two iterative analyses:

Systems analyses to formulate representative networks,

estimate performance characteristics, establish ran es of

modal sphts, estimate patronage and fare levels, an con- i

duct sensitivity analysls on hypothetical systems.

Market analyses to estimate potential applications, estimate cost effectiveness, verify usefulness of performance

characteristics identified in the systems analysis, and test

the hypothetical systems.

● If the prior analyses warrant, proceed with preliminary design

studies. These studies would include: alternative methods of

suspension, guidance, control and propulsion; evaluation of

available components or improvements needed; development of

necessary components; synthesis of the best design elements;

and preparation of a preliminary systems design.

● Design and develop a prototype system including the vehicles,

guideway, stations, controls, and other supporting features;

● On government test facilities, construct a test track with

vehicles and su porting features to permit the test, evaluation,

redesign, retro t, and stabilization of the system design; z

● Deplo a small demonstration system in an urban area. The

proce ures are comparable to those discussed above for demon- J

strating a GRT system.

. Estabhsh uidelines and criteria governing both the standardization of RT system performance and the conditions under F

which federal financial assistance would be available for revenue

installations.

. Process planning and capital grants which meet the guidelines

and. are qtherwise eligible. Execute grant contracts for planning,

engmeermg and procuring PRT systems.

This scenario could take from 10 to 15 years to complete and is

estimated to cost about $250 million.

A LTERNATIVE I NSTITUTIONAL A RRANGEMENT S

The limited accomplishments of government, industry and transit

operators since 1968 in devising effective ways to develop and deploy

new urban transportation systems su gest that current roles and responsibilities should be reexamined. A ether a government bureaucracy is an appropriate mechanism for achieving improvements in

urban mass transportation through innovation is open to question.

As has been pointed out, funding for R & D programs has not kept

pace with. the growth of UMTA’S resources for capital, operating,

and planmng assistance funds. However, even if funding levels for

R & D are increased to a level commensurate with the need to develop better solutions, the results will not contribute significantly to

urban mobility unless a corresponding effort is made to devise effective means of applying the results of the R &D.
69

It appears appropriate at this time to reassess the federal role in

urban transportation, particularly as regards the development and

deployment of AGT systems, To this end, three possible alternative

institutional arrangements are proposed for consideration.

GOVERNMENT CORPORATION

There are at least two relevant examples of government corporations established for conducting R & D and managing the application of results.

In the United States, the Communications Satellite Act of 1962

created a corporation for profit, not an agency of the United States

Government, to develop and Implement a commercial communications satellite system. T e corporation is authorized to: 1

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Plan, initiate, construct, own, manage and operate by itself or in conjunction with foreign governments or business entities a commercial communications satellite system.

Furnish, for hire, channels of communication to United States communications common carriers and to other authorized entities, foreign and domestic.

Own and operate satellite terminal stations when licensed.

Conduct or contract for research and development related to its mission.

Acquire the physical facilities, equipment and devices necessary to its

operations? including communications satellites and associated equipment

and facilities, whether by construction, purchase, or gift.

Purchase satellite launch and related services from the United States

Government.

Contract with authorized users, including the United States Government,

for the services of the communications satellite system.

Develop plans for the technical specifications of all elements of the communica~i&s satellite system. -

In Canada, the Province of Ontario established the Urban Transportation Development Corporation in 1973. Other provinces and the

Canadian federal government are expected to become share holders

in this corporation.

The objectives of the Corporation are to:

●

●

●

●

●

●

Acquire, develop, adapt, use and license patents, inventions, designs and

systems for all or any part of transit systems related to pubhc transportation and rights and interests therein or thereto.

Encourage and assist in the creation, development and diversification of

Canadian businesses, resources, properties and research facilities related

to public transportation.

Undertake the design, development, construction, testing, operation, manufacture and sale of all or any part of transit systems related to public

transportation.

Test or operate and provide services and facilities for all or any part of

transit systems related to public transportation and in connection therewith build, establish, maintain and operate, in Ontario or elsewhere, alone

or in conjunction with others, either on its own behalf or as agent for others,

all services and facilities expedient or useful for such purposes, using and

adapting any improvement or invention for any means of public

transportation.

Manufacture vehicles and control, propulsion and guideway systems and

their appurtenances and other instruments and plant used in connection

with transit systems related to public transportation as the Corporation

may consider advisable and acquire, purchase, sell, license or lease the

same and rights relating thereto, and build, establish, construct, acquire,

lease, maintain, operate, sell or let all or any part of transit systems related to public transportation in Ontario or elsewhere.

Carry on any other trade or business that, in the opinion of the Board, can

be carried on advantageously by the Corporation in connection with or as

ancillary to the carrying out of the objectives of the Corporation set out

above.
Both of these examples suggest means by which innovative transportation development anddeployment could be achieved in the J

United States. Congressional action could establish a private, for

profit corporation to undertake the development and installation of

AGT systems.

TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

One frequently heard complaint is that the operators, collectively,

have had ittle to say about what research and development is con- Y

ducted to meet their needs., When originally conceive , the UMTA I

demonstration program was intend~d to help transit operators experiment with their own ideas of service and equipment improvements.

Over the years, demonstrations have largely become structured and

directed by the Federal Government.

The Transit Development Corporation (TDC) was established in

October, 1972 by the major transit operating agencies of the United

States and Canada. TDC is registered as a non-profit, scientific and

educational organization whose purpose is to pursue and foster research

and development projec.ts relatlve to urban mass transportation systems and the commumtles they serve. TDC’S purpose is also to make

its findings and information available to the ~ublic, governmental

bodies, and the industry. Specifically, TDC is intended to:

● Focus on the research needs of the industry today to improve reliability

and performance of public transport.

. Sponsor research and development of use to the transit operators for public

benefit.

● Mobilize the talent in the industry to help conduct and supervise such

research and development.

● Develop industry-wide support of such research and development, both

directly through financial contributions and indirectly through the furnishing of materials, plant and personnel for research and experimentation.

● Channel and coordinate demands made upon individual pro erties and

groups of properties for agency personnel and agency services or research f

and development activities.

● Insure the dissemination of research and experimental findings and operational experiences among the transit operators, governmental agencies and

the public.

The transit operators participating in this corporation are having

difficulty financing TDC’S major activities. A recent administrative

ruling b-y DOT makes TDC ineligible for sole-source, R & D grant

contracts. Reconsideration of this ruling, or identification of other

sources of financing, could enable this representative of the transit

industry to help develop and implement AGT systems. Procedures

used in funding the National Cooperative Highway Research Program

or independent research and development under defense and hTASA

contracts could be considered.

GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY CONSORTIUM

While unprecedented in the United States, government-industry

consortia are widely used throughout Europe and Japan as a means to

accomplish research and development and to penetrate the commercial market. The arrangement has several advantages.

● The best talent of industry specialties can be concentrated on

a particular development project.
●

●

●

●

Scarce resources, including personnel, capital and facilities, can

be conserved by avoiding competition between participants.

Government expenditures are reduced through cost sharing

with inclustry.

Because the government is a participant, there is mutual interest in commercialization of the product. Both the government and industry stand to get a return on the initial investment.

To strengthen the price advantage of the consortium in an

initial foreign competition, the government can waive the recovery of cost provisions for the industry participants.

These advantages, available to foreign AGT system developers, have

placed United States manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage.

The above alternfitive institutional arrangements offer opportunities

to improve the efficiency of transit R & D and to accelerate the rate

of transit innovation and improvement.

O THER T RANSPORTATION A LTERNATIVE S

There are other transportation options which are worthy of attention in addition to Automated Guideway Transit but which do not

truly fall within the scope of this study. Some of the possible options

for solving the variety of problems confronting urban communities,

including pollution, congestion, mobility for the disadvantaged and

energy conservation, are briefly described below.

BATTERY POWERED VEHICLES

Several versions of small automobiles powered by rechargeable

batteries have been developed in the U.S. and abroad. In Washington, D. C,, the CitiCar is being marketed at a cost of approximately

$3,000 for a 2-passenger vehicle which can travel about 4O miles at

speeds of 35 miles per hour before requiring a recharge. The cost of

electricity for recharging batteries is estimated at less than 1 per mile.

In Monchengladbach, Germany, the transit system uses batterypowered buses. Operating costs are reported comparable to those for

diesel engines.

Battery powered vehicles offer several attractive advantages. They

do not pollute the atmosphere, they do not consume petroleum fuels,

though they would require more nuclear, coal or hydroelectric power

sources if used in large numbers. Because of their restricted range and

speeds, they are special purpose vehicles, limited to such uses as commuting and short neigborhood trips. This should not present a

problem in urban areas where 90% of all trips are less than 10 miles

long. However most of them have one serious drawback—the time

required to recharge their batteries.

VEHICLES ADAPTED TO DENSE URBAN AREAS

In addition to energy and pollution, the size of the average automobile causes serious problems both in the form of congestion on the

streets and the space required for parking when not in use. Encouraging the use of small vehicles in cities and towns and for commutmg to

built up areas from suburbia has been recommended by planners and

consultants. The value of land in most urban areas is such that the
72

cost of structural and underground parking is about $3,5oo and $5,OOO

respectively for a standard automo ile parking space. Thus, there are bi

significant economic advantages in reducing t e size of vehicles by a

factor of 2 or 3. Conversely, the occupants of small vehicles are not

as safe as those riding in big cars. Statistics indicate that, in mixed

traffic, the risk and seriousness of injury increases as the weight of

the vehicle decreases.

For most urban uses, low performance vehicles would be entirely

satisfactory. They could use batteries or other low-power propulsion

systems.

BATTERY POWERED VEHICLES

Electric Bus

Monchengladbach,

Germany

(Note the trailer

for battery and the

recharging station, in

background.)

CitiCar

Manufactured by

Sebring Vanguard, Inc.

Sebring, Florida

These vehicles will not fill the role of a family car on long trips. Such

a car could be rented, or other forms of transportation used on such

occasions. Neither will these small urban cars provide transportation

for those who cannot afford or do not care to buy one, or who are unable to drive.
73

SPECIAL RENTAL VEHICLES

To obtain better utilization and to minimize storage problems, the

rental of special small vehicles has been proposed. A variety of options

are available, but essentially the vehicles would be rented by individuals from a private company or public agency for single trips or extended periods of time. Such an arrangement is in operation in Amsterdam, where one may rent at 4¢ per minute, small, battery-powered !

vehicles not unlike golf carts, for transportation to various places

within the city. Special parking places are set aside for these vehicles

at recharging stations near major attractions. By the end of 1975, it is

planned to have 15 stations and 125 cars in service.

A similar operation can be visualized as a demonstration in Washington, D. C., for transportation between the many tourist attractions

along the Mall and elsewhere in the heart of the city. Remote parking

for full-sized family cars could be provided at locations such as RF

Stadium and the Pentagon (on weekends). Small vehicle rental and

storage facilities available at these locations, selected metro stations,

and the Visitor’s Center at Union Station could provide a personal

transportation service.

OTHER TRANSIT SERVICE POSSIBILITIES

Among other applications which offer interesting possibilities is the

Company Van-Poo!, organized and operated by t e 3M Corporation !

in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The company purchased 67 twelve-passenger vans and made them availab e to volunteer employees who r

drive them to and from work, stopping along the way for door-to-door

service for fellow employees. A modest fare is charged, with an incentive arrangement for the driver which permits him to make money if

he gets more than eight passengers.

After two years of operation the 3M program is reported to be very

successful, averaging about 11 passengers per van. The average round

trip is about 50 miles. Other companies m the Twin Cities area are

considering instituting similar service. Among the benefits resulting

from such programs are:

. Less congestion on the roads.

. Less gasoline used and less pollution.

. Less employee parking space required.

 Less cost to employees for home to work transportation.

● N. government involvement, but privately financed transportation with

cost shared by company and employees.

Shared use of taxi cabs also warrants consideration as an alternative

for home to work transportation. Because of the cost of downtown

b

parking and the cost of operating private cars, pooled taxi service is

ecoming increasinly popular, with groups of three or four people

arranging to be ic ed up at their homes each morning by the same t

cab driver. In su urban San Diego, shared rides are subsidized by the b~

cit .

The foregoing is but a partial listing of transportation o options which

deserve continuing attention along with Automated Gui eway Tran- x

sit. While this list suggests alternatives to the large, family-owned

automobile, it does not adequately address the needs of the transportation disadvantaged. Some modes, notably the private automobile,

have created serious problems which comman urgent attention. x
74

Better urban mobility is likely only to be achieved through the

judicious blending of a broad range of techniques. Conventional modes

of transportation no longer adequately satisfy the growing requirements in some commumties. The Federal Government, through a

balanced program of R & D and financial assistance, can provide the

leadership and the incentive? for innovation needed for improving

urban moblhty without adding to the problems created by past

solutions.
Chapter 5: The FiscaI Year 1976 Program—Alternative Courses

of Action

The major issues raised in the last chapter provide a frame of

reference within which UMTA’s FY 1976 budget request for Automated Guideway Transit research and development should be considered. Many of these issues have far reaching implications and are

deserving of careful study by the Congress.

This chapter presents four possible alternative courses of action on

the FY 76 ud et for research and development of Automated Guide- b{

way Transit. f or each of these alternatives, the points in favor and

C

arguments against are summarized under the headings ‘Pro” and

“ on”. Consequences of each action are also discussed.

A LTERNATIVE A

Approve the AGT R & D program as submitted. Provide $10

million for the ‘High Performance Personal Rapid Transit (HPPRT)”

Program and $4 million for the

T

“Automated Guideway Transit

echnology” program, which will also receive $4.4 million in reprogrammed or carry-over funds.

PRO

● The Automated Guideway Transit Technology program will

contribute to AGT systems at all three levels o technology:

shuttle and loop transit, group transit and personal rapid

transit. This program will accomplish needed work on theory;

research, development and testing of components and subsystems; and preparation of standards and criteria for system

acceptance.

● The “HPPRT” program will push forward the frontiers of

technology in AGT. It will continue UMTA’s thrust toward

the development of automated guideway transit systems at the

high-technology end of the spectrum—well beyond the capability of AIRTRANS and Morgantown. f

● “HPPRT” will result in a test facility which can be used for

further testing and evaluation.

● “HPPRT”, through its Urban Deployability Studies, will

develop simulations and generate data that, with the actual

hardware, will be of assistance to urban communities which

are considering or planning advanced GRT systems.

● A modest beginning on P T concept evaluation will be made. a

CON

● SLT systems receive minimal attention. No actions which would

lead to a demonstration of this technology in an urban activity

center are indicated.

(75)
76

● It may be too soon to embark on another GRT system development. The results of Morgantown and Dallas-1 Fort Worth are

not yet in. Once these results have been thoroughly assessed, a

new program could be better structured.

● The three system concepts selected for initial appraisal in

Phase I of the “HPPRT” project are very different. It will be

most difficult to determine w ich approach is worthy of full h

development before actual hardware IS built and tested. Also,

selection of a single supplier may inhibit multiple source competition for full-scale production if a significant market

●

. The “HPPRT” project does not address a known requirement

for such systems. No urban communities have made plans for

highly sophisticated GRT s stems involving 12-passenger

ve “c es moving at 3 second i eadways with a 7 to 10 year

development lead time.

● The program does not provide for R & D effort in the social and

economic areas.

● The AGT program as currently structured does not place

sufficient emphasis on such problems common to all systems,

such as guideway improvements, passenger safety and security,

and door mechanisms.

CONSEQUENCES

Approval of the program as submitted:

. Continues the policy of funding R & D for systems of increasing complexity, with emphasis on high technology.

short-term and mid-term applications.

ready status with multiple suppliers.

tions bearing on the potential role of PRT.

A LTERNATIVE B

Development. Use carry-over funds for data gathering and analysis.

PRO

● Delay in funding R & D starts will allow time to assimilate

information on installations already made at Morgantown and

Dallas-Fort Worth. Also, more time will be available to review

the need for GRT and PRT, including factors affecting social

acceptability and economics.

. Industry will not look to UMTA for leadership in R & D and

will thus be more inclined to undertake proprietary developments more responsive to the needs of the market place.

● Rejection by t e Congress of proposals to proceed with the t

development of sophisticated systems will focus the interests

of urban communities on conventional transit modes supplemented by shuttle and loop systems which are more nearly

available.
77

CON

● Disapproval of further R & D funding will halt further regress

in the United States toward the development and dep oyment l’

of new urban transportation systems because industry has little

incentive to spend its own resources on systems the Federal

Government has rejected. State and local governments are not

likely to expend resources without Federal participation in

such programs.

● The possibility of perfecting a broader range of market-ready

SLT systems from experience accumulated to date is

diminished.

. Foreign exploitation of any potential United States market is

invited with possible effects on balance of payments and

United States dependence on foreign technology.

CONSEQUENCES

If no funds are provided, the following results can be expected:

●

●

●

●

The United States will become increasingly dependent on foreign sources

for high technology improvements to urban mobility.

Companies which have developed R & D capabilities for AGT systems

may abandon this line of business, thus reducing the number of available

suppliers and dissipating the expertise they have acquired.

The primary transportation options available to urban communities will

remain limited to bus and rail, supplemented by SLT systems.

It will be possible to acquire useful data on the performance of the systems

installed at Morjzantown and Dallas. Ft. Worth, if carry over funds are

sufficient and are-applied to this purpose.

A LTERNATIVE C

Approve the level of funding requested by UMTA for AGT, but

restructure the program to provide:

“HPPRT” :

A?nount8

Continue detailed engineering work by the 3 selected manufacturers ..-

A & E and initial construction on test facility infrastructure and support facilities -------- ___ ___ --- ------- ___ ---- ------------- ----

AGT technology:

Common development requirements, i.e., guideways, doors, brakes,

etc----- _- -- ------- -------------------- ------------- ----- ---

SLT—refinements and product improvements to facilitate an urban

demonstration ----- -------- ----- ------------------------ - --- -

GRT—analysis and operation of Morgantown system and surveillance

of Airtrans operation -------- -- ----------- ------. ---------- ---

PRT—feasibility studies and simulations ------- ----- ---_---------

AGT social and economic studies and analysis_ ----- --------- ------ ---—

$3.0

3.0

3.4

2 . 0

3.0

2.0

2.0

Total, including $4.4 million of carryover funds-_ --------------- 18.4

PRO

● This restructured program provides improved balance in urban

transit research between short-term improvements in capabilities and long range development of innovative new alternatives. It permits a start on the next logical stage in the development of advanced AGT systems, the ‘f HPPRT” project. It

recognizes the need for intensive work on social and economic

issues which have heretofore been neglected.
78

● The program provides for follow-on detailed engineering by the

three manufacturers selected for the ~’HPPR “ project. This f

avoids the necessity to select a sin le concept for further

development on the basis of paper stu “es only.

● Allocation of R & D funds to perfecting and monitoring SLT

systems will facilitate the deployment of such systems by

documenting unproved performance and costs. It. will also

encourage supphers stay in business, thus preserving opportunities for competition and more options for urban consideration. Successful initial efforts could lead to a federally funded

demonstration project in an urban area.

. Industry should be stimulated to fund product improvement

work.

. The benefits of earlier GRT programs are maximized, while

the forward momentum of the program is maintained.

CON

. The time required to design, build, test and evaluate advanced

technology s stems would be stretched out.

● UMTA would be in the business of financing development and r

engineering , a responsibility previously allocated to industry.

. Significant y increasing the number o subjects to be addressed Y [

in the AGT R & D program may cause administration and

coordination problems.

CONSEQUENCES

Redirecting the emphasis to near-term solutions:

● Shifts the balance of new systems R ~ D from exploring distance Possibilities

toward exploiting existing technology.

. Involves government in the process of product development which has

been considered by UMTA to be the function of industry.

● Delays the possibility of installing the more advanced AGT systems in

United States cities. In some cases, stretching out the development period

may prompt local agencies to abandon such programs.

● Recognizes the potential of simpler SLT Systems as useful supplements

to conventional transit modes which are currently available.

● Acknowledges that the long range potential of PRT warrants a modest

investment of R & D funds for economic studies, market analyses, social

acceptability studies and limited operational simulations.

A LTERNATIVE D

Increase the scope and funding for AGT R & D as follows:

“HPPRT”: Detailed engineering and hardware work by the 3 selected

manufacturers, plus a start on construction of the test facility .--. _. -- $15.0

AGT technology:

Common development requirements. ---- ---------------------- -- 5.4

SLT—refinements and product improvements and support of urban

demonstration project ---------------- ---------------------- -- 3.0

GRT—analysis and improvement of Morgantown and Airtrans

systems- -------- --- ----------- --- -------------------- ------

PRT—feasibility and urban deployability studies and simulations- - :: :

AGT social and economic studies and analysis ---------------- -------- 3.0

Total, including $4.4 million of carryover funds ---------------- 34+ 4
79

PRO

● Increasing the AGT funding level to $34.4 million, by roviding $30.0 million in new fiiscal Year 1976 funds, wi bring

UMTA’S R & D budget to a level more in keeping with other

government rograms.

● The probabi ity of making a good decision on the selection of f

a preferred ‘f HPPRT” concept will be improved if it is based

on the evaluation of operational hardware rather than paper

design concepts, as is currently planned. The three manufacturers selected for Phase I are designing three very different

approaches: a suspended monorail with magnetic levitation,

an air cushion suspension and linear motor propulsion, and

rubber tires with conventional traction motors. Final selection

of the concept to be demonstrated in urban use will be difficult

even after extensive test track operations.

 The increased cost of carrying three hardware concepts through

the prototype testing stage can be minimized by the use of common facilities, such as:

A multi- purpose guideway, wayside power supply “and

control cab ing system to serve the two bottom-supported r

systems; and

Central control computer, shop and support facilities to

serve all three test programs.

. A significant increase in funding for R & D of components and

common development requirements, as well as a stepped-u~

effort to learn from the Morgantown and AIRTRAN experi- 8

ences, will maximize the possibility that AGT systems will

become cost-effective alternatives for urban transit.

● Such action will demonstrate interest by the government in

finding better ways to provide urban mobility through technological innovation.

● It will stimulate innovation by manufacturers, particularly in

the area of product improvements, and will allow industry to

plan on a continuing Federal commitment.

● With more money available, it will be appropriate to make a

significant start toward determining the technical, operational,

and economic feasibility for PRT systems.

CON

. Any large increase in funding for AGT systems is inapproriate

until the need for such systems has been more clearly estabished lY

and the national potential market has been assessed.

● Additional time and funds will be required to meet the

“HPPRT” program goals through testing three prototype systems. Even with maximum use of common facilities, a total

program cost on the order of $5o million (in lieu of UMTA’S

estimate of $34.5 million for the current proposal) should be

anticipated.

. Management of the ‘‘HPPRT” program will be complicated

by testing three prototype systems concurrently through the

use of common support services.
80

● UMTA may not have the management capacity and organizational structure to handle an expanded R & D program so as

to insure that the funds are spent where they wi do the most f

T

ood.

s here is no point in stepping up R & D efforts until better

procedures are developed to prepare for delivery of the results

of R & D to the marketplace.

CONSEQUENCE S

A significant increase in funds implies the following:
APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCTING

THE ASSESSMENT
APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCTING THE

ASSESSMENT

APPROACH

This assessment was conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment

(OTA) Transportation Assessments Group. The OTA staff was augmented by two

consultants who served as project principals. Mr. Frederick A. F. Cooke was

the Program Director and Mr. H, William Merritt was Deputy Program Director.

Both have had broad experience with PRT and other forms of Automated Guideway Transit. They were assisted in framing the assessment and directing the

Service by Dr. Leon M. Cole of the Library of Congress, Congressional Research .

At the outset of the study, the subjects to be examined were grouped in five

general categories:

Current Developments in the United States.

Economics.

Social Acceptability.

Operations and Technology.

International Developments.

Detailed topics within each of these categories are listed at the end of this

appendix.

Five study panels were organized, one for each of the general areas. Panels

were drawn from public transportation agencies, nonprofit organizations and

associations, manufacturers, transit planning organizations, educational and

research institutions, consulting firms and citizen organizations. A special effort

was made to have a variety of points of view represented on each panel, i.e.,

enthusiasts and skeptics alike. (Brief biographies of panel members are provided

at the end of this appendix.)

The work of each panel was organized and directed by its Chairman with the

support and assistance of the Program Director. The panels met in Washington

several times to discuss findings, issues and conclusions. Each panel chairman

submitted a report. Abstracts of the five panel reports are attached as Appendix B.

During the course of this assessment, most of the Federal and local government officials concerned with the planning and implementation of Automated

Guideway Transit projects were contacted by members of the study team, as

were a majority of the significant s stem suppliers. About 20 members of the

team were briefed in detail by UM A Administrator, Frank C. Herringer and T

members of his staff. In addition, there have been many separate meetings

with UMTA and DOT personnel. Special briefings were made by Dr. J. Edward

Anderson, of the University of Minnesota, and Messrs Harry Bernstein and C. L.

Olson of the Aerospace Corporation. Members of the team visited the Morgantown project in January and April and the AIRTRANS project at Dallas/Ft.

Worth in February.

DATA BAsE

During the course of this assessment, the Program Director, Deputy Program

Director, and the Panel Chairmen reviewed numerous reports, studies, professional

papers and general material on the subject of Automated Guideway Transit.

Additionally, the views of many people of diverse backgrounds were solicited.

This material forms the data base for this assessment report. It is maintained

on file for ready reference in OTA’S Transportation Assessments Group. The

bibliography which is attached as Appendix C lists material of general interest.

Eaoh panel report also includes a listing of reference material which is available on

file.

($3)
84

A CKNOWLEDGEMENT S

This assessment was made possible by the capable and enthusiastic support of

the panel members, a majority of whom were made available to OTA at no cost

by their parent organizations. In addition to the panel members, many other

individuals participated in this effort by attending panel meetings and by preparing thoughtful responses to detailed questions. Specific acknowledgements are

contained in the reports prepared by the Panel Chairman.

T OPICS A SSIGNED To S TUDY P ANEL S

The following pages outline in greater detail the topics assigned for investigation

by each of the five panels:

1. CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

● Identification of strong points as well as deficiencies.

. Levels of reliability which have been achieved.

● Safety record and analysis of causes of major accidents.

 Extent of public acceptance.

● Capital as well as operating and maintenance cost. Effect of varying

degrees of system sophistication on such costs.

. How can experience to date be applied to new systems being planned?

II. ECONOMICS

Cost-benefit analysis of AGT in relation to other transportation modes:

. As an alternative to buses as feeders to conventional rail transit system.

. As a means of linking remote automobile parking facilities with activity

centers.

● As circulation systems in congested downtown areas, airports, commercial

developments, universities and other major activity centers.

● As a reasonable alternative to the private automobile in urban areas.

Economic aspects of short headway systems, ranging from three seconds to

the fractional second headways required to achieve high capacity with very small

vehicles:

. Effect of large volume production on vehicle costs,

. Projected guideway network and station costs.

. Effect on capital as well as O & M costs of increasing levels of control

sophistication.

● Measures required to achieve required levels of reliability and cost

implications.

 Projection of extent to which personalized service can be expected to increase ridership.

111. SOCIAL Acceptability

Safety and Security

Passenger safety:

● identification of major hazards.

● Evaluation of risks and determination of acceptable probability levels for

accidents and injuries.

. Revriew of safety criteria being used as a basis of current designs for

adequacy and uniformity.

● Emergency escape and rescue capabilities.

Safety of the general public:

● Review of measures being used to keep people off the guide ways.

● Evaluation of alternatice means of preventing injuries or damage to

property resulting from vehicles running off or falling from guideways

unto city streets.

. 1s further federal action required to insure that adequate safety measures

are uniformly observed?

Passenger security:

● Risks to passengers—especially women traveling alone at night on station

platforms and in unattended vehicles.

● Evaluation of alternative techniques to insure security, such as TV n~onitors, emergency communication, roving patrols, etc.

● How can public be convinced that adequate security is being provided?
85

System security:

Measures required to minimize opportunities for vandalism rind/or sabotage.

Equipment design to reduce cost of repair. what further action is indicated?

Environmental Impacts and Aesthetics

maximum allowable noise levels both inside and outside vehicles.

Visual impact of elevated guidewny systems and station structures.

measures required to insure architectural compatibility with existing

surroundings. How can public acceptance be assured?

Effect on adjacent land values of overhead systems.

Arc current revulations governing environmental impact studies effective?

Do PRTs warrant special treatment?

.

~Social Implications

Offsetting economic costs, how can AGT enhance the overall quality of urban

life by:

● Reducing air pollution and noise levels?

. Easing traffic congestion and reducing travel and commuting time?

● Providing increased mobility for the disadvantaged, the elderly and the

handicapped?

How can these benefits be evaluated or quantified?

To what extent can the social benefits of AGT bc expected to foster public

acceptance, i.e. :

● Willingness to approve bond issues to pay for first costs and to cover

possible operating~-deficits?

● Reducing reliance on the private automobile?

Under what circumstances can a case be made for providing

as is universally. accepted in the case of elevators in buildings?

IV. OPERATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY

Lev.el of Service

free PRT service

What is the optimum level of service which must be provided if PRT is to

become a viable alternativ’e to the private automobile?

● How far arc people willing to walk under varying circumstances?

● How long arc they willing to wait?

● How important is travel time in relation to comfort?

● What is the minimum acceptable interval between stops?

Can meaningful conclusions be drawn from actual experience with existing

automated \-chicle systems and other transportation modes?

● Are current planning criteria based on fact or theory?

How important is it to provide point-to-point, non-stop service?

● Will ridership fall off as intermediate stops are made and to what extent?

Under what circumstances are people willing to transfer from one vehicle to

another enroute?

● To what extent will transfer affect ridership?

Ride Quality and Comfort

W’hat criteria are being used for acceleration,/deceleration rates, jerk rates,

sound levels, smoothness of ride, air conditioning and heating, etc?

● Is there a need to establish uniform criteria for specific types of service?

● To w’hat extent have design objectives been met in existlng systems?

● Can any meaningful conclusions be drawn as to public acceptance of

varying level~ of comfort? How rough a ride is acceptable?

How long arc people willing to ride standing versus seated?

● what has been the basis for determining number of seats versus space for

standees?

● How much crowding is acceptable and safe?

To achieve an acceptable Ievel of comfort should emphasis be placed on building guideways to precise smoothness and tolerances or on \.chicle suspension

systems?

● What conclusion can be drawn from experience to date?

● What further study is indicated?
86

Energy Considerations

Energy consumption for varying levels of service, vehicle sizes, means of

propulsion.

Comparison with amounts of energy consumed by conventional rail systems,

buses and automobiles.

Effect on ridership of continuing gasoline price escalation or shortage of

supplies.

Reliability

What reliability criteria have been used to date and what results have been

achieved?

● Are uniform criteria being established for similar systems?

● Are criteria consistent with experience with other transportation modes

and other industries?

What cost-benefit studies have been made in determining:

 Extent to which hi h reliability components are used?

● Use of redundancyf

● providing rapid diagnostic and repair cabilities?

How does reliability affect public acceptance

● What level of occasional breakdown will the public accept willingly?

To what extent does the current state of the art it the degree of complexity

and sophistication which can reasonably be incorporated into PRT systems?

 What further work needs to be done?

V. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Appraisal of PRT developments abroad:

● To what extent has foreign technology advanced beyond ours?

. HOW are foreign governments stimulating development and fostering export

of technology and hardware to the United States and the world at large?

● How successful have foreign companies been in penetrating the United

States’ market for PRTs? What licensing agreements have been made with

United States industry? and

s What can we learn from PRT developments and actual experiences abroad

in the areas of technology and public acceptance? What is the extent of the international market for PRTs?

● What is the competitive posture of the United States engineering and

industrial community? and

● What steps are being taken by the United States Government to insure a

fair share of foreign projects for United States intereats?

Future Directions

Does the promise of PRT as a cost effective new mode of transportation warrant

a continuing investment of substantial government funds for research development and demonstration, and if so:

● In what areas?

● At what financial levels? and

● On what time schedule?

All Panels considered these questions.

P ROJECT T E A M

The team assembled to conduct this assessment, under the overall direction

of Dr. Gretchen S, Kolsrud and V. Rodger Digilio of the Transportation Projects

staff of OTA, was composed of the following people:

A SSEMENT P ROGRAM D IRECTIO N

Frederick A. F. Cooke, Program Director

Consulting Engineer

On Contract with OTA

Since 1968 Mr. Cooke has been active in planning and implementing AGT

systems. Earlier he directed highway and semi-metro designs in Europe. As

Vice President of the Dashaveyor Company, which became a Bendix subsidiary,
87

he conducted numerous studies of potential applications for innovative systems.

He supervised the construction, installation and testing of the Bendix-Dashaveyor

TRASPO-72 demonstration at Dulles Airport.

H. Wm. Merritt, Deputy Program Director

Transportation Consultant

On contract with OTA

H. Wm. Merritt directed the Study of New Systems of Urban Transportation

for HUD in 1967–1968. Until 1973 he was the Associate Administrator for

Research and the Director, Special Projects, in UMTA. Since 1973, he has

consulted on urban transportation planning, engineering, and energy conservation. Mr. Merritt chairs a task force of the National Academy of Sciences

which publishes a Newsletter on New Concepts of Urban Transportation.

Dr. Leon M. Cole

Congressional Research Service

The Library of Congress

Consultant to OTA

Active in teaching, research and consulting in urban transportation and lanning for fifteen years, Dr. Cole was co-author and editor of Tomorrow’s ramporiation: New systern.s for the Urban Future, published in 1968. As a former

commissioner of the Texas Urban Development Commission and chairman of

the City of Austin Board of Natural Resources and Environmental Quality,

he has helped develop state and local governmental policies in transportation

matters as well as Federal legislation. Dr. Cole also serves as a group council

member of Transportation Research Board, National Academy of Sciences—

National Research Council.

Panel on Current Developments in the United States

Clark Henderson, Chairman

Staff Scientist

Stanford Research Institute

Menlo Park, California

Mr. Henderson has conducted research on transportation since 1953 and

has specialized in urban public transportation systems during the past decade.

He was the principal author of Future Urban Transportation Systems prepared

for the Federal government in 1968. He has conducted studies for local and

regional transit agencies and for suppliers of transit systems.

John K. Howell

Transportation Consultant

Gerald D. Hines Interests

Houston, Texas

Mr. Howell was project manager of the Westinghouse Electric Transit Expressway Demonstration Project and directed the Tampa and Sea-Tac Transit Expressway projects. In consulting practice since 1970 he has completed more than

50 transit studies involving planning, engineering, specifications and proposals,

economic estimates and evaluations.

John R. Jamieson

Director of Transit Development

Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission

St. Paul, Minnesota

Mr. Jamieson has occupied his present position for five years. He has conducted

a number of long range planning studies including technology assessment, optimum systems, and most recently a detailed study of small vehicle fixed guldeway

systems. Previous experiences included Deputy Federal Highway Administrator,

Minnesota Commissioner of Highways and fifteen years in industry in various

assignments ranging from field engineering to product development.
88

Thomas A. Lancaster

Manager of Market Analysis

Rohr Industries, Inc.

Chula Vista, California

Mr. Lancaster is responsible for long-range forecasting, planning and detailed

analysis of transit trends at Rohr. Earlier he was engaged in product development

and engineering work with the Bendix Corporation. In 1971–1972 he participated

in the President’s Commission on Personnel Interchange and served as Deputy

Director-Special Projects in UMTA. He is a professional engineer.

Roy Lobosco

Supervisor, Facilities Planning

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

New York, New York

Since 1965, Mr. Lobosco has been responsible for a program directed toward

installation and operation of an AGT system serving Newark International Airport

and connecting the terminal with a proposed PATH extension. He has super~’ised

internal planning and the work of consultants and has negotiated with four potential suppliers regarding all technical and operational features of their proposed

systems.

Panel on Economics

Dr. Lyle C. Fitch, Chairman

President, Institute of Public Administration

Washington, D.C.

Lyle C. Fitch is president of the Institute of Public Administration, the nation’s

oldest nonprofit govrnmental research and consulting organization, He has held

numerous municipal, state and federal offices, including City Administrator of

New’ York City. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University and has

taught at Columbia, City University of New York, Wesleym Univcrsit}”, and

clse~~’here. In 1961 he directed a study of federal urban transportation policy,

commissioned by HHFA and the Bureau of Public Roads, which provided important inputs to the first federal urban mass transportation act.

Dr. J. Edward Anderson

Regional Transportation District

Denver, Colorado

J. Edward Anderson, PhD, P. E., is a professor of Mechanical Engineering, CTni~.ersit3. of ~~innC?SOt:l, on lea~’c a+ consultant to Regional Transportation

I)istric\, I)en\’er, Colorado. IIis ncad(’mic expcri(’nces includes BSIIE, Iowa

State L nit.ersity, 1949; hISNIE, Uni\’crsit~” of Jlinnwotil, 1955; and Phl~, hlassnchusctts Institute of Technology, 1962. IIc is (3encr:il Chairman of the international Conference on Personal Rapid Transit and Editor, Personal Rapid Transit.

Personal Rapid Transit II.

Thomas B. Deen

Vice President

Alan M. Voorhees and Associates, Inc.

McLean, Virginia

Mr. Thomas B. I)eel~ has ser~red as principal-in-charge of comprehensi~’e

transit and Urban Transportation Studies in many principle cities of the world

including \\’:lshington, D. C., Atlanta, Baltimore, Caracas, 1 Ionolulu, and Rio

Paulo. He formerly was director of planning for the federal agency which developed plans for the \\’ashington Metro now under construction. His writings ha~’e

been published in most of the professional journals in the urban transportation

field.

Dr. Paul K. Dygert

Senior Consultant

Peat, IJlarwick, Mitchell & Company

J\rashington, 1). C.

Dr. D?rgert has cngngcd in teaching, rcse:lrch, and Cons[llting in transportation

economics and financing for a number of J-cars. I{ecentl~’ he undertook a financial

feasibility anal~”sis for a proposed personal ru])id transit system, and conducted

~ Study Of L’rban .Vass Transportation Needs and Financing which the Secretar~r

of Transportation transmitted to the Congress in July, 1974. He has also undertaken transportation studies for international, state, and local agencies.
89

Dr. Aaron J. Gellman

President

Gelhman Research Associates, Inc.

Jenkintown, Pennsylvania

Dr. Gellman, since 1972, has been president of his own research consulting firm

and is concurrently an adjunct professor in the Transportation and Regional

, .

Science Division of the Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania.

Before forming the consulting firm, Dr. Gellman was vice president for planning

at the Budd Company, ) Philadelphia, where he was responsible for all economic

planning activties of the company. His formal education took place at the University of Virginia (B.A.- Economics), the University of Chicago (M.B.A.-Transportation) and M.I.T. (Ph. D.-Economics).

Charles Hickox

Director of Ground Transportation Marketing

LTV Aerospace Corporation

Dallas, Texas

Mr. Hickox has been responsible for market planning and development for

ground transportation since the inception of his company’s commitment to this

field of business. He has been closely associated with the development of the

AIRTRAN’S system at the Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport and the licensing of this

technology in both Japan and France. He has lectured extensively on automated

transit.

Douglas B. Lee

Office of Comprehensive Planning

Fairfax County

Fairfax, Virginia

Dr. Lee recently left the University of California, Berkeley, where he was

teaching in city planning and conducting research in the comparative costs of

urban transportation modes. After spending a yearworking in Fairfax County’ s

land use planning program, he will join the faculty at the University of Iowa.

Sumner Myers

Director Urban System Studies

Institute of Public Administration

Washington, D.C.

Sumner Myrers, a graduate of M.I.T., is a director of Urban Systems Studies for

the Institute of Public Administration in Washington, D.C. and the author of

numerous publications on technological innovation and transportation. He was a

participant in H.U.D.’s study of transportation technology and an editorial advisor for its final report, Tomorrow’s Transportation: New Systems for the Urban

Future.

Panel on Social Acceptability

Jacquelyn A. Ingersoll, Chairman

Citizen Advisor on Urban and Transportation Planning

St. Louis Park, Minnesota

Mrs. Ingersoll has been very active in civic planning and transportation matters

in the Twin Cities for several years. She is past chairman of the St. Louis Park

Planning Commission which serves a community of 50,000 people. She also serves

as a membcr of the Citizens Advisory. Committee on Transit of the Twin Cities

Metropolitan Transit Commission.

Ralph Jackson

Director of Planning

Regional Transportation District

Den\’er, Colorado

Mr. Jackson returned to his home town of Denver in September, 1970 to accept

the position as director of planning for the Regional Transportation District

(RTD). Previously, he was a senior associate engineer with Barton-Aschman

Associates, Inc. of Chicago, where he participated in transit planning and traffic

engineering studies in over 20 cities. Prior to his employment at Barton-Aschman

Associates, hr. Jackson was a research associate with the Departmemt of Urban

Studies, University of Illinois at Chicago.
90

Alain L. Kornhauser

Assistant Professor of Civil and Geological Engineering

Princeton University

Princeton, N.J.

Professor Kornhauser has taught courses and conducted research on transportation for the past five years, specializing in automated forms of mass transportation.

He is co-editor of Personal Rapid Transit I and author of journal publications on

design of automatic control systems, network design and analysis methodologies,

energy impacts and attitudinal considerations in predicting the demand for new

technologies.

Rodney K. Lay

Group Leader, Transportation Systems Planning

The MITRE Corporation

McLean, Virginia

Dr. Lay has conducted and supervised the evaluation of a broad range of

ground transportation systems as a member of MITRE’s consultant systems

engineering staff supporting the USDOT Urban Mass Transportation and

Federal Rail R,D & Programs. He has directed a recent technology review and

an assessment of the state of the art of personal rapid and dual mode transit

systems.

John B. Schnell

Manager-Research

American Public Transit Association

Washington, D.C.

Mr. Schnell has served in this position with APTA for five years and specializes

in all of the technical maintenance and operation aspects of urban mass transportation and automobile transportation with the Institute of Traffic Engineers and

the Keystone Automobile Club. He has been a county engineer and a township

engineer.

Reed H. Winslow

Department Head

Transportation Systems Planning

The MITRE Corporation

Mr. Winslow’s experience includes twenty years of progressive development in

transportation management, planning, and engineering. Under a contract with

the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Mr. Winslow has been involved

in research and development projects for demand responsive transportation, bus

propulsion systems, methods for granting priority to transit buses in traffic, automatic vehicle location and monitoring systems, urban transportation planning,

and software and advanced technology for rapid transit systems.

George V. Wickstrom

Director, Office of Technical Studies

Metropolitan Washington

Council of Governments

Washington, D.C.

Mr. Wickstrom has been actively engaged in the practice of urban transportation planning for over 20 years. He has served as director of several large-scale

urban transportation studies in Philadelphia, Delaware and Washington, D.C.

A registered professional engineer, he is also active in transportation research,

and has authorized over 20 published articles on land use and traffic planning.

Panel on Operations and Technology

Robert A. Makofski, Chairman

Manager, Urban Transportation Programs

A plied Physics Laboratory

The Johns Hopkins University

Silver Spring, Maryland

Mr. Makofski has been involved in the research and development of automated

transit systems since 1968. This work has covered a broad spectrum of technology

in automated systems with emphasis on the command and control aspects of

these systems. He is also a Senior Research Associate of the Center for Metropolitan Planning and Research of the Johns Hopkins University.
91

Richard H. Donlon

Director of Operations

Transportation Technology Division

Otis Elevator Company

Denver, Colorado

Mr. Donlon has 24 years of experience in a wide range of advanced technologies

with emphasis on technical program management, engineering and research. He

has devoted the last seven years to the development of advanced automated

vehicle transit systems. Mr. Donlon was a founder of Transportation Technology,

Inc.

Eugene Jones

Senior Vice President

Frederic R. Harris, Inc.

Stamford, Connecticut

Mr. Jones has been involved in the planning and design of transportation

facilities for over 25 years. He serves on the Board of Directors of Northeast

Utilities, the State National Bank of Connecticut and the Stamford Area Commerce and Industry Association. He was Chairman of the Committee on New

Towns and Urban Development for the Consulting Engineers Council,

Thomas McGean

De Leuw, Cather and Company

Washington, D.C.

Mr. McGean provides technology and system engineering support on a nationwide basis—most recently in studies of transit alternatives for the Twin

Cities, Denver and Santa Clara. Prior to joining De Leuw, Cather he was involved in numerous major Federal transportation programs including tracked

air cushion vehicle research, the TRANSPO ’72 People Movers, Dual-Mode,

the Rapid Rail Research Program and the HPPRT program.

David R. Phelps

Director of Systems Technology

Transit Development Corporation, Inc.

Washington, D.C.

Mr. Phelps is responsible for the management of funded programs and offers

technical direction in providing work scope for proposed programs. He was previously with GE where he was Manager of Development Engineering and Systems

Engineering. He was responsible for advanced preliminary design and proposal

activity on transit and commuter rail car design. He received a BSEE with honors

from Lehigh University and is a registered professional engineer.

Stanley A. Spinwebber

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

ONE World Trade Center

New York, New York

Mr. Spinwebber has served as Supervisor of the Ground Transportation Projects

Section since 1972. He has a BS Degree from Pennsylvania State University, MS

Degree from Stevens Institute of Technology, and is a licensed Professional

Engineer and Planner. He is responsible for planning, developing, and implementation of all ground transportation projects for Kennedy and La Guardia Airports,

including rail access, bus programs, and automated passenger and baggage handling systems.

Dr. Vukan Vuchic

Department of Civil and Urban Engineering

University of Pennsylvania

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Dr. Vuchic holds a diploma from the University of Belgrade, Master’s and Ph.D.

degrees from the University of California (Berkeley). In addition to his academic

work he has been consultant to many firms and to the U.S. Department of Transportation. He has lectured at a number of universities, professional and public

forums and published over 30 professional papers here and in Europe. His specialties are urban transportation systems; public transportation; urban and national

transportation policy.
Panel on International Developments

H. Wm. Merritt, Chairman

Transportation Consultant

Arlington, Virginia

(See biography on page 87.)

Robert A. Burco

President Public Policy Research Associates

Berkeley, California

Robert A. 13urco specializes in urban transportation system evaluation, institutional aspects of planning and public policy and technology assessment. In

1971–1972 he assessed innovations in urban transit in Europe, North America,

and Japan for OECD. Mr. Burco authored the 1968 SRI report on impacts of

future urban transportation systems. He is a member of the OTA Urban Mass

Transit Advisory Panel and the NAS Transportation Research Board.

Thomas H. Floyd, Jr.

Vice President DGA International

Washington, D.C.

Mr. Floyd is currently involved in the transfer of European technology and

industrial innovations to the United States, specializing in ground transportation.

Prior to his association with DGA International in 1969, Mr. Floyd was the

director of research project management in the Urban Mass Transportation

Administration. In this capacity, he was responsible for the planning and management of research, development and demonstration programs.

Howard R. Ross

Transportation Consultant

Menlo Park, California

Mr. Ross has worked in the urban transportation field for over ten years, and

has specialized in problems of advanced technology systems. Since 1971, he has

headed a consulting firm dealing with system design and analysis, technology

forecasting, transportation planning, financial studies and economic analyses for

urban transit systems. Mr. Ross was a founder of Transportation Technology

Incorporated in 1968, and prior to that was at Stanford Research Institute.
APPENDIX B

ABSTRACTS OF PANEL REPORTS
.

APPENDIX B

ABSTRACTS OF PANEL REPORTS

A BSTRACT OF THE R EPORT OF T HE P ANEL O N

C URRENT D EVELOPMENTS IN THE U NITED S TATE S

This report describes the development and current status of Automated Guideway Transit (AGT) systems in the U.S. It is based on information from a wide

variety of sources, including the major suppliers of equipment for the 17 AGT systems now being built or in operation in this country and public agencies which are

considering future systems.

The anel examined seven questiom+ as follows:

(1) #hy AGT? This section is a recitation of the arguments which proponents

of AGT systems put forward.

(2) What distinguishes three AGT system types from one another? Shuttle-Loop

Transit (SLT), Group Rapid Transit (GRT), and Personal Rapid Transit

(PRT), are described in terms of their use and particular attributes.

(3) Who owns AGT? The 17 existing systems are described in detail. Fifteen of

them are SLT systems, representing private investment of $75 million. The other

two are GRT systems, representing private investment of about $46 million and

federal investment of about $72 million. Of the 17 systems, 10 are in service, one is

idle, and six are in advanced stages of construction.

The systems, in general, have operated very safely. There has been one injurious

accident in about 150 million passenger trips. The ability of these systems to provide continuous service varies a great deal, depending on the reliability of component hardware and on system layout and vulnerability to complete shut down as

a consequence of a single failure.

(4) Who warks AGT? This section examines data from studies of possible AGT

application in 36 localities. The studies represent perhaps one-third to one-half

the planning that has been done on potential deployment of AGT. Four of the

studies are for metropolitan networks at a cost of $6.7 billion. Two are for corridor

systems in urban areas at a cost of about $250 million. The remaining 30 plans are

for business districts, airports, and other major activity centers at costs totaling

about $1 billion.

Most of the studies are on simple SLT systems but some include low technology

GRT features. Several studies for large, metropolitan systems have considered

high technology GRT or PRT systems and then rejected them because of uncertainty about whether certain technical features are sufficiently developed for

everyday use, Prospective buyers appear to be more interested in proven systems

which could be quickly installed rather than in more sophisticated systems which

may require R & D. Thus, prospective buyers seem to have little interest in

systems more sophisticated than the low technology GRT level.

(5) Who supplzes AGTand what are their probknzs? Six firms in the AGT business

have supplied all but one of the 17 AGT systems. A larger number of companies

are prepared to sell systems if they can find a market. Reliable estimates su gest

that these firms have invested $100 million corporate funds in develo ing GT i

capability. However, the market has become increasingly uncertain. ome J firms

have already discontinued their AGT programs and others are considering similar

action.

(6) What has UMZ’A done? Federal agencies, mainly the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, have spent more than $100 million on AGT installations and development programs. The two GRT systems—AIRTRANS at the

Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport and the Morgantown project—received about 70Y0

of the federal funds. All other A GT efforts, including $10 million spent on demonstration of four systems at Transpo ’72, absorbed the remaining 30Y0

.

(7) What actions would encourage greater exploitation of AGT? The panel sought

the views of suppliers on this question and found their responses varied. Recommendations ranged from minimal government involvement to extensive government involvement both in financial support and product control.

(95)
36

The suppliers agreed that UMTA must clarify the level of funding which will

be available for capital grants for AGT and the conditions that a supplier must

meet to qualify his product for capital funds.

Suppliers also said a clearer definition of the part the federal government

intends to play in research and development is needed.

Finally, they asked that the federal government specify what financial aid or

assurance of markets it can provide industry in order to encourage investments

which, the suppliers say, me necessary to get technically advanced systems into

production.

From the information before it, the panel on current developments in the U.S.

concludes that UMTA has the authority to establish conditions for the qualification of new products for capital grants and needs only to act, if it chooses to do so.

Likewise, the role of UMTA in developing and selecting hardware-systems,

subsystems and components—could be redefined by administrative action, backed

by the necessary appropriation of funds.

ABSTRACT OF THE REPORT OF THE PANEL ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

This report discusses recent international developments in Automated Guideway

Transit systems. The research and development efforts underway in Germany,

France and Japan on PRT and the institutional arrangements for developing and

deploying new systems are highlighted.

The stimulus for automated systems in foreign cities is that these cities adapt

poorly to large numbers of automobiles. Some older urban areas have suffered

physical, environmental and aesthetic damage from excessive automobile use.

As a result, many foreign governments are taking steps to arrest further automobile

intrusions.

The remedies include preservation and improvement of traditional transit

service including tram and bus lines. In addition, the cities are considering AGT

systems where transit service is insufficient or nonexistent. In some cities, these

remedies are coupled with the creation of auto-free zones. Only walking and

transit are permitted in these zones. Sheffield, England, and Grenoble, France serve

as examples.

Lower technology AGT systems have not proliferated in Europe and Japan as

fast as they have in the United States. One SLT system is in operation in Paris and

one in Japan. Also in Japan, three GRT systems are under construction.

Despite lower levels of application than in the U. S., foreign technical research

and development is more ambitious. PRT systems are in prototype testing in

Japan, Germany and France. If present plans are followed, they will have surpassed United States technological developments in this field in two to four years.

If PRT systems are of interest to United States cities, this country has three

options:

● To begin a catch-up program of research and development.

. To attempt to negotiate cooperative development and licensing agreements

with foreign governments or companies.

● To import the technology when it becomes available.

Foreign AGT system development, in general, is proceeding relatively faster

than it is domestically, in part, because of official attitudes. In the first place, the

purpose of AGT installations overseas is primarily to solve urban transportation

problems; not to perform limited, special tasks, as it is in the U.S. In addition,

uncertainty about the economics of a system (particularly the high technology

systems) is not considered serious enough to halt research and development.

With these attitudes have come institutional advantages to the developers of

foreign systems that are not available to U.S. manufacturers:

France.—A supplier is selected early in the planning process, He details his

design and engineering work for the specific installation, instead of universalizing

the product for general sale. He concentrates his efforts, with the cost of competition eliminated. Developers are also advanced “front-end” funds which are paid

back from the resulting commercial installations; thus the government also has an

incentivre in seeing that the eventual revenue operation is successful.

Germany.-Suppliers arc funded up to 80% of project costs by the Ministry of

Research and Technology. The Ministry finances only those projects which

industry considers most viable. The 20% industry share is an inducement to build

a profitable system, The developer may retain all patents, rights to data and rights

for commercial exploitation.

Japan.—As in other areas, Japanese transportation development involves

cooperative government-industry cartels. Development of the CVS has involved

eight industries, partially funded through the Japan Society for the Promotion of
97

Machine Industry. CVS is managed by a team from the Ministry of International

Trade and Industry and the University of Tokyo. The Japanese Dual-Mode BUS

Program involves a consortium of 17 industrial parties.

One particular interesting institutional arrangement is the Urban Transportation

Development Corporation in Ontario, Canada. The corporation encourages the

participation of other provinces and the federal government in its research and

development efforts, thereby aggregating a large enough market to undertake

large-scale development, license imported technology, and market the various

systems. Sales royalties are used to offset costs of the operation.

In conclusion, a review of foreign programs suggests that there are many

institutional arrangements which the U.S. might consider in developing and

deploying AGT systems. Foreign installations are not as extensive as those in the

U. S., but development programs are more ambitious. The status of technology is

comparable, at present, but if present plans are successfully completed overseas,

foreign technology will surpass that in the U.S. in two to four years.

A BSTRACT OF THE R EPORT OF T HE PANEL ON E CONOMICS

This panel examines the reasons for the scanty AGT market that now exists’

briefly discusses the probable economics of AGT compared with other transit

modes, and recommends an accelerated UMTA research and development program to assess the utility of AGT systems in urban environments.

Properly timed research and development of AGT systems can be expected to

yield two results: improved hardware systems and an understanding of the potential of AGT for competing with auto transportation in cities. To the extent that

the need for urban arterial highways is reduced, there will be a direct return on the

research and development investment. A savings in energy cost over rapid rail will

occur if AGT system technology can produce a reduction m the weight of vehicles

per passenger. At present AGT hardware is not an improvement over rapid rail

with respect to energy cost.

One indication of the size of potential economies of AGT systems lies in the

fact that AGT capital costs are projected by UMTA at half the cost of rail transit

systems, if both are constructed above ground. More research is needed to test

whether the potential AGT cost can be achieved in practice. Research is also

needed on the technical and social implications of deploying AGT in already

developed areas.

No form of existing transit meets the random access needs of the millions of

suburban residents as efficiently as the personal automobile. Once the consumer

owns an automobile, use of that auto versus use of mass transit is determined by

perceived cost, even though the social costs of urban auto use are undoubtedly

much higher.

Therefore, a shift to mass transit could best be achieved by raising the cost of

driving a car in congestion-prone areas. Several reputable studies indicate that

raising the out-of-pocket costs of auto trips is a more effective method than doing

the reverse, that is, lowering transit fares. Political and public opposition, however,

have so far made raising auto costs impractical.

The remaining option is to subsidize competing transit modes as heavily as the

automobile is being subsidized.

Because of their economic situations, states and localities will not be inclined in

the near future to make heavy, additional expenditures for new transit services.

If a community or metropolitan area perceives the level of federal transit assistance

to be low, the demand for building or improving mass transit will also be slight;

the more federal money available, the greater will be the public demand for transit.

The panel finds that the potential benefits nationwide of AGT technology are

great enough to justify the high risk investment which AGT research and development will require.

The panel recommends that Federal research and develoment should remain at

least as high as five percent of the mass transit budget. In the decade 1963–73,

R & D was about seven percent of the total UMTA program; in 1974 the level was

about five percent, and in 1975 and 1976 it dropped to about two percent.

R & D programs should include demonstrations of systems in actual USC. Such

systems should be built in incremental stages, beginning with small applications of

promising technologies and, if these are successful, continuing with progressively

larger applications,

The panel recommends that research and development of AGT systems be

accclerated so that it does not fall behind in the general UMTA mass transit program and so that the technology can be applied during the period of urban growth

expected to end circa 1995.
98

A critical question is the manpower savings that can be achieved by automation. Depending on the levels of wages and interest rates, the amount that can be

economically spent on automation may range up from $100,000 per job saved.

However automated systems have yet to demonstrate significant manpower

savings in practice. Any savings in operating personnel are largely offset by increased maintenance manpower requirements.

The current UMTA program lacks long-term objectives for AGT. It also lacks

hardware specifications and criteria for evaluating AGT systems.

The panel has four major concerns on the current federal AGT research and

development program:

With regard to the “HPPRT” project, selection of one of three quite

different technologies before each is demonstrated could result in selection of

a less than optimal technology and prevent development of alternatives.

With regard to the “HPPRT” project, selection of a single company to

build the prototype AGT project could reduce future competition in the

transit supply field, because of the enormous competitive advantage of the

chosen firm.

Conduct of research and development without application tends to make

R & D a dead-end exercise.

Use of research and development projects for corporate or government

public relations purposes tends to destroy much that could be learned from

the projects.

A BSTRACT OF THE R EPORT OF THE P ANEL ON S OCIAL A CCEPTABILIT Y

This report examines potential attitudes of a spectrum of interest groups re

garding whether or not to introduce an AGT system in a metropolitan com

munity.

The panel found five areas of significant public concern, summarized as follows:

Quality of service.—The acceptability of transit service is clearly dependent on

quality. The level of availability, area coverage, safety and dependability that are

proposed for public AGT systems determine, to a large extent, the social acceptability of the systems.

Relationship to Automobile Use.—Whether AGT is Derceived as an alternative

form of transportation for specialized trips, or perceived as a general transportation system will influence acceptability. The manner in which the relationship

between AGT and automobile use either evolves naturally, or is regulated, is of

public concern.

Cost.—Present knowledge of cost is inadequate. Construction, operation and

maintenance costs for AGT are often generalized and Preliminary. First system

implementation costs and capital and ‘operational financing arraangements have

received little analysis, though financing will directly affect public acceptance.

Aesthetic and Land Value Impact. The total physical impact of AGT systems,

both the appearance and the effect on land values m both business and residential

districts, is poorly understood.

Effect on Development Patterns. Undoubtedly fixed transit guideways and the

travel patterns they create will influence development patterns. However, the

extent of influence and the benefits and liabilities which might accompany

poorly defined patterns are even less well understood than the four effects already

discussed.

The panel makes four recommendations about federal R & D activities:

● Re-evaluate the concept of deriving system performance criteria for

PRT directly from the automobile. The current presumption that automated transit must copy the good features of the automobile in order to

attract people from their cars may be mistaken. This presumption requires

that AGT research and development progress toward pure PRT forms.

Instead, the federal government should develop national goals for AGT

that match its service characteristics with services not being adequately

performed by automobiles. Commuting in critical corridors and access

to and circulation within major activity centers are examples.

● initiate a major research effort into the social, political, financial and

operational effects of installing AGT systems which are matched with

specific, existing transportation needs.

● Establish measures of the benefits and liabilities of AGT to a community

so that the value of the system can be weighed by the public during planning

stages.
99

● Develop guidelines for superimposing fixed guideway systems on urban

master plans, just as guidelines are developed for adopting major thoroughfare plans or urban development plans and superimposing them on the

master plan.

The panel concluded that the general public will support improved transit,

particularly as the cost of private transportation rises. The majority of nontransit users, however, are not likely to ‘convert to transit without special incentives. If installation of automated transit is accompanied by economic penalties

or disincentives to drivers of automobiles, the rising costs could cause this taxpaying majority to balk at transit expenditures, particularly if transit is viewed

as “welfare” program. A national commitment to mass transit, the panel

concludes, must be accompanied by guarantees of federal financial aid sufficiently

large to reassure the local taxpayer that the commitment will be met. Otherwise

the taxpayer, who pays added sales tax or whose home is being assessed for the

local share of transit projects, will object to the increased taxation.

In conclusion, the panel urges that Federal R & d policy include a program

to put several SLT and less sophisticated GRT systems into operation in cities.

The panel rejects the contention that SLT and medium- to large-vehicle GRT

is ready for use whereVer needed. It is the opinion of the panel that UMTA’s

present approach neglects the near term need of local communities, and that

concentrating solely on the small vehicle GRT type commonly called “HPPRT’

will unnecessarily delay putting automated systems into use.

A BSTRACT OF THE R EPORT OF THE P ANEL ON O PERATIONS AND TECHNOLOG Y

This report describes the technological advances necessary to improve upon

present installations or to develop more sophisticated types of Automated Guideway Transit systems. The panel began by identifying potential system applications and then developed technological requirements.

The four unanimous findings of the Panel were as follows:

. The moderate headway Group Rapid Transit concept (headways of 15

seconds or more and \’chicle capacities of 15 passengers or more) can

provide a technologically feasible and useful transit service at a capacity

between that provided by buses and rail rapid transit. GRT line-haul and

collection/distribution services combined with other modes are feasible.

The present need is to develop the concept to a fully automated operational

status, to improve reliability and performance, and to reduce cost and

weight of the vehicles and guideway. A small scale urban installation of an

improved system is essential to establish design and performance standards,

cost data, and the size of the potential market.

. The development of a technological baseline for the Group Rapid Transit

concept should be pursued along with the initial staging of a federally owned

test facility. The baseline can be used to: 1) provide data on performance,

cost, reliability, and safety; 2) formulate specifications for deployable

systems; 3) examine performance and cost trade-offs; and 4) examine

options in operational mode. The proposed UMTA “HPPRT” program,

with reorientation, could provide this development to support and permit

expansion of initial simple deployments of group rapid transit technology.

The “HPPRT” test facility can also be employed for continued development and testing of various automated transit systems and their components.

. The case for or against the Personal Rapid Transit system concept has not

been adequately established. The panel is skeptical regarding the eventual

deployment of these systems because of the long-term development requirements, possible lack of economic viability, and the intrusive nature of the

fine-grid network of guideways. How-ever, limited funding is justified to

clarify the advantages and disadvantages of the PRT concept.

. Because the requirements for development of new technology are dependent

on the application, the federal government should interact more strongly

with transit authorities in urban areas to consolidate and to define the

public transit needs of these areas and the relationship of automated

vehicle transit systems to those needs. This interaction is necessary to

identify which AGT systems combined with which other modes will most

economically meet transportation needs.
100

The panel concluded that certain development requirements are common to all

Automated Guideway Transit systems, regardless of type. These include:

Automation.— Improvements to performance and reliability of certain critical

subsystems such as wayside and vehicle control systems and wayside-to-vehicle

communications; development of software techniques to manage vehicle fleets;

and development of methods to accommodate failures.

Short headway operation will require improvement in vehicle detection, faster

responding equipment, increased accuracy in speed and position control, and

development of controlled deceleration profile emergency braking.

Reliability.— Improved definition of reliability goals, improvement in reliability

of critical subsystems and components, and development of techniques to minimize

the time to restore service in the event of failure. Establishment of a reliability

data bank is recommended.

Guideway Cost and lntrusion.-Guideways represent about one-half the system

capital cost which warrants effort to develop procedures, designs, and erection

techniques to reduce cost. Improved ride quality standards are also required,

System Integration.—Integration of subsystems is necessary to insure that design

objectives are achieved. This process requires computer simulation of systems and

testing of subsystems and components.

The panel concluded that certain technological development requirements are

specific to the different classes of automated systems, as follows:

Shuttle-Loop Transit.—The technology for this class is essentially developed and

available for limited operation in urban areas. Systems still require product

improvement and production engineering, especially in reliability.

Moderate-Headway Group Rapid Transit (greater than 15 seconds) .—The feasibility of this concept has been demonstrated. Improvement is required in reliability, software development for system management, cost and weight reduction of

vehicles and guideway. Vehicle suspension technology trade-offs need to be

examined to determine effects on guideway size, cost, foul weather operation, and

lateral guidance and switching.

Short-Headway Group Rapid Transit (three to 15 seconds).—This class requires

a test facility for integrated system prototype testing with specific attention to

improving the responsiveness and accuracy of longitudinal control systems and to

the development of a controlled deceleration profile emergency braking system.

The potential application of this concept including safety and economic features,

needs to be clarified.

Personal Rapid Transit.—Development requirements for PRT include such

initial steps as establishing the basic system goals: performance, cost, reliability,

service level and development objectives.
APPENDIX C

BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX C

BIBLIOGRAPHY *

F EDERAL P OLICY AND P ROGRAM S

LEGISLATION AND REPORTS TO CONGRESS

Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Tomorrow’s

Transportation: New Systems for the Urban Future: a report from the President

to the Congress; Washington, D. C.; May 1968.13

Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation, A Study of Urban Mass Transportation Needs and Financing: report of the Secretary of Transportation to the

U.S. Congress pursuant to Sec. 138(a), P.L. 93-87 (Federal-Aid Highway Act

of 1973) ; July, 1974.12

U.S. Department of Transportation, Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 and

related laws: a compendium of UMTA legislation, amended through November

26, 1974; document undated.12

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION

Cole, Leon M., for Library of Congress CRS, Summary Review of Federal R&D

Programs in Urban Mass Transportation; July 25, 1973.

Economics and Science Planning, Inc., for UMTA, Public Transportation Service

Quality—Some Program Alternatives (Contract PT-50047); March 6, 1975.1

Fisher, R. J., of UMTA, Overview of the UMTA Service and Methods Demonstrations

Program: paper presented at 54th Annual TRB Meeting, Washington, D. C.;

January 13, 1975.1

General Motors, for UMTA, Cost Parametric Analysis, Dual-Mode Transit

System; March, 1974.2

General Motors, for UMTA, Cost Parametric Data Standardization, Dual-Mode

Transit System; November, 1974.2

Goldmuntz, L., Federal Investment Policy in Urban Transportation R&D; September 4, 1974.2

Kelm, D., Chairman, Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission, and

others, Correspondence Regarding a Proposed Federal R&D Project for High

Performance Personalized Rapid Transit (HPPRT); March-May, 1974.

Orski, C. Kenneth, of UMTA, UMTA Future Directions: remarks delivered at

54th Annual TRB Meeting; January 17, 1975.1

Orski, C. Kenneth, of UMTA, Remarks Before the Conference on Evaluation of

Urban Transportation Alternatives: Airlie House; February 24, 1975.1

Sulkins, Parson, Lieberman, of North American Rockwell Corp., for Department

of Housing and Urban Development, Implementation Requirements for Four

Advanced Urban Transportation Systems; October 18, 1968.23

UMTA, Office of Research and Development, New Systems Division, United

States Department of Transportation Automated Urban Transportation System

Developments; February, 1974.3

UMTA, Office of Research and Development, New Systems Division, High

Capacity Personal Rapid Transit Systems Developments; February, 1974.3

U.S. Department of Transportation, UMTA, Innovation in Public Transportation:

A Directory of Research, Development and Demonstration Projects; June 30, 1974.

(also 1973 and 1972).

UMTA, Office of Research and Development, New Systems Division, United

States Department of Transportation Personal Rapid Transit System Developments;

April, 1974.3

● Entries are keyed with one or more numbers indicating subject areas emphasized in them,

as follows :

1 Planning.

2 Economics.

3 Technology.

~ Social acceptance.

(103)
104

U.S. Department of Transportation, UMTA, Request for Proposal (RFP) DOTUT–30014 High Performance Personal Rapid Transit (HPPRT) System;

February, 1974.

RESPONSES TO OTA PROJECT REQUESTS

Anderson, J. Edward, Correspondence on UMTA’S HPPRT Program; March 6,

1975 (draft, February 28, 1975).

Herringer, Frank C., Correspondence in Answer to Questions on HPPRT and

Evaluation of Morgantown; March 7, 1975.

Howell, J. K., Office of Technology Assessment Transit Project, Urban Transit

Policy; February 17, 1975.

UMTA, Automated Guideway Transit Technology Program; briefing charts prepared for OTA presentation; January 31, 1975.

UMTA, High Performance PRT System Development Program: briefing charts for

OTA presentation; January 31, 1975.

UMTA, High Performance Personal Rapid Transit, Urban Deployability Studies

Program; January 31, 1975.

INDUSTRY POSITION PAPERS

BOEING

Correspondence from Boeing Aerospace Company on Automated Guideway Transit

(AGT) Operations and Technologyj for OTA Project panel on operations and

technology; February 10, 1975.3

O’Brien, Thomas E., and Hitsman, A. E., Official Responses of Boeing on HPPRT;

February 26, 1975 and February 21, 1975.

OTIS-TTD

Best, Keith V., Correspondence from Otis-TTD on High Technology GRT and

AGT systems deployment; March 7, 1975.

Donlon, Richard H., Summary of Market Background: Official position of OtisTTD on Automated Guideway Transit (AGT) research and development;

March 5, 1975.2

ROHR

Ehrlich, Lyman S., Need for Greater Commitment to Transit Technology: official

position of Rohr Industries, Inc.; March 5, 1975.

Lancaster, T. A., and Hearn, D. L., of Rohr Industries, Inc., The Role of Personal

Rapid Transit in Mass Transit: a paper delivered to the Society of Automotive

Engineers; August 12-16, 1974.

M ETROPOLITAN PLANNI N G STUDIE S

NEW YORK

Kaiser Engineers, and others, People Mover Systems for Mid and Lower Manhattan,

for New York City Transit Authority, Metropolitan Transportation Authority,

New York City Planning Commission, and New York City Transportation

Administration; January, 1973.12

SAN DIEGO

Booz, Allen Applied Research and Simpson and Curtin, Personal Rapid Transit

Feasibility Case Study; San Diego: study for Rohr Industries, Inc.; October

1974. 12

BRH Mobility Services Company, and others, Summary of Performance and Engineering Economics Analyses for Alternative Vehicle Systems; Centre City Transit System, City of San Diego; 5 Vol.; January 27, 1975.12

TORONTO

Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, Toronto Transit Commission, and the

Ministry of Transportation and Communications of Ontario, Choices for the

Future, Summary Report; report #64; January, 1975.1
105

TWIN CITIES (CHRONOLOGICALLY )

Alan M. Voorhees & Associates, Inc., Development of a Long-Range Transit Improvement Program for the Twin Cities Area: Technical Report No. 3, for the Twin

Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission; November, 1969.12

Development Research Associates, Financial Plan: Technical Report No.. 6, prepared for the Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission; November

30, 1970.12

Development Research Associates, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Technical Report No. ?’,

prepared for Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission; March 22,

1971.12

Development Research Associates, Evaluation of Regional Growth and Development

impact: Technical Report No. 5, prepared for the Twin Cities Area Metropolitan

Transit Commission; March 25, 1971.14

Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall, and Midwest, Planning and Research,

inc., Transit Options for the Twin Cities Metropolitan Region, prepared for the

Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission; January, 1971.134

Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission, Transit in Transportation;

January, 1971.1

Mass Transit Subcommittee, Metropolitan and Urban Affairs Committee of the

Minnesota State Senate, Report on the Metropolitan Mass Transit Need; November 15, 1973.1

DeLeuw, Cather and Company, Inc., and others, Automated Small Vehicle Fixed

Guideway Systems Study, prepared for the Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission; 11 Vol. and Briefing Charts; September, 1974–March, 1975.1234

Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission, The Optimum Fixed Guideway Plan for the Twin cities, Area: draft report to the 1975 Minnesota Legislature and the Metropolitan Council; February, 1975.1

URBAN TRANSIT S YSTEMS

Deen, Kulash and Baker, of Alan M. Voorhees and Associates, Critical Decisions in

the Rapid Transit Planning Process: paper presented at 54th Annual TRB

Meeting; January, 1975. 12

Golob, Canty, and Gustafson of the Transportation Research Department,

General Motors Research Laboratories, An Analysis of Consumer Preferences

for a Public Transportation System; October 26, 1970.14

Henderson, Clark, of Stanford Research Institute, New Urban Public Transportation Systems; October, 1974.

The MITRE Corporation, Transportation in the U.S.: An Appraisal; January,

1975.1

Owen, W’ilfred, The Accessible City; The Brookings Institution; 1972.1

Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, and System Design Concepts, Inc., Assessment of

Community Planning for Mass Transit, Problem Definition and Technical Supplement, for the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress; August 22,

1974. 124 

Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, and System Design Concepts, Inc., Preliminary

Report, Part 1: Assessment of Community Planning for Mass Transit, Part II

Energy, the Economy and Mass Transit, for the Office of Technology Assessment,

U.S. Congress; February 8, 1975.124

Sobey, A. J., The Future of Public Transportation, A Preliminary Evaluation of Some

Alternatives: paper presented at the International Conference on Transportation

Research; Bruges, Belgium; June 19, 1973.1

U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Highway

Statistics; 1973.2

University of Minnesota faculty in cooperation with the Science Museum of

Minnesota, Comparative Analysis of the Impacts of Conventional and New

Transport Systems: a research proposal; April 3, 1974.14

AUTOMATED GUIDEWAY TRANSIT SYSTEMS

Anderson, J. Edward, The Automation of Urban Transportation: an unedited

manuscript for a proposed book; undated.4

Anderson, Romig, cd., Personal Rapid Transit II—Progress, Problems, Potential:

a compendium of papers presented at the 1973 International Conference on

Personal Rapid Transit; February, 1974.1

234
106

Costantino, Dobson and Canty, General Motors Corporation, An Investigation of

Modal Choice for Dual-Mode Transit, People Mover and Personal Rapid Transit

Systems; May 29, 1974.14

Elms, Charles P., N.D. Lea Transportation Research Corporation, New Transit

Modes: Applicability and Current Status: paper delivered to the Automotive

Engineering Congress and Exposition,; February 24-28, 1975.3

Hall, J. Weston, Systems Concepts Applied to Concrete Guideways: paper presented

to the ASCE-EIC/RTAC Joint Transportation Engineering Meeting in Montreal; July 18, 1974.3

Hemmes, Robert A., A Proposal for a National PRT Program; December, 1974.

Henderson, Clarkj and Erickson, Linda, of Stanford Research Institute, Personal

and Group Rapid Transit System and Technology: A Selected Bibliography, for

NASA; May, 1973.1234

The Mitre Corporation, for the Transportation Systems Center, U.S. Department

of Transportation, Technology Assessment of Personal Rapid Transit Systems;

March, 1974.1

The Mitre Corporation, Technology Assessment of Personal Rapid Transit Systems;

January, 1975.1

Richards, Brian, "PRT/GRT, Development in Personal Rapid Transit,” in

Architectural Digest; March, 1974.3

Todd, Thomas, of research division Minnesota State House of Representatives,

The Transit Issue: abridged version of talk presented to the Minnesota House,

Urban Affairs Committee; January 22, 1975.12

Light Guideway Transit: Lea Transit Compendium, Vol. 1, No. 3; 1974.3

S HUTTL E- LOOP T RANSIT S YSTEM S

Henderson, Clark, Implementation of People Movers at Airports: paper presented at

the 54th Annual TRB Meeting; January, 1975.

The Ford Motor Company, International Transportation System for El PasoJuarez: Part I, Executive Summary; December 21, 1973.1

MPC Corporation, Pittsburgh, Transit Expressway Report: summary report of

testing and evaluation project, for the Port Authority of Allegheny County;

February 20, 1967.234

MPC Corporation, Pittsburgh, Transit Expressway Report, Phase II, for the Port

Authority of Allegheny County; June, 1973.3

PRT Systems Corporation/Franklin Institute Research Laboratories/Herbert

Morris, Ltd., Transit Now For Tomorrow: public relations materials; 1975,

G ROUP R APID T RANSIT S YSTEM S

AIRTRANS

LTV Aerospace Corporation, AIR TRANS, Automatic Transportation System

Technical Orientation; November 15, 1974.3

Morgantown (Chronologically)

Elias, Samy E. G., West Virginia Univ., A Feasibility Study of an Integrated City

and University Transportation System; August, 1970.3

The Boeing Company, M-PRT Phase IB, System and Subsystem CDR’s; Kent,

Washington; March 4-8, 1974.3

The Boeing Company, Product Assurance Critical Design Review, Morgantown;

March 25, 1974.3

The Boeing Company, Morgantown Project History; April 15, 1974.12

Currence, C., for The Boeing Company, Post-Turnover Operational Requirements

Plan, M–PRT, phase IB; May 17, 1974.3

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, Morgantown

Project, Requirements and Constraints Document (TRD 100-1); December 21,

1974.3

Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., for the Smithsonian Institution Air and Space

Museum, Transfer of Aerospace Technology to Civilian Transportation Modes,

Personal Rapid Transit System, Morgantown, W. Va.: draft report; January,

1975.13

Barton-Aschman Associates, Inc., and others, for UMTA, Office of Transit

Planning, Evaluation of Alternatives, Morgantown PRT System; February, 1975.1
107

U.S. General Accounting Office, staff study, The Personal Rapid Transit System,

Morgantown, West Virginia: final report; April, 1975.2

Cole, Leon M., of the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,

Federal Research and Demonstrations in New Transit Technology: The Morgantown, West Virginia Project; May 23, 1975.

GENERA L

Thiokol Chemical Corporation, Materially Speaking: Vo/. #20: public relations

materials; June, 1973.

P ERSONAL R APID T RANSIT S YSTEM S

STUDIES AND PAPERS

The Aerospace Corporation, Personal Rapid Transit, Overview of System

Concept and Development Status; revised October, 1972.3

Anderson, J. Edward, Dais, Jack L., Garrard, William L., and York, Harold L.,

University of Minnesota, Institute of Technology, PRT Planning in the Twin

Cities and Duluth; undated.12

Bernstein? Harry, and Schmitt, Arthur, of the Aerospace Corporation, Emergency

Strategies for Safe Close-headway Operation of PRT Vehicles, in Personal Rapid

Transit; April, 1972.3

Bush, Leon R., of the Aerospace Corporation, The Economics of High-Capacity

PRT Systems, in Personal Rapid Transit; April, 1972.2

Holt, W. J., and Corey, R. W., A Personal Rapid Transit (PRT) System for Las

Vegas, Nevada: technical proposal by Rohr Industries; undated.13

Irving, J. H., of the Aerospace Corporation, The Promise of Area-Wide Personal

Rapid Transit: paper presented at AAAS Annual Meeting; January 28, 1975.1

2

Lavine, Peterson, Bulbulian, University of Minnesota for UMTA, Visual Impact

of Personal Rapid Transit; November, 1974.14

University of Minnesota, for UMTA, Vehicle Scheduling and Control in Personal

Rapid Transit Systems; September, 1974.3

University of Minnesota, Task Force on New Concepts for Urban and Regional

Affairs, Planning for Personal Rapid Transit: a summary report to the Minnesota State Legislature; July, 1973.124

University of Minnesota, Task Force on New Concepts in Urban Transportation, Planning for Personal Rapid Transit; December, 1972.1

24

RESEARCH PROPOSALS

University of Minnesota, Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, A Technology

Assessment of Personal Rapid Transit: a research proposal to the National

Science Foundation; May 21, 1971.

University of Minnesota, Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, Development

of Methods for Planning Automated Network-Cab Transport Systems: a research

proposal to the Department of Transportation; November, 1972.1

COMPENDIUM

Personal Rapid Transit: Lea Transit Compendium, Vol. 1, No. 4; 1974.3

INTERNATIONAL D EVELOPMENT S

AUSTRALIA

Loder, J. L., of Loder and Bayly, Consulting Engineers and Planners, Melbourne

Australia, Automated Personal Transportation; June, 1973.1

CANADA

Foley, K. W., president, Ontario Urban Transportation Development Corporation Go-Urban and the Transit Demonstration System: progress to April 9, 1974.

Soberman, R. M., Vice-president for Planning, Ontario Urban Transportation

Development Corporation, Transportation Concepts for the Future: paper resented to the Canadian Electrical Manufacturers’ Association, Ottawa;

November 5, 1974.1

Ontario Ministry of Transportation and Communications, R&D Division, Intermediate Capacity Transit—Ontario’s Program; February, 1974.
108

FRANC E

Transportation Technology, Inc., Nancy Project Papers; most undated

JAPAN AND WESTERN EUROPF:

Anderson, J. Edward, Developments in Urban Transport Systems in Western

Europe; November 7, 1974.

Howard R. Ross Associates, Plans for Deployment of Advanced Transit Systems in

Euro e and Japan; December 31, 1974 (updated, February 10, 1975).1 s

Asahiraph ? Special Issue on “Transportation Systems with Human Ccmsiderations as the Theme, ” Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, Japan; March 18, 1975.4
PANEL REPORTS

ON

AUTOMATED GUIDEWAY TRANSIT

IN SUPPORT OF

I.

~lN ASSESSMENT

OTHER NEW

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 

OF PRT AND

SYSTEMS

IN THE U NITE D

11. I NTERNATIONAL D E VLOPMENT S

III.

IV. SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY

V. OPERATIOXS AND TECHNOLOG Y

PREP. ~REI) FOR THE

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

“U.S. CONGRESS

,1[’A’E 197.7
The reports contained in this volume are the work of five

panels assembled to compile background material in suport of

Automated Guideeway Transit, An Assessmentt of PRT a Other

New Sywstems, prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment.

The views presented in the Panel Reports are those of the

panel members, as interpreted by the respective panel chairmen,

and do not, necessarily, reflect the views of the Office of Technology Assessment.

(110)
REPORT OF THE PANEL ON

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Prepared for

the Office of Technology Assessment

PANEL MEMBERS

Clark Henderson, Chairman

John K. Howell

John R. Jamieson

Thomas A. Lancaster

Roy LobOScO
CONTENT S

Page

introduction ------ _ -------------- _ --------- _ -------------------- -- 115

Chapter:

1. Ft’hy 14GT?- ---------------- ---- ------------------ --------- 117

2. If’hat arc the A~,T System Types?-- -------------- ------------ 123

~. It-ho Owns AGT Systems? ------------ --------------------- --

129

4. \\”ho I\’ants ACT?- ----------------- ---- ------------------ -- 151

5. if-ho Supplies ACT?- ---------------- ---------------------- - 163

~. Summary and}’icw-s of I{cspondents ---------- ---------------- 181

Appendix: Biographies of Panel hlcmbcrs---- -------------------- ----- 195

(113)
Introduction

The Panel on Current Developments in the United States was

asked to examine the background and current status of automatic

guideway transit in the United States. Attention was devoted to each

of the following questions:

. Why AGT? How do the advocates of AGT argue their case?

. What are the AGT system types? How do personal rapid transit, group

rapid transit, and shuttle-loop transit differ from one another?

. Who owns AGT systems? What systems are in service and in construction?

. Who wants AGT? What agencies have studied possible applications?

What do they have in mind?

. Who supplies AGT? What are the problems of suppliers?

. What have Federal agencies done?

● What are the obstacles to progress? What actions would encourage early,

effective and general exploitation of AGT?

The panel includes five individuals with extensive experience in the

field of urban public transportation. Brief biographies of the panel

members are included in Appendix A. The panel members have

performed this work for OTA within a period of three months while

attending to their regular jobs. Only one meeting of the entire panel

was held—in Washington, D.C. on February 18 and 19, 1975. Four

panel members attended a meeting with UMTA officials on February

14. Some six or eight additional meetings were held when two members

of the panel could et together.

Many sources of data have been used by the panel. Formal documentation of the field is not yet well established. Much of the data

contained in the report was gathered by correspondence, telephone

interviews, and conferences with specialists and leaders in the field.

Although some information expresses the considered positions of

these specialists and their firms the panel has attempted to compile

and report on as factual a basis as possible.

The panel has had valuable assistance from many individuals,

firms, and agencies. The assistance of the following individuals was

especially valuable:

Dennis Elliott, Dallas-Fort Worth Airport.

Phillip E. Gillespie, Westinghouse Electric Co.

James G. Harlow, West Virginia University.

Charles Hickox, LTV Aerospace Corporation.

Arthur E. Hitsman, Boeing Aerospace Co.

Eino Latvalla and Richard Donlon, Otis—Transportation

Technology Division.

Hendrik Pater, Universal Mobility Inc.

Farrel L. Schell, Kaiser Engineers.

A. J. Sobey, General Motors.

Russell Thielman, Ford Motor Company.

W. J. Holt, Rohr Industries, Inc.

(115)
Chapter 1: Why AGT?

N EED FOR M OBILIT Y

People congregate in cities to obtain access to opportunities for

housing, jobs, education, recreation, purchase of goods and services,

medical care and so on. Mobility is the principal means of gaining access to such opportunities. The means for achieving mobility are far

from ideal, and consequently there are strong incentives to improve

transportation services. A review of the characteristics of existing

modes reveals limitations and deficiencies that cannot be easily removed. Therefore the promises of improvements made by advocates

of entirely new automated guideway transit systems warrant careful

study.

W ALKIN G

Walking is the most nearly universal means of achieving mobility

and is used to some extent by all but the severely handicapped. Measures are being taken in some communities to increase the effectiveness and the usage of walking as a mode of urban travel. Among these

are land use patterns that promote closer spatial rouping of urban

structures; better walking surfaces and shelters; e imination of bar- Y

riers; installation of mechanical aids such as elevators, escalators and

conveyors; and the elimination of competition between pedestrians

and vehicular traffic. Howeve~, even if all possible encouragement and

assistance is given to pedestrian travel, most urban residents will remain heavily dependent upon vehicles and other mechanical aids.

P RIVATE V EHICLE S

Automobiles, motorcycles, and bicycles provide the greater part of

urban transportation and will continue to do so for a long time. However, the automobile is too costly for the poor and is not directly usable

by many, including the more affluent, who are unable to drive because

of youth, old age, physical limitations and lack of skill.

Even those who own and operate automobiles are being pressed

by circumstances to re-evaluate their customary practice and to consider alternatives. The main forces at work are all too familiar:

● Environmental programs.

● Energy shortage.

● Traffic safety.

● Congestion.

c Resistance to urban sprawl.

. Desire for transportation efficiency.

Today urban sprawl and the lack of public transit forces many

families to own and operate two or more automobiles at considerable

expense. Future growth in urban population and in affluence will aggravate present auto-related problems and will accentuate the need

for alternatives.

(117)
118

Bicycles are extensively used, especially by the young, and their use

should be encouraged. However, like walking, bicycling will not be

used enough to make everyone mobile. Motorcycles are probably a

negligible factor although they offer advantages over the automobile

in most respects other than safety and comfort.

C ONVENTIONAL U RBAN P UBLIC T RANSPORTATIO N

The conventional public transportation modes now serving urban

America are:

● Transit:

Scheduled Buses.

Rail Rapid Transit—Subways.

Street Cars—Light Rail Vehicles.

Trolley Coaches—Electric Buses.

● Commuter Rail Trains. . School Buses.

● Taxis.

These systems provided about 12.5 billion rides in 1971 for outlays

totaling about $5 billion. These outlays were about 5 percent as great

as the amount spent on the private automobile in the same year. Transit

in typical urban areas provides 3–10 percent of all trips, 15–30 percent of all peak-hour tmps and 30–50 percent of peak-hour trips to the

central area.

The programs of UMTA and earlier agencies have focused on the

four transit modes and commuter rail. These programs began modestly in the early 1960’s and have increased greatly both in scope and

in funding levels. Yet a decade of federal support passed before the

decline of transit patronage was stopped and regrowth has been small.

The characteristics of the two principal conventional modes of

transit are ill-suited for universal application in all urban situations.

. Rail systems are capital-intensive and are difficult to justify except where

their high capacities can be utilized.

. Buses are labor intensive and, in most cases, slow. Frequent service is

usually provided only on heavily traveled routes and only during peak

hours of travel.

Rail and bus systems appear incapable of providing service of good

quality throughout metropolitan areas at all times of day and at

acceptable costs. Even 100 percent or 200 percent increases in outlays

for rail and bus service would leave most of the problem of urban

mobility unsolved.

The level of public expenditure necessary to extend rail and bus

service to all urban areas and to raise the quality of transit services

to the level enjo~-ed by auto travelers would almost certainly be unacceptable. Therefore, compelling reasons exist for a search for new

modes of transportation that will be more effective and less costly.

Both public and private agencies are making innovative uses of

conventional vehicles in providing para-transit services. Among

these are:

Dial-a-Bus.

Shared ride taxis.

Employer or developer supplied van pools.

Subscription bus pools.

Matching schemes for car pools.
119

These systems undoubtedly provide valuable services and may enjoy considerable growth. However, some are costly and others are

mainly suitable for work trips to major employers. They offer aid but

are not full solutions.

A DVANCED S YSTEM S

Since the early 1960’s there has been growing interest in the possibility that advanced urban public transportation systems can be

explolted to overcome existing deficiencies and to satisfy other

broadly defined urban goals. Advanced systems include accelerating

pedestrian conveyors, continuous capacity or moving way vehicle

systems, fast urban transit links, and dual-mode transit as well as

several types of automated guideway transit systems (AGT).l The

latter class is the subject assigned to this panel.

A major incentive for U.S. development of AGT systems was provided in 1966 by the Reuss-Tydings Amendments to the Urban

Mass Transportation Act of 1964. These amendments required the

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to: 1 1 . . . undertake a project to study and prepare a program

of research, development, and demonstration of new systems of

urban transportation that will carry people and goods within

metropolitan areas speedily, safely, without polluting the air,

and in a manner that will contribute to sound city planning. The

program shall (1) concern itself with all aspects of new systems

of urban transportation for metropolitan areas of various sizes,

including technological, financial, economic, governmental, and

social aspects; (2) take into account the most advanced available

technologies and materials; and (3) provide national leadership

to efforts of States, localities, private industry, universities, and

foundations. ”

The resulting report, Tomorrow’s Transportation, New Systems for the

Urban Future, was submitted by the President to the Congress in

May, 1968. This report and the related backup stuclies are credited

with prompting interest in government and industrial development of

AGT systems in the U.S. and abroad.

Various types of AGT systems have been envisioned for use in

conjunction with one another and as complements and supplements to

conventional modes. A single, all-purpose AGT system is not likely to

emerge in the foreseeable future. hfore likelJ”, multi-modal mixes of

conventional and advanced systems till be used.

Automated guidewa~r s~wtems are used and have been studied in a

variety of settings. Among these are relativel~’ small applications in

major activity centers such as airports and business district?, large

networks to serve entire metropolitan areas, and installations in

heavily traveled corridors. If AGT systems can be widely exploited,

as many authorities envision, they may prove to be the most valuable

of all urban public transportation modes in terms of the amount and

qualit~r of service rendered, the economy of capital and operational

costs, and in contributions to social goals. However, widespread use

will also require enormous capital outlays.

Automated guidewa~r transit systems have a remarkable ability to

capture the imagination, and a considerable number of advocates has

1 See p. 129 for definitions of AGT types and settings.
120

emerged. Included are scientists, engineers, transportation specialists

from various fields, university professors, public officials, inventors,

consultants, manufacturers and citizens-at-large.

The advantages claimed for automated guideway transit are summarized below. Some of the advantages are available, to varyin

degrees, from other modes. Also, various AGT system types wi 1f

undoubtedly differ from one another in their abilities to dehver the

advantages claimed.

More Routes and Stations.—It is argued that AGT systems can

economically serve a 1arge number of routes and many closely spaced

stations, thus they can make service more nearly universally accessible than is possible with conventional modes and para-transit. This

attribute is especially valuable to travelers with limited mobility via

automobile.

Travel Tirne.—AGT will allow passengers to save travel time. They

will board vehicles with shorter waiting times and proceed to their

destination at higher average speeds than with conventional modes.

Ofl-Peak Service.—Furthermore, it is claimed that AGT systems

can maintain a uniformly high level of service at all times of the day

and night whereas conventional modes almost universally cut back

service to save on labor.

&’ajety.-It is claimed that automated guideway systems will be

safer than manually controlled vehicles to passengers and nontravelers as well.

Costs to Operators. -It is argued that certain types of AGT systems

can provide a high level of service with less capital cost than is required

for rail systems, especially on routes requiring intermediate or low

capacities. Current costs of entire rail rapid transit systems are in the

range of $20-$50 million per mile for capacities of about 30,000

passengers per hour per direction. Underground lines cost as much as

$100 million er mile.

It is also c aimed that AGT can provide more service per unit of Y

labor cost than buses and taxis. Relying on these claims, it is argued

that the life-cycle costs of AGT systems can be lower than conventional systems for prescribed conditions and levels of service, and that

AGT systems can have superior cost-effectiveness characteristics on

many routes.

Resources.—For a given set of conditions it is claimed that AGT

systems will save land, material, energy and the time and effort of

travelers. Furthermore, urban development plans geared to the use of

AGT s~stems will enlarge those savin s.

Enmronment.— It is claimed that GT systems will reduce air and 1

water pollution, noise, aesthetic offenses, and damage to biotic communities while providing an improved environment to users in terms

of ride quality, comfor~, visual impact and convenience.

Employers.—It is clalmed that employers—public and private-will

gain from an enlarged labor market, more regular attendance and less

need for employee parking lots.

Merchants.-It 1s claimed that some merchants will gain from an

enlarged market and from less need for parking lots.

S’chools.-It is claimed that AGT systems can relieve school districts of a substantial part of the burden of transporting students.

Luhor.-It is claimed that the construction and operation of AGT

systems will create employment opportunities of value to labor.
121

Suppliers.—It is claimed that the development, manufacture and

installation of AGT systems will provide valuable business o portunities, will exploit United States developed technology, an will /

promote a favorable balance of trade.

Land Owners.-It is claimed that AGT systems will increase the

value of land and floor space, reduce the total cost of land develo men~,

and speed the development of land in areas near stations. A us, lt

would contribute toward im roved efficiency of operations.

Land Use Patterns and rban Form.—It 8 is clalmed that new fixed

guideway systems will encourage clustered development in land use

rather than continued costly development of urban sprawl where costs

of public service are exceptionally high.

Tazpayers.—It is claimed that AGT systems will enjoy higher

patronage and lower unit costs than conventional modes and that the

need for subsidies will be less per passenger served. Where subsidies

are required they will be amply rewarded by savings in travel time,

increased productivity, and the like.

NEED FOR VALIDATION

The claims made by the advocates of AGT systems require close

study and evaluation. It is natural to expect that results will differ

greatly among system types and application sites; thus requiring

detailed analyses and comparisons of life-cycle costs, revenues,

operating and service attributes, environmental impacts, and contributions to social goals.
Chapter 2: What are the AGT Systems Types?

Terms for automated guideway transit systems and related subjects

have not yet been completely standardized. Consequentl~’, the vocabulary of this report contains a number of new terms. The names of

system types and other specialized terminology are italicized where

defined or explained.

The following names and acronyms are used:

Automtited Guideway Transit (AGT).

Personal Rapid Transit (PRT).

Group Rapid Transit (GRT).

Shuttle-Loop Transit (SLT).

Automated guideway transit systems have two distinguishing features:

. The?” have their own roadwa~w which are usually called exclwnve guideways. Guideways may be elevated, at or near

ground level, or underground.

● Vehicles are automafed—Thatt is, they can carry passengers

without a driver on board although a staff of employees is

used to monitor operations, assist and provide security for

passengers, collect fares, maintain and service equipment,

and perform administration. Attendants may be assigned to

vehicles or trains on occasion.

AGT S YSTEM S

AGT systems can differ from one another in ~ great many ways and

any scheme of sub-classification is necessarily somewhat arbitrary.

~1’hrec sub-classes are defined below. ‘rhe~~ differ with respect to

technical sophistication, service attributes, operations and availability

or readiness for applications by local transit agencies. These differences are summarized in the tabulation entitled Attributes of AGT

Systems. A representative concept of each is shown on the next page.

Further pictures and diagrams of AGT are contained in Chapter 3 of

of this report.

(123)
CLASSESOF

Shuttle-Loop Transit

● simplest technology

. little or no switching

● vehicle size varies

. long headway-60

seconds or more

Passenger Shuttle-Tampa International Airport

AIRTRANS-Dallas/Fort Worth

Airport

Personal Rapid Transit

● one to six riders

● no en route delays or transfers

● short headway—less than two

seconds

Group Rapid Transit

switching to shorten en route

delays

more than six riders

intermediate headway-three to

60 seconds

Cabinentaxi—Hagen, W. Germany
Attributes of AGT Systems

PRT GRT SLT

Availability for use___ ----- Future:

No revenue system, no system

in construction, no systems

planned.

Operations.. - _ ___________ Vehicles follow paths tailored

to personal needs of traveler.

Service- _ _ --- _ _ -- _ _ _ ----- Traveler will ride alone or

with his own travel party

in one vehicle from origin to

destination with minimum

en route delays and no

transfers.

Guideway configuration---- Network of single or double

gu:;;;a: :r v ~

;rm;; ~a @ ~

r

decelerating and accelerating guideways at off-line

stations—switching extensively used.

Technical sophistication---- Complex. Only partly demonstrated.

Emerging:

1 revenue system exists and 1

system is in construction.

Others are in the planning

stage.

Vehicles or trains follow multiple paths.

Traveler must wait for right

vehicle and ride with group.

Traveler will bypass some

or all en route stations and

will make few transfers.

Single and double guideway,

trunk, and branching lines,

stations on-line or off-line,

switching commonly used.

Intermediate. Not yet perfected in application.

Current:

Many systems are in service,

in construction, and in planning stage.

Vehicles or trains follow unvarying paths.

Traveler will board first vehicle, will be delayed at en ~

route stations, if any, and @

will transfer from route to

route.

Single and double guideway

shuttles and loops, on-line

stations, switching used

sparingly.

Simple. Requires refinement.
126

It is not always easy to draw sharp boundaries between classes and

efforts to do so are tedious and impractical. Consequently, the following definitions deal with middle-of-class examples.

PRT SYSTEMS

The term personal rapid transit or PRT entered the technical vocabulary in 1968 when It was used in "Tomorrow’s Transportation”

to identify a conceptual system that would use automobile scale

vehicles (two to six seats). Each vehicle would carry one person or a

small group traveling together by choice—a single travel party. Vehicles

would operate over a network or grid of guideways having many stations and intersecting lines. The intersections of lines would provide

each vehicle with alternative paths. Switches (or the equivalent) would

allow vehicles to make turns or to continue in the original direction of

travel just like autos at street intersections and freeway interchanges.

These intersections of routes are called nodes, and the ability of vehicles

to continue or to change directions at nodes is called coupling. PRT

systems are fully coupled at the nodes.

Nothing would prevent strangers from riding together in a PRT

vehicle if they chose to do so. However, in a PRT network containing

dozens or hundreds of stations, there will be few occasions when opportunities for ride sharing occur by chance. For example, one traveler

about to board a vehicle at station number 1 bound for station number

99 is unlikely to encounter a stranger going to the same place. Furthermore, it can be shown that the first rider would usually suffer an intolerable delay if he were required to wait for another person going to

the same place.

PRT vehicles will carry loads comparable to private automobiles

and therefore must follow one another very. closely to achieve acceptable line capacities. The time interval between vehicles is called

headway. Transit experts agree that close spacing or short headway is

necessary to make PRT systems attractive for metropolitan networks.

For example, an average headway of about two seconds will be needed

to give a PRT line a capacity equal to one lane of auto traffic on a

freeway—about 1800 vehicles carrying average loads of 1.4 passengers,

or 2,500 passengers per hour per direction. An average headway of

about one-half second will be needed to give a PRT line the same capacity as auto traffic on a four-lane freeway-—about 10,000 passengers

per hour per direction.

PRT systems must have stations located on sidings rather than on

the main line--i.e. off-line platforms. This feature allows some vehicles

to pass a station while others stop. The most severe technological

challenges that face developers of PRT systems are to achieve close

headways safely, reliably, and economically, and to manage thee empty

vehicle fleet. No PRT system exists, and no urban application is m

early prospect.

While some PRT proponents feel the social benefits of private party

service will provide superior public transit, others feel the environmental issues far surpass the severity of the technological issues mentioned above. Aerial guideways in residential areas; the large number

of lines (both main lines and sidings) ; the size and number of stations

needed in downtown areas; and large number of vehicles in motion

represent visual intrusion issues yet to be considered.
127

GRT SYSTEMS

Group rapid transit systems are designed to serve travel groups

having similar origins ancl destinations rather than single travel

parties. G1l’1’ vehicles maj” be of any size although van-scale and

bus-scale vehicles (ten to fiftj passengers) are likely to be most

common. Trains maj- be used.

GRT ~~-stems ma~~ have on-line stations on lightly traveled route

and off-line stations on main rolltes. GRT routes may divide into

branchin@ines and maj- remerge, bllt thej” do not have full~~ collpled

3-w\Ijr or 4-w~y nodes. ‘1’hc combination of branches and off-line

stntlons allows the ~ystem to l)rovidc service on a variet(j’ of routes,

thus the traveler using a GR’1’ sj’stcm m~lst be careful to bomrd tl~c

correct car and mav ha,vc to wait while other cars ]Jass. (See Figplrc ;j

below). Also, GR71’ passengers making relativclj- long triI)s in a

metropolitan-scale sj’stem v’ill ])robablj- find it necessar~r to make one

or a few transfers from one vehicle to another.

GRT headwa}s can be relatively long in comparison with PRT.

]’or exanll)lc, a ‘line with average headwajrs of about 15 scconds—

vs. 2—and a}’eragc vehicle loads of about 10 persons-—vs. 1.4—would

carr~- as nlan~- passengers as one frecwa~- land devoted to auto trdfic—

2,500 ])asscngers per hour per direction. J“ehicle loads of 40 would

increase line ca])acitlr to 10,000 passengers per hour ])er direction with

single vehicles or 20,000 passengers per hour per direction w.itl]

two-vehicle trains.

GI’OUp rapid transit systems exist at Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport,

Texas, and in Xiorgantown, ~~~est Virginia and on the West Virginia

~niversit~r ctimpus. These s~-stems represent two quite different technical approaches. The llallas/Ft. Worth system has been in service for

more than a y;ar. Thp Nlor,qantown s)’stem is scheduled for operational

testing b~T ml[l-197S. 130th have experienced considerable difficult~-

but offer valllab]e opportunities for learning. Substantial effort can be

profitabl~ expended on the perfection of those two s~-stems ancl on the

design of altcrnati~’es suitable for other applications.

SLT SYSTEMS

Shuttle-loop transit systems are the simplest of the three sub-systems

find b~’ far the best understood. SLT systems have a single essential

characteristic: their vehicles follow unvarying paths and make little

or no INC of switches. Vehicles nla~’ be of any size, and trains may be

used .

‘1’hc ~“chir]es of a sh~lttle s}’stcm move back and forth on a simple

gllidewa?r-t l]e horizont fil cq~l;valent of an automat ed elevator. Shut t les

ha~’e stations at botl~ ends of the run and maj’ have intermediate

st[i t ions as we]]. (See Figure 1 below).

The vel~icles of a loop system move round and round a closed path

which m:l~’ incl{ldc an?’ number of stations. Stations are on the main

line. IIcadva]s are ]imltcd to about 60 seconds. (See Figure 2, below.)

J’ariations of the S1.’1’ make limite(l IIW of sw-itches. Do(lblc gui(lewa~’ lines nl:i~’ (~se crosso~’er switches ratl~cr than tllrnaround tracks at

the cnfls. Single g[]i(lpwaj- lines usc switches to allow two cars or trains

to b}Tpass near the midpoint of the line.
128

Capacity and speeds of SLT systems can vary over a wide range.

For example, one application has two shuttles on parallel guideways in

each route. The run is 1,000 feet long, the vehicle capacity is 100 passengers, the maximum speed is 30-35 mph, and the capacity of each

shuttle is 2,500 passengers per hour per direction—equal to the capacit of one freeway land devoted to auto traffic.

1LT systems are becoming relatively common in the United States.

There are 15 installations, counting those in construction, from four

suppliers.
Chapter 3: Who Owns AGT Systems?

The panel has identified and obtained data on seventeen AGT

installations presently in existence in the United States. Fifteen are

of the shuttle and loop transit type: of these, nine are operating and

six are in construction with completion scheduled for mid-1975.

There are no personal rapid transit systems in service or in construction. The installations are:

SHUTTLE AND LOOP TRANSIT

Operating

1. Tampa International Airport, Florida, 8 Shuttles.

2. Houston Intercontinental Airport, Texas, 1 Loop.

3. Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Washington, 2 Loops,

1 Shuttle.

4. Love Field, Dallas, Texas, 1 Loop.

5. California Exposition and State Fair, Sacramento, 1 Loop.

6. Hershey Amusement Park, Hershey, Pa., 1 Loop.

7. Magic Mountain, Valencia, Calif., 1 Loop.

8. Carowinds, Charlotte, NT

. C., 1 Loop.

9. Kings Island, Kings Mill, Ohio, 1 Loop.

In Construction

10. Kings Dominion, Ashland, Va., 1 Loop.

11. Pearl Ridge, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1 Shuttle.

12. Bradley International Airport, Hartford, Corm., 1 Shuttle, byass.

13. Fairlane Town Center, Dearborn, Mich., 1 Shuttle, bypass.

14. Miami International Airport, Florida, 2 Shuttles.

15. Busch Garden, Williamsburg, Va., 1 Loop.

GROUP RAPID TRANSIT

Operating (partial)

16. Dallas/Ft. Worth Regional Airport, Texas, 17 Overlapping

Loops.

In Construction

17. Morgantown, West Virginia, 3 Stations with demand responsive

routing and scheduling.

(129)
130

TAMPA AIRPORT COMPLEX

Figure I.—Shuttle System Layout

(a) Passengers Boarding
131

TAMPA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

In April, 1971 the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, after

a nine-year program of study and construction, opened a new air

terminal of pioneering design. Among other features it included eight

guideways and driverless shuttle vehicles. This installation is the

largest and most not able example of the use of shuttles.

The design objective for the new terminal complex was to limit the

walking distances of air travelers to a maximum of 700 feet—a distance considered tolerable to virtually everyone. The same terminal

design without the shuttles would have imposed walks in the range of

about 1,500 to 2,500 feet. Although the designers observed the imposition of much longer walks at other airports they considered distances greater than 1,300 feet to be burdensome to almost all travelers

and unacceptable to some.

The terminal complex includes a central building and four satellites.

Space is reserved for two more satellites (See Fig. 1). Each satellite is

linked to the central building by an elevated structure about 1,000

feet long containing two guideways and a walkway for emergency use.

Each guideway carries a single passenger vehicle which operates as a

shuttle between two stations. (See Fig. lb). The system is the horizontal equivalent of an automated express elevator.

Each ~-chicle carries 100 passengers normally- (125 with crowding).

The \-chicle dwells-stands idle to unload and reload—about so seconds

at each station. Travel time is about 40 seconds at a maximum commanded speed of so to 35 mph, Each vehicle can make about 25 round

trips per hour. Thus the capacity of each shuttle is about 2,500 passengers per hour both to and from the central building. Each twoshuttle route can carry about 5,000 passengers per hour in both directions—about the same as a four-lane freeway devoted to auto traffic.

The average trip time, counting waiting and riding, is about 1.25

minutes for a l,000-foot trip. This is equivalent to a constant speed

of about 9 miles per hour, or about three times as fast as walking.

The equipment w-as produced b?- Westinghouse Electric Corporation. It is the second in a series of five installations by that firm. The

first was the Port Authority of Alleghany County Demonstration

Project at South Park, Pa. The airport estimates that the total cost

of the system was $8.25 million; $4.5 million for engineering and transit hardware; and $3.75 million for structures, stations, utilities and

the like. operating costs are now about $275,000 per year-only

$6,000 of that is for electric power. A work force of 6 is required to

keep the 8-car system in 24-hour service.

The Tampa shuttles have carried about 50,000,000 passengers in

slightly less than four years of operation. At present the system

averages about 37,000 passengers per day.

No fare is collected. The cost of supplying the service is about 7

cents a ride, including capital and interest as well as operations.

The system is able to provide service on each route almost constantly-99.96 percent of the time in 1973. When stoppages occur,

the system fails gracefully’. Individual vehicles arc stopped involuntarily about once every 20 hours on the average—usually for very

minor incidents. They are restored to service with an average delay
132

of less than 7 minutes. The stoppage of one vehicle does not impede

the vehicle on the parallel path and passengers are usually able to

change cars after a brief delay. In the rare case when both vehicles

are out of service—about once a week on each line—travelers simply

leave the stopped car—which is always possible—and finish the trip

on foot on the walkway. The walk requires less than 4 minutes.

There have been no accidents in which vehicles were damaged. In

one case power was reversed on a moving car, and two passengers

suffered significant injuries. There have been reports of minor injuries

and a few claims. As a whole, the injuries and claims have been

substantially lower, on a comparable basis, than those encountered

on the facility’s elevators and escalators.

Each vehicle runs about 48,000 miles per year-comparable to a

New York City subway car. Vehicle travel totals about 1,500,000

miles to date.

HOUSTON INTERCONTINENTAL AIRPORT

In 1969, the City of Houston opened up one of the largest commercial airports that had ever been planned and built from bare

ground. The program had started in 1960. The terminal design was

innovative in arrangement and in its dependence upon driverless

vehicles operating on a simple closed loop.

Monotrain at Houston—Rohr Industries

The objective was to limit walking distances to about 600 feet for

most air ‘travelers. The terminal c;mplex is being built in stages

and when complete, will include four terminal buildings and a hotel

complex. The units stand in a straight line and are separated from

one another by more than M mile. The entire complex will be longer

than one mile. Two terminals were built in the initial phase and the

hotel was recently completed.
133

The guideway and a median walkway are underground in tunnels

beneath parking lots and in the basements of buildings. The route

is about 3,oOO feet long with 6,20( I feet of guideway. There are eight

stations: one in the hotel, two in the terminals and five in the parking

lots. There is also a separate maintenance and storage area and

switches for moving trains to and from passenger service.

Each train includes three cars and has a total capacity of up to

36 passengers—half seated and half standing. At present average

headwa~’s can be as low as 3 minutes, when all 6 trains are used,

and the highest capacit~” is about 72o passengers per hour per direction.

With a larger fleet-18 trains in service—the system would reach its

limiting headways of 60 seconds and its maximum capacity of about

2,160 passengers per hour per direction.

Vehicles operate at a maximum speed of 8 mph but stop at every

station and slow for short-radius turns. Average speed of travel is

about 400 ft. per minute—only about 50 percent better than walking.

Average waiting time for a vehicle is now about 2 minutes but may

eventually be as low as 30 seconds. While the system does not save

much time for the average traveler it is a basic convenience. It is

usually agreed that time spent riding is more tolerable than equal time

spent walking, for most travelers, and also that the ability to ride

is especiall~~ valuable for travelers encumbered with luggage, parcels

or small chddren. Thus the system provides valuable services without

greatly shortening travel time.

The system originally installed was replaced in 1972 by a system

purchased from Westinghouse Air Brake Corporation (WABCO).

That product line was later sold to Rohr Industries, and Rohr has

provided aid in perfecting the design and maintaining the system.

The Houston installation is the first of two revenue systems of this

design. (See Pearl I{idge below.) A test track was established at

Cape May, New Jersey during product development and remains in

service.

Total capital cost of the system has not been estimated. Cost of

the replacement hardware was reported to be $815,000. Total operating costs are not available. A fare is not charged and data on patronage

are not available.

The system is reported to have experienced many technical difficulties that caused frequent interruption of services at the outset.

Many of these problems are reported to have been worked out.

However, data are not available on the mean time between failures

and mean time to restore service,

The layout of the Houston airport system does not lend itself to

partial operation when trouble develops—it does not fail gracefully.

A defect on one train or at one point on the guideway will block the

loop and stop the entire system within a short time. h-o provision

has been made to reverse trains so that serviceable trains can provide

a shuttle service. Neither is it possible to cross over to the other

track or to turn back at an intermediate point to maintain partial

service.

‘I’he s~’stem has an excellent safet~’ record. There has been one case

of damage to a vehicle while under manual control but no accident of

consequence involving passengers.

The six trains in this s~wtem accumulate more than 34,000 miles of

travel each year.
134

S EATTL E- TACOMA I NTERNATIONAL A IRPOR T

In mid-1973 the Port of Seattle opened two major new satellite

facilities at Sea-Tac and began operation of an SLT system. It includes about 8,800 feet of route in three elements: one shuttle and

two loops (See below). A single vehicle type is used. Cars are shifted

from one element to another and to the storage and maintenance

area by three transfer tables.

All routes are below ground level and the loops are located beneath

aircraft taxiways and aprons over much of their length. The objective

of this system was to provide the sole means of passenger access for

the two satellites that are several hundred feet away from the buildings of the central terminal complex. This design eliminated the need

for finger piers or other connections above ground and conserved scarce

land for the movement and parking of aircraft.

The shuttle is located beneath the main terminal complex. It has

a single track ancl operates one vehicle between two stations almost

1,000 feet apart. Each of the two loops has a single track and three

stations: one in the new satellite terminal, one interfacing with a

shuttle station and one at the outer end of a concourse which is an

extremity of the central terminal complex. The loops are about 3,700

and 4,1OO feet long.

Figure 2.—Sea-Tac Satellite Transit System Layout

The vehicles normally carry 102 passengers with 12 seated and 90

standing (see below). When fully equipped the system will have 25

vehicles. At present there are 9 vehic]es in service and 3 on order. When

9 vehicles are in use four are assigned to each loop and one to the

shuttle. Capacities are about 1,800 passengers per hour per direction

on the shuttle and about 4,800 passengers per hour in the one direction

of travel on the loops. Loop capacities can be increased to 14,400 passengers per hour. Vehicles receive ma~inllln~ spe~d~ con~man.d of 27

mph. Average trip times, including both the wmt and the ride, me

about 1.8 mmutes on the shuttle and about 3,3 minutes on the loop.

The Sea-Tac system was supplied by Westinghouse Electric

Corporation and is the second revenue system from that source. The

capital cost of the initial 9-vehicle system has been estimated by the
135

airport to be $14 million including $5.3 mi

and its installation and $8.7 million for

elements. The annual operating cost has

lion for the transit hardware

tunnels, stations and other

been estimated at $540.000

per }-ear. Total cost pe~ airline”passenger is estimated at almost 274:

about 9# for operation and about 18f for capital recovery with interest.

No fare is collected. Patronage has been estimated to be about

6,000,000 riders per ~’ear.

The system enjo~-s a high degree of reliability. The mean time between failures for a vehicle is almost a week, The mean time to restore

service is 6 minutes. Service is available within two minutes at all

stations 99.9~o of the time.

The system is designed to limit the consequences of failures when

they occur. Personnel at a console in a central control room can use

remote controls to restart vehicles, push or pull defective vehicles,

form and separate trains, and operate transfer tables to add or remove

vehicles from service. When a vehicle is stalled between stations on one

of the loops, all other vehicles on the loop can be operated in a shuttle

mode and all stations can be served. Passengers in a stalled vehicle can

always evacuate to a parallel walkway and walk to the next station.

There have been no accidents of consequence.

It is estimated that each vehicle will average 47,000 miles of travel

per year.

Vehicle in Tunnel Vehicle Interior

Westinghouse Electric Satellite Transit System

Seattle-Tacoma Airport
136

/’ ‘

Loop System Designed for Braniff

International Airline at Love Field,

Dallas, Texas-now idle due to

Braniff service shut down.

B RANIF F- STANRAY C ORPORATIO N

LOVE FIELD

Early in 1970, Braniff International inaugurated a new transit

service at Love Field, Dallas, Texas. It connected their portion of the

air terminal and a parking lot located some 4,200 feet away from the

terminal. The objective was to exploit parking space far beyond

tolerable walking distance and also to make access to Braniff more

attractive than other air lines. The system has been idle since Braniff

ended commercial services at Love Field.

The system employs a single closed loop. Switches and sidings are

incorporated at both ends of the loop for empty vehicle storage and at

one end for maintenance and cleaning. One terminal of the route is at a

building in the pinking lot and the other is in the terminal near the

aircraft loading gates. A single intermediate station is located on the

line to the parking lot at a point near the former baggage retrieval

urea. The .guideway is mn overhead monorail about 8,400 feet in length

located some 20 feet above grade in double guideway configuration

with loops at each end.

Vehicles normall~ carry up to 10 passengers with six seated and four

standing md up to 14 with crowding. Minimum headway was reported

to be 20 seconds and maximum capacity was said to be 2,OOO passengers

per hour per direction. However, the fleet contained only 10 vehicles

(rather than a full complement of 20) and it appears likely that actual

capacity was about 600 passengers per hour per direction.
137

Maximum speed is about 15-17 mph with an average near 13 mph.

Waiting was usually brief and total travel time is about 4–5 minutes.

The overall speed is at least equivalent to three times walking speed.

The system was tailored to the needs of the owner—Braniff International. It was developed and installed by a team including the

airline, Stanray Corporation, and American Crane Corporation. The

system at Love Field is the only one of its type. It is reported to be

usable and available for sale. At present the monorails and one vehicle

are being used by PRT Systems, Inc. as a test facility for an advanced

version of the system.

The cost of stations is not known but costs of equipment and structures have been reported to be about $925,000 including losses born

by the contractors. Annual operating costs have been reported to be

about $240,000 per year including about $10,000 for power. Operating

costs were reported to be 45¢ per vehicle mile.

Fares were not charged but it was estimated that patronage was at

least 1.5 million riders in the last year of service and at least 5,000,000

in the entire period of service.

Estimates have not been prepared of the mean time between failures

or of the mean time to restore service. However, the owner expressed

pleasure regarding the reliability of the system during the last half of

the 4-year service period. Five employees were required to maintain

the system. Two employees were always available for emergencies but

they- performed other duties unless called.

Evacuation of stalled vehicles presented a difficult problem since

the passengers were some 15 feet above ground level. Fortunately,

evacuations became infrequent as reliability improved and did not

pose a severe problem.

The safety record of the system was very good. One accident

occurred under manual control and caused damage to an empty car.

there were no accidents of consequence involving passengers.

Based on data reported from the project, it can be inferred that the

entire fleet accumullated about 500,000 vehicle miles per year and that

individual vehicles traveled about 50,000 miles per year.

This system is considered successful by the owners.

CALIFORNIA EXPOSITION AND SIMIL.4R SYSTEMS

,Six loop systems from one supplier-Universal mobility, Inc.—have

been installed in recreational facilities in the U.S. T’hree installations

of the same type were used at EXPO 67 in Montreal, Quebec, Canada,

and others are used abroad. Some of these systems serve transportation purposes primarily and some have only an entertainment purpose.

Some use open vehicles while others are enclosed and air conditioned.

All are automated but some, carry attendants, observers or narrators.

The system are included in this discussion because they are undoubtedly~- applicable in a variety of non-recreational uses. Experience

gamed in their use is valuable

The California Exposition system was first installed in about 1968

but was removed for a time and then replaced for the 1974 Exposition

and Fair. It ranI~ under automatic control in 1974 but with a monitor

on board. It is expected to operate unattended in 1975.
138

The main purposes of the system is to transport passengers between

the main gate and a major attraction on the opposite side of the

grounds. The entertainment value of the ride is secondary’. The route

is 1.7 miles long and links two stations. A plan has been made to add

4 miles of dual guideway to serve a second recreation park some distance from the fair grounds.

The system employs four trains. Each train includes 8 vehicles and

carries 50 to 60 passengers. Trains are reported to have maximum

speeds of about 10 mph nnd make about 4 or 5 round trips per hour.

Capacity is about 1,500 to 2,000 passengers per hour per direction.

The capital cost of the system is not known although one report

places it at about $2.5 million. operating cost is estimated to be

$40,000 per year with most costs incurred during a 23-day season.

operating cost is about 27¢ per ride. A 50¢ fare is charged. In 1974,

revenue of $75,000 was received from 150,000 riders. The 1975 season’s

patronage is expected to be higher.

Safety has not been a problem. Reliability statistics are not available. However. significant delays are rare.

The

●

●

●

●

●

other U. S.”insta]lations “of this type are listed here:

Hershey Amusement Park

Hershey, Pennsylvania

In service since 1969.

Magic Mountain

Valencia, California

In service since 1971

Carowinds

Charlotte, N,C.

In service since 1972.

Kings Island

Kings Mill, Ohio

In service since 1974

Kings Dominion

Ash~and, Virginia

To0 enter service in 1975.

A representative of the supplier reports that 6 U.S. and 3 Canadian

installations represent a total capital cost of about $30 million and

that the systems have carried 125 million passengers wthout serious

injuries or fatalities.

PEARL RIDGE

During 1975 a shuttle system will be installed in Pearl Ridge,

Honolulu, Hawaii, by private interests to link two shopping centers

separated by about 1,000 feet. Service is scheduled to begin in September. The elevated route contains a single guideway and two stations

plus track for storage and maintenance of vehicles. The system will

employ one train made up of four vehicles.

The supplier is Rohr Industries and the car design is a derivative of

the design used at the Houston airport. Capital cost is reported to be

$1.1 million. Operating cost is not available.

Normal train capacity is 48 passengers with half seated and half

standing. The train will make about 25–30 round trips per hour.

Maximum capacity will be about 1,200–1 ,500 passengers per hour per

direction.
139

The service will be free. Estimates of patronage are not available.

Specifications call for the system to be out of service no more than

60 hours per year and no longer than 12 hours at any one time.

BRADLEY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

In November, 1975, the Connecticut Department of Transportation

is scheduled to begin demonstrating a new shuttle transit system at

Bradley Field near Hartforcl, Connecticut. The system will link the

air terminal with a parking lot and serve a motel at an intermediate

station. The primary purpose of the .systcm is to improve the airport

with respect to appearance, congestion, comfort and convenience. A

second purpose is to demonstrate automated guideway transit for the

benefit of other potential users in Connecticut.

The end-to-end length is 3,700 feet with 3 stations: one at each end

and one near the center. The guiclew~~~- is a single path shuttle except

for a 700-foot b~-pass section ne~~r tl~e mid-point. This CJ1OWS the

guidewa~’ to accommodate two vehicles without incurring the full

cost of a clouble path.

J“ehicle speed is 30 mph. Nominal capacity is 24 (six seated and 18

stancling) or 30 with crowding (See below). Each vehicle will make about

11 round trips per hour. Without crowding the total capacity of the

2-vehicle system is ubout 545 passengers per hour per direction.

VEHICLE FOR BRADLEY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

(Ford Motor Company)

-,. . ., .

6 -.4 ”

-

,+, ,* . . .4. , . . .-

Exterior View
140

Interior View

Average time for the longest trip—waiting, riding, and dwell—is

3.5 minutes. From the traveler’s view this is equivalent to a constant

speed of 12 miles per hour or 4 times walking speed.

Ford Motor Company is the supplier. This will be their first revenue

system. However, an earlier model was demonstrated successfully at

TRANSPO 72, and the current model is being tested extensively at

the company’s test track near Dearborn, Michigan, and at Bradley

before the start of passenger service.

Capital cost of the system is reported to be $4.5 million. Operating

costs are estimated to be $250,000 per year. Patronage is estimated at

one million passengers per year.

Safety features, reliability, availability and maintainability are

specified in detail but experience data remain to be generated. Portions

of the guideway will be heated to avoid problems from snow and ice.

The system can operate at half capacity with one vehicle out of service

provided it is not stalled somewhere on the single path guideway.

Disabled vehicles can be towed to the shop.

There are no firm plans to extend the Bradley installation but the

design permits expansion if that should become desirable.

FAIRLANE TOWN CENTER

In March, 1976, the Ford .Motor Land Development Corporation.

in partnership with other private interests, plans to begin public
141

operation of a shuttle system at Fairlane Town Center. Opening the

transit system has been delayed by other conditions. The purposes of

the system are to serve as a major attraction and transportation

service in a multi-purpose commercial development, The system will

operate between the Hyatt Regency Hotel and the Shopping Center.

The end-to-end length is 2,600 feet and is a single path except for an

800-foot by-pass section near the mid-point. There are two stations at

the ends of the line. Vehicles are similar to those described for Bradley

except that 10 passengers can be seated while 14 will stand. Each

vehicle can make up to 18 round trips per hour. With two vehicles in

service maximum capacity is about 860 passengers per hour per

direction.

Total trip time will average about 2 minutes including waiting.

Equivalent constant speed, for the traveler, is about 15 mph or five

times walking speed.

Ford Motor Corn any is the sup lier. This will be the second

revenue installation or their second [ AGT model. The capital cost is

reported to be $4.5 million and operating cost is reported at $250,000

per year.

The service will be free. Patronage has been estimated at 3 million

riders per year. The system will operate 11 hours per day. The comments on safety and reliability for Bradley a ply here.

Fairlane Town Center is the initial phase o a much larger develop- f

ment called the Fairlane NTew Town. The SLT system has been

designed with a view toward expansion to serve other parts of the

project.

hlIAlll INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Metropolitan Dade County Aviation Authority is presently engaged

in the installation of two shuttles at .Miami International Airport. The

start of services is scheduled for 1976 having been delayed by other

construction. The purpose of the system is to exploit otherwise

unusable land. The shuttles will connect the main air terminal structure with a new international terminal located in a satellite beyond

acceptable walking distance.

The installation will employ an elevated structure containing two

guidewa~w. Each guidewa~’ will carr~” a two-vehicle train. The system

is comphcated by the fact that one vehicle must be “free” and the

other ‘[sterile” in the vernacular of customs officials. That is, one

vehicle must be reserved for the exclusive use of international passengers who have not yet completed entry procedures.

The two guideways will be parallel and about 1,400 feet long. Each

will carry a two-vehicle train and each train will accommodate 200

passengers, all standing, during peak periods.

Train speeds commanded are 28 mph, maximum. Dwell time is 15

to 20 seconds and travel time is 62 seconds. Each train will make

about 22 round trips per hour and the entire system will carry about

9,000 passengers per hour per direction. overall trip time is about

80 seconds on the average. Equivalent speed is about 10.5 miles per

hour or 3.5 times walking speed.

Transit hardware is being supplied by Westinghouse Electric Corporation under a $3.5 million contract. This will be their fourth revenue

system and also represents the fourth model of their design. Construction is being procured locally. Total capital cost of the system is
142

estimated at $6.7 million. Operating costs have been forecast at

$300,000 per year.

Patronage is forecast to be 5.1 million in 1980. A fare will not be

charged. Operating cost will average about 6¢ per ride. Total costs

of capital, interest and operation are not available but would probably be about 15¢ per ride.

Safety and reliability specifications exist but experience with this

design “is lacking. The commendable record achieved by Sea-Tac

should be equalled or surpassed.

BUSCH GARDENS

Anheuser-Busch is installing a loop transit system at Busch Gardens, Williamsburg, Va., with a planned opening in June 1975.

The system will provide transportation services as well as an overview

of the park. The single loop will be 7,000 feet long and will contain

two stations.

Westinghouse Electric Corporation is the supplier. This is their

third revenue system. The system will employ a single two-vehicle

train similar to those at Miami International. Normal capacity will be

180 passengers per train—24 seated and 156 standing. Maximum

commanded train speed will be 30 mph. With one train, system capacities will be 2)000 passengers per hour in the one direction served,

Seven vehicles could be added to increase capacity to 9,000 passengers

per hour per direction.

The cost has been reported to be $4 million.

DALLAS/FT. WORTH AIRPORT

In January 1974, the Dallas/Ft. Worth Regional Airport Board

opened an entirely new airport which is the largest and most innovative

ever developed. The Airtrans intra-airport transit system is an integral

part of the aiport design and operations. It links the numerous

widely separateT elements of the airport to transport passengers and

material of various types.

The Urban Mass Transportation Administration has made important financial contributions to the project. In 1970 a grant of

about $1 million was made to the airport to support studies and to

finance test tracks by the two competing suppliers who were then

favored: Dashaveyer and Varo. Later, in 1972, UMTA made a capital

grant of $7.6 million to the airport to aid in the installation of Airtrans

by LTV Aerospace Corporation.

Airtrans employs vehicles of two types—passenger and utility.

When fully operational passenger vehicles will be used to serve airport

employees separately from air travelers and airport visitors. The

utility vehicles will provide several material transport functions using

containers of various types.

Vehicles will operate over 17 distinctly different service loops as

follows :

5 passenger loops:

2 between terminals and remote parking.

3 among terminals.

2 employee loops between terminals and remote parking lots.
2

4

4

143

Air Mail Facility loops.

interline baggage and mail transfer loops.

supply and solid waste loops which will operate only on slack

period.

The Airtrans system includes the following major elements:

13 miles of one-way guideway (65,000 feet).

55 station stops:

14 passenger.

14 employee.

27 material and other.

68 vehicles:

51 passenger.

17 utility.

74 switches.

Airtrans exploits switches for two purposes: to direct vehicles from

the main line to off-line stations and to branch and remerge the main

lines, These features allow the vehicles of various service loops to

share a common guldeway network and allow some vehicles to by-pass

en route stations while others stop to discharge and reload. Passengers

must wait to board the correct vehicle but they proceed to their

AIRTRANS SYSTEM DALLAS/FT. WORTH AIRPORT

(LTV Aerospace Corporation)

Vehicle Train on Passenger Service Route
144

destination without transfers, in almost all cases, and with few station

delays. These technical and operating features make Airtrans outstanding in size and complexity in comparison with all systems

discussed above.

A schematic diagram of the guideway and the system’s 17 distinct

service loops is shown below.

P PASSENGER STATION T TRASH

E EMPLOYEE STATION S SUPPLIES STATION

B/M BAGGAGE AND MAIL STATION I J

T TRANSPORTATION BRANIFF

CENTRAL UTILITIES

PLANT FACILITY

[

E E ‘ ST

+

DELTA 2

NORTH CONTINENTAL

Schematic Guideway Layout at Dallas/Ft. Worth

vehicle Routes

ROUTES VEHICLES AND GUIDEWAY”

STATIONS

1 PAsSENGER

2 PASSENGER

3 PASSENDER

4 EMPLOYEE

5 PASSENGER -

6 PASSENGER

7 EMPLOYEE

11 INTERLINE B/M

12

13

14 SUPPLY DELIVERY

‘PASSENGER VEHICLES WILL USE THE PASSENGER (INSIDE) ROUTE OF THE GUIDEWAY THROUGH THE TERMINALS

ALL OTHER VEHICLES WILL USE THE OPPOSITE (OUTSIDE) ROUTE OF THE GUIDEWAY THROUGH THE TERMINALS

 INTERLINE B/M ROUTES DIFFER IN LOAD/UNLOAD FUNCTION AT EACH STATION.

Distinct Service Routes at Dallas/Ft. Worth

Figure 3.—Schematic Guideway Layout of AIRTRANS, Dallas/Ft. Worth

Airport, LTV Aerospace Corporation
145

The design of the airport makes walking distances short enough to

be satisfactory for most air travelers and airport visitors. However,

distances for trips to remote parking lots and to other airlines are so

great that walking is not feasible and walkways have not even been

provided. Vehicular service is, therefore, essential for some intraairport travel as well as for all goods movements. When Airtrans is

out of service, it is necessary to use buses, trucks, and other automotive vehicles.

Airtrans passenger vehicles are designed to accommodate 40 passengers—16 seated and 24 standing. Utility vehicles carry 3 containers.

Vehicles operate singly and in 2-vehicle trains according to need.

The capacity of the entire system (all routes combined) is specified

as 9,000 passengers, 6,000 pieces of luggage and 70,000 pounds of mail

S

per hour. However, no single link would have to carry the full load.

pecifications call for maximum speeds of about 18 mph. Average

travel times should not exceed either 10 or 20 minutes depending upon

the destination. Maximum travel times should not exceed 20 or 30

minutes.

Unexpected difficulties have been experienced both with the Airtrans system and with materials handling systems and procedures.

Also, times available for interline connections were reduced by the airlines after Airtrans was designed and in operation. The time now

allowed for baggage and mail transfers is beyond Airtrans capability.

As a result only the five passenger services remained in regular use

through the first year of operations. Buses have been kept on standby

to provide service whenever stoppages exceed about 15 minutes. At

the start of the second year buses were seldom needed. Automotive

vehicles were used throughout the first year to transport employees

and at times for all of the materials services. The airport has made

plans to initiate all of the specified services except interline baggage and

mail transfers in 1975. However, difficulties between the airlines, the

airport board and LTV resulted in a crisis on March 6, 1975 and the

system was shut down. Service was restored on March 17 under a new

agreement.

The Airtrans system was designed, fabricated and installed by LTV

Aerospace Corporation under a $35.3 million contract. The company

has reported that costs have exceeded the contract amount by more

than $18 million. LTV also has a contract to maintain the system for

three years after it has been “conditionally accepted. ” That period has

not yet started to run because of the inability of the principal parties

to agree upon the system status relative to the original specifications.

Total operating costs of the system are not available. However, there

are indications that the costs of operating and maintaining Alrtrans

plus the costs of providing stand by and alternative services are great

enough to cause serious concern to the airport’s major tenants, the airlines, and to the airport board.

Patronage was about 3 million during the first year, A fare of 25¢# is

charged. Therefore, passenger revenue is now about $750,000 per year.

Reliability was an extremely serious problem for Airtrans at the

outset. Statistical data are not available but considerable improvement has been achieved. The design of Airtrans with numerous over-
146

lapping service loops makes the operation of the entire system vulnerable to stoppage if a single vehicle or wayside element fails. All routes

are one-way and there are few opportunitys for vehicles to by-pass one

that is stalled. One vehicle cannot push or pull another. When mobile

repair teams cannot restore a vehicle to service, a tow vehicle must

enter the guideway and remove the disabled vehicle to an exit.

Safety has not been a problem for Airtrans. There have been no

accidents or injuries of consequence to passengers.

The system accumulated more than three million vehicle miles in

the first year of operation.

MORGANTOWN, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY

The Morgantown project is scheduled to reach operational status in

mid-1975 with all features needed to support normal passenger service

but without elevators needed for some handicapped travelers. The

project has a long and complex history that can only be sketched here.

The project was initiated by West Virginia University” in 1967 and

funds for a study were obtained from UMTA in 1969. In August, 1970,

the University proposed a project to design and construct a system

containing 3.6 miles of double guideway, six stations and 90 vehicles.

The umversity had two purposes:

. To establish a national demonstration facility for the study of

technical, behavioral, social, economic, urban design and other

aspects of automated guideway transit.

● To transport 17,000 students, 5,000 faculty and staff members,

to better utilize facilities and staff, and to transport the people

of Morgantown.

In August, 1970, UMTA took charge of the management and funding of the project as a demonstration. The physical scale of the initial

phase of the project has since been considerably reduced. The route is

now 2.2 miles in length, there are three stations, and a 3-way interchange has been eliminated. The design of the initial phase would allow

for later completions of the full project.

The objectives reported by UMTA in 1974 were:

. To dimension the service benefits of systems of this type.

. To assess the institutional problems encountered in building

such a system in the urban environment.

. To determine the costs to build, maintain and operate the

system.

. To determine the impact of the system on congestion.

In October, 1972, the prototype version of the systym was successfully demonstrated to the public and press in a dedication ceremony

conducted by Secretary Volpe. In the next few months tests were run

using a fleet of five vehicles. As can be expected in R&D programs considerable redesign was found necessary and that work has been done.

Fort}’ -five new vehicles are being produced and are in various stages of

testing. The entire system is to be tested in the spring of 1975. Successful completion of those tests plus minor tasks will end the contractors’ present obligations. UXITA and the University have agreed

on the conditions for accepting the present installation and for completing the system with capital grant assistance.

The Morgantown system now contains 2.2 miles of double guideway,

three stations and a maintenance and operations facility. Vehicles
147

can operate non-stop between any pair of stations. The intermediate

station contains multiple paths and sidings arranged so that vehicles

can pass without stopping or stop to discharge and reload. Some vehicles will stop and then continue in the same direction while others

will stop and turn back.

The sy-stem will operate in both scheduled and demand modes. The

scheduled mode is like other transit systems: that is, each vehicle will

have a pre-determined destination. However, travelers will be advised

by computer controlled graphic displays which vehicle to board. The

demand mode is unique. The traveler will push a button or otherwise

indicate his desired destination at the boarding point. The control

system will make available a vehicle either by recognizing that an

empty vehicle is already in the station load berth or by dispatching a

vehicle from another source to provide the needed service. The value

of the demand mode is relatively small with the three stations presently

provided but will be considerable if and when the network is increased

to include five or six stations as desired by the University

Vehicles carry 21 passengers—8 seated and 13 standing—with crush . . loading.

Morgantown Vehicle Gets Finishing Touches—wing Aerospace Company

The minimum headway is 15 seconds, which is equivalent to 240

vehicles per hour per direction. The maximum theoretical capacity is

5,040 pphpd. However, in practice, average headways will be longer

than 15 seconds and average loads will be less than 21 passengers.

Actual loads imposed on the system will have to be determined by

operating in revenue service. Peak loads are expected to occur during

class change intervals at the University. Consequently, the maximum

loads experienced will depend on the way classes are scheduled as well

as on the number of passengers seeking to use the system. Present

>4-37 (1 ( ) i -) - I 1
148

indications are that peak loads will be in the range of 50 to 80 percent

of the theoretical maximum capacity-that is, 2,500 to 4,000 pphpd.

Vehicle speed is 30 mph maximum. Waiting time will not exceed 5

minutes in slack periods and 2 minutes in peak operations. Riding

time from one end of the system to the other will be about 7 minutes

for 2.2 miles or about 19 mph.

The Morgantown system was supplied by the Boeing Company

with support from sub-contractors. UMTA’s outlays to contractors

and others are reported to total $64.2 million through June of 1975.

Costs of administration are not known. The University has made

cash outlays of about $1 million and has furnished or accumulated

land from other public agencies for much of the right-of-way. Boeing

has expended additional funds from company sources in an amount

not announced to develop certain essential proprietary components

and for all other work necessary to complete the tests. Operating

costs have been estimated by the University and their consultants

at an average level of $850,000 per year over a 10-year period based

on 1972 prices. (Another source indicates costs of $970,000 per year,

presumably in 1975 prices). This includes the cost of a work force of

about 40 persons at labor rates supplied by the University. These

cost estimates will have to be updated during the initial operation

period.

Recent estimates prepared for UMTA indicate that patronage

may be about 29,500 rides per day. Students would pay $5 per month

for a transit pass along wit other university fees, Other riders would h

pay 25# per ride. The University has expressed concern that operation

costs for the 3-station system will exceed revenue by at least $500,000

per year.

hluch of the redesign accomplished in 1973 and 1974 has been

devoted to reliability and safety assurance. Service availability is now

specified at 96 percent. Components have been selected and redundant

elements have been included as needed to satisfy that goal.

The system will not fail gracefully and few physical features have

been provided to deal with vehicle stoppages. Vehicles are not designed

to push or pull one another. There are limited sidings to hold defective

vehicles. Cross-over switches are not provided to allow routing of

traffic around a stalled vehicle. Stalled vehicles will be removed to the

yard by a maintenance vehicle. With these features a 30-minute

period of time will be needed to restore service. The physical design

accentuates the need for high reliability. On the other hand, automatic

software reactions have been included in the system design to minimize

recovery time of a stopped vehicle and to reduce the system impact

of a vehicle stoppage.

Guideways are heated to insure operating capabilities when it is

precipitating below freezing temperatures, This feature is reported

to have added $4 million to capital costs and $17,000 per year to

operating costs.

Safety has received detailed attention in the design of the system.

operational testing with multiple vehicles is scheduled to begin in

May, 1975.
149

The Morgantown system has been developed only to about half of

the scale orginally planned. Provisions have been made for expansion

to the original design.

It appears that the cost of expansion of the Morgantown program

will be in the vicinity of $40 to $50 million for a route extension of

about 1.3 to 1.4 miles (15,650 feet of single lane guideway), 30 new

vehicles, 2 new stations, expansion of one station, and associated

software, power supply and other ancillary equipment.
Chapter 4: Who Wants AGT?

The panel has attempted to identify and question all of the publin

agencies and private interests that have given serious study and consideration to the purchase and use of AGT systems. In the time

available it has not been possible to do a thorough and complete job,

and consequently the information presented below is only a sample

of a larger universe. However, data have been obtained regarding 36

agencies and firms who have shown interest in application of AGT

systems. of these, six deal with metropolitan scale applications and

29 deal with major activity center applications.

The panel recognizes several deficiencies in the abbreviated presentation of interests in AGT systems. The list is incomplete. A showing

of interest today does not mean genuine demand tomorrow—some

agencies many never decide to make AGT installations. It was not

possible, in the time available, to write descriptions of a number of

projects for which data were obtained.

M ETROPOLITAN S CALE A PPLICATIONS OF A G T

At least a dozen public agencies and a few private interests have

studied the possible employment of AGT systems to serve major

parts of a metropolitan region. The panel has obtained data from

six such studies: four deal with metropolitan networks and two

deal with corridors. The sponsors and locations are:

Metropolitan Networks

1. Regional Transportation District, Denver, Colorado.

2. Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission, St. Paul,

Minneapolis, Minnesota.

3. Comprehensive Planning Organization of the San Diego Region,

San Diego, California.

4. Transportation Commission of Santa Clara County, San Jose,

California.

Corridors

5. Port Authority of Allegheny County, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

(TERL) project.

6. Private interests, El Paso/Juarez international link.

These projects, if executed, would require a capital investment of

almost $7 billion: $6.7 billion for the four networks and $250 million

for the two corridors. A more thorough canvass might easily turn up

additional studies that would require a similar amount.

REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT, DENVER, COLORADO

Organization of the RTD was authorized in July 1969. It became

a working entity in 1970 and launched an innovative transportation

study in February, 1971. In January, 1972, a report was issued summarizing the year’s work and making certain recommendations.

(151)
152

In March, 1973, a Summary Report was issued in which the installation of an automated guideway system was recommended together

with improvements in conventional modes. me term PRT was used

in the Summary Report but in to today's vocabulary the system would

be classified as group rapid transit or GRT. The technology was, in

fact, quite similar to that employed at Morgantown, The system

envisioned in 1973 would have included about 100 route miles of

double guideway, 67 stations and a fleet of about 800 12-passenger

vehicles. The total capital cost of the AGT system was estimated at

almost $1.1 billion at 1973 price levels.

In September, 1973, the Region’s voters approved a bond issue of

$425 million to cover the local share-then one-third-of the AGT

system plus buses and other improvements. The bonds are backed by

a one-half cent sales tax which started in 1974. Under current legislation the local share is one-fifth rather than one-third, and the Federal

Government might be called upon to supply capital grants up to $1.7

billion for a total program costing just over $2.1 billion,

Early in 1974 RTD contracted with a consultant to serve as system

manager for the AGT program and other work, However, detailed

work on the 1973 plan is not going forward because of concerns expressed by UMTA. Instead, RTD and its consultants are engaged in

a restudy of five alternatives, including bus, light rail transit, conventional rail rapid transit, GRT and PRT. A report is being issued in

the spring of 1975. As this report is written, it is impossible to say

what the RTD will recommend.

TWIN CITIES AREA METROPOLITAN TRANSIT COMMISSION,

ST.PAUL/MINNEAPOLIS

The Commission was created by the Minnesota Legislature in 1967

and was directed to develop a plan for a complete, integrated mass

transit system for the Twin Cities area. Numerous studies have been

made during the past 8 years dealing with short term and conventional transit modes as well as AGT systems. Since the early 1970’s

exploitation of AGT systems in some fashion appears to have been

widely accepted by officials and citizens of the Twin Cities. However,

controversy has raged over the level of technological sophistication to

be sought, the extent of networks and location of routes and other

matters.

The most recent study- effort is now approaching completion and

several reports and drafts have been released. The study has treated four

system types which represent the entire spectrum of AGT technologj-.

Terms used by Twin Cities Equivalent OTA terminology

Intermediate Capacity Rapid Transit -- ICRT Shuttle and Loop TransitSLT.

Group Rapid Transit - GRT ------- .._- ----- Group Rapid Transit (low

technology level)—GRTHigh Performance Personal Rapid Transit Group Rapid Transit (high

HPPRT. technology level)—GRT- II.1

High Capacity Personal Rapid Transit- Personal Rapid Transit- -

HCPRT. PRT.

1 See the report of the Panel on Operations and Technology for definitions of GRT–I

and GRT–II.
153

03[PREHENSIVE PL.4NNIN”G ORG.4NIZATIOh’ OF THE SAN DIEGO

REGION , CALIFORNIA
154

grant from UMTA would be needed at the end of 1978. The first

stage of the system would begin operation at the end of 1986, and

the last stage would be completed sometime after 1995.

TRAN’SPORTATION COMM1SS1ON OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, SAN JOSE,

CALIFORNIA

The Commission was created to plan a county-wide rapid transit

system. Consultants were hired in March, 1974, for a three-phase,

study. A Preliminary Phase Report was submitted in October 1974,

for review and discussion. The panel does not have the results of the

review.

The Commission stated that one goal was to provide a transit

system capable of attracting a major share of all travel in the county.

More specifically, the Commissioners called for:

. Thirty- percent transit ridership.

● Streets and highways carrying a number of cars no higher than

there were in 1967.

● Encouragement of transit ridership by persons having a second

family car.

This mandate is in sharp contrast with the current low level of

transit usage and posed an unparalleled challenge to the staff and

consultants, In fact, it would require transit to carry 1.8 million

passengers daily in 1990 if popdation and employment grow as

projected.

The consultants considered a variety of alternatives, including

BART extension, extensive use of buses and bus ways, and two kinds

of automated guideway transit.

The consultants’ Medium Capacity Rapid Transit system was not

specified in detail. It might turn out of be a member of the shuttle

and loop class or a low-technology example of the group rapid transit

class. It would employ’ 20 to 30 passenger vehicles operating singly

or in trains. Maximum speeds would be 40 to 50 mph and line capacities

would be 10,000 to 15,000 pphpd. Headways are not specified and

other features are open.

The consultants also studied PRT systems with characteristics

that conform to the definition used by OTA in this report. This

technology was treated in case studies but was not recommended—in

part because of the long lead time needed for development.

Four cases were studied. The one which appears to be most appropriate would employ 140 miles of dual guideway, and about 140

stations. Capital costs would total $2.35 billion at 1974 price levels.

Operating costs would be $160 million per year. It was estimated that

manual controls could be substituted for automatic controls for am

additional cost of $15 million per. year.

The consultants called attention to the urgent need for entirely

new transportation systems to transport travelers short distances

to and from transit stations and for other short trips. Neither scheduled

buses nor dial-a-bus systems appear capable of supplying the needed

service.

PITTSBURGH TERL PROJECT

In 1969, a plan was initiated by the Port Authority of Allegheny

County for construction of a fully automated rubber-tired vehicle
155

system in Pittsburgh, Pa. This system would operate as a double

guideway shuttle with turn-back switches at the ends of the lines.

The purpose is to provide line-haul service in a radial corridor focused

on the rental business district. The proposed route is 10.5 miles long

and includes 11 stations and one yard.

The vehicles envisioned are similar to the Westinghouse Transit

Expressway vehicles used at Tampa and Sea-Tac but would not

necessarily be from that source. Vehicles will run in pairs up to trains

of 10 vehicles.

Each vehicle will be 35 feet long, about the same as a city bus, and

will normally carry up to 66 passengers with 28 seated and 38 standing.

Headway will be 2 minutes at the outset but reducible to 1.5 minutes.

Theoretical capacity will be 19,800 passengers per hour per direction

at the outset. Peak loads are estimated to be 15,000 pphpd.

Vehicles will have maximum speeds of 60 mph but will average

28 mph. With an average of one-minute waiting during peak hours a

passenger would spend about 12 minutes on a 5-mile trip—the equivalent of 25 mph overall.

The system would operate 20 hours per day. The frequency of

service would drop to 15 minutes in slack periods. That is more

frequent service than is usually provided by manned systems, and

even longer hours of service and closer headways might prove to be

attractivc and economically’ justifiable with automatic controls.

The cost of the system would he determined by competitive bidding.

In 1974, the Authoritty's consultant estimated that all costs and

contingencics would total about $232 million on about, $22 million per

mile. operating costs were estimated at $5.7 million per year including

$3.6 for labor and $1.2 for power. Patronage was estimated at 12.5

million riders per year. The fare would be 40¢ and would provide

revenue of $5 million per year.

Detailed specifications were drafted for safety and reliability.

The plan envisions future projects to extend lines, add routes, add

stations and shorten headways.

The TERL project has been the subject of political conflict almost

from the start and has suffered a, number of delays. Its fate is uncertain

at this time.

EL PASO/’JUAREZ

An international application of AGT has been planned between

El Paso, Texas and Juarez, Mexico, by two privately financed organizations-International Monorail (corporation of the U.S. and

Moncrriel Intelnational, S.A. of Mexico. In January, 1974, the firms

selected Ford Motor Company” as their supplier.

The sponsors hope to operate the system as a business enterprise

for profit and without public aid. Other stated purposes me to encourage tourism and commercial activity to aid in revitalizing the

central business districts; to provide efficient, safe, economical and

attractive service, and to relieve congestion.

The route would be 1.5 miles long and would be a single guideway

except for by pass near the midpoint. The system will employ. four

70-passenger vehicles. Waiting time will average about 1 minute

and travel time at a cruise speed of 40 mph will be about 2.5 minutes.

Overall speed will be equivalent to about 25 mph.
Patronage was estimated at 25,000 to 30,000 riders per day although

frees were only specified as 25¢ to 50¢. The capital cost of the system

was estimated to be about $15 million. Operating costs are not known.

This project has been delayed indefinitely by financial difficulties.

MAJOR ACTIVITY CENTER STUDIES

The panel obtained information regarding some 30 possible applications of AGT systems in major activity centers. These have been

grouped under the following headings:

. Airports.

. Central Business Districts/Center City.

. Multiple Purpose Developments.

. Medical Centers.

There has not been time enough to describe all of the studies. Some

examples are presented for each type of application-others are only

listed.

Capital costs of the group of prospective AGT applications cannot

be estimated precisely but are in the order of $1 billion.

AIRPORTS

The panel has obtained information regarding AGT studies at

airports in these nine cities:

1. Atlanta, Georgia,

2. Boston, Massachusetts.

3. Chicago, Illinois (O’Hare).

4. Detroit, Michigan (Metropolitan).

5. Los Angeles, California (Internatioal).

6. Oakland, California.

7. San Francisco, California.

8. New York, New York (JFK International). 9. Newark, New ,Jersey (Newark International).

The study for Newark is described here as all example of the class.

NEWARK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Since 1966, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has

planned to include a transit system in the terminal and grounds at

Newark International Airport in New Jersey. Space for guideways

and stations has been reserved. The primary purpose is to link the

terminal complex with a station on a proposed extension of the PATH

rail rapid transit line. Other purposes are to link three major terminal

buildings with one another and to serve remote parking lots.

During 1971 and 1972 planning became specific and m 1973 technical proposals were solicited. The respondents were Westinghouse

Electric Corporation, Rohr Industries, Inc., LTV Aerospace Corporation, and the Dashaveyor Company, a Bendix subsidiary.

The route would include a double guideway about 9,000 feet in

length and seven stations. Vehicles would operate as shuttles but

would use switches to change tracks at the ends of lines. Cross-over

tracks at intermediate points would allow vehicles to turn back or

operate around a stalled vehicle, A walkway would parallel the guideway to allow easy evacuation of stalled vehicles.
157

The terminal buildings were planned at a time when only the South

Park prototype of the Westinghouse Transit Expressway system was

in existence. Consequently, space was reserved for vehicles of about

that size. Specifications call for vehicles to carry 36 passengers normally with 24 seated and 12 standing and up to 50 or 60 with crowding.

The specifications called for 15 vehicles and 1 minute headways. Peak

loads could be accommodated with headways of about 2 minutes and

without crowding.

Vehicles would have maximum speeds of 35 mph and average

speeds of 30 mph. Total trip time from the rail station to the first

terminal would average 5.5 minutes-4.5 minutes in the vehicle and

1 minute waiting to board. The distance is 1.3 miles and the equivalent

constant speed is almost 15 mph or five times walking speed.

In 1974 the project was held up indefinitely because PATH was

delayed and because of the decline in air travel. Consequently, there

was no call for priced bids. The Port Authority had estimated a cost

of $35 to $40 million for transit hardware, guideways and other elements that had not already been incorporated in the terminal. Total

cost was not estimated.

It was planned that the winning contractor would also maintain

the system for 5 years. The cost of operations was not determined.

Patronage was estimated at 5 million trips per year, 16,000 trips per

day and 1,000 trips in the peak hour. Capacity could be increased to

about 4,0OO pphpd by- using two-car trains and by shortening headways to 50 seconds. Service would be provided 24 hours each day. A

fare would be charged but the amount was not set.

Specifications covered numerous safety and reliability features.

Requirements included:

. Operation in snow and ice storms.

● Walkways for evacuations.

● Non-combustible and fire retardant materials.

● Crash worthy’ vehicle design.

 Cross-overs to allow operation around stalled vehicles.

CBD/CENTRAL CITY STUDIES

The panel obtained information on 9 studies dealing with AGT application

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

in and near central business districts. The cities are: -

Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Detroit, Michigan.

Las Vegas, Nevada.

Long Beach, California.

Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Mid-NIanhattan, New York, N.Y.

Lower Manhattan, New York, N.Y.

Norfolk, Virginia.

San Diego, California.

Descriptions for Los Vegas, Ann Arbor and San Diego are presented

below.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA

Efforts to install an automatesd guideway system in Las Vegas and

Clark County, Nevada began at least as early as 1968. The purpose of

the system was to improve transportation services among the CBD,
158

the world-famous “strip”, a convention center and the airport. It was

considered desirable to relieve congestion on the streets, to make travel

fast and pleasant, to achieve a degree of privacy by using small cars,

and to enhance the image of Las Vegas.

The project has an extremely complex history that cannot be recited

here. In the most recent episode proposals were submitted in February,

1973 by three firms:

● Aerial Transit Systems of Nevada, Inc., a venture of Pullman,

Inc. and Bendix.

. Monocab, Inc., a subsidiary of Rohr Industries, Inc.

● LTV Aerospace Corporation.

LTV withdrew their proposal. Rohr Monocab was selected as the

supplier in November, 1973. However, delays occurred and both the

cost of the project and the availability of funds changed for the worse.

A revised proposal was submitted in February, 1974, at which time

the total cost was estimated at $103 million. In September, 1974, the

county withdrew and other changes in participants occurred, leaving

only Rohr and the City as parties to the negotiations. A reduced project was proposed and rejected by the City in December, 1974. The

resolution under which the negotiations had been authorized was then

rescinded.

This was an extremely expensive adventure for all parties involved,

both public and private. For example, Rohr conducted promotional

and engineering efforts over a period of about 5 years and spent something in the order of $1 million. other contractors must also have incurred substantial costs. Local agencies incurred considerable administrative expense.

In 1973 it was expected that patronage would be in the range of 18

to 20 million per year with an average fare of $1.40. The project was

to be financed by sale of revenue bonds. A public trust was to be set

up to facilitate the financing. None of this was realized.

According to Rohr’s proposal, the route was to be 8.5 miles long with

24 miles of guideway. It included 18 stations, 140 vehicles and one

yard. Stations would have been off-line and vehicles would have seated

SIX passengers—many travel parties would have enjoyed a private ride

without stops enroute. Privacy could be ensured by paying a special

fare.

Vehicle maximum speed was 35 mph. The longest trip would have

required about 16 minutes riding and less than 2 minutes waiting.

Minimum headway was planned for 10 seconds. Maximum link capacity was 2,160 passengers per hour per direction. Practicable capacity

would probably have been 20 to 40 percent less.

This would have been the first revenue system by Monocab. However, the company demonstrated a system successfully at TRANSPO

72 and also had extensive experience with a 2,20O foot test track at

Garland, Texas.

ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY 1

This system would link the central business district of Ann Arbor

with the University of Michigan’s Central, Medical and North

1 This study was one of the five concluded under a State of Michigan program called New Transit for Michigan Communities or New-TRAN for short.
159

Campuses, Dial-a-Ride stations, remote parking, and the AMTRAK

station.

Phase I of the program would include 13,160 feet of guideway, 8

stations, a yard and shops, and four vehicles. The system study

included provision for extension. The vehicles would have nominal

capacities of 50 passengers including standees, top speeds of 37 mph

and average speeds of 15 mph. Minimum headways would be about

2.5 minutes.

Patronage was estimated at 2,300 passengers per hour in the peak

period, 20,000” passengers on an average work day, and 6.6 million

passengers per year.

Estimated costs, in 1973 price, were $14.3 million for capital investment and less than $300,000 per year for operations. operating costs

would average 4.4 cents per trip. Service would be free.

The project has not been carried forward by state and local agencies

CENTRE CITY, SAN” DIEGO

During the past two years the City of San Diego, California has

conducted a series of urban design and transportation studies of the

central city area, An urban design concept was developed; then,

transportation systems linking the activity nodes were defined and

alternative analyses and evaluations were made. The objective wm

to enhance the urban design concept-make it happen-by providing

efficient transit access/circulation services including service to peripheral parking garages and interfaces with regional transit services.

Future objectives include a link to Lindbergh Field and options to

extend the centre cit~’ system to serve the region.

Four alternatives were considered: two using buses of different

sizes and two using AGT s~stems. One AGT s~’stem was of the PRT

t~-pc and the other represented the GRT t~’pe. The GRT s~’stenl was

recommended.

The s~’stenl, with an airport link, would include 7.6 miles of double

guidewa)-

, mostlj- elevated, 20 stations, 75 vehicles and a yard.

Vehicles would have top speeds of 35 mph. Enroute stops would

reduce the average speed to about ]4 mph. ~Tchicles would operate -

singl~~ or in trains. Each unit would carr~~ 44 passengers with 22 seated

and 22 standing. Headwa~” would be about 60 seconds,

Peak patronage in 1986 would be 31,000 passengers per hour

distribllted o~~er all lines of the network. Patronage would be 256,000

riders for an average work da?’ and 78.6 million riders per ~’car.

Costs, estimated in 1974 prices, were $74 million for capital investment and $2 million for operations in the first year. Cost of operations would avemge 3.3 cents per ride.

This project is active ancl is likel~: to be carried forward. There are,

howe~er, differences between the clt~ plan and the overall regional

])Ian in~ol~”ing the location of peri])heml parking but not the center

city transit project per se. Resolution of the parking philosoph~~ can

be achie~-ed. This transit project provides an excellent opportunity

for the first phase of a multi-l) hased regional s~rstem. Viewed in this

light, tile l)robabilitj- for implementation is high.
160

MULTIPLE PURPOSE DEVELOPMENTS

The panel obtained information on 8 studies dealing with possible

applications of AGT systems in newly developed multiple purpose

centers.

Their locations are:

1. Crown City, Kansas City, Missourio

2. Echelon, New Jersey.

3. Cameron, Alexandria, Virginia.

4. Plaza del Ore, Houston, Texas.

5. Post Oak, Houston, Texas.

6. Southfield, Michigan.

7. Crystal City, Arlington, Virginia.

8. Interama, Dade County, Florida.

The latter project is described here.

INTERAMA

In 1972, the Inter-American Center Authority and other agencies

began planning a new Cultural and Trade Center north of Miami,

Florida on the mainland side of Biscayne Bay and near the northeast

corner of Dade County. The center was to occupy about 300 acres

of a 1,700 acre parcel of land. In 1973, an automated guideway transit

system was incorporated in the plan,

The purpose of the system was to connect the Center with the

Dade County Regional Transit System and other modes of public

transportation, to serve remote parking lots, to provide circulation

among the elements of the Center and to provide passengers with an

overview of the area.

The route was to be 7,350 feet long and was to employ a double

guideway. Vehicles would either operate as shuttles and use switches

to turn back at the ends or would operate in closed loops. Seven

stations were planned: two in the south parking area, two in the

Center and three in the north parking area. One of the latter would also

interface with a station of the regional transportation system. A Yard

and maintenance area were included in the layout.

Technical specifications were issued in March, 1974, and bids were

received in May. Proposals were received from Bendix, Ford, ROhr,

Westinghouse Electric and Arrow Development. The proposed systems

differed in many respects and consequently: the data presented here

are drawn from a baseline system estabhshed by BRH Mobility

,Services CO., a consultant to Interama.

The baseline system would employ 31 vehicles, each with a capacity

for 52 passengers. Vehicles would operate single or in trains of two or

three cars. Vehicles were limited to maximum speeds of 28 mph. Dwell

times were 40 seconds. Average speed for a typical trip was just over 9

miles per hour. Minimum headway was about 90 seconds. With threecar trains maximum capacity was about 6,200 pphpd. Peak loads were

estimated at 10,800 passengers per hour m both directions. Patronage

on an average weekday was about 69,000. Annual patronage was

estimated to be 16 million.

Safety was specified h. “- terms of automatic train control systems and

fail safe principles. Suppliers were requested to state mean times

between failures for major components.
161

Capacity could be expanded by adding cars and the route could be

extended to serve other areas. Evaluation of bids was completed in

August, 1974. However, by that time the Authority had encountered

severe problems in raising funds and in the fall of 1974 the transit

project was aborted.

MEDICAL CENTERS

A number of medical centers have conducted studies of automated

guideway transit systems. Brief descriptions of four studies are ‘.included below. The locations are:

1. Detroit Medical Center Corporation, Detroit, Michigan.

2. Duke University- Medical Center, Durham, North Carolina.

3. The University’ Health Center of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh,

Pennsylvnnia.

4. Texas Medical Center, Inc., Houston, Texas,

The objectives of these studies are similar in many respects and

include the following:

● To transport passengers, patients and cargo within the complex

and thereby make circulation easier and faster.

● To transport passengers to and from transit routes and remote

parking thereby making access easier.

● To link the medical center with other nearby centers of activity.

● To reduce traffic congestion in and near the medical complex.

● To reduce the need for parking lots and garages especially

within the densely developed areas of the medical complex.

DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER

The Center occupies a 97-acre site and is one of the nation’s largest

centers for medical services, education and research. It contains five

major hospital and plans exist for expansion. Alternative AGT systems studied included two shuttle configurations and two loop configurations. One alternative single guideways and bypasses, and

included one branch line. That system would have a route length of 1.8

miles, 10 stations of three types, 7 vehicles, a yard and a control

center. Capital cost was estimated at $12 million. Operating cost was

estimated at $185,000 per year. Patronage was estimated to be in the

range of 58,000 to 69,000 riders per week in 1976 or about 3.0 to 3.5

million riders per year. Operation cost per trip would average about

5 to 6¢. A fare would not be charged.

DUKE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER

A study conducted in 1973 and 1974 described an AGT system to

carry passengers and cargo. Initially the system would link the existing

hospital and a planned 900-bed facility. It would be expandable to

serve remote parking, transit stations, a V.A. hospital, and other

facilities.

It would include guideways in tunnels, at grade and on elevated

structures. Two intersecting loops were planned. A north-south loop

would be developee in three stages and would eventually include 8

stations, An east-west loop to be developed at some later tim would

include 7 stations.
162

Passenger vehicles would accommodate up to 35 riders and would

be able to carry patients on stretchers. Five passenger vehicles and

two cargo vehicles would be required on the north-south loop.

Vehicle top speed would be 31.6 mph. Average speed would be 8.5

mph. Minimum headway would be about 2 minutes.

Patronage was estimated at 2,200 passengers per hour in peak

periods, 18,000 passengers on the average day, and 5.6 million per

year. Average operating cost would be 3¢ per trip. A fare would not be

charged.

Decisions are forthcoming relative to the construction of the hospital

expansion and connecting transit link, pending the development of an

acceptable financing program. Under the present rules, private financing would be necessary if the University acts alone. Sponsorship by a

public agency may emerge at some later time.

THE UNIVERSITY HEALTH CENTER OF PITTSBURGH

A study conducted in 1971 and 1972 described an SLT system employing 2,400 feet of double guideway on elevated structures, three

stations, three vehicles and a yard. The system was expandable to

include five stations and could be extended further to serve other

facilities and transit stations.

Vehicles would have top speeds of 35 mph and would carry 35

passengers.

The system would carry 2,000 passengers in the peak hour, 14,000 on

an average work day and 4.2 million riders per year.

Cost estimates in 1972 prices were $7.7 million for capital investment

and $190,000 per year for operations. The average operating costs

would be 4.4¢-per trip.

TEXAS MEDICAL CENTER

Texas medical Center contains 28 member institutions and attracts

tens of thousands of visitors and staff members daily. A study conducted in 1972 and 1973 considered installation of an automatic guideway transit system of the loop type. dual guideway and 10 stations

would be placed on elevated structures. Passenger vehicles would carry

16 seated passengers and up to 19 standees. Patients on stretchers

could be carried and cargo vehicles would be provided. l’chicle speeds

would reach a maximum of 35 mph and would average 15 mph.

Headways WOUld be 90 seconds.

The system would carry- 5,500 passengers in the peak hour mnd 26,400

passengers on the average work day. Annual patronage would be

almost 8 million riders.

Capital cost of the transit system would have been almost $12.5

million in 1972 prices. Operating costs would have been almost

$380,000 per year. operating cost per rider would be 4.8¢.

The plan contemplated extension to connect the medical center with

other major activity centers.

Inability to finance the project has prevented construction.
Chapter 5: Who Supplies AGT?

The 17 AGT sytems now in existence in the United States have

been supplied by SIX firms who remain in the business and one group

formed for a single project (Braniff International and others). The

firms and number of installations are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Pittsburgh, Pa., 4.

Universal Mobility, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, 6.

Rohr Industries, Inc. (Monotrain), Chula Vista, Calif., 2,

Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, Mich., 2.

LTV Aerospace Corporation, Dallas, Tex., 1.

Boeing Aerospace Company. Seattle. Wash.. 1.

Other firms have spent considerable time, effort, and money on the

development of full-scale test tracks and vehicles, prototype systems,

and temporary demonstration projects (such as TRANSPO ‘72).

Some of the firms are believed to have stopped their programs or to

have withdrawn entirely. None have yet been rewarded by sales of

revenue passenger systems in the United States. Prominent members

of this class are:

7.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

In other parts of the would, AGT development has proceeded in

Europe, Japan, and Canada. Progress in these countries is the subject

covered by another panel report in this study for the Office of Technology Assessment. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the

current situation for the United States suppliers and their appraisal

of the AGT market.

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC

Otis Elevator Company, Inc., Transportation Technology Division, Denver, Colo.

Rohr Industries, Inc. (Monocab), Chula Vista, Calif.

Alden Self-Transit Systems Corporation, Bedford, Mass.

Bendix Corporation (Dashaveyor), Ann Arbor, Mich.

Pullman, Inc. (Aerial Transit), Las Vegas, Nev.

Uniflo Systems Company, Minneapolis, Minn.

Mobility Systems and Equipment Company, LOS Angeles,

Calif.

PRT Systems Corporation, Chicago, Ill.

General Motors Corporation, Transportation Systems Division,

Warren, Mich.

McDonnell Douglas. Redondo Beach. Calif.

The Westinghouse Electric Corporation of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

has been a supplier to electric rail and traction companies for more than

85 years. It entered the AGT field in about 1961 when the Transit

Expressway’ system concept was announced. In 1963 Westinghouse

entered into a contract with the Port Authority of Allegheny County

and an agency later incorporated in the United States Department

of Housing and Urban Development for the demonstration of the

(163)
164

Transit Expressway system at South Park in Allegheny County. That

demonstration opened successfully in 1965 and remains intact and

operable.

The South Park Test Track is a closed loop 9,360 feet long, mostly

elevated with a 1,000-ft. spur line at grade. It contains one switch, two

stations and a maintenance and control facility. Vehicles are 30.5 feet

long and normally accommodate up to 54 passengers—28 seated and

26 standing-or up to 70 passengers with crowding (See below). Vehicles run at speeds up to 55 mph on straight sections and at 2-minute

headways. Vehicles can operate singly or in trains of up to 10 cars.

Theoretical capacity of this system could be increased to 21,000 pphpd.

The system as used primarly for demonstration tests but on many

occasions it was opened to visitors and for the Allegheny County Fair.

A 10-cent fare was charged during Fair operations. In one 2-month

period almost 41,000 passengers were carried without accidents of any

kind. In one 10-month period the system logged more than 21,000

vehicle miles.

The total budget for the demonstrations between 1963 and 1973

was $7.4 million. The U.S. Government paid about $4.5 million, state

and local agencies supplied about $1.7 million and Westinghouse and

other contributing companies paid about $1.2 million.

Transit Expressway System Vehicle-Westinghouse Electric
165

The company reports that it has spent a total of $35 million on the

development of Transit Expresswau and related transit technologies.

Development funded by government agencies has been about $6.2

million.

The Transit Expressway at South Park was the prototype for four

revenue systems described elsewhere in this report:

1. Tampa International Airport, Florida.

2. Seattle-Tacoma Internatioal Airport, Washington.

3. Miami International Airport, Florida.

4. Busch Gardens, Williamsburg, Virginia.

Company representatives indicate that this work has not all been

profitable but specific data are proprietary.

Westinghouse has competed for a number of jobs that were not

awarded or that were won by other firms. Among these are:

Interama (aborted by client just short of selection of supplier).

Bradley International Airport (won by Ford).

Morgantown (won by Boeing).

Dallas-Ft. Worth (won by LTV).

Newark International Airport (delayed by client).

The company will be able to compete for the Pittsburgh TERL

project if it is ever carried forward.

Bid and proposal costs have ranged from $25,000 to $250,000 per

project. A total figure was not supplied.

Westinghouse representatives call attention to the fact that the

company has invested a significant amount of its own funds to meet

the predicted demands for new transit markets. An AGT system of the

loop type-the first Transit Expressway-was originated by Westinghouse in response to requests by Pittsburgh planners, the City of

Pittsburgh and Allegheny County and was designed for medium

density rapid transit corridors. Automatic train control (ATC) was

seen as a vital subsystem for Transit Expressway.

The market for conventional rail has developed much more slowly

than projected. In Los Angeles, Seattle, Houston and New York

State it lost out on voter referendums. AGT systems using rubber

tires have been proposed for metropolitan application, such as in

Pittsburgh, Honolulu, San Juan, Miami and Baltimore but have also

been used as the scapegoat of political in-fighting among vested

interests. Those who object to the innovation of AGT systems do not

face up to the fact that Westinghouse can point to outstanding successes wit h such systems.

The overall business atmosphere for AGT marketing has been

troubled. There has been shifting emphasis and lack of clear policy at

tile federal level, lack of knowledgeable leadership at the federal and

local level, continual project postponement, irresponsible political

squabbling, uncontrolled project delays, ambiguous specifications,

lack of standards in general and particularly regarding safety performance and measurement, one-sided contract terms and conditions,

inflation, lack of funds, high interest rates and public apathy. To make

matters even worse, the Federal government has used its funding

power to bring forth more potential suppliers into the market place

than the market has been able to provide with business opportunities.
166

The number of companies that have left the transit industry after long

histories or that have entered and abandoned the field within the past

few years attest to this.

The transportation business has not produced the profit or the return on investment for Westinghouse that could be achieved in other

businesses. Consequently, there are periodic corporate reviews to

determine whether to stay in or get out of the business. Westinghouse

has made a special study of the market and marketplace over the past

four years. So far the results have indicated that a definite shift of

emphasis is necessary if government and industry are to serve the

needs of the people.

Company representatives feel that the needs for transit have been

incorrectly assessed by extremists on both ends of the technological

spectrum: the case has not been made for revolutionary transit concepts like PRT nor will it be sufficient just to spend billions of dollars

of government money to modernize transit cars and buses with air

conditioning and the like, They favor a moderate course, one which will

utilize new concepts while at the same time improving existing

facilities.

The immediate problem really boils down to the ills of urbanization.

The transit industry can aid in improving the quality of urban life by

using good innovative transportation methodology and proven transit

technology. This does not mean that the development of new technology should be neglected but rather that the realistic market needs

of today, and in the near term, can be addressed without quantum

leaps into unknown technologies. Westinghouse is against standing

still, as is evidenced by the fact that it is first in the field of AGT. But

the company also favors orderly, well thought out, evolutionary

improvements with proper emphasis on real market needs and several

application methods.

Specifically the quality of urban life needs to be improved first in

the major centers of urban activity, such as the central business

districts, suburban centers, air terminals, medical centers and universities. Such centers have pressing needs and warrant particular

attention.

Westinghouse representatives suggest that AGT applications must

start with the major activity centers and expand outward, rather than

concentrate on regional urban mass transit networks while ignoring

the dire need for urban center mobility. AGT vehicle systems in

major activity centers can intercept automobile, bus and train passengers at convenient transfer points and prevent the stuffing of

major activity centers with street vehicles. This shows promise of

capturing a much larger share of the passenger-trip market and continuing to utilize the automobile and commuter buses and trains for

the functions they are presently performing satisfactorily. AGT must

be planned and integrated with parking, street uses, pedestrian-ways,

buildings, commerce and security systems for it to make a significant

impact on urban life styles.

Westinghouse is optimistic about many aspects of this business.

More than the people of an~~ other nation, the American people are

quick to adjust and to support a good product or service where they

are free to make a choice. However, an alternative to the automobile

must be given urban residents that is a good competitive choice, not

just a new item of hardware or a repainted vehicle.
167

Westinghouse is optimistic about the technology that is available

today. Automated guideway systems of the shuttle ancl loop types and

modest extensions of that technology will perform most of the functions that can be foreseen for urban centers. Higher speed versions of

the same system types can perform the functions of rapid transit as

well.

Westinghouse is pessimistic about the viability of the whole “PRT”

concept. The necessary automatic control system alone to control a

short-headwa~r small car PRT system, as proposed by the PRT

purists, is not going to be available in the foreseeable future without

seriously degrading our safety philosophy for operating public system-

 Even at that, the cost of developing and supplying such a system looks prohibitive. The signs that a realistic market for PRT exists

are not evident and, as a matter of fact, it seems to be an ill-conceived solution, looking for a problem to solve.

Westinghouse believes it is reasonable and proper to expect a stable

and non-hostile environment in which to do business. It expects good

and fair competition—the lack of competition can be worse than too

much because public bodies will not ordinarily buy a one-of-a-kind

product or deal with a single source. Westinghouse expects to work to

competently written specifications and to meet well defined standards.

Ambiguity makes the risks of doing business unpredictable and uncontrollable for a, supplier. Finally, Westinghouse expects to meet its

corporate business objectives or to find another business in which to

invest its limited resources,

Westinghouse representatives express concern about the employment and productivity aspects of the AGT business. Transportation

is a labor-intensive industry both from the standpoint of the system

owners and the supplier. Westinghouse is working hard at standardization and cost reduction to increase productivity and offset the

impact of inflation. Westinghouse employment, like that of its innumerable suppliers required to support its manufacturing operation,

fluctuates with the workload.

Dollar volumes traditionally fluctuate widely in this industry, For

example, they may be $15 million one year and $60 million the next.

This has a serious effect on employment, employee morale, retention

of seasoned, experienced professionals, and, of course, development

funding and limits. Present plant facilities could support a substantial increase in direct employmlcnt. Westinghouse has mapped out

growth to broaden its product base and to reduce severe fluctuations.

Political and economic influences have thwarted this effort time and

time again.

With regard to changes in Federal programs, Westinghouse representatives have expresse these views: the conpany believes that much

of the R&TD monies spent so far have been spent on projects which

have overlapped previous efforts, demonstrated concepts of questionable values and marketability or have had as their main objective

putting new’ suppliers into the business. It is highly questionable to

use MD funds to create new competitors to established suppliers.

Prior to undertaking development programs, Westinghouse suggests

that the responsible federal agency or department evaluate the pro-

\
gram with a sufficient cross-section of industry to insure the marketability of the results. Significant influences in the transportation

market include:

Users—the consumer.

Transit properties, both private and public.

Labor.

Suppliers.

Land developers and redevelopers—both private and public.

Property owners.

Municipalities.

States.

Federal.

The program must define what is needed and the procedure to be

followed to insure meaningful results. Long-term and short-term

programs should be clearly identified with the markets they are

intended to serve.

The federal level should provide national standards for transportation, particularly on matters of safety. In conjunction with these

standards, formalized procedures must be provided to determine

whether or not they have been met. ‘iCertification” is not recommended because it would have a detrimental effect on the marketability of valid new ideas.

The federal level should continuously and realistically monitor and

document the state-of-the-art in the transit industry. It should estimate and publish the amounts of time and the costs needed to develop

new systems or subsystems. This would allow planners, consultants,

transit properties and governmental interests to be more objective in

assessing technology.

Westinghouse representatives feel that R&D should be directed to

solving real, near-term consumer problems. The HPPRT is viewed as a

program to develop a system which may have no realistic, economic

application. Further, they feel that the ‘f Standard Light Rail Vehicle”

(SLRV) has been endorsed by UMTA as a favored rapid transit

alternative for the United States. In view of the fact that the “Transit

Expressway” vehicle system has logged a considerable number of

revenue passenger miles at Tampa and Seattlet they feel it would

be reasonable for UNITA also to endorse Transit Expressway as an

equally viable alternative.

UNIVERSAL hfOBILITY

Since 1963, Universal Mobility, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, has

been associated with Habegger, I.tcl., Thul], Switzerland, in the

development, fabrication and sale of the Minirail AGT systems in

North America. The first three systems of this type were installed

at EXPO Lausanne in Switzerland in 1964. Additional systems were

installed at Munich, Federal Republic of Germany, in 1965 and at

Blackpool, England in 1966. Three systems were installed at EXPO

’67 in Montreal, Canada, and two are used in Japan. Six systems have

been installed in the United States between 1969 and 1975 (See list

in Chapter 3). Proposals were made and lost for the Sea-Tac airport

il~stallation and for a TRANSPO 72 demonstration.
169

The development of this system hm been accomplished by Universal Mobility and Habegger without UMTA assistance. Owners

of the United States systerns iuclude one state government and

five private firms. None of the instillations received capital grants

from UMTA. Approximately 10 percent of the cost of each system

is used to purchase imported components while the remainder is for

United States goods and services-much of which is from local

sources.

The company’s experience has been mainly with fairs, expositions

and recreation parks. However, these automated systems are suitable

for use in urban public transportation services and such applications

are under study. Vehicle bodies have been designed to meet the

needs of the buyer-some are open and some are enclosed and air

conditioned.

A representative of the company has estimated that the capital

cost of the American systems (United States and Canada) totals

$30 million. Patronage totals 125 million rides. He reported that

there have been no accidents of consequence to passengers.

FORD

Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, Michigan, began a development

program in AGT systems in 1970 with a decision to construct 650

feet of test guideway. During 1971 and 1972 they supplied one of the

TRANSPO ’72 demonstration systems and operated it successfully,

carrying 25,000 riders, That system included two stations (one online and one off-line), 750 feet of guideway, and two 24-passenger

vehicles. The company received partial reimbursement from UMTA

for the construction and operation of the TRANSPO ’72 demonstration; however, all AGT development work by Ford has been privately

financed.

In February, 1974, the company completed its Cherry Hill Test

Facility on a 230-acre parcel of land near Dearborn. It includes an

0.8 mile loop, a 600-foot off-line station lane and a maintenance

control building. These facilities allow testing vehicles at speeds up

to 35 mph. With expansion of the facility the track will be able to

test vehicles at speeds of up to 60 mph. The vehicles for revenue

installations will be tested at Cherry Hill. The facility. has been

in continuous operation since February 1974 at levels of manning

ranging from one to three shifts.

The company is now installing two systems for passenger serviceone at the Fairlane Town Center near Dearborn and another at

Bradley International Airport near Hartford, Connecticut. (See

discussions above.) These systems are a second generation model of

the TRANSPO 72 design and have incorporated many improvements.

The total capital cost of these two projects is about $9 million.

Ford has competed for two jobs that have not been executed. They

were selected for the El Paso Juarez job, which would have cost about

$15 million. However, the project has been delayed by difficulties in

financing and may be aborted. Ford competed against three other

firms for the Interama project. The proposals were evaluated but no

award was made because of the inability of the client to finance the

project. Some $500,000 has been expended on bids and proposals.
170

Ford has guarded optimism regarding the future market for automated transportation systems. There is a need for new systems offering

increased mobility in congested areas. However, there is no present

mechanism by which the federal government is effectively stimulating

the development of this market. The future of the public sector market

depends almost entirely on the leadership and direction which must be

supplied by the federal government.

There is a latent need which has been estimated by a number of

published sources as between $2 and $5 billion over the next twenty

years. Exactly how and if the market develops will be largely the

result of responsive federal policy.

There are some indications that the automated transportation

system market is beginning to develop. During 1974 approximately

$400 million in new business opportunities were under active consideration. It is significant, however, that only $1 to $2 million in new systems

was awarded.

Government must provide leadership and direction in solving

national transportation needs. Industry will respond if the risks and

returns are favorable compared to alternative investment opportunities. It is not enough for the federal government to sponsor

prototype development and to expect industry and transit authorities

to shoulder the remaining risks and expenses. The uncertainties

regarding additional development expense and eventual product

marketability represent an unacceptable risk to industry.

The deployment of urban AGT demonstration programs must be

encouraged and sponsored by the government. Only when the social

and economic consequences of meaningful deployments are known

will the marketability of AGT be established. The government can

encourage demonstration programs by offering capital grants to communities with suitable applications. The present cost-effectiveness

criteria governing capital grants should be relaxed in recognition of

the high costs associated with early installations and in view of such

factors as economy of scale and relative product maturity.

ROHR I$IONORAIL

Facilities of the Monorail System Division of Rohr Industries are

located in New Jersey near Wildwood and Cape May. The product

line of this division was acquired from Westinghouse Air Brake

(WABCO) in 1972, and WABCO had acquired the product line from

Universal Design, Ltd. in 1968. The entire history of the product line

goes back to about 1960. Facilities include a manufacturing plant

and office and three test tracks in New Jersej-. Each track includes

an operating switch. The test tracks accommodate the three models in

the product line. Rohr Industries has expended $850,000 on system

development including product rights.

The Division has produced two full~’ automated passenger carrying

systems: Houston International Airport, Texas, and Pearl Ridge,

Honolulu, Hawaii, both described elsewhere in this report. Two other

s~*stems were designed for manual operation with automatic control

features as a back Up: the San Diego Animal Park in California and

the Bronx Zoo in New l“ork. In addition the Division and its earlier

entities have produced 10 passenger carr~’ing s~wtenls that depend

entirel~’ or almost entirel~r on manual controls.
171

The Division has bid and lost two projects: Dallas-Ft. Worth

Regional Airport and Bradley International Airport. They have also

bid two jobs that have been delayed or aborted: Newark International

Airport and Interama. Costs of bids and proposals were not disclosed.

Representatives of the company have a guarded outlook for the

future. The current Rohr Monorail products, now in passenger service,

are of the shuttle and loop type and are suitable for major activity

centers where modest speeds are acceptable. There are many potential

urban sites where systems costing $1 to $2 million could produce

valuable services. Examples are central business districts, airports,

medical centers, universities and government installations, Lead time

for design and installation is short-about 18 months. The company

could supply 3 to 4 systems per year now and could increase output

as sustained demand Increases. From the supply side, there would be

few problems in delivering several dozen small systems with a total

value of $50 to $100 million within 5 years. The difficulty is that potential buyers must overcome complex institutional problems and raise

money before the latent demand becomes effective.

The Monorail products do not require research and development

for urban applications although better components and improved

designs are possible. It would also be useful to have advanced approval

of the designs by UMTA in anticipation of receipt of applications for

capital grants but that problem has not yet been encountered.

LTV

LTV Aerospace Corporation, Dallas, Texas has been active in the

AGT field since about 1970 but their main endeavors have been

associated with the Airtrans installation at the Dallas/Ft. Worth

Airport. (That installation is described above.)

LTV received authority to proceed with the Airtrans project on

August, 2, 1971 and began providing services on some routes less than

30 months later on January 13, 1974, in time for the airport opening.

The speed with which this project was conducted borders on the

amazing and reflects great credit on the firm. This can be put in

perspective by reciting some of the milestones of the project:

August 1971—Authorized to proceed.

February 1972—Broke ground for guideway.

May 1972—Ran prototype vehicle on guideway.

September 1972—Conpleted first production vehicle.

February 1973—Operated vehicle in a closed loop.

March 1973—Conducted first completely automatic route

operation.

September 1973—Completed the 13-mile guideway.

January 1974—Started inter-terminal passenger service 15

hours per day when airport opened.

February 1974—Extended passenger service to remote parking.

March 1974—Inaugurated services to Air Mail Facility.

May 1974—Logged millionth vehicle mile.

June 1974—Began 24-hour service.

December 1974—Logged three-millionth vehicle mile.

The time limitations for the project and the need to make decisions

quickly and to act upon them at once left many problems unsolved

when the airport opened. Only a miracle of technical achievements

could have avoided such troubles.
172

LTV has conducted a large and costly program to redesign and

retrofit troublesome elements and to maintain the system. In its

1974 annual report the company indicated that it had written off just

over $18 million in Airtrans costs over and above current contract

coverage.

Although great progress has been made in the 15 months since

opening, Airtrans has not provided a number of the services for which

it was designed. Some of the deficiencies can be attributed to difficulties still experienced by Airtrans equipment but others are the result

of external forces. For example, Airtrans met the airport’s specifications regarding timely movements of mail and baggage among terminals but the airlines shortened the time available for interline transfers

after Airtrans was designed and operating. It appears that a considerable revision of the Airtrans routes and other features will be necessary

to meet the new requirements. Also, the equipment and procedures

used with the utility vehicles to discharge and reload containers

carrying mail, baggage and other material have not always been

prompt and effective, Resultant delays disrupt other schedules and

cause further delays throughout the system. Because of various technical and operating difficulties and disagreements regarding financial

matters, relations among LTV, the airport and the airlines have

become increasingly strained, A breakdown of relations occurred on

March 6, 1975 and LTV discontinued maintenance of the system.

This made it necessary for the airport to shutdown operations.

Operations were resumed on March 17 under a new agreement.

There is considerable danger that an opportunity of very substantial

general value to the Nation will be lost in this situation. LTV has

undoubtedly learned many valuable lessons and is in the best position

to carry the learning process forward. However, institutional sponsorship does not exist and funds are not available to do additional work

directed at both local and national objectives or to publish and disseminate such information, The local situation makes it almost certain

that initiative for a program aimed at national interest and needs

will not come from the parties on the scene.

UMTA might provide such a service. UMTA has participated in the

Airtrans project at three stages. A grant was made in the late 1960’s

for technical work and testing by two firms other than LTV. In 1972,

a capital grant in the amount of about $7.5 million was made to aid

construction. Recently, UMTA has opened discussion with the airport

and others with a view toward conducting a technical and operative

assessment of the project. This is envisioned as a limited effort involving UMTA staff and support from Transportation Systems Center

and others,

In the view of panel members it would be worthwhile to consider

the possibility of greatly increasing UMTA participation in Airtrans

beyond that originally envisioned. Assistance could bc of three kinds:

●

●

Technical studies to more accurately specify the needs for

service in light of a year’s experience.

R & D projects to improve the system design and to introduce

second-generation components.

Capital grants for alterations, improvements and enlargements

of the physical system and studies of user and public acceptance.
173

The results of a successful program along these lines together with

full documentation and display of results would be of value to many

other potential users of AGT systems and to other suppliers as well.

LTV has been involved in other AGT work. The firm proposed in

competition with three others on the Newark International Airport

project described above. A selection was not made and action on the

project has been postponed indefinitely. The company also proposed

on the Las Vegas project but withdrew from the competition before

a selection was made, The firm has affiliations with French and Japanese firms. LTV has expended almost $30 million in company funds on

ground transportation developments of all types, mostly on Airtrans.

Company representatives express the view that the money spent by

the Department of Transportation on R & D is too low in relation to

the money spent for capital assets. They are of the opinion that

industry should bear a part of the costs of R & D but there is not

much incentive under present market conditions.

Representatives of the company feel that UMTA should support

development of components to achieve much higher reliability than

now available. This was identified as a critical deficiency since many

shelf components do not have known or predictable mean times

between failure, and vendors have little incentive to subject them to

the costly tests that would be needed to make the estimates. “Certification” at the component level might be undertaken by UMTA. The

company endorses estimates of others that the cost of developing a

GRT system suitable for regional-scale deployment till be at least

$50 million and that. developing high technology PRT systems may

require 10 years and cost $250 million.

Spokespersons indicate that the lack of a well established and

dependable procurement process is a serious limitation. There is a

need to examine various alternatives, including those used in defense

and aerospace procurement, ordinary commercial transactions, commercial aircraft procurement and the earlier practices of the transit

industry such as the cooperative drafting of specifications for the

President’s Conference car.

BOEING

The Boeing Aerospace Company, Seattle, Washington, made

in-house studies of AGT systems as early as 1962, but Morgantown

has been their main effort. In February 1971, Boeing bid on two

elements of the project: the vehicle contract, which they won in May,

and the command and control systems, which they lost to Bendix.

In August, 1971, they contracted with UMTA to add the system

management function which had previously been assigned to Jet

Propulsion Laboratories, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena,

California. The Morgantown project is described elsewhere in this

report.

The cost of the entire project to UMTA is reported to be $64.2

million. major Boeing subcontractors received $25 million for guideways and stations and $7.5 million for command and control. One

element of the Morgantown system—the vehicle command and control

system-was developed by Boeing with company funds and remains

proprietary.
174

The end date of Boeing’s current contract is June 30, 1975. They

are now training University personnel to maintain and operate the

system. When all of the company’s obligations are discharged—

which could be later than June—Boeing plans to relocate the staff

to Seattle.

Members of the panel have expressed the view that Boeing has

learned much that would be of value to the Nation and specifically

to prospective buyers and suppliers of GRT systems. The firm is

well situated to learn far more by continuing work at Morgantown

through the initial operating stages. Early withdrawal would be

wasteful of experience and detrimental to the R & D purposes of the

project. It would be in the national interest for Boeing to be retained

under contract at Morgantown to operate the system until it is

thoroughly debugged and until maintenance and operation become

routine. It would also be appropriate for UMTA to finance Boeing

in the conduct, of redesign and retrofit programs which are certain

to be needed at least in some degree. These activities might profitably

extend over a period of 2 or 3 years. During that period technical,

operating and economic information regarding the project should be

documented in reports and otherwise made available to outsiders

including competent professional personnel, prospective buyers of

AGT systems and suppliers of components and systems.

Other than Morgantown, Boeing has constructed a test track at the

Boeing Space Center in Kent, Washington. Its purposes include functional test and checkout of the Morgantown vehicles as well as evaluation of application developments and technology advancements, and

display of operating vehicles to visitors. The track contains a simulated

station, a variety of geometric sect sections and a number of switches.

Boeing bid and lost the Toronto Zoo project and the Bradley International Airport project. The company is affiliated with Japanese

interests and is participating in the EXPO 75 transportation system

on Okinawa. That system is based on Morgantown technology- and

represents a $10 millon return on Morgantown investment in the form

of positive balance of payments. Boeing-Vertol was recently awarded

one of three UMTA contracts for High Performance PRT studies.

Boeing spokesmen indicate that the firm does not have a clear

picture of where the market is going. There is no national policy —no

long-term plan or direction. UMTA has confused industry about opportunities. Boeing, like other firms, is always prepared to do work on

a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis but does not want to put up large "front

end" investments for A GT systems under prevailing market conditions. After the market has been verified the company would consider

private funding of system development if it were coupled with a "certification” procedure by which products could pre-qualify for capital

grants. UMTA-funded research on components, theory, etc--–the

NACA/NASA role in civil aviation--would be welcome. Efforts to

establish configuration standards would be premature at this time.

OTIS-TTD

The Transportation Technology Division of Otis Elevator Company

is located in Aurora and Denver, Colorado. The Division and its earlier

entities have been engaged in the AGT business since 1968 and foun-
175

ders of the firm had done related work at General Motors for several

years. Two test facilities were built near Detroit, Michigan, in 1969,

and a third exists near Denver, built in 1971. An Otis-TTD system

was demonstrated at TRANSPO 72 (see below) and was subsequently’

tested there. Four test vehicles have been built.

Otis-TTD systems have exploited two advanced subsystems –-air

cushion suspension and linear electric propulsion. Recent work has

considered rubber tires and rotary electric motors as alternatives.

Their designs have also featured a unique station apparatus-a dockwhich slides the vehicle clear of the track to its loading position.

Otis-TTD has spent more than $10 million on proprietary development and about $1.6 million on government funded demonstrations.

Otis-TTD was one of three contractors engaged by UMTA in 1973

for a preliminary study of dual-mode transit. They now have one of

three contracts with UMTA to study HPPRT. The company has an

association] with a French concern and has had negotiations regarding

licenses with two ,Japanese firms. The company bid and lost two projects currently underway by others: Miami International Airport

(Westinghouse Electric) and Bradley International Airport (Ford).

They also proposed a system for Centaworld, Jacksonville, Florida

which was not executed for lack of funds. Two other bids were made

and withdrawn: Toronto Zoo, Ontario, Canada; and El Paso,/Juarez.

The company has spent in excess of $600,000 on bid and proposal

work.

Otis Linear Induction Motor (LIM) Vehicle at Transpo ’72, Dunes Airport,

Otis Elevator Company, Transportation Technology Division

Representatives of otis-TTD are optimistic regarding the future of

AGT systems. They feel that economics will ultimately dictate driverless operation of transit vehicles. AGT will become a major business
176

within the next 10 years after the current emphasis on buses has subsided. Private corporations have spent tens of millions of dollars on

development but none has produced a system with sufficient reliability

and sophistication to meet the needs of an urban area installation, It

is clear that industry will not spend its own money to develop systems

for a market which does not yet exist and for which no standards or

specifications are set for capital grant support.

In their view it is appropriately that the Federal Government sponsor

the development of systems at least through the engineering prototype

level. Such development would establish a market for which industry

could compete. Industry would fund development to bridge the gap

between engineering prototype and production status. Such funding

would be amortized by competing firms over a number of systems and

installations in much the same way as developments for many commercial markets are presently handled (e.g., computer systems and

other forms of automation such as material handling).

The federal Government should set standards for various classes of

systems, particularly as they relate to passenger safety. The government should also maintain a continuing R&D effort to provide improvements in system and component areas. Such development

would be available as public information to the industry and transit

authorities.

Otis-TTD representatives believe that Congressional support of the

proposed UMTA programs for Fiscal Year 1976 is especially crucial.

Automated guideway transit systems can provide significant help in

solving the congestion problems of our cities as wel as providing a

means of transport dependent upon electrical energy which can be

derived from other than petroleum fuel sources to assist in achievement of our national self-sufficiency goal. These systems can have

stable operating cost characteristics and lower life cycle costs than

labor intensive conventional systems or heavy rail systems. These

judgments are obviously shared by other industrialized countries in

the western world (Germany, France, England and Japan) where

development of advanced guideway transit systems are well underway

with government sponsorship. If our cities are to have the option to

install automated guideway systems, it is essential that the U.S.

Government support the development.

If such support is not forthcoming from the Federal Government in

fisca] Year 1976, company representatives predict that the U.S.

industry efforts will serlously” recede or disappear and that nothing

constructive will be accomplished in the United States in terms of

development over the next five years. At the end of such period we

would probably find ourselves incapable of competing with foreign

development and would end up importing foreign technology to satisfy

our urban transport needs in order to keep pace with advancements

in the rest of the western world. This would further exacerbate our

problems with balance of payments and deprive U.S. industry of its

rightful role in leading, at least in the United States, in automated

urban transit.

ROHR MONOCAB

Monocab, Inc., of National City, California has been a subsidiary

of Rohr Industries, Inc. since July, 1971. The firm’s history goes back

to 1968 when activities started as the transportation System Division
177

of Varo, Inc., in Garland, Texas. Two test tracks were constructed at

Garland. The longest was a 2,200-foot loop with one off-line station.

The conmpany installed a 1 ,900-foot loop and one off-line station at

TRANSPO ’72 (See below) and successfully operated two, 6-passenger

vehicles during the exposition demonstrating lo-second headway

operations. For the demonstration and subsequent test program

Monocab received about $1.8 million from UMTA and put in about

$1 million of their own money. The conmpany has recently- developed

a 500-foot test track at Chula Vista, California for an advaced

vehicle. The vehicle employs a new electrical subsystem which provides

propulsion, braking and switching.

Monocab was one of the two suppliers originally favored for the

Dallas-Ft. Worth project and received support from UMTA via the

airport borad for design studies and tests. They competed for the

Morgantown project at an early stage. They were selected for the

Las Vegas project but that project was aborted. They were one of the

competitors for the Interama project, which was also aborted. They

were recently awarded one of the three HPPRT contracts by UMTA.

Rohr Monocab representatives anticipate sales of small systems for

special purpose applica t ions such as shopping centers, universities,

medical centers, airports and recreational parks. However, high

interest rates and other financing difficulties are the main limitation.

their outlook for larger installations to serve more general urban

needs depends upon action of the Federal Government. They expect

the HPPRT program to be the pacing item and to lead to the deployment of the first such system. HPPRT is viewed as a medium capacity

transit system potentially usable in Denver, Miami, the Twin Cities,

Honolulu, San Juan, San Diego, Los Angeles, Trenton, and Detroit.

Monocab Vehicle at Transpo ’72, Dunes Airport, Rohr Industries
178

ALDEN SELF TRANSIT SYSTEMS CORPORATION, BEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS

Alden was one of the pioneers in the PRT field and did much to

promote the concept, including development of test vehicles and

tracks. Alden was a subcontractor to Boeing in the Morgantown

project as a supplier of components. The firm does not have a fully

developed system.
179

THE BENDIX CORPORATION, ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN

The Bendix Corporation acquired the Dashaveyor Company and

its AGT product line in 1971. At least two test tracks have been developed, and the system was one of four demonstrated at TRANSPO

’72. One test track and the demonstration received financial support

from UMTA totaling about $2 million. The company appears to have

withdrawn from the business of supplying AGT systems but remains

a supplier of control subsystems. Its Canadian affiliate continues to

supply small transit systems for recreation parks.

PULLMAN, INC., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Aerial Transit Systems of Nevada, Inc. was formed by Pullman and

others with the primary objective of competing for the Las Vegas,

Nevada project which has been aborted. A test track and vehicles

were developed at Hammond, Indiana. Apparently, the firm is no

longer active in the AGT field.

UNIFLO SYSTENS COMPANY, MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

The Uniflo Systems Company traces its history to 1967. Financial

support totaling $2 million has come from Rosemount, Inc., and

UMTA supplied $400,000 for component R & D work. The firm has

developed test tracks and vehicles and has conducted extensive tests

and demonstrations for visitors. They have competed on a number of

jobs without success. They submitted a proposal in the HPPRT

competition and lost. The company is reported to have stopped AGT

business activities.

MOBILITY SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT COMPANY, LOS ANGELES,

CALIFORNIA

This firm was founded by one of the engineers responsible for the

Braniff AGT installation at Love Field. It received a contract in the

amount of $225,000 funded by UMTA for work on an AGT propulsion subsystem, Other information is not available.

PRT SYSTEMS CORPORATION, CHICAGO HEIGHTS, ILLINOIS

This firm is presently using the Braniff Love Field AGT installation as a test track for a new vechicle of advanced design. One vehicle

is being tested. It employs a new electrical device to achieve magnetic

levitation and propulsion. Negotiations are being conducted with

several prospective buyers, but no systems are in service.

GENERAL MOTORS CORP., TRANSPORTATION’ SYSTEMS DIVISION.

 WARREN, MICH.

General Motors did work on automated controls for highway vehicles in the late 1950’s and began work on AGT systems in the early

1960’s. A 4-seat vehicle employing air cushion suspension and linear

electric motors was operated on a 20()-foot test track in 1962. A substantial program was conducted during the period until 1966. Total

54-370 0 - 75 - 13
180

cost was reported to be $4 to $5 million. In 1968, General Motors gave

licenses to Transportation Technology, Inc., which later became OtisGeneral Motors established a new Transportation Department in

the Engineering Staff in 1973 and elevated it to division level in 1975.

The Transportation Systems Division was one of three contractors

who received $500,000 contracts from UMTA for work on dual-mode

buses. That program was aborted by UMTA for lack of funds. The

Division is now making a broad study of-public transportation systems

but has made no announcements regarding AGT plans, lf any exist.

31CDONNELL DOUGLAS, HUNTINGTON BEACH, CALIF.

The firm has monitored the development of AGT sytems for a numn

ber of years. In 1974, McDonnell Douglas announced its interest in

joining the Ontario Transportation Development Coporation and the

West German firm of Krauss-Maffei in a joint venture to bring the

KM magnetic-levitated system to this country. However, extreme

difficulties in developing the system for the Toronto Exposition and the

resulting cancellation of the project caused McDonnell Douglas to reconsider its position. The firm was prepared to invest up to $20 million

in the project. However, the cancellation became effective before McDonnell Douglas invested any funds.
Chapter 6: Summary and Views of Respondents

S YSTEMS IN E XISTENC E

Seventeen AGT systems exist in the United States. Fifteen are relatively simple shuttle and loop transit (SLT) systems. Two are of the

group rapid transit (GRT) type. Ten are currently providing service,

one is idle, and six are in advanced stages of construction. Six industrial

firms and one consortium have supplied the 17 systems. The installations are tabulated on the next page by type of system, supplier, type

of application, present status, and location.

(181)
Existing AGT Systems

Airports Parks Commercial University Total Locations

developments communities

SLT Systems:

Westinghouse Electric. 2+1 1

11 ---------- --- ------- 4

Universal mobility- ___ ___ _ _ _ - _ ,; + 1 1 ---------------- _ --- 6

Ford. --- _ _ - _ - _ -- _ - _ - ; 1 ~ :::::::: : 11 ---------- 2

Rohr Monotrain _ - _ _ _ _ 1 I ---------- 2

Braniff ___ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 12 --------- -—-.-—--————----.—. _— 1

GRT Systems:

Boeing---- _ -- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ ---- — -- — ---- — -- — - — ---------- 11 1

LTV--- - ___ --- _ -. _ ___ 1 ------------------------------ 1

Total-- ------------ 7 7 2 1 17

TamI>a, Fla., Seattle-T:~conq l~”ush., Miami, Fla.,

Williamsburg, Va.

Hershey, Pa., Valencia, Calif., Charlotte, N, C.,

Kings hlill, Ohio, Ashland, Va., Sacramento. ~ - ..- Uahf.

Hartford. Corm.. Dearborn. Mich.

Houston; Tex., Honolulu,

l)allas (Love Field), Tex.

Morgantovvr\, W. Va.

Dallas/Ft. M orth, Tex.

H:lwnii.

1 In construction. 2 Idle.
S’cate.-These systems employ approximately- 200 automated

vehicles or permanently linked trains. They operate over some 35

miles of single-lane, automated guideways or the equivalent of about

17 miles of double guideway route.

Performance.-Speeds are in the range of 8 mph to 35 mph. Capacities are in the range of 600 passengers per hour per direction to

9,000 pphpd.

Patronuge.-Total patronage of AGT systems is believed to be in

the range of 120 to 150 million riders to date. When the 17 systems

are all fully operational, patronage will be in the order of 50 million

riders per year.

Costs of installations.—The cost of AGT installations to their owners

and the United States Government plus losses suffered by contractors,

where known, totals about $200 million. Of this amount about $75

million is associated with 15 shuttle and loop transit systems and

$125 million is associated with the two existing group rapid transit

systems—both in the low-technology band of the GRT spectrum. The

federal government has made no contributions to the capital costs of

the 15 SLT systems. It has contributed about $7.5 million toward the

capita] costs of the GRT system at Dallas/Ft. Worth and about

$64.2 million on the Morgantown GRT installation including both

R & D and capital outlays.

COSts of operations.—Information regarding operating costs is

incomplete and of poor quality; however, available data indicate

that operation of the 17 systems will require outlays of about $6.5

million per year after shake-downs.

Safety.-The systems in existence have experienced few accidents

and only one in which a passenger suffered serious injury. This performance is remarkable when one considers that there are no uniform

standards governing the design or operation of the systems.

Availability of Service/Reliability .—The systems differ markedly

in their abilities to provide service at all times. Panel members agree

that both the Tampa and Sea-Tac systems should be regarded as

successful]] in this respect. The systems display these attributes:

• The mean times between failures are only moderately long. For

example, at Sea-Tac vehicles experience involuntary stoppages

at intervals of about 150 hours on the average.

• The time to restore service is short: about 6 or 7 minutes on

the avearge.

● Service is available about 99.9 percent of the time.

• Both systems ems fail gracefully. At Tampa, stoppage of one vehicle has no effect on others. At Sea-Tac failure of one vehicle

on a loop has a limited effect on the operation of other vehicles

but does not stop service on the loop. Failure of a vehicle on

the Sea-Tac shuttle stops service on that link until repaired.

An emergency walkway is provided on all Tampa and Sea-Tac

routes to guard against immobilizing passengers when a general stoppage occurs as during a power failure. Passengers can

always evacuate the vehicle and proceed on the walkway. This

evacuation procedure is quite satisfactory for a simple system;

however, for a fully developed urban transit system this may

not be the best alternative-allowing passengers to proceed on

a walkway adjacent to the guideway over the complete length.
184

It should be noted that neither of the two GRT systems in existence

fails as gracefully’, and restoration after some failures cannot be accomplished as quickly. Consequently, both system designers found

it necessary to seek highly reliable components, For example, vehicles

need to achieve mean times between failures of about 1,500 hours10 times as long as at Sea-Tac-to achieve established standards

of service availability. In both systems the need for highly reliable

components could have been reduced, to some degree, by design

changes. Some opportunities of this type may have been overlooked

through haste or inexperience. Others appear to have been omitted

in the interest of capital cost savings. For example, neither system

provides an emergency walkway.

STUDIES OF POSSIBLE FUTURE APPLICATIONS

The panel identified and obtained data for 36 cases in which public

agencies and private interests made studies of AGT applications. A

more thorough search would turn up additional cases—perhaps a

total of 75 to 100. The capital cost estimates cited in the 36 studies

total about $8 billion. A complete survey of the field might double

or triple that figure.

Interest exhibited today does not mean that purchases will necessarily be made tomorrow. The panel found no way of estimating

the number of projects that will be undertaken, their size or their

timing. Inquiries at UMTA yielded no such estimates.

It is clear that the possible exploitation of AGT systems has

captured the interest of a great many possible buyers even though

information available to officials and planners at the local level has

been limited. Almost all of the studies settle on systems at the low

end of the technological] scale--SLT or simple GRT systems. The

uncertainties regarding availability, cost, and other characteristics

of PRT systems account for their exclusion.

METROPOLITAN NETWORKS

The largest systems in prospect would include extensive networks

designed to serve entire metropolitan areas. Four studies dealing

with the initial stages of such networks describe possible future

systems containing about 380 miles of dual guideway and almost

380 stations. Full development would be staged over several decades.

Capital cost estimates for the four installations total $6.7 billion.

To provide perspective, it may be useful to note that rail rapid transit

routes in the United States total about 500 miles and that the

WMATA system will add 100 miles to that total at a cost of about

$4.5 billion.

The studies display serious concern with the economic, service and

other limitations of conventional transit modes—bus and rail rapid

transit—and indicate the hope or expectation, based on analysis,

that AGT systems will have superior characteristics. The studies

show varying degrees of awareness of the differences among system

types-–such as SLT, GRT, and PRT in the vocabulary of this report.

All appear to recognize that PRT systems involve exploitation of

high technology and will not be available for many years until largescale development and test projects are completed. Some express

concern over the economics of PRT. These beliefs tend to focus
185

attention on SLT systems of the types now available and on lower

technology systems of the GRT type that could be installed in the

near-term.

It is not clear that local agencies concerned with metropolitan

networks use objective approaches in choosing between SLT and

GRT systems, or in selecting a multi-modal mix of systems most

suitable for a particular community.

Natural conservatism coupled with the desire for early action tends

to encourage adoption of SLT designs which have records of successful use. However, if decisions must be delayed a few years, as is likely

in some cases, the technical risks of GRT systems real’ appear lower

and the service advantages and other features promised by GRT

technology may lead to their adoption.

Corridor applications of AGT systems may be regarded as the

initial stage of a metropolitan network. Two cases were examined:

the Pittsburgh TERL project and the El Paso/Juarez international

link. Their costs would have totalled about $250 million. Neither seems

likely to be built. However, the decisions apparently turned on

financial and political rather than technical issues. The SLT hardware

proposed in each study involves little or no technical risk or

uncertainty.

MAJOR ACTIVITY CENTERS

Studies dealing with AGT applications in major activity centers

have been conducted in profusion. The panel obtained data from 30

studies:

Number

Type of application: of studies

Airports ------------- ------------------ ------------ -- -- 9

Central city /CBD. _ --- - - 9

Multiple-purpose developments - - -- ---- - 8

Medical centers - ------- -- --------- --------- 4

Total ---------- --- ------------------- ---------- - 30

These studies dealt almost entirely with low technology systems of

the SLT type. This is explained in part by factors of uncertainty

discussed above but also by the simplicity of the route structures

envisioned which make sophisticated hardware unnecessary,

Again, the panel’s search was not exhaustive—several dozen

studies of AGT ssstems for major activity centers could probably

be added to the list. Estimates are not available for all of the 30

studies but it appears that total capital costs would be on the order of

$1 billion.

Many of these studies have been frustrated by financial difficulties,

objectives that differ significtintly from those of UMTA, and institutional relationships. Many of these projects serve special functions,

i.e., airport circulation, CBD or institutional circulation, etc., and

when measured against UMTA objectives for serving the commuters

and the disadvantaged, these projects have relatively low priorities.

A respondent with considerable experience in the AGT field feels

this market should start with the development of AGT systems

in major activity centers, and such systems should be expandable

outward in such a way that ultimately they can serve both the local
186

and express functions of the transit system. This concept could appear

to have substantial merit and could fit nicely with the new UMTA

philosophy’ of starting with a basic element and adding to it “useable

segments”.

A PROPER MATCH OF PRODUCT LINES AND MARKETS

There is now considerable evidence that the application of PRT

in an established large urban area is a decade or more away. Furthermore, PRT may, be environmentally undesirable in established

urban areas. Early applications of SLT or GRT on appropriate routes

would forestall further excessive urban sprawl by the encouragement

of clustered development in areas ready for urban renewal. Thus, if

a major goal for urban transit is to forestall further urban sprawl

and its accompanying increased petroleum consumption, then technology efforts should be directed to match SLT and GRT to the needs

of existing urbanization and focus any further R & D efforts in PRT

on furture new towns where its application can be simplified. The

allocation of investments in these technologies should be proportionate

to the urban potentials identified above.

SUPPLIERS OF AGT SYSTEMS

The community of suppliers of AGT systems in the United States

is headed by six firms that have systems m revenue service and that

remain in the business.

Number of

installations

1. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Pittsburgh, Pa - -------------------- - 4

2. Universal Mobility, Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah ---- _ _ --------- _ --- _ - 6

3. Rohr Industries, Inc. (Monotrain), Chula Vista. Calif - - _ - _ - _ ---- _ --

4. Ford Motor Co., Dearborn, Mich.-- ---- - - --- 2

5. LTV Aerospace Corp., Dallas, TeX ---- --- 1

6. Boeing Aerospace Co., Seattle, Wash - ------ ----- ------ ------- 1

Other firms with aspirations to be system suppliers but without a

record of actual sales of revenue systems are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Otis Elevator Company, Inc. Transportation Technology Division, Denver, Colo.

Rohr Industries, Inc. (Monocab), Chula Vista, Calif.

Alden Self-Transit Systems Corporation, Bedford, Massachusetts.

Bendix Corporation (Dashaveyor), Ann Arbor, Mich.

Pullman, Inc. (Aerial Transit,), Las Vegas, Nevada.

Uniflo Systems Company, Minneapolis, Minn.

Mobility Systems and Equipment Company, Los Angeles, Calif.

PRT Systems Corportition (associated with Braniff), Chicago,

General Motors Corporation, Transportation Systems Div.,

Warren, Mich. - 

“

10. .McDonnell Douglas, Redondo Beach, California.

Close observers of the industry estimate that privately financed

development costs incurred by the entire group total at least $100

million. These companies are suffering severe frustrations in their

efforts to do business. Some firms have withdrawn from the field
187

after large expenditures of private funds and years of effort by dedicated staff members. Others appear to be on the verge of withdrawing.

Some suppliers observe that there are more AGT suppliers than

justified by the market, and complain that UMTA has encouraged

firms without transit experience to enter the field while established

transit suppliers are finding it necessary to withdraw.

DEFINITION’ OF PRODUCT LINES

There is a need for stability and common definitions in the product

lines being offered for sale, and for dependable data on costs. This

deficiency” leaves suppliers without guidance or reference points in

designing new- products and handicaps buyers in making comparisons

among products. Suppliers of systems are at a disadvantage because

competing products proposed for a particular application often differ

in so many respects that buyers find comparisons of products impossible or meaningless. Sellers also complain that they spend substantial

amounts on proposals that do not lead to sales by any one.

UNREALISTIC PROCUREMENTS

Local agencies have a record of initiating procurements that are

unrealistic with respect to the costs and availability of hardware and

that are not supported by a financial plan. Such procurements are

often aborted after considerable time and effort has been expended

by suppliers and local agencies as well.

.4 CC EPTANCE CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES

There is a need for national level standards, criteria and procedures

that can be used to demonstrate that a product has reached “market

ready” status. There should be a wa-y to determine with confidence

that UMTA will not reject an otherwise sound capital grant application for an AGT system on grounds of technical inadequacy of the

project. The same framework needs to be extended to cover final

test and buyer acceptance of completed AGT systems. Suppliers

cannot write specifications for competitive procurements. Local agencies and consultants often lack experience in the field and are likely to

write specifications that are incomplete and ambiguous. Such specifications are costly to satisfy and often prove to be unenforceable in

the end.

FEDERAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Federal agencies—mainly UMTA—have aided several of the installations and development programs surveyed by the panel. Instances

that came to light are recapitulated here:

● Grants of almost $4.5 million were made to the Port Authorit.~’

of Allegheny County to aid in demonstrating the Transit

Expressway.

. A grant of $1.0 million was made to the Dallas/Ft. Worth

Regional Airport Board in 1970 to support studies and test

track developments by two prospective vendors—both of whom

were unsuccessful bidders in the end.

 A capital grant of $7.6 million was made to the same Board in

1972 to aid in paying for the Airtrans system.
188

. R & D studies were funded in the amount of $1.8 million for

component developments by four prospective suppliers—Mobility Systems, Uniflo, Pullman and Alden—and related work.

● Approximately $9.7 million was expended by UMTA for

demonstrations of four AGT prototype systems at Transpo 72

and for tests conducted thereafter. A second generation design

of one of those systems-developed with private funds by

Ford-is now being installed at two sites.

● UMTA has contributed about $64 million to the Morgan town

project at all stages from technical studies through final deployments and test.

This listing may not include all minor items. The activities identified

involve expenditures of about $95 million.

I. ELDERSHIP AND D IRECTIO N

Suppliers and prospective buyers complain that there is a lack of

leadership or direction at the national level regarding the development

and deployment of AGT systems. This deficiency is charged most often

against agencies of the federal government including the Urban Mass

Transportation Administration and other parts of DOT, the Office of

Management and Budget, the White House and Congress. The same

charge could be lodged against national level professional and trade

organizations. Recent formation of a special task force on AGT

systems by the American Public Transit Association (APTA) is an

encouraging development. Initiative is in long supply at the regional

and local level but is not yet focused.

A LTERNATIVE S TRATEGIE S

There is a need for clear, complete, explicit statements of the strategies to be followed in developing and deploying AGT systems and

for definitions of the roles of industry, transit operators, federal, state

and !ocal governments and others. Suggestions on these subjects were

solicited from system buyers and suppliers and from panel members.

Most of the responses can be summarized under four headings:

● The transit industry’s ‘( PCC’) precedent.

. The industrial standardization process.

. The airworthiness certification procedure.

. The DOD/NASA approach.

THE PCC PRECEDENT

The transit industry has had one outstandingly successful exr

perience in establishing% standards for streetcars. In the mid-1930’s

eaders of the industry met and, with technical aid, established

standards for what was called the President’s Conference Committee

Car. Vehicles of that design are still in use and are known by the

acronym “PCC Car”. One panel member has suggested that representatives of transit properties in eight or nine cities now studying

AGT applications might be able and willing to initiate a new version

of that program. The primary objective would be to achieve low

costs while obtaining desired systems. Sponsorship and financial
1$9

support would be needed from agencies such as UMTA, APTA, the

Conference of Mayors, the National League of Cities, and the Transportation Research Board. This technique would be workable for

relatively simple systems or for the subsystems of more advanced

systems. Such systems could be developed by UMTA contractors

but if costs are low and markets are assured, might more appropriately

be developed by private industry.

STANDARDIZATION

Industrial standardization procedures provide a second approach

that has been used with great success in many fields for 50 years.

This would be accomplished with the aid of the American National

Standards Institute. Their procedures are well established and require

the cooperation of all interested parties such as the American Public

Transit Association, the Transit Development Corporation, the

Transportation Research Board, prospective buyers and suppliers,

professional societies and UMTA. Again, this procedure is most

suitable for relatively simple systems and for subsystems and components. UMTA could pay the cost of development; but development

by industrj’ would be feasible, and a mixed approach could be used.

CERT[FICATION

Certification of the airworthiness of new aircraft, as is done by the

Federal Aviation Administration, suggests a third alternative. This

procedure would place a heavy burden on UMTA to establish

standards and to devise acceptance testing procedures. Doubts

were expressed by various respondents regarding UMTA’S ability

to obtain staff and develo competence to do the job. If aircraft

industry practices were fo lowed, the procedure would require the r

supplier to produce a testable prototype system and to operate it

in tests specified and monitored by UMTA. The costs of the prototype

sj”stem and most of the cost~ of the tests would be borne b~’ the

supplier.

Bringing a high-technology s~wtem to the point of certification

would probabl~’ require expenditures comparable to those for a

large commercla] aircraft. This burden would probabl~r be unacceptable to all suppliers, at least until a large market is assured,

tind could force man~- firms to abandon the field. However, the costs

of bringing simple systems and evolutionarjr improvements to the

point of certification would be acceptable to several firms. UMTA

might encourage evolutionary advances by paying for R&D on advanced subsystems or might share costs in other ways provided that

industry would be willing to accept cost-sharing. Industry, however,

has become disenchanted with cost-sharing to expedite development

of AGT.

NASA AND DOD APPROACH

NASA and DOD procurement practices in developing space exploration systems and weapons systems provide a fourth alternative.

Specifications would be prepared and the costs of development and

testing would be paid by the government. contractors would do the
190

work under cost-plus, fixed fee contracts but would acquire no formal

proprietary rights in products developed entirely under the contract.

At the end of a successful development program all suppliers would

be allowed to produce the system.

This approach would be attractive if the development of a technically advanced GRT system or a high-technology PRT were given a

high national priority. One of the main disadvantages of the approach

is that the supplier of the prototype system inevitably achieves a

great competitive advantage from experience gained at government

expense even though the firm obtains no proprietary rights. Newcomers find it necessary to spend private funds on in-house development or to underprice proposals to catch up.

It appears that UMTA’S HPPRT program will follow this path at

least during the four years required to develop and test a prototype.

1f that wor proves satisfactory, the problems of going into production t

and of establishing multiple sources of supply will remain. The cost

of production design, tooling, manufacturing plants and producttesting facilities will be considerable–-perhaps several hundred million

dollars. The panel found no well founded estimate of these costs.

It appears that UMTA expects industry to pay the costs needed to

carry the HPPRT program forward through production and deployment beyond the end of the four-year prototype development and

test program. If present government practices regarding competitive

procurements continue to be followed the deployment of the first

HPPRT system cannot begin until there are in existence at least two

sources of supply. It is hardly conceivable that two or more U.S.

firms would make private investments of the magnitude required to

produce HPPRT systems without assurances that their products will

enjoy large-scale and continuing sales. At present there is no way that

UMTA or the potential buyers of such systems can give assurances.

Thus, it appears that the UMTA plan for HPPRT is not complete.

Something must be added to bridge the gap between final testing of a

successful prototype and approval of capital grant applications from

local agencies for actual installations of the HPPRT systems.

cLOSURE

●

Respondents held different view-s regarding the merits of the four

alternative development strategies and other matters. Generally,

those interested in low-technology systems of the SLT class tended to

favor private funding of development and reliance on professional and

industrial practices in establishing acceptance standards. Respondents

interested in PRT systems and relatively sophisticated GRT systems

agree that government financing is needed at least through prototype

development and testing.

Statements made by seven respondents are repeated here, with some

editorial license, to indicate the diversity of opinions.

1. One school of thought is to encourage only the early exploitation

of low-risk technology systems, the development of software and

standards, and the development of hardware at the component and

subsystem level. It is argued that this evolutionary process will

progressively determine the needs for AGT systems and bring forth

mlprovements.
191

2. Another respondent indicates that, to date, AGT systems have

been successfully applied to targets of opportunist]”, such as an airport,

zoo, or an educational institution. The big market is the urban scene

where AGT applications should curtail urban sprawl and its resulting

increases in gasoline consumption. AGT should encourage clustered

development, shorten the length of vehicle trips, and even encourage

more walk trips. Ultimately, it should produce transportation with

relatively lower operating costs. There is a need to continue developing

relatively simple systems. The research and development thrust

should be sufficient to carry AGT rapidly into larger urban markets

with ’add-on” degrees of sophistication as the technology evolves

and is proven suitable for urban deployment.

3. One respondent states that automated guideway transit technology represents UMTA’s only investment to date in developing

viable alternatives to the conventional modes of urban public transportation. Transit operating losses require government subsidy of $1

for. evey $2 of revenue, yet this problem receives minimal attention

in guiding a search for alternatives to conventional transit. In view

of todays urban economic, energy and environmental situation the

requirement for accelerated UMTA R&D spending is critical. UMTA’S

R&D budget size is inadequate in the face of its task and in relation

to its overall expenditures.

4. A fourth respondent is quoted as follows: ‘{Based on the results

of planning studies of several urban areas, prototypical of the majority

of the urban areas in the United States, there has been stated the

need for transit options that bridge the gap between traditional rail

transit and bus. This transit option would be particularly attractive

for the medium density type urban areas and would offer a service

level to attract riders from the automobile. The HPPRT project

provides an option for this transit need. combined with a well structured technology development program, which could address the

total spectrum of AGT technology, UMTA permently has the sole opportunity to guide and stimulate this technological option. ”

5. Another respondent, commenting on UMTA’s HPPRT program,

has suggested that the problem of assuring competition might be

overcome by carrying development through the engineering prototype level on two or three different approaches. If the cost for each

approach is on the order of $30 million, then three approaches could

be execised in prototype form for around $100 million.

6. Others have taken the opposite positiom-that f(lnds for R&D

for the HPPRT system should have vcry low priority, and that funds

should rather be allocated in greater amounts to Improving systems

at Morgantown and Dallas~ Ft. Worth. The same respondents state

the view that it would appear that the greatest benefits of the AGT

system are in the city, where automobile congestion has become a

serious problem and will eventually be nearly’ intolerable. This is

especially’ significant at this time because of the emphasis on energy

conservation. With $200” million invested in AGT installations, it is

unfortunate that there is no such installation in a city to ascertain

feasibility. There should be a concerted effort by the Federal Government, municipalities, and the transportation industry to initiate

a first urban application promptly.
192

7. Still another respondent suggests that the government’s role must

be to provide leadership and direction in national transportation

matters. Industry will respond if the risks and returns are avorable f

compared to alternative investment opportunities, It is not enough

for the federal government to sponsor prototype development and to

expect industry. and transit authorities to shoulder the remaining risks

and expenses. The uncertainties regarding additional (Development expense and eventual product marketability represent an unacceptable

risk to industry’. The deployment of urban people mover (Demonstration

programs must be encouraged and sponsored by the government. Only

when the social and economic consequences of meaningful deployments

are known will the marketability of people movers be established. The

government can encourage demonstration programs by offering capital

grants to communities with suitable applications. The present cost

effectiveness criteria governing capital grants should be relaxed in

recognition of the high costs associate(l with early installations and because of such factors as economy of scale andl relative product

maturity.

Among the panel members and respondent,s there appears to be considerable agreement that UMTA should indicate clearly what conditions must be met by a supplier and a product to quality for capital

grants. There was also wide agreement that the government’s role and

contributions should be defined regarding research and development on

components, subsystems, and systems. Finally, a need is felt for the

government to specify what financial aid or assurances of markets it

will provide to industry to encourage investments needed to get technically advanced systems into production.

UMTA)S authorltly to act on the suggestions made in this report

needs to be ascertained. However, it appears that UMTA now has tiuthority. to establish conditions for the qualification of new products for

capita] grants and needs only. to act if it chooses to do so. I t appears

that the government’s role and contributions to the process of selecting

and developing hardware-components, subsystems and systems-can

be redefined over broad limits by administrative action backed by the

appropriation of funds. It appears that the problem of providing financial aid to bring advanced systems into production or of tiss[lring markets for such systems to encourage private investments may be beyond

Uhl TA’s authority an(l, if such tictions are desired, new legislation

nla~~ be reqllired.
APPENDIX

—-— — — —.
APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHIEX

Members of the Panel on Current Developments in the United States

Clark Henderson, Chairman

Staff Scientist

Stanford Research Institute

Menlo Park, California

Mr. Henderson has conducted research on transportation since 1953 and has

specialized in urban public transportation systems during the past decade. He

was the principal author of Future Urban Transportation System prepared for

the federal government in 1968. He has conducted studies for local and regional

transit agencies and for suplliers of transit systems.

John K. Howell

Transportation Consultant

Gerald D. Hines Interests

Houston, Texas

Mr. Howell was project manager of the Westinghouse Electric Transit Expressway Demonstration Project and directed the Tampa and Sea-Tac Transit Expressway projects. In consulting practice since 1970, he has completed more than

50 transit projects involving planning, engineering, specifications and proposals,

economic estimates and evaluations.

John R. Jamieson

Director of Transit Development

Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission

St. Paul, Minnesota

Mr. Jamieson has occupied his present position for five years. He has conducted

a number of long-range planning studies including technology assessment, optimum systems, and most recently a detailed study of small vehicle fixed guideway

systems. Previous experiences included Deputy Federal Highway Administrator,

Minnesota Commissioner of Highways and fifteen years in industry in various

assignments ranging from field engineering to product development.

Thomas A. Lancaster

Manager of Market Analysis

Rohr Industries, Inc.

Chula Vista, California

Mr. Lancaster is responsible for long-range forecasting, planning and detailed

analysis of transit trends at Rohr. Earlier, he was engaged in product development and engineering work with the Bendix Corporation. In 197 1–72 he participated in the President’s Commission on Personnel Interchange and served as

Deputy Director—Special Projects in UMTA. He is a professional engineer.

Roy Lobosco

Supervisor, Facilities Planning

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

New York, New York

Mr. Lobosco has been responsible since 196.5 for the program aimed at installation and operation of an AGT system serving Newark International Airport and

connecting the terminal with a proposed PATH extension. He has supervised

internal planning and the work” of consultants and has negotiated with four

potential suppliers regarding all technical and operational features of their proposed systems.

(195)

54-370 0 - 75 - 14
REPORT OF THE PANEL ON INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENTS

Prepared for the Office of Technology

PANEL MEMBERS

H.William Merrit, Chairman

Robert A. Burco

Thomas H. Floyd, Jr.

Howard R. Ross

Assessment
C O N T E N T S

Introduction -- _ _ _ -- _. ------ _. .. ------- _. . . . _ _ _ ---- _ -- _ _ -------- _ _ _

Chapter:

1. History of Foreign Intere~ts. -... ......-- - --------------------

2. Requirements and opportunities _ _____________________ _________

3. Status of Foreign Systems -------------- --------------------- -

operational Systems -.-.... ---- ------------------ ---------

Systems Under Construct ion.. _ _ _ __ -- _ --------------------

Systems Planned to the Bid Stage _--.. . - _ _ -- _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ---

h

S?wt.ems A ~plica.tion Planning_ ------ _ --------------------

4. IIescrlptlon of ~ uppllers _ _ _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _______________ --- _ - _ - _

England. _ .- ___________ _______ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

France ______ ___ _. . . . . . . ______________ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ ---- _ - _ _ _

West Germany ----------- ____________________________

Jap:ln - _ _ .... _____ --- _ ____ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ ----- _ _ ------ _

.5. Acqulsltlon Procedures --------- ----------------------------

Government Involvement_ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ ___________ -- _ - _ _ _ _ _

Industry Incentives _ _ _. _ . . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ - _ _ ---- _ --- _

Institutional-Political Considerations ----- _____________ --- _

6. Findings and Summary z----- .:.. _____________________ --------

Appendix A—Panel M:mt)er Blograph]es_. _ --- _ _ _ --------------------

Appendix B—International Contributors- _.. _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ --- _ - _ _ _ ------- _

.Appendix C—Bibliography- _ _______________ --- _ - _ - _ ----------------

(199)

Page

201

203

205

213

213

214

217

218

23.5

235

238

242

249

259

259

265

266

271

277

279

281
Introduction

This assessment of international developments in automated

guideway transit has been accomplished by:

Ž First, a panel whose members have visited and studied foreign

developments, then discussed and reported on their findings.

Biographic sketches of the panel members are included in

Appendix A.

● Second, the willing cooperation of officials in foreign governments and industries who have shared their knowledge with

the panel. The invaluable contributions from these individuals

are acknowledged in Appendix B.

The panel also appreciates the assistance of many others who have

contributed to this effort. particularly:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Mlyron B. Kratzer, Counselor for Scientific and Technological

Affairs, U.S. Embassy; Tokyo, Japan.

Akira Yamashita, CVS International; Boston, Massachusetts.

R. M. Du Bois, Consultant, LTV Aerospace Corporation;

Washington, D.C.

Donald G. Agger, President, DGA International; Washington,

D.C.

J. Edward Anderson, University of Minnesota; Minneapolis,

Minnesota.

K. P. Fletcher, Transit 70’s; St. Paul, Minnesota.

Steven A. Barsony and Duncan MacKinnon, UMTA-DOT;

Washington, D.C.

Richard F. Daly, Raytheon Company; Lexington, Massachusetts.

Dr. John Harding and Matthew Guarino, Jr., FRA–DOT;

Washington, D.C.

Niels de Terra, Office of International Affairs, DOT; Washington, D.C.

Dr. Geurt Hupkes, Vice President, Center for Transportation

Planning; Utrecht, The Netherlands.

Namiki Oka, Chief Transportation Editor, Asahi Shimbun,

Tokyo, Japan.

(201)
Chapter 1: History of Foreign Interests

Much of the impeus for foreign development of Automated Guideway Transit (AGT) stems from a study of new transportation systems

initiated by the United States Congress in 1966. The resulting report,

Tomorrow’s Transportation, New Systems for the Urban Future, was

submitted by. the President, to the Congress in May, 1968. It has been

translated into French, German, and Japanese. This report, and the

related back-up studies, are generally credited with providing the

incentive for developing new transportation systems in those three

countries.

Foreign research on the technology that was to become a part of

these systems began much earlier. For instance, the Krauss-Maffei

work on magnetic attractive levitation began in the early 1960’s and

was based on research by Professor H. Kemper initiated in 1935. A

French engineer, Emile Bachelet, built a small demonstration transport system using magnetic levitation and propulsion in 1912. Serious

work on electric linear induction motors for transportation use began

with the publication of E. R. Laithwaites’ book, Induction Machines

for Special Purposes, in 1966 at the Imperial College, London.

The combination of technologies into new transportation concepts

commenced in earnest in 1968. Tokyo University began planning for

the Japanese Computer-controllecl Vehicle System (CVS) in that

year. The computer control logic, using a “traffic game”, was demonstrated at the World Exposition in Osaka from March to September of

1970. The French government began assisting several private developers in 197. German industry commenced research and development of AGT systems in 197o. The Federal Ministry of Research and

Technology has shared in the cost of this development since 1972.

Development of an AGT system in Great Britain preceded the

U.S. New Systems Study. Such a system, "Cabtrack,” was conceptualized by L. R. Blake Of the Brush Electrical Company in 1966. This

work was inspired by a trip to the United States where Blake became

acquainted with pioneering efforts with the staRRcar, Urbmobile and

Teletrans.

Interest in Great Britain was also crystallized with the publication

in 1.966 of Brian Richard’s book: New Movements in Cities.

(203)
Chapter 2: Requirements and Opportunities

The incentive for foreign development of AGT' systems originated

from several sources. Cities in Europe and ,Japan have not adapted well

to the private automobile. Street congestion has reduced the efficiency

and use of trams and buses. The high cost of building and operating

heavy rail rapid transit systems has hindered plans for future installations of this mode. These problems, coupled with advantages perceived

for AGT systems, have prompted the development of 18 foreign systems and commensurate planning for their installation.

D EFICIENCIES IN P RESENT T RANSPORTATION S YSTEM S

Most major cities throughout the world are faced with the same general problems: rush-hour street congestion, mass transit overcrowding

in peak periods and underutilization during off-peak hours, deteriorating bus service, increasing traffic accidents, noise and air pollution,

and continually rising transit costs. The ubiquitous automobile has

been at the center of the cause and effect of most these problems.

PRIVATE .4 ATOMOB1LES

The foreign popularity of private automobiles as preferred personal

transportation did not emerge until the 1950’s. While owners were

were quick to take advantage of new-found mobility, city officials were

slow in anticipating the long-range consequences of increased motor

vehicle use. The urban form, pattern and size of city- streets in Europe

and ,Japan were established long before the advent of motor vehicles.

Provision of roads and parking has not kept pace with motorization.

In Western Europe, for example, the number of cars per 1,000 persons

increased from 68 in 1960 to 174 in 1970. During the same period in

Japan, car ownership in increased from five to 85 per 1,000 persons.

Adaptation to such increases has been difficult. find in the process has

eroded much of what was once described as old world charm”.

Ancient buildings have been damaged by passing motor trucks and

automobiles-m have been destroyed to make way-for roads and parking structures. The automobile population in Paris covers more area

than till her road surface, thus, the tree-lined medians and sidewalks

become parking lots at night. The din of automobile horns in Paris

has been quieted in recent years by- strictly enforced codes. The high

level of traffic accidents are universally cited as a major urban problem

to be addressed by new transit systems. Injury accidents per 100-

million vehicle-kilometers in 1970 were 126 in France, 139 in West

Germany and 390 in Japan in 1969. Automobile air pollution is

regarded as the cause of extensive illness among school children in

Tokyo. Chronic traffic jams and limited parking spaces have reduced

the usefulness of private automobiles for transportation in major

Japanese cities. Recent advertising campaigns by automobile agencies

(205)
206

in Japan stress the comfort, air conditioning and entertainment

within the private space of an automobile, but not the convenience

of trip taking. These problems and the related environmental deterioration have caused serious social and political problems.

on the other hand, motor vehicles have provided a range of independent mobility and service unknown previously’. In England, the

limited degree of private car ownership now (3.6 persons per car) and

in the future is a major reason for the need of public transport. Yet,

the present level of car ownership

F

is the major cause of traffic congestion and reduced efficiency o public transport, The increasing

dependence on automobile transportation in Germany is shown by

the following:

. In 1950, travel amounted to a little more than one trip per

person per day and 70 percent of this travel was by public

transit.

. By 1970, travel doubled to nearly two trips per person per day,

with 75 percent by private automobile and only 25 percent by

public transit.

Freight movement also depends heavily upon motor carriers. For

example, in Japan in 1973, 93.6 percent of all freight was moved by

motor vehicles. In Japanese urban areas, 50 percent of all traffic is

truck movement. Delivery trucks and service vehicles are a major

source of street congestion, but functions performed by these vehicles

are not performed by public transportation systems.

Greater reliance on motor vehicles for private transportation has

affected public transportation in two ways. First, the increased amount

of urban travel performed in private automobiles has diverted transit

patrons. Private automobiles enabled large sections of the population

to move to the fringes of cities where thinl~’ populated areas could not

be served by mass transit. As a consequence, public transport has

suffered a proportionate and absolute decline in usage. The following

German experience illustrates the loss of attractiveness in spite of

reliable service and good networks:

Transit supply capcity increased from 9.5 million passengerkm per day ii 1960 to nearly 15 million passenger-km per day

in 1970.

. During this same period, the load factor dropped from 32 to

17 percent.

,Second, street congestion has reduced running speeds and has made

accurate scheduling for surface transit impossible. For example, in

West Germany 80 percent of urban public transportation is provided

by buses and trams which operate in the same space as private automobiles and motor trucks. Typical traffic speeds averge 28 km/hr (17

mph). The average speed of a Paris bus declined from 15 km/hr (9

mph) in 1959 to 9.5 km/hr (5.7 mph) in 1968. The decline in use and

usefulness of public transit has forced operators to curtail services and

raise fares (or obtain larger subsidies).

In addition to the impact of the private automobile discussed above,

other deficiencies in present transportation systems have prompted

the development of automated guideway systems. Some of these other

deficiencies are discussed below.
207

BUSES

Except for taxicabs, buses are the most labor intensive form of

public transportation. Between 70 and 80 percent of bus system

operating costs are for labor. Escalating personnel expenses result in

higher fares or larger subsidies and add to the general inflation. In

recent years, transit operators have had difficulty recruiting and

retaining staff. For example, in recent years as much as 20 to 30

percent of London Transport equipment has been out of service

during peak hours due to the lack of operating personnel. This situation is being corrected through an aggressive job enhancement

program, a wage increase and the depressed state of other employment

opportunities. Nevertheless, there is less willingness to work the

awkward times necessary to keep a public service operating 18 hours

a day.

Buses operating on exclusive rights of way or on priority lanes have

been successful in attracting and increasing ridership. Dial-a-Bus

systems have also filled a gap in public transportation services.

However, initial experiments with these systems have found that the~

are expensive to operate. A demonstration project in North Toronto

was discontinued after six months, even though one-third of the

patrons were automobile users who previously. did not use transit.

More research and experimentation is needed on exclusive and demand

responsive bus services in order to successfully tailor their use to

specific community. needs.

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT

Of the conventional public transportation modes, light rail transit

(LRT) offers the service characteristics which most closely approximate SLT and GRT systems. Nevertheless, LRT also has deficiencies

which justify a search for improved alternatives.

LRT, or trams, running on city streets are subjected to delays from

traffic congestion, as discussed above. Left turns at busy intersections

contribute to the congestion. Patrons crossing streets to and from loading points are subjected to traffic hazards. Dedicated rights of ways

can avoid some of these problems, can be made attractive, and are

thus more acceptable to the neighborhoods they traverse.

LRT is labor intensive, though not as much so as bus transit. A

typical 4-axle tram can seat 32 and has a total capacity of 110 with

standees. For a 6-axle LRT, these capacities become 43 and 158

respectively. Thus, the passenger-driver ratio is about twice that of a

bus. New articulated, three-car vehicles can provide 94 seats and a

total capacity of 254. The addition of an unmanned, non-powered

trailer (as used in Hong Kong) can add 150 to the capacity. At 400

passengers per operator, the tram becomes one-fifth as labor intensive

as a bus.

LRT is also subject to the same labor problems as other conventional

modes. Split shifts, double shifts or overtime are necessary to cover

the morning and evening peaks. LRT does have the advantage of being

able to add equipment, without necessarily adding operators, to meet

peak-hour demands.
208

Other objections to LRT include the obtrusive overhead catenaries

for power. A third rail on dedicated rights of way can remove this

objection, but a trough for power collection on city streets (once used

in Washington, D. C.) presents formidable maintenance problems.

Noise and limited ability to climb grades are also cited as disadvantages.

The deficiencies discussed above are generally regarded as the

reasons for shifting to other forms of public transportation. All but

three tramways have been abandoned in France. There is a resurgence

of interest throughout the world in LRT, particularly where tramways

or other rights of way exist. On a trip to four European countries m

January, one panel correspondent visited 32 cities where light rail or

pre-metro systems are being upgraded or extended. Even where

totally new systems are contemplated, LRT is being evaluated as one

alternative to new forms of automated guideway transit.

Proponents of LRT contend that research and development on

this form of transit could bring significant advances in performance.

It has been suggested that LRT could be fully automated for segregated routes. Vehicles could be made smaller for higher frequency

routes when automation becomes operational. R & D could help

reduce the costs of construction and operation. Reductions in vehicle

weight would lower energy consumption, noise and vehicle costs. The

result of this R & D would be a public transit system comparable to

the SLT and GRT systems being assessed by this report. Only a

semantic difference would remain.

RAIL RAPID TRANSIT

Heavy rail rapid transit systems, such as the London Underground,

do not provide the fine mesh transport offered by bus systems. Access

time to the system is relatively long. Underground stations are costly

to build and are widely spaced. Such systems are appropriate for

long trips where the volume of travel along the corridor warrants the

investment.

Service attributes of rail rapid transit systems, while tolerated, are

not considered ideal. Use requires time-table dependent waiting or

rushing. Entry and exit to and from stations and vehicles may be

uncomfortable or impossible for many. Long intervals between runs,

especially during off-peak hours and standing in crowded vehicles

during peak hours discourages use. Tokyo’s railroad and subway net.-

work is one of the most extensive and modern in the world. Seventeen

railroad companies operate 35 passenger lines with a total length of

832 km (520 miles) in the greater Metropolitan Tokyo region, and

seven lines of subway with a total length of 155 km (97 miles). Railroads and subways account for 20.4 million passenger trips each day,

or over 59 percent of all passenger trips made within 50 km (23.5

miles) of the city center.

Despite the extensiveness of the network, it lacks the capacity to

handle rush hour demands. on almost all the lines during the morning

rush hours, trains are overcrowded to 2.5 times normal capacity.

Passengers are so tightly squeezed together that injuries are not uncommon. Railroads hire college students as ‘(pushers’) and “pullers"

to get people on or off the trains.
209 I

Efforts to meet the growing demand include such measures as: increasing the length of the trains, combining different suburban railroad

lines to and from downtown points, adding additional tracks to existing

lines, and improving old and adding new subway lines downtown.

Three measures are hampered by the cost of underground construction

and by the lack of space for extending station platforms or building

new subways.

The high construction and operating costs, the space constraints and

undesirable service features of heavy rail rapid transit systems are

cited as justification for pursuing an automated guideway transit

alternative.

DESIRED AUTOMATED GUIDEWAY TRANSIT CHARACTERISTICS

To overcome the deficiencies cited above, and to improve the supply

of public transportation serves, government agencies and private

sYstem (developers nave postulated the characteristics desired in an

AGT system. These features constitute the goals on which system

developments are focused. They are also the basis for planning future

installations.

The characteristics summarized below represent a cross-section of

the expectation expressed in correspondence from officials in government agencies and industrial firms in Canada, Great Britain, France,

West Germany, and Japan.

FLEXIBILITY

Service which is more responsive to the needs of the traveler is envisaged. Departure from limited routes and fixed schedules is the aim.

Sufficient capacity to meet peak-hour demands, perhaps with scheduled operations, but on-call service during off-peak hours would

best accommodate travel needs. Automation would permit vehicles

to be coupled into trains to vary capacity for peak demands without a one-to-one increase in operating personnel, Automation would

also enable service to be extended at nights, on holidays and weekends

at times when manned service is infeasible. Flexibility in choice of

times for departure and arrival should compare favorably with a

private automobile. Flexibility also implies the capability to build the

system in useful increments so that it can be extended and upgraded

without, major changes in the basic technology.

CONVENIENCE

Finer networks of lines with stations spaced closer than rail rapid

transit systems would shorten walking distances. off-line stations

would permit station spacing from 100 to 350 km (300 to 1,000 ft)

without reducing on-line speeds. A network of lines would reduce the

need for transfers, reduce the capacity required on individual links and

enhance the capability to provide “door-to-door” service.

Such convenience requires exclusive guideways, segregated from

other traffic. Guideways must be unobtrusive and with tight turn

radii (1 O meters, 33 feet) in order to follow existing street patterns.
210

Stations should be designed to facilitate transfers. If designed well as

part of an urban complex, stations could make transfers an enjoyable

part of the trip.

Convenience implies individual usage, or a choice of riding with a

roup having the same origin and destination. Direct travel is the aim,

B ut economies and site-specific situations may require transfers or

intermediate stops enroute. Convenience also implies minimum overall

travel time by providing:

. Short access time by means of convenient stations.

. Short waiting time with frequent service.

. Direct service with few intermediate stops, operating flexibility,

and combined services which are responsive to variations in

demand.

. Short transfer times where required through frequent service

and integration with other modes.

. A high level of service 24 hours a day.

To make travel times comparable to average street traffic, vehicle

speeds should be a minimum of 28 km/h (17 mph). To minimize

travel times on long trips, top speeds of 60 to 80 km/h (36 to 48 mph)

are contemplated.

CAPACITY

AGT systems are needed to fill the gap in capacity between typical

bus or tram operations and rail rapid transit services. Intermediate

capacities in the range of 2,000, to 30,000 passengers per hour per

direction are required. These capacities can be provided by a combination of vehicle sizes and headways. These factors could range from

vehicles with 100 passengers and one-minute or more headways, six

to 50 passengers and three to 50-seconds headways, down to two or

three- passenger cars traveling at headways less than three seconds.

The o jectives of greater flexibility and convenience are better satisfied with smaller vehicles and shorter headways. Capacity implies

the capability to satisfy peak demands while adapting to daily

fluctuations in requirements.

RELIABILITY

Technical components and system integration should achieve a high

degree of reliability with operating and maintenance procedures

requiring only normal skills. Reliability to the patron means service

dependability which would be achieved by adherence to schedules or

quick response to on-demand calls. The patron must have confidence

in the systems’ ability to provide a vehicle that will take him to his

destination within reasonable travel times. The system must continue to function, insofar as possible, while observing safety criteria,

in the event of breakdowns in the lines, vehicles, automation components, or from congestion in the system.

ENVIRONMENTAL

To minimize the neighborhood impacts, an AGT system should

function at the least possible levels of noise and vibration. Direct

and indirect air pollution should be minimized. Conflicts with surface
211

movements of vehicles and pedestrians should be avoided in order

to improve safety and traffic flow. Land taking should be minimal.

Guideways and stations should not intrude or create community

barriers. Rather, they should contribute to good urban design by

providing relatively low-cost opportunities for physical integration

into the architecture of major centers of activity. AGT systems

should complement other transport systems and services and should

be in accord with related urban functions,

IMPLEMENTATION

Capital investments should be acceptable in terms of the service,

direct and indirect benefits expected. Advantage should be taken of

small, lighter vehicles and guideways in determining capital costs.

Running costs for personnel, energy and operating materials as well

as the interest and depreciation on investment over the life of the

system should compare favorable with alternative systems. Expectations are that fully automatic operations and lower maintenance

costs will make AGT systems more economically attractive than

comparable investments in conventional systems.

OTHER

The desired characteristics described above are expected to be

achieved with a comfortable ride and no compromise in safety.

Furthermore, investment in the infrastructure for an AGT system

warmths consideration of its use for goods movement in appropriate

settings.

P ERCEIVED A DVANTAGES AND O PPORTUNITIE S

Achievement of the characteristics described above offer many

opportunities for alternative solutions to urban problems. Public

transportation is recognized for its key role in urban development

and the opportunities it holds for arresting some of the problems

created by private automobiles. AGT systems are perceived as advantageous by enhancing the role of public transportation in improving

the environment, reducing air pollution, easing traffic congestion, and

filling a gap in the demand for urban mobility with a more rational

use of petroleum fuels.

Sponsors perceived that AGT sy:stems allow additional intermediate

transit capacity to be introduced into existing cities with a minimum

of disruption. Smaller ph~’sical dimensions present opportunities for

lower capital costs and easier insertion into urban space. Line capacities could be increased in a small cross-sectional area in congested

urban situations. Segregated tracks, above ground or tunneled, should

be less expensive than rail rapid transit tracks.

Automation is perceived as an opportunity to provide more frequentl, responsive service. Achieving full automation introduces the

opportunity to curb rising costs entirely controlled by escalating labor

costs. By the same token, AGT offers a public transport solution which

avoids the necessity for working large numbers of people at unsocial

hours. Dependability’ is enhanced by eliminating potential labor conflicts. Thus, there is an opportunity to provide public transport in an

54 -37(1 () - 7$ - 15
212

acceptable form,

dav or night. In

under particular circumstances, at all hours of the

such a situation, traffic restraints on private automobiles could become more accetable.

.

AGT is expected to achieve t e same transport effectiveness at 50 {

percent of the cost of highway technology. At intermediate capacities,

AGT systems have the opportunity to provide transit service in average cities where demands do not warrant heavy rail rapid transit

installations. In this regard, AGT is perceived as an agent for renewin interest in public mass transportation.

P lanning for AGT system installations in Europe and Japan is

primarily concerned with the following opportunities:

●

●

●

In heavily traveled corridors, AGT systems would augment

existing modes—subways, streetcars, buses—to relieve the

F

ressures and improve services.

n less dense areas, AGT networks would be complemented by

bus service.

In new towns and limited small areas. AGT svstems would

provide general service and feeders to ‘and from subway and

railroad stations.

Transportation technology, represented by the new AGT systems

can be active or passive, it can be used or not. Only if developed and

deployed will there be an opportunity to assess the usefulness of these

concepts in overcoming the deficiencies in present transportation systems and achieving the expected advantages.
Chapter 3: Status of Foreign Systems

Foreign development of AGT systems commenced later than U.S.

development. This lag, a more deliberate planning pace and the smaller

economic base available in other countries, have resulted in fewer

foreign installations. This chapter presents the status of implementing

AGT systems. First, the systems in operation are described, then

those under construction. Planning for one system progressed to the

point that construction bids were invited, but never awarded. Finally,

the status of planned installations is discussed. A more detailed

technical discussion of the systems is provided in Chapter 4. Enough

description is included here to depict the complexity of the

installations.

OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS

Only two operational systems of any significance have been

installed—one in Japan and one in France.

YATSU AMUSEMENT PARK, CHIBA PREFECTURE, JAPAN

This installation is a prototype for the system described as the

“Vehicle of a New Age” (VONA). A single loop, 400m (1312 ft.)

long, with two, 30-passenger, vehicles and one terminal station

platform comprise the installation. The vehicles operate automatically,

on two-minute headways, without an attendant on the vehicle.

Vehicles are designed to travel at a maximum speed of 60 km/hr (36

mph). They do not stop at the station but slow down to 2 km/hr (1.2

mph). The outer ring of the station datform rotates at 2 km/hr to

effect loading and unloading.

.

VONA

(213)
214

The VONA system was developed by Mitsui Trading Company and

Nippon Sharo Seizo Kaisha, Ltd. The installation at Yatsu was

purchased by the Keisei Electric Company, Ltd. in 1973. No other

reformation is available on costs or operations.

PARIS, FRANCE

A prototype installation of a VEC system has been in operation

since June, 1974. The installation, 300 meters long, connects a large

Paris department store, F. N.A.C., to its remote parking garage in the

Montparnasse area. Technical problems have temporarily halted

operations.

The system uses two-p

f

assenger vehicles with seats facing outboard.

Vehicles normally trave at 1o–2o mph on steel wheels supported by

tubular rails. A conveyor belt, propelled by linear induction motors,

drives the vehicles. In stations, the vehicles are slowed to about 1

ft/sec or stopped for loading and unloading.

SYSTEMS UNDER CONSTRUCTION

Five AGT systems are under construction—two in Okinawa, one

in Nagoya, Ja an, one in Kita-Kyushu, Japan, and one in Toronto,

Canada. The anadian installation has experienced a set-back which 6

is discussed below.

OKINAWA

Two AGT systems are under construction as part of the International Ocean exposition to be held in Okinawa starting in July,

1975. One is a GRT system, as defined elsewhere in this study. The

other combines the features of a GRT and a personal dual-mode .

vehicle system.

Kobe Rapid Transit (KRT).—This system uses essential the Boeing Morgantown vehicle under licensing agreements with ~obe Steel,

Ltd., and the Nisho Iwai Trading Company. Boeing is su~pl ing the

control system; all other subsystems are being fabricated m apan. i

Construction of the KRT system began in November 1974 and is to

be complete by July 1975. The overall length of the guideway is 2.8

km (1.75 miles) with three stations. The system will use 16 vehicles,

with a capacity for ei ht sitting and 13 standing. The vehicles will

travel at top speeds o 30 mph at 15 second headways. The system f

will include three stations—two on-line terminals and one off-line

station. Switching will be demonstrated at the off-line station.

Duul-Mode Vehicle System.—This system, also called CVS, is based

on the conce ts being developed at the MITI test track at Higashimurayama. ?)f the original consortium only Mitsubishi Heavy Industmes and Nippon Steel Corporation are Involved in the Okinawa

installation.

The system will use 15 PRT-type vehicles and three dual-mode

vehicles. The latter will be capable of automated operation on the

guideway and manual operation when driven off the guideway. The

guideway length is about 1.2 miles with a figure-of-eight configuration

at one end. Vehicle speeds will average 20 km/hr (12 mph) at headways

of about 13 seconds. Operations will be scheduled rather than ondemand. Five off-line stations will be included in the facilities. As

with CVS, the Okinawa vehicles will seat four persons. Other features

are quite different: the control system has been simplified to a single
215

computer, the guideway and station designs are less complex, speeds

and headways are slower.

INTERNATIONAL OCEAN EXPOSITION OKINAWA

Kobe Rapid Transit (KRT)

Built by Kobe Steel, Ltd.

in cooperation with

Boeing Aerospace Co.

CVS Dual-mode Vehicle

Is Driven Manually

on the Road . . .

. . . or Controlled

Automatically on the Guideway
216

KOMAKI, NAGOYA PREFECTURE, JAPAN

In 1974 construction started on a GRT system connecting a newly

developed residential town to a neighboring interurban railway station. This system will be 7.7 km (4.6 miles) long and is expected to

cost $44.6-million. The system is planned to carry 40,500 passengers

per day by 1985. Most of the trips are for work and school.

KITA-KYUSHU, JAPAN

This system, also started in 1974, uses a monorail guide beam. The

system, 8.8 km (5.3 miles) long, connects the central business district

with a suburban residential area. The installation is expected to cost

$87-million. It will be in operation in 1978 and is planned to carry

107,000 passengers per day. Most passengers will be workers or

students.

GO-URBAN TRANSIT DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM, TORONTO, ONTARIO,

CANADA

In May 1973 Krauss-Maffei AG of Munich, Germany, signed a

contract with the Ontario Provincial Government for $16-mil ion to T

build an AGT system at the Canadian National Exhibition Park in

Toronto, Ontario. The system was to become operational in August

1975 and available for testing and public passenger-carrying throuh

September 1975 followed by a one-year proving test program. T eh

installation was planned with a one-way guidewa

t

loop about 2.5

miles long and an additional mile of station trac s and a storage

loop. Four off-line stations were planned, though econom measures

reduced these to three stations, one on-line and two o -line. The n

system design called for full automation, with a hierarchical, trile

computer, relatively centralized control s stem. Fifteen vehic es Y

capable of operation singly or in trains of t ree vehicles were to be i

tested. Vehicle specifications required 12 seated and 8 to 15 standing

passengers. Speeds would normally be 45 mph with a maximum

operating speed of 50 mph. Headways would be 10 seconds at 30 mph

and 15 seconds at 45 mph. For testing, without public passengers,

headways of 6 seconds at 30 mph would be used.

The vehicles were to be magnetically levitated and guided, Electromagnets on the vehicles attracted to armature rails on the guideway

would suspend the vehicles. Current to the magnets would be regulated

to maintain a constant air gap. No seconday suspension was contemplated. Propulsion was to be supplied by a linear induction motor,

controlled by an inverter and fed from a 600-volt D.C.power distribution system.

Switching was to be accomplished magnetically from the vehicle.

There were to be no moving parts on the track. An on-board mechanical switch arm deployed from the vehicle would serve as a safety

back-u .

By ovember 1974, most of the 482 guideway caissons had been N

placed. Existing underground utilities had been relocated. Bids

received for the guideway and stations were rejected as excessively

costly. These facilities were redesigned to make them more spartan.

A 1200-meter engineering test track with full-scale switches was

completed in Munich. Two rubber-tired vehicles were built to test
217

the automatic command and control system. The third prototype of

the magnetically levitated vehicle had undergone static tests preparatory to the start of drive tests.

At this point, technical difficulties appeared. Weight of the three

electromagnetic systems (suspension, propulsion and switching) and

electronic controls to regulate them exceeded initial estimates. This

added weight, and the vehicle dynamics involved, required heavier,

and more costly, guideway beams than had been originally designed.

A technical evaluation by the Ontario Urban Transportation Development Corporation (UTDC) found that these problems could be corrected with more time and at additional cost.

From a review of this situation, the German Ministry of Research

and Technology concluded that magnetic levitation for transport

vehicles was more suitable for high-speed, high-passenger capacity

systems. The component weights, electronic complexity and costs

could be economically distributed on systems with potentially higher

productivity than the small urban vehicles proposed for Toronto.

This review resulted in a decision on 14 November 1974 by the

Ministry to withdraw further financial support from the Krausskfaffei urban system program. This decision had several consequences.

● Without Ministry financial support Krauss-Maffei was unable

to uphold its contract with Ontario. By mutual agreement the

contract to complete the Transit Demonstration System has

been terminated.

. The Ministry has consolidated magnetic levitation development in a new program to develop a 400 km/hr (240 mph)

train. This program reaffirrns confidence in the performance,

environmental advantages, and freedom from obsolescence

afforded by mag-lev technology. The program combines the

talents of both Krauss-Maffei and Messerschmitt-BolkowBlohm in a new consortium funded by the Ministry.

. Krauss-Maffei is continuing the development of an automated

~rban transportation vehicle system. This development will

retain the best features of the linear induction propulsion

system and control system previously developed.

UTDC is now seeking other vehicle and system suppliers to complete the Transit Demonstration System. Available choices are under

consideration and a decision is expected to be made in time for a revised

system to be in operation for the 1977 Canadian National Exposition.

Under terms of the licensing arrangements with Krauss-Maffei,

UTDC will retain the right to use Krauss-31affei technology, to use

the test facilities, and to exchange engineering information on system

developments.

S YSTEMS P LANNED TO THE B ID S TAG E

In 1972 French officials awarded four $100,000 study contracts

for an SLT s~-stein to be constructed in conjunction with the new

Charles de Gaulle Airport near Paris. The four participants were

Jeurnont Schneider (with Westinghouse), MATRA, Regie Renault

and the LTV Aerospace Corporation in conjunction with COMSIP

Enterprises. The studies were to cover proposals to build a 3.6 km, twodirection, loop from Aerogard No. 1 and the central unit; designs for a
second

No. 2;

airport

Bids

218

2.8 km loop from the central unit to Air France at Aerogard

and Plans for a future extension 4.4 km long to serve other

faciltiies.

—

were requested in April 1974 from three firms: LTV/COMSIP,

based on AIRTRANS; MTE, a joint venture with Schneider and

Creusot Loire, an industrial and ‘railroad heavy equipment manufacturer; and Engins MATRA, using the ARAMIS system. In June,

1974 it was decided to delay the project for several years; no contract

awards were made.

SYSTEMS APPLICATION PLANNING

A summary of the status of planned installations is given below:

ENGLAND

Sheffield

Under a study sponsored by the Transport and Road Research

Laboratory (TRRL), preliminary design of a GRT system (Minitram) has been completed for Sheffield. Sheffield is in Yorkshire, in

the heart of England’s industrial area, about 380 km north of London.

The population is 570,000 with nearly one million persons in the

metropolitan area.

The planning for Sheffield has envisioned use of system concepts

advanced by Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics, Ltd. (HSD) or the EASAMS Ltd. (a GEC subsidiary). Both concepts have been under

feasibility study financed by the Department of the Environment.

The Department has also funded British Rail to investigate magnetic

levitation for the Minitram route in Sheffield.

The guideway route starts with a turning loop at the British Rail

station and follows the axis of the shopping spine. The route serves bus

stations, automobile parking lots, commercial areas, the Town Hall

and a pedestrian shopping center. The other terminal serves a redevelopment area. The proposed GRT route makes additional pedestrian

shopping areas possible that could not be served as well with existing

modes of transport.

A schematic drawing of the route is shown in Figure 1 on the next

page.
219

Cathedra1

Castle

Market

5 min. 45

Sheaf

Market

min. 30

Town Hall

L I

Planning and preliminary engineering and operations studies were

completed in 1974 by Robert Matthew Johnson-Marshall

ners. The following summarizes the planning for Sheffield:

Guideway.. --------- _ - _ ------ _

Stations- -- _ _ ---- _ -------------

Vehicles_ - _ --------------------

Speed- - _ -- _ --- ___ -------------

Headways - ----------------- ___

Operations____ _ _ _ _ - _ -----------

2.4 km of double track.

5.0 km total length with loops.

Elevated clearance: 5.1 m at

simzs. 3.5 m elsewhere.

and Parttraffic cros9 s~ations with average spacings of 300 m.

1 or 2 off line. - - -

Dwell time: 15 sec.

25 with 6 seated, 6 to 18 standing.

15–20 km/hr terminal to terminal.

60 km/hr cruise speed.

Peak hour: 30 sec.

Off peak: 90–120 sec.

Single vehicles off peak: 180 seats/hour.

3-car trains, peak hour 5,400 passengers

hour.

per
220

On May 22, 1975 the Minister for Transport advised leaders of the

Sheffield Metropolitan District Council, and the South Yorkshire

County Council, that he would not proceed with the proposal for a

public demonstration in Sheffield of the Minitram automated public

transit system. The two main reasons given for the decision were the

public expenditures required and the need for more development work

before the system could enter

h

public use. The decision is a final one

for a public demonstration at t is particular site. This avoids leaving

any uncertainty in Sheffield which might affect other proposals for

the development of the city. Research plans are being revised and an

experimental test track program for Minitram is being reconsidered.

Brighton

An SLT system has been proposed for Brighton, East Sussex. Brighton is a seaside resort, 50 km (30 miles) from London, with a population of 400,000. The system runs a distance of 2.8 km (1.75 miles)

between Aquarium and Black Rock along the seafront. The SLT system would replace the Volk Railway which is an existing narrow gauge

railroad built in 1883. This railroad is now considered antiquated with

limited capacity and poor service amenities.

The SL Project is sponsored by the Brighton Corporation, Pro- T

posals have been received from Otis International for a small vehicle

system, and from Sussex University for a magnetically levitated

system. Since most government funds available for AGT development

are focused on the Minitram project and a possible demonstration

elsewhere, the Brighton proposal has a high y doubtful near-term lY

future.

Summary.—Princi al

R f

government planning efforts are focussed

on the project in S effie d. The government has sponsored a competition between two potential suppliers—EASAMS Ltd. and Hawker

Siddeley Dynamics Ltd.—and is evaluating a magnetically levitated

alternative system. Since the risks are considered too great for commercialization at this time, the Department of the Environment is

financing 100 percent of the development and planning costs. Cancellation of the reject in Sheffield would likely have a serious effect

on the future o AGT development in England. r

FRANCE

Initiatives in France for planning AGT systems appear to originate

local ’y. The central government has encouraged local innovation with

the result that several projects are well along in the planning phase.

The projects are focussed on solving urban transportation problems,

not merely the application of new technologies in special settings.

Along with the local initiative there is an early marriage between

hardware suppliers and local planners. This arrangement, which is

quite different from U.S. practices, is claimed to ave several ad- %

vantages:

● Wasteful competition is eliminated at a time in the life of a

project when hard decisions are needed.

● Early involvement of a system supplier makes his designs more

responsive to public needs, and makes project planning more

rea istic in terms of the technologies that can be urnished. Y !
221

● An early commitment to a system supplier reduces anxiety about

the market and eases the financial burden in preparing preliminary engineering and cost data.

This arrangement in France is evidenced by the presumption that

Societe POMA has a clear field in Grenoble; that Otis/SOCEA will

build the system in Nancy; and that MATRA is favored in Line and

Nice. These, and other plans under consideration in France, are discussed below.

Grenoble

The city of Grenoble has a population of 340,000, with 420,000 in

the region. It is now experiencing one of the most rapid growths of

any French city, with a population of 510,0OO expected for the region

by 1985. Current public transport needs are met by trolleys (3 lines,

30 vehicles and 25 km of routes), and by buses (15 lines, 100 vehicles

and 135 km of routes). Use of public transportation is declining, which

the Agence d’Urbanisme de la Region Grenoblois (AURG) attributes

to its service characteristics, Buses, for example, average less than 8

km/hr (5 mph) in the city. To reverse this trend AURG has adopted a

planning policy which concentrates on:

● Improving the existing trolley and bus systems.

● Creating a completely new system on an exclusive right-of-way.

The system on which planning is based is the POMA 2000. This

system was developed in Grenoble by Pomagalski (a ski lift manufacturer) and Creusot Loire. The planned installation for Grenoble

envisages three lines requiring passenger, rather than vehicle, transfers

between the lines. A total system with 40 km (25 miles) of two-way

lines is contemplated. The system would be built in four stages, with

an initial 1 km demonstration line.

The demonstration line, which would become part of the 15 km

revenue line, would connect the new town of Echirolles to downtown

Grenoble. A l-million FFr study has been undertaken for the preliminary design of this line. Results are expected in the spring of 1977.

Cars with 15 seated and 15 standees have been considered, but no

decision has been made and, hence, no data are available on the

number of cars or capacity of the system. Stations would be on line,

though a switching capability is being developed for situations where

a double track and limited express service is deemed desirable. The

system concept is limited to scheduled service, since the operating mode

precludes demand responsiveness.

The major planning difficulties center on whether or not parts of

the line must be put underground. Societe PO.MA 2000 and AURG

originally envisaged an aerial structure throughout. However, the

central area of Grenoble, where the three lines would cross, contains

clustered old buildings on narrow streets. There are legal questions as

to whether an elevated guideway could be permitted to obscure two

historic plazas. Many local officials consider that an elevated structure in the central area would be destructive. Thus, there has been

considerable pressure on the local planners to place the lines underground in the center area. Underground construction would quadruple

the cost of an elevated system.

Construction of the elevated demonstration line has been estimated

to cost about $6-million, No decision has been made to proceed with

the demonstration sy~stem. Thus, no schedule for planning and constructing the system 1s available.
2%!2

Nancy

The city of Nancy is growing almost as rapidly as Grenoble. Only

17 percent of CBD trips are made on public transport, and a decline

in usage is attributed to increasing affluence in the area. As a result,

the narrow city streets are greatly congested; pollution and motor

vehicle accidents are considered serious problems. Near term improvements focus on the bus s)’stem, while longer term solutions

involve an automated guideway transit system.

(he of the largest manufacturing firms in France is the Saint

Gobain-l?ont a’ Mousson group, located in Nancy. The group’s

subsidiary)’, SOCEA (an engineering and construction firm), teamed

as the prime contractor, with Otis-TTD in 1973. A project plan was

submitted to the District Urbain de Nancy in December 1974. This

plan is summarized below:

Guideway. -------

Stations- -- _ --- _ --

Vehicles- - _ _ _ --- _ _

Speed- --- _ _ -- _ _ --

1leadways _ _ _ _ _ ---

Operations ---- - _. -

23.1 km (13.9 mi) of one-way guideways and sidings.

Elevated—13.8 km (8.3 mi).

Underground—9.3 km (5.6 mi.)

Total—28.

Elevated—18.

Underground—lO.

Dwell Times—15 sec.

Initialiy on-line, but with provisions for later conversion to

off-line operations.

Suspension —air cushion.

Propulsion—linear induction motor.

Capacity—12–16 seated, 20–16 standing, 32 total capacity.

Vehicles per train—3 (individual or 2-car trains in off-peak

hours).

Total number—106 (10 spares).

37—Train Lead Cars.

69—Train Cars (1$’ithout Vehicle Control System).

Maximum—50 km/hr 30 mph).

Civil Limits on Curves-40 km/hr (24 mph), 23 km/hr (14

mph) and 18 km/hr (11 mph).

West Loop—43 sec.

East Loop—90 sec.

West Loop Turnback—84 sec.

East Loop Turnback—90 sec.

Inbound plus outbound service—Initially: 14,300 passenger .

trips/hr.

Growth: 3.9 percent per year for 10 yrs.

19 hr scheduled operations per day.

Several alternative plans have been considered. The favored option

at present would start operations with three-car trains in a line-stop

mode of operation. Provision would be made for convwsion to off-line

operations and individual vehicle operations within the second half of

the first decade of operations to accommodate the projected traffic

increase. This conversion would substantiate further capital investment. This changeover would be accomplished without interruption

of service. The District of Nancy has not formally responded to the

proposed plan. As a result of elections held in the fall of 1974, the

district is reorganizing with appointment of a new transit director and
223

staff. While there is still interest in the Otis-TTD system, a certain

amount of redirection is anticipated. The project, which may take

from 4 to 5 years to complete, is expected to be delayed at least a year.

Line

The city of Line has a population of 800,000 and is expected to

grow to one million by 1985. It is part of an urban complex of 1,470,000

comprising Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing. This three-city conurbation embracm 87 separate municipalities.

At present, Line is served by three transportation systems:

●

●

●

Buses provide some local service throughout the mea.

The national railways (SNCF) have a terminal station in Line

with main line and suburban services to nearby towns in seven

directions.

The Societe Nouvelle L’Electrique Lille’ Roubaix-Tourcoing

(ELRT) operates 23 km of meter-gauge electric tramway, 86

percent of it on reserved track. This tramway links Line with

the cities of Roubais and Tourcoing near the Belgian frontier.

Although the fleet of 28 cars is over 20 years old, these are being

progresively modernized and much of the track has been

renewed and upgraded. Commercial speed of the cars at present

is 22 km/hr (13 mph).

Transport planning in the region has considered several possibilities:

• Proposals exist for a metro system which would connect Lille

with Nord-pas de Calais, Tourcoing and Arras. Other metro

lines would serve Ronchin, Lomme, La Madeleine, Roubaix/

Tourcoing and Velleneuve d’Aeq (Lille-Est). A new metro

line through the center of Line to the Regional Hospital

center would require mini-metro cars to save costs in tunnel

construction.

. An automated guideway transit system (17 AL) has also been

proposed to connect Lille with the new town, as well as to

provide service to the hospital center, Tourcoing and Roubaix.

Engins MATRA, in conjunction with EPALE (the public authority

formed to direct. development of the new town) have undertaken

planning the VAL system to Lille-Est and the university there.

T’here has been considerable controversy about the system recently,

mainly of a political nature but to some extent flavored with technical

concerns. One of the three remaining streetcar lines in France is in the

city of Lille and this has resulted m a huge contrivers}: between the

advocates of VAL and those who prefer light rail transit technology?’.

The issues are well summarized in an October 1973 article in Railway

Gazette International by Professor Vuchic of the University of Pennsylvania. To resolve the controversy, the city of Lille has requested

financial assistance from the government to undertake a two-phase

further analysis lasting a total of about 9 months. The government has

not yet provided any funding for this study, but the French Chamber

of Deputies in late 1974 authorized the government to decide whether

to provide more funds. A decision is expected in about 2 to 3 months.
224

Figure 2.—Route Ma~VAL in Line

The selection of VAL is one of the few examples in France of the use

of the American technique of inviting proposals through a request for

proposals (RFP). Engins MATRA was the winner of the competition.

The Paris metro system (RATP) is a consultant to EPALE for the

decision on the system.

Though VAL is an elementary SLT system, use of a fully automated

vehicle is seen by the participating agencies m Line as a major innovation and departure from tradition.

Paris

The Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP), the regional

transport authority for Paris, is involved in three aspects of PRT

development and planning.

. RATP is managing, on behalf of the French ~overnment, a develo ment program to establish the reliabihty, safety, costs,

tra c management, and ultimate qualification of the ARAMIS &

PRT system. This program is based on the results of earlier

experiments carried out on a l-km test track with 3 vehicles

near Orly Airport. This 12-month study began in September

1974 and includes a parallel assessment of bus transit. Two

comparisons of the costs and benefits are being made. One
225

compares the performance of both systems in meeting the same

total demand. The other optimizes the two systems and comR

ares performance for the resulting demand, Preliminary

ndings suggest that the bus service is 2 to 3 times as expensive

as ARAMIS.

● A new test track with 3 km of guideway, 3 stations and 10 to

15 six-passen er vehicles is bein planned in the vicinity of

Creteil and 6 hoisy-le Roi near $ aris. (Consideration is also

being given to the use of 12-passenger vehicles for this demonstration. ) Tests will not involve passengers, but will focus on

maintainability and automatic test eqmpment. The aim is to

have the system certified for urban use in 1977 or 1978.

. Concepts are bein developed for a revenue system to link suburban terminals o rail commuter lines. The eventual plan is to f

provide a rather complete network linking the commuter

lines on the outskirts of Paris in an arc about 70 km in length.

An extension of 20 km would be made by 1982 and the remaining connections would be completed by 1990. Since these

plans are to provide case studies to guide realistic development

of ARAMIS, there are no commitments to their implementation. A demonstration line, comprising a useful increment of a

commercial system is contemplated. This line would be 6–10

km long, include 6-8 stations and would involve 200-300

vehicles, Capacity would handle 2000 people per hour in one

direction. Building and testing would require 26 months plier

to the start of passenger operations.

Nice

With a population of 300,000 no corridor in Nice is ever expected

to generate more than 10,000 passengers per hour. Since difficult

subterranean conditions exist, the municipal authorities decided to

examine an advanced transportation system in lieu of a subway. In

1974 a study was commissioned to consider an ARAMIS PRT system.

The system being studied would be largely elevated, use 4 to 12

passenger vehicles, would be demand activated, and would operate

at speeds of about 50 km/hr (30 mph), Although no route plans have

been published, a north-south alignment from St. Sylvestre to Massena

and an east-west corridor from St. Augustin to the port of ISice are

being examined, Long-range plans call for a network of 35-4o km of

double tracks, 50–55 stations and approximately 2000 vehicles. The

system would carry 8000 peak-hour passengers in one direction, Near

term lans, to be completed by the end of 1975, call for an increment

6–10 m long with 10–15 stations. Though this reference line is to be E

self supporting, no data was available on potential patronage or

numbers of vehicles anticipated.

S’unwnary.-France: Planning in France which contemplates AGT

technology is focussed on urban transportation problems. Service is

planned to complement existing systems, to relieve street traffic or to

provicie new service where either marginal or no service exists. The

major planning difficulties occur with the problems of inserting a new

elevated guidewa~’ s~wtem into an older historic community. The costs

of tunneling an~’ transit system are almost prohibitive. Where serious
226

planning for AGT systems is occurring, there has been an early

selection of system hardware. Principal systems being considered me

POMA 2000, Otis-TTD, ARAMIS and VAIJ.

SWEDEN

Gothenburg is the second largest city in Sweden, with a population

of 458,000 and 690,000 in the region. The total regional population is

expected to go to about 850,000 by 1985. As headquarters for Volvo, it

is one of Sweden’s most important industrial cities.

At present Gothenburg has 10 tram lines 96 km in length (60 miles)

with 268 trams in service. Though tram and bus ridership have shown

a steady clecline over the past 20 years, Gothenburg is planning some

extensions to the existing tramlines. One factor contributing to the

decline of ridershi is the high standard of living which is expected to

increase automobi e ownership from 0.33 per capita to 0.55 by 1985. Y

In 1970a study of a large PRT system was i~itiated b,? the Goteborg

Sparvager (municipal transport operators) under the direction of Mr.

Sixten Camp. This study concluded by recommending a PRT system

using five-passenger vehicles and having 250 km (153 miles) of double

track and 360 stations. The stations were intencled to be within 800-

1000 meters from homes in low density areas and 500 meters in high

density areas. This system would require 18,000 vehicles. The report

recommended that a test track be constructed for demonstration purposes, and that the entire network be built in stages over a 20–25 ~“ear

period. The table below suggests the staging plan and related change in

control technology toward shorter headways for the initial increment of

the total network.

Table l.–Staged plan for Gothenburg, Sweden, PRT system

D:;abJ: Stations Vehicles I n operPartCost Headway

ation mill ion (seconds)

miles crowns

1.. . 3 6 100 1976 8,0

2. . . . . . . . . . . 800 1980 l % 4.0

3. ..., . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,,. : : ; : 1,100 1985 150 2.0

4, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 . . . . . . . . . . 1985 200 1,5

The network proposed would be expected to attract 38 percent of

the trips made in the year 2000, compared with 13 percent for the

conventional bus and train systems.

In 1972 a second study was made, the Gothenburg Public Transport

Study, and all alternatives including PRT were reexamined. This

study concluded that all of the modes were feasible, and that the

PRT system with small vehicles would be preferred. It recommended

against use of the subway s~”stem originall~. planned for C~othenburg.

However it also concluded that there were technical and economic

uncertainties with the new sj~stem, and that satkfactorj” public

transport could be provided for the next few years by conventional

means.
227

The recommendations from the study were:

. Improve the existing system.

. Reconsider the use of an advanced system in 5 years (before

1980) .

. Reserve space for an advanced system with a fairly dense network of the PRT type,

WEST GERNfANY

Planning for AGT systems in West German?-, as in France, depends

on an early close association of hardware supplier and local agencies,

Three

The

systems under development and their” planning sites include:

Cabinentaxi: DEMag and MBB (Messerschmitt-BolkowBlohm GmbH)—Hagen, Westphalia.

Trasurban: Krauss-Maffei-Heidelberg.

H-Bahn: Duwag and Siemens—Erlangen.

status of each of these planning endeavors is summarized

below:

Hagen, Westphalia

In late 1971 the Hagener Strassenbahn AG (street railway system)

contracted with the DEhlag-MBB consortium to stud)- the application

of a PRT s.~-stem in the greater Hagen area. This area includes

peripheral cities of Wetter, Gebelsberg, Herdecke and Berchum

Hohenlirnburg, Population in the area is expected to reach 400,000

b~’ the ~’ear 2000. These studies were completed in 1972 and have

been published in several reports.

While the analysis for Hagen was extensive, some U.S. visitors to

Hagener Strassenbahn contend that the effort was no more than a

plan to help define operational characteristics for the Cabinentaxi

s~stem.

The network for Hagen has been 1aid out in stages. The first stage

includes 33 km (20 miles) of guidewa~’ and 42 stations. Subsequent

stages bring the total s)-stem to 138 km (86 miles) of aerial track and

182 stations.

Traffic projections for the year 2000 suggest a total of 572,000

passenger trips per day (24 hours) with 158,000 for business trips and

414,000 for occasional trips. The volume of morning peak hour travel

was estimated at 56,000. With the closely meshed network, station

loading was estimated as averaging about 170 alighting and entering

passengers per peak hour over both directions of travel. Only in

exceptional instances would station loading exceed 300 passengers

per peak hour.

At a pessimistic occllpanc~” value of one passenger per car, for about

96 percent of the line length, a capacity less than 4,OOO cars per hour

is required. The following table summarizes the number of cars with

a three-seat capacit~- required for various degrees of occupancy.

Table 2.—Occupancy rates projected for Hagen-area PRT system

Occupancy. . . . . . . . . . .

Occupied runs.. . . . . . . 34,3;: 28,5;; 24,5;: 21,4:: 19,0k : 17,1%

Empty runs. . . . . . . . . . 18,000 15,000 12,860 11,250 10,000 9,000

Number of cars. . . . . . . . 8,900 7,400 6,400 5,600 5,000 4,500

>. $-37(1 f ) - ‘, j . 1(,
228

The computation is based on a peak hour demand of 34,300 passengers on a mean distance for one useful run of 6.07 km. The modal-split

models for predicting patronage used total trip time as the principal

parameter. hese analyses predicted use by Cabinentaxi of 60 percent 5

of the overall peak hour travel, 60 percent of the business trips, 40

percent of the occasional trips. While 50 percent of the overall daily

trip average was projected for Cabinentaxi, only 20 percent of the

overall average for short-distance travel was forecast for the conventional bus and tram systems. 1

Greater Hagen A

HAGEN URBAN Area

467000

50V0

Cabinentax

Network

m n alternatives ~ ~

,rea

47%

Bus and Tram Bus Cabinentaxi

General Expertise Hagen Project Study

Traffic Plan DEMAG + MBB

(Kocks) (Prof. Grabe) 1972

1969 1971 ● ) extrapolated from peak hour

Figure 3.—Comparison of Forecasts for the Year 2000

Source: DEMag-MBB, Hagen, West Germany.

The Cabinentaxi, developed as a PRT system, would operate at

one-second headways, traveling at speeds of 36 km/hr (22 mph).

These headways and speeds have been demonstrated at the Hagen

test facility.

A reduction in the FY 1975 budget for the Ministry of Transport

eliminated a proposed urban demonstration of Cabinentaxi in Hagen.

Comparative Analysis of Hagen

An independent analysis of transit network plans for Ha en, West

Germany, has been made by Dr. Guert Hu kes, Vice resident, F

Center for Transportation Planning, Utrecht, he Netherlands. This ‘1!
22!3

analysis compared Cabinentaxi, Transurban, an upgraded bus/tram

system using reserved rights of way, and an actual bus~tram system

having no exclusive right-of-way. The study used basic data derived

from the original Hagen study and from the system suppliers, but

modified as deemed necessary for purposes of comparison. Costs were

prepared for the years 1975–2000, using 1972 guilders which have been

converted below at the rate of $0.30/guilder, exclusive of inflation.

The study assumed a 4 percent yearly growth for wages and 6 percent

for energy. The following table summarizes the results of this analysis.

Results of comparative analysis

Trans.

urban

Bus/tram

right of

way

Bus tram

no r ght of f

way

System date:

Inhabitants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400,000

Network (kilometers)/(miles), . . . . . l~8~~&J

Vehicles.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,

Commercial sDeed (kilometers Der

hour) /(miles per hour) . . . . . , ~.... 304 &

Person net. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Passengers/year (millions). . . . . . . . 60

Passenger kilometers/year (mile

lions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300/180

Cost (million dollars):

Investment in infrastructure. . . . . . . 249

Investment per vehicle (dollars). . . 4,500

1975 cost 1,............, . . . . . . . . . . .

2000 cost 1.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 %

1975-2000 cost totaled 1...., . . . . . . 712

Disbenefits per year: ~

Energy used (billion kilo calories).. 279

Land use (hectares)/(acres). ... . . 35/; ;

Noise index (db (A)), . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Air pollution (tonnes)/(tons).. . . . . . 559/616

Safety (fatalities). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4

Visual intrusion (kilometers/miles

viaduct) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69/41

Criminality (index).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Benefits per year:

Travel time won (million hours)..,. 3.35

Number of iobs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581

400,000

83fW&

400,000

1 19/;;;

33/19 25/15

350 978

60

300/180

206

60,000

21

60

300/180

120

16.2

; . ;

300,000

145{: :

120/72

o

240 75 119

42/1~() 114/2;$ 146/361

100

477/;2; 485/;3; 1,643/1,811

o 8,5

83/5 ;

3,85

549

-0.2 5

1,230

0

1

1,28:

1 Costs include operations plus 50 percent of investment in infrastructure; the other 50

percent government grant disregarded.

230,000,000 passenger trips per automobile included.

Under the conditions assumed, this study concluded:

●

●

●

The capital and operating costs of the automated uideway

systems investigated over the 25 year period would e higher i

than the costs of the upgraded bus and tram system;

The disbenefits of the actual bus/tram system are attributed

largely to 30 million trips which would be made by automobiles

but which would be diverted to the other three innovative

concepts; and

There are benefits in travel times associated with the automated

systems as well as reductions in direct and related labor.
Several factors highlighted by the study warrant consideration:

. The ratio of personnel per vehicle for the Cabinentaxi system

is low in comparison with United States experience on AGT

systems to date.

. This consideration would delay by several years, at current

labor inflation rates, any benefits attributed to the labor

reduction on the automated systems.

. Cabinentaxi vehicle costs are considered low, even though

based on a volume production run of 6–9,000 vehicles.

. The diversion of 30 million automobile trips to any of the

three innovative systems would likely require coercive government action.

Other Plans fol Cabinentaxi

Reports persist of Ianning activity involving Cabinentaxi at other

locations in West &ermany. The following summarizes the best

current information available:

Perlach: A system would serve a surburban community of

80,000 with 30,000 jobs.

Freiburg: A suburban community would be linked to the city

center as the first increment of a potential overall network.

Ziegenhain: The hospital, near Kassel, would be equipped with

a special version of Cabinentaxi to transport patients, hospital

staff, food, supplies and other materials between the different

buildings of the medical center. Plans call for the system to be

in operation during 1977.

Hamburg and Marl: Applications have been made for a reference installation. Studies would be initiated in 1975. After completion, and if a project is approved, one city would be selected

for the installation. Both small and large cabs would be tested for

public acceptance and serviceability. Construction would begin

m 1977 and the system would be operational in 1979.

Heidelberg

An extensive preliminary design, urban compatibility, patronage

and economic feasibility study was done by the Krauss-Maffei consortium in collaboration with the planning authorities of Heidelberg.

This study contemplated a Transurban system as developed and

tested by Krauss-Maffei at their facilities in Munich. The system

involved 3.6 km (2.2 miles) of guideway and 10 stations f~r the central

part of the city. Consideration was given to placing the system underground to preselve the historic bmldings in the city center. lt was

expected that a small vehicle system could be tunneled at less cost

and with less danger to building foundations. Withdrawal of funding

support by the Ministry of Research and Technology for Transurban

development has not cancelled further planning in Heidelberg. The

city is evaluating other bottom-supported GRT systems that could

meet planned requirements. Krauss-Maffei is continuing with the

development of a GRT system but without magnetic levitation for

vehicle suspension, and hopes to team with another supplier.
Erlangen

As the headquarters for Siemens, Erlangen is a natural choice for

simulating deployment of the H-Bahn system. A fine-grained network has been planned, with all stations within walking distance.

The simulation uses a 45 km network, 60 off-line stations and 260

vehicles. The vehicles seat 8, on two, four-abreast seats facing each

other. There is space for an additional 8 standees in the middle.

Vehicle speed is planned at 36 km/hr (22 mph) at 8 second headways.

Thus, vehicle flow rates are 450 per hour or 3600 seats per hour.

Dwell times for a three-berth station are 20 seconds. hTo additional

information on the status of plans for deployment of H-Bahn is

available.

JAPAN

There is considerable activity throughout Japan concerned with

planning the deployment of AGT systems. There is evidence of some

intense competition between cities to be the first to install a new

system in ,Japan. In addition to the (NS development, eight system

suppliers are vying for the market. Two significant planning efforts

for deployments in Tokyo, as well as those planned in other parts

of Japan, are discussed below.

Ikebukuro, Tokyo

The most ambitious

[

lans for deployment of CVS involve the

northwestern part of To yo, Ikebukuro. These plans would connect

central Tokyo with Ikebukuro by means of 8.5 km (5.3 miles) of

guideway. The four-lane track would be all elevated with two lanes

northbound and two southbound. The system would be designed to

carry both passengers and goods. However, the 36 to 50 stations along

the route would be designated to handle either people or cargo, but

not both. Stations would be simple in design with a single channel,

off-line ~latform, space for a few vehicle berths, fare collection gates,

destination selection equipment and a small shelter. Vehicles would

operate at one-second headways during peak hours. Since land is

extremely expensive in Tokyo, every effort has been made to minimize the space requirements. The study is being financed largely

by private industrial groups with very few data released. Representatives of .Mitsubishi report that planning was about 90 percent complete at the end of 1974. The plan is expected to be presented to the

Ministry of Construction early in 1975. If approved, it would be

submitted to the Ministry of Finance and then to the Diet for appropriations, hopefully during 1975.

Tsukiji, Tokyo

The Tsukiji District of Tokyo is in the eastern part of the city

near Tokyo Bay on land reclaimed from the sea. Tsukiji is growing

rapidly, and would be an attractive commerical area, if it were served

adequately with a transit system.

Funding was approved in 1974 in the amount of $1.7 million for

preparation of plans to be submitted to the .Ministry of Construction

in mid-1975. Unlike plans for Ikebukuro, the system for Tsukiji

would be selected by competition.
232

Other Planned installations

There are eight industrial firms in Japan either independently

developing or marketing their versions of U.S.-licensed automated

guideway transit systems. The following is a list of these systems:

Firm Syste m

Mitsubishi. -.. - ------ ------ _ -------- MAT (Mitsubishi Automated Transit).

Mitiui/Seizo Sharyo ----------------- VONA (Vehicle of a New Age).

Kawasaki--_-_----_---- -- ----------- KCV (Kawasaki Computer-Controlled

Vehicle System).

Hitachi ----------------------------- PARATRANS.

Kobe Steel -------------------------- KRT1

(Kobe Rapid Transit).

Niigata Tekko, Sumitomo- ----------- NTS2 (New Transportation System).

Toshiba ---------------------------- Minimonorail.

Nichimen, Fuji Car------------------ Dashaveyor.3

1 Adaptation of Boeing/Morgantown. 2 Adaptation of LTV Airtrans. 3 Adaptation of Bendix/Dashaveyor.

These systems exhibit the performance characteristics of SLT or

GRT systems. Their technical characteristics vary slightly, but generally conform to specifications for an on-line medium-capacity and

medium-speed system. All of the systems listed use rubber tires. All

but KRT have track switching systems; all have automatic coupling

capabilities. The nominal headway is 90 seconds. These specifications

a pear to be tailored for small-scale installations at Osaka and Kobe.

Planning for deployments in these cities is discussed below.

Nanko Project, Osaka.—The Nanko Area Project (south Port Area

of Osaka) is on reclaimed land in the Osaka harbor, which will have 900

hectares (about 2300 acres) when completed. The permanent population of 40,000 will reside on 110 hectares of land; about 5000 of this

population already resides there. Originally intended as primarily

industrial, Nanko has been expanded to include a large residential

area.

A new GRT system is planned to connect Nanko with the No. 3

subway line terminal. The length of the new system is to be 7.2 km

(4.5 males); it would all be aerial, and there would be 9 on-line stations.

Extensions within the Nanko area and beyond the No. 3 terminal are

planned for the future. The cost of the system is projected at 22 billion

yen, or about $70 million ($15 million/mile). A decision on type of

system is expected in mid-1975.

Kobe.—A system with many similar features is planned for Kobe,

a city with three quarters of a million people. Plans exist for a subway

in Kobe (14 km by 1978; 22 km by 1985). The new system, described

by representatives of the Traffic and Transportation Bureau of Kobe,

would be about 4 km in length, linking Sannomiya station of the

Japanese National Railways (JNR) with a “port island’) new town.

The new town, built on land fill in Kobe arbor, has a projected

population of 14,000 people. A completion date of about 4 years was

indicated.
233

Proposed Installations.-One of the companies that is contending

for the Osaka and Kobe installations is Mitsui/Seizo Sharyo, M/SS

reports that it has submitted the following proposals for installations:

Interurban

Toso New Town in Chiba Prefecture: 3,350 m (10,928 ft) Guideway,

42 Vehicles, 3 Stations, 2.5 min Headway, and 5,640 Passengers/hr

Capacity.

Kaihin New Town in Chiba Prefecture: 14,300 m (46,904 ft) Guideway, 178 Vehicles, 8 Stations, 1.5 min Headway, and 20,000

Passengers/hr Capacity.

Tokadai New Town in Aidi Prefecture: 17,500 m (57,400 ft) Guideway, 183 Vehicles, 20 Stations, 1.5 min Headway, and 18,720

Passengers/hr Capacity.

Fujisawa Seibu New Town in Kanagawa Prefecture: 12,000 m

(39,360 ft) Guideway, 55 Vehicles, 7 Stations, 2.5 min Headway,

and 5,500 Passengers/hr Capacity.

Airport Distributor

Shin Tokyo International Airport in Chiba Prefecture: 600 m

(1,968 ft) Guideway, 24 Vehicles, 2 Stations, and 1.5 min Headway.

Cargo Distributor

Grocery Distribution Center in Chiba Prefecture: 7,000 m (22,960

ft) Guideway, 39 Vehicles, and 6 Stations.

No decisions have been made on any of the above proposals.

Summary-Japan.—AGT system planning in Japan is proceeding at

a pace commensurate with the status of development. One PRT

system, CVS, is being planned for the Ikebukuro District of Tokyo.

Since CVS testing will not be completed before the summer of 1978,

deployment could not begin earlier. Other installations are being

planned for competitive proposals from among eight prospective

system suppliers. Several of the planned installations address the

transportation problem created by the historic development of many

Japanese coastal cities in which the port activities were separated

by many miles from the commercial and residential centers of the

city. There are numerous other proposals for AGT installations

serving new towns, the new Tokyo airport and a food distribution

center.
Chapter 4: Description of Foreign Suppliers

Industry support for AGT system development starting in the

late 1960’s and early 1970’s occurred for many reasons. Some companies were already involved in supplying the transportation industry

and this new form of transit was a logical extension of their manufacturing and marketing capabilities. The aerospace and military

hardware suppliers looked upon AGT development as technically

challenging and an opportunity to diversify into a civilian market. The

apparent U.S. interest in AGT systems, as evidenced by the N’ew

Systems Study, undoubtedly suggested an opportunity for foreign

exports. Though energy was not a major concern, problems of the

environment, air pollution and automobile congestion provided an

incentive for alternative ancl attractive transit s,ystems. The rapidly

expanding population and interest in new residential areas—even

new towns-invited consideration of complementary new transit

systems.

A combination of these factors led many industries to believe that a

potential market for such systems was developing that could bring a

reasonable return on corporate investments. This belief was reinforced b~ government’s willingness to share or totally compensate for

the cost of developing this new urbtin transit system.

As a result, hundreds of concepts evolved, many were developed,

some have progressed to operational testing and deployment. The

following section describes the status of the significant developments

which have survived. hTo attempt has been made to exhaust the

subject. The purpose is to show that foreign development of AGT

systems is seriolw and proceeding on a technically sound basis.

E NGLAND

A PRT network-t ‘pe system was first conceived in Great Britain

in 1965. Leslie R. d lake of the Brush Electrical Company, a subsidia~~ of Hawker Siddele~”, formulated his concepts for such a s~-stem

after visiting staRR car and Te]etrans developments in the U.S. Studies

of the Auto-Taxi were sponsored by the National Research and Development Corporation (N RDC) in 1967. These studies continued

through 1971 under the name of Cabtrack b~- the Transport Research

Assessment Group (TRAG), a working group attached to the Joint

Ministries of Transport and Technology. A number of components

and subsystems of Cabtrack were developed to the stage of full-scale

experimental technology at the Ro~’al Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough. During this periocl., a number of crucial aspects of the original

concept were altered, but m basic outline, it remained a PRT-t~-]m

of s~-stem. The system being developed was to be a 4-seat, automatlcall~- controlled, electrically’ propelled vehicle. It was to travel at

35–40 mph on an exclusive guldew~~-. Passengers could travel between

stations of their choice without intermediate stops. These features

conforni to the Personal Ral)id Transit conce])t as presentl~- defined.

An environmental stud}- of Cabtrack undertaken in 1971 endeavored

to show the architectural iml)act on the West End of London. The

attempt was to assess the visu~il accel)tance of such a s~wtenl in an

existing cit~”. ‘llc Tlrest End was selected because considerable traffic

(235)
’236

data were available, but the study highlighted the difficulties of adding

aerial structures to a well-known, densely developed and cherished

section of London. Critical press reports m May, 1971 resulted in a

reevaluation of the project.

In 1971 a change in administration of the Department of the

Environment and the ensuing reevaluation of Cabtrack resulted in

redirection of efforts to a technically less ambitious system. The

m’inciDal reasons for dropping Cabtrack were: .

.’ Technical goals appeared too ambitious relative to the develom

ment funs available and to the benefits to be realized. ‘A

one-second headway for cars was not regarded as a realistic

objective at that time. Better benefit/cost values could be

achieved, it was believed, with larger capacity vehicles operating at reater headways.

Fail-sa e features were neither well-enough analyzed nor shown f

to be feasible at reasonable cost. Risks to passengers had been

too readily dismissed in earlier studies,

The addition of aerial structures within compact, older areas of

London (and similar cities) could have serious adverse environmental impacts, far greater than originally envisioned. Tunneling became the only sensible approach, which would be

excessively extensive.

The result of the redirection of activity was a decision to study a

new concept which became known as ‘iMinitram.”

This concept uses a larer vehicle than Cabtrack. It would have

mostly on-line stations, a though the system is being conceived to f

allow incremental future evolution into a system having PRT attributes, such as: off-line station capabilities, fully automatic control,

and some degree of demand responsiveness.

The Department of the Environment, through the Transport and

Road Research Laboratory, has competitive feasibility studies with

EASAMS Ltd. (a GEC subsidiary) and Hawker Siddeley Dynamics

Ltd. Probable characteristics of the eventual system, depending upon

final design, are:

Capacity- _. ... ---

S eed_-----------

$eadways - -------

Operations---- ----

Grades -_ - _- --- ---

12–15 seated, 10–15 standees.

30-45 mph.

10 seconds.

Individual and 3-car trains.

10-percent maximum.

,. 2997mm ~

2591 mm ! —— 1

,~OOOmm

+– ‘ “

‘ B

2300

mm : =

j

.— .—. .-.= —

DOUBLE DECKER BUS LTSTANDARDCOACH LT TUBE COACH URBAN MINITRAM

(6seat-12 Place)

Figure 4 .—Cross Section Dimensions of Various Urban Vehicles

Source : Dr. M. H. 1., Waters, Minitram-The TRRL Programme,

Transport and Road Research Laboratory, Crowthorne, Berkshire,

1973.

.
237

There are differences in the two system designs:

. The Hawker Siddeley system uses rubber tires on a concrete

guideway, A center slot below the running surface provides

guidance, power collection and vehicle retention. The vehicle

steering mechanism is controlled by guide wheels in the slot.

Guideway side walls provide emergency guidance and reduce

any noise or splashing.

5 0

4 0

30

TRIP

TIME

(rein)

2 0

10

G

AIR-LINE DISTANCE (miles)

Figure 5.—Performance Curves of Various Urban Vehicles

Source : Dr. J. W. Fitchie, iNew Tran8port @8tf2m8 for (?it{e8,

Transport and Road Research Laboratory, Crowthorne, Berkshire ; 1973.

. The ESSAMS system also uses concrete as a supportin structure, but the vehicle uses steel wheels on steel rails. T e steel i

rails are mounted on resilient isolators to reduce noise and

vibration. The steel wheels are also fabricated with resilient

materials to minimize noise and vibration transmissions. Use
’238

of steel wheels and rails eliminates the need for additional uide

wheels, but imposes a requirement for steering to avoid an.ge f

contact and the resulting noise on tight curves. Concrete side

curbs contain the power rails and provide positive vehicle

retention.

In addition to the EASAMS and HSD designs, the Department of

the Environment is investigating a magnetically levitated alternative.

This study is based on the contention that maintenance costs could be

lowered through reductions in rotating equipment and less guideway

wear. British Rail is doing the magnetic levitation work. Data developed thus far raises more questions than are answered. The possibility

of lower reliabilities f?r the magnetic levitation and higher operating

costs for linear induction propulsion may offset an}. other advantages.

FRANCE

Three AGT systems are under active development in France. A

fourth, VEC, has been installed commercially. Each is discussed below.

A2?AlZ~S’.-The ARAMIS systeIn k being developed by Engins

MATRA from patents of Gerard Bardet. This system is the most likely

of all French developments to achieve PRT performance. The following

is a summary of ARAMIS technical characteristics.

Guideway.. --- _ -- Concrete running surface with lateral guidance curbs.

Stations- --------- Sized for volume of traffic.

Control the adjacent line operations.

Load/unloading areas may be superimposed vertically.

Vehicles_ --------- 4–10 seats.

Run on 4 pneumatic tires.

Guided by 4 rubber wheels.

Traction: 2 variable reluctance motors, 1 for each rear wheel.

Speed --- _ ________ 50 km/hr (30 mph).

Headway s- ------- Vehicles are electronically coupled 0.3m apart.

Spacing: 0.2 seconds between vehicles, 60 seconds between

platoons.

Operations ---- _ _ _ - 25 electronically trained vehicles with 10 seats in a platoon

could provide a capacity of 15,000 seats.

Electronic coupling permits high-speed switching for adding

or removing cars.

Iligh traffic capacities are possible with off-line stations and

high-speed switching.

Development of ARAMIS was started in 1970 with design studies,

site feasibility studies in the Paris suburbs and prototype development. A one-km test track with three prototype vehicles has been

constructed near Orly Airport. Tests with the prototype vehicles are

essentiall~’ complete. The cost of the program through this prototype

testing phase is about 13.9 million FFr. Total French government

assistance since 1970 has been approximately 7.1 million FFr. The

second phase of the program started in 1974. The system manager

for this phase is the Regie Autonorne des Transports Parisiens

(RATP), the regional transport authorit~- for Paris. RATP is funding

70 percent of a 40–50 million FFr program of 30 months duration.

This phase will include the following three parts:

I?art I—Design Review, September 1974 to September 1975:

. Analyses of equipment, costs, reliability, safety and traffic

management,

. Technical qualification of critical components.
239

. Redesign of the ARAMIS system incorporating features proven

from RATP experience with the Paris Metro and from the

design review.

Part II—Qualification Tests, September 1975 to March 1977:

. Construct a new test track, 3 km long with 3 stations, crossing

switches, underground and elevated sections and 10 to 15

vehicles.

. Conduct qualification tests on the maintainability and automatic diagnostic equipment.

. Public use of the system during these tests is not planned.

Part III—Experimental system, March 1976 to May 1978: 1n

parallel with Parts I and 11, case studies will be made of possible

ARAMIS installations in the Val de Marne district near Paris. Plans

for a possible demonstration installation are discussed in Chapter 3

of this report.

ARAMIS Test Facility, Orly AirporQ Pari% France

VAL The VAL system is also being developed by Engins MATRA

of Velizy, an industrial park near Paris, in conjunction with EPALE,

the Public Authority for the Planning of Lille-Est. French government assistance began in 1970. Total expenditures thus far on the

system amount to 30 million FFr, of which the government’s contribution has totaled about 24 million FFr, the VAL system is fully

automated and has the following technical characteristics:

Gujdeway. ------ Concrete running surfaces.

Stations---- ----- On line.

Vehicles_ -- _ -- _ -- Capacity: 36 seated, 17 to 26 standees.

Rubber tired.

speed - ---- ------ 40 km/hr avg, 30 km/hr max (25-50 mph).

Headways - ------ 1 min.

Acceleration- ---- 1.3 m/sz (2.8 m/hr/see).

Operations ---- --- Single- or 2-car trains.

Capacity: 2,000-15,000 persons per hour per direction.

Test facilities were constructed in 1972 and consist of a 2 km test

track with two switching sections, a station, a central control post

and two prototype vehicles. Tests have been underway since 1973.

Engins MATRA plans to expand these facilities to provide 8 km of

test track and 8 stations in 1975.
240

VAL Test Vehicle at Line, France

POik2A 2000.-The POMA 2000 was develo ed by a Grenoble

firm, Pomagalski (a ski lift manufacturer) and reusot Loire Enter- 8

prises. A joint venture subsidiary, Societk POMA 2000, has been

formed to develop and market the system. POMA 2000 uses a passive

vehicle with cable propulsion—a modern version of the San Francisco

cable car. However, rubber tires are used foI support and guidance,

and the vehicle is automatically latched to the cable and released.

In 1971 a prototype vehicle and a test track were constructed at

Montmelian. In 1972 two rototy e vehicles and a 565 meter test

100 were constructed at omaga ski facilities in Grenoble. Tests F Y

wit the three vehicles since 1972 have resulted in claims that the t

passive vehicle and simplification of the control system offer major

advantages. The ride, at 33 km/hr (20 mph) on the test track is conPOMA 2000 Test Facility, Grenoble, France
sidered quiet and of high quality. Headways as low as 10 seconds

appear to be feasible. t his system is fully automated for on-line

operations. The vehicles seat 36 with 17 to 27 standees and would

operate in married pairs.

The next step in the test program will be to double track the test

loop, to add a second station and to build three additional vehicles.

These facilities are expected to cost about 8.5 million FFr and will

be available early in 1976. Total expenditures thus far on the system

are aproximately 4 million FFr. The French government has been

assisting with development since 1971. Of the total expenditure, the

company is allowed to provide one half, either in cash or in equivalent

facihties and services. The General Commission for Scientific and

Technical Research provides a loan for the other half. Repayment of

this loan with a low interest rate is required only if a return is realized

on future commercial sales.

VEC.-The VEC system uses passive vehicles propelled by a

conveyor belt. Present vehicles seat two passengers in an open cab,

but designs are available for a 4–6 seat enclosed cab with space for

six stanees. Technical characteristics are summarized below: Y

Guideway... ----

Stations --- ------

Vehicles -- - -_ -- _ -

Propulsion ---- ---

Speed___ ---- -_ _ -

Headways -------

Operations --------

Concrete with a tubular steel rail for 1 side of the vehicle,

the conveyor belt supports the other side.

Station lengths determined by traffic. On-line or off-line.

May use a moving belt loading platform.

Vehicles are slowed to 1 ft/sec or stopped for loading and

unloading.

Propulsion is pa9sive.

For 2-seat vehicle passengers face outboard.

For an enclosed vehicle, passengers face fore and aft.

In stations, vehicles are moved by slow conveyor belts and

accelerated or decelerated by a friction wheel.

In line operations, vehicles are moved by a continuous conveyor belt propelled by linear induction motors.

10–20 mph.

Separation is maintained by contact with conveyor belt.

Vehicles are allowed to bump at low relative speeds in

stations.

2 to 6 second headways are achievable.

Capacities: 1,800 to 21,600 passengers/hour.

Shuttles, loops or grids are possible.

VEC Installation in Montparnasse, Paris, France
,

The system was developed with French technology by the SAVEC

Company. This technology was acquired by Cytec Development,

Inc. of Minneapolis, Minn.; a licensing agreement with SAVEC

provides for further development with SAVE facilities and for marketing the system in France and elsewhere. Development of the system

commenced in 1972. Approximately 1.4 million FFr have been expended to date, of which governmental assistance has totaled about

0.8 million FFr. The French government considers the system ready

for commercial applications. It has recently issued a letter of commitment to provide financial assistance in the form of working capital

up to about 1 million FFr. This letter was provided through the

Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Small Business. In addition, the

government is continuing with non-financial support by providing the

company a place for demonstrating the system at the planned Transport Expo in 1975.

WEST GERMANY

Development of AGT systems in West Germany began in 1970. The

initiative for this development came from private industry. Participation by the Federal industry for Research and Technology commenced in 1972. The development was not ordered, rather an incentive

was offered in the form of payments up to 80 percent of the cost. The

remaining 20 percent was borne by private industry. Cost sharing was

considered advantageous to. the governent in that only those projects would be sponsored which private industry felt could be successful, but which otherwise were too costly, or risky, to be undertaken by

industry alone.

Four systems under development in West Germany are discussed

below.

Cabinentaxi Test Facility, Hagen, West Germany
Cabinentaxi.—Development of Cabinentaxi was started with

design studies in 1970 by DEMag-MBB (Messerschmitt-BolkowBlohm). Federal participation commenced in January, 1972. The

objectives of this development were to provide an urban transportation system with the following characteristics:

. Small, comfortable vehicles with seats, available at stations

and ready for use on demand.

c Origin-to-destination operation with no changes or intermediate

stops by virtue of separate stopping tracks at the stations

(no obstruction of through traffic).

. Traveling speed of at least 30 km/hr (18 mph).

● Separation of the track from road traffic, most efficiently

achieved by elevated guideway structures. The flexibility of

the system should permit underground installation, if required.

. Fully automatic operation of the entire system.

. Linear induction motor drive to guarantee low noise levels

and no exhaust fumes.

, . . . . . . .

Wartungshalle

Trafo-Slatlon J

m 02 /

~/=-- -

,.’ ,/ ,’

Figure 6.—Cabinentaxi Test Track Configuration, Hagen, West Germany

Source : DEMag-MBB, Hagen, West Germany.

System definition and laboratory experimentation on components

commenced in 1972. The control system was developed and tested on

a 13m diameter, rotary, test fixture during 16 months, commencing

in October, 1972. The first stage of a test faclhty was completed near

Hagen in August, 1973, and test operations commenced the next

month. Facilities included 150 meters of double guideway (for both
supported and suspended vehicles), a merge point, a passenger station

and three vehicles. By October, 1974 the track had been extended to a

closed 100 with two by-passes, 1136 meters long. Five vehicles, three

above an two below the track, have since been undergoing operational

tests. In 1975 the track will have two passenger stations, a service

building, a check-out position and nine fully automatic vehicles. In

October 1975 a 12-seat vehicle is planned to be introduced onto the

guideway for testing. In 1976, the test facilities will be completed to

form a small operating network with 1.9 km of guideway, t ree sta- h

tions and 24 vehicles. Testing will continue through 1977, after which

work will begin on a reference installation for public transport in a

city. The system is expected to be put into service in 1979.

Technical characteristics for Cabinentaxi are summarized below:

Guideway.. - _ --- Box girder provides guidance and support for vehicles both

under and over the girder.

Stations ---------- Off-line stations spaced 0.3 to 0.8 km apart.

Capacity: 1,000 vehicles/hour.

Vehicles_ -- _ _ ---- 3 seated, no standees.

Propulsion --- ---- 2 double-comb linear electric motors, mounted horizontally

inside the box girder.

s eed- --- -_ ---- - 36 km/hr (22 mph).

# eadways - --- --. 0.5–1.0 seconds.

Operations ---- --- For guideway 20 percent full: 5,000 veh/hr or 15,000 seat/hr.

For guideway 100 percent full: 7,200 veh/hr or 21,600 seat/hr.

Headway control is based on three factors: the vehicle’s own speed,

distance to the preceding vehicle and speed of the preceding vehicle.

The headway is a fully asynchronous operation, monotonously increasing with speed. During tests, Cabinentaxi has achieved headways down to 0.5 seconds in the speed range of O–36 km/hr (o–22

mph).1 Passengers have been carried at l-second headways., but only

under manual control. Close-headway operational tests with all vehicles will be performed by the end of 1975.

The vehicle has three independent braking systems: a linear eddy

current brake, a hydraulically operated wheel brake and a mechanically operated wheel brake for standstill. Braking is at a constant deceleration. An emergency braking distance of 7 meters (23 feet) has

been experimentally demonstrated.

Though Cabinentaxi operates at headways larger than the emergency braking distance, several safety measures have been taken.

. The vehicle structure will resist a brick-wall crash at full speed

without loosening essential parts.

. The front side of the passenger cabin is equipped with a crash

pad.

. An air bag system is under test—particularly to protect standing children.

Cabinentaxi is the most significant PRT development in West

Germany. Tests of a 12-passenger vehicle indicate that GRT a plications are also being considered. The Ministry of Research and ch- l ?

nology has participated in the cost of development since 1 January

1972. Funds allocated by the Ministry through 1975 are estimated

at about 37.3-million DM ($13.3-million).

1 The 0.5 second headway was attained on the 13m rotary, test fixture in Munich.
245

Cabinentaxi: Suspended and Supported Vehicles

Cabinentaxi: Guideway and Supporting Structures
Transurban.—This system has been under development by KraussMaffei AG since 1970. Standard Elektrik Lorenz AG has developed

the electronic remote control and surveillance system. Design and

laboratory testing was sufficiently promising that the Ministry of

Research and Technology began sharing the cost of development on

1 October 1971.

Magnetic attraction suspension was demonstrated with a prototype

vehicle in 1972. Trade-off studles conducted by Kraus~-Maffei suggested that magnetic attractlon suspension would require less than

half the power per unit weight of? repulslon system. Other advantages

claimed for the magnetic suspension and guidance system were:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

By

No contact with the underlying surface (no wear).

No noise or vibration emission.

Extremely low drag resistance.

Minimal vehicle cross section.

No secondary suspension required (no moving parts).

Simple track construction with wide techmcal tolerances.

Simple infrastructure due to better load-distribution and absence of overload problems.

displacing the armature rails with respect to the magnets for

support and guidance, the system was “self centering” and required

no additional guidance system. Figure 7 shows the position of linear

motors, magnetic suspension and guidance units relative to the reaction

and armature rails.

POWER

COLLECTOR

STATION \

I

Figure 7.-Cross Section of Transurban Vehicle

Source : “Intermediate Capacity Transit—Ontario’s Program,” Ontario Ministry of Transportation and Communications ; February, 1974.
247

Additional characteristics of Transurban are summarized as follows:

Guideway.. -----

Stations- ----- _ --

Vehicle ----------

Propulsion -------

Speed ------------

Headways -------

Operations _______

A ],200-meter

Reinforced concrete post and beam construction surmounted

by the reaction and armature rails.

Radius of curvature at 12mph:30m (98ft).

Maximum slope: +8 percent, –15 percent.

Clearance for double track: Width:4.40m (14.4 ft). Height:

3.85n~ (12.6 ft).

Clearance for tunnels: Width: 5.00m (16.4 ft). Height:

3.85m (12.6 ft).

On-line or off-line.

12 seated, 6–8standees.

Single-sided linear induction motor.

600 v D.CV 50 kwat50 mph.

Nominal:45mph.

Maximum:50-75mph.

At 48 km/hr (30 mph); 10 seconds.

At 72 km/hr (45 mph); 15 seconds.

Vehicles would operate singly or in 5-car trains.

Coupling and uncoupling would be automatic.

Economic operations were projected at capacities of 100 to

2,000 passengers per hour per direction per vehicle.

(3,636 -foot) test track loop was completed in 1973.

This track has been used primarily to test the automatic control

system with two rubber-tired vehicles.

Electronic Control Test Car and Track

Another 600-foot test track is available for testing the prototype

magnetically levitated vehicle, This track also includes a prototype

of the passive switch design.
248

Prototype Transurban MagLev Vehicle

Visitors to the Krauss-Maffei test facilities who have heard and

ridden the prototype vehicle have generally had two observations:

. The system is noisier than expected. Vibration of the reaction

plate due to excitation from the linear induction motor produced an objectionable 50-cycle hum. This noise source could

be corrected by a heavier plate or by anchoring it more securely

to the supports.

. The ride has been described as “hard. ” There is no secondary

suspension on the vehicle. Rigid maintenance of an air gap

between 10 and 25 mm (0.4-1.0 inches) gives a ride t at

emphasizes any imperfections in guideway smoothness.

The German Ministry for Research and Technology allocated

31.7-million DM ($11.3-million) for Transurban development from

1 October 1971 through 1976. The project was terminated on 14 November 1974 for the reasons descrnbed in Chapter 3. Krauss-Maffei

remains active in AGT development endeavors and is seeking to

establish a joint venture with another supplier so that their earlier

work on automated controls and linear induction propulsion can be

utilized.

H-Bahn,-This system, designed with the track above the vehicle,

is being developed by Siemens and DuWag with financial assistance

from the Ministry for Research and Technology.

System design and component tests began m 1973. A 180-meter

(590-foot) full scale switch section and tract with a prototype car

have been built at the DuWag plant in Dusseldorf. Tests started in

October 1974. Plans are to build a 1.5 km (4920 ft.) test track with

ten vehicles at the Siemen facility in Erlangen. A one to two-year

test program would start early in 1976.
249

Technical characteristics of H-Bahn are as follows:

Guideway. _. _ - _.

Stations- - _ - _ ----

Vehicles. - _ - _ - _ --

Suspension -------

Propulsion -------

Controls ---------

Speed-----------

Headways -------

Operations --------

Hollow steel box beam, l meter(39.4 in) deep.

Slot on the bottom through which the vehicle is suspended.

On and off-line.

20-second delay for a 3-berth station.

16-passenger maximum capacity.

Two 4-abreast seats facing 8 standees in the middle.

Steel wheels with composite facings run on the inside bottom

surface of the box beam.

Lateral guidance is provided by rubber wheels which press

on the vertical upper inside surface of the box beam.

Two l-sided linear synchronous electric motors.

Used asynchronously during acceleration and braking.

Speed and position control determined by spacing of iron

cores in the track.

35 km/hr (21 mph).

80 meters (260 feet).

Based on a braking distance of 50 meters and a 7.5 meter

fixed block sensing system using inductive loops in the

track.

Vehicle flow-4,50/hr.

Seats—3,600/hr.

H-Bahn is conceived as a GRT s~~stem offering demand-type service

over a coarse network of lines.

The Nlinistry of Research and Technology has allocated 8.5-

million DN1 ($3-million) for H-Bahn development over the period

from 1 ,Januarry 1973 through 30 April 1975.

1 Kom~akfbahn.—G1onceptllnlizati{)n and design of an intermediate

capacitj” AGT system by Krupp Industries and Stahlbau began

in Jully 1974. Fom vehicle sizes under study are described below:

Vehicle height Track width

Capacity,

Vehicle type Seated standing Total Meters Feet Meters Feet

AO. . . . . . . ., 32 28 60 2.0 6.6 2.2 7.2

Al, ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.0

A2. ... ... , ,, . . . . . . . . . . . . . x . . . . . i% 1.5 ::: : : : H

A3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 . . . . . 18 1.5 4.9 1.3 4.3

All vehicles are 8 meters (26.2 feet) long with a minimum turn

radius of 9 meters (29.5 feet), Operations me on line with vehicles run

singly or in trains. Guideway’s are reinforced concrete channels to

guide the rubber-tired vehicles. No other technical det ails me available.

The Ministry for Research and Technology has allocated 3.4-

million DM ($1 .2-million) to the project for the period 1 ,JulJ’ 1974 to

30 June 1975. Plans are to condurt tests on a 1,000-meter (3,280-foot)

closed loop test track at the I{rupp works, Proposecl test facilities

include a switrh, passenger loading station and a varie~~- of guideway

materials. Tests would begin in 1976 and be completed m 1977.

JAPAN

The greatest interest in AGT development has been shown by the

Japanese. They have imported systems from Boeing Morgantown),

LTV Aerospace (AI RTRAAT

S) and Bendix Dashave}ror). Five other

SLT or GRT systems are under development by Japanese industry.
250

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry has sponsored

development of the world’s most sophisticated PRT system—CVS

(Computer-controlled Vehicle System). In addition, a small dual-mode

vehicle system, also called CVS, will be demonstrated at the International Ocean Exposition on Okinawa in July 1975.

The CVS developrnent is described below. Characteristics of the

other systems are summarized at the end of this section.

CViS.-This PRT system has been under development in Japan

since 1968. At that time preparations were made for a “traffic game”

to be demonstrated at the Osaka World Exposition, which was held

from March to September 1970. The demonstration in the Automobile

Industries Pavilion consisted. of more than ten specially designed

electric vehicles operating indlvldually under computer control on a

checkerboard-like guideway network with intersections every five

meters (16.4 feet). The two-seat vehicles communicated with the

central computer through an underground communication channel.

Though primarily designe(} as an exhibition facility, this demonstration accomplished several things, includmg:

. Development of elementary computer logic for controlling a

small fleet of vehicles.

. Development of techniques for managing vehicle grade crossings on a highly integrated network of intersections.

● Assessment of public attitudes toward the use of small, tiutomated vehicles.

The basic concept for CVS was formulated in July 1970. In the

autumn of 1970 work on the basic design of the system began with

support of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).

Miniature models of vehicles and a glideway were constructed. A

total system with 1,000 vehicles was simulated on a. large computer

as the basis for preparing fundamental techmcal specflcations.

Based on this research, a reduced-scale experiment was preptired

from April to October 1971. Cars for a network representing the

central 300-meter” square area (984 feet) of the Ginza District in

Tokyo. CVS cars at 1 :20 scale were operated under computer control

for the public at the 18th Tokyo Motor show from 28 October to

21 November 1971. Though the velllcles and guldeway were onetwentieth scale, the computer-control system was full scale. Thus, the

experiment provided an opportumt)r to exercise both the computer

hardware and software for an extensive automated network system.

At the conclusion of the Tokyo Motor Show in November 1971,

full-scale development of CVS began. hlITI financed construction of

test facilities on the site of Japan’s first automobile test track at

Higashimurayarna, about 30 ,km (18 milep) wept of Tokyo. The testtrack configuration is shown m the follo\\-mg diagram. An aerial view

of the CVS test facilities are shown on the next page.

Figure 8.—CVS Test Track Configuration, Higashimurayama Tokyo, Japan.

(The maintenance area and an off-line station are shown within the 100-

meter grid in the middle of the test loop.)
251

The total length of the guideway is 4.8 km (2.9 miles). At the top

of the diagram, 2 km of straight track permit high speed operations

at 60–80 km/hr (36–48 mph). Two parallel traffic lanes at the bottom

of the diagram permit, high-speed lane changing experiments. The

diamond-shaped portion in the center represents the grid in a lowspeed network. One side of the grid is 100 meters (328 feet) long,

which is technicall~: the minimum distance betw’een stations. The test

track is designed with two at-grade crossings to check performance of

the vehicle control system at these intersections. The telephone-shaped

track inside the grid has a circular guideway with a radius of 5 meters

(16.4 feet) at both ends and is used as a maintenance mea. The control

center, vehicle storage yard and passenger cargo station are below the

maintenance truck. A second passenger/cargo station is located at

midpoint on the upper high-speed track.

. .

CVS Project Experimental Center—Higashimurayama, Tokyo, Japan. (Vehicle

storage in the foreground, off-line station at the right and at grade intersection at the right rear.)

Control System

The CVS system is controlled by a synchronous moving block

system using three separate computer systems. The first one is the

Hitachi computer system, which controls the vehicles high speed

operation, i.e., the outer-ring (speed betw-een 40-60 knl/hr) ; the second

is the Toshiba computer system controlling the low speed operation,

i.e., the inner-ring (speeds below 40 km/hr) and moving blocks on the

guidway; the third one is the Fujitsu computer system which functions as the supervisory computer, controlling overall SJ stem operation, and monitors the other two computer systems.

Vehicles

While originally planned for a 100-vehicle test operation, inflation

has reduced the scope to 60 vehicles, as follows:
252

Phase 1 Phase 2

“All up” vehicles:

Passenger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 13

Cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o 6

“Testbed’’chassis:

Passenger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 27

Cargo. ..,....,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 14

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 60

All vehicles have been delivered tothe site, but test operations will

be scheduled over two phases discussed in a following section.

A variety of vehicle configurations are available for testing. The

“all-up” versions are complete prototypes, whereas the ‘itest-bed”

chassis contain only the essential propulsion, control and braking

systems. Passenger vehicles generally have four seats—facing backwards for safety purposes. Standing is not permitted on automated

transit s stems in Japan. Other passenger-carrying versions have

forward acing seats; two of the seats can be folded to provide space [

for a baby carriage or hand baggage. The following photograph

shows a CVS passenger vehicle manufactured by the Toyo Kogyo

CovLtd.

The cargo vehicles are designed witha capacity of300to 400kg

(660-880 pounds), and since the vehicleshaveno springs, they remain

level with the cargo platform. Three versions have been observed:

a flat-bed type with two conveyor belts built into the floor, a panel

truck type and apostal truck type.

?!

CVS Passenger Vehicle
The following

Guideway. _ --.-.

Stations- --------

Vehicles- --------

Speed- ----------

Headways.. ------

Braking ---------

Operations -------

253

System Characteristics

is a summary of the main CVS characteristics:

Steel “I’’ -beams for the running surface.

Steel sections for the guide groove containing controls and

power rails.

Dimensions: 2m (6.6 ft) wide, 0.8m (2.6 ft) deep.

Span: 20-30m (66-98 ft).

Maximum Grade: 10 percent.

Minimum Radius: 5m (16.4 ft).

Passenger or cargo,

Off-line.

Minimum spacing: IOOm (328 ft).

4 passengers (all seated).

Pneumatic rubber tires.

Propulsion: 200v AC motor.

Normal: 40 km/hr (24 mph).

High Speed: 60 km/hr (36 mph).

~%~;i~;m: 80 km/hr (48 mph).

Electric regenerative for high speeds—O.2 G.

Friction for low speeds—O.2 G and 0.5 G.

Emergency, explosive activated—2.O G.

Per lane: 3,600 veh/hr 14,400 seats/hr.

Entrained operations are contemplated with 20 to 30 passengers/train.

Program Schedule

The Higashimurayama project begain in 1971 and its basic design

was completed by the middle of 1972. In the autumn of the same year

the maintenance guideway and the first experimental vehicle were

completed. Basic driving tests under manual control commenced

shortly thereafter. In the spring of 1973 basic experiments with computer control began. The full length of guideway was constructed in

the autumn of 1973. At this time the second stage of experiments

began, including: computer control of several vehicles, operations for

passenger service at stations, control of automatic loading and unloading of freight containers, lane changing experiments and overtaking of vehicles at high speed.

Phase I of the Higashimurayama project will extend through the

spring of 1976. The objective during this phase is to accumulate

itemized basic experimental data. Condensed experiments will be

conducted to maximize the capability of vehicles to follow the guide

target. The system reliability including the reliability of mobile communications between the vehicle and the wayside computer. Phase I

is intended to prove the technical practicability of CVS through item

tests of components and subsystems.

Speed tests have been conducted at 60 km/hr (36 mph) and headways of five seconds have been consistently achieved at 20 to 30

km/hr (12 to 18 mph). No attempt has been made to test operations

at headways close to one second. To reduce risks to equipment and

vehicles, the short-headway tests will not be attempted until they

can be carried out safely, sometime during Phase II.

The second phase will last several years, starting in the spring of

1976. The urpose of Phase II is to conduct a total trial of the system,

with 60 ve icles operating on the test track under complete computer Fl
254

control. This phase will be primarily concerned with cargo operations,

and will not emphasize passenger transport. Reliable and consistent

one-second headways will be attempted with those vehicles designed

for such operations. Phase II will also incorporate mechanisms for

collision avoidance, obstacle detection/avoidance, and a 0.5 G

emergency braking system.

Observations

Those who have had an opportunity to visit Higashimurayama

generally have the following observations:

. The test facilities and scope of the experimental operations are

impressive.

● The three-tiered computer control system seems unnecessarily

complex. The Japanese claim it was no more difficult to design

the computer interfaces than a single computer system to do

all the necessary functions.

. Use of an explosive-actuated emergency brake to avoid a

catastrophic collision would produce a 2.0 G deceleration

force. While passengers face backwards on high-backed seats

to minimize the effect of such an instantaneous stop, there is

concern that injuries may still occur.

Project Management

The CVS Project is under the general direction of MITI and is

sponsored by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Machine Industry

(JSPMI). The Ministry has spent approximately $10 million to date

on the project, mostly for the test track and related facilities. JSPMI

channels funds derived from other industry associations to help fund

the project.

A consortium of eight private industrial firms share in the cost and

provide technical resources. These firms are:

TOyO Kog~o

Mitsubishi Jukogyo

Tokyo Shibaura Denki

Hitachi Seisakusho

Fugi~su

Sumltomo Denki Kogyo

Nippon Denki

Shm-Nihon Seitetsu

The CVS Project is managed by a team from Tokyo University

and MITI.

Other Japanese A(7T Systems.—Of the eight SLT or GRT systems

under development, three are based on United States Technology.

Two of these three systems—KRT (Boeing) and NTS (LTV)—are

pictured on the next pa e. Vehicles for the third system, Dashaveyor

(Bendix), have been sol but not shipped to Japan. The main features %

of all eight systems are summarized in Table 3.

Another transit system known as “Beltica” has been developed by

the Fuchu Worfis of Toshiba Electric Co. Ltd. A prototype system

with 400 meters (1,312 feet) of track and one vehicle has been built

and operated at the Toshiba plant. Vehicle capacity is 20 with five

seated and 15 standees. The vehicle is propelled by a continuously
255

moving rubber belt within vertical concrete guide rails. Both the car

and a belt on the passenger platform move at 1.5 mph for loading and

unloading. After leaving the station, the vehicle is accelerated to 15

mph by powered wheels in the guideway. Though no operator is on

board the vehicle, the moving-way technology employed as well as

the short distances (0.5 to 4 km, 0.3 to 2.4 mi) and high capacities

(40,000 passengers per hour) preclude further assessment as an AGT

system.

JAPANESE SLT/GRT VEHICLES

MAT

Mitsubishi

Heavy Industry,

Ltd., 32-Passenger

Vehicle

Ltd., 30 to 50- -

-

Passenger

Vehicle

ParaTran

Hitachi

40-Passenger

Vehicle
Table 3:FSATURSS OF mCH SYSTEM

.

.~—..——— ----- -

Item KGV N A T !4ini NOnorail NTS

Developet Kawasaki Heavy Ind, Nitr.ubishi iie~Vy Toshiba ,

Fuji Slectxic 18dusr.ry* Anzen Sakudo

Niigata Tekko,

Srmitcw S2ectric*

Cuideway Typ e Guiding at sidesGuiding in NOuating type, Guiding at sides

Hiddla Small mnorail

—.. . . ...— ———..

Paratran K R T VON A Oadraveyor

Hitachi TokyoKabeSteel,Nisho Nihon Sltaryo, Betrdixl

Sharyo Iwai TradiogPritsui Tradin g Oashaveyor

Guiding insideGuiding at Guiding in Guiding ● t

or rails sides middle sides

Development StageTest Track Tast Trac k Desig n

Test track Test track Licensing byTest track Teat track

(licensing by LTV) SOeing (Yazu Park Oper.) TrmspO 72

Scandard Capacit(1) y 50 (3) 22 50 (seats 20) K2

(2) 30

25-70

32

30

(k) 25

(8) 36 (meats 12)

(5) 25

(9)4-6(022mated)

4J I,xwxfl (m ) (1)9.1 %2.35X3.15 5.7x2.2x2. 9 (3i7.15x2.ti2.k 7.5x2.3x3. 4 7.0x2.2x3,1 5

(2)6.35x2.35x3.1 5 (4)4.5 x2.0x2.4

4.7x2.0x2. 7(6) 5.8x20.6x3.06 (8)7.2x2.2x3. 2

: (7) 5.3x2.D6x3.06

~:]5.~7:x2.0x2.4

(9)3.4x1.6x.1 7

~ .

$ Empty Height (ton(1) 8.5 )

(2) 4.5

6.4

(4) 3:8

5 . 5 3 . 9 (6) 5.5 or less (8) 6.5

rb.5-5.o (7) 5.0 or less

(5) 4.5

(9) 1.1

Tires ‘ 4 Rubber ‘Tires 1! Subber Tiree k Ribber Tires 4 rubber tires8 rubber tiresb robber tires 4 rubber tires 4 rubber tires

1

Voltag e 36AC 440/400v 3$ 55QV 36 AC 440/400V 36 AC 4401W3V M 4401400V (8) 4s.09

2

AC600V w 600V

* ‘i’taction NOtors(1) 50-65kwx 265kw 45 h

(9) : 480V

50-70KW

g

(2) 50-6W Xl

55U4 75P S 55K1.1 (8) 30 Ps x 2

(9) 15PSX2

mx. Speed (kmph/mph)

I

75145 60/3 6 60/3 6

1!

60/3 6 60/3 6 64J38 60/36 (8) 65139

: Nax. Crade (X ) 1 0

(9) 48129

!J Min. mmtiirtguadius #JW:6 10;:3 Wk9

10 1 0 10 10

(m/ft)

2518 2 30/9 8 (8) 23%

&

9/3 0 20/6 6

(9) 6/2 0

San Naterial I(m/ft) Steel or I Stee l Lox steel

Concret e

Concret e Concret e Steel or I - steel Concrete or

Standard Span 15/49 (m/ft) 15/49 20/66

comrrece

20/6 6 15f49

Stee l

1514 9 10-17/33-5 6 (8) 15149

1

$’ Poet Msterial Steel pipe or Steel pipe Stee l jhicrete

(9) 251S2

Steel pipe

concret e

Stee l

or concret e

Sceel pip e Steel or

or concret e

z Stitching Vertica l Krrtatittg (180” )Horizonta l bwitching blad e

concret e

Block type OrI Smrd TypIiorizontal e (8) Vertical

d

Switching Time (see) 3 6 8 3

Sving (9) Horizontal

4 1 . 2 5 (8) 4

(9) 1

,.

~ -

trol central, autmtic central, autmatic Central, automatic central, autc-

.# h Floating

central, autO -

6 Pleating

Central, auto- Central, automtic

u h Floating

Central, automati c

: Wt. 51eadway (see )

matic& floatinmtic&f20ating g matic6 t%rtiag& floating & floating

90 1 2 0 20

* *x. capacit y

9 0 10 9 0

(1) 28& 2 20,00 0 12,00 0 20,00 0 19,00 0

(8)15, (9) 5-8

16,00 0

(Pdhr) (2) 17,000

19,00 0 (8) 21,000

(9) 5,000

(l): KCV-12 *Mitsubishi Electri (1): front car c Woyo Elettric

Uotes: (2): KCV-13

(6): front car (8): CR’I

Mitsubishi Trading (2): middle car Sumitom Tradin g (7): follrminn (9): car PRT

(3): rsar car

I

tiurce: Hrodling Tomorrow’s Transportation Today: The Nev Transport.gt.cn System;

Japan Transportation Plannitts Association .
257

EXAMPLES OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY USED IN JAPAN

Test Track built by LTV Licensees, Niigata Engineering Co. and

Sumitomo Shoji Kaisha, Ltd.

Kobe Rapid Transit (KRT) System for Expo ’75 on Okinawa.

Built by Kobe Steel, Ltd. in cooperation with Boeing Aerospace Co.
Chapter 5: -Acquisition Procedures

The development and deployment of new transportation systems,

such as A GT, depend upon the institutional and financial procedures

available in the sponsoring countries. The days are long gone when a

priviate inventor or entrepreneur could muster enough cspital and

political license to build an innovative transportation system in the

expectation that fares would realize a profit on the scheme. The

success of transportation innovation depends on government involvement, industry incentives and institutional-political considerations

which establish the climate for innovation.

GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT

Policies and procedures adopted by federal and local governments

have a msjor effect on the realization of new system concepts. Policies

on sponsoring and funding, proprietary rights, contracting procedures

for both development and construction , and continuity of support

influence the outcome of such efforts. Government involvement can

set the pace for innovation or can interfere with attempts to do so.

SPONSORING AND FUNDING

Research and Development

The derision to sponsor and fund R & D for AGT systems development recognizes the need for transportation alternatives beyond the

capability of local governments or any one industrial compsny.

Federal goverm\nment financial involvement absorbs some or all of the

risks and provides an incentive for development of AGT alternatives.

The opportunities for exporting systems has also figured in decisions

to sponsor and fund AGT system development. CVS development in

Japan is under the general direction of the Ministry of International

Trade and Industry (MITT), not by the Ministries of Transportation

and Construction who would normally have responsibilities for

installations of such a system. In England, the Programmes Analysis

Unit, a joint unit of the Department of Industry and United Kingdom

Atomic Energy Authority, completed a study, in 1974 of the likely

export market for systems developed in the United Kingdom. Recent

endeavors to establish licensing agreements reinforce the idea that

foreign decisions to sponsor and fund AGT system development

recognize the potential world-wide export market.

In England, AGT hardware development has been 100 percent

funded by the Department of the Environment. The work has been

accomplished through the government research establishments in

the belief this procedure produces the most robust results. Functional

specifications for hardware performance have been drawn up by external consultants under contract to either local or national govern-

(259)

,.\. ,, ,) , , . ,
260

ment bodies. Propositions from the small companies can be presented

to the government and to the National Research and Development

Corporation for funding. No recent transit proposals have been

worthy of support by these means.

The French government uses a variety of techniques, many similar

to those employed in the United States, to stimulate industry and

university laboratories to engage in the research, development and

commercialization of new systems. Some techniques act directly.

Examples are loans, grants and reimbursable advances. Others have an

indirect effect, with examples being tax policies and measures to

stimulate the creation of private venture capital.

The following techniques are worthy of particular note because they

tire not presently practiced at all or to the same degree in the United

States.

Reimbursable Advances.—In the development stage of new systems,

when the developer must invest in expensive prototype hardware

and software, the government and the company enter into a sharedcost contract based upon the estimated total cost for the project.

Typically, the government agrees to provide a 50 percent cash advance,

payable periodically at pre-determined dates. The company agrees

to generate the balance during the term of the project in my form

accountable on the company’s books. The government allows the

company to possess the proprietary rights to the system and to

commercialize it; however, the company must agree to the following:

. To pay a royalty (typically about 2 percent) on the value, less

taxes, of each commercial sale of the system.

. To pay a royalty (typically as much as 30 percent) of royalties

received from third parties who sell the system under lcenses

from the company.

. To continue to pay royalties to the government until the

government’s cash advance, plus interest (at a rate established

in the contract), has been fully repaid,

If the first phase has gone well, and If the system prototype is in good

running order, the government will increase the share of financing for

subsequent phases.

Assistance to Inventors.—A special agency of the French government, the National Office for Dissemination of Research (ANVAR),

was established in July 1968 to stimulate invention. It provides several

kinds of assistance. It can make, for example, small financial advances

that me reimbursable in amounts and according to a schedule which is

a function of revenues from future sales. It can also establish a special

entity to assist the inventor in bringing the invention to the status of

commercial exploitation. In addition, it can make available up to a

maximum of 20 percent of the capital of an existing company to help

strengthen its capability to adopt the invention.

In contrast to practices in other countries, the Federal German

Ministry for Research and Technology has not ordered AGT developments, but pays 80 percent of the development costs. The remaining

20 percent must be borne by the developing companies. This costsharing is to the advantage of the government in that only those

projects are furthered which are liable to succeed but which are too

expensive for industry alone.
261

The sponsored development is carefully controlled by:

. Critical discussions in annual status seminaries, during which

the development team has to present their results and further

Planning in the presence of their competitors.

● independent experts.

● A project monitor, who controls critical cost, time and work

schedules.

The Ministry for Research and Technology, however, leaves the

entire power of decision and complete responsibility for the direction

of development to the developing industry. The Ministry neither

directly nor indirectly participates in the development and does not

give technical directions. In this way, the expenses of governmental

administration are minimized and the developing industry can react

very flexibly to altered circumstances.

Construction

Procedures for financing the construction of AGT systems also

vary among foreign countries. In Jap)an, the government (princi])all~’

the Ministry of Construction) could finance up to 50 percent of the

cost. This share would cover the fixed facilities considered part of the

road and street network. The source of these funds would be gasoline

tax relenues. The remaining costs would be divided between the local

government or municipality, and the operating agency. The operating

agency would collect revenues, meet operating? financing and depreciation costs, and retain any profits. The Ministry of Construction

appears to favor ownership and operation by a governmental agency.

The Ministry of Transportation seems to favor private owner

operations and is considering procedures whereby a private operator

could be loaned funds for system development and installation. After

acceptance test approval, the Ministry of Transportation would no

longer be involved in system operations.

Procedures are similar in West Germany, except that federal and

state (lander) governments would finance up to 80 percent of the fixed

facilities. The federal share would be 60 percent and the state would

provide 20 percent. The municipality would cover the remaining

20 percent of the fixed instillation and 100 percent of the vehicle

costs.

In France, the government can provide up to 50 percent of the

capital costs for public transport. Most important, it will finance

up to 70 percent if new technology systems are being introduced. A

law intro uced in July 1973 permits the local share to be derived from t

a salary’ tax imposed on emplo~-ers of more than nine people in an

urban area. with a population of more than 300,000. In special cases,

even smaller towns qllalify.

In the Unite(l King(lom, allocation of funds for the requisition of

a transit s~wtem is made through the Transportation Polic~- and Programme proced~we. Each ~“ear each county (state) prepares a document, the ‘‘TPP”, which states its policy intentions to allocate its

transport funds over the next five ~’ears. A district counci] and county

council would have to agree to i~corporate an AGT system for the

town in the TPP. The Secretary of State for the En~Tironment, on

the basis of the total set of TTPs submitted, and the amount of money

avadable, allocutes funds to the local governments through a Transport Supplementary Grant.
262

PROPRIETARY RIGHTS

Foreign governments differ with the United States government in

their treatment of data and patents considered proprietary by system

developers. Though foreign government funds are used to reduce

concepts to operating prototypes and to develop and test new systems,

the proprietary rights remain with the foreign private developer. In

France, even the prototype hardware and software belongs to the

company, except that if the company fails to achieve a commercial

success with the system, the prototypes may revert to the government. Furthermore, the government must wait at least 12 months

before releasing data or other information about the system to any

third parties and may be limited beyond 12 months from releasing

information considered to be company-confidential. In ,Japan, patent

rights stemming from CVS development are jointly owned by the

Japan Society for the Promotion of Machine Industry and the eight

participating enterprises.

In the United States, R & D accomplished with Federal funds

generally requires the relinquishment of proprietary rights. While the

specific requirements vary with contract negotiations, the general

implication is that United States developers are at a disadvantage in

terms of exploiting new developments. (This subject is discussed in

greater detail in Chapter 3, Volume 1).

CONTRACTING PROCEDURES

Research and Development

Foreign R & D depends to a greater degree on private initiatives

than it does in the United States. As mentioned above, initiatives for

AGT development in Germany originate with private industry. In

France, development occurs in collaboration with both a system supplier and another transport agency or government body. Sole-source

contracts are used extensively, but there are exceptions. The development of VAL, in conjunction with the new French town of Lille-Est,

responded to a competition based on a request for proposals initiated

by EPALE, the local public planning authority.

Sole-source development contracts arc considered advantageous in

that the costs of preparing competing proposals are eliminated. There

is believed to be a greater commitment to achieve company motivated

performance than to satisfy system specifications drawn up by others.

The disadvantages to sole-source contracts are that costs may not be

the lowest for comparable effort and potential sources may be excluded

from the development. Nevertheless, officials in England, France and

Germany consider that their present R & D programs embrace the

systems worthy of development.

AGT development procedures in England most nearly match those

in the United States. The Department of the Environment, which has

responsibility for transportation planning, construction and operations

in the United Kingdom, initiated development of the Minitram

system through a field agency, the Transport and Road Research

Laboratory, Competitive feasibility studies for hardware concepts

htive been undertaken. In addition, the laborator~~ has commissioned

detailed planning, engineering and operating feasibility studies for a
263

demonstration system in Sheffield. The resulting report, Minitram in

Shefield, was published in October ]974. The Department of the Environment must be satisfied with the technical feasibility of the project.

The Sheffield metropolitan District Council must decide whether to

participate in the demonstration project.

The practice of planning demonstration installations in parallel

with technical development is used in most foreign countries. This

procedure has not been commonly used in the United States. The main

advantages in the practice are that hardware development is conditioned by the realities of feasible deployment and planning is kept

pragmatic by the realities of achievable system designs. The disadvantagc is that technical development could be curtailed if city

officials disapprove a demonstration installation.

Construction

Actual construction of operating AGT systems abroad has not been

sufficient to assess differences in constructlon contracting procedures.

However, various procedures have been considered and the Panel on

International Developments considered it important to include a

discussion of the significant procedures in this report.

Public works contracts.-~lost public agencies prefer, or are

required by law, to acquire facilities through typical public works

contracting procedures. Under these procedures, plans and specifications are prepared for various elements of a transit system, competitively advertised and awarded to the lowest price, responsible,

and responsive bidder.

Tile public agency administers and inspects the construction and

installation as lt progresses.

ADVANTAGE S

The procedure is well-known; contract administration would

be straightforward.

Maximum competition could be achieved with some opportunities for small local contracting firms.

DISADVANTAGES

There is no standardization of AGT technology. Standardization would prematurely preclude competition among s~’stem

suppliers. The lack of standardization makes difficult the

engineering design and construction of fixed facilities through

public w’orks contracting procedures.

The guideways represent 50 to 70 percent of the cost of an

AGT installation. Separation of this clement and other fixed

facilities may- ]eavc a vehicle supplier with 10 to 20 percent

of the project funds, but with most of the exposure for success

or failure of the system.

Public agencies have little capability or experience in the

integration management of such a system. This service can

be performed by a consultant organization, hilt the illtimate

responsibility for the performance and satisfactory operation

of the system rests with the vehic]e supplier. however, uncler
264

typical public works contracting procedures the vehicle supplier

has virtually no authority over features that would interface

with the vehicle, such as: guideway configuration, power rails,

automatic control system.

Systems Integration Management.—Under this procedure the public

agency retains a non-hardware, consulting engineering organization,

to plan, design, and prepare bidding documents for the AGT installation. The consultant would be responsible for managing the integration

of all elements of the system, reviewing the technical adequacy and

prices of proposals, and would supervise the installation. The public

agency would control funds, advertise and award contracts.

●

●

●

●

●

●

ADVANTAGES

A qualified organization can provide special competence not

normally available in the public agency.

Interface problems are minimized and can readily be resolved

when they occur.

Maximum competition is preserved.

The technique has been successfully used in space, defense and

rail rapid transit programs.

DISADVANTAGES

The total project cost may be increased, but this cost is likely

to be far less than the overruns resulting from the lack of

integration management.

There are few non-hardware firms with extensive experience in

managing the installation of AGT systems.

A

Turn-Key Contracts. -Under these procedures, the public agency

would complete all preliminary engineering, including foundation

analyses, site surveying, locating underground utilities, right-of-way

acquisition, and make this data available m the bid-reformation

package. A system supplier is selected from competitive proposals

responsive to a performance specification, and would be responsible

for the final engineering, system integration management, construction, vehicle fabrication and pre-acceptance system testing. The system supplier is responsible and has authority for the scope of the

work—he is held accountable to a public agency for performance of

the system within agreed upon costs and time schedules.

●

●

●

●

ADVANTAGES

The vehicle supplier, with the greatest technical knowledge of

his system, has responsibility for satisfactory performance.

Competition among system suppliers is preserved, avoiding a

premature rejection of alternatives.

The vehicle supplier can make the most cost-effective tradeoffs on such features as ride comfort involving guideway roughness and vehicle suspension.

DISADVANTAGES

While there is competition among suppliers, and subcontracts

for certain features (guideways) could be competitively awarded,

other elements would be proprietary to the system and may

not be bid.
. This procedure can be

265

the most costly since the vehicle supplier is performing the integration management and would base

his profits and overhead on the total project cost.

• Most system suppliers have had only limited experience in

managing construction contracts.

CONTINUITY OF SUPPORT

A long-range commitment to a development project is necessary if

there is to be a reasonable chance for success. Appropriate check

points should be included in a development plan to review progress

and to determine whether to proceed or terminate, but these check

points may not coincide with the start-stop cycle of fiscal year appropriations. Continuity of support for development programs abroad

depends on the way some foreign governments are organized.

In Germany and Japan, technical development of AGT systems

tends to be separated from agencies having responsibility for construction and operation of revenue systems. The German Ministry for

Research and Technology undertakes development through test operations of prototype systems The Ministry of Transportation budgets

funds for urban demonstration and revenue installations. The Japanese

Ministry of International Trade and Industry manages the long-range

development of CVS while the Ministries of Construction and Transportation share responsibilities for installation and operation of available AGT systems. Such separations have the advantage in that

competition for resources to solve immediate transportation problems

is avoided, at least within one ministry. The arrangement has two

major disadvantages. Organizations responsible for the eventual

installation and operation of the new systems are not involved in their

development. Planning considerations may not be adequately addressed, unless parallel studies are undertaken, as described above.

The continuity of support is provided by other means. In Germany,

the Ministry for Research and Technology has established a program

through 1978 with a budget of 350-million DM ($125-million). Development of AGT systems is a major part of this program. In France,

the government’s current five year plan makes a commitment to commercial experiments with AGT systems in medium-sized towns. Grants

are available for R & D. This form of government planning and commitment has encouraged the early marriage of a system supplier and

local municipality described in Chapter 3.

I NDUSTRY I NCENTIVE S

Most foreign AGT system development has been initiated by private

industry. For many of the developers this endeavor was regarded as a

logical expansion of traditional transit supply activities or diversification from military and aerospace production. While governments

have encouraged AGT development, private firms were expected to

independently develop a potential product before government support

was made available.

For those industries which have taken the initiative in supporting

initial development and are willing to share costs up to system commercialization, a variety of incentives are available.
266

Costg sharing.—As discussed above, governments may reimburse

from 50 to 80 percent, or even 100 percent, of the development costs.

As the Krauss-Maffei experience with Transurban indicated, government support is not interminable. However, foreign developers can

expect consistent government cost sharing throughout the life of the

project. This practice contrasts with typica] United States procedures

which establish ceilings on the amount of financial support with no

relief from full contractual obligations.

Recouery of costs.—As is the practice with R & D procurement contracts in the United States, foreign development also requires the

payment of royalties to recover the government share of costs. However, these royalties may be reduced if a lower rate would help the

company win an export sale in a competition. Furthermore, the recovery of cost provisions are regarded as an incentive for commercialization. Government agencies in France, Germany. and Japan

actively participate in endeavors to achieve the commercial success of

systems at home and abroad.

Insurance against loss.—A technique used by France in other areas

of transportation which may be applied in the AGT market is a

government guarantee against loss in the marketplace. This protection

is made available to stimulate a company to invest in production

facilities and marketing activities when the product is socially desirable

but is risky to commercialize, In effect, the government guarantees the

company a minimum financial return sufficient to cover the company

break-even costs. The measure is the difference between actual sales

and the company’s break-even point if the actual sales generate a

lower value.

I NSTITUTIONAL AND P OLITICAL C ONSIDERATION S

There are differences in foreign institutional and political arrangements for sponsoring the acquisition of AGT systems which offer both

advantages and disadvantages in comparison with procedures in the

United States. Since there are no AGT installations abroad which

compare with those made in the United States it is too early to judge

the effectiveness of the foreign institutional and political arrangements. However, to the extent that United States practices are found

wanting, foreign procedures are worth~” of consideration.

COOPERATION BETWEEN SYSTEM MANUFACTURERS AN-D LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS

Concurrent system development and planning is fostered through

the close cooperation of manufacturers and local governments. System

developers in Germany and Japan have been involved in detailed

planning studies for the installation and operation of their systems.

This cooperation has aided the developer in defining development

requirements. It has also helped the public agency in evaluating

alternative solutions to local transportation problems. So far as is

known, this cooperation has not resulted in commitments for engineering design. or construction of an AGT installation in Germany.

In France, local governments are encouraged to initiate innovative

transit solutions. Contractual arrangements with a system supplier

define the scope of activities relatlve to planning and pricing the
267

installation. Negotiations lead to early decisions concerning the type

of system to be installed, the scope and staging of the project. Projects

which have national interest and are consistent with the government’s

five-year plan become eligible for financing from various ministries

having cognizance of land use, regional development, transportation

and public works. The project is managed by representatives from

these ministries in addition to officials from the local and regional

planning agencies and transit operating authorityo

The main advantage to early cooperation between supplier and

local government is that planning tends to be more pragmatic. The

system manufacturer becomes aware of performance requirements

which must be achieved through his development programs. Local

planners can incorporate specific system characteristics rather than

leave them unresolved until a final system choice is made. Early

involvement of a system supplier has other advantages. The cost of

preparing and evaluating competitive proposals is avoided. The

developer is encouraged to proceed with confidence that if there is to

be a commercial installation, it will be his, thus assuring a return on

his development investments. Government participation in the

project will underwrite the supplier’s development costs. One successful installation will enable a system supplier to write off costs for

preproduction engineering and tooling.

There are disadvantages to such a cooperative arrangement. System

selection may be based on entrepreneurial influence without an objective evalutaon of potentially- more competent systems. Without price

competition, obtaining the least costly installation becomes much

more difficult. If parallel development IS not successful, some planning

efforts could be wasted and installation would be delayed.

GOVERXIIENT-INDUSTRY COOPERATION

While llnprecedented in the United States, government-industr~’

ronsortia nre w-idel~” used thmughollt Europe and Japan as a means to

accomplish research nnd development an(l to penetrate the commercial

market. In German?’j L’abinentaxi development is being accomplished

throllgh a joint ventllre involving DE31ACI Forclertechnik and

31essers{:hrnitt-Bf) lko\~~-BlohIll GInbH. in Japan a consortitlm of

eight Pril’ate inC{11str

ie5, ~ tra(]e associiltion, tl~e ~~niversit~’ of ‘1’ok~’o

and the hl inistr~- of Int erntit ional Trade and Industrj- me cooperating

on the development, find the test facilities for tl~e Compllter-controlled

l’chicle S~wtem (L’JTS). The ~~inistr~ of Construction in Japan has

organized an ~llltolnateCl (]llal-nloc~ e blls developtnent group involving

17 private enterprises. The total cost of this latter pro~oect is estimated

at nbout $5.5 -nlillion; abotlt one-fourth of the cost WI1l be subsidized

by the l[inistr~’ of (.’onstr~lction.

While a consortium is clifficlllt to manage, the arrangement has

several advantages:

● The best talent of industr~ specialties can be concentrated on a

particular development project.

● ,Scarce resources, inc]uding personnel, capital and facilities, can

be conscr~’ed b~- aloiding competition between participants.

. Go ~“ernnlent expend it ures are reduced through cost sharing

with industrl-

.
26$

. Because the government is a participant, there is mutual

interest in commercialization of the product. Both the government and industry stand to get a return on the initial investments.

. To strengthen the price advantage of the consortium in an

initial foreign competition, the government can waive the

recovery of cost provisions for the industry participants.

These advantages, available to foreign AGT system developers, have placed United States manufacturers at a competitive

disadvantage.

GOVERNIIENT CORPORATION

Government corporations have been established for conducting

R & D and for managing the commercialization of results. In the

United Kingdom, the National Research and Development Corporation was set up by the government to invest in new technological

development with a responsibility for breakin even in its operation

“taking one year with another”. In July 1973, t e Province of Ontario, i

Canada, established an Urban Transportation Development Corporation (UTDC). Other provinces and the Canadian Federal government

are expected to become share-holders in this corporation.

The objectives of the Corporation are to:

. Acquire, develop, adapt, use and license patents, inventions,

desi ns and systems for all or any part of transit systems relate to public transportation and rights and interests therein i

or thereto.

. Encourage and assist in the creation, development and diversification of Canadian businesses, resources, properties and

research facilities related to public transportation.

. Undertake the design, development, construction, testing,

operation, manufacture and sale of all or any part of transit

systems related to public transportation.

. Test or operate and provide services and facilities for all or any

part of transit systems related to public transportation and in

connection therewith build, establish, maintain and operate, in

Ontario or elsewhere, alone or in conjunction with others, either

on its own behalf or as agent for others, all services and facilities

expedient or useful for such purposes, using and adapting any

improvement or invention for any means of public transG

ortation.

. . anufacture vehicles and control, propulsion and guideway

systems and their appurtenances and other instruments and plant

used in connection with transit systems related to public transportation as the Corporation may consider advisable and

acquire, purchase, sell, license or lease the same and rights

relating thereto, and build, establish, construct, acquire, lease,

maintain, operate, sell or let all or any part of transit systems

related to public transportation in Ontario or elsewhere.

. Carry on any other trade or business that, in the opinion of the

Board, can be carried on advantageously by the corporation in

connection with or as ancillary to the carrying out of the objectives of the Corporation set out above.
269

The goal of UTDC is to improve the quality of urban life through

innovations in transit. The company operates as a private, for-profit,

corporation with a management team and a board of directors representing a broad cross-section of private and public interests. Technical

and management staff within the corporation are directly engaged in

immediate and long-range development of transit concepts, products

and systems. In addition UTDC retains the assistance of consultants

from Canadian universities and industry.

In addition to the development and demonstration of an AGT system, UTDC has inaugurated development of a small bus and a light

rail vehicle. Originally designed for dial-a-bus service, the small bus is

being configured to accommodate handicapped persons in wheel

chairs. The light rail vehicle will incorporate the most modern technology available for Canadian operating requirements.

Establishment of the UTDC required the government to appropriate

a $6 million working fund and to delegate authority to enter mto specific kinds of contracts. Once estabhshed, the UTDC is expected to

proceed with developing and marketing new transportation systems,

depending upon the cash flow from these operations to preclude the

need for extensive additional government aid. This independence

provides continuity. to development programs since they are not subject to fluctuations m annual appropriations.
Chapter 6: Findings and Summary

Significant finding: from this assessment of foreign AGT develop-

. -- -merit

●

●

●

●

●

●

are summarized as follows:

Foreign technical developments are more ambitious than those in the

United States. Actual technical accomplishments are comparable at

present but foreign developments will surpass those in the United States

by 1979 if all present programs are carried out as planned.

No nation has an ideal organizational arrangement for the development and

deployment of AGT systems. France appears to use one of the best procedures but the lack of any actual revenue installations makes judgment

difficult at this time. All other countries, including the United States, have

a serious gap between programs to develop and test AGT systems and

programs to install and operate AGT systems in revenue service.

Foreign developments are focused on the solution of urban transportation

problems. There are no foreign deployments comparable to those in the

United States, but those being planned will provide transit in urban areas

in contrast to the highly specialized areas served by United States systems.

Foreign development procedures offer potential system suppliers many

advantages not available to United States developers.

Other institutional arrangements for the development and deployment of

AGT systems are worthy of consideration. Alternatives such as a national

development corporation or a consortium of cities and industries merit

serious consideration.

Licensing arrangements which export and import foreign technology are

Proliferating. Whether market expansion will make these agreements

‘worthwhile-remains to be seen. -

International developments of AGT systems are earnest. They are

focused on meeting anticipated deficiencies in existing transit systems

and providing alternatives to increasing dependence on the automobile

with its attendant problems of congestion and use of petroleum fuel.

Foreign developments also have an eye on a potential United States

market and within four years will be able to offer AGT systems more

attractive than an~’ under development in the United States at present.

SUMMARY

An assessment of foreign development can be summarized as follows:

. Technical development is comparable to that which has been

achieved in the United States. There are differences in specific

accomplishments:

The United States lags by about four years in the acquisition of test facilities comparable to those of the Japanese for

CVS or the Germans for Cabinentaxi. Howevert no foreign

deployments of AGT systems have been made which are comparable to the airport installations in Tampa, Sea~tle.-Tacoma,

and Dallas/Ft. Worth, or to Morgantown, West Vwgnua.

(271)
272

Development goals for the foreign systems are generally more

ambitious than those in the United States. For example:

Foreign United States

Headways. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 second and less. 3.0 seconds.

l-way line capacities 16,000 (maximum). 14,400 (maximum).

(seats per hour).

Velocities (miles per

hour):

Maximum. . . . . . . . . . 22.4 to 50. . . . . . . . . . 40 to 55.

Cruise.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.4 to 37. . . . . . . . . . 16 to 40.

The state-of-the-art in braking, propulsion and control technology is approximately the same for both United States and

foreign developments. Thus, there are less risks in achieving

the nited States goals than there are for the foreign programs. 6

● Differences in the way foreign governments are organized to

sponsor AGT system development offer both advantages and

disadvantages in comparison with United States procedures:

In Germany and Japan, technical development of AGT

systems tends to be separated from agencies having responsibility for construction and operation of revenue systems. This

separation has an advantage in that it tends to insure continuity

of development by avoiding competition for resources to solve

immediate transportation problems. Such separation has a

disadvantage in that system development tends to be aloof

from the problems of deployment. In both Germany and Japan,

the system developers have been involved in planning large

urban AGT networks. However, this planning has been more

concerned ~vith defining development efforts than with planning

the actual installatlon and operation of a system.

In France, AGT development has generally been initiated by

local governments in conjunction with a hardware supplier.

This arrangement leads to early decisions as to the type of

system to be incorporated in the local transportation improvement program. If the planned development is of national

interest, financial assistance can be made available from various

ministries having cognizance of land use, regional development,

transportation and public works. Representatives of local and

regional planning and operating agencies, in addition to representatives from these ministries, participate in management of

the project. One advantage to this arrangement is that planning

tends to be more pragmatic with early heavy involvement of a

specific system supplier. Another advantage is that market

uncertainties are reduced through commitments to a supplier

that his system, if any, will be installed. Once the hardware

decision is made, wasteful competition is eliminated. This arrangement has disadvantages. System selection may be based

on entrepreneurial prowess. Absence of price competition may

not produce the least costly installation. It is too early to

judge whether this management procedure offers the best

solutions to both the technical and implementation problems

of an AGT system.
273

AGT development procedures in England most nearly match

those in the United States. The one ministry having cognizance

of transportation planning, construction and operations is

sponsoring AGT development through a field laboratory. The

laboratory- has sponsored detailed planning studies for a

demonstration installation, but—as in the United States—the

city selected will have the final say as to whether it will host

the project. This procedure has the advantage of keeping a

focus on the realities of eventual deployment. The disadvantage

is that technical development may be truncated if a city

demonstration is not forthcoming.

● Deployments of AGT systems in the United States have been

in hlghll- specialized areas-parks, airports, commercial developments and a university campus. NO comparable instillations have been built overseas. As mentioned above, foreign

planning for large-scale networks has been associate(l wltb

definition of harware requirements. Planning for actual deplo~ment is limited to SLT or GRT systems of modest scope.

mle significant difference is that concrete planning for foreign

installations is predominantly for urban, rather than special

uses. Though installations at airports ancl medical centers are

contempltitecl, principal applications are as follows:

~ew towns or residential complexes near existing cities would

be served with SLT or GRT s~-stems to provide some internal

service and to connect these towns to existing rail lines in the

adjacent cit,~-.

,Sorne existing older t owms have experienced population

growth tind increased automobile usage. ll~here the resulting

traffic congestion and decline in transit usage is not readil~~

correctable b~” conventional means, national governments have

encour~gecl innovation with AGT systems. Either SLT or

GRT s]:stems would augment existing transit service and open

up possibilities for auto-free, pedestrian malls served b~- the

new transit s~-stem.

Q Foreign ;}-stem developers frequently have an advantage over

their Umted States counterparts. Preelection through noncompetitive procedures is common (France). Consortia of several

industries are fostered b~” the national governments to develop

~~ particular concept (Germtin~’ and Japan). Private capital ma~-

sponsor research and development through the concept stage.

If the concept is found attractive, the government can offer

nltin~” incentives for protot)pe development and testing, including:

Cost sharing with a 50 percent cash advance.

Compan~’ retention of proprietary rights for commercialization with payment of modest royalties.

Companyt retention of hardware, software and data rights.

Government financial support for a local development and

demonstration project virtuall~~ insures the company against

losses for investments in production facilities and engmeerin~.

This insurance is a strong incentive for a developer to explolt

his system commercially. Successful commercialization is an

advantage to the government since royalties are paid to the

government until the initial cash advances, with interest, are
274

fully repaid. Thus, the government is motivated to encourage

adoption of new systems to secure a return of the investment

in the initial development.

. Other institutional arrangements for developing AGT systems

are worth noting.

The Ontario government in Canada has established an Urban

Transportation Development Corporation (UTDC). The Canadian government, as well as other provincial governments, me

expected to participate in the development programs. The role

of this corporation is to:

Coordinate and promote the development of advanced

technology of all types relating to public transit and to

integrate this development with the design and production

of conventional transit facilities.

Fund research in transit innovations in intermediate

capacity systems and others.

Market systems through the private sector in Ontario

and Canada.

Under the Government of Ontario, the UTDC has authority

to:

Acquire and hold license rights for Canadian and foreign

developments pursuant to contracts for present and future

related technology.

Retain patents and industrial property for system applications in Canada.

Develop an export market from which it would receive

a percentage of royalty income.

Sublicense companies in Canada for the manufacture

and sale of complete transit systems, subsystems, and

components.

Establishment of the UTDC required the government to

appropriate a $6-million working fund and to delegate authority

to enter into specific kinds of contracts. Once established, the

UTDC is expected to proceed with developing and marketing

systems, such as AGT, depending upon the cash flow from these

operations to preclude the need for extensive additional government aid. This independence provides continuity to development programs since they are not subject to fluctuations in

annual appropriations. There are precedents in the United

States for similar institutional arrangements in the establishment of the Communications Satellite Corporation and passage

of the Solar Heating and Cooling Demonstration Act of 1974.

Institutional arrangements used in Japan for development

of CVS are somewhat more complex. The project is under the

general direction of the Ministry of International Trade and

Industry (MITI), which provided the test facilities at Japan’s

first automobile proving grounds in Higashimuryama, Tokyo.

Sponsorship is provided by the Japan Society for the Promotion

of Machine Industry. This society channels funds derived from

other industry associations to finance the development project.

A consortium of eight industries share in the cost and provide

technical resources. A team from Tokyo University and MITI

comprise the management of the CVS project. This approach,

using management by committees, has produced some significant results:
275

In six years, the most ambitious PRT development

program in the world has progressed from conceptual

planning to a sophisticated test program involving 60

vehicles and 4.8 km of test track.

Government expenditures on the development have been

less than $10 million to date. However, arrangements

between three responsible Ministries (International Tracie

and Industry, Construction, and Transportation) have yet

to be devised which will make a revenue installation

possible.

. World-wide interest in AGT systems has produced several

international licensing arrangements.

Three United States companies have licensing agreements

with Japanese organizations. (LTV) Aerospace corporation, the

Boeing Company, find the Bendix Aerospace Corporation.)

The otis Transportation Technology Division has an understanding with SOCEA, an engineering and construction subsidiary of Saint Gobain-Pent a’ Mousson to plan and build an

AGT system in Nancy, France.

Kralws-hIaffei of Munich, Germany, has a licensing agreement with the Urban Transportation Development Corporation, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.

LTV)’ and their French licensee, C0MSIP Enterprise, jointly

bid a variation of the AIRTRANS system for the new Charles

de Gaulle Airport.

Several United States companies are pursuing licensing agreements with European developers. Both European and Japanese

developers are actively seeking United States licensees. W’hether

the AGT market will materialize in a way that could make these

licenses profitable remains to be seen.
APPENDIX A

BIOGRAPHIES

M EMBERS OF THE P ANEL ON INTERNATIONAL D EVELOPMENT S

H. Wm. Merritt, Chairman

Transportation Consultant

Arlington, Virginia

H. Wm. Merritt directed the Study of New Systems of Urban Transportation

for HUD in 1967–1968. Until 1973 he was the Associate Administrator for Research and the Director, Special Projects, in UMTA. Since 1973, he has consulted on urban transportation plannin ,

#

engineering, and energy conservation.

Mr. Merritt chairs a task force of the ational Academy of Sciences which publishes a Newsletter on New Concepts of Urban Transportation.

Robert A. Burco, President

Public Policy Research Associates

Berkeley, California

Robert A. Burco specializes in urban transportation system evaluation, institutional aspects of planning and public policy and technology assessment. In

1971–1972 he assessed innovations in urban transit in Europe, North America and

Japan for OECD. Mr. Burco authorized the 1968 SRI report on impacts of future

urban transportation systems. He is a member of the OTA Urban Mass Transit

Advisory Panel and the NAS Transportation Research Board.

Thomas H. Floyd, Jr.

Vice President DGA International

}1’ashington, D,C.

Mr. Floyd is currently involved in the transfer of European technology and

industrial innovations to the United States, specializing in ground transportation.

Prior to his association with I)GA International in 1969, Mr. Floyd was the director of research project management in the Urban Mass Transportation Administration. In this capacity, he was responsible for the planning and management of

research, development and demonstration programs.

Howard R. Ross

Transportation Consultant

Menlo Park, California

Mr. Ross has worked in the urban transportation field for over ten years, and 4

h= specialized in problems of advanced technology systems. since lgi’1, he has

headed a consulting firm dealing with system design and analysis, technolog~”

forecasting, transportation planning, financial studies and economic analyses

for urban transit systems. Mr. Ross was a founder of Transportation Technology

Incorporated in 1968, and prior to that was at Stanford Research Institute.

(277)
APPENDIX B

INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The panel gratefully acknowledges information on international developments

provided by the following individuals:

JAPAN

Mr. Takuji Masuda, Policy Planning Officer (Urban Traffic), Minister’s

Secretariat, Ministry of Transport.

Mr. Kazuhiro Sate, Social Systems Development Office, Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

Mr. Shuichi Sate, Policy Planning Officer, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry

of Construction.

Dr.-Engr. Masakazu Iguchi, Dean, Department of hlechanical Engineering,

The University of Tokyo.

CANADA

Mr. John D. Hedge, Vice President Research and Development, Urban Transportation Development Corporation; Toronto, Ontario.

ENGLAND

Mr. D. J. Lyons, Director General of Research, Department of the Environment.

Mr. F. C. Munns, Division Director, Department of Trade and Industry.

FRANCI;

Mr. Claude Collet, Director of Ground Transport, Ministry of Transportation.

Mr. Michel Frybourg, Director, Transportation Research Institute.

W EST G ERMANY

Dr.-Eng. Herman Zemlin, Federal Ministry for Research and Technology.

Dipl-Kfm G. von Lieres u. Wilkau, Manager External Relations, Messerschrnitt -

Bolkow-Blohm.

(279)
1.

2.

3.

4.

,,

:.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

1!5.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

APPENDIX C

BIBLIOGRAPHY—INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

L~near Motor Patents—Chronology of Patent Numbers and Inventors;

Extract from Garrett Airesearch Report: “Study of the Linear-Induction

Nfotor and Its Feasibility for High-Speed Ground Transportation ;“

June 1967 (Furnished by Matthew Guarino, Jr., FRA– DOT).

Systems Innovations for Urban Transportation; Robert A. Burco and Clark

D. Henderson; Transportation Engineering Journal, Proceedings of the

American Society of Civil Engineers; hlay 1971.

~on~p~~ter-ControZ/ed ~7eh~cle System (07

S); Japan Society for the Promotion

of Llnchine Industry, Tokyo, Japan; .4pril 1972.

A A’ew Urban TrajEc System—Cl”S; Japan Society for the Promotion of

JIachinc Industry, Tok~’o, Japan; May 1972.

Cab~nentaxi; Hagen Project Planning Summar~”, DeMag-MBB; June 1972.

An Urban Transportation Policy jor Ontario; Statement by the Honorable

Jf’illiarn G. Davis, Premier of Ontario; 22 No\-ember 1972.

International Act~tIzly in Personal Rapid Transit Development and Assessment;

Robert .4. Burco; IIighway Research Record, No. 427, ,52d Annual Meeting; 1973.

Cabinentazi; De-Mag-MBB, Progress Report.; May 1973.

Remarks to the Roads and Transportation Association oj Canada, The Honournble W’illiarn G. Da}’is, Premier of Ontario; 11 illay 1973.

The Ontario Transportation Deue[opment Corporation Acf, 1.975’, Statutes of

Ontario, Chapter 66; JUIV 1973.

Cabinentaxi-Urban Transit System, System Description, DeMag-MBB;

.4ugust 1973.

New Modes of Transporf; Fichier Technique; .\linistry of Transport, Director

of Ground ‘Transport, Economic Study C,roup; September 1973 (In French).

Japanese Deueloprnent of Computer-Controlled I’chicle System; Two Reports

from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, to the Department of State; 30 October

1973 and 19 December 1973 (Furnished by llyron B. Kratzer, Counselor

for Scientific and Technological Affairs, 2.5 February 1975).

Preliminary Reporf on Station C’o~l$quration and Dimensions for the Go-Urban

Transit kysfem; P. M. IInlton and J. J. IIajek, Ministry of Transportation

and Communication<, Ontario; l)ecember 1973.

Lea Transit Compendium, Moving Way Transit, Vol. 1, No. l?; N. D. Lea Transportation Research Corporation; 1974.

Lea Transit Compendium, Personal Rapid Transit, Vol. 1, No. 4; N. D. Lea

Transportation Research Corporation; 1974.

New Concepts in Urban Transportation, Newsletter, Transportation Research

Board, National Research Council; 1974.

The Likely Export Market for L’. h”. Automated Personal Rapid Transit Systems

(F’RTs); Programmed Analysis Unit (A Joint Unit of the Department of

Industry and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority) ; 1974 (Transmitted by Frank C. Tfunn:, 1)01, on 21 February 1975).

Intermediate Capacity Transzt-Ontario’s Program; Research and DeI’elopment Di\rision, Ontario Ministr~’ of Transportation and Communications;

February 1974.

The A’ew Transportation System; Japan Transportation Planning Association;

V’ndated, transmitted February 1974; (Translated for the Bendix Aerospace Corporation).

PRT/GRT—Development in Personal Rapid Transit; Brian Richards; AD;

March 1974.

The Financernent oaf New Transport Modes in France for 1965 to 1973; Ministry

of Land Management, Equipment and Transports, Director of Ground

Transport Economic Study Group; April 1974 (In French).

Go- L’rban and the Transit Demonstration System; K. W. Foley, president,

Ontario Transportation Development Corporation; 9 April 1974.

(281)
9Q9

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

A U a

Ontario’s Approach to Personalized Rapid Transit; Address by K. W. Foley,

President, Ontario Transportation Development Corporation; 6 May 1974.

Integrated Linear Electric Motor Propulsion Systems for High Speed Transportation; Matthew Guarino, Jr., FRA; Conference on Linear Electric

Motors and High Speed Electric Propulsion, International Symposium on

Linear Electric Motors; 15 May 1974, Lyon; 16-17 May 1974, Grenoble,

France.

Corporate Report—1973; The Ontario Transportation Development Corporation, Toronto, Ontario, Canada; 30 May 1974.

The Urban Transportation Development Corporation and Its Impact on the

Canadian Transit Industry; Address by K. W. Foley-, President, Urban

Transportation Development Corporation; 25 June 1974.

Rapid Transit in French Provincial Cities; Railway Gazette International;

July 1974.

Status of Some European Advanced Transportation System Developments and

the IFAC/IFIP/IFORS Z%d World Symposium on Trafic Control and Transportation Systems (Trip Report); Duncan MacKinnon, Chief, Advanced

Development Branch, UMTA-DOT; 31 October 1974.

H. Bahn, Siemens (Color Brochure Describing the H. Bahn System-in

German) ; Undated, transmitted November 1974.

Transportation Concepts for the Future—Some Practical Considerations; Address by R. M. Soberman, Vice President—Planning, Ontnrio Trm-q>ortation Development Corporation; 5 November 1974.

Developments in New 15’rban Transport Systems in Western Europe; J. Edward

Anderson, Uni\’ersity of Minnesota; 7 November 1974.

Go-Urban Intermediate Capacity Transit System Program; Statement by The

Honorable John Rhodes, Minister of Transportation and Communications, Ontario; 13 November 1974.

Public Policy and the Urban Transportation Problem; Address by K. JV. Folev,

President, Ontario Transportation Development Corporation; 20 No\’ember 1974.

Urban Transportation Development Corporation; Joint Statement by The

Honorable Alastair W. Gilles ie, Minister of Industry, Trade and Conlmerce, and The Honorable laude Bennett, Minister of Industry and 8

Tourism of the Ontario Governrncnt; 29 November 1974.

Transurban; Krauss-Maffei (Two Color Brochures—in English—Describing

the Transurban System); No dates, transmitted December 1974.

The VEC Urban Transport System; SAVEC, Route Nationale 10, Coigniercs,

78310 Mnurepas; 1 December 1974 (In French).

Toshiba “Beltica” Personal L’rban Rapid Transit System; U.S. Embassy,

Tokyo, Japan ; Report to the Department of State; Dated 31 December

1974; Transmitted 7 January 1975 (Provided by Myron B. Kratzer,

Counselor for Scientific and Technological Affairs, 24 February 1975).

Choices for the Futwre-Summary Report; Metropolitan Toronto Transportation Plan Review-Report No. 64; Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto,

Toronto Transit Commission, Ministry of Transportation and Communicat~ons, Ontario; January 1975.

Trtp Report to Japan-November 1–14, 1974; Steven A Barsony, UMTA–

DOT; 10 January 1975.

Correspondence jrorn Thomas H. Floyd, Jr., DGA International; Status and

Description of European AGT Systems; 17 January 1975.

42. Correspondence from Thomas H. Floyd, Jr., DGA International; Descriptions

of Go~’ernment Fjnancing in France; 30 January 1975.

43. Research and Development in the Field of Urban Transportation in the Federal

Republic oj Germany from the Governmental Point ojView; Dr.-Ing. H. Zemlin,

Federal Mininstry for Research and Technology; (Abstract of a Paper

To be Presented at Denver PRT Conference, 17-19 September 1975);

Undated.

44. Transit Development in Europe; Mortimer L. Downey, Port Authority of

New York and New Jersey; Report on Trip to Europe in 1974 with the

Carnegie-Mellon Professional Program; February 1975.

45. Plans for Deployment of Advanced Transit Systems in Europe and Japan;

Howard R. Ross Associates; 10 Feburary 1975.

46. Criteria Taken as a Basis jor Decisions by the Management of the German

Cabinentaxi Development Project: Dr. K. Becker; DeMag, Fordertechnik;

14 February 1!375; (Abstract of a Paper To Be Presented at Denver PRT

Conference, 17-19 September 1974).
283

47. Correspondence from Masakazu Iguchi, Department of Mechanical Engineering,

University of Tokyo, Japan; Response to Questionnaire; 21 February 1975:

(Translated and Transmitted by Akira Yamashita, CVS International,

Inc., on 26 February 197.5).

48. Correspondence from John D. Hedge, Vice President, Research and Development,

Urban Transportation Development Corporation, Toronto, Ontario, Canada;

Response to Questionnaire of 21 February 1975; 25 February 1975.

49. Correspondence from K. P. Fletcher, Transit 70’s; Report on Trip to Europe,

21 January to 14 February 1975, covering visits to major transit installations

at 32 cities in the Netherlands, Belguim, Switzerland and West German;

26 February 1975.

50. Correspondence from Shuichi Sate, Senior Policy Manning Officer, Ministry

of Construction; Response to Questionnaire; 3 March 1975.

51. Correspondence from Richard F. Daley, Director of Marketing, Raytheon Company, Lexington, Mass.; Report of trip with motion pictures to MBB

facilities, Munich, Germany, on 10–11 October 1974; 4 March 1975.

52. ARAMIS; MATRA (Color Brochure Describing the ARAMIS System-in

French) ; Undated, transmitted 5 March 1975.

53. Correspondence from Claude Collet, Director of Ground Transport, Ministry of

Transport, Paris, France; Subject: Transmission of Manufacturers’ Brochures and reports from the Division of Economic Studies; 5 March 1975.

54. Correspondence from Gert v. Lieres, Manager, External Relations, Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm; Subject: Response to technical questions; 5 March

197.5.

55. POMA 2000; Creusot-Loir\ Entreprises Pomagalski S.A. (Color Brochure in

French describing the POMA 2000) ; Undated, transmitted 5 March 1975.

56. VAL; MATRA, CIMT, CEM (Color Brochure in French describing the VAL

System); Undated, transmitted 5 March 1975.

57. DuBoise, Mike-Consultant to LTV Aerospace Corporation; Personal Communications on: VEC, Cytec Development, Inc.; Charles de Gaulle Airport

for AirTrans in Conjunction with ComSip Enterprises; Transmitted 10

March 1975.

58. Correspondence from Georges Dobias, L’ Adjoint au Directeur des Transports

Terrestres, Ministry of Transport, Paris, France; Response to Questionnaire;

11 March 1975.

59. Urban Transportation-.4nother Alternative, a World-Wide Survey of Light

Rail Technology; Stewart F. Taylor, The Heritage Foundation, Inc.; 1974.

60. Rapid Transit Automation and The Last Crew Member; Dr. Vukan R. Vuchic;

The Railway Gazette International; October, 1973.

61. New Transit Technologies: An objective Analysis is Overdue; Vukan R. Vuchic

and Richard M. Stanger; The Railway Gazette International; October,

1974.

—

62. The Automobile Abroad: Characteristics and Causes; Cris Hornig; Transportation Systems Center Cambridge, Mass.; September, 1973.

63. Correspondence from D. J. Lyons, The Director-General of Research, Department of the Environment, London, England; Response to Questionnaire;

9 April 1975.

64. Moving People in Cities; Transport and Road Research Laboratory Suppletary Report 6 UC on a Conference held at Crowthrne, England on 5 and 6

April 1973; Papers prepared by Dr. J. W. Fitchie and Dr. M. H. L. W’aters.
REPORT OF THE PANEL ON ECONOMICS

Prepared for the Office

PANEL

of Technology

MEMBERS

Lyle C. Fitch, Chairman

J. Edward Anderson

Thomas B. Deen

Paul K. Dygert

Aaron J. Gellman

Charles Hickox

Douglas B. Lee

Sumner Myers

Assessment
— — -

CONTENT S

Introduction. -------------------- -------------------- -------------

Chapter 1: Changing Transportation Needs ------------------- ---------

Population Shiftsin Urban Areas -------------------- --------------

Demand for Transit by Individuals ------------- ----------------

Chapter2: Demand for Transit Service of State and Local Jurisdictions--

Ability and Willingness To Finance Transit Innovation and

Development -------------------- --------------- _ ---- _ ------

State and Local Government Transit Support___ _ _ - _ - ___ ----- _ - _ --

Demand for Federal Financial Assistance-_ _ --- _ ---- _ _ _ _______ - _ --

Magnitude of Potential Transit Needs- ----- _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ ---- _ _ ----

Comparative Costs of Transit Modes_ - _ - _ _ - _ - _ - _ --- _ - ___ - _ --- ___

Range of Tradeoffs between Automation and Labor ----- ------ _ _ _ --

Costs of Automated Guideway and PRT Systems- ----- _ _ ---- _ -- _ _

Other Questions About PRT--- _- ___ _____ - ____ ------- ------- -----

Chapter 3: Justification for Transit Research and Development_ - _ --- _ - _

R & D Expenditures in the United States_ - _ _ _ ---- _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ - _ --- _

Considerations Bearing on Transit R & D.. - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _

Chapter 4: Suggestions and Recomnlendations _ - _ _ _ _ _ -- _ _ _ _ -- _ _ _ - _ _ _ --

General R & D Policy _________ ____ _____ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ -- _ _ _ _ -- _ _ _ _

Suggestions for Transit Research hlanagement_ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

Broader Views of Transit Functions _____ -- _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ --- _ - _ _ _

Specific. I~ong-Term Objectives- - --- –- - – -- ----- --------------

Increasing Incentive for Suppliers _ _ _ _ - _ _ --- _ - _ _ -- _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _

Specific :ltions.. - --- _ _ _ – _ _- _ _ _ _ - _ - _- _ -------------------- ----

I)eployment Demonstrations- -- _ -. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Incremental Building_ - _ -- ___ --- _ - _ --- _ - _ - _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _

Continue and 1~;xpand Present Systems _____ - _ - ---- - _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ -

Personal Rapid Transit- ---. _ ---- ___ -- _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ --

Appendix: Composition of the Panel on Economics- ---------- _ - _ ------

(287)

Page

289

291

291

295

301

301

302

303

304

305

307

309

311

315

315

315

319

319

320

320

321

321

321

322

322

322

322

323
Introduction

A high level of dissatisfaction with urban transportation is indicated

by the growing interest in maintaining, improving and expanding systems, despite the precipitous decline in transit 1 usage over the past

two decades. That interest is demonstrated by the increasing number

of communities which are subsidizing transit out of general tax funds,

and the number which are giving serious consideration to installing

fixed .guideway systems or otherwise expanding transit to something

more than buses traveling in mixed traffic.

The dissatisfaction stems from both the disadvantages of present

private automobiles and the deficiencies of existing transit.

Auto disadvantages include high capital and operating costs, the

large amounts of space required for movement and parking,2 contribution to the nation’s air pollution (50 percent or more of the total), and

(of recent special concern) high energy requirements, accounting for

about 50 percent of the nation’s petroleum consumption. Typically,

congestion in urban places increases as automobiles use increases, but

attempts to relieve congestion by building more roadways, at progressively higher costs, only promote still more auto travel and a new

round of congestion .

3 The other main complaint against private automobile transportation is its failure to serve those who cannot afford

automobiles or who, for reason of age or physical condition, cannot

drive.

Meanwhile, it becomes increasingly apparent that existing transit

forms are not suitable for the emergmg requirements of many urban

areas. The two principal proven technologies available are heavy,

large-volume rail transit and buses operating either in mixed traffic

or on exclusive rights-of -what~. In addition there is “light rail transit, ”

the trolley car, or adaptations thereof, which is still being used in

several American cities and in many European cities.

Heavy rail hardware still leaves someth!ng to be desired, as is

shown by the long record of problems with the BART system in the

San Francisco Bay Area. Even more serious, recent cost estimates of

the new systems indicate that their full average long-run costs per

passenger mile may be higher than the comparable costs of private

automobile transportation. If this is so, there are two implications.

First, the main rationale for building a heavy rail transit system must

rest on any indirect cost advantages it, may have over private automobiles, such as lower pollution, lower fuel consumption per passenger,

and less diversion of land from other purposes. Second, there is a

great need for lower cost, more adaptable, fixed guideway technology.

An even more basic problem lies in the fact that large rail systemssix now existing, one under construction (Washington, D.C, area),

and two which have recently broken ground (Atlanta and Baltimore),

I Transit here means public tramfl—mass transportation facilities available to the general public. Transit

rides per year declined from approximately 17.2’ billion in 19i50 to 9.4 billion in 19M to 6.7 billion in 1573. The

annual rate of decline in 1950-1973 was about 4 percent in both periods. Between 1960 and 1970, the proportion

of the labor force going to work by automobile rose from M percent to 78 percent. The proportion using rail

transit fell from 3.8 percent to 3 peccent, and bus, 8 percent to fi.s percent (American Transit Association,

reported in the United States Statistical Abstract, 1974, Table 949).

Z De ending on assumptions concerning the average number of p~engers per vehicle, the average journeyto-wor at about 20 mph requires by automobile roughly six to ! 4fI times M much road space per personas by

transit bus, and 10 to 90 times as much road space aS travel by multiple-unit rail car. The differentials are

even greater at higher speeds. Lyle C. Fitch and Amciatcs, ~rr~an ~anuport~ion and Public POUCU (Chandler Publishing Company, 1964, p. 14).

3 Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that street networks and access roadways of already built-uP communities cannot be readily enlarged to handle the increasing volumes of traffic generated by arterials.

(289)
290

have been designed primarily to carry passengers from residential

suburbs to concentrated central business districts. Population and

employment in most of the larger central cities have been declining

recently, so that this function promises to be decreasingly important.

Also rapid rail transit does not meet the needs of central city residents

who commute, or might commute, to dispersed places of employment

either in or outside central cities.

Buses have also suffered from design deficiencies, though desi n

improvements are appearing. Buses in mixed traffic are slowed yE

traffic congestion, and by loading-unloading delays. Exclusive rightsof-way enable faster service, but right-of-way requirements for buses

are greater than for automatically guided vehicles of the same width.

The necessity of a driver for each vehicle is a major cost.

For suburban transportation needs, nothing has appeared which

meets the need for random access as well as the private motor vehicle,

although special services have developed to meet special needs:

school buses, commuter buses and trains for channelized, mostly

journey-to-work, movement.

Light rail systems (LRV) still remain in a few American cities,

operating essentially as streetcars, competing with buses and auto

traffic on the same roadways. UMTA’S Standard Light Rail Vehicle

(SLRV) program will provide modern versions of the time-honored

streetcar for San Francisco, Boston and other cities considering

such equipment. It is possible some of the innovations being introduced

in European cities by LRV systems may be employed in various ways

as means of bridging the gap between rapid rail and buses and automobiles, following innovations already induced in several European

cities.

Suburban taxi service tends to be erratic and expensive. Fares and

regulations are usually designed to further the monopolistic positions

of the politically potent taxi interests rather than to promote competition in the interests of the riding public. An exception is the D.C.

taxi system, which is one of the cheapest in the country and indicates

some of the possibilities of competitive taxi service.

Dial-a-ride systems are proving moderately successful in some communities, providing a service with fares somewhere between taxis and

buses, but usually requiring substantial public subsidies. Jitneys,

which still might perform a useful function, have long since been

driven out of existence in most areas by a combination of taxi and

transit interests.4

The need in urban transportation, therfore, is not only for new and

improved technologies per se but also for concepts of systems which

can serve unmet needs of the kinds described above, which can fit into

already developed areas and into new urban communities, and which

are financially and administratively feasible.

Personal rapid transit, its advocates claim, can meet such criteria.

If so, it holds out great promise for improving intra-urban transportation, the convenience of urban living, and the quality of the urban

environment. 5

~ Regulatory commissions, which purpose to regulate the various modes, have little concern with quality

of service or with encouraging technological innovation or with adapting existing services, such as bus routes,

to changing needs and demands.

5 Definition of PRT. P RT here refers to a svstem of small automated vehicles which travel on exclusive

guideways and are designed to carry one Per;on, or a small group of people traveling together by choice,

from orfgin to destination without intermediate stops.

PRT is essentially a metropolitan-scale concept in that it would link all parts of a metropolitan area instead of linking only central cities to suburbs—the essential function of presentday rail and express bus

intra-urban transit systems. PRT service thus would approach more closely the level of automobile service

than do present transit services.
Chapter 1: Changing Transportation Needs

POPULATION SHIFTS iN URBAN AREAS

In the postwar period, central cities have been losing much of the

manufacturing and other goods-handling activities which historically

concentrated in cities. The reasons stem largely from the development

of private motor vehicle transportation; these activities have gravitated to the periphery where land is cheaper, congestion less, and taxes

lower. Older central cities which attained the status of national or

regional capitals have continued, until recently, to provide a congenial

climate for certain specialized manufacturing, cultural, recreational,

and educational functions and, most notably, corporate and management functions and their attendant services. Office industries became

the predominant economic activity of the large central cities. Central

cities which were not management centers have tended to decline

throughout the postwar period.

Middle-class white collar workers who man the office industries

have been leaving central cities for residences in the suburbs. This

exodus has reached flood tide. Table 1 reveals what has been happening in the 1960s and 1970s.

In brief, in the 1960s central cities of all United States metropolitan areas gained 3.3 million blacks and 19,000 whites; suburbs

gained 14.7 million whites and 0.8 million blacks; the numbers of

blacks and whites locating in metropolitan areas were respectively 109

percent of the total black population increase 1 and 78 percent of the

white population increase.

In the period 1970-1973, central cities lost 2.2 million whites and

121,000 blacks; 139 percent of the black population increase, but only

3 percent of the white population increase, located in metropolitan

areas.

One of the most striking developments is the fact that in 1970–1973

the increase in the number of white residents of the country’s metropolitan areas dwindled to near zero, in contrast to the 1960’s when

78 percent of the white increase located in metropolitan areas.

A large proportion of the white increase apparently has located in

rural areas; 2

some of it is probably in exurban counties outside the

existing SMAS and ma~’ be commuting to work in the SNIAS.

In the 1960s there was no net central city-to-suburban white shift

for all metropolitan areas, though the central cities of the 24 largest

metropolitan areas lost approximately 2 million whites who were

replaced by an equivalent number of blacks.

1 The fact that the numher of blacks locating in metropolitan areas was 9 percent greater than the total

population increase is explained by the migration from non-metrowlitan areas to metropolitan areas.

~ U.S. Bureau of the Census, Mobility ojthe Population of the L’nited States, March 1970-M6rch 1974, Current

Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 273.

(291)

54- ?7(( ( ! - i -, - ,?[1
292

‘1’ABLE I.—Location of Black-white Population Increases, 1960-70 and

1970-73

19s0-70 1970-73

Number Percent of Number Percent of

(thousands) total increase (thousands) total increase

Black population increase:

United States.. _. ____ -- _ ---- 3, 708 100.0 609 100.0

Metropolitan areas- _ -------- 4, 031 108.7 849 139.4

Central cities_ -- _ - --- -- _ 3, 267 88.1 728 119.5

Suburbs- ------ _ -------- 764 20.6 121 19.9

Nonmetropolitan areas- ------ –323 –8. 7 –240 –39. 4

U.S. annual rate of increase,

percent---- - _ - _ ----- --- --- 1.8 9

White population increase:

.

United States_ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ -- _ _ - _ 18, 917 100.0 1, 825 100.0

Metropolitan areas- - _ -- _ ---- 14, 755 78.0

Central cities- ---------- –2, 2;; – 12? :

Suburbs- - _ -------- _ ---- 14, 7;: 77 : 2, 276 124.8

Nonmetropolitan areas- ------ 4, 162 22.0 1, 774 97.2

U.S. annual rate of increase,

percent---- --------------- 1.3 . 4 — . — .

Total opulation increase:

T?nited States- -------------- 22, 625 100.0 2, 434 100.0

Metropolitan areas- --------- 18, 786 83.0 900 37.0

Central cities- _ - _ _ ------ 3, 286 14.5 –1, 497 –61. 5

Suburbs -- ------ _ -- ---- - 15, 500 68.5 2, 397 98.5

Nonmetropolitan areas- ------ 3, 839 17, 0 1, 534 63.0

U.S. annual rate of increase,

percent---- --------------- 1.2 .4

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Currant Population Reports: Special Studies, Series P-23, No, 48,

“The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1!)73,” July 1974; and

series P-25, No. 537 ,“Population Estimates and Projections, ” Estimates of the Population of Metropolitan

areas, 1972 and 1973, and Components of Change Since 1970.

Also significant was the rise, in 1970–1973, of black migration into

metropolitan areas, and the greater degree of concentration in central

cities.

These and other data also indicate:

●

o

●

●

Significant shifts of economic activity from metropolitan to

non-metropolitan areas;

Shifts in the functions of metropolitan areas and their central”

cities;

Shifts in the location of political power, with blacks gaining in

central cities and whites strengthening their numerical position

elsewhere, which in turn affects the politics of mass transportation systems; and

Decreasing concentration of population and lower land-use

densities in urban areas.

The implications of these data for intra-urban travel patterns are

not yet clear. The substantial shift of white populations from central

cities to suburbs may increase journey-to-work travel from suburbs

to central cities, in the historic commutation pattern, but there is as

yet little indication of such a development.
Much depends on what will happen to employment in central cities.

Employment declined in a number of the larger central cities in the

early 1970s, when even white collar employment began slipping. New

York City, for example, lost in the 1970 recession all the employment

it had gained during the 1960s, and the decline has continued and

accelerated during the 1974–1975 recession. There are indications

that the boom in office industries, which has recently sustained

large-city economies, may be over as (1) corporations and governments

prune their managerial and white collar staffs; (2) corporations shift

white collar functions out of central cities into suburbs, following the

flight from central cities of middle-class whites; (3) computers replace

clerical workers; and (4) electronic communications replace vis-~-vis

conferences.

With all the recent metropolitan growth in employment and population locating in the suburbs, increases in intra-urban travel demand

likewise are concentrated in the suburbs, but suburban development

has been predicated almost entirely upon automobile transportation.

The decentralized pattern of suburban settlement, with no systematic

planning, has tended to scatter activity centers. Accordingly, urban

residents require a “random access” form of transportation capable

of carrying different members of a suburban family in different directions to different activities at different times. Of the available modes,.

the automobile can best meet such requirements, though it has great

disadvantages for those who cannot drive, and only the fact that

suburban housewives serve as family chauffeurs enables many suburban

families to carry on their multiple activities.

As Anthony Downs and others have shown,3 urban sprawl magnifies

the length and the number of vehicle trips needed to serve the urban

population, in addition to being costly in other respects. Urban

designers hold that more systematic planning can improve both the

efficiency and the aesthetic qualit~’ of urban development; 4 for example, the Regional Plan Association of New York has suggested a plan of

polynucleated settlement in the New l“ork region, with more concentrated activity centers. One objective is reduction in overall transportation requirements (particularly length of trip), and arrangements

whereby a larger proportion of person trips can be served by mass

transportation. Other planners argue that the travel reduction made

possible by even highly structured land-use development may not

exceed 10 percent.

5 In any case, such patterns have gained little support from either consumers or developers thus far.

Fifteen years ago it was still thought, and hoped, that transportation

planning in itself could rationalize urban settlement patterns, at least

to the extent of allowing choices among different patterns predicated

upon different transportation systems (combinations of modes).

This belief turned out to be unrealistic for several reasons. First,

attempts to formulate models which would show the relationship between transportation systems and land-use development proved

s Real Estate Research Corporation, ‘The Cods o-f Sprawl, \’ol. 2, prepared for the Council on Environmental Quality and other federal government agencies (U SGPO, 1974).

4 Wilfred Owens, The Accessible City, (The Brookings Institution, 1972).

S The Year 2000 Plan for the Washington Metropolitan Area, drawn up by the National Capital Planning

Commission in the late 1950’s is a case-in point. -
294

abortive. Second, several broad-scale regional plans which were formulated for New York, Washington, and other areas, and which

rested heavily on specific transportation systems for their realization,

failed to attract general support.5 One reason lies in the fractionated

local governments characteristic of American metropolitan areas,

which make development of a consensus about regional land-use policy

almost impossible, since some jurisdictions in an area are likely to be

disadvantaged compared to others when such regional schemes are

imposed. Third, planning and development dynamics in this country

make It difficult to use transportation for purposes of implementing

large-scale land-use plans; the tendency is for transportation to respond

to development, rather than to be used as a force for guiding it. The

one thing on which there is general agreement is that every residence,

place of business and other activity center must be accessible by motor

Whiie the growth in transportation demand is heavily concentrated

in the suburbs, many of the central cities still suffer from transportation deficiencies and are seeking to improve both internal transportation and links to suburban areas. The main objective is to save and

expand central cities, most of which are declining in both residential

population and jobs.”

The new heavy rail transportation systems under construction or

in planning (such as the San Francisco Bay Area,’ Washington, D. C.,

an Atlanta systems) have been designed primarily to ferry white :

collar suburbanites to central city jobs, and thus to save and expand

central cities. Thus, the Bay Area system was sold by a group of

downtown San Francisco businessmen anxious to preserve the dominance of the central city in the Bay Area.8

In view of the sharp decline of traffic on the five older heavy rail

systems (New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland and Boston)

and the failure of those systems to prevent recent central city decline

(though they doubtless delayed it), many critics think the new systems may turn out to be quixotic rear-guard efforts. Only time will

tell.

The new transit systems have not been designed for the reverse

commute—hauling central city workers to suburban jobs. It has

been claimed that lack of transportation facilities in the past has

prevented large numbers of urban dwellers, predominantly unskilled,

from reaching available jobs in suburban factories and other employment centers, g but the notion that more adequate transportation

would have promoted higher employment of central-city slum dwellers

has never been verified.l”

There are numerous kinds of needs for special services, such as

hauling people from large parking facilities and rapid transit stations

to work places in central business districts, circulation in central

6 Some cities, particularly cities of the south and southwest, are still growing. Although a majority of

the 25 largest central cities declined in population in the period 1970-1973, several increased, including

Houston, Miami and San Diego (large increases), and Dallas, Buffalo, Seattle, Milwaukee and Newark

(small increases).

T The Bay Area system is in operation but several facilities are still under construction and extensions,

such as to the Oakland and San Francisco airports, are still under study.

8 Stephen Zwerling, Maw Transit and the Politics of Technology, a Study of BAR T and the San Francisco

Bay Area (New York: Praeger, 1974).

~ John F. Kain and John R. Meyer, “Transportation and Poverty,” The Public Interest, Winter 1970.

10 Thereis co~siderab]eevidence that the journey to suburban jobs of non-whites is considerably longer,

on the average, than that of whites. But this is a problem of housing location, not of transportation per at.
295

business districts, university campuses, and new towns and new

business centers, and intra-airport transportation, which need improved

transportation technologies. And finally there are the special needs

of the aged, the poor, and others who do not drive. The aged and the

poor, particularly, are concentrated in the central cities.

D EMAND FOR T RANSIT BY I NDIVIDUAL S

The choice of a potential traveler between transit and auto depends

on a number of factors having to do with (1) the circumstances of the

individual and his household, and (2) the comparative advantages

which he perceives between the transit ride and the automobile

ride. The main factors are summarized in the following expression in

which:

Subscripts ~ and a refer to transit and automobile, respectively,

DE= The decision respecting a particular trip,

1= Household income,

C= Number of cars owned by household members,

H= Number of drivers in household,

2’7’= Time required for trip, including walking at both ends,

V!l’=Variation in times required for individual trips

CE= Convenience, as measured by accessibility and average waiting time,

CO= Comfort,

SA= Safety, referring both to vehicular safety and personal security,

OF= Other factors,

P= hloney cost to the would-be traveler of a trip or series of trips.

This expression assumes that the individual’s choice is between auto

and transit for making a particular trip. He may have other options,

such as not making the trip at all, or utilizing still other means of

transportation, including walking.

In comparison with auto, most transit is slower, less convenient,

and less comfortable. Long-run costs and the larger social advantages

of one mode over another, such as pollution, environmental damage,

and so on, will not ordinarily influence modal choice save for individuals with a strong personal commitment to environmental or

other social values.

Rising family income levels are also an important factor in the

transit decision. Although the evidence is not conclusive! a number of

studies indicate that, above a certain level, income increases will

reduce the demand for transit, i.e., the income elasticity is negative.11

Although the out-of-pocket cost of making a transit trip is only

one factor in the transit choice, it is nonetheless true that if transit

is to attract riders who have a choice, the price of transit rides must be

sufficiently lower than auto-trip costs to offset transit’s relati~Te

disadvantages.

As long as transit systems were forced to pay their own way, they

were subjected to a competitive disadvantage against heavilj- subsidized automobiles, which contributed to their rapid decline in

patronage over the ~-ears.lz

11 s~~ a~~~~ w Hilt~~, F~&~~l T~an~it &b~idi?~: The ~TTban &fu.s fian~it Assistance Progra??l, (American

Enterprise Tnstitute for Policy Research, 1974), p. 119.

19 SeeFitch, op. cit., especially ~h ~pter 4; T.~. Kuhn,public ~~terprise Econornic8 and Transport Problemu

(University of California Press, 1962); John R. Meyer et al, The Urban Transportation Problem (Harvard

University Press, 1965); Martin Wohl, Transportation Zncestmerzt Planning (D. C. Heath & Company,

1972), especially chapter 3.
296

The familiar vicious cycle of increasing costs + rising fares +

reduced patronage + fa ling revenues was dramatic evidence that lr

transit patronage is sensitive to fare levels. The old rule of thumb is

that a given increase of x percent in fares will reduce patronage by $

percent. But it is also well known that peak-hour travel, which

typically is dominated by the journey-to-work, is less sensitive to

fare changes than off-peak travel, when recreational, social and other

trip purposes are more important. This has led to proposals for

multi-fare systems, with hig er fares in peak hours and ower fares in E Y

off-peak. Until recently, this idea has been resisted by transit operators, but an increasing number of systems are reducing fares for

off-peak and/or Sunday and holiday travel, with encouraging results.

Recognizing these facts, the National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974 states that continued increases in the cost of transit

to the user, particularly low-income persons, are undesirable and that

therefore it is a goal to hold down transit fares. The Act also in effect

provides that, as a condition for federal financial assistance, operators

must reduce fares by at least 50 percent to elderly and handicapped

persons during off-peak hours.

The effect of sharply reducing fares was dramatically demonstrated

in Atlanta when, in 1972, bus fares were reduced from 40 cents to

15 cents. In the following 12 months, ridership increased 30.2 percent.

An estimated 63.7 percent of the increase represented diversions from

automobiles. 13 Since that time, ridership has continued growing, and

there were sharp increases during the energy shortage in the first

quarter of 1974.

One principal reason for the transit price disadvantage concerns the

perceived price of automobile transportation in households which own

automobiles. Once a car is purchased, a user contemplating a particular trip presumably will take into account only the out-of-pocket

costs, mainly gasoline, tolls and parking charges. Costs which accrue

over a longer run, such as repair costs and depreciation, will get less

consideration; and those which are largely a function of time, such as

insurance and garage costs, will not be considered at all. Presumably,

the only time when such costs are taken into account is when the

decision is made to acquire a car for a specific purpose that could

otherwise be provided by transit—usually the journey to work.

The automobile enjoys a number of other price-cost advantages, in

that its cost to users does not fully reflect its cost to the public. First,

it is well established that the cost of providing road space in congested

urban areas usually exceeds the user charges paid by motorists m the

form of taxes and tolls. In addition, many of the costs of controlling

traffic and otherwise serving automobiles, including costs of protection against theft, are typically met from general taxation rather than

from specific automobile charges. Motorists using road space and

traffic and other services are in effect subsidized from other sources.

Second, automobiles impose a number of indirect costs not paid by

the motorist, which are borne by the public at large or by other

motorists. These typically include air and noise pollution and congestion costs.

13 Metropolit~ Atl~ta Rapid Transit Authority, Anal@u of !l’ran$it Panaenuer Data, oct.ober 1973.
297

Such costs are not communicated by the system of pricing for

automobile travel in congested centers. The main user charges, aside

from tolls and parking charges, are gasoline taxes. But, considered as

a charge for the use of roads, the gasoline tax is a highly inefficient

instrument in that the charge is the same under all conditions—for

high-cost roads and low-cost roads, for peak-hour travel when the

supply of road space is scarce and at slack periods when it is plentiful.

Parking fees aside, it does not cost the motorist any more to drive in

downtown traffic on high-valued land than on empty suburban streets

or on lower-valued land. (Flat-rate transit fares are subject to the

same limitations.) In crowded urban centers automobile use is held in

check by congestion and the competition for parking space.

In summary, the private-car owner seldom keeps any true accounts,

ordinarily pal’s nothing extra for more expensive rights-of-way, does

the driving himself, and thinks that his heavy bills for depreciation

and insurance have no connection with the individual decision to take

the car because his payment for these items is annual and not related

to each trip. Neither does he take into account as a cost for the trip

the cost to the community of road and parking space, policing and

maintenance. He thus makes his decision on what for him may be a

rational basis but which is for the total economy a fallacious

comparison .14

Given that automobile use in congested urban places is heavily

subsidized, the economic remedy is to raise the cost of driving an

automobile in congestion-prone areas, and at congestion-prone times,

to the point where congestion will be eliminated.1~ The revenues from

such charges would in some measure meet the costs which previously

have been subsidized. The main rationale of “anti-congestion pricing,” however, is not to raise revenue. It is rather to tailor the demand

for road space to the supply thereof, so that vehicles can move freely

in the urban network.

The extent to which raising auto-user charges would shift patronage

to transit has never been thoroughl~- tested; there is a need for more

research and field experimentation m this area. Some shifts have been

observed recently, as the cost of automobiles and motor fuel and other

auto operating costs have risen. Several studies indicate that, raising

the out-of-pocket costs of automobile trips is more effective in shifting

travel from auto to transit than is lowering transit fares.16

14 Fitch, op. cif., pp. 22-3.

15 A nllmher of techni~[ll means of imposing SUCh Charges h~ve })WII SUggIXtd.SOrl]e @rllplO\” f?]~CtriC Vt?hif?le

identi ficatioll technolagj’. Setting parking charges at kwels which discoumge driving into congest ion-prone

areas is the on]!- mm.sure much used to date. Although pm-ki ug charges are a rather crude inst rrrnwnt of

control, properly used they arc much I)etter than nothing. (See Transportation Research Record, Number

4!14, ~rotJl( ms i?l Implementing Roadt:la!/ Pricing.) 16 A Rand (lor~ration report argues that, for di~~rsion~ of aut O]nol)i]ps exccpdi IIg .5 per(’el]t, dkiIICPnti Vt?S

to auto driviug are almut three timw as effective as transit suhsidies. B. F. (ioellrr et al, San Dkgo C2ran Air

Project Sum marv Report, Report R-1362-S I), Rand [’orpora[ion, 1!173. Cited in 1[ilton, op cit., p. 1)0.

(’ornputations hy Moses and Williamson with Chicago data of t he late 1%50s indicated that increase of dirwt

user charges of 48 cents would divert some 40 percent of comn)ut ing motorists 10 other modes of travel.

Sce Leon N. MOSI?S rinri 1 larold F. Williamson, Jr., “Value of Tin]t,, (’hoiw of Mode, and th? Sulwid}- Issur

ill I’rl)at) Trmsportat ion, ” Journal OJ Political Econonty, June 1!KX3. owil~g to limitations ~n the data and

analytical technique, the findings are onlj’ suggestive, not col~(lusivr, in an}” cm?, the ante has gOUO Up

considrral)ll- in the ensuing 15 S“Cars.
But while anti-congestion pricing has the support of a band of

economists and transportation planners, it is anathema to politicians

and the motoring public. The public has accepted the principle of

special tolls and charges only as a means of paying for something visible, such as bridges and turnpikes, and staunchly resists paying for

something which historically has been free, especially since they cannot see what they are paying for.

In the face of pubic opposition to raising auto-user charges to

levels more nearly approximating full economic and social costs of

auto driving, the only recourse, if transit is to be economically competitive, is to subsidize transit. Subsidies may take the form of

improved service, or lower fares, or both. The level at which subsidies

should be set to get the best economic results is an unsettled issue.

In principle, the subsidy per trip should be reasonably uniform

for all competing transportation modes. In other words, if for historical

reasons (good or bad) one mode of transportation is being subsidized

by a certain amount per passenger trip, competing modes should be

subsidized by at least roughly corresponding amounts per trip.:’

The difficulty of applying this principle is that the amounts of

subsidy for automobile trips vary according to a number of factors,

including the time at whicE the trip is taken. Second, the automobile

subsidy includes a variety of indirect costs, some of which are not

quantitatively measurable. The notion of matching subsidies therefore

cannot be applied with an de ree of precision, though it is a useful

principle to keep in mind.1

d

The principle most widely accepted, until recently, is that capital

costs of transit should be met by public subsidies, leaving only operating expenses for the fare box. There is no particular economic reason

for distinguishing between capital and operating costs, so far as

subsidies are concerned, and the distinction does have the disadvantage of encouraging investments in capital intensive improvements, such as automated controls, not necessarily because they

reduce the total cost of trips but only because they hold down operating costs and hence fares. (The computation of tradeoffs between

capital and labor is discussed in a following section.)

The principal ration d’i%v for basing fares on operating expenses

is not so much economic as political—the hope that public resistance

to fare increases will dampen wage demands of transit labor. The hope

has proved futile, and the resistance to operating subsidies is

crumbling.

A number of jurisdictions are makin funds available to cover

transit operating deficits. The Federal 8 rban Mass Transportation

Assistance Act of 1974 for the first time provided federal funds for

transit operating subsidies.

Unless the conditions for such grants are spelled out very carefully,

they may be dissipated by labor demands and wasteful management

practices. Such difficulties are always encountered by subsidies for

17 Fitch, op. cU., pp. 156ff.

18 A fomula sometimes suggested calls fcr transit subsidies sufficient to make transit fares equal to the

out-of-pocket costs of automobile operation. The formula is faulty on two counts. First, out-of-pocket auto

operating costs per passenger vary widely depending on the number of passengers, the amounts of tolls and

parking charges paid by the particular vehicle, and other variable factors. Second, the amount cf the transit

subsidy under this formula has no necessary relation to the amount of automobile subsidy; the transit

subsidy might be much higher or much lower, depending on circumstances.
299

operating expenses,. though the difficulties maybe minimized by having

flat grants for major service units, rather than simply picking up

the bill for operating deficits.lg

Some communities have been experimenting with zero fares (Seattle,

for instance, and, as above noted, Atlanta’s system has used revenues

from a special sales tax to reduce fares to 15 cents, thereby stimulating

patronage. The main objection to very low transit fares is that

they. encourage the use of facilities whose marginal costs (costs of

hauling additional passengers) are likely to be relatively high in peak

hours, though they may be relatively low in off-peak hours.

Once an expensive transit system, particularly one using exclusive

rights-of-way is in place, fares should be set low enough to insure its

full utilization, even though subsidies for operating costs, as well as

capital costs, may be required. The economist’s rule that fares should

not go below incremental (or marginal) costs may be breached if

(1) the social benefits of additional travel, made possible by low fares,

are thought to justify the additional subsidies required, or if (2) the

alternative is greater automobile use and resulting financial and social

costs which would exceed the amounts of transit subsidies.

!9 This suggests ~ a starting point,a simpleflat grant per transit passenger trip. Such a grant would at

once avoid incentives to wasteful management and would encourage service improvements and ether eflcrts

to increase patronage, thereby increasing the amounts of grants.
Chapter 2: Demand for Transit Service of State and Local

Jurisdictions

A BILITY AND W ILLINGNESS To F INANCE T RANSIT I NNOVATION AN D

D EVELOPMEN T

From the standpoint of the community at large, there are a number

of reasons for subsidizing transit service:

. To balance the subsidies, direct and indirect, already extended

to automobile driving in congested urban centers, as discussed

in the preceding section.

. To reduce the high social-environmental costs of and the large

amounts of space required by automobile transportation.

. To avoid the necessity of building even more expensive

highways.

. To provide such service for those physically or financially unable to drive automobiles.

. To stimulate the growth, or arrest the decline, of central cities

or other built-up areas.

. To stimulate patterns of urban growth more efficient than the

‘(sprawl” patterns of development associated with the primary

reliance on the automobile.

If transit is to be subsidized, why should not the subsidies be paid

by governments of the states and localities where transit is used rather

than by the federal government?

One reason is that the federal government is already heavily subsidizing highway construction and transit subsidies are needed to

redress the balance.

Second, a premise of American federalism, by now generally accepted, is that the federal government is superior as a revenue collector to the state and local governments, and that it should use this

power to assist lower levels of government to meet their responsibilities. This is the premise underlying the increasing grants-m-aid

to state and local governments, and the recently instituted concept of

revenue sharing.

Third, governments responsible for urban areas are already pressed

by a multitude of competing demands and are hurting financially.

Many are already subsidizing existing transit services.

State and local governments account for over 80 percent of domestic

government purchases of goods and services in the United States.

Total expenditures went from $49.6 billion in 1960 to $206 billion in

1974, an annual increase of 9.9 percent compounded. By comparison,

the annual increase rate of the Gross National Product was 7.6 percent. State-local expenditures were 9.8 percent of the GNP in 1960

and 14.7 percent in 1974. An increasing proportion of state-local

expenditures has been financed by federal grants-in-aid: 13 percent

in 1960 and 21 percent in 1974.

(301)
In general, state-local government as measured by employment,

grew more rapidly than any other major economic sector in the period

1960-74, and the rate of inflation was greater in the state-local government sector than in any other economic sector. (The high inflation

rate was due in large part to the extraordinary increase of employee

compensation rates.)

Tough state and local governments, as a class, were not pinched

for revenues during the 1960s and early 1970s, the recent rapid increase of state-local taxes has stiffened taxpayer resistance to further

tax, and hence expenditure, increases. Suc resistance, coupled with

revenue declines resulting from the economic recession, have forced

many state-local governments to retrench and to begin reducing

personnel. Capital improvements are one of the first casualties.

Governments of large cities, where major transit deficiencies lie,

are another matter. Their revenues have been constrained, and their

costs increased., by the fact that they have become concentration

centers for minority and poverty-prone groups while losing large

numbers of middle-class, predominantly white, residents. In recent

h

ears, most large cities have lost population and jobs, and most

ave high rates of unemployment.

Saddled with the bur ens of providing special assistance and serv- f

ices for poverty-prone populations, they were forced to retrench

earlier than other governments. After an upward surge in the early

1960s, their expenditure increases began leveling off.1 Most large

cities have been financially strapped for years. New York City, for

example, faces a budget deficit of some $650 million in the current

fiscal year and a larger gap in the coming fiscal year. Cleveland and

Detroit were, and most other large cities recently have been, forced

to follow suit.

S TATE AND L OCAL G OVERNMENT T RANSIT S UPPOR T

Although a few state governments (including New York, New

Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts) are contributing to mass transit

support, political forces in various states can be expected to severely

limit state financial support, for the simple reason that people in

areas not directly served by transit see little reason for helping

finance transit. Only in areas where suburbs make common cause

with central cities can there be hope of getting substantial state

funds. This throws the financial burdens back on the metropolitan

areas themselves. Both states and municipalities, as noted above,

will be strapped for funds in the foreseeable future, with little likelihood that they will make heavy additional expenditures for new

transit systems.

A survey by the American Transit Association put total state-local

subsidies in 1972 at $454 million. Among communities already subsidizing transit, New York City contributes several hundred million

dollars a year, including funds for operating subsidies. The state

of New York is contributing some $100 million to help preserve the

35 cent transit fare. The communities served by the Boston MBTA

have long shared MBTA deficits; recently the state of Massachusetts

has undertaken to meet half the MBTA deficit. A number of jurisdic1 New York City was an exception: its expenditures accelerated in the latter 1960s owing partly to an

exuberant administration, partly to the strength of the municipal unions in collective bargaining.
303

tions impose special property, sales or payroll taxes specifically for

transit. Thus the Twin Cities XITA is empowered to impose a special

property tax (replacing an earlier tax on automobiles). Atlanta

8

imposes a special sales tax.

Only one area, the San Francisco Bay Area, undertook to raise

funds from its own sources for a large new transit system. BART

District voters in 1962 approved a bond issue of $792 million thereby

obligating themselves to pay debt service from property taxes.2 As

time went on and cost escalated, residents accepted a .5 percent sales

tax earmarked for BART. Still later state gasoline tax revenues were

diverted to transit purposes, including support of BART.3

DEMAND FOR FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

In the late 1950s, the American Municipal Association launched

a campaign for federal grants for transit expansion and improvement.

The campaign was impelled by—

●

●

●

Increasing congestion in central cities, brought about in part

by the new arterials constructed to bring vehicles into cities.

The high cost of providing road space in cities, and the greater

space economies of mass transportation, which can handle

several times as many passengers per lane 4 as can private

autos.

The large amounts of funds supplied bv federal and state

governments for highway construction and maintenance, in

particular the resources of the Federal Highway Trust Fund

established by the Highway Act of 1956. Municipal officials

and transit proponents claimed! with considerable justification, that federal subsidies runmng up to 90 percent of costs

inevitably distorted state-local decisions, skewing them toward

highways instead of exclusive right-of-way transit.

After considerable pulling and hauling, the first federal legislation

to provide significant capital assistance was passed in 1964. A trickle

of funds has steadily increased, and the federal government now

provides financing for a large proportion of expenditures for transit

equipment, mainly buses, in the country today. The annual grants,

by year, for the period 1965–73, are as follows:

capUaJ

Fiscal year: (?%{%8 )

1965 ---------------- -------------------- ------------------ _ -- $52

1966 ---------------- -------------------- ------------------ _ - _ 106

1967 ---------------- -------------------- -------------------- _ 121

1968 ---------------- -------------------- -------------------- - 122

1969 ---------------- -------------------- -------------------- - 148

1970 ---------------- -------------------- --------------- _ ----- 133

1971 ---------------- -------------------- -------------------- - 284

1972 ---------------- -------------- --- -------------------- - _ - _ 491

1973 ---------------- -------------------- -------------------- - 871

With funds authorized by the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974, the total authorization for assistance over the next

six years stands at $11.8 billion.

Z At the time it was hoped that farw would cover a substantial part of the debt service.

$ BART received support from still other sources. The tunnel under the bay was financed by revenues

from Bay Bridge motor vehicle tolls. The federal government has also contributed to various elements of the

system.

t An arterial highway lane can handle about 1,803 cars per hour—2,400 people assuming a load factor of

1.33; buses can move 6,000-7,000 people per lane per hour; and rail transit UP to 40,~ Per how.
304

MAGNITUDE OF POTENTIAL TRANSIT NEEDS

The concept of transit “needs” is ambiguous because of the difficulty of defining seeds. “ “Needs” is a relative concept, which depends on the communit ‘s income level and the priority accorded

transportation compare to other community “needs”. From the

community level, the amount of federal or state financing available

is also an important factor in the community’s perception of its own

‘heeds.”

In this discussion, the term “mass transportation needs” refers,

first, to mass transportation facilities and services which, if instituted, are projected to yield benefits exceeding their costs. Since

this condition might be met by several different transportation

systems, or combinations of modes, in a particular community, a

second condition is required—that the transportation facility chosen

is the most cost-effective, which is to say the most economical, means

of meeting that particular travel demand. The choice of a rail transit

facility over alternative modes, for example, is taken to mean a comparative analysis has been made of all means of satisfying the

E

articular set of travel demands, and that rail transit is considered to

e economically referable, all things considered.

In practice, t orough projections of benefits and costs are not h

often undertaken. In any case, they are subject to wide margins of

error, and so are projections of needs. To take one instance, the

projections underlying the San Francisco Bay Area urban rail system

(BART) were controversial from the beginning; many transportation

experts doubted that the volume of travel and other benefits projected

for the system would actually materialize. Costs escalated over the

planning and construction period, and finally turned out to be about

double the amount projected at the time the voters approved the

project. Similarly the Washington, D.C. system is costing several

times as much as had been projected when decisions to proceed with

it were taken. It is likely that neither system would have been undertaken if accurate cost projections had been available for making

decisions. The planned Atlanta rail system is a “need,” as defined by

local advocates who have convinced the community to proceed with

the project, whose costs are estimated at $1.4 billion but will doubtless

go much higher if they follow the precedents of the BART and

WMATA systems. Again the decision may well have been taken out

of a failure to foresee ultimate costs.

Given the lack of adequate cost-benefit data and other information

for sound decisions, estimates of transit “needs” must rest mainly on

what community officials and planners say they plan to spend for

transit, if stipulated amounts of outside assistance are forthcoming.

All large new systems now under serious consideration are predicated

on the assumption that the federal government will put up a large

share of the capital costs; present legislation now provides for up to

80 percent. The lower the level of federal assistance expected, the

less will be the serious demand for a transit system and equipment.

The BART system was remarkable in being financed largely by local

funds.

Recent surveys by the Institute of Public Administration for the

Department of Transportation indicate that the perceived need for

transit facilities, on the part of state-local transportation planners, is
305

in the magnitude of $33 billion over the next ten-year period. By

comparison, the congressional fund authorization now stands at $11.8

billion, which on an 80-20 sharing basis would fund approximately

$14.6 billion expenditures, less than half the indicated “need.” The

discrepancuy- is greater than these figures show because of the certainty

that costs will continue rising. Assume they rise at the rate of 10

percent per year; the minimum amount necessary” to carry out the

“needs” program is at least $53 billion. In summary, the relative

data are—

Billion

Estimated transit “needs” over next 10 yrs. (1975 dollars) ------- ------- $33.0

Minimum current dollar costs of meeting “needs,” assuming annual cost

inflation of 10 percent--- -------------------- -------------------- - 53.0

Outstanding Federal authorization--- -------------------- ------ _ -- -_ - 11.8

Amount of funding supportable by Federal authorization (80 percent

matching) -------------------- -------------------- -------------- 14.6

C OMPARATIVE C OSTS OF T RANSIT M ODE S

Central to policy choices in the field of urban transportation are the

comparative costs of various levels of service and various transportation modes. Yet, in this field, there is little solid information on which

to base judgment. Different transit systems now operating show

substantial variations in operating and maintenance costs, and great

differences in capital costs. New systems such as the BART and

WMATA have grossly overrun original projected costs, owing partly

to inflation and partly to unanticipated developments. NTew demonstration systems, notably Morgantown, have had even more difficulty

with cost overruns.5

The situation is further complicated by the fact that, whereas art

of the costs involved in a transit choice are measurable by standard

statistical and accounting procedures, part of them—in particular

many of the all-important social and environmental costs—are not

amenable to quantitative measurement in dollar terms.

Cost comparisons are relevant, moreover, only if they involve

alternative means of accomplishing approximately the same objective.

While transportation systems featuring different modes (auto, express

bus, rail transit, automated guideway group rapid transit, or personal

rapid transit) may serve community travel needs, such diflerent

systems in fact ordinarily perform somewhat different tasks and cause

their service areas to develop in somewhat different ways.

Given the public apathy toward transit generally (as evidenced by

the secular decline in transit patronage), transit development can be

justified only if it promises to be substantially cheaper in out-ofpocket costs, or has the clear advantage of providing superior service.

Preceding studies have established, however, that the advantage

of existing transit over auto is in the line haul, where large numbers

of people can be carried along a corridor. Here, transit’s potential

advantages can be realized, including economies as to right-of-way,

space required for vehicles, capital costs of vehicles, operating and

maintenance costs, and fuel consumption. On the other hand, transit

has a number of disadvantages, such as the fact that economies

5 The Morgantown Automated Guideway Demonstration Project, first projected by West Virginia University to cost $18 million, has thus far cost $64 million for little more than half the system originally planned.
306

depend on a relatively high load factor, and the need for paid drivers

or for costly automatic guidance and control systems. A subtle

competitive disadvantage is in the previously discussed peculiarities

of the automobile pricing system which hide a substantial part of

automobile transportation costs.

The Economic Panel is therefore unable to present a systematic

picture of costs, particularly operating and maintenance costs of the

newer guideway systems. More information on this subject is one of

the greatest needs for future policy decisions. Some light on general

parameters may be shed, and perhaps some illusions dispelled, by the

following data and conjectures.

The most recent comparative estimates that came to the attention

of the Economics Pane were from a study now being completed by r

Douglas B. Lee, a member of the panel. Lee’s comparative cost data

are based on the Washington metropolitan area. The first set of figures

indicate the following “average long run” cost per passenger mile of

three modes, assuming that each mode is utilized to 20 percent of

capacity.

Average estimated long-run costs per passenger mile-auto, rail, and bus

Mode: Ce?lt8

per mile

Rail rapid, half in subway. ------------- _ ---- -.-_ ------ _ --------

Rail rapid, all above surface- _ _ ------ ----------------------- --- : :

Automobile (1.2 riders) ----- ------------------ _ ----- _______ --- _ _

Bus, in mixed traffic_ ------- -_ ------ ___ -- _ ------- _ _ ------------ ; :

The picture changes, however, if we assume that the respective

t

s stems are built for, and charged against, peak-hour travel, which in

t e Washington area is dominated by the journey-to-work. Transit

vehicles are assumed to be loaded to full seated capacity.

Estimated cost of peak hour travel on exclusive rights of way, auto, rail, and bus per

passenger mile

Mode: cent a

per mile

Rail rapid, surface---- ---- -------- ---- - ----- ---- ------ --------- 29

Bus, on exclusive right-of-way ----- _ --- _ _ ----- _ _ -----------------

Automobile (1.2 riders) ----- - ---- --- --- -------------- ---- ------- %

Automobiles (3 riders)_ - _ - ----- ------------------- ------------- 35

The broad relations shown by the above figures are believed to be

generally valid though absolute figures for different systems will, of

course, vary.e The following observations are of particular interest. “

. Where average loading is 20 percent of capacity, rail rapid

costs per mile are by far the highest cost mode. But when

facilities are provided exclusively for peak-hour travel, the

auto is by far the most costly unless the average number of

passengers can be substantially increased.

6 The relation between auto and heavy rail transit costs for eak-hour travel corresponds

with computations made from cost estimates prepared for the 1 ashington Mass Transporta- $

tion Study in 1958 of the costs for handling peak-hour trafic by three modes—with automobiles and rail rapid transit each requiring new roadways, and express buses requiring

reserved lanes and other special facilities. The per-passenger-mile figures were :

Cent8

per mile

Automobile (1.5 riders) ------------------------ --------------------- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1:.:

Rapid rail ---------- --------------------- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... -----------------

Express bus ------------------ ------------------- ---------------------- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318

(Fitch and Associates, op. cit., p. 266. ) The substantial differences between these figures and

Lee’s figures reflect both the extraordinary inflation between 195S and 1973, and the fact

that the 1958 figures omit some elements included by Lee, notably environmental costs.
307

Bus costs are relatively low when buses utilize existing roadways, where they are impeded by competing traf%c. Improving

bus service by exclusive rights-of-way increases costs.

Bus and rapid rail operating costs per mile are approximately

equal. Where buses operate on exclusive rights-of-way, total

costs per mile are approximately equal to those of rail on

surface.

About 60 percent of bus costs are in labor, and about 40

percent (two-thirds of the labor costs) are in bus drivers.

(Some systems report substantially higher proportions.)

Rapid rail is fastest, but is disadvantaged by the time and

effort required to get to the relatively few stations.

Buses destined downtown. and rapid rail. are disadvantaged

by difficulties of distributing passengers to’destinations. Q

RANGE OF TRADEOFFS BETWEEN AUTOMATION AND LABOR

A subject of great interest among transit engineers and operators

has to do with automation as a means of reducing transit labor

requirements. Bus operators in particular, plagued by high ratios

of operator costs to total operating and maintenance costs, collective

bargaining and rising wage rates, and the always-present threat

of strikes, find the idea of automation appealing. The automatic

elevator is often cited as evidence that automation can produce substantial savings by replacing operating personnel.

Ignoring for the moment the politica and labor relations problems

of substituting automatic controls for union labor, however, the

economics of automation involve a tradeoff between labor required

for a less automated system (all transit involves some degree of automation) and the amount of capital and labor required for a more automated system. Automation requires high-skilled labor for maintenance

which at least partially offsets the greater labor requirements of less

automated systems. The central question concerns the amount which

can be economically invested in automation for the purpose of reducing

personnel requirements.

Assume: (a) drivers compensation beginning at $15,000 a year,

increasing at the rate of 7% a year; (b) a 15-year life for automated

equipment; and (c) a discount rate of 7%. Under these assumptions,

the present value of the driver’s compensation, for 15 years, is approximately $136,000, which is the limit of an investment in automation

to replace one driver (or equivalent employee). Various assumptions

as to the rate of wage inflation and the level of discount (interest)

rates yield the following results.

Initial wage--$l5,000 a year

Discount rate Break+ men point for

Annual rate of wage increase (percent) labor-saving investment

in automation

5 percent. ------------ --- ------ --- ----- _ ---- 7 $117,274

7 percent-- -------------------- -- _ ---------- 136, 700

10 percent- -------------------- ------------- ; 172, 700

7 percent- -------------------- -------------- 10 90,200

10 percent- -------------------- ------------- 10 114, 000
3(M3

The break-even point varies directly with the level of wages and

fringe benefits and the rate at which they increase, and inversely

with the levels of interest rates: high interest rates raise the cost of

capital equipment.

With these data we can make some illustrative conjectures respecting the benefits and costs of complete automation. We begin with an

actual bus transit operation in a major city, with 2,OOO buses. It

employs—

3,300 operating personnel.

700 maintenance personnel.

The number of personnel required is thus two per bus, 1.65 for

operations, and .35 for maintenance.

An engineering group with recent experience in automated guideway

l

construction estimates that the cost of complete automation,

incuding equipment for both guideways and vehicles, is approximately equal to that if unequipped vehicles. The cost of a present-day

50-passenger bus (weighmg 15,000 pounds) is a about $60,000. Assuming

that automation costs another $60,000 we have a benchmark for

evaluating the possibilities of tradeoff, using the data presented in

the preceding table of breakeven points.

An automated system itself requires extensive maintenance, both

because of the complexities of the control technology and the very

high performance standards required to keep the system in continuous

sa e operation. Referring back to the personnel requirements of the f

above-cited bus system, assume that automation could reduce the

number of operating personnel required by two-thirds, but that an

additional .5 man per vehicle would be required for maintenance.

These assumptions would reduce the labor force to 2,800 for a saving

of 1,200 or .6 employees per vehicle. Reference to the above table

shows a positive payoff for an investment of $60,000 to eliminate

one position. For example, assume for the eliminated position:

Starting compensation of $15,000, increasing at an average

rate of 5 percent per year;

A discount rate of 7 percent; and

A 15-year life for equipment.

The discounted cost of .6 of a position is approximately (.6X

$117,272) $70,400; the benefit-cost ratio is ($70,400-$60,000) l.17—

not a large margin in view of the many uncertainties.

If it were possible to bring the operating and maintenance staff

down to one per vehicle, the benefit-cost ratio under these assumptions would be 1.9. But observation of present systems, and consideration of union pressures and other factors, make it appear unlikely

that any such figures can be achieved. The semi-automated Lindenwold line, with 75 cars, employs a maintenance force of 76 for

vehicles and 55 for right-of-way, power, signals, communications,

and stations—a total of 1.75 per vehicle. Another 117 (1.56 per

vehicle) are employed in operations—police, passenger agents,

operators, revenue collectors. The total is 3.31 per vehicle, 1.31

more than that of the bus system referred to.

The above statements, to reiterate, are only conjectural. But

they do argue against blind faith that complete automation can

signficantly reduce transit labor costs. Automation must depend on

ot er rationales such as greater safety in operation, increased comfort Y
(as through

309

controlled acceleration and deceleration), and lower

headways -

(making it possible to increase the flow of vehicles on a . . . guideway).

Finally, a high degree of automation is required for personal rapid

transit, if this is to be an ultimate objective of transit &D. R

C OSTS OF A UTOMATED G UIDEWAY AND PRT SYSTEM S

At the time of this report, only two automated guideway systems

more complex than simple loops or shuttles had been installed—

Airtrans at the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport and the Morgantown

demonstration system at Morgantown, West Virginia. The Airtrans

system had not yet s%haken down, ” so that no data were available

on the number of operating and maintenance personnel which would

be required after the shake-down period.

The Morgantown system was not yet in operation. Engineers of

The Boeing Company, main contractors for the system estimated

roughly that the capital costs would break down approximately as

follows: right-of-way, 50 percent; vehicles, 25 percent; automatic

control system, 25 percent.

Vehicles cost about $113,000 apiece, or roughly $13 a pound for

an 8800-pound vehicle with a capacity of 20 (8 seated, 12 standing).

Boeing engineers expressed the opinion that production in modest

volume might reduce costs to roughly $10 per pound, or $85,000-

$90,000 per vehicle (1974 dollars).

The fact that the development costs of the Morgantown system

were greatly over original projections ($64 million has been spent on

little more than half a system originally projected to cost $18 million)

indicates the hazards of projecting development costs of new technologies, let alone ultimate capital and operating costs of actual

systems deriving therefrom.

The point is demonstrated also in the great differences in the

projected costs of constructing, equipping and operating a PRT

system. The following table gives comparative data from three recent

analyses: one by the Aerospace Corporation of a system projected

for Los Angeles; 7

one done for the U.S. Department of Transportation of a hypothetical town (Plastictown); 8 and one by a consortium

of firms headed by DeLeuw, Cather and Company, for a system

projected for the Twin Cities area.g

The data for the last study concern a so-called “high performance

personal rapid transit”, elsewhere referred to as “group rapid transit”,

which is between the present generation of SLT systems and true PRT.

The vehicles are 8-passenger instead of 4 to 6–passenger.

T Results summarized in Economics and Science Planting, Inc, Public Z’randportatiora Service QuaZity—

Some program .4 Zternatfoeu, a report prepared for the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Departmfy~igf Transportation, March 1975.

@ Aukmated SrnaU Vehicle Fixed tiideway S@em8 Study, Twin Cities Metropolitan Area Transit Commission Study, March 1975. Page VII-18.
I

I

1

t

1

1

I

I

I

1

I

t

I

I

1

1

I

#

t

I

I

I

t

1

t1

I

I

I

I

1

1

I

1

1

1

I

1

1

I

1

I

I1

I

I

I

1

I

I

I

I

I

t1

II

Ice II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

IN”

I

I

t

I I 1

11

t I

1 I

I

1

I

I

I

NIIa

0 0 0

*O*

o

dI

t

1

1

I

(

I

I

1

I

1

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

1

I

1

1

t

I

1

1

1

I

1

I

I

I1

t

I

I

.

I

I

I

1

I

I

I

I

I

I

1

I

I

I

I

t

I

!

1

I

I

1

I

t

I

I

I

1

I

I

I

\

I

I

I

I

t

I

1

t

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

1

I

1

1

1

I

1

t

1

I

I

I

1

I

I

t

I

(

I

I

1

I

1

I

I

I

I

1

t

tI

1

1

t

I

I

1

I

1

!

I

I

I

I

I

I

t

I

I

I

I

1

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

1

1

I

t

1

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

1

I

I

I

I

#

1

I

I

I

1

1

I

I

I

1

1

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

1

I

I

I

I

1

I

1

1

I

1

I

1

I

I

I

I

t

I

1

1

I

t

I

1

I

1

{

I

I

1

f

I

I

1

I

1

I

I

I

t

I

1

1

I

I

I

1

1

I

I

t

I

1

I

I

I

1

I

1

I

1

1

I

1

1

I

1

I

I

I

I

1

1

1

I

I

I

I

I\

I

I

t

I

I

1

#

I

I

I

1

I

t

I

I

1

I\

I

1

I

I

I

1

I

1

t

I

I

I

I

I

1

1

I

I

1

1

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

1

I

t

I

I

I

I

(

1

1

I

I

I

(

1

1

I

I

t

1

I

I

1

1

I

I

1

1

1

1

I

f

1

1

I

1

1

I

I

I

I

I

1

I

1

I

I

1

1

t

1

1

I

I

I

I

1

I

1

I

I

1

I

1

1

1

I

I

t1

I

I

t

1

I

I

1

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

1

I

I

I

I

I

I

1

I

1

I

I

1

I

t

1

I

1

I

I

1

1

1

I

I

1

I

1

1

I

1

I

!

I

I

I

I

t

1

I

1

t

I

I

I

1

1

I

1

1-

,Ul

,’U

IG

Id

,*

,9

, 0

I n

,+

l . .

1A

Id

-“ n---
311

Even allowing for the fact that the cost data are on somewhat

different bases, the respective projections differ greatly; vehicle cost

estimates, for example, are an order of magnitude apart. It may be

pointed out, however, that the $10,000 per vehicle cost estimates for

PRT systems are in the cost range of high-performance automobiles,

although the performance reliability for PRT vehicles would need to

be much higher than for private automobiles, in addition to which

PRT systems would require highly complex control systems.

The Twin Cities study vehicle cost projection is in the range of the

actual cost of the considerably larger Morgantown vehicles. There is

no apparent reason for the great difference between the vehicle cost

estimates; if anything, the more complex pure PRT vehicles should

be more costly.

There are no comparable estimates of operating costs, but data

published by Aerospace engineers appear unrealistically low. One

Aerospace-sponsored study cites a vehicle operating cost figure of 1.9¢

per occupied vehicle mile.10 Average occupied mileage per vehicle is

estimated at 20,000; annual vehicle operating costs thus would be

$380 (1971 dollars). But if one assumes one maintenance man for

five vehicles (probably a conservative estimate in view of the experience of present systems), at $10,000, the annual labor cost for maintenance alone would be $2,0OO per vehicle, or 10¢ per occupied vehicle

mile for maintenance alone. Another $1,000 for fuel and operating

labor costs, which seems not unreasonable, would bring total operating costs to 15¢ per mile.

Assume (a) a more realistic, but still conservative, vehicle capital

cost of $25,000, (b) a 20-year life for vehicles, and (c) an interest rate

of .08 percent per annum. The annual amortization charge per vehicle

is $2,546, or 12.74¢ per mile. This brings the total figure for vehicle

operating and capital costs to 27.7¢ per occupied mile, compared with

the Aerospace projection of 15.6¢ for total costs, including operating

and capital amortization costs of guideways and stations, shown in

Table 2.

These projections and conjectures are cited only to demonstrate

the unsatisfactory state of PRT cost data at the present time.

O THER Q UESTIONS A BOUT P R T

Assuming that PRT systems are technically possible, a number of

other critical questions respecting them arise which cannot be answered with information now available. More extensive engineering

and economic studies may narrow the range of cost projections,

utilization projections, etc., but no amount of paper analysis can take

the place of actual hardware development and testing, and experimentation on a substantial scale.

Critical questions include the following:

. Can PRT systems provide cheaper transportation than private

automobiles? It would seem that the more nearly PRT approximates the kind of random access capability afforded by the

private automobile, the more likely it is to exceed automobile10 L~~~ R. B~h, The ~~~~i~a ~j H@.c~p~City PR1’ s~a~t~~, a paper presented at the National cOllference on Personal Rapid Transit, November 1971.
312

level costs. The proper comparison is not with the present

generation of automobiles but with the future generation which

will be on hand by the time PRT systems can be developed and

installed, and which (if present trends continue) will be lighter

and more economical. There appears to be no reason why

automobiles designed for urban use should be bigger or heavier

than PRT vehicles, and accordingly there is no a parent reason

why they should require more energy 11’ PRT as the major

disadvantage of requiring higher performance vehicles and

complex control systems, both of which would be costly and

wou d require a high level of maintenance. f

. How many automobiles could be replaced by PRT vehicles?

For peak-hour work trips, the number of PRT vehicles required

will be some fraction of the number of automobiles, which is

approximately the reciprocal of the number of rush-hour work

trips they can make. Presumptively the average is between one

and two, meaning that each PRT vehicle can replace no more

than one to two automobiles. In off-peak hours some PRT

vehicles can be employed for off-peak travel, replacing

t

still

other automobiles. he ones replaced, however, WOU1 presumptively be only those whose use is limited to the urban area

served by PRT. There would seem to be an outside limit on

the number of automobiles that could be replaced per PRT

vehicle.

. What is the tradeoff between storing automobiles in parking

lots or garages near work places, and the alternate of storing

PRT vehicles in other areas where land maybe cheaper? Backand-forth movement of empty PRT vehicles would offset part

of the presumptively more expensive storage of automobiles near

activity centers.

. How much social cost would PRT impose on neighborhoods in

the form of noise, unsightly guideways, disruption of on-going

activities, alteration of buildings, etc. ? Despite claims to the

contrary, the structure for an elevated guideway in high

density areas would have to carry at least as much weig t

as a single-lane guideway designed for automobiles, since it

would have to support moderately heavy vehicles running at

short headways.

. How much road space could PRT eliminate? What with continuing urban decentralization and lower, but more homogeneous, land use densities, there will be less need for transit

lines or freeways to provide access to areas of high concentration. Roadways will still be needed for motor vehicle access,

goods movement, and other purposes, so that the possibilities

for tradeoffs appear to be limited.

. How good a substitute is PRT for the private automobile,

particularly in less densely populated areas? A PRT rid with

ines spaced one-half mile apart, for example, WOU1 require ld

trips of up to one-half mile to reach a PRT station.12

11 probably pRT vehicl~ wo~d utilize @ &flerent form of energy, for example, ekotricity instead Of

gasoline.

IS A pe~n located in the Cent,or of as uare of a grid ~ udle on aside is [2(.25)3] .6, or.% mile. ~ the crow

fliea, from the intersections of the rid, w J%we PRT stationawould be located. If he h~ totravel along streets

laid out parallel angles to the grf , he would have to travel ~ mile to reach an intersection.
313

. What are the tradeoffs between PRT and various substitute

transportation systems and modes? Three possible alternatives,

as yet little utilized, are the following:

Uncoupled grid systems with transit vehicles running back

and forth on the rows and columns of the grid, so that a

traveler starting from any intersection on the grid could

reach any other intersection, with only one change of vehicle.

One of the advantages is that different types of vehicles

might be used on the various lines of the grid, depending on

travel densities, local physical conditions, and already

existing facilities.

Utilization of small rental automobiles, perhaps electrically

powered, which could be procured expeditiously for trips

between points in the service area. (Amsterdam is reported

to be experimenting with such a system, which would have

the advantage of (1) utilizing existing roadways and (2)

avoiding the need for high-cost guidance and control systems.)

Para-transit modes, for example, dial-a-bus systems.
Chapter 3: Justification for Transit Research and Development

What criteria can be used to decide upon the amounts of research

and development funds which the Congress should appropriate to

further transit expansion and improvement? As with many such

questions, there are no formulae which give definite answers, partly

because the benefits of R&D expenditures may not be immediately

discernible, may take a different form than those originally anticipated, and may accrue to society at large instead of a particular

corporation or government agency in a form which can be measured.

There are no data with which cost-benefit analyses can be constructed. The cost of obtaining specified results in this field cannot

be computed in advance within wide limits. Estimates of the cost of

developing PRT technology, for example, run up to $250 million;

its benefits, at the present stage, are, in the view of most of the members of this committee, unpredictable.

R&D expenditures in this field, therefore, are essentially an exercise

in decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. In such situations, however, there are rules for promoting desirable outcomes

and reducing the probability and impact of bad decisions.1

The following considerations and suggestions set forth in a concluding section aim at these objectives.

R&D EXPENDITURES IN THE U nITED STATES

Estimated research and development outlays in the United States

were $13.7 billion in 1960 and $32.1 billion in 1974. Defense and space

expenditures, however, accounted for 55 percent of total R&D in

1960 and 38 percent in 1974. The federal government supplied 64

percent of R&D funds in 1960, and 53 percent in 1974. Industry

funds supplied 32 percent in 1960 and 40 percent in 1974.

In the defense area, R&D expenditures were 16 percent of U.S.

defense expenditures in 1960, and 12 percent in 1974. Industr~-

supplied R&D funds amounted to 6 percent of U.S. private domestic

investment in both 1960 and 1974,2

C ONSIDERATIONS B EARING ON T RANSIT R & D

The following considerations bear upon the needed R&D effort in

transit, and particularly for the automated guideway program:

. Industry interest in the field of transit has been greater than in

many other fields, because of the hopes in the 1960s that a

market would develop for new transit forms which would be

lighter and more flexible than traditional heavy rail systems

and avoid the disadvantages of buses operating on highways

1 See Ruth P. Wick, Planni~ on Uncertainty; Decfaion-Making in Buaine88 and f30vernment Administration. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971.

2 Source of data: U.S. National Science Foundation, reported in Stattitical Abstract of the United State8,

1974, pp. 530-2.

(315)
316

and streets. Several variations of automated guideway transit

systems were developed and exhibited in prototype form at

DOT’s 1972 transportation exposition. (Transpo-72). But the

market never materialized. Outside of several airports and

amusement parks, there were no commercial applications of

light-weight AGT systems in the United States. Industry is

losing interest in the field.

. Technological development in the field of transit is similar to

that of government technological applications generally. It is

difficult to stimulate demand for products which have not yet

been developed; private industry, uncertain as to the needs

and potentia for technological applications in a field dominated

by government, hesitates to undertake large R&D expenditures.

. Expenditures for transit R&D were of the ma

P

f

cent of total Federal capital rants between

f

Y 1966 and FY

1973, but for FY 1974 and Y 1975, R&D has amounted to

somewhat less than 5% of capital grants.

. As indicated earlier, the Federal government is already committed to spend nearly $12 billion in transit improvement over

the next half dozen years. Total transit needs over the nexit

decade are projected at $33 billion; and as much as $60 billion

over the next two decades. (These projections are in 1975

dollars.) The Economics Panel’s opinion is that expenditures

of as much as 5 percent of the amount of projected grants for

mass transit improvement would be a modest investment in

improved transit technology to realize the greatest possible

benefits from transit development expenditures. The amount

would be equivalent to some $600 million R&D, as a corollary

to the present congressional authorization of $11.8 billion. The

panel points out also that it is imperative that, for the huge

transit development program to benefit from technological

advance, the advance must be made early in the program. The

panel therefore recommends accelerating the R&D program for

automated guideway transit systems, and undertaking the

exploration of several technologies. We emphasize that if the

results of such research are not forthcoming early, their potential benefits will almost certainly be greatly reduced since a

large share of the nation’s future urban growth will occur in the

next two decades.

Having indicated the amount that may be justified, however, the

panel wishes to add that productive expenditure of transit R&D funds

will require much better management of UMTA’S R&D program than

has characterized the program in the past. Some speci c suggestions !

and recommendations toward this end are made in the final section.

● A s

f’

reviously mentioned, the two chief technologies now

avai able are rail systems (with some distinction between

“light” and “heavy”) and bus. A number of communities, including the Twin Cities and Denver are interested in automated guideway (GRT) systems with lower capital and

operating costs and greater flexibility than the heavy rail

systems which have dominated transit development recently.

While GRT capacities are less than those of heavy rail systems,
317

the capacity specified by UMTA—15,000 per lane per hour—

is adequate for nearly every corridor in United States urban

areas today not already served by mass transit.

● The magnitude of the potential benefit of R&D is suggested by

the following comparisons. The costs of the Washington mass

transit system will come between $45 and $50 million per mile

for a two-track system, with the cost of the above-grade portion of the METRO system trackage estimated at $11.7 million

a mile. The target figure for UMTA’S GRT project is $3.0

million for above-grade, single lane guideway, or $6.0 million

per mile for a two-track guideway, and $8.0 million a mile for

the complete system.

Recognizing that these two sets of figures are not strictly comparable (the WMATA guideway figure includes land costs, for examr

ple), the UMTA target is a cost figure of no more than half, perhaps

ess, of the cost of present heavy rail systems. however it should be

emphasized that such savings apply only to systems which can be

constructed above ground. Once It becomes necessary to put AGT

underground, guideway costs may approach those of conventional

rail systems. More research is needed respecting the problems of

deploying GRT in already built-up areas.

Another question lies in the area of operating costs. While the weight

of the so-called light transit vehicles may be less than that of conventional buses and rail cars, the weight per passenger of systems developed thus far approaches that of conventional systems. Without a

reduction of per passenger weight it will not be possible to reduce

energy costs of operation. Table 3, below, shows the comparative

weights of various transit vehicles.

TABLE 3.—Comparative weights of various transit uehicles

Lm~ty Area Empty Weight Maximum Loaded

(Sq. weight per sq. passenger weight per

feet) (pounds) foot load 1 passenger z

BART. ---------------- 75.0 787.5 59, 000 75 240 395

Lindenwold -- ----------- 67.5 675.0 72, 000 108 169 600

Washin ton Metro ----- --

8

75.0 765.0 72, 000 94 221 475

Ford A T-------------- 24.7 165.5 12, 500 75 48 410

Mor antown-- ---------- 15.5 103.8 8, 600 83 21 565

AIR?I’RANS (Dallas/

Fort Worth Airport) --- 21.0 147.0 14, 000 95 60 403

Westinghouse (SeattleTacoma Airport) - _ ---- 30.5 265.4 20, 500 77 120 340

1 Based on maximum possible loading.

z Ratio equals loaded weight divided by the number of passengers.

. Another measure of potential return on transit R&D lies in the

possibility of reducing the needs for urban arterial highways

for peak-hour transit. The cost of a six-lane highway, in an area

with an average population density of 6,000 per square mile, is

of the rnagnitucle of $25–$30 million per mile, of which $14–$16

million is for construction. The capacity of such a freeway

assuming average loading of 1.2 persons per auto, is less than
318

the target capacity specified by UMTA for the automatic

guideway project.. If UMTA’S cost targets of $4 million per

one-way system mile could be achieved, a saving from reducing

highway construction by one mile would pay for four miles of

two-lane transit line, of somewhat greater capacity. Land costs

for GRT would also be lower.

● The hoped-for payoffs of R&D are two. First is a much deeper

knowledge of the nature of transportation needs in present and

developing urban communities and the technologies by which

needs may be most effectively served. Second are improved

technologies which can meet future as well as present transit

needs in many urban areas. At the least, there is bright hope

for improvement of propulsion systems, braking systems and

other hardware which will improve the serviceability and comfort of the next generation or transit vehicles. Further in the

future is the potential of a true personal rapid transit technology, which should go far toward overcoming the disadvantages of and inadequacies which characterize today’s

urban transportation systems.

. The panel warns that transit R&D is a high-risk investment.

It is not yet certain that quantum advances are possible. In the

panel’s estimation, however, the potential payoffs of a wellmanaged R&D program justify the risk.
Chapter 4: Suggestions and Recommendations

G ENERAL RAD P OLIC Y

The Economics Panel concurs with R&D expenditures of up to 5

percent of federal appropriations for transit, providing that program

objectives are more clearly defined and more emphasis is given to the

purposes to be served by different transit modes, the environment in

which they must operate, and the kinds of new technological developments most needed.

The Economics Panel is concerned with the lack of knowled e

respecting specific transit needs in American cities, how new tech- i

nologies might be adapted to already built-up areas without incurring

the enormous costs o going underground, and how they most effec- f

tively serve new developing areas. One panel member expresses his

concern as follows:

Deployment studies should be the main focus of PRT research

because it is not certain that present hardware development

objectives, even if they achieve fractional headways, would be

useful for major metropolitan systems in the United States.

Extensive research and development in improving the suspension,

propulsion, and control hardware on PRT systems wou d seem Y

to be premature until it is clear that they would be useful when

perfected,

Application studies should be conducted across a wide range

of cit)’ sizes, densities and configurations. In each case, actual

PRT systems should be laid out and planned on the assumption

that technological im movements can be made available. Simulation studies should e conducted to the extent necessary to 11

determine best control of system strategies, vehicle deplo~’ment

strategies, best highwa~’ planning strategies, etc. The results

would provide better insights into such matters as:

1. The headway required for transit vehicles to be effective under different

situations; (Perhaps fractional second headways are not needed after all.)

2. The number of stations required under different conditions;

3. The number of tracks needed and the dimensions of stations in central

business districts, outlying residential areas, and other major commercial

areas;

4. The line spacings appropriate under different city sizes, densities, and

configurations;

5. Research on public acceptability of new hardware in various areas in

actual cities.

Another panel member believes that great emphasis in UMTA’S

overall program should be on rationalizing urban transportation policy

in such a way as to create a climate that is conducive to the success

and growth of transit alternatives.

(319)
320

For example, full cost pricing-especially during peak periods—

of existing transportation would have much more impact on

urban transit than the most exotic, attractive and functional

new technology. Anything less would leave UMTA with an increasingly expensive sector to subsidize, less flexibility in responding to urban transit needs, and little opportunity to introduce

new technology into a friendly environment.

Another panel member also questions the priority of more hardware

R&D at this stage. He says:

The main (research) issue is whether there exists a set of

transit performance characteristics that, at any non-negative

price, and at existing or expected automobile trip prices, wil 1 lead

significant numbers of persons to choose transit rather than

automobiles for urban trip s during congested portions of the day.

It would seem, then, t at the requisite research would divide h

rather naturally into the following parts:

1. The first part would be some sort of a parametric simulation to determine if any vector of transit characteristics, including price, exists which

might have some chance of attracting large volumes of riders, with or without

changing the price structure for automobile trips.

2. If such a vector is found, the second step would be to undertake the

hardware and system research required to determine whether a system with

the desired characteristics can be produced and operated at costs which

would make it consistent with acceptable fares and subsidies.

3. If a system appears technically feasible, the third stage of research

would be to desi n and deploy that system in an environment in which both

the technical an demand characteristics of the system could be tested. The J

purpose of this step would be to validate both the market simulation and the

technical research. If the system proved effective, further deployments

could be executed.

The major difficulty with the research program outlined by

the panel report is the inadequate emphasis on demand and the

excessive emphasis on the hardware and system side. There is

little point in designing new hardware or systems unless there is

some indication that the system would attract riders at some

economically reasonable price.

SUGGESTIONS FOR T RANSIT R ESEARCH M ANAGEMEN T

Various members of the Economics Panel sumgested that the UMTA

R&D program in the past has lacked focus and direction and that

more attention should be given to improving research management

and to strategies for encouraging the development and adoption of

new transit technologies. The panel lacked time to formulate a comF

rehensive set of suggestions, but contributed a number of suggestions

or improving research management.

Broader Views of Transit Functions.—As to UMTA’S proposed research on automated guideway transit, the Economics Panel has expressed four main concerns.

● It was generally felt that the proposed GRT development program, which

will select one of three quite different technologies for actual development

and demonstration, will incur the risk of freezing GRT technology before

the principal alternatives have been sufficiently explored.
321

● There is some danger in the proposal that the firm selected to build the

prototype system in Phase 2 of the GRT project will gain a monopolistic

position in the transit supply field. Such a development, it is felt, would

be prejudicial to the interest of both potential future transit suppliers and

the urban areas which are the potential customers for new transit

technologies.

● The proposed technique of selecting firms for R&D does not afford sufficient incentive for firms to develop products in the hope of marketing them

thereafter. Partly because of disillusionment over the failure to develop a

market for new technologies, firms tend to regard R&D projects as ends in

themselves, from which to extract as much profit as possible. Such an

attitude is not conducive to the innovative, yet practical, product development at which American industry presumably excels.

● The Economics Panel wishes particularly to emphasize demonstration

projects should not be exploited for political purposes of the incumbent

administration, nor for public relations purposes of the supplier or of

UMTA. Both the Morgantown demonstration project and the BART

system have suffered as a result of pressure to rush them along and to

open them prematurely.

Specific Long-Term Objectives.—The present “HPPRT” program,

is felt to be lacking in specific long-term objectives. A principal

objective mentioned by UMTA is the ultimate development of P Ti

technologies, It is not clear how the proposed project would contribute to this long-term objective, or what the next steps would

be. Also, there is no plan for utilizing the results of R&D thus far,

nor the results of the proposed project, The most pressing present

needs, on the other hand, are ones to which light-weight GRT systems

may be applicable.

Increasing Incentive for Suppliers.—UMTA should examine the

possibility of aggregating markets for transit systems and transit

hardware as a means of increasing incentive for suppliers to undertake R&D on their own and enable realization of economies of largescale production. Market aggregation could be achieved in several

ways. One way is to induce several communities with similar needs

to contract with a supplier or suppliers for specific items, which

may range from whole systems to specific hardware. Such a buyer

consortium would presumably use mutually agreed-upon specifications

in soliciting bids from suppliers. (The following recommendation

has to do with the development of specifications for such purposes.)

UMTA’S position as a major source of funds for transit development

places it in a strategic position to encourage such consortiums.

Specifications.—One of the objectives of the research program

should be the development of specifications for automated transit

systems and components thereof. It was noted that many elements of

transit technology are still in the experimental stage. (Even the

rail systems which have recently begun operating, notably Lindenwold

and BART, have experienced much trouble with design and performance of various hardware components.)

. Primary attention should be given to developing specifications

for requirements of transit systems overall, environmental

aspects (for example, designs which can be adapted to already

built-up areas), and hardware components.

. Also needed are better evaluation criteria for determining

whether performance specifications have been met.
Deployment Dernomtrationx.—Once a new technology has been developed, UMTA should take the responsibility for seeing that it is

adequately tested and demonstrated in real-use situations. This

involves projects which will put the technology to actual use. For

example, the next round of development in GRT systems might be

utilized to meet some such common need as connecting a large parking

area to a central business district. University campuses offer a good

testin ground for transit development. The unfortunate experience

with Morgantowm should not preclude deployment demonstrations

on other campuses.

Incremental Building. -Such deployment demonstrations may serve

as building blocks for testing larger systems. For example, a technology

which has proved successful on, say, a university campus might be

employed next in a small urban community as a second development

stage, and in a still larger community as a third stage. Or transit

systems may be built incrementally, perhaps in $100-million units

rather than billion-dollar units. In this connection, the experience of

Toronto, which started with a four-mile line along Yonge Street, is

instructive, Baltimore and Buffalo are using such a strategy at the

Present time.1 .

Continue and Expand Present Systems.-UMTA should make sure

that the utmost benefit is derived from projects already mounted.

This means learning all Possible from the Morgantown. Dallas-Fort

Worth, BART, and other new systems. In particular, a’ system such

as Morgantown should not be written off as an unfortunate mistake

but should be continued and, if possible, expanded to the point of

making the project useful for learning purposes as well as for practical

DurDoses.

 Personal Ravid Transit.—Finallv, it should be recorded that one

member of the’ Economics Panel, ~. ‘Edward Anderson, feels strongly

that personal rapid transit is so promising, and the need for it so

imperative, that a significant portion of federal transit R&D should

concentrate on bringing the technology and planning methodology to

fruition within the shortest practical time consistent with good

management practice. He believes that the concept is feasible technologically. Other members of the panel are skeptical about the

possibility of developing dependable, economically feasible PRT

within the foreseeable future.

1 One panel member objects that “the deployment demonstrations suggested simply do not contemplate

the kind of environment necessary to make the necessary market tests.”
APPENDIX

COMPOSITION OF THE PANEL ON ECONOMICS

Dr. Lyle C. Fitch, Chairman

President, Institute of Public Administration

Washington, D.C.

Lyle C. Fitch is president of the Institute of Public Administration, the nation’s

oldest nonprofit governmental research and consulting organization. He has

held numerous municipal, state and federal offices, including City Administrator

of New York City. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University

and has taught at Columbia, City University of New York, Wesleyan University,

and elsewhere, In 1961 he directed a study of federal urban transportation policy,

commissioned by HHFA and the Bureau of Public Roads, which provided

important inputs to the first federal urban mass transportation act.

Dr. J. Edward Anderson

Regional Transportation District

Denver, Colorado

J. Edward Anderson, Ph. D., P. E., Professor of Mechanical Engineering,

University of Minnesota, on leave as consultant to Regional Transportation

District, Denver, Colorado. BSME, Iowa State University, 1949; MSME,

~Tniversitlr of ~~innes ota, 195,5; Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

1962. General Chairman, International Conference on Personal Rapid Transit.

Editor, Personal Rapid Transit. Personal Rapid Transit II.

Thomas B. Deen

Vice President

Alan M. Voorhees and Associates, Inc.

hlcLean, Virginia

hlr. Deen has served as principal-in-charge of comprehensive transit and

urban transportation studies in many large cities of the world including

Washington, D. C., Atlanta, Baltimore, Caracas, Honolulu, and Sao Paulo. He

formerly was director of planning for the federal agency which developed plans

for the l$rashington Nfetro now under construction. His writings have been

published in most of the professional journals in the urban transportation field.

Dr. Paul K. Dygert

Senior Consultant

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

Washington, D.C.

Dr. Dygert has engaged in teaching, research, and consulting in transportation

economics and financing. Recently he undertook a financial feasibility analysis

for a proposed personal rapid transit system, and conducted a study for urban

mass transportation needs and financing which the Secretary of Transportation

transmitted to the Congress in July 1974. He has also undertaken transportation

studies for international, state, and local agencies.

Dr. Aaron J. Gellman

Gellman Research Associates

Jenkintown, Pennsylvania

Dr. Gellman, since 1972, has headed his own research consulting firm and has

servdd as adjunct professor in the Transportation and Regional Science Division

of the Wharton School of Business, L“niversity of Pennsylvania. Formerly, he

was vice president for planning at The Budd Company, Philadelphia. B.A,—

EC onomics, L’niversity of Virginia, i$lBA-Transportation, I_~niversity of Chicago

and Ph.D.—Economics, M.1.T.

(323)
324

Charles Hickox

Director of Ground Transportation Marketing

~~mAe+~;p;ce Corporation

Mr. Hicko~ has been responsible for market lanning and development for

E

ound transportation since the inception of L V’s commitment to this area. {

e has been closely associated with the development of the AIRTRANS system

at the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport and the licensing of this technology in both

Japan and France. He has lectured extensively on automated transit.

Dr. Douglas B. Lee

Office of Comprehensive Planning

Fairfax County

Fairfax, Virginia

Dr. Lee was formerly at the University of California, Berkeley, where he taught

City Planning and conducted research in the comparative costs of urban transportation modes. After a year’s work on Fairfax County’s land-use planning

program, he will join the faculty of the University of Iowa.

Sumner Myers

Director Urban System Studies

Institute of Public Administration

Washington, D.C.

Sumner Myers, a graduate of M. I. T., is a director of Urban Systems Studies

for the Institute of Public Administration in Washington, D.C. and the author of

numerous publications on technological innovation and transportation. He was a

participant in HUD’s study of transportation technology and editorial advisor

for the final report, TomorrotL$s Transportation.
REPORT OF THE PANEL ON

SOCIAL ACCEPTABILITY

Prepared for

the Office of Technology Assessment

PANEL MEMBERS

Jacquelyn A, Ingersoll, Chairman

Ralph Jackson

Alain L, Kornhauser

Rodney K. Lay

John B. Schnell

Reed H. Winslow

George V. Wickstrom

(325)
CON T E N TS

Introduction ----------------- ----- ------------------ --------------

Chapter:

1.A Context of Need- ---n --------------- ----- -----------------

2. Interest~~ou s and thelr Concerns -------------- ---------------

Users ----------------- ------------------- --------

Operating Agencies -------- _-___. __- T-------------- ------

The Community and the General Pubic ------------- ------

Labor--------------n--n-- ------------------------- -----

Landowners and Destmatlon Groups ------------------- -..

3. Impact on the Neighborhood- ----- ------------------- --------

4. Conclusions-T ------------- ---- ------------------ -------------

AppendIx: Blographlc Summary of Panel Member --------------- ----

Pam

329

331

335

335

338

340

341

342

343

347

353

(327)
Introduction

Any assessment of the social acceptability of automated transit

can only be speculative at this time. The Social Acceptability Panel

offers the following comments and opinions to illustrate issues that

need further research and consideration rather than to attempt a definitive or authoritative review of the subject. Indeed, the most

significant conclusion this panel can offer is that there is at least

as much research work to be done on the potential social and environmental impact in urban areas of automated guideway transit as there

is on the technological developments.

The evidence of recent and current local studies on automated

transit indicates that planning and decision-making at the local

level on the use of automated systems is an exceptionally difficult

process in automobile-dependent communities.1 Achieving an “acceptable” plan involving massive capital investment, uncertain operating cost, and educated guesses about the resultin impact on trans ortation, the environment, and urban form is a fformldable task.khe

process must not only involve a complete analysis of all possible

alternative approaches to transit—automated, non-automated, and

mixed—but must also be responsive to a broad range of community

interest groups. It must be strongly related to comprehensive regional

land use planning. If the reserach efforts of the Federal government

are to result in actual urban use of automated systems, it must be

recognized that communities need a great deal more than test track

technological developments with which to judge the merits of these

automated systems. They must have better answers about human

engineering issues, costs, eflects on land use and environmental impact. At this time, it may be appropriate to apply existing automated

technology to urban and specialized settings to get some of those answers be ore committing the bulk of available research funds to more

advanced technology ies. It must be remembered that local decisionmakers are more li f ely to be politicians than technical experts. The

negative consequences of their last venture into major transportation

‘improvement” (i.e., urban freeways) has made them very wary.

This panel agreed that raising the level of confidence concerning the

social acceptability of automated transit will require:

. R&D programs directed at the process of predicting, interpreting, and communicating the social consequences of transportation improvements.

● clear indication of long-term Federal financial commitment to

automated transit.

I ~{DeVelOprnent 0[ performance specifications for the Regional Fixed CMideway SYstem,” SimWn &

Curtin/Midwest Planning, Inc. for Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission. Reports 74-1 & 2,

January 1974.

“Automated Small Vehicle Fixed @ideway Systems Study,” prepared by DeLeuw-Cather for Twin

Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Planning Commission, #75-03 (Preliminary Draft), January 1975.

“The Transit Issue,” Thomas Todd, presented to the House ha! and Urban Af?atrs Committee, Minnesota Legislature, January 22, 1975.

(329)
330

The and members gratefull acknowledge numerous contributions

from teir colleagues and t e generous response of specialists, h K

particularly:

. Earl Putnam, General Counsel, Amalgamated Transit Union.

● Frank Caiatl, GM Transportation Systems Division.

. Larry Dallam, Director of Transportation Planning, Twin

Cities Metropolitan Council.

The appendix summarizes the professional experience of the members of t is panel, Social Acceptability of Automated Guideway !

Transit in the United States.
Chapter 1: A Context of Need

The question of the overall social acceptability of automated guideway transit must be viewed within the context of the comprehensive

transportation challenge facing many emerging metropolitan communities today. Until fairly recently, the combination of cheap land, cheap

energy, strong economic growth, and lack of concern about pollution

and urban decay, coupled with relatively high personal income and

widespread auto ownership ,

t

led inevitably to the wide dispersion of

homes, jobs, stores and ur an activities. In most cases, the only link

now joining these elements is an extensive network of highways and

streets. Public transit systems, coomposed mainly of buses, carry only a

tmy fraction of travelers even m communities which are pursuing

aggresslve upgrading of service.

8 lowly people began to notice that the resulting urban form with

its accompanying auto congestion was causing roblems both in the

suburbs and central cities. Public awareness o the plight of those r

with no access to the auto developed. The first step taken to combat

the ills was localized opposition IO new urban freeways. Renewed

interest in improving public transit marked the beginning of a new

era. Environmental concerns, shortage of oil, inflation and the threat

of economic slowdown boosted the cause and elevated transportation

issues into general public consciousness. Current man-on-the-street

interest in public transit may be shifting from an attitude of “We

must have better public transit so that I can drive without hindrance

and my neighborhood can be protected from excessive through

traffic” to a new focus best expressed as “Can I get to work on time

if I have to give up my second car, or, will my family have to face

isolation at home during the day?”

This shift in public attitude has major potential for those who must

find solutions. The task may no longer be to lure the consumer from

his auto by duplicating the characteristics of that auto in the form of

regionally deployed true PRT, as was once thought. It now seems

more probab e that the challenge of the next thirty years lies in 1y

increasing the productivity of aU elements of the existing investment

in road systems. This period will probably be characterized by a

reduction in family auto ownership, emphasis on more efficient autos,

car pooling, more efficient use of roads, attempts to check urban sprawl,

and reduction of total transportation demand through clustered development. The public transit systems will be expected to increase

ridership significantly, particularly in peak hours for work trips, and

to provide access to transportation for the disadvantaged. In the interest of labor, equipment and energy efficiency, some transit operators

can be expected to make a relatively modest, but none the less costly,

shift to electrification and automation to boost the productivity of

buses. Regional land use planners will be interested in using automated systems as a tool to direct new developments toward more

economic patterns of land use.

(331)
The 2lst century seems likely to bring a period of major shift

from an oil based urban transportation system to one dependent again

on electricity. There could, but not necessarily would, be a shift

of equal magnitude in modal split between private and public transit.

Urban form could change drastically. Life styles, the mechanics of

earning a living and personal value systems could undergo changes as

radical as were expemenced in the last century’s shift from horse and

electricity to oil. It is futile to speculate on the exact nature of such

changes, but automated transit systems may well become primary

elements of urban transportation. Beyond that assertion, one can only

see that the nature of such systems will be geared to the unpredictable

human needs and urban form of that time. Current resumptions

that such systems must inevitably be of the pure P T type are R

based on a debatable determination that this is the ideal response to

the needs, values and urban form of today, which is not a very reliable

guide for the future.

It maybe well to heed the lessons of natural evolution which indicate

that creatures with. the generalized capacity to adapt to a wide range

of unpredictable circumstances tend to survive over those not so

gifted. Applied to transit technology, it would seem wiser to assume

at this time that all possible automated systems types have potentially

valid urban application on their own merits and are not simpIy steps

to PRT. This is an issue of overall importance to the socia accept- r

ability of automated guideway transit to da as well as its utility in

the future. So long as t e “all roads lead to P T“ psychology prevails,

there will be extreme reluctance to make major capital investment in

near-term available automated transit that may shortly be “outdated.” This concern, coupled with the doubtful public acceptability

of fine-gnd aerial PRT guideway networks in residential areas may

cause local commumties to drop consideration of automation altogether. This would be unfortunate, because simpler automated systems

could play an important role in meeting the needs of those communities

in the next few years.

Public and “expert” percetion of the problem must be turned from

the oversold long-term need or an alternative to the automobile to the

more prosaic but urgent need to make existing bus and rail systems,

as well as the auto, more productive. Discussion and utilization of automated guideway transit can then proceed on a more realistic basis to

meet the needs of today and provide sufficient experience to guide the

planning for using automation in the future.

Public acceptance is seldom clearly traceable to calm reasoning.

Opinions about the influence of major transportation improvements on

the quality of life are not necessarily formed from orderly inter~retation of fact. Broad community education and involvement is required before the oinions of incident groups will include an understanding, for examp e, of economic costs and benefits. Y

Acceptability in the short term is a function of clearly perceived

immediate advantages to the individual. The public consensus, such as

may evolve, will be an integration of many narrow viewpoints; the advanta es to the broader society of environmental protections sought by

specia interest groups, for example, are generally only recognized with

hindsight.

One source of information on public acceptance of new systems is

the continuing Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) Impact Study.
333

Early evaluations were reported at the annual Transportation Research Board conference in January 1975.1 Apparent from the study

is a time lag between building the system and feeling its effects: very

few clear impacts are yet traceable to BART, probably because of

the size of the region involved. Certainly, many people ride the system

and alternative modes of public transportation have in some cases

lost patronage. Effects other than those on the total transportation

systems’ modal split, however, are less obvious at this early date.

Impacts that were predicted, both positive and negative, have not

yet materialized. This may be due partly to community accommodations, partly to imprecise techniques for stating and measuring

probable Impacts, both by planners and lay citizens.

National interests center on issues of federal involvement in research,

development and demonstration of new systems and probable heavy

Federal funding of local systems. AGT systems are of national interest

because of their potential for contributing to a better balanced urban

transportation system and increasing the productivity of money and

energy used in transportation. National interests in environmental

improvement and improved transit for the disadvantaged are also

important considerations. Further, there is national interest in the

economic consequences of developing a new AGT industry. The potential of both domestic and foreign markets for U.S. AGT systems

and competition for U.S. markets from foreign suppliers is a significant

matter of national policy.

Hence, the questions of encouraging or discouraging automated

transit technology touch both immediate, individual interests and

national interests. Both ends of the spectrum deserve much more

careful thought on the part of those who make transit decisions. In

particular, ways and means have to be found to ready existing institutions to make the chosen transportation improvements work.

Finally, the panel noted the considerable (if not overriding) influence

state and local government wields over transportation decisions.

State governments have major transportation responsibilities. They

can be expected to be concerned about costs. The rise in the cost of

urban road building and maintenance creates interest at the state

level in automated urban systems; so does the lack of public acceptance

of new highways. The states usually have a responsibility for environmental improvement as well as a concern for the economic health of

the state as a whole. The movement of goods is heavily regulated at

the state level as is traffic and public safety.

State governments are the ultimate source of the powers delegated

to local governments. Structuring metropolitan agencies to make

them capable of handling regional problems in a coordinated fashion

is a tremendous challenge, particularly in the field of transportation

where jurisdictions are typically fragmented and in competition for

ever scarcer transportation funds. Extensive reliance on automated

transit to meet a significant portion of urban trips would likely require

much greater coordination and more centralized authority than is now

typical . creating and funding effective, accountable, and responsive

metropolitan agencies to handle transportation and land use problems

is the most serious challenge facing state governments, and one that is

critical to the future of automated transit.

1 1lA Review of some Anticipated and Observed Impacts of the Bay Ar08 Rapid Tra~ft s~tem~”

R. Ellis (PMM&CO,), TRB Annual Meeting Conference s~ion, Januai y 13, 1975.
Chapter 2: Interest Groups and Their Concerns

Assessment of the social acceptability of automated guideway transit

systems must proceed from an understanding of the needs and concerns of groups of people, all of whom have a role to play in the local

decision making process. The panel selected a short list representing

the incident society, whose concerns will govern the “acceptability”

of AGT plans and subsequent implementation. The following brief

summary of these stakeholders and their interests highlights some of

the most important considerations.

T RANSIT U SER S

As a group, users can be expected to be concerned mainly about

reliability, safety, total trip time, comfort, noise, convenience and

accessibility, availability and frequency of service, personal security,

out-of-pocket cost, and ease of transfer to and from other modes of

travel. Users have a large stake in the question of how soon transit

can be significantly improved and how extensive systems will be.

PERSONAL TRANSPORTATION COSTS

Many users and potential users, particularly commuters, have a

serious and urgent interest in reducing personal overall transportation

costs by reducing the need for a second car.

PASSEN(3ER INFORMATION

An important and frequently overlooked concern of the user and

would-be user is the need for information about how to use the transit

system. Ready access to complete and specific information about the

system poses a challenge to managers in all forms of transit. Not only

must information be available in stations and bus shelters, it must be

available in the home where most decisions on mode are made. Public

awareness campaigns comparable to existing driver education programs are needed.

THE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTA(3ED

The stake in the potential of automated guideway transit is perhaps

greatest for those disadvantaged by lack of access to private autos,

especially in communities that are today essentially auto-dependent.

These groups comprise the bulk of present transit users and their

ranks will grow as more and more famdies are unable to afford private

transportation for all family members for all trips. Daily existence,

for this group, is tied to the adequacy of the public transit system.

Increasing the range of choice of jobs, housing, health care, educational

opportunity, shopping, recreational and cultural opportunities for

this group can be expected to be an important goal of regional transportation planning. ft is possible that a great number of latent trans-

(335)
336

it users could be found among the disadvantaged. They could easily

be overlooked in making patronage estimates, particularly for offpeak travel; though they should be counted.

THE PHYSICALLY DISADVANTA(3ED

If automated systems are to be useful to the elderly, the very young

and the handicapped, design features that enable them to use the

system easily and safely are of paramount importance. Attendants

in stations may be necessary. These factors may add significantly to

operating and capital costs of automated systems.

PERSONAL SECURITY

Personal security is of critical concern to users. Transit crime is a

reality in non-automated systems; it poses even greater problems in

automated ones. Concern for security must be an Important aspect of

design for all types of automated systems. Adequate remote surveillance, good communication and prompt response to incidents may add

significantly to labor costs of automated systems. And labor costs may

increase proportionately as the size of vehicles is reduced and the number of vehicles and stations increases. 1 Efforts to enhance security

must recognize that dangers perceived by the user may not correspond

with actual danger. The user must not only be secure, but feel secure.

The security problem may be especially acute for small vehicles featuring shared rides where there is neither the safety in numbers characteristic of medium and large vehicles of the group rapid transit and

shuttle types, or the privacy of true PRT.

RELIABILITY

Reliability is another critical measure of user acceptability. Reliability of an automated system should be based upon a standard,

relevant to the consumer, such as: the passenger should not have to

experience a significant delay (30 minutes or more) more often than

once in 100 trips.

PEDESTRIAN SUPPORT

In general, users can currently be expected to walk about 1/4 of a

mile.2 This, of course, presumes adequately constructed and maintained pedestrian access—a cost factor frequently overlooked because

it falls outside the jurisdiction of transit operating agencies. 1t is

possible that if auto usage becomes severely curtailed, longer walking

distances will be more acceptable.

TRANSFERS AND INTERMEDIATE STOPS

A major continuing theoretical discussion, relative to acceptability

by the user, centers on the events of transfers and interxnediate stops

vs. origin-destination service. Transfers have a bad name. This is

I Preliminary Draft Study Report of the Twin Cities SVS, DeLeuw-Cather and Co., Inc. et al, Report No.

7543 January 1975.

s This, and other characteristics of Transit Users as a class. have been extmwively rewrted and reviewed,

e.g.,

. -

“User Detenn.ined Attributes of Ideal Transportation SystmnS,” Department of Business Adrniniatration,

University of Maryland, June 1966.

“Technol~ Assessment O/ Pe~nal Rapir3 Tr~t S~eme,” The ~TRE Corporation, MTR 6664,

January 1975,
337

quite understandable since transfers on the present bus service frequently involve long waits unexposed locations. One response to this

problem is to attempt to develop a transit system which carries a

passenger from origin to destination on a single vehicle, preferably on

a personal basis without intermediate stops. Such an attempt may

well exceed public need or expectation and, since it is technically

difficult and very expensive to achieve, deserves some re-examination.

Studies in Denver indicate that the negative environmental impact

of guideway interchanges significantly outweighs the marginal patronage advantage achieved by eliminating transfers.3

Investigation may show that what is really important to those

currently depending on autos and pressed by increasing auto costs is

safe, reliable, frequent service to multiple destination in a reasonable

period of time. Transfers that can be accomplished quickly in a climate

controlled, secure location may be quite acceptable. If transfer points

are laced with opportunities to turn single-purpose trips into multipurpose ones, so much the better.

Using the station clustering concept—carrying groups of passengers

from a cluster of origin stations to a cluster of common estimation

stations—the few intermediate stops involved may not add significantly to total trip time. It is possible that this will suffice for

“personalizing” service as far as passengers are concerned.

Adoption of these points of view has considerable implication for

the near-term utilization of AGT systems. Currently available

technology for loop and shuttle systems and medium and large

vehicle G RT could probably do an acceptable job in many urban

applications. It would no longer be necessary to choose a single

vehicle for a system. A regional transit system could be composed of

a mixture of AGT systems, each geared to the needs of the area

or function it serves. Those beleaguered citizens seeking to replace

a planned freeway or reduce its scale with an AGT suitable for

coridor service could be satisfied as could those needing a smaller

vehicle system to serve a university community with a different set

of problems.

Attempting to provide no-transfer non-stop service for an entire

region puts all generic types of AGT under severe technological and

economic stress. As suggested above, it may not be all that important

to the user. Certainly further consideration of true public need and

preference is desirable. Such consideration should be based on some

real urban experience with AGT.

Regional p arming agencies, committed to development strategies r

which encourage living, working and shopping within a single compact

subregion, will probably place a premium on short trip transit service.

Provision of transfer-free region-wide service would work against

short trips.

STANDEES VERSUS SEATED PASSEN(3ERS

Recent improvements to the interior design, and the resultant

comfort levels, of bus and rail transit vehicles are assumed for AGT.

One particular aspect of AGT vehicle design with broad acceptability

and system design implications is the question of standing passengers.

A great many technical problems hang on the issue of whether standees

should be allowed.

$ "Alternatives Analysis Report,” Denver Alternative Analyais Study, Denver RTD, April 1975.
338

Seated, and preferably restrained, passengers would vastly improve

safety and comfort features of small vehicles operating at very short

headways. Such a requirement has two serious drawbacks. One:

requiring passengers to be seated reduces operating flexibility in

coping with unanticipated increases in demand on a localized basis

and could result in a significant increase in waiting time. Two: a

policy requiring seated passengers could be very difficult to enforce.

Even low ceilings are not a complete answer because they would not

affect young children, Controlling the exact number of passengers

entering a vehicle is complicated and expensive for group-ride vehicles.

Interlock systems for passenger restraints could cause serious delays

in stations. On the other hand, public cooperation may prove easier

to achieve with an entirely new mode than has been the case with

the auto.

The standing vs. seated question has relevance to acceptability

beyond the technological aspects of achieving safety and comfort. If

it is presumed that people will not shift from autos to transit unless

guaranteed a seat, that presumption should be retested. Studies done a

few years ago in an era of higher auto availability and cheap gasoline

are apt to be misleading for today in trying to answer this question,

and others, Such evidence as exists from current transit usage indicates

that standing for short trips or short portions of long trips at peak

hours is quite acceptable. An exception would be the elderly, but most

travel by the elderly is probably during off-peak periods when seating

is not a problem.

If the shift from auto to transit is based on an attempt to reduce

personal transportation costs, being seated is not likely to be nearly

so important as trip time, reliability, and frequency o service. Auto t

owners’ recent willingness to relinquish automobile comfort and safety

features in favor of better mileage and lower capital cost has important

implications for this and other operational characteristics o AGT. f

O PERATING A GENCIE S

Operators originally developed an interest in automated transit in

the ope of increasing the productivity of labor. Now, in the face of E

community demand for an expanded role and level of service for

transit, the concern for reducing marginal cost is even greater.

Rehability of automated systems is perhaps the most important

issue to operators. Automated systems that require an army of highly

skilled maintenance workers for both preventive maintenance and

restoration of breakdowns represent a risk that few operators are

likely to be willing to take. At the present time, it ap ears that the

risk of high expense for maintenance increases as vehic es get smaller 1’

and more numerous, and headways become shorter.

Safety is an important issue to operators. Today’s safet~r standards

dictate that there be sufficient headway between vehicles to allow for

safe stopping distance without collision. Operators have to be concerned that any change in that policy to allow ‘<soft” crashes (as may

well be necessary to achieve adequate system capacity on the smaller

vehicle systems) poses serious questions of public acceptability and

potentially high insurance costs. The popular solution is to require

that all passengers be seated and restrained. As stated previously, this

could reduce flexibility in system capacity and add additional costs for
339

passenger management. The panel noted that a major reason airline

cabin personnel are required is to insure passengers are buckled in

seats and trays are upright during take-off and landing. Another area

of potentia!l~r high labor cost with automated systems is that of personal security~~, Responding promptly to emergencies is an important

key to security. It is probable that the cost of that response is tied

directly to the number of vehicles and stations.

It has been assllmed that the development of automated fare

collection systems and superior methods for informing and managing

passengers would eliminate the need for attendants in stations. It is

possible, however, that the interaction of patrons and the system is

more complex than realized. At this time, operators will probably

have to assume that stations must be manned, especially in high

crime are~s, until it is proven unnecessar~-. This represents another

potential cost to operators, one that is directly related to the number

of stations involved and the number of hours of daily operation.

The panel was asked to examine the impact of providing free transit

on automated s~-stems. A few examples of no-fare transit systems have

been in continuous operation for a number of years. These include the

service at Colonial Williamsburg, which operates in a continuous

one-way loop from the visitor center, and the M&O subway in Fort

Worth, Texas which although primarily intended to serve shoppers,

has developed a significant commuter load. These systems, however,

are relativel~” limited in size and scope.

No-fare systems also operate on a number of college campuses and

into the surrounding areas. One such system, at Kent State University

(Kent, Ohio), has all the characteristics of a conventional bus system,

with a number of routes, and seven day per week operation. Ridership

is limited to students, faculty, and employees of the university, and

is financed through a levy on riders,

Fare boxes, particularly the registering type, have proved to be

a persistent maintenance problem on buses, and a common source of

road calls. By definition, a no-fare system eliminates the need for a

transit company to handle cash, and no monitoring of assengers is

required b~” the operator, except where ridership is imited to a r

specific group of users.

The impact of a no-fare system on ridership is difficult to estimate.

It is possible that ridership will not increase significantly at peak

times, since there is evidence that peak-period riders tend to select

their transportation on the basis of convenience rather than cost.

I.arger increases in ridership are to be expected at off-peak times,

when cost is a more critical factor than convenience. This minimal

experience (in addition to the example of elevators in buildings and

the majority of operating automated systems in airports) points to

a no-fare policy being acceptable when: (1) The system serves special

interest groups or enhances a commercial enterprise, (2) there is no

reasonable alternative mode, (s) the typical trip is short, frequent,

and many-to-many, (4) handling money, operating and maintaining

fare box equipment, and the associated security problems outweigh

the value of the revenue, and (5) the operators’ expenses are offset

by other economic advantages, which is not likely to be the case with

urban systems.

i’!-:ji( ( ) - 7- - ~ ;
340

Beyond the questions of labor costs, reliability and safety, operators have to consider capacity, patronage, revenues and energy

requirements. Effectively coordinating automated transit service

with other public systems and private transportation is important.

Operating flexibility and the ability of the system to expand are of

serious concern. Operators must consider staging strategy for capital

investment. They must also consider development costs, a significant

item even for so-called ‘(existing” technology. The are anxious to

reduce technological and acceptance risks and 100 to the federal

government for help in this area as well as capital funding, especially

those considering "first” applications of new technology.4

For the long run, operators have to consider how systems they might

install in the near future can gracefully adapt to new technological

developments. They have to consider the possibility that public

transit will one day be the most dominant element in urban trans ortation and perhaps the only element along with walking, within se ected Y

urban settings.

THE COMMUN ITY AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC

At the community level, the interests of all the stakeholder groups

come together in the local decision-making process. The lack of sohd

information about the technological feasibihty, capital and operating

cost, social and environmental impact and public acceptance of automated systems makes that process very difficult. It must be emphasized that balancing all of the interests involved would be a difficult political task, even if good information existed. Communities

are considering a major shift in travel behavior when they examine

transit options. Depending on the option chosen transportation costs

could shift from the private to the public sector, as education costs

did decades a o. Certainly, this would be the case with extensive

deployment of automated systems. The complex impact of such

shifts cannot be overestimated and it should not be surprising if communities are hesitant to make quick decisions. People want assurance

that automated systems will solve more problems than they create.

The following is simply a sample of community concerns about the

possible consequences of automated transit. These must not only be

Identified, but also weighed against one another in any assessment of

AGT. ●

● Impact on achieving compliance with air quality and noise

level standards.

. Impact on regional energy consumption and conservation.

. Impact on present land use and property values.

. Impact on the pattern and extent of future development.

. Impact on existin

7

and future road systems.

. Impact on regiona economic growth.

● Impact on personal m!bility and op ortunity.

. Impact on citizen

r

artlcipation in ur an planning. t

. Impact on regiona bonded indebtedness. 6

● Impact on local and state taxes.

4 uestions Of Multi-modality and Incremental planning were central to the item of a Nent UMTA/

TR workshop: see “O ning Remarks by C. Kenneth Omki, before the Conference on Evaluation of %

Urban Transportation A ternatives Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia, February 24, 1975”. P

t ~~The Au~mated Small VeMcle ‘Fixed ~ufdeway Study,” (P. *). A Report to the 1975 biskt

u

e ‘f

the Stab of Minnesota, Metropolitan council of the T~n ci~le.s Areat April 1975,
341

Individuals who choose not to use automated transit will nevertheless face higher transportation costs in the form of increased taxation

to pay for the system since it cannot be assumed at this time that

either capital or operating costs will be met by revenues. It is possible

that if installation of automated transit is accompanied by economic

penalties or disincentives for auto usage, costs for this group will

climb even higher. Resentment and opposition from this majority

group could be a serious acceptability problem, particularly if transit

is viewed as a ‘(welfare” program.

The unserved public can be expected to pressure for expansion of

service, just as is now the case with bus service. Such expansion maybe

uneconomic or out of phase with system implamentation strategy and

severe political and economic problems cou d result. r

The general public can expect to share in any general community

benefits such as lessened auto congestion and environmental enhancement. Residents of the central city and those in the suburbs do not

necessarily agree on just what are the transit “problems”. The confirmed automobile driver has been characterized as looking to public

transportation to bring about a return to the uncontested roads of an

earlier privileged era. This attitude (if it ever reflected a significant

percentage of auto drivers) is no doubt losing ground as the perceived

cost of driving a private car increases. An operating agency, however,

can hardly expect support in financing large capital costs solely on the

$

expectation of long term community benefits.

Proposals for major capital investment in automated transit, whatever its virtues, must compete with other capital needs in the community. The Metro Council in the Twin Cities as indicated its support [

for low capital transit alternatives, basing its case heavily on protection of the regional credit rating.

LABOR

Labor groups can be expected to view the prospect of automated

guideway transit in terms of jobs. In general, automation will be

viewed as a positive step if it both increases the productivity of labor

and enhances job opportunity. Labor groups can be expected to take

a strong political role both locally and nationally in transit decision

making and the thrust of their efforts will be related to how much

consideration is given their interests in the local planning process.

Transit operatmg unions are interested in the potentia of auto- l

mation for increasing the role of public transit in urban areas and

therefore expandin

Y

job opportunities. These unions prefer that

institutional contro of re~onal transit be unified. They also feel

that more imaginative approaches to management and labor relations

are needed to cope with the complexity automation will bring. They

are especially interested in the safety, reliability and personal securit

aspects of AGT as well as improved fare collection systems for a 1r

elements of transit. These groups have an interest in promotion of

equality of mobility for all, and m seeing transit become a completely

tax-supported public service available to all without charge, a position

which may or may not be altruistically motivated.
342

Others unions can be expected to have an interest in the potential

of automated systems to provide new job o opportunities in the construction and fabrication fields. Unions wit a major stake in the R

auto industry may consider the boost AGT could give to public

transit as both an opportunity and a threat,

L ANDOWNERS AND D ESTINATION G ROUP S

The possible impact of automated s stems on patterns of urban

development and re-development is t e principal concern of real 1

estate interests. Its potential effect on the abatement of sprawl and

on the clustering of development around stations and in major activity centers will be acceptable or unacceptable to landowners depending on whether they stand to lose or gain. The timing and extent of

deployment and its impact on road building will be of concern to

this group as will be the manner of assessing costs. The impact on

parking needs is important. It could be expected that “downtown”

interests might be in continuous conflict with those in more dispersed

locations on the question of the extent and type of deployment of

automated systems.

Employers, retailers, and purveyors of professional services have

a large stake in transit improvement as have recreational, cultural

and educational institutions. They be can expected to take a strong

interest m levels of service, extent of networ s, location of stutions, k

comparability with other modes and the timing of deployment. Some

in this classification are heavy community taxpayers and will be very

concerned about costs. The extent of concentration or dispersion of

the facilities these groups control within the urban area wdl greatly

influence the type of automated system chosen, if any.
Chapter 3: Impact on the Neighborhood

Predicting, interpreting and communicating the impact that AGT

systems will have on the environment and neighborhood is a major

challenge. Jerome Lutin put this aspect of AGT development into

context as follows: ~

“Research in urban planning and physical design for PRT systems

has lagged far behind that of a more purely technological nature. This

is indeed unfortunate, for architects and urban planners have a

unique opportunity to predict and plan for long-term urban growth

by utilizing an innovative form of transportation as a determinant

for the placement of activities. Although many of the technical problems of PRT have yet to be resolved, the physical and performance

parameters are known. By relating these parameters to the attainment

of goals for structuring future urban society, it may be possible to

achieve an orderly progression to future forms of urban development.

Present conflicts between transportation systems and urban form

may be eliminated, and future conflicts prevented. Clearly, there is a

need to involve the planning and design professions more closely in

the development of PRT. Such an involvement should not merely be

that of mediating the effects of systems which constitute an imposition

on urban life, nor should it be one of applying superficial cosmetics.

The inquiry of the design professions should be addressed to a much

more fundamental issue, that of fitting the system to the needs and

aspirations of society, and bringing together all the elements in a

unified physical form. ”

Recent studies in the Twin Cities and Denver indicate that well

designed aerial guideways are probably acceptable in major transportation corridors (highway or rail), along purely commercial

arterials, and in areas subject to redevelopment where an opportumty

exists to truly integrate guideways with new land uses. Aetual guideways in the metropolitan centers (downtowns) of the Twin Cities

are unacceptable for aesthetic reasons, but there the opportunity

exists to use cut and cover techniques under pedestrian malls, in an

economical way.

In Denver, downtown aerial guideways are preferred to the disruptions inherent in underground installation. 2 Acceptability in

residential areas, particularly the low-density, and suburban ones,

is a questionable proposition. The problem is deeper than aesthetics

and visual intrusion, important as those two factors are. Preservation

of personal privacy in the home and yard in the face of a stream of

prying eyes at second-story level is a serious matter. Concern for the

protection of the trees which canopy the streets, is another. Perhaps

the most important concern is for the stability of property values

and land use in the guideway path and the vicinity of stations. This

worry is closely followed by a well-founded concern that stations could

bring on an increase in auto traffic in affected neighborhoods, especially

if provision is made for park-and-ride.

1 IIA Method~@y for Integrating p RT Networks into the Urban Environment,” Jerome ‘. ‘Utinj

PRT II, University of Minnesota, 1974.

~ “Envi~~@al Overview Report,” Denver Alternatives Analysis Study, Denver RTD, April 1975.

(343)
344

All of these concerns are potentially as important as the similar set

that leads impacted neighborhoods to oppose freeways. It is important

to remember that in the Twin Cities (and probably elsewhere) the

life style inherent in this kind of housing which emphasizes privacy

and tranquility is prized above all other considerations including

transportation. It is possible that the positive features developed by

the urban design study team such as inear parks along guideways,

that themselves are confined to side streets, and integration of stations

into neighborhood shopping facilities, could improve acceptability,

but no one is taking any bets. Experiences in t e Twin Cities and \

Denver bring into question whether fine grid networks can be im lemen ted and raise some doubt about the eventual regional deployabi ity Y

of the smaller vehicle types of AGT that require such networks. It

ap ears that deplo ment will have to be limited to major corridors,

ru ing out small ve icle systems in residential areas. f i

According to most proponents of personal rapid transit, the popular

concept of small vehicle automated systems is that they will function

best in a uniform gridded network. In such systems, particularly those

using one-way guideways, one finds a configuration which seeks to

provide a uruformly high level of accessibility to all sections of the

urban area. Many PRT advocates feel that ubi uitous service and

coverage is the most important attribute of the RT conce t; that %

only by providing service to the majority of dispersed trip en s in the z

urban area can PRT be an effective transit competitor to the auto.

In many respects, PRT and auto networks share similar attributes.

Each expects small vehicles with low vehicle occupancy. Each functions best on a guideway system with relatively even spacing. Neither

favors on-line stations, and both seem to have low tolerances for congestion. The similarity between PRT and the auto is a conscious effort

to emulate the most “successful” transport mode history has ever

seen. Yet how far should this similarity go? By replacing autos with a

transit system so similar in operating characteristics we run the risk of

propagating many of the adverse impacts of the system we seek to

dis lace, including the low load factor typical of autos.

8 y attempting to create a uniform level of accessibility throughout

the urban area, the PRT planner allows, and in fact encourages,

activities to be dispersed throughout the urban area. At the same time,

the guideway system like the auto will encourage a uniform distribution of po ulation and activity density throughout the area. In both

auto and RT systems, this is the logical consequence of networks $

which attempt to minimize congestion by adding links, and thus, as a

consequence, foster urban sprawl.

Before one advocates a transit network whose form guarantees the

continuation of the present urban form, one must examme the factors

which underly the creation of that form. Contemporary low-density

cities may not be the reflection of consumer preference as to house

type and location, neighborhood references, and travel desires. A

more diverse range of choice may e in order. Even if cities were the {

exact sum of all appropriate consumer preferences, can we assume that

these preferences are an adequate statement of human desires? The

main point of this argument is that one should not begin planning
345

PRT systems with assumptions about gridded networks or uniform

population densities, at least, not without careful testing of those

assumptions. 3

Demonstration and deployment of the larger GRT systems should

shed some light on guideway acceptance. P T advocates insist that

the less bulky guideways of small GRT and PRT systems will solve

the problem, but as indicated above, aesthetics is not the only issue,

and perhaps not the most important. The panel sees evidence that

neighborhoods will accept loss of personal convenience in driving and

even lowered response time for fire and police service in order to keep

traffic volumes down. They will go to court over even imagined

threats to land-use and property values. The potential for aerial

guideways to be accepted in residential neighborhoods is very low,

judging from reactions to similar intrusion.

It is important to note that unless neighborhood groups are included

in the regional transit planning process, the full dimensions of opposition to and support of AGT systems in residential areas is not likely

to surface until the environmental impact statement stage, It would be

well not to repeat this mistake, too frequently made in freeway

planning, The procedure tends to coalesce the opposition and leave

the support disorganized, regardless of the merits of the project.

The challenge of integrating an AGT guideway into the environment has been the subject of numerous papers. Among the more significant is a study by Jerome Lutin 4 and a review by H. Riley of several

additional studies.5

q The four paragraphs above are the rationale behind and stimulus for an architectural design workshop

held at Princeton University reported in “Using PRT to Shape Suburban ~rowth”, Transportation Program, Princeton University, 1974. 4 “A Methodology f or Integrating p RT Networks into the Urban Environment,” Jerome M. Lutin,

PRT II, University of Minnesota, 1974,

6 14 The Assessment of \’isual Intrusion, ” H. Riley, Warwick University/Manchester Polytechnic, Urban

Transportation Research Group, Working Paper No. 17, August 1973.
Chapter 4: Conclusions of the Social Acceptability Panel

The Social Acceptability Panel reached the following conclusions

in its discussion about the direction of federal research, development

and demonstration programs in the field of automated transit,

(1) We suggest that the first order of business is the establishment

of specific sets of national and local goals on the role of transit in

urban transportation and its desired impact on urban form. The

focus, direction, and funding level of R, D&D should be based on

those goals. In the interest of public and private economy, provision

of mobility for the disadvantaged, oil conservation, environmental

improvement, and liveable urban form, transit must be given an

increased role, particularly in those metropolitan areas of moderate

size which are now almost totally dependent on automobiles. The

needs which arise out of national and local goals provide the basis

for the necessary R, D&D programs.

(2) Recent survevs by regional planning authorities and by

Congressman W. Frenzel (R.-lIinn.) indicate that public interest

in investing in transit improvement, as opposed to other public needs,

is quite high. Public willingness to use existing transit, however, does

not appear to be assured. Transit ridership is declining in many

communities.

The major response to the gas shortage was a cut back in travel,

not a shift to transit. Some panel members felt strongly that even

the higher service levels possible with automated systems will not

attract increased patronage without strong government regulation

of auto use. Other members felt that the natural rise in auto costs

alone will ultimately have a significant impact on transit usage,

assuming high levels of service. In any case, the possibility that

annual costs for automated systems could be lower than operating

costs for bus systems justifies continued research and development

at least until the cost issues are settled.

(3) The panel does not, at this time, see any likelihood of regional

deployment of automated systems. There appears good reason, on

the other hand, to believe that the most likely deployment of automated systems will be in downtown and major activity centers. Some

corridor applications coulcl occur. Such applications, both downtow n

and corridor, will be for the purpose of increasing bus productivity}”,

allowing remote parking interception, improving air quality, promoting clustered, mixed use development, and overcoming deficiencies in highway and street capacity.

(4) Consideration of a national policy to increase transit usage a

significant amount carries with it the implication of far greater

investment of public funds to subsidize both operating and capital

costs. It is not likely that fare revenues in a given region will cover

6 A Mass Transit Survey hy the Comprehensive Planning Organization for San Diego Region’s Council

of Governments, Januarv 1975.

“1974 Attitude Survey;” memorandum to the Technology Advisory Committee from the Transportation

Staff of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council, February 1975.

“Summary Report,” Denver Alternatives Analysis Study, Denver RTD, April 1975.

(347)
348

system operating expenses, although some segments may more than

pay their way. Low out-of-pocket cost to the user appears to be

as essential as high level of service if transit is to attract new

riders and meet the needs of the disadvantaged. Unless the commitment at all levels of government exists to provide the billions required

to develo ,

x

construct, and operate both the automated and nonautomated elements of effective transit systems in a significant

number of cities, there is little point in spending any money on

research and technolo ical development of automated transit.

(5) The amount o money proposed by the Administration for f

research in automated technology 1s far too small if the intent is to

provide new options for current problems.

(6) Time is of the essence. Automated transit cannot hope to be a

significant factor in near-term national energy, transportation and

environmental policy unless system de loyment in urban areas can

begin within the next few }-ears. It must e remembered that planning, \

fabrication and construction of local systems is itself a lengthy process. That recess cannot even begin until technological feasibility

and reliab e cost estimates are clearly established. A significantly r

heavier investment than is now being made in development of low

technology AGT systems over, say, the next five years, coupled with

assurance of adequate capital and o crating funding concentrated in

the next fifteen years, would give oth private industry and local !

communities the kind of fiscal assurance necessary to undertake the

massive job of alterin

Y

travel behavior. If this cannot be agreed, it

should be stated clear y that automation is not considered a viable

option for meetin

Y

transit needs for the remainder of the Xlth

century—that loca communities will have to concentrate on other

means.

(7) In addition to an increase in research and development funding

and assurance of adequate ca ital and o crating funds based on a

clear national policy for AG , ? the Socia Acceptability Panel feels Y

that Congress needs to give more direction to research efforts it supports. To date, efforts have failed to yield market-ready systems,

primarily because the research has not provided sufficient answers to

establish the necessary levels of confidence about technological

feasibility, reasonable and predictable costs, and social acceptabdity

and impact for urban decision-makers. VVe reject uMTA’s contention

that the technology for Shuttle-Loop Transit and medium-to-lar e

vehicle GRT is “here” today and that the bulk of currently availab e!

research money should be spent at this time on the small vehicle

GRT type commonly called HPPRT. It is our opinion that this

approach is not based on an assessment of near term need by local

communities and will unnecessarily delay implementation of automated systems. Current local studies imply that simpler and more

nearly available systems can do an adequate and even su erior job

with much less risk of acceptability. It would be very help FU1 from a

social acceptance viewpoint if policy direction clearly favored the

regional im lamentation in this century in a number of urban areas

of SLT an GRT systems operating at headways which allow safe cl’

sto ping distance without collision and can achieve adequate capacity

wit out deployment of fine grid aerial guideways. If such systems are t

supplemented with strong and innovative programs for feeder and

express bus and all forms of para-transit, the transit needs of many

communities can probably be met. under such a policy, research funds
349

should be primarily devoted to the list of AGT programs directed at

improving reliability and safety proposed by UMTA and heavily

supplemented by urban demonstration projects aimed at problems of

social engineering, guideway acceptability and costs, proper integration with other transit modes, and land-use controls.

It is our belief that this approach for transit research is the most

consistent with the broader goals of improving the productivity of

existing transportation resources, meeting the established standards

for air quality and noise levels, beginning the transition from oil as a

transportation fuel, and providing adequate mobility for urban

populations. We believe a new focus for AGT research is also a necessary step in determining the role and form of public transit for the

21st century. Specifically, it is necessary for determining the need,

impact and acceptability of regional application of PRT.

(8) An understanding of the thinking of comprehensive regional

planners about the urban form of the future is basic to determining

regional transit needs in the future. One approach being suggested,

most notably in the Twin Cities and Denver, is that, in the interest

of public economy and reduction of the anxiety of urban life, more

individuals should be enabled to live, work, shop and meet most

daily needs within fairly small subregions. 7 Public transportation

investments and housing policies should be directed at encouraging

short trips, a broad mix of housing for all income groups, and clustered

industrial, commercial and high density residential development. This

approach is completely opposite from recent patterns which tend to

encourage long trips and dispersed development. Whether such a

shift on a significant scale is either possible or desirable will be the

subject of lively debate. Exactly what its implications are for public

transit, particularly automated transit, is not clear at this time.

Certainly adoption of a transportation and development policy which

encourages short trips would not be likely to lead to a transit system

which provides single vehicle origin to destination service over an

entire metropolitan area. Such a policy could favor that kind of service

on a local basis and provide it in a number of ways, including both

automated and non-automated modes, paratransit, and walking.

Requiring transfers to make longer regional trips would be a positive

strategy under such a policy. Traditional line-haul service would

E

probably not receive priority for the most superior service. Express

uses would probably be used extensively for line-haul to major activity

centers wherever freeways are available to accommodate them. Under

this sort of planning, automated transit could play a useful role in

circulation systems for activity centers and downtowns and in provldmg local service within subregions. It could also provide linehaul service, particularly in areas where freeways are not yet built

or are seriously deficient in capacity.

It is the consensus of this panel that the concept of favoring the

short trip and clustered development has merit, although there is

doubt it can be successful if the constraints on regional travel are

applied only to transit. We also feel the short trip concept drastically

eases the strain on technological development of automated transit.

Creating compact systems to serve a particular area or purpose

7 “Metropoutan Transport@ion Development @-dde pOliCY plan,”

Ci~\w Area, as revised March 1975.

Metropolitan Council of the Twin

ummary Report,” Denver Alternatives Analysis Study, Denver RTD, April 1975.
350

without having to interconnect them physically would obviously

make all phases of operation easier and probably much less expensive.

(9) We question the wisdom of anticipating extensive regional

implementation of HPPRT or PRT. Local studies in Denver and the

Twin Cities have shown that extensive deployment of aerial guideways and stations is probably unacceptable in most residential, and

some downtown, areas. Requiring that all passengers be seated would

be a drawback. Such systems may require igh expenditures for labor E

for preventive maintenance, breakdown response and security forces,

thereby negating one of the principal reasons for automation. 1t

appears at this time that both the high order of reliability required

and the extensive guideway needed will be very costly.

The personalized non-stop service provided by these systems can

probably be handled adequately at lower cost in the near future by

para-transit, innovative use of taxis, and specialized services. We do

not feel that public transit is going to have to duplicate the level of

service offered by the auto in order to be successful in the next thirty

years. The rise in auto costs will in and of itself lower public demand

for luxury service. The general rise in the cost of public services,

which is outstripping the growth of public resources, will dictate

economy. 1t does not seem reasonable that the ublic will be able

to bear the cost of what amounts to a double set o roadways—one for r

PRT plus the existing one for conventional vehicles. The emphasis

on encouraging short trips and clustered development could answer

the need for PRT levels of service.

(10) We particularly question the utility of HPPRT from a social

acceptability oint of view. It seems to offer the greatest likelihood

of serious pro lems of personal security of all the automated types {

because of the high probability of forced shared rides with one or a

few strangers.

Simulation in the Twin Cities and Denver studies indicated that

small group service even to and from a cluster of stations involves

significant longer waiting time than either scheduled GRT service

or true PR . A number of studies have shown that waiting is the k most

irritating aspect of transit service to the user as well as the most

dangerous in terms of transit crime. Further, the weight of the HPPRT

eight to 12- passenger vehicle would seem to make the task of achieving

reiable an T x safe performance at very short headways much more

difficult than it would be for true PRT with a smaller, auto size

vehicle.

(11) Since the majority opinion of the Social Acceptability Panel

finds neither sufficient need for, nor public acceptance of, hi~h technology, area-wide small vehicle systems at this time, we suggest that

such systems receive less research priority unless funds are virtually

unlimited, Should this class of AGT later become more viable, it will

have done so in large degree from urban experience gained with simpler

technology, and from any deficiencies found in experiments with

systems favoring short tri s. The funding and program proposed for

HPPRT is not unreasona le when viewed ~ as long term preparatory

research. To spend limited research funds on HPPRT instead of taking

steps to meet real current needs with lower technology seems

unreasonable.
351

(12) There are a number of reasons why urban demonstration of

AGT system prototypes should be considered as much a part of a

research program as test track technological developments:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

How well the system serves actual passengers must be explored

for a wide range of operational problems.

The full scale impact of stations needs to be assessed in a

variety of settings.

Land-use controls along the guideway and near stations need

to be developed and effectively demonstrated.

The opportunity to integrate stations and guideways properly

into redevelopment projects and new development needs to be

explored.

The impact of AGT service on auto congestion and parking in

activity: centers and near stations needs to be determined.

The ability~ to move goods, of all kinds, needs to be developed

for AGT systems and demonstrated in an urban setting.

The extent to which the system can accommodate needs of the

young, the elderly and the handicapped economically needs to

be determined so that communities can judge what supplementary specialized services will be required.

The true labor cost of AGT needs to be established for maintenance, security, station management, controls, and other

functions.

Work needs to be done on the coordination of AGT with other

modes: buses, rail systems, para-transit, private autos, taxis

and pedestrian systems.

The nature of psychological resistance to automation per se,

if any, on the part of potential passengers needs to be evaluated.

The impact of AGT on housing choices of the poor needs to be

assessed. It is possible that land values in AGT service areas

could rise so high that pressures for redevelopment would push

the poor out of. the area and defeat the basic goal of improving

moblhty for this group.

The securitv risk of AGT in high crime areas needs to be

assessed as does the cost of vanda’i’ism.

This list is by no means complete, but its scope does indicate the

nature of important unknowns for automated systems that simply

cannot be handled on a test track or in simulation. Automated transit

cannot be considered market ready until such work is done.

Every effort should be made to do as much evaluation as possible

of social impacts of existing automated and near-automated systems.

This work will have to be supplemented by more urban demonstration

in the near future.

(13) A number of service features assumed for AGT systems could

be tested using conventional transit and para-transit including:

. The effect of saturating an area with high qualit~- demand

responsive service.

. The effect of transfer reduction and/or provision of climate

controlled transfer points.

. The effect of improved passenger information programs.
352

(14) An important aspect of urban transit demonstration and

F

planning for transit improvement in general, that is frequently overooked, is involving the community in the planning and allowing for

a multidisciplinary approach to design and impact assessment.

Transportation is not an isolated element, the exclusive realm of

technical experts, but a basic part of urban life. We urge that more

effort be made to involve local communities in helping to set priorities

for research.
APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY OF PANEL MEMBERS

Jacquelyn A. Ingersoll, Chairman

Citizen Advisor on Urban and Transportation Planning

St. Louis Park, Minnesota

Mrs. Ingersoll has been very active in civic planning and transportation matters

in the Twin Cities for several years. She is past chairman of the St. Louis Park

Planning Commission which serves a community of 50,000 people. She also

serves as a member of the Citizens Advisory Committee on Transit of the Twin

Cities Metropolitan Transit Commission.

Ralph Jackson

Director of Planning

Regional Transportation District

Denver, Colorado

Mr. Jackson returned to his home town of Denver in September, 1970, to

accept the position as director of planning for the Regional Transportation

District (R D). Previously, he was a senior associate engineer with BartonAschman Associates, Inc., of Chicago, where he participated in transit planning

and traffic engineering studies in over 20 cities. Prior to his employment at

Barton-Aschman Associates, Mr. Jackson was a research associate with the

Department of Urban Stidies, University of Illinois at Chicago.

Alain L, Kornhauser

Assistant Professor of Civil and Geological Engineering

Princeton University

Princeton, N.J.

Professor Kornhauser has taught courses and conducted research on Transportation for the past five years, specializing in automated forms of mass transportation.

He is co-editor of Personal Rapid # ran.sit Z and author of journal publications

on design of automatic control systems, network design and analysis methodologies, energy impacts and attitudinal considerations in predicting the demand

for new technologies.

Rodney K. Lay

Group Leader, Transportation Systems Planning

The Mitre Corporation

McLean, Va.

Dr. Lay has conducted and supervised the evaluation of a broad range of

ground transportation systems as a member of MITRE’s consultant systems

engineering staff supporting the USDOT Urban Mass Transportation and Federal

Rail R, D&L) Programs. He has directed a recent technology review and an assessment of the state of the art of Personal Rapid and Dual Mode Transit Systems.

John B. Schnell

Manager-Research

American Public Transit Association

Washington, D.C.

Mr. Schnell has served in this position with APTA for five years and specializes

in all of the technical maintenance and operation aspects of urban mass transportation. He previously was involved in both mass transportation and automobile

transportation with the Institute of Traffic Engineers, the Keystone Automobile

Club and has been a County Engineer and a Township Engineer.

(353)
354

Reed H. Winslow

Department Head

Transportation Systems Planning

The MITRE Corporation

Mr. Winslow’s experience includes twenty years of progressive development in

transportation management, planning, and engineering. Under a contract with

the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Mr. Winslow has been involved

in research and development projects for demand responsive transportation, bus

propulsion systems, methods for granting priority to transit buses in traffic,

automatic vehicle location and monitoring systems, urban transportation planning, and software and advanced technology for rapid transit systems.

George V, Wickstrom

Director, Office of Technical Studies

Metropolitan Washington

Council of Governments

Washington, D.C.

Mr. Wickstrom has been actively engaged in the practice of urban transportation planning for over 20 years. He has served as Director of several large-scale

urban transportation studies in Philadelphiaj Delaware and Washington, D.C.

A registered professional engineer, he is also active in transportation research,

and has authored over 20 published articles on land use and traffic planning.
REPORT OF THE PANEL ON

OPERATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY

Prepared for

the Office of Technology Assessment

PANEL MEMBERS

Robert A. Makofski, Chairman

Richard H. Donlon

Eugene Jones

Thomas McGean

David R. Phelps

Stanley A. Spinwebber

Vukan Vuchic

54-37(J (1 - 75 - Z-4
. . - . . — —. . — — .

Summary. -.. -------- _ --- -_. -- _ - _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ --- _ -.. _ - _ -- _ _.. _ ---

Chapter:

1. Introduction ------------- ____ ___________________ -----------

Panel Membership and Procedures ______________ __________

System Classification and hlodes __________________ --------

2. Potential Role of Automated Systems _______________ ----------

TheUrban Transportation Problem ------------------- ------

Role of Automated Systems ---------------- -._-_----_-_---

Comparison with Current Capabilities ------ ---------------

Summary --------------- ---- ------------------------- -_

3. System Description and Development Requirements ------------

Shuttle and Loop Systems ----------------- --------------

Group Rapid Transit Systems ----- ----- ------------------ -

GRT Systems (Moderate Headway) ---------------- --

GRT Systems (Short Headway) --------------- -------

Personal Rapid Transit Systems ---------------- ------

4. Discussion ------------- _____ _________________ --------------

General Comments -------------- ---- ------------------- -

Common Development Requirement~----------_- -----------

Automation ------------ ------------------------ ----

System Refiabifity ________________ ------------------

Guideway Cost and Intrusion ----------- --------------

S stem Integration -------------- ---- -------------------

‘ +est Facility -------------- ---- ------------------ ------

Development Plan and Recommendations --------- __________

References ------------- ---- ------------------- ----- ----------------

Appe~dixes:

B.

c.

D.

Panel Membership ----- ---- ------------------- --------------

Operations and Technology Panel Questionnaire ------ ----------

~~;;f uestionnaire Respondents ------------- _______________

L % onpanel Members Attending Meeting of February 18,

----

1975------ ----------- --------------------- -------------- -

Page

359

365

365

366

369

369

370

371

; ; ;

375

375

376

377

377

381

381

382 382

384

385

386

387

388

391

393

395

399

401

(357)
Summary

The primary purpose of the Operations and Technology Panel is

to determine the technological development requirements for the systems considered in the report-Shuttles and Loops, Group Rapid

Transit Systems, and Personal Rapid Transit. The fulfilling of this

purpose is relatively straightforward once the potential a placations

and the operational service characteristics have been de lined. This c

is not to say that the solutions to these technological requirements

will be easy or inexpensive to obtain but rather that the technology

cannot be separated from the social and economic considerations that

determine the applicability of these systems. The basic issues center

about the need and applicability of some of the concepts.

M AJOR F INDING S

The panel arrived at several major findings that reflect the view of

the entire panel.

The Group Rapid Transit Concept.—This concept is exemplified by

the moderate headway (15 sec. or more), intermediate-sized vehicle

(15 pass. or more) which can provide a technologically feasible and

useful transit service in the capacity range between buses and rail

rapid transit both in the line-haul mode of service and in the collection and distribution mode. Several of these group systems are in

prototype operation and the basic needs are to bring the full automation to operational status and for product improvement in terms of

reliability, performance, and cost and weight reduction of the vehicles

and guideway. A small-scale urban installation of an improved system

is absolutely necessary to establish design and performance standards,

cost data, and the size of the potential market. Because of the uncertainty regarding the market and the substantial funding required for

final development and demonstration, it will not be possible for a

specific communit~- or organization to undertake such an effort without

federal financial assistance. Rather, the urban installation and production engineering will require a mechanism by which the federal government can provide partial funding for these activities. The technical

study and capital grant programs may be able to serve as a vehicle

for such funding. Details regarding the develo~ment requirements

for these systems are provided in the text of this report.

The Development of a Technological Baseline.—The Group Rapid

Transit Concept needs such a baseline which should be pursued

along with the initial staging of a federally owned test facility.

Such a baseline can provide technical data on performance, cost,

reliability, and safety characteristics which can be used to formulate

specifications for deployable s wtems; can aid in identifying and

examining the performance anc1 cost trade-offs; and can permit the

options in operational mode to be examined. The proposed UMTA

HPPRT program can be reoriented to provide this development to

(359)
360

support and ~ermit ex ansion of initial simple de loyments of Group

Ra id Transit techno ogy as advocated under inding No. 1. The f’ #

HP$RT program with proper orientation can also provide the test

facility for continued development and testing of various automated

transit systems and their components. System-level improvements,

es ecially in automatic control performance and overall system

re iability, are essential if initial installations are to expand to a 1’

meaningful role in urban transit.

In addition, a program should be pursued for the development of

critical components and subsystems common to all systems. This

activity can support the above effort and can be encompassed by the

Automated Guidewa

J

Technology program proposed by UMTA.

The Personal Rap” , Transit Conce t.—As defined in this study, the

concept a proximate most closely t e service provided by the auto- E

mobile. l+’owever, the long-term development requirements, the economic viability, the intensive nature of a fine grid network, and the

difficulty of introduction of such systems into an urban area resulted in

skepticism on the part of the panel regarding the eventual development of these systems. However, the placing of major constraints upon

automobile use in urban areas may provide an incentive for the development of these and other automated systems. The majority of the

~

anel feels that the case for or against the Personal Rapid Transit

ystems has not been adequately established and limited funding is

justified to more fully clarify the advantages and disadvantages of

this concept. One of the panel members feels that there are no conceivable conditions under which this conce t would find a significant

role in transportation and recommends no k &D funding for this concept. Details are provided in the text.

Interaction by the Federal Government.—The Federal Government

should interact more strongly with transit authorities in urban areas

to consolidate and define the ublic transit needs of these areas in

order to better determine the est methods of ap@ication for auto- t

mated vehicle transit systems. This type of interaction is already present to some degree in the categories of rail and bus transit systems.

It should be implemented even more vigorously with regard to automated vehicle systems so that an understanding can be obtained of

the most economic spectrum of modes required to satisfy the real

needs of our urban communities.

C OMMON D EVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS

Regardless of the system considered, there are certain common roblems which differ only in the degree of development required. hese ?’

include:

Automation.-The development of fully automated transit systems

will require a substantial develo~ment effort directed toward improving the performance and reliabihty of certain critical subsystems and

~arameters. These include substantial improvements in the reliability of the wayside and vehicle control systems, in communications

(especially between vehicle and wayside), and in the data processing

equipment. The development of software techniques to manage the

vehicle fleet are required and will probably be the pacing item in the

introduction of systems employing demand-actuated operation. In-
361

sufficient attention has been devoted to the methods for managing

system failures and of introducing methods to keep the system

operational in the event of failure. Furthermore, the improvement of

methods of detecting or removing foreign objects on the guideway

which may affect safe operation is required.

As the headway$ are reduced, the complexity of the system and the

need for components and subsystems with improved performance and

accuracy is required, Specifically, a substantial reduction in headway

below 15 seconds will require Improved vehicle detection techniques,

faster responding equipment, increased accuracy in speed and position

control, and, eventually, the de~~elopment of a controlled deceleration

profile braking s~’stem.

l?eZiaWity.-The need to improve the reliability of automated guideway systems is beyond question. The development of better reliability will require improved definition of the s~’~tem reliability goals

necessary for public acceptance of the system, Improvements to the

critical subsystems and components to reduce failure rates, and the

development of techniques to minimize the time to restore service in

the event of a failure.

There exists a need to establish a data bank on the reliability of

transit system components and to develop procedures and models

that permit a common basis for obtaining reasonably accurate

estimates of system reliability. Such procedures are necessary to

permit the development of reasonable specifications and to identify the

subsystems and components for which improvements in reliability

are cost effective.

Guideway Cost and Intrusion.-Since guideways represent a substantial portion (50~0 to 70~c

) of the investment costs for all of these

automated systems and also a major obstacle to public acceptance, a

successful effort to reduce the cost and intrusiveness of the guideway

can have an immediate impact on the successful deployment of these

systems. Such an effort would require work on the design, materials,

fabrications, and methods for erection of such guideways, on the

minimum design requirements to meet ride qllality standards, on the

vehicle support and suspension technologies that produce the least

expensive and minimum size guideway, and on the techniques for ice

and snow removal and for passenger evacuation from a stranded

vehicle.

System Integration.—The development of reliable high performance

component or subs~wtem does not insure that this item will operate as

designed in a transit system unless the entire system design is carefully controlled with specific design objectives and with an understanding of the interactions between the various subsystems. This

process called system integration generally represents about 10~

o to

15~C of the system development and investment costs but is critical

to obtaining satisfactory performance of the transit system. The system

integration process requires that careful control be exercised over the

system design to insure that design goals are being met and that the

trade-offs in s~.stem performance are being examined. Such a process

requires constructing and exercising computer simulations of the

system and the extensive testing of the components and subsystems

individually and then in the system as a whole.
362

Test Facility.—The well publicized failures of attempts to concurrently develop and implement a complex automated transit system are

indicative of the risk of attempting to bypass the prototype develo -

ment stage and of insufficient attention to carrying out a careful yr

planned test program free of the demands of revenue operation. To

minimize these roblems and to provide a common basis for the develo~rnent of t ese systems, a federally owned and operated test [

facihty is suggested; the facility being located at a permanent site to

permit long-term development and testing. Such a facility would be

available for:

. Testing critical aspects of system design.

. Estabhshing design and operational standards.

● Testing differing design approaches and components for

comparison with standards.

● Testing verification of integrated automatic control systems,

operational performance and reliability.

. Identifying and defining engineering trade-offs.

● Limited ~{check-out” of systems prior to urban deployment.

With proper reorientation, the HPPRT program can provide the

initial stage of such a facility. It will be necessary to include as a

design requirement for this facility the need to provide sufficient

flexibility to permit the testing and development of alternative subsystems and components either separately or together.

The development requirements for the systems considered are

given below:

1. tVLUttZe and Loop Systems,—Are essentially developed and available for limited operation in urban areas although the full potential

of these systems has not been explored or exploited for urban transportation. The systems require product improvement and production

engineering, especially in reliability, prior to urban deployment. However, the lower level of sophistication and previous experience with

these systems suggest that these requirements do not pose a significant

technical risk.

2. Group Rapid Transit in the moderate headwuy jorm.-Can be

considered to be in the engineering development state, i.e., the

feasibility of the concept has been demonstrated but significant effort

is required to improve the product and to undertake production of

the system. The major development requirements are given in Chapter 5 and include improvements in reliability especially of the automated control, computer software develo ment for managing the

system, cost and weight reduction of vehic es and guideways, and of f

methods for detecting or removing obstacles.

The initial requirements are related to the development of full

automation of the systems which requires two basic characteristics:

physical guidance of the vehicle and full control of the right-of-way.

Neither of these requirements are related to any specific uideway or

vehicle support technology. In fact, the support and gui eway tech- %

nologies require a closer examination of their impact on guideway

s]ze, cost, and on the needs for lateral guidance and switching to

define their applicability and potential.

3. Group Rapid Transit in the short headway form.—Currently under

development in the UMTA HPPRT Pro ram. The concept 1s based

upon the use of smaller vehicles and imp icitly smaller guldeways to Y
363

reduce the intrusive nature of the guideways and to make them more

acceptable to the community. Operation at shorter headways should

permit line capacity growth and more frequent service to the diverse

destinations typical of urban travel and should result in increased

system patronage; the smaller vehicle requirement being the result

of increased frequency cf service and an increase in the number of

destinations. At peak demand periods, the system could be operated

in a scheduled manner with the smaller vehicles coupled into trains.

There exists, however, a considerable body of opinion that feels that

the economics of such systems may be unacceptable to the community

and that the increased service may be more apparent than real, i.e.,

that comparison of passenger travel times, for instance, a~ provided

by these systems or the longer headway Group Rapid Transit Systems

would be about equal. This opinion group feels that further develo -

ment of these systems requires clarification of “the potential app i- r

cations’) and an examination of the ‘fsafety and economics. ”

As already discussed in Finding Number 2 the panel suggests that

the priorities of the HPPRT program be directed toward establishing

of a technological baseline with emphasis upon reducing system

capital and operating cost and upon increasing system reliability.

A long-term goal can be that of determining the extent to which the

state-of-the-art of Group Rapid Transit Systems can be advanced

while still adhering to the conventional safety standards.

Development of the advanced group concept will require a test

facility for integrated system protot~”pe testing with specific attention

to improving the responsiveness and accuracy of the longitudinal

control s)-stem and to the development of a controlled deceleration

braking system to replace the currently employed fixed force emergency braking.

4. Personal Rapid Transit Systems.—Have been discussed previously.

The development requirements for these systems include establishing

the basic system requirements in terms of performance, cost, reliability, service and development objectives. These requirements

include demonstrating the essential feasibility of the lon itudinal

control system for short headway operation and of the vehic e design f

to permit controlled collisions.

In conclusion, the panel wishes again to emphasize that the technological requirements of a system cannot be separated from the

economic and social considerations and that the priorities in development must be established by need. However, needs and requirements are often based upon available technology and are known to

change drastically with time. For these reasons, the priorities that

are established by identifiable and immediate needs should not be

so narrowly defined so as to preclude the capability to investigate

alternative procedures which may be needed to satisfy future requirements.
Chapter 1: Introduction

At the request of the Senate Appropriations Committee, the Office of

Technology Assessment (OTA) is examining the potential urban transportation role ‘of small-to-moderate size vehicles that operate under

automatic control on exclusive guideways; these systems often being

misnomered as “PRT’s”. 1 The purpose of this assessment is to

determine if these systems can provide sufficiently improved service

and life cycle costs compared to conventional transit systems to

warrant continuing development, to identify- the development and

implementation requirements, and to establish the needs and priorities

for development.

To aid in this assessment, OTA formed several panels to consider

various aspects of these systems. One of these panels is concerned

with operations and technology. This report covers the work of that

panel.

The Operations and Technology (O & T) Panel in the conduct of

this work considered:

●

●

●

●

The potential urban applications of these systems as related to

the level of service offered to the passengers and to the operational modes available.

The capability of these systems to offer these services in comparison with current systems.

The development requirements and specific issues concerning

the development and implementation of these systems.

The priorities for development of these systems based upon .-

identifiable needs.

It is not possible to separate the technology requirements from the

social and economic aspects of these systems. As a result, the panel

was required to make judgments on the applicability of the systems

based upon social and economic considerations and then to apply

these judgments to the operational and technological requirements.

This report reflects the views of the panel members regarding all of

these considerations.

PANEL MEMBERSHIP AND PROCEDURES

The panel membership was chosen not only on the basis of technical

knowledge of the systems but also to reflect the viewpoint of different

interest groups—system suppliers, consultants, transit operating

agencies, and academics. The panel membership, their affiliation, and

a brief biographical note on each member are given in Appendix A.

The panel members performed this work for OTA over a period of

10 weeks while attending to their regular duties. The Chairman met

with individual panel members on several occasions and also discussed specific points b~~ telephone. Four of the panel members

attended the briefing by UMTA officials on January 31, 1975. The

full panel met only once for a two-da~’ session on February 18 and 19,

1975, to formulate and discuss the primary issues.

1 

The term “PRT” in this report is specifically reserved for the class of systems called

Personal Rapid Transit as defined in Chapter 3.

(365)
366

The panel’s initial efforts were devoted to classifying automated

guideway transit systems and to formulating a questionnaire to

solicit various viev~points regarding these systems. The classification

scheme is described in Chapter 3.

The questionnaire (Appendix B) was concerned with the principal

issue of whether the use of exclusive rights-of-way, automation, and

small-to-moderate sized vehicle transit systems can provide sufficient)’

improvecl service and life cycle costs compared to conventional transit

to warrant their continued development. The questionnaire was sent

to approximately’ 50 individuals and organizations. The responses

listed in Appenclix C are on file at the ()TA office in Washington, D.C,

No attempt has been made to correlate the various responses; ratl~w,

they were usec] by the individual panel members as an aid in assessing

the various viewpoints regarding the development of these automated

systems.

Further, various individuals with specific technical knowledge of

these systems were invited to participate in the discussions during the

February 18 meeting of the panel. These individuals and their affiliation are given in Appendix D. The panel wishes to acknowledge the

contribution of these individuals to the work of the panel.

The meeting on February 19 was attended onl~’. by panel members.

The purpose of this meeting was to define the prlmary issues and to

formulate the views expressed in this report.

SYSTEM CLASSIFICATION AND M ODES OF O PERATIO N

The automated guideway svstems were classified according to the

operational complexity’ (and, implicitl)’, technological complexity and

according to the vehicle occupancy: characteristics, i.e., whether the

vehicle is occupied by. multiple individuals or parties simultaneously

(as in a bus) or by. a single individual or related party (as in an automobile). This classification scheme (Table 1) is identical to the scheme

used by the other panels except that the technoloqy assessment

required the system characteristics to be more explicty~’ defined.

Further the Group Rapid Transit concept was separated into two

categories to reflect the differences in operational and technological

cornplexit~- between the two categories of the Group Rapid Transit

concept. system clescriptions are given in Table 1 ancl covered in

more detail in Chapter 3. In general, as the vehicles considered for

the various systems decrease in size, the service becomes more personalized and more complex to provide, especially in terms of the level

of automation.

The classification scheme does assume certain operational and service characteristics and, implicitly, certain types of applications but it

does not assume specific technologies. For example, any of the systems

can use steel wheel-on-rail, rubber-tires, air-cushions, or magnetic

levitation. This is not to say that such considerations are not important. The eventual capability of these system concepts to provide the

service expected at minimum cost will be strongly dependent upon the

technologies chosen for the various subsystems. It is incumbent upon

the system designer to examine the subsystem technologies available

and to choose these technologies to prowcle the best overall performance for the system.
367

operation of these systems can be either scheduled or demandactuated. The schedule mode provides service over predetermined

routes following a predeterrrlinecl timetable with the passenger expected to time his arrival inlrnediatelJ’ prior to the vehicle arrival or

with the frequencl- of service being sufficiently high so that the

]Jassenger waiting ~ime is short. Demand-actuated o~)eration, on the

other hand, provides a space or vehicle to a passenger in response to

a specific request for service with the passenger waiting time being

(lepen(]ent llpon the availabilit~- of vehicles to that station. In the

multiple partjr occllpancj’ case, the waiting time is dependent upon the

availabilit~’ of a space aboard an approaching vehicle which can provide the necessar~- service.

The dependence of these operational mocles upon the various s~’stem

configurations possible is discussed below:

~huft/e.-This tJ-pe of s~’stem serves moderate traffic density

(several hundred passengers per hour) operating between two points

tvpica]l~’ separated b~ a few hundred feet to a large fraction of a

mile. A single vehicle or train is operated in both directions on the

gui(lewa~-. .Sometimes pairs of guicleways and vehicles are used to

increase capacit~- and reliability; a prime example being the Tampa

Airport Shuttle system. Service can be scheduled or partially demandact uated.

On-Line Stop.—The stations in this configuration are located so

that the vehicle stops on the main line. This configuration is best

suited to 1arge vehicles (e.g., 40 to 100 passengers) or trains of vehicles.

The vehicles generall~- operate in a scheduled mode and are typically

programmed to stop at ever)- station on the line or to operate in a

skip-stop mode (e.g., everl- other station or everj’ third station, etc.).

I.oading dwell times in combination with time allocations for acceleration, deceleration, and safe operating headw?~-s typically require the

vehicles to operate at headwn~-s of one mmute or more. Demand

actuation is not usuall?: appropriate. However, the number of trains

or vehicles on line is a(i]ustecl to variations of demand up to a saturation level. Since onl~~ some lines are interconnected, transfers are

usual!}- required. This configuration is emplo~”ed by most existing

transit s~’stems. It would also appl~” to simple multi-stop shuttle

and loop s~-stems ancl could be used at line-end stations for Group

Rapid Transit systems.

Of-1ine Stops.—Passenger loading and unloading is done at

stations located on sidinos connected to the main line. This configuration permits the vehic es to b~’pass intermediate stations and to r

operate from zone to zone or m express mode to meet trip time

objectives with low to moderate line speeds. Schedules and operating

modes would be adjusted to meet projected demands. Shorter headwa~’s are feasible thereby effecting potentiall~- much higher main

line loadings than is the case with the on-line stop operation. Current

headwal-s with off-line loading are limited to about 15 seconds

minim(lm.

Off-line stations are t~’pical in proposed applications of Group

Rapid Transit s~stems using medium sized vehicles. This allows

serving of the collection, distribution, and line-haul functions of

medium densit~’ urban areas using interconnected lines and minimum

transfers, The service would be primaril~” scheduled, however, demand-
368

actuation may be appropriate in off-peak periods with the smaller

Group Rapid Transit vehicles. Off-line loading is required in the

Personal Rapid Transit class of systems.

In addition, a differentiation must be made between those systems

which in general will require a passenger to transfer and those which

provide direct origin-to-destination service. The latter service is

designed to provide a passenger with a trip from a station near his

origin to a station near his destination withcut transfer. This service

is generally associated with demand-actuated operation and is primarily of interest to Personal Rapid Transit Systems but can be

implemented to a limited degree in off-peak periods ~th the group

transit concept. Even in these systems, a transfer wdl be required

between the fixed guideway system and the flexible route portion

(auto or bus). Transfers can also be an effective method of accommodating high demands while reducing, to some degree, capital cost

requirements and simplifying control system requirements. Reasonable limits must be placed on the number of transfers any one

passenger must make in order to maintain an acceptable level of

service and to provide a hi h ridership incentive.

The current technological state-of-the-art is also an input to anysuch f

examination of systems. The panel, in general, was well acquainted

with the current status and this kno~~’ledge was enhanced by means of

the questionnaire, by discussions with the people invited to attend

the February 18 meeting, and by other contracts. No definition of

the state-of-the-art will be provided in this report except as necessary

to the discussion of specific problems. Rather, the reader is referred

to the report of the Panel on Current System Developments.
Chapter 2: Potential Role of Automated Systems

The purpose of this section is to identify the urban transportation

problems that can be effectively addressed by the various types of

automated guideway systems. The urban transportation problem has

many facets including traffic congestion, lack of mobility for certain

groups, land use, energy and environmental impacts, capital and operating cost of publicly supported systems, level of service, and safety.

The role of automated transit may be brought into focus by comparing

its capabilities and disadvantages with the merits and weaknesses of

the automobile and present modes of public transportation.

THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM

Congestion is obvious to anyone who must travel major arterial

streets or freeways during commuter rush hours. This problem is

probably what most people think of when they refer to the urban

transportation problem. Less obvious to those with access to an automobile, but frustratingly real to the remainder of the population, is

the lack of mobility in our auto-oriented cities if no car is available.

Only half of the American population is licensed to drive. The remainder, comprising the young, the old, the poor and the handicapped must

either rely upon a friend or family member with a license or make do

with the present transit systems which are inadequate in many of our

cities.

The energy and environmental impacts of transportation are also

important. Transportation1

accounts directly for approximately onequarter of our annual energy consumption—in addition, approximately

half again as much fuel is consumed indirectly for production and

maintenance of vehicles, highways, fuels and facilities. The transportation segment of our energy consumption is especially significant

because 96% of this segment requires petroleum-based fuels. Therefore,

the development of transportation modes that are energy efficient

and that are less petroleum dependent will be favorable to current

efforts to conserve energy and to lessen the nation’s dependence on

foreign oil.

The adverse environmental impact of transportation is also well

known. About seventy-five percent of our atmospheric pollutants

are attributable to transportation. These emissions consist primarily

of unburned hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide and oxides of nitrogen.

Because pollution is concentrated in areas of high auto density, the

diversion of auto use to public transit in some of these regions can be

important in reducing emissions,

The cost of transportation, especially mass transportation, is high.

Revenues from bus and rail systems are inadequate to cover replace1 Hirst, E., “Automobile Energy Requirements, ”

ASCE, Vol. 100, No. TE4, November 1974.

Transportation Engineering Journal of

(369)
370

ment of capital equipment and are inadequate to meet operating

costs. To halt the complete deterioration of our transit systems from

a vicious cycle of increased fares, reduced patronage, less frequent

schedules, further reduced patronage and further increased fares,

capital grants and, more recenty-, operating subsidies have been

provided. However, the economic condition can be most significantly

improved by increasing labor productivity and by attracting more

passengers—perhaps through increasing the level of service.

Level of service refers to the convenience, reliability, accessibility,

frequency of service, speed and comfort offered by a transportation

model. On this basis, most public transit compares poorly with the

automobile. There are, however, two areas where the level of service

of the automobile is rapidly declining, and these present natural

opportunities for the application of public transportation. Congested

commuter routes and the dowmtown areas of many of our cities are

areas of opportunity for a public transit service that can provide

lower trip times and reduce land use.

Finally, about one-third of the 50,000 automobile-related deaths in

the U.S. occur in urban areas. Since the evidence now available indicates that public transportation is about 30 times safer on a per

person-hour of exposure basis ,

2 the potential saving in life and in

money cannot be ignored in the cost-benefit equation for public transit.

R OLE OF Automated Syste m

The development of new transportation technology has been to

some degree a part of an attempt to refocus technical effort from aerospace to civilian markets in response to cuts in defense and space

budgets and shifts in what are perceived to be national priorities.

This involvement of the aerospace companies has been desirable in

that it has helped spark a technical renaissance in the transportation

industry. However, there has been some tendency to view the transportation problem in isolation from concomitant problems of economics, finance, modal compatibility, politics, legal issues and community

acceptance. As a result, systems have been proposed having institutional obstacles of such magnitude as to appear insurmountable.

To avoid this pitfall, realistic markets for these systems must be

identified and examined. Three such markets are discussed below.

The first potential market is already’ being exploited. This market

involves the use of simple shuttle and loop concepts as horizontal

elevators for airports, shopping centers, remote parking areas, hospitals, and similar applications. There is evidence that such applications

may be financially viable without federal assistance because of the

increased architectural freedom and improved land use made possible.

A developer may be willing to spend several million dollars to connect

two activity centers with an automated system if such a connection

permits budding on a less expensive and more suitable site and reduces

construction disruption in the existing areas. The technology for such

applications is proven with installations at airports in Tampa, Miami,

Houston, Seattle-Tacoma and Hartford which are either operational

or presently under construction. In addition, the Airtrans system at

Dallas-Forth Worth has gone beyond demonstrating feasibility for

3 Starr, Chauncey, “Social Benefit versus Technological Risk,” Science, Vol. 165, No. 3899,

Sept. 19, 1969,
371

simple shuttle and loop applications by operating (albeit with well

publicized problems) a simple network with off-line stations and

switching.

The second use for which automated systems have promise is to

circulate people in downtown areas and major activity centers.

These automated systems can increase the feasibility of auto-free

zones while reducing pollution, saving energy, and enhancing the

mobility and quality of life in the downtown areas. Such concepts can

also reduce the disproportionate amount of valuable urban real estate

devoted to parking, streets and automotive support functions.

The third market for automated sytems is that of intermediate

capacity line-haul systems. The use of automation permits smaller

vehicles which can provide more frequent service, especially during the

off-peak hours. Such line-haul concepts do not offer a replacement

for the automobile and are not expected to attract more than about

10% of the total trips in an urban area. However, these systems when

designed to complement the automobile offer a number of significant

benefits to the community”.

These benefits include provision of reliable and efficient transportation for the young, aged, disabled poor and others without access to an

automobile. The system should permit orderly land use development

and should reduce and control the urban sprawl induced by sole

dependence on the automobile. It may prove to be the missing tool

to permit a development alternative to the high density eastern city

served by subways on one hand and the low density western city

served solely by the automobile. The line-haul automated system,

concentrated as it is on major corridors, can be expected to provide

relief to the taxpayer’s major complaint-rush hour traffic congestion—and will also offer benefits in reduced pollution and energy consumption. In the event of a petroleum shortage, the line-haul system

can represent a nonpetroleum dependent transportation backbone to

assure continued commercial viability of the community.

The major economic incentive for all of the automated transit

concepts is that of increased labor productivity. Studies 3 suggest

that fully automated transit systems may have operating and maintenance costs of about 60¢ per vehicle-mile, about half that of buses

and a third that of manned rapid transit. These lower costs make it

possible to offer more frequent service in non-peak hours-providing

a frequency of service sufficient to significantly increase ridership and

service to the community.

C OMPARISON W ITH C URRENT C APABILITIE S

The decision on the implementation of an automated system must

rest on a detailed comparison with current alternatives—automobile,

bus, and rail transit—for the given application and site. Such an

examination is beyond the scope of this panel. However, some general

commentary on this comparison is appropriate and is given below.

AUTOMATED SYSTEMS AND THE AUTOMOBILE

In most respects, the automobile as a transportation mode is without peer. It offers demand service, has low labor costs since it is

self-driven, and has low capital costs associated with highly sophisti3 De Leuw Cather, et al., “Automated Small Vehicle Fixed Guideway Systems Study.’)

Draft report prepared for Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit Commission.

-).1 -37C) ( ) - T,, . J -,
372

cated mass production of a thoroughly proven design. But the automobile is by no means capable of performing all transportation functions

better than other modes. The primary function of transit, then, is to

complement the auto mode by doing well those tasks which the auto

does most poorly.

The deficiencies of the auto mode are most evident on major traffic

arteries in our urban areas. Here, attempts to move large numbers of

commuters by automobile have been notoriously unsuccessful. The

result has been traffic congestion, pollution and excess energy consumption. Attempts to meet the need with additional freeways have met

with citizen opposition to the unreasonable land requirements for

multi-lane freeways and the undesirable impact upon the quality of

life.

In downtown areas, the concentration of heavy auto traffic into a

small area destroys the human vitality which is essential to a metropolitan area, interferes with commerce, and prevents effective human

interaction. Excessive land use is devoted to parking and auto service

functions. The prevalence of off-street parking prevents use of the

auto for travel within the downtown area without heavy cost and

time penalties. Such travel is also unattractive because of the heavy

congestion on city streets, which cannot be relieved because of the

high cost of land and the previous investment in valuable real estate

development.

These tasks, line-haul, arterial traffic and downtown circulation,

performed so poorly by the automobile, are ideal for the automated

guideway transit system such as the Group Rapid Transit concept.

Such systems can carry more than ten times the passengers of a freeway lane on a right-of-way that is several feet narrower. They remove

noise and pollution from the congested downtown area and major

line-haul arteries and offer attractive energy savings over use of the

automobile, typically about a quarter as much energy per passenger

mile.

AUTOMATED TRANSIT AND THE BUS

The bus, because of its low capital cost, is often promoted as the

panacea for transit. However, the poor labor productivity of bus operation has lead to high operating deficits which in turn have lead to

reduced service frequency and coverage during off-peak hours. Typical

bus systems have about one employee for every 120 to 160 daily

passengers or every 14,000 vehicle-miles.4 Several proven operating

installations, such as Tampa and Seattle-Tacoma Airports, average

one employee per more than 1000 daily passenger or more than 30,000

vehicle-miles. Admittedly the operating conditions and environment

are substantially different between an airport and a city but the large

difference in magnitude between these numbers suggest the advantages

of automation.

The labor disadvantage of the bus is magnified on line-haul routes

such as the Shirley Highway Expressway by the large amount of

deadheading— or travel opposite to the prevailing direction of flow—

required to circulate the equipment to where it is needed. This counterflow service generates very little revenue. An automated system, because it is unattended, can better afford to circulate vehicles to meet

the demand. In a downtown circulation mode, the slow speed of the

4 American Transit Association “Transit Operating Reports, ”
373

bus on congested streets reduces both its labor productivity and the

attractiveness of its service to the public. In Washington, the bus

takes longer to traverse a 12-block (about 1.6 mile) downtown route

segment during rush hour than is spent on the entire trip segment on

the longest Shirley Highway Express route (about 10.8 miles).

The advantage of automated systems compared with buses are

more frequent service, shorter travel times downtown and lower

operating costs and, possibly, lower life cycle costs. The disadvantages

are in the considerably higher capital cost requirement and the lack

of ubiquity compared with the bus. The automated system is constrained to its expensive right-of-way, while the bus is free to travel

anywhere and can easily adapt to changes in demand patterns.

A final advantage of the automated system is its ability to affect

land development. The high investment in guideway committed by

urban authorities, inspires similar investments from the private

sector which can be confident the transit system will be there to improve mobility and increase land values. Conversely, no such confidence can exist that bus routes will be maintained.

AUTOMATED TRANSIT AND RAPID RAIL

Since both rapid rail and automated guided transit systems use

fixed guideways, the distinction here can only be based on two criteria—vehicle/train size and degree of automation. Present practice

in rapid rail transit operation requires that an attendant be present

on each train regardless of its size and degree of automation. On the

other hand, over four years and many millions of passenger miles on

fully automated systems (Tampa, Sea-Tac, and D/FW Airports), has

been accumulated without a single fatality, admittedly under better

controlled conditions than exist for rail rapid transit. There is some

evidence that the very conservative safety-first design approaches

used for automated systems and the use of coordinated vehicle-station

doors to prevent passenger access to the guideway, may lead to a new

standard of transit safety. At any rate, the safety record during what

is always the dangerous introductory phase seems to establish the

high probability that completely driverless operation would be

acceptable on regular transit systems. If this proves to be true, then

automated transit will offer a potentially higher labor productivity

than manned rapid rail. Further, this higher productivity will make

possible smaller vehicles and more frequent service—especially during

off-peak hours. 5 Thus, the concept of fully automated fixed guideway

systems, whether they be rail or some other support technology, offer

a high potential for improving service and increasing the system

productivity. Obviously, the benefits of full automation can be applied

to existing systems, such as light rail, where applicable. In this case,

the advantages of a proven support technology place less of a demand

on the system development requirements.

such system characteristics may make line haul fixed guideway

systems economically viable for the large number of American cities

which are too small to justify full rapid rail systems and which are too

large to be adequately served only by bus transit.6

S Vuchic V. R., "Rapid Transit Automation and the Last Crew Member, ” Railway Gazette

International, October 1973, pp. 382–385.

8 Vuchi, V. R., and Stanger, R. M., “New Transit Technologies : An Objective Analysis is

Overdue,” Railway Gazette International, October 1974, pp. 384-387.
374

S UMMAR Y

To conclude, the auto is here to stay and no transit mode will completely replace it in the foreseeable future. However, it is essential to

complement the auto mode with transit for two reasons:

. The automobile is unable to function effectively on high density

commuter routes or in crowded downtown areas. It causes congestion, pollution and high energy consumption.

● Mobility must be provided to those without access to an

automobile.

For lightly traveled routes, the bus will remain the preferred mode

because of its ability to operate on the existing street network. On

major line-haul routes or in downtown areas, where existing street

networks are overcrowded, it makes sense to consider fixed guideway

transit, since a single lane can carry ten times the traffic of another

highway lane. By automating the fixed guideway system, a doubling of

productivity seems possible compared with bus systems. When peakhour demand exceeds 20–30)000 passengers per hour, it seems clear that

conventional rail rapid transit systems, possibly automated to reduce

operating costs, will continue to be the mode of choice.

The role for fully automated, fixed guideway transit will be to

provide line haul and downtown circulation functions, which are

presently poorly met by the automobile and require operating subsidies when met by buses. These systems will also continue to play an

expanding role as horizontal elevators connecting remote parking lots

and buildings within major activity centers.
Chapter 3: System Description and Development Requirements

This section describes the systems given in Table 1, below, with

emphasis on the technological development requirements. These

parameters are summarized in Table 2.

S HUTTLE AND LOOP SYSTEM S

Shuttle and Loop Systems represent the most advanced of the

systems being considered in terms of their engineering development

being in operation at several airports and other locations. The report

of the panel on current status describes these applications in more

detail. The basic physical difference between these systems and the

other automated guideway systems is that the Shuttle and Loops do

not make extensive use of operational switching in passenger carrying

operation. As a result, stations must be on-line and the time allocations for stations dwell time, acceleration, and deceleration require

headways between vehicles of about one minute. The required vehicle

size is set primarily by the anticipated peak demand.

Because of the limitations imposed on travel time by the mode of

operation and guideway layout, such systems are generally limited in

length and in the number of stations that can be accommodated on a

single line. However, the potential in comparison with buses for improved service at lower operating cost and life cycle cost recommends

these systems for use as short-haul transit and as feeders to other

transportation modes. These advantages must, of course, be balanced

against the higher capital investment and the need for exclusive

rights-of-way.

The potential use of these systems in urban areas has not been

sufficiently examined or exploited. A partial reason may be the desire

on the part of interested communities in obtaining the greater capacity

and flexibility promised by the Group Rapid Transit concept, It

should be noted, however, that Shuttles and Loops do possess the

evolutionary potential to be upgraded as necessary to the Group

Transit concept. Incorporation of operational switching could be exploited initially to permit off-line stations and, as required, to interconnect lines.

For their current applications, the Shuttle and Loop Systems can

be considered to be fully developed with site-specific engineering required and, of course, some product improvement. If the systems are

to be deployed in substantial urban installations, further production

engineering will be necessary with emphasis on increased system

reliability.

G ROUP R APID T RANSIT S YSTEM S

Because of technological differences in the characteristics and stateof-the-art, these systems are discussed according to their operational

headway. For convenience these categories are listed as moderate

headway (greater than 15 seconds) and short headway (less than 15

seconds).

(375)
376

Group RAPID TRANSIT SYST E MS (MoDERATE HEADWAY)

The moderate headway Group Rapid Transit, as a generic classification, represents only a slight departure from those rail rapid transit

modes presently in existence. Group Rapid Transit is typically

deployed in network configurations involving switching for multiple

routing and involves the operation of single or trained vehicles. The

typical capacity of the vehicles in those systems allows the use of

fixed block train separation systems readily available with state-ofthe-art technology. In general, Group Rapid Transit Systems utilize

vehicles noticeably smaller than those normally associated with conventional rapid transit, but this generic classification can be considered, at the high end, to merge with the overlay with light rail

transit.

Table 1 summarizes typical examples of the moderate headway

Group Rapid Transit systems and their generic characteristics.

Table 2 lists some of the advantages and disadvantages of these

systems compared to conventional rail transit. The systems are

capable of operation as intermediate capacity line-haul systems and

as regional networks. In addition, they have the potential to circulate

people in major activity centers and to connect major centers. The

required vehicle size is primarily a function of the peak demand and

the type of operation employed. The panel believes that these systems

represent a much needed mode which, if satisfactorily developed,

will assume a major role in urban transportation between rail rapid

transit and the bus and that the deployment of these systems should

be encouraged.

Group Rapid Transit Systems operating at moderate headways

have been deployed in special applications, e.g., “Airtrans” at the

Dallas/Fort Worth Regional Airport. These deployments are in a

benign environment compared to that expected in urban deployment.

Therefore, a selected urban installation will be required to “prove”

these systems in an urban environment. These systems are considered

to be in engineering development, i.e., the basic technology has been

proven and work is required on the system design to improve the

product and to prepare the system for larger scale production, The

required improvements and development include:

Substantial improvements in system reliability, especially

automated control and communications, switching equipment

and automated vehicle doors.

Extensive development of computer software for managing

the vehicle fleet and for accommodating the system to failures.

Reduction in cost and weight of guideways and vehicles,

Improvement of techniques for detecting or removing obstacles

that may affect passenger safety or cause damage to the vehicle.

The substantial funding required for the engineering development is

beyond the means of a specific community or organization especially

in view of the current economic climate and the uncertainty regarding

the market and level of federal involvement in these systems. Deployment of these systems will require at least partial federal funding

for the conduct of the engineering development.

The panel specifically cautions that this consideration of Group

Rapid Transit is based upon the service concept and does not imply an

endorsement of any of the existing hardware,
377

GROUP RAPID TRANsIT SYST E MS (sHORT HEADWAY)

The short headway Group Rapid Transit System is characterize d

by headways from about 3 to 15 seconds, smaller vehicles (8 to 2 0

seats passengers), operational switching, and off-line stations. Ca -

pacities range from 3,000 to 15,000 passengers per lane per hour. Th e

potential application for such systems are as activity center circulatio n

and connection and as urban network systems. These applications ar e

based upon the premise that the smaller vehicles and, implicitly ,

smaller guideways would reduce the cost and the intrusive nature o f

the guideway and increase their acceptability to the community .

in addition, the operation at shorter headways would permit lin e

capticity growth and more frequent service to the diverse destination s

typical of urban travel and would result in increased system patronage ;

the smaller vehicle requirement being the result of the increased service

and an increase in the number of destinations. At peak demand periods,

the system could be operated in a scheduled manner with the smaller

vehicles coupled into trains. If the unit costs and the guideway intrusiveness are reduced, more guideways can be constructed for the

same price. In turn, the added guideway will increase the system reliability as perceived by the passenger by providing multiple routing

alternatives to by-pass failures.

Howeverj the economic feasibility, the increased service potential,

and the greater accept ability of the potentially lighter guideways

have not been established and a considerable body of opinion exists

that feels that the short headway group system will not be acceptable.

This group feels that further development of these systems requires

clarification of the potential applications for these small vehicle,

short headway systems and an examination of their economics and

safety.

This difference in viewpoint does exist within the panel especially

with regard to the UMTA HPPRT Program. However, the panel

does feel that the priorities of this program with proper reorientation

can be directed toward establishing of a technological baseline with

emphasis upon reducing system capital and operating costs and upon

increasing system reliability. A long-term goal can be that of determining the extent to which the state-of-the-art of GRT Systems can

be advanced while still adhering to conventional safety standards.

The decision to develop the short headway Group Rapid Transit

System concept will require a test facility for integrated system prototype testing with specific attention devoted to:

●

●

●

Improving the responsiveness and accuracy of the longitudinal

control system including the vehicle separation detection and

wayside communication,

Development of an emergency braking system capable of

providing a controlled deceleration profile independent of

vehicle loading, grade, and winds while still meeting the safety

and reliability goals, and

careful intergation of the system hardware and software if the

development goals are to by achieved.

PERSONAL RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEMS

The Personal Rapid Transit (PRT) System, as defined in this

report, is considered to provide non-stop service from an origin to a

destination station for an individual or related group of passengers.
378

Demand-actuated service is provided using small (4-to-6 passenger)

vehicles. To achieve adequate capacity, headways of one-half to

two seconds are required. Since these headways are below the headways

that can assure an emergency stopping distance without collision,

the system must be designed to be highly reliable and the vehicles

designed to accept only seated passengers and to be crashworthy in

the event of a collision. The proponents of these systems see them as

eventually providing area-wide coverage with a fine-grained network

of guideways and stations.

The PRT concept is based upon the premise that the only means

by which a significant fraction of the urban trips may be attracted

from the automobile is to provide a service comparable to that of

the automobile, that is a personal vehicle with accessibility to a major

portion of the urban area with trip times, cost, and direct service

competitive with that of the auto. To obtain this service level, the

system would require spacings of guideway and stations of approximately one-half mile and fleet sizes of the order of 10,000 vehicles

for a city of one million population. Supporters of this concept feel

that a large market for these systems exists because of the need to

suppress the automobile. As a result, the economics of mass production will reduce the capital and operating costs to a level comparable

to that of the auto.

The opposing viewpoint questions whether the PRT even with

its claimed service could attract a significant fraction of the urban

automobile trips unless severe restrictions are placed upon the use

of the auto. Impedances such as the walk to and from a station and

the difficulty of handling and storing packages are often cited as

constraints on the use of such a system. The primary questions, even

for those who accept the service concept, focus upon the economic

viability and community acceptance of a fine-structured elevated

guideway network which would essentially duplicate the existing

street system and the capital and operating costs of a large fleet of

vehicles designed to accommodate single party occupancy. The

arguments for the large reduction in capital costs by means of mass

production are not generally accepted nor are the means to attain

the market required for mass production adequately defined.

The panel, as a whole, is skeptical regarding the eventual development of PRT Systems because of the long-term development requirements, the economic viability of the system, the intrusive nature of

the fine grid network, and the difficulty of introducing such systems

into an urban area. The majority of the panel feel that the case for or

against PRT’s as defined in this report has not been adequately

established and that limited funding is justified to more fully clarify

the advantages and disadvantages of this concept by a group of

knowledgeable persons other than the system proponents.

One of the panel members feels that the PRT concept is inherently

self-contradictory combining small vehicles optimal for dispersed

travel with expensive fixed facilities which are economically viable

only in high density corridors. He also claims that it can be shown that

the claimed performance of this mode in terms of fractional second

headway with acceptable speeds and safety cannot be physically

achieved. Further, the inefficiencies of small vehicles in terms of

energy, costs, and complexity in control and operation place these
379

systems outside the realm of reality. He feels that there are no conceivable conditions under which this system would play a significant

role in transportation and that with current trends with respect to

energy the chances for these systems are even less likely in the future.

As a result, this panel member recommends no R&D funding for this

concept.

Another panel member who also believes that the economics of the

larger vehicle sytems are likely to prevail supports limited funding for

the Personal Rapid Transit concept because the technological advances

resulting from such research will be applicable to the broad spectrum

of automated transit and because the evolution of technology has in the

past provided viable concepts that were originally believed to be

uneconomic.

A decision to pursue the development of the Personal Rapid Transit

concept will require resolution of the problems described for the other

systems and, to some extent, can be aided by these developments.

However, in view of the exploratory nature of this concept, emphasis

should be placed upon establishing the basic economic and technological feasibility of these systems prior to undertaking major development. Thus, attention should be devoted to:

Basic system recquirements to provide service.

. Performance-speed, headways, acceleration and deceleration

requirements.

● Service—capacity, passenger waiting and travel times, accessibility, and availability.

. Development objectives-Safety and reliability goals, cost

goals, guideway and vehicle envelopes, station throughputs

and configurations.

Demonstrating feasibility of longitudinal control systems for short

headways (0.5 to 2.0 sec.).

Determining the requirements to be imposed on the vehicle and on

other parts of the system by permitting controlled collisions.

Examining the fleet management requirements for short headway

operation.

The decision to initiate a development and implementation program

for a Personal Rapid Transit System must recognize that the system

deployment can be a decade or more away and that the management,

financing, and risk exceed in magnitude any other development program ever undertaken by the Urban Mass Transportation Administration, The need for careful long-range planning and for a commitment

on the part of the federal government to such a program, if initiated,

cannot be overstated.
Chapter 4: Discussion

This section discusses the systems covered in Section 5 with emphasis upon the technological development requirements common

to all of the systems and upon a development plan for these systems.

G ENERAL C OMMENT S

All of the systems in this assessment operate automatically without

attendants or drivers in the vehicles. The objectives of this automation are the reduction and stabilization of operating costs, the

improvement of service to the passenger, and a reduction in life

cycle costs compared to other modes using drivers such as buses

and manually operated rail systems. No one class of these systems is

clearly superior for the entire range of applications envisioned. Each

system has a range of conditions for which it may be best suited

and it is only natural to expect that an urban area will be best served

by a multi-modal approach incorporating these systems and conventional transit.

The complexity of the systems considered increases as the size of

the vehicle and the headways decrease and as the operation expands

to demand-actuated and origin-to-destination service. The introduction of this complexity is an attempt to increase the attractiveness

of the system to the potential passenger and to reduce the trip impedances normally associated with transit use. There is no doubt

that increasing the system accessibility to the passenger and reducing

the passenger’s waiting time and trip time are desirable and necessary

attributes of a system if the potential ridership is to be increased.

However, even in this case quantitative measures of the impact of

time saving on the modal split are arbitrary and in need of further

study. Other attributes such as no-transfers and single party occupancy are even more difficult to assess. For example, the public

apathy to transfers is probably based upon current systems where

the transfer takes place at an unprotected location with long or at

least uncertain waits for the arrival of the next vehicle. Transfers

may not be considered odious if they occurred in a protected environment and were simple and quick as has been done with some subway

systems. The use of transfers would, in general, reduce the cost and

complexity of the transit system. In effect, the panel requests that

more study be given to this subject so that the necessary system

attributes can be separated from those that may be desirable but

may have only a small effect on the service provided or on the level

of ridership.

Although prototypes of these automated guideway systems do exist

and some are in operation in limited and special purpose installations,

none of the systems are operating in a true urban environment. Urban

operation places severe requirements upon a system in comparison

with operation at airports, universities, or other activity centers

(381)
382

especially in terms of the maintenance and reliability requirements

and for operation under varying climatic conditions. At the same time

it must be noted that the well publicized problems of automated

systems me not a reflection on the concept but rather a problem in

management and hardware; problems inherent in the introduction of

new equipment.

It is not sufficient for these new systems to be shown to be operationally and technically feasible prior to their introduction into urban

transportation. In addition, their role in urban transportation will be

determined by their capability}’ to offer a service and cost "package”

which is superior to or at least equal to such "packages” offered by

existing modes. It is incumbent, therefore, upon the agency developing

these new systems to conduct an objective analysis of the system for

comparison with conventional modes; the analysis taking account of

the experience of transit planners and operators.

COMMON DEVELOPMENT R EQUIREMENTS

The major technical problems that need to be resolved regardless of

the system considered are the development of reliable automation for

the control of the system, the increase in overall system reliability,

the development of less intrusive and less expensive guideways, and

the assurance that system integration has taken place in accord

with the development objectives. These items arc discussed below.

CONTROL SYSTEM AUTOMATION

Full automation implies automatic functioning of three distinct

operational responsibilities. The first is system management of vehicle

movements, schedules, fleet size, and operating strategies under normal

and degraded conditions. The second is control of vehicle propulsion

and braking, door operation, station stopping, and the like. The third

is the prevention of vehicle collisions and the protection of system

equipment, personnel, and passengers under emergency conditions.

Neer systems such as BART employ computer installations to

automatically maintain or adjust schedules and fleet size. The second

function is performed in existing systems with widely varyring levels

of automation depending on site specific and system specific considerations. Extensive use is made of automated equipment to perform

the third function in existing rail systems.

The automated systems considered in this report differ from automation in current systems mainly: by complete removal of the vehicle

operating crew. This full automation promises reduced operating costs

and, perhaps, life cycle costs, increased service by providing the

opportunity to run smaller vehicles or trains at greater frequency, and

in compaison with manual operation, some possible benefits in

energy consumption, ride comfort, capacity, and schedule maintenance. These advantages are purchased at the price of increased

investment costs and complexity.

For the automated guideway systems, the major R&D problems for

full automation are those associated with management of the vehicle

fleet, especially in dermand-actuated operation, and with the control

of individual vehicles in short, headway operation. These are discussed

below :
383

Vehicle Management

The vehicle and traffic management function of automated guideway

transit systems provides the overall opertitional control for the vehicles

in the system and as such implements the real time decisions pertaining

to the disposition of vehicles in the fleet, The major subfunctions

which the vehicle and traffic management system must perform are:

Provision of a vehicle to serve a trip.

Regulation of traffic flow on the guideway network to prevent

saturation.

Adaptation and reconfiguration of the system in response to

anomalous conditions arising in the network.

Scheduling vehicles for periodic servicing such as cleaning,

washing, and inspection.

Providing system status to supervisory personnel and implementing their decision.

The development of the vehicle and traffic management system for

an urban installation requires work in three areas:

(a) Development of algorithms for performing the required automated functions.

Most of the attention in this area has been directed at demonstrating

the feasibility of algorithms for nominal operational.123 The work in

deman-activated operation has developed algorithms for regulating

the number of vehicles in use relative to the total trip request rate, for

circulating vehicles to locate them near anticipated trip origins, and

for regulating the flow of vehicles at merge junctions and stations.

Algorithms for performing the automatic detection and evaluation of

anamalous operating conditions and for implementing the required

response remain to be developed. This development to some extent has

been delayed by the dependence of the algorithm on the network

configuration and hardware selection.

(b) Development of real-time communications, computation, and

display hardware system.

The hardware components for such systems exist but the collection

and integration of these equipments into a cost-effective system needs

to be performed for a particular application. Better estimates are required of the storage and timing requirements of the various software

algorithms. These estimates will help prevent the recurring problem

of undersized computers.

(c) Development of real-time computer software for executing the

control programs.

The development of the real time software has lagged behind the

conceptual hardware design. This software which is dependent upon

the selected hardware controls the implementation of the vehicle

management algorithms, set priorities within the equipment on which

algorithms are to be operated, and controls the input and output of

data from the machine.

Headway Control

The safety standards for guided systems have historically required

the headway be limited to the “brick-wall stop”, i.e., the spacing

between vehicles be constrained to a value exceeding that required

1 “Personal Rapid Transit, ” edited by J. E. Anderson, et al. 2 “personal Rapid Transit I I ,“ edited by J. E. Anderson, et al.

3 “Command and Control Status Report, ”

available from NTIS PB–231 681/SET.

edited by E S. Hinman. UMTA DOT Report
384

for a vehicle to come to a full stop under emergency braking conditions. The braking distance 24 is a function of the vehicle speed, the

braking rate and jerk (usually the guaranteed minimum rates), the

detection and reaction delays necessary to recognize the existence of

an emergency and to implement braking, and the state of the vehicle

at the time of the emergency, e.g., whether the vehicle is accelerating

or traveling at constants speed. Current systems employing fixed block

detection techniques will have a minimum headway of 10 to 12 seconds

at 40 feet per second. The development of high resolution separation

detection devices in place of the fixed block scheme and the use of

accelerometers to detect vehicle overspeed will decrease the headway

to approximately 6 to 8 seconds. These developments together with

the development of a braking system capable of providing a controlled

deceleration profile independent of vehicle weight, grade, and winds

should reduce the headway to about 3 seconds. Such emergency braking systems which would replace the constant force emergency brakes

currently in use are being proposed for development in the HPPRT

Program.

Further reduction in headways to those proposed (2 to 1⁄2 sec.) for

the Personal Rapid Transit concept will require the “brick-wall stopping” criteria to be abandoned in favor of a criteria which emphasizes

high reliability and which permits occasional collisions between vehicles in the event of a failure. The requirements for these systems are

discussed in Section 5.

Further work is also needed on identifying and seeking solutions to

the social and legal problems that may be encountered as full automation is introduced into an urban area.

SYSTEM RELIABILITY

One of the most important aspects of the practicality of automated

guideway transit is the degree to which travel may be made reliable.

This is especially true for the automated systems which employ a

large number of vehicles. Methods for expeditiously and economically

handling failures in the system and for maintaining service to as high

a degree as possible must be designed into both the traffic management

system and the hardware subsystems.

The reliability of a system is dependent upon:

(a) System availability goals for public acceptance. The availability goals are often expressed as: On the average, a passenger should

not be subjected to more than one 5-minute delay in 10 trips or no

more than 1-hour delay in 1 year. Too often these values are set

without a careful analysis of the passenger’s acceptance criteria. Since

low values may reduce the public acceptability of the system and

high values will result in higher costs, the availability goals must be

established on a firmer footing than current practice.

(b) Subsystem and component failure rates. Procedures and a data

base with which to estimate the reliability of typical components

used in automated systems are only beginning to be available; e.g.,

data to establish appropriate derating factors for the application of

electronic components in a mass transit environment. Such information will allow the critical components with high failure rates to be

t Hinmau, E. J. and Pitts, (+. L., “Practical Headway Limitations for Personalized Automated Transit Systems. ” Proceedin s of IEE Conference on Control Aspects of New Forms

of (lutded Land Transport, I@ndon, kngland, August 1!)74,
385

identified and to be improved by controlling the environment in which

the part operates, by derating the component, and by adding redundancy to the system for those subsystems and components where

reducing the failure rate is of critical importance. In all such cases

testing of the components and subsystems and of the total system are

necessary to establish the failure levels of the system.

It has been shown 5 that the reliability dependent, subsystems of

an automated transit system are a relatively small percentage (about

20%) of the total system costs. If this factor remains valid, additional

funding to develop improved reliability of these subsystems can have

a marked impact upon the overall system reliability without significantly increasing the system costs.

UMTA should consider the establishment of a data bank on transit

system components with the information provided and used by the

transit operating agencies and other transit-related organizations.

The existence and organization of such information can of itself

provide an incentive for manufacturers to improve component

reliability.

(c) Time to restore service. Failures which require long periods

to repair and restore service will affect proportionately higher numbers of passengers and reduce the public acceptance of the system.

Efforts, then, to develop means of rapidly identifying failures and to

take quick corrective actions are of prime importance to these automated systems and are in need of development. It should be noted

that if for the same investment the smaller scale vehicles and guideways

permit more dispersion of guideways than the larger scale systems,

then the additional routes available can provide a means of quickly

restoring service even with a blockage in the system.

There is a need for design procedures and methods to permit determination of the system availability especially for the smaller vehicle

systems. Such analysis will ultimately require a computer simulation

to evaluate the numerous design variations which affect system reliability. Such work must be performed during the planning and specification stage for any automated system.

It is necessary to remember however, that mathematical modeling

will not make a system reliable. Rather, it is the combination of design

procedures, modeling, production quality control, and testing which

is required. Such programs are generally expensive but experience

has taught that their successful application has been worth the price.

GUIDEWAY COST AND INTRUSION

Two of the most critical factors facing the implementation of automated guideway systems are the cost of the elevated structure, which

represents 50% to 70% of the total investment cost, and the community acceptance of the elevated structure. Significant attention

to these items is required. This work should include:

. Introduction of realistic design standards for guideway design.

This work should include design studies on innovative structures that can reduce guideway cost and size such as those

being undertaken by various architectural and engineering

firms for the moderate headway group systems.

‘ Smith, Frank C., “Systenl Assurance ; Current and Future Guideway Transportation

S~”stems,” First International Conference on Dual Mode Transportation, Washington, D. C.,

~fay 1974,
386

. Introduction of production and assembly techniques to reduce

the cost of the guideway elements and to reduce the disruption

associated with on-site construction. Pre-cast concrete is particularly adaptable to this requirement.

. Determination of realistic ride quality standards. Current

standards appear to be overly stringent resulting in higher costs

and larger guideway structures than are necessary.

● Development of cost effective methods of minimizing the effect

of ice and snow on system operation.

. Development of techniques or various elevated guideway configurations for providing for safe and rapid evacuation of

passengers from a stranded vehicle.

● Examination of guideway configurations and vehicle support

technologies to establish the trade-offs in terms of cost, guideway

size, energy consumption, operational reliability and foul

weather performance.

The final item includes the need for additional development of the

basic lateral guidance and switching concepts as related to the support

technology. To-date, most automated group system vehicles have

employed rubber tires although alternative suspension concepts have

been proposed using steel wheels and rail, air cushions, and magnetic

levitation. Currently, the basic lateral guidance and switching capabilities of steel wheel technology still a pear to be superior to that of

rubber-tired systems although the adhesion for fail-safe emergency

braking may limit the headway capabilities of a system employing

steel wheel technology. Further work is necessary to define the applicability of these various suspension concepts and the effect of the

suspension on guideway size and cost and on the lateral guidance and

switching.

SYSTEM INTEGRATION

The development of a reliable high performance component or

subsystem does not insure that this item will operate as designed in

a transit system unless the entire system design IS carefully controlled

with specific design goals and with an understanding of the interactions between the various subsystems. This process called system

integration generally represents about 10% to 15% of the system

development and investment costs but is critical to obtaining satisfactory performance of the transit system. The system integration

process requires that careful control be exercised over the system

design to insure that design goals are being met and that the tradeoffs in system performance are being examined. Such a process requires constructing and exercising computer simulations of the system

and the extensive testing of the components and subsystems individually and then in the system as a whole.

It should be noted that the systems integration process has been

informally applied to many transit projects. However, the increasing

complexity of the automated systems and the interdependence

between subsystems requires that this process be formalized and controlled. System integration does not insure absolute success of the

system development program but neglect of the process almost

positively insures that the design goals will not be achieved.
387

TEST FACILITY

Many of the problems encountered in attempting to introduce

automated systems are the result of attempting to undertake concurrent development and implementation of a system. Further, the

pressure for implementing the system has tended to reduce the time

available for system testing, check-out, and debugging. As a result,

failures which could have been avoided by developing and testing of

a prototype system occurred with embarrassing frequency in revenue

operation,

To minimize these problems and to provide a common basis for

the conduct of the above developments, a federally owned and operated

test facility is suggested; the facility being located at a permanent

site to permit long-term development and testing. Such a facility

would be available for:

● Testing critical aspects of system design.

. Establishing design and operational standards.

. Testing differing design approaches and components for comarisen with standards.

● Testing and verification of integrated automatic control system

operational performance and reliability.

. Identifying and defining engineering trade-offs.

. Limited "check-out” of systems prior to urban deployment.

With proper reorientation, the HPPRT program can provide the

initial stage of such a facility. It will be necessary to include as a design requirement for this facility the need to provide sufficient flexibility to permit the testing and development of alternative subsystems and components either separately or together.

As noted by one of the panel members, there may be justification

in certain cases for limited funding to specific vendor/manufacturers

to construct a limited test facility for supplying specialized data.

D EVELOPMENT P LAN AND R ECOMMENDATION S

In view of their development status, the Federal Government should

be receptive to providing capital grant support for initial deployments

of the systems now available which are shown to be the best alternatives for the proposed application. The deployments should be carefully planned to permit modest improvements in the performance and

reliability of these systems with sufficient schedule allocation to permit these improvements to be accomplished with confidence. The

initial deployments should be planned to permit incorporation of

improvements in performance and expansion capability derived from

parallel R&D programs to enable extension and upgrading of these

systems while mimmizing the interruption to existing service.

In the R&D area, the development of a technological baseline for

the Group Rapid Transit concept should be pursued along with the

initial staging of a federally owned test facility. Such a baseline can

provide technical data on performance, cost, and component characteristics that can be used to formulate specifications for deployable

systems, can aid in identifying and examining the performance and

cost trade-offs, and can permit the options in operational mode to be

examined. The HPPRT Program can be re-oriented to provide this

)4 -37(! ( ) - 7 i - ?11
388

development and to be the initial stage of a test facility for continued

development and testing of automated transit systems and their comorients. Such improvements, especially in automatic control performance and overall system reliability are essential if initial installations are to expand to a meaningful role in urban transit.

In addition, a separate program to pursue the critical component

and subsystem development common to all systems should be pursued.

Further, the majority of the panel feels that the issues surrounding the

Personal Rapid Transit concept warrant limited exploratory funding

to determine if the economic and technological feasibility exists and

if the systems can be acceptable to the community. This study should

be carefully addressed to the feasibility issues and include proponents

and opponents of these systems. The study should also be staged so

that the need for further study can be determined and directed.

Finally, the Federal Government should interact more strongly

with transit authorities in urban areas to consolidate and define the

public transit needs of these areas in order to better determine the best

methods of application for automated vehicle transit systems. This

type of interaction is already present to some degree in the categories

of rail and bus transit systems. It should be implemented even more

vigorously with regard to automated vehicle systems so that an understanding can be developed of the most economic spectrum of modes

require to satisfy the real needs of our urban communities.
TABLE 1.–AUTOMATED GUIDEWAY SYSTEM CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION

IntermeSystem

classification System chaaracteristics Examples

diate

Vehicle Pro service stops and Station Appilcations actual

occupancy modes transfers location Routing capability (A), proposed (P)

Shuttle and loop

transit systems.

Group rapid transit systems:

Moderate headway.

Short headway.

Personal rapid

transit systems.

Large vehicles (30 to 00

plus passengers); headways equal 1 minute or

greater; limited operational switching; capacity from 3,000 to

5,000 pass/lane-hour.

Moderate-to-large vehicles (15 to 40 plus passengers); headways

equal 15 seconds or

more;

:2:”3% ‘:;?2

=m~~~~iehicl~ (8

to 20 seats); headways

equal 3 to 15 seconds;

operational switching;

capacity from 3,000 to

15,000 pass/lane-hour.

Small vehicle (4 to 8 passengers) all seated; headLa&:qgi:”58%t%Gcapability;

from 1,000 to 10,000 pass/

lane-hour.

Tampa Airport,

Seattle/Tacoma

Airport, Houston

Airport.

Dallas/Fort Worth

Airport “Airtrans,”

Morgantown,

Aerospace concept

(United States)–

prototypes: Cabinentaxi (German

CVS (Japan).

Y),

Multiple party. Generally scheduled

but may operate

only in response to

observed demand.

... -ado----- Generally scheduled

although demand

responsive service

possible.

 .--do---- Scheduled and demand-actuated.

Possible origin-todestination service

at low demand

Single Origin-to-destination

party. demand actuated

Service.

Yes------- On-1ine---- None ------------------ Special purpose shorthaul A); feeder to r

other transit modes

(P).

Possible.. - On- and Limited alternative

ofl-line. routing.

-----do---- Generally Moderate alternative

Off-line routing.

No-------- Off-line --- Generally conceived

as having many

alternative routes,

Intermediate capacity

line-haul (P);

regional network

(P); circulation (A).

Regional network

(P); activity center

circulation and distribution (P).

Fine-grained regional

network (P).
TABLE 2.—SYSTEM COMPARISON AND DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS

Risk Of

succesaComparison with conventional transit

technoComparison with previous category

System Development Development development

classification Advantages Disadvantages

Development

Advantages Disadvantages Status requirements time

Shuttle and loop

transit system.

Group rapid transit

Moderate

headways.

Short headway-.

Personal rapid

transit systems.

Lower operating cost per

passenger

possible lower life cycle

cost; improve service

and reduce travel time

to passenger; potential

reduction in energy consumption per passengermile.

Above, plus smaller vehicle t an rail rapid !l

transit permit use of

smaller guideways;

shorter trip times than

buses; may be able to

combine intermediate

line haul with limited

circulation in activity

centers.

Above, plus provide

higher performance than

minibus or taxi; existence of system in activity center could generate

demand; could provide

means to encourage

auto-free zones if travel

times are sufficiently

Basically acts as an automobile alternative since

it provides single party

occupancy, origin-b

destination: service over

trip length;

highest level of transit service.

Higher capital

investment.

Requires

guideway.

Above plus;

complexity

with implied

higher initial

maintenance

costs to obtain

required

reliability.

Above ----------

Change in

current safety

criteria;

requires significant development.

-------------------------------------- Essentially

developed

(Site specific

engineering

required).

-------------------------------------- Engineering

development

revenue

operation

systems in

existence).

Higher service

capability

direct service

and fewer

transfers;

routing options would

exist and

demandactuatedService possible; vehicles

and guideways should

be smaller.

Single party

occupancy;

direct originto-destination

service.

More extensive

guideway netinterchange

required for

land; increased

complexity;

higher energy

consumption

per unit

passenger

Space.

Extensive guideway network;

highest level of

.

plexity; requires

significant

advances in

state-of-art.

Advanced

development;

(prototype design)

Product improvement ------------------ None.

especial reliability (for

larger installations).

Selected urban installation; product improvement especial reliabil- %

ity, cost and weight,

reduction of guideways

and vehicles; obstacle

detection and removal;

fleet management software.

Above plus: longitudinal

vehicle control including

vehicle separation det8&fmnwayaidecommu-

; braking System development; system integration.

Establish system requirements; determine feasibility of: longitudinal

control; braking and

propulsion; collision

protection; vehicle fleet

control.

Development, Very

low.

urban implementation, 3

to 5 years.

Development, Moderurban imple “

mentation;

3 to 6 years.

Development, High.

3 to 5 years;

urban implementation,

4 to 7 years.
391

REFERENCES

1. Hirst, E., “Automobile Energy Requirements”, Transportation Engineering

Journal of ASCJ?3, Vol. 100, No. TE4, November 1974.

2. Starr, Chauncey, “Social Benefit versus Technological Rist, ” Science, Volume

165, No. 3899, September 19, 1969.

3. De Leuw Cather, etal. “Automated Small Vehicle Fixed Guideway Systems

Study. ” Draft report prepared for Twin Cities Area Metropolitan Transit

Commission.

4. American Transit Association, “Transit Operating Reports. ”

5, Personal Rapid Transit, edited by J. E. Anderson, etal.

6. Personal Rapid Transit II, edited by J. E. Anderson, etal. 7 ‘[command and Control status Report, ” edited by E. S. Hinrnan, UMTADO”T Report. Available from NTIS P13-231 681/8 WT.

8, Hinman, E. J. and Pitts, G. L. “Practical Headway Limitations for Personalized Automated Transit Systems. ’ Proceedings of IEE Conference on

Control Aspects of New Forms of Guided Land Transport, London, England,

August 1974.

9. Smith, Frank C. “System Assurance; Current and Future Guideway Transportation Systems. ” First International Conference on Dual Mode Transportation,

Washington, D.C. May 1974.

10. Vuchic, V. R. “Rapid Transit Automation and the Last Crew Member. ”

Railway Gazette International, October 1973, pp. 382-385.

11. Vuchic, V. R. and Stanger, R. M. ‘

[New Transit Technologies; An Objective

Analysis Is Overdue.” Railway Gazette International, October 1974, pp. 384-387.
APPENDIX A

BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS OF THE PANEL ON OPERATION AND

TECHNOLOGY

Robert A. Makofski

Manager, Urban Transportation Programs

Applied Physics Laboratory

The Johns Hopkins University

Silver Spring, Maryland

Mr. Makofski has been involved in the research and development of automated

transit systems since 1963. This work has covered a broad spectrum of technology

in automated systems with emphasis on the command and control aspects of these

systems. He is also a Senior Research Associate of the Center for Metropolitan

Planning and Research of the Johns Hopkins University.

Richard H. Donlon

Director of Operations

Transportation Technology Division

Otis Elevator Company

Denver, Colorado

Mr. Donlon has 24 years of experience in a wide range of advanced technologies

with emphasis on technical program management, engineering, and research. He

has devoted the last seven years to the development of advanced automated

vehicle transit systems. Mr. Donlon was a founder of Transportation Technology,

Inc.

Eugene Jones

Senior Vice President

Frederic R. Harris, inc.

Stanford, Connecticut

Mr. Jones has been involved in the planning and design of transportation

facilities for over 25 years. He serves on the Board of Directors of Northeast

Utilities, the State National Bank of Connecticut, and the Stanford Area Commerce and Industry Association. He was Chairman of the Committee on New

Towns and Urban Development for the Consulting Engineers Council.

Thomas McGean

De Leuw Cather and Company

Washington, D.C.

Mr. McGean provides technology and system engineering support on a nationwide basis—most recently including studies of transit alternatives for the Twin

Cities, Denver and Santa Clara. Prior to joining De Leuw Cather, he was involved

in numerous major federal transportation programs including tracked air cushion

vehicle research, the TRANSPO ’72 People Movers, Dual Mode, the Rapid

Rail Research Program and the HPPRT program.

David R. Phelps

Director of Systems Technology

Transit Development Corporation, Inc.

Washington, D.C.

Mr. Phelps is responsible for the management of funded programs and offers

technical direction in providing work scope for proposed programs. He was

previously with GE where he was Manager of Development Engineering and

Systems Engineering. He was responsible for advanced preliminary design and

proposal activity on transit and commuter rail car design. He received a BSEE

with honors from Lehigh University and is a registered Professional Engineer.

(393)
394

Stanley A. Spinwebber

The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

ONE World Trade Center

New York, New York

Mr. Spinwebber has served as Supervisor of the Ground Transportation

Projects Section since 1972. He has a BS Degree from Pennsylvania State University, MS Degree from Stevens Institute of Technology, and is a licensed

Professional Engineer and Planner. He is responsible for planning, developing,

and implementation of all ground transportation projects for Kennedy and

La Guardia Airports, including rail access, bus programs, and automated passenger

and baggage handling systems.

Dr. Vukan Vuchic

Department of Civil and Urban Engineering

University of Pennsylvania

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Dr. Vuchic holds a diploma from the University of Belgrade, master’s and Ph. D

degrees from the University of California (Berkeley). In addition to his academic

work he has been consultant to many firms and to the U.S. Department of

Transportation. He has lectured at a number of universities, professional and

public forums and published over 30 professional papers here and in Europe.

His specialties are urban transportation systems, public transportation, urban

and national transportation policy.
APPENDIX B

OPERATION AND TECHNOLOGY PANEL QUESTIONNAIRE

Your response to the questions given below are solicited by the Operations

and Technology Panel to aid in their deliberations. Due to the short time available to the panel, a response by February 10 would be appreciated.

To provide a basis for responding to the questions, the automated, fixed guideway transit systems under consideration have been classified as: Loops and

Shuttles, Group Rapid Transit, and Personal Rapid Transit. A brief description

of this classification is given in Attachment A. It should be noted that the emphasis of this classification has been placed upon driverless, self-propelled vehicle

systems that employ exclusive rights-of-way.

In responding to these questions, please cite or, if possible, supply documentation that would assist the panel in its work.

Q UESTION S

1. What do you foresee as the potential urban transportation role, if any, for

the automated, fixed guideway systems described in Attachment A? What service

attributes, operational modes, and life cycle cost advantages must these systems

possess to fulfill that role? Life cycle costs are taken as being the total capital

and operating costs over the useful life of the equipment including labor, material,

energy, replacement parts and maintenance.

2. Can these service attributes be provided by modifying or upgrading current

urban transportation systems? What advantages, disadvantages, and risks would

accrue from such an approach?

3. Based upon cost considerations and upon the service attributes and operational modes described above what range of trip demand densities can these

systems be expected to serve?

4. The Group Rapid Transit Concept is often considered to be a retreat imposed by technological considerations from the Personal Rapid Transit Concept.

However, the Group Rapid Transit, concept does appear to have considerable

flexibility in \’chicle size, in ability to train vehicles, in providing scheduled or

passenger-actuated operation, and in possibly being able to provide Personal

Rapid Transit capabilities in off-peak hours. How can the potential service

capabilities of the Group Rapid Transit concept be exploited? Can the same

service be provided by conventional means in a more “cost-effective” manner?

5. The automated systems currently being considered employ driverless, selfpropelled vehicles operating on a fixed and exclusive guideway. Can lower capital

cost systems (cost per route mile) using less complex technology be devised that

will provide a level of service better than that of current transit? How would the

operating cost and life cycle cost characteristics of such an approach compare

with the automated guideway alternatives? Please provide details on how such an

approach may be implemented and the level of service to be achieved.

6. In your view, what is the development status of systems described in Attachment A, particularly in the category of the Group Rapid Transit? What additional

development should be performed to assure successful large scale urban deployment? It is appropriate to express such development requirements in terms of

procedures, time. and cost to reach the stage at which prototype technology

can be implemented at an acceptable risk to the community, assume an urban

system consisting of 150 to 200 miles of one-way guideway, 60 to 70 stations, and

2,000 to 2,500 vehicles. An urban system of such scale would necessarily be implemented in an incremental fashion.

7. Given a limited level of R&D funding, should the priorities be placed upon

continuing the development of systems currently undergoing prototype development and testing or on advancing the technology to improve the performance,

service level, and cost characteristics of these systems.

8. For the classes of systems given in Attachment A, identify the R&D requirements that are critical to the eventual development of these systems and that

will have a major impact on the capital and operating costs. Estimate the cost

and time of developing a solution to each of these requirements.

(395)
396

9. What are the reliability requirements that must be imposed upon the systems

described in Attachment A for these systems to provide a viable urban service?

How can these requirements be attained and at what cost?

10. One of the long standing controversies regarding automated systems is the

need and safety of short headway operation. From a technological point of view,

what are the major development requirements, time, and costs to develop prototypes of systems capable of operating at headways of 20 sec., 10 sec., 6 sec., 3 sec.,

1 sec., and 0.5 see?

11. What is your estimate of the current status of software development for

the management of the fleet of vehicles? What are the critical development areas?

How much of this development can be performed independent of site-specific

applications?

12. Would the development of these systems be helped or hindered by establishing standard sets of specifications for these systems?

13. The systems described in Attachment A implicitly assume a large portion

of elevated guideways in urban areas. Inevitably the question of guideway

esthetics and intrusiveness and of public acceptance becomes of critical importance

to the eventual development of these systems. Studies in cities such as Minneapolis

suggest that guideway locations along freeways, railroads, and certain major

thoroughfares may be acceptable but that locations in residential neighborhoods

may not be acceptable. From both technological and environmental-architectural

points of view, what can be done to improve the acceptability of the aerial structure to the community, particularly in residential and semi-residential neighborhoods? What impact will such changes have on cost? Will the need to locate

guideways for public acceptance seriously hinder the operational modes and

service capabilities of these systems?

14. There has been considerable discussion on how the development of these

T

s stems should be funded and who should set the standards an specifications. d

he federal government presently controls the market by control of capital grant

funding. What should be the role of the federal government? Should the federal

government sponsor prototype development and depend on industry and the

transit authorities to take the prototypes to production status? Should the federal

government set standards for the different system applications?

15. Please supply additional information or statements that you believe would

be of use to the panel.

A UTOMATED G UIDEWAY S YSTEM D ESCRIPTIO N

A brief description of the system classification employed in this questionnaire

is given in the table below. It is recognized that the relation of the system description to the passenger service concepts are not based upon a 1: 1 correspondence.

Rather, the classification is to be used as a basis for responding to the questions.

Alternative classifications are welcomed.

The possible overlap in system classification and the wide variety of technological and service options are recognized but are not included for simplicity

of presentation. Two GRT concepts are given to reflect differences in current and

future technological developments.

Some of the terms employed in the table are given below:

Single-party occupancy ---- _._. -- Vehicle occupied by 1 or more passengers traveling as a grou from the

d

Multiple-party occupancy- -----------

same origin to the same estimation.

Vehicle occupied by 2 or more unrelated parties.

Routing capability ----- -------------- Determines if network employed permits a choice of 1 or more routes

from origin to destination under

normal operating conditions.

Special purpose circulation--- - _ _ --- _ -- Limited network or guideway layout

that may be employed for special

purpose movement of people such as

at airports, universities, amusement

parks, etc.

Collection, circulation, and distribution- Implies a more extensive network

application such as in CBD’s, large

airport complexes, major activity

centers, etc.
ATTACHMENT TO APPENDIX B

AUTOMATED GUIDEWAY SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS

Vehicle Interoccu- mediate Station Routing

System Characteristics pancy Service mode stops Transfers location capability Possible application Example

Loops and

shuttles.

Personal rapid

transit.

Generally larger vehicles (site Multiple

dependent); moderate head- parties.

ways (~1 min.+); switching

not normally employed m passenger service.

Bus-sized vehicles (20 to 40 . . do-----

pass.); moderate headway

(-15. sec. +).

Somewhat smaller vehicles (~12 -.. doass.); short headway (-7.5

sec. +); rapid switching capability at line speeds; requires

advanced technology.

Small auto-sized vehicles; short Single

headways (<1 sec. +); re- parties.

quires advanced technology.

Generally scheduled but may

operate only in

response to observed demand.

Probably scheduled although

demand responsive service

possible.

Both passengeractuated origindestination

service and

scheduled

operation.

Origin-to-destination, passengerservice.

Yes- . . . . . . Yes . . . . . . On-line - -. None ------

Possible--- Possible--- Off-line Limited aland on- ternative

line. routing.

.--do ------ -.-do ------ Generally ---do------

No-. . . . . . . No-------- Off-line --- Alternative

available.

Special purpose circu- Tampa Airport;

lation; feeder; collec- - Sea-Tac Airtion, circulation, and

distribution; possi- Field; etc.

ble line-haul applications.

.- ..do ---------------- Dallas/Fort

Worth “Airtrans”;

Morgantown.

Above; possible re- HPPRT

gional application. (UMTA).

Collection, circulation,

distribution;

regional application

over extensive network.

w

1
APPENDIX C

LIST OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS

Given below is a list of respondents to the questionnaire of Appendix B as of

April 1, 1975. The panel wishes to thank these respondents for their aid and

interest in this effort.

1. The Aerospace Corporation, Harry Bernstein, Los Angeles, California.

2. Alan M. Voorhees & Associates, Inc., Thomas B. Deen, McLean, Va.

3. Alden Self-Transit Systems Corporation, William L. Alden, Milford, Mass.

4. American Public Transit Association, John B. Schnell, Washington, D.C.

5. Applied Physics Laboratory, W. H. Avery, Silver Spring, Maryland.

6. Battelle Memorial Institute, Roger L. Merrill, Colombus, Ohio.

7. Bendix Aerospace S stems Division, T. T. Trexler, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

8. Boeing Aerospace Company, A. E. Hitsman, Seattle, Washington.

9. Department of Transportation, E. L. Tennyson, Harrisburg, Pa.

10. Department of Transportation, Charles E. Zen, Sacramento, California.

11. Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, Donald J. Ochsner, Dallas, Texas.

12. Ford Motor Company, Russell F. Thielman, Dearborn, Michigan.

13. General Railway Signal Company, Peter M. Kirk, Rochester, New York.

14. Honeywell Systems and Research Center, Nell C. Sher, Minneapolis,

Minnesota.

15. IBM Corporation, J. F. Obendorfer, Gaithersburg, Maryland.

16. Kaiser industries Corporation, Farrel L. Schell, Oakland, California.

17. LTV Aerospace Corp., C. R. Hickox, Dallas, Texas.

18. The Mitre Corporation, Reed H. Winslow, McLean, Virginia.

19. Otis Elevator Company, E. K. Latvala, Denver, Colorado.

20, Princeton University, Alain K. Kornhauser, Princeton, New Jersey.

21. Frank C. Smith & Associates, Frank C. Smith, Dallas, Texas.

22. Southern California Rapid Transit District, Richard Gallagher, Los Angeles,

California.

23. Transportation Research Board, Wm. Campbell Graeub, Washington, D.C.

24. Tri-State Regional Planning Commission, J. Douglas Carroll, Jr., New York,

New York.

25. West Virginia University, Samy E. G. Elias, Morgantown, West Virginia.

(399)
APPENDIX D

LIST OF NONPANEL MEMBERS ATTENDING FEBRUARY 18, 1975

MEETING OF THE PANEL ON OPERATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY

1. Dr. Harry Bernstein, Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, Calif.

2. Mr. Charles Broxmeyer, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.

3. Mr. Eugene J. Hinman, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel,

.

4. Mr. Robert Macguire, Tampa Airport Authority, Tampa, Fla.

5. Mr. Robert C. Milner, Boeing Aerospace Corporation, Seattle, Wash.

6. Mr. George Pastor, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Department

of Transportation, Washington, D.C.

7. Mr. Frank C. Smith, Frank Smith and Associates, Dallas, Tex.

(401)

o