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57-093 PDF 2010

STATE PLANNING FOR 

OFFSHORE ENERGY 

DEVELOPMENT: STANDARDS 

FOR PREPAREDNESS 

(PART 3 OF 3) 

OVERSIGHT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INSULAR AFFAIRS, 

OCEANS AND WILDLIFE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

Thursday, June 24, 2010 

Serial No. 111-60 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

or 

Committee address: http://resourcescommittee.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Chairman 

DOC HASTINGS, Washington, Ranking Republican Member 

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan 

Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American Samoa 

Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey 

Grace F. Napolitano, California 

Rush D. Holt, New Jersey 

Rau ́l M. Grijalva, Arizona 

Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam 

Jim Costa, California 

Dan Boren, Oklahoma 

Gregorio Sablan, Northern Marianas 

Martin T. Heinrich, New Mexico 

Ben Ray Luja ́n, New Mexico 

George Miller, California 

Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts 

Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon 

Maurice D. Hinchey, New York 

Donna M. Christensen, Virgin Islands 

Diana DeGette, Colorado 

Ron Kind, Wisconsin 

Lois Capps, California 

Jay Inslee, Washington 

Joe Baca, California 

Stephanie Herseth Sandlin, South Dakota 

John P. Sarbanes, Maryland 

Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire 

Niki Tsongas, Massachusetts 

Frank Kratovil, Jr., Maryland 

Pedro R. Pierluisi, Puerto Rico 

Don Young, Alaska 

Elton Gallegly, California 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Jeff Flake, Arizona 

Henry E. Brown, Jr., South Carolina 

Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Washington 

Louie Gohmert, Texas 

Rob Bishop, Utah 

Bill Shuster, Pennsylvania 

Doug Lamborn, Colorado 

Adrian Smith, Nebraska 

Robert J. Wittman, Virginia 

Paul C. Broun, Georgia 

John Fleming, Louisiana 

Mike Coffman, Colorado 

Jason Chaffetz, Utah 

Cynthia M. Lummis, Wyoming 

Tom McClintock, California 

Bill Cassidy, Louisiana 

James H. Zoia, Chief of Staff 

Rick Healy, Chief Counsel 

Todd Young, Republican Chief of Staff 

Lisa Pittman, Republican Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INSULAR AFFAIRS, OCEANS AND WILDLIFE 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam, Chairwoman 

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina, Ranking Republican Member 

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan 

Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American Samoa 

Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey 

Gregorio Sablan, Northern Marianas 

Donna M. Christensen, Virgin Islands 

Diana DeGette, Colorado 

Ron Kind, Wisconsin 

Lois Capps, California 

Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire 

Frank Kratovil, Jr., Maryland 

Pedro R. Pierluisi, Puerto Rico 

Ben Ray Luja ́n, New Mexico 

Nick J. Rahall, II, West Virginia, ex officio 

Don Young, Alaska 

Jeff Flake, Arizona 

Doug Lamborn, Colorado 

Robert J. Wittman, Virginia 

John Fleming, Louisiana 

Jason Chaffetz, Utah 

Bill Cassidy, Louisiana 

Doc Hastings, Washington, ex officio 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Hearing held on Thursday, June 24, 2010 ............................................................ 1 

Statement of Members: 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate in Congress from Guam ............... 1 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 2 

Cassidy, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Louisiana ....................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 4 

Statement of Witnesses: 

Barton, Manly, Supervisor, District 1, Jackson County Board of 

Supervisors, Pascagoula, Mississippi .......................................................... 20 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 22 

Fletcher, Kristen M., Executive Director, Coastal States Organization, 

Washington, D.C. .......................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 12 

Response to questions submitted for the record ..................................... 16 

Menashes, Matthew E., Executive Director, National Estuarine Research 

Reserve Association, Washington, D.C. ....................................................... 23 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 25 

Response to questions submitted for the record ..................................... 33 

Takahashi-Kelso, Dennis, Ph.D., Executive Vice President, The Ocean 

Conservancy, Santa Cruz, California .......................................................... 35 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 36 

Walker, William W., Ph.D., Executive Director, Mississippi Department 

of Marine Resources, ..................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 7 

Additional materials supplied: 

National Estuarine Research Reserve Association, Supplemental 

statement submitted for the record ............................................................. 62 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON STATE PLANNING 

FOR OFFSHORE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT: 

STANDARDS FOR PREPAREDNESS 

Thursday, June 24, 2010 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife 

Committee on Natural Resources 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m. in Room 

1324, Longworth House Office Building, The Honorable Madeleine 

Z. Bordallo [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Bordallo, Christensen, Kind, Capps, 

Wittman, Fleming and Cassidy. 

Also Present: Representatives Herseth Sandlin and Cao. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Good morning, everyone. The oversight hearing 

by the Subcommittee of Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife will 

now come to order. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A 

DELEGATE IN CONGRESS FROM THE TERRITORY OF GUAM 

Ms. BORDALLO. Today the Subcommittee holds its third hearing 

on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. While the tragedy continues for 

both Gulf communities and the environment, we will look ahead 

and examine whether current planning efforts and requirements 

under the law are sufficient to ensure a coordinated and effective 

response to any future spills. 

Yesterday, we were again reminded of the difficulties of operating a mile below the sea surface when a remotely operated vehicle accident suspended operations, and the cap was temporarily removed, allowing much more oil to gush into the Gulf—as it has 

been for the last nine weeks. Nearly 2,000 birds, sea turtles and 

mammals are known to have died as a result of the spill, while 

hundreds or possibly thousands more may never be accounted for, 

and by now we are all familiar with the tragic degradation of the 

wetlands and beaches in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and also 

Florida. 

While the many hearings and investigations to date have shown 

that the oversight and regulation of the offshore oil industry is in 

clear need of reform, we must also look beyond regulatory mechanisms and recognize that informed and thorough preparedness is 

necessary for effective and coordinated disaster response and to 

2 

protect marine environments and coastal communities from the effects of a spill. 

Various response plans were in place before the Deepwater Horizon incident, including offshore facility local and state plans. In addition to this localized planning area, regional and national contingency plans were mandated by the Oil Pollution Act. Other planning statutes include the Coastal Zone Management Act which requires states to include in their Federally approved coastal management plans a process for anticipating impacts resulting from offshore energy facilities, and the Stafford Act which authorized the 

President to issue major disaster declarations to enable Federal 

agencies to provide assistance to state and local governments overwhelmed by catastrophes. 

Current response and recovery activities have adhered to existing 

plans, but as the National Institute Commander Admiral Thad 

Allen as noted, ‘‘The unprecedented complexity and magnitude of 

this disaster shows us those plans may not have gone far enough.’’ 

This spill is a wake up call. Its damages stretching from coral 

reefs to coastal communities, and we must do our best to prepare 

for a new worst-case scenario. 

I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today, and I look 

forward to hearing how to improve our preparedness for oil spills 

amongst all levels of government. 

Before I recognize the Acting Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, I would like to ask for unanimous consent that our colleague from Louisiana, Congressman Joseph Cao, be allowed to join 

the Subcommittee on the dais for this hearing. Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

And now at this time I would like to recognize Mr. Cassidy, the 

Acting Ranking Member of the Subcommittee. 

[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Bordallo follows:] 

Statement of The Honorable Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Chairwoman, 

Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife 

Today the Subcommittee holds its third hearing on the Deepwater Horizon oil 

spill. While the tragedy continues for both Gulf communities and the environment, 

we will look ahead and examine whether current planning efforts and requirements 

under the law are sufficient to ensure a coordinated and effective response to future 

spills. 

Yesterday we were again reminded of the difficulties of operating a mile below 

the sea surface when a remotely operated vehicle accident suspended operations and 

the cap was temporarily removed allowing much more oil to gush into the Gulf as 

it has been for the last nine weeks. Nearly 2,000 birds, sea turtles, and mammals 

are known to have died as a result of the spill while hundreds or possibly thousands 

more may never be accounted for, and by now we are all familiar with the tragic 

degradation of wetlands and beaches in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. 

While the many hearings and investigations to date have shown that the oversight and regulation of the offshore oil industry is in clear need of reform, we must 

also look beyond regulatory mechanisms and recognize that informed and thorough 

preparedness is necessary for effective and coordinated disaster response, and to 

protect marine environments and coastal communities from the effects of a spill. 

Various response plans were in place before the Deepwater Horizon incident, including offshore facility, local, and State plans. In addition to this localized planning, area, regional, and national Contingency Plans were mandated by the Oil Pollution Act. Other planning statutes include the Coastal Zone Management Act, 

which requires States to include in their Federally-approved Coastal Management 

Plans, a process for anticipating impacts resulting from offshore energy facilities, 

and the Stafford Act, which authorizes the President to issue major disaster declaraVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:20 Jan 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\57093.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
3 

tions to enable Federal agencies to provide assistance to State and local governments overwhelmed by catastrophes. 

Current response and recovery activities have adhered to existing plans, but as 

the National Incident Commander, Admiral Thad Allen, has noted, the unprecedented complexity and magnitude of this disaster shows us those plans may not 

have gone far enough. This spill is a wake-up call, its damages stretching from coral 

reefs to coastal communities, and we must do our best to prepare for a new worst 

case scenario. 

I thank all the witnesses for being here today and look forward to hearing how 

to improve our preparedness for oil spills amongst all levels of government. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. BILL CASSIDY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 

Mr. CASSIDY. Thank you, Madam Chair. I compliment you for 

scheduling these series of oversight hearings on the Deepwater Horizon incident. During the last two weeks, we have heard from 

nearly 30 witnesses representing Federal, state, local officials, university professors, conservation and environmental groups, fishermen, tourism experts, and seafood processors and, despite all we 

have learned, the fact remains that the leak is not yet plugged, our 

coast not yet protected, and claims for damages not being adequately processed and funded by BP, and there are still many unanswered questions. 

We need to get to the bottom of what happened to prevent it 

from ever happening again. We need to know the facts. A detailed 

account informed by understanding so that Congress and the Administration can put in place new safety and enforcement measures to make the United States the safest place in the world to 

drill for the energy resources that power our economy. 

Now, as much as I applaud your effort, Madam Chair, I am concerned regarding President Obama’s. This fact finding was supposed to be the purpose of a national oil spill commission. Instead 

the President has created a commission that doesn’t appear to be 

up to the challenge. Instead of appointing independent experts with 

knowledge and expertise of deepwater drilling, he has packed the 

commission with people who lack expertise in the issues we are 

confronting. 

For example, there are no petroleum engineers on this commission, nor is there anyone with experience in deepwater drilling. 

My concern is that they do not have the members capable of understanding what is needed to be understood. If you are going to 

have a commission to figure out what went wrong in petroleum engineering circumstances in deepwater drilling, you need petroleum 

engineers and deepwater drillers. If we don’t learn from BP’s mistakes and our government’s failures, we will not be able to implement reforms needed to prevent another spill, and our energy future will be far less secure. 

I will point out this is not the first time the President has rejected science and professional expertise in responding. He recently 

imposed a moratorium on deepwater drilling that was denounced 

by his own hand-picked advisors at the National Academy of Engineering. These experts stated that the moratorium, and I quote, 

‘‘will not measurably reduce risk further and it will have a lasting 

impact on our nation’s economy which may be greater than that of 

the oil spill.’’ 

4 

Now, as a physician and a medical school teacher, I tell my students first do no harm, but the President’s six-month moratorium 

on deepwater exploration and production is doing great harm to 

our regional economy. The jobs and the livelihoods of thousands of 

workers and their families are at risk every day this moratorium 

goes on. We must ensure the safety of our offshore energy production, but there is no scientific basis for this moratorium according 

to these engineers. 

This Administration was touted as one in which science would 

trump politics. Just over a year ago President Obama said, ‘‘Under 

my Administration, the days of science taking a back seat to ideology are over. To undermine scientific integrity is to undermine 

our democracy. I want to be sure that facts are driving scientific 

decisions and not the other way around.’’ 

In the case of the deepwater moratorium and the appointments 

to the oil spill commission, the President has apparently chosen 

politics over science. 

Madam Chair, at stake is our entire way of life along the Gulf 

Coast—our jobs, energy production, fisheries, wetlands and our dynamic ecosystem, and beyond the Gulf at stake is the ability of our 

nation to produce affordable energy to heat our home, fuel or vehicles, and power the businesses that provide jobs. In short, this is 

about America’s resources, the environment and jobs. 

More than 30 percent of this nation’s oil comes from the Gulf of 

Mexico, and 80 percent of that from deepwater wells. As a result 

of this moratorium, American job losses will range in tens or even 

hundreds of thousands. Lost wages could be over $330 million per 

month, and the amount of oil and gas production from deepwater 

drilling in the Gulf is reduced by 193,000 barrels in the year 2011, 

and this is not just a six-month moratorium. 

If those mobile rigs leave the Gulf, they may be gone for at least 

three to five years as they sign contracts to produce in other sites 

around the world. By the way, these are deepwater sites. 

Because of this economic cost and the fact that the moratorium 

will not increase safety, I introduced H.R. 5519, the Gulf Coast 

Jobs Preservation Act. The twin goals of this legislation are to terminate the moratorium and direct the Secretary of the Interior to 

identify additional measures to ensure the safety of deepwater 

drilling. 

Madam Chair, our response to this disaster needs to be guided 

by facts, not emotion, not political opportunism, but truth. Let us 

stay focused on the evidence and figure out what measures will ensure that the people, the economies, and the ecosystems of the Gulf 

can thrive. 

Madam Chair, thank you again for holding these hearings, and 

I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cassidy follows:] 

Statement of The Honorable Bill Cassidy, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Louisiana 

Madam Chairwoman, I want to compliment you for scheduling this series of oversight hearings on the Deepwater Horizon incident. During the past two weeks, we 

will have heard from nearly 30 witnesses representing Federal, state, and local officials, university professors, conservation and environmental groups, fishermen, tourism experts, and seafood processors. 

5 

Despite all we have learned, the fact remains that the leak is not yet plugged, 

our coasts are not yet protected, and claims for damages are not being adequately 

processed and funded by BP. And there are still many unanswered questions. 

We must get to the bottom of what happened and prevent it from ever happening 

again. We need to know the facts—a detailed account informed by understanding— 

so Congress and the Administration can put in place new safety and enforcement 

measures to make the United States the safest place in the world to drill for the 

energy resources that power our economy. 

This fact-finding was supposed to be the purpose of a National Oil Spill Commission. Instead, the President created a Commission that is not up to the challenge. 

Instead of appointing independent experts with knowledge and expertise of deepwater drilling, he packed the Commission with people who lack expertise in the 

issues we’re confronting. 

There are no petroleum engineers on this Commission, nor is there anyone with 

experience in deepwater drilling. My concern is that they do not have the members 

capable of understanding what is needed to be understood. If you’re going to have 

a commission figure out what went wrong in a petroleum engineering circumstance 

in deepwater drilling, you need petroleum engineers and deepwater drillers. 

If we don’t learn from BP’s mistakes and our government’s failures, we won’t be 

able to implement reforms needed to prevent another spill, and our energy future 

will be far less secure. 

This is not the first time that the President has rejected science and professional 

expertise in responding to the spill. He recently imposed a moratorium on deepwater drilling that was denounced by his own hand-picked advisers at the National 

Academy of Engineering. These experts stated that the moratorium, and I quote,— 

‘‘will not measurably reduce risk further and it will have a lasting impact on the 

nation’s economy which may be greater than that of the oil spill’’—unquote. 

As a physician and a medical school teacher, I tell my students ‘‘First, do no 

harm.’’ The President’s 6-month moratorium on deepwater exploration and production is doing great harm to our regional economy. The jobs and livelihoods of thousands of workers and their families are at risk every day this moratorium goes on. 

We must ensure the safety of our offshore energy production, but there is no scientific basis for this moratorium. 

This Administration was touted as one in which science would trump politics. Just 

over a year ago, President Obama said quote—‘‘Under my Administration, the days 

of science taking a back seat to ideology are over...To undermine scientific integrity 

is to undermine our democracy...I want to be sure that facts are driving scientific 

decisions, and not the other way around.’’—unquote. In the case of the deepwater 

moratorium and the appointments to the Oil Spill Commission, the President has 

chosen politics over science. 

Madam Chairwoman, at stake is our entire way of life along the Gulf Coast—our 

jobs, our energy production, our fisheries, our wetlands, and our dynamic Gulf ecosystem. And beyond the Gulf, at stake is the ability of our nation to produce affordable energy to heat our homes, fuel our vehicles, and power the businesses that provide jobs. In short, this is about America’s resources, the environment, and jobs. 

More than 30 percent of this nation’s oil comes from the Gulf of Mexico, and 80 

percent of that comes from deepwater wells. As a result of this moratorium, American job losses will range in tens or even hundreds of thousands, lost wages could 

be over $330 million dollars per month, and the amount of oil and gas production 

from deepwater drilling in the Gulf will be reduced by 193,000 barrels in 2011. 

And this is not just a six month moratorium. If these mobile rigs leave the Gulf, 

they will be gone for at least three to five years to other sites around the world. 

Because of these economic costs and the fact that the moratorium will not increase safety, I introduced H. R. 5519, the Gulf Coast Jobs Preservation Act. The 

twin goals of this legislation are to terminate the moratorium and direct the Secretary of the Interior to identify additional measures to ensure the safety of deepwater drilling. 

Madam Chair, our response to this disaster needs to be guided by facts—not emotion, not political opportunism, but truth. Let’s stay focused on the evidence and figure out what measures will ensure that the people, the economies, and the ecosystems of the Gulf can thrive. 

Madam Chair, thank you for again holding these hearings. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I thank the gentleman for his opening statement, 

the acting Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, and I would now 

like to recognize our panel of witnesses that are here to testify. 

6 

First, let me introduce Dr. William W. Walker, Chair, Gulf of 

Mexico Alliance, and Executive Director, Mississippi Department of 

Marine Resources. The second witness is Ms. Kristen Fletcher, Executive Director of the Coastal States Organizations; Mr. Manly 

Barton, District 1 Supervisor, Jackson County Board of Supervisors; Mr. Matt Menashes, Executive Director of the National Estuarine Research Reserve Association; and Dr. Dennis TakahashiKelso, Executive Vice President of The Ocean Conservancy. 

We will begin with the testimony from Dr. William Walker. 

I would like to mention to the witnesses that we do have a timing process here. The red timing light that is right in front of you 

on the table will indicate when five minutes have passed, and your 

time has concluded. So we appreciate your cooperation with keeping with the timing. Your full written statement will be included 

in the record. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. WALKER, CHAIR, GULF OF 

MEXICO ALLIANCE, BILOXI, MISSISSIPPI 

Dr. WALKER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Within days of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, Mississippi began 

putting together a plan to protect and, if necessary, clean up coastal Mississippi following the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater 

Horizon. This plan is consistent with the area contingency plan as 

required by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. This plan is also consistent with Mississippi’s coastal program, a Federally approved 

coastal management plan as required by the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. 

Our first priority was protection of the critical marsh habitat 

that serves as nursery ground and protective refuge for Mississippi’s juvenile shrimp, crab, and fish species. Mississippi’s plan 

to combat this oil spill has been provided to you. The plan has several facets and triggers that, when pulled, result in specific actions. 

Our preference and first line of defense is to fight this spill offshore at the site of the spill, far from Mississippi’s coastline. 

Currently, while some relatively small patches of weathered oil 

and sheen have reached our barrier islands and into the Mississippi Sound, the vast majority of oil—crude and degraded 

forms—remains offshore. The key to success here is closing off or 

significantly reducing the introduction of new crude oil into the 

water. If those efforts are successful, we should be able to deal with 

most of the oil offshore. 

With regard to other funding that might be applied to the activities associated with this event, I am pleased that BP has pledged 

$500 million to research, monitoring and restoration efforts in the 

aftermath of this massive oil release. I feel very strongly that a significant portion of these funds should flow through the Gulf of 

Mexico Governors Alliance, a partnership of the Governors of the 

five states which border the Gulf of Mexico. 

The Gulf of Mexico Alliance is a partnership initiated in 2004 by 

the States of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas, 

with the goal of significantly increasing regional collaboration to 

enhance the environmental and economic health of the Gulf of 

Mexico. The alliance is a state-led Federally supported partnership 

that works closely with a variety of partners. The alliance is foVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:20 Jan 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\57093.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
7 

cused on planning, implementation, and management at the regional level, and has identified six priority issue areas that are significant to the Gulf of Mexico region. These areas are: improved 

water quality for healthy beaches and shell fish beds; habitat conservation and restoration; environmental education; ecosystem integration and assessment; producing nutrient input to coastal ecosystems; and building more resilient coastal communities. 

The alliance released its second action plan in June 2009. This 

plan is aggressive and addresses some of the most processing 

issues affecting the Gulf of Mexico region. The second action plan 

has been provided to you as well. 

The Gulf of Mexico region is continuing to demonstrate the 

power of partnership, and other regions of the continental United 

States are following our example. The Gulf Alliance is working 

closely with the interagency task force established by President 

Obama to develop a national plan for ocean governance and coastal 

and marine special planning. The Gulf Alliance is also working 

closely with the interagency working group established by the 

President to assist with recovery and restoration of Mississippi and 

Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 

The Gulf of Mexico Alliance is well positioned to play a significant role in the current oil event in the Gulf. The Gulf Alliance 

presently has teams of qualified people working together in the 

Gulf now for almost nine years, and they are in place to respond 

to the research, monitoring and remediation needs brought on by 

the Deepwater Horizon explosion and resulting continuing oil spill. 

BP has pledged $500 million to fund a 10-year research program 

focused on assessing long-term effect of this event. Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour, who presently serves as the gubernatorial 

lead for the Gulf Alliance, has made it clear to BP that his expectation is that a significant portion of these funds in fact are placed 

with the Gulf of Mexico Alliance. 

To date, two other Governors have joined Governor Barbour and 

the final two should pledge their support soon. Governor Barbour 

also discussed his desires with President Obama during the President’s recent visit to Mississippi. 

In closing, I ask for your consideration and support of using the 

funds pledged by BP to leverage funding already provided to the 

Gulf region by NOAA, U.S. EPA, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Department of the Interior, USDA, and by congressional action 

itself to allow the Gulf of Mexico Alliance to continue to make improvements in the Gulf region that will result in improving environmental health, the economy, and the overall quality of life in 

the Gulf of Mexico region. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Walker follows:] 

Statement of William W. Walker, Ph.D., Executive Director, 

Mississippi Department of Marine Resources 

Within days of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, the Mississippi Department of 

Marine Resources, the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, and Governor Haley Barbour began putting together a plan to protect and if necessary clean up Coastal Mississippi following the explosion and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform and the 

resultant release of crude oil into the waters of the Gulf of Mexico at a site some 

96 miles south southeast of Mississippi’s coastline. 

8 

This Plan is consistent with the Area Contingency Plan (ACP) developed by the 

Mobile Sector Area Committee (AC) as required by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 

This Plan is also consistent with Mississippi’s Coastal Program, our federally 

(NOAA)-approved coastal management plan which addresses energy facilities located in or which may affect our coastal zone as required by the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. 

Regarding protecting Coastal Mississippi, MDMR and MDEQ decided early on 

that our first priority was protection of the critical marsh habitat that serves as 

nursery ground and protective refuge for Mississippi’s juvenile shrimp, crab, and 

fish species. These priority areas were communicated to BP, and BP contractors 

have protected these areas with boom material. Presently, the following areas are 

protected with boom: Grand Bay, the Pascagoula River, Biloxi Bay, Bay St. Louis, 

and the marshes west of Bayou Caddy. Additional marsh areas requested by our 

cities and counties have also been boomed. On Monday of this week we began installing a second layer of larger boom in all of these areas to further fortify and protect our sensitive and critical habitat and nursery areas. We have installed strategic 

test areas nearly two miles of absorbent silt fencing designed to allow water but not 

oil to pass supplement the booms. This fencing has worked well, and we have asked 

BP to approve installation of 30 additional miles. 

Mississippi’s plan to combat this oil spill is attached. The Plan has several facets 

and triggers that, when pulled, result in specific actions. Our preference and first 

line of defense is to fight this spill offshore, at the site of the spill. Our first trigger 

is pulled when oil material is detected within 30 miles of our barrier islands, some 

45 miles offshore from our coastal beaches. This trigger was pulled on May 31 when 

degraded oil and sheen was detected some 40 miles south of Horn and Petit Bois 

Islands which are located 12 miles south of Mississippi’s coastline. Pulling this trigger resulted in BP contractors deploying collection vessels to the location and removal of all material related to the oil spill. 

Our second trigger is activated when oil material is detected on our barrier islands. This trigger was pulled on June 1 when balls or patties degraded oil were 

reported onshore on Petit Bois Island. Pulling this trigger resulted in BP contractors 

deploying personnel to Petit Bois Island to pick up this material and place it in plastic bags for analysis and landfill disposal. 

Our third trigger is pulled when oil material is reported north of our barrier islands in the Mississippi Sound. This trigger was pulled on June 2 when weathered 

oil was reported north of Petit Bois Island, and resulted in BP contractors sending 

vessels to the area to pick up the material. All of these actions were executed in 

concert with the plan and all were successful. The good news is that these events 

were relative small portions of weathered oil material that had broken away from 

the main body of the oil, which remains today some 70 or so miles south of our barrier islands. Degraded oil south of Mobile Bay is only 25 to 30 miles away from our 

barrier islands, and BP contractors are aggressively skimming that material. Should 

more significant amounts of oil material enter the Mississippi Sound, we are prepared to skim it, corral it with boom, and where feasible burn it to keep it from 

reaching our mainland coast. 

Our fourth trigger is pulled when oil material reaches our mainland beaches and 

wetlands, and our fifth trigger is pulled when oil material reaches our bays, rivers, 

and bayous. Thankfully, these final two triggers have not been pulled, and we continue to work to ensure that we will not have to trigger them. We are, however prepared to do so if necessary. 

So, our current situation is that while some relatively small patches of weathered 

oil and sheen have reached our barrier islands and into the Mississippi Sound, the 

vast majority of oil, crude and degraded forms, remains offshore. This is in part due 

to favorable weather conditions. Prevailing winds continue to move the oil away 

from Mississippi. Current winds are pushing the oil to the east, away from our 

shores. And, anticipated winds from the north will move the oil farther south. Also, 

there is a tremendous level of activity going on at the site of the spill to skim, burn, 

and siphon the oil to reduce the amount of product on the surface of the water. And, 

the use of dispersants, both sprayed from airplanes at the surface and injected subsurface at the source of the emerging crude, is successfully breaking the crude oil 

into hundreds and thousand of small droplets with significantly increased surface 

area available to microorganisms capable of biologically degrading or ‘‘eating’’ the 

oil. These microorganisms are present in the Gulf because of natural oil seeps that 

release about 250,000 barrels of oil annually into Gulf of Mexico waters. These bacteria would not be there if not for the oil seepage, and they are quite capable of 

metabolizing the oil, especially in dispersed form. 

Now a word about the subsurface ‘‘oil plumes.’’ Dispersants serve to break crude 

oil into small particles of varying size and buoyancy. When dispersed, these parVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:20 Jan 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\57093.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
9 

ticles float in the water column and drift with the prevailing current. As these particles drift in the current, the bacteria naturally present in the environment metabolize the oil, reducing it over time ultimately to carbon dioxide and water. 

The key to success here is closing off or significantly reducing the introduction of 

new crude oil into the water. If those efforts are successful, we should be able to 

deal with most of the oil offshore. If that is the case, Mississippi’s short term effects 

should be minimal. Even if we are successful in dealing with the oil offshore, questions about long term effects remain. Long term effects on populations of marine 

species whose larval forms are currently present in the area of the spill are unknown and will take years to assess and monitor. Fortunately, Mississippi has talented and qualified scientists who stand at the ready to address these long term 

concerns and questions. 

With regard to other funding that might be applied to the activities associated with this event, I am pleased that BP has pledged $500 million to research, monitoring, and restoration efforts in the aftermath of this massive oil release. I feel very 

strongly that a significant portion of these funds should flow through the Gulf of 

Mexico Governors’ Alliance, a partnership of the governors of the five states which 

border the Gulf of Mexico. Contained within the membership of the Gulf Alliance 

are academic institutions, state agencies, NGOs, and others from all five Gulf states, 

as well as an outstanding group of federal agencies. I will speak about the Gulf Alliance later in this testimony and provide you with the Alliance’s latest Action Plan. 

I hope you will get a flavor of the overall focus and capability of the Alliance and 

I hope you will agree that this is the proper mechanism for designing and implementing the BP research, monitoring, and restoration effort. 

Let me close by once again stressing that BP has stepped forward as the responsible party and said repeatedly and publically that they will pay all costs associated 

with damage assessment, mitigation, and compensation. BP has provided Mississippi with $50 million to reimburse cities and counties for lost revenues, for the 

purchase of equipment necessary to deal with the oil spill, and for other purposes. 

BP has promised additional funds are available for these purposes if needed. BP has 

paid $6 million in claims directly to Mississippi citizens and businesses. They have 

denied no claims to date, although some continue to be under investigation. BP has 

provided $15 million to Mississippi to promote tourism, and have put 2000 Mississippians to work. 

The Gulf of Mexico Alliance 

The Gulf of Mexico Alliance is a partnership, initiated in 2004, by the states of 

Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, with the goal of significantly 

increasing regional collaboration to enhance the environmental and economic health 

of the Gulf of Mexico. The Alliance is a state led, federally supported partnership 

that works closely with a variety of partners, including state agencies and academic 

institutions, the Gulf of Mexico Foundation, the Northern Gulf Institute, the Hart 

Research Institute, the Nature Conservancy, and the six Mexican states. 

The Alliance is focused on planning, implementation, and management at the regional level and has identified six priority issues that are significant to the Gulf of 

Mexico Region and that can be more effectively addressed through collaboration at 

state, local, and federal levels. Each issue area has a team of scientists and resource 

managers working to establish priorities and plans to address the most pressing 

issues. These issue areas are: 

• Improved Water Quality for Healthy Beaches and Shellfish Beds 

• Habitat Conservation and Restoration 

• Environmental Education 

• Ecosystem Integration and Assessment 

• Reducing Nutrient Impacts to Coastal Ecosystems 

• Coastal Community Resilience 

The five U.S. Gulf state governors released the 1st Governors’ Action Plan for 

Healthy and Resilient Coasts in March 2006. That first plan challenged the new Alliance partnership to make tangible progress over the next 36 months. Ninety-six 

specific deliverables were contained in Action Plan I, and 96% of them were accomplished over the 3-year span of the Plan. 

Building on the success of the first Plan, the Alliance released the second Governors’ Action Plan in June 2009. The 2nd Plan is longer and more aggressive and 

addresses some of the most pressing issues affecting the Gulf of Mexico Region. The 

2nd Action Plan is provided as a handout. 

The Gulf of Mexico Region continuing to demonstrate the power of partnership, 

and other regions of the continental United States is following our example. This 

national trend of regional ocean partnerships is exemplified by the West Coast Governors’ Agreement on Ocean Health, the Great Lakes Regional Collaboration, the 

10 

Northeast Regional Ocean Council, the Mid-Atlantic Regional Council on the Ocean, 

the Governors’ South Atlantic Alliance, and the Gulf Alliance. The Gulf Alliance, 

along with the other U.S. Regional partnerships, is working closely with the Interagency Task Force established by President Obama to develop a national plan for 

ocean governance and coastal and marine spatial planning. The Gulf Alliance is also 

working closely with the Interagency Work Group established by the President to 

assist with the recovery and restoration of Mississippi and Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. With respect to Katrina, in January 2006 Congress 

directed the Mobile District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to develop a comprehensive plan to restore Mississippi. At the direction of Gov. Haley Barbour and 

in my position of co-lead of the Gulf Alliance, I worked closely with the Mobile Corps 

District to ensure that the developed plan, the Mississippi Coastal Improvements 

Program (MSCIP), was directly aligned with the goals and objectives of the Gulf Alliance. MSCIP is complete, it has been signed by the Secretary of the Army, and 

it has been presented to Congress. The cost to fully implement MSCIP is $1.2 billion, and you have funded Phase 1of the plan at the level of $439 million focused 

on restoring our barrier islands and our coastal wetland and wildlife nursery areas. 

For that I say thank you and I ask that you continue your support of Mississippi’s 

recovery and restoration through MSCIP. 

The Gulf of Mexico Alliance is well positioned to play a significant role in the current oil event in the Gulf. The Gulf Alliance presently has teams of qualified people 

working together in the Gulf working on the projects outlined in Action Plan II. 

These folks have been working together now for almost nine years, and they are 

in place to respond to the research, monitoring, and remediation needs brought on 

by the Deepwater Horizon explosion and resulting continuing oil spill. BP has 

pledged $500 million dollars to fund 10-year research program focused on assessing 

long-term effects of this event, putting appropriate remediation and recovery actions 

in place, and monitoring the recovery of the Gulf Region once the event is over. Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour, who presently serves as gubernatorial lead for the 

Gulf Alliance, has made it clear to BP that his expectation is that a significant portion of those funds is, in fact, placed with the Gulf of Mexico Alliance. To date, two 

other Gulf governors have joined to support Gov. Barbour’s request. The remaining 

two should place their support. Gov. Barbour also discussed this situation with 

President Obama during the President’s recent visit to Mississippi. Placing these 

funds with the Gulf Alliance will ensure that an appropriate, comprehensive, and 

meaningful research plan is developed, that the region’s best and brightest minds 

are brought to bear on this issue, that the research will be carried out by competent 

individuals familiar with and working in the region, and that the result will be that 

the region will be ultimately restored to conditions better than before the event occurred on April 20, 2010. 

I ask for your consideration and support of using the support pledged by BP to 

leverage funding already provided to the region by NOAA, USEPA, USACOE, DOI/ 

MMS, USDA and by Congressional action, to allow the Gulf of Mexico Alliance to 

continue to make improvements in the Gulf Region that will continue to result in 

improving the environmental health, the economy, and the overall quality of life in 

the Gulf of Mexico Region. 

www.gulfofmexicoalliance.org 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony today. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Dr. Walker, for your insight on 

planning efforts by the State of Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico 

Alliance. 

Ms. Fletcher, welcome back to the Committee, and please 

proceed with your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF KRISTEN FLETCHER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. FLETCHER. Thank you. Chairwoman Bordallo, Ranking Member Cassidy, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, good 

morning. It is a pleasure to be with you today. 

My name is Kristen Fletcher and I am Executive Director of the 

Coastal States Organization known as CSO. CSO represents the 

11 

interests of the Governors of the 35 coastal states and territories 

on coastal, ocean, and Great Lakes issues. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. 

While the Deepwater Horizon blowout was not deliberate, it is 

our obligation to be deliberate in our response to it, to be bold in 

putting in place the resources, authorities, and plans to reduce the 

chances for such an environmental disaster in the future. CSO appreciates the leadership of this Subcommittee in ensuring state authority and capacity to address natural resource needs. It is time 

to renew this commitment to coastal states’ ability to plan, prepare, 

and respond to impacts from energy development. 

My testimony will focus on consistency review under the Coastal 

Zone Management Act, also known as the CZMA, and how that 

works with the Oil Pollution Act to enable a more thorough planning and response effort. Examples from two oil spill affected 

states—Alaska and California—will show why these efforts are so 

critical. I will conclude with recommendations for Federal actions. 

The Coastal Zone Management Act consistency review serves as 

a valuable tool for states to review Federal activities that impact 

the coastal zone. This authority is even more vital in light of the 

spill’s impacts on coastal resources in the Gulf and potentially beyond. A Gulf of Mexico leak, releasing thousands of barrel of oil per 

day that may reach the coast of South Carolina within the summer, is a prime example of the interconnectedness of coast and 

ocean ecosystems and the need for state review. Alaska’s consistency review of OCS exploration provides opportunities to prepare 

for the unique arctic conditions in that state. California’s bill response standards were developed during state consistency review of 

oil and gas activities, and served as a foundation for California’s 

Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act. 

States integrate CZMA authority with requirements under the 

Oil Pollution Act. Alaska has used authority from both statutes in 

planning for potential blowout. The initial Deepwater Horizon flow 

estimates were 1,000 barrels per day but are now exponentially 

greater. 

In Alaska’s review of Shell’s Chukchi Sea Exploration Plan, there 

was not sufficient data to determine historical flow rates from the 

well in question, so the state required that Shell be able to respond 

to higher volumes of flow if the actual flow rate increased. 

When a spill occurs in California, the state ensures that all affected resources are included in the assessment of natural resource 

damages. In the past, California has requested assessments for 

public access impacts, beach closures, and tourism loss, in addition 

to natural resource damages, such as fishery closures and wildlife 

losses. 

This integration of CZMA and Oil Pollution Act authority enables 

a more thorough state, Federal, and private response. However, because state capacity is limited, CSO recommends the following Federal actions: 

First, because the CZMA plays such a vital role in preparing for 

coastal emergency, the fact that it has awaited reauthorization for 

10 years reveals a crack in the foundation of state preparedness. 

CSO recommends that Congress reauthorize the CZMA. 

12 

Second, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act currently provides a 30-day window for the review of OCS exploration plans. 

States cannot conduct an effective consistency review in 30 days. 

CSO recommends that Congress extend the review period to allow 

states to conduct proper reviews. 

Finally, most states do not have the capacity to implement their 

own inspection program of offshore platforms and have relied on 

MMS inspection reports. CSO recommends that Congress provide 

funds for states to participate in the MMS inspections to enable a 

more thorough and objective review. 

The Deepwater Horizon spill has starkly illustrated the research 

needs and planning for and responding to spills. CSO recommends 

that Congress call for enhanced research, including boom technology that enables better environmental protection and evaluation 

of the impacts of dispersants on natural resources. CSO also recommends that Congress provide NOAA the resources to serve as an 

oil spill portal for dissemination of key information and lessons 

learned. A model portal has been created by the Gulf Sea Grant 

Programs that have identified spill-related research needs to pursue through their Gulf-wide research program. 

In closing, as someone who is inspired by the sea and a former 

resident of both Alabama and Mississippi, it is my honor to testify 

on how to prevent and prepare for a spill like the one affecting the 

people, marine life and ecosystem of the Gulf Coast. Thank you 

again for your leadership on these issues. I welcome any questions 

you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fletcher follows:] 

Statement of Kristen M. Fletcher, Executive Director, 

Coastal States Organization 

Chairwoman Bordallo, Ranking Member Brown, and distinguished members of 

the subcommittee, my name is Kristen Fletcher and I am Executive Director of the 

Coastal States Organization. For the last 40 years, CSO has represented the interests of the Governors of the 35 coastal states and territories in Washington, DC on 

legislative and policy issues relating to the sound management of coastal, Great 

Lakes, and ocean resources. Thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding state 

preparedness for offshore energy development and response. Please include my written testimony in the record. 

CSO recognizes the consistent leadership of this subcommittee in ensuring that 

states have the appropriate authorities and resources to address natural resource 

needs, especially on the coast. There is no more critical time than now to renew this 

commitment to coastal states’ ability to plan, prepare and respond to impacts from 

offshore energy development. While the Deepwater Horizon blow-out was not deliberate, it is our obligation as a nation to be deliberate in our response to it, to be 

bold in looking ahead and putting in place the resources, authorities and plans in 

order to reduce the chances for such an environmental disaster in the future. 

My testimony on behalf of the coastal state and territory governors will focus first 

on state planning efforts and existing authorities, especially consistency review 

under the Coastal Zone Management Act and how the CZMA works with the Oil 

Pollution Act to present a more thorough planning and response effort. Second, I 

will offer recommendations for federal action to assist the states. Both of these 

points will be placed in context by examples from Alaska and California showing 

why these efforts are so critical to state preparedness. 

I. Planning Efforts and Existing Authority 

While each U.S. coastal state has different planning and response authorities, 

consistency review under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) serves as a 

valuable tool among the nation’s 34 states with approved coastal programs. 

Throughout the history of the CZMA, one of the greatest incentives for states to participate in the nation’s coastal management program is the ability to review federal 

activities in and beyond state waters that have an impact on the coastal zone. This 

13 

review indicates whether the project is consistent with the state’s coastal program 

and policies. This authority has become even more vital in light of the spill and its 

myriad impacts on state coastal resources – in the Gulf and potentially beyond. A 

Gulf of Mexico oil leak releasing thousands of barrels per day that may reach to 

the Northeast U.S. within a few months is a prime example of the interconnectedness of coastal and ocean ecosystems and the need for state review even if potential 

impacts seem unlikely. 

CZMA consistency can be employed in a proactive manner to review plans developed by the federal government in preparation for incident response. The coordination role of state CZMA consistency coordinators is also a valuable tool in the development or updating of those plans. State coastal programs, through their partnerships with NOAA, are uniquely set up to facilitate the coordination of government 

agency technical staff, elected officials, and other stakeholders in preparation for 

disasters such as these as well as natural disasters. This coordination identifies 

available resources and potential needs for additional resources for adequate, timely 

responses to such incidents. 

For example, CZMA consistency is a critical part of State of Alaska review of 

Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas project proposals. Within Alaskan waters, 

the issuance of permits, certifications, approvals, and authorizations of the Alaska 

Department of Environmental Conservation establishes consistency with the Alaska 

Coastal Management Program for oil spill planning. In federally administered lands 

and the OCS, state environmental statutes and regulations serve as the basis to determine consistency of proposed oil and gas activities. The CZMA consistency review 

process for OCS oil and gas exploration provides public input opportunities in order 

to fine tune spill contingency plans so that they incorporate appropriate Arctic conditions into response scenarios, and adequately address logistical obstacles that 

could affect response capabilities. 

California’s federal consistency authority, as authorized by the CZMA and the federally certified California Coastal Management Program, has been very important 

for requiring offshore oil and gas development projects to provide for systems safety 

and oil spill prevention and response measures. The oil spill equipment and response standards developed during the California Coastal Commission’s CZMA federal consistency review and approval of the offshore oil and gas platforms during 

the 1980s provided a foundation for the development of California’s Lempert-KeeneSeastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990 and the implementation 

of its statewide regulations and programs. The Coastal Act Policy 30232 compliments it by requiring: ‘‘Protection against the spillage of crude oil, gas, petroleum 

products, or hazardous substances shall be provided in relation to any development 

or transportation of such materials. Effective containment and cleanup facilities and 

procedures shall be provided for accidental spills that do occur.’’ 

II. Case Studies for Preparedness: OPA and the CZMA 

A. Statewide Efforts 

Both Alaska and California provide excellent case studies of coordination, capacity, and lessons learned and demonstrate the assistance needed from the federal 

government in order to better prepare for emergencies related to offshore energy development. Much of the current federal and state law regarding spill response in 

Alaska is based upon the State of Alaska’s experience with the Exxon Valdez oil 

spill. State and Federal response and preparedness planning is guided by the National Contingency Plan and state law. 

As the law that establishes the federal response and supports state responses, the 

Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) requires the development of Area Contingency 

Plans. In Alaska, this applies to four main regions. State law divides Alaska into 

ten separate regions for spill response planning, which addresses the OPA requirements through the publication and regular update of the Unified Plan. In addition, 

Alaska has developed a number of specific spill response tools to supplement the information provided in the Unified Plan. The Department of Natural Resources is the 

lead agency for coastal zone management plans and regularly coordinates with state 

resources agencies, coastal district management plan representatives, cities and boroughs, Native organizations, federal agencies, regional citizen advisory councils, and 

the public. 

Oil spill drills and exercises provide valuable opportunities to identify gaps in response readiness and capability. In a large spill incident Alaska’s State On-Scene 

Coordinator works closely with the U.S. Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency as part of the Unified Command. In incidents where an oil spill is located outside of state waters, but poses an imminent threat to state waters, Alaska 

is notified by the U.S. Coast Guard and the two agencies work closely to identify 

priority protection sites by coordinating them with both state and federal agencies. 

14 

A prime example of the coordination efforts between state and federal agencies can 

be seen in the CANUS North Joint Pollution Contingency Plan exercises in the 

Beaufort Sea north of Alaska which includes state and federal agencies as well as 

Canadian agencies and regional stakeholders. These exercises are held regularly to 

improve joint response capabilities. 

The California Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) is the State’s lead 

Trustee agency for natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) and restoration. 

OSPR uses the federal NOAA NRDA process and calculations developed under OPA 

90. OSPR confers with the other state and local agencies within California – e.g., 

Coastal Commission, State Parks, State Lands Commission, Native American Council, Counties and Cities – to ensure that all resources that may have been impacted 

by an oil spill have been included in the NRDA. This coordination works well to ensure that CZMA resources issues are adequately addressed in the NRDA process. 

For example, in a past spill, the Coastal Commission requested the addition of assessments for public access impacts, beach closures, and tourism loss in addition to 

the already identified NRDA impacts for seafood industry loss, fishery closures, 

oiled bird and wildlife losses. After the NRDA process has reached litigation or settlement, then the monies go to restoration projects with the federal and state trustee agencies. The Coastal Commission, pursuant to the California Coastal Act and 

as the CZMA representative for California, is often involved in the development and 

review/permitting of post-oil spill restoration projects in the coastal zone. 

One example of the critical interplay between OPA and the CZMA is the review 

of flow rates from an offshore well. The initial Deepwater Horizon incident flow rate 

estimates were 1,000 barrels per day, subsequently increased to 5,000 barrels per 

day, and now appear to be greater than 25,000 barrels per day, possibly as great 

as 60,000 barrels per day. In Alaska’s consistency review of Shell’s Chukchi Sea Exploration Plan, there was not sufficient well data to determine historical well flow 

rates, so the state made the following requirement a condition for finding Shell’s Exploration Plan and C–Plan consistent with Alaska standards: ‘‘If the actual flow rate 

of a well exceeds 5,500 barrels per day, and Shell is to continue drilling, the response planning standard (RPS) volume must be increased for subsequent exploration wells drilled to an RPS volume taking into account the actual flow rate of 

the well.’’ The CZMA consistency authority complements the requirements under 

OPA, allowing for a more thorough state, federal, and private response. 

B. Building Local Capacity 

The CZMA enables effective local response as well. The Local Coastal Program 

component of California’s statewide program gives added strength to the review and 

oversight of the onshore facilities supporting offshore oil and gas development. The 

County of Santa Barbara has certified Local Coastal Program policies and ordinances that mirror and expand upon the Coastal Act’s policies for resource protection and oil spill prevention and response. The County’s coastal development permits for the onshore facilities supporting offshore oil and gas development have explicit conditions for frequent inspections, operation manuals, safety systems requirements, and oil spill prevention and response requirements. As an example, the 

County’s System Safety Program requires monthly inspections of the onshore facilities, and has public meetings for the review of oil and gas facility safety deficiencies. 

The County also reviews all changes to the oil spill contingency/response plans for 

the platforms, and all changes to response equipment configurations. 

In Alaska, two Regional Citizen’s Advisory Councils were created under OPA 1990 

and both are quite actively engaged and involved with oil spill response planning 

efforts in Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet. A new Advisory Council for the Arctic Ocean would presumably benefit planning efforts for that region of Alaska. Good 

coordination also exists in Alaska among state and federal agencies including the 

U.S. Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Minerals Management Service. For example, oil spill drills and table-top exercises are routinely coordinated among the state and federal agencies, plan holders and response action 

contractors to demonstrate competency with the incident command system procedures, communications, planning, logistics, operations, equipment maintenance and 

tactics. 

III. Recommendations for Federal Action 

Even though the CZMA and OPA provide adequate authorities for planning and 

response, the effectiveness of these statutes is limited by limited capacity and resources. CSO recommends that Congress consider updates to these laws along with 

federal assistance in research and implementation. 

15 

A. Legislative Actions and Appropriations 

As the CZMA plays such a vital role in planning for management of coastal resources and responses to environmental emergencies such as the Deepwater Horizon 

Spill, the fact that it has been overdue for reauthorization since 2000 shows a crack 

in the foundation for state preparedness. With unanimous support from its members, CSO issued a draft bill in 2008 which provides for more thorough planning 

at the state level, regional collaboration, and management of renewable energy development. While the existing CZMA provides enough flexibility for states to develop 

effective responses to a spill, the need for reauthorization is evident. 

With respect to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, it currently provides a 30- 

day window for the review and approval of OCS Exploration Plans. It is impossible 

for the CZMA state agencies to conduct a federal consistency review within a 30- 

day window. CSO recommends that Congress extend the 30-day review period to 

allow for CZMA state agencies to conduct federal consistency reviews. 

Finally, most states do not have the funds or staff to implement their own inspection program of the offshore oil and gas platforms, and therefore have relied on reports from the MMS inspection of the federal platforms. CSO recommends that Congress provide funds for CZMA state agency and applicable local government agencies to participate in the MMS inspections of the offshore oil and gas operations to 

enable a more thorough and objective review. 

B. Research and Information Dissemination 

The Deepwater Horizon spill has starkly illustrated the research needs in the 

planning and response for oil spills. For example, conventional containment and exclusion booms begin to fail when currents exceed 3⁄4 knots. This limitation makes 

spill containment and protection of environmentally sensitive areas difficult if not 

impossible. Many states need a deployable boom that operates effectively in complex, high-velocity currents and high waves that are frequently encountered in 

coastal environments. CSO recommends that Congress call for enhanced boom technology that can operate in high currents and in high waves. 

In light of the heavy dispersant use in the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, states 

and their citizens have concerns about the potential adverse effects of dispersants 

on the ocean’s sensitive ecosystem, especially the deep ocean. CSO recommends that 

Congress provide for the evaluation of the impacts of dispersants on natural resources in the water column, at depth, offshore, nearshore and along the coast and 

how it affects different life stages of finfish and shellfish. Such an evaluation should 

include impacts of dispersants on the persistence of oil in ecosystems due to oil settling and being re-suspended. 

Alaska has particular needs in this area as applied research efforts are needed 

to establish and distribute information about the current best available technology 

for oil spill response activities under Arctic and sub-arctic conditions. Examples include technology for tracking oil spills under ice, blowout prevention, toxicity and 

effectiveness of dispersants in cold, marine waters, in-situ burning and other response techniques during broken ice conditions, and improved weather and storm 

prediction in Arctic waters. Grants could assist communities with spill protection of 

subsistence resources and with planning, coordination and communication efforts. 

Federal funding could help the U.S. Coast Guard acquire Arctic-capable assets and 

could help construct port facilities in Arctic Alaska, which would improve response 

capabilities and simplify planning logistics. 

Finally, CSO recommends that Congress provide NOAA the resources to serve as 

a Portal for Dissemination of Lessons Learned from BP Oil Spill. As a result of the 

BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Gulf of Mexico Sea Grant Programs’ website 

(http:/gulfseagrant.tamu.edu/oilspill/GMRPloillspilllresearch.htm) has posted an 

addendum of research topics that will be added to its Gulf of Mexico Research Program. The research topics include ecosystem impacts, community resilience, fisheries, restoration post-spill, tourism, ecosystem services, impacts from dispersants, 

displaced people and workers, seafood industry, etc. The lessons learned from this 

research will be beneficial to the coastal states and territories for oil spill preparedness, response, recovery and restoration. This portal could provide a valuable mechanism for coastal states to review and offer input and could be paired with funding 

for NOAA or the Gulf States Sea Grant Programs to hold research and policy conferences for the information dissemination to other coastal states and communities. 

Closing 

In closing, thank you again for your leadership on these issues and for inviting 

me to testify today. The coastal states and territories look forward to continued 

work with committee staff, nongovernmental partners, federal agencies and others 

to ensure healthy oceans in the future. I welcome any questions you may have. 

16 

Response to questions submitted for the record by Kristen M. Fletcher, 

Executive Director, Coastal States Organization 

We appreciate the opportunity to elaborate on testimony offered on June 24 on 

regarding state preparedness for offshore energy development and response and the 

leadership of the Subcommittee on these issues. 

Questions from Chairwoman, Congresswoman Madeline Z. Bordallo (D–GU) 

1. Under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, coastal States are required to have included in their Federally-approved coastal management plans, a planning process for energy facilities in the coastal zone, 

including a process for anticipating the management of the impacts resulting from such facilities. Have these planning efforts been adequate 

to respond to an oil spill of this size and complexity? Should the Federal 

government provide additional technical or financial resources to assist 

coastal States for oil spill planning, logistics, response, and recovery? 

Although states use their oil spill and coastal management planning processes to 

prepare for a catastrophic spill like the complexity and magnitude of the Deepwater 

Horizon, there is no level of response equipment and emergency preparedness planning that is sufficient to effectively prevent the devastating impacts to the natural, 

economic, and social ecosystems that will occur from a catastrophic ongoing spill like 

the BP Deepwater Horizon well-blowout. 

CSO does encourage additional financial and technical resources from the federal 

government to ensure state and federal preparedness. CSO recommends that Congress provide funds for CZMA state agency and applicable local government agencies to participate in the MMS inspections of the offshore oil and gas operations to 

enable a more thorough and objective review. CSO recommends that Congress call 

for enhanced boom technology that can operate in high currents and in high waves, 

provide for the evaluation of the impacts of dispersants on natural resources in the 

water column, at depth, offshore, nearshore and along the coast and how it affects 

different life stages of finfish and shellfish. The Arctic has particular needs in this 

area as applied research efforts are needed to establish and distribute information 

about the current best available technology for oil spill response activities under 

Arctic and sub-arctic conditions. Federal funding could help the U.S. Coast Guard 

acquire Arctic-capable assets and data which would improve response capabilities 

and simplify planning logistics. Finally, CSO recommends that Congress provide 

NOAA the resources to serve as a Portal for Dissemination of Lessons Learned from 

BP Oil Spill. The lessons learned from this research will be beneficial to the coastal 

states and territories for oil spill preparedness, response, recovery and restoration. 

2. Your testimony makes clear that the Coastal Zone Management Act and 

the Oil Pollution Act are complimentary, but it is not clear how State 

and Federal contingency planning processes are coordinated with industry planning processes? How are these integrated and where can improvements be made? 

Alaska provides a good example of the integration. While the state notes that 

there is always room for improvement in any government-led coordination effort, 

Alaska generally has good coordination and participation among various governments and stakeholder groups for planning efforts under both OPA and CZMA. The 

Department of Natural Resources is the lead agency for coastal zone management 

plans and regularly coordinates with state resources agencies, coastal district management plan representatives, cities and boroughs, Native organizations, federal 

agencies, regional citizen advisory councils, and the public. Two Regional Citizen’s 

Advisory Councils (RCACs) were created under OPA 1990 and both are quite actively engaged and involved with oil spill response planning efforts in Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet. Councils like this one provide good examples for future 

improvements toward integrated processes. 

Furthermore, the Oil Spill Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) requires the development of Area Contingency Plans for four main regions in Alaska. State law divides 

Alaska into ten separate regions for spill response planning, which addresses the 

OPA requirements through the publication and regular update of the Unified Plan. 

In addition, ADEC has developed a number of specific spill response tools to supplement the information provided in the Unified Plan including: Spill Tactics for Alaska Responders; Alaska Incident Management System Guide for Response to Oil and 

Hazardous Substance Releases; Permits Tool; Tundra Treatment Guidelines; Local 

Response Agreements; Statewide Hazmat Team Program; Geographic Response 

Strategies and Potential Place of Refuge documents; and Memoranda of Understanding/Memoranda of Agreement between federal and state agencies. These eleVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:20 Jan 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\57093.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
17 

ments are integrated with other state planning efforts including coastal zone management. 

The California Area Committee process is another example of integration and specifically incorporates industry. The process has developed three regional Area Contingency Plans that cover the entire coast of California and all of San Francisco Bay. 

The process appears to be working well in California for improving oil spill emergency response planning efforts, improving coordination among government, nongovernment organizations, and industry, and for incorporating lessons learned from 

past spills. The Area Committees have been actively meeting since the mid 1990s. 

The Area Committees are co-chaired by the California OSPR and US Coast Guard 

and include representatives from industry, non-governmental organizations, and 

local state and federal agencies. Each Area Committee is responsible for working 

with State and local officials to pre-plan for joint response efforts, including appropriate procedures for mechanical recovery, dispersal, shoreline cleanup, protection 

of sensitive environmental areas, and protection, rescue, and rehabilitation of fisheries and wildlife. Federal legislation can provide incentives for this type of collaboration and integrated planning. 

Pursuant to California’s OSPRA 1990 and OPA 90, California’s OSPR and the US 

Coast Guard have implemented a comprehensive oil spill drills and exercise program in California. Coordination among federal, state, local agencies, environmental 

groups, and industry during oil spill emergency response is continually being refined 

and improved as a result of the frequent regional and statewide oil spill drills. Pursuant to the California’s OSPRA 1990, California’s OSPR also has implemented a 

comprehensive equipment deployment drills and exercise program that routinely 

has announced and unannounced drills to test the response capability of the oil spill 

response organizations (‘‘OSROs’’) and owner/operator of vessels and marine facilities (e.g. marine terminals, platforms, processing facilities) operating in California). 

These drills and exercises test the capability for fast on-water containment and recovery by requiring the OSROs and company personnel to deploy oil spill response 

vessels and equipment (e.g., booms and skimmers) within California’s oil spill response timeframes (e.g., 30 minutes, 60 minutes, 2 hours, 6 hours). 

California uses the federal US Coast Guard Incident/Unified Command System 

for oil spill response. The central Unified Command consists of the California Office 

of Spill Prevention and Response as the lead State On-Scene Commander representing California, the US Coast Guard as the Federal On-Scene Commander, and 

the Responsible Party. In California, under the ICS there is also the Multi-Agency 

Coordination group that consists of the other affected state, federal, and local agencies – including the California Coastal Commission, Marine Sanctuaries, and local 

governments—that is supposed to have a direct dotted line of communication to the 

Unified Command in order to get their respective agency concerns addressed. After 

the 2007 Cosco Busan spill – and after much discussion and negotiation from Local 

Governments—Local Governments may now have a representative directly in the 

Unified Command to have direct input on response strategies for their local resources. Local Government may now also be tasked deploying boom to protect their 

local resources and coordinating the volunteer function. The adding of local government representatives to this federal/state/industry structure is also a potential area 

for improvement. 

The coordination role of state CZMA consistency coordinators is also a valuable 

tool in the development or updating of those plans. State coastal programs, through 

their partnerships with NOAA, are uniquely set up to facilitate the coordination of 

government agency technical staff, elected officials, and other stakeholders in preparation for disasters such as these as well as natural disasters. This coordination 

identifies available resources and potential needs for additional resources for adequate, timely responses to such incidents. The CZMA consistency review process for 

OCS oil and gas exploration provides public input opportunities in order to fine tune 

spill contingency plans so that they incorporate appropriate local, state or regional 

conditions into response scenarios, and adequately address logistical obstacles that 

could affect response capabilities. The continued support for coastal management 

programs and reauthorization of the CZMA is vital. 

Questions from Ranking Republican Member, Congressman Henry E. 

Brown, Jr. (R–SC) 

1. In your testimony, you state that the 30-day window for the review and 

approval of OCS exploration plans is insufficient. Why is it impossible 

for states to conduct a federal consistency review in 30 days? How much 

time does a state need to review these plans? 

Given the complexity of the plans and the importance of a thorough review, states 

have indicated the preference for at least 90 days or up to 180 days to review the 

18 

plans. This is consistent with review requirements at the state and federal level for 

plans with similar levels of complexity. 

2. If the federal government is properly fulfilling its inspection responsibilities, why do states have to have their own inspection of offshore oil and 

gas platforms that are permitted in federal offshore waters? 

CSO supports the states serving as an active partner with the federal agency in 

its inspections, rather than introducing a separate inspection into the process. CSO’s 

recommendation that Congress provide funds for CZMA state agency and applicable 

local government agencies to participate in the MMS inspections of the offshore oil 

and gas operations will enable a more thorough and objective review, including from 

those most familiar with the local conditions and resources. 

3. Do states now inspect platforms on the federal OCS? Why should states 

inspect federal projects in federal waters? 

Because most states do not have the funds or staff to implement their own inspection program of the offshore oil and gas platforms, they have relied completely on 

reports from the MMS inspection of the federal platforms. Consistent with the rationale in the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, because activities in federal 

waters have impacts in state waters, there is an inherent state interest in those activities. The Deepwater Horizon spill is a keen example of those unintended impacts. 

4. In the current fiscal year, the Congress has appropriated $67 million to 

the 29 states and 5 territories with approved CZMA programs. How 

much of this money is spent on consistency reviews? Isn’t the overwhelming majority of this money spent on the administrative costs of 

implementing the program? 

The amount of federal dollars spent on consistency reviews and program administration will vary with each state and territory depending on how those funds are 

leveraged. However, facts indicate that the $67 million appropriated to the state 

grant program is money that is leveraged well and spent on a diverse range of 

coastal and ocean priorities nationwide. 

While a 2:1 match is required, most states match at a higher rate than that, giving the federal government even more for its money. For example, in 2008, states 

leveraged their federal funding and state match to secure an additional 25% of investment for habitat, water quality, hazards, and public access projects. 

In South Carolina in FY ’09, over $2.4 million (55% of the total program) was 

spent on coastal habitat conservation and restoration. In New Hampshire in FY ’09, 

over $630,000 (30% of the total funding) was spent on community and other technical assistance including on-the-ground coastal hazard mitigation. In Virginia in 

FY ’09, just under $1 million (20% of the total program) was spent on coastal water 

quality protection including education of municipal officials and enhanced nutrient 

removal technologies. 

Finally, compared to the ocean and coastal economy that this program supports, 

the $67 million appropriation does not match the high value that the coastal states 

provide to the nation. Considering the three states noted above, South Carolina’s 

Ocean Economy in 2000 was $1.4 billion, New Hampshire’s was over $500 million, 

and Virginia’s was $3.89 billion. 

5. Does your organization support Governor Bobby Jindal’s proposal to 

build 24 barrier islands to protect 130 miles of Louisiana’s fragile 

marshlands and beaches? 

CSO does not have a position on Governor Jindal’s proposal but continues to serve 

as a resource for the coastal state Governors when appropriate. 

6. Would you agree that it was a mistake to dump nearly 500,000 gallons 

of dispersant into the subsurface waters of the Gulf of Mexico without 

really knowing the short-term or long-term impacts of this action? 

CSO does not have a position on the use of dispersants; however, CSO recognizes 

that states and their citizens have concerns about the potential adverse effects of 

dispersants and recommends that Congress provide for the evaluation of the impacts of dispersants on natural resources in the water column, at depth, offshore, 

nearshore and along the coast and how it affects different life stages of finfish and 

shellfish. 

19 

7. Does your organization support the Obama Administration’s decision to 

establish a 6-month moratorium on deepwater exploration in the Gulf of 

Mexico? What is the rationale for this moratorium? 

CSO does not have a position on the moratorium and cannot speak to the Administration’s rationale for the moratorium. 

8. You mention the importance of lessons learned and state that federal 

and state laws in Alaska are based on the State’s experience with the 

Exxon Valdez. Did any other state implement changes to their spill response programs based on the Exxon Valdez incident? 

While states enacted oil spill legislation at different times, most of the West Coast 

states (Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and California) established significant oil spill 

laws and regulations in the early 90s, based on the Exxon Valdez oil spill as well 

as other incidents. They now require oil spill contingency plans, drills, and Certificates of Financial Responsibility, among other things, and those requirements are 

directed at facilities, tank vessels, and non-tank vessels. The West Coast states also 

joined with the West Coast Canadian Province of British Columbia in 1989 to form 

the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, which provides a forum for 

them to coordinate oil spill policies and programs, and to work cooperatively on 

issues of regional concern. 

In California specifically, the Exxon Valdez inspired the California Legislature to 

enact legislation in 1990 called the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention 

and Response Act (Act), which covers all aspects of marine oil spill prevention and 

response in California. In 1991, the California Department of Fish and Game, Office 

of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) was established with the primary authority in California to direct prevention, removal, abatement, response, containment, 

and cleanup efforts with regard to all aspects of any oil spill in marine waters of 

the state. The Act established a fee on oil imported into California to fund more 

than 200 employees dedicated to the prevention of, response to, and recover from 

oil spills. OSPR is the most robust state level oil spill program in the nation. In 

addition, following the Cosco Busan oil spill in the San Francisco Bay in November 

2007, a number of legislative bills and regulations were enacted to improve oil spill 

prevention and response in California. The resulting changes/additions included 

training of local government officials in oil spill response and management; grants 

to local governments to provide oil spill response equipment; fishery closure protocols; requirements for an Independent Drill Monitor to evaluate certain aspects of 

out-of-state oil spill drills, shortening of response times for on-water recovery; and 

adding 2 hour containment requirements for identified Oil Pollution Risk Areas in 

the San Francisco Bay and Los Angeles/Long Beach Harbors. 

9. You state that oil spill drills and exercises provide valuable opportunities to identify gaps in response readiness and capability. To your 

knowledge, how often do states conduct these drills? If they were conducted in the Gulf of Mexico, did any states find gaps in their response 

readiness and capability? 

California Department of Fish and Game, Office of Spill Prevention and Response 

(OSPR) conducts over 100 drills a year that test the response readiness of oil spill 

contingency plan holders. The drills are planned ahead of time for maximum effect 

and test the plan holder’s response structure and its ability to deploy response 

equipment. OSPR also conducts unannounced drills that put companies ’on the spot’ 

and test their ability to make the proper notifications as well as deploy equipment 

within a set amount of time. OSPR also conducts annual drills that test oil spill 

response organizations (OSRO) on their capabilities of responding with equipment 

necessary to clean specific amounts of spilled product, within required time limits. 

The OSROs must pass these drills to operate in California. In addition, OSPR tests 

and evaluates the readiness and effectiveness of oil spill response strategies that 

protect designated environmentally sensitive resources along California’s coast 

through our Sensitive Site Strategy Exercise Program. These defensive actions are 

tested by site-specific exercises, which involve the mobilization of an OSRO in a designated area and its deployment of protective and oil recovery equipment. As of the 

2nd quarter of 2010, OSPR has evaluated 71 sensitive site strategies as contained 

within the California Area Contingency Plans. 

Coordination among federal, state, local agencies, environmental groups, and industry during oil spill emergency response is continually being refined and improved 

as a result of the frequent regional and statewide oil spill drills. 

CSO cannot respond to the question regarding gaps in the readiness of the Gulf 

of Mexico state, although it supports a thorough review of the federal, state, and 

20 

industry responses to the Deepwater Horizon incident so that all agencies and 

states may glean important lessons. 

10. You stated that the CZMA and OPA provide adequate authorities for 

planning and response, but the statutes are limited by capacity and resources. What capacity and resources are necessary for full implementation of these laws? 

The programs under each of these statutes can benefit from increased federal 

funding. For example, the Coastal Zone Management Act funding has been level for 

much of the last decade. Accounting for only inflationary increases, the state grants 

line would be $88 million this year; it remains at or around $66 million. With the 

emerging challenges of sea level rise and other climate change impacts, the capacity 

to respond both day-to-day and in the case of an emergency is eroded. 

11. Is it your view that we were victims of our own success, that since we 

had not had an oil spill of this magnitude that necessary research on 

dispersant use, boom technology and usage, among other spill response 

research went unfunded? 

Since 2000, there have been no fewer than 6 accidents in the Gulf of Mexico which 

released oil into the natural environment. Decisions have been made to dedicate 

funds toward developing technology to drill in deeper and deeper areas. Unfortunately, funds toward research on dispersant use, boom technology and other spill 

response techniques were not priorities and did not keep pace. 

Notably, the California Coastal Commission has not found state-of-the-art systems 

safety features and oil spill prevention and response measures to be effective in preventing oil spills or effectively containing and cleaning up oil spills to avoid adverse 

impacts to California’s coastal zone resources. Experience in California has shown, 

and continues to show, that human error and mechanical failures can cause oil 

spills in spite of the most advanced system safety technologies and programs. Even 

small oil spills, if close to shore, can have devastating impacts on shoreline resources, even with rapid response using best state-of-the-art booms and skimmers. 

Despite its approval of 13 offshore OCS oil and gas development platforms, in each 

case the Coastal Commission explicitly found that the oil spill response measures 

did not meet the second test of Coastal Act Policy 30232 which requires ‘‘Effective 

containment and cleanup facilities and procedures shall be provided for accidental 

spills that do occur.’’ 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Ms. Fletcher, for explaining the state’s role in oil spill contingency planning. 

Now it is my pleasure to introduce Mr. Barton. You can begin 

your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MANLY BARTON, SUPERVISOR, DISTRICT 1, 

JACKSON COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, PASCAGOULA, 

MISSISSIPPI 

Mr. BARTON. Thank you. I am Manly Barton. I am a District 1 

Supervisor at Jackson County, Mississippi, Board of Supervisors. 

First, I would like to thank the Committee members for allowing 

us to be here today and have input into this very important issue. 

Living on the Gulf Coast all my life, I have experienced many 

disasters, mainly hurricanes, and the response and recovery period 

for each of these has been different. It is difficult to look at our current situation today and not compare the current disaster response 

to that of Hurricane Katrina five years ago, and we are still dealing almost every week with issues that are still not resolved. 

Disaster response today is not the same as the response of 20 

years ago. Hurricane Katrina was a good test of the new National 

Incident Management System, or NIMS, administered by the Department of Homeland Security. This provider provides a framework for Federal, state, and local governments to work together in 

responding to major disasters. The process worked well after HurriVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:20 Jan 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\57093.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
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cane Katrina, bringing the resources and the skilled people we 

needed to our county. 

In my opinion, the key to that process working as well as it did 

was communication from all the partners in the process, the Federal, state, and local. The local partners know their needs and 

should and do play an important role in that NIMS process. 

Because of our location on the Gulf Coast, we have had many 

disaster events. The planning that was in place at the time of the 

Deepwater Horizon event has provided an effective initial response. 

But as we move forward, these plans need to evolve to meet the 

changing needs of our local communities, the state, and the region. 

We need to continue to emphasize communications, and these are 

common issues between what I will call our normal natural disasters and this current Deepwater Horizon event. 

The framework of a NIMS’s management at the unified command level appears to be working very well. Our current unified 

command overseas the response and recovery efforts in Alabama, 

Florida, and Mississippi. That is a large, very diverse area to effectively manage. We are talking about three different states, three 

different coastlines. We believe the event has localized enough to 

warrant the full development of the state area commands. Those 

area commands could then coordinate their respective response 

plans under the direction of the unified command, and this would 

give us a better, or this would better customize the response and 

recovery efforts to the particular needs of each state, and would improve the communications down to the local level. 

As far as the technical and financial resources that the Federal 

Government might help with, there were two specific things that 

came to mind. 

On the technical side, we need personnel on site at the local level 

that are trained in oil spill response and recovery. If not on site, 

at least made available to us on some as-needed basis. For example, as an elected official, I have people almost every day that are 

coming to me saying that they have the latest product that will 

solve all of our problems. They will stop the oil, clean up and protect our shoreline. And we are not—we just don’t have the expertise to make those calls. We need somebody with some expertise 

that can help us through those evaluation processes. 

Second, most emergency operation centers on the Gulf Coast 

were designed and built many years ago under a very different disaster response model. Most would be considered functionally obsolete today. 

The NIMS’ process requires a greater number of personnel involved in the response and recovery effort and the technology needed today is quite different. Hurricane Katrina and the Deepwater 

Horizon event have made us painfully aware that we need to upgrade our facilities to manage these emergencies successfully. We 

knew this after Katrina, and we certainly know this today. 

For communities still recovering from Katrina, several million 

dollars, perhaps as much as $8 million for a new or upgraded emergency operation center, is difficult to fund. This is something that 

would help our county, it would help many of our neighbors along 

the Gulf Coast still struggling to recover from Hurricane Katrina, 

22 

responding to the current Deepwater Horizon event, and contending 

with yet another hurricane season. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barton follows:] 

Statement of Manly Barton, Supervisor, District 1, 

Jackson County Board of Supervisors, Pascagoula, Mississippi 

Overview 

We have been asked to provide a local government’s perspective on coastal State 

planning for offshore events. Three plans have been identified that should be in 

place for Mississippi: (1) An Area Contingency Plan (ACP) which includes coastal 

Mississippi and is implemented in conjunction with the National Contingency Plan 

(NCP) under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990; (2) an independent State contingency 

plan which is implemented in coordination with the relevant ACP and the NCP; and 

(3) a State plan in its coastal management plan required under the Coastal Zone 

Management Act of 1972. 

Dr. William W. Walker will address the Area Contingency Plan in his report. We 

can confirm specific action BP has taken at the request of Mississippi. BP has installed boom at critical habitats early on and has recently installed absorbent silt 

fencing at test sites. BP has further hired contractors to deploy collections vessels 

and to collect and dispose of oil material found on the barrier islands. Finally, Mississippi directed BP to address small incidents of oil material which managed to bypass the barrier islands. 

Being from a county on the Gulf Coast, we have been the dubious recipient of 

years of experience in multi-jurisdictional disaster events. Two issues are common 

in our responses to these events and are relevant to the success of our response to 

the current Deepwater Horizon event: (1) the ability to adjust plans to meet the 

changing needs of the event and (2) effective communication. To that end, the planning in place at the time of the event has provided an effective initial response. We 

find as we move forward that these plans need to evolve to meet the changing needs 

of our state and that communication needs to be emphasized. 

While we offer some observations on the effectiveness of Mississippi’s ACP, we 

center our comments on the coordination of that planning effort through the NIMS 

framework. We thought our value to this hearing would be in our ability to compare 

the NIMS management of this event with the NIMS management during our 

Katrina response and recovery efforts: 

Responses 

1. Adequacy of these planning efforts to respond to an oil spill of this complexity and magnitude. 

The framework of NIMS management at the Unified Command level appears to 

be set-up satisfactorily. However, we believe the event has localized enough to warrant the full development and implementation of State Area Commands under the 

direction of the Unified Command. We discuss that in more detail in Response 2. 

Also, the lines of communication between the upper level and the lower level of the 

command structure could be improved. For instance, we are involved in several conference calls throughout the day with several different levels of command and various agencies. Especially early on, the information was inconsistent and, in some 

cases, inaccurate. For instance, boom deployment location and length differed from 

conference to conference. 

Also, this disconnect is magnified by the fact that the local level coastal facilities 

are not capable of handling something of the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon 

event. Events like Deepwater Horizon and Katrina involve multiple local, State and 

federal agencies. It is imperative that each local facility has the necessary amount 

of personnel on site with the necessary skill sets to address the issues specific to 

that local area. However, many of the local emergency management agencies operate in outdated facilities which do not have sufficient capacity or infrastructure to 

house the required personnel (NIMS) during a long-term, large-scale event. Thus, 

communication is hindered because decisions are made elsewhere and local level responders have to rely on ‘‘outside’’ communications for updates and directives. As 

a corollary, today’s agencies take advantage of the latest technology. Many of the 

local facilities were built decades ago and are not equipped with compatible support 

systems. 

23 

2. The sufficiency of the coordination amongst these planning efforts and 

between different levels of government. 

Again, communication—and coordination—is enhanced when those with decisionmaking authority and those who are experts in the relevant fields are onsite at the 

local level. Many general or broad decisions are made at the Unified Command level 

which necessitates some discretion at the lower level. As noted above, it would be 

most beneficial if personnel with training specific to the event (e.g., oil shoreline 

cleanup) were available to assist with the local planning and recovery efforts. Also, 

we have experienced an improvement in the transfer of some information. But, room 

for improvement still exists. First, a good system exists for submitting requests. 

But, getting clear, timely responses to some of those requests have been difficult. 

Second, the current unified command does not include a branch for local input and 

our local facilities do not accommodate a fully functional Emergency Support Functions (ESF) set-up. 

Irrespective of the current system, it would be more effective at this point if State 

Area Commands were fully developed. Our current Unified Command oversees the 

response and recovery efforts in Florida, Alabama and Mississippi. Today, it is too 

spread out to effectively manage the overall recovery along those three states’ coastlines. We recommend that each of the three states have fully implemented Area 

Commands that can coordinate its respective response plan under the direction of 

the Unified Command. This will better customize the response and recovery efforts 

to the particular needs of each state and will improve communications down to the 

local level. 

As to the coordination of funding, the current structure is better than the structure in Katrina. The current decision-making funding process has fewer levels of hierarchy. The FEMA Public Assistance (PA) program necessarily involves the State 

as the Grantee and the local government as the Sub-Grantee. The PA program also 

involves reviews by State analysts and the Office of Inspector General. The State 

plays a significant role in the current event (primarily through MDEQ and MDMR) 

and other agencies are heavily involved. However, we observe more efficient decision-making and a more efficient funding process in the current event than in the 

Katrina event. 

3. Additional technical or financial resources that might be provided by 

the Federal Government to assist coastal States for oil spill planning, logistics, response, and recovery. 

Two resources discussed above would assist us in the oil spill planning, logistics, 

response and recovery: (1) personnel on-site at the local level who are trained in oil 

spill response and recovery; and (2) modern emergency operations centers built to 

meet FEMA 361 construction standards which can handle today’s technology and 

personnel required to successfully and efficiently manage long-term, large-scale 

events like hurricanes and oil spills. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Barton, for informing 

us about the oil spill planning efforts in Jackson County. 

Next, it is my pleasure to introduce Mr. Menashes. 

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW MENASHES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL ESTUARINE RESEARCH RESERVE ASSOCIATION, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. MENASHES. Thank you, Chairwoman Bordallo, and members 

of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the 

state agencies and academic institutions that operate the nation’s 

27 national estuarine research reserves. 

I am Matt Menashes, Executive Director of the National Estuarine Research Reserve Association. NERRA is dedicated to the protection, understanding, and science-based management of our nation’s estuaries and coasts. 

As you know, the Research Reserve System was authorized in 

1972 under the Coastal Zone Management Act. The program is a 

unique partnership between NOAA and state agencies and universities to protect lands and waters for long-term research and eduVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:20 Jan 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\57093.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
24 

cation purposes. As part of the CZMA, reserves play a strong role 

in providing the science needed to effectively manage our estuaries. 

The five reserves along the Gulf of Mexico make up nearly 45 

percent of the total acreage of the reserve system. With such a significant amount of the system located around the Gulf, we are concerned about the long-term impacts of this spill on natural resources in the reserves and beyond. We have recently seen oil impacts to the Grand Bay Reserve in Mississippi, which is in Mr. 

Barton’s district, and we hope we can avoid damages to the other 

reserves along the Gulf. 

My comments today are intended to highlight what our people 

are experiencing and how those experiences can inform planning 

efforts. First, let me talk about preparedness planning. 

We have identified two key areas where we believe attention 

needs to be focused to ensure we are prepared in the future. First, 

we need to prioritize training for responding to oil spills higher 

than we have. Our reserve managers and staff have struggled to 

figure out HAZMAT training requirements and the damage assessment process. Agencies need to ensure that sufficient personnel are 

trained in HAZMAT procedures to expedite booming and recovery 

operations, and NOAA needs to invest more effort in resources and 

to providing training on NRDA sampling prior to a spill. We have 

the infrastructure to help our partners develop these capacities. 

Second, preparedness requires continual improvement in governmental coordination. Our reserves must be integrated into area 

contingency plans and county emergency operation commands 

should know where our reserves are. There must be incentives for 

ACPs and EOCs to integrate coastal protected areas into their 

planning. 

In the area of contingency planning, we know that the cost of restoring marshes and mangroves is exorbitant. The Coast Guard 

needs the best information to develop contingencies that protect 

these critical habitats. We need to ensure high resolution special 

data about critical reserve habitats is provided to the Coast Guard, 

and that boom deployment strategies reflect that data. This will reduce costs and increase restoration success rates by minimizing 

damage to critical resources. 

Because reserves are managed by state institutions, we don’t 

have the ability to mobilize personnel of the Federal Government 

like our colleagues in marine sanctuaries and wildlife refuges. 

NOAA should work with the states to identify ways to deploy adequate personnel to reserves in times of emergency. 

I would also like to point out that the CZMA requires that NOAA 

give priority consideration to research that uses the reserves. We 

hope to work with NOAA to ensure that the agency’s post-spill 

research plans use the reserves for baseline and applied research. 

With regard to damage assessment planning, we are concerned 

that personnel limits and a lack of funding will have a negative effect on our ability to fully assess the damages to reserve resources. 

This will affect NOAA’s and the state’s ability to recoup the total 

value of damages for those resources. 

It is also our understanding that the NRDA biological monitoring 

protocols were not sufficient for this spill, and that there were duplicative Federal reporting requirements. NOAA and the states 

25 

need to collaborate ahead of time to establish effective biological 

monitoring protocols, and the Federal agencies need to develop one 

database for reporting. We also need to do a better job of integrating existing data sets into the damage assessment process. 

Our experience to this point shows that our use of baseline data 

are not being used. And in consideration of the scale of this event, 

it incumbent upon Federal programs to reconsider their long-term 

monitoring priorities. Congress should require the reserve system, 

and the Integrated Ocean Observing System for that matter, to 

consider adding hydrocarbon testing to their current monitoring 

protocols. 

On restoration planning, we believe that the Gulf of Mexico Alliance could be the coordinating body for state restoration efforts in 

the Gulf. The alliance has the established networks and relationships and the experience to ensure interstate coordination is carried out effectively. 

On the Federal side, NOAA should align its Gulf of Mexico regional efforts to recover from this spill. NOAA needs dedicated staff 

on the ground in the region bringing together their assets, like the 

reserves, the sanctuaries’ Sea Grant Coastal Programs more to create efficiencies and avoid duplication. 

I would also like to reiterate Kristen Fletcher’s point. CZMA has 

been overdue for reauthorization for 10 years. We must reauthorize 

the CZMA and improve the reserve system. We will work with the 

Subcommittee to explore areas to improve the legislation. 

Chairwoman Bordallo, we wish to express our condolences to the 

families of the Deepwater Horizon workers who lost their lives, and 

acknowledge that the livelihoods and quality of life of many in the 

Gulf region are in jeopardy. Our efforts to help restore the environment will draw inspiration from the strength of the families who 

lost loved ones and the resiliency of the people of the Gulf region. 

I will be happy to answer any questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Menashes follows:] 

Statement of Matthew E. Menashes, Executive Director, 

National Estuarine Research Reserve Association 

Thank you Chairwoman Bordallo, Ranking Member Brown, and Members of the 

Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the state agencies and academic institutions that operate the nation’s 27 National Estuarine Research Reserves (reserves) about planning standards for offshore energy development in the 

context of the oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. 

I am Matt Menashes, Executive Director of the National Estuarine Research Reserve Association (NERRA). Our association was founded in 1987 by the state and 

academic institutions that operate the reserves. NERRA is dedicated to the protection, understanding, and science-based management of our nation’s estuaries and 

coasts. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify, and on behalf of NERRA’s members, want 

to express our appreciation to the committee for focusing this hearing on planning 

issues. While we know that Americans right now really just want someone to stop 

the oil spill, the reality is that what was needed, and what is still needed, is to have 

effective plans in place before disasters like this happen. Planning is what we do 

in order to reduce risks in the first place. Planning is what we need to ensure effective response when something happens. Effective planning is an obligation we owe 

to our communities so we can recover quickly when disaster strikes. Planning is absolutely required in order for us to execute our responsibility, and the trust we hold, 

to protect and restore the environment. 

As you know, the National Estuarine Research Reserve System (reserve system) 

was authorized in 1972 under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). The program is a unique federal-state partnership which brings the National Oceanic and 

26 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) together with state agencies and universities 

to protect lands and waters for long-term research and education purposes. NOAA 

and reserve staffers collaborate to provide education, training, and stewardship programs that ensure the protection of these wonderful places while advancing our collective understanding of how estuaries function. As part of the CZMA, the reserves 

play a strong role in providing the science needed by coastal managers at the local, 

state, and federal levels to effectively manage our estuarine and coastal resources. 

The five reserves in the Gulf of Mexico make up nearly 45 percent of the total 

acreage of the reserve system. The Rookery Bay reserve in Florida, designated in 

1978, has over 110,000 acres. The Apalachicola reserve in Florida, designated in 

1979, has over 246,000 acres. The Weeks Bay reserve in Alabama, designated in 

1986, has just over 6500 acres. The Grand Bay reserve in Mississippi, designated 

in 1999, has over 18,400 acres, and the newest reserve, Mission-Aransas in Texas, 

designated in 2006, has over 186,000 acres. With such a significant amount of the 

total system located in the Gulf of Mexico, we are obviously concerned about the 

long-term impacts of this spill on natural resources in the reserves and beyond. 

Perhaps the best way to put our concerns into context is this; staffs at our two 

Florida Gulf coast reserves have been working for over 30 years to improve the condition of their estuaries. They conduct research, educate citizens, and provide 

science-based information to decision-makers at all levels of government. They work 

on some of the most pressing long-term environmental questions in the Gulf region, 

from freshwater requirements for Gulf coast oysters to restoration of the Everglades. 

In just over 60 days, though, 30 years of effort could be lost from one short-term 

event with highly destructive, long-term consequences. 

My comments today are intended to highlight what our people on the ground in 

the Gulf of Mexico region are experiencing and how those experiences can inform 

planning efforts so that we are more efficient, and respond faster in a coordinated 

way, in response to future events. 

I want to assure the committee that our members will continue to work with their 

federal, state, and local partners to ensure that the research we conduct, and the 

training and education we provide, are integrated into preparedness and contingency plans at all levels of government and across the country. I also want to let 

you know that we recognize that what is happening in the Gulf now will most likely 

change our program’s emphasis in the Gulf of Mexico for years to come. We will conduct careful assessments, we will secure the necessary resources, we will do the research, and we will restore the reserves while helping others in region restore the 

Gulf. 

Our recommendations are included in this testimony and are summarized at the 

end. 

Preparedness Planning 

Nobody was prepared for an incident of this magnitude, including our members 

and their federal partners. While there were gaps in planning and issues of coordination have arisen and will continue to arise, our members are extremely grateful 

for the support they have received from federal partners at NOAA, the U.S. Coast 

Guard (USCG), and the Department of the Interior in particular. In a time of crisis, 

the level of professionalism that has been shown time and time again by our federal 

partners is testimony to efforts undertaken at all levels of government to improve 

coordination and efficiency. In particular, our members in the Gulf and I want to 

commend our partners at NOAA’s Estuarine Reserves Division for their efforts to 

coordinate the reserves’ response to the spill. 

We have identified two key areas where we believe attention needs to be focused 

to ensure adequate preparedness planning is in place. First, it is clear that we need 

to prioritize outreach and training for responding to oil spills higher than we have. 

The severity of oil spills in the coastal and marine environment requires us to 

rethink our training priorities. This is particularly clear when weighing the severity 

of spills against the short time periods during which oil spills cause damage. The 

risks are too great not to prioritize oil spill training. 

A couple of recent examples speak to the reserves’ abilities to facilitate training 

and outreach. The Rookery Bay reserve in Florida held a workshop with the USCG 

for over 70 organizations and agencies working on the spill to facilitate increased 

coordination and training. The Rookery Bay staff was able to pull the workshop together within 48 hours because of their connections to networks of coastal resource 

managers in the state. In addition, our Weeks Bay, Alabama, and Grand Bay, Mississippi, reserves collaborated with the Sea Grant institutions in the region on outreach workshops for local communities. Our people know the players and their communities, and can assist agencies at all levels in training and outreach. 

27 

We need to think about opportunities for NOAA and the USCG to provide training to local and state level officials, including senior level officials, on larger scale 

events like this one. There are planning lessons from Department of Defense-style 

‘‘all hands’’ drills that should become part of the way we do business in coastal management, particularly as we look more and more at the ocean and our coastal areas 

as ways to meet our energy needs. 

Our experiences during this crisis highlight several areas where we believe better 

coordination between federal agencies and our staff for training can have a significant impact in the short-term: 

1. Hazardous materials (hazmat) and hazardous waste operations (hazwoper) 

training. It is clear that the availability of trained hazmat and hazwoper 

workers has been an issue facing incident commanders. While we recognize 

that all spill responses are unique, some standardization will allow workers 

to be better prepared. The states have been struggling to figure out hazmat 

training requirements. It is my understanding that there is a lot of misinformation about the requirements for who needs training and for how long 

it has to be. It is also my understanding that this information is changing 

on a week-to-week or sometimes daily basis. Congress and the federal agencies need to ensure that sufficient personnel are trained—or available to provide training—on short notice in order to quickly ramp-up booming and oil 

recovery operations. We have the infrastructure to help our partners develop 

this capacity. From classrooms and auditoriums to other site-based infrastructure like storage areas and hazmat labs, many of our facilities make 

ideal locations for this type of training. Technical staff at the reserves already provide training programs for coastal managers, local decision-makers, 

and the public on a regular basis and can easily gear up for a focus on hazardous materials. Strong networks of potential clients for such training and 

excellent outreach capabilities exist at our reserves. We believe Congress 

could require that NOAA and other federal agencies take advantage of the 

investments already made in the reserve system and quickly generate new 

capacity for such training. 

2. Natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) training. Nothing delays governmental response more than the confusion that results from a steep learning curve. As we have seen with this spill, reserve staffers and agency managers were temporarily hamstrung while they learned how the NRDA process worked. In addition to basic, recurring training on how NRDA works, 

NOAA needs to invest more effort and resources into providing training on 

NRDA sampling before a spill occurs. With limited resources and personnel, 

it is more efficient for such training to be done before a spill occurs, so that 

in the thick of a disaster, staff can be doing the assessments rather than 

learning how to do the assessments. Standardization of basic NRDA sampling protocols would allow sampling to begin immediately after an incident. 

Each day of delay in assessing resources puts information useful to the restitution process at risk. I do want to point out that an excellent web-based 

seminar, given each day, was developed by NOAA to guide sampling teams 

through data entry formats, photo and global positioning system (GPS) documentation. Due to the rapidity of the response in the early days, however, 

some of our first sampling crews were not able to participate in this training 

prior to sampling. 

3. Incident Command System (ICS) training. Many reserve managers and staff 

have been deployed to the incident command center. This training would be extremely valuable to explain the incident command process and the role of each 

team member. There is a free online course from FEMA that should be recommended to all natural resource managers. 

4. Shoreline Cleanup and Assessment Team (SCAT) protocol training. While 

some of our reserves and states are now trained for shoreline cleanup and assessment, we recognize that reserve staff and other natural resource managers 

should be trained in these protocols before a spill occurs. 

Second, we believe preparedness requires continual improvements in coordination 

between all levels of government. The people who work in the reserve system understand the importance of maintaining relationships with different levels and agencies 

of government. Our unique model, the federal-state partnership with NOAA, requires us to coordinate with the federal government on an almost daily basis. Our 

role in our communities is to support local decision-making with scientific information, and we work with our county government and town councils regularly. We cannot, however, claim that we maintain relationships with every federal and local official involved in preparedness planning. For instance, Area Contingency Plans 

(ACPs) are developed by the USCG in coordination with county-level Emergency OpVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:20 Jan 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\57093.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
28 

erations Commands (EOCs). We are not confident that each of our reserves is integrated into ACPs or known to county EOCs. We do not believe that county level 

EOCs regularly engage with the resource managers in coastal areas. There must be 

some type of incentive, or mandate, for ACPs and EOCs to integrate coastal protected areas into their planning efforts. While some of our reserves were involved 

to varying degrees with ACP efforts, it has become obvious that many local entities 

were not. This causes some local efforts to be fragmented. 

Training and inter-governmental coordination are just two areas for Congress to 

examine as we look to improve our preparedness planning. We believe these are 

areas where small investments or minor policy changes can lead to significant 

change in a short time frame. 

Contingency Planning 

What we have learned from this event is that even the best processes and planning can sometimes marginalize good information. While we fully support the centralized response planning model, we recognize that the model has its limits. Plugging our people, our program, and our data into this model can be difficult. 

As an example we do not believe that our principal federal partner, NOAA, is recognized for their expertise in some state-level contingency plans. The reserves are 

a unique natural resource. While these sites are owned and operated by the states 

and sometimes local governments in a networked model, NOAA has significant natural resource trust authority for reserve resources. If state plans do not account for 

NOAA’s role in the reserves, and if contingency plans for protecting reserve resources are not well established, we believe both the federal and state partners will 

be limited in successfully preventing injury to reserve resources or in negotiating 

effective settlements with responsible parties. 

Contingency planning requires the ability to anticipate what could happen and develop plans for multiple scenarios. It also requires the ability to adapt to changing 

conditions on the ground. Primarily, however, contingency planning requires excellent information. We now recognize that reserve management and staff have not 

been sufficiently plugged in to the USCG’s ACPs. 

As an example, reserves now generally have high resolution spatial data about 

critical habitats that is a significant advancement over the data we had just five 

or 10 years ago. We need to ensure this information is provided to the USCG and 

that boom deployment strategies reflect it. As the USCG makes decisions about 

where to deploy boom, their highest priority must be on protecting fragile coastal 

wetlands including marshes and mangroves. We don’t think anyone will argue that 

the cost of restoring marshes and mangroves is exorbitant, and that such restoration is not often highly effective. By using booms to push oil to less fragile areas, 

incident commanders can more effectively deploy a limited number of skimmers and 

help ensure oil does not get into sensitive areas in the first place. Having the best 

scientific information available for contingency plans will reduce costs and increase 

success rates for restoration. 

NOAA and the state agencies that manage the reserves need to ensure that the 

USCG regularly updates boom deployment strategies in ACPs based on the latest 

scientific information about our reserve resources, and also do so in consultation 

with local communities. We know, for example, that our reserves in Florida were 

actively involved in creating ACPs for the resources they manage. Staff identified 

and mapped boom placement locations, sensitive resources, and oil recovery locations. We cannot say with certainty, however, that all 27 reserves have had this 

level of involvement in ACP development. We encourage the USCG to be clearer 

with federal and state partners about the process for updating ACPs. We encourage 

these agencies to consider an annual updating process that reaches out to coastal 

resource managers in the reserve system and other programs. We also request that 

the USCG engage the right people in these tasks by working with existing networks 

of coastal managers and marine protected area managers to deliver information in 

a timely fashion. We believe there is an opportunity through the reserve managing 

agencies and NOAA to regularly update incident command centers regarding reserve resources to ensure that effective planning is in place before a spill happens. 

We recommend that NOAA develop guidelines for reserve managing agencies to coordinate with the USCG. We also recommend that NOAA and the USCG report to 

Congress their progress on this issue. 

We believe county-level EOCs must be incentivized to engage with the coastal 

management community on contingency planning. We don’t believe there is currently an effective mechanism to ensure this happens. Oftentimes, EOCs do not 

have connections with the marine protected area and coastal management networks. 

We believe our reserve staff can assist county EOCs in building these relationships. 

29 

Earlier I noted that contingency planning requires the ability to adapt to changing conditions. While we do have some concerns about improved coordination with 

the USCG, we have found that they are willing to make adjustments based on new 

information we develop and provide. We would like to commend them on their flexibility during this difficult time. 

For short-term, highly destructive events, whether an oil spill or a hurricane, we 

need federal policy to strengthen our ability to react and protect the resources we 

have been entrusted with. As research reserves, we also need the ability to study 

and understand what is happening to our resources so that we can inform future 

scenarios and planning. Our capacity is highly limited by the lack of immediate access to contingency funds and staff. NOAA currently does not have the ability to 

provide significant resources to reserves to undertake contingency efforts for staffing, response, research, or restoration. We believe that Congress should consider establishing a method for NOAA to provide contingency funds and staffing to its state 

agency partners who manage the reserves. Several examples are described below. 

With regards to this spill, we are finding that some funding for contingencies is 

available but that some of our financial needs are not being met. While our reserves 

are getting what they need to conduct NRDA hydrocarbon sampling, we believe 

there are funding gaps with regard to biological inventory needs. NERRA has advocated for an additional $2.5 million for wildlife assessments at the reserves. To date 

we have not received this funding. We recognize that the federal government or the 

states will ultimately be reimbursed by the responsible party, yet without dedicated 

funding right now to conduct the work we cannot even get these studies underway. 

This is particularly exacerbated by state budget crises. We are concerned that the 

damages assessed on the reserves will be undervalued if we do not have the funding 

necessary to conduct the additional survey work needed. 

In addition, because these sites are managed by state governments, or in some 

cases by state universities, we don’t have the ability to mobilize the personnel resources of the federal government like our colleagues in the National Marine Sanctuaries or National Wildlife Refuges. Reserves are among the few site-based programs within NOAA’s portfolio. The agency should work with states to deploy adequate resources to these special places in time of emergency. We have no real option 

for bringing in colleagues with experience in oil spills from reserves in other states 

to assist in our efforts. There is also no current option for NOAA to assign people 

to our reserves to assist during events like this. We believe Congress should require 

NOAA to develop the interagency personnel agreements that would allow the agency to facilitate additional staffing for reserves facing large-scale events. We need 

this type of procedure in place as part of our contingency planning efforts. 

Additionally, there are currently no resources available to our reserves for research on the oil spill, nor when significant research opportunities present themselves from other anomalous events. We believe this is a significant problem for a 

network of sites established specifically for research purposes. To give you an example, after Hurricane Andrew in 1993, we were presented with an excellent research 

opportunity to understand the impact of the storm on mangroves. Yet we had an 

extremely difficult time accessing funding following the event. Many research opportunities were lost that could have advanced contingency planning for future storm 

events. While BP has provided millions of dollars to academic research institutions 

in the Gulf, and will provide more, there is no current funding for research reserve 

staff to access for monitoring and impact research. I would also like to point out 

that the CZMA requires that NOAA, in conducting or supporting estuarine research, 

give priority consideration to research that uses the reserve system. Even if no direct funding is available to reserve staff to conduct research, we believe the CZMA 

requires NOAA to prioritize the use of the five Gulf coast reserves for research on 

this spill. We hope to work with NOAA to ensure that the agency’s post-spill research plan gives that priority consideration to the reserves. 

We believe there needs to be a way for NOAA to get resources to the reserves 

for the important contingency and research work needed in the face of dramatic 

events like a spill or a storm. We urge Congress to consider establishing a contingency funding mechanism for the reserve system. 

Damage Assessment Planning 

While the natural resource damage assessment process appears to be advancing, 

there are some areas where we have concerns. Our concerns should be considered 

in the context that this spill is, hopefully, anomalous. 

Twenty years of NRDA experience following the Exxon Valdez oil spill has provided the states and NOAA with many of the tools to effectively assess damages to 

marine and coastal resources. We support a process of continual, iterative improvement so that we can generate excellent information while finding program effiVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:20 Jan 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\57093.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
30 

ciencies. Right now we do not have the luxury to change course in mid-spill. But 

there are some initial lessons that we believe could help improve the process later. 

We must recognize that NOAA does not have enough personnel to effectively manage a spill of this size. This is not a criticism of NOAA; it is just the reality of federal spending priorities developed over many years. Our people report that they 

have had little interaction with NOAA’s office that is responsible for damage assessments. We are concerned that this will have a negative effect in the future on 

NOAA’s and the states’ ability to recoup damages from the responsible party for all 

reserve resources. Reserves are NOAA trust resources and the agency has a responsibility to the states to ensure that the settlement from this spill reflects the full 

extent of damages to these resources. We believe NOAA should be prioritizing reserves for additional attention and study. 

We also must recognize that sampling is expensive. While it is convenient to think 

that the responsible party will pay for sampling and other assessments, the reality 

is that we cannot recover the lost time, the program delays, and other direct and 

indirect costs associated with shifting labor away from our principal activities to 

NRDA sampling. These are costs we will never recover. Federal policy needs to address the costs incurred by agencies during catastrophic events as part of the restitution process. 

Sampling is also highly complex. NRDA protocols were established following the 

Exxon Valdez spill, but it is our understanding that they have not been thoroughly 

updated in about 20 years. The protocols that were originally provided for sampling 

were generally relevant to the biogeography of the Gulf of Mexico, but some were 

not. For instance, biological monitoring protocols were not sufficient for this spill. 

I have been told that there were no approved protocols beyond benthic invertebrate 

and tissue sampling. NOAA and the states need to collaborate ahead of time to establish effective biological monitoring protocols. We are concerned that the efforts 

now underway to refine biological monitoring and sampling protocols were not done 

before the spill happened; this should take place as part of the preparedness process. Conducting proper assessments requires good information on what protocols to 

use, quick access to trained people and equipment, and most importantly sufficient 

laboratory capacity. Immediately after the spill, reserve managers and staff were 

asked whether they could quickly begin NRDA sampling. At that time our people 

had no sampling kits, no training, and were expecting oil to wash ashore within 

hours. We did the best we could in these conditions. It is my understanding that 

sampling protocols, though available on the web, were password protected. Sampling 

protocols made their way into our people’s hands via email chains. As protocols 

changed, our people were left guessing whether they had the latest information on 

how to do the work. If our goal is to get people up and sampling in short time 

frames, sampling protocols must be made widely available so that state and county 

personnel can get the right information in a timely manner. 

The lack of access to equipment also likely delayed sampling by a few days. Luckily, weather patterns minimized oil washing ashore, granting us sufficient time to 

get sampling underway. 

Another concern is that some of the early sampling we conducted was lost due 

to the lack of analysis capacity at laboratories. We know that one of our reserves 

has had to resample some areas due to this problem. The laboratory backlog has 

apparently eased, but plans should have been in place to prepare laboratories much 

sooner. A network of third-party labs that can be immediately engaged for damage 

assessment analyses should be established. 

Database management and quality assurance protocols should be developed and 

should be in place on the first day of a spill. These protocols should be designed 

and properly staffed for rapid implementation and deployment. While the sampling 

is happening and is now highly coordinated, we believe there are duplicative requirements being placed on reserve staff by having to report monitoring and sampling data to two different federal agencies through two different reporting systems. 

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and NOAA have different responsibilities for damages arising from the spill and personnel are being asked to provide 

data through EPA’s SCRIBE site and to a NOAA FTP site. We should do our best 

to create efficiencies and eliminate this additional burden on them, especially given 

the already long hours that are being worked in response to the spill. We are concerned that the agencies had coordinated on one data network and that this might 

result in some data being in one location and not the other. I have received recent 

information, though, that these issues are being resolved. 

We also need to do a better job of integrating existing data sets into the damage 

assessment process. In a time of limited resources, existing data, particularly data 

that is acquired in a consistent manner over long-time periods, can and should be 

31 

used in NRDA. Our experience with the NRDA process to this point shows that 

years of baseline data we have developed are not being used. Whether it is data collected by the reserve system’s long-term monitoring program or the detailed spatial 

data we have collected, these data needs to be integrated into damage assessments. 

This will require NOAA and the states to develop a plan for using and sharing these 

data. It will also require NOAA to update their ESI maps on a more frequent basis 

with data collected by the reserves and others in the coastal management community. 

Finally, in consideration of the scale of this event, it is incumbent upon programs 

to reconsider their long-term monitoring priorities. While it may be hard for us to 

currently envision hydrocarbon testing as a key protocol for the reserve system’s 

long-term monitoring program, or for the Integrated Ocean Observing System 

(IOOS) network for that matter, we need to consider this as an option. Congress 

should require both of these programs to consider adding hydrocarbon testing to 

their current monitoring programs. By establishing long-term trend data for hydrocarbons in the coastal and marine environment through the reserve system and 

IOOS, we can help reduce the burden on hydrocarbon sampling in the future. NOAA 

should be required to weigh the costs of these additional sampling regimes against 

the risks associated with major spills and the assessment process. At minimum, 

however, we need to be better prepared to conduct hydrocarbon testing in the event 

of a spill regardless of its magnitude. 

Restoration Planning 

Restoring the Gulf will happen, but it will take many years. As we prepare for 

what many are calling the largest environmental restoration effort in history, we 

believe there are actions that can be taken now to improve the ability of states and 

the federal government to ensure restoration happens in a coordinated and efficient 

manner. 

NOAA and the administration have spent significant time over the past 18 

months focused on regional ocean governance. We support this effort and believe the 

Gulf of Mexico Alliance could be the coordinating body for efforts in the Gulf. The 

alliance has the established networks and relationships, and the experience to ensure this process is carried out effectively. It will also provide the best opportunity 

to highlight the value of regional ocean and coastal governance, a direction that we 

support. 

In support of regional governance, we now believe that NOAA should realign its 

efforts for Gulf of Mexico regional issues with a primary emphasis on spill recovery. 

We believe the agency needs a dedicated staff, on the ground in the region, focused 

on bringing together NOAA resources for the long-term recovery of the Gulf. This 

group needs to bring together NOAA assets like the reserves, the National Marine 

Sanctuaries, Sea Grant institutions, state coastal management programs, the Coastal Services Center, the Restoration Center, the National Weather Service, and more 

and focus on finding efficiencies and avoiding duplication. They should be given direct access to the NOAA administrator or a senior designee, have significant budgetary authority, and a clear mandate to leverage all of NOAA’s resources for restoring the Gulf. The team should be focusing NOAA resources on coordinated education 

and training, research and monitoring, and direct restoration activities. It is our understanding that NOAA is currently coordinating regional oil spill activities through 

a regional fisheries service official. This will not work for Gulf recovery. Fisheries 

service staffers have full-time, highly visible jobs to begin with. We cannot expect 

them to take on this type of additional task. There needs to be a dedicated leader 

with a dedicated regional staff. 

We also believe that the federal interagency Estuary Restoration Council, currently led by NOAA, should be charged with coordinating the interagency restoration activities that will occur in the Gulf. The council, established under the Estuary 

Restoration Act, can be a model for interagency collaboration and coordination on 

restoration efforts. 

We need to ensure that all habitat restoration projects are planned to take into 

account the need to advance restoration science. Restoration plans must include 

community input and outreach, incorporate long-term monitoring, and many of the 

other principles identified in the report Principles of Estuarine Habitat Restoration 

by Restore America’s Estuaries and the Coastal and Estuarine Research Federation. 

Our research reserves can provide reference sites, long-term monitoring protocols, 

and training for community leaders on restoration activities. 

Coastal Zone Management Act 

The National Estuarine Research Reserve System is authorized under Section 315 

of the CZMA, which as you know, has been overdue for reauthorization since 2000. 

32 

NERRA believes this spill underscores the importance of reauthorizing the Coastal 

Zone Management Act and improving the reserve system. We will work with the 

Subcommittee to explore areas to improve the legislation so that in the event of another catastrophe, the reserve system is prepared. 

Summary of our Recommendations 

1. All levels of government need to place higher priority on oil spill training. 

Our reserves can assist in providing training through the Coastal Training 

Program and also provide infrastructure for other trainers. 

2. Federal policy should provide incentives for, or mandate, ACPs and EOCs 

to integrate coastal protected areas into their planning efforts. 

3. NOAA should collaborate with the reserve managing agencies/universities 

to develop guidelines for coordination with the USCG. NOAA and the 

USCG report to Congress their progress on this issue. 

4. Congress should consider establishing a method for NOAA to provide contingency funds and staffing to its state agency partners who manage the reserves. Congress should require NOAA to develop the interagency personnel 

agreements that would allow the agency to facilitate additional staffing for 

reserves facing events like this. 

5. NOAA should prioritize reserves for additional attention and study during 

and after oil spills by NOAA scientists and other researchers. 

6. Federal policy needs to address the costs incurred by agencies during catastrophic events as part of the restitution process. 

7. NOAA and EPA should coordinate and use one data network for NRDA 

sampling. 

8. NOAA and the states must develop a plan for using and sharing reserve 

baseline data prior to spill and during the NRDA process. This will require 

NOAA to update ESI maps on a more frequent basis with data collected by 

the reserves and others in the coastal management community. 

9. NOAA should be required to weigh the costs of additional hydrocarbon sampling for existing long-term monitoring programs against the risks associated with major spills and the costs of the assessment process. At a minimum, we need to be better prepared to conduct hydrocarbon testing in the 

event of a spill regardless of its magnitude. 

10. The Gulf of Mexico Alliance should play an active role for Gulf restoration 

by coordinating state and local activities and working with federal partners. 

11. NOAA should develop a regional office for the Gulf of Mexico charged with 

coordinating the agency’s role and assets, including the reserves, in the oil 

spill recovery and restoration process. 

12. The interagency Estuary Restoration Council should be given a mandate to 

improve federal interagency coordination on Gulf oil spill restoration. 

13. Restoration plans must include community input and outreach, incorporate 

long-term monitoring, and many of the other principles identified in the report Principles of Estuarine Habitat Restoration by Restore America’s Estuaries and the Coastal and Estuarine Research Federation. 

14. The CZMA must be reauthorized. NERRA will work with the Subcommittee 

to ensure that the reserve system is strengthened, particularly in the area 

of preparedness and planning related to large-scale incidents like this. 

Finally, Chairwoman Bordallo, Ranking Member Brown, and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the more than 400 people who work at the National Estuarine Research Reserves and our many not-for-profit partners, we wish to express our 

condolences to the families of the Deepwater Horizon workers who lost their lives 

in this incident. We also want to recognize the impacts to the people of the Gulf 

region whose livelihoods and quality of life are in jeopardy. Our efforts to help restore the environment will draw inspiration from the strength of the families who 

lost loved ones and the resiliency of the people of the Gulf region. I will be happy 

to answer any questions you may have. 

33 

Response to questions submitted for the record by Matthew Menashes, 

Executive Director, National Estuarine Research Reserve Association 

(NERRA) 

Questions from Chairwoman, Congresswoman Madeline Z. Bordallo (D–GU) 

1. In addition to including reserve managers in an annual updating process of the area contingency plans, what else could be included in NOAA 

guidelines to ensure that reserve managers are part of the planning 

process? 

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) should develop 

spill response guidelines for the National Estuarine Research Reserve System (reserve system) that: 

• Provides an understanding of the role of both the state and NOAA in spill 

response at a reserve, and outlining how the state and NOAA will coordinate 

on damage assessments, training, and restitution. 

• Ensure that each reserve has a spill response plan that identifies priority or 

key land and water areas for protection. This requires an understanding of 

estuarine dynamics in each reserve and high-resolution maps, imagery and 

information on land use/land cover. 

• Ensure reserve managers and selected staff members receive Incident Command System (ICS) training on a regular basis. This will help ensure that reserve personnel are aware of response procedures and protocols for regional 

catastrophic events. 

• Ensure reserve managers are included as members of state-based or regional 

response teams. 

• Require NOAA to develop capacity within the reserve system for Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) certified hazardous materials 

trainers who can be deployed in the event of a catastrophe. This will also require NOAA to provide the resources and personnel agreements to allow 

rapid deployment. 

• Ensure US Coast Guard (USCG) Sector Commands have updated information 

(e.g. boundary and habitat maps, facilities, staffing and response capabilities) 

regarding reserves within their regions, similar to information provided for 

national parks, national wildlife refuges, and national marine sanctuaries. 

• Facilitate regional networks of national estuarine research reserves, national 

parks, national wildlife refuges, and national marine sanctuaries to improve 

communication and response during catastrophic incidents. These collaborative networks can participate in regional response planning much more effectively than each agency working alone. 

2. In your testimony, you state that the NRDA process has not incorporated long-term baseline data from the reserves. Can you explain why 

that may be and why it is important to do so? 

We believe there are two primary reasons for ensuring reserve long-term data is 

incorporated into the natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) process. First, 

we believe our long-term data can help ensure that spill-affected reserves are fairly 

compensated for the value of losses. Second, we believe our long-term data can also 

help to establish baselines against which damages to nearby estuarine and coastal 

areas can be judged and compensation set. 

The Coastal Zone Management Act established the reserve system, in part, to ensure that the nation protected biogeographically representative estuaries. The protections required for estuaries to gain reserve designation are intended to ensure the 

reserve is a stable environment for long-term research purposes to improve our understanding of estuarine functions. To support the role of reserves in improving that 

understanding, the federal government and its state partners have made key public 

investments in long-term baseline monitoring. Reserves collect a wide range of data 

including physical, chemical, and biological parameters designed to help define conditions required to sustain the long-term ecological integrity of estuaries. The data 

also increases our understanding of local anthropogenic disturbances that can result 

in degradation of these ecosystems. The results of reserve baseline monitoring efforts are primarily used by local and state coastal managers and researchers to inform local management and restoration actions. But they can also be used to understand regional impacts in a large scale event such as the Gulf spill. 

The monitoring data we collect, plus much other detailed scientific information 

about reserves, provides critical information for assessing not only damages to reserve resources but also for understanding damages to other estuarine resources in 

a region. 

34 

Long-term data collected by reserves generally is not incorporated into NRDA efforts or planning. While there may be legal reasons, such as establishing a clear 

chain of custody, to conduct new sampling as an incident occurs, this should not obviate the use of the best available scientific information about reserves. The baseline 

data we collect at reserves is perhaps the nation’s best source of long-term information about trends in our estuarine environments. 

NOAA’s NRDA processes could be refined to ensure that reserve science becomes 

an integral part of the damage assessment process. The Gulf spill has illustrated 

that the NRDA process should plan for spills that have a regional impact. Since we 

will never be able to afford long-term hydrocarbon monitoring along the entire coast, 

strategic investments in such sampling at reserves could provide valuable information for comparative NRDA purposes. Sensors could be pre-stationed at reserves and 

deployed when a spill happens, or could possibly be permanently deployed to monitor long-term hydrocarbon trends. In either case, NRDA protocols could then be developed to use the hydrocarbon data from the reserves to establish baselines for restitution and restoration. 

While we are now learning that some reserve data was useful in the NRDA process and protocol development, there is no comprehensive plan for using reserve 

data. In addition, we are concerned that failing to use the full suite of data available 

at reserves may result in not having a full picture of the damage done to reserve 

resources, or nearby estuaries, limiting what will be recovered in the restitution 

process. 

3. In your testimony, you advocate for reauthorization of the Coastal Zone 

Management Act (CZMA). What specific recommendations is your association making for a reauthorized CZMA? How will your recommendations better prepare the reserves for an oil spill of this size and complexity? 

The Gulf spill has demonstrated that reserves can, and do, play vital roles in responding to catastrophic events. We must, however, increase the capacity of the reserves to support response planning and implementation. 

NERRA drafted a reauthorization bill (enclosed for your information) earlier this 

year. Our draft includes sections that could enhance the capacity of the reserves to 

support planning for and response to catastrophic events. These include: 

• Development of regional networks of coastal and marine protected 

areas (Sec. 11). These networks could provide incentives for coastal states 

and federal agencies to work collaboratively to support regional science, restoration, training and education. These networks should participate in area 

contingency planning and ICS training with the USCG, share site specific 

data through direct participation on NRDA planning teams, and facilitate 

HAZMAT training for reserve personnel as needed. An effective investment 

in regional planning includes establishing full-time regional coordinators that 

do not have other full-time jobs. 

• Increase the capacity of the reserves’ baseline monitoring program 

(Sec. 5). We now believe this should include sampling for hydrocarbons in 

water and sediments within regions at risk of oil spills (i.e. local or large 

scale). 

• Increase the capacity of the reserves’ training programs (Sec. 6). Reserve coastal training programs should have HAZMAT training capabilities, 

including OSHA certified HAZMAT trainers on staff. These trainers would facilitate training for federal, state, and local government agencies involved in 

event response. 

We will be happy to work with the subcommittee to further refine these sections 

to ensure that the language addresses oil-spill preparedness and planning. 

In addition, we now recognize two additional areas we believe a revised CZMA 

should address. 

• Establish a catastrophic event contingency fund for reserves and 

state coastal management programs. This fund, administered by NOAA, 

would provide necessary funding to reserves and state coastal programs faced 

with immediate response needs. This fund should cover the costs of meeting 

demands for training, equipment and safety requirements, regional coordination, and science-based monitoring. Funds not used during a fiscal year 

should rollover to the next year. 

• Require reserves to incorporate better planning for hazardous oil 

spills into their management plans. In addition, each state coastal management program should incorporate better oil spill planning that also includes coordination with any reserves in the state. 

35 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Menashes, for explaining the role that the National Estuarine Research plan in preparedness planning. 

And now for our last witness this morning, Dr. Takahashi-Kelso. 

You can begin your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DENNIS TAKAHASHI-KELSO, EXECUTIVE VICE 

PRESIDENT, THE OCEAN CONSERVANCY, SANTA CRUZ, 

CALIFORNIA 

Dr. TAKAHASHI-KELSO. Thank you. Good morning, and thank you 

for the invitation to participate in this hearing. I would like to 

thank Chairwoman Bordallo, Ranking Member Cassidy, and other 

members of the Subcommittee for the important work you are undertaking in response to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. The 

hearings you are conducting and the legislative responses you are 

considering are a vital part of ensuring that this human and environmental tragedy is never repeated. 

My name is Dennis Takahashi-Kelso, and I am the Executive 

Vice President of The Ocean Conservancy. Just yesterday, I walked 

the oiled beaches of the Florida Panhandle with Governor Crist, 

and it was a haunted reminder of my time as Alaska Commissioner 

of Environmental Conservation in the late 1980s. Instead of a 

beach, I stood on the bridge of the Exxon Valdez mere hours after 

the tanker ran aground on Bly Reef. For me, that began two years 

of work and oversight on the spill and its aftermath, including policy reform at the state and Federal level. 

As a precondition of the right to ship oil from the Valdez Marine 

Terminal, Exxon was required by Alaska law to formulate an oil 

spill contingency plan. The plan, which I approved for the State of 

Alaska, required sufficient response capacity for specific scenarios, 

included detailed maps and incorporated knowledge from fishermen 

and other local experts. During the real spill, however, Exxon 

failed to follow the approved plan. 

At that time the state and Federal governments did not have the 

authority to wrest control from Exxon. When the company’s initial 

response proved ineffective, state agency staff, fishermen and other 

local volunteers took it upon themselves to mount a separate spill 

response in the high priority areas identified by the approved contingency plan. 

My point in telling this story is that spill response plans must 

not be just paper exercises. They are critical to effective recovery. 

Had the contingency plan been followed the response might have 

turned out very differently. 

The question today is: How can we make sure adequate site-specific planning with balanced input from state and Federal governments is a valuable part of any future spill response? The Valdez 

Exxon spill provided five clear lessons about how to strengthen oil 

spill contingency planning. 

First, to be effective planning must be linked to immediately 

available equipment and personnel. Major spills happen, and we 

must be ready for them. We need to increase minimum response 

capacity, require that equipment be held on site or at nearby depots, provide training for local teams, and substantially increase 

funding for response efforts. 

36 

Second, we must plan for true worst-case scenarios. Prior to the 

Exxon Valdez, the company resisted planning for a spill in excess 

of 100,000 barrels, saying it was unnecessary. The spill totaled 

more than twice that amount. The corner cutting that preceded the 

BP blowout showed a profound unwillingness to plan for a major 

spill. 

Third, states should have a meaningful role in reviewing and approving spill response plans. These plans should be available for 

public review and input. Affected communities should participate 

in the decisions about risks that impact them. 

Fourth, the Federal Government should establish regional citizens advisory councils to perform watchdog research and monitoring functions in areas that might be harmed by oil spills. 

My last point relates to my first. Major spills are a certainty, 

even though the probability of any single event may be low. In 

order to respond adequately, we need better baseline scientific information. We must ensure state and Federal agencies have the resources necessary to collect the data that will provide a foundation 

for natural resource damage assessments and the restoration steps 

to follow. 

Let us not forget, however, that while planning for spills is important, prevention is the real solution and, in the final analysis, 

the tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico highlights, all too poignantly, the 

need to reform how we manage our ocean and to abandon our current piecemeal approach. We need multi-objective planning that 

boosts interagency coordination and transparency in the trade-offs 

we are making between oil and gas production and other activities 

like fisheries, and we need to protect the overall heath of the ocean. 

The President’s Ocean Policy Task Force has produced a compelling blueprint for moving forward, and the Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, released in discussion 

draft form this week, also includes many excellent reforms. I look 

forward to working with the Committee as the bill moves through 

markup. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Takahashi-Kelso follows:] 

Statement of Dennis Takahashi-Kelso, Ph.D., Executive Vice President, The 

Ocean Conservancy, Santa Cruz, California 

Good morning, and thank you for the invitation to participate in this hearing. My 

name is Dennis Takahashi-Kelso, and I am the Executive Vice President of Ocean 

Conservancy. My career includes diverse roles in natural resources management 

and environmental protection over several decades, much of it in Alaska. As Alaska 

Commissioner of Environmental Conservation when the tanker Exxon Valdez ran 

aground, I was the governor’s cabinet officer responsible for enforcing the state’s oil 

spill clean-up standards. For two years, I worked on the spill and its aftermath, including policy reform, in both the Alaska Legislature and in Congress. 

What we are currently witnessing in the Gulf is a human and environmental tragedy. I would like to thank your subcommittee, Chairwoman Bordallo, for the important work you are undertaking in response to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. 

The hearings you are convening, and the legislative responses you are considering, 

are a vital part of ensuring that a disaster of this magnitude is never repeated. 

This subcommittee has requested testimony on coastal state planning for offshore 

energy development and whether current planning efforts are adequate to ensure 

an effective, coordinated spill response. In particular, you requested consideration 

of whether planning efforts are adequate for large, complex spills, such as the BP 

Deepwater Horizon disaster; whether these planning efforts are sufficiently well-coVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:20 Jan 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\57093.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
37 

ordinated among governmental agencies and levels; and what resources might improve oil spill planning, logistics, response, and recovery. 

In addressing those questions, I will first discuss my own experience in Alaska 

during and after the Exxon Valdez spill and review some of the lessons learned from 

that disaster. The Exxon Valdez spill underscored that it is essential for states to 

ensure adequate planning for spill response, and I will discuss ways in which this 

planning and response process can be improved. Finally, the BP Deepwater Horizon 

disaster has made it even clearer that prevention is absolutely critical. I will explain 

how the current ground rules governing oil and gas development need comprehensive reassessment and revision, within a context of improved ocean governance, and 

how those changes would improve the ability of states to reduce the risks of major 

oil spills and ensure better response preparedness. 

Lessons learned from Exxon Valdez 

When the Exxon Valdez grounded and ripped open in Alaska’s Prince William 

Sound, it spilled 11 million gallons of crude oil, about 20 percent of the tanker’s 

cargo. As a precondition of shipping oil from the Valdez Marine Terminal, state law 

required a site-specific oil spill ‘‘contingency plan,’’ and Exxon’s approved plan addressed a hypothetical event that turned out to be of the same order of magnitude 

as the actual spill. The plan laid out the response capacity required of the shipper 

along with detailed maps, as well as other specific information drawn from fishermen and other local experts. When the spill occurred, however, Exxon’s designated 

spill response agent, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, did not carry out the actions described in the response plan. After about 24 hours, Exxon mobilized its own 

spill response, but without many of the site-specific features and other requirements 

of the state-approved plan. Under the applicable law—prior to passage by Congress 

of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990—the spiller had the right to maintain control over 

the spill response and the US Coast Guard had only limited authority to displace 

the company’s control. Because the spill was in waters subject to federal jurisdiction, the state was not in a position to direct Exxon to implement the requirements 

of the approved plan. When Exxon had difficulty carrying out an effective response 

during the first several days of the spill, state agency staff, fishermen, and other 

local volunteers, mobilized our own spill response that targeted high priority areas 

identified by the approved oil spill contingency plan. 

Ultimately, the spill oiled at least parts of more than 1200 miles of shoreline— 

roughly equivalent to the distance from Massachusetts to North Carolina—and resulted in closures of salmon and herring fisheries, as well as economic losses to the 

tourism industry and other severe community impacts. Although most intensive 

during the first summer after the accident, the spill response extended over three 

years; and the damage assessment and restoration efforts continued for several 

more years. Now, 21 years later, recovery is well underway but not yet complete. 

Lessons learned from Exxon Valdez include: 

• Prevention must be paramount. Once a large amount of oil is in the 

water, damage is inevitable and removal of the spilled oil is difficult. Consequently, prevention must be our top priority. To achieve prevention, statutory and regulatory standards must be high, application and enforcement of 

those standards by government agencies must be diligent, and incentives 

must be aligned with prevention. In the case of oil transport, states have 

some, but limited, authority; the primary responsibility lies with the US 

Coast Guard. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 made substantial improvements 

in some prevention measures, such as requirements for double-hulled tankers. 

While tankers still pose a sizable threat, we need to ensure oil spill response 

plans and states can both address current threats and adapt as new technologies and techniques pose different challenges and risks. 

• In a major spill, the spiller should not be in control of the response. 

At the time of the Exxon Valdez spill, the spiller had the legal right to direct 

and maintain control of the spill response. As a result, Exxon could simply 

substitute its judgment for that of government officials who had first-hand 

knowledge of local conditions; there was no effective recourse under the law 

as it then existed. The federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 improved the situation by enabling the government to federalize spill response efforts, direct the 

responsible party’s spill response efforts, or merely monitor the responsible 

party’s spill response efforts. 

• The Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration phases 

are crucial. The assessment of natural resources damage and associated injuries as articulated by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 is not only a key element 

in establishing the spiller’s liability, but also in laying ground for long-term 

restoration. In the Exxon Valdez spill, little baseline information existed on 

38 

which to assess damages. Even in the Gulf of Mexico, the baseline is limited. 

It is essential that studies begin immediately, even as the emergency response is proceeding, in order to provide that key foundation for a full assessment of injuries. The spiller should pay all costs of the Natural Resource 

Damage Assessment, including the costs of gathering and synthesizing baseline data; and it should not fall upon the government agencies to ‘‘front’’ those 

costs from their budgets, even if the expenditures are later reimbursed. Restoration efforts will necessarily take years, and monitoring should be ongoing 

for decades. 

Policy changes following the Exxon Valdez spill 

The Exxon Valdez spill spurred changes in both state and federal legislation governing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response as they began to address 

some of the lessons learned from the spill. During the year following the Exxon 

Valdez spill, the Alaska Legislature began to strengthen the requirements for oil 

spill contingency planning. In many ways, the new legislation was a model of how 

a state can protect its citizens through better spill response preparedness. These 

changes substantially increased minimum response capacity, required equipment to 

be available on-site or in nearby equipment depots, called for training of local response teams, increased the size of the oil and hazardous substance response fund, 

and made other significant improvements. The situation in Alaska illustrates how 

important it is to have a stable triangle of protection: state response and preparedness standards; federal regulation of activities beyond state jurisdiction, for prevention and response; and strong watchdog functions carried out by residents who know 

the area and are exposed to the risks. In this way, the affected public and the ocean 

ecosystems on which communities depend are more likely to be protected than if 

they rely solely on state or federal authorities. 

The most important federal legislative change was passage of the Oil Pollution 

Act of 1990 (OPA 90), which introduced several critical reforms, including technical 

standards, improved response planning, funding for research and development, and 

liability and compensation requirements. Under OPA 90’s amendments to the Clean 

Water Act, the federal government may respond to a spill event by ‘‘federalizing’’ 

the spill and engaging directly in the cleanup, monitoring the responsible party’s 

cleanup efforts, or directing the responsible party in implementation of the response. 

33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1)(B). These changes have made it more likely that the relevant 

contingency plans would be properly carried out during a major spill. The state’s 

role is limited, however, because the federal government retains authority to decide 

when cleanup is complete. 

OPA 90 also expanded the role and breadth of the National Contingency Plan 

(NCP) and linked the NCP to area and regional plans—a multi-layered planning 

and response system intended to improve spill preparedness and response effectiveness by combining the site-specificity of plans formulated by Area Committees and 

states with the consistency of the NCP and regional plans. OPA 90 also includes 

a requirement for establishing procedures and standards for responding to worst 

case oil spill scenarios. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(J). 

While OPA 90 made several significant improvements and addressed critical gaps 

in spill response plans, it did not resolve all the issues related to exploration and 

development of oil and gas resources, nor to planning for, response to, and remediation of spills. Three problems undercut the effectiveness of this approach. First, the 

adequacy of planning efforts and other legal requirements depends substantially on 

the ability to mobilize and sustain an emergency response. That is, the nested plans 

in the NCP array, no matter how thoughtfully conceived, can be effective only if 

equipment and personnel are deployed immediately in response. The actual location 

of these resources, not the contractual arrangements to get them, is crucial and may 

be a weak link. Second, a ‘‘worst case’’ is often difficult to pursue when the key government agency— Minerals Management Service, in the case of offshore drilling— 

insists that the risk is ‘‘insignificant.’’ In another example, Exxon resisted Alaska’s 

efforts to require contingency plan scenarios for spills in excess of 100,000 barrels; 

the company said that such a scenario was unnecessary because its modeling indicated that a spill of that magnitude would happen only once in 241 years. The 

Exxon Valdez spill exceeded 250,000 barrels. Achieving a meaningful ‘‘worst case’’ 

spill planning scenario will always be difficult, and planning only for less severe 

spills will leave residual risk that is not addressed. Third, for a state to be effective, 

it needs to have the capacity to enforce its plan and participate simultaneously in 

the Natural Resources Damage Assessment, which must start almost as soon as the 

emergency response begins. This level of engagement, immediate and long-term, is 

both expensive and technically demanding. Few states have the staffing and technical support to sustain it without external funding and other resources. 

39 

In the intervening decades, as both the complacency of the public and the political 

influence of the oil and gas industry have grown, these standards have been repealed or severely weakened. There are a number of areas in which OPA 90 can 

and should be improved in order to help coastal states address potential impacts of 

oil spills on their shores. 

Oil spill response plans must address spill events of very large size, must be sitespecific, and must be tailored to local conditions. The federal government should 

provide both funding and logistical assistance to states to ensure their plans include 

improved baseline data to better understand potential impacts, a clearer role for 

public review and better standards to ensure response plans can be fully executed 

in the event of a spill. 

Improved baseline data 

Increased funding for science and response efforts is needed for states to fully understand the potential impacts on the local ecosystem from a large-scale spill and 

how best to respond to a spill given these ecological conditions. Baseline scientific 

data are critical to ensure that the response and clean up are appropriate, and are 

also an important foundation for a Natural Resource Damage Assessment. This information can and should guide the type of response efforts the states should require in clean up plans. Annual funding is needed to support a comprehensive program of research, monitoring, and documentation of local and traditional knowledge. 

That work would assess and monitor populations of principal species in the ecosystem and the biological and physical factors that affect their abundance and distribution; construct and maintain an updated quantitative food web model; identify 

sensitive species and important ecological areas; and enhance understanding of temporal and spatial variability within ecosystems. 

It may be possible to provide funding to fill these needs with minor changes to 

OPA 90, 33 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. OPA 90 authorizes certain uses of the Oil Spill 

Liability Trust Fund, which holds revenue from a per-barrel tax on oil production. 

33 U.S.C. § 2712. With minor changes, OPA 90 could provide funds to the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or other agencies to conduct the necessary science and to the US Coast Guard 

to identify and implement the necessary precautions. It is important to provide the 

public with access to data and other information. Congress should guarantee public 

access to information gathered after a spill and as part of the research and planning 

process. 

Strong Standards for Response 

In the case of the Exxon Valdez spill, unlike the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, 

the size of the maximum possible spill was clear: it could not exceed the total cargo 

carried by the vessel. As a result, planning for a ‘‘worst case’’ spill was more 

straightforward. Although a site-specific plan—as required by state law—was preapproved and in place, the failure to carry out the plan resulted in the loss of valuable time and a less effective response. In order to be deployed quickly, equipment 

and personnel must be either pre-positioned near potential spill sites or quickly mobilized from nearby locations that actually have those resources on site. Spill response plans, of which Exxon’s plan is an example, rely upon contracts with spill 

response companies or regional consortia. Delays in mobilization of an effective spill 

response may result from the lack of actual capacity in the area of the spill. To be 

effective in an emergency, response capability must be mobilized immediately, and 

if the response plan calls for contractors to provide the equipment and workers for 

the response, actual capacity needs to be demonstrated ahead of time. Equipment 

must be based in the near vicinity of potential accidents, and trained teams of responders must be available in-region to operate the equipment in accordance with 

the pre-approved plan. 

We need to ensure that companies have considered the worst case scenario and 

have the resources and infrastructure to fully execute their response plans. The 

plans may be very good, but they are blueprints for response, not actual spill response capacity. Plans must link with other providers of response equipment and 

personnel. The amount of equipment and its location is crucial to whether the plans 

can actually make a difference if a spill actually occurs. 

Public Review and Participation 

In addition, spill response plans, as part of exploration or development plans, are 

intended to be available for public review—a key way in which affected communities 

can participate in the decisions about risks that affect them. States should develop 

a specific process to ensure the public has access and input to the plan. Exploration 

and development plans are generally approved ‘‘conditionally,’’ pending development 

of a spill response plan subsequent to the approval. There is no specific public reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:20 Jan 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\57093.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
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view process for the plan. Consideration should be given to developing such a process, or, more broadly, to avoiding conditional approvals. Any public process around 

spill response plans should also require that MMS respond to public comments, 

questions, and input specifically, rather than simply issuing an approval with standard, vague language stating that the agency concluded the plan met statutory and 

regulatory requirements. 

Lastly, the federal government should establish Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils (RCAC) for regions that could be impacted by oil spills. One area of OPA 90 

that has proven to be particularly useful is the establishment of RCACs specifically 

for terminal and tanker oversight and monitoring in Alaska. Essentially, RCACs 

offer the opportunity for local residents to perform a watchdog, research, and monitoring function. Duties of the RCACs include providing advice and recommendations 

on policies, permits, and regulations; monitoring environmental impacts and operations and maintenance of facilities; and reviewing adequacy of spill prevention and 

contingency plans. The RCACs are also allowed to review scientific research and to 

conduct their own studies. According to Boston College Law Professor Zygmunt Plater, an expert in oil and gas regulatory policy, the original OPA 90 language proposed RCACs for areas of oil and gas development outside of Alaska, but this language was removed from the bill due to political pressure from the oil and gas industry (National Public Radio interview, June 17, 2010). Establishing one or more 

RCACs in the Gulf of Mexico could help Gulf states and local communities maintain 

ongoing oversight of oil and gas operations in the Gulf. It would be important to 

ensure that the membership of RCAC included persons who in a position to play 

a watchdog role. 

Policy Reforms to Focus on Prevention and Minimization of Risk 

As we saw with the Exxon Valdez, where no more than 10 percent of the spilled 

oil was actually cleaned up—and as we are now seeing with the tragedy in the 

Gulf—prevention is far more effective than is response. The BP Deepwater Horizon 

disaster demonstrates vividly that our nation’s approach to oil and gas activities on 

the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is fundamentally flawed. In the case of oil and 

gas drilling, the primary government authority lies with the Minerals Management 

Service (MMS); and substantial changes to federal laws are needed to establish new 

standards for its decisions. The standards and procedures applicable to these government agencies must define effective roles for the states to play in preventing 

spills. Beyond changes to OPA 90, other regulatory reforms are needed to prevent 

or address disasters like the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout. The federal agency responsible for oil and gas activities on the OCS, the Department of the Interior’s 

MMS, has proved incapable of effective planning, regulation, and oversight. Federal 

statutes governing oil and gas activities on the OCS do too little to ensure that 

coastal and ocean ecosystems—including living coastal and marine resources and 

habitats—receive adequate protection. As Congress acts to develop a legislative response to the events of this disaster, we urge you to act on the following five priorities to reform OCS legislation. 

• Reform the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) by adding 

substantive standards to adequately protect ocean health and coastal 

economies. In planning and administering OCS oil and gas activities, existing law requires MMS to balance oil and gas development with protection of 

human, marine, and coastal environments. In practice, however, MMS 

prioritizes resource extraction, often at the expense of these other concerns, 

as demonstrated by the current spill. Congress should change the statute’s 

mission to place a greater emphasis on protecting ocean health. OCSLA 

should allow oil and gas activities only when it is proven such activities pose 

minimal environmental risk. In addition, Congress should add substantive 

standards to OCSLA to ensure protection. For example, before an area is 

opened to oil and gas leasing, there must be a threshold level of baseline 

science to inform decision-making. Similarly, OCS planning efforts must identify and protect important ecological areas to minimize the potential for environmental harm. Congress should prohibit the sale of oil and gas leases in 

an area unless and until operators have demonstrated their ability to respond 

effectively to an oil spill in real-world conditions in that area. Congress 

should also impose more rigorous standards to ensure that OCS facilities are 

equipped with the best available technology and safety equipment. 

• Fix the planning and leasing process to ensure robust environmental 

review, enhance transparency, and allow for community input. MMS 

must no longer be allowed to use the segmented nature of the OCSLA process 

to avoid rigorous analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA) and other laws. OCSLA should be amended to impose specific reVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:20 Jan 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\57093.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
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quirements for environmental analysis at each stage in the process and require full, site-specific analyses of exploration and production as early as possible. Planning and leasing activities for oil and gas development need to proceed at scales that allow for meaningful environmental review with ample opportunity for community input and inclusion of local and traditional knowledge. Congress should require five-year leasing programs to be more precise 

in identifying the portions of planning areas that will be open to oil and gas 

leasing by, for example, placing an upper limit on the percentage of a planning area that may be included in any one five-year leasing program. Alternatively, Congress could require MMS to focus individual lease sales on specific lease tracts, rather than offering enormous portions of planning areas. 

In order to facilitate more rigorous NEPA analysis, Congress should also 

eliminate the 30-day deadline under which MMS must approve a ‘‘submitted’’ 

exploration plan. Furthermore, natural resource and environmental agencies 

should have a greater role in providing baseline science and influencing decision-making about oil and gas activities off our coasts. In particular, NOAA 

and Interior agencies, such as the US Fish and Wildlife Service, should play 

key roles in deciding which areas will be available for leasing, and in preparing environmental analyses in support of oil and gas leasing decisions. 

• Restructure the agency responsibilities for oil and gas planning, leasing, and oversight. MMS lacks the expertise and institutional interest in 

broad ocean issues and has proven to be unable to assess objectively and accurately the potential risks of OCS drilling. Restructuring MMS should fully 

address conflicts between the revenue generating, planning, and environmental and safety enforcement responsibilities of the agency. In addition, expert agencies beyond MMS, such as NOAA and the US Fish and Wildlife 

Service, should have a much greater role in decisions about OCS oil and gas 

activities and preparation of environmental analyses surrounding them. 

• Hold oil companies and other responsible parties accountable for 

paying for clean up and damages associated with oil spills. The current 

$75 million cap on liability should be removed in order to hold companies like 

BP responsible for their actions and ensure that oil companies, not taxpayers, 

are forced to clean up after their mistakes. 

• Direct funding from oil and gas activities to protect and restore 

ocean and coastal resources, increase our ocean knowledge, and develop our capacity to respond to and recover from oil spills. Oil companies make billions of dollars while putting our ocean ecosystems and coastal economies at risk. A portion of the revenue from these activities should be 

permanently available to protect, restore, and maintain our ocean and coastal 

resources and be provided in such a way that it does not incentivize new drilling activity. In addition, as efforts over the last two months have demonstrated, our ability to respond to oil spills and reduce environmental harm 

is limited by the state of our ocean and coastal science and technology. Additional resources should be provided to better understand our coastal and marine environment and improve our ability to safely and sustainably operate 

there. Last year this committee held hearings on H.R. 3534 the Consolidated 

Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2009, which would establish an 

Ocean Resources Conservation and Assistance Fund. We strongly support the 

establishment of this type of permanent funding for ocean conservation, 

science, and planning. 

The Bigger Picture: Healthy Oceans Matter 

More broadly, this disaster is only the most dramatic example of the threats facing our ocean. Habitat destruction, ocean acidification, marine debris and coastal 

runoff are among the many threats to the health of ocean ecosystems. The tragedy 

in the Gulf of Mexico highlights poignantly why healthy oceans matter – not only 

for fish and marine wildlife, but for coastal economies that rely on healthy fisheries 

and clean beaches. In addition to enacting specific reforms to the statutes that govern oil and gas development, we must reform our overall approach to managing our 

oceans. 

In part, the threatened state of our ocean is due to the sector-by-sector management of diverse uses. Sector-by-sector management has led to serious conflicts 

among users. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, a single-minded focus 

on natural resource extraction with only cursory consideration of potential impacts 

to ecosystem health or other ocean uses created conditions in which safety, environmental reviews, preparation, safeguards, monitoring and oversight, and response capabilities were all inadequate. 

42 

We rely on our ocean and coasts to provide much more than just oil and gas. Decision-making based on a detailed review of only one sector, or only one use, is insufficient. As we increasingly look to our oceans to provide food, energy, transportation, 

and recreation, we need better coordination and a more complete approach to planning and risk management. We also need to prioritize ecosystem health, because we 

cannot afford to lose the critical ecosystem services that only healthy ecosystems 

provide. Many of these recommendations are incorporated in the presidentially established Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force’s (IOPTF) draft recommendations on 

National Ocean Policy (NOP) and coastal and marine spatial planning (CMSP). 

A strong NOP that implements ecosystem-based management and establishes protection, maintenance, and restoration of ocean and coastal ecosystems as the foundation for federal management—if mandatory and properly implemented—would 

protect ocean wildlife and habitat from harmful development, reduce impacts on 

sensitive and special areas, and help to build ecosystem resilience. It would also 

help balance resource extraction and ecosystem protection, ensuring careful consideration of the potential impacts of oil and gas activities on the marine and coastal 

environment, other ocean uses, and ecosystem health and resilience. Protecting important ecological areas and limiting hazardous activities would safeguard wildlife 

populations, promote healthier estuaries and watersheds, and reduce the likelihood 

and cumulative impacts of catastrophes like the disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. 

Coastal and marine spatial planning, used to implement a strong NOP, could provide several key benefits that could prevent the conditions that led to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. CMSP would facilitate interagency coordination and decision-making and would allow other expert agencies to have increased input on, or 

authority over, decisions about oil and gas activities. This process would result in 

a foundation of baseline scientific data that facilitates science-based management, 

help identify future use or management problems, and promote smarter, more sustainable uses. Implementation of the IOPTF recommendations would also provide 

for increased public input into decision-making, including from local communities, 

other ocean users, and non-governmental organizations. 

Additionally, having in place a multi-objective plan and an established agreement 

on management goals can help when emergencies such as oil disasters or hurricanes 

occur. Preparing for and working to prevent impacts from extreme weather events, 

commercial use and development, or industrial disasters is an integral part of 

CMSP. Better oversight and enforcement can help prevent disasters; better planning, preparation, and coordination can help minimize the impacts of those that do 

occur. While a national ocean policy using CMSP has not yet been finalized, Congress can craft new legislation or amend existing statutes in ways that would both 

set the stage for and align with CMSP processes. 

While none of these changes could guarantee that we will never have another oil 

spill disaster, taken together they could ensure that we will not have one of this 

magnitude and complexity before we have fully understood and accounted for the 

risks involved. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Dr. Takahashi-Kelso, for 

your valuable input on this subject matter, and I will now be recognizing members of the Subcommittee for any questions that they 

have to ask those that have testified, and I will begin with myself. 

I have a couple of questions here for Dr. Walker. 

BP has pledged $500 million to fund the Gulf of Mexico research 

initiative. How much of this funding would the alliance like to receive, and how would you prioritize it? 

Dr. WALKER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Our Governor has been clear that he would like for the alliance 

to receive as much of that as possible. About 25 million has been 

given out already to the States of Florida, Mississippi and Louisiana. We would suggest that the bulk of the remaining funds be 

provided to the Gulf Alliance so that those funds can be controlled 

by the Governors of the states that are most affected by this event. 

What we would do is pull together a select group of scientists 

from universities, from Federal agencies, from NGO’s, from the 

Coastal States Organization, from folks that are knowledgeable 

43 

about this and have been working in the Gulf for years and years, 

ask them to help us develop the scope of the research, remediation 

and restoration program that needs to take place, and then help us 

determine the actual process of an RFP or some other ways to actually select and provide support to the teams of scientists that would 

actually do the work. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Another question, does the alliance’s network of 

scientists have the expertise and capacity to conduct research to 

understand the fate and the impacts of the oil and dispersants on 

the environment and the resource-dependent industries? 

Dr. WALKER. Yes, ma’am. Absolutely we do. Many of the research 

teams that are out in the Gulf even now looking at the oil spill and 

the dispersed cloud of oil that is below the surface are Mississippi 

scientists. They are from places like the Stennis Space Center, 

LUMCON, and the southern South Florida Research Institute, but 

we are not suggesting that no expertise outside of the Gulf states 

would be sought. Certainly there is expertise at many other places 

in this country of outstanding scientific minds that we would certainly bring to the table to respond to this situation. Thank you. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. Ms. Fletcher, you recommend that 

Congress extend the 30-day review period to allow for CZMA state 

agencies to conduct Federal consistency reviews. Now, what would 

be an adequate review period and why? And should this apply to 

all proposed actions or apply to just proposals for offshore energy? 

Ms. FLETCHER. Thank you, Chairwoman. 

The review period right now at 30 days is simply not adequate. 

In reaching out to the states in preparation for this testimony, 

many states weighed in at a six-month mark, that that would give 

the states the ability to go through a consistency review that would 

give them the information that they need. Also, the tool of consistency is one that allows communication both ways, and so there is 

communication back and forth, and that is really what consistency 

is about. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, and I have one last question for Mr. 

Barton. Do you think that the Jackson County emergency operations command has fully engaged with the managers at the Grand 

Bay National Estuarine Research Reserve with regard to oil spill 

contingency planning, and has the environmental information gathered by the Grand Bay Reserve as part of the systemwide monitoring program been utilized for this purpose? 

Mr. BARTON. I am not sure that I know that total answer. I know 

that there is communication that has been going on. They have a 

great relationship between the folks at the Grand Bay and our 

emergency operations folks, and so there is a good relationship 

there. Exactly how much of that data is being passed back and 

forth? I couldn’t really answer that question. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Would there be any way that you 

could get some information on that and provide it for the Committee? 

Mr. BARTON. We actually have our emergency operations guy 

here with us today, he is sitting behind me. He says the data is 

being made available both ways. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. Mr. Menashes, in your testimony, you 

make recommendations for improved training for oil spills. If there 

44 

is one area where you would improve training right now, where 

would that be? And is such training within the mission and purposes of the National Estuarine Research Reserve System? 

Mr. MENASHES. Thank you, Chairwoman. 

Yes, the training is within our mission. This is also an area 

where we are hoping to see as part of the reauthorization of the 

Coastal Zone Management Act additional emphasis placed on 

training within the reserve system. We believe the area where we 

can provide the most immediate impact on oil spills is within our 

DA training and working with our partners at NOAA and the offices at the agency to develop tools for our people, whether they be 

in the Gulf of Mexico or on the Atlantic or Pacific coasts, to be able 

to gear up very quickly and provide training where NOAA staff 

cannot because they are involved in other activities. So we think 

NRDA training is probably an area where we can provide quick impact. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, and now I would like to 

recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Cassidy, our acting 

Ranking Member of the Subcommittee. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Thanks to all the witnesses because I feel like each 

of your comments illuminated my understanding. 

Mr. Barton. 

Mr. BARTON. Yes. 

Mr. CASSIDY. This is obviously about—you mentioned communication. I have found that the absence of communication is the 

root of the fights in my marriage, so I can imagine that it has a 

role here too. Clearly, the folks along coastal Louisiana, the local 

officials have been frustrated about the absence of coordination, the 

absence of a decision chain where they could find one person that 

would say ‘‘Yea’’ or ‘‘Nay’’ to a proposal. But it appears your experience is different. Can you give me a sense of why that difference 

might be there? 

Mr. BARTON. Well, we have certainly had some frustrations as 

we have worked our way through this ourselves. You know, as I 

said earlier, we have had many hurricanes, the last one certainly 

being Katrina, and working through that process we—of course, 

working through the Stafford Act and there are some specific 

things there, but the process actually worked fairly well there in 

terms of the NIMS process and the command process, incident command, unified command, and so forth. That is not to say that communications was always real good from the top to the bottom or the 

bottom to the top. 

Now, the communications issue has been an issue with us even 

through this event, and part of the problem has been through no 

fault of any one specific person or group, it is just that, as I said 

in my written testimony, the unified command has a fairly large 

area that they are trying to coordinate all the activities in, and so 

when it is that spread out, and we are getting bits and pieces, for 

instance, if there is oil coming up south of the islands, as it is 

today, we know that there is a tripping point, we know there is a 

point at which there is going to be a response. 

The local folks though, the local elected officials, many times may 

not know and may not hear exactly when something is going to 

happen, so there is a little bit of a disconnect there, and sometimes 

45 

it takes longer to get specific things, and that is why I say this 

communication is so important because the local people, they expect the people they believe they have elected to manage those 

things locally are supposed to know the answer, and that is very 

difficult thing to get. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Well, there seems to be a disconnect between the 

knowledge base, which I think is stronger among the locals, and 

the power to deploy assets, which is Federal. Now obviously communication, communication, communication. What would be a specific example of how we could say, heck, like Billy Nungesser, go 

to Plaquemines Parish. We saw oil going past a rig. We called and 

said oil is going past a rig on Tuesday. Thursday morning somebody was sent out there to look at the oil going past the rig. 

Mr. BARTON. Right. 

Mr. CASSIDY. By that time it is approaching the beach. So there 

seems to be a lag time. Is there anything more than—— 

Mr. BARTON. The one thing I would say, in our particular case, 

we had a lot of experience with hurricanes, and so a lot of the people that are at the table have been at the table many times. They 

all know each other. They have dealt with each other. 

Mr. CASSIDY. So relationships. 

Mr. BARTON. There are a lot of good relationships there. 

Mr. CASSIDY. And that helps. 

Mr. BARTON. And if I have a question, I will pick up the phone 

and call Bill Walker. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Right. 

Mr. BARTON. OK. I mean, if it is that important that I get an 

answer right now, then that is what I would do, and so those relationships are there. 

Mr. CASSIDY. So several of the folks have suggested that there 

needs to be kind of an infrastructure of response, if you will, but 

part of that infrastructure is to allow those kind of informal relationships to allow an expeditious response, kind of? 

Mr. BARTON. Yes. 

Mr. CASSIDY. And let me move on because I am about to lose 

time. 

Ms. Fletcher or Mr. Kelso, I am sorry, I cannot take a crack at 

your middle name, I apologize. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Takahashi. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Takahashi, I apologize. It seems like education. I 

mean, a spill of national significance exercises should address this 

lack of coordination that both of you decry. If it really works, then 

everything the two of you suggested seems like it would be brought 

to bear. Does that make sense? 

Dr. TAKAHASHI-KELSO. Thank you, Mr. Cassidy. 

The structure that exists now does, in theory, build in local 

knowledge and the relationships that will allow a spill of national 

significance to have a response that is grounded in real information, as Mr. Barton was just describing, and also has the kind of 

command structure that allows a major spill to have a response. So 

here is what I would suggest. I think this is directly responsive to 

your point. 

It is really important for the area committees at the local level 

to have a spill response plan that builds into it those plans that 

46 

are specific to facilities; that is, you need something that is really 

site-specific. The time to build in local knowledge is right at the 

outset. And then the regional response team and its regional plan, 

the national contingency plan, you need to incorporate those, and 

the reason for that is that when there is a spill you don’t have time 

to invent that piece. You have to have it ready to go, and assuming 

that it is a spill of national significance, as in this case, then the 

Coast Guard commander can implement directly the spill response 

that already has that local and state input. So the communication, 

the relationships, the on-the-ground content need to be built in 

right from the outset. 

The reason I emphasize that is the facility-specific plans should 

have direct information about what is on site, what can be mobilized within two hours, what takes half a day, what can be there 

the next day. That kind of specificity you don’t find in the larger 

nested plans, and that is why you have to have it at the beginning, 

and you have to have it built in so that the national plan actually 

carries it out. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Ms. Fletcher, would you add anything? Actually, 

can you hold because I am out of time, and the Madam Chair is 

being very indulgent. I am sorry, go ahead. 

Ms. FLETCHER. I don’t have a lot to add to that, but I would 

agree that the information does have to go in at the outset, and we 

have other authorities, and the Coastal Zone Management Act is 

one of those that allows for the gathering of that information and 

allows for both the states as well as the communities to be putting 

in that information. 

I think the other example is our Chair is actually here in town 

this week from New Hampshire, and New Hampshire has been 

doing these type of cooperative arrangements in terms of bringing 

the industry, as well as the state agencies, together and they actually have a Canadian input into that as well. So there are opportunities there for some industry and state cooperative arrangements 

that can help to develop those relationships that Mr. Barton was 

discussing as well. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Thank you. I yield back. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I thank the acting Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, and now I would like to recognize the gentlelady from 

California, Ms. Capps. 

Ms. CAPPS. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for your 

testimony, each of you. 

It is clear that an oil spill of this volume, scale and duration was 

never fully contemplated by state or regional responders. The complexity and magnitude of this ongoing spill has highlighted the 

need for extensive ocean observing network that can be immediately activated in the event of a spill. This ocean observing network, including satellites, buoys and underwater gliders, should be 

coordinated at the state and regional levels to provide pre-spill assessments and real time forecasts that guide the work of responders. That is the impression I am getting from you all as well. 

Dr. Walker, this first question will be to you. I am advocating for 

more money for the Integrated Ocean Observing System—I guess 

it is called IOOS—and calling attention to the utility of a fully operated ocean observing system throughout the nation. Dr. Walker, 

47 

do you feel that having a robust IUs or an ocean observing system 

in place is important in situations like this one in the Gulf for providing data on things like oil concentration and transport with 

ocean currents? 

Dr. WALKER. Absolutely. We are working with the State of Mississippi as well as the Gulf of Mexico Alliance is working very hard 

with Dr. Nolans out of Texas that sort of chairs the IOOS group. 

We have membership from all of the Gulf states are involved with 

that group. They are active in the Gulf of Mexico Alliance organization and activities, and they are a critical part of our habitat integration and assessment team within the Gulf Alliance. 

So, any help you can provide to help provide support for IOOS 

and the other IOOSs around the country would be greatly appreciated. Thank you. 

Ms. CAPPS. Thank you. I appreciate that you are highlighting 

both the state’s responsibility but also a regional network that you 

have. 

Ms. Fletcher, the Coastal States Organization is the topic now. 

In your testimony, you suggest that states should review and provide oversight of offshore oil and gas operations. This makes sense. 

In California, the Coastal Commission has not had the funds or the 

staff to implement its own inspection program of offshore drilling. 

Therefore it relies on MMS inspections. Can you provide the Subcommittee specific recommendations to provide for state and local 

agency participation in such inspections? 

Again, I am honing in on the ability of local and even state input 

but sometimes the funding is not there to have the adequate staff. 

Ms. FLETCHER. Yes. We actually had a conversation with the 

California Coastal Commission before testifying today, and they indicated that was one of their greatest challenges. The ability to rely 

on firsthand knowledge as opposed to the Federal agency reports 

is going to be critical in bringing to bear the state knowledge, the 

county’s knowledge. They were giving me examples of the expertise 

at the Santa Barbara County level as a result of the oil spill that 

they deal with—— 

Ms. CAPPS. Yes. 

Ms. FLETCHER. So to be able to bring that kind of knowledge into 

the forefront will also help that Federal report to be more thorough. It can be more of a partner-created format, and that report 

ultimately will be more effective. 

Ms. CAPPS. Thank you. Now, Manly Barton, would you offer your 

perspective? Do you have recommendations to provide for local participation in inspections? 

Mr. BARTON. On the inspection side? 

Ms. CAPPS. Or participation in general. 

Mr. BARTON. Well, participation in general, and that is one of the 

reasons we talked about in this response in the NIMS process. It 

kind of brings that back to the state level where the local input, 

as has been mentioned here today, is very important because they 

know what their needs are, they know what is there. 

Ms. CAPPS. Right. 

Mr. BARTON. They know how to protect what needs to be protected, and that was one of the reasons we had indicated that we 

would like to see that because we believe if it is brought back to 

48 

a state level, then the local community would be more involved in 

the entire process. 

Ms. CAPPS. Thank you. Dr. Kelso, in California following the 

2007 COSCO Busan spill, NOAA used data regarding currents to 

create oil spill trajectories using real time conditions. From your 

perspective as a scientist, why is it important to provide Federal 

funding for the integration and continued operation of IOOSs? 

Dr. TAKAHASHI-KELSO. Thank you. It is crucial that the response 

be tailored as tightly as possible to what is actually happening and 

what is going to happen in the near term and, for that to be effective, it requires a fair amount of good science ahead of time and 

the kind of modeling that predicts the trajectory. That way you can 

move equipment and personnel into place. You can do other data 

gathering that you are going to need later in order to assess damage, and without it, without the input, the science input and the 

good modeling to make the trajectories realistic, you are simply 

going to be at the wrong place at the wrong time. So I think it is 

absolutely essential. 

There are several layers in which the information and modeling 

can be improved, but I think the overall goal of doing that is fundamental to improving our response capability. 

Ms. CAPPS. So it is clear—I know I am out of time—the Federal 

Government has a role, the regional coalitions or alliances, the 

state has a clear role to play, but it all depends on what the local 

knowledge has yielded as well, and I had another question for Mr. 

Menashes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. We will have a second round. 

Ms. CAPPS. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I thank the gentlelady from California. I would 

now like to recognize Mr. Wittman, the gentleman from Virginia. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I would like 

to thank the witnesses for joining us today. 

Dr. Walker, let me begin with you. In your testimony, you talk 

about Mississippi’s effort in planning. It appears as though the 

planning effort coincided with the area contingency plan or the 

Mississippi Coastal Program, so there was some coordination there 

in understanding at the state level. Apparently that led to better 

decisionmaking between the state and BP in coordination and, of 

course, that is the central crux, I think, of a lot of concerns here 

is how do those pieces of the decisionmaking come together. So I 

want to get your thoughts on that and how you believe the Mississippi planning efforts to protect the coastal zones came together 

based on previous efforts, and then how that is put in place right 

now, and how successful that is, and then I have a follow-up question about some of the other areas of contingency, but if you could 

give us your thoughts and ideas about that. 

Dr. WALKER. Thank you, Congressman. 

We work with the Federal Government and with organizations 

like Kristen’s all the time in updating our coastal program so that 

we can better understand and better plan for what kind of energy 

type industries we want in our general area and where we want 

them, and that has worked out very well. We review all of the permit applications. We make recommendations for siting in different 

places, and I think that is helpful. 

49 

In an after-the-fact sort of pulling together a plan, we always 

think in terms of trying to pull together a good team. After this 

event happened, we immediately opened up our building in Biloxi, 

Mississippi. We brought in BP there in our building; we brought 

in the Department of Environmental Quality there in our building; 

and we brought in NOAA, the Coast Guard, and the National 

Guard. So all of those folks are physically located in our building. 

Every morning we get together and talk about what happened 

the day before, what needs to happen in the current day. And these 

are not people who have to go four or five levels up in their perspective organizations to get an answer to a question. These are 

people who can say ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No,’’ right then, on the spot, with a 

fair level of confidence. 

So I feel that, more than anything else, has helped us, I think, 

be a little bit ahead in this process of dealing with the aftermath 

of this event. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Great. I think that is an important point, that 

flattened hierarchy where you, as you said, where somebody can 

make a decision now, there doesn’t need to be another step or another delay in that decisionmaking. 

Let me ask this. As you look at the idea of contingency planning, 

obviously you have laid out about how you make decisions from day 

to day in addressing the threats from the oil. How do you take that 

next step and then look at the effects on the economy from that? 

And I speak specifically of the seafood industry there and what the 

effects are going to be there. And as you know that is many fold, 

not just on the areas that have to be closed for shell fishing, but 

also the effects on the processors, on the harvesters, and in the secondary effects, their markets that they sell to, and the effects, you 

know, extend all the way up to places like Virginia who our processors buy seafood from Mississippi and now those markets are interrupted. So the economic effects shutter throughout the United 

States. 

Can you give me a little more information about how Mississippi 

looks at that and what you do as far as contingency planning both 

on the effect on the industry there, and then how you try to counteract that to make sure people are aware of not only the safety 

of the seafood but how processors and harvesters can be prepared 

for that? 

Dr. WALKER. Well, let me say first, Congressman, that if you 

walk down the beaches of Mississippi now from the Louisiana line 

to the Alabama line, you would see beaches that look today just 

like they looked two years ago. And if you got in a boat and went 

out to our barrier islands, you would see islands that look just like 

they did five years ago. Some of them have small amounts of tar 

balls on there but, other than that, the impact to Mississippi has 

been minimal so far. 

If you watch the national media, however, you would be convinced that the Mississippi beaches are ankle-deep in oil, and the 

effect of that has been disastrous, not only to our state, but also 

the states that surround us—all of the states in the Gulf. You have 

heard all of their Governors singing that same song, including ours. 

And what that has done is keep the tourists from coming to Mississippi. The charter boats don’t have charters anymore. The resVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:20 Jan 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\57093.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
50 

taurant trade is down, product is down and more expensive, so the 

economic damage to Mississippi had been great. 

What we have done to try to counter that is we have joined with 

the Department of Environmental Quality and the Mississippi 

Health Department to collect samples, to analyze those samples, to 

provide the results of those analyses to the public and show them 

that seafood in Mississippi is safe to eat, that Mississippi is still 

open. We would like for you to come down and visit. 

We are developing a—we should have completed development of 

a poster now that restaurants, seafood houses can place in their 

windows saying that Department of Marine Resources, Department 

of Environmental Quality and the Health Department of the State 

of Mississippi have together declared that Mississippi seafood is 

safe to eat. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Dr. Walker. I yield back my time, 

Madam Chair. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I thank the gentleman, and how I would like to 

recognize the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Ms. Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for 

the series of hearings that you have been holding on the oil spill 

and its impact on the natural resources of the Gulf area, and thank 

you to the witnesses for being here and for your testimony and recommendations that you have made. 

I understand that there have been a series of exercises centered 

around a major spill in the Gulf as a subject of the exercise over 

the last eight or so years, the last one perhaps being a month or 

so before April. 

Dr. Walker and Mr. Barton, do you have any knowledge of that 

exercise? Was the alliance a participant in any way or any of the 

state or local officials participating in an exercise in the Gulf 

around March of this year? 

Mr. BARTON. No. 

Dr. WALKER. I will add to that just a bit to say that scientists 

through the Gulf of Mexico Alliance process are in the Gulf all the 

time. It just so happened by happenstance that one of the scientific 

vessels that was supported by this particular crew who was supported by NOAA, I believe, was actually out there doing normal operations when the explosion and the resulting fire occurred, so they 

were on scene, they were able to capture data that would not have 

been available, had they not been out there doing routine science. 

So that goes on relatively commonly in the northern Gulf of 

Mexico, and the State of Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico Alliance is intimately involved in those activities. Thank you. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. Dr. Takahashi-Kelso, one of the 

challenges of preparing any—I think you speak to this somewhat 

in your testimony—preparing better managing and especially preventing these kinds of incidences, that the responsibilities are 

siloed in different agencies. 

Can they be better coordinated, do you think, through something 

like a fusion center where each agency has someone there all the 

time, or do we need, as some people are suggesting, a single entity, 

a new agency to oversee the oil drilling, regulating, managing, preventing? 

51 

Dr. TAKAHASHI-KELSO. Thank you; a very important question, I 

think. 

My view is that the response and the agency coordination and 

communication can be accomplished in the existing incident command structure, but I would begin that process far back. That is, 

when Kristen Fletcher talked about the importance of Coastal Zone 

Management Act, and building in a state role very early in decisions about what kinds of activities are going to take place and 

under what conditions, that is very important. 

When a Federal agency like the Minerals Management Service 

has authority to make decisions about moving forward with activities like oil and gas development, it is crucial to have the agencies 

manage other parts of the ecosystems, activities, and resources 

which people make use of—fishing, tourism, other kinds of important economic issues—and that those be built in early and taken 

quite seriously. 

We just have not done that very well at all. We have segmented 

the decisions so that the units of analysis are so small that they 

are meaningless, with respect to any serious worst-case scenario. 

Even in the case of decisions about oil and gas leasing, the Minerals Management Service has simply written them off as insignificant risks and have not analyzed them at all. 

So, I think your point is a very important one, and we need to 

build in those levels of coordination and take seriously the science, 

the local knowledge, the inputs from states right at the beginning 

when the decisions about the activities are made, and then when 

the decisions about spill response preparedness. 

There is not currently a provision in the Coastal Zone Management Act that expressly recognizes the roles of states in the contingency planning process. Section 307 consistency determinations to 

recognize the role for the state in making recommendations about 

consistency determinations with respect to things like oil and gas 

leasing and facilities, but not about contingency planning. I think 

that is an area that could be strengthened and would help address 

the point that you raise. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I guess my time is up. Thank you. Thank you 

for your answers. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I thank the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands. 

I have a few more questions. Dr. Takahashi-Kelso, I have a couple 

for you. 

In your testimony, you mentioned the states’ role in NRDA process. How does the NRDA process intersect with the response and 

the clean-up effort, and what are the key elements to ensure longterm restoration and recovery? 

Dr. TAKAHASHI-KELSO. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

The NRDA process is the Natural Resources Damage Assessment, and that is a process required by Federal law that includes 

not only the Federal agencies that have natural resource management authority primarily in the Department of the Interior and the 

Department of Commerce, NOAA, but also state agencies that have 

similar responsibilities in their areas of jurisdiction. 

The Natural Resources Damage Assessment is crucial for two 

things: First, it is the basis for an important part of the liability 

that the spiller ultimately will bear, and the reason for that, of 

52 

course, is that resources, as well as the people who depend upon 

them, have been hurt. When Mr. Wittman was asking earlier about 

impacts on the seafood industry and the supply chain there, he 

raised, I think, an important piece of what the Natural Resources 

Damage Assessment actually addresses, and under Federal law 

those impacts, including lost profits, are properly part of the liability assessment. So, the Natural Resources Damage Assessment 

does that as one piece of its important mission. 

The second piece, equally important and fundamental to the 

long-term recovery from a spill, is that the science and the gathering of information from other sources, not just scientists, lays the 

groundwork for restoration, and the restoration steps need to go on 

for years. 

So the way I would lay it out, Madam Chair, is the emergency 

response happens right away, and it is ongoing, at least it is ongoing right now and will be for some time. In the Exxon Valdez case, 

it took three years. Overlapping with that, and essentially beginning immediately, there needs to be the gathering of the science, 

the initiating of baseline work, the start of longer term science that 

will not only help us understand the impacts, but also lay the 

groundwork for restoration. Then, overlapping with the Natural 

Resources Damage Assessment, the restoration steps will begin before all of that Natural Resources Damage Assessment work is 

completed. Basically, running throughout, there should be a monitoring element that continues well beyond the restoration phase as 

well, to see how effective we have been. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Along the same lines, you testified that few 

states have the staffing and the technical support to sustain the 

level of engagement necessary to respond to the worst-case scenarios, but that we must improve our ability to do so. Who should 

be responsible for the cost of pre-training personnel and 

prepositioning infrastructure to respond to future oil spills? 

Dr. TAKAHASHI-KELSO. The costs of preparing for response in 

particular areas should largely be borne by the industry that is undertaking the activities that contain the risk, and I would be happy 

to say more about that. 

Clearly, in some areas there are multiple individual businesses 

at work or corporations at work, but often the kind of activity that 

is being undertaken, the source of the risk, is in an industry sector 

and they should be responsible largely for footing the bill for the 

preparations necessary to make sure that safety is in place. 

The Federal Government and the state governments, of course, 

are appropriately paying the costs of their own agency staff and the 

capacity to be involved effectively at the agency level, but with respect to these particular plans and the preparedness to be really 

effective in worst-case scenarios, that cost should be borne by the 

industry. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So that is very clear then in your mind, and so 

I guess we are on the right track here. 

Dr. TAKAHASHI-KELSO. Yes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. And although the Federal agencies are assisting, 

we are being reimbursed by the industry. 

Dr. TAKAHASHI-KELSO. Exactly right. I would say that with 

something like the Natural Resources Damage Assessment, it is 

53 

important for BP in this case to pay those costs up front, and the 

reason is that otherwise the Federal and state agencies and the 

independent scientists or university scientists who work with them 

will simply not have the resources necessarily to do what needs to 

be done at the beginning of that process. It is not sufficient to take 

resources from your existing budget because you just don’t have 

enough to do that, even if it is reimbursed later, so there is kind 

of a front-loading issue that ought to be undertaken there. 

There are also some clear examples that I would be happy to 

identify for the Committee—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. 

Dr. TAKAHASHI-KELSO.—in which both Federal and state funds 

that came from industry serve as a pool in order to support planning and preparation for potential spill response. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Good, if you would provide us with that we would 

be grateful. 

Ms. Fletcher, would your organization be supportive of grants to 

states, through the Coastal Zone Management Act, to increase 

planning for oil spill response? 

Ms. FLETCHER. Yes, Chairwoman, absolutely. The Coastal Zone 

Management Act is actually a perfect statute for—it is already set 

up for grants to states. It has been effectively managed. CZMA will 

celebrate 40 years in 2012. Actually, in New Hampshire, coastal 

zone program funds initially sponsored some oil spill response activities. That led to the creation of the cooperative, the agency/industry cooperative that I mentioned earlier. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. 

Ms. FLETCHER. So, again, that granting of capacity and authority 

is already there, and I think the CZMA is a good place to make 

that connection between what is going on with the oil spill response as well as coastal management authority. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, and I have one follow up. Please tell 

us about the Coastal Impact Assistance Program. Is the program 

effectively managed by the Minerals Management Service, and if 

not, what solutions does CSO propose to help the states implement 

the program? 

Ms. FLETCHER. Well, the CIAP program is quite a valuable resource for coastal states. It provides funding to support activities 

that address the impacts of energy production within coastal and 

marine areas. Since it was established in the Energy Policy Act of 

2005, $250 million in funding was intended to be distributed to the 

energy-producing coastal states for each fiscal year from 2007 to 

2011. Unfortunately, to date, MMS has distributed less than 20 

percent of that funding due to a complex in changing grants process. 

So, we would recommend that there be some clear language 

about spending those dollars; making sure that congressional intent is carried through, and getting those dollars in the hands of 

the states where that work can be done. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Excellent. Thank you. And now I would like to 

recognize the Ranking Member Mr. Cassidy. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Another name I am going to have a difficult time 

with although I shouldn’t. Mr. Menashes? 

Mr. MENASHES. That is right. 

54 

Mr. CASSIDY. Man, I was just like so into what you were saying, 

I felt like I couldn’t find a question because I am totally in agreement. It has been part of my frustration, for example, at LSU 

School of Fireman Training who have all that HAZMAT training, 

but initially there was no ability to—the people didn’t have 

HAZMAT training. I am thinking, 80 miles up the river, you have 

all these guys who do nothing but all day teach people how to do 

HAZMAT, and I kind of gather from—just as I review your testimony, it is just like having local resources present on an as-needed 

basis, knowing that the folks who are locally engaged are, if you 

will, most prepared. So first let me just thank you for that testimony, and hopefully you will be appointed as the next director of 

something or other. 

Something you said is a little different from what Dr. Walker 

said, so I just want the two of you to kind of have a knife fight. 

He mentioned, I think, very plausibly that the use of dispersants 

will break up the oil. I have heard this from other experts, allowing 

the microorganisms to destroy. You suggest that it will take three 

to four years for the estuaries to respond. 

Now the Ixtoc spill, I am told, within three years the Gulf just 

recovered. Now granted Ixtoc was not marshland as it is in Louisiana. I gather marshlands and estuaries are more vulnerable. 

Nonetheless, we have two different kinds of scenarios on how this 

plays out. So could I ask you both to comment upon your prognosis 

of how these estuaries and how the Gulf will heal? This is not so 

much about your testimony because I am in total agreement with 

it—I am going to ask my staff to find something, some legislation 

we can come up with. 

Mr. MENASHES. I probably should defer to Dr. Walker’s expertise 

on how the estuaries will heal, but I think what I can say is that, 

with marshes and mangroves in particular, the risks to those 

resources are extremely high. So, our efforts at this point need to 

be focused on moving oil away from those resources and toward 

areas where it is going to be easier to clean, and that is what is 

happening. 

The Coast Guard is working with scientists and working with 

natural resource managers in the Gulf to do exactly that, and that 

is where we need to be focused right now. 

For the long term restoration is obviously going to take quite 

some time. For our program, for the Research Reserve System I 

think what is important for us—— 

Mr. CASSIDY. Why do you say—I am going to challenge you a little bit. 

Mr. MENASHES. Sure. 

Mr. CASSIDY. Because someone came from NOAA, an acting director of some sort, and he said he was cautiously optimistic that 

recovery will take place sooner as opposed to later because, again, 

the hope that the microorganisms would disperse, it would be 

weathered. Even the folks from Mississippi have told us that it was 

washing up as tar balls, which are easily removed. So continue. 

Mr. MENASHES. Well, I think the risks for clean up in marshes 

is that because of the fragility as we are in the marshes themselves 

and working on the marsh restoration, we have the impacts not 

55 

only from the oil itself but from the restoration recovery activities 

as well. 

Mr. CASSIDY. So the folks at LSU who have been studying this 

forever say the restoration could do more damage than the spill 

itself, and I guess that is why I continue to come back to should 

there be this huge—I don’t want to say they are fatalistic, but they 

are denialistic, but rather they just are, like, it may be benign neglect is the better policy because our efforts may be more destructive than the original oil. 

Mr. MENASHES. I cannot comment on whether they will be more 

destructive or not. What I can say is we need to study it further, 

and that is what the Research Reserves are there for. I think to 

work with Dr. Walker’s department or folks from NGO’s like the 

Ocean Conservancy and our Research Reserves and state and Federal partners are going to be able to address some of these questions in the long term. We are going to be able to take some of the 

information—— 

Mr. CASSIDY. Let me interrupt you—— 

Mr. MENASHES. Sure. 

Mr. CASSIDY.—because I am on my yellow light, and Dr. Walker, 

any comments on what we have been speaking of? 

Dr. WALKER. Sure. Matt mentioned the reserve system in Mississippi, and that reserve system is almost completely very vulnerable pristine marsh areas. After Katrina, that area had anything 

from houses to automobiles to whatever else washed up in it, and 

we got the bulk of the material out of there, but some of the biodegradable material that was in there, we made the decision to 

leave it there and it was a good decision. That stuff biologically degraded and the marshes came back in that system in the next 

growing cycle, and after two growing cycles you really couldn’t tell 

that there ever had been an impact. 

Similar to this oil spill, there was a rig that leaked, an on-land 

rig that leaked a lot of oil into marsh areas in Louisiana. Louisiana 

chose to burn those marshes, and those marshes came back the 

very next year. So critical wetland marshes are very resilient 

places. 

Mr. CASSIDY. So what I am also hearing from you, in the spirit 

of this testimony, is that the local experience and expertise is irreplaceable in understanding how to manage damaged resources in 

that area. 

Mr. MENASHES. Absolutely. You know, we had proposals to purchase large equipment to come in and dig up marsh that had oil 

in it, and you know, there are a lot of different ways to get oil out 

of places, but most of the time if this is weathered oil, and I want 

to say something about dispersing in just a minute, but if it is in 

fact weathered oil oftentimes it is better to leave it where it is and 

let the natural microflora take control of it. 

With regard to dispersants, I would like to think of dispersants 

in terms of a bar of soap that is floating in the bathtub. If the bar 

of soap is intact, it is going to go away but it is going to take a 

long time. But if you could break that bar of soap into thousands 

of small pieces, it will go away a lot quicker, and that is what 

dispersants are designed to do, and that is what they are doing in 

this spill. The dispersants that are injected subsea at the source of 

56 

the leak are breaking that oil into literally thousands of very small 

pieces of oil surrounded by water. In that water is contained natural microorganisms that are there because the Gulf floor naturally 

seeps something like 250,000 barrels of oil a year. Those organisms 

are capable of—— 

Mr. CASSIDY. Now let me interrupt you, I am allowed to ask one 

more question. Are the bacteria—now this has intrigued me. When 

we are talking about 5,000 feet below sea level at 40 degrees Fahrenheit and great pressures, do the bacteria exist there, and if they 

do not, how do they enter the water column? Bacteria just don’t appear. Are they just so diffuse throughout the Gulf of Mexico that 

when hydrocarbon floats by, despite entropy, they are going to 

nonetheless coincide? 

Mr. MENASHES. Well, first, not only microorganisms, but an 

awful lot of sealife, is at the seafloor, and they are active. They are 

different kinds of creatures as you can imagine. But the bacteria 

that I am talking about are present at the seafloor, and they are 

only present there because of the oil seeps. They are there because 

food is there for them. They have adapted to be able to utilize this 

crude material as a food source. So they have the enzymes and the 

other materials that they need to degrade this material. So what 

you want to do is provide them as much surface area as they can 

to get at this oil, so that is what dispersants do. 

There has been a lot of concern about dispersants themselves 

and where they are. From what I can tell from the report that 

NOAA released yesterday, the area of dispersed oil is pretty much 

all in the area of the spill, and the dispersants are working as they 

should to break down the oil so it can degrade faster. 

The concentration of oily material in that plume below the surface of the water is somewhere in the one to two part per million 

level, which is relatively low. 

Mr. CASSIDY. OK, thank you very much for illuminating. I yield 

back. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I thank the gentleman. I would like now to recognize the gentlelady from California, Mrs. Capps. 

Ms. CAPPS. Thank you again, Madam Chair. 

I want to continue Mr. Cassidy’s line of questioning and pick up 

on something that you said, Ms. Fletcher, and all of you seem to 

have supported, but I would like to get it on the record. More local 

input, the question is this—and I will go down the row—you can 

answer ‘‘Yes’’ or ‘‘No.’’ 

Do each of you think providing a local public forum for the discussion of deficiencies found in inspections and recommended solutions as well as preparing oil spill response is a good idea? So Dr. 

Walker, I will start with you. 

Dr. WALKER. Yes, absolutely. 

Ms. CAPPS. Good. It was your idea so I assume you would agree. 

Ms. FLETCHER. Brilliant. 

Ms. CAPPS. Brilliant. Yes. 

Ms. FLETCHER. And I do think that there is room for creativity 

in terms of having a local forum, but also some other mechanisms 

for the local information to get into the system. 

Mr. BARTON. I certainly agree with that, and that was part of my 

testimony. I would say that Dr. Walker and I actually attended an 

57 

open-house-type forum for local input just so people could come, 

ask questions, and participate in the process, put their ideas on the 

table, just this past week. 

Ms. CAPPS. Yes. 

Mr. MENASHES. I think if there is anything we have learned from 

having research reserves in local communities, it is that local people care and provide excellent information. I think our research reserves have been helping out with sea grant institutions in the 

Gulf and putting on some of those public forums, so yes, we would 

support that as well. 

Dr. TAKAHASHI-KELSO. And I agree. It is absolutely essential. I 

would suggest that there is an appropriate role both for the Federal Government and for state—— 

Ms. CAPPS. Yes. 

Dr. TAKAHASHI-KELSO.—and local government, and that you 

need both of them operating together. 

Ms. CAPPS. And so hopefully there will be some Federal representation at one of these local public forums, and I bring this up a little bit tongue-in-cheek because, as some of you know, I represent 

Santa Barbara where we had a big spill in 1969, and for years our 

local community has been sort of chomping at the bit to have a say 

because, as you just said, Doctor, they care so much about their 

local community and what happens to it, so thank you, all of you. 

Dr. Menashes, I agree that this is it—I wanted to get to you in 

the last round, but this has to do with the baseline data which my 

researchers at UC-Santa Barbara tell me is so critical. The collection of baseline data is critical to preparing damage assessments. 

That is a given. But what other benefits could we expect to see 

with better baseline data collection? 

And I am just thinking of this. We have such technology now 

that we did not have before. I have a company in my district that 

it is mainly geared—that do underwater observing, and it kind of 

is a natural for our defense departments, and so that is where they 

have gone, and they are ready to have these be deployed in our 

coastal areas as well so that we would have in place the structure 

for plugging something in so that you could start this observing 

and you could collect this baseline data, Mr. Menashes. 

Mr. MENASHES. Well, I think it is important to recognize the difference between using the baseline data for the Natural Resources 

Damage Protection process, which is currently going on, and the 

long-term recovery and restoration efforts. I think it is wise to look 

at the NRDA process and baseline data as somewhat having longterm baseline data as part of the NRDA process could be valuable, 

but it is more important to get information very quickly before the 

spill hits the land. 

Ms. CAPPS. Right. 

Mr. MENASHES. We have time series that are relatively recent. 

Ms. CAPPS. But it could start prior to that if you have—— 

Mr. MENASHES. It could. 

Ms. CAPPS.—invasive drilling or some other activity in the area. 

Mr. MENASHES. And I think that is important, particularly when 

it comes to looking at efficiencies for use of Federal dollars. Our 

systemwide monitoring program, which has been in place for about 

15 years in the reserve system and is part of the Integrated Ocean 

58 

Observing System. If we were sampling for hydrocarbons over the 

past 15 years, we could use that information to show long-term 

trends in the Gulf or along any of the coasts. 

We don’t have the resources to do hydrocarbon testing, let alone 

some of the other testing and monitoring that we would like to be 

doing in the long term; for instance, biological monitoring or 

changes—— 

Ms. CAPPS. Maybe that is something we should look at. I want 

to get to one more topic with your indulgence, Madam Chair. 

California has been a leader for the rest of the Nation, in many 

respects, in the development of training and use of oiled wildlife 

care volunteers during an oil spill response. Oil spill birds have 

been the image that has come out of the Gulf that has touched, I 

think, people more dramatically than anything else, and if you 

have oil offshore, you have situations that occur from time to time. 

So oiled bird response is something that the volunteers have cared 

very much about in our area. 

California has also partnered with the National Marine Sanctuaries to create a beach monitoring network that can be activated 

in the event of an oil spill, and even in pre-spill planning, and we 

have these sanctuaries now in very many of our protected areas everywhere we have oceans. 

My question, and I will put this to Mr. Menashes and Dr. Kelso, 

but anyone can respond, begging the time. Do you have any recommendations for the Subcommittee to better utilize, and some 

language we might want to promote in terms of some legislation, 

to better utilize volunteers’ expertise for oiled wildlife care and recovery? 

Mr. MENASHES. I will answer real quickly that it is important in 

dealing with the oiled wildlife that we—as we were talking about 

with Mr. Cassidy—that hazardous materials training is in place for 

these folks. So from a legislative standpoint—— 

Ms. CAPPS. Yes. 

Mr. MENASHES.—the first thing we need to make sure is—— 

Ms. CAPPS. That they are safe. 

Mr. MENASHES. That they are safe, and I will turn you over to 

Dr. Kelso for anything additional. 

Dr. TAKAHASHI-KELSO. I will be quick. California has been a 

leader and the center at the University of California—Davis, is 

really a superb source of expertise. 

I think the keys are to have a framework in which volunteers 

can be useful, do some pre-training so that they are a trained corps 

that is ready to go; make sure that they have enough equipment 

to be effective; and also to build a network among the different 

wildlife facilities, say along the West Coast, not just in California. 

And I think that, regionally, those wildlife facilities and experts 

can be more effective if, prior to any spill, those relationships are 

established and the depots of equipment and training are already 

in place. 

Ms. CAPPS. Do mind if I ask Mr. Barton and Dr. Walker because 

you represent different coastal areas. Does this seem of value to 

you? 

Dr. WALKER. Well, in the State of Mississippi, we have an Audubon Institute, we have a Wildlife Rehabilitation Institute and we 

59 

have an Institute on Marine Mammal Studies, and it focuses on 

marine mammals and turtles. All of those places, if they had funding, could train this workforce of volunteers that Dennis was talking about and that you are referring to. So I think it is an outstanding idea. We simply need to get additional support to these 

folks so that they can provide this critical training. 

Mr. BARTON. And there is a big part of our county set aside for 

marine protection. We have the Audubon presence there, and we 

have the National Grand Bay Estuarine Reserve there. We have 

the Sandia National Laboratory, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Service is there. So, we have a lot of expertise in the county that 

would certainly help with this, and it would certainly be something 

we would like to participate in. It would be very important, and I 

think we have a lot of local expertise in those areas. 

Ms. CAPPS. I am over my time. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I thank the gentlelady, and now I would like to 

recognize Mr. Wittman, the gentleman from Virginia. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

I want to go to Mr. Barton and get your perspective. I thought 

it was interesting about your ideas about how this affects localities, 

and having served on the Board of Supervisors in Virginia for a 

number of years it is near and dear to my heart about how localities have to deal with this, and obviously this is not just an issue 

for you now, but down the road. 

You talk about there being not as much capacity in your local 

coastal facilities to really be able to deal with this particular spill. 

I would be interested to know how many people are actually at 

those facilities and, if you were to look into the future and ask 

what kind of capacity do we need in those facilities for a spill such 

as we are experiencing now, what do you think the future need 

would be to be properly prepared? 

Then, I like your idea of this regionalism, these area commands 

which are really what states are looking at, to make sure resources 

are being leveraged in an immediate way. Obviously, one county 

may not have it by itself but you could leverage those regionally. 

So tell me what exists now. What do you think a locality needs in 

the future, and how do you see that being leveraged as far as these 

area commands are doing regionally? 

Mr. BARTON. OK. Well, let me try to do that in two answers. 

First, responding to the facilities themselves. As I said in the written testimony and in my oral comments, most of the facilities along 

the entire Gulf Coast—Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, 

probably in Texas also—most of these facilities were built a number of years ago when the responses were just different. We had 

a different response model. We didn’t have near the people, and 

really, as I said earlier, Katrina taught us a lot of lessons, but one 

of the things that came in with Katrina was the current NIMS 

model, and that was our first really broad experience with that, 

and it actually was a pretty good model. I mean, it brought a lot 

of the right people to the table, but it also brought a larger presence, and it required that there be a Federal presence, that there 

be a state presence, that there be a local presence, and then you 

had these incident command teams and so forth. 

60 

So, when you got everybody together, you had all the right people. We just didn’t have any place big enough to put them, and it 

was a large number of people over a fairly long period of time, and 

so immediately after that storm, we started looking at the future 

and said, if this is the future type of response, then what do we 

need in place to be able to manage those emergencies successfully 

locally? I mean, what do we need in place? 

Well, we went out and we looked at some other facilities here 

and there, just a few, not very many that really are designed with 

this process in mind. Actually the one in Escambia County, Florida, 

is a real good one. It’s just been fairly recently built. And so we 

started looking at these footprints and the footprint, I think, can 

be easily defined to do everything you need to be able to do and 

do it locally, but the problem you get into and the problem we are 

certainly in, in most of the coastal regions that I know of, you 

know, it might cost as little as maybe a couple hundred thousand 

dollars up to maybe a million dollars to do maybe some upgrades 

or something, but if you had to build a new facility, you might 

spend $6-8 million. 

Well, that is a pretty tough hill to climb for a lot of local communities, and especially communities that, like where we are, we are 

still within five years of the storm, I mean, we are still rebuilding, 

you know, and we are not at a point right now where we could borrow that kind of money to build that kind of building. We know it 

is a priority, and it is on our list of things to do, and one day hopefully the county will do that. 

But then the second question, if you don’t mind repeating the 

second question. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. The second question is sort of extended from 

what you are talking about, about those command centers. How do 

you—— 

Mr. BARTON. Oh, the command centers. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Area commands. 

Mr. BARTON. What I was going to say, and I will do this as quickly as I can, and I will go back to the Katrina model in that sense. 

In that particular time, we had very similar to where we are now. 

We had damage in Alabama, we had damage in Mississippi, we 

had damage in Louisiana. But the way the area commands were 

set up, they were really more set up by state, and in that particular case it was under the Stafford Act, which is slightly different, but the states kind of coordinated the local communities and 

then it was up to a unified type command structure. 

And where that worked well, and without going into a lot of details, but where you have got such a regional approach to something like this, and if you have sat on a Board of Supervisors you 

will know where I am headed here, many times, you know, what 

I can do in Mississippi, or maybe turn that around. Maybe something they can do in Mobile, Alabama, because they have the statutory authority to do it, in Mississippi, I may not have that statutory authority. 

So, if that coordination is done through a state area command, 

and if it is Dr. Bill Walker, he understands the limitations that we 

may have that maybe somebody in Alabama doesn’t have or somebody in Florida doesn’t have, and maybe there are a lot of similarVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:20 Jan 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\57093.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
61 

ities, but when you cross the state lines, there are always differences, and so in trying to pull that area command back into a 

state level, in our opinion, it would just make it work a lot better, 

and the relationships are much closer at the state levels than they 

are across a regional basis. 

Mr. WITTMAN. If I can ask just one additional question. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I just want to, Mr. Barton, get your perspective. 

Obviously we are dealing with the here and now. How do we respond to this? How do we make sure we deal with the impacts of 

this? Give me your perspective on how you think we best deal with 

it, and you have been through it with Katrina. How do we best deal 

with the economic impacts of this event, down the road, to make 

sure that those economies can rebound from this? 

Mr. BARTON. That is a much more difficult question to answer, 

and you know, I will be honest with you. We have kind of worked 

our way through this trying to visualize what the impacts are 

going to be. I mean, the impact could be for many, many, many 

years, and property values go down, tax revenue goes down, that 

is at the governmental level, and then the services that you are 

trying to provide. Obviously, in this particular case, local governments would not have the luxury, I don’t think, of raising taxes because you are raising taxes on people whose economy has gone 

south. So, those things are going to be problematic long term. 

But then you get into the small businesses, and I will give you 

a perfect example. I had someone in my office earlier this week— 

a boat business—primarily saltwater boats. He is going out of business. Eleven employees who have now lost their jobs. 

So how do you frame something to make the owner of the business whole, the eleven employees who no longer have a job, and 

that business may never come back? 

So, it kind of goes across a very broad spectrum of all of our businesses are being hit. I think someone said awhile about the seafood 

industry and the restaurants and those kinds of things. Well, that 

is something you can quantify. I mean, you can go back and say, 

well, how well did you do last year, how well are you doing this 

year, and there is a delta, but it is not always easy to measure 

what that is going to be or how long the impact is going to last. 

But there is no question that it is going to be a significant impact, 

and I think it is going to impact us for quite sometime. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I thank the gentleman. We do have votes in a 

few minutes, so I would like to thank the panel for their participation in the hearing this morning, and members of the Subcommittee may have some additional questions for our witness, and 

we will ask you to respond to these in writing. In addition, the 

hearing record will be held open for 10 days for anyone who would 

like to submit additional information for the record. 

If there is no further business before the Subcommittee, the 

Chairwoman thanks the members for their participation here this 

morning, and the Subcommittee now stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Additional material submitted for the record follows:] 

62 

Supplemental Written Statement of the 

National Estuarine Research Reserve Association 

Thank you Chairwoman Bordallo and Members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to provide this additional written statement on behalf of the state agencies and academic institutions that operate the nation’s National Estuarine Research Reserves (reserves) about efforts to improve standards for preparedness for 

offshore energy development. 

As we noted in the written testimony we submitted earlier for this hearing, the 

National Estuarine Research Reserve System (reserve system) was authorized in 

1972 under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). The program is a unique 

federal-state partnership which brings the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) together with state agencies and universities to protect lands 

and waters for long-term research and education purposes. NOAA and reserve staffers collaborate to provide education, training, and stewardship programs that ensure the protection of these wonderful places while advancing our collective understanding of how estuaries function. As part of the CZMA, the reserves also play a 

strong role in assisting coastal managers in reaching out to the public on critical 

coastal issues. 

We all know that the impact in the Gulf of Mexico is not just to natural resources, 

but also to the people of the region. We want to expand on our earlier comments 

by drawing some attention to the need to better prepare to respond to—and support—citizens in the local communities affected by oil spills. 

Planners need to focus more effort on getting accurate, locally specific information 

to communities and businesses about the true impacts to natural resources, how 

commercial and recreational activities are impacted, and what limitations communities and businesses may face and for how long. As an example, Gulf coast reserve 

staff hear repeatedly from residents in their communities that people want to understand the characteristics of spilled oil and chemical dispersants, and want to 

know what can be expected if people come into contact with either. Because of the 

number of questions we are receiving on this topic, we believe the public may not 

be getting information in the most effective manner. Agencies can always do a better job of communicating with the public. By addressing public outreach needs in 

advance, contingency planners can ensure well-established networks like the reserve 

system can be used to quickly reach out to the public to relay critical information 

in times of crisis. With our long tenure in many coastal communities, research reserve staff members are trusted experts that are counted on to provide timely and 

accurate information. 

We also would like to encourage the committee to explore the necessary social 

science research and related public outreach that should be included in spill contingency plans. Contingency plans should include ways to immediately begin the research and outreach necessary to understand the impacts of a spill on people’s lives 

and livelihood. For instance, with the prevalence of fishing and tourism related businesses along America’s coasts, a common set of social science research and public 

outreach programs focused on these areas could be developed. Universities and 

other research institutions could be pre-positioned to begin studies immediately 

after a spill to determine the economic impacts to tourism or fishing businesses for 

example. Other efforts could focus on ensuring that outreach materials are presented to diverse communities with appropriate tools and language. 

We believe there are many opportunities to strengthen planning to address the 

social impacts of spills and other disasters. We appreciate the opportunity to provide 

this supplemental statement to our original testimony as a way to draw attention 

to some of these opportunities. 

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