[Cite as In re Howland Children, 2015-Ohio-3862.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

IN THE MATTER OF: : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

HOWLAND CHILDREN : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. 

 : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

 : 

 : 

 : Case No. 2015CA00113 

 : 

 : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 

2013JCV00968 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: September 21, 2015 

APPEARANCES: 

For Appellant For Appellee 

JOHN JAKMIDES BRANDON J. WALTENBAUGH 

325 East Main Street 300 Market Avenue North 

Alliance, OH 44601 Canton, OH 44702 

 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00113 2 

Farmer, J. 

{¶1} On September 18, 2013, appellee, Stark County Job and Family Services, 

filed a complaint alleging two children, M.H. born December 29, 2007, and M.H. born 

February 23, 2009, to be neglected and/or dependent children. Mother of the children is 

Tina Ibrahim nka Stremo; father is Marcello Howland. 

{¶2} On December 4, 2013, the children were found to be dependent and were 

placed in the custody of Ms. Ibrahim's mother, appellant herein, Jennifer Lawson. The 

children were removed from this home due to improper disciplinary methods, and 

temporary custody was granted to appellee on April 23, 2014. 

{¶1} On October 9, 2014, appellee filed a motion for permanent custody. A 

hearing was held on April 30, 2015. By judgment entry filed May 14, 2015, the trial 

court terminated parental rights and granted appellee permanent custody of the 

children. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed contemporaneously with the 

judgment entry. 

{¶3} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for 

consideration. Assignment of error is as follows: 

I 

{¶4} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT MATERNAL 

GRANDMOTHER CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN. THE DECISION WAS BASED 

ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE DISCIPLINE METHODS EMPLOYED AS SHE 

ADJUSTED TO PARENTING SPECIAL NEEDS CHILDREN FOR THE FIRST TIME." 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00113 3 

I 

{¶5} Appellant claims the trial court erred in not granting her legal custody of 

the children as she completed parenting classes at her own expense and was learning 

to adapt to new disciplinary methods. We disagree. 

{¶6} R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) states the following in pertinent part: 

 (A) If a child is adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent 

child, the court may make any of the following orders of disposition: 

 (3) Award legal custody of the child to either parent or to any other 

person who, prior to the dispositional hearing, files a motion requesting 

legal custody of the child or is identified as a proposed legal custodian in a 

complaint or motion filed prior to the dispositional hearing by any party to 

the proceedings. 

{¶7} We agree with the following analysis set forth by our brethren from the 

Eighth District in In re D.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100970 and 100971, 2014-Ohio4818, ¶ 19-22: 

 Legal custody is significantly different than the termination of 

parental rights in that, despite losing legal custody of a child, the parent of 

the child retains residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities. In 

re G.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95410, 2011-Ohio-4090, ¶ 14, citing R.C. 

2151.353(A)(3)(c). In such a case, a parent's right to regain custody is not 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00113 4 

permanently foreclosed. In re M.J.M. [8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94130, 

2010-Ohio-1674] at ¶ 12. For this reason, the standard the trial court uses 

in making its determination is the less restrictive "preponderance of the 

evidence." Id. at ¶ 9, citing In re Nice, 141 Ohio App.3d 445, 455, 751 

N.E.2d 552 (7th Dist.2001). "Preponderance of the evidence" means 

evidence that is more probable, more persuasive, or of greater probative 

value. In re C.V.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98340, 2012-Ohio-5514, ¶ 7. 

 Unlike permanent custody cases in which the trial court is guided 

by the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D) before terminating parental 

rights and granting permanent custody, R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) does not 

provide factors the court should consider in determining the child's best 

interest in a motion for legal custody. In re G.M. at ¶ 15. We must 

presume that, in the absence of best interest factors in a legal custody 

case, "the legislature did not intend to require the consideration of certain 

factors as a predicate for granting legal custody." Id. at ¶ 16. Such 

factors, however, are instructive when making a determination as to the 

child's best interest. In re E.A. [8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99065, 2013-Ohio1193] at ¶ 13. 

 The best interest factors include, for example, the interaction of the 

child with the child's parents, relatives, and caregivers; the custodial 

history of the child; the child's need for a legally secure permanent 

placement; and whether a parent has continuously and repeatedly failed 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00113 5 

to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed 

outside the child's home. R.C. 2151.414(D). 

 Because custody determinations " 'are some of the most difficult 

and agonizing decisions a trial judge must make,' " a trial judge must have 

broad discretion in considering all of the evidence. In re E.A. at ¶ 10, 

quoting Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159 

(1997). We therefore review a trial court's determination of legal custody 

for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 523 

N.E.2d 846 (1988). An abuse of discretion implies that the court's attitude 

is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 

Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

Accord, In re L.D., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-985, 2013-Ohio-3214; Stull v. Richland 

County Children Services, 5th Dist. Richland Nos. 11CA47 and 11CA48, 2012-Ohio738. 

{¶8} Appellant passed a home study and was granted temporary custody of the 

children on December 4, 2013. T. at 10, 24. Appellant was cautioned by several 

individuals prior to receiving temporary custody of the children not to use physical 

discipline because the children had "already suffered some damage in their lives." T. at 

31. After a few months, the children were removed because of appellant's use of 

corporal punishment with a belt against the children, leaving the children in their rooms 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00113 6 

all day, and permitting a male friend, "Big Mike," to also discipline the children. T. at 11, 

31, 58. Appellant did not object to the removal, but assented to it. T. at 12, 32. 

{¶9} Appellant participated in parenting assessment and Goodwill Parenting 

and has paid for the services out of her own pocket. T. at 27-28, 33. However, the 

caseworker opined "I don't think that anything's going to make a difference" given her 

psychological evaluation and "this later date, she's still going in, trying to figure out 

when she can use physical discipline." T. at 27. After receiving education on 

disciplinary methods, appellant asked "if it would be acceptable to spank the children 

with an open hand and not with a fist or object." T. at 56. 

{¶10} There was constant friction and conflict between appellant and her 

daughter, the mother of the children. T. at 17, 33. They have spoken "horribly about 

each other to the children." T. at 33. Mother perceived appellant as having an alcohol 

problem, and reported she had been sexually abused by one of appellant's boyfriends, 

disclosed the abuse to appellant, and appellant "did not believe her allegations." T. at 

43-44, 57. 

{¶11} Based upon appellant's poor choices of discipline with admittedly very 

emotionally troubled children, her on-going difficulties with the mother of the children, 

and her permitting her male friend to also discipline the children, the experts opined 

appellant was not a good placement. T. at 25, 38, 55-59, 108-110, 122-123. 

{¶12} The children are placed together in an "Agency foster to adopt home" and 

are doing very well and their needs are being met. T. at 106-108, 124. The children are 

bonded to one another and their foster family. T. at 108. 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00113 7 

{¶13} Based upon the testimony and evidence presented, we concur with the 

trial court's following finding of fact filed on May 14, 2015: 

 10. On December 04, 2013, the children were placed in the 

temporary custody of maternal grandmother Jennifer Lawson. The 

children were removed from the care of Ms. Lawson in April 2014 due to 

concerns that Ms. Lawson and her live in boyfriend were punishing the 

children using belts and other forms of corporal punishment. There were 

also concerns that Ms. Lawson was leaving the children in their rooms all 

day without food until dinner. Reasonable efforts were made to keep the 

children with maternal grandmother but despite removal and education on 

the inappropriateness of Ms. Lawson's use of corporal punishment; she 

was unable to grasp the fact that she could not hit the children. 

 Ms. Lawson's relationship with her daughter was described by Dr. 

Aimee Thomas, psychologist from Northeast Ohio Behavioral Health 

(NEOBH), as not a positive one. Dr. Thomas testified that Ms. Lawson 

was not supportive of her daughter and that Ms. Ibrahim felt that her 

mother was always at the bar and never around to care for her as a child. 

As a minor, Ms. Lawson let her daughter live with an unrelated adult male 

much older than Ms. Ibrahim at the time. 

 Given the foregoing facts, the Court cannot find at this time that 

placement of the children with Ms. Lawson would be appropriate. 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00113 8 

{¶14} Upon review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not 

granting legal custody to appellant, and find the trial court did not err in finding the best 

interest of the children was best served with permanent custody to appellee (see this 

court's opinion in Stark County Case No. 2015CA00109). 

{¶15} The sole assignment of error is denied. 

{¶16} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio, 

Juvenile Division is hereby affirmed. 

By Farmer, J. 

Gwin, P.J. and 

Delaney, J. concur. 

 

 

 

 

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