### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ugus t 15 , 200 6 S es sio n STATE OF TENNESS EE v . ROBERT L . MYERS
Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty

No. S49,260 P hylli s H. Miller, Judge

No. E2005-02576-CC A-R3- CD - F iled October 2, 2006

T h e d e f e n d a n t , R o b e r t

L

. M ye r s , p l e d g u i l t y t o t w o c o u n t s o f a t t e m p t e d a g g r a v a t e d s e x u a l b a t t e r y, a Cla ss C fe lon y , an d wa s sen te nc e d as a Ran g e I , s tand ardof fe nd e r t o s ix y e ars on e a c h c ou nt, to be served conc urre ntly . On appe al , h e ar gues that the trial c ourt err ed in denying pr obation or alternative sentenc ing. Following our revie w, we conclude that the trial court p ro p er l ysentenc ed the def endant a nd aff

irm the judg ments of conviction. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed
A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., joined. G AR Y R. W ADE , P

. J

. , n o tp ar t i ci p at i n g. R i c h ar d A

. S p i v e y

a n d T i m o t h y

R

. W i l k e r s o n , K i n g s p o r t , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , R o b e r tL. My e rs . Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Ca me ro n L . H y de r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; H. Gre eley

Wells, J r., District Att orney Gene ral; and Kent L

. Chitwood, J r. and Wil liam B. Ha rper , Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee . OP IN ION
On J une 9, 2004, a g rand jury indicted the six ty -five- y ear -old defe ndant on two counts of ag g ravated sexual battery , and he subse quently pled guiltyto the lesser- included off enses of attempted agg ravated s exual battery

. At the s ubmission hearing, the State summarized the evidenc e it w a s p re pa

re d to pr e se nt h a d th e ma tte r g on e to t ri a l: [O] n September 9th, 2003, Deputy Sherrie Ramsey of the Sullivan CountySheriff’ s Depa rtment rec eived a

ref err al of c hild sex ual abuse from the Department of Children’s Service s. I t was originated by a Kimber ly

Nee ce. She stated that at the tim e Ms. Ne e c e liv e d w ith th e de fe nd a nt, Mr . Ro be rt My e rs , a ndhe r f

ive y e ar- old daug hter, Emily ; he r daug hter’s birthday , Dec ember 5th, 1997, and they lived at 750-2-

VI Ranch Road in B ristol, Tennessee

. She stated t hat on September 6th, 2003 she’d g otten off of

work e arly and got hom e somewhe re be tween 10:30 a nd 11 p.m., and home is the addre ss that I

just mention[ ed] . . . in Sull ivan County . [Ms . Nee ce] went into the house and wa s g oing to sne ak up on the defe ndant and Emily and let them know that she was home early

. She stated that she wa lked up the stairs, c ould hear them talking and laug hing. The defe ndant’s bedroom door wa s half cr acke d and she could clea rly see inside the be droom. She stated that she sa w the def endant, who w as ly ing on the be d w ith his un de rw e ar pu lle d do wn , a ndhe wa s h old ing his pe nis in h is hand. The five y ear -old, [Ms

. Nee ce’ s] five- y ear -old daug hter was sitti ng on the bed in front of him an d s he wa s also naked and she wa s leaning back on he r knee s and sh e wa s laug hin g a s if

the y we re play ing a

g a me . [Ms . N e e c e ] we nt i nto the ro om, confr onted them, took [t he victim] t o her own b ed ro o m and then conf ronted the defe ndant ag ain with r eg ard to what had ha ppened. T he def

endant c ame in, g ave a state me nt t o t he S ulliv a n Co un ty She ri ff ’s De pa

rt me nt andstate d th a t prior to M s. Ne e c e . . . a

rrivi ng ho me , th a t . . . [th e vic tim ] .

. ., fi ve y e ars of a g e , h a d to uc he d h is penis on two occ asions. Acc ording to his statement the second time he did not make he r sto p. Al so , it

wo uldbe the State ’s c on te nti on that th e [vic tim ] ma de a state me nt, and would make the statement had this c ase g one to trial, that they had bee n play ing a g ame a nd also and not at the sa me t ime in which she ha d touched his penis but on the sa me nig ht h e ha d p la c e d h is m ou th o n b othof he r br e a sts a nd on he r va g ina wi th re g ardto this g a me that the y ha d play e d, a nd that wo uld be the State ’s pr oo f in this case . At the subsequent se ntencing hearing, the defe ndant offe red no pr oof and sa id that he was relying, in pa

rt, on the pre sentenc e re port and sex offende r risk asse ssment from Counseling and Consultation S er v i ce s , wh i ch ar e in the re cord on a ppeal. The risk assessment stated that the defe n d a n t p o s e d a “ mo d e r a te r is k to r e - o f f e n d ” a n d th a t h e p r o v id e d d if f e rin g v e r s io ns of the inc ide nt: The will ingne ss or abili ty to honestly discuss their sexual offending behavior i s t h e sing le most important factor a ssociated with succ essful treatment. [ The defe ndant] provided differ en t v er sions of the “truth” during the course of the ass e s s me n t. His statements were also signif icantly differ ent than the victim[’] s. [The de fe nd a nt’ s] se lf

-r e po rt is cons ide re d u nr e lia

ble a ndhis la c k o f f

ull dis c los ur e is associate d with a poor tre atment outcome. The trial c ourt denied a lternative se ntencing , stating that the defe ndant’s sente nce ha d “alr eady been mitig ated e noug h by letting him plea d to attempt.” Additionally , the court noted that the victim, be ing five y ear s old, ha d no choice about wher e to live and that the de fendant blamed her fo r the se xua l c on ta c t: [T] his lit tle g irl couldn’t leave . She couldn’t g o out and find her another home, and it was her home , the only

place she had unf

ortunately to halfway , supposed to be saf e-3-

in this world, was wher e she lives with her mother, and in that house is a man who would abuse he r the way

this report re ads. Now, . . . who doe s h e b l am e? Does he take r esponsibilityfor it? No, he blames the fiv e-y ear -old. That’s what the Counseling a nd Consultation S ervic es re po rt state s. I t sta te s, nu mbe r one , h e ’s a mod e rate rang e of

ri sk . T he ne xt is h e is able to a c kn ow le dg e so me of the inc ide nt o ff

e ns e , h ow e ve r p la c e s th e re sp on sib ili ty for the se x ual contac t on the five y ear -old victim.
The trial c ourt

ap p l i ed en h an ce m en tfa ct o r ( 1 6 ), s ee T en n . C o d e A n n . § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4 (16) (Supp. 2005), finding that the defendant had “abuse d a posi tion of private trust on more than one occa sion,” which the c ourt g ave g reat weig ht. As for mi tigating f actor s, the court c oncluded that the de fe nd a nt’ s la c k o f a

c ri min a l r e c or d w a s r e le va nt bu t e nti tle d to “ ve ry , ve ry lit tle we ig ht i n a

c ri me of thi s n atur e .” Th e tr ia l c ou rt no te d th a t th e de fe nd a nt h a d a n e xce lle nt w or k h ist ory . H ow e ve r, in summation, the trial court dec ided that incar cer ation was a ppropriate : [C]omm un ity

c or re c tio ns is o ut o f the qu e sti on . I do n’ t f indthat th a t w ou ld b e ne fi t hi m or the c ommun ity . H e ha s n o d ru g pr ob le m. T he re ’s no thi ng that c aus e d th is e xce pt h is d e sir e fo r s e xua l e xcit e me nt andthe fi ve y e ar- old wa s the re to p ro vid e it. So I ’m denying a lternative se ntencing , [finding] that the enhanc em en t factors that I ’v e fo un d f

ar ou tw e ig h a ny

of the g oo d w or

k h ist ory a ndthe no c ri min a l r e c or d. So he’s or dere d to serve his sente nce of six y ear s [as a] R ang e I

standard of

fende r in the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ections.
AN AL YSI S On appe al, the def

endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in denying pr obation or alternative sentenc ing, say ing the court “ fail[ed] to properly weig h and bala nce e stablished mitigating fac tors wi th the sin g le e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor app lic able to [ the de fe nd a nt], a pr e su mpt ive ly

fa vo ra ble c a nd idate fo r p ro batio n o r o the r a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing .” Th e State arg ue s th a t th e re c or d s up po rt s the tr ia l c ou rt ’s imp os iti on of a se nte nc e of

c on fi ne me nt. When r eviewing the denial of pr obation, this court conducts a de novo revie w on the re cord, “with a pr esumption that the determinations made by the court from which the a ppeal is take n are c or re c t.” Te nn . Cod e An n. § 40 -3 5- 40 1( d) (2 00 3) (ame nd e d 2 00 5) . T he pr e su mpt ionof c or re c tne ss is “condit i o n ed u p o n the af firmative showing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the sentenc ing pri nciples and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991)

. I f appe llate
revie w “r efle cts that the trial court followed t he statutory sentenc ing pr ocedur e, imposed a lawf

ul sentence afte r having g iven due c onsideration and pr oper wei g ht to the fac tors and princ iples set out under the se ntencing law, and that the trial court’ sW e ci t e t o t h e 2 0 0 3 ve r s i on of t h e Code be ca u s e i t i s t h e l aw pr oper l y a ppl i ed t o t h e def en dan t

. Se e 2005 1 T enn . P ub. Act s ch

. 353 , § 18

. T he defendan t coul d hav e e l ect ed t o be s ent enc ed un der t he 20 05 Act becau s e h i s cr i mes w e re c o m m itt e d p rio r to J u n e 7 , 2 0 0 5 , an d he w a s se n te n c e d a fter tha t d a te

. S e e id

. A s the d e fen d a n t d id no t so e le c t, t h e 2003 pr obat i on pr ov i s i on a ppl i es i n t h i s c as e. H o wever, w e n ot e t h at s u bs t an t i al c h an g es c ame w i t h t h e 2005 ame n dmen t , i n cl u di n g i n cr ea s i n g t h e max i mu m s en t en ce l en g t h a def en dan t ca n r ec ei v e an d s t i l l be el i g i bl e for pr obat i on f rom ei ght t o t en y ears. T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 3 0 3 (a) (20 0 5 ).

-4- finding s are adequat el y s u p p o rted by the re cord, the n we may not modify

the sentenc e eve n if we w ould have pr efe rre d a diffe rent re sult.”
St a te v . H o o p e r , 2 9 S. W. 3 d 1 , 5 ( T e n n . 2 0 0 0 ) ( q u o ti n g St a te v . F le tcher , 8 0 5 S .W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) ).
A defe ndant shall be elig ible for pr obation, subject to ce rtain exceptions, if the sentenc e imposed upon the defe ndant is eig ht y ear s or less. Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35 -3 0 3(a) (2003) (ame nded 2005). Even if elig ible, howeve r, the defe ndant is not automatically entitled to probation 1 as a matter of law . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 303(b). The burden is on the appellant to show the de nia l of

pr ob a tio n w a s impr op e r. Se e State v. Sum me rs ,1 59 S.W. 3d 58 6, 59 9- 60 0 (T e nn . Crim. App. 2004) (c iting Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169); see a lso St ate v. B aker , 966 S.W .2d 429, 434 (Tenn. Crim. A p p . 1 9 9 7 ) ( s tati n g th a t “ [a ] c r im in a l d e f e n d a n t s e e k in g f

u ll p r o b a ti o n b e ar s th e b u r den on app e a l of sh ow ing the se nte nc e a c tua lly imp os e d is imp ro pe r, a nd that ful l pro batio n w ill be in b oth the best intere st of the def endant a nd the public”)

. There is no brig ht line rule for determining whe n a def

endant should be g rante d probation. State v. Bing ham, 910 S.W.2d 448, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), overr uled on other g rounds by State v. Hooper , 29 S.W .3d 1 (Tenn. 2000). Every sentenc ing decision nece ssarily require s a ca seby -ca se ana ly sis. I d. Fa ctors to be c onsidered include the c ircumstance s surrounding the offe nse, the defe ndant’s criminal rec ord, the defe ndant’s social history and prese nt c ondition, the ne ed for deter renc e, and the best interest of the defe ndant and the public. State v. G oode, 956 S .W.2d 521, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Another appropriate fa ctor for

a trial c ourt to consider in de termining whether to gr ant probation is a defendant’s cre dibilit y or lac k there of, as this ref lects on the defe ndant’s potential for

reha bilitation. I d.
I n this matter, it is clear that, in denying pr obation, the trial court considere d the relevant fac ts, c ircumstance s, and sentenc ing principles; and, thus, its findings as to the se ntence are entitled to a pre sumption of corre ctness. In denying pr obation, the court found that the def endant h ad not been candid as to the fac ts of the incident but had, in fac t, “place [d] the re sponsibili ty for the se x ual c on ta c t onthe fi ve y e ar- oldvic tim .” As we ha ve se t ou t, a de fe nd a nt’ s la c k o f c a nd or re fl e c ts o n h is potential for r ehabilitation. Further, a ccor ding to the r eport from Counseling a nd Consultation S e r v i c e s , t h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s “ l a c k

o f f u l l d i s c l o s u r e i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a p o o r tr e a t m e n to u t c o m e . ” In essenc e, the de fendant simpl y disag ree s with the weig ht whi ch the trial court affor ded the-5-

enhanc ement and mitig ating fac tors. Howeve r, it is within the discretion of the tria l court as to the weig ht to be aff

orded the fac tors. State v. Bog g s, 932 S.W .2d 467, 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

. We conclude that the rec ord ea silysupports the trial court’s determination that the defe ndant did not establish that he wa s a fa vorable candidate for pr obation.
CO NC LU SION
Fo r t h e f o re go i n g re as o n s , we af

fi rm t h e t ri al co u rt ’s d en i al o f a l t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE