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78–620 PDF 2003

S. Hrg. 107–383

THE ROLE OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL

ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IN CONTROLLING THREATS FROM THE PROLIFERATION

OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND

FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST AND SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 7, 2001

CURRENT AND FUTURE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

PROLIFERATION THREATS

NOVEMBER 14 AND 29, 2001

COMBATING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

(WMD) WITH NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS: NONPROLIFERATION

ASSISTANCE COORDINATION ACT OF 2001

FEBRUARY 12, 2002

MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES, WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES, AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

JULY 29, 2002

STRENGTHENING MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee

TED STEVENS, Alaska

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Staff Director and Counsel

HANNAH S. SISTARE, Minority Staff Director and Counsel

DARLA D. CASSELL, Chief Clerk

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION AND FEDERAL SERVICES

SUBCOMMITTEE

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

MAX CLELAND, Georgia

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

TED STEVENS, Alaska

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director

MITCHEL B. KUGLER, Minority Staff Director

BRIAN D. RUBENS, Chief Clerk

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Opening statements: Page

Senator Akaka ................................................................................ 1, 31, 59, 93, 121

Senator Cleland ............................................................................................ 2, 40, 60

Senator Cochran........................................................................... 12, 34, 72, 98, 122

Senator Domenici ............................................................................................. 32

Senator Carnahan ............................................................................................ 75

Senator Thompson ............................................................................................ 94

Prepared statement:

Senator Carnahan, November 14, 2002 .......................................................... 52

WITNESSES

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2001

Michael L. Moodie, President, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute ........................................................................................................................ 4

Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D., Director, Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of

International Studies ........................................................................................... 6

Rose Gottemoeller, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace ..................................................................................................................... 9

Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. General

Accounting Office ................................................................................................. 20

Richard T. Cupitt, Associate Director, Center for International Trade and

Security ................................................................................................................. 22

James A. Lewis, Senior Fellow and Director of Technology Policy, Center

for Strategic and International Studies ............................................................. 24

Gary Milhollin, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control .............. 26

WENDESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2001

Hon. Chuck Hagel, a U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska .......................... 35

Ms. Gary L. Jones, Director of Nuclear and Nonproliferation Issues, Natural

Resources and the Environment, U.S. General Accounting Office .................. 38

Laura S.H. Holgate, Vice President for Russia Newly Independent States

Programs, Nuclear Threat Initiative .................................................................. 41

Leonard S. Spector, Deputy Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,

Monterey Institute of International Studies ...................................................... 43

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 2001

Vann H. Van Diepen, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau

of Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State .................................................. 62

Marshall S. Billingslea, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Negotiation Policy, U.S. Department of Defense ............................................... 65

Kenneth E. Baker, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Defense

Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration ............ 69

Matthew S. Borman, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce .............................................................. 72

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2002

Elisa D. Harris, Research Fellow, Center for International and Security Studies .......................................................................................................................... 96

Amy E. Smithson, Ph.D., Director, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project, Henry L. Stimson Center ................................................. 99

Page

IV

Jim Walsh, Ph.D., Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University ......................................................................................................................... 101

Dennis M. Gormley, Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies .......................................................................................................................... 106

MONDAY, JULY 29, 2002

Vann H. Van Diepen, Director, Office of Chemical, Biological and Missile

Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State ...................................................... 123

Marshall S. Billingslea, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 127

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Baker, Kenneth E.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 69

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 290

Billingslea, Marshall S.:

Testimony ..........................................................................................................65, 127

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 279, 346

Borman, Matthew S.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 72

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 296

Christoff, Joseph A.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 20

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 178

Cupitt, Richard T.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 22

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 196

Gormley, Dennis M.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 106

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 322

Gottemoeller, Rose:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 171

Hagel, Hon. Chuck:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 35

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 219

Harris, Elisa D.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 96

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 298

Holgate, Laura S.H.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 41

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 233

Jones, Ms. Gary L.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 38

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 223

Lewis, James A.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 24

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 206

Milhollin, Gary:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 26

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 212

Moodie, Michael L.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 145

Smithson, Amy E., Ph.D.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 99

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 304

Spector, Leonard S.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 43

Prepared statement with attachments ........................................................... 245

Tucker, Jonathan B., Ph.D.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6

Prepared statement with an attached table ................................................... 155

Page

V

Van Diepen, Vann H.:

Testimony ........................................................................................................ 62, 123

Prepared statement ...................................................................................... 268, 331

Walsh Jim, Ph.D.:

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 101

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 313

APPENDIX

Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware, November 29, 2001, prepared statement ....................................................................... 90

Information submitted for the record by Mr. Billingslea entitled ‘‘Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency’’ ....... 355

Copy of S. 673 .......................................................................................................... 369

S. 673—Section by Section Analysis ...................................................................... 377

USEC Inc., Executive Agent for the U.S. Government Implementing the

Megatons to Megawatts Program, prepared statement, November 14, 2002 . 379

Appendix ——: Current and Future Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Proliferation Threats ........................................................................................... 387

Appendix ——: Background on Non-proliferation Assistance Programs ............ 396

Appendix ——: Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes ........................................ 414

Questions submitted for the Record by Senator Akaka with answers from:

Mr. Christoff ..................................................................................................... 417

Mr. Cupitt ......................................................................................................... 420

Mr. Lewis .......................................................................................................... 423

Mr. Milhollin ..................................................................................................... 425

Mr. Billingslea .................................................................................................. 427

Mr. Borman ....................................................................................................... 429

Ms. Harris ......................................................................................................... 430

Ms. Smithson .................................................................................................... 435

Mr. Walsh .......................................................................................................... 441

Mr. Gormley ...................................................................................................... 459

Mr. Van Diepen ................................................................................................ 466

Questions submitted for the Record by Senator Cleland with answers from:

Ms. Harris ......................................................................................................... 434

Ms. Smithson .................................................................................................... 440

Mr. Gromley ...................................................................................................... 457

Questions submitted for the Record by Senator Thompson with answers from:

Mr. Van Diepen ................................................................................................ 472

Mr. Billingslea .................................................................................................. 485

(1)

CURRENT AND FUTURE WEAPONS OF

MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROLIFERATION

THREATS

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 2001

U.S. SENATE,

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION,

AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel Akaka,

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Akaka, Cleland, Carper, Cochran, Stevens, and

Thompson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee will please come to order. I

welcome my friend, Senator Cleland, and our first panel.

Today’s hearing about export controls and weapons of mass destruction is not a new topic for this Subcommittee. Senator Cochran, our distinguished Ranking Member and good friend, also held

hearings on export controls when he chaired this Subcommittee. It

is not a partisan issue. I think it is fair to say that our witnesses

today, who are all noted experts on the subject of proliferation and

export controls, reflect the bipartisan nature of this discussion.

Since September 11, however, developing an effective approach to

controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction to both state

and non-state actors has taken a new urgency. The terrorists of the

21st Century are not intent on using one bullet to assassinate political leaders, as did the lone Serbian nationals who triggered the

First World War at the beginning of the last century with the

shooting of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Twenty-first Century

terrorists strive to cause the maximum amount of damage to the

maximum number of innocent people. Their weapons of choice are

amazingly simple and astoundingly deadly. But they are still the

few against the many.

As one of our witnesses today notes, contemporary terrorists

have a mystical fascination with chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. Osama bin Laden and his followers would use

these weapons to harm us all without regard to age, gender, or nationality. Men, women, and children from over 50 nations died on

September 11. We cannot forget this fact as we prepare for future

2

conflicts during the rest of this century, which has begun as sadly

as the last.

The technology that has made us rich, however, also threatens

to be the technology that destroys us. High-speed computers, Internet access, dual-use materials, equipment, and know how are essential ingredients of these simple but deadly devices. Unfortunately, we know from sad experience with the recent anthrax attacks that these threats are real.

Our hearing is about how we can prevent more laboratories with

dangerous weapons capabilities from being developed. Some might

argue that it is too late. Technology is loose. Dual-use items are too

difficult to control, or trying to control dual-use exports will only

hinder our own economy.

I do not think we have the luxury of indulging in any of those

arguments anymore. Our enemies are using our own technology

and our own open society against us.

We cannot declare war against international terrorism while saying at the same time that we should conduct business as usual.

There is no more time for business as usual. We need to examine

every aspect of our society to see how we can harden ourselves

against terrorist attack and we need to examine every aspect of our

international transactions to see how we can inhibit our enemies

from gaining technologies to use against us.

In World War II, export controls were not ‘‘dirty words.’’ They

were an essential part of our defense. In today’s war, there is also

a role for export controls because if we do not do everything we can

do to deter our enemies from gaining deadly weapons, then we all

will pay the ultimate price in our own backyards. This is the terrible message from today’s terrorists.

This hearing is an effort to start identifying those technologies

and the means to prevent them from hurting us later.

I am pleased to welcome my colleague, Senator Cleland, and ask

him for an opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and

members of our panel, thank you for coming. I am pleased that this

Subcommittee is addressing this critical issue today and that we

are further scheduled to address the Nonproliferation Assistance

Coordination Act next week.

I note that a dear friend of mine, former Senator Sam Nunn, in

his recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee

called once again for enhancing the cooperative threat reduction

measures that he helped put in place several years ago. I strongly

support such action. There is no more important topic for our national security than addressing the threat posed by proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction. I have long advocated a comprehensive national strategy for dealing with this threat and I believe

that our strategy must be based on the likelihood of each type of

incident as well as on our vulnerability to it.

For many years, I have argued that we were too focused on low

probability, high-tech threats and not focused enough on high probability, low-tech threats. Regardless of the threat, I am convinced

3

that we must enhance the mechanisms for coordinating our response to WMD.

Coordination is essential. It is my conviction that we must better

coordinate the efforts of all players that led me to develop legislation I am introducing today, the Public Health Emergencies Accountability Act. This act puts in place a procedure that allows

clear assignment of responsibility in cases where the public health

is threatened. It further mandates the exchange of information between institutions primarily responsible for public health, such as

the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and those primarily responsible for countering criminal and terrorist activities.

We must also resource these agencies to enable them to carry out

this essential coordination. Coordination is particularly important

in the tough areas where the lines of responsibility and definition

blur.

This hearing addresses another such arena, the dual-use technologies that lie at the heart of chemical, biological, even nuclear

infrastructures that exist around the world today. To achieve the

necessary coordination, we must tackle the hard questions that

arise when talking about technologies that provide legitimate commercial opportunities, but which in the wrong hands can also mask

potential threats.

It is no longer enough to throw up our hands and walk away

from the table when the establishment and enforcement of necessary counterproliferation protocols conflicts with legitimate commercial interests. We have got to find a way to strike a balance

that allows commercial enterprises a reasonable degree of autonomy while ensuring the greater public good is not compromised.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your statement, Senator. Senator

Stevens.

Senator STEVENS. I have no statement, Senator. I wish I could

stay longer. I am just here for a little while. Thank you very much.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for being here.

We are glad to have our panel this morning. I am pleased to welcome you. Dr. Moodie is co-founder and President of the Chemical

and Biological Arms Control Institute and former Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Dr. Jonathan Tucker is Director of the Chemical and Biological

Nonproliferation Program and was a member of the biological

weapons inspection team in Baghdad, Iraq, with the United Nations Special Commission.

Ms. Rose Gottemoeller is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She holds a joint appointment,

the Russian and Eurasian program and global policy program, and

is former Deputy Under Secretary for Defense, Nuclear Nonproliferation, in the U.S. Department of Energy and former Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and National Security.

I would like to at this time, before I call on Dr. Moodie, to yield

to Senator Thompson for any statement he may have.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have any

statement to give. I am looking forward to hearing the testimony

of these fine witnesses. This is, of course, a continuation of a series

4

1The prepared statement of Mr. Moodie appears in the Appendix on page 145.

of hearings that this Committee and Subcommittee has had for a

long time on this subject, and, of course, it is much more timely

now in a lot of people’s minds than it has been in times past, but

I commend you for keeping the spotlight on this important area.

Hopefully, people will now pay attention. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.

Dr. Moodie, we welcome any opening statement you may have.

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL L. MOODIE,1 PRESIDENT, CHEMICAL

AND BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL INSTITUTE

Mr. MOODIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate

the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee as it addresses

this very important topic.

In the summary of my statement, in the few minutes that I have,

I would like briefly to address three interrelated issues, the need

for better threat assessments, the linkage between state and nonstate threats, and the need for a strategic response in which export

controls continue to play an important role. My remarks today will

focus on the chemical and especially the biological weapons threats.

My starting point is the recommendation of the Gilmore Commission that we must improve our threat assessments. This is true not

only with respect to the chemical and biological terrorism threat,

but also for the challenge of proliferation at the state level. Traditionally, threat assessments have been overly simplistic. They have

tended to focus on only a single factor, such as the agent that

might be used or the motivations of the state or terrorist who

might use them. In addition, these more simple threat assessments

have emphasized vulnerabilities rather than genuine risks, which

are a combination of vulnerability and likelihood.

But conducting more complex threat assessments is not easy. It

demands good intelligence and creative analysis. But better threat

assessments would do three things. First, they would describe a

threat envelope that identifies the most plausible contingencies.

Second, they would provide a means to identify those contingencies that require hedging in that due to the severity of their

consequences, some preparation for them should be undertaken

even if they are relatively unlikely, and this combination of a plausible threat envelope and the hedging contingencies should give to

policy makers some measure for making decisions regarding policy

priorities and resource allocations.

Third, a good threat assessment will highlight the fact that the

threat is not uni-dimensional, rather that it is composed of several

elements, including the actor, his motivations, intentions regarding

casualties and capabilities, the agent involved, the target, and

issues regarding the mode of attack and other operational considerations.

The key to a successful threat assessment is disaggregating the

threat into these component elements and assessing the possibilities that various combinations of them produce. Some combinations

of factors will yield significant consequences, others will produce no

consequences at all.

5

This approach to threat assessment leads to important conclusions that should inform policy decisions. First, the degree of risk

declines as the level of desired casualties increases insofar as the

contingency involving higher levels of casualties become less likely.

Second, we should not take great comfort from this conclusion because, despite the low probability of catastrophic attacks in the

United States, there is still ample cause for concern because we do

not know how massive a mass attack has to be. Worst case scenarios need not happen to stress the response system to the point

of collapse. Moreover, the danger and harm inherent in the use of

chemical and especially biological weapons is not limited to physical casualties. As we have seen with the anthrax attacks, psychological impacts and social and economic disruption are also potentially severe.

Third, the events of September 11 and subsequent anthrax attacks suggest that the connections between state and non-state actors warrant increased attention. Analysts have tended to conceptualize and address the state CBW proliferation challenge and

chemical and biological terrorism along separate tracks.

Today, the distinction between war and terrorism has become

blurred and they have become inextricably linked. Our adversaries

have declared war on the West and the United States in particular

and they are using terrorist tactics as part of their campaign. We

confront an adversary that is not necessarily a State, although it

might be, but nevertheless has chemical and terrorism weapons potential, at a minimum.

As this war unfolds, then, the United States may find itself at

war against one or more chemical and biological armed adversaries, whether a state or non-state. How do they think about the

strategic and tactical utility of such weapons? Saying that chemical

and biological capabilities will be part of an asymmetric strategy

of either a state or a terrorist is not enough. Different strategic

goals point to different chemical and biological weapons uses and

a number of possibilities, each of which has both a limited and an

ultimate form, suggest themselves as examples.

One, the desire to generate fear among the U.S. population, ultimately pushing such fear to the point that it raises questions about

the integrity of U.S. society.

Second, slowing military action or ultimately crippling U.S. strategies that depend on power projection and coalition warfare.

Or third, disrupting the U.S. economy or ultimately undermining

it by attacking such critical components as the agricultural sector,

a threat that I believe has received insufficient attention, or the financial centers of the country. The willingness of terrorists or

states to resort to chemical or biological capabilities depends on

these kinds of strategic objectives, and our response depends, in

part, on understanding what those strategic objectives might be.

What does this approach to defining the threat suggest about the

needs for responding effectively? First, that because the threat is

a multi-dimensional one and a complex one, an effective response

must be strategic in nature, one that addresses requirements that

span a spectrum from deterrence through prevention, defense, and

preparedness to responses.

6

1The prepared statement of Mr. Tucker with an attached table appears in the Appendix on

page 155.

To perform each of these strategic missions effectively, difficult

challenges must be overcome. Effective responses, for example,

whether on the battlefield or in terms of homeland defense, demand meeting both short-term needs, such as adapting military

concepts of operations or upgrading the Public Health System, and

long-term measures, including an effective research and development program.

Second, a strategic response is also a multi-faceted response. A

range of tools must be exploited. These include intelligence, defenses, both active and passive, diplomacy, legal measures, preparedness, financial measures, military options, and arms control.

Each of these tools of policy contributes something to an effective

response to the CBW proliferation challenge, but each tool has

shortcomings that must be overcome and none of them constitutes

a silver bullet that provides the total answer.

In this context, export controls have an important role to play,

but it is not necessarily the traditional contribution of the past. Export control regimes can be effective in delaying the acquisition of

sensitive technologies by a committed proliferator. But in the

longer term, they cannot realistically be expected to stop the transfer of technology that may be used for weapons purposes, particularly since so much of that technology also has legitimate commercial medical and other uses.

This does not mean that export controls should be abandoned.

They perform other functions. Regulation through export controls,

for example, facilitates the global dissemination of materials and

equipment. By defining the rules of the game by which companies

must abide, for example, export controls make it easier for those

companies to engage in international trade and cooperation.

It is this kind of newly defined role for export controls that

should be emphasized in the future. At the same time, the United

States must maintain open markets and avoid neo-protectionist

practices that deny or severely limit access to markets or appropriate technology which would make key states less inclined to pursue cooperative measures.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your statement.

Dr. Tucker, we welcome your statement.

TESTIMONY OF JONATHAN B. TUCKER, Ph.D.,1 DIRECTOR,

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. TUCKER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members

of the Subcommittee and guests, many thanks for the opportunity

to appear before you today on a topic of great importance and concern in the aftermath of September 11: The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons to states and terrorist organizations.

The recent series of anthrax attacks through the U.S. mail indicates that the global spread of dual-use technologies, materials,

and scientific know how relevant to the production and delivery of

7

1The table referred to by Mr. Tucker appear in the Appendix on pages 167–170.

chemical and biological weapons poses a clear and present danger

to U.S. national security.

The anthrax that was mailed to Senator Tom Daschle’s office

contained dried spores that were milled to an extremely fine powder and treated with chemical additives so they would readily become airborne and infect through the lungs. These facts suggest

that the perpetrators, whoever they are, had access to specialized

military technology and expertise related to the weaponization of

anthrax. Although to date the exposures have remained limited, a

large-scale attack by the chemical or biological agent against U.S.

targets at home or abroad is now a real possibility.

Because the senders of the anthrax-tainted letters may have received assistance from former weapons scientists or from a state

sponsor, it is important to assess which states possess chemical

and biological weapons capabilities and the extent to which trade

in dual-use materials and technologies contributes to clandestine

CBW programs. Evidence from open sources indicates that roughly

13 countries are actively seeking biological warfare capabilities and

closer to 20 are seeking chemical warfare capabilities. Proliferant

states of particular concern to the United States include Iraq, Iran,

Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. More information on statelevel proliferation is contained in a table attached to my written

testimony.1

Furthermore, over the past decade, sub-state groups have been

increasingly interested in acquiring chemical and biological weapons. The Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo, the Kurdistan

Workers’ Party, and bin Laden’s al Qaeda are only a few of the

groups actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

In recent years, the growing availability of dual-use technologies,

materials, information, and expertise associated with production

and delivery of chemical and biological weapons has exacerbated

the problem of CBW proliferation. Indeed, the relative ease of acquiring these weapons when compared to advanced conventional or

nuclear weapons has increased their attractiveness to states that

cannot afford more advanced weapons or are technically incapable

of developing them. Nearly all the materials and equipment used

to make chemical and biological weapons are dual-use, complicating the control, detection, and interdiction of proliferation-relevant exports.

Attempts to regulate trade in dual-use technologies to countries

of proliferation concern are extremely difficult. They face intense

opposition not only from non-aligned states that claim that such

controls are discriminatory, but also from international suppliers,

companies, and research institutes that benefit from the commercial sale and transfer of such technologies.

The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Australia Group, an

informal forum of 33 exporting counties, restrict trade in chemical

weapons precursors, dangerous biological pathogens, and certain

types of dual-use equipment. Even so, proliferant states have often

been successful in circumventing these controls by purchasing the

materials from unscrupulous suppliers and evading interdiction efforts by means of trans-shipment points and front companies.

8

Given the dual-use dilemma and the rapid diffusion of legitimate

chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industries around the

globe, strengthened dual-use export controls can buy time, but they

do not offer a long-term solution to the CBW proliferation problem.

Accordingly, export controls should be seen as one of a set of policy

tools for addressing the proliferation threat, together with active

interdiction efforts, passive and active defenses, strengthened consequence-management capabilities, cooperative threat reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union, and multilateral arms control.

Although the Bush Administration has taken a skeptical attitude

towards arms control, a strengthened international legal regime

banning the possession and use of these weapons, backed by a

credible threat of economic sanctions and military action against

violators, offers, in my view, the best hope of reversing the spread

of these heinous weapons.

Because of the dangerous precedent that has been set by the actual use of biological weapons against civilian targets in the United

States, it is vital for the international community to continue to

strengthen the existing international norm against possession and

use of chemical and biological weapons. Although the Chemical

Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention impose a blanket prohibition on such weapons, both regimes have serious weaknesses that undermine their effectiveness. Accordingly,

both regimes must be strengthened if they are to promote the

international norm of non-use and non-possession by states of concern, and by extension, sub-state actors, as well.

For example, the United States has repeatedly accused Iran, a

party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, of systematically violating its treaty obligations. To date, however, the United States

has failed to request a challenge inspection of Iran as permitted

under the Chemical Weapons Convention, undermining the credibility of this key element of the treaty’s verification regime.

With respect to the Biological Weapons Convention, the Bush Administration decided in July 2001, earlier this year, to withdraw

from a 6-year effort to negotiate a legally binding compliance regime. Although the administration has recently proposed an alternative package of voluntary measures, they appear insufficiently

intrusive or effective to deter violations or to enhance compliance

with the treaty. The administration should work with our European allies to make legally binding the proposed measure for investigation of alleged use of biological weapons and suspicious outbreaks of disease.

To achieve these goals, the United States should devote greater

political and financial capital to strengthening the Chemical and

Biological Weapons Conventions, make more effective use of existing treaty instruments, for example, by requesting a challenge inspection of Iran and other suspected violators, and seek to brand

the possession and use of chemical and biological weapons as a

crime against humanity under international law.

That concludes my oral testimony and I would be happy to answer your questions.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your testimony. Ms. Gottemoeller.

9

1The prepared statement of Ms. Gottemoeller appears in the Appendix on page 171.

TESTIMONY OF ROSE GOTTEMOELLER,1 SENIOR ASSOCIATE,

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you

for the honor of appearing today before the Subcommittee before

you and Senator Thompson.

Suddenly, the press is full of terrible scenarios of suitcase bombs

spewing detonation in the middle of the Golden Gate Bridge, a radiological bomb spreading plutonium over the White House, creating a ‘‘keep out’’ zone in central Washington that could last for

many years. After reading about threats such as these and scenarios such as these, many people are worried, so I commend the

Subcommittee for confronting these complex and difficult issues in

the search for new answers in export controls as in other areas.

A simple device of the Hiroshima design is actually not the easiest nuclear capability for a proliferator to acquire, be he a terrorist

or a rogue state actor. A simple device of this kind actually requires a large amount of nuclear material to achieve a nuclear explosion. We assume that 15 to 30 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, or three to four kilograms of plutonium are needed for a sophisticated nuclear device, and for a cruder device, a great deal

more material may be required.

For this reason, international proliferation policy has stressed

keeping nuclear material production and enrichment technologies

out of proliferators’ hands. Following the break-up of the Soviet

Union in 1991, the possibility that large amounts of weapons-usable material could be stolen from former Soviet nuclear facilities

has also become a major concern for nonproliferation policy worldwide. What would have been achieved through years of arduous

and expensive production, enrichment, and separation work, that

is, a sufficient amount of material to build a bomb, could be acquired in an instant through thievery.

Therefore, in the past decade, an enormous amount of attention

and significant U.S. dollars, $173 million in fiscal year 2001 alone,

have been spent on cooperating with Russia and the other states

in the region to enhance the physical protection of weapons-usable

material in facilities that house the Soviet weapons complex.

In contrast to bombs that would produce a nuclear detonation,

however, radiological weapons are a simpler capability for a

proliferator to acquire, if only because the threat in the case of a

radiological device exists across a wide spectrum. The spectrum

could range from a low-level nuclear waste package planted in an

urban location through a highly toxic nuclear material explosion in

the form of a dirty bomb, using conventional explosives to spread

material over a wide geographic area. At the very end of the spectrum could be an aircraft attack on a nuclear facility that would

turn the facility itself into a radiological weapon.

It is important to stress in looking at this spectrum the different

types of radioactive materials that might come into play in a radiological attack. Since 1993, the International Atomic Energy Agency

has tracked 175 cases of trafficking in nuclear materials and 201

cases of trafficking in radioactive materials. These are the kinds of

materials used for medical and industrial purposes.

10

Of all of these cases, only 18 involved small amounts of plutonium or highly-enriched uranium, the so-called weapons-usable

material that is required to make a nuclear bomb. But even a small

amount of low-level nuclear waste, if planted in an urban setting,

would have the potential to sow considerable panic unless authorities were quickly able to neutralize the incident in the public mind.

For that reason, I believe that quick action to analyze and clarify

for the public the nature of radiological threats should be an important goal of public policy in the current environment, whether here

in the United States or in other countries around the world where

such incidents might occur.

Now let me turn my attention quickly to nuclear and radiological

threats deserving more attention. In my view, we must now strike

a balance between the most dangerous nuclear threats and the less

lethal but profoundly disruptive radiological threats. I would like

to suggest in my spoken testimony today that we focus immediately

on four priorities as threats that would deserve more attention, and

I will pay a little more time on the radiological threat because I

think that is essentially a new priority coming to play now. But I

also wanted to note that given the demand on U.S. budgetary resources, we should also be considering new methods of funding

such projects, which I will specifically remark on, as well.

The four priorities that I would suggest are: Halting the production of weapons-grade plutonium in Russia; securing nuclear facilities that remain vulnerable in the former Soviet Union on a quick

fix, quick turnaround basis; closing down nuclear warhead production plants in Russia, that is, the production of warheads and

maintenance of warheads at plants in Russia; and improving the

security at nuclear reactors and other sites where lower-level, that

is, non-weapons-usable nuclear material is stored. I offer these four

in no particular order of priority. That is not a relative list, but I

do believe that all should be given serious and urgent attention.

Before I turn for a moment to the radiological priority, the fourth

on my list, I would like to mention a new kind of funding that I

think we should consider, given that there are many demands on

the U.S. budget at the present time. One good idea, I believe, has

already been suggested by Senators Biden and Lugar in some recent legislation, that is the so-called debt-for-security swaps. Under

this concept, we would forgive Soviet-era debts that the Russians

are holding in exchange for Russia putting more rubles into nonproliferation programs, and sir, I believe that should be an overall

priority for U.S. policy at this point, emphasizing urging Russia to

put more of their own budgetary resources into these important

programs.

Now let me say just a few words about my priority with regard

to improving security at nuclear reactors and other sites where

lower-level nuclear material is stored or used, because, as I mentioned at the outset, I believe it addresses the radiological threat

that has taken on new importance in the wake of September 11.

Traditionally, U.S. cooperation with the countries of the former

Soviet Union to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation have emphasized so-called higher-value nuclear materials and facilities,

sites associated with the weapons complex and especially with nuclear material that can be used in the manufacture of weapons. But

11

given that radiological threats have taken on new importance, programs should be emphasizing these particular kinds of threats, and

I believe that one simple step the United States could accomplish

would be to restore funds for international nuclear safety in the

Federal budget.

For nearly a decade, the United States has been working with

countries of the former Soviet Union to upgrade the safety of Soviet-built nuclear reactors and prevent another Chernobyl-style incident. This has been a largely successful program, and, in fact, the

permanent shut-down of the last unit at Chernobyl occurred in December of last year. For that reason, the program is slowly ramping

down, dropping from over $30 million in fiscal year 1999 to just

$10 million in fiscal year 2002. The program, I believe, could be

quickly ramped up in order to improve security at nuclear reactors

and other sites where low-level non-weapons-usable nuclear materials are stored, and these efforts could be undertaken not only in

Russia and the former Soviet Union but also other countries

around the world where such facilities are vulnerable.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I would like to note what I believe is

a potential important development in nuclear technology that will,

I think, impact in important ways on the future of export controls

with regard to nuclear systems. Increasingly, those who are engaged in nuclear technology development, particularly for electricity generation purposes, are interested in new approaches that

would limit the cross-over between peaceful uses of nuclear technology and the weapons sector.

They want to avoid the kind of situation that has been inherent,

for example, in the Soviet Union, where the Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk reactors produced plutonium for the weapons system at

the same time they were producing heat and electricity for the local

urban areas, and this continues today. In fact, the civilian use of

these reactors continues apace while these reactors are still pumping out plutonium that adds to stocks of plutonium available potentially for weapons purposes in Russia, although Russia, of course,

says that no longer they are used for that purpose.

For that reason, the nuclear industry today, and here and around

the world, is beginning to concentrate on developing so-called proliferation-resistant technologies, particularly in the reactor arena,

that will minimize the production of weapons-usable material in

their cycles. Ideally, proliferation-resistant reactors, for example,

would burn plutonium, dispose of plutonium, rather than breeding

it.

Although such reactors may be 20 years or more from commercial application, I think it is important that there is a new strategic

approach developing in the nuclear industry. The industry is emphasizing proliferation-resistance along with other attributes such

as minimization of nuclear waste and stringent design for safety

and security. If this trend develops successfully, it will simplify the

export control problem for nuclear technologies, and, in fact, may

also prove to be the best way to fulfill the promise of peaceful nuclear uses under the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Thank you, sir, for this opportunity.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your statement.

12

I would like to yield to the Ranking Member and friend, Senator

Cochran, for any statement. Following his statement and before the

questions, I am going to ask that we recess. There is a vote that

is on now that is on the floor, and then we will be back shortly.

Senator Cochran.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I congratulate you for organizing and calling this hearing. It is a very

important subject for us to learn as much as possible about.

I wonder, while we are over voting, whether the panelists can be

thinking about whether the recent experiences that we have had

with the anthrax attacks have led them to reach any new conclusions about the proliferation of bioterrorism capabilities and what,

if anything, we should plan to do about it.

One of the major efforts that we have made is to reach agreements with other countries to try to prevent the export of weapons

or technologies that could be made into weapons of mass destruction, especially in the chemical and biological area. Do you think

any of these agreements can serve as guides for the future and

have we prevented any terrorist acts or activities by reason of

these conventions and agreements that countries have joined to use

as a way to combat proliferation of weapons, particularly the

Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention? Have they kept states or terrorist groups from acquiring

weapons of mass destruction?

Mr. Chairman, I think, since we have jurisdiction over the proliferation subject, it is certainly important for us to begin a set of

hearings on this subject and I congratulate you for leading that effort.

Senator AKAKA. As I mentioned, you have worked on this before

in this Subcommittee and we are still continuing this.

We all have questions for you, and I would ask that we recess

and come back to ask you the questions. In the meantime, I want

to say that your full statements will be printed in the record. Are

there any further comments before we recess?

[No response.]

Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee recesses.

[Recess.]

Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee will be in order.

I want to thank you again for your testimony. I am impressed

with the work you have accomplished on nonproliferation issues.

Let me begin with some questions for Dr. Moodie, and you mentioned this, so I am asking the question about this. I agree that the

threat of agriculture terrorism has been given little attention, as

you mentioned. Do you believe that USDA has access to the intelligence reports and information required to perform a full risk assessment of American agriculture?

Mr. MOODIE. Mr. Chairman, I do not know the inner workings

of the Department of Agriculture to be able to say exactly whether

they have access to that material or not. I do think that the appreciation of the agricultural dimension of this problem was slow in

developing, and therefore, the Department of Agriculture as a player in the development of our response was slow to come to the

13

table. As a consequence, I think they are still trying to establish

the kind of relationships among the other players, probably including the intelligence community, that they need to do the job that

they have to do.

So while I cannot be specific, my hunch would be that they probably need to improve their access, not just in terms of looking at

the information or the intelligence, but dealing with the intelligence community on an ongoing basis so that they have an ongoing, evolving appreciation of the nature of the challenge that they

confront.

Senator AKAKA. You suggest that smallpox is unlikely to be a

threat, if you would mention something about that again. Which

kinds of chemical and biological threats do you see as more likely

at this time?

Mr. MOODIE. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the

smallpox threat, I would put smallpox into that category within the

threat assessment that I talked about of contingencies against

which we have to hedge. Certainly, the consequences of a smallpox

attack are potentially so great that we have to have taken some

measure of preparation. But you can have a smallpox scenario that

either is—that is so horrific that it either causes policy paralysis

because it is too hard to do or that you put so much money against

it that you never have enough.

And I think that for those of you who are responsible for allocating limited resources, this kind of open-ended vulnerability assessment that has huge consequences is not the best scenario on

which to do your planning and to make the kinds of decisions with

respect to limited resources that you have to make. Having said

that, as I mentioned, I do think you have to get a hedge against

that possibility.

I think, though, that we have not necessarily, in our focus on

smallpox on anthrax, necessarily examined the full range of other

biological agents that have traditionally been examined as potential biological weapons, including hemorrhagic fevers, plague, tularemia, and things of that kind.

I also do not think that we have necessarily looked, especially on

the chemical side, looked at some of the low-tech threats. We have

been fascinated by the higher-end, VX, sarin, the nerve gases,

when, in fact, a contingency or a couple of contingencies that we

have not really looked at in as much detail as perhaps we should

are simple things like somebody hijacking a chlorine tanker and

blowing it up outside Wall Street or somebody trying on a deliberate basis to produce the kind of consequence at a chemical production facility that we saw in Bhopal, essentially a deliberate Bhopal that caused enormous loss of life. Those do not involve sophisticated or exotic agents, but they are the use of chemicals to create

mass disruption and potentially mass casualties.

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Tucker, in your testimony, you mentioned

that many developing countries have obtained or might develop

chemical and biological weapons capabilities as a result of foreign

investment by chemical and biotechnology industries. Just as we

have laws against bribery by American companies in the Foreign

Corrupt Practices Act, should we be considering restrictions on

American companies investing in certain countries?

14

Mr. TUCKER. I think we should with respect to countries of proliferation concern, though it may be difficult. If we do not invest

in such a country, it is very likely that our competitors will do so.

So the problem with unilateral U.S. action in this area is that we

can be very easily undercut by other countries, not only our allies,

but also countries that are not friendly to the United States but

that are increasingly investing in the developing world.

So that is why I view the utility of U.S. export controls with

some skepticism. I think this is a threat that has to be dealt with

in a multilateral context. We have the Australia Group, but it encompasses only 33 like-minded countries that export chemical or biological-relevant materials and equipment. But there are other

countries that are now in a position to provide equipment and materials to countries of proliferation concern, so it is a broader problem that we need to look at in a multilateral framework.

Senator AKAKA. You mentioned the Bush Administration several

times in your testimony. The Bush Administration has recently

made proposals to enhance the enforcement of the Biological Weapons Convention. You recently stated that these efforts are insufficient, since they would not be part of a treaty with rights and obligations. What other measures would you recommend the administration take in this area or in regard to other unilateral actions?

Mr. TUCKER. Well, I should say that the proposals by the Bush

Administration would be useful. I do not criticize them. I just do

not think they go far enough. For example, the idea of urging countries to pass uniform domestic laws that would regulate access to

dangerous pathogens to make sure that these materials are only

accessible to legitimate scientists and not terrorists or people who

would misuse these materials to make weapons, I think that is a

very desirable goal and should be encouraged.

But as you know, the United States withdrew in July from a 61⁄2- year effort to negotiate a formal treaty that would provide measures to enhance compliance and deter violations of the Biological

Weapons Convention. I do not think that the alternative U.S. proposals, at least as far as we know, will be effective. The details of

these measures have not been released yet, but from the press release that the White House released last week, it appears that

these measures are all voluntary, they are not legally binding, and,

hence, they really depend on the good will of the participating

countries.

My concern is, for example, if we set up a mechanism to investigate alleged use of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of

disease and if this is done, let us say, within the context of the

United Nations but not in a treaty context, then any country that

is accused could simply refuse access to the investigation team. It

would have no legally binding obligation to grant access to the inspectors or investigators to determine that it is, in fact, in compliance or noncompliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

So my concern about the Bush Administration approach is that

it is too weak, and clearly, we are facing a real threat. These anthrax attacks have made it very clear that this is not a hypothetical threat, that this is a real threat. The actual use of anthrax

against civilians is challenging the norm that has existed for many,

many years and we must reinforce that norm. If we do not, then

15

I think a growing number of states and terrorist groups will be attracted to these weapons and we will face a much more serious proliferation problem in the future.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Ms. Gottemoeller, you mentioned the

danger of a terrorist developing a so-called dirty bomb using nuclear waste. There are about 440 nuclear reactors in the world and

countless facilities with other types of nuclear materials. What

should we be doing now to secure those plants or to monitor their

use so terrorists cannot take them? Do we need a new international

agency or a new agreement?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, I think the International Atomic Energy

Agency already has responsibility for many related types of missions and the Director General of the IAEA, Mr. el Baradei, called

last week for enhanced funding for surveillance of nuclear sites

around the world, nuclear reactor and research sites, related industrial sites, as you have stated. So I think for certain missions, certainly, there is already an international agency well experienced in

this arena. I do not think we need to create anything new.

I do think that we need to set some priorities. I mentioned that

the IAEA would like to enhance its capability for surveillance of

threats around plants. I think we also need to pay attention to

those research reactors, for example, where the highest level of nuclear material is currently stored. Few people know, for example,

that there is a research reactor at Belgrade where not so long ago

U.S. bombs were dropping in the vicinity, and at that site is stored

a significant amount of highly enriched uranium to fuel that reactor.

So I think it is important to look at some of the higher-priority

sites in order to get that material out of there. I would urge for Soviet-built research reactors in Eastern Europe, for example, that

such materials be moved back to Russia and down-blended so they

no longer pose such a proliferation threat in the future.

And then in regard to the radiological threats that I mentioned,

again, you do point to a good fact, sir, and that is there is an enormous number of sites around the world where such materials

might be stored or used in one way or another. So it does require

some prioritization, as well, but I think particularly with regard to

training of facility operators and some other perhaps lower-cost options, there are ways to proceed that would not cost an enormous

amount but could overall increase and improve the security at

these sites.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Carper is here. I would yield

to the Senator for any statement or questions.

Senator CARPER. I have no statement, but a question or two, if

I could, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome one and all. I am glad you are here and thank you. Obviously, I have missed your statements, and I would just ask, if I

could, for each of you just to maybe take a minute and share with

me, with respect to the issues that are before us today, what

should the Congress be doing? What is our appropriate role? Dr.

Moodie, we will start with you, if you will.

Mr. MOODIE. How much time do you have, Senator?

Senator CARPER. Well, I have about 5 minutes. The Chairman is

in a good mood.

16

Mr. MOODIE. I think, first of all, conceptually, we have to recognize that the problems we are dealing with with respect to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons are a single problem now. It is not the state problem on one hand and the terrorists

on the other. They are two sides of the same coin, and to begin

from that point.

Second, I think we have to focus on a strategic response that ensures that, first of all, all the tools we have in our toolbox—intelligence, diplomacy, defenses, military options, arms control, and export controls—each individual tool is as strong as it can be, but at

the same time that our strategy is one in which we allow those

tools to work together to achieve the same objective, not at cross

purposes, and that is not always an easy task.

Third, I think the Congress in terms of its own organization

should look at where it is. The Congress suffers from the same

problem the administration does in terms of the vast number of

people who are stakeholders in this and who have responsibility for

doing it, and just as the administration is being called on to

streamline their decision making processes with respect to some of

these issues, that Congress may take a look and streamline how it

does its business in this area, as well.

Senator CARPER. Good. Thanks very much. Dr. Tucker.

Mr. TUCKER. Yes. I would endorse everything that my colleague,

Michael Moodie, has said, and I would add that the United States

really cannot go it alone in the field of nonproliferation.

Senator CARPER. You said can or cannot?

Mr. TUCKER. Cannot go it alone in the field of nonproliferation.

I mean, we can enhance our defenses. We can improve our intelligence, develop better consequence management in case we are attacked, but if we are going to try to attack this problem at the

roots, we need to do it through multilateral instruments and mechanisms, including existing treaties that are in force, the Chemical

Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, that

are potentially useful tools but have been underutilized by the

United States.

For example, they have been underfunded. We have instruments

such as the opportunity to request challenge inspections of countries that we believe are violating the convention and we have not

used those instruments. And as a result, they——

Senator CARPER. Could I ask, why do you think that is?

Mr. TUCKER. I think there are a number of reasons, concern that,

for example, there might be a retaliatory challenge. If we challenge

Iran, which we have openly accused of violating the Chemical

Weapons Convention, they might challenge us back, and I think

there has been some concern about a harassing type inspection.

But I think we should be able to deal with that contingency—

there are mechanisms within the Chemical Weapons Convention to

manage access and to protect legitimate national security information and proprietary information, and there is a provision under

the treaty for a three-quarter majority of the Executive Council to

block a frivolous or abusive inspection request. If we make a compelling argument that a retaliatory challenge is, in fact, frivolous

and abusive, then it could be blocked.

17

I also think that there are some concerns that if we challenge a

country and the inspectorate does not come up with a ‘‘smoking

gun,’’ or very compelling evidence of a violation, then we will create

a false sense of security that country is in compliance. So I think

we have to lower the bar of expectation about what can be accomplished through challenge inspection.

But I still think it is a very powerful mechanism. Even if it does

not find a smoking gun, I think it can find a pattern of evidence

that is indicative of a treaty violation and it is probably the most

powerful instrument within the Chemical Weapons Convention

verification regime. If we do not make use of it, it will atrophy, lose

its credibility, and any deterrent effect it might have on would-be

violators.

Senator CARPER. Thank you, sir. Ms. Gottemoeller.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Senator, I believe that the Congress now

has both an opportunity and a responsibility to draw together the

struggle against international terrorism with regard to weapons of

mass destruction and are already establishing cooperation with

Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union to address

what we commonly call the ‘‘loose nukes’’ problem, but it also refers

to loose biological agents, and loose chemical agents, as well.

And I think up to this point, quite frankly, there has not been

sufficient attention to placing new resources to the service of this

particular fight against terrorism, that is, ensuring that all of these

weapons of mass destruction resources are safely and securely held

in facilities where they can be responsibly guarded by the countries

that currently own them or hold them in one way or the other.

I want to underscore, I believe that, in general, Russia is a responsible custodian, for example, of nuclear materials, but they are

short on resources to ensure that those materials do not go walking

out of those facilities and into the hands of those who might use

them as instruments of terror.

So I think the Congress really has an important role to play in

drawing together the counterterrorism struggle with our struggle

to ensure threat reduction in the nuclear, chemical, and biological

arena.

Senator CARPER. Great. Thank you. Thanks to each of you. Mr.

Chairman, thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your questions.

I have further questions. Dr. Moodie, we have been talking about

multilateral arms control and you mentioned that classic multilateral arms control such as the Chemical Weapons Convention is unlikely to yield significant results. So my question to you is, how

would you strengthen the CWC, and just as importantly, what

would you propose in terms of new multilateral approaches?

Mr. MOODIE. Mr. Chairman, my comment really was to the biological side, and to me, the Chemical Weapons Convention is classical arms control and I think it is appropriate for dealing with the

chemical weapons problem. I had the good fortune, I guess it is, to

have worked on negotiating the Chemical Weapons Convention

during the administration of the former President Bush and I think

that we accomplished something in that.

But I think to take the same approach in the biological area is

not going to accomplish what we were able to do in the chemical

18

area because I think the chemical problem and the biological problem are quite different and the politics and the science and technology and the language of the treaty that surround the biological

side, to me are so complex that classic arms control is not the way

to go forward.

I think what we have to do is redefine the problem and redefine

the environment within which solutions can be found, and what I

mean by that is to take it out of being a classic security arms control problem, but define the biological weapons as part of a broader

challenge that has to do with the appropriate use of the life

sciences to serve the public safety and security and to create an environment in which the misuse of that science is diminished to the

point that you can manage. It includes not just biological weapons

but other kinds of challenges that we have in looking at where the

incredibly rapid advances in the life sciences are going to be going

in the next two decades.

I think that if we approach the problem from that redefinition,

that we will, in fact, find more acceptable mechanisms for dealing

with the problem. One of the issues, for example, in the arms control approach and the protocol negotiations that was mentioned

earlier was a difficult relationship between industry and the negotiators and the role of industry in this. I think if we set the problem on a different footing, we will have a different basis in which

to engage industry to ensure that their contribution in this area,

because they are such a driver of the science and technology at this

point, that if we redefine the problem in that way, we will have a

better basis for engaging industry in looking at solutions.

So I think some of the measures that the Bush Administration

has proposed to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention

move in this direction. I think they provide a basis for moving forward. They are not the total answer. They are not where we want

to go or should go. But I think they give us a starting point for that

kind of redefinition of the problem that will yield some more creative solutions.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you so much for that. There is a need to

review these and come out with other solutions.

Dr. Tucker, you just stated that export controls buy time for diplomacy but do not offer a long-term solution. Are there any

changes to our current export control policies you would advocate?

Mr. TUCKER. Well, I think some of the controls probably could be

made more targeted on technologies that are really critical, that

provide bottlenecks to the acquisition of chemical and biological

weapons. Increasingly, of course, these technologies are becoming

widely available as they diffuse to more and more countries in the

developing world. So we have to identify those really key critical

technologies that are not widely available that are really still a monopoly of the highly-advanced countries and which by withholding,

we will place significant impediments in the path of proliferators.

So it may be a form of ‘‘smart’’ export controls or more targeted

export controls, which I think will be welcomed by industry because they will be less affected by more targeted controls. That will

require quite a bit of thought, because it is the conventional wisdom that this technology is all dual-use. That is not strictly true.

There are some specialized technologies and certain types of pathoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
19

gens, for example, weaponized pathogens, whose access should be

very tightly restricted. So I think there is a need to rethink export

controls in a way to make them more targeted and, hence, more effective.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Ms. Gottemoeller, in your written testimony, I think you raised

a good point on the priorities we should take to prevent further

proliferation of nuclear material from the former Soviet Union.

Many are also concerned about the proliferation of nuclear expertise and know how. We are familiar with examples of nuclear scientists being offered substantial sums of money either to train others or to develop nuclear weapons.

The Subcommittee is going to hold a hearing on this subject next

week, but some would suggest that it is already too late. For example, there is no doubt Iran’s nuclear program being developed with

Russian assistance has a weapons component or potential. What

should we be doing to ensure that Iran complies with its Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty obligations?

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Sir, I hesitate to say what the future will

bring, but I would say the first step, if U.S. relations improve with

Iran, as there have been some hints recently in Washington they

may improve, I think the first step we should undertake is to take

up these issues directly with Tehran.

We have been working this issue through and with Moscow. It

has been a difficult issue. Apparently, President Putin in an interview that will appear this evening on television has denied pretty

firmly that there is any official Russian government involvement in

nuclear technology trade with Iran. Well, I think we have long felt

that it is not a matter of an official Russian government policy, but

that there are some organizations in Russia that are perhaps not

paying the attention to export control laws that they should be paying attention to, first of all. And second of all, I believe there is also

disagreement among some Russian experts about the danger inherent in particular dual-use technologies, and so there is a disagreement and discussion between the United States and Russia in that

regard.

I believe we should continue very vigorously to pursue these

issues with Russia and I hope that we will do so at the upcoming

Washington Crawford Summit. But I believe in addition to that

that should our relationship improve with Iran, this is something

we need to take up directly with the Iranians, as well.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Carper do you have any further questions?

Senator CARPER. No, I do not.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Thank you, Dr. Moodie,

Dr. Tucker, and Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you for all of your testimony and for your cooperation, also. Some of what you said will

certainly be helpful to us in what we are trying to do here. So

thank you again and you may be excused.

Mr. MOODIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TUCKER. Thank you.

Ms. GOTTEMOELLER. Thank you, sir.

20

1The prepared statement of Mr. Christoff with attachments appears in the Appendix on page

178.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. I just received a call that there is another vote on, but I want to prepare for the second panel and ask

the second panel to come forward, please.

The Subcommittee will be in recess.

[Recess.]

Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee will be in order.

Thank you, Mr. Christoff, Dr. Cupitt, Dr. Lewis, and Dr.

Milhollin for being part of our second panel, and at this time, I invite you to make any statement or comments you wish, beginning

with Mr. Christoff.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH A. CHRISTOFF,1 DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am pleased to be

here today to discuss the efforts of the United States and the international community to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Historically, the United States has used four important tools to

combat WMD proliferation: International treaties, multilateral export control arrangements, U.S. export control laws, and security

assistance to other countries. My bottom line is that each tool is

important to U.S. nonproliferation policy, but each tool has limitations, and I would like to briefly describe and comment on each of

these tools.

First, the international community has established treaties to

eliminate chemical and biological weapons and prohibit the spread

of nuclear weapons. Three treaties are of particular importance, the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention. These

treaties share similar objectives. They are legally binding and they

include most countries. However, their effectiveness depends on the

mechanisms for verifying and enforcing them and the integrity of

those countries party to them. For example, the Biological Weapons

Conventions lacks the inspection and enforcement provisions that

might have detected the Soviet Union’s massive biological weapons

program in the 1970’s and the 1980’s.

Limitations in membership also constrain the effectiveness of

these treaties. Key states remain outside the treaties. For example,

India, Israel, and Pakistan are not party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, while Iraq and Syria have not signed the

Chemical Weapons Convention.

The second tool for controlling sensitive technologies is multilateral export control arrangements. Both the Executive and Legislative Branches have affirmed support for strengthening these arrangements. However, their effectiveness has been challenged in

recent years.

As part of GAO’s ongoing work on these arrangements, we are

examining the following important questions. Does the voluntary

nature of these arrangements and the dependence on member nations to impose export control limits affect their effectiveness? Do

21

member nations abide by their commitments to refrain from exporting items other members have denied? How do member nations

share information about their export decisions? And how do the arrangements ensure that non-member nations do not transfer sensitive technologies to countries of concern?

The third tool is U.S. export control policy, which is intended to

constrain the transfers of WMD technology. In GAO’s past work,

we have identified problems with U.S. policy. First, the Executive

Branch has not assessed national security risks for important dualuse items, such as high-performance computers and semi-conductor

technologies.

Second, the government does not adequately screen proposed recipients of sensitive U.S. technologies. For example, the government does not always have complete intelligence information on license applicants who may serve as fronts for proliferators or terrorists.

And third, the government cannot always ensure that recipients

of sensitive technologies comply with the conditions of the license.

This is most important in countries of concern, such as China,

which restrict U.S. officials’ access to facilities that house U.S.

technologies.

And finally, the fourth tool is the security assistance to other

countries that we provide, most importantly to the former Soviet

Union. At the time of its collapse, the Soviet Union had, by some

estimates, 30,000 nuclear weapons, 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, and an extensive biological weapons program. The collapse

also left 30,000 to 75,000 Soviet weapons scientists without fulltime employment.

Since 1991, the United States has helped Russia eliminate and

secure weapons of mass destruction and provide part-time employment to former Soviet scientists. U.S. efforts have helped make

large quantities of WMD-related materials more secure and they

have supplemented the incomes of several thousand former Soviet

scientists.

However, it has been difficult to assess the effectiveness of these

programs, which have cost about $5.5 billion since 1991. Russian

officials continue to limit U.S. access to certain WMD facilities. In

addition, the part-time employment provided by the United States

may not necessarily deter Russian scientists from selling their

weapons knowledge to rogue states or terrorists.

So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the events of the past 2 months

provide the impetus for reexamining all these tools that are used

to restrict the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Ten years

ago, the international community made major changes in its controls over nuclear technology after revelations about the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. We may be at a similar point today. We

need to reassess the adequacy of our current policy tools to address

the vulnerabilities and the changed perceptions of the threat that

we currently face.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Christoff. Dr. Cupitt,

please?

22

1The prepared statement of Mr. Cupitt appears in the Appendix on page 196.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD T. CUPITT,1 ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SECURITY

Mr. CUPITT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate

you calling and organizing this hearing on what I think is a very

important topic. I have submitted some additional remarks that

represent my personal views on several of the broader export control questions raised by the Subcommittee staff, so I would like to

focus this testimony on some problems the U.S. Government will

face in coordinating nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls

with its allies and on some possible steps to address these difficulties.

Senator AKAKA. At this time, may I say that all of your full statements will be made part of the record.

Mr. CUPITT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The tragic events of the

last 2 months not only emphasize the need to reform the multilateral export control system, they have shaken the international community sufficiently, I believe, that reform initiatives may actually

succeed. So this is a moment of opportunity for us, because the importance of limiting the weapons of mass destruction capabilities of

terrorists and states that support international terrorism has never

been more clear.

Nonetheless, many of the same problems that plagued efforts to

improve multilateral coordination of proliferation-related export

control systems in the late 1990’s will hamper attempts to coordinate nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls now. Let me

mention five likely problem areas—and I will be happy to go into

detail about them perhaps in the question and answer period—and

then raise some possible responses to these problems.

First and foremost, there is a very weak infrastructure for coordinating nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls internationally. The Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime,

the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement, for

example, have pretty primitive methods and mechanisms for gathering and sharing information, resolving disputes, and enforcing

group norms.

Second, the list of sensitive anti-terrorism items appears to be

based mainly on delaying state-sponsored weapons of mass destruction programs and not with a view towards delaying or preventing

the development of non-state weapons of mass destruction programs.

Third, there are very divergent national nonproliferation antiterrorism export control systems now, even among key U.S. allies.

Fourth, there are divergent views on the targets of nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls.

And finally, there are very divergent approaches to industry-government cooperation on nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls.

Based on these concerns, I would like to take the opportunity to

recommend that the U.S. Government consider five steps in the

near term to begin to address these problems.

First, I think the U.S. Government should consider doing more

extensive assessments of foreign export control policies related to

23

nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls, starting with the

policies and programs of the G–8 and other key members of the

supplier arrangements. Frankly, we simply do not know enough. A

critical lack of information and analysis of these policies, as well

as broader export control policies, exists. We need to do more.

Second, the U.S. Government should consider providing more

funding, technical assistance, and critical information to help U.S.

partners implement and coordinate their intelligence, licensing,

and enforcement activities related to nonproliferation anti-terrorism export controls. This includes an increase in efforts and support for U.S. export control outreach programs worldwide. We do

have an extensive program through the Department of Commerce

and also the Department of Energy to do work in the former Soviet

Union and elsewhere and there has been some work now in China

and India, but it needs to be much more extensive in order to succeed—and the United States has to take the lead on this.

Third, the U.S. Government should consider creating priorities in

its list of items of greatest nonproliferation anti-terrorism concern

as a basis for international negotiations. It is not clear from our

current list of, for instance, dual-use items, which items are more

important than others to control for anti-terrorism purposes. There

are very few items that are controlled for anti-terrorism purposes

alone. For most of the others, it appears that if there is a requirement related to chemical, biological proliferation, nuclear nonproliferation, or missile proliferation, we just tack anti-terrorism on

to that as well, and I am not sure that that is an appropriate way

to address the problem. Some items may be more important to control than others, and if we do not see that, maybe some of our allies

will.

Fourth, the U.S. Government should also consider creating priorities for listed terrorists and terrorist organizations that pose the

greatest weapons of mass destruction threat as a basis for negotiations. I think one might start by differentiating among those individuals and entities on the specially designated terrorist list or the

foreign terrorist organizations list according to the weapons of

mass destruction risk they present.

Finally, I think the U.S. Government should consider creating

new standards for industry export control compliance programs, including certification of the substantive knowledge of export administrators regarding nonproliferation anti-terrorism controls. Export

administrators in several of the national laboratories, for example,

have expressed keen interest in certification as a means of ensuring the highest standards of compliance with nonproliferation export controls, and I think this would also hold true for related antiterrorism controls.

Again, let me thank the Subcommittee both for holding the hearing and for allowing me to present my views. Thank you very

much.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your statement. Mr. Lewis.

24

1The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis appears in the Appendix on page 206.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES A. LEWIS,1 SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. LEWIS. Let me thank you for the opportunity to testify on

this important subject. I think that since September 11, we have

an opportunity and a need for a new look at nonproliferation and

controlling export of technology.

Changes in international security and the global economy have

made export controls less effective in preventing technology transfer. In particular, technological change and economic integration

pose real challenges for both nonproliferation and counterterrorism.

This decline in effectiveness is less noticeable in the nonproliferation regimes because of their strength. The Missile Technology

Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers

Group have strong support from their members. They focus their

efforts on key proliferation technologies and they have good mechanisms for information exchange.

In contrast, there is another arrangement called the Wassenaar

Arrangement. It is ineffective. There is little consensus. This would

be a problem except for the fact that most of what Wassenaar controls is unimportant for nonproliferation purposes, and I think we

would get more benefit if we paid less attention to Wassenaar and

more attention to strengthening both our own national catch-all

controls and helping foreign countries strengthen their catch-all

controls, as well.

Another problem that we have with the export control debate in

the United States, Mr. Chairman, is that we have not spent enough

time perhaps looking at some of the larger problems. First, the rationale for nonproliferation export controls needs to be reexamined,

and hearings like this are very helpful in advancing the thinking

of the United States.

Export controls were designed, as many of my colleagues have

said, and it is amazing to me how, at least with the first panel and

I think some of the others, I will be repeating many of the things

they said, which is the problem for being last, but export controls

for nonproliferation were designed to make programs more costly

and to buy time for diplomacy. This worked very well for the last

10 years, but we are now facing a hard core of countries—Iraq,

Iran, and North Korea—where export controls are going to be very

less effective and we will need some new approach.

In addition to that level of problem, we face new problems with

non-state actors who seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

They pose a serious challenge to current nonproliferation controls,

which are aimed at countries and large government programs.

Nonproliferation is now more than an arms control problem that

can be approached in the traditional diplomatic and military context.

Export licensing will be less important for dealing with terrorist

organizations. Terrorists will not be applying for licenses and they

may not even try to export materials. A more plausible scenario is

that terrorists will attempt to acquire WMD-related materials in

25

the country where they intend to use them, bypassing all of our

current export control mechanisms.

For example, many of the previous speakers have noted the dangers of radiological weapons. While all countries have good export

controls on nuclear fuel, it is not clear that they have all taken the

necessary steps to safeguard this fuel from theft, and this includes

Western European countries. A terrorist organization could steal

spent nuclear fuel and use it to build radiological weapons.

Similarly, security measures at U.S. and foreign laboratories

may not be adequate to prevent the theft of dangerous biological

samples, and in this sense, internal security measures are important to nonproliferation as are export controls.

Nonproliferation must become part of the larger system of homeland defense and the response to terrorism that the administration

is building. Proliferation regimes can make an important contribution to this by identifying the key WMD-related items that need

additional safeguards and by coordinating effective security measures. Efforts to ensure that WMD does not fall into the hands of

terrorists must become part of the multilateral defense against terrorism, and the support we have received since September 11 could

be channeled into reinvigorating nonproliferation.

Let me just touch on one of the issues that your staff raised,

which is deemed exports. Making nonproliferation a part of the

larger counterterrorism and homeland defense effort has implications for deemed exports. Students coming to the United States to

study and do research have been a problem for proliferation here

and in other countries for many years. The important thing to realize is that the benefits we receive from having these people in the

United States probably outweighs the costs of any potential leak of

technology, and when I say this, I am reiterating a conclusion that

the Reagan Administration came to in its National Security Decision Directive 189.

The answer to deemed exports may lie less in export controls,

but thinking in terms of the larger approach to homeland security.

Immigration control is one of the most serious vulnerabilities revealed by September 11. All of the terrorists were able to enter the

United States, passing through multiple checkpoints both here and

in allied countries. Some sort of improved screening for people coming to the United States that included some nonproliferation criteria would probably be more useful than export licensing.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I think export controls can still

play a role in nonproliferation and national security, but this role

is shrinking. In looking at where we might want to move ahead,

it would help to reexamine the fundamental approach to nonproliferation export controls. It would be good to find ways to use

the strengths of the three nonproliferation regimes to support

homeland defense and counterterrorism. Deemed exports would

probably be better treated as part of a broader solution to screening immigrants. And finally, when we move ahead with building

export controls, picking up on what Dr. Moodie and Dr. Tucker

said, we probably should start with the lists and procedures of the

regimes, the use of catch-all controls, and improved immigration

procedures.

26

1The prepared statement of Mr. Milhollin with an attachment appears in the Appendix on

page 212.

I would like to thank you and I will be happy to take any questions.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Dr. Lewis. Dr. Milhollin.

TESTIMONY OF GARY MILHOLLIN,1 DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN

PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

Mr. MILHOLLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is both an honor

and a privilege to appear before this distinguished Subcommittee

and testify on this important topic.

I would like to address my remarks to four points: First, whether

export controls are succeeding in protecting our security; second,

whether they are now being weakened; third, whether violations

are being punished; and fourth, what could be done to make export

controls stronger.

First, it is very important to realize that export controls can

work if they are given a chance. There are success stories in the

world that export controls can claim. Argentina and Brazil decided

to give up nuclear weapons because, in large part, export controls

were imposing great costs on the development of those countries.

We know from U.N. inspections in Iraq that Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapon developers could not import certain parts. They had

to reverse engineer them, which took time and it is not even clear

that they worked. Also, export controls pretty much stopped Saddam Hussein’s most ambitious rocket program.

Today, export controls are slowing down India and Pakistan in

their efforts to miniaturize their warheads and to build more effective long-range missiles. As long as we have export controls that

work decently, that will be true in the future.

However, despite clear successes, American export controls are

now weaker than they have ever been in history. Since 1998, when

Saddam Hussein was building his mass destruction arsenal, export

controls in the United States have been cut about 90 percent.

Today, the Commerce Department is receiving about a tenth as

many applications as it received in the late 1980’s, and when the

applications do come in, they are almost always approved. In the

last fiscal year, only 4 percent of the applications were denied.

This system imposes virtually no burden on industry and it is a

system that seemed to please us quite well in peacetime. Now,

however, we are not in peacetime and we know that there are terrorist organizations that want to do us harm and we know that

weapons of mass destruction in their hands would threaten our

way of life.

I would just like to give you some examples of cases in which our

export control system has allowed technology, American technology,

to threaten American Armed Forces. Perhaps the most recent case

is that of Huawei Technologies, a Chinese company that was

caught earlier this year helping Iraq improve its air defense network. These air defenses are designed to shoot down our pilots.

This Chinese firm helped Iraq in defiance of the international

embargo against this kind of transaction. At the time the assistance was discovered, Motorola had an export license application

27

pending at the Commerce Department to help this company improve its ability to build high-speed switching and routing equipment, which would be ideal for an air defense network.

In the recent past, the Commerce Department has licensed a series of sensitive items to Huawei Technologies. Huawei was allowed to buy high-performance computers from Digital Equipment

Corporation, IBM, and Hewlett Packard, and Sun Microsystems. In

addition, Huawei got $500,000 worth of telecommunication equipment from Qualcomm. Other U.S. firms have helped Huawei by

setting up joint operations. These include Lucent Technologies,

AT&T, Motorola, and IBM.

As a result of all this American assistance, Huawei’s sales are

projected to reach $5 billion in 2001. This company began as a

$1,000 start-up in 1988, so the result is that U.S. technology, some

of which is controlled for export but licensed, and other technology

going through joint operations, has built out of virtually nothing a

Chinese company that now is able to help Iraq improve its air defenses and put the lives of U.S. servicemen and women at risk.

These exports no doubt made money for American companies, but

at a cost of threatening our pilots.

Huawei, unfortunately, is not an isolated case. There are two

others mentioned in my testimony. One is a situation in which the

Commerce Department approved exports to a company in China

that supplied anti-ship missiles to Iran and was sanctioned for missile proliferation. We, the United States, sold that company computer equipment for simulating wind effects. If you are building

anti-ship missiles, a computer to simulate wind effects is quite useful.

Also, only last month, the Washington Times reported that Iran

was installing another large JY–14 radar near its border with Afghanistan. This radar is a very aggressive and powerful air defense

radar. It was sold to Iran by a Chinese company called China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation. Before that sale occurred, the U.S. Government approved a series of exports to that

company that would be very useful for making that very radar. So

again, we are facing a situation where our pilots, if we ever get in

a fight with Iran, will have to face equipment probably made with

our own technology.

The second point I would like to make is that export controls are

now being weakened. In response to the attacks on September 11,

the U.S. Government dropped export control sanctions on a series

of Indian and Pakistani companies. In my testimony, I provided descriptions and photographs of some of the companies that were

dropped from the control list.

One of them is Hindustan Aeronautics. It makes major components for India’s largest rockets. In my testimony, there is a photograph of nose cones made by that company.

Another company is Godrej and Boyce. It also makes components

for India’s largest rockets. It makes a rather powerful liquid fuel

rocket engine, which is depicted in a photograph in my testimony.

A third firm is India’s National Aerospace Laboratory. It conducts missile research. In my testimony, I have a picture of a missile being tested in this company’s wind tunnel.

28

And fourth, there is Walchandnagar Industries. It produces

major components for Indian nuclear reactors that are not inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The absence

of inspections means that the plutonium that those reactors make

is free for use in atomic bombs. This company, too, was dropped

from export control sanctions.

So we have this serious situation where we have a terrorist attack on American soil, and in response to that attack, the U.S.

Government drops export controls on companies in developing nations that are making weapons of mass destruction. It seems to me

that this is a mistake. It is not the right way to respond to a terrorist attack.

Also, I would like to draw the Subcommittee’s attention to the

problem of export enforcement. It is very rare for a big company

that breaks export control laws in the United States to be punished. I have cited two cases.

One involves the company Silicon Graphics. In 1996, it sold highperformance computers without the required export license to one

of Russia’s leading nuclear weapons laboratories. After the computers arrived, one of Russia’s leading nuclear scientists announced

that the Russians were going to start doing simulations like we did

with computers instead of doing actual tests. This is a case where

it is undisputed that the export needed a license. It was made

without the license and nothing has happened. It went to a grand

jury years ago and has simply disappeared.

More recently, in 1999, the Cox Committee found that Hughes

Electronics and Loral Space Communications—I am sure the Subcommittee is familiar with that case—the Cox Committee found

that they deliberately acted without the legally required licenses

and violated U.S. export control laws. That case has been in a

grand jury for nearly 4 years without any results.

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Milhollin, there is a vote that has been in

progress. How much more time do you need?

Mr. MILHOLLIN. I need about 1 minute, perhaps 2 minutes. Perhaps I can do it in 1 minute.

Senator AKAKA. Yes. I have questions, but go ahead.

Mr. MILHOLLIN. I think there are things we can do which would

be very easy. In my testimony, I have indicated that we could list

the dangerous companies abroad that are trying to make weapons

of mass destruction. We know who they are. Their names are well

known. I have attached to my testimony a list of 50 Chinese companies that could easily be added to the Federal Register list of

dangerous buyers. I recommend that be done as soon as possible.

That concludes my testimony.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Dr. Milhollin.

I am so sorry. We have a rash of votes going on, so let me ask

this question of Mr. Christoff and GAO. Has GAO ever looked at

which items are of greatest concern for WMD? Is it your experience

that an industry compliance program, voluntary or obligatory, can

work?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Mr. Chairman, let me just talk to you about

what we have done in GAO. I think one of the important areas that

we have addressed is how to balance the risk in determining what

29

are the national security implications when you try to decontrol an

item and balancing it against the market availability.

The work that we did for this full Committee on high-performance computers is a good example in the sense that Executive

Branch agencies, I think, do a good job of determining that many

of these high-performance computers are available elsewhere, but

they do not look at the national security implications. As we said

in the past, that is an important balancing act that oftentimes does

not occur within the Executive Branch.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Let me ask a final question so I have a few minutes left to get

to the floor. Dr. Cupitt, in your written testimony, you made a

strong argument for a comprehensive study of the anti-terrorist export control policies of key U.S. allies. Should we make changes in

the way our current government agencies charged with dual-use

export controls work? Do we need a new agency or new interagency

process?

Mr. CUPITT. As you may know, I think S. 149, for instance, was

going to set up an Office of Technology Assessment that would

have as part of its mandate a requirement to assess the export controls systems of other countries. I think that might be an example

of one of the things that might be done.

Even though we spend, I know at our Center, we spend a lot of

time assessing other countries’ export control systems, we are frequently asked, have you assessed country X, and we have to say,

no, and we have to say, no one else has and, at least in a comprehensive or systematic way. And for us, I think, to make good

policy decisions and good strategies in terms of building a coalition

of partners that would have complementary export control systems,

we need to know a lot more than what we currently do.

Related to that, I want to mention that I think Dr. Lewis’s point

about catch-all systems, one of the successes that we have had in

recent years is to promote catch-all as a means of addressing some

of the items that may not be listed or may have moved off the list,

not only here in the United States but in other countries, and that

has been an important step. But even there, we do not know that

much about who is implementing the catch-all control policies.

Even very basic data like that, we do not really have a good idea,

and I think that would be something that would be very useful.

Again, I think that S. 149, setting up that Office of Technology Assessment in the Commerce Department, is an example of one of the

ways that this might be achieved, that we might improve our data

capabilities.

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Lewis, would you make any comments on the

same question?

Mr. LEWIS. The question being, do we need a new export control

agency? Was that the question?

Senator AKAKA. Yes, whether we need a new agency or new

interagency process.

Mr. LEWIS. One thing that would help, Mr. Chairman, and thank

you for the question, is that we could definitely use a new law. The

law we have now dates from 1979, and so it is an interesting historical artifact, but it does not work very well and the system of

export controls it sets up with national security regimes is comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
30

plicated and ineffective. So that would be one area that I hope the

Congress will be able to return to next year.

We have looked in a couple of studies about whether or not there

would be a benefit from having an individual agency that was responsible for export controls. I would agree with anyone who said

that none of the agencies now do a particularly good job. It is very

hard to get consensus on where you should move it. And a new

agency may not have the power or the clout of an office that is

linked to a cabinet member. So it probably would not hurt to shake

up the system, but I am not sure we are ready to identify what the

outcome would be.

Senator AKAKA. I have to go, but we have questions for you. We

will send the questions to you for your responses. But I want to

thank you so much for coming today and appearing as our second

panel and for sharing your statements with us. There is no question, what you have said will help us do a better job here in the

U.S. Senate. Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:59 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(31)

COMBATING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS

OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) WITH

NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS:

NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE

COORDINATION ACT OF 2001

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2001

U.S. SENATE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE, OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m., in room

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel Akaka,

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Akaka, Cleland, Domenici, and Cochran.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee will please come to order. The

Subcommittee is here to discuss the threats we face from insecure

critical equipment and discontented scientists from the former Soviet nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons complex.

I want to thank our colleague, Senator Hagel, for joining us

today. I also wish to thank our other witnesses for being here, Ms.

Gary Jones, the Director of Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues at

GAO; Ms. Laura Holgate, Vice President of the Russian Newly

Independent States Program of the Nuclear Threat Initiative; and

Mr. Leonard Spector, Deputy Director of the Monterey Institute of

International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

President Bush and President Putin yesterday announced historic cuts to the nuclear stockpiles in the United States and Russia.

For the future of both our nations and the prospect of a more secure world, I hope they are successful in addressing another legacy

of the Cold War, the materials, facilities, equipment, and people

used to make these and other weapons in the former Soviet Union.

We have faced a major national security problem since the 1991

breakup of the Soviet Union. Control of chemical, biological, and

nuclear weapon materials was suddenly spread out among a number of newly independent nations. We could no longer be assured

of adequate control of these weapons or the people who had designed them.

Prior to 1991, international nonproliferation policy stressed keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of a few states.

Since 1991, we have been faced with the possibility the information

32

and materials which would have taken years to acquire to build a

WMD weapon could be stolen in an instant.

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, the problem of preventing WMD proliferation has gained both a new urgency and a

greater complexity. The FBI’s assessment of the anthrax attacks

which have plagued the Senate and the Nation’s mail may have

been perpetrated by a lone disgruntled scientist, demonstrates how

a weapon that had only been in the hands of a state can now be

wielded by a single terrorist. Weapons that we previously worried

about being delivered by an intercontinental ballistic missile we

now know can be infiltrated into our midst without any advance

warning.

We are faced with the prospect of spending billions of dollars to

protect our homeland against multiple threats from multiple

sources. Nonproliferation programs, the subject of today’s hearing,

are a critical means to prevent weapons, materials, equipment, and

technology from falling into the wrong hands.

I want to thank again our colleague, Senator Hagel, for being

here to discuss this proposal to achieve a national strategy and improve coordination between the various nonproliferation programs.

His legislation, the Nonproliferation Coordination Assistance Act,

would establish a coordinating body to ensure that nonproliferation

activities are efficient, effective, and further national interests.

The Departments of State, Defense, and Energy have asked that

their testimony be postponed until after President Bush’s summit

with President Putin. We have agreed to this and will reschedule

their testimony in the near future.

In our discussion of current and future nonproliferation plans

and the ways to improve and better coordinate them, we must keep

in mind two questions. First, how can we adapt to ever-changing

WMD threats? And second, are our plans and policies making the

world more secure? I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ comments on these two questions.

At this time, I would like to yield to my friend, Senator Domenici, for his statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DOMENICI

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator Hagel, I am pleased to be here adding some positive thrust to

your legislation. I want to compliment you and the Chairman for

holding this hearing. In addition, I want to compliment Senator

Hagel for his proposed legislation. It has a very simple title but a

very profound process is involved in this. It is called Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001.

The importance of nonproliferation programs with the former

Soviet Union should not be open to question. The collapse of the

Soviet Union ended the Cold War, but it also tremendously increased the risk that materials and expertise for weapons of mass

destruction could contribute to new threats to global stability. For

a country which relied on guards and guns to protect secrets and

material, it was a jolting transition to a new situation where it was

not clear if the guards, that is, if they were even still present, were

being paid.

33

The current war on terrorism is critically dependent on minimizing the extent of the threat that terrorists can mount. Preventing their access to weapons of mass destruction must be one

of our highest priorities.

Many nonproliferation programs were created, all with the best

of intentions. Each program has well-stated goals. But these programs frequently are intertwined and interrelated in various complex and difficult ways. There could be no question that better coordination among the programs would lead to enhanced effectiveness, as well as potential cost efficiencies.

The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation—it is also obviously in

Nunn-Lugar, but this followed it by a few years, in 1996—called for

a nonproliferation coordinator for all these programs. The administration at that time chose to ignore that. After the legislation’s call

for a coordinator expired in 1999, I helped with further legislation

for this coordinator in amendments to previous Defense Authorization Acts, again to no avail. There was nobody worried enough

about it, and clearly the Executive Branch did not think it was a

big enough or a powerful enough issue.

Numerous committees have called for this coordination and have

studied it. John Deutch chaired one of these committees. More recently, the superb effort from Senator Howard Baker and the Hon.

Lloyd Cutler again called for this coordination. That is a current

report, Mr. Chairman. For everybody on this staff that is interested

in moving this issue along, that is ‘‘must reading.’’ It is very current and has many current evaluations and studies in it. My

friend, Chuck Hagel, is totally familiar with it, I am sure.

In an amendment to the current defense authorization bill, I

called for tighter coordination. I was pleased to develop that

amendment with Senator Hagel, he might recall, building on the

same bill that you are discussing here today. In addition to Senator

Hagel, Senators Lugar, Biden, Bingaman, and Landreau joined us

in cosponsoring it. All I can say is that it was unfortunate, but no

action was taken on that amendment due to confusion in the minutes before the Senate voted on the defense authorization bill.

Now I understand that the Armed Services Committee is working in conference to incorporate the themes of that amendment.

But I am very pleased that while that is stalemated somewhere,

you are giving birth to the idea with your bill here today. I do hope

it is given every consideration and I hope you pursue it with vigor.

It is very, very important.

We can’t forget about this coordination as terrorism gets closer

and closer on the television monitors of Americans. There is an

awful lot of terrorism potential when you think about what can be

put together with all of the leftover Soviet materials and all of the

material that comes from dismantlement programs. Clearly there

are risks that come with the Soviet Union’s turning out to have a

very different amalgamation of programs. Clearly they have a difficult time finding money to pay just the ordinary kinds of expenditures to maintain control over these materials and expertise to

avoid it spreading all over the world.

There can be many examples where we needed this improved coordination. One of the immediate concerns involves the very vital

plutonium disposition programs, which require coordination beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
34

tween the United States and Russia. The recent suggestion from

the National Security Council that this program might be modified,

along with strong budget signals that we are wavering in our support for the program, has introduced some great uncertainties.

Failure to coordinate this complex program has led to some very

serious issues which threaten to derail the entire effort in terms of

plutonium disposition with Russia.

We are now seeing the Governor of South Carolina, incidentally,

refusing to accept plutonium from Rocky Flats and a German company withdrawing their offer to assist Russia with the MOX program because the administration has injected some really serious

uncertainty by saying the program did not work by not having one

to take its place. We saw a collapse of the efforts to obtain international funding for the program in Russia. Coordination could

have avoided all these problems.

In conclusion, I strongly concur, Mr. Chairman, with Senator

Hagel and many of our colleagues that a far better coordination is

needed across the government for our nonproliferation programs

with the former Soviet Union.

I might say that I am privileged to serve on a board of directors

of a nonprofit corporation that is called the Nuclear Threat Initiative. That was set up with a $50 million a year pledge, I do not

know how many years, but it will be a number of years, perhaps

5 years, or $250 million. I note that one of those who are working

with Sam Nunn is Laura Holgate, sitting in the front row. She is

going to be on our next panel. It has been a pleasure working with

Ted Turner, Senator Lugar, and former Senator Nunn, and some

other distinguished people, and we are going to make some real

headway in terms of getting the world moving with reference to

nonproliferation.

We commented at our last board meeting that does not mean

that we do not need government’s action. Quite to the contrary.

The reason some of the things are being done by that nonprofit is

because our government has failed and they have not done some

things they ought to be doing. So this is one of them, to get started

on coordinating our own programs.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Domenici. Thank

you for your statement.

Senator Cochran, may I yield to you if you have a statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you very much. I ask unanimous consent that my prepared statement be placed in the record as if read.

Senator AKAKA. Without objection, it will be placed in the record.

[The prepared opening statement of Senator Cochran follows:]

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to join you in welcoming Senator Hagel and our

other witnesses to today’s hearing on the United States’ nonproliferation and threat

reduction assistance programs in the former Soviet Union. I appreciate the fact that

Senator Hagel is taking the time to be here with us despite the fact that he has

another hearing to attend and so I will make just a brief statement.

We have in place already several nonproliferation programs which are important

tools that contribute to the effort to control the proliferation of weapons of mass deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
35

1The prepared statement of Senator Hagel with an attachment appears in the appendix on

page 219.

struction. But, I think we must do more to deal with this serious problem which

threatens our nation and other nations as well.

The bill before us today is designed to strengthen and improve the implementation of these programs by the U.S. Government. S. 673 would create a committee

within the Executive Branch with the responsibility of monitoring and coordinating

U.S. policies in the former Soviet Union.

I commend Presidents Bush and Putin for their statements yesterday reiterating

their strong commitments to cooperation in this area of concern. It is clear that the

Bush Administration places a high priority on these programs and is working, as

the White House press release stated, to ‘‘ensure that existing efforts serve priority

threat reduction and nonproliferation goals, as efficiently and effectively as possible....’’

I look forward to today’s testimony on this very important topic and to our future

hearings on this subject.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, let me just welcome my good

friend and colleague from Nebraska. I appreciate the fact that he

is here today to talk about his new initiative in the proliferation

area, trying to control more effectively the spread of weapons of

mass destruction. I cannot think of a more important subject for

him to work on than that, and to looking at who is cosponsoring

the legislation with him, it makes me realize that we need to take

this very seriously. I am certain that it is a proposal that has been

carefully reviewed and thought out and the Congress should pay

close attention to this suggestion. We appreciate your taking time

to come and testify before the Subcommittee.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Cochran.

Again, I want to welcome you, Senator Hagel, and I want to

thank you for taking the time to be with us today to discuss S. 673,

the Nonproliferation Coordination Assistance Act of 2001. If you

are ready for your statement, we will be glad to hear it.

Senator HAGEL. I am, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DOMENICI. Mr. Chairman, could I become a cosponsor?

Would you let me do that today and you note it in the record? Senator, I would like to be a cosponsor.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Fine.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much.

TESTIMONY OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL,1 A U.S. SENATOR FROM

THE STATE OF NEBRASKA

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and to my friends,

Senator Cochran, and Senator Domenici, thank you. What I am

going to present today, Mr. Chairman, is essentially an effort that

has worked from and off of the leadership of Senators Domenici,

Lugar, Nunn, and Cochran and so many of my senior colleagues

who have been not just working on this general issue, but trying

to frame it in a way to call attention to the relevancy and the real

dynamic of the threat of terrorism. That, of course, as Senator

Domenici noted, has now been moved from a threat to a reality as

of September 11, and hence, the timeliness and the importance of

these kinds of issues, most specifically nonproliferation, is beyond

just urgent but it is now of necessity that the Congress of the

United States deal with this.

36

What I have done in the bill that I put together a few months

ago was essentially reframe much of the work of Senators Domenici, Lugar, Biden, Cochran, and others with their support, with

their concurrence, and with their encouragement. And so I want to

acknowledge them as I begin to lay out what my bill would do, Mr.

Chairman, because essentially, it is because of their efforts and

those who have gone before me that I have been able to do this.

A few months ago, I introduced, as you noted, the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act to address the coordination of

nonproliferation efforts in Russia and the former Soviet Union.

Senators Lugar and Biden were original cosponsors of this legislation and we will include, of course, Senator Domenici, as well.

This legislation was divided into eight sections. Section four of

this bill establishes a Committee on Nonproliferation Assistance at

the assistant secretary level or higher, to be chaired by a senior

representative of the National Security Council and comprised of

representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and Energy.

I would also note, Mr. Chairman, that I take no particular pride

in my colleagues’ or others’ efforts to strengthen, improve, restate,

and restructure what I have laid out here and I am certain that

can be done. I introduced this bill not because of any territorial

sense of prerogatives as to who chairs anything, but rather to try

to bring some accountability to this issue, and you will hear from

witnesses, especially GAO and other administration witnesses that

you noted later on, that will have their own sense of this bill and

will come forward, I am sure, with a more effective way to structure the bill.

Section five sets out the duties of the Subcommittee. Section six

relates to administrative support. Section seven protects confidentiality of information.

Mr. Chairman, it has been 10 years since the Congress took the

important step to help reduce the threat of nuclear chaos emerging

from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Under the foresight

and leadership of Senators Nunn and Lugar, Congress established

the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, authorizing funding

through the Department of Defense budget to assist with the safe

and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear,

chemical, and other weapons in the former Soviet Union.

We are aware of that. It has been alluded to especially in the remarks of Senator Domenici. And upon that first important piece of

legislation, we build the next stage of the Nunn-Lugar effort. And

as Senator Domenici noted, the next stage of that came in 1996,

when Senator Domenici joined with Senators Lugar and Nunn to

further define and refine Nunn-Lugar.

Thousands of nuclear warheads have been deactivated and missiles dismantled in Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Russia. In

the past 10 years, the Nunn-Lugar initiative has grown into a

multi-pronged effort by the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy to ensure that weapons of mass destruction, weapons-usable

material and technology, and weapons-related knowledge in Russia

and the Newly Independent States remain beyond the reach of terrorists and weapons proliferating states.

37

The investments we have made in this area have yielded an impressive return. By assisting Russia in this area, we have reduced,

not eliminated, nuclear threats we face in the United States and

the world and have enhanced our national security. But just as the

Nunn-Lugar initiative has changed over the last decade, so, too,

has the world changed, especially since the terrorist attacks on this

country on September 11.

Nonproliferation is one of the key components of the war on terrorism. On November 6, President Bush stated, ‘‘Al Qaeda operates

in more than 60 nations, including some in Central and Eastern

Europe. These terrorist groups seek to destabilize entire nations

and regions. They are seeking chemical, biological, and nuclear

weapons. Given the means, our enemies would be a threat to every

Nation and eventually to civilization itself.’’

Last January, a bipartisan task force led by former Senator

Baker and former White House Counselor Lloyd Cutler, which Senator Domenici mentioned, released a report calling for improved coordination within the U.S. Government on nonproliferation assistance to Russia. In particular, the report noted, ‘‘Coordination within and among U.S. Government agencies is now insufficient and

must be improved. Although the task force focused on the DOE

nonproliferation programs, the members heard from many interlocutors that the programs would be improved and could be improved, as would the counterpart programs in other agencies, if

there were more coordination at all levels among all U.S. Government programs.’’

That, Mr. Chairman, is what my legislation intends to do. President Bush recognized the need for greater coordination in our domestic security policy, as evidenced by the appointment of Governor Ridge as Director of the Office for Homeland Security. The

Baker-Cutler report recommended establishing a new position for

nonproliferation coordination within the National Security Council

or creating a high-policy-level nonproliferation czar.

My legislation does not impose such a mandate on the President,

but instead calls for coordination of our nonproliferation programs

through a senior level coordinating committee. And again, I would

say that if there are suggestions, particular points that could improve and would improve the structure of this accountability, I certainly would welcome those.

A second aspect of my legislation is the inclusion of efforts undertaken by private sector programs in this area, such as corporations

and nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs. And again, Senator

Domenici alluded to one of those organizations a few minutes ago.

This Subcommittee will hear testimony today from the Nuclear

Threat Initiative, a private organization founded by Ted Turner

and former Senator Sam Nunn to reduce the threat from nuclear

weapons. You will also hear from NGOs and their efforts through

testimony from a representative of the Russian Newly Independent

States Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute. Currently, this private spending is small, but it is registering positive

results. It will continue to increase. We should ensure that government and non-government spending on nonproliferation programs

complement each other and are not duplicative.

38

1The prepared statement of Ms. Jones appears in the appendix on page 223.

Our previous efforts have yielded significant results, but there is

far more work yet to do. Yesterday, Senator Dodd and I wrote in

the New York Times that Presidents Bush and Putin should use

the current summit as an opportunity to discuss effective ways to

ensure that weapons and materials of mass destruction in and

around Russia remain safe, accounted for, and secure.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the discussions between Presidents

Bush and Putin are already yielding agreement in this area. As

you noted, yesterday afternoon, President Bush noted that the

United States and Russia will strengthen our efforts to cut off

every possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons,

materials, and expertise. Presidents Bush and Putin also announced yesterday that they will dramatically reduce nuclear arsenals in both countries. This will probably require more spending

from the United States.

If we in Congress are asked to spend more of our budget on this

effort, then we must ensure these funds are spent efficiently, effectively, and not on repetitive efforts. And again, Mr. Chairman, that

is as much the focus of my legislation as any other part.

I appreciate the Subcommittee’s serious review of this timely and

relevant issue and I would say, Mr. Chairman, that if there is anything I can do to further that effort, I look forward to working with

you and the members of this Subcommittee. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. Thank

you for your leadership in this area. I really appreciate what you

have said. It will be helpful to the Subcommittee and with you, too,

in looking for ways of preparing us to deal with whatever threats

that might be coming, so I thank you very much again for your

statement.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Now you will hear

from the real pros.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

At this time, I will call our next panel, Ms. Gary Jones from

GAO, Ms. Laura Holgate from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and

Leonard Spector from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

They have been asked to discuss current nonproliferation programs, how they are coordinated with Federal, private, and international efforts, and how S. 673, the Hagel bill, would make these

programs and efforts more effective.

Ms. Jones, please proceed with your statement at this time. I

want all of you to know that your full written statements will be

entered into the record.

TESTIMONY OF MS. GARY L. JONES,1 DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR

AND NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES, NATURAL RESOURCES

AND THE ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Ms. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are pleased to be here

today to discuss our recent work on U.S. nonproliferation programs

and to comment on S. 673, a bill to establish an interagency committee to review and coordinate U.S. nonproliferation programs.

39

As others have said, the events of September 11 have heightened

the importance of these nonproliferation programs to our national

security. Let me first briefly summarize the results of our work on

several of the U.S. Government’s nonproliferation programs. We

have found that they have achieved some success, but more needs

to be done to keep nuclear weapons, materials, and technologies

out of the hands of terrorists and countries of concern.

Successes include improved security systems, which have reduced the risk of theft of nuclear material in Russia; the purchase

of weapons grade uranium that is equivalent to 4,000 nuclear warheads that has been turned into fuel for commercial nuclear power

reactors; and the creation of non-military jobs for some weapons

scientists.

But the task is far from over. Hundreds of metric tons of nuclear

material remain at some risk because improved security measures

have not yet been installed. This is because DOE’s program to secure this material has experienced problems with access to sensitive Russian sites. Further, DOE does not know how much and

for how long additional assistance will be needed to sustain the operation and maintain the new security equipment already involved.

Two DOE programs and one at the State Department share the

goal of employing Russia’s weapons scientists in non-military work

and thereby preventing them from selling their knowledge to terrorists or countries of concern. With hundreds employed by one

program and several thousand employed part-time by another,

these programs are a long way from reaching the 30,000 to 75,000

senior nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons scientists without

full-time employment.

Even when jobs are created, these programs face difficulty in

conclusively demonstrating that they are achieving their intended

goal of preventing the spread of weapons-related knowledge and expertise. Our reports on these DOD nonproliferation programs made

numerous recommendations to improve their overall management

and DOE has addressed or is in the process of making changes to

address these recommendations.

Let me turn to the bill, S. 673, that the Subcommittee has under

consideration. There is some debate among officials, both within

and outside government, about the need for more coordination of

U.S. nonproliferation programs. To prepare for this hearing, we

spoke with representatives from the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, and some private interest groups. They all believe

that coordination among Federal agencies implementing nonproliferation programs is already taking place and the mechanism

envisioned by the bill may not be needed.

However, based on our work and the findings of two independent

groups that recently examined these programs, the Deutch Commission and the Baker-Cutler Task Force, we believe that additional coordination would be helpful. For example, some officials

told us that better coordination is needed between the United

States and international programs, such as those implemented by

the European Union. Further, program officials have also noted

that although coordination does occur at some level, it is frequently

informal and subject to changes in program personnel. We believe

that greater coordination could minimize duplication, leverage

40

resources, and focus programs more clearly on common goals and

objectives.

However, the legislation did not address a number of other problems that I have just talked about, such as limited access to sensitive Russian sites and various program management concerns.

However, the coordinating body envisioned by the legislation could

serve as a vehicle to share information and best practices for addressing these types of problems.

We also believe the bill could be strengthened by mandating development of an overarching strategic plan that clearly identifies

overall goals, time frames for meeting these goals, and ways to set

priorities for allocating resources government-wide to address nonproliferation concerns. Both the Deutch Commission and the

Baker-Cutler Task Force believe that such a strategic plan was the

missing element from the U.S. Government implementation of nonproliferation programs.

Building on the individual programs’ strategic plans, a government-wide plan could also address questions such as are the end

dates for the completion of the various nonproliferation programs,

such as securing nuclear materials in Russia, still viable? How can

the security improvements made be sustained beyond the completion of the programs? And in light of September 11, do we continue

to have the right mix of nonproliferation programs needed to address the varying security problems facing our Nation?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Ms. Jones.

At this time, I would like to yield to Senator Cleland.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would

like to thank particularly our colleague, Senator Hagel, and the

witnesses who appear here today to testify about this important

subject.

The threat posed by the weapons of mass destruction that are retained in the states comprising the former Soviet Union is actually

mind boggling. I was struck by the fact that a bipartisan task force

headed by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler has recently called this,

‘‘the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United

States,’’ and called for a four-fold funding increase for our threat

reduction efforts.

In the wake of September 11, we cannot hesitate to take strong

action to implement this recommendation. We are indeed fortunate

that 10 years ago, a group of distinguished Senators, including my

friend and the former Senator from Georgia, Sam Nunn, put in

place what has come to be known as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative

Threat Reduction Act. The programs that have been carried out

under this legislation have, without a doubt, profoundly improved

the security of the United States and may well have prevented a

far worse catastrophe than what we have recently experienced. I

reiterate my support for these programs and call for the enhanced

funding recommended by the bipartisan task force mentioned previously.

To the purpose of this hearing, I say that the proposed legislation

is fully consistent with the requirement to provide additional reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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1The prepared statement of Ms. Holgate appears in the appendix on page 233.

sources for cooperative threat reduction and I support it. I also believe that the committee proposed by the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001 will need a highly-placed advocate

to ensure that its mandate is effectively carried out.

To that end, I endorse Ms. Holgate’s recommendation for the creation of a Deputy National Security Advisor committed exclusively

to reducing the threats we face from weapons of mass destruction.

This threat is far too grave to go without such an advocate. I am

convinced that our national security depends upon the effective coordination and resourcing that this position will enable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your statement and

your support.

I would like to now call on Ms. Holgate for her testimony.

TESTIMONY OF LAURA S.H. HOLGATE,1 VICE PRESIDENT FOR

RUSSIAN NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE

Ms. HOLGATE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and other

Subcommittee Members for the opportunity to testify today about

how the U.S. Government can strengthen its efforts to prevent the

spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and keep them

from falling into the hands of groups and states who would do us

harm.

The Nation and the world discovered on September 11 that there

are terrorist forces in the world who will stop at nothing in their

efforts to take innocent lives. The work that the U.S. Government

does to reduce the threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical

weapons and materials is our first line of defense in keeping these

weapons out of terrorist hands.

Dismantling weapons, securing material, eliminating infrastructure, and directing know-how to peaceful pursuits, all of these play

an essential role in fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We have taken important steps towards these problems, but

to protect the security of the American people, we need giant

strides, so I would like to thank the Chairman and the Members

of the Subcommittee for putting the spotlight on this issue and giving me and others a chance to contribute our ideas.

President Bush clearly shares the concern that has been noted

by Howard Baker, Lloyd Cutler, and many others in the introductory comments to this hearing. Two years ago at the Reagan Library, candidate Bush praised, ‘‘the foresight and statesmanship of

Senators Lugar and Nunn for their legislation to improve security

at many Russian nuclear facilities,’’ and then he added, ‘‘A great

deal of Russian nuclear material cannot be accounted for. The next

President must press for an accurate inventory of all this material

and we must do more. I will ask the Congress to increase substantially our assistance to dismantle as many of Russia’s weapons as

possible as quickly as possible.’’

Sadly, the administration’s actions in the first months of its tenure fall short of the vision and purpose articulated by President

Bush. Earlier this year, the administration announced a review of

42

nonproliferation programs, then cut the program budgets back before it even began the review. The review itself stopped action in

its tracks. Travel was halted. Work was postponed. Momentum was

lost. And program managers felt they lacked the authority to go

forward. The review was undertaken without even the courtesy of

telling our partners in Russia. Now we are told the review is complete, but we have not seen its outcome.

I strongly support a review of our nonproliferation programs. We

have not had one since 1993. But it needs to be broad and it needs

to be strategic. The review that was recently completed appeared

to be aimed merely at finding inefficiencies in individual program

activities. That is a worthy purpose in its own terms, but it is no

substitute for strategic thinking about U.S. national security goals

and how threat reduction programs can help achieve them.

I worked for many years in many capacities, first at the Department of Defense in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,

then at the Department of Energy, and now at the Nuclear Threat

Initiative, to implement and advance these programs to prevent

nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons from falling into the

wrong hands. It is my view that these programs are critically important, largely effective, and because of the obvious urgency, more

in need than ever of high-level attention, increased funding, greater staffing, and continuous fresh thinking to help speed up the pace

and widen the scope of these programs. If terrorists are racing to

acquire weapons of mass destruction, we ought to be racing to stop

them.

Ten years after the passage of the landmark Nunn-Lugar Act to

establish the legal basis of nonproliferation cooperation with Russia

and other former Soviet States, U.S. Government activities in this

area approach $1 billion annually and involve multiple agencies

from Defense to Health and Human Services, myriad contractors,

and over a dozen Congressional committees and subcommittees.

This growth has been, by and large, organic, with each agency pursuing its own contacts and relationships in recipient countries, assembling and justifying its own budget, implementing programs

based on its own culture and approaches, and interacting with its

own Congressional oversight committees.

This is a complex task. Some point to the involvement of so many

agencies as evidence of poor management. It is not. It is evidence

that such a program requires wide-ranging expertise and, therefore, will always be a challenge to administer, a challenge that can

be fully met, in my view, only with high-level leadership and coordination. This leadership and coordination has been hard to come

by since the early days of these programs.

Where it has worked well, it has been a consequence of personalities, committees, or commissions that are not enduring features of

the organizational structure, either within the U.S. Government or

in relations between the United States and states of the former Soviet Union. Coordination with nongovernmental organizations like

mine also occurs primarily ad hoc, based on personal relationships

and our own initiative. Relationships with other countries working

in these areas tends to be intermittent and opportunistic.

Despite the complexity of these nonproliferation cooperation activities, programmatic duplication has been remarkably low and

43

1The prepared statement of Mr. Spector with attchments appears in the appendix on page

245.

program implementation is, in general, very effective. In spite of

proceeding without a comprehensive and coordinated vision administered from the top, these programs taken collectively have massively improved U.S. national security. Improving the coordination

and accountability of these programs should result in even greater

improvements.

What is missing in the process is a definitive statement of strategy and consistent advocacy of administration goals. This must include holding agencies accountable for financing and implementing

programs that accomplish these goals. Without this clear high-level

direction and the interagency process that creates and maintains

it, agencies have set and articulated their own priorities, resources

have not always been aligned with those priorities, even within

agencies, and differences among agencies’ rhetoric and programmatic actions have created perceptions of inefficiency and contradiction which are exploited by opponents of the programs and

missions.

To address these structural flaws, I recommend the creation of

a Deputy National Security Advisor committed explicitly and exclusively to reducing the threats we face from weapons of mass destruction. This individual would be responsible for leading and enforcing interagency decisions and for creating a unified programmatic budget presentation.

In whatever manner Congress and the Executive Branch decide

to organize our programs, and there are many effective ways to do

so, they must have high-level Presidential attention. Any organizational structure with high-level attention will be better than the

best organizational structure with low-level attention.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. Spector, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF LEONARD S. SPECTOR,1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR,

CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. SPECTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the

opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on improving the effective of U.S. nonproliferation programs in the successor states of

the former Soviet Union.

I want to try to emphasize three themes today. The first is that

the indecision of the administration, and what I think has to be

characterized to some degree as ‘‘dithering,’’ is damaging our efforts

to control weapons of mass destruction material and expertise in

the Newly Independent States, especially in Russia. I think this is

an especially troubling situation given the new urgency that has

emerged to deal with these matters, in light of the September 11

events.

The second theme I want to emphasize is that the programs that

are functioning could function much more efficiently and more effectively if they could be better integrated and if there were better

planning among them and better oversight from above. I will supVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
44

port the current legislation in some of my comments in terms of its

approach.

And finally, I want to comment on the private-public partnerships and just note how important a role they have played historically in this area and how important a role they are playing today.

The fundamental goal of the majority of the programs that are

operating in Russia today and the other Newly Independent States,

especially those whose purpose is to secure and eliminate fissile

material and to provide employment for Soviet weapons of mass destruction scientists, is to prevent terrorists and states of proliferation concern from acquiring these materials and getting access to

this expertise. As such, the programs are an integral and highly

important component of U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

Osama bin Laden, as we know, has been seeking weapons of

mass destruction, and, of course, he recently claimed to possess

chemical and nuclear weapons, although most observers, disbelieve

that latter claim of possession of nuclear weapons. He is also

known to have extensive links throughout the former Soviet Union.

It is worth recalling the scale of the Soviet weapons of mass destruction legacy. The Department of Energy estimates that Russia

possesses 603 tons of weapons-usable fissile materials, that is plutonium or highly enriched uranium, outside of weapons. That is

enough for 41,000 nuclear arms. And to provide a benchmark, let

us just consider what North Korea may have. It is said by the U.S.

Government to possess enough plutonium for one or two nuclear

weapons, and we all know how serious we take that national security threat.

But one or two weapons is less than five-one-thousandths of a

percent of the Russian stockpile of weapons-grade material that I

described earlier. One shudders to imagine the mischief that

Osama bin Laden or a terrorist of his ilk might cause, if he were

to obtain a comparably minuscule fraction of the nuclear weapons

material in Russia.

Russia also possesses a vast arsenal of chemical weapons that

are now currently awaiting destruction with U.S. assistance, if we

can get the program moving, and they also possess the ability to

manufacture the world’s most potent biological weapons. The bulk

of these various weapons-of-mass-destruction materials are not

subject to adequate security measures.

Despite new evidence of terrorist interest in acquiring and using

WMD, the Bush Administration has not acted to accelerate efforts

to improve security over these materials and over WMD expertise

in the former Soviet States. Indeed, nearly 10 months after taking

office, as Ms. Holgate just noted, and really throughout an entire

budget cycle, the administration is still ‘‘reviewing’’ U.S. nonproliferation programs in Russia. It is apparently unable to decide

whether and/or how to pursue a number of the critically important

initiatives that are already underway.

Inexplicably, the one point that the administration has decided

upon is that the programs do not need additional funding, and

that, accordingly, no monies from the $40 billion in anti-terrorist

funds that will be made available by the Congress should be used

for the purpose of helping secure weapons-grade materials and expertise in the former Soviet Union.

45

Let me review with you a few of the programs. I have listed quite

a few in my testimony. I will try to just summarize and only hit

the highlights. Perhaps the most salient of the programs for dealing with the Soviet nuclear legacy, is the Material Protection Control and Accounting Program at the Department of Energy. As was

pointed out earlier by the GAO, to date, this program has made

great strides.

It has, I believe, protected about 200 tons of weapons-grade material. It is roughly a third of the 603 tons that now needs to be

secured. The remaining material will not receive so-called ‘‘rapid

upgrades’’ until 2007 and it will not be comprehensively secured

until 2011.

Surprisingly, the Bush Administration’s fiscal year 2002 budget

reduced the funding for this program to a bit below the fiscal year

2001 levels, (although 2 weeks ago, Congress increased support for

this effort above the administration’s request, from $143 million up to $173 million). The events of September 11 call for additional

funding.

Now, I was at the Department of Energy when we put together

the previous administration’s budget in this field, and I know that

there were other parts of this program that are not going to be addressed in the coming year because of these lower budget numbers.

We all know that not every item on the wish list can be funded,

but I know that we will not be doing some very important work because of the administration’s hesitancy in moving forward.

Now, one way that we can rapidly improve security over tons of

material is to complete another one of these material security programs in Russia, and that is to complete the facility at Mayak,

known as the Fissile Material Storage Facility. We have already

spent $400 million on this facility, and it is supposed to be operational in the coming year, when it will secure 6 tons of weaponsgrade material. They will load it at a rate of about 6 tons per year

and eventually 25 tons of plutonium will be secured.

What is holding up the operation of this facility is we cannot

quite come to conclusion with the Russians on measures for having

confidence about what goes into the facility and mechanisms for

monitoring it. This has been a problem for a number of years, but

it is not moving forward, in part because it is not getting high-level

attention at the Pentagon, where this program sits. It is extremely

important when you have a high-level official from the Pentagon

here to ask what steps he is taking to make this $400 million investment good. We have to take advantage of this facility in the

coming year, and I think the ball is very definitely in the court of

the Pentagon.

Another program which I think has been an unalloyed success

and is widely applauded is the High Enriched Uranium Purchase

Agreement. This is an agreement under which weapons-grade material is blended down to non-weapons-grade nuclear power plant

fuel in Russia and then purchased by the United States and used

to fuel U.S. nuclear power plants. This is where 110 tons of material have indeed been removed from being a problem. This 110 tons

is no longer usable for weapons, a very large quantities. But the

program itself will last for many more years and needs to be accelerated.

46

The intellectual father of the program, Thomas Neff of MIT, believes that with some ingenuity, we could double the rate of downblending from 30 tons a year to 60 tons a year at a cost of roughly

$150 million per year, but the bulk of this money will come back

to us when that uranium would be sold on the open market some

years from now.

The President is looking into this, supposedly. I had an interview

with Robert Joseph at the National Security Council, which is an

on-the-record interview that we published recently in the Nonproliferation Review. He said that this program was ‘‘under review.’’ The administration was trying to stabilize it in some fashion. But it was clear there was no impetus, no energy to try to

make the program move at a faster pace and to try to introduce

some new thinking as to how this might work.

Other programs are also losing momentum, including one that

Ms. Holgate used to run at the Department of Energy, is the Plutonium Disposition Program. This program desperately needs leadership and drive from high up in the administration because it requires the participation of foreign governments. Because of uncertainties about funding and the lack of such leadership, the program

has lost a year, an entire year, in its efforts to eliminate and dispose of 34 metric tons of Russian weapons plutonium, which would

basically be removed from a concern if we could get the program

on track and moving forward. Again, the problem, I would say, lies

with the administration in its slowness to come to a conclusion

about the program and in its reluctance to champion it internationally.

There are several other programs that are worthy of mention.

The plutonium production reactor shutdown agreement would end

production of new plutonium. Why do we want the Russians making more plutonium? We have a program to end this. Again, it is

falling on hard times in the sense that it is not getting the leadership from the Pentagon that it needs: In particular, a solution was

reached to actually get this program implemented during the last

part of the Clinton Administration. It has not yet been embraced

by the Bush Administration, but it is ready and, I think, a very

thoughtful solution. This needs to be pried out of the bureaucracy

and made to move forward.

Let me only turn to one or two other points here in reviewing

some of these programs. A program that I participated in while I

was at the Department of Energy was to go around to small research reactors outside of Russia and try to bring weapons-grade

material back into Russia to be consolidated and down-blended.

The material is used as fuel at these facilities, and one facility of

particular concern was in the former Yugoslavia. Now with the

change of government there, the dangers are reduced, but it is a

significant quantity of material and we need to get this program

moving forward. We also need to try to move material out of

Belarus and out of the Kharkiv reactor in the Ukraine.

Tactical nuclear weapons, just to change focus a bit, are another

area that has not gotten attention under this administration or the

previous administration. There are thousands of them in Russia.

We have done some work to secure them, but there is no work to

eliminate these weapons or to provide transparency to ensure that

47

Russia is complying with undertakings made in 1992. Urgent work

is needed here, but there is no program of any kind in the administration’s current initiatives to address this challenge.

If I may, let me turn next to summarize a number of these points

and basically say that in all of these cases, the issue really lies

with the administration and its inability to decide where it wants

to come out and to move emphatically forward with these efforts.

Let me turn now, if I may, to a different part of the proliferation

threat in the former Soviet Union, and this is one that is very germane to today’s dangers. This is the threat of biological weapons.

As we know, the Soviet Union, had the most advanced biological

weapons program in the world. We have worked during the Clinton

Administration and are continuing to work during the Bush Administration to try to hire as many of these scientists—this program was mentioned earlier—so that they do not go off and share

their expertise with others. We have converted some of the biological weapons sites to non-weapons use, but some of these sites remain completely unknown to us. We are not given any access, and

we have not had any programs there. These are the programs that

are in the Russian military. It is an important gap.

But what came to mind most recently and what a colleague of

mine, Sonia Benouaghram, has brought to my attention are the socalled ‘‘museums.’’ These are the collections of extremely potent biological weapon agents that remain at many of the sites. The work

at the sites now, the ones that the United States has worked with

no longer involves offensive biological weapons, but some of the

material remains there.

Last night on television, I am not sure how many may have seen

this, Senator, but a broadcast showed the refrigerator in which

some of these vials were sitting. They were barely labeled. There

was very limited security. One only hopes that we can do our work

at these sites—and it is underway—more rapidly than others may

figure out how to defeat the rudimentary security systems that now

exist. This is a major gap and we really need to move this forward

dramatically.

Let me turn if I may, now, to the issue of planning and coordination.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Spector you have exceeded your time, but

will you please summarize?

Mr. SPECTOR. Thank you. I would be happy to do that. Planning

and coordination has been discussed here, and in my testimony and

in the accompanying article, I have identified a number of areas

where we simply do not have cross-program coordination the way

we need it. The most clear-cut example is that the program to secure nuclear materials uses one number to describe the amount of

material that needs to be addressed. Other programs, however, are

reducing this quantity of material by moving it, destroying it, or

eliminating it in various fashions, and we need a government-wide

analysis of this problem, as well as a government-wide analysis of

job creation, and of U.S. activities in other areas. If you had this,

you could exploit synergies between the programs; you could avoid

situations where programs interfere with each other inadvertently;

and you could make much more thoughtful planning decisions.

48

In the interview that Bob Joseph gave, he did indicate that the

one element of the administration’s review could be announced,

and it was that there would be increased planning and that, indeed, the planning process would take place in an interagency

group of the very kind recommended in the legislation before the

Subcommittee. Now, if this is announced publicly in a more formal

way, perhaps during your next hearing, it may mean that the need

for legislation is less apparent because the administration, in effect, will have adopted this very strategy. However, I would recommend a number of studies be requested by the committee that

would, in fact, push the planning process forward.

Let me conclude just by mentioning the relationship between

public and private activities. It really would be worthwhile spending a bit more time on this to appreciate the incredible history of

participation by private organizations in this very area. The concept of the Nunn-Lugar program and cooperative threat reduction

was first envisioned and described at Harvard by a group up there.

My organization has done very important reviews of these programs, and has conducted extensive training programs to support

them, to create a cadre of specialists in Kazakhstan and Ukraine

and elsewhere. The Nuclear Threat Initiative, of course, will play

a very important role, as well.

This has been a very successful partnership and I think it is one

that we certainly hope will continue. There is much more work to

be done and many more contributions to be made by these private

organizations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Spector.

I have some questions for each of you. I would just like to ask

your opinion on some of the views of the administration.

A number of critics have praised the administration for undertaking the first comprehensive assessment of our nonproliferation

programs in decades. At the same time, they fault the administration for failing to develop a strategic plan for these programs. Do

you agree with these views, and if so, what should our strategy be?

Ms. Jones.

Ms. JONES. Senator, I think part of our testimony today was basically to say that the legislation currently being considered could

be improved by requiring a strategic plan and that strategic plan

would talk about the overall goals that we are after governmentwide for the nonproliferation program. It would enable us to measure progress, hold particular agencies accountable for meeting

those goals, but it would also provide a forum to set relative priorities, particularly from a funding standpoint. So I would agree that

a strategic plan is something that we should be looking for here.

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Holgate.

Ms. HOLGATE. I would certainly associate myself with the views

that you expressed, Mr. Chairman, in terms of the contrast between a review of existing programs and a strategy for how to

move forward and match programs to goals. That strategy can only

be created in the context of interagency coordination led by a firm

hand at the White House and is desperately needed.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Spector.

49

Mr. SPECTOR. I would agree because I, among others, have been

urging such planning to take place. When you do such planning,

certainly in the fissile material area, you look across a whole spectrum of challenges. I would say by the time the last administration

left office, pretty much every challenge was addressed in some

fashion, sometimes more successfully, sometimes less successfully.

But you need to have that across-the-board approach which a senior-level review that attempted to examine this work strategically

could achieve.

So I would certainly support that, and I support the comments

of Ms. Holgate that the administration has not done this. They

have looked program by program at some of the policy issues, but

not at the big picture.

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Jones, in terms of proliferation threats from

Soviet chemical and biological weapons facilities, we are concerned

with dual-use materials and equipment and expertise being sent to

suspected proliferating nations. To what extent can these concerns

be met by formal nonproliferation activities and how can such activities be coordinated with multilateral agreements and treaties?

Ms. JONES. If we are talking about expertise going from weapons

scientists in the Soviet Union possibly to other countries, I think

that the programs that the Department of Energy has in place

have been dealing with that, as well as the science center programs

at the State Department. I think that a coordinating committee

that we are talking about today in terms of this legislation could

go a long way to bringing those programs together and possibly leverage the programs and we could be more efficient in terms of

their delivery.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Spector, there has been concern that too

much of U.S. assistance was going to the nuclear weapons complex.

Some have called for a new program dedicated to chemical weapon

scientists and engineers. Do you believe that Federal programs

have paid enough attention to chemical and biological weapon scientists?

Mr. SPECTOR. This was one of the occasions on which the programs worked extremely well together. There was a very specialized program during the previous administration, which I know is

continuing, to try to address these biological weapons and chemical

weapons scientists, institute by institute, and to take every job creation program we had—the Science Centers, DOD, DOE—and

surge those programs in. Interagency teams were always used to

make the visits implement the overall strategy.

I would say that the job here is to keep these programs going.

They have received adequate funding, I think, for the present year,

and in this area, you had excellent planning. It is really a model

for what you want to see elsewhere. So I think this is a job we have

done very well—and with great caution, so that we were not supporting improper activities at these locations.

I would also have to say I was very familiar with the danger of

spending too much money in the United States, which I think was

the early part of your question. I think most of the jobs creation

programs now have ceilings on them limiting the proportion of

funds that can be spent here, which though somewhat difficult to

meet, are being met. As a result, the bulk of money is spent in the

50

former Soviet Union, and I think these are good guidelines for us

to have.

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Holgate, in Sunday’s Washington Post, Russian President Putin is quoted as saying categorically that he denied that terrorists could obtain nuclear weapons originating in

Russia or the former Soviet Union. He also stated that in the unlikely event that the terrorists in Afghanistan have weapons of

mass destruction, ‘‘they cannot be of Soviet or Russian origin. I am

absolutely sure of that.’’ What do you think of President Putin’s comments? Is he making

a distinction between nuclear weapons and nuclear material, as

some have suggested that nuclear material is missing from Russia?

Ms. HOLGATE. It is an awkward position to criticize a head of

state currently visiting in the United States, but I will say I have

no basis myself to be as certain as he is. I think he is not in a position to say anything other than the statements that he made. I do

not think he could possibly be seen to be admitting that there are

challenges. So I think he made the statements you would expect a

President to make.

Based on what I know of the Russian inventory of their weapons,

their materials, and the people that are involved with them, I cannot imagine how anyone can make a categorical statement that

every gram of weapons-usable material is accounted for and every

individual with knowledge is safe in their beds in Russia.

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Jones, Mr. Spector recommends that our

Subcommittee use its oversight authority to request that the administration prepare three baseline studies to improve the planning and coordinating process. These studies would include an inventory of cross-program relationships, a year-by-year projection of

the inventory of Russian nuclear material not in weapons, and a

year-by-year projection of the employment impact of all U.S. nonproliferation programs. Would such an exercise improve planning

and coordination, and how useful would this be?

Ms. JONES. Senator, I believe that it would provide a baseline for

the administration to begin setting goals. I think the kinds of

things that Mr. Spector has pointed out here could be used as part

of the goals for this overarching strategy that we are talking about

and the administration could then be measured on an annual basis

in terms of how effective the programs are in meeting those goals.

So I would sign on to the fact that these studies might be useful.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Ms. Holgate, some U.S. nonproliferation goals have been hindered by Russia’s strict secrecy standards. The GAO reported in

May that U.S. officials had yet to gain access to 104 of 252 nuclear

site buildings requiring improved security. While we can appreciate

Russia’s concerns, access is required to ensure that U.S. tax dollars

are being spent appropriately. In your opinion, how do we resolve

this conflict?

Ms. HOLGATE. This is a tough one that a lot of smart people have

been working on for quite a while, Senator, and it is in some ways

a measure of the success of the programs that we are encountering

this challenge. The easy stuff has been, by and large, completed

and we are getting into the more difficult areas where we are talking about the most sensitive facilities and the most sensitive mateVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
51

rials in Russia. This has happened simultaneously with Putin’s rise

to power, which has given a boost to the security services within

Russia, and at the very same time, our own national security labs

have had their security posture raised in the wake of the Wen Ho

Lee problems.

The challenge here, therefore, is that even when there can be reciprocal visits, it can be almost more difficult for Russian scientists

to visit our facilities for cooperative research than it is for our scientists and implementors to visit Russian facilities. So it is kind of

an upward ratcheting process on both sides simultaneously with

the increased calls and increased political attention for access.

The first thing that is needed here is a clear statement from both

Presidents—and Senator Nunn has called for this to come out of

the summit, I do not know whether it will or not—that the mutual

monitoring of each country’s weapons, excess materials and weapons and stocks, could assure the world that these are taken care

of and that will give the Russian system an ability to have access

to some of the U.S. systems that will help make it possible for U.S.

officials to have access to Russian systems.

So the first step is a presidential determination and enforcement

through the bureaucracies that puts the onus on the security people to explain how to make transparency work as opposed to taking

the easy way out about why it should not work.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Spector, and I would like to have Ms. Jones

also respond to this question, environmental and local public advocacy groups have gained influence in the former Soviet Union.

What problems is this creating for American aid efforts and how

can the United States resolve them?

Mr. SPECTOR. Well, I think this really varies program by program. In some cases, such as the material protection program, the

environmental concerns are really nonexistent. There are no environmental impacts. This is just improving security.

In other settings where you are moving around radioactive materials or you are proposing to irradiate materials in reactors and so

forth, local opposition is very significant and it really must be

taken into account. We are observing the Russians now adopting

a licensing and environmental impact statement process somewhat

like our own. So one program I was involved in—we were hoping

to have results in 2 years. It was for storing spent fuel. We gradually were advised, ‘‘well, that is not going to happen in 2 years.’’ We are going to have to go by the book and make sure we have

looked at all of these issues.

I think virtually every program that I was associated with is

very environmentally attuned and has not caused serious consequences, and I think we can make the case when we need to to

local Russian groups or through Russian government officials make

the case. But it is a factor that has to be weighed and I think we

should be sensitive to it. We do not want to have a steamroller here

that creates a backlash.

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Jones.

Ms. JONES. Just one other point to add to what Mr. Spector had

to say, and that is as these environmental groups are becoming

more active, as he noted, it could delay certain activities that the

United States might want to have happen, such as opening of a faVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
52

cility. And I think that as part of the strategic plan, and as part

of the funding requirements, you have to look at the sequencing of

these activities and whether or not the timing is going to be different now because of some of these environmental interactions.

And again, let us make sure that we can spend the money effectively and efficiently, and if a schedule is going to be stretched out,

then let us only put the money in that can be spent during the

time frame.

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Holgate, Presidents Bush and Putin have

agreed to significant reductions in nuclear weapons. One expert on

nonproliferation issues, Kenneth Luongo, said that, ‘‘Despite the

widespread belief that the United States is helping Russia to dismantle its nuclear weapons, it is not true. There is no dedicated

program to assist Russia with wide dismantlement.’’ Will you

please share your thoughts on Mr. Luongo’s statement?

Ms. HOLGATE. His statement is technically accurate, Mr. Chairman. The challenge comes from the confusion in how we talk about

these dangerous pieces of equipment. It is true that there is no

dedicated program to deal with the warhead dismantlement itself,

and sometimes people use the word ‘‘nuclear weapon’’ to talk about

the warhead. Sometimes they use it to talk about the entire delivery system, the missile, the silo, the submarine, or the bomber.

And while there are massive programs underway in the Department of Defense aiming at the delivery systems, the Russians have

so far refused offers of U.S. assistance to help actually dismantle

the warhead.

At the Defense Department, when I led the Cooperative Threat

Reduction Program there, we orchestrated a package to offer the

Russians to help them dismantle nuclear warheads and they were

so concerned at that time about what kind of information and sensitive knowledge might be gained by the United States because of

our access requirements that they knew would follow from that

money, that they refused to accept our assistance to do that. I

would expect that if you ask current Department of Defense officials whether that offer would either be reiterated or whether it is

still on the table, you would find that it is, but it is not part of a

budget and it is not part of a program at this time.

Senator AKAKA. I have a question for all of you. Prior to that,

Senator Carnahan has asked me to place a statement into the

record, and so without objection, Senator Carnahan’s statement

will be placed in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Carnahan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARNAHAN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing is especially important today, as the

United States examines claims by Osama bin Laden that he has acquired chemical,

biological, and nuclear weapons. The implications are quite serious—whether or not

this claim is true. the United States must continue improving its efforts to counter

the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Yesterday, the Washington Post reported that a chief Pakistani nuclear scientist

had been holding talks with bin Laden’s followers. Equally as disturbing are recent

reports that nuclear materials may have been stolen from Russia in the last two

years.

The intelligence community has said that it is unlikely that bin Laden’s al

Quaeda group obtained sufficient resources to construct a nuclear bomb. The prospect of international terrorists and rogue nations obtaining such weapons is

daunting.

53

For the last decade, America’s enemies have expressed a willingness to pay Soviet

scientists for expertise to build weapons of mass destruction. The United States and

its allies have tried to stop this so-called ‘‘brain drain,’’ by providing financial incentives to former Soviet scientists to discourage them from cooperating with rogue elements.

In addition, the Defense Department’s Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction

program has worked with other governments to reduce former Soviet stockpiles. The

results have been quite promising. Since 1997, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus

have been free of nuclear weapons. And Russia continues to work with the United

States to comply with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). As a result,

we have managed to cut nuclear stockpiles practically in half, with Russia maintaining only 8,000 active warheads to date. But much more remains to be done.

I am pleased that President Bush and Russian President Putin are conducting

their arms control talks today. Both nations appear committed to work closely together to reduce their nuclear arsenals to START II requirements. This is an important step forward. As we progress on the diplomatic front, we must also improve

our internal efforts to re-shape our government to reinforce counter-proliferation

policies.

It is imperative that the United States remain proactive in suppressing the worldwide spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. This requires that we upgrade our intelligence capabilities, continue monitoring other nations’ compliance

with arms control treaties, provide adequate compensation to former Soviet weapons

scientists, and continue accounting for the thousands of weapons produced by the

Soviet Union.

As of now, our government attempts to accomplish these objectives through several Federal agencies, spread out among three Cabinet Departments. These organizations do great work. But I do not believe that they have reached their maximum

potential.

Senator Hagel’s proposal attempts to better coordinate America’s WMD policies.

I am hopeful that this hearing will shed light on this proposal, and provide additional recommendations for improving our counter-proliferation efforts.

I look forward to hearing our panelists’ testimony today, and working with Senator Hagel on this important issue. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. To all of you, yesterday, President Bush said,

‘‘Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons

of mass destruction and we will strengthen our efforts to cut off

every possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons

material and expertise.’’ From this statement, what changes do you

see with respect to U.S. nonproliferation programs in Russia? Ms.

Jones.

Ms. JONES. I think that statement calls even more for the kind

of committee we are talking about to coordinate the efforts. I think

it also underlies the importance of the strategic plan so that we can

look at whether or not we have the right mix of nonproliferation

programs? Are we providing the funds to those pieces or those programs that could tackle the highest risk? So I think the statement

really underscores the need for the strategic plan and this coordinating committee.

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Holgate.

Ms. HOLGATE. Mr. Senator, my fear is that the current efforts to

deal with the specific challenge that the President referenced in

that statement focus almost exclusively on the demand side of the

problem and totally inadequately on the supply side. The current

counterterrorism activities are trying to identify, locate, and root

out terrorists where they currently are located, but it has no component that addresses how you protect the material that those terrorists might be trying to get access to.

As Dr. Spector mentioned, the $40 billion emergency appropriation to address counterterror activities in the wake of September

11 contained absolutely no money to increase or accelerate these

54

programs of cooperation with Russia designed specifically to get at

the supply of the materials and the weapons that so concern us all.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Spector.

Mr. SPECTOR. Well, I think that is right. I think there is a disconnect between the President’s statement and the actual activities

of the administration. We saw it in the way they handled the budget this year, where these programs tended to be trimmed rather

than boosted up. We are seeing it now in this sort of ongoing review that never seems to end, so that some of these programs are

just mired in uncertainty. Thus, I think there is, as I said, there

is a gap, indeed a gulf, between what the President’s aspirations

are and what his administration is actually doing at this time. I

think that is very unfortunate.

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Jones, in your testimony, you note that the

Congress has authorized in excess of $5.5 billion for U.S. nonproliferation programs to Russia and the other Newly Independent

States. How much of this money has been spent in Russia and the

Newly Independent States? Also, would you share some success

stories regarding the nonproliferation programs?

Ms. JONES. Senator, I am not sure that I would have the numbers for you. I can certainly try to provide them for the record in

terms of how much has been spent in Russia. For two of the programs that we have looked at, the Nuclear Cities Initiative and the

Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, as Dr. Spector mentioned,

a great portion of the funding was initially spent at the weapons

complex here in the United States. That has been changing and it

is evolving so that more money will be going to Russia. But for the

whole $5 billion, I am not sure that I have that breakdown for you.

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Holgate, are there routine joint U.S.-Russian

strategic planning meetings, and if so, how successful are these

meetings?

Ms. HOLGATE. At the current time, I am aware of no such meetings. In the history of the U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, I

would say that the bi-national commission established by Vice

President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin offered one of

the few venues in which cabinet-level colleagues in the United

States and Russia would interact every 6 months, and the preparation for that interaction, the attention that was brought from the

Vice President and his office to delivering on commitments made

at the previous 6-month meeting, really did create a mechanism for

senior-level interactions, whether it is Defense, Energy, State Department, or other departments involved. That interaction provided—probably not what it was quite planned to do—but in this

nonproliferation cooperation field, it did provide a good mechanism

to be sure that senior people knew what was going on and to give

impetus to bureaucracies that might get mired down in workinglevel concerns.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Spector, you recommend that Congress

should require that the President report on the status of its efforts

to accelerate the highly-enriched uranium purchase agreement. Do

you feel that the current focus on proliferation risks of nuclear material from Russia will accelerate the administration’s review of the

agreement?

55

Mr. SPECTOR. I wish I could say yes. But, I must say that that

has not been my impression. My impression is that this review is

a slow but steady effort, and it seems to be dragging on. When I

interviewed the National Security Council official I mentioned earlier, I asked him in many different ways what was being done in

this sphere in light of September 11. And in many different ways,

he deflected me, in effect to say, we are still reviewing these programs. This high-enriched uranium program is one of them. But

nothing was said with a sense of urgency and no statement was

made suggesting that the administration was moving the process

aggressively because it was so concerned about these matters. It

was much the opposite, a sort of treadmill. They are just going to

go about their business as usual.

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Jones, the Department of Defense is responsible for assisting former Soviet States with destroying their nuclear and chemical weapons stockpiles. Were biological agents

stockpiled? If so, are there plans to destroy these stockpiles, as

well? Which agency should take the lead for U.S. assistance?

Ms. JONES. I am sorry, Senator, I do not have the information

to be able to respond to that question.

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Holgate.

Ms. HOLGATE. I can shed a little bit of light on that question, sir.

There was very minimal stockpiling of actual delivery-scale biological agents in Russia in the Soviet time frame. They mainly depended on having massive production capability to allow for surge

production in the case of an order given from Moscow. Tons of anthrax could be created, just as an example, within months of a direct order if a need was identified. So there were very little actual

stocks in place.

Many of those stocks were destroyed in the wake of President

Gorbachev’s announcement that, in fact, the Soviet Union had violated the Biological Weapons Convention and they were coming

clean in the late 1980’s and the Soviets then destroyed many of

those stocks. Some of the way that they destroyed them was to

bury them on the island called Resurrection Island in the Aral Sea

in the territory of what is now Uzbekistan, and there is a project

underway through the Department of Defense under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to go back and make sure that

those stocks were actually permanently destroyed. There was concern that they were not fully destroyed.

And so that is one of the few examples where stocks have been

addressed. Mostly, the DOD activities have been focusing on eliminating the massive production capabilities.

Senator AKAKA. Can you answer the question about which agency should take the lead for U.S. assistance?

Ms. HOLGATE. I would say the Department of Defense is already

engaged in this area, has good relationships, and has the ability to

get the funding when they are ready for it.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Ms. Holgate, cooperative threat reduction efforts have tended to

experience mission creep in which funds are used for other activities, such as infrastructure and support costs. How have these tendencies affected the efficiency of these programs and could a coordinating body make these programs more efficient?

56

Ms. HOLGATE. Sir, I certainly think a coordinating body can

make the programs more efficient, but I would suggest that the inclusion of U.S. Government funds to support some of the infrastructure and supporting activities has actually increased the efficiency of these programs. Rather than representing mission creep,

they represent a recognition of the total mission.

The reason that many of these activities have been undertaken

in Russia has to do with resource limitations within Russia, and

what these program managers were finding was that they might

have funding to do a very narrow slice, in some ways the most exciting slice of the project, but it was not moving forward because

they had inability to provide funding for the support activities that

would actually make the achievement of the nonproliferation goals

possible. And so they began to incorporate into budget requests the

supporting requirements to achieve the goals, and that has made

the achievement of those goals much more efficient in the time

since that has been done.

Senator AKAKA. Ms. Jones, the brain drain prevention programs

within the Departments of State, Energy, and Defense have enabled former USSR weapons scientists to remain in their states

without having to sell their weapons-related knowledge. To what

extent can these programs be combined with weapons and material

storage and disposal activities? Could former Soviet chemical weapons scientists be employed in the construction of Russian chemical

weapons destruction facilities?

Ms. JONES. I think that is, again, where a committee that would

be coordinating the various activities of these programs could look

for those kinds of synergies. Are there skills and abilities that

weapons scientists have, whether they specialized in biological

weapons or nuclear weapons, that could be used for some other

program?

Just as a simple example, DOE also runs a program to improve

the safety of Soviet-designed reactors. When we looked at that program, there was a need for fire doors, metal doors rather than

wooden doors in these particular facilities. Let us look at the brain

drain programs. Are there people already in Russia that could help

design and build those doors, again, looking for leveraging with the

different programs? So I think there is room for that, Senator.

Senator AKAKA. I have a final question to all of you. As I said

earlier, we will reschedule the administration’s testimony after the

Bush-Putin summit. As experts in this field, are there questions

you would ask of our administration witnesses when they appear

before this Subcommittee in a couple of weeks? That is my question

to you. If you want to reserve that, please give us the questions

and that might help us have better insight into some questions to

them.

Again, I want to thank all of you for being here, for your responses, for your testimonies, and I want to thank you, Ms. Jones,

Ms. Holgate, and Dr. Spector, for being with us today.

I believe that the Russian government wishes to be a responsible

steward of its weapons of mass destruction. I also believe that

President Bush recognizes the importance of threat reduction programs. However, I share our witnesses’ concerns that the administration, even with new evidence of terrorists’ interests in acquiring

57

and using weapons of mass destruction, has not acted to accelerate

efforts to improve security over critical materials and expertise in

the former Soviet States.

Indeed, coordination, management, and attention is needed from

senior levels in the administration. Unless this attention is concentrated exclusively on nonproliferation and threat reduction objectives, the relationships between U.S. and Russian counterparts

will continue to weaken and opportunities for cooperation in new

areas will continue to be lost.

Ms. Holgate recommends the appointment of a Deputy National

Security Advisor devoted to addressing these programs. This is an

interesting concept and I look forward to the administration’s comments on your proposal, Ms. Holgate.

The record will remain open for questions from Members of the

Subcommittee for 1 week and we ask that the witnesses respond

to any questions in a timely manner. I remind you again, if you

have any questions that we can ask to the administration, we

would certainly want to receive them.

Again, I thank all of you very much and the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(59)

COMBATING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS

OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) WITH

NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS:

NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE

COORDINATION ACT OF 2001

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 2001

U.S. SENATE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE, OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka,

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Akaka, Cleland, Cochran, and Carnahan.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee will come to order.

I want to thank our witnesses from the administration for being

here with us today. We are joined by Vann Van Diepen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; Marshall Billingslea, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations; Kenneth Baker, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Defense

Nuclear Nonproliferation from the Department of Energy; and Matthew Borman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.

I would like to reiterate that our Subcommittee rules require all

testimony to be submitted 48 hours before the hearing. The Departments represented today were invited to testify at this hearing

more than 2 weeks ago. In spite of this and repeated reminders as

of yesterday afternoon, we had received only one statement. This

was as of yesterday.

I would like to apologize to the Members of the Subcommittee for

the administration’s inability to comply with the Subcommittee

rules.

This morning’s hearing is a continuation of one we held on

Wednesday, November 14. The reason I called these hearings is because I have been deeply concerned about potential proliferation of

chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons from the former Soviet

Union. Since September 11, I think this is an issue that we have

to focus on with even greater intensity.

President Bush came into office declaring that he would ask, ‘‘the

Congress to increase substantially our assistance to dismantle as

60

many of Russia’s weapons as possible as quickly as possible.’’ He

began his administration announcing a review of Russian nonproliferation programs. This was a welcome first step.

One of the reasons for this hearing is to determine how we can

focus our aid efforts more effectively. Unfortunately, the administration cut the budgets for these programs before completing its review. This approach does not seem to me to make sense, particularly in light of the events of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks.

I hope today the administration will be able to brief us on the

results of its review and indicate to us what its intentions are concerning funding for the future of these vital programs. If it still

proposes to advocate cutting these programs, the administration

needs to justify why these cuts increase our security.

We have lost valuable time in figuring how to recork the bottles

containing dangerous chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. I

hope the administration shares my sense of urgency, and if it does

not, I would like to know why not.

After the first day of the Bush-Putin summit, President Bush remarked that, ‘‘Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction . . . we will strengthen our

efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical, and

nuclear weapons material and expertise.’’ Today’s witnesses will discuss how the administration proposes

to carry out that pledge. I hope we may learn how the various programs in the different agencies involved in nonproliferation and

threat reduction work together, how these agencies include private

sector and nongovernmental efforts in nonproliferation activities.

We must make certain that government and non-government

spending on nonproliferation programs complement each other so

that resources are used effectively and efficiently.

Let me again thank our witnesses again for being with us today.

I look forward to your testimony on these important and timely

questions.

At this time, I would like to call on my colleague for his statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It has been clear to me for some time that nonproliferation is an

absolutely critical element to our national security. I believe that

we must expand and enhance our current nonproliferation programs to eliminate as quickly as possible the threat posed by inadequately controlled weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union.

A bipartisan task force led by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler

recently concluded that the funding for these programs should be

increased to four times the current level. As I stated at our previous hearing on this topic, the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001 is a useful step to take in conjunction with the

increased funding recommended by the Baker-Cutler task force.

In their recent book, ‘‘Plague Wars’’—and I have a copy of it

here—it is a fascinating book. Investigative journalist Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg provide a frightening glimpse of the biologiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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cal weapons research that was conducted by the Soviet Union.

They portray a bureaucracy run amuck with layers of secrecy that

prevented effective oversight by any responsible agency.

Furthermore, they cite Defense Intelligence Agency and CIA reports that as late as 3 years ago, we could not preclude the potential of ongoing biological warfare research in Russia. Some reports

even suggest the Russian program has produced genetically engineered anthrax and other pathogens resistant to existing antibiotics and vaccines.

The proliferation problem is two-dimensional. We must ensure

that any existing stocks of biological agents are properly secured

and destroyed as soon as possible. We must prevent Russian scientists with expertise in such weapons from selling their skills to

rogue states or terrorists.

In the face of this clear and present danger, we have disturbing

evidence that our own capacity to respond to bioterrorist attacks is

inadequate. Besides the difficulties in coordination revealed by the

recent anthrax attacks, Department of Defense exercises over the

past several years have highlighted problems in our preparedness.

Even with this overwhelming evidence that more must be done

quickly, my efforts to speed funding to improve the facilities at the

CDC have met with opposition.

The CDC is the arm of our government responsible for controlling outbreaks of disease. The almost accidental involvement of the

CDC in the first anthrax mailing in Florida is all that stood between this country and a far higher casualty count from these anthrax attacks.

The current facilities at the CDC that house these critical links

in our ability to detect and respond to a biological attack are painfully and woefully inadequate. In the middle of the anthrax crisis,

a broken cable line interrupting the CDC’s testing of samples for

12 hours was found. With a finite window of opportunity to test,

diagnose, and treat victims of a possible biological attack, every

minute of testing counts. To lose half-a-day is an eternity for scientists and technicians. Yet, it has happened, and it will happen

again if Congress does not act to upgrade these facilities quickly.

That is why I introduced the Public Health Emergencies Accountability Act earlier this month. This act puts in place a procedure that allows clear assignment of responsibility in cases where

the public health is threatened. It further mandates the exchange

of information between institutions primarily responsible for public

health, such as the CDC, and those primarily responsible for countering criminal and terrorist activities.

We must resource the CDC to carry out its critical function. The

CDC currently has a 10-year construction plan to make these necessary upgrades, but since September 11, it has been painfully obvious that we do not have 10 years to get the CDC ready for what

we now know is a very possible bioterrorist attack.

We need a 5-year plan at the very least. That means Congress

needs to approve the $250 million in funding this year. The Senate

has approved the full $250 million, and I helped to get $100 million

here, added on in the Senate, over the $150 million the President

proposed, but I am getting very concerned that the Members of the

House do not want to act on this legislation.

62

1The prepared statement of Mr. Van Diepen appears in the Appendix on page 268.

The Members of the House who are participating in the Labor/

HHS/Appropriations Conference Committee are not willing to fund

the CDC above the $175 million for construction which passed the

House this fall. I do not know what else has to happen in this

country to demonstrate to the Members of the House that this construction is not only important, but mandatory, to upgrade the

CDC as soon as possible. And I call on them today to match the

Senate’s mark of $250 million in construction aid to the CDC.

My friend, the former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, continues his tireless advocacy for the nonproliferation initiatives

begun under his sponsorship 10 years ago. He has recently provided testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee upon

which I sit with a series of recommendations for enhancing our

counter-proliferation programs as well as improving our ability to

respond to a bioterrorist attack.

These recommendations include increase funding for nonproliferation programs, including a program to actively engage the

scientists of the Russian and former Soviet Union programs in our

own defensive research. Such a program could enhance our ability

to produce and stockpile needed vaccines while preventing the loss

of dangerous skills to other parties.

I am convinced that our national security depends upon the effective coordination and resourcing of our nonproliferation programs.

I support both the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of

2001 of which I am a co-sponsor and the creation of a Deputy National Security Advisor committed exclusively to reducing the

threats we face from weapons of mass destruction.

We can no longer afford to under-resource nonproliferation. Many

distinguished of both parties have cited the need for increasing

nonproliferation funding. Our intelligence community continues to

highlight the threat of improperly controlled weapons falling into

the wrong hands. The time to act is now. I encourage the administration and my colleagues in Congress to support the full resourcing of required nonproliferation programs and our public

health infrastructure. There is no higher national security priority.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your statement, Senator Cleland.

Now I would like to ask for the statements of our witnesses. Mr.

Van Diepen, you may give your statement at this time.

All the witnesses will have their full written statements entered

into the record.

You may begin, Mr. Van Diepen.

TESTIMONY OF VANN H. VAN DIEPEN,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator.

I am very pleased to be here to discuss nonproliferation assistance programs and coordination. The proliferation of nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them is a central security threat facing the United States,

63

our allies, and our friends. Where we once faced thousands of nuclear weapons under centralized command of a rival great power,

September 11 and the biological attacks since have shown how

much more diverse and less predictable the threat has become.

While we must be prepared to address the many avenues from

which rogue countries and terrorists and their supporters may

choose when seeking to advance their attack capabilities, we must

also, as both of you have noted in your statements, address the Soviet legacy and its proliferation implications.

The State Department has direct responsibility for several nonproliferation programs directed at or relevant to the countries of

the former Soviet Union. In addition, the Department provides foreign policy guidance and diplomatic support for the programs of

other agencies.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the new countries lacked the

laws, expertise, and technical resources to implement effective export controls. State’s Export Control Assistance Program was created to help establish or strengthen export controls in the new

independent states of the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. As funding increased and the program matured, the scope

has expanded to include key countries through which weapons of

mass destruction, materials, and technologies are likely to transit

while continuing to support the development of more robust systems in potential supplier states. This program has grown from

less than $5 million per year in the mid-1990’s to the President’s

request for $39 million for this fiscal year.

State Department chairs an interagency working group on export

control assistance which directs and coordinates the work of the

various U.S. agencies that implement these programs in over 25

countries worldwide.

Another concern was the threat posed by the thousands of Soviet

weapon scientists who no longer would be supported after the Soviet Union’s demise, and this is something that Senator Cleland

made clear in his statement.

The International Science and Technology Centers began their

work to address this problem in Moscow in 1994 and in Kiev in

1995. As the program has matured, the focus has shifted from simply stemming brain drain to also redirecting scientists towards sustainable careers in peaceful, transparent, civilian endeavors in

their home countries, be these commercial endeavors or scientific

endeavors.

The program now includes nations of particular interest to the

U.S. war in Afghanistan: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia, and Georgia. Other key regional states,

Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, are in the process of joining

one of the science centers.

For the past 4 years, the State Department has been an active

participant in the U.S. effort to redirect former Soviet biological

weapons scientists. The program provides incentives for scientists

to refrain from cooperating with terrorist groups or states harboring them and focuses their expertise on critical public health

needs such as HIV/AIDS, multi-drug resistant tuberculosis, and a

number of plant and animal diseases. The solid collaborative research basis that we have developed through this effort will be a

64

springboard for expanded work that will respond to the Bush-Putin

initiative to counter bioterrorism.

The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, created to permit

a rapid response to unanticipated requirements or opportunities, is

a flexible responsive nonproliferation tool. Of particular relevance

to the request of this Subcommittee is the NDF’s work on Tracker,

a stand-alone software package that permits a country to use modern computer tools to track export licensing and enforcement matters from a license application through the process, among central

government agencies, and with the export control personnel at

ports and border posts. This system is now deployed in eight countries with further applications in process.

State Department also plays a key role in efforts concerning plutonium disposition, eliminating Russian plutonium production reactors, support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and safeguarding nuclear materials worldwide and coordinating efforts to

prevent nuclear smuggling.

Another priority is making sure that our friends and allies shoulder their fair share of the burden. It is important to build a community committed to paying more than lip service, and we are not

shy about letting our allies know when we think they should be

providing more resources.

On your question concerning how these programs are funded and

how they are coordinated, all U.S. policy implementation and oversight of nonproliferation assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union is coordinated at senior levels by the Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee, or PCC, chaired by a National

Security Council senior director with Assistant Secretary-level representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and

other concerned agencies.

This committee works to ensure that individual assistance programs are coordinated within and across agencies and that they

serve nonproliferation threat reduction priorities effectively. The

PCC has also been charged to develop the strategic plan to guide

near- and farther-term nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation with Russia and Eurasia.

In addition, there are standing working groups to ensure close

day-to-day coordination among programs so that the programs complement, not compete, with each other in addressing U.S. nonproliferation objectives. The work of these groups feed directly into

the PCC. This structure works well and substantially addresses

what is proposed in the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination

Act of 2001.

As noted in several of the statements from the witnesses in your

November 14 hearing, despite the number and complexity of nonproliferation assistance programs, effective implementation and

senior-level coordination already exists.

As you know, President Bush directed that a rigorous review be

conducted of all U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance to Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union. That

review is now in the final stages.

Without prejudicing the White House’s final decision, we expect

that the State Department’s nonproliferation assistance programs

65

1The prepared statement of Mr. Billingslea appears in the Appendix on page 279.

will continue to play a critical role in combating the proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction.

In the post-September 11 world, we believe that stemming the

flow of WMD materials, technologies, and expertise worldwide has

to be among our highest national priorities and our programs must

address that challenge.

The private sector and nongovernmental organizations play several important roles in this endeavor. In our efforts to redirect

former weapons scientists to peaceful civilian scientific and commercial research, U.S. industry is helping scientists and their institutes make a permanent transition to peaceful pursuits.

The Science and Technology Centers’ industry partner program, for example, now attracts over $20 million annually in corporate

funding.

In export controls, U.S. companies have a great deal of expertise

in implementing export control regulations. They know the ins and

outs of licensing systems, and they have a great deal of knowledge

to share with countries and foreign companies that are new to this

world. U.S. companies play an important role in our effort to inform and educate their foreign counterparts.

During the past year, a new opportunity for public-private nonproliferation partnership emerged with the establishment of Ted

Turner’s Nuclear Threat Initiative. Its management and board of

directors, which includes several members of Congress, have consulted actively with the administration on their program and have

made a commitment to coordinate their activities with those of the

government.

I think it is clear that the Bush Administration fully shares the

objectives that led Senator Hagel and the other sponsors of S. 673

to offer this legislation. I believe a close examination of how we are

coordinating policy and implementation of these programs today

will provide clear evidence that we are already doing what Congress would have us do in this regard. S. 673 is not needed, as the

Bush Administration has already acted and has already taken the

kind of steps this legislation calls for.

We look forward to working with you and other committees and

to keeping you fully informed on how we conduct these programs

of U.S. nonproliferation assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union, on how we work with other concerned governments to

increase their contribution and ensure that our respective assistance is complementary and not duplicative, and on how we seek to

work with private-sector donors of assistance in these areas.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Van Diepen, for your

statement.

Mr. Billingslea, you may give your statement now.

TESTIMONY OF MARSHALL S. BILLINGSLEA,1 ACTING DEPUTY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEGOTIATION

POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before

your Subcommittee this morning to discuss nonproliferation assistVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
66

ance programs to the republics of the former Soviet Union and the

need for careful interagency coordination of these projects.

A key objective of this hearing, as I understand it, is to obtain

administration views on S. 673. So I will address this legislation

first and then will turn to a brief discussion of the Department of

Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and our views on

proliferation issues in general. And with your permission, I will

simply summarize and highlight my testimony and submit the remainder for the record.

The Department of Defense has reviewed S. 673, legislation that

would establish an interagency committee within the Executive

Branch to review and coordinate U.S. proliferation prevention efforts. We agree that interagency coordination of nonproliferation

programs is crucial, but the Department of Defense believes that

the Bush Administration is already doing precisely that.

We believe that a legally mandated interagency committee could

complicate the existing interagency coordinating process that is

currently managed by the National Security Council. We must be

careful not to preclude delegation of authority below the Assistant

Secretary level since this would be inconsistent with the way the

Executive Branch is currently doing business. A great deal of coordination and policy work is done at successive levels beginning

with action officers proceeding through office directors and on to

Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense and up.

The strategy that the Executive Branch is pursuing is straightforward. First and foremost, we seek to destroy weapons of mass

destruction and their means of delivery, if possible, at their existing location. If it is not possible to destroy such weapons, as is

sometimes the case with pathogen stocks that might be needed for

disease research, then we will seek to consolidate and secure them.

Further, we seek to prevent weapons of mass destruction materials

and knowledge from leaving the territory of the former Soviet

Union.

The Department of Defense has worked closely with the NSC

and other Departments such as the Departments of State, Energy,

and Commerce to ensure effective execution of these programs. We

also work closely with other agencies to ensure that there is no duplication of effort.

Finally, we must take great care to ensure that U.S. assistance

to the former Soviet republics cannot be diverted, cannot contribute

to offensive weapons programs or proliferation, or subsidize or otherwise offset other military activities.

A good example of this coordination that is ongoing is found in

the Department of Defense’s efforts to prevent the proliferation of

biological weapons. The Department of Defense is part of an interagency group that reviews all biological weapons proliferation prevention projects that are proposed through the Department of

State’s International Science and Technology Center. Based on

those reviews, approved projects are matched to various departments’ areas of expertise and authority.

For our part, the Department of Defense is most concerned with

the threat that is posed by dangerous pathogens, particularly the

infectious diseases such as smallpox. Over the years, we have

found that Russian scientists frequently have unique valuable inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
67

sights into the pathogenesis of various biological agents. The Department of Defense engages in targeted biodefense research

projects with Russia in these areas, as agreed to in the interagency

process. These projects are designed to cooperatively exploit knowledge to enhance U.S. detection of, protection from, and treatment

of these potentially deadly substances. I will return to the matter

of biological weapons in a moment, but I use it here to illustrate

that we do have a good process in place and that that process is

working well.

Let me turn now to an overview of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the areas of activity in the former Soviet

Union. We believe that the CTR program is an important part of

our national security strategy. We are privileged to have enjoyed

sustained congressional support and robust funding since the inception of this program.

The President’s fiscal year 2002 budget request included $403 million for the DOD CTR program, $403 million, which was virtually the same amount budgeted by the previous administration.

We appreciate the House Appropriations Committee’s full funding

of our request and are hopeful that the Senate Appropriations

Committee will be equally supportive.

The funds that we have asked for will be used in a variety of program areas that I can summarize. In the nuclear weapons and delivery systems area, we maintain a Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination program that is reducing Russia’s strategic offensive arms

by destroying strategic WMD delivery systems. I can give you a

breakout of the numbers of nuclear submarines, launchers for submarine launch ballistic missiles and SLBMs. It is in my testimony.

We also have a Weapons Transportation Security program with

Russia that assists in the movement and consolidation of nuclear

weapons from Russia’s Ministry of Defense operational sites to

Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy nuclear weapons dismantlement facilities, and we are providing assistance to the Russian

MOD to bolster their ability to respond to and to mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapons accident or an attempted theft.

For instance, in fiscal year 2001, we funded 53 train shipments

designed to carry nuclear weapons to dismantlement sites. We

funded the maintenance of 79 railcars and contracted for special

emergency response vehicles and equipment to be given to the

MOD.

We continue to be concerned, Mr. Chairman, with the potential

for theft or diversion from Russia of nuclear weapons. Therefore,

we have developed the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security program

to make physical security upgrades to key sites, to install inventory

control systems and practices to account for these weapons in the

custody of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

During fiscal year 2001, we completed testing and we finalized

selection on an approved suite of sensors and equipment to be installed at Russian weapon storage sites. We shipped six sets of

Quick Fix fences and sensors to various sites in northern Russia.

We funded and verified installation of such kinds of equipment at

numerous other sites, contracted for additional guard equipment,

training, and facilities, and delivered certified computers to help in

inventory management. We think that the installation of physical

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security measures, preferably those that can be provided without

extensive training of guard forces, is a good interim solution pending the eventual dismantlement of nuclear weapons stocks, and we

may look to do more of this kind of work.

Because time is short, I will turn briefly to Ukraine and a few

other countries. I am pleased to report that our Strategic Nuclear

Arms Elimination program in Ukraine has eliminated all of the

START-accountable nuclear delivery system launchers, and we are

dismantling other WMD delivery systems and infrastructure.

Similarly, we have completely eliminated all weapons of mass destruction from Kazakhstan.

On the biological weapons front, we believe that it is important

to continue cooperation with the biological weapons designers and

engineers in the former Soviet Union. This practice is enabling us

to identify many research institutes that house dangerous pathogens and production-capable facilities.

The Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention program of the

CTR program is consolidating and securing dangerous pathogen

collections. We are dismantling former Soviet BW research and

production facilities, and as I described earlier, we are targeting research to enhance U.S. biodefense capabilities against dangerous

pathogens, some of the work we actually are doing with the CDC

and other research institutes.

In our view, the Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention aspect of the CTR program is of exceptional and increasing importance. We also attach great importance to the comparable programs

maintained by other agencies such as the Department of State’s

ISTC program and the Department of Energy’s programs.

We have two objectives for the BWPP, the consolidation and

elimination of pathogenic stocks, to prevent them from falling into

the wrong hands, and collaborative research and development with

foreign scientists who can assist the United States in better protecting the American people and the global community from these

diseases. In this vein, the Department of Defense believes that the

Joint Statement on Bioterrorism reached between President Bush

and Russian President Putin creates an important opportunity for

closer collaboration.

On the chemical weapons front, we also are concerned with the

threat of chemical weapons proliferation, and we are troubled by

inadequate security and safety measures currently being maintained on stocks of chemical agent and we have a program that is

addressing this concern.

In Uzbekistan, we are dismantling the former Soviet chemical

weapons research, development, and testing facilities, and there

are numerous other activities that I could get in, time permitting,

but I have already greatly exceeded my time, Mr. Chairman.

So let me just summarize by saying that we believe the CTR program has played a crucial role in the Department of Defense’s efforts and the U.S. Government’s larger efforts to prevent proliferation. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have all acceded to the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and have rid themselves of their

nuclear capability. The DOD portion of the CTR program was essential and instrumental in this respect.

69

1The prepared statement of Mr. Baker appears in the Appendix on page 290.

The Congress, the Executive Branch, and the American people

can and should be proud of the Cooperative Threat Program’s accomplishments to date, and I appreciate the opportunity to testify

before this committee.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Billingslea, for your

statement.

Mr. Baker, you may give your statement at this time.

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH E. BAKER,1 PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT

DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,

thank you for the opportunity to be here today to talk about the

Department of Energy’s nuclear nonproliferation programs.

With your permission, I will make a few opening comments and

submit a longer one for the record.

Senator AKAKA. We would appreciate that.

Mr. BAKER. I want to thank the Subcommittee and, indeed, all

the Members of the Senate for their strong interest and support of

the U.S. nonproliferation programs. Congress’ demonstrated commitment to these programs has sent a strong signal that it knows

the mission is critical and enduring and has helped the National

Nuclear Security Administration to plan effectively and to work

even harder after September 11.

In the aftermath of September 11, the attacks against the United

States, the work of the National Nuclear Security Administration

within the Department of Energy has taken on higher visibility

and greater importance. Almost a year ago, in January 2001, the

bipartisan report by Baker-Cutler mentioned by Senator Cleland

concluded the most urgent unmet national security threat to the

United States today. This is the danger of weapons of mass destruction and weapons-usable materials falling in the hands of terrorists or hostile states and used against American citizens at

home.

All of us have seen the reports that Osama bin Laden has attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and that he has

called the attainment of such weapons a religious duty. In a nutshell, that face of the threat is confronting us today. Let me assure

you, all of the people in the National Nuclear Security Administration are committed to supporting with all available resources, this

country’s work, and accelerate our efforts to eliminate this threat

from the face of the earth.

If I may make a few general comments on the draft legislation

and more later that you are considering. The NNSA wants to ensure to you that the interagency coordination is as good as it can

be in programs, and they are effective against the nonproliferation

agenda. We have already been successful in many of these areas,

and I will discuss a few of these in my following testimony.

Even before September 11, reducing the potential for diversion of

Russian nuclear warheads and materials has been a critical priority for the United States. It is essential that such warheads and

70

materials be kept out of the hands of the so-called rogue states as

well as terrorist organizations.

The National Nuclear Security Administration is working with

Russia to attack this problem on many fronts. For example, to improve security at sites that have weapons-usable materials, improve Russia’s export control systems, and train Russian experts to

take greater responsibility to ensuring security and protecting

weapons of mass destruction materials.

The United States has already completed rapid security upgrades

for thousands of Russian Navy warheads, and security of over 220

metric tons of Russian fissile material has been secured, enough to

make roughly 20,000 nuclear devices.

Last year, Russia and the United States agreed to dispose of 68

metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium, 34 metric tons in

each country. The administration is currently examining alternatives to reduce the cost of this program and to make it more sustainable to Russia. A final decision is expected in about 2 months.

And under the HEU purchase agreement, the United States has

removed more than 130 metric tons of HEU from Russia’s military

programs. The United States is working with Russia to improve its

ability to detect and interdict nuclear materials at border checkpoints and at airports. Some borders are thousands of miles long

and pose difficult challenges, but we are tackling that problem.

The NNSA is working intensively to reduce the risk of Russia’s

highly trained nuclear scientists and engineers already mentioned,

also, the ones that are unemployed or under-employed and would

be tempted to sell their expertise to the highest bidder. The United

States is taking steps to help Russia transform its closed nuclear

cities by developing civilian employment opportunities for displaced

workers. These objectives are pursued principally through what we

call the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Russia Transition Assistance Efforts, which encompass the initiatives for proliferation prevention in a program called Nuclear Cities Initiatives.

To give you a couple examples of what the initiatives for proliferation prevention system has done, we work very closely with

State Department to make sure that we secure jobs for Russians

in basic technology work. Currently, programs in particular on the

IPP have been effectively demonstrated. We have private and public partnerships in pursuing the nonproliferation objectives. IPP

has developed partnerships with former weapons scientists and

technicians in over 160 institutions in the former Soviet Union.

While IPP had only $24.5 million to invest in projects during the

past year, it also has required commercial partners at least to

match IPP’s investment projects. These matching funds requirement assisted IPP and Russian partners in identification of technologies that offer the greatest commercial promise by requiring

U.S. industry to make financial commitments to development of

technology at the project’s initiation.

The NNSA believes that the formula that we have developed for

converting former weapons scientists to commercial enterprises

have been successful.

A few examples. Several energy-related technologies have been

commercialized, including what we call a borehole radar intended

71

to enhance coal and oil recovery. This technology could result in

revenues exceeding $2 billion in the next 10 years.

We are seeing the successful commercialization of a wheelchair

seat cushion that will prevent pressure ulcers, responsible for causing tens of thousands of deaths in the United States every year,

saving Medicare $3 billion in annual costs.

The Nuclear Cities Initiative’s first major commercial effort

facilitates the production of kidney dialysis equipment by a joint

venture established between Fresenius Medical Care Center of Lexington, Massachusetts, and the Avangard nuclear weapons assembly plant in Sarov, Russia. This has been a very successful program

that will put a thousand people to work.

A year ago, virtually no westerners has ever been allowed to set

foot into the Avangard facility. Now they are part of the joint venture that will use resources, buildings, and personnel that previously produced nuclear weapons to manufacture life-saving medical devices. This is truly swords in the plowshares.

Looking ahead, as we look ahead, the National Nuclear Security

Administration considers new priorities. We are accelerating, an

important word. The Secretary just said yesterday in Russia, we

will accelerate these programs. There are on going efforts. The National Security Administration is taking advantage of a recently

signed DOE Ministry of Atomic Energy access agreement and focusing on sites in Russia that hold large quantities of fissile materials. Working with the Russian Navy, we are securing approximately 4,000 nuclear weapons and have completed the Second Line

of Defense program, and this now is being expanded into 12 sites.

Today, the NNSA will work even harder to get the 12 up to even

higher numbers.

Research and development is critical to the National Security Administration’s mission. NNSA works with numerous other government agencies to develop technologies that will help detect nuclear,

chemical, and biological proliferation and terrorism, and, hence, the

United States’ ability to address nuclear smuggling and assist local

responders to respond to terrorist threat.

I would like to close by talking about the formal draft legislation.

Although the administration has not taken formal position on draft

legislation you are considering, NNSA respectively believes that it

is not necessary. Too many layers of management can hurt, not

help, effect the implementation of these programs.

The NSC’s Proliferation Strategy Policy Committee chaired by

Dr. Robert Joseph, Assistant to the President, provides a vehicle

for interagency coordination, as it cooperates and provides over

sight over nonproliferation assistance programs to Russia and the

other states of the former Soviet Union. Chaired by the NSC, the

Committee consists of Assistant Secretaries of Defense, from State,

from DOE, from intelligence, and from the Office of the Vice President and other agencies as appropriate for the issue.

This group meets frequently to coordinate critical nonproliferation areas. Just yesterday, we had two meetings discussing nonproliferation issues.

As you know, the NSC is completing a comprehensive review of

all U.S. nonproliferation programs. I applaud this review, which I

see as a viable road map to guide the program to follow on for the

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Borman appears in the Appendix on page 296.

next few years, but the best way to improve communications and

coordination is to make sure the people in place are committed to

doing the best job possible to communicate and coordinate.

The NNSA is committed to this, and I know my colleagues

around this table and the other agencies share in this commitment.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me appear today to address

this panel. I look forward to any questions that you may have.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Baker, for your statement.

My friend and colleague, Ranking Member, Senator Cochran is

here, and I would like to ask him for his statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want

to compliment you for convening this hearing on our efforts to deal

with proliferation and the threat reduction programs that are designed to help make it less likely that there will be proliferation

of mass destruction weapons systems from the former Soviet

Union.

The President has directed that these programs be reviewed, and

I am pleased that the administration has moved forward with the

review and has taken steps to ensure that we are getting good

value for the funds we are spending. It is deceptive and misleading

for some to suggest that funding has been reduced. It is more important to look at these efforts on a program-by-program basis. Reviewed in this way, it is clear that the administration is increasing

funds for programs that are contributing to our national security

and to the security of others as well.

For example, the program to eliminate strategic offensive arms

in Ukraine has been increased by 77 percent in order to accelerate

the elimination of SS–24 ICBMs, and unlike previous years, no

funds were requested to eliminate silos because they have already

been eliminated.

So I am hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that the hearing will offer insight and suggestions that will be helpful to us in determining how

we can put the emphasis where it ought to be put, so that we are

getting good value for the dollars we are spending and that what

we are spending is productive in the overall effort to reduce the

threat and improve security for everyone.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your statement, Senator.

I would like now to call on Mr. Borman for your statement, and

following that, we will have questions for you.

TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW S. BORMAN,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Mr. BORMAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you as

well on behalf of the Department of Commerce for the opportunity

to testify at this hearing on this important subject.

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related matters. So it is a pleasure to be here now at the table, as

it were, to testify.

As with my colleagues, I have a longer statement which I would

appreciate being put in the record, and I will summarize it orally.

For several years, the Department of Commerce has played a significant role in the U.S. Government’s international nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union. My testimony will give

a brief overview of Commerce’s role and then address the questions

you had in your invitation letter.

Since the end of the Soviet Union, Commerce has participated in

the U.S. Government’s nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union. Commerce has worked closely with the Departments of

State, Defense, Energy, and the Customs Service of the Department of Treasury to carry out the export control cooperation programs designed to enhance and, in some cases, establish export

control systems in these various countries.

Commerce strongly believes that bilateral and multilateral export control cooperation is an important part of the U.S. Government’s effort to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms. Experience has shown that export controls are most effective when producing, consuming, and transit

countries all cooperate and maintain similar export controls.

The overarching objective of the U.S. export control cooperation

program, whether in the former Soviet Union or other countries, is

to: (1), assist countries in controlling the export, reexport, and transit of all items on the various multilateral export control regime

lists; that is, the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers

Group, Australia Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime;

(2), also have these countries implement some kind of catch-all controls to catch lower-level items that could be used for weapons of

mass destruction, but are not on the regime list; and then, (3), also

to control the activities of persons subject to these countries’ jurisdiction if these activities could facilitate weapons of mass destruction program, brokering, financing, and technical support.

Commerce’s export control cooperation, which is done primarily

through funding from the State Department, consists primarily of

bilateral technical workshops on specific export control issues, some

multilateral conferences to encourage regional cooperation on export controls, and seminars that are targeted specifically at defense

enterprises in the former Soviet Union countries, particularly Russia and Ukraine.

Over the past several years, Commerce has conducted, in conjunction with the agencies represented here and others, over 200

workshops and seminars with both government officials and industry officials in the former Soviet Union States.

There have been several notable accomplishments as a result of

this program. They include comprehensive export control laws enacted in over half of the former Soviet Union countries with most

of the remaining countries likely to enact such laws within the next

year, significant progress on a regional transit agreement between

the countries in Central Asia and the caucuses to reduce the likelihood that items will be diverted when transiting through these

countries, Kazakhstan promulgating a national control list that

really mirrors the multilateral control list that the United States

74

and the European Union have. Kazakhstan is the first former Soviet Union country to do so.

We have also received some leads on possible violations of U.S.

export control laws from the context we have developed, our law

enforcement officials have developed in the course of doing these

cooperation programs.

Over 900 defense enterprises and other exporters in Russia and

Ukraine have received detailed training and software to enable

them to establish their own internal company control programs, so

that they can control properly the sophisticated dual-use items and

technology that they have.

Finally, we have also distributed software to train foreign export

control licensing officers in 9 of the 12 former Soviet Union countries.

In addition, the enforcement arm of the Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce, has an export control attache

in Moscow now, and this attache essentially has two functions. One

is to really work with Russian export control enforcement officials

to get them to enhance their enforcement of Russia’s export control

law and also to help ensure that U.S. items that are exported into

Russia are not diverted to improper uses.

Let me now briefly address the questions that you had posed in

your invitation letter, Mr. Chairman; first, how does the Department of Commerce participate in the nonproliferation activities

with Federal partners using multilateral export control regimes.

The Department of Commerce, as you know, Bureau of Export Administration, is responsible for implementing the dual-use controls

of the various multilateral export control regimes, and, of course,

we do that in concert with the Departments of State, Energy, and

Defense. We both make proposals to State Department to advance

the regimes in terms of changing controls and also provide input

to the Department of State when other countries make proposals

to change regime controls or policy. In connection with that, whenever the regimes, for example, the missile technology control regime, have outreach efforts to non-members like transit states, the

Commerce Department also participated in that with the other departments mentioned here.

Your second question, how well do Federal nonproliferation programs interact with U.S. commercial interests, from our point of

view, in export control cooperation, there is quite good interaction.

As Mr. Van Diepen has already mentioned, whenever we have bilateral exchanges, we always have the foreign delegations meet

with representatives of U.S. exporting companies, and we think

this is crucial for them to understand why U.S. companies spend

time and money to comply with our export controls and also how

important it is for any government to talk to its industry about

controlling and consulting on export controls.

In fact, just to give you a concrete example, a few weeks ago, we

had a delegation from Ukraine here. The delegation consisted of

some government officials, as well as some members of the Ukrainian parliament, and in addition to meeting with Commerce, Energy, State, Defense, and the Customs Service, they also had a

meeting with a U.S. exporting company and they came up here and

actually had meetings with some members as well.

75

We also work with the various agencies represented here and

any contractors they use on these various nonproliferation assistance programs that you have already heard mentioned to make

sure that any delivery of goods or technologies from the United

States to Russia or other countries complies with U.S. export control laws. So that is another way we interact with U.S. commercial

interests in doing our programs.

That really concludes my summary. Once again, I thank you for

the opportunity to testify on this important subject, and I am

happy to answer whatever questions you or other Members have.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Borman, for your

statement.

I would like to call on my colleague, Senator Carnahan, for your

statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARNAHAN

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I

want to thank you for holding this very important hearing today.

The testimony that we will hear today is especially important as

the evidence mounts up that Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda

network were actively taking steps to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Although these revelations are disturbing, the threat of proliferation has been a concern for some time. Over 11 months ago, Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler presented a report on nonproliferation

programs to the President, and those findings were startling. They

found that 10 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear

weapons remained scattered throughout Russia in more than 100

poorly guarded depots. These weapons are not appropriately accounted for or secured. These conditions make it possible for rogue

nations or terrorists to steal or to buy nuclear materials and to

smuggle them out of Russia.

In fact, 3 weeks ago, the Washington Post reported that nuclear

scientists had been holding talks with bin Laden’s followers. In this

same article, it was reported that nuclear material may have been

stolen from Russia over the last 2 years.

The Baker-Cutler report suggests that the only way to stop this

situation is to expand the United States’ nonproliferation programs. This will require sizeable investments, including a $30 million 10-year budget for these programs overseen by the Departments of Energy, Defense, and State. I believe that this would be

an important first step.

Today, I hope that we can use this hearing to evaluate the findings of this report in light of the Nation’s new war on terrorism.

It is imperative that the United States remain proactive in suppressing the worldwide spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological

weapons. To accomplish this goal, I feel we need to upgrade our intelligence capability, more closely monitor other nations for compliance with arms control treaties, provide better compensation to

former Soviet weapons scientists, and provide accounting for the

thousands of weapons produced by the Soviet Union.

Currently, our government attempts to accomplish these objectives through several Federal agencies spread out among four CabiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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net Departments. These organizations do find work, but there is

room for improvement.

Coordinating the nonproliferation activities of these agencies, as

suggested by Senator Hagel’s legislation, is an idea worthy of examination. Funding these nonproliferation programs needs to be

one of our highest national security priorities, and I look forward

to hearing from the panelists today about that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your statement, Senator Carnahan.

Now we would like to ask you questions. My first question is for

all of the witnesses here today. We have talked about the National

Security Council and about what they have been doing. Has the extended National Security Council review of our nonproliferation

programs affected the activities of any of our current programs? In

other words, has it delayed implementation of any programs or the

fulfillment of their objectives?

Let me start with Mr. Van Diepen.

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I indicated in my statement that review is in its final stages,

but, certainly, as a general matter, we have not been holding back

from doing necessary work while the review has been ongoing. The

review is basically going to be an effort to try and prioritize and

give us guidance on, as Senator Cochran said, trying to get the best

bang for the buck on these programs, but we certainly have not

been holding back from doing necessary work while the review has

been proceeding.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Billingslea.

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Mr. Chairman, the review is ongoing, but it

has not affected the important work that needs to be done through

the CTR program.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Chairman, as I said, I applaud the review. I

think it is badly needed.

Our programs are continuing, the ones of securing nuclear materials. We are working night and day. As a matter of fact, just today

I got 12 different teams throughout Russia securing the stuff, just

today.

What has changed a little bit is our plutonium disposition because we are looking at a plutonium disposition program and coming up with alternatives on plutonium disposition in accordance

with the treaty, and we will have options. The Secretary of Energy

has got the pin on this, and we will get back to the White House

in 2 months. A decision will be made before the next budget cycle

on what option we should pursue with plutonium dispositions.

The Russians are on board on this. We met the Russians the

week before last, and we have come up with options to make this

program successful and to make it cheaper if that is possible.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Borman.

Mr. BORMAN. The export control cooperation programs that the

Department of Commerce is involved in have not been affected in

any way by the ongoing review. We have continued with our efforts.

77

Senator AKAKA. Let me ask Mr. Billingslea in relation to what

we just talked about. Has DOD’s chemical demilitarization program been affected?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. The chemical weapons destruction facility program is part of the ongoing review. Decisions on that particular

program have not been reached yet, and I would not want to prejudge the outcome of that review.

But as I did mention in my testimony, one of the other important

areas relating to chemical weapons is the large numbers of stockpiles of chemical agent throughout Russia, which we believe are

not subjected to the best possible physical security measures. So we

have been aggressively pursuing the installation of physical security around those stocks to prevent their diversion.

I am also told that the design of the facility is ongoing, the chemical weapons destruction facility, although any final determination

on that facility is still going to be made at the Cabinet level.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Mr. Van Diepen, in your testimony, you observe that several

statements from our November 14 hearing note that effective implementation and senior-level coordination already exists. While

our witnesses say that nonproliferation programs have been effective, they unanimously agreed that senior-level coordination is

lacking.

In fact, Laura Holgate of the Nuclear Threat Initiative recommended the creation of a Deputy National Security Advisor to

ensure high-level attention and agency cooperation.

Who is in charge of overseeing all of our nonproliferation programs right now?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. At one level, Mr. Chairman, the President is,

of course, but at the more operational level, as we have indicated

in all of our statements, the Policy Coordinating Committee on Proliferation Strategy is the sort of operational place at the assistant

secretary level where this kind of coordination is done.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker, basic physical security upgrades such

as securing doors, installing alarms, and hardening guard posts are

not scheduled to be completed on all nuclear facilities until, I think,

2007. The question immediately is: Why is it taking so long?

In light of the events of September 11, how can we wait until

2007, knowing that terrorists are actively trying to obtain nuclear

material?

Along that same line, are sites with the completed security systems subject to periodic vulnerability testing?

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I have been on both sides of the

house. I used to write the black book for the President during the

cold war and knew every target we had from Russia. When the

Cold War was over, I saw personally firsthand that these nuclear

materials were all over Russia, they did not know how many they

had. Their accounting system was not there, and we are working

night and day to get this secured. It is something that you can’t

get done overnight.

During the Cold War, of course, they had guns, gates, and

guards, and all of that went away after the Cold War. I will tell

you, I walked into Kurchatov 1 day with a guard half asleep and

walked in myself and the deputy secretary and opened up a locker

78

like a bicycle locker and I found 75 KGs of highly enriched uranium laying in a locker. So this is what we faced back in 1993.

We have secured all of the Russian Navy facilities that we know

about that had warheads. We did triage immediately. We have

done quick upgrades. Yes, there has got to be comprehensive upgrades, but to make sure these things are secure, we have done

that.

The other facilities, at the Ministry of Atomic Energy, we are

working on it as fast as we can. Like I say, I have got 12 teams

in there now. One thing that slowed us down was an access agreement with the Russians; that now we are seeing things that we

have never seen before; that they are letting us into facilities that

no American citizen has ever been in. So now we have got an access agreement. Now we are into the biggest facilities in Russia

where there is tons and tons of the stuff, securing this, and we are

going to work as fast as we can to get this done.

Senator AKAKA. I will ask for any questions from my Ranking

Member.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

In my opening statement, I mentioned that the administration

had increased its funding request for work in Ukraine in connection with eliminating strategic arms. I wonder if there are other examples that you can tell us about.

I know, for example, that there has been an increase in the program that is designed to provide employment opportunities for

former Soviet weapons scientists. Now, that is a program I think

the State Department is involved in.

Mr. Van Diepen, can you tell us about that program and whether

or not that is correct, that there has been a new emphasis on trying to increase the opportunities for Russian weapons scientists or

former Soviet weapons scientists?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Certainly, Senator. That is one of the key programs that we have at the State Department. Through the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow and the Science

and Technology Center in Ukraine, our programs have engaged

with 40,000 former Soviet WMD and missile scientists to try and

give them peaceful civilian employment in-country and thereby reduce the incentives that they may have to sell their wares to countries like North Korea or Iran. This has been a very effective program.

We have also been partnering with industry in trying to leverage

some of their resources to increase the impact that we have on the

problem, but, of course, there are many weapons scientists in the

former Soviet Union, and we continue to try and do our best to

prioritize and work where things could be more effective, for example, increasing our outreach in the biological area, which is of obvious relevance in the post-September 11 environment.

Mr. BAKER. Senator Cochran, we have one, also.

Senator COCHRAN. This is the Department of Energy?

Mr. BAKER. Department of Energy, yes, sir.

We have what we call an Initiative for Proliferation Prevention

which is putting Russia’s scientists to work with commercial companies. We have over 160 commercial companies right now inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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volved. The commercial companies have put more than $50 million

into these programs right now.

As I was mentioning before you arrived, sir, things like wheelchair, it was voted this year as the medical science breakthrough

of the year, which has a cushion that moves that prevents people

in nursing homes from getting pressure sores. Many people have

died. It will save Medicare, they say, $3 billion a year. It came out

of this IPP program, Russian scientists and our scientists working

together. That is one example.

Then we worked very closely with the State Department on their

ISTC program. Again, it is an example of coordination between the

agencies.

Senator COCHRAN. Are there any other examples, Mr. Billingslea?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Yes, sir. I think it is important to stress that

the CTR program’s funding is done on an ebb and flow of business.

We budget according to what can realistically be achieved in the

coming fiscal year.

Senator COCHRAN. What does the CTR mean? What is that acronym?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. I am sorry, sir. It is the Nunn-Lugar program,

the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

The fiscal year 2002 budget actually had about $100 million in

new or expanded projects that included things like $15 million was

for dismantlement of a chemical weapons production facility in

Russia. There was an additional $10 million put in to expand our

defense and military contacts programs through the CTR program.

We put $5 million additionally into biological weapons proliferation

prevention and so on and so forth.

Now, there were also funds that we did not need as we began

winding up various projects or it became apparent that the Russians were not going to provide access to do certain things. So we

have engaged in several new starts and other old starts are beginning to wind up, and it is just an ongoing review process.

Senator COCHRAN. Let me ask you something about the coordination of all of these activities. Mr. Van Diepen talked about the fact

that there is a committee at the assistant secretary level that has

the responsibility for coordinating what all the departments and

agencies are doing in this connection and trying to make sure that

there is no overlap. I guess that is to ensure that we are not doing

something twice, and that there is nothing falling through the

cracks.

What would your assessment be of the effectiveness of this committee? I understand the National Security Council has a chairman

who serves as a coordinating chairman or an organizational chairman. How is that working?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Yes, Senator. It is chaired by a senior director

at the National Security Council and has all of the relevant agencies involved. Obviously, any group can do its work better, but

what strikes me is how similar the functions of the current PCC

are to the functions that are envisaged in the proposed legislation.

Basically, this group is already doing the kinds of things that the

legislation calls for.

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I think it is doing its work reasonably well. Again, it can always

do its work better, and one of the things we hope to come out of

the administration’s review of these programs are ways that we

can do this job better and make sure that we are getting the best

value for the dollar and that we are complementing each other as

effectively as possible.

Senator COCHRAN. In connection with the cooperation of Russia

in particular, with the new spirit of cooperation and the commitment to work together on a number of different issue areas and

problems confronting both of our countries, it seems to me that the

climate has improved. The relationship has changed. Is this proving to be the case in fact in the day-to-day operation of these programs we are talking about? What would your assessment be?

Mr. Baker.

Mr. BAKER. My assessment would be, yes, sir, they are improving. In my opinion, they are better than they ever have been since

I came to the Department of Energy in 1993. I think doors are

opening that have not been opened. They are letting us into facilities to help them. I think the relationship that the two presidents

have now is a great relationship.

I know just right now my boss, Secretary Abraham, is over there

meeting with the head of MinAtom. Minister Rumyantsev, I just

talked to him yesterday. He said that it is going great. He has

never seen better relationships. They want to accelerate these programs. They want to work together. They want to work hand in

glove, and the Secretary was really happy.

As a matter of fact, he is on his way to Vienna today to tell the

chairman of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed

ElBaradei, how well it went in Russia. So I think after September

11, things have really come together, and I think it is going to even

get better, and we are going to make this thing work.

Like Baker-Cutler says, we have got to work faster, and we are

going to work faster and we are going to get this job done.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I noticed that the second bells

have rung on a vote over on the Senate floor. We might talk ourselves out of a vote here if we are not careful.

Senator AKAKA. That is correct. We have a vote on now.

I would like to ask Senator Carnahan if there are a couple of

questions you want to ask.

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will confine myself to just one question since the vote is underway.

Mr. Baker, as I discussed in my opening statement, the BakerCutler report describes some very dire conditions in Russia, with

the tons of nuclear weapon material, much of it unaccounted for

and scattered throughout Russia in 100 different poorly guarded

depots.

Some of the critics of the Energy Department programs have indicated that DOE puts too much emphasis on quick fixes, just putting bars on windows or securing doors or checking inventories.

Certainly, these are important initiatives, but I think it is also important that we consider some long-term solutions as well, such as

installing fences or advanced security systems, barcoding equipment, and training workers.

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Would you describe the Energy Department’s long-term plans to

enhance security at the Russian nuclear depots?

Mr. BAKER. Yes, ma’am. We are doing exactly what you just said.

We are now. We did put up fences and gates and everything you

could think of, but we are barcoding. We have got a complete inventory of what they have. We are barcoding all of their stuff. We

are working a sustainability program because, some day when all

of this is fixed, we have got to get out. We cannot stay forever. So

we are showing them how to sustain this equipment and how to

make sure it is secure in the future. So we are working the longterm things right now, ma’am.

I was with Senator Baker and Mr. Cutler when we went to Russia, and as a matter of fact, Senator Baker and I found out we are

related to each other from Tennessee and Kentucky, long cousins,

but he is a man that saw that we are for doing long-term things

and we are doing the barcoding. We are doing the things that you

just mentioned. That is going on right now. So we are taking longterm issues to make sure these places are as secure as you can

make it.

Senator CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your questions.

The Subcommittee will take a recess now. There is a vote on, and

we will return to the questions. We stand in recess.

[Recess.]

Senator AKAKA. The hearing will be in order.

Again, I want to thank the witnesses for your statements and

your responses to the questions. My question now is to Mr.

Borman.

Commerce is responsible for deemed export control issues, as you

mention in your statement. Does Russia have similar concerns?

Have we discussed this with them in light of our concerns, of our

concerns about foreign students and scientists who work in American universities and laboratories?

Mr. BORMAN. Yes, we have. I guess I can answer that or address

that in a couple of aspects, Mr. Chairman. When foreign nationals

come into the United States, whether they are from Russia or another country and whether they are here for work or other purposes, there is a certain set of regulations that apply to them. And

to simplify it, it is if they will have access to technology that would

require a license to be exported to their home country, they need

a license to get it in the United States. That is why we call it the

deemed export. It most typically comes up with foreign nationals

being employed at U.S. companies.

Certainly, when we talk to Russia or any other country about

their own export control program, we also emphasize that this is

an element that we think they need to incorporate into their own

systems, so that if foreign students, for example, from one country

into Russia to study or to work, that the same types of restrictions

apply to them and their access to Russian-origin technology. This

is a harder concept for other countries to get their arms around because it is kind of a complicated concept, but I think that they are

becoming more and more sensitive to that and are really designing

their export control systems to account for that as well as the more

traditional export, the machine tool leaving the country.

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Senator AKAKA. You mentioned in your statement that there is

an attache—— Mr. BORMAN. Yes.

Senator AKAKA [continuing]. Now in Russia, and that attache is

to carry out the programs and also to—and if I may use the word— enforce some of our policies there. How long has the attache been

there in Russia?

Mr. BORMAN. He started there at the beginning of this year.

Senator AKAKA. Oh.

Mr. BORMAN. This is the first time we have had funding for such

a position.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Billingslea, some have suggested that U.S.

taxpayer funds are going to Russian scientists who continue to

work on poison gas, biological agents, and nuclear weapons designs

for the Russian Government. Is this true, and if so, what is being

done to prevent it?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Mr. Chairman, we continue to have concerns

regarding Russia’s compliance with the chemical and the biological

weapons conventions to which they are a party. We could discuss

that a little more fully in closed session. However, as I indicated

in my opening statement, the Department of Defense is very concerned to know and to make sure that funds are not diverted, that

funds do not contribute to offensive weapons programs, whether on

the chemical or biological side or even to offensive nuclear modernization or missile modernization.

In order to guard against this, we have a very rigorous audit and

examination process that the Department of Defense follows.

Further, no project, no research project that the Department of

Defense undertakes, is approved or undertaken until it is subjected

to a rigorous interagency review.

Speaking only for the Department of Defense’s projects, I do not

believe on the basis of my review of the CTR program that we are

contributing in any way to Russian WMD programs, but it is something that we must be very wary of. As we look to improve our collaboration on biological defense activities with the Russian Government, we must be very wary and must factor this into consideration.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker, the International Atomic Energy

Agency has recently listed radiological dispersion weapons, or dirty

bombs as they call it, as their top priority. What is the United

States doing to address this proliferation threat?

Mr. BAKER. Right now, sir, it is a concern. What it would do if

a dirty bomb was built, it may kill a few people very close to it,

but the big problem would be the radiation that would be spread

over an area like Chernobyl or that Chernobyl had a problem, that

long-term illnesses could occur.

What are we doing about it? Well, right now, we are looking at

how we can expand our materials protection control and accounting

program to do things that we have not done before, like secure

spent fuel.

There are areas that we have looked before the September 11 situation. We were securing weapons materials, things that were enriched above 20 percent. Now you have to worry some about below

20 percent. So we are concerned about this.

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We are looking into what we can do. There is so much person

power one has and so many things you can do and negotiations you

have to make, but it is a concern and we are looking very hard into

that for the last 2 months.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Billingslea, witnesses in a previous hearing

stated that there is no dedicated program to assist Russia in warhead dismantlement, and that plans for this are not part of the

budget at this time. Why is this the case, and are there plans for

including this type of assistance at a later date?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Well, Mr. Chairman, I believe it is important

to clarify that the Department of Defense is not involved in the actual dismantlement of any Russian nuclear weapons.

We are constructing a fissile material storage facility that will

provide centralized, safe, and ecologically sound storage for up to

50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 200 metric tons of

highly enriched uranium removed from nuclear weapons. This is

the Mayak facility. The Russians have, I believe, a dismantlement

site in proximity to that facility.

The physical construction of the storage facility and all of the

support structures is 80 percent complete, although equipping the

facility is only 60 percent complete at this stage.

We have been under a cost cap for that facility, Mr. Chairman, but the total cost is going to be about $40 million less than that

cap, I am pleased to report. About $370 million it will cost to establish this facility.

We anticipate that the storage site will be completed next year

and that we will be able to begin loading it with fissile material

from the warhead dismantlement process, although I think that we

need to be clear that Russia has indicated that it does not want

or need U.S. Government assistance in preparing the plutonium

and the HEU from dismantled warheads that is to be stored at this

site.

Senator AKAKA. I recall in your statement, I think, that it is the

intent of our country to dismantle at these sites as much as we

can.

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. We, together with the Department of Energy

and the other U.S. Government agencies, are very concerned with

the large numbers, large stockpiles of fissile material throughout

Russia, including stocks of warheads and would obviously believe

that dismantlement of warheads by the Russian Government is a

positive development.

It is important to maintain physical security on not only the warheads, but the fissile materials stocks themselves which is why the

agreement that DOE has recently signed that Mr. Baker referenced

is so important. It begins to open the doors for the U.S. Government to move in and provide the kinds of physical protection that

need to be provided.

With the Department of Defense programs, we continue to have

difficulty in obtaining access to key sites, and the Russian Government is going to need to give us access to these sites to perform

surveys and assessments and then to install equipment, and most

importantly to verify after the installation that it was done correctly and that we are, in effect, getting what we are paying for,

which is a key test.

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Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker, at the end of September 2001, a new

agreement to provide U.S. officials with expanded access to Russian nuclear sites and facilities was announced. What sites are not

covered by this agreement? How much nuclear material is housed

at the facilities covered by the agreement, and how long will this

agreement stay in force?

Mr. BAKER. The agreement, sir, is with the Ministry of Atomic

Energy. It does not cover the work we are doing with the Russian

Navy. We have another agreement with the Russian Navy already,

and we have had no problems securing weapons with the Russian

Navy at all. We have had complete access.

This access agreement will cover all MinAtom facilities, about 90

facilities.

It is about 600 metric tons that this access agreement will cover.

So, with that agreement, we can almost get into—well, we can.

With the Russian Navy, we have got complete access right now so

far, and with the Ministry of Atomic Energy, we will have the other

access now, which we have, to get into the big sites like Tomsk.

Chelyabinsk-70, it used to be called. This is where a lot of material

is that we never could get in before. Now we are in.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Borman, what are the other problems with

Russian export controls? What is the Department of Commerce

doing to help Russia correct these problems and strengthen their

export controls?

Mr. BORMAN. Well, Russia’s export control system is evolving.

Obviously, under the Communist system, they had probably a very

tight export control system. With the breakup of the Soviet Union,

obviously a lot of resources are lost, and our principal focus right

now with Russia’s export control system is on their defense enterprises.

As I mentioned earlier, we have a very, I think, aggressive program to go to individual defense enterprises with Russian Government officials. The Russian Government officials explain Russia’s

export control system to these enterprises, and then we bring U.S.

company officials along to explain their own internal company control programs and try to help the Russian enterprises understand

that it is in their business interest to comply with Russia’s export

control system. We even have a software tool that helps these companies set up their own internal control program so they know

what of their goods and technologies are subject to export controls

and which are not, and that is an ongoing effort. We have done it

in dozens of defense enterprises, but these defense enterprise

which, of course, used to be very tightly controlled by the government are now players in the free market and they don’t have that

much exposure to even their own government’s export control system, let alone how the market operates. So that is one area of our

focus.

Another area of our focus, now that Russia has a comprehensive

export control law, is to work with them more on enforcement techniques that are particular to export controls. I think one view of

export controls is you have to have tight border security, and certainly that is true, but obviously a lot of enforcement is done upstream. Enforcement officials have to know what are the enterprises that are producing items of concern, go out and talk to them

85

and monitor them and make sure that they are complying with the

law. And that is another area of our focus that we are going to be

stepping up.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Billingslea, how should DOD’s Cooperative

Threat Reduction programs be expanded to accommodate the reduction in strategic nuclear weapons agreement reached between

President Bush and Russian President Putin, 2 weeks ago? Do you

expect increased funding, or will other assistance activities need to

be scaled back?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. The potential, which has now been realized in

the agreement, for the deep reductions has already been factored

into our budget request. There may be substantial new opportunities in the CTR program, but that may be more in the chemical

and biological side of the house where, again, as I mentioned, the

bioterrorism agreement that was reached, if this leads to a greater

opening in access and collaborative research, then that would be an

area of active consideration, but on the nuclear side and the delivery platform side, this is already factored within the budget.

Further, I do point out that since we have already essentially

begun to wind up the destruction of platforms in places like

Kazakhstan and Ukraine, there will be a natural and inevitable tapering down of some parts of that program and a ramping up in

other parts. It is just depending on the opportunities we are given.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker, nuclear accounting requires that facilities undertake a physical inventory of their nuclear material. To

what extent have individual former Soviet sites completed their

physical inventory. Has a national inventory system been established to account for nuclear material movements from site to site?

Mr. BAKER. When we first started doing this program back in

1993, it was not a good accounting systems where these materials

were located. We found this.

We have been on the ground over there, and we have got a good

accounting system. We have, sir, a system that we are teaching the

Russians how to count, and some of it, like barcode, this equipment. We are monitoring when it goes from site to site with help

of other agencies. So we do have a fairly decent—we think what

you do not know, you do not know, but we think we have a very

accurate count of what they have in Russia in terms of nuclear material. We have that ourselves, and they, of course, also have it

now.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Billingslea, what has DOD done to destroy

any biological weapons stockpiles or dismantle the surge production capabilities developed within former Soviet biological weapon

facilities?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. In fiscal year 2001, Mr. Chairman, we continued—there were six ongoing projects—to make security enhancements at various sites, six of those. We initiated efforts at six additional sites in fiscal year 2001.

We also continued six ongoing collaborative projects and initiated

seven new collaborative projects, and we have been working on dismantlement and continued that in this past year of the former biological weapons production facility at Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan.

We also began developing dismantlement efforts at four Russian

institutes, and we have recently completed an assessment of the

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1The information submitted for the record by Mr. Billingslea entitled ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency,’’ appears in the Appendix on page 355.

former biological weapons test facility at Vozrozhdeniye Island in

Uzbekistan and are looking at ways to engage in future dismantlement and pathogen elimination efforts on that island. So these are

the ongoing programs that we have.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Van Diepen, we have been talking about

how relationships have improved between us and Russia. The Department of State coordinates the Defense, Energy, Health and

Human Services, and Agriculture to engage Russian and other biologists in peaceful civilian collaboration with western experts and

businesses. How has this coordination changed since September

11?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Mr. Chairman, I think what we are trying to

do is intensify the effort. It is not so much changing the coordination, but increasing the throughput that is being coordinated to try

and be more effective, reach out to more institutes, get our hands

around more capability that could potentially find its way into the

hands of terrorists.

The bioredirect program, we think the coordination has been

very effective on, and we are trying to use that coordination to leverage increased output and effectiveness from that program.

Senator AKAKA. Are there plans for joint U.S.-Russian planning

meetings for nonproliferation? What are the formal mechanisms to

coordinate with your Russian counterparts in that?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. There are a variety of interactions that we

have with the Russian Government on all different levels in the

nonproliferation arena. At the Under Secretary or their Vice Foreign Minister level, it was agreed some time ago to have regular

discussions on nonproliferation issues. Likewise, at the Assistant

Secretary level, my boss, John Wolf, will be beginning a regular series of consultations with his Russian counterpart. Basically, this

goes on down through the pyramid, and, of course, integral to all

of these cooperative programs with Russia are ongoing interactions

with the Russian Government.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Baker, since the start of the Nunn-Lugar

nonproliferation programs, Congress has authorized $5.5 billion for

assistance to former Soviet States. How much of this money has

been spent in Russia and the newly independent states?

Mr. BAKER. Sir, with all due respect, I think that can be better

answered by the Department of Defense, being as they control the

Nunn-Lugar money.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Billingslea, would you have any comment on

that?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Yes, sir. We are doing the calculations for you

right now. May I submit that for the record, so that we get it down

to the precise dollar amount? 1

Senator AKAKA. All right.

Mr. Baker and Mr. Van Diepen, the GAO has testified that the

Departments of State and Energy programs to employ weapons scientists have not been able to demonstrate that they achieved these

objectives. What are you doing to correct this problem?

87

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, I will start, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure

exactly what the assessment of GAO was, but a lot of nonproliferation is trying to keep dogs from barking, so to speak, and it is often

difficult to demonstrate that a dog did not bark and it did not bark

because of your program. But we are quite confident that the extensive engagement that we have had through these programs, engaging again with 40,000 former weapons scientists in the former

Soviet Union, has had a substantial impact on trying to reduce the

so-called brain-drain problem.

By definition, if a scientist did not go to North Korea because he

is employed in our programs, it is difficult for us to know that he

was going to go otherwise, except for our program. So it is not clear

to me how these sort of classic accounting techniques could be used

to measure the effectiveness of these programs. All we can say is

based on the phenomena that we see in the intelligence, we are

quite satisfied that these programs have had a substantial impact

on addressing this problem.

Mr. BAKER. That question, sir, always comes up, how many people have you saved from going to a rogue state. As just stated, it

is hard to, but I will tell you from a personal experience from talking to Russian scientists and asked them across the table, have

they ever been recruited. I had one down in the Department of Energy just about a month ago, and he now works in Emergency

Management. I asked him the question, ‘‘You used to build Russian

weapons. Why did you take an Emergency Management job?’’ He

said, ‘‘To feed my family.’’ I said, ‘‘Have you ever had a chance to

get more money?’’ He said, ‘‘Absolutely,’’ and he said, ‘‘My buddies

have done the same thing.’’ So, when the GAO makes that comment, I can tell you from personal experience in talking to them,

many of them have been recruited by rogue states.

Now, have they gone? We do not have a number. It is very hard

to track if we have lost any, but I can tell you right now, it is happening. It is happening that people are being recruited.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Billingslea, environmental and local public

advocacy groups have gained influence in the former Soviet Union.

What problems is this creating for American aid efforts, and how

can we resolve those problems?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Senator, I am not aware of any specific problems, at least in my short time within the Department of Defense,

that have been brought to my attention as resulting from an environmental group’s advocacy for one people or another.

I am sure that Russia will encounter the same kinds of environmental considerations when they finally commence their chemical

warfare destruction activities, as they are required to do under the

Chemical Weapons Convention, but to date I am not sure that the

CTR program that I would say we have been adversely affected by

environmental groups. Let me give you a more fulsome assessment

of that for the record.

It would appear there may have been some time, additional time

that was needed for us in establishing a facility to deal with solid

propellant. So there may have been some environmental considerations there. Let me get you a description of that.

Senator AKAKA. All right. Thank you.

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I have some questions here for Senator Levin, and let me ask

these questions for him. In your testimony, Mr. Billingslea, you

state, ‘‘We remain concerned that Russia continues to produce

weapons-grade plutonium.’’ You also state, ‘‘The best approach to

achieving shutdown of these reactors, which we all agree is an important objective, is still under review by the administration.’’ At the time the DOD budget request was submitted to DOD, it

was going to build a fossil-fuel coal plant at one site and upgrade

an existing coal-fired plant at the other site. This would allow the

reactors to shut down.

The reactors produce plutonium, but also power for the local

communities. Building these fossil-fuel plants is the cheapest and

fastest way to shut down these reactors. Is DOD walking away

from this plan? What is DOD considering instead? Will the alternatives cost less and be quicker to complete?

My understanding of the situation is that the NSC prefers to

pursue the fossil-fuel option, and here is a question. What is the

process for resolving this difference of opinion, and when will it be

resolved?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Senator, the——

Senator AKAKA. Let me finish. There is just one more.

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Yes, sir.

Senator AKAKA. When can we expect a decision on how to shut

down these reactors?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, my hope is that the

administration will arrive at a final decision on the best approach

for getting the plutonium production reactors, the three of them,

shut down in the near term. I cannot put a precise date on it, but

it is under active consideration by the administration in discussion

at the Cabinet level.

I would suggest, as I did in my testimony, that we very much do

want to see the reactors shut down. That is an objective. However,

as my testimony also states, the material in the fuel assemblies

that are being irradiated by these reactors is of a less direct proliferation risk than the processed weapons-usable material that lies

at countless sites that the Baker-Cutler Task Force talked about,

unsafeguarded or very poor safeguards throughout Russia. So, certainly, getting physical security safeguards on that material is of

a high priority.

The Department of Defense has been looking at various ways to

achieve shutdown of these reactors. Fossil-fuel plants was but one

option. Other options have been considered, some put aside, some

being further explored, perhaps reactors that could burn plutonium.

The House of Representatives and, in fact, the Congress has been

very cool in the past towards the Department of Defense engaging

in this effort, and, in fact, funds had been prohibited from being

used in the past for establishment of fossil-fuel plants. I think the

question is whether or not the Department of Defense is the right

agency to be involved in building powerplants in Russia, but we

look to have an administration decision shortly on that.

Senator AKAKA. I have another question from Senator Levin. Mr.

Billingslea, in your testimony, you address the question of improving security of chemical weapons. What about destroying those

89

weapons? The DOD requested funds to build a chemical weapons

demilitarization facility. The Senate bill authorizing the Cooperative Threat Reduction program supports this effort. The House bill

does not. Is DOD walking away from the U.S. commitment to destroy these weapons? It seems to me that the ultimate way to ensure they are secure is to destroy them.

So I guess the question to you, Mr. Billingslea, is DOE walking

away from the U.S. commitment to destroy these weapons?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Mr. Chairman, as Senator Levin’s question

points out, the Congress is divided on the issue, which suggests

that there are good arguments to be made on both sides. The administration is examining the merits of the case, and my hope is

that we will have a decision on that shortly.

Senator AKAKA. Another question from Senator Levin to Mr. Van

Diepen, the Department of State appears to be the appropriate

agency to coordinate policy for these programs in the absence of

any formal coordinator. Has the State Department sought additional funds for these programs from the $40 billion in additional

emergency funds?

We understand that, notwithstanding the recent evidence that

bin Laden is seeking nuclear materials, no additional funds will be

made available to secure these materials in Russia. My understanding is that the administration has taken the position that increased efforts to secure material is not a priority. The question is:

Is this true?

The final question is: Is securing these weapons-grade materials

not a priority and will additional funds be forthcoming?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In terms of securing

weapons-usable materials, I think it is clear from the testimonies

that you have heard that that is and remains a key priority. I am

not sure it is my place to talk about the programs that are not

State Department programs. We don’t do securing weapons-usable

materials.

On the question of resources from the supplemental, one example

is we were able to get, I believe it is, $42 million to improve export

controls and border security in Central Asia that came out of the

supplemental. So we definitely have been weighing in and trying

to use that to help improve our nonproliferation efforts.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Billingslea, would you want to make any

comment on those questions?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the nuclear

side, we are pressing the Russian Ministry of Defense very aggressively to finalize procedures for access. We have for our part done

all of our work that we need to do, testing various components, and

looking at the different integration measures that are needed to

put a comprehensive security upgrade in place at facilities once we

gain access.

As I mention, we have also been engaging in the more interim

kinds of physical security measures, things like truck barriers and

very simple kinds of physical security that can be provided on a

quick basis that don’t need a lot of training involved.

This is a costly program. We are going to have to have access to

ensure that the upgrades that we are paying for are actually installed and installed correctly.

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On the biological side, we still have not been able to get the Russian Government to designate an executive agent that the Department of Defense can work with directly, and as a result, we are

working through the ISTC program that the Department of State

manages to address those kinds of issues.

Senator AKAKA. Well, I want to say thank you to all of you for

your statements and your responses. This will certainly help the

Subcommittee.

The events of September 11 have made the prospect of WMD terrorism a reality. It has certainly changed our lives here in our

country.

I am pleased that the administration today has stated that it

shares my sense of urgency for nonproliferation activities. I hope

its words will be matched by action with appropriate funds.

On another issue, every witness today said that the statutory coordination mechanism for U.S. nonproliferation is unnecessary. Mr.

Van Diepen suggests that it could even be counterproductive or intrusive. This view contradicts those of every one of our witnesses

from our hearing on November 14.

Each of the proliferation experts welcomed the prospect of additional senior-level coordination and even suggested how the provisions proposed by S. 673 should be expanded. In fact, they all stated that improved coordination was vital to an effective national

nonproliferation strategy. I am just giving you some idea of what

happened in the last hearing.

There is agreement that we need a national strategy. I hope the

administration’s review will be completed soon so that this Subcommittee can be briefed on its conclusions.

Senator Biden has asked to submit a statement for the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., A U.S.

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to submit written testimony to the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services in

support of S. 673, the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001, of

which I am an original co-sponsor. There are many important questions to consider

on U.S. nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union, including the need

to do far more than we do today.

S. 673 would perform a narrower, but vital, function: To establish a high-level

interagency committee within the Executive Branch to achieve better coordination

of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union. In addition, this new

committee could help coordinate official U.S. Government activities with those undertaken by private sector organizations, such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and

by foreign governments.

Senators Hagel, Lugar, and I decided to introduce this bill in April, shortly after

the Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the results of the Baker-Cutler

Task Force, a high-level advisory panel which reviewed the Department of Energy’s

nonproliferation programs in Russia. Former Senator Howard Baker and the former

White House Counsel, Lloyd Cutler, the co-chairs of the Task Force, reiterated to

the Committee the report’s principal conclusion:

The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States

today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable

material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nationstates and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.

The events of September 11 and the risks that U.S. forces face in Operation Enduring Freedom only reinforce this conclusion. Every day, we learn more details

about Osama bin Laden’s chilling quest for weapons of mass destruction, including

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efforts to enlist the Russian mafia in purchasing and/or stealing sensitive nuclear

materials in the former Soviet Union.

Over the past ten years, beginning with the Nunn-Lugar initiative, the United

States has spent more than $5 billion to help the states in the former Soviet Union

reduce the threat posed by poorly secured, excess stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, related raw materials and the human expertise behind it all. While these

efforts have contributed vital individuals to the security of the United States and

every other nation in the world, the bottom line is that we have not done enough.

One glaring concern is the lack of sufficient coordination inside the U.S. Government in planning and implementing various nonproliferation activities. Dozens of

program offices in various Federal agencies and departments, ranging from the

State Department to the Department of Agriculture, implement nonproliferation assistance with little or no overarching strategic guidance. According to the final report released by the Baker-Cutler Task Force:

In particular, the urgent risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction demands the attention of the highest level of the U.S. Government.

. . . Coordination within and among U.S. Government agencies is insufficient and must be improved. [Emphasis added.]

Let me give you a sense of the costs of the lack of sufficient coordination within

the U.S. Government on this issue. I’m not just talking about program duplication

and overlapping efforts, although those are legitimate concerns which can be addressed by better coordination. More critically, the absence of an overarching strategic vision on U.S. nonproliferation efforts can result in missed opportunities to

neutralize emerging threats. It can prompt a timid bureaucracy to ignore opportunities for enhanced cooperation with foreign governments. We cannot be satisfied with

our efforts to date so long as some nuclear materials and chemical weapons storage

sites and former biological weapons production plans in the former Soviet Union

still have no more protection than padlocks or barbed wire fences.

To ensure that the Executive Branch creates, implements, and manages nonproliferation activities in the former Soviet Union in a coordinated fashion, S. 673

will establish an interagency committee consisting of high-level representatives from

the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and Commerce and chaired by a National Security Council official. This committee shall prepare appropriate analyses

and provide the needed guidance to ensure appropriate monitoring of U.S. nonproliferation activities in the former Soviet Union. I understand the administration

has implemented an interagency process on these lines, but judging by the slow

pace of its review of existing programs, a committee that is empowered to make decisions would be a most beneficial addition to the policy-making process. This bill

would provide such a committee and not leave the policy process so dependent on

individual personalities or temporary circumstances.

I encourage the Governmental Affairs Committee to move quickly, therefore, on

S. 673 and report this bill out for floor consideration. Two weeks ago, the Foreign

Relations Committee incorporated a slightly revised text of S. 673 in marking up

and passing the Security Assistance Act.

Regardless of the specific legislative vehicle, it is my fervent hope that the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act will become law in the near future. We

cannot talk seriously about homeland defense or a war to deny terrorists access to

weapons of mass destruction if we do not put in order our own efforts to work with

the states of the former Soviet Union to secure, safeguard, and reduce its stockpiles

of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and materials.

Senator AKAKA. And any Senator wishing to give a statement or

offer questions for the witnesses may do so. The record will remain

open for 1 week to do that.

Again, I want to say thanks so much for your responses and your

statements.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(93)

MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION

REGIMES, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

TECHNOLOGIES, AND THE WAR ON

TERRORISM

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2002

U.S. SENATE,

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION,

AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka,

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Akaka, Thompson, Stevens, and Cochran.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee will please come to order. I

want to thank our witnesses, Ms. Elisa Harris of the Center for

International and Security Studies at Maryland and Dr. Amy

Smithson of the Stimson Center for being with us this morning. I

want to also welcome Dr. Jim Walsh of the Belfer Center for

Science and International Affairs and Dennis Gormley of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Today’s hearing about multilateral non-proliferation regimes is

the fourth of a series of hearings this Subcommittee has held on

the issue of weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Last November the Subcommittee held a hearing on current and future weapons of mass destruction and proliferation threats and a second on

combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with nonproliferation programs.

This Subcommittee has jurisdiction over intergovernmental relationships between the United States and international organizations of which the United States is a member. In holding today’s

hearing we will explore ways in which these organizations may be

used more effectively to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the means to deliver them.

Since September 11 we have all become aware of the dangers directly posed by these weapons. Attacks against the United States

are no longer in the realm of science fiction or Hollywood. As technology evolves, these weapons threaten to become even more deadly and more difficult to detect and to prevent from being used. If

we do not take September 11 as a wake-up call history may well

repeat itself with even more terrible consequences. We must use

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every tool at our disposal to deter the development and use of these

weapons.

We know now that the al Qaeda network was busy trying to develop biological, chemical and so-called dirty nuclear weapons.

These were not weapons that al Qaeda could develop on its own— they needed access to foreign technology and foreign scientists. Fortunately, so far it appears that they did not get enough information

to perfect these weapon systems before we disrupted their efforts.

This demonstrates why it is so important that we choke off the proliferation of WMD technology at its source—government labs and

commercial enterprises. Terrorists can gain access to weapons of

mass destruction or the technology to make them but they can only

do so if foreign governments or foreign scientists or foreign companies willingly provide that information or technology to them.

Multilateral agreements are one way to prevent terrorists from

gaining weapons technology but multilateral regimes are worthless

if they are not effective. China, for example, adheres to most of

these agreements but as a recent unclassified report to the Congress by the CIA notes, China continues to provide missile-related

technology to a variety of countries of proliferation concern. The

CIA cannot rule out contacts by China with foreign nuclear weapons programs and Chinese firms continue to supply chemical weapons production equipment and technology to Iran.

If we cannot get countries to abide by the international agreements they have adhered to, then our only alternative may be to

take unilateral action to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This is not the preferred step but it may be our only

choice if multilateral agreements do not work.

I welcome our witnesses to today’s hearing. I look forward to

their suggestions as to what works and what does not work in our

effort to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

I want to welcome Senator Thompson this morning to this hearing and ask him for his statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you

for holding this hearing today. I think it is an extremely important

one. We, of course, these days are very concerned about the terrorism problem, but it is really hand in hand with the proliferation

problem. At least 25 countries now possess—or are in the process

of acquiring and developing—capabilities to inflict mass casualties

and destruction—nuclear, biological or chemical weapons or the

means to deliver them. The nexus between terrorism and proliferation is very disturbing.

The possibility that a terrorist organization will acquire a weapon of mass destruction from one of the many countries developing

weapons of mass destruction capabilities is increasing daily. According to a recent intelligence report, several of the 30 designated

foreign terrorist organizations and other non-state actors worldwide have sought chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Many of

these terrorists are receiving assistance from countries of concern.

Highlighting this danger is the fact that our troops recently uncovered rudimentary designs of a nuclear weapon in an al Qaeda facility in Afghanistan.

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The rapid spread of information and technology has greatly complicated our efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The information on chemical, biological and even nuclear

weapons is widely available on the Internet.

Multilateral nonproliferation regimes are one of several tools

that our country, and the global community at large, uses to stop

the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Today we will be discussing the strengths and weaknesses of those regimes. These regimes are not perfect. Each has significant shortcomings. Collectively, though, they have apparently made a difference in slowing

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

However, we should keep in mind that a multilateral nonproliferation regime is only as effective as the strength of each

member’s commitment to abide by the principles and rules of the

regime. Unfortunately, some regimes have members with weak national export control systems that invariably permit elicit technology transfers.

Despite being a member of all of the regimes that we will discuss

today, Russia, for example, has yet to develop an effective national

export control system. Russia’s export controls are still apparently

incapable of preventing the illicit transfer of WMD technologies.

Other regimes have members that are covertly seeking weapons

of mass destruction. Iran, for example, is a member of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, but has not honored the

commitments to either regime. Intelligence reports tell us that Iran

has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons and aggressively sought biotechnical materials and expertise for its offensive

biological weapons program.

Compounding these problems is the fact that some regimes have

members that deliberately sell weapons of mass destruction technologies to countries of concern. These suppliers, though publicly

supporting the aims of multilateral non-proliferation regimes, are

covertly selling dangerous technologies to rogue states. The most

flagrant example of this behavior is China’s WMD assistance to

Pakistan. Though a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a proclaimed adherent to the Missile Technology Control Regime, China has armed Pakistan with nuclear bombs and ballistic

missiles to deliver them.

We must never assume that because a country is a member of

a multilateral non-proliferation regime that it will abide by its commitments. To do so, would lead us to a false sense of security. We

must be cautious and diligent. And we must be careful not to rely

on those regimes as the sole means of stopping the spread of WMD

information and technology.

Moreover, it is critical that we effectively use our other foreign

policy tools, as well. Sanctions, national export controls, foreign aid,

and military force are just a few examples of tools that could be

used to address the growing threat of WMD proliferation.

I am pleased that we have such a distinguished panel of experts

with us today to discuss these issues, Mr. Chairman. Thank you

again.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Senator Thompson.

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1The prepared statement of Ms. Harris appears in the Appendix on page 298.

I have some brief questions for you. Before I ask you the questions I would like to ask you for your statements. So will Miss Harris please begin?

TESTIMONY OF ELISA D. HARRIS,1 RESEARCH FELLOW,

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY STUDIES

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my testimony this

morning I would like to address three issues, consistent with your

letter of invitation: First, the nature of the chemical and biological

weapons threat to the United States; second, the impact of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention on this threat; and third, measures for enhancing the effectiveness of these multilateral treaties in preventing the acquisition of

chemical and biological weapons by both national and subnational—in other words, terrorist—groups. I will summarize my

prepared statement but would request that the full text be included

in the hearing record.

Senator AKAKA. Without objection, it will be included.

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you. Prior to September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks, the threat of national and terrorist acquisition of chemical and biological weapons were often seen as separate

issues requiring separate solutions. Now, however, we must recognize that these two proliferation problems are closely linked in that

assistance from national programs is likely to be critical to terrorist

efforts to acquire and use chemical or biological weapons successfully.

According to the U.S. Government, about a dozen countries are

believed to have chemical weapons programs and at least 13 are

said to be pursuing biological weapons. These national programs

pose a direct threat to U.S. military forces and to our friends and

allies in the two regions where the weapons are proliferating—

Northeast Asia and the Middle East. They also pose an indirect

threat because of their potential to serve as a source of chemical

and biological weapons expertise or materials to other national or

terrorist programs.

One cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that terrorists will

acquire chemical or biological weapons on their own without assistance from a national program. But to date, the three most significant terrorist incidents involving chemical or biological weapons—

the recent anthrax attacks here, the Aum Shinriko CBW attacks

and the Rajneeshee salmonella attack—all suggest that assistance

from national programs is likely to be crucial to terrorist efforts to

acquire and use chemical or biological weapons successfully.

Of course, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the

Chemical Weapons Convention have had some impact on these national programs. But the 1972 BWC lacks enforcement provisions

and has been violated by a number of countries, including the

former Soviet Union, and more recently, Iraq. Unfortunately, the

Bush Administration has opposed efforts to negotiate legally binding measures to strengthen enforcement with the Convention.

The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, by comparison, contains the most extensive enforcement provisions ever negotiated in

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the arms control area. But it, too, faces a number of challenges in

these first years of its implementation.

Clearly steps can and should be taken to enhance the effectiveness of and reinforce the prohibitions in each of these treaties. In

the time that I have left, I would like to just mention a few of those

steps.

First, with respect to the Biological Weapons Convention, we

should resume multilateral discussions on measures to strengthen

the BWC. Specifically, the United States should abandon its opposition to multilateral discussions and agree at the November 2002

continuation of the BWC review conference on a process that will

allow both U.S. proposals and other proposals for strengthening the

Convention to be explored.

Second, pending international agreement on legally binding

measures to strengthen the Convention, the United States should

support efforts to expand the U.N. Secretary General’s authority to

investigate allegations of the development, production or possession

of biological weapons. Today the Secretary General can only investigate the use of these weapons. We should give him the power to

investigate activities prior to use.

Third, we should strengthen controls over dangerous pathogens.

The United States should take the lead in securing tighter international controls on culture collections and other repositories of biological materials. We should also work with other countries to

strengthen oversight of laboratories to prevent either deliberate or

inadvertent misapplications of biotechnology research for destructive purposes.

And fourth, we should enhance oversight of the U.S. biological

defense program. Revelations that the United States has produced

weapons-grade anthrax and replicated a Soviet era biological

bomblet as part of its biological defense program have raised questions both here and abroad about the nature and scope of U.S. activities in this area. Today, there are no comprehensive review

mechanisms in place for these secret biological defense activities.

The U.S. Congress should hold oversight hearings on the biological

defense program to ensure that its scientific, legal, and foreign policy impact is consistent with U.S. non-proliferation interests.

With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, we should,

first, make adherence to the CWC an explicit foreign policy goal.

Libya’s recent decision to join the Chemical Weapons Convention

demonstrates that even in complicated regions like the Middle East

there are opportunities for expanding membership in this treaty. It

is not unimaginable that North Korea might agree to abandon its

chemical weapons program and join the convention as part of a

broader security arrangement on the Korean Peninsula. The

United States should ensure that CWC adherence is a prominent

issue in its foreign policy toward the key hold-out countries, including North Korea.

Second, we should be prepared to use challenge inspections to

address serious compliance concerns, especially in countries where

bilateral consultations have been either unsuccessful or are not appropriate.

Third, we should devote the resources necessary to meet the

treaty’s destruction deadlines. Both the United States and Russia

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have indicated to the treaty organization that they will be unable

to meet the April 2007 deadline for destroying their chemical weapon stocks. We should work with Russia and ensure in our own case

that adequate resources are devoted to meeting this important obligation.

Fourth, we should rectify the budget problems in the treaty organization for the Chemical Weapons Convention. Because of a zero

growth budget imposed on the OPCW over the past 5 years, we are

beginning another year millions of dollars short for implementation. This has serious implications for the verification activities of

the OPCW. The United States should work with the OPCW and

other parties to ensure that there are sufficient funds to carry out

all planned verification activities.

And finally, we can strengthen both conventions, both the BWC

and the CWC, by making it an international crime for individuals

to develop, possess or use chemical and biological weapons. Both

the BWC and the CWC impose legally binding obligations on governments but not on individuals. The United States should support

the negotiation of a treaty that would make it a crime under international law for individuals to acquire or use chemical or biological

weapons or to knowingly assist others in doing so. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.

At this time I would like to call on Senator Cochran for his statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am

pleased to join you in this hearing this morning and I thank you

for convening the hearing and assembling the witnesses that we

will hear from today.

This is a very interesting and troubling issue. I have been frustrated over a period of time that our efforts to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other items that threaten

the security of the world have not been more successful. We have

these international agreements, these so-called non-proliferation

regimes, and it seems to me that in most of the serious cases of

proliferation these agreements are ineffective to stop or even slow

down the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the missile systems that could be used to deliver them over long ranges.

So I am concerned if we continue to put our trust and faith in

that process, in those regimes, whether we are really contributing

to a false sense of security. I am curious to know what the witnesses might say about alternatives to the regimes and I just heard

Ms. Harris, of course, point out a couple of things that she thinks

could be considered to improve the effectiveness of the regimes.

It is this kind of suggestion I think we are looking for this morning, not only observations and discussions of the regimes themselves and what our practices have been in the past. And if there

have been successes, we need to think about those. We do tend to

focus probably on the ineffectiveness rather than the good that the

regimes may have done and that would be useful for us, in order

to have a balanced view.

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1The prepared statement of Ms. Smithson appears in the Appendix on page 304.

So it is important and I do not know of any other issue more serious to us as a country at this time, certainly coming on the heels

of the attacks that we have seen last year and the concerns we

have for future terrorism attacks against the United States and our

citizens.

So it is very timely and we appreciate very much the cooperation

of all of you to help make this hearing a success.

[The prepared statement of Senator Cochran follows:]

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the greatest threats our

nation faces today, and will continue to face in coming years. Countering that threat

in order to ensure the security of our citizens and deployed forces requires a variety

of means, ranging from diplomacy to intelligence to active and passive defenses, and

even to military action when necessary.

Nonproliferation regimes are important tools in this fight against the spread of

chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and their delivery means. Unfortunately,

despite the existence of regimes covering all types of weapons of mass destruction,

the spread of these weapons to nations and even terrorist groups continues, as the

CIA has documented in its recent Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition

of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction. Consider Iran, for example.

According to the CIA’s report, despite being a signatory to the Chemical Weapons

Convention, Iran has manufactured and stockpiled several thousand tons of chemical weapons, comparable in size to Iraq’s stockpile before the Gulf War. And the

Director of Central Intelligence told the Senate just last week that Iran, despite

being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is at work now on a nuclear weapons and may succeed in developing one in just a few years.

The extent to which these nonproliferation regimes can stop or slow the proliferation of WMD remains to be seen. I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ views on

how the effectiveness of these regimes can be improved, and I commend the Chairman for calling this hearing to examine this important issue.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Cochran.

I would like to then call on a statement from Dr. Smithson.

TESTIMONY OF AMY E. SMITHSON, Ph.D.,1 DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION

PROJECT, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER

Ms. SMITHSON. Thank you. Adjusting policies and programs to

address the threat of terrorism is not easy. I would like to thank

this Subcommittee for looking beyond the obvious, for holding a

hearing that examines the utility of international treaties in helping to assure this Nation’s well-being.

Arms control critics often deride treaties as weak mechanisms

that can be broken with impunity, yet these same critics would

hardly advocate scrapping U.S. laws against murder even if those

laws are broken with disturbing frequency. Rather, they would call

for better enforcement of the laws. Even a good law is only as effective as its enforcement. Member governments are the custodians of

these treaties. As the world’s most powerful nation, the United

States has a special responsibility to lead efforts to enforce them.

Despite what you might have heard, terrorists are likely to have

difficulty overcoming the technical hurdles associated with acquiring a capability to inflict mass casualties with chemical and biological weapons. Therefore one key to keeping such weapons out of

their hands is to tackle the proliferation problem at the national

level. Treaties such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons ConvenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
100

tion and the Chemical Weapons Convention are intended to compel

governments to abandon their weapons programs.

Moreover, full and effective implementation of these treaties applies to the subnational actor security threat in three important

ways. First, the fewer governments that maintain chemical or biological weapons programs, the fewer places terrorists can turn to

for help with weapons materials and expertise.

Second, the CWC, but not at present the BWC, requires states

to outlaw offensive weapons activities domestically. The CWC approaches its fifth anniversary with 145 members, all now obligated

to have enacted penal laws that hold individuals accountable.

Third, treaties can block weapons proliferation via the incorporation of export controls. Three years after the CWC was activated,

treaty members were barred from trading so-called Schedule II

chemicals with countries that had not joined. Should the CWC’s

members decide this fall to apply export controls to the more widely traded Schedule III chemicals, states that remain outside of this

treaty would incur tremendous economic hardship. Moreover, the

CWC would have significantly amplified the practice of multilateral

export controls by having almost five times the number of countries

in the Australia Group enforce export controls on hundreds of

chemicals.

As you know, midway through 2001 the Bush Administration rejected the draft BWC monitoring protocol, a decision with which I

agree. My agreement is based on the advice of 35 technical experts,

top-notch experts from the U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology

industries, research institutes, universities, defense contractors,

and veterans of the two U.S. trial inspections to see how the BWC

could be monitored. There are a number of reasons why this protocol should have been rejected, which I will be delighted to elaborate on in Q and A.

In November of this past year the Bush Administration proposed

several alternatives to monitor the BWC, some of which are downright puzzling. For example, putting investigations of suspicious

disease outbreaks and alleged biowarfare incidents in the hands of

the U.N. Secretary General suffers the same handicap as the current structure; namely, the possible politicization and delay of challenge inspections.

Another baffling proposal involves voluntary nonchallenge visits.

Not to mince words, but why would a BWC violator invite inspectors into its midst unless it had taken extreme care to clean up all

evidence of cheating prior to issuing the invitation?

The Bush Administration also advanced proposals with significant merit, as Mrs. Harris has described, to strengthen the security

of access to pathogenic microorganisms, to have governments oversee high-risk experiments with pathogens, to establish professional

scientific codes of conduct, to improve disease surveillance, and to

require BWC members to pass legislation criminalizing offensive

bioweapons activities. The common downfall of these proposals is

that the Bush Administration would leave it to each of the BWC’s

141 members to set their own domestic standard; to wit, country

A could enact a criminalization law with slap-on-the-wrist penalties

while country B puts in place a stiff penal code.

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Walsh appears in the Appendix on page 313.

As for the CWC, which has enjoyed a relatively strong launch in

its first 5 years, this treaty clearly could be working better. One

need only ask a U.S. official or discretely circulate among the treaty’s cognoscenti to hear whispers of compliance problems, yet no

challenge inspections have been requested to address these concerns. The reasons for these circumstances lie largely in how the

United States has implemented this treaty.

When the Senate gave its advice and consent to the CWC’s ratification and Congress passed the treaty’s implementing legislation,

the bills were spiked with exemptions that deprived the inspectors

of their two strongest tools; namely, challenge inspections and laboratory analysis of samples. Officials from other nations, including

Russia and China, have privately told me that their countries

would not hesitate to cite the U.S. exemptions to hold inspectors

at bay.

In this day and age it would be foolhardy to neglect any viable

mechanism that can reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. I will conclude with a few recommendations to improve the

performance of these treaties.

I would ask that Congress and the Bush Administration waste

no time in taking the appropriate steps to see that the CWC is

fully implemented and that all reasonable efforts are made to

strengthen the BWC with a panoply of monitoring tools. U.S. policymakers must push this year to add Schedule III chemicals to the

export control list and also overturn the aforementioned exemptions, restoring full power to the CWC’s inspectors. Please give

these inspectors a fighting chance to catch treaty violators. Otherwise the United States will have no one to blame but itself for this

treaty’s weakened condition.

Second, Congress should insist that the Bush Administration fulfil Public Law 106–113 and conduct BWC monitoring trials at various sites. Should such trials show that meaningful monitoring results can be achieved at a tolerable cost, then regular or random

nonchallenge inspections would be far preferable to the proposed

voluntary visits. Moreover, to have a chance of being effective, challenge inspections must be as automatic and as distanced as possible from politics.

Finally, to make the other BWC monitoring proposals more effective, the United States should add tough standards that make the

desired changes reasonably uniform, not hit or miss. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Dr. Smithson.

Dr. Walsh, your statement, please.

TESTIMONY OF JIM WALSH, Ph.D.,1 RESEARCH FELLOW,

BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Dr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,

thank you so much for giving me the opportunity to speak to you

today about an issue that I think is of singular importance to U.S.

national security, and that is nuclear terrorism. What I would like

to do in my brief remarks is focus on three of the questions that

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I raise in my written testimony. Those questions are: First, are

multilateral nuclear treaties effective? Second, where do multilateral treaties fit in a broader strategy against nuclear terrorism?

And finally third, what is the role for Congress?

Let us begin with the first question: Are multilateral nuclear regimes effective? Of course, multilateral nuclear institutions come in

a variety of forms. Some are treaties, like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Others are informal multilateral

groups like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, while still others, like

UNSCOM and KEDO, are at hoc agencies that were developed in

response to a particular crisis.

Now, of course, creating a multilateral institution is one thing

but having an effective multilateral institution is quite something

else. Some multilateral institutions have been tremendous successes while others have been abject failures. How are we to judge

the regime, the nuclear regime and the way it has performed? I

would like to take just a minute and look in particular at the role

of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and related regime components and their effect on the spread of nuclear weapons around the

world.

After 50 years the most striking feature of the nuclear age is

that there are so few nuclear weapon states, far fewer than predicted by virtually every expert and every policy-maker. As one

observer noted, ‘‘Almost all published predictions of the spread of

nuclear weapons have turned out to be too pessimistic.’’ Perhaps

the most famous or infamous prediction of nuclear proliferation

was offered by President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy warned that

in 10 years—this was back in the early 1960’s—that in 10 years

an additional 21 countries might develop nuclear weapons. And

published work at the time from universities, from think-tanks and

defense intelligence estimates endorsed that prediction. As one

commentator put it, ‘‘The belief was common that the nuclear

spread has proceeded and would continue to proceed as fast as the

technology would take it.’’ The French military theorist Pierre

Gallois observed that proliferation was as irreversible as the generalization of fire arms.

Yet the results have been far different than those predictions. An

overwhelming majority of nuclear-capable countries have opted to

forego nuclear weapons and, over time, the rate of proliferation has

actually declined. Let me repeat that, that the rate of proliferation

has actually declined. After peaking in the 1960’s the number of

new nations joining the nuclear club each decade has gone steadily

downhill and several nations that built or inherited nuclear weapons—South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan—chose to renounce their nuclear weapons.

When in history, asked one scholar, have so many nations had

the capability to produce a powerful weapon and chosen not to exercise it? Indeed, I would argue that the absence of widespread proliferation may be the greatest unheralded public policy success of

the 20th Century.

A key factor in the success was the establishment of the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty. Archival documents, interviews with

former country leaders and a general pattern of state behavior sugVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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gests that the NPT had a decisive impact on the spread of nuclear

weapons.

Now it should be emphasized that the nuclear non-proliferation

regime is not a magic bullet. Several factors in addition to the NPT

have contributed to nuclear restraint and, like any policy instrument, the non-proliferation regime suffers from imperfections and

trade-offs. The record suggests, however, that many of those earlier

predictions of widespread proliferation would have come true in the

absence of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Let me turn to the second question. How can these multilateral

instruments fit into a broader strategy to reduce the risk of nuclear

terrorism? It seems to me that any strategy to reduce the threat

of nuclear terrorism should recognize at least two principles. The

first principle is that the United States is only as secure as the

weakest link in international security. Applied to the issue of nuclear terrorism, what that means is that the security of nuclear

materials and nuclear technology is determined not by the level of

security at the most protected facilities but rather, by the level of

security at the least protected facilities.

The second principle, and I think it is self-evident, is that it is

better to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction than trying to stop them after they have already gotten

them.

Together these principles suggest that in the field of WMD terrorism, homeland security begins abroad. The United States has to

improve its level of domestic security—I think that is obvious—particularly in the areas of aviation and infectious disease, but that

will not be enough. We cannot wait for terrorists to acquire nuclear

materials and then try to stop them once they are bound for America on their deadly mission.

Instead, homeland defense abroad suggests five policy objectives.

One, prevent and otherwise reduce the number of nuclear weapon

states. Two, reduce the number of states with stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Three, secure all remaining

nuclear weapons materials and facilities. Four, increase the number of area and interstate nuclear checkpoints. And five, develop

the capacity to quickly identify and trace nuclear materials.

All of these objectives lend themselves to multilateral regimes.

These regimes provide a way to build the first line of defense

against nuclear terrorism. Moreover, they do so in a way that is

financially and politically prudent. The United States cannot singlehandedly improve the security of all the world’s nuclear installations. Such a task is neither financially nor politically feasible.

Working with other nations through multilateral nuclear regimes

provides a practical alternative for reducing the threat of nuclear

terrorism.

Finally, let me turn to the third question: What is the role of

Congress? And here I am going to talk about nuclear terrorism in

particular and I can talk more generally about non-proliferation in

the Q and A if there is interest there.

There are a number of actions that Congress might take to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. These legislative responses fall

generally into one of three categories: Oversight, appropriations,

and policy innovation. Let me briefly touch on each of these.

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First, oversight. Congressional oversight can be a powerful tool

for change. Hearings, annual reporting requirements and appropriations tied to certification can focus the attention of the executive, the bureaucracy and the public. Given the events of the last

several months, there are a number of things Congress might do

in this area and I will just name one here.

Congress should insist on all available information about nuclear

terrorism. Congress cannot fulfill its legislative responsibilities

without such information and yet much of it is scattered or being

withheld from the public domain. A variety of news organizations,

including the Times of London and CNN, have their own cache of

documents collected from al Qaeda safehouses and training facilities. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense and various executive

agencies have their own set, a separate set of documents, as well

as the results of prisoner interviews and the results of forensics

tests. Most of this information can be made available without endangering sources and methods.

This is a small but critical step in the fight against nuclear terrorism. The history of WMD terrorism suggests that it is self-defeating for the executive to maintain a monopoly over information.

Most of the important nuclear initiatives of recent years have had

their origins outside the executive—in Congress, for example, with

cooperative threat reduction, in university research centers, and

with nongovernmental organizations.

If Congress is going to pursue new approaches to WMD terrorism

and if scholars are going to provide independent assessments of the

dangers and opportunities, then Congress has to take the lead in

seeing that the relevant information is available.

Second, appropriations. Progress against nuclear terrorism will

not be possible without financial resources. Unfortunately, efforts

to prevent nuclear terrorism have not been a funding priority. This

year billions of dollars will be devoted to new weapon systems and

other activities whose purpose is to respond to a terrorist attack

and yet only a tiny fraction of this amount will be expended on efforts that would prevent WMD terrorism from taking place in the

first place.

In the past, Congress has used its power over the purse to ensure that funds were devoted to the problem of nuclear terrorism

even in the face of executive and bureaucratic indifference. Today

the need for Congressional leadership is stronger than ever before.

With rising deficits and a long list of interests lining up for their

share of the anti-terrorism funds, this will not be easy. But success

in the fight against nuclear terrorism depends on continued leadership from Congress. Congress must find a way not only to fund efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism but fund them at a scale commensurate with the size of the problem—at a scale commensurate

with the size of the problem.

Finally and quickly, third, policy innovation. One of the most exciting areas where Congress can contribute to nuclear security is

in the field of policy innovation. For reasons of time let me simply

list some of these areas.

One, internationalizing the concept of cooperative threat reduction beyond the Soviet Union. Cooperative threat reduction started

out of the Congress, started out of the Senate, and it seems to me

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that this has been a successful innovative program, not without

problems but nevertheless successful and innovative, that can be

expanded beyond the former Soviet Union.

Two, developing world-wide civil constituencies for nuclear security. During the Cold War, the United States pursued a variety of

initiatives to promote democracy around the world and to defeat

communism. It set up a special institute to support democratic institutions abroad, established Radio Free Europe, and funded a variety of programs whose purpose was to develop a constituency for

democratic governance. Congress later used this tactic in support

of a different objective when it established the private U.S. Institute for Peace. For its own part, the executive has established a series of special funds; for example, the special fund on AIDS in Africa.

These same tactics can be applied to the new problem of nuclear

security. Congress could, for example, establish a foundation or an

institute for the prevention of WMD terrorism. Acting as a private

entity, this institute could train and support the development of

professional nuclear societies, journalists and locally-based environmental groups and others from other countries, from foreign nations, and then these people could go and monitor the state of nuclear security and press for improvements in their own country,

much as we did the same thing in our fight against communism

decades ago.

Third, Congress might look at the establishment of legislator-tolegislator dialogue with legislators from other countries on this

issue of nuclear terrorism and WMD terrorism.

This list of initiatives is obviously not exhaustive. Instead, it is

meant to illustrate how Congress might approach the question of

policy innovation. Simply put, it makes sense for Congress to think

about policy instruments it has used in other issue domains and

how they might be creatively applied in the new context of nuclear

terrorism.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, it has been a

great honor to speak with you today. In my testimony I have suggested that multilateral regimes have proven to be effective and

that they can be even more effective if considered as part of a

broader strategy against nuclear and WMD terrorism. This strategy, premised on the notion that homeland security begins abroad,

seeks to prevent terrorism at the source, to stop terrorists before

they reach our shores.

September 11 was a wake-up call, as the Chairman rightly said.

It is history grabbing us by the collar and telling us to act now before it is too late. No institution has shown more vision, steadfastness or creativity on the problem of WMD terrorism than the U.S.

Senate but recent events clearly demonstrate that additional action

is required. My hope and expectation is that the Senate will respond to this challenge as it has responded to the challenges of the

past and that America will be a stronger and more secure Nation

as a result. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. Walsh.

Before I ask for Mr. Gormley’s statement I would like to ask Senator Stevens for his statement.

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Gormley appears in the Appendix on page 322.

Senator STEVENS. I am sorry to be late, Mr. Chairman. I had another meeting. I have no opening statement.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Mr. Gormley, your statement, please.

TESTIMONY OF DENNIS M. GORMLEY,1 SENIOR FELLOW,

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

Mr. GORMLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to offer my

suggestions on ways to enhance the Missile Technology Control Regime to cope with the prospects of weapons of mass destruction in

the hands of both state and nonstate actors.

I fear we have fallen short in adapting the MTCR to cope with

rapid changes in the technologies underlying WMD delivery. The

most egregious shortcoming is in the way the MTCR is ill prepared

to deal with the next great missile proliferation threat, that of land

attack cruise missiles. Concern about the spread of land attack

cruise missiles is driven by two realities. First, the quantum leap

in dual use technologies supporting cruise missile development,

and these include satellite navigation and guidance, high resolution

satellite imagery from a host of commercial vendors, unregulated

flight management systems for converting manned aircraft into unmanned aerial vehicles, and digital mapping technologies for mission planning.

And second, the fact that the 33-nation missile technology control

regime is much less effective at controlling the spread of cruise

missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles than ballistic missiles. To

be sure, ballistic missiles receive top priority because they are already widely proliferated while land attack cruise missiles have

only begun to emerge as a threat, but that is precisely the reason

why improved controls on cruise missiles are so critical now. Were

the gaping deficiencies in the way the current MTCR provisions

handle cruise missile transfers eliminated, the MTCR could conceivably do as well with cruise missiles as it has with controlling

the spread of highly sophisticated ballistic missiles.

So far, ballistic missile technology that has spread is largely 50-

year-old SCUD technology, a derivative of World War II German

V–2 systems. Many of the weaknesses of this technology can be exploited by missile defenses.

It is equally important to say what has not spread because of the

MTCR—sophisticated Pershing–2 technology with terrain contour

guidance and maneuvering reentry vehicles, as embodied in Argentina’s and Iraq’s forestalled Condor missile program, which would

have greatly stressed today’s missile defenses. My prepared statement goes into some detail on ways to repair the regime but let me

offer just two stark examples of what might very well occur absent

essential reforms.

First, whereas today’s MTCR has hindered advanced ballistic

missile sales, ambiguities surrounding the ground rules for determining the true range and payload of cruise missiles threatens to

open the floodgates of advanced cruise missile sales. This would be

the equivalent of uncontrolled sales of Pershing–2 missiles to states

outside the MTCR membership.

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Second, perhaps the gravest near-term terrorist threat of exploiting cruise missile technology lies in transforming manned kit airplanes into unmanned and armed weapons carriers. There is a dizzying array of kit airplanes in today’s marketplace. A simple Internet search recently produced close to 100,000 copies of about 425

systems in a growing worldwide market.

But the biggest challenge in transforming these kit airplanes into

unmanned attack means involves the design and integration of a

flight management system. At present, MTCR controls fail to deal

with an emerging phenomenon of small aerospace firms getting

into the business of selling flight management systems for transforming manned into unmanned air vehicles. The mind spins with

scenarios of such unmanned systems, which are ideal means for

disseminating biological agents threatening both domestic and

overseas targets.

Essential MTCR reform will be impossible without the determined leadership of senior Executive Branch decisionmakers, as

well as a more rigorous and consistent management of the interagency process by the National Security Council. Leaders of key

MTCR states, spurred by U.S. leadership, must come together to

convince the broad partnership of the benefits of enhanced MTCR

controls on cruise missile proliferation.

It is important to recall President Reagan’s original objective in

announcing the MTCR in 1987, ‘‘Hindering, not eliminating the

spread of missiles capable of delivering mass destruction weapons.’’ However imperfect the MTCR has been as a non-proliferation

mechanism, it has hindered the spread of the most advanced and

pernicious forms of ballistic missiles, making ballistic missile defenses more conceivable. It needs to do as well with cruise missiles.

Letting cruise missiles proliferate will ultimately not only present

its own set of unique demands from a cruise missile defense standpoint but will make effective ballistic missile defenses more costly

and demanding, too. That is simply because in many respects they

use the same interceptors. Patriot–3 is one good example.

We need to spend far less time expanding MTCR membership

and writing an international code of conduct, which shamelessly

neglects to include cruise missiles in its language, and much more

time reforming and adapting the regime to cope with technological

change and new missile threats.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Gormley. We do have

questions.

I would like to ask Ms. Harris, the first question. There has been

an on-going debate on the question of mass attack with biological

weapons. Before September 11 and the anthrax attacks, U.S. military and nongovernment experts agreed that for some time to come

terrorist groups are unlikely to have sufficient expertise and resources to succeed in a mass attack with biological weapons. Do

you believe this statement?

Ms. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think that assessment is still valid,

with one caveat, and that is assuming terrorists do not get assistance from a national biological or chemical weapons program. The

technical and operational hurdles to terrorists acquiring these capabilities on their own are really very substantial.

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The worrying thing, as both the President and Secretary Rumsfeld have emphasized in recent weeks, is the possibility of assistance from a national program to one of these terrorist groups. This

nexus between proliferation and terrorism really is the issue that

we should be focusing on—to prevent national programs from being

a source of assistance to terrorists’ chemical and biological acquisition efforts.

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Smithson, the administration has pointed to

the failed UNSCOM inspections in Iraq as evidence of how even

the most invasive inspections cannot stem biological weapon development and production. Do you agree?

Ms. SMITHSON. No, sir, I do not agree with that position, the reason being that I have spent quite a bit of time in the company of

those very UNSCOM inspectors. They have told me that virtually

from the minute they walked into facilities, like Al Hakum and

Salman Pak, they knew they were in the midst of an offensive biological weapons program. The same would hold true for the inspectors who first went over to the former Soviet facilities under what

is known as the Trilateral Agreement. This also is the case with

what U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry experts told

me, and their views are presented in the Stimson Center report

‘‘House of Cards.’’

So I think UNSCOM actually caught the Iraqi bioweapons program quickly, but did not come up with hard proof until very late

in the game. So I would think there should be constructive measures that might be put in place to monitor the BWC.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Dr. Walsh, Iraq nearly completed building nuclear weapons despite IAEA inspections. There have been questions about IAEA’s

capabilities. Can current IAEA inspections detect clandestine nuclear programs?

Dr. WALSH. It is an excellent question, Mr. Chairman, and I

think when you look at the history of the non-proliferation regime

what you see is, as in a lot of domains in life, something bad happens and then it is followed by something good. Something bad

happens and it focuses attention, creates the political will, and

then we have an improvement.

When the NPT first came into force in 1970, it had no enforcement provisions, none. Subsequent to that we have had a series of

arms control and other agreements that have become progressively

more intrusive and therefore have given us greater transparency,

a better look inside countries to see, in fact, if they are violating

agreements.

Now, in the case of Iraq, I think it is absolutely right that IAEA

failed us, in part because they did not make use of the powers that

they already possessed. They could have done more without having

written an additional protocol but they failed to use those powers.

Following Iraq, however, I think we have seen a reform of IAEA.

There are still improvements to be made but you will remember

that following Iraq we had the 93 Plus two protocol that would

have established environmental monitoring and now there are a

number of states who have joined that additional protocol.

So, in response to Iraq, we developed new procedures and technologies to improve our ability to detect violations of the treaty.

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You also will have noticed that after Iraq, IAEA was much more

aggressive and part of the reason why we knew about the North

Korean problems, and were able to intervene to freeze that program, was because of the work of IAEA.

I think also it would be unfair to say that IAEA was the only

one responsible for negligence in the Iraqi case. Declassified documents indicate that a number of countries had suspicions about

Iraq’s nuclear behavior in the 1970’s but for political reasons—animosity towards Iran after the hostage crisis, that sort of thing— many countries looked the other way. They knew what was going

on but they looked the other way because they were more focused

on Iran than Iraq. That was a decision that came back to haunt

them.

So in summary, it was more than IAEA that failed us in Iraq but

since then there have been a number of administrative and technical steps that have bolstered and strengthened the regime.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

Mr. Gormley, your testimony mentions the challenge of determining cruise missile range and payload and how the range of

cruise missiles may be changed with little apparent modification to

its air frame. The question is could these challenges be addressed

through an inspection regime?

Mr. GORMLEY. That is a very good question and one I had not

much thought about but it seems to me that an inspection regime

with sufficient scrutiny would certainly provide one with enough

information about the sheer volume of the missile and the relationship between the true payload and the amount of space earmarked

for fuel. Then the calculation of range is a relatively straightforward one, assuming various launch altitudes, which account for

the difficulty with cruise missiles compared with ballistic missiles.

A ballistic missile is a ground-to-ground system and it is a simple

determination of maximum range trajectory. In the case of a cruise

missile, it can be launched from the ground and fly at a low altitude but because it is an aerodynamic vehicle, it can also fly at

higher altitudes where the fuel efficiency is much greater.

So the calculation based on an inspection with some scrutiny

would certainly allow you to provide enough information to determine the true range capability of a cruise missile.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

I call on Senator Thompson.

Senator THOMPSON. I will defer to Senator Cochran.

Senator COCHRAN. I yield to you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

Let me ask both Miss Harris and Miss Smithson for an interchange about the issues concerning the chemical and biological

weapons conventions. I get the impression, Miss Harris, that you

think the United States should have signed on to the recommendations of the November 2001 review conference.

I get the impression, Miss Smithson, you really do not think that

they should have and perhaps the United States is not going far

enough in terms of the issues of verification.

Here, as in other areas, it seems like we have a lot of nations

who have signed on and a lot of nations who are in violation to the

Chemical Weapons Convention. It seems we have a better system

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of verification apparently than we have with the Biological Weapons Convention. I would be interested in elaborating a little bit

more about the distinction, why that distinction is extant, what you

think about it, what we might do differently and, as I indicated,

your view of the United States position with regard to the 2001 review conference. If either one of you would like to comment.

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Senator. I think the key difference we

have to start with between the Biological Weapons Convention and

the Chemical Weapons Convention is that the BWC has no enforcement provisions and the Chemical Weapons Convention has extensive enforcement provisions—requirements for declarations, routine

visits to facilities that are covered by the treaty and challenge inspections.

Today, we have no ability to pursue concerns that another country is developing or producing or stockpiling biological weapons.

Senator THOMPSON. If I could stop you there, how did that come

about? That does not make any sense to the average person who

is unfamiliar with the background. It might help for both or either

of you to explain to people why an area that seems nowadays to

be much more dangerous, and that is biological, why would anyone

enter into an agreement that had absolutely no verification requirements at all.

Ms. HARRIS. I think it is very unlikely that any country would

enter into an agreement now that had no enforcement mechanisms,

but we have to remember the BWC was negotiated in the late

1960’s and early 1970’s. When it was concluded in 1972, it was the

first treaty to outlaw an entire category of weapons. It was completed during the Cold War, at a time when arms control and the

accompanying verification provisions were really in their infancy.

To the extent that there were verification provisions being pursued,

they were on the nuclear side, and relied primarily on national

technical means.

At the time, it was viewed as simply not feasible to consider anything more intrusive in terms of verification arrangements. It was

also deemed to be technically quite difficult.

So I think one needs to look at the BWC in the context of the

time in which it was negotiated, these political environments and

what was deemed to be possible, both technically and politically, in

terms of verification.

Senator THOMPSON. The question is, as it always is, whether or

not it is better to enter into something that might give you a false

sense of security rather than having nothing at all.

Ms. HARRIS. I think the decision made by President Nixon in

1969 was the right one, which was that biological weapons offered

few military advantages to a major military power such as the

United States, but if they were to spread to other countries, they

could challenge and degrade our military capabilities. So despite

the political and technical difficulties of verifying a BW ban, the

Nixon Administration decided to go forward with this treaty.

Senator THOMPSON. Would you move on to these other points,

please, that we raised?

Ms. HARRIS. Certainly. As I said a moment ago, today we have

no ability to enforce compliance with the BWC. The whole point of

the Biological Weapons Convention protocol was to try to put in

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place enforcement mechanisms that, while not providing high confidence ability to detect cheating, would nevertheless make it harder, more costly and more risky for countries to violate their obligations under this treaty.

So the goal was not to catch every cheater but instead, to try to

deter this illicit activity and to get information that could help inform our own decisions about biological defense activities, export

controls, etc. Because the objective was more modest—deterrence

rather than verification—the set of measures that were pursued in

the negotiations were more modest than those in the Chemical

Weapons Convention. This meant declarations of the facilities most

likely to be misused for BW purposes rather than all relevant faculties, on-site visits rather than routine inspections and the possibility of challenge inspections.

Senator THOMPSON. Ms. Smithson.

Ms. SMITHSON. You are correct in detecting a difference of our

opinions. I would argue that the draft BWC protocol should have

been rejected simply because it could not perform as advertised.

Let me give you an example. One of the provisions that the technical experts that sat around my table had problems with was the

idea that a nonchallenge visit would deploy four inspectors for 2

days. One of the industry experts who participated in this exercise,

Dr. Steve Projan, who is the director of antibacterial research at

Wyeth-Ayerst Research, summed up his views of this particular

provision by saying, ‘‘Four inspectors for 2 days couldn’t even get

through all the bathrooms at my facility.’’

Now what these experts told me is that they do believe it is possible to craft monitoring provisions that can tell the good guys from

the bad guys, and I believe them because this is one of the most

heavily regulated industries in the world. They know their way

around inspections. They also believed that it was possible to manage the risks of those inspections to protect confidential or proprietary business information. That is why they urged the Executive

Branch, and they urge you to ask the Executive Branch, to fulfill

the public law that requires additional research and field trials in

this area. The resulting data should inform the U.S. position in future negotiations.

Ms. HARRIS. Senator, could I just add one point? While Amy and

I disagree on the value of the draft Biological Weapons Convention

protocol, I think the one thing we would both agree on is that the

Bush Administration has made a mistake in rejecting any subsequent multilateral process for trying to develop a stronger, legally

binding regime to strengthen the convention.

So whatever differences we have on the protocol, I think we both

feel that it is critically important for the United States to support

the resumption of international efforts to try to develop legally

binding enforcement mechanisms for this treaty, which we both believe are possible.

Senator THOMPSON. My time is up, but what is that issue, Miss

Smithson? What is the procedural issue there and what reason

does the administration give for not proceeding with trying to get

a better deal?

Ms. SMITHSON. Perhaps you can ask that question directly of

Under Secretary of State Bolton, who essentially rained on the

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party. He called the negotiations quits. There is a 1-year hiatus

here. I hope that the United States uses that year to get its act

together, to do the technical field work necessary to come to the negotiating table with a well informed negotiating position.

At this point, I think the jury is out. We really do not know

whether or not this treaty can be monitored but these are such odious weapons that we ought to give it our best shot.

Senator THOMPSON. Whether or not anyone will agree to have

them monitored.

Ms. SMITHSON. Well, sir, I would remind you that 145 countries

have signed up for the tremendously strict monitoring provisions of

the Chemical Weapons Convention, so sometimes it can surprise

you what countries will agree to.

Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Senator Cochran.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, one of the ways we have tried

to enforce agreements and to convince countries they should not

engage in proliferation activities is the use of economic sanctions.

To what extent do you think these have been effective? Are there

any instances where you know that the imposition of sanctions

have worked to help diminish the threat caused by proliferation?

Mr. Gormley, let us start with you.

Mr. GORMLEY. In my view, I think there is room for and a strong

utility for the implementation of sanctions. Unfortunately, the history of the use of sanctions in regard to missile proliferation has

been notably weak.

Do I think there is room for improvement? I think one might look

at ways of standardizing the best provisions of the existing law to

create more targeted and calibrated sanctions that are precisely focused on the issue of trying to take the profit out of proliferation.

This requires identifying those particular entities and imposing

costs on those entities that outweigh the benefits of sanctionable

activity that has occurred.

So I think there is some room for improvement, but I think the

record from 1990, with the implementation of the first Export Administration Act and more recently in 1996, with the Arms Export

Control Act, the evidence is not strong that it has been terribly effective at impeding missile proliferation.

Senator COCHRAN. Dr. Walsh.

Dr. WALSH. Sanctions have not been a frequent part of the nuclear non-proliferation regime but they have been used on occasion.

You will remember after the Indian nuclear test in 1974 there were

a series of sanctions imposed by individual countries and again

after the 1998 tests in South Asia, Japan and to some extent by

the United States placed economic sanctions against the parties.

Those were later withdrawn.

I think sanctions can be useful. You want to be able to send the

message to potential proliferators that if they cross the line there

will be consequences to their behavior. And when people do cross

the line you do want to punish them so that future proliferators see

what those consequences will be.

I am an advocate of smart sanctions. I think that when it comes

to nuclear proliferation the key question is who is sitting around

the table? Who are the decisionmakers and what are their interVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00120 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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ests? When it comes to nuclear weapons the decisionmakers tend

to be the country leader, the military, the scientific bureaucracy,

typically the nuclear agency, and sometimes there are players on

the side. And they are struggling with this question: Is this nuclear

weapons program in my interests or not, not only from a national

security standpoint but from the standpoint of bureaucratic interests? Do I, as the head of my nuclear agency in Country X, am I

going to do better or do worse if we pursue nuclear weapons? Sometimes these people have concluded they will do better budget-wise,

jurisdiction-wise, etc., and have voted in favor of pursuing nuclear

weapons.

I think one of the things we can do with sanctions is not only

send the message that if you cross this line you will be punished

but also make them smart, targeted sanctions so they affect the interests at the table as decisionmakers sit around and try to decide

their nuclear future.

Senator COCHRAN. Dr. Smithson.

Ms. SMITHSON. The main sanction that has come into play with

efforts to retard the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons would be economic sanctions. In the mid-1980’s a number of

countries, led by Australia, formed an export control cooperative

known as the Australia Group, which controls now a lengthy list

of chemical precursors, chemical and biological equipment, as well

as pathogens and other diseases that could be used to inflict harm

on animals, humans or crops.

The Chemical Weapons Convention has amplified the Australia

Group’s effectiveness many times over when it comes to the control

of chemical weapons precursors.

There is a role for sanctions, although I have to concede that

since I do not see classified information, I do not know exactly how

effective these sanctions have been. However, I hear a number of

government officials arguing that these are efforts well worthwhile.

Senator COCHRAN. Ms. Harris.

Ms. HARRIS. Senator, I would make three points with respect to

sanctions. First, I believe, having been involved in sanctions decisions over the course of 8 years in the Clinton Administration, that

sanctions are most effective before they are imposed, when they

can be used as a tool to try to influence state behavior, to try to

influence governments to tighten up their export controls so as to

prevent the transfer of sensitive WMD-related technologies.

Second, sanctions are most effective when they are applied

broadly by the international community, rather than by the United

States alone.

And third, they are most effective when they give the Executive

Branch the flexibility to defer the imposition of sanctions in order

to work with the government of jurisdiction to try to put a stop to

the transfers of concern and to put in place stronger domestic

mechanisms to prevent such transfers in the future.

Senator COCHRAN. Its been several years now since the Chemical

Weapons Convention has been in force. One of the provisions is to

permit challenge inspections of suspected activities or facilities.

Why hasn’t that been used? Why hasn’t that right to ask for challenge inspections been used? And do you think it would be appropriate, since according to unclassified intelligence reports that we

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have talked about, there are suspected activities, there are suspected facilities, why not use that provision of the treaty to try to

find out what is going on and put a stop to it under the terms of

that treaty? Dr. Smithson.

Ms. SMITHSON. Actually, I would argue that the reason challenge

inspections have not been used or one of the main reasons is that

we have shot ourselves in the foot. There was an exemption passed

with the implementing legislation on this treaty that gives the

President the right to refuse a challenge inspection on the grounds

that it might threaten U.S. national security. Well, according to the

article in the treaty that governs challenge inspections, that option

is not there. So what this exception does is it allows other governments to use a loophole that we ourselves have created.

I mentioned that Chinese and Russian officials have told me they

are delighted at this turn of events, that they would be able to say

hey, you challenge us; well, we refuse the challenge because it

would threaten our national security.

So we have kind of made this an impotent tool and that, I think,

is definitely not in U.S. interests, which is why I argued that this

exemption and the exemption on analysis of samples must be overturned if we are to restore full powers to these inspectors.

Senator COCHRAN. Dr. Walsh, do you have an observation about

that question?

Dr. WALSH. No, sir, I do not. Only to say that I would like to see

us break that barrier and for them to be a more regular feature

of arms control and international multilateral treaties. I would like

to see more challenge inspections. That was the issue around Iraq.

IAEA had the power to do more and they did not use it. They became much more aggressive in North Korea and I would like to see

that same level of aggressiveness in other areas, as well.

Senator COCHRAN. Ms. Harris.

Ms. HARRIS. Senator, I think the situation with respect to the

Chemical Weapons Convention and challenge inspections is rather

more complicated than has been suggested here. There are, in fact,

a number of reasons why challenge inspections were not utilized in

the first few years after the treaty entered into force, which was

in 1997.

First, here in the United States, we were very much focused on

our own implementation of the treaty—passing implementing legislation, preparing our declarations, ensuring that on a national

basis we were meeting our treaty obligations.

Second, the international implementing organization, the OPCW,

also was focused in the initial years on verifying the initial declarations by countries, verifying the beginning of destruction activities

and, quite frankly, was not prepared technically to proceed with

challenge inspections.

And third, as Under Secretary Bolton said at the CDClast week,

we were using the treaty’s consultation provisionsvery effectively to

pursue concerns about whether a number of countries had made

accurate declarations or whether they may have been engaged in

on-going offensive activity. Those bilateral consultations resolved

our compliance concerns with a number of countries.

Today, we are in a different situation. Our own domestic implementation is going fairly well, notwithstanding delays in the deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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struction program. The treaty organization is up and running and

ready to carry out challenge inspections. And we have come close

to exhausting the prospects for using other treaty provisions, such

as the consultation provisions to resolve our concerns.

So I think it is appropriate now to be considering challenge inspections in those cases where consultations have not addressed

our concerns or in cases where such bilateral discussions are simply inappropriate or not likely to be productive. If we have good

intelligence information about particular countries, we should proceed with these types of inspections.

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Cochran.

Senator Stevens, your questions?

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

Dr. Walsh, you have twice said that we did not use the powers

that we had in Iraq. My memory is that Sadam Hussein dismissed

the American leader of our inspection team and then he expelled

the whole team. What powers did we have under those circumstances that we did not use?

Dr. WALSH. I am sorry, Senator Stevens. I should have been

clearer in my statements. I am talking not about the post-Gulf War

inspections. I am talking about IAEA’s failure to use challenge inspections prior to the Gulf War when there were suspicions about

nuclear activities in Iraq.

You will remember, for example, in 1981 the Osiraq reactor was

bombed by Israel. There are any number of documents that have

mentioned—American declassified documents—that expressed concerns about Iraqi nuclear behavior throughout the 1970’s. So what

I would have liked to have seen is that power exercised earlier so

that we were not in a situation where we fought a war and then,

after the fact, discovered nuclear ambitions and nuclear programs

that were further along than we had suspected.

Senator STEVENS. My problem is I do not know how to go back

and renew that now. You imply that we might be able to do something now. What would you suggest we could do now?

Dr. WALSH. Well, let me speak more generally about the issue of

challenge inspections and make two points.

First, I probably take a different view than some of my colleagues in that I would like to see more regular challenge inspections. Right now challenge inspections are seen as such a big deal

that if I issue a challenge inspection it is really an indictment of

another country. So there is a real barrier, a psychological and political barrier, to crossing that line. Those who might ask for a

challenge inspection ask themselves: Do we have the goods? Do we

really want to do this or do we want to pursue other instrumentalities?

I would like to see the threshold for being able to execute a special inspection, the political threshold lowered so that they are

more common because I think the more common they are, the

greater the transparency and the greater the likelihood that we

will deter potential proliferators. So I would like to see them become a more frequent part of the regime.

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In terms of IAEA in particular, we have had a strengthening of

IAEA since Iraq and part of that has been this protocol I referred

to earlier, 93 Plus 2, or the Additional Protocol. Essentially it says

we are going to collect information about nuclear activities not only

by going to the reactor or doing material accountancy; we are also

going to test the air and the water. We are going to do environmental monitoring. So even if you do not let us into a facility, we

are still going to have the ability to detect clandestine activity. I

think that is enormously useful. So what we need to do is continue

to expand.

Senator Thompson, you raised the issue of why would we join

something that did not have an enforcement mechanism and, of

course, the NPT did not have an enforcement mechanism. I think

it is important to remember that these institutions are not fixed.

They evolve over time. The NPT and the non-proliferation regime

is certainly bigger and better than it was in 1970. We have more

instrumentalities, we have more resources, so we should expect

that with experience, sometimes bad experiences, but with experience we are able to craft better instruments to try to enforce and

try to verify the agreements.

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Walsh, I am sorry to say I do not think

we have any options left with Iraq.

Dr. WALSH. Oh, you mean currently?

Senator STEVENS. Yes.

Dr. WALSH. Well, let me be clear about Iraq. I know we are focused on nuclear terrorism and Bin Laden. Bin Laden has somewhere between $25 and $300 million. Sadam Hussein has billions

of dollars. He is, in my mind, an international war criminal. He is

one of the few leaders ever to have used chemical weapons against

innocent civilians and then used weapons of mass destruction in a

war with another country. I think he is a seriously bad guy.

I think having said that, I would like to see him removed from

office. The question is how do you get to that? How do you get

there? And I think reasonable people can disagree. This is a policy

conundrum. It is not going to be an easy one to solve but he ranks

as high as anyone in my mind as a threat to international security.

Senator STEVENS. Let me just state that Senator Cochran and I

are on the Appropriations Committee and we do not have money,

as you have indicated, to continue down some of these avenues you

would like us to pursue because of the circumstance that exists

now.

We do not make any more nuclear weapons. Russia throws theirs

out and renews them every 5 years. Most of the nuclear nations

make new weapons. We do not make any new weapons. We have

a nuclear stockpile program that now costs us several billion dollars a year to try to determine whether the nuclear weapons that

were built 20 years ago are still not only safe but potentially effective if we ever were called upon to use them.

Now that determination not to test weapons has strained away

in the appropriations process the money we would use to follow all

the things you would like us to follow in terms of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons inspections and detection concepts. Do you

have any comment on that? Why were we pushed into that corner

of not making weapons and instead spending billions of dollars to

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pursue the policy of assuring the utility of weapons made 20 years

ago?

Dr. WALSH. A quick overview and then a response to your question, Senator. The overview is that nuclear weapons, and I do not

have to tell this Subcommittee but I think it is worth it for the

broader public to understand this, nuclear weapons are not like

conventional weapons. Numbers matter less. Whether I have five

nuclear weapons and you have four is less of an issue. The issue

is deterrence and national security and the destruction that you

can do to another country.

I do not know of another country in the world that we would

want to trade places with in terms of our current nuclear stockpile.

There is no country that has a more resourced, more sophisticated,

more deadly stockpile and any of those countries that have ambitions in those areas would certainly prefer ours to theirs. So I do

not worry about our stockpile as much.

I think we also have to look at this in the context of proliferation.

We made commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

and we made commitments to other countries in order to get the

indefinite extension of that treaty that said that we would pursue

the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And I know that there are

different views about this treaty probably on the Subcommittee, as

there are in Congress, but my own view is that this is an important

non-proliferation tool and it is an important political issue because

of the commitments the U.S. Government has made in order to get

other non-proliferation achievements and victories.

Now as to the question of cost, yes, stockpile stewardship is a

very expensive program and I would certainly not disagree with

that. But I am hopeful that given the intelligence and creativity of

the Senate, that they will be able to find funds for these vitally important issues for U.S. national security, as they have been able to

find funds for other things.

Before September 11 the surplus was going down and yet we

have been able to find the money to fund homeland security. It

seems to me, again with this notion that homeland security begins

abroad, that we can find the money and we need to find the money

to strengthen the system internationally so that those things do

not come back to haunt us.

Senator STEVENS. The vote is on, Mr. Walsh. I do not know if

maybe the rest of the people want to make some comments on that

but in my judgment you may be right today but will you be right

5 years from now, 10 years from now? We will still be maintaining

the most expensive program of stockpile maintenance in the world.

We spend more annually than most nuclear nations spent to get

into the nuclear circle and we spend it to preserve weapons that

are 20 years old now.

I disagree violently with this concept that we should continue to

spend that money. We should start building some again and we

should toss out the ones that are old. If we did, we would have

some money to do what you suggest.

Thank you very much.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. I would like to ask the

Members present whether they want to return for more questions.

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We now have a vote call and we expect to have three votes, one

after the other, which will take some time.

So let me ask the Members whether you have further questions

or whether you would be willing to submit it and adjourn this hearing.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I have no other questions. I

asked that my complete statement be printed in the record at the

beginning of the hearing.

Senator AKAKA. Without objection it will be printed.

Senator COCHRAN. We appreciate very much the witnesses’ efforts to help us this morning and the excellent answers to our

questions. I think it has broadened our appreciation of the challenge that we face in this area and deepened our understanding,

as well. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Thompson.

Senator THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions,

either. I would ask that my full statement be made a part of the

record and I, too, would want to thank the witnesses and let them

know that the statements they have submitted will be the basis of

a lot of consideration by the staff. As we approach these issues it

is much more than just the little time we spend here together that

you have contributed and we appreciate that.

I am always trying to learn more about these complex issues and

trying to figure out just exactly what is the significance of inspection. Miss Smithson, you seem to have some faith in it. Sometimes

I feel that we should look at it more from a common sense standpoint. Who would allow you to come in and inspect something that

is going to be a problem for them?

Ms. SMITHSON. That is what I said, sir.

Senator THOMPSON. I hope Sadam Hussein never agrees to us

coming in to inspect because if he does, we will be in the same rigmarole that we were in before. It will be hide and seek and running around. I am convinced he will never let us in. An inspection

regime presumes a mechanism whereby people in good faith are

trying to convince one another that there is no problem. If there

is a problem and you allow an inspection regime, that just means

it is a matter of one trying to out-fox the other. Then, in his case

you get into issues of intrusiveness and what was actually found,

then running to the United Nations every time there is a dispute

and the same sorts of things.

So I am troubled by the whole concept. I am not sure how effective that can ever be in a big nation, with all kinds of capabilities.

I also look for signs of optimism with regard to these other regimes. Clearly we have got to try to reach some accommodations

with these other countries. But, when you look at the nuclear nonproliferation regime, we learn things as we go along. One of the

things we learn is that it does not keep China from outfitting Pakistan soup to nuts and we do nothing about it. Basically we catch

them and they say well, those pictures you have of missile canisters, you cannot prove there are missiles actually in those canisters that we have sent to Pakistan and we accept that. So it is

kind of farcical.

With regard to the MTCR, China and Russia or entities within

those countries basically do what they feel like they need to do

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with regard to assisting Iran, Pakistan, and other nations. Then

you have the rogue nations themselves, like North Korea, developing indigenously all these things and becoming suppliers within

their region.

So continue to look for reasons for optimism, why these regimes

really work. I am sure that there are some things that we have deterred that we otherwise would not, as you pointed out. But, with

regard to the big players and countries that determine this is what

they need in their own national interest, whether it be India or

Pakistan, it seems that these things, international norms and all

that mean nothing in the face of all that. So continue trying to convince people like myself that these are doing a lot of good.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Senator Thompson.

As you can tell, Members of this Subcommittee have deep interest in this area and we will continue to explore this.

Miss Harris, Dr. Smithson, Dr. Walsh, and Mr. Gormley, I want

to thank you again for coming this morning and for your testimony

and your responses.

A number of points are clear. Terrorists will need to rely largely

on states to develop weapons of mass destruction. Currently multilateral non-proliferation regimes are not effective enough to detect

and prevent states from developing WMD programs. However,

these regimes are an essential part of a strategy to prevent WMD

proliferation.

The key question then is how does the administration intend to

strengthen verification regimes? The administration’s proposals for

national regulations and voluntary cooperation mechanisms within

the BWC are not enough and what I would call moving beyond traditional arms control. Moving beyond traditional arms control is no

substitute for arms control if there is nothing concrete to replace

it.

For our next hearing that we are planning on this subject, we

will invite the administration to appear.

We have no further questions at this time because of the vote

that we are expecting. However, Members of this Subcommittee

may submit questions in writing for any of the witnesses. We

would appreciate a timely response to any questions. The record

will remain open for these questions and for further statements

from my colleagues.

I would like to express my appreciation once again to all the witnesses for your time and for sharing your insights with us this

morning.

Any further comments? Otherwise, the Subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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STRENGTHENING MULTILATERAL

NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES

MONDAY, JULY 29, 2002

U.S. SENATE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE, OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka,

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Akaka and Cochran.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee will please come to order. I

want to say good afternoon to everyone, both our witnesses and the

audience. I want to welcome all of you here today.

As you know, last week the Committee approved a substitute

amendment to S. 2452, legislation creating the Homeland Security

Department. Today, we are going to focus on how we can improve

our security through more effective international agreements.

Earlier this month, John Bolton, the Undersecretary of State for

Arms Control, commented in a State Department journal, ‘‘With

very few exceptions, terrorist groups have not acquired and cannot

acquire weapons of mass destruction without the support of nationstates.’’

Our nonproliferation policies help prevent terrorists from obtaining these weapons. U.S. nonproliferation strategy is a four-pronged

approach that includes treaties, export control systems, multilateral regimes, and assistance to other countries.

This Subcommittee has held hearings in the past on U.S. export

control systems and assistance to other nations, especially the

states of the former Soviet Union. Today, we will discuss international regimes and treaties.

Over the next 4 months, each of the six nonproliferation regimes

will have a general members meeting. A primary topic to be discussed will be the new threat environment and how the regimes

should address WMD proliferation to terrorist groups.

Today, the Subcommittee will learn what steps the administration is taking to strengthen these regimes.

Last week, Stephen Younger, the Director of the Department of

Defense’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, said ‘‘Al Qaeda has

been trying to get weapons of mass destruction capability. I think

that they had a limited infrastructure in Afghanistan to produce it

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indigenously. However, that doesn’t mean that they don’t have a

different capability elsewhere.’’

The President’s just-released national homeland security strategy

fails to include nonproliferation among the principles of homeland

security. However, our nonproliferation policies, including U.S. participation in multilateral regimes, are an essential part of our defense against a WMD terrorist attack on American soil.

I would like to welcome our administration witnesses, Vann Van

Diepen, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and Marshall

Billingslea, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. This is not

the first time either of you have appeared before this Subcommittee, and I thank you for your continued assistance in our

international security and proliferation oversight responsibilities.

And now, I would like to yield to my friend, Senator Cochran.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your convening this hearing today.

It follows on an earlier hearing that we had back in February,

when we heard from experts in this area on the dangers that flow

from proliferation, dangers to our national security and the security of mankind, as a matter of fact. When you stop to think about

the awesome consequences of an accidental nuclear incident, for example, or an exchange between two nation-states of ICBMs

equipped with weapons of mass destruction, the consequences are

just enormous and not just for the individual countries that may

be actively engaged or involved.

I recall saying one time that an accident in the nuclear area,

such as we had with the Chernobyl incident in Ukraine, a nuclear

accident anywhere is a nuclear accident everywhere, because of the

possibility of fallout and the impact that it potentially has around

the world.

One other aspect of this hearing that I think is particularly significant is assessing not just what our obligations are to try to

strengthen the nonproliferation regimes—that is part of our challenge, and that is the topic that we are operating under today—

but what are the consequences on our cooperative efforts to develop

defenses against missile attacks, and how would they be affected

by the Missile Technology Control Regime?

For example, specifically, our relationship in the co-production of

the Arrow missile system—it is a missile defense system that

Israel has deployed—to what extent will our export or cooperation

in developing and co-producing these systems have, in terms of the

Missile Technology Control Regime?

There are other nation-states, too. In NATO, for example, we are

talking about cooperative efforts to defend our European allies. We

already have one program, the MEADS program, which involves

Germany and Italy as well as the United States. It would be interesting to assess what impact the Missile Technology Control Regime or any other nonproliferation regime might have on our future efforts to cooperatively defend against missile attack on NATO

countries.

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Van Diepen appears in the Appendix on page 331.

So those are some of my thoughts as we open this hearing. Mr.

Chairman, thank you again for chairing the hearing. We look forward to hearing our government witnesses today.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your statement, Senator Cochran.

And now, I would like to proceed to our witnesses and ask Mr.

Van Diepen to proceed with his statement.

TESTIMONY OF VANN VAN DIEPEN,1 DIRECTOR OF CHEMICAL,

BIOLOGICAL AND MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran. It

is my privilege to testify before you today on behalf of the State Department on the important subject of multilateral nonproliferation

regimes, which play a vital role in the United States and international efforts to impede the spread of weapons of mass destruction, missiles for their delivery, and advanced conventional weapons.

Nonproliferation continues to be one of the most important and

complex of America’s foreign policy challenges. Preventing the

spread of WMD and missiles is among the President’s highest national security priorities. He has made clear that halting proliferation is a central tenet of U.S. foreign policy and that a comprehensive nonproliferation strategy is needed.

We are responding to this challenge with the active use of a

broad range of tools: Norms, export controls, interdiction, sanctions,

counterproliferation, deterrence, and direct diplomacy. Our toolkit

also includes the multilateral nonproliferation arrangements or regimes: The Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia

Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and

the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Members of these regimes agree as a matter of policy to control

an agreed list of items according to agreed guidelines implemented

according to national laws.

The other key multilateral approaches are legally binding global

treaties that establish basic norms: The Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

These regimes and treaties have made important contributions in

conjunction with the rest of our nonproliferation strategy in slowing WMD and missile proliferation worldwide. Through effective

enforcement of comprehensive export controls, broad multilateral

cooperation in halting shipments of proliferation concern, and active outreach to key nonmembers to increase their awareness of

proliferation threats, the regimes and treaties have made it more

difficult, more costly, and more time-consuming for programs of

proliferation concern to obtain the expertise and material needed

to advance their programs, compelling them to rely on older and

often less effective technology.

The treaties also have established a global, political, and legal

barrier against the spread of WMD. The Chemical Weapons Convention and Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, in particular, have

international verification organizations that have a legal right to

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inspect and require other measures from states’ parties in order to

promote compliance and provide a basis on which the International

Community can cooperate to enforce these norms.

My written testimony, which I hope can be entered into the

record, describes the background, purpose, and membership of each

of these regimes and treaties. Each of them continues to serve a

vital role in the fight against proliferation. Each has recorded a

number of successes, and each faces unique challenges.

I would like to review now the current effectiveness of the various mechanisms. By the 1990’s, the Australia Group had largely

succeeded in removing its members as an inadvertent source of

supply for nation-state chemical and biological weapons programs.

Since September 11, the group has been focusing on revamping

its controls to better address the terrorist threat. In 2002, the AG

adopted licensing guidelines that include CBW terrorism as a reason for control and became the first regime to require participants

to have so-called catchall controls, controls that cover nonlisted

items when destined for a CBW program, and the first regime to

control intangible transfers of technology. The AG also agreed to

control technology for the development and production of listed biological agents and equipment.

In recent years, AG members have begun to consider measures

to address the cooperation between nonmember countries on CBW

programs. While the AG has been attacked in the BWC and the

CWC by some nonaligned countries seeking to abolish export controls, AG participants agree on the continued necessity and viability of the group, its compatibility with the conventions, and the

need to educate nonmembers on the regime. Dealing with a hostile

environment in the BWC and the CWC will remain a priority.

Over the course of the Missile Technology Control Regime’s 15-

year history, the regime has persuaded most major suppliers to

control responsibly their missile-related exports. We have reduced

the number of countries with MTCR-class or Category I missile

programs, eliminating programs in Latin American and Central

Europe. MTCR countries have cooperated to halt numerous shipments of proliferation concern. The MTCR has established a broad

outreach program to increase awareness of the global missile

threat, and the MTCR Guidelines and Annex have become the

international standard for responsible missile-related export behavior.

In addition to the MTCR, the United States supports the wide

acceptance of the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic

Missile Proliferation. Initiated by the MTCR countries in 1999, the

code is intended to be a new multilateral complement to the work

of the MTCR. It will supplement but not supplant the MTCR.

The code would consist of a small set of broad principles, general

commitments, and modest confidence-building measures. It is intended to be a voluntary political commitment to establish a broad

multilateral norm against missile proliferation. It will complement

the MTCR and other national missile nonproliferation efforts by establishing a widely subscribed consensus that countries should cooperate on a voluntary basis to impede missile proliferation. We

hope the code will come into effect as early as the end of this year.

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The Nuclear Suppliers Group’s greatest successes included requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply to

non-nuclear states, and controlling nuclear dual-use equipment and

technology.

We have had notable success in gaining consensus within the

Wassenaar Arrangement conventional regime on guidelines for the

exports of Man Portable Air Defense Systems, expanding the arrangement’s mandate to explicitly prevent terrorists from acquiring

controlled items and increasing categories for arms reporting.

Wassenaar provides a useful forum for discussing developments

that have a bearing on national export control policies, regional developments, and possible mutual restraint.

The Biological Weapons Convention has served for nearly 30

years as an important international prohibition on nearly all activities associated with biological weapons. The BWC does not include

a mechanism for checking compliance, as it is inherently unverifiable.

Although the United States concluded that we could not support

the approach embodied in the draft BWC protocol and that the protocol’s flaws could not be fixed, we have proposed several important

alternative measures to combat the BW threat. Such proposed

measures include promotion of standards for biosafety and biosecurity, scientific and industrial codes of conduct, and improved disease surveillance.

Our goal is to highlight compliance concerns and gain support

from states’ parties for the U.S. package and other measures that

would address the BW threat of today and the future. We hope

that BWC parties can agree on measures that will effectively do so.

The Chemical Weapons Convention has helped reduce the threat

from chemical weapons, resulting in international disclosure of

chemical weapons programs in India, China, and Iran. Stockpiles

of chemical weapons, as well as chemical weapons production facilities, are being destroyed in Russia and a number of other countries. Around the world, facilities that could be used for chemical

weapons-related purposes are subject to international inspection.

The CWC demonstrates the value of properly designed multilateral agreements for placing constraints on potential proliferators.

Our experience with the CWC demonstrates the need for supplementary mechanisms, such as the Australia Group, to assist likeminded states in coordinating national nonproliferation efforts, and

it also demonstrates the critical importance of U.S. leadership not

only in negotiating an agreement but also in ensuring that it is effectively implemented.

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has contributed importantly to stemming the tide of nuclear proliferation. States such as

South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil decided against nuclear weapons and joined the NPT. Following the dissolution of the Soviet

Union, all former Soviet nuclear weapons were transferred to Russia. All other former Soviet States joined the NPT as non-nuclearweapon states. The NPT remains especially critical today with the

threat of nuclear terrorism.

The periodic NPT review process called for in the treaty is an important means for addressing these issues, including strengthening

the treaty’s verification system. As the key verification mechanism

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under the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency has performed well but has also been frank in recognizing its deficiencies

and in proposing remedies. Over the past 10 years, the IAEA has

taken several steps to improve its safeguard systems.

Adoption by member states of the model additional protocol to

existing safeguards agreements would strengthen the effectiveness

and improve the efficiency of the safeguard system.

After September 11th, the IAEA moved promptly to expand its

programs to combat nuclear terrorism. The IAEA has served as an

important source of assistance to developing countries, which might

otherwise not obtain the benefits of peaceful nuclear applications

as envisaged for NPT parties in good standing.

A strong, effective, and efficient IAEA serves important U.S. interests. The IAEA must have sufficient and predictable funding resources to fulfill all aspects of its mission.

The Zangger Committee, the committee of NPT nuclear exporters, has taken the lead in developing supplier consensus to add enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production commitment to

the so-called trigger list that the group administers.

This talks about what we have done up until now, but nonproliferation faces a challenging future. As events of the past year

have demonstrated, we face an increasing proliferation threat from

terrorists and their state sponsors. The treaties face a continuous

threat from states that would seek to violate them. We must scrutinize not only the nonproliferation regimes and treaties but all of

our nonproliferation tools with an eye toward improving their effectiveness.

These regimes and treaties have contributed greatly to international nonproliferation efforts, but we cannot become complacent.

As a starting point, rigorous, energetic, and ever-vigilant enforcement is essential.

Nonproliferation remains a perpetually unfinished project. More

work always needs to be done. We must deal with continuing proliferation threats posed by countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya,

North Korea, India, and Pakistan. We must strengthen cooperation

and cope with the impact of technological advances. We must continue to combat the terrorist threat. We must consider new potential threats, expand our nonproliferation toolkit, and improve the

efficiency of those tools we have.

My written testimony describes our ongoing and future efforts to

address these challenges in some detail. To summarize, I would

note the need for the regimes and treaties to focus on the following

five priority areas.

First, regional nonproliferation, focusing on steps beyond simply

controlling our own exports that we and our partners can take individually or collectively to impede proliferation.

Two, look for ways that these mechanisms can help deal with the

threat of terrorism.

Three, continue to update control lists to reflect technological advances and ensure that they keep pace with proliferation trends,

including terrorism and the use of so-called dirty bombs or radiological dispersal devises.

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Billingslea appears in the Appendix on page 346.

Four, work to extend export controls in line with regime standards to all potential suppliers, as well as to those countries that

serve as transshipment points.

And five, increase efforts to make nonmembers more aware of

the threat and consequences of proliferation, urge them to adopt

polices and practices consistent with regime standards, and provide

export control assistance as necessary.

In closing, multilateral nonproliferation regimes and treaties

have an important role to play as two components of a comprehensive approach to advancing U.S. national security and nonproliferation policy. They must remain vibrant, active tools, focused on their

collective and individual core mission, impeding threatening weapons programs, especially via impeding the spread of weapons and

related equipment and technology, and reinforcing and verifying

treaty obligations against the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, these multilateral instruments must also possess the flexibility to adapt to new challenges on the battlefield of

proliferation. The continued exercise of strong U.S. leadership will

play an indispensable role in strengthening these multilateral regimes and treaties to better combat proliferation. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your statement.

Mr. Billingslea, please proceed with your statement.

TESTIMONY OF MARSHALL S. BILLINGSLEA,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Chairman Akaka, Senator Cochran, as requested, today I will provide the views of the Department of Defense regarding the effectiveness of current multilateral nonproliferation regimes and organizations in preventing WMD and

missile proliferation. I will discuss some of the emerging trends

that we are witnessing and how these regimes are able or unable

to address such developments. I will then conclude with a look at

where we should go from here.

I will start by characterizing the growing WMD threat. In terms

of the terrorist dimension to the problem, we see an alarming pattern developing. With increasing frequency since the mid-1980’s,

we have seen a steady growth in the awareness of and interest in

WMD by terrorist groups. These groups are aggressively trying to

procure the necessary materials to conduct a WMD attack.

For instance, Osama bin Laden has publicly announced his WMD

aspirations. He has likened the acquisition and use of WMD to a

religious duty.

Our friends and allies have, on several occasions, thwarted WMD

acquisition efforts, whether we are talking about cyanide smuggling or trafficking in radiological materials. A few months ago, for

instance, a terrorist cell was caught with a cyanide compound and

a map of the U.S. Embassy in Rome.

Though we have had some important successes, we know we are

not completely blocking WMD procurement efforts by terrorist organizations.

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Part of the problem is that much of the equipment used to make

and deliver WMD is commercially available from a large number

of sources. It is very difficult to track dual-use technology and to

stop it from falling into the wrong hands. The manufacturing

equipment is generally small; it is generally portable; it is easily

concealed. For instance, this hearing room is big enough to house

a complete nerve agent production facility. And even less space, the

anteroom, would be needed for a biological weapons production program.

Likewise, terrorist groups have both used and are interested in

a variety of delivery mechanisms for their WMD; again, many of

which can be constructed or adapted from commonly available materials or systems, such as pesticide sprayers.

There are, in short, seemingly infinite ways that a determined

terrorist group could conduct a WMD attack. As you can see, it is

difficult to combat the spread of this capability through multilateral arms control instruments such as treaties or export control regimes, though we believe that these regimes are generally helpful

to the overall effort to block proliferation.

Terrorist WMD aspirations and threats are receiving a high degree of attention from the Bush Administration because the results

of a WMD attack by terrorist groups or by countries could be catastrophic. We are particularly intent on ensuring that these groups

are not able to obtain highly contagious pathogens.

Giving added emphasis to our efforts is the variety of excellent

work being done by the medical and academic community regarding the various unconventional threats we now face. In particular,

I would like to direct the attention of the Subcommittee to the recent work done by Johns Hopkins University in an exercise called

Dark Winter. I summarize the results of that exercise in my testimony.

In addition to the fact that many terrorist groups are known to

harbor WMD ambitions, there is another worrisome linkage. Every

country that is a ‘‘state-sponsor of terrorism’’ also is pursuing its

own national-level WMD and missile programs. In other words,

every country that harbors, funds, or otherwise assists terrorist

groups as a matter of government policy also as a matter of government policy is pursuing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons

and missile systems to deliver these weapons.

Countries such as Iran and Syria continue to support terror

groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,

and other groups, such as the PFLP–GC.

Some of the groups, like Hamas, are exploring ways to utilize

WMD. Hamas is working with poisons and chemicals in an effort

to coat suicide bomb fragments.

At the same time, both Iran and Syria themselves have robust

chemical warfare programs, and both are exploring biological weapons. Both countries can deliver these weapons by a variety of

means via short-range missile systems such as Scuds or by artillery

shells. And Iran is making strides in developing the Shahab–3 medium range missile and longer range systems.

We also believe that Iran is pursuing aggressively a nuclear

weapons capability, and we are concerned that the Bushehr nuclear power project is, in reality, a pretext for the creation of an

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infrastructure that is designed to help Tehran acquire atomic

weapons.

The same worrisome linkage exists in other terror-abetting countries.

Cuba, for instance, has a limited developmental research effort

relating to biological weapons and also harbors terrorist groups

such as the Basque separatist ETA and FARC and ELN operatives.

Iraq, which stands in violation of numerous Security Council resolutions and which expelled international weapons inspectors several years ago, is believed to be rebuilding its WMD infrastructure.

On the terrorism side, Iraq today continues to harbor several terrorist organizations and provides bases of operations for groups

such as the PKK, MEK, Abu Nidal, and the Palestine Liberation

Front.

The linkage between terrorist groups and countries with WMD

aspirations concerns us for several reasons. First, these countries

give wide latitude to terrorist groups that operate within their borders. Terrorists are able to establish training and research camps

where they are free to develop WMD and to perfect their plans for

delivery. There also is a very dangerous potential that equipment

and expertise meant for a state-level program could fall into the

hands of terrorist groups, either unintentionally or by design. Finally, we are worried about the potential for a country to use terrorist networks to conduct a WMD attack.

I will turn now to an assessment of nonproliferation regimes.

President Bush has placed a high priority on combating the spread

of WMD and their delivery systems. We have moved rapidly to

counter imminent terrorist threats and to identify and thwart future ones. In countering these urgent threats, President Bush has

stated that traditional Cold War concepts, such as deterrence and

containment, may no longer be appropriate in every situation. The

international security situation has changed, and we must adapt

our nonproliferation and defense strategies to recognize these

changes.

Over the last 50 years, we have achieved important success in

stemming the proliferation of WMD through a variety of mechanisms, ranging from treaties to multilateral technology control

mechanisms such as the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Domestic export controls and transshipment laws and regulations designed to control the movement

of sensitive goods and technologies also are very important.

That said, while the traditional nonproliferation policy instruments the United States has used to combat the proliferation of

WMD—again, international treaties, multilateral export control regimes, and so forth—continue to have value in the collective international nonproliferation framework, they also have limitations.

One of the limitations is enforceability. At this stage, for instance, several countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Cuba seem

able to violate their obligations under treaties such as the Biological Weapons Convention with relative impunity. The United States

continues to employ treaty compliance as an issue at annual or biennial review conferences associated with these treaties and regimes, but we have not received a great deal of support from even

our closest allies.

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In the case of multilateral export control regimes—the MTCR,

the Australia Group, Wassenaar—these are voluntary, nonbinding

agreements. And an underlying assumption has been that the

members are like-minded and would implement voluntary controls

in a like-minded fashion. Unfortunately, in some instances, that

has not always been the case.

Domestic export control laws and multilateral export and transshipment controls continue to be a vital part of the various successes that the United States and other allies have had. But with

the global economy becoming more and more interconnected, dualuse items and technologies used to develop weapons of mass destruction cannot be effectively controlled without better cooperation

among exporting and transit countries. Moreover, export controls

and transshipment controls are only as good as the capability of

those who adopt the measures in terms of their ability to enforce

their laws and regulations.

This is an area where the Department of Defense sees an opportunity for improvement. We need to look at ways to bolster our

interaction and cooperation with key transit countries, most of

whom are friendly to the United States but who lack the technical

capacity themselves to monitor and seize dangerous cargo.

We also need to work on countering the ability of WMD states

and terrorist organizations denied an item by one country to obtain

the same item from other sources outside the reach of traditional

nonproliferation treaties and regimes.

Finally, we are seeing new patterns in WMD-related trade developing that existing export control regimes are currently unable to

address, but which I think can be expanded and adapted to address

this problem. Increasingly, trade in WMD and missile-related items

is occurring between countries outside of the regimes. This is a new

trend in secondary proliferation; that is, former importers are now

becoming exporters to other states of concern.

And most troubling of all is the nexus that I have described between WMD, state-sponsors of terrorism, and terrorists themselves

seeking these capabilities.

So as a result, the picture I paint today is a threat that is

increasingly diverse, increasingly unpredictable, dangerous, and

difficult to counter using traditional measures. But while these

dangers are growing, the United States and our allies in the International Community are formulating ways to improve our ability to

deal effectively with these new threats.

We will continue to use existing diplomatic and economic tools to

engage with countries involved in proliferation activities to urge

them to constrain, halt, or reverse those activities, to encourage

them to desist. And we will continue to work with and assist

friends and allies in developing and implementing their own mechanisms, domestic export controls regimes.

But to meet the threat head-on and stop it is going to require a

new definition of nonproliferation, a stronger global nonproliferation architecture, and strenuous national efforts.

On the international front—and here I will echo much what my

State Department colleague has said—we need to expand and enhance and enforce existing international nonproliferation treaties

and regimes. This includes pursuing adoption of the IAEA’s AddiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00138 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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tional Protocol. This is the protocol developed in the wake of Desert

Storm and the discoveries of how Iraq was exploiting the existing

protocol at that time, the new protocol that plugs those loopholes.

We need to encourage countries to adopt that treaty and encourage

other countries to fully comply with their obligations to the NPT,

the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons

Convention.

Naming names is a very powerful diplomatic tool that we will

continue to use at these annual review conferences for these treaties.

The United States also has proposed an amendment to the 1988

Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea Treaty, or the SUA Convention. We have proposed to expand the coverage of that treaty to include a wider range of additional offenses, including terrorist acts.

The proposed amendment the United States is pushing will make

it a criminal offense to carry or transport, or cause to be carried

or transported, items that are in violation of the CWC or the BWC

or the NPT. If adopted, this proposal would effectively transform

the SUA Convention from an after-the-fact extradite or prosecute

treaty to a proactive treaty where military forces could board ships

in international waters if they were carrying dual-use WMD-related materials.

We also need to continue to strengthen the multilateral export

control regimes themselves to better equip them to combat the

evolving global nonproliferation threat. Sensitive dual-use items

and technology cannot be controlled effectively unless there is

broad cooperation among exporting and transit countries. We have

made an important start in this effort with the decision taken by

the Australia Group to broaden the number of dual-use items that

it controls.

But all of these steps taken together, unfortunately, are not

going to be enough, given that yesterday’s recipients of WMD-related systems and technologies are today’s purveyors of WMD-related systems and technologies to other countries. As President

Bush said in June at the West Point commencement ceremony,

‘‘We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best.

We cannot put faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign nonproliferation treaties and then systematically break them. If we

wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.

The war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take

the battle to the enemy. In the world we have entered, the only

path to safety is the path of action.’’

So in conclusion, from our standpoint, the future is ours to lose.

In preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their

delivery systems, there is no excuse for inaction. The United States

and the International Community must act and act decisively. As

long as there are would-be-proliferators or groups seeking WMD,

we must remain vigilant and resolute. And we need to take the initiative away from these groups, so that they are not able to choose

the time and place of such an attack. I thank the Subcommittee.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Billingslea, for your

statement.

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Mr. Billingslea, as you mentioned Dark Winter, we have witnesses in previous hearings from Johns Hopkins who participated

in Dark Winter.

Mr. Van Diepen, according to an article in today’s Washington

Post, there is discussion among some in the administration about

a preemptive strike against the Iranian nuclear reactor before it

becomes operational. Others argue that the reactor would be under

the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards and does not

pose a security risk.

What are we doing now to ensure that the IAEA has the financial and personnel resources to safeguard this facility?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, Senator, first of all, overall, we have been

doing a lot to assist the IAEA in improving its safeguard system

through direct U.S. contributions, so-called voluntary additional

contributions, that we make. We provide a lot of assistance in

terms of technology and expertise to help them boost their overall

level of safeguards capability.

As Mr. Billingslea indicated, we have serious concerns about the

Bushehr facility. And while certainly, if and when that facility becomes operational, the IAEA will safeguard it and do the best job

possible, our real concern runs to the cover that the existence of

that facility, and the large amount of equipment and technology

and personnel attendant to it, could provide for a covert Iranian

nuclear weapons program. And IAEA’s safeguards of the reactor

itself really would not deal effectively with that problem.

Senator AKAKA. In your statement, you mentioned, ‘‘The IAEA

must have sufficient and predictable financial resources to fulfill all

aspects of its mission.’’ The IAEA has determined that it will need

an additional $40 million to fulfill all the safeguard activities that

it is being asked to do. The United States share amounts to $10

million. Is the United States providing this additional funding?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Senator, I do not know the exact answer to that

particular question. I do know, again, that we have been making

additional contributions, so-called voluntary contributions, that go

beyond our assessed contribution. And we have been working both

internally and with other countries to try to boost the overall level

of funding for the IAEA safeguard activities.

If you wish, we could provide you an answer for the record that

specifically addresses that question.

Senator AKAKA. Will you please do that?

And this next question is for both of you. The pledges by the

United States and other nuclear states to never use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state were a significant factor in winning

a consensus for an indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation

Treaty. Administration officials openly state that we should expand

our options for nuclear attacks and widen the number of targeted

nations.

Has the United States changed its policy? If so, do you think that

this change will have any effect on compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

Mr. Billingslea.

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Senator, I think that the policy of the United

States has been clearly articulated by both the President and by

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the National Security Advisor. It very much tracks other statements for the record under the previous administration.

Secretary Cohen, for instance, made clear that any use of WMD

against the United States, its friends, its allies, or our troops overseas would be met with an overwhelming and devastating response. We would not specify in advance the nature of that response, but there should be no doubt in that fact.

Senator AKAKA. Would you have any comment, Mr. Van Diepen?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Just, Mr. Chairman, that I am certainly not

aware of any change in policy in this area.

Senator AKAKA. To both of you, has the administration engaged

in any new discussions with either India or Pakistan concerning a

possible resolution to bringing them into Non-Proliferation Treaty

compliance?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. We have extensive dialogues with both countries that include extensive nonproliferation discussions. And certainly, in those discussions, we make clear our desire that those

countries restrain their programs to the maximum extent possible.

And of course, our ultimate objective would be to see them do what

would be necessary to sign up to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons

states.

But the current reality is that there is no near-term prospect

that those countries will take that step.

Senator AKAKA. Would you have any comment to that, Mr.

Billingslea?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. No, sir. I would agree with that assessment.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Van Diepen, last year, the GAO produced a

report that showed minimal emphasis by the State Department in

recruiting and placing Americans in international organizations.

We understand that the number of Americans employed by the

IAEA has been decreasing.

Could you tell us what efforts are being made to make it more

attractive for Americans to accept employment at the IAEA?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Frankly, Senator, I do not know the answer to

that question. I will have to take that one for the record.

Senator AKAKA. Well, I am not surprised at that answer, because, on this Subcommittee, Senator Voinovich and I have been

pursuing what we call workforce or human capital issues. We find,

according to some of the reports that we are receiving, that our

country is going to be in critical need of people to work in our

workforce. And we know that, by next year, the baby boomers are

going to be eligible to retire. Eventually, they will have to retire.

By then, we will be in deep trouble if we do not begin to plan to

recruit and hire people for those jobs now.

Mr. Van Diepen, since September 11, the IAEA has moved to expand its programs to combat nuclear terrorism. Did the emergency

appropriations supplemental include a request for programs for the

protection against nuclear terrorism through IAEA? If not, does the

State Department still support the programs proposed by IAEA?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Senator, I do not know what was in the supplemental, but we are certainly strong supporters of the IAEA’s efforts

to deal with nuclear terrorism. We have been providing a lot of direct assistance in that effort. They are trying to come to help deal

with this problem of radiological dispersal devices, trying to locate

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and secure so-called orphan sources, nuclear sources that could

provide the basis for radiological dispersion devices that, particularly in the former Soviet Union, have literally been misplaced and

cannot be located.

So they are in the process of doing a lot of good work to deal with

this problem. We are certainly very supportive of it. But I am not

aware of what was or was not in the supplemental.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. I will yield to Senator

Cochran for questions.

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thought it was fortuitous that in this morning’s paper there

was a detailed discussion of the construction of the nuclear power

reactor in Iran where Russia is actively involved in the construction of that facility.

In your opinion, so we will have this in the record, why is it

there is so much concern about the construction of that nuclear

power plant? And why does it pose a threat, in the view of some,

to our security and the security of other countries in that region

of the world?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Well, we should start with examining the Iranian claim that the power reactor is to help bolster Iran’s energy

grid. The truth of the matter is that Iran is a major natural gasproducing country, but they are flaring or venting six times more

natural gas than any other major gas-producing nation.

Now, the energy equivalence of the gas that they are venting or

flaring off is three times what they are going to get out of that one

reactor at Bushehr. So they could, for a fraction of the cost at the

Bushehr plant, simply capture three times as much energy, if they

wanted to. So there is clearly something else going on here.

What is going on is Iranian recognition that possessing the

Bushehr reactor will allow them to argue to have all of the other

bits and pieces of a domestic nuclear infrastructure that ostensibly

is designed to support the civil power plant but, in reality, we feel

is designed to support nuclear weapons ambitions.

It also puts them in proximity to Russian firms and allows them

to continue to try to obtain materials and expertise for what is, in

effect, a violation of their NPT obligations.

Senator COCHRAN. Is it true, as the paper suggests, that we still

have 5 or 6 years left within which to decide how we are going to

react to this? Or do you think we are operating under a much

shorter time constraint than that?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Senator, I read the press story this morning,

and I do not want to be overly alarmist, but I would also say that

this is a pressing matter that has very much got the administration’s attention. We have a tendency in the nonproliferation business to be overly sanguine that we can predict when those red-line

thresholds are crossed and frequently find ourselves surprised.

Often, we only learn how wrong we were after the fact.

So the only surprise here is that, as Secretary Rumsfeld says, we

keep allowing ourselves to get surprised. We should not do that.

So I would not want to debate 5 years, 7 years. It is an ongoing

matter of the highest priority for the administration. We are dealing with the Russians on this issue.

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Senator COCHRAN. Judging from press accounts, our President

has been in active discussions with President Putin and others

about this situation and has expressed our concerns, and has requested that Russia take steps to see that this activity, the proliferation aspects of it, come to a halt. Do you have any indication

now whether progress is being made in that area? That is in the

diplomatic effort to persuade and convince our friends in Russia

that they have an obligation to take some positive steps here to ensure that security interests here and elsewhere, even in Russia, are

not threatened by the development of this nuclear capability in

Iran.

What is your reaction to that, Mr. Van Diepen? Could you give

us the status on that? What is the latest?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, this continues to be an issue that is discussed with the Russians regularly and at the highest levels. It

was discussed at the recent summit, and it has been discussed in

every significant meeting of United States and Russian officials.

I think the honest answer is that it is a mixed picture. On the

one hand, because of the high-level U.S. efforts since about mid1997, the Russians have taken a number of important steps to help

them deal with this problem. They have put in place very good export control legislation, including so-called catchall controls, to deal

with items not on multilateral lists. They have investigated some

entities. They have taken some level of action.

But the unfortunate truth is that Iranian entities, in particular,

still continue to have substantial success in obtaining missile and

nuclear-related technologies from Russian entities. And so we are

far from satisfied with the level of performance from the Russians.

And so we continue to engage. We continue to try to get them

to realize that this is a serious, ongoing problem that they need to

devote the necessary resources and priority to, because it is happening in their territory, so it is fundamentally their responsibility

to get it fixed.

Senator COCHRAN. We are also at a disadvantage with respect to

discussions with Iranian officials because we do not have diplomatic relations, and we do not have people there. Is that true, that

we have an impediment to our efforts to discuss this directly with

Iranians?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, I guess potentially implicit in your question is some assessment of the effectiveness of having such discussions. Certainly, our European friends and others have had direct

discussions with the Iranians on these matters, and the answers either range from, ‘‘We are not doing anything,’’ to ‘‘Hey, we live in

a tough neighborhood.’’ So it is not clear to me that the addition

of a direct U.S.-Iranian dialogue on this subject would necessarily

be all that helpful, given where they are. I think, frankly, that our

other range of nonproliferation activities is more effective in impeding Iran’s activities than a direct dialogue would be.

Senator COCHRAN. There is a suggestion that the Iranian reactor

and others that may come afterward would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and inspections. What

is your assessment of that? And will that help assuage our concerns, or should it, that there is no plutonium being converted to

nuclear weapons?

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Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, by treaty, the Iranians must subject reactors to IAEA inspections, so that is not an extra offer on their part.

That is part of their current obligation as being a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And likewise, the Russians in this

case also are obligated under the treaty to subject reactors to those

kinds of safeguards.

I think the real issue is less with the reactor itself than with, as

Marshall indicated, what having the reactor and the reactor project

in place may allow the Iranians to do under the surface and the

sort of covert assistance that could facilitate to a nuclear weapons

program.

Senator COCHRAN. It was also suggested in this newspaper article that the Russians plan to sell equipment to the Iranians for

four or five additional reactors after this project is over. Do you

have any assessment of whether that is true or not? And what, if

anything, does our administration intend to do to convince them

they should not do that or take steps to dissuade them from it?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Marshall, you may correct me, but my recollection is there has been talk off and on for years about potential additional units at Bushehr, and it remains to be seen to what extent

they may eventuate.

By definition, our concerns about the current ongoing project

would extend to any additional units, and additional units would

simply make it easier to use the infrastructure of this project to try

to facilitate a covert nuclear weapons program.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Billingslea, anything to add on that?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Well, Senator, all I would say is that, if we are

upset about one reactor at Bushehr, you can imagine how upset we

would be over the prospects of five or six.

Senator COCHRAN. This is considered to be a very serious matter,

as far as this administration is concerned?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. This is a very serious matter. And the concern

over Bushehr predates this administration as well. There has been

a great deal of success in turning off cooperation with the Bushehr

project in terms of other countries. But the quest to obtain Russian

cessation is ongoing and has not produced the kind of results we

want yet.

Senator COCHRAN. There was some talk at one time about our offering lucrative incentives to Russia to help them understand that

it would be in their own interest if they took steps to stop this proliferation of technology and information that could be converted to

weapons use. Has there been any indication that those incentives

have been a positive contribution to getting the Russians to do

what we hope they will do?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, certainly some of the progress we have

seen out of the Russians—for example, legislation, actions against

specific entities—has come in the context of previous efforts to use

sort of a carrot-and-stick approach.

For example, in 1998 and 1999, we used discretionary authorities

to put penalties on certain Russian entities that were involved with

Iran’s missile or nuclear programs. And in the wake of that activity, there was a noticeable upsurge in Russian efforts on the legislative front.

137

So certainly, there is a generic understanding that the carrotand-stick approach is helpful in getting progress. But we still have

a substantial way to go, and the exact path ahead to get to where

we want to go is sort of unclear right now.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I see that the red light came

on, and I think my time is up for this round.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.

I have a number of questions. I want to switch from nuclear

weapons proliferation to missile proliferation, and you may have

time after that for further questions.

This is to both of you. Israel is considering arm sales of the

Arrow missile defense system to India. Do either of you have concerns over the Arrow sale for Missile Technology Control Regime

reasons? And do you think that Arrow sales to India might further

destabilize the security situation in South Asia or exacerbate the

regional arms race?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Mr. Chairman, let me try to answer that in generic terms. First of all, the Arrow interceptor is a so-called MTCR

Category I rocket system. Israel is a country that unilaterally has

pledged its adherence to the MTCR, so it, just as we or countries

that are members of the MTCR, is committed to apply what is

called a strong presumption of denial to exports of any Category I

system, including Arrow, to any end-user for any purpose.

And so, in the example that you cite in that case, Israel would

have to go through the necessary procedures to decide that it could

overcome that strong presumption of denial and make that sale.

And that is, by definition, not an easy matter.

Clearly, South Asia is a region of tension, as is obvious by ongoing events. India is a country that is pursuing programs of proliferation concern. So by definition, there would be issues that one

would have to consider of that nature, in deciding whether or not

to go ahead with such a sale.

Senator AKAKA. Do you have any comments on that, Mr.

Billingslea?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Senator, this matter came up in a hearing last

week on the Moscow Treaty, where Senator Levin asked Secretary

Rumsfeld about this, so I will cleave to, in essence, what my Secretary had to say.

We believe that missile defenses, generally speaking, are part of

an inherently stabilizing concept. The right to defend yourself

against these missiles is something that we feel is a matter to explore with the Indians, with the Pakistanis, if they are interested.

What I would say is that we need to look at it more from the standpoint of what do the Indians feel they need in terms of defense for

the region.

The Arrow system, because it is an MTCR-class missile, does

raise certain obligations that we have under the MTCR. And I do

not think the administration has come to a position on that whole

complex issue of balancing the MTCR, our defense cooperation with

India, so on and so forth. But it is a matter under active discussion.

Again, we also need to hear from the Indians in terms of what

they want and what they need.

Senator AKAKA. To both of you, the United States is considering

collaborating with international partners on development and fieldVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00145 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
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ing of a missile defense system. Would the interceptor technology

anticipated for use in a missile defense system violate the MTCR

if it is shared with non-MTCR partners?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, Mr. Chairman, the answer is, it depends.

It depends critically on what the capability of the missile system

is we are talking about.

For example, Patriot PAC–3 is below the so-called Category I

threshold, and so exports of PAC–3 would not be subject to this

strong presumption of denial. MEADS, which Senator Cochran

mentioned, falls below that line. So a lot of the more theater-oriented missile defense systems do not raise this issue of the strong

presumption of denial.

If there were a future system that were capable enough to cross

that line, then, again, we would be committed under the MTCR

guidelines to apply that strong presumption.

Now, as we discussed in the UAV hearing, the strong presumption is not an absolute ban. It can be overcome on so-called rare

occasions that are extremely well-justified in terms of five specific

nonproliferation and export control factors in the MTCR guidelines.

So another thing it would depend on would be who is the recipient,

and how do they stack up against those factors?

So it is difficult to go too far down the hypothetical path, because

the real world facts of what system to whom for what purpose really start to come into play very early on into this.

Senator AKAKA. Do you have a comment, Mr. Billingslea?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Well, happily, most of the countries with whom

we would want and intend to work collaboratively on missile defense are within the MTCR framework as member countries. So a

lot of this issue really goes away, in effect. I am certain that we

will be able to balance these two priorities to get a good outcome.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Van Diepen, in your testimony, you discussed the possibility of challenge inspections as provided in the

Chemical Weapons Convention. Is the administration considering

using challenge inspections? And if so, against whom?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I certainly could not say

anything in open session about anyone we might be considering

challenging. But it is an active tool in the toolkit, and we are looking for potential opportunities for using it that makes sense, balancing all the various factors, including the very important need to

protect intelligence sources and methods.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Van Diepen, in November 2001, the United

States declared the Biological Weapons Convention draft protocols

a dead issue and proposed voluntary measures for BWC members

to demonstrate compliance. The question is, has the administration

offered any standards or guidelines for these voluntary measures?

And have any state parties enacted criminal legislation or stricter

standards for security of biological agents?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, first of all, we made very specific proposals at the November 2001 review conference, along the lines

that I described in my testimony. So there were very explicit proposals that we made.

Under the existing convention, states’ parties are required to put

in place criminal legislation to enforce their obligations under the

convention. One of the things that we have found out, to our disVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:24 Jan 30, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00146 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 78620.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: SAFFAIRS
139

appointment, is that a large number of states’ parties have not

done so. And so we have been engaged in a remedial effort to try

to get them to meet their treaty obligations in that respect. And

certainly in the wake of September 11th and, in a sense, outside

the context of the BWC, we have been engaged in separate efforts.

As Marshall indicated, it is very important to try to secure dangerous pathogens that might fall into the hands of terrorists. And

we have been engaged in a number of efforts in the Australia

Group and elsewhere to try to promote awareness of this problem

and to try to urge countries to put on higher levels of security in

biosafety.

Senator AKAKA. Here is a question about control lists. The BWC

and CWC have their own control lists. Is it realistic to pursue a

comprehensive control list?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. I am not quite sure I understand the question,

Mr. Chairman. But, first of all, the BWC, the convention, does not

have attended to it any lists of pathogens or equipment. Such lists

were posited in the context of this protocol, but as you have already

noted, the protocol is not going anywhere.

The CWC has lists of agents, but the purpose of that list of

agents is to facilitate the work of onsite verification. In addition,

those lists are used, in effect, as a sanction against countries that

are not members of the convention to try to get them to join. There

are so-called trade restrictions that limit to varying extents the degree to which state parties to the CWC can trade with nonparties

in listed chemicals.

But, strictly speaking, there is not really an export control component to the CWC.

Senator AKAKA. Before I yield to my friend, Senator Cochran, I

would like to ask Mr. Billingslea a question.

In your testimony, you state the United States has proposed an

amendment to the 1988 Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the

safety of maritime navigation. The amendment would allow military forces to board ships in international waters if they were carrying items in violation of the CWC, NPT, and BWC. How have our

allies and international partners responded to this proposal?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Senator, I do not have in front of me a roster

of reactions. This is being worked through the International Maritime Organization.

What I will say is that there already exists a consent-based regime for dealing with narcotics trafficking. We have gotten good

support out of a number of nations in terms of maritime operations

to stop and board and inspect vessels suspected of trafficking or

moving terrorists. And so there is a logical third piece to the puzzle

that needs to be added here, which is the WMD cargo moving

about.

If we feel that a vessel is carrying commodities that would assist

a terror group or a terrorist-sponsoring state in acquiring WMD,

we would like to see a consent-based regime, as well as a nonconsensual regime, established for stopping and searching certain

vessels.

I am told that actually the United Kingdom has expressed a lot

of interest in helping us on this, so it would appear that this piece

of the puzzle also will be put in place.

140

Senator AKAKA. Senator Cochran.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I want to explore

just for a minute some of the policy decisions that are being made

by the administration with respect to what is and what is not subject to Missile Technology Control Regime provisions.

For example, you mentioned already this Category I definition of

the kind of missile that would be included or prohibited from being

exported or shared, even with a cooperative arrangement with an

ally and even if it is for a defensive purpose. It is not designed to

be an offensive missile; it is designed strictly to defend against missile attacks; it is an interceptor that is supposed to intercept an incoming missile.

Now you mentioned that the standard, if I have this right, was

whether a missile has enough energy or capacity to propel a 500

kilogram warhead a distance of 300 kilometers, not whether the

missile is actually suitable as an offensive weapon.

And if such a missile has those characteristics, then, as I understand it, there would be a strong presumption to deny its export.

Does this mean that there is room in that definition and that

standard to decide that you could export the missile, even though

it had the capacity to propel a certain size warhead a certain distance?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. That’s exactly right, Senator. Under the guidelines, we are allowed to overcome that strong presumption of denial

in what are called rare occasions that, again, have to be very welljustified, in terms of these five specific nonproliferation and export

control factors in the MTCR guidelines.

So in the past, for example, we sold Trident missiles and Tomahawk missiles to the UK as a rare occasion to overcome the strong

presumption of denial. And that was a recipient that obviously

scores very high in terms of those five—— Senator COCHRAN. But in the case of the Arrow system and

Israel, for example, I understand that there may be a strong presumption of denial invoked there because it would fit within that

category. If we co-produce the Arrow interceptor missile here and

ship it back to Israel, because they cannot produce enough to really

meet what they consider to be their need to protect their security

interest, is it our policy right now to deny the export of those interceptor missiles if we co-produce them with Israel?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, actually, Senator, this is a good example

of how we work to balance the various considerations that apply to

these sorts of ideas.

In this case, we worked very closely with the government of

Israel, with Israeli industry, with U.S. industry, and with the Missile Defense Organization, and came up with a way of increasing

Israel’s ability to make Arrow interceptors that did not require the

United States to export Category I items to Israel. In effect, we designed what we are calling enhanced production of components for

the Arrow.

And so Israel will be building more Arrows in Israel using more

components from the United States. And so the Israelis will be able

to get what they need in terms of enhanced production of the

Arrow, while the United States will be able to support that basically in the way that we have supported the Arrow program since

141

1982. That does not rely on the transfer from the United States to

Israel of Category I items.

And so, we found, in effect, a workaround that does not do coproduction in the sense of making it here and shipping it there, but

having enhanced U.S. assistance to Israel making it there, so that

they can make more, faster, by getting more components made in

the United States.

Senator COCHRAN. Well, adhering to that, would you then say

that it would be a prohibition of the regime if we decided to build

the entire missile here and ship it back to Israel? Are you painting

us in a corner where, in an emergency situation or under later developing challenges that Israel might face, we would not be able to

build that missile here and send it to them, even if it meant it was

critical and important to the protection of Israel from its adversaries?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, again, Senator, that same strong presumption of denial would apply and the United States would have

the ability to decide as a matter of policy that, in that particular

case, it was a rare occasion. But we would have to be prepared to

justify that to our MTCR partners. In terms of the MTCR guidelines, we would have to be prepared to live with whatever precedents other countries decided to draw from that sale.

The problem being, of course, that Israel itself maintains certain

programs of proliferation concern, and so if the United States said

yes to a Category I rocket system export to Israel, it is going to be

hard for us potentially to say no to a Russian export of Category

I rocket technology to Iran.

I do not want to draw those kinds of parallels, but you can see

people trying to make those kinds of arguments. And all of that

would have to be taken into account in any decisionmaking on that

kind of question.

But thus far, we have been able to provide very substantial support to the Arrow program by remaining below the Category I line,

and that seems to be working out very well.

Senator COCHRAN. Another anomaly seems to me to be the situation with another missile system like the Theater High Altitude

Area Defense System. It is a long, slender missile. It does not have

the capacity, really, to accommodate a 500 kilogram payload. But

because of the amount of energy and thrust it has and capabilities

to propel objects long distances, could it probably be classified the

same as the Arrow in terms of reaching the Category I definition?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Senator, let me ask for us to go away and come

back to you with the technical parameters on that, because I am

not certain that is a——

Senator COCHRAN. That is correct?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Yes, I also——

Senator COCHRAN. It would be good to know, because if we are

adhering to a standard that is really going to get us in deep trouble

in terms of our own security interests and our allies’ security interest, then we need to rethink it. That is all I am saying.

And that is why, in my opening statement, I wondered aloud,

what do we need to think through and what do we need to assess

as serious challenges in this area? We are all in favor of doing everything we can to keep down the proliferation of weapons of mass

142

destruction and missiles, but in the effort to do that and adhering

to the MTCR, we at the same time are putting ourselves in jeopardy by our own interpretations and our own policies and our cooperative efforts with our friends around the world. I just do not

want us to go off down a trail that ends up putting us in jeopardy.

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. And there is certainly no intention to do that,

Senator. I think what we were able to work out with our Defense

Department colleagues on UAVs is very much proof of the idea that

we can in fact think ahead——

Senator COCHRAN. These are the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles that

we are seeing now, the Global Hawk, the Predator.

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. But that’s a good example, I think. There are

a lot of analogies to be drawn from that experience. When you look

at operation Enduring Freedom, you see what systems worked really well, what systems did not. You come to the conclusion that

there is a real future for UAV and weaponized UAV platforms.

Now, the UAV family of systems has a lot of technical ties to

basic cruise missile technology and, therefore, do in fact potentially

get caught up in the whole Missile Technology Control Regime effort.

But we were able to work out with the Department of State, recognizing this fact but also recognizing that we want to work with

our NATO allies and our other allies to bring them along to capitalize upon this new generation of technology, we were able to

work out a regime that lets us cooperate with allies but, again, in

a way that does not jeopardize the effective functioning of the

MTCR, which in and of itself, I have to say, is a valuable regime.

When you look at a lot of the threat missiles that we are dealing

with today, one thing that can be said of a lot of it—now, this is

not perfectly true, because you have a lot of Russian and Chinese

technology increasingly mixed in—but a lot of this stuff is based on

Soviet Arrow Scud technology that has been configured and reconfigured in new and interesting ways to give longer and longer and

more dangerous range. So we have effectively channeled some of

the foreign missile programs, and the MTCR gets a lot of credit for

that.

But that is only part of the picture, and both active and passive

defenses have to be brought into the equation here.

And in the case of India, Arrow with India, Israeli cooperation

with India, the jury is still out on that. The administration is working the issue, but we also need to hear from the Indians in terms

of what they need, what they want, what kind of missile defense

systems do they want to have, and for what ends. And we are pursuing that.

Senator COCHRAN. Well, thank you very much. I think your testimony today and your participation in this hearing have been very

helpful to our depth of understanding and appreciation of the challenges that we face in trying to help support the administration’s

good efforts in this area. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Cochran.

Mr. Van Diepen and Mr. Billingslea, thank you very much again

for being with us today and for your statements. No question, it

will be a big help to this Subcommittee.

143

As your testimony indicates, without help from the states with

weapons of mass destruction, terrorists will have significant difficulty in acquiring a WMD capability. We need to work on both

ends of the problem, discouraging state WMD programs, as well as

destroying terrorist organizations.

We also need to strengthen current nonproliferation regimes. As

Mr. Van Diepen indicated, an activist agenda must use a broad

range of tools—and I like that toolkit description—to limit proliferation. These tools include our bilateral assistance programs.

We must be careful about the impact that weakening one of these

tools will have on our overall nonproliferation goals.

For example, the administration froze funding for all cooperative

threat reduction programs because of Russian noncompliance to the

Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Is America more secure after several months of stalled

projects in the former Soviet Union? Is Russia more open to U.S.

pleas to end their assistance to Iran’s nuclear power plant? These

issues are linked and must be answered.

Press reports indicate that Russia is proposing to construct five

additional nuclear power plants in Iran. Where our bilateral efforts

are insufficient, we should strengthen multilateral regimes. A fully

funded IAEA is a good way to ensure that a new Iranian nuclear

reactor is not being used to advance a weapons program.

Preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD is a complicated task.

However, it is easier than the alternative of responding to a WMD

terrorist attack.

Gentlemen, we have no further questions at this time. However,

Members of this Subcommittee may submit questions in writing for

any of the witnesses. We would appreciate a timely response to any

questions. The record will remain open for these questions and for

further statements from my colleagues.

Again, if my friend does not have anymore statements—— Senator COCHRAN. I have nothing further.

Senator AKAKA [continuing]. I would like to express my appreciation to our witnesses for their time and for sharing their insights

with us. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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