Assessment of Community Planning for

Mass Transit: Volume 5—Denver Case

Study

February 1976

NTIS order #PB-253683
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE

Emilio Q. Daddario, Director

Daniel V. De Simone, Deputy Director

URBAN MASS TRANSIT ADVISORY PANEL

George Krambles, Chairman, Chicago Transit Authority

Walter J. Bierwagen Bernard M. Oliver

Amalgamated Transit Union Hewlett-Packard Corporation

Robert A. Burco Simon Reich

Oregon DOT Gibbs and Hill

Jeanne J. Fox

Joint Center for

Thomas C. Sutherland, Jr.

Political Studies

Princeton University

Lawrence A. Goldmuntz Frederick P. Salvucci

Economics and Science Planning Massachusetts DOT

Dorn McGrath Stewart F. Taylor

George Washington University Sanders and Thomas, Inc.

OTA TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM STAFF

Gretchen S. Kolsrud, Program Manager

Mary E. Ames Larry L. Jenney

V. Rodger Digilio Bev Johnson

Thomas E. Hirsch, 111 Teri Miles

CONTRACTORS

Skidmore, Owings and Merrill System Design Concepts, Inc.

111
PREFACE

This report on urban transportation planning in the Denver, Colorado

metropolitan area is one of nine case studies undertaken by the Office of

Technology Assessment to provide an information base for an overall

assessment of community planning for mass transit.

The findings of the overall study are reported in the summary

document, An Assessment of Community Planning /or Mass Transit, which forms the

first volume of this series. The assessment was performed at the request of

the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S Senate, on behalf of its

Transportation Subcommittee.

The study was directed by the Office of Technology Assessment’s

Transportation Program Staff with guidance and review provided by the

OTA Urban Mass Transit Advisory Panel. The firms of Skidmore, Owings

and Merrill and System Design Concepts, Inc., were contractors for the

study. This assessment is a joint effort, identifying different possible points

of view but not necessarily reflecting the opinion of any individual.
INTRODUCTION

This report assesses how one of nine major

United States metropolitan areas made its decisions

about the development or modernization of rail

transit.

The assessment of the nine cities attempts to

identify the factors that help communities, facing

critical technological choices, make wise decisions

that are consistent with local and national goals for

transit. The study investigates the following issues:

. Are there major barriers to communication

and cooperation among governmental

agencies involved in transit planning and

operating ? Do these barriers interfere with

making sound decisions?’

● Do transit decisions reflect the combined

interests of all major public groups, including citizen organizations, trade unions,

the business community, and others?

● Does the planning process provide enough

information about the advantages and

disadvantages of alternative courses of

action to provide a solid basis for making

decisions?

● Does the availability or lack of financing, or

the conditions under which financing has

been provided, unnecessarily limit the

range of options that are considered?

The ultimate purpose of the work has been to

cast light on those prospective changes in national

transit policy and administrative programs which

might improve, in different ways and to different

extents, the way communities plan mass transit

systems. The nine cities were selected to represent

the full range of issues that arise at different stages

in the overall process of planning and developing a

transit system.

San Francisco, for example, has the first regional

rail system built in decades, while Denver is

planning an automated system, and voters in

Seattle have twice said “no” to rail transit funding

proposals.

The assessment of transit planning in each of the

nine metropolitan areas has been an inquiry into an

evolving social process. Consequently, the study

results more closely resemble historical analysis

than classical technology assessment.

This study employs a set of evaluation guidelines

to orient the investigation in the nine metropolitan

areas and to provide the basis for comparative

judgments about them. The guidelines were

derived from issues identified during preliminary

visits to the metropolitan areas, a review of Federal

requirements for transit planning, and an investigation via the literature into the state-of-theart in the field.

The evaluation guidelines cover major topics

which were investigated during the case assessment process. They deal with the character of the

institutional arrangements

technical planning process.

GUIDELINES FOR

and the conduct of the

ASSESSMENT:

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Some of the most significant influences on

transit planning are exerted by the organizations

responsible for conducting the planning and

making the decisions. Three guidelines were used

to evaluate the institutional arrangements in the

nine metropolitan areas:

●

●

●

Agencies responsible for various aspects of

transit decisionmaking should cooperate

effectively in a clearly designated “forum”.

The participants in this forum should have

properly designated decisionmaking

authority, and the public should have

formal channels for holding decisionmakers accountable for their actions.

Citizens should participate in the transit

planning process from its beginning and

should have open lines of communication

with decisionmakers.

vii
GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT:

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

The technical planning process provides the

information that public officials and their constituents draw upon in making plans and decisions.

Four guidelines were used to assess the technical

planning process in the nine metropolitan areas:

●

●

●

●

Broad, explicit goals and objectives should

guide technical planning and decisionmaking.

A range of realistic alternative solutions

should be developed.

The evaluation of these alternatives should

give balanced consideration to a full range

of goals and objectives.

A practical and flexible plan for financing

and implementation should be developed.

During visits to each of the nine metropolitan

areas, the study team interviewed the principal

representative of the transportation planning

institution and other main participants in the local

planning process. The visits were supplemented by

interviews with UMTA officials in Washington.

Pertinent documents—official plans, reports,

studies, and other material—were reviewed in each

case.

The information thus collected was used in

compiling a history of the transit planning process

in each case area, organized around key decisions

such as the decision to study transit, the selection of

a particular transit system, and public ratification

of the decision to pay for and build the system. The

main political, institutional, financial and technical

characteristics affecting the conduct of the planning process were then assessed in light of the

evaluation guidelines.

The same set of guidelines used in assessing each

case metropolitan area was employed in making a

generalized evaluation of the metropolitan experience. The results of the generalized evaluation

are summarized in the report, An Assessment o}

Community Planning for Mass Transit: Summary Repot-f,

issued by the Office of Technology Assessment in

February 1976.

Vlll
CONTENTS

SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● . . . . . . . . . . I

METROPOLITAN SETTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

General Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Existing Transportation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Transportation Planning Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

CRITICAL HISTORY OF TRANSIT PLANNING AND

DECISIONMAKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Decision to Study Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Decision to Approve a Transit Financing Plan

in1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Selection of the ART System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

CHRONOLOGY OF THE TRANSIT PLANNING PROCESS . . . 1 9

ASSESSMENT OF THE PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING

PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Institutional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Technical Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

SUMMARY CASE ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

68-201 0-76-2

ix
Summary and Highlights

Artist’s sketch of the personal rapid transit system proposed for Denver in 1973

● It was not until 1971 that serious planning

for a modern rapid transit system began in

Denver.

. Transit planners in Denver capitalized

upon environmental concerns, especially

growing air pollution and suburban

sprawl, to help generate enthusiasm and

acceptance for their transit proposals.

● Land use, highway, and transit plans in

the Denver area are well coordinated, and

the agencies responsible for these plans

are reasonably successful in working

together through a formal contractual

agreement. The highway and transit

agencies have the authority and usually

the money to implement their plans, while

the land use planning agency has little or

no implementation authority.

. The current Denver regional land use plan

was developed in 1972 in conjunction

with the transit plan and reflects the

environmental concern of the citizens by

directing growth away from environmentally unsuitable areas. The proposed

transit plans for Denver have been

presented as contributing to implementation of the land use plan.

● In 1973 voters in Denver adopted a

financing plan for a rapid transportation

program. Although no technology was

specifically identified, public discussion

before the election prominently featured

personal rapid transit. In addition, UMTA’s placement of a PRT demonstration

project in Denver and the views of the

Regional Transportation District’s ex1
ecutive director and senior consultants

contributed to the climate of opinion

favoring PRT.

● In 1974 UMTA insisted upon an alternatives analysis before funding of the

system would be considered. The alternative analysis was completed in April

1975 and recommended an Automated

Regional Transit (ART) system, which

uses less advanced technology than PRT.

This system was approved by all of the

regional transportation and planning

authorities in June 1975.

● The most recent alternatives analysis

illustrates the difficulties in providing

complete information about a full range of

transit alternatives when local official and

public support for a particular option is

expressed from the beginning.
Metropolitan Settingl

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Denver, the largest city between Kansas City and

the west coast, is a wholesale, service, manufacturing, research, and governmental center for a

large portion of the plains and mountain States. It is

the capital and principal city of the State of

Colorado.

In the decade between 1960 and 1970 Denver

was among the 10 fastest growing metropolitan

areas in the United States. During this period the

population of the Denver region grew by more than

a third to over 1.2 million. In 1970 Denver ranked

twenty-seventh in SMSA population.

Between 1960 and 1970 over half of the

population growth represented net migration as

families were drawn by economic opportunities and

by Denver’s clean attractive environment. Most of

the new arrivals settled in the suburban ring, which

grew at a much faster pace than Denver itself2 in

spite of annexations (see Figure 2). The change in

work trip distribution between 1960 and 1970

reflects the greater growth in the suburbs. The

percentage of work trips beginning and ending in

the suburban ring increased from 25 percent to 34

percent of total areawide work trips over the

decade (see Figure 3).

The relatively high rate of growth in the lowdensity suburbs and the fast growth of suburban

employment centers has contributed to the decline

in the use of transit in the Denver metropolitan

area and increased reliance upon the automobile. In

1970, 89 percent of residents of Denver suburbs

and 80 percent of city residents drove to work.

Only 2 percent of suburbanites and 8 percent of city

residents rode transit; regionwide, 4.2 percent of

work trips used transit. These percentages are

lowest of the nine cities studied in this report, Even

in Los Angeles, 5 percent of all SMSA work trips

and 9.2 percent of work trips originating in Los

Angeles City used transits

I See Figure 1, pages 12 and 13,

L Denver is a city-county jurisdiction that operates as a single

unit of government called the City and County of Denver.

] American lnstitu te of Planners and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers of the U. S., Inc., Urb~n Transportat~on F~CI Book, 1974.

EXISTING TRANSPORTATION

SYSTEM

The extensive low-density pattern of development in the Denver area has been well suited to

automobile transportation, which almost totally

dominates travel in the region. Denver has one of

the highest automobile ownership rates in the

Nation (with 1.46 autos per household), and 20

times more work trips were taken by automobile

than transit in 1970.

Denver has an extensive grid of major arterial

streets that is supplemented by two major interstate routes and their spurs. Interstate 70 passes

through Denver just north of the CBD going east

to west. North-south routes are 1-25, which passes

just west of downtown, and I-225, which runs east

of the city. Denver does not yet have a circumferential highway. However, I-470, planned for a

corridor south and west of the city, would complete

a loop. This highway is currently the subject of a

dispute between the Colorado State Highway

Commission, which has directed the road to be

built, and the Governor, who, supported by many

environmentalists, opposes the highway.

The existing highway network services the auto

traffic in the area so adequately that traffic is free

flowing except in a few locations even at the height

of the rush hour. However, the reliance upon the

automobile has contributed to a severe increase in

air pollution, and Denver now ranks among the six

cities in the United States with the worst air quality

problems. 4

Public transportation is provided by about 350

diesel buses on 987 miles of one-way routes

oriented toward the central business districts

Between 1960 and 1970 transit ridership decreased

by 60 percent as the privately owned Denver

Tramway System raised fares from 25 cents to 40

cents and cut service in an attempt to stay solvent.

Since the public takeover in 1971, fares have been

J R TD Trcnsit Development Progrwm 19 i’5-80, March 197.5, p. 2-4.

s As of January 1, 197’.5, however, since then RTD has

expanded its service by acquiring additional bus operations in

the area, and by expanding its bus fleet.

3
—

LAND AREA

(in square miles) 1960 1970

Suburban Ring 3,592. 0 3,564. 8

Center City 68. 0 95. 2

Population

Percent Change 1960-1970

63.7%

POPULATION

Suburban Center

Ring City

1960 435,496 493,887

1970 712,851 514,678

Suburban Center

Ring City

DENSITY

(population/square mile)

Suburban Center

Ring City

1960 121 7,263

1970 200 5,4061

IThe change in Denver City’s density reflects the annexation of 27 miles

into the city between 1960-1970.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area.

4
WORK TRIP DISTRIBUTION

WORK TRIP MODE

196 0

Center City to Suburban Ring

Suburban Ring to Center City

Beginning and Ending in Suburban Ring

inning and Ending in Center City

\

Employed Residents Using Public Transportation

m

Suburban Ring

m

Employed Residents Using Autos Center City

Remaining workers either walked to work,

stayed at home, or did not report mode. w

FIGURE 3: DENVER SMSA TRAVEL CHARACTERISTICS

Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners and

the Motor vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S. , Inc., 1974.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area.

5
lowered to 3S cents during the peak and 25 cents in

the offpeak, service has been increased (including

the expansion of intrasuburban routes), and

ridership has risen more than so percent to over 24

million passengers in 1974 (see Figure 4). Most of

the bus service is now owned and operated by the

Regional Transportation District (RTD), which

coordinates service throughout the DenverBoulder area.

The fixed guideway system planned for the

Denver area is not scheduled to be under construction until early 1978, and is not scheduled to begin

initial revenue operations until 1981. In the

meantime, RTD is planning extensive upgrading of

bus service in the area.

TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

INSTITUTIONS

The organizational framework for transportation planning in the Denver area is distinguished by

the strong contractual arrangement between the

three regional and State agencies most concerned

with transportation, which have joined to form the

Joint Regional Planning Program (JRPP). The three

agencies represented in JRPP are the Regional

Transportation District (RTD), which is responsible for transit planning, construction, and operation; the Colorado Division of Highways (CDH),

which has similar responsibilities for highways; and

the Denver Regional Council of Governments

(DRCOG), which is responsible for land use

planning in the Denver area.

TABLE I.—Federally Recognized Regional Agencies

Designation Agency

A-95 Denver Regional Council of Governments

MPO Joint Regional Planning Program

Joint Regional Planning Program

(JRPP)

JRPP was established in early 1971 when RTD,

CDH, and DRCOG joined together to coordinate

transportation and land use planning in the Denver

region. JRPP has been designated by Federal

transportation agencies to coordinate transportation planning and programing for the region. b

As established in a recent internal reorganization

process, the decisionmaking body within JRPP is a

collective regional directorate comprised of the

executive directors of RTD, DRCOG, and CDH.

The three executives are required to reach

unanimous agreement on any action or policy

recommendation. Their recommendations are

presented to the DRCOG, which is empowered to

act on behalf of JRPP for planning and management. In this role DRCOG can approve (or reject) a

recommendation from the collective regional

director but cam-tot modify the recommendation in

any way unless the regional directorate approves.

The reorganization plan provided JRPP with a

citizens’ advisory committee composed of the

DRCOG Citizens’ Advisory Committee, the Steering Committee of the RTD Citizen Action Committee, and other citizens selected by the regional

directorate. The citizens’ committee is instructed to

set up meetings between the regional director body

and the public,” in addition to other duties.

Regional Transportation District (RTD)

RTD is responsible for both long- and shortrange transit planning (subject to JRPP approval),

for operating most of the transit systems in the

Denver area, and for implementing long- and

short-range plans. RTD’s area of jurisdiction

includes the City and County of Denver, Boulder,

Douglas, and Jefferson counties, and western

portions of Adams and Arapahoe counties (see

Figure 1). RTD is governed by a 21-member board

of directors. Directives from the board are carried

out by RTD’s staff, which is headed by an executive

director.

6 The Urban Mass Transportation Administration and the

Federal Highway Administration require Governors to

designate a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) in each

area to carry out the “continuing, comprehensive transportation

planning process. . . carried out cooperatively . . .“ (the “3-C”

process) mandated by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and

the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 197’4.

According to joint UMTA-FHWA regulations published in

September 197.s, MPO’S must prepare or endorse (1) a longrange general transportation plan, including a separate plan for

improvement ts in management of the existing transportation

system; (2) an annually updated list of specific projects, called the

Transportation Improvement Program (TIP), to implement

portions of the long-range plan; and (3) a multi-y=r planning

prospectus supplemented by annual unified planning work

programs.

6
10.3

VEHICLE MILES OPERATED

(millions of miles)

Peak Year= 1974 (10.3 million miles)

Low Year= 1970 (6.9 million miles)

REVENUE PASSENGERS

(millions of passengers)

Peak Year= 1974 (20.9 million riders)

LOw Year= 1970 (13.7 million riders)

NET OPERATING REVENUE

(millions of dollars)

Peak Year= 1965 ($280,538)

Low Year= 1974 (-$8,863,147)

1965 1970 1974

1965 1970 - 1974

1965 1970 1974

-$8. 9

FIGURE 4: DENVER TRANSIT OPERATIONS, 1965- 1974

No data on Denver transit operations was reported in 1972.

Source: American Publlc Translt Association records for the Denver Tramway

Corporation and the Regional Transportation District.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000( plus adjacent counties

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area.

7

68.201 0-76-3
Besides fares and Federal grants, RTD has three

major sources of funds: (1) a one-half mill property

tax for planning, (2) a two mill property tax to cover

operating deficits, and (3) a one-half cent sales tax

for operations, capital construction, equipment,

and debt repayment.

Colorado Division of Highways (CDH)

CDH is a State agency directly under the

Colorado State Highway Commission, a semiindependent commission appointed by the Governor. CDH is responsible for planning (subject to

JRPP approval in the Denver area), location, design,

construction, and maintenance of State highways.

Denver Regional Council of

Governments (DRCOG)

DRCOG is the weakest of the three agencies

represented in the JRPP. DRCOG has no independent funding authority and has no power to

implement either land use or transportation plans.

It is, however, the A-95 agencyp and thus must

review and approve urban area plans.

T Circular A-95 of the Federal Office of Management and

Budget requires one agency in each region to be empowered to

review all proposals for Federal funds from agencies in that

region. Circular A-95 replaced Circular A-82, which was created

to implement Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and

Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 3301).

DRCOG is responsible for compiling land use

and transportation information and developing and

evaluating land use and transportation models.

DRCOG also is directed to identify natural and

manmade physical characteristics influencing

regional development, to identify and project

requirements for community facilities and services,

and to prepare land development criteria and

standards. While in theory DRCOG has responsibility for land use planning in the Denver region,

most of the actions required to implement land use

plans are taken by local governments or private

developers, over which DRCOG has little control.

DRCOG’S jurisdiction extends over an area that

includes the City and County of Denver, and

Jefferson, Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Douglas,

Gilpin, and Clear Creek counties. Most counties

and cities within the area delegate representatives

to the DRCOG board of directors. A staff carries

out the policy directives of the board.

City and County of Denver

The City and County of Denver functions as a

jurisdictional unit. Through its City Planning

Department Denver has participated in many of

the transportation studies in the Denver region,

including several studies designed to encourage

continued downtown growth. Since RTD was

created, Denver City, which is well represented on

the RTD board, has tended to participate in transit

planning within that forum.

8
Critical History of Transit Planning

Ten years ago few people thought Denver

needed a fixed guideway transit system. Most

residents of Denver’s low-density urbanized area

could travel easily by automobile. Since then,

however, worsening air pollution and other

impacts of growth have sharpened concern for

environmental quality among the residents of the

area and, in turn, aroused interest in fixedguideway transit.

While popular support for mass transit was

growing, several factors encouraged the development of automated transit for Denver. Increasing

bus system deficits inspired a search for a more

efficient approach to transit operations. UMTA’S

Center City Transportation Project in 197 0

suggested a PRT link for downtown Denver, thus

ins talling the PRT concept as a popular favorite.

The relocation of many advanced technology

companies to the Denver area provided a reservoir

of experts with skills and interest in new

technolog y. This was the context that shaped

transit planning in Denver.

The following history covers the decision making

process in Denver from its beginnings in regional

high way-oriented studies through the recent

systern selection decision. The discussion is

organized around three key decision periods: (1) the

decision to study transit that was implicit in the

establishment of a regional transit planning and

operating authority; (2) the decision to approve a

transit financing plan in 1973; and (3) the period of

reevaluation leading to the decision to select an

automated rapid transit system in 1975,

DECISION TO STUDY TRANSIT

Until the late 1960’s Denver was strictly a

highway-oriented city. Support for transit grew

out of an interest in environment tal protection and

control of future growth that swept the region (and

the rest of the Nation) at the turn of the decade. In

short order the environmentalists had joined forces

with city officials, civic groups, and businessmen

and Decisionmaking

concerned about financial difficulties of the city’s

bus company to negotiate the establishment of a

powerful regional transit authority that could plan

improvements in the area’s transit service.

Transportation planning in the Denver

metropolitan area began in the early 1940’s with

origin-destination studies performed by the

Colorado Division of Highways (CDH). In 1957,

the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads provided funds

that allowed CDH to sponsor the first Denver

Metropolitan Area Transportation Study

(DMAT S). DMATS was jointl y carried out by

CDH, the Inter-County Regional Planning Commission (the predecessor of DRCOG), and the City

and County of Denver. Financed primarily by

Federal highway and HUD 701 funds, DMATS

concentrated on planning a highway network. The

study forecast that a maximum of only 4 percent of

total trips in Denver would use public transportation.

In the late 1960’s the highway orientation of

DMATS alarmed many citizens who felt that

additional highways might turn Denver into a Los

Angeles-type spread city. Transit was viewed as a

tool for shaping a more desirable urban form.

Environmental organizations, concerned citizen

groups, and the Metropolitan League of Women

Voters therefore began to promote transit.

During the same period, the Denver Tramway

Corporation, the principal transit operator in the

region, was encountering increasingly difficult

financial circumstances. The Denver Chamber of

Commerce set up a transportation committee to

investigate remedies to these fiscal problems.

Both the citizen groups and the businessmen

advocated the creation of an independent regional

transit agenc y with taxing authorit y to plan,

cons t ruc t, and operate transit facilities in the

Denver metropolitan area. They were joined by

officia1s from the City and County of Denver in

lobbying the Colorado State Legislature to create

such an agency.

9
In 1969, the Center City Transportation Project

began discussing a proposal to build a PRT system

from the Denver’s Mile High Stadium to the CBD.8

This system would allow CBD commuters to park

at the stadium and ride the PRT downtown. The

recommendation for PRT rather than a more

conventional transit technology was significant.

PRT was popular in Denver from the beginning of

public attention to transit needs. Both UMTA and

the transit industry considered PRT a promising

new system. While no particular technology was

promoted at that time, PRT was generally assumed

to be the only transit system suitable for Denver’s

low-density land use patterns,

These various developments and pressures

persuaded State legislators to stand behind

Denver’s transit initiatives. In 1969 the Colorado

State Legislature established the Regional

Transportation District (RTD). RTD was mandated to develop a transit plan and hold a financing

referendum for it within 5 years. After gaining

voter approval, RTD could construct and operate

the transit system.

s Arthur D. Little, Skidmore, Owings & Merrill et al., Denuer,

Cent~r City Transportation Project, Washington, D. C., 197].

10

A

DECISION TO APPROVE

TRANSIT FINANCING PLAN

IN 1973

RTD’s planners worked in a climate in which a

majority of Denver’s residents were solidly in favor

of PRT. A carefully integrated land use and

transportation planning effort with continuous

involvement of citizens and local officials had no

trouble in reaching a consensus to recommend a

long-range plan for a PRT system and a complementary early action bus improvement

program. The proposal won public support in the

September 1973 referendum as voters approved a

one-half cent sales tax authority for RTD.

When it was created in 1969, RTD actively

sought to coordinate land use and transportation

planning. The consultant RTD hired to prepare a

long-range transit development plan in 1971 was

an interdisciplinary team. The joint venture of

Development Research Associates (DRA) and

Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and Todd (WMRT) was

chosen from among 13 bidders. The winning team’s

three-step planning process proposed to (1) survey

the goals and desires of the community; (2) forecast
a land use plan acceptable to the citizens and public

agencies in the area; and (3) then design a

transportation package tailored to implement the

land use plan. Kaiser Engineers was later added to

the team.

An integrated planning approach was being

institutionalized in the Denver region at that time.

In 1971 RTD had entered into an agreement with

the Denver Regional Council of Governments

(DRCOG) and the Colorado Department of

Highways (CDH) to establish the Joint Regional

Planning Program (JRPP). The JRPP was structured

to coordinate land use planning, highway planning,

and public transportation planning. Within that

framework the three agencies cooperated in

assembling data for the first phase of the DRAWMRT study. DRCOG supervised and coordinated the demographic projections. Local

governments also contributed data to the plan.

In spring 1972 DRA-WMRT completed its Phase

I report, A CorIcepf. The study surveyed the

ecological and social composition of the region and

included a development plan and preliminary

transportation data. Seven county profiles in

separate documents supplemented the report. It

was adopted by all three agencies—RTD on

February 1973, CDH in August 1973, and DRCOG

in December 1973.

The development plan relied heavily upon

environmental factors in determining the best

locations for future growth. Hazards to development, such as poor soil and drainage conditions and

steeply sloping topography, were identified along

with ecologically fragile or valuable areas—

watersheds, rare wildlife habitat, and the like.

Environmentally advantageous sites for new

development were located. The plan proposed that

much of the new growth be sited in already

developed areas so that suburban sprawl would be

curtailed. According to this policy of encouraging

more concentrated development, Denver City was

forecast to gain 90,000 inhabitants by the year

2000, whereas trend projections expected only

50,000 new residents. A series of activity centers

were identified where high density growth would

be located and urban services concentrated. g

The strong environmental influence in the land

use plan was consistent with prevailing opinion of

the citizens and leaders in Denver at the time. RTD

q The activity centers are shown on Figure 5, Denver

Recommended Transit System, page 14.

had been created in 1969 under the influence of a

number of individual environmentalists. But by

1972 environmentalism had taken hold among the

general public. That year, as RTD’s land use plan

was released, fears about uncontrolled growth led

area voters to refuse to host the 1976 Winter

Olympics.

DRA/WMRT incorporated these popular concerns into its transit and land use plans. In 1971

RTD established Citizen Action Committees

(CAC). CAC’S included many of the same people

who, out of interest in relating transit and land use

policy, had helped create RTD. They worked closely

with the DRA-WMRT team as it surveyed the goals

and desires of the community and developed a land

use plan.

In June 1973 DRA-WMRT published its final

report, Phase 11: A Public Transportation P/an. The plan

called for a 98-mile personal rapid transit-type

system supplemented by a bus feeder system and

included an “early action plan” for immediate bus

improvements. The transit system would utilize

12-passenger unattended vehicles that a patron

could summon to a station and direct to his

destination like a horizontal elevator. Such a

“personalized” system appeared to be highly

competitive with the private automobile. The

report projected an appealingly low operating cost

for the proposed system—lower than for a similar

level of bus service.

The PRT concept was endorsed by the three

agencies in JRPP in spite of the apparent risk

inherent in an unproven technology. The reasons

for its acceptance can be found in the series of

events that had unfolded since RTD was created.

First, while RTD was being organized, another

PRT project was proposed for Denver. (The first

proposed PRT had been the Center City Transportation Project CBD shuttle. ) The new proposal was

UMTA’S “Demo B“ project, which would provide

for construction and operation of a demonstration

PRT system. In 1972 Dr. Robert Hemmes, Assistant Administrator for UMTA’S Research and

Development program, announced that Denver

would be the site for the “Demo B.”

Meanwhile RTD hired an executive director,

Harry Parrish, who was interested in PRT. RTD’s

consulting team included Bill Eager, a p!anner who

had previously worked for Boeing, which was

developing its own PRT technology. Eager helped

shape RTD’s “family of vehicles” concept, which

11
FIGURE 1: DENVER METROPOLITAN AREA

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plt

or other political divisions that are economically and S O(

with the central area.

12
Adams Count y

10

H H H

o 10 20

m i Ies

Inter city (or

adjacent counties

y integrated

13
.

RTD BOUNDARY

s

?5<

1

GRAND

COUNTY

BOULDER COUNTY

}

\

GILPIN COUNTY

PARK COUNTY

‘INE JUNCTION

?

WELD COUNTY

\

PARKER

FIGURE 5: DENVER- RECOMMENDED TRANSIT SYSTEM

Source: Regional Transportation District, Long Range Transit Development

Analysis: Transit Concept Comparison, April 1975.

14
called for use of new technologies where appropriate.

During the same period a conference on PRT in

the Denve r area generated considerable

enthusiasm about new-technology transportation

systems. An additional factor favoring PRT was the

movement to Denver of several advancedtechnology research and development firms,

including Martin Marietta Aerospace and

Transportation Technology, Inc., whos e

enthusiasm for developing new technologies may

have added to the atmosphere in favor of new

technology in Denver.

PRT also looked appealing for practical reasons.

In April 1971 Denver took over bus transit

operations from the local operators. The public

agency incurred growing deficits that totaled

nearly $4 million by the end of 1973. The large

deficit tended to make capital-intensive systems

such as PRT more attractive than conventional bus

and nonautomated rail transit. Theoretically,

automated systems cost less to operate principally

because of lesser labor costs per passenger.

Another reason behind popular enthusiasm for

improved transit was a gasoline shortage in the

Denver area in 1973.10

After publication of its Phase I and II reports,

RTD assembled a campaign to cement the public

support behind the PRT plan and a financing plan to

implement it. Before the referendum, RTD drafted

and gained approval for legislation that substituted

a sales tax increase for the general property tax

contemplated in the original RTD legislation. The

one-half cent sales tax was expected to generate

$1.5 billion (including the Federal share) to

implement the RTD plan, if the financing plan was

approved in referendum. At the same time the

legislature acted to permit a second referendum if

voters rejected the RTD plan during the first trip to

the polls.

RTD’s strategy for promoting the plan to the

public included surveys, media advertisements,

campaign mailings, special fund-raising committees, and speaking tours. During the campaign

citizen advisory committees actively promoted the

RTD plan by holding informational meetings and

distributing literature.

The election was scheduled for September 1973,

although RTD could have waited as much as a year

10 The ~aso]ine shortage in the Denver area occurred prior to

the nationwide fuel shortages of fall and winter 1973-74.

longer. The referendum was timed to take advantage of popular support for the efforts to address

environmental issues in Denver, which had been

expressed in the decision to reject the 197 6

Olympics sponsorship.

Technicall y the issue before the voters at

referendum was RTD’s request to levy the one-half

cent sales tax. However, the tax was linked closely

to a promotional campaign for the PRTs system. The

RTD literature made direct reference to PRT, and a

few weeks before the vote several firms displayed

their PRT vehicles in Denver. In addition, the RTD

board promised to consult the people again if the

transit system finally selected was substantially

different from PRT. The campaign strategy was

successful, and on September 7, 1973, 57 percent of

Denver region voters registered approval.

SELECTION OF THE ART SYSTEM

After the referendum vote, RTD’s progress

toward implementing the transit proposal temporarily reversed. UMTA required RTD to

evaluate a full range of alternatives to the PRT

concept before proceeding with preliminary design.

RTD carried out an alternatives analysis and

produced a plan which, although the PRT concept is

considerably modified, nevertheless enjoys broadbased popular support.

UMTA began backing away from its early

enthusiasm for the Denver PRT proposal in 1974.

Embarrassing cost overruns in the demonstration

project in Morgantown, W. Va. had cast doubt on

the financial and technical feasibility of a PRT

system similar to the one proposed in Denver. In

addition, the Airtrans System at the Dallas-Fort

Worth Airport—like Morgantown’s PRT, a

technological predecessor of the proposed Denver

system—was not performing up to specifications.

At the same time these projects were running

into difficulties, UMTA began to realize that it

could not meet all the requests for Federal

assistance from cities across the country with large

fixed-guideway systems in planning or preplanning

stages.

When RTD asked for a study grant to continue

work on the PRT-type system approved in 1973,

UMTA responded with a new requirement for a

complete evaluation of alternatives. UMTA implied

informally that its funding levels would be geared

to the most cost-effective alternative. After the

15
The transit system proposed in 1973 linked personal rapid transit lines with feeder bus service

referendum RTD had taken steps to select a

consul tan t to refine the PRT plan, prepare an

UMTA capital grant application, and ultimately to

do final design and manage construction of the

entire system. UMTA’S insistent request for an

alternatives analysis resulted in the addition of this

task to the work program. However, the candidates

for the consultant job had already submitted their

proposals—and had undergone a round of

interviews—by this time,

RTD selected a consultant team headed by TRW,

Inc. with participation of architects Gruen

Associates, engineers Ralph M. Parsons & Co., and

DeLeuw, Cather & Co. The consultants were hired

to function as the “system management contractor, ” a title that implied the predominance of the

construct ion-phase responsibilities.

The findings were reported in April 1975. 11 They

included recommendations for an 80-mil e

I I RT~, PU/I/l( l“r[l ttsl~orfil[lotl A/ttr H(it Iws. Reporl a nd RcrovI VIHIIifl-

/ImIS IO Iht’ Bo[~rd 01 Dlrr(/ors from t)ir S/a/f [7( Ihc RegIorIal Trans~orh/tott

Dldrl(t, April 197s, p S.

16

automated fixed-guideway system—referred to as

the Automated Rapid Transit system (ART)—

supplemented by expanded bus service (see Figure

5). The proposed ART system employs a much

simpler and, it was hoped, less expensive

technology than the PRT system proposed in 1973.

The ART system would use automated or

semiautomated vehicles that would be mass

produced. The specially designed vehicles of the

earlier plan were ruled out.

The system would serve all 12 of the activity

centers identified by the 1972 Phase I plan and

would be implemented in stages up to the year

2000. The initial 30-passenger vehicle probably

would be replaced with larger vehicles as demand

increased. The first segment of the ART system,

approximately 28 miles long, would run north and

south from Denver’s CBD to serve three other

activity centers.

Most of the first segment follows expressways

and railroads and therefore would cause little (if

any) disruption of residential communities. RTD
was sensitive to neighborhood opposition because

it found (as did many other cities) that people who

support a plan in the abstract often become

concerned if transit facilities threaten to disrupt

their own neighborhoods.

In the period following the 1973 referendum—

but before the reevaluation got underway—

citizens in the east side of Denver had begun to

oppose PRT alinements routed through their area

that did not follow railroad rights-of-way. In

addition, citizen groups in the South Colorado and

East Colfax corridors objected to having an

elevated PRT guideway in their neighborhoods.

To avoid such criticisms, the ART plan promises

to implement segments of the transit system only

as the demand arises and to give priority to those

segments that are acceptable to the residents of

neighborhoods they affect. In the meantime the

other corridors would be provided with improved

bus service—ranging from local buses to exclusive

bus lanes as circumstances warrant.

JRPP adopted the ART plan on June 19, 1975. It

has thus been officially approved by the three

agencies participating in JRPP: the Denver Regional

Council of Governments, the Colorado Department of Highways, and, of course, RTD. The plan

has been well received by local governments, other

regional agencies, and the public, and continued

support is expected.

Despite widespread support for the plan, issues

have been raised concerning two aspects of the

alternatives analysis: the procedures used for

formal citizen and public agency participation, and

some of the procedures and the assumptions used

in the alternatives evaluation itself.

RTD, however, has fulfilled its obligation to do

an analysis of alternatives, and the ball is once again

in UMTA’S court. UMTA plans to comment on

RTD’s alternatives analysis by November 1975.

17
.—

Chronology of the Transit Planning Process

19.57 The Denve r Metropolitan Area

Transportation Study (DMATS) commenced. The highway orientation of this

study helped generate interest in transit

and in controlling growth.

1969 Effective July I, the Regional Transportation District (RTD) was created by the

State legislature and given authority to

develop a transit plan.

1970 In September the UMTA-funded Center

City Transportation Project released its

final report recommending a PRT 1973 system between the downtown and Mile

High Stadium.

1971 1n April the City and County of Denver

took over ownership and operations of

the financially ailing Denver Tramways

Corporation.

In April the Regional Transportation

District (RTD), the Colorado Department of Highways (CDH), and the

Denve r Regiona1 Council o f

1974

Governments (DRCOG) entered into an

agreement to create JRPP, giving it the

power to approve and coordinate

transportation and land use planning in

the Denver region.

RTD hired Development Research

Associates and Wallace, McHarg,

Roberts & Todd (DRA-WMRT) to

develop complementary land use and

transportation “concept” plans (“Phase

I“) that would provide the groundwork

for designing a transit plan.

Later in the year RTD contracted DRA- 1975

WMRT and Kaiser Engineers to develop

a public transportation plan (“Phase II”).

1972 In May the DRA-WMRT plan Phase 1: A

Concept was released. The land u s e

concept identified regional growth

centers, and the transportation concept

called for a range of service levels. The

plan was adopted by RTD in February

1973, by CDH in August 1973, and by

DRCOG in December 1973.

In October UMTA announced it would

locate the “Demo B“ demonstration

project in Denver. Funds were

designated for the first mile of a 5-mile

PRT system. The project was later

moved to Broom field, a Denver suburb.

In November Denver area voters rejected funding for the 1976 Winter

Olympics and forced the Olympics to

seek a site elsewhere.

In June the Phase 11 report, A Public

Transportation Plan, was issued. It called

for a 98-mile personal rapid transit type

of system for Denver supplemented by

an early action bus program.

In September Denver area voters approved a one-half cent sales tax levy to

support RTD and to pay for construction and operation of transit systems.

In February RTD began negotiations

with consultants to perform preliminary

engineering work on the approved PRT

system and prepare an UMTA capital

grant application. In the midst of the

consultant selection process, UMTA

requested an analysis of alternative

transit systems. Subsequently RTD

selected a consulting group, led by TRW,

Inc., to conduct the alternatives analysis.

In July RTD acquired the Denver transit

system from the City and County of

Denver.

In April RTD released its Transit Concept

Comparison report recommending an 80-

mile automated rapid transit system

supplemented by express bus.

In May public hearings were held on the

ART proposal.

In June JRPP approved the ART plan.

In July UMTA began its evaluation of

the alternatives analysis study.

19
Assessment of the Planning

and Decisionmaking Process

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The institutional structure for transportation

planning in Denver is relatively clearly articulated.

The three major participating agencies cooperate in

a single forum in which responsibilities are

reasonably well defined. However, while collaboration is encouraged, institutional rivalries stand in

the way of genuine integration between transit

planning and other planning efforts. An active

program for citizen participation has led to

enthusiastic public support for transit proposals.

Forum for Decisionmaking

The responsibility for transit decisionmaking is

firmly lodged in the Regional Transportation

District (RTD), although some decisions must be

executed through the Joint Regional Planning

Program (JRPP). Under the JRPP umbrella, transit

policies can be coordinated with highway and land

use planning. The JRPP structure allows the three

participating agencies to cooperate effectively.

However, the nature of the decisionmaking

procedure with JRPP encourages compromise

among the three participating agencies, while their

unequal political clout has led to competition over

which agency should make which decisions.

RTD, created by the State Legislature in 1969, is

the only organization in the Denver region with the

authority to plan, implement, and operate transit

service. RTD joined with the Colorado Department

of Highways (CDH) and the Denver Regional

Council of Governments (DRCOG) to create JRPP.

A governing board was established consisting of

the combined boards of the three agencies. This

structure proved to be cumbersome and time

consuming, and a board consisting of the executives of each agency was substituted for it.

Operating procedures that were adopted require

the board to reach unanimous agreement on all

policy matters. As the designated Metropolitan

Planning Organization (MPO), JRPP is the

recipient of all assistance from the U.S. Department of Transportation, and the JRPP board must

approve funding requests and distribution among

the three agencies.

The JRPP forum has encouraged cooperation

among the three participating agencies, and staffs

of these agencies have established close working

relationships. However, the structure of the JRPP

board has set the stage for decisionmaking that is

characterized by negotiation and compromise.

Evidence of concessions by one agency to another

in JRPP are difficult to document. However, some

features of the recent ART plan reflect compromise

between RTD and” CDH. None of the busway

alternatives tested in that study recommended

using any portion of the highway system that was

needed to carry congestion-free automobile traffic.

In addition, the recommended alternative did not

affect CDH’S plans for construction of new

highways. Although CDH has not endorsed the

technical planning process that produced the ART

proposal, the agency nevertheless has officially

approved the transit plan. One CDH official stated

the agency felt able to approve ART because the

highway programs would remain intact.

Thus, although JRPP provides opportunities for

cooperative planning, the participating agencies

have tended to guard their independent autonomy.

DRCOG is weakest of the three JRPP agencies

primarily because it lacks a steady source of

funding. Nevertheless, DRCOG has taken several

initiatives to strengthen its hand. DRCOG, not

JRPP, is the regional A-95 review agency. Using

this status as leverage, DRCOG recently renewed

its request to the Governor to transfer the MPO

designation to DRCOG from JRPP. As MPO,

DRCOG would become the lead agency in JRPP. To

date, RTD, understandably interested in protecting

its autonomy, has been able to head off the change.

RTD also has lobbied against several attempts in

the Colorado legislature during recent years to

improve regional planning coordination by creating

an urban service authority for the Denver area.

The proposed regional agency would have had a

number of broad powers, including control of

transportation as well as more traditional urban

services, such as water and sewers. If such an

agency existed, RTD would become one of several

departments within it.

21
The State of Colorado has no continuing

involvement in transit planning in the Denver area

other than through CDH, Occasional acts by the

legislature, of course—such as creation of RTD—

have been influential. In addition, the Governor’s

recent involvement in curtailing highway development sets a precedent for high-level State participation in some aspects of transit planning. A move to

create a State department of transportation during

the 1975 legislative session was unsuccessful. RTD

was one of the opponents of this proposal.

Accountability of Decisionmakers

Most of Denver’s transit decisions are reached in

a process that offers a relatively high degree of

public accountability. RTD, which bears the

responsibility for the bulk of decisionmaking, has a

board that is structured to respond to the will of

elected officials. However, to the extent that

decisions are reached in the JRPP forum, accountability is reduced.

Most of RTD’s 21-person board is appointed by

the officials of the participating jurisdictions. The

mayor of Denver appoints 10 delegates. Boulder,

Jefferson, Arapahoe, and Adams Counties each

appoint two board members, and Douglas County

names one. Within each county the appointees are

subject to confirmation by a majority of the

municipalities in that county, a procedure that adds

a special degree of public responsiveness. The

remaining two board members are appointed by the

other 19 to represent the region at large.

As explained, transportation programing

decisions involving Federal funds are reached in the

JRPP forum. In this context RTD must gain

approval from DRCOG and CDH for its proposals.

To an extent that varies with the nature of

particular decisions, therefore, the structure of

these two organizations affects the accountability

of transit decisionmakers in Denver. The DRCOG

board of directors is made up of one representative

from each city and each county in the region with

the exception of Denver, which has two representatives. CDH, a State agency, is further removed

from the public.

Public Involvement

Denver citizens have been a guiding force behind

the development of the region’s transit plan.

Pressure from civic activists and environmentalists

helped set the stage for creation of RTD. Later,

they helped shape the transportation “concept” and

complementary land use plan that led to design of

the PRT proposal in 1973. RTD’s program for

public involvement continued through the recent

ART study, although there is controversy over

whether the public had adequate opportunity to

participate in the analysis of alternatives required

by UMTA in 1974.

RTD’s first Citizen Advisory Committees (CAC)

were organized in 1969 by many of the same

individuals who had campaigned for RTD. The

original CAC’S were organized around council

districts and provided citizen input into the land use

and transportation concepts developed by RTD and

its consultants. The CAC’S were major contributors to the establishment of goals and

identification of activity centers. They worked

closely with the consultant personnel. Later, the

CAC’S actively supported RTD in preparing for the

referendum by distributing literature and holding

informational meetings. DRCOG’S own CAC’S

also contributed to aspects of the transit planning

effort. In all, the citizen participation program

during the early phases of RTD planning was

admirably progressive.

After the 1973 referendum the CAC’S were

reorganized to correspond to the PRT corridors for

the purpose of recommending guideway

alinements. RTD presented alternative alinements

to the CAC’S and asked citizens to rank alinements

in order of preference. Some CAC’S could not agree

on an acceptable alinement and others ranked only

one alternative as acceptable. In several cases the

alternatives selected by the CAC’S generated less

ridership or cost considerably more than the

alinements favored by RTD planners. In these cases

the relationship between RTD and the CAC’S

deteriorated as the citizens and planners adopted

conflicting positions. However, in general, the

citizen involvement program was considered a

good effort.

At the time of the alternatives analysis, RTA

began by restructuring CAC’S once again,

assimilating the small units that had been organized around PRT corridors into larger groups. This

restructuring was a logical step, since planning had

shifted away from selection of alinements at the

neighborhood level and back to system-level

concerns. Nevertheless, the change tended to dilute

the strength of old CAC’S. In at least one case, the

difficulties were compounded because the change

in structure was announced without consulting the

old CAC leaders. The old East Colfax CAC was

22
combined with other groups and its members

required to work under the leadership of strangers.

RTD attempted to resolve the tension that

developed subsequently between the old East

Colfax people and the new CAC leader but was

only partially successful.

Citizen leaders have complained that RTD’s

presentations to new CAC’S were not designed to

elicit direct citizen input into evaluation and

selection of alternatives. All RTD’s technical

reports were made available to the public, and

citizens attempting to contribute were not rebuffed. But evidence indicates that RTD did more to

obtain ratification of a particular alternative than to

involve citizens in the examination of a full range of

alternatives. Gary Robertson, RTD’s Community

Liaison Officer, stated that the citizens never voted

on alternatives. Don Bain, former head of the East

Colfax CAC, said that his group was asked to

comment on alternatives on only one occasion, at

which time the RTD staff requested support for its

findings that the ART system was the best

alternative. Some responsible regional officials also

expressed displeasure at not having played any role

in the technical planning work.

Following publication of Transit Concepi Comparison

in April 1975, which presented the findings of the

alternatives analysis and recommended an 80-mile

automated regional system, the public was given a

period of about a month to register comments

before the plan was officially adopted. Some

students of the Denver planning process have

questioned whether this period was too short to

allow for substantive modifications to be made,

although there is no evidence of public conflict in

this particular case that would have required

additional time and study to resolve.

In spite of the criticisms of RTD’s approach to

citizen involvement during the alternatives

analysis, the plan that evolved has won acceptance

from most groups. Criticism has been stemmed by

the promise that no transit route will be constructed through unreceptive neighborhoods.

Under these conditions the Denver public generally

supports the ART plan.

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

The decisions by leaders and citizens of Denver

to choose fixed-guideway transit have followed

logically from the technical information provided

by RTD. However, the process has been criticized

for failing to provide accurate information on a full

range of alternatives.

Goals and Objectives

Transit planning in Denver began with an

elaborate and comprehensive goal-setting process

based on a strong community participation

program that has received widespread notice and

praise. In keeping with current planning theory,

the set of goals and objectives that evolved was

intended for use in evaluating alternative plans.

Many of the goals were employed for this purpose,

although due to difficulties inherent in their broadranging character, other goals were ignored or used

less effectively.

June 1970 RTD adopted several goals and

objectives to guide the transportation planning

process. First on the list was the objective of

providing “maximum feasible integration of public

transportation planning with comprehensive land

use planning. “ 12 This general goal has been cast in

various forms over the .5-year period of transit

planning. Most recently it surfaced in the April

1975 ART study in this phase: “A basic goal served

by planning for the future is the preservation and

enhancement of the quality of life, commonly

expressed as preservation of the natural environment, improvement of cultural opportunities, and

control of growth. ”13

This basic goal had to be refined to produce the

objectives that could guide selection of a transit

plan. One of the first tasks RTD’s consultants

undertook in 1971 was to assemble all the goals and

objectives that had been drawn up by local

jurisdictions. Community meetings throughout

the region generated additional goals and a sense of

priority ordering among them. Both land use and

transportation objectives were articulated. In

January 1972 the RTD board approved a regional

transportation concept reported in Phase 1: A Concept

and containing the following points:

● A transportation system must be designed

to serve present needs and meet current

transportation problems.

I z The other ~oa]s for transportation planning that appeared

on the June I Q70 I IS t dealt with the desirability of (1‘I achieving a

reg iona 1 perspective, ( 2 ) protecting and enhancing the environmen t, ( 3 ) invol~ring citizens i n an i n formed dec is ion making

process, (~) utilizlng existlnR transportation systems, and (.5)

coordinating WI th other agencies.

1.~ ]<D T Trflt151t c,lrj~ q~t Conlp(? rl~t]!!, April 1975, pp 1-5

23
●

●

Development should be directed away

from areas that the ecological inventory

identified for protection.

Uncontrolled or minimally controlled suburban sprawl is detrimental to the region.

The transportation system should reflect a

family of technologies, each designed to

best meet specific needs.

A transportation system should be designout to transform it into a specific system. The

alternative systems were measured against a set of

service quality criteria, but they also had to honor a

wide range of economic, social, environmental, and

ecological goals.

Like its Phase 11 predecessor, the evaluation

process for the ART study also took regional goals

and community concerns into account. The

regional goals were extrapolated from the Year

2000 Land Use Plan that was developed during the

ed over a period of time to meet changing

needs of the district.

Once the “concept” 14 had been identified, the

consultant during the second phase of planning set

14 This transportation concept was defined as “a synthesis of

regional transportation objectives. ” The report summarized

these objectives into a list of “three important functions for the

regional transportation system:

● “to alleviate immediate and growing transportation

problems—congestion, pollution, and lack of adequate

opportunity for mobility-deficient riders.

● “to reinforce and organize development of existing

urban areas.

● “to serve and encourage development in new regional

patterns as directed by local and State legislative

policies. ”

(RTD, A Publlc Transportation Plan for Colorado's Regional Transportation

Dlstrict, Technical Report 1—Preliminary System Design, June

1973. )

first phase of the transit planning effort and

adopted by JRPP in 1973. The regional goals were

summarized as: (1) directing growth to designated

areas; (2) providing a high degree of accessibility to

employment, activity centers, and other attractions; and (3) supporting national energy programs.

Citizen concerns were solicited during some 250

community and CAC meetings in 1974. The

“community values” identified during these

sessions dealt with mobility issues; the desire to

minimize relocation, disruption, and other adverse

effects in neighborhoods; enhancement of the

environment; esthetic concerns; and the wish to

minimize cost. 15

l5 The Consultant also built traditional transportation planning factors into the evaluation process: the operational

effectiveness of the alternatives, their relative financial

feasibility, and the comparative economic viability. This last

issue responded to UMTA’S interest in cost-effectiveness

analysis.

In this sketch, an elevated station

collects passengers

24

on the personal rapid transit system proposed in 1973

arriving by bus, bicycle, and automobile
The consultant had mixed success in translating

these goals into workable evaluation criteria. The

ability of alternatives to meet goals for mobility, for

example, would be tested by counting the number

of disadvantaged persons each alternative would

bring within 40 minutes of employment and

activity centers. Other goals were not so amenable

to quantification, although they were employed in

the evaluation process, as described in the next

sect ion.

Development and Evaluation

of Alternatives

Over the past 3 years, RTD conducted two

technical studies to evaluate alternative transit

systems and recommend a system that would best

serve Denver’s needs. The first study took only a

cursory look at alternatives before recommending a

PRT system. The second study was more thorough

but did not put all the technical issues to rest. This

section discusses both studies but focuses on the

second, more recent study.

The first study was prepared by consultants

Development Research Associates and Wallace,

McHarg, Roberts & Todd with Kaiser Engineers.

Published in June 1973, the study recommended a

PRT transit system for the Denver region. The

400-page, three-volume technical report entitled A

Public Transportation Plan /or Colorado’s Regional

Transportation Disirict limits the discussion of alternatives evaluation to eight pages.

Three alternatives were considered in the 1973

study: (1) the PRT system, (2) an all-bus system,

and (3) a conventional rapid transit system. The

analysis of alternatives was conducted in three

cycles. Cycle 1 compared all-bus against an allfixed-guideway system. (No feeder bus systems

were considered. ) The all-f ixed-guideway solution

was rejected because the ridership generated in

low-density areas would not justify the high cost of

constructing guideways. It was concluded that an

all-bus and a combination bus-and-f ixed-guideway

system merited further analysis.

Cycle 2 compared the all-bus alternative with a

nonspecified fixed-guideway and feeder bus combination. The all-bus alternative was rejected for

two reasons. The report found that (1) the all-bus

system would cost more in the long run due to

higher operating costs and (2) that “with the

possible exception of the busways, the potential

influence of a bus system on development is highly

questionable , . . “16 Neither of these reasons for

rejecting the all-bus alternative is fully justified in

the report. The all-bus alternative assumed standard transit buses of no more than so seats; larger

articulated or double-decker buses that might

reduce operating costs per passenger were not

considered. In addition, the analysis notes that a

bus system probably would not influence development without proving that any other transit

systems would be more effective in doing so.

The third cycle in the alternatives analysis

compared conventional rail transit with a PRT

system. The conventional system was rejected for

several reasons. One reason was that it would not

be able to carry the projected passenger demand.

Actually, the conventional rapid transit system

hypothesized in the analysis had the same on-line

passenger capacity as the PRT system, although

this fact was not reported in the analysis. Furthermore, the conventional system was defined in a

way that its capacity was less than a third of the

capacity typically estimated for a double-tracked

rapid rail system. 17

This “conventional” rapid transit system was

compared with an advanced personal rapid transit

system. The PRT vehicles were assumed to hold 12

passengers, attain speeds of 40 miles per hour, have

off-track stations, operate “on demand” (if

necessary), and achieve headways of 7.5 seconds. 18

At that time, no operating PRT systems could

achieve 7.5 second headways and “on demand”

operational capability. 19 The study offers no

I o RTD, A Pu~/lc Tru~Sp~rta/i~~ P/an for Colorado Rrgiorm / Tra nsft

District, Technical Report 1: Preliminary System Design, June 197’3, p. 23

1’ The conventional rail system was defined to have 90-

second headways, maximum speeds of 50 to 75 mph., on-line

stations, and a maximum of three cars per train with 4 8

passengers per car. These assumptions result in a maximum

one-way ] ine capacity of 5,760 passengers per hour, The capacity

of most existing rapid transit cars is at least 70 passengers seated

with an additional .50 or more standing. The train size of three

cars also is very unusual. Normally, rapid transit cars are

operated in semi-permanently coupled pairs, making train sizes

usually two, four, six, or eight cars. In most other cities, it has

been assumed that a double-tracked rapid rail system could

handle an excess of 20,000 one-way passengers per hour,

]8 The use of the term “pRT” in Denver at that time does not

coincide with current usage. A June 197s definition that

appeared in the Office of Technology Assessment’s Autonmfd

Guideway Trand stated that a PRT system would inc!ude 3-

second headways and vehicles that could carry up to six

passengers.

IQ The state-of-the-art of PRT is advancing. Although no

system now has both on-demand service and T. S-second

headways, some claim to have achieved one or the other.

25
evidence that such systems could be operating in

the near future.

Another reason given for rejecting the conventional rapid transit system was that it would cost

more than the PRT system. Since there is no

experience in either construction or operation of

the kind of PRT system described in the study, the

relatively low cost figures have been questioned.

Indeed, one member of the consulting team

advocated including a large contingency factor in

the cost estimate to allow for unexpected cost

overruns on the untested technology. This was not,

done.

The second alternatives analysis was performed

at the request of UMTA. It was carried out by

RTD’s System Management Contractor, a consultant team headed by TRW, Inc. and including

Gruen Associates, Deleuw Cather & Company,

and Ralph M. Parsons and Company. An 80-mile

automated rapid transit (ART) system was

recommended in the final report, entitled Transii

Concept Comparison, which was released in April

1975.20

At the time that RTD/TRW was conducting the

alternatives analysis, UMTA was in the process of

preparing new guidelines for evaluation of capital

grant applications. The study was designed to

conform to the new guidelines, to the extent that

UMTA had developed them as the study got

underway. Although the RTD/TRW alternatives

analysis had been completed, final guidelines for

UMTA’S capital grant application evaluation have

not yet been developed. Thus, this alternative

analysis is not only the first of its kind, but it was

conducted without the benefit of final UMTA

guidelines. 21

Several characteristics of the analysis are regarded as steps forward in the practice of transit

planning. First, the RTD/TRW analysis assumed

that fares would increase at only 3 percent per year

while costs would increase at 6 percent to 8 percent

annually. Most past financial analyses assumed

that fares and costs would increase at the same rate.

RTD’s conservative approach is more realistic,

given current economic trends.

20 ART is the term used in Denver for a group rapid transit

system (CRT), as defined by the Office of Technology

Assessment in Automfltd Gudeway Trawl, June 1975.

‘I Draft guidelines were published in the August 1, 1975,

Fedw/ Rtglstrr (pp. 32546-7) under the title “Proposed Policy for

Major Urban Mass Transportation Investments. ”

Another strength of RTD’s alternatives analysis

was that instead of using the highways planned for

the year 2000, RTD considered only existing

highways plus those to which full funding had been

committed. This approach eliminated several major

expressways that are planned for construction by

the year 2OOO, according to the official plan. Public

opposition to the construction of new freeways in

Denver is considered likely to delay completion of

the major highways for which funds have not been

committed, and assuming their completion would

have given a distorted picture of regional travel

needs.

The third and most significant strength of RTD’s

analysis is associated with the relationship between

transit and land use change. Most transit studies

have assumed that transit itself will have a

significant effect on land use. RTD, however,

assumed that a fixed-guideway system will not

necessarily shape land use that would encourage

transit use unless those patterns are reinforced

through other governmental actions. RTD has

stated that Denver’s transit system will be implemented.” . . . where responsible local officials

are receptive to early development of the transit

infrastructure, as evidenced by their adoption of

policies which complement the provision of rapid

transit in a corridor. ”22

If RTD demands the “policies” to be backed by

effective programs of incentives and/or controls,

and if the promise of transit service can be used in

this way to put genuinely coordinated and comprehensive urban area plans into effect, Denver

will have made a significant advance in planning

practice.

Despite these contributions to the state-of-theart, however, the alternatives analysis has been the

source of controversy within professional transit

planning circles. To a great extent, the debate turns

on questions of approach and value. Some disagreements center on the contention that the

analysis did not produce adequate information

about the full range of feasible alternatives.

The following discussion examines the RTD/TRW

alternatives analysis in detail, paying special

attention to four areas of disagreement: (1)

elimination of low-capital alternatives, (2) exten26
siveness of the fixed-guideway system, (3)

patronage estimates, and (4) economic analysis.

1. Elimination of Low-Capital Alternatives

One issue involves the analysis of low-capital

alternatives. Critics suggest the RTD/TRW report

does not provide all the information helpful in

determining whether a high-capital system would

be worth the extra cost required to provide a higher

level of transit service.

Denver has defined the alternatives analysis as

involving essentially a choice between a fixedguideway system and buses in mixed traffic. The

issue, as described in the Transit Concept Comparison, is

whether an expensive fixed-guideway system can

be economically justified in a moderately large city,

or whether a buses-in-mixed-traffic system would

be more suitable. The question becomes one of

ratio of benefits to costs. An improved bus system

may cost in the neighborhood of $2OO million and

generate several times that figure in benefits, but

this level of benefits would be small compared to

the benefits generated by a fixed-guideway system

that would cost several billion dollars.

The alternatives analysis developed the theme of

the fixed-guideway versus bus. Denver examined

seven alternatives, including five fixed-guideway

options:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Baseline bus, assuming operation of buses in

mixed traffic at the same level of service as

the existing bus system;

Expanded bus, which would increase baseline

bus operations by 48 percent;

Advanced Bus, with 70 miles of bus operating

on exclusive busways;

Light rail, operating on 79 miles of fixed

guideways;

Conventional rapid rail, operating on 46 miles

of fixed guideway;

Automated rapid transit, operating on 80 miles

of fixed guideway; and

Demand-responsive transit, operating on 93

miles of fixed guideway.

The expanded and the baseline bus systems art

the only low-capital alternatives described in the

Transit Concept Comparison.All of the fixed-guideway

systems include extensive fixed-guideway systems

covering several corridors.

The expanded bus system was eliminated from

further consideration early in the Transit Concept

Comparison .23 In Chapter III, “The Issue,” RTD

summarized its position on the low-capital expanded bus system:

On balance, an expanded bus system is

economically a desirable investment but cannot

meet either the national or regional goals for

transportation investment. In order to provide

the improved transit mobility and accessibility

necessary to support these goals, transit

alternatives with higher levels of service and

resulting higher capital costs must be examined.

Thus, on the grounds that it would not provide

sufficient transit service, RTD eliminated the

expanded bus alternative. It was not mentioned in

the remaining seven chapters of the report, or in

the Economic Analysis Report, which provided technical

backup for the economic analysis.

One point of information useful in deciding what

level of transit service is appropriate to an area is

the marginal cost—or total extra cost—required to

achieve a higher level of service. The marginal cost

would represent the difference in capital plus

operating costs between a system that would

provide the desired service level and a less

expensive system providing a lower level of service,

such as a buses-in-mixed-traffic system or a small

fixed-guideway system. RTD has not provided this

information in any of its reports.

However, from the data supplied in the Transit

Concept Comparison and the Economic Analysis Report, it

is possible to calculate roughly the marginal capital

costs of achieving the increased level of service

desired by RTD above the level of service provided

by the expanded bus alternative. The expanded bus

system will require $247 million (1974 dollars) in

capital costs by the year 2000 and offer a level of

transit service that would attract 5 percent of all of

person trips in the Denver region. The Automated

Rapid Transit system, the alternative eventually

selected by RTD will have a capital cost of $1,488

million (1974 dollars) by the year 2000 and is

Z-I The baseline bus was not eliminated but was kept to provide

a point of reference for the systems that were evaluated. It was

not an alternative for Improving transit service but was the “donothing” alternative.

27
predicted to handle 7.5 percent of all daily Denver

area person trips.

Thus, the Denver region would pay $247 million

in capital costs in order to provide an expanded bus

transit system that would carry 5 percent of the

total daily person trips in the region. In order to

increase the percentage of trips taken on transit to

7.5 percent the Denver region would have to pay

additional capital costs of $1,241 million (1974

dollars) by the year 2000 to pay for the ART

system. RTD has decided that the extra cost is

justified in order to increase the level of transit

service so that an additional 2.5 percent of all area

trips will be taken on transit. The report states the

justification to be the benefits from “improved

transit mobility and accessibility.”24 The comparison would have been aided if these benefits had

been assigned dollar values or other measures.

In evaluating marginal costs, one must also take

into account a comparison of the operating costs of

the two systems. In the year 2000, the ART system

will carry 495, 000 daily passengers at an annual

operating cost of $57 million. The expanded bus

system will carry 341,ooo daily passengers at an

annual operating cost of $5o.8 million. Assuming

the same cost per passenger, the annual operating

cost of using the expanded bus system to carry the

number of passengers that the ART is projected to

carry (an additional 154 million passengers) would

be $73.9 million. Under these assumptions, the

ART system would cost about $15.9 million less per

year to operate than the bus system. Over the 40-

year life of the ART system, this would amount to a

savings of $165.3 million when discounted at 10

percent 25 or $334.5 million when discounted at 4

percent. 26 However, these savings would not alter

the fact that the ART system would cost considerably more to provide the higher service level

desired.

The need for marginal cost information has

become more widely recognized since the publication of UMTA’S proposed policy governing

technical planning, which calls for identifying the

most cost-effective alternative, or the one that

meets planning objectives at- the lowest cost.

2. The Extensiveness of the System

The methodology used in the RTD/TRW analysis

to determine the length of the fixed-guideway

system required for the Denver area is unconventional. The systemwide approach taken, in combination with a decision not to examine any fixedguideway system under 45 miles in length, has not

provided information that would be useful in

determining either the optimum length of the

system or the segment of the system that should be

built and put into operation first.

The accepted practice for determining the length

of a fixed-guideway system is to examine the

demand for transit service in each subarea or

corridor in order to determine where sufficient

demand exists to justify a fixed-guideway system.

UMTA’S proposed policy on major urban mass

transportation investments calls for this kind of

subarea approach when it states, “The plans should

include specific transit elements tailored to the level

demands and service requirements of the specific

corridors and neighborhoods they serve. ”27 However, instead of doing a corridor-by-corridor

analysis, the RTD/TRW analysis examined the

effect of varying lengths of fixed-guideways on the

whole area.

RTD takes the position that, whereas a subarea

approach would result in the appropriate transit

mode for each corridor, the combination of corridor

transit systems may not be the best transit system

for the urban area as a whole. 28 (In practice, transit

studies using the subarea approach have

simultaneously considered the systemwide implications of corridor alternatives and thus have

been able to study systems using the same

technology in several corridors. )

One of the disadvantages of the RTD/TRW

approach is that it provides little data that would be

useful in determining how to stage implementation

of the plan. In order to meet the requirements in

UMTA’S proposed policy for building the system in

stages, it would be necessary to know how each

section of the system functions independently.

Data on ridership generated by systems under 45

miles in length also would have been useful in

determining the optimum system length, but

ZJ Tra/lslt Cm(cpl Comparison, p. 3-3.

zs The rate recommended b)’ the Office of Management and Z? Ibid.

Budget. M John Gaudette, Executive Assistant to the Director of RTD,

zo The rate used by RTD/T1<W. in a telephone interview with System Design Concepts, Inc.

28
— .

RTD/TRW elected not to examine shorter alternatives. Examination of patronage estimates

indicates that the reason for the 45-mile minimum

is not intuitively clear. The 45-mile fixed-guideway

system was shown to carry 236,000 daily riders.

Two of three 60-mile fixed-guideway systems

would have carried fewer riders (232,000 and

235,000 per day), although probably because they

occupied less favorable corridors; while the third

system tested would have produced only 5,OOO

additional patrons. Since the addition of 15 miles to

the 45-mile system generated so little additional

patronage, it would have been appropriate to test

smaller fixed-guideway systems of 30, 20, 10, and

even 5 miles to determine the length of the shortest

fixed-guideway system that could generate a

significant portion of the 230,000 or so daily linehaul riders projected to use the longer systems.

3. Patronage Estimates

Patronage estimates for the year 2000 were

developed for each of the six alternatives and were

later used to determine the benefits of each of the

fixed-guideway systems. The patronage estimates

were developed using trip generation, trip distribution, and modal split models that represent the

state-of-the-art in modeling. However, the data

manipulated by these models yielded transit

patronage estimates that have been criticized as

being unrealistically high.

At the current time, the percentage of the total

trips in the Denver region taken on transit is less

than 3 percent. The model predicts that in the year

2000 the baseline bus system, which would provide

the same level of service (i.e. an increase in service

proportionate to the increase in population

growth), would attract proportionally more riders,

or 3.4 percent of the total daily trips in the region.

The expanded bus system, which represents a 48

percent increase in bus miles above the baseline bus

system, is projected to generate an increase in

patronage of 54 percent (equal to a total of 5

percent of all daily trips in the region). These

increases in ridership are very difficult to explain

under normal conditions. 29 In other transit studies,

the existing bus system is usually assumed to serve

~“ Such increases would be conceivable under gas shortage

cond it ions. However, the model would reflect a gas shortage in

increased auto operating costs. Since RTD’s model projected

operating costs at normal levels, it seems that the high

patronage increases do not assume gas shortages

the best transit markets, and thus expanded service

is assumed to serve areas that generate proportionally fewer transit users. Thus, an increase in

the transit service of 48 percent would normally be

expected to generate ridership increases of less

than 48 percent. RTD’s figures do not bear out this

logic.

The RTD/TRW reports did not explain what

might have led to their apparently high patronage

estimates. RTD subsequently has said that the

greater-than-expected ridership increases in the

expanded bus system would be generated through

improvements in the bus operations, although this

explanation does not account for good performance

of the baseline bus system.

One reason for the high patronage estimates

may be that unrealistic assumptions were made for

future parking charges. The average parking costs

for a work trip into the Denver CBD in 1971 were

assumed to be $2, and these costs were expected to

increase to $3.9o by the year 2000. The $2 figure

appears high in view of the report that in January

197o parking charges in downtown Denver exceeded $2 in less than seven square blocks, and most of

the CBD had charges of much less than $2. so

The assumptions about parking charges greatly

influenced the modal split figures developed by the

RTD. The patronage model used an implied timecost tradeoff for vehicle work trips of $1.78 per

hour. 31 In other words, if all other factors are equal,

RTD assumed that a person would be willing to

spend somewhat over an hour on the bus in order

to avoid driving his car and incur a $2 parking

charge. This assumption, which greatly influenced

the modal split developed by RTD, does not seem

valid on the basis of past experience.

4. Economic Analysis of Alternatives

The analysis of alternatives resulted in the

finding that the Automated Rapid Transit System

(ART) was not only cost-effective but provided

other community benefits such as reduced air

pollution, increased mobility for the disadvantaged,

and the diversion of more auto riders to transit.

The part of the analysis to which RTD/TRW

devoted the most attention was the determination

JO A,D, Litt]e, et, a]., Center City Transportation project,

September 1970, p. 45,

~ I RTD, SMC (Systems Management Consultant), MulliMcd~/ Pntrm,7<~, ,Jfmicl, May 30, 1975, p, 6-5.

29
of the most cost-effective system by comparing

benefit-cost ratios. Aspects of the benefit-cost

analysis have been questioned by some of the

study’s reviewers.

The benefits quantified for the evaluation of

alternatives are all related to the savings incurred

due to the diversion of auto trips to transit. These

benefits include: (1) savings in private and commer- —

cial vehicle operating costs due to fewer total trips

and increased operating efficiency for those

vehicles remaining on less crowded highways; (2)

decreases in accidents on the less crowded and

therefore safer highways; and (3) construction and

operating costs for highways and parking spaces

avoided due to the decrease in demand for

highways.

The first two categories of benefits are commonly taken into account in transit benefit-cost

analyses. The third category is unusual and has

been handled in such a way that benefits are

claimed that have already been counted once before

under the first category.

The normal procedure is to count as a benefit the

decrease in demand for highways in the form of

decreased congestion and elimination of some auto

trips. RTD/TRW did this under the first category—

but the analysis then double counted this decrease

in demand for highways by counting as an

additional benefit the construction costs saved

when unneeded highways were not built. Furthermore, these were hypothetical highways: they

were not included in Denver’s year 2000 highway

plan and are unlikely to be built regardless of the

future of the transit system.

The analysis that double counted benefits in this

fashion used what RTD termed a cost-avoided

approach. It did not take into account the dollar

value of time saved due to the reduction in travel

time on less congested highways. RTD also

calculated benefits in this second fashion, which it

called the value-of-time approach (see Table 2).

Because the total benefits under the value-of-time

approach exceeded the total under the cost-avoided

approach, RTD/TRW opted to use the latter total in

making its system selection decision because it

appeared to be more conservative. In fact, if the

benefits had not been double counted, the benefitcost ratio developed under the cost-avoided approach would have been even smaller and the

value-of-time approach would have seemed much

more attractive. However, the calculation of the

$722.5 million benefit from the value-of-time

savings also has been questioned by several

authorities as being excessively high.

RTD/TRW estimated the value of time at $6.88

per hour, and assumed that any time savings

incurred on trips would be valued by the individual

at his full pay. Critiques of this evaluation of timesaving benefits focus on: (1) the calculation of the

hourly rate, and (2) the application of a value-oftime only to work trips.

The hourly rate used by RTD is higher than

would be justified by Bureau of the Census

statistics. Page 5-11 of the Economic Analysis Report

states that the median family income for the

Denver-Boulder SMSA in 1974 was estimated at

$13,750, or $6.88 per hour. This calculation

assumes that there is only one wage earner per

family. In fact, according to the Bureau of the

Census, there were 304,456 families in the Denver

SMSA in 1970 and 525,744 people in the work force

or about 1.7 workers per family. If the same

relationship holds true in 1974, dividing the median

family income by the number of workers per family

(1.7) indicates an average hourly wage per worker

of $4. 05 compared to the RTD figure of $6.88. 32

The RTD/TRW study assigned the value of $6.88

for work trips only. No time value was assigned to

nonwork trips. Because of the difficulty of determining time values for the variety of trips for

nonwork purposes, values-of-time for these trips

usually are much less than for work trips.

However, RTD mistakenly implies that increased

benefits would accrue if it had assigned time value

to nonwork trips. Page 5-40 of the Economic Analysis

Rcport states, “The Denver analysis excluded

nonwork trips . . . and therefore is basically conservative.” An examination of the data in the

Patronage Results for the Analysis of Transit Alternatives for

Regional Transportation District indicates that this is

not true. As can be seen in Table 3, the average

speed of all trips (automobile and transit) is higher

with the ART system in operation than it is for the

baseline bus system, thus generating travel time

savings for the ART. The table also shows that total

nonwork trips travel at a slower speed with ART

than with the baseline bus system. If a value-oftime had been applied to these trips, the ART

system would have incurred additional costs in the

form of increased travel time for nonwork trips.

32 Elsewhere in the study, RTD used a much smaller rate of

$1.78 per hour in figuring the time-cost tradeoff in its

determination of the modal split.

30
. —.— —

TABLE 2.—Art Concept Relative Present Values of the Benefit-Cost Analysis

At 4.0 Percent

Discount Rate

Cost-Avoided Value-of-Time

Approach Approach

Benefits

Capital Costs Avoided

Highway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Parking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Operating Costs Avoided

Highway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Parking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Value of Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Autos—Peak Hour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Autos—Off Peak Hour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Commercial Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Value of Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

393.3

15.2

38.1

6,1

—

733.5

693.2

57.0

23.0

126.5

——

——

——

722,5

733.5

693.2

57.0

23.0

126.5

Total Present Value of Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2085.9 2355.7

costs

Transit System

Capital Costs

Line Haul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1209.1 1209.1

CDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -13.6 -13.6

Operating Costs

Line Haul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378.0 378.0

CDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -84.5 -84.5

Total Present Value of Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1489.0 1489.0

Benefit/CostRatlo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.401 1.582

Net Present Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 596.9 866.7

Internal Rate of Return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.04 8.25

Source: RTD, .Economic Analysis Report 96264-9036-OO,May 23, 1975, pp. 5-12

TABLE 3.—Average Speed of Total Work and

Nonwork Trips for the Baseline Bus

System and Art System

Average Speed in MPH

Trip Baseline ART

Type Bus System

Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.0 20.6

Nonwork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.2 18.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18.8 18.9

Note: Work trips are 22.9 percent of total trips.

Source: RTD, Patronage Results for the Analysis of Transit

Alternatives for fhe Regional Transportation District May 9,

1975, pp.46 and 56,

On the cost side of the ledger, two factors in the

benefit-cost analysis do not seem to have been

adequately justified. First, no debt service costs are

included in the cost of the system. Since RTD will

be floating bonds to pay for its share of the

construction of this system, it will incur a cost for

debt service that should be included.

Second, for all of the fixed-guideway systems,

the same contingency factor of 30 percent was

used. This figure is reasonable for normal construction work, considering the uncertainty of the

current economic situation. Most engineering

estimates include a contingency factor of about 20

percent. However, the assumption of the same

contingency factor for each fixed-guideway system

disregards the fact that the options are at different

levels of technological development. It can be

assumed that the cost of the advanced bus system,

the light rail system, and the conventional rapid

transit system can be reasonably well predicted,

since the construction industry has had a great deal

of experience building these systems. In these cases

a 30 percent contingency factor is adequate. The

31
—

automated rapid transit system and the demandresponsive transit system, on the other hand, are

not yet in standard production or in operation in an

ordinary urban setting. Thus, it should be assumed

that there will be additional startup costs that

cannot be predicted as well as they could be for

other systems that have been well tested and for

which production methods have been developed.

RTD has included greater “preoperation, testing,

training and maintenance” costs for the automated

systems but these additional costs were $10

million. A greater contingency factor for the

automated system would have been justified.

Benefit-cost analyses generally assume that

future costs and benefits are worth less than

current costs and benefits. Thus, a cost that will not

be incurred until 10 years from now would be

assigned a lesser value than a cost to be incurred

this year. For the purpose of calculating the value of

future costs and benefits, an analytical tool known

as the “discount rate” has been devised to discount

future costs and benefits so that they are expressed

in values comparable to today’s values. Thus,

future benefits must be greater than today’s costs

in order to justify the expenditure of resources at

this time.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in

its Circular A-94, “Discount Rates to be Used in

Evaluating Time Distributed Costs and Benefits,”

recommends a 10 percent discount rate for all

government projects except those involving post

offices and water resources management. JJ OMB

has directed UMTA to apply this rate 10 transit

projects. However, the RTD/TRW analysis used a

discount rate of 4 percent. RTD/TRW justified

using its lower figure on the grounds that, after 6

percent to 8 percent was added to its discount rate

to account for inflation, its figure would be very

close to OMB’S figure. In other words, once an

inflation rate of 6 percent to 8 percent was added to

its 4 percent discount rate, its discount rate would

be 10 percent to 12 percent, nearly equivalent to

OMB’S 10 percent recommended rate. However,

this is not a valid claim, since OMB’S 10 percent

figure is applied to values from which inflation has

been eliminated. OMB Circular A-94 states that,

“all estimates of the costs and benefits for each year

of the planning period should be made in constant

dollars, i.e., in terms of the general purchasing

power of the dollar at the time of the decision.”

33 Of flee of Management arid Budget, circular A-94 (revised),

March 27, 1972.

In the past, transit benefit-cost analyses have not

adhered to the 10 percen t discount rate

recommended by OMB. No effort was made at the

Federal level to get them to do so until UMTA and

OMB began to develop the recently formulated

policy of requiring cost-effectiveness analysis.

However, although most have used figures lower

than OMB’S 10 percent, their average is in the

neighborhood of 6 percent, considerably higher

than RTD’s 4 percent discount rate.

The use of the low 4 percent discount rate tends

to exaggerate the value of future benefits. For

example, the net present value of $1 in benefits 20

years from now is less than 14 cents when

discounted at 10 percent. The value of this same

dollar of benefits 20 years from now when

discounted at only 4 percent is about 46 cents. In

the case of most major transportation investments,

costs need not be discounted over as many years as

benefits, because they are incurred in the early

years of the life of the project. In contrast, benefits,

which normally accrue after the construction costs

have been incurred, are stretched out for years into

the future and thus are discounted for many more

years than are to the capital costs. A low discount

rate tends to justify an expensive investment by

preserving the value of future benefits; a high rate

makes it extremely difficult to justify expensive

investments in terms of their long-term benefits

because those benefits tend to be reduced to

insignificance by years of repeated discounting.

After the costs and benefits have been discounted,

they are compared in a ratio known as the benefitcost ratio. In the case of the ART system, using

benefits and costs discounted at 4 percent, the ratio

of benefits to costs was 1,4 to 1. The benefit-cost

ratio of the improved bus system was 4.85 to 1. If a

discount rate of 10 percent had been used in this

benefit-cost analysis, the discounted cost of ART

would have exceeded the benefits, and the project

would be assumed to be unjustified economically.

The benefits used in the benefit-cost analysis do

not include all of the benefits that can be credited to

the system. The Transit Concept Comparison cites

several additional benefits accruing to the ART

system. These additional benefits include improved

air quality, improved transit safety, and savings in

government expenditures due to more economical

land use patterns, all of which are assumed to

follow the construction and operation of the ART.

The savings in governmental expenditures for

infrastructural development such as sewers and

roads that would accompany the implementation of

32
the year 2000 Denver land use plan have been

quantified and added to the benefits of the ART

system. These benefits raise the ART’s benefit-cost

ratio to 4.87 to 1.

The Transit Concept Comparison presents no

evidence that the transit system alone will be

responsible for the changes in land use patterns

that would allow savings in government expenditures for infrastructure. RTD has expressly

recognized this fact by proposing to give priority to

implementin g its transit plan in communities that

have adopted complementary land use policies.

However, the additional benefits in land development savings do not subtract any cost that might be

required to put these land use policies into effect.

In conclusion, the RTD/TRW alternatives analysis contributed to the state-of-the-art in several

important ways. It established precedents for a

realistic assessment of fare and cost increases and

for using only existing highways and those with

full funding commitments behind them in

calculating transit patronage. (The questionable

assumptions about future highway construction

were confined to the benefit-cost part of the

analysis. ) The Denver study’s most important

contribution is its stated intention to offer transit

service as an incentive for implementation of

desired land use patterns. Most other urban areas

could benefit greatly from the Denver example in

this regard. A number of other lessons for future

transit planning are provided by Denver’s technical

process~ ,

● Calculation of marginal costs can aid in

accurately determining the comparative

costs of providing different levels of service.

● Testing smaller systems may be necessary

to determine optimal system length.

● Using a subarea approach for evaluating

different systems is more likely to identify

the type of transit service best suited for

individual corridors and the most appropriate schedule for staging construction

of system increments.

● A low discount rate tends to exaggerate

future transit benefits.

Professional planners familiar with Denver’s

alternatives evaluation have raised questions about

the validity and reliability of the assumptions and

procedures used. To the extent that the process did

not provide complete, accurate information about a

full range of feasible alternatives, it illustrates the

difficulty of accomplishing this ideal in a

metropolitan area where, with few exceptions,

there was solid support from public officials and

private citizens for a specific transit system. Few

forces were pushing for a thorough analysis of

alternative transit improvements in Denver when,

to meet a requirement imposed by UMTA, the ART

study was begun. In the view of most Denver

residents, the time for alternatives analysis had

passed. The Denver experience suggests the need

for UMTA to develop explicit guidelines for

conduct of alternatives analysis that specify

evaluation procedures and to apply these guidelines

from the beginning of the transit planning process.

Financing and Implementation

RTD is one of the few transit agencies in the

country with no major money problems. RTD has

sources of revenue which it has not tapped yet and

last year had a $17 million surplus. The fact that

RTD has an assured source of local money probably

contributes to its eagerness to build a transit

system.

RTD can raise revenue from a 1/2 cent sales tax

and a 2-1/22 mil property tax. The sales tax can be used

to back bond sales of up to $425 million to pay the

local share of new system costs. The $425 million

local share will generate a total of approximately $2

billion when the 80 percent Federal share is added.

A $2 billion limit on transit system cost will affect

the type of transit system the region can afford.

Washington’s largely underground 98-mile system

will cost at least $4.5 billion. If Denver is to

construct an 80-mile system, at-grade and elevated

structures will have to be used almost exclusively.

RTD has stated that the construction of the ART

system will require an 80 percent Federal share. At

the same time, however, it is not clear whether the

Federal share is forthcoming. (Table 4 shows

Federal aid to Denver transit from 1962 through

May 1975.)

TABLE 4.—Federal Assistance to Denver Transit

Programs From F.Y. 1962 to May 31, 1975

Type of Assistance Federal Share Total Costs

Capital Grants . . . . . . . . $20,737,000 $34,054,000

Technical Studies . . . . . 2,017,000 3,807,000

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . $22,754,000 $37,861,000

Source: Urban Mass Transportation Administration.

33
Summary Case Assessment

The purpose of this section is to summarize the

nature of the transit planning and decisionmaking

process in the Denver region in light of the

guidelines listed in the Introduction, The summary,

therefore, is divided into two parts: (1) Assessment

of the Institutional Context, and (2) Assessment of

the Technical Planning Process.

1. ASSESSMENT OF THE

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

. Forum for Decisionmaking. -The responsibility for transit decisionmaking is firmly

lodged in the Regional Transportation

District (RTD), although some decisions

must be executed through the Joint

Regional Transportation Program (JRPP).

Under the JRPP umbrella, transit policies

can be coordinated with highway and land

use planning and the staffs of the three

participating agencies (RTD, Colorado

Department of Highways, and the Denver

Regional Council of Governments) have

established successful working relationships. However, the nature of the

decisionmaking procedure within JRPP

encourages compromise among the three

agencies, while their unequal political clout

had led to competition over where

decisionmaking should take place.

● Accountability of Decisionmakers.—

RTD, which is directly responsible for the

bulk of transportation decisionmaking in

the Denver region, is accountable to the

public through a board appointed by

elected officials. To the extent that

decisions are reached in the JRPP forum,

accountability is reduced.

● Public Involvement.—The public has been

influential throughout the goal-setting,

alinement selection, and initial system

selection periods of transit planning in

Denver, acting through RTD’s citizen

action committees and, in 1973, at the polls.

RTD minimized the public role during the

recent study of alternatives, although the

chosen system met with widespread public

approval.

2. ASSESSMENT OF THE

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

. Goals and Objectives.—RTD established a

comprehensive set of goals in a broadly

participatory process and has used many of

these goals in evaluating alternative

systems,

● Development and Evaluation of

Alternatives.—Denver’s latest alternatives analysis makes several contributions to the state-of-the-art, most

importantly in its stress on the need for

coordinated government policies to shape

land use to encourage use of transit.

Questions raised about the quality and

completeness of the technical information

have identified additional, more specific

lessons for future transit planners. The

fact that Denver officials and residents had

registered approval of a specific system

before UMTA required a detailed analysis

of alternatives points to the difficulty of

directing equal attention to all options

under such circumstances.

. Financing and Implementation.—RTD

enjoys a steady source of local share

financing and in 1974 had a $17 million

surplus. However, the system RTD

selected to construct will require an 80

percent Federal share.

34 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 0-68-201