Space Science Research in the United States

September 1982

NTIS order #PB83-166512
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 82-600633

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Preface

Selective budget cuts and reallocation of funds within the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration’s space science program have left planetary science, solar and

heliospheric physics, gamma ray astronomy, and X-ray astronomy with uncertain futures.

Indeed, many in the space science community think that the program has lost its sense

of direction and that it is time for national goals for space science to be articulated.

Responding to this concern, Rep. Cooper Evans of Iowa requested the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to examine the direction and purpose of the U.S. space science

program. In particular, Rep. Evans asked OTA to “assist Congress in evaluating the

effectiveness of our space science program and in discovering what its future needs are.”

In undertaking the study, OTA sought the contributions of a wide spectrum of

knowledgeable and interested parties. To this end, a questionnaire, designed to elucidate

the issues and problems in the current conduct of the U.S. space research program, was

sent to representatives of several Federal agencies, space scientists, and staff members

of congressional committees and individual Congressmen. Over 80 formal replies were

received. Concurrently, OTA arranged a number of separate meetings and discussions

with these three groups for additional detailed evaluation of the issues. These various

contributions were then organized into background reports which served as the basis

of a workshop held at OTA on May 5, 1982.

The following technical memorandum summarizes and critiques the views of many

people interested in space science, several of whom attended the workshop. In preparing this document, OTA did not attempt to obtain the views of those who are opposed

to or uninterested in space science, nor did OTA attempt to rank space science against

other national priorities.

.

JOHN H. GIBBONS

Director

. . . Ill
—

OTA Space Science Research in the United States Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA

Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

William Mills, Program Manager

Space, Transportation, and Innovation Program

Philip P. Chandler, II, Project Director

William E. Howard, III*

Contributor

Ray A. Williamson

Administrative Staff

Paula Walden Marsha Fenn

Jannie Coles R. Bryan Harrison

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

John Bergling Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson

● On detail from the National Science Foundation (February-August 1982),
Contents

Chapter Page

1. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Current Situation—Descriptive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Current Situation—Analytic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Possible New Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Current Situation in Space Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. Issues and Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lack of Policy Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Continuity, Planning, Approaches, Costs, and Liaison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Impact of Manned Spaceflight-Present and Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mix of Science Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Management Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. The Importance of Doing Space Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Expense of Space Science and Role of Public Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Earth and the Planetary Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Formation of the Ozone Layer.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Solar Particle Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Weather and Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Process Interchange in the Earth’s Atmosphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Effects of Solar Variations on Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Satellite Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Commercial Importance of Near-Earth Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendixes

A. Trends in the Space Science Budget. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Successive Galileo Cost Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C. Budget for Space Telescope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

D. Shuttle/ELV Price Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

E. Economics of the Space Shuttle, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

F. Space Science Workshop Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

G. Additional Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 1

Summary

The information presented in this document derives primarily from consultation with a wide spectrum of people involved in space science. In undertaking this study, OTA did not obtain the views of those outside the space

science community, nor did OTA attempt to rank space science against other

national priorities.

CURRENT SITUATION–DESCRIPTIVE

Despite its many noteworthy achievements

over the past 20 years, the space science program

of the United States has, as a whole, been placed

in a holding pattern and, in significant parts, been

forced to retrench. Many now see space science

as in a state of crisis. The National Aeronautics

and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) overall

budget for space science has, in general, been on

the decline since 1974 (see app. C), and that of

one category, planetary science, has declined precipitously. For the latter part of this period, the

space science budget for physics and astronomy

has been on the rise, but this increase is largely

being spent on a single major project, the Space

Telescope.

As a result, few missions are in prospect: in

planetary science, only the major Galileo mission

to Jupiter is planned for the 1980’s; in solar and

heliospheric physics and X-ray and gamma ray

astronomy, all major missions have been postponed. Not only have the numbers of missions

decreased, but there is insufficient funding for important interim activities such as data analysis.

Thus, there is an uncertain future, not only for

planetary science, but also for several subCURRENT SITUATION–ANALYTIC

In all U.S. pronouncements on space policy,

from the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space

Act to the White House Fact Sheet on National

Space Policy, released on July 4, 1982, continuing progress in space science is cited as a national

goal. Because of this general policy, space science

receives some portion of the Federal budget for

space activities. Unlike the manned program,

disciplines which fail under the rubric of physics

and astronomy.

Two additional factors make the situation particularly acute. First, most research activities

follow a cycle in which new subdiscipline are

born, grow to maturity, and then taper off into

a continued, but reduced level of activity. But

space science, as a relatively new field of research,

finds itself with all of its subdiscipline still ripe

for further growth. No space science subdiscipline have yet reached a point of naturally reduced activity. Given this situation, the general

truth that, with a relatively constant level of

overall funding, growth of some subdiscipline

can occur only at the expense of others, becomes

of particular concern. Second, as the number of

missions has declined, those that remain have

tended to be more complex, sophisticated, and expensive, and have tended to squeeze out the

smaller and less expensive missions which have

in the past supported a broad research base. These

two factors, taken together, make it difficuIt for

a number of productive teams of researchers in

universities and in industry to remain viable.

however, space science has never been directed

toward a particular goal of unequivocal priority. Without the kind of commitment that arises

from acceptance of a challenge to meet a particular goal, space science research has been conducted in a mode where the programs undertaken

are determined primarily by whatever budget is

made available (the levels of which fluctuate wide98-704 Q - 82 - 2 1
2

ly) and only secondarily by scientific goals. Furthermore, even within the budget made available

for all of space science, the importance of certain

scientifically critical activities has not always been

recognized. As a result, no base budget has ever

been set to ensure that these activities are sustained.

The impacts on space science from the manned

program are often substantial. Large development

programs, like Apollo or the Space Transportation System (space shuttle), are undertaken as national political commitments, and therefore have

the highest priority within NASA. When these

programs experience cost overruns, they tend to

draw funds away from NASA’s other programs,

including that of space science. When there is

pressure to move funds out of space science into

other parts of NASA, the purely scientific activities—data analysis, theory, and mission design—

are the least protected.

An analogous problem exists within the space

science program in that large science projects, like

Viking or Voyager, tend to draw funds away from

the smaller ones. A significant measure of the past

success of NASA’s space science program has resulted from a balance of large and small projects

undertaken at the same time; a certain concern,

therefore, must attend the possibility that, with

limited total funding, the few remaining projects

may be large, leaving no support for small ones.

There is an additional concern that, especially

with approval of new-start status for small missions at least as difficult to achieve as for large

ones, missions originally designed to be small tend

to grow into relatively large ones. The Space Test

Program, operated by the U.S. Air Force for the

Department of Defense, could provide a model

for a renewed NASA effort to design a series of

small-scale, productive missions that would remain small.

At the present time, funding allocation for postmission data analysis is generally insufficient to

permit optimal use of data returned from spacecraft. Relative to the total cost of a given mission,

the cost of analyzing the data returned is small.

Given the current practice of combining the budget for science per se with the budget for hardware,

some have suggested a minor reallocation of mission funding, in which a modest reduction in overall mission capability would free additional funds

for data analysis, as a way to ensure an improved

scientific return. Alternatively, a base budget for

science, including support for data analysis, might

also solve the problem.

The budgetary situation of space science has

been characterized by major fluctuations caused,

in large part, by pressures originating in other

areas of the space program. Planning for space

science, therefore, even if it is extensive, is not

necessarily effective over the long run. Every effort should be made to avoid situations in which

plans are made on scientific grounds and then

modified later on nonscientific grounds. At a

minimum, the science will suffer; to the extent that

expenditures have been made, there will also be

monetary loss. In addition, because many efforts

are interrelated, changing one may affect others,

sometimes substantially. Finally, failure to see a

project through to completion can adversely affect the careers of the scientists involved, often

requiring them to reorient their research programs, and can damage the prestige of the Nation, particularly when international agreements

are broken.

International cooperation in scientific activities

has been fruitful in the past and, for possible

major missions in the future, may be highly desirable in order to share costs. International partners, however, perceive a problem of the United

States reneging on commitments to international

missions, including commitments made by Congress. As a result, they are reluctant to enter future

agreements with the United States. This situation

is likely to continue until better assurance can be

given that U.S. commitments made to international space science missions are honored.
3

POSSIBLE NEW DIRECTIONS

The current practice of budgeting most flight

missions as independent new starts emphasizes

spectacular accomplishments, and is not necessarily optimal for scientific progress. This practice has

perhaps been perceived as necessary in the absence

of a national commitment to particular space science goals. The alternative most often discussed—what might be termed the programmatic

approach—differs in at least two respects.

First, budgets for important continuing activities (including instrument design, data

analysis, theory, and perhaps small- to moderatesized missions) would be separated from (and

thereby protected from cost overruns in) the

budgets for major missions (including hardware,

launch, and mission operations). With this separation, scientifically valuable, but unspectacular activities could be sustained even in times when

overall funds are strictly limited; missions to take

advantage of unique opportunities could be supported as the overall budget allowed.

Second, missions for each discipline would be

designed primarily in accordance with long-term

scientific needs. Especially with a commitment to

particular scientific goals, the programmatic approach might make the entire space science effort—planning, execution, and data analysis—

more effective.

In the opinion of many space scientists it would

be advisable to place the responsibility for scientific projects as nearly as possible in the hands of

the principal investigators. The current management scheme for the Space Telescope Science Institute provides an interesting example (and test

case) of how scientists themselves may undertake

the long-term operation of a major research facility.

The boundaries that formerly justified NASA’s

being the lead agency for the space-based efforts

in space science and the National Science Foundation’s playing a similar role for those that are

ground-based are becoming increasingly arbitrary. There is some indication that a cross-agency

advisory mechanism would be useful in adjudicating jurisdictional questions that occasionally

arise among these and other agencies responsible

for various space science activities and in ensuring a balanced, nonduplicative space science effort. One possibility for addressing problems of

coordination would be to broaden the charter of

the Space Science Board (SSB) of the National

Academy of Sciences to include determination of

priorities of all activities in space science, not just

those proposed for NASA.

The current crisis in space science might well

be an opportunity for SSB to take stock of the

details of the problems indicated in this technical

memorandum. An initial task would be to give

a clear accounting of the numbers of people engaged in space science, and of their distribution;

analyses of the effects of reduced or level funding

on research groups could be undertaken. Information relating to these matters is still largely

anecdotal. Without this information, the present

health of space science research in the United

States cannot be precisely assessed, nor can its

future needs be predicted.

Overall, it seems desirable for SSB or some

other duly constituted body to begin a more

thoroughgoing effort to set scientific priorities for

space science within a framework of possible

budgetary alternatives. If this were done in a context in which: 1) one budget would be set for continuing activities that are scientific per se, and

2) another budget for missions would be separately negotiated, scientific expertise might be brought

to bear on the choice of space science activities

more effectively.
——

Chapter 2

Current Situation in Space Science

Over the past quarter century the United States

has developed a scientifically productive space science program. The largest number of missions

have been dedicated to solar and solar-terrestrial

physics; as a result of this sustained work, scientists are developing a good understanding of

Earth’s magnetosphere and its interactions with

many solar phenomena. The Mariner, Pioneer

Venus, and Viking missions have been flown to

our neighboring terrestrial planets, Mercury,

Venus, and Mars; Pioneer and Voyager spacecraft

have returned a vast array of important and exciting data from Jupiter and Saturn in the outer solar

system. The planned launch of the Space Telescope will increase our knowledge of the farthest

reaches of the universe with imaging capabilities

never before achieved in optical astronomy.

Over the past few years, however, there has

been a significant downward trend of budgetary

support for one subdiscipline* of space science,

planetary exploration. (See app. A.) Recent budget cuts have now called into question the continuation, survival, and future viability of the U.S.

planetary science program. In the view of the

planetary scientists, the program is in danger of

complete collapse. If the present trend in funding

were to continue, the planetary science program

would be extinct by the end of the decade.

In spite of the apparently greater resources at

their disposal, problems confront solar and heliospheric physics, and X-ray and gamma ray astronomy, all of which have had their major missions

deferred. Overall, only the launch of the Space

Telescope and a possible repair of the Solar Maximum Mission remain in prospect. Indeed, there

is no assurance that the United States will fly a

major space science mission after the Space Telescope.

It was widely held in the OTA workshop that

current funding for space science makes it impossible to maintain all the subdiscipline at viable levels. There is some possibility, however, that a

● In this document the word “subdiscipline” is taken to mean any

branch of recognized disciplines; thus, X-ray astronomy is a subdiscipline of astronomy.

relatively minor reapportionment in funding from

hardware development to postmission data analysis could be a useful interim measure. Despite

its best efforts to provide a balanced space science

effort, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has found it necessary to

reduce support in planetary research in an attempt

to maintain previous commitments within the

agency and to maintain the viability of the remaining projects.

Space scientists are especially concerned by four

immediate problems:

1. lack of flight opportunity;

2. uncertain commitment to the range of disciplines;

3. lack of support for postmission data analysis; and

4. threatened loss of data from existing spacecraft.

None of the disciplines of space science escapes

the threat posed by these elements.

The area of most pressing concern to scientists,

however, has been planetary exploration, where

effected or proposed funding cuts of so percent

in mission operations and data analysis and 30

percent in research and analysis, between fiscal

year 1981 and fiscal year 1983, are resulting in

significant reductions in basic research in planetary science programs at universities and NASA

centers; if inflation is taken into account, these

cuts are significantly larger. Some research laboratories and institutes such as the Jet Propulsion

Laboratory, which have been operating for many

years, may have to direct their efforts into other

fields.

These cuts have seriously threatened to terminate productive, active spacecraft (Pioneer Venus

Orbiter and Pioneers 10 and 11). Because of the

current situation in planetary science funding, no

experimenter can with any reasonable degree of

assurance foresee the time when his experiment,

if selected, will fly; no laboratory scientist can feel

confident that a new research project will be

funded long enough to come to fruition.

5
6

The Diversity of Space Science

By releasing visible metal vapors at altitudes of about 1,450 km, NASA scientists were able to measure the electric

fields that cause auroras in the underlying ionosphere by accelerating charged particles along the Earth’s magnetic

field lines. Measurements were made Apr. 12 and 28,1982, by particle detectors aboard two Dynamics Explorer satellites

Region of volcanic eruption on the Jovian satellite 10 is

pictured from data returned from Voyager l’s encounter

with Jupiter, Mar. 4, 1981

Jupiter, its Great Red Spot, and three of its four largest

satellites are visible in this photo taken Feb. 5, 1979, by

Voyage 1, when the spacecraft was 28.4 km from the

planet. The innermost satellite, 10, can be seen

against Jupiter’s disk
7

.

- .

.- --* ‘* ‘“

%- *“

.“#

Photo credits: National Aeronautics Space Administration

Top: Litter on Mars: the shroud which protected the surface

sampler instrument on Viking II during the spacecraft’s yearIong journey from Earth lies shining on the Martian surface

after its ejection

Middle left: Image of the far side of Saturn and its rings,

returned by Voyager II on Aug. 29, 1981

Middle right: Artist’s conception of the Gamma Ray

Observatory

Lower left: The Space Telescope, to be launched into orbit

from the Space Shuttle, will allow scientists to gaze seven

times farther into space than ever before
8

Throughout space science this problem is compounded by the maturation of the several space

science disciplines. At present funding levels, the

frequency of new missions for each major discipline has already decreased to about one per decade per discipline. The disciplinary category of

planetary exploration and the subdiscipline of

X-ray astronomy are perhaps affected the most

by this situation; solar-terrestrial research and the

atmospheric sciences also are approaching a critical level of support. Increasingly, universities and

industry are assessing the opportunities to be so

minimal that they will no longer pursue them; as

a result, experienced scientists are leaving these

fields, and students and other new researchers are

not entering them.

This situation has been caused in large part by

a trend toward fewer, more expensive missions.

During the earlier stages of the national space program, there was, at least in the astronomy and

physics disciplines, a broad mix of relatively inexpensive science opportunities (including experiments on sounding rockets and balloons) and facilities-class spacecraft (Orbiting Geophysical

Observatories, Orbiting Solar Observatories, Orbiting Astronomical Observatories, Interplanetary

Monitoring Platforms, Pioneers, etc.). This mix

allowed for an active, growing community to do

important, productive work. If one group failed

to qualify for flight on a major observatory spacecraft, it might still qualify for a small project, in

which the group could still maintain productive

activity and could develop plans for the next major opportunity. Today, however, failure to qualify for a major mission is extremely detrimental

to the long-term continuity of the proposing

group, for there are insufficient funds set aside

for the smaller projects. (These include such important interim activities as analysis of data from

previous missions.)

A number of problems have attended the development of large, sophisticated missions. For example, because the Galileo mission to Jupiter is

dependent on the shuttle, delays in the latter, and

its associated upper stage, have caused the former

to be delayed as well. The delay in Galileo caused

its funding to be stretched out, and ultimately increased its costs.l For another example, maintaining balance within a discipline becomes a problem when, given a relatively constant space science budget, increasing outlays for one project,

particularly a major one like the Space Telescope,

reduces the funding for others.2 Space science has

been affected also in that the number of flight opportunities on the shuttle has been decreased and

in that those missions which require a high-energy

upper stage have been indefinitely postponed.

Another important aspect of the current situation is that the United States currently enjoys scientific and technological leadership in most of

space science, but in certain areas, e.g., cometary

research and ocean remote sensing, leadership

could soon pass to the Soviets, the Europeans, and

the Japanese. Failure of the United States to mount

a mission to Halley’s Comet puts U.S. scientists

at a clear disadvantage with respect to the Europeans and the Soviets, both of whom will be flying such missions. A similar situation prevails in

oceanography:

Japan presently has an ocean satellite under

development, MOS-1, scheduled for launch in

1985; it will carry all passive sensors. The European Space Agency is in the final stages of authorizing funds for ERS-1, scheduled for launch in

1986 or 1987—it will carry active and passive sensors. Canada is interested in flying a Synthetic

Aperture Radar (SAR) with another country in

the late 1980’s.3

‘See app. B.

‘See app. C.

3W. Stanley Wilson, “Oceanography From Satellites?” (Oceanus,

XXIV, 3 .
— —

Chapter 3

Issues and Findings

LACK OF POLICY COMMITMENT

A major difference between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s)

space science program and its manned program

is that the latter has developed in response to national commitments to particular goals such as

landing an astronaut on the Moon before 1970

or developing a reusable space shuttle; space

science has not been charged with meeting particular national goals, but has proceeded in accordance with its own priorities, at a much lower

level of commitment.

Because of the central importance of this issue,

it is desirable to reach a clear understanding of

the different levels on which the United States can

(or cannot) be said to have a space policy. At one

end of the scale, the 1958 National Aeronautics

and Space (NAS) Act is the foundation on which

the U.S. space program now rests.l As a kind of

constitution for the conduct of space activities,

the NAS act articulates the principles in accordance with which particular national policy commitments are to be framed. These policy principles

include that:2

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

The

nor

peaceful uses of space are to be developed;

U.S. preeminence in space science and applications be maintained;

knowledge be increased;

economic and social benefits be derived;

civilian and military activities be separated

(though they are to be coordinated so as not

to duplicate one another unnecessarily;

NASA, the civilian agency, be limited largely

to research and development (R&D); and

international cooperation be fostered.

NAS act neither specifies national policy goals

provides guidelines for implementing par- . —-

ticular programs.

INational Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (42 U.S. C. 2451

et seq.), as amended.

‘For a fuller discussion of these policy principles, see: CiviZian

Space Policy ancf Apphcations, OTA-STI-177 (Washington, D. C.:

Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, June 1982), pp.

35-44.

At the other end of the scale are particular internal policies which NASA or any other agency

may institute in order to carry out its mandated

duties in an orderly and successful fashion. One

example of such particular policies is that NASA

maintains lead-agency responsibility for spacebased astronomy, and the National Science Foundation (NSF) that for ground-based astronomy.

Between these two levels is that of national

policy goals. Such goals are set at the highest

levels of Government; they provide a direction,

define the scope, or name targets for the Nation’s

space activities. In addition, a policy goal defines

by its wording the relative importance of the activity. The most significant aspects of these goals

are that they often command bipartisan support,

that they outlast any given administration, and

therefore, that they serve as pledges that the Nation will support the long-term conduct of the

specified space activities. At present, no national

policy goals for space science exist.

Without national commitments to particular

science goals, waste and instability in the space

science program have been unavoidable: 1) projects being planned have been substantially

changed or reordered in priority (e.g., Galileo),

2) projects under development have been deferred

or canceled (e.g., the Mars Voyager mission), and

3) projects in operation have been scheduled for

early termination (e.g., the Apollo Lunar Service

Experiment Package, ALSEP). * In addition, the

absence of policy goals has meant that several important questions, the answers to which determine

the characteristics of the space science program

the Nation actually undertakes, are decided ad

hoc. These questions include:

‘Part of the reason for these difficulties is that a commitment to

science is usually understood to be a commitment of funds to a “new

start.” More conducive to the accomplishment of good science would

be a view that a policy commitment entaiIs commitment to a program of investigation (i.e., a series of related missions extending

beyond the time when the instruments are successfully operating

to include funds for data analysis and design of future experiments).

For further discussion of a program approach to science, see “New

Starts” v. “Programs.”

9

98-704 0 - 82 - 3
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●

●

●

●

The

How may the goals of space science research

be maintained vis-a-vis the objectives of a

much larger manned space program?

What is the proper mix of expensive, complex science projects and those that are simpler and less costly?

How may international missions be undertaken effectively?

How can the management of space science

be improved?

issues raised by these questions will be examined in the subsequent sections of this technical

memorandum.

The key factor to be noted here is that in the

absence of a national policy goal for space science,

program decisions are determined by the size of

the available budget. The reverse situation, in

which policy determines budget, would probably

be the more desirable, but neither Congress nor

any recent administration has made a policy commitment strong enough to do so. If such a policy

commitment were made, it would then be possible to set a base budget adequate to sustain the

activities deemed essential to meeting the goals

of that policy.

An advantage of adopting one or more national

policy goals for space science would be resolution of the question of balance in the space science

program. Traditionally, it has been thought that

science as a whole progresses best when effort is

rather evenly balanced among its parts. Maintenance of a balanced effort by means of an even

spread of funding has, for example, been the cornerstone of NSF’s support of science. Space

science, however, forces a reconsideration of what

balance in the program should mean, because

some disciplinary areas (and the planetary sciences

in particular) seem to have a higher threshold

value for worthwhile missions than do others.

If a national policy commitment to a clear set

of goals for U.S. space science were in place, space

scientists would have a more realistic framework

within which to set their priorities. Even without

such a commitment, it is necessary, given NASA’s

limited budget, that scientists make a more thoroughgoing attempt to weigh scientific priorities

against considerations of cost.

CONTINUITY, PLANNING, APPROACHES, COSTS, AND LIAISON

There are several problems in the space science

program that result from causes other than the

absence of policy goals. These causes include:

modification of long-term planning in response

to near-term crises, NASA’s emphasis on “new

starts, ” the accumulation of costs that may be unnecessary, and the need for more effective contact between the scientific community and the appropriate congressional committees and their

staff. These problems are summarized in this

section.

Continuity and Planning

Continuity is essential to the accomplishment

of good scientific work; no scientist can respond

efficiently to frequent, major perturbations. Continuity is particularly important when the Nation

undertakes cooperative programs with other

countries. The development of hardware and software and the training of personnel cannot be accomplished overnight. In addition, the cancellations and/or deferrals of programs (International

Solar Polar Mission, Venus Orbiting Imaging

Radar, Gamma Ray Observatory, Galileo, Origin

of Plasmas in the Earth’s Neighborhood, Upper

Atmosphere Research Satellite, etc.) suggest to

many young scientists, engineers, and technicians

that the future of U.S. space science programs is

now sufficiently uncertain that they should direct

their careers elsewhere.

One step in addressing the discontinuities in the

space science program would be to establish policies that would permit effective long-range planning. If such policies were in place, the program

would be more stable because discontinuities

would be minimized, if not eliminated. According

to the workshop participants, achieving stability

in the space science program, through effective

implementation of NASA’s long-range plans, is

at least as important as raising the current level
11

of funding. The key term here is “effective;”

NASA’s long-range planning seems formally to

be quite good, requiring few modifications. However, if there were a stronger national policy commitment to space science, * NASA’s long-range

planning would be less affected by instabilities

deriving from extreme budget fluctuations** and

by delays in portions of the manned program on

which the science program is dependent.

Because space science projects require a decade

of work from serious inception to significant funding, a good long-range plan should span 10 to 15

years. Within the general guidelines of any plan,

however, flexibility must be maintained, first,

because the priorities of science may change, and

second, because budgets tend to fluctuate. Given

that a base budget has been established as a matter of national policy, the plan could make provision for periodic adjustments resulting from

those budget fluctuations. In general, the plan

could be elaborated within two separate budgets,

one for science per se, the other for missions, including hardware, launch, and operations. The

first would establish a base level of continuing activities, all of which would be supported even in

times when overall funds are strictly limited. The

second would establish a set of initiatives, subject to revision in the light of scientific advances

or because of changes in scientific priorities, to

take advantage of unique opportunities as budget

allocations allow. In particular, provision should

be made that:

● a detailed subset of the plan extend over 3 to

4 budget years,

● all interested parties contribute to the formulation of the plan,”*** and

*Throughout this document, the notion of stronger policy commitment is to be distinguished from that of a greater funding commitment (i.e., larger appropriations); neither necessarily implies the

other.

● ● To see that there have been extreme budget fluctuations, it suffices to consider the figures in app. A.

● ● ● It is important for all components of the space science establishment, Federal and non-Federal alike, to participate in the plaming

process. If all groups are invited to contribute to these discussions,

those which may be adversely affected by the final outcome will

have a better chance to adapt to their new constraints and will have

less cause to complain. In addition, particular attention should be

paid to interagency coordination. The importance of this topic warrants separate discussion, in see International Concerns.

● there be developed alternatives in the schedule

and scope of the program that correspond to

realistic alternatives in the final budgets. *

Finally, subject to full discussion and periodic

review, the plan could incorporate decisions reflecting the balance to be struck among subdiscipline.

“New Starts” v. “Programs”

The current practice of designing most flight

missions as independent new starts tends to emphasize the space spectaculars and to distort

priorities of space science, thus reducing the efficiency with which its objectives are pursued. In

many cases a more cost-effective method would

be to support continuing programs, which might

include small- to moderate-sized missions as part

of the baseline, and to obtain new-start status only

for the more expensive missions.

NASA’s conduct of space science by means of

spectacular, independent missions has achieved

notable successes in opening new scientific domains to investigation. In addition to accomplishing much good space science, such missions are attractive to Congress and to administrations because they appeal to the public and

because they add to the international prestige of

the Nation.

Another characteristic of stand-alone new

starts, however, is that they tend to be expensive.

There is every temptation to make these missions

as sophisticated as possible, rather than to design

them to accomplish, say, 90 percent of the scientific objectives at 50 percent of the cost.** In times

when the budget for space science is large enough

to meet the major objectives of science, this

method of conducting research presents few problems, but in the present era of more limited available funding, another method may be appropriate.

“Given that budgets might vary from 5 to 10 percent above and

below the planned levels, three alternative plans might be devised:

one, in which the current level of effort is maintained, and one each

for a 5 to 10 percent increase or decrease in the current level. If it

is necessary for the budget to be cut, or possible for it to be raised,

the existence of these alternative plans will facilitate making the corresponding changes in the program, with minimal wasted effort.

● *To a first approximation, it is just as difficult to obtain commitment to a small mission as to a large one.
12

The major alternative is to conduct space

science research programmatically—i.e., to emphasize the development of disciplines and continuity of operations rather than to emphasize new

starts (see app. A). This approach might be realized by sets of several closely connected space

missions or experiments, planned as integrated

series, directed toward well-defined goals of the

several subdiscipline, and supported by programmatic and budgetary continuity from inception

through postmission reduction and analysis of

data.

Funding Delays and Effects of

Cost Uncertainties

Funding delays, wherever they arise, generate

increased costs, and these, in turn, cause instabilities in program planning, leading finally to

an instability in the program and the planning

process.

One important aspect of program stability is

sound implementation. If projects turn out to have

been initially underbudgeted, or if they must be

stretched out in order to accommodate budget

cuts, their cost effectiveness decreases. The Galileo

mission is an example where costs have increased

substantially because of delays; the result is fewer

missions or higher overall costs. Although current budget totals appear to compare favorably

with those of the past, a larger portion of current

funding in fact tends to go toward supporting unproductive work, as is the case with Galileo. *

● The labor expended in redesigning a mission for other than scientific reasons, particularly when it is done more than once, can hardly

be considered productive.

The appearance of current budget totals (see app. A) is deceptive

in another way: just as the Space Telescope is taking a larger portion of NASA’s physics and astronomy budget, so Galileo is doing

The Need for Adequate Discussion

of Program Priorities Among

Interested Participants

If they wish to take a more active role in setting national policy goals for space science, appropriate congressional committees need to have

closer contacts with the space science community. Because of its scientific status, its representative character, and its relative independence, the

Space Science Board (SSB) of the National Academy of Sciences could be the appropriate vehicle

for improving the liaison between Congress

and the community of space scientists. Especially if, as suggested in the section entitled Management Issues, its advisory responsibility is widened

to include related activities within other agencies,

SSB can present formally to NASA and informally to Congress an integrated program of space

science priorities based on the process of peer

review. Through annual discussions with SSB, or

more frequently, if appropriate, congressional

staff could, in turn, assist scientists in understanding congressional priorities and funding considerations. *

the same for the planetary science budget-a factor which makes

the decrease in the overall total of the latter even more serious for

other parts of the planetary program.

● A formal relationship could also be established between Congress and SSB. In this mode, Congress through its committees could

ask SSB to carry out special studies, in which case Congress could

be expected to contribute to SSB’S costs. If this were done, SSB would

be related to Congress as it now is to NASA: reports would not

be delivered to Congress until they had been carefully reviewed and

approved by the National Academy of Sciences through the mechanisms of the National Research Council. It would be desirable, however, for congressional staff to attend the nonexecutive sessions relevant to the studies, so that nothing in the final report would come

as a surprise,

IMPACT OF MANNED SPACEFLIGHT–PRESENT AND FUTURE

Manned space projects arise as national political

imperatives. Their total costs dwarf the science

components that accompany them, and their impact on the space science program is substantial.

Although scientists will learn to make good use

of the shuttle, that vehicle is inappropriate and

inadequate for certain kinds of research. Similarly, if a single permanent, manned space station

is built, its architecture and orbital characteristics

will to a large extent determine the kinds of space

science research that can be done. For example,

X-ray research needs a low-inclination orbit; solar

terrestrial research and weather monitoring need

high-inclination orbits. In general, a space station

could be useful to science if: 1) a large enough

research and analysis budget is set aside; 2) requirements for cleanliness and capabilities for

pointing are met; and 3) access to orbits incom-
13

patible with the shuttle is assured (i.e., a commitment to an orbital transfer vehicle is made).

Many scientists believe that the United States

should ultimately develop a permanent presence

in space, centered on some type of manned space

station, and that the need for such an effort will

become more evident as the intentions and capabilities of other nations become clearer. In its planning for a possible space station, NASA has initiated extensive discussions with the Space Applications Board and SSB of the National Academy of Sciences to define the science and applications needs that a space station could meet. Scientists remain concerned that capabilities promised

for a space station be in fact achieved, in order

that situations may be avoided in which these capabilities —on which scientists have counted in

planning and designing their experiments-remain

merely virtual. Scientists are also concerned that

cost overruns for a space station might, at least

indirectly, reduce the funding available for the

space science that cannot be done on a space station, or might result in a less ambitious project

from which science capabilities might be excluded. *

Although most space scientists prefer to conduct experiments on unmanned flights, they will

now have to tailor many of their projects to

manned flights. To date, most space science ex-

● Space scientists remain convinced that cost overruns on the shuttle have been a major cause of the problems now facing the space

science program. See, for example, app. F.

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Artist’s conception of future space station tended by

advanced space shuttle

periments do not require the assistance of

astronauts, whose presence adds greatly to the expense of missions. In the future, however, this

situation may change. Already, the manned program has been very valuable to solar physics (e.g.,

in X-ray and ultraviolet photography of solar

flares from Skylab) and to planetary science (e.g.,

in the selection of lunar samples), and it promises

to be important for the life sciences. Eventually,

astronauts may retrieve, repair, or refurbish scientific experiments, just as they may construct large

space structures which hold promise for space research.

General Problem of Big Projects

For purposes of this discussion, a dividing line

between big and small projects within NASA

might be set somewhere between $100 million to

$200 million. * Small projects include unmanned,

*More accurately, there are four major mission categories:

1) small (< $100 million to $200 million); 2) large ($200 million to

$750 million); 3) very large ($750 million to $1,500 million); and

4) manned missions. Explorers fit into the first category. The second contains missions such as Galileo, Voyager, HEAO, Landsat,

and GRO. The third contains the Viking missions, the Space Telescope, and the proposed OPEN and AXAF missions.

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

A 15-second far-ultraviolet exposure of the Earth,

showing the extended hydrogen geocorona. This picture

was taken by Apollo astronauts on the Moon
14

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

This photograph of the Sun taken Dec. 19, 1973, by

astronauts aboard Skylab, shows one of the most

spectacular solar flares ever recorded, spanning more

than 588,000 km across the solar surface

typically scientific spacecraft in the Explorer class;

big projects include all the manned efforts as well

as several important science and applications missions, including Viking, Voyager, and Landsat.

In practice, the large projects are divided into two

categories: those, like Apollo or Space Shuttle,

which respond to a national policy commitment

and those, like Galileo or Voyager, which respond

to the priorities of particular communities of end

users. To date, no unmanned missions have fallen

into the first category.

Within NASA, missions of the first type are

given priority over those of the second, and those

of the second tend to receive priority over small

projects. The scientific community is apprehensive, on the one hand, that large reamed projects

will increasingly call the tune for the entire space

research program, specifically that science projects will be required to use the shuttle or a new

space station, and, on the other hand, that large

space science projects will draw funds away from

smaller ones.

There are different points of view concerning

the role of big projects within NASA. One point

of view, reportedly shared by all previous NASA

Administrators, holds that the agency’s raison

d’etre is its large manned programs, and that much

of what the agency has been able to accomplish

in space research has been based on the existence

of those programs. A contrary point of view,

shared by a number of scientists, holds that the

Nation would have recognized the importance of

basic research in space and that the space science

program would have been successful regardless

of the presence of large programs like Apollo or

the Space Shuttle. The rationale given for this second point of view is that space science and the

techniques for accomplishing it have provided and

may be expected to continue to provide the basis

for most of the utilitarian applications of space

technology.

The Nation’s past and largely successful space

science effort has been conducted with both large

and small projects in progress at the same time.

Just as there are fundamental questions in high

energy physics that cannot be answered without

large particle accelerators, and questions at the

frontier of astronomy that cannot be addressed

without large telescopes, so there are important

areas in space science that can be opened for investigation only by large, sophisticated missions.

On the other hand, small space science projects

(e.g., those conducted on balloons or rockets,

laboratory investigations, data analysis, and instrumentation development) are important in at

least two respects: first, it is uneconomical to

employ large instruments to do what small instruments can do; second, the existence of relatively many small projects provides the overall scientific context of the field, from which new ideas

and concepts originate. A space science program

consisting only of small projects would, over the

long term, produce results of decreasing interest;

one consisting only of large projects would soon

be unsupportable.

NASA is aware of these arguments and, by conducting large and small projects simultaneously

as much as possible, has strived to maintain a

balanced space research program. With the maturation of each of the disciplines in space science,

with level or declining budgets, and with other

large, costly projects within NASA, it has become

increasingly difficult to conduct a well-balanced

space research program. Since autumn of 1981,

the large-scale science projects have been par-
15

ticularly under attack, for the elimination of one

or more of them would free substantial funds for

other programs.

Another consideration is that, in a situation of

more limited funding, large space science missions

can be flown less often, partly because the competing needs of the several space science disciplines

call for higher percentages of the space science

budget, and partly because the growing sophistication of the instrumentation on these missions

tends to make them more costly. Indeed, the frequency with which they are flown has decreased

to the point where major groups within industry

and in U.S. universities that are necessary for a

successful, long-term space science program are

being disbanded.

In summary, large science projects are necessary

to sustain scientific progress, but tend to crowd

out smaller scale projects, and, given current

budget constraints, they have been mounted less

often than required to maintain space science

teams. In the present situation of level overall

funding divided among fewer, but generally more

expensive activities, an increasingly heterogeneous

space science community has been forced into a

mode of divisive competition for available resources. The diversity of the community, set in

the context of constrained funding, makes consensus on priorities set by means of broad-based

peer review especially difficult to achieve. Thus,

officials at NASA, whose responsibility it is to

make these decisions, face growing difficulties. A

good solution to this complex set of problems is

not yet evident.

Costs of Shuttle Payloads

During the past decade, the United States has

spent some $20 billion for development of the

space shuttle, which is the fundamental component of the Space Transportation System (STS).

Advocates of this development have maintained

that STS will: 1) advance the Nation’s technological competence in space flight, 2) make it feasible to continue manned flight, and 3) reduce the

cost of launching scientific and applications

payloads (below the cost of launches on expendable unmanned launching systems), and thereby

greatly expand the practical uses of space technology. The first and second of these objectives

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Launch of the space shuttle Columbia

seem well served by the shuttle; the verdict on

the third is not yet clear.3 The whole question of

how shuttle costs ought to be calculated is vexed.

NASA’s current policy is to recover from users

only the marginal operating costs of shuttle

flights, not total operating costs. (See app. D for

a comparison of shuttle and expendable launch

vehicle (ELV) costs. )

Constraints Imposed by the Shuttle

Use of the shuttle, both because of what it requires and because of what it can and cannot ac3See, for example, Daniel Deudney, “Space: The High Frontier

in Perspective, ” Worldwatch Paper 50, The Worldwatch Institute,

August 1982: ‘The reusable space shuttle, first tested in 1981, was

expected to accelerate the exploitation of space by reducing the cost

of putting an object into orbit and allowing the repair or retrieval

of orbiting satellites. However, [because of] funding delays and cost

overruns it now appears that the shuttle will be only marginally

cheaper than the new generation of expendable rockets. ” See also

app. E for an analysis of shuttle economics by James A. Van Allen.
16

complish, has a significant impact on space

science. Experiments to be conducted on the shuttle require extensive documentation because they

must all be man-rated, (i.e., certified not to endanger the crew). This requirement presents an

unwelcome and inconvenient barrier to scientists,

and raises costs. As more experience is gained with

the shuttle, however, documentation requirements

for man-rating may be eased.

The brief time of a shuttle flight presents

another problem for scientific experiments designed to be conducted on the shuttle. In many

investigations, a shuttle flight is scarcely long

enough to provide a check-out of the equipment

and provides modest results when compared with

really long-term temporal and spatial coverage—

often for more than 2 years—with free-flying satellites. In addition, if space science is not to be

limited to those orbits accessible to the shuttle,

one or more high energy upper stages or perhaps

one type of ground-launched, ELV will be needed

to supplement the shuttle’s capabilities.

The shuttle is especially appropriate for space

science missions that do not require long durations in orbit, that require a heavy payload to be

placed in low Earth orbit, or that can fly in shuttle orbital inclinations. Observational astronomy

and Earth observational experiments can benefit

from the shuttle more readily than can other disciplines. On the other hand, the present capability

of the shuttle is incompatible with the needs of

some scientists (e.g., atmospheric scientists who

require a polar orbit, or planetary scientists who

require high-energy stages for interplanetary

probes). However, with greater frequency of shuttle flights, launches into polar orbits from

MIX OF SCIENCE EFFORTS

Mission Complexity

Over the years in which the United States has

been conducting space science, a broad range of

mission types has been flown-from relatively

simple experiment packages carried by sounding

rockets and high-altitude balloons, to the highly

complex Voyager flybys of Jupiter and Saturn.

Now that funds to support space science have,

overall, been on the decline since 1974 (see app.

C), it has become necessary to make certain difficult choices as to which future missions, and

Vandenberg Air Force Base, and the development

of an appropriate upper stage, this particular

problem may diminish over time.

Concerns Regarding Military Use

of the Shuttle

There is a general concern throughout the

civilian community that military requirements

may begin to dominate the shuttle’s budgets,

flights, and schedules. There is a similar concern

that if a space platform is built, the military would

preempt it, crowding out possible uses for science.

Recently, the U.S. General Accounting Office

(GAO) has reported’ that of the 234 shuttle flights

scheduled through 1994, 114 of them (i.e., 48 percent) are dedicated to the Department of Defense

(DOD); in the nearer term, 13 of the initial 44

flights through 1986 will be exclusively military.

Not only will DOD be NASA’s single largest customer, but also, at least through 1986, when user

fees for the shuttle are to be renegotiated, NASA

may be charging DOD substantially less per flight

than it charges civilian users-$12.2 million as opposed to $18 million, a discount of 32 percent.

In addition, it seems likely that NASA will be doing substantially more work for the military, and

that the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which has

been heavily involved with NASA’s planetary

science program, may return, for the most part,

to its earlier support role for the military.5

“’NASA Must Reconsider Operations Pricing Policy to Compensate for Cost Growth on the Space Transportation System,” a Report

to the Conzress bv the Comptroller General, MASAD-82-lS (Washington,

5The

even

D~C.: U~S. Gener~l Accounting Office, Feb. 23, 1982).

Washington Post, June 5, 1982.

which types of future missions, are to be

supported.

As space science matures, missions tend to grow

more complex and expensive. As missions grow

more costly, fewer can be flown, given a constant

or decreasing level of funding; but as flight opportunities are cut back, there is a tendency to

make the remaining missions more complex (and,

usually, more expensive). Some program officers

at NASA believe that the era of small-scale missions is mostly passed-that to obtain scientifically useful results now requires sophisticated (and
17

Photo credit: National Aeronaut/es and Space Administration

Artist’s conception of the descent of the Galileo probe into the atmosphere of Jupiter

costly) missions. It has become more and more

difficult to mount small-scale missions, with the

consequence that fewer sustaining activities are

available between major flight opportunities. *

In view of the difficulty of planning and executing a balance of large- and small-scale missions in planetary science, NASA has established

the Solar System Exploration Committee (SSEC).

The charge of SSEC is to recommend to NASA

an ordered, affordable program of exploration of

the solar system.

● Two committees of SSB—the Committee on Space Astronomy

and Astrophysics, and the Committee on Solar and Space Physics—

are currently examining these issues.

There is disagreement about whether large or

small missions are the more cost effective, and a

detailed analysis of this question is beyond the

scope of this study. * Similarly, the question of

whether the Nation’s broad technological base

would be strengthened by a policy of funding

more small missions is difficult to resolve. Basic

agreement, however, seems to exist on the position that a range of missions makes the most scientific sense. Not only will the small missions pro-

*Often a debate about cost effectiveness degenerates into a dispute about costs. It is tautological to assert that large missions cost

more than small ones; the real question involves the amount of

science returned per dollar of outlay. (The probability that quality

of science differs from quantity of science is another complicating

factor.) The absolute increase in launch costs, which translates into

an increase as a proportion of total mission cost, has become a dominant factor in such calculations.

98-70L O - 82 - 4
18

vide a continuous level-of-effort when budgets are

low, but these types of small expenditures, including the funding for laboratory work, will lead

to interesting and promising new laboratory techniques and other new instrumental approaches.

If NASA were to revive small-scale scientific

missions, some sort of safeguard would be necessary to allow at least some of them to remain

small. One possibility would be to adopt some

version of the strategy employed by the Department of Defense (DOD). The U.S. Air Force has

been designated as the service responsible for

coordinating much of the unclassified space research for DOD, and it does so through the Space

Test Program (STP). A scientist who is interested

in flying an experiment on an STP mission submits a proposal without knowing to which mission it will be assigned. Both university-based

scientists and those at Government labs may compete for space on a mission.

Experiments are selected for utility and relevance to the DOD mission. Once the experiments

have been ranked within each DOD lab, STP

selects a compatible set of lab and universitybased experiments for flight on a mission for

which one or more DOD experiments have the

top priority. There is an average of six or seven

experiments per flight, together with the experiment(s) for which the flight was chosen. As of

spring 1982 there have been 32 STP flights. Currently, the average is one flight per year. The cost

for an STP flight is comparable to that of an earlyday Explorer mission.

Scientists who have experience with STP cite

several advantages that it provides:

●

●

●

●

●

●

minimal documentation;

minimal oversight and review procedures;

emphasis on low-cost missions;

willingness to stand by decisions, with no rescoping;

willingness to accept experiments with a relatively high risk of failure; and

possibility of short turnaround times for

some types of experiments.

There are, however, some generally perceived disadvantages. These include:

● orientation toward narrowly conceived missions;

●

●

●

●

inadequate support for postflight data analysis;

uncertainty of launch time and possibility of

long waits in the queue;

poor cross-checking of experiments for payload compatibility; and

a failure rate higher than that of NASA.

For the needs of space science, the general negative

feature of STP is that it supports isolated missions

rather than basic research programs.

Some features of STP appear to be attractive

for the support of small-scale missions; some of

its procedures might be adopted by NASA in cases

where they would be appropriate. Another possibility would be for NASA actively to promote,

through wider publication and support, the flight

of experiments in which it is interested on STP

missions. STP offers some segments of the scientific community an alternate way to fly an experiment at low cost and with few restrictions.

Funding Allocation for Data Analysis

Compared with the costs of the actual mission

(including launch vehicle, instrumentation, mission operations, and support facilities and personnel), the cost of postmission data reduction and

analysis is minor. Even so, according to recent

independent reports of SSB and GAO, the funding set aside for data analysis is inadequate. b

NASA’s emphasis on supporting new starts has

tended to concentrate attention on hardware and

operations, rather than on the total scientific project. Consequently, proper attention to the problem of data analysis has not been given beyond

that required for the major, relatively easily

achieved initial results of the experiment. There

is, however, more science to be gained by allocating an additional small percentage of the total

cost of the mission to further data analysis. Continued examination of the data can still yield imbAccording to GAO, “the Congress should examine the adequacy

of NASA’s allocation of resources between gathering space science

data and analyzing it. Greater emphasis is needed during the data

analysis phase of a program to obtain the maximum scientific benefit

from the data obtained.” (“More Emphasis Needed on Data Analysis

Phase of Space Science Programs,” a Report to the Congress by the

Comptroller General; PSAD-77-114; June 27, 1977). See also the

CODMAC report of SSB (“Data Management and Computation,

Volume 1: Issues and Recommendations,” National Adademy Press,

1982).
19

portant scientific advances as new techniques for

analysis are developed, existing techniques are

refined, and increased understanding of the underlying physical processes is acquired.

Postmission data analysis is often the lifeblood

of university space research groups. If NASA

places more emphasis on this activity, these

groups will be better protected in times of more

limited budgets; data analysis is a type of activity that can be conducted with success, regardless

of the level of the overall budget. At present,

however, follow-on data analysis for the lunar

and Martian missions, as well as for those of

several subdiscipline (e.g., X-ray astronomy), is

funded below the level at which the activity can

remain viable. If all scientific activity is not to

cease in those areas of research which will have

no missions for the foreseeable future, then a base

level of funding for data analysis must be maintained.

In addition, there is a need for data from past

missions to be correlated over a long time sequence in order to corroborate the findings of

independent missions and/or experiments, as well

as to facilitate syntheses unifying results from

related fields of science. Past results are often the

key to understanding in the fields of solar physics,

solar-terrestrial relations, and atmospheric

physics, all of which require that data obtained

INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS

International cooperation promises scientific,

cultural, economic, and social benefits to all participants. Over the long term, the prospects for

international cooperation in space science ventures look very good. In general, it seems clear

that missions that would be too expensive for the

United States to mount alone could be undertaken

with international support. The space programs

of the Europeans and the Japanese have now sufficiently matured to permit them to become substantial partners in joint missions. While the current international situation tends to minimize EastWest interactions in high-technology fields, the

Soviet Union is quite active in space research activities, and it would be to the Nation’s advanover many years be compared in order to understand the basic processes in the Sun and in the

Earth’s weather and, in particular, to discover

cyclic phenomena.

Archiving of Data

Whether or not data returned from space missions should be archived depends on several factors, including that of costs v. benefits. Because

space missions are very costly, and the data returned from them correspondingly valuable, data

should be archived if they are likely to be lost,

if the cost to repeat the experiment is sufficiently

large, if a long time base is crucial for the success

of the project, or if the data might be unavailable

when required. Too often, however, data may

have been archived as an alternative to timely

analysis.

One technological development that may go far

toward solving the problems of data archiving is

the new laser-read video disk. All the data returned from the Voyager missions to Jupiter and

Saturn could be stored on disk and made widely

available to scientists for a few hundred dollars.

An investment in technology will still be needed

to realize this possibility, and it will still be

necessary for a calibration program to be included

on each disk in order to make the data most usable

to other researchers.

tage to cooperate in some areas where the

U.S.S.R. is clearly the leader—e.g., in the life

sciences. In the past, international science projects

have been one of the most effective means of making contacts across cultural and political barriers.

In the short term, however, prospects for major

cooperative efforts are not so bright. Cancellation of the U.S. spacecraft in the International

Solar Polar Mission argues that the United States

and the U.S.S.R. are unreliable partners. If

Spacelab-6 (to which Canada has already committed substantial funds) is also disapproved,

foreign governments will be even less likely to

agree to international ventures with the United
2 0

States. In any case, there seems to be little possibility for cost sharing on the missions in the immediate future, for most of them are already

planned and do not include foreign partners. A

more feasible form of cooperation for the near

term is that of coordinated spacecraft launches,

such as the International Sun-Earth Explorer missions, where each spacecraft is fully prepared by

a single nation; in such cases, the scientific benefits

derive from the sharing of data. However, the

decision not to fly an appropriately designed mission of this sort to Halley’s Comet, in coordination with the Giotto spacecraft of the European

Space Agency (ESA), represents another lost opportunity for international cooperation.

In general, a more effective mode of cooperation must be devised that will allow two or more

nations jointly to plan and execute space missions

with minimal difficulties. There are two particular

concerns that should be addressed. One is that

commitments which the United States makes to

international ventures should, if at all possible,

be kept. Nothing will more effectively prevent

future joint missions than a U.S. record of broken

agreements. Cancellations of U.S. commitments

to international space ventures maybe necessary

for budgetary reasons, but such cancellations indicate uncoordinated budget planning and the

lack of concerted, bipartisan support for space exploration. It would seem fruitless to urge that, in

order to avoid such cancellations in the future,

commitments to international missions should be

made at higher levels of authority, for some of

the international commitments on which the

United States has reneged were made by Congress.

Nevertheless, it would be desirable to devise some

means of assuring that U.S. commitments are

honored.

The second concern is that, whereas NASA has

allowed foreign experiments to be proposed for

inclusion in U.S. missions (e.g., 20 percent of the

instruments on the Space Telescope are Euro-
21

pean), foreign organizations have generally been

opposed to including U.S. experiments on their

spacecraft. Now that foreign programs have in

important respects become competitive with those

of the United States, there is less need for them

to protect their missions from possible dominance

by U.S. teams of experimenters. In response to

U.S. pressure for an appropriate quid pro quo in

order to redress this imbalance, ESA, at the urging

of the Space Science Committee of the European

Science Foundation, has recently begun to formulate a new policy to address this problem.

From the U.S. point of view, increased participation in foreign missions is desirable. First,

it obviously costs less for a U.S. team of scientists to pay the incremental costs of participating

in a mission whose major costs (for design of the

mission, for the launch vehicle, and for various

support services) are borne by a foreign agency,

than for the United States to develop and fly a

comparable mission. Second, U.S. scientists find

the cross-fertilization of ideas which results from

participating in foreign missions to be very valuable. Nevertheless, if the level of U.S. participaMANAGEMENT ISSUES

Management Alternatives

To date, most of the support for space science

research has come from NASA, though DOD has

funded much classified activity as well as the

relatively small STP effort, and NSF supports

work in ground-based astronomy and some data

analysis and theoretical work in solar-terrestrial

space physics. As space science has developed into

well-defined disciplines and subdiscipline, requirements for flights to further their research programs have multiplied. Because of the high cost

of its scientific missions relative to the cost of

related science projects within DOD or NSF,

NASA has a greater problem as it considers

whether its missions will be supported by Congress and be appealing to the public.

It has been suggested that NASA should place

more responsibility for space science experiments

in the hands of principal investigators and to

assign responsibility for future space science

tion in foreign missions does increase, the Nation

should be prepared to provide the travel and other

mission support costs that will be necessary to

assure the success of that participation.

One difficulty for international cooperation in

science surfaces when foreign experimenters participate in U.S. missions, for acceptance of a

foreign proposal in a given subdiscipline necessarily reduces the support for U.S. teams competing

in the same subdiscipline. Another problem is that

NASA does not have well-understood and uniform procedures for funding U.S. co-investigators

on European missions.

In summary, the prospects for international

cooperation on large-scale projects, which the

United States would find it difficult to fund alone,

appear to be promising. Before an international

venture is begun, however, it should be assured

that all partners will gain by the cooperation, that

it can be carried out with the backing of all participants throughout the lifetime of the project,

and that the additional administrative costs that

will be incurred are acceptable.

operations to organizations like the Space Telescope Science Institute (STSCI). Another more

radical suggestion has been to establish a separate

agency, with a structure parallel to that of NSF,

whose responsibility would be to support large,

more costly, scientific enterprises such as space

science research and high-energy physics. The

general rationale for these suggestions is that

NASA is chartered as an R&D agency, not an operations agency, and that the orderly progress of

science requires commitment to continuing operation of scientific facilities. Both of these suggestions require comment.

Although there are good individual scientistmanagers, not all scientists are good managers.

As long as the science is not costly, and risks can

be taken, there is considerable advantage in diversifying managerial responsibility. However, when

costly, large projects are undertaken, the Government will generally institute procedures to make
2 2

success more certain. These procedures lead to

more oversight and tend to separate the scientist

from his experiment.

The growth of “big science” has led to the

establishment of national centers in astronomy,

of which STSCI is one example. Patterned after

its successful ground-based counterparts, STSCI

is an example where managerial responsibility has

been placed in the hands of the space science community. NASA set up STSCI at the urging of the

scientific community, although NASA’s success

in managing the International Ultraviolet Explorer

indicated that it could have managed the Space

Telescope quite effectively. In any case, STSCI

promises to satisfy the desires of the space scientists to have a more active management role in

space research than they have had in the past.

At first sight, the establishment of a separate

agency to support large scientific enterprises appears to have merit. As noted above, large projects require a different type of organizational

management and more personnel than do small

projects. Although concentration in a single agency would group large science projects, it might

later destroy much of the internal balance and

coordination between large and small science that

currently exists within NASA and the Department

of Energy (DOE). The new agency could easily

become a target for budget cuts on the premise

that a small percentage cut would still permit the

science to be done, but would be the source of

significant amounts of funds.

Distribution of Talent and Resources

So far, the space research programs conducted

within NASA, at universities, and in industry

have been rather evenly supported. The U.S.

space science effort is truly a national program,

and the distribution of resources and capabilities

throughout the country has resulted in a reasonable balance. If, however, budgets for space

science research remain constrained, then the

possibility of an imbalance in the distribution of

talent becomes greater because university and industry teams increasingly will have to be disbanded. It is important that a reasonable balance

be maintained: healthy competition among researchers within NASA, at universities, and in industry has produced and will continue to produce

the best science. Each leg of this triad has particular strengths, requirements, and/or responsibilities:

●

●

●

Many of the new ideas for research originate

within universities; in addition, the independence of university teams is vital to the

process of correcting imbalances in the program if they should occur.

NASA teams need sufficient work to maintain a reasonable level of competence because

they manage the projects and provide valuable firsthand experience necessary for successful missions.

As builders of most of the complex spacecraft

systems, industry teams are crucial to the survival of an experimental space science. It is

already the case that much of the complicated

hardware for sophisticated missions cannot

be built except with the expertise to be found

in industry. There are too few civilian space

missions to provide substantial profits for

any company, but industry desires to participate in the civilian program because of the

positive influence of space research activity

on recruiting and retention of staff and on

corporate image.

A further problem resulting from recent budget

cuts is that, in order to retain key technical personnel, NASA maybe assigning them to relatively

unproductive oversight roles. This may lead not

only to further loss of key personnel, but also to

an overassignment of oversight tasks to the people who remain, even though there are fewer programs to administer. However understandable

this response to a difficult budgetary situation

may be, it is wasteful of resources, and in the long

run, it maybe detrimental to the morale of good

scientists and engineers who would prefer to work

in a more strictly scientific capacity.

Toward a More Effective Program

With time, the boundaries between space- and

ground-based astronomy are becoming less well

defined. The division of Federal funding wherein

NASA has the lead agency responsibility for

space-based astronomy and NSF that for groundbased astronomy is becoming arbitrary, for scien-
23

tists increasingly need to conduct both types of

research in the ordinary course of their studies.

As a result, it has been suggested that NSF should

assume a larger share of postmission analysis of

space-derived data and that NASA should fund

a larger share of ground-based research that is of

interest and importance to its overall mission. If

this course is to be taken, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) could assume the responsibility for assuring that the balance of funding

available to these two agencies would allow a

more effective partnership to develop in the

Federal funding for space- and ground-based

astronomy than that which currently exists.

A similar problem has been indicated by the

Astronomy Survey Committee report of the National Academy of Sciences,7 namely that the support for ground-based astronomy provided by

NSF is not keeping pace with the support for

space-based astronomy provided by NASA. In

order to correct this imbalance, $40 million (in

1982 dollars) would have to be added to the NSF

astronomy budget. The Solar-Terrestrial Physics

report of the National Academy of Sciences also

shows a relative lack of support for ground-based

activities. In general, whereas at least the physics

and astronomy portion of NASA’s space science

budget has continued to increase in recent years,

NSF has been unable to make any new major capital expenditure decisions in astronomy for over

12 years.

Scientists generally do not believe that existing

coordinating mechanisms are very effective. They

do not see evidence that coordination is occurring at the higher levels of the agencies; some of

them doubt that it occurs sufficiently at lower

levels. One widespread opinion holds that OMB

or the Office of Science and Technology Policy

should take a more active role in interagency coordination, if only to set up a formal cross-agency

advisory mechanism.

Some type of cross-agency advisory mechanism

might be useful, for example, in resolving potential jurisdictional disputes and coordinating situa7George B. Field, report of the Astronomy Survey Committee,

Astronomy and Astrophysics for the z980’s (Washington, D. C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1982). It should be noted, however,

that this report does not treat the entire range of space science disciplines.

tions where one agency may wish to assume new

responsibilities, to relinquish previous ones, or to

exchange some of its current ones for others belonging to another agency. If an effective mechanism of this kind had been in place, the recent

budgetary uncertainties involving the responsibility for funding the Infrared Telescope Facility in

Hawaii might have been averted.

Another means of addressing the problem of

interagency coordination would be to broaden the

responsibilities of SSB to include oversight of

NSF’s activities in solar-terrestrial physics,

astronomy, and some atmospheric research, as

well as space-related activities of other agencies.

As the major existing scientific advisory body for

space research, SSB presents recommendations

only to NASA. If, however, the purview of SSB

were broadened, then its recommendations to

NASA would be more likely to be based on considerations of disciplinary continuity across agency boundaries. Such continuity would help to ensure a more balanced Federal program in space

science. *

In addition, it maybe desirable to broaden the

charter of SSB in another direction, namely, to

give it the responsibility for combining priorities

of space science with considerations of cost. If this

is done, several considerations must be kept in

mind. First, SSB, by virtue of its role within the

National Academy of Sciences, operates in conjunction with an extensive process of peer review,

and, hence, cannot do short-term problem-solving. Second, the space science community is quite

heterogeneous (as is SSB itself); space science,

properly speaking, covers a broad range of

disciplines, each of which has its own set of

*On the other side it must be said that NSF’s Astronomy Activity Committee already provides guidance in the area of astronomy

and takes the space science activities into account. The National

Academy of Sciences has found it necessary to maintain separate

committees for space physics and solar terrestrial research, even

though they address the same subject matter, because the modes

of operation for space- and ground-based research are rather

different.

In addition, such broadening of SSB’S responsibilities could make

it into an unwieldy bureaucracy. In each subject area in which this

were done, the relevant committee of SSB would have to assume

additional responsibilities, and SSB itself would have to assume more

of an oversight role and less of a coordinating role. All of this would

be possible only if quite a number of different offices in several different agencies consented to be advised in this manner.
24

priorities. Third, as contrasted, for example, with

the organization of high energy physics into three

or four cost centers, space science has many cost

centers; it is big science, but it is not so heavily

concentrated. For these reasons, SSB cannot be

expected to function in the same way as does the

High Energy Physics Advisory Panel (HEPAP),

a scientific advisory panel of the Department of

Energy. *

The heterogeneity of space science complicates

the choice of priorities. Given NASA’s division

of space science into:

1. physics and astronomy,

2. planetary sciences, and

3. life sciences,

and assuming, further, that in each of these divisions subsets of SSB can meaningfully rank potential projects, it is nevertheless true that the assignment of a single absolute priority for all of space

science from among the top ranked projects in

each division is not a scientific decision. Such a

decision is essentially political, based on considerations of what Congress is likely to support

or what is needed to maintain balance among the

disciplines. Space scientists are not notably more

qualified to make such a political decision than

is any other community.

An essential element in making this situation

more tractable is to make a clear separation between the activities that are purely scientific and

those that are, more strictly, engineering. In the

past, the funds for the latter have far exceeded

the funds for the former, and each division of

science within NASA has had to pay for its mis-

‘Overall, the HEPAP model is not a good one for SSB. Highenergy physics is a rather narrowly defined scientific area with a

small range of potential initiatives that have been well studied and

costed. SSB and its committees, on the other hand, deal with areas

in which costs are usually vaguely defined, although they make use

of whatever cost information is available.

sions out of its own budget. For reasons detailed

earlier, big science missions—i.e., the engineering activities (hardware development, launch

costs, and mission operations)—tend to consume

the resources for small science-i. e., the continuing activities that are scientifically significant (including data analysis, theory, experiment design,

and perhaps small to moderate missions for which

hardware costs do not entirely dominate). If these

budgets were separated, then SSB could very well

make recommendations for setting the level of the

nonmission budget, which would support the

continuing science efforts of each of the space

science divisions.

The level of the hardware budget, because it

would have a strong political component, would

be much more complicated to set. In general,

because there would be a series of missions, each

dedicated to one or more disciplines or subdiscipline, the level of this budget would vary

rather widely, depending on the point of the mission cycle. SSB could function with respect to this

budget much as it does now; i.e., it could continue to make recommendations for major missions corresponding to projected increases in

available funding.

The current crisis in space science might well

be an opportunity for SSB to take stock of the

details of the problems indicated in this report.

There is, for example, no clear accounting of the

numbers of people engaged in space science, or

of their distribution; data concerning the precise

effects of reduced or level funding on research

groups are still anecdotal. Without this information, the present health of space science research

in the United States cannot be precisely assessed,

nor can its future needs be predicted. This information would be especially useful for determining what an optimal base budget for space science

would be.
Chapter 4

The Importance of Doing Space Science

INTRODUCTION

Over the past 300 years, accelerating advances

in scientific theory and practice have aided man

in remaking the world. As scientific descriptions

of our surroundings become more detailed, the

practical consequences of applying scientific results and techniques to the problems of everyday

life become more far-reaching. As the effects of

science move out of the theoretician’s study and

the experimenter’s laboratory, it is important to

reflect on the reasons for undertaking science at

all. It is not in the province of this report to justify the national effort in science, but it is nevertheless appropriate to discuss the importance of

the space science program as a component of all

Federal expenditures. Indeed, much of the rationale for doing space science is a corollary for doing science in general.

Space science is an undertaking that satisfies the

visionary and exploratory needs of the human

race. “In the future, as in the past, our freedom,

independence and national well-being will be tied

to new achievements, new discoveries and pushing back frontiers. ”1 It is a cultural as well as a

scientific activity that seeks to understand the

Earth’s place in the solar system, the solar system’s

place in the Milky Way Galaxy, and our Galaxy’s

place in the Universe. In assisting man to gain a

better understanding of his place in his surroundings, space science also explores the fine structure

of the universe in the form of samples, either examined in situ or returned for study on Earth.

At the bottom of the Earth’s atmosphere, our

ability to sense the universe is restricted to the visible and radio portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, but our extended ability to observe from

above the atmosphere by means of instruments

aboard spacecraft has widened our scientific vista

enormously, and has permitted observations to

be made of celestial objects that could not have

been made in any other way. We are now truly

viewing the universe

tral eyes.

1President Ronald Reagan,

through a set of multispec-

“State of Space” speech, July 4, 1982.

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

A lunar sample from Apollo 14 pictured in the Lunar

Receiving Laboratory at the Manned Spaceflight Center,

Houston, Tex.

Astronomy is only one of the fields of science

of which instruments aboard spacecraft have revolutionized our understanding. Others include the

physics and chemistry of the Sun; energetic particles; the interplanetary medium; and the planetary

sciences, whose purview properly includes Earth,

as well as the Moon, the other planets and their

satellites, and comets and asteroids. These fields

have immediate importance for life on Earth. In

fact, solar terrestrial physics and the planetary

sciences as conducted from space have provided

the basis for many of the important utilitarian applications for space technology--communications, navigation, meteorology, atmospheric

physics.

25
2 6

EXPENSE OF SPACE SCIENCE AND THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT

Increasingly, there are those who believe that

the pursuit of expensive science solely for the sake

of understanding, particularly in the face of other

urgent problems facing mankind, may not be defeasible. Because an expensive science project is

a social product that depends on the common

labor of many scientists, and because tax money

must be allocated to support such an activity, the

decision to pursue an expensive project and to allocate resources to it among competing alternatives necessarily entails political oversight.

More than ever before, a successful scientific

career now depends on the support of public and

private institutions. The days when individuals

of independent means could make fundamental

advances in science have mostly passed. The expense of pursuing fundamental research, particularly in the areas of so-called big science (e.g.,

high-energy physics, astronomy conducted with

large telescopes, or space science), places these activities beyond the financial means of individuals.

The costs of adequate scientific instrumentation

are, for the most part, not borne by those who

are to use them, but by Federal, State, and private

laboratories—and ultimately by society as a

whole. Thus, there is a kind of social contract between scientists and society, in which the pursuit

of knowledge is exchanged for economic support.

Although the results of science have become

part of our common heritage, the practice of science is becoming more and more a cooperative

enterprise. Even though the individual genius will

always be important in the process of scientific

discovery, especially in purely theoretical work

and in the practice of small-scale science, teams

of scientists engaged in large-scale research projects are now quite common.

If society agrees to support science, the problem of just how that support should be apportioned remains complex. First, the very progress of

science often leads to the need for more powerful instrumentation, especially in space science.

As our understanding becomes more detailed, additional subdiscipline are founded, and each of

them requires continued public support if it is to

advance further. At the same time, other subdiscipline may be terminated, either because they

reach a natural close or because they become too

expensive to pursue further. In general, however,

a situation where overall funding does not increase

requires that some projects be delayed, stretchedout, or dropped, if others are to be supported.
2 7

Second, it is not possible to predict which scientific research programs will lead to improvement

in the quality of human life. Applied science and

engineering are undertaken with a view to producing relatively near-term benefits, but their productivity will soon become exhausted if a broad-scale

program of basic research is not sustained.

It is important in this context to distinguish between further or continued research at a more or

less constant level of funding and expanded research at a higher level of funding. In this report,

OTA examines what value space science research

has had in the past and is likely to have in the

future, and what difficulties have arisen in maintaining a research effort at more or less constant

overall funding levels; OTA has not considered

the desirability of increasing funding levels for

space science.

EARTH AND THE PLANETARY SCIENCES

The pursuit of planetary science has been of study of the crustal features and inferences about

substantial importance to many of the geosci- the interior of terrestrial (i.e., Earth-like) planetary

ences, including geology, geochemistry, geophys- bodies, including Mercury, Venus, Mars, and the

ics, geodesy, cartography, and photogrammetry. satellites of Jupiter and Saturn.

Exploration of other planets has returned results

fundamental to understanding the evolution of The two principal drivers of planetary evoluEarth. These results derive, in large part, from the tion are tectonism and vulcanism. Tectonism, the

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Earth as a planet: the weather satellite GOES EAST shows two hurricanes

bracketing Mexico, on Aug. 8, 1980
28

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

A giant photo map of the contiguous 48 States of the United States, the first ever assembled from satellite images.

The images were produced by the Multispectral Scanner aboard Landsat I (formerly ERTS-1) between July 25 and

Oct. 31, 1972

processes that determine how the crusts of planets

deform and buckle, is important to understand

for purposes of predicting and giving early warning of earthquakes; research into vulcanism, the

processes whereby molten portions of a planet’s

interior emerge onto its surface (either on the seabed or on land, in the case of Earth), is a subject

of practical importance because further understanding may eventually lead to prediction of volcanic eruptions.

Both earthquakes and volcanic eruptions remain major hazards in many parts of the world.

The thorough devastation resulting from the recent eruption of Mt. St. Helen’s in Washington

State and the great loss of life in recent earthquakes in Italy and Central America attest to the

power of these processes and their consequences

for human life. Planetary science is providing revolutionary insight into these processes. The hyperactive vulcanism on the Jovian satellite Io, for example, follows an entirely different pattern from

that of the Earth; study of these differences may

be the key to understanding how volcanic processes work.

Planetary science, by furthering our understanding of the processes whereby mineral deposits are formed, may provide unexpected assistance

in evaluating, seeking, and discovering these resources on Earth. Extensive research on Earth has

revealed that mineral deposits are unevenly distributed; a fundamental problem in plate tectonics—the theory of how the continental land

masses slowly move over the Earth’s surface—is

to explain the peculiar distribution of these deposits. Many of them are very ancient, formed when

Earth was more like the Moon, Mars, or Venus;
29

a b c

d e f

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Successive images of volcanic plumes on 10, taken from the Voyager I spacecraft

some of these are no longer being formed; others

are still being produced, by a combination of

crustal movements and volcanic activity. Comparative studies of other terrestrial bodies are

assisting in the resolution of these issues.

In many respects, Venus and Earth are twins,

but they have taken radically different evolutionary paths. Scientists now think that Earth owes

its particular course of development to the early

formation of life. Life forms in the early ocean

are thought to have pulled carbon dioxide out of

the atmosphere and laid it down in limestone.

Decreasing the level of carbon dioxide prevented

the runaway greenhouse effect that characterizes

the atmosphere of Venus, and this in turn preserved Earth’s oceans. Recent evidence from

Venus indicates that it once had oceans, too. Presumably, however, life did not appear at all there,

or it did not become sufficiently widespread to

remove much carbon dioxide.

The oceans are not a mere secondary feature

of the Earth’s surface; they permit continued evolution of its crust. Ocean water cools molten basalt emerging from the midocean ridges, thus making the basalt dense enough so that the continental plates can “float” above it. Without this oceanic cooIing of basalt, the continents would freeze

in place, as they have on Venus. In this view, sea

floor spreading and plate tectonic motion, made

possible by the presence of the oceans, provide
30

the present dynamic control of Earth’s evolution.

Thus, the presence of life and the presence of the

oceans make Earth unique, at least in our star

system. Life and the oceans each owes their preservation to the other, and the oceans control the

way Earth’s crust forms and therefore, indirectly, the course of evolution of living things. Without a study of Venus—an opposite case, where

some particular differences have made all the difference—it is unlikely that our understanding of

FORMATION OF THE OZONE

The monitoring of ozone is one example

Earth’s evolution would have progressed as far

as it has.

Planetary science, therefore, has enlarged and

deepened our understanding of the fundamental

processes molding the Earth. In addition, it has

given evidence both of what kinds of results might

be expected if the balance of Earth’s system were .

disturbed, and of ● how a relatively small change

could drive the whole system into a dry, dead end.

practical activity growing out of space science.

Ozone is a small, but important constituent of the

Earth’s atmosphere: too little of it in the stratosphere allows dangerous levels of ultraviolet radiation to reach the Earth’s surface; too much of

it near the Earth’s surface has more immediate

deleterious effects on human health. The level of

ozone in the stratosphere can be altered both

through increased technological activity, which

causes relatively slow changes, and through alterations in the level of solar ultraviolet radiation,

LAYER

of a which causes more rapid fluctuations. Whereas

SOLAR PARTICLE EMISSIONS

Space research systems are also useful for measuring the level at which high-energy protons,

emitted from solar flares, bombard the Earth’s atmosphere, particularly at high latitudes. Instruments aboard spacecraft can detect the emission

of these particles early enough so that the routes

of aircraft flying over the polar caps may be

changed or manned satellites may take appropriincreased technological activity tends to add compounds to the atmosphere which decrease the

stratospheric ozone, solar ultraviolet radiation

produces additional ozone. The mechanisms by

which stratospheric ozone is formed and maintained are still not thoroughly understood, and

space research systems are being used not only

to monitor ozone but to measure related parameters which are critical to increasing our knowledge.

ate precautions. To perform well, these warning

systems must be sufficiently accurate to differentiate between flares that have a major effect and

those that have only minor effects. The flare signatures that will provide this separation are not

well defined, and only further basic research from

space vehicles will provide the answers.

WEATHER AND CLIMATE

Another example of the practical effects of casts could be of great strategic value—in predictspace science is the observation of the Earth’s cli- ing energy consumption requirements, for exammate and weather. The Earth’s weather and pie. Accurate predictions depend on a substantial

secular or cyclic changes in its climatic conditions monitoring system in which satellites play a mahave a significant impact on commercial activity. jor role. If these satellites are to succeed in their

Accurate weather predictions are very useful for missions, they must monitor the most predictive

a variety of purposes, and accurate climatic fore- sets of parameters, and their downward-looking
31

.“ Pg

systems must measure cloud cover, infrared and

visible radiation, temperature, and the changes

in these parameters. Because the relative reliability

of these parameters is still under investigation,

there is need for a continuing basic research partnership in which observations made from space

and studies made from the ground are correlated,

the parameters most critical over long time sequences are identified, and the largest available

computers are employed—if there is a determination that the nationaI interest is well served by

more accurate weather predictions and climate

monitoring.

Prediction of the Earth’s weather presents an

extremely complicated problem. Weather prediction is still in its infancy, and progress to date has

been dependent on an increasingly sophisticated

sensing system, combined with elaborate computer analysis. Space scientists are gaining further insight into how planetary atmospheres originate,

circulate and evolve, principally because of recent

space research on the atmospheres of other planets

(Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn). This insight

promises to remove some of the uncertainty in

our knowledge of the circulation patterns of the

Earth’s atmosphere.
PROCESS INTERCHANGE IN THE EARTH’S ATMOSPHERE

Our life system on Earth is crucially dependent on a delicate balance and interchange of processes that occur at the interface of the Earth, the

oceans, and the atmosphere. The presence of man

and, in particular, the population explosion, compounded with the growth of industry, have begun

to affect that balance in ways that are not yet

understood. One primary means of monitoring

and understanding these processes is through satellite remote sensing, an activity that is only a

decade old.

Sampling the troposphere, the stratosphere, and

much of the ionosphere can be done by Earthbased methods; the magnetosphere can be investigated only by space vehicles. The parameters of

the “middle atmosphere, ” the region from 30 or

40 to 100 km above the Earth’s surface, are still
33

uncertain, especially the composition and the elec- spacecraft operating near the Earth are to be untric fields of the region. If the effects that solar derstood, the magnetosphere must be fully

variations and the Van Allen Belt will have on mapped throughout the solar cycle.

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Landsat D—launched July 1982
34

EFFECTS OF SOLAR VARIATIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS

The Sun is the primary driving power underlying most processes on Earth, and its presence

is an absolute necessity for our own existence. But

the Sun is variable, and most of the variations

that can occur have important effects on communications systems. Many of the important variations, however, can be seen only in regions of the

spectrum accessible from above the Earth’s atmosphere.

It had been known for decades that geomagnetic storms on the Earth seriously affect communications on the Earth, particularly at high latitudes.

Geomagnetic storms result from streams of hot

ionized gas that originate in solar storms, then are

shot into interplanetary space, and finally impinge

on the Earth’s magnetosphere and disrupt communications. It is now known that the geomagnetic

storms coincide with the arrival of streams of matSATELLITE RELIABILITY

Spacecraft operate in an environment that is

largely foreign to us and virtually impossible to

duplicate for study on the ground. In addition to

the primary hazard of energetic particles in Earth’s

radiation belts, they are subject to differential

charging, to emissions of electrons, protons, and

other energetic particles from the Sun, to cosmic

rays, and to high-energy solar and stellar ultraviolet, and X-ray and gamma ray radiation, any

of which, if encountered in sufficient strength, can

degrade the performance of the spacecraft. Damage may occur through irradiation of its detectors and electronics, electrostatic discharges, and

the physical effects of collisions, including particle sputtering on mirror surfaces. As longer-lived

satellites are orbited, degradation in performance

because of environmental factors will be a more

likely source of failure than will exhaustion of onboard energy sources.

The environment in which the now more than

4,000 manmade objects are orbiting the Earth is

still not understood in detail. We do not yet know

the time, frequency, or amplitude ranges over

which variations in particulate bombardment and

ter that travel much faster than the normal solar

wind, and that these high-speed streams originate

from regions on the Sun that do not emit X-rays,

regions where there are “holes” in the low-energy

X-ray emission, seen on photographs of the Sun

taken in X-ray light. Thus, the presence of solar

coronal holes, dark regions on an X-ray photograph of the solar disk, correlates significantly

with geomagnetic storm activity on Earth.

Thus, there is a direct connection between the

reliability of radio communications at high altitudes on Earth and our ability to monitor and

study the Sun by X-ray satellites, by means of

techniques not possible from the ground. The

manifestations of this connection are not yet highly predictable, and the benefits of making them

so will accrue only if basic research is continued.

radiation take place. In the beginning of June

1980, for example, an unexpected increase in the

flux of high-energy electrons at synchronous altitude particularly affected the performance of geostationary satellites. This result showed that the

near-Earth space environment still held surprises

and that instruments more immune to the effects

of radiation had to be developed.

The requirement of the Department of Defense

that the electronic components of its spacecraft

be protected both against the natural radiation environment and, especially, against radiation from

the explosion of nuclear devices has been the primary driver in the development of advanced

“hardening” techniques. (The deep space probe

Galileo, which must be able to withstand an environment of very high radiation around Jupiter,

will be making use of some of these developmerits. ) After these techniques are perfected, further study of the radiation environment around

the Earth, particularly of the triggering mechanisms by which particles are dumped from the

Earth’s geomagnetic tail into the Earth’s atmosphere, will be needed, if the national interest requires more assured satellite operations.
3 5

Common to civilian and military applications

is the requirement to minimize payload weight

while maximizing payload performance. This requirement has been the principal driving force behind the miniaturization of components, of which

the development of tiny electronic circuits on silicon chips has been a major technological breakthrough. When these chips first found application

on satellites, they were relatively large and not

too densely packed. These features, combined

with space hardening techniques, made the chips

relatively reliable in the spacecraft environment.

However, the technological state of the art in

making chips has now progressed to the point

where the chips are smaller and more densely

packed, and have, size for size, orders of magnitude more capability than the previous generation of chips they will replace.

It is known that the new, high-density chips will

be more susceptible to damage from radiation

bombardment than were their predecessors, but

it is not known how much more susceptible they

will be. Here is another instance in which, if the

answer is to be achieved, basic and applied research will both be needed: basic research to investigate the radiation environment, and applied

research to investigate the effects of that environment on the new series of chips in order to predict

how long they will last under various environmental conditions and under various degrees of radiation hardening.

COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE OF NEAR= EARTH SPACE

The commercial importance of the space environment near the Earth has not yet been fully evaluated because, apart from the communications

industry, there has been little involvement of the

private sector. In the future, the investment of the

private sector in space activities will almost certainly increase, particularly in satellite communications, remote sensing, and materials processing.

Materials processing in space (MPS) may be singled out as a new and interesting area for commercially oriented space research. In order to ease

the way for industry to exploit the possibilities

of MPS, NASA has developed the Joint Endeavor

Agreement, in which the agency and industry

share in the costs and the risks of the project:

NASA provides technical advice and assumes the

costs of the launch vehicle, including flight time,

and industry provides the development funds.

One promising example of this Governmentindustry symbiosis is in drug manufacturing,

where McDonnell Douglas Astronautics and the

Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corp. of Johnson& Johnson are making a substantial investment in order

to determine whether certain drugs can be manufactured in space more profitably than on the

ground. Studies have shown that, by means of

a process known as electrophoresis (a technique

whereby a solution flows through an electric field

in which molecules of different charges are separated from each other as a result of their migration in different directions at different speeds), it

should be possible for cells to be separated from

proteins about 100 to 400 times more quickly and

with five times the product purity that can be obtained from the ground.

There are potential applications in the manufacture of interferon (a treatment for cancer), beta

cells (a possible single-injection cure for diabetes),

epidermaI growth factor products (for treating

burn patients), growth hormone products (for

juvenile bone growth stimulation and the healing

of ulcers), antitryspin products (for limiting the

progress of emphysema), and antihemophilic

products (for eliminating immunological reactions

for hemophilia). In all these cases, there is promise that commercially viable quantities of these

drugs can be made in the zero-gravity environment of space.

Materials processing is only one example of the

possibilities of industrial use of near-Earth space.

If these possibilities are to be exploited, scientists

will require a better knowledge of the space

parameters that may modify processes whose

ground-based instances are well understood. If

these developments are to be successful, continued

interaction between pure space science and applied

space science will be necessary.
.

Appendixes

.

,
Appendix A

Trends in the Space Science Budget

It is instructive to view the total NASA budget in

the context of recommendations that were made within

the administration in 1969, the year of the first Apollo

landings on the Moon. Recognizing that the Nation

needed to take a close look at the space program in

the post-Apollo era, the President in February 1969

formed a Space Task Group (STG) to study the future

course of the U.S. space program. STG was chaired

by the Vice President, with membership from the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration (NASA), and the office of

President’s Science Advisor.

The report, entitled “The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future, ” was received in September 1969. It presented a comprehensive plan which

presented three possible program levels to achieve five

program objectives: 1) increased emphasis on activities

that have service to man (an expanded space applications program); 2) an enhanced defense posture for the

Nation; 3) continuation of a strong program of space

research to increase man’s knowledge of the universe;

4) development of new systems and technology for

space operations, emphasizing certain critical factors

as: a) commonality, b) reusability, and c) economy,

through the development of a new space transportation capability and space station modules; and 5) promotion of programs that provide broad international

participation and cooperation.

The three program levels all contained a space shuttle, a 12-man space station, a 100-man space base, and

lunar orbiting and surface stations. Two of the three

options also included a manned mission to Mars. The

time frames of these options differed, depending on

the annual budgets projected for the future, which varied from $6 billion to $10 billion per year (1969 dollars). Figure A-1 shows a comparison of those NASA

funding options (I, II and III, with a low-level bound

having no manned flight). The upper curve marked

“maximum pace bound” presents the funding required

for a program limited not by funds, but by technology; the low-level program was constructed with an

increased unmanned science and applications effort

without a manned flight program. Figure A-1 also

shows in 1969 dollars what level of funding for NASA

actually was achieved.

In the post-Apollo era there was opposition to the

levels of the space program proposed in the STG report

which was expressed by critics in Congress, in the

media, and in the American public generally and

which led to a stretched-out time schedule shown in

figure A-1. The actual program included the development of the space shuttle, but the rest of the recommendations of STG were not implemented. At the moment, no effort to develop a space station has been

approved by the administration, despite the fact that

the Soviet Union has been very active in developing

a strong capability in this field for a number of years

and will soon be able to sustain a permanent presence

of man in orbit, either around the Earth or around the

Moon.

Figures A-2 and A-3 show the space science budget

of the NASA Office of Space Science and Applications

(OSSA) from fiscal year 1964 to fiscal year 1983, expressed in millions of (1983) dollars, corrected for inflation.l

They are expressed in numerical form in tables A-1

and A-2. Three major components of the space science

budget are shown: 1) the planetary sciences program,

2) the physics and astronomy program, and 3) the life

sciences program. The factors by which actual budget

figures have been converted to constant dollar figures

are given in the middle (escalation) columns in table

A-1. Table A-2 shows the budgets for individual flight

programs during the same time interval, expressed in

current-year dollars.

Several features of figures A-2 and A-3 deserve mention. First, in terms of purchasing power, the total

budget for space science from the mid-1960’s to the

present time has fallen from about $1,450 million to

about $650 million, or to approximately 45 percent of

its former size. Most of this decline took place precipitously between 1966 and 1969. The budget increased

again, but by only 50 percent of its decline, from 1972

to 1975, but fell again to its current value of about $650

million by 1977.

Reference to the other components of figure A-2

shows the trends of those components during the same

time interval. The physics and astronomy program decreased by approximately 5o percent in the decade

from 1964 to 1974, but has regained about two-thirds

of its former value since 1974, principally because of

increased funding for Space Telescope. The planetary

science program was cut to one-third of its 1965 level

by 1969, but grew to slightly more than its 1965 level

by 1972-74, principally because of funding support for

the Mars Viking program and the beginning of the

*The budget figures for the NASA Office of Space Science and Applications were supplied to OTA by 1. Duke Stanford (NASA/OSSA).

39
4 0

Figure A-l .—Annual NASA Expenditure and Options

$5

n

,’ pace bound ‘S/<

/’ /’ Option> >

/

/’ /

\

● * ● *** *

.* \ _

t

/

●

●

I

●

/

● Option ;I* ● ● . .

● ●

tt *

● ● **

●

1’ i ●

●

✎

●

✚✏

✏

✎✎ L.

c“

—* — ● — * -

. >“ Option Ill

● ☛☛

\

--- -- — .. — ---

Low level bound

I

196 0 196 5 197 0 197 5 198 0 198 5

Fiscal year

SOURCE: Space Task Group Report to the President, “The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future,” September 1969.

Voyager programs. However, as these programs tapered off, starting in 1974 and 1976, respectively, the

budget for planetary sciences underwent a sharp decrease from its peak of $900 million (1983 dollars) to

its current level of about $200 million, a drop to 22

percent of its value in 1974. The life sciences component of the NASA space science budget has remained

relatively constant for the past decade.

Reference to figure A-3 shows that the life sciences

have typically taken about 510 percent of the space

sciences budget for the past two decades. The budget

for planetary science exceeded the budget for physics

and astronomy from 1964 to 1968 and from 1970 to

1976, whereas the budget for physics and astronomy

exceeded the budget for planetary science for 1969 and

for the period from 1977 to the present. The budget

for planetary science has been significantly lower in

1981-1983. It was noted that the fiscal year 1983 budget

is still under discussion at the time of this writing

(August 1982).
41

Figure A-2.— Budgets for NASA’s Space Science Program

$1,50 0

$1 ,000

C--3

al

al

$50 0

0

.

.

●

✼

‘\\

Key:

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

Fiscal yea r

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment from NASA’s supplied data
42

Figure A-3.— Breakdown of NASA’s Space Science Budget

90 -

80 -

70 “

~ 60 “

o

m

E

o

2 50 -

&’

40 -

30 —

20 -

10 -

,1-’ \

o ‘

I I 1

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

Fiscal year

SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Table A-1 .—Office of Space Science Funding Summary (dollars in millions)

Actuals In constant 1983 dollars

Actual Physics and Life Escalation aPhysics and Life

fiscal year astronomy Planetary science Total Rat e Facto r astronom y Planetar y scienc e Total

1964 . . . . . . 148. 6 205. 8 21. 5

1965 . . . . . . 139.1 206. 0 28. 5

1966 . . . . . . 142. 8 221. 4 34. 4

1967 . . . . . . 129, 8 184. 2 42. 0

1968 . . . . . . 139. 5 147. 5 41. 8

1969 . . . . . . 128. 9 87. 9 37. 9

1970 . . . . . . 112. 8 150. 9 19. 7

1971 . . . . . . 116. 0 144. 9 12. 9

1972 . . . . . . 110.1 285. 5 22. 8

1973 . . . . . . 126. 2 325. 9 26. 6

1974 . . . . . . 94. 0 387. 7 22. 8

1975 . . . . . . 136. 3 261. 2 19. 8

1976 . . . . . . 159. 3 254. 2 20. 6

1977 . . . . . . 154. 7 191. 9 22.1

1978 . . . . . . 212. 6 147. 2 33. 3

1979 . . . . . . 270. 0 182. 4 40.1

1980 . . . . . . 336. 8 219. 9 43. 8

1981 . . . . . . 323. 7 175. 6 42. 2

1982 . . . . . . 323. 5 205. 0 39. 5

1983 b 

. . . . . (471.7) (154.6) (55.7)

a

Based On NASA R&D Index dated September 1981

b

Proposed.

SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

375.9

373.6

398.6

356.0

328.8

254.7

283.4

273.8

418.4

478.7

504.5

417.3

434.1

368.7

393.1

492.5

600.5

541.5

568.0

(682.0)

3.7

3.0

4.1

4.9

5.4

5.7

6.9

6.3

5.7

5.7

7.2

10.8

9.0

8.5

7.8

9.5

10,7

12.0

10.7

3.983

3.867

3.714

3.541

3.359

3.178

2.973

2.797

2.645

2.503

2.335

2.108

1.934

1.782

1.653

1.510

1.364

1.218

1.100

591. 8

537. 8

530. 3

459. 6

468. 5

409. 6

335. 3

324. 4

291. 3

315. 8

219. 4

287. 3

308. 0

275. 7

351. 4

407, 7

459. 3

394. 2

355. 8

(471.7)

819. 7

796. 6

822. 2

652. 2

495. 4

279. 3

448, 6

405. 2

755. 4

815. 7

905. 2

550. 6

491. 6

341. 9

243. 3

275. 4

299. 9

213. 8

225. 5

(154.6)

85. 6

110. 2

127. 7

148, 7

140, 4

120. 4

58. 5

36.1

60. 3

66. 5

53. 2

41. 7

39. 8

39. 3

55. 0

60. 5

59. 7

51. 4

43. 4

(55.7)

1,497.1

1,444. 6

1,480. 2

1,260. 5

1,104. 3

809. 3

842. 4

765. 7

1,107. 0

1,135. 0

1,177. 8

879. 6

839. 4

656. 9

649. 7

743. 6

818. 9

659. 4

624. 7

(682.0)
43

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .
\

Appendix B

Successive Galileo Cost Estimates

Table B-1 .—Chart of Galiieo Cost Estimates (In 1982 dollars)

Date of cost estimate Cost estimate Launch date

1977 (for 1978 start) ... ... ... .. .$455 million January 1982

January 1980 ... ... ... ... ... .. .$650 milliona February 1984 (orbiter)

March 1984 (probe)

February 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $695 millionb April 1985

February 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $865 millionc May 1985

July 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $(pending)d May 1985

with three-stage IUS.

%With Centaur.

cwith two-stage IUS with kick stage.

dwith Centaur.

SOURCE: Figures provided by Klein Spencer, U.S. General Accounting Office.

44
Appendix C

Budget for Space Telescope

Table C-1.—The President’s Fiscal Year 1983 Budget for Space Telescope (doliars in millions)

Fiscal year Budget to

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 completion Total

Space telescope development ... ... ... .. $36.0 $79.2 $112.7 $119.3 $121.5 $137.5 $117-167 $725-775

Space telescope operationsa . . . . . . . . . . . . — — 1.8 6.7 13.2 32,8 continues

aFiscal year 1982 and prior funding to the space Telescope Science Institute is $5.6 milllon and fiscal year 1983 funding iS $7.0 million. The estimated cost of the Space

Telescope Science Institute facility, located at Johns Hopkins Universlty, Is $10 million.

SOURCE: Figures provided by Lynne Murphy, Congressional Liaison Office, National Aeronautic and Space Administration Headquarters.

45
Appendix

Shuttle/ELV Price Comparison

The estimated price to place a 2,750 lb spacecraft

into geosynchronous transfer orbit if launched in 1982

is as follows:

Shuttle Delta

(in millions) (in millions)

Transportation $ 8 $ 30

Upper stage 4-5 3-4

Total estimate* $12-13 $33-34

The above shuttle price is derived using the shuttle introductory period price of $18 million (in fiscal year

1975 economics) for a dedicated shuttle launch during the 1982-85 timeframe. If the recently established

$38 million price (in fiscal year 1975 economics) for

a 1986-87 launch is used, the equivalent price for a

1982 launch would be:

Shuttle Delta

(in millions) (in millions)

Transportation $ 17 $ 3 0

Upper stage 4-5 3-4

Total estimate* $21-22 $33-34

● Costs include payload integration.

SOLJRCE: Estimates courtesy of Robert V. Lottman, Director, Congressional Liaison

Office, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Headquarters.

46
Appendix E

Economics of the Space Shuttle

by James A. Van Allen

In April 1982, James A. Van Allen of the University of Iowa presented to a meeting of Tau Beta Pi a

paper entitled “Applications of Space Research to

Modern Day Society.” In preparation for the May 5

OTA workshop in which he participated, Van Allen

sent a copy of that paper to OTA. Included here is

the section of that paper in which he treats the

economics of the space shuttle. Van Allen’s analysis,

which differs markedly from NASA’s, is included in

order to show how the space shuttle may have, more

or less directly, affected the funding for space science.

It is included with only minor explanatory comments.

The reader should note that Van Allen includes overhead costs* in his calculations; these costs are not included when calculating marginal costs.l

The opinions expressed by Van Allen are his own

and do not necessarily reflect those of OTA.

There were many . . . weaknesses in the famous

forecast of $100 per pound into orbit . . . I have prepared several (charts) analyzing the economics of the

shuttle. The summary of this analysis is that there is no

prospect whatever of bringing shuttle launch costs

below some $5,000 per pound (1982 dollars). Even this

figure is optimistic because my assumed payload of

60,000 lb per flight includes the mass of upper stages

and other equipment that is not properly classified as

useful payload.

Hence, for realistic missions during the next 20 years

or so, the shuttle system is actually much more expensive than are conventional, expendable boosters as exemplified by Delta, the Atlas-Centaur, the TitanCentaur, and the French-German Ariane, all of which

are in the advanced state of development and available

for frequent use.

*Overhead costs are defined to be the fixed costs of the Federal establishment and associated contractors for maintaining the full operational capability

of conducting a program of space shuttle flights, whether or not such flights

actually occur.

‘See, for example, Engel, Rolf, 1982, Interavia vol. 2, No. 177.

Table E-1 A.—Shuttle Economics (Federal Government)

A

M =

c =

L =

c =

L =

Number of flights per year

Annual overhead

Out-of-pocket costs per flight

Cost per payload

Mass of payload

Cost per flight

Launch cost per pound of payload

O + N (A + P)

N

O + NA

NM

OTA’S comments: Table E-1A gives Van Allen’s basic equation in which the quantity C, the cost per flight, Is expressed as a function of overhead costs, the number

of flights per year, the out-of-pocket costs per flight, and the cost per payload.

Table E-1 B.—Shuttle Economics (Federal Government)

Examples:

o = $2,000,000,000 per year

A

= $40,000,000 per flight

P = $100,000,000 per payload

M = 60,000 lb

Launch cost

N Annual total c per lb of payload

 $2,140,000,000 $2,140,000,000 1 $34,000

2,420,000,000 806,700,000 11,780

10 3,400,000,000 340,000,000 4,000

50 9,000,000,000 180,000,000 1,300

OTA’S comments: Table E-l B uses Van Allen’s basic formulas of table E-1A to

compute values of launch cost per pound of payload as a function of the number

of flights per year N for assumed values of O, A, P, and M as Iisted at the head

of table E-18.

Van Allen’s comments: This analysis Ignores overhead during the lo-year developmental period; amortization of the investment for development of the vehicle

and for facilities; and Interest on the Investment during the developmental and

amortization periods.

Note that often quoted “marginal” or Incremental launch cost per flight is the

quantity A, a grossly unrealistlc representation of the true cost. For the examples

given here the “marginal” launch cost per pound of payload Is $670, irrespective of the number of flights per year.

Note: “Payload” Includes upper stages, if they are necessary, plus other equipment not properly considered useful payload.

47
I

48

Table E4A.-Shuttle Economics

(Private enterprise/Federal Government)

Table E-2B.—Shuttle Economics

(Private enterprise/Federal Government)

Van Allen’s comments:

Assumed: That the Space Transportation System including

facilities had been developed by private enterprise and then

had been taken over by the Federal Government.

I = direct investment costs accrued linearly as a loan over

a period of 10 years

The direct investment costs plus interest over the developmental period are then amortized linearly over an operational

period of Y years by the Federal Government.

X = annual interest rate over (10 + Y) years

In this case the additional annual cost averaged over the Y

years of operational use is given by

z = (1 + 51X) (1/y + x/2)

Numerical examples are given in table E-2B for N = 1,3, 10,

and 50 launches per year.

Examples:

I = $15,000,000,000

Y = 15 years

x = 0.1 (10%)

z = $2,625000000

Launch cost

N Annual total c per lb of payload

$77,750

1,681,700,000 26,360

10 6,025,000,000 602,500,000 8,360

50 11,625,000,000 232,500,000 2,270

Van Allen’s comments: “Payload” includes upper stages, If they are necessary,

plus other equipment not property considered useful payload.

Assumed values of O, A, P, and M are the same as In table E-l B.

All estlmatsd cost flguras In tables E-1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B are given In 1982 dollars.

OTA’S comments: Table E-2B uses the formula of table E-2A to calculate four

specific examples of the launch cost per pound of payload. Taking a developmental cost of $15 billion amortized over 15 years at an Interest rate of 10 percent,

Van Allen calculate that for 1,3,10, or 50 flights per year, the total (not marginal)

launch cost per pound of payload will be $77,750, $26,360, $8,380, or $2,270,

respectively.

Van Allen’s calculations are Intended to call Into question the assertion that the

shuttle wiII be able to bring the launch cost par pound of payload down to $100

to $30/Ib. It should be noted, however, that this figure is the rnarginal launch

cost per pound of payload, and that Van Allen’s calculations are baaed on the

total launch cost per pound of payload. It Is, of course, the total cost of the shuttle which has had an Impact on the space program.
Appendix F

Space Science Workshop Participants,

May 5, 1982

Alastair G. W. Cameron Frederick L. Scarf

Harvard College Observatory TRW

Thomas M. Donahue Erick O. Schonstedt

Department of Atmospheric and Ocean Sciences Schonstedt Instrument

University of Michigan Bradford A. Smith

co.

Herbert Friedman

National Academy of Sciences

Riccardo Giacconi

Space Telescope Science Institute

Louis J. Lanzerotti

Bell Laboratories

Robert M. MacQueen

NCAR—High Altitude Observatory

Department of Planetary Sciences

University of Arizona

Edward C. Stone, Jr.

Division of Physics, Mathematics and Astronomy

California Institute of Technology

John W. Townsend, Jr.

Fairchild Space & Electronics Co.

James A. Van Allen

Harold Masursky

Branch of Astrogeologic

U.S. Geological Survey

David Morrison

University of Hawaii

Institute for Astronomy

.

Physics and Astronomy Department

Studies University of Iowa

A. Thomas Young

Martin Marietta Aerospace

49
Appendix G

Additional Contributors

Scientific contributions were received from:

James R. Arnold

Lorenzo Bell

Michael J. S. Belton

William Bishop

Peter B. Boyce

P. Robin Brett

Geoffrey Briggs

Alastair G. W. Cameron

Herbert Carlson

William E. Carter

Clark R. Chapman

Robert Chapman

Lawrence Colin

Ted Cress

Arthur Davidson

John R. Dickel

Thomas M. Donahue

Michael B. Duke

William G. Fastie

Paul Feldman

Herbert Friedman

Riccardo Giacconi

Isaac Gillam

Bruce Gregory and

Herbert Gursky

Donald N. Hall

Richard C. Henry

Noel Hinners

Space Science Board

Odette B. James and Lunar and Planetary

Sample Team

Francis S. Johnson

Kenneth Johnston

Frank J. Kerr

Ronald Konkel

S. M. Krimigis

Louis J. Lanzerotti

Eugene H. Levy

Frank MacDonald

Robert M. MacQueen

Franklin Martin

Harold Masursky

H. Warren Moos

David Morrison

Tom Murdock

Randall Murphy

Eugene N. Parker

George Paulikis

Dennis Peacock

Charles Pike

Ron Posadro

Tom Poterma

5 0

Ronald Prinn

Robert Proodian

Henry Radowski

Lawrence Randall

Jefferey Rosendahl

Rita Sagalyn

Michael Sander

Frederick L. Scarf

Chris Schade

Erick O. Schonstedt

Francois Schweitzer

George Simon

Bradford A. Smith

Vernon Soumi

Andrew Stofan

Edward C. Stone, Jr.

Gerald F. Tape

Shelby Tilford

Alan Title

John W. Townsend, Jr.

Paul Try

James A. Van Allen

Martin Walt

Gerald J. Wasserburg

Laurel L. Wilkening

Andrew T. Young

A. Thomas Young

In addition, discussions regarding the study were

held with:

L. P. Bautz

Darrell Branscome

Albert Bridgewater

Radford Byerly

Wesley Clark

John Dill

Steven Flajser

Sybil Francis

Edward Hall

Donald Heinrichs

C. Lincoln Hoewing

Diana Hoyt

Carol Lane

Richard Malow

Phyllis Minn

Steven Moore

Susan Podolsky

Jack Scum

Ira Shapiro

Marcia Smith

Scott Ulm

John Warner

Leonard Weiss

U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1982 98-704