Keeping the Peace 

Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping 

JOHN S. CLARK JR., Major, USAF

School of Advanced Airpower Studies 

THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF


THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES,


MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR COMPLETION OF


GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, ACADEMIC YEAR 1995–96.


Air University


Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama


November 1997 
Disclaimer 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author(s), and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air 

Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public 

release: distribution unlimited. 

ii 
Contents 

Chapter Page 

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii 

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 

THE NATURE OF PEACEKEEPING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING . . . . . . . 13 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

Table 

1 

2 

3 

PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL OF REGIONAL 

ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

THE US ROLE IN SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING 

RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Illustrations 

Approximate Strength of IAPF—30 June 1965 . . . 

ECOWAS Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Composition of ECOMOG Troops . . . . . . . . 

iii 

. . . . . . . . . 19 

. . . . . . . . . 33 

. . . . . . . . . 39 

. . . . . . . . . 47 

. . . . . . . . . 51 

. . . . . . . . . 22 

. . . . . . . . . 26 

. . . . . . . . . 27 

Abstract 

During the cold war, the United Nations (UN) developed the mission termed

peacekeeping to help manage conflict. These peace operations helped save millions of

lives, prevented conflicts from escalating, and provided an environment for the

political settlement of disputes despite the superpower conflict. In the aftermath of

the cold war, the UN found itself freer to act than at any time in its history, and the

demands placed on the organization quickly outstripped its ability to cope. This

study examines the role of regional organizations in the conduct of peacekeeping. It

asks if the international community’s singular focus on the UN as the vehicle for

peacekeeping prevented the regional organizations from contributing more to

international security. Furthermore, if the regional organizations could contribute

significantly to international peace, then what role should the Department of

Defense (DOD) play in supporting these efforts?

Regional organizations have conducted peacekeeping operations in the past with

mixed results. This study examines the intervention by the Organization of

American States (OAS) into the Dominican Republic in 1965, the OAS role in the

Central American peace process in the late 1980s, and the intervention by the

Economic Community of West African States into Liberia in 1990. These operations

illustrate several salient features of regional organizations conducting peacekeeping.

This study concludes that in order for peacekeepers to achieve their mandate, it is

critical to possess strong political will and a minimum of operational support.

Furthermore, regional organizations run the gamut in both political will and

operational capability. Their performance indicates that when their national

interests are at stake, the regionals demonstrate the required political will to

persevere in a mission. Furthermore, they indicate an increasingly strong

determination to participate in peacekeeping missions. They understand that a

positive correlation exists between regional political stability and economic growth,

and they appear ready to build an environment that fosters such growth. However, a

gap exists between their political will and operational capability. This gap should be

remedied by a United States (US) strategy that recognizes regional organizations as

the second tier in an international community that may contribute to international 

peace.

This study recommends that the DOD and other US agencies support and

encourage regional organizations to bear more of the peacekeeping burden, either

independently or as a partner with the UN. DOD should actively support the

improvement of these organizations’ capabilities to conduct peacekeeping operations

through a comprehensive strategy that builds on the activities taking place on the

bilateral level and within the combatant commands. Strengthening regional

organizations can ameliorate the burden of being the world’s remaining superpower,

leverage the US leadership position, and further US national interests. 

v 

About the Author 

Maj John S. Clark Jr. (BS, Stetson University; MS, Chapman College), a senior

navigator with more than 1,700 flying hours, was commissioned in 1984. After

completing undergraduate navigator training as a distinguished graduate in 1984,

he went on to fly the Phantom II accumulating 950 hours in the F-4D/E/G. In 1991

Major Clark transitioned to the F-15E and served as an instructor weapon systems

officer and flight commander. He is a distinguished graduate of Officer Training

School, Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and a 1996

graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies. In July 1996 Major Clark was

assigned to Air Combat Command as an action officer. 

vii 

Acknowledgments 

I acknowledge the assistance provided by a number of individuals in preparing 

this document. Thanks to Dr. James S. Corum and Dr. Harold R. Winton for their 

help during the research phase and especially for their efforts in reading several 

drafts of the thesis and offering suggestions that improved this study. Thanks to 

Brig Gen Hendrik Potgieter, Brig Gen R. P. Gray, Maj Antonio L. Pala, Dr. Margaret 

Vogt, Dr. Frank Mora, Lt Col Pat Larkin, Col Thomas Resau, Lt Col Chess Harris, 

Mr. Phillip Comstock, Mr. Steven R. Rader, Col Thomas Kearney, Col F. 

Labuschagne, Maj Russ Hall, and Lt Col Samuel Butler who provided their time for 

interviews. I owe thanks to my loving and supportive wife, Michelle. Her patience 

and understanding were instrumental in completing this project. 

ix 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. . . . Out of these troubled 

times, . . . a new world order can emerge: a new era, freer from the threat of terror, 

stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. . . . Today 

that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve 

known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. 

—President George W. Bush 

As long as man has fought wars, he has sought the means to preserve 

peace. The Athenian League, the Treaty of Westphalia, and the League of 

Nations exemplify past efforts to secure peace and stability. Likewise, in the 

aftermath of World War II, the representatives of 50 nations established the 

United Nations (UN). Fresh in their minds was the destruction wrought by 

the global conflagration that claimed over 50 million lives. Thus, the 

representatives resolved to create a robust international security forum in 

order to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”1 While the UN 

achieved success in several areas, such as humanitarian assistance and 

economic development, the polarizing effect of the superpower confrontation 

hampered the organization’s ability to act on security issues. For example, 

between 1945–90, members of the UN Security Council vetoed 279 measures 

involving matters of international security.2 

Despite the limitations imposed on the UN by the cold war, the organization 

developed the mission termed peacekeeping to help manage conflict. During the 

cold war, the UN established 14 peacekeeping operations. The superpowers 

perceived that these operations did not negatively affect their vital national 

interests; thus, they allowed their establishment. These operations tended to 

involve the mediation of isolated and idiosyncratic conflicts, the monitoring of 

cease-fire agreements, and the establishment of buffer zones.3 Furthermore, 

these peace operations helped save millions of lives, prevented conflict from 

escalating, and provided an environment for the political settlement of disputes.4 

The end of the cold war presented both opportunities and challenges for the 

international community: opportunities in the sense that the UN found itself 

freer to act than at anytime in its history; challenges in the sense that the cold 

war and communism had suppressed many long simmering economic and ethnic 

conflicts that were now unleashed. The UN attempted to answer the challenge 

and established 17 new peace operations, many of which were larger in scope 

and more expensive than peace operations during the cold war. While there 

have been some notable setbacks in peacekeeping, such as the failure of the 

1 
operation in Somalia to bring stability to that country, peacekeeping has 

garnered some worthwhile successes over the years, notably in the Sinai and 

Central America, and will continue to be a part of the post-cold-war 

landscape. 

While the UN has conducted the majority of peacekeeping missions, regional 

organizations also have worked to keep the peace. The fundamental question 

examined in this study concerns the role of regional organizations in the conduct 

of peacekeeping. Has the international community’s singular focus on the UN as 

the vehicle for peacekeeping prevented the regional organizations from 

contributing more to international security? If regional organizations could 

contribute significantly to international peace, then what role should the 

Department of Defense (DOD) play in supporting their efforts? Chapter 2 lays a 

theoretical basis for understanding the nature of peace operations. It offers a 

common lexicon for discussing peacekeeping, identifies the functions of 

peacekeeping, and establishes the influencing factors by which to measure the 

success of a peacekeeping operation. Chapter 3 examines the role of regional 

organizations in peacekeeping. It explores the legal basis for regional 

organizations conducting peacekeeping and discusses the various advantages 

and disadvantages of regional organizations intervening in that capacity. 

Chapter 4 examines the performance and potential of regional organizations 

conducting peacekeeping. Regional organizations have been involved in several 

peace operations with mixed results. For example, in 1961, the Arab League 

replaced a British force along the border separating Iraq and Kuwait and 

successfully kept the peace until a treaty was signed. This chapter explores two 

peacekeeping operations by the Organization of American States (OAS). The 

first operation concerns the intervention into the Dominican Republic in 1965, 

and the second operation is the implementation of the Central American peace 

process in the late 1980s. This chapter also examines the efforts of the Economic 

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to keep the peace in Liberia and 

explores the current efforts of the regional organizations to improve their 

peacekeeping capabilities. Chapter 5 examines the strategy of the United States 

regarding peacekeeping operations and more specifically, how DOD could 

enhance the capability of the regional organizations. Chapter 6 offers specific 

recommendations geared towards enhancing the regional organization’s ability 

to conduct peacekeeping operations. Today, the United States remains 

committed to a strategy of engagement and enlargement. The United States has 

military forces engaged in peace operations in Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 

Macedonia, northern Iraq, and the Sinai. Furthermore, the United States 

supports numerous UN peace operations through financial and material 

support. This study examines whether a tool for regional peace and stability in 

the form of regional organizations has been underutilized and whether the 

United States should place greater emphasis on these organizations. If the 

United States maintains its support for peacekeeping, then the regional 

organizations should be considered for their potential contribution to peace 

operations. 

2 
Notes 

1. United Nations, United Nation’s Charter, 1. 

2. Victoria K. Holt, The US Role in United Nations Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: 

Council for a Livable World Education Fund, 1995), 1. 

3. William J. Durch and Barry M. Blechman, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the 

Emerging World Order (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1992), 1. 

4. Holt, 1. 

3

Chapter 2 

The Nature of Peacekeeping 

Peacekeeping is a useful and highly visible element of the efforts of the United 

Nations to maintain international peace and security. . . . Peacekeeping, properly 

conceived, directed, and financed, could become an important and effective symbol of 

a new determination to relieve the peoples of the world of unnecessary conflict, 

excessive armaments and the constant threat of war. 

—Sir Brian Urquhart 

In early 1956, tension over the Suez Canal erupted into open hostility when 

forces from Great Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt in order to 

secure control of the waterway. Under international diplomatic and economic 

pressure, the belligerents agreed to allow the establishment of a buffer zone 

patrolled by an armed UN truce-monitoring force.1 This first-ever armed 

intervention by the UN gave birth to the term peacekeeping and culminated 

in the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) I, which 

remained in place until Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser requested its 

withdrawal in 1967. 

This chapter discusses the nature of peacekeeping. It examines the 

characteristics of peacekeeping since the establishment of UNEF I, in both a 

cold war and post-cold-war context. It offers a common lexicon for analyzing 

peacekeeping and identifies the factors that influence the success of such 

operations. It also examines the functions and the principles of peacekeeping. 

An understanding of these fundamental peacekeeping concepts will allow one 

to judge the peacekeeping capability of the regional organizations. 

Peace Operations Defined 

Peacekeeping is found nowhere in the UN Charter. Paul Lewis notes in his 

study of UN peacekeeping that “. . . its invention is often credited to 

Secretary-General Hammarskjold, who jokingly called it ‘chapter six and a 

half’ of the Charter, meaning that it fell between chapter six, which calls for 

the peaceful resolution of disputes, and chapter seven, which empowers the 

Security Council to reverse aggression by military might if negotiations fail.”2 

While much has been written on peacekeeping in the last few years, there are 

still definitional disconnects between the DOD’s Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 

3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping 

Operations, and the UN’s white paper An Agenda for Peace usage.3 For 

5 
instance, the term peace enforcement has multiple interpretations. In An 

Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali uses peace 

enforcement to describe cases in which an established cease-fire has been 

agreed to, but not complied with, and peace enforcement units are called in to 

restore and maintain the cease-fire. The US definition describes a chapter 7 

situation to breaches of the peace such as Desert Storm.4 Clearly, in coalition 

operations, it is necessary to establish common definitional understanding of 

the nature of the conflict and the explicit tasks to be accomplished. The 

following definitions are offered as point of departure for this study. 

Peace. What is meant by the term peace? It can be described in the 

negative sense as the absence of war. This may be sufficient as a goal of the 

peacekeeper in maintaining a cease-fire. However, in the positive sense, peace 

connotes a long term period of tranquillity between governments. This should 

be the ultimate objective of a peace process. 

Preventive Diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy is an “action to prevent 

disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from 

escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they 

occur.”5 Preventive diplomacy serves as the most desirable and cost effective 

mechanism for easing tension. It can include a host of initiatives including 

confidence building measures, fact finding missions, and preventive 

deployments, such as Operation ABLE SENTRY in Macedonia. 

Peacemaking. According to the UN, peacemaking “is an action to bring 

hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as 

those foreseen in chapter 7 of the UN Charter.”6 Peacemaking includes 

diplomatic actions such as mediation and negotiation. 

Peace Building. Civil-military actions and support structures that will 

tend to strengthen and solidify peace and avoid a relapse into conflict. This 

term includes humanitarian actions that may alleviate or ameliorate the 

conditions leading to conflict. 

Peace Operations. According to Joint Pub 3-07.3, peace operations is “the 

umbrella term encompassing peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and any other 

military, paramilitary, or nonmilitary action taken in support of a diplomatic 

peacemaking process.”7 

Peacekeeping. According to the unofficial UN definition as described in 

The Blue Helmets, peacekeeping is “an operation involving military personnel, 

but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help 

maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict.”8 The Pentagon offers a more 

comprehensive definition in Joint Pub 3-07.3, “military or paramilitary 

operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, 

designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and 

support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement.”9 

Peace Enforcement. According to the DOD, peace enforcement involves 

“military operations using appropriate force to separate belligerents, with or 

without their consent, at any time after a dispute has erupted and prior to a 

peaceful settlement.”10 

6 
Peacekeeping versus Peace Enforcement 

According to Carl von Clausewitz “the first, the supreme, the most 

far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to 

make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are 

embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that 

is alien to its nature.”11 Traditionally, US military doctrine has described 

conflict along a spectrum of war. This spectrum can be defined by the type of 

war, level of intensity, or type of weapons employed. This author suggests 

that the difference between peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement 

operations represents more than a simple increase in intensity along the 

spectrum of war. The two operations are of a very different nature and 

require distinct solutions. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the 

intricacies of these two mission types. It is sufficient for this study to state 

that the distinction exists, the international community does not agree on the 

degree of distinction, and the results of mistaking peace enforcement for 

peacekeeping could be catastrophic as the events in Somalia proved. 

Measuring Success of a Peacekeeping Operation 

Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States 

Air Force, states that “success in war is not determined solely by military 

defeat of the enemy, casualties inflicted, or territory occupied. Success is 

determined by whether or not political objectives are met.”12 Likewise, 

judging success in peace operations requires an understanding of the desired 

political objectives. Importantly, peacekeeping creates a suitable environment 

to allow peacebuilding to work. For example, the UN has patrolled the Green 

Line in Cyprus since 1964. Is this long-term peace operation a success? For 

most of the operation, peace, defined here as the absence of war, has reigned. 

Further, the fact that Greece and Turkey almost went to war recently over 

the possession of two barren rocks in the Aegean Sea would indicate that the 

UN forces have helped prevent further hostilities on Cyprus. While the 

success of the peacemaking process is arguable, it remains undeniable that 

the peacekeepers have succeeded in avoiding open conflict. 

Marjorie Ann Browne, a specialist in international relations, offers a choice 

of three measures to judge the success of a mission. Was the mandate set 

forth by the establishing organization met?13 Did the operation lead to a 

resolution of the underlying dispute? Did the operation lead to international 

peace and stability? Within the narrow confines of the first criterion, UNEF I, 

the interposition force placed between Egypt and Israel in 1956, was a success 

because it achieved the mandate until it was removed at Nasser’s request. 

Under the more comprehensive criterion, UNEF I was unsuccessful because it 

only provided an 11-year pause between hostilities. The main point is that 

peacekeeping is essentially a diplomatic action using military forces. It is the 

7 
great enabler that sets the conditions for peacebuilding, a diplomatic and 

political process, to take place.14 And the ultimate success or failure of a 

peacekeeping operation may not be manifest for years, or perhaps even decades. 

Cold War Peacekeeping 

The cold war dashed the hopes of those who wished for a world body with 

the capability to provide for the world’s peace and security through a robust 

collective security system. The structure of the United Nations Security 

Council (UNSC), with veto provisions for the five permanent members, helped 

assure that the cold war adversaries could block the UN enforcement 

mechanisms on matters any one of the five deemed vital to its interests.15 In 

fact, the cold war caused UN officials to tiptoe around the superpower 

confrontation that permeated many of the salient decisions at the 

organization. For example, the famous image of Ambassador Adlai E. 

Stevenson confronting the Soviet representative over the installation of 

ballistic missile launch facilities in Cuba belies the fact that no resolution 

condemning the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was passed.16 While no 

state would agree to compromise on an issue of vital interest during the cold 

war, that conflict made every area of the globe a potential flash point and 

impeded the UN’s ability to act. 

Despite the constraints placed on the UN by the cold war, a mechanism for 

enhancing the prospects of peace developed. Thirteen peacekeeping 

operations were undertaken from 1956 to 1988. Twelve of these operations 

could be characterized as traditional peacekeeping, while the mission in the 

Congo represented a peace enforcement operation. The following types of 

missions are included under traditional peacekeeping: observe cease-fires, 

interpose forces along a buffer zone, provide early warning, and monitor and 

verify truce agreements. From these traditional missions, a set of principles 

were developed that was articulated by UN Secretary-General Dag 

Hammarskjöld as early as 1958. 

Hammarskjöld, who died while traveling to the UN peace operation in the 

Congo in 1961, stated that the peacekeepers must have the consent of the 

parties involved. Second, the troops should not come from the great powers. 

Third, the troops must maintain a strict impartiality. Fourth, the troops must 

retain the capability to defend themselves. These principles were abided by in 

12 of the 13 operations embarked on by the UN, with the Congo failure 

representing the exception. 

Influencing Factors 

With this in mind, a broad study of peacekeeping operations reveals several 

salient factors that this author suggests play significant roles in their success 

8 
or failure. The first of these factors is international support. Positive 

international support confers legitimacy upon an operation. This support may 

be derived from the UN, regional organizations, or a coalition. The 

responsible organization also decides upon the mandate, or objective, of the 

operation.17 A second factor, domestic support, involves the will of the nations 

participating. In the United States, this centers on the Congress, media, 

intellectuals, and public opinion. This support translates into the third factor, 

financial support, which provides the resources to turn strategy into action. 

The fourth factor is consent, which addresses the degree to which the 

antagonists agree to third party intervention. The fifth factor under 

examination is force application, the extent to which force must be applied to 

preserve the peace. Because peacekeepers operate under the dual principles 

of restraint and security, they are normally armed with light weapons for 

personal defense and refrain from using force unless absolutely necessary. 

While political factors determine to a large extent the degree of success for a 

mission, a final factor, operational support, also influences the outcome. 

The peacekeeper requires a certain degree of operational capability in order 

to succeed. In fact, there exists no shortage of well-trained infantry 

worldwide. However, logistical capability has been a significant problem in 

conducting peace operations. Peacekeepers in Cambodia, for instance, 

deployed without maps of the country.18 The organization chartering a peace 

operation must provide the resources necessary to deploy, sustain, and 

redeploy the peacekeepers. A common complaint among peacekeepers is that 

they deploy with inadequate support and must fend for themselves. 

Peacekeeping evolved under the political realities of the cold war. It 

conducted several types of missions under a clear set of well-defined 

principles and achieved some notable success. Today’s political reality forces 

one to ponder the question posed by former UN Secretary-General Brian 

Urquhart: “Does the end of the cold war alter these principles?”19 

Post-Cold-War Peace Operations:

The Promise and the Challenge 

At the 1988 Nobel prize ceremony, Sir Brian Urquhart said, “the rigors of 

the Cold War no longer paralyze the UN. It even seems possible humanity 

could take the great step forward towards a community of nations.”20 The fall 

of the Soviet Union caused seismic shifts in the international order that 

continue to reverberate. While the nature of the international order remains 

ambiguous, it appears that the end of the cold war has resulted in profound 

changes in the environment into which the peacekeeper may be sent. The 

post-cold-war peacekeeping environment is characterized by greater size, 

complexity, and cost relative to its cold war counterpart. For example, the 

peace operation in Cambodia known as UN Transitional Authority in 

Cambodia (UNTAC) has over 23,000 peacekeepers employed at an estimated 

9 
cost of $1.9 billion through the first 15 months of operation.21 Today, both 

governmental and nongovernmental organizations play an increasing 

influential role in world affairs. In the Namibian peace process, for example, 

over 50 nations, and numerous nongovernmental organizations, participated 

in both negotiations and implementation. Other trends affecting the 

peacekeeping environment include the increasing globalization of the 

economy; increasing interdependence of national governments, as exemplified 

by the North American Free Trade Agreement and the General Agreement on 

Tariffs and Trade; and proliferation of weapons with longer range and greater 

destructive power than their predecessors. There is also a trend toward an 

increasing number of economic refugees and toward a more significant 

burden that the host-nations bear in supporting the refugee. The United 

States was so concerned about illegal immigrants attempting to reach 

America that it intervened in the sovereign state of Haiti largely to stem the 

tide of refugees to American shores. Finally, the contemporary environment 

includes the need for intervention based solely on humanitarian grounds.22 

This environment creates a complicated situation for the peacekeepers that 

forces them to contend with new issues. While the US Army peacekeeper’s 

main task in Haiti was to provide a stable environment to allow a smooth 

transition to the democratically elected government, it became clear that 

internal economic and political conditions had to be established to enhance 

the chances for mission success. Thus, peacekeepers in Haiti found 

themselves conducting humanitarian assistance, training a police force, 

establishing a judicial system, and restoring electricity.23 The following is a 

partial list of wider peacekeeping functions that the peacekeeper is expected 

to perform in addition to the previously listed traditional peacekeeping 

functions: 

• Assisting and verifying disarmament and demobilization. 

• Controlling weapons of the belligerents. 

• Clearing land mines. 

• Protecting humanitarian convoys. 

• Establishing and training new police forces. 

• Supplying basic humanitarian needs. 

• Investigating human rights violations. 

• Observing, monitoring, and verifying elections. 

The expansion of functions suggests that the post-cold-war environment is 

more complicated for the peacekeeper. Another reality of the post-cold-war 

environment is the realization that the UN, despite its best efforts, appears 

overwhelmed by the magnitude of the requirement. 

The UN organization comprises over 184 nations and serves many 

purposes in fields such as economics, diplomacy, and humanitarian 

assistance. Peacekeeping is a relatively small part of the UN mission, and the 

Department of Peace Operations comprises only a small portion of the UN 

staff. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, though recently 

expanded, still numbers only a few dozen people and has only recently 

10 
developed the capacity to monitor operations around-the-clock. Moreover, the 

post-cold-war environment has placed a great burden on the UN 

peacekeeping apparatus. “UN peace operations nearly doubled from ten in 

1990 to seventeen in 1994. And the cost of UN operations exploded from less 

than $500 million in 1990 to nearly $4 billion in 1994.”24 These operations 

have expanded quantitatively and qualitatively.25 Simply put, it is beyond 

reasonable expectations for one organization to conduct robust early warning, 

preventive diplomacy, and peacekeeping missions for the entire world.26 For 

example, in December 1989, Charles Taylor launched an attack against the 

government of Samuel Doe in Liberia. This event and the subsequent civil 

war garnered little international attention, and the conflict was soon 

overshadowed by the Persian Gulf crisis.27 According to Gerhard Kummel, 

the “UN is facing overstretch unless it comes to terms with the gap between 

problems and tasks with which it is burdened (or which it feels compelled to 

tackle) and the resources that it has at its disposal.”28 Further, UN Under 

Secretary-General Dick Thornburgh states “the UN’s capacity to undertake 

additional responsibilities is dubious.”29 

Conclusion 

Under the shadow of the cold war, peacekeeping evolved as a tool to assist 

diplomats in keeping the peace. In the post-cold-war era, it remains to be seen to 

what extent the new environment alters the traditional peacekeeping principles 

and influencing factors. For instance, the reason that the great powers did not 

contribute troops directly in the cold war era stemmed from a fear of escalating 

the conflict into a cold war battleground. While this rationale is no longer 

operative, it is interesting to note that many nations still prefer not to have US 

peacekeepers directly involved. At a National Defense University (NDU) 

workshop on peacekeeping, participants from Latin America remarked that the 

US carries a lot of historic baggage in the hemisphere and that US soldiers tend 

to become targets for extremist groups.30 

What is clear, however, is that peacekeeping remains a valuable tool to set the 

conditions for peace building. Also, more is expected of the peacekeeper in this 

environment; and the end of the cold war has not mitigated the importance of 

operational and political factors in achieving success. Finally, the UN appears 

too overwhelmed by the requirements of the new world order. The next chapter 

examines the performance and potential of regional organizations in peace 

operations. Can the regionals help to mitigate the UN’s burden? 

Notes 

1. Victoria K. Holt, The US Role in United Nations Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: 

Council for a Livable World Education Fund, 1995), 4. 

11 
2. Paul Lewis, “A Short History of UN Peacekeeping,” Military History Quarterly 5, no. 1 

(Spring 1994): 34. 

3. John O. B. Sewall, “Implications for UN Peacekeeping,” Joint Force Quarterly 1, no. 2 

(Winter 1993–94): 29. 

4. Ibid. 

5. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 

Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, 1992), par. 20, 9. 

6. Ibid. 

7. Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations, 

1996, GL-7. 

8. The Blue Helmets (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1990), 4–5. 

9. Joint Pub 3-07.3, A-1. 

10. Ann E. Story, Peace Support Operations: A Concept Whose Time Has Come (Langley Air 

Force Base, Va.: Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 1993), 13. 

11. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret 

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 88. 

12. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, vol. 2, March 1992, 1. 

13. Marjorie Ann Browne, The Future of International Peacekeeping: The UN/Non-UN 

Option (Washington, D.C.: NDU, March 1984), 13. 

14. International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper’s Handbook (New York: Pergamon Press, 

1984), 30–32. 

15. The five permanent members of the UNSC are the United States, France, Great 

Britain, China, and Russia. 

16. Jan Eliasson, “Peacemaking into the 21st Century,” International Peacekeeping 2, no. 1 

(Spring 1995): 100. 

17. A. S. Henry, A. A. Clark, and P. F. Heenan, “Final Report on NDHQ Program 

Evaluation E2/90 on Peacekeeping” (Ottawa, Canada: National Defense Headquarters, 30 June 

1992), 22. 

18. William H. Lewis, Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 

(Washington, D.C.: NDU, June 1993), 69. 

19. Brian Urquhart, “Beyond the ‘Sheriff’s Posse’,” Survival 32, no. 3 (May/June 1990): 200. 

20. Robert W. Poor, The United States in United Nations Military Operations (Monterey, 

Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1992), 2. 

21. Thomas G. Weiss, “New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an 

Agenda for Peace,” Washington Quarterly 16, no. 1 (January 1993): 51–66. 

22. Henry, Clark, and Heenan, 3. 

23. Joseph R. Fischer, “A Sack Full of Democracy: Special Operations Forces in Operation 

Uphold Democracy” (paper, September 1995), 4. 

24. Sarah B. Sewell, “Peace Operations: A Department of Defense Perspective,” SAIS 

Review 15 (Winter–Spring 1995): 123. 

25. Ibid., 124. 

26. Eliasson, 104. 

27. Oluyemi Adeniji, “Regionalism in Africa,” Security Dialogue 24, no. 2 (June 1993): 215. 

28. Gerhard Kummel, “UN Overstretch: A German Perspective,” International Peacekeeping 

1, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 162. 

29. Neil S. MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, “The United Nations, Regional 

Organizations, and Human Security: Building Theory in Central America,” Third World 

Quarterly 15, no. 2 (June 1994): 282. 

30. David S. Alberts, Command and Control in Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: 

Institute for National Strategic Studies, NDU, May 1995), A-14. 

12

Chapter 3 

Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping 

There should be several regional councils, august, but subordinate; these should 

form the massive pillars upon which the world organization would be founded in 

majesty and calm. 

—Sir Winston Churchill 

In April 1994, the central African state of Rwanda erupted in violence and 

bloodshed. The UN Security Council faced the choice of reinforcing and 

empowering the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda 

(UNOMUR) or withdrawing the observers for their own security.1 SecretaryGeneral Boutros-Ghali opted for a pullout, but left a small contingent to act 

as intermediaries between the factions. Following the withdrawal, the Hutu 

majority embarked on a killing spree that targeted the minority Tutsi 

population and Hutu opposition leaders. Despite the scope and viciousness of 

the genocidal attacks, the UN and international community were slow to 

respond. As Dr. Margaret Vogt remarked, “After the April to July 1994 

massacre in Rwanda, it took the expanded UN force to February 1995 to fully 

deploy its troops in Rwanda.”2 This delay caused a refugee crisis in 

neighboring states and allowed ethnic violence to spread into Burundi. This 

episode highlights the UN’s inadequacies in dealing with a crisis in a timely 

manner. If it is beyond the UN’s capabilities to deal with the post-cold-war 

peacekeeping environment adequately, then what alternatives exist to meet 

the needs of international peacekeeping? Could regional organizations, based 

on both their peacekeeping performance and potential, contribute more to 

peacekeeping, either independently or through a UN partnership? 

Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping 

First, what is a regional organization? A “region is a geographical identity, 

the components of which share attributes or interactions distinguishing them 

from entities beyond the boundaries of the region.”3 Thus, these organizations 

may be cultural, economic, and/or political and are normally comprised of 

contiguous states. Examples of regional organizations include the 

Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Arab League, and the 

Western European Union (WEU). Furthermore, subregional organizations 

13 
play an important role in collective security and include organizations such as 

the Economic Community of West African States, and the South African 

Development Community (SADC). 

The idea of a regional organization conducting peacekeeping operations is 

not new. Indeed, several regional organizations have conducted such 

operations with mixed results. The OAS had some success in the 1950s and 

1960s, with the most notable operation in the Dominican crisis of 1965. The 

OAU’s foray into Chad in 1981 was terminated in less than one year amid 

general failure. The OAU troops were simply overwhelmed by the task at 

hand, came under fire themselves, and lacked both a clear mandate and 

direction from the OAU.4 For example, the field commander lacked 

communication with OAU headquarters, which limited his ability to respond 

to a rapidly deteriorating situation. The Arab League conducted a successful 

peacekeeping operation in 1961 when it replaced British troops and 

interposed itself between Iraq and the newly independent Kuwait. The Arab 

League’s mission in Lebanon from 1979 to 1982 suffered from Syrian 

dominance and generally did no better than UN missions to that country. 

Legal Basis for Regional Organizations

Conducting Peacekeeping Operations 

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in the UN white paper titled An Agenda 

for Peace, clearly articulates a desire for regional organizations to accept a 

greater role in security operations. “In this new era of opportunity, regional 

arrangements or agencies can render great service if their activities are 

undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the 

UN Charter. What is clear, however, is that regional arrangements or 

agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving 

the functions covered in this report: preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, 

peacemaking and post-conflict peace building.”5 

The UN founders also envisioned a strong role for regional organizations 

and embodied this principle in chapter 8 of the UN Charter. For example, 

Articles 52 and 53 specifically call for regional organizations to conduct those 

operations that have come to be known as peace operations.6 

Article 52. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance 

of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided 

that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the 

purposes and principles of the United Nations. 

Article 53. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional 

arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. 

14 
Beyond the UN Charter, most regional organizations have mechanisms 

that provide for some degree of collective security. For instance, the OAS 

Charter addresses the pacific settlement of disputes in chapter 5, and 

collective security in chapter 6. Clearly, the OAS Charter focuses more on 

threats external to the hemisphere, but the Rio Treaty of 1948 does address 

intrahemispheric security. Article 6 of the Rio Treaty states that “if the 

inviolability or the integrity of the territory, or the sovereignty or political 

independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression 

which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental 

conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of 

America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree 

on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the 

victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken 

for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of 

the continent.”7 Furthermore, the OAS maintains a relationship with the 

Inter-American Defense Board which is comprised of senior military officers 

from the member-nations and advises the OAS on military and security 

matters.8 

While there exists the legal basis for conducting peacekeeping operations, 

the strongest basis for conducting the operations may be both moral and 

practical. A common theme among the regional organizations is a realization 

that in the post-cold-war world the nations with the most at stake should 

stand ready to solve their own problems. As Brig Gen Hendrik A. Potgieter, 

chief of Operations of the South African Air Force, said of the current 

problems of ethnic violence in Africa, “economic growth and stability go hand 

in hand. We can’t expect anyone else to solve southern Africa’s problems. We 

must look to ourselves.”9 

Advantages of Regional

Organizations in Peacekeeping 

Each regional organization maintains a unique structure, purpose, and 

identity. In general, regional organizations offer several advantages in 

conducting peacekeeping operations. First, the members of a regional 

organization are the ones who will suffer the consequences of instability in 

their region most directly. Their nations will bear the cost of providing for 

refugees, end up as sanctuaries for insurrectionist action, have to spend more 

on defense, and bear the cost of reduced economic growth when foreign 

corporations decide the area is too risky for investment. Therefore, the 

members of a regional organization have a vital interest at stake in 

preserving regional stability. This vital interest ought to translate into a 

greater political will to see the problem through to a solution. 

Second, the members of a regional organization are likely to be more in 

tune with the conflict at hand as they share the same cultural background 

15 
and often speak the same language. In some cases, personal relationships 

have developed among the leaders which undoubtedly results in greater 

understanding of the situation and may result in fruitful dialogue based on 

personal trust.10 Third, the regional organization, being more in tune with its 

own area of interest, may provide a timely response based on better 

intelligence of a looming crisis. As the UN Deputy Force commander in 

Rwanda, Brig Gen Henry Anyidoho noted that “the major handicap for the 

UN in achieving its assigned role is a lack of timely and positive response 

from member-states when a distress signal goes out. In crisis, time is of the 

essence. Often in the UN, help arrives too late owing to too much hesitation 

on the part of member-states. It is like the fire truck arriving after the 

market place has been consumed by fire. Its effectiveness is lost.”11 Finally, 

the regional organization may have a more legitimate reason for intervention 

than a peacekeeping mission from a global source. While the advantages are 

many, there exist some serious drawbacks to regional organizations 

conducting peacekeeping operations. 

Disadvantages of Regional

Organizations in Peacekeeping 

Some regional organizations suffer from a dearth of financial resources. 

While NATO, WEU, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) maintain a solid financial base, the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and 

OAS suffer from financial shortages. However, it must be noted that the UN 

shares this trait with regional organizations, as it also suffers from severe 

fiscal constraints. According to UN Under Secretary-General Thornburgh, 

UN financing “is still much like a financial bungee jump, often undertaken 

strictly in blind faith that timely appropriations will be forthcoming.”12 

The military structure for peacekeeping runs the gamut from a robust 

military and security structure to a very limited military security capability. 

For example, NATO has the military structure, doctrine, and training to 

conduct peacekeeping operations. Conversely, the OAS does not have a 

military security structure or a security council embodied in the OAS 

Charter. A loose connection exists between the Inter-American Defense Board 

as an advisor to the OAS, but it is not codified.13 

The regional organizations may be perceived to lack impartiality in a 

dispute.14 While a regional organization may be interested solely in 

ameliorating the human suffering in a neighboring country, or ensuring the 

conflict does not spread to their nations, clearly, a thin line exists between 

legitimate security interventions and hegemonic interventions.15 The 

intervention of India into Sri Lanka was ostensibly a humanitarian mission. 

However, it smacked of ulterior motives and lost the consent of the 

disputants, resulting in failure. While this disadvantage remains a great 

concern, it should be noted that the intervention must occur under the 

16 
consent of the UN according to the UN Charter.16 Finally, critics of regional 

organizations contend, with some justification, that these groups base their 

resolutions on consensus which results in feeble organizations that are simply 

not up to the task of conducting complicated peacekeeping operations. These 

disadvantages must be weighed when considering the option of regional 

organizations conducting peacekeeping operations. 

In conclusion, regional organizations are an important component of the 

international order and have contributed to maintaining peace and security 

through peacekeeping operations. Clearly, regional organizations possess 

both advantages and disadvantages in conducting peacekeeping operations; 

however, a regional’s main advantage stems from the fact that these 

organizations perceive it is in their interest to keep peace in their region. 

Conversely, their main disadvantage centers on an inadequate organization 

to conduct peacekeeping operations. With the political will present to conduct 

this type of operation, the main disadvantage can be minimized through a 

support effort by the developed world. The next chapter examines the 

performance and potential of regional organizations in conducting 

peacekeeping operations. 

Notes 

1. Margaret Vogt, PhD, senior associate, Africa Program, International Peacekeeping 

Institute, telephone interview with author, 18 March 1996. 

2. Ibid. 

3. Neil S. MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, “The United Nations, Regional Organizations 

and Human Security: Building Theory in Central America,” Third World Quarterly 15, no. 2 

(June 1994): 280. 

4. Vogt. 

5. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 

Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, 1992), A/47/277, S/24111. 

6. Brig Gen Henry Kwani Anyidoho, “The Role of the United Nations,” address to the Institute 

for Defence Policy and the South African Institute of International Affairs, 14 July 1995. 

7. David W. Wainhouse, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads (Baltimore: Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1973), 464. 

8. Frank Mora, PhD, professor of international relations, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 

South Africa, interviewed by author, Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Ala., 7 March 1996. 

9. Brig Gen Hendrik A. Potgieter, chief of Operations, SAAF, interviewed by author, 

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 6 March 1996. 

10. W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, “Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The 

ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia,” International Peacekeeping 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 262. 

11. Anyidoho, 40. 

12. Victoria K. Holt, The US Role in United Nations Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: 

Council for a Livable World Education Fund, 1995), 10. 

13. Maj Antonio L. Palo, AFIT doctoral candidate, University of Miami, telephone interview 

with author, 18 March 1996. 

14. Paul F. Diehl, “Institutional Alternatives to Traditional UN Peacekeeping: An 

Assessment of Regional and Multi-National Options,” Armed Forces and Society 19, no. 2 

(Winter 1993): 216. 

15. Ibid., 218. 

16. MacFarlane and Weiss, 283. 

17 
Chapter 4 

Performance and Potential of 

Regional Organizations 

In this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or agencies can render great 

service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the purposes 

and principles of the Charter. . . . Regional action as a matter of decentralization, 

delegation, and cooperation with UN efforts could not only lighten the burden of the 

council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs. 

—Boutros Boutros-Ghali 

When the UN was founded at the San Francisco Conference of 1947, strong 

support emerged for a prominent role of regional organizations in 

maintaining peace. While the UN has accepted the dominant role in 

peacekeeping operations, many regional organizations have attempted to 

resolve regional disputes over the years. The success of regional organizations 

in conducting peacekeeping has been mixed. The OAS has shown some 

success over the years in the resolution of regional disputes without UN 

participation. “These include conflicts between Costa Rica and Nicaragua 

(1948–49, 1955–56, 1959), Honduras and Nicaragua (1957), Venezuela and 

the Dominican Republic (1960–61), Venezuela and Cuba (1963–64, 1967), the 

Dominican Republic and Haiti (1950, 1960–65), Panama and the US (1964), 

and El Salvador and Honduras (1960–70).”1 On the other hand, the OAU’s 

limited efforts at peacekeeping have been unsuccessful, most notably in Chad 

during a civil war in 1981. The OAU, at that time, lacked the resources, force 

structure, and leadership necessary to conduct a large scale peace 

enforcement operation. This study examines the OAS and ECOWAS 

peacekeeping in detail. 

The Organization of American States 

The OAS is the world’s oldest regional organization tracing its roots to the 

First International Conference of American States held in 1890. The OAS 

Charter was signed in Bogota, Colombia, in 1948, and it currently comprises 

35 member-states and 33 states with permanent observer status. The basic 

purpose of the OAS is to: 

19 
Strengthen the peace and security of the continent; to promote and consolidate 

representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of nonintervention; to 

prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the member states; to provide for common action on 

the part of those states in the event of aggression; to seek the solution of political, 

juridical and economic problems that may arise among them; to promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social, and cultural development, and to achieve an 

effective limitation of conventional weapons that will make it possible to devote the 

largest amount of resources to the economic and social development of the member 

states.2 

As previously mentioned, the OAS had been active in peacekeeping 

missions in the late fifties and early sixties. The OAS discontinued taking 

part in this type of mission as a result of the relationship that had developed 

between the OAS and the United States. The reputation of the OAS was 

tarnished by its supporting role in the Dominican Republic intervention in 

1965, where it functioned as an arm of US policy.3 

This association with the United States highlights both a unique problem 

and a potential advantage for the OAS. On the one hand, the United States 

tends to dominate events in the Western Hemisphere and has a history of 

intervention in the affairs of Latin America, which makes Latin Americans 

wary of US military action in the region. On the other hand, the United 

States brings significant resources to the missions which the OAS 

participates in and takes a keen interest in the security of this hemisphere. 

With its participation in the Central American peace process and its 

pronouncements at the Miami summit indicate a willingness on the OAS’s 

part to continue to participate in regional stability, the reputation of the OAS 

has improved in the 1980s. Two examples of OAS peacekeeping operations 

are those in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the peace missions in 

Nicaragua in the 1980s. Both provide significant lessons regarding regional 

organization’s performance in peacekeeping operations. 

Dominican Republic and the

Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) 

Historical Background. The history of the Dominican Republic is one of 

political instability, often resulting in direct US intervention. The United 

States ruled the country from 1916 to 1924; and the commanding general of 

the army established under US occupation, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, 

became president in 1930.4 Trujillo consolidated power and became a dictator 

who ruled ruthlessly for three decades.5 His regime was characterized by 

“flagrant and widespread violations of human rights, the denial of assembly 

and free speech, arbitrary arrest, and cruel and inhumane treatment of 

political prisoners.”6 Until he was assassinated in 1961, Trujillo ruled directly 

or indirectly through his brother and through Joaquin Balaguer, the 

subsequent president.7 

20 
The Crisis. Following Balaguer’s resignation on 6 January 1962, a 

civil-military junta took control of the government until elections could be 

held. On 20 December 1962, Juan D. Bosch, leader of the Dominican 

Revolutionary Party, was overwhelmingly elected president and served until 

25 September 1963 when he was ousted in a bloodless military coup.8 Donald 

J. Reid Cabral, the former foreign minister under the civil-military junta, 

became president. In April 1965, military supporters of Bosch initiated an 

uprising which thrust the nation into chaos. “In Santo Domingo, the 

pro-Bosch rebels handed out rifles and machine guns to several thousand 

civilians. . . . Looting and arson were widespread.”9 

The Military Intervention. With the danger to foreigners constantly 

increasing, and a number of US citizens fearing for their lives, President Lyndon 

B. Johnson received a request from the US ambassador to the Dominican 

Republic, Tapley Bennett, to evacuate American citizens from the US Embassy 

in Santo Domingo. Bennett suggested that US Marines secure evacuation routes 

and help remove US citizens. On the afternoon of 28 April, Bennett cabled 

Washington with news of a brewing crisis, and asked about the introduction of 

armed US forces to protect Americans who had not been evacuated the previous 

evening by the marines, and most importantly, to calm the situation in Santo 

Domingo.10 Furthermore, Bennett indicated that without intervention the 

communists would seize power in the Dominican Republic.11 

And on 30 April President Johnson deployed the 82d Airborne Division to 

the Dominican Republic with the mission of preventing a communist 

takeover. Concurrent with the deployment, the Johnson administration 

worked to gain OAS approval for cooperation in the operation. Initially, the 

OAS was outraged over the intervention of US forces in violation of 

Dominican sovereignty.12 However, when the United States presented the 

OAS with the facts, it became clear that the first part of the US mission, 

protecting and evacuating US citizens, was legitimate. The subsequent 

action, to prevent a communist takeover based on the fear of creating another 

Cuba in the hemisphere, was deemed by some OAS members to be on shaky 

ground, regardless of the consensus that another communist state was 

undesirable.13 Nevertheless, the OAS voted 14 to 5 with one abstention, to 

intervene in the Dominican Republic to restore peace and constitutional 

government.14 On 6 May the OAS created the first Inter-American Peace 

Force made up of forces from several Latin American nations (table 1). 

Resolving the Conflict. Gen Hugo Panasco Alvim of Brazil commanded 

the IAPF, with an American general, Bruce Palmer, as his deputy. The OAS, 

including US Ambassador to the OAS Ellsworth Bunker, assumed the main 

role of arbitration and negotiation.15 These diplomats reached the conclusion 

that the best way to resolve the crisis was to conduct free and democratic 

elections. They proposed that elections would be held between six and nine 

months after June 1965. Further, the OAS would assist in preparing for and 

observing the elections for accuracy and fairness. Also, the IAPF would 

remain in the Dominican Republic through the election to assist in 

maintaining order. These and other peacekeeping tasks allowed the OAS to 

21 
Table 1


Approximate Strength of IAPF—30 June 1965


Nation Officers Enlisted Total Personnel 

Brazil 145 1,007 1,152 

Costa Rica 3 18 21 

El Salvador 3 – 3 

Honduras 10 240 250 

Nicaragua 6 153 159 

Paraguay 8 170 178 

United States – – 11,935 

Total 175 1,588 13,698 

help restore stability to the nation.16 On 1 June 1966 Balaguer of the 

Reformist Party won the presidency in a landslide election witnessed by an 

OAS observer force comprised of distinguished persons of several Western 

Hemisphere countries. On 21 September 1966, the last of the IAPF troops 

withdrew. 

Assessment. Conventional wisdom maintains that the OAS acted as a 

front for the US during the intervention in the Dominican crisis and simply 

rubber-stamped the operation without careful consideration.17 However, an 

examination of the facts reveals a more complicated situation. The Johnson 

administration’s actions to evacuate US and other nationals appears justified. 

The subsequent intervention to thwart Communism was, however, a 

contravention of the OAS Charter, violating articles 15, 16, 17, and 19 

regarding sovereignty.18 The OAS legitimized this action to some degree when 

it voted to support the intervention during the Tenth Meeting of Foreign 

Ministers.19 The OAS took an active role in the US-dominated IAPF and 

insisted, over the objections of the US military, on its being commanded by a 

Latin American.20 Importantly, the perception that the OAS was kowtowing 

to the United States, and a long-standing fear of US intervention in Latin 

America, led to the OAS decision to abandon peacekeeping missions for the 

next 25 years.21 

This OAS mission in the Dominican Republic was successful from the 

standpoint of meeting its mandate and establishing regional stability and 

peace. The mission benefited from political support in most OAS countries, 

especially the United States who contributed significant economic assistance 

to the operation. US military expenditures were $38.2 million. Further, total 

US economic assistance totaled $270 million from April 1965 to July 1966. 

Obviously, this commitment on Washington’s part assured adequate financial 

and operational support for the mission. Significant to the success of the 

mission was the fact that the factions consented to the presence of the 

22 
peacekeepers and realized that the overwhelming force displayed by the IAPF 

precluded serious resistance and compelled them to find a diplomatic solution. 

The OAS in Nicaragua 1989–92 

Historical Background. During the 1980s, Central America was the 

locale of several civil wars. The United States remained actively involved in 

supporting anti-Communist governments and achieving peace in the region 

became a torturous process. However, in the mid-1980s, according to Virginia 

Page Fortna of the Henry L. Stimson Center, “a joint UN-OAS effort in 

Central America came to be seen as a way to satisfy both the preference of 

Nicaragua’s Sandinista government for UN involvement in the peace process 

(the OAS being too U.S.-dominated for Nicaragua’s taste) and the preference 

of the United States, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras for OAS 

involvement (the UN being too ‘leftist’ for these countries’ taste).”22 

As Robert Durch remarked in his study, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, 

“The popular uprisings and insurgencies in Central America of the 1970s and 

1980s grew out of long-term economic and political disparities in those 

countries that were cast in sharp relief by the global competition for influence 

between Washington and Moscow.”23 In July 1979 the Somoza government 

fell to the Sandinistas, who swiftly developed close ties to Cuba and moved to 

authoritarian single-party rule. In 1981 the new Reagan administration acted 

to help support a counterrevolutionary movement known as the contras. 

Nearby, the government of El Salvador was also engaged in suppressing a 

communist insurgency that grew in intensity during the early 1980s. “The 

threat of continuous regional instability and fear of active US military 

intervention led Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela to form the 

Contadora Group to seek a negotiated peace for the entire region.”24 

On 7 September 1984 the Contadora program was proclaimed, calling for 

the cessation of hostilities and establishing provisions for settlement of the 

disputes. Because of the need for consensus among the belligerents and with 

the United States, the peace process stalled repeatedly. In May 1986 the 

foreign ministers of the Central American countries met in Esquipulas, 

Guatemala, and hammered out a new peace agreement that was rejected by 

Nicaragua.25 Finally, in August 1987 Costa Rican president Oscar Arias put 

forth the plan called Esquipulas II, which was accepted by the participants. 

Specifically, Esquipulas II called to the participants to: 

• Grant amnesty to political prisoners; 

• Negotiate an end to hostilities, and achieve cease-fires; 

•	 Support a democratic and pluralistic political process including free and 

fair elections; 

• End support for irregular and insurrectionist forces; and 

•	 Support the establishment and work of an International Commission for 

Verification and Follow-up (CIVS). 

23 
Implementation of the International

Commission for Verification and Follow-up 

The first CIVS was comprised of a joint UN and OAS team. However, the 

commission was underrepresented by OAS members, and once its frank 

report on regional compliance with the human rights provisions of Esquipulas 

II painted Nicaragua in a better light than El Salvador, the Central American 

leaders withdrew support for the commission.26 Following the 1988 US 

presidential election, and renewed skirmishes between Nicaragua and 

Honduras, the peace process began to move forward once more. A more 

balanced CIVS, jointly organized by the OAS and UN, was established. In 

March 1989, the Nicaraguan government invited the OAS to observe the 

entire election process in Nicaragua. The OAS maintained a presence in 

Nicaragua from August 1989 through April 1990, with the mandate of 

“verifying the legitimacy of the electoral process at every stage with the hope 

that this would improve the outlook for peace and reconciliation in Nicaragua 

and other countries of the region.”27 OAS observers, in conjunction with UN 

observers, met with election officials, monitored media access, attended 

campaign events, investigated alleged violations and on election day, 

observers visited 70 percent of the polling stations.28 

The election was not without problems such as isolated cases of voter fraud, 

and the week after the election was quite tense as the defeated Sandinista 

government settled into the transition period leading up to the inauguration 

of the opposition candidate, Violeta de Chamorro. “The presence [of the 

election observers] helped maintain order and stability in a potentially 

explosive situation. Impartial observers helped to convince the populace that 

they were safe to exercise their right to vote without intimidation and that 

the election would not be fraudulent.”29 

International Commission of 

Support and Verification (CIAV) 

Another commission of the peace process comprised members of the UN 

and OAS in an effort to verify voluntary demobilization of the contras. It was 

established in September 1989 after the Tela Summit in Honduras but did 

not become operational until 23 March 1990 with the signing of the Tocontin 

agreement between the contras and President-elect Chamorro. Virginia Page 

Fortna notes that “as originally planned, CIAV was to be entirely responsible 

for the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance, but it was soon decided 

that armed UN peacekeepers would be better equipped to secure 

demobilization areas and to dispose of weapons. . . . CIAV was left with 

responsibility for the civilian aspects of demobilization.”30 CIAV-OAS was 

entirely responsible for Nicaragua, and in 1991 when CIAV-UN dissolved, 

24 
CIAV became entirely an OAS operation, continuing to moderate tensions 

within Nicaragua until its dissolution in 1992. 

CIAV-OAS played a significant role in easing tensions and assisting the 

resistance fighters with their transition back into a peaceful society. The OAS 

provided financial assistance, infrastructure projects, security zones, and 

served to build confidence in the peace process during a tense period. 

Assessment. The OAS performance in Nicaragua points to the patient and 

determined attitude necessary to conduct peacemaking in Latin America. The 

OAS, in partnership with the UN, was successful in reaching a resolution to 

the civil conflict in Central America. The belligerents consented to the 

peacekeepers in each case, and the participants to the peace process benefited 

from both international and domestic support. Financially, the UN and US 

commitment to the peace process allowed the OAS to support the observers in 

the field. While these missions are relatively small in scale, they also 

benefited from adequate operational support. 

The implications of OAS intervention in Nicaragua bode well for the future of 

both Latin America and the OAS. Dr. Frank Mora, professor of international 

relations at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa, points out that five 

border disputes in Latin America have a strong potential for conflict. He 

assesses the borders between Peru and Ecuador as capable of further conflict, 

with five other border disputes rating a low to moderate chance of conflict.31 

These potential conflicts indicate a need for peacekeepers in the region. 

Regional Peacekeeping in Africa 

Regional organizations have conducted several peacekeeping operations 

independently of the UN in Africa. In 1980 the United Kingdom led a 

commonwealth mission to oversee the transition of Zimbabwe to majority 

rule. This mission, with a high degree of political will and financial 

commitment by the British government, was successful in achieving its 

mandate. The OAU foray into Chad in 1981–82 remains an example of a 

regional organization with an inadequate logistical, financial, or 

organizational structure attempting to accomplish a major peace operation. 

This mission met with resistance from the belligerents and was withdrawn 

without achieving its objectives. A third example of regional organizations 

conducting peacekeeping operations is ECOWAS in 1990. This mission will be 

examined in detail due to the fact that it highlights both the pitfalls and 

potential of regional organizations executing peace operations. 

ECOWAS was established by the Treaty of Lagos in 1975 to promote trade, 

cooperation, and self-reliance in West Africa and is comprised of 16 states 

(table 2). 

Although “primarily an economic organization, ECOWAS created a 

collective security system in 1981, and a standby mediation committee in May 

25 
Table 2


ECOWAS Nations


Benin Guinea Mali Senegal 

Cape Verde Guinea-Bissau Mauritania Sierra Leone 

The Gambia Ivory Coast Niger Togo 

Ghana Liberia Nigeria Upper Volta 

1990.”32 This collective security structure would be put to the test in the civil 

war brewing in Liberia. 

The regime of Doe attempted to transform itself from a military 

dictatorship into an “elected” presidency sporting a democratic façade in order 

to ease international political pressure. This was construed as just one more 

maneuver by Doe to maintain his power base indefinitely. On Christmas eve, 

1989, Charles Taylor and Prince Johnson led a group of Liberians in an 

attempt to overthrow Doe.33 In response, forces loyal to Doe launched a 

campaign of terror designed to quell the rebellion and in the process 

committed a number of atrocities including the rape and massacre of innocent 

civilians. These actions initiated a civil war that would claim over 100,000 

lives, cause 600,000 refugees, and displace one-half of the 3 million 

population who flooded into neighboring countries causing serious regional 

instability.34 On 7 May 1990, Doe appealed to Nigeria and Togo for help 

leading to the ECOWAS intervention.35 

During this period, the UN was unwilling to play a role since it was already 

actively engaged in several other peacekeeping missions, and the OAU was 

hamstrung by a lack of resources and political will reinforced by vivid images 

of the Chadian foray.36 Thus, “the primacy of ECOWAS as the international 

organization most heavily involved in the Liberian conflict was due, in part, 

to the vacuum created by the unwillingness of the UN and the inability of the 

OAU to intervene in the conflict.”37 According to Dr. Vogt of the International 

Peace Academy, “ECOWAS has been criticized as acting as an agent of 

Nigeria, but the fact remains that ECOWAS under Nigerian leadership 

stepped forward to stop the killing of innocents. ECOWAS was the last 

chance the Liberians had to end the bloodshed.”38 

Undoubtedly, Nigeria had several objectives in mind when spearheading 

the Liberian intervention. It wished to establish itself as the most influential 

power in Sub-Saharan Africa. “Nigerian leaders saw the West African 

sub-region as their special preserve in which they had a special responsibility 

to maintain order.”39 In July 1990 ECOWAS mediated a peace proposal that 

included a cease-fire agreement. Taylor, who already controlled 95 percent of 

the nation, refused to comply. Regardless, the Economic Community of West 

African States Military Operations Group (ECOMOG) deployed to Liberia in 

August under Ghanaian command (table 3).40 

26 
Table 3


The Composition of ECOMOG Troops


Country Total National Forces Troops in ECOMOG 

Nigeria 76,000 5,000 

Senegal 9,700 1,200 

Guinea 9,700 400 

Ghana 7,200 1,500 

Sierra Leone 6,150 400 

Gambia 800 100 

Guinea-Bissau 9,200 ? 

Mali 7,300 ? 

Total 126,050 9,500 

ECOMOG’s forces experienced problems in several areas. First, Johnson’s 

forces captured Doe at ECOMOG headquarters under dubious circumstances 

that called into question ECOMOG’s neutrality. Doe was subsequently killed 

on Johnson’s orders. Next, ECOMOG clashed with Taylor’s forces and began 

taking casualties. This clash caused ECOMOG forces to question their policy 

of fighting only in self-defense, and subsequently this policy shifted to limited 

offensive operations and retaliation when attacked.41 

The situation in Liberia remained tense with sporadic fighting and 

setbacks in negotiations. In July 1993 a meeting held at Cotonou, Benin, 

under the cochairmanship of the OAU and ECOWAS resulted in a cease-fire 

agreement and a plan for subsequent demobilization, disarmament, as well as 

national elections.42 This agreement led to the establishment of the UN 

Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). This process has been marred by 

repeated acts of violence and breakdowns in negotiations, as evidenced by the 

outbreak of violence in April 1996. This setback highlights the protracted 

nature of peacekeeping and illustrates the importance of perseverance. Peace 

operations require a long-term commitment to be successful. 

Assessment. The Liberian episode suggests there are lessons to be 

learned about the role of regional organizations conducting peacekeeping 

missions in the context of intrastate conflict. When no other international 

body cared, Nigeria and Ghana led ECOWAS in an effort to reach both a 

diplomatic and military solution in Liberia. The intervention highlights 

both the advantages and disadvantages of intercession by regional 

organizations. Questions concerning Nigeria’s intentions demonstrate the 

gray area that exists between legitimate intervention and a quest for 

hegemony. On the one hand, Nigeria and the ECOWAS community were 

seeing the effects of the civil war in Liberia on their own borders, and the 

slaughter of innocent Africans was undeniable. Furthermore, Nigeria was 

27 
interested in enhancing its own role as the leading regional power. The fact is 

that Nigeria and ECOWAS states were the ones most affected by the war and 

their intervention, while by no means ideal, appeared to be the only practical 

choice short of doing nothing. 

This case also substantiates the conclusion that consent among the 

belligerents remains the sine qua non of peacekeeping. It was only after the 

UN and ECOWAS teamed up and diplomatic pressure was brought to bear 

that the belligerents agreed to a cease-fire. Lacking the experience of the UN 

peacekeepers, the ECOMOG peacekeepers failed to remain impartial and 

may have caused the mission to become one of peace enforcement. ECOMOG 

benefited from domestic support for the intervention and received adequate 

financial support from the Nigerian government which was fully committed to 

the operation. The loss of consent once Taylor believed that ECOWAS and 

Nigeria were supporting Doe resulted in a more complicated mission and a 

transition to peace enforcement. 

This mission demonstrates convincingly the importance of political will to 

the success of an operation. Would the United States have remained in 

Liberia once the peacekeepers suffered casualties? Without a vital interest at 

risk, it is doubtful that it would, considering the minuscule role that Liberian 

stability plays in US strategy. Further, this mission demonstrates that in a 

partnership with the UN, subregional organizations are viable organizations 

for peacekeeping that are worthy of greater support. 

Potential of Regional

Organizations in Peacekeeping 

The historic performance of regional organizations conducting peacekeeping has been mixed. As with the UN, there have been both successes 

and failures. Based solely on historical evidence, one would hesitate to 

endorse the capability of regional organizations to conduct peacekeeping 

operations; however, a closer examination paints a more optimistic picture. 

As Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali noted in a Supplement to An Agenda

for Peace, “the capacity of regional organizations for peacemaking and 

peacekeeping varies considerably. None of them has yet developed a 

capacity which matches that of the United Nations, though some have 

accumulated important experience in the field and others are developing 

rapidly.”43 In fact, organizations such as NATO already possess the 

capability to conduct any peace operation, and others are attempting to 

improve their capability. 

Members of regional organizations increasingly understand that economic 

progress is tied to global trade based on regional trading blocs. Further, it is 

understood that political stability at the regional and national level is an 

important factor in economic development.44 In short, the political will exists 

among member-states of regional organizations to take a more active role in 

28 
peacekeeping operations. A recent RAND study found that 40 countries have 

the potential to be significant contributors to peacekeeping operations, and 26 

of those are politically willing.45 But, for most developing countries, it is not a 

question of will, but a question of logistics. In trying to cope with their own 

domestic problems of development, which are substantial, they have hardly 

anything left to be spent on equipment to be reserved solely for standby 

peacekeeping forces.46 

Undoubtedly, regional organizations are making improvements in the area of 

peace operations. For example, the OAU has been able to observe 39 elections or 

referenda in 25 member-states. In most of these cases, potential conflict was 

diffused in nations such as Togo, Congo, and Ghana.47 The point is that prior to 

1990, nobody envisioned the OAU doing this. For the OAU to enter a sovereign 

state for any reason was unheard of. The OAU is establishing an early warning 

network centered in the Conflict Resolution Mechanism with a Crisis 

Management Room, 24 hour operations, and the ability to intervene politically to 

diffuse a situation before it becomes a crisis.48 

At a summit in Zimbabwe’s capital, Harare, eight southern African 

countries warned Mozambique to accept the fair election results and embrace 

the results of the democratic process. This seems to have had a positive effect 

in supporting the efforts at bringing peace to a war-ravaged nation. 

Furthermore, this exemplifies the potential of a regional network of nations 

working together for regional stability.49 

In 1995 the South African Development Community intervened in Lesotho 

to diffuse a political situation that threatened to erupt into violence. Under 

the leadership of President Nelson Mandela, the SADC coordinated with the 

OAU and brought political pressure to bear, early in the crisis, to defuse the 

situation.50 

The OAS continues to improve its conflict resolution mechanism and 

looks to partnerships with the UN as in the Nicaragua case. Further, the 

OAS is very interested in land mine removal.51 With millions of mines left 

over from the wars in Central America, it behooves the OAS to help clear 

mines that maim or kill innocents, and damage the ability of a region to 

recover economically. It costs $1,000 to locate and disable a mine that cost 

three dollars to procure, and the United States can assist the OAS in this 

effort. 

The potential of regional and subregional organizations should be seen in 

the larger context of the global community. At the top of a pyramid stands 

the UN. On the second tier stands the regionals. The third tier contains the 

subregionals, and on the fourth, individual nations. Each builds on and 

cooperates with the other organizations. It is in this framework that regional 

organizations can contribute the most to international peace. The regionals 

have demonstrated a political willingness and the potential to contribute 

more to peacekeeping. Their efforts must be rewarded with support and 

encouragement. 

29 
Conclusion 

Based on the current environment and a realistic projection of the world in 

two decades, it is clear that conflict will continue to be a part of the landscape. 

Also, it is clear that neither the United States nor the UN possesses the 

political will or resources to provide collective security, or even peacekeeping 

services, for the entire globe. It is imperative that the regional organizations 

build their experience in peacekeeping and continue to develop the 

organization, resources, and doctrine necessary to successfully conduct those 

operations that will contribute to regional security. The history of 

peacekeeping shows that an intervening force must have the political will to 

see the mission through to conclusion and the operational capability to effect 

the mission. Both conditions are necessary for success. While a survey of the 

regional organizations indicate sufficient political will to conduct the 

operations, they are deficient in the support structure. The United States is 

encouraging and supporting the regional organizations’ development of 

conflict resolution capability. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott 

promised the OAU in 1994, that if they stood up to the challenge of 

peacekeeping, then the United States stood ready to assist.52 The next 

chapter examines DOD’s role in enhancing the regional organizations’ 

capability. 

Notes 

1. James S. Sutterlin, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security 

(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), 96. 

2. Organization of American States, Charter of the Organization of American States, Signed 

at the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, March 30–May 2, 1948 

(Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1948). 

3. Frank Mora, PhD, professor of international relations, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 

South Africa, interviewed by author, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 7 March 1996. 

4. David W. Wainhouse, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads (Baltimore: Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1973), 461. 

5. Virginia Page Fortna, Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping (Washington, D.C.: 

Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993), 2. 

6. Wainhouse, 462. 

7. Fortna, 2. 

8. Wainhouse, 463. 

9. Ibid., 465. 

10. Lawrence M. Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 

1965 Dominican Republic Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Army Center of Military History, 

1987), 20. 

11. Arleigh Burke, Dominican Action (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic Studies, 

Georgetown University, 1966), 34. 

12. Mora. 

13. Burke, 51. 

14. Ibid. 

15. Ibid., 52. 

16. Wainhouse, 492. 

30 
17. Mora. 

18. Wainhouse, 492. 

19. Ibid., 497. 

20. Burke, 52. 

21. Mora. 

22. Fortna, 6. 

23. William J. Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 

1993), 437. 

24. Ibid., 438. 

25. Ibid., 439. 

26. Ibid., 440. 

27. Fortna, 7. 

28. Ibid. 

29. Ibid., 8. 

30. Ibid., 9. 

31. Mora. 

32. Fortna, 29. 

33. W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, “Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: 

The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia,” International Peacekeeping 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 

262. 

34. Margaret Vogt, PhD, senior associate, Africa Program, International Peacekeeping 

Institute, telephone interview with author, 18 March 1996. 

35. Ibid. 

36. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 270. 

37. Ibid. 

38. Vogt. 

39. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 272. 

40. Ibid., 290. 

41. Fortna, 30. 

42. United Nations official report on the situation in Liberia. UN Homepage 

internet.undp.org:70/00/unearth/pko/Liberia. 

43. United Nations Secretary General, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (New York: 

United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, 1992), A/50/60, S/1995/1. 

44. Oluyemi Adeniji, “Regionalism in Africa,” Security Dialogue 24, no. 2 (June 1993): 213. 

45. Thomas S. Szayna, William D. O’Malley, and Preston Niblack, Peace Operations 

Deficiencies: A Global Survey (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995), ix. 

46. Brig Gen Henry Kwani Anyidoho, “The Role of the United Nations,” address to the 

Institute for Defence Policy and the South African Institute of International Affairs, 14 July 

1995, 5. 

47. Vogt. 

48. William Nhara, The OAU and the Potential Role of Regional and Sub-Regional 

Organizations, address delivered to the Institute for Defence Policy and South African Institute 

of International Affairs, 13 July 1995, 7. 

49. “Peacekeeping in Africa by Africans,” Economist, 29 October 1994, 43. 

50. Brig Gen Hendrik A. Potgieter, chief of Operations, SAAF, interviewed by author, 

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 6 March 1996. 

51. Mora. 

52. Strobe Talbott, “Increasing the Role of Regional Organizations in Africa,” Department of 

State Dispatch 5, no. 45 (7 November 1994): 740. 

31

Chapter 5 

The US Role in Support of Peacekeeping 

Multilateral peace operations are an important component of our strategy. From 

traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement, multilateral peace operations are 

sometimes the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be 

far more costly and deadly. 

—President William J. Clinton 

Each and every day since 1982, American soldiers, along with 13 other 

national contingents, have patrolled the Sinai demilitarized zone between 

Egypt and Israel. This peacekeeping mission illustrates that successful 

peacekeeping garners little media interest, as this quiet, relatively 

inexpensive mission has assisted in keeping the peace between two 

traditional foes for 15 years. In fact, the United States has a long history of 

participation and support in peacekeeping, and a large percentage of these 

missions relied on American support in the form of equipment, funding, and 

transportation. This chapter examines the US role in support of peace 

operations. 

US Commitment to Peacekeeping

and Regional Organizations 

The national security strategy of the United States acknowledges that 

the United States no longer faces the threat of Communism; but, at the 

same time, it recognizes that the security environment remains 

challenging nonetheless. The strategy identifies the danger of regional 

instabilities caused by ethnic conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, terrorism, and drug trafficking.1 Furthermore, the strategy 

articulates a policy of strong support for peacekeeping, and extols the belief 

that regional organizations can share more of the burden with support 

from America. According to President Clinton “the United States 

recognizes that we have a special responsibility that goes along with being 

a great power and, at times, our global interests and ideals lead us to 

oppose those who would endanger the survival or well being of their 

peaceful neighbors.”2 This assessment of the strategic environment led to 

the 1996 document titled A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 

Enlargement. This document places emphasis on preventive diplomacy in 

33 
order to help resolve problems, reduce tensions, and defuse conflicts before 

they become crises.3 Moreover, it clearly states that the United States 

“must prepare our forces for peace operations to support democracy or 

conflict resolution.”4 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, US Policy 

on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, further elaborates on the 

peace operations identified in our national security strategy. 

PDD 25 delineates the framework for US participation in peace operations. 

This document reinforces the US commitment to peace operations and also 

articulates the proposed role for regional organizations. PDD 25 states “in 

some cases, the appropriate way to perform peace operations will be to involve 

regional organizations. The United States will continue to emphasize the UN 

as the primary international body with the authority to conduct peacekeeping 

operations. At the same time, the United States will support efforts to improve 

regional organizations peacekeeping capabilities.”5 It appears clear from 

national policy pronouncements that the United States is fully committed to 

peacekeeping and while reserving the right to act unilaterally or through 

alliances, the United States is “relying on regional organizations such as 

ECOWAS and CSCE [Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe] 

wherever appropriate.”6 

The Rationale for US Involvement 

in Peacekeeping Operations 

While there may be valid altruistic reasons for supporting peace 

operations, the policy maker’s rationale for US involvement in peacekeeping rests on the fact that it is in the US interest to do so. First, the 

United States remains the sole superpower in a world that has been 

transformed by the end of the cold war, and US policy states that it will 

help shape a stable world order in which democracy and economic growth 

can flourish.7 Second, if the United States intends to be the world’s leader, 

then its forces may be required to participate. Clearly, it is more difficult to 

persuade others to act if you are not committed yourself to some degree. 

Participation provides leverage to the United States and allows it to 

exercise influence without bearing the burden of unilateral action.8 Third, 

Americans support peacekeeping operations because they contribute to a 

less violent, more stable, and more democratic world. According to Deputy 

Secretary of State Talbott, “In this increasingly interdependent world of 

ours—a world of shrinking distances, instant communication, growing 

international trade, and ever more porous borders—our own prosperity and 

our own security depend, to a significant extent, on whether people in 

lands far away are at peace with each other.”9 

Fourth, the United States has economic reasons for supporting peace 

operations. The world spends about $900 billion each year for defense. The 

UN spends $3 billion on peacekeeping. The United States spends about 1 

34 
percent of its defense budget on peacekeeping related activities.10 As former 

Secretary of State James Baker said, “We have spent trillions of dollars to 

win the Cold War, and should be willing to spend millions to secure the 

peace.”11 Fifth, the United States has a reason for supporting regional 

organizations’ efforts to conduct peacekeeping. It is fundamentally in the US 

interests to support these operations and build the capabilities of 

international institutions and other countries to conduct peace operations 

effectively. As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and 

Peace Enforcement Policy Sarah B. Sewell said, “Failure to do so could mean 

increasing cost and risk to Americans, or countenancing the spread of 

violence to the detriment of U.S. interests.”12 

Finally, the most persuasive reason for doing so may be to create the 

conditions for a more rigorous and consistent enforcement of international 

norms and behavior. As Robert Jervis has phrased it, “The world community’s 

choice today may be between ‘time’s cycle’ and ‘time’s arrow,’ time’s cycle, in 

which international relations slip back into the unstable patterns of history, 

the current amity among major powers collapses, and the supposed anarchy 

of the state system re-emerges; or time’s arrow, a progression beyond those 

old tendencies toward a new era of major power peace and increasingly robust 

international institutions capable of holding states to certain standards of 

conduct, both external and internal.”13 While there exists a solid rationale for 

the United States to support peacekeeping, several constraints emerge when 

considering DOD support for these operations. 

Constraints on the DOD Role in Peacekeeping 

While there are numerous benefits for the United States to conduct 

peacekeeping missions, it is important to note that several constraints limit 

the ability of the US military to conduct operations directly and unilaterally. 

DOD is reluctant to conduct peacekeeping operations for three reasons: 

mission, culture, and money. 

First, the administration clearly has stated that the mission of the US 

armed forces is to fight and win the nation’s wars. Peace operations will 

continue to be an ancillary mission that should not detract from the primary 

mission. The two major regional contingencies strategy also conflicts with a 

desire to conduct peacekeeping missions. When a battalion of soldiers is 

committed to an operation, three battalions are really committed as one is 

preparing to deploy, a second is deployed, and a third is recovering to include 

retraining for the combat mission.14 

Second, only a small percentage of the forces are trained for either 

peacekeeping type operations or low intensity conflict. For example, the 

special forces community has been severely tested by the operations in Bosnia 

and Haiti. Over 90 percent of the civil affairs functions resides in the Reserve 

and National Guard units and the president must utilize the presidential 

35 
selective reserve call-up in order to augment the active force. Switching more 

of these skills to the active force would conflict with the mission of being 

prepared to fight two major regional conflicts. “Peacekeeping operations do 

not play to any of the advantages of the U.S. armed forces. They are long term, 

low-tech, manpower intensive operations.”15 And they contradict a central tenet 

of US warfighting doctrine; the use of overwhelming and decisive force.16 

Furthermore, the protracted nature of peacekeeping operations runs counter to 

the US desire for quick results when engaged militarily. 

Third, peacekeeping is usually a contingency operation, which by its very 

definition is unplanned for and unbudgeted. These operations are 

expensive and tend to cost the services in readiness. Under the guidance of 

PDD 25, the State Department “will have lead responsibility for the 

oversight and management of those traditional peacekeeping operations 

(Chapter VI) in which U.S. combat units are not participating. The 

Administration will seek to fund the assessments for these operations 

through the existing State Contributions for International Peacekeeping 

Activities account.”17 DOD will have lead responsibility for the oversight 

and management of those chapter 6 operations which employ combat units 

and for all peace enforcement operations.18 Currently, these operations are 

funded through operations and management funds and, in theory, DOD 

should receive reimbursement from the UN for contributions of goods, 

services, and troops to UN peace operations. In practice the UN reimbursement mechanism is so slow that often the reimbursement period 

exceeds 180 days and, by law, the funds are required to be returned to the 

US Treasury.19 Moreover, Congress has been slow to approve supplemental 

appropriations resulting in the services having to readjust their operations. 

For example, the Navy in 1993 was forced to ground its aircraft in the last 

quarter, and fiscal constraints on training required the Army to lower the 

readiness status of its combat divisions.20 

Based on these constraints, Sewell states that “DOD has a direct interest 

and a role to play in helping establish more capable institutions and 

procedures within which to participate, and in improving the capabilities of 

other nations with whom we will cooperate.”21 The United States should 

embrace a peacekeeping strategy that plays to US advantages and downplays 

the limitations. For example, no military in the world can match the US 

projection capability when it comes to airlift for deployment, sustainment, or 

redeployment. The United States can make the difference between 

peacekeepers arriving in time with a minimum of logistic support or arriving 

too late to stabilize the situation. 

Since the US military is properly focused on the assigned mission of 

winning the nation’s wars, and assuming that the US military is not going to 

reorient its reserve component and move those civil affairs and engineering 

skills to the active duty, it makes sense to orient our focus on enhancing 

regional organizations to conduct those skills valuable to a peacekeeping 

mission. 

36 
DOD Support for Regional

Organizations and Peacekeeping 

Haiti serves to illustrate the differences between combat operations and peacekeeping. In Haiti the success of the mission depends as much on medical battalions, military police, civil engineers, and psychological operations as the 

presence of combat troops. Maj Joseph R. Fischer, serving as historian for the 3d 

Special Forces Group (SFG) in Haiti relates that “originally, U.S. military planners only envisioned the need for one of 3rd SFG’s three battalions as well as a 

sizable contingent of psychological operations and civil affairs soldiers.”22 In 

actuality the mission involved all of the 3d group, and every special forces group 

currently in the active and reserve components provided support to some degree.23 

Additionally, rather than reinforcing the judicial and police institution in Haiti, 

the US military found itself providing the entire structure.24 Another example of 

the tasks facing the peacekeepers in Haiti was a dysfunctional power system. 

Operation Light Switch was a project to restore electricity to Haiti. Over 94 civil 

affairs soldiers had supervised the delivery of 130,000 gallons of fuel to 14 cities. 

Two months later, the US military was still providing the electricity as President 

Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s government delayed accepting responsibility.25 

While political will, consent, and a clear mandate are components of achieving 

success, there exists a requirement for supporting the operational art. 

Historically, “logistics has been the UN’s greatest operational problem.”26 The 

mission in Cambodia, UNTAC, deployed without maps.27 The troops in the field 

received a per diem allowance but no field rations and were told to fend for 

themselves.28 The peacekeeper’s environment frequently contains a ruined 

infrastructure and social anarchy. “The destruction and disorder so often found 

when peacekeeping forces arrive also force military leaders to repair devastated 

infrastructure. Roads, ports, and airfields usually require repair or modification 

for mission accomplishment. This in turn forces planners to provide a larger 

than normal engineer contingent with deploying forces.”29 

The United States can best support peacekeeping by playing to its operational 

and institutional strengths.30 This includes deployment planning, logistics, and 

technology. Furthermore, Gen David Ramsbotham, a commander of UN forces 

in the former Yugoslavia, lists a number of areas that the military can best help 

peacekeeping: intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination; communications; contingency planning; doctrine and training; lessons learned 

preparation and dissemination; logistics; and procurement are all important to a 

mission.31 The next chapter recommends specific ways that DOD can enhance 

the peacekeeping capabilities of regional organizations. 

Notes 

1. President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1996, i. 

37 
2. Ibid., iii. 

3. Ibid., 11. 

4. Ibid., 22. 

5. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace 

Operations, May 1994, 6. 

6. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Anthony Lake, and Lt Gen Wesley Clark, USA, 

“The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” The 

DISAM Journal 16, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 43. 

7. Sarah B. Sewell, “Peace Operations: A Department of Defense Perspective,” SAIS Review 

15 (Winter-Spring 1995): 114. 

8. “Focus on the United Nations,” Department of State Dispatch 16, no. 18 (1 May 1995): 378. 

9. Strobe Talbott, “Increasing Role of Regional Organizations in Africa,” Department of 

State Dispatch 5, no. 45 (7 November 1994): 738. 

10. Albright, 43. 

11. Sewell, 115. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Michael J. Mazarr, “The Military Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention,” Security 

Dialogue 24, no. 2 (June 1993): 151. 

14. Sewell, 115. 

15. John L. Clarke, “Which Forces for What Peace Ops?” Naval Institute’s Proceedings 

(February 1995): 47. 

16. Sewell, 117. 

17. PDD 25, 13. 

18. Ibid., 13. 

19. Lt Col Chess Harris, USA, Office of the Secretary of Defense, telephone interview with 

author, 18 March 1996. 

20. Ibid. 

21. Sewell, 117. 

22. Joseph R. Fischer, “A Sack Full of Democracy: Special Operations Forces in Operation 

Uphold Democracy,” 26 September 1995, 4. 

23. Ibid., 4. 

24. Ibid., 9. 

25. Ibid., 12. 

26. James S. Corum, “Supporting United Nations and Regional Peacekeeping Efforts,” in 

Challenge and Response: Anticipating U.S. Military Security Concerns, ed. Dr. Karl P. Magyar 

et al. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 270. 

27. William H. Lewis, Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 

(Washington, D.C.: NDU, 1993), 69. 

28. Ibid., 69. 

29. Lt Col John P. Abizad, USA, “Lessons for Peacekeepers,” Military Review 73, no. 3 

(March 1993): 15. 

30. Corum, 270. 

31. Gen David Ramsbotham, “How Can the Military Best Help the United Nations?” Army 

Quarterly & Defence Journal International 131, no. 5 (December 1993): 290. 

38

Chapter 6 

Recommendations 

In today’s unstable world, it is vital that the United States remain engaged and 

provide leadership to the international community. This includes working to advance our national security objectives through the United Nations when it is in our 

interest to do so, and it includes conducting contingency operations independently of 

the United Nations whenever necessary. Peace operations are a useful and necessary 

tool of United States national security that should continue to be improved, not 

abandoned. 

—Edward L. Warner III 

Strategic Issues 

The United States needs to develop a comprehensive peacekeeping strategy 

that maintains congruency with the current national security strategy and 

national military strategy. While PDD 25 frames the administration’s policy 

on peacekeeping in general, and it assists policy makers in deciding the level 

of participation in peace operations, it falls short of articulating a clear 

strategy. According to a RAND study on peacekeeping, “there is no single 

programmatic focus on peace operations, and the efforts that have been made 

have been ad hoc responses to current operations.”1 Clearly, based on the 

importance of both military and diplomatic cooperation necessary for a 

peacekeeping success to occur, the Defense and State departments need to 

develop a unified strategy, and the Office of Secretary of Defense for 

Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement should lead this effort. As Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements Edward L. Warner III 

said in a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 3 May 1995, 

“[the DOD] and many others have come to believe that the United Nations is 

not the best organization to direct the conduct of large-scale peace 

enforcement operations that may involve substantial risk of combat. Such 

operations can be conducted more effectively by coalitions of the willing, or by 

capable regional organizations.”2 Therefore, this strategy should focus 

attention on actions that enhance the regional organizations’ ability to 

conduct peace operations. The following are recommendations that DOD 

should pursue to enhance their capability. 

Establish the US Center for Peace Operations. DOD should establish 

the US Center for Peace Operations to serve as the focal point for peace 

operations. This center would include representatives of government agencies 

39 
with peacekeeping roles such as the Defense Department, the State 

Department, and the Justice Department. It would establish and maintain 

relationships with the UN and organizations that represent those interested 

in peacekeeping. This center would develop doctrine for peacekeeping, 

coordinate training for the regional organizations, and collect and 

disseminate lessons learned.3 

Much activity is occurring in DOD regarding peace operations. For 

example, the Army Peacekeeping Institute actively supports foreign nations 

peacekeeping programs. Officers assigned to the institute recently traveled to 

Argentina to evaluate and share information with the Argentine Peacekeeping Training Center.4 This activity reflects the initiative of military 

professionals who are adapting to the changing strategic environment. The 

combatant commands each have established peacekeeping programs and 

have conducted exercises with a peacekeeping focus. For example, the US 

Southern Command recently participated in peacekeeping activities with the 

Argentines. The European Command has been actively engaged in several 

peacekeeping contingency operations to include UN protective forces in 

Bosnia, Operation Deny Flight, and Operation Provide Comfort in northern 

Iraq. In fact, this is a bottom-up strategy and the overall effort could be more 

focused and unified. As Sewell said the US government “lacks a process for 

incorporating the full range of lessons learned from peace operations. Because 

no single agency is responsible for peace operations, no one is responsible for 

compiling and institutionalizing agency-wide lessons.”5 The US Peace 

Operations Center would serve as a conduit for sharing this information. 

The Peace Operations Center should contain a deployable headquarters 

staff team that could augment the combatant command’s strategic planning 

cell in a contingency and provide experience and expertise specific to 

peacekeeping. Moreover, this team could deploy to a regional organization’s 

headquarters and not only provide expertise but also serve as liaison officers 

to help the regional organization access US logistics and intelligence. 

Currently, each service conducts their own level of peacekeeping training, 

doctrine, and education based primarily on their traditional roles and 

missions. Consequently, the US Army leads DOD in peacekeeping education, 

training, and expertise. The Army Peacekeeping Institute actually provides 

many of the services mentioned regarding the proposed Peace Operations 

Center, albeit on a smaller scale, with only 11 officers assigned. Each service 

can offer a certain degree of peacekeeping expertise and establishing closer 

service ties in this area will improve US capability and put the United States 

in a better position to assist regional organizations’ capability. 

Increase Contacts between the Combatant Commands and 

Regionals. The strategy of peacekeeping must not detract from the current 

role of the combatant commands. Rather it should build upon their area 

expertise, bilateral agreements, military to military contacts, and regional 

exercises. The unified commanders should be encouraged to strengthen ties 

with the regional organizations and work with the State Department to 

ensure that agreements with the regional organizations complement standing 

40 
bilateral agreements. Currently, no process exists at the State Department to 

review regional organizations agreements with their member’s bilateral 

agreements.6 The role the unified commanders are expected to play in peace 

operations should be spelled out in the Defense Planning Guidance and Joint 

Strategic Capabilities Plan. This would assist the commands in allocating 

resources and should improve budgeting for peace operations. 

Develop a Technology Strategy That Considers Peace Missions. The 

US Peace Operations Center would serve along with the combatant 

commanders to develop requirements for appropriate peacekeeping 

technological products. At a National Defense University sponsored workshop 

studying operations other than war (OOTW), the military officers attending 

concluded that “at present there appears to be no coherent comprehensive 

approach to framing OOTW technology requirements. Many agencies are 

developing technologies relevant to OOTW, but their efforts are not fully 

coordinated.”7 In coordinating these technologies, there are several 

considera-tions. First, will it contribute to enhancing the mission of 

peacekeeping? For example, will it save lives and help keep the peace? 

Second, is it technologically and economically feasible? It may be a great idea, 

but regional organizations are under severe budgetary constraints and the 

systems must be procured and maintained by smaller nations. Third, the 

technology must have applications beyond peacekeeping. If the military 

spends money on it, then it better contribute to warfighting.8 The NDU 

conference identified several technologies needed in peacekeeping today, 

including mine clearing, counter sniper, and counter mortar capability, and 

language capability.9 An example of pursuing appropriate systems that are 

affordable, meet the peacekeepers requirements, and serve other military 

purposes is in the area of aircraft procurement. 

The United States can make a contribution to peacekeeping in the form of 

airpower. Airpower can make a significant contribution: humanitarian 

operations support, troop and equipment airlift, force protection, psychological operations, reconnaissance, and surveillance.10 In Somalia the US 

armed forces found that a need existed for twin engine, fixed wing, light 

transport aircraft of the CASA 100 type, capable of carrying a small number 

of passengers or limited supply, and able to land on the short rough airfields 

scattered throughout the country.11 Maj Michael C. Koster examined the 

issue of foreign internal defense as a research fellow for Special Operations 

Command in 1993. He discovered that a “few areas in the third world are well 

suited for C-130 operation. At issue are their runways. They are either too 

small or stressed to handle lighter aircraft.”12 Moreover, he notes that 

helicopter assets are the most maintenance intensive and expensive 

aerospace vehicles to operate.13 The same aircraft he recommends for foreign 

internal defense would serve the peacekeeper as well. For example, aircraft 

such as the Pilatus PC-6 turbo can conduct surveillance and airlift at 

relatively inexpensive cost. This particular aircraft could operate from 91 

percent of South America’s runways and 93 percent of Africa’s.14 The 

Skytrader Scout STOL costs $1.6 million, carries 6,700 pound payload, and 

41 
can operate from 82 percent of South America’s runways and 64 percent of 

Africa’s.15 Investing in systems such as these would enhance the capabilities 

of regional organizations to conduct peacekeeping while at the same time they 

would provide legitimate enhancements to their own internal defense. 

Moreover, these products may be made more attractive to the nations if 

purchased under the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP), which 

provides loans and grants for equipment purchases. A RAND study on 

peacekeeping suggests that one “way to proceed would be to offer FMFP grant 

funds to groups of countries that voluntarily come together and propose a 

plan for formation of a regional unit as an incentive for their creation.”16 

Develop Regional Core Competencies. The United States needs to 

focus and expand current programs in order to help regional organizations to 

develop their organizational capability to field troops, as well as train and 

equip them. According to Johan Holst, “Infantry units are not in short supply, 

however, the need for more specialized units and particularly experience in 

the technology of peacekeeping will be significantly constraining.”17 Officers 

who work with foreign infantry units are usually impressed by their skill and 

dedication. Officers refer to the excellent performance of the Uruguayans in 

the Sinai Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) mission for the last 14 

years.18 The US strategy ought to coordinate with regional organizations and 

member-states to develop core competencies within the regions. Rather than 

attempt to develop general peacekeeping capabilities in each member-state, 

the United States, through the regional bodies, should develop specialized 

expertise in each nation. For example, the Argentines could be encouraged to 

develop civil engineering units, the Uruguayans could develop a medical unit, 

and the Chileans could develop transportation units and civil affairs. While 

this would create a certain level of dependency, it would also facilitate 

efficiency and effectiveness. These specialized units would be tied to more 

developed partners that would support these specialized units logistically. For 

example, the Argentine civil engineering battalion could establish a 

partnership with a Canadian unit. 

RAND recently conducted a global survey regarding the peace operations 

capabilities of over 46 countries. This study identified the strengths and 

limitations of a host of nations who may contribute to peacekeeping activities. 

This information should be used to target current assistance programs to 

encourage peacekeeping capability. This information should be further 

expanded to the regional organization level to ensure regional organizations 

that are willing possess the capability to conduct peacekeeping.19 

Ensure Adequate Funding. Funding of peacekeeping remains extremely 

problematic. Congress attempted to legislate responsibility to DOD for all 

peacekeeping, not because of strategic reasons, but because DOD would be 

tasked to fund the operation without an increase in budget. This obviously 

contradicts the spirit of the national security strategy and national military 

strategy. Advanced funding is a partial solution to long-term operations; 

however, DOD must continue to make its case to Congress that line items for 

peacekeeping should be included in the budget; possibly under the foreign 

42 
assistance budget or special allocations assigned to enhance peacekeeping 

capability in the OAS, OAU, SADC, and ASEAN. 

Education and Training. Currently, DOD maintains a robust professional military education program and conducts numerous exercises. For 

example, most professional schools include some discussion of peacekeeping 

operations, usually as part of a course on OOTW. Also, exercise participants 

at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, have the 

option to train in a peacekeeping scenario.20 Current practice is to conduct 

predeployment training for troops identified to conduct peace operations. 

Each organization should have the capability to train at one such center and 

consideration should be given to developing a center in Panama for the OAS. 

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program should 

be expanded and include specific training regarding peacekeeping. 

Operational Art Issues 

While changes at the strategic level may enhance regional peacekeeping, 

one notices when talking to those with peacekeeping experience how quickly 

the talk turns to operational deficiencies. The United States can enhance 

regional organizations’ capability for conducting peacekeeping by improving 

the operational capability in several areas. Peacekeepers agree that the keys 

to successful coalition operations in peacekeeping were understood to be unity 

of command, unity of purpose, and effective communications.21 

Military Staff Headquarters. According to military professionals, “a well 

structured and staffed headquarters is essential to any military force.”22 This 

staff develops the courses of action, develops and implements plans, and 

issues orders. US expertise can assist in developing this capability to include 

communications. While no two operations are the same, a minimum set of 

required communication capabilities was defined for effective peace 

operations. First, the peacekeeper’s communications within the theater must 

be interoperable and secure. This problem for the peacekeeper is exacerbated 

by different national equipment, procedures, and languages.23 Second, “the 

lack of permanent communications facilities often forces peacekeepers to rely 

on temporary and ad hoc arrangements. This problem is best summed up by a 

Canadian peacekeeper: ‘I was involved in setting up communications for 

several peacekeeping operations, and every time was completely different. We 

were never sure what would work until we hit the ground, and we were 

usually wrong the first time.’”24 In 1981 the commander of the OAU 

intervention force in Chad could not communicate with the OAU 

headquarters in order to relate the changing environment and receive orders, 

thus contributing to that operation’s failure. The United States could help the 

regionals to standardize equipment and provide communication equipment 

and training for contingencies. 

43 
Liaison personnel should be assigned to the major regional and subregional 

organizations, with frequent time spent at the organizations headquarters. 

NATO serves as an example of how working relationships over time serve to 

build confidence, improve cooperation, and facilitate communication. Personal 

contacts with regional organizations on a military level will help improve the 

peacekeeping capability of the regional organization and smooth cooperation 

during an operation as the liaison would improve access to communications, 

logistics, and intelligence. For instance, military personnel ought to provide 

liaison teams to act upon requests for information and to pass on US-derived 

intelligence. 

Improve Logistical Support. “Logistics is the Achilles heel of any 

peacekeeping operation.”25 Logistics entails all aspects of theater operational 

support from deployment, sustainment, and withdrawal to include 

consumables, transportation, maintenance, clothing, and medical needs. It is 

a strength of the US military. Peacekeepers relate many horror stories 

regarding logistics. General Douglas, chief of staff of the UN mission in 

Central America, December 1989 until December 1990, relates how he had to 

rent banana trucks in Central America for peacekeeping duties.26 Maj George 

Steuber, a peacekeeper in Cambodia, tells how he had to threaten a UN 

official with bodily harm to receive funds for maps and then buy them on the 

black market. He further relates how his troops were told to buy rations on 

the economy in a war torn Cambodia. The troops were inadequately cared for, 

to include a unit going two weeks without potable drinking water.27 The point 

is that small improvements in logistics can pay big dividends in peacekeeping. 

The US-led international community can do better by identifying the needs 

of the member-states of the key regional organizations and then targeting the 

excess defense articles program to those needs. Further, each regional 

organization should identify a logistic center and those should be stocked with 

nonlethal prepositioned items such as vehicles, tents, emergency rations, 

mission start-up kits, and medical supplies. Moreover, dormant contracts 

should be established in order to facilitate procurement. Finally, the United 

States, in conjunction with regional organizations, must establish standard 

operating procedures for conducting the logistics portion of the operations. 

Procedures for supply support, resupply, procurement, and maintenance of 

materials should be addressed.28 

Improved Intelligence Support. Military organizations rely on the 

collection and analysis of accurate intelligence to conduct mission analysis 

and assist decision making. “The biggest single problem in the area of control 

of UN peacekeeping operations has been the lack of adequate intelligence for 

both the UN planners and the deployed forces.”29 As William Durch and 

Barry Blechman note in their study, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations 

in the Emerging World Order, “high quality initial information may be most 

important in the case of a multi-component operation that deploys on a 

time-limited mission. It has basically one chance to do its job. If its 

information is faulty, the result can be fatal to mission members, due to 

uncharted minefields or unappreciated local sensitivities, or even fatal to the 

44 
mission itself.”30 In Namibia in 1989, the United States denied national 

intelligence asset information to the peacekeepers, and the Canadians blamed 

the lack of prompt intelligence on hostile troop movements as “potentially 

disastrous” and requested that national intelligence sources be used for UN 

force defense in the future.31 Clearly, adequate and timely intelligence is an 

important component of achieving operational success. 

Traditionally, the UN has resisted the area of intelligence because of the 

connotations of spying.32 Intelligence remains an emotionally charged term 

for many developing countries; however, professional peacekeepers recognize 

its importance and regional organizations want to improve their capability in 

this area.33 The focus needs to be on getting the information to the deployed 

forces and the headquarters while protecting the sources. The United States 

should pursue two avenues to improve regional organizations intelligence 

capabilities. First, the deployable headquarters team and liaison officers 

should have the training to assist in accessing the intelligence information 

while protecting the sources. Concurrently, the regionals should have 

personnel trained in the United States on standardized procedures for 

collecting, reporting, and communicating intelligence information. The need 

for information in peacekeeping dictates that the United States encourage 

regional organizations to establish an intelligence capability. 

Conclusion 

Successful peacekeeping relies on consent of the parties, political 

willingness of the intervening parties, and a degree of operational capability. 

The United States is in a unique position as world leader to assure that a 

peacekeeping operation does not fail due to inadequate support. The United 

States should play to its strengths and provide strategic lift, logistics, 

communications, and intelligence to a peacekeeping operation, and assist in 

improving the regional organizations’ abilities to conduct civil affairs, 

psychological operations, engineering, and headquarters staff functions. In 

the long run, these contributions will pay dividends in both money and lives 

saved. 

Notes 

1. Preston Niblack, Thomas S. Szayna, and John Bordeaux, Increasing the Availability and 

Effectiveness of Non-United States Forces for Peace Operations (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 

1996), xiv. 

2. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements Edward L. Warner III, 

Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 3 May 1995. 

3. The author is indebted to Lt Col Ann Story for the title and suggestions regarding the US 

Center for Peace Operations. 

4. Lt Col Samuel Butler, USA, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, telephone interview with 

author, 27 March 1996. 

45 
5. Sarah B. Sewell, “Peace Operations: A Department of Defense Perspective,” SAIS Review 

15 (Winter–Spring 1995):14. 

6. Col Thomas Resau, USAF, military liaison with the State Department, telephone 

interview with author, 8 March 1996. 

7. David S. Alberts, Operations other than War (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, NDU, November 1995), 21. 

8. Ibid., 28. 

9. Ibid., 4. 

10. James S. Corum, “Airpower and Enforcement” (paper presented at the Royal Norwegian 

Air Force Academy, February 1996), 4. 

11. Ibid., 5. 

12. Michael C. Koster, Foreign Internal Defense: Does Air Force Special Operations Have 

What It Takes? (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1993), 45. 

13. Ibid., 46. 

14. Ibid., 59. 

15. Ibid., 61. 

16. Niblack, Szayna, and Bordeaux, 30. 

17. Johan Jorgen Holst, “Enhancing Peacekeeping Operations,” Survival 32, no. 3 

(May/June 1990): 271. 

18. Maj Russ Hall, USAF, telephone interview with author, December 1995. 

19. Thomas S. Szayna, William D. O’Malley, and Preston Niblack, Peace Operations 

Deficiencies: A Global Survey (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995), ix. 

20. Butler. 

21. David S. Alberts, Command and Control in Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: NDU, 

1995), 1. 

22. Roger Palin, Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects, Adelphi Paper 294 

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 42. 

23. Brooks L. Bash, The Role of United States Air Power in Peacekeeping (Maxwell AFB, 

Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 19. 

24. Ibid., 20. 

25. William H. Lewis, Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 

(Washington, D.C.: NDU, June 1993), 56. 

26. Ibid. 

27. Ibid., 69. 

28. Rodney A. Mallette, “Logistics for UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Army Logistician 

(January–February 1994): 22. 

29. James S. Corum, “Operational Problems in Peacekeeping and Humanitarian 

Operations” (paper presented at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 

undated), 3. 

30. William J. Durch and Barry M. Blechman, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the 

Emerging World Order (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1992), 37. 

31. A. S. Henry, A. A. Clark, and P. F. Heenan, “Final Report on NDHQ Program 

Evaluation E2/90 on Peacekeeping” (Ottawa, Canada: National Defense Headquarters, 30 June 

1992), 116. 

32. Col Thomas Kearney, USAF, US Mission to the UN, 1992–1994, interviewed by author, 

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 19 March 1996. 

33. Brig Gen Hendrik A. Potgieter, chief of operations, SAAF, interviewed by author, 

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 6 March 1996. 

46

Chapter 7 

Conclusion 

There is, after all, no more immediate or local an issue than whether our sons and 

daughters will some day be called upon to do battle in big wars because we failed to 

prevent or contain small ones. 

—Madeleine K. Albright 

The post-cold-war strategic environment offers both challenges and 

opportunities. The challenges posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction, drug trafficking, and ethnic wars appear overwhelming. 

Conversely, opportunities exist to mitigate violent conflict by improving the 

ability of the international community to resolve conflict through tools such 

as peacemaking, truce monitoring, and peacekeeping. While the UN leads the 

list of international organizations pursuing the peaceful resolution of conflict, 

it simply lacks the resources, organization, and personnel to engage in every 

dispute in every region. Perhaps the single-minded focus on the UN as the 

vehicle for peaceful resolution has caused the international community to 

overlook the potential of regional organizations. Regional organizations—with 

an improved capability to reduce, resolve, and prevent conflict—can share the 

peacekeeping burden, and intervene at the earliest point before a dispute 

becomes a crisis. 

Regional organizations provide a second tier in the international community 

for conducting peacekeeping operations. They are closer to the situation, have 

a greater interest in the outcome, and possess the best opportunity for early 

intervention. Obviously, regional organizations are not the right vehicle for 

peacekeeping in every situation. For instance, the UN or a coalition such as 

the Sinai’s MFO are better suited for manning a buffer zone between Israel 

and Egypt than the Arab League would be. The point is that in all cases the 

regional organization should provide early warning to the UN, and in most 

cases, either independently or in concert with the UN, regionals should be 

capable of conducting peacekeeping operations. 

Since World War II, regional organizations have conducted several peacekeeping operations with various degrees of success. The Arab League was 

successful in keeping the peace between Iraq and the newly independent 

Kuwait in 1961. Conversely, the OAU’s foray into Chad was a failure by any 

standard. This study examined the OAS intervention in the Dominican 

Republic in 1965, the OAS involvement in the Central American peace 

process in the late 1980s, and the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia in 1990 to 

the present. These cases illustrate many lessons regarding regional 

47 
organizations conducting peacekeeping. First, the nature of peacekeeping is 

complicated requiring a high degree of perseverance and political will. In a 

mission such as observing a buffer zone between two states, where consent is 

granted by the belligerents, then peacekeepers from outside the region may 

be acceptable. However, in a case of intrastate conflict that calls for the 

imposition of peace, a regional organization may be more desirable because 

they will have greater political will to see the problem through. It is doubtful 

that the United States or other nations outside the region would have stayed 

the course to the extent that ECOWAS has in Liberia under the tenuous 

conditions of that cease-fire. Second, peacekeeping is a military mission that 

provides diplomats an opportunity to secure lasting peace. The OAS 

participation in the Central American peace process, in conjunction with the 

UN, demonstrates what can be accomplished when the conditions for peace 

are facilitated by peacekeepers. Third, a certain degree of operational support 

is necessary to be successful. While it would be beneficial for peacekeeping to 

move beyond the binocular phase and into high tech acoustic and seismic 

sensors and UAVs, it would be premature in most cases for regional 

organizations. An effort should be made to assist regionals in acquiring 

fundamental equipment and training for the mission. The Department of 

Defense can enhance the regional organizations through many existing 

programs and should focus on establishing core competencies among nations 

in these organizations. 

The United States should play to its strengths and offer intelligence, 

logistic, transportation, equipment, and organizational support to regional 

organizations. The focus should be on developing national core competencies 

that when combined provide a regional organization with the operational 

capability to conduct peacekeeping. Establishing a US Center for Peace 

Operations would facilitate this effort and could provide the expertise and 

liaison capability to these organizations. Furthermore, existing programs 

such as IMET and FMFP should be expanded and more effort focused on 

enhancing the regional organizations capabilities. Regional organizations run 

the gamut in both political will and operational capability. However, many 

indicate an increasingly strong willingness to participate in peacekeeping 

missions. They understand that a positive correlation exists between regional 

political stability and economic growth, and they appear ready to take the 

steps necessary to create an environment for regional growth. This political 

willingness should be encouraged and supported. 

The United States must act to enhance the capability of regional 

organizations to conduct peacekeeping, not because of altruistic or moralistic 

concerns, but because it is in the US interest to do so. Regional stability 

enhances US economic and political well-being. Actions that dampen conflict 

and alleviate human suffering at the earliest level of a crisis eliminate the 

need for the United States to intervene later at greater material and human 

cost. Indeed, it is likely that the United States must play a leadership role to 

ensure the success of the international community in preventing or limiting 

conflict. The Department of Defense should actively support the improvement 

48 
of regional organizations capability to conduct peacekeeping operations 

through a comprehensive strategy that builds on the activities taking place on 

the bilateral level and within the combatant commands. Strengthening 

regional organizations can ameliorate the burden of being the world’s 

remaining superpower, leverage the US leadership position, and further US 

national interests. 

49

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