NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GRACIANO S. ESCOSIA,

Claimant-Appellant,

v.

 Eric K. Shinseki, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee.

______________________ 

2013-7019

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 11-2993, Judge Margaret C. 

Bartley.

______________________ 

Decided: April 9, 2013 

______________________ 

GRACIANO S. ESCOSIA, of Zambales, Phillippines, pro 

se. 

ELIZABETH ANNE SPECK, Trial Attorney, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondentappellee. With her on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, 

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E.
2 GRACIANO ESCOSIA v. SHINSEKI

DAVIDSON, Director, and MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were MICHAEL J.

TIMINSKI, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, and BRIAN 

D. GRIFFIN, Attorney, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, BRYSON, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Graciano S. Escosia appeals from the decision of the 

United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(“Veterans Court”) affirming the Board of Veterans’ 

Appeals’ (“Board”) decision denying entitlement to payment from the Filipino Veterans Equity Compensation 

(“FVEC”) fund. Because the Veterans Court properly 

upheld the Board’s decision that Mr. Escosia was barred 

from receiving such payment due to an earlier, unappealed forfeiture decision, this court affirms.

BACKGROUND

On July 26, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a Military Order ordering into the service of the 

United States armed forces “for the period of the existing 

emergency . . . all of the organized military forces of the 

Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.” 

Military Order, 6 Fed. Reg. 3825 (Aug. 1, 1941). Mr. 

Escosia served in the recognized guerilla forces of the 

Commonwealth Army of the Philippines from March 1945 

until June 1945 and in the Philippine Army from June 

1945 to March 1946. In October 1976, the VA denied Mr. 

Escosia’s claim for disability benefits on the ground of 

forfeiture due to fraud, finding that Mr. Escosia had 

“knowingly and intentionally furnished, or caused to be 

presented to the Veterans Administration, materially 

false and fraudulent evidence in support of a claim for 

additional allowance for dependents on behalf of [another 

veteran]” (“October 1976 forfeiture decision”). App’x at 14. 
 GRACIANO ESCOSIA v. SHINSEKI 3

In 2009, Congress established the FVEC fund as part 

of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 

(“Recovery Act”), and instructed the VA to make one-time 

payments to eligible persons who submitted claims within 

the one-year period following enactment. Pub. L. No. 111-

5, § 1002, 123 Stat. 115, 201 (2009). In February 2009,

Mr. Escosia filed a claim for payment from the FVEC 

fund. A VA regional office denied his claim on the ground 

that the October 1976 forfeiture decision barred Mr. 

Escosia from receiving payment under any laws administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (“the Secretary”). The Board affirmed the denial. Following appeal 

by Mr. Escosia, the Veterans Court likewise affirmed the 

denial of Mr. Escosia’s claim on the ground of forfeiture by 

fraud. Escosia v. Shinseki, 11-2993, 2012 WL 4377702 

(Vet. App. Sept. 26, 2012) (“Escosia”) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 

6103(a)). Mr. Escosia filed this timely appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans 

Court is limited by statute. Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 

7292(a), this court has jurisdiction to review “the validity 

of a decision of the [Veterans] Court on a rule of law or of 

any statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation thereof 

(other than a determination as to a factual matter) that 

was relied on by the [Veterans] Court in making the 

decision.” Except to the extent that a constitutional issue 

is presented, this court may not review “a challenge to a 

factual determination,” or “a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2). This court reviews the Veterans Court’s 

legal determinations de novo. Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 

F.3d 1290, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

On appeal, Mr. Escosia argues that the Veterans 

Court erred in affirming the Board’s denial of his FVEC 

claim. Mr. Escosia contends he is eligible for payment 

under the FVEC fund and, for various reasons, is not 
4 GRACIANO ESCOSIA v. SHINSEKI

barred by the forfeiture provision in 38 U.S.C. § 6103. As 

discussed above, the Recovery Act provides for a one-time, 

lump-sum payment to an eligible person who submitted 

his claim within the one-year period following the date of 

enactment. Recovery Act § 1002. An “eligible person” is 

one who served before July 1, 1946 in the organized 

military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth 

of the Philippines, including the recognized guerilla 

forces, and was discharged or released from service under 

other than dishonorable conditions. Id. § 1002(d). Although Mr. Escosia may otherwise be eligible for payment 

under the FVEC fund, the Veterans Court did not err in 

holding him ineligible for such payment due to forfeiture 

by fraud. 

Section 6103(a) provides, in part: 

whoever knowingly makes or causes to be made or 

conspires, combines, aids, or assists in, agrees to, 

arranges for, or in any way procures the making 

or presentation of a false or fraudulent affidavit,

declaration, certificate, statement, voucher, or paper, concerning any claim for benefits under any 

of the laws administered by the Secretary (except 

laws pertaining to insurance benefits) shall forfeit 

all rights, claims, and benefits under all laws administered by the Secretary (except laws pertaining to insurance benefits).

38 U.S.C. § 6103(a). Application of section 6103 to the 

unappealed October 1976 forfeiture decision—which 

found Mr. Escosia had “knowingly and intentionally 

furnished, or caused to be presented to the [VA], materially false and fraudulent evidence”—means Mr. Escosia has 

forfeited his claim to benefits from the VA. App’x at 14. 

On appeal, Mr. Escosia contends there was error in the 

October 1976 forfeiture decision. See Appellant’s Br. at 1 

(arguing he should not be subject to forfeiture under 

section 6103 because he “acted as [an] interpreter not as a 
 GRACIANO ESCOSIA v. SHINSEKI 5

fixer.”). However, a final VA decision may be collaterally 

attacked only by filing a motion for revision based on 

clear and unmistakable error (“CUE”) with the appropriate VA regional office or by requesting to reopen the 

original claim based on new and material evidence. Cook 

v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Mr. 

Escosia has not pursued either course of action. See

Escosia at *2 (affirming that Mr. Escosia failed to plead 

CUE to the Board with sufficient specificity to constitute 

a cognizable motion for revision pursuant to 38 C.F.R. 

§ 20.1404(b)). This court, like the Veterans Court, lacks 

jurisdiction to entertain a CUE challenge in the first 

instance. See Andre v. Principi, 301 F.3d 1354, 1361-62

(Fed. Cir. 2002); Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369, 1372 

(Fed. Cir. 2004) (this court reviews only questions of law 

and cannot review any application of law to fact). Mr. 

Escosia’s contentions of factual error in the October 1976 

forfeiture decision are thus not reviewable by this court.

Mr. Escosia also contends the Veterans Court improperly failed to consider 38 U.S.C. § 107, which, according to 

Mr. Escosia, grants “specific rights and benefits” to Filipino veterans. Appellant’s Br. at 1. According to Mr. Escosia, section 107 provides that “Filipino Veterans are 

considered [to be] CIVILIAN Employees of the Armed 

Forces of the United States,” and, as such, “may[] be 

covered under [Workmen’s] Compensation Act . . . .” Id. 

Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 107, those who served before July 

1, 1946 in the organized military forces or the organized 

guerilla forces of the Government of the Commonwealth 

of the Philippines “shall not be deemed to have been 

active military, naval, or air service” for purposes of 

entitlement to most veteran benefits. However, this does 

not indicate that such persons are defined as civilian 

employees of the military. Section 107 was enacted after 

World War II, when Congress provided that Filipino 

veterans who had served in the organized military forces 

of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philip-
6 GRACIANO ESCOSIA v. SHINSEKI

pines under United States authority prior to July 1, 1946, 

were entitled to certain specified service-connected disability compensation and death benefits, but were not 

entitled to other benefits typically afforded to veterans of 

the United States military. First Supplemental Surplus 

Appropriation Rescission Act of 1946, Pub. L. 79-301, 60 

Stat. 6 (1946) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 107(a)). 

Section 107 thus places Filipino veterans in a category of 

their own; the fact that they are not considered to have 

been in active military service for purposes of VA benefits 

does not imply that they are instead considered civilian 

employees of the military. 

Mr. Escosia further presents several arguments why 

section 6103 does not bar him from receiving payment 

from the FVEC fund. First, Mr. Escosia appears to argue 

that the earlier finding of forfeiture no longer bars him 

from receipt of VA benefits, because he has since been 

naturalized as a United States citizen. Appellant’s Br. at 

2. However, nothing in section 6103 indicates that a 

change in citizenship constitutes a basis for avoiding the 

forfeiture bar. 38 U.S.C. § 6103. Second, Mr. Escosia 

appears to contend that payment pursuant to the Recovery Act’s FVEC fund is not subject to the section 6103 bar.

Appellant’s Br. at 2. This argument similarly lacks merit, 

because the FVEC fund is a law “administered by the 

Secretary” pursuant to section 6103, and payment from 

the fund is thus properly barred by forfeiture for fraud. 

See Recovery Act §§ 1002(b)(2), (c)(1), (j)(2) (instructing 

the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to administer the provisions of the FVEC fund consistently with other applicable 

provisions of Title 38 United States Code). Last, Mr. 

Escosia argues that he is not subject to section 6103 

because he is not a “veteran of the United St[a]tes Armed 

Forces.” Appellant’s Br. at 2. As discussed above, Mr. 

Escosia’s service in the Philippine military forces prior to 

July 1, 1946 is not deemed to be “active military, naval, or 

air service,” 38 U.S.C. § 107; nevertheless, section 6103
 GRACIANO ESCOSIA v. SHINSEKI 7

applies to any person who engages in fraud concerning a 

claim for benefits under laws administered by the Secretary, including Mr. Escosia. 38 U.S.C. § 6103(a). 

We have considered Mr. Escosia’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the 

Veterans Court’s decision affirming the denial of Mr. 

Escosia’s claim for payment is 

AFFIRMED

No costs.