FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FREDERICK K. C. PRICE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 09-55087

JOHN STOSSEL, an individual;

D.C. No. GLENN RUPPEL, an individual;  2:08-cv-03936- AMERICAN BROADCASTING

COMPANIES, INC., a Delaware RGK-FFM

corporation; TRINITY FOUNDATION, OPINION

INC., an entity, form unknown;

OLE ANTHONY, an individual,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 2, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed August 24, 2010

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Raymond C. Fisher and

N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Schroeder

12685
COUNSEL

Anthony Michael Glassman (argued), Richelle Kemler,

Glassman, Browning, Saltsman and Jacobs, Inc., Beverly

Hills, California, and Robert A Olson, Greines, Martin, Stein

& Richland, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for plaintiff-appellant Frederick K.C. Price.

Andrew M. White, White O’Connor Fink & Brenner LLP,

Los Angeles, California (argued for defendants-appellees),

David E. Fink, White O’Connor Fink & Brenner LLP, Los

Angeles, California, Allison S. Brehm, White O’Connor Fink

& Brenner LLP, Los Angeles, California, Tami Kameda,

White O’Connor Fink & Brenner LLP, Los Angeles, California, for defendants-appellees John Stossel, Glenn Ruppel, and

American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.

William E. Pallares, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP,

Los Angeles, California, for defendants-appellees Trinity

Foundation, Inc. and Ole Anthony.

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

Journalists and publishers risk a defamation action when

they put words in a public figure’s mouth. The New Yorker

magazine learned this to its chagrin in Masson v. New Yorker

Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991). The issue in this case

is whether there are similar risks when a network television

program broadcasts a statement actually made by a public figure, but presents the statement in a misleading context,

thereby changing the viewer’s understanding of the speaker’s

words. 

12688 PRICE v. STOSSEL
The plaintiff public figure in this case is Dr. Frederick

Price, a minister known for his television evangelism. Defendants are American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (“ABC”)

and others involved in the production of the news program

“20/20,” including correspondent John Stossel, producer

Glenn Ruppel, and televangelist critics Ole Anthony and Trinity Foundation, Inc., who allegedly provided the original footage of Price to the network. The primary statement in

question comes from a film clip (“the Clip”) of Price delivering a sermon, in which Price says: “I live in a 25-room mansion. I have my own $6 million yacht. I have my own private

jet, and I have my own helicopter, and I have seven luxury

automobiles.” ABC broadcast the Clip suggesting that Price

was boasting about his own wealth, which is substantial. In

fact, however, the Clip was excerpted from part of a longer

sermon in which Price was speaking from the perspective of

a hypothetical person who, though wealthy, was spiritually

unfulfilled. After ABC broadcast a retraction acknowledging

the mistake, this lawsuit ensued. 

The district court dismissed Price’s defamation action as

frivolous under California’s anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against

Public Participation (“anti-SLAPP”) statute, California Code

of Civil Procedure § 425.16(b)(1), which provides for early

dismissal of suits that threaten defendants’ right of expression

under the First Amendment. The district court concluded that

Price could not prove that Defendants’ broadcast of the Clip

was “false” within the meaning of defamation law, because

the plaintiff had elsewhere made similar statements about his

own wealth.

We conclude, for the reasons explained more fully below,

that the district court’s dismissal of the suit under the antiSLAPP statute was premature. The district court erroneously

compared the statements in the Clip with Price’s actual wealth

and possessions, agreeing with Defendants that the Clip was

“substantially true.” Under Masson, however, when dealing

with material that is portrayed as a quotation, we are to comPRICE v. STOSSEL 12689
pare the quotation as published with the words the speaker

actually said. See 501 U.S. at 502. Where the published quotation contains a material alteration of the meaning conveyed by

the speaker, the published quotation is false. Id. at 517. Here,

the context in which Price’s words were presented materially

changed the words’ meaning. Because Price has a reasonable

possibility of proving that the Clip, as broadcast, was false,

and because Defendants relied exclusively on the issue of

non-falsity in their motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP

statute, we must reverse the dismissal of the express defamation claim and remand. We express no opinion as to whether

Price can satisfy the remaining elements of a defamation

claim or whether there were any damages. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Price’s implied defamation claims. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1973, Price founded the Crenshaw Christian Center/Ever

Increasing Faith Ministry (“the Church”), which presently

claims a congregation of over 22,000 members. For decades,

Price has televised his sermons through his “Ever Increasing

Faith” television programs. Price preaches a theology known

as the “prosperity gospel,” which emphasizes God’s generosity, particularly financial generosity, and the ability of believers to claim that generosity for themselves. 

As a self-proclaimed “prophet of prosperity,” Price touts

his own prosperity in his preaching, books, audio recordings,

and public statements. Price is indeed wealthy. The undisputed evidence establishes that Price owns an 8,000 square

foot house worth $4.6 million, travels around the world in a

private Gulfstream jet owned by the Church, owns a Rolls

Royce, wears an $8,500 watch, and serves as Chief Executive

Officer of the Church, which Price describes as a $40 million

corporation. 

On March 23, 2007, ABC broadcast a program entitled

“Enough” on its news show “20/20.” The program, hosted by

12690 PRICE v. STOSSEL
ABC news correspondent John Stossel, featured seven individuals who had taken personal, moral stances on a variety of

topics, including children’s behavior in restaurants, the price

of basketball shoes, politicians’ practice of naming buildings

after themselves, children born out of wedlock, earmarks for

local interests, and treatment of animals by law enforcement.

The portion of the program at issue in this case was a report

on wealthy preachers, as investigated by a non-profit watchdog group dedicated to improving the transparency and

accountability of Christian ministries. ABC promoted the

report using teasers and a mini-report on “Good Morning

America,” which included excerpts of the full-length report as

well as silent footage from the Clip of Price’s sermon, with

voice-overs by news presenters pitching the report. It is the

contents of the report, mini-report, and teasers that give rise

to Price’s defamation action. 

The following is a narrative of the seven-minute report,

drawn largely from the district court’s description. The Clip

at issue is emphasized: 

The report begins with a question posed by Stossel:

“They preach the gospel of giving to God. But how

much of what you give do they keep for themselves?

Is it time for someone to say ‘enough’?” Stossel then

states, “[m]aybe they will do great things with your

money.” Subsequently, the report shows audiovisual

clips of several ministers, not including Price.

The report then turns to a brief interview with a

member of Price’s congregation, who states that she

believes her “money is being put to excellent use,

without one question.” Stossel continues, “[a]nd yet

her pastor, Fred Price, boasts that . . . [cutting to an

audio-visual clip of Plaintiff]: ‘I live in a 25-room

mansion. I have my own $6 million yacht. I have my

own private jet, and I have my own helicopter, and

I have seven luxury automobiles.’ ” Stossel states,

PRICE v. STOSSEL 12691
“At least he tells people about it, but many preachers

don’t advertise how well they live.” The report then

runs video clips of other ministers who are identified

as less forthcoming about their wealth. Stossel

explains that some of these other ministers “point out

that they comply with all IRS regulations.” The

report then turns to the featured guest, who states

that complying with all IRS regulations is “not good

enough.”

The featured guest, Rusty Leonard, is the founder of

Ministry Watch, an organization created to improve

fiscal transparency of ministries and charities. Stossel presents him as “a deeply religious man who

invests and lectures about investing in companies

that he believes have Christian-friendly values.”

Stossel reports that Leonard left a lucrative Wall

Street career “because he thought it was un-Christian

[for ministers, including Price to] ask donors for

money but [not] reveal how they spend it.” During

Stossel’s voiceover, images of 10 different ministers

flash across the screen. Price’s image appears for

approximately one second. Stossel then states,

“[Leonard] says donors are being hosed.” The report

then cuts to Stossel interviewing Leonard. Stossel

asks Leonard about how he knows donors are being

hosed. Leonard states, “You’re being hosed if you

don’t know.”

Turning to a clip of a Ministry Watch employee, the

report shows how Ministry Watch asks ministries to

reveal their finances. A Ministry Watch employee is

shown making a call in an office: “We sent you a letter a couple of weeks ago requesting your organization’s latest 990,” she says. Stossel explains, “They

ask Christian ministries and charities to reveal their

finances.” Stossel asks Leonard: “So you call up and

say, ‘Hi, I’d like to know where your money’s

12692 PRICE v. STOSSEL
going,’ and they say, ‘Go to Hell’?” Leonard laughs

and answers, “Essentially. Especially the bad guys,

right? Nobody had ever held them to account from

an independent perspective, right? So they were

totally freaked out by it.” Stossel then remarks how

some of the people have threatened to sue Leonard,

to which Leonard responds: “Bring it on,” and

explains that all he gets are threats, not real lawsuits.

Stossel then explains that “[w]hile most charities

legally must report their finances, ministries are

exempt.” 

Stossel reports that Ministry Watch has criticized

approximately 28 religious groups for not revealing

how they spend donations. At this point, an image of

Ministry Watch’s “Transparency List” flashes on the

screen for approximately five seconds, showing the

names of approximately 11 ministries, including

Price’s “Ever Increasing Faith” television ministry.

Stossel then identifies specific ministers, not including Price, as televangelists whom Ministry Watch

has criticized for being secretive and having little or

no financial transparency. Leonard states that people

should not donate to such ministries because they are

not open about how they spend donations. Leonard

also notes that the lack of openness “does not mean

that [the ministries are] doing anything wrong,”

although it indicates a “very high probability that

something is wrong there.”

Leonard states that, as indicated on the website MinistryWatch.com, there are “good guys” (Shining

Light Ministries) and “bad guys” (Donor Alerts) in

the religious fundraising arena, and that there are “a

lot more good guys than there are bad guys.” Stossel

reports Leonard’s belief that “the vast majority” of

ministries “do a good job and spend your money

well.” Stossel continues by stating that Leonard,

PRICE v. STOSSEL 12693
however, remains critical of televangelists who own

multi-million dollar homes in gated communities

and travel the world in multi-million dollar jets.

Leonard states that the leadership of the ministries

should, like Jesus, maintain some degree of sacrifice.

Leonard then states that the ministers that he criticizes do “some good works, but they could spend a

whole lot more money if they sold the house and the

car and the jet plane.” The report then discusses

another televangelist, whose improved financial

transparency earned praise from Leonard. The report

ends with the conclusion of Leonard’s interview. 

Following ABC’s broadcast of the report, Price demanded

a retraction on the ground that the Clip, which suggested that

Price was speaking about his own wealth, was taken out of

context. In the actual sermon from which the Clip was

excerpted, Price was telling a parable of unhappiness brought

about by a lack of faith, and he was speaking from the perspective of a hypothetical man. In response, on May 11, 2007,

ABC broadcast a retraction on “Good Morning America” and

“20/20,” and posted the retraction on its website. The retraction, narrated by John Stossel, aired as follows: 

Now I want to correct a mistake we made. Several

weeks ago, in a story about the financial openness of

Christian ministries, we heard this clip of televangelist Frederick Price. 

[Replay of the Clip.]

We thought Dr. Price, founder of Crenshaw Christian Center, was talking about himself, but we later

learned he was preaching a sermon about a hypothetical person who had many material possessions but

lived a spiritually unfulfilled life. We’d used his

quote out of context, and for that, we apologize to

Dr. Price and the Crenshaw Christian Center. And

12694 PRICE v. STOSSEL
we apologize to you if we misled you. Also, the Center sent us a statement saying Dr. Price is paid,

quote, “a salary commensurate with his duties” and

that the church, quote, “openly shares its financial

information with its congregation.”

This litigation followed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Price first filed a defamation action against Defendants in

Los Angeles County Superior Court in July 2007. Defendants

removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.

The parties then agreed to dismissal of the complaint without

prejudice in an attempt to resolve the dispute through mediation. When mediation failed, Price filed the complaint again,

this time in the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York. Defendants moved for a change of

venue, claiming that Price had filed in New York in an

attempt to avoid California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The New

York court granted Defendants’ motion, citing “Price’s apparent — albeit unsuccessful — forum shopping,” and transferred the action back to the Central District of California.

Price’s amended complaint alleged defamation and intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and sought compensatory,

general, and punitive damages. 

Once the case returned to California, Defendants moved to

strike the amended complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Under California law, defamation “involves the intentional

publication of a statement of fact which is false, unprivileged,

and has a natural tendency to injure or which causes special

damage.” Gilbert v. Sykes, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 752, 764 (Ct.

App. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants’

motion to strike addressed only falsity. Defendants’ motion

argued that the broadcast Clip was not false, and that the suit

should therefore be dismissed. Defendants explicitly reserved

their right to challenge the remaining elements of Price’s defPRICE v. STOSSEL 12695
amation claim, such as actual malice and special damages, at

a later stage in the proceedings. 

Defendants’ motion was limited to falsity for tactical reasons apparent from the district court’s earlier published opinion on discovery. See Price v. Stossel, 590 F. Supp. 2d 1262

(C.D. Cal. 2008). Under California law, discovery is automatically stayed when a defendant files an anti-SLAPP motion,

unless the opposing party can demonstrate “good cause.” Cal.

Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(g). Price had sought discovery on

intent, but after Defendants gave notice they would file an

anti-SLAPP motion, the district court denied Price’s motion

to compel discovery, ruling that Price failed to show good

cause because ABC’s intent was irrelevant to the anti-SLAPP

motion’s narrow focus on falsity. Price, 590 F. Supp 2d at

1270-71. Defendants’ focus on falsity thus avoided discovery

as to their intent when they broadcast the Clip. 

A few months later, the district court granted Defendants’

anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that Price could not establish

a probability that he would prevail on his claims because he

would not be able to establish falsity. The district court compared the assets listed in the Clip (a 25-room mansion, a $6

million yacht, a private jet, a helicopter, and seven luxury

automobiles) with assets that Price actually enjoys, and concluded that the allegedly defamatory Clip was “substantially

true.” The district court also dismissed the claim that the

report implied criminal misconduct. 

Price now appeals to this court. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP

statute. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1102

(9th Cir. 2003).

12696 PRICE v. STOSSEL
DISCUSSION

I. California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute 

[1] California’s anti-SLAPP statute permits courts at an

early stage to dismiss meritless defamation cases “aimed at

chilling expression through costly, time-consuming litigation.” Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 839

(9th Cir. 2001). The statute was passed in 1993 in response

to the legislature’s concern that strategic defamation lawsuits

were deterring citizens from exercising their political and

legal rights. United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct. App.

1994)). We have repeatedly held that California’s anti-SLAPP

statute can be invoked by defendants who are in federal court

on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See Vess, 317 F.3d at

1109; Newsham, 190 F.3d at 970-73. “The hallmark of a

SLAPP suit is that it lacks merit, and [that it] is brought with

the goals of obtaining an economic advantage over a citizen

party by increasing the cost of litigation to the point that the

citizen party’s case will be weakened or abandoned . . . .”

Newsham, 190 F.3d at 970-71. The anti-SLAPP statute

attempts to counteract the chilling effect of strategic suits by

providing that such suits should be dismissed under a special

“motion to strike.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). The

statute provides:

A cause of action against a person arising from any

act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right

of petition or free speech under the United States

Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that

the plaintiff has established that there is a probability

that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.

Id. 

PRICE v. STOSSEL 12697
The parties in this case do not dispute that this action arises

from an act in furtherance of free speech in connection with

a public issue; the report was broadcast on national television

and featured issues of widespread public interest. For a plaintiff to establish a probability of prevailing on a claim, he must

satisfy a standard comparable to that used on a motion for

judgment as a matter of law. Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 840. The

plaintiff “must demonstrate that ‘the complaint is legally sufficient and supported by a prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the

plaintiff is credited.’ ” Id. (quoting Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d

at 454). “[A] defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion should be

granted when a plaintiff presents an insufficient legal basis for

the claims or when no evidence of sufficient substantiality

exists to support a judgment for the plaintiff.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

II. Whether the Clip was False: Plaintiff’s Express Defamation Claim

The only express defamation claim before us arises from

ABC’s use of the Clip, which was undisputably broadcast out

of context. Price contends that the district court erred in dismissing the express defamation claim under the anti-SLAPP

statute because there is a reasonable probability that he will

be able to prove that ABC broadcast a misleading and therefore false statement when it aired the Clip. 

The district court characterized California law as holding

that a statement is not “false” for purposes of a defamation

suit if the statement is “substantially true,” citing Vogel v.

Felice, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350, 361 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Masson, 501 U.S. at 516-17). It explained, citing Masson, that

“[a]n inaccurate statement is considered substantially true if

there is no difference in effect on the mind of the reader from

that which the pleaded truth would have produced.” The district court then found that Price “lives an uncommonly

wealthy and luxurious material lifestyle,” and concluded that

12698 PRICE v. STOSSEL
the Clip was therefore “substantially true” because it was

more or less an accurate portrayal of Price’s actual wealth.

The court thus found it immaterial that the Clip portrayed

Price as talking about himself when he was not. The district

court also dismissed Price’s contention that the Clip falsely

conveyed to the viewer the impression that Price was boasting

about his wealth. The court pointed to other public statements

in which Price talked about his own material prosperity. The

court implicitly acknowledged that the Clip itself, as broadcast, portrayed a false impression of what Price was saying.

All parties agree that the controlling authority with respect

to falsity of quoted material is the Supreme Court’s decision

in Masson. Masson involved an article in The New Yorker

magazine about a noted psychoanalyst, Jeffrey Masson, who

was formerly affiliated with the Sigmund Freud Archives. 501

U.S. at 499-500. Masson sued the publisher of the magazine

for printing extensive quotations of his remarks that painted

him in a highly unflattering light. Id. at 500-01. The plaintiff

claimed that he was misquoted, and that the misquotations

were false enough to be defamatory. Id. at 499. The record

contained more than 40 hours of the author’s recorded interviews, which enabled the Court to compare what the plaintiff

had actually said with the quotations printed. Id. at 502. There

was material published in the article as quotations that contained statements Masson had not uttered. Id.

The Supreme Court took the case to decide what degree of

falsity is required to prove “actual malice” for purposes of

summary judgment on a defamation claim brought by a public

figure. Id. at 499. To prove “actual malice,” a plaintiff must

prove the defendant knew the statement was false, or acted in

reckless disregard of its falsity. Id. at 510. Thus, in Masson,

the constitutional question of actual malice necessarily drew

from common law concepts underlying liability, because the

question was how inaccurate a published statement had to be

for a plaintiff to create a triable issue of fact regarding both

falsity and knowledge of that falsity. Id. at 513-18. 

PRICE v. STOSSEL 12699
[2] Masson explained the common law principle that inaccuracies alone do not render a statement false if there remains

“substantial truth” to what was said. See id. at 516. Citing

California law, the Court said that “[m]inor inaccuracies do

not amount to falsity so long as ‘the substance, the gist, the

sting, of the libelous charge be justified.’ ” Id. at 517 (quoting

Heuer v. Kee, 59 P.2d 1063, 1064 (Cal. 1936)). The Supreme

Court concluded that, when dealing with quotations, a minor

alteration of the words does not make the quotation “false”

unless the alteration changes the meaning in a material way.

Id. at 517. The Court said that “deliberate alteration of the

words uttered by a plaintiff does not equate with knowledge

of falsity . . . unless the alteration results in a material change

in the meaning conveyed by the statement.” Id.

The problem for the defendants in Masson was that the

author of the article had in several instances materially

changed the meaning of the plaintiff’s words when she quoted

him. For example, the author quoted Masson as saying that

his superiors at the archives regarded him as an “intellectual

gigolo.” Id. at 502. In fact, Masson simply said that they

thought he was a “private asset but a public liability” and that

he was much “too junior within the hierarchy of analysis, for

these important training analysts to be caught dead with

[him].” Id. at 503. The Supreme Court held that a reasonable

jury could find a material difference between the fabricated

quote and the actual one. Id. at 522. Likewise, the Supreme

Court held that a jury could find that the author materially

misrepresented Masson’s words and tone in a fabricated quote

about the potential impact of his new book. Id. at 524-25. The

reporter quoted Masson as saying that his colleagues “will say

that Masson is a great scholar, a major analyst—after Freud,

. . . the greatest analyst who ever lived.” Id. at 506. In fact,

Masson described his intellectual isolation more than his

superiority when he said that “finally . . . I realized, that I hold

a position that no other analyst holds, including, alas, Freud.”

Id.

12700 PRICE v. STOSSEL
In concluding that a jury could find these published passages, among others, to be false, the Supreme Court emphasized the special qualities of quotations as a literary

convention. Id. at 511-13. It explained that when an author

chooses to use quotation marks, that choice signals to the

reader that the author is attempting to represent what the

speaker actually said, rather than paraphrasing or conveying

the statement through an interpretive lens. Id. at 511. It also

explained that, when quotations are used, loyalty to the speaker’s intended meaning is more important than a precise reproduction of the words spoken. Id. at 514-17. The Court

observed that extensive revisions to a quoted statement can

result in no change to the overall meaning, whereas “an exact

quotation out of context can distort meaning, although the

speaker did use each reported word.” Id. at 515.

The district court apparently considered the presentation of

Price’s remarks to be within the zone of alteration permitted

by Masson. The district court relied on Vogel, a California

case where a defamation action by a public figure was dismissed under the anti-SLAPP statute because the alleged

defamatory statements were substantially true. See Vogel v.

Felice, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350 (Ct. App. 2005). The plaintiffs

in Vogel were candidates for public office who challenged

statements the defendant made about them on his public website. Id. at 353. The website accused one plaintiff of being a

“Dead Beat Dad” who “owe[d] [his] [w]ife and kids thousands.” Id. at 355. The plaintiff contended that the statement

was “false in that I do not owe my wife and kids thousands.”

Id. The website accused the second plaintiff of being “Bankrupt, Drunk, & Chewin tobaccy.” Id. at 355. That plaintiff

denied that he presently chewed tobacco or that he was an “alcoholic.” Id. The Court of Appeal ruled that the partial denials

were inadequate to establish the statements were substantially

false and hence the anti-SLAPP motion should have been

granted. Id. at 362-65. The statements had to be regarded as

substantially true. Id. at 362-63. 

PRICE v. STOSSEL 12701
Vogel, like Masson and this case, involved comparing the

allegedly defamatory statements with the “truth” as acknowledged by the public figure plaintiffs, in order to evaluate

whether the differences between the two were material. The

“truth” in Vogel was derived from the facts plaintiffs admitted. In contrast, the “truth” in Masson was what the plaintiff

had actually said, because the claimed defamatory statements

were published as quotations. 

[3] The district court followed the California Court of

Appeal in Vogel and compared the assets Price identified in

the Clip with some facts Price had acknowledged about the

assets he owned. That was error, because this case, like Masson, involves the truth or falsity of a quotation. In Masson, the

Supreme Court compared the meaning of the material represented as quotations in the magazine article with the audio

tapes of what Masson actually said in the author’s interviews.

Under Masson, the district court in this case should have compared the meaning conveyed by the Clip as broadcast with the

meaning of Price’s own words in the context of the sermon

he actually delivered. 

[4] Indeed, Masson commented upon the special nature of

quotations as appearing more authoritative and credible than

descriptive passages. 501 U.S. at 511-13. The Supreme Court

observed that “[q]uotations allow the reader to form his or her

own conclusions and to assess the conclusions of the author,

instead of relying entirely upon the author’s characterization

of her subject.” Id. at 511. Even if a fabricated quotation

asserts something that is true as a factual matter, the fabrication may nonetheless “result in injury to reputation because

the manner of expression or even the fact that the statement

was made indicates a negative personal trait or an attitude the

speaker does not hold.” Id. These observations are particularly

relevant here because Price’s quotation was published using

a medium in which the viewer actually sees and hears the

plaintiff utter the words. See generally White v. Fraternal

Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 526-27 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (sen12702 PRICE v. STOSSEL
sory impacts of television in comparison to printed word must

be taken into account); Info. Control Corp. v. Genesis One

Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting

relevance of medium). 

[5] Because under Masson the proper comparison is

between the meaning of the quotation as published and the

meaning of the words as uttered, we conclude that the video

quotation of Price’s statement materially changed the meaning of Price’s words. Price did not make any representations

about his own wealth when he delivered the sermon that was

excerpted in the Clip. In the quote, as misrepresented by the

Clip, Price is speaking about himself, whereas in the context

of the actual sermon, Price is telling a story about someone

entirely different. 

[6] We therefore hold that the district court erred as a matter of law in dismissing Price’s express defamation claim at

this preliminary stage in the proceedings on the grounds of

lack of falsity. Under controlling Supreme Court precedent on

when journalists’ misquotations of statements made by public

figures are false for purposes of establishing actual malice,

there is a substantial likelihood that Price can establish that

the publication of the Clip was false. Hence we reverse the

district court’s dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statute.

In so holding, we emphasize the narrow question presented

to this court: whether Price can probably prove that the Clip,

as broadcast, was false. We express no opinion as to whether

Price, on remand, will be able to meet his burden to show a

probability of prevailing on the other elements of his express

defamation claim, including damages and intent. 

III. Implied Defamation 

Price contends the district court erred in dismissing his

claims of implied defamation. Independent of the alleged misrepresentations in the Clip, Price claims that the report

PRICE v. STOSSEL 12703
implied (1) that he engaged in criminal and/or dishonest conduct; and (2) that he lacks transparency in his Church dealings. 

[7] California law recognizes that a defamatory statement

can be “expressly stated or implied.” Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608

P.2d 716, 721 (Cal. 1980). “If the defendant juxtaposes a

series of facts so as to imply a defamatory connection

between them, or otherwise creates a defamatory implication,

he may be held responsible for the defamatory implication,

even though the particular facts are correct.” Weller v. Am.

Broad. Co., 283 Cal. Rptr. 644, 652 n.10 (Ct. App. 1991)

(quoting Prosser, The Law of Torts § 116 (5th ed. Supp.

1988)) (internal alterations omitted). To state a claim for

implied defamation, however, the published statement must

reasonably “be understood as implying the alleged defamatory content.” Id. at 651 n.8. This threshold requirement,

derived from the common law, is independent of any constitutional requirements that would otherwise protect speech. Id.

The district court found that it could not reasonably conclude that the broadcast implied criminal wrongdoing by

Price. The district court accurately explained, “[n]owhere in

the ABC Broadcasts is there even the slightest indication that

Plaintiff is either accused, or guilty, of criminal wrongdoing.

In fact, in its only mention of the law, the Report makes clear

that religious organizations such as Plaintiff’s are not legally

required to provide a financial accounting.” 

[8] Price contends that the district court erred because John

Stossel’s exclamations of “Enough!” and the statement that

“Stossel . . . is ‘taking on the case’ ” somehow suggest a

“criminal proceeding or something that deserves to be one.”

We disagree. The broadcast was intended to be a public

exposé of questionable, self-serving conduct on the part of

ministers, but there was no direct statement or suggestion that

a criminal proceeding had been or should be instituted. The

broadcast does suggest people should not continue to give

12704 PRICE v. STOSSEL
money, but we agree with the district court that it would be

unreasonable to infer allegations of criminal wrongdoing from

the statements identified by Price, or elsewhere in the broadcast and teasers. The statement that John Stossel is “taking on

the case,” reasonably refers to an investigative television

news reporter, not a prosecutor. The statement thus indicates

that he is taking on a newsworthy issue, not exposing a crime.

Both parties rely on the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Weller for support, but it favors Defendants. In Weller,

an antique dealer sued ABC for a broadcast that implied he

had sold a stolen candelabra to the de Young Museum. 283

Cal. Rptr. at 647-48. The broadcast at issue in Weller connected the plaintiff to a convicted felon, described the plaintiff

as “reportedly” out of town during the criminal investigation,

credited a witness who identified the candelabra as stolen, and

asserted that the plaintiff refused to disclose the source of the

candelabra. Id. at 651. The Court of Appeal determined that

this series of facts could reasonably be understood to imply

that the plaintiff had dealt in stolen goods. Id.

[9] The facts in this case do not approximate those in Weller, as ABC’s broadcast in this case did not discuss any identifiable crime, and in fact stressed the lack of legal constraints

on the ministries highlighted in the report. Price cannot meet

his burden to show probable success in proving the report

fairly implied criminal conduct under California law, and the

district court therefore correctly dismissed that implied defamation claim.

Price also contends that even if the broadcast did not imply

accusations of criminal behavior, it nonetheless implied accusations that Price was dishonest. The district court found that

the remaining implications alleged by Price were too vague to

constitute actionable defamation. We agree. Cf. Underwager

v. Channel 9 Australia, 69 F.3d 361, 367 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Finally, with respect to Price’s additional contention on

appeal that the broadcast implied that he lacks transparency in

PRICE v. STOSSEL 12705
his Church dealings, Price cites to references in the Clip and

Leonard’s inclusion of Price’s ministry as one of the “bad

guys” on Ministry Watch’s “Transparency List.” Because this

argument was not developed in the district court, the district

court did not expressly decide an implied defamation claim

for lack of transparency. We can therefore deem it waived.

See Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380, 389 n.6 (9th Cir.

1996). Nevertheless, even if we were to consider Price’s

transparency claim as presented for the first time on appeal,

we would conclude that it should have been dismissed under

the anti-SLAPP statute along with the other implied defamation claims. 

The factual basis for the conclusion that Price’s ministry

lacked transparency was shown to viewers, and a speaker who

outlines the factual basis for his conclusion is protected by the

First Amendment. Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 987

(9th Cir. 2009); Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1156-

62 (9th Cir. 1995). The report showed footage of a Ministry

Watch employee calling an unspecified ministry to ask for

disclosure of tax filings, and broadcast Leonard’s explanation

that the “bad guys” are those ministries that refuse to accede

to the organization’s requests for voluntary disclosure. A reasonable viewer may or may not agree with Leonard that ministries should disclose their financial data whenever a watchdog organization asks them for it. The viewer knows, however, that a ministry’s negative response will land it on the

organization’s “bad guys” list and that Price and his Church

are on it. The report’s criticism that Price and his Church lack

transparency is therefore supported by a disclosed factual

basis, and cannot provide grounds for a successful defamation

suit. 

[10] In sum, because it is unlikely that Price could prevail

on his implied defamation claims, the district court correctly

dismissed them under the anti-SLAPP statute.

12706 PRICE v. STOSSEL
CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s

dismissal of the express defamation claim under the antiSLAPP statute, and remand for further proceedings. We

affirm the district court’s dismissal of the implied defamation

claims. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. 

REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND

REMANDED. 

PRICE v. STOSSEL 12707