GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman and Ranking 

Minority Member, Subcommittee on 

Defense, Committee on Appropriations, 

U.S. Senate

September 1999 NATO

Progress Toward More 

Mobile and 

Deployable Forces

GAO/NSIAD-99-229

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Fieldwork Observations, by Country 24

Appendix II: Characteristics of Transport and In-flight 

Refueling Aircraft in NATO Nations’ Inventories 30

Appendix III: Characteristics of Sealift Vessels in NATO 

Nations’ Inventories 32

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense 34

Tables Table 1: Increases, Decreases, or No Change in Airlift, Sealift, and 

In-flight Refueling Capabilities 5

Table 2: Events in the 2-Year Defense Planning Process and 

Annual Defense Review 11

Table 3: Countries’ Increases in Transport Aircraft Since 1990 14

Table 4: Countries That Have Not Increased Their Transport 

Aircraft and Airlift Capability Since 1990 15

Table 5: Countries’ Inventories of Large Amphibious and Sealift

Vessels 16

Table 6: Countries’ Inventories of In-flight Refueling Capability 17

Table 7: Force Restructuring in Selected Countries 19

Table 8: Characteristics of Transport Aircraft 30

Table 9: Tanker Aircraft, by Type and Fuel Offload Capacity 31

Table 10: Characteristics of Sealift Vessels 32

Figures Figure 1: NATO Members’ Active Duty Forces and Percent of 

Conscripts 18
Contents

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Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

MNC Major NATO Commanders

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SDR Strategic Defence Review
Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-283443 Letr

September 30, 1999

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

In 1991, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) revised its strategic 

concept to reflect the reduced threat of a large east-west military 

confrontation. The concept revision provided for major changes in NATO’s 

integrated military forces, including reductions in size and readiness; 

improvements in mobility and deployability for contingencies such as crisis 

management, search and rescue, and peacekeeping; and greater use of 

multinational formations. Because of instability in and around the 

Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of crises at the periphery of the 

alliance, the strategic concept was revised again in 1999 to further 

emphasize the need for greater mobility and deployability of forces to meet 

these potential crises. The United States has the capability to deploy troops 

and equipment over large distances. Many of our European allies, however, 

did not see the need for this kind of capability because during the Cold War, 

they were planning to fight in place with logistical support provided by 

fixed facilities and their civilian economies. 

Concerned about European allies’ ability to share in the cost of providing a 

common defense and specifically whether they are improving mobility and 

deployability, you asked us to undertake two studies: one to assess how the 

European Economic and Monetary Union, the enlargement of the 

European Union, and other factors may affect countries’ ability to share in 

the cost of NATO over the long run and another to address NATO force 

planning and implementation issues. On June 30, 1999, we reported to you 

on the first study.1

 This study identifies (1) how NATO determines its force 

requirements and each member’s contribution to meeting those 

1

NATO: Implications of European Integration for Allies’ Defense Spending

(GAO/NSIAD-99-185, June 30, 1999).
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requirements and (2) how NATO allies have responded to the need for 

increased mobility and deployability in their military forces. 

To address this study, we assessed the forces of 13 NATO members2

 to 

determine whether their military forces had become more mobile and 

deployable. To make this assessment, we consulted with Department of 

Defense (DOD) officials and other experts and developed 10 indicators: 

(1) the number of active duty personnel; (2) the percent of the force that is 

a professional volunteer force rather than a conscripted force, and thus 

generally more deployable; (3) airlift inventory; (4) sealift inventory; 

(5) in-flight refueling aircraft inventory; (6) the number of trucks to 

transport heavy equipment, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants; (7) the 

number of transport helicopters; (8) the number of satellite communication 

terminals; (9) the number of mobile airfield communications systems; and 

(10) changes in types of training. We analyzed data on these indicators 

obtained from U.S. embassies in 13 countries and did follow-up work in 

6 countries3

 that represent over 80 percent of the 13 countries’ active duty 

personnel. (App. I summarizes our country-specific findings.)

Results in Brief NATO establishes its force goals through an iterative 2-year defense 

planning process that starts with an analysis of the threat and other NATO 

missions, such as search and rescue; incorporates political and 

affordability considerations through multiple negotiations with each 

country; and ends with the members’ defense ministers’ adoption of force 

goals. Through this process, NATO commanders and planners identify the 

forces needed and seek commitments from member countries to develop 

the forces necessary for the broad range of potential NATO missions. The 

force planning process differs from the process for generating forces for 

specific operational missions such as those in Bosnia. Although U.S. and 

NATO officials believe that the planning process is a fair method for 

distributing the burden of providing for NATO’s common defense, the 

2

The United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy, 

Greece, Turkey, Luxembourg, Germany, and Canada. We did not include Iceland, which does 

not have a military; France, which does not participate in the NATO defense planning 

process; or the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland, which have only recently joined the 

alliance.

3

The six countries are the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and 

Turkey.
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process does not quantify the costs associated with what each country is 

asked to contribute. 

As NATO members’ forces have become smaller in size and the 

composition of those forces has changed, NATO allies have become more 

mobile and deployable as envisioned by the strategic concept. Our analysis 

of 10 indicators for the 13 countries’ military forces indicates that each 

country has acquired specific equipment to increase mobility, and some 

have reorganized and restructured forces to make them more deployable. 

Table 1 shows, for example, whether countries have increased, decreased, 

or maintained the same airlift, sealift, and in-flight refueling capability. It 

shows that for these indicators almost all countries have either increased 

or maintained existing capabilities, which combined with force reductions 

would indicate greater mobility and deployability of existing forces. 

Table 1: Increases, Decreases, or No Change in Airlift, Sealift, and In-flight Refueling 

Capabilities

Legend

+ = increase

- = decrease

0 = no change

a

Belgium has one less aircraft, but that was offset by the increased capacity of two aircraft purchased 

to replace two older aircraft.

Source: GAO analysis.

Country Airlift Sealift In-flight refueling

Belgium a 0 0

Canada + - +

Denmark 0 0 0

Germany + + 0

Greece + + 0

Italy + + +

Luxembourg 0 Not applicable 0

The Netherlands + + +

Norway 0 0 0

Portugal 0 0 0

Spain + + +

Turkey + + +

United Kingdom - + -
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Other indicators we assessed also show general gains in the mobility and 

deployability of forces. However, the alliance still faces challenges to 

continue to improve mobility and deployability capabilities. Recognizing 

that challenges still exist, NATO launched the Defense Capabilities 

Initiative at the April 1999 summit.

Background NATO, a military alliance of 19 European and North American countries, 

receives support from its members in two ways. First, countries, at their 

own expense, maintain forces and assets that they pledge to NATO through 

a defense planning process. Second, countries make contributions to 

NATO’s commonly funded budgets. NATO does not quantify the cost of the 

forces that national governments commit to the alliance, although a 

country’s level of defense spending helps approximate this measure.

In establishing force goals, NATO considers the missions it may be facing in 

the future. Before the end of the Cold War, NATO’s primary mission was to 

defeat a large-scale invasion by the Soviet Union and its allies with little or 

no warning. Accordingly, the alliance planned, through its defense planning 

process, to maintain (1) large numbers of forward-deployed forces, (2) the 

ability to reinforce Europe by safeguarding the Atlantic sea lanes, and (3) a 

robust nuclear deterrent. This plan enabled countries like Germany to rely 

on the civilian sector for support elements such as hospitals and 

transportation assets. In addition, host nations agreed to support

forward-deployed forces from other countries, and those countries and 

NATO funded the development of substantial infrastructure, including 

aircraft shelters, prepositioned weapon storage facilities, and fuel storage 

and distribution networks.

The end of the Cold War transformed the European security environment 

and made highly unlikely a large-scale attack on Western Europe; 

nevertheless, potential risks to security from instability or tension 

remained. In 1991, NATO revised its strategic concept to reflect the 

changed security environment from the threat of a single, massive global 

war to risks posed by diverse multinational contingencies. Specifically, the 

concept called for NATO to move from a large, static force structure to 

fewer, but more mobile, forces that could react to a wider range of 

contingencies. In many cases, this required countries to reorganize their 

militaries, acquire transport assets for mobility and sustainability, acquire 

deployable communications, and refocus training exercises to enable them 

to deploy forces outside their countries’ borders.
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NATO Defense 

Planning Process

NATO establishes its force goals through an iterative 2-year defense 

planning process that starts with a threat assessment and mission analysis 

by NATO military commanders and planners. NATO assumes it may face 

missions ranging from small search and rescue missions to the largest 

possible invasion of NATO territory. Based on the force requirements 

generated from these assessments, NATO commanders and planners seek 

commitment from member nations to develop the necessary forces. This is 

done through negotiations among NATO international civilian and military 

staffs and member countries’ military and political representatives. During 

this process, a range of political and affordability considerations are taken 

into account to determine what forces each country should have available 

for NATO to fulfill its missions. This aspect of the defense planning process 

is completed when NATO defense ministers adopt the force goals.

Although affordability is a consideration when developing members’ force 

goals, the alliance does not actually estimate the cost of the goals, and the 

process therefore does not necessarily ensure a strictly equitable sharing of 

the defense burden. Additionally, NATO’s force planning process does not 

ensure that forces will be available for specific operations. When specific 

operations are approved, NATO embarks on a force generation process to 

obtain a commitment of forces from its member countries.

Development of Force 

Goals 

The basis of the force goal development process is guidance that NATO 

members’ defense ministers develop biennially and the North Atlantic 

Council approves at a meeting at the defense ministers level.4

 The 

ministerial guidance establishes overall aims for members’ planning and 

force structure during a 6-year planning period. NATO staff draft the 

guidance, and the defense ministers approve it in the December preceding 

the first year of the planning process. For example, Ministerial Guidance 

approved in December 1998 will guide the development of force goals to be 

approved in the spring of 2000.

4

The North Atlantic Council comprises permanent representatives of all member countries 

and has effective political authority and powers of decision in the alliance. The Council also 

meets with higher level officials such as foreign ministers, defense ministers, and heads of 

government, but its decisions have the same status and validity, regardless of the level of 

officials that meet.
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The development of NATO force goals is rooted in the defense 

requirements review conducted by the major NATO commanders (MNC).5

The review is developed in even-numbered years, and its output is usually 

issued in January of odd-numbered years. MNCs develop the review based 

on NATO strategic intelligence guidance and planning scenarios illustrative 

of the kinds of operations they could be called upon to execute during the 

6-year planning cycle. Through modeling of the scenarios, planners 

generate a set of force requirements necessary to execute the full range of 

possible missions. Planners then rely on the ministerial guidance to 

determine how many situations and the scale of which they need to be 

prepared for at one time. Through this process, the overall requirements of 

the alliance are established. The planners then look at the forces each of 

the allies was asked to provide in the past and determine what each nation 

should be able to contribute toward meeting the new requirements in the 

future. Part of the future requirements for each country is based on a 

concept called reasonable challenge. Under this concept, force 

requirements are based on what a country could be expected to contribute 

and additional requirements that represent a fair and reasonable challenge 

to the country, above and beyond the requirements in its national plans.

 The results of this analysis serve as the basis for the MNCs force 

proposals. The military planners then develop for each member country the 

force proposals for forces, capabilities, and facilities to be provided to 

enable the alliance to accomplish the full range of NATO missions during 

the 6-year planning period.

The draft proposals are then evaluated in a series of meetings with an 

expanding number of participants whose views and analyses are 

incorporated through a process of negotiation. When these proposals are 

first developed, they are shared with the member countries’ military 

planners in “bilateral” meetings between two parties: the MNC planners 

and the country military representatives. These meetings are held in March 

of odd-numbered years in the country whose force proposals are being 

developed. After the military planners incorporate the results of this 

meeting into revised force proposals, NATO’s civilian and military staffs 

examine the draft force proposals. “Trilateral” meetings are then held 

among the MNC planners, the country military representatives, and the 

5

Major NATO commands are the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Supreme 

Allied Commander Atlantic. As of September 1, 1999, under NATO’s new force structure 

they will be called Strategic Commanders.
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civilian and military staffs. The trilateral meetings are held at NATO 

headquarters in January of even-numbered years.

Finally, in each of a series of “multilateral” meetings, which include the 

parties from the trilateral meetings and representatives of all the member 

countries, one country’s force goals are debated. Force goals are assigned 

to the country under review based on consensus minus one. That is, all the 

countries except the country being reviewed must agree to the assignment 

of the force proposal to that country. When that occurs, usually during 

March and April of even numbered years, the force proposals are 

forwarded for approval by the defense ministers at NATO’s Defense 

Ministerial meetings in June of even-numbered years. Force goals have four 

parts: 

• Force tables that show the required forces, by specific type of asset or 

unit, that include readiness and command characteristics such as 

number and types of ships, aircraft, or units.

• Force goals stated in narrative statements that qualitatively describe the 

required capability, such as a nuclear, biological, or chemical capability 

and its priority.

• Long-term requirements that are outside the 6-year planning horizon. 

• Military assistance requirements, or unassigned force goals, that 

countries can volunteer to undertake. (NATO military authorities in 

practice work to minimize or eliminate these force goals, according to 

officials from the U.S. Mission to NATO.)

Review of Force Goal 

Implementation

A country’s status in achieving an assigned force goal is reviewed in an 

annual defense review. A full defense review is conducted in the autumn of 

even-numbered years. In odd-numbered years, the preceding year’s review 

is updated. The review process is similar to the force goal development 

process in that a series of meetings are held with an expanding list of 

participants. The mechanism for this review is the defense planning 

questionnaire, to which each country is asked to respond by July, on the 

status of achieving each force goal. Countries can classify the status of a 

force goal in one of five ways: (1) fully implemented, (2) partially 

implemented, (3) extended implementation, (4) under consideration, and 

(5) will not be implemented. For those goals that are not being fully 

implemented, countries are required to provide an explanation. 

MNCs initially assess the questionnaire responses and follow that 

assessment with trilateral meetings, beginning in September, that include 
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the country representatives and representatives from NATO’s civilian and 

military staff. Thereafter, all the members review each country’s 

questionnaire response in multilateral meetings in the Defense Review 

Committee in October. The result of this review is captured for each 

country in a report that summarizes the status of the country’s force goal 

achievement. In addition, the Military Committee assesses the military 

suitability and attendant risk associated with any resulting shortfalls in 

force availability. On the basis of the country chapters and the military 

assessment, the Defense Review Committee submits to the North Atlantic 

Council a general report, in which it recommends a NATO 5-year force plan 

for adoption by the Defense Ministers. Table 2 shows the chronological 

order of events in the force goal development process and annual defense 

reviews.
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Table 2: Events in the 2-Year Defense Planning Process and Annual Defense Review

Source: GAO Summary of NATO Documents.

Month Planning process Annual defense review

December Ministerial Guidance issued

January (odd-numbered 

years)

Defense requirements 

review report is issued

March Major NATO commanders’ 

discuss draft force proposals 

with nations

Questionnaire is updated 

and distributed to nations for 

responses

July Countries reply to 

questionnaires

September Trilateral meetings are held 

for defense review update

October Multilateral meetings are 

held for defense review 

update

November Multilateral meetings 

continue

December Defense ministers agree and 

issue update year General 

Report

January (even-numbered 

years)

International staff and 

international military staff 

jointly screen major NATO 

commanders’ force 

proposals

March Each individual country’s 

representatives meet with all 

other country 

representatives present

Questionnaire is updated 

and issued for full defense 

review

June Defense ministers adopt 

force goals

July Countries reply to 

questionnaires 

September Trilateral meetings are held 

for full defense review

October Multilateral meetings are 

held for full defense review

November Country chapters and 

general report are submitted 

to North Atlantic Council for 

approval

December Ministerial Guidance issued Defense ministers agree and 

issue General Report
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Out-of-Cycle Requirements The planning process allows for dealing with unforeseen events that occur 

outside the planning cycle. Out-of-cycle consultation with allies can be 

conducted when a country is contemplating important changes to 

commitments and plans that would substantially impact the common 

defense. Out-of-cycle force goals may also be developed for emerging 

requirements that should not wait for the next biennial cycle.

Force Planning Differs 

From Operational Planning

Force planning as conducted in the defense planning process and 

operational planning for specific operations are quite different. The former 

requires countries to identify and commit forces to the alliance to meet 

various missions envisioned in the planning process. On the other hand, in 

planning for a proposed contingency operation such as that in Kosovo, 

NATO defines the missions, tasks, and force structure of the NATO force 

for the specific operation. The forces committed in the defense planning 

process are not automatically available to the alliance for these proposed 

operations. Through a separate force generation process, NATO’s military 

headquarters determines the resources required for the specific 

contingency operation under consideration, and each NATO member 

decides what resources it will provide to address those requirements. 

Although all members must agree to NATO’s conduct of contingency 

operations, they are not obligated to provide forces identified or committed 

for them during the defense planning process. 

Alliance Members 

Have Become More 

Mobile and 

Deployable, but NATO 

Still Faces Challenges

Our analysis indicates that each of the 13 allied countries we studied have 

achieved greater mobility and deployability either by procuring additional 

assets or by reorganizing their force structures. While we were able to 

develop consistent data that compares airlift and sealift assets and 

personnel (which fall under the first five indicators we used) among the 

13 countries, the data on trucks, transport helicopters, communications, 

and training (which fall under the last five indicators) are less consistent 

among the countries. Thus, we describe achievements in the latter in terms 

of the specific country and make no comparisons among countries. Despite 

the 13 countries’ achievements, NATO may be challenged in fulfilling its 

missions because of the changing nature of the contingencies it is likely to 

face in the future. 

Airlift Inventory In evaluating countries’ airlift capabilities, based on increases in the 

quantity and capacity of their transport aircraft, we found that NATO allies 
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as a whole have more lift capability now than they had in 1990, but some 

countries have achieved more than others.6

 Seven of the 13 countries for 

which we collected data increased airlift capability, 4 countries made no 

change in airlift capability, and 1 country (the United Kingdom) decreased 

airlift capability.7

 In one country a change in quantity was offset by a 

change in capacity, and we concluded that capability had neither increased 

nor decreased. 

Despite NATO’s progress, the alliance still depends heavily on the United 

States for airlift capability. For example, only the United States has the 

capability to airlift unusually large or heavy weapon systems such as a 

Patriot missile system. (Tables 3 and 4 show the progress made in acquiring 

airlift assets by country. App. II contains information about the 

characteristics of the assets described in the tables.)

6

We define capacity as the ability to move troops and tons of equipment.

7

Although the United Kingdom did not increase airlift, its inventory of transport aircraft is 

among the largest in the alliance. With a traditionally global outlook, the United Kingdom 

has maintained more mobile and deployable forces than its European counterparts and has 

focused most of its efforts on restructuring its forces and acquiring major combat 

capabilities such as attack helicopters and cruise missiles. 
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Table 3: Countries’ Increases in Transport Aircraft Since 1990

Source: The countries’ ministries of defense and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 

The Military Balance 1998/99, The Military Balance 1990/91, and Jane’s World Air Forces 1997-98.

Country Assets Changes since 1990 

Canada 32 CC-130E/Hs, 

5 CC-150s (Airbus 

310s),

6 CC-115s, 

2 CC-142s

Added six C-130s (two C-130H-30s) and five CC-150s; eliminated three Boeing 707s, one 

CC-132, and eight CC-115s. The CC-150s have greater capacity than the 707s and the 

CC-132s, and CC-115s are about half the size of C-130s and cannot carry the same types and 

volume of cargo. 

Germany 86 C-160s, 

7 A310s,

1 Tu-154

1 707

Added seven Airbus A310 aircraft and added one Tu-154 from the East German inventory, while 

eliminating one C-160 and 3 707 aircraft for a net gain of four aircraft. 

Greece 10 C-130Hs,

5 C-130Bs,

4 C-47s,

1 747,

3 A-300s

Added five C-130Hs, one 747 and three A-300s; eliminated 2 C-130Hs and retired four old C-47 

aircraft. The three A-300s are leased by the military.

Italy 11 C-130Hs,

32 G-222s

Added one C-130H and has 18 C-130Js on order. 

Netherlands 2 F-50s,

4 F-60s,

2 C-130H-30s

Added all transport aircraft; eliminated 12 older F-27s. The eight new aircraft represent an 

overall increase in payload and range.

Spain 7 C-130Hs,

34 C-212s,

18 CN-235s

Added 2 C-130Hs and 11 CN-235s. 

Turkey 6 C-130Bs

7 C-130Es

19 C-160Ds,

54 CN-235s

Added 6 C-130Bs and 54 CN-235s; eliminated 40 old C-47s and 1 C-160D. This represents a 

net increase in both cargo and troop transport capacity and results in a significantly modernized 

transport fleet.
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Table 4: Countries That Have Not Increased Their Transport Aircraft and Airlift Capability Since 1990

Source: The countries’ ministries of defense, IISS The Military Balance 1998/99, The Military Balance 

1990/91, and Jane’s World Air Forces 1997-98.

Sealift Inventory In evaluating countries’ inventories based on increases in the quantity and 

capacity of their naval vessels, we found, as with the airlift inventories, that 

NATO allies as a whole have greater sealift capability now than in 1990 

although some countries have achieved more than others. Seven of 

12 countries8

 increased sealift capability, 4 countries made no change in 

sealift inventories, and one decreased sealift capability. (Table 5 shows the 

progress made in acquiring sealift assets, by country, and app. III provides 

information on the characteristics of the assets.)

Country Assets Changes since 1990 

No change in airlift capability

Denmark 3 C-130Hs No change in transport aircraft inventory.

Luxembourg None None.

Norway 6 C-130Hs No change in transport aircraft inventory.

Portugal 6 C-130Hs, 

18 C-212s

No change in transport aircraft inventory.

Decrease in airlift capability

United Kingdom 55 C-130s,

3 Tristars

Added one Tristar; eliminated five C-130s. The loss of five C-130s represents a 

decrease in cargo capacity not completely offset by the addition of the Tristar. 

However, 25 C-130Js are on order.

Data inconclusive regarding airlift capability

Belgium 11 C130Hs,

2 A310-200s,

3 HS 748s

Lost one C-130 in an accident and replaced two Boeing 727 aircraft with Airbus 

A310-200s. The A310-200s are more capable than the 727s in both payload and 

range, but the loss of the C-130 means a loss in the ability to carry certain types of 

cargo.

8

We did not include Luxembourg in our sealift analysis because it is a landlocked country.
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Table 5: Countries’ Inventories of Large Amphibious and Sealift Vessels

Sources: The countries’ ministries of defense and IISSs, The Military Balance 1998/99, The Military 

Balance 1990/91, and Jane’s 1997-1998 Fighting Ships.

In-flight Refueling 

Capability

In-flight refueling capability increases the deployability of national forces 

because it can extend the range of aircraft. Prior to 1990, only three NATO 

countries other than the United States had in-flight refueling capability; 

today that number has doubled to six. Turkey, Italy, and the Netherlands 

have developed in-flight refueling capabilities that they did not possess 

before 1990. The Netherlands is using its newly acquired capability to 

participate in air operations in the Balkans. Further, the Netherlands and 

Belgium have agreed to the joint use of their assets and Luxembourg army 

assets for peace support operations under the auspices of the United 

Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO, 

or the Western European Union. Through this agreement, Belgium has 

access to the Netherlands’ refueling capabilities, and the Netherlands has 

Country Assets Changes since 1990

Increase in sealift capability

Germany 1 roll-on, roll-off vessel Added one. A civilian shipping company owns it, but the military 

has absolute priority in its use.

Greece 10 amphibious vessels Replaced five old smaller amphibious vessels with two new 

amphibious vessels; three more are on the way.

Italy 3 amphibious vessels Added one amphibious vessel. 

Netherlands 1 amphibious vessel Acquired one amphibious vessel.

Spain 5 amphibious vessels Acquired one new amphibious vessel and two newer amphibious 

vessels to replace three old amphibious vessels.

Turkey 8 amphibious vessels This represents an increase of one amphibious vessel.

United Kingdom 8 amphibious vessels and 2 roll-on, 

roll-off vessels

Added one amphibious vessel. Also added two roll-on, roll-off 

vessels, which are leased and not equipped to enter war zones.

No change in sealift capability

Belgium 0 No change.

Denmark 0 No change.

Norway 0 No change.

Portugal 0 No change.

Decrease in sealift capability

Canada 2 auxiliary vessels No dedicated sealift assets; reduced auxiliary vessels, which can 

carry limited amounts of cargo, troops, and equipment, by one.
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access to Belgium’s airlift assets. Table 6 shows the 13 countries’ in-flight 

refueling aircraft capabilities.

Table 6: Countries’ Inventories of In-flight Refueling Capability

Source: The country ministries of defense, IISS The Military Balance 1998/99, The Military Balance 

1990/91, and Jane’s World Air Forces 1997-98.

Personnel In general, the alliance members have made progress in establishing 

smaller militaries, as envisioned by the strategic concept, and more 

professional militaries. Professional forces are generally more deployable, 

as many European countries have legislation limiting the deployability of 

conscripts. Of the 13 countries from which we collected data, 12 have 

reduced the total end strengths of their militaries, and 10 have changed the 

composition of their forces by increasing the proportion of professional 

forces (see fig. 1). 

Country Assets Changes since 1990

Increase in in-flight refueling capability

Canada 5 KC-130 tanker/transports Five KC-130s have replaced two CC-137 

tanker/transports

Italy 4 707-320 tanker/transports All added

Netherlands 2 DC-10 tanker/transports All added

Spain 5 KC-130s,

4 707 tanker/transports

Added two 707 tanker/transports

Turkey 7 KC-135R All added

No change in in-flight refueling capability

Germany None No change

Belgium None No change

Denmark None No change

Greece None No change

Luxembourg None No change

Norway None No change

Portugal None No change

Decrease in in-flight refueling capability

United Kingdom 2 Tristar K-1 tanker/transports, 

4 Tristar KC-1 tanker/cargo, 

3 VC-10-K-2 tankers, 

4 VC-10-K-3 tankers, 

12 VC-10C-1/C-1K tanker/ transports

Reduced by two VC-10-K-2 tankers and one 

VC-10C-1/C-1K tanker/transport
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Figure 1: NATO Members’ Active Duty Forces and Percent of Conscripts

Source: Countries’ Ministries of Defense.

Germany

Spain

Canada

87,976 58,847

0% 0%

30,142 25,220

34% 31%

92,326 42,125

41% 0%

 467,000 330,547

44% 41%

290,926 201,491

72% 50%

389,000 265,500

67% 47%

104,024 54,689

46% 0%

Turkey

Italy

Denmark

700 808

0% 0%

306,000 210,940

0% 0%

164,333 158,167

73% 59%

646,100 616,900

85% 83%

37,000 31,150

66% 61%

Norway

59,480 48,110

61% 57%

United Kingdom

Netherlands

Belgium

Luxembourg

Greece

Portugal

1990 1998/99

Number of

Active Duty

Forces and

Percent Conscript
B-283443

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Force Reorganization and 

Restructuring

The strategic concept recognized that the changing security environment 

required different force structures and capabilities. Accordingly, some 

countries have reorganized their force structures, and others have begun to 

reorganize their force structures from largely territorial defense forces to 

force structures that can deploy outside their territory. The forces of all six 

countries we visited had reorganized. In most cases, countries reorganized 

because of the changed security environment and financial considerations. 

Although force restructuring was not in response to any specific NATO 

force goals, it was consistent with the direction of the new strategic 

concept and emphasized by officials in the countries we visited. The 

countries’ restructuring is summarized in table 7.

Table 7: Force Restructuring in Selected Countries

a

SFOR = Stabilization Force, NATO’s ongoing operation in Bosnia.

Source: GAO analysis.

Country Force restructuring

Germany Developed reaction forces, which do not contain conscripts, for peace support, rescue and evacuation, or 

relief operations. Forces are maintained in a high state of readiness for rapid response to NATO defense 

operations. Main force for territorial defense largely comprises conscripts maintained at lower readiness 

levels than during the Cold War, since Germany assumes it will have 12 months’ warning as opposed to 

48 hours for any aggression.

Italy Implementing a new defense model that calls for a reduced but more flexible and readily deployable force 

capable of undertaking a wider range of operational capabilities. Also participating in more diversified 

operational scenarios in a more multinational joint context.

Netherlands Military restructuring, begun in 1991 and expected to conclude in 2000, is intended to increase ability to 

sustain prolonged crisis management or peacekeeping operations and meet NATO’s collective defense 

requirements. Has eliminated conscription and is now an entirely professional force. Is disbanding three tank 

battalions, increased the number of combat-ready armored infantry companies from six to nine, plans to 

increase combat-ready division by 800 personnel, and consolidated medical services into a joint brigade. 

Each of three partially active mechanized brigades will be capable of deploying one battalion-sized task 

force for SFOR-type operations.a

Spain Reorganized and has begun to modernize its army. Cut the number of army personnel in half and closed 

many small bases and detachments. Will also end conscription officially in 2003.

Turkey Finished restructuring of forces in 1993. Has developed more independent, deployable brigades and leased 

or purchased tanker aircraft for greater flexibility. New force structure provides for a minimum of one-third of 

the land forces to be combat ready. 

United Kingdom Defense review envisions a joint rapid reaction force comprising air, ground, and naval assets. Will 

restructure its army to retain two deployable divisions, one based in Germany and the other in Britain, and 

will establish an additional mechanized brigade. It also plans to convert airborne brigade to mechanized 

brigade and reduce front-line naval forces, including destroyers and frigates.
B-283443

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Trucks, Transport 

Helicopters, 

Communication, and 

Training Capabilities

The data for these indicators were less consistent across countries due to 

definitional problems, so we have not made any comparisons between or 

among countries, but rather have noted change in a country between 1990 

and the present. Most countries’ defense ministries reported little change in 

inventories of transport helicopters and trucks for heavy equipment and 

fuel. Notable exceptions are the Netherlands, which added 13 CH-47 

Chinook helicopters to its inventory where they previously did not have 

any, and Denmark, which more than doubled the number of its heavy 

equipment transports, from 31 to 65.

Many countries have acquired satellite communications terminals and 

other mobile communication assets; not all countries responded to our 

queries about this indicator, however. These types of assets are necessary 

to allow units to deploy from areas where they have preexisting 

communication links. For example, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Portugal 

had no mobile satellite communication terminals in 1990, and all have that 

capability today. Similarly, Norway had no mobile airfield communications 

capability in 1990 and does today.

Since 1990, NATO members have increased their focus on multinational 

exercises and on exercises and missions other than countering a 

large-scale invasion as called for in the 1991 strategic concept. Some 

countries stated that increased deployments have reduced the frequency of 

exercises but that out-of-area deployments have provided valuable 

experience. For example, Spain not only has participated in NATO 

operations in the Balkans but also has executed other deployments, most 

recently to Central America, when it sent engineers and supplies in the 

wake of Hurricane Mitch. Similarly, Belgium has deployed units to Rwanda 

and the Congo in addition to its NATO activities. 

Despite Progress, 

Challenges Remain

Although alliance members have made progress in increasing mobility and 

deployability, challenges remain. Recognizing that challenges still exist, 

NATO launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative at the April 1999 summit 

to encourage member countries’ greater movement toward mobility and 

deployability of their forces by working together to develop assets that 

support each other’s forces. This represents a shift from the alliance’s 

position that each country is responsible for the sustainability 

requirements and logistics resources for the forces it contributes. The five 

areas identified for improvement under this initiative include deployability 

and mobility of alliance forces; sustainability and logistics; effective 
B-283443

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

engagement capability; survivability of forces and infrastructure; and 

command and control and information systems. 

Scope and 

Methodology

To describe how NATO establishes its force requirements and how it 

identifies what it asks each member to contribute, we obtained and 

reviewed documents relevant to the defense planning process from U.S. 

Department of Defense and NATO officials. We interviewed DOD and State 

officials as well as scholars and defense analysts to obtain their perspective 

on the process. We also visited the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels, 

Belgium, and conducted in-depth interviews with U.S. Mission officials; 

NATO international staff and international military staff; and U.S. European 

Command staff. We also interviewed military officers from Belgium, 

Germany, and Norway. 

To determine how NATO member militaries have become more mobile and 

deployable since the adoption of the strategic concept in 1991, we 

identified criteria in the 1991 strategic concept that reflected the force 

structure attributes the alliance wished to forge (that is, more mobile, 

flexible, and deployable forces). Using these criteria, we developed 

tentative indicators that reflect mobility and deployability. We reviewed 

these draft indicators with the help of expert analysts from the Brookings 

Institute, the National Defense University, and the Cato Institute; officials 

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Program Analysis and 

Evaluation Division, the Department of the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Washington, D.C.; the Logistics Management Institute, McLean 

Virginia; and U.S. and international military and civilian officials at NATO. 

Based on this review we selected 10 indicators on which to collect data.

We collected data for three points: 1990, the last year before the adoption of 

the 1991 strategic concept; the most recent available data; and future plans. 

We then identified six countries for in-depth fieldwork to validate and 

expand on the information we received and obtained input from those 

countries’ ministries of defense on the status of their forces’ movement 

toward greater mobility and deployability. We selected these countries 

based on the coverage of NATO they represented in terms of budgets and 

forces and in terms of variance of progress toward the goals of mobility and 

deployability. We also solicited input from DOD desk officers for the 

selected countries, country delegation members at the U.S. Mission to 

NATO, NATO international staff, and European Command staff. We also 

collected data from published sources such as Jane’s and International 

Institute for Strategic Studies. 
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

We have not made judgments about what constitutes sufficient progress, 

whether any particular country has made enough progress in enhancing 

force mobility and deployability, or whether any particular country can 

participate in or accomplish a specific mission.

We conducted our review from August 1998 to September 1999 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, the Defense Department 

concurred with our findings. (DOD’s comments are reprinted in app. IV). 

DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated where 

appropriate. In oral comments on this report, the Department of State 

concurred with our findings. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 15 days from the 

issuance date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report to other 

appropriate congressional committees; the Honorable William S. Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense, and the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary 

of State. We will also provide copies to other interested parties upon 

request. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me or Jim Shafer at (202) 512-4128. Key contributors to this report 

were Muriel Forster, Hynek Kalkus, and Patricia Martin.

Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director

International Relations and Trade Issues
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Appendix I

Fieldwork Observations, by Country ApApenednxidexiIs

National priorities, independent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) requirements, have influenced NATO members’ progress in 

changing their force structures to meet the new security environment. To 

better understand the changes that these militaries have undergone, 

quantitatively and qualitatively, we visited six NATO member 

countries—the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, 

and Turkey—seeking in-depth information about our indicators and other 

factors that would pertain to enhanced mobility and deployability of their 

forces. 

The United Kingdom Historically, the United Kingdom has maintained a global outlook that 

requires it to maintain more mobile and deployable forces than most of its 

European counterparts. The United Kingdom has focused on restructuring 

its forces and procuring weapons such as attack helicopters, cruise 

missiles, and the Eurofighter, an attack aircraft. The United Kingdom’s 

Strategic Defence Review (SDR) completed in July 1998 recognized a need 

for more airlift and sealift capabilities and logistics support for their forces.

The United Kingdom has reduced its forces, all of which are professional, 

by over 30 percent and is restructuring them to form joint rapid reaction 

forces to be operational in 2001. These forces will consist of two echelons, 

the first of which will be at a very high state of readiness to provide early 

entry forces, and the second of which will provide follow-up forces. The 

first echelon will comprise a maritime task group; air power; land forces, 

including an armored battle group; a special forces component; and a fully 

equipped, rapidly deployable headquarters to command the forces. The 

SDR also calls for a restructuring of the United Kingdom’s reserve forces. 

For example, the United Kingdom recognizes the need for additional 

medical support in major operations such as the Gulf War but finds it too 

expensive to maintain in the active force structure and hopes to use 

reservists for such tasks.

The SDR specifically calls for enhanced strategic lift to enable movement 

of the joint rapid reaction forces to an overseas theater. In the near term, it 

calls for the acquisition of four C-17-like aircraft to meet short-term 

strategic airlift needs in addition to the 25 C-130Js already on order and the 

addition of four roll-on, roll-off container ships for strategic sealift needs. 

In the long term, it recognizes the need to replace the rest of the aging 

transport fleet, possibly with the European Future Large Aircraft. 

Additionally, the SDR acknowledges the need for additional medical 

support. According to a United Kingdom Ministry of Defense official, prior 
Appendix I

Fieldwork Observations, by Country

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

defense cuts resulted in severe shortages in medical support. U.S. officials 

and other military experts said that the results of the SDR are consistent 

with NATO’s vision for what allied forces should look like and could serve 

as a model for other countries.

Germany In 1990, Germany’s military found itself in a position unique to any NATO 

state. Reunification added about 100,000 East German troops to Germany’s 

military, but the treaty enabling reunification mandated that the military be 

reduced to a maximum of 370,000 troops. Further, Germany had spent the 

past 40 years preparing to defend its territory from an invasion and did not 

foresee sending any combat forces outside of Germany. Therefore, it 

invested less in logistics and support, since it expected to use civilian 

assets such as hospitals and trucks, and more in combat forces. 

In 1994, Germany issued a white paper that detailed its restructuring 

actions based on the reunification and the need for additional changes to 

reflect the changed security environment. One key decision was to develop 

rapid reaction units that would consist entirely of professionals or 

temporary career volunteers.1

 The rapid reaction units total 53,000 men and 

include air, naval, and ground units. 

German officials believe in the need for and benefits of conscription. For 

national and NATO defense purposes they want to maintain the ability to 

mobilize a 680,000-man force. To do this, Germany needs a large number of 

skilled reservists, which are available through conscription. Germany’s 

ability to significantly increase its forces in case of a major war may 

contribute to other European allies’ abilities to restructure their forces into 

smaller, professional militaries. At the same time, Germany maintains that 

its ability to contribute up to 53,000 rapid reaction forces to a NATO or 

other coalition force is significant. Also, over 50 percent of Germany’s 

regular officers and noncommissioned officers are recruited from its pool 

of conscripts, and without conscription the overall quality of the military 

would probably decrease, since entire segments of the population would 

not consider military service. Finally, Germany does not accept that 

professionals are necessarily better than conscripts. According to German 

1

Temporary career volunteers are conscripts that have volunteered to serve for an additional 

2 to 13 months beyond their basic military service of 10 months and can be deployed for 

duties other than national or NATO defense missions, which is all that is asked of regular 

conscripts.
Appendix I

Fieldwork Observations, by Country

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

officials, units with conscripts have proven themselves in military 

exercises, military competitions, and peacetime support operations. For 

example, German units with temporary career volunteers that are in Bosnia 

have performed as well as units of professional armies, according to the 

Stabilization Force Commander. 

Germany is now undertaking another broad defense review by a blue 

ribbon panel representing all segments of German society. This review will 

take at least a year to complete and will cover all aspects of Germany’s 

defense policy. Although the review may lead to more improvements in 

Germany’s ability to react to a crisis, until it is completed, Germany will 

probably not undergo any major changes in its current policies.

The Netherlands The Netherlands has made numerous changes in its force structure, but 

limited defense spending may impact sustainability. Changes to date in the 

structure illustrate a move toward NATO-desired mobility. In 1991, 

recognizing it unlikely that its forces would be needed for home defense, 

the Netherlands began to restructure its forces. As the country determined 

to act militarily only in partnership with others, its goal was to increase 

mobility and the ability to integrate with other forces in the alliance. It has 

reduced its forces by about 50 percent and now has an all-volunteer force, 

which eliminates restrictions on where they can be deployed. In addition, 

the Netherlands has changed its force structure to have more rapidly 

deployable, flexible, and mobile units. However, according to the 

Clingendale Institute, a Dutch think tank, the force structure changes are 

still insufficient. According to the Institute, the Army needs additional 

combat personnel to enable it to sustain its forces in the field for longer 

lengths of time. 

The Netherlands plans to add about 800 additional personnel to its 

combat-ready infantry companies and engineer and logistics units and is 

considering consolidating logistic support among the services. The country 

has increased both its airlift and sealift capability since 1990. Current plans 

focus on equipment purchases: two amphibious transport ships, Patriot 

missile upgrades, and Apache helicopters—all high-priced items. However, 

the Netherlands plans no increases in its defense budget, which at 

1.9 percent of the gross domestic product is already under NATO’s average 

of 2.8 percent of the gross domestic product. 

According to U.S. embassy officials, the Netherlands has added some 

courses to its training requests in response to NATO force goals. For 
Appendix I

Fieldwork Observations, by Country

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

example, Dutch forces will attend civil-military affairs training in the 

United States, since the Netherlands has been designated a lead country in 

establishing a civil-military unit. 

Spain Spain joined NATO in 1982 and joined NATO’s integrated military structure 

in 1999. According to U.S. and Spanish officials, Spain recognized in the 

early 1990s that the integration would require a reorganization and 

modernization of its armed forces. Since 1990, Spain has reduced its active 

duty forces by 30 percent and reduced its proportion of conscript forces 

from 72 percent to 50 percent. During this effort, Spain reorganized its 

army and cut its force level by half. Conscription will end officially in 2003, 

but will as a practical matter end sooner. 

According to U.S. officials, modernization in the army is less advanced than 

the reorganization process. Modernization of the C-130 fleet is scheduled to 

be completed this year. Since 1990 Spain has increased its sealift capacity 

by acquiring one amphibious vessel. Spain’s newest ship is an oiler/supply 

ship. Spain plans to add another amphibious vessel, which will be 

configured with command and control capability. 

U.S. officials described Spain as having a “small but robust military,” but it 

is not a power projection force. Further, while recognizing the need for 

greater mobility and deployability and making advances in that direction, 

Spain believes it will never operate alone, that it will always be part of 

some multinational coalition or operation. Therefore, Spain will limit the 

resources it devotes to strategic acquisitions such as lift. However, 

according to U.S. officials, Spain does much for the alliance, at great 

domestic political cost, that tends to be overlooked, such as making basing 

agreements and serving as an air bridge. For example, over the last 4 years, 

Spain has permitted 50,000 U.S. flights from its bases for various operations 

and contingencies. It has also contributed to the operations in Bosnia and 

Albania. Spain contributed about 1,500 troops to both the United Nations 

Protection Force and the NATO-led Implementation Force. The current 

commitment for the Stabilitzation Force is about 1,100 troops, which given 

rotation requirements represents a commitment of about one-third of 

Spain’s nine-brigade army. Spain also commits one frigate each to NATO’s 

standing naval forces in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, which 

represents one-third of its frigates.
Appendix I

Fieldwork Observations, by Country

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Italy In response to the changed security environment and NATO’s strategic 

concept, Italy has adopted a new defense model and is now implementing 

it. This model calls for a reduced but more flexible and readily deployable 

force capable of undertaking a wider range of operational capabilities and 

participating in more diversified, multinational operational scenarios. Italy 

has reduced its active duty personnel level by 30 per cent and plans to 

reduce it another 22 percent by 2005. About 47 percent of the armed forces 

are conscripts, but Italy hopes to reduce that percentage to 11 per cent by 

2005. According to U.S. officials, however, this goal is optimistic. 

U.S. officials said that Italy does not have a power projection force and that 

deploying more than 5,000 troops outside its territory would stretch its lift 

and sustainability resources. Italy has provided support to the alliance that 

has been domestically unpopular, such as the use of Aviano Air Base. Italy 

also has 400 policemen in Bosnia performing civil police duties. According 

to U.S. officials, Italy took the lead in this initiative, which NATO was 

unable to persuade any other ally to perform. Since 1993, Italy has 

maintained 1,800 troops in Bosnia, which in addition to land, navy, and air 

infrastructure for land and air operations requires a total commitment of 

about 10,000 personnel, according to Italy’s Minister of Defense. In 1997, 

Italy led a coalition of 7,000 troops from 11 nations in the United Nationsmandated Operation Alba to provide internal peace and restore 

governmental authority in Albania. Italy provided 3,000 troops and 

coordinated the operation through its completion in August 1997.

Turkey Turkey’s security challenges differ from other NATO members, and this 

difference affects its strategic posture. Turkey borders Iran, Iraq, and Syria; 

has cultural and historical connections to the Balkans and Caucasus; and is 

near the Middle East and central Asian energy sources. Therefore, Turkey’s 

defense planning is focused more on responding to crises in this region and 

being reinforced with forces from its allies than on deploying its forces 

great distances outside its territory. According to U.S. and Turkish officials, 

this focus is entirely consistent with NATO interests. In addition, Turkey is 

containing civil unrest in the country’s southeast quadrant. For these and 

other social and economic reasons, Turkey plans to reduce the size of its 

armed forces and the proportion of conscripts in its forces slowly. Since 

1990, Turkey has reduced its active duty forces less than 5 percent and its 

conscript active duty forces from 85 percent to 83 percent. A Turkish 

official said that the deployment and disposition of conscripts in the armed 
Appendix I

Fieldwork Observations, by Country

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

forces are not constrained in any way and that conscription therefore does 

not present the same problems it does for other NATO allies. 

As a result of its experience in the Gulf War, Turkey realized that its 

division-based army had not been easy to move to southeast Turkey, so it 

has since reorganized to achieve more independent deployable brigades. 

Turkish forces have participated in numerous operations, including the 

United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia, with over 1,460 personnel; in 

Operation Alba with about 700 personnel; and numerous other United 

Nations missions. Currently, it has about 800 personnel, equivalent to half a 

brigade, in Bosnia.
Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-99-299 NATO

Appendix II

Characteristics of Transport and In-flight 

Refueling Aircraft in NATO Nations’ 

Inventories ApendxiI

The range of transport aircraft varies depending on the loads they carry. In 

table 8, we show the ranges for the payload listed in parentheses. Payloads 

are rounded to the nearest half ton for cargo and numbers of passengers or 

troops if listed that way. Nations may have reconfigured their specific 

aircraft, which affect these measures.

Table 8: Characteristics of Transport Aircraft

Aircraft Range in miles

Maximum payload in

tons/passengers

707-320 3,625 (40-ton payload) 44.5/219

727-300 2,880 (maximum payload) 20/189

A310 5,523 55 /270

A310-200 4,200 (220 passengers with bags) 36/280

C-130B 2,090 −/92

C-130E 2,420 (maximum payload) 22.5/92

C-130H 2,238 (20-ton load) 25/92

C-130H-30 2,238 (20-ton load) 23/128

CC-150a

C-160 1,151 (maximum payload) 17.5/91

C-212 519 (maximum payload) 3/25

C-47 2,700 4

CC-115 754 (maximum payload) 9/41

CC-132 1,335 (3-ton payload) 5.5/50

CC-137 4,300 (maximum payload) 45.5/219

CC-142 1,357 (with 50 passengers) 7/50

CL-215 1,301 (2-ton payload) 4/26

Cn-235 950 (maximum payload) 6.5/48

DC-10-30 4,606 (maximum payload) 53/380

F-27 1,150 (5-ton payload) 6.5/45

F-50 2,146 (5.5-ton payload) 6.5/48

F-60 1,208 (7.5-ton payload) or

1,841 (50 troops) 8.5/55

G-222 783 (maximum payload) 10/46

HS 748 1,898 (4-ton load) 8.5/58

Tristar C-2A 5,998 (400 passengers with bags) 48.5/400

Tu-154 2,299 (maximum payload) 20/166

YS-11-200 680 (maximum payload) 7/60

(Table notes on next page)
Appendix II

Characteristics of Transport and In-flight 

Refueling Aircraft in NATO Nations’ 

Inventories

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-99-299 NATO

a

The Canadian designation for an A310.

Source: Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft.

Tanker aircraft in NATO members’ inventories are detailed in table 9. We 

converted their maximum fuel capability into U.S. gallons.

Table 9: Tanker Aircraft, by Type and Fuel Offload Capacity

a

Canadian designation for 707 tanker/transports.

Sources: Various Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft and the U.S. Naval Institute.

Aircraft Maximum fuel offload capability in tons/gallons

707 tanker/transport 61.5/18,917

CC-130T 12/3,600

CC-137a 61.5/18,917

DC-10-30 100/30,760

KC-130 35/10,769

KC-135R 101.5/31,221

Tristar K-1/KC-1 150/46,140

VC-10 K2 81/24,884

VC-10 K3 88/27,130
Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Appendix III

Characteristics of Sealift Vessels in NATO 

Nations’ Inventories ApendxiI

Sealift vessels are described in table 10 by class, size, and capacity for lift 

by either square footage or capacity of troops or equipment.

Table 10: Characteristics of Sealift Vessels

Country Number/class/type Size in tons Lift capability in troops/vehicles

Canadaa 2 Provider replenishment vessels 24,700 full 16,678 square feet

Germany 1 Germania roll-on, roll-off vessel 8,720 full Not available

Greeceb 2 Chios LSTs 4,400 full 300/not available

2 Inouse LSTs 5,800 full 400/18 tanks

3 Ikaria LSTs 4,080 200/16 tanks

2 Roussen LSMs 1,095 50/4

1Nafkratoussa LSD 9,357 full 200/18

Italy 2 San Giorgio LPDs 7,665 full 400/30-36 armored personnel carriers or 

30 medium tanks

1 San Giusto LPD 7,950 full 400/30-36 armored personnel carriers or 

30 medium tanks

Netherlands 1 Rotterdam LPD 12,750 full 611/170 armored personnel carriers or 

33 main battle tanks

Spain 2 Castilla LPAs 10,709 light 1,657/not available

2 Cortes LSTs 4,975 light 374/500 tons of vehicles

1 Galicia LPD 12,250 full 611 troops or 170 armored personnel 

carriers or 33 main battle tanks

Turkey 1 Osman Gazi LST 3,773 full 900/15 tanks

2 Ertugal LSTs 5,800 395/2,220 tons cargo

2 Sarucabey LSTs 2,600 full 600/11

1 Cakabey LSM 1,600 400/9 tanks

2 Bayraktar LSTs 4,080 full 200/16 tanks

United Kingdom 2 Fearless LPDs 12,120 full 400/15 main battle tanks

4 Sir Belvedere LSLs 5,674 full 340/17 or 18 main battle tanks

1 Sir Galahad LSL 8,585 full 343/18 main battle tanks

1 Ocean LPHc 20,500 full Most equipment for a marine commando 

battalion

2 Sea Crusader roll-on, roll- off vessels 23,986 gross tons 2,300 lane meters of space

(Table notes on next page )
Appendix III

Characteristics of Sealift Vessels in NATO 

Nations’ Inventories

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Legend

LPA = landing platform attack

LPD = landing platform dock

LPH = landing platform helicopter

LSD = landing ship dock

LSL = landing ship logistics

LSM = landing ship medium 

LST = landing ship tank 

Note: Information was not always available in each category. Vessels in italics are those added to the 

inventories since 1990. 

a

Canada does not have Amphibious or roll on, roll off vessels, but does use its replenishment vessels 

for sealift. Its lift is measured by available square footage of space.

b

Three additional Chios class vessels are under construction and are all scheduled for commissioning 

by the end of 1999. They are scheduled to replace older LSTs and LSMs.

c

 This vessel is primarily a helicopter carrier but can carry almost an entire marine commando battalion 

and its equipment.

Source: The country ministries of defense, IISS The Military Balance 1998/99, The Military Balance 

1990/91, and Various years of Jane’s Fighting Ships.
Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-99-229 NATO

Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiIV

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